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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<p style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:0; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway</p> -<p style='display:block; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:0;'>A study in imperialism</p> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Edward Mead Earle</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: September 5, 2021 [eBook #66221]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY ***</div> - -<div class="figcenter"><a name="fp" id="fp"></a> -<img src="images/frontispiece.jpg" alt="TURKISH RAILWAYS IN 1918" width="500" height="330" /> -<div class="caption">TURKISH RAILWAYS IN 1918<br /> - -<p><a href="images/frontispiece.jpg"><small>Larger image</small></a></p> -</div></div> - -<p class="center">TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS,<br /> -AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY<br /> -</p> -<hr /> -<div class="figcenter" style="width: 100px;"> -<img src="images/pm.jpg" width="100" alt="pm" /> -</div> - -<p class="center">THE MACMILLAN COMPANY<br /> -<br /> -NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS ·<br /> -ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO<br /> -<br /> -MACMILLAN & CO., <span class="smcap">Limited</span><br /> -<br /> -LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA ·<br /> -MELBOURNE<br /> -<br /> -THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span><br /> -<br /> -TORONTO</p> - -<h1>Turkey, The Great Powers,<br /> -and<br /> -The Bagdad Railway</h1> - -<p class="center"><i>A Study in Imperialism</i><br /> -<br /> -<br /> -BY<br /> -<br /> -EDWARD MEAD EARLE, <span class="smcap">Ph.D.</span><br /> -<small> -ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN<br /> -COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY</small><br /> -<br /> -<b>New York</b> -<br /> -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY -<br /> -1924 -<br /> -<i>All rights reserved</i></p> - -<hr /> - -<p class="center"> -<br /> -PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smcap">Copyright, 1923,<br /> -By</span> THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.<br /> -Set up and electrotyped. Published July, 1923.<br /> -<i>Reprinted</i><i>July, 1924</i><br /> - -<br /> -Press of<br /> -J. J. Little & Ives Company<br /> -New York, U. S. A.<br /> -</p> -<hr /> -<p><small>“When the history of the latter part of the nineteenth century -will come to be written, one event will be singled out -above all others for its intrinsic importance and for its far-reaching -results; namely, the conventions of 1899 and of -1902 between His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey -and the German Company of the Anatolian Railways.”—Charles -Sarolea, <i>The Bagdad Railway and German Expansion -as a Factor in European Politics</i> (Edinburgh, 1907), -p. 3.</small></p> - -<p><small>“The Turkish Government, I know, have been accused of -being corrupt. I venture to submit that it has not been for -want of encouragement from Europeans that the Turks have -been corrupt. The sinister—I think it is not going too far -to use that word—effect of European financiers on Turkey -has had more to do with the misgovernment than any Turk, -young or old.”—Sir Mark Sykes, in the House of Commons, -March 18, 1914.</small></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></span></p> - -<h2>PREFACE</h2> - -<p>The Chester concessions and the Anglo-American controversy -regarding the Mesopotamian oilfields are but two -conspicuous instances of the rapid development of American -activity in the Near East. Turkey, already an important -market for American goods, gives promise of -becoming a valuable source of raw materials for American -factories and a fertile field for the investment of American -capital. Thus American religious interests in the -Holy Land, American educational interests in Anatolia -and Syria, and American humanitarian interests in Armenia, -are now supplemented by substantial American -economic interests in the natural resources of Asia Minor. -Political stability and economic progress in Turkey no -longer are matters of indifference to business men and -politicians in the United States; therefore the Eastern -Question—so often a cause of war—assumes a new importance -to Americans. This book will have served a useful -purpose if—in discussing the conflicting political, -cultural, and economic policies of the Great Powers in -the Near East during the past three decades—it contributes -to a sympathetic understanding of a very complicated -problem and suggests to the reader some dangers -which American statesmanship would do well to avoid. -Students of history and international relations will find -in the story of the Bagdad Railway a laboratory full of -rich materials for an analysis of modern economic imperialism -and its far-reaching consequences.</p> - -<p>The assistance of many persons who have been i<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></span>ntimately -associated with the Bagdad Railway has enabled -the author to examine records and documents not heretofore -available to the historian. To these persons the -author is glad to assign a large measure of any credit -which may accrue to this book as an authoritative and -definitive account of German railway enterprises in the -Near East. He wishes especially to mention: Dr. -Arthur von Gwinner, of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, president of -the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies; Dr. Karl -Helfferich, formerly Imperial German Minister of -Finance, erstwhile managing director of the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i>, and at present a member of the Reichstag; Sir -Henry Babington Smith, an associate of the late Sir -Ernest Cassel, a director of the Bank of England, president -of the National Bank of Turkey, and at one time -representative of the British bondholders on the Ottoman -Public Debt Administration; Djavid Bey, Ottoman Minister -of Finance during the régime of the Young Turks, -an economic expert at the first Lausanne Conference, and -at present Turkish representative on the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration; Mr. Ernest Rechnitzer, a banker -of Paris and London, a competitor for the Bagdad Railway -concession in 1898–1899; Rear Admiral Colby M. -Chester, of the United States Navy (retired), beneficiary -of the “Chester concessions.”</p> - -<p>Valuable assistance in the collection and preparation of -material has been rendered, also, by the following persons, -to whom the author expresses his grateful appreciation: -Sir Charles P. Lucas, director, and Mr. Evans Lewin, -librarian, of the Royal Colonial Institute; Sir John Cadman, -director of His Majesty’s Petroleum Department; -Professor George Young, of the University of London, -formerly attaché of the British embassy at Constantinople; -Mr. Charles V. Sheehan, sub-manager in London -of the National City Bank of New York; Mr. M. Zekeria,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></span> -chief of the Turkish Information Service in the United -States; Mr. René A. Wormser, an American attorney -who assisted the author in research work in Germany -during the summer of 1922. Dr. Gottlieb Betz, of Columbia -University, and Dr. John Mez, American correspondent -of the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, have aided in the -translation of important documents.</p> - -<p>Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and William R. Shepherd, -of Columbia University, have been patient advisers -and judicious critics of the author during the preparation -of his manuscript. To them he owes much, as teachers -who stimulated his interest in international relations, and -as colleagues who cheerfully coöperate in any useful enterprise. -Professor Parker Thomas Moon, of Columbia -University, also has read the manuscript and offered -many valuable suggestions.</p> - -<p class="right"> -EDWARD MEAD EARLE</p> - -<p>Columbia University<br /> - June, 1923</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">x/xi</a></span></p> - -<hr /> -<h2>CONTENTS</h2> - -<table summary="contents" border="0" width="100%"><tr> -<td class="tdl"><small>CHAPTER</small></td><td> </td><td class="tdr" colspan="1"><small>PAGE</small></td> -</tr></table> -<table summary="contents" border="0" width="100%"><tr> -<td class="tdr">I </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">An Ancient Trade Route is Revived</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">II </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Backward Turkey Invites Economic Exploitation</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_9">9</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Turkish Sovereignty is a Polite Formality</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_9">9</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Natural Wealth of Asiatic Turkey Offers Alluring -Opportunities</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Forces Are at Work for Regeneration</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">III </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Germans Become Interested in the Near East</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_29">29</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The First Rails Are Laid</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_29">29</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Traders Follow the Investors</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_35">35</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The German Government Becomes Interested</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2"><p class="indent">German Economic Interests Make for Near Eastern -Imperialism</p></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_45">45</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">IV </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Sultan Mortgages His Empire</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_58">58</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Germans Overcome Competition</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_58">58</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Bagdad Railway Concession is Granted</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_67">67</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Locomotive is to Supplant the Camel</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_71">71</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Sultan Loosens the Purse-Strings</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_75">75</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Some Turkish Rights Are Safeguarded</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_81">81</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">V </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Peaceful Penetration Progresses</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Financiers Get Their First Profits</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_92">92</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Bankers’ Interests Become More Extensive</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_97">97</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Broader Business Interests Develop</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_101">101</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Sea Communications Are Established</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_107">107</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">VI </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Bagdad Railway Becomes an Imperial Enterprise</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Political Interests Come to the Fore</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_120">120</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Religious and Cultural Interests Reënforce Political -and Economic Motives</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_131">131</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></span></td><td class="tdl padl2">Some Few Voices Are Raised in Protest</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">VII </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Russia Resists and France is Uncertain</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_147">147</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Russia Voices Her Displeasure</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_147">147</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The French Government Hesitates</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_153">153</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">French Interests Are Believed to be Menaced</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_157">157</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Bagdad Railway Claims French Supporters</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td> -</tr><tr> - -<td class="tdr">VIII </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Great Britain Blocks the Way</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Early British Opinions Are Favorable</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The British Government Yields to Pressure</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_180">180</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Vested Interests Come to the Fore</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_189">189</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Imperial Defence Becomes the Primary Concern</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_195">195</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">British Resistance is Stiffened by the Entente</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_202">202</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr">IX </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Young Turks Are Won Over</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">A Golden Opportunity Presents Itself to the Entente -Powers</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_217">217</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Germans Achieve a Diplomatic Triumph</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_222">222</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The German Railways Justify Their Existence</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_229">229</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Young Turks Have Some Mental Reservations</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_235">235</a></td> -</tr><tr> - -<td class="tdr">X </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Bargains Are Struck</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Kaiser and the Tsar Agree at Potsdam</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_239">239</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">French Capitalists Share in the Spoils</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">The Young Turks Conciliate Great Britain</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_252">252</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">British Imperial Interests Are Further Safeguarded</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_258">258</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Diplomatic Bargaining Fails to Preserve Peace</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td> -</tr><tr> - -<td class="tdr">XI </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Turkey, Crushed to Earth, Rises Again</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Nationalism and Militarism Triumph at Constantinople</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Asiatic Turkey Becomes One of the Stakes of the -War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Germany Wins Temporary Domination of the -Near East</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_287">287</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">“Berlin to Bagdad” Becomes but a Memory</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_292">292</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">To the Victors Belong the Spoils </td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_300">300</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">“The Ottoman Empire is Dead. Long Live -Turkey!”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_303">303</a></td> -</tr><tr> - -<td class="tdr">XII </td><td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">The Struggle for the Bagdad Railway is Resumed</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">Germany is Eliminated and Russia Withdraws</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_314">314</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">France Steals a March and is Accompanied by -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span>Italy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_318">318</a></td> -</tr><tr> - -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">British Interests Acquire a Claim to the Bagdad -Railway</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_327">327</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td><td class="tdl padl2">America Embarks on an Uncharted Sea</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_336">336</a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Index</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_355">355</a></td> -</tr></table> - -<h2>MAPS</h2> -<table summary="contents" border="0" width="100%"><tr> -<td class="tdl">The Railways of Asiatic Turkey</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#fp"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">The Chester Concessions</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_340">340</a></td> -</tr></table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">xiv</a></span></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">xv</a></span></p> -<hr /> -<p class="center">TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS,<br /> -AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY</p> -<hr /> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - -<p class="center"><big>TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS -AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY</big><br /><br /> - -<small>A Study in Imperialism</small></p> - -<h2>CHAPTER I<br /> - -AN ANCIENT TRADE ROUTE IS REVIVED</h2> - -<p>Many a glowing tale has been told of the great Commercial -Revolution of the sixteenth century and of the -consequent partial abandonment of the trans-Asiatic trade -routes to India in favor of the newer routes by water -around the Cape of Good Hope. It is sometimes overlooked, -however, that a commercial revolution of the nineteenth -century, occasioned by the adaptation of the steam -engine to land and marine transportation, was of perhaps -equal significance. Cheap carriage by the ocean greyhound -instead of the stately clipper, by locomotive-drawn -trains instead of stage-coach and caravan, made possible -the extension of trade to the innermost and outermost -parts of the earth and increased the volume of the world’s -commerce to undreamed of proportions. This latter commercial -revolution led not only to the opening of new -avenues of communication, but also to the regeneration of -trade-routes which had been dormant or decayed for centuries. -During the nineteenth century and the early part -of the twentieth, the medieval trans-Asiatic highways -to the East were rediscovered.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span></p> -<p>The first of these medieval trade-routes to be revived -by modern commerce was the so-called southern route. -In the fifteenth century curious Oriental craft had brought -their wares from eastern Asia across the Indian Ocean -and up the Red Sea to some convenient port on the Egyptian -shore; here their cargoes were trans-shipped <i>via</i> -caravan to Alexandria and Cairo, marts of trade with the -European cities of the Mediterranean. The completion -of the Suez Canal, in 1869, transformed this route of -medieval merchants into an avenue of modern transportation, -incidentally realizing the dream of Portuguese and -Spanish explorers of centuries before—a short, all-water -route to the Indies. Less than forty years later the northern -route of medieval commerce—from the “back doors” -of China and India to the plains of European Russia—was -opened to the twentieth-century locomotive. With -the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1905 -the old caravan trails were paralleled with steel rails. The -Trans-Siberian system linked Moscow and Petrograd -with Vladivostok and Pekin; the Trans-Caspian and -Trans-Persian railways stretched almost to the mountain -barrier of northern India; the Trans-Caucasian lines provided -the link between the Caspian and Black Seas.</p> - -<p>The heart of the central route of Eastern trade in the -fifteenth century was the Mesopotamian Valley. Oriental -sailing vessels brought commodities up the Persian Gulf -to Basra and thence up the Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris -to Bagdad. At this point the route divided, one branch following -the valley of the Tigris to a point north of Mosul -and thence across the desert to Aleppo; another utilizing -the valley of the Euphrates for a distance before striking -across the desert to the ports of Syria; another crossing the -mountains into Persia. From northern Mesopotamia and -northern Syria caravans crossed Armenia and Anatolia -to Constantinople. This historic highway—the last of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span> -the three great medieval trade-routes to be opened to -modern transportation—was traversed by the Bagdad -Railway. The locomotive provided a new short cut to -the East.</p> - -<p>That a commercial revolution of the nineteenth century -should revive the old avenues of trade with the East was -a matter of the utmost importance to all mankind. To -the Western World the expansion of European commerce -and the extension of Occidental civilization were incalculable, -but certain, benefits. Statesmen and soldiers, -merchants and missionaries alike might hail the new railways -and steamship lines as entitled to a place among -the foremost achievements of the age of steel and steam. -To the East, also, closer contacts with the West held out -high hopes for an economic and cultural renaissance of -the former great civilizations of the Orient. Alas, however, -the reopening of the medieval trade-routes served to -create new arenas of imperial friction, to heighten existing -international rivalries, and to widen the gulf of suspicion -and hate already hindering cordial relationships between -the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia. Economic -rivalries, military alliances, national pride, strategic maneuvers, -religious fanaticism, racial prejudices, secret diplomacy, -predatory imperialism—these and other formidable -obstacles blocked the road to peaceful progress and -promoted wars and rumors of wars. The purchase of -the Suez Canal by Disraeli was but the first step in the -acquisition of Egypt, an imperial experiment which cost -Great Britain thousands of lives, which more than once -brought the empire to the verge of war with France, and -which colored the whole character of British diplomacy -in the Middle East for forty years. No sooner was the -Trans-Siberian Railway completed than it involved Russia -in a war with Japan. So it was destined to be with the -Bagdad Railway. Itself a project of great promise for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> -the economic and political regeneration of the Near East, -it became the source of bitter international rivalries which -contributed to the outbreak of the Great War. It is one -of the tragedies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries -that the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Suez Canal, and the -Bagdad Railway—potent instruments of civilization for -the promotion of peaceful progress and material prosperity—could -not have been constructed without occasioning -imperial friction, political intrigues, military alliances, -and armed conflict.</p> - -<p>The geographical position of the Ottoman Empire, -the enormous potential wealth of its dominions, and the -political instability of the Sultan’s Government contributed -to make the Bagdad Railway one of the foremost imperial -problems of the twentieth century. At the time of the -Bagdad Railway concession of 1903 Turkey held dominion -over the Asiatic threshold of Europe, Anatolia, and the -European threshold of Asia, the Balkan Peninsula. Constantinople, -the capital of the empire, was the economic -and strategic center of gravity for the Black Sea and eastern -Mediterranean basins. By possession of northern -Syria and Mesopotamia, the Sultan controlled the “central -route” of Eastern trade throughout its entire length -from the borders of Austria-Hungary to the shores of -the Persian Gulf. The contiguity of Ottoman territory -to the Sinai Peninsula and to Persia held out the possibility -of a Turkish attack on the Suez and trans-Persian -routes to India and the Far East. In fact, the Sultan’s -dominions from Macedonia to southern Mesopotamia -constituted a broad avenue of communication, an historic -world highway, between the Occident and the Orient. -To a strong nation, this position would have been a source -of strength. To a weak nation it was a source of weakness. -As Gibraltar and Suez and Panama were staked -out by the empire-builders, so were Constantinople and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> -Smyrna and Koweit. Strategically, the region traversed -by the Bagdad Railway is one of the most important in -the world.</p> - -<p>Turkey-in-Asia, furthermore, was wealthy. It possessed -vast resources of some of the most essential materials -of modern industry: minerals, fuel, lubricants, abrasives. -Its deposits of oil alone were enough to arouse the -cupidity of the Great Powers. Irrigation, it was believed, -would accomplish wonders in the revival of the ancient -fertility of Mesopotamia. By the development of the -country’s latent agricultural wealth and the utilization of -its industrial potentialities, it was anticipated that the Ottoman -Empire would prove a valuable source of essential -raw materials, a satisfactory market for finished products, -and a rich field for the investment of capital. Economically, -the territory served by the Bagdad Railway was one of the -most important undeveloped regions of the world.</p> - -<p>Neither the geographical position nor the economic -wealth of the Ottoman Empire, however, need have been -a cause for its exploitation by foreigners. Had the Sultan’s -Government been strong—powerful enough to present -determined resistance to domestic rebellion and foreign -intrigue—Turkey would not have been an imperial -problem. But Abdul Hamid and his successors, the Young -Turks, showed themselves incapable of governing a vast -empire and a heterogeneous population. They were unable -to resist the encroachments of foreigners on the -administrative independence of their country or to defend -its borders against foreign invasion. That the Ottoman -Empire, under these circumstances, should fall a prey -to the imperialism of the Western nations was to be -expected. Its strategic importance was a “problem” of -military and naval experts. Its wealth was an irresistible -lure to investors. Its political instability was the excuse -offered by European nations for intervening in the affair<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span>s -of the empire on behalf of the financial interests of the -business men or the strategic interests of the empire-builders. -Diplomatically, then, the region traversed by -the Bagdad Railway was an international “danger zone.”</p> - -<p>The problem of maintaining stable government in Turkey -was complicated by the religious heritage of the Ottoman -Empire. It was the homeland of the Jews, the birthplace -of Christianity, the cradle of Mohammedanism. -European crusaders had waged war to free the Holy Land -from Moslem desecrators; the followers of the Prophet -had shed their blood in defence of this sacred soil against -infidel invaders; the sons of Israel looked forward to a -revival of Jewish national life in this, their Zion. It is -small wonder that Turkey-in-Asia was a great field for -missions—Protestant missions to convert the Mohammedan -to the teachings of Christ; Catholic missions to win -over, as well, the schismatics; Orthodox missions to retain -the loyalty of adherents to the Greek Church. Despite -their cultural importance in the development of modern -Turkey, the missions presented serious political problems -to the Sultan. They hindered the development of Turkish -nationalism by teaching foreign languages, by strengthening -the separatist spirit of the religious minorities, and by -introducing Occidental ideas and customs. They weakened -the autocracy by idealizing the democratic institutions -of the Western nations. They occasioned international -complications, arising out of diplomatic protection -of the missionaries themselves and the racial and religious -minorities in whose interest the missions were maintained. -In no country more than in Turkey have the emissaries -of religion proved to be so valuable—however unwittingly—as -advance pickets of imperialism.</p> - -<p>Complicating and bewildering as the Near Eastern -question always has been, the construction of the Anatolian -and Bagdad Railways made it the more complicating<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> -and bewildering. The development of rail transportation -in the Ottoman Empire was certain to raise a new -crop of problems: the strategic problem of adjusting military -preparations to meet new conditions; the economic -problem of exploiting the great natural wealth of Turkey-in-Asia; -the political problem of prescribing for a “Sick -Man” who was determined to take iron as a tonic. These -problems, of course, were international as well as Ottoman -in their aspects. The economic and diplomatic advance of -Germany in the Near East, the resurgent power of Turkey, -the military coöperation between the Governments of the -Kaiser and the Sultan were not matters which the other -European powers were disposed to overlook. Russia, -pursuing her time-honored policy, objected to any bolstering -up of the Ottoman Empire. France looked with alarm -upon the advent of another power in Turkish financial -affairs and, in addition, was desirous of promoting the -political ambitions of her ally, Russia. Great Britain became -fearful of the safety of her communications with -India and Egypt. Thus the Bagdad Railway overstepped -the bounds of Turco-German relationships and became -an international diplomatic problem. It was a concern of -foreign offices as well as counting houses, of statesmen -and soldiers as well as engineers and bankers.</p> - -<p>The year 1888 ushered in an epoch of three decades during -which two cross-currents were at work in Turkey. -On the one hand, earnest efforts were made by Turks, -old and young, to bring about the political and economic -regeneration of their country. On the other, the steady -growth of Balkan nationalism, the relentless pressure of -European imperialism, and the devastation of the Great -War gradually reduced to ruins the once great empire of -Suleiman the Magnificent. The history of those three -decades is concerned largely with the struggles of European -capitalists to acquire profitable concessions in A<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>siatic -Turkey and of European diplomatists to control the -finances, the vital routes of communication, and even the -administrative powers of the Ottoman Government. The -coincidence between the economic motives of the investors -and the political and strategical motives of the statesmen, -made Turkey one of the world’s foremost areas of imperial -friction. Its territories and its natural wealth were “stakes -of diplomacy” for which cabinets maneuvered on the diplomatic -checkerboard and for which the flower of the world’s -manhood fought on the sands of Mesopotamia, the cliffs -of Gallipoli, and the plains of Flanders. To tell the story -of the Bagdad Railway is to emphasize perhaps the most -important single factor in the history of Turkey during -the last thirty eventful years.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span></p> -<h2>CHAPTER II<br /> - -BACKWARD TURKEY INVITES ECONOMIC -EXPLOITATION</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Turkish Sovereignty is a Polite Formality</span></h3> - -<p>The reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) began -with a disastrous foreign war; it terminated in the -turmoil of revolution. And during the intervening -three decades of his régime the Ottoman Empire was -forced to wage a fight for its very existence—a fight -against disintegration from within and against dismemberment -from without.</p> - -<p>One of the principal problems of Abdul Hamid was -the government of his vast empire in spite of domestic -dissension and foreign interference. His subjects were -a polyglot collection of peoples, bound together by few, -if any, common ties, obedient to the Sultan’s will only -when overawed by military force. In Turkey-in-Asia -alone, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks -combined to form a conglomerate population, professing -a variety of religious faiths, speaking a diversity of languages -and dialects, and adhering to their own peculiar -social customs. Of these, the Armenians were receiving -the sympathy, support, and encouragement of Russia; the -Kurds were living by banditry, terrorizing peasants and -traders alike; the Arabs were in open revolt.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span></p> - -<p>Nature seemed to make more difficult the task of bringing -these dissentient peoples under subjection. The -mountainous relief of the Anatolian plateau lent itself to -the success of guerrilla bands against the gendarmerie; -a high mountain barrier separated Anatolia, the homeland -of the Turks, from the hills and deserts of Syria -and Mesopotamia, the strongholds of the Arabs. The -vast extent of the empire—it is as far from Constantinople -to Mocha as it is from New York to San Francisco—still -further complicated an already tangled problem, -for there were not even the poorest means of communication. -Under these circumstances the authority of the -Sultan was as often disregarded as obeyed. To police -the country from the Adriatic to the Indian Ocean, from -the borders of Persia to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, -was a physical impossibility. Universal military -service was enforced only in the less rebellious provinces. -It was almost out of the question to mobilize the military -strength of the empire for defence against foreign invasion -or for the suppression of domestic insurrection. -Efforts to build up effective administration from Constantinople -were paralyzed by incompetent, insubordinate, -and corrupt officials.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>To these problems of maintaining peace and order at -home there was added the equally difficult problem of -preventing the extension of foreign interference and -control in Ottoman affairs. The integrity of Turkey -already was seriously compromised by the hold which the -Great Powers possessed on Turkish governmental functions. -Under the Capitulations foreigners occupied a -special and privileged position within the Ottoman Empire. -Nationals of the European nations and the United -States were practically exempt from taxation; they could -be tried for civil and criminal offences only un<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span>der the -laws of their own country and in courts under the jurisdiction -of their own diplomatic and consular officials; in -fact, they enjoyed favors comparable to diplomatic immunity. -By virtue of treaties with the Sultan the Powers -exercised numerous extra-territorial rights in Turkey, -such, for example, as the maintenance of their own postal -systems.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>The finances of Turkey, furthermore, were under the -control of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, -composed almost entirely of representatives of foreign -bondholders and responsible only to them. The Council -of Administration of the Public Debt—composed of one -representative each from the United Kingdom, France, -Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey—had -complete control of assessment, collection, and expenditure -of certain designated revenues. In fact, it controlled -Ottoman financial policy and exercised its control -in the interest of European bankers and investors. -Customs duties of the Sultan’s dominions might be increased -only with the consent of the Great Powers. Almost -all administrative and financial questions in Turkey -were directly or indirectly subject to the sanction of foreigners.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>European governments were not content to interfere in -the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. They sought to destroy -it. Their zeal in this latter respect was limited -only by their jealousies as to who should become the -heir of the Sick Man. Russia encouraged the Balkan -and Transcaucasian peoples to resist Turkish domination; -France acquired control of Tunis and built up a -sphere of interest in Syria; Great Britain occupied -Egypt; Italy cast longing glances at Tripoli and finally -seized it; Greece fomented insurrection in Crete. Germany -and Austria-Hungary sought to bring all of Turkey -into the economic and political orbit of Central<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> -Europe. The Powers rendered lip-service to the sovereignty -and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, -but they never allowed their solemn professions to -interfere with their imperial practices. At best Turkish -sovereignty was a polite fiction—it was always a fiction, -if not always polite.</p> - -<p>The economic backwardness of Turkey emphasized the -existing political confusion and instability. From one -end of the empire to the other, it seemed, obstacle was -piled on obstacle to prevent the modernizing of the nation. -Brigandage made trade hazardous; there were almost -no roads; the rivers of Anatolia and Cilicia were -not navigable; the mineral resources of the country had -been neglected; internal and foreign customs duties were -the last straws to break the camel’s back—business was -taxed to death. Agriculture, the occupation of the great -majority of the people, was in a state of stagnation. The -absence of systems of drainage and irrigation made the -countryside the victim of alternate floods and droughts. -Methods of cultivation were archaic: the wooden plow, -used by the Hittites centuries before, was among the -most advanced types of agricultural implements in use in -Anatolia and Syria; harvesting and threshing were performed -in the most antiquated manner; fertilization and -cultivation were practically unknown. Markets were inaccessible; -the peasant could not dispose of a surplus if -he had it; therefore, production was limited to the needs -of the family, and the Turkish peasant acquired a widespread -reputation for inherent laziness.</p> - -<p>Industrially, the Ottoman Empire had back of it a great -past. The fine and dainty fabrics of Mosul; the famous -mosque lamps, wonder-art of the glass-workers of Mesopotamia; -the master workmanship of the coppersmiths of -Diarbekr; the tiles of Erzerum; the steel work and the -enamels of Damascus—all of these had been f<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span>ar-famed -articles of world commerce for centuries. But Turkey -in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was, industrially -as well as politically, a “backward nation.” Her manufactures -were conducted under the time-honored handicraft -system, which long since had been discarded by her -European neighbors. In other words, Turkey had not -experienced the Industrial Revolution which was the modern -foundation of Western society and civilization. But -Turkey was victimized by the Industrial Revolution. Her -manufactures—with the exception of some luxuries of -incomparable craftsmanship—produced by outworn -methods, found it increasingly difficult to compete even -in the markets of the Ottoman Empire with the cheaper -machine-made goods of Europe. The pitiless competition -of the industrialized West eliminated the cottage spinner -and weaver, the town tailor and cobbler. And yet for -Turkey to adopt European methods—to introduce the machine, -the factory, and the factory town—was for a time -impracticable. There was no mobile fund of capital for -the purpose, and even Young Turks were not in a position -to furnish the necessary technical skill. As for foreign -capital and foreign directing genius, they could be obtained -only under promises and guarantees which might still -further jeopardize the independence of the Ottoman -Empire.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Natural Wealth of Asiatic Turkey Offers -Alluring Opportunities</span></h3> - -<p>It was not because of a lack of natural resources that -Turkey was a “backward nation.” The Sultan’s Asiatic -dominions were rich in raw materials, in fuel, and in agricultural -possibilities. Anatolia, for example, is a great -storehouse of important metals. A fine quality of chrome -ore is to be found in the region directly south of th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span>e Sea -of Marmora and in Cilicia, constituting sources of supply -which were sufficient to assure Turkey first position among -the chrome-producing nations until 1900, when exports -from Russia and Rhodesia offered serious competition. -There are valuable deposits of antimony in the vilayets -of Brusa and Smyrna, as well as commercially profitable -lead and zinc mines near Brusa, Ismid, and Konia. These -metals, particularly chrome and antimony, are not only -valuable for peace-time industry, but are almost indispensable -in the manufacture of armor-plate, shells and shrapnel, -guns, and armor-piercing projectiles.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>In the vicinity of Diarbekr there are mines, which, -although not entirely surveyed, promise to yield large supplies -of copper. Southern Anatolia is the world’s greatest -source of emery and other similar abrasives. The famous -meerschaum mines near Eski Shehr enjoy practically a -universal monopoly. Boracite, mercury, nickel, iron, manganese, -sulphur, and other minerals are to be found in -Anatolia, although there is some question of the commercial -possibilities of the deposits.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>Although Anatolia is not ranked among the principal -fuel-producing countries of the world, its coal deposits -are not inconsiderable. Operation of the chief of the coalfields, -in the vicinity of Heraclea, was begun in 1896 by -a French corporation, <i>La Société française d’Héraclée</i>, -which invested in the enterprise during the succeeding -seven years more than a million francs. The venture -proved to be profitable, for by 1910 the mines were producing -in excess of half a million tons of coal annually. -In addition to coal, Anatolia possesses large deposits of -lignite which, mixed with coal, is suitable fuel for ships, -locomotives, gasworks, and factories.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>Oil exists in large quantities in Mesopotamia and in -smaller quantities in Syria. The deposits are said to be -part of a vast petroliferous area stretching from the shores<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span> -of the Caspian Sea to the coast of Burma. As early as -1871 a commission of experts visited the valleys of the -Tigris and the Euphrates for the purpose of studying the -possibility of immediate exploitation of the petroleum wells -in that region. They reported that although there was a -plentiful supply of petroleum of good quality, difficulties -of transportation made it extremely doubtful if the -Mesopotamian fields could compete with the Russian and -American at that time. The oil supply was then being -exploited on a small scale by the Arabs and proved to be -of sufficient local importance, as well as of sufficient profit, -to warrant its being taken over by the Ottoman Civil List, -in 1888, as a government monopoly.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>In 1901 a favorable report by a German technical commission -on Mesopotamian petroleum resources stated that -the region was a veritable “lake of petroleum” of almost -inexhaustible supply. It would be advisable, it was pointed -out, to develop these oilfields if for no other purpose than -to break the grip of the “omnipotent Standard,” which, -in combination with Russian interests, might speedily -monopolize the world’s supply.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Shortly afterward, Dr. -Paul Rohrbach, a celebrated German publicist, visited the -Mesopotamian valley and wrote that the district seemed -to be “virtually soaked with bitumen, naphtha, and gaseous -hydrocarbons.” He was of the opinion that the oil resources -of the region offered far greater opportunity for -profitable development than had the Russian Transcaucasian -fields.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> In 1904 the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, of Berlin, -promoters of the Bagdad Railway, obtained the privilege -of making a thorough survey of the oilfields of the Tigris -and Euphrates valleys, with the option within one year of -entering into a contract with the Ottoman Government -for their exploitation.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> Shortly thereafter Rear Admiral -Colby M. Chester, of the United States Navy, became interested -in the development of the oil industry in Asiatic -Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span></p> - -<p>The Near East possesses not only mineral wealth but -potential agricultural wealth as well. Mesopotamia, for -example, gives promise of becoming one of the world’s -chief cotton-growing regions. In antiquity the Land of -the Two Rivers was an important center of cotton production, -and recent experiments have held out great inducements -for a revival of cotton culture there. The climate -of Mesopotamia is ideal for such a purpose. The length -of the summer season is from six to seven months, with -a constantly rising temperature, as contrasted with a -shorter season and variable temperatures in America and -Egypt. Frost is almost unknown. Rainfall is plentiful -during the early part of the year and scarce, as it should be, -during the growing period. The soil contains a good percentage -of the essential phosphorus, potash, and nitrogen. -It is believed that Mesopotamia can grow cotton as good -as the best Egyptian and better than the best American -product and at a considerably higher yield per acre.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>Extravagant prophecies have been made regarding the -rôle of irrigation in bringing about an agricultural renaissance -in Turkey-in-Asia. A writer in the Vienna <i>Zeit</i> of -August 31, 1901, predicted that as soon as the economic -effects of irrigation and of the Bagdad Railway should be -fully realized, “Anatolia, northern Syria, Mesopotamia, -and Irak together will export at least as much grain as -all of Russia exports to-day.” Dr. Rohrbach claimed that -this probably would prove to be an exaggeration, but that -certainly Mesopotamia would become one of the great -granaries of the world.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Sir William Willcocks, the distinguished -English engineer who had planned and supervised -the construction of the famous irrigation works of -the Nile, was no less enthusiastic about the prospects of -Mesopotamia. “With the Euphrates and Tigris floods -really controlled,” he wrote, “the delta of the two<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span> rivers -would attain a fertility of which history has no record; -and we should see men coming from the West, as well as -from the East, making the Plain of Shinar a rival of the -land of Egypt. The flaming swords of inundation and -drought would have been taken out of the hands of the -offended Seraphim, and the Garden of Eden would have -again been planted.... Speaking in less poetical language -we might say that the value of every acre in the joint -delta of the two rivers would be immediately trebled before -the irrigation works were carried out, and again increased -many fold more the day the works were completed. Every -town and hamlet in the valley from Bagdad to Basra -would find itself freed from the danger, expense, and intolerable -nuisance of flooding, and the resurrection of -this ancient land would have been an accomplished fact.”<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>Here in the Near East, then, was a great empire awaiting -exploitation by Western capital and Western technical -skill. No man could adequately predict its ultimate contributions -in raw materials to Western industry, or accurately -foretell its ultimate capacity in consumption of the -products of Western factories, or confidently prophesy -its final rôle in the promotion of Western commerce. But -a trained and intelligent observer, surveying the situation -at the opening of the twentieth century, could have said -with a certain amount of assurance that there were two -essential conditions to even a partial realization of the -economic possibilities of the Ottoman Empire: the provision -of adequate railway communications and the establishment -of political security. The former of these -conditions was met, in part, during the régime of Abdul -Hamid and his successors, the Young Turks. The second, -in spite of earnest efforts by loyal Ottomans, has not yet -been satisfied.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Forces Are at Work for Regeneration</span></h3> - -<p>Probably there was no group of men more fully aware -of the needs of Turkey than the members of the Ottoman -Public Debt Administration. They were concerned, it is -true, solely with obtaining prompt payment of interest -and principal of Ottoman bonds and with improving Ottoman -credit in European financial markets. But the accomplishment -of this purpose, they realized, was altogether -out of the question in the continued presence of -political instability and economic stagnation. One must -feed the goose which lays the golden eggs. They sought -some means, therefore, of establishing domestic order in -the Ottoman Empire, of lessening the constant danger -of foreign invasion, and of providing a tonic for the -economic life of the nation. All of these purposes, it was -believed, would be served by the encouragement of railway -construction in Turkey.</p> - -<p>The interest and imagination of the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration were stimulated by the plans of the -eminent German railway engineer Wilhelm von Pressel, -one of the Sultan’s technical advisers. Von Pressel had -established an international reputation because of his services -in the construction of important railways in Switzerland -and the Tyrol. In 1872 he was retained by the Ottoman -Government to develop plans for railways in Turkey, -and a few years later he assumed a prominent part in -the construction of the trans-Balkan lines of the Oriental -Railways Company. No one knew more than von Pressel -of the railway problems of Turkey; few were more enthusiastic -about the rôle which rail communications might -play in a renaissance of the Near East.</p> - -<p>Von Pressel foresaw the possibility of establishing a -great system of Ottoman railways extending from the -borders of Austria-Hungary to the shores of the Persian -Gulf. In this manner the far-flung territories of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span> -empire would be brought into communication with one -another and with the capital, and an era would be begun -of unprecedented development in agriculture, mining, -and commerce. A market would be provided for the crops -of the peasantry; the hinterland of the ports of Constantinople, -Smyrna, Mersina, Alexandretta, and Basra -would be opened up; heretofore inaccessible mineral resources -would be exploited. Foreign commerce might be -restored to the prosperity it had once enjoyed before the -Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century replaced -the caravan routes of the Near East by the new sea routes -to the Indies. Mesopotamia might be transformed into -a veritable economic paradise. The railways also would -insure political stability, for rapid mobilization and transportation -of the gendarmerie to danger points would enable -the Sultan’s Government to suppress rebellions of the -turbulent tribesmen of Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and -Arabia. Peace and prosperity were goals within easy -reach, thought von Pressel, if Turkey could be provided -with a comprehensive system of railways.<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<p>To the Ottoman Public Debt Administration peace and -prosperity were means to reaching another goal—a full -treasury. Greater income for the Turkish farmer, miner, -artisan, and trader would mean greater opportunities for -the extension of tax levies. And the greater the tax receipts -the greater would be the payments to the European -bondholders and the greater the value of the bonds themselves. -Obviously, railway construction would improve -Turkish credit in the financial centers of the world. But, -for the time, the Ottoman Government had at its disposal -neither the capital nor the technical skill to carry into -execution the plans for an ambitious program of railway -building, and private enterprise showed no disposition to -interest itself without substantial guarantees. It was under -these circumstances, therefore, that the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration recommended to the Sultan that c<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span>ertain -revenues of his empire should be set aside for the -payment of subsidies to railway companies.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>The Public Debt Administration were not unaware that -the payment of railway subsidies would materially increase -the amount of the imperial debt and mortgage certain -of the imperial revenues. But they were confident -that railways would be a powerful stimulant to economic -prosperity in Turkey and would ultimately increase the -revenues of the Government by an amount in excess of -the amount of the subsidies. They believed that generous -initial expenditures in a worth-while enterprise might -yield generous final returns. As an instance of this they -could point to the development of sericulture in Turkey. -Under the auspices of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration -tens of thousands of dollars were expended in the -reclamation of more than 130,000 acres of land and the -planting thereon of over sixty million mulberry trees. As -a result, the silk crop increased more than tenfold during -the years 1890–1910, with a result that there was a corresponding -increase in the 10% levy (or tithe) on agricultural -products in the regions affected. If the Public Debt -Administration were actuated by self-interest, at least it -was intelligent and far-sighted self-interest.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>But Sultan Abdul Hamid was no less interested than -foreign bondholders in the extension of railway construction -in his empire. Railways could be utilized, he believed, -to serve his dynastic and imperial ambitions. Effective -transportation was essential to the solution of at least -three vexatious political problems: first, the problem of -exercising real, as well as nominal, authority over rebellious -and indifferent subjects in Syria, Mesopotamia, -Kurdistan, Arabia, and other outlying provinces; second, -the problem of compelling these provinces, by military -force if necessary, to contribute their share of blood <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span>and -treasure to the defence of the empire;<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> third, the problem -of perfecting a plan of mobilization for war, on whatever -front it might be necessary to conduct hostilities. The -maintenance of order, the enforcement of universal military -service, the collection of taxes in all provinces of the -empire, and defence against foreign invasion—all of these -policies would be seriously handicapped, if not paralyzed, -by the absence of adequate railway communications.</p> - -<p>For strategic reasons, if for no other, Abdul Hamid -would have especially favored the Bagdad Railway. For -strategic reasons, also, he supplemented the Bagdad system -with the famous Hedjaz Railway—from Damascus -to the holy cities of Medina and Mecca—one of the achievements -of which the wily old Sultan was most proud.<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> -The completion of these two railways would have extended -Turkish military power from the Black Sea to the Persian -Gulf, from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf. General -von der Goltz epitomized their military importance in the -following terms: “The great distance dividing the southern -provinces from the rest of the empire was not the -only difficulty in holding them in control; it made Turkey -unable to concentrate her strength in case of great danger -in the north. It must not be forgotten that the Osmanlie -Empire in all former wars on the Danube and in the -Balkans has only been able to utilize half her forces. Not -only did the far-off provinces not contribute men, but, on -the contrary, they necessitated strong reënforcements to -prevent the danger of their being tempted into rebellion. -This will be quite changed when the railroads to the -Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are completed. The empire -will then be rejuvenated and have renewed strength.”<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> -The General might have added that the new railways might -conceivably be utilized for the transportation to the Sinai -Peninsula of an army intended to threaten the Suez -Canal and Egypt.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span></p> -<p>The Ottoman Government made it plain from the very -start that the Bagdad Railway, in particular, was intended -to serve military, as well as purely economic, purposes. -The concession of 1903 contained a number of explicit -provisions regarding official commandeering of the lines -for the objects of suppressing rebellion, conducting military -maneuvers, or mobilizing in the event of war. Furthermore, -the Ottoman military authorities insisted that -strategic considerations be taken into account when the -railway was constructed. For example, the sections of -the Bagdad line from Adana to Aleppo were carried -through the Amanus Mountains, in spite of formidable -engineering difficulties and enormous expense, although -the railway could have been carried along the Mediterranean -coast with greater ease and economy. The latter -course, however, would have exposed to the guns of a -hostile fleet the jugular vein of Turkish rail communications. -From an economic point of view the Amanus tunnels -were the most expensive and most unremunerative -part of the Bagdad Railway; strategically, they were indispensable. -This point was emphasized in 1908, when the -Ottoman General Staff refused to consider a proposal -to divert the line from the mountain passes to the shore.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>One of the most frequent criticisms of Turkish railway -enterprises in general, and of the Bagdad Railway in particular, -is that they were military as well as economic in -character. Such criticisms, however, must be discounted, -for potentially every railway is of military value. And in -the European countries few railways were constructed -without frank consideration of their adaptability to military -purposes in time of war. Railways, in fact, were one -of the most important branches of Europe’s “preparedness” -for war. Which European nation, therefore, was in -a position to cast a stone at Turkey for adopting this lesson -from the civilized Occident? If the Ottoman Empi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span>re had -a right to prepare for defence against invasion, it had the -right to make that defence effective—at least until such -time as its neighbors, Russia and Austria, should abandon -military measures of potential menace to Turkey.</p> - -<p>Germans and Turkish Nationalists contended that there -was a certain amount of cant in the righteous indignation -of the Powers that Turkey should become militaristic. -Was Russia, they said, as much interested in the welfare -of Turkey as she was angered at the active measures of -the Sultan to prevent a Russian drive at Constantinople -via the southern shore of the Black Sea? Was France as -much concerned with the safety of Turkey as she was -solicitous of the imperial interests of her ally? Was Great -Britain engaged in preserving the peace of the Near East, -or was she fearful of a stiffened Turkish defence of -Mesopotamia or of a Turkish thrust at Egypt?<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> For -the Sultan to have admitted that foreign powers had the -right to dictate what measures he might or might not -take for the defence of his territories would have been -equivalent to a surrender of the last vestige of his -sovereignty. Obviously this was an admission he could -not afford to make.</p> - -<p>Whatever else Abdul Hamid may have been, he was no -fool. To assume that this shrewd and unscrupulous autocrat -walked into a German trap when he granted the Bagdad -Railway concession is naïve and absurd. Abdul -Hamid was not in the habit of giving things away, if he -could avoid it, without adequate compensation for himself -and his empire. As Lord Curzon said, there was no -axiom dearer to the Sultan’s heart than that charity not -only begins, but stays, at home.<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> Abdul Hamid knew -that the granting of railway subsidies would mortgage -his empire. He knew that mortgages have their disadvantages, -not the least of which is foreclosure. But -mortgages also have their advantages. Abdul Hamid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> -granted extensive railway concessions, carrying with them -heavy subsidies, because he hoped the new railways would -strengthen his authority within the Ottoman Empire and -improve the political position of Turkey in the Near East.</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">1</span></a> Count L. Ostrorog, <i>The Turkish Problem</i> (Paris, 1915, English -translation, London, 1919), Chapter II; Leon Dominian, -<i>The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe</i> (London, -1917); V. Bérard, <i>Le Sultan, l’Islam, et les puissances</i> (Paris, -1907), pp. 15 <i>et seq.</i>; E. Fazy, <i>Les Turcs d’aujourd’hui</i> (Paris, -1898); A. Vamberry, <i>Das Türkenvolk</i> (Leipzig, 1885); A. Geiger, -<i>Judaism and Islam</i> (London, 1899). Regarding Arab nationalism, -in particular, <i>cf.</i> N. Azoury, <i>Le réveil de la nation arabe</i> -(Paris, 1905); E. Jung, <i>Les puissances devant la révolte arabe</i> -(Paris, 1906). A fascinating tale of the Arab separatist movement -during the Great War is that of L. Thomas, “Lawrence: -the Soul of the Arabian Revolution,” in <i>Asia</i> (New York), -April, May, June, 1920. <i>Cf.</i>, also, H. S. Philby, <i>The Heart of -Arabia</i> (2 volumes, New York, 1923).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">2</span></a> There is a wealth of material upon the problems of the Ottoman -Empire during the reign of Abdul Hamid. In particular, -consult the following: A. Vamberry, <i>La Turquie d’aujourd’hui -et d’avant quarante ans</i> (Paris, 1898); C. Hecquard, <i>La Turquie -sous Abdul Hamid</i> (Paris, 1901); G. Dory, <i>Abdul Hamid Intime</i> -(Paris, 1901); Sir Edwin Pears, <i>The Life of Abdul Hamid</i> -(London, 1917); W. Miller, <i>The Ottoman Empire, 1801–1913</i> -(Cambridge, 1913), Chapters XVI-XVIII; N. Verney and G. -Dambmann, <i>Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie, -et en Palestine</i> (Paris, 1900); Baron von Oppenheim, <i>Von Mittelmeer -zum persischen Golfe</i> (2 volumes, Berlin, 1899–1900); -Lavisse and Rambaud, <i>Histoire Générale</i> (12 volumes, 1894–1901), -Volume XI, Chapter XV; Volume XII, Chapter XIV; -R. Davey, <i>The Sultan and His Subjects</i> (London, 1897); V. Cardashian, -<i>The Ottoman Empire of the Twentieth Century</i> (Albany, -N. Y., 1908).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">3</span></a> The texts of the various treaties of capitulation may be found -in G. E. Noradounghian (ed.), <i>Recueil d’actes internationaux de -l’Empire ottoman, 1300–1902</i> (4 volumes, Paris, 1897–1903), Volume -I, documents numbers 153, 170, 196, 201, etc., <i>ad lib.</i>, Volume -II, numbers 499, 593, etc., <i>ad lib.</i>; also <i>Recueil des traités de la -Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères, 1536–1901</i> (10 -volumes, Paris, 1864–1901), <i>passim</i>; E. A. Van Dyck, <i>Report on -the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire</i>, Forty-seventh Congress, -Special Session, Senate Executive Document No. 3, First<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span> -Session, Senate Executive Document No. 87 (Washington, 1881–1882); -G. Pelissie du Rausas, <i>Le régime des capitulations dans -l’Empire ottoman</i> (2 volumes, Paris, 1902–1905); A. R. von -Overbeck, <i>Die Kapitulationen des osmanischen Reiches</i> (Breslau, -1917); W. Lehman, <i>Die Kapitulationen</i> (Weimar, 1917); P. M. -Brown, <i>Foreigners in Turkey, Their Juridical Status</i> (Princeton, -1914).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">4</span></a> For an account of the establishment, functions, and operation -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, <i>cf.</i> George Young -(ed.), <i>Corps de droit ottoman—Recueil des codes, lois, réglements, -ordonnances, et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, -et d’études sur le droit coutumier de l’Empire ottoman</i> -(7 volumes, Oxford, 1905–1906), Volume V, Chapter LXXXV; -A. Heidborn, <i>Manuel de droit public et administratif de l’Empire -ottoman</i> (2 volumes, Vienna, 1912), Volume II; C. Morawitz, -<i>Les finances de Turquie</i> (Paris, 1902); A. du Velay, <i>Essai sur -l’histoire financière de la Turquie</i> (Paris, 1903), Parts V and -VI; L. Delaygue, <i>Essai sur les finances ottomanes</i> (Paris, 1911).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">5</span></a> There were a few factories erected in Turkey by foreign capitalists, -notably those of the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, Ltd., -the American Tobacco Company, and the <i>Deutsche-Levantischen -Baumwollgesellschaft</i>. In general, however, the factory and the -factory town were not common phenomena in Asiatic Turkey. -An interesting account of the effects of the Industrial Revolution -upon economic conditions in Turkey is that of Talcott -Williams, <i>Turkey a World Problem of Today</i> (Garden City, -1921), pp. 268 <i>et seq.</i>; W. S. Monroe, <i>Turkey and the Turks: an -Account of the Lands, Peoples and Institutions of the Ottoman -Empire</i> (London, 1909), Chapter X; M. J. Garnett, <i>Turkish Life -in Town and Country</i> (London, 1904).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">6</span></a> J. E. Spurr (ed.), <i>Political and Commercial Geology</i> (New -York, 1921), pp. 109, 115–116, 172–173, 184–185; <i>Anatolia</i>, No. 17 -in a series of handbooks published by the Historical Section of -the Foreign Office (London, 1920), pp. 88–90.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">7</span></a> Spurr, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 358–359; <i>Armenia and Kurdistan</i>, No. 62 -of the Foreign Office Handbooks, p. 60; L. Dominian, “The -Mineral Wealth of Asia Minor,” in <i>The Near East</i>, May 26, -1916, p. 91; E. Banse, <i>Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn</i> (Weimar, -1913), pp. 140–145; L. de Launay, <i>La Géologie et les richesses -minerales de l’Asie</i> (Paris, 1911); R. Fitzner, <i>Anatolien, Wirtschaftsgeographie</i> -(Berlin, 1902); P. Rohrbach, <i>Die wirtschaftliche -Bedeutung Westasiens</i> (Halle, 1902); G. Carles, <i>La Turquie -économique</i> (Paris, 1906); E. Mygind, “Anatolien und seine -wirtschaftliche Bedeutung,” in <i>Die Balkan Revue</i>, Volume 4 -(1917), pp. 1–6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">8</span></a> L. Dominian, “Fuel in Turkey: an Analysis of Coal Deposits,” -in <i>The Near East</i>, June 23, 1916, pp. 186–187; J. Kirsopp, “The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span> -Coal Resources of the Near East,” <i>ibid.</i>, October 10, 1919, pp. -393–394.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">9</span></a> F. Maunsell, “The Mesopotamian Petroleum Field,” in the -<i>Geographical Journal</i>, Volume IX (1897), pp. 523–532; L. Dominian, -“Fuel in Turkey: Petroleum,” in <i>The Near East</i>, July 14, -1917; <i>Mesopotamia</i>, No. 63 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, -pp. 34, 85–86; <i>Syria and Palestine</i>, No. 60 of the Foreign Office -Handbooks, p. 111.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1921, Cmd. 675; <i>The Near East</i>, October -26, 1917, p. 516.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i> (1903), pp. 26–28.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1921, Cmd. 675. For some reason or -other this option was allowed to lapse.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">13</span></a> H. Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey,” in <i>Current -History</i> (New York), Volume XV (1922), pp. 953–959.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">14</span></a> <i>Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia, -1920</i> (Bagdad, 1921); <i>The Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia</i> -(Bagdad, 1922); “Cotton Growing in Mesopotamia,” in the -<i>Bulletin of the Imperial Institute</i>, Volume 18 (1920), pp. 73–82.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">15</span></a> Rohrbach, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 30–46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">16</span></a> Quoted in <i>The Near East</i>, October 6, 1916, pp. 545–546. For -an elaboration of the views of Sir William Willcocks see the -following of his books and articles: <i>The Recreation of Chaldea</i> -(Cairo, 1903); <i>The Irrigation of Mesopotamia</i> (London, 1905, -and Constantinople, 1911); “Mesopotamia, Past, Present and -Future,” in the <i>Geographical Journal</i>, January, 1910, pp. 1–18. -For further works on the economic resources of Turkey-in-Asia -consult, also, the following: K. H. Müller, <i>Die wirtschaftliche -Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn</i> (Hamburg, 1917); L. Blanckenhorn, -<i>Syrien und die deutsche Arbeit</i> (Weimar, 1916); L. Schulmann, -<i>Zur türkischen Agrarfrage</i> (Weimar, 1916); A. Ruppin, <i>Syrien -als Wirtschaftsgebiet</i> (Berlin, 1917).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">17</span></a> W. von Pressel, <i>Les chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie</i> -(Zurich, 1902), pp. 4–5, 52–59, etc. <i>ad lib.</i> For statements of the -importance of von Pressel in the development of railways in -Turkey <i>cf.</i> André Chéradame, <i>La question d’Orient: la Macédoine, -le chemin de fer de Bagdad</i> (Paris, 1903), pp. 25 <i>et seq.</i>; -C. A. Schaefer, <i>Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik</i> -(Weimar, 1916), p. 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">18</span></a> <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 62–64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">19</span></a> Sir H. P. Caillard, Article “Turkey” in the <i>Encyclopedia -Britannica</i>, eleventh edition, Volume 27, p. 439; <i>Reports of the -Ottoman Public Debt</i> (London, 1884 <i>et seq.</i>), <i>passim.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">20</span></a> In Turkey all Mussulmans over 20 years of age were liable -to military service for a period of 20 years, 4 of which were -with the colors in the regular army. Residents in the outlyin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span>g -territories, notably the Arabs and the Kurds, constantly avoided -military service and went unpunished because of the inability -of the Government to send punitive expeditions into these -regions. Railways would have produced satisfactory bases of -operations for such expeditions and would have shortened their -lines of communication. <i>The Statesman’s Year Book</i>, 1903, pp. -1168–1170.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">21</span></a> The Hedjaz Railway was a great national enterprise which -indicated the strength of Moslem feeling in Turkey and which -proved the desire of the Ottoman Government to construct -national railways as far as capital and technical skill could be -obtained. So far as Abdul Hamid was concerned, the railway -was an attempt to gain prestige for his claim to the Caliphate, -as well as a move to strengthen his political position in Syria -and the Hedjaz. In April, 1900, the Sultan announced to the -Faithful his determination to construct a railway from Damascus -to the holy cities of Medina and Mecca. An appeal was issued -to Mohammedans the world over for funds to carry out the -work. The Sultan headed the list with a subscription of about -a quarter of a million dollars, and by 1904 over three and a half -million dollars had been collected. The only compulsory contributions -were the levies of 10% on the salary of every official -in the civil and military service of the empire. It is estimated -that the contributions eventually amounted to almost fifteen -million dollars. The engineers in charge of the construction -were Italians, although the great bulk of the work was done by -the army and the peasantry. Nearly seven hundred thousand -persons were employed on the construction work at one time or -another, the non-Moslems being replaced as quickly as Mussulmans -could be trained to take their places. On August 31, 1908, -the thirty-second anniversary of the accession of Abdul Hamid, -the railway was completed to Medina, where construction was -halted temporarily because of the Young Turk Revolution and -the international complications which followed it. <i>Corps de -droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 242–244; A. Hamilton, <i>Problems -of the Middle East</i> (London, 1909), pp. 273–292; <i>Annual Register</i>, -1908, pp. 328–329.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">22</span></a> Quoted by Hamilton, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 274–275.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Via</i> the Bagdad Railway and the Syrian system Turkish -troops could have been transported to a point less than 200 miles -from Suez. A successful attack on the Canal, of course, would -have severed British communications with the East. In addition, -it would have given the Sultan an opportunity to attack, -and assert his suzerainty over, Egypt. Dr. Rohrbach made a -great point of this alleged menace to the British position in -Egypt. <i>Cf.</i> <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, pp. 18–19; <i>German World Policies</i>, -pp. 165–167. This program, however, would have been an altogeth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span>er -too ambitious one for the military strength of the Ottoman -Empire, which had such far-flung frontiers to defend. In -any event, British statesmen seemed to realize that the Sinai -Peninsula was a formidable natural defence against an attack -on the Suez Canal and that such an expedition would be merely -a pin-prick in the imperial flesh. <i>Parliamentary Debates, House -of Lords</i>, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 601 <i>et seq.</i> The -termination in a fiasco of the Turkish drive of 1914–1915 against -the Canal confirmed this prophecy.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, p. 83; Kurt Wiedenfeld, <i>Die deutsch-türkische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen</i> -(Leipzig, 1915), p. 23; <i>Report of the Bagdad -Railway Company</i>, 1908, pp. 4–5.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">25</span></a> <i>Cf.</i>, <i>e.g.</i>, K. Helfferich, <i>Die deutsche Tü<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span>rkenpolitik</i>, p. 22.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>Persia and the Persian Question</i>, Volume I, p. 634.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER III<br /> - -GERMANS BECOME INTERESTED IN THE -NEAR EAST</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The First Rails Are Laid</span></h3> - -<p>During the summer of 1888 the Oriental Railways—from -the Austrian frontier, across the Balkan Peninsula -<i>via</i> Belgrade, Nish, Sofia, and Adrianople, to Constantinople—were -opened to traffic. Connections with the railways -of Austria-Hungary and other European countries -placed the Ottoman capital in direct communication with -Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and London (<i>via</i> Calais). The -arrival at the Golden Horn, August 12, 1888, of the first -through express from Paris and Vienna was made the -occasion of great rejoicing in Constantinople and was -generally hailed by the European press as marking the -beginning of a new era in the history of the Ottoman Empire. -To thoughtful Turks, however, it was apparent that -the opening of satisfactory rail communications in European -Turkey but emphasized the inadequacy of such -communications in the Asiatic provinces. Anatolia, the -homeland of the Turks, possessed only a few hundred -kilometres of railways; the vast areas of Syria, Mesopotamia, -and the Hedjaz possessed none at all. Almost -immediately after the completion of the Oriental Railways, -therefore, the Sultan, with the advice and assista<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span>nce -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, launched a -program for the construction of an elaborate system of -railway lines in Asiatic Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_1_27" id="FNanchor_1_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_27" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>The existing railways in Asia Minor were owned, in -1888, entirely by French and British financiers, with -British capital decidedly in the predominance. The oldest -and most important railway in Anatolia, the Smyrna-Aidin -line—authorized in 1856, opened to traffic in 1866, -and extended at various times until in 1888 it was 270 kilometres -in length—was owned by an English company. -British capitalists also owned the short, but valuable, Mersina-Adana -Railway, in Cilicia, and held the lease of the -Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway. French interests were in -control of the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, which operated -168 kilometres of rails extending north and east from the -port of Smyrna. It was not until the autumn of 1888 -that Germans had any interest whatever in the railways -of Asiatic Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_2_28" id="FNanchor_2_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_28" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>The first move of the Sultan in his plan to develop -railway communication in his Asiatic provinces was to -authorize important extensions to the existing railways of -Anatolia. The French owners of the Smyrna-Cassaba -line were granted a concession for a branch from Manissa -to Soma, a distance of almost 100 kilometres, under substantial -subsidies from the Ottoman Treasury. The -British-controlled Smyrna-Aidin Railway was authorized -to build extensions and branches totalling 240 kilometres, -almost doubling the length of its line. A Franco-Belgian -syndicate in October, 1888, received permission to construct -a steam tramway from Jaffa, a port on the Mediterranean, -to Jerusalem—an unpretentious line which -proved to be the first of an important group of Syrian -railways constructed by French and Belgian promoters. -Shortly afterward the concession for a railway from -Beirut to Damascus was awarded to French interests<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span>.<a name="FNanchor_3_29" id="FNanchor_3_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_29" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>But the great dream of Abdul Hamid was the great -dream of Wilhelm von Pressel: the vision of a trunk line -from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf, which, in connection -with the existing railways of Anatolia and the new -railways of Syria, would link Constantinople with Smyrna, -Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Mosul, and Bagdad. As early -as 1886 the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works had suggested -to the lessees of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway -that they undertake the extension of that line to Angora, -with a view to an eventual extension to Bagdad. The proposal -was renewed in 1888, with the understanding that -the Sultan was prepared to pay a substantial subsidy to -assure adequate returns on the capital to be invested. The -lessees of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid line, however, were unable -to interest investors in the enterprise and were compelled -to withdraw altogether from railway projects in -Turkey-in-Asia. Thereupon Sir Vincent Caillard, Chairman -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, endeavored -to form an Anglo-American syndicate to undertake -the construction of a Constantinople-Bagdad railway, -but he met with no success.<a name="FNanchor_4_30" id="FNanchor_4_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_30" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>The opportunity which British capitalists neglected German -financiers seized. Dr. Alfred von Kaulla, of the -<i>Württembergische Vereinsbank</i> of Stuttgart, who was in -Constantinople selling Mauser rifles to the Ottoman -Minister of War, became interested in the possibilities -of railway development in Turkey. With the coöperation -of Dr. George von Siemens, Managing Director of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>, a German syndicate was formed to take -over the existing railway from Haidar Pasha to Ismid -and to construct an extension thereof to Angora. On -October 6, 1888, this syndicate was awarded a concession -for the railway to Angora and was given to understand -that it was the intention of the Ottoman Government to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span> -extend that railway to Bagdad <i>via</i> Samsun, Sivas, and -Diarbekr. The Sultan guaranteed the Angora line a minimum -annual revenue of 15,000 francs per kilometre, for -the payment of which he assigned to the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration the taxes of certain districts through -which the railway was to pass. Thus came into existence -the Anatolian Railway Company (<i>La Société du Chemin -de Fer Ottomane d’Anatolie</i>), the first of the German -railway enterprises in Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_5_31" id="FNanchor_5_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_31" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>The German concessionaires were not slow to realize -the possibilities of their concession. They elected Sir -Vincent Caillard to the board of directors of their Company, -in order that they might receive the enthusiastic -coöperation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration -and in order that they might interest British capitalists -in their project. With the assistance of Swiss bankers -they incorporated at Zurich the <i>Bank für orientalischen -Eisenbahnen</i>, which floated in the European securities -markets the first Anatolian Railways loan of eighty million -francs—more than one fourth of the loan being underwritten -in England. Shortly thereafter this same financial -group, under the leadership of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, acquired -a controlling interest in more than 1500 kilometres -of railways in the Balkan Peninsula, by purchasing the -holdings of Baron Hirsch in the Oriental Railways Company. -The <i>Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen</i> became -a holding company for all of the <i>Deutsche Bank’s</i> railway -enterprises in the Near East.<a name="FNanchor_6_32" id="FNanchor_6_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_32" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>Under the direction of German engineers, in the meantime, -construction of the Anatolian Railway proceeded at -so rapid a rate that the 485 kilometres of rails were laid -and trains were in operation to Angora by January, 1893. -About the same time a German engineering commission, -assisted by two technical experts representing the Ottoman -Ministry of Public W<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span>orks and by two Turkish army -officers, submitted a report on their preliminary survey -of the proposed railway to Bagdad. This was enthusiastically -received by the Sultan, who reiterated his intention -of constructing a line into Mesopotamia at the earliest -practicable date.<a name="FNanchor_7_33" id="FNanchor_7_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_33" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>In 1887 there was no German capital represented in the -railways of Asiatic Turkey. Five years later the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> and its collaborators controlled the railways of Turkey -from the Austro-Hungarian border to Constantinople; -they had constructed a line from the Asiatic shore of -the Straits to Angora; they were projecting a railway -from Angora across the hills of Anatolia into the Mesopotamian -valley. In coöperation with the Austrian and -German state railways they could establish through -service from the Baltic to the Bosporus and, by ferry and -railway, into hitherto inaccessible parts of Asia Minor. -Almost overnight, as history goes, Turkey had become an -important sphere of German economic interest. Thus was -born the idea of a series of German-controlled railways -from Berlin to Bagdad, from Hamburg to the Persian -Gulf!</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government apparently was well pleased -with the energetic action of the German concessionaires -in the promotion of their railway enterprises in Turkey. -In any event, a tangible evidence of appreciation was extended -the Anatolian Railway Company by an imperial -<i>iradé</i> of February 15, 1893, which authorized the construction -of a branch line of 444 kilometres from Eski -Shehr (a town about midway between Ismid and Angora) -to Konia. The new line, like its predecessor, was -guaranteed a minimum annual return of 15,000 francs per -kilometre, payments to be made under the supervision -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The obvious -advantages of developing the potentially rich regions of -southern Anatolia, and of providing improved communication -between Constantinople and the interior of Asia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span> -Minor, led the Anatolian Company to hasten construction, -with the result that service to Konia was inaugurated -in 1896.<a name="FNanchor_8_34" id="FNanchor_8_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_34" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>Simultaneously with the granting of the second Anatolian -concession the Sultan authorized an important extension -to the French-owned Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. -The existing line was to be prolonged a distance of 252 -kilometres from Alashehr to Afiun Karahissar, at which -latter town a junction was to be effected with the Anatolian -Railway. Another French company was awarded a concession -for the construction of the Damascus-Homs-Aleppo -railway, in Syria, under substantial financial -guarantees from the Ottoman Treasury. It was said that -these concessions to French financiers were “compensatory” -in character and were granted upon the urgent representations -of the French ambassador in Constantinople.<a name="FNanchor_9_35" id="FNanchor_9_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_35" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>Between 1896 and 1899 no further definite steps were -taken to extend the Anatolian Railway beyond Angora, -as had been provided by the original concession. In the -latter year, however, largely because of Russian objections -to the further development of railways in northern Asia -Minor, the Sultan took under consideration the advisability -of projecting and building, instead, a line from Konia to -Bagdad <i>via</i> Aleppo and Mosul. Early in 1899 a German -commission left Constantinople to make a thorough survey -of the economic and strategic possibilities of such a line. -Included in the commission were Dr. Mackensen, Director -of the Prussian State Railways; Dr. von Kapp, Surveyor -for the State Railways of Württemberg; Herr Stemrich, -the German Consul-General at Constantinople; Major -Morgen, German military attaché; representatives of the -Ottoman Ministry of Public Works. It was this commission -that finally decided upon the route of the Bagdad -Railway.<a name="FNanchor_10_36" id="FNanchor_10_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_36" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span></p> -<p>At the close of the nineteenth century, therefore, the -sceptre of railway power in the Near East was passing -from the hands of Frenchmen and Englishmen into the -hands of Germans. In a period of about ten years the -German-owned Anatolian Railway Company had constructed -almost one thousand kilometres of railway lines -in Asia Minor. A German mission was blazing a trail -through Syria and Mesopotamia for the extension of the -Anatolian Railway to the valley of the Tigris River and -the head of the Persian Gulf. German prestige seemed -to be in the ascendancy: the Directors of the Anatolian -Company reported to the stockholders in 1897 that, “as -in former years, our Company has concerned itself continuously -with the development of trade, industry, and -agriculture in the region served by the Railway. As a -result our enterprise has enjoyed in every sense the whole-hearted -support and the powerful protection of His -Majesty the Sultan. Our relationships with the Imperial -Ottoman Government, the local authorities, and all classes -of the people themselves are more cordial than ever.”<a name="FNanchor_11_37" id="FNanchor_11_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_37" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>The system of railways thus founded had been conceived -by a German railway genius; it had been constructed -by German engineers with materials made by German -workers in German factories; it had been financed by -German bankers; it was being operated under the supervision -of German directors. In the minds of nineteenth-century -neo-mercantilists this was a matter for national -pride. A Pan-German organ hailed the Anatolian Railways -and the proposed Bagdad enterprise in glowing -terms: “The idea of this railway was conceived by German -intelligence; Germans made the preliminary studies; -Germans overcame all the serious obstacles which stood in -the way of its execution. We should be all the more -pleased with this success because the Russians and the -English busied themselves at the Golden Horn endeavoring -to block the German project.”<a name="FNanchor_12_38" id="FNanchor_12_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_38" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Traders Follow the Investors</span></h3> - -<p>The construction of the Anatolian Railways by German -capitalists was accompanied by a considerable expansion of -German economic interests in the Near East. In 1889, for -example, a group of Hamburg entrepreneurs established -the <i>Deutsche Levante Linie</i>, which inaugurated a direct -steamship service between Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, -and Constantinople. It was the expectation of the owners -of this line that the construction of the Anatolian railways -would materially increase the volume of German trade with -Turkey—an expectation which was justified by subsequent -developments. In 1888, the year of the original -railway concession to the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, exports from -Germany to Turkey were valued at 11,700,000 marks; -by 1893, when the line was completed to Angora, they -mounted to a valuation of 40,900,000 marks, an increase -of about 350%. Imports into Germany from Turkey -during the same period rose from 2,300,000 marks to -16,500,000 marks, showing an increase of over 700%. -No small proportion of the phenomenal increase in the -volume of German exports to Turkey can be attributed to -the use of German materials on the Ismid-Angora railway. -In any event, there was no further substantial development -of this export trade between 1895 and 1900, -although imports into Germany from Turkey reached -the high figure of 28,900,000 marks at the close of the -century.<a name="FNanchor_13_39" id="FNanchor_13_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_39" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>That German traders should follow German financiers -into the Ottoman Empire was to be expected. The -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>—sponsor of the Anatolian Railways—had -been notably active in the promotion of German foreign -commerce. From its very inception it had devoted itself -energetically to the promotion of industrial and commer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span>cial -activity abroad, thus carrying out the object announced -in its charter “of fostering and facilitating commercial -relations between Germany, other European countries, and -oversea markets.” By the establishment of foreign -branches, by the liberal financing of import and export -shipments, by the introduction of German bills of exchange -in the four corners of the earth, and by other similar -methods, this great bank was largely responsible for the -emancipation of German traders from their former dependence -upon British banking facilities. The Anatolian -Railways concessions marked the initial efforts of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> at Constantinople. What it had done elsewhere -it could be expected to do in the interests of German -business men operating in Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_14_40" id="FNanchor_14_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_40" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>The London <i>Times</i> of October 28, 1898, contained a -significant review of the status of German enterprise in -the Ottoman Empire during the decade immediately preceding. -Whereas ten years before, the finance and trade -of Turkey were practically monopolized by France and -Great Britain, the Germans were now by far the most -active group in Constantinople and in Asia Minor. Hundreds -of German salesmen were traveling in Turkey, -vigorously pushing their wares and studiously canvassing -the markets to learn the wants of the people. The Krupp-owned -Germania Shipbuilding Company was furnishing -torpedoes to the Turkish navy; Ludwig Loewe and Company, -of Berlin, was equipping the Sultan’s military machine -with small arms; Krupp, of Essen, was sharing with -Armstrong the orders for artillery. German bicycles were -replacing American-made machines. There was a noticeable -increase of German trade with Palestine and Syria. -In 1899 a group of German financiers founded the -<i>Deutsche Palästina Bank</i>, which proceeded to establish -branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, -Nablus, Nazareth, and Tripoli-in-Syria.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span></p> -<p>Promoters, bankers, traders, engineers, munitions manufacturers, -ship-owners, and railway builders all were playing -their parts in laying a substantial foundation for a -further expansion of German economic interests in the -Ottoman Empire.<a name="FNanchor_15_41" id="FNanchor_15_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_41" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The German Government Becomes Interested</span></h3> - -<p>In a sense, German diplomacy had paved the way for the -Anatolian Railway concessions. For numerous reasons, -which need not be discussed here, French and British influence -at the Sublime Porte gradually declined during -the decades of 1870–1890. British prestige, in particular, -waned after the occupation of Egypt in 1882. The German -ambassador at Constantinople during most of this -period was Count Hatzfeld, an unusually shrewd diplomatist, -who perceived the extraordinary opportunity which -then existed to increase German prestige in the Near East. -His place in the counsels of the Sultan became increasingly -important, as he missed no chance to seize privileges surrendered -by France or Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_16_42" id="FNanchor_16_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_42" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>An instance of Count Hatzfeld’s activity was the appointment -of a German military mission to Turkey. Until -1870 there had been a French mission in Constantinople, -with almost complete control over the training and equipment -of the Ottoman army. At the outbreak of the Franco-German -War, however, the mission was recalled because -of the crying need for French officers at the front. After -the termination of hostilities, and again after the collapse -of the Turkish defence against Russia in 1877, the Sultan -requested the reappointment of the mission, but the French -Government politely declined the invitation. The German -ambassador seized upon this neglected opportunity and, -in 1883, persuaded Abdul Hamid to invite the Kaiser to -designate a group of German officers to serve with the -Ottoman General Staff.<a name="FNanchor_17_43" id="FNanchor_17_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_43" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span></p> -<p>In command of the German military mission despatched -to Turkey in response to this invitation was General von -der Goltz. This brilliant officer—who, appropriately -enough, was to die in the Caucasus campaign of 1916—remained -in Turkey twelve years, reorganizing the Turkish -army, forming a competent general staff, establishing a -military academy for young officers, and formulating -plans for an adequate system of reserves. So great was -his success that he won the lasting respect of Turkish military -and civil officials; time and time again he was invited -to return to Turkey as military adviser extraordinary; in -1909 he answered the call of the Young Turks and lent -his ripened judgment to the solution of their distracting -problems; he was granted the coveted title of Pasha. -The personal prestige of von der Goltz was of no small -importance in brightening Germany’s rising star in the -Near East.<a name="FNanchor_18_44" id="FNanchor_18_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_44" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>Another event of first rate importance in the history of -German ventures in the Ottoman Empire was the accession, -in 1888, of Emperor William II. During the three -decades of his reign the economic foundations of German -imperialism were strengthened and broadened; the superstructure -of German imperialism was both reared and -destroyed. During his régime the German industrial revolution -reached its height, and the empire, it seemed, became -one enormous factory consuming great quantities -of raw materials and producing a prodigious volume of -manufactured commodities for the home and foreign markets. -Simultaneously there was developed a German merchant -marine which carried the imperial flag to the seven -seas. A normal concomitant of this industrial and commercial -progress was the expansion of political and economic -interests abroad—renewed activity in the acquisition -of a colonial empire; marked success in the further conquest -of foreign markets; the creation of a great navy;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span> -the phenomenal increase of German investments in Turkey. -It is no insignificant coincidence that German financiers -received their first Ottoman railway concession in the -year of the accession of William II and that the capture -of Aleppo—ending once and for all the plan for a German-controlled -railway from Berlin to Bagdad—occurred just -a few days before his abdication.</p> - -<p>From the first the Kaiser evinced a keen interest in the -Ottoman Empire as a sphere in which his personal influence -might be exerted on behalf of German economic -expansion and German political prestige. He was quick -to recognize the opportunities for German enterprise in -a country where much went by favor, and where political -influence could be effectually exerted for the furtherance -of commercial interests. In one of a round of royal visits -following his accession, the young Emperor, in November, -1889, paid his respects to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Upon -the arrival in the Bosporus of the imperial yacht <i>Hohenzollern</i>, -the Kaiser and Kaiserin received an ostentatious -welcome from the Sultan and cordial greetings from the -diplomatic corps. It was suggested at the time that there -was more than formal significance in this visit of the -German sovereigns, coming, as it did, when prominent -German financiers were engaged in constructing the first -kilometres of an important Anatolian railway. This impression -was confirmed when, shortly after the Emperor’s -return to the Fatherland, a favorable commercial -treaty was negotiated by the German ambassador at Constantinople -and ratified by the German and Ottoman Governments -in 1890.<a name="FNanchor_19_45" id="FNanchor_19_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_45" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>The expansion of German economic interests and -political prestige in the Ottoman Empire was not looked -upon with favor by Bismarck. The Great Chancellor was -primarily interested in isolating France on the continent -and in avoiding commercial and colonia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span>l conflicts overseas. -In particular he had no desire to become involved in the -complicated Near Eastern question—toward which at -various times he had expressed total indifference and contempt—for -fear of a clash with Russian ambitions at Constantinople. -He realized that German investments in -Turkey might lead to pressure on the German Government -to adopt an imperial policy in Asia Minor, as, indeed, -German investments in Africa had forced him to enter -colonial competition in the Dark Continent.<a name="FNanchor_20_46" id="FNanchor_20_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_46" class="fnanchor">20</a> When the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> first called the Chancellor’s attention to its -Anatolian enterprises, therefore, Bismarck frankly stated -his misgivings about the situation. In a letter to Dr. von -Siemens, Managing Director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, dated -at the Foreign Office, September 2, 1888, he wrote:<a name="FNanchor_21_47" id="FNanchor_21_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_47" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>“With reference to the inquiry of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> of -the 15 ultimo, I beg to reply that no diplomatic objections -exist to an application for a concession for railway construction -in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>The Imperial Embassy at Constantinople has been authorized -to lend support to German applicants for such concessions—particularly -to the designated representative of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> in Constantinople—in their respective endeavors -in this matter.</p> - -<p>The Board of Directors in its inquiry has correctly given -expression to the assumption that any official endorsement -of its plans, in the present state of affairs, would neither -extend beyond the life of the concession nor apply to the -execution and operation of the enterprise. As a matter of -fact, German entrepreneurs assume a risk in capital investments -in railway construction in Anatolia—a risk which lies, -first, in the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of -the law in the East, and, second, in the increase of such -difficulties through war or other complications.</p> - -<p><i>The danger involved therein for German entrepreneurs -must be assumed exclusively by the entrepreneurs, and the -latter must not count upon the protection of the German -Empire against eventualities connected with precarious enterprises -in foreign countries.</i>”<a name="FNanchor_22_48" id="FNanchor_22_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_48" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> -</div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span></p> - -<p>Bismarck disapproved of the visit of William II to Turkey -in 1889. Failing to persuade the young Emperor to -abandon the trip to Constantinople, the Chancellor did -what he could to allay Russian suspicions of the purposes -of the journey. Describing an interview which he had -with the Tsar, in October, 1889, Bismarck wrote, in a -memorandum recently taken from the files of the Foreign -Office: “As to the approaching journey of the Kaiser to -the Orient, I said that the reason for the visit to Constantinople -lay only in the wish of our Majesties not to -come home from Athens without having seen Constantinople; -Germany had no political interests in the Black -Sea and the Mediterranean; and it was accordingly impossible -that the visit of our Majesties should take on a -political complexion. The admission of Turkey into the -Triple Alliance was not possible for us; we could not lay -on the German people the obligation to fight Russia for -the future of Bagdad.”<a name="FNanchor_23_49" id="FNanchor_23_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_49" class="fnanchor">23</a> In 1890, however, Prince Bismarck -was dismissed, and the chief obstacle to the Emperor’s -Turkish policy was removed.</p> - -<p>During the succeeding decade the German diplomatic -and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire rendered -yeoman service in furthering investment, trade, and -commerce by Germans in the Near East. It became proverbial -among foreign business men in Turkey that no -service was too menial, no request too exacting, to receive -the courteous and efficient attention of the German governmental -services. German consular officers were held -up as models for others to pattern themselves after. The -British Consul General at Constantinople, for example, -informed British business men that his staff was at their -disposal for any service designed to expedite British trade -and investments in Turkey. “If,” he wrote, “any merchant -should come to this consulate and say, ‘The German cons<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span>ulate -gives such and such assistance to German traders, do -the same for me,’ his suggestion would be welcomed and, -if possible, acted on at once.”<a name="FNanchor_24_50" id="FNanchor_24_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_50" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>A judicious appointment served to reinforce the already -strong position of the Germans in Turkey. In 1897 Baron -von Wangenheim was replaced as ambassador to Constantinople -by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein (1842–1912), -a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. -Baron Marschall was one of the most capable of German -bureaucrats. The Kaiser was glad to have him at Constantinople -because his training and experience made him -an admirable person for developing imperial interests -there; his political opponents considered his appointment -to the Sublime Porte a convenient method of removing -him from domestic politics. The new ambassador’s political -views were well known: he was a frank believer in a -world-policy for Germany; he was an ardent supporter of -colonialism, if not of Pan-Germanism; he was a bitter -opponent of Great Britain; he espoused the cause of a -strong political and economic alliance between the German -and Ottoman Empires. What Baron Marschall did he -did well. Occupying what appeared, at first, to be an -obscure post, he became the foremost of the Kaiser’s -diplomatists and for fifteen years lent his powerful personality -and his practical experience to the furthering of -German enterprise in Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_25_51" id="FNanchor_25_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_51" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>In 1898 William II made his second pilgrimage to the -Land of Promise. Every detail of this trip was arranged -with an eye to the theatrical: the enthusiastic reception at -Constantinople; the “personally conducted” Cook’s tour -to the Holy Land; the triumphal entry into the Holy City -through a breach in the walls made by the infidel Turk; -the dedication of a Lutheran Church at Jerusalem; the -hoisting of the imperial standard on Mount Zion; the gif<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span>t -of hallowed land to the Roman Catholic Church; the visit -to the grave of Saladin at Damascus and the speech by -which the Mohammedans of the world were assured of -the eternal friendship of the German Emperor.<a name="FNanchor_26_52" id="FNanchor_26_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_52" class="fnanchor">26</a> The -dramatic aspects of the royal visit were not sufficient, -however, to obscure its practical purpose. It was generally -supposed in western Europe that the Kaiser’s trip to -Turkey was closely connected with the application of the -Anatolian Railways for the proposed Bagdad Railway -concessions.<a name="FNanchor_27_53" id="FNanchor_27_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_53" class="fnanchor">27</a> But little objection was raised by the British -and French press. Paris laughed at the obvious absurdity -of a Cook’s tour for a crowned head and his entourage; -London took comfort in the discomfiture which the incident -would cause Russia. But there was no talk then of -a great Teutonic conspiracy to spread a “net” from Hamburg -to the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_28_54" id="FNanchor_28_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_54" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>The true significance of this royal pilgrimage of 1898 -cannot be appreciated without some reference to its background -of contemporary events. For the preceding four -years the Ottoman Government had permitted, if not -actually incited, a series of ruthless massacres of Christians -in Macedonia and Armenia. European public opinion was -unanimous in condemnation of the intolerance, brutality, -and corruption of Abdul Hamid’s régime; the very name -of the “Red Sultan” was anathema. Under these circumstances -any demonstration of friendship and respect for -the Turkish sovereign would be considered flagrant flaunting -of public morality.<a name="FNanchor_29_55" id="FNanchor_29_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_55" class="fnanchor">29</a> By Abdul Hamid, on the other -hand, it would be welcomed as needed support in time of -trouble. With the Kaiser the exigencies of practical -politics triumphed!</p> - -<p>It was appropriate, furthermore, that the year 1898 -should be marked by some definite step forward in German -imperialist progress in Turkey, for during that year -notable advances had been made by German imperial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span>ism -in other fields. On March 5 there was forcibly wrung -from China a century-long lease of Kiao-chau and of -certain privileges in the Shantung Peninsula, thus assuring -to German enterprise a prominent position in the Far -East. Two weeks later was passed the great German -naval law of 1898, laying the foundation of a fleet that -later was to challenge British supremacy of the seas. -German diplomacy had developed interests in eastern -Asia; it was developing interests on the seas and in western -Asia; it had abandoned a purely Continental policy. -No further signs were needed that a new era was dawning -in German foreign affairs—unless, perhaps, it be mentioned -that the great Prince Bismarck quietly passed away -at Friedrichsruh on July 30 of that momentous year!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">German Economic Interests Make for Near -Eastern Imperialism</span></h3> - -<p>Bismarck’s policy of aloofness in the Near East, however -desirable it may have been from the political point -of view, could not have appealed to those statesmen and -soldiers and business men who believed that diplomatic -policies should be determined in large part by the economic -situation of the German Empire. The interest of William -II in Turkey was enthusiastically supported by all those -who sought to have German foreign affairs conducted -with full recognition of the needs of industrialized Germany -in raw materials and foodstuffs, of the importance -of richer and more numerous foreign markets for the -products of German factories, and of the exigencies of -economic, as well as military, preparation for war. The -great natural wealth of the Ottoman Empire in valuable -raw materials, the possibilities of developing the Near East -as a market for manufactured articles, and the geographical -situation of Turkey all help to explain why the economic -exploitation of the Sultan’s domini<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span>ons was a matter -of more vital concern to Germany than to any other -European power. To make this clear it will be necessary -to digress, for a time, to consider the nature of the imperial -problems of an industrial state and, in particular, -the problems of industrial Germany.</p> - -<p>Under modern conditions the needs of an industrial -state are imperious. Such a state is dependent for its very -existence upon an uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs for -the workers of its cities and of raw materials for the -machines of its factories. As its population increases—unless -it be one of those few fortunate nations which, like -the United States, are practically self-sufficient—its importations -of foodstuffs mount higher and higher. As its -industries expand, the demand for raw materials becomes -greater and more diversified—cotton, rubber, copper, -nitrates, petroleum come to be considered the very life-blood -of the nation’s industry. It is considered one of -the functions of the government of an industrial state—whether -that government be autocratic and dynastic or -representative and democratic—to interest itself in securing -and conserving sources of these essential commodities, -as well as to defend and maintain the routes of communication -by which they are transported to the domestic -market. The securing of sources of raw materials may involve -the acquisition of a colonial empire; it may require -the establishment of a protectorate over, or a “sphere of -interest” in, an economically backward or a politically -weak nation; or it may necessitate nothing more than the -maintenance of friendly relations with other states. Protection -of vital routes of communication may demand the -construction of a fleet of battleships; it may be the <i>raison -d’être</i> for a large standing army; it may necessitate only -diplomatic support of capitalists in their foreign investments. -Methods will be dictated by circumstances, but the -impulse usually is the same.<a name="FNanchor_30_56" id="FNanchor_30_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_56" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span></p> -<p>The German Empire was an industrial state, and its -needs were imperious. In the face of a rapidly increasing -population the nation became more and more dependent -upon importations of foreign foodstuffs. Herculean efforts -were made to keep agricultural production abreast of the -domestic demand for grain: transient laborers were imported -from Russia and Italy to replace those German -peasants who had migrated to the industrial cities; machinery -was introduced and scientific methods were applied; -high protective tariffs were imposed upon imported -foodstuffs to stimulate production within the empire. -These measures, however, were insufficient to meet the -situation; the greatest intensive development of the agricultural -resources of the nation could not forestall the -necessity of feeding some ten millions of Germans on -foreign grain.<a name="FNanchor_31_57" id="FNanchor_31_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_57" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>German manufacturers, as well, were unable to obtain -from domestic sources the necessary raw materials for -their industrial plants. Many essential commodities were -not produced at all in Germany and in only insignificant -quantities in the colonies. Some German industries were -almost wholly dependent upon foreign sources of supply -for their raw materials. The most striking example of -this was the textile manufactures, which had to obtain -from abroad more than nine tenths of their raw cotton, -jute, silk, and similar essential supplies.<a name="FNanchor_32_58" id="FNanchor_32_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_58" class="fnanchor">32</a> Interruption -of the flow of these or other indispensable goods would -have brought upon German industrial centers the same -paralysis which afflicted the British cotton manufactures -during the American Civil War.</p> - -<p>The German Empire had to pay for its imported foodstuffs -and raw materials with the products of its mines -and factories, with the services of its citizens and its ships, -with the use of its surplus funds, or capital.<a name="FNanchor_33_59" id="FNanchor_33_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_59" class="fnanchor">33</a> The development -of a German export trade was the natural outcome<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> -of the development of German industry. And as -German industries expanded, the demand for imported -raw materials increased, thus rendering more necessary -the extension of the export trade. The German industrial -revolution of the late nineteenth century was at once the -cause and the effect of the growing dependence of German -economic prosperity upon foreign markets.