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diff --git a/old/66221-0.txt b/old/66221-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 4953ce0..0000000 --- a/old/66221-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13589 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad -Railway, by Edward Mead Earle - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway - A study in imperialism - -Author: Edward Mead Earle - -Release Date: September 5, 2021 [eBook #66221] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Turgut Dincer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at - https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images - generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND THE -BAGDAD RAILWAY *** - - -[Illustration: TURKISH RAILWAYS IN 1918] - - TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, - AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY - -[Illustration: ·The MM C^o·] - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS · - ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO - - MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED - - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA · - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - - TORONTO - - - - - Turkey, The Great Powers, - and - The Bagdad Railway - - _A Study in Imperialism_ - - - BY - - EDWARD MEAD EARLE, PH.D. - - ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN - COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - - - New York - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - 1924 - - _All rights reserved_ - - PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - - COPYRIGHT, 1923, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - - Set up and electrotyped. Published July, 1923. - - _Reprinted_ _July, 1924_ - - - Press of - J. J. Little & Ives Company - New York, U. S. A. - -“When the history of the latter part of the nineteenth century will -come to be written, one event will be singled out above all others for -its intrinsic importance and for its far-reaching results; namely, the -conventions of 1899 and of 1902 between His Imperial Majesty the Sultan -of Turkey and the German Company of the Anatolian Railways.”—Charles -Sarolea, _The Bagdad Railway and German Expansion as a Factor in -European Politics_ (Edinburgh, 1907), p. 3. - -“The Turkish Government, I know, have been accused of being corrupt. I -venture to submit that it has not been for want of encouragement from -Europeans that the Turks have been corrupt. The sinister—I think it is -not going too far to use that word—effect of European financiers on -Turkey has had more to do with the misgovernment than any Turk, young -or old.”—Sir Mark Sykes, in the House of Commons, March 18, 1914. - - - - -PREFACE - - -The Chester concessions and the Anglo-American controversy regarding -the Mesopotamian oilfields are but two conspicuous instances of the -rapid development of American activity in the Near East. Turkey, -already an important market for American goods, gives promise of -becoming a valuable source of raw materials for American factories -and a fertile field for the investment of American capital. Thus -American religious interests in the Holy Land, American educational -interests in Anatolia and Syria, and American humanitarian interests -in Armenia, are now supplemented by substantial American economic -interests in the natural resources of Asia Minor. Political stability -and economic progress in Turkey no longer are matters of indifference -to business men and politicians in the United States; therefore the -Eastern Question—so often a cause of war—assumes a new importance to -Americans. This book will have served a useful purpose if—in discussing -the conflicting political, cultural, and economic policies of the Great -Powers in the Near East during the past three decades—it contributes to -a sympathetic understanding of a very complicated problem and suggests -to the reader some dangers which American statesmanship would do well -to avoid. Students of history and international relations will find in -the story of the Bagdad Railway a laboratory full of rich materials -for an analysis of modern economic imperialism and its far-reaching -consequences. - -The assistance of many persons who have been intimately associated -with the Bagdad Railway has enabled the author to examine records -and documents not heretofore available to the historian. To these -persons the author is glad to assign a large measure of any credit -which may accrue to this book as an authoritative and definitive -account of German railway enterprises in the Near East. He wishes -especially to mention: Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, of the _Deutsche Bank_, -president of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies; Dr. Karl -Helfferich, formerly Imperial German Minister of Finance, erstwhile -managing director of the _Deutsche Bank_, and at present a member of -the Reichstag; Sir Henry Babington Smith, an associate of the late -Sir Ernest Cassel, a director of the Bank of England, president of -the National Bank of Turkey, and at one time representative of the -British bondholders on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; Djavid -Bey, Ottoman Minister of Finance during the régime of the Young Turks, -an economic expert at the first Lausanne Conference, and at present -Turkish representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; Mr. -Ernest Rechnitzer, a banker of Paris and London, a competitor for the -Bagdad Railway concession in 1898–1899; Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester, -of the United States Navy (retired), beneficiary of the “Chester -concessions.” - -Valuable assistance in the collection and preparation of material has -been rendered, also, by the following persons, to whom the author -expresses his grateful appreciation: Sir Charles P. Lucas, director, -and Mr. Evans Lewin, librarian, of the Royal Colonial Institute; Sir -John Cadman, director of His Majesty’s Petroleum Department; Professor -George Young, of the University of London, formerly attaché of the -British embassy at Constantinople; Mr. Charles V. Sheehan, sub-manager -in London of the National City Bank of New York; Mr. M. Zekeria, -chief of the Turkish Information Service in the United States; Mr. -René A. Wormser, an American attorney who assisted the author in -research work in Germany during the summer of 1922. Dr. Gottlieb Betz, -of Columbia University, and Dr. John Mez, American correspondent of -the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, have aided in the translation of important -documents. - -Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and William R. Shepherd, of Columbia -University, have been patient advisers and judicious critics of the -author during the preparation of his manuscript. To them he owes much, -as teachers who stimulated his interest in international relations, -and as colleagues who cheerfully coöperate in any useful enterprise. -Professor Parker Thomas Moon, of Columbia University, also has read the -manuscript and offered many valuable suggestions. - - EDWARD MEAD EARLE - - Columbia University - June, 1923 - - - - -CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER PAGE - - I AN ANCIENT TRADE ROUTE IS REVIVED 1 - - - II BACKWARD TURKEY INVITES ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION 9 - - Turkish Sovereignty is a Polite Formality 9 - - The Natural Wealth of Asiatic Turkey Offers Alluring - Opportunities 13 - - Forces Are at Work for Regeneration 17 - - - III GERMANS BECOME INTERESTED IN THE NEAR EAST 29 - - The First Rails Are Laid 29 - - The Traders Follow the Investors 35 - - The German Government Becomes Interested 38 - - German Economic Interests Make for Near Eastern - Imperialism 45 - - - IV THE SULTAN MORTGAGES HIS EMPIRE 58 - - The Germans Overcome Competition 58 - - The Bagdad Railway Concession is Granted 67 - - The Locomotive is to Supplant the Camel 71 - - The Sultan Loosens the Purse-Strings 75 - - Some Turkish Rights Are Safeguarded 81 - - - V PEACEFUL PENETRATION PROGRESSES 92 - - The Financiers Get Their First Profits 92 - - The Bankers’ Interests Become More Extensive 97 - - Broader Business Interests Develop 101 - - Sea Communications Are Established 107 - - - VI THE BAGDAD RAILWAY BECOMES AN IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE 120 - - Political Interests Come to the Fore 120 - - Religious and Cultural Interests Reënforce Political - and Economic Motives 131 - - Some Few Voices Are Raised in Protest 137 - - - VII RUSSIA RESISTS AND FRANCE IS UNCERTAIN 147 - - Russia Voices Her Displeasure 147 - - The French Government Hesitates 153 - - French Interests Are Believed to be Menaced 157 - - The Bagdad Railway Claims French Supporters 165 - - - VIII GREAT BRITAIN BLOCKS THE WAY 176 - - Early British Opinions Are Favorable 176 - - The British Government Yields to Pressure 180 - - Vested Interests Come to the Fore 189 - - Imperial Defence Becomes the Primary Concern 195 - - British Resistance is Stiffened by the Entente 202 - - - IX THE YOUNG TURKS ARE WON OVER 217 - - A Golden Opportunity Presents Itself to the Entente - Powers 217 - - The Germans Achieve a Diplomatic Triumph 222 - - The German Railways Justify Their Existence 229 - - The Young Turks Have Some Mental Reservations 235 - - - X BARGAINS ARE STRUCK 239 - - The Kaiser and the Tsar Agree at Potsdam 239 - - French Capitalists Share in the Spoils 244 - - The Young Turks Conciliate Great Britain 252 - - British Imperial Interests Are Further Safeguarded 258 - - Diplomatic Bargaining Fails to Preserve Peace 266 - - - XI TURKEY, CRUSHED TO EARTH, RISES AGAIN 275 - - Nationalism and Militarism Triumph at Constantinople 275 - - Asiatic Turkey Becomes One of the Stakes of the War 279 - - Germany Wins Temporary Domination of the Near East 287 - - “Berlin to Bagdad” Becomes but a Memory 292 - - To the Victors Belong the Spoils 300 - - “The Ottoman Empire is Dead. Long Live Turkey!” 303 - - - XII THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGDAD RAILWAY IS RESUMED 314 - - Germany is Eliminated and Russia Withdraws 314 - - France Steals a March and is Accompanied by Italy 318 - - British Interests Acquire a Claim to the Bagdad - Railway 327 - - America Embarks on an Uncharted Sea 336 - - INDEX 355 - - - MAPS - - The Railways of Asiatic Turkey _Frontispiece_ - - The Chester Concessions 340 - - - TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, - AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY - -TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY - -A Study in Imperialism - - - - -CHAPTER I - -AN ANCIENT TRADE ROUTE IS REVIVED - - -Many a glowing tale has been told of the great Commercial Revolution -of the sixteenth century and of the consequent partial abandonment of -the trans-Asiatic trade routes to India in favor of the newer routes -by water around the Cape of Good Hope. It is sometimes overlooked, -however, that a commercial revolution of the nineteenth century, -occasioned by the adaptation of the steam engine to land and marine -transportation, was of perhaps equal significance. Cheap carriage by -the ocean greyhound instead of the stately clipper, by locomotive-drawn -trains instead of stage-coach and caravan, made possible the -extension of trade to the innermost and outermost parts of the earth -and increased the volume of the world’s commerce to undreamed of -proportions. This latter commercial revolution led not only to the -opening of new avenues of communication, but also to the regeneration -of trade-routes which had been dormant or decayed for centuries. -During the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, the -medieval trans-Asiatic highways to the East were rediscovered. - -The first of these medieval trade-routes to be revived by modern -commerce was the so-called southern route. In the fifteenth century -curious Oriental craft had brought their wares from eastern Asia -across the Indian Ocean and up the Red Sea to some convenient port -on the Egyptian shore; here their cargoes were trans-shipped _via_ -caravan to Alexandria and Cairo, marts of trade with the European -cities of the Mediterranean. The completion of the Suez Canal, in -1869, transformed this route of medieval merchants into an avenue of -modern transportation, incidentally realizing the dream of Portuguese -and Spanish explorers of centuries before—a short, all-water route to -the Indies. Less than forty years later the northern route of medieval -commerce—from the “back doors” of China and India to the plains of -European Russia—was opened to the twentieth-century locomotive. -With the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1905 the old -caravan trails were paralleled with steel rails. The Trans-Siberian -system linked Moscow and Petrograd with Vladivostok and Pekin; the -Trans-Caspian and Trans-Persian railways stretched almost to the -mountain barrier of northern India; the Trans-Caucasian lines provided -the link between the Caspian and Black Seas. - -The heart of the central route of Eastern trade in the fifteenth -century was the Mesopotamian Valley. Oriental sailing vessels -brought commodities up the Persian Gulf to Basra and thence up the -Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris to Bagdad. At this point the route -divided, one branch following the valley of the Tigris to a point north -of Mosul and thence across the desert to Aleppo; another utilizing -the valley of the Euphrates for a distance before striking across the -desert to the ports of Syria; another crossing the mountains into -Persia. From northern Mesopotamia and northern Syria caravans crossed -Armenia and Anatolia to Constantinople. This historic highway—the -last of the three great medieval trade-routes to be opened to modern -transportation—was traversed by the Bagdad Railway. The locomotive -provided a new short cut to the East. - -That a commercial revolution of the nineteenth century should revive -the old avenues of trade with the East was a matter of the utmost -importance to all mankind. To the Western World the expansion of -European commerce and the extension of Occidental civilization were -incalculable, but certain, benefits. Statesmen and soldiers, merchants -and missionaries alike might hail the new railways and steamship -lines as entitled to a place among the foremost achievements of the -age of steel and steam. To the East, also, closer contacts with the -West held out high hopes for an economic and cultural renaissance -of the former great civilizations of the Orient. Alas, however, the -reopening of the medieval trade-routes served to create new arenas -of imperial friction, to heighten existing international rivalries, -and to widen the gulf of suspicion and hate already hindering cordial -relationships between the peoples of Europe and the peoples of Asia. -Economic rivalries, military alliances, national pride, strategic -maneuvers, religious fanaticism, racial prejudices, secret diplomacy, -predatory imperialism—these and other formidable obstacles blocked the -road to peaceful progress and promoted wars and rumors of wars. The -purchase of the Suez Canal by Disraeli was but the first step in the -acquisition of Egypt, an imperial experiment which cost Great Britain -thousands of lives, which more than once brought the empire to the -verge of war with France, and which colored the whole character of -British diplomacy in the Middle East for forty years. No sooner was -the Trans-Siberian Railway completed than it involved Russia in a war -with Japan. So it was destined to be with the Bagdad Railway. Itself a -project of great promise for the economic and political regeneration -of the Near East, it became the source of bitter international -rivalries which contributed to the outbreak of the Great War. It is one -of the tragedies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that the -Trans-Siberian Railway, the Suez Canal, and the Bagdad Railway—potent -instruments of civilization for the promotion of peaceful progress and -material prosperity—could not have been constructed without occasioning -imperial friction, political intrigues, military alliances, and armed -conflict. - -The geographical position of the Ottoman Empire, the enormous potential -wealth of its dominions, and the political instability of the Sultan’s -Government contributed to make the Bagdad Railway one of the foremost -imperial problems of the twentieth century. At the time of the Bagdad -Railway concession of 1903 Turkey held dominion over the Asiatic -threshold of Europe, Anatolia, and the European threshold of Asia, the -Balkan Peninsula. Constantinople, the capital of the empire, was the -economic and strategic center of gravity for the Black Sea and eastern -Mediterranean basins. By possession of northern Syria and Mesopotamia, -the Sultan controlled the “central route” of Eastern trade throughout -its entire length from the borders of Austria-Hungary to the shores -of the Persian Gulf. The contiguity of Ottoman territory to the Sinai -Peninsula and to Persia held out the possibility of a Turkish attack -on the Suez and trans-Persian routes to India and the Far East. In -fact, the Sultan’s dominions from Macedonia to southern Mesopotamia -constituted a broad avenue of communication, an historic world highway, -between the Occident and the Orient. To a strong nation, this position -would have been a source of strength. To a weak nation it was a source -of weakness. As Gibraltar and Suez and Panama were staked out by -the empire-builders, so were Constantinople and Smyrna and Koweit. -Strategically, the region traversed by the Bagdad Railway is one of the -most important in the world. - -Turkey-in-Asia, furthermore, was wealthy. It possessed vast resources -of some of the most essential materials of modern industry: minerals, -fuel, lubricants, abrasives. Its deposits of oil alone were enough to -arouse the cupidity of the Great Powers. Irrigation, it was believed, -would accomplish wonders in the revival of the ancient fertility of -Mesopotamia. By the development of the country’s latent agricultural -wealth and the utilization of its industrial potentialities, it was -anticipated that the Ottoman Empire would prove a valuable source of -essential raw materials, a satisfactory market for finished products, -and a rich field for the investment of capital. Economically, the -territory served by the Bagdad Railway was one of the most important -undeveloped regions of the world. - -Neither the geographical position nor the economic wealth of the -Ottoman Empire, however, need have been a cause for its exploitation -by foreigners. Had the Sultan’s Government been strong—powerful enough -to present determined resistance to domestic rebellion and foreign -intrigue—Turkey would not have been an imperial problem. But Abdul -Hamid and his successors, the Young Turks, showed themselves incapable -of governing a vast empire and a heterogeneous population. They were -unable to resist the encroachments of foreigners on the administrative -independence of their country or to defend its borders against foreign -invasion. That the Ottoman Empire, under these circumstances, should -fall a prey to the imperialism of the Western nations was to be -expected. Its strategic importance was a “problem” of military and -naval experts. Its wealth was an irresistible lure to investors. Its -political instability was the excuse offered by European nations for -intervening in the affairs of the empire on behalf of the financial -interests of the business men or the strategic interests of the -empire-builders. Diplomatically, then, the region traversed by the -Bagdad Railway was an international “danger zone.” - -The problem of maintaining stable government in Turkey was complicated -by the religious heritage of the Ottoman Empire. It was the homeland of -the Jews, the birthplace of Christianity, the cradle of Mohammedanism. -European crusaders had waged war to free the Holy Land from Moslem -desecrators; the followers of the Prophet had shed their blood in -defence of this sacred soil against infidel invaders; the sons of -Israel looked forward to a revival of Jewish national life in this, -their Zion. It is small wonder that Turkey-in-Asia was a great field -for missions—Protestant missions to convert the Mohammedan to the -teachings of Christ; Catholic missions to win over, as well, the -schismatics; Orthodox missions to retain the loyalty of adherents to -the Greek Church. Despite their cultural importance in the development -of modern Turkey, the missions presented serious political problems -to the Sultan. They hindered the development of Turkish nationalism -by teaching foreign languages, by strengthening the separatist spirit -of the religious minorities, and by introducing Occidental ideas and -customs. They weakened the autocracy by idealizing the democratic -institutions of the Western nations. They occasioned international -complications, arising out of diplomatic protection of the missionaries -themselves and the racial and religious minorities in whose interest -the missions were maintained. In no country more than in Turkey -have the emissaries of religion proved to be so valuable—however -unwittingly—as advance pickets of imperialism. - -Complicating and bewildering as the Near Eastern question always has -been, the construction of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways made -it the more complicating and bewildering. The development of rail -transportation in the Ottoman Empire was certain to raise a new crop -of problems: the strategic problem of adjusting military preparations -to meet new conditions; the economic problem of exploiting the great -natural wealth of Turkey-in-Asia; the political problem of prescribing -for a “Sick Man” who was determined to take iron as a tonic. These -problems, of course, were international as well as Ottoman in their -aspects. The economic and diplomatic advance of Germany in the Near -East, the resurgent power of Turkey, the military coöperation between -the Governments of the Kaiser and the Sultan were not matters which -the other European powers were disposed to overlook. Russia, pursuing -her time-honored policy, objected to any bolstering up of the Ottoman -Empire. France looked with alarm upon the advent of another power in -Turkish financial affairs and, in addition, was desirous of promoting -the political ambitions of her ally, Russia. Great Britain became -fearful of the safety of her communications with India and Egypt. Thus -the Bagdad Railway overstepped the bounds of Turco-German relationships -and became an international diplomatic problem. It was a concern of -foreign offices as well as counting houses, of statesmen and soldiers -as well as engineers and bankers. - -The year 1888 ushered in an epoch of three decades during which two -cross-currents were at work in Turkey. On the one hand, earnest efforts -were made by Turks, old and young, to bring about the political and -economic regeneration of their country. On the other, the steady growth -of Balkan nationalism, the relentless pressure of European imperialism, -and the devastation of the Great War gradually reduced to ruins the -once great empire of Suleiman the Magnificent. The history of those -three decades is concerned largely with the struggles of European -capitalists to acquire profitable concessions in Asiatic Turkey and -of European diplomatists to control the finances, the vital routes -of communication, and even the administrative powers of the Ottoman -Government. The coincidence between the economic motives of the -investors and the political and strategical motives of the statesmen, -made Turkey one of the world’s foremost areas of imperial friction. Its -territories and its natural wealth were “stakes of diplomacy” for which -cabinets maneuvered on the diplomatic checkerboard and for which the -flower of the world’s manhood fought on the sands of Mesopotamia, the -cliffs of Gallipoli, and the plains of Flanders. To tell the story of -the Bagdad Railway is to emphasize perhaps the most important single -factor in the history of Turkey during the last thirty eventful years. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -BACKWARD TURKEY INVITES ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION - - -TURKISH SOVEREIGNTY IS A POLITE FORMALITY - -The reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) began with a disastrous -foreign war; it terminated in the turmoil of revolution. And during the -intervening three decades of his régime the Ottoman Empire was forced -to wage a fight for its very existence—a fight against disintegration -from within and against dismemberment from without. - -One of the principal problems of Abdul Hamid was the government of his -vast empire in spite of domestic dissension and foreign interference. -His subjects were a polyglot collection of peoples, bound together -by few, if any, common ties, obedient to the Sultan’s will only when -overawed by military force. In Turkey-in-Asia alone, Turks, Arabs, -Armenians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks combined to form a conglomerate -population, professing a variety of religious faiths, speaking a -diversity of languages and dialects, and adhering to their own -peculiar social customs. Of these, the Armenians were receiving the -sympathy, support, and encouragement of Russia; the Kurds were living -by banditry, terrorizing peasants and traders alike; the Arabs were in -open revolt.[1] - -Nature seemed to make more difficult the task of bringing these -dissentient peoples under subjection. The mountainous relief of the -Anatolian plateau lent itself to the success of guerrilla bands -against the gendarmerie; a high mountain barrier separated Anatolia, -the homeland of the Turks, from the hills and deserts of Syria and -Mesopotamia, the strongholds of the Arabs. The vast extent of the -empire—it is as far from Constantinople to Mocha as it is from New -York to San Francisco—still further complicated an already tangled -problem, for there were not even the poorest means of communication. -Under these circumstances the authority of the Sultan was as often -disregarded as obeyed. To police the country from the Adriatic to -the Indian Ocean, from the borders of Persia to the eastern coast of -the Mediterranean, was a physical impossibility. Universal military -service was enforced only in the less rebellious provinces. It was -almost out of the question to mobilize the military strength of the -empire for defence against foreign invasion or for the suppression of -domestic insurrection. Efforts to build up effective administration -from Constantinople were paralyzed by incompetent, insubordinate, and -corrupt officials.[2] - -To these problems of maintaining peace and order at home there was -added the equally difficult problem of preventing the extension of -foreign interference and control in Ottoman affairs. The integrity -of Turkey already was seriously compromised by the hold which the -Great Powers possessed on Turkish governmental functions. Under the -Capitulations foreigners occupied a special and privileged position -within the Ottoman Empire. Nationals of the European nations and the -United States were practically exempt from taxation; they could be -tried for civil and criminal offences only under the laws of their own -country and in courts under the jurisdiction of their own diplomatic -and consular officials; in fact, they enjoyed favors comparable to -diplomatic immunity. By virtue of treaties with the Sultan the Powers -exercised numerous extra-territorial rights in Turkey, such, for -example, as the maintenance of their own postal systems.[3] - -The finances of Turkey, furthermore, were under the control of -the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, composed almost entirely -of representatives of foreign bondholders and responsible only to -them. The Council of Administration of the Public Debt—composed of -one representative each from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, -Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey—had complete control of assessment, -collection, and expenditure of certain designated revenues. In fact, -it controlled Ottoman financial policy and exercised its control in -the interest of European bankers and investors. Customs duties of -the Sultan’s dominions might be increased only with the consent of -the Great Powers. Almost all administrative and financial questions -in Turkey were directly or indirectly subject to the sanction of -foreigners.[4] - -European governments were not content to interfere in the affairs of -the Ottoman Empire. They sought to destroy it. Their zeal in this -latter respect was limited only by their jealousies as to who should -become the heir of the Sick Man. Russia encouraged the Balkan and -Transcaucasian peoples to resist Turkish domination; France acquired -control of Tunis and built up a sphere of interest in Syria; Great -Britain occupied Egypt; Italy cast longing glances at Tripoli and -finally seized it; Greece fomented insurrection in Crete. Germany and -Austria-Hungary sought to bring all of Turkey into the economic and -political orbit of Central Europe. The Powers rendered lip-service to -the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, -but they never allowed their solemn professions to interfere with their -imperial practices. At best Turkish sovereignty was a polite fiction—it -was always a fiction, if not always polite. - -The economic backwardness of Turkey emphasized the existing political -confusion and instability. From one end of the empire to the other, -it seemed, obstacle was piled on obstacle to prevent the modernizing -of the nation. Brigandage made trade hazardous; there were almost no -roads; the rivers of Anatolia and Cilicia were not navigable; the -mineral resources of the country had been neglected; internal and -foreign customs duties were the last straws to break the camel’s -back—business was taxed to death. Agriculture, the occupation of the -great majority of the people, was in a state of stagnation. The absence -of systems of drainage and irrigation made the countryside the victim -of alternate floods and droughts. Methods of cultivation were archaic: -the wooden plow, used by the Hittites centuries before, was among the -most advanced types of agricultural implements in use in Anatolia and -Syria; harvesting and threshing were performed in the most antiquated -manner; fertilization and cultivation were practically unknown. Markets -were inaccessible; the peasant could not dispose of a surplus if he -had it; therefore, production was limited to the needs of the family, -and the Turkish peasant acquired a widespread reputation for inherent -laziness. - -Industrially, the Ottoman Empire had back of it a great past. The -fine and dainty fabrics of Mosul; the famous mosque lamps, wonder-art -of the glass-workers of Mesopotamia; the master workmanship of the -coppersmiths of Diarbekr; the tiles of Erzerum; the steel work and the -enamels of Damascus—all of these had been far-famed articles of world -commerce for centuries. But Turkey in the nineteenth and twentieth -centuries was, industrially as well as politically, a “backward -nation.” Her manufactures were conducted under the time-honored -handicraft system, which long since had been discarded by her European -neighbors. In other words, Turkey had not experienced the Industrial -Revolution which was the modern foundation of Western society and -civilization. But Turkey was victimized by the Industrial Revolution. -Her manufactures—with the exception of some luxuries of incomparable -craftsmanship—produced by outworn methods, found it increasingly -difficult to compete even in the markets of the Ottoman Empire with the -cheaper machine-made goods of Europe. The pitiless competition of the -industrialized West eliminated the cottage spinner and weaver, the town -tailor and cobbler. And yet for Turkey to adopt European methods—to -introduce the machine, the factory, and the factory town—was for a time -impracticable. There was no mobile fund of capital for the purpose, -and even Young Turks were not in a position to furnish the necessary -technical skill. As for foreign capital and foreign directing genius, -they could be obtained only under promises and guarantees which might -still further jeopardize the independence of the Ottoman Empire.[5] - - -THE NATURAL WEALTH OF ASIATIC TURKEY OFFERS ALLURING OPPORTUNITIES - -It was not because of a lack of natural resources that Turkey was a -“backward nation.” The Sultan’s Asiatic dominions were rich in raw -materials, in fuel, and in agricultural possibilities. Anatolia, for -example, is a great storehouse of important metals. A fine quality of -chrome ore is to be found in the region directly south of the Sea -of Marmora and in Cilicia, constituting sources of supply which were -sufficient to assure Turkey first position among the chrome-producing -nations until 1900, when exports from Russia and Rhodesia offered -serious competition. There are valuable deposits of antimony in the -vilayets of Brusa and Smyrna, as well as commercially profitable lead -and zinc mines near Brusa, Ismid, and Konia. These metals, particularly -chrome and antimony, are not only valuable for peace-time industry, but -are almost indispensable in the manufacture of armor-plate, shells and -shrapnel, guns, and armor-piercing projectiles.[6] - -In the vicinity of Diarbekr there are mines, which, although not -entirely surveyed, promise to yield large supplies of copper. -Southern Anatolia is the world’s greatest source of emery and other -similar abrasives. The famous meerschaum mines near Eski Shehr enjoy -practically a universal monopoly. Boracite, mercury, nickel, iron, -manganese, sulphur, and other minerals are to be found in Anatolia, -although there is some question of the commercial possibilities of the -deposits.[7] - -Although Anatolia is not ranked among the principal fuel-producing -countries of the world, its coal deposits are not inconsiderable. -Operation of the chief of the coalfields, in the vicinity of Heraclea, -was begun in 1896 by a French corporation, _La Société française -d’Héraclée_, which invested in the enterprise during the succeeding -seven years more than a million francs. The venture proved to be -profitable, for by 1910 the mines were producing in excess of half a -million tons of coal annually. In addition to coal, Anatolia possesses -large deposits of lignite which, mixed with coal, is suitable fuel for -ships, locomotives, gasworks, and factories.[8] - -Oil exists in large quantities in Mesopotamia and in smaller quantities -in Syria. The deposits are said to be part of a vast petroliferous area -stretching from the shores of the Caspian Sea to the coast of Burma. -As early as 1871 a commission of experts visited the valleys of the -Tigris and the Euphrates for the purpose of studying the possibility -of immediate exploitation of the petroleum wells in that region. They -reported that although there was a plentiful supply of petroleum of -good quality, difficulties of transportation made it extremely doubtful -if the Mesopotamian fields could compete with the Russian and American -at that time. The oil supply was then being exploited on a small scale -by the Arabs and proved to be of sufficient local importance, as well -as of sufficient profit, to warrant its being taken over by the Ottoman -Civil List, in 1888, as a government monopoly.[9] - -In 1901 a favorable report by a German technical commission on -Mesopotamian petroleum resources stated that the region was a veritable -“lake of petroleum” of almost inexhaustible supply. It would be -advisable, it was pointed out, to develop these oilfields if for no -other purpose than to break the grip of the “omnipotent Standard,” -which, in combination with Russian interests, might speedily monopolize -the world’s supply.[10] Shortly afterward, Dr. Paul Rohrbach, a -celebrated German publicist, visited the Mesopotamian valley and -wrote that the district seemed to be “virtually soaked with bitumen, -naphtha, and gaseous hydrocarbons.” He was of the opinion that the oil -resources of the region offered far greater opportunity for profitable -development than had the Russian Transcaucasian fields.[11] In 1904 -the _Deutsche Bank_, of Berlin, promoters of the Bagdad Railway, -obtained the privilege of making a thorough survey of the oilfields -of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, with the option within one year -of entering into a contract with the Ottoman Government for their -exploitation.[12] Shortly thereafter Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester, of -the United States Navy, became interested in the development of the oil -industry in Asiatic Turkey.[13] - -The Near East possesses not only mineral wealth but potential -agricultural wealth as well. Mesopotamia, for example, gives promise -of becoming one of the world’s chief cotton-growing regions. In -antiquity the Land of the Two Rivers was an important center of cotton -production, and recent experiments have held out great inducements for -a revival of cotton culture there. The climate of Mesopotamia is ideal -for such a purpose. The length of the summer season is from six to -seven months, with a constantly rising temperature, as contrasted with -a shorter season and variable temperatures in America and Egypt. Frost -is almost unknown. Rainfall is plentiful during the early part of the -year and scarce, as it should be, during the growing period. The soil -contains a good percentage of the essential phosphorus, potash, and -nitrogen. It is believed that Mesopotamia can grow cotton as good as -the best Egyptian and better than the best American product and at a -considerably higher yield per acre.[14] - -Extravagant prophecies have been made regarding the rôle of irrigation -in bringing about an agricultural renaissance in Turkey-in-Asia. A -writer in the Vienna _Zeit_ of August 31, 1901, predicted that as -soon as the economic effects of irrigation and of the Bagdad Railway -should be fully realized, “Anatolia, northern Syria, Mesopotamia, and -Irak together will export at least as much grain as all of Russia -exports to-day.” Dr. Rohrbach claimed that this probably would prove -to be an exaggeration, but that certainly Mesopotamia would become -one of the great granaries of the world.[15] Sir William Willcocks, -the distinguished English engineer who had planned and supervised the -construction of the famous irrigation works of the Nile, was no less -enthusiastic about the prospects of Mesopotamia. “With the Euphrates -and Tigris floods really controlled,” he wrote, “the delta of the two -rivers would attain a fertility of which history has no record; and we -should see men coming from the West, as well as from the East, making -the Plain of Shinar a rival of the land of Egypt. The flaming swords -of inundation and drought would have been taken out of the hands of -the offended Seraphim, and the Garden of Eden would have again been -planted.... Speaking in less poetical language we might say that the -value of every acre in the joint delta of the two rivers would be -immediately trebled before the irrigation works were carried out, -and again increased many fold more the day the works were completed. -Every town and hamlet in the valley from Bagdad to Basra would find -itself freed from the danger, expense, and intolerable nuisance of -flooding, and the resurrection of this ancient land would have been an -accomplished fact.”[16] - -Here in the Near East, then, was a great empire awaiting exploitation -by Western capital and Western technical skill. No man could adequately -predict its ultimate contributions in raw materials to Western -industry, or accurately foretell its ultimate capacity in consumption -of the products of Western factories, or confidently prophesy its -final rôle in the promotion of Western commerce. But a trained and -intelligent observer, surveying the situation at the opening of the -twentieth century, could have said with a certain amount of assurance -that there were two essential conditions to even a partial realization -of the economic possibilities of the Ottoman Empire: the provision of -adequate railway communications and the establishment of political -security. The former of these conditions was met, in part, during -the régime of Abdul Hamid and his successors, the Young Turks. The -second, in spite of earnest efforts by loyal Ottomans, has not yet been -satisfied. - - -FORCES ARE AT WORK FOR REGENERATION - -Probably there was no group of men more fully aware of the needs of -Turkey than the members of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. -They were concerned, it is true, solely with obtaining prompt payment -of interest and principal of Ottoman bonds and with improving Ottoman -credit in European financial markets. But the accomplishment of this -purpose, they realized, was altogether out of the question in the -continued presence of political instability and economic stagnation. -One must feed the goose which lays the golden eggs. They sought some -means, therefore, of establishing domestic order in the Ottoman Empire, -of lessening the constant danger of foreign invasion, and of providing -a tonic for the economic life of the nation. All of these purposes, -it was believed, would be served by the encouragement of railway -construction in Turkey. - -The interest and imagination of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration -were stimulated by the plans of the eminent German railway engineer -Wilhelm von Pressel, one of the Sultan’s technical advisers. Von -Pressel had established an international reputation because of his -services in the construction of important railways in Switzerland -and the Tyrol. In 1872 he was retained by the Ottoman Government to -develop plans for railways in Turkey, and a few years later he assumed -a prominent part in the construction of the trans-Balkan lines of the -Oriental Railways Company. No one knew more than von Pressel of the -railway problems of Turkey; few were more enthusiastic about the rôle -which rail communications might play in a renaissance of the Near East. - -Von Pressel foresaw the possibility of establishing a great system of -Ottoman railways extending from the borders of Austria-Hungary to the -shores of the Persian Gulf. In this manner the far-flung territories -of the empire would be brought into communication with one another -and with the capital, and an era would be begun of unprecedented -development in agriculture, mining, and commerce. A market would be -provided for the crops of the peasantry; the hinterland of the ports -of Constantinople, Smyrna, Mersina, Alexandretta, and Basra would -be opened up; heretofore inaccessible mineral resources would be -exploited. Foreign commerce might be restored to the prosperity it had -once enjoyed before the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century -replaced the caravan routes of the Near East by the new sea routes to -the Indies. Mesopotamia might be transformed into a veritable economic -paradise. The railways also would insure political stability, for rapid -mobilization and transportation of the gendarmerie to danger points -would enable the Sultan’s Government to suppress rebellions of the -turbulent tribesmen of Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Arabia. Peace and -prosperity were goals within easy reach, thought von Pressel, if Turkey -could be provided with a comprehensive system of railways.[17] - -To the Ottoman Public Debt Administration peace and prosperity were -means to reaching another goal—a full treasury. Greater income for -the Turkish farmer, miner, artisan, and trader would mean greater -opportunities for the extension of tax levies. And the greater the tax -receipts the greater would be the payments to the European bondholders -and the greater the value of the bonds themselves. Obviously, railway -construction would improve Turkish credit in the financial centers -of the world. But, for the time, the Ottoman Government had at its -disposal neither the capital nor the technical skill to carry into -execution the plans for an ambitious program of railway building, and -private enterprise showed no disposition to interest itself without -substantial guarantees. It was under these circumstances, therefore, -that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration recommended to the Sultan -that certain revenues of his empire should be set aside for the -payment of subsidies to railway companies.[18] - -The Public Debt Administration were not unaware that the payment of -railway subsidies would materially increase the amount of the imperial -debt and mortgage certain of the imperial revenues. But they were -confident that railways would be a powerful stimulant to economic -prosperity in Turkey and would ultimately increase the revenues of the -Government by an amount in excess of the amount of the subsidies. They -believed that generous initial expenditures in a worth-while enterprise -might yield generous final returns. As an instance of this they could -point to the development of sericulture in Turkey. Under the auspices -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration tens of thousands of dollars -were expended in the reclamation of more than 130,000 acres of land and -the planting thereon of over sixty million mulberry trees. As a result, -the silk crop increased more than tenfold during the years 1890–1910, -with a result that there was a corresponding increase in the 10% levy -(or tithe) on agricultural products in the regions affected. If the -Public Debt Administration were actuated by self-interest, at least it -was intelligent and far-sighted self-interest.[19] - -But Sultan Abdul Hamid was no less interested than foreign bondholders -in the extension of railway construction in his empire. Railways could -be utilized, he believed, to serve his dynastic and imperial ambitions. -Effective transportation was essential to the solution of at least -three vexatious political problems: first, the problem of exercising -real, as well as nominal, authority over rebellious and indifferent -subjects in Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan, Arabia, and other outlying -provinces; second, the problem of compelling these provinces, by -military force if necessary, to contribute their share of blood and -treasure to the defence of the empire;[20] third, the problem of -perfecting a plan of mobilization for war, on whatever front it might -be necessary to conduct hostilities. The maintenance of order, the -enforcement of universal military service, the collection of taxes in -all provinces of the empire, and defence against foreign invasion—all -of these policies would be seriously handicapped, if not paralyzed, by -the absence of adequate railway communications. - -For strategic reasons, if for no other, Abdul Hamid would have -especially favored the Bagdad Railway. For strategic reasons, also, -he supplemented the Bagdad system with the famous Hedjaz Railway—from -Damascus to the holy cities of Medina and Mecca—one of the achievements -of which the wily old Sultan was most proud.[21] The completion of -these two railways would have extended Turkish military power from the -Black Sea to the Persian Gulf, from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf. -General von der Goltz epitomized their military importance in the -following terms: “The great distance dividing the southern provinces -from the rest of the empire was not the only difficulty in holding -them in control; it made Turkey unable to concentrate her strength in -case of great danger in the north. It must not be forgotten that the -Osmanlie Empire in all former wars on the Danube and in the Balkans has -only been able to utilize half her forces. Not only did the far-off -provinces not contribute men, but, on the contrary, they necessitated -strong reënforcements to prevent the danger of their being tempted into -rebellion. This will be quite changed when the railroads to the Persian -Gulf and the Red Sea are completed. The empire will then be rejuvenated -and have renewed strength.”[22] The General might have added that the -new railways might conceivably be utilized for the transportation to -the Sinai Peninsula of an army intended to threaten the Suez Canal and -Egypt.[23] - -The Ottoman Government made it plain from the very start that the -Bagdad Railway, in particular, was intended to serve military, as -well as purely economic, purposes. The concession of 1903 contained a -number of explicit provisions regarding official commandeering of the -lines for the objects of suppressing rebellion, conducting military -maneuvers, or mobilizing in the event of war. Furthermore, the Ottoman -military authorities insisted that strategic considerations be taken -into account when the railway was constructed. For example, the -sections of the Bagdad line from Adana to Aleppo were carried through -the Amanus Mountains, in spite of formidable engineering difficulties -and enormous expense, although the railway could have been carried -along the Mediterranean coast with greater ease and economy. The latter -course, however, would have exposed to the guns of a hostile fleet the -jugular vein of Turkish rail communications. From an economic point of -view the Amanus tunnels were the most expensive and most unremunerative -part of the Bagdad Railway; strategically, they were indispensable. -This point was emphasized in 1908, when the Ottoman General Staff -refused to consider a proposal to divert the line from the mountain -passes to the shore.[24] - -One of the most frequent criticisms of Turkish railway enterprises in -general, and of the Bagdad Railway in particular, is that they were -military as well as economic in character. Such criticisms, however, -must be discounted, for potentially every railway is of military value. -And in the European countries few railways were constructed without -frank consideration of their adaptability to military purposes in time -of war. Railways, in fact, were one of the most important branches of -Europe’s “preparedness” for war. Which European nation, therefore, -was in a position to cast a stone at Turkey for adopting this lesson -from the civilized Occident? If the Ottoman Empire had a right to -prepare for defence against invasion, it had the right to make that -defence effective—at least until such time as its neighbors, Russia and -Austria, should abandon military measures of potential menace to Turkey. - -Germans and Turkish Nationalists contended that there was a certain -amount of cant in the righteous indignation of the Powers that Turkey -should become militaristic. Was Russia, they said, as much interested -in the welfare of Turkey as she was angered at the active measures -of the Sultan to prevent a Russian drive at Constantinople via the -southern shore of the Black Sea? Was France as much concerned with the -safety of Turkey as she was solicitous of the imperial interests of her -ally? Was Great Britain engaged in preserving the peace of the Near -East, or was she fearful of a stiffened Turkish defence of Mesopotamia -or of a Turkish thrust at Egypt?[25] For the Sultan to have admitted -that foreign powers had the right to dictate what measures he might -or might not take for the defence of his territories would have been -equivalent to a surrender of the last vestige of his sovereignty. -Obviously this was an admission he could not afford to make. - -Whatever else Abdul Hamid may have been, he was no fool. To assume -that this shrewd and unscrupulous autocrat walked into a German trap -when he granted the Bagdad Railway concession is naïve and absurd. -Abdul Hamid was not in the habit of giving things away, if he could -avoid it, without adequate compensation for himself and his empire. -As Lord Curzon said, there was no axiom dearer to the Sultan’s heart -than that charity not only begins, but stays, at home.