<a name="FNanchor_34_60" id="FNanchor_34_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_60" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>But foreign commerce is not concerned with the sale of -manufactured articles only. In its export trade, German -industry was closely allied with German shipping and -German finance. The services rendered German trade by -the German merchant marine need not be reiterated; they -are sufficiently well known. The relationship between the -policies of German industry and the policies of German -finance was no less important. The export of goods by -German factories was supplemented by the so-called “export -of capital” by German banks. Sometimes the German -trader followed the German investor; sometimes the -investor followed the trader. But whichever the order, -the services rendered by the investor were to develop the -purchasing power and the prosperity of the market, as -well as to oil the mechanism of international exchange.<a name="FNanchor_35_61" id="FNanchor_35_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_61" class="fnanchor">35</a> -The industrial export policy and the financial export policy -went hand in hand. Certainly this was the case in the -Near East.</p> - -<p>The German Empire depended for its welfare, if not -for its existence, upon an uninterrupted supply of food for -its workers and of raw materials for its machines. But -this supply, in turn, was conditional upon the maintenance -and development of a thriving export trade. The allies -of this export trade were a great merchant marine and a -vigorous policy of international finance and investment. -Thus the nation which in 1871 was economically almost -self-sufficient, by 1900 had extended its interests to the -four corners of the earth. This could not have been wi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span>thout -its effects upon German international policy. “The -strength of the nation,” said Prince von Bülow, “rejuvenated -by the political reorganization, as it grew, burst -the bounds of its old home, and its policy was dictated by -new interests and needs. In proportion as our national -life has become international, the policy of the German -Empire has become international.... Industry, commerce, -and the shipping trade have transformed the old -industrial life of Germany into one of international industry, -and this has also carried the Empire in political -matters beyond the limits which Prince Bismarck set to -German statecraft.”<a name="FNanchor_36_62" id="FNanchor_36_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_62" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>From the German point of view, the call to German -imperialism was clearly urgent, but the resources of German -imperialism were seriously limited. The colonial ventures -of the Empire had culminated in no outstanding successes -and in some outstanding failures. Entering the -lists late, the Germans had found the spoils of colonial -rivalry almost completely appropriated by those other -knights errant of white civilization, French, British, and -Russian empire-builders. The few African and Asiatic -territories which the Germans did succeed in acquiring -were extensive in size, but unpromising in many other -respects. With the exception of German East Africa the -colonies were comparatively poor in the valuable raw materials -so much desired by the factories of the mother -country; they were unimportant as producers of foodstuffs. -Attempts to induce Germans to settle in these -overseas possessions were singularly unsuccessful. On -the other hand, colonial enterprises had involved the empire -in enormous expenditures aggregating over a billion -marks; had precipitated a series of wars and military expeditions -costing the nation thousands of lives and creating -a host of international misunderstandings; had won -for Germans widespread notoriety as poor colonizers, as -tactless and autocratic officials, as ruthless ov<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span>erlords of -the natives. It was no wonder that the German people -seemed to be thoroughly discouraged and discontented -with their colonial ventures.</p> - -<p>However, even had the German colonies been richer -than they were, they, alone, could not have solved the -imperial problem of an industrialized Germany. German -colonial trade was possessed of the same inherent weakness -as German overseas commerce—it would be dependent, in -the event of a general European war, upon British sea -power. German industry could be effectually crippled -by interruption of the flow of essential raw materials, such -as cotton and copper, or by the cutting of communications -with her foreign markets. It was questionable whether -the German navy could be relied upon to keep the seas -open.</p> - -<p>Blockades, furthermore, exist not only in time of war, -but in time of peace as well. European nations were -surrounded by tariff barriers which seriously restricted -the development of international trade and served to promote -a system of national economic exclusiveness—a condition -of affairs which harmonized only too well with the -existing colossal military establishments. In this respect, -of course, Germany was more sinner than sinned against. -But in such an age it behooved every nation to build its -industries, as well as its armies, with some view to the -contingencies of war.</p> - -<p>German statesmen and economists were by no means -backward in understanding the situation. Although they -had no disposition to overlook the development of the -merchant marine and the navy, they believed this was -not enough. They sought to build up in Central Europe -a system of economic alliances, as they previously had -effected a formidable military alliance. Thus might Germany -and her allies become an economically self-sufficient -unit, freed from dependence upon British sea power.<a name="FNanchor_37_63" id="FNanchor_37_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_63" class="fnanchor">37</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> -And into this alliance could be incorporated the Near -East!</p> - -<p>Beyond the Bosporus lay a country rich in oils and -metals; a country capable of supplying German textile -mills with cotton of superior quality; a country which in -ancient times was fabulously wealthy in agricultural products; -a country which gave promise of developing into -a rich market for western commodities. Communication -with this wonderland was to be established by a German-controlled -railway upon which service could be maintained -in time of war, as in time of peace, without the aid of -naval power. What greater inducements could have been -offered to German imperialists, living in an imperialist -world? Turkey was destined to fall within the economic -orbit of an industrialized Germany!</p> - -<p>A distinguished German publicist said in 1903, “From -the German point of view, it would be unparalleled stupidity -if we did not most energetically do our part to acquire -a share in the revival of the ancient civilization of -Mesopotamia, Syria, and Babylonia. What we do not do -others will surely do—be they British, French, or Russian; -and the increased economic advantage which, through the -Bagdad Railway, will accrue to us in the Nearer East -would otherwise not only fail to be ours, but would serve -to strengthen our rivals in diplomacy and business.”<a name="FNanchor_38_64" id="FNanchor_38_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_64" class="fnanchor">38</a> -Some years later, in the midst of the Great War, an American -writer expressed much the same point of view: -“Hemmed in on the west by Great Britain and France -and on the east by Russia, born too late to extend their -political sovereignty over vast colonial domains, and unable -(if only for lack of coaling stations) to develop sea power -greater than that of their rivals, nothing was more natural -than the German and Austro-Hungarian conception of a -<i>Drang nach Osten</i> through the Balkan Peninsula, over <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>the -bridge of Constantinople, into the markets of Asia. The -geographical position of the Central European states made -as inevitable a penetration policy into the Balkans and -Turkey as the geographical position of England made -inevitable the development of an overseas empire.”<a name="FNanchor_39_65" id="FNanchor_39_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_65" class="fnanchor">39</a> Karl -Helfferich has said that “it was neither accident nor deliberate -purpose, as much as it was the course of German -economic development, which led Germany to take an -active interest in Turkey.”<a name="FNanchor_40_66" id="FNanchor_40_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_66" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_27" id="Footnote_1_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_27"><span class="label">1</span></a> <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1888, pp. 44, 310.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_28" id="Footnote_2_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_28"><span class="label">2</span></a> Good general statements of the transportation problem of -Turkey during the two decades 1880–1900 are Verney and Dambmann, -<i>op. cit.</i>, Part III; J. Courau, <i>La locomotive en Turquie -d’Asie</i> (Brussels, 1895), pp. 18–47; <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, -Volume IV, pp. 117 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_29" id="Footnote_3_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_29"><span class="label">3</span></a> <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 202–223, 237–242, etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_30" id="Footnote_4_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_30"><span class="label">4</span></a> <i>Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople</i>, -August 31, 1888, p. 10; September 30, 1888, p. 31. <i>Cf.</i>, -also a prospectus issued by a banker, Mr. W. J. Alt, “Heads of -a Convention for the extension of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid -Railway” (London, 1886), a copy of which was loaned to the -author by Mr. Ernest Rechnitzer.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_31" id="Footnote_5_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_31"><span class="label">5</span></a> The story of these negotiations is well told in a new book -by Dr. Karl Helfferich, <i>Georg von Siemens—ein Lebensbild</i> -(Leipzig, 1923), the proofs of which I have had the privilege -of reading. For an official copy of the convention and by-laws -of the Anatolian Railway Company (<i>Firman Impérial de concession -et statuts de la Société du Chemin de Fer Ottomane -d’Anatolie</i>, Constantinople, 1889), I am indebted to Dr. Arthur -von Gwinner, of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Administration -de la dette publique ottomane—Rapport sur les opérations de -l’année 1888</i> (Constantinople, 1889); <i>Report of the Anatolian -Railway Company</i>, 1889, pp. 1–2; <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume -IV, pp. 120–142.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_32" id="Footnote_6_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_32"><span class="label">6</span></a> Helfferich, <i>op. cit.</i>, Part V; A. P. Brüning, <i>Die Entwicklung -des ausländischen, speciell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens</i> -(Berlin, 1907), pp. 14 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Report of the Anatolian -Railway Company</i>, 1889, p. 3; <i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, -1892, p. 4, 1890, p. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_33" id="Footnote_7_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_33"><span class="label">7</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1891, p. 20, 1892, -pp. 16, 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_34" id="Footnote_8_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_34"><span class="label">8</span></a> <i>Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span> Shehr-Konia</i> -(Constantinople, 1893); <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, -1896, pp. 4, 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_35" id="Footnote_9_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_35"><span class="label">9</span></a> <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 191–197. The junction -of the two systems at Afiun Karahissar did not immediately -materialize. The distance from that town to Constantinople is -longer by sixty-six kilometres than the distance to Smyrna; -the latter port, therefore, is the better natural outlet for the -products of Anatolia. This diversion of traffic to Smyrna the -Anatolia Railway sought to avoid, it is said, by granting discriminatory -rates in favor of through freight to Constantinople -over its own lines. A rate war ensued between the Anatolian -and Smyrna-Cassaba systems, and neither was willing to permit -an actual joining of the tracks at Afiun Karahissar, with the -result that for years the rails of the two roads lay a comparatively -few yards apart. This absurd situation, so obviously -detrimental to the interests of the two roads, was remedied by -an agreement of 1899. <i>Infra</i>, pp. 59–60. <i>Cf.</i>, also R. LeCoq, -<i>Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure</i> (Paris, 1907), pp. 23–24; -<i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1899, p. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_36" id="Footnote_10_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_36"><span class="label">10</span></a> A summary of the report of the Commission is to be found -in <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3140 (London, 1903), -pp. 26 <i>et seq.</i> A statement of its membership and purposes is -given in the <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1899, -p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_37" id="Footnote_11_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_37"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1897, p. 3.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_38" id="Footnote_12_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_38"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Alldeutsche Blätter</i>, December 17, 1899. It should be borne -in mind, however, that until the Bagdad Railway concession was -granted French financiers held the lead in the number of -kilometres of railway in operation or contracted for. The situation -in 1898 was as follows:</p> - -<table summary="railways" border="0" width="50%"><tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>British</i></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Kiloms.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Smyrna-Aidin</td><td class="tdr">373</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Mersina-Adana</td><td class="tdr">67</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">—-</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl"> Total</td> -<td class="tdr">440</td> -</tr></table> - -<p> </p> - -<table summary="railways" border="0" width="50%"><tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>French</i></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Kiloms.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Smyrna-Cassaba</td><td class="tdr">512</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Jaffa-Jerusalem</td><td class="tdr">87</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Beirut-Damascus</td><td class="tdr">247</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Damascus-Aleppo</td><td class="tdr">429</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">—-</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl"> Total</td> -<td class="tdr">1,266</td> -</tr></table> - -<p> </p> - -<table summary="railways" border="0" width="50%"><tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>German</i></td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">Kiloms.</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Haidar Pasha-Ismid</td><td class="tdr">91</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Ismid-Ankara</td><td class="tdr">485</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Eski Shehr-Konia</td><td class="tdr">444</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">—-</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl"> Total</td> -<td class="tdr">1,020</td> -</tr></table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span></p> -<p> -All of the British and German lines were in operation in 1898, -whereas the French Syrian Railways were only partially completed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_39" id="Footnote_13_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_39"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Statistisches Handbuch für das deutsche Reich</i>, Volume 2, -pp. 506, 510; <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 2950 (1902), -pp. 5, 23; <i>Turkey in Europe</i>, No. 16 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, -pp. 86–87.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_40" id="Footnote_14_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_40"><span class="label">14</span></a> J. Riesser, <i>Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration -im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft -in Deutschland</i> (third edition, Jena, 1909); translated into -English and published as Senate Document No. 593, Sixty-first -Congress, Second Session, 1911. References here given are to -the translation. In this connection <i>cf.</i> “The Oversea and Foreign -Business of the German Credit Banks,” pp. 420 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_41" id="Footnote_15_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_41"><span class="label">15</span></a> <i>Syria and Palestine</i>, p. 126; <i>The Times</i>, October 28, 1898, -August 2 and 16, 1899.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_42" id="Footnote_16_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_42"><span class="label">16</span></a> Karl Helfferich, <i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i> (Berlin, 1921), -pp. 10 <i>et seq.</i>; J. A. R. Marriot, <i>The Eastern Question</i> (Oxford, -1917), pp. 347 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_43" id="Footnote_17_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_43"><span class="label">17</span></a> L. Ostrorog, <i>The Turkish Problem</i> (London, 1919), pp. -52–53; E. Dutemple, <i>En Turquie d’Asie</i> (Paris, 1883), pp. 131 -<i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_44" id="Footnote_18_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_44"><span class="label">18</span></a> For a biographical account of General von der Goltz (1843–1916) -<i>cf.</i> F. W. Wile, <i>Men Around the Kaiser</i> (Philadelphia, -1913), Chapter XXVI. Bismarck consented to the appointment -of von der Goltz’s military mission—which was not in accord -with his general Eastern policy—as a sort of insurance against -the possibility that chauvinism, Pan-Slavism, and anti-German -elements in Russia should gain the ascendancy at the court of -the Tsar. In such an event it might be possible to utilize Turkish -bayonets and Turkish artillery, especially if they had been -trained by Prussian officers. <i>Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst</i> -(English translation, New York, 1906), Volume -II, p. 268.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_45" id="Footnote_19_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_45"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman</i>, Volume -IV (1903), Document No. 960.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_46" id="Footnote_20_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_46"><span class="label">20</span></a> Mary E. Townsend, <i>Origins of Modern German Colonialism</i> -(New York, 1921), Chapters V-VII; Prince Bismarck, <i>Reflections -and Reminiscences</i> (New York, 1899), Volume II, pp. 233 -<i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_47" id="Footnote_21_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_47"><span class="label">21</span></a> For this letter, hitherto unpublished, I am indebted to Dr. -Karl Helfferich, son-in-law of the late George von Siemens.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_48" id="Footnote_22_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_48"><span class="label">22</span></a> The italics are mine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_49" id="Footnote_23_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_49"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914</i> -(Berlin, 1922 <i>et seq.</i>), Volume VI, pp. 360–361. (A compilation -of documents from the files of the Foreign Office, edited by <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span>a -non-partisan commission appointed by the Government of the -German Republic.) Of Bismarck’s policy in the Near East the -Ex-Kaiser writes, “Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, -of the men in high position there, and of conditions in that land.– -I thought I might inspire him in part with essentially more -favorable opinions, but my efforts were of little avail.... Prince -Bismarck was never favorably inclined toward Turkey and never -agreed with me in my Turkish policy.” W. von Hohenzollern, <i>My -Memoirs, 1878–1918</i> (New York, 1922), p. 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_50" id="Footnote_24_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_50"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 2950 (1902), p. 20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_51" id="Footnote_25_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_51"><span class="label">25</span></a> For information regarding the appointment of Baron Marschall -to Constantinople the author is indebted to Dr. Arthur -von Gwinner, who believes that the Baron was being sentenced -to political exile when he was detailed to the Sublime Porte, -but that his opponents overlooked the possibilities of the embassy -at the Ottoman capital. Wile, <i>op. cit.</i>, Chapter XVIII, -gives a short biographical account of Baron Marschall.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_52" id="Footnote_26_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_52"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> E. Lamy, “La France du Levant: Voyage de l’Empereur -Guillaume II,” in <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 150 (1898), -pp. 880–911, Volume 151 (1899), pp. 315–348; E. Lewin, <i>The -German Road to the East</i> (New York, 1917), pp. 105 <i>et seq.</i>; -C. S. Hurgronje, <i>The Holy War, Made in Germany</i> (New York, -1915), pp. 70–71; <i>The All Highest Goes to Jerusalem</i>, being an -English translation of a series of articles published in <i>Le Rire</i> -(Paris) during 1898 (New York, 1917). In Germany the royal -pilgrimage was intended to be taken seriously. Herr Heine, of -the Munich <i>Simplicissimus</i>, was convicted of <i>lèse majesté</i> and -imprisoned for six months for having published humorous cartoons -of the Kaiser and his party on their travels. <i>The Annual -Register</i>, 1898, pp. 255–258.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_53" id="Footnote_27_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_53"><span class="label">27</span></a> The author found some difference of opinion in Germany -regarding the connection between the Kaiser’s visit and the pending -Anatolian and Bagdad concessions. Dr. von Gwinner denies -that there was any such purpose behind the Emperor’s trip to the -East—or, at least, if there was, that it was unsolicited by the -promoters and not looked upon with favor by them. Dr. Helfferich, -on the other hand, is convinced that His Majesty was -directly concerned with the desirability of obtaining additional -railway concessions for German financiers. The Kaiser himself -agrees with Dr. Helfferich. <i>Cf.</i>, <i>My Memoirs, 1878–1918</i>, p. 86.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_54" id="Footnote_28_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_54"><span class="label">28</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> foreign correspondence in <i>The Times</i> (London), October -25, 1898, and days immediately thereafter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_55" id="Footnote_29_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_55"><span class="label">29</span></a> For an analysis of this situation see <i>The Manchester Guardian</i>, -July 31, 1899, which took the stand that “for no sort of -mercantile gain would a nation be justified in making friendly -advances to the blood-stained tyrant of Armenia.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_56" id="Footnote_30_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_56"><span class="label">30</span></a> In this connection see Leonard Woolf, <i>Economic Imperialism</i> -(London and New York, 1920), Chapter I; Ramsay Muir, <i>The -Expansion of Europe</i> (New York, 1917), Chapter I; J. E. Spurr -(editor), <i>Political and Commercial Geology</i> (New York, 1920), -Chapter XXXII, entitled “Who Owns the Earth?”; Aspi-Fleurimont, -“La Question du coton,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 429–432; J. A. B. Scherer, -<i>Cotton as a World Power</i> (New York, 1922). In addition, for -the wider aspects of imperialism, consult H. N. Brailsford, <i>The -War of Steel and Gold</i> (New edition, London, 1915), Chapter -II; F. C. Howe, <i>Why War?</i> (New York, 1916), <i>passim</i>; Walter -Lippman, <i>The Stakes of Diplomacy</i> (New York, 1915); J. A. -Hobson, <i>Imperialism: A Study</i> (London, 1902).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_57" id="Footnote_31_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_57"><span class="label">31</span></a> W. H. Dawson, <i>The Evolution of Modern Germany</i> (New -York, 1908), Chapter XII. P. Rohrbach, <i>Deutschland unter den -Weltvölkern</i>, p. 17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_58" id="Footnote_32_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_58"><span class="label">32</span></a> Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 110, 121.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_59" id="Footnote_33_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_59"><span class="label">33</span></a> It should be remarked here that the author is not unaware -of the fallacy of speaking of “German trade” and “German industry.” -He is cognizant of the fact that trade takes place not -between countries, but between individuals. If he anthropomorphizes -the German Empire for the purposes of this description, -it is not because of either ignorance or malice, but for -convenience.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_60" id="Footnote_34_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_60"><span class="label">34</span></a> For further consideration of German economic progress during -the late nineteenth century see: Dawson, <i>op. cit.</i>, Chapters -III, IV, XII, XVI; E. D. Howard, <i>The Cause and Extent of -the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany</i> (New York, 1907); -T. B. Veblen, <i>Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution</i> -(New York, 1915); W. H. Dawson, <i>Industrial Germany</i> (London, -1913); Karl Helfferich, <i>Germany’s Economic Progress and -National Wealth</i> (New York, 1913); G. Blondel, <i>L’Essor industriel -et commercial du peuple allemand</i> (Paris, 1900).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_61" id="Footnote_35_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_61"><span class="label">35</span></a> Paul Dehn, <i>Weltwirtschaftliche Neubildungen</i> (Berlin, 1904), -<i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_62" id="Footnote_36_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_62"><span class="label">36</span></a> Bernhard von Bülow, <i>Imperial Germany</i> (English translation, -New York, 1914), pp. 17, 18–20.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_63" id="Footnote_37_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_63"><span class="label">37</span></a> The extent of German economic control of central and eastern -Europe before the War is indicated by Mr. J. M. Keynes, -in his book <i>The Economic Consequences of the Peace</i> (New -York, 1920), pp. 17–18: “Germany not only furnished these countries -with trade, but in the case of some of them supplied a -great part of the capital needed for their own development. -Of Germany’s pre-war foreign investments, amounting in all to -about six and a half billion dollars, not far short of two and a -half billions was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgari<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span>a, -Rumania, and Turkey. And by the system of ‘peaceful penetration’ -she gave these countries not only capital, but what they -needed hardly less, organization. The whole of Europe east of -the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its -economic life was adjusted accordingly.” A frank German admission -of a policy of a self-sufficient Central Europe is the -work of Friedrich Naumann, <i>Mittel-Europa</i>, translated into -English by C. M. Meredith and published under the title <i>Central -Europe</i> (New York, 1917). See, especially, Chapters IV-VII. -<i>Cf.</i>, also, Ernst zu Reventlow, <i>Deutschlands auswärtige Politik</i> -(3rd revised edition, Berlin, 1916), pp. 336 <i>et seq.</i>; K. H. Müller, -<i>Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn</i> (Hamburg, 1916), p. 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_64" id="Footnote_38_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_64"><span class="label">38</span></a> Paul Rohrbach, <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i> (Berlin, 1903), p. 16.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_65" id="Footnote_39_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_65"><span class="label">39</span></a> H. A. Gibbons, <i>The Reconstruction of P<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span>oland and the Near -East</i> (New York, 1917), pp. 57–58. The author is not in agreement -with either Dr. Rohrbach or Dr. Gibbons. He certainly -would hesitate to call any imperialist policy “inevitable.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_66" id="Footnote_40_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_66"><span class="label">40</span></a> <i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i>, p. 8.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER IV<br /> - -THE SULTAN MORTGAGES HIS EMPIRE</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Germans Overcome Competition</span></h3> - -<p>During 1898 and 1899 the Ottoman Ministry of Public -Works received many applications for permission to construct -a railway to Bagdad. Whatever may have been -thought later of the financial prospects of the Bagdad -Railway there was no scarcity then of promoters who were -willing and anxious to undertake its construction. It was -not because of lack of competition that the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> -finally was awarded the all-important concession.</p> - -<p>In 1898, for example, an Austro-Russian syndicate proposed -the building of a railway from Tripoli-in-Syria to -an unspecified port on the Persian Gulf, with branches -to Bagdad and Khanikin. The sponsor of the project was -Count Vladimir I. Kapnist, a brother of the Russian ambassador -at Vienna and an influential person at the Tsar’s -court. Count Kapnist had the support of Pobêdonostsev, -the famous Procurator of the Holy Synod, who was an -avowed Pan-Slavist and an enthusiastic promoter of Russian -colonization in Asia Minor.<a name="FNanchor_1_67" id="FNanchor_1_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_67" class="fnanchor">1</a> The Sultan instructed -his Minister of Public Works to study the Kapnist plan -and submit a report. The Austro-Russian syndicate, however, -made no further progress at Constantinople. The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span> -Sublime Porte obviously was opposed to any expansion -of Russian influence in Turkey—a point of view which -received the encouragement of the British and German -ambassadors. Furthermore, in Russia itself there was -opposition to Count Kapnist’s project. Count Witte, Imperial -Minister of Finance, and foremost political opponent -of Pobêdonostsev, emphasized the strategic menace to -Russia of improved railway transportation in Turkey and -sturdily maintained that Russian capital and technical -skill should be kept at home for the development of Russian -railways and industry. By the spring of 1899 the -Kapnist plan had been shelved.<a name="FNanchor_2_68" id="FNanchor_2_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_68" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>In the meantime French bankers had become interested -in the possibilities of constructing a railway from the -Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, utilizing the existing -railways in Syria as the nucleus of an elaborate system. -Their spokesman was M. Cotard, an engineer on the staff -of the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. This project was possessed -of such strong financial and political support at -Constantinople that the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> considered it best -to negotiate for a merger with the French interests involved.<a name="FNanchor_3_69" id="FNanchor_3_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_69" class="fnanchor">3</a> -Accordingly conversations were held at Berlin -early in 1899 between the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the Anatolian -Railway Company, on the one hand, and the Imperial -Ottoman Bank and the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, -representing French interests, on the other. The result -was an important agreement of May 6, 1899, the chief -provisions of which were as follows:<a name="FNanchor_4_70" id="FNanchor_4_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_70" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot"> - -<p>1. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i> admitted the Imperial Ottoman -Bank to participation in the proposed Bagdad Railway Company. -German and French bankers were to be equally represented -in ownership and control, each to be assigned 40% -of the capital stock, the remaining 20% to be offered to -Turkish investors. If British, or other capital were subsequently -interested in the Company, the share of the new -participants was to be taken from the German and French -ho<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span>ldings in equal proportions.</p> - -<p>2. A <i>modus vivendi</i> was arrived at between the Anatolian -and Smyrna-Cassaba Railways. The prevailing rate-war was -to be stopped; a joint commission was to be appointed to -agree upon a uniform tariff for the two companies; a junction -of the two lines was to be effected and maintained at -Afiun Karahissar for reciprocal through traffic.</p> - -<p>3. In order to assure the faithful execution of the agreement -between the Anatolian and Cassaba railways, each of -the companies was to designate two of its directors to sit -on the board of the other.<a name="FNanchor_5_71" id="FNanchor_5_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_71" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>4. French proposals for the construction of a Euphrates -Valley railway were to be withdrawn.</p> - -<p>5. The French and German bankers were to use their -best offices with their respective governments to secure united -diplomatic support for the claims of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> to -prior consideration in the award of the Bagdad Railway -concession.</p></div> - -<p>This agreement temporarily removed all French opposition -to the Bagdad Railway. M. Constans, the French -ambassador at Constantinople, joined Baron Marschall -von Bieberstein in cordial support of the new “Franco-German -syndicate.”<a name="FNanchor_6_72" id="FNanchor_6_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_72" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>Competition had arisen, however, from a third source. -During the summer of 1899 British bankers, represented -in Constantinople by Mr. E. Rechnitzer, petitioned for -the right to construct a railway from Alexandretta to -Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. The terms offered by -the British financiers were considered more liberal than -any heretofore proposed,<a name="FNanchor_7_73" id="FNanchor_7_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_73" class="fnanchor">7</a> and they were endorsed by the -Ministry of Public Works. Mr. Rechnitzer enlisted the -aid of Mahmoud Pasha, a brother-in-law of the Sultan. -He secured the assistance of Sir Nicholas O’Connor, the -British ambassador. He attended to the niceties of Orien<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span>tal -business by sending the Sultan and his aids costly -presents.<a name="FNanchor_8_74" id="FNanchor_8_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_74" class="fnanchor">8</a> He engineered an effective press campaign in -Great Britain to arouse interest in his project. Just how -much success Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan might have achieved -on its own merits is an open question. It definitely collapsed, -however, in October, 1899, when the outbreak of -the Boer War diverted British attention and energies from -the Near East to South Africa.<a name="FNanchor_9_75" id="FNanchor_9_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_75" class="fnanchor">9</a> It was under these circumstances -that the Sultan, on November 27, 1899, -announced his decision to award to the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> the -concession for a railway from Konia to Bagdad and the -Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_10_76" id="FNanchor_10_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_76" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>The success of the Germans was not unexpected. They -had a strong claim to the concession, for, in 1888 and -again in 1893, the Sultan had assured the Anatolian Railway -Company that it should have priority in the construction -of any railway to Bagdad. On the strength of that -assurance, the Anatolian Company had conducted expensive -surveys of the proposed line.<a name="FNanchor_11_77" id="FNanchor_11_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_77" class="fnanchor">11</a> After a short period -of sharp competition for the concession in 1899, the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> group was left in sole possession of the -field—the Russian promoters had withdrawn because of -lack of support at home; the French financiers had accepted -a share in the German company in preference to -sole responsibility for the enterprise; the British proposals -had lost support when the Boer difficulty temporarily obscured -all other issues. The diplomatic situation, furthermore, -was distinctly favorable to the German claims. The -Fashoda Affair and the serious Anglo-Russian rivalry in -the Middle East had served to put Russia, France, and -Great Britain at sixes and sevens, leaving Germans practically -a free hand in the development of their interests -in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Aside from these purely temporary advantages, however, -there were excellent reasons, from the Ottoman point of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">62</a></span> -view, for awarding the Bagdad Railway concessions to the -German Anatolian Railway Company. The usual explanations—that -the soft, sweet-sounding flattery of William II -overcame the shrewdness of Abdul Hamid; that Baron -Marschall von Bieberstein dominated the entire diplomatic -situation at the Porte; that the German military mission -exerted a powerful influence in the final result—are more -obvious than convincing. These were all contributing factors -in the success of the Germans, but they were not -determining factors. The reasons for the award of the -concession to the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> were partly economic, -partly strategic, partly political.</p> - -<p>The Germans alone submitted proposals which met the -demands of the Public Debt Administration and the Ottoman -Government. They proposed to extend the existing -Anatolian Railway from Konia, across the mountains into -Cilicia and Syria, down the valley of the Tigris to Bagdad -and Basra and the Persian Gulf. The railway which -they had in mind would reach from one end of Asiatic -Turkey to the other; in connection with the railways of -southern Anatolia and of Syria, it would provide continuous -railway communication between Constantinople -and Smyrna in the north and west, with Aleppo, Damascus, -Beirut, Mecca, and Mosul in the south and east. There -were serious technical and financial difficulties in the -construction of such a railway, it is true, but there were -political and economic considerations which warranted -the expenditure of whatever effort and funds might be -necessary to carry the line to completion.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the groups other than the Germans -proposed the construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway -which did not come up to specifications. They submitted -plans calling for the building of a line from some -Mediterranean port—such as Alexandretta or Tripoli-in-Syria—down -the Euphrates valley to the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_12_78" id="FNanchor_12_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_78" class="fnanchor">12</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">63</a></span> -Such a line would have had obvious advantages, from -the point of view of the concessionaires, over the projected -German railway. The cost of construction would -have been materially less, for it would have been unnecessary -to build the costly sections across the Taurus and -Amanus mountains. The prospects of immediate earning -power were better, for the railway would have been able -to take over some of the caravan trade from Arabia to -the Syrian coast and from Mesopotamia to Aleppo. From -the Ottoman point of view, however, the proposal was -altogether unsatisfactory. The railway would have developed -the southern provinces of the empire without -connecting them with Anatolia, the homeland of the Turks -themselves and the heart of the Sultan’s dominions. It -might have promoted a separatist movement among the -Arabs. Its termini on the Mediterranean and the Persian -Gulf could have been controlled by the guns of a foreign -fleet. From every standpoint—economic, political, strategic—the -acceptance of such a proposal was out of the -question.</p> - -<p>Even had all other things been equal, it is probable -that the German bankers would have been given preference -in the award of the concession. The Turkish Government -was determined that the Anatolian lines should be -made the nucleus of the proposed railway system for the -empire. That being the case, no purpose, other than the -promotion of confusion, would have been served by -awarding the Bagdad plum to interests other than those -which controlled the Anatolian Railway Company. This -reasoning was fortified by the fact that the Company had -made an enviable record in its dealings with the Ottoman -Ministry of Public Works. The existing lines were well -constructed and were being operated in a manner entirely -satisfactory to the Ottoman Government and to the peasantry -and business men of Anatolia. And M. Huguenin,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">64</a></span> -Assistant General Manager of the Anatolian system, announced -that his Company would observe a similar policy -in the construction and operation of the proposed Bagdad -Railway. “We are determined,” he said, “to build a model -line such as exists nowhere in Turkey, able in all respects -to undertake efficiently an international service involving -high speeds over the whole line.”<a name="FNanchor_13_79" id="FNanchor_13_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_79" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>From the political point of view, too, there were reasons -for giving preference to German capitalists. Abdul Hamid -was seeking moral and material assistance for the promotion -of his favorite doctrine of Pan-Islamism. He -sought to foster this movement, which looked toward the -unification of Islamic communities for resistance to Christian -European domination over the Moslem world. As -Caliph of the Mohammedan world, Abdul Hamid placed -himself at the head of those defenders of the faith who -had been propagating the idea that Mussulmans everywhere -must resist further Christian encroachment and -aggression, be it political, economic, religious, cultural. -That the Sultan’s primary motives were religious is doubtful. -Apparently he believed that the Pan-Islamic movement -could be utilized to the greater glory of his dynasty -and his empire. As the tsars of Russia had utilized their -position as head of the Orthodox Church for the purpose -of strengthening the power of the autocracy, so Abdul -Hamid proposed to exploit his position as Caliph for purposes -of personal and dynastic aggrandizement.<a name="FNanchor_14_80" id="FNanchor_14_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_80" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>In awarding the Bagdad Railway concession, which -was of such considerable economic and political importance, -it was essential to choose the nationals of a power -which would be sympathetic toward Pan-Islamism. Would -it be Russia, whose tsars had set fires in Afghanistan, -sought to destroy the independence of Persia, and threatened -all of the Middle East? Would it be Great Britain, -whose professional imperialists were holding in subjection<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span> -more than sixty million Mohammedans in India alone? -Would it be France, whose soldiers controlled the destinies -of millions of Mussulmans in Algeria and Tunis? These -nations could have no feeling for Pan-Islamism other than -fear and hatred,<a name="FNanchor_15_81" id="FNanchor_15_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_81" class="fnanchor">15</a> for it threatened their dominion over -their Moslem colonies. Germany, however, had everything -to gain and nothing to lose in lending support to Abdul -Hamid’s Pan-Islamic program. She had practically no -Mohammedan subjects and therefore had no reason to -fear Moslem discontent. She had imperial interests which -might be served by the revolt of Islam against Christian -domination.<a name="FNanchor_16_82" id="FNanchor_16_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_82" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>Turkish patriots, as well as Moslem fanatics, would -have preferred to see Germans favored in the award of -economic concessions in the Ottoman Empire. The Germans -came to Turkey with clean hands. Their Government -had never despoiled the Ottoman Empire of territory -and appeared to have no interests which could not be as -well served by the strengthening of Turkey as by its destruction. -On the other hand, Russia, traditional enemy of -the Turks, sought, as the keystone of her foreign policy, -to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. France, by -virtue of her protectorate over Catholics in the lands of -the Sultan, sought to maintain special privileges for herself -in Syria and the Holy Land. Great Britain held Egypt, -a nominal Turkish dependency, and was fomenting trouble -for the Sultan in the region of the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_17_83" id="FNanchor_17_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_83" class="fnanchor">17</a> Germany, -it appeared, was the only sincere and disinterested -friend of the Ottoman Empire!</p> - -<p>The rising prestige of Germany in the Near East and -the rapid expansion of German economic interests in -Turkey, however, did not, during these crucial years of -1898–1900, arouse the fear or the cupidity of other European -powers. Russia, it is true, objected for strategic -reasons to the construction of the proposed Bagda<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span>d Railway -<i>via</i> the so-called “northern” or trans-Armenian route -from Angora. But when the Tsar was assured by the -Black Sea Basin Agreement that a southern route from -Konia would be substituted, M. Zinoviev, the Russian minister -at Constantinople, withdrew his formal diplomatic -protest.<a name="FNanchor_18_84" id="FNanchor_18_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_84" class="fnanchor">18</a> The French Government adopted a policy of -benevolent neutrality toward the claims of the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> for the concession, on the ground that the Imperial -Ottoman Bank, representing powerful financial interests -in Paris, was to be given a substantial participation in the -proposed Bagdad Railway Company. The pact of May 6, -1899, between the German and French promoters satisfied -even M. Delcassé!<a name="FNanchor_19_85" id="FNanchor_19_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_85" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>In Great Britain, likewise, there was the friendliest feeling -toward the German proposals. When the Kaiser made -his second visit to the Near East in 1898 the London -<i>Times</i> said: “In this country we can have nothing but -good wishes for the success of the Emperor’s journey and -for any plans of German commercial expansion which may -be connected with it. Some of us may perhaps be tempted -to regret lost opportunities for our own influence and our -own trade in the Ottoman dominions. But we can honestly -say that if we were not to have these good things for -ourselves, there are no hands we would rather see them -in than in German hands.”<a name="FNanchor_20_86" id="FNanchor_20_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_86" class="fnanchor">20</a> <i>The Morning Post</i> of -August 24, 1899, expressed the hope that no rivalry over -the Bagdad Railway would prejudice the good relations -between Great Britain and Germany. “So long as there -is an efficient railway from Haidar Pasha to Bagdad, and -so long as the door there is open, it should not really -matter who makes the tunnels or pays the porters. If it -should be necessary to insist on an open door, the Foreign -Office will probably see to it; while if it should happen to -be, as usual, asleep, there are always means of poking it up. -As a matter of general politics it may not be at all a bad -thing to give Germany a strong reason for defending th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span>e -integrity of Turkey and for resisting aggression on Asia -Minor from the North.”</p> - -<p>Sympathetic consideration of German expansion in the -Near East was not confined to the press. Cecil Rhodes, -great apostle of British imperialism, visited Germany in -the spring of 1899 and came away from Berlin favorably -disposed toward the Bagdad Railway and none the less -pleased with the Kaiser’s apparent enthusiasm for the -Cape-to-Cairo plan. In November of the same year -William II paid a royal visit to England. It was then that -Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for the Colonies, learned -the details of German plans in the Ottoman Empire, but, so -far from being alarmed, he publicly announced his belief in -the desirability of an Anglo-German entente. The almost -simultaneous announcement of the award of the preliminary -Bagdad Railway concession met with a favorable -reception from the British press.<a name="FNanchor_21_87" id="FNanchor_21_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_87" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<p>At the same time, however, less cordial sentiments -were expressed toward Russia and France. There was -general agreement among the London newspapers regarding -at least one desirable feature of the Bagdad -Railway enterprise: the discomfiture it would be certain to -cause the Tsar in his imperial ambitions in the Near East. -<i>The Globe</i> characterized as “impudence” the desire of -Russia to regard Asiatic Turkey as “a second Manchuria.”<a name="FNanchor_22_88" id="FNanchor_22_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_88" class="fnanchor">22</a> -No love was being lost, either, on France. -<i>The Daily Mail</i> of November 9, 1899, said: “The French -have succeeded in wholly convincing John Bull that they -are his inveterate enemies. England has long hesitated -between France and Germany. But she has always respected -German character, while she has gradually come -to feel scorn for France. Nothing in the nature of an -<i>entente cordiale</i> can exist between England and her nearest -neighbor. France has neither courage nor political -sense.”</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Bagdad Railway Concession Is Granted</span></h3> - -<p>It was almost three years after the Sultan’s preliminary -announcement of the Bagdad concession that the imperial -decree was issued. During the interval the German technical -commission was completing its survey of the line; -details of the concession were being arranged between -Zihni Pasha, Minister of Public Works, and Dr. Kurt -Zander, General Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company; -Dr. von Siemens was working out plans for the -financing of the enterprise. Finally, on March 18, 1902, -an imperial <i>iradé</i> of Abdul Hamid II definitely awarded -the Bagdad Railway concession to the Anatolian Railway -Company.<a name="FNanchor_23_89" id="FNanchor_23_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_89" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>The Constantinople despatches announcing the Sultan’s -award met with a varied reception. In Germany, of course, -there was general satisfaction and, in some quarters, jubilation. -The Kaiser telegraphed his personal thanks to the -Sultan. In Vienna, the semi-official <i>Fremdenblatt</i> expressed -the opinion that “the construction of the railway -would be an event of the greatest economic and political -importance and would materially strengthen Turkey’s -power of resistance.”<a name="FNanchor_24_90" id="FNanchor_24_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_90" class="fnanchor">24</a> M. Delcassé, French Minister of -Foreign Affairs, interpolated in the Chamber, informed -the Deputies that, whether one liked it or not, the convention -was a <i>fait accompli</i> which France must accept, -particularly because French capitalists were associated -with the German concessionaires in the enterprise.<a name="FNanchor_25_91" id="FNanchor_25_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_91" class="fnanchor">25</a> The -Russian Government was silent at the time, although two -months before M. Witte had informed the press that he -saw no reason for granting financial assistance or diplomatic -acquiescence to a possible competitor of Russian -trans-Asiatic railways.<a name="FNanchor_26_92" id="FNanchor_26_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_92" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>In England there was very little opposition, but much<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span> -friendly comment, on the German plans. Earl Percy expressed -the hope that Great Britain would do nothing to -interfere with the construction of the Bagdad Railway. -“Germany,” he told the House of Commons, “is doing -for Turkey what we have been doing for Persia, for the -social improvement and material welfare of native races; -and in the struggle between the Slavonic policy of compelling -stagnation and the Teutonic policy of spreading -the blessings and enlightenment of civilization, the victory -will lie with those nations which are striving, selfishly or -unselfishly, consciously or unconsciously, to fulfil the high -aims which Providence has entrusted to the imperial races -of Christendom.” Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary for -Foreign Affairs, announced that, although the Government -had every intention of maintaining the <i>status quo</i> -in the Persian Gulf, it would not otherwise interfere in -the project for a German-owned trans-Mesopotamian railway. -Lord Lansdowne, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, -informed the French and German ambassadors at London -that His Britannic Majesty’s Government would not -oppose the Bagdad enterprise, particularly if British capital -were invited to participate in its consummation.<a name="FNanchor_27_93" id="FNanchor_27_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_93" class="fnanchor">27</a> This -was taken as a definite promise, for English financiers -already had been asked to take a share in the Bagdad Railway -Company by purchase, <i>pro rata</i>, of portions of the -holdings of the German and French interests.<a name="FNanchor_28_94" id="FNanchor_28_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_94" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>Although there was a noticeable lack of unanimity in -European diplomatic circles, little or no reason existed -in 1902 to believe that any determined resistance would -be made to the consummation of the plans for the construction -of the Bagdad Railway. The chief difficulties of -the concessionaires seemed to be not political, but financial -and administrative. The year 1902 was one of economic -depression; in Germany, in particular, industrial and financial -conditions were distinctly unfavorable for the flotation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span> -of a large bond issue such as would be required to -raise funds for the construction of the Bagdad Railway. -Certain of the minor provisions of the convention of -1902, furthermore, were unsatisfactory to the financiers -of the project. The concession for the lines beyond Konia -had been granted to the Anatolian Railway Company -without privilege of assignment to any other corporation. -This meant that any participation of outside capital in the -new Bagdad Railway would, of necessity, involve participation -in the profits of the Anatolian lines already in -operation—a prospect by no means pleasing to the original -promoters. Furthermore, there was some question -as to the advisability of placing under a single administrative -head all of the line and branches from Constantinople -to the Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_29_95" id="FNanchor_29_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_95" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>It was because of these difficulties, financial and -administrative, that the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> marked time until -March 5, 1903, when a revised Bagdad Railway convention -was executed and plans were perfected for the financing -of the first section of the line. It is to this Great -Charter of the Berlin-to-Bagdad plan that we now must -turn our attention.<a name="FNanchor_30_96" id="FNanchor_30_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_96" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> - -<p>The definitive convention of 1903 provided that the existing -Anatolian lines were to continue in the possession of -their owners; the construction and operation of the new -railway beyond Konia was to be vested—without right -of cession, transfer, or assignment—in a new corporation, -the Bagdad Railway Company. This new company -was incorporated under Turkish law on March 5, 1903, -with a capital stock of fifteen million francs, of which -the Anatolian Railway Company subscribed ten per cent. -Continued Turco-German control of the railway enterprise -was assured by a provision of the charter that of the -eleven members of the Board of Directors, three should -be appointed by the directors of the Anatolian Railway -Company, and at least three others should be Ottoman<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span> -subjects.<a name="FNanchor_31_97" id="FNanchor_31_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_97" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>It was apparent that the Ottoman Government expected -big things of the German concessionaires and their French -associates. The new convention provided, first, for the -construction of a great trunk line from Konia, southeastern -terminus of the existing Anatolian Railways, to the -Persian Gulf. This was to be the Bagdad Railway proper, -but the concession carried with it, also, the privilege of -constructing important branches in Syria and Mesopotamia. -With all its proposed tributary lines completed, -the Railway would stretch from the Bosporus to the Persian -Gulf and from the Mediterranean to the frontiers -of Persia. Second, it was stipulated that the Anatolian -Railway Company should effect any necessary improvements -on its lines to make possible the early initiation of -a weekly express service between Constantinople and -Aleppo and the operation of fortnightly express trains -to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf as soon as the lines should -be completed. The Anatolian concessions were extended -for a period of ninety-nine years from 1903 to make them -coincident with the new concession. The concessionaires -were obliged to make all improvements and to complete -all new construction by 1911, it being understood, however, -that this time limit might be extended in the event -of delays by the Government in the execution of the -financial arrangements or in the event of <i>force majeure</i>—the -latter specifically including, not only a European war, -but any radical change in the financial situation in Germany, -England, or France.<a name="FNanchor_32_98" id="FNanchor_32_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_98" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Locomotive Is to Supplant the Camel</span></h3> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway was to revive the “central route” -of medieval tra<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span>de—to traverse one of the world’s historic -highways. It was to bring back to Anatolia, Syria, and -Mesopotamia some of the prosperity and prestige which -they had enjoyed before the explorations of the Portuguese -and Spaniards had opened the new sea routes to -the Indies.<a name="FNanchor_33_99" id="FNanchor_33_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_99" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<p>The starting point of the new railway was to be Konia. -This town of 44,000 inhabitants, situated high in the -Anatolian plateau, was a landmark in the Near East. -It was once the capital of the Seljuk Turks and during -its heyday had been a crossroads of the caravan routes -of Asia Minor. Along one of these old routes to the -northwest ran the Anatolian Railway, with which the -Bagdad line was to be linked. From Konia the new -railway was to cross the Anatolian table-lands, at an -average altitude of 3500 feet, passing through the towns -of Karaman and Eregli. Just beyond the latter town are -the foothills of the Taurus, the first of the mountain -barriers between Asia Minor and the Mesopotamian -valley. In crossing the Taurus range the railway was to -pass through the famous Cilician Gates, down the eastern -slope into the fertile Cilician plain. At Adana, center of -the trade of this region, a junction was to be effected with -the existing railway to Mersina, a small port on the -Mediterranean.<a name="FNanchor_34_100" id="FNanchor_34_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_100" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>Formidable engineering difficulties faced the succeeding -stretch of the railway. Beyond Adana stood the -second mountain barrier of the Amanus range, through -which there was no natural pass, and it was apparent that -costly blasting and tunneling would be required before the -hills could be pierced.<a name="FNanchor_35_101" id="FNanchor_35_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_101" class="fnanchor">35</a> Once beyond the mountains the -railway could be carried quickly to Aleppo, a city of -128,000, “the emporium of northern Syria,” and a meeting -place for the Mesopotamian, Syrian, and Anatolian -trade-routes. At this point connections were to be established -with the important railways of Syria, providing<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span> -direct communication with Hama, Homs, Tripoli-in-Syria, -Beirut, Damascus, Jaffa, and Jerusalem. In fact, enthusiastic -Syrians have prophesied that when all projected transcontinental -railways are completed in Europe, Asia, and -Africa, Aleppo will become “the crossroads of the -world”—a junction point for rail communication between -Berlin and Bagdad, Calais and Calcutta, Bordeaux and -Bombay, Moscow and Mecca, Constantinople and Cairo -and Cape Town.<a name="FNanchor_36_102" id="FNanchor_36_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_102" class="fnanchor">36</a> Seventy miles away from Aleppo, -along one of the few good wagon roads in Turkey, lay the -important Mediterranean port of Alexandretta. Leaving -Aleppo, the Bagdad Railway was to turn east, crossing a -desert country, to Nisibin and to Mosul, on the Tigris. -From this sector of the railway it was proposed to construct -several short spurs into the Armenian foothills, as -well as a longer branch from Nisibin to Diarbekr and -Kharput.</p> - -<p>The city of Mosul is the northern gateway to the Mesopotamian -valley, the “Land of the Two Rivers.” In medieval -times it was a center of caravan routes between -Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia, and once was -famed for its textile manufactures, which produced a -cloth named after the city, “muslin.” It is located on the -site of a suburb of the ancient city of Nineveh and guards -a high pass leading through the mountains into Armenia. -In 1903 it had a population of 61,000 and bade fair, after -the completion of the Bagdad Railway, to regain some -of its lost lustre. South and southeast of Mosul flows -the Tigris River all the way to the Persian Gulf. Along -the valley of this river was to run the new railway, through -the towns of Tekrit, Samarra, and Sadijeh, to Bagdad.<a name="FNanchor_37_103" id="FNanchor_37_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_103" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p>In 1903 the splendor of the ancient city of Bagdad was -very much dimmed. Although it still was the center of -an important caravan trade with Persia, Arabia, and Syria, -its prosperity was but a name compared with the riches<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span> -which the city had enjoyed before the commercial revolution -of the sixteenth century. The population of 145,000—in -part nomad—was to a large extent dependent upon the -important export trade in dates and cereals, amounting, in -1902, to almost £1,000,000. All told, the trade of Bagdad -was valued at about £2,500,000 annually. Whether the -shadow of the former great Bagdad could be transformed -into a living thing was an open question.<a name="FNanchor_38_104" id="FNanchor_38_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_104" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<p>Five hundred miles south of Bagdad is the Persian -Gulf,<a name="FNanchor_39_105" id="FNanchor_39_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_105" class="fnanchor">39</a> the proposed terminus of the Bagdad Railway. -About sixty miles north of the Gulf, located on the Shatt-el-Arab—the -confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates -Rivers—is the port of Basra, the outlet for the trade of -Bagdad. Communication between these two Mesopotamian -cities was carried on, in 1903, by means of a weekly -steamer service operated by the English firm of Lynch -Brothers, under the name “The Euphrates and Tigris -Steam Navigation Company, Ltd.” The Lynch Brothers—typical -British imperial pathfinders—had established themselves -at Basra during the decade 1840–1850 and had succeeded -during the following half-century in securing a -practical monopoly of the river trade from Bagdad to -the Persian Gulf. The absence of effective competition -and the hesitancy of the Turkish Government to grant -permission for the operation of additional steamers were -responsible for a totally inadequate service. It was not -uncommon for freight to stand on the wharves at Bagdad -and Basra for three months or more awaiting transportation. -Under these circumstances it was to be expected -that freight charges would be exorbitant; it cost more to -transfer cargoes from Bagdad to Basra than from Basra -to London. The advent of the Bagdad Railway promised -great things for the trade of lower Mesopotamia and -Persia.<a name="FNanchor_40_106" id="FNanchor_40_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_106" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<p>It was the aim of the Turkish Government and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span> -concessionaires not only to compete with the river trade -of the Tigris, but to develop the Euphrates valley as well, -there being no steamer service on the latter river. With -this in mind, it was decided to divert the railway beyond -Bagdad from the Tigris to the Euphrates and down the -valley to Basra. For a time Basra was to mark the terminus -of the railway; the concession made provision, however, -for the eventual construction of a branch “from -Zubeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon -between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the concessionaires.”<a name="FNanchor_41_107" id="FNanchor_41_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_107" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - -<p>Of considerable importance was a proposed branch line -from Sadijeh, on the Tigris, to Khanikin, on the Persian -frontier. This railway, it was believed, would take the -place of the existing caravan route from Bagdad to Khanikin -and thence to Teheran. The annual value of British -trade alone transported <i>via</i> this route was estimated at -about three quarters of a million pounds sterling.<a name="FNanchor_42_108" id="FNanchor_42_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_108" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway, as thus projected, was one of the -really great enterprises of an era of dazzling railway construction. -Here was a transcontinental line stretching -some twenty-five hundred miles from Constantinople, on -the Bosporus, to Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab—a project -greater in magnitude than the Santa Fé line from Chicago -to Los Angeles or the Union Pacific Railway from Omaha -to San Francisco.<a name="FNanchor_43_109" id="FNanchor_43_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_109" class="fnanchor">43</a> It was a promise of the rejuvenation -of three of the most important parts of the Ottoman Empire—eastern -Anatolia, northern Syria, and Mesopotamia. -It was to open to twentieth-century steel trains a fifteenth-century -caravan route. It was to replace the camel with -the locomotive.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Sultan Loosens the Purse-Strings</span></h3> - -<p>There are special and peculiar problems connected wi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span>th -the construction of railways in the economically backward -areas of the world. In well populated regions, such as -western Europe, railways have been built to accommodate -existing traffic; in sparsely populated regions, such as eastern -Russia and western United States, they have been constructed -chiefly to create new traffic. In the economically -advanced countries of the world the railway has been the -result of civilization; in the backward countries it has -been the outpost of civilization. A new railway in an undeveloped -region is obliged at the outset to concern itself -mainly with the upbuilding of the territory through which -it runs, in order to assure abundant traffic for the future; -during this period its receipts are rarely, if ever, adequate -to meet the costs of operation. Private capital cannot be -expected to assume alone the risk and burden thus involved, -but the public service which the railway renders -during this critical time justifies the government in subsidizing -the enterprise until it can become self-supporting. -The granting of state subventions has been a common -practice of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China -time and time again has pledged national revenues in -support of railway construction; the Latin-American countries -have been conspicuous exemplars of the same practice; -more than half of the railways of Russia were -constructed with government funds.<a name="FNanchor_44_110" id="FNanchor_44_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_110" class="fnanchor">44</a></p> - -<p>There was every reason to believe that the Bagdad Railway -would be built with some system of state guarantees. -Almost every railway in Asiatic Turkey at one time or -another had been the recipient of a government subvention, -and the proposed trans-Mesopotamian railway faced many -more obstacles than had faced any then in operation. The -provinces through which the Bagdad Railway was to pass -were sparsely settled and were too backward, economically, -to warrant the construction of a railway for the accommodation -of existing traffic;<a name="FNanchor_45_111" id="FNanchor_45_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_111" class="fnanchor">45</a> the German technical commis<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">77</a></span>sion -of 1899 had pointed out that the estimated gross -operating revenue for some years would be entirely inadequate -to pay the expenses of running trains even if there -should be an unlooked for volume of passenger and mail -service to India. In time, it was believed, improved -transportation and greater political security would induce -immigration and produce widespread economic prosperity -in the provinces of Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia, thus -assuring financial independence to the railway.<a name="FNanchor_46_112" id="FNanchor_46_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_112" class="fnanchor">46</a> During -the interim, however, a state guarantee appeared to be -necessary.</p> - -<p>Under the terms of the convention of 1903, the Turkish -Government undertook partially to finance the construction -of the Bagdad Railway. For each kilometre of the line -built the Government agreed to issue to the Company -the sum of 275,000 francs, nominal value, in Imperial -Ottoman bonds, to be secured by a first mortgage on the -railway and its properties.<a name="FNanchor_47_113" id="FNanchor_47_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_113" class="fnanchor">47</a> The payment of interest -and sinking fund on these bonds was to be guaranteed -by the assignment to the Public Debt Administration for -this purpose of the revenues of certain of the districts -through which the railway was to pass. For the purpose -of financing the first section of two hundred kilometres -beyond Konia, there was delivered to the Company on -March 5, 1903, an issue of fifty-four million francs of -“Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Four Per Cent Bonds, -First Series.”<a name="FNanchor_48_114" id="FNanchor_48_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_114" class="fnanchor">48</a> Similar payment for the construction -of subsequent sections was to be made the subject of -further agreement between the Government and the concessionaires.</p> - -<p>In addition to supplying in this manner the actual -funds for the building of the railway, the Ottoman Government -guaranteed gross operating receipts of forty-five -hundred francs annually for each kilometre of the -line open to traffic. If the receipts failed to reac<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">78</a></span>h that -sum, the Government was to reimburse the Company for -the deficiency. If the receipts amounted to more than -forty-five hundred francs per kilometre in any given -year, the excess over that amount to ten thousand francs -was to belong to the Government; any excess over and -above ten thousand francs was to be divided sixty per cent -to the Government, forty per cent to the Railway. The Government -also agreed to reimburse the Company, in thirty -annual payments of three hundred fifty thousand francs, -for such improvements as might be necessary to prepare -the Anatolian Railways for the initiation of a through -express service to the Persian Gulf and, furthermore, to -subsidize that express service at the rate of three hundred -fifty thousand francs annually from the date of the completion -of the main line to Aleppo.<a name="FNanchor_49_115" id="FNanchor_49_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_115" class="fnanchor">49</a></p> - -<p>Closely connected with these financial guarantees were -grants of public lands. Lands owned by the Government -and needed for right-of-way were transferred to the concessionaires -free of any charge. Additional land required -for construction purposes might be occupied without rental -as well as worked by the Company for sand and gravel. -Wood and timber necessary for the construction and -operation of the railway might be cut from State-owned -forests without compensation. The concessionaires were -permitted to operate mines within a zone twenty kilometres -each side of the line, subject to such regulations as might -be laid down by the Ministry of Public Works. As a -public utility, the railway was granted the right of expropriation -of such privately owned land as might be -essential for the right-of-way, as well as quarries, gravel-pits, -or other properties necessary for purposes of construction. -The Company was authorized, also, to conduct -researches for objects of art and antiquity along the route -of the railway!<a name="FNanchor_50_116" id="FNanchor_50_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_116" class="fnanchor">50</a></p> - -<p>In the foregoing respects the Bagdad Railway Conve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span>ntion -was by no means revolutionary in character. In issuing -its bonds for the purpose of financing railway construction, -in pledging public revenues as a guarantee of -traffic receipts, in granting public lands for right-of-way, -the Imperial Ottoman Government was following wellestablished -precedents of the nineteenth century. The -United States, for example, had adopted similar measures -to encourage the building of transcontinental railways. -To cite a single instance, Congress granted the promoters -of the Union Pacific system a right-of-way through the -public domain, twenty sections of land on each side of each -mile of the railway, and a loan of bonds of the United -States to an amount of fifty million dollars. Between -1850 and 1873 alone the Government transferred to the -railways some thirty-five million acres of public lands, -an area in excess of that of the State of New York.<a name="FNanchor_51_117" id="FNanchor_51_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_117" class="fnanchor">51</a></p> - -<p>In certain other respects, however, the Bagdad Railway -Convention was radical and far-reaching in its innovations. -Worthy of first mention among its unusual provisions is -the sweeping tax exemption granted the concessionaires -by <i>Article 8</i>: “Manufactured material for the permanent -way and materials, iron, wood, coal, engines, cars and -coaches, and other stores necessary for the initial establishment -as well as the enlargement and development of the -railway and everything pertaining thereto which the concessionaires -shall purchase in the empire or import from -abroad shall be exempt from all domestic taxes and customs -duties. The exemption from customs duties shall -also be granted the coal necessary for the operation of -the road, imported abroad by the concessionaires, until -the gross receipts of the line and its branches reach 15,500 -francs per kilometre. Likewise, during the entire period -of the concession the land, capital, and revenue of the -railway and everything appertaining thereto shall not be -taxed; neither shall any stamp duty be charged on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span> -present Convention or on the Specifications annexed -thereto, the additional conventions, or any subsequent instruments; -nor on the issue of Government bonds; nor -on the amounts collected by the concessionaires on account -of the guarantee for working expenses; nor shall any duty -be levied on their stock, preferred stock and bonds, or on -the bonds which the Imperial Ottoman Government shall -issue to the concessionaires.” Thus the Bagdad Railway -not only was assured of a subsidy constituting a preferred -claim on certain taxes collected from the Turkish peasantry, -but, in addition, was exempted from the payment -of important contributions to the national revenue. The -extent to which such an arrangement would confound confusion -will be clear if one will recall that many other restrictions -on the collection and disbursement of public -funds were vested in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.<a name="FNanchor_52_118" id="FNanchor_52_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_118" class="fnanchor">52</a></p> - -<p>Incidental to the railway, the Bagdad Company was -granted other valuable concessions. The corporation was -given permission to establish and operate tile and brick -works along the line of the railway. For the direct and -indirect use of the railway and its subsidiary enterprises -the Company was authorized to establish hydro-electric -stations for the generation of light and power. The -erection of necessary warehouses and depots was permitted -as essential to the proper operation of the railway. -The Anatolian Railway was empowered to provide for -satisfactory ferry service between Constantinople and -Haidar Pasha, in order to insure direct sleeping-car service -from Europe to Asia and to provide other facilities for -through traffic. All of these subsidiary projects were to -enjoy the same exemption from taxation as the railway -itself.<a name="FNanchor_53_119" id="FNanchor_53_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_119" class="fnanchor">53</a></p> - -<p>The concessionaires were granted the right of constructing -at Bagdad, Basra, and at the terminus on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span> -Persian Gulf modern port facilities, including “all necessary -arrangements for bringing ships alongside the quay -and for the loading, unloading, and warehousing of goods.” -During the period of the construction of the railway the -Company was granted rights of navigation on the Tigris, -the Euphrates, and the Shatt-el-Arab for the transportation -of materials and supplies necessary to the building -and operation of the main line and its branches.<a name="FNanchor_54_120" id="FNanchor_54_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_120" class="fnanchor">54</a> These -river and harbor concessions aroused the fear and the -rage of the Lynch Brothers, who, as we shall see, were to -be among the leaders of British opposition to the Bagdad -Railway.<a name="FNanchor_55_121" id="FNanchor_55_121"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_121" class="fnanchor">55</a></p> - -<p>These, then, were the outstanding economic provisions -of the Bagdad Railway Convention of 1903. The Imperial -Ottoman Government assumed the cost of the construction -of the railway and, in addition, guaranteed a -certain minimum annual return on each kilometre in operation. -It pledged for these purposes the taxes of the -districts through which the railway was to pass, and it deputed -the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to collect -these revenues and supervise payments to the concessionaires. -As additional compensation to the Company -it made large grants of public lands and conceded valuable -privileges indirectly connected with the construction of -the railway. In this manner the Sultan mortgaged his -empire. But mortgages have their purposes, and Abdul -Hamid hoped for big things from the Bagdad Railway.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Some Turkish Rights Are Safeguarded</span></h3> - -<p>As mortgagor the Sultan was certain to insist upon -the recognition and protection of certain rights. To assure -observance by the concessionaires of their obligations under -the convention, supervision over construction, operation, -and maintenance of the railway was vested in t<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span>he Ministry -of Public Works, represented by two Imperial Railway -Commissioners. As a guarantee of good faith the Company -was obliged to deposit with a Constantinople bank a -bond of £30,000, subject to release only upon the completion -of the entire line. The Ottoman Government was -determined, also, that the concession, far-reaching as were -its implications, should not lead to additional extra-territorial -rights, or “capitulations,” in favor of foreign -powers. The concessionaires were forbidden to contract -for the transportation of foreign mails, or to perform -other services for the foreign post offices in Turkey, -without the formal approval of the Ottoman Government. -It was specified, also, that, inasmuch as the Anatolian and -the Bagdad Railway Companies were Ottoman joint-stock -corporations, all disputes and differences between -the Government and the Companies, or between the Companies -and private persons, “arising as a result of the -execution or interpretation of the present Convention and -the Specifications attached thereto, shall be carried before -the competent Ottoman courts.” It was further provided -that the concessionaires “must correspond with the State -Departments in Turkish, which is the official language -of the Imperial Ottoman Government!”<a name="FNanchor_56_122" id="FNanchor_56_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_122" class="fnanchor">56</a></p> - -<p>The Government was sincere in its determination that -the railway should become a powerful instrument in the -economic development of the backward provinces of the -empire. A significant clause specified that the section -between Bagdad and Basra should not be placed in operation -before the section between Konia and Bagdad should -have been opened to traffic, although immediate operation -of trains on the former section would have enabled the -Company to compete with the valuable trade of the Lynch -Brothers on the Tigris. The traffic between Bagdad and -Basra would have been profitable and would thus have -decreased by a considerable figure the total subsidie<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span>s the -Treasury might be obliged to pay for railway operation. -It was of more immediate concern to the Turkish Government, -however, that southern Mesopotamia should be -connected by an economic and political link with the -rest of the Sultan’s dominions. Elaborate regulations -were laid down regarding a minimum train service which -the Company was required to supply, and it was specified -in this connection that Turkish mails, together with postal -employees and officials, should be transported without -charge and under such other conditions as the Government -might stipulate. To forestall discriminatory treatment -of passengers and shippers maximum rates were prescribed -for all classes of traffic, including express, insurance, and -similar supplementary services; it was decreed that “all -rates, whether they be general, special, proportional, or -differential, are applicable to all travelers and consignors -without distinction”; the concessionaires were “formally -prohibited from entering into any special contract with -the object of granting reductions of the charges specified -in its tariffs.”<a name="FNanchor_57_123" id="FNanchor_57_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_123" class="fnanchor">57</a> This last provision was of the utmost -importance, as it enabled Germans and Turks alike to -point to the railway as an outstanding example of the -economic “open door.”</p> - -<p>One of the chief interests of the Turkish Government -in the construction of the Bagdad Railway was the possibility -of its utilization for military purposes. In time of -peace for purposes of maneuvers or the suppression of -rebellion, in time of war for purposes of mobilization, the -Company was required, upon requisition of the military -authorities, to place at the disposal of the Government its -“entire rolling stock, or such as might be necessary, for -the transportation of officers and men of the army, navy, -police or gendarmerie, together with any or all equipment.” -The Government undertook to maintain order -along the line and to construct such fortifications <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span>as it -might consider necessary to defend the railway against -invading armies, and the Company was obliged to expend, -under the direction of the Minister of War, a total of -four million francs for the construction of military stations. -To give effect to all of these provisions, a special -military convention was to be drawn up and approved -by the Company and the Minister of War.<a name="FNanchor_58_124" id="FNanchor_58_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_124" class="fnanchor">58</a></p> - -<p>Upon the expiration of the concession all rights of the -concessionaires in the railway, port works, and other subsidiary -enterprises were to revert, free of all debt and -liability, to the Imperial Government. In the meantime, -a semblance of Turkish nationality was to be assured the -enterprise by the stipulation that the railway employees -and officials should wear the fez and such uniform as might -be approved by the Government. It was contemplated, -also, that within five years after the opening of each section -to traffic the whole of the operating staff, except the -higher officials, should be composed exclusively of Ottoman -subjects.<a name="FNanchor_59_125" id="FNanchor_59_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_125" class="fnanchor">59</a></p> - -<p>Appended to the Bagdad Railway Convention was a -secret agreement binding the Company not to encourage -or install foreign settlements or colonies in the vicinity of -the Anatolian or Bagdad Railways.<a name="FNanchor_60_126" id="FNanchor_60_126"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_126" class="fnanchor">60</a> Although the Sultan -had mortgaged his empire, at least he was determined to -retain possession!<a name="FNanchor_61_127" id="FNanchor_61_127"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_127" class="fnanchor">61</a></p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_67" id="Footnote_1_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_67"><span class="label">1</span></a> On this point <i>cf.</i> M. Solovieff, <i>La Terre Sainte et la société -impériale de Palestine</i> (Petrograd, 1892). The society there referred -to was said to be liberally patronized by the Tsar and -other members of the imperial family.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_68" id="Footnote_2_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_68"><span class="label">2</span></a> For details of the Kapnist plan see <i>The Times</i> (London), -December 17, 1898; <i>The Euphrates Valley Railway</i>—a prospectus -(London, 1899).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_69" id="Footnote_3_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_69"><span class="label">3</span></a> In a memorandum of June 10, 1899, to the Sultan, Dr. Kurt -Zander, General Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company, -said that, in accordance with the wishes of the Sultan—and “to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span> -avoid all obstacles and avert every possibility of opposition”—his -Company sought to arrive at a satisfactory understanding -with the Smyrna-Aidin and Smyrna-Cassaba railways. All proposals -to the Smyrna-Aidin Company, however, “met with -evasive answers, which finally resulted in a termination of negotiations.” -<i>Cf.</i>, also, E. Aublé, <i>Bagdad—son chemin de fer, son -importance, son avenir</i> (Paris, 1917), pp. 9 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_70" id="Footnote_4_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_70"><span class="label">4</span></a> For a copy of the text of this agreement the author is indebted -to Mr. E. Rechnitzer. Summaries were published in <i>The -Times</i>, August 10, 1899; <i>Le Temps</i> (Paris), August 15, 1899; -<i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 155–156.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_71" id="Footnote_5_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_71"><span class="label">5</span></a> In June, 1899, the Anatolian Railway Company elected to its -Board of Directors M. L. Rambert, of the Imperial Ottoman -Bank, and in June, 1900, M. Gaston Auboyneau, of the same -institution. The new directors replaced Mr. George Henry -Maxwell Batten, of London, and Sir Edward F. G. Law, of the -Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The refusal of the -Smyrna-Aidin line to come to a working agreement with the -Anatolian Company thus removed the last British directors from -the board of the latter. <i>Cf.</i> <i>Reports of the Anatolian Railway -Company</i>, 1898–1900, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_72" id="Footnote_6_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_72"><span class="label">6</span></a> A letter from Mr. E. Rechnitzer to the Sultan, dated August -16, 1899, accuses M. Constans of having publicly referred to the -“accord” between French and German interests in Turkish railways. -Dr. Karl Helfferich states that the agreement between -the two railway companies was supplemented by a gentlemen’s -agreement between the two ambassadors. <i>Die Vorgeschichte des -Weltkrieges</i> (Berlin, 1919), p. 127. This would seem to be confirmed -by André Chéradame, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 48 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_73" id="Footnote_7_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_73"><span class="label">7</span></a> The proposals previously made called for an absolute guarantee -of several thousands of francs income per kilometre per -annum. Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan called for “an annual guarantee -of 15,000 francs in gross receipts per kilometre, the said guarantee -to be paid exclusively out of the excess of the tithes of the -<i>vilayets</i> through which the railway is to pass; it being understood -that in the event that the excess of such tithes be not -sufficient to defray the kilometric guarantee, the concessionaire -shall have no redress against the Imperial Government on account -of the insufficiency.” Memorandum of May 14, 1899, from Mr. -Rechnitzer’s files. Although this plan had the great advantage -of requiring no immediate payments from the Ottoman Treasury, -it probably would have cost Turkey more in the long run, for -the guarantee specified was excessively high. Compare with -provisions of the Bagdad Railway concession of March, 1903, -<i>infra</i>. Mr. Rechnitzer also asked for extensive port privileges -in Alexandretta and in the port to be determined on the -Persian Gulf. The chief features of the plan were outli<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span>ned in -a pamphlet published in London, July 29, 1899, entitled <i>The -Euphrates Valley Railway</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_74" id="Footnote_8_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_74"><span class="label">8</span></a> Mr. Rechnitzer now has in his possession a beautiful watch—inlaid -with a map of the Ottoman Empire, in precious stones, -showing the route of the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway—which -he presented to Abdul Hamid in 1899. He repurchased it -at a public auction held in Paris after the Young Turk revolution -of 1909.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_75" id="Footnote_9_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_75"><span class="label">9</span></a> In a letter dated September 30, 1922, to the author Mr. Rechnitzer -outlines the situation as follows: “My offer being much -more favorable than that of the Germans, it seemed likely in -August, 1899, that it would be accepted. Unfortunately the -Transvaal War broke out in the autumn of that year, and the -German Emperor, a few days after the declaration of war, specially -came to London to ask our Government to give him a -free hand in Turkey. It appears that there was an interview -between the Emperor and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who was -more interested in Cecil Rhodes’ scheme in Africa than in my -scheme in Turkey. As a consequence Sir Nicholas O’Connor -was instructed to inform the Turkish Government that the -British Government’s support was withdrawn from my offers.” -It is only fair to add, however, that there may have been other -factors in the situation. <i>The Financial News</i> (London), of -August 17, 1899, intimated that Mr. Rechnitzer’s proposal did -not have sufficiently strong financial backing; that it was more -Austrian than British; that the support of the British Government -was more formal than whole-hearted.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_76" id="Footnote_10_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_76"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1899, pp. 9–10; -<i>The Annual Register</i>, 1899, p. 292. Simultaneously the Sultan -granted the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> group a concession for the construction -of port and terminal facilities at Haidar Pasha, across the -Straits from Constantinople. Sweeping privileges were granted -for the building of docks, stations, sidings, and quays to a subsidiary -of the Anatolian Railway, the Haidar Pasha Port Company. -The latter company completed a handsome station and -terminal at Haidar Pasha in 1902, the year before the definitive -Bagdad Railway concession. Furthermore, it entered into close -coöperation with the Mahsoussie Steamship Company, a Government-owned -company operating a ferry service between Constantinople -and the Asiatic side of the Straits; in this manner -adequate service was assured passengers and freight from European -to Asiatic points. The text of the concession is to be -found in <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume III, pp. 342–351. <i>Cf.</i>, -also, <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1902, p. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_77" id="Footnote_11_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_77"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 31–34.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_78" id="Footnote_12_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_78"><span class="label">12</span></a> The single exception was Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan, which provided -that within five years of the award of the concession, the -Sultan might require the construction of a spur from Alexandretta -to Konia, on terms to be agreed upon between the Government -and the concessionaire. The chief feature of Mr. Rechnitzer’s -plan, however, unquestionably was the railway from -Alexandretta to the Persian Gulf—<i>i.e.</i>, the Syrian and Mesopotamian, -not the Anatolian and Cilician, sections. Furthermore, -there were political objectives connected with the Rechnitzer -proposal which, however attractive to British imperialists, could -not have been regarded with equanimity by the Sultan. The -following are typical quotations from Mr. Rechnitzer’s prospectus: -“It has long been the object of English statesmen to -consolidate the position of England in the Persian Gulf, where -British interests (both political and commercial) are now paramount. -With a railway in this region controlled by British -interests ... a very strong foothold would accrue to British -influence” (p. 12). Among the advantages of the proposed railway -are listed the following (pp. 17–18): “It will place under -British control two important ports, one on the Mediterranean -and the other on the Persian Gulf; it will strengthen British -influence in Turkey and in the Persian Gulf, and indirectly, in -Persia and Afghanistan; it will afford England powerful means -of exercising her influence over the territory of Central Persia, -and of establishing new commercial enterprises over an enormous -area of unexploited country of exceptional wealth.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_79" id="Footnote_13_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_79"><span class="label">13</span></a> Quoted by A. D. C. Russell, “The Bagdad Railway,” in <i>The -Fortnightly Review</i>, Volume 235 (1921), p. 312. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Corps -de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 153 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_80" id="Footnote_14_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_80"><span class="label">14</span></a> Pan-Islamism started as a religious and cultural revival but -rapidly took on political and economic significance. Later, in -connection with Turkish nationalism (see <i>infra</i>, Chapter IX), it -became a serious international problem. A short, popular discussion -of the rise of Pan-Islamism is Lothrop Stoddard’s <i>The -New World of Islam</i> (New York, 1921), Chapters I, II, V. -<i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Mohammedan History</i>, No. 57 of the Foreign Office -Handbooks (London, 1920), Part I; G. Charmes, <i>L’avenir de la -Turquie: le pan-islamisme</i> (Paris, 1883); A. J. Toynbee, <i>Nationality -and the War</i> (London, 1915), pp. 399–411, and <i>Turkey: a -Past and a Future</i> (New York, 1917); Tekin Alp, <i>Türkismus -und Pantürkismus</i> (Weimar, 1915); C. Snouck Hurgronje, <i>The -Holy War, “Made in Germany”</i> (New York, 1917). Regarding -Abdul Hamid’s place in the Pan-Islamic movement <i>cf.</i> <i>Mohammedan -History</i>, pp. 42–46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_81" id="Footnote_15_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_81"><span class="label">15</span></a> Great Britain, characteristically enough, took steps to protect -her interests by reviving the Arabian caliphate—<i>i.e.</i>, by -supporting the claims of the Sherif of Mecca to the caliphate.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_82" id="Footnote_16_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_82"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, pp. 127–128.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_83" id="Footnote_17_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_83"><span class="label">17</span></a> Regarding British activities in Koweit, <i>cf. infra</i>, pp. 197–198.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_84" id="Footnote_18_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_84"><span class="label">18</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, p. 149.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_85" id="Footnote_19_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_85"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, pp. 155–157; Chéradame, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 267 <i>et seq.</i>; K. -Helfferich, <i>Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</i> (Berlin, 1919), pp. -124 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_86" id="Footnote_20_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_86"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, October 28, 1898</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_87" id="Footnote_21_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_87"><span class="label">21</span></a> <i>Annual Register</i>, 1899, pp. 289–291; <i>Parliamentary Debates, -House of Commons</i>, Volume 120 (1903), p. 1247, Volume 126 -(1903), p. 108; W. von Hohenzollern, <i>My Memoirs, 1887–1918</i>, -pp. 84–86, 101–103.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_88" id="Footnote_22_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_88"><span class="label">22</span></a> <i>The Globe</i>, August 10, 1899. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>The Morning Herald</i>, -August 10, 1899, and <i>The Westminster Gazette</i>, August 11, 1899.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_89" id="Footnote_23_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_89"><span class="label">23</span></a> No attempt is made here to analyze the convention of March -18, 1902 (which had been preceded by a draft convention of -January 8, 1902), as it was superseded by the convention of -March 5, 1903. <i>Cf. infra</i>, pp. 70–71, 77–84. The text of the convention -of 1902 is to be found as an appendix to R. LeCoq, <i>Un -chemin de fer en Asie Mineure</i> (Paris, 1907). George von Siemens -(1839–1901) did not live to see the consummation of his -great plans for the development of Turkish railways. After his -death in 1901 his work was taken up by his successor as Managing -Director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, Dr. Arthur von Gwinner. For -a short account of the life of von Siemens see an obituary by -Professor J. Riesser, in <i>Bank-Archiv</i>, No. 2, November, 1901. -The work of von Siemens in the development of German economic -enterprises in the Near East is told in a biography by his -son-in-law, Dr. Karl Helfferich; <i>Georg von Siemens</i> (Leipzig, -1923).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_90" id="Footnote_24_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_90"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, January 25, 1902.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_91" id="Footnote_25_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_91"><span class="label">25</span></a> <i>Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés</i>, -1902, pp. 1468 et seq.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_92" id="Footnote_26_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_92"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, January 25, 1902.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_93" id="Footnote_27_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_93"><span class="label">27</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 101, pp. -129, 597, 628, 669, Volume 120 (1903), p. 1371.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_94" id="Footnote_28_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_94"><span class="label">28</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1901, p. 17; <i>The -Times</i>, January 25, 1902.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_95" id="Footnote_29_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_95"><span class="label">29</span></a> <i>Annual Register</i>, 1902, pp. 290–291; <i>Report of the Bagdad -Railway Company</i>, 1904, p. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_96" id="Footnote_30_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_96"><span class="label">30</span></a> <i>La Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad-Firman, -Convention, Cahier des Charges, Statuts</i>, in French and -Turkish (Constantinople, 1905); translated into English in -<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cd. 5635, Volume CIII (1911), No. -1. Where references are here given to the convention itself, no -preceding identifying word will be given, the citation being -merely, <i>e.g.</i>, <i>Article I</i>. The <i>Statuts</i> will<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span> be referred to as “By-Laws” -and the <i>Cahier des Charges</i> as “Specifications.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_97" id="Footnote_31_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_97"><span class="label">31</span></a> Turco-German control of the Board of Directors was not -inconsistent with the agreement of 1899 between the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which assured French -interests only 40% of the shares of the Bagdad Railway Company. -For details of the organization of the Company see the -<i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1903, pp. 4–7; <i>By-Laws</i>, -<i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_98" id="Footnote_32_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_98"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>Articles 1–4, 7, 12, 37–39</i>; <i>Specifications</i>, Article 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_99" id="Footnote_33_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_99"><span class="label">33</span></a> In this connection see Sir W. M. Ramsay, <i>The Historical -Geography of Asia Minor</i> (London, 1890); D. G. Hogarth, <i>The -Nearer East</i> (London, 1902); Jastrow, <i>op. cit.</i>, Chapter II; Sir -C. W. Wilson, <i>Murray’s Handbook for Asia Minor</i> (London, -1895 and 1900); R. Fitzner, <i>Anatolien-Wirtschaftsgeographie</i> -(Berlin, 1902); F. Dernburg, <i>Auf deutscher Bahn in Kleinasien</i> -(Berlin, 1892). Good general accounts of the regions through -which the Bagdad Railway was to run are: Baron E. von der -Goltz, <i>Reisebilder aus dem griechisch-türkischen Orient</i> (Halle, -1902); R. Oberhummer and H. Zimmerer, <i>Durch Syrien und -Kleinasien</i> (Berlin, 1899); E. Banse, <i>Die Türkei; eine moderne -Geographie</i> (Berlin, 1916); Sir Mark Sykes, <i>The Caliph’s Last -Heritage—A Short History of the Turkish Empire</i> (London, -1915), Part 2, Chapters II and IV. A well-informed article -describing the projected route of the Bagdad railway is one by -a member of the German technical commission, “Die anatolischen -Eisenbahnen und ihre Fortsetzung bis zum persischen Golf,” in -<i>Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen</i>, Volume 26 (1903), pp. 75–90.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_100" id="Footnote_34_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_100"><span class="label">34</span></a> For a description of the line from Konia to Adana, including -an historical sketch of the principal towns served by the railway, -<i>cf.</i> Karl Baedeker, <i>Konstantinopel und das westliche Kleinasien</i> -(Leipzig, 1905), pp. 156–172, and <i>Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, -Kleinasien, Archipel, Cypern</i> (second edition, Leipzig, 1914), pp. -270–306, generously supplied with excellent maps.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_101" id="Footnote_35_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_101"><span class="label">35</span></a> A popular account of the engineering difficulties facing the -construction of the railway from Adana to Aleppo is to be -found in <i>The Scientific American</i>, supplement, Volume 51 (1901), -pp. 21248–21249.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_102" id="Footnote_36_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_102"><span class="label">36</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> W. H. Hall (of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut), -<i>The Near East</i> (New York, 1920), particularly an interesting -map, p. 174. According to the convention of 1903, Article 1, -Aleppo was to be connected with the main line by a branch from -Tel-Habesh, but in 1910 the route was changed, on petition of -the inhabitants, to include Aleppo as a station on the Bagdad -line itself. <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1910, p. 8. -Statistics regarding the population of Aleppo and other cities -along the line are taken, unless otherwise indicated, from the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span> -<i>Statesman’s Year Book</i>, 1903, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_103" id="Footnote_37_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_103"><span class="label">37</span></a> <i>Article 38</i>; “The Trade of the Mesopotamian Valley,” in -<i>Commerce Reports</i>, No. 280 (Washington, 1912), pp. 1050–1065, -and No. 256 (1913), pp. 350–358; Karl Baedeker, <i>Palestine and -Syria, with the chief routes through Mesopotamia and Babylonia</i> -(fourth edition, Leipzig, 1906), pp. 351–411.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_104" id="Footnote_38_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_104"><span class="label">38</span></a> Valentine Chirol, <i>The Middle Eastern Question, or Some -Political Problems of Indian Defence</i> (New York, 1903), pp. -179–182.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_105" id="Footnote_39_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_105"><span class="label">39</span></a> This is the distance by the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab; as -the crow flies, the distance is about 150 miles shorter.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_106" id="Footnote_40_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_106"><span class="label">40</span></a> Regarding the Lynch Brothers see David Fraser, <i>The Short -Cut to India</i> (London, 1909), pp. 42 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Mesopotamia</i>, p. 30; -<i>The Near East</i>, August 11, 1916, p. 358; <i>infra</i>, pp. 190–191.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_107" id="Footnote_41_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_107"><span class="label">41</span></a> <i>Article 1</i>, which describes in detail the route of the Bagdad -Railway and its branches.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_108" id="Footnote_42_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_108"><span class="label">42</span></a> Chirol, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 179; <i>Supplement to Daily Consular and -Trade Reports</i>, Annual Series (Washington, 1915).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_109" id="Footnote_43_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_109"><span class="label">43</span></a> The distances on the Bagdad Railway may be estimated as -follows:</p> - -<table summary="railways" border="0" width="50%"><tr> - -<td class="tdl">Haidar Pasha to Ismid</td><td class="tdr">91</td><td class="tdc">kilometres</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Ismid to Eski Shehr</td><td class="tdr">174</td><td class="tdc">”</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Eski Shehr to Konia</td><td class="tdr">444</td><td class="tdc">”</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Konia to Basra</td><td class="tdr">2,264</td><td class="tdc">”</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl">Branch lines, about</td><td class="tdr">800</td><td class="tdc">”</td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdr" colspan="2">-—-</td><td> </td> -</tr><tr> -<td class="tdl"> Total</td> -<td class="tdr">3,773</td><td class="tdc">kilometres</td> -</tr></table> - -<p>or approximately 2,400 miles. This does not include the section -of the Anatolian Railway from Eski Shehr to Angora, a distance -of 311 kilometres, or 194 miles additional. The Atchison, Topeka -and Santa Fé Railway from Chicago to Los Angeles is 2,246 -miles in length. The distance from Chicago to San Francisco -<i>via</i> the Chicago and Northwestern-Union Pacific system is 2,261 -miles. <i>Official Guide of the Railways of the United States</i> -October, 1921, pp. 679, 825.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_110" id="Footnote_44_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_110"><span class="label">44</span></a> <i>Cf., e.g.</i>, T. W. Overlach, <i>Foreign Financial Control in China</i> -(New York, 1919), <i>passim</i>; <i>La Gaceta Oficial</i> of the Republic -of Cuba for the years 1911 and 1912, regarding the <i>Ferrocarril -de la Costa Norte de Cuba</i>; the <i>Statesman’s Year Book</i>, 1903, -p. 1044.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_111" id="Footnote_45_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_111"><span class="label">45</span></a> The average population per square mile in eastern Anatolia -was 27, in northern Syria 31, in Mesopotamia 13.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_112" id="Footnote_46_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_112"><span class="label">46</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, 1903, No. 3140, pp. 26–27; -Sir William Willcocks, <i>The Recreation of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span>Chaldea</i> (Cairo, 1903).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_113" id="Footnote_47_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_113"><span class="label">47</span></a> This financial assistance was granted at the rate of 11,000 -francs per kilometre, payable annually throughout the ninety-nine -years of the concession. The obligation was capitalized and met -by the issue of 4% bonds as here described.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_114" id="Footnote_48_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_114"><span class="label">48</span></a> <i>Bagdad Railway Loan Contract</i>, March 5, 1903. M. Léon -Berger, President of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, -and a French citizen, was one of the signatories of this document. -The bonds of the loan were issued in denominations of -500 francs, 408 marks, 20 pounds sterling, 22 pounds Turkish, -and 245 Dutch florins, in order to facilitate their sale in the -international securities markets. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i> was made -fiscal agent for all transactions in connection with the loan, with -the single qualification that it was to appoint as its Paris agent -the Imperial Ottoman Bank, representing the French interests -in the enterprise. The syndicate apparently made a profit of -over 2,500,000 francs on the transaction, as the bonds were delivered -to the concessionaires, under <i>Article 35</i> of the Convention, -valued at 81–1/2% of par but were sold at 86.40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_115" id="Footnote_49_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_115"><span class="label">49</span></a> <i>Articles 35</i> and <i>37</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_116" id="Footnote_50_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_116"><span class="label">50</span></a> <i>Articles 6, 10, 22, 27.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_117" id="Footnote_51_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_117"><span class="label">51</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> W. A. Dunning, <i>Reconstruction, Political and Economic, -1865–1877</i> (New York, 1907), pp. 145, 227; H. V. Poor, <i>Manual -of the Railroads of the United States</i> (New York, 1869), pp. -xlvi-xlvii.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_118" id="Footnote_52_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_118"><span class="label">52</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 11.