[26] Abdul Hamid -knew that the granting of railway subsidies would mortgage his empire. -He knew that mortgages have their disadvantages, not the least of -which is foreclosure. But mortgages also have their advantages. Abdul -Hamid granted extensive railway concessions, carrying with them heavy -subsidies, because he hoped the new railways would strengthen his -authority within the Ottoman Empire and improve the political position -of Turkey in the Near East. - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Count L. Ostrorog, _The Turkish Problem_ (Paris, 1915, English -translation, London, 1919), Chapter II; Leon Dominian, _The Frontiers -of Language and Nationality in Europe_ (London, 1917); V. Bérard, _Le -Sultan, l’Islam, et les puissances_ (Paris, 1907), pp. 15 _et seq._; -E. Fazy, _Les Turcs d’aujourd’hui_ (Paris, 1898); A. Vamberry, _Das -Türkenvolk_ (Leipzig, 1885); A. Geiger, _Judaism and Islam_ (London, -1899). Regarding Arab nationalism, in particular, _cf._ N. Azoury, _Le -réveil de la nation arabe_ (Paris, 1905); E. Jung, _Les puissances -devant la révolte arabe_ (Paris, 1906). A fascinating tale of the -Arab separatist movement during the Great War is that of L. Thomas, -“Lawrence: the Soul of the Arabian Revolution,” in _Asia_ (New York), -April, May, June, 1920. _Cf._, also, H. S. Philby, _The Heart of -Arabia_ (2 volumes, New York, 1923). - -[2] There is a wealth of material upon the problems of the Ottoman -Empire during the reign of Abdul Hamid. In particular, consult the -following: A. Vamberry, _La Turquie d’aujourd’hui et d’avant quarante -ans_ (Paris, 1898); C. Hecquard, _La Turquie sous Abdul Hamid_ (Paris, -1901); G. Dory, _Abdul Hamid Intime_ (Paris, 1901); Sir Edwin Pears, -_The Life of Abdul Hamid_ (London, 1917); W. Miller, _The Ottoman -Empire, 1801–1913_ (Cambridge, 1913), Chapters XVI-XVIII; N. Verney and -G. Dambmann, _Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie, et -en Palestine_ (Paris, 1900); Baron von Oppenheim, _Von Mittelmeer zum -persischen Golfe_ (2 volumes, Berlin, 1899–1900); Lavisse and Rambaud, -_Histoire Générale_ (12 volumes, 1894–1901), Volume XI, Chapter XV; -Volume XII, Chapter XIV; R. Davey, _The Sultan and His Subjects_ -(London, 1897); V. Cardashian, _The Ottoman Empire of the Twentieth -Century_ (Albany, N. Y., 1908). - -[3] The texts of the various treaties of capitulation may be found in -G. E. Noradounghian (ed.), _Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire -ottoman, 1300–1902_ (4 volumes, Paris, 1897–1903), Volume I, documents -numbers 153, 170, 196, 201, etc., _ad lib._, Volume II, numbers 499, -593, etc., _ad lib._; also _Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane -avec les puissances étrangères, 1536–1901_ (10 volumes, Paris, -1864–1901), _passim_; E. A. Van Dyck, _Report on the Capitulations of -the Ottoman Empire_, Forty-seventh Congress, Special Session, Senate -Executive Document No. 3, First Session, Senate Executive Document -No. 87 (Washington, 1881–1882); G. Pelissie du Rausas, _Le régime des -capitulations dans l’Empire ottoman_ (2 volumes, Paris, 1902–1905); A. -R. von Overbeck, _Die Kapitulationen des osmanischen Reiches_ (Breslau, -1917); W. Lehman, _Die Kapitulationen_ (Weimar, 1917); P. M. Brown, -_Foreigners in Turkey, Their Juridical Status_ (Princeton, 1914). - -[4] For an account of the establishment, functions, and operation -of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, _cf._ George Young -(ed.), _Corps de droit ottoman—Recueil des codes, lois, réglements, -ordonnances, et actes les plus importants du droit intérieur, et -d’études sur le droit coutumier de l’Empire ottoman_ (7 volumes, -Oxford, 1905–1906), Volume V, Chapter LXXXV; A. Heidborn, _Manuel de -droit public et administratif de l’Empire ottoman_ (2 volumes, Vienna, -1912), Volume II; C. Morawitz, _Les finances de Turquie_ (Paris, 1902); -A. du Velay, _Essai sur l’histoire financière de la Turquie_ (Paris, -1903), Parts V and VI; L. Delaygue, _Essai sur les finances ottomanes_ -(Paris, 1911). - -[5] There were a few factories erected in Turkey by foreign -capitalists, notably those of the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers, -Ltd., the American Tobacco Company, and the _Deutsche-Levantischen -Baumwollgesellschaft_. In general, however, the factory and the factory -town were not common phenomena in Asiatic Turkey. An interesting -account of the effects of the Industrial Revolution upon economic -conditions in Turkey is that of Talcott Williams, _Turkey a World -Problem of Today_ (Garden City, 1921), pp. 268 _et seq._; W. S. -Monroe, _Turkey and the Turks: an Account of the Lands, Peoples and -Institutions of the Ottoman Empire_ (London, 1909), Chapter X; M. J. -Garnett, _Turkish Life in Town and Country_ (London, 1904). - -[6] J. E. Spurr (ed.), _Political and Commercial Geology_ (New York, -1921), pp. 109, 115–116, 172–173, 184–185; _Anatolia_, No. 17 in a -series of handbooks published by the Historical Section of the Foreign -Office (London, 1920), pp. 88–90. - -[7] Spurr, _op. cit._, pp. 358–359; _Armenia and Kurdistan_, No. 62 of -the Foreign Office Handbooks, p. 60; L. Dominian, “The Mineral Wealth -of Asia Minor,” in _The Near East_, May 26, 1916, p. 91; E. Banse, -_Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn_ (Weimar, 1913), pp. 140–145; L. de -Launay, _La Géologie et les richesses minerales de l’Asie_ (Paris, -1911); R. Fitzner, _Anatolien, Wirtschaftsgeographie_ (Berlin, 1902); -P. Rohrbach, _Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Westasiens_ (Halle, 1902); -G. Carles, _La Turquie économique_ (Paris, 1906); E. Mygind, “Anatolien -und seine wirtschaftliche Bedeutung,” in _Die Balkan Revue_, Volume 4 -(1917), pp. 1–6. - -[8] L. Dominian, “Fuel in Turkey: an Analysis of Coal Deposits,” in -_The Near East_, June 23, 1916, pp. 186–187; J. Kirsopp, “The Coal -Resources of the Near East,” _ibid._, October 10, 1919, pp. 393–394. - -[9] F. Maunsell, “The Mesopotamian Petroleum Field,” in the -_Geographical Journal_, Volume IX (1897), pp. 523–532; L. Dominian, -“Fuel in Turkey: Petroleum,” in _The Near East_, July 14, 1917; -_Mesopotamia_, No. 63 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, pp. 34, 85–86; -_Syria and Palestine_, No. 60 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, p. 111. - -[10] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1921, Cmd. 675; _The Near East_, October -26, 1917, p. 516. - -[11] _Die Bagdadbahn_ (1903), pp. 26–28. - -[12] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1921, Cmd. 675. For some reason or other -this option was allowed to lapse. - -[13] H. Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey,” in _Current -History_ (New York), Volume XV (1922), pp. 953–959. - -[14] _Report of the Department of Agriculture in Mesopotamia, 1920_ -(Bagdad, 1921); _The Cultivation of Cotton in Mesopotamia_ (Bagdad, -1922); “Cotton Growing in Mesopotamia,” in the _Bulletin of the -Imperial Institute_, Volume 18 (1920), pp. 73–82. - -[15] Rohrbach, _op. cit._, pp. 30–46. - -[16] Quoted in _The Near East_, October 6, 1916, pp. 545–546. For an -elaboration of the views of Sir William Willcocks see the following -of his books and articles: _The Recreation of Chaldea_ (Cairo, 1903); -_The Irrigation of Mesopotamia_ (London, 1905, and Constantinople, -1911); “Mesopotamia, Past, Present and Future,” in the _Geographical -Journal_, January, 1910, pp. 1–18. For further works on the economic -resources of Turkey-in-Asia consult, also, the following: K. H. Müller, -_Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn_ (Hamburg, 1917); L. -Blanckenhorn, _Syrien und die deutsche Arbeit_ (Weimar, 1916); L. -Schulmann, _Zur türkischen Agrarfrage_ (Weimar, 1916); A. Ruppin, -_Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet_ (Berlin, 1917). - -[17] W. von Pressel, _Les chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie_ (Zurich, -1902), pp. 4–5, 52–59, etc. _ad lib._ For statements of the importance -of von Pressel in the development of railways in Turkey _cf._ André -Chéradame, _La question d’Orient: la Macédoine, le chemin de fer -de Bagdad_ (Paris, 1903), pp. 25 _et seq._; C. A. Schaefer, _Die -Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik_ (Weimar, 1916), p. 13. - -[18] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 62–64. - -[19] Sir H. P. Caillard, Article “Turkey” in the _Encyclopedia -Britannica_, eleventh edition, Volume 27, p. 439; _Reports of the -Ottoman Public Debt_ (London, 1884 _et seq._), _passim._ - -[20] In Turkey all Mussulmans over 20 years of age were liable to -military service for a period of 20 years, 4 of which were with the -colors in the regular army. Residents in the outlying territories, -notably the Arabs and the Kurds, constantly avoided military service -and went unpunished because of the inability of the Government to send -punitive expeditions into these regions. Railways would have produced -satisfactory bases of operations for such expeditions and would have -shortened their lines of communication. _The Statesman’s Year Book_, -1903, pp. 1168–1170. - -[21] The Hedjaz Railway was a great national enterprise which indicated -the strength of Moslem feeling in Turkey and which proved the desire of -the Ottoman Government to construct national railways as far as capital -and technical skill could be obtained. So far as Abdul Hamid was -concerned, the railway was an attempt to gain prestige for his claim to -the Caliphate, as well as a move to strengthen his political position -in Syria and the Hedjaz. In April, 1900, the Sultan announced to the -Faithful his determination to construct a railway from Damascus to the -holy cities of Medina and Mecca. An appeal was issued to Mohammedans -the world over for funds to carry out the work. The Sultan headed the -list with a subscription of about a quarter of a million dollars, and -by 1904 over three and a half million dollars had been collected. The -only compulsory contributions were the levies of 10% on the salary -of every official in the civil and military service of the empire. -It is estimated that the contributions eventually amounted to almost -fifteen million dollars. The engineers in charge of the construction -were Italians, although the great bulk of the work was done by the army -and the peasantry. Nearly seven hundred thousand persons were employed -on the construction work at one time or another, the non-Moslems -being replaced as quickly as Mussulmans could be trained to take -their places. On August 31, 1908, the thirty-second anniversary of -the accession of Abdul Hamid, the railway was completed to Medina, -where construction was halted temporarily because of the Young -Turk Revolution and the international complications which followed -it. _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 242–244; A. Hamilton, -_Problems of the Middle East_ (London, 1909), pp. 273–292; _Annual -Register_, 1908, pp. 328–329. - -[22] Quoted by Hamilton, _op. cit._, pp. 274–275. - -[23] _Via_ the Bagdad Railway and the Syrian system Turkish troops -could have been transported to a point less than 200 miles from Suez. A -successful attack on the Canal, of course, would have severed British -communications with the East. In addition, it would have given the -Sultan an opportunity to attack, and assert his suzerainty over, Egypt. -Dr. Rohrbach made a great point of this alleged menace to the British -position in Egypt. _Cf._ _Die Bagdadbahn_, pp. 18–19; _German World -Policies_, pp. 165–167. This program, however, would have been an -altogether too ambitious one for the military strength of the Ottoman -Empire, which had such far-flung frontiers to defend. In any event, -British statesmen seemed to realize that the Sinai Peninsula was a -formidable natural defence against an attack on the Suez Canal and that -such an expedition would be merely a pin-prick in the imperial flesh. -_Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), -pp. 601 _et seq._ The termination in a fiasco of the Turkish drive of -1914–1915 against the Canal confirmed this prophecy. - -[24] _Infra_, p. 83; Kurt Wiedenfeld, _Die deutsch-türkische -Wirtschaftsbeziehungen_ (Leipzig, 1915), p. 23; _Report of the Bagdad -Railway Company_, 1908, pp. 4–5. - -[25] _Cf._, _e.g._, K. Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 22. - -[26] _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume I, p. 634. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -GERMANS BECOME INTERESTED IN THE NEAR EAST - - -THE FIRST RAILS ARE LAID - -During the summer of 1888 the Oriental Railways—from the Austrian -frontier, across the Balkan Peninsula _via_ Belgrade, Nish, Sofia, and -Adrianople, to Constantinople—were opened to traffic. Connections with -the railways of Austria-Hungary and other European countries placed the -Ottoman capital in direct communication with Vienna, Paris, Berlin, -and London (_via_ Calais). The arrival at the Golden Horn, August 12, -1888, of the first through express from Paris and Vienna was made -the occasion of great rejoicing in Constantinople and was generally -hailed by the European press as marking the beginning of a new era in -the history of the Ottoman Empire. To thoughtful Turks, however, it -was apparent that the opening of satisfactory rail communications in -European Turkey but emphasized the inadequacy of such communications -in the Asiatic provinces. Anatolia, the homeland of the Turks, -possessed only a few hundred kilometres of railways; the vast areas -of Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hedjaz possessed none at all. Almost -immediately after the completion of the Oriental Railways, therefore, -the Sultan, with the advice and assistance of the Ottoman Public Debt -Administration, launched a program for the construction of an elaborate -system of railway lines in Asiatic Turkey.[1] - -The existing railways in Asia Minor were owned, in 1888, entirely -by French and British financiers, with British capital decidedly in -the predominance. The oldest and most important railway in Anatolia, -the Smyrna-Aidin line—authorized in 1856, opened to traffic in 1866, -and extended at various times until in 1888 it was 270 kilometres in -length—was owned by an English company. British capitalists also owned -the short, but valuable, Mersina-Adana Railway, in Cilicia, and held -the lease of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway. French interests were in -control of the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, which operated 168 kilometres -of rails extending north and east from the port of Smyrna. It was not -until the autumn of 1888 that Germans had any interest whatever in the -railways of Asiatic Turkey.[2] - -The first move of the Sultan in his plan to develop railway -communication in his Asiatic provinces was to authorize important -extensions to the existing railways of Anatolia. The French owners -of the Smyrna-Cassaba line were granted a concession for a branch -from Manissa to Soma, a distance of almost 100 kilometres, under -substantial subsidies from the Ottoman Treasury. The British-controlled -Smyrna-Aidin Railway was authorized to build extensions and branches -totalling 240 kilometres, almost doubling the length of its line. A -Franco-Belgian syndicate in October, 1888, received permission to -construct a steam tramway from Jaffa, a port on the Mediterranean, to -Jerusalem—an unpretentious line which proved to be the first of an -important group of Syrian railways constructed by French and Belgian -promoters. Shortly afterward the concession for a railway from Beirut -to Damascus was awarded to French interests.[3] - -But the great dream of Abdul Hamid was the great dream of Wilhelm von -Pressel: the vision of a trunk line from the Bosporus to the Persian -Gulf, which, in connection with the existing railways of Anatolia and -the new railways of Syria, would link Constantinople with Smyrna, -Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Mosul, and Bagdad. As early as 1886 the -Ottoman Ministry of Public Works had suggested to the lessees of the -Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway that they undertake the extension of that -line to Angora, with a view to an eventual extension to Bagdad. The -proposal was renewed in 1888, with the understanding that the Sultan -was prepared to pay a substantial subsidy to assure adequate returns -on the capital to be invested. The lessees of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid -line, however, were unable to interest investors in the enterprise -and were compelled to withdraw altogether from railway projects in -Turkey-in-Asia. Thereupon Sir Vincent Caillard, Chairman of the Ottoman -Public Debt Administration, endeavored to form an Anglo-American -syndicate to undertake the construction of a Constantinople-Bagdad -railway, but he met with no success.[4] - -The opportunity which British capitalists neglected German financiers -seized. Dr. Alfred von Kaulla, of the _Württembergische Vereinsbank_ -of Stuttgart, who was in Constantinople selling Mauser rifles to the -Ottoman Minister of War, became interested in the possibilities of -railway development in Turkey. With the coöperation of Dr. George von -Siemens, Managing Director of the _Deutsche Bank_, a German syndicate -was formed to take over the existing railway from Haidar Pasha to -Ismid and to construct an extension thereof to Angora. On October -6, 1888, this syndicate was awarded a concession for the railway to -Angora and was given to understand that it was the intention of the -Ottoman Government to extend that railway to Bagdad _via_ Samsun, -Sivas, and Diarbekr. The Sultan guaranteed the Angora line a minimum -annual revenue of 15,000 francs per kilometre, for the payment of which -he assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration the taxes of -certain districts through which the railway was to pass. Thus came into -existence the Anatolian Railway Company (_La Société du Chemin de Fer -Ottomane d’Anatolie_), the first of the German railway enterprises in -Turkey.[5] - -The German concessionaires were not slow to realize the possibilities -of their concession. They elected Sir Vincent Caillard to the board -of directors of their Company, in order that they might receive the -enthusiastic coöperation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and -in order that they might interest British capitalists in their project. -With the assistance of Swiss bankers they incorporated at Zurich the -_Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_, which floated in the European -securities markets the first Anatolian Railways loan of eighty million -francs—more than one fourth of the loan being underwritten in England. -Shortly thereafter this same financial group, under the leadership -of the _Deutsche Bank_, acquired a controlling interest in more than -1500 kilometres of railways in the Balkan Peninsula, by purchasing the -holdings of Baron Hirsch in the Oriental Railways Company. The _Bank -für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_ became a holding company for all of the -_Deutsche Bank’s_ railway enterprises in the Near East.[6] - -Under the direction of German engineers, in the meantime, construction -of the Anatolian Railway proceeded at so rapid a rate that the 485 -kilometres of rails were laid and trains were in operation to Angora -by January, 1893. About the same time a German engineering commission, -assisted by two technical experts representing the Ottoman Ministry of -Public Works and by two Turkish army officers, submitted a report on -their preliminary survey of the proposed railway to Bagdad. This was -enthusiastically received by the Sultan, who reiterated his intention -of constructing a line into Mesopotamia at the earliest practicable -date.[7] - -In 1887 there was no German capital represented in the railways -of Asiatic Turkey. Five years later the _Deutsche Bank_ and -its collaborators controlled the railways of Turkey from the -Austro-Hungarian border to Constantinople; they had constructed a line -from the Asiatic shore of the Straits to Angora; they were projecting a -railway from Angora across the hills of Anatolia into the Mesopotamian -valley. In coöperation with the Austrian and German state railways they -could establish through service from the Baltic to the Bosporus and, -by ferry and railway, into hitherto inaccessible parts of Asia Minor. -Almost overnight, as history goes, Turkey had become an important -sphere of German economic interest. Thus was born the idea of a series -of German-controlled railways from Berlin to Bagdad, from Hamburg to -the Persian Gulf! - -The Ottoman Government apparently was well pleased with the energetic -action of the German concessionaires in the promotion of their -railway enterprises in Turkey. In any event, a tangible evidence of -appreciation was extended the Anatolian Railway Company by an imperial -_iradé_ of February 15, 1893, which authorized the construction of a -branch line of 444 kilometres from Eski Shehr (a town about midway -between Ismid and Angora) to Konia. The new line, like its predecessor, -was guaranteed a minimum annual return of 15,000 francs per kilometre, -payments to be made under the supervision of the Ottoman Public Debt -Administration. The obvious advantages of developing the potentially -rich regions of southern Anatolia, and of providing improved -communication between Constantinople and the interior of Asia Minor, -led the Anatolian Company to hasten construction, with the result that -service to Konia was inaugurated in 1896.[8] - -Simultaneously with the granting of the second Anatolian concession -the Sultan authorized an important extension to the French-owned -Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. The existing line was to be prolonged a -distance of 252 kilometres from Alashehr to Afiun Karahissar, at which -latter town a junction was to be effected with the Anatolian Railway. -Another French company was awarded a concession for the construction -of the Damascus-Homs-Aleppo railway, in Syria, under substantial -financial guarantees from the Ottoman Treasury. It was said that these -concessions to French financiers were “compensatory” in character and -were granted upon the urgent representations of the French ambassador -in Constantinople.[9] - -Between 1896 and 1899 no further definite steps were taken to extend -the Anatolian Railway beyond Angora, as had been provided by the -original concession. In the latter year, however, largely because of -Russian objections to the further development of railways in northern -Asia Minor, the Sultan took under consideration the advisability of -projecting and building, instead, a line from Konia to Bagdad _via_ -Aleppo and Mosul. Early in 1899 a German commission left Constantinople -to make a thorough survey of the economic and strategic possibilities -of such a line. Included in the commission were Dr. Mackensen, Director -of the Prussian State Railways; Dr. von Kapp, Surveyor for the State -Railways of Württemberg; Herr Stemrich, the German Consul-General at -Constantinople; Major Morgen, German military attaché; representatives -of the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works. It was this commission that -finally decided upon the route of the Bagdad Railway.[10] - -At the close of the nineteenth century, therefore, the sceptre of -railway power in the Near East was passing from the hands of Frenchmen -and Englishmen into the hands of Germans. In a period of about ten -years the German-owned Anatolian Railway Company had constructed -almost one thousand kilometres of railway lines in Asia Minor. A -German mission was blazing a trail through Syria and Mesopotamia for -the extension of the Anatolian Railway to the valley of the Tigris -River and the head of the Persian Gulf. German prestige seemed to be -in the ascendancy: the Directors of the Anatolian Company reported to -the stockholders in 1897 that, “as in former years, our Company has -concerned itself continuously with the development of trade, industry, -and agriculture in the region served by the Railway. As a result our -enterprise has enjoyed in every sense the whole-hearted support and the -powerful protection of His Majesty the Sultan. Our relationships with -the Imperial Ottoman Government, the local authorities, and all classes -of the people themselves are more cordial than ever.”[11] - -The system of railways thus founded had been conceived by a German -railway genius; it had been constructed by German engineers with -materials made by German workers in German factories; it had -been financed by German bankers; it was being operated under the -supervision of German directors. In the minds of nineteenth-century -neo-mercantilists this was a matter for national pride. A Pan-German -organ hailed the Anatolian Railways and the proposed Bagdad enterprise -in glowing terms: “The idea of this railway was conceived by German -intelligence; Germans made the preliminary studies; Germans overcame -all the serious obstacles which stood in the way of its execution. We -should be all the more pleased with this success because the Russians -and the English busied themselves at the Golden Horn endeavoring to -block the German project.”[12] - - -THE TRADERS FOLLOW THE INVESTORS - -The construction of the Anatolian Railways by German capitalists was -accompanied by a considerable expansion of German economic interests in -the Near East. In 1889, for example, a group of Hamburg entrepreneurs -established the _Deutsche Levante Linie_, which inaugurated a direct -steamship service between Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, and Constantinople. -It was the expectation of the owners of this line that the construction -of the Anatolian railways would materially increase the volume of -German trade with Turkey—an expectation which was justified by -subsequent developments. In 1888, the year of the original railway -concession to the _Deutsche Bank_, exports from Germany to Turkey were -valued at 11,700,000 marks; by 1893, when the line was completed to -Angora, they mounted to a valuation of 40,900,000 marks, an increase -of about 350%. Imports into Germany from Turkey during the same period -rose from 2,300,000 marks to 16,500,000 marks, showing an increase of -over 700%. No small proportion of the phenomenal increase in the volume -of German exports to Turkey can be attributed to the use of German -materials on the Ismid-Angora railway. In any event, there was no -further substantial development of this export trade between 1895 and -1900, although imports into Germany from Turkey reached the high figure -of 28,900,000 marks at the close of the century.[13] - -That German traders should follow German financiers into the Ottoman -Empire was to be expected. The _Deutsche Bank_—sponsor of the Anatolian -Railways—had been notably active in the promotion of German foreign -commerce. From its very inception it had devoted itself energetically -to the promotion of industrial and commercial activity abroad, thus -carrying out the object announced in its charter “of fostering and -facilitating commercial relations between Germany, other European -countries, and oversea markets.” By the establishment of foreign -branches, by the liberal financing of import and export shipments, by -the introduction of German bills of exchange in the four corners of -the earth, and by other similar methods, this great bank was largely -responsible for the emancipation of German traders from their former -dependence upon British banking facilities. The Anatolian Railways -concessions marked the initial efforts of the _Deutsche Bank_ at -Constantinople. What it had done elsewhere it could be expected to do -in the interests of German business men operating in Turkey.[14] - -The London _Times_ of October 28, 1898, contained a significant review -of the status of German enterprise in the Ottoman Empire during the -decade immediately preceding. Whereas ten years before, the finance -and trade of Turkey were practically monopolized by France and -Great Britain, the Germans were now by far the most active group in -Constantinople and in Asia Minor. Hundreds of German salesmen were -traveling in Turkey, vigorously pushing their wares and studiously -canvassing the markets to learn the wants of the people. The -Krupp-owned Germania Shipbuilding Company was furnishing torpedoes to -the Turkish navy; Ludwig Loewe and Company, of Berlin, was equipping -the Sultan’s military machine with small arms; Krupp, of Essen, was -sharing with Armstrong the orders for artillery. German bicycles were -replacing American-made machines. There was a noticeable increase -of German trade with Palestine and Syria. In 1899 a group of German -financiers founded the _Deutsche Palästina Bank_, which proceeded to -establish branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, -Nablus, Nazareth, and Tripoli-in-Syria. - -Promoters, bankers, traders, engineers, munitions manufacturers, -ship-owners, and railway builders all were playing their parts in -laying a substantial foundation for a further expansion of German -economic interests in the Ottoman Empire.[15] - - -THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT BECOMES INTERESTED - -In a sense, German diplomacy had paved the way for the Anatolian -Railway concessions. For numerous reasons, which need not be -discussed here, French and British influence at the Sublime Porte -gradually declined during the decades of 1870–1890. British prestige, -in particular, waned after the occupation of Egypt in 1882. The -German ambassador at Constantinople during most of this period was -Count Hatzfeld, an unusually shrewd diplomatist, who perceived the -extraordinary opportunity which then existed to increase German -prestige in the Near East. His place in the counsels of the Sultan -became increasingly important, as he missed no chance to seize -privileges surrendered by France or Great Britain.[16] - -An instance of Count Hatzfeld’s activity was the appointment of a -German military mission to Turkey. Until 1870 there had been a French -mission in Constantinople, with almost complete control over the -training and equipment of the Ottoman army. At the outbreak of the -Franco-German War, however, the mission was recalled because of the -crying need for French officers at the front. After the termination -of hostilities, and again after the collapse of the Turkish defence -against Russia in 1877, the Sultan requested the reappointment of the -mission, but the French Government politely declined the invitation. -The German ambassador seized upon this neglected opportunity and, in -1883, persuaded Abdul Hamid to invite the Kaiser to designate a group -of German officers to serve with the Ottoman General Staff.[17] - -In command of the German military mission despatched to Turkey in -response to this invitation was General von der Goltz. This brilliant -officer—who, appropriately enough, was to die in the Caucasus campaign -of 1916—remained in Turkey twelve years, reorganizing the Turkish army, -forming a competent general staff, establishing a military academy -for young officers, and formulating plans for an adequate system of -reserves. So great was his success that he won the lasting respect -of Turkish military and civil officials; time and time again he was -invited to return to Turkey as military adviser extraordinary; in 1909 -he answered the call of the Young Turks and lent his ripened judgment -to the solution of their distracting problems; he was granted the -coveted title of Pasha. The personal prestige of von der Goltz was of -no small importance in brightening Germany’s rising star in the Near -East.[18] - -Another event of first rate importance in the history of German -ventures in the Ottoman Empire was the accession, in 1888, of Emperor -William II. During the three decades of his reign the economic -foundations of German imperialism were strengthened and broadened; the -superstructure of German imperialism was both reared and destroyed. -During his régime the German industrial revolution reached its height, -and the empire, it seemed, became one enormous factory consuming -great quantities of raw materials and producing a prodigious volume -of manufactured commodities for the home and foreign markets. -Simultaneously there was developed a German merchant marine which -carried the imperial flag to the seven seas. A normal concomitant of -this industrial and commercial progress was the expansion of political -and economic interests abroad—renewed activity in the acquisition of -a colonial empire; marked success in the further conquest of foreign -markets; the creation of a great navy; the phenomenal increase of -German investments in Turkey. It is no insignificant coincidence that -German financiers received their first Ottoman railway concession -in the year of the accession of William II and that the capture of -Aleppo—ending once and for all the plan for a German-controlled railway -from Berlin to Bagdad—occurred just a few days before his abdication. - -From the first the Kaiser evinced a keen interest in the Ottoman -Empire as a sphere in which his personal influence might be exerted -on behalf of German economic expansion and German political prestige. -He was quick to recognize the opportunities for German enterprise in -a country where much went by favor, and where political influence -could be effectually exerted for the furtherance of commercial -interests. In one of a round of royal visits following his accession, -the young Emperor, in November, 1889, paid his respects to the Sultan -Abdul Hamid. Upon the arrival in the Bosporus of the imperial yacht -_Hohenzollern_, the Kaiser and Kaiserin received an ostentatious -welcome from the Sultan and cordial greetings from the diplomatic -corps. It was suggested at the time that there was more than formal -significance in this visit of the German sovereigns, coming, as it -did, when prominent German financiers were engaged in constructing the -first kilometres of an important Anatolian railway. This impression was -confirmed when, shortly after the Emperor’s return to the Fatherland, -a favorable commercial treaty was negotiated by the German ambassador -at Constantinople and ratified by the German and Ottoman Governments in -1890.[19] - -The expansion of German economic interests and political prestige in -the Ottoman Empire was not looked upon with favor by Bismarck. The -Great Chancellor was primarily interested in isolating France on the -continent and in avoiding commercial and colonial conflicts overseas. -In particular he had no desire to become involved in the complicated -Near Eastern question—toward which at various times he had expressed -total indifference and contempt—for fear of a clash with Russian -ambitions at Constantinople. He realized that German investments in -Turkey might lead to pressure on the German Government to adopt an -imperial policy in Asia Minor, as, indeed, German investments in Africa -had forced him to enter colonial competition in the Dark Continent.[20] -When the _Deutsche Bank_ first called the Chancellor’s attention -to its Anatolian enterprises, therefore, Bismarck frankly stated -his misgivings about the situation. In a letter to Dr. von Siemens, -Managing Director of the _Deutsche Bank_, dated at the Foreign Office, -September 2, 1888, he wrote:[21] - - “With reference to the inquiry of the _Deutsche Bank_ of the 15 - ultimo, I beg to reply that no diplomatic objections exist to an - application for a concession for railway construction in Asia Minor. - - The Imperial Embassy at Constantinople has been authorized to lend - support to German applicants for such concessions—particularly to the - designated representative of the _Deutsche Bank_ in Constantinople—in - their respective endeavors in this matter. - - The Board of Directors in its inquiry has correctly given expression - to the assumption that any official endorsement of its plans, in the - present state of affairs, would neither extend beyond the life of the - concession nor apply to the execution and operation of the enterprise. - As a matter of fact, German entrepreneurs assume a risk in capital - investments in railway construction in Anatolia—a risk which lies, - first, in the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the law - in the East, and, second, in the increase of such difficulties through - war or other complications. - - _The danger involved therein for German entrepreneurs must be assumed - exclusively by the entrepreneurs, and the latter must not count upon - the protection of the German Empire against eventualities connected - with precarious enterprises in foreign countries._”[22] - -Bismarck disapproved of the visit of William II to Turkey in 1889. -Failing to persuade the young Emperor to abandon the trip to -Constantinople, the Chancellor did what he could to allay Russian -suspicions of the purposes of the journey. Describing an interview -which he had with the Tsar, in October, 1889, Bismarck wrote, in -a memorandum recently taken from the files of the Foreign Office: -“As to the approaching journey of the Kaiser to the Orient, I said -that the reason for the visit to Constantinople lay only in the wish -of our Majesties not to come home from Athens without having seen -Constantinople; Germany had no political interests in the Black Sea and -the Mediterranean; and it was accordingly impossible that the visit of -our Majesties should take on a political complexion. The admission of -Turkey into the Triple Alliance was not possible for us; we could not -lay on the German people the obligation to fight Russia for the future -of Bagdad.”[23] In 1890, however, Prince Bismarck was dismissed, and -the chief obstacle to the Emperor’s Turkish policy was removed. - -During the succeeding decade the German diplomatic and consular -representatives in the Ottoman Empire rendered yeoman service in -furthering investment, trade, and commerce by Germans in the Near -East. It became proverbial among foreign business men in Turkey that -no service was too menial, no request too exacting, to receive the -courteous and efficient attention of the German governmental services. -German consular officers were held up as models for others to pattern -themselves after. The British Consul General at Constantinople, for -example, informed British business men that his staff was at their -disposal for any service designed to expedite British trade and -investments in Turkey. “If,” he wrote, “any merchant should come to -this consulate and say, ‘The German consulate gives such and such -assistance to German traders, do the same for me,’ his suggestion would -be welcomed and, if possible, acted on at once.”[24] - -A judicious appointment served to reinforce the already strong position -of the Germans in Turkey. In 1897 Baron von Wangenheim was replaced -as ambassador to Constantinople by Baron Marschall von Bieberstein -(1842–1912), a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Baron -Marschall was one of the most capable of German bureaucrats. The -Kaiser was glad to have him at Constantinople because his training -and experience made him an admirable person for developing imperial -interests there; his political opponents considered his appointment to -the Sublime Porte a convenient method of removing him from domestic -politics. The new ambassador’s political views were well known: he -was a frank believer in a world-policy for Germany; he was an ardent -supporter of colonialism, if not of Pan-Germanism; he was a bitter -opponent of Great Britain; he espoused the cause of a strong political -and economic alliance between the German and Ottoman Empires. What -Baron Marschall did he did well. Occupying what appeared, at first, to -be an obscure post, he became the foremost of the Kaiser’s diplomatists -and for fifteen years lent his powerful personality and his practical -experience to the furthering of German enterprise in Turkey.[25] - -In 1898 William II made his second pilgrimage to the Land of Promise. -Every detail of this trip was arranged with an eye to the theatrical: -the enthusiastic reception at Constantinople; the “personally -conducted” Cook’s tour to the Holy Land; the triumphal entry into the -Holy City through a breach in the walls made by the infidel Turk; the -dedication of a Lutheran Church at Jerusalem; the hoisting of the -imperial standard on Mount Zion; the gift of hallowed land to the -Roman Catholic Church; the visit to the grave of Saladin at Damascus -and the speech by which the Mohammedans of the world were assured -of the eternal friendship of the German Emperor.[26] The dramatic -aspects of the royal visit were not sufficient, however, to obscure its -practical purpose. It was generally supposed in western Europe that the -Kaiser’s trip to Turkey was closely connected with the application of -the Anatolian Railways for the proposed Bagdad Railway concessions.[27] -But little objection was raised by the British and French press. Paris -laughed at the obvious absurdity of a Cook’s tour for a crowned head -and his entourage; London took comfort in the discomfiture which the -incident would cause Russia. But there was no talk then of a great -Teutonic conspiracy to spread a “net” from Hamburg to the Persian -Gulf.[28] - -The true significance of this royal pilgrimage of 1898 cannot be -appreciated without some reference to its background of contemporary -events. For the preceding four years the Ottoman Government had -permitted, if not actually incited, a series of ruthless massacres -of Christians in Macedonia and Armenia. European public opinion was -unanimous in condemnation of the intolerance, brutality, and corruption -of Abdul Hamid’s régime; the very name of the “Red Sultan” was -anathema. Under these circumstances any demonstration of friendship -and respect for the Turkish sovereign would be considered flagrant -flaunting of public morality.[29] By Abdul Hamid, on the other hand, it -would be welcomed as needed support in time of trouble. With the Kaiser -the exigencies of practical politics triumphed! - -It was appropriate, furthermore, that the year 1898 should be marked -by some definite step forward in German imperialist progress in -Turkey, for during that year notable advances had been made by German -imperialism in other fields. On March 5 there was forcibly wrung from -China a century-long lease of Kiao-chau and of certain privileges in -the Shantung Peninsula, thus assuring to German enterprise a prominent -position in the Far East. Two weeks later was passed the great German -naval law of 1898, laying the foundation of a fleet that later was to -challenge British supremacy of the seas. German diplomacy had developed -interests in eastern Asia; it was developing interests on the seas -and in western Asia; it had abandoned a purely Continental policy. No -further signs were needed that a new era was dawning in German foreign -affairs—unless, perhaps, it be mentioned that the great Prince Bismarck -quietly passed away at Friedrichsruh on July 30 of that momentous year! - - -GERMAN ECONOMIC INTERESTS MAKE FOR NEAR EASTERN IMPERIALISM - -Bismarck’s policy of aloofness in the Near East, however desirable -it may have been from the political point of view, could not have -appealed to those statesmen and soldiers and business men who believed -that diplomatic policies should be determined in large part by the -economic situation of the German Empire. The interest of William II -in Turkey was enthusiastically supported by all those who sought to -have German foreign affairs conducted with full recognition of the -needs of industrialized Germany in raw materials and foodstuffs, of -the importance of richer and more numerous foreign markets for the -products of German factories, and of the exigencies of economic, as -well as military, preparation for war. The great natural wealth of -the Ottoman Empire in valuable raw materials, the possibilities of -developing the Near East as a market for manufactured articles, and the -geographical situation of Turkey all help to explain why the economic -exploitation of the Sultan’s dominions was a matter of more vital -concern to Germany than to any other European power. To make this clear -it will be necessary to digress, for a time, to consider the nature of -the imperial problems of an industrial state and, in particular, the -problems of industrial Germany. - -Under modern conditions the needs of an industrial state are imperious. -Such a state is dependent for its very existence upon an uninterrupted -supply of foodstuffs for the workers of its cities and of raw materials -for the machines of its factories. As its population increases—unless -it be one of those few fortunate nations which, like the United -States, are practically self-sufficient—its importations of foodstuffs -mount higher and higher. As its industries expand, the demand for -raw materials becomes greater and more diversified—cotton, rubber, -copper, nitrates, petroleum come to be considered the very life-blood -of the nation’s industry. It is considered one of the functions of the -government of an industrial state—whether that government be autocratic -and dynastic or representative and democratic—to interest itself in -securing and conserving sources of these essential commodities, as -well as to defend and maintain the routes of communication by which -they are transported to the domestic market. The securing of sources -of raw materials may involve the acquisition of a colonial empire; it -may require the establishment of a protectorate over, or a “sphere -of interest” in, an economically backward or a politically weak -nation; or it may necessitate nothing more than the maintenance of -friendly relations with other states. Protection of vital routes of -communication may demand the construction of a fleet of battleships; -it may be the _raison d’être_ for a large standing army; it may -necessitate only diplomatic support of capitalists in their foreign -investments. Methods will be dictated by circumstances, but the impulse -usually is the same.[30] - -The German Empire was an industrial state, and its needs were -imperious. In the face of a rapidly increasing population the nation -became more and more dependent upon importations of foreign foodstuffs. -Herculean efforts were made to keep agricultural production abreast of -the domestic demand for grain: transient laborers were imported from -Russia and Italy to replace those German peasants who had migrated to -the industrial cities; machinery was introduced and scientific methods -were applied; high protective tariffs were imposed upon imported -foodstuffs to stimulate production within the empire. These measures, -however, were insufficient to meet the situation; the greatest -intensive development of the agricultural resources of the nation could -not forestall the necessity of feeding some ten millions of Germans on -foreign grain.[31] - -German manufacturers, as well, were unable to obtain from domestic -sources the necessary raw materials for their industrial plants. Many -essential commodities were not produced at all in Germany and in only -insignificant quantities in the colonies. Some German industries were -almost wholly dependent upon foreign sources of supply for their -raw materials. The most striking example of this was the textile -manufactures, which had to obtain from abroad more than nine tenths -of their raw cotton, jute, silk, and similar essential supplies.[32] -Interruption of the flow of these or other indispensable goods would -have brought upon German industrial centers the same paralysis which -afflicted the British cotton manufactures during the American Civil War. - -The German Empire had to pay for its imported foodstuffs and raw -materials with the products of its mines and factories, with the -services of its citizens and its ships, with the use of its surplus -funds, or capital.[33] The development of a German export trade was the -natural outcome of the development of German industry. And as German -industries expanded, the demand for imported raw materials increased, -thus rendering more necessary the extension of the export trade. The -German industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century was at once -the cause and the effect of the growing dependence of German economic -prosperity upon foreign markets.[34] - -But foreign commerce is not concerned with the sale of manufactured -articles only. In its export trade, German industry was closely allied -with German shipping and German finance. The services rendered German -trade by the German merchant marine need not be reiterated; they -are sufficiently well known. The relationship between the policies -of German industry and the policies of German finance was no less -important. The export of goods by German factories was supplemented by -the so-called “export of capital” by German banks. Sometimes the German -trader followed the German investor; sometimes the investor followed -the trader. But whichever the order, the services rendered by the -investor were to develop the purchasing power and the prosperity of the -market, as well as to oil the mechanism of international exchange.[35] -The industrial export policy and the financial export policy went hand -in hand. Certainly this was the case in the Near East. - -The German Empire depended for its welfare, if not for its existence, -upon an uninterrupted supply of food for its workers and of raw -materials for its machines. But this supply, in turn, was conditional -upon the maintenance and development of a thriving export trade. The -allies of this export trade were a great merchant marine and a vigorous -policy of international finance and investment. Thus the nation which -in 1871 was economically almost self-sufficient, by 1900 had extended -its interests to the four corners of the earth. This could not have -been without its effects upon German international policy. “The -strength of the nation,” said Prince von Bülow, “rejuvenated by the -political reorganization, as it grew, burst the bounds of its old home, -and its policy was dictated by new interests and needs. In proportion -as our national life has become international, the policy of the -German Empire has become international.... Industry, commerce, and the -shipping trade have transformed the old industrial life of Germany into -one of international industry, and this has also carried the Empire in -political matters beyond the limits which Prince Bismarck set to German -statecraft.”[36] - -From the German point of view, the call to German imperialism was -clearly urgent, but the resources of German imperialism were seriously -limited. The colonial ventures of the Empire had culminated in no -outstanding successes and in some outstanding failures. Entering the -lists late, the Germans had found the spoils of colonial rivalry -almost completely appropriated by those other knights errant of white -civilization, French, British, and Russian empire-builders. The -few African and Asiatic territories which the Germans did succeed -in acquiring were extensive in size, but unpromising in many other -respects. With the exception of German East Africa the colonies were -comparatively poor in the valuable raw materials so much desired -by the factories of the mother country; they were unimportant as -producers of foodstuffs. Attempts to induce Germans to settle in these -overseas possessions were singularly unsuccessful. On the other hand, -colonial enterprises had involved the empire in enormous expenditures -aggregating over a billion marks; had precipitated a series of wars -and military expeditions costing the nation thousands of lives and -creating a host of international misunderstandings; had won for Germans -widespread notoriety as poor colonizers, as tactless and autocratic -officials, as ruthless overlords of the natives. It was no wonder that -the German people seemed to be thoroughly discouraged and discontented -with their colonial ventures. - -However, even had the German colonies been richer than they were, they, -alone, could not have solved the imperial problem of an industrialized -Germany. German colonial trade was possessed of the same inherent -weakness as German overseas commerce—it would be dependent, in the -event of a general European war, upon British sea power. German -industry could be effectually crippled by interruption of the flow of -essential raw materials, such as cotton and copper, or by the cutting -of communications with her foreign markets. It was questionable whether -the German navy could be relied upon to keep the seas open. - -Blockades, furthermore, exist not only in time of war, but in time of -peace as well. European nations were surrounded by tariff barriers -which seriously restricted the development of international trade -and served to promote a system of national economic exclusiveness—a -condition of affairs which harmonized only too well with the existing -colossal military establishments. In this respect, of course, Germany -was more sinner than sinned against. But in such an age it behooved -every nation to build its industries, as well as its armies, with some -view to the contingencies of war. - -German statesmen and economists were by no means backward in -understanding the situation. Although they had no disposition to -overlook the development of the merchant marine and the navy, they -believed this was not enough. They sought to build up in Central Europe -a system of economic alliances, as they previously had effected a -formidable military alliance. Thus might Germany and her allies become -an economically self-sufficient unit, freed from dependence upon -British sea power.