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_119" id="Footnote_53_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_119"><span class="label">53</span></a> <i>Articles 13, 24, 25, 33</i>; <i>Specifications</i>, Article 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_120" id="Footnote_54_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_120"><span class="label">54</span></a> <i>Articles 9</i> and <i>23</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_121" id="Footnote_55_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_121"><span class="label">55</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, pp. 190–191.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_122" id="Footnote_56_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_122"><span class="label">56</span></a> <i>Articles 5, 18, 29, 34.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_123" id="Footnote_57_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_123"><span class="label">57</span></a> <i>Article 29</i>; <i>Specifications</i>, Articles 21, 24, 25, 29, 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_124" id="Footnote_58_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_124"><span class="label">58</span></a> <i>Articles 15, 26, 45</i>; <i>Specifications</i>, Article 26.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_125" id="Footnote_59_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_125"><span class="label">59</span></a> <i>Articles 20</i> and <i>21</i>. Another sop to Turkish pride was <i>Article -46</i>, which required the Company to contribute annually to the -Constantinople Poorhouse the sum of £500.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_126" id="Footnote_60_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_126"><span class="label">60</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, March 14, 1903, contained a report of this secret -appendix. A denial was issued by the Berlin <i>National Zeitung</i> -of March 18, 1903, but the existence of the supplementary agreement -was confirmed by Dr. von Gwinner in 1909 (<i>op. cit.</i>, p. -1092). Djavid Bey, in a memorandum to the author, has stated -that the Ottoman Government considered this appendix of the -utmost importance.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61_127" id="Footnote_61_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_127"><span class="label">61</span></a> A proviso of the concession of 1903 was that the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> was to float an Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of March, -1903, to an amount of about $10,000,000. <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, -1920, No. Cmd. 964, pp. 57–58.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER V<br /> - -PEACEFUL PENETRATION PROGRESSES</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Financiers Get Their First Profits</span></h3> - -<p>The convention of March, 1903, marked the beginning, -not the end, of the work of the promoters of the Bagdad -Railway. Ahead of Dr. von Gwinner<a name="FNanchor_1_128" id="FNanchor_1_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_128" class="fnanchor">1</a> and his associates -lay all sorts of obstacles, some of which proved to be -insurmountable. There were the financial difficulties and -risks attendant upon the task of borrowing and expending -the funds for the construction of the railway—estimated -at about one hundred million dollars. There were the -technical difficulties of constructing a line across obstinate -mountain barriers and inhospitable desert plains. There -were the political difficulties of retaining the friendship -of notoriously fickle Ottoman ministers and of preventing -diplomatic opposition on the part of foreign powers. -Events proved that this was to be a thorny path indeed—a -path which was to lead through political intrigue, diplomatic -bargaining, a Turkish revolution, and a world war.</p> - -<p>The concessionaires began work in a manner indicative -of a determination to succeed in spite of all obstacles. The -Bagdad Railway Company was incorporated in Constantinople, -March, 1903, under the joint auspices of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, as <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span>provided -by their mutual agreement of 1899. Almost immediately -an invitation was extended to British capitalists to -participate in the enterprise. Three-cornered negotiations -were conducted by German, French, and British bankers—under -the watchful eyes of their respective foreign offices— -to arrive at some satisfactory plan for internationalization -of the railway. An agreement was reached by the financiers -by which British capital was to share equally in ownership -and control with the German and the French, but the -hostile attitude of the English press and the disapproval -of the Balfour Government led to the abandonment of -the proposed tripartite syndicate.<a name="FNanchor_2_129" id="FNanchor_2_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_129" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>Failing to secure British cooperation, the concessionaires -proceeded to finance the Bagdad Railway by other means. -Ten per cent of the stock of the Company was subscribed -by the Ottoman Government, ten per cent by the Anatolian -Railway Company, and the remainder by an international -syndicate headed by the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. The Board of -Directors was enlarged to twenty-seven members, as follows: -eight Germans, chosen by the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>; three -Germans elected by the Anatolian Railway Company; -eight Frenchmen designated by the Imperial Ottoman -Bank; four Ottomans; two Swiss; one Austrian; and one -Italian.<a name="FNanchor_3_130" id="FNanchor_3_130"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_130" class="fnanchor">3</a> The control of the Bagdad Railway Company -thus remained in Turco-German hands, but French and -other interests were too well represented to justify the -criticism that the railway was a purely German enterprise -secretly coöperating with the German Foreign Office. In -fact, in 1903 Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne were as -much alarmed by the possibility of pernicious French activities -in the line as they were disturbed by the predominantly -German character of the scheme.<a name="FNanchor_4_131" id="FNanchor_4_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_131" class="fnanchor">4</a> Baron von -Schoen, one-time German Foreign Secretary, described the -Bagdad Railway as “an Ottoman enterprise which has an -international character under German guidance.”<a name="FNanchor_5_132" id="FNanchor_5_132"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_132" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span></p> -<p>The great resources of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> were now -brought into play to provide the funds for the construction -of the first section of the railway. The necessary capital -was to be secured, it will be recalled,<a name="FNanchor_6_133" id="FNanchor_6_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_133" class="fnanchor">6</a> by the sale of an -issue of Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Bonds amounting -to 54,000,000 francs. With comparatively little difficulty -the German share of the loan was subscribed, but -the allotment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and its associates -was not so easily disposed of, because of the decision -of the French Government to exclude the Bagdad Railway -Bonds from the Bourse. Nevertheless, the entire loan -was successfully underwritten, and by November, 1903, -preparations had been completed for the construction of -the line from Konia to Bulgurlu, a distance of 200 -kilometres.<a name="FNanchor_7_134" id="FNanchor_7_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_134" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>Building of the railway went forward with great -rapidity, and the rails reached Bulgurlu by early autumn, -1904. On October 25, the Sultan’s birthday, this first -section of the Bagdad Railway was opened to traffic with -pompous ceremonies. And well might the concessionaires -have celebrated! Not only had they passed the first milestone -of their great task, but they had made a comfortable -profit on their operations. By numerous economies the -Bagdad Railway Company had saved 3,697,000 francs of -the 54,000,000 francs allowed by the Ottoman Government -to defray the costs of construction. The commissions of -the bankers in underwriting the bond issue, it was said, -raised the total profit on the first section of the railway—before -a single train had been operated—to about 6,000,000 -francs.<a name="FNanchor_8_135" id="FNanchor_8_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_135" class="fnanchor">8</a> This surplus, however, was not all available for -distribution among the concessionaires. A reserve fund -of almost 4,000,000 francs was established to provide for -the subsequent construction of the costly sections across -the Taurus and Amanus mountains. The promoters had -to be reimbursed for preliminary expenditures, such as the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span> -expensive surveying of the entire line from Konia to the -Persian Gulf. Included in these “out of pocket” payments -was a large item for <i>backshish</i>—gratuities to Ottoman -dignitaries. “Nobody,” said Dr. von Gwinner, “having -done business in Turkey ignores the fact that <i>backshish</i> -on the Bosporus ruled supreme and was hitherto an absolute -condition of any contract. We had to pay in proportion -to the importance of a business of some £20,000,000.”<a name="FNanchor_9_136" id="FNanchor_9_136"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_136" class="fnanchor">9</a> -Djavid Bey informs the author that the item of -<i>backshish</i> must have amounted to almost £100,000, “for -during the Hamidian régime friendship between sovereigns -was not enough to bring about the granting of a concession.”</p> - -<p>Within nineteen months after the Turkish Government -had issued its bonds to cover the cost of the project, the -first section of the Bagdad Railway, from Konia to -Bulgurlu, had been completed. The success of the concessionaires -in this part of the enterprise might have been -taken as a criterion of rapid progress with the further -construction of the line to the Persian Gulf. Such an -expectation, however, would have been premature. Beyond -Bulgurlu lay the Taurus mountains and innumerable -engineering difficulties which could be overcome only -after the expenditure of considerable time and money. -The Turkish Government, furthermore, was in no position -to issue additional bonds to the amount of fifty or sixty -millions francs to cover the costs of constructing the second -section of the line. Interest and sinking fund charges -on the first issue of Bagdad Railway bonds were a serious -drain on the treasury; additional charges of a like character -could be met only by an increase of the customs revenues -of the Empire. Such an increase could not be effected, -however, except by international agreement, because under -existing treaties between Turkey and the Great Powers all -import duties were fixed at eight per cent <i>ad valorem</i>.<a name="FNanchor_10_137" id="FNanchor_10_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_137" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span></p> -<p>In 1903, coincident with the first issue of bonds for the -Bagdad Railway, the Ottoman Government had requested -permission to increase these duties to eleven per cent but -had been unable to obtain the consent of the interested -nations. It was not until 1906, after prolonged and irritating -negotiations, that the Powers agreed to a three per -cent increase, effective in July of the following year. Even -then, however, the higher duties were assented to under a -number of restrictions which rendered difficult the diversion -of the increased revenue to the payment of railway -guarantees; elaborate regulations were incorporated in -the treaties prescribing expensive reform of the government -of Macedonia and costly readjustments in the customs -administration.<a name="FNanchor_11_138" id="FNanchor_11_138"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_138" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>By 1908, nevertheless, Turkish fiscal affairs were in a -sufficiently satisfactory state to enable the Government -to conclude arrangements for the construction of succeeding -sections of the Bagdad Railway. On June 2 of that -year an imperial <i>iradé</i> was granted authorizing the extension -of the line from Bulgurlu to Aleppo and thence eastward -to El Helif (near Nisibin), a distance of some eight -hundred and forty kilometres. The completion of this -portion of the line would bring the railway to a point about -eleven hundred miles from Constantinople and only a -little over seven hundred miles from Basra. Arrangements -were effected for the immediate issue of the Imperial -Ottoman Bagdad Railway Four Per Cent Loans, -Second and Third Series, to an amount of one hundred -and eight million and one hundred and nineteen million -francs respectively, to provide the capital necessary for -the building of the railway. Interest and sinking fund -payments on these loans were guaranteed from the surplus -of net revenues accruing to the Imperial Government from -the Ottoman Public Debt. In case of emergency, certain -taxes (notably the cattle tax) of the vilayets of Konia, -Adana, and Aleppo were pledged for this purpose.<a name="FNanchor_12_139" id="FNanchor_12_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_139" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span></p> - -<p>Only a month after the conclusion of this convention -the Near East was thrown into a state of turmoil as a -result of the outbreak of the first of the Young Turk -revolutions. Under these circumstances it appeared inexpedient -to the Bagdad Railway Company to push construction -of its line until such time as a reasonable degree -of security should be restored. It was not until December, -1909, therefore, after the deposition of Abdul Hamid, -that good friend of German enterprise in Turkey, that -a construction company was formed to build the railway -across the Taurus and Amanus mountains. During the -autumn of the same year a Franco-German syndicate underwrote -the second and third series of Bagdad Railway -loans, thereby providing the necessary funds for the -work.<a name="FNanchor_13_140" id="FNanchor_13_140"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_140" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Bankers’ Interests Become More Extensive</span></h3> - -<p>The years 1904 to 1909 were lean years, judged by -actual progress in the laying of rails from Bulgurlu to -Bagdad and Basra. Nevertheless, they were years characterized, -on the part of the investors interested in the consummation -of the great enterprise, by every possible activity -to prepare the way for eventual success on a grand -scale. In the spring of 1906, for example, Dr. Karl -Helfferich was appointed assistant general manager of -the Anatolian Railways, and one year later was elected -a managing director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> with general -supervision over all of the Bank’s railway enterprises in -the Near East. The appointment of Dr. Helfferich—who, -although he was only thirty-four years of age, had achieved -an international reputation—aroused widespread comment -and turned out to be an event of first-rate importance in -the history of the Bagdad Railway. As a yo<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span>ung professor -of political science in the University of Berlin, Dr. Helfferich -won general recognition as an unusually able economist. -He was persuaded to enter the Government service -in 1901 and became assistant secretary in the Colonial Department -of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was -known to be in the good graces of the Emperor and of -Prince von Bülow, and it was said that he became their -chief adviser on Near Eastern affairs.<a name="FNanchor_14_141" id="FNanchor_14_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_141" class="fnanchor">14</a> The choice of -such a distinguished person as directing genius of the -Anatolian and Bagdad Railways gave renewed confidence -in Germany that the Bagdad plan would succeed. In -Great Britain the appointment was considered an ominous -sign that a very real connection existed between the economic -enterprises of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the Near -Eastern activities of the German Foreign Office.<a name="FNanchor_15_142" id="FNanchor_15_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_142" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<p>In 1907 the Anatolian Railway Company, under a contract -with the Turkish Government, completed arrangements -for the irrigation of the desert plain southeast of -Konia. It was planned to water artificially about one -hundred and fifty thousand acres of arid land, thus rendering -the region independent of weather conditions. The -effects of such an improvement would be far-reaching. -Much idle land would be made available for profitable -farming, and the yield of soil already under cultivation -would be developed materially. Increased production -might lead to a surplus of agricultural products for export, -and the greater purchasing power of a prosperous Anatolian -farming class would stimulate import trade. Agriculture, -commerce, and manufacturing alike, therefore, -could be served. The Anatolian Railway Company issued -some 135,000 new shares of stock to defray its part of -the expenses, hoping to be richly compensated by increased -traffic on the railway. The Imperial Ottoman -Treasury issued £800,000 of Konia Irrigation Bonds, an -outlay which it hoped to offset by increased taxes from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span> -the Konia district, by rentals and sales of irrigated lands, -and by decreased guarantees to this section of the railway.<a name="FNanchor_16_143" id="FNanchor_16_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_143" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>A number of German banks, meanwhile, were pushing -their financial operations in the Near East. The success -of the <i>Deutsche Palästina Bank</i><a name="FNanchor_17_144" id="FNanchor_17_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_144" class="fnanchor">17</a> encouraged the formation -of other similar institutions. The <i>Nationalbank für -Deutschland</i>, in 1904, founded the <i>Banque d’Orient</i>, with -offices in Hamburg, Athens, Constantinople, Salonica, and -Smyrna. The following year the <i>Dresdner Bank</i>, in -coöperation with other large Austro-German financial institutions, -inaugurated the important <i>Deutsche Orientbank</i>, -with a capital stock of sixteen million marks. This latter -bank took over the Hamburg and Constantinople offices of -the <i>Banque d’Orient</i> and established a large number of -branches of its own, including those at Alexandria, Cairo, -and Smyrna. The <i>Deutsche Orientbank</i> became an active -promoter of industrial enterprises in Asiatic Turkey; for -example, in 1908 it organized <i>La Société pour Enterprises -Electriques en Orient</i>, a company which proceeded to take -over the surface railways as well as the electric light and -power concession of Constantinople. In 1908 the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> itself formally opened an office in Constantinople -for the transaction of a general banking business.<a name="FNanchor_18_145" id="FNanchor_18_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_145" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>The entry of these German banks into the Near Eastern -field was of no small importance to the British and French -financial institutions already there. The German bankers -allowed liberal rates of interest on time and check deposits -and permitted reasonable overdrafts at low rates. These -practices were in sharp contrast with the rigid regulations -of the older-established banks. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i> undertook -to collect claims of local merchants against the Turkish -Government; through its influence in the Government -departments it cut red tape and secured payments which -otherwise might have been delayed for years. Constant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span>inople -business men welcomed their emancipation from -the ultra-conservative methods of the older institutions, -and it was not long before a very thriving business was -being transacted by the German banks and their agencies -in the Near East.<a name="FNanchor_19_146" id="FNanchor_19_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_146" class="fnanchor">19</a> Here was a high-powered bomb to -disturb the quiet which heretofore had ruled in the banking -community of Constantinople and of Asiatic Turkey. -Germans were disturbing the financial, as well as the commercial -and industrial, <i>status quo</i> in the Near East!</p> - -<p>The advance of the German banks in Turkey was almost -certain to be the first step in a more general industrial -and commercial penetration. This will be the more -readily understood if one recalls the close coöperation -which characterized the relationships between the German -banks and the business interests of the empire. This coöperation -which amounted, in effect, to financial interdependence—was -one of the striking features of the German -economic advance in the generation before the Great War. -It strengthened German industrial enterprises at home -and promoted German trade and investments abroad. If -a great business needed capital, the banks furnished the -necessary funds by the purchase of securities which made -them at once creditors and copartners in that business. -Sooner or later this connection would find expression in -the appointment of a representative of the bank on the -supervisory council of the industrial enterprise; occasionally -a “captain of industry” would be elected to the -board of directors of the bank. Although this procedure -of interlocking directorates was not unique to Germany—it -was an established practice in the United States, certainly—there -was no country in which these alliances were -so far-reaching, or in which financial power was so centrally -controlled, as in the German Empire. In Germany -finance and industry were wedded—permanently united for -better or for worse.<a name="FNanchor_20_147" id="FNanchor_20_147"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_147" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span></p> -<p>Of this alliance of banking and business the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i>, chief promoter of the Bagdad Railway, was a shining -example. Its industrial connections were too numerous -to catalogue. It enjoyed intimate financial relations -with hundreds of companies engaged in every important -branch of manufacturing in Germany; it was represented -on the directorates of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American -steamship lines; it was the organizer of -and chief stockholder in the German Petroleum Company. -It was the owner of a number of overseas banking corporations -stretching their activities from South America -on the west to China on the east. The officers of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> firmly believed that the export of capital -and the export of commodities should go hand in hand. -The other banks associated in the Bagdad Railway enterprise -likewise were closely affiliated with important industrial -enterprises. For example, the <i>Dresdner Bank</i> held -the vice-chairmanship of Ludwig Loewe & Company, -prominent manufacturers of munitions, and the chairmanship -of the Orenstein Koppel Company, manufacturers -of railway supplies. The <i>Bank für Handel und Industrie</i> -possessed interests in the <i>Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft</i>, -the German General Electric Company. A -still further evidence of this close association of financial -and industrial interests was furnished in January, 1905, -when the chief German banks entered into a “community -of interests” with August Thyssen and Hugo Stinnes, -the steel and coal barons of Germany.<a name="FNanchor_21_148" id="FNanchor_21_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_148" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<p>If German business men were likely to be interested in -the economic development of Asia Minor, what was the -nature of this interest?</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Broader Business Interests Develop</span></h3> - -<p>Speaking to the Reichstag in March, 1908, Baron von<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span> -Schoen, Foreign Secretary of the Empire, explained a -few of the opportunities which the Bagdad Railway opened -to German industry and commerce. “The advantages,” he -said, “which accrue to Germany from this great enterprise, -conceived on a grand scale, are obvious. In the first place, -there arises the prospect of considerable participation of -German industry in the furnishing of rails, rolling stock, -and other railway materials. Furthermore, German engineers, -German construction workers, and German contractors -are very likely to find remunerative occupation in -the construction of the railway. Finally, it is certain that -with the rising civilization and the higher standard of -living of the inhabitants of the country, a new market -will be made available. That this territory will be opened -up not merely for us, but also for other nations, we can -allow without envy.... What we have in view is the -development of regions that seem to be worth developing; -we wish to coöperate in awakening from a sleep of a -thousand years an ancient flourishing civilized region, -thereby creating a new market for ourselves and others.”<a name="FNanchor_22_149" id="FNanchor_22_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_149" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>This same idea had been advanced by others on other -occasions. The <i>Alldeutsche Blätter</i> of December 17, -1899, had prophesied that the construction of the railway -by a German-controlled syndicate would result in the purchase -of some eighty million dollars’ worth of German -products and that, once completed, the railway would open -to German business an enormous and wealthy market. -Lord Ellenborough, speaking in the House of Lords of -the United Kingdom, on May 5, 1903, expressed the -opinion that “the capital disbursed in constructing the -railway would be largely spent on German steel industries, -and on salaries to German engineers and German surveyors, -so that even if the railway, as a railway, were a -failure, it would not be a total loss to Germany.”<a name="FNanchor_23_150" id="FNanchor_23_150"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_150" class="fnanchor">23</a> The -British Consul General at Constantinople pointed out, in -1903, that, in addition to all of the aforementio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span>ned advantages, -there would be innumerable special opportunities -for the remunerative investment of German capital -in the regions traversed by the railway.<a name="FNanchor_24_151" id="FNanchor_24_151"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_151" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>Events seemed to establish the wisdom of these expressions -of opinion. Rails for the Bagdad line were -ordered in Germany from the Steel Syndicate (<i>Stahlwerksverband</i>). -Transportation of materials from Europe -to the Near East was arranged for through German -steamship companies. German engineers were given the -executive positions in the construction and operation of -the railway. Important subsidiary companies were formed -for the construction of port and terminal facilities, for -the building of irrigation works, and for other purposes -incidental to the railway proper. German banks established -branches on the ground in order to take advantage of -other opportunities for the profitable investment of surplus -funds.<a name="FNanchor_25_152" id="FNanchor_25_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_152" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>There was much evidence, however, to indicate that -the preëminently German character of the railway was -not preserved. An English observer, after a trip over -the Anatolian lines in 1908, wrote that he noted a great predominance -of Turkish, Greek, and Italian employees over -the Germans. “The fact is,” he maintained, “that the -people who run the line, though Germans, care first for -their own pockets and next for Germany. They buy or -employ what is cheapest and most suitable and do not -care a finger-snap for the origin of an article or a servant. -Patriotism occupies a small place in the calculations of -promoters. The tendency to deal with the Fatherland -must always be strong, but it is founded chiefly on the -fact that the German knows the goods available in his -own country better than the goods of other countries and -that credit and banking facilities are more easily obtained -at home. The master impulse in every German engaged<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span> -in business in Turkey, as in business men of every other -nationality, is to make money for himself as soon as -possible.” This same observer pointed out that there was -an astonishing absence of German employees in even the -more responsible positions of the Anatolian Railway and -that the great majority of the unskilled laborers were -Italians.<a name="FNanchor_26_153" id="FNanchor_26_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_153" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>Ultra-patriotic Germans, furthermore, denounced Dr. -von Gwinner and his associates for not making the Bagdad -Railway an exclusively Teutonic enterprise. A speaker -at a Berlin branch of the Pan German League had this -to say of the situation: “The Bagdad Railway, which in its -origins was entirely German, has, thanks to the criminal -negligence of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, become almost wholly -French. The German schools along the line of the Railway, -which were established by von Siemens, have fallen -into decay. The officials of the Railway speak French. -The ordinary language for transacting the business of the -Railway is French, although the French share of the capital -is only thirty per cent. The German engineers may as well -be called home to-day as to-morrow.”<a name="FNanchor_27_154" id="FNanchor_27_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_154" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of German financial -interests in the Near East and the established policy of the -German banks to encourage and assist export trade were -factors in a remarkable development of German trade in -the Ottoman Empire, as will be indicated by the following -table:<a name="FNanchor_28_155" id="FNanchor_28_155"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_155" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<table summary="exports" border="0"><tr> -<td class="center"><span class="smcap">Year </span></td> -<td class="center padr2 padl2"><span class="smcap">Exports from<br />Turkey to<br />Germany—Marks</span></td> -<td class="center padr2 padl2"><span class="smcap">imports to<br />Turkey from<br />Germany—Marks</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1900</td><td class="tdr padr4">30,400,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">34,400,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1901</td><td class="tdr padr4">30,000,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">37,500,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1902</td><td class="tdr padr4">36,500,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">43,300,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1903</td><td class="tdr padr4">37,700,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">50,200,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1904</td><td class="tdr padr4">43,500,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">75,300,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1905</td><td class="tdr padr4">51,600,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">71,000,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1906</td><td class="tdr padr4">55,000,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">68,200,000</td> -</tr><tr><td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span>1907</td><td class="tdr padr4">55,100,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">81,500,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1908</td><td class="tdr padr4">47,600,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">64,000,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1909</td><td class="tdr padr4">57,300,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">78,900,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1910</td><td class="tdr padr4">67,400,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">104,900,000</td> -</tr><tr><td>1911</td><td class="tdr padr4">70,100,000</td><td class="tdr padr4">112,800,000</td> -</tr></table> - -<p>This table eloquently describes the nature of the advance -of German economic interests in Turkey. It does not, -however, tell the whole story. Was this advance the result -of a general increase of prosperity in the Ottoman -Empire in which the Germans shared in common with -other traders? Or was the increase in German trade out -of proportion to the progress of other nationals—perhaps -at the expense of the French and British? The following -tables will help answer these questions:<a name="FNanchor_29_156" id="FNanchor_29_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_156" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<table summary="Exports" border="1"><tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><span class="smcap">Exports from Turkey</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td>Year</td><td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">To United<br />Kingdom<br />Marks</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">To France<br />Marks</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">To Italy<br />Marks</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">To Austria<br />Hungary<br />Marks</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1900</td><td class="tdc"> 118,760,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 86,220,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 22,520,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 35,220,000 </td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1901</td><td class="tdc">122,000,000</td><td class="tdc"> </td><td class="tdc">26,120,000</td><td class="tdc">31,540,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1902</td><td class="tdc">130,520,000</td><td class="tdc">83,040,000</td><td class="tdc">28,980,000</td><td class="tdc">35,580,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1903</td><td class="tdc">127,400,000</td><td class="tdc">81,200,000</td><td class="tdc">38,120,000</td><td class="tdc">39,900,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1904</td><td class="tdc">122,760,000</td><td class="tdc">73,120,000</td><td class="tdc">31,300,000</td><td class="tdc">39,120,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1905</td><td class="tdc">118,960,000</td><td class="tdc">80,780,000</td><td class="tdc">42,240,000</td><td class="tdc">37,640,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1906</td><td class="tdc">129,440,000</td><td class="tdc">91,600,000</td><td class="tdc">45,100,000</td><td class="tdc">39,300,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1907</td><td class="tdc">136,600,000</td><td class="tdc">95,320,000</td><td class="tdc">50,480,000</td><td class="tdc">34,640,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1908</td><td class="tdc">109,220,000</td><td class="tdc">70,760,000</td><td class="tdc">44,580,000</td><td class="tdc">34,360,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1909</td><td class="tdc">109,320,000</td><td class="tdc">79,000,000</td><td class="tdc">59,080,000</td><td class="tdc">36,600,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1910</td><td class="tdc">100,660,000</td><td class="tdc">77,000,000</td><td class="tdc">48,000,000</td><td class="tdc">43,340,000</td> -</tr></table> -<p> </p> -<table summary="Exports" border="1"><tr> -<td class="tdc" colspan="5"><span class="smcap">Imports to Turkey</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td><span class="smcap">Year</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">From<br />From United<br />Kingdom</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">From<br />France<br />Marks</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">From Italy<br />Marks</span></td> -<td class="tdc"><span class="smcap">From<br />Austria<br />Hungary<br />Marks</span></td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1900</td><td class="tdc"> 102,920,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 29,800,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 29,720,000 </td><td class="tdc"> 53,440,000 </td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1901</td><td class="tdc">128,220,000</td><td class="tdc">37,880,000</td><td class="tdc">43,800,000</td><td class="tdc">57,100,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1902</td><td class="tdc">123,980,000</td><td class="tdc">37,200,000</td><td class="tdc">40,400,000</td><td class="tdc">61,380,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1903</td><td class="tdc">114,020,000</td><td class="tdc">36,640,000</td><td class="tdc">45,360,000</td><td class="tdc">65,120,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1904</td><td class="tdc">151,960,000</td><td class="tdc">40,880,000</td><td class="tdc">53,280,000</td><td class="tdc">77,600,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1905</td><td class="tdc">139,300,000</td><td class="tdc">42,420,000</td><td class="tdc">57,200,000</td><td class="tdc">76,660,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span>1906</td><td class="tdc">167,040,000</td><td class="tdc">47,300,000</td><td class="tdc">70,900,000</td><td class="tdc">92,620,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1907</td><td class="tdc">147,380,000</td><td class="tdc">46,380,000</td><td class="tdc">63,040,000</td><td class="tdc">89,920,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1908</td><td class="tdc">145,260,000</td><td class="tdc">51,600,000</td><td class="tdc">58,700,000</td><td class="tdc">69,240,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1909</td><td class="tdc">156,280,000</td><td class="tdc">54,600,000</td><td class="tdc">67,740,000</td><td class="tdc">77,040,000</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1910</td><td class="tdc">177,160,000</td><td class="tdc">58,400,000</td><td class="tdc">94,000,000</td><td class="tdc">107,300,000</td> -</tr></table> - -<p>Certain important conclusions may be drawn from these -statistics:</p> - -<p>1. British trade continued during the decade 1900–1910 -to dominate the Near Eastern market. With total imports -and exports in the latter year of over 277,000,000 -marks it was in no immediate danger of being outstripped -by its nearest rivals—a German trade of about 172,000,000 -marks and an Austro-Hungarian trade of about 150,000,000 -marks.</p> - -<p>2. France, whose Near Eastern trade in 1900 had -proudly held a position second only to that of the United -Kingdom, was being obliged to accept a less prominent -place in the economic life of the Ottoman Empire. During -the first ten years of the new century French merchants -obviously were being outmaneuvered by Germans, Austro-Hungarians, -and Italians. In spite of a total increase of -17% in exports and imports between France and Turkey -it was apparent that French trade was not keeping the -pace; during the same period Austro-Hungarian trade -showed an increased valuation of 81%, German trade of -166%.</p> - -<p>3. Although it continued to dominate the Near Eastern -market, British commerce, likewise, was losing ground. -Between 1900 and 1910 it showed an increase of only -25% as compared with the Italian record of 172% during -the same period. During the decade British exports, -although showing an increased valuation, fell off from -35% to 22–1/2% of the total import trade of Turkey; for -the same period German exports achieved not only an -absolute gain of almost eighty million marks, but also a -relative increase from 2–1/2% to 11–1/2% of the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span>whole.</p> - -<p>4. The advance of German trade was not equal to the -advance of Italian trade in the Ottoman Empire during -the same period. This explains, in part, the rapidly increasing -political interest of Italy in the Near East and -seems to set at rest the notion that the Germans acquired -a stranglehold on exports and imports from and to Turkey.</p> - -<p>5. Looking at the question from a purely political -standpoint, one’s attention is struck by the fact that -commercial laurels in the Ottoman Empire were going -to the nationals of the Triple Alliance powers. Economically, -Turkey was leaning toward the Central Powers. -Few international alliances are not based upon coincidence -of economic interests; it appeared that a solid -foundation was being laid for the eventual affiliation of -Turkey with the Triple Alliance.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Sea Communications are Established</span></h3> - -<p>Exports and imports, however, are not the only items -which enter into the international balance sheet. As has -been so amply demonstrated in the experience of the -British Empire, ocean freights may constitute one of the -chief items in the prosperity of a nation which lives upon -commerce with other nations. It was not surprising, -therefore, that upon the heels of German banks and German -merchants in the Near East closely followed those -other great promoters of German economic expansion, -the steamship companies. The success of the <i>Deutsche -Levante Linie</i>, established in 1889,<a name="FNanchor_30_157" id="FNanchor_30_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_157" class="fnanchor">30</a> indicated that there -was room for additional service between German ports -and the cities of the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Accordingly, -in 1905, the Atlas Line, of Bremen, inaugurated -a regular service from the Baltic to Turkish ports. One -line was to ply between Bremen and Smyrna, with Rotte<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span>rdam, -Malta, Piraeus, Salonica, and Constantinople as -ports of call. Another of this same company’s lines was -to carry freight and passengers from Bremen to the -Syrian city of Beirut. During the same year the North -German Lloyd was responsible for the formation of the -<i>Deutsche Mittelmeer Levante Linie</i>, providing service between -Marseilles and Genoa and Smyrna, Constantinople, -Odessa, and Batum.<a name="FNanchor_31_158" id="FNanchor_31_158"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_158" class="fnanchor">31</a> The considerable increase of trade -between Germany and Turkey made a very real place for -these lines, especially in the transportation of such commodities -as could not be expected to bear the heavy charges -of transportation by rail through the Balkans and overland -to German cities. These lines were put into operation -to provide for a traffic already in existence and waiting -for them.</p> - -<p>Such was not the case, however, with the establishment -of German steamship service to the Persian Gulf. Here -British trade had been dominant for centuries. The German -railway invasion had not as yet reached Mesopotamia, -and German trade in this region was negligible. The establishment -of a German steamship service to Basra would -be equivalent to the throwing out of an advance guard -and reconnaissance expedition on behalf of German trade. -Incidentally it would mean the destruction of the practical -monopoly which had been enjoyed by the British in the -trade of Irak. It was considered of no slight importance, -therefore, when, in April of 1906, the Hamburg-American -Line announced its intention of establishing a regular -service between European ports and the Persian Gulf. An -office of the Company was immediately opened at Basra, -and in August the first German steamer, with a German -cargo, made its way up the Shatt-el-Arab. Soon afterward -the Hamburg-American Line inaugurated, also, a service -between British ports and Mesopotamia, and it provided -a regular schedule of sailing dates, a luxury to which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span> -merchants doing business in the Near East had not heretofore -been accustomed. With the aid of a government -subsidy the German company cut freight rates in half. -This rude disturbance of the <i>status quo</i> in the shipping -of the Persian Gulf dealt a severe blow to British companies -engaged in the carrying trade between European -ports and Mesopotamia. After a futile rate war the -British lines, represented by Lord Inchcape, came to an -agreement, in 1913, with their German competitors, ending -a rivalry which had been the cause of considerable -concern on the part of their respective foreign offices.<a name="FNanchor_32_159" id="FNanchor_32_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_159" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<p>In order to coöperate with the attempts of Germans to -have a share in the trade of the Mesopotamian valley, the -German Government established a consulate at Bagdad in -1908. The services of this consulate, supplementing the -pioneer work of the Hamburg-American Line, had immediate -results in the development of commercial relationships -with the Land of the Two Rivers. The value -of exports from Basra to Germany increased from about -half a million dollars in 1906 to slightly in excess of a -million dollars in 1913; German goods received at Basra -during the same period increased from about half a million -dollars to almost nine million dollars. Herr von Mutius, -the German Consul at Bagdad, conducted an active campaign -of education and propaganda, urging upon business -men at home the importance of participating further in -the development of the economic resources of the land of -the Arabs.<a name="FNanchor_33_160" id="FNanchor_33_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_160" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<p>The establishment of steamship communication between -Europe and Asiatic Turkey was welcomed by the -Bagdad Railway Company. To widen the scope of usefulness—and, -consequently, to increase the revenues—of -the railway it was essential that every feeder for freight -and passenger service be utilized. This was a consideration -in the agreement with the Smyrna-Cassaba line an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span>d -in the purchase, in 1906, of the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana -Railway.<a name="FNanchor_34_161" id="FNanchor_34_161"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_161" class="fnanchor">34</a> The establishment of connections with the -former system developed a satisfactory volume of traffic -with Smyrna. The acquisition of the latter line provided -direct connections with the Mediterranean coast.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless, the promoters of the Bagdad Railway -were by no means satisfied with their terminal ports. Constantinople -was at a disadvantage as compared with -Smyrna in the trade of Anatolia. Smyrna was within -reach of the Bagdad system only over the tracks of a -French-owned line which might not always be in the -hands of well-disposed owners. The prospects that the -Railway soon would reach Basra were not very bright. -Mersina was limited in its possibilities of development—shut -off by the mountains from Anatolia, on the north, -and Syria, on the south, it was the natural outlet only for -the products of the Cilician plain.</p> - -<p>The port which the company sought to bring under -its control was Alexandretta, on the Mediterranean, -seventy miles from Aleppo. Article 12 of the concession -of 1903 assured preference to the Bagdad Railway Company -in the award of a “possible extension to the sea -at a point between Mersina and Tripoli-in-Syria.” The -construction of a branch from the main line to Alexandretta -would provide the Railway with sea communications -for the valuable trade of northern Syria and the -northern Mesopotamian valley, then almost entirely dependent -upon the caravan routes centering in Aleppo. Accordingly, -negotiations were begun in the spring of 1911 -looking toward the building of a branch line to Alexandretta -and the construction of extensive port facilities at -that harbor.</p> - -<p>Serious financial difficulties were encountered, however, -in the promotion of this plan. The Young Turk budget -of 1910 had announced that no further railway concessio<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span>ns -carrying guarantees would be granted. Even had -the Government been disposed to depart from its avowed -intention, it would have been unable to do so. Suffering -from the usual malady of a young government—lack of -funds—it was running into debt continually and finding -it increasingly difficult to borrow money. Early in 1911 -the Imperial Ottoman Treasury addressed a request to the -Powers for permission to increase the customs duties -from eleven to fourteen per cent. <i>ad valorem</i>. Great Britain -immediately announced its determination to veto the proposed -revision of the revenues, unless the increase were -granted with certain important qualifications. Sir Edward -Grey informed the House of Commons, March 8: “I wish -to see the new régime in Turkey strengthened. I wish to -see them supplied with resources which will enable them -to establish strong and just government in all parts of the -Turkish Empire. I am aware that money is needed for -these purposes, and I would willingly ask British trade -to make sacrifices for these purposes. But if the money -is to be used to promote railways which may be a source -of doubtful advantage to British trade, and still more if the -money is going to be used to promote railways which will -take the place of communications which have been in the -hands of British concessionaires [<i>i.e.</i>, the Lynch Brothers], -then I say it will be impossible for us to agree to that -increase of the customs duty until we are satisfied that -British trade interests will be satisfactorily guarded.”<a name="FNanchor_35_162" id="FNanchor_35_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_162" class="fnanchor">35</a> -This clear pronouncement of British policy made it plain -that no increased Turkish customs revenues could be diverted -to the proposed Alexandretta branch. It was even -doubtful if further funds would be forthcoming for the -construction of the main line beyond El Helif.</p> - -<p>This complicated domestic and international situation -led to the conventions of March 21, 1911, between the Imperial -Ottoman Government and the Bagdad Railway<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span> -Company. One of these conventions provided for the -construction of a branch line of the Bagdad Railway from -Osmanie, on the main line, to Alexandretta, but without -kilometric guarantee or other subsidy from the Turkish -Government. A second convention leased for a period -of ninety-nine years to the Haidar Pasha Port Company -the exclusive rights of constructing port and terminal -facilities at Alexandretta—including quays, docks, warehouses, -coal pockets, and elevators. As in the case of the -Bagdad Railway itself, public lands were to be at the disposal -of the concessionaires without charge, and private -lands were to be subject to the law of expropriation if -essential for the purposes of the Company. Within the -limits of the port the Company was authorized to maintain -a police force for the maintenance of order and the -protection of its property.<a name="FNanchor_36_163" id="FNanchor_36_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_163" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>Because of the refusal of the Powers to permit an increase -in the customs, the Turkish Government was unable -to assign further revenues to the payment of railway -guarantees. The Bagdad Railway Company thereupon -agreed to proceed with the construction of the sections -from El Helif to Bagdad without additional commitments -from the Imperial Ottoman Treasury. The Company likewise -renounced its right to build the sections beyond -Bagdad, including its concession for the construction of -port works at Basra, with the proviso, however, that this -section of the line, if constructed, be assigned to a Turkish -company internationally owned and administered.<a name="FNanchor_37_164" id="FNanchor_37_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_164" class="fnanchor">37</a> This -surrender by the Bagdad Railway Company of its rights -to the pledge of additional revenues by the Ottoman -Treasury and its surrender of its hold on the sections of -the railway beyond Bagdad are by far the most important -provisions of the conventions of March 21, 1911.</p> - -<p>German opinion, as a whole, considered these self-denying -contracts of the Company an indication of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span> -willingness of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the German Government -to go more than half way in removing diplomatic -objections to the construction of the Bagdad Railway.<a name="FNanchor_38_165" id="FNanchor_38_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_165" class="fnanchor">38</a> -There were Englishmen, however, who felt that the conventions -of 1911 were a mere gesture of conciliation; in -their opinion the renunciation of these important rights -was bait held out to win foreign diplomatic support and -to induce the participation of foreign capital in the Railway -and its subsidiary enterprises. Lord Curzon, for example, -expressed to the House of Lords his belief that -technical and financial difficulties made it impossible for -the German bankers to proceed with the construction of -the Bagdad line without the assistance of outside capital. -He was firmly of the opinion that no railway stretching -from the Bosporus to the Gulf could be financed by a -single Power.<a name="FNanchor_39_166" id="FNanchor_39_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_166" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>The unsettled political conditions in Turkey, meanwhile, -had delayed, but not halted, construction of the Bagdad -Railway. The years 1910 and 1911 were marked -by progress on the sections in the vicinity of Adana. -From that Cilician city the railway was being laid westward -to the Taurus Mountains, eventually to pass through -the Great Gates and meet the tracks already laid to Bulgurlu. -Eastward the line was being constructed in the -direction of the Amanus mountains, although there seemed -to be little chance for an early beginning of the costly -tunneling of the barrier. During 1911 and 1912 attention -was concentrated on the building of the sections east of -Aleppo, which in 1912 reached the Euphrates River. The -branch line to Alexandretta was completed and opened to -traffic November 1, 1913.<a name="FNanchor_40_167" id="FNanchor_40_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_167" class="fnanchor">40</a> Financial difficulties in the -way of further construction of the main line were overcome -in the latter part of 1913, when the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> -disposed of its holdings in the Macedonian Railways and -the Oriental Railways to an Austro-Hungarian syndicate.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span> -The funds thus obtained were re-invested in the Bagdad -Railway, and the necessity was obviated for a further sale -of securities on the open market.<a name="FNanchor_41_168" id="FNanchor_41_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_168" class="fnanchor">41</a> In 1914 the Amanus -tunnels were begun, a great steel bridge was thrown across -the Euphrates, the sections east of Aleppo were constructed -almost to Ras el Ain, in northern Mesopotamia. In addition, -rails were laid from Bagdad north to Sadijeh, on -the Tigris, before the outbreak of the Great War.<a name="FNanchor_42_169" id="FNanchor_42_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_169" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<p>Thus far we have considered the Bagdad Railway almost -entirely as a business undertaking. In its inception, in -fact, it was generally thus regarded throughout Europe. -As time passed, however, the enterprise overstepped the -bounds of purely economic interest and entered the arena -of international diplomacy. The greatest usefulness of the -Bagdad Railway was in the economic services it was -capable of rendering the Ottoman Empire and, further, -all mankind. Its widest significance is to be sought in the -part it played in the development of German capitalistic -imperialism. Its greatest menace was its consequent -effects upon the relations between Turkey, Germany, and -the other Great Powers of Europe. The succeeding chapters -will deal with the political ramifications of the Bagdad -enterprise.</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_128" id="Footnote_1_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_128"><span class="label">1</span></a> Dr. Arthur von Gwinner (1856- ) is one of the most distinguished -of modern financiers. He was born, appropriately -enough, at Frankfort-on-the-Main when that city was a center -of international finance. His father, a lawyer, was an intimate -friend of Schopenhauer and the latter’s executor and biographer. -In 1885 young Gwinner married a daughter of Philip Speyer -and thus became a member of one of the famous families of -bankers in Europe and America. For a time he conducted a -private banking business in Berlin, but in 1894 he became an -active director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. Two years later he was -sent to America to supervise the reorganization of the Northern -Pacific Railway by its European creditors; and while he was -in the United States, he formed lasting friendships with J. Pierpont<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span> -Morgan and James J. Hill. In 1901 he succeeded Dr. von -Siemens as the guiding spirit of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, which under -his administration made even more remarkable progress than -under his capable predecessor. As managing director of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> he became president of the Anatolian and Bagdad -Railway Companies. It was in 1909 that Dr. von Gwinner’s -father received from the Kaiser the patent of hereditary nobility—an -honor said to have been intended as much for the distinguished -son as for the distinguished sire. Intellectually, Dr. von -Gwinner is an international man: he quotes Dickens and Shakespeare -and Molière, Goethe and Schiller and Lessing, with almost -equal facility. His delightful personality stands out in all the -Bagdad Railway negotiations.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_129" id="Footnote_2_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_129"><span class="label">2</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, Chapter IX. The French bankers also shared in the -ownership of the construction company. A. Géraud, “A New -German Empire: the Story of the Bagdad Railway,” in <i>The -Nineteenth Century</i>, Volume 75 (1914), p. 967; <i>Report of the -Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1903, pp. 4, 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_130" id="Footnote_3_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_130"><span class="label">3</span></a> Among the German members were Dr. von Gwinner; Dr. -Karl Testa, representative of the German bondholders on the -Ottoman Public Debt Administration; Dr. Alfred von Kaulla, a -director of the <i>Württembergische Vereinsbank</i>, and original concessionaire -of the Anatolian Railways; Dr. Karl Schrader, a -member of the Reichstag; Dr. Kurt Zander, general manager -of the Anatolian Railway Company. The directors nominated by -the French interests were Count A. D’Arnoux, Director General, -and M. Léon Berger, French member, of the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration; MM. J. Deffes, G. Auboyneau, P. Naville, -Pangiri Bey, and A. Vernes, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the -last-named being vice-president of the Bagdad Railway Company; -M. L. Chenut, a member of the Ottoman <i>Régie Générale de -chemins de fer</i>. The Turkish members of the Board were -Hamdy Bey, representative of the Ottoman bondholders on the -Public Debt Administration; Hoene Effendi, under-secretary in -the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs; and two Constantinople -bankers. The Swiss were Herr Abegg-Arter, president of the -<i>Schweizerische Kreditanstalt</i>, of Zurich, and M. A. Turrettini, -of <i>L’Union financière de Genève</i>. The Austrian was Herr Bauer, -of the <i>Wiener Bankverein</i>, and the Italian was Carlo Esterle, -of the Italian Edison Electric Company, of Milan. There were -few important changes in the personnel of the Board of Directors -between 1903 and 1914, perhaps the most notable being the election -of Dr. Karl Helfferich, in 1906. <i>Cf.</i> <i>Reports of the Bagdad -Railway Company</i>, 1903, <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_131" id="Footnote_4_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_131"><span class="label">4</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fourth series, -Volume 120 (1903), p. 1371. During the Great War<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span> a conspicuous -German general complained that the Swiss in charge of the -operation of the Railway was more interested in the commercial -than in the strategic value of the line and did not coöperate with -the military authorities. <i>Cf.</i> Field Marshal Liman von Sanders, -<i>Fünf Jahre Türkei</i> (Berlin, 1919), p. 40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_132" id="Footnote_5_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_132"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Stenographische Berichte, -XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_133" id="Footnote_6_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_133"><span class="label">6</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 77.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_134" id="Footnote_7_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_134"><span class="label">7</span></a> Paul Imbert, “Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in <i>Revue des -deux mondes</i>, Volume 197 (1907), p. 672. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, -with its capital and surplus of about $75,000,000, was the foremost -of the German banks. Associated with it in the Bagdad -Railway enterprise were a number of other financial institutions, -including, it is said, the <i>Dresdner Bank</i> and the <i>Darmstädter -Bank</i>, ranking second and fourth respectively among the great -banks of the German Empire. Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 642–644.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_135" id="Footnote_8_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_135"><span class="label">8</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, Chapter IV, Note 48; Fraser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 48–49; -Jastrow, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 94; <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, -1904, p. 3; 1905, p. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_136" id="Footnote_9_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_136"><span class="label">9</span></a> Von Gwinner, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 1088.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_137" id="Footnote_10_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_137"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume III, pp. 221–228.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_138" id="Footnote_11_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_138"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Turkey in Europe</i>, pp. 128–129; <i>The Quarterly Review</i>, -Volume 228 (1917), pp. 510–511; <i>Parliamentary Debates, House -of Commons</i>, fourth series, Volume 159 (1906), pp. 1338, 1359; -<i>ibid.</i>, Volume 162 (1906), p. 1419; Volume 178 (1907), p. 321; -<i>ibid.</i>, fifth series, Volume 53 (1913), p. 368.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_139" id="Footnote_12_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_139"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad—Convention -Additionelle</i> (Constantinople, 1908); <i>Parliamentary -Papers</i>, No. Cd. 5636, Volume CIII (1911); <i>Report of the -Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1908, pp. 4–5; 1909, p. 4; <i>Bagdad Railway -Loan Contract, Second and Third Series</i>, June 2, 1908; -<i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1909, p. 12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_140" id="Footnote_13_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_140"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1909, p. 12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_141" id="Footnote_14_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_141"><span class="label">14</span></a> <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1906, p. 4; K. Helfferich, -<i>Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</i>, pp. 131–132; Dr. -Helfferich’s reputation was based largely upon his writings on -two important subjects: the gold monetary standard; government -promotion of foreign trade. <i>Cf.</i> <i>Germany and the Gold -Standard</i> (London, 1896); <i>Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen -Geldreform</i> (Leipzig, 1901). See the enthusiastic appreciation -of Dr. Helfferich’s services voiced by his associates of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> upon the occasion of his appointment as Secretary -of State for the Imperial Treasury, January, 1915. <i>Report -of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1915, pp. 11–12; <i>Report of the -Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1914, p. 8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_142" id="Footnote_15_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_142"><span class="label">15</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, October 25, 1905, commenting upon the proposed -appointment of Helfferich.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">117</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_143" id="Footnote_16_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_143"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1907, p. 7; H. C. -Woods, “The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries,” in <i>The Geographical -Journal</i>, Volume 50 (1917), pp. 32 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Parliamentary -Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 964 (1920). The irrigation system -thus planned was completed before the outbreak of the Great -War. It justified the sanguine expectations of its promoters, -for the agricultural yield of the irrigated lands increased from -five to fifteen fold over the former production. In 1911 a similar -irrigation project was gotten under way in Cilicia. <i>Diplomatic -and Consular Reports</i>, No. 4835 (1911), pp. 18–19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_144" id="Footnote_17_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_144"><span class="label">17</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, p. 37.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_145" id="Footnote_18_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_145"><span class="label">18</span></a> Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 454; <i>Report of the Dresdner Bank</i>, 1905, -p. 6; <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3553 (1905), p. 29; -<i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1908, p. 10. The Bagdad office of -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> was not established until 1914, just before -the outbreak of the War. <i>Ibid.</i>, 1914, p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_146" id="Footnote_19_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_146"><span class="label">19</span></a> The principal bank in Turkey before the War was the Imperial -Ottoman Bank. This institution was owned by French -and British capitalists, the French interest being predominant -and in control. It was a quasi-public bank, founded in 1863, -and enjoying since then a monopoly of bank-note issues. Its -central office was at Constantinople, but it maintained a branch -in practically every important city of Asiatic Turkey, including -Smyrna, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Beirut, Damascus, -Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. The capital stock of the Imperial -Ottoman Bank was £10,000,000 sterling. A British bank -of some importance was The Eastern Bank, Ltd., of which the -Right Honorable Lord Balfour of Burleigh was chairman—the -same Lord Balfour who was Secretary for Scotland in the -ministry of his namesake, Arthur J. Balfour, in 1903, when the -British Government quashed the participation of English capitalists -in the Bagdad Railway. The head office of the Eastern -Bank was in London, and it maintained branches in Basra and -Bagdad, although its principal sphere of activity was India. Sir -Ernest Cassell’s National Bank of Turkey was not established -until 1909. <i>Cf.</i> Caillard, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 439; weekly advertisements -of these banks in <i>The Near East; Parliamentary Debates</i>, Index -for 1903, p. v; <i>Turkey in Europe</i>, p. 36.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_147" id="Footnote_20_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_147"><span class="label">20</span></a> D. S. Jordan, “The Interlocking Directorates of War,” in -<i>The World’s Work</i>, July, 1913, p. 278; H. Hauser, <i>Les Méthodes -Allemandes d’Expansion Économique</i>, seventh edition (Paris, -1917), <i>passim</i>; Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 366–367.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_148" id="Footnote_21_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_148"><span class="label">21</span></a> Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 373–375, 432, 474, 745–746.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_149" id="Footnote_22_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_149"><span class="label">22</span></a> <i>Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c. The -speech of the Secretary was followed by “Bravos” from the -National Liberals.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">118</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_150" id="Footnote_23_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_150"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fourth series, -Volume 121 (1903), p. 1340.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_151" id="Footnote_24_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_151"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3140 (1903), p. 40.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_152" id="Footnote_25_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_152"><span class="label">25</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 98–99, <i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1909, p. 12; -<i>Stenographische Berichte, XII. Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 260 (1910), p. 2181d, statement by Baron von Schoen.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_153" id="Footnote_26_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_153"><span class="label">26</span></a> Fraser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 16–17, 18–20. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Report of the -Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1911, p. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_154" id="Footnote_27_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_154"><span class="label">27</span></a> <i>Staatsbürger Zeitung</i> (Berlin), March 3, 1912.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_155" id="Footnote_28_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_155"><span class="label">28</span></a> Compiled from the <i>Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche -Reich</i>, 1900–1914, as corrected for 1900–1905 according to the -<i>Statistisches Handbuch für das deutsche Reich</i>, Volume 2, pp. -506–510. A remarkable increase of German exports to Turkey—an -increase of 50%—is to be noted in the year 1904, during -which the first section of the Bagdad Railway was constructed. -Undoubtedly this increase is to be partially accounted for by the -purchase in Germany of materials for right of way as well as -rolling stock for the railway. This factor should not be over-estimated, -however, as a glance at the following tables will show -that imports into Turkey from other European countries during -the same year likewise showed increases, without exception. -The general falling off in trade during 1908 may be attributed, -in part, at any rate, to the Young Turk Revolution of that -year.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_156" id="Footnote_29_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_156"><span class="label">29</span></a> Compiled from <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, Nos. 2950 -(1902), 3533 (1905), 4188 (1908), and 4835 (1910–1911).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_157" id="Footnote_30_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_157"><span class="label">30</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 36.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_158" id="Footnote_31_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_158"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3533 (1905), p. 27; -<i>Turkey in Europe</i>, pp. 86–87.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_159" id="Footnote_32_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_159"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>Mesopotamia</i>, pp. 99–101; Schaefer, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 22. Regarding -British interests in the Persian Gulf, <i>cf.</i>, a detailed statement -by Lord Lansdowne to the House of Lords, May 5, 1903. -<i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fourth series, Volume -121 (1903), pp. 1347–1348.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_160" id="Footnote_33_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_160"><span class="label">33</span></a> “Bagdad: Handelsbericht des kaiserlichen Konsulats für das -Jahr 1908–1909,” in <i>Deutsches Handels-Archiv</i>, 1910, part 2, pp. -27–35; also, “Bericht über den Handel in Basra und Bagdad für -das Jahr 1910,” <i>ibid.</i>, 1912, part 2, pp. 263–270; <i>Mesopotamia</i>, p. -108.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_161" id="Footnote_34_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_161"><span class="label">34</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 59–60; <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, -1906, p. 4, 1908, pp. 7–8; <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. -3533 (1905), p. 29. The Mersina-Adana line was formally incorporated -in the Bagdad system in 1908. <i>Cf.</i> <i>Deuxième convention -additionelle à la convention du chemin de fer de Bagdad</i> (Constantinople, -1910).</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_162" id="Footnote_35_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_162"><span class="label">35</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fifth series, -Volume 22 (1911), pp. 1284–1285.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_163" id="Footnote_36_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_163"><span class="label">36</span></a> <i>Quatrième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, -1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad</i> (Constantinople, 1911). -H. F. B. Lynch (of the firm of Lynch Brothers), “The Bagdad -Railway: the New Conventions,” in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, new -series, Volume 89 (1911), pp. 773–780. Mr. Lynch explains that -his summary of the Alexandretta port concessions is based upon -an authentic article appearing in <i>La Turquie</i>, a Constantinople -newspaper, of March 21, 1911. <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, -No. 4835 (1911), p. 16; <i>The Times</i> (London), March 23, 1911.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_164" id="Footnote_37_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_164"><span class="label">37</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII. Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5984c <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Troisième convention additionelle -à la convention du 5 Mars, 1903, relative au chemin de -fer de Bagdad</i> (Constantinople, 1911); <i>Parliamentary Debates, -House of Commons</i>, fifth series, Volume 23 (1911), pp. 582–583, -statement by Sir Edward Grey.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_165" id="Footnote_38_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_165"><span class="label">38</span></a> See speeches of Herr Scheidemann and Herr Bassermann -before the Reichstag, March 30, 1911. <i>Stenographische Berichte, -XII. Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5980 -<i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_166" id="Footnote_39_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_166"><span class="label">39</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fifth series, Volume -23 (1911), p. 589.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_167" id="Footnote_40_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_167"><span class="label">40</span></a> D. Chatir, “L’État actuel du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in -<i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 36 (1913), pp. 279–281; -<i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1910, p. 4, 1911, -p. 4, 1913, pp. 3–5, 1914, pp. 6–8.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_168" id="Footnote_41_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_168"><span class="label">41</span></a> <i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1913, pp. 11–12.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_169" id="Footnote_42_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_169"><span class="label">42</span></a> <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1914, pp. 6–8. It -was not until September, 1918, that the Amanus tunnels were -completed, the first train being operated through to Aleppo just -before the capture of that city by Lord Allenby’s army. Von -Sanders, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 42.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER VI<br /> - -THE BAGDAD RAILWAY BECOMES AN -IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Political Interests Come to the Fore</span></h3> - -<p>It was asserted times without number that the Bagdad -Railway was an independent financial enterprise, unconnected -with the political aims of the German Government -in Turkey and in no sense associated with an imperialist -policy in the Near East. At the time the concession of -1903 was granted Dr. Rohrbach expressed the belief that -political and diplomatic considerations were quite outside -the plans and purposes of the promoters of the Railway.<a name="FNanchor_1_170" id="FNanchor_1_170"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_170" class="fnanchor">1</a> -Herr Bassermann, leader of the National Liberal Party, -announced to the Reichstag that, although German capital -was predominant in the Railway, there was no intent on -the part of the owners or on the part of the Government -to build with any political <i>arrière-pensée</i>. Baron von -Schoen, Imperial Secretary for Foreign Affairs, reiterated -this idea with emphasis. He pointed out that the Bagdad -convention of 1903 was <i>not a treaty</i> between Germany -and Turkey, <i>but a contract</i> between the Ottoman Government -and the Anatolian Railway Company. He maintained -that if the railway were considered, properly, as a purely -economic enterprise, “all the fantastic schemes that ar<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span>e -from time to time being attached to it would evaporate.”<a name="FNanchor_2_171" id="FNanchor_2_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_171" class="fnanchor">2</a> -A British journalist wrote in 1913: “Gwinner, it may be -assumed, is not building the Bagdad Railway for the purposes -of the German General Staff. What chiefly keeps -him awake of nights is how to extract dividends from it -for the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and how best to promote the golden -opportunities which await the strategists of the German -trading army in the Near East.”<a name="FNanchor_3_172" id="FNanchor_3_172"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_172" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>The German Government, nevertheless, had been interested -in the Bagdad plan almost from its inception. -The visits of the Emperor to Constantinople and Palestine; -the appointment of German military and consular officers -to the technical commission which surveyed the line in -1899; the enthusiastic support of the German ambassador -all contributed to the success of the enterprise. In fact, -the German Government was almost too solicitous of the -welfare of the concessionaires; assistance, it was said, -bordered upon interference. During the early stages of -the negotiations of 1898–1899 Dr. von Siemens complained -that the German embassy was jeopardizing the -success of the project by insisting that the issuance of the -concessions should be considered a diplomatic, as well as -a business, triumph. Dr. von Gwinner, also, was discontented -with the tendency of the German Government to -urge strategic, rather than purely economic, considerations. -There was a widespread belief in Germany, as -well as elsewhere in Europe, that the Imperial Foreign -Office nurtured the Bagdad Railway and its affiliated enterprises -with a full realization that “the skirmishes of the -political advance guard are fought on financial ground, -although the selection of the time and the enemy, as well -as the manner in which these skirmishes are to be fought, -depends upon those responsible for our foreign policy. -Much more than ever before Germans will have to bear in -mind that industrial contracts, commercial enterprises, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span> -capital investments are conveying from one country to -another not only capital and labor, but also political influence.”<a name="FNanchor_4_173" id="FNanchor_4_173"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_173" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>Had the German Government been disposed to pursue -a different policy in the Near East, had it refused to link -its political power with the economic interests of its nationals, -it would have been standing out against an accepted -practice of the Great Powers. Lord Lansdowne, -British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed -the House of Lords, in May, 1903, that it was impossible -for the Foreign Office to dissociate commercial and political -interests. He doubted whether British success in -the Middle and Far East could have been achieved without -careful diplomatic promotion of British economic interests -in those regions.<a name="FNanchor_5_174" id="FNanchor_5_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_174" class="fnanchor">5</a> Through financial control Russia -and Great Britain effectually throttled Persian reform -and nationalist aspirations. The pioneer activities of -French capital in Tunis and Morocco are outstanding instances -of modern imperial procedure. Such also is the use -by the Government of the French Republic of its power -to deny listings on the Paris Bourse for the purpose of -forcing political concessions—a procedure which a French -banker described to the author as “a species of international -blackmail.”<a name="FNanchor_6_175" id="FNanchor_6_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_175" class="fnanchor">6</a> A prominent historian and economist -has described the Franco-Russian alliance as a “bankers’ -creation.”<a name="FNanchor_7_176" id="FNanchor_7_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_176" class="fnanchor">7</a> What other powers had been doing it was to -be expected that Germany would do. The ownership and -operation of the Bagdad Railway by a predominantly German -company was an important factor in a notable expansion -of German commercial and financial activities in -the Near East. In an age of keen competition for economic -influence in the so-called backward areas of the -world, this growth of German interests in Turkey was -almost certain to influence the diplomatic policy of Germany -toward the Ottoman Empire. The political aspirations -of the diplomatists were reënforced by the econ<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span>omic -interests of the bankers.</p> - -<p>Had the German Government not voluntarily taken the -Bagdad enterprise under its wing, it might have been compelled -to do so. Popular dissatisfaction with a “weak” -policy toward investments in backward countries may -force the hand of an unwilling government. Whether -this dissatisfaction be spontaneous or created by an interested -press or both, it is certain to be powerful, for -there are few governments which can resist for long the -clamor for vigorous fostering of the nation’s interests and -rights abroad. And there was no lack of popular enthusiasm -in Germany for the Bagdad Railway. The fact -that French capital had been invested in the undertaking -was usually forgotten. The grand design came to be referred -to, affectionately, as <i>unser Bagdad</i> and, somewhat -flamboyantly, as the “B. B. B.” (Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad). -German publicists of imperial inclinations contemplated -the Railway with reverent amazement, as though -hypnotized. The project speedily became an integral part -of the national <i>Weltanschauung</i>—a means of enabling -Germans to compete for the rich commerce of the Orient, -to appropriate some of its enormous wealth, to develop -some of its apparently boundless possibilities. As a branch -of <i>Weltpolitik</i> it held out alluring inducements for the -exercise of political influence in the East—an influence -which would serve at once to discomfit the Continental -rivals of Germany and to promote the <i>Drang nach Osten</i> -of her Habsburg ally.</p> - -<p>The political aims of the German Empire in Turkey, -however, were not concerned with colonization or conquest. -It was not proposed, for example, to encourage German -colonization of the regions traversed by the Bagdad Railway. -During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, -it is true, attempts had been made to stimulate German -settlements in Syria and Mesopotamia. But later, when<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span> -the problem of German oversea migration had become -less acute, all proposals for German colonization in the -Near East were abandoned.<a name="FNanchor_8_177" id="FNanchor_8_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_177" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>The difficulties in the way of European settlement of -Asiatic Turkey were almost insurmountable. Mesopotamia -is unbearably hot during the summer and is totally unfit -for colonization by Europeans. During July and August -the thermometer registers between 100 and 120 almost -every day, and the heat is particularly oppressive because -of the relatively high humidity. The total number of -Europeans resident in Mesopotamia before the War was -not in excess of 200, who were almost all missionaries, -engineers, consuls, or archæologists. Palestine is more -suitable as a place of residence, but the country is not -particularly alluring; a few German agricultural colonies, -chiefly Jewish, were established there, but they were comparatively -unimportant in size, wealth, and political influence. -In Anatolia the climate is tolerable, but not -healthful for western Europeans. The plateau is subject -to sudden and extreme changes in temperature in both -winter and summer, and, consequently, pneumonia and -malaria are almost epidemic among foreigners. To the -German who was considering leaving the Fatherland to -seek his fortune abroad, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia -were by no means as attractive as Wisconsin, Minnesota, -and the Dakotas. Turkey offered few inducements -to compare with the lure of the United States or of South -America.<a name="FNanchor_9_178" id="FNanchor_9_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_178" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>In addition to these natural difficulties, there existed -the pronounced opposition of the Turks to foreign colonization -of their homeland. This opposition was so deep-rooted -that General von der Goltz warned his fellow -countrymen not to migrate to the Near East if friendly -relations were to be maintained with the Ottoman<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span> Empire. -Paul Rohrbach said that colonization of Turkey-in-Asia -by Europeans was quite out of the question. H. F. B. -Lynch, of the English firm of Lynch Brothers, one of the -most pronounced opponents of the Bagdad Railway, declared -that fear of German settlement of Asia Minor was -sheer nonsense, that no such plan was in contemplation -by the promoters of the Bagdad enterprise, and that the -reports of such intentions were the work of ignorant chauvinists. -It will be recalled, also, that a secret annex to the -concession of 1903 pledged the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> not to encourage -German or other foreign immigration into -Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_10_179" id="FNanchor_10_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_179" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>Germans denied, likewise, that they had any intention -of utilizing the Bagdad Railway as a means of acquiring -an exclusive sphere of economic interest in the Ottoman -Empire. Attention was continually directed to Articles -24 and 25 of the Specifications of 1903, which decreed -that rates must be applicable to all travelers and consignors -without discrimination, and which prohibited the concessionaires -from entering into any contract whatever with -the object of granting preferential treatment to any one. -Arthur von Gwinner, President of the Bagdad Railway, -stated that his company had loyally abided by its announced -policy of equality of treatment for all, regardless of nationality -or other considerations, and he challenged the -critics of the enterprise to cite a single instance in which -the contrary had been the case. Dr. Rohrbach wrote, in -1903, that it was “unthinkable that Germans should seek -to monopolize the territories of the Turkish Empire for -the purposes of economic exploitation.” Somewhat later -he again stressed this point: “Germany’s political attitude -to Turkey is unlike that of all other European powers because, -in all sincerity, we ask not a single foot of Turkish -territory in Europe, Asia, or Africa, but have only the -wish and the interest to find in Turkey—whether its dom<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span>ination -be in future restricted to Asia or not—a market -and a source of raw materials for our industry; and in -this respect we advance no claim on other nations than -that of the unconditional open door.” Baron von Schoen -pledged the Government to a policy of equal and unqualified -opportunity for all in the regions to be opened up -by the Railway.<a name="FNanchor_11_180" id="FNanchor_11_180"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_180" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that the -Germans had any intention of establishing a protectorate -over Asiatic Turkey. Their determination to respect the -territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was due, of -course, not to magnanimity on their part as much as to -expediency. Protectorates are expensive. For the same -reason it may be doubted that there was any intention of -maintaining an extensive military control over Turkey. -German aims were to be served by the economic, military, -and political renaissance of Turkey-in-Asia. A strong -Turkey economically would be a Turkey so much the -better able to increase the production of raw materials for -the German market as well as to provide an ever more -prosperous market for the products of German factories. -A powerful Turkish military machine might strike some -telling blows, in alliance with German arms, in a general -European war; in the event of a Near Eastern conflict it -might be utilized to menace the southern frontier of Russia -or to strike at British communications with India. A -politically strong Ottoman Empire might offer serious -resistance to the Russian advance in the Middle East and -might menace Britain’s hold on her Mohammedan possessions.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, a Turkey in subjection would be an -unwilling producer and a poor customer. The occupation -of Turkey by German armed forces would seriously deplete -the ranks of the German armies on the Russian and -French frontiers, and in time of war would confront the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span> -German General Staff with the additional problem of maintaining -order in hostile Mohammedan territory. The -conquering of Turkey would bring the German Empire -into the ranks of European powers with Mohammedan -subjects, thus exposing it to the menace, common to Great -Britain, France, and Russia, of a Pan-Islamic revival. -For all of these reasons the obvious German policy was -not only to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey, -but to defend it against the encroachments of other -powers. “Not a penny for a weak Turkey,” said Rohrbach, -“but for a strong Turkey everything we can give!”<a name="FNanchor_12_181" id="FNanchor_12_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_181" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>In its political aspects the Bagdad Railway was something -more than a railway. It was one phase of the great -diplomatic struggle for the predominance of power, one -pawn in the great game between the Alliance and the -Entente, one element of the Anglo-German rivalry on the -seas. The development of closer relations, political and -economic, between Germany and Turkey was in accord -with the spirit of an era of universal preparedness—preparedness -for pressing economic competition, preparedness -for the expected great European war in which every nation -would be obliged to fight for its very existence. Through -control of the economic resources of the Ottoman Empire, -German diplomacy sought to arrive at an <i>entente cordiale</i> -or a formal military alliance with the Sultan. Through -support of the chief Mohammedan power Germany might -throw tempting “apples of discord” into the colonial empires -of her chief European rivals, for Great Britain ruled -about eighty-five million subject Mohammedans, Russia -about seventeen million, France about fifteen million; but -Germany possessed almost none.<a name="FNanchor_13_182" id="FNanchor_13_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_182" class="fnanchor">13</a> Friedrich Naumann -wrote in 1889, in connection with the Kaiser’s pilgrimage to -the Near East: “It is possible that the world war will break -out before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. -Then the Caliph of Constantinople will once <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span>more uplift -the standard of the Holy War. The Sick Man will raise -himself for the last time to shout to Egypt, the Soudan, -East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, ‘War against -England.’ It is not unimportant to know who will support -him on his bed when he utters this cry.”<a name="FNanchor_14_183" id="FNanchor_14_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_183" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>This menace to the British Empire was no more serious -than another which was frankly espoused by certain supporters -of the Bagdad plan—the possibility, even without -a preponderance of naval power, of severing the communications -of the empire in time of war. Dr. Rohrbach, -for example, put it this way: “If it comes to war with -England, it will be for Germany simply a question of life -and death. The possibility that events may turn out -favorably for us depends wholly and solely upon whether -we can succeed in putting England herself in a precarious -position. That cannot be done by a direct attack in the -North Sea; all idea of invading England is purely chimerical. -We must, therefore, seek other means which -will enable us to strike England in a vulnerable spot.... -England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land -from Europe in only one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt -would mean not only the end of her dominion over the -Suez Canal and of her communications with India and the -Far East, but would probably entail, also, the loss of her -possessions in Central and East Africa. We can never -dream, however, of attacking Egypt until Turkey is mistress -of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and -Syria, and until, through the extension of the Anatolian -Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an -attack by England upon Mesopotamia.... The stronger -Turkey grows the more dangerous does she become for -England.”<a name="FNanchor_15_184" id="FNanchor_15_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_184" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<p>It is only fair to add, however, that Dr. Rohrbach was -not an authorized spokesman of the German people, the -German Government, or the Bagdad Railway Company.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span> -His views were personal and are to be given weight only -in so far as they influenced or reflected public opinion in -Germany; to estimate their importance by such a standard -is no simple task. But whatever its true significance, Dr. -Rohrbach’s interest in the Bagdad Railway was certainly -a source of great annoyance to Dr. von Gwinner, who was -constantly called upon to explain irresponsible, provocative, -and bombastic statements from Rohrbach’s pen. It -is well to recall that the writings of publicists are sometimes -taken too seriously.<a name="FNanchor_16_185" id="FNanchor_16_185"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_185" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>It would have been foolhardy, nevertheless, to discard -these possibilities as purely imaginary. Once the Bagdad -Railway was constructed and its subsidiary enterprises -developed, there would have existed the great temptation -to utilize economic influence for the promotion of strategic -and diplomatic purposes. In an era of intensive military -and economic preparedness for war the observance of the -niceties of international relationships is not always to be -counted upon. In such circumstances the wishes of -the business men—whether they were imperialistic or anti-imperialistic—may -be over-ruled by the statesmen and -the soldiers. The chance to strike telling blows at French -prestige in the Levant; the opportunity to embarrass -Russia by strengthening Turkey; the possibility of menacing -the communications of the British Empire; the -likelihood of recruiting Turkish military and economic -strength in the cause of Germany,—these were alluring -prospects for discomfiting the Entente rivals of the German -Empire.</p> - -<p>At the same time it should be mentioned that promotion -of the Bagdad Railway would serve to weld firmer the -Austro-German alliance. Austrian ambitions in the Near -East centered in the Vienna-Salonica railway and were -distinct from the Berlin-to-Bagdad plan of the Germans; -nevertheless circumstances served to promote a commu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span>nity -of interest. First, the routes of the railways -through the Balkans coincided in part: the Austrian railway -ran <i>via</i> Belgrade and Nish to Salonica; traffic “from -Berlin to Bagdad” followed the same line to Nish, where -it branched off to Sofia and Constantinople. Second, -Austrian, as well as German, trade would be carried over -the Bagdad lines to the Orient, and Austrian industries -would be able to secure raw materials from Anatolia and -Mesopotamia. If the railway was to run from Berlin to -Bagdad, it also was to run from Vienna to Bagdad. Third, -similarly, German industry was to profit by the Austrian -railway to Salonica, for it opened a new route to German -commerce to the Aegean. “Germany’s road to the Orient -lay, literally as well as figuratively, across the Balkan -Peninsula.”<a name="FNanchor_17_186" id="FNanchor_17_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_186" class="fnanchor">17</a> The <i>Drang nach Osten</i> was near to the -hearts of both allies!</p> - -<p>It was not without warning that the German nation permitted -itself to be drawn into the imperial ramifications -of the Bagdad Railway. Anti-imperialists sensed the -dangers connected with such an ambitious project. Herr -Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats in the -Reichstag, for example, warned the German people that -the railway was certain to raise increasingly troublesome -international difficulties, and he expressed the fear that -the German protagonists of the plan would come to emphasize -more and more its political and military, rather -than its economic and cultural, phases.<a name="FNanchor_18_187" id="FNanchor_18_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_187" class="fnanchor">18</a> Karl Radek, also -a Socialist, wrote that “The Bagdad Railway possessed -great political significance from the very moment the plan -was conceived.” He prophesied that German economic -penetration in Turkey would prove to be only the first -step toward a formal military alliance, which, in turn, -would heighten the fear and animosity of the Entente -Powers. “The Bagdad Railway,” he said, “constitutes -the first great triumph of German capitalistic imperia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span>lism.”<a name="FNanchor_19_188" id="FNanchor_19_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_188" class="fnanchor">19</a> -Business men and politicians of imperialist inclinations -did not deny the charges of their pacifist opponents. -Herr Bassermann, so far from deprecating a -greater political influence in the Ottoman Empire, came -to glory in it. Baron von Schoen qualified his earlier -statements with the following enunciation of policy: “With -reference to the attitude of the Imperial Government, it -goes without saying that we are giving the enterprise our -full interest and attention and will make every effort to -further it.”<a name="FNanchor_20_189" id="FNanchor_20_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_189" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>The political potentialities of the Bagdad Railway -aroused the fear and opposition of the other European -Powers. Exaggerated charges were made as to the intentions -of the German promoters and the German Government, -and there was a widespread feeling that there was -something sinister about the plan. Professor Sarolea -sounded a prophetic warning when he wrote, “The trans-Mesopotamian -Railway ... will play in the Near East -the same ominous part which the Trans-Siberian played -in the Far East; with this important difference, however, -that whilst the Far Eastern conflict involved only one -European Power and one Asiatic Power, the Near Eastern -conflict, if it breaks out, must needs involve all the European -powers, must force the whole Eastern Question to -a crisis, and once begun, cannot be terminated until the -map of Europe and Asia shall be reconstructed.”<a name="FNanchor_21_190" id="FNanchor_21_190"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_190" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Religious and Cultural Interests Reënforce -Political and Economic Motives</span></h3> - -<p>Along with economic and political motives for imperialist -ventures there frequently goes a religious motive. -That such should be the case in the Near East was to be -expected because of the religious appeal of the Ottoman -Empire as the homeland of the Jews, the birthplace of -Christianit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span>y, the cradle of Mohammedanism. It was -small wonder, then, that the Bagdad Railway, which promised -to link Central European cities with the holy places -of Syria and Palestine, should have been supported -enthusiastically by German missionaries and other German -Christians.</p> - -<p>German Protestant missions were represented in the -Holy Land as early as 1860, when the Kaiserswerth Deaconesses -established themselves in Jerusalem. Shortly -thereafter the <i>Jerusalems-Verein</i> began work in Jerusalem -and Bethlehem, and about this same time, 1869, Lutheran -missionaries calling themselves Templars settled near -Jaffa. Under William II additional impetus was given -to German religious activities in the Near East. The -<i>Jerusalems-Verein</i>, which was taken under the special -patronage of the Kaiserin Auguste Victoria, supported a -Lutheran clergyman in Jerusalem and was responsible for -the erection in the Holy City of the Church of the Redeemer. -This same society rapidly spread its activities -throughout all of Palestine, and in 1910 it dedicated the -famous Kaiserin Auguste Victoria <i>Stiftung</i>,<a name="FNanchor_22_191" id="FNanchor_22_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_191" class="fnanchor">22</a> erected on -the Mount of Olives by the Hohenzollern family at a -cost in excess of half a million dollars. The Evangelical -Union, organized in 1896, established a large orphanage -in Jerusalem, together with schools and related institutions, -and proved to be a very useful auxiliary to the work of -the Deaconesses in maintaining schools, dispensaries, -and hospitals. Also in 1896 there was founded the -<i>Deutsche Orient Mission</i>, which rendered its services particularly -in Cilicia, and which kept up the interest of its -supporters at home by the publication in Berlin of a -monthly periodical, <i>Der Christliche Orient</i>. It was estimated -that, during the early years of the twentieth century, -the German Protestant societies maintained in Turkey-in-Asia -about 450 missionaries and several hundred native -assistants at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. -By 1910 the Germans occupied a conspicuous position<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span> in -evangelical missions in the Near East.<a name="FNanchor_23_192" id="FNanchor_23_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_192" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>The German Catholics were no less zealous than their -Protestant compatriots. Although for centuries Italian -and French members of the Franciscan order had been -preëminent in Catholic missions in Turkey, there was a -marked tendency during the last decade of the nineteenth -century and the first decade of the twentieth for German -members of other religious orders to take an interest in -the Near East. This may have been merely the result of -a general increase in missionary activity connected with -the increasing imperial activities of the German Government. -It may have been due to the announced intention -of the German Foreign Office to protect Christian missions -and missionaries and to the vigorous fulfilment of -that promise after the murder of two German Catholic -priests in the Chinese province of Shantung. It may have -been a natural consequence of the fact that the Prefect of -the Propaganda from 1892–1902 was a famous German -cardinal.<a name="FNanchor_24_193" id="FNanchor_24_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_193" class="fnanchor">24</a> In any event, under the guiding ægis of the -<i>Palästinaverein</i>, a society for the promotion of Catholic -missions in the Holy Land, German Lazarists, Benedictines, -and Carmelites established and maintained schools, -hospitals, and dispensaries, as well as churches, in Syria -and Palestine.<a name="FNanchor_25_194" id="FNanchor_25_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_194" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>Even Jewish religious interests in Palestine promoted -Teutonic peaceful penetration in Turkey. As part of the -Zionist activities of <i>L’Alliance Israelite Universelle</i>, agricultural -colonies were founded by German Jews in the -vicinity of Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa. These colonists -appeared to be proud of their German nationality and were -an integral part of the German community in the Holy -Land.<a name="FNanchor_26_195" id="FNanchor_26_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_195" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>The German Government had no intention of overlooking -the political possibilities of this religious penetration.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">134</a></span> -Promotion of missionary activities might be made to serve -a twofold purpose: first, to win the support, in domestic -politics, of those interested in the propagation of their -faith in foreign lands—more particularly to hold the loyalty -of the Catholic Centre party; second, to further one other -means of strengthening the bonds between Germany and -the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>An excellent illustration of the inter-relation among -economic, political, and religious aspects of modern imperialism -is to be found in the visit of William II to -Turkey in 1898. On the morning of October 31—the -anniversary of the posting of Luther’s ninety-five theses -at Wittenberg—the Emperor participated in the dedication -of the Lutheran Church of the Redeemer in Jerusalem. -During the afternoon of the same day he presented the -supposed site of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary to -the German Catholics of the Holy City, for the construction -thereon of a Catholic memorial church, and he telegraphed -the Pope expressing his hope that this might be -but one step in a steady progress of Catholic Christianity -in the Near East. The Kaiser likewise might have visited -the German Jewish communities in the vicinity of -Jerusalem, but perhaps he felt, as a French writer put it, -that such a visit “between his devotions at Gethsemane -and at Calvary would have created a public scandal.”<a name="FNanchor_27_196" id="FNanchor_27_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_196" class="fnanchor">27</a> -Nevertheless he did not hesitate, a week later, at Damascus, -to assure “three hundred million Mohammedans” that -the German Emperor was their friend. Yet with all this -pandering to religious interests—to the Protestants of -Prussia, to the Catholics of South Germany, to his Moslem -hosts—the Kaiser found time ostentatiously to promote -the German Consul at Constantinople to the rank -of Consul General. And upon his return home he justified -all of these activities on the ground that his visit -“would prove to be a lasting source of advantage to the -German name and German national interests.”<a name="FNanchor_28_197" id="FNanchor_28_197"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_197" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">135</a></span></p> - -<p>This curious admixture of religion and diplomacy was -made the more complicated when the Imperial Chancellor -informed the Reichstag, on December 7, 1898, that one of -the purposes of the Emperor’s visit to His Ottoman -Majesty was to make it plain that the German Government -did not propose to recognize anywhere “a foreign protectorate -over German subjects.” This served notice to -France that Germany would not respect the French -claim to exclusive protection of Catholic missionaries in -the Ottoman Empire. “We do not lay claim,” said Prince -von Bülow, “to a protectorate over all Christians in the -East. But only the German Emperor can protect German -subjects, be they Catholics or Protestants.”<a name="FNanchor_29_198" id="FNanchor_29_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_198" class="fnanchor">29</a> This pronouncement -was received in France with undisguisedly -poor grace. One writer in a prominent fortnightly magazine -frankly expressed his disgust: “Germany possesses -military power; she possesses economic power; she proposes -to acquire maritime power. But she needs the support -of moral power. On the world’s stage she aspires to -play the part of Principle. To base her world-wide prestige -upon the protection of Christianity, Protestant and Catholic; -to centralize the divergent sources of German influence; -to have all over the globe a band of followers, at -once religious and economic in their interests, who will -propagate the German idea, consume German products, -and, while professing the gospel of Christ, will preach the -gospel of the sacred person of the Emperor—these are -the ultimate ends of the world policy of William II.”<a name="FNanchor_30_199" id="FNanchor_30_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_199" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> - -<p>Closely allied with the spread of German missions was -the propagation of <i>das Deutschtum</i>—that is, the spread -of the German language, instruction in German history -and ideals, appreciation of the character of German civilization. -German religious schools in the Near East were -dynamos of German cultural influence. The <i>Jeru<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">136</a></span>salems-Verein</i> -alone, for example, maintained, in 1902, eight -schools with more than 430 pupils. In these schools German -was taught. This also was the case with the Catholic -schools, under German influence. Even the Jews—a large -number of whom had emigrated from Germany because -of anti-Semitic feeling there—carried with them their German -patriotism. The <i>Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden</i>, -the German section of <i>L’Alliance Israélite Universelle</i>, not -only taught German in its own schools, but made a strenuous -effort to have German adopted as the official language -of all Zionist schools in the Near East.<a name="FNanchor_31_200" id="FNanchor_31_200"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_200" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>It should be pointed out that this injection of nationalism -into religious education was an obvious imitation of -the French method of spreading imperial influence in Syria -and Palestine. And it was frankly admitted to be an -imitation. “A policy of German-Turkish culture,” wrote -Dr. Rohrbach, “deserves to be pressed with renewed ardor. -We must endeavor to make the German language, and -German science, and all the great positive values of our -energetic civilization, duties faithfully fulfilled—active -forces for the regeneration of Turkey by transplanting -them into Turkey. To do this we need above everything -else a system of German schools, which need not rival the -French in magnitude, but which must be planned on a -larger scale than that of the now existing schools. No -lasting and secure cultural influences are possible without -the connecting link of language. The intelligent and -progressive young men of Turkey should have an abundant -opportunity to learn German.... We can give the -Turks an impression of our civilization and a desire to -become familiar with it only when we teach them our language -and thus open the door for them to all of our -spiritual possessions. In doing this we are not aiming to -Germanize Turkey politically or economically or to colonize -it, but to introduce the German spirit into the great -national process of development through which that n<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span>ation, -which has a great future, happens to be passing.”<a name="FNanchor_32_201" id="FNanchor_32_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_201" class="fnanchor">32</a> French -methods were to be paid the compliment of imitation.</p> - -<p>The sentimental appeal of the Bagdad Railway was -more than a religious and cultural appeal alone. The -Great Plan was assiduously promoted by a patriotic and -Pan-German press. It caught the interest of the ordinary -workaday citizen, whose imagination was fired by the -sweeping references to “our” trade, “our” investments, -“our” religious interests in the Near East; the Bagdad -Railway was the very heart of all these interests. Here -was a railway which was to revive a medieval trade route -to the East, which was to traverse the route of the Crusades. -Here was a country which had been the much-sought-after -empire of the great nations of antiquity, -Assyria, Chaldea, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome. Here -had risen and fallen the great cities of Nineveh, Babylon, -and Hit. To these regions had turned the longing of the -great conquerors, Sargon, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, -Alexander, Saladin. With such materials some German -Kipling might evolve phrases far more alluring than Fuzzy -Wuzzy, and Tommy Atkins, and the White Man’s -Burden.