[37] And into this alliance could be incorporated -the Near East! - -Beyond the Bosporus lay a country rich in oils and metals; a country -capable of supplying German textile mills with cotton of superior -quality; a country which in ancient times was fabulously wealthy in -agricultural products; a country which gave promise of developing -into a rich market for western commodities. Communication with this -wonderland was to be established by a German-controlled railway upon -which service could be maintained in time of war, as in time of -peace, without the aid of naval power. What greater inducements could -have been offered to German imperialists, living in an imperialist -world? Turkey was destined to fall within the economic orbit of an -industrialized Germany! - -A distinguished German publicist said in 1903, “From the German -point of view, it would be unparalleled stupidity if we did not most -energetically do our part to acquire a share in the revival of the -ancient civilization of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Babylonia. What we do -not do others will surely do—be they British, French, or Russian; and -the increased economic advantage which, through the Bagdad Railway, -will accrue to us in the Nearer East would otherwise not only fail to -be ours, but would serve to strengthen our rivals in diplomacy and -business.”[38] Some years later, in the midst of the Great War, an -American writer expressed much the same point of view: “Hemmed in on -the west by Great Britain and France and on the east by Russia, born -too late to extend their political sovereignty over vast colonial -domains, and unable (if only for lack of coaling stations) to develop -sea power greater than that of their rivals, nothing was more natural -than the German and Austro-Hungarian conception of a _Drang nach Osten_ -through the Balkan Peninsula, over the bridge of Constantinople, into -the markets of Asia. The geographical position of the Central European -states made as inevitable a penetration policy into the Balkans and -Turkey as the geographical position of England made inevitable the -development of an overseas empire.”[39] Karl Helfferich has said that -“it was neither accident nor deliberate purpose, as much as it was the -course of German economic development, which led Germany to take an -active interest in Turkey.”[40] - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] _The Annual Register_, 1888, pp. 44, 310. - -[2] Good general statements of the transportation problem of Turkey -during the two decades 1880–1900 are Verney and Dambmann, _op. cit._, -Part III; J. Courau, _La locomotive en Turquie d’Asie_ (Brussels, -1895), pp. 18–47; _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 117 _et seq._ - -[3] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 202–223, 237–242, etc. - -[4] _Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople_, -August 31, 1888, p. 10; September 30, 1888, p. 31. _Cf._, also a -prospectus issued by a banker, Mr. W. J. Alt, “Heads of a Convention -for the extension of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway” (London, 1886), a -copy of which was loaned to the author by Mr. Ernest Rechnitzer. - -[5] The story of these negotiations is well told in a new book by -Dr. Karl Helfferich, _Georg von Siemens—ein Lebensbild_ (Leipzig, -1923), the proofs of which I have had the privilege of reading. For an -official copy of the convention and by-laws of the Anatolian Railway -Company (_Firman Impérial de concession et statuts de la Société -du Chemin de Fer Ottomane d’Anatolie_, Constantinople, 1889), I am -indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, of the _Deutsche Bank_. _Cf._, -also, _Administration de la dette publique ottomane—Rapport sur les -opérations de l’année 1888_ (Constantinople, 1889); _Report of the -Anatolian Railway Company_, 1889, pp. 1–2; _Corps de droit ottoman_, -Volume IV, pp. 120–142. - -[6] Helfferich, _op. cit._, Part V; A. P. Brüning, _Die Entwicklung -des ausländischen, speciell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens_ -(Berlin, 1907), pp. 14 _et seq._; _Report of the Anatolian Railway -Company_, 1889, p. 3; _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1892, p. 4, 1890, -p. 4. - -[7] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1891, p. 20, 1892, pp. -16, 23. - -[8] _Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia_ -(Constantinople, 1893); _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, -1896, pp. 4, 9. - -[9] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 191–197. The junction of -the two systems at Afiun Karahissar did not immediately materialize. -The distance from that town to Constantinople is longer by sixty-six -kilometres than the distance to Smyrna; the latter port, therefore, is -the better natural outlet for the products of Anatolia. This diversion -of traffic to Smyrna the Anatolia Railway sought to avoid, it is -said, by granting discriminatory rates in favor of through freight -to Constantinople over its own lines. A rate war ensued between the -Anatolian and Smyrna-Cassaba systems, and neither was willing to permit -an actual joining of the tracks at Afiun Karahissar, with the result -that for years the rails of the two roads lay a comparatively few yards -apart. This absurd situation, so obviously detrimental to the interests -of the two roads, was remedied by an agreement of 1899. _Infra_, pp. -59–60. _Cf._, also R. LeCoq, _Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure_ (Paris, -1907), pp. 23–24; _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1899, p. 3. - -[10] A summary of the report of the Commission is to be found in -_Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (London, 1903), pp. 26 -_et seq._ A statement of its membership and purposes is given in the -_Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1899, p. 9. - -[11] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1897, p. 3. - -[12] _Alldeutsche Blätter_, December 17, 1899. It should be borne in -mind, however, that until the Bagdad Railway concession was granted -French financiers held the lead in the number of kilometres of railway -in operation or contracted for. The situation in 1898 was as follows: - -_British_ Kiloms. Smyrna-Aidin 373 Mersina-Adana 67 —- Total 440 - -_French_ Kiloms. Smyrna-Cassaba 512 Jaffa-Jerusalem 87 Beirut-Damascus -247 Damascus-Aleppo 420 ——- Total 1,266 - -_German_ Kiloms. Haidar Pasha-Ismid 91 Ismid-Angora 485 Eski -Shehr-Konia 444 ——- Total 1,020 - -All of the British and German lines were in operation in 1898, whereas -the French Syrian Railways were only partially completed. - -[13] _Statistisches Handbuch für das deutsche Reich_, Volume 2, pp. -506, 510; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 2950 (1902), pp. 5, -23; _Turkey in Europe_, No. 16 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, pp. -86–87. - -[14] J. Riesser, _Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im -Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland_ -(third edition, Jena, 1909); translated into English and published as -Senate Document No. 593, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, 1911. -References here given are to the translation. In this connection _cf._ -“The Oversea and Foreign Business of the German Credit Banks,” pp. 420 -_et seq._ - -[15] _Syria and Palestine_, p. 126; _The Times_, October 28, 1898, -August 2 and 16, 1899. - -[16] Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_ (Berlin, 1921), pp. -10 _et seq._; J. A. R. Marriot, _The Eastern Question_ (Oxford, 1917), -pp. 347 _et seq._ - -[17] L. Ostrorog, _The Turkish Problem_ (London, 1919), pp. 52–53; E. -Dutemple, _En Turquie d’Asie_ (Paris, 1883), pp. 131 _et seq._ - -[18] For a biographical account of General von der Goltz (1843–1916) -_cf._ F. W. Wile, _Men Around the Kaiser_ (Philadelphia, 1913), -Chapter XXVI. Bismarck consented to the appointment of von der Goltz’s -military mission—which was not in accord with his general Eastern -policy—as a sort of insurance against the possibility that chauvinism, -Pan-Slavism, and anti-German elements in Russia should gain the -ascendancy at the court of the Tsar. In such an event it might be -possible to utilize Turkish bayonets and Turkish artillery, especially -if they had been trained by Prussian officers. _Memoirs of Prince -Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst_ (English translation, New York, 1906), -Volume II, p. 268. - -[19] _Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman_, Volume IV -(1903), Document No. 960. - -[20] Mary E. Townsend, _Origins of Modern German Colonialism_ (New -York, 1921), Chapters V-VII; Prince Bismarck, _Reflections and -Reminiscences_ (New York, 1899), Volume II, pp. 233 _et seq._ - -[21] For this letter, hitherto unpublished, I am indebted to Dr. Karl -Helfferich, son-in-law of the late George von Siemens. - -[22] The italics are mine. - -[23] _Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914_ -(Berlin, 1922 _et seq._), Volume VI, pp. 360–361. (A compilation -of documents from the files of the Foreign Office, edited by a -non-partisan commission appointed by the Government of the German -Republic.) Of Bismarck’s policy in the Near East the Ex-Kaiser writes, -“Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high -position there, and of conditions in that land.– I thought I might -inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinions, but my -efforts were of little avail.... Prince Bismarck was never favorably -inclined toward Turkey and never agreed with me in my Turkish policy.” -W. von Hohenzollern, _My Memoirs, 1878–1918_ (New York, 1922), p. 27. - -[24] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 2950 (1902), p. 20. - -[25] For information regarding the appointment of Baron Marschall to -Constantinople the author is indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, who -believes that the Baron was being sentenced to political exile when he -was detailed to the Sublime Porte, but that his opponents overlooked -the possibilities of the embassy at the Ottoman capital. Wile, _op. -cit._, Chapter XVIII, gives a short biographical account of Baron -Marschall. - -[26] _Cf._ E. Lamy, “La France du Levant: Voyage de l’Empereur -Guillaume II,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 150 (1898), pp. -880–911, Volume 151 (1899), pp. 315–348; E. Lewin, _The German Road -to the East_ (New York, 1917), pp. 105 _et seq._; C. S. Hurgronje, -_The Holy War, Made in Germany_ (New York, 1915), pp. 70–71; _The All -Highest Goes to Jerusalem_, being an English translation of a series of -articles published in _Le Rire_ (Paris) during 1898 (New York, 1917). -In Germany the royal pilgrimage was intended to be taken seriously. -Herr Heine, of the Munich _Simplicissimus_, was convicted of _lèse -majesté_ and imprisoned for six months for having published humorous -cartoons of the Kaiser and his party on their travels. _The Annual -Register_, 1898, pp. 255–258. - -[27] The author found some difference of opinion in Germany regarding -the connection between the Kaiser’s visit and the pending Anatolian -and Bagdad concessions. Dr. von Gwinner denies that there was any such -purpose behind the Emperor’s trip to the East—or, at least, if there -was, that it was unsolicited by the promoters and not looked upon with -favor by them. Dr. Helfferich, on the other hand, is convinced that -His Majesty was directly concerned with the desirability of obtaining -additional railway concessions for German financiers. The Kaiser -himself agrees with Dr. Helfferich. _Cf._, _My Memoirs, 1878–1918_, p. -86. - -[28] _Cf._ foreign correspondence in _The Times_ (London), October 25, -1898, and days immediately thereafter. - -[29] For an analysis of this situation see _The Manchester Guardian_, -July 31, 1899, which took the stand that “for no sort of mercantile -gain would a nation be justified in making friendly advances to the -blood-stained tyrant of Armenia.” - -[30] In this connection see Leonard Woolf, _Economic Imperialism_ -(London and New York, 1920), Chapter I; Ramsay Muir, _The Expansion of -Europe_ (New York, 1917), Chapter I; J. E. Spurr (editor), _Political -and Commercial Geology_ (New York, 1920), Chapter XXXII, entitled -“Who Owns the Earth?”; Aspi-Fleurimont, “La Question du coton,” -in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 15 (1903), pp. -429–432; J. A. B. Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_ (New York, 1922). -In addition, for the wider aspects of imperialism, consult H. N. -Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_ (New edition, London, 1915), -Chapter II; F. C. Howe, _Why War?_ (New York, 1916), _passim_; Walter -Lippman, _The Stakes of Diplomacy_ (New York, 1915); J. A. Hobson, -_Imperialism: A Study_ (London, 1902). - -[31] W. H. Dawson, _The Evolution of Modern Germany_ (New York, 1908), -Chapter XII. P. Rohrbach, _Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern_, p. 17. - -[32] Riesser, _op. cit._, pp. 110, 121. - -[33] It should be remarked here that the author is not unaware of the -fallacy of speaking of “German trade” and “German industry.” He is -cognizant of the fact that trade takes place not between countries, but -between individuals. If he anthropomorphizes the German Empire for the -purposes of this description, it is not because of either ignorance or -malice, but for convenience. - -[34] For further consideration of German economic progress during the -late nineteenth century see: Dawson, _op. cit._, Chapters III, IV, -XII, XVI; E. D. Howard, _The Cause and Extent of the Recent Industrial -Progress of Germany_ (New York, 1907); T. B. Veblen, _Imperial Germany -and the Industrial Revolution_ (New York, 1915); W. H. Dawson, -_Industrial Germany_ (London, 1913); Karl Helfferich, _Germany’s -Economic Progress and National Wealth_ (New York, 1913); G. Blondel, -_L’Essor industriel et commercial du peuple allemand_ (Paris, 1900). - -[35] Paul Dehn, _Weltwirtschaftliche Neubildungen_ (Berlin, 1904), -_passim_. - -[36] Bernhard von Bülow, _Imperial Germany_ (English translation, New -York, 1914), pp. 17, 18–20. - -[37] The extent of German economic control of central and eastern -Europe before the War is indicated by Mr. J. M. Keynes, in his book -_The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (New York, 1920), pp. 17–18: -“Germany not only furnished these countries with trade, but in the case -of some of them supplied a great part of the capital needed for their -own development. Of Germany’s pre-war foreign investments, amounting -in all to about six and a half billion dollars, not far short of two -and a half billions was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, -Rumania, and Turkey. And by the system of ‘peaceful penetration’ she -gave these countries not only capital, but what they needed hardly -less, organization. The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell -into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted -accordingly.” A frank German admission of a policy of a self-sufficient -Central Europe is the work of Friedrich Naumann, _Mittel-Europa_, -translated into English by C. M. Meredith and published under the title -_Central Europe_ (New York, 1917). See, especially, Chapters IV-VII. -_Cf._, also, Ernst zu Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswärtige Politik_ (3rd -revised edition, Berlin, 1916), pp. 336 _et seq._; K. H. Müller, _Die -Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn_ (Hamburg, 1916), p. 29. - -[38] Paul Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_ (Berlin, 1903), p. 16. - -[39] H. A. Gibbons, _The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East_ -(New York, 1917), pp. 57–58. The author is not in agreement with either -Dr. Rohrbach or Dr. Gibbons. He certainly would hesitate to call any -imperialist policy “inevitable.” - -[40] _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 8. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE SULTAN MORTGAGES HIS EMPIRE - - -THE GERMANS OVERCOME COMPETITION - -During 1898 and 1899 the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works received -many applications for permission to construct a railway to Bagdad. -Whatever may have been thought later of the financial prospects of -the Bagdad Railway there was no scarcity then of promoters who were -willing and anxious to undertake its construction. It was not because -of lack of competition that the _Deutsche Bank_ finally was awarded the -all-important concession. - -In 1898, for example, an Austro-Russian syndicate proposed the building -of a railway from Tripoli-in-Syria to an unspecified port on the -Persian Gulf, with branches to Bagdad and Khanikin. The sponsor of -the project was Count Vladimir I. Kapnist, a brother of the Russian -ambassador at Vienna and an influential person at the Tsar’s court. -Count Kapnist had the support of Pobêdonostsev, the famous Procurator -of the Holy Synod, who was an avowed Pan-Slavist and an enthusiastic -promoter of Russian colonization in Asia Minor.[1] The Sultan -instructed his Minister of Public Works to study the Kapnist plan and -submit a report. The Austro-Russian syndicate, however, made no further -progress at Constantinople. The Sublime Porte obviously was opposed -to any expansion of Russian influence in Turkey—a point of view which -received the encouragement of the British and German ambassadors. -Furthermore, in Russia itself there was opposition to Count Kapnist’s -project. Count Witte, Imperial Minister of Finance, and foremost -political opponent of Pobêdonostsev, emphasized the strategic menace -to Russia of improved railway transportation in Turkey and sturdily -maintained that Russian capital and technical skill should be kept -at home for the development of Russian railways and industry. By the -spring of 1899 the Kapnist plan had been shelved.[2] - -In the meantime French bankers had become interested in the -possibilities of constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the -Persian Gulf, utilizing the existing railways in Syria as the nucleus -of an elaborate system. Their spokesman was M. Cotard, an engineer on -the staff of the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway. This project was possessed -of such strong financial and political support at Constantinople that -the _Deutsche Bank_ considered it best to negotiate for a merger with -the French interests involved.[3] Accordingly conversations were held -at Berlin early in 1899 between the _Deutsche Bank_ and the Anatolian -Railway Company, on the one hand, and the Imperial Ottoman Bank and -the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, representing French interests, on the -other. The result was an important agreement of May 6, 1899, the chief -provisions of which were as follows:[4] - - 1. The _Deutsche Bank_ admitted the Imperial Ottoman Bank to - participation in the proposed Bagdad Railway Company. German and - French bankers were to be equally represented in ownership and - control, each to be assigned 40% of the capital stock, the remaining - 20% to be offered to Turkish investors. If British, or other capital - were subsequently interested in the Company, the share of the new - participants was to be taken from the German and French holdings in - equal proportions. - - 2. A _modus vivendi_ was arrived at between the Anatolian and - Smyrna-Cassaba Railways. The prevailing rate-war was to be stopped; a - joint commission was to be appointed to agree upon a uniform tariff - for the two companies; a junction of the two lines was to be effected - and maintained at Afiun Karahissar for reciprocal through traffic. - - 3. In order to assure the faithful execution of the agreement between - the Anatolian and Cassaba railways, each of the companies was to - designate two of its directors to sit on the board of the other.[5] - - 4. French proposals for the construction of a Euphrates Valley railway - were to be withdrawn. - - 5. The French and German bankers were to use their best offices with - their respective governments to secure united diplomatic support for - the claims of the _Deutsche Bank_ to prior consideration in the award - of the Bagdad Railway concession. - -This agreement temporarily removed all French opposition to the -Bagdad Railway. M. Constans, the French ambassador at Constantinople, -joined Baron Marschall von Bieberstein in cordial support of the new -“Franco-German syndicate.”[6] - -Competition had arisen, however, from a third source. During the -summer of 1899 British bankers, represented in Constantinople by Mr. -E. Rechnitzer, petitioned for the right to construct a railway from -Alexandretta to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. The terms offered by the -British financiers were considered more liberal than any heretofore -proposed,[7] and they were endorsed by the Ministry of Public Works. -Mr. Rechnitzer enlisted the aid of Mahmoud Pasha, a brother-in-law of -the Sultan. He secured the assistance of Sir Nicholas O’Connor, the -British ambassador. He attended to the niceties of Oriental business -by sending the Sultan and his aids costly presents.[8] He engineered -an effective press campaign in Great Britain to arouse interest -in his project. Just how much success Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan might -have achieved on its own merits is an open question. It definitely -collapsed, however, in October, 1899, when the outbreak of the Boer -War diverted British attention and energies from the Near East to -South Africa.[9] It was under these circumstances that the Sultan, on -November 27, 1899, announced his decision to award to the _Deutsche -Bank_ the concession for a railway from Konia to Bagdad and the Persian -Gulf.[10] - -The success of the Germans was not unexpected. They had a strong claim -to the concession, for, in 1888 and again in 1893, the Sultan had -assured the Anatolian Railway Company that it should have priority in -the construction of any railway to Bagdad. On the strength of that -assurance, the Anatolian Company had conducted expensive surveys of -the proposed line.[11] After a short period of sharp competition for -the concession in 1899, the _Deutsche Bank_ group was left in sole -possession of the field—the Russian promoters had withdrawn because -of lack of support at home; the French financiers had accepted a -share in the German company in preference to sole responsibility for -the enterprise; the British proposals had lost support when the Boer -difficulty temporarily obscured all other issues. The diplomatic -situation, furthermore, was distinctly favorable to the German claims. -The Fashoda Affair and the serious Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle -East had served to put Russia, France, and Great Britain at sixes and -sevens, leaving Germans practically a free hand in the development of -their interests in Asia Minor. - -Aside from these purely temporary advantages, however, there were -excellent reasons, from the Ottoman point of view, for awarding the -Bagdad Railway concessions to the German Anatolian Railway Company. The -usual explanations—that the soft, sweet-sounding flattery of William -II overcame the shrewdness of Abdul Hamid; that Baron Marschall von -Bieberstein dominated the entire diplomatic situation at the Porte; -that the German military mission exerted a powerful influence in -the final result—are more obvious than convincing. These were all -contributing factors in the success of the Germans, but they were not -determining factors. The reasons for the award of the concession to -the _Deutsche Bank_ were partly economic, partly strategic, partly -political. - -The Germans alone submitted proposals which met the demands of the -Public Debt Administration and the Ottoman Government. They proposed to -extend the existing Anatolian Railway from Konia, across the mountains -into Cilicia and Syria, down the valley of the Tigris to Bagdad and -Basra and the Persian Gulf. The railway which they had in mind would -reach from one end of Asiatic Turkey to the other; in connection with -the railways of southern Anatolia and of Syria, it would provide -continuous railway communication between Constantinople and Smyrna in -the north and west, with Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Mecca, and Mosul -in the south and east. There were serious technical and financial -difficulties in the construction of such a railway, it is true, but -there were political and economic considerations which warranted the -expenditure of whatever effort and funds might be necessary to carry -the line to completion. - -On the other hand, the groups other than the Germans proposed the -construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway which did not come up -to specifications. They submitted plans calling for the building -of a line from some Mediterranean port—such as Alexandretta or -Tripoli-in-Syria—down the Euphrates valley to the Persian Gulf.[12] -Such a line would have had obvious advantages, from the point of view -of the concessionaires, over the projected German railway. The cost of -construction would have been materially less, for it would have been -unnecessary to build the costly sections across the Taurus and Amanus -mountains. The prospects of immediate earning power were better, for -the railway would have been able to take over some of the caravan -trade from Arabia to the Syrian coast and from Mesopotamia to Aleppo. -From the Ottoman point of view, however, the proposal was altogether -unsatisfactory. The railway would have developed the southern provinces -of the empire without connecting them with Anatolia, the homeland of -the Turks themselves and the heart of the Sultan’s dominions. It might -have promoted a separatist movement among the Arabs. Its termini on the -Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf could have been controlled by the -guns of a foreign fleet. From every standpoint—economic, political, -strategic—the acceptance of such a proposal was out of the question. - -Even had all other things been equal, it is probable that the -German bankers would have been given preference in the award of the -concession. The Turkish Government was determined that the Anatolian -lines should be made the nucleus of the proposed railway system for -the empire. That being the case, no purpose, other than the promotion -of confusion, would have been served by awarding the Bagdad plum to -interests other than those which controlled the Anatolian Railway -Company. This reasoning was fortified by the fact that the Company had -made an enviable record in its dealings with the Ottoman Ministry of -Public Works. The existing lines were well constructed and were being -operated in a manner entirely satisfactory to the Ottoman Government -and to the peasantry and business men of Anatolia. And M. Huguenin, -Assistant General Manager of the Anatolian system, announced that -his Company would observe a similar policy in the construction and -operation of the proposed Bagdad Railway. “We are determined,” he said, -“to build a model line such as exists nowhere in Turkey, able in all -respects to undertake efficiently an international service involving -high speeds over the whole line.”[13] - -From the political point of view, too, there were reasons for giving -preference to German capitalists. Abdul Hamid was seeking moral and -material assistance for the promotion of his favorite doctrine of -Pan-Islamism. He sought to foster this movement, which looked toward -the unification of Islamic communities for resistance to Christian -European domination over the Moslem world. As Caliph of the Mohammedan -world, Abdul Hamid placed himself at the head of those defenders of the -faith who had been propagating the idea that Mussulmans everywhere must -resist further Christian encroachment and aggression, be it political, -economic, religious, cultural. That the Sultan’s primary motives were -religious is doubtful. Apparently he believed that the Pan-Islamic -movement could be utilized to the greater glory of his dynasty and his -empire. As the tsars of Russia had utilized their position as head of -the Orthodox Church for the purpose of strengthening the power of the -autocracy, so Abdul Hamid proposed to exploit his position as Caliph -for purposes of personal and dynastic aggrandizement.[14] - -In awarding the Bagdad Railway concession, which was of such -considerable economic and political importance, it was essential -to choose the nationals of a power which would be sympathetic -toward Pan-Islamism. Would it be Russia, whose tsars had set fires -in Afghanistan, sought to destroy the independence of Persia, and -threatened all of the Middle East? Would it be Great Britain, whose -professional imperialists were holding in subjection more than sixty -million Mohammedans in India alone? Would it be France, whose soldiers -controlled the destinies of millions of Mussulmans in Algeria and -Tunis? These nations could have no feeling for Pan-Islamism other than -fear and hatred,[15] for it threatened their dominion over their Moslem -colonies. Germany, however, had everything to gain and nothing to -lose in lending support to Abdul Hamid’s Pan-Islamic program. She had -practically no Mohammedan subjects and therefore had no reason to fear -Moslem discontent. She had imperial interests which might be served by -the revolt of Islam against Christian domination.[16] - -Turkish patriots, as well as Moslem fanatics, would have preferred -to see Germans favored in the award of economic concessions in the -Ottoman Empire. The Germans came to Turkey with clean hands. Their -Government had never despoiled the Ottoman Empire of territory and -appeared to have no interests which could not be as well served by -the strengthening of Turkey as by its destruction. On the other hand, -Russia, traditional enemy of the Turks, sought, as the keystone of her -foreign policy, to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. France, by -virtue of her protectorate over Catholics in the lands of the Sultan, -sought to maintain special privileges for herself in Syria and the Holy -Land. Great Britain held Egypt, a nominal Turkish dependency, and was -fomenting trouble for the Sultan in the region of the Persian Gulf.[17] -Germany, it appeared, was the only sincere and disinterested friend of -the Ottoman Empire! - -The rising prestige of Germany in the Near East and the rapid expansion -of German economic interests in Turkey, however, did not, during these -crucial years of 1898–1900, arouse the fear or the cupidity of other -European powers. Russia, it is true, objected for strategic reasons to -the construction of the proposed Bagdad Railway _via_ the so-called -“northern” or trans-Armenian route from Angora. But when the Tsar -was assured by the Black Sea Basin Agreement that a southern route -from Konia would be substituted, M. Zinoviev, the Russian minister -at Constantinople, withdrew his formal diplomatic protest.[18] The -French Government adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality toward the -claims of the _Deutsche Bank_ for the concession, on the ground that -the Imperial Ottoman Bank, representing powerful financial interests -in Paris, was to be given a substantial participation in the proposed -Bagdad Railway Company. The pact of May 6, 1899, between the German and -French promoters satisfied even M. Delcassé![19] - -In Great Britain, likewise, there was the friendliest feeling toward -the German proposals. When the Kaiser made his second visit to the Near -East in 1898 the London _Times_ said: “In this country we can have -nothing but good wishes for the success of the Emperor’s journey and -for any plans of German commercial expansion which may be connected -with it. Some of us may perhaps be tempted to regret lost opportunities -for our own influence and our own trade in the Ottoman dominions. But -we can honestly say that if we were not to have these good things for -ourselves, there are no hands we would rather see them in than in -German hands.”[20] _The Morning Post_ of August 24, 1899, expressed the -hope that no rivalry over the Bagdad Railway would prejudice the good -relations between Great Britain and Germany. “So long as there is an -efficient railway from Haidar Pasha to Bagdad, and so long as the door -there is open, it should not really matter who makes the tunnels or -pays the porters. If it should be necessary to insist on an open door, -the Foreign Office will probably see to it; while if it should happen -to be, as usual, asleep, there are always means of poking it up. As a -matter of general politics it may not be at all a bad thing to give -Germany a strong reason for defending the integrity of Turkey and for -resisting aggression on Asia Minor from the North.” - -Sympathetic consideration of German expansion in the Near East was -not confined to the press. Cecil Rhodes, great apostle of British -imperialism, visited Germany in the spring of 1899 and came away from -Berlin favorably disposed toward the Bagdad Railway and none the less -pleased with the Kaiser’s apparent enthusiasm for the Cape-to-Cairo -plan. In November of the same year William II paid a royal visit -to England. It was then that Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for the -Colonies, learned the details of German plans in the Ottoman Empire, -but, so far from being alarmed, he publicly announced his belief in -the desirability of an Anglo-German entente. The almost simultaneous -announcement of the award of the preliminary Bagdad Railway concession -met with a favorable reception from the British press.[21] - -At the same time, however, less cordial sentiments were expressed -toward Russia and France. There was general agreement among the London -newspapers regarding at least one desirable feature of the Bagdad -Railway enterprise: the discomfiture it would be certain to cause -the Tsar in his imperial ambitions in the Near East. _The Globe_ -characterized as “impudence” the desire of Russia to regard Asiatic -Turkey as “a second Manchuria.”[22] No love was being lost, either, on -France. _The Daily Mail_ of November 9, 1899, said: “The French have -succeeded in wholly convincing John Bull that they are his inveterate -enemies. England has long hesitated between France and Germany. But she -has always respected German character, while she has gradually come to -feel scorn for France. Nothing in the nature of an _entente cordiale_ -can exist between England and her nearest neighbor. France has neither -courage nor political sense.” - - -THE BAGDAD RAILWAY CONCESSION IS GRANTED - -It was almost three years after the Sultan’s preliminary announcement -of the Bagdad concession that the imperial decree was issued. During -the interval the German technical commission was completing its survey -of the line; details of the concession were being arranged between -Zihni Pasha, Minister of Public Works, and Dr. Kurt Zander, General -Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company; Dr. von Siemens was working -out plans for the financing of the enterprise. Finally, on March 18, -1902, an imperial _iradé_ of Abdul Hamid II definitely awarded the -Bagdad Railway concession to the Anatolian Railway Company.[23] - -The Constantinople despatches announcing the Sultan’s award met with a -varied reception. In Germany, of course, there was general satisfaction -and, in some quarters, jubilation. The Kaiser telegraphed his personal -thanks to the Sultan. In Vienna, the semi-official _Fremdenblatt_ -expressed the opinion that “the construction of the railway would be -an event of the greatest economic and political importance and would -materially strengthen Turkey’s power of resistance.”[24] M. Delcassé, -French Minister of Foreign Affairs, interpolated in the Chamber, -informed the Deputies that, whether one liked it or not, the convention -was a _fait accompli_ which France must accept, particularly because -French capitalists were associated with the German concessionaires in -the enterprise.[25] The Russian Government was silent at the time, -although two months before M. Witte had informed the press that he saw -no reason for granting financial assistance or diplomatic acquiescence -to a possible competitor of Russian trans-Asiatic railways.[26] - -In England there was very little opposition, but much friendly -comment, on the German plans. Earl Percy expressed the hope that -Great Britain would do nothing to interfere with the construction -of the Bagdad Railway. “Germany,” he told the House of Commons, “is -doing for Turkey what we have been doing for Persia, for the social -improvement and material welfare of native races; and in the struggle -between the Slavonic policy of compelling stagnation and the Teutonic -policy of spreading the blessings and enlightenment of civilization, -the victory will lie with those nations which are striving, selfishly -or unselfishly, consciously or unconsciously, to fulfil the high aims -which Providence has entrusted to the imperial races of Christendom.” -Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that, -although the Government had every intention of maintaining the -_status quo_ in the Persian Gulf, it would not otherwise interfere -in the project for a German-owned trans-Mesopotamian railway. Lord -Lansdowne, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed the French and -German ambassadors at London that His Britannic Majesty’s Government -would not oppose the Bagdad enterprise, particularly if British capital -were invited to participate in its consummation.[27] This was taken as -a definite promise, for English financiers already had been asked to -take a share in the Bagdad Railway Company by purchase, _pro rata_, of -portions of the holdings of the German and French interests.[28] - -Although there was a noticeable lack of unanimity in European -diplomatic circles, little or no reason existed in 1902 to believe -that any determined resistance would be made to the consummation -of the plans for the construction of the Bagdad Railway. The chief -difficulties of the concessionaires seemed to be not political, but -financial and administrative. The year 1902 was one of economic -depression; in Germany, in particular, industrial and financial -conditions were distinctly unfavorable for the flotation of a -large bond issue such as would be required to raise funds for the -construction of the Bagdad Railway. Certain of the minor provisions -of the convention of 1902, furthermore, were unsatisfactory to the -financiers of the project. The concession for the lines beyond Konia -had been granted to the Anatolian Railway Company without privilege of -assignment to any other corporation. This meant that any participation -of outside capital in the new Bagdad Railway would, of necessity, -involve participation in the profits of the Anatolian lines already in -operation—a prospect by no means pleasing to the original promoters. -Furthermore, there was some question as to the advisability of placing -under a single administrative head all of the line and branches from -Constantinople to the Gulf.[29] - -It was because of these difficulties, financial and administrative, -that the _Deutsche Bank_ marked time until March 5, 1903, when a -revised Bagdad Railway convention was executed and plans were perfected -for the financing of the first section of the line. It is to this -Great Charter of the Berlin-to-Bagdad plan that we now must turn our -attention.[30] - -The definitive convention of 1903 provided that the existing -Anatolian lines were to continue in the possession of their owners; -the construction and operation of the new railway beyond Konia was -to be vested—without right of cession, transfer, or assignment—in a -new corporation, the Bagdad Railway Company. This new company was -incorporated under Turkish law on March 5, 1903, with a capital stock -of fifteen million francs, of which the Anatolian Railway Company -subscribed ten per cent. Continued Turco-German control of the railway -enterprise was assured by a provision of the charter that of the eleven -members of the Board of Directors, three should be appointed by the -directors of the Anatolian Railway Company, and at least three others -should be Ottoman subjects.[31] - -It was apparent that the Ottoman Government expected big things of -the German concessionaires and their French associates. The new -convention provided, first, for the construction of a great trunk line -from Konia, southeastern terminus of the existing Anatolian Railways, -to the Persian Gulf. This was to be the Bagdad Railway proper, but -the concession carried with it, also, the privilege of constructing -important branches in Syria and Mesopotamia. With all its proposed -tributary lines completed, the Railway would stretch from the Bosporus -to the Persian Gulf and from the Mediterranean to the frontiers of -Persia. Second, it was stipulated that the Anatolian Railway Company -should effect any necessary improvements on its lines to make possible -the early initiation of a weekly express service between Constantinople -and Aleppo and the operation of fortnightly express trains to Bagdad -and the Persian Gulf as soon as the lines should be completed. The -Anatolian concessions were extended for a period of ninety-nine -years from 1903 to make them coincident with the new concession. The -concessionaires were obliged to make all improvements and to complete -all new construction by 1911, it being understood, however, that this -time limit might be extended in the event of delays by the Government -in the execution of the financial arrangements or in the event of -_force majeure_—the latter specifically including, not only a European -war, but any radical change in the financial situation in Germany, -England, or France.[32] - - -THE LOCOMOTIVE IS TO SUPPLANT THE CAMEL - -The Bagdad Railway was to revive the “central route” of medieval -trade—to traverse one of the world’s historic highways. It was to -bring back to Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia some of the prosperity -and prestige which they had enjoyed before the explorations of -the Portuguese and Spaniards had opened the new sea routes to the -Indies.[33] - -The starting point of the new railway was to be Konia. This town of -44,000 inhabitants, situated high in the Anatolian plateau, was a -landmark in the Near East. It was once the capital of the Seljuk Turks -and during its heyday had been a crossroads of the caravan routes of -Asia Minor. Along one of these old routes to the northwest ran the -Anatolian Railway, with which the Bagdad line was to be linked. From -Konia the new railway was to cross the Anatolian table-lands, at an -average altitude of 3500 feet, passing through the towns of Karaman -and Eregli. Just beyond the latter town are the foothills of the -Taurus, the first of the mountain barriers between Asia Minor and the -Mesopotamian valley. In crossing the Taurus range the railway was to -pass through the famous Cilician Gates, down the eastern slope into the -fertile Cilician plain. At Adana, center of the trade of this region, -a junction was to be effected with the existing railway to Mersina, a -small port on the Mediterranean.[34] - -Formidable engineering difficulties faced the succeeding stretch of the -railway. Beyond Adana stood the second mountain barrier of the Amanus -range, through which there was no natural pass, and it was apparent -that costly blasting and tunneling would be required before the hills -could be pierced.[35] Once beyond the mountains the railway could be -carried quickly to Aleppo, a city of 128,000, “the emporium of northern -Syria,” and a meeting place for the Mesopotamian, Syrian, and Anatolian -trade-routes. At this point connections were to be established with -the important railways of Syria, providing direct communication with -Hama, Homs, Tripoli-in-Syria, Beirut, Damascus, Jaffa, and Jerusalem. -In fact, enthusiastic Syrians have prophesied that when all projected -transcontinental railways are completed in Europe, Asia, and Africa, -Aleppo will become “the crossroads of the world”—a junction point for -rail communication between Berlin and Bagdad, Calais and Calcutta, -Bordeaux and Bombay, Moscow and Mecca, Constantinople and Cairo and -Cape Town.[36] Seventy miles away from Aleppo, along one of the few -good wagon roads in Turkey, lay the important Mediterranean port of -Alexandretta. Leaving Aleppo, the Bagdad Railway was to turn east, -crossing a desert country, to Nisibin and to Mosul, on the Tigris. From -this sector of the railway it was proposed to construct several short -spurs into the Armenian foothills, as well as a longer branch from -Nisibin to Diarbekr and Kharput. - -The city of Mosul is the northern gateway to the Mesopotamian valley, -the “Land of the Two Rivers.” In medieval times it was a center of -caravan routes between Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia, and -once was famed for its textile manufactures, which produced a cloth -named after the city, “muslin.” It is located on the site of a suburb -of the ancient city of Nineveh and guards a high pass leading through -the mountains into Armenia. In 1903 it had a population of 61,000 and -bade fair, after the completion of the Bagdad Railway, to regain some -of its lost lustre. South and southeast of Mosul flows the Tigris River -all the way to the Persian Gulf. Along the valley of this river was to -run the new railway, through the towns of Tekrit, Samarra, and Sadijeh, -to Bagdad.[37] - -In 1903 the splendor of the ancient city of Bagdad was very much -dimmed. Although it still was the center of an important caravan trade -with Persia, Arabia, and Syria, its prosperity was but a name compared -with the riches which the city had enjoyed before the commercial -revolution of the sixteenth century. The population of 145,000—in part -nomad—was to a large extent dependent upon the important export trade -in dates and cereals, amounting, in 1902, to almost £1,000,000. All -told, the trade of Bagdad was valued at about £2,500,000 annually. -Whether the shadow of the former great Bagdad could be transformed into -a living thing was an open question.[38] - -Five hundred miles south of Bagdad is the Persian Gulf,[39] the -proposed terminus of the Bagdad Railway. About sixty miles north of -the Gulf, located on the Shatt-el-Arab—the confluence of the Tigris -and Euphrates Rivers—is the port of Basra, the outlet for the trade -of Bagdad. Communication between these two Mesopotamian cities was -carried on, in 1903, by means of a weekly steamer service operated -by the English firm of Lynch Brothers, under the name “The Euphrates -and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Ltd.” The Lynch Brothers—typical -British imperial pathfinders—had established themselves at Basra -during the decade 1840–1850 and had succeeded during the following -half-century in securing a practical monopoly of the river trade from -Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. The absence of effective competition -and the hesitancy of the Turkish Government to grant permission for -the operation of additional steamers were responsible for a totally -inadequate service. It was not uncommon for freight to stand on -the wharves at Bagdad and Basra for three months or more awaiting -transportation. Under these circumstances it was to be expected that -freight charges would be exorbitant; it cost more to transfer cargoes -from Bagdad to Basra than from Basra to London. The advent of the -Bagdad Railway promised great things for the trade of lower Mesopotamia -and Persia.[40] - -It was the aim of the Turkish Government and the concessionaires not -only to compete with the river trade of the Tigris, but to develop -the Euphrates valley as well, there being no steamer service on the -latter river. With this in mind, it was decided to divert the railway -beyond Bagdad from the Tigris to the Euphrates and down the valley to -Basra. For a time Basra was to mark the terminus of the railway; the -concession made provision, however, for the eventual construction of a -branch “from Zubeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon -between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the concessionaires.”[41] - -Of considerable importance was a proposed branch line from Sadijeh, -on the Tigris, to Khanikin, on the Persian frontier. This railway, it -was believed, would take the place of the existing caravan route from -Bagdad to Khanikin and thence to Teheran. The annual value of British -trade alone transported _via_ this route was estimated at about three -quarters of a million pounds sterling.[42] - -The Bagdad Railway, as thus projected, was one of the really great -enterprises of an era of dazzling railway construction. Here was a -transcontinental line stretching some twenty-five hundred miles from -Constantinople, on the Bosporus, to Basra, on the Shatt-el-Arab—a -project greater in magnitude than the Santa Fé line from Chicago to Los -Angeles or the Union Pacific Railway from Omaha to San Francisco.[43] -It was a promise of the rejuvenation of three of the most important -parts of the Ottoman Empire—eastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and -Mesopotamia. It was to open to twentieth-century steel trains a -fifteenth-century caravan route. It was to replace the camel with the -locomotive. - - -THE SULTAN LOOSENS THE PURSE-STRINGS - -There are special and peculiar problems connected with the -construction of railways in the economically backward areas of the -world. In well populated regions, such as western Europe, railways -have been built to accommodate existing traffic; in sparsely populated -regions, such as eastern Russia and western United States, they have -been constructed chiefly to create new traffic. In the economically -advanced countries of the world the railway has been the result of -civilization; in the backward countries it has been the outpost of -civilization. A new railway in an undeveloped region is obliged at the -outset to concern itself mainly with the upbuilding of the territory -through which it runs, in order to assure abundant traffic for the -future; during this period its receipts are rarely, if ever, adequate -to meet the costs of operation. Private capital cannot be expected -to assume alone the risk and burden thus involved, but the public -service which the railway renders during this critical time justifies -the government in subsidizing the enterprise until it can become -self-supporting. The granting of state subventions has been a common -practice of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China time and time -again has pledged national revenues in support of railway construction; -the Latin-American countries have been conspicuous exemplars of -the same practice; more than half of the railways of Russia were -constructed with government funds.[44] - -There was every reason to believe that the Bagdad Railway would be -built with some system of state guarantees. Almost every railway in -Asiatic Turkey at one time or another had been the recipient of a -government subvention, and the proposed trans-Mesopotamian railway -faced many more obstacles than had faced any then in operation. -The provinces through which the Bagdad Railway was to pass were -sparsely settled and were too backward, economically, to warrant -the construction of a railway for the accommodation of existing -traffic;[45] the German technical commission of 1899 had pointed -out that the estimated gross operating revenue for some years would -be entirely inadequate to pay the expenses of running trains even -if there should be an unlooked for volume of passenger and mail -service to India. In time, it was believed, improved transportation -and greater political security would induce immigration and produce -widespread economic prosperity in the provinces of Anatolia, Syria, and -Mesopotamia, thus assuring financial independence to the railway.[46] -During the interim, however, a state guarantee appeared to be necessary. - -Under the terms of the convention of 1903, the Turkish Government -undertook partially to finance the construction of the Bagdad Railway. -For each kilometre of the line built the Government agreed to issue -to the Company the sum of 275,000 francs, nominal value, in Imperial -Ottoman bonds, to be secured by a first mortgage on the railway and -its properties.[47] The payment of interest and sinking fund on these -bonds was to be guaranteed by the assignment to the Public Debt -Administration for this purpose of the revenues of certain of the -districts through which the railway was to pass. For the purpose of -financing the first section of two hundred kilometres beyond Konia, -there was delivered to the Company on March 5, 1903, an issue of -fifty-four million francs of “Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Four Per -Cent Bonds, First Series.”[48] Similar payment for the construction of -subsequent sections was to be made the subject of further agreement -between the Government and the concessionaires. - -In addition to supplying in this manner the actual funds for the -building of the railway, the Ottoman Government guaranteed gross -operating receipts of forty-five hundred francs annually for each -kilometre of the line open to traffic. If the receipts failed to -reach that sum, the Government was to reimburse the Company for the -deficiency. If the receipts amounted to more than forty-five hundred -francs per kilometre in any given year, the excess over that amount to -ten thousand francs was to belong to the Government; any excess over -and above ten thousand francs was to be divided sixty per cent to the -Government, forty per cent to the Railway. The Government also agreed -to reimburse the Company, in thirty annual payments of three hundred -fifty thousand francs, for such improvements as might be necessary to -prepare the Anatolian Railways for the initiation of a through express -service to the Persian Gulf and, furthermore, to subsidize that express -service at the rate of three hundred fifty thousand francs annually -from the date of the completion of the main line to Aleppo.