<a name="FNanchor_33_202" id="FNanchor_33_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_202" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Some Few Voices are Raised in Protest</span></h3> - -<p>Not all Germans were dazzled by the Oriental glamor -of the Bagdad Railway plan. Herr Scheidemann, leader -of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, time and time -again sounded warnings against the complications almost -certain to result from the construction of the railway. -Speaking before the Reichstag in March, 1911, for example, -he said: “We are the last to misjudge the great -value of this road to civilization. We know its economic -significance: we know that it traverses a region which -in antiquity was a fabulously fertile country, and we <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span>welcome -it as a great achievement if the Bagdad Railway -opens up that territory. And if, by gigantic irrigation -projects, the land can be made into a granary for Europe, -as well as a land to which we could look for an abundant -supply of raw materials, such as cotton, that would be -doubly welcome.” But that is not all, continued Herr -Scheidemann. German capitalists would not be able to -overlook the military-strategic interests of the line, for -only the establishment of a strong centralized government -in Turkey “can offer European capitalism the necessary -security for the realization of its great capitalistic plans.” -This military strengthening of Turkey would be almost -certain, he pointed out, to arouse the opposition of Great -Britain, Russia, and France. Particularly was he desirous -of avoiding any additionally irritating relations with -Great Britain, for the traditional friendship with that nation -had already been seriously compromised by colonial -and naval rivalries.<a name="FNanchor_34_203" id="FNanchor_34_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_203" class="fnanchor">34</a> Similar warnings were uttered by -other Socialists and anti-imperialists.</p> - -<p>Quite different in character was the objection raised to -the Bagdad Railway by a certain type of more conservative -German. An aggressive policy in the Near East -naturally would have been distasteful to the diplomatists -of the old school, who were disposed to adhere to the -Bismarckian principles of isolating France on the Continent -and avoiding commercial and colonial conflicts overseas. -According to their point of view, German ventures -in the Ottoman Empire were certain to lead to two -complications: first, the support of Austrian imperial ambitions -in the Balkans; second, a German attempt to maintain -a dominant political position at Constantinople. Under -such circumstances, of course, it would not be possible to -bring about a divorce of the newly married France and -Russia, for Russian interests in the Near East would brook -no compromise on the part of the Tsar’s Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span>. In -addition, it was feared, the establishment of German ports -on the Mediterranean and on the Persian Gulf would -strengthen British antipathy to Germany, already augmented -by naval and commercial rivalry. The final outcome -of such a situation undoubtedly would be the formation -of a Franco-British-Russian coalition against the -Central Powers.</p> - -<p>During the Great War these views were given wide -publicity by Prince Lichnowsky, former German ambassador -to Great Britain. In a memorandum, written for a -few friends but subsequently published broadcast in -Europe and America,<a name="FNanchor_35_204" id="FNanchor_35_204"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_204" class="fnanchor">35</a> the Prince vehemently denounced -the <i>Drang nach Osten</i> as the greatest of German diplomatic -mistakes and as one of the principal causes of the -Great War. “We should have abandoned definitely the -fatal tradition of pushing the Triple Alliance policies in -the Near East,” he said; “we should have realized that it -was a mistake to make ourselves solidary with the Turks -in the south and with the Austro-Magyars in the north; -for the continuance of this policy ... was bound in time, -and particularly in case the requisite adroitness should -be found wanting in the supreme directing agencies, to -lead to the collision with Russia and the World War. -Instead of coming to an understanding with Russia on the -basis of the independence of the Sultan; ... instead of -renouncing military and political interference, confining -ourselves to economic interests in the Near East, ... our -political ambition was directed to the attainment of a -dominant position on the Bosporus. In Russia the opinion -arose that the way to Constantinople ran <i>via</i> Berlin.” This -was the “fatal mistake, by which Russia, naturally our -best friend and neighbor, was driven into the arms of -France and England.” Furthermore, maintained the -Prince, a policy of Near Eastern expansion is contrary to -the best commercial and industrial interests of the emp<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span>ire. -“‘Our future lies on the water.’ Quite right”; -therefore it does not lie in an overland route to the Orient. -The <i>Drang nach Osten</i> “is a reversion to the Holy Roman -Empire.... It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that -of Drake and Raleigh.... Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley -and not the way into the open, to unlimited possibilities, -to the universal mission of the German nation.”<a name="FNanchor_36_205" id="FNanchor_36_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_205" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>There may have been another reason for the opposition -of Prince Lichnowsky to the Bagdad Railway. As the -owner of large Silesian estates he was agrarian in his -point of view. If it were true, as was maintained, that -after the opening of Mesopotamia to cultivation, the -Railway would be able to bring cheap Turkish grain to -the German market, the results would not be to the liking -of the agricultural interests of the empire. As Herr -Scheidemann informed the Reichstag, there was something -anomalous in the Conservative support of the Bagdad -Railway on this score, because it was “in most violent -contrast to their procedure in their own country, where -they have artificially raised the cost of the necessaries of -life by incredibly high protective tariffs, indirect taxation, -and similar methods.”<a name="FNanchor_37_206" id="FNanchor_37_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_206" class="fnanchor">37</a> Perhaps Prince Lichnowsky was -somewhat more intelligent and far-sighted than his land-owning -associates!</p> - -<p>There were some Germans who were not opposed to -the Bagdad Railway enterprise, but who were opposed to -the extravagant claims made for it by some of its friends -and protagonists. A typical illustration of this is the following -statement of Count zu Reventlow, shortly before -the outbreak of the war: “Great Britain, Russia, and -France, in order to interpose objections, made use of the -expedient of identifying the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> with the German -Government. To this there was added the difficult -and complicating factor that in Germany itself, in many -quarters, the aim and the significance of the railway<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span> plan -were proclaimed to the world, partly in an inaccurate and -grossly exaggerated manner.... In this respect great -mistakes were made among us, which it was in no way -necessary to make. The more quietly the Railway could -have been constructed the better.... That it would be -possible to make Turkey a dangerous threat against Egypt -and India, after the development of its railway system, -was correct, to be sure, but it was imperative not to say -anything of that kind as long as Great Britain still had -means to hinder and prevent the construction of the railway.” -Similar opinions were expressed from time to time -on the floor of the Reichstag.<a name="FNanchor_38_207" id="FNanchor_38_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_207" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway, however, was a triumphant enterprise -which would brook no opposition. In the army of -its followers marched the stockholders and directors of -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>—such men as Edward B. von Speyer, -Wolfgang Kapp, Karl von Siemens, Karl Helfferich, -Arthur von Gwinner—good patriots all, with a financial -stake in the Railway. Then there came the engineers and -contractors who furnished the materials and constructed -the line and who shared in the profits of its subsidiary -enterprises—mines, oil wells, docks, wharves, irrigation -works. Next came the shipping interests—the subsidized -services of Herr Ballin and the Hamburg-American Line -included—which were at once the feeders and the fed of -the Railway. There were also the German traders who -sought in the Near East a market for their products and -the German manufacturers who looked to this newly -opened territory for an uninterrupted supply of raw materials. -In the line of march, too, were the missionaries, -Catholic and Protestant, who sought to promote a renaissance -of the Holy Land through the extension of German -influence there. Bringing up the rear, although by no -means the least important, were the soldiers and the diplomatic -and consular officers, those “parasites” of modern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span> -imperialism who almost invariably will be found in cordial -support of any movement for political and economic expansion. -In the reviewing stand, cheering the marchers, -were the great mass of average patriotic citizens who were -thrilled with “their” Bagdad Railway and “their” <i>Drang -nach Osten</i>. And the chief of the reviewers was His -Imperial Majesty, William II.<a name="FNanchor_39_208" id="FNanchor_39_208"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_208" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>If there was a preponderance of opinion in Germany -favorable to the Bagdad Railway, there was by no means -a similar favorable sentiment in the rest of Europe. -Statesmen in the other imperial nations were not unaware -of the potentialities of railways constructed in the backward -nations of the world. They knew that “railways -are the iron tentacles of latter-day expanding powers. -They are stretched out caressingly at first. But once the -iron has, so to say, entered the soul of the weaker nation, -the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawny arms, and -the embrace tightens to a crushing grip.”<a name="FNanchor_40_209" id="FNanchor_40_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_209" class="fnanchor">40</a> Russia, Great -Britain and France, therefore, were gradually led to obstruct -the progress of the railway by political and economic -means—at least until such time as they could purge the -project of its political possibilities or until they could -obtain for themselves a larger share of the spoils.</p> - -<p>Thus the Bagdad Railway was an imperial enterprise. -It became an important concern of the Foreign Office, a -matter of national prestige. It was one of the stakes of -pre-war diplomacy. Its success was associated with the -national honor, to be defended, if need be, by military -force and military alliances. The Railway was no longer -a railway alone, but a state of mind. Professor Jastrow -called it “the spectre of the twentieth century”!<a name="FNanchor_41_210" id="FNanchor_41_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_210" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_170" id="Footnote_1_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_170"><span class="label">1</span></a> <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, p. 46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_171" id="Footnote_2_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_171"><span class="label">2</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226a, 4253c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_172" id="Footnote_3_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_172"><span class="label">3</span></a> Wile, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 39–40.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_173" id="Footnote_4_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_173"><span class="label">4</span></a> Riesser, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 543; <i>The Quarterly Review</i>, Volume 235 -(1921), p. 315.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_174" id="Footnote_5_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_174"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, Volume 121 (1903), -p. 1348.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_175" id="Footnote_6_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_175"><span class="label">6</span></a> For an interesting discussion of this point see George von -Siemens, “The National Importance of the Bourse,” in <i>The -Nation</i> (London), October 6, 1900. <i>Cf.</i>, also, W. M. Shuster, -<i>The Strangling of Persia: a Record of European Diplomacy</i> and -<i>Oriental Intrigue</i> (New York, 1912).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_176" id="Footnote_7_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_176"><span class="label">7</span></a> W. M. Sombart, <i>Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft in neunzehnten -Jahrhundert</i> (second edition, Berlin, 1909), p. 184.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_177" id="Footnote_8_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_177"><span class="label">8</span></a> Regarding early German interest in Near Eastern colonization -<i>cf.</i> K. A. Sprenger, <i>Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit -und das lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart</i> (Heidelberg, -1886); Paul Dehn, <i>Deutschland und die Orientbahnen</i> -(Munich, 1883); K. Karger, <i>Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld</i> -(Berlin, 1892); <i>Deutsche Ansprüche an das türkischen -Erbe</i> (Munich, 1896), a symposium including an article by von -Moltke.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_178" id="Footnote_9_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_178"><span class="label">9</span></a> C. Nawratski, <i>Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas</i> (Munich, -1914); <i>Syria and Palestine</i>, p. 59; <i>Mesopotamia</i>, pp. 6–7, 11; -<i>Anatolia</i>, pp. 4–7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_179" id="Footnote_10_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_179"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 84; H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad Railway,” in -the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, March 1, 1911, pp. 376–377; A. Brisse, -“Les intérêts de l’Allemagne dans l’Empire Ottoman,” in <i>Revue -de Géographie</i>, June, 1902, pp. 486–487; P. Rohrbach, <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, -pp. 17–21, 35.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_180" id="Footnote_11_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_180"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c; P. Rohrbach, <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, p. -16, and <i>Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern</i>, pp. 51–53; Von -Gwinner, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 1090.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_181" id="Footnote_12_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_181"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, p. 16. <i>Cf.</i>, also, R. Henry, <i>Des Montes -Bohèmes au Golfe Persique; l’Asie Turque et le Chemin de fer -de Bagdad</i> (Paris, 1908), p. 509 <i>et seq.</i>; C. H. Becker, <i>Deutschland -und der Islam</i> (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914); Ernst Jäckh, -<i>Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft</i> (Stuttgart and Berlin, -1915).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_182" id="Footnote_13_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_182"><span class="label">13</span></a> H. A. Gibbons, <i>The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near -East</i> (New York, 1917), pp. 109–110.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_183" id="Footnote_14_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_183"><span class="label">14</span></a> Quoted by Marriot, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 356.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_184" id="Footnote_15_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_184"><span class="label">15</span></a> <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, pp. 18–19.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_185" id="Footnote_16_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_185"><span class="label">16</span></a> In this connection see an important statement by Sir Thomas -Barclay in the <i>Proceedings of the Central Asian Society</i> (London), -March 1, 1911, pp. 21–22, and the opinion of Karl Helfferich, -<i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i>, p. 14.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_186" id="Footnote_17_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_186"><span class="label">17</span></a> Von Reventlow, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 343. Regarding the so-called -<i>Drang nach Osten</i> and the coincidence of Austrian and German -interests in the Near East <i>cf.</i> M. Meyer, <i>Balkanstaaten, Bagdadbahn</i> -(Leipzig, 1914); J. W. Headlam, “The Balkans and Diplomacy,” -in the <i>Atlantic Monthly</i> (Boston), January, 1916, pp. 124 -<i>et seq.</i>; N. and C. R. Buxton, <i>The War and the Balkans</i> (London, -1915); M. I. Newbigin, <i>Geographical Aspects of Balkan -Problems</i> (London, 1915); Evans Lewin, <i>The German Road to -the East</i> (New York, 1917), Chapters VIII, IX, X; P. N. -Milyoukov, <i>The War and Balkan Politics</i> (Cambridge, 1917).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_187" id="Footnote_18_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_187"><span class="label">18</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5984c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_188" id="Footnote_19_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_188"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Der deutsche Imperialismus und die Arbeiterklasse</i> (Bremen, -1912), pp. 33, 53.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_189" id="Footnote_20_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_189"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5984c, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_190" id="Footnote_21_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_190"><span class="label">21</span></a> Charles Sarolea, <i>The Anglo-German Problem</i> (London, -1912), p. 252.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_191" id="Footnote_22_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_191"><span class="label">22</span></a> A <i>Stiftung</i> is a general religious establishment, this particular -one serving manifold purposes as school, hospice, home, hospital, -etc.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_192" id="Footnote_23_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_192"><span class="label">23</span></a> J. Richter, <i>A History of Protestant Missions in the Near -East</i> (New York, 1910), pp. 258–270, 416–419; L. M. Garnett, -<i>Turkey of the Ottomans</i> (London, 1911), Chapters VII-IX; -H. C. Dwight, H. A. Tupper, and E. M. Bliss, <i>Encyclopedia of -Missions</i> (second edition, New York, 1910), pp. 260, 263, 720; -<i>New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge</i> (New -York, 1912), Volume XII, pp. 39–41.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_193" id="Footnote_24_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_193"><span class="label">24</span></a> Cardinal M. H. Ledochowski (1822–1902). <i>Cf.</i> <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i> -(New York, 1912), Volume IX, pp. 111–112. French -Catholics openly charged that Cardinal Ledochowski used his -official position as director of all Catholic missions to promote -German religious and political interests at the expense of those -of France. <i>Cf.</i> an article “La Politique Allemande et le Protectorat -des Missions Catholiques,” in the <i>Revue des deux -mondes</i>, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 11–12.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_194" id="Footnote_25_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_194"><span class="label">25</span></a> On the general subject of German Catholic missions in the -Near East consult W. Koehler, <i>Die katholische Kirchen des -Morgenlandes</i> (Darmstadt, 1898); H. M. Krose, <i>Katholische -Missionsstatistik</i> (Freiburg, 1908); L. Bréhier, article “Turkish -Empire-Missions,” in the <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i>, Volume XV, -pp. 101–102; L. Bertrand, “La Melée des Religions en Orient,” -in the <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 53 (1909), pp. 830–861.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_195" id="Footnote_26_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_195"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>The Jewish Encyclopedia</i> (New York, 1906), Volume XII, -pp. 286 <i>et seq.</i>; Sir C. W. Wilson, <i>Handbook for Asia Minor</i> -(London, 1895), pp. 240 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_196" id="Footnote_27_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_196"><span class="label">27</span></a> Etienne Lamy, “La France du Levant: le Voyage de l’Empereur -Guillaume II,” in <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 151 -(1899), pp. 336–337; see also Volume 150 (1898), pp. 421–440, -880–911. Further observations on the religious aspects of the -Kaiser’s trip to Palestine are to be found in <i>The Times</i>, November -23, 1898; <i>Annual Register</i>, 1898, pp. 255–257; W. von Hohenzollern, -<i>My Memoirs</i>, 1878–1918, pp. 210–211.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_197" id="Footnote_28_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_197"><span class="label">28</span></a> <i>Annual Register</i>, 1898, pp. 257–258.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_198" id="Footnote_29_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_198"><span class="label">29</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 261. Regarding the French protectorate of Catholics -in the Near East <i>cf.</i> <i>infra</i>, Chapter VII.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_199" id="Footnote_30_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_199"><span class="label">30</span></a> “La Politique Allemande et le Protectorat des Missions -Catholiques,” in <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 149 (1898), -pp. 8–9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_200" id="Footnote_31_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_200"><span class="label">31</span></a> L. Bertrand, “Les Écoles d’Orient: I. Les Écoles Chrétiennes -et Israelites,” in <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 52, new series -(1909), pp. 755–794; H. M. Kallen, <i>Zionism and World Politics</i> -(Garden City, N. Y., 1921), pp. 117 <i>et seq.</i>; A. Paquet, <i>Die -jüdische Kolonien in Palästina</i> (Weimar, 1915); M. Blanckenhorn, -<i>Syrien und die deutsche Arbeit</i> (Weimar, 1916), pp. 26–30; -C. Nawratzki, <i>Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas</i> (Munich, -1914); M. Franco, <i>Essai sur l’histoire des juifs de l’empire -ottoman depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours</i> (Paris, 1897); G. -Corneilhan, <i>La judaisme en Egypte et en Syrie</i> (Paris, 1889).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_201" id="Footnote_32_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_201"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>German World Policies</i>, pp. 229–231. On this same general -subject consult an article by “Immanuel,” entitled “Die Bagdadbahn -ein Kulturwerk in Asien,” in <i>Globus</i>, Volume 81 (1902), -pp. 181–185; M. Hartmann, <i>Islam, Mission, Politik</i> (Leipzig, -1912). It should be pointed out that the Anatolian Railway -itself established two schools, at Haidar Pasha and Eski Shehr, -for the instruction of its employees in German and other subjects. -Bohler, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 275.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_202" id="Footnote_33_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_202"><span class="label">33</span></a> That Germans were not unfamiliar with the spectacular history -of this region is evidenced by the popularity of General von -Moltke’s writings on Turkey, which were published in several -large editions, apart from his collected works, between 1900 and -1911. <i>Cf.</i>, <i>e.g.</i>, H. K. B. (Graf von) Moltke, <i>Briefe über Zustände -und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis -1839</i>, seventh edition, with explanatory notes by G. Hirschfeld -(Berlin, 1911). Of this work H. S. Wilkinson, Professor of -Military History at Oxford University, wrote in the <i>Encyclopedia -Britannica</i> (eleventh edition), “No other book gives so -deep an insight into the character of the Turkish Empire” -(Volume 18, p. 678). It is interesting to note, also, that Moltke -himself was a firm believer in the great military utility of all -railways. For the history of the Near East <i>cf.</i> Jastrow, <i>op. cit.</i>, -pp. 31–81; A. R. Hall, <i>The Ancient History of the Near East</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span> -(fourth edition, London, 1919), Chapters V, VIII, IX, X, XII; -W. A. and E. T. A. Wigram, <i>The Cradle of Mankind</i> (London, -1914). A curious sidelight on this phase of the question is the -assertion of Baron von Hertling, in 1907, that Germany’s chief -interest in the Bagdad Railway was scientific—geographic, geological, -archæological—not military or economic! Quoted by -Dawson, <i>The Evolution of Modern Germany</i>, p. 346.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_203" id="Footnote_34_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_203"><span class="label">34</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5980c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_204" id="Footnote_35_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_204"><span class="label">35</span></a> Karl Maximilan, sixth Prince, Lichnowsky (1860- ) had -been a member of the German diplomatic service since his youth. -He was attached to the embassy at London when he was but -twenty-five and later served at Constantinople, Bucharest, and -Vienna and in the Foreign Office at Berlin. He resigned in 1904 -to devote himself to the management of his large estates in -Silesia, but he was recalled in 1912 to become German ambassador -to Great Britain, succeeding Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, -who had died after only a few months’ service at his new post. -Prince Lichnowsky’s memorandum <i>My London Mission, 1912–1914</i> -was written only to justify the Prince before a small circle -of his acquaintances. Fugitive copies reached the press, however, -and the full text was published in the Berlin <i>Börsen-Courier</i> of -March 21, 1918. The quotations here given are from the translation -of Munroe Smith, <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i> (New -York, 1918).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_205" id="Footnote_36_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_205"><span class="label">36</span></a> <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i>, pp. 37–41, 127.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_206" id="Footnote_37_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_206"><span class="label">37</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 226 (1911), p. 5980c. <i>Cf.</i>, also, W. H. Dawson, <i>The -Evolution of Modern Germany</i>, pp. 346 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_207" id="Footnote_38_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_207"><span class="label">38</span></a> Von Reventlow, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 340; <i>Stenographische Berichte, -XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, Volume 226 (1911), p. 5994b.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_208" id="Footnote_39_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_208"><span class="label">39</span></a> Regarding the Emperor’s personal interest in the Bagdad -Railway consider the following Reuter dispatch, published in -<i>The Near East</i>, December 6, 1911, p. 143: “By desire of the -German Emperor, Herr Gwinner, director of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, -will give an address on the Bagdad Railway before the Emperor -and a number of invited guests, in the Upper House of the -Prussian Diet soon after the Emperor’s return to Berlin, December -8.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_209" id="Footnote_40_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_209"><span class="label">40</span></a> E. J. Dillon, quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, <i>The New World -of Islam</i>, p. 98.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_210" id="Footnote_41_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_210"><span class="label">41</span></a> Jastrow, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 9.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER VII<br /> - -RUSSIA RESISTS AND FRANCE IS UNCERTAIN</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Russia Voices Her Displeasure</span></h3> - -<p>Russian objections to the Bagdad Railway were put -forth as early as 1899, the year in which the Sultan announced -his intention of awarding the concession to the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>. The press of Petrograd and Moscow -roundly denounced the proposed railway as inimical to -the vital economic interests of Russia. It was claimed -that the new line would offer serious competition to the -railways of the Caspian and Caucasus regions, that it -would menace the success of the new Russian trans-Persian -line, and that it might prove to be a rival even of the -Siberian system.<a name="FNanchor_1_211" id="FNanchor_1_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_211" class="fnanchor">1</a> The extension of the existing Anatolian -Railway into Syria, it was asserted, would interfere with -the realization of a Russian dream of a railway across -Armenia to Alexandretta—a railway which would give -Russian goods access to an all-year warm water port on -the Mediterranean. The Mesopotamian sections of the -line, with their branches, might open to German competition -the markets of Persia and, later, of Afghanistan. If -German capital should develop the grain-growing possibilities -of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, what would -happen to the profits of the Russian landed aristocr<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span>acy? -And if the oil-wells of Mesopotamia were as rich as they -were said to be, what would be the fate of the South -Russian fields? The Tsar was urged to oppose the granting -of the kilometric guarantee to the concessionaires, on -the ground that the increased charges on the Ottoman -Treasury would interfere with payment of the indemnity -due on account of the War of 1877.<a name="FNanchor_2_212" id="FNanchor_2_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_212" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>Russian objections to the Bagdad Railway did not meet -with a sympathetic reception in England. <i>The Engineer</i>, -of August 11, 1899, in an editorial “Railways in Asia -Minor,” for example, expressed its firm opinion that many -of the demands for the protection of Russian economic -interests in Turkey were specious. “The world has yet -to learn,” ran the editorial, “that Russia allows commercial -considerations to play any great part in her ideas of -constructing railways; the Imperial authorities are influenced -mainly by the policy of political expediency. The -commercial competition thus foreseen by Russia is put -forward merely as a stop-gap until Russia can get time and -money to repeat in Asia Minor the methods of which she -has made such success in Persia and the Far East.” Other -British opinion was of like character.</p> - -<p>The Russian claim for exclusive control of railway -construction in northern Anatolia met with equally bitter -denunciation. The London <i>Globe</i>, of August 10, 1899, -characterized as “impudence” the intention of the Russian -Government “to regard Asiatic Turkey as a second Manchuria, -on the pretence that the whole country has been -mortgaged to Russia for payment of the Turkish war -indemnity. If this preposterous claim were admitted, not -only the development of Asia Minor but the opening of -another short-cut to the East might be delayed until the -end of the next century. Russia had so many ambitious -and costly projects on hand at present that her nearly -bankrupt treasury could not meet any fresh drain, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span> -especially one of such magnitude as that in question. The -policy of her Government, therefore, is to preserve Asia -Minor as a <i>tabula rasa</i> on which the Russian pen can -write as it pleases hereafter. It is a cool project, truly, -but the success which has attended similar Russian endeavors -in the Far East will not, we undertake to predict, -meet with repetition.”</p> - -<p>The Russian Government, meanwhile, was interposing -serious objections to the Bagdad Railway. M. Zinoviev, -the Tsar’s minister at Constantinople, informed the Sublime -Porte that the proposed extension of the Anatolian -Railways from Angora across Armenia to Mosul and -Bagdad would be a strategic menace to the Caucasus frontier -and, as such, could not be tolerated. If Russian -wishes in the matter were not respected, immediate measures -would be taken to collect all arrears—amounting to -over 57,000,000 francs—of the indemnity due the Tsar -under the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The outcome of these -demands was submission by the Sultan’s Government. The -proposed Angora-Kaisarieh-Diarbekr route was abandoned -in favor of one extending from Konia, through the -Cilician Gates of the Taurus Mountains, to Adana, Aleppo, -and Mosul—the latter being the route over which the -Bagdad Railway actually was constructed. The discussions -between the Russian and Ottoman Governments -subsequently were crystallized and confirmed by the so-called -Black Sea Agreement of 1900, which pledged the -Sultan to award no further concessions for railways in -northern Anatolia or Armenia except to Russian nationals -or to syndicates approved by the Tsar, and, furthermore, -to award such Russian concessionaires terms at least as -favorable as those to be granted the Bagdad Railway -Company.<a name="FNanchor_3_213" id="FNanchor_3_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_213" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>The agreement thus reached, however, satisfied Russia -only temporarily. In December, 1901, M. Witte, Imperial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span> -Minister of Finance at Petrograd, stated categorically that -he considered the construction of the Bagdad Railway by -any Power other than Russia a menace to the imperial -interests of the Tsar. Proposals for the internationalization -of the line he asserted to be chimerical; in his opinion -the nationals of one Power would be certain to control the -administration of the enterprise. The Tsar was determined -that Russian capitalists should have nothing to do -with the Railway; Russian capital, for a time at least, -should be conserved for industrial development at home. -“The Government of Russia,” he concluded, “is more interested -in devoting its available resources to the construction -of new railways within the Empire than it is in -promoting an enterprise destined to offer competition to -Russia’s railways and industries.”<a name="FNanchor_4_214" id="FNanchor_4_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_214" class="fnanchor">4</a> In 1902 and again -in 1903, M. Witte made similar statements, asserting that -he saw no reason for changing his point of view.<a name="FNanchor_5_215" id="FNanchor_5_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_215" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>Witte’s words carried weight in Russia. As an erstwhile -railway worker he knew the great economic importance -of railways. During his régime as Minister of -Finance (1893–1903) an average of 1,400 miles of rails -was laid down annually in Russia; the Transcaspian and -Transcaucasian systems were constructed, and the Siberian -Railway was pushed almost to completion. He foresaw -that one day these railways would be powerful weapons -in the commercial and political expansion of an industrialized -Russia. As an official in charge of troop movements -during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 he had -learned to understand the function of railways in offensive -and defensive warfare. Although he considered it wasteful -to construct railways for military purposes alone, he -believed that every railway was of strategic value; in fact, -he looked upon railways as the most important single -factor in national preparedness. As the foremost protagonist -of Russia’s tariff war with the German Empire he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span> -was opposed to any plan which promised to promote German -commerce and to open up new resources and new -markets to German industry. As a native of the Caucasus -region and as an ardent advocate of colonial expansion -Witte looked forward to the time when Russia herself— -possessed of capital for the purpose—should dominate the -transportation system of Asiatic Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_6_216" id="FNanchor_6_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_216" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>It is questionable, however, if the Bagdad Railway really -threatened any important Russian economic interests. The -railways of southern Russia, so far from being injured by -competition with the proposed new railways of Turkey, -would be almost certain to profit from any increase of -trade in the region of the Black Sea. The Russian dream -of a railway to Alexandretta was still very much of a -dream; but even if the contrary had been the case, its -construction for peaceful purposes would not have been -hindered by the Bagdad plan. The claim that a trans-Mesopotamian -railway would compete with the Far Eastern -traffic of the Siberian Railways was purely fantastic; -it overlooked the obvious fact that an ideal shipping route, -like a straight line, is the shortest distance between two -points. It would be at least a generation before Mesopotamian -grain and oil could play a prominent part in the -Russian market.<a name="FNanchor_7_217" id="FNanchor_7_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_217" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>But with Russian political interests the case was different. -Ever since the days of Peter the Great, the Russian -Tsars had persistently and relentlessly continued their -efforts to obtain a “window” on the Mediterranean. This -historical trend toward the open sea led to a well-defined -intention on the part of Russia, in one way or another, -to take Constantinople from the Turks. The dynastic -interests of Russia were reënforced by commercial considerations. -“Most of Russia’s southern trade is bound -to pass through the Bosporus. Her wheat and hides, her -coal and oil cannot reach the European markets any other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span> -way; her manganese and petroleum are inaccessible to -other nations if they cannot find an outlet from the -Caucasus to the Dardanelles.” During the Turco-Italian -War the closing of the Straits for a few days was said to -have cost Russian shipping about eight million francs.<a name="FNanchor_8_218" id="FNanchor_8_218"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_218" class="fnanchor">8</a> -Bonds of religion and race enlisted Russian sympathy in -the struggle of the Balkan states to win independence -from Turkey—a cause which harmonized with the Russian -ambition to bring about the disintegration of Turkey-in-Europe. -The rise of German influence at Constantinople—of -which the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions -were a tangible manifestation—had been a source of -annoyance to Russia, not only because it prevented Russian -domination of Turkish affairs and because it strengthened -the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, -but also because it tended to strengthen Turkish military -power. It was annoying enough to witness the rising -political and economic power of Germany in the Near -East; it was more annoying to realize that, under German -guidance, the Turks might experience an economic and -military renaissance which would end once and for all the -Russian hope of possessing ancient Byzantium.</p> - -<p>Strategically the construction of the Bagdad Railway -was a real menace to Russian ambitions in the Near East. -The completion of the line would enable the Ottoman -Government to effect a prompt mobilization along the -Armenian front. For example, the Fifth Turkish Army -Corps, from Damascus, and the Sixth Corps, from Bagdad—which -in the War of 1877 arrived on the field after -a series of forced marches, minus a large number of its -effectives, too late to save Kars or to raise the siege of -Erzerum—could be brought quickly by rail from Syria -and Mesopotamia to Angora for the defence of northern -Anatolia. In the event of a Russo-Turkish war such a -maneuver would render extremely precarious a Russian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span> -invasion of Armenia or a Russian advance on Constantinople -along the south shore of the Black Sea. In a general -European war in which both Russia and Turkey -might be involved the existence of this railway line would -make possible a Turkish stroke at the southern frontier -of Russia, thus diverting troops from the European front. -That the German General Staff was not ignorant of these -possibilities is certain because of the presence in Turkey, -during this time, of General von der Goltz.<a name="FNanchor_9_219" id="FNanchor_9_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_219" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>The Russian Government and the Russian press were -fully aware of the menace of the Bagdad Railway to Russian -imperial interests. That the Tsar did not offer serious -resistance to the construction of the line was due to the -rise of serious complications in the Far East, the crushing -defeats of his army and navy in the War with Japan, -friction with Great Britain in Persia and in Central Asia, -and the outbreak of a revolutionary movement at home. -But the Russian press called upon French citizens to show -their loyalty to the Alliance by refusing to participate in -the financing of the Railway.<a name="FNanchor_10_220" id="FNanchor_10_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_220" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>The plaintive call of the Russians, however, did not fall -on altogether sympathetic ears in the Republic; a conflict -of interests led some French citizens to invest in the -Railway even though it was denounced by their Government.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The French Government Hesitates</span></h3> - -<p>The position of France in the Bagdad Railway controversy -was anomalous. In addition to political, economic, -and religious reasons for opposing the construction of the -trans-Mesopotamian railway, the French had many historical -and sentimental interests which influenced the Government -of the Republic to resist German penetration in -the Near East. French patriots recalled with pride the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span> -rôle of France in the Crusades; they remembered that -Palestine itself was once a Latin kingdom; they believed -that Christians in the Levant looked to France as their -protector and that this protection had received formal -recognition under the Capitulations, negotiated by Francis -I and renewed and extended by his successors from -Henry IV to Louis XV. They knew that the French -language was the language not only of the educated classes -in Turkey, but, also, in Syria, of the traders, so that it -could be said that a traveler in Syria might almost consider -himself in a French dependency. They were proud -of the fact that the term “Frank” was the symbol of -Western civilization in the Near East. They were aware -of the far-reaching educational work of French missionaries. -France, to their mind, had done a great work -of Christian enlightenment in the Moslem stronghold, -Turkey. Was the Government of the Republic to be -backward in asserting the interests of France, when Bourbons -and Bonapartes had so ably paved the way for the -extension of French civilization in the Holy Land? Reasoning -of this kind was popular in France during 1898 -and 1899, when the Kaiser’s visit to Abdul Hamid was -still under discussion and when the first indications were -given that a German company was to be awarded a concession -for the construction of a railway from Constantinople -to the Persian Gulf.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, however, there was a considerable -and a powerful group in France which urged the French -Government, if not to support the project of the Bagdad -Railway, at least to put no obstacles in its way. The -members of this group were French financiers with investments -in Turkey. They believed that the construction -of the Railway would usher in a new era of prosperity in -the Ottoman Empire which would materially increase the -value of the Turkish securities which they owned. I<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span>f -the interests of these financiers were not supported by -historical traditions and nationalist sentiment, they were -tangible and supported by imposing facts. It was estimated, -in 1903, that French investors controlled three-fifths, -amounting to a billion and a half of francs, of the -public obligations of the Imperial Ottoman Treasury. -French promoters owned about 366 million francs in the -securities of Turkish railroads and over 162 millions in -various industrial and commercial enterprises in Asia -Minor. French banks had approximately 176 million -francs invested in their branches in the Near East. The -total of all French investments in Turkey was more than -two and a half billion francs.<a name="FNanchor_11_221" id="FNanchor_11_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_221" class="fnanchor">11</a> The French-controlled -Imperial Ottoman Bank, the French-owned Smyrna-Cassaba -Railway, and the French-administered Ottoman -Public Debt Council all favored the promotion of the -Bagdad Railway idea.</p> - -<p>For a time, the French Government decided to follow -the lead of the financial interests. French bankers, in -1899, had entered into an agreement with the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> to operate the Anatolian and Smyrna-Cassaba systems -under a joint rate agreement, to coöperate in the -construction of the Bagdad Railway, and to attempt to -secure diplomatic support for their respective enterprises.<a name="FNanchor_12_222" id="FNanchor_12_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_222" class="fnanchor">12</a> -At the request of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, M. Constans, -the French Ambassador at Constantinople, adopted -a policy of “benevolent neutrality” toward the negotiations -of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> with the Ottoman Ministry -of Public Works. This course was approved by M. Delcassé, -Minister of Foreign Affairs, who considered the -Bagdad Railway harmless because French capitalists were -to participate in its construction and operation. Just how -much this diplomatic non-interference assisted the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> in obtaining the concessions of 1899 and -1903 is an open question. It is extremely doubtful if<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span> -French objections could have blocked the award of the -concessions, although M. Chéradame subsequently maintained -that the consummation of the plans of the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> would have been impossible without the tacit -coöperation of the French embassy at Constantinople.<a name="FNanchor_13_223" id="FNanchor_13_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_223" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>Between 1899 and 1902 the proposed Bagdad Railway -was discussed occasionally by French publicists, but it -could not have been considered a matter of widespread -popular interest. In the spring of the latter year, however, -immediately after the award of the first Bagdad -concession by the Sultan, a bitter protest was voiced in the -Chamber of Deputies against the policy of the French -Government. M. Firmin Fauré, a deputy from Paris, -introduced a resolution that “the issue of debentures, -stocks, or bonds designed to permit the construction of -the Bagdad Railway shall not be authorized in French -territory except by vote of the Chamber of Deputies.” -In a few words M. Fauré denounced the Bagdad Railway -plan as a menace to French prestige in the Near -East and as a threat against Russian security in the Caucasus. -He believed, furthermore, that Bagdad Railway -bonds would be an unsafe investment: “It is a Panama -that is being prepared down there. Do you choose, perchance, -my dear colleagues, to allow French capital to be -risked in this scheme without pronouncing it foolhardy? -Do you choose to allow the great banks and the great -investment syndicates to realize considerable profits at the -expense of the small subscribers? If that is how you -attend to the defence of French capital, well and good, -but you will permit me to disagree with you.” He warned -the members of the Chamber that they would not dare -to stand for reëlection if they thus allowed the interests -of their constituents to be prejudiced.<a name="FNanchor_14_224" id="FNanchor_14_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_224" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, objected -to the resolution. He denied that French diplomacy h<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span>ad -assisted the German bankers in securing the Bagdad Railway -concession.<a name="FNanchor_15_225" id="FNanchor_15_225"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_225" class="fnanchor">15</a> But the concession was a <i>fait accompli</i>, -and it also was a fact that French financiers felt they -could not afford to refuse the offer of participation with -the German concessionaires. “I venture to ask how it -can be prevented, and I inquire of the Chamber whether, -when such an enterprise has been arranged and decided -upon, it is not preferable that French interests, so considerable -in the East, should be represented therein.” He -promised that every possible precaution would be taken -to assure French capitalists a share in the enterprise equal -to that of any other power. The Minister was upheld, the -motion being defeated by a vote of 398 to 72.<a name="FNanchor_16_226" id="FNanchor_16_226"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_226" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>Less than two years later, in October, 1903, the Paris -Bourse, at the instigation of the French Government, excluded -all Bagdad Railway securities from the privileges -of the Exchange. This change in policy was not so much -the result of a <i>volte face</i> on the part of M. Rouvier and -M. Delcassé as it was a consequence of a persistent clamor -on the part of the French press that the construction of -the Bagdad Railway, which was popularly considered a -serious menace to French interests, should be obstructed -by every effective method at the disposal of the Government.<a name="FNanchor_17_227" id="FNanchor_17_227"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_227" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">French Interests are Believed to be Menaced</span></h3> - -<p>The commercial interests of southern France were opposed -to participation in the Bagdad Railway by the -French Government or by French capitalists. Business -men were fearful, for example, lest “the new route to -India” should divert traffic between England and the East -from the existing route across Europe <i>via</i> Calais to Marseilles -and thence by steamer to Suez, to a new express -service from Calais to Constantinople <i>via</i> Osten<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span>d, Cologne, -Munich, and Vienna. Thus the importance of the port -of Marseilles would be materially decreased, and French -railways would lose traffic to the lines of Central Europe. -Also, there was some feeling among the manufacturers of -Lyons that the rise of German economic power in Turkey -might interfere with the flow to France of the cheap raw -silk of Syria, almost the entire output of which is consumed -in French mills. The fears of the silk manufacturers -were emphasized by one of the foremost French -banks, the <i>Crédit Lyonnais</i>, which maintained branches in -Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Beirut, for the purpose of financing -silk and other shipments. This bank had experienced -enough competition at the hands of the <i>Deutsche Palästina -Bank</i> to assure it that further German interference was -dangerous.<a name="FNanchor_18_228" id="FNanchor_18_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_228" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>From the political point of view there was more to be -said for the French objections. Foremost among serious -international complications was the strategic menace of -the Railway to Russia. The Bagdad enterprise was described -as the “anti-Russian maneuver <i>par excellence</i>.” -To weaken Russia was to undermine the “foundation stone -of French foreign policy,” for it was generally conceded -that “the Alliance was indispensable to the security of -both nations; it assured the European equilibrium; it was -the essential counterbalance to the Triple Alliance.”<a name="FNanchor_19_229" id="FNanchor_19_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_229" class="fnanchor">19</a> -Then, too, the question of prestige was involved! In the -great game of the “balance of power” an imperial advance -by one nation was looked upon as a humiliation for -another! Thus a German success in Turkey, whether -gained at the expense of important French interests or -not, would have been considered as reflecting upon the -glory of France abroad! There was also a menace to -France in a rejuvenated Turkey. A Sultan freed from -dependence upon the Powers might effectively carry on a -Pan-Islamic propaganda which would lead to serious discontent -in the French colonial empire in North Africa.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">159</a></span> -What would be the consequences if the Moors should -answer a call to a Holy War to drive out the infidel -invaders?<a name="FNanchor_20_230" id="FNanchor_20_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_230" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>Still more fundamental, perhaps, than any of these -reasons was the fear among far-sighted French diplomatists -that the Bagdad Railway would be but the first -step in a formal political alliance between Germany and -Turkey. The French, more than any other European -people, have been schooled in the political ramifications -of foreign investments. The very foundations of the Russian -Alliance, for example, were loans of French bankers -to Russian industries and to the Tsar. Might not Baron -Marschall von Bieberstein and Karl Helfferich, Prince -von Bülow and Arthur von Gwinner, tear a leaf out of -the book of French experience? Certainly the way was -being paved for a Turco-German alliance, and M. Deschanel -eloquently warned his colleagues in the Chamber -of Deputies that there were limitless possibilities in the -situation. Speaking in the Chamber on November 19, -1903, he said: “Behold a railway that can divert from -the Suez Canal a part of the traffic of the Far East, so -that the railways of Central Europe will become the competitors -of Marseilles and of our French railways! Behold -a new colonial policy which, instead of conquering -territories by force of arms, makes war with funds; possesses -itself of the means of communication; crushes out -the life of states, little by little, by the artifices of the -financiers, leaving them only a nominal existence! And -we, who possess the world’s greatest fund of <i>capital, that -supreme weapon of modern conquest</i>, we propose to place -it at the disposal of foreign interests hostile to our fundamental -and permanent foreign policies! Alas, it is not -the first time that our capital has gone to nourish rival, -even hostile, schemes!”<a name="FNanchor_21_231" id="FNanchor_21_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_231" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">160</a></span></p> -<p>Religious interests supported the political and economic -objections to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. -French Clericals were fearful lest this railway become the -very backbone of German interests in the Ottoman Empire, -thus strengthening German missionary activities and -jeopardizing the time-honored protectorate of France over -Catholics in the Near East. As early as 1898 an anonymous -writer sounded a clarion call to Catholics and nationalists -alike that German economic penetration in -Turkey was a matter of their common concern: “Preeminent -in the Levant, thanks to the friendship of the -Sultan and to the progress of the commerce of her -nationals, Germany, if she gathers in, besides, our religious -heritage, will crown her formidable material power with an -enormous moral power; she will assume in the world the -eminent place which Charlemagne, St. Louis, Francis I, -Richelieu, Louis XIV, and Napoleon have assured to our -country. The ‘nationalization’ of missions will inaugurate -a period of German supremacy in the Orient, where the -name of France has been so great and where it still is so -loved.”<a name="FNanchor_22_232" id="FNanchor_22_232"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_232" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>France occupied a unique position in the Near East. -For centuries she had been recognized as shouldering -a special responsibility in the protection of Catholics and -of Catholic missions in the Ottoman Empire. This protectorate—which -as late as 1854 had provided the occasion -for a war between the empire of Napoleon III and -Russia—had been acquired not by military conquest alone, -but by outstanding cultural and religious services as -well.<a name="FNanchor_23_233" id="FNanchor_23_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_233" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>Certainly at the end of the nineteenth century French -missions held a preëminent position in Turkey. French -Jesuits and Franciscans maintained elementary, secondary, -and vocational schools in Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, -Jerusalem, and numerous smaller towns throughout Syria<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span> -and Palestine. A Jesuit school established at Beirut in -1875 rapidly expanded its curricula until it obtained -recognition as a university, its baccalaureate degree being -accredited by the French Ministry of Public Instruction -early in the decade of the eighties. The medical faculty -of this Jesuit University—said to have been founded under -the patronage of Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta—was -given authority to grant degrees, which were recognized -officially by France in 1888 and by Turkey in 1898. In -addition to the classical and medical courses, instruction -was given in law, theology, philosophy, and engineering. -A preparatory school, conducted in connection with the -university, had an enrollment of about one thousand -pupils. By 1907 it was estimated that over seventy thousand -Syrian children were receiving instruction in French -religious schools. In addition to these educational accomplishments -mention should be made of the work of the -Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition and the Society of -St. Vincent de Paul, who made Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and -other towns centers of French religious and philanthropic -activity.<a name="FNanchor_24_234" id="FNanchor_24_234"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_234" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>The progress of German missions and schools was a -challenge to the paramount position of France in the -cultural development of the Near East. And it was not -a challenge which was passed unanswered. To counteract -the influence of German schools established, with the aid -of the Railway Company, at a few of the more important -points along the Anatolian lines, French missionary schools -were established at Eski Shehr, Angora, and Konia.<a name="FNanchor_25_235" id="FNanchor_25_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_235" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, German missions seemed to bring with -them an additional threat—an attempt to discredit the -French claim to an exclusive protectorate over Catholics -in the Ottoman Empire. As early as 1875 the German -Government declared that “it recognized no exclusive right -of protection of any power in behalf of Catholic establi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span>shments -in the East,” and that “it reserved its rights with -regard to German subjects belonging to any of these -establishments.”<a name="FNanchor_26_236" id="FNanchor_26_236"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_236" class="fnanchor">26</a> This position appeared to be strengthened -by Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which -affirmed that “ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all -nationalities traveling in Turkey shall enjoy the same -rights, advantages, and privileges. The official right of -protection of the diplomatic and consular agents of the -Powers in Turkey is recognized, with regard both to the -above-mentioned persons and to their religious, charitable, -and other establishments in the Holy Places and elsewhere.”<a name="FNanchor_27_237" id="FNanchor_27_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_237" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>In 1885 it was proposed that the Sultan should appoint -his own emissary to the Vatican, thus rendering -supererogatory the time-honored procedure of transacting -all affairs of the Church through the French embassy -at Constantinople. French Catholics immediately charged -that this proposal emanated from Berlin and did everything -possible to oppose its acceptance. Italian and German -influences in Rome heartily supported the idea of -direct communications between the Vatican and the Porte, -but Pope Leo XIII and Cardinal Rampolla finally decided -against maintaining diplomatic relations with the Infidel.<a name="FNanchor_28_238" id="FNanchor_28_238"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_238" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>Largely as a result of Italian insistence that the rights -of the diplomatic and consular agents of the Kingdom -be given recognition, it was considered advisable for the -Pope to state definitely his position on the French protectorate. -This he did in an encyclical of May 22, 1888, -<i>Aspera rerum conditio</i>, which informed all Catholic missionaries -in the Levant that “the Protectorate of the French -Nation in the countries of the East has been established -for centuries and sanctioned even by treaties between the -empires. Therefore there must be absolutely no innovation -in this matter; this Protectorate, wherever it is in -force, is to be religiously preserved, and the missiona<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span>ries -are warned that, if they have need of any help, they are -to have recourse to the consuls and other ministers of -France.”<a name="FNanchor_29_239" id="FNanchor_29_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_239" class="fnanchor">29</a> In a letter dated August 1, 1898, addressed -to Cardinal Langénieux, Archbishop of Rheims, Leo XIII -again confirmed this opinion: “France has a special mission -in the East confided to her by Providence—a noble -mission consecrated not alone by ancient usage, but also -by international treaties.... The Holy See does not wish -to interfere with the glorious patrimony which France has -received from its ancestors, and which beyond a doubt it -means to deserve by always showing itself equal to its -task.”<a name="FNanchor_30_240" id="FNanchor_30_240"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_240" class="fnanchor">30</a> No more sweeping confirmation of French rights -could have been desired.</p> - -<p>The German Government, however, was by no means -willing to accept these pronouncements as final. In the -name of nationalism German unification was accomplished; -in the name of nationalism German missionaries abroad -must look to their own Government for protection. To -admit a foreign claim to the protectorate of Germans was -to stain the national honor. To accede to the French pretension -that Catholic Germans occupied an inferior position -in the East was to decrease the prestige of German -citizenship. The Shantung incident was a noisy demonstration -of the intention of the German Empire to recognize -no such distinctions. The visit of the Kaiser to the -Sultan in the same year, 1898, was directly concerned with -the determination of <i>Wilhelmstrasse</i> to assert the secular -rights of German missionaries, Catholics as well as -Protestants.<a name="FNanchor_31_241" id="FNanchor_31_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_241" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>French Catholics denied the German claims and worked -upon national sentiment at home to add to the growing -fear of German imperial aggrandizement. “Catholic -missions,” it was asserted, “by their very nature and purpose -are a supra-national institution, similar to the sovereign -majesty of the Pope.” What could be the purpose<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span> -of the Germans in asserting the doctrine of the “nationalization -of missions,” if it were not to undermine French -influence in Turkey? How great would be the national -humiliation if the protectorate of the Faithful in the East -should pass from the hands of Catholic France to Protestant -Prussia! The Germans, too, were prejudicing the -Holy See against the Republic. A notoriously pro-German -party at the Vatican, supported by their political allies, -the Italians, were winning the sympathies of the Pope -by insinuating references to “red France,” “schismatic -Russia,” and “heretical England”! Thus was a dark plot -being hatched against France and against the unity of -Christendom!<a name="FNanchor_32_242" id="FNanchor_32_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_242" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<p>This situation was not without its advantages to the -French Clericals. Between the years 1899 and 1905, when -the Bagdad Railway controversy was at its height, a -serious domestic controversy was raging in France. In a -bitter fight to extirpate Clericalism the Republican ministries -of Waldeck-Rousseau and Émile Combes had put -through law after law to curb the power of the Church -and to break up the influence of the religious orders. The -Clericals were waging a losing battle. But perhaps the -last crushing blows might be warded off by resorting to a -favorite maneuver of Louis Napoleon—the diversion of -popular attention from domestic affairs to foreign policy. -If Republicans and Monarchists, Socialists and bourgeois -Liberals, Radicals and Conservatives, Free-Masons and -Clericals, could be aroused against the German advance in -Turkey, a common outburst of national pride might obscure, -for a time at least, the domestic war on organized -Catholicism. Therefore Clerical writers in France -warned of the menace of the Bagdad Railway to the -Russian Alliance, to the advance of French commerce, and -to the ancient prerogatives in the East. “It is Germany, -preëminent at Constantinople,” said an anonymous writer<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span> -in the <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, “which blocks the future -of Pan-Slavism in the East; it is Germany, installed in -Kiao-chau, which can forestall Muscovite expansion toward -the Pacific; it is Germany which, in the East and -Far East, seeks to undermine our religious protectorate. -Faced by the same adversary, it is natural that France -and Russia should build up a common defence.” That -France should not desert her ally Russia or her own -prerogatives in the protectorate of Near Eastern missions -is self-evident. “The protectorate over Catholics is for us, -in short, a source of material advantage!”<a name="FNanchor_33_243" id="FNanchor_33_243"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_243" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Bagdad Railway Claims French Supporters</span></h3> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway was not without friends in -France. The French chairman of the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration was an enthusiastic supporter of the -project and served on the Board of Directors of the Bagdad -Railway Company, for he believed that widespread -railway construction was essential to the establishment, -upon a firm basis, of Turkish credit. The French-controlled -Imperial Ottoman Bank, as early as 1899, had -agreed to participate in the financing of the Bagdad line, -and an officer of the bank had accepted the position of -vice-president of the Bagdad Railway Company at the time -of its incorporation in 1903. The French owners of important -railways in Anatolia and Syria believed it would -be suicidal for them to obstruct the plans of the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> and preferred to coöperate with the German concessionaires. -Unless the French opponents of the Bagdad -Railway were prepared to offer these interests material -compensation for resisting its construction, it was hardly -likely that, hard-headed business men as they were, they -would jeopardize the security of their investments for the -sake of such intangible items as international prestige and -protectorates of missions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span></p> - -<p>There were two important groups of French-owned -railways in Turkey-in-Asia. In Anatolia there was the -important Smyrna-Cassaba system, extending east and -north-east from the French-developed port of Smyrna. -At Afiun Karahissar the main line of this system from -Smyrna connected with the Anatolian line from Constantinople -to Konia. Therefore a route for French trade -already existed to all of Asia Minor; and when the Bagdad -Railway was completed, direct service could be instituted -from Smyrna to Adana, Aleppo, Mosul, Bagdad, -and Basra. The second group of French railways was -the Syrian system, owned by <i>La Société Ottomane du -Chemin de fer Damas-Hama et Prolongements</i>. This -company operated railway lines from Aleppo to Damascus, -from Tripoli to Homs, from Beirut to Damascus, from -Jaffa to Jerusalem, and between other less important -points. After the completion of the Bagdad Railway this -group of railways would have direct connections, at -Aleppo, with all of Europe <i>via</i> Constantinople and with -the Indies <i>via</i> Basra and the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the -French interests controlling these railways were chagrined -at their inability to secure the trans-Mesopotamian concession -for themselves. But faced with the <i>fait accompli</i> -of the German concession, they realized that coöperation -with the Bagdad Railway would make their lines an integral -part of a greater system of rail communications -within Turkey and also between Turkey and the nations -of Europe and Farther Asia. Refusal to coöperate would -be cutting off their noses to spite their faces.<a name="FNanchor_34_244" id="FNanchor_34_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_244" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>French bankers were disposed to look at the Bagdad -enterprise in much the same light. The economic renaissance -of Turkey, which it was hoped would be an effect -of improved rail communications, would increase the value -of their earlier investments in that country. But, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span>in addition, -the Bagdad Railway offered handsome profits in -itself: profits of promoting the enterprise and floating the -various bond issues; profits of the construction company, -in which French capital was to participate; profits of the -shareholders when the Railway should become a going -concern. True, the Council of Ministers had requested -the Bourse to outlaw the Bagdad securities. But, after -all, when profits are at stake, what is a mere resolution -of the Cabinet among friends? A syndicate of French -financiers invested heavily in the bonds and stock of the -Bagdad Railway Company, the hostility of their Government -notwithstanding. And it was said that one of the -bankers who participated in the syndicate was none other -than M. Rouvier, Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of -M. Combes, and subsequently Prime Minister.<a name="FNanchor_35_245" id="FNanchor_35_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_245" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>Many intelligent French students of foreign affairs felt -that a merely obstructionist policy on the part of France -toward the Bagdad Railway would be futile and, in the -end, disastrous. In spite of the many historical and sentimental -attachments of France in the Near East, she really -had no vital interests which were jeopardized by the -Bagdad enterprise. It was urged, therefore, that she -should play the rôle of conciliator of the divergent interests -of Russia, Great Britain, Germany, and Turkey. A -forward-looking program, it was suggested, would be to -urge these nations to reach a full and equitable agreement -in the promotion of “a project unquestionably valuable -in the progress of the whole human race.” National -material interests should be merged in “the superior -interests of civilization.” Mere self-interest demanded -this of France, because, should a war break out over the -Near Eastern question, France would most certainly become -involved.<a name="FNanchor_36_246" id="FNanchor_36_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_246" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>As regards the claims of Russia to influence French -policy in the Bagdad Railway affair, there was a considerab<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span>le -amount of irritability exhibited by French publicists. -It was pointed out, for example, that M. Witte -was unwilling to accept “internationalization” of the Railway -at a time when the German and French bankers were -prepared to effect a satisfactory settlement on that basis. -It was asserted, also, that Russian strategic interests were -adequately safeguarded when the northern route was abandoned -by the Black Sea Basin Agreement of 1900. So -far from decreased difficulties of Turkish mobilization -constituting a menace to Russia, “Russia still had both -the power and, apparently, the inclination to be a formidable -menace to Turkey.”<a name="FNanchor_37_247" id="FNanchor_37_247"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_247" class="fnanchor">37</a> How could the Colossus of -the Caucasus tremble before the Sick Man!</p> - -<p>One French writer was frank in advocating that France -should pursue a course independent of Russia in this -instance. “The St. Petersburg press,” he wrote, “has -asserted vehemently that we are unjust to support an enterprise -which will injure considerably the economic interests -of Russia, which will seriously prejudice its grain trade, -and create a ruinous competitor to Russian railways now -projected. Of what use is the Franco-Russian Alliance -if our policy runs counter to Russian interests?</p> - -<p>“We are particularly pleased to answer the question. -The Franco-Russian Alliance does not imply complete -servility on the part of France toward Russia, or annihilation -of all free will, or perpetual agreement on matters of -finance. After having furnished our ally with almost -seven billion francs, we find ourselves called upon to -support her policies in the Far East, although we ourselves -were abandoned and isolated in the Fashoda affair. -It will be well for us now to think of ourselves somewhat, -although respecting scrupulously, even cordially, the -clauses of the contract of alliance.... It is in our own -interests to coöperate with Germany in the Bagdad enterprise. -It is extremely regrettable that we cannot carry -it out ourselves; but since it is otherwise, we should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span> make -the most of the conditions.”<a name="FNanchor_38_248" id="FNanchor_38_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_248" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<p>It is said that M. Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign -Affairs, certainly no friend of German imperial designs, -never really was hostile to the Bagdad Railway and its -affiliated enterprises. As Bismarck welcomed French -colonial activities in Africa and China as a means of -diverting French attention from the Rhine and the -Vosges, so Delcassé hoped that the colossal Bagdad plan -would absorb all German imperial inclinations, leaving -Morocco an exclusive sphere of French influence. In -the construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire, Germany -might satisfy her “irresistible need for expansion,” -without menacing vital French interests. And all the -while the <i>Quai d’Orsay</i>, through the French representatives -on the Board of Directors of the Bagdad Railway -Company, could be kept fully informed of the progress -of the German concessionaires and the purpose of the -German diplomatic agents interested in the success of the -project.<a name="FNanchor_39_249" id="FNanchor_39_249"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_249" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>There were other ardent French nationalists who felt -very much the same way about it. However, in their -opinion, it would be unwise to gamble on the complete -absorption of Germany in her <i>Bagdadbahn</i>. It would be -wiser, perhaps, to withhold financial support until such -time as the German Foreign Office was willing to execute -a formal treaty conferring upon France an exclusive sphere -of interest in Morocco. Bagdad was to be had for the -asking—but in exchange for Morocco! It is said that in -1905, after the fall of Delcassé and on the eve of the -Algeciras Conference, M. Rouvier, Prime Minister of -France, approached the German ambassador in Paris with -a view to negotiating a Franco-German agreement granting -Germany a free hand in Turkey in return for recognition -of the special interests of France in Morocco.<a name="FNanchor_40_250" id="FNanchor_40_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_250" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span></p> -<p>M. André Tardieu revived this suggestion two years -later. “Germany needs capital,” he said. “And when -one needs capital, it is to France that one comes in search -of it. It is inevitable, necessary, therefore, that Germany -come to us. She will be obliged to come to us sooner or -later to seek our capital for the Bagdad enterprise. Germany -has the concession. She has commenced the lines. -But all the sections requiring the greatest engineering -skill are still to be constructed, and she has not the money -to construct them.” If France agrees to let Germany -have the necessary funds, it will be on the condition that -Germany allow France important compensations. “Where -will these compensations be sought? I have no hesitation -in saying, in Morocco. The Act of Algeciras must be set -aside, and France must have a free hand in Morocco! -An agreement upon the Bagdad question would be mischievous -if it concerned Bagdad alone, for, the Germans -having the concession in their pockets, the positions of the -negotiators would not be equal. On the other hand, if -the agreement is for two purposes, if it refers to Bagdad -<i>and</i> Morocco, I believe, I repeat, it would be both practicable -and desirable.”<a name="FNanchor_41_251" id="FNanchor_41_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_251" class="fnanchor">41</a></p> - -<p>The proposal that French consent to the Bagdad Railway -could be purchased with compensations in North -Africa met with no enthusiasm in Germany. Herr Bassermann, -leader of the National Liberals in the Reichstag, -urged the Foreign Office to meet any such diplomatic -maneuver on the part of France with a sharp rebuff.<a name="FNanchor_42_252" id="FNanchor_42_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_252" class="fnanchor">42</a> -At the time of the Agadir crisis, furthermore, Baron -Marschall von Bieberstein is said to have warned Bethmann-Hollweg -that Germany would have to stand firm -on Morocco, for “if, notwithstanding Damascus and -Tangier, we abandon Morocco, we lose at one blow our -position in Turkey, and with it the advantages and prospects -for the future which we have acquired painfully by -years of toil.”<a name="FNanchor_43_253" id="FNanchor_43_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_253" class="fnanchor">43</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span></p> - -<p>It was not until 1914 that an agreement was reached -between France and Germany on Asiatic Turkey. For -more than ten years, then, the Bagdad Railway was a -stinging irritant in the relations between the Republic and -the Empire. It aggravated an open wound which needed, -not salt, but balm. We shall return later to consider its -consequences. But in the meantime we must turn our -attention to Great Britain, standing astride the Persian -Gulf and blocking the way.</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_211" id="Footnote_1_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_211"><span class="label">1</span></a> Regarding Russian railways in the Near East <i>cf.</i> the article -“Russia—Railways,” in the <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i>, 11th edition, -Volume 23, p. 891. The trans-Persian railway from Resht, a -Persian port on the Caspian, to Teheran was completed in -September, 1899. <i>Cf.</i> “Russia’s Tightening Grip on Persia,” in -<i>The Globe</i> (London), August 24, 1899; also “Russian Railways -in Asia,” <i>The Financial News</i> (London), August 14, 1899. The -Bagdad Railway frequently was referred to in the French and -Russian press as the <i>Petit Transasiatique</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_212" id="Footnote_2_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_212"><span class="label">2</span></a> Foreign correspondence of <i>The Globe</i>, July 28, 1899; <i>Commerce</i> -(London), August 2, 1899; articles quoted from the <i>Novoe -Vremya</i> in <i>The Globe</i>, August 10, 1899; <i>The Engineer</i> (London), -August 11, 1899; <i>The Observer</i>, August 13, 1899; R. Henry, -“L’intérêt française en Asie occidentale—Le chemin de fer de -Bagdad et l’alliance franco-russe,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 673–688.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_213" id="Footnote_3_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_213"><span class="label">3</span></a> <i>Corps de droit ottoman</i>, Volume IV, pp. 64 <i>et seq.</i>; Paul -Imbert, “Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in <i>Revue des deux -mondes</i>, 5 period, Volume 38 (1907), pp. 657–659.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_214" id="Footnote_4_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_214"><span class="label">4</span></a> Quoted by Georges Mazel, <i>Le chemin de fer de Bagdad</i> (Montpelier, -1911), p. 324. It should be remembered that Russia at -this time was experiencing the Industrial Revolution. <i>Cf.</i> James -Mavor, <i>An Economic History of Russia</i>, Volume II (Toronto, -1914), Book VI.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_215" id="Footnote_5_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_215"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Annual Register</i>, 1902, p. 323; 1903, pp. 293–294.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_216" id="Footnote_6_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_216"><span class="label">6</span></a> <i>Memoirs of Count Witte</i>, edited and translated by A. Yarmolinsky -(Garden City, 1921), pp. 75 <i>et seq.</i>; G. Drage, <i>Russian -Affairs</i> (London, 1904), pp. 507 <i>et seq.</i>; A. Sauzède, “Le -développement des voies ferrées en Russie,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 272–281; F. H. -Skrine, <i>The Expansion of Russia</i> (Cambridge, 1904), <i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_217" id="Footnote_7_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_217"><span class="label">7</span></a> Bohler, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 294–295; G<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span>ervais-Courtellemont, “La -question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 499–507.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_218" id="Footnote_8_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_218"><span class="label">8</span></a> Baron S. A. Korff, <i>Russia’s Foreign Relations during the -Last Half Century</i> (New York, 1922), pp. 133–134.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_219" id="Footnote_9_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_219"><span class="label">9</span></a> Rohrbach, <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, pp. 10–13; Imbert, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 678. -Enthusiastic Turks believed that, with adequate rail communications, -Erzerum might be transformed into a Turkish Belfort. -<i>Cf.</i> Mazel, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 37. Had the Bagdad Railway and the -projected railways of northern Anatolia been completed before -the outbreak of the Great War, the Turks could have made a -more effective defence in the Caucasus campaign of the Grand -Duke Nicholas in 1916.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_220" id="Footnote_10_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_220"><span class="label">10</span></a> For a general statement of the attitude of Russia and the -Balkan States to the Bagdad Railway <i>cf.</i> Alexandre Ilitch, <i>Le -chemin de fer de Bagdad, ou l’expansion de l’Allemagne en -Orient</i> (Brussels, Paris, Leipzig, 1913), pp. 100–107, 121–123.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_221" id="Footnote_11_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_221"><span class="label">11</span></a> Bohler, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 273–289; <i>cf.</i>, also, P. Rohrbach, <i>German -World Policies</i>, pp. 223–224.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_222" id="Footnote_12_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_222"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 59–60.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_223" id="Footnote_13_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_223"><span class="label">13</span></a> Chéradame, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 267 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>The Times</i>, August 10, -1899; K. Helfferich, <i>Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</i>, p. 124.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_224" id="Footnote_14_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_224"><span class="label">14</span></a> <i>Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des -Députés</i>, March 25, 1902, p. 1468.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_225" id="Footnote_15_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_225"><span class="label">15</span></a> According to M. Deschanel, this was sophistry. The French -Government, if it was not guilty of an error of commission, -certainly was guilty of a sin of omission. It was the opinion -of M. Deschanel that the French Ambassador at Constantinople -should have done something to put the French Government on -record as opposed to the Bagdad Railway. M. Deschanel was -not certain, however, that the French Ministry had not consented -to the participation of French capital in the plan. “How can -one imagine,” he said, “that an institution such as the Ottoman -Bank became involved in an enterprise of such great political -and military importance without the approval of our Foreign -Office?... How is it that the Ottoman Bank is a party to this -enterprise, and how is it that the Board of Directors for the -first section of the line has French representatives, when only a -word from the Government could have prevented it?” <i>Ibid.</i>, -November 20, 1903, p. 2798.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_226" id="Footnote_16_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_226"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, March 25, 1902, pp. 1468 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_227" id="Footnote_17_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_227"><span class="label">17</span></a> Victor Bérard, “Le Discours du Chancelier,” in the <i>Revue de -Paris</i>, December 15, 1906.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_228" id="Footnote_18_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_228"><span class="label">18</span></a> The <i>Revue Bleue</i>, April 6, 1907, p. 429; <i>Syria and Palestine</i>, -p. 126. Many of the claims that the Bagdad Railway jeopardized -French prosperity were purely fantastic. It was maintained that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span> -the opening of the great Mesopotamian granary would cripple -French agriculture, already seriously handicapped by the competition -of the new world. To this was added the suggestion -that development of cotton-growing in Turkey would stifle the -infant efforts at the cultivation of cotton in the French colonies. -It is incredible that Mesopotamian grain and cotton would have -interfered with the flourishing prosperity of the French peasantry; -in any event, any such danger was at least a generation -removed. France raised high tariff barriers against foreign competition -in the home market for agricultural products; she was -not an exporter of grain.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_229" id="Footnote_19_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_229"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés</i>, -March 25, 1902, pp. 1467 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_230" id="Footnote_20_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_230"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>Cf.</i>, M. Montbel, “Les puissances coloniales devant l’Islam,” -in <i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 37 (1914), pp. -348–362.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_231" id="Footnote_21_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_231"><span class="label">21</span></a> <i>Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés</i>, -November 20, 1905, p. 2798. The italics are mine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_232" id="Footnote_22_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_232"><span class="label">22</span></a> <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 149 (1898), p. 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_233" id="Footnote_23_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_233"><span class="label">23</span></a> Sources of the treaties granting special privileges to France -are sighted in Note 3, Chapter II. Regarding the origins and -nature of the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions -see the article “Capitulations” in the <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i>, -previously cited; J. Brucker, “The Protectorate of Missionaries -in the Near East,” in the <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i>, Volume XII, -pp. 488–492; A. Schopoff, <i>Les Réformes et la Protection des -Chrétiens en Turquie, 1673–1904</i> (Paris, 1904); <i>Livre de propagande -de l’alliance française, 1883–1893</i> (Paris, 1894), especially -pp. 35 <i>et seq.</i>; Viscomte Aviau de Piolant, <i>La défense des -intérêts catholiques en Terre Sainte et en Asie Mineure</i> (Paris, -1886).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_234" id="Footnote_24_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_234"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>Syria and Palestine</i>, pp. 43–45, 54–55; L. Bréhier, “Turkish -Empire—Missions,” in <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i>, Volume XV, pp. -101–102; J. Atalla, “Les solutions de la question syrienne,” in -<i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 24 (1907), p. 472.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_235" id="Footnote_25_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_235"><span class="label">25</span></a> <i>Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople</i>, -June 30, 1897, pp. 112–113, November 30, 1897, p. 149.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_236" id="Footnote_26_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_236"><span class="label">26</span></a> Brucker, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 490.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_237" id="Footnote_27_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_237"><span class="label">27</span></a> It should be added that the Treaty also stipulated that “the -acquired rights of France are explicitly reserved, and there shall -be no interference with the <i>statu quo</i> in the Holy Places.” E. -Hertslet, <i>The Map of Europe by Treaty</i>, Volume IV (London, -1891), p. 2797.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_238" id="Footnote_28_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_238"><span class="label">28</span></a> <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 149, (1898), pp. 24–25; -Brucker, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 491.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_239" id="Footnote_29_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_239"><span class="label">29</span></a> <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i>, Volume XII, p. 49<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">174</a></span>1. The rôle of the -Italians in this controversy is of considerable interest. The -desire of the Italian Government to assert its right to protect -its own citizens abroad was a manifestation of the Italian -nationalism which brought about the establishment of the Kingdom; -at the same time it was an expression of that anti-Clerical -tendency which characterized Italian politics from the days of -Cavour to the outbreak of the Great War. Undoubtedly, also, -there was an economic side to the question. It will be recalled -that Italian trade with the Ottoman Empire grew more rapidly -than that of any other power after the opening of the twentieth -century. (<i>Supra</i>, pp. 105–106.) This growth was due, in no small -degree, to the earlier rise of Italian missionary activity in Turkey. -This growth of missions and schools, as well as of commercial -establishments, was irritating to patriotic Frenchmen. <i>Cf.</i> two -articles by René Pinon, “Les écoles d’Orient,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 415–435, 487–517. -Italian missionaries, charged M. Pinon, were encouraged in every -way to ignore the French protectorate, appealing only to Italian -diplomatic and consular representatives. “Official Italy, Catholic -and papal Italy, free-mason Italy and clerical Italy, all are working -together in a common great patriotic effort for the spread -of the Italian language and the rise of the national power” -(p. 500). Annoying as this is, says M. Pinon, it should be “a -singular lesson for certain Frenchmen!” That there was no -love lost on the Italian side of the controversy may be gathered -from an analysis of the Italian press comments which appeared -in <i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 37 (1914), p. -495.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_240" id="Footnote_30_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_240"><span class="label">30</span></a> Brucker, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 491. Inasmuch as the protectorate of -Catholic missions involved a considerable responsibility for -France, one may ask why the French Government should have -been so solicitous that no other nation be allowed to share the -burden. The answer is suggested by the <i>Catholic Encyclopedia</i>, -which states that the system of religious protectorates is almost -invariably subject to the abuse that “the protectors will seek -payment for their services by trammeling the spiritual direction -of the mission or by demanding political services in return.” -Volume XII, p. 492.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_241" id="Footnote_31_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_241"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 134–135.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_242" id="Footnote_32_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_242"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 149 (1898), p. 39. The -“pro-German party” was said to consist of Cardinals Ledochowski, -Hohenlohe, Galimberti, and Kapp. <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 11–12; Reinsch, -<i>op. cit.</i>, p. 269.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_243" id="Footnote_33_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_243"><span class="label">33</span></a> <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 36–40. On -this whole subject see, also, C. Lagier, <i>Byzance et Stamboul: nos -droits françaises et nos missions en Orient</i> (Paris, 1905); Hilaire -Capuchin, <i>La France Cat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">175</a></span>holique en Orient durant les trois-derniers -siècles</i> (Paris, 1902); A. Schopoff, <i>Les Réformes et la -Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie</i> (Paris, 1904).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_244" id="Footnote_34_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_244"><span class="label">34</span></a> G. Saint-Yves, <i>Les Chemins de fer françaises dans la Turquie -d’Asie</i> (Paris, 1914).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_245" id="Footnote_35_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_245"><span class="label">35</span></a> The French and Belgian banks principally interested were: -the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the <i>Banque de l’Union Parisienne</i>, -and the <i>Banque Internationale de Bruxelles</i>. <i>Cf.</i> article “Ou en -est la question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 167–171; E. Letailleur, -<i>Les capitalistes français contre la France</i> (Paris, 1916), pp. -72–110. M. Rouvier visited Turkey in 1901, at the request of -the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, to suggest improvements -in the fiscal system of the Empire. (<i>Corps de droit -ottoman</i>, Volume IV, p. 110.) It was at this time, probably, -that he learned enough of the Bagdad Railway to persuade him -of the wisdom of investing in its securities.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_246" id="Footnote_36_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_246"><span class="label">36</span></a> Gervais-Courtellemont, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 507; Imbert, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. -682.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_247" id="Footnote_37_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_247"><span class="label">37</span></a> Gervais-Courtellemont, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 507; Bohler, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 294.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_248" id="Footnote_38_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_248"><span class="label">38</span></a> Bohler, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 293–295.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_249" id="Footnote_39_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_249"><span class="label">39</span></a> Mazel, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 315–322.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_250" id="Footnote_40_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_250"><span class="label">40</span></a> K. Helfferich, <i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i>, p. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_251" id="Footnote_41_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_251"><span class="label">41</span></a> “La politique extérieure de l’Allemagne,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales</i>, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 340–341.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">176</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_252" id="Footnote_42_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_252"><span class="label">42</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_253" id="Footnote_43_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_253"><span class="label">43</span></a> Quoted by the <i>Annual Register</i>, 1913, p. 326.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -GREAT BRITAIN BLOCKS THE WAY</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Early British Opinions Are Favorable</span></h3> - -<p>The idea of a trans-Mesopotamian railway was not new -to informed Englishmen. As early as 1831 a young British -army officer, Francis R. Chesney, who had seen service -in the Near East, became impressed with the desirability -of constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the -Persian Gulf. From 1835 to 1837—while Moltke was -in Turkey studying military topography—Chesney was -engaged in exploring the Euphrates Valley and upon his -return to England brought glowing tales of the latent -wealth of ancient Babylonia. It was not until twenty -years later, however, that his plan for a Mesopotamian -railway was taken up as a practical business proposition. -In 1856 Sir William Andrew incorporated the Euphrates -Valley Railway Company, appointed General Chesney as -chief consulting engineer, and opened offices at Constantinople -to carry on negotiations for a concession from -the Imperial Ottoman Government. The plans of the -Company were supported enthusiastically by Lord Palmerston, -by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British ambassador -at Constantinople, and by the Turkish -ambassador in London. The following year the Sultan<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span> -granted the Euphrates Valley Company a concession for -a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the city of -Basra, with the understanding that the Ottoman Treasury -would guarantee a return of six per cent upon the capital -invested in the enterprise. The promoters, however, experienced -difficulty in raising funds for the construction -of the line, and the project had to be abandoned.<a name="FNanchor_1_254" id="FNanchor_1_254"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_254" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>Lord Palmerston, in the meantime, was busily opposing -the Suez Canal project. De Lesseps was handicapped -by the obstructionist policies of British diplomacy as well -as by the unwillingness of British financiers to invest in -his enterprise. Palmerston frankly informed the great -French engineer that in the opinion of the British Government -the construction of the Canal was a physical -impossibility; that if it were constructed it would injure -British maritime supremacy; and that, after all, it was -not so much a financial and commercial venture as a -political conspiracy to provide the occasion for French -interference in the East!<a name="FNanchor_2_255" id="FNanchor_2_255"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_255" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless the Suez Canal was completed in 1869, -and immediately thereafter the question of a Mesopotamian -railway was again brought to the fore in England. -The advance of the Russians in the Near East and the -control by the French of a short all-water route to the -Indies gave rise to serious concern regarding the maintenance -of communication with British India. In 1870 -a British promoter proposed the construction of a railway -from Alexandretta <i>via</i> Aleppo and Mosul to Bagdad -and Basra. Such a railway, as Sir William Andrew had -pointed out, would assure the undisturbed possession of -India, for the “advancing standard of the barbarian Cossack -would recoil before those emblems of power and -progress, the electric wire and the steam engine, and his -ominous tread would be restrained behind the icy barrier -of the Caucasus.”<a name="FNanchor_3_256" id="FNanchor_3_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_256" class="fnanchor">3</a> Also it would render Great Britai<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span>n -independent of the French-owned Suez Canal by providing -an alternative route to the East, making possible more -rapid transportation of passengers, mails, and troops to -India. This plan seemed desirable of execution from -so many points of view that a special committee of the -House of Commons, presided over by Sir Stafford Northcote, -was appointed “to examine and report upon the -whole subject of railway communication between the -Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf.” -This committee reported that the construction of a trans-Mesopotamian -railway was a matter of urgent imperial -concern and recommended a plan which would have involved -the investment of some £10,000,000. The necessity -of providing an alternative route to India was obviated, -however, by Disraeli’s purchase, in 1875, of a controlling -interest in the Suez Canal at a cost of less than half that -sum.<a name="FNanchor_4_257" id="FNanchor_4_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_257" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>For the forty years during which, at intervals, these -projects were under discussion Germany was not even an -interested spectator in Near Eastern affairs. Domestic -problems of economic development and national unification -were all-absorbing, and capitalistic imperialism was -quite outside the scope of German policies. France and -Russia, not Germany, were the disturbers of British tranquillity -in the Orient.</p> - -<p>When during the last two decades of the nineteenth -century there was a marked increase of German political -and economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, there was -little disposition in England to resent the German advance. -As late as 1899, the year in which the preliminary Bagdad -Railway concession was awarded to German financiers, -British opinion, on the whole, was well disposed to Teutonic -peaceful penetration in the Near East. The press -was delighted at the prospect that the advent of the Germans -in Turkey woul<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span>d block Russian expansion in the -Middle East. Such eminent imperialists as Joseph Chamberlain -and Cecil Rhodes announced their willingness to -conclude an <i>entente</i> with Germany in colonial affairs. The -British Government was more suspicious of France than -of Germany.<a name="FNanchor_5_258" id="FNanchor_5_258"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_258" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>During the opening years of the twentieth century, -however, the situation was materially changed. Although -there was a continuance of the cordial relations between -the British and German Governments, there was an undercurrent -of hostility to Germany in England (as well as to -England in Germany) which was to be disastrous to the -hopes for an Anglo-German agreement on the Near East. -By 1903, the year of the definitive Bagdad concession, -German diplomacy and German business were under a -cloud of suspicion and unpopularity in Great Britain.</p> - -<p>The underlying reason for the increasing estrangement -between England and Germany was, as far as the -British were concerned, the phenomenal rise of Germany -as a world power. The commercial advance of the German -Empire disturbed the complacent security and the -stereotyped methods of British business. The colonial -aspirations of German imperialists rudely interfered with -British plans in Africa and appeared to be threatening -British domination of the East. The German navy bills -of 1898 and 1900 constituted a challenge to Britannia’s -rule of the waves. German criticism of English procedure -in South Africa had aroused widespread animosity, -in large part because the British themselves realized that -their conduct toward the Boers had not been above reproach. -This animosity was revealed in an aggravated -and unreasoning form in the vigorous denunciation which -greeted the Government’s joint intervention with Germany -in the Venezuela affair of 1902. Joseph Chamberlain, -who in 1899 had advocated an Anglo-German alliance, -in 1903 was preaching “tariff reform,” directed, among<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span> -other objectives, against the menace to the British Empire -of the rising industrial prosperity of Germany. The -proposal that British capital should participate in the -Bagdad Railway project was introduced to the British -public at a distinctly inopportune time from the point of -view of those who desired some form of coöperation between -England and Germany in the successful prosecution -of the plan.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The British Government Yields to Pressure</span></h3> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway came up for discussion in Parliament -on April 7, 1903. Mr. Balfour then informed the -House of Commons that negotiations were being carried -on between British and German capitalists, and -between British capitalists and the Foreign Office, for the -purpose of determining the conditions upon which British -financiers might participate in the enterprise. If a satisfactory -agreement could be reached by the bankers, His -Majesty’s Government would be asked to give its consent -to a reasonable increase in the customs duties of the -Ottoman Empire, to consider the utilization of the new -railway for the transportation of the Indian mails, and -to adopt a friendly attitude toward the establishment of -the eastern terminus of the Bagdad Railway at or near -Koweit.</p> - -<p>Coöperation with the German concessionaires on any -such basis was attacked vigorously from the floor of the -House. One member declared it a menace to the existing -British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway lines in Turkey, -a potential competitor of British maritime supremacy, and -a threat at British imperial interests in Egypt and in the -region of the Persian Gulf. Another member of the -House believed that “it was impossible to divorce the -commercial from the political aspect of the quest<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span>ion. What -made the House take a real, live interest in it was the -feeling that bound up with the future of this railway there -was probably the future political control of large regions -in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf.” -Another member was certain the House “knew Mesopotamia -was a blessed word. They all felt it was impossible -for this country to oppose the introduction of a railway -through Mesopotamia. The only wonder was that the -railway was not constructed forty or fifty years ago.” -At the same time, he felt, it would be well for Britain to -be assured that her participation in the enterprise would -not lead to another “Venezuela agreement”; Germany -must be given to understand that Britain, by control of -the Persian Gulf, held the “trump card” of the deck.</p> - -<p>The Prime Minister made it plain, nevertheless, that he -favored coöperation with the German concessionaires provided -British capital were permitted to participate on a -basis of equality with any other power. He believed, also, -that an obstructionist policy would be futile. “I have no -doubt that whatever course English financiers may take -and whatever course the British Government may pursue, -sooner or later this great undertaking will be carried out,” -said Mr. Balfour. “It is undoubtedly in the power of the -British Government to hamper and impede and inconvenience -any project of the kind; but that the project will -ultimately be carried out, with or without our having a -share in it, there is no question whatsoever.”</p> - -<p>“There are three points,” continued Mr. Balfour, “which -ought not to be lost sight of by the House when trying -to make up their minds upon this problem in its incomplete -state. They have to consider whether it is or is -not desirable that what will undoubtedly be the shortest -route to India should be entirely in the hands of French -and German capitalists. Another question is whether -they do or do not think it desirable that if there is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span> a trade -opening in the Persian Gulf, it should be within the territories -of the Sheik whom we have under our special protection -and with whom we have special treaties [<i>i.e.</i>, the -Sheik of Koweit], or whether it should be in some other -port of the Persian Gulf where we have no such preferential -advantage. The House must also have in view a -third consideration with regard to a railway which goes -through a very rich country and which ... is likely after -a certain period of development to add greatly to the riches -of Turkey, and indirectly, I suppose, greatly to the riches -of any other country which is ready to take advantage of -it. Whether the British producer will be able to take -advantage of it is not for me to say; but the House will -have to consider whether he is more likely to be able to -take advantage of it if English capital is largely interested, -than if it is confined to French and German capital. -The House will have to calculate whether ... it will be -prudent to leave the passenger traffic in the hands of those -two nations, France and Germany, with whom we are on -the most friendly terms, but whose interests may not be -identical with our own.”<a name="FNanchor_6_259" id="FNanchor_6_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_259" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>Mr. Balfour’s presentation of the case was hailed in -Berlin as eminently lucid and fair. The <i>National Zeitung</i> -and the <i>Vossische Zeitung</i> of April 8 expressed the hope -that British participation in the Bagdad Railway would -be approved by Parliament and the press, in order that -the German promoters might have the opportunity to -demonstrate that no political ambitions were connected -with the enterprise. The Russian attitude of refusing -even to discuss internationalization, on the other hand, -was roundly denounced.</p> - -<p>The London press, however, saw no reason for enthusiasm -over the Prime Minister’s proposal. <i>The Times</i>, -the <i>Daily Mail</i>, the <i>Daily Telegraph</i>, the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, -and the <i>National Review</i> let loose a torrent <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span>of vituperation -against German imperialist activities in general and the -Bagdad Railway in particular. The <i>Spectator</i>, forswearing -any thought of prejudice against Germany, constantly -reminded its readers of German unfriendliness during the -Boer War and suggested that the Bagdad negotiations -offered the British Government an admirable opportunity -to retaliate.</p> - -<p>The <i>Manchester Guardian</i>, organ of the old Liberalism, -likewise was opposed to British participation in the Bagdad -Railway. Pleading for continued observance of -Britain’s time-honored policy of isolation, its leading editorial -of April 15 said: “Mr. Balfour expressed his belief -that ‘this great international artery had better be in the -hands of three great countries than in the hands of two -or of one great country.’ In other words, England is to be -mixed up in the domestic broils of Asia Minor; every -Kurdish or Arab attack on the railway will raise awkward -diplomatic questions, and any disaster to the Turkish military -power will place the whole enterprise in jeopardy. -What is far more important, English participation in -railway construction in Asia Minor will certainly -strengthen the suspicions which Russia entertains regarding -our policy. It is the fashion with certain English -politicians to abuse Russia for building railways in Manchuria -and for projecting lines across Persia. Yet Mr. -Balfour seems more than half inclined to pay her policy -the compliment of imitation by helping to build a railway -across Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf—and, worse still, -of imperfect imitation, since the Government is certainly -not prepared to occupy the territory through which the -railway will pass, as Russia does in Manchuria. What -vital interests of our own shall we strengthen by this -sudden ardour for railways in Turkey to counterbalance -the certain weakening of our friendly relations with -Russia?”</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span></p> -<p>Violent as was the opposition of the press to any -coöperation with the Germans in the Bagdad Railway, the -opposition would have been still more violent had all of -the facts been public property. Mr. Balfour, however, -was keeping the House and the country in complete ignorance -of many of the most important aspects of the -situation. Although the Prime Minister denied that there -had been any negotiations between the British and German -Governments regarding the Bagdad enterprise, he failed -to admit that there had been such negotiations between -His Majesty’s Government and German financiers. He -made no mention of the fact, for example, that he and -Lord Lansdowne, his Secretary of State for Foreign -Affairs, had attended a meeting at the home of Lord -Mount Stephen at which Dr. von Gwinner, on behalf of -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, and Lord Revelstoke, on behalf of the -interested British financiers, explained the terms of the -proposed participation of British capital in the Bagdad -Railway.<a name="FNanchor_7_260" id="FNanchor_7_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_260" class="fnanchor">7</a> The plan was to place the Railway, including -the Anatolian lines, throughout its entire length from the -Bosporus to the Persian Gulf, under international control. -Equal participation in construction, administration, and -management was to be awarded German, French, and -British interests to prevent the possibility of preferential -treatment for the goods or subjects of any one country.<a name="FNanchor_8_261" id="FNanchor_8_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_261" class="fnanchor">8</a> -To this proposal both Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne -gave their approval, assuring the bankers that no diplomatic -obstacles would be offered by Great Britain to the -construction of the Bagdad Railway. Dr. von Gwinner -thereupon returned home to obtain the consent of his -associates to the reapportionment of interests and, perhaps, -to consult the German Foreign Office and the Ottoman -minister at Berlin. This was early in April, 1903.<a name="FNanchor_9_262" id="FNanchor_9_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_262" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>Persistent rumors in the London press that a Bagdad -Railway agreement had been negotiated brought the subj<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span>ect -to the attention of the Cabinet, which heretofore, -apparently, had not been consulted by the Prime Minister -and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It was -decided that the Prime Minister should make a statement -to Parliament—a statement which, perhaps, might serve -as a sort of trial balloon to ascertain the opinion of the -country upon the question. Mr. Balfour’s presentation -of the Bagdad Railway affair to the House of Commons, -as we have seen, however, provoked unfriendly comments -from the floor and was subjected to heavy fire from the -press. Thereupon a rebellious element in the Cabinet—led, -presumably, by Joseph Chamberlain, who now was -more interested in the development of the economic resources -of the British Empire under a system of protective -and preferential tariffs, than in coöperation with -other nations—persuaded Mr. Balfour not to risk the life -of his Ministry on the question of British participation -in the Bagdad enterprise. Accordingly, the agreement -with the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> was repudiated, and on April 23, -1903, Mr. Balfour informed the House of Commons that -His Majesty’s Government was determined to withdraw -all support, financial and otherwise, which Great Britain -might be in a position to lend the Bagdad Railway. He -was convinced, he said, after a careful examination of the -proposals of the German promoters, that no agreement -was possible which would compensate the Empire for its -diplomatic assistance and guarantee security for British -interests.<a name="FNanchor_10_263" id="FNanchor_10_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_263" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>This announcement was a distinct disappointment to -the bankers in Berlin and in London. The directors of -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> were stunned by the termination of -negotiations which they believed had been progressing -satisfactorily. The British financiers were chagrined at -the sudden decision of their Government to oppose their -participation in a promising enterprise. They were c<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span>onvinced -that the terms offered by the German bankers met -every condition imposed by the Prime Minister. They -were agreed on the wisdom of British coöperation with -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, and they were not a little annoyed at -what appeared to be bad faith on the part of Downing -Street. They were convinced that only a bellicose press -frustrated the attempt to make the Bagdad Railway an -international highway.<a name="FNanchor_11_264" id="FNanchor_11_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_264" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>This, in any event, is the diagnosis of the situation -furnished by Sir Clinton Dawkins, of the Morgan group, -one of the British financiers interested in the project. In -a letter to Dr. von Gwinner written on April 23, 1903, -but not made public until six years later, he said, “As you -originally introduced the Bagdad business to us, I feel that -I cannot, upon its unfortunate termination, omit to express -to you personally my great regret at what has occurred. -After all you have done to meet the various points raised, -you will naturally feel very disappointed and legitimately -aggrieved. But I am glad to think, and I feel you will be -convinced, that your grievance lies not against the British -group but against the British Foreign Office. The fact -is that the business has become involved in politics here -and has been sacrificed to the very violent and bitter feeling -against Germany exhibited by the majority of our -newspapers, and shared in by a large number of people. -This is a feeling which, as the history of recent events will -show you, is not shared by the Government or reflected -in official circles. But of its intensity outside these circles, -for the moment, there can be no doubt; at the present -moment coöperation in any enterprise which can be represented, -or I might more justly say <i>mis</i>represented, as -German will meet with a violent hostility which our -Government has to consider.”</p> - -<p>Sir Clinton thereupon asserted that the effort of Mr. -Balfour to quiet the uproar in Parliament was due to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span> -the Prime Minister’s complete satisfaction with the agreement -reached by the financiers. Just as success seemed -assured, a bitter attack was launched on the Government -“by a magazine and a newspaper [The <i>National Review</i> -and <i>The Times</i>] which had made themselves conspicuous -by their criticisms of the British Foreign Office on the -Venezuela affair. Who instigated these papers, from -whence they derived their information, is a matter upon -which I cannot speak with certainty. My own impression -is that the instigation proceeded from Russian sources. -The clamour raised by these two organs was immediately -taken up by practically the whole of the English press, London -having really gone into a frenzy on the matter owing -to the newspaper campaign, which it would have been -quite impossible to counteract or influence. It is, I think, -due to you that you should know the <i>histoire intime</i> of -what has passed.”<a name="FNanchor_12_265" id="FNanchor_12_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_265" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>There was only one London newspaper, the <i>St. James’s -Gazette</i>, which came out frankly in favor of British participation -in the Bagdad Railway. In the issue of April -14, 1903, the editor ridiculed the suggestion of the <i>Spectator</i> -that the Foreign Office was obliged to warn bankers -of the financial risks involved in the enterprise. “Why -our contemporary should be so anxious to save financiers, -British or foreign, from making a bad investment of their -money, we cannot imagine. Financiers are generally -pretty wide-awake, and the City as a rule requires no -advice from Fleet Street, the Strand, or Whitehall in -transacting its business.” In an editorial entitled “Bagdad -and Bag Everything,” April 22, 1903, the <i>Gazette</i> condemned -<i>The Times</i> for the “curious and alarmist deductions” -which that journal drew from the terms of the -Bagdad Railway convention. The suggestion that this -was a deliberate attempt on the part of Germany to ruin -British trade was characterized “as much a figment of a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span> -fevered imagination as the mind-picture of Turkey using -‘this enormous line to pour down troops to reduce the -shores of the Persian Gulf to the same happy condition -as Armenia and Macedonia,’ about which <i>The Times</i> is -so suddenly and unaccountably concerned. The concession -is a monument to the German Emperor’s activity, built -on the ruins of the influence which we threw away, and we -do not precisely see what our <i>locus standi</i> in the matter is. -If the interests of the Ottoman Government and of the -German concessionaires be served by the construction of -the line, constructed the line will be, and there’s an end. -Whether it ever will, or ever can pay its way, is the -affair only of capitalists who are contemplating investment -in it. It is not the slightest use barking when we cannot -bite, and our power of biting in the present instance is -excessively small.... The Emperor William, like Jack -Jones, has ‘come into ’is little bit of splosh’ in Asia -Minor, and it is quite useless to be soreheaded about it. -It is childish to be ever carping and nagging and ‘panicking.’ -We question whether the Bagdad Railway—while -the rule of the Sultan endures—is going to do much good -or much harm to anybody. The vision which some Germans -have of peaceful Hans and Gretchen swilling -Löwenbrau in the Garden of Eden to the strains of a -German band, is little likely of fulfilment. If trade develops, -a fair share of it will come our way, provided -we send good wares and such as the inhabitants want to -buy.” This minority opinion, however, was unheeded in -the outburst of anti-German feeling which followed Mr. -Balfour’s first statement to the House of Commons.</p> - -<p>As events turned out, the failure of the Balfour Government -to effect the internationalization of the Bagdad -Railway was a colossal diplomatic blunder. If the proposed -agreement of 1903 had been consummated, the <i>entente</i> -of 1904 between France and England would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span> -taken control of the enterprise out of the hands of the -Germans, who would have possessed, with their Turkish -collaborators, only fourteen of the thirty votes in the -Board of Directors. Sir Henry Babington Smith assures -the author that there was nothing in the arrangement suggested -by the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> which would have prevented -eventual Franco-British domination of the line. Surely, as -Bismarck is said to have remarked, every nation must -pay sooner or later for the windows broken by its bellicose -press!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Vested Interests Come to the Fore</span></h3> - -<p>In addition to the pressure which was brought to bear -on the Balfour Cabinet by the newspapers, there were important -vested business interests which quietly, but effectively, -made themselves heard at Downing Street during -the critical days of the Bagdad negotiations of 1903.</p> - -<p>It already has been noted that in 1888, as part of the -plans of the Public Debt Administration for the improvement -of transportation facilities in Turkey, the British-owned -Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company was granted permission -to construct several important branches to its main -line. For a time this new concession thoroughly satisfied -the owners and directors of the Company, and there was -no objection on their part to the extension and development -of the German-owned Anatolian system. By 1903, -however, when the Bagdad concession was under discussion, -the Smyrna-Aidin line demanded the protection of -the British Government against the undue extension of -German railways in the Near East. In particular, it objected -to the agreement between the Anatolian Railway -and the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, by which the latter -joined its tracks with the Anatolian system at Afiun Karahissar -and accepted a schedule of tariffs satisfactory to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span> -both lines.<a name="FNanchor_13_266" id="FNanchor_13_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_266" class="fnanchor">13</a> The Smyrna-Aidin Company feared that -the Bagdad Railway would develop the ports of Haidar -Pasha, Alexandretta, and Mersina at the expense of the -prosperity of Smyrna, thereby decreasing the relative -importance of the Smyrna-Aidin line and cutting down -the volume of its traffic. Finally, it objected to the payment -of a kilometric guarantee to the German concessionaires -while there was no likelihood of its being -similarly favored by the custodians of the public purse. -The interests of the shareholders of the railway were well -represented in the House of Commons by “that watchful -dragon of imperial interests”, Mr. Gibson Bowles.</p> - -<p>Mr. Bowles (Conservative member from King’s Lynn, -1892–1906, and Liberal from the same constituency, 1910–1916) -was a frank defender of the interests of the stockholders -of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. He believed that -investors were entitled to governmental protection of -their investments, whether at home or abroad. He left -no doubt, however, that he took his stand on high grounds -of patriotism as well. He informed the House that “he -did not object to the railway, because all railways were -good feeders of ships. But this was not a railway; it -was a financial fraud and a political conspiracy—a fraud -whereby English trade would suffer and a conspiracy -whereby the political interests of England would be threatened. -It amounted to a military and commercial occupation -by Germany of the whole of Asia Minor.”<a name="FNanchor_14_267" id="FNanchor_14_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_267" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>Comparable to the interests of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway -were those of the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation -Company, Ltd. Under this name the Lynch Brothers -had been operating steamers on the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab -since the middle of the nineteenth century. In -the trade between Bagdad and Basra they enjoyed a -practical monopoly. In the absence of competition they -were able to render indifferent service at exorb<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span>itant rates, -and there was nothing to disturb their tranquillity except -an occasional complaint from a British merchant. But -the old order was about to change. The Bagdad Railway -concession of 1903 (articles 9 and 23) destroyed the monopoly -of the Lynch Brothers by granting to the Railway -Company limited rights of navigation on the Tigris. Construction -of the Mesopotamian sections of the Railway, -furthermore, would be almost certain to kill, by competition, -profitable navigation between Bagdad and Basra. -The course of the Tigris is shallow and winding, subject -to heavy rises and falls, and constantly changing with the -formation and disappearance of sand shoals. The river -journey from Bagdad to Basra is about five hundred miles -and takes from four to five days by steamer, under favorable -conditions. The distance by land is about three -hundred miles and could be traversed by railway in a -single day’s journey, regardless of weather conditions. -For passengers and most classes of freight the Bagdad -Railway promised more economical transportation. The -Lynch Brothers were determined, however, to resist such -rude encroachment on their profitable preserves. In defence -of their interests they wrapped themselves in the -Union Jack and called upon their home government for -protection; they were patriotic to the last degree and were -determined “that the custody of a privilege highly important -to British commerce would never pass to Germany -except over the dead bodies of the principal partners.”<a name="FNanchor_15_268" id="FNanchor_15_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_268" class="fnanchor">15</a> -Overcharge their countrymen they might; surrender this -prerogative to a German railway they would not!</p> - -<p>British shipping interests, also, were vigorous in their -opposition to the Bagdad Railway. A trans-Mesopotamian -railway, they knew, would absorb some of the through -traffic to the East, and the competition of the locomotive -might compel a general readjustment of freight rates. -Furthermore, it was one of the avowed purposes of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span> -Bagdad line to acquire the profitable Indian mails concession -from the British Government; this would be -equivalent to the withdrawal of a subsidy from the steamship -lines operating to the East. It was not for their -own sake, but for the sake of British commerce, however, -that these shipping interests objected to the construction -of the Bagdad line! They warned the British public that -the proposed railway would adversely affect the traffic -passing through the Suez Canal; inasmuch as the United -Kingdom was a stockholder in the Canal, this was the -concern of every English citizen. They pointed out that -the kilometric subsidy which had been guaranteed the -Railway was to be paid from an increase in the customs -duties; thus, it was charged, British commerce would be -obliged to contribute indirectly to the dividends of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>. The improvement of communications -between Middle Europe and the Near East would be -almost certain to disturb British trade with Turkey; the -feared and hated “Made in Germany” trade-mark might -exert its hypnotic influence in a region where British -commerce heretofore had been preëminent. If, in addition, -the German owners of the Bagdad Railway should choose -to grant discriminatory rates to German goods, a severe -body-blow would be dealt British economic interests in -the Ottoman Empire. The completion of this Railway -would bring with it all sorts of German interference in -the Near East and undermine British commercial and -maritime interests in the region.<a name="FNanchor_16_269" id="FNanchor_16_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_269" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>Many of the charges brought against the Bagdad Railway -by the British shipping interests could not have been -substantiated. As early as 1892, Lord Curzon stated emphatically -that, for most commercial purposes, a trans-Mesopotamian -railway would be next to valueless. “If -I were a stockholder in the P. & O. [the Peninsular and -Oriental, one of the Inchcape lines touching at Indian an<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span>d -Persian Gulf ports], I would not,” he said, “except for -the possible loss of the mails, be in the least alarmed at the -competition of such a railway.”<a name="FNanchor_17_270" id="FNanchor_17_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_270" class="fnanchor">17</a> Informed Germans, -likewise, did not consider the Bagdad Railway a serious -competitor to the Suez Canal. One authority, for example, -wrote: “The Bagdad Railway taken as a whole is of importance -only for through passenger and postal traffic -(in which respect, therefore, it is of greatest value to the -British in their communications with India) and occasionally -for fast freight. The great bulk of the freight traffic, -on the other hand, carrying the import and export trade -of the East, hardly can fall to the Bagdad Railway, which, -for a long time at least, must content itself with the local -traffic of certain sections of the line,” particularly in -Cilicia, Syria, and northern Mesopotamia.<a name="FNanchor_18_271" id="FNanchor_18_271"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_271" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>The assertion that the cost of constructing and operating -the line would be borne by British commerce was -based upon specious reasoning. Higher customs duties -would not be paid by the British merchant, but by the -Turkish consumer. The only harmful effect of the increased -duties would be a general increase of prices of -imported commodities in Turkey, leading, perhaps, to a -lesser demand for foreign goods. It was probable, on -the other hand, that this slight disadvantage would be more -than offset by the wider prosperity which the Railway -was almost certain to bring the districts traversed. In -any event, whatever burden might be saddled upon the -import trade would have to be borne, in proportion to the -volume of business transacted, by the competitors of -British merchants as well as by British merchants themselves.</p> - -<p>Many British business men were shrewd enough to -foresee that the Bagdad Railway might prove to be far -from disadvantageous to their interests. Where was the -menace to British prosperity in a railway, German or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span> -otherwise, which promised improved communication with -the British colonies in the Orient? The facilitation of -mail service to India; the development of rapid passenger -service to the East; the reduction of ocean freight rates -as a result of healthy competition—all of these injured -no one except the vested interests which had handicapped -the expansion of British commerce by inadequate service -and exorbitant rates. There was no indication that the -Bagdad Railway Company proposed to discriminate -against non-German shippers; in any event, such a course -was specifically prohibited by the concession of 1903, -which decreed that “all rates, whether they be general, -special, proportional, or differential, are applicable to all -travelers and consignors without distinction,” and which -prohibited the Company “from entering into any special -contract with the object of granting reductions of the -charges specified in the tariffs.”<a name="FNanchor_19_272" id="FNanchor_19_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_272" class="fnanchor">19</a> As the British Chamber -of Commerce at Constantinople appropriately pointed -out, the most certain means of avoiding discriminatory -treatment was to permit and encourage the participation -of British capital in the enterprise and to assure the -presence of British subjects on the Board of Directors of -the Company.<a name="FNanchor_20_273" id="FNanchor_20_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_273" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>From an economic point of view, it would appear that -the British Empire had a great deal to gain from the construction -of the Bagdad Railway. In proportion as -improved methods of transportation shrink the earth’s -surface, the contacts between mother country and dependencies -will become more numerous. An economic community -of interest is more likely to spring up and thrive -with the aid of more numerous and more rapid means -of communication. True, certain interests believed that -the Bagdad Railway threatened their very existence. But -would the British people have been willing to sacrifice the -wider economic interests of the Empire to the ve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span>sted -privileges of a handful of English capitalists? They -would not, of course, if the issue had been put to them -in such simple terms. The problem was complicated by -the obvious fact that it was not alone the economic interests -of the empire which were at stake. The political -import of the Bagdad enterprise overshadowed all economic -considerations.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Imperial Defence Becomes the Primary Concern</span></h3> - -<p>British journalists and statesmen, as well as the ordinary -British patriot, have been accustomed to judge international -questions from but one point of view—the promotion -and protection of the interests of that great and -benevolent institution, “the noblest fabric yet reared by -the genius of a conquering nation,” the British Empire.<a name="FNanchor_21_274" id="FNanchor_21_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_274" class="fnanchor">21</a> -Imperial considerations have been the determining factors -in the formulation of diplomatic policies and of naval and -military strategy. The possession of a far-flung empire -has required further imperial conquests to insure the defence -of those already acquired. Strategic necessities -have constituted a “reason for making an empire large, -and a large empire larger.”<a name="FNanchor_22_275" id="FNanchor_22_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_275" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>India, an empire in itself, is the keystone of the British -imperial system. To defend India it has been considered -necessary for Great Britain to possess herself of vital -strategic points along the routes of communication from -the Atlantic seaboard to the Indian Ocean. The acquisition -of Cape Colony from the Dutch at the conclusion -of the Napoleonic Wars enabled the British fleet to dominate -the old route to India, around the Cape of Good Hope. -Judiciously placed naval stations at Gibraltar, Malta, and -Cyprus assured the safety of British trade with the East -<i>via</i> the Mediterranean. After a futile attempt to prevent -the construction of the Suez Canal, which temporari<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span>ly -placed a new and shorter all-water route to India in the -hands of the French, Great Britain proceeded to acquire -the Canal for herself. To assure the protection of the -Suez Canal, in turn, it was necessary to occupy Egypt and -the Sudan. Control of Somaliland and Aden, together -with friendly relations with Arabia, turned the Red Sea -into a British lake. Menaced by the Russian advance -toward India, Great Britain proceeded to dominate the -entire Middle East: the foreign affairs of Afghanistan -were placed under British tutelage and protection; Baluchistan -was compelled to submit to the control of British -agents; parts of Persia were brought within the sphere -of British influence.<a name="FNanchor_23_276" id="FNanchor_23_276"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_276" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>Great Britain, apparently, was determined to control -every important route to India. What, then, would be -her attitude toward a trans-Mesopotamian railway, terminating -at the only satisfactory deep-water port on the -Persian Gulf? Was the possession of such a short-cut -to India consistent with the exigencies of imperial defence?</p> - -<p>Without a satisfactory terminus on the Persian Gulf -the Bagdad Railway would lose its greatest possibilities -as a great transcontinental line; with such a terminus it -might become a menace to vital British interests in that -region. British imperialists had been interested in control -of the Persian Gulf since the seventeenth century, -when the East India Company established trading posts -along its shores. The British navy cleared the Gulf of -pirates; it buoyed and beaconed the waters of the Gulf -and the Shatt-el-Arab. A favorable treaty with the Emir -of Muscat, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, -provided Great Britain with a “sally port” from which to -organize the defence of the entrance to the Gulf; later, -Muscat became a protectorate of Great Britain. From -time to time treaties were negotiated with the Arab chieftains -of southern Mesopotamia, extending British influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span> -up the Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris and Euphrates -to Bagdad. Under these circumstances, it was apparent -from the very beginning that, whether or not the Balfour -Government consented to British participation in the -Bagdad enterprise, there would be no surrender of the -privileged position enjoyed by Great Britain in the Persian -Gulf. Foreign merchants might be admitted to a -share in the Gulf trade, but the existence of a port under -foreign control hardly could be approved.<a name="FNanchor_24_277" id="FNanchor_24_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_277" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign -Affairs, speaking before the House of Lords, on May 5, -1903, made the position of the Government clear: “I -do not yield to the noble Lord [Lord Ellenborough] in -the interest which I take in the Persian Gulf or in the -feeling that this country stands, with regard to the navigation -of the Persian Gulf, in a position different from -that of any other power.... The noble Lord has asked -me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian -Gulf. I think I can give him one in a few simple words. -It seems to me that our policy should be directed in the -first place to protect and promote British trade in those -waters. In the next place I do not think that he suggests, -or that we would suggest, that those efforts should -be directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade -of other powers. In the third place—I say it without -hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval -base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any -other power as a very grave menace to British interests, -and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our -disposal. I say that in no minatory spirit, because, as -far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment -of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf.”<a name="FNanchor_25_278" id="FNanchor_25_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_278" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>Lord Lansdowne might have reminded his hearers that, -although the British Government was disposed to be -friendly toward the Bagdad Railway, measures already<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span> -had been taken which effectively precluded any possibility -of the construction by the concessionaires, without British -consent, of terminal and port works at Koweit. In 1899, -when the first announcements came from Constantinople -regarding the Bagdad project, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy -of India, became alarmed at the construction of a railway -which would link the head of the Persian Gulf with the -railways of Central Europe. Lord Curzon was a trained -imperialist. It was his custom to utter few words; to make -no proclamations from the housetops; to act promptly—and -in secret. It was at the instigation of the Indian -Government that Colonel Meade, British resident in the -Persian Gulf region, proceeded to Koweit and negotiated -with the Sheik a clandestine agreement by which the -latter accepted the “protection” of the British Government -and agreed to enter into no international agreements without -the consent of a British resident adviser.<a name="FNanchor_26_279" id="FNanchor_26_279"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_279" class="fnanchor">26</a> When a -German technical commission visited Koweit in 1900 to -negotiate for terminal and port facilities, they found the -Sheik suspiciously intractable to their wishes. Thereupon -Abdul Hamid despatched an expedition to Koweit to -assert his sovereignty over the Sheik’s territory, but the -presence of a British gunboat rendered both reason and -force of no avail.<a name="FNanchor_27_280" id="FNanchor_27_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_280" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>“Protection” of Koweit by Great Britain served notice -on both Turkey and Germany that the construction of a -railway, owned and controlled by Germans, to a deep-water -port on the Persian Gulf was deemed contrary to -the interests of the British Empire. From first to last -British officials persistently refused to accede to any arrangement -which would thus jeopardize imperial communications. -Control of the Persian Gulf, an outpost of -Indian defence, became the keynote of British resistance -to the Bagdad Railway.</p> - -<p>During the visit of William II to England in 1907, he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span> -was informed by Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, and -other responsible British statesmen, that their objections -to the Bagdad enterprise would be removed if the sections -of the Railway from Bagdad to Basra and the Persian -Gulf were under the administration of British capitalists.<a name="FNanchor_28_281" id="FNanchor_28_281"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_281" class="fnanchor">28</a> -In March, 1911, shortly after the Kaiser and the Tsar -had reached an agreement at Potsdam on the Bagdad -Railway question, Lord Curzon vigorously denounced the -enterprise as a blow at the heart of Britain’s empire in -India and called upon the Foreign Office to persist in its -policy of blocking construction of the final sections of -the line.<a name="FNanchor_29_282" id="FNanchor_29_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_282" class="fnanchor">29</a> This was in accord with a caustic criticism -of German and Russian activities in the Near East, delivered -by Mr. Lloyd George to the House of Commons, -during which the future Premier made it plain that, whatever -course Russia might pursue, Great Britain would -not compromise her vital imperial interests in the region -of the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_30_283" id="FNanchor_30_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_283" class="fnanchor">30</a> The German concessionaires -learned, to their disappointment and chagrin, that, on this -point, in any event, the British Government stood firm. -Even in 1914, when an international agreement was -reached permitting the construction of the Bagdad Railway, -Great Britain subscribed to the arrangement with -the express proviso that the terminus of the line should -be Basra and that the port to be constructed at Basra -should be jointly owned and controlled by German and -British capitalists. Construction of the line beyond Basra -was not to be undertaken without the permission of the -British Government.<a name="FNanchor_31_284" id="FNanchor_31_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_284" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>Although fear of foreign interference in the Persian -Gulf region was the chief political objection raised by -Great Britain to the construction of the Bagdad Railway, -it was supplemented by a number of other objections—all -associated, directly or indirectly, with the defence of -India. The Bagdad Railway concession of 1903 prov<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span>ided -for the construction of a branch line from Bagdad to -Khanikin, on the Turco-Persian border. This proposed -railway not only would compete with the British caravan -trade between these cities, amounting to about three-quarters -of a million pounds sterling annually, but would, -perhaps, lead to the introduction into the Persian imbroglio -of the influence of another Great Power. Persia lay -astride one of the natural routes of communication to -India. The uncertainty of the situation in Persia already -was such as to cause grave concern in Great Britain, and -there were few British statesmen who would have welcomed -German interference in addition to Russian intrigue.<a name="FNanchor_32_285" id="FNanchor_32_285"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_285" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<p>British imperialists, too, had excellent reason to fear -that any increase in the power of the Sultan, such as -would be certain to follow the construction of adequate -rail communications in the Ottoman Empire, might be -but the first step in a renaissance of Mohammedan political -ambitions, and, perhaps, a Moslem uprising everywhere -against Christian overlords. Such a situation—had -it been sufficiently matured before the outbreak of the -War of 1914—might have been disastrous to the British -position in the East: a rejuvenated Turkey, supported by -a powerful Germany, might have been in a position to -menace the Suez Canal, “the spinal cord of the Empire,” -and to lend assistance to seditious uprisings in Egypt, -India, and the Middle East. Why should Britain not -have been disturbed at such a prospect, when prominent -German publicists were boastfully announcing that this -was one of the principal reasons for official espousal of -the <i>Bagdadbahn</i>?<a name="FNanchor_33_286" id="FNanchor_33_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_286" class="fnanchor">33</a> Why should British statesmen have -closed their eyes to such a possibility, when the recognized -parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party in -Germany warned the members of the Reichstag that limits -must be placed upon the political ramifications of the -Bagdad enterprise, lest it lead to a disastrous war with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span> -Great Britain?<a name="FNanchor_34_287" id="FNanchor_34_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_287" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, British statesmen were too intimately -acquainted with the dynamics of capitalistic imperialism -to accept the assurances of Germans that the Bagdad Railway, -and other German enterprises in Turkey, were business -propositions only. They knew that promises to respect -the sovereignty of the Sultan were courteous formalities -of European diplomatists to cloak scandalous -irregularities—it was in full recognition of the sacred and -inviolable integrity of Turkey that Disraeli had taken possession -and assumed the “defence” of Cyprus in 1878! -Furthermore, experienced imperialists knew full well that -economic penetration was the foundation of political control. -As Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons -in 1911, the kilometric guarantee of the Bagdad -Railway gave German bankers a firm grip on the public -treasury in Turkey, and such a hold on the imperial Ottoman -purse-strings might lead no one could prophesy -where.<a name="FNanchor_35_288" id="FNanchor_35_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_288" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>British experience in Egypt, however, indicated one -direction in which it might possibly lead. English control -in Egypt had been acquired by the most modern and -approved imperial methods. It was no old-fashioned conquest; -the procedure was much more subtle than that. -First, Egypt was weighted down by a great burden of -debt to British capitalists; then British business men and -investors acquired numerous privileges and intrenched -themselves in their special position by virtue of the Anglo-French -control of Egyptian finance; the “advice” of -British diplomatists came to possess greater force of law -than the edicts of the Khedive; “disorders” always could -be counted upon to furnish an excuse for military conquest -and annexation, should that crude procedure -eventually become necessary.<a name="FNanchor_36_289" id="FNanchor_36_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_289" class="fnanchor">36</a> Might not <i>Wilhelmstrasse</i> -tear a leaf out of Downing Street’s book of imperi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span>al -experience?</p> - -<p>There is a seeming inconsistency in this description of -the British interests involved in the Bagdad Railway question. -If British shipping might be seriously injured, if -the imperial communications were to be endangered, if -undisputed control of the Persian Gulf was essential to -the safety of the Empire, if the defence of India was -to be jeopardized, if a German protectorate might be -established in Asia Minor—if all these were possibilities, -how could the Balfour Government afford to temporize -with the German concessionaires, holding out the hope of -British assistance? Were Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne -less fearful for the welfare and safety of the -Empire than were the newspaper editors? Rather, of -course, were they convinced that the very best way of -forestalling any of these developments was to permit -and encourage British participation in the financing of -the Bagdad Railway Company.<a name="FNanchor_37_290" id="FNanchor_37_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_290" class="fnanchor">37</a> Only thus could British -trade hope to share in the economic renaissance of the -Ottoman Empire; only thus could there be British representatives -on the Board of Directors to insist that the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> confine its efforts to the economic development -of Turkey, excluding all political <i>arrières pensées</i>. -And it would not have required an imperialist of the experience -of Mr. Balfour to imagine that dual ownership -of the Bagdad Railway might have the same ultimate -outcome as the Dual Control in Egypt. But blind antagonism -toward Germany prevented the average Englishman -from seeing the obvious advantages of not abandoning -the Bagdad Railway to the exclusive control of -German and French capitalists.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">British Resistance is Stiffened by the Entente</span></h3> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span></p> -<p>One year after the failure of the Bagdad Railway -negotiations of 1903, the age-old colonial rivalry of France -and Great Britain was brought to a temporary close by -the <i>Entente Cordiale</i>. It is not possible, with the information -now at our disposal, to estimate with any degree -of accuracy the influence which the Bagdad Railway exerted -upon British imperialists in the final determination -to reach an agreement with France. One may agree with -an eminent French authority, however, that “neither in -England nor in France is the principle of the understanding -to be sought. Rather was it the fear of Germany -which determined England—not only her King and Government, -but the whole of her people—to draw nearer -France.”<a name="FNanchor_38_291" id="FNanchor_38_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_291" class="fnanchor">38</a> British fear and dislike of Germany were -founded upon the phenomenal growth of German industry -and overseas commerce, the rapid expansion of the German -mercantile marine, the construction of the German -navy, and the insistence of German diplomatists that -Germany be not ignored in colonial matters. The Bagdad -Railway did nothing to quiet those fears. It served, -rather, to render precarious Britain’s position in the East.</p> - -<p>In March, 1903, when the definitive Bagdad Railway -concession was granted, British imperial affairs were in -a far from satisfactory state. The termination of the -Boer War had ended the fear that the British Empire -might lose its hold on South Africa, but the sharp criticism -of British conduct toward the Boers—criticism which -came not only from abroad, but from malcontents at -home—had dealt a severe blow to British prestige. The -relentless advance of Russia in China, Persia, and Afghanistan -gave cause for anxiety as to the safety of Britain’s -possessions in the Middle and Far East. And although -France had withdrawn gracefully from the Fashoda affair, -it was by no means certain that Egypt had seen the last -of French interference. Added to all of these difficulties -was the proposed German-owned railway from Constantin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span>ople -to the Persian Gulf, flanking the Suez Canal and -reaching out to the back door of India.</p> - -<p>Under such circumstances it was small wonder that -Great Britain took stock of her foreign policies. The -Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 already had ended the -British policy of aloofness, and there appeared to be no -sound reason against the negotiation of other treaties -which similarly would strengthen the British position in -the East. The Bagdad Railway negotiations collapsed, -but the agreement with France—which seemed far more -difficult of achievement—was consummated without further -delay. Three years later, in 1907, Great Britain -came to an agreement with another of her rivals in the -East—Russia. The Tsar, chastened by military defeat -abroad and by revolution at home, recognized a British -sphere of interest in Persia, relinquished all claims in -Afghanistan, and acknowledged the suzerainty of China -over Tibet.<a name="FNanchor_39_292" id="FNanchor_39_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_292" class="fnanchor">39</a> The understanding with France had assured -the safety of the Suez Canal from an attack from the -Sudan; the agreement with Russia removed the menace -of an attack upon India from the north and northwest. -Germany became Great Britain’s only formidable rival -in the Near East.</p> - -<p>Thus the Germans found themselves facing a powerful -diplomatic obstacle to the construction of the Bagdad -Railway. Here was another instance, in their minds, of -the “encirclement” of Germany by a hostile coalition—an -“encirclement” not only on the Continent, but in a -German sphere of imperial interest as well. A conspicuous -German Oriental scholar said that the attitude -of the other European powers toward the Bagdad Railway -was the best proof of their enmity toward Germany. -“Every single kilometre had to be fought for against the -unyielding opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span> -France, who desired to frustrate any increase in the -power of Turkey. Great Britain led and organized this -opposition because she feared that India and Egypt were -threatened by the Bagdad Railway.” If one wishes to -understand the diplomatic history of the War, “he needs -only to study the struggle for the Bagdad Railway—he -will find a laboratory full of rich materials.”<a name="FNanchor_40_293" id="FNanchor_40_293"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_293" class="fnanchor">40</a> Here was -the tragedy of the Bagdad Railway—it was one of a number -of imperial enterprises which together constituted a -principal cause of the greatest war of modern times!</p> - -<p>There were some ardent British imperialists who were -out of sympathy with the popular opposition to the Bagdad -Railway and with the policy of the <i>Entente</i> in obstructing -the building of the line. Few Englishmen -were more thoroughly acquainted with the Near East -than Sir William Willcocks.<a name="FNanchor_41_294" id="FNanchor_41_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_294" class="fnanchor">41</a> Basing his opinions upon -an intimate, scientific study of conditions in Mesopotamia, -he advocated full British coöperation with the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> in the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which -he considered was the best means of transportation for -Irak. He criticized the British Government for its short-sighted -policy in the protection of the Lynch Brothers and -their antiquated river service; “rivers,” he said, “are for -irrigation, railways for communications.” Furthermore, -“You cannot leave the waters of the rivers in their channels -and irrigate the country with them. For navigation -you may substitute railway transport; for the purpose of -irrigation nothing can take the place of water.”<a name="FNanchor_42_295" id="FNanchor_42_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_295" class="fnanchor">42</a> He -believed that adequate irrigation of the Mesopotamian -Valley would result in such a wave of prosperity for the -country that it would induce immigration, particularly -from Egypt and British India. It was not inconceivable, -under such conditions, that Britain would fall heir to -ancient Mesopotamia when the Ottoman Empire should -disintegrate.<a name="FNanchor_43_296" id="FNanchor_43_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_296" class="fnanchor">43</a> Sir William Willcocks was neither pacifist -nor visionary; he, himself, was an empire-builder.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span></p> - -<p>Another British imperialist who believed that Great -Britain was pursuing entirely the wrong course in obstructing -German economic penetration in Turkey was -Sir Harry Johnston, novelist, explorer, lecturer, former -member of the consular service. He believed in “The -White Man’s Burden,” in the inevitable overrunning of -the habitable globe by the Caucasian race. But he believed -that the task of spreading white civilization to the four -corners of the earth was such an herculean task, that -“what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech -and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all -the world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. -We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes -of conflict.” His program for the settlement of the Near -Eastern question was: “the promotion of peace and goodwill -among white nations, to start with; and when the -ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence have -been nicely adjusted, then to see that the educational task -of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a -practical, and sympathetic fashion towards the other races -and sub-species of humanity.” Sir Harry believed that -Great Britain was the last country in the world which -ought to oppose the legitimate colonial aspirations of any -other nation. There was every reason for the recognition -of the economic and moral bases of German expansion, -and any dog-in-the-manger attitude on the part of British -statesmen, he was sure, would defeat the highest interests -of the Empire.<a name="FNanchor_44_297" id="FNanchor_44_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_297" class="fnanchor">44</a></p> - -<p>Applying his principles to the problem of Teutonic -aggrandizement in the Ottoman Empire, Sir Harry -Johnston advocated that the western European nations -should acknowledge the Austrian <i>Drang nach Osten</i> as -a legitimate and essential part of the German plans for a -Central European Federation and for the economic developme<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span>nt -of Turkey. “The Turkish Sultanate would -possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within -certain limits, be directed and dominated by German -councils. Germany in fact would become the power with -the principal ‘say’ as to the good government and economic -development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted -as a separate state under French protection, and Judea -might be offered to the Jews under an international -guarantee. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed -British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, -which already lies within the British sphere of influence) -be regarded as a federation of independent Arab -States. For the rest, Turkey-in-Asia—less Armenia, -which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, -become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom -to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and -transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan -Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies -of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them -contented, prosperous, busy, and happy, for at least a -century ahead.” Sir Harry believed that obstructionist -tactics on the part of Great Britain would promote Prussianism -within Germany, whereas, on the other hand, a -frank recognition of Germany’s claims in the Near East -would provide Central Europe with a safety valve which -would “relieve pressure on France, Belgium, and Russia, -paving the way for an understanding on Continental -questions. Let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome -German expansion with Kruger’s metaphor of the tortoise -putting out his head. Germany and Austria are dangerous -to the peace of the world only so long as they are penned -up in their present limits.”<a name="FNanchor_45_298" id="FNanchor_45_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_298" class="fnanchor">45</a></p> - -<p>One obvious disadvantage of the solution suggested by -Sir Harry Johnston was its total indifference to the wishes -of the Ottoman Turks. Apparently it was out of pl<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span>ace -to consider the welfare of Turkey in a discussion of the -Bagdad Railway question! Certainly there were very -few European statesmen who cared the least about the -opinions of Turks in the disposition of Turkish property. -Among the few was Viscount Morley, one of the old -Gladstonian Liberals. Answering Lord Curzon, in the -House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Lord Morley, a member -of the Asquith cabinet, asserted the right of the Turks to -determine their own destinies: “A great deal of nonsense,” -he said, “is talked about the possible danger to British -interests which may be involved some day or other when -this railway is completed, and there have been whimsical -apprehensions expressed. One is that it will constitute -a standing menace to Egypt ... because it would establish -[by junction with the Syrian and Hedjaz railways] -uninterrupted communication between the Bosporus and -Western Arabia. <i>That would hardly be an argument for -Turkey to abandon railway construction on her own soil</i>, -whereas it overlooks the fact that the Sinai Peninsula intervenes. -You cannot get over this plain cardinal fact, -that this railway is made on Turkish territory by virtue -of an instrument granted by the Turkish Government.... -I see articles in newspapers every day in which it is -assumed that we have the right there to do what we please. -That is not so. It is not our soil, it is Turkish soil, and -the Germans alone are there because the Turkish Government -has given them the right to be there.”<a name="FNanchor_46_299" id="FNanchor_46_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_299" class="fnanchor">46</a></p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_254" id="Footnote_1_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_254"><span class="label">1</span></a> Sir William Andrew, <i>Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route</i> -(London, 1857), <i>passim</i>; also <i>The Euphrates Valley Route to -India</i> (London, 1882); F. R. Chesney, <i>Narrative of the Euphrates -Expedition</i> (London, 1868); <i>The Proposed Imperial Ottoman -Railway</i>, a prospectus issued by the promoters (London, 1857); -F. von Koeppen, <i>Moltke in Kleinasien</i> (Hanover, 1883).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_255" id="Footnote_2_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_255"><span class="label">2</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> article “Suez Canal” in <i>Encyclopedia Britannica</i>, Volume -26, p. 23. How similar were these objections to those subsequently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span> -advanced in opposition to the Bagdad Railway! <i>Cf.</i>, -<i>e. g.</i>, a statement by Lord Curzon, <i>Parliamentary Debates, House -of Lords, fifth series</i>, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_256" id="Footnote_3_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_256"><span class="label">3</span></a> Andrew, <i>Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route</i>, p. 225.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_257" id="Footnote_4_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_257"><span class="label">4</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fourth series, Volume -121 (1903), p. 1345; “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations,” in -<i>The Quarterly Review</i>, Volume 228 (1917), pp. 489–490; Baron -Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, <i>The Strategical Importance of the Euphrates -Valley Railway</i> (English translation by Sir C. W. -Wilson, London, 1873); V. L. Cameron, <i>Our Future Highway -to India</i>, 2 volumes (London, 1880); A. Bérard, <i>La route de -l’Inde par la vallée du Tigre et de l’Euphrate</i> (Lyons, 1887); -F. Jones, <i>The Direct Highway to the East considered as the -Perfection of Great Britain’s duties toward British India</i> (London, -1873).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_258" id="Footnote_5_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_258"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 66–67.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_259" id="Footnote_6_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_259"><span class="label">6</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 120 -(1903), pp. 1247–1248, 1358, 1361, 1364–1367, 1371–1374.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_260" id="Footnote_7_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_260"><span class="label">7</span></a> Lord Mount Stephen had been president of the Canadian -Pacific Railway and of the Bank of Montreal. Lord Revelstoke -was senior partner in the firm of Baring Brothers & Company -and a director of the Bank of England.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_261" id="Footnote_8_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_261"><span class="label">8</span></a> The participation of the three Great Powers was to be on the -basis of 25–25–25%, 15% was to be reserved for minor groups, -and 10% for the Anatolian Railway Company. The provisions -of Article 12 of the concession of 1903 were to be amended to -establish a board of directors of 30, upon which each of the -principal participants should be represented by 8 members. The -remaining 6 members of the board were to be designated by the -Ottoman Government and the Anatolian Railway Company. The -directors were to be appointed by the original subscribers so that -sale or transfer of shares could not alter the proportionate representation -thus agreed upon.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_262" id="Footnote_9_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_262"><span class="label">9</span></a> For the facts in this and the succeeding paragraph the author -is indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, managing director of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>; and to Sir Henry Babington Smith, erstwhile -chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a partner -of Sir Ernest Cassel, president of the National Bank of Turkey, -and a director of the Bank of England. Dr. von Gwinner -placed at the disposal of the author many of the records of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i> and of the Bagdad Railway Company, and Sir -Henry Babington Smith graciously volunteered to answer many -puzzling questions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_263" id="Footnote_10_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_263"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 121 -(1903), pp. 271–272.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">210</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_264" id="Footnote_11_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_264"><span class="label">11</span></a> The British banking houses interested in the Bagdad enterprise -were Baring Brothers, Sir Ernest Cassel, and Morgan-Grenfell -Company. <i>Cf.</i> <i>The Westminster Gazette</i>, April 24, -1903; <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, -Volume 260 (1910), p. 2181d. The bankers, of course, were not -bound by the decision of the Cabinet to withdraw from the -negotiations; they still would have been at liberty to invest in -Bagdad Railway securities, as did the French bankers. However, -it has been the practice of British financiers to accept the -“advice” of the Foreign Office in the case of loans which may -lead to international complications. An analogous case in -American experience was the decision of prominent New York -financial institutions to withdraw from the Chinese consortium -in 1913 because of the avowed opposition of President Wilson -to the terms of the loan contract.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_265" id="Footnote_12_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_265"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>The Nineteenth Century</i>, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1090–1091.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_266" id="Footnote_13_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_266"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 30, 59–60.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_267" id="Footnote_14_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_267"><span class="label">14</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 120, -pp. 1360–1361; Volume 126, p. 108. The opinions of Mr. Gibson -Bowles were not cordially received by <i>The Scotsman</i>, which said, -April 9, 1903, “Mr. Gibson Bowles carried the House in imagination -to the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris. Germany is there -seeking by means of a railway to supersede our trade, and to -serve herself heir to the wealth and empire of ancient Babylon -and Assyria. The member for King’s Lynn was, as usual, not -very well posted up on his facts. On this occasion he was so -entirely wrong-headed that no one on the opposition bench would -agree with him.... The outstanding moral of the debate was, -indeed, that the honorable member for King’s Lynn was much in -want of a holiday.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_268" id="Footnote_15_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_268"><span class="label">15</span></a> Fraser, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 42–43. The senior member of the firm -of Lynch Brothers was H. F. B. Lynch (1862–1913), who was -widely known as an authority on the Near East and who, as a -Liberal member of Parliament, 1906–1910, was able to call official -attention to the necessity for safeguarding British interests in -Persia and Mesopotamia. That he succeeded in convincing the -Government of the importance of his navigation concession is -evidenced by the vigorous protests filed by the British Government -with the Young Turks in 1909, when the latter attempted -to operate competing vessels on the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab. -On this point see <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, -2 Session</i>, Volume 260 (1910), pp. 2174d <i>et seq.</i> Again -in 1913–1914, the British Government refused to consider any -settlement of the Bagdad Railway question which did not adequately -protect the interests of the Lynch Brothers. <i>Infra</i>, pp. -258–265. Mr. Lynch, however, was not an irreconcilable opponent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">211</a></span> -of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. He took the point of view that the Germans -had rendered Turkey a great service by the construction -of the Anatolian Railways because of the total lack of natural -means of communication in the Anatolian plateau. He urged -that they were making a great mistake, however, to extend the -Anatolian system into Mesopotamia, where the Tigris and Euphrates -provided natural and logical avenues of trade for the -Valley of the Two Rivers. In Mesopotamia, he maintained, -what was needed was a development of the river traffic, not the -construction of railways. <i>Cf.</i> H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad -Railway,” <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, March 1, 1911, pp. 384–386.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_269" id="Footnote_16_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_269"><span class="label">16</span></a> It will be recalled that the Hamburg-American Line established -a Persian Gulf service in 1906. <i>Supra</i>, pp. 108–109. Regarding -the activities of British shipping and commercial interests -in opposing the Bagdad Railway see <i>Diplomatic and Consular -Reports</i>, No. 2950 (1902), pp. 25 <i>et seq.</i>, No. 3140 (1904), pp. 24 -<i>et seq.</i>; <i>The Times</i>, April 24, 1903.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_270" id="Footnote_17_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_270"><span class="label">17</span></a> G. N. Curzon, <i>Persia and the Persian Question</i> (2 volumes, -London, 1892), Volume I, p. 635; a similar view was set forth -by Sir Thomas Sutherland, of the P. & O., in a letter to <i>The -Times</i>, April 27, 1903.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_271" id="Footnote_18_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_271"><span class="label">18</span></a> E. Banse, <i>Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn</i> (Weimar, 1913), -Chapter XI, <i>Die Wahrheit über die Bagdadbahn</i>, a critical analysis -of the value of the Railway in Eastern trade, pp. 145–146. -<i>Cf.</i>, also, Dr. R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des -Suez- und des Bagdad-Weges,” in <i>Geographische Zeitschrift</i>, -Volume 22 (1916), pp. 649–656.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_272" id="Footnote_19_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_272"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Specifications</i>, Articles 24–25. It might be added that the -Company loyally observed this restriction; C. W. Whittall & Co., -largest British merchants in Turkey so testified. <i>Anatolia</i>, p. -103; von Gwinner, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 1090. Sir Edward Grey said no -complaints of discrimination against British goods had come to -the attention of the Foreign Office. <i>Parliamentary Debates, -House of Commons,</i> 5 Series, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–393.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_273" id="Footnote_20_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_273"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3140, p. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_274" id="Footnote_21_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_274"><span class="label">21</span></a> Consider the dedication of Lord Curzon’s <i>Persia and the -Persian Question</i>: “To the officials, military and civil, in India, -whose hands uphold the noblest fabric yet reared by the genius -of a conquering nation, I dedicate this work, the unworthy tribute -of the pen to a cause, which by justice or the sword, it is their -high mission to defend, but whose ultimate safeguard is the -spirit of the British people.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_275" id="Footnote_22_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_275"><span class="label">22</span></a> Woolf, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 24.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_276" id="Footnote_23_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_276"><span class="label">23</span></a> Regarding the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, <i>cf.</i> -Rose, <i>op. cit.</i>, Part II, Chapters I-IV; Curzon, <i>Persia and the -Persian Question</i>, Volume II, Chapter XXX.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">212</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_277" id="Footnote_24_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_277"><span class="label">24</span></a> See a statement by Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, -<i>Parliamentary Debates</i>, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), p. -1347, and a statement by Lord Curzon, <i>ibid.</i>, fifth series, Volume -7 (1911), pp. 583–587; also Curzon, <i>Persia and the Persian Question</i>, -Volume II, Chapter XXVII. The strategic importance of -the Persian Gulf to the British Empire was realized by foreign -observers, as well as by English statesmen. Writing in 1902, -Admiral A. T. Mahan, an American, said, “The control of the -Persian Gulf by a foreign state of considerable naval potentiality, -a ‘fleet in being’ there based upon a strong military port, -would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to -the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the farther -East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal -to the Empire, regarded as a political system; and although at -present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet, -so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a -detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength -of her naval position.” A. T. Mahan, <i>Retrospect and Prospect</i> -(New York, 1902), pp. 224–225. Lord Curzon is said to have -remarked that he “would not hesitate to indict as a traitor to -his country any British minister who would consent to a foreign -Power establishing a station on the Persian Gulf.” A. J. Dunn, -<i>British Interests in the Persian Gulf</i> (London, 1907), p. 7. See -also <i>The Persian Gulf</i> (No. 76 of the Foreign Office Handbooks); -<i>Handbook of Arabia</i>, Volume I (Admiralty Intelligence -Division, London, 1916); Lovat Fraser, <i>India under Curzon and -After</i> (London, 1911).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_278" id="Footnote_25_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_278"><span class="label">25</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fourth series, -Volume 121 (1903), pp. 1347–1348. Two observations should be -made regarding this quotation. First, it is included in every -book I have consulted on the Bagdad Railway, written since -1903, but in every instance the last sentence has been omitted—a -sentence which considerably alters the spirit of the statement. -Second, the German press, at the time, considered that the warning -was directed, not at the Bagdad Railway, but at the rapid -and alarming advance of Russia in Persia. <i>Cf.</i> an analysis of -foreign press comments in an article by J. I. de La Tour, “Le -chemin de fer de Bagdad et l’opinion anglaise,” in <i>Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 609–614—an -excellent digest.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_279" id="Footnote_26_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_279"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> a statement by Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State -for Foreign Affairs, in <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, -fourth series, Volume 101 (1902), p. 129. Although he -was less than forty years of age at the time of his appointment -as Governor-General of India (1898), the Right Honorable -George Nathaniel Curzon, Baron Curzon of Kedleston, even at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span> -that early age, had had wide experience and training of the type -so common among the masters of British imperial destiny. He -was educated at Eton and Oxford, and he traveled widely in the -Near East. He served as a member of Parliament from 1886 -until 1898. He was Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891–1892; -Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1895–1898; -Privy Councillor, 1895.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_280" id="Footnote_27_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_280"><span class="label">27</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 34; <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1901, pp. 304–305; K. -Helfferich, <i>Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</i>, p. 129.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_281" id="Footnote_28_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_281"><span class="label">28</span></a> Viscount Haldane, <i>Before the War</i> (London, 1920), pp. 48–51; -Viscount Morley, <i>Recollections</i> (New York, 1917), p. 238.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_282" id="Footnote_29_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_282"><span class="label">29</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, pp. 239–244; <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, -fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583–587, 589. It is interesting -to contrast this opinion of a German trans-Mesopotamian railway -with that held by the same man when it was proposed that -British capitalists should construct such a line. Writing in -1892, Lord Curzon had this to say regarding the project: “Its -superficial attractions judiciously dressed up in a garb of -patriotism, were such as to allure many minds; and I confess -to having felt, without ever having succumbed to, the fascination. -Closer study, however, and a visit to Syria and Mesopotamia -have convinced me both that the project is unsound, and -that it does not, for the present, at any rate, lie within the -domain of practical politics.” Lord Curzon believed that a -Mesopotamian railway would be practically valueless for military -purposes: “The temperature of these sandy wastes is excessively -torrid and trying during the summer months and I decline to -believe that during half the year any general in the world would -consent to pack his soldiers into third class carriages for conveyance -across those terrible thousand miles, at least if he -anticipated using them in any other capacity than as hospital -inmates at the end.” <i>Persia and the Persian Question</i>, Volume -I, pp. 633–635.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_283" id="Footnote_30_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_283"><span class="label">30</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fifth series, -Volume 21 (1911), pp. 241–242.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_284" id="Footnote_31_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_284"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>Infra</i>, pp. 258–265.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_285" id="Footnote_32_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_285"><span class="label">32</span></a> For the views of a typical British imperialist on the Persian -situation, <i>cf.</i>, Curzon, <i>Persia and the Persian Question</i>, Volume -II, Chapter XXX; a later account is that of the American, W. -Morgan Shuster, <i>The Strangling of Persia</i> (New York, 1912); -<i>cf.</i>, also, H. F. B. Lynch, “Railways in the Middle East,” in -<i>Proceedings of the Central Asian Society</i> (London), March 1, -1911.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_286" id="Footnote_33_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_286"><span class="label">33</span></a> See P. Rohrbach, <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i>, p. 18; Reventlow, <i>op. cit.</i>, -pp. 338–343. That Rohrbach’s frank avowal of the menace of -the Bagdad Railway to India and Egypt was not without influence -in Great Britain is evidenced by the fact that long quotations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span> -from <i>Die Bagdadbahn</i> were read into the records of the -House of Commons by the Earl of Ronaldshay, on March 23, -1911. <i>Parliamentary Debates</i>, fifth series, Volume 23, p. 628.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_287" id="Footnote_34_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_287"><span class="label">34</span></a> Herr Scheidemann, in an eloquent speech to the Reichstag, -March 30, 1911, pleaded with the German Government to be -sympathetic with the position in which Great Britain found herself. -No nation with the imperial responsibilities of Great -Britain could afford to neglect to take precautionary steps against -the possibility of the Bagdad Railway being used as a weapon -of offense against Egypt, the Suez Canal, and India. “Complications -upon complications,” he said, “are certain to arise as -a result of the construction of the Bagdad Railway. But we -expect of our Government, at the very least, that in the course -of protecting the legitimate German economic interests which -are involved in the Bagdad Railway, it will leave no stone unturned -to prevent the development of Anglo-German hostility -over the matter. We want to do everything possible to effect -a thorough understanding with England. Only by such a policy -can we hope to quiet the fears of British imperialists that the -Railway is a menace to the Empire.” <i>Stenographische Berichte, -XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5980c-5984b.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_288" id="Footnote_35_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_288"><span class="label">35</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fifth series, -Volume 21 (1911), pp. 241–242.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_289" id="Footnote_36_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_289"><span class="label">36</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> H. N. Brailsford, <i>The War of Steel and Gold</i>, Chapter -III, “The Egyptian Model.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_290" id="Footnote_37_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_290"><span class="label">37</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 181–182.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_291" id="Footnote_38_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_291"><span class="label">38</span></a> André Tardieu, <i>France and the Alliances</i> (New York, 1908), -p. 46. For M. Tardieu’s analysis of the causes of the growing -Anglo-German hostility, <i>cf.</i> pp. 48–57. It was in the latter part -of April, 1903, that the Bagdad Railway negotiations fell through. -In May, Edward VII paid an official visit to Paris; in October, -an arbitration agreement was signed by France and Great Britain. -The following spring the treaties constituting the Entente Cordiale -were executed. Sir Thomas Barclay, <i>Thirty Years’ Reminiscences</i> -(London, 1906), pp. 175 <i>et seq.</i> For the text of these -agreements <i>cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, Volume 103 (1905), No. -Cd. 2384.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_292" id="Footnote_39_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_292"><span class="label">39</span></a> For the text of the Anglo-Russian Entente, <i>cf.</i> <i>British and -Foreign State Papers</i>, Volume 100, pp. 555 <i>et seq.</i> Regarding -the nature of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East and -the effect of the Bagdad Railway in hastening a settlement of -that rivalry, <i>cf.</i> Edouard Driault, <i>La question d’Orient depuis -ses origines jusqu’à la paix de Sèvres</i> (Paris, 1921), Chapter -VIII, and pp. 273 <i>et seq.</i>; also Tardieu, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 239–252, and -Curzon, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume II, Chapter XXX.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_293" id="Footnote_40_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_293"><span class="label">40</span></a> Ernst Jäckh, <i>Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft</i> -(Stuttgart, 1915), pp. 17–18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_294" id="Footnote_41_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_294"><span class="label">41</span></a> Sir William Willcocks (1852- ) is one of the foremost -authorities on Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia. As a young man -he was employed in India by the Department of Public Works -and for a period of eleven years, 1872–1883, was engaged in the -construction of the famous irrigation works there. From 1883–1893, -he was employed in a similar capacity by the Egyptian -Public Works and was largely responsible for the development -of irrigation in the Nile Valley. In 1898, he planned and projected -the Assuan Dam, which turned out to be the greatest -irrigation work in the East. In 1909, Sir William Willcocks -became consulting engineer to the Ottoman Ministry of Public -Works, and was responsible for the construction, 1911–1913, by -the British firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd., of the famous Hindie -barrage, the first step in the irrigation of the Valley of the Two -Rivers.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_295" id="Footnote_42_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_295"><span class="label">42</span></a> <i>Mesopotamia</i>, p. 54, and <i>The Geographical Journal</i>, August, -1912.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_296" id="Footnote_43_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_296"><span class="label">43</span></a> <i>The Recreation of Chaldea</i> (Cairo, 1902). This suggestion -led to the absurd charge by Dr. Rohrbach that Sir William Willcocks -was actively promoting the establishment of a British -colonial empire in southern Mesopotamia. <i>German World Policies</i>, -pp. 160–161. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, -No. 3140 (1903), p. 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_297" id="Footnote_44_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_297"><span class="label">44</span></a> H. H. Johnston, <i>Common Sense in Foreign Policy</i> (London, -1913), pp. v-vii. A similar opinion was expressed by Colonel -A. C. Yate, at a meeting of the Central Asian Society, May 22, -1911. In answer to an alarmist paper on the Bagdad Railway -which had been read to the society by André Chéradame, Colonel -Yate made a spirited speech in which he warned his countrymen -that M. Chéradame proposed that they should follow the same -mistaken policy which had guided Lord Palmerston in resistance -to the construction of the Suez Canal. “We cannot pick up -every day,” he said, “a Lord Beaconsfield, who will repair the -errors of his blundering predecessors.... Because the German -Emperor and his instruments have adopted and put into practice -the plans which Great Britain rejected [for a trans-Mesopotamian -railway], we are now, forsooth, to pursue a policy which savours -partly of ‘sour grapes’ and partly of ‘dog-in-the-manger,’ and -which in either aspect will do nothing to strengthen British hands -and promote British interests.” <i>Proceedings of the Central Asian -Society</i> (London), May 22, 1911, p. 19.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_298" id="Footnote_45_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_298"><span class="label">45</span></a> Johnston, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 50–51, 61. Sir Harry Johnston made -an extended lecture tour through Germany during 1912 for the -purpose of promoting Anglo-German friendship. For details of -this trip see Schmitt, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 355–356. It is interesting to -note how nearly Sir Harry’s proposals corresponded with the -terms of the treaties of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span>1913–1914. <i>Infra</i>, Chapter X. For a -similar point of view, <i>cf.</i> Angus Hamilton, <i>Problems of the -Middle East</i> (London, 1909), pp. 178–180.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_299" id="Footnote_46_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_299"><span class="label">46</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords</i>, fifth series, Volume -7 (1911), pp. 601–602. The italics are mine.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER IX<br /> - -THE YOUNG TURKS ARE WON OVER</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">A Golden Opportunity Presents Itself to the -Entente Powers</span></h3> - -<p>The Young Turk revolutions of 1908 and 1909, which -ended the reign of Abdul Hamid in the Ottoman Empire, -offered France and Great Britain an unprecedented opportunity -to assume moral and political leadership in the -Near East. Many members of the Committee of Union -and Progress, the revolutionary party, had been educated -in western European universities—chiefly in Paris—and -had come to be staunch admirers of French and English -institutions. “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” the slogan -of Republican France, became the watch-cry of the new -era in Turkey. Parliamentary government and ministerial -responsibility under a constitutional monarch, the -political contribution of Britain to Western civilization, -became the aim of the reformers at Constantinople. The -Ottoman Empire was to be modernized politically, industrially, -and socially according to the best of western -European traditions.<a name="FNanchor_1_300" id="FNanchor_1_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_300" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>Into this scheme of things German influence fitted not -at all. From the Young Turk point of view the Kaiser -was an autocrat who not only had blocked democ<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span>ratic reform -in Germany, but also had propped up the tottering -regime of Abdul Hamid and thus had aided suppression of -liberalism in the Ottoman Empire. As for Baron Marschall -von Bieberstein, he had hobnobbed with the ex-Sultan -and was considered as much a representative of -the old order of things as Abdul Hamid himself. As Dr. -Rohrbach described the situation, “the Young Turks, -liberals of every shade, believed that Germany had been -a staunch supporter of Abdul Hamid’s tyrannical government -and that the German influence constituted a decided -danger for the era of liberalism. That thought was -zealously supported by the English and French press in -Constantinople. The Young Turkish liberalism showed -in the beginning a decided leaning toward a certain form -of Anglomania. England, the home of liberty, of parliaments, -of popular government—such were the catch -phrases promulgated in the daily papers.”<a name="FNanchor_2_301" id="FNanchor_2_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_301" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>German prestige suffered still further because of the -unseemly conduct of Germany’s allies toward the Young -Turk Government. The revolution of 1908 was less than -three months old when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. -Almost simultaneously, Ferdinand of -Bulgaria—presumably at the instigation and with the connivance -of Austria—declared the independence of Bulgaria -from the Sultan and assumed for himself the title -of tsar. To cap the climax, Italy was intriguing in Tripoli -and Cyrenaica with a view to the eventual seizure of those -provinces. Baron Marschall found it impossible to explain -away these hostile moves of the allies of Germany, -and he protested vehemently against the failure of the -Foreign Office at Berlin to restrain Austria-Hungary and -Italy. He warned Prince von Bülow that vigorous action -must be taken if Germany’s influence in the Near East -were not to be totally destroyed.<a name="FNanchor_3_302" id="FNanchor_3_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_302" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>The decline of German prestige at Constantinople could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span> -not have been without effect upon the Bagdad Railway -and the other activities of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. The Bagdad -enterprise, in fact, was looked upon as a concrete manifestation -of German hegemony at the Sublime Porte and as -the crowning achievement of the friendship of those two -autocrats of the autocrats, Abdul Hamid and William II. -As such, it was certain to draw the fire of the reformers. -The concession of 1903 had never been published in Turkey. -Only fifty copies had been printed, and these had -been distributed only among high officials of the Palace, -the Sublime Porte, and the Ministries of War, Marine, -and Public Works. It was generally supposed by the -Union and Progress party, therefore, that the summaries -published in the European press were limited to what the -Sultan chose to make public. “The secrecy which thus -enveloped the Bagdad Railway concession gave rise to -the conviction that the contract contained, apart from detrimental -financial and economic clauses, provisions which -endangered the political independence of the State.”<a name="FNanchor_4_303" id="FNanchor_4_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_303" class="fnanchor">4</a> -And Young Turks were determined to tolerate no such -additional limitations on the sovereignty of their country.</p> - -<p>The opening, in the autumn of 1908, of the first parliament -under the constitutional regime in Turkey gave the -opponents of the Bagdad Railway their chance. A bitter -attack on the project—in which hardly a single provision -of the contract of 1903 escaped scathing criticism—was -delivered by Ismail Hakki Bey, representative from Bagdad, -editor of foreign affairs for a well-known reform -journal, and a prominent member of the Union and Progress -party. Hakki Bey denounced the Railway as a -political and economic monstrosity which could have been -possible only under an autocratic and corrupt government; -in any event, he believed, it could have no place in the -New Turkey. He proposed complete repudiation of the -existing contracts with the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. In this proposal -he received considerable support from other me<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span>mbers -of the parliament.</p> - -<p>An equally ringing, but more reasoned, speech was delivered -by the talented Djavid Bey, subsequently to become -Young Turk Minister of Finance. He agreed that -the concession of 1903 infringed upon the economic and -administrative independence of the Ottoman Empire; he -condemned the scheme of kilometric guarantees as an -unwarranted and indefensible drain upon the Treasury; -he denounced the preponderance of strategic over business -considerations in the construction of the line; he made it -plain that he had no wish to see the extension of German -influence in Turkey. He believed that the Bagdad concession -should be revised in the interest of Ottoman -finance and Ottoman sovereignty. But there must be no -repudiation. “We must accept the Bagdad Railway -contract, because there should exist a continuity and -a solidarity between generations and governments. If -a revolutionary government remains true to the obligations -of its predecessor—even if those obligations be -contracted by a government of the worst and most -despotic kind—it will arouse among foreigners admiration -of the moral sense of the nation and will -accordingly increase public confidence. Just now, more -than at any other time in our history, we Turks -need the confidence of the world.” Everything should -be done to effect a revision of the Bagdad Railway concession, -however, and a firm resolve should be taken never -again to commit the nation to such an engagement.</p> - -<p>The anti-German and pro-Entente proclivities of the -Young Turks were expressed in tangible ways. In 1909, -for example, the Ottoman Navy was placed under the -virtual command of a British admiral, and British officers -continued to exercise comprehensive powers of administration -over the ships and yards almost to the declaration<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span> -of war in 1914. In 1909, also, Sir Ernest Cassel accepted -an invitation to establish the National Bank of Turkey, -for the purpose of promoting more generous investment -of British capital in the Ottoman Empire. During the -same year Sir William Willcocks was appointed consulting -engineer to the Minister of Public Works, and his -plans for the irrigation of Mesopotamia were put into -immediate operation. Sir Richard Crawford, a British -financier, was appointed adviser to the Minister of -Finance; a British barrister was made inspector-general -of the Ministry of Justice; a member of the British consular -service became inspector-general of the Home Office. -Later, serious consideration was given to a proposal to -invite Lord Milner to head a commission to suggest reforms -in the political and economic administration of -Anatolia. A French officer was made inspector-general -of the gendarmerie. In June, 1910, a French company -was awarded a valuable concession for the construction -of a railway from Soma to Panderma, and the following -year the lucrative contract for the telephone service in -Constantinople was granted to an Anglo-French syndicate.<a name="FNanchor_5_304" id="FNanchor_5_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_304" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>The Young Turk Government likewise was desirous -of doing everything possible to remove French and British -objections to the construction of railways in the Ottoman -Empire. With this end in view they prevailed upon Dr. -von Gwinner to reopen negotiations with Sir Ernest Cassel -regarding British participation in the Bagdad Railway, -and they secured the consent of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> to a -rearrangement of the terms of the concession of 1903. -The latter was to be undertaken in accordance with -British wishes and with due regard to the financial situation -of Turkey. This was followed up, on November 8, -1909, by a formal request of the Ottoman ambassador at -London for a statement of the terms upon which the -British Government would withdraw its diplomatic objections -to the Bagdad enterprise. Simultaneously negotiat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span>ions -were initiated for “compensations” to French -interests, represented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank.</p> - -<p>Until the end of the year 1909, then, the political situation -in the Ottoman Empire under the revolutionary government -had been almost altogether to the advantage of -the Entente Powers. During 1910, however, German -prestige began to revive in the Near East, and by the -spring of 1911 German influence in Turkey had won -back its former preëminent position.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Germans Achieve a Diplomatic Triumph</span></h3> - -<p>The Young Turk program, in its political aspects, was -not only liberal, but nationalist. In the fresh enthusiasm -of the early months of the revolution, emphasis was laid -upon modernizing the political institutions of the empire—parliamentary -government and ministerial responsibility -and equality before the law were the concern of -the reformers. As time went on, however, liberalism was -eclipsed by nationalism and modernizing by Ottomanizing. -By the autumn of 1909 Turkish nationalist activities were -in full swing. Revolts in Macedonia and Armenia were -suppressed with an iron hand; there were massacres in -Adana and elsewhere in Anatolia and Cilicia; restrictions -were imposed upon personal liberties and upon freedom -of the press; martial law was declared. Pan-Turkism -and Pan-Islamism were revived as political movements.<a name="FNanchor_6_305" id="FNanchor_6_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_305" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - -<p>The development of an aggressive Turkish nationalism -was not viewed with equanimity by the Entente nations. -The newspapers of France and England roundly denounced -the Adana massacres and came to adopt a hostile -attitude toward the Young Turk Revolution, which only -a short time previously they had extravagantly praised. -Great Britain looked with apprehension upon <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span>Ottoman -support of the nationalist movements in Egypt and India, -and France was disturbed at the prospect of a Pan-Islamic -revival in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. Russia demanded -“reform” in Macedonia and Armenia and encouraged -anti-Turk propaganda in the Balkans. English -interference in Cretan affairs and British support of the -insolent Sheik of Koweit still further complicated the -situation.<a name="FNanchor_7_306" id="FNanchor_7_306"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_306" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>For Germany, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism -held no menace. So far from desiring a weak Turkey—as -did most of the other European Powers—her policy -in the Near East was based upon the strengthening of -Turkey. If Turkey was to be strong, she must suppress -dissentient nationalist and religious minorities; therefore -Germany raised no voice of protest against the Armenian -and Macedonian atrocities. If Turkey sought to recover -territories which formerly had acknowledged the suzerainty -of the Sultan, Germany had nothing to fear; the -Kaiser ruled over no such territories. If Turkey chose -to arouse the Moslem world by a Pan-Islamic revival, that -was no concern of Germany; the German Empire had a -comparatively insignificant number of Mohammedan subjects. -If the Turkish program discomfited the Entente -Powers, that was to Germany’s advantage in the great -game of world politics; therefore Germany could afford -to support the Young Turk Government. As in the days -of Abdul Hamid, Germany appeared to be the only friend -of the Ottomans.<a name="FNanchor_8_307" id="FNanchor_8_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_307" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>The improvement in the German political position at -Constantinople was reflected in a changing Turkish attitude -toward the Bagdad Railway. Among revolutionary -leaders there was a growing realization of the great economic -and political importance of railways and, particularly, -of the Bagdad system. It became apparent upon -examination, also, that others than Germans had obtained<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span> -monopolistic concessions in the Ottoman Empire—in this -respect the Lynch Brothers came in for a good deal of attention. -The Ottoman General Staff—which had recalled -General von der Goltz as chief military adviser—insisted -that the early construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway -at whatever cost, was essential to the defence of the -empire. In spite of serious financial difficulties resulting -from strikes, increased cost of materials, and general -economic paralysis which followed upon the heels of the -revolutions of 1908 and 1909, the Anatolian and Bagdad -Railway Companies advanced large sums to the Minister -of Finance toward the ordinary expenses of running the -Government. In addition, the concessionaires evinced a -desire to meet all Turkish financial and diplomatic objections -to the provisions of the concession of 1903.<a name="FNanchor_9_308" id="FNanchor_9_308"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_308" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>It was the financial needs of the Young Turk administration -which enabled German diplomacy and the <i>Deutsche -Bank</i> to reëstablish themselves thoroughly in the good -graces of the Ottoman Government. But here again the -Germans were given their chance only after England and -France had turned the Turks away empty handed.</p> - -<p>During the summer of 1910, Djavid Bey, as Ottoman -Minister of Finance, went to Paris to raise a loan of -$30,000,000, secured by the customs receipts of the Ottoman -Empire. The negotiations with the Parisian bankers -were complicated by a bitter anti-Turk campaign on the -part of the press and by the frequent interference of the -French Government. Nevertheless, Djavid Bey succeeded -in signing a satisfactory contract with a French -syndicate, and his task appeared to be accomplished. At -this juncture, however, M. Pichon, French Minister of -Foreign Affairs, informed the bankers that official sanction -for the proposed loan would be withheld unless the -Ottoman Government would consent to have its budget -administered by a resident French adviser. The Young<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span> -Turk ministry, determined to tolerate no further foreign -intervention in the administrative affairs of the empire, -flatly refused to consider any such proposal, and Djavid -Bey was instructed to break off all negotiations. “As a -true and loyal friend of France,” wrote Djavid, “I regretted -this incident as one likely to strain the future relations -between the two countries.”</p> - -<p>From Paris Djavid Bey went to London. Sir Ernest -Cassel appeared to be willing to negotiate a loan to Turkey -of the desired amount, but, upon representations from M. -Cambon, the French ambassador at London, Sir Edward -Grey persuaded Cassel not to put in a bid for the bonds. -This decision was reached largely, as Djavid Bey was informed -by the British Foreign Office, because the Bagdad -Railway was considered to be “an enterprise which -under the existing concession has not been conceived in -the best interests of the Ottoman Empire, while it offers, -as at present controlled, an undoubted menace to the -legitimate position of British trade in Mesopotamia.” To -the Turkish Government this statement was a piece of -gratuitous impertinence, for, as Djavid Bey replied, “It -was a prerogative only of the Ottoman Government to -determine whether the conditions of construction and -management of the Bagdad Railway were beneficial or -detrimental to Turkey. England had no more right to object -to the Bagdad Railway than Germany had to object -to the British and French lines in operation in Turkey.”</p> - -<p>The collapse of the financial negotiations in Paris and -London offered the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> an opportunity which -its directors were too shrewd to overlook. Dr. Helfferich -was despatched to Constantinople and within a few weeks -had secured the contract for the entire issue of $30,000,000 -of the Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of 1910, upon -terms almost identical with those agreed upon with the -French syndicate before M. Pichon’s interference. “On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span> -this occasion,” writes Djavid Bey, “the Germans handled -the business with great intelligence and tact. They brought -up no points which were not related directly or indirectly -to the loan, and they made no conditions which would -have been inconsistent with the dignity of Turkey. This -attitude of Germany met with great approval on the part -of the Turkish Government, which was then in a very -difficult position. The result was the greatest diplomatic -victory in the history of the Ottoman Empire between -the revolution of 1908 and the outbreak of the Great -War.”<a name="FNanchor_10_309" id="FNanchor_10_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_309" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>The purchase of the loan of 1910 by the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, -however, did not solve the financial problems of the Young -Turk Government. It was essential that measures be -taken to increase the revenues of the Ottoman Empire. -Accordingly, negotiations had been conducted during 1910, -and were continued until midsummer of 1911, to secure -the consent of the Powers to an increase of 4% in the -customs duties. It was apparent from the outset that -the British Government would block any project for an -increase in Turkish taxes, unless it were granted important -compensations of a political and economic character -and unless it could determine, in large measure, -the purposes for which the additional revenues would be -expended. In this respect, also, it appeared that Entente -policy was standing in the way of the success of the Revolution -in Turkey!</p> - -<p>British objections to the proposed increase in the Ottoman -customs duties were founded in large part upon -British opposition to the Bagdad Railway and, more particularly, -to the sections of the Railway between Bagdad -and the Persian Gulf. In the spring of 1910, the British -Government proposed that a concession for a railway from -Bagdad to Basra <i>via</i> Kut-el-Amara should be awarded to -British financiers, in order that British economic interests<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span> -in Mesopotamia might be adequately safeguarded. In -May of that year Sir Edward Grey wrote the British ambassador -at Constantinople, “Please explain quite clearly -to the Turkish Government that the British Government -will not agree to any addition to the taxes until this claim -for a concession is taken into favorable consideration, -and also that Great Britain’s attitude towards Turkey will -depend largely upon how she meets this demand of yours.” -Upon the refusal of the Ottoman Government to accede -to this demand, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Henry -Babington Smith, English representative on the Ottoman -Public Debt Administration, that England must be -awarded at least a 55% participation in the Bagdad-Basra -section of the Bagdad Railway, as well as concessions for -the construction and control of port works at Koweit. In -addition, Turkey should be made to understand that Great -Britain could approve no agreement without the sanction -of the French and Russian Governments.</p> - -<p>When Djavid Bey was in London in July, 1910, he submitted -two counterproposals to Sir Edward Grey: first, -that the portion of the Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to -Basra should be internationalized upon terms agreeable -to Sir Ernest Cassel and Dr. Arthur von Gwinner; or, -second, that the Ottoman Government itself should undertake -the construction of the line beyond Bagdad. The -British Foreign Office indicated that it might consent to -an increase in the Ottoman customs duties until April, -1914, upon some such terms, provided the consent of the -other Powers were forthcoming, and provided Turkey -would surrender her right of veto over the borrowing -powers of Egypt. Because of the collapse of the loan -negotiations, however, nothing further came of these -proposals.</p> - -<p>On March 7, 1911, the Ottoman ministers at London -and Paris presented to the British and French Gover<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">228</a></span>nments -respectively a proposition that the Bagdad-Basra -section of the Bagdad Railway should be constructed by -an Ottoman company, to the capital of which the Turkish -Government should subscribe 40%, and German, French, -and British capitalists 20% each. The Sublime Porte -expressed a willingness, furthermore, to confer with representatives -of France and Great Britain for the purpose -of satisfying the legitimate political demands of those -two nations in Syria and Mesopotamia. The following -day, nevertheless, Sir Edward Grey informed the House -of Commons that His Majesty’s Government was not prepared -to consent to an increase in the Turkish customs -duties, because it was not clear that the Ottoman Government -was ready to guarantee adequate protection to -British commercial interests in Mesopotamia and the region -of the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_11_310" id="FNanchor_11_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_310" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>This decision was received in Constantinople with undisguised -animosity. Young Turks were as little disposed to -tolerate British, as they were French, supervision of Ottoman -finances and economic policies. The press roundly -denounced the British and said that once again Turkey -had been shown the wisdom of friendship for Germany.<a name="FNanchor_12_311" id="FNanchor_12_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_311" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Entente actions were contrasted with the more conciliatory -policy of the Germans. As early as November, 1910, -Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had notified the Sublime -Porte that Germany would place no obstacles in the way -of an increase in the Ottoman customs duties and that, -furthermore, his Government was prepared to urge that -the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies forego any -additional assignment of Turkish revenues. During the -first week of March, 1911, Dr. von Gwinner and Dr. -Helfferich informed the Ottoman Government that the -Bagdad Railway Company was willing to abandon its -right to construct the sections of the line from Bagdad -to Basra and the Persian Gulf, including the concessions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">229</a></span> -for port and terminal facilities at Basra. The Turkish -Government was to be given a free hand as to the disposition -of the portion of the railway beyond Bagdad, -with the single reservation that the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> should -be awarded a share in the enterprise equal to that granted -any non-Ottoman group of financiers. The German proposals -were accepted and incorporated in a formal convention -of March 21, 1911, by which the Bagdad Railway -Company abandoned its claims to further commitments -from the Ottoman Treasury and agreed, at the pleasure -of the Turkish Government, to surrender its concession -for the Bagdad-Basra-Persian Gulf sections to an Ottoman -company internationally owned and controlled.<a name="FNanchor_13_312" id="FNanchor_13_312"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_312" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>The outcome of the negotiations for an increase in the -customs duties was a keen disappointment to the Young -Turks. Desirous as they were of carrying the Bagdad -enterprise to a successful conclusion, they could not help -resenting its political implications. “We tried,” writes -Djavid Bey, “to better our relations with the English; they -talked to us of the Bagdad Railway! We tried to introduce -financial and economic reforms in Turkey; we found -before us the Bagdad Railway! Every time an occasion -arose, the French stirred up the Bagdad Railway question. -Even the Russians, notwithstanding the Potsdam Agreement,<a name="FNanchor_14_313" id="FNanchor_14_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_313" class="fnanchor">14</a> -constantly waved in their hands the Bagdad -weapon.” This resentment was fortified by the knowledge -that those who opposed the Bagdad Railway were those -who believed that the Sick Man would die and were interested -in the division of his inheritance. From these -Powers Turkey could accept no tutelage!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The German Railways Justify Their Existence</span></h3> - -<p>From the Turkish point of view, the best test of the -wisdom of supporting the German railway concessions in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">230</a></span> -Turkey was an examination of the results achieved in improving -political and economic conditions in the Ottoman -Empire. By 1914 the Anatolian Railways and part of the -Bagdad Railway had been in existence a sufficient length -of time to appraise their worth to Asia Minor, and the -appraisal thus arrived at would be a fair prognostication -of the value of the entire system when it should be opened -to operation.</p> - -<p>Dr. von Gwinner, in justification of the Bagdad Railway -enterprise, summarized what he believed to be the -chief services of the Anatolian Railways to Turkey. -“More than twenty years ago,” he wrote in 1909, “my -predecessor, the late George von Siemens, conceived the -idea of restoring to civilization the great wastes of Asia -Minor and Mesopotamia, once and for long the center of -the history of humanity. The only means of achieving -that end was by building railways; this was undertaken, -slowly but persistently, and with marvelous results. Constantinople -and the Turkish army at that time were eating -bread made from Russian flour; they are now eating grain -of their own country’s growth. Security in Asia Minor -at that time was hardly greater than it is to-day in Kurdistan. -When the <i>Deutsche Bank’s</i> engineers reached a station -a little beyond Ismid (Nikomedia) on the Sea of -Marmora, the neighborhood was infested by Tscherkess -robbers; the chief of those robbers is now a stationmaster -of the Anatolian Railway Company, drawing about £100 -<i>per annum</i>, a party as respectable as the late Mr. Micawber -after his conversion to thrift. The railways brought -ease to the peasantry, who are obtaining for their harvest -twice to four times the price formerly paid, and the railways -have brought revenue to the Treasury. The Anatolian -Railway’s lines are in as good condition as any -line in the United Kingdom, and their transportation -charge is less than half the rates of any railway in -England.”<a name="FNanchor_15_314" id="FNanchor_15_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_314" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">231</a></span></p> - -<p>Although this was the statement of an avowed protagonist -of the Anatolian Railway, the testimony of other observers -must lead to the conclusion that it was not an -overestimate of the value of the Anatolian system. As -early as 1903, for example, the British Consul General at -Constantinople wrote: “There is no doubt that the agricultural -production of the districts traversed by the Angora -Railway has increased largely. Before the Angora -Railway was opened there was no export of grain from -that district; the annual export of wheat and barley is now -from £1,500,000 to £2,000,000. The Railway has attracted -a large number of immigrants from Bulgaria and Russia, -who have settled in the most fertile parts. They form a -hardworking and intelligent population, accustomed to -more civilized methods of cultivation than the Anatolian -peasantry. Population, improved communications and security -are the essentials required for the development of -Asia Minor. The Railway attracts the one and creates the -others. All agree that the country along the Railway is -much safer than elsewhere. It would be surprising, therefore, -if the production of the country did not increase.”<a name="FNanchor_16_315" id="FNanchor_16_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_315" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>The improvement in economic conditions in Anatolia -became more marked as time went on. The Anatolian -Railway Company established a special agricultural department -for the education of the peasantry in more improved -methods of farming; nurseries and experimental -stations were maintained; demonstrations were given of -the best systems of irrigation and drainage; attention was -paid to the development of markets for surplus products -of various kinds. American agricultural machinery was -introduced and promised to become widely adopted. -As a result of these improvements, the agricultural output -of the country increased by leaps and bounds, and -the cultivated areas in some districts were more than<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">232</a></span> -doubled. Famine, formerly a common occurrence, became -a thing of the past, because irrigation eliminated the danger -of recurrent droughts and floods. Increased production -assured a plentiful food supply, and improved -transportation enabled the surplus of one district to be -transferred, in case of need, to another. All in all, the -peasantry were developing qualities of industry, thrift, and -adaptability which seemed to forecast great things for -the future of Asia Minor.<a name="FNanchor_17_316" id="FNanchor_17_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_316" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, the German railways in Turkey, the -failure of which had been freely prophesied, proved to be -successful business enterprises. The directors took all -possible steps to build up the earning power of the lines, -rather than depend upon the minimum return guaranteed -by the Ottoman Government. The railways were efficiently -and intelligently administered—the operating expenses -of the Anatolian and Bagdad lines never exceeded -47% of the gross receipts, although the operating expenses -of the chief European railways, under much more -favorable conditions, varied from 54% to 62% of gross -receipts during the same period. Occasional dividends of -5% or 6% were paid by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway -Companies between 1906 and 1914, but only when -the disbursements were warranted by earnings. In 1911, -a notable advance was made by the introduction of oil-burning -locomotives on the Bagdad lines; henceforth the -German railways in Turkey were operated with fuel -purchased from the Standard Oil Company of New -Jersey!<a name="FNanchor_18_317" id="FNanchor_18_317"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_317" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>This scrupulously careful management eventually -brought its reward. In 1911, the earnings of the Angora -line exceeded the kilometric guarantee and, in accordance -with the terms of the concession, the Ottoman Government -received a share of the receipts. In 1912, the returns -of the Eski Shehr-Konia line also exceeded th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">233</a></span>e sum -guaranteed by the Government, the Ottoman Treasury -receiving a share of the earnings of the Anatolian system -to an amount of more than $200,000. After 1913, no -further payments to the Anatolian Railway Company were -required under the kilometric guarantees.<a name="FNanchor_19_318" id="FNanchor_19_318"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_318" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>The results on the completed sections of the Bagdad -Railway were equally promising, as will be indicated by -the following table:<a name="FNanchor_20_319" id="FNanchor_20_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_319" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<table summary="completed" border="0"><tr> -<td class="tdc"><br /><br /><i>Year</i></td> -<td class="tdc"><i>Kilometres</i><br />in<br />Operation</td> -<td><br /><br /><i>Passengers</i></td> -<td class="tdc"><i>Freight</i><br />Tons</td> -<td class="tdc"><i>Gross</i><br />Receips per<br />Kilometres<br />(Francs)</td> -<td class="tdc">Total<br />Govenment<br />Subsidy<br />(Francs)</td> -</tr><tr> -<td>1906</td><td class="tdc">200</td><td class="tdc">29,629</td><td class="tdc">13,693</td><td class="tdc">1,368.83</td><td class="tdc">624,028.21</td></tr><tr> -<td>1907</td><td class="tdc">200</td><td class="tdc">37,145</td><td class="tdc">23,643</td><td class="tdc">1,754.44</td><td class="tdc">546,129.77</td></tr><tr> -<td>1908</td><td class="tdc">200</td><td class="tdc">52,759</td><td class="tdc">15,941</td><td class="tdc">1,839.86</td><td class="tdc">529,443.12</td></tr><tr> -<td>1909</td><td class="tdc">200</td><td class="tdc">57,026</td><td class="tdc">15,364</td><td class="tdc">1,936.72</td><td class="tdc">509,565.45</td></tr><tr> -<td>1910</td><td class="tdc">200</td><td class="tdc">71,665</td><td class="tdc">27,756</td><td class="tdc">2,571.43</td><td class="tdc">381,135.58</td></tr><tr> -<td>1911</td><td class="tdc">238</td><td class="tdc">95,884</td><td class="tdc">38,046</td><td class="tdc">3,379.34</td><td class="tdc">238,166.59</td></tr><tr> -<td>1912</td><td class="tdc">609</td><td class="tdc">288,833</td><td class="tdc">57,670</td><td class="tdc">5,315.67</td><td class="tdc">278,785.25</td></tr><tr> -<td>1913</td><td class="tdc">609</td><td class="tdc">407,474</td><td class="tdc">78,645</td><td class="tdc">3,786.53</td><td class="tdc">216,295.17</td></tr><tr> -<td>1914</td><td class="tdc">887</td><td class="tdc">597,675</td><td class="tdc">116,194 </td><td class="tdc">8,177.97</td><td class="tdc">2,939,983.00 </td></tr> -</table> - -<p><small>Figures in italics indicate payments <i>to</i> the Turkish Government -of its share of the receipts in excess of the guarantee of 4,500 -francs per kilometre.</small><br /></p> - -<p>The improvement in the economic conditions of Anatolia, -and the success of the German railways as business -enterprises, were sources of great satisfaction and profit -to the Imperial Ottoman Government. Not only was the -Treasury receiving revenue from the railway lines which -had formerly been a drain upon the financial resources of -the empire, but the receipts from taxes in the regions -traversed by the railways were constantly increasing. As -early as 1893 the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works announced -that the increase in tithes and the increased value -of farm lands in Asia Minor had more than justified expenditures -by the Sultan’s Government in subsidies to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">234</a></span> -the Anatolian Railway.