[49] - -Closely connected with these financial guarantees were grants of public -lands. Lands owned by the Government and needed for right-of-way were -transferred to the concessionaires free of any charge. Additional -land required for construction purposes might be occupied without -rental as well as worked by the Company for sand and gravel. Wood and -timber necessary for the construction and operation of the railway -might be cut from State-owned forests without compensation. The -concessionaires were permitted to operate mines within a zone twenty -kilometres each side of the line, subject to such regulations as might -be laid down by the Ministry of Public Works. As a public utility, -the railway was granted the right of expropriation of such privately -owned land as might be essential for the right-of-way, as well as -quarries, gravel-pits, or other properties necessary for purposes of -construction. The Company was authorized, also, to conduct researches -for objects of art and antiquity along the route of the railway![50] - -In the foregoing respects the Bagdad Railway Convention was by -no means revolutionary in character. In issuing its bonds for the -purpose of financing railway construction, in pledging public -revenues as a guarantee of traffic receipts, in granting public lands -for right-of-way, the Imperial Ottoman Government was following -wellestablished precedents of the nineteenth century. The United -States, for example, had adopted similar measures to encourage the -building of transcontinental railways. To cite a single instance, -Congress granted the promoters of the Union Pacific system a -right-of-way through the public domain, twenty sections of land on -each side of each mile of the railway, and a loan of bonds of the -United States to an amount of fifty million dollars. Between 1850 and -1873 alone the Government transferred to the railways some thirty-five -million acres of public lands, an area in excess of that of the State -of New York.[51] - -In certain other respects, however, the Bagdad Railway Convention was -radical and far-reaching in its innovations. Worthy of first mention -among its unusual provisions is the sweeping tax exemption granted -the concessionaires by _Article 8_: “Manufactured material for the -permanent way and materials, iron, wood, coal, engines, cars and -coaches, and other stores necessary for the initial establishment as -well as the enlargement and development of the railway and everything -pertaining thereto which the concessionaires shall purchase in the -empire or import from abroad shall be exempt from all domestic taxes -and customs duties. The exemption from customs duties shall also be -granted the coal necessary for the operation of the road, imported -abroad by the concessionaires, until the gross receipts of the line -and its branches reach 15,500 francs per kilometre. Likewise, during -the entire period of the concession the land, capital, and revenue of -the railway and everything appertaining thereto shall not be taxed; -neither shall any stamp duty be charged on the present Convention or -on the Specifications annexed thereto, the additional conventions, -or any subsequent instruments; nor on the issue of Government bonds; -nor on the amounts collected by the concessionaires on account of the -guarantee for working expenses; nor shall any duty be levied on their -stock, preferred stock and bonds, or on the bonds which the Imperial -Ottoman Government shall issue to the concessionaires.” Thus the Bagdad -Railway not only was assured of a subsidy constituting a preferred -claim on certain taxes collected from the Turkish peasantry, but, in -addition, was exempted from the payment of important contributions to -the national revenue. The extent to which such an arrangement would -confound confusion will be clear if one will recall that many other -restrictions on the collection and disbursement of public funds were -vested in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.[52] - -Incidental to the railway, the Bagdad Company was granted other -valuable concessions. The corporation was given permission to establish -and operate tile and brick works along the line of the railway. For the -direct and indirect use of the railway and its subsidiary enterprises -the Company was authorized to establish hydro-electric stations for the -generation of light and power. The erection of necessary warehouses -and depots was permitted as essential to the proper operation of -the railway. The Anatolian Railway was empowered to provide for -satisfactory ferry service between Constantinople and Haidar Pasha, in -order to insure direct sleeping-car service from Europe to Asia and to -provide other facilities for through traffic. All of these subsidiary -projects were to enjoy the same exemption from taxation as the railway -itself.[53] - -The concessionaires were granted the right of constructing at Bagdad, -Basra, and at the terminus on the Persian Gulf modern port facilities, -including “all necessary arrangements for bringing ships alongside -the quay and for the loading, unloading, and warehousing of goods.” -During the period of the construction of the railway the Company -was granted rights of navigation on the Tigris, the Euphrates, and -the Shatt-el-Arab for the transportation of materials and supplies -necessary to the building and operation of the main line and its -branches.[54] These river and harbor concessions aroused the fear and -the rage of the Lynch Brothers, who, as we shall see, were to be among -the leaders of British opposition to the Bagdad Railway.[55] - -These, then, were the outstanding economic provisions of the Bagdad -Railway Convention of 1903. The Imperial Ottoman Government assumed the -cost of the construction of the railway and, in addition, guaranteed -a certain minimum annual return on each kilometre in operation. It -pledged for these purposes the taxes of the districts through which -the railway was to pass, and it deputed the Ottoman Public Debt -Administration to collect these revenues and supervise payments to -the concessionaires. As additional compensation to the Company it -made large grants of public lands and conceded valuable privileges -indirectly connected with the construction of the railway. In this -manner the Sultan mortgaged his empire. But mortgages have their -purposes, and Abdul Hamid hoped for big things from the Bagdad Railway. - - -SOME TURKISH RIGHTS ARE SAFEGUARDED - -As mortgagor the Sultan was certain to insist upon the recognition -and protection of certain rights. To assure observance by the -concessionaires of their obligations under the convention, supervision -over construction, operation, and maintenance of the railway was vested -in the Ministry of Public Works, represented by two Imperial Railway -Commissioners. As a guarantee of good faith the Company was obliged -to deposit with a Constantinople bank a bond of £30,000, subject to -release only upon the completion of the entire line. The Ottoman -Government was determined, also, that the concession, far-reaching as -were its implications, should not lead to additional extra-territorial -rights, or “capitulations,” in favor of foreign powers. The -concessionaires were forbidden to contract for the transportation -of foreign mails, or to perform other services for the foreign -post offices in Turkey, without the formal approval of the Ottoman -Government. It was specified, also, that, inasmuch as the Anatolian and -the Bagdad Railway Companies were Ottoman joint-stock corporations, -all disputes and differences between the Government and the Companies, -or between the Companies and private persons, “arising as a result -of the execution or interpretation of the present Convention and the -Specifications attached thereto, shall be carried before the competent -Ottoman courts.” It was further provided that the concessionaires “must -correspond with the State Departments in Turkish, which is the official -language of the Imperial Ottoman Government!”[56] - -The Government was sincere in its determination that the railway -should become a powerful instrument in the economic development of the -backward provinces of the empire. A significant clause specified that -the section between Bagdad and Basra should not be placed in operation -before the section between Konia and Bagdad should have been opened -to traffic, although immediate operation of trains on the former -section would have enabled the Company to compete with the valuable -trade of the Lynch Brothers on the Tigris. The traffic between Bagdad -and Basra would have been profitable and would thus have decreased -by a considerable figure the total subsidies the Treasury might be -obliged to pay for railway operation. It was of more immediate concern -to the Turkish Government, however, that southern Mesopotamia should -be connected by an economic and political link with the rest of the -Sultan’s dominions. Elaborate regulations were laid down regarding a -minimum train service which the Company was required to supply, and -it was specified in this connection that Turkish mails, together with -postal employees and officials, should be transported without charge -and under such other conditions as the Government might stipulate. To -forestall discriminatory treatment of passengers and shippers maximum -rates were prescribed for all classes of traffic, including express, -insurance, and similar supplementary services; it was decreed that “all -rates, whether they be general, special, proportional, or differential, -are applicable to all travelers and consignors without distinction”; -the concessionaires were “formally prohibited from entering into any -special contract with the object of granting reductions of the charges -specified in its tariffs.”[57] This last provision was of the utmost -importance, as it enabled Germans and Turks alike to point to the -railway as an outstanding example of the economic “open door.” - -One of the chief interests of the Turkish Government in the -construction of the Bagdad Railway was the possibility of its -utilization for military purposes. In time of peace for purposes of -maneuvers or the suppression of rebellion, in time of war for purposes -of mobilization, the Company was required, upon requisition of the -military authorities, to place at the disposal of the Government -its “entire rolling stock, or such as might be necessary, for the -transportation of officers and men of the army, navy, police or -gendarmerie, together with any or all equipment.” The Government -undertook to maintain order along the line and to construct such -fortifications as it might consider necessary to defend the railway -against invading armies, and the Company was obliged to expend, under -the direction of the Minister of War, a total of four million francs -for the construction of military stations. To give effect to all of -these provisions, a special military convention was to be drawn up and -approved by the Company and the Minister of War.[58] - -Upon the expiration of the concession all rights of the concessionaires -in the railway, port works, and other subsidiary enterprises were to -revert, free of all debt and liability, to the Imperial Government. In -the meantime, a semblance of Turkish nationality was to be assured the -enterprise by the stipulation that the railway employees and officials -should wear the fez and such uniform as might be approved by the -Government. It was contemplated, also, that within five years after the -opening of each section to traffic the whole of the operating staff, -except the higher officials, should be composed exclusively of Ottoman -subjects.[59] - -Appended to the Bagdad Railway Convention was a secret agreement -binding the Company not to encourage or install foreign settlements -or colonies in the vicinity of the Anatolian or Bagdad Railways.[60] -Although the Sultan had mortgaged his empire, at least he was -determined to retain possession![61] - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - - [1] On this point _cf._ M. Solovieff, _La Terre Sainte et la société - impériale de Palestine_ (Petrograd, 1892). The society there referred - to was said to be liberally patronized by the Tsar and other members - of the imperial family. - - [2] For details of the Kapnist plan see _The Times_ (London), - December 17, 1898; _The Euphrates Valley Railway_—a prospectus - (London, 1899). - - [3] In a memorandum of June 10, 1899, to the Sultan, Dr. Kurt Zander, - General Manager of the Anatolian Railway Company, said that, in - accordance with the wishes of the Sultan—and “to avoid all obstacles - and avert every possibility of opposition”—his Company sought to - arrive at a satisfactory understanding with the Smyrna-Aidin and - Smyrna-Cassaba railways. All proposals to the Smyrna-Aidin Company, - however, “met with evasive answers, which finally resulted in a - termination of negotiations.” _Cf._, also, E. Aublé, _Bagdad—son - chemin de fer, son importance, son avenir_ (Paris, 1917), pp. 9 _et - seq._ - - [4] For a copy of the text of this agreement the author is indebted - to Mr. E. Rechnitzer. Summaries were published in _The Times_, August - 10, 1899; _Le Temps_ (Paris), August 15, 1899; _Corps de droit - ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 155–156. - - [5] In June, 1899, the Anatolian Railway Company elected to its Board - of Directors M. L. Rambert, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and in - June, 1900, M. Gaston Auboyneau, of the same institution. The new - directors replaced Mr. George Henry Maxwell Batten, of London, and - Sir Edward F. G. Law, of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The - refusal of the Smyrna-Aidin line to come to a working agreement with - the Anatolian Company thus removed the last British directors from - the board of the latter. _Cf._ _Reports of the Anatolian Railway - Company_, 1898–1900, _passim_. - - [6] A letter from Mr. E. Rechnitzer to the Sultan, dated August - 16, 1899, accuses M. Constans of having publicly referred to the - “accord” between French and German interests in Turkish railways. Dr. - Karl Helfferich states that the agreement between the two railway - companies was supplemented by a gentlemen’s agreement between the two - ambassadors. _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1919), p. - 127. This would seem to be confirmed by André Chéradame, _op. cit._, - pp. 48 _et seq._ - - [7] The proposals previously made called for an absolute guarantee - of several thousands of francs income per kilometre per annum. - Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan called for “an annual guarantee of 15,000 - francs in gross receipts per kilometre, the said guarantee to be - paid exclusively out of the excess of the tithes of the _vilayets_ - through which the railway is to pass; it being understood that in - the event that the excess of such tithes be not sufficient to defray - the kilometric guarantee, the concessionaire shall have no redress - against the Imperial Government on account of the insufficiency.” - Memorandum of May 14, 1899, from Mr. Rechnitzer’s files. Although - this plan had the great advantage of requiring no immediate payments - from the Ottoman Treasury, it probably would have cost Turkey - more in the long run, for the guarantee specified was excessively - high. Compare with provisions of the Bagdad Railway concession of - March, 1903, _infra_. Mr. Rechnitzer also asked for extensive port - privileges in Alexandretta and in the port to be determined on the - Persian Gulf. The chief features of the plan were outlined in a - pamphlet published in London, July 29, 1899, entitled _The Euphrates - Valley Railway_. - - [8] Mr. Rechnitzer now has in his possession a beautiful watch—inlaid - with a map of the Ottoman Empire, in precious stones, showing the - route of the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway—which he presented to - Abdul Hamid in 1899. He repurchased it at a public auction held in - Paris after the Young Turk revolution of 1909. - - [9] In a letter dated September 30, 1922, to the author Mr. - Rechnitzer outlines the situation as follows: “My offer being much - more favorable than that of the Germans, it seemed likely in August, - 1899, that it would be accepted. Unfortunately the Transvaal War - broke out in the autumn of that year, and the German Emperor, a - few days after the declaration of war, specially came to London to - ask our Government to give him a free hand in Turkey. It appears - that there was an interview between the Emperor and Mr. Joseph - Chamberlain, who was more interested in Cecil Rhodes’ scheme in - Africa than in my scheme in Turkey. As a consequence Sir Nicholas - O’Connor was instructed to inform the Turkish Government that the - British Government’s support was withdrawn from my offers.” It is - only fair to add, however, that there may have been other factors in - the situation. _The Financial News_ (London), of August 17, 1899, - intimated that Mr. Rechnitzer’s proposal did not have sufficiently - strong financial backing; that it was more Austrian than British; - that the support of the British Government was more formal than - whole-hearted. - - [10] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1899, pp. 9–10; _The - Annual Register_, 1899, p. 292. Simultaneously the Sultan granted - the _Deutsche Bank_ group a concession for the construction of port - and terminal facilities at Haidar Pasha, across the Straits from - Constantinople. Sweeping privileges were granted for the building of - docks, stations, sidings, and quays to a subsidiary of the Anatolian - Railway, the Haidar Pasha Port Company. The latter company completed - a handsome station and terminal at Haidar Pasha in 1902, the year - before the definitive Bagdad Railway concession. Furthermore, - it entered into close coöperation with the Mahsoussie Steamship - Company, a Government-owned company operating a ferry service between - Constantinople and the Asiatic side of the Straits; in this manner - adequate service was assured passengers and freight from European to - Asiatic points. The text of the concession is to be found in _Corps - de droit ottoman_, Volume III, pp. 342–351. _Cf._, also, _Report of - the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1902, p. 8. - - [11] _Supra_, pp. 31–34. - - [12] The single exception was Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan, which provided - that within five years of the award of the concession, the Sultan - might require the construction of a spur from Alexandretta to - Konia, on terms to be agreed upon between the Government and the - concessionaire. The chief feature of Mr. Rechnitzer’s plan, however, - unquestionably was the railway from Alexandretta to the Persian - Gulf—_i.e._, the Syrian and Mesopotamian, not the Anatolian and - Cilician, sections. Furthermore, there were political objectives - connected with the Rechnitzer proposal which, however attractive to - British imperialists, could not have been regarded with equanimity - by the Sultan. The following are typical quotations from Mr. - Rechnitzer’s prospectus: “It has long been the object of English - statesmen to consolidate the position of England in the Persian - Gulf, where British interests (both political and commercial) are - now paramount. With a railway in this region controlled by British - interests ... a very strong foothold would accrue to British - influence” (p. 12). Among the advantages of the proposed railway - are listed the following (pp. 17–18): “It will place under British - control two important ports, one on the Mediterranean and the other - on the Persian Gulf; it will strengthen British influence in Turkey - and in the Persian Gulf, and indirectly, in Persia and Afghanistan; - it will afford England powerful means of exercising her influence - over the territory of Central Persia, and of establishing new - commercial enterprises over an enormous area of unexploited country - of exceptional wealth.” - - [13] Quoted by A. D. C. Russell, “The Bagdad Railway,” in _The - Fortnightly Review_, Volume 235 (1921), p. 312. _Cf._, also, _Corps - de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 153 _et seq._ - - [14] Pan-Islamism started as a religious and cultural revival but - rapidly took on political and economic significance. Later, in - connection with Turkish nationalism (see _infra_, Chapter IX), it - became a serious international problem. A short, popular discussion - of the rise of Pan-Islamism is Lothrop Stoddard’s _The New World of - Islam_ (New York, 1921), Chapters I, II, V. _Cf._, also, _Mohammedan - History_, No. 57 of the Foreign Office Handbooks (London, 1920), - Part I; G. Charmes, _L’avenir de la Turquie: le pan-islamisme_ - (Paris, 1883); A. J. Toynbee, _Nationality and the War_ (London, - 1915), pp. 399–411, and _Turkey: a Past and a Future_ (New York, - 1917); Tekin Alp, _Türkismus und Pantürkismus_ (Weimar, 1915); C. - Snouck Hurgronje, _The Holy War, “Made in Germany”_ (New York, 1917). - Regarding Abdul Hamid’s place in the Pan-Islamic movement _cf._ - _Mohammedan History_, pp. 42–46. - - [15] Great Britain, characteristically enough, took steps to protect - her interests by reviving the Arabian caliphate—_i.e._, by supporting - the claims of the Sherif of Mecca to the caliphate. - - [16] _Infra_, pp. 127–128. - - [17] Regarding British activities in Koweit, _cf. infra_, pp. 197–198. - - [18] _Infra_, p. 149. - - [19] _Infra_, pp. 155–157; Chéradame, _op. cit._, pp. 267 _et seq._; - K. Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1919), - pp. 124 _et seq._ - - [20] _The Times_, October 28, 1898 - - [21] _Annual Register_, 1899, pp. 289–291; _Parliamentary Debates, - House of Commons_, Volume 120 (1903), p. 1247, Volume 126 (1903), p. - 108; W. von Hohenzollern, _My Memoirs, 1887–1918_, pp. 84–86, 101–103. - - [22] _The Globe_, August 10, 1899. _Cf._, also, _The Morning Herald_, - August 10, 1899, and _The Westminster Gazette_, August 11, 1899. - - [23] No attempt is made here to analyze the convention of March - 18, 1902 (which had been preceded by a draft convention of January - 8, 1902), as it was superseded by the convention of March 5, 1903. - _Cf. infra_, pp. 70–71, 77–84. The text of the convention of 1902 - is to be found as an appendix to R. LeCoq, _Un chemin de fer en - Asie Mineure_ (Paris, 1907). George von Siemens (1839–1901) did not - live to see the consummation of his great plans for the development - of Turkish railways. After his death in 1901 his work was taken up - by his successor as Managing Director of the _Deutsche Bank_, Dr. - Arthur von Gwinner. For a short account of the life of von Siemens - see an obituary by Professor J. Riesser, in _Bank-Archiv_, No. 2, - November, 1901. The work of von Siemens in the development of German - economic enterprises in the Near East is told in a biography by his - son-in-law, Dr. Karl Helfferich; _Georg von Siemens_ (Leipzig, 1923). - - [24] _The Times_, January 25, 1902. - - [25] _Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés_, - 1902, pp. 1468 et seq. - - [26] _The Times_, January 25, 1902. - - [27] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 101, pp. 129, - 597, 628, 669, Volume 120 (1903), p. 1371. - - [28] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1901, p. 17; _The - Times_, January 25, 1902. - - [29] _Annual Register_, 1902, pp. 290–291; _Report of the Bagdad - Railway Company_, 1904, p. 7. - - [30] _La Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de - Bagdad-Firman, Convention, Cahier des Charges, Statuts_, in French - and Turkish (Constantinople, 1905); translated into English in - _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cd. 5635, Volume CIII (1911), No. - 1. Where references are here given to the convention itself, no - preceding identifying word will be given, the citation being merely, - _e.g._, _Article I_. The _Statuts_ will be referred to as “By-Laws” - and the _Cahier des Charges_ as “Specifications.” - - [31] Turco-German control of the Board of Directors was not - inconsistent with the agreement of 1899 between the _Deutsche Bank_ - and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which assured French interests only - 40% of the shares of the Bagdad Railway Company. For details of the - organization of the Company see the _Report of the Anatolian Railway - Company_, 1903, pp. 4–7; _By-Laws_, _passim_. - - [32] _Articles 1–4, 7, 12, 37–39_; _Specifications_, Article 30. - - [33] In this connection see Sir W. M. Ramsay, _The Historical - Geography of Asia Minor_ (London, 1890); D. G. Hogarth, _The Nearer - East_ (London, 1902); Jastrow, _op. cit._, Chapter II; Sir C. W. - Wilson, _Murray’s Handbook for Asia Minor_ (London, 1895 and 1900); - R. Fitzner, _Anatolien-Wirtschaftsgeographie_ (Berlin, 1902); F. - Dernburg, _Auf deutscher Bahn in Kleinasien_ (Berlin, 1892). Good - general accounts of the regions through which the Bagdad Railway - was to run are: Baron E. von der Goltz, _Reisebilder aus dem - griechisch-türkischen Orient_ (Halle, 1902); R. Oberhummer and H. - Zimmerer, _Durch Syrien und Kleinasien_ (Berlin, 1899); E. Banse, - _Die Türkei; eine moderne Geographie_ (Berlin, 1916); Sir Mark - Sykes, _The Caliph’s Last Heritage—A Short History of the Turkish - Empire_ (London, 1915), Part 2, Chapters II and IV. A well-informed - article describing the projected route of the Bagdad railway is one - by a member of the German technical commission, “Die anatolischen - Eisenbahnen und ihre Fortsetzung bis zum persischen Golf,” in _Archiv - für Eisenbahnwesen_, Volume 26 (1903), pp. 75–90. - - [34] For a description of the line from Konia to Adana, including - an historical sketch of the principal towns served by the railway, - _cf._ Karl Baedeker, _Konstantinopel und das westliche Kleinasien_ - (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 156–172, and _Konstantinopel, Balkanstaaten, - Kleinasien, Archipel, Cypern_ (second edition, Leipzig, 1914), pp. - 270–306, generously supplied with excellent maps. - - [35] A popular account of the engineering difficulties facing the - construction of the railway from Adana to Aleppo is to be found - in _The Scientific American_, supplement, Volume 51 (1901), pp. - 21248–21249. - - [36] _Cf._ W. H. Hall (of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut), - _The Near East_ (New York, 1920), particularly an interesting map, p. - 174. According to the convention of 1903, Article 1, Aleppo was to be - connected with the main line by a branch from Tel-Habesh, but in 1910 - the route was changed, on petition of the inhabitants, to include - Aleppo as a station on the Bagdad line itself. _Report of the Bagdad - Railway Company_, 1910, p. 8. Statistics regarding the population of - Aleppo and other cities along the line are taken, unless otherwise - indicated, from the _Statesman’s Year Book_, 1903, _passim_. - - [37] _Article 38_; “The Trade of the Mesopotamian Valley,” in - _Commerce Reports_, No. 280 (Washington, 1912), pp. 1050–1065, and - No. 256 (1913), pp. 350–358; Karl Baedeker, _Palestine and Syria, - with the chief routes through Mesopotamia and Babylonia_ (fourth - edition, Leipzig, 1906), pp. 351–411. - - [38] Valentine Chirol, _The Middle Eastern Question, or Some - Political Problems of Indian Defence_ (New York, 1903), pp. 179–182. - - [39] This is the distance by the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab; as the - crow flies, the distance is about 150 miles shorter. - - [40] Regarding the Lynch Brothers see David Fraser, _The Short Cut to - India_ (London, 1909), pp. 42 _et seq._; _Mesopotamia_, p. 30; _The - Near East_, August 11, 1916, p. 358; _infra_, pp. 190–191. - - [41] _Article 1_, which describes in detail the route of the Bagdad - Railway and its branches. - - [42] Chirol, _op. cit._, p. 179; _Supplement to Daily Consular and - Trade Reports_, Annual Series (Washington, 1915). - - [43] The distances on the Bagdad Railway may be estimated as follows: - - Haidar Pasha to Ismid 91 kilometres - Ismid to Eski Shehr 174 ” - Eski Shehr to Konia 444 ” - Konia to Basra 2,264 ” - Branch lines, about 800 ” - ——- - Total 3,773 kilometres, - - or approximately 2,400 miles. This does not include the section of - the Anatolian Railway from Eski Shehr to Angora, a distance of 311 - kilometres, or 194 miles additional. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa - Fé Railway from Chicago to Los Angeles is 2,246 miles in length. - The distance from Chicago to San Francisco _via_ the Chicago and - Northwestern-Union Pacific system is 2,261 miles. _Official Guide of - the Railways of the United States_ October, 1921, pp. 679, 825. - - [44] _Cf., e.g._, T. W. Overlach, _Foreign Financial Control - in China_ (New York, 1919), _passim_; _La Gaceta Oficial_ of - the Republic of Cuba for the years 1911 and 1912, regarding the - _Ferrocarril de la Costa Norte de Cuba_; the _Statesman’s Year Book_, - 1903, p. 1044. - - [45] The average population per square mile in eastern Anatolia was - 27, in northern Syria 31, in Mesopotamia 13. - - [46] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, 1903, No. 3140, pp. 26–27; - Sir William Willcocks, _The Recreation of Chaldea_ (Cairo, 1903). - - [47] This financial assistance was granted at the rate of 11,000 - francs per kilometre, payable annually throughout the ninety-nine - years of the concession. The obligation was capitalized and met by - the issue of 4% bonds as here described. - - [48] _Bagdad Railway Loan Contract_, March 5, 1903. M. Léon Berger, - President of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, and a French - citizen, was one of the signatories of this document. The bonds of - the loan were issued in denominations of 500 francs, 408 marks, 20 - pounds sterling, 22 pounds Turkish, and 245 Dutch florins, in order - to facilitate their sale in the international securities markets. - The _Deutsche Bank_ was made fiscal agent for all transactions in - connection with the loan, with the single qualification that it was - to appoint as its Paris agent the Imperial Ottoman Bank, representing - the French interests in the enterprise. The syndicate apparently made - a profit of over 2,500,000 francs on the transaction, as the bonds - were delivered to the concessionaires, under _Article 35_ of the - Convention, valued at 81–1/2% of par but were sold at 86.40. - - [49] _Articles 35_ and _37_. - - [50] _Articles 6, 10, 22, 27._ - - [51] _Cf._ W. A. Dunning, _Reconstruction, Political and Economic, - 1865–1877_ (New York, 1907), pp. 145, 227; H. V. Poor, _Manual of the - Railroads of the United States_ (New York, 1869), pp. xlvi-xlvii. - - [52] _Supra_, p. 11. - - [53] _Articles 13, 24, 25, 33_; _Specifications_, Article 4. - - [54] _Articles 9_ and _23_. - - [55] _Infra_, pp. 190–191. - - [56] _Articles 5, 18, 29, 34._ - - [57] _Article 29_; _Specifications_, Articles 21, 24, 25, 29, 30. - - [58] _Articles 15, 26, 45_; _Specifications_, Article 26. - - [59] _Articles 20_ and _21_. Another sop to Turkish pride was - _Article 46_, which required the Company to contribute annually to - the Constantinople Poorhouse the sum of £500. - - [60] _The Times_, March 14, 1903, contained a report of this secret - appendix. A denial was issued by the Berlin _National Zeitung_ of - March 18, 1903, but the existence of the supplementary agreement was - confirmed by Dr. von Gwinner in 1909 (_op. cit._, p. 1092). Djavid - Bey, in a memorandum to the author, has stated that the Ottoman - Government considered this appendix of the utmost importance. - - [61] A proviso of the concession of 1903 was that the _Deutsche Bank_ - was to float an Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of March, 1903, to an - amount of about $10,000,000. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1920, No. Cmd. - 964, pp. 57–58. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -PEACEFUL PENETRATION PROGRESSES - - -THE FINANCIERS GET THEIR FIRST PROFITS - -The convention of March, 1903, marked the beginning, not the end, of -the work of the promoters of the Bagdad Railway. Ahead of Dr. von -Gwinner[1] and his associates lay all sorts of obstacles, some of which -proved to be insurmountable. There were the financial difficulties and -risks attendant upon the task of borrowing and expending the funds for -the construction of the railway—estimated at about one hundred million -dollars. There were the technical difficulties of constructing a line -across obstinate mountain barriers and inhospitable desert plains. -There were the political difficulties of retaining the friendship of -notoriously fickle Ottoman ministers and of preventing diplomatic -opposition on the part of foreign powers. Events proved that this was -to be a thorny path indeed—a path which was to lead through political -intrigue, diplomatic bargaining, a Turkish revolution, and a world war. - -The concessionaires began work in a manner indicative of a -determination to succeed in spite of all obstacles. The Bagdad Railway -Company was incorporated in Constantinople, March, 1903, under the -joint auspices of the _Deutsche Bank_ and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, -as provided by their mutual agreement of 1899. Almost immediately -an invitation was extended to British capitalists to participate -in the enterprise. Three-cornered negotiations were conducted by -German, French, and British bankers—under the watchful eyes of their -respective foreign offices—to arrive at some satisfactory plan for -internationalization of the railway. An agreement was reached by the -financiers by which British capital was to share equally in ownership -and control with the German and the French, but the hostile attitude of -the English press and the disapproval of the Balfour Government led to -the abandonment of the proposed tripartite syndicate.[2] - -Failing to secure British cooperation, the concessionaires proceeded to -finance the Bagdad Railway by other means. Ten per cent of the stock of -the Company was subscribed by the Ottoman Government, ten per cent by -the Anatolian Railway Company, and the remainder by an international -syndicate headed by the _Deutsche Bank_. The Board of Directors was -enlarged to twenty-seven members, as follows: eight Germans, chosen by -the _Deutsche Bank_; three Germans elected by the Anatolian Railway -Company; eight Frenchmen designated by the Imperial Ottoman Bank; four -Ottomans; two Swiss; one Austrian; and one Italian.[3] The control of -the Bagdad Railway Company thus remained in Turco-German hands, but -French and other interests were too well represented to justify the -criticism that the railway was a purely German enterprise secretly -coöperating with the German Foreign Office. In fact, in 1903 Mr. -Balfour and Lord Lansdowne were as much alarmed by the possibility of -pernicious French activities in the line as they were disturbed by the -predominantly German character of the scheme.[4] Baron von Schoen, -one-time German Foreign Secretary, described the Bagdad Railway as “an -Ottoman enterprise which has an international character under German -guidance.”[5] - -The great resources of the _Deutsche Bank_ were now brought into -play to provide the funds for the construction of the first section -of the railway. The necessary capital was to be secured, it will -be recalled,[6] by the sale of an issue of Imperial Ottoman Bagdad -Railway Bonds amounting to 54,000,000 francs. With comparatively -little difficulty the German share of the loan was subscribed, but the -allotment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and its associates was not so -easily disposed of, because of the decision of the French Government -to exclude the Bagdad Railway Bonds from the Bourse. Nevertheless, -the entire loan was successfully underwritten, and by November, 1903, -preparations had been completed for the construction of the line from -Konia to Bulgurlu, a distance of 200 kilometres.[7] - -Building of the railway went forward with great rapidity, and the rails -reached Bulgurlu by early autumn, 1904. On October 25, the Sultan’s -birthday, this first section of the Bagdad Railway was opened to -traffic with pompous ceremonies. And well might the concessionaires -have celebrated! Not only had they passed the first milestone of their -great task, but they had made a comfortable profit on their operations. -By numerous economies the Bagdad Railway Company had saved 3,697,000 -francs of the 54,000,000 francs allowed by the Ottoman Government to -defray the costs of construction. The commissions of the bankers in -underwriting the bond issue, it was said, raised the total profit -on the first section of the railway—before a single train had been -operated—to about 6,000,000 francs.[8] This surplus, however, was not -all available for distribution among the concessionaires. A reserve -fund of almost 4,000,000 francs was established to provide for the -subsequent construction of the costly sections across the Taurus and -Amanus mountains. The promoters had to be reimbursed for preliminary -expenditures, such as the expensive surveying of the entire line from -Konia to the Persian Gulf. Included in these “out of pocket” payments -was a large item for _backshish_—gratuities to Ottoman dignitaries. -“Nobody,” said Dr. von Gwinner, “having done business in Turkey -ignores the fact that _backshish_ on the Bosporus ruled supreme and -was hitherto an absolute condition of any contract. We had to pay in -proportion to the importance of a business of some £20,000,000.”[9] -Djavid Bey informs the author that the item of _backshish_ must have -amounted to almost £100,000, “for during the Hamidian régime friendship -between sovereigns was not enough to bring about the granting of a -concession.” - -Within nineteen months after the Turkish Government had issued its -bonds to cover the cost of the project, the first section of the Bagdad -Railway, from Konia to Bulgurlu, had been completed. The success of -the concessionaires in this part of the enterprise might have been -taken as a criterion of rapid progress with the further construction -of the line to the Persian Gulf. Such an expectation, however, would -have been premature. Beyond Bulgurlu lay the Taurus mountains and -innumerable engineering difficulties which could be overcome only after -the expenditure of considerable time and money. The Turkish Government, -furthermore, was in no position to issue additional bonds to the amount -of fifty or sixty millions francs to cover the costs of constructing -the second section of the line. Interest and sinking fund charges on -the first issue of Bagdad Railway bonds were a serious drain on the -treasury; additional charges of a like character could be met only by -an increase of the customs revenues of the Empire. Such an increase -could not be effected, however, except by international agreement, -because under existing treaties between Turkey and the Great Powers all -import duties were fixed at eight per cent _ad valorem_.[10] - -In 1903, coincident with the first issue of bonds for the Bagdad -Railway, the Ottoman Government had requested permission to increase -these duties to eleven per cent but had been unable to obtain the -consent of the interested nations. It was not until 1906, after -prolonged and irritating negotiations, that the Powers agreed to a -three per cent increase, effective in July of the following year. Even -then, however, the higher duties were assented to under a number of -restrictions which rendered difficult the diversion of the increased -revenue to the payment of railway guarantees; elaborate regulations -were incorporated in the treaties prescribing expensive reform of -the government of Macedonia and costly readjustments in the customs -administration.[11] - -By 1908, nevertheless, Turkish fiscal affairs were in a sufficiently -satisfactory state to enable the Government to conclude arrangements -for the construction of succeeding sections of the Bagdad Railway. On -June 2 of that year an imperial _iradé_ was granted authorizing the -extension of the line from Bulgurlu to Aleppo and thence eastward to -El Helif (near Nisibin), a distance of some eight hundred and forty -kilometres. The completion of this portion of the line would bring -the railway to a point about eleven hundred miles from Constantinople -and only a little over seven hundred miles from Basra. Arrangements -were effected for the immediate issue of the Imperial Ottoman Bagdad -Railway Four Per Cent Loans, Second and Third Series, to an amount of -one hundred and eight million and one hundred and nineteen million -francs respectively, to provide the capital necessary for the building -of the railway. Interest and sinking fund payments on these loans were -guaranteed from the surplus of net revenues accruing to the Imperial -Government from the Ottoman Public Debt. In case of emergency, certain -taxes (notably the cattle tax) of the vilayets of Konia, Adana, and -Aleppo were pledged for this purpose.[12] - -Only a month after the conclusion of this convention the Near East -was thrown into a state of turmoil as a result of the outbreak of the -first of the Young Turk revolutions. Under these circumstances it -appeared inexpedient to the Bagdad Railway Company to push construction -of its line until such time as a reasonable degree of security should -be restored. It was not until December, 1909, therefore, after the -deposition of Abdul Hamid, that good friend of German enterprise in -Turkey, that a construction company was formed to build the railway -across the Taurus and Amanus mountains. During the autumn of the same -year a Franco-German syndicate underwrote the second and third series -of Bagdad Railway loans, thereby providing the necessary funds for the -work.[13] - - -THE BANKERS’ INTERESTS BECOME MORE EXTENSIVE - -The years 1904 to 1909 were lean years, judged by actual progress in -the laying of rails from Bulgurlu to Bagdad and Basra. Nevertheless, -they were years characterized, on the part of the investors interested -in the consummation of the great enterprise, by every possible -activity to prepare the way for eventual success on a grand scale. In -the spring of 1906, for example, Dr. Karl Helfferich was appointed -assistant general manager of the Anatolian Railways, and one year -later was elected a managing director of the _Deutsche Bank_ with -general supervision over all of the Bank’s railway enterprises in -the Near East. The appointment of Dr. Helfferich—who, although he -was only thirty-four years of age, had achieved an international -reputation—aroused widespread comment and turned out to be an event -of first-rate importance in the history of the Bagdad Railway. As a -young professor of political science in the University of Berlin, Dr. -Helfferich won general recognition as an unusually able economist. -He was persuaded to enter the Government service in 1901 and became -assistant secretary in the Colonial Department of the Ministry of -Foreign Affairs. He was known to be in the good graces of the Emperor -and of Prince von Bülow, and it was said that he became their chief -adviser on Near Eastern affairs.[14] The choice of such a distinguished -person as directing genius of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways gave -renewed confidence in Germany that the Bagdad plan would succeed. In -Great Britain the appointment was considered an ominous sign that a -very real connection existed between the economic enterprises of the -_Deutsche Bank_ and the Near Eastern activities of the German Foreign -Office.[15] - -In 1907 the Anatolian Railway Company, under a contract with the -Turkish Government, completed arrangements for the irrigation of the -desert plain southeast of Konia. It was planned to water artificially -about one hundred and fifty thousand acres of arid land, thus rendering -the region independent of weather conditions. The effects of such -an improvement would be far-reaching. Much idle land would be made -available for profitable farming, and the yield of soil already under -cultivation would be developed materially. Increased production -might lead to a surplus of agricultural products for export, and the -greater purchasing power of a prosperous Anatolian farming class would -stimulate import trade. Agriculture, commerce, and manufacturing alike, -therefore, could be served. The Anatolian Railway Company issued some -135,000 new shares of stock to defray its part of the expenses, hoping -to be richly compensated by increased traffic on the railway. The -Imperial Ottoman Treasury issued £800,000 of Konia Irrigation Bonds, -an outlay which it hoped to offset by increased taxes from the Konia -district, by rentals and sales of irrigated lands, and by decreased -guarantees to this section of the railway.[16] - -A number of German banks, meanwhile, were pushing their financial -operations in the Near East. The success of the _Deutsche Palästina -Bank_[17] encouraged the formation of other similar institutions. The -_Nationalbank für Deutschland_, in 1904, founded the _Banque d’Orient_, -with offices in Hamburg, Athens, Constantinople, Salonica, and Smyrna. -The following year the _Dresdner Bank_, in coöperation with other -large Austro-German financial institutions, inaugurated the important -_Deutsche Orientbank_, with a capital stock of sixteen million marks. -This latter bank took over the Hamburg and Constantinople offices of -the _Banque d’Orient_ and established a large number of branches of its -own, including those at Alexandria, Cairo, and Smyrna. The _Deutsche -Orientbank_ became an active promoter of industrial enterprises in -Asiatic Turkey; for example, in 1908 it organized _La Société pour -Enterprises Electriques en Orient_, a company which proceeded to take -over the surface railways as well as the electric light and power -concession of Constantinople. In 1908 the _Deutsche Bank_ itself -formally opened an office in Constantinople for the transaction of a -general banking business.[18] - -The entry of these German banks into the Near Eastern field was of -no small importance to the British and French financial institutions -already there. The German bankers allowed liberal rates of interest -on time and check deposits and permitted reasonable overdrafts at -low rates. These practices were in sharp contrast with the rigid -regulations of the older-established banks. The _Deutsche Bank_ -undertook to collect claims of local merchants against the Turkish -Government; through its influence in the Government departments it cut -red tape and secured payments which otherwise might have been delayed -for years. Constantinople business men welcomed their emancipation -from the ultra-conservative methods of the older institutions, and it -was not long before a very thriving business was being transacted by -the German banks and their agencies in the Near East.[19] Here was -a high-powered bomb to disturb the quiet which heretofore had ruled -in the banking community of Constantinople and of Asiatic Turkey. -Germans were disturbing the financial, as well as the commercial and -industrial, _status quo_ in the Near East! - -The advance of the German banks in Turkey was almost certain to be the -first step in a more general industrial and commercial penetration. -This will be the more readily understood if one recalls the close -coöperation which characterized the relationships between the German -banks and the business interests of the empire. This coöperation which -amounted, in effect, to financial interdependence—was one of the -striking features of the German economic advance in the generation -before the Great War. It strengthened German industrial enterprises -at home and promoted German trade and investments abroad. If a great -business needed capital, the banks furnished the necessary funds by -the purchase of securities which made them at once creditors and -copartners in that business. Sooner or later this connection would -find expression in the appointment of a representative of the bank on -the supervisory council of the industrial enterprise; occasionally a -“captain of industry” would be elected to the board of directors of -the bank. Although this procedure of interlocking directorates was -not unique to Germany—it was an established practice in the United -States, certainly—there was no country in which these alliances -were so far-reaching, or in which financial power was so centrally -controlled, as in the German Empire. In Germany finance and industry -were wedded—permanently united for better or for worse.[20] - -Of this alliance of banking and business the _Deutsche Bank_, chief -promoter of the Bagdad Railway, was a shining example. Its industrial -connections were too numerous to catalogue. It enjoyed intimate -financial relations with hundreds of companies engaged in every -important branch of manufacturing in Germany; it was represented on the -directorates of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American steamship -lines; it was the organizer of and chief stockholder in the German -Petroleum Company. It was the owner of a number of overseas banking -corporations stretching their activities from South America on the -west to China on the east. The officers of the _Deutsche Bank_ firmly -believed that the export of capital and the export of commodities -should go hand in hand. The other banks associated in the Bagdad -Railway enterprise likewise were closely affiliated with important -industrial enterprises. For example, the _Dresdner Bank_ held the -vice-chairmanship of Ludwig Loewe & Company, prominent manufacturers -of munitions, and the chairmanship of the Orenstein Koppel Company, -manufacturers of railway supplies. The _Bank für Handel und Industrie_ -possessed interests in the _Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft_, -the German General Electric Company. A still further evidence of this -close association of financial and industrial interests was furnished -in January, 1905, when the chief German banks entered into a “community -of interests” with August Thyssen and Hugo Stinnes, the steel and coal -barons of Germany.[21] - -If German business men were likely to be interested in the economic -development of Asia Minor, what was the nature of this interest? - - -BROADER BUSINESS INTERESTS DEVELOP - -Speaking to the Reichstag in March, 1908, Baron von Schoen, Foreign -Secretary of the Empire, explained a few of the opportunities which -the Bagdad Railway opened to German industry and commerce. “The -advantages,” he said, “which accrue to Germany from this great -enterprise, conceived on a grand scale, are obvious. In the first -place, there arises the prospect of considerable participation of -German industry in the furnishing of rails, rolling stock, and other -railway materials. Furthermore, German engineers, German construction -workers, and German contractors are very likely to find remunerative -occupation in the construction of the railway. Finally, it is certain -that with the rising civilization and the higher standard of living of -the inhabitants of the country, a new market will be made available. -That this territory will be opened up not merely for us, but also for -other nations, we can allow without envy.... What we have in view is -the development of regions that seem to be worth developing; we wish -to coöperate in awakening from a sleep of a thousand years an ancient -flourishing civilized region, thereby creating a new market for -ourselves and others.”[22] - -This same idea had been advanced by others on other occasions. The -_Alldeutsche Blätter_ of December 17, 1899, had prophesied that the -construction of the railway by a German-controlled syndicate would -result in the purchase of some eighty million dollars’ worth of German -products and that, once completed, the railway would open to German -business an enormous and wealthy market. Lord Ellenborough, speaking in -the House of Lords of the United Kingdom, on May 5, 1903, expressed the -opinion that “the capital disbursed in constructing the railway would -be largely spent on German steel industries, and on salaries to German -engineers and German surveyors, so that even if the railway, as a -railway, were a failure, it would not be a total loss to Germany.”[23] -The British Consul General at Constantinople pointed out, in 1903, -that, in addition to all of the aforementioned advantages, there would -be innumerable special opportunities for the remunerative investment of -German capital in the regions traversed by the railway.