<a name="FNanchor_21_320" id="FNanchor_21_320"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_320" class="fnanchor">21</a> For those portions of Anatolia -which were served by the Railway, the amount of the -tithes had almost doubled in twenty years: in 1889, the -year after the award of the Anatolian concession, $639,760 -was collected; in 1898, $948,070; in 1908, $1,240,450. In -certain districts the amount of the tithes collected in 1908 -was five or six times as great as the yield before the construction -of the Railway.<a name="FNanchor_22_321" id="FNanchor_22_321"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_321" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>The economic prospects of Turkey never were brighter -than they were just before the outbreak of the Great War. -The new régime had removed many of the vexatious restrictions -on individual initiative which had characterized -the rule of Abdul Hamid. The country’s losses in men -in the Italian and Balkan wars had been made up by an -immigration of Moslem refugees from the ceded territories. -Numerous concessions had been granted for the -exploitation of mines, the construction of public utilities, -and the improvement of the means of communication. -“There was a feeling abroad in the land that an era of -exceptional commercial and industrial activity was about -to dawn upon Turkey.” The Ottoman Empire was in -a fair way to become modernized according to Western -standards.<a name="FNanchor_23_322" id="FNanchor_23_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_322" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>Thus the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways achieved all -that was claimed for them by their sponsors. They increased -political security in Asia Minor; they brought -about an economic renaissance in the homeland of the -Turks; they justified the investment of public funds which -was necessary to bring the system to completion. Beyond -the Amanus Mountains lay the plains of Syria and the -great unexploited wealth of Mesopotamia. A development -of Mesopotamia, even as modest as that achieved in Anatolia, -would pay the cost of the Bagdad Railway many -times over. Were the Ottoman statesmen who supported -this great project to be condemned for so great a servi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">235</a></span>ce -to their country? Or would they have been short-sighted -had they failed to realize the great potentialities of railway -construction in Asiatic Turkey? That the Bagdad -Railway contributed to the causes of Turkish participation -in the Great War—and to the disintegration of the Ottoman -Empire—was not so much the fault of the Turks -themselves as it was the blight laid upon Turkey, a “backward -nation,” by European imperialism.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Young Turks Have Some Mental Reservations</span></h3> - -<p>Although the revolutionary party in Turkey had come -to look with favor upon German influence in the Near -East, and particularly to support the Bagdad Railway, -there is little reason for accepting the too hastily drawn -conclusion that the Young Turks had sold their country -to the Kaiser or that they were under a definite obligation -to subscribe to German diplomatic policies. They were too -strongly nationalistic for that. They believed that the -Ottoman Empire must eventually rid itself of foreign administrative -assistance, foreign capital invested under far-reaching -economic concessions, and foreign interference -in Ottoman political affairs. But for a period of transition—during -which Turkey could learn the secrets of Western -progress and adapt them to her own purposes—it was the -obvious duty of a forward-looking government to utilize -European capital and European technical assistance for -the welfare of the empire. Patriotism and modernism -went hand in hand in the Young Turk program.<a name="FNanchor_24_323" id="FNanchor_24_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_323" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>The Young Turks were not unaware of the menace of -the Bagdad Railway to their own best hopes. As Djavid -Bey appropriately says: “The great drawback of this enterprise -was its political character, which clung to it and -became a source of endless toil and anxiety for the country. -In a word, it poisoned the political life of Turk<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">236</a></span>ey. -If the Bagdad concession had not been granted, the revolutionary -government could have solved much more easily -pending political and economic problems. But one must -admire the courage of Abdul Hamid in granting the concession, -no matter what the cost, because the construction -of the Bagdad line was essential for the defence and the -economic progress of the empire. Unfortunately for -Turkey, she has always had to suffer from such politico-economic -concessions.</p> - -<p>“The Bagdad Railway did not escape the malady of -politics. When one entered the meeting room of the -company, one breathed the atmosphere of the ministerial -chamber in <i>Wilhelmstrasse</i> and felt in both Gwinner and -Helfferich the presence of undersecretaries for foreign -affairs. This state of affairs, instead of simplifying the -negotiations and relations between Germany and Turkey, -served only to envenom them.”</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_300" id="Footnote_1_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_300"><span class="label">1</span></a> For accounts of the Young Turk Revolutions see René Pinon, -<i>L’Europe et la jeune Turquie</i> (Paris, 1911); V. Bérard, <i>La révolution -turque</i> (Paris, 1909); C. R. Buxton, <i>Turkey in Revolution</i> -(London, 1909); Ernst Jäckh, <i>Der aufsteigende Halbmond</i> (Berlin, -1911); A. H. Lybyer, “The Turkish Parliament,” in <i>Proceedings -of the American Political Science Association</i>, Volume -VII (1910), pp. 66 <i>et seq.</i>; S. Panaretoff, <i>Near Eastern Affairs -and Conditions</i> (New York, 1922), Chapter V; A. Kutschbach, -<i>Die türkische Revolution</i> (Halle, 1909); Baron C. von der Goltz, -<i>Der jungen Türkei Niederlage und die Möglichkeit ihrer Wiedererhebung</i> -(Berlin, 1913).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_301" id="Footnote_2_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_301"><span class="label">2</span></a> Paul Rohrbach, <i>Germany’s Isolation</i>, p. 50.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_302" id="Footnote_3_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_302"><span class="label">3</span></a> Karl Helfferich, <i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i>, p. 21</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_303" id="Footnote_4_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_303"><span class="label">4</span></a> This quotation, together with many other facts in this chapter, -is from a lengthy memorandum of Djavid Bey on the Bagdad -Railway, prepared especially for the use of the author in the -writing of this book. It is dated January 3, 1923, and was forwarded -from the Lausanne Conference for Peace in the Near -East. Unless otherwise specified, quotations from Djavid Bey -here given are from this memorandum. There probably is no -person who knows more of the Ottoman po<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">237</a></span>int of view on the -Bagdad Railway than Djavid, who as Young Turk Minister of -Finance and, later, as Turkish delegate to the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration has had perhaps an unprecedented opportunity -to observe the financial and economic ramifications of -European imperialism in the Near East.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_304" id="Footnote_5_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_304"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 4835 (1911), p. 16; -<i>Mesopotamia</i>, p. 41; <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1911, pp. 364–365; -<i>Armenia and Kurdistan</i>, p. 62; <i>Turkey in Europe</i>, pp. 72–73; -<i>Anatolia</i>, pp. 51–52, 81; <i>infra</i>, pp. 244–246.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_305" id="Footnote_6_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_305"><span class="label">6</span></a> Pan-Turkism, or Pan-Turanianism, started as a cultural -movement among Ottoman intellectuals. It assumed political -aspects as a result of three important circumstances: 1. Aggressions -against Turkey by foreign powers; 2. The ardent nationalism -of the Balkan states bordering on Turkey; 3. The existence -within Turkey of vigorous dissident nationalities, such -as the Armenians and the Arabs. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, -although separate movements, had much in common. -In 1911, at any rate, the Young Turks adopted Pan-Islamism -as part of their program. Pinon, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 134 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Mohammedan -History</i>, pp. 89–96; Sir Thomas Barclay, <i>The Turco-Italian -War and Its Problems</i> (London, 1912), pp. 100 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_306" id="Footnote_7_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_306"><span class="label">7</span></a> For an excellent statement of the reaction of Turkish nationalism -upon European politics see <i>The Quarterly Review</i>, Volume -228 (1917), pp. 511 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_307" id="Footnote_8_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_307"><span class="label">8</span></a> Regarding the coincidence of German and Turkish interests -during the reign of Abdul Hamid <i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 64–65, 125–130.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_308" id="Footnote_9_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_308"><span class="label">9</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1908 and 1909, pp. -8–9; <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1909, pp. 337 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Stenographische -Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, Volume 260 (1910), -pp. 2174d <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_309" id="Footnote_10_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_309"><span class="label">10</span></a> From Djavid Bey’s memorandum. For scattered details of -these negotiations see <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1910, pp. 336–340; -<i>Report of the Deutsche Bank</i>, 1910, pp. 13 <i>et seq.</i>; K. Helfferich, -<i>Die deutsche Türkenpolitik</i>, pp. 23 <i>et seq.</i>; Ostrorog, <i>op. cit.</i>, -pp. 60–61.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_310" id="Footnote_11_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_310"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fifth series, -Volume 22 (1911), pp. 1284–1285. For further details of the -negotiations of 1909–1911 <i>cf.</i> B. von Siebert, <i>Diplomatische -Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre</i> -(Berlin and Leipzig, 1921), Chapters VIII and IX. Hereinafter -cited as <i>de Siebert</i> documents.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_311" id="Footnote_12_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_311"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> foreign correspondence of <i>The Times</i>, March 21, 1911.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_312" id="Footnote_13_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_312"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Troisième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, -1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad</i> (Constantinople, -1911); <i>supra</i>, pp. 111–113.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_313" id="Footnote_14_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_313"><span class="label">14</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>infra</i>, Chapter X.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_314" id="Footnote_15_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_314"><span class="label">15</span></a> <i>The Nineteenth Century</i>, Volume 65 (1909), pp. <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">238</a></span>1083–1084.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_315" id="Footnote_16_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_315"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 3140 (1903), p. 29.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_316" id="Footnote_17_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_316"><span class="label">17</span></a> <i>Société du chemin de fer d’Anatolie-Jahresbericht des -Agrikultur-Dienstes</i> (Berlin, 1899 <i>et seq.</i>), <i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_317" id="Footnote_18_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_317"><span class="label">18</span></a> <i>Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen</i>, Volume 31 (Berlin, 1908), pp. -207–211, 1485–1491; <i>Commerce Reports</i>, No. 18d (Washington, -1915), p. 9; <i>Diplomatic and Consular Reports</i>, No. 4835 (1911), -p. 17; <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway Company</i>, 1910–1913, -<i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_318" id="Footnote_19_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_318"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Report of the Anatolian Railway</i>, 1911–1914, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_319" id="Footnote_20_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_319"><span class="label">20</span></a> Compiled from the <i>Report of the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, -1903–1914. Figures for the years 1904 and 1905 are incomplete -and have therefore been omitted. It should be kept in mind in -reading this table that the years 1912–1914 were abnormal, especially -as regards passenger traffic, because of the two Balkan -Wars and the Great War.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_320" id="Footnote_21_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_320"><span class="label">21</span></a> <i>The Levant Herald</i> (Constantinople), October 25, 1893.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_321" id="Footnote_22_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_321"><span class="label">22</span></a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">239</a></span> Caillard, <i>loc. cit.</i>, p. 439.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_322" id="Footnote_23_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_322"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Commerce Reports</i>, No. 18d (1915), pp. 1–2.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_323" id="Footnote_24_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_323"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 26 (1908), -pp. 475–477.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER X<br /> - -BARGAINS ARE STRUCK</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Kaiser and the Tsar Agree at Potsdam</span></h3> - -<p>During the early days of November, 1910, William II -entertained at the Potsdam palace his fellow sovereign -Nicholas II, Tsar of all the Russias. He extended his -royal hospitality, also, to the recently chosen foreign ministers -of Germany and Russia respectively—Herr von -Kiderlen-Waechter, next to the ambassador at Constantinople -the Kaiser’s most competent expert on the tortuous -affairs of the Near East; and M. Sazonov, subsequently to -guide Russian foreign policy during the critical days of -July, 1914. It was apparent even to the untutored that -there was some political significance to the conference between -the German Emperor and his distinguished guests, -and the press was rife with speculation as to what the outcome -would be. The answer was forthcoming on November -4, when it was announced that the Kaiser and the -Tsar, with the advice and assistance of their foreign -ministers, had reached an agreement on the Bagdad Railway -question.</p> - -<p>A short time later the terms of this Potsdam Agreement -were made public. As outlined by the German -Chancellor, with some subsequent modifications, they<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">240</a></span> were -as follows: 1. Germany recognized the Russian sphere of -interest in northern Persia, as defined by the Anglo-Russian -agreement of 1907, and undertook not to seek or -support concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, or -other means of communication in the region; in other -words, there was to be no change in the <i>status quo</i>. 2. -Russia recognized the rights of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> in the -Bagdad Railway and agreed to withdraw all diplomatic -opposition to the construction of the line and to the participation -of foreign capital therein. 3. Russia agreed to -obtain from Persia, as soon as possible, a concession for -the construction of a railway from Teheran, the capital -city, to Khanikin, an important commercial city on the -Turco-Persian frontier. This new railway was to be -linked with a branch of the Bagdad system to be constructed -in accordance with the terms of the concession -of 1903 from Sadijeh, on the Tigris, to Khanikin. Both -lines were to be planned for through international traffic. -If, for any reason, the Russian Government should fail -to build the proposed railway from Teheran to Khanikin, -it was understood that German promoters might then apply -for the concession. 4. The policy of the economic open -door was to be observed by both nations. Russia agreed -not to discriminate against German trade in Persia, and -the two nations pledged reciprocal equality of treatment -on the new railway lines from Sadijeh to Teheran.<a name="FNanchor_1_324" id="FNanchor_1_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_324" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>Russia had a great deal to gain and little to lose by -the Potsdam Agreement. Whether Russia liked it or not, -the Bagdad Railway had become a going concern, and -there was every indication that another decade would see -its completion. When finished, the Bagdad system, together -with projected Persian lines, would provide Russian -trade with direct communications with the Indies -(<i>via</i> Bagdad and the Persian Gulf) and with the Mediterranean -(<i>via</i> Mosul, Aleppo, and the Syrian coast). By<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">241</a></span> -the entente of 1907 with Great Britain the Tsar had renounced -his imperial interests in southern Persia; therefore -he had little to gain by a dog-in-the-manger attitude -toward the development of Mesopotamia by the Germans. -Under these circumstances continued resistance to the -Bagdad Railway appeared to be short-sighted and futile. -Cheerful acquiescence, on the other hand, might bring -tangible diplomatic compensations. In addition, it has -been suggested, Russian reactionaries were delighted at the -prospect of a <i>rapprochement</i> with Prussia, in which they -saw the last strong support of a dying autocracy.<a name="FNanchor_2_325" id="FNanchor_2_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_325" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>From the German point of view the agreement with -Russia was a diplomatic triumph. All that Germany conceded -was recognition of Russia’s special position in -Persia, which affected no important German interests and -exerted no appreciable influence on the balance of power -in the Near East. In return, German trade was to be admitted -to the markets of Persia, heretofore an exclusively -British and Russian preserve; the sphere of the Bagdad -Railway was to be considerably enlarged; Russian political -obstruction of the Bagdad enterprise was to cease. Russian -objections had been the first stumbling block in the -way of the Railway; Russian protests had been the instigation -of French opposition; now Russian recognition held -out high promise for the final success of the Great Plan. -The first breach had been made in the heretofore solid -front presented by the Entente.<a name="FNanchor_3_326" id="FNanchor_3_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_326" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>Outside of Germany and Russia, however, the Potsdam -Agreement met with a heated reception. The Ottoman -press complained that Turkey was being politely ignored -by two foreign powers in the disposition of her rights. -One Constantinople daily said it was a sad commentary -on Turkish “sovereignty” that in an important treaty on -the Bagdad Railway “there is no mention of us, as if we -had no connection with that line, and we were not masters<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">242</a></span> -of Bagdad and Basra and the ports of the Persian Gulf.”<a name="FNanchor_4_327" id="FNanchor_4_327"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_327" class="fnanchor">4</a> -M. Hanotaux, a former French minister of foreign affairs, -expressed his belief that “the negotiations at Potsdam -have created a situation which, from every point of view, -obliges us to ask, now, if Russia has dissolved the Triple -Entente.”<a name="FNanchor_5_328" id="FNanchor_5_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_328" class="fnanchor">5</a> Mr. Lloyd George delivered a particularly -venomous attack upon Russia for having disregarded her -diplomatic engagements, and he announced in clarion tones -that this desertion from the ranks of the Entente—even -if condoned by France—would not cause Great Britain -to alter one iota her former policy.<a name="FNanchor_6_329" id="FNanchor_6_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_329" class="fnanchor">6</a> The “Slav peril” -appeared to be more keenly appreciated, for the moment, -in France and England than in Germany!</p> - -<p>M. Jaurès, the brilliant French Socialist parliamentarian, -believed that the Potsdam Agreement was an admirable -instance of the menace of the Russian Alliance to the -security of France and the peace of Europe. During the -course of a bitter debate in the Chamber of Deputies he -confronted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, -with this dilemma: “What is the situation in which you -find yourself? You are going to be faced, you already are -faced, with a <i>fait accompli</i>, a Russo-German convention -on the Bagdad question. What do you propose to do? -Well, you may pursue an independent course and continue -to oppose the Bagdad Railway. In that event you -will be in the unenviable position of opposing Germany -in an enterprise to which Russia—whose interests are -more directly involved—has given her support. Or, on -the other hand, you may subscribe with good grace to this -enterprise which Russia commends to you. What then -will be your situation? For some years France has successfully -resisted the Bagdad Railway. If during this -time we have sulked at the enterprise, it was not of our -own choice, but out of regard for Russia, because Russia -believed her interests to be menaced. In short, we arri<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">243</a></span>ve -at this paradox. You have created an extremely delicate -situation between France and Germany by opposing the -Bagdad Railway, in which you had no interests other -than those of Russia. And now it is this same Russia -which, without previously consulting you, places at the -disposal of Germany the moral advantage of compelling -you—you who resisted only on behalf of Russia—to accede -to the Bagdad Railway.” Was this the sort of ally -to whom France should entrust her national safety?<a name="FNanchor_7_330" id="FNanchor_7_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_330" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>In the midst of the storm over the Potsdam Agreement, -M. Stephen Pichon and Sir Edward Grey alone -appeared to be unruffled. Both of these gentlemen, interpolated -in the Chamber of Deputies and the House of -Commons respectively, averred that they saw no reason -for becoming disturbed or alarmed at the new Russo-German -understanding. This point of view was incomprehensible -to the average citizen, unskilled in the niceties of -professional diplomacy, until on January 31, 1911, M. -Jaurès forced M. Pichon to admit that the French Foreign -Office had been informed of the character of the Potsdam -negotiations before they took place. Less than a month -later Mr. Lloyd George severely criticized his fellow-minister -Sir Edward Grey for having taken no action -against the policy of Russia at Potsdam, although, as -Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward had been fully posted on -the nature of the negotiations. Apparently, then, Russia -had come to the agreement with Germany only after having -consulted France and Great Britain and, perhaps, after -having received their consent.<a name="FNanchor_8_331" id="FNanchor_8_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_331" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>There were a few persons who hoped that the Potsdam -Agreement might be the first step in a general settlement -of the Bagdad Railway entanglement. One humble member -of the House of Commons, Mr. Pickersgill, said, for -example, “I cannot understand the policy of continued -antagonism to Germany. Ex-President Roosevelt recently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">244</a></span> -gave much good advice to our Foreign Minister, and -amongst other things he said that the presence of Germany -on the Euphrates would strengthen the position of Great -Britain on the Nile.... The action of Russia in the -recent meeting at Potsdam has brought matters to a head, -and I hope the Foreign Office will approach Turkey with -a view to an arrangement for the completion of the Bagdad -Railway which might be agreeable to Turkey, Germany -and ourselves.”<a name="FNanchor_9_332" id="FNanchor_9_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_332" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>The hope of Mr. Pickersgill was fulfilled, for the agreement -of November 4, 1910, proved to be the first of a -series of conventions regarding the Near East negotiated -between 1911 and 1914 by Germany, Turkey, Great Britain -and France. On the eve of the Great War the Bagdad -Railway controversy had been all but settled!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">French Capitalists Share in the Spoils</span></h3> - -<p>France, relieved of the necessity of supporting Russia’s -strategic objections to the Bagdad Railway, was glad to -compromise with Turkey—in return for compensatory -concessions to French investors. The sharp rebuff given -M. Pichon by the Young Turks in the loan negotiations -of the spring and summer of 1910 had convinced French -diplomatists and business men alike that a policy of bullying -the new administration at Constantinople would be -futile.<a name="FNanchor_10_333" id="FNanchor_10_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_333" class="fnanchor">10</a> Continued obstruction of Ottoman economic -rehabilitation could have but two effects: to injure French -prestige and prejudice the interests of French business; -to drive the Young Turks into still closer association with -the German Government and still greater dependence upon -German capitalists. On the other hand, a conciliatory -policy might be rewarded by profitable participation of -French bankers in the economic development of Turkey-in-Asia -and by a revival of French political influence at -the Sublime Porte.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">245</a></span></p> - -<p>Even before the negotiation of the Potsdam Agreement -the Young Turks had smiled upon French financial interests -in the hope that the French Government might adopt -a more friendly attitude toward the new régime in Turkey. -In June, 1910, for example, the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway -was authorized to extend its existing line from Soma, in -western Anatolia, to Panderma, on the Sea of Marmora. -The concession carried with it the highest kilometric -guarantee (18,800 francs) ever granted a railway in the -Ottoman Empire, although the construction of the line -offered fewer engineering and financial difficulties than -other railways which had been constructed under less -favorable terms. From the standpoint of the Turkish -Government, however, the Soma-Panderma railway offered -economic and strategic returns commensurate with the -investment, for it was part of a comprehensive plan for -the improvement of commercial and military communications -in Asia Minor.<a name="FNanchor_11_334" id="FNanchor_11_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_334" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>The acceptance of this concession by French capitalists—presumably -with the approval, certainly without the -opposition, of their Government—was an interesting commentary -on the official attitude of the French Republic -toward the Bagdad Railway. If it was unprincipled for -Germans to accept a guarantee for the construction and -operation of their railways in Turkey, it is difficult to -ascertain what dispensation exempted Frenchmen from -the same stigma. If the Anatolian and Bagdad systems -were anathema because of their possible utilization for -military purposes, little justification can be offered for the -Soma-Panderma line, which, completed in 1912, was one -of the principal factors in the stubborn defence of the -Dardanelles three years later.</p> - -<p>Shortly after the promulgation of the Soma-Panderma -convention additional steps were taken by the Ot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">246</a></span>toman -Government toward the further extension of French railway -interests in Anatolia and Syria. Negotiations were -initiated with the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the award -to a French-owned company, <i>La Société pour la Construction -et l’Exploitation du Réseau de la Mer Noire</i>, -of a concession for a comprehensive system of railways -in northern Anatolia. It was proposed to construct elaborate -port works at the Black Sea towns of Heraclea, -Samsun, and Trebizond, and to connect the new ports by -railway with the inland towns of Erzerum, Sivas, Kharput, -and Van. Connections were to be established at Boli and -Sivas with extensions to the Anatolian Railways, and at -Arghana with a branch of the Bagdad line to Nisibin and -Diarbekr. Thus adequate rail communications would be -provided from the Ægean to the Persian Gulf, from the -Black Sea to the Syrian shore of the Mediterranean.<a name="FNanchor_12_335" id="FNanchor_12_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_335" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Simultaneously, negotiations were being carried on between -the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works and the -Imperial Ottoman Bank for extensive concessions to the -French Syrian Railways, owned and operated by <i>La -Société du Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hama et Prolongements</i>. -Provision was made for the construction of port -and terminal facilities at Jaffa, Haifa, and Tripoli-in-Syria; -a traffic agreement was negotiated with the Ottoman-owned -Hedjaz Railway, pledging both parties to -abstain from discriminatory rates and other unfair competition; -tentative arrangements were made for the construction -of a line from Homs to the Euphrates. -Provisional agreements embodying the Black Sea and -Syrian railway and port concessions were signed in 1911, -but technical difficulties of surveying the lines, together -with the political instability occasioned by the Tripolitan -and Balkan Wars, postponed the definitive contract.<a name="FNanchor_13_336" id="FNanchor_13_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_336" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>After the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, the -Ottoman Government was more determined than ever to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">247</a></span> -do everything in its power to eliminate French opposition -to railway construction in Asia Minor and to secure French -aid in the further economic development of Turkey. -Crushing defeats at the hands of the Italians and the -Balkan states had emphasized the deficiencies of Ottoman -communications, Ottoman economic and military organization, -Ottoman financial resources. The national treasury, -emptied by the drain of three wars, needed replenishment -by an increase in the customs duties, to which French -sanction would have to be obtained, and by a foreign loan, -for which it was hoped French bankers would submit a -favorable bid. All of these questions were so closely associated -with the question of political influence in the Near -East, however, that it was obviously desirable to arrive at -some <i>modus vivendi</i> between French and German interests -in Ottoman railways and in Ottoman financial affairs. -Accordingly, the Young Turk Government prevailed upon -the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> to -discuss a basis for a Franco-German agreement, and -Djavid Bey was despatched to Paris to conduct whatever -negotiations might be necessary with the French -Government.</p> - -<p>On August 19 and 20 and September 24, 25, 26, 1913, -a series of important meetings was held in Berlin to ascertain -upon what terms French and German investments in -Turkey might be apportioned with the least possibility of -conflict. German interests were represented by Dr. von -Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich; the chief of the French -negotiators were Baron de Neuflize, a Regent of the Bank -of France, and M. de Klapka, Secretary-General of the -Imperial Ottoman Bank. Supposedly the conferences were -conducted only between the interested financiers, but the -discussions were participated in by representatives of the -French, German, and Ottoman foreign offices. Obstacles -which, at the start, seemed insurmountable we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">248</a></span>re overcome -at the Berlin meetings and a series of minor conferences -which followed. The result was one of the most important -international agreements of the years immediately -preceding the Great War—the secret Franco-German convention -of February 15, 1914. The terms of this agreement, -heretofore unpublished, may be summarized as -follows:<a name="FNanchor_14_337" id="FNanchor_14_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_337" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> -<p>1. Northern Anatolia was recognized as a sphere of French -influence for purposes of railway development. Arrangements -were concluded for linking the Anatolian and Bagdad systems -with the proposed Black Sea Railways, and traffic agreements -satisfactory to all of the companies were ratified and appended -to the convention. It was agreed that the port and terminal -facilities at Heraclea should be constructed by a Franco-German -company.</p> - -<p>2. Syria, likewise, was recognized as a French sphere of influence. -In particular, the right of the Syrian Railways to construct -a line from Tripoli-in-Syria to Deir es Zor, on the -Euphrates, was confirmed. A traffic agreement between the -Bagdad and Syrian companies was ratified and appended to -the convention.</p> - -<p>3. The regions traversed by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways -were defined as a German sphere of influence. A neutral -zone was established in Northern Syria to avoid infringement -upon German or French rights in that region.</p> - -<p>4. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the Imperial Ottoman Bank each -pledged itself to respect the concessions of the other, to seek no -railway concessions within the sphere of influence of the other, -and to do nothing, directly or indirectly, to hinder the construction -or exploitation of the railway lines of the other in Asiatic -Turkey.</p> - -<p>5. It was agreed that appropriate diplomatic and financial -measures should be taken to bring about an increase in the -revenues of the Ottoman Empire, sufficient, at least, to finance -all of the projected railways, both French and German. Construction -of the lines already authorized, or to be authorized, -should be pursued, as far as possible, <i>pari passu</i>, each group to -receive subsidies from the Ottoman Treasury in about the same -proportion.</p> - -<p>6. The <i>Deutsche Bank</i> agreed to repurchase from the Imperial -Ottoman Bank all of the latter’s shares and debentures of the -Bagdad Railway and its subsidiary enterprises, amounting to -Fr. 69,400,000. Payment was to be made in like value of Imperial -Ottoman bonds of the Customs Loan of 1911, Second Ser<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">249</a></span>ies, -which had been underwritten by a German syndicate.</p></div> - -<p>Certain observations should be made regarding the character -of this convention, if its full significance is to be -appreciated. It was an agreement between two great financial -groups in France and Germany; as such it was signed -by M. Sergent, Sub-Governor of the Bank of France; -M. de Klapka, Secretary-General of the Imperial Ottoman -Bank; and Dr. Karl Helfferich, Managing Director of the -<i>Deutsche Bank</i>. In addition, it was an understanding between -the Governments of France and Germany; as such -it was signed by M. Ponsot, of the French Embassy in -Berlin, and by Herr von Rosenberg, of the German Foreign -Office. A speech of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg -to the Reichstag, December 9, 1913, acknowledged -the official character of the negotiations being -conducted by the French and German bankers. That the -French Government considered the convention a binding -international agreement is made perfectly clear by a -despatch of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister in Berlin, -to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, -February 20, 1914, in which the attention of the Belgian -Government is officially called to the existence of the convention.<a name="FNanchor_15_338" id="FNanchor_15_338"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_338" class="fnanchor">15</a> -The agreement, furthermore, was acceptable to -the Ottoman Government, for the Sultan promptly confirmed -the concessions for the new Black Sea and Syrian -lines and for the necessary extensions to the Anatolian -Railways. Much has been written about governmental -support of investors in foreign countries, but, so far as -the author has been able to ascertain, this is the first instance -in which a financial pact and an international agreement -have been combined in one document. No longer -are treaties negotiated by diplomatists alone, but by -diplomatists and bankers!</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">250</a></span></p> -<p>From the standpoint of the French interests involved, -the February convention of 1914 was an eminently satisfactory -settlement of the Bagdad Railway controversy. -French capitalists secured concessions for more than 2,000 -miles of railways in Asiatic Turkey, thus eliminating the -danger of eventual German control of all communications -in the Ottoman Empire. The Imperial Ottoman Bank was -relieved of the risk of carrying an investment of almost -seventy million francs in the Bagdad enterprise—an investment -which had been a “frozen asset” because of the -persistent refusal of the French Government to admit the -Bagdad securities to the Bourse. In return, the Bank -received a large block of Imperial Ottoman bonds, which -were readily negotiable and which materially increased -French influence in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. -Furthermore, as a result of a tacit agreement with -the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, the Imperial Ottoman Bank was -awarded the Imperial Ottoman Five Per Cent Loan of -1914, amounting to $100,000,000, upon terms affording a -handsome profit to the underwriters.<a name="FNanchor_16_339" id="FNanchor_16_339"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_339" class="fnanchor">16</a> As for the French -Government, it was enabled to emerge gracefully from the -difficult situation in which it found itself after the Potsdam -Agreement. France no longer was obliged to pursue -a purely Russian policy in the Near East, for the Tsar’s -Government—in addition to withdrawing its objections -to German railways in Asiatic Turkey—gave its consent -to the construction of the French Black Sea Railways with -the sole proviso that the system should not be completed -in its entirety until Russia had constructed certain strategic -railways necessary to assure the safety of the Caucasus -frontier.<a name="FNanchor_17_340" id="FNanchor_17_340"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_340" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<p>German diplomacy, on the other hand, had strengthened -its position in the Near East by securing definite recognition -of central and southern Anatolia, northern Syria -and Mesopotamia as German spheres of interest. German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">251</a></span> -financiers acquired exclusive control of the Bagdad enterprise -and were assured that there would be no further -obstruction of their plans by the French Government. The -French promise to coöperate in improving the financial -situation in Turkey meant that funds would be forthcoming -for continued construction of uncompleted sections of -the Bagdad Railway. The Young Turks were delighted at -the prospect that the Powers might finally consent to the -much-needed increase in the customs duties. They were -no less delighted to know that railway construction in -Asia Minor—which held out so much promise for the -economic development and the political stability of the -country—was to go on unimpeded by Franco-German -rivalry and antagonism.<a name="FNanchor_18_341" id="FNanchor_18_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_341" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>There was some harsh criticism in Great Britain, however, -of the advantages which France had obtained for -herself in the Ottoman Empire. Sir Mark Sykes, an -eminent student of Near Eastern affairs, believed that -the new state of affairs was worse than the old. Speaking -in the House of Commons, March 18, 1914, he warned -the Foreign Office that “the policy of French financiers -will produce eventually the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.... -Take the proposed loan arranged with the French -Government, for something over £20,000,000. In order -to get this there are concessions which I cannot help feeling -are more brazen and more fatal than any I have seen. -The existing railways in Syria meander for miles to avoid -legitimate profits in order to extort a guarantee. Alongside -these railways you can see the merchants’ merchandise -and the peasants’ produce rotting because the railway people -do not trouble to warehouse the stuff or to shift it. -They have got their guarantee, and they do not care. -These concessions, which have been extracted from Turkey, -mean a monopoly of all Syrian transit; and, further, -a native press is to be subventioned practically in the intere<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">252</a></span>st -of these particular monopolies.... In practice, loans, -kilometric guarantees, monopolies, and a financed native -press must, whether the financiers desire it or not, pave -the way to annexation. I submit that this is not the spirit -of the <i>entente</i>. The British people did not stand by the -French people at Agadir to fill the pockets of financiers -whose names are unknown outside Constantinople or the -Paris Bourse.... The Ottoman Empire is shaken, and -the cosmopolitan financier is now staking out the land -into spheres of interest. An empire may survive disaster, -but it cannot survive exploitation. A country like Turkey, -without legislative capacity, without understanding what -the economics of Europe mean and at the same time rich, -is a lamb for the slaughter.”<a name="FNanchor_19_342" id="FNanchor_19_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_342" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>This trenchant criticism of French policy might have -been taken more seriously had Great Britain herself been -actuated by magnanimous impulses. Instead, British -financiers were joining the common scramble for concessions, -and British statesmen were pursuing with ruthless -avidity every means of protecting British imperial interests.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">The Young Turks Conciliate Great Britain</span></h3> - -<p>The Bagdad negotiations of 1910–1911 between Sir -Ernest Cassel and Dr. von Gwinner, on the one hand, and -the British and Ottoman Governments, on the other, came -to naught, it will be recalled, because of the refusal of -Sir Edward Grey to consent to an increase in the Turkish -customs duties. The Sublime Porte was unwilling to -grant the economic concessions demanded by Great Britain -as the price of her assistance in Ottoman financial stabilization. -But the Young Turks were shrewd enough to -keep the door open for further negotiations by removing -the chief political objection of England to the Bagdad -enterprise—namely, that it <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">253</a></span>menaced British imperial interests -in the region of the Persian Gulf. In the convention -of March 21, 1911, with the Bagdad Railway -Company, the Ottoman Government reserved to itself -considerable latitude in the disposition of the sections of -the line beyond Bagdad.<a name="FNanchor_20_343" id="FNanchor_20_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_343" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>Conversations were resumed in July, 1911, when the -Turkish minister in London solicited of the Foreign Office -a further statement of the conditions upon which British -objections to the Bagdad Railway might be waived. He -was informed that English acquiescence might be forthcoming -if the Bagdad-Basra section of the railway were -constructed by a company in which British, French, German, -Russian, and Turkish capital should share equally; -if adequate guarantees were obtained regarding the protection -of British imperial interests in southern Mesopotamia -and Persia; if English capital were granted important -navigation rights on the Shatt-el-Arab, including -complete exemption of British ships and British goods -from Ottoman tolls; if safeguards were provided against -discriminatory and differential tariffs on the Bagdad -system.</p> - -<p>These proposals met with only partial acceptance by the -Ottoman Government. Turkey was willing to internationalize -the southernmost sections of the Bagdad Railway, -but under no circumstances would she permit Russian -participation in an enterprise which was so vital to the -defence of the Sultan’s Empire. Turkey was prepared to -discuss with England measures for the protection of -legitimate British interests in the Middle East, provided -there be no further infringement on the sovereign rights -of the Sultan in southern Mesopotamia. Turkey agreed -that the principle of the economic open door should be -scrupulously observed throughout the Ottoman Empire; -therefore she could not agree to discriminatory treatment -in favor of British commerce on the Shatt-el-Arab, the -Tigris, and the Euphrates. Upon these conditions th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">254</a></span>e -Ottoman minister at London was authorized to continue -negotiations in the most friendly spirit.<a name="FNanchor_21_344" id="FNanchor_21_344"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_344" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<p>The Agadir crisis, which threatened war between England -and Germany, and the Tripolitan War, which diverted -Turkish attention from domestic reform to defence of -the Empire, unfortunately led to a suspension of the -Anglo-Turkish conversations. They were not resumed -until 1913, when Turkey found a breathing spell between -the first and second phases of the First Balkan War.</p> - -<p>During the interim, however, steps were taken to remove -the obstacles which stood in the way of an Anglo-German -understanding. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane visited -Berlin as the guest of the Kaiser to discuss curtailment -of the naval programs of the two Powers and to agree -upon other measures which would effect a <i>rapprochement</i> -between <i>Wilhelmstrasse</i> and Downing Street. As regards -the Bagdad Railway, Lord Haldane informed the German -Government that he stood upon the position he had taken -in 1907—that Great Britain was prepared to grant its -consent to the enterprise if British political interests in -Mesopotamia were adequately safeguarded.<a name="FNanchor_22_345" id="FNanchor_22_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_345" class="fnanchor">22</a> A few -months later, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein—who for -fifteen years had guided Germany’s destiny in the Near -East—was transferred from Constantinople to the embassy -at London, as the first step in an attempt to reconcile -British imperial interests with German diplomatic -hegemony in Turkey. Almost simultaneously, Sir Harry -Johnston, whose enthusiasm for German ventures in Asia -Minor has already been mentioned,<a name="FNanchor_23_346" id="FNanchor_23_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_346" class="fnanchor">23</a> began a quasi-official -lecture tour in Germany to urge a sane settlement -of the Near Eastern tangle. Another important development -was the appointment as German Minister of Foreign -Affairs, in January, 1913, of Herr von Jagow, who believed -that a great European war was inevitable unless -England and Germany could come to terms on the Turkish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">255</a></span> -question.<a name="FNanchor_24_347" id="FNanchor_24_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_347" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>In this manner the stage was set for a resumption of -Anglo-Turkish conversations on the Bagdad Railway. In -February, 1913, Hakki Pasha, minister plenipotentiary and -extraordinary of the Ottoman Government, arrived in -London with instructions to leave no stone unturned to -settle outstanding differences with Great Britain. For -almost four months Hakki Pasha and Sir Edward Grey -discussed the problems of the Near East and conferred -with Herr von Kühlmann and Prince Lichnowsky, of the -German embassy at London, regarding the general terms -of a tripartite settlement of the economic and political -questions at issue. In May, 1913, a full agreement was -reached upon the following wide range of subjects: regularization -of the legal position in Turkey of British religious, -educational, and medical institutions; pecuniary -claims of Great Britain against the Ottoman Empire; the -Turkish veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt; Turco-Persian -boundary disputes, particularly in so far as they -affected oil lands; navigation of the Tigris, Euphrates, and -Shatt-el-Arab; irrigation of the Mesopotamian valley; -the status of Koweit. The settlements agreed upon were -ratified by a series of treaties between Great Britain and -Turkey, notably those of July 29, and October 21, 1913, -and of June, 1914. Reconciliation of British and German -interests was reserved for discussion between London and -Berlin.<a name="FNanchor_25_348" id="FNanchor_25_348"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_348" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>In so far as concerned the Bagdad Railway, the substance -of the Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913 is as -follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>1. Turkey recognized the special position of Great Britain in -the region of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, although Great -Britain acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit, -the Ottoman Government pledged a policy of non-interference -in the affairs of the principality. The existing treaties between -the Sheik and Great Britain were confirmed.</p> - -<p>2. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra, -un<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">256</a></span>less and until Great Britain should give consent to an extension -of the line to the Persian Gulf.</p> - -<p>3. In order to assure equality of treatment for all, regardless -of nationality or other considerations, the Ottoman Government -agreed that two British citizens should be elected to the Board -of Directors of the Bagdad Railway Company.</p> - -<p>4. Exclusive rights of navigation by steamers and barges on -the Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt-el-Arab were granted to the -Ottoman River Navigation Company, to be formed by Baron -Inchcape, chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental and the -British India Steam Navigation Companies. The Navigation -Company, in which Turkish capital was to be offered a fifty per -cent participation, was to have wide powers for the improvement -and regulation of all navigable streams in Mesopotamia, in cooperation -with a commission to be appointed by the Ottoman -Government. Lord Inchcape’s concession was for a period of -sixty years, with optional renewals for ten-year periods.</p> - -<p>5. It was agreed, however, that the Bagdad Railway and -Inchcape concessions were without prejudice to the rights of the -Lynch Brothers, which were specifically reaffirmed. The Lynch -Brothers, in fact, were granted the privilege of adding another -steamer to their equipment, with the single restriction that it fly -the Turkish flag.</p> - -<p>6. The British Government agreed that no navigation rights -of its nationals would be construed as permitting interference -with the development of Mesopotamia by irrigation, and the -Ottoman Government guaranteed that no irrigation works would -be permitted to divert navigable streams from their course.</p> - -<p>7. In return for these, and other, assurances and concessions, -Great Britain consented to support an increase of 4% in the -customs duties of the Ottoman Empire.</p></div> - -<p>The terms of this settlement were hailed by the English -press as an admirable solution of the Mesopotamian -imbroglio. <i>The Times</i> of May 17, 1913, for example, -said: “Great Britain will have no further reason for looking -askance at a project which should do much for the -development of Asiatic Turkey. Our interests will be -safeguarded; we have always said that a terminus at Basra -offered no menace to specific British interests in the Pe<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">257</a></span>rsian -Gulf; and the German promoters will be free to -complete their great project with the benevolent acquiescence -of Great Britain. There will be no official participation -in the construction of the line, but there will also -be nothing to deter British capital from being associated -with the scheme. We believe that if some such solution -is adopted, a fertile source of international misunderstanding -will disappear. It is a solution which should receive -the approval of France and Russia and should give gratification -to Germany. It appears to leave no room for -subsequent differences of opinion, while it wipes out a -whole series of obscure disputes. It will be a further -demonstration of that spirit of coöperation among the -Great Powers which has done so much of late to preserve -the peace of Europe. It should convince Germany that -Great Britain does not oppose the essential elements of -the Bagdad Railway scheme provided her own special interests -are protected. Above all, it will relieve the financial -disabilities of Turkey and will enable her to press -forward the great task of binding with bonds of steel -the great Asiatic territories in which her future chiefly -lies.” Other press opinion was in accord with Sir -Edward Grey that the agreement “justifies us in saying -that it is no longer in British interests to oppose the -line.”<a name="FNanchor_26_349" id="FNanchor_26_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_349" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>In Germany, likewise, the Anglo-Turkish agreement -was favorably received. The <i>Berliner Tageblatt</i> of December -29, 1913, hailed it as a triumph of German diplomacy. -“For years,” it said, “this undertaking has -threatened to become a bone of contention between Russia, -England, and Germany. The German Government has -now, through its cleverness and tenacity, succeeded in removing -all differences and in bringing the line altogether -into German possession.” In the Reichstag, as well, the -general tenor of the comments was favorable<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">258</a></span>, although -Herr Bassermann and other National Liberals were somewhat -vociferous about the great “sacrifices” which Germany -had made to propitiate Great Britain. Among the -Social Democrats and the Centrists, however, the sentiment -was obviously in accord with one member who -said, “We share the general satisfaction at this <i>rapprochement</i>, -which is an aid to world peace, but we also -are of the opinion that there is no occasion for over-exuberance -or patriotic bombast.”<a name="FNanchor_27_350" id="FNanchor_27_350"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_350" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>As usual, the rôle of the Turks themselves was slighted. -A casual observer might have remarked that whatever -“benevolent acquiescence” was included in the settlement -originated in Constantinople rather than in London, and -that the “sacrifices” involved were much more painful to -Turkey than to Germany!</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">British Imperial Interests Are Further -Safeguarded</span></h3> - -<p>In the Speech from the Throne, February 10, 1914, -King George V informed Parliament that the Near Eastern -question was approaching a solution. “My relations -with foreign Powers continue to be friendly,” he said. “I -am happy to say that my negotiations, both with the German -Government and the Ottoman Government as regards -matters of importance to the commercial and industrial -interests of this country in Mesopotamia are rapidly approaching -a satisfactory issue.” Nothing was said to -indicate the character of the negotiations or to identify the -“commercial and industrial interests” which were the -objects of royal solicitude.</p> - -<p>Before the British Government would give its consent -to a final agreement with Turkey and Germany regarding -the Bagdad Railway, the King might have added, it -was determined to acquire for certain worthy Britons <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">259</a></span>a -share in some of the choicest economic plums in the -Ottoman Empire. Heading the interests which were thus -to be favored was the Right Honorable James Lyle -Mackay, Baron Inchcape of Strathnaver, who had been the -beneficiary of the aforementioned Mesopotamian navigation -concession of July, 1913. Lord Inchcape is perhaps -the foremost shipping magnate in the British Empire. He -is chairman and managing director of the Peninsular -and Oriental and the British India Steam Navigation -Companies; chairman and director of the Australasian -United Steam Navigation Company and the Eastern and -Australian Steamship Company; a director of the Steamship -Owners’ Coal Association, the Australasia and China -Telegraph Company, the Marine Insurance Company, the -Central Queensland Meat Export Company, and various -other commercial enterprises. He is a vice-president of -the Suez Canal Company. He has extensive interests in -the petroleum industry as a director of the Anglo-Persian -Oil Company, Scottish Oils, Ltd., and the D’Arcy Exploration -Company.</p> - -<p>Lord Inchcape’s interests were given ample consideration -in the Anglo-German negotiations of 1914. On -February 23, a contract was signed at London between -the Bagdad Railway Company and Lord Inchcape, the -signatures to which were witnessed by Herr von Kühlmann, -of the German embassy, and Sir Eyre Crowe, of -the British Foreign Office. Under the terms of this -contract the Bagdad Railway Company acknowledged the -monopolistic privileges in Mesopotamian river navigation -conferred upon Lord Inchcape’s interests by the Ottoman -Government; agreed to cancel its outstanding engagements -with the Lynch Brothers for the transportation of railway -materials between Basra and points along the Tigris; -and guaranteed Lord Inchcape a minimum amount of -100,000 tons of freight, at a figure of 22–1/2 shillings per -ton, in the transportation on the Tigris of supplies<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">260</a></span> for -the construction of the Bagdad Railway and its subsidiary -enterprises.<a name="FNanchor_28_351" id="FNanchor_28_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_351" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>This contract was so obviously in contravention of -earlier rights of the Lynch Brothers, which had been -specifically reaffirmed by the negotiations with Turkey, -that it was amended by an agreement of March 27, 1914, -between Lord Inchcape, Mr. John F. Lynch, and the Bagdad -Railway Company. The latter arrangement provided: -1. That Lord Inchcape should immediately organize the -Ottoman Navigation Company to take over the concession -of July, 1913, and the rights conferred upon Lord Inchcape -by his agreement of February 23, 1914, with the -Bagdad Railway Company; 2. That the Lynch Brothers -should be admitted to participation in the new Navigation -Company and that Mr. John F. Lynch should be elected -a director thereof; 3. That the Bagdad Railway should -assign to a new Ottoman Ports Company—in which Mr. -Lynch and Lord Inchcape should be granted a 40% -participation—all of the rights of the Railway to the construction -of port and terminal facilities at Bagdad and -Basra; 4. That the Bagdad Railway Company should be -granted a 20% participation in the new Ottoman Navigation -Company. Thus were Lord Inchcape’s powerful -interests further propitiated! Thus did the Lynch -Brothers cease to be big fish in a small pond, to become -small fish in a big lake!</p> - -<p>Measures were now taken to protect another vested -interest, the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company. -On March 26, a draft agreement, subsequently -confirmed as part of the Anglo-German convention of -June 15, was executed by Dr. Carl Bergmann, of the -Bagdad Railway Company, and Lord Rathmore, of the -Smyrna-Aidin Company. It provided for important -extensions of over 200 miles to the existing Smyrna-Aidi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">261</a></span>n -line (including a junction with the Anatolian-Bagdad -system at Afiun Karahissar), granted to British -interests valuable navigation rights on the lakes of Asia -Minor, and protected each railway from discriminatory -treatment at the hands of the other. This settlement was -approved by Herr von Kühlmann, on behalf of the German -Government; Mr. Alwyn Parker, of the British -Foreign Office; and Hakki Pasha, minister plenipotentiary -of the Sultan to the Court of St. James.<a name="FNanchor_29_352" id="FNanchor_29_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_352" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>Oil—the magic word which has become the open sesame -of so many diplomatic mysteries—was of no inconsiderable -importance in 1914. Early in that eventful year the -British Government—in order to insure an uninterrupted -supply of fuel to the fleet—had purchased a controlling -interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. As a necessary -step in the negotiations regarding Turkish oilfields -the German Government was obliged, in March, 1914, to -recognize southern Mesopotamia, as well as central and -southern Persia, as the exclusive field of operations of -the Anglo-Persian Company, and, in addition, to agree -to the construction of a railway from Kut-el-Amara to -Mendeli for the purpose of facilitating petroleum shipments. -Thereupon an Anglo-German syndicate organized -the Turkish Petroleum Company for the acquisition and -exploitation of the oil resources of the vilayets of Mosul -and Bagdad. Half of the stock of the new company was -assigned to the National Bank of Turkey (controlled by -Sir Ernest Cassel) and the D’Arcy group (in which Lord -Inchcape was interested); one quarter was assigned to -the Royal Dutch Company, and the remainder was reserved -for the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>. Upon joint representations -by the British and German ambassadors at the Sublime -Porte, the Sultan, in June, 1914, conferred upon the Turkish -Petroleum Company exclusive rights of exploitation -of the oil resources of the Mesopotamian valley from -Mosul to Bagdad.<a name="FNanchor_30_353" id="FNanchor_30_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_353" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">262</a></span></p> - -<p>The vested interests of certain of its citizens having thus -been amply protected, the British Government proceeded -to complete its negotiations with the German ambassador -in London. On June 15, 1914, Sir Edward Grey and -Prince Lichnowsky initialed an important convention regarding -the delimitation of English and German interests -in Asiatic Turkey. The following day <i>The Times</i> announced -that the terms of an Anglo-German agreement -had been incorporated in a draft treaty, and on June 29, -Sir Edward Grey informed the House of Commons that -formal ratification of the convention was being postponed -only “until Turkey and Germany have completed their -own separate negotiations.” By mid-July all was in readiness -for the definitive signing of the treaty, but the widening -importance of the Austro-Serbian dispute and the outbreak -of the Great War put an end to the Bagdad Railway -conversations.<a name="FNanchor_31_354" id="FNanchor_31_354"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_354" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>The terms of the convention of June 15, 1914—which -might have meant so much to the future of Anglo-German -relations—constituted a complete settlement of -the controversy which had waged for more than ten -years over German railway construction in the Mesopotamian -valley. The reconciliation of the divergent interests -of the two Powers was based upon the following -considerations:<a name="FNanchor_32_355" id="FNanchor_32_355"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_355" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>1. “In recognition of the general importance of the Bagdad -Railway in international trade” the British Government bound -itself not “to adopt or to support any measures which might -render more difficult the construction or management of the -Bagdad Railway by the Bagdad Railway Company or to prevent -the participation of capital in the enterprise.” Great Britain -further agreed that under no circumstances would it “undertake -railway construction on Ottoman territory in direct competition -with lines of the Bagdad Railway Company or in contravention -of existing rights of the Company or support the efforts of any -persons or companies directed to this end,” unless in accord with -the expressed wishes of the German Government.</p> - -<p>2.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">263</a></span> His Britannic Majesty’s Government pledged itself to support -an increase in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire -from 11% to 15% <i>ad valorem</i> and, furthermore, to “raise no -objection to the assignment to the Bagdad Railway Company of -already existing Turkish State revenues, or of revenues from the -intended increase in tariff duties, or of the proposed monopolies -or taxes on the consumption of alcohol, petroleum, matches, -tinder, cigarette-paper, playing cards, and sugar to the extent -necessary for the completion of the Railway.“</p> - -<p>3. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra. -Both of the signatory Powers declared that under no circumstances -would they “support the construction of a branch from -Basra or any other point on the main line of the Bagdad Railway -to the Persian Gulf, unless a complete understanding be previously -arrived at between the Imperial Ottoman, the Imperial -German, and His Britannic Majesty’s Governments.” The German -Government furthermore pledged itself under no circumstances -to “undertake the construction of a harbor or a railway -station on the Persian Gulf or support efforts of any persons -or companies directed toward that end, unless a complete agreement -be previously arrived at with His Britannic Majesty’s -Government.”</p> - -<p>4. The German Government undertook to see that “on the -lines of the Bagdad Railway Company, as hitherto, no direct or -indirect discrimination in transit facilities or freight rates shall -be made in the transportation of goods of the same kind between -the same places, either on account of ownership or on account -of origin or destination of the goods or because of any other -consideration.” In other words, the German Government agreed -to enforce Articles 24 and 25 of the Specifications of March 5, -1903, which provided that “all rates, whether they be general, -special, proportional, or differential, shall be applicable to all -shippers and passengers without distinction,” and which prohibited -the Company to enter into any agreement for the purpose -of granting reductions in the rates announced in its published -tariffs.</p> - -<p>5. In order further to protect British interests the German -Government assumed responsibility for the election to the Board -of Directors of the Bagdad Railway Company of “two English -members acceptable to His Britannic Majesty’s Government.”</p> - -<p>6. Both Powers pledged themselves unreservedly to observe -the principle of the economic open door in the operation of railway, -ports, irrigation, and navigation enterprises in Turkey-in-Asia.</p> - -<p>7. Great Britain recognized German interests in the irrigation -of the Cilician plain, and Germany recognized British interests -in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">264</a></span> the irrigation of the lower Mesopotamian valley.</p> - -<p>8. Both signatory Powers took cognizance of and agreed to -observe the Anglo-Turkish agreement of July, 1913, conferring -important navigation rights in Mesopotamia upon British subjects; -the agreements between Lord Inchcape and the Bagdad -Railway Company, regarding navigation and port and terminal -facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates; the agreement between -the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Bagdad Railway regarding -important extensions to the former line.</p> - -<p>9. Great Britain and Germany agreed to “use their good -offices with the Imperial Ottoman Government to the end that -the Shatt-el-Arab shall be brought into a satisfactory navigable -condition and permanently maintained in such condition, so that -ocean-going ships may always be assured of free and easy access -to the port of Basra, and, further, that the shipping on the -Shatt-el-Arab shall always be open to ocean-going ships under -the same conditions to ships of all nations, regardless of the -nationality of the ships or their cargo.”</p> - -<p>10. It was agreed, finally, that any differences of opinion resulting -from the convention or its appended documents should -be subject to arbitration. If the signatory Powers were unable -to agree upon an arbitrator or a special court of arbitration, the -case was to be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration -at the Hague.</p></div> - -<p>From both the German and the British points of view -the foregoing convention was an admirable solution of -the Turkish problem. Had the agreement been reached -ten years earlier, it might have avoided estrangement between -the two nations. Had it come at almost any other -time than on the eve of the Great War, it would have been -a powerful stimulus to an Anglo-German <i>rapprochement</i>.</p> - -<p>Germany, it is true, was obliged to abandon any hope -of establishing a port on the Persian Gulf. But there -were grave uncertainties that Koweit could ever be developed -as a commercially profitable terminus for the Bagdad -Railway, whereas its very possession by a German -company would have been a constant source of irritation -to Great Britain. Basra, on the other hand, had obvious<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">265</a></span> -advantages. Like many of the great harbors of the world—Hamburg, -Bremen, Antwerp, London, New York—it -was on a river, rather than the open sea; and inasmuch as -Great Britain had agreed that the freedom of the open -sea should be applied to the Shatt-el-Arab, German ships -were assured unrestricted access to the southern terminus -of the Bagdad Railway. In return for surrendering the -Basra-Persian Gulf section of the Bagdad system and -for admitting British capitalists to participation in the -Bagdad and Basra ports company, Germany received full -recognition of her economic rights in Anatolia, Syria, and -northern Mesopotamia, together with a minor share in -Lord Inchcape’s navigation enterprises and in the newly -formed Turkish Petroleum Company. Above all, British -opposition to the Bagdad Railway, which had been so -stubbornly maintained since 1903, was to be a thing of the -past. For these considerations Germany could well afford -to accept a subordinate place in southern Mesopotamia -and to recognize British interests in the Persian Gulf.</p> - -<p>Great Britain gained even more than Germany. She -abandoned her policy of obstruction of the Bagdad Railway -and consented to an increase in the customs duties of -the Ottoman Empire. These considerations had never -been ends in themselves, but rather pawns in the great -game of diplomacy, to be surrendered in return for other -valuable considerations. For them England secured guarantees -of equality of treatment for British citizens and -British goods on the German railway lines in Turkey. In -addition, English capitalists received a monopoly of navigation -on the Tigris and Euphrates, a 40% interest in -port and terminal facilities at Bagdad and Basra, control -of the oil resources of the Mesopotamian valley, extensions -to British-owned railways in southern Anatolia, and other -valuable economic concessions. British political control -was recognized as dominant in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">266</a></span> southern Mesopotamia; -therefore the Bagdad Railway no longer could be said to -be a menace to the safety of India. As for Britain’s new -position in the Persian Gulf, one of her own publicists -said, “England has virtually annexed another sea, one -of the world’s highways.”<a name="FNanchor_33_356" id="FNanchor_33_356"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_356" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Diplomatic Bargaining Fails to Preserve Peace</span></h3> - -<p>It is one of the tragedies of pre-War diplomacy that -the negotiations of 1910–1914 failed to preserve peace in -the Near East or, at least, to prevent the entry of Turkey -into the Great War. But the failure of the treaties between -Germany and the Entente Powers regarding the -Ottoman Empire can be traced, in general, to the same -reasons that contributed to the collapse of all diplomacy -in the crisis of 1914. Imperialism, nationalism, militarism—these -were the causes of the Great War; these were -the causes of Ottoman participation in the Great War.</p> - -<p>One obvious defect of the Potsdam Agreement, the -Franco-German agreement regarding Anatolian railways, -the Anglo-Turkish settlement of 1913, and the Anglo-German -convention regarding Mesopotamia, was the fact -that they were founded upon the principle of imperial -compensations. Each of the Great Powers involved made -“sacrifices”—but in return for important considerations. -And throughout all of the bargaining the rights of Turkey, -a “backward nation,” were completely ignored. As the -German ambassador in London wrote: “The real purpose -of these treaties was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of -interest, although this expression was anxiously avoided, -out of regard for the rights of the Sultan.... By virtue -of the treaties all Mesopotamia as far as Basra became -our sphere of interest, without prejudice to older British -rights in the navigation of the Tigris and in the Willcocks -irrigation works. Our sphere further included the whole -region of the Bagdad and Anatolian Railways. The British -economic domain was to include the coasts of the P<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">267</a></span>ersian -Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin line; the French, Syria; -the Russian, Armenia.”<a name="FNanchor_34_357" id="FNanchor_34_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_357" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>In the scramble for concessions in Asia Minor, Italy -had been overlooked. The proposed extension of the -Smyrna-Aidin Railway met with vehement denunciation -on the part of patriotic Italians who looked forward to -the further development of Italian economic influence in -the hinterland of the port of Adalia. The Italian press -loudly demanded that energetic action be taken by the -Government to secure from Turkey compensatory concessions -or, in default of that, to announce to the Sublime -Porte that Italy would not return to Turkey the Dodecanese -Islands, of which Italy was in temporary occupation -under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (1912). A -formal demand of this character was made by King Victor -Emmanuel’s ambassador at Constantinople, but was -met with a curt refusal on the part of the Turks to bargain -for the return of their own property.<a name="FNanchor_35_358" id="FNanchor_35_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_358" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>The Young Turks were not unaware of the true character -of the agreements they had entered into with the -respective European Powers, but they considered themselves -impotent to act otherwise at the time. They knew -full well that there was grave danger in an extension of -British influence in Mesopotamia, French interests in -Syria, and Franco-Russian enterprise in northern Anatolia. -They had not forgotten the spoliation of their -empire by Austria-Hungary and Italy. They were not -altogether unsuspicious about the intentions of Germany. -But they believed they could never emancipate their -country from foreign domination until they had modernized -it. They needed foreign capital and foreign technical -assistance, and they had to pay the price. In order to -throw off the yoke of European imperialism they had to -consent temporarily to be victimized by it.<a name="FNanchor_36_359" id="FNanchor_36_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_359" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">268</a></span></p> -<p>Nationalistic fervor added to the difficulties created by -imperialist rivalry. M. André Tardieu, political editor at -the time of <i>Le Temps</i>, did not let a single opportunity -pass during February and March, 1914, to denounce the -French Government for its pro-German policy in the Bagdad -Railway question. When M. Cambon, French ambassador -at Berlin, was asked whether the Franco-German -agreement on Turkish railways would improve the relations -between his country and the German Empire, he -said: “Official relations, yes, perhaps to some extent, but -I do not think that the agreement will affect the great body -of public opinion on both sides of the Vosges. It will not, -unfortunately, change the tone of the French press towards -the Germans.... There is no doubt whatever that -the majority, both of Germans and Frenchmen, desire to -live at peace; but there is a powerful minority in each -country that dreams of nothing but battles and wars, either -of conquest or revenge. That is the peril that is always -with us; it is like living alongside a barrel of gunpowder -which may explode on the slightest provocation.” Herr -von Jagow, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed -a similar opinion when he said that he was watching -for a favorable moment for the publication of the -Anglo-German convention of June 15, 1914—“an appropriate -moment when the danger of adverse criticism was -no longer so acute.”<a name="FNanchor_37_360" id="FNanchor_37_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_360" class="fnanchor">37</a> Hatred, suspicion, fear, and other -unbridled passions were the stock-in-trade of the Continental -press during the months preceding the outbreak -of the Great War. Patriotic bombast, not international -conciliation, was demanded by the imperialist and nationalist -minorities, who exerted only too much influence upon -the Governments and made politicians fear lest their -efforts at peace be misconstrued as treason!</p> - -<p>A situation which was made bad by imperial rivalries -and national antagonisms was made intolerable by militari<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">269</a></span>sm. -During the year 1913–1914, when the diplomatists -were working for peace, preparations were being made for -war. In the month of August, 1913, while conversations -were being held in Berlin to reconcile French and German -interests in the Near East, General Joffre was on his way -to Russia to confer with the Tsar’s general staff regarding -the reorganization of the Russian army. In October -of the same year, while tripartite negotiations were being -conducted by England, Turkey, and Germany regarding -Mesopotamia, General Liman von Sanders was despatched -to Constantinople by the Kaiser as head of a German military -mission to rebuild the Ottoman army and improve -the Ottoman system of defence. Considerations of military -strategy were vitiating the efforts of conciliatory -diplomacy.</p> - -<p>The mission of Liman von Sanders created a crisis at -Constantinople. The Russian, French, and British ambassadors -protested against such an obvious menace to -the interests of the Entente. Russia, in particular, objected -to the announced intention of the German general -to strengthen the defences of the Straits. All three of the -Powers expressed opposition to the further proposal that -Field Marshal von Sanders be placed in command of the -First Army Corps, with headquarters at Constantinople. -The Ottoman Government replied that it meant no offence -to England or France, but that it could not allow its military -policy to be determined by Russia. It called attention -to the fact that the improvement of the navy was in the -hands of a British mission and that the reorganization -of the gendarmerie was going on under the direction of a -French general. German officers were being asked to -perform similar services for the army because the great -majority of Turkish officers had completed their training -in Germany, and the rest, since the days of General von -der Goltz Pasha, had been educated and experienced in -German methods. To change from German to French or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">270</a></span> -British technique appeared to the Ottoman Minister of -War an extremely inadvisable procedure.<a name="FNanchor_38_361" id="FNanchor_38_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_361" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<p>Although the storm over Liman von Sanders cleared -by February, 1914, it left behind it certain permanent -effects. It strengthened German influence at Constantinople, -indirectly because of the increased Turkish hostility -to Russia and suspicion of France and England, -directly because of the presence of hundreds of German -staff and regimental officers who used every opportunity -to increase German prestige in the army and the civil -services. The German ambassador at the Sublime Porte, -Baron von Wangenheim, readily capitalized this prestige -in the interest of German diplomacy. A formal Turco-German -alliance was rapidly passing from the realm of -the possible to the realm of the probable.</p> - -<p>In the meantime feverish efforts were being made to -complete Turkey’s military preparations. In March, 1914, -at the request of the Minister of War, a conference was -held of representatives of all railways in Asiatic Turkey -to discuss the utilization of Ottoman rail communications -for mobilization in the event of war. Under the guidance -of German and Turkish staff officers a plan was adopted -by which the respective railways agreed to merge their -services into a unified national system for the transportation -of troops. Throughout the spring of 1914 the defences -of the Dardanelles were being strengthened, schools were -being conducted for junior officers and non-commissioned -officers, the General Staff was reorganized, new plans for -mobilization were in process of completion. On July 23, -1914, the handiwork of Field Marshal Liman von Sanders -Pasha was exhibited in a great national military review. -On that occasion Baron von Wangenheim said to the -Ottoman Minister of Marine: “Djemal Pasha, just look -at the amazing results achieved by German officers in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">271</a></span> a -short time. You have now a Turkish army which can be -compared with the best organized armies in the world! -All German officers are at one in praising the moral -strength of the Turkish soldier, and indeed it has proved -itself beyond all expectation. We could claim we have -won a great victory if we could call ourselves the ally of -a Government which has such an army at its disposal!”<a name="FNanchor_39_362" id="FNanchor_39_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_362" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>A few days later the Ottoman Empire was admitted to -the Triple Alliance—with the consent of Austria, but -without even the knowledge of Italy. The die was cast -for Turkey’s participation in the War of the Nations!<a name="FNanchor_40_363" id="FNanchor_40_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_363" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_324" id="Footnote_1_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_324"><span class="label">1</span></a> Statement of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg to the -Reichstag, December 10, 1910, in <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 2 Session</i>, Volume 262, pp. 3561b <i>et seq.</i> <i>Cf.</i>, -also, <i>The Annual Register</i>, 1910, pp. 314–315, 335–336; Shuster, -<i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 225 <i>et seq.</i> The informal agreement reached at -Potsdam was confirmed by a treaty of August 19, 1911. <i>The -Annual Register</i>, 1911, pp. 357–358. For the diplomatic correspondence -arising out of the Potsdam Agreement <i>cf.</i> de Siebert, -<i>op. cit.</i>, Chapter IX.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_325" id="Footnote_2_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_325"><span class="label">2</span></a> Korff, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 163–164. Baron Korff believes, also, that -the Potsdam Agreement was forced upon the weak and vacillating -Nicholas II by the unscrupulous and bullying William II.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_326" id="Footnote_3_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_326"><span class="label">3</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 65–66, 147–153. For German estimates of the importance -of the Potsdam Agreement see a reasoned and temperate -speech by Dr. Spahn, of the Catholic Centre, and an impassioned -and boisterous speech by Herr Bassermann, of the National -Liberals. <i>Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 -Session</i>, Volume 266 (1911), PP. 5973 <i>et seq.</i>, 5984 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_327" id="Footnote_4_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_327"><span class="label">4</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, January 18, 1911.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_328" id="Footnote_5_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_328"><span class="label">5</span></a> Quoted by W. M. Fullerton, <i>Problems of Power</i> (new and -revised edition, New York, 1915), p. 171.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_329" id="Footnote_6_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_329"><span class="label">6</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, fifth series, Volume -21 (1911), pp. 241–244.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_330" id="Footnote_7_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_330"><span class="label">7</span></a> <i>Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés</i>, -January 13, 1911, pp. 33–34. M. Jaurès was one of the Frenchmen -who felt that their Government never should have opposed -the Bagdad Railway in the first instance.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_331" id="Footnote_8_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_331"><span class="label">8</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, January 16, pp. 64 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Parliamentary Debates, -House of Commons</i>, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 82 <i>et seq.</i>, 243–244; -<i>The Times</i>, January 17 and 19, 1911.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_332" id="Footnote_9_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_332"><span class="label">9</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 21 -(1911), p. 82.</p></div> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">272</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_333" id="Footnote_10_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_333"><span class="label">10</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 224–225.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_334" id="Footnote_11_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_334"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> G. Saint-Yves, “Les chemins de fer français dans la -Turquie d’Asie,” in <i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume -37 (1914), pp. 526–531; <i>Anatolia</i>, pp. 51–52.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_335" id="Footnote_12_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_335"><span class="label">12</span></a> It was proposed that the Anatolian Railways should construct -three branches: one from a point east of Bulgurlu north -and north-east to Kaisarieh and Sivas; a second from Angora -east to the aforementioned branch, joining it near Kaisarieh; a -third from Adabazar to Boli. The branch of the Bagdad Railway -from Nisibin to Diarbekr and Arghana was authorized by -the concession of 1903.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_336" id="Footnote_13_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_336"><span class="label">13</span></a> Much of the present account of the negotiations of the years -1910–1914 is based upon documentary material furnished by Dr. -von Gwinner and upon additional information supplied by Sir -Henry Babington Smith and Djavid Bey. Almost everything -heretofore published has been very general in character, but -one may find some illuminating details in the following: R. de -Caix, “La France et les chemins de fer de l’Asie turque,” in -<i>Questions diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 36 (1913), pp. -386–387; <i>Armenia and Kurdistan</i>, p. 36; <i>Commerce Reports</i>, No. -18a (1915), pp. 2–3; <i>Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, -1 Session</i>, Volume 291 (1913), pp. 6274c <i>et seq.</i>; <i>American -Journal of International Law</i>, April, 1918; Commandant de -Thomasson, “Les négotiations franco-allemandes,” in <i>Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales</i>, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 257 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_337" id="Footnote_14_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_337"><span class="label">14</span></a> For certified copies of the minutes of the meetings of -August 19–20 and September 24–26, 1913, and for the text of -the convention of February 15, 1914, the author is indebted to -Dr. von Gwinner.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_338" id="Footnote_15_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_338"><span class="label">15</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 291 (1913), p. 6274c. No. 111 of a series of despatches -published by the German Foreign Office (Berlin, 1915), an -English translation of which is to be found in E.D. Morel’s -<i>Diplomacy Revealed</i> (London, 1921), pp. 282–283.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_339" id="Footnote_16_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_339"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 964 (1920).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_340" id="Footnote_17_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_340"><span class="label">17</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> de Caix, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 386–387.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_341" id="Footnote_18_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_341"><span class="label">18</span></a> It should be made clear that not all the terms of the Franco-German -agreement were carried out before the beginning of the -Great War. Because of the delay in the negotiations with Great -Britain (<i>cf.</i> <i>infra</i>) the exchange of Bagdad Railway securities -for Imperial Ottoman Bonds was not completed, with the result -that, when the War came, French bankers still held an interest in -the Bagdad Railway Company.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_342" id="Footnote_19_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_342"><span class="label">19</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, f<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">273</a></span>ifth series, -Volume 59 (1914), pp. 2179–2189. Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919) -had traveled extensively in the Near and Far East and was the -author of many books on the political and economic problems of -those regions. During the Great War he was commissioned by -the British Government to negotiate with France regarding the -delimitation of the Allies’ interests in Mesopotamia and Syria. -He was one of the authors of the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_343" id="Footnote_20_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_343"><span class="label">20</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 111–112, 228–229.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_344" id="Footnote_21_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_344"><span class="label">21</span></a> Memorandum of Djavid Bey, cited in Chapter IX, <i>supra</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_345" id="Footnote_22_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_345"><span class="label">22</span></a> Haldane, <i>op. cit.</i>, <i>passim</i>; W. von Hohenzollern, <i>My Memoirs, -1878–1918</i>, pp. 142–156; <i>supra</i>, pp. 198–199; <i>The Annual Register</i>, -1912, pp. 16, 332; Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, -to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 9 -and 16, 1912, despatches Nos. 88 and 90, translated in Morel, <i>op. -cit.</i>, pp. 228–230.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_346" id="Footnote_23_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_346"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 205–207.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_347" id="Footnote_24_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_347"><span class="label">24</span></a> Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, after only a few -weeks of service at his new post. He was succeeded by Prince -Lichnowsky, who took up his duties in London in November. -Regarding the lecture tour of Sir Harry Johnston see the authentic -account by Bernadotte Schmitt, <i>England and Germany, 1740–1914</i>, -pp. 355–356. Herr von Jagow’s opinion of the importance -of an Anglo-German understanding on the Near East is to be -found in his reply to Prince Lichnowsky, in the <i>Norddeutsche -Allgemeine Zeitung</i> of March 23, 1918, translated by Munroe -Smith, <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i>, pp. 130–131.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_348" id="Footnote_25_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_348"><span class="label">25</span></a> Regarding the Anglo-Turkish negotiations <i>cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary -Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–395; -<i>Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 291 (1913), pp. 6274c-6294d; Karl Helfferich, <i>Die Vorgeschichte -des Weltkrieges</i>, pp. 143 <i>et seq.</i>; <i>Mesopotamia</i>, pp. -97–98; <i>The Times</i> (London), May 17 and May 31, 1913; <i>The -Quarterly Review</i>, Volume 228 (1917), pp. 517–521; de Siebert, -<i>op. cit.</i>, Chapter XX.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_349" id="Footnote_26_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_349"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 53 -(1913), p. 393.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_350" id="Footnote_27_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_350"><span class="label">27</span></a> <i>Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session</i>, -Volume 289 (1913), p. 4744d. <i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>ibid.</i>, pp. 4744c-4746c; -Volume 290 (1913), p. 5326a-c.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_351" id="Footnote_28_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_351"><span class="label">28</span></a> For copies of this and other agreements the author is indebted -to Dr. von Gwinner, of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_352" id="Footnote_29_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_352"><span class="label">29</span></a> For the text of the agreement <i>cf.</i> E.M. Earle, “The Secret -Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey,” -in the <i>Political Science Quarterly</i> (New York), Volume -XXXVIII (1923), pp. 41–44.</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">274</a></span></p> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_353" id="Footnote_30_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_353"><span class="label">30</span></a> “Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government and the -United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in -Mandated Territories,” <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 675 -(1921); <i>The Daily News</i> (London), June 26, 1920; G. Slocombe, -“The Oil Behind the War Scare,” in <i>The Daily Herald</i> (London), -October 12 and 13, 1922; <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i>, -p. 238.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_354" id="Footnote_31_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_354"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons</i>, Volume 64 -(1914), pp. 116–117.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_355" id="Footnote_32_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_355"><span class="label">32</span></a> For the complete text of the convention, <i>cf.</i> E. M. Earle, -“The Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic -Turkey,” <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 24–44.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_356" id="Footnote_33_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_356"><span class="label">33</span></a> Fullerton, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 307.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_357" id="Footnote_34_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_357"><span class="label">34</span></a> Prince Lichnowsky, quoted from <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i>, -pp. 71–72.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_358" id="Footnote_35_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_358"><span class="label">35</span></a> Saint-Yves, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 526–531; <i>Anatolia</i>, pp. 49 <i>et seq.</i> -Regarding the earlier development of Italian economic interests in -Turkey <i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 105–107.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_359" id="Footnote_36_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_359"><span class="label">36</span></a> For an interesting discussion of this point see Ahmed Djemal -Pasha, <i>Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes</i> (Munich, -1922), translated into English under the title, <i>Memories of a -Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919</i> (New York, 1923), pp. 107–115 of -the translation, pp. 113–122 of the German text. (Hereafter page -references are given for the translation only).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_360" id="Footnote_37_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_360"><span class="label">37</span></a> Baron Beyens, Belgian minister in Berlin, to M. Davignon, -Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 111 of the Belgian -documents, translated in Morel’s <i>Diplomacy Revealed</i>, p. 283. -The quotation from von Jagow is from <i>The Disclosures from -Germany</i>, p. 251.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_361" id="Footnote_38_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_361"><span class="label">38</span></a> Regarding the German military mission to Turkey <i>cf.</i> Djemal -Pasha, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 65–70, 101–102; Liman von Sanders, <i>Fünf -Jahre Türkei</i> (Berlin, 1919); Field Marshal von der Goltz, <i>Die -Militärische Lage der Türkei nach dem Balkankriege</i> (Berlin, -1913); <i>The Disclosures from Germany</i>, pp. 57 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_362" id="Footnote_39_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_362"><span class="label">39</span></a> Djemal Pasha, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 108.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_363" id="Footnote_40_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_363"><span class="label">40</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 107–115. Regarding other aspects of German -military and diplomatic successes in Turkey during 1914, <i>cf.</i> -<i>Anatolia</i>,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">275</a></span> pp. 44–45; Henry Morgenthau, <i>Ambassador Morgenthau’s -Story</i> (New York, 1918); Karl Helfferich, <i>Die deutsche -Türkenpolitik</i>, pp. 28 <i>et seq.</i>, and <i>Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</i>, -<i>passim</i>; André Chéradame, <i>The Pan German Plot Unmasked</i> -(New York, 1917)—all representing widely divergent -points of view.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER XI<br /> - -TURKEY, CRUSHED TO EARTH, RISES -AGAIN</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Nationalism and Militarism Triumph at -Constantinople</span></h3> - -<p>The outbreak of the Great War precipitated a serious -political crisis at Constantinople. Decisions of the utmost -moment to the future of the Ottoman Empire had to be -taken. Chief among these was the choice between neutrality -and entry into the war in coöperation with the -Central Powers. Pacifists and Entente sympathizers, of -whom Djavid Bey was perhaps the foremost, counseled -non-intervention in the struggle. Militarists and Germanophiles, -headed by Enver Pasha, the distinguished -Minister of War, advocated early and complete observance -of the alliance with Germany, which called for active -military measures against the Entente. In support of the -pacifists were the great mass of the people, overburdened -with taxes, worn out with military service, and weary of -the sacrifices occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan -Wars. In support of the militarists were German economic -power, German military prestige, and the powerful -emotion of Turkish nationalism.</p> - -<p>The case of the pacifists, like that of their opponents, -was based frankly upon national self-interest. A gr<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">276</a></span>eat -European war seemed to them to offer an unprecedented -opportunity for setting Ottoman affairs in order without -the perennial menace of foreign interference. Ottoman -neutrality would be solicited by some of the belligerents, -Ottoman intervention by others; during the war, however, -no nation could afford to bully Turkey. By clever -diplomatic bargaining economic and political privileges of -the greatest importance might be obtained—the Capitulations, -for example, might be abolished. Neutral Turkey -might grow prosperous by a thriving commerce with the -belligerents. After the peace both victor and vanquished -would be too exhausted to think of aggression against a -revivified Ottoman Empire. To remain neutral was to -assure peace, security, and prosperity. To intervene was -to invite defeat and dismemberment.</p> - -<p>Militarists, however, appraised the situation differently. -National honor demanded that Turkey go to the assistance -of her allies. But, more than that, national security -demanded the decisive defeat of the Entente Powers. As -contrasted with the firm friendship of Germany for Turkey, -it was pointed out, there was the traditional policy -of Russia to dismember the Ottoman Empire and of -France and Great Britain to infringe upon Ottoman -sovereignty whenever opportunity presented itself. A -victorious Russia would certainly appropriate Constantinople, -and as “compensations” France would take Syria -and England Mesopotamia. By closing the Dardanelles -and declaring war, Turkey could deal Russian economic -and military power a blow from which the empire of -the Tsars might never recover. By associating herself -with the seemingly irresistible military forces of Germany, -Turkey might once and for all eliminate Russia—the -feared and hated enemy of both Turks and Germans—from -Near Eastern affairs. In addition, British security -in Egypt might be shaken, and the French colonial empire -in North Africa might be menaced by a Pan-Islamic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">277</a></span> -revival. In these circumstances the war might be for -Turkey a war of liberation, from which only the craven-hearted -would shrink.</p> - -<p>For a time, however, practical considerations led to the -maintenance of Ottoman neutrality. “To Germany the -‘sphere of influence’ in Turkey was of far greater economic -and political importance than all her ‘colonies’ in -Africa and in the South Seas put together. The latter, -under the German flag, were an obvious and quick prey -to Great Britain’s naval superiority, but so long as Turkey -remained out of the war the German sphere of -influence in Anatolia and Mesopotamia was protected -by the neutral Crescent flag. As soon as Turkey entered -the war, however, Great Britain’s naval superiority could -be brought to bear upon Germany’s interests in the Near -East as well as upon her interests in Africa and Oceanica. -If German imperialists were devoted to a Berlin-to-Bagdad -<i>Mittel-Europa</i> project, there were British imperialists -whose hearts and minds were set upon a Suez-to-Singapore -South-Asia project. The Ottoman Empire -occupied a strategic position in both schemes. A neutral -Turkey, on the whole, was favorable to German imperialism. -A Turkey in armed alliance with Germany presented -a splendid opportunity for British imperialism.”<a name="FNanchor_1_364" id="FNanchor_1_364"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_364" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>Turkish mobilization, furthermore, was a tediously -slow process. The construction of the Bagdad Railway, -as we have seen, had not been completed before the outbreak -of the Great War.<a name="FNanchor_2_365" id="FNanchor_2_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_365" class="fnanchor">2</a> There were wide gaps in -northern Mesopotamia and in the Amanus mountains -which made difficult the transportation of troops for the -defence of Irak, an attack on the Suez, an offensive in -the Caucasus, or the fortification of the Dardanelles. -The entry of Turkey into the war before the completion -of mobilization would have been of no material adv<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">278</a></span>antage -to Germany and would almost certainly have brought -disaster to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while the -war went well for Germany on the French and Russian -fronts, German influence at Constantinople was more -concerned with creating sentiment for war and with -speeding up mobilization than with encouraging premature -intervention. After the Teutonic defeats at the -Marne and in Galicia, however, active Turkish support -was needed for the purpose of menacing Russian security -in the Caucasus and British security in Egypt, as well -as for bolstering up German morale. During the latter -part of September and the month of October, Marshal -Liman von Sanders, Baron von Wangenheim, the commanders -of the <i>Goeben</i> and the <i>Breslau</i>, and other German -influences at Constantinople exerted the strongest possible -pressure on the Ottoman Government to bring Turkey -into the war on the side of her Teutonic allies.</p> - -<p>On October 31, 1914, the Turkish Government took -the fatal step of precipitating war with the Entente -Powers, after Enver Pasha, Minister of War, and Djemal -Pasha, Minister of Marine, were satisfied that Ottoman -preparations were sufficiently advanced to warrant the -beginning of hostilities. The outcome of the Bagdad -Railway concession of 1903 was the entry of Turkey into -the War of 1914!<a name="FNanchor_3_366" id="FNanchor_3_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_366" class="fnanchor">3</a></p> - -<p>Discouraged by their failure to maintain the peace, and -fearful of impending disaster to their country, Djavid -Bey and three other members of the Ottoman ministry -resigned their posts. There were other indications, also, -that intelligent public opinion at Constantinople was not -whole-hearted in support of war. But the nationalists—playing -upon the “traditional enmity” toward Russia—had -their way, and with an outburst of patriotic fervor -Turkey began hostilities. In a proclamation to the army -and navy the Sultan affirmed that the war was being<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">279</a></span> -waged for the defence of the Caliphate and the “emancipation” -of the Fatherland: “During the last three hundred -years,” he said, “the Russian Empire has caused our -country to suffer many losses in territory. And when we -finally arose to a sentiment of awakening and regeneration -which was to increase our national welfare and our power, -the Russian Empire made every effort to destroy our -attempts, either with war or with numerous machinations -and intrigues. Russia, England, and France never for a -moment ceased harboring ill-will against our Caliphate, -to which millions of Mussulmans, suffering under the -tyranny of foreign domination, are religiously and wholeheartedly -devoted. And it was always these powers that -started every misfortune that came upon us. Therefore, -in this mighty struggle which we are undertaking, we -once and for all will put an end to the attacks made from -one side against the Caliphate and from the other against -the existence of our country.”<a name="FNanchor_4_367" id="FNanchor_4_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_367" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>Turcophiles in Germany were enthusiastic over Ottoman -participation in the Great War. The Turkish military -contribution to a Teutonic victory might not be -decisive, but neither would it be insignificant. And German -coöperation in Ottoman military ventures would -certainly strengthen German economic penetration in the -Near East, even though Turkish arms might not drive -Britain out of Egypt or Russia out of the Caucasus. -“Over there in Turkey,” wrote Dr. Ernest Jäckh, “stretch -Anatolia and Mesopotamia—Anatolia, the ‘land of sunrise,’ -Mesopotamia, an ancient paradise. Let these names -be to us a symbol. May this world war bring to Germany -and Turkey the sunrise and the paradise of a new era. -May it confer upon a strengthened Turkey and a greater -Germany the blessings of fruitful Turco-Teutonic cooperation -in peace after victorious Turco-Teutonic collaboration -in war.”<a name="FNanchor_5_368" id="FNanchor_5_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_368" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">280</a></span></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Asiatic Turkey Becomes One of the Stakes of the -War</span></h3> - -<p>Whatever may have been the European origins of the -Great War, there was no disposition on the part of the -belligerents to overlook its imperial possibilities. A war -which was fought for the protection of France against -German aggression, for the defence of Belgian neutrality, -for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, for the democratizing -of a bureaucratic German Empire—this war was -fought not only in Flanders and Picardy and the Vosges, -but in Africa and Asia and the South Seas; not only in -Poland and Galicia and East Prussia, but in Mesopotamia -and Syria and the Dardanelles. Anatolia, Palestine, and -the region of the Persian Gulf were as much the stakes -of the war as <i>Italia irredenta</i>, the lost provinces of -France, or the Serbian “outlet” to the Adriatic.</p> - -<p>Of all the spoils of the war, Turkey was among the -richest. Her undeveloped wealth in minerals and fuel; -her potentialities as a producer of foodstuffs, cotton, and -other agricultural products; her possibilities as a market—these -were alluring as war-time necessities and peace-time -assets. Her strategic position was of inestimable -importance to any nation which hoped to establish colonial -power in the eastern Mediterranean. Her future as a -sphere of influence promised unusual opportunities for -the investment of capital and the acquisition of exclusive -economic rights. It was no accident, therefore, that -brought men from Berlin and Bombay, Stuttgart and -Sydney, Munich and Marseilles, to fight bitterly for possession -of the cliffs of Gallipoli, the deserts of Mesopotamia, -and the coast of Syria. Turkey-in-Asia was a -rich prize upon which imperialists in Berlin and Vienna, -London and Paris and Petrograd, had set their hearts.</p> - -<p>No sooner had Turkey entered the war than the imperial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">281</a></span> -aspects of the struggle became apparent. Germany -was deluged with literature designed to show that Ottoman -participation in the war would assure Germany and -Austria their legitimate “place in the sun.” Business -men and diplomatists, missionaries and Oriental scholars<a name="FNanchor_6_369" id="FNanchor_6_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_369" class="fnanchor">6</a> -combined in prophesying that the Turco-German brotherhood-in-arms -would fortify the Teutonic economic position -in the Near East, disturb Russian equanimity in the -Caucasus, menace Britain’s communications with India, -and end once and for all French pretensions in Syria. -Moslem sympathizers predicted that the Holy War would -shake the Entente empires to their foundations. Pan-Germans -frankly avowed that the war offered an opportunity -to make Berlin-to-Bagdad a reality rather than a -dream—some went so far as to believe that German domination -could be extended from the North Cape to the -Persian Gulf! Mercantilists foresaw the possibility of -creating a politically unified and an economically self-sufficient -Middle Europe.<a name="FNanchor_7_370" id="FNanchor_7_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_370" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>As a means of promoting closer relationships with -Turkey numerous societies were established in Germany -for the purpose of disseminating information on the Near -East and its importance in the war. For example, Dr. -Hugo Grothe conducted at Leipzig the work of the -<i>Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee</i>—<i>Vereinigung zur Förderung -deutscher Kulturarbeit im islamischen Orient</i>. -This organization published and distributed hundreds of -thousands of books, pamphlets, and maps regarding -Asiatic Turkey; conducted a Near East Institute, at -which lectures and courses of instruction were given; -maintained an information bureau for business men interested -in commercial and industrial opportunities in the -Ottoman Empire; and established German libraries in -Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Konia, and elsewhere -along the line of the Bagdad Railway. A similar org<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">282</a></span>anization, -the <i>Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung</i>, was maintained -at Berlin under the honorary presidency of Dr. -von Gwinner of the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> and the active supervision -of Dr. Ernest Jäckh. The two societies numbered -among their members and patrons Herr Ballin, of the -Hamburg-American Line, General von der Goltz, Baron -von Wangenheim, and the Ottoman ambassador at -Berlin.<a name="FNanchor_8_371" id="FNanchor_8_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_371" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>The watchdogs of British imperial welfare, however, -were not asleep. Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for -India, was busily engaged in plans for safeguarding -British economic and strategic interests in Mesopotamia. -Early in September, 1914, General Sir Edmund Barrow, -Military Secretary of the India Office, prepared a memorandum, -“The Rôle of India in a Turkish War,” which -proposed the immediate occupation of Basra on the -grounds that it was “the psychological moment to take -action” and that “so unexpected a stroke at this moment -would have a startling effect” in checkmating Turkish -intrigues, encouraging the Arabs to revolt and thus forestalling -an Ottoman attack on the Suez, and in protecting -the oil installations at the head of the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_9_372" id="FNanchor_9_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_372" class="fnanchor">9</a> -Supporters of a pro-Balkan policy, in the meantime, were -urging an attack on Turkey from the Mediterranean. -Winston Churchill, Chief Lord of the Admiralty, for -example, in a memorandum of August 19, 1914, to Sir -Edward Grey, advocated an alliance with Greece against -Turkey; by September 4 he had completed plans for a -military and naval attack on the Dardanelles; on September -21 he telegraphed Admiral Carden, at Malta, to “sink -the <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Breslau</i>, no matter what flag they fly, if -they come out of the Straits.” Mr. Churchill, with whose -name will ever be associated the disastrous expedition to -the Dardanelles, believed that, whatever the outcome of -the war on the Western Front, the success or failure of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">283</a></span> -Germany would be measured in terms of her power in -the Near East after the termination of hostilities. To -destroy German economic and political domination of -Turkey it was necessary to have an expedition at the head -of the Persian Gulf and, possibly, another in Syria, but -the commanding strategic position was the Straits. The -capture of Constantinople would win the war.<a name="FNanchor_10_373" id="FNanchor_10_373"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_373" class="fnanchor">10</a></p> - -<p>There were others who considered that a purely defensive -policy should be followed in the Near East. Lord -Kitchener, for example, believed in concentrating the -maximum possible man power in France and advocated -restricting Eastern operations to the protection of the -Suez Canal and other essential communications. Influential -military critics, like Colonel Repington, were firmly -opposed to “side shows” in Mesopotamia, at the Dardanelles, -or elsewhere, which would divert men, matériel, -and popular attention from the Western Front. Sir -Edward Grey appeared to be more interested in Continental -than in colonial questions. Lord Curzon was -swayed between fear of a Moslem uprising in India and -the hope that British prestige in the East might be -materially enhanced by outstanding military successes at -the expense of the Turks.<a name="FNanchor_11_374" id="FNanchor_11_374"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_374" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>The Near Eastern imperialists, however, had their way. -During September, 1914, the Government of India was -ordered to prepare an expeditionary force for service in -the region of the Persian Gulf. Early in October, almost -four weeks before Turkey entered the war, Indian Expeditionary -Force “D,” under General Delamain, sailed -from Bombay under sealed orders. It next appeared on -October 23, at Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf, where -General Delamain learned the purposes of the expedition -which he commanded. His army was to occupy Adaban -Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, “with the object -of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">284</a></span> [of -the Anglo-Persian Company], covering the landing of -reënforcements should these be required, and assuring -the local Arabs of support against Turkey.” For the -last-named purpose Sir Percy Cox, subsequently British -High Commissioner in Irak, was attached to the army as -“political officer.” In addition, General Delamain was to -“take such military and political action as he should consider -feasible to strengthen his position and, if necessary, -occupy Basra.” Nevertheless, he was warned that the -rôle of his force was “that of demonstrating at the head -of the Persian Gulf” and that on no account was he “to -take any hostile action against the Turks without orders -from the Government of India, <i>except in the case of -absolute military necessity</i>”!<a name="FNanchor_12_375" id="FNanchor_12_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_375" class="fnanchor">12</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, subsequently -first High Commissioner in Egypt under the Protectorate, -entered into an agreement, dated October 23, 1914, with -the Sherif of Mecca, assuring the latter that Great Britain -was prepared “to recognize and support the independence -of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain is -free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, -France,” it being understood that “the districts of Mersina -and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the -west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and -Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab.” In other -words, an independent Arab state was considered to be -feasible insofar as it did not conflict with the sphere of -interest in Syria developed by French railway-builders -and recognized by the Franco-German agreement of -February 15, 1914.<a name="FNanchor_13_376" id="FNanchor_13_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_376" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>Even before Turkey formally entered the war, therefore, -a British army was “demonstrating” in the Shatt-el-Arab; -Sir Percy Cox was coöperating with the Sheik -of Koweit for the purpose of precipitating a rebellion -among the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and a British represen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">285</a></span>tative -had sown the seeds of a separatist movement -in the Hedjaz. It was a short step from this, after the -declaration of hostilities, to the occupation of Basra, on -November 22, and of Kurna, on December 9. The close -of the year 1914 saw Turkey in the unenviable position -of having to choose between increasing German economic -and political domination, on the one hand, and dismemberment -by the Entente Allies, on the other.</p> - -<p>The political and military situation of Turkey did not -improve during the year 1915. By mid-January, the -rigors of a Caucasian winter and the absence of adequate -means of communication and supply brought to a standstill -Enver Pasha’s drive against the Russians. Early in -February, Djemal Pasha’s army, which had crossed the -Sinai Peninsula in the face of seemingly insuperable obstacles, -attacked the Suez Canal only to be decisively -defeated by its British and French defenders. During -March a secret agreement was reached between Great -Britain, France, and Russia for the partition of the Ottoman -Empire, including the assignment of Constantinople -to the Tsar. On April 26, by the Treaty of London -which brought Italy into the war, the Entente Powers -bound themselves to “preserve the political balance in the -Mediterranean” by recognizing the right of Italy “to -receive on the division of Turkey an equal share with -Great Britain, France and Russia in the basin of the -Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it -contiguous to the province of Adalia, where Italy already -had obtained special rights and developed certain interests”; -likewise the Allies agreed to protect the interests -of Italy “in the event that the territorial inviolability of -Asiatic Turkey should be sustained by the Powers” or -that “only a redistribution of spheres of interest should -take place.”<a name="FNanchor_14_377" id="FNanchor_14_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_377" class="fnanchor">14</a> To give greater effect to these secret -imperialistic agreements British troops were landed at the -Dardanelles on April 28. The bargains were sealed w<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">286</a></span>ith -the blood of those heroic Britons and immortal Anzacs -who went through the tortures of hell—and worse—at -Gallipoli!<a name="FNanchor_15_378" id="FNanchor_15_378"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_378" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<p>In the meantime, British activities were resumed in -Mesopotamia. In March, 1915, General J. E. Nixon was -ordered to Basra with renewed instructions “to secure the -safety of the oilfields, pipe line and refineries of the -Anglo-Persian Oil Company,” as well as with orders to -consolidate his position for the purpose of “retaining -complete control of lower Mesopotamia” and of making -possible a subsequent advance on Bagdad. On May 29, -in accordance with these instructions, the Sixth Division, -under General Sir Charles Townshend, occupied Amara, -a town of 12,000 lying about fifty miles north of Basra -on the Tigris, seat of the Turkish provincial administration -and one of the principal entrepôts of Mesopotamian -trade. Beyond this point General Nixon refused to -extend his operations unless assured adequate reënforcements, -which were not forthcoming. Nevertheless, because -of the insistence of Sir Percy Cox that some outstanding -success was necessary to retain support of the -Arabs, another advance was ordered in the early autumn. -On September 29, General Townshend occupied Kut-el-Amara, -180 miles north of his former position.</p> - -<p>Then followed the decision to advance on Bagdad—a -move which will go down in history as one of the chief -blunders of the war, as well as a conspicuous instance -of the manner in which political desiderata were allowed -to outweigh military considerations. The soldiers on -the ground were opposed to the move. General Nixon -believed it would be disastrous to advance farther than -Kut without substantial reënforcements. General Townshend -was convinced that “Mesopotamia was a secondary -theatre of war, and on principle should be held on t<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">287</a></span>he -defensive with a minimum force,” and he warned his -superiors that his troops “were tired, and their tails were -not up, but slightly down,” that they were fearful of -the distance from the sea and “were going down, in -consequence, with every imaginable disease.” But the -statesmen at London were thinking not only of winning -the war but of eliminating Germany from all future -political and economic competition in the backward areas -of the world. “Because of the great political and military -advantages to be derived from the capture of Bagdad,” -and because the “uncertainty” of the situation at -the Dardanelles made apparent “the great need of a -striking success in the East,” Austen Chamberlain, Secretary -of State for India, telegraphed the Viceroy on -October 23, 1915, that an immediate advance should be -begun. Fearful of the consequences, but faithful to his -trust, General Townshend began the hundred-mile march -to Bagdad. Worn out, but heroic beyond words, his -troops drove the Turkish forces back and, on November -22, occupied Ctesiphon, only eighteen miles from their -goal. This, however, marked the high tide of Allied -success in the Near East during 1915, for General Townshend -was destined to reach Bagdad only as a prisoner -of war.<a name="FNanchor_16_379" id="FNanchor_16_379"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_379" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Germany Wins Temporary Domination of the Near -East</span></h3> - -<p>Allied military successes in Turkey were not looked -upon with equanimity in Germany. There was a realization -in Berlin, as well as London and Paris and Petrograd, -that the stakes of the war were as much imperial as -Continental. Nothing had as yet occurred which had -lessened the importance of establishing an economically -self-sufficient Middle European <i>bloc</i> of nations. In the -event that the German oversea colonies could not be<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">288</a></span> -recovered, Asiatic Turkey—because of its favorable geographical -position, its natural resources, and its potentialities -as a market—would be almost indispensable in -the German imperial scheme of things. As Paul Rohrbach -wrote in <i>Das grössere Deutschland</i> in August, 1915, -“After a year of war almost everybody in Germany is of -the opinion that victory or defeat—at least political victory -or defeat—depends upon the preservation of Turkey -and the maintenance of our communications with her.”</p> - -<p>The dogged defence of the Dardanelles had convinced -Germany that, granted proper support, Turkey could be -depended upon to give a good account of herself. The -problem was one of supplementing Ottoman man power -with Teutonic military genius, technical skill, and organizing -ability. The enlistment of Bulgaria and the obliteration -of Serbia made possible more active German assistance -to Turkey, and during the latter months of 1915 -and the early months of 1916 strenuous efforts were made -to bring the Turkish military machine to a high point of -efficiency. Large numbers of German staff officers were -despatched to Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia, and -Turkish officers were brought to the French and Russian -fronts to learn the methods of modern warfare. The -Prussian system of military service was adopted throughout -the Ottoman Empire, and exemptions were reduced -to a minimum. Liberal credits were established with -German banks for the purchase of supplies for the new -levies of troops. Field Marshal von der Goltz was sent -to Mesopotamia as commander-in-chief of the Turkish -troops in that region.<a name="FNanchor_17_380" id="FNanchor_17_380"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_380" class="fnanchor">17</a></p> - -<p>Perhaps the chief handicap of the Turks in all their -campaigns was inadequate means of transportation. The -Ottoman armies operating in the vicinity of Gaza and of -Bagdad were dependent upon lines of communication -more than twelve hundred miles long; and had the B<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">289</a></span>agdad -Railway been non-existent, it is doubtful if any military -operations at all could have been conducted in those -regions. But the Bagdad Railway was uncompleted. -Troops and supplies being despatched from or to Anatolia -had to be transported across the Taurus and Amanus -mountains by mule-back, wagon, or automobile, and then -reloaded on cars south or north of the unfinished tunnels. -To remedy these deficiencies, herculean efforts were made -by Germans and Turks during 1915 to improve the service -on existing lines and to hurry the completion of the -Bagdad Railway. Locomotives and other rolling stock -were shipped to Turkey, and German railway experts -coöperated with the military authorities in utilizing transportation -facilities to the best advantage. In September, -1915, the Bagtché tunnel was pierced; and although -through service to Aleppo was not inaugurated until -October, 1918, a temporary narrow-gauge line was used, -during the interim, to transport troops and matériel -through the tunnel. Commenting on the importance of -the Bagtché tunnel, the American Consul General at Constantinople -wrote: “With its completion the most serious -difficulties connected with the construction of the Bagdad -Railway have been overcome, and the work of connecting -up many of the isolated stretches of track may be expected -to be completed with reasonable rapidity. In spite -of delays occasioned by the war, this most important -undertaking in railway construction in Turkey has passed -the problematical stage and is now certain to become an -accomplished fact in the near future.”<a name="FNanchor_18_381" id="FNanchor_18_381"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_381" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> - -<p>The effects of German assistance to Turkey soon made -themselves apparent. Field Marshal von der Goltz, commanding -a reënforced and reinvigorated Ottoman army, -supported by German artillery, compelled General Townshend -to abandon hope of occupying Bagdad and to fall -back toward Basra. By December 5, 1915, Townshend’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">290</a></span> -army was besieged in Kut-el-Amara; and although the -Turks failed to take the town by storm, they did not fail -to beat off every Russian and British force sent to the -relief of the beleaguered troops. About the same time, -December 10, evacuation of the Dardanelles was begun, -and the last of the British troops were withdrawn during -the first week of January, 1916. On April 29, Townshend’s -famished garrison surrendered. Shortly thereafter -the offensive of the Grand Duke Nicholas in -Turkish Armenia was brought to a standstill. During -July and August a second Ottoman attack was launched -against the Suez Canal; and although it was unsuccessful, -the expedition reminded the British that Egypt was by no -means immune from danger. By the end of the year -1916 Turkey, with German assistance, had completely -cleared her soil of enemy troops, except for a retreating -Russian army in northern Anatolia and a defeated British -expedition at the head of the Persian Gulf.<a name="FNanchor_19_382" id="FNanchor_19_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_382" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>As for Germany, she “was unopposed in her mastery -of that whole vast region of southeastern Europe and -southwestern Asia which goes by the name of the Near -East.... She now enjoyed uninterrupted and unmenaced -communication and commerce with Constantinople -not only, but far away, over the great arteries of Asiatic -Turkey [the Bagdad and Hedjaz railways], with Damascus, -Jerusalem, and Mecca, and with Bagdad likewise.... -If military exploits had been as conclusive as they -had been spectacular, Germany would have won the Great -War in 1916 and imposed a <i>Pax Germanica</i> upon the -world.... With the adherence of Turkey and Bulgaria -to the Teutonic Alliance, and the triumphs of those states, -a Germanized <i>Mittel-Europa</i> could be said to stretch from -the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, from the Baltic to -the Red Sea, from Lithuania and Ukrainia to Picardy and -Champagne. It was the greatest achievement in empire-building -on the continent of Europe since the days of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">291</a></span> -Napoleon Bonaparte.”<a name="FNanchor_20_383" id="FNanchor_20_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_383" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<p>If Germany had been alarmed during the summer of -1915 at the prospect that she might lose her preponderant -position in Turkey, the world was now alarmed at the -prospect that she might maintain that position. Nor was -that alarm easily dispelled, for the Bagdad Railway and -the power and prestige it gave Germany in the Near East -were pointed to by statesmen as additional evidence of -the manner in which the Kaiser and his cohorts had -plotted in secret against the peace of an unsuspecting and -unprepared world. In fact, the Bagdad Railway came -to be considered one of the fundamental causes of the -war, as well as one of the chief prizes for which the war -was being fought. President Wilson, for example, in -his Flag Day speech, June 14, 1917, stated the case in -the following terms:<a name="FNanchor_21_384" id="FNanchor_21_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_384" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“The rulers of Germany ... were glad to go forward unmolested, -filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, -putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her -armies and make interest with her government, developing plans -of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in -Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere -single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from -Berlin to Bagdad....</p> - -<p>“The plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power -and political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond -the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary -was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or -Turkey or the ponderous states of the East.... The dream had -its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else!...</p> - -<p>“And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing -plan into execution.... The so-called Central Powers are in fact -but a single Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be -but for a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and -Roumania is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans -trained, are serving Germany, certainly not themselves, and the -guns of German warships lying in the harbor at Constantinople -remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but -to take their orders from Berlin. From Hamburg to the P<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">292</a></span>ersian -Gulf the net is spread!”</p></div> - -<p>As late as November 12, 1917, after some spectacular -victories by the Allies in Mesopotamia and Syria, President -Wilson made it plain that no peace was possible -which did not destroy German military power in the Near -East. Addressing the American Federation of Labor, -at Buffalo, N. Y., he said:<a name="FNanchor_22_385" id="FNanchor_22_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_385" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“Look at the map of Europe now. Germany, in thrusting upon -us again and again the discussion of peace, talks about what? -Talks about Belgium—talks about Alsace-Lorraine. Well, these -are deeply interesting subjects to us and to them, but they are -not talking about the heart of the matter. Take the map and -look at it. Germany has absolute control of Austria-Hungary, -practical control of the Balkan States, control of Turkey, control -of Asia Minor. I saw a map the other day in which the whole -thing was printed in appropriate black, and the black stretched -all the way from Hamburg to Bagdad—the bulk of the German -power inserted into the heart of the world. If she can keep that, -she has kept all that her dreams contemplated when the war -began. If she can keep that, her power can disturb the world -as long as she keeps it, always provided ... the present influences -that control the German Government continue to control it.”</p></div> - -<p>In the light of all the facts, this diagnosis of the situation -is incomplete, to say the least. Had President Wilson -been cognizant of the contemporaneous counter-activities -of the Allied Powers, he might not have been prepared -to offer so simple an explanation of a many-sided problem. -For it was not German imperialism alone which -menaced the peace of the Near East and of the world, -but <i>all</i> imperialism.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">“Berlin to Bagdad” Becomes But a Memory</span></h3> - -<p>Germany may have been determined to dominate the -Ottoman Empire by military force. But from the Turkish -point of view domination by Germany was hardly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">293</a></span> -more objectionable than the dismemberment which was -certain to be the result of an Allied victory.</p> - -<p>Indeed, confident that they would eventually win the -war, the Entente Powers had proceeded far in their plans -for the division of the Ottoman Empire. During the -spring of 1915, as has been indicated,<a name="FNanchor_23_386" id="FNanchor_23_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_386" class="fnanchor">23</a> Russia had been -promised Constantinople, and Italy had been assigned a -share of the spoils equal to that of Great Britain, France, -or Russia. To give full effect to these understandings, -further negotiations were conducted during the autumn -of 1915 and the spring of 1916, looking toward a more -specific delimitation of interests.</p> - -<p>Accordingly, on April 26, 1916—the first anniversary -of the Treaty of London with Italy—France and Russia -signed the secret Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty concerning -their respective territorial rights in Asiatic Turkey. -Russia was awarded full sovereignty over the vilayets -of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van—a vast area of -60,000 square miles (about one and one-fifth times the -size of the State of New York), containing valuable -mineral and petroleum resources. This handsome prize -put Russia well on the road to Constantinople and in a -fair way to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake. And -at the moment the treaty was signed the armies of the -Grand Duke Nicholas were actually overrunning the territory -which Russia had staked out for herself! For her -part, France was to receive adequate compensations in -the region to the south and southwest of the Russian -acquisitions, the actual delimitation of boundaries and -other details to be the result of direct negotiation with -Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_24_387" id="FNanchor_24_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_387" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<p>Thus came into existence the famous Sykes-Picot -Treaty of May 9, 1916, defining British and French political -and economic interests in the hoped-for dismemberment<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">294</a></span> -of the Ottoman Empire. The Syrian coast from -Tyre to Alexandretta, the province of Cilicia, and southern -Armenia (from Sivas on the north and west to -Diarbekr on the south and east) were allocated to France -in full sovereignty. In addition, a French “zone of influence” -was established over a vast area including the -provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Deir, and Mosul. Administration -of this stretch of coast and its hinterland -would give French imperialists what they most wanted in -the Near East—actual possession of a country in which -France had many religious and cultural interests, control -of the silk production of Syria and the potential cotton -production of Cilicia, ownership of the Arghana copper -mines, and acquisition of that portion of the Bagdad -Railway lying between Mosul and the Cilician Gates of the -Taurus.<a name="FNanchor_25_388" id="FNanchor_25_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_388" class="fnanchor">25</a> Aside from its satisfaction of French imperial -ambitions, however, “the French area defied every -known law of geographic, ethnographic, and linguistic -unity which one might cite who would attempt to justify -it.”<a name="FNanchor_26_389" id="FNanchor_26_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_389" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<p>Great Britain, by way of “compensation,” was to receive -complete control over lower Mesopotamia from -Tekrit to the Persian Gulf and from the Arabian boundary -to the Persian frontier. In addition, she was recognized -as having special political and economic interests—particularly -the right “to furnish such advisers as the -Arabs might desire”—in a vast territory lying south of -the French “zone of influence” and extending from the -Sinai Peninsula to the Persian border. Palestine was -to be internationalized, but was subsequently established -as a homeland for the Jews. In this manner Britain, -also, had adequately protected her imperial interests—she -had secured possession of the Bagdad Railway in -southern Mesopotamia; she had gained complete control -of the head of the Persian Gulf, thus fortifying he<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">295</a></span>r -strategic position in the Indian Ocean; she was assured -the Mesopotamian cotton supply for the mills of Manchester -and the Mesopotamian oil supply for the dreadnoughts -of the Grand Fleet; she had erected in Palestine -a buffer state which would block any future Ottoman -attacks on the Suez Canal. All in all, Sir Mark Sykes -had driven a satisfactory bargain.<a name="FNanchor_27_390" id="FNanchor_27_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_390" class="fnanchor">27</a></p> - -<p>Italian ambitions now had to be propitiated. For a -whole year before the United States entered the war—while -the Allied governments were professing unselfish -war aims—secret negotiations were being conducted by -representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy to determine -what advantages and territories, equivalent to -those gained by the other Allies, might be awarded Italy. -In April, 1917, by the so-called St. Jean de Maurienne -Agreement, Italy was granted complete possession of -almost the entire southern half of Anatolia—including -the important cities of Adalia, Konia, and Smyrna—together -with an extensive “zone of influence” nort-heast -of Smyrna. With such a hold on the coast of Asia -Minor, Italian imperialists might realize their dream of -dominating the trade of the Ægean and of reëstablishing -the ancient power of Venice in the commerce of the -Near East.<a name="FNanchor_28_391" id="FNanchor_28_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_391" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<p>These inter-Allied agreements for the disposal of -Asiatic Turkey were instructive instances of the “old -diplomacy” in coöperation with the “new imperialism.” -The treaties were secret covenants, secretly arrived at; -they bartered territories and peoples in the most approved -manner of Metternich and Richelieu. But they were less -concerned with narrowly political claims than with the -exclusive economic privileges which sovereignty carried -with it; they determined boundaries with recognition of -their strategic importance, but with greater regard for -the location of oilfields, mineral deposits, railways and -ports of commercial importance. They left no doubt a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">296</a></span>s -to what were the real stakes of the war in the Near East.</p> - -<p>It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the secret -treaties with the pronouncements of Allied statesmen -regarding the origins and purposes of the Great War. -Certainly they were no part of the American program -for peace, which promised to “the Turkish portions of -the Ottoman Empire a secure sovereignty”; which demanded -“a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial -adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict -observance of the principle that in determining all such -questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations -concerned must have equal weight with the equitable -claims of the government whose title is to be determined”; -and which announced in no uncertain terms that “the day -of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by” as is also -“the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest -of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for -moment to upset the peace of the world.”<a name="FNanchor_29_392" id="FNanchor_29_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_392" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>Allied diplomacy was to have its way in the Near East, -however, for the goddess of victory finally smiled upon -the Allied armies and frowned upon both Turks and -Germans. As 1916 had been a year of Turco-German -triumphs at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, 1917 -brought conspicuous Allied victories along the Tigris -and in Syria, and 1918 saw the complete collapse of the -Ottoman Empire. On February 24, 1917, General Sir -Stanley Maude, in command of reënforced and rejuvenated -British forces in Mesopotamia, captured Kut-el-Amara, -retrieving the disaster which had befallen Townshend’s -army a year before. Deprived of the services of -Field Marshal von der Goltz, who died during the Caucasus -campaign, the Turks retired in disorder, and on -March 11 British troops entered Bagdad—the ancient -city which had bulked so large in the German scheme of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">297</a></span> -things in the Near East. Although the capture of Bagdad -was not in itself of great strategic importance, its -effect on morale in the belligerent countries was considerable. -British imperialists were in possession of the -ancient capital of the Arabian Caliphs, as well as the chief -entrepôt of caravan trade in the Middle East; therefore -their prestige with both Arabs and Turks was certain to -rise. At home, pictures of British troops in the Bagdad -of the Arabian Nights appealed to the imagination of -the war-weary, as well as the optimistic, patriot. In the -Central Powers, on the other hand, the loss of Bagdad -created scepticism as to whether the German dream of -“Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” was not now beyond -realization. This scepticism became more confirmed -when, on April 24, General Maude captured Samarra, -northern railhead of the uncompleted Bagdad line in -Mesopotamia.<a name="FNanchor_30_393" id="FNanchor_30_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_393" class="fnanchor">30</a></p> - -<p>Scepticism would have turned to alarm, however, had -Germans been fully aware of the significance of the British -advance in the Land of the Two Rivers. For behind -the armies of General Maude came civil officials -by the hundreds to consolidate the victory and to lay the -foundations of permanent occupation. An Irrigation -Department was established to deal with the menace of -floods, to drain marshes, and to economize in the use -of water. An Agricultural Department undertook the -cultivation of irrigated lands and conducted elaborate -experiments in the growing of cotton—the commodity -which means so much in the British imperial system. A -railway was constructed from Basra to Bagdad which, -when opened to commerce in 1919, became an integral part -of the Constantinople-Basra system. There was every indication -that the British were in Mesopotamia to stay.<a name="FNanchor_31_394" id="FNanchor_31_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_394" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>Germans and Turks were sufficiently aroused, however, -to take strenuous measures to counteract Genera<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">298</a></span>l Maude’s -successes. In April, 1917, Field Marshal von Mackensen, -hero of the Balkan and Rumanian campaigns and -strong man of the Near East, was sent to Constantinople -to confer with Enver Pasha regarding the military situation. -It was decided, apparently, that Bagdad must be -retaken at all costs, for throughout the summer quantities -of rolling stock for the Bagdad Railway were shipped to -Turkey, enormous supplies of munitions were accumulated -at Haidar Pasha, and a division of picked German -troops (including machine-gun and artillery units) made -its appearance in Anatolia. Command of all the Turkish -armies in Mesopotamia was conferred upon General von -Falkenhayn, former German Chief of Staff. Germany -was not yet prepared to surrender her sphere of interest -in Turkey.</p> - -<p>The great expedition against Bagdad, however, had to -be abandoned. In the first place, Turkish officers were -loath to serve under von Falkenhayn. Turkish nationalism -was beginning to assert itself, and German supervision -of Ottoman military affairs was resented—Mustapha -Kemal Pasha, for example, refused to accept orders -from German generals and resigned his commission. -Von Falkenhayn himself was disliked because of his -dictatorial methods and was held in light esteem because -of his responsibility for the disastrous Verdun offensive. -Furthermore, many Turks deemed it inadvisable to dissipate -energy in a Mesopotamian campaign, the avowed -purpose of which was a recovery of German prestige, -when all available man power was required for the defence -of Syria. Djemal Pasha was so insistent on this -point that he received from the Kaiser an “invitation” to -visit the Western Front! In the second place, Providence -or, perhaps, an Allied spy intervened to thwart -the German plans, for a great fire and a series of explosions -(September 23–26, 1917) destroyed the entire port<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">299</a></span> -and terminal of Haidar Pasha, together with all the munitions -and supplies which had been accumulated there -by months of patient effort. And finally, the spectacular -campaign of Field Marshal Allenby in Palestine, which -opened with the capture of Beersheba, on October 31, -convinced even von Falkenhayn that an expedition in -Mesopotamia, while Aleppo was in danger, would be the -height of folly. German energies were thereupon diverted -to the defence of the Holy Land.<a name="FNanchor_32_395" id="FNanchor_32_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_395" class="fnanchor">32</a></p> - -<p>During the autumn of 1917, Great Britain and France, -to assure their possession of the territories assigned them -by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, began a Syrian campaign -which was not to terminate until Turkey had been put -out of the war. Under Field Marshal Sir E. H. H. -Allenby, British troops, reënforced by French units and -assisted by the rebellious Arabs of the Hedjaz, captured -Gaza (November 7), Jaffa (November 16), and Jerusalem -(December 9). The triumphal entry of General -Allenby into Jerusalem was hailed throughout Christendom -as marking the success of a modern crusade to rid -Palestine of Ottoman domination forever. Jericho was -occupied, February 21, 1918, but Turkish resistance, -under Marshal Liman von Sanders, stiffened for a time, -and it was not until the autumn that large-scale operations -were resumed. On October 1, Damascus was occupied -by a combined Arab and British army; a week -later Beirut was taken; and on October 25, Aleppo, the -most important junction point on the Bagdad Railway, -capitulated. Five days afterward, Turkey gave up the -hopeless fight by signing the Mudros armistice, terminating -hostilities.<a name="FNanchor_33_396" id="FNanchor_33_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_396" class="fnanchor">33</a></p> - -<p>Thus ended a Great Adventure for both Turkey and -Germany. Germany lost all hope of retaining any economic -or political influence in the Ottoman Empire; the -dream of Berlin-to-Bagdad became a nightmare. Turke<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">300</a></span>y -faced dismemberment. “The Bagdad Railway had -proved to be the backbone of Turkish utility and power -in the War. Were it not for its existence, the Ottoman -resistance in Mesopotamia and in Syria could have been -discounted as a practical consideration in the War, -and the sending of Turkish reënforcements to the Caucasus -would have been even more materially delayed than -was in fact the case.”<a name="FNanchor_34_397" id="FNanchor_34_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_397" class="fnanchor">34</a> For Turkey, then, the war had -come at a most inappropriate time. Had hostilities begun -ten years later, after the completion of the Bagdad -system, military operations in the Near East might have -had an entirely different result. As it was, the Bagdad -Railway—and the international complications arising -from it—proved to be the ruination of the Ottoman -Empire.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">To the Victors Belong the Spoils</span></h3> - -<p>During 1919, the Allied Governments set about possessing -themselves of the spoils which were theirs by virtue -of the secret treaties and by right of conquest. In -April, Italian troops occupied Adalia and rapidly extended -their lines into the interior as far as Konia. In -November, French armies replaced the British forces -in Syria and Cilicia. Great Britain began the “pacification” -of the tribesmen of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. -And in the meantime there was plentiful evidence that -German rights in the Near East would be speedily liquidated -in the interest of the victorious Powers. For example, -on March 26, the Interallied Commission on Ports, -Waterways, and Railways announced at Paris the adoption -of “a new transportation agreement designed to -secure a route to the Orient by railway without passing -through the territories of the Central Empires.” Accordingly, -a fast train, the “Simplon-Orient Express,” -was to be run regularly from Calais to Constantinople<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">301</a></span> -<i>via</i> Paris, Lausanne, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Agram, and -Vinkovce. Later this service was to be extended into -Asiatic Turkey, over the lines of the Anatolian, Bagdad, -and Syrian railways. To meet a changed situation one -must provide new paths of imperial expansion, and the -French press spoke glowingly of the prospect that the -slogans “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” and “Berlin to -Bagdad” would be speedily replaced by “Calais to Cairo” -and “Bordeaux to Bagdad”!<a name="FNanchor_35_398" id="FNanchor_35_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_398" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>All German rights in the Bagdad Railway and other -economic enterprises in the Near East were abrogated by -the Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919. The German -Government was obligated to obtain and to turn -over to the Reparation Commission “any rights and interests -of German nationals in any public utility undertaking -or in any concession operating in ... Turkey, -Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria” and agreed, as well, -“to recognize and accept all arrangements which the -Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey -and Bulgaria with reference to any rights, interests and -privileges whatever which might be claimed by Germany -or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria.”<a name="FNanchor_36_399" id="FNanchor_36_399"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_399" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>The Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920—together with -the accompanying secret Tripartite Agreement of the same -date between Great Britain, France, and Italy—carried -still further the liquidation of German interests in the -Near East. The Turkish Government was required to -dispose of all property rights in Turkey of Germany, -Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or their respective nationals -and to turn over the proceeds of all purchases and sales to -the Reparation Commission established under the treaties -of peace with those Powers. The Anatolian and Bagdad -Railways were to be expropriated by Turkey and all -of their rights, privileges, and properties to be assigned—at -a valuation to be determined by an arbitrator appoint<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">302</a></span>ed -by the Council of the League of Nations—to a Franco-British-Italian -corporation to be designated by the representatives -of the Allied Powers. German stockholders -were to be compensated for their holdings, but the -amount of their compensation was to be turned over to -the Reparation Commission; compensation due the -Turkish Government was to be assigned to the Allied -Governments toward the costs of maintaining their armies -of occupation on Turkish soil. German and Turkish -property in ceded territories of the Ottoman Empire was -to be similarly liquidated. The Treaty of Versailles and -the Treaty of Sèvres left hardly a vestige of German influence -in the Near East.<a name="FNanchor_37_400" id="FNanchor_37_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_400" class="fnanchor">37</a></p> - -<p>The Sèvres settlement, furthermore, destroyed the -Ottoman Empire and sought to give the Allies a stranglehold -upon the economic life of Turkey. Great Britain -and France received essentially the same territorial privileges -as they had laid out for themselves in the Sykes-Picot -Treaty, with the vague restrictions that they should -exercise in Mesopotamia and Palestine and in Syria and -Cilicia respectively only the rights of mandatory powers. -Great Britain was confirmed in her oil and navigation -concessions in Mesopotamia, France in her railway rights -in Syria; in addition, the Hedjaz Railway was turned -over outright to their joint ownership and administration. -Italy received only a “sphere of influence” in southern -Anatolia, including the port of Adalia, but, as a consequence -of one of the most sordid of the transactions of -the Paris Conference, she was deprived of the bulk of -the privileges guaranteed her under the Treaty of London -and the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement.<a name="FNanchor_38_401" id="FNanchor_38_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_401" class="fnanchor">38</a> Greece -was installed in Smyrna—the most important harbor in -Asia Minor, a harbor the control of which was vital to -the peasantry of Anatolia for the free export of their -produce and for the unimpeded importation of farm <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">303</a></span>machinery -and other wares of western industry. Constantinople -was put under the jurisdiction of an international -commission for control of the Straits, and the balance -of the former Russian sphere of interest was assigned -to the ill-fated Armenian Republic. The Hedjaz was -declared to be an independent Arab state. The Ottoman -Empire was no more.</p> - -<p>Even the Turkey that remained—a portion of Anatolia—enjoyed -sovereignty in name only. The Capitulations, -which the Sultan had terminated in the autumn -of 1914, were reëstablished and extended. Concessions -to Allied nationals were confirmed in all the rights which -they enjoyed before Ottoman entry into the Great War. -Because of the reparations, and because of the high cost -of the Allied armies of occupation, the country was being -loaded down with a still further burden of debt from -which there appeared to be no escape—and debts not -only mortgaged Turkish revenues but impaired Turkish -administrative integrity. To assure prompt payment of -both old and new financial obligations of the Turkish -Government, an Interallied Financial Commission was -superimposed upon the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. -The Financial Commission had full supervision -over taxation, customs, loans, and currency; exercised -final control over the Turkish budget; and had the right -to veto any proposed concession. In control of its domestic -affairs the new Turkey was tied hand and foot. -Here, indeed, was a Carthaginian peace! And all of -this was done in order “to help Turkey, to develop her -resources, and to avoid the international rivalries which -have obstructed these objects in the past!”<a name="FNanchor_39_402" id="FNanchor_39_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_402" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<h3>“<span class="smcap">The Ottoman Empire is Dead. Long Live Turkey!</span>”</h3> - -<p>In the meantime, however, while the Sèvres Treaty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">304</a></span> -was still in the making, there was a small handful of -Turkish patriots who were determined at all costs to -win that complete independence for which Turkey had -entered the war. These Nationalists were outraged by -the Greek occupation of Smyrna, in May, 1919, which -they considered a forecast of the kind of peace to be -dictated to Turkey. During the summer of 1919 they -held two conferences at Erzerum and Sivas and agreed -to reject any treaty which handed over Turkish populations -to foreign domination, which would reduce Turkey -to economic servitude to the victorious Powers, or which -would impair the sovereignty of their country. Upon -this program they won a sweeping victory in the parliamentary -elections of 1919–1920. For leadership they -depended largely upon that brilliant soldier and staunch -Turk, Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had distinguished -himself by his quarrel with Liman von Sanders at the -Dardanelles and his defiance of von Falkenhayn in -Syria. Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had bitterly contested -the growth of German influence in Turkey during -the war, was not likely to accept without a struggle the -extension of Allied control over Turkish affairs.<a name="FNanchor_40_403" id="FNanchor_40_403"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_403" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<p>In Constantinople, January 28, 1920, the Nationalist -members of the Turkish Parliament signed the celebrated -“National Pact”—frequently referred to as a Declaration -of Independence of the New Turkey. “The Pact -was something more than a statement of war-aims or a -party programme. It was the first adequate expression -of a sentiment which had been growing up in the minds -of Western-educated Turks for three or four generations, -which in a half-conscious way had inspired the reforms -of the Revolution of 1908, and which may dominate -Turkey and influence the rest of the Middle East for -many generations to come. It was an emphatic adoption -of the Western national idea.”<a name="FNanchor_41_404" id="FNanchor_41_404"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_404" class="fnanchor">41</a> It was based upon<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">305</a></span> -principles which had received wide acceptance among -peoples of the Allied nations during the war: self-determination -of peoples, to be expressed by plebiscite; -protection of the rights of minorities, but no further -limitations of national sovereignty. As regards the Capitulations -and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, -the Pact is explicit: “With a view to assuring our national -and economic development,” it reads, “and with the -end of securing to the country a more regular and more -modern administration, the signatories of the present pact -consider the possession of complete independence and -liberty as the <i>sine qua non</i> of our national existence. -In consequence, we oppose all juridical or financial restrictions -of any nature which would arrest our national -development.” Rather that Turkey should die free than -live in slavery! Foreswearing any intention of recovering -the Sultan’s former Arab possessions, the Pact proceeded -to serve notice, however, that Cilicia, Mosul, and the -Turkish portions of Thrace must be reunited with the -fatherland. “The Ottoman Empire is dead! Long live -Turkey!”<a name="FNanchor_42_405" id="FNanchor_42_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_405" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<p>With this amazing program Mustapha Kemal Pasha -undertook to liberate Turkey. In April, 1920, the government -of the Grand National Assembly was instituted -in Angora and proceeded to administer those portions of -Anatolia which were not under Allied or Greek occupation. -The proposed Treaty of Sèvres—which was handed -to the Turkish delegates at Paris on May 11—was condemned -as inconsistent with the legitimate national aspirations -of the Turkish people. The Allies and the -Constantinople Government were denounced—the former -as invaders of the sacred soil of Turkey, the latter as -tools of European imperialists. Then followed a series -of successful military campaigns: by October, 1920, the -French position in Cilicia had been rendered untenable,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">306</a></span> -the Armenian Republic had been obliterated, the British -forces of occupation had been forced back into the Ismid -peninsula, and the Italians had withdrawn their troops -to Adalia. In the spring of 1921 separate treaties were -negotiated with Russia, Italy, and France, providing for -a cessation of military operations and for the evacuation -of certain Turkish territories.<a name="FNanchor_43_406" id="FNanchor_43_406"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_406" class="fnanchor">43</a> Then came the -long, bitter struggle against the Greeks, terminating with -the Mudania armistice of October 10, 1922, which assured -to the Turks the return of Smyrna and portions of -Thrace. On November 1, the Sultanate was abolished, -and Turkey became a republic. Four days later the -Turkish Nationalists entered Constantinople in triumph. -The struggle for the territorial and administrative integrity -of a New Turkey seemed to be won.</p> - -<p>The victory of the Nationalists scrapped the Treaty -of Sèvres and called for a complete readjustment of the -Near Eastern situation. When the first Lausanne Conference -for Peace in the Near East assembled on November -20, 1922, there were high hopes that a just and lasting -settlement might be arrived at. The conference was -only a few days old, however, when the time-honored -obstacles to peace in the Levant made their appearance: -the rival diplomatic policies of the Great Powers; the -desire of the West, by means of the Capitulations, to -maintain a firm hold upon its vested interests in the -East; the imperialistic struggle of rival concessionaires, -supported by their respective governments, for possession -of the raw materials, the markets, and the communications -of Asiatic Turkey. Once more the Bagdad Railway, with -its tributary lines in Anatolia and Syria, became one of -the stakes of diplomacy!</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_364" id="Footnote_1_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_364"><span class="label">1</span></a> C. J. H. Hayes, <i>A Brief History of the Great War</i> (New -York, 1920), pp. 71–72; “A Rival to the Bagdad Line,” in <i>The -Near East</i>, May 25, 1917.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_365" id="Footnote_2_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_365"><span class="label">2</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, Chapter V.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">307</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_366" id="Footnote_3_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_366"><span class="label">3</span></a> Regarding the diplomatic situation at Constantinople during -the critical months of July to November, 1914, <i>cf.</i> “Correspondence -respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with -Turkey,” <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cd. 7628 (1914); C. -Mehrmann, <i>Der diplomatische Krieg in Vorderasien</i> (Dresden, -1916); J. Aulneau, <i>La Turquie et la Guerre</i> (Paris, 1916); C. -Strupp, <i>Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage</i> -(Berlin, 1916); Historicus, “Origines de l’alliance turco-germanique,” -in <i>Revue</i>, 7 series, Volume III (Paris, 1915), pp. -267 <i>et seq.</i>; Ostrorog, <i>op. cit.</i>, Chapters XII-XVI; footnote 40, -Chapter X, <i>supra</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_367" id="Footnote_4_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_367"><span class="label">4</span></a> Quoted from <i>Current History</i>, Volume I (New York, 1915), -p. 1032.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_368" id="Footnote_5_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_368"><span class="label">5</span></a> <i>Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft</i>, p. 30.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_369" id="Footnote_6_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_369"><span class="label">6</span></a> Notably Dr. Ernst Jäckh and Dr. Hugo Grothe.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_370" id="Footnote_7_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_370"><span class="label">7</span></a> The following list of books is given without any pretence -that it is a complete bibliography of German publications on -the Near Eastern question during the year 1914–1915: A. Ritter, -<i>Berlin-Bagdad, neue Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik</i> (Munich, -1915) and <i>Nordkap-Bagdad, das politische Programm des -Krieges</i> (Frankfort a. M., 1914); Hugo Grothe, <i>Die Türken -und ihre gegnerkriegsgeographische Betrachtungen</i> (Frankfurt -a. M., 1915), <i>Deutsch-türkische wirtschaftliche Interessengemeinschaft</i> -(Munich, 1915), and <i>Deutschland, die Türkei und -der Islam</i> (Leipzig, 1915); C. A. Schäfer, <i>Deutsch-türkische -Freundschaft</i> (Stuttgart, 1915); Carl H. Becker, <i>Deutschland -und der Islam</i> (Leipzig, 1914); J. Ritter von Riba, <i>Der türkische -Bundesgenosse</i> (Berlin, 1915); J. Hall, <i>Der Islam und die -abendländische Kultur</i> (Weimar, 1915); Ernst Marré, <i>Die -Türken und wir nach dem Kriege</i> (Leipzig, 1916); Tekin Alp, -<i>Türkismus und Pantürkismus</i> (Weimar, 1915); R. Schäfer, -<i>Der deutsche Krieg, die Türkei, Islam und Christentum</i> (Leipzig, -1915); W. T. Vela, <i>Die Zukunft der Türkei in Bundnis -mit Deutschland</i> (Berlin, 1915); W. Blanckenburg, <i>Die Zukunftsarbeit -der deutschen Schule in der Türkei</i> (Berlin, 1915); -H. Schmidt, <i>Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen Türkei</i> -(Berlin, 1914); H. Margulies, <i>Der Kampf zwischen Bagdad -und Suez in Altertums</i> (Weimar, 1915); M. Horten, <i>Die islamische -Geisteskultur</i> (Leipzig, 1915); Fritz Regel, <i>Die deutsche -Forschung in türkische Vordasien</i> (Leipzig, 1915); M. Roloff, -<i>Arabien und seine Bedeutung für die Erstärkung des Osmanenreiches</i> -(Leipzig, 1915); A. Paquet, <i>Die jüdische Kolonien in -Palästina</i> (Weimar, 1915); C. Nawratzki, <i>Die jüdische Kolonisation -Palästinas</i> (Munich, 1914); D. Trietsch, <i>Die Juden der -Türkei</i> (Leipzig, 1915). Two not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">308</a></span>able magazine articles are: -R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des Suez- und des -Bagdad-Weges,” in <i>Geographische Zeitschrift</i>, 1916, pp. 649–656; -A. Tschawisch, “Der Islam und Deutschland—Wie soll man sich -die Zukunft des Islams denken?”, in <i>Deutsche Revue</i>, 1915, -Volume III, pp. 249 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_371" id="Footnote_8_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_371"><span class="label">8</span></a> See advertisements regarding the society and its work in a -series of pamphlets <i>Länder und Völker der Turkei</i>, edited by -Dr. Hugo Grothe (Leipzig, 1915, <i>et seq.</i>), and descriptions of -similar organizations in a series <i>Orientbücherei</i>, edited by Dr. -Ernst Jäckh (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914, <i>et seq.</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_372" id="Footnote_9_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_372"><span class="label">9</span></a> “Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament -to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia,” <i>Parliamentary -Papers</i>, 1917, No. Cd. 8610.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_373" id="Footnote_10_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_373"><span class="label">10</span></a> W. S. Churchill, <i>The World Crisis, 1910–1915</i> (New York, -1923), pp. 529–535; A. MacCallum Scott, <i>Winston Churchill in -Peace and War</i> (London, 1916), Chapter X.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_374" id="Footnote_11_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_374"><span class="label">11</span></a> C. C. Repington, <i>The First World War, 1914–1918</i> (2 volumes, -London, 1920), Volume I, pp. 42, 51, etc. <i>ad lib.</i>; Churchill, -<i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 537–538.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_375" id="Footnote_12_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_375"><span class="label">12</span></a> The italics are mine. The proposed debarkation of troops, -however, was certain to involve a breach of Persian neutrality. -<i>Cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1917, No. Cd. 8610.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_376" id="Footnote_13_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_376"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i> Regarding the Franco-German agreement of February -15, 1914, <i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 246–250.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_377" id="Footnote_14_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_377"><span class="label">14</span></a> The text of the agreement between England, France and -Russia regarding the disposition of Constantinople and other -portions of Turkey is to be found in <i>Full Texts of the Secret -Treaties as Revealed at Petrograd</i> (New York, <i>The Evening -Post</i>, 1918); <i>cf.</i>, also, R. S. Baker, <i>Woodrow Wilson and World -Settlement</i> (3 volumes, Garden City, 1922), Volume I, Chapter -III. The text of the Treaty of London between Italy and the -Allies is to be found in <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1920, No. Cmd. -671, Miscellaneous No. 7.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_378" id="Footnote_15_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_378"><span class="label">15</span></a> The best single work on military operations in Turkey during -the Great War is Edmund Dane’s <i>British Campaigns in the -Nearer East, 1914–1918</i> (2 volumes, London, 1919). Regarding -the Caucasus campaigns of 1914–1915 <i>cf.</i> M. P. Price, <i>War and -Revolution in Asiatic Russia</i> (London, 1918), Chapter I; R. -Machray, “The Campaign in the Caucasus,” in the <i>Fortnightly -Review</i>, Volume 97 (1915), pp. 458–471. Excellent accounts of -the first Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal are to be -found in G. Douin, <i>Un épisode de la guerre mondiale: l’attaque -du canal de Suez, 3 Fevrier, 1915</i> (Paris, 1922); C. Stiénon, “Sur -le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in <i>Revue des deux mondes</i>, 6 series, -Volume 5 (1916), pp. 148–174; T. Wiegand, <i>Sinai</i> (Berlin, 1920); -N. Moutran, <i>La Syrie de demain: France et Syrie</i> (Paris, 19<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">309</a></span>16); -R. Hennig, <i>Der Kampf um den Suezkanal</i> (Stuttgart, 1915); E. -Serman, <i>Mit den Türken an der Front</i> (Berlin, 1915); J. Walther, -<i>Zum Kampf in der Wüste am Sinai und Nil</i> (Leipzig, -1916); P. Schweder, <i>Im türkischen Hauptquartier</i> (Leipzig, -1916); <i>Eine Geschichte der Türkei im Weltkriege</i> (Munich, -1919). For the Mesopotamian expedition of 1914–1915 consult -<i>Despatches Regarding Operations in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia</i> -(London, the War Office, 1915); G. M. Chesney, “The -Mesopotamian Breakdown,” in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, Volume -102 (1917), pp. 247–256; H. B. Reynardson, <i>Mesopotamia, 1914–1915</i> -(London, 1919); C. H. Barber, <i>Besieged in Kut and After</i> -(Edinburgh, 1917). Of the great quantity of material available -on the Dardanelles campaign, <i>cf.</i>, in particular, the following: -<i>Gallipoli: der Kampf um den Orient, von einem Offizier aus dem -Stab des Marschalls Liman von Sanders</i> (Berlin, 1916); General -Sir Ian Hamilton, <i>Gallipoli Diary</i> (London, 1920); H. W. Nevinson, -<i>The Dardanelles Campaign</i> (London, 1918); S. A. Moseley, -<i>The Truth About the Dardanelles</i> (London, 1916); John Masefield, -<i>Gallipoli</i> (London, 1916).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_379" id="Footnote_16_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_379"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, 1917, No. Cd. 8610; C. V. F. Townshend, -<i>My Campaign in Mesopotamia</i> (London, 1920).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_380" id="Footnote_17_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_380"><span class="label">17</span></a> Regarding renewed German activity and interest in the Near -East after the elimination of Serbia from the war seemed to -bring the <i>Drang nach Osten</i> within the realm of practical politics, -<i>cf.</i>: R. Zabel, <i>Im Kampfe um Konstantinopel und die wirtschaftliche -Lage der Türkei während des Weltkrieges</i> (Leipzig, 1916); -C. H. Müller, <i>Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn</i> -(Hamburg, 1917); R. Junge, <i>Die deutsch-türkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen</i> -(Weimar, 1916); E. Marré, <i>Die Türken und wir -nach dem Kriege: ein praktisches Wirtschaftsprogramm</i> (Berlin, -1916); H. Rohde, <i>Deutschland in Vorderasien</i> (Berlin, 1916); -H. W. Schmidt, <i>Auskunftsbuch für den Handel mit der Türkei</i> -(Leipzig, 1917); E. Mygind, <i>Anatolien und seine wirtschaftliche -Bedeutung</i> (Berlin, 1916); C. V. Bichtligen, “<i>Die Bagdadbahn, -eine Hochstrasse des Weltverkehrs in ihrer wirtschaftliche Bedeutung</i>,” -in <i>Soziale Revue</i>, 16 year (1916), pp. 1–11, 123–139; -F. C. Endres, <i>Die Türkei</i> (Munich, 1916); A. Philippsohn, <i>Das -türkische Reich</i> (Weimar, 1916); H. Kettner, <i>Vom Goldenen Tor -zum Goldenen Horn und nach Bagdad</i> (Berlin, 1917). For the -point of view of Allied sympathizers, <i>cf.</i>: E. F. Benson, <i>Deutschland -über Allah</i> (London, 1917), and <i>Crescent and Iron Cross</i> -(New York, 1918); E. A. Martel, <i>L’emprise austro-allemande sur -la Turquie et l’Asie Mineure</i> (Paris, 1918); H. C. Woods, <i>The -Cradle of the War</i> (New York, 1919), and an article, “The -Bagdad Railway in the War,” in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, Volume -102 (1917), pp. 235–247; J. Thureau, “La pénétration allemande<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">310</a></span> -en Asie Mineure,” in <i>Revue politique et parlementaire</i>, Volume -86 (1916), pp. 19–44; R. Lane, “Turkey under Germany’s Tutelage,” -in <i>Unpopular Review</i>, Volume 9 (1918), pp. 328 <i>et seq.</i>; -N. Markovitch, <i>Le pangermanisme en Orient</i> (Nice, 1916); A. J. -Toynbee, <i>Turkey, a Past and a Future</i> (New York, 1917).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_381" id="Footnote_18_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_381"><span class="label">18</span></a> Quoted in <i>The Near East</i>, November 12, 1915. For other -material regarding construction of the Bagdad Railway during -the war and its utilization for military purposes, <i>cf.</i>: <i>Report of -the Bagdad Railway Company</i>, 1914, pp. 6–7; 1915, pp. 3–6; <i>The -Engineer</i>, February 4, 1915; “Transportation in the War—The -Railways of Mesopotamia,” in <i>Modern Transport</i> (London), -November, 1919; D. G. Heslop, “The Bagdad Railway,” in <i>The -Engineer</i> (London), November 12 and 26 and December 3 and 17, -1920; “Railways of Mesopotamia,” in the <i>Railway Gazette</i> (London), -War Transportation Number, September 21, 1920, pp. 129–140; -“Die Bagdadbahn und der Durchschlag des letzten grossen -Tunnels,” in <i>Asien</i>, 14 year (1917), pp. 97–101.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_382" id="Footnote_19_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_382"><span class="label">19</span></a> Dane, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume I, Chapters VIII-XII, inclusive; “The -German-Turkish Expedition Against the Suez Canal in 1916,” in -<i>Journal of the United Service Institution</i>, Volume 65 (London, -1920), pp. 353–357.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_383" id="Footnote_20_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_383"><span class="label">20</span></a> Hayes, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 142–143.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_384" id="Footnote_21_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_384"><span class="label">21</span></a> Quoted from the official text as given in E. E. Robinson and -V. J. West, <i>The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1917</i> -(New York, 1917), pp. 403–405.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_385" id="Footnote_22_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_385"><span class="label">22</span></a> <i>The New York Times</i>, November 13, 1917.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_386" id="Footnote_23_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_386"><span class="label">23</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 285.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_387" id="Footnote_24_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_387"><span class="label">24</span></a> Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume I, Chapter IV, contains an excellent -account of the inter-Allied negotiations of 1916–1917 regarding -Asiatic Turkey, based upon the private papers of Woodrow Wilson. -<i>Cf.</i>, also, <i>Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed at -Petrograd</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_388" id="Footnote_25_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_388"><span class="label">25</span></a> The Treaty provided that the Bagdad Railway should not be -extended southward from Mosul or northward from Samarra -without the express consent of both France and Great Britain -and in no case before the construction of a railway from Bagdad -to Aleppo <i>via</i> the Euphrates Valley—the purpose being, as far as -possible, to develop southern Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast -rather than Kurdistan. By a subsequent agreement of December, -1918, between Messrs. Lloyd George and Clémenceau, Mosul was -transferred to Great Britain.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_389" id="Footnote_26_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_389"><span class="label">26</span></a> W. L. Westermann, “The Armenian Problem and the Disruption -of Turkey,” in <i>What Really Happened at Paris—The -Story of the Peace Conference, 1918–1919, by American Delegates</i>, -edited by E. M. House and C. Seymour (New York, 1921), pp. -176–203. <i>Cf.</i> p. 183.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_390" id="Footnote_27_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_390"><span class="label">27</span></a> The text of the Sykes-Picot Treaty was first published by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">311</a></span> -<i>The Manchester Guardian</i>, January 8, 1920, and was reprinted in -<i>Current History</i>, Volume XI (1920), pp. 339–341. <i>Cf.</i>, also, -Bowman, <i>The New World</i>, pp. 100–104; Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 67–69.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_391" id="Footnote_28_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_391"><span class="label">28</span></a> Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 68–70. The negotiations concerning the -St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement extended from the autumn of -1916 to August, 1917. The agreement appears to have been -negotiated with the Italians by Mr. Lloyd George, in April, 1917, -while Mr. Balfour was in America with the British Mission. It -was amended in August, as a result of the insistence of the -Italians that they had not received an adequate share of the -spoils.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_392" id="Footnote_29_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_392"><span class="label">29</span></a> President Wilson’s address to a joint session of the Congress -of the United States, January 8, 1918, setting forth the famous -Fourteen Points of a durable peace. Quoted from James Brown -Scott, <i>President Wilson’s Foreign Policy</i> (New York, 1918), -pp. 354–363.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_393" id="Footnote_30_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_393"><span class="label">30</span></a> Regarding General Maude’s brilliant campaign in Mesopotamia, -<i>cf.</i>: Dane, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume II, Chapters II, III, XII; E. F. -Eagan, <i>The War in the Cradle of the World</i> (London, 1918); -Kermit Roosevelt, <i>War in the Garden of Eden</i> (New York, 1919); -Sir Charles Collwell, <i>Life of Sir Stanley Maude</i> (London, 1920); -E. Betts, <i>The Bagging of Bagdad</i> (London, 1920); E. Candler, -<i>The Long Road to Bagdad</i> (London, 1920); C. Cato (pseudonym), -<i>The Navy in Mesopotamia</i> (London, 1917); F. Maurice, -“The Mesopotamian Campaign,” in <i>Asia</i>, Volume 18 (New York, -1918), pp. 933–936.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_394" id="Footnote_31_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_394"><span class="label">31</span></a> British intrenchment in Mesopotamia, 1917–1920, is described -in the following: “Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia,” -<i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 1061 (1920); R. -Thomas, <i>Report on Cotton Experimental Work in Mesopotamia</i> -(Bagdad, 1919); “Cotton Growing in Mesopotamia,” <i>Bulletin of -the Imperial Institute</i>, Volume 18 (London, 1920), pp. 73–82; -<i>Mesopotamia as a Country for Future Development</i> (Cairo, -Ministry of Public Works, 1919); “Transportation and Irrigation -in Mesopotamia,” <i>Commerce Reports</i>, No. 50 (Washington, -1919), pp. 948–954; Sir H. P. Hewett, <i>Some Impressions of Mesopotamia</i> -(London, 1919); C. R. Wimshurst, <i>The Wheats and -Barleys of Mesopotamia</i> (Basra, 1920); <i>Review of the Civil -Administration of the Occupied Territories of Irak</i> (Bagdad, -1918); L. J. Hall, <i>Inland Water Transport in Mesopotamia</i> (London, -1921); Sir Mark Sykes, <i>The Commercial Future of Bagdad</i> -(London, 1917); “Turkish Rule and British Administration in -Mesopotamia,” in The Quarterly <i>Review</i>, Volume 232 (1919), -pp. 401 <i>et seq.</i>; W. Ormsby Gore, “The Organization of British -Responsibilities in the Middle East,” in <i>Journal of the Central -Asian Society</i>, Volume 7 (1920), pp. 83–105; I. A. Shah, “The<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">312</a></span> -Colonization of Mesopotamia,” in <i>United Service Magazine</i>, -Volume 179 (1919), pp. 350 <i>et seq.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_395" id="Footnote_32_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_395"><span class="label">32</span></a> Townshend, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 375 <i>et seq.</i>; Djemal Pasha, <i>op. cit.</i>, -Chapter VII; <i>Current History</i>, Volume XII (1920), pp. 117–118; -A. D. C. Russell, <i>loc. cit.</i>, pp. 325 <i>et seq.</i>; F. C. Endres, <i>Der Weltkrieg -der Türkei</i> (Berlin, 1919).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_396" id="Footnote_33_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_396"><span class="label">33</span></a> Regarding General Allenby’s campaigns in Palestine and -Syria, see: H. Pirie-Gordon, <i>A Brief Record of the Advance of -the Egyptian Expeditionary Force</i> (London, 1919); W. T. Massey, -<i>Allenby’s Final Triumph</i> (London, 1920); C. C. R. Murphy, -<i>Soldiers of the Prophet</i> (London, 1921); H. O. Lock, <i>The Conquerors -of Palestine Through Forty Centuries</i> (New York, -1921); R. E. C. Adams, <i>The Modern Crusaders</i> (London, 1920); -H. Dinning, <i>Nile to Aleppo: With the Light Horse in the Near -East</i> (London, 1920); P. E. White, <i>The Disintegration of the -Turkish Empire</i> (London, 1920); C. T. Atkinson, “General Liman -von Sanders and His Experiences in Palestine,” <i>Army Quarterly</i>, -Volume 3 (London, 1922), pp. 257–275; A. Aaronsohn, <i>Mit der -türkischen Armee in Palästina</i> (Berne, 1918); J. Bourelly, <i>Campagne -d’Égypte et de Syrie contre les Turcs</i> (Paris, 1919); G. -Gautherot, <i>La France en Syrie et en Cilicie</i> (Paris, 1920); C. -Stiénon, <i>Les campagnes d’Orient et les intérêts de l’entente</i> (Paris, -1918), and <i>La défense de l’Orient et le rôle de l’Angleterre</i> (Paris, -1918); A. Mandelstamm, <i>Le sort de l’Empire Ottoman</i> (Paris, -1917); G. A. Schreiner, <i>From Berlin to Bagdad: Behind the -Scenes in the Near East</i> (New York, 1918).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_397" id="Footnote_34_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_397"><span class="label">34</span></a> H. Charles Woods, <i>The Cradle of the War</i>, p. 271.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_398" id="Footnote_35_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_398"><span class="label">35</span></a> See a suggestive article by Hilaire Belloc, “Europe’s New -Paths of Empire,” in <i>Our World</i> (New York), October, 1922, -pp. 41–46; <i>The Evening Post</i> (New York), January 3 and March -27, 1919.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_399" id="Footnote_36_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_399"><span class="label">36</span></a> <i>The Treaty of Peace with Germany</i>, Articles 155, 258, 260, -261, 297.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_400" id="Footnote_37_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_400"><span class="label">37</span></a> “Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sèvres August 10, -1920,” <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. 11, -1920; “Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France, -and Italy, Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sèvres, August 10, -1920,” <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, -1920. An official summary of the Sèvres treaty was published in -<i>The Nation</i> (New York), International Relations Section, Volume -111 (1920), pp. 21–28, and in <i>Current History</i>, Volume XIII -(1921), pp. 164–184. An excellent discussion of the main provisions -of the treaty and its probable effects is to be found in -Bowman’s <i>The New World</i>, Chapters XXIV and XXVI.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_401" id="Footnote_38_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_401"><span class="label">38</span></a> Regarding the negotiations at the Paris Conference by which -the claims of Italy were disregarded in favor of those of Greece, -<i>cf.</i> Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume II, Chapter XXXII, and Volum<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">313</a></span>e III, -Documents Nos. 1, 31–41.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_402" id="Footnote_39_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_402"><span class="label">39</span></a> Preamble to the Tripartite Agreement of August 10, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_403" id="Footnote_40_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_403"><span class="label">40</span></a> Regarding the Turkish Nationalist movement, see: Major -General James G. Harbord, “Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His -Party,” in the <i>World’s Work</i>, Volume 36 (London, 1920), pp. 470–482; -M. Paillarès <i>La kémalisme devant les Alliés</i> (Paris, 1922); -“The Recovery of the Sick Man of Europe,” an excellent review, -with a colored map, in the <i>Literary Digest</i>, November 11, 1922, -pp. 17 <i>et seq.</i>; M. K. Zia Bey, “How the Turks Feel,” in <i>Asia</i>, -Volume XXII (1922), pp. 857 <i>et seq.</i>, and “The New Turkish -Democracy,” in <i>The Nation</i>, Volume 115 (New York, 1922), pp. -546–548; Major General Sir Charles Townshend, “Great Britain -and the Turks,” in <i>Asia</i>, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 949–953; Clair -Price, “Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government,” in <i>Current -History</i>, Volume XVI (1922), pp. 790–800; Ludwell Denny, -“The Turk Comes Back,” in <i>The Nation</i>, Volume 115 (1922), pp. -575–577; “The New Epoch in Turkey,” in the <i>Muslim Standard</i> -(London), November 9, 1922.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_404" id="Footnote_41_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_404"><span class="label">41</span></a> A. J. Toynbee, <i>The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: -A Study in the Contact of Civilizations</i> (New York, 1922), p. 190. -Professor Toynbee’s book is the most noteworthy of recent contributions -to the history of Turkey since the Great War.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_405" id="Footnote_42_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_405"><span class="label">42</span></a> The text of the National Pact, as tra<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">314</a></span>nslated from the French, -is to be found in <i>The Nation</i>, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 447–448, in -<i>Current History</i>, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 280–281, and in Toynbee, -<i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 207–211 (in both French and English).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_406" id="Footnote_43_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_406"><span class="label">43</span></a> <i>Infra.</i>, pp. 316–317, 323–324.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>CHAPTER XII<br /> - -THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGDAD RAILWAY -IS RESUMED</h2> - -<h3><span class="smcap">Germany is Eliminated and Russia Withdraws</span></h3> - -<p>The Great War has completely destroyed German influence -in the Near East. In the way of any resumption -of German enterprise in Turkey are formidable obstacles -which are not likely to be removed for some time. To -begin with, the Turks themselves will not encourage -German attempts to recover the Bagdad Railway or other -property rights which were liquidated by the Treaty of -Versailles. Among Turkish Nationalists there is satisfaction -that Turkey has “shaken off the yoke of the ambitious -leaders who dragged the country into the general -war on the side of Germany” and has got rid of the “arrogance” -of the Germans who infested the Near East -during the last years of the war. Resentment at German -military domination of Turkey during 1917 and 1918 -will not soon disappear.<a name="FNanchor_1_407" id="FNanchor_1_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_407" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<p>Furthermore, Germany possesses neither the disposition -nor the power to regain her former preëminence in -the Near East. The confiscation by the Treaty of Versailles -of private property in foreign investments has -set a precedent which will make German investors—as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">315</a></span> -well as prudent investors everywhere—extremely chary -of utilizing their funds for the promotion of such enterprises -as the Bagdad Railway. The surplus production -and surplus capital of Germany may be absorbed by -reparations payments or attracted to such enterprises as -the reconstruction of the German merchant marine. But -the <i>Drang nach Osten</i> has become a thing of the past. -The dismemberment of the Austrian Empire and the -erection of the Jugoslav Kingdom have shut off German -access, through friendly states, to the Balkan Peninsula -and Asiatic Turkey. Formidable customs barriers will -stand in the way of overland trade with the Near East -and render railway traffic from “Berlin to Bagdad” unprofitable. -Defeat and disarmament have destroyed German -prestige in the Moslem world. Democratization of -both Germany and Turkey, it is hoped, will render increasingly -difficult the kind of secret intrigue that characterized -Turco-German relations during the régime of -William II and of Abdul Hamid. If Germany returns to -the Near East in the next generation or two, it is not -likely to be in the rôle of an Imperial Germany promoting -railway enterprises of great economic and strategic -importance.</p> - -<p>Russian diplomatic policy toward Turkey has likewise -undergone important changes. Imperial Russia had been -a bitter opponent of Imperial Germany in the Bagdad -Railway project. Imperial Russia had conspired with -Great Britain and France to bring about the collapse and -dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Imperial Russia -was the “traditional enemy” of the Turk. But Imperial -Russia was destroyed in 1917 by military defeat -and social revolution. Regardless of the pronunciamentos -of bourgeois imperialists like Professor Milyukov, revolutionary -Russia was certain to look upon the Near -Eastern question in a new light. Political and economic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">316</a></span> -disorganization incidental to the war and the revolution -would have made it imperative for any government in -Russia to curtail its imperialistic pretensions. And with -the advent of Bolshevism the outcome was certain. A -government which was anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist -could not sanction Russian “spheres of interest” or Russian -territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey. -A government which preached “self-determination of -peoples” and “no annexations” could not confirm the -secret treaties of 1915–1916. A government which was -engaged in repelling foreign invasion and in resisting -counter-revolutionary insurrections had to keep within -strict limits its military liabilities. Therefore, Soviet -Russia speedily foreswore any intention of occupying -Constantinople, declared unreservedly for a free Armenia, -and proceeded forthwith to withdraw its troops from -Persia. These measures were considered “a complete -break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilization -which built the prosperity of the exploiters among the -few chosen nations upon the enslavement of the laboring -population in Asia,” as well as an expression of Bolshevist -Russia’s “inflexible determination to wrest humanity -from the talons of financial capital and imperialism, -which have drenched the earth with blood in this most -criminal of wars.”<a name="FNanchor_2_408" id="FNanchor_2_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_408" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>Turkish Nationalist resistance to the Treaty of Sèvres -met with a sympathetic response on the part of Bolshevist -Russia, and on March 16, 1921, the Government of the -Grand National Assembly and the Government of the -Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic signed at -Moscow a treaty to confirm “the solidarity which unites -them in the struggle against imperialism.” By the terms -of this treaty Russia refused to recognize the validity of -the Treaty of Sèvres or of any other “international acts -which are imposed by force.” Russia ceded t<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">317</a></span>o Turkey -the territories of Kars and Ardahan, in the Caucasus -region, as a manifestation of full accord with the principles -of the National Pact. The Soviet Republic, -“recognizing that the régime of the capitulations is incompatible -with the national development of Turkey, as -well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, considers -null and void the exercise in Turkey of all functions -and all rights under the capitulatory régime.” In -particular, Russia freed Turkey “from any financial or -other obligations based on international treaties concluded -between Turkey and the Government of the Tsar.” -As regards the construction of railways in Anatolia, the -Soviet Government completely reversed the former policy -of Imperial Russia, which was to oppose all such railways -as a strategic menace.<a name="FNanchor_3_409" id="FNanchor_3_409"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_409" class="fnanchor">3</a> It was now provided that, -“with the object of facilitating intercourse between their -respective countries, both Governments agree to take in -concert with each other all measures to develop and maintain -within the shortest possible time, railway, telegraphic, -and other means of communication,” as well as measures -“to secure the free and unhampered traffic of passengers -and commodities between the two countries.” Finally, -both countries agreed to stand together in resisting all -foreign interference in their domestic affairs: “Recognizing -that the nationalist movements in the East,” reads -the treaty, “are similar to and in harmony with the -struggle of the Russian proletariat to establish a new -social order, the two contracting parties assert solemnly -the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and -free choice of the forms of government under which -they shall live.”<a name="FNanchor_4_410" id="FNanchor_4_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_410" class="fnanchor">4</a></p> - -<p>No more complete disavowal of Russian imperialism -could be desired by the New Turkey. It is by no means -certain, however, that Russia will continue indefinitely -to pursue so magnanimous a policy in the Near Eas<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">318</a></span>t. -With the development of her natural resources and the -extension of industrialism, it is not improbable that Russia—in -common with the other Great Powers—will once -again feel the urge to imperialism. Raw materials, markets, -the maintenance of unimpeded routes of commercial -communication, and opportunities for profitable investment -of capital are likely to be considered—in the present -anarchic state of international relations—as essential to -an industrial state under working-class government as -to an industrial state under bourgeois administration. If -such be the case, Russian economic penetration in Turkey -and Persia may be resumed, and Russian eyes may once -more be cast covetously at Constantinople. “In Mongolia -and Tibet, in Persia and Afghanistan, in Caucasia and at -Constantinople, the Russian has been pressing forward -for three hundred years,” writes an eminent American -geographer, “and no system of government can stand that -denies him proper commercial outlets.”<a name="FNanchor_5_411" id="FNanchor_5_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_411" class="fnanchor">5</a></p> - -<p>Nevertheless, whatever be the future policy of Russia -in the Near East, for the present the Russian Republic -has no economic or strategic interests which are -inconsistent with the national development of the Turkish -people. Certainly Russia has neither the economic -nor the political resources to demand a share in the Bagdad -Railway or to seek for herself other railway concessions -in Anatolia. And the Western Powers are little -likely to heed the wishes of the Soviet Government until -such time as those wishes are rendered articulate in a -language the Western Powers understand—the language -of power.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">France Steals a March and Is Accompanied by Italy</span></h3> - -<p>Those who believed that the defeat of Germany and -the withdrawal of Russia would solve all problems o<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">319</a></span>f -competitive imperialism in the Near East were destined -to be disillusioned. For no sooner was the war over than -France and Great Britain took to pursuing divergent -policies regarding Turkey. The rivalry between these -two powers—which had been terminated for a time by -the Entente of 1904—was resumed in all its former intensity. -The Entente, in fact, had been formed because -of common fear of Germany, rather than because of coincidence -of colonial interests; and with that fear removed, -the foundation of effective coöperation had been -undermined.<a name="FNanchor_6_412" id="FNanchor_6_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_412" class="fnanchor">6</a> The Great War may be said to have -terminated the first episode of the great Bagdad Railway -drama—the rise and fall of German power in the -Near East; it opened a second episode, which promises -to be equally portentous—an Anglo-French struggle for -the right of accession to the exalted position which Germany -formerly occupied in the realm of the Turks.</p> - -<p>Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East will not be -an unprecedented phenomenon. “Since the Congress -of Vienna in 1814, France and Great Britain have never -fought in the Levant with naval and military weapons -(though they have several times been on the verge of -open war), but their struggle has been real and bitter -for all that, and though it has not here gone the length -of empire-building, it has not been confined to trade. Its -characteristic fields have been diplomacy and culture, -its entrenchments embassies, consulates, religious missions, -and schools. It has flared up on the Upper Nile, -in Egypt, on the Isthmus of Suez, in Palestine, in the -Lebanon, at Mosul, at the Dardanelles, at Salonica, in -Constantinople. The crises of 1839–41 and 1882 over -Egypt and of 1898 over the Egyptian Sudan are landmarks -on a road that has never been smooth, for conflicts -[of one sort or another] have perpetually kept -alive the combative instinct in French and English missi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">320</a></span>onaries, -schoolmasters, consuls, diplomatists, civil servants, -ministers of state, and journalists. One cannot -understand—or make allowances for—the post-war relations -of the French and British Governments over the -‘Eastern Question’ unless one realizes this tradition of -rivalry and its accumulated inheritance of suspicion and -resentment. It is a bad mental background for the individuals -who have to represent the two countries. The -French are perhaps more affected by it than the English, -because on the whole they have had the worst of the -struggle in the Levant as well as in India, and failure -cuts deeper memories than success.”<a name="FNanchor_7_413" id="FNanchor_7_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_413" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>French statesmen were dissatisfied with the division of -the spoils of war in the Near East. They had a feeling -that here, as elsewhere, Britain had obtained the lion’s -share. They believed that Mr. Lloyd George had been -guilty of sharp practice in his agreement of December, -1918, with M. Clémenceau, by the terms of which Mosul -and Palestine were to be turned over to Great Britain.<a name="FNanchor_8_414" id="FNanchor_8_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_414" class="fnanchor">8</a> -Frenchmen were suspicious of British solicitude for the -Arabs, which they believed was not based upon disinterested -benevolence; in fact, self-determination for the -Arabs came to be considered a political move to render -precarious the French mandate for Syria. French -patriots chafed at British emphasis upon the fact that -“the British had done the fighting in Turkey almost without -French help” and that “there would have been no -question of Syria but for England and the million soldiers -the British Empire had put in the field against the -Turks.” French pride was hurt by the rapid rise of -British prestige in a region where France had so many -interests. And prestige—diplomatic, military, religious, -cultural, and economic—has always been an important -desideratum in Near Eastern diplomacy.<a name="FNanchor_9_415" id="FNanchor_9_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_415" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>French dissatisfaction with the Turkish settlement was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">321</a></span> -one of the issues of the San Remo Conference of April, -1920, at which were assigned the mandates for the territories -of the former Ottoman Empire. Exclusive control -by Great Britain of the oilfields of the Mosul district -was so vigorously contested that M. Philippe Berthelot, -of the French Foreign Office, and Professor Sir John -Cadman, Director of His Majesty’s Petroleum Department, -were instructed to work out a compromise. Thus -came into existence the San Remo Oil Agreement of -April 24, 1920, by which Great Britain, in effect, assigned -to France the former German interest in the Turkish -Petroleum Company’s concession for exploitation of the -oilfields in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad.<a name="FNanchor_10_416" id="FNanchor_10_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_416" class="fnanchor">10</a> But the -British drove a shrewd bargain, for it was provided, in -consideration, that the French Government should agree, -“as soon as application is made, to the construction of -two separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their -construction and maintenance and for the transport of -oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres -of influence to a port or ports on the Mediterranean.” -The oil thus transported was to be free of all French -taxes.<a name="FNanchor_11_417" id="FNanchor_11_417"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_417" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>French imperialists likewise were dissatisfied with the -disposition of the Bagdad Railway as provided for by -the unratified Sèvres Treaty. French bankers had held -a thirty per cent interest in the Bagdad line while it -was under German control,<a name="FNanchor_12_418" id="FNanchor_12_418"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_418" class="fnanchor">12</a> and they believed, for this -reason, that they were entitled to a controlling voice in -the enterprise when it should be reorganized by the -Allies. Although the settlement at Sèvres—the Treaty -of Peace with Turkey and the Tripartite Agreement between -Great Britain, France, and Italy—recognized the -special interests of France in the Bagdad Railway, and -particularly in the Mersina-Adana branch, it provided, -as has been seen, for international ownership, contro<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">322</a></span>l, -and operation.<a name="FNanchor_13_419" id="FNanchor_13_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_419" class="fnanchor">13</a> Now, Frenchmen were suspicious of -internationalization, particularly where British participation -was involved. Had not the condominium in Egypt -proved to be a step in the direction of an eventual British -protectorate? Might not the history of the Suez Canal -be repeated in the history of the Bagdad Railway? -Would Great Britain look with any greater equanimity -upon French, than upon German, interests in one of the -great highways to India? To answer these questions was -but to increase the French feeling of insecurity.</p> - -<p>French dissatisfaction with the distribution of the -spoils in the Near East and French fear of British imperial -power and prestige—these were factors in a new -alignment of the diplomatic forces in Turkey during -1920–1922. British imperialists were desirous of keeping -Turkey weak. A weak Turkey could never again menace -Britain’s communications in the Persian Gulf and at Suez; -a weak Turkey could be of no moral or material assistance -to restless Moslems in Egypt and India. To keep -Turkey weak the Treaty of Sèvres had loaded down -the Ottoman Treasury with an enormous burden of reparations -and occupation costs (to which France could -not object without repudiating the principle of reparations); -had taken away Turkish administration of -Smyrna and Constantinople, the two ports essential to -the commercial life of Anatolia; and had made possible -a Greek war of devastation and extermination in the -homeland of the Turks. France, on the other hand, -would have preferred to see Turkey reasonably strong. -A strong, prosperous Turkey would the more readily -pay off its pre-War debt, of which French investors held -approximately sixty per cent; payment of this debt was -more important to France than payment of Turkish reparations. -A strong Turkey, furthermore, might fortify -the French p<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">323</a></span>osition in the Near East. As Germany had -utilized Ottoman strength against Russia and Great Britain, -so France might utilize Nationalist Turkey against -a Bolshevist Russia which would not pay its debts or -an imperial Britain which might prove unfaithful to the -Entente.<a name="FNanchor_14_420" id="FNanchor_14_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_420" class="fnanchor">14</a></p> - -<p>Anglo-French differences in the Near East were -brought to a head by the rapid rise of the military power -of the Angora Government, for it was against France -that Mustapha Kemal’s troops launched their principal -early attacks. General Gouraud—his hands tied by an -Arab rebellion which had necessitated a considerable extension -of his lines in Syria—was unable to repulse the -Turkish invasion of Cilicia, which reached really serious -proportions in the autumn of 1920. Time and again -French units were defeated and French garrisons massacred -by the victorious Nationalists. In these circumstances, -France “had to choose between the two following -alternatives: either to maintain her effectives and to -continue the war in Cilicia, or to negotiate with the <i>de -facto</i> authority which was in command of the Turkish -troops in that region.” The French armies in Syria and -Cilicia already numbered more than 100,000 men; to reënforce -them would have been to flout the opinion of -the nation and the Chamber, “which had vigorously expressed -their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed -and to expenditure which it was particularly difficult -to bear.” To negotiate with Mustapha Kemal was, -to all intents and purposes, to scrap the unratified Treaty -of Sèvres. The French Government chose the latter alternative. -It is said that during the London Conference -of February-March, 1921, “M. Briand declared to Mr. -Lloyd George on several occasions, without the British -Prime Minister making the slightest observation, that -he would not leave England without having concluded -an agreement with the Angora delegation. M. Briand -pointed out that neither the Chamber nor French pu<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">324</a></span>blic -opinion would agree to the prolongation of hostilities, -involving as they did losses which were both heavy and -useless.”<a name="FNanchor_15_421" id="FNanchor_15_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_421" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<p>Accordingly, on March 9, 1921, there was signed at -London a Franco-Turkish agreement terminating hostilities -in Cilicia. The Turkish Nationalists recognized -the special religious and cultural interests of France in -Turkey and granted priority to French capitalists in the -awarding of concessions in Cilicia and southern Armenia. -French interests in the Bagdad Railway were confirmed. -In return, France was to evacuate Cilicia, to readjust the -boundary between Turkey and Syria, and to adopt a more -friendly attitude toward the Government of the Grand -National Assembly.<a name="FNanchor_16_422" id="FNanchor_16_422"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_422" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<p>The Italian Government was only too glad to have so -excellent an excuse for throwing over the Treaty of -Sèvres, which had thoroughly frustrated Italian hopes -in Asia Minor to the advantage of Greece. Italian -troops, furthermore, had been driven out of Konia and -were finding their hold in Adalia increasingly precarious; -the Italian Government had neither the disposition nor -the resources to wage war. Therefore, on March 13, -1921, the Italian and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs -signed at London a separate treaty, providing for “economic -collaboration” between Turkey and Italy in the hinterland -of Adalia, including part of the sanjaks of Konia, -Aidin, and Afiun Karahissar, as well as for the award to -an Italian group of the concession for the Heraclea coal -mines.<a name="FNanchor_17_423" id="FNanchor_17_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_423" class="fnanchor">17</a> The Royal Italian Government pledged itself -to “support effectively all the demands of the Turkish -delegation relative to the peace treaty,” more especially -the demands of Turkey for complete sovereignty and for -the restitution of Thrace and Smyrna. Italian troops -were to be withdrawn from Ottoman soil.<a name="FNanchor_18_424" id="FNanchor_18_424"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_424" class="fnanchor">18</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">325</a></span></p> -<p>During the summer of 1921 further negotiations were -conducted between France and Turkey for the purpose -of elaborating and confirming their March agreement. -The outcome was the so-called Angora Treaty, signed -October 20, 1921, by M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon, a -special agent of the French Government, and Yussuf -Kemal Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government -of the Grand National Assembly. This treaty -formally brought to an end the state of war between the -two countries, provided for the repatriation of all prisoners, -defined new boundaries between Turkey and Syria, -and awarded valuable economic privileges to French -capitalists. It obligated the French Government “to make -every effort to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all -questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of -Turkey.”<a name="FNanchor_19_425" id="FNanchor_19_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_425" class="fnanchor">19</a></p> - -<p>The Bagdad Railway was given a great deal of consideration -in the Angora Treaty. The Turks wanted -possession of the line because of its great political and -strategic value; French capitalists sought full recognition -of their previous investments in the railway, together -with a controlling interest in its operation. A solution was -reached which fully satisfied both Turkish Nationalists -and French imperialists. The Turco-Syrian boundary -was so “rectified” that the Bagdad Railway from Haidar -Pasha to Nisibin was to lie within Turkish territory, -whereas formerly the sections from the Cilician Gates -to Nisibin lay within the French mandate for Cilicia and -Syria.<a name="FNanchor_20_426" id="FNanchor_20_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_426" class="fnanchor">20</a> In return for these territorial readjustments the -Turkish Government assigned to a French group (to be -nominated by the French Government) the <i>Deutsche -Bank’s</i> concession for those sections of the railway, including -branches, between Bozanti and Nisibin, “together -with all the rights, privileges, and advantages attached to -that concession.” The Government of the Grand National<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">326</a></span> -Assembly, furthermore, declared itself “ready to -examine in the most favorable spirit all other desires -that may be expressed by French groups relative to mine, -railway, harbor and river concessions, on condition that -such desires shall conform to the reciprocal interest of -Turkey and France.” In particular, the Turkish Government -agreed to take under advisement the award to -French capitalists of concessions for the exploitation of -the Arghana copper mines and for the development of -cotton-growing in Cilicia.<a name="FNanchor_21_427" id="FNanchor_21_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_427" class="fnanchor">21</a></p> - -<p>Thus France sought to make herself heir to the former -German estate in Asiatic Turkey. Her capitalists became -the recipients of the kilometric guarantee for which German -concessionaires had been so freely criticized. And -in some respects the conditions of French tenancy were -questionable. The old Bagdad Railway concession had -prohibited the Germans, under any and all circumstances -to grant discriminatory rates or service to any passenger -or shipper.<a name="FNanchor_22_428" id="FNanchor_22_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_428" class="fnanchor">22</a> The conditions of French control of the -line, however, recognized only a limited application of -the principle of the “open door”: “Over this section and -its branches,” reads Article 10 of the Angora Treaty, -“no preferential tariff shall be established <i>in principle</i>. -Each Government, however, <i>reserves the right to study -in concert with the other any exception to this rule which -may become necessary. In case agreement proves impossible, -each party will be free to act as he thinks -best.</i>”<a name="FNanchor_23_429" id="FNanchor_23_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_429" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>During the spring of 1922 the concession for the operation -of the French sections of the Bagdad Railway, as -defined by the Angora Treaty, was assigned to the -Cilician-Syrian Railway Company (<i>La société d’exploitation -des chemins de fers de Cilicie-Nord Syrie</i>.) The -Mesopotamian sections of the line, from Basra to Bagdad -and Samarra, were under the j<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">327</a></span>urisdiction of the British -Civil Administration for Irak. From Haidar Pasha to -the Cilician Gates the Railway was being operated by -the Turkish Nationalist Government, although its utilization -for commercial purposes was seriously curtailed -by the Greco-Turkish War.<a name="FNanchor_24_430" id="FNanchor_24_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_430" class="fnanchor">24</a></p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">British Interests Acquire a Claim to the Bagdad -Railway</span></h3> - -<p>The Angora Treaty met with a distinctly heated reception -from the British Government. During November -and December, 1921, Lord Curzon carried on a lengthy -correspondence with the French Embassy at London, in -which he made it perfectly plain that the British Government -considered the Franklin-Bouillon treaty a breach -of good faith on the part of France, in the light of which -Great Britain must possess greater freedom of action -than would otherwise be the case.<a name="FNanchor_25_431" id="FNanchor_25_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_431" class="fnanchor">25</a></p> - -<p>Lord Curzon called into question the moral right of -the French Government to enter into separate understandings -with Turkey or to recognize the Angora Assembly -as the <i>de jure</i> government of the country. He insisted -that a revision of the frontier of northern Syria “could -not be regarded as the concern of France alone”:</p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory -which had been conquered from her by British forces and which -constituted a common gage of allied victory, although by an -arrangement between the Allies the mandate has been awarded to -France. The mandate is now under consideration by the League -of Nations, and this important and far-reaching modification of -the territory to which it applies altogether ignores the League of -Nations, while the return to Turkey of territory handed over -to the Allies in common without previous notification to Great -Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter -of the treaties which all three have signed.</p> - -<p>“Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the -localities of Nisibin and Jezirit-ibn-Omar, both of which are of -great strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; -the same consideration applies to the handing back to Turkey of -th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">328</a></span>e track of the Bagdad Railway between Tchoban Bey and -Nisibin.... His Majesty’s Government cannot remain indifferent -to the manifest strategic importance to their position in Irak of -the return to Turkey of the Bagdad Railway or of the transfer -to that power of the localities of Jezirit-ibn-Omar and Nisibin.”</p></div> - -<p>In addition to disputing the territorial readjustments -contemplated by the Angora Treaty, the British Government -challenged the transfer to French capitalists of the -former German concession for the Bozanti-Nisibin sections -of the Bagdad Railway. Lord Curzon pointed out -that Great Britain would not recognize the Franco-Turkish -treaty as overriding the Treaty of Sèvres, -“whereby Turkey was herself to liquidate the whole -Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal Allies”; -neither would the British Government assent to the award -to France of “a large portion of the railway without regard -to the claims of her other allies upon a concern -which both under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty -of Sèvres is the Allies’ common asset.”<a name="FNanchor_26_432" id="FNanchor_26_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_432" class="fnanchor">26</a></p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained -by France by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line -to a French company in advance—and therefore possibly to the -prejudice—of the reciprocal allied arrangements contemplated by -Article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres and Article 4 of the Tripartite -Agreement, it is necessary to point out that these stretches -of the railway which were previously in Syria, but are now -surrendered to Turkey, although placed in the French zone of -economic interest, ought naturally to be divided among the Allies -in accordance with the above mentioned treaties.... The transfer -to a French company of that part of the railway which still -remains in Syria does not in itself fulfil the provisions of the -Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulates for liquidation by the mandatory -and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial Commission -as an allied asset.”</p></div> - -<p>The correspondence was concluded by Lord Curzon -with emphatic statements that “when peace is finally concluded -the different agreements which have been negotiated<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">329</a></span> -up to date, including the Angora Agreement, will -require to be adjusted with a view to taking their place -in a general settlement”; that he was obliged “explicitly -to reserve the attitude of His Majesty’s Government with -regard to the Angora Agreement”; and that there must -especially be reserved for further discussion “all articles -of the Agreement which appear to infringe the provisions -of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement.</p> - -<p>Subsequent events did nothing to restore Anglo-French -unity in the Near East. At the Washington Conference -in December, 1921, Lord Lee and M. Briand engaged in -a verbal war over submarines which created no little -hard feeling and suspicion in both Great Britain and -France. Differences of opinion regarding Russia and -other questions discussed at the Genoa Conference, together -with a clash over reparations in midsummer, 1922, -strained relations still further. Charges by Greeks and -Englishmen that France and Italy were supplying munitions -to the Turkish Nationalists were received with -counter-charges that British officers were aboard Greek -warships and that British “observers” were directing -Greek military operations in Asia Minor.<a name="FNanchor_27_433" id="FNanchor_27_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_433" class="fnanchor">27</a> Feeling ran -high in September, 1922, when—seeking to avoid a Near -Eastern war—the French and Italian Governments withdrew -their troops from the Neutral Zone of the Straits, -leaving the British forces to face, alone, the victorious -Nationalist army of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. British -patriots were further irritated by the mysterious activities -of M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon in the negotiations -preceding the Mudania armistice and by the claims of -the Paris press to a great victory thereby for French -prestige at Angora and Constantinople. Fundamental -differences of opinion regarding reparations—culminating -in the French invasion of the Ruhr in January, 1923—made -still more difficult coöperation by the former Allies -in the Near East. In fact, it might be questioned wheth<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">330</a></span>er -the Entente Cordiale any longer existed.</p> - -<p>This situation was brought into sharp relief at the -first Lausanne Conference for Peace in the East.<a name="FNanchor_28_434" id="FNanchor_28_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_434" class="fnanchor">28</a> -Great Britain’s interests were chiefly territorial. She -had abandoned all hope of destroying Turkish power by -creating a Greek empire in Asia Minor; Greece was gone -from Smyrna for good. But England was determined to -maintain her hold in Mesopotamia—particularly in the -oilfields of Mosul—and to hold out for neutralization of -the Straits. These territorial questions occupied the -major part of the first six weeks of the Conference. -France had no interest in the decisions regarding the -Straits and Mosul; therefore she supported the Turks -and placed Lord Curzon in the position of appearing to -be the real opponent of Turkish Nationalist ambitions -and the principal obstacle in the way of an equitable -settlement. Lord Curzon himself strengthened this impression, -for many of his utterances were provocative -and bombastic in the extreme—apparently he would not -give up the idea that the Turks could be bluffed and -bullied into submission.</p> - -<p>While the conference as a whole was debating territorial -questions and problems concerning the rights of -minorities, a member of the French delegation was presiding -over the sessions of the all-important Committee -on Financial and Economic Issues. It was in this committee -that questions of the Ottoman Public Debt and -of concessions were to be threshed out; therefore it was -in this committee that French imperialists hoped to -achieve real successes. And while France was framing -the economic sections of the treaty, her co-worker Italy -was supervising the work of the Committee on the Status -of Foreigners in Turkey, to determine the conditions -upon which French and Italian schools and missions -should continue their activities in Asia Minor. In <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">331</a></span>this -manner France hoped to protect adequately her economic -and cultural interests in the Near East.</p> - -<p>As the work of these committees progressed, the Turks -became more and more suspicious of French aims. The -Nationalist delegates—including Djavid Bey—were -mindful of the price which their country had had to pay -because of its economic exploitation by Germany, and -they were determined not to permit another European -Power to succeed to the position which Germany had -left vacant. Friction developed, therefore, as soon as -concessions came up for consideration. The French -delegation asked for the incorporation in the treaty of -provisions confirming all concessions to Allied nationals -whether granted by the old Ottoman Government before -the War, or by the Constantinople Government after the -armistice, or by mandatory powers in territory subsequently -evacuated (as in Cilicia, Smyrna, and Adalia). -The Turks objected that they were not aware of the -nature, the number and extent, or the beneficiaries of the -concessions coming within the last two categories; confirmation -of such would have to be the subject of independent -investigation and negotiation, for the Turks -would not sign any blank checks at Lausanne. They -doubted whether they could accept the financial burden -which would be involved in validating concessions granted -by the Sultan’s Government before the War, especially -if the National Assembly was to be obliged to honor Ottoman -pre-War debts in full. In any case, the Turkish -delegates insisted, no concessions would be confirmed if -they in any way limited the sovereignty of Turkey or -infringed upon its financial and administrative integrity. -Between the French and Turkish views was a chasm -which it would be difficult, indeed, to bridge. The French -stood upon the rock of the old imperialism; the Turks -were fortified in their new nationalism. The French we<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">332</a></span>re -seeking to intrench certain important vested interests; the -Turks were striving to preserve a precious independence, -recently won at great price.