[24] - -Events seemed to establish the wisdom of these expressions of opinion. -Rails for the Bagdad line were ordered in Germany from the Steel -Syndicate (_Stahlwerksverband_). Transportation of materials from -Europe to the Near East was arranged for through German steamship -companies. German engineers were given the executive positions in -the construction and operation of the railway. Important subsidiary -companies were formed for the construction of port and terminal -facilities, for the building of irrigation works, and for other -purposes incidental to the railway proper. German banks established -branches on the ground in order to take advantage of other -opportunities for the profitable investment of surplus funds.[25] - -There was much evidence, however, to indicate that the preëminently -German character of the railway was not preserved. An English observer, -after a trip over the Anatolian lines in 1908, wrote that he noted a -great predominance of Turkish, Greek, and Italian employees over the -Germans. “The fact is,” he maintained, “that the people who run the -line, though Germans, care first for their own pockets and next for -Germany. They buy or employ what is cheapest and most suitable and -do not care a finger-snap for the origin of an article or a servant. -Patriotism occupies a small place in the calculations of promoters. The -tendency to deal with the Fatherland must always be strong, but it is -founded chiefly on the fact that the German knows the goods available -in his own country better than the goods of other countries and that -credit and banking facilities are more easily obtained at home. The -master impulse in every German engaged in business in Turkey, as in -business men of every other nationality, is to make money for himself -as soon as possible.” This same observer pointed out that there was an -astonishing absence of German employees in even the more responsible -positions of the Anatolian Railway and that the great majority of the -unskilled laborers were Italians.[26] - -Ultra-patriotic Germans, furthermore, denounced Dr. von Gwinner and his -associates for not making the Bagdad Railway an exclusively Teutonic -enterprise. A speaker at a Berlin branch of the Pan German League -had this to say of the situation: “The Bagdad Railway, which in its -origins was entirely German, has, thanks to the criminal negligence of -the _Deutsche Bank_, become almost wholly French. The German schools -along the line of the Railway, which were established by von Siemens, -have fallen into decay. The officials of the Railway speak French. -The ordinary language for transacting the business of the Railway -is French, although the French share of the capital is only thirty -per cent. The German engineers may as well be called home to-day as -to-morrow.”[27] - -Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of German financial interests in the -Near East and the established policy of the German banks to encourage -and assist export trade were factors in a remarkable development -of German trade in the Ottoman Empire, as will be indicated by the -following table:[28] - - EXPORTS FROM IMPORTS TO - TURKEY TO TURKEY FROM - YEAR GERMANY—MARKS GERMANY—MARKS - - 1900 30,400,000 34,400,000 - 1901 30,000,000 37,500,000 - 1902 36,500,000 43,300,000 - 1903 37,700,000 50,200,000 - 1904 43,500,000 75,300,000 - 1905 51,600,000 71,000,000 - 1906 55,000,000 68,200,000 - 1907 55,100,000 81,500,000 - 1908 47,600,000 64,000,000 - 1909 57,300,000 78,900,000 - 1910 67,400,000 104,900,000 - 1911 70,100,000 112,800,000 - -This table eloquently describes the nature of the advance of German -economic interests in Turkey. It does not, however, tell the whole -story. Was this advance the result of a general increase of prosperity -in the Ottoman Empire in which the Germans shared in common with other -traders? Or was the increase in German trade out of proportion to the -progress of other nationals—perhaps at the expense of the French and -British? The following tables will help answer these questions:[29] - - EXPORTS FROM TURKEY - TO UNITED TO AUSTRIA - KINGDOM TO FRANCE TO ITALY HUNGARY - YEAR MARKS MARKS MARKS MARKS - - 1900 118,760,000 86,220,000 22,520,000 35,220,000 - 1901 122,000,000 26,120,000 31,540,000 - 1902 130,520,000 83,040,000 28,980,000 35,580,000 - 1903 127,400,000 81,200,000 38,120,000 39,900,000 - 1904 122,760,000 73,120,000 31,300,000 39,120,000 - 1905 118,960,000 80,780,000 42,240,000 37,640,000 - 1906 129,440,000 91,600,000 45,100,000 39,300,000 - 1907 136,600,000 95,320,000 50,480,000 34,640,000 - 1908 109,220,000 70,760,000 44,580,000 34,360,000 - 1909 109,320,000 79,000,000 59,080,000 36,600,000 - 1910 100,660,000 77,000,000 48,000,000 43,340,000 - - IMPORTS TO TURKEY - FROM - FROM UNITED FROM AUSTRIA - KINGDOM FRANCE FROM ITALY HUNGARY - YEAR MARKS MARKS MARKS MARKS - - 1900 102,920,000 29,800,000 29,720,000 53,440,000 - 1901 128,220,000 37,880,000 43,800,000 57,100,000 - 1902 123,980,000 37,200,000 40,400,000 61,380,000 - 1903 114,020,000 36,640,000 45,360,000 65,120,000 - 1904 151,960,000 40,880,000 53,280,000 77,600,000 - 1905 139,300,000 42,420,000 57,200,000 76,660,000 - 1906 167,040,000 47,300,000 70,900,000 92,620,000 - 1907 147,380,000 46,380,000 63,040,000 89,920,000 - 1908 145,260,000 51,600,000 58,700,000 69,240,000 - 1909 156,280,000 54,600,000 67,740,000 77,040,000 - 1910 177,160,000 58,400,000 94,000,000 107,300,000 - -Certain important conclusions may be drawn from these statistics: - -1. British trade continued during the decade 1900–1910 to dominate -the Near Eastern market. With total imports and exports in the latter -year of over 277,000,000 marks it was in no immediate danger of being -outstripped by its nearest rivals—a German trade of about 172,000,000 -marks and an Austro-Hungarian trade of about 150,000,000 marks. - -2. France, whose Near Eastern trade in 1900 had proudly held a -position second only to that of the United Kingdom, was being obliged -to accept a less prominent place in the economic life of the Ottoman -Empire. During the first ten years of the new century French merchants -obviously were being outmaneuvered by Germans, Austro-Hungarians, and -Italians. In spite of a total increase of 17% in exports and imports -between France and Turkey it was apparent that French trade was not -keeping the pace; during the same period Austro-Hungarian trade showed -an increased valuation of 81%, German trade of 166%. - -3. Although it continued to dominate the Near Eastern market, British -commerce, likewise, was losing ground. Between 1900 and 1910 it showed -an increase of only 25% as compared with the Italian record of 172% -during the same period. During the decade British exports, although -showing an increased valuation, fell off from 35% to 22–1/2% of the -total import trade of Turkey; for the same period German exports -achieved not only an absolute gain of almost eighty million marks, but -also a relative increase from 2–1/2% to 11–1/2% of the whole. - -4. The advance of German trade was not equal to the advance of Italian -trade in the Ottoman Empire during the same period. This explains, in -part, the rapidly increasing political interest of Italy in the Near -East and seems to set at rest the notion that the Germans acquired a -stranglehold on exports and imports from and to Turkey. - -5. Looking at the question from a purely political standpoint, one’s -attention is struck by the fact that commercial laurels in the Ottoman -Empire were going to the nationals of the Triple Alliance powers. -Economically, Turkey was leaning toward the Central Powers. Few -international alliances are not based upon coincidence of economic -interests; it appeared that a solid foundation was being laid for the -eventual affiliation of Turkey with the Triple Alliance. - - -SEA COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED - -Exports and imports, however, are not the only items which enter into -the international balance sheet. As has been so amply demonstrated in -the experience of the British Empire, ocean freights may constitute -one of the chief items in the prosperity of a nation which lives -upon commerce with other nations. It was not surprising, therefore, -that upon the heels of German banks and German merchants in the Near -East closely followed those other great promoters of German economic -expansion, the steamship companies. The success of the _Deutsche -Levante Linie_, established in 1889,[30] indicated that there was room -for additional service between German ports and the cities of the -Aegean and the Mediterranean. Accordingly, in 1905, the Atlas Line, of -Bremen, inaugurated a regular service from the Baltic to Turkish ports. -One line was to ply between Bremen and Smyrna, with Rotterdam, Malta, -Piraeus, Salonica, and Constantinople as ports of call. Another of this -same company’s lines was to carry freight and passengers from Bremen to -the Syrian city of Beirut. During the same year the North German Lloyd -was responsible for the formation of the _Deutsche Mittelmeer Levante -Linie_, providing service between Marseilles and Genoa and Smyrna, -Constantinople, Odessa, and Batum.[31] The considerable increase of -trade between Germany and Turkey made a very real place for these -lines, especially in the transportation of such commodities as could -not be expected to bear the heavy charges of transportation by rail -through the Balkans and overland to German cities. These lines were -put into operation to provide for a traffic already in existence and -waiting for them. - -Such was not the case, however, with the establishment of German -steamship service to the Persian Gulf. Here British trade had been -dominant for centuries. The German railway invasion had not as yet -reached Mesopotamia, and German trade in this region was negligible. -The establishment of a German steamship service to Basra would be -equivalent to the throwing out of an advance guard and reconnaissance -expedition on behalf of German trade. Incidentally it would mean -the destruction of the practical monopoly which had been enjoyed by -the British in the trade of Irak. It was considered of no slight -importance, therefore, when, in April of 1906, the Hamburg-American -Line announced its intention of establishing a regular service between -European ports and the Persian Gulf. An office of the Company was -immediately opened at Basra, and in August the first German steamer, -with a German cargo, made its way up the Shatt-el-Arab. Soon afterward -the Hamburg-American Line inaugurated, also, a service between British -ports and Mesopotamia, and it provided a regular schedule of sailing -dates, a luxury to which merchants doing business in the Near East had -not heretofore been accustomed. With the aid of a government subsidy -the German company cut freight rates in half. This rude disturbance of -the _status quo_ in the shipping of the Persian Gulf dealt a severe -blow to British companies engaged in the carrying trade between -European ports and Mesopotamia. After a futile rate war the British -lines, represented by Lord Inchcape, came to an agreement, in 1913, -with their German competitors, ending a rivalry which had been the -cause of considerable concern on the part of their respective foreign -offices.[32] - -In order to coöperate with the attempts of Germans to have a share in -the trade of the Mesopotamian valley, the German Government established -a consulate at Bagdad in 1908. The services of this consulate, -supplementing the pioneer work of the Hamburg-American Line, had -immediate results in the development of commercial relationships with -the Land of the Two Rivers. The value of exports from Basra to Germany -increased from about half a million dollars in 1906 to slightly in -excess of a million dollars in 1913; German goods received at Basra -during the same period increased from about half a million dollars -to almost nine million dollars. Herr von Mutius, the German Consul -at Bagdad, conducted an active campaign of education and propaganda, -urging upon business men at home the importance of participating -further in the development of the economic resources of the land of the -Arabs.[33] - -The establishment of steamship communication between Europe and Asiatic -Turkey was welcomed by the Bagdad Railway Company. To widen the scope -of usefulness—and, consequently, to increase the revenues—of the -railway it was essential that every feeder for freight and passenger -service be utilized. This was a consideration in the agreement -with the Smyrna-Cassaba line and in the purchase, in 1906, of the -Mersina-Tarsus-Adana Railway.[34] The establishment of connections -with the former system developed a satisfactory volume of traffic with -Smyrna. The acquisition of the latter line provided direct connections -with the Mediterranean coast. - -Nevertheless, the promoters of the Bagdad Railway were by no -means satisfied with their terminal ports. Constantinople was at -a disadvantage as compared with Smyrna in the trade of Anatolia. -Smyrna was within reach of the Bagdad system only over the tracks -of a French-owned line which might not always be in the hands of -well-disposed owners. The prospects that the Railway soon would reach -Basra were not very bright. Mersina was limited in its possibilities of -development—shut off by the mountains from Anatolia, on the north, and -Syria, on the south, it was the natural outlet only for the products of -the Cilician plain. - -The port which the company sought to bring under its control was -Alexandretta, on the Mediterranean, seventy miles from Aleppo. Article -12 of the concession of 1903 assured preference to the Bagdad Railway -Company in the award of a “possible extension to the sea at a point -between Mersina and Tripoli-in-Syria.” The construction of a branch -from the main line to Alexandretta would provide the Railway with -sea communications for the valuable trade of northern Syria and the -northern Mesopotamian valley, then almost entirely dependent upon the -caravan routes centering in Aleppo. Accordingly, negotiations were -begun in the spring of 1911 looking toward the building of a branch -line to Alexandretta and the construction of extensive port facilities -at that harbor. - -Serious financial difficulties were encountered, however, in the -promotion of this plan. The Young Turk budget of 1910 had announced -that no further railway concessions carrying guarantees would be -granted. Even had the Government been disposed to depart from its -avowed intention, it would have been unable to do so. Suffering from -the usual malady of a young government—lack of funds—it was running -into debt continually and finding it increasingly difficult to borrow -money. Early in 1911 the Imperial Ottoman Treasury addressed a request -to the Powers for permission to increase the customs duties from eleven -to fourteen per cent. _ad valorem_. Great Britain immediately announced -its determination to veto the proposed revision of the revenues, unless -the increase were granted with certain important qualifications. Sir -Edward Grey informed the House of Commons, March 8: “I wish to see -the new régime in Turkey strengthened. I wish to see them supplied -with resources which will enable them to establish strong and just -government in all parts of the Turkish Empire. I am aware that money is -needed for these purposes, and I would willingly ask British trade to -make sacrifices for these purposes. But if the money is to be used to -promote railways which may be a source of doubtful advantage to British -trade, and still more if the money is going to be used to promote -railways which will take the place of communications which have been in -the hands of British concessionaires [_i.e._, the Lynch Brothers], then -I say it will be impossible for us to agree to that increase of the -customs duty until we are satisfied that British trade interests will -be satisfactorily guarded.”[35] This clear pronouncement of British -policy made it plain that no increased Turkish customs revenues could -be diverted to the proposed Alexandretta branch. It was even doubtful -if further funds would be forthcoming for the construction of the main -line beyond El Helif. - -This complicated domestic and international situation led to the -conventions of March 21, 1911, between the Imperial Ottoman Government -and the Bagdad Railway Company. One of these conventions provided for -the construction of a branch line of the Bagdad Railway from Osmanie, -on the main line, to Alexandretta, but without kilometric guarantee or -other subsidy from the Turkish Government. A second convention leased -for a period of ninety-nine years to the Haidar Pasha Port Company -the exclusive rights of constructing port and terminal facilities at -Alexandretta—including quays, docks, warehouses, coal pockets, and -elevators. As in the case of the Bagdad Railway itself, public lands -were to be at the disposal of the concessionaires without charge, -and private lands were to be subject to the law of expropriation if -essential for the purposes of the Company. Within the limits of the -port the Company was authorized to maintain a police force for the -maintenance of order and the protection of its property.[36] - -Because of the refusal of the Powers to permit an increase in the -customs, the Turkish Government was unable to assign further revenues -to the payment of railway guarantees. The Bagdad Railway Company -thereupon agreed to proceed with the construction of the sections -from El Helif to Bagdad without additional commitments from the -Imperial Ottoman Treasury. The Company likewise renounced its right -to build the sections beyond Bagdad, including its concession for the -construction of port works at Basra, with the proviso, however, that -this section of the line, if constructed, be assigned to a Turkish -company internationally owned and administered.[37] This surrender by -the Bagdad Railway Company of its rights to the pledge of additional -revenues by the Ottoman Treasury and its surrender of its hold on the -sections of the railway beyond Bagdad are by far the most important -provisions of the conventions of March 21, 1911. - -German opinion, as a whole, considered these self-denying contracts -of the Company an indication of the willingness of the _Deutsche -Bank_ and the German Government to go more than half way in removing -diplomatic objections to the construction of the Bagdad Railway.[38] -There were Englishmen, however, who felt that the conventions of 1911 -were a mere gesture of conciliation; in their opinion the renunciation -of these important rights was bait held out to win foreign diplomatic -support and to induce the participation of foreign capital in the -Railway and its subsidiary enterprises. Lord Curzon, for example, -expressed to the House of Lords his belief that technical and financial -difficulties made it impossible for the German bankers to proceed with -the construction of the Bagdad line without the assistance of outside -capital. He was firmly of the opinion that no railway stretching from -the Bosporus to the Gulf could be financed by a single Power.[39] - -The unsettled political conditions in Turkey, meanwhile, had delayed, -but not halted, construction of the Bagdad Railway. The years 1910 -and 1911 were marked by progress on the sections in the vicinity of -Adana. From that Cilician city the railway was being laid westward -to the Taurus Mountains, eventually to pass through the Great Gates -and meet the tracks already laid to Bulgurlu. Eastward the line was -being constructed in the direction of the Amanus mountains, although -there seemed to be little chance for an early beginning of the -costly tunneling of the barrier. During 1911 and 1912 attention was -concentrated on the building of the sections east of Aleppo, which -in 1912 reached the Euphrates River. The branch line to Alexandretta -was completed and opened to traffic November 1, 1913.[40] Financial -difficulties in the way of further construction of the main line -were overcome in the latter part of 1913, when the _Deutsche Bank_ -disposed of its holdings in the Macedonian Railways and the Oriental -Railways to an Austro-Hungarian syndicate. The funds thus obtained -were re-invested in the Bagdad Railway, and the necessity was obviated -for a further sale of securities on the open market.[41] In 1914 the -Amanus tunnels were begun, a great steel bridge was thrown across the -Euphrates, the sections east of Aleppo were constructed almost to Ras -el Ain, in northern Mesopotamia. In addition, rails were laid from -Bagdad north to Sadijeh, on the Tigris, before the outbreak of the -Great War.[42] - -Thus far we have considered the Bagdad Railway almost entirely as a -business undertaking. In its inception, in fact, it was generally thus -regarded throughout Europe. As time passed, however, the enterprise -overstepped the bounds of purely economic interest and entered the -arena of international diplomacy. The greatest usefulness of the Bagdad -Railway was in the economic services it was capable of rendering the -Ottoman Empire and, further, all mankind. Its widest significance -is to be sought in the part it played in the development of German -capitalistic imperialism. Its greatest menace was its consequent -effects upon the relations between Turkey, Germany, and the other Great -Powers of Europe. The succeeding chapters will deal with the political -ramifications of the Bagdad enterprise. - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Dr. Arthur von Gwinner (1856- ) is one of the most distinguished -of modern financiers. He was born, appropriately enough, at -Frankfort-on-the-Main when that city was a center of international -finance. His father, a lawyer, was an intimate friend of Schopenhauer -and the latter’s executor and biographer. In 1885 young Gwinner -married a daughter of Philip Speyer and thus became a member of one -of the famous families of bankers in Europe and America. For a time -he conducted a private banking business in Berlin, but in 1894 he -became an active director of the _Deutsche Bank_. Two years later he -was sent to America to supervise the reorganization of the Northern -Pacific Railway by its European creditors; and while he was in the -United States, he formed lasting friendships with J. Pierpont Morgan -and James J. Hill. In 1901 he succeeded Dr. von Siemens as the guiding -spirit of the _Deutsche Bank_, which under his administration made -even more remarkable progress than under his capable predecessor. As -managing director of the _Deutsche Bank_ he became president of the -Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies. It was in 1909 that Dr. von -Gwinner’s father received from the Kaiser the patent of hereditary -nobility—an honor said to have been intended as much for the -distinguished son as for the distinguished sire. Intellectually, Dr. -von Gwinner is an international man: he quotes Dickens and Shakespeare -and Molière, Goethe and Schiller and Lessing, with almost equal -facility. His delightful personality stands out in all the Bagdad -Railway negotiations. - -[2] _Infra_, Chapter IX. The French bankers also shared in the -ownership of the construction company. A. Géraud, “A New German Empire: -the Story of the Bagdad Railway,” in _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume -75 (1914), p. 967; _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1903, pp. 4, -8. - -[3] Among the German members were Dr. von Gwinner; Dr. Karl Testa, -representative of the German bondholders on the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration; Dr. Alfred von Kaulla, a director of the -_Württembergische Vereinsbank_, and original concessionaire of the -Anatolian Railways; Dr. Karl Schrader, a member of the Reichstag; Dr. -Kurt Zander, general manager of the Anatolian Railway Company. The -directors nominated by the French interests were Count A. D’Arnoux, -Director General, and M. Léon Berger, French member, of the Ottoman -Public Debt Administration; MM. J. Deffes, G. Auboyneau, P. Naville, -Pangiri Bey, and A. Vernes, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the -last-named being vice-president of the Bagdad Railway Company; M. L. -Chenut, a member of the Ottoman _Régie Générale de chemins de fer_. -The Turkish members of the Board were Hamdy Bey, representative of the -Ottoman bondholders on the Public Debt Administration; Hoene Effendi, -under-secretary in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs; and two -Constantinople bankers. The Swiss were Herr Abegg-Arter, president of -the _Schweizerische Kreditanstalt_, of Zurich, and M. A. Turrettini, -of _L’Union financière de Genève_. The Austrian was Herr Bauer, of the -_Wiener Bankverein_, and the Italian was Carlo Esterle, of the Italian -Edison Electric Company, of Milan. There were few important changes in -the personnel of the Board of Directors between 1903 and 1914, perhaps -the most notable being the election of Dr. Karl Helfferich, in 1906. -_Cf._ _Reports of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1903, _et seq._ - -[4] _Cf._ _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fourth series, -Volume 120 (1903), p. 1371. During the Great War a conspicuous German -general complained that the Swiss in charge of the operation of the -Railway was more interested in the commercial than in the strategic -value of the line and did not coöperate with the military authorities. -_Cf._ Field Marshal Liman von Sanders, _Fünf Jahre Türkei_ (Berlin, -1919), p. 40. - -[5] _Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c. - -[6] _Supra_, p. 77. - -[7] Paul Imbert, “Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Revue des deux -mondes_, Volume 197 (1907), p. 672. The _Deutsche Bank_, with its -capital and surplus of about $75,000,000, was the foremost of the -German banks. Associated with it in the Bagdad Railway enterprise were -a number of other financial institutions, including, it is said, the -_Dresdner Bank_ and the _Darmstädter Bank_, ranking second and fourth -respectively among the great banks of the German Empire. Riesser, _op. -cit._, pp. 642–644. - -[8] _Supra_, Chapter IV, Note 48; Fraser, _op. cit._, pp. 48–49; -Jastrow, _op. cit._, p. 94; _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, -1904, p. 3; 1905, p. 4. - -[9] Von Gwinner, _loc. cit._, p. 1088. - -[10] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume III, pp. 221–228. - -[11] _Turkey in Europe_, pp. 128–129; _The Quarterly Review_, Volume -228 (1917), pp. 510–511; _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, -fourth series, Volume 159 (1906), pp. 1338, 1359; _ibid._, Volume 162 -(1906), p. 1419; Volume 178 (1907), p. 321; _ibid._, fifth series, -Volume 53 (1913), p. 368. - -[12] _Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad—Convention -Additionelle_ (Constantinople, 1908); _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cd. -5636, Volume CIII (1911); _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1908, -pp. 4–5; 1909, p. 4; _Bagdad Railway Loan Contract, Second and Third -Series_, June 2, 1908; _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1909, p. 12. - -[13] _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1909, p. 12. - -[14] _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1906, p. 4; K. Helfferich, -_Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 131–132; Dr. Helfferich’s -reputation was based largely upon his writings on two important -subjects: the gold monetary standard; government promotion of foreign -trade. _Cf._ _Germany and the Gold Standard_ (London, 1896); _Beiträge -zur Geschichte der deutschen Geldreform_ (Leipzig, 1901). See the -enthusiastic appreciation of Dr. Helfferich’s services voiced by his -associates of the _Deutsche Bank_ upon the occasion of his appointment -as Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury, January, 1915. _Report -of the Deutsche Bank_, 1915, pp. 11–12; _Report of the Bagdad Railway -Company_, 1914, p. 8. - -[15] _The Times_, October 25, 1905, commenting upon the proposed -appointment of Helfferich. - -[16] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1907, p. 7; H. C. -Woods, “The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries,” in _The Geographical -Journal_, Volume 50 (1917), pp. 32 _et seq._; _Parliamentary Papers_, -No. Cmd. 964 (1920). The irrigation system thus planned was completed -before the outbreak of the Great War. It justified the sanguine -expectations of its promoters, for the agricultural yield of the -irrigated lands increased from five to fifteen fold over the former -production. In 1911 a similar irrigation project was gotten under way -in Cilicia. _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), pp. -18–19. - -[17] _Cf._ _supra_, p. 37. - -[18] Riesser, _op. cit._, p. 454; _Report of the Dresdner Bank_, -1905, p. 6; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3553 (1905), p. -29; _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1908, p. 10. The Bagdad office of -the _Deutsche Bank_ was not established until 1914, just before the -outbreak of the War. _Ibid._, 1914, p. 9. - -[19] The principal bank in Turkey before the War was the Imperial -Ottoman Bank. This institution was owned by French and British -capitalists, the French interest being predominant and in control. It -was a quasi-public bank, founded in 1863, and enjoying since then a -monopoly of bank-note issues. Its central office was at Constantinople, -but it maintained a branch in practically every important city -of Asiatic Turkey, including Smyrna, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Aleppo, -Alexandretta, Beirut, Damascus, Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. The capital -stock of the Imperial Ottoman Bank was £10,000,000 sterling. A British -bank of some importance was The Eastern Bank, Ltd., of which the -Right Honorable Lord Balfour of Burleigh was chairman—the same Lord -Balfour who was Secretary for Scotland in the ministry of his namesake, -Arthur J. Balfour, in 1903, when the British Government quashed the -participation of English capitalists in the Bagdad Railway. The head -office of the Eastern Bank was in London, and it maintained branches in -Basra and Bagdad, although its principal sphere of activity was India. -Sir Ernest Cassell’s National Bank of Turkey was not established until -1909. _Cf._ Caillard, _loc. cit._, p. 439; weekly advertisements of -these banks in _The Near East; Parliamentary Debates_, Index for 1903, -p. v; _Turkey in Europe_, p. 36. - -[20] D. S. Jordan, “The Interlocking Directorates of War,” in _The -World’s Work_, July, 1913, p. 278; H. Hauser, _Les Méthodes Allemandes -d’Expansion Économique_, seventh edition (Paris, 1917), _passim_; -Riesser, _op. cit._, pp. 366–367. - -[21] Riesser, _op. cit._, pp. 373–375, 432, 474, 745–746. - -[22] _Verhandlungen des Reichstages, Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c. The speech -of the Secretary was followed by “Bravos” from the National Liberals. - -[23] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume 121 -(1903), p. 1340. - -[24] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (1903), p. 40. - -[25] _Supra_, pp. 98–99, _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1909, p. 12; -_Stenographische Berichte, XII. Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume -260 (1910), p. 2181d, statement by Baron von Schoen. - -[26] Fraser, _op. cit._, pp. 16–17, 18–20. _Cf._, also, _Report of the -Bagdad Railway Company_, 1911, p. 4. - -[27] _Staatsbürger Zeitung_ (Berlin), March 3, 1912. - -[28] Compiled from the _Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich_, -1900–1914, as corrected for 1900–1905 according to the _Statistisches -Handbuch für das deutsche Reich_, Volume 2, pp. 506–510. A remarkable -increase of German exports to Turkey—an increase of 50%—is to be -noted in the year 1904, during which the first section of the Bagdad -Railway was constructed. Undoubtedly this increase is to be partially -accounted for by the purchase in Germany of materials for right of way -as well as rolling stock for the railway. This factor should not be -over-estimated, however, as a glance at the following tables will show -that imports into Turkey from other European countries during the same -year likewise showed increases, without exception. The general falling -off in trade during 1908 may be attributed, in part, at any rate, to -the Young Turk Revolution of that year. - -[29] Compiled from _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Nos. 2950 (1902), -3533 (1905), 4188 (1908), and 4835 (1910–1911). - -[30] _Supra_, p. 36. - -[31] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3533 (1905), p. 27; _Turkey -in Europe_, pp. 86–87. - -[32] _Mesopotamia_, pp. 99–101; Schaefer, _op. cit._, p. 22. Regarding -British interests in the Persian Gulf, _cf._, a detailed statement -by Lord Lansdowne to the House of Lords, May 5, 1903. _Parliamentary -Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), pp. -1347–1348. - -[33] “Bagdad: Handelsbericht des kaiserlichen Konsulats für das Jahr -1908–1909,” in _Deutsches Handels-Archiv_, 1910, part 2, pp. 27–35; -also, “Bericht über den Handel in Basra und Bagdad für das Jahr 1910,” -_ibid._, 1912, part 2, pp. 263–270; _Mesopotamia_, p. 108. - -[34] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 59–60; _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, -1906, p. 4, 1908, pp. 7–8; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3533 -(1905), p. 29. The Mersina-Adana line was formally incorporated in the -Bagdad system in 1908. _Cf._ _Deuxième convention additionelle à la -convention du chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Constantinople, 1910). - -[35] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 22 -(1911), pp. 1284–1285. - -[36] _Quatrième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, -1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Constantinople, 1911). -H. F. B. Lynch (of the firm of Lynch Brothers), “The Bagdad Railway: -the New Conventions,” in the _Fortnightly Review_, new series, Volume -89 (1911), pp. 773–780. Mr. Lynch explains that his summary of the -Alexandretta port concessions is based upon an authentic article -appearing in _La Turquie_, a Constantinople newspaper, of March 21, -1911. _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), p. 16; _The -Times_ (London), March 23, 1911. - -[37] _Stenographische Berichte, XII. Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, -Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5984c _et seq._; _Troisième convention -additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, 1903, relative au chemin de fer -de Bagdad_ (Constantinople, 1911); _Parliamentary Debates, House of -Commons_, fifth series, Volume 23 (1911), pp. 582–583, statement by Sir -Edward Grey. - -[38] See speeches of Herr Scheidemann and Herr Bassermann before -the Reichstag, March 30, 1911. _Stenographische Berichte, XII. -Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 266 (1911), pp. 5980 _et seq._ - -[39] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 23 -(1911), p. 589. - -[40] D. Chatir, “L’État actuel du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in -_Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 36 (1913), pp. 279–281; -_Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1910, p. 4, 1911, p. 4, 1913, -pp. 3–5, 1914, pp. 6–8. - -[41] _Report of the Deutsche Bank_, 1913, pp. 11–12. - -[42] _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, 1914, pp. 6–8. It was not -until September, 1918, that the Amanus tunnels were completed, the -first train being operated through to Aleppo just before the capture of -that city by Lord Allenby’s army. Von Sanders, _op. cit._, p. 42. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -THE BAGDAD RAILWAY BECOMES AN IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE - - -POLITICAL INTERESTS COME TO THE FORE - -It was asserted times without number that the Bagdad Railway was an -independent financial enterprise, unconnected with the political aims -of the German Government in Turkey and in no sense associated with an -imperialist policy in the Near East. At the time the concession of -1903 was granted Dr. Rohrbach expressed the belief that political and -diplomatic considerations were quite outside the plans and purposes -of the promoters of the Railway.[1] Herr Bassermann, leader of the -National Liberal Party, announced to the Reichstag that, although -German capital was predominant in the Railway, there was no intent on -the part of the owners or on the part of the Government to build with -any political _arrière-pensée_. Baron von Schoen, Imperial Secretary -for Foreign Affairs, reiterated this idea with emphasis. He pointed -out that the Bagdad convention of 1903 was _not a treaty_ between -Germany and Turkey, _but a contract_ between the Ottoman Government -and the Anatolian Railway Company. He maintained that if the railway -were considered, properly, as a purely economic enterprise, “all the -fantastic schemes that are from time to time being attached to it -would evaporate.”[2] A British journalist wrote in 1913: “Gwinner, it -may be assumed, is not building the Bagdad Railway for the purposes of -the German General Staff. What chiefly keeps him awake of nights is -how to extract dividends from it for the _Deutsche Bank_ and how best -to promote the golden opportunities which await the strategists of the -German trading army in the Near East.”[3] - -The German Government, nevertheless, had been interested in the -Bagdad plan almost from its inception. The visits of the Emperor to -Constantinople and Palestine; the appointment of German military -and consular officers to the technical commission which surveyed -the line in 1899; the enthusiastic support of the German ambassador -all contributed to the success of the enterprise. In fact, the -German Government was almost too solicitous of the welfare of the -concessionaires; assistance, it was said, bordered upon interference. -During the early stages of the negotiations of 1898–1899 Dr. von -Siemens complained that the German embassy was jeopardizing the success -of the project by insisting that the issuance of the concessions -should be considered a diplomatic, as well as a business, triumph. -Dr. von Gwinner, also, was discontented with the tendency of the -German Government to urge strategic, rather than purely economic, -considerations. There was a widespread belief in Germany, as well as -elsewhere in Europe, that the Imperial Foreign Office nurtured the -Bagdad Railway and its affiliated enterprises with a full realization -that “the skirmishes of the political advance guard are fought on -financial ground, although the selection of the time and the enemy, as -well as the manner in which these skirmishes are to be fought, depends -upon those responsible for our foreign policy. Much more than ever -before Germans will have to bear in mind that industrial contracts, -commercial enterprises, and capital investments are conveying from -one country to another not only capital and labor, but also political -influence.”[4] - -Had the German Government been disposed to pursue a different policy -in the Near East, had it refused to link its political power with the -economic interests of its nationals, it would have been standing out -against an accepted practice of the Great Powers. Lord Lansdowne, -British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed the House of -Lords, in May, 1903, that it was impossible for the Foreign Office -to dissociate commercial and political interests. He doubted whether -British success in the Middle and Far East could have been achieved -without careful diplomatic promotion of British economic interests in -those regions.[5] Through financial control Russia and Great Britain -effectually throttled Persian reform and nationalist aspirations. -The pioneer activities of French capital in Tunis and Morocco are -outstanding instances of modern imperial procedure. Such also is the -use by the Government of the French Republic of its power to deny -listings on the Paris Bourse for the purpose of forcing political -concessions—a procedure which a French banker described to the author -as “a species of international blackmail.”[6] A prominent historian -and economist has described the Franco-Russian alliance as a “bankers’ -creation.”[7] What other powers had been doing it was to be expected -that Germany would do. The ownership and operation of the Bagdad -Railway by a predominantly German company was an important factor in a -notable expansion of German commercial and financial activities in the -Near East. In an age of keen competition for economic influence in the -so-called backward areas of the world, this growth of German interests -in Turkey was almost certain to influence the diplomatic policy of -Germany toward the Ottoman Empire. The political aspirations of the -diplomatists were reënforced by the economic interests of the bankers. - -Had the German Government not voluntarily taken the Bagdad enterprise -under its wing, it might have been compelled to do so. Popular -dissatisfaction with a “weak” policy toward investments in backward -countries may force the hand of an unwilling government. Whether this -dissatisfaction be spontaneous or created by an interested press or -both, it is certain to be powerful, for there are few governments -which can resist for long the clamor for vigorous fostering of the -nation’s interests and rights abroad. And there was no lack of -popular enthusiasm in Germany for the Bagdad Railway. The fact that -French capital had been invested in the undertaking was usually -forgotten. The grand design came to be referred to, affectionately, -as _unser Bagdad_ and, somewhat flamboyantly, as the “B. B. B.” -(Berlin-Byzantium-Bagdad). German publicists of imperial inclinations -contemplated the Railway with reverent amazement, as though hypnotized. -The project speedily became an integral part of the national -_Weltanschauung_—a means of enabling Germans to compete for the rich -commerce of the Orient, to appropriate some of its enormous wealth, to -develop some of its apparently boundless possibilities. As a branch -of _Weltpolitik_ it held out alluring inducements for the exercise -of political influence in the East—an influence which would serve at -once to discomfit the Continental rivals of Germany and to promote the -_Drang nach Osten_ of her Habsburg ally. - -The political aims of the German Empire in Turkey, however, were not -concerned with colonization or conquest. It was not proposed, for -example, to encourage German colonization of the regions traversed -by the Bagdad Railway. During the last two decades of the nineteenth -century, it is true, attempts had been made to stimulate German -settlements in Syria and Mesopotamia. But later, when the problem -of German oversea migration had become less acute, all proposals for -German colonization in the Near East were abandoned.[8] - -The difficulties in the way of European settlement of Asiatic Turkey -were almost insurmountable. Mesopotamia is unbearably hot during the -summer and is totally unfit for colonization by Europeans. During July -and August the thermometer registers between 100 and 120 almost every -day, and the heat is particularly oppressive because of the relatively -high humidity. The total number of Europeans resident in Mesopotamia -before the War was not in excess of 200, who were almost all -missionaries, engineers, consuls, or archæologists. Palestine is more -suitable as a place of residence, but the country is not particularly -alluring; a few German agricultural colonies, chiefly Jewish, were -established there, but they were comparatively unimportant in size, -wealth, and political influence. In Anatolia the climate is tolerable, -but not healthful for western Europeans. The plateau is subject to -sudden and extreme changes in temperature in both winter and summer, -and, consequently, pneumonia and malaria are almost epidemic among -foreigners. To the German who was considering leaving the Fatherland to -seek his fortune abroad, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia were by no -means as attractive as Wisconsin, Minnesota, and the Dakotas. Turkey -offered few inducements to compare with the lure of the United States -or of South America.[9] - -In addition to these natural difficulties, there existed the pronounced -opposition of the Turks to foreign colonization of their homeland. This -opposition was so deep-rooted that General von der Goltz warned his -fellow countrymen not to migrate to the Near East if friendly relations -were to be maintained with the Ottoman Empire. Paul Rohrbach said -that colonization of Turkey-in-Asia by Europeans was quite out of the -question. H. F. B. Lynch, of the English firm of Lynch Brothers, one of -the most pronounced opponents of the Bagdad Railway, declared that fear -of German settlement of Asia Minor was sheer nonsense, that no such -plan was in contemplation by the promoters of the Bagdad enterprise, -and that the reports of such intentions were the work of ignorant -chauvinists. It will be recalled, also, that a secret annex to the -concession of 1903 pledged the _Deutsche Bank_ not to encourage German -or other foreign immigration into Turkey.[10] - -Germans denied, likewise, that they had any intention of utilizing -the Bagdad Railway as a means of acquiring an exclusive sphere of -economic interest in the Ottoman Empire. Attention was continually -directed to Articles 24 and 25 of the Specifications of 1903, which -decreed that rates must be applicable to all travelers and consignors -without discrimination, and which prohibited the concessionaires -from entering into any contract whatever with the object of granting -preferential treatment to any one. Arthur von Gwinner, President of -the Bagdad Railway, stated that his company had loyally abided by -its announced policy of equality of treatment for all, regardless of -nationality or other considerations, and he challenged the critics of -the enterprise to cite a single instance in which the contrary had -been the case. Dr. Rohrbach wrote, in 1903, that it was “unthinkable -that Germans should seek to monopolize the territories of the Turkish -Empire for the purposes of economic exploitation.” Somewhat later he -again stressed this point: “Germany’s political attitude to Turkey is -unlike that of all other European powers because, in all sincerity, we -ask not a single foot of Turkish territory in Europe, Asia, or Africa, -but have only the wish and the interest to find in Turkey—whether -its domination be in future restricted to Asia or not—a market and -a source of raw materials for our industry; and in this respect we -advance no claim on other nations than that of the unconditional open -door.” Baron von Schoen pledged the Government to a policy of equal and -unqualified opportunity for all in the regions to be opened up by the -Railway.[11] - -Furthermore, there is little reason to believe that the Germans had any -intention of establishing a protectorate over Asiatic Turkey. Their -determination to respect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman -Empire was due, of course, not to magnanimity on their part as much as -to expediency. Protectorates are expensive. For the same reason it may -be doubted that there was any intention of maintaining an extensive -military control over Turkey. German aims were to be served by the -economic, military, and political renaissance of Turkey-in-Asia. A -strong Turkey economically would be a Turkey so much the better able -to increase the production of raw materials for the German market as -well as to provide an ever more prosperous market for the products of -German factories. A powerful Turkish military machine might strike some -telling blows, in alliance with German arms, in a general European war; -in the event of a Near Eastern conflict it might be utilized to menace -the southern frontier of Russia or to strike at British communications -with India. A politically strong Ottoman Empire might offer serious -resistance to the Russian advance in the Middle East and might menace -Britain’s hold on her Mohammedan possessions. - -On the other hand, a Turkey in subjection would be an unwilling -producer and a poor customer. The occupation of Turkey by German armed -forces would seriously deplete the ranks of the German armies on the -Russian and French frontiers, and in time of war would confront the -German General Staff with the additional problem of maintaining order -in hostile Mohammedan territory. The conquering of Turkey would bring -the German Empire into the ranks of European powers with Mohammedan -subjects, thus exposing it to the menace, common to Great Britain, -France, and Russia, of a Pan-Islamic revival. For all of these reasons -the obvious German policy was not only to respect the territorial -integrity of Turkey, but to defend it against the encroachments of -other powers. “Not a penny for a weak Turkey,” said Rohrbach, “but for -a strong Turkey everything we can give!”[12] - -In its political aspects the Bagdad Railway was something more than -a railway. It was one phase of the great diplomatic struggle for -the predominance of power, one pawn in the great game between the -Alliance and the Entente, one element of the Anglo-German rivalry on -the seas. The development of closer relations, political and economic, -between Germany and Turkey was in accord with the spirit of an era of -universal preparedness—preparedness for pressing economic competition, -preparedness for the expected great European war in which every nation -would be obliged to fight for its very existence. Through control of -the economic resources of the Ottoman Empire, German diplomacy sought -to arrive at an _entente cordiale_ or a formal military alliance with -the Sultan. Through support of the chief Mohammedan power Germany -might throw tempting “apples of discord” into the colonial empires of -her chief European rivals, for Great Britain ruled about eighty-five -million subject Mohammedans, Russia about seventeen million, France -about fifteen million; but Germany possessed almost none.[13] Friedrich -Naumann wrote in 1889, in connection with the Kaiser’s pilgrimage -to the Near East: “It is possible that the world war will break out -before the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Then the Caliph of -Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of the Holy War. -The Sick Man will raise himself for the last time to shout to Egypt, -the Soudan, East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, ‘War against -England.’ It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed -when he utters this cry.”[14] - -This menace to the British Empire was no more serious than another -which was frankly espoused by certain supporters of the Bagdad plan—the -possibility, even without a preponderance of naval power, of severing -the communications of the empire in time of war. Dr. Rohrbach, for -example, put it this way: “If it comes to war with England, it will -be for Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility -that events may turn out favorably for us depends wholly and solely -upon whether we can succeed in putting England herself in a precarious -position. That cannot be done by a direct attack in the North Sea; all -idea of invading England is purely chimerical. We must, therefore, seek -other means which will enable us to strike England in a vulnerable -spot.... England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from -Europe in only one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean not only -the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her communications -with India and the Far East, but would probably entail, also, the loss -of her possessions in Central and East Africa. We can never dream, -however, of attacking Egypt until Turkey is mistress of a developed -railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the -extension of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to -withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia.... The stronger Turkey -grows the more dangerous does she become for England.”[15] - -It is only fair to add, however, that Dr. Rohrbach was not an -authorized spokesman of the German people, the German Government, or -the Bagdad Railway Company. His views were personal and are to be -given weight only in so far as they influenced or reflected public -opinion in Germany; to estimate their importance by such a standard -is no simple task. But whatever its true significance, Dr. Rohrbach’s -interest in the Bagdad Railway was certainly a source of great -annoyance to Dr. von Gwinner, who was constantly called upon to explain -irresponsible, provocative, and bombastic statements from Rohrbach’s -pen. It is well to recall that the writings of publicists are sometimes -taken too seriously.[16] - -It would have been foolhardy, nevertheless, to discard these -possibilities as purely imaginary. Once the Bagdad Railway was -constructed and its subsidiary enterprises developed, there would have -existed the great temptation to utilize economic influence for the -promotion of strategic and diplomatic purposes. In an era of intensive -military and economic preparedness for war the observance of the -niceties of international relationships is not always to be counted -upon. In such circumstances the wishes of the business men—whether -they were imperialistic or anti-imperialistic—may be over-ruled by -the statesmen and the soldiers. The chance to strike telling blows at -French prestige in the Levant; the opportunity to embarrass Russia by -strengthening Turkey; the possibility of menacing the communications -of the British Empire; the likelihood of recruiting Turkish military -and economic strength in the cause of Germany,—these were alluring -prospects for discomfiting the Entente rivals of the German Empire. - -At the same time it should be mentioned that promotion of the Bagdad -Railway would serve to weld firmer the Austro-German alliance. Austrian -ambitions in the Near East centered in the Vienna-Salonica railway -and were distinct from the Berlin-to-Bagdad plan of the Germans; -nevertheless circumstances served to promote a community of interest. -First, the routes of the railways through the Balkans coincided in -part: the Austrian railway ran _via_ Belgrade and Nish to Salonica; -traffic “from Berlin to Bagdad” followed the same line to Nish, where -it branched off to Sofia and Constantinople. Second, Austrian, as -well as German, trade would be carried over the Bagdad lines to the -Orient, and Austrian industries would be able to secure raw materials -from Anatolia and Mesopotamia. If the railway was to run from Berlin -to Bagdad, it also was to run from Vienna to Bagdad. Third, similarly, -German industry was to profit by the Austrian railway to Salonica, for -it opened a new route to German commerce to the Aegean. “Germany’s road -to the Orient lay, literally as well as figuratively, across the Balkan -Peninsula.”[17] The _Drang nach Osten_ was near to the hearts of both -allies! - -It was not without warning that the German nation permitted itself -to be drawn into the imperial ramifications of the Bagdad Railway. -Anti-imperialists sensed the dangers connected with such an ambitious -project. Herr Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats in the -Reichstag, for example, warned the German people that the railway was -certain to raise increasingly troublesome international difficulties, -and he expressed the fear that the German protagonists of the plan -would come to emphasize more and more its political and military, -rather than its economic and cultural, phases.[18] Karl Radek, -also a Socialist, wrote that “The Bagdad Railway possessed great -political significance from the very moment the plan was conceived.” -He prophesied that German economic penetration in Turkey would prove -to be only the first step toward a formal military alliance, which, -in turn, would heighten the fear and animosity of the Entente Powers. -“The Bagdad Railway,” he said, “constitutes the first great triumph of -German capitalistic imperialism.”[19] Business men and politicians of -imperialist inclinations did not deny the charges of their pacifist -opponents. Herr Bassermann, so far from deprecating a greater political -influence in the Ottoman Empire, came to glory in it. Baron von Schoen -qualified his earlier statements with the following enunciation of -policy: “With reference to the attitude of the Imperial Government, it -goes without saying that we are giving the enterprise our full interest -and attention and will make every effort to further it.”[20] - -The political potentialities of the Bagdad Railway aroused the fear and -opposition of the other European Powers. Exaggerated charges were made -as to the intentions of the German promoters and the German Government, -and there was a widespread feeling that there was something sinister -about the plan. Professor Sarolea sounded a prophetic warning when he -wrote, “The trans-Mesopotamian Railway ... will play in the Near East -the same ominous part which the Trans-Siberian played in the Far East; -with this important difference, however, that whilst the Far Eastern -conflict involved only one European Power and one Asiatic Power, the -Near Eastern conflict, if it breaks out, must needs involve all the -European powers, must force the whole Eastern Question to a crisis, and -once begun, cannot be terminated until the map of Europe and Asia shall -be reconstructed.”[21] - - -RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL INTERESTS REËNFORCE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC -MOTIVES - -Along with economic and political motives for imperialist ventures -there frequently goes a religious motive. That such should be the case -in the Near East was to be expected because of the religious appeal -of the Ottoman Empire as the homeland of the Jews, the birthplace of -Christianity, the cradle of Mohammedanism. It was small wonder, then, -that the Bagdad Railway, which promised to link Central European cities -with the holy places of Syria and Palestine, should have been supported -enthusiastically by German missionaries and other German Christians. - -German Protestant missions were represented in the Holy Land as early -as 1860, when the Kaiserswerth Deaconesses established themselves in -Jerusalem. Shortly thereafter the _Jerusalems-Verein_ began work in -Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and about this same time, 1869, Lutheran -missionaries calling themselves Templars settled near Jaffa. Under -William II additional impetus was given to German religious activities -in the Near East. The _Jerusalems-Verein_, which was taken under -the special patronage of the Kaiserin Auguste Victoria, supported a -Lutheran clergyman in Jerusalem and was responsible for the erection in -the Holy City of the Church of the Redeemer. This same society rapidly -spread its activities throughout all of Palestine, and in 1910 it -dedicated the famous Kaiserin Auguste Victoria _Stiftung_,[22] erected -on the Mount of Olives by the Hohenzollern family at a cost in excess -of half a million dollars. The Evangelical Union, organized in 1896, -established a large orphanage in Jerusalem, together with schools -and related institutions, and proved to be a very useful auxiliary -to the work of the Deaconesses in maintaining schools, dispensaries, -and hospitals. Also in 1896 there was founded the _Deutsche Orient -Mission_, which rendered its services particularly in Cilicia, and -which kept up the interest of its supporters at home by the publication -in Berlin of a monthly periodical, _Der Christliche Orient_. It was -estimated that, during the early years of the twentieth century, -the German Protestant societies maintained in Turkey-in-Asia about -450 missionaries and several hundred native assistants at a cost of -hundreds of thousands of dollars. By 1910 the Germans occupied a -conspicuous position in evangelical missions in the Near East.[23] - -The German Catholics were no less zealous than their Protestant -compatriots. Although for centuries Italian and French members of -the Franciscan order had been preëminent in Catholic missions in -Turkey, there was a marked tendency during the last decade of the -nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth for German -members of other religious orders to take an interest in the Near -East. This may have been merely the result of a general increase in -missionary activity connected with the increasing imperial activities -of the German Government. It may have been due to the announced -intention of the German Foreign Office to protect Christian missions -and missionaries and to the vigorous fulfilment of that promise -after the murder of two German Catholic priests in the Chinese -province of Shantung. It may have been a natural consequence of the -fact that the Prefect of the Propaganda from 1892–1902 was a famous -German cardinal.[24] In any event, under the guiding ægis of the -_Palästinaverein_, a society for the promotion of Catholic missions -in the Holy Land, German Lazarists, Benedictines, and Carmelites -established and maintained schools, hospitals, and dispensaries, as -well as churches, in Syria and Palestine.[25] - -Even Jewish religious interests in Palestine promoted Teutonic peaceful -penetration in Turkey. As part of the Zionist activities of _L’Alliance -Israelite Universelle_, agricultural colonies were founded by German -Jews in the vicinity of Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Haifa. These colonists -appeared to be proud of their German nationality and were an integral -part of the German community in the Holy Land.[26] - -The German Government had no intention of overlooking the political -possibilities of this religious penetration. Promotion of missionary -activities might be made to serve a twofold purpose: first, to win the -support, in domestic politics, of those interested in the propagation -of their faith in foreign lands—more particularly to hold the loyalty -of the Catholic Centre party; second, to further one other means of -strengthening the bonds between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. - -An excellent illustration of the inter-relation among economic, -political, and religious aspects of modern imperialism is to be found -in the visit of William II to Turkey in 1898. On the morning of October -31—the anniversary of the posting of Luther’s ninety-five theses at -Wittenberg—the Emperor participated in the dedication of the Lutheran -Church of the Redeemer in Jerusalem. During the afternoon of the same -day he presented the supposed site of the Assumption of the Virgin -Mary to the German Catholics of the Holy City, for the construction -thereon of a Catholic memorial church, and he telegraphed the Pope -expressing his hope that this might be but one step in a steady -progress of Catholic Christianity in the Near East. The Kaiser likewise -might have visited the German Jewish communities in the vicinity of -Jerusalem, but perhaps he felt, as a French writer put it, that such a -visit “between his devotions at Gethsemane and at Calvary would have -created a public scandal.”[27] Nevertheless he did not hesitate, a week -later, at Damascus, to assure “three hundred million Mohammedans” that -the German Emperor was their friend. Yet with all this pandering to -religious interests—to the Protestants of Prussia, to the Catholics of -South Germany, to his Moslem hosts—the Kaiser found time ostentatiously -to promote the German Consul at Constantinople to the rank of Consul -General. And upon his return home he justified all of these activities -on the ground that his visit “would prove to be a lasting source of -advantage to the German name and German national interests.”[28] - -This curious admixture of religion and diplomacy was made the more -complicated when the Imperial Chancellor informed the Reichstag, on -December 7, 1898, that one of the purposes of the Emperor’s visit to -His Ottoman Majesty was to make it plain that the German Government -did not propose to recognize anywhere “a foreign protectorate over -German subjects.” This served notice to France that Germany would -not respect the French claim to exclusive protection of Catholic -missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. “We do not lay claim,” said Prince -von Bülow, “to a protectorate over all Christians in the East. But -only the German Emperor can protect German subjects, be they Catholics -or Protestants.”[29] This pronouncement was received in France with -undisguisedly poor grace. One writer in a prominent fortnightly -magazine frankly expressed his disgust: “Germany possesses military -power; she possesses economic power; she proposes to acquire maritime -power. But she needs the support of moral power. On the world’s stage -she aspires to play the part of Principle. To base her world-wide -prestige upon the protection of Christianity, Protestant and Catholic; -to centralize the divergent sources of German influence; to have all -over the globe a band of followers, at once religious and economic in -their interests, who will propagate the German idea, consume German -products, and, while professing the gospel of Christ, will preach the -gospel of the sacred person of the Emperor—these are the ultimate ends -of the world policy of William II.”[30] - -Closely allied with the spread of German missions was the propagation -of _das Deutschtum_—that is, the spread of the German language, -instruction in German history and ideals, appreciation of the character -of German civilization. German religious schools in the Near East were -dynamos of German cultural influence. The _Jerusalems-Verein_ alone, -for example, maintained, in 1902, eight schools with more than 430 -pupils. In these schools German was taught. This also was the case -with the Catholic schools, under German influence. Even the Jews—a -large number of whom had emigrated from Germany because of anti-Semitic -feeling there—carried with them their German patriotism. The -_Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden_, the German section of _L’Alliance -Israélite Universelle_, not only taught German in its own schools, but -made a strenuous effort to have German adopted as the official language -of all Zionist schools in the Near East.[31] - -It should be pointed out that this injection of nationalism into -religious education was an obvious imitation of the French method of -spreading imperial influence in Syria and Palestine. And it was frankly -admitted to be an imitation. “A policy of German-Turkish culture,” -wrote Dr. Rohrbach, “deserves to be pressed with renewed ardor. We must -endeavor to make the German language, and German science, and all the -great positive values of our energetic civilization, duties faithfully -fulfilled—active forces for the regeneration of Turkey by transplanting -them into Turkey. To do this we need above everything else a system -of German schools, which need not rival the French in magnitude, but -which must be planned on a larger scale than that of the now existing -schools. No lasting and secure cultural influences are possible without -the connecting link of language. The intelligent and progressive young -men of Turkey should have an abundant opportunity to learn German.... -We can give the Turks an impression of our civilization and a desire to -become familiar with it only when we teach them our language and thus -open the door for them to all of our spiritual possessions. In doing -this we are not aiming to Germanize Turkey politically or economically -or to colonize it, but to introduce the German spirit into the great -national process of development through which that nation, which has -a great future, happens to be passing.”[32] French methods were to be -paid the compliment of imitation. - -The sentimental appeal of the Bagdad Railway was more than a religious -and cultural appeal alone. The Great Plan was assiduously promoted -by a patriotic and Pan-German press. It caught the interest of the -ordinary workaday citizen, whose imagination was fired by the sweeping -references to “our” trade, “our” investments, “our” religious interests -in the Near East; the Bagdad Railway was the very heart of all these -interests. Here was a railway which was to revive a medieval trade -route to the East, which was to traverse the route of the Crusades. -Here was a country which had been the much-sought-after empire of -the great nations of antiquity, Assyria, Chaldea, Babylon, Persia, -Greece, Rome. Here had risen and fallen the great cities of Nineveh, -Babylon, and Hit. To these regions had turned the longing of the great -conquerors, Sargon, Sennacherib, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander, Saladin. -With such materials some German Kipling might evolve phrases far more -alluring than Fuzzy Wuzzy, and Tommy Atkins, and the White Man’s -Burden.[33] - - -SOME FEW VOICES ARE RAISED IN PROTEST - -Not all Germans were dazzled by the Oriental glamor of the Bagdad -Railway plan. Herr Scheidemann, leader of the Social Democrats in -the Reichstag, time and time again sounded warnings against the -complications almost certain to result from the construction of the -railway. Speaking before the Reichstag in March, 1911, for example, -he said: “We are the last to misjudge the great value of this road -to civilization. We know its economic significance: we know that it -traverses a region which in antiquity was a fabulously fertile country, -and we welcome it as a great achievement if the Bagdad Railway opens -up that territory. And if, by gigantic irrigation projects, the land -can be made into a granary for Europe, as well as a land to which we -could look for an abundant supply of raw materials, such as cotton, -that would be doubly welcome.” But that is not all, continued Herr -Scheidemann. German capitalists would not be able to overlook the -military-strategic interests of the line, for only the establishment -of a strong centralized government in Turkey “can offer European -capitalism the necessary security for the realization of its great -capitalistic plans.” This military strengthening of Turkey would be -almost certain, he pointed out, to arouse the opposition of Great -Britain, Russia, and France. Particularly was he desirous of avoiding -any additionally irritating relations with Great Britain, for the -traditional friendship with that nation had already been seriously -compromised by colonial and naval rivalries.[34] Similar warnings were -uttered by other Socialists and anti-imperialists. - -Quite different in character was the objection raised to the Bagdad -Railway by a certain type of more conservative German. An aggressive -policy in the Near East naturally would have been distasteful to -the diplomatists of the old school, who were disposed to adhere to -the Bismarckian principles of isolating France on the Continent -and avoiding commercial and colonial conflicts overseas. According -to their point of view, German ventures in the Ottoman Empire were -certain to lead to two complications: first, the support of Austrian -imperial ambitions in the Balkans; second, a German attempt to -maintain a dominant political position at Constantinople. Under such -circumstances, of course, it would not be possible to bring about a -divorce of the newly married France and Russia, for Russian interests -in the Near East would brook no compromise on the part of the Tsar’s -Government. In addition, it was feared, the establishment of German -ports on the Mediterranean and on the Persian Gulf would strengthen -British antipathy to Germany, already augmented by naval and commercial -rivalry. The final outcome of such a situation undoubtedly would be the -formation of a Franco-British-Russian coalition against the Central -Powers. - -During the Great War these views were given wide publicity by Prince -Lichnowsky, former German ambassador to Great Britain. In a memorandum, -written for a few friends but subsequently published broadcast in -Europe and America,[35] the Prince vehemently denounced the _Drang nach -Osten_ as the greatest of German diplomatic mistakes and as one of the -principal causes of the Great War. “We should have abandoned definitely -the fatal tradition of pushing the Triple Alliance policies in the -Near East,” he said; “we should have realized that it was a mistake -to make ourselves solidary with the Turks in the south and with the -Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of this policy ... -was bound in time, and particularly in case the requisite adroitness -should be found wanting in the supreme directing agencies, to lead -to the collision with Russia and the World War. Instead of coming to -an understanding with Russia on the basis of the independence of the -Sultan; ... instead of renouncing military and political interference, -confining ourselves to economic interests in the Near East, ... our -political ambition was directed to the attainment of a dominant -position on the Bosporus. In Russia the opinion arose that the way -to Constantinople ran _via_ Berlin.” This was the “fatal mistake, by -which Russia, naturally our best friend and neighbor, was driven into -the arms of France and England.” Furthermore, maintained the Prince, -a policy of Near Eastern expansion is contrary to the best commercial -and industrial interests of the empire. “‘Our future lies on the -water.’ Quite right”; therefore it does not lie in an overland route to -the Orient. The _Drang nach Osten_ “is a reversion to the Holy Roman -Empire.... It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake -and Raleigh.... Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into -the open, to unlimited possibilities, to the universal mission of the -German nation.”[36] - -There may have been another reason for the opposition of Prince -Lichnowsky to the Bagdad Railway. As the owner of large Silesian -estates he was agrarian in his point of view. If it were true, as was -maintained, that after the opening of Mesopotamia to cultivation, -the Railway would be able to bring cheap Turkish grain to the German -market, the results would not be to the liking of the agricultural -interests of the empire. As Herr Scheidemann informed the Reichstag, -there was something anomalous in the Conservative support of the -Bagdad Railway on this score, because it was “in most violent -contrast to their procedure in their own country, where they have -artificially raised the cost of the necessaries of life by incredibly -high protective tariffs, indirect taxation, and similar methods.”[37] -Perhaps Prince Lichnowsky was somewhat more intelligent and far-sighted -than his land-owning associates! - -There were some Germans who were not opposed to the Bagdad Railway -enterprise, but who were opposed to the extravagant claims made for -it by some of its friends and protagonists. A typical illustration of -this is the following statement of Count zu Reventlow, shortly before -the outbreak of the war: “Great Britain, Russia, and France, in order -to interpose objections, made use of the expedient of identifying -the _Deutsche Bank_ with the German Government. To this there was -added the difficult and complicating factor that in Germany itself, -in many quarters, the aim and the significance of the railway plan -were proclaimed to the world, partly in an inaccurate and grossly -exaggerated manner.... In this respect great mistakes were made among -us, which it was in no way necessary to make. The more quietly the -Railway could have been constructed the better.... That it would be -possible to make Turkey a dangerous threat against Egypt and India, -after the development of its railway system, was correct, to be sure, -but it was imperative not to say anything of that kind as long as Great -Britain still had means to hinder and prevent the construction of the -railway.” Similar opinions were expressed from time to time on the -floor of the Reichstag.[38] - -The Bagdad Railway, however, was a triumphant enterprise which -would brook no opposition. In the army of its followers marched the -stockholders and directors of the _Deutsche Bank_—such men as Edward -B. von Speyer, Wolfgang Kapp, Karl von Siemens, Karl Helfferich, -Arthur von Gwinner—good patriots all, with a financial stake in the -Railway. Then there came the engineers and contractors who furnished -the materials and constructed the line and who shared in the profits of -its subsidiary enterprises—mines, oil wells, docks, wharves, irrigation -works. Next came the shipping interests—the subsidized services of -Herr Ballin and the Hamburg-American Line included—which were at once -the feeders and the fed of the Railway. There were also the German -traders who sought in the Near East a market for their products and -the German manufacturers who looked to this newly opened territory -for an uninterrupted supply of raw materials. In the line of march, -too, were the missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, who sought to -promote a renaissance of the Holy Land through the extension of German -influence there. Bringing up the rear, although by no means the least -important, were the soldiers and the diplomatic and consular officers, -those “parasites” of modern imperialism who almost invariably will be -found in cordial support of any movement for political and economic -expansion. In the reviewing stand, cheering the marchers, were the -great mass of average patriotic citizens who were thrilled with “their” -Bagdad Railway and “their” _Drang nach Osten_. And the chief of the -reviewers was His Imperial Majesty, William II.[39] - -If there was a preponderance of opinion in Germany favorable to the -Bagdad Railway, there was by no means a similar favorable sentiment in -the rest of Europe. Statesmen in the other imperial nations were not -unaware of the potentialities of railways constructed in the backward -nations of the world. They knew that “railways are the iron tentacles -of latter-day expanding powers. They are stretched out caressingly at -first. But once the iron has, so to say, entered the soul of the weaker -nation, the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawny arms, and the -embrace tightens to a crushing grip.”[40] Russia, Great Britain and -France, therefore, were gradually led to obstruct the progress of the -railway by political and economic means—at least until such time as -they could purge the project of its political possibilities or until -they could obtain for themselves a larger share of the spoils. - -Thus the Bagdad Railway was an imperial enterprise. It became an -important concern of the Foreign Office, a matter of national -prestige. It was one of the stakes of pre-war diplomacy. Its success -was associated with the national honor, to be defended, if need be, -by military force and military alliances. The Railway was no longer a -railway alone, but a state of mind. Professor Jastrow called it “the -spectre of the twentieth century”![41] - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 46. - -[2] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, -Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226a, 4253c. - -[3] Wile, _op. cit._, pp. 39–40. - -[4] Riesser, _op. cit._, p. 543; _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 235 -(1921), p. 315. - -[5] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1348. - -[6] For an interesting discussion of this point see George von Siemens, -“The National Importance of the Bourse,” in _The Nation_ (London), -October 6, 1900. _Cf._, also, W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia: -a Record of European Diplomacy_ and _Oriental Intrigue_ (New York, -1912). - -[7] W. M. Sombart, _Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft in neunzehnten -Jahrhundert_ (second edition, Berlin, 1909), p. 184. - -[8] Regarding early German interest in Near Eastern colonization _cf._ -K. A. Sprenger, _Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das -lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart_ (Heidelberg, 1886); -Paul Dehn, _Deutschland und die Orientbahnen_ (Munich, 1883); K. -Karger, _Kleinasien, ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld_ (Berlin, 1892); -_Deutsche Ansprüche an das türkischen Erbe_ (Munich, 1896), a symposium -including an article by von Moltke. - -[9] C. Nawratski, _Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas_ (Munich, -1914); _Syria and Palestine_, p. 59; _Mesopotamia_, pp. 6–7, 11; -_Anatolia_, pp. 4–7. - -[10] _Supra_, p. 84; H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad Railway,” in -the _Fortnightly Review_, March 1, 1911, pp. 376–377; A. Brisse, -“Les intérêts de l’Allemagne dans l’Empire Ottoman,” in _Revue de -Géographie_, June, 1902, pp. 486–487; P. Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, -pp. 17–21, 35. - -[11] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, -Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c; P. Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 16, and -_Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern_, pp. 51–53; Von Gwinner, _loc. -cit._, p. 1090. - -[12] _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 16. _Cf._, also, R. Henry, _Des Montes -Bohèmes au Golfe Persique; l’Asie Turque et le Chemin de fer de -Bagdad_ (Paris, 1908), p. 509 _et seq._; C. H. Becker, _Deutschland -und der Islam_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914); Ernst Jäckh, _Die -deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1915). - -[13] H. A. Gibbons, _The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East_ -(New York, 1917), pp. 109–110. - -[14] Quoted by Marriot, _op. cit._, p. 356. - -[15] _Die Bagdadbahn_, pp. 18–19. - -[16] In this connection see an important statement by Sir Thomas -Barclay in the _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_ (London), -March 1, 1911, pp. 21–22, and the opinion of Karl Helfferich, _Die -deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 14. - -[17] Von Reventlow, _op. cit._, p. 343. Regarding the so-called _Drang -nach Osten_ and the coincidence of Austrian and German interests in the -Near East _cf._ M. Meyer, _Balkanstaaten, Bagdadbahn_ (Leipzig, 1914); -J. W. Headlam, “The Balkans and Diplomacy,” in the _Atlantic Monthly_ -(Boston), January, 1916, pp. 124 _et seq._; N. and C. R. Buxton, _The -War and the Balkans_ (London, 1915); M. I. Newbigin, _Geographical -Aspects of Balkan Problems_ (London, 1915); Evans Lewin, _The German -Road to the East_ (New York, 1917), Chapters VIII, IX, X; P. N. -Milyoukov, _The War and Balkan Politics_ (Cambridge, 1917). - -[18] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5984c. - -[19] _Der deutsche Imperialismus und die Arbeiterklasse_ (Bremen, -1912), pp. 33, 53. - -[20] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5984c, Volume 231 (1908), p. 4253c. - -[21] Charles Sarolea, _The Anglo-German Problem_ (London, 1912), p. 252. - -[22] A _Stiftung_ is a general religious establishment, this particular -one serving manifold purposes as school, hospice, home, hospital, etc. - -[23] J. Richter, _A History of Protestant Missions in the Near East_ -(New York, 1910), pp. 258–270, 416–419; L. M. Garnett, _Turkey of the -Ottomans_ (London, 1911), Chapters VII-IX; H. C. Dwight, H. A. Tupper, -and E. M. Bliss, _Encyclopedia of Missions_ (second edition, New York, -1910), pp. 260, 263, 720; _New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious -Knowledge_ (New York, 1912), Volume XII, pp. 39–41. - -[24] Cardinal M. H. Ledochowski (1822–1902). _Cf._ _Catholic -Encyclopedia_ (New York, 1912), Volume IX, pp. 111–112. French -Catholics openly charged that Cardinal Ledochowski used his official -position as director of all Catholic missions to promote German -religious and political interests at the expense of those of France. -_Cf._ an article “La Politique Allemande et le Protectorat des Missions -Catholiques,” in the _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), pp. -11–12. - -[25] On the general subject of German Catholic missions in the Near -East consult W. Koehler, _Die katholische Kirchen des Morgenlandes_ -(Darmstadt, 1898); H. M. Krose, _Katholische Missionsstatistik_ -(Freiburg, 1908); L. Bréhier, article “Turkish Empire-Missions,” in the -_Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XV, pp. 101–102; L. Bertrand, “La Melée -des Religions en Orient,” in the _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 53 -(1909), pp. 830–861. - -[26] _The Jewish Encyclopedia_ (New York, 1906), Volume XII, pp. 286 -_et seq._; Sir C. W. Wilson, _Handbook for Asia Minor_ (London, 1895), -pp. 240 _et seq._ - -[27] Etienne Lamy, “La France du Levant: le Voyage de l’Empereur -Guillaume II,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 151 (1899), pp. -336–337; see also Volume 150 (1898), pp. 421–440, 880–911. Further -observations on the religious aspects of the Kaiser’s trip to Palestine -are to be found in _The Times_, November 23, 1898; _Annual Register_, -1898, pp. 255–257; W. von Hohenzollern, _My Memoirs_, 1878–1918, pp. -210–211. - -[28] _Annual Register_, 1898, pp. 257–258. - -[29] _Ibid._, p. 261. Regarding the French protectorate of Catholics in -the Near East _cf._ _infra_, Chapter VII. - -[30] “La Politique Allemande et le Protectorat des Missions -Catholiques,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 8–9. - -[31] L. Bertrand, “Les Écoles d’Orient: I. Les Écoles Chrétiennes -et Israelites,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 52, new series -(1909), pp. 755–794; H. M. Kallen, _Zionism and World Politics_ (Garden -City, N. Y., 1921), pp. 117 _et seq._; A. Paquet, _Die jüdische -Kolonien in Palästina_ (Weimar, 1915); M. Blanckenhorn, _Syrien und -die deutsche Arbeit_ (Weimar, 1916), pp. 26–30; C. Nawratzki, _Die -jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas_ (Munich, 1914); M. Franco, _Essai sur -l’histoire des juifs de l’empire ottoman depuis les origines jusqu’à -nos jours_ (Paris, 1897); G. Corneilhan, _La judaisme en Egypte et en -Syrie_ (Paris, 1889). - -[32] _German World Policies_, pp. 229–231. On this same general -subject consult an article by “Immanuel,” entitled “Die Bagdadbahn -ein Kulturwerk in Asien,” in _Globus_, Volume 81 (1902), pp. 181–185; -M. Hartmann, _Islam, Mission, Politik_ (Leipzig, 1912). It should be -pointed out that the Anatolian Railway itself established two schools, -at Haidar Pasha and Eski Shehr, for the instruction of its employees in -German and other subjects. Bohler, _loc. cit._, p. 275. - -[33] That Germans were not unfamiliar with the spectacular history of -this region is evidenced by the popularity of General von Moltke’s -writings on Turkey, which were published in several large editions, -apart from his collected works, between 1900 and 1911. _Cf._, _e.g._, -H. K. B. (Graf von) Moltke, _Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten -in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839_, seventh edition, with -explanatory notes by G. Hirschfeld (Berlin, 1911). Of this work H. -S. Wilkinson, Professor of Military History at Oxford University, -wrote in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ (eleventh edition), “No other -book gives so deep an insight into the character of the Turkish -Empire” (Volume 18, p. 678). It is interesting to note, also, that -Moltke himself was a firm believer in the great military utility of -all railways. For the history of the Near East _cf._ Jastrow, _op. -cit._, pp. 31–81; A. R. Hall, _The Ancient History of the Near East_ -(fourth edition, London, 1919), Chapters V, VIII, IX, X, XII; W. A. -and E. T. A. Wigram, _The Cradle of Mankind_ (London, 1914). A curious -sidelight on this phase of the question is the assertion of Baron von -Hertling, in 1907, that Germany’s chief interest in the Bagdad Railway -was scientific—geographic, geological, archæological—not military or -economic! Quoted by Dawson, _The Evolution of Modern Germany_, p. 346. - -[34] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, -Volume 266 (1911), p. 5980c. - -[35] Karl Maximilan, sixth Prince, Lichnowsky (1860- ) had been a -member of the German diplomatic service since his youth. He was -attached to the embassy at London when he was but twenty-five and -later served at Constantinople, Bucharest, and Vienna and in the -Foreign Office at Berlin. He resigned in 1904 to devote himself to the -management of his large estates in Silesia, but he was recalled in -1912 to become German ambassador to Great Britain, succeeding Baron -Marschall von Bieberstein, who had died after only a few months’ -service at his new post. Prince Lichnowsky’s memorandum _My London -Mission, 1912–1914_ was written only to justify the Prince before a -small circle of his acquaintances. Fugitive copies reached the press, -however, and the full text was published in the Berlin _Börsen-Courier_ -of March 21, 1918. The quotations here given are from the translation -of Munroe Smith, _The Disclosures from Germany_ (New York, 1918). - -[36] _The Disclosures from Germany_, pp. 37–41, 127. - -[37] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, -Volume 226 (1911), p. 5980c. _Cf._, also, W. H. Dawson, _The Evolution -of Modern Germany_, pp. 346 _et seq._ - -[38] Von Reventlow, _op. cit._, p. 340; _Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 226 (1911), p. 5994b. - -[39] Regarding the Emperor’s personal interest in the Bagdad Railway -consider the following Reuter dispatch, published in _The Near East_, -December 6, 1911, p. 143: “By desire of the German Emperor, Herr -Gwinner, director of the _Deutsche Bank_, will give an address on the -Bagdad Railway before the Emperor and a number of invited guests, in -the Upper House of the Prussian Diet soon after the Emperor’s return to -Berlin, December 8.” - -[40] E. J. Dillon, quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, _The New World of -Islam_, p. 98. - -[41] Jastrow, _op. cit._, p. 9. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -RUSSIA RESISTS AND FRANCE IS UNCERTAIN - - -RUSSIA VOICES HER DISPLEASURE - -Russian objections to the Bagdad Railway were put forth as early as -1899, the year in which the Sultan announced his intention of awarding -the concession to the _Deutsche Bank_. The press of Petrograd and -Moscow roundly denounced the proposed railway as inimical to the -vital economic interests of Russia. It was claimed that the new line -would offer serious competition to the railways of the Caspian and -Caucasus regions, that it would menace the success of the new Russian -trans-Persian line, and that it might prove to be a rival even of the -Siberian system.[1] The extension of the existing Anatolian Railway -into Syria, it was asserted, would interfere with the realization of -a Russian dream of a railway across Armenia to Alexandretta—a railway -which would give Russian goods access to an all-year warm water port -on the Mediterranean. The Mesopotamian sections of the line, with -their branches, might open to German competition the markets of Persia -and, later, of Afghanistan. If German capital should develop the -grain-growing possibilities of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, what -would happen to the profits of the Russian landed aristocracy? And if -the oil-wells of Mesopotamia were as rich as they were said to be, what -would be the fate of the South Russian fields? The Tsar was urged to -oppose the granting of the kilometric guarantee to the concessionaires, -on the ground that the increased charges on the Ottoman Treasury would -interfere with payment of the indemnity due on account of the War of -1877.[2] - -Russian objections to the Bagdad Railway did not meet with a -sympathetic reception in England. _The Engineer_, of August 11, 1899, -in an editorial “Railways in Asia Minor,” for example, expressed -its firm opinion that many of the demands for the protection of -Russian economic interests in Turkey were specious. “The world has -yet to learn,” ran the editorial, “that Russia allows commercial -considerations to play any great part in her ideas of constructing -railways; the Imperial authorities are influenced mainly by the policy -of political expediency. The commercial competition thus foreseen by -Russia is put forward merely as a stop-gap until Russia can get time -and money to repeat in Asia Minor the methods of which she has made -such success in Persia and the Far East.” Other British opinion was of -like character. - -The Russian claim for exclusive control of railway construction in -northern Anatolia met with equally bitter denunciation. The London -_Globe_, of August 10, 1899, characterized as “impudence” the intention -of the Russian Government “to regard Asiatic Turkey as a second -Manchuria, on the pretence that the whole country has been mortgaged to -Russia for payment of the Turkish war indemnity. If this preposterous -claim were admitted, not only the development of Asia Minor but the -opening of another short-cut to the East might be delayed until the -end of the next century. Russia had so many ambitious and costly -projects on hand at present that her nearly bankrupt treasury could not -meet any fresh drain, and especially one of such magnitude as that -in question. The policy of her Government, therefore, is to preserve -Asia Minor as a _tabula rasa_ on which the Russian pen can write as it -pleases hereafter. It is a cool project, truly, but the success which -has attended similar Russian endeavors in the Far East will not, we -undertake to predict, meet with repetition.” - -The Russian Government, meanwhile, was interposing serious -objections to the Bagdad Railway. M. Zinoviev, the Tsar’s minister -at Constantinople, informed the Sublime Porte that the proposed -extension of the Anatolian Railways from Angora across Armenia to -Mosul and Bagdad would be a strategic menace to the Caucasus frontier -and, as such, could not be tolerated. If Russian wishes in the matter -were not respected, immediate measures would be taken to collect all -arrears—amounting to over 57,000,000 francs—of the indemnity due -the Tsar under the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The outcome of these -demands was submission by the Sultan’s Government. The proposed -Angora-Kaisarieh-Diarbekr route was abandoned in favor of one extending -from Konia, through the Cilician Gates of the Taurus Mountains, to -Adana, Aleppo, and Mosul—the latter being the route over which the -Bagdad Railway actually was constructed. The discussions between the -Russian and Ottoman Governments subsequently were crystallized and -confirmed by the so-called Black Sea Agreement of 1900, which pledged -the Sultan to award no further concessions for railways in northern -Anatolia or Armenia except to Russian nationals or to syndicates -approved by the Tsar, and, furthermore, to award such Russian -concessionaires terms at least as favorable as those to be granted the -Bagdad Railway Company.[3] - -The agreement thus reached, however, satisfied Russia only temporarily. -In December, 1901, M. Witte, Imperial Minister of Finance at -Petrograd, stated categorically that he considered the construction -of the Bagdad Railway by any Power other than Russia a menace to the -imperial interests of the Tsar. Proposals for the internationalization -of the line he asserted to be chimerical; in his opinion the nationals -of one Power would be certain to control the administration of the -enterprise. The Tsar was determined that Russian capitalists should -have nothing to do with the Railway; Russian capital, for a time at -least, should be conserved for industrial development at home. “The -Government of Russia,” he concluded, “is more interested in devoting -its available resources to the construction of new railways within -the Empire than it is in promoting an enterprise destined to offer -competition to Russia’s railways and industries.”[4] In 1902 and again -in 1903, M. Witte made similar statements, asserting that he saw no -reason for changing his point of view.[5] - -Witte’s words carried weight in Russia. As an erstwhile railway -worker he knew the great economic importance of railways. During his -régime as Minister of Finance (1893–1903) an average of 1,400 miles -of rails was laid down annually in Russia; the Transcaspian and -Transcaucasian systems were constructed, and the Siberian Railway was -pushed almost to completion. He foresaw that one day these railways -would be powerful weapons in the commercial and political expansion of -an industrialized Russia. As an official in charge of troop movements -during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 he had learned to understand the -function of railways in offensive and defensive warfare. Although he -considered it wasteful to construct railways for military purposes -alone, he believed that every railway was of strategic value; in fact, -he looked upon railways as the most important single factor in national -preparedness. As the foremost protagonist of Russia’s tariff war with -the German Empire he was opposed to any plan which promised to promote -German commerce and to open up new resources and new markets to German -industry. As a native of the Caucasus region and as an ardent advocate -of colonial expansion Witte looked forward to the time when Russia -herself—possessed of capital for the purpose—should dominate the -transportation system of Asiatic Turkey.[6] - -It is questionable, however, if the Bagdad Railway really threatened -any important Russian economic interests. The railways of southern -Russia, so far from being injured by competition with the proposed -new railways of Turkey, would be almost certain to profit from any -increase of trade in the region of the Black Sea. The Russian dream of -a railway to Alexandretta was still very much of a dream; but even if -the contrary had been the case, its construction for peaceful purposes -would not have been hindered by the Bagdad plan. The claim that a -trans-Mesopotamian railway would compete with the Far Eastern traffic -of the Siberian Railways was purely fantastic; it overlooked the -obvious fact that an ideal shipping route, like a straight line, is the -shortest distance between two points. It would be at least a generation -before Mesopotamian grain and oil could play a prominent part in the -Russian market.[7] - -But with Russian political interests the case was different. Ever -since the days of Peter the Great, the Russian Tsars had persistently -and relentlessly continued their efforts to obtain a “window” on the -Mediterranean. This historical trend toward the open sea led to a -well-defined intention on the part of Russia, in one way or another, -to take Constantinople from the Turks. The dynastic interests of -Russia were reënforced by commercial considerations. “Most of Russia’s -southern trade is bound to pass through the Bosporus. Her wheat and -hides, her coal and oil cannot reach the European markets any other -way; her manganese and petroleum are inaccessible to other nations -if they cannot find an outlet from the Caucasus to the Dardanelles.” -During the Turco-Italian War the closing of the Straits for a few days -was said to have cost Russian shipping about eight million francs.[8] -Bonds of religion and race enlisted Russian sympathy in the struggle -of the Balkan states to win independence from Turkey—a cause which -harmonized with the Russian ambition to bring about the disintegration -of Turkey-in-Europe. The rise of German influence at Constantinople—of -which the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions were a tangible -manifestation—had been a source of annoyance to Russia, not only -because it prevented Russian domination of Turkish affairs and because -it strengthened the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but -also because it tended to strengthen Turkish military power. It was -annoying enough to witness the rising political and economic power of -Germany in the Near East; it was more annoying to realize that, under -German guidance, the Turks might experience an economic and military -renaissance which would end once and for all the Russian hope of -possessing ancient Byzantium. - -Strategically the construction of the Bagdad Railway was a real menace -to Russian ambitions in the Near East. The completion of the line would -enable the Ottoman Government to effect a prompt mobilization along -the Armenian front. For example, the Fifth Turkish Army Corps, from -Damascus, and the Sixth Corps, from Bagdad—which in the War of 1877 -arrived on the field after a series of forced marches, minus a large -number of its effectives, too late to save Kars or to raise the siege -of Erzerum—could be brought quickly by rail from Syria and Mesopotamia -to Angora for the defence of northern Anatolia. In the event of a -Russo-Turkish war such a maneuver would render extremely precarious a -Russian invasion of Armenia or a Russian advance on Constantinople -along the south shore of the Black Sea. In a general European war in -which both Russia and Turkey might be involved the existence of this -railway line would make possible a Turkish stroke at the southern -frontier of Russia, thus diverting troops from the European front. That -the German General Staff was not ignorant of these possibilities is -certain because of the presence in Turkey, during this time, of General -von der Goltz.[9] - -The Russian Government and the Russian press were fully aware of the -menace of the Bagdad Railway to Russian imperial interests. That the -Tsar did not offer serious resistance to the construction of the line -was due to the rise of serious complications in the Far East, the -crushing defeats of his army and navy in the War with Japan, friction -with Great Britain in Persia and in Central Asia, and the outbreak of -a revolutionary movement at home. But the Russian press called upon -French citizens to show their loyalty to the Alliance by refusing to -participate in the financing of the Railway.[10] - -The plaintive call of the Russians, however, did not fall on altogether -sympathetic ears in the Republic; a conflict of interests led some -French citizens to invest in the Railway even though it was denounced -by their Government. - - -THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HESITATES - -The position of France in the Bagdad Railway controversy was anomalous. -In addition to political, economic, and religious reasons for opposing -the construction of the trans-Mesopotamian railway, the French had many -historical and sentimental interests which influenced the Government -of the Republic to resist German penetration in the Near East. French -patriots recalled with pride the rôle of France in the Crusades; -they remembered that Palestine itself was once a Latin kingdom; they -believed that Christians in the Levant looked to France as their -protector and that this protection had received formal recognition -under the Capitulations, negotiated by Francis I and renewed and -extended by his successors from Henry IV to Louis XV. They knew that -the French language was the language not only of the educated classes -in Turkey, but, also, in Syria, of the traders, so that it could be -said that a traveler in Syria might almost consider himself in a French -dependency. They were proud of the fact that the term “Frank” was the -symbol of Western civilization in the Near East. They were aware of the -far-reaching educational work of French missionaries. France, to their -mind, had done a great work of Christian enlightenment in the Moslem -stronghold, Turkey. Was the Government of the Republic to be backward -in asserting the interests of France, when Bourbons and Bonapartes had -so ably paved the way for the extension of French civilization in the -Holy Land? Reasoning of this kind was popular in France during 1898 and -1899, when the Kaiser’s visit to Abdul Hamid was still under discussion -and when the first indications were given that a German company was -to be awarded a concession for the construction of a railway from -Constantinople to the Persian Gulf. - -On the other hand, however, there was a considerable and a powerful -group in France which urged the French Government, if not to support -the project of the Bagdad Railway, at least to put no obstacles in its -way. The members of this group were French financiers with investments -in Turkey. They believed that the construction of the Railway would -usher in a new era of prosperity in the Ottoman Empire which would -materially increase the value of the Turkish securities which they -owned. If the interests of these financiers were not supported by -historical traditions and nationalist sentiment, they were tangible and -supported by imposing facts. It was estimated, in 1903, that French -investors controlled three-fifths, amounting to a billion and a half -of francs, of the public obligations of the Imperial Ottoman Treasury. -French promoters owned about 366 million francs in the securities of -Turkish railroads and over 162 millions in various industrial and -commercial enterprises in Asia Minor. French banks had approximately -176 million francs invested in their branches in the Near East. The -total of all French investments in Turkey was more than two and a -half billion francs.[11] The French-controlled Imperial Ottoman Bank, -the French-owned Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, and the French-administered -Ottoman Public Debt Council all favored the promotion of the Bagdad -Railway idea. - -For a time, the French Government decided to follow the lead of -the financial interests. French bankers, in 1899, had entered into -an agreement with the _Deutsche Bank_ to operate the Anatolian and -Smyrna-Cassaba systems under a joint rate agreement, to coöperate -in the construction of the Bagdad Railway, and to attempt to secure -diplomatic support for their respective enterprises.