</p> - -<p>In these circumstances, it was to be expected that the -British and the Turks should seek to effect an understanding. -The claims of Great Britain, it appeared, were -more easily reconcilable with the Turkish program than -were the claims of France. Concessions obtained by -British nationals between 1910 and 1914 were largely in -areas detached from Turkey during the War—chiefly in -Mesopotamia—whereas many of the most important -French concessions were in Anatolia, the stronghold of -the Turkish Nationalists.<a name="FNanchor_29_435" id="FNanchor_29_435"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_435" class="fnanchor">29</a> To Great Britain, therefore, -it was a matter of comparative indifference whether all -concessions within Turkey were specifically confirmed; -to France it was a matter of the utmost importance. According -to the proposed Lausanne treaty the Turkish -Government was to expropriate the former German railways -in Turkey, with a view to incorporating them into a -state-owned system, and was to pay therefor to the -Financial Commission, on reparations account, a sum to -be fixed by an arbitrator appointed by the League of -Nations.<a name="FNanchor_30_436" id="FNanchor_30_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_436" class="fnanchor">30</a> It suited British interests thus to prevent a -rival Power from obtaining control of the former Bagdad -line; it suited French interests not at all to be deprived -of a considerable share in a highly important -enterprise. In the settlement of questions regarding the -Ottoman Public Debt, likewise, the French were more -obdurate than the British.</p> - -<p>In the closing days of the conference, the question of -Mosul and its oilfields—the last question which stood in -the way of an Anglo-Turkish agreement—was temporarily -settled by a decision to make it the subject of -“direct and friendly negotiations between the two intereste<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">333</a></span>d -Powers.” But no agreement was possible between -Turkey and France on concessions and capitulations. -When the first Lausanne Conference broke up, therefore, -it was because of the determination of the Turks not to -accept economic, financial, and judicial clauses which they -believed menaced their independence. “The treaty,” said -Ismet Pasha, head of the Turkish delegation, “would -strangle Turkey economically. I refuse to accept economic -slavery for my country, and the demands of the -Allies remove all possibility of economic rehabilitation -and kill all our hopes.” On the other hand, the refusal -of the Turks to sign was characterized by the chief of -the French delegates as “a crime.”<a name="FNanchor_31_437" id="FNanchor_31_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_437" class="fnanchor">31</a></p> - -<p>During the interim between the first and second Lausanne -conferences French prestige in the Near East was -dealt some severe blows. The Turkish press attacked -the French Government for having insisted upon concessions -and capitulations which were designed to keep -Turkey under foreign domination in the interest of bondholders -and promoters. Such conduct, it was pointed -out, was altogether inconsistent with the terms of the -Angora Treaty by which France agreed “to make every -effort to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions -relating to the independence and sovereignty of -Turkey.”<a name="FNanchor_32_438" id="FNanchor_32_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_438" class="fnanchor">32</a> In the National Assembly hostility to -French claims was so pronounced that no further action -was taken toward the ratification of the Angora Treaty—and -without such ratification the French title to certain -sections of the Bagdad Railway would be invalid. The -Turkish army on the Syrian frontier was reënforced -for the purpose of bringing home to France the determination -of the Angora Government to tolerate no foreign -interference in its domestic affairs. The situation in -Syria became so serious that M. Poincaré saw fit to -despatch to Beirut one of Marshal Foch’s right-hand men, -General Weygand, as commander-in-chief in Syria.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">334</a></span></p> - -<p>The breach between France and Turkey was widened -when, on April 10, 1923, the Angora Government -awarded to an American syndicate headed by Admiral -Colby M. Chester, a retired officer of the United States -Navy, concessions for almost three thousand miles of -railway, together with valuable rights to the exploitation -of the mineral resources of Anatolia.<a name="FNanchor_33_439" id="FNanchor_33_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_439" class="fnanchor">33</a> The Chester -concessions conflicted with certain French claims which -had been under discussion at the first Lausanne Conference: -the concession for a Black Sea railway system, -which had been conferred upon French capitalists in -1913; and rights to the Arghana copper mines, to which a -French group had been given a kind of priority under the -Angora Treaty of 1921.<a name="FNanchor_34_440" id="FNanchor_34_440"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_440" class="fnanchor">34</a> In part, at least, the award -of the Chester concessions at this particular time was a -shrewd political move on the part of the Nationalist Government. -It was designed to serve notice on France that -no treaty would be acceptable to Turkey which would -require complete confirmation of pre-War concessions; -from this decision there could be no departure without -infringing upon American rights and without recognizing -the acts of a former Sultan as superior to acts of the -new government of Turkey. It was intended, also, to -win for the Turks a measure of American diplomatic -support. That the French Government understood the -implications of the Chester concessions is evidenced by -the fact that the Foreign Office despatched to Angora a -note which characterized the award as “a deliberately -unfriendly act, of a nature to influence adversely the coming -negotiations at Lausanne.”<a name="FNanchor_35_441" id="FNanchor_35_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_441" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>When the second Lausanne Conference convened on -April 22, 1923, therefore, it was France, not Great Britain, -which was on the defensive. And the French position -became steadily worse, rather than better. On May<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">335</a></span> -15, it was announced that a syndicate of British banks -had purchased a controlling interest in the <i>Bank für -orientalischen Eisenbahnen</i>, of Zurich, the <i>Deutsche -Bank’s</i> holding company for the Anatolian and Bagdad -Railway Companies. Ismet Pasha, it was said, was kept -fully informed of the British plans and expressed his -pleasure at the consummation of the transaction. Thus, -after twenty years of diplomatic bargaining, British imperialists -had won possession of the “short cut to -India”!<a name="FNanchor_36_442" id="FNanchor_36_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_442" class="fnanchor">36</a> Should Great Britain succeed in establishing -her point that the <i>Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen</i> -is a neutral Swiss, rather than enemy German, corporation -and therefore exempt from seizure under the reparations -provisions of the Treaty of Versailles; and should -the Chester concessions be recognized as superseding the -rights of the Black Sea Railways, French interests in -the Levant will face a powerful Anglo-American competition -which it will be very difficult for them to combat -with any degree of success.<a name="FNanchor_37_443" id="FNanchor_37_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_443" class="fnanchor">37</a> And the power of the -French Government is so heavily invested in the Ruhr -occupation that it is doubtful if it can do anything at -all to coerce the Turks into full recognition of French -claims.</p> - -<p>Kaleidoscopic indeed have been the changes in the -Near East since the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. -The economic and political power of Germany in Anatolia, -Syria, and Mesopotamia has been completely destroyed. -The Ottoman Empire has disappeared, and in its place -has risen a republican Nationalist Turkey. Tsarist Russia, -with its consuming desire for aggrandizement in the -Caucasus, in Asia Minor, and at the Straits, has given -way to a proletarian Russia which foreswears imperialist -ambition. Italy, which sought to transform the Adriatic -and the Ægean into Italian lakes, has finally been compelled -to recognize that she assumed imperial liabilities<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">336</a></span> -out of all proportion to her economic resources. France, -after achieving a temporary victory in the New Turkey, -has had to surrender her position to more powerful competitors. -But Great Britain has emerged from the conflict -in all her glory. She has obtained possession of another -highway to the East. Alongside the Suez Canal, in the -collection of British imperial jewels, will be placed the -Bagdad Railway; alongside of Malta and Gibraltar and -Cyprus must be placed Jerusalem and Basra and Bagdad.</p> - -<p>No less remarkable than all these changes, however, is -the entry of American interests into the tangled problem -of the Near East.</p> - -<h3><span class="smcap">America Embarks upon an Uncharted Sea</span></h3> - -<p>The Great War was accompanied by a definite growth -of American prestige in the Near East. After the entry -of Turkey into the war against the Allied Powers, American -schools and missions were left practically a free -hand in the Ottoman Empire; and inasmuch as the -United States did not declare war against Turkey, American -institutions were not disturbed even after 1917. -Carrying on their work under the most trying circumstances, -these educational and philanthropic enterprises -established a still greater reputation than they formerly -possessed for efficient and disinterested service. In consequence, -an American official mission to the Near East -in 1919 was able to report that the moral influence of the -United States in that region of the world was greater -than that of any other Power. President Wilson was -looked upon as the champion of small nations and oppressed -peoples. Americans were considered to be charitable -and generous to a fault. The United States was -hailed as the only nation which had entered the war for -unselfish purposes.<a name="FNanchor_38_444" id="FNanchor_38_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_444" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">337</a></span></p> -<p>Since the armistice of 1918 events have not materially -decreased the prestige which the War built up. -“From Adrianople to Amritsar, and from Tiflis to Aden, -America is considered a friend. It has become a tradition -in the Near East to interpret every action of the -European Powers as an attempt at political domination. -America is the only power considered strong enough to -provide the Orient with the capital and expert knowledge -for its industrial development, without aiming at -more than a legitimate profit. The Oriental feels that -he needs coöperation with the West; but he is anxious -to restrict that coöperation to the economic field. And -he considers the United States the only power which -would replace Europe’s political ambitions by a sound, -matter-of-fact, and sincere economic policy.”<a name="FNanchor_39_445" id="FNanchor_39_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_445" class="fnanchor">39</a></p> - -<p>During the Great War the economic situation of the -United States underwent certain fundamental changes -which seem to forecast increasing American interest in -imperialism. Before the War, America was practically -self-sufficient in raw materials; its export trade was composed -very largely of foodstuffs and raw materials which -found a ready market in the great industrial nations of -Europe; financially, it was a debtor, not a creditor, nation. -The enormous industrial expansion of the United States -during the Great War, however, has changed these conditions. -Raw materials have become an increasingly -greater proportion of the nation’s import trade, and -American business men are becoming concerned about -foreign control of certain essential commodities such as -rubber, nitrates, chrome, and petroleum. American export -trade has experienced an unparalleled period of expansion, -and American manufactured articles are competing -in world markets which formerly were the exclusive -preserves of European nations. Furthermore, the -export of American capital has almost kept pace with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">338</a></span> -export of American goods, so that by 1920 the United -States had taken its place alongside Great Britain and -France as one of the great creditor nations of the world. -As time goes on American business will be reaching out -over the world for a fair share of the earth’s resources -in raw materials, for new markets capable of development, -and for opportunities for the profitable investment -of capital.<a name="FNanchor_40_446" id="FNanchor_40_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_446" class="fnanchor">40</a></p> - -<p>These new tendencies were quickly reflected in American -relations with the Near East. As early as the spring -of 1920 the Government of the United States was engaged -in a lengthy correspondence with His Britannic -Majesty’s Government regarding the right of American -capital to participate in the exploitation of the oil resources -of Mesopotamia.<a name="FNanchor_41_447" id="FNanchor_41_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_447" class="fnanchor">41</a> About the same time the -Guaranty Trust Company of New York—the second -largest bank in the United States—established a branch -in Constantinople and proceeded to inform American -business men regarding the opportunities for commercial -expansion in the Near East. In a booklet entitled <i>Trading -with the Near East—Present Conditions and Future -Prospects</i>, the bank had this to say:</p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“The establishing of a Constantinople branch of the Guaranty -Trust Company of New York brings forcibly to mind the growing -importance of the Near East to American foreign trade. -Up to the present time American business in Constantinople has -been seriously handicapped by the absence of American banking -facilities. Our traders were forced to rely on British, French, or -other foreign banks for their financial transactions. This was -not only inconvenient, but it was devoid of that business secrecy -which is so necessary in exploiting new fields.</p> - -<p>“Before the war merchandise from the United States was a -negligible factor in the business life of Constantinople, and a -vessel flying the Stars and Stripes was a rare sight. Today one -will find four or five American liners in the Golden Horn at all -times.... Today a dozen important American corporations have -permanent offices there, and many other American concerns are -represented by local agents.</p> - -<p>“T<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">339</a></span>he future possibilities of imports from and exports to the -Eastern Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea -ports from the United States are of almost unbelievable proportions. -These entire sections must be fed, clothed, and largely -rehabilitated. Roads, ports, railways, and public works of all -kinds are needed everywhere. The merchants of the Near East -have valuable raw products to send us in exchange for the manufactured -goods which they so urgently need.“</p></div> - -<p>This estimate of the situation was confirmed by the -American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant when, -in urging upon the Department of State the vigorous defence -of the “open door” in Turkey, it said: “The opportunities -for the expansion of American interests in -the Near East are practically unlimited, provided there is -a fair field open for individual enterprise.... In fact, -with the conclusion of peace, there is the economic structure -of an empire to be developed.”<a name="FNanchor_42_448" id="FNanchor_42_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_448" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<p>The rapid development of American economic interests -in Turkey can be most effectively presented by reference -to the trade statistics. American exports to Turkey -at the opening of the twentieth century amounted to only -$50,000. In 1913 they had risen to $3,500,000. But between -1913 and 1920 they showed a phenomenal increase -of over twelve hundred per cent, reaching the sum of -$42,200,000. Nor was this trade one sided, for during -the period 1913–1920, American imports from Turkey -increased from $22,100,000 to $39,600,000.<a name="FNanchor_43_449" id="FNanchor_43_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_449" class="fnanchor">43</a></p> - -<p>The Chester concessions are another important step in -the development of a new American policy in the Near -East. They provide for the construction by the Ottoman-American -Development Company—a Turkish corporation -owned and administered by Americans—of approximately -2800 miles of railways, of which the following are the -most important:</p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>1. An extension of the old Anatolian Railway from -Angora to Sivas, with a branch to the port of Samsun, -on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">340</a></span> the Black Sea.</p> - -<p>2. A line from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">341</a></span> Sivas to Erzerum and on to the Persian -and Russian frontiers, with branches to the Black -Sea ports of Tireboli and Trebizond.</p></div> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/i_p340.jpg" alt="THE CHESTER CONCESSIONS" width="500" height="330" /> -<div class="caption">THE CHESTER CONCESSIONS<br /> - -<p><a href="images/i_p340.jpg"><small>Larger image</small></a></p> -</div></div> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>3. A line from Oulu Kishla, on the Bagdad Railway, -to Sivas <i>via</i> Kaisarieh.</p> - -<p>4. A trans-Armenian railway from Sivas to Kharput, -Arghana, Diarbekr, Mosul, and Suleimanieh, including -branches to Bitlis and Van.</p> - -<p>5. A railway from Kharput to Youmourtalik, a port -on the Gulf of Alexandretta.</p></div> - -<p>No more elaborate project for railway construction in -Asiatic Turkey has ever been incorporated in a definitive -concession. That it should be entrusted to American promoters -and American engineers is one of the most significant -developments in the long and involved history of the -Eastern Question.</p> - -<p>But the Chester concessions do not stop at railway construction -alone. As in the case of the Bagdad Railway, -the Turkish Government is obliged to offer the financiers -powerful inducements to the investment of capital in railway -enterprises which, in themselves, may be unremunerative -for a time. The German promoters of the Bagdad -Railway obtained a kilometric guarantee, or subsidy; the -American promoters of the Chester lines are granted exclusive -rights to the exploitation of all mineral resources, -including oil, lying within a zone of twenty kilometres on -each side of the railway lines. The Bagdad Railway -mortgaged the revenues of Imperial Turkey; the Chester -concessions mortgage the natural resources of Nationalist -Turkey. The Ottoman-American Development Company, -furthermore, is authorized to carry out important enterprises -subsidiary to the construction of the railway lines<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">342</a></span> -and the exploitation of the mines aforementioned. It may, -for example, lay such pipe lines as are necessary to the -proper development of the petroleum wells lying within its -zone of operations. It is permitted to utilize water-power -along the line of its railways and to install hydro-electric -stations for the service of its mines, ports, or railways. -It is required to construct elaborate port and terminal -facilities at Samsun, on the Black Sea, and at Youmourtalik, -on the Gulf of Alexandretta.</p> - -<p>There are other respects in which the terms of the -Chester grant are strikingly similar to those of the Bagdad -Railway concession of March 5, 1903.<a name="FNanchor_44_450" id="FNanchor_44_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_450" class="fnanchor">44</a> Lands owned by -the Turkish Government and needed for right-of-way, -terminal facilities, or exploitation of mineral resources are -transferred to the Ottoman-American Development Company, -free of charge, for the period of the concession -(ninety-nine years). Public lands required for construction -purposes—including sand-pits, gravel-pits, and quarries—may -be utilized without rental, and wood and timber -may be cut from State-owned forests without compensation. -As public utilities, the Chester enterprises are -granted full rights of expropriation of such privately -owned land as may be necessary for purposes of construction -or operation. Like the <i>Deutsche Bank</i>, the Ottoman-American -Development Company is granted sweeping -exemption from taxation, as follows: “The materials, machines, -coal, and other commodities required for the construction -operations of the Company, whether purchased -in Turkey or imported from abroad, shall be exempt from -all customs duties or other tax. The coal imported for the -operation of the [railway] lines shall be exempt from -customs duties for a period of twenty years, dating from -the ratification of the present agreement. For the entire -duration of the concession the lines and ports constructed -by the Company, as well as its capital and revenues, shall -be exempt from all imposts.”<a name="FNanchor_45_451" id="FNanchor_45_451"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_451" class="fnanchor">45</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">343</a></span></p> - -<p>From the Turkish point of view, the Chester concessions -may be justified on the grounds that the new railways will -bring political stability to Anatolia<a name="FNanchor_46_452" id="FNanchor_46_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_452" class="fnanchor">46</a> and will initiate an -era of unprecedented economic progress. From the point -of view of those American interests which believe in the -stimulation of foreign trade, likewise, the Chester project -has much to commend it. Exploitation of the oilfields of -the vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and Mosul, and the -development of the mineral resources of Armenia—including -the valuable Arghana copper mines—will provide rich -sources of supply of raw materials. In the construction -of railways, ports, and pipe lines there will be a considerable -demand for American steel products. Economic development -of the vast region through which the new railways -will pass promises to furnish a market for American -products, such as agricultural machinery, and to offer -ample opportunity for the profitable investment of American -capital. The Chester project may well become an -imperial enterprise of the first rank.</p> - -<p>With the exception of the temporary advantage which -they hoped to gain at the second Lausanne Conference, the -Turkish Government wished no political importance to be -attached to the Chester concessions. As Abdul Hamid had -awarded the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions to -a German company because he believed Germans would be -less likely to associate political aims with their economic -privileges, so the Government of the National Assembly -has awarded the Chester concessions to an American syndicate -because Turkish Nationalists are convinced that -Americans have no political interests in Turkey. This was -made clear by Dr. I. Fouad Bey, a member of the National -Assembly, in a semi-official visit to the United States during -April, 1923. “We Turks wish to develop our country,” -he said. “We need foreign coöperation to develop<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">344</a></span> -it. We cannot do without this coöperation. Now, there -are two kinds of foreign coöperation. There is the foreign -coöperation that is coupled with foreign political -domination—coöperation that brings profit only to the -foreign investor. We have had enough of that kind. -There is another kind of coöperation—the kind we conceive -the Chester project and other American enterprises -to be. This kind of coöperation is a business enterprise -and has no imperialistic aim. It is a form of coöperation -designed to profit both America and Turkey, and not to -invade Turkish sovereignty and Turkish political interests -in any way. That is why we prefer American coöperation. -That is why the Grand National Assembly at Angora is -prepared to welcome American capital with open arms and -secure it in all its rights.”<a name="FNanchor_47_453" id="FNanchor_47_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_453" class="fnanchor">47</a></p> - -<p>These sentiments found a ready echo among American -merchants. At a dinner given in honor of Dr. Fouad Bey -by the American Federated Chambers of Commerce for -the Near East, one of the speakers said: “Turkey, in our -opinion, is destined to have a magnificent future. It is on -the threshold of a new and great era. Its extraordinary -resources, amazingly rich, are practically untouched. -Although in remote ages of antiquity these vast regions -played a great rôle in history, they have for many centuries -lain practically fallow. The tools, appliances, machinery -and methods which have been so highly perfected -in the United States are appropriate to and will be needed -for the development of this marvelous latent wealth. Our -capital likewise can be very helpful. The members of our -Chamber of Commerce have a keen interest in the furtherance -of trade relations between Turkey and the United -States. We want both to increase the imports of its raw -materials into our country and to stimulate the export of -our manufactured articles to Turkey. We are inspired by -no political aims. We s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">345</a></span>eek no annexation of territory. -We desire no exclusive privileges. Our motto, if we had -one, would be ‘A fair field and no favors.’ In the development -of commercial relations with Turkey, in seeking the -investment of our capital there, we ask for nothing more -than an open door.”<a name="FNanchor_48_454" id="FNanchor_48_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_454" class="fnanchor">48</a></p> - -<p>The American press, likewise, is in accord with a policy -of governmental non-intervention in the ramifications of -the Chester project. The following editorial from the new -York <i>World</i> of April 23, 1923, is perhaps representative:</p> - -<div class="blockquot2"> - -<p>“There is no reason why the State Department should make -itself the attorney for or the promoter of the Chester business -enterprises. If the Angora Government has granted privileges -to the Admiral’s company, then the Admiral’s business is with -Angora and not with Washington.</p> - -<p>“Certainly the American people have no more interest in taking -up the Chester concessions diplomatically than they would -have if the Admiral were proposing to open a candy store in -Piccadilly, a dressmaking establishment in the Rue de la Paix, -or a beauty parlor on the Riviera. If the Admiral and his -friends wish to invest money in Turkey, they no doubt know -what they are doing. They will expect profits commensurate -with the risks, and they should not expect the United States -Government, which will enjoy none of the profits, to insure them -against the risks.”</p></div> - -<p>It is difficult, nevertheless, to see how the Chester concessions, -and their affiliated enterprises can be kept scrupulously -free from political complications. The French -Government, in defence of the interests of its nationals, -has announced semi-officially that American support of the -concessions might lead to “a diplomatic incident of the -first importance.”<a name="FNanchor_49_455" id="FNanchor_49_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_455" class="fnanchor">49</a> Furthermore, the United States -Navy is said to be vitally interested in the Chester project. -The oilfields to which Admiral Chester’s Ottoman-American -Development Company obtain rights of exploitation -may prove to be important sources of fuel supply to -American destroyers operating in the Mediterranean—Mr.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">346</a></span> -Denby, Secretary of the Navy, said apropos of the -concessions that the Navy “is always concerned with the -possibility of oil supplies.”<a name="FNanchor_50_456" id="FNanchor_50_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_456" class="fnanchor">50</a> Furthermore, an American-built -port at Youmourtalik, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, -might conceivably be utilized as an American naval base. -Such a station, less than 150 miles from Cyprus and less -than 400 miles from the Suez Canal, could hardly be expected -to increase the British sense of security in the -Eastern Mediterranean.</p> - -<p>The American Navy has already been very active in the -Near East. “Soon after the armistice, Rear Admiral -Bristol was sent to Constantinople to command the small -American naval forces there. A large part of his efforts -was immediately devoted to the promotion of American -business in that unsettled region, including the countries -bordering on the Black Sea. He soon established for himself -such an influential position by sheer force of character -and by his intelligent grasp of both the political and -economic situations that he was appointed high commissioner -by the State Department.</p> - -<p>“Early in 1919 several American destroyers were ordered -to Constantinople for duty in the Near East. Although -these destroyers are good fighting ships, it costs -some $4,000,000 a year to maintain them on this particular -duty, which does not train the crews for use in battle.... -The possible development of the economic resources of this -part of the world was carefully investigated by representatives -of American commercial interests. These representatives -were given every assistance by the Navy, transportation -furnished them to various places, and all information -of commercial activities obtained by naval officers in their -frequent trips around the Black Sea given them. The -competition for trade in this part of the world is very keen, -the various European countries using every means at their -disposal to obtain preferential rates. The Navy not only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">347</a></span> -assists our commercial firms to obtain business, but when -business opportunities present themselves, American firms -are notified and given full information on the subject. -One destroyer is kept continuously at Samsun, Turkey, -to look after the American tobacco interests at that port. -... The present opportunities for development of American -commerce in the Near East are very great, and its -permanent success will depend largely upon the continued -influence of the Navy in that region.”<a name="FNanchor_51_457" id="FNanchor_51_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_457" class="fnanchor">51</a> This is the situation -as diagnosed by the Navy Department itself.</p> - -<p>“With the assistance of a small force of destroyers based -on Constantinople,” according to an instructor in the -United States Naval Academy, “our commercial representatives -are establishing themselves firmly in a trade -which means millions of dollars to the farmers of the -American Middle West. By utilizing the wireless of destroyers -in Turkish ports, at Durazzo, and elsewhere, commercial -messages have been put through without delay.... -Destroyers are entering Turkish ports with ‘drummers’ -as regular passengers, and their fantails piled high -with American samples. An American destroyer has made -a special trip at thirty knots to get American oil prospectors -into a newly opened field.” Here is “dollar diplomacy” -with a vengeance! “If this continues, we shall -cease to take a purely academic interest in the naval problems -of the Near East. These problems are concerned -with the protection of commerce, the control of narrow -places in the Mediterranean waterways, and the naval -forces which the interested nations can bring to bear. -They cannot be discussed without constant reference to -political and commercial aims.”<a name="FNanchor_52_458" id="FNanchor_52_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_458" class="fnanchor">52</a></p> - -<p>Americans would do well to take stock of this Near -Eastern situation. Mustapha Kemal Pasha invites the -participation of American capital in railway construction -in Anatolia for substantially the same reasons which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">348</a></span> -prompted Abdul Hamid to award the Bagdad Railway -concession to German bankers. In 1888, Abdul Hamid -considered Germany economically powerful but politically -disinterested. Today, Mustapha Kemal Pasha believes -that American promoters, engineers, and industrialists -possess the resources and the technical skill which are -required to develop and modernize Asia Minor. And, -from the Turkish point of view, the political record of the -United States in the Near East is a good record. America -never has annexed Ottoman territory or staked out spheres -of interest on Turkish soil; America has not participated -in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; America has -few Mohammedan subjects and therefore is not fearful -of the political strength of Pan-Islamism; America did not -declare war on Turkey during the European struggle; -America was not a party to the hated treaty of Sèvres. -America alone among the Western Powers seems capable -of becoming a sincere and disinterested friend of Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_53_459" id="FNanchor_53_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_459" class="fnanchor">53</a> -The avowed foreign policies of the United States appear -to confirm the opinion of the Turks that Americans can -be depended upon not to infringe upon Turkish sovereignty. -America must be kept scrupulously free from -all “foreign entanglements”; therefore an American mandate -for Armenia has been firmly declined. Splendid isolation -is declared to be the fundamental American principle -in international affairs.</p> - -<p>The political theory of isolation, however, is not altogether -in harmony with the economic fact of American -world power. The enormous expansion of American -commercial and financial interests during and since the -Great War brings the United States face to face with new, -difficult, and complicated international problems. American -business men will be increasingly interested in the -backward countries of the world, in which they can purchase -raw materials, to which they can sell their f<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">349</a></span>inished -products, and in which they can invest their capital. -American financiers, manufacturers, and merchants will -look to their government for assistance in the extension of -foreign markets and for protection in their foreign investments. -Already there is grave danger that the United -States may “plunge into national competitive imperialism, -with all its profits and dangers, following its financiers -wherever they may lead.”<a name="FNanchor_54_460" id="FNanchor_54_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_460" class="fnanchor">54</a></p> - -<p>The situation is not unlike that which faced the German -Empire in 1888. When the <i>Deutsche Bank</i> initiated its -Anatolian railway enterprises, it inquired of the German -Government whether it might expect protection for its -investments in Turkey. Bismarck—who desired to avoid -imperialistic entanglements and to limit German political -interests, as far as possible, to the continent of Europe—replied -with a warning that the risk involved “must be -assumed exclusively by the entrepreneurs” and that the -Bank must not count upon the support of the German -Government in “precarious enterprises in foreign countries.” -But Bismarck’s policy did not take full cognizance -of the phenomenal industrial and commercial expansion of -the German Empire, whose nationals were acquiring economic -interests in Asia and in Africa and on the Seven -Seas. William II was more sensitive than Bismarck to the -demands of German industrial, commercial, and financial -interests that they be granted active governmental support -and protection abroad. Bismarck tolerated German enterprises -in Turkey; William II sponsored them. It was -under William II, not under Bismarck, that Germany definitely -entered the arena of imperial competition.<a name="FNanchor_55_461" id="FNanchor_55_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_461" class="fnanchor">55</a></p> - -<p>The development of American interests in Turkey puts -the Government of the United States to a test of statesmanship. -The temptations will be numerous to lend governmental -assistance to American business men against -their European competitors; to utilize the new American<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">350</a></span> -economic position in Turkey for the acquisition of political -influence; to use diplomatic pressure in securing additional -commercial and financial opportunities; to emphasize -the economic, at the expense of the moral, factors in Near -Eastern affairs. To yield to these temptations will be to -destroy the great prestige which America now possesses in -the Levant by reason of disinterested social and educational -service. To yield will be to forfeit the trust which -Turkish nationalists have put in American hands. To -yield will be to intrench the system of economic imperialism -which has been the curse of the Near East for half -a century. To yield will be to involve the United States -in foreign entanglements more portentous than those connected -with the League of Nations, or the International -Court of Justice, or any other plan which has yet been -suggested for American participation in the reconstruction -of a devastated Europe and a turbulent Asia.</p> - -<p>The Chester concessions may be either promise or -menace. They will give promise of a new era in the Near -East insofar as they contribute to the development and the -prosperity of Asia Minor, without infringing upon the -integrity and sovereignty of democratic Turkey, and without -involving the Government of the United States in -serious diplomatic controversies with other Great Powers. -They will be a menace—to Turkey, to the United States, -and to the peace of the world—if, unhappily, they should -lead republican America in the footsteps of imperial -Germany.</p> - -<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES</h3> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_407" id="Footnote_1_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_407"><span class="label">1</span></a> Mufty-Zade Zia Bey, “How the Turks Feel,” in <i>Asia</i>, Volume -XXII (1922), p. 857.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_408" id="Footnote_2_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_408"><span class="label">2</span></a> “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited -People,” Article III. Available in English translation in <i>International -Conciliation</i>, No. 136 (New York, 1919).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_409" id="Footnote_3_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_409"><span class="label">3</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, Chapter VII.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_410" id="Footnote_4_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_410"><span class="label">4</span></a> The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is -given as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, “Russia’s -Treaty with Turkey,” in <i>Current History</i>, Volume XVII (1922), -pp. 276–279.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">351</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_411" id="Footnote_5_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_411"><span class="label">5</span></a> Bowman, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 398.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_412" id="Footnote_6_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_412"><span class="label">6</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 202–203. Professor Toynbee now speaks of this -feature of the Entente in terms of contempt: “Its direct motive -was covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial -than the precarious honor among thieves who find their business -threatened by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the -thieves, at any rate, never got out of the habit of picking their -temporary partners’ pockets.“ <i>Op. cit.</i>, p. 46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_413" id="Footnote_7_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_413"><span class="label">7</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, pp. 45–46.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_414" id="Footnote_8_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_414"><span class="label">8</span></a> It seems to be established that Mr. Lloyd George compelled a -readjustment of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty by threatening -M. Clémenceau with a complete exposure and repudiation of -all of the secret treaties. <i>Cf.</i> Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume I, pp. 70–72.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_415" id="Footnote_9_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_415"><span class="label">9</span></a> See Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, reported -in full by Baker, <i>op. cit.</i>, Volume III, Document No. 1.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_416" id="Footnote_10_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_416"><span class="label">10</span></a> Regarding the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company, <i>cf.</i> -<i>supra</i>, p. 261.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_417" id="Footnote_11_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_417"><span class="label">11</span></a> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 675 (1920). <i>Cf.</i>, also, the -“Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on Certain -Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, -Palestine, and Mesopotamia,” <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, No. Cmd. -1195 (1921). For a general discussion of the oil situation, see: -H. Bérenger, <i>La politique du pétrole</i> (Paris, 1920); F. Delaisi, <i>Le -pétrole—La politique de la production</i> (Paris, 1921); A. Apostol -and A. Michelson, <i>La lutte pour le pétrole</i> (Paris, 1922).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_418" id="Footnote_12_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_418"><span class="label">12</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, Chapter X, Note 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_419" id="Footnote_13_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_419"><span class="label">13</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 301–302.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_420" id="Footnote_14_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_420"><span class="label">14</span></a> Interesting sidelights on these points will be found in the -correspondence between the French and British Governments regarding -the Angora Treaty of October 20, 1921, <i>Parliamentary -Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922). <i>Cf.</i>, also, -Toynbee, <i>op. cit.</i>, Chapter III, “Greece and Turkey in the Vicious -Circle”; Jean Lescure, “Faut-il détruire la Turquie?” in <i>Revue -politique et parlementaire</i>, Volume 103 (1920), pp. 42–48; “Where -Diplomacy Failed,” <i>The Daily Telegraph</i> (London), September -19, 1922.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_421" id="Footnote_15_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_421"><span class="label">15</span></a> M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, November -17, 1921, in the official correspondence cited in Note 14.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_422" id="Footnote_16_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_422"><span class="label">16</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and the -scope of the agreement, <i>Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, -Chambre des députés</i>, March 16, 1921, pp. 1272–1273. The text of -the agreement is available in <i>Current History</i>, Volume XIV -(1921), pp. 203–204, and in the <i>Contemporary Review</i>, Volume -119 (1921), pp. 677–679.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_423" id="Footnote_17_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_423"><span class="label">17</span></a> Regarding the Heraclea coal mines <i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">352</a></span>, p. 14. During -the War the mines were operated by Hugo Stinnes.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_424" id="Footnote_18_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_424"><span class="label">18</span></a> For the text of the Turco-Italian treaty see <i>L’Europe Nouvelle</i> -(Paris), May 28, 1921, or <i>The Nation</i>, Volume 113 (New -York, 1921), p. 214. <i>The New York Times</i>, April 13, 1921, contains -a good summary of the treaty and the circumstances of its -negotiation.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_425" id="Footnote_19_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_425"><span class="label">19</span></a> The text of the Angora Treaty is given in <i>Parliamentary -Papers</i>, No. Cmd. 1556, Turkey No. 2 (1921). It has been reprinted -in Current History, January, 1922. For a statement by -M. Briand regarding the purposes and scope of the treaty, <i>cf.</i> -<i>Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Sénat</i>, October 28, 1921, -pp. 818–819.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_426" id="Footnote_20_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_426"><span class="label">20</span></a> Aleppo remained within the French mandate for Syria, so -that for a time—until the Turks construct a substitute line—through -trains will have to pass through French territory for a -short distance. Guarantees against interruption of either military -or commercial traffic were exacted by the Turks, however. In -addition, Turkey was guaranteed full use of the port of Alexandretta -on a basis of absolute equality with Syria.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_427" id="Footnote_21_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_427"><span class="label">21</span></a> Most of the supplementary economic concessions are provided -for in a covering letter of Yussuf Kemal Bey and in an exchange -of notes which coincided with the signature of the treaty. These -were kept absolutely secret until December, when their contents -were made known to the British Government.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_428" id="Footnote_22_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_428"><span class="label">22</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, p. 83.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_429" id="Footnote_23_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_429"><span class="label">23</span></a> The italics are mine. Discrimination against British trade -from Mosul to Alexandretta, for example, might be used to force -Great Britain to abandon many of her claims in northern Mesopotamia.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_430" id="Footnote_24_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_430"><span class="label">24</span></a> <i>The Times</i> (London), August 2, 1922; <i>Manchester Guardian -Commercial</i>, August 31, 1922; <i>Chicago Tribune</i>, Paris edition, -August 21, 1922.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_431" id="Footnote_25_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_431"><span class="label">25</span></a> For the text of the correspondence, <i>cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, -No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_432" id="Footnote_26_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_432"><span class="label">26</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 301–302.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_433" id="Footnote_27_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_433"><span class="label">27</span></a> A not unrepresentative Greek view is the following: -“Nationalist Turkey became, in a military sense, French territory. -Political missions, military missions, propaganda missions, financial -missions, found their way from Paris to Angora. The entire -credit of the French Republic was placed behind Kemal. The -warships of France and the liners of the <i>Messageries Maritimes</i> -became Turkish transports, and the French arsenals were placed -at the disposal of the Turks. Once the ally of Kemal, France -supported him to the fullest extent of its ability and its resources.” -A. T. Polyzoides, “The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor,” in <i>Current -History</i>, Volume XVII (1923), p. 35.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">353</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_434" id="Footnote_28_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_434"><span class="label">28</span></a> Material regarding the Lausanne Conference is scattered and -fragmentary. The text of the proposed treaty is to be found in -<i>L’Europe Nouvelle</i> (Paris), February 24 and March 10, 1923; a -summary is given in <i>The Times</i> (London), February 1, 1923. The -newspaper accounts which I have used are those of <i>The New -York Times</i>, <i>The Times</i> (London), <i>The Manchester Guardian</i>, -<i>The World</i> (New York), and the <i>Christian Science Monitor</i> -(Boston). For reports and editorial comment in weekly periodicals -I have consulted <i>The Near East</i>, <i>L’Europe Nouvelle</i>, <i>Journal -des Débats</i>, <i>The New Statesman</i> (London), <i>The Nation</i> (New -York). The following magazine articles have proved useful: -“The Lausanne Conference,” in <i>Current History</i>, Volume XVII -(1923), pp. 531–537, 743–748, 929–930; Saint-Brice, “De la Ruhr à -Lausanne,” in <i>Correspondance d’Orient</i> (Paris), February, 1923; -“The Oriental Labyrinth at Lausanne,” in the <i>Literary Digest</i>, -April 21, 1923, pp. 19–20; H. Froidevaux, “Les négociations de -Lausanne et leur suspension,” in <i>L’Asie Française</i>, 33 year, No. -208 (Paris, 1923), pp. 8–10; J. C. Powell, “Italy at Lausanne,” in -<i>The New Statesman</i>, Volume XX (1922), pp. 291–292; A. J. -Toynbee, “The New Status of Turkey,” in the <i>Contemporary -Review</i>, Volume 123 (1923), pp. 281–289; P. Bruneau, “La question -de Mossoul,” in <i>L’Europe Nouvelle</i>, February 3, 1923, pp. -138–140. For some of my information regarding the Lausanne -Conference I am indebted to Djavid Bey.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_435" id="Footnote_29_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_435"><span class="label">29</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, Chapters IX and X, <i>ad lib.</i></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_436" id="Footnote_30_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_436"><span class="label">30</span></a> Compare with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, <i>supra</i>, -pp. 301–302.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_437" id="Footnote_31_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_437"><span class="label">31</span></a> <i>The New York Times</i>, February 5, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_438" id="Footnote_32_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_438"><span class="label">32</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, pp. 324–325.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_439" id="Footnote_33_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_439"><span class="label">33</span></a> The Chester concessions will be treated more fully in the -succeeding pages.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_440" id="Footnote_34_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_440"><span class="label">34</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 245–249, 325–326. It was the Turkish contention -that the Black Sea concessions were invalid for the following -reasons: they were negotiated by a government for the acts of -which the National Assembly assumed no responsibility; they -never had been ratified by the Turkish Parliament; the French -bankers had not fulfilled all the conditions upon which the concessions -were predicated.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_441" id="Footnote_35_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_441"><span class="label">35</span></a> <i>The New York Times</i>, April 12, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_442" id="Footnote_36_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_442"><span class="label">36</span></a> Regarding the <i>Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen</i>, <i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, -p. 32. Accounts of the purchase by British interests are to be -found in <i>The New York Times</i>, April 28, May 15 and 16, 1923, -and <i>The Times</i> (London), May 18, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_443" id="Footnote_37_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_443"><span class="label">37</span></a> The Chester concessions conflict, to a degree, with the rights -of the British-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (<i>cf.</i> <i>supra</i>, -Chapter X) in the vilayet of Mosul. The area in conflict is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">354</a></span> -so small, compared to the total of the two concessions, however, -that it is extremely doubtful if there will be any serious difficulty -in reaching a satisfactory adjustment.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_444" id="Footnote_38_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_444"><span class="label">38</span></a> “Report of the King-Crane Mission to the Near East,” published -as a supplement to the <i>Editor and Publisher</i>, Volume 55 -(New York, 1922), pp. I-XXVIII. <i>Cf.</i>, also, “Report of the -American Military Mission to Armenia,” Senate Document No. -266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1920).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_445" id="Footnote_39_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_445"><span class="label">39</span></a> E. J. Bing, “Chester and Turkey, Inc.,” in <i>The New Republic</i>, -Volume XXXIV (New York, 1923), pp. 290–292.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_446" id="Footnote_40_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_446"><span class="label">40</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> E. M. Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” in -the <i>Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social -Science</i>, Volume CVIII (Philadelphia, 1923).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_447" id="Footnote_41_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_447"><span class="label">41</span></a> For the text of this correspondence, <i>cf.</i> <i>Parliamentary Papers</i>, -No. Cmd. 675 (1921).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_448" id="Footnote_42_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_448"><span class="label">42</span></a> <i>The New York Times</i>, October 29, 1922.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_449" id="Footnote_43_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_449"><span class="label">43</span></a> <i>Statistical Abstract of the United States</i>, 1921, <i>passim</i>; “The -Trade of Turkey During 1920,” <i>Commerce Reports</i>, Special Supplement -(Washington, 1921).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_450" id="Footnote_44_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_450"><span class="label">44</span></a> Compare with the terms of the Bagdad Railway concession, -<i>supra</i>, pp. 70–71, 77–84.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_451" id="Footnote_45_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_451"><span class="label">45</span></a> The text of the Chester concessions—in an English translation -which leaves much to be desired—is to be found in <i>Current -History</i>, Volume XVIII (1923), pp. 485–489. For an official -copy of the concessions, with a map, I am indebted to Mr. M. -Zekeria, Secretary of the Turkish Information Service in New -York.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_452" id="Footnote_46_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_452"><span class="label">46</span></a> The Chester concessions contain the usual provisions for the -utilization of the railways by the gendarmerie and the military, -both in time of peace and in time of war.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_453" id="Footnote_47_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_453"><span class="label">47</span></a> <i>The World</i> (New York), April 10, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_454" id="Footnote_48_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_454"><span class="label">48</span></a> The remarks are those of Mr. Ernest Filsinger, of the firm -of Lawrence & Company, exporters. Mr. Filsinger has been good -enough to supply me with a copy of his speech.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_455" id="Footnote_49_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_455"><span class="label">49</span></a> <i>The New York Times</i>, April 12, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_456" id="Footnote_50_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_456"><span class="label">50</span></a> <i>Ibid.</i>, April 23, 1923.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_457" id="Footnote_51_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_457"><span class="label">51</span></a> <i>The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset</i> (Washington, -Office of Naval Intelligence, 1923). <i>Cf.</i>, also, C. Merz, “Bristol, -Quarterdeck Diplomat,” in <i>Our World</i>, December, 1922.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_458" id="Footnote_52_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_458"><span class="label">52</span></a> Allen Westcott, “The Struggle for the Mediterranean,” in -<i>Our World</i>, February, 1923, pp. 11–17.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_459" id="Footnote_53_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_459"><span class="label">53</span></a> <i>Cf.</i>, <i>supra</i>, pp. 63–65.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_460" id="Footnote_54_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_460"><span class="label">54</span></a> <i>Cf.</i> W. E. Weyl, <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">355</a></span><i>American World Policies</i> (New York, 1917), -Chapter V; A. Demangeon, <i>America and the Race for World -Dominion</i> (Garden City, 1921), a translation of <i>Le Déclin de -l’Europe</i> (Paris, 1920).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_461" id="Footnote_55_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_461"><span class="label">55</span></a> <i>Supra</i>, pp. 40–42.</p></div> - -<hr /> - -<h2>INDEX</h2> -<ul class="index"> -<li class="ifrst">Abdul Hamid, Sultan, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">problems of, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">interest in railway construction, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">deposition of, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Adaban Island, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Adalia, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Adana, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>. (<i>See also</i> Mersina-Adana Railway.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Adrianople, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Afiun Karahissar, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Agadir crisis, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Agriculture in Turkey. (<i>See</i> Turkey, agricultural conditions.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Aidin, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>. (<i>See also</i> Smyrna-Aidin Railway.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Alashehr, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Aleppo, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Alexandretta, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Allenby, Field Marshal Sir E. H. H., <a href="#Page_298">298</a>-299.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Alliance Israélite Universelle</i>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Amanus Mountains, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Bagdad Railway tunnels through, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Amara, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">America. (<i>See</i> United States of America.)</li> - -<li class="indx">American Federated Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, <a href="#Page_344">344</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anatolia, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">geography of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">natural resources of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>-14;</li> -<li class="isub1">railways of, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>-30.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Anatolian Railway, Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Smyrna-Aidin Railway, Black Sea Railways, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Anatolian Railway, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">concession of 1888, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">concession of 1893, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">agreement with Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>-60;</li> -<li class="isub1">board of directors, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">irrigation enterprises, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic achievements of, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-232;</li> -<li class="isub1">concessions of 1914, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-249, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Andrew, Sir William, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-177.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-French Entente. (<i>See</i> Entente Cordiale.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>-329.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-German Agreement of June 15, 1914, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-265.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-German rivalry, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>-180, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-Japanese Alliance, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-Persian Oil Company, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-Russian Agreement (1907), <a href="#Page_204">204</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Anglo-Turkish Agreements (1913), <a href="#Page_254">254</a>-258, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>-264.</li> - -<li class="indx">Angora, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Angora Government. (<i>See</i> Grand National Assembly.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Angora Treaty (October 20, 1921), <a href="#Page_324">324</a>-325, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Arabs, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>-10, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>-284, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ardahan, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Arghana, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">copper mines of, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Armenia, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">republic of, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">proposed American mandate, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Asia Minor. (<i>See</i> Anatolia.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Atlas Line, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Auguste Victoria, Kaiserin, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Austria-Hungary, policies in Near East, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">railways in Turkey, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">trade with Turkey, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>-106;</li> -<li class="isub1">annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">relations with Germany in Near East, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>-130.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also Drang nach Osten.</i>)</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Backshish</i>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bagdad, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-74, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">factor in Great War, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>-289, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>-300;</li> -<li class="isub1">strategic importance to Turkey, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>-153;</li> -<li class="isub1">mileage, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">construction, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>-95, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-114, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">political importance to Germany, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>-131;</li> -<li class="isub1">opponents and friends of enterprise in Germany, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>-142;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic success, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>-234;</li> -<li class="isub1">disposition of by Allies, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Angora Treaty, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>-326;</li> -<li class="isub1">status in 1922, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">purchase by British bankers, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Bagdad Railway Company, incorporation of, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">concession of 1903, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>-75, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>-84, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attempt to internationalize (1903), <a href="#Page_92">92</a>-93;</li> -<li class="isub1">board of directors, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">preliminary concession of 1899, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>-65, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">financing concession of 1903, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>-94, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">concession of 1908, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>-97;</li> -<li class="isub1">convention of March, 1911, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>-112, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>-229, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Franco-German agreement of 1914, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-252;</li> -<li class="isub1">contracts with Lord Inchcape, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>-260, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">agreement with Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">proposed liquidation, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bagtché tunnel, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bahrein Island, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balfour, A. J. (Earl Balfour), <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>-185, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balfour of Burleigh, Lord, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balkan States, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">nationalism of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Balkan Wars, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>-275.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ballin, Albert, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Banditry, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Bank für Handel und Industrie</i>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Bank für orientalische Eisenbahnen</i>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Banque d’Orient</i>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Barrow, General Sir Edmond, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Basra, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bassermann, Herr, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Beersheba, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Beirut, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Belgium. Railway concessions of Belgians in Turkey, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Berger, Léon, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bergmann, Dr. Carl, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Berthelot, Philippe, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bethmann-Hollweg, von, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Beyens, Baron, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bismarck, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-42, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bitlis, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Black Sea Basin Agreement, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Black Sea Railways, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>-246, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-249.</li> - -<li class="indx">Boer War, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Boli, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bowles, Gibson, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bozanti, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Breslau</i> (Cruiser), <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Briand, Aristide, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Brusa, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bulgaria, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bulgurlu, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Bülow, Prince von, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Cadman, Sir John, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Caillard, Sir Vincent, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Caliphate, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>-279, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cambon, Jules, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cambon, Paul, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Capitulations, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>-11, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>-154, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>-306, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Carden, Admiral, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cassel, Sir Ernest, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>-221, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chamberlain, Austen, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chamberlain, Joseph, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>-179, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chéradame, André, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chesney, Francis R., <a href="#Page_176">176</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chester, Rear Admiral Colby M., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chester concessions, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">compared with Bagdad Railway concessions, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>-343;</li> -<li class="isub1">political significance of, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Chrome, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Churchill, Winston, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cilicia, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>-326, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">French mandate for, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Mersina-Adana Railway.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Cilician Gates of the Taurus, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cilician-Syrian Railway Company, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Clémenceau, Georges, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Coal, Heraclea mines, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Colonization, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>-125.</li> - -<li class="indx">Combes, Émile, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Commercial Revolution, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>-4, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>. (<i>See also</i> Trade routes.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Committee of Union and Progress, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Constans, M., <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Constantinople, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cotton, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cox, Sir Percy, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>-284, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Cranborne, Lord, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crawford, Sir Richard, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Crédit Lyonnais</i>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crewe, Lord, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Crowe, Sir Eyre, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ctesiphon, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Curzon, Lord, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-198, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>-213, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Customs duties of Ottoman Empire, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>-228, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Damascus, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Damascus-Homs-Aleppo Railway, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">D’Arcy Exploration Company, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>-289.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dawkins, Sir Clinton, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Deir, province of, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Deir es Zor, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Delamain, General, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>-284.</li> - -<li class="indx">Delcassé, Théophile, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>-157, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>-169.</li> - -<li class="indx">De Lesseps, Ferdinand, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Denby, Charles, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Deschanel, Paul, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Dette Publique.</i> (<i>See</i> Ottoman Public Debt Administration.)</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Bank</i>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>-33, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>-185, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">negotiations of 1899 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>-60, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">influential position in German industry, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>-101;</li> -<li class="isub1">loans to Young Turks, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">negotiations of 1913–1914 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-252.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway Company, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Levante Linie</i>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Mittelmeer Levante Linie</i>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Orientbank</i>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Orient Mission</i>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Palästina Bank</i>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung</i>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee</i>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Deutschtum, das</i>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Diarbekr, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield), <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Djavid Bey, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>-220, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-229, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>-236, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Djemal Pasha, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Dodecanese Islands, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Downing Street, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Drang nach Osten</i>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>-130, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>-142, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Dresdner Bank</i>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Eastern Bank, The, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Egypt, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">El Helif, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ellenborough, Lord, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Entente Cordiale, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>-204, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Enver Pasha, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Eregli, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Erzerum, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Eski Shehr, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Euphrates River, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Lynch Brothers.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Euphrates Valley Railway Company, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Euphrates & Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. (<i>See</i> Lynch Brothers.)</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Falkenhayn, General von, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>-299.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fashoda incident, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Fouad Bey, Dr. I., <a href="#Page_343">343</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">France, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">French railways in Turkey, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>-166, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>-246, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-249.</li> -<li class="isub2">(<i>See also</i> Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Damascus-Homs-Aleppo Railway, etc.);</li> -<li class="isub1">trade with Turkey, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>-106;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialism, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude toward Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>-169;</li> -<li class="isub1">investments in Turkey, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>-155;</li> -<li class="isub1">spheres of interest in Near East, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-294, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">mandate for Syria and Cilicia, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">rivalry with Great Britain in Near East, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>-329;</li> -<li class="isub1">treaty of March 9, 1921, with Turkish Nationalists, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>-324;</li> -<li class="isub1">Angora Treaty, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>-326;</li> -<li class="isub1">policy at Lausanne Conferences, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>-335;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude toward Chester concessions, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>-334, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Francis I, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franco-German convention of 1914, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-252, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franco-Russian Alliance, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>-159, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franco-Turkish Treaty of March, 1921, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>-324.</li> - -<li class="indx">Franco-Turkish Treaty of October, 1921. (<i>See</i> Angora Treaty.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Franklin-Bouillon, Henri, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Gallipoli, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gaza, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Genoa Conference, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">George V, of Great Britain, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Germany, railways in Turkey. (<i>See</i> Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway, <i>Deutsche Bank</i>);</li> -<li class="isub1">trade with Turkey, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>-106, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">banks in the Near East, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>-101;</li> -<li class="isub1">steamship lines in the Near East, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-110;</li> -<li class="isub1">military missions to Turkey, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>-298;</li> -<li class="isub1">Near Eastern policies, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-45, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>-65, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>-131, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-265, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>-279, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>-292, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>-300;</li> -<li class="isub1">schools and missions, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-136, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialism, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-40, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>-52, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-135, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>-281, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">anti-imperialism, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>-138;</li> -<li class="isub1">rivalries with Great Britain, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>-180, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">alliance with Turkey, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">propaganda, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>-282;</li> -<li class="isub1">military campaigns in Turkey, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-290, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-299;</li> -<li class="isub1">destruction of interests in Near East, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>-315.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Goeben</i> (cruiser), <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Golden Horn, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Goltz, Field Marshal von der, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-39, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gouraud, General, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Grand National Assembly, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>-334, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Great Britain, Near Eastern policies, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-67, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-69, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-208, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-228, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-265, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>-287, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude toward Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-67, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>-201, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>-209, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-265;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialism, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-197, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">trade with Turkey, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>-106;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic enterprises in Near East, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-192, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li> -<li class="isub2">(<i>see also</i> Lynch Brothers, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Inchcape, etc.);</li> -<li class="isub1">spheres of interest in Ottoman Empire, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">acquisition by Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>-335;</li> -<li class="isub1">military campaigns in Near East, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>-285, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>-287, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-297, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>-299.</li> -<li class="isub2">(<i>See also</i> headings under “Anglo,” Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, Suez Canal, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Great War, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>-276;</li> -<li class="isub1">rôle of Bagdad Railway in, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-290, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-299.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greece, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922), <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount Grey), <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-227, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-262, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>-283.</li> - -<li class="indx">Grothe, Dr. Hugo, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Guaranty Trust Company of New York, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Gwinner, Dr. Arthur von, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>-115, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Haidar Pasha, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Haidar Pasha Port Company, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Haifa, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hakki Bey, Ismail, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hakki Pasha, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>-255, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Haldane, Lord, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hama, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hamburg-American Line, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-109, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hanotaux, Gabriel, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>-242.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hatzfeld, Count, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hedjaz, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hedjaz Railway, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Helfferich, Dr. Karl, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Heraclea, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">coal mines of, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden</i>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hirsch, Baron, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Hittites, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Holy Land, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Palestine.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Holy War, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>-279, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Homs, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Huguenin, M., <a href="#Page_63">63</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Immigration, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Imperial Ottoman Bank, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>-248.</li> - -<li class="indx">Imperialism, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>-8, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>-12, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>-52, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>-236, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>-280, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>-296, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>-318, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-338, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Imperialism as sub-topic under France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, United States.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Inchcape, Lord, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>-260.</li> - -<li class="indx">India, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Industrial Revolution, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>-46.</li> - -<li class="indx">Industry in Turkey. (<i>See</i> Turkey, industrial backwardness.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Interallied Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Interallied Financial Commission, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">International Court of Justice, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Irak, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Mesopotamia.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Irrigation, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>-17, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ismet Pasha, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>-334.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ismid, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Italy, trade with Turkey, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>-107;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialism, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-174, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Tripolitan War, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic interests in Turkey, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-267;</li> -<li class="isub1">spheres of interest in Near East as defined by secret treaties, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">treaty of 1921 with Turkish Nationalists, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Jäckh, Ernst, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>-205, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jaffa, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jagow, Gottlieb von, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jastrow, Morris, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jaurès, Jean, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jericho, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jerusalem, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Jerusalems-Verein</i>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Jezirit-ibn-Omar, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Joffre, Marshal, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>-269.</li> - -<li class="indx">Johnston, Sir Harry H., <a href="#Page_205">205</a>-206, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Kaisarieh, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kapnist, Count Vladimir I., <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kapp, Wolfgang, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Karaman, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kars, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kaulla, Dr. Alfred von, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kemal Bey, Yussuf, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kemal Pasha, Mustapha, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Khanikin, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kharput, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kiderlen-Waechter, von, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kilometric guarantees, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>-78, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kipling, Rudyard, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kitchener, Lord, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Klapka, M. de, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Konia, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Koweit, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-198, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Sheik of, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kühlmann, Herr von, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kurds, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kurna, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Kut-el-Amara, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>-291.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Land of the Two Rivers. (<i>See</i> Mesopotamia.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Langénieux, Cardinal, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>-163.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lansdowne, Lord, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lausanne Conferences (1922–1923), <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>-333, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>-343.</li> - -<li class="indx">League of Nations, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ledochowski, Cardinal M. H., <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lee, Lord, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lichnowsky, Prince, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-140, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lloyd George, David, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>-243, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ludwig Loewe & Company, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Lynch Brothers, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>-191, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>-211, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">McMahon, Sir Arthur H., <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Macedonian Railways Company, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mackensen, Dr., <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mackensen, Field Marshal von, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mahmoud Pasha, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mandates, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Manissa, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Maude, General Sir Stanley, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Meade, Colonel, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mecca, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Medina, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mendeli, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mersina, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mersina-Adana Railway, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mesopotamia, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>-181, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>-266, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">trade routes, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>-2;</li> -<li class="isub1">natural resources, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>-17;</li> -<li class="isub1">Bagdad Railway in, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-75;</li> -<li class="isub1">German steamship service, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-109;</li> -<li class="isub1">military campaigns, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>-287, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>-290, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-299;</li> -<li class="isub1">British sphere of interest, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>-295;</li> -<li class="isub1">British mandate for, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">British Civil Administration, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Persian Gulf, Shatt-el-Arab, Koweit, Irak.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Metternich, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Middle East, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Militarism, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>-271, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>-276.</li> - -<li class="indx">Milyoukov, Professor, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Minerals in Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>-15, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Chrome, Oil, Turkey, mineral resources.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Missions and missionaries, effect on Turkey, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">in support of the Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-133, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>-133;</li> -<li class="isub1">French, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>-165;</li> -<li class="isub1">Italian, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-174;</li> -<li class="isub1">American, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Mittel-Europa</i>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mocha, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Moltke, General H. K. B., <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Morgen, Major, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Morley, Viscount, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-208.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mosul, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mount Stephen, Lord, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mudania armistice, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mudros armistice, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Mutius, Herr von, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">National Bank of Turkey, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">National Pact, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>-305, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nationalism, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>-268;</li> -<li class="isub1">Balkan, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">German, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>-137, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">French, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Italian, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-174;</li> -<li class="isub1">English, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Turkish, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>-304, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>.</li> -<li class="isub2">(<i>See also</i> Young Turks, Pan-Turanianism, Kemal Pasha, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Naumann, Friederich, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Near East. (<i>See</i> Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Middle East.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Neuflize, Baron de, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Neutral Zone of the Straits, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nicholas, Grand Duke, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nineveh, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nisibin, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Nixon, General J. E., <a href="#Page_286">286</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Northcote, Sir Stafford, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">North German Lloyd Steamship Company, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">O’Connor, Sir Nicholas, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Oil, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>-15, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>-283, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Open Door, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Oriental Railways, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Osmanie, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman-American Development Company. (<i>See</i> Chester concessions.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman Civil List, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman Empire, economic, strategic, and religious importance, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>-17;</li> -<li class="isub1">military system, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">partition of, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-295, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>-303;</li> -<li class="isub1">abolition of Sultanate, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Turkey, Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Public Debt Administration, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman General Staff, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman Ports Company, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Inchcape.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman Public Debt Administration, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">railway policies, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>-20, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ottoman River Navigation Company, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Inchcape.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Oulu Kishla, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Palästinaverein</i>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Palestine, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>-320;</li> -<li class="isub1">British mandate, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Palmerston, Viscount, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-177.</li> - -<li class="indx">Panderma, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pan-Germanism, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">support of Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>-137.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pan-Islamism, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pan-Slavism, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pan-Turanianism, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Parker, Alwyn, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Persia, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-240, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Persian Gulf, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">British strategic interests, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>-199, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>-212.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Koweit, Shatt-el-Arab, Anglo-Persian Oil Company.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Petroleum. (<i>See</i> Oil.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Pichon, Stephen, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pobêdonostsev, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Poincaré, Raymond, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Ponsot, M., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Potsdam Agreement, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-244.</li> - -<li class="indx">Pressel, Wilhelm von, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Propaganda, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>-282.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Quai d’Orsay</i>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Radek, Karl, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Railways, military value of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See</i> Abdul Hamid, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Ras el Ain, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rathmore, Lord, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rechnitzer, Ernest, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>-86, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Reparation Commission, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302.</li> - -<li class="indx">Repington, Colonel, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Revelstoke, Lord, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Reventlow, Count zu, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>-141.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rhodes, Cecil, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Richelieu, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Roosevelt, Theodore, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rosenberg, Baron von, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Rouvier, M., <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Russia, Near Eastern policies, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-153, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-244,</li> -<li class="isub2">315–318;</li> -<li class="isub1">attitude toward Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>-66, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-153;</li> -<li class="isub1">Potsdam Agreement with Germany, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>-244;</li> -<li class="isub1">entente with Great Britain and France, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>-159, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialism, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>-153, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>-168, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-241, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>-279;</li> -<li class="isub1">spheres of interest defined by secret treaties, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">Soviet Republic and the Near East, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>-318.</li> - -<li class="indx">Russo-Japanese War, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Russo-Turkish War of 1877, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Sadijeh, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Samarra, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Samsun, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sanders, Field Marshal Liman von, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">San Remo Conference, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">San Remo Oil Agreement, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sarolea, Charles, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sazonov, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Scheidemann, Philip, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Schoen, Baron von, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>-102, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>-131.</li> - -<li class="indx">Seljuk Turks, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sericulture. (<i>See</i> Silk.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Shatt-el-Arab, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sherif of Mecca, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Siemens, Carl von, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Siemens, George von, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Silk, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Simplon-Orient Express, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sinai Peninsula, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sivas, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Slav Peril, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Smith, Sir Henry Babington, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_227">227</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Smyrna, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Smyrna-Aidin Railway, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>-60, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société d’exploitation des chemins de fer de Cilicie-Nord Syrie</i>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société du chemin de fer de Damas-Hama et prolongements</i>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société du chemin de fer ottomane d’Anatolie.</i> (<i>See</i> Anatolian Railway.)</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société française de Heraclée</i>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société impériale ottomane du chemin de fer de Bagdad.</i> (<i>See</i> Bagdad Railway Company.)</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société pour la construction et l’exploitation du réseau de la Mer Noire.</i> (<i>See</i> Black Sea Railways.)</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Société pour enterprises électriques en Orient</i>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Soma, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Soma-Panderma Railway, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Speyer, Edward B. von, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Spheres of influence, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Stahlwerksverband</i>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Standard Oil Company, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Stemrich, Herr, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sublime Porte, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Subsidies, railroad, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>-80.</li> - -<li class="indx">Suez Canal, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-28, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Suleiman the Magnificent, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Suleimanieh, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sykes, Sir Mark, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>-273, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Sykes-Picot Treaty, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-294, <a href="#Page_310">310</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Syria, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">railways of, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>-246, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-249, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">military campaigns, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">French sphere of interest, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-294;</li> -<li class="isub1">French mandate, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Tardieu, André, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>-170, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>-268.</li> - -<li class="indx">Taurus Mountains, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tchoban Bey, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Teheran, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tekrit, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Thrace, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tigris River, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Lynch Brothers.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Tireboli, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Townshend, General Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trade routes, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trans-Caspian Railway, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trans-Caucasian Railways, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trans-Persian Railway, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trans-Siberian Railway, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Berlin (1878), <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>-163.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Bucharest (1913), <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Lausanne (1912), <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of London (1915), <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Sèvres (1920), <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Treaty of Versailles (1919), <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Trebizond, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tripartite Agreement (Great Britain, France, Italy, 1920), <a href="#Page_301">301</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Triple Entente, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tripoli-in-Syria, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Tripolitan War, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Turco-Italian Treaty (March, 1921), <a href="#Page_324">324</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Turkey, agricultural conditions, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>-16, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-232;</li> -<li class="isub1">industrial backwardness, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>-13;</li> -<li class="isub1">general economic conditions, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>-17, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>-234;</li> -<li class="isub1">finances (<i>see</i> Ottoman Public Debt Administration);</li> -<li class="isub1">mineral resources, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>-15, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">foreign trade, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>-107, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">alliance with Germany and Austria, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">entry into Great War, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>-278;</li> -<li class="isub1">as spoils of war, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>-281, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a>-295, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302;</li> -<li class="isub1">military campaigns of 1920–1922, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>-306;</li> -<li class="isub1">a republic, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>.</li> -<li class="isub1">(<i>See also</i> Ottoman Empire, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Grand National Assembly, Angora Treaty, Lausanne Conferences, etc.)</li> - -<li class="indx">Turkish Petroleum Company, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Union and Progress, Committee of, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">United States of America, railroad subsidies, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">economic changes since the Great War, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-338;</li> -<li class="isub1">American interests in the Near East, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-338</li> -<li class="isub2">(<i>see also</i> Chester concessions);</li> -<li class="isub1">naval activity in Near East, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>-347;</li> -<li class="isub1">outlook for American imperialism, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-338, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>-350.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Van, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Wangenheim, Baron von, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Washington Conference (1921), <a href="#Page_329">329</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Weygand, General, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Wilhelmstrasse</i>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Willcocks, Sir William, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>-215, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>-221.</li> - -<li class="indx">William II, German Emperor, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">imperialistic policies of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-40, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>-52, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>;</li> -<li class="isub1">visits to Turkey, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-44, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>-135;</li> -<li class="isub1">and Bagdad Railway concession of 1899, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Wilson, Woodrow, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Witte, Count, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>-150.</li> - -<li class="indx"><i>Württembergische Vereinsbank</i>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.</li> - -<li class="ifrst"><i>Young Turks</i>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-111, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>-218;</li> -<li class="isub1">hostility to Germans, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>-224;</li> -<li class="isub1">financial difficulties, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-229;</li> -<li class="isub1">efforts to conciliate France and Great Britain, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-261;</li> -<li class="isub1">hostility to imperialism, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Young Turk Revolution, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Youmourtalik, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>-341.</li> - -<li class="ifrst">Zander, Dr. Kurt, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Zihni Pasha, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Zinoviev, M., <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.</li> - -<li class="indx">Zubeir, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>.</li> -</ul> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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