[12] At the request -of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, M. Constans, the French Ambassador at -Constantinople, adopted a policy of “benevolent neutrality” toward the -negotiations of the _Deutsche Bank_ with the Ottoman Ministry of Public -Works. This course was approved by M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign -Affairs, who considered the Bagdad Railway harmless because French -capitalists were to participate in its construction and operation. Just -how much this diplomatic non-interference assisted the _Deutsche Bank_ -in obtaining the concessions of 1899 and 1903 is an open question. It -is extremely doubtful if French objections could have blocked the -award of the concessions, although M. Chéradame subsequently maintained -that the consummation of the plans of the _Deutsche Bank_ would have -been impossible without the tacit coöperation of the French embassy at -Constantinople.[13] - -Between 1899 and 1902 the proposed Bagdad Railway was discussed -occasionally by French publicists, but it could not have been -considered a matter of widespread popular interest. In the spring of -the latter year, however, immediately after the award of the first -Bagdad concession by the Sultan, a bitter protest was voiced in the -Chamber of Deputies against the policy of the French Government. -M. Firmin Fauré, a deputy from Paris, introduced a resolution that -“the issue of debentures, stocks, or bonds designed to permit the -construction of the Bagdad Railway shall not be authorized in French -territory except by vote of the Chamber of Deputies.” In a few words -M. Fauré denounced the Bagdad Railway plan as a menace to French -prestige in the Near East and as a threat against Russian security in -the Caucasus. He believed, furthermore, that Bagdad Railway bonds would -be an unsafe investment: “It is a Panama that is being prepared down -there. Do you choose, perchance, my dear colleagues, to allow French -capital to be risked in this scheme without pronouncing it foolhardy? -Do you choose to allow the great banks and the great investment -syndicates to realize considerable profits at the expense of the -small subscribers? If that is how you attend to the defence of French -capital, well and good, but you will permit me to disagree with you.” -He warned the members of the Chamber that they would not dare to stand -for reëlection if they thus allowed the interests of their constituents -to be prejudiced.[14] - -M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, objected to the resolution. -He denied that French diplomacy had assisted the German bankers in -securing the Bagdad Railway concession.[15] But the concession was a -_fait accompli_, and it also was a fact that French financiers felt -they could not afford to refuse the offer of participation with the -German concessionaires. “I venture to ask how it can be prevented, and -I inquire of the Chamber whether, when such an enterprise has been -arranged and decided upon, it is not preferable that French interests, -so considerable in the East, should be represented therein.” He -promised that every possible precaution would be taken to assure French -capitalists a share in the enterprise equal to that of any other power. -The Minister was upheld, the motion being defeated by a vote of 398 to -72.[16] - -Less than two years later, in October, 1903, the Paris Bourse, at the -instigation of the French Government, excluded all Bagdad Railway -securities from the privileges of the Exchange. This change in policy -was not so much the result of a _volte face_ on the part of M. Rouvier -and M. Delcassé as it was a consequence of a persistent clamor on the -part of the French press that the construction of the Bagdad Railway, -which was popularly considered a serious menace to French interests, -should be obstructed by every effective method at the disposal of the -Government.[17] - - -FRENCH INTERESTS ARE BELIEVED TO BE MENACED - -The commercial interests of southern France were opposed to -participation in the Bagdad Railway by the French Government or by -French capitalists. Business men were fearful, for example, lest “the -new route to India” should divert traffic between England and the East -from the existing route across Europe _via_ Calais to Marseilles and -thence by steamer to Suez, to a new express service from Calais to -Constantinople _via_ Ostend, Cologne, Munich, and Vienna. Thus the -importance of the port of Marseilles would be materially decreased, -and French railways would lose traffic to the lines of Central Europe. -Also, there was some feeling among the manufacturers of Lyons that the -rise of German economic power in Turkey might interfere with the flow -to France of the cheap raw silk of Syria, almost the entire output of -which is consumed in French mills. The fears of the silk manufacturers -were emphasized by one of the foremost French banks, the _Crédit -Lyonnais_, which maintained branches in Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Beirut, -for the purpose of financing silk and other shipments. This bank had -experienced enough competition at the hands of the _Deutsche Palästina -Bank_ to assure it that further German interference was dangerous.[18] - -From the political point of view there was more to be said for -the French objections. Foremost among serious international -complications was the strategic menace of the Railway to Russia. The -Bagdad enterprise was described as the “anti-Russian maneuver _par -excellence_.” To weaken Russia was to undermine the “foundation stone -of French foreign policy,” for it was generally conceded that “the -Alliance was indispensable to the security of both nations; it assured -the European equilibrium; it was the essential counterbalance to the -Triple Alliance.”[19] Then, too, the question of prestige was involved! -In the great game of the “balance of power” an imperial advance by -one nation was looked upon as a humiliation for another! Thus a -German success in Turkey, whether gained at the expense of important -French interests or not, would have been considered as reflecting -upon the glory of France abroad! There was also a menace to France in -a rejuvenated Turkey. A Sultan freed from dependence upon the Powers -might effectively carry on a Pan-Islamic propaganda which would lead to -serious discontent in the French colonial empire in North Africa. What -would be the consequences if the Moors should answer a call to a Holy -War to drive out the infidel invaders?[20] - -Still more fundamental, perhaps, than any of these reasons was the fear -among far-sighted French diplomatists that the Bagdad Railway would -be but the first step in a formal political alliance between Germany -and Turkey. The French, more than any other European people, have been -schooled in the political ramifications of foreign investments. The -very foundations of the Russian Alliance, for example, were loans of -French bankers to Russian industries and to the Tsar. Might not Baron -Marschall von Bieberstein and Karl Helfferich, Prince von Bülow and -Arthur von Gwinner, tear a leaf out of the book of French experience? -Certainly the way was being paved for a Turco-German alliance, and M. -Deschanel eloquently warned his colleagues in the Chamber of Deputies -that there were limitless possibilities in the situation. Speaking in -the Chamber on November 19, 1903, he said: “Behold a railway that can -divert from the Suez Canal a part of the traffic of the Far East, so -that the railways of Central Europe will become the competitors of -Marseilles and of our French railways! Behold a new colonial policy -which, instead of conquering territories by force of arms, makes war -with funds; possesses itself of the means of communication; crushes -out the life of states, little by little, by the artifices of the -financiers, leaving them only a nominal existence! And we, who possess -the world’s greatest fund of _capital, that supreme weapon of modern -conquest_, we propose to place it at the disposal of foreign interests -hostile to our fundamental and permanent foreign policies! Alas, it is -not the first time that our capital has gone to nourish rival, even -hostile, schemes!”[21] - -Religious interests supported the political and economic objections to -the construction of the Bagdad Railway. French Clericals were fearful -lest this railway become the very backbone of German interests in the -Ottoman Empire, thus strengthening German missionary activities and -jeopardizing the time-honored protectorate of France over Catholics -in the Near East. As early as 1898 an anonymous writer sounded a -clarion call to Catholics and nationalists alike that German economic -penetration in Turkey was a matter of their common concern: “Preeminent -in the Levant, thanks to the friendship of the Sultan and to the -progress of the commerce of her nationals, Germany, if she gathers in, -besides, our religious heritage, will crown her formidable material -power with an enormous moral power; she will assume in the world the -eminent place which Charlemagne, St. Louis, Francis I, Richelieu, Louis -XIV, and Napoleon have assured to our country. The ‘nationalization’ of -missions will inaugurate a period of German supremacy in the Orient, -where the name of France has been so great and where it still is so -loved.”[22] - -France occupied a unique position in the Near East. For centuries she -had been recognized as shouldering a special responsibility in the -protection of Catholics and of Catholic missions in the Ottoman Empire. -This protectorate—which as late as 1854 had provided the occasion for a -war between the empire of Napoleon III and Russia—had been acquired not -by military conquest alone, but by outstanding cultural and religious -services as well.[23] - -Certainly at the end of the nineteenth century French missions held -a preëminent position in Turkey. French Jesuits and Franciscans -maintained elementary, secondary, and vocational schools in Aleppo, -Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and numerous smaller towns throughout -Syria and Palestine. A Jesuit school established at Beirut in 1875 -rapidly expanded its curricula until it obtained recognition as a -university, its baccalaureate degree being accredited by the French -Ministry of Public Instruction early in the decade of the eighties. -The medical faculty of this Jesuit University—said to have been -founded under the patronage of Jules Ferry and Léon Gambetta—was -given authority to grant degrees, which were recognized officially by -France in 1888 and by Turkey in 1898. In addition to the classical and -medical courses, instruction was given in law, theology, philosophy, -and engineering. A preparatory school, conducted in connection with -the university, had an enrollment of about one thousand pupils. By -1907 it was estimated that over seventy thousand Syrian children were -receiving instruction in French religious schools. In addition to these -educational accomplishments mention should be made of the work of the -Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition and the Society of St. Vincent -de Paul, who made Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and other towns centers of -French religious and philanthropic activity.[24] - -The progress of German missions and schools was a challenge to the -paramount position of France in the cultural development of the Near -East. And it was not a challenge which was passed unanswered. To -counteract the influence of German schools established, with the aid of -the Railway Company, at a few of the more important points along the -Anatolian lines, French missionary schools were established at Eski -Shehr, Angora, and Konia.[25] - -Furthermore, German missions seemed to bring with them an additional -threat—an attempt to discredit the French claim to an exclusive -protectorate over Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. As early as 1875 the -German Government declared that “it recognized no exclusive right of -protection of any power in behalf of Catholic establishments in the -East,” and that “it reserved its rights with regard to German subjects -belonging to any of these establishments.”[26] This position appeared -to be strengthened by Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), which -affirmed that “ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities -traveling in Turkey shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and -privileges. The official right of protection of the diplomatic and -consular agents of the Powers in Turkey is recognized, with regard both -to the above-mentioned persons and to their religious, charitable, and -other establishments in the Holy Places and elsewhere.”[27] - -In 1885 it was proposed that the Sultan should appoint his own emissary -to the Vatican, thus rendering supererogatory the time-honored -procedure of transacting all affairs of the Church through the French -embassy at Constantinople. French Catholics immediately charged that -this proposal emanated from Berlin and did everything possible to -oppose its acceptance. Italian and German influences in Rome heartily -supported the idea of direct communications between the Vatican and the -Porte, but Pope Leo XIII and Cardinal Rampolla finally decided against -maintaining diplomatic relations with the Infidel.[28] - -Largely as a result of Italian insistence that the rights of the -diplomatic and consular agents of the Kingdom be given recognition, it -was considered advisable for the Pope to state definitely his position -on the French protectorate. This he did in an encyclical of May 22, -1888, _Aspera rerum conditio_, which informed all Catholic missionaries -in the Levant that “the Protectorate of the French Nation in the -countries of the East has been established for centuries and sanctioned -even by treaties between the empires. Therefore there must be -absolutely no innovation in this matter; this Protectorate, wherever it -is in force, is to be religiously preserved, and the missionaries are -warned that, if they have need of any help, they are to have recourse -to the consuls and other ministers of France.”[29] In a letter dated -August 1, 1898, addressed to Cardinal Langénieux, Archbishop of Rheims, -Leo XIII again confirmed this opinion: “France has a special mission in -the East confided to her by Providence—a noble mission consecrated not -alone by ancient usage, but also by international treaties.... The Holy -See does not wish to interfere with the glorious patrimony which France -has received from its ancestors, and which beyond a doubt it means -to deserve by always showing itself equal to its task.”[30] No more -sweeping confirmation of French rights could have been desired. - -The German Government, however, was by no means willing to accept these -pronouncements as final. In the name of nationalism German unification -was accomplished; in the name of nationalism German missionaries abroad -must look to their own Government for protection. To admit a foreign -claim to the protectorate of Germans was to stain the national honor. -To accede to the French pretension that Catholic Germans occupied an -inferior position in the East was to decrease the prestige of German -citizenship. The Shantung incident was a noisy demonstration of the -intention of the German Empire to recognize no such distinctions. -The visit of the Kaiser to the Sultan in the same year, 1898, was -directly concerned with the determination of _Wilhelmstrasse_ to -assert the secular rights of German missionaries, Catholics as well as -Protestants.[31] - -French Catholics denied the German claims and worked upon national -sentiment at home to add to the growing fear of German imperial -aggrandizement. “Catholic missions,” it was asserted, “by their very -nature and purpose are a supra-national institution, similar to the -sovereign majesty of the Pope.” What could be the purpose of the -Germans in asserting the doctrine of the “nationalization of missions,” -if it were not to undermine French influence in Turkey? How great would -be the national humiliation if the protectorate of the Faithful in -the East should pass from the hands of Catholic France to Protestant -Prussia! The Germans, too, were prejudicing the Holy See against the -Republic. A notoriously pro-German party at the Vatican, supported -by their political allies, the Italians, were winning the sympathies -of the Pope by insinuating references to “red France,” “schismatic -Russia,” and “heretical England”! Thus was a dark plot being hatched -against France and against the unity of Christendom![32] - -This situation was not without its advantages to the French Clericals. -Between the years 1899 and 1905, when the Bagdad Railway controversy -was at its height, a serious domestic controversy was raging in France. -In a bitter fight to extirpate Clericalism the Republican ministries of -Waldeck-Rousseau and Émile Combes had put through law after law to curb -the power of the Church and to break up the influence of the religious -orders. The Clericals were waging a losing battle. But perhaps the -last crushing blows might be warded off by resorting to a favorite -maneuver of Louis Napoleon—the diversion of popular attention from -domestic affairs to foreign policy. If Republicans and Monarchists, -Socialists and bourgeois Liberals, Radicals and Conservatives, -Free-Masons and Clericals, could be aroused against the German advance -in Turkey, a common outburst of national pride might obscure, for a -time at least, the domestic war on organized Catholicism. Therefore -Clerical writers in France warned of the menace of the Bagdad Railway -to the Russian Alliance, to the advance of French commerce, and to -the ancient prerogatives in the East. “It is Germany, preëminent at -Constantinople,” said an anonymous writer in the _Revue des deux -mondes_, “which blocks the future of Pan-Slavism in the East; it -is Germany, installed in Kiao-chau, which can forestall Muscovite -expansion toward the Pacific; it is Germany which, in the East and -Far East, seeks to undermine our religious protectorate. Faced by the -same adversary, it is natural that France and Russia should build up -a common defence.” That France should not desert her ally Russia or -her own prerogatives in the protectorate of Near Eastern missions is -self-evident. “The protectorate over Catholics is for us, in short, a -source of material advantage!”[33] - - -THE BAGDAD RAILWAY CLAIMS FRENCH SUPPORTERS - -The Bagdad Railway was not without friends in France. The French -chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was an enthusiastic -supporter of the project and served on the Board of Directors of -the Bagdad Railway Company, for he believed that widespread railway -construction was essential to the establishment, upon a firm basis, of -Turkish credit. The French-controlled Imperial Ottoman Bank, as early -as 1899, had agreed to participate in the financing of the Bagdad line, -and an officer of the bank had accepted the position of vice-president -of the Bagdad Railway Company at the time of its incorporation in 1903. -The French owners of important railways in Anatolia and Syria believed -it would be suicidal for them to obstruct the plans of the _Deutsche -Bank_ and preferred to coöperate with the German concessionaires. -Unless the French opponents of the Bagdad Railway were prepared -to offer these interests material compensation for resisting its -construction, it was hardly likely that, hard-headed business men as -they were, they would jeopardize the security of their investments -for the sake of such intangible items as international prestige and -protectorates of missions. - -There were two important groups of French-owned railways in -Turkey-in-Asia. In Anatolia there was the important Smyrna-Cassaba -system, extending east and north-east from the French-developed port -of Smyrna. At Afiun Karahissar the main line of this system from -Smyrna connected with the Anatolian line from Constantinople to Konia. -Therefore a route for French trade already existed to all of Asia -Minor; and when the Bagdad Railway was completed, direct service could -be instituted from Smyrna to Adana, Aleppo, Mosul, Bagdad, and Basra. -The second group of French railways was the Syrian system, owned by _La -Société Ottomane du Chemin de fer Damas-Hama et Prolongements_. This -company operated railway lines from Aleppo to Damascus, from Tripoli -to Homs, from Beirut to Damascus, from Jaffa to Jerusalem, and between -other less important points. After the completion of the Bagdad Railway -this group of railways would have direct connections, at Aleppo, -with all of Europe _via_ Constantinople and with the Indies _via_ -Basra and the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the French interests controlling -these railways were chagrined at their inability to secure the -trans-Mesopotamian concession for themselves. But faced with the _fait -accompli_ of the German concession, they realized that coöperation with -the Bagdad Railway would make their lines an integral part of a greater -system of rail communications within Turkey and also between Turkey and -the nations of Europe and Farther Asia. Refusal to coöperate would be -cutting off their noses to spite their faces.[34] - -French bankers were disposed to look at the Bagdad enterprise in -much the same light. The economic renaissance of Turkey, which it -was hoped would be an effect of improved rail communications, would -increase the value of their earlier investments in that country. But, -in addition, the Bagdad Railway offered handsome profits in itself: -profits of promoting the enterprise and floating the various bond -issues; profits of the construction company, in which French capital -was to participate; profits of the shareholders when the Railway should -become a going concern. True, the Council of Ministers had requested -the Bourse to outlaw the Bagdad securities. But, after all, when -profits are at stake, what is a mere resolution of the Cabinet among -friends? A syndicate of French financiers invested heavily in the -bonds and stock of the Bagdad Railway Company, the hostility of their -Government notwithstanding. And it was said that one of the bankers -who participated in the syndicate was none other than M. Rouvier, -Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of M. Combes, and subsequently Prime -Minister.[35] - -Many intelligent French students of foreign affairs felt that a merely -obstructionist policy on the part of France toward the Bagdad Railway -would be futile and, in the end, disastrous. In spite of the many -historical and sentimental attachments of France in the Near East, she -really had no vital interests which were jeopardized by the Bagdad -enterprise. It was urged, therefore, that she should play the rôle -of conciliator of the divergent interests of Russia, Great Britain, -Germany, and Turkey. A forward-looking program, it was suggested, would -be to urge these nations to reach a full and equitable agreement in -the promotion of “a project unquestionably valuable in the progress of -the whole human race.” National material interests should be merged in -“the superior interests of civilization.” Mere self-interest demanded -this of France, because, should a war break out over the Near Eastern -question, France would most certainly become involved.[36] - -As regards the claims of Russia to influence French policy in the -Bagdad Railway affair, there was a considerable amount of irritability -exhibited by French publicists. It was pointed out, for example, that -M. Witte was unwilling to accept “internationalization” of the Railway -at a time when the German and French bankers were prepared to effect -a satisfactory settlement on that basis. It was asserted, also, that -Russian strategic interests were adequately safeguarded when the -northern route was abandoned by the Black Sea Basin Agreement of 1900. -So far from decreased difficulties of Turkish mobilization constituting -a menace to Russia, “Russia still had both the power and, apparently, -the inclination to be a formidable menace to Turkey.”[37] How could the -Colossus of the Caucasus tremble before the Sick Man! - -One French writer was frank in advocating that France should pursue -a course independent of Russia in this instance. “The St. Petersburg -press,” he wrote, “has asserted vehemently that we are unjust to -support an enterprise which will injure considerably the economic -interests of Russia, which will seriously prejudice its grain trade, -and create a ruinous competitor to Russian railways now projected. Of -what use is the Franco-Russian Alliance if our policy runs counter to -Russian interests? - -“We are particularly pleased to answer the question. The Franco-Russian -Alliance does not imply complete servility on the part of France toward -Russia, or annihilation of all free will, or perpetual agreement on -matters of finance. After having furnished our ally with almost seven -billion francs, we find ourselves called upon to support her policies -in the Far East, although we ourselves were abandoned and isolated in -the Fashoda affair. It will be well for us now to think of ourselves -somewhat, although respecting scrupulously, even cordially, the clauses -of the contract of alliance.... It is in our own interests to coöperate -with Germany in the Bagdad enterprise. It is extremely regrettable that -we cannot carry it out ourselves; but since it is otherwise, we should -make the most of the conditions.”[38] - -It is said that M. Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, -certainly no friend of German imperial designs, never really was -hostile to the Bagdad Railway and its affiliated enterprises. As -Bismarck welcomed French colonial activities in Africa and China as a -means of diverting French attention from the Rhine and the Vosges, so -Delcassé hoped that the colossal Bagdad plan would absorb all German -imperial inclinations, leaving Morocco an exclusive sphere of French -influence. In the construction of railways in the Ottoman Empire, -Germany might satisfy her “irresistible need for expansion,” without -menacing vital French interests. And all the while the _Quai d’Orsay_, -through the French representatives on the Board of Directors of the -Bagdad Railway Company, could be kept fully informed of the progress -of the German concessionaires and the purpose of the German diplomatic -agents interested in the success of the project.[39] - -There were other ardent French nationalists who felt very much the same -way about it. However, in their opinion, it would be unwise to gamble -on the complete absorption of Germany in her _Bagdadbahn_. It would be -wiser, perhaps, to withhold financial support until such time as the -German Foreign Office was willing to execute a formal treaty conferring -upon France an exclusive sphere of interest in Morocco. Bagdad was to -be had for the asking—but in exchange for Morocco! It is said that -in 1905, after the fall of Delcassé and on the eve of the Algeciras -Conference, M. Rouvier, Prime Minister of France, approached the -German ambassador in Paris with a view to negotiating a Franco-German -agreement granting Germany a free hand in Turkey in return for -recognition of the special interests of France in Morocco.[40] - -M. André Tardieu revived this suggestion two years later. “Germany -needs capital,” he said. “And when one needs capital, it is to France -that one comes in search of it. It is inevitable, necessary, therefore, -that Germany come to us. She will be obliged to come to us sooner or -later to seek our capital for the Bagdad enterprise. Germany has the -concession. She has commenced the lines. But all the sections requiring -the greatest engineering skill are still to be constructed, and she -has not the money to construct them.” If France agrees to let Germany -have the necessary funds, it will be on the condition that Germany -allow France important compensations. “Where will these compensations -be sought? I have no hesitation in saying, in Morocco. The Act of -Algeciras must be set aside, and France must have a free hand in -Morocco! An agreement upon the Bagdad question would be mischievous if -it concerned Bagdad alone, for, the Germans having the concession in -their pockets, the positions of the negotiators would not be equal. On -the other hand, if the agreement is for two purposes, if it refers to -Bagdad _and_ Morocco, I believe, I repeat, it would be both practicable -and desirable.”[41] - -The proposal that French consent to the Bagdad Railway could be -purchased with compensations in North Africa met with no enthusiasm -in Germany. Herr Bassermann, leader of the National Liberals in the -Reichstag, urged the Foreign Office to meet any such diplomatic -maneuver on the part of France with a sharp rebuff.[42] At the time -of the Agadir crisis, furthermore, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein is -said to have warned Bethmann-Hollweg that Germany would have to stand -firm on Morocco, for “if, notwithstanding Damascus and Tangier, we -abandon Morocco, we lose at one blow our position in Turkey, and with -it the advantages and prospects for the future which we have acquired -painfully by years of toil.”[43] - -It was not until 1914 that an agreement was reached between France and -Germany on Asiatic Turkey. For more than ten years, then, the Bagdad -Railway was a stinging irritant in the relations between the Republic -and the Empire. It aggravated an open wound which needed, not salt, but -balm. We shall return later to consider its consequences. But in the -meantime we must turn our attention to Great Britain, standing astride -the Persian Gulf and blocking the way. - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Regarding Russian railways in the Near East _cf._ the article -“Russia—Railways,” in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, 11th edition, -Volume 23, p. 891. The trans-Persian railway from Resht, a Persian -port on the Caspian, to Teheran was completed in September, 1899. -_Cf._ “Russia’s Tightening Grip on Persia,” in _The Globe_ (London), -August 24, 1899; also “Russian Railways in Asia,” _The Financial News_ -(London), August 14, 1899. The Bagdad Railway frequently was referred -to in the French and Russian press as the _Petit Transasiatique_. - -[2] Foreign correspondence of _The Globe_, July 28, 1899; _Commerce_ -(London), August 2, 1899; articles quoted from the _Novoe Vremya_ in -_The Globe_, August 10, 1899; _The Engineer_ (London), August 11, 1899; -_The Observer_, August 13, 1899; R. Henry, “L’intérêt française en Asie -occidentale—Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et l’alliance franco-russe,” in -_Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 673–688. - -[3] _Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, pp. 64 _et seq._; Paul Imbert, -“Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, 5 period, -Volume 38 (1907), pp. 657–659. - -[4] Quoted by Georges Mazel, _Le chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Montpelier, -1911), p. 324. It should be remembered that Russia at this time was -experiencing the Industrial Revolution. _Cf._ James Mavor, _An Economic -History of Russia_, Volume II (Toronto, 1914), Book VI. - -[5] _Annual Register_, 1902, p. 323; 1903, pp. 293–294. - -[6] _Memoirs of Count Witte_, edited and translated by A. Yarmolinsky -(Garden City, 1921), pp. 75 _et seq._; G. Drage, _Russian Affairs_ -(London, 1904), pp. 507 _et seq._; A. Sauzède, “Le développement des -voies ferrées en Russie,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, -Volume 37 (1914), pp. 272–281; F. H. Skrine, _The Expansion of Russia_ -(Cambridge, 1904), _passim_. - -[7] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 294–295; Gervais-Courtellemont, “La -question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Questions diplomatiques et -coloniales_, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 499–507. - -[8] Baron S. A. Korff, _Russia’s Foreign Relations during the Last Half -Century_ (New York, 1922), pp. 133–134. - -[9] Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, pp. 10–13; Imbert, _loc. cit._, p. 678. -Enthusiastic Turks believed that, with adequate rail communications, -Erzerum might be transformed into a Turkish Belfort. _Cf._ Mazel, _op. -cit._, p. 37. Had the Bagdad Railway and the projected railways of -northern Anatolia been completed before the outbreak of the Great War, -the Turks could have made a more effective defence in the Caucasus -campaign of the Grand Duke Nicholas in 1916. - -[10] For a general statement of the attitude of Russia and the Balkan -States to the Bagdad Railway _cf._ Alexandre Ilitch, _Le chemin de fer -de Bagdad, ou l’expansion de l’Allemagne en Orient_ (Brussels, Paris, -Leipzig, 1913), pp. 100–107, 121–123. - -[11] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 273–289; _cf._, also, P. Rohrbach, -_German World Policies_, pp. 223–224. - -[12] _Supra_, pp. 59–60. - -[13] Chéradame, _op. cit._, pp. 267 _et seq._; _The Times_, August 10, -1899; K. Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 124. - -[14] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, -March 25, 1902, p. 1468. - -[15] According to M. Deschanel, this was sophistry. The French -Government, if it was not guilty of an error of commission, certainly -was guilty of a sin of omission. It was the opinion of M. Deschanel -that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should have done -something to put the French Government on record as opposed to the -Bagdad Railway. M. Deschanel was not certain, however, that the French -Ministry had not consented to the participation of French capital -in the plan. “How can one imagine,” he said, “that an institution -such as the Ottoman Bank became involved in an enterprise of such -great political and military importance without the approval of our -Foreign Office?... How is it that the Ottoman Bank is a party to this -enterprise, and how is it that the Board of Directors for the first -section of the line has French representatives, when only a word from -the Government could have prevented it?” _Ibid._, November 20, 1903, p. -2798. - -[16] _Ibid._, March 25, 1902, pp. 1468 _et seq._ - -[17] Victor Bérard, “Le Discours du Chancelier,” in the _Revue de -Paris_, December 15, 1906. - -[18] The _Revue Bleue_, April 6, 1907, p. 429; _Syria and Palestine_, -p. 126. Many of the claims that the Bagdad Railway jeopardized French -prosperity were purely fantastic. It was maintained that the opening -of the great Mesopotamian granary would cripple French agriculture, -already seriously handicapped by the competition of the new world. To -this was added the suggestion that development of cotton-growing in -Turkey would stifle the infant efforts at the cultivation of cotton -in the French colonies. It is incredible that Mesopotamian grain -and cotton would have interfered with the flourishing prosperity of -the French peasantry; in any event, any such danger was at least a -generation removed. France raised high tariff barriers against foreign -competition in the home market for agricultural products; she was not -an exporter of grain. - -[19] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, -March 25, 1902, pp. 1467 _et seq._ - -[20] _Cf._, M. Montbel, “Les puissances coloniales devant l’Islam,” in -_Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 348–362. - -[21] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, -November 20, 1905, p. 2798. The italics are mine. - -[22] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), p. 29. - -[23] Sources of the treaties granting special privileges to France are -sighted in Note 3, Chapter II. Regarding the origins and nature of -the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions see the article -“Capitulations” in the _Encyclopedia Britannica_, previously cited; J. -Brucker, “The Protectorate of Missionaries in the Near East,” in the -_Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XII, pp. 488–492; A. Schopoff, _Les -Réformes et la Protection des Chrétiens en Turquie, 1673–1904_ (Paris, -1904); _Livre de propagande de l’alliance française, 1883–1893_ (Paris, -1894), especially pp. 35 _et seq._; Viscomte Aviau de Piolant, _La -défense des intérêts catholiques en Terre Sainte et en Asie Mineure_ -(Paris, 1886). - -[24] _Syria and Palestine_, pp. 43–45, 54–55; L. Bréhier, “Turkish -Empire—Missions,” in _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XV, pp. 101–102; -J. Atalla, “Les solutions de la question syrienne,” in _Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), p. 472. - -[25] _Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople_, -June 30, 1897, pp. 112–113, November 30, 1897, p. 149. - -[26] Brucker, _loc. cit._, p. 490. - -[27] It should be added that the Treaty also stipulated that “the -acquired rights of France are explicitly reserved, and there shall be -no interference with the _statu quo_ in the Holy Places.” E. Hertslet, -_The Map of Europe by Treaty_, Volume IV (London, 1891), p. 2797. - -[28] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149, (1898), pp. 24–25; Brucker, -_loc. cit._, p. 491. - -[29] _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Volume XII, p. 491. The rôle of the -Italians in this controversy is of considerable interest. The desire -of the Italian Government to assert its right to protect its own -citizens abroad was a manifestation of the Italian nationalism which -brought about the establishment of the Kingdom; at the same time it -was an expression of that anti-Clerical tendency which characterized -Italian politics from the days of Cavour to the outbreak of the Great -War. Undoubtedly, also, there was an economic side to the question. -It will be recalled that Italian trade with the Ottoman Empire -grew more rapidly than that of any other power after the opening -of the twentieth century. (_Supra_, pp. 105–106.) This growth was -due, in no small degree, to the earlier rise of Italian missionary -activity in Turkey. This growth of missions and schools, as well as -of commercial establishments, was irritating to patriotic Frenchmen. -_Cf._ two articles by René Pinon, “Les écoles d’Orient,” in _Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 415–435, 487–517. -Italian missionaries, charged M. Pinon, were encouraged in every way to -ignore the French protectorate, appealing only to Italian diplomatic -and consular representatives. “Official Italy, Catholic and papal -Italy, free-mason Italy and clerical Italy, all are working together in -a common great patriotic effort for the spread of the Italian language -and the rise of the national power” (p. 500). Annoying as this is, says -M. Pinon, it should be “a singular lesson for certain Frenchmen!” That -there was no love lost on the Italian side of the controversy may be -gathered from an analysis of the Italian press comments which appeared -in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), p. 495. - -[30] Brucker, _loc. cit._, p. 491. Inasmuch as the protectorate of -Catholic missions involved a considerable responsibility for France, -one may ask why the French Government should have been so solicitous -that no other nation be allowed to share the burden. The answer is -suggested by the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, which states that the system -of religious protectorates is almost invariably subject to the abuse -that “the protectors will seek payment for their services by trammeling -the spiritual direction of the mission or by demanding political -services in return.” Volume XII, p. 492. - -[31] _Supra_, pp. 134–135. - -[32] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), p. 39. The “pro-German -party” was said to consist of Cardinals Ledochowski, Hohenlohe, -Galimberti, and Kapp. _Ibid._, pp. 11–12; Reinsch, _op. cit._, p. 269. - -[33] _Revue des deux mondes_, Volume 149 (1898), pp. 36–40. On this -whole subject see, also, C. Lagier, _Byzance et Stamboul: nos droits -françaises et nos missions en Orient_ (Paris, 1905); Hilaire Capuchin, -_La France Catholique en Orient durant les trois-derniers siècles_ -(Paris, 1902); A. Schopoff, _Les Réformes et la Protection des -Chrétiens en Turquie_ (Paris, 1904). - -[34] G. Saint-Yves, _Les Chemins de fer françaises dans la Turquie -d’Asie_ (Paris, 1914). - -[35] The French and Belgian banks principally interested were: the -Imperial Ottoman Bank, the _Banque de l’Union Parisienne_, and the -_Banque Internationale de Bruxelles_. _Cf._ article “Ou en est la -question du chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Questions diplomatiques -et coloniales_, Volume 24 (1907), pp. 167–171; E. Letailleur, _Les -capitalistes français contre la France_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 72–110. M. -Rouvier visited Turkey in 1901, at the request of the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration, to suggest improvements in the fiscal system of -the Empire. (_Corps de droit ottoman_, Volume IV, p. 110.) It was at -this time, probably, that he learned enough of the Bagdad Railway to -persuade him of the wisdom of investing in its securities. - -[36] Gervais-Courtellemont, _loc. cit._, p. 507; Imbert, _loc. cit._, -p. 682. - -[37] Gervais-Courtellemont, _loc. cit._, p. 507; Bohler, _loc. cit._, -p. 294. - -[38] Bohler, _loc. cit._, pp. 293–295. - -[39] Mazel, _op. cit._, pp. 315–322. - -[40] K. Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 18. - -[41] “La politique extérieure de l’Allemagne,” in _Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 23 (1907), pp. 340–341. - -[42] _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, -Volume 231 (1908), pp. 4226 _et seq._ - -[43] Quoted by the _Annual Register_, 1913, p. 326. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -GREAT BRITAIN BLOCKS THE WAY - - -EARLY BRITISH OPINIONS ARE FAVORABLE - -The idea of a trans-Mesopotamian railway was not new to informed -Englishmen. As early as 1831 a young British army officer, Francis -R. Chesney, who had seen service in the Near East, became impressed -with the desirability of constructing a railway from the Mediterranean -to the Persian Gulf. From 1835 to 1837—while Moltke was in Turkey -studying military topography—Chesney was engaged in exploring the -Euphrates Valley and upon his return to England brought glowing tales -of the latent wealth of ancient Babylonia. It was not until twenty -years later, however, that his plan for a Mesopotamian railway was -taken up as a practical business proposition. In 1856 Sir William -Andrew incorporated the Euphrates Valley Railway Company, appointed -General Chesney as chief consulting engineer, and opened offices at -Constantinople to carry on negotiations for a concession from the -Imperial Ottoman Government. The plans of the Company were supported -enthusiastically by Lord Palmerston, by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, -British ambassador at Constantinople, and by the Turkish ambassador in -London. The following year the Sultan granted the Euphrates Valley -Company a concession for a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the -city of Basra, with the understanding that the Ottoman Treasury would -guarantee a return of six per cent upon the capital invested in the -enterprise. The promoters, however, experienced difficulty in raising -funds for the construction of the line, and the project had to be -abandoned.[1] - -Lord Palmerston, in the meantime, was busily opposing the Suez Canal -project. De Lesseps was handicapped by the obstructionist policies of -British diplomacy as well as by the unwillingness of British financiers -to invest in his enterprise. Palmerston frankly informed the great -French engineer that in the opinion of the British Government the -construction of the Canal was a physical impossibility; that if it -were constructed it would injure British maritime supremacy; and that, -after all, it was not so much a financial and commercial venture as a -political conspiracy to provide the occasion for French interference in -the East![2] - -Nevertheless the Suez Canal was completed in 1869, and immediately -thereafter the question of a Mesopotamian railway was again brought to -the fore in England. The advance of the Russians in the Near East and -the control by the French of a short all-water route to the Indies gave -rise to serious concern regarding the maintenance of communication with -British India. In 1870 a British promoter proposed the construction of -a railway from Alexandretta _via_ Aleppo and Mosul to Bagdad and Basra. -Such a railway, as Sir William Andrew had pointed out, would assure -the undisturbed possession of India, for the “advancing standard of -the barbarian Cossack would recoil before those emblems of power and -progress, the electric wire and the steam engine, and his ominous tread -would be restrained behind the icy barrier of the Caucasus.”[3] Also -it would render Great Britain independent of the French-owned Suez -Canal by providing an alternative route to the East, making possible -more rapid transportation of passengers, mails, and troops to India. -This plan seemed desirable of execution from so many points of view -that a special committee of the House of Commons, presided over by -Sir Stafford Northcote, was appointed “to examine and report upon the -whole subject of railway communication between the Mediterranean, the -Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf.” This committee reported that the -construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway was a matter of urgent -imperial concern and recommended a plan which would have involved -the investment of some £10,000,000. The necessity of providing an -alternative route to India was obviated, however, by Disraeli’s -purchase, in 1875, of a controlling interest in the Suez Canal at a -cost of less than half that sum.[4] - -For the forty years during which, at intervals, these projects were -under discussion Germany was not even an interested spectator in Near -Eastern affairs. Domestic problems of economic development and national -unification were all-absorbing, and capitalistic imperialism was quite -outside the scope of German policies. France and Russia, not Germany, -were the disturbers of British tranquillity in the Orient. - -When during the last two decades of the nineteenth century there was -a marked increase of German political and economic interests in the -Ottoman Empire, there was little disposition in England to resent the -German advance. As late as 1899, the year in which the preliminary -Bagdad Railway concession was awarded to German financiers, British -opinion, on the whole, was well disposed to Teutonic peaceful -penetration in the Near East. The press was delighted at the prospect -that the advent of the Germans in Turkey would block Russian expansion -in the Middle East. Such eminent imperialists as Joseph Chamberlain and -Cecil Rhodes announced their willingness to conclude an _entente_ with -Germany in colonial affairs. The British Government was more suspicious -of France than of Germany.[5] - -During the opening years of the twentieth century, however, the -situation was materially changed. Although there was a continuance -of the cordial relations between the British and German Governments, -there was an undercurrent of hostility to Germany in England (as well -as to England in Germany) which was to be disastrous to the hopes for -an Anglo-German agreement on the Near East. By 1903, the year of the -definitive Bagdad concession, German diplomacy and German business were -under a cloud of suspicion and unpopularity in Great Britain. - -The underlying reason for the increasing estrangement between England -and Germany was, as far as the British were concerned, the phenomenal -rise of Germany as a world power. The commercial advance of the German -Empire disturbed the complacent security and the stereotyped methods -of British business. The colonial aspirations of German imperialists -rudely interfered with British plans in Africa and appeared to be -threatening British domination of the East. The German navy bills of -1898 and 1900 constituted a challenge to Britannia’s rule of the waves. -German criticism of English procedure in South Africa had aroused -widespread animosity, in large part because the British themselves -realized that their conduct toward the Boers had not been above -reproach. This animosity was revealed in an aggravated and unreasoning -form in the vigorous denunciation which greeted the Government’s joint -intervention with Germany in the Venezuela affair of 1902. Joseph -Chamberlain, who in 1899 had advocated an Anglo-German alliance, in -1903 was preaching “tariff reform,” directed, among other objectives, -against the menace to the British Empire of the rising industrial -prosperity of Germany. The proposal that British capital should -participate in the Bagdad Railway project was introduced to the British -public at a distinctly inopportune time from the point of view of those -who desired some form of coöperation between England and Germany in the -successful prosecution of the plan. - - -THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT YIELDS TO PRESSURE - -The Bagdad Railway came up for discussion in Parliament on April 7, -1903. Mr. Balfour then informed the House of Commons that negotiations -were being carried on between British and German capitalists, and -between British capitalists and the Foreign Office, for the purpose -of determining the conditions upon which British financiers might -participate in the enterprise. If a satisfactory agreement could be -reached by the bankers, His Majesty’s Government would be asked to -give its consent to a reasonable increase in the customs duties of the -Ottoman Empire, to consider the utilization of the new railway for the -transportation of the Indian mails, and to adopt a friendly attitude -toward the establishment of the eastern terminus of the Bagdad Railway -at or near Koweit. - -Coöperation with the German concessionaires on any such basis was -attacked vigorously from the floor of the House. One member declared -it a menace to the existing British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway lines -in Turkey, a potential competitor of British maritime supremacy, and -a threat at British imperial interests in Egypt and in the region of -the Persian Gulf. Another member of the House believed that “it was -impossible to divorce the commercial from the political aspect of -the question. What made the House take a real, live interest in it -was the feeling that bound up with the future of this railway there -was probably the future political control of large regions in Asia -Minor, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf.” Another member was certain -the House “knew Mesopotamia was a blessed word. They all felt it was -impossible for this country to oppose the introduction of a railway -through Mesopotamia. The only wonder was that the railway was not -constructed forty or fifty years ago.” At the same time, he felt, it -would be well for Britain to be assured that her participation in the -enterprise would not lead to another “Venezuela agreement”; Germany -must be given to understand that Britain, by control of the Persian -Gulf, held the “trump card” of the deck. - -The Prime Minister made it plain, nevertheless, that he favored -coöperation with the German concessionaires provided British capital -were permitted to participate on a basis of equality with any other -power. He believed, also, that an obstructionist policy would be -futile. “I have no doubt that whatever course English financiers may -take and whatever course the British Government may pursue, sooner or -later this great undertaking will be carried out,” said Mr. Balfour. -“It is undoubtedly in the power of the British Government to hamper and -impede and inconvenience any project of the kind; but that the project -will ultimately be carried out, with or without our having a share in -it, there is no question whatsoever.” - -“There are three points,” continued Mr. Balfour, “which ought not to be -lost sight of by the House when trying to make up their minds upon this -problem in its incomplete state. They have to consider whether it is or -is not desirable that what will undoubtedly be the shortest route to -India should be entirely in the hands of French and German capitalists. -Another question is whether they do or do not think it desirable that -if there is a trade opening in the Persian Gulf, it should be within -the territories of the Sheik whom we have under our special protection -and with whom we have special treaties [_i.e._, the Sheik of Koweit], -or whether it should be in some other port of the Persian Gulf where -we have no such preferential advantage. The House must also have in -view a third consideration with regard to a railway which goes through -a very rich country and which ... is likely after a certain period of -development to add greatly to the riches of Turkey, and indirectly, -I suppose, greatly to the riches of any other country which is ready -to take advantage of it. Whether the British producer will be able to -take advantage of it is not for me to say; but the House will have to -consider whether he is more likely to be able to take advantage of it -if English capital is largely interested, than if it is confined to -French and German capital. The House will have to calculate whether ... -it will be prudent to leave the passenger traffic in the hands of those -two nations, France and Germany, with whom we are on the most friendly -terms, but whose interests may not be identical with our own.”[6] - -Mr. Balfour’s presentation of the case was hailed in Berlin as -eminently lucid and fair. The _National Zeitung_ and the _Vossische -Zeitung_ of April 8 expressed the hope that British participation in -the Bagdad Railway would be approved by Parliament and the press, -in order that the German promoters might have the opportunity -to demonstrate that no political ambitions were connected with -the enterprise. The Russian attitude of refusing even to discuss -internationalization, on the other hand, was roundly denounced. - -The London press, however, saw no reason for enthusiasm over the -Prime Minister’s proposal. _The Times_, the _Daily Mail_, the _Daily -Telegraph_, the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and the _National Review_ let -loose a torrent of vituperation against German imperialist activities -in general and the Bagdad Railway in particular. The _Spectator_, -forswearing any thought of prejudice against Germany, constantly -reminded its readers of German unfriendliness during the Boer War and -suggested that the Bagdad negotiations offered the British Government -an admirable opportunity to retaliate. - -The _Manchester Guardian_, organ of the old Liberalism, likewise was -opposed to British participation in the Bagdad Railway. Pleading for -continued observance of Britain’s time-honored policy of isolation, -its leading editorial of April 15 said: “Mr. Balfour expressed his -belief that ‘this great international artery had better be in the hands -of three great countries than in the hands of two or of one great -country.’ In other words, England is to be mixed up in the domestic -broils of Asia Minor; every Kurdish or Arab attack on the railway will -raise awkward diplomatic questions, and any disaster to the Turkish -military power will place the whole enterprise in jeopardy. What is -far more important, English participation in railway construction -in Asia Minor will certainly strengthen the suspicions which Russia -entertains regarding our policy. It is the fashion with certain English -politicians to abuse Russia for building railways in Manchuria and -for projecting lines across Persia. Yet Mr. Balfour seems more than -half inclined to pay her policy the compliment of imitation by helping -to build a railway across Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf—and, worse -still, of imperfect imitation, since the Government is certainly -not prepared to occupy the territory through which the railway will -pass, as Russia does in Manchuria. What vital interests of our own -shall we strengthen by this sudden ardour for railways in Turkey to -counterbalance the certain weakening of our friendly relations with -Russia?” - -Violent as was the opposition of the press to any coöperation with the -Germans in the Bagdad Railway, the opposition would have been still -more violent had all of the facts been public property. Mr. Balfour, -however, was keeping the House and the country in complete ignorance -of many of the most important aspects of the situation. Although the -Prime Minister denied that there had been any negotiations between -the British and German Governments regarding the Bagdad enterprise, -he failed to admit that there had been such negotiations between His -Majesty’s Government and German financiers. He made no mention of the -fact, for example, that he and Lord Lansdowne, his Secretary of State -for Foreign Affairs, had attended a meeting at the home of Lord Mount -Stephen at which Dr. von Gwinner, on behalf of the _Deutsche Bank_, -and Lord Revelstoke, on behalf of the interested British financiers, -explained the terms of the proposed participation of British capital -in the Bagdad Railway.[7] The plan was to place the Railway, including -the Anatolian lines, throughout its entire length from the Bosporus -to the Persian Gulf, under international control. Equal participation -in construction, administration, and management was to be awarded -German, French, and British interests to prevent the possibility of -preferential treatment for the goods or subjects of any one country.[8] -To this proposal both Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne gave their -approval, assuring the bankers that no diplomatic obstacles would be -offered by Great Britain to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. -Dr. von Gwinner thereupon returned home to obtain the consent of his -associates to the reapportionment of interests and, perhaps, to consult -the German Foreign Office and the Ottoman minister at Berlin. This was -early in April, 1903.[9] - -Persistent rumors in the London press that a Bagdad Railway agreement -had been negotiated brought the subject to the attention of the -Cabinet, which heretofore, apparently, had not been consulted by the -Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It was -decided that the Prime Minister should make a statement to Parliament—a -statement which, perhaps, might serve as a sort of trial balloon to -ascertain the opinion of the country upon the question. Mr. Balfour’s -presentation of the Bagdad Railway affair to the House of Commons, as -we have seen, however, provoked unfriendly comments from the floor and -was subjected to heavy fire from the press. Thereupon a rebellious -element in the Cabinet—led, presumably, by Joseph Chamberlain, who now -was more interested in the development of the economic resources of the -British Empire under a system of protective and preferential tariffs, -than in coöperation with other nations—persuaded Mr. Balfour not to -risk the life of his Ministry on the question of British participation -in the Bagdad enterprise. Accordingly, the agreement with the _Deutsche -Bank_ was repudiated, and on April 23, 1903, Mr. Balfour informed -the House of Commons that His Majesty’s Government was determined to -withdraw all support, financial and otherwise, which Great Britain -might be in a position to lend the Bagdad Railway. He was convinced, -he said, after a careful examination of the proposals of the German -promoters, that no agreement was possible which would compensate the -Empire for its diplomatic assistance and guarantee security for British -interests.[10] - -This announcement was a distinct disappointment to the bankers in -Berlin and in London. The directors of the _Deutsche Bank_ were -stunned by the termination of negotiations which they believed -had been progressing satisfactorily. The British financiers were -chagrined at the sudden decision of their Government to oppose their -participation in a promising enterprise. They were convinced that the -terms offered by the German bankers met every condition imposed by the -Prime Minister. They were agreed on the wisdom of British coöperation -with the _Deutsche Bank_, and they were not a little annoyed at what -appeared to be bad faith on the part of Downing Street. They were -convinced that only a bellicose press frustrated the attempt to make -the Bagdad Railway an international highway.[11] - -This, in any event, is the diagnosis of the situation furnished by Sir -Clinton Dawkins, of the Morgan group, one of the British financiers -interested in the project. In a letter to Dr. von Gwinner written on -April 23, 1903, but not made public until six years later, he said, -“As you originally introduced the Bagdad business to us, I feel that -I cannot, upon its unfortunate termination, omit to express to you -personally my great regret at what has occurred. After all you have -done to meet the various points raised, you will naturally feel very -disappointed and legitimately aggrieved. But I am glad to think, and -I feel you will be convinced, that your grievance lies not against -the British group but against the British Foreign Office. The fact is -that the business has become involved in politics here and has been -sacrificed to the very violent and bitter feeling against Germany -exhibited by the majority of our newspapers, and shared in by a large -number of people. This is a feeling which, as the history of recent -events will show you, is not shared by the Government or reflected in -official circles. But of its intensity outside these circles, for the -moment, there can be no doubt; at the present moment coöperation in -any enterprise which can be represented, or I might more justly say -_mis_represented, as German will meet with a violent hostility which -our Government has to consider.” - -Sir Clinton thereupon asserted that the effort of Mr. Balfour to quiet -the uproar in Parliament was due to the Prime Minister’s complete -satisfaction with the agreement reached by the financiers. Just as -success seemed assured, a bitter attack was launched on the Government -“by a magazine and a newspaper [The _National Review_ and _The Times_] -which had made themselves conspicuous by their criticisms of the -British Foreign Office on the Venezuela affair. Who instigated these -papers, from whence they derived their information, is a matter upon -which I cannot speak with certainty. My own impression is that the -instigation proceeded from Russian sources. The clamour raised by -these two organs was immediately taken up by practically the whole -of the English press, London having really gone into a frenzy on the -matter owing to the newspaper campaign, which it would have been quite -impossible to counteract or influence. It is, I think, due to you that -you should know the _histoire intime_ of what has passed.”[12] - -There was only one London newspaper, the _St. James’s Gazette_, which -came out frankly in favor of British participation in the Bagdad -Railway. In the issue of April 14, 1903, the editor ridiculed the -suggestion of the _Spectator_ that the Foreign Office was obliged to -warn bankers of the financial risks involved in the enterprise. “Why -our contemporary should be so anxious to save financiers, British -or foreign, from making a bad investment of their money, we cannot -imagine. Financiers are generally pretty wide-awake, and the City as -a rule requires no advice from Fleet Street, the Strand, or Whitehall -in transacting its business.” In an editorial entitled “Bagdad and Bag -Everything,” April 22, 1903, the _Gazette_ condemned _The Times_ for -the “curious and alarmist deductions” which that journal drew from -the terms of the Bagdad Railway convention. The suggestion that this -was a deliberate attempt on the part of Germany to ruin British trade -was characterized “as much a figment of a fevered imagination as the -mind-picture of Turkey using ‘this enormous line to pour down troops -to reduce the shores of the Persian Gulf to the same happy condition -as Armenia and Macedonia,’ about which _The Times_ is so suddenly and -unaccountably concerned. The concession is a monument to the German -Emperor’s activity, built on the ruins of the influence which we threw -away, and we do not precisely see what our _locus standi_ in the matter -is. If the interests of the Ottoman Government and of the German -concessionaires be served by the construction of the line, constructed -the line will be, and there’s an end. Whether it ever will, or ever can -pay its way, is the affair only of capitalists who are contemplating -investment in it. It is not the slightest use barking when we cannot -bite, and our power of biting in the present instance is excessively -small.... The Emperor William, like Jack Jones, has ‘come into ’is -little bit of splosh’ in Asia Minor, and it is quite useless to be -soreheaded about it. It is childish to be ever carping and nagging and -‘panicking.’ We question whether the Bagdad Railway—while the rule of -the Sultan endures—is going to do much good or much harm to anybody. -The vision which some Germans have of peaceful Hans and Gretchen -swilling Löwenbrau in the Garden of Eden to the strains of a German -band, is little likely of fulfilment. If trade develops, a fair share -of it will come our way, provided we send good wares and such as the -inhabitants want to buy.” This minority opinion, however, was unheeded -in the outburst of anti-German feeling which followed Mr. Balfour’s -first statement to the House of Commons. - -As events turned out, the failure of the Balfour Government to -effect the internationalization of the Bagdad Railway was a colossal -diplomatic blunder. If the proposed agreement of 1903 had been -consummated, the _entente_ of 1904 between France and England would -have taken control of the enterprise out of the hands of the Germans, -who would have possessed, with their Turkish collaborators, only -fourteen of the thirty votes in the Board of Directors. Sir Henry -Babington Smith assures the author that there was nothing in the -arrangement suggested by the _Deutsche Bank_ which would have prevented -eventual Franco-British domination of the line. Surely, as Bismarck is -said to have remarked, every nation must pay sooner or later for the -windows broken by its bellicose press! - - -VESTED INTERESTS COME TO THE FORE - -In addition to the pressure which was brought to bear on the Balfour -Cabinet by the newspapers, there were important vested business -interests which quietly, but effectively, made themselves heard at -Downing Street during the critical days of the Bagdad negotiations of -1903. - -It already has been noted that in 1888, as part of the plans of the -Public Debt Administration for the improvement of transportation -facilities in Turkey, the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company -was granted permission to construct several important branches to -its main line. For a time this new concession thoroughly satisfied -the owners and directors of the Company, and there was no objection -on their part to the extension and development of the German-owned -Anatolian system. By 1903, however, when the Bagdad concession was -under discussion, the Smyrna-Aidin line demanded the protection of the -British Government against the undue extension of German railways in -the Near East. In particular, it objected to the agreement between the -Anatolian Railway and the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, by which the latter -joined its tracks with the Anatolian system at Afiun Karahissar and -accepted a schedule of tariffs satisfactory to both lines.[13] The -Smyrna-Aidin Company feared that the Bagdad Railway would develop the -ports of Haidar Pasha, Alexandretta, and Mersina at the expense of -the prosperity of Smyrna, thereby decreasing the relative importance -of the Smyrna-Aidin line and cutting down the volume of its traffic. -Finally, it objected to the payment of a kilometric guarantee to the -German concessionaires while there was no likelihood of its being -similarly favored by the custodians of the public purse. The interests -of the shareholders of the railway were well represented in the House -of Commons by “that watchful dragon of imperial interests”, Mr. Gibson -Bowles. - -Mr. Bowles (Conservative member from King’s Lynn, 1892–1906, and -Liberal from the same constituency, 1910–1916) was a frank defender -of the interests of the stockholders of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. -He believed that investors were entitled to governmental protection -of their investments, whether at home or abroad. He left no doubt, -however, that he took his stand on high grounds of patriotism as well. -He informed the House that “he did not object to the railway, because -all railways were good feeders of ships. But this was not a railway; -it was a financial fraud and a political conspiracy—a fraud whereby -English trade would suffer and a conspiracy whereby the political -interests of England would be threatened. It amounted to a military and -commercial occupation by Germany of the whole of Asia Minor.”[14] - -Comparable to the interests of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway were those -of the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, Ltd. Under this name -the Lynch Brothers had been operating steamers on the Tigris and the -Shatt-el-Arab since the middle of the nineteenth century. In the trade -between Bagdad and Basra they enjoyed a practical monopoly. In the -absence of competition they were able to render indifferent service at -exorbitant rates, and there was nothing to disturb their tranquillity -except an occasional complaint from a British merchant. But the old -order was about to change. The Bagdad Railway concession of 1903 -(articles 9 and 23) destroyed the monopoly of the Lynch Brothers by -granting to the Railway Company limited rights of navigation on the -Tigris. Construction of the Mesopotamian sections of the Railway, -furthermore, would be almost certain to kill, by competition, -profitable navigation between Bagdad and Basra. The course of the -Tigris is shallow and winding, subject to heavy rises and falls, and -constantly changing with the formation and disappearance of sand -shoals. The river journey from Bagdad to Basra is about five hundred -miles and takes from four to five days by steamer, under favorable -conditions. The distance by land is about three hundred miles and -could be traversed by railway in a single day’s journey, regardless -of weather conditions. For passengers and most classes of freight the -Bagdad Railway promised more economical transportation. The Lynch -Brothers were determined, however, to resist such rude encroachment on -their profitable preserves. In defence of their interests they wrapped -themselves in the Union Jack and called upon their home government -for protection; they were patriotic to the last degree and were -determined “that the custody of a privilege highly important to British -commerce would never pass to Germany except over the dead bodies of -the principal partners.”[15] Overcharge their countrymen they might; -surrender this prerogative to a German railway they would not! - -British shipping interests, also, were vigorous in their opposition -to the Bagdad Railway. A trans-Mesopotamian railway, they knew, would -absorb some of the through traffic to the East, and the competition -of the locomotive might compel a general readjustment of freight -rates. Furthermore, it was one of the avowed purposes of the Bagdad -line to acquire the profitable Indian mails concession from the -British Government; this would be equivalent to the withdrawal of a -subsidy from the steamship lines operating to the East. It was not for -their own sake, but for the sake of British commerce, however, that -these shipping interests objected to the construction of the Bagdad -line! They warned the British public that the proposed railway would -adversely affect the traffic passing through the Suez Canal; inasmuch -as the United Kingdom was a stockholder in the Canal, this was the -concern of every English citizen. They pointed out that the kilometric -subsidy which had been guaranteed the Railway was to be paid from an -increase in the customs duties; thus, it was charged, British commerce -would be obliged to contribute indirectly to the dividends of the -_Deutsche Bank_. The improvement of communications between Middle -Europe and the Near East would be almost certain to disturb British -trade with Turkey; the feared and hated “Made in Germany” trade-mark -might exert its hypnotic influence in a region where British commerce -heretofore had been preëminent. If, in addition, the German owners -of the Bagdad Railway should choose to grant discriminatory rates -to German goods, a severe body-blow would be dealt British economic -interests in the Ottoman Empire. The completion of this Railway would -bring with it all sorts of German interference in the Near East and -undermine British commercial and maritime interests in the region.[16] - -Many of the charges brought against the Bagdad Railway by the British -shipping interests could not have been substantiated. As early as 1892, -Lord Curzon stated emphatically that, for most commercial purposes, a -trans-Mesopotamian railway would be next to valueless. “If I were a -stockholder in the P. & O. [the Peninsular and Oriental, one of the -Inchcape lines touching at Indian and Persian Gulf ports], I would -not,” he said, “except for the possible loss of the mails, be in the -least alarmed at the competition of such a railway.”[17] Informed -Germans, likewise, did not consider the Bagdad Railway a serious -competitor to the Suez Canal. One authority, for example, wrote: “The -Bagdad Railway taken as a whole is of importance only for through -passenger and postal traffic (in which respect, therefore, it is of -greatest value to the British in their communications with India) and -occasionally for fast freight. The great bulk of the freight traffic, -on the other hand, carrying the import and export trade of the East, -hardly can fall to the Bagdad Railway, which, for a long time at least, -must content itself with the local traffic of certain sections of the -line,” particularly in Cilicia, Syria, and northern Mesopotamia.[18] - -The assertion that the cost of constructing and operating the line -would be borne by British commerce was based upon specious reasoning. -Higher customs duties would not be paid by the British merchant, but -by the Turkish consumer. The only harmful effect of the increased -duties would be a general increase of prices of imported commodities -in Turkey, leading, perhaps, to a lesser demand for foreign goods. It -was probable, on the other hand, that this slight disadvantage would be -more than offset by the wider prosperity which the Railway was almost -certain to bring the districts traversed. In any event, whatever burden -might be saddled upon the import trade would have to be borne, in -proportion to the volume of business transacted, by the competitors of -British merchants as well as by British merchants themselves. - -Many British business men were shrewd enough to foresee that the Bagdad -Railway might prove to be far from disadvantageous to their interests. -Where was the menace to British prosperity in a railway, German or -otherwise, which promised improved communication with the British -colonies in the Orient? The facilitation of mail service to India; the -development of rapid passenger service to the East; the reduction of -ocean freight rates as a result of healthy competition—all of these -injured no one except the vested interests which had handicapped the -expansion of British commerce by inadequate service and exorbitant -rates. There was no indication that the Bagdad Railway Company -proposed to discriminate against non-German shippers; in any event, -such a course was specifically prohibited by the concession of 1903, -which decreed that “all rates, whether they be general, special, -proportional, or differential, are applicable to all travelers and -consignors without distinction,” and which prohibited the Company -“from entering into any special contract with the object of granting -reductions of the charges specified in the tariffs.”[19] As the British -Chamber of Commerce at Constantinople appropriately pointed out, the -most certain means of avoiding discriminatory treatment was to permit -and encourage the participation of British capital in the enterprise -and to assure the presence of British subjects on the Board of -Directors of the Company.[20] - -From an economic point of view, it would appear that the British -Empire had a great deal to gain from the construction of the Bagdad -Railway. In proportion as improved methods of transportation shrink the -earth’s surface, the contacts between mother country and dependencies -will become more numerous. An economic community of interest is more -likely to spring up and thrive with the aid of more numerous and -more rapid means of communication. True, certain interests believed -that the Bagdad Railway threatened their very existence. But would -the British people have been willing to sacrifice the wider economic -interests of the Empire to the vested privileges of a handful of -English capitalists? They would not, of course, if the issue had been -put to them in such simple terms. The problem was complicated by the -obvious fact that it was not alone the economic interests of the empire -which were at stake. The political import of the Bagdad enterprise -overshadowed all economic considerations. - - -IMPERIAL DEFENCE BECOMES THE PRIMARY CONCERN - -British journalists and statesmen, as well as the ordinary British -patriot, have been accustomed to judge international questions from -but one point of view—the promotion and protection of the interests of -that great and benevolent institution, “the noblest fabric yet reared -by the genius of a conquering nation,” the British Empire.[21] Imperial -considerations have been the determining factors in the formulation of -diplomatic policies and of naval and military strategy. The possession -of a far-flung empire has required further imperial conquests to insure -the defence of those already acquired. Strategic necessities have -constituted a “reason for making an empire large, and a large empire -larger.”[22] - -India, an empire in itself, is the keystone of the British imperial -system. To defend India it has been considered necessary for Great -Britain to possess herself of vital strategic points along the routes -of communication from the Atlantic seaboard to the Indian Ocean. The -acquisition of Cape Colony from the Dutch at the conclusion of the -Napoleonic Wars enabled the British fleet to dominate the old route to -India, around the Cape of Good Hope. Judiciously placed naval stations -at Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus assured the safety of British trade -with the East _via_ the Mediterranean. After a futile attempt to -prevent the construction of the Suez Canal, which temporarily placed -a new and shorter all-water route to India in the hands of the French, -Great Britain proceeded to acquire the Canal for herself. To assure -the protection of the Suez Canal, in turn, it was necessary to occupy -Egypt and the Sudan. Control of Somaliland and Aden, together with -friendly relations with Arabia, turned the Red Sea into a British lake. -Menaced by the Russian advance toward India, Great Britain proceeded -to dominate the entire Middle East: the foreign affairs of Afghanistan -were placed under British tutelage and protection; Baluchistan was -compelled to submit to the control of British agents; parts of Persia -were brought within the sphere of British influence.[23] - -Great Britain, apparently, was determined to control every -important route to India. What, then, would be her attitude toward -a trans-Mesopotamian railway, terminating at the only satisfactory -deep-water port on the Persian Gulf? Was the possession of such a -short-cut to India consistent with the exigencies of imperial defence? - -Without a satisfactory terminus on the Persian Gulf the Bagdad Railway -would lose its greatest possibilities as a great transcontinental -line; with such a terminus it might become a menace to vital British -interests in that region. British imperialists had been interested in -control of the Persian Gulf since the seventeenth century, when the -East India Company established trading posts along its shores. The -British navy cleared the Gulf of pirates; it buoyed and beaconed the -waters of the Gulf and the Shatt-el-Arab. A favorable treaty with the -Emir of Muscat, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, provided -Great Britain with a “sally port” from which to organize the defence -of the entrance to the Gulf; later, Muscat became a protectorate of -Great Britain. From time to time treaties were negotiated with the Arab -chieftains of southern Mesopotamia, extending British influence up -the Shatt-el-Arab and the Tigris and Euphrates to Bagdad. Under these -circumstances, it was apparent from the very beginning that, whether -or not the Balfour Government consented to British participation in -the Bagdad enterprise, there would be no surrender of the privileged -position enjoyed by Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. Foreign -merchants might be admitted to a share in the Gulf trade, but the -existence of a port under foreign control hardly could be approved.[24] - -Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking before -the House of Lords, on May 5, 1903, made the position of the Government -clear: “I do not yield to the noble Lord [Lord Ellenborough] in the -interest which I take in the Persian Gulf or in the feeling that this -country stands, with regard to the navigation of the Persian Gulf, in a -position different from that of any other power.... The noble Lord has -asked me for a statement of our policy with regard to the Persian Gulf. -I think I can give him one in a few simple words. It seems to me that -our policy should be directed in the first place to protect and promote -British trade in those waters. In the next place I do not think that -he suggests, or that we would suggest, that those efforts should be -directed towards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other powers. -In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the -establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian -Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, -and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. -I say that in no minatory spirit, because, as far as I am aware, no -proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in -the Persian Gulf.”[25] - -Lord Lansdowne might have reminded his hearers that, although the -British Government was disposed to be friendly toward the Bagdad -Railway, measures already had been taken which effectively precluded -any possibility of the construction by the concessionaires, without -British consent, of terminal and port works at Koweit. In 1899, -when the first announcements came from Constantinople regarding the -Bagdad project, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, became alarmed -at the construction of a railway which would link the head of the -Persian Gulf with the railways of Central Europe. Lord Curzon was a -trained imperialist. It was his custom to utter few words; to make no -proclamations from the housetops; to act promptly—and in secret. It -was at the instigation of the Indian Government that Colonel Meade, -British resident in the Persian Gulf region, proceeded to Koweit and -negotiated with the Sheik a clandestine agreement by which the latter -accepted the “protection” of the British Government and agreed to enter -into no international agreements without the consent of a British -resident adviser.[26] When a German technical commission visited Koweit -in 1900 to negotiate for terminal and port facilities, they found the -Sheik suspiciously intractable to their wishes. Thereupon Abdul Hamid -despatched an expedition to Koweit to assert his sovereignty over the -Sheik’s territory, but the presence of a British gunboat rendered both -reason and force of no avail.[27] - -“Protection” of Koweit by Great Britain served notice on both Turkey -and Germany that the construction of a railway, owned and controlled by -Germans, to a deep-water port on the Persian Gulf was deemed contrary -to the interests of the British Empire. From first to last British -officials persistently refused to accede to any arrangement which would -thus jeopardize imperial communications. Control of the Persian Gulf, -an outpost of Indian defence, became the keynote of British resistance -to the Bagdad Railway. - -During the visit of William II to England in 1907, he was informed by -Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, and other responsible British statesmen, -that their objections to the Bagdad enterprise would be removed if -the sections of the Railway from Bagdad to Basra and the Persian Gulf -were under the administration of British capitalists.[28] In March, -1911, shortly after the Kaiser and the Tsar had reached an agreement -at Potsdam on the Bagdad Railway question, Lord Curzon vigorously -denounced the enterprise as a blow at the heart of Britain’s empire in -India and called upon the Foreign Office to persist in its policy of -blocking construction of the final sections of the line.[29] This was -in accord with a caustic criticism of German and Russian activities in -the Near East, delivered by Mr. Lloyd George to the House of Commons, -during which the future Premier made it plain that, whatever course -Russia might pursue, Great Britain would not compromise her vital -imperial interests in the region of the Persian Gulf.[30] The German -concessionaires learned, to their disappointment and chagrin, that, -on this point, in any event, the British Government stood firm. Even -in 1914, when an international agreement was reached permitting the -construction of the Bagdad Railway, Great Britain subscribed to the -arrangement with the express proviso that the terminus of the line -should be Basra and that the port to be constructed at Basra should -be jointly owned and controlled by German and British capitalists. -Construction of the line beyond Basra was not to be undertaken without -the permission of the British Government.[31] - -Although fear of foreign interference in the Persian Gulf region -was the chief political objection raised by Great Britain to the -construction of the Bagdad Railway, it was supplemented by a number -of other objections—all associated, directly or indirectly, with the -defence of India. The Bagdad Railway concession of 1903 provided for -the construction of a branch line from Bagdad to Khanikin, on the -Turco-Persian border. This proposed railway not only would compete -with the British caravan trade between these cities, amounting to -about three-quarters of a million pounds sterling annually, but would, -perhaps, lead to the introduction into the Persian imbroglio of the -influence of another Great Power. Persia lay astride one of the natural -routes of communication to India. The uncertainty of the situation in -Persia already was such as to cause grave concern in Great Britain, -and there were few British statesmen who would have welcomed German -interference in addition to Russian intrigue.[32] - -British imperialists, too, had excellent reason to fear that any -increase in the power of the Sultan, such as would be certain to -follow the construction of adequate rail communications in the Ottoman -Empire, might be but the first step in a renaissance of Mohammedan -political ambitions, and, perhaps, a Moslem uprising everywhere against -Christian overlords. Such a situation—had it been sufficiently matured -before the outbreak of the War of 1914—might have been disastrous to -the British position in the East: a rejuvenated Turkey, supported by -a powerful Germany, might have been in a position to menace the Suez -Canal, “the spinal cord of the Empire,” and to lend assistance to -seditious uprisings in Egypt, India, and the Middle East. Why should -Britain not have been disturbed at such a prospect, when prominent -German publicists were boastfully announcing that this was one of the -principal reasons for official espousal of the _Bagdadbahn_?[33] Why -should British statesmen have closed their eyes to such a possibility, -when the recognized parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party -in Germany warned the members of the Reichstag that limits must be -placed upon the political ramifications of the Bagdad enterprise, lest -it lead to a disastrous war with Great Britain?[34] - -Furthermore, British statesmen were too intimately acquainted with -the dynamics of capitalistic imperialism to accept the assurances -of Germans that the Bagdad Railway, and other German enterprises in -Turkey, were business propositions only. They knew that promises to -respect the sovereignty of the Sultan were courteous formalities of -European diplomatists to cloak scandalous irregularities—it was in -full recognition of the sacred and inviolable integrity of Turkey that -Disraeli had taken possession and assumed the “defence” of Cyprus -in 1878! Furthermore, experienced imperialists knew full well that -economic penetration was the foundation of political control. As Mr. -Lloyd George informed the House of Commons in 1911, the kilometric -guarantee of the Bagdad Railway gave German bankers a firm grip on the -public treasury in Turkey, and such a hold on the imperial Ottoman -purse-strings might lead no one could prophesy where.[35] - -British experience in Egypt, however, indicated one direction in which -it might possibly lead. English control in Egypt had been acquired by -the most modern and approved imperial methods. It was no old-fashioned -conquest; the procedure was much more subtle than that. First, Egypt -was weighted down by a great burden of debt to British capitalists; -then British business men and investors acquired numerous privileges -and intrenched themselves in their special position by virtue of the -Anglo-French control of Egyptian finance; the “advice” of British -diplomatists came to possess greater force of law than the edicts -of the Khedive; “disorders” always could be counted upon to furnish -an excuse for military conquest and annexation, should that crude -procedure eventually become necessary.[36] Might not _Wilhelmstrasse_ -tear a leaf out of Downing Street’s book of imperial experience? - -There is a seeming inconsistency in this description of the British -interests involved in the Bagdad Railway question. If British shipping -might be seriously injured, if the imperial communications were to be -endangered, if undisputed control of the Persian Gulf was essential -to the safety of the Empire, if the defence of India was to be -jeopardized, if a German protectorate might be established in Asia -Minor—if all these were possibilities, how could the Balfour Government -afford to temporize with the German concessionaires, holding out -the hope of British assistance? Were Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne -less fearful for the welfare and safety of the Empire than were the -newspaper editors? Rather, of course, were they convinced that the -very best way of forestalling any of these developments was to permit -and encourage British participation in the financing of the Bagdad -Railway Company.[37] Only thus could British trade hope to share in -the economic renaissance of the Ottoman Empire; only thus could there -be British representatives on the Board of Directors to insist that -the _Deutsche Bank_ confine its efforts to the economic development -of Turkey, excluding all political _arrières pensées_. And it would -not have required an imperialist of the experience of Mr. Balfour to -imagine that dual ownership of the Bagdad Railway might have the same -ultimate outcome as the Dual Control in Egypt. But blind antagonism -toward Germany prevented the average Englishman from seeing the obvious -advantages of not abandoning the Bagdad Railway to the exclusive -control of German and French capitalists. - - -BRITISH RESISTANCE IS STIFFENED BY THE ENTENTE - -One year after the failure of the Bagdad Railway negotiations of -1903, the age-old colonial rivalry of France and Great Britain was -brought to a temporary close by the _Entente Cordiale_. It is not -possible, with the information now at our disposal, to estimate with -any degree of accuracy the influence which the Bagdad Railway exerted -upon British imperialists in the final determination to reach an -agreement with France. One may agree with an eminent French authority, -however, that “neither in England nor in France is the principle of the -understanding to be sought. Rather was it the fear of Germany which -determined England—not only her King and Government, but the whole of -her people—to draw nearer France.”[38] British fear and dislike of -Germany were founded upon the phenomenal growth of German industry and -overseas commerce, the rapid expansion of the German mercantile marine, -the construction of the German navy, and the insistence of German -diplomatists that Germany be not ignored in colonial matters. The -Bagdad Railway did nothing to quiet those fears. It served, rather, to -render precarious Britain’s position in the East. - -In March, 1903, when the definitive Bagdad Railway concession was -granted, British imperial affairs were in a far from satisfactory -state. The termination of the Boer War had ended the fear that the -British Empire might lose its hold on South Africa, but the sharp -criticism of British conduct toward the Boers—criticism which came -not only from abroad, but from malcontents at home—had dealt a severe -blow to British prestige. The relentless advance of Russia in China, -Persia, and Afghanistan gave cause for anxiety as to the safety of -Britain’s possessions in the Middle and Far East. And although France -had withdrawn gracefully from the Fashoda affair, it was by no means -certain that Egypt had seen the last of French interference. Added -to all of these difficulties was the proposed German-owned railway -from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, flanking the Suez Canal and -reaching out to the back door of India. - -Under such circumstances it was small wonder that Great Britain took -stock of her foreign policies. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 -already had ended the British policy of aloofness, and there appeared -to be no sound reason against the negotiation of other treaties -which similarly would strengthen the British position in the East. -The Bagdad Railway negotiations collapsed, but the agreement with -France—which seemed far more difficult of achievement—was consummated -without further delay. Three years later, in 1907, Great Britain -came to an agreement with another of her rivals in the East—Russia. -The Tsar, chastened by military defeat abroad and by revolution at -home, recognized a British sphere of interest in Persia, relinquished -all claims in Afghanistan, and acknowledged the suzerainty of China -over Tibet.[39] The understanding with France had assured the safety -of the Suez Canal from an attack from the Sudan; the agreement with -Russia removed the menace of an attack upon India from the north and -northwest. Germany became Great Britain’s only formidable rival in the -Near East. - -Thus the Germans found themselves facing a powerful diplomatic -obstacle to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Here was another -instance, in their minds, of the “encirclement” of Germany by a hostile -coalition—an “encirclement” not only on the Continent, but in a German -sphere of imperial interest as well. A conspicuous German Oriental -scholar said that the attitude of the other European powers toward -the Bagdad Railway was the best proof of their enmity toward Germany. -“Every single kilometre had to be fought for against the unyielding -opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and France, who desired to -frustrate any increase in the power of Turkey. Great Britain led and -organized this opposition because she feared that India and Egypt -were threatened by the Bagdad Railway.” If one wishes to understand -the diplomatic history of the War, “he needs only to study the -struggle for the Bagdad Railway—he will find a laboratory full of rich -materials.”[40] Here was the tragedy of the Bagdad Railway—it was -one of a number of imperial enterprises which together constituted a -principal cause of the greatest war of modern times! - -There were some ardent British imperialists who were out of sympathy -with the popular opposition to the Bagdad Railway and with the -policy of the _Entente_ in obstructing the building of the line. Few -Englishmen were more thoroughly acquainted with the Near East than -Sir William Willcocks.[41] Basing his opinions upon an intimate, -scientific study of conditions in Mesopotamia, he advocated full -British coöperation with the _Deutsche Bank_ in the construction -of the Bagdad Railway, which he considered was the best means of -transportation for Irak. He criticized the British Government for its -short-sighted policy in the protection of the Lynch Brothers and their -antiquated river service; “rivers,” he said, “are for irrigation, -railways for communications.” Furthermore, “You cannot leave the waters -of the rivers in their channels and irrigate the country with them. -For navigation you may substitute railway transport; for the purpose -of irrigation nothing can take the place of water.”[42] He believed -that adequate irrigation of the Mesopotamian Valley would result -in such a wave of prosperity for the country that it would induce -immigration, particularly from Egypt and British India. It was not -inconceivable, under such conditions, that Britain would fall heir to -ancient Mesopotamia when the Ottoman Empire should disintegrate.[43] -Sir William Willcocks was neither pacifist nor visionary; he, himself, -was an empire-builder. - -Another British imperialist who believed that Great Britain was -pursuing entirely the wrong course in obstructing German economic -penetration in Turkey was Sir Harry Johnston, novelist, explorer, -lecturer, former member of the consular service. He believed in “The -White Man’s Burden,” in the inevitable overrunning of the habitable -globe by the Caucasian race. But he believed that the task of spreading -white civilization to the four corners of the earth was such an -herculean task, that “what we white peoples ought to strive for, with -speech and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all the -world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. We ought to -adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict.” His program -for the settlement of the Near Eastern question was: “the promotion of -peace and goodwill among white nations, to start with; and when the -ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence have been nicely -adjusted, then to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is -carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical, and sympathetic -fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity.” Sir -Harry believed that Great Britain was the last country in the world -which ought to oppose the legitimate colonial aspirations of any other -nation. There was every reason for the recognition of the economic and -moral bases of German expansion, and any dog-in-the-manger attitude on -the part of British statesmen, he was sure, would defeat the highest -interests of the Empire.[44] - -Applying his principles to the problem of Teutonic aggrandizement in -the Ottoman Empire, Sir Harry Johnston advocated that the western -European nations should acknowledge the Austrian _Drang nach Osten_ -as a legitimate and essential part of the German plans for a Central -European Federation and for the economic development of Turkey. -“The Turkish Sultanate would possibly not come to an end, but would -henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German -councils. Germany in fact would become the power with the principal -‘say’ as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. -Syria might be constituted as a separate state under French protection, -and Judea might be offered to the Jews under an international -guarantee. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, -and Arabia (except the southern portion, which already lies within the -British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent -Arab States. For the rest, Turkey-in-Asia—less Armenia, which might -be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt -is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps -transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan -Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both -Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, prosperous, -busy, and happy, for at least a century ahead.” Sir Harry believed -that obstructionist tactics on the part of Great Britain would promote -Prussianism within Germany, whereas, on the other hand, a frank -recognition of Germany’s claims in the Near East would provide Central -Europe with a safety valve which would “relieve pressure on France, -Belgium, and Russia, paving the way for an understanding on Continental -questions. Let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome German expansion -with Kruger’s metaphor of the tortoise putting out his head. Germany -and Austria are dangerous to the peace of the world only so long as -they are penned up in their present limits.”[45] - -One obvious disadvantage of the solution suggested by Sir Harry -Johnston was its total indifference to the wishes of the Ottoman Turks. -Apparently it was out of place to consider the welfare of Turkey in -a discussion of the Bagdad Railway question! Certainly there were -very few European statesmen who cared the least about the opinions -of Turks in the disposition of Turkish property. Among the few was -Viscount Morley, one of the old Gladstonian Liberals. Answering Lord -Curzon, in the House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Lord Morley, a member -of the Asquith cabinet, asserted the right of the Turks to determine -their own destinies: “A great deal of nonsense,” he said, “is talked -about the possible danger to British interests which may be involved -some day or other when this railway is completed, and there have been -whimsical apprehensions expressed. One is that it will constitute a -standing menace to Egypt ... because it would establish [by junction -with the Syrian and Hedjaz railways] uninterrupted communication -between the Bosporus and Western Arabia. _That would hardly be an -argument for Turkey to abandon railway construction on her own soil_, -whereas it overlooks the fact that the Sinai Peninsula intervenes. You -cannot get over this plain cardinal fact, that this railway is made on -Turkish territory by virtue of an instrument granted by the Turkish -Government.... I see articles in newspapers every day in which it is -assumed that we have the right there to do what we please. That is not -so. It is not our soil, it is Turkish soil, and the Germans alone are -there because the Turkish Government has given them the right to be -there.”[46] - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Sir William Andrew, _Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route_ (London, -1857), _passim_; also _The Euphrates Valley Route to India_ (London, -1882); F. R. Chesney, _Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition_ (London, -1868); _The Proposed Imperial Ottoman Railway_, a prospectus issued by -the promoters (London, 1857); F. von Koeppen, _Moltke in Kleinasien_ -(Hanover, 1883). - -[2] _Cf._ article “Suez Canal” in _Encyclopedia Britannica_, Volume -26, p. 23. How similar were these objections to those subsequently -advanced in opposition to the Bagdad Railway! _Cf._, _e. g._, a -statement by Lord Curzon, _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, fifth -series_, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583 _et seq._ - -[3] Andrew, _Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route_, p. 225. - -[4] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume 121 -(1903), p. 1345; “The Bagdad Railway Negotiations,” in _The Quarterly -Review_, Volume 228 (1917), pp. 489–490; Baron Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld, -_The Strategical Importance of the Euphrates Valley Railway_ (English -translation by Sir C. W. Wilson, London, 1873); V. L. Cameron, _Our -Future Highway to India_, 2 volumes (London, 1880); A. Bérard, _La -route de l’Inde par la vallée du Tigre et de l’Euphrate_ (Lyons, 1887); -F. Jones, _The Direct Highway to the East considered as the Perfection -of Great Britain’s duties toward British India_ (London, 1873). - -[5] _Supra_, pp. 66–67. - -[6] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 120 (1903), pp. -1247–1248, 1358, 1361, 1364–1367, 1371–1374. - -[7] Lord Mount Stephen had been president of the Canadian Pacific -Railway and of the Bank of Montreal. Lord Revelstoke was senior partner -in the firm of Baring Brothers & Company and a director of the Bank of -England. - -[8] The participation of the three Great Powers was to be on the -basis of 25–25–25%, 15% was to be reserved for minor groups, and 10% -for the Anatolian Railway Company. The provisions of Article 12 of -the concession of 1903 were to be amended to establish a board of -directors of 30, upon which each of the principal participants should -be represented by 8 members. The remaining 6 members of the board were -to be designated by the Ottoman Government and the Anatolian Railway -Company. The directors were to be appointed by the original subscribers -so that sale or transfer of shares could not alter the proportionate -representation thus agreed upon. - -[9] For the facts in this and the succeeding paragraph the author is -indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, managing director of the _Deutsche -Bank_; and to Sir Henry Babington Smith, erstwhile chairman of the -Ottoman Public Debt Administration, a partner of Sir Ernest Cassel, -president of the National Bank of Turkey, and a director of the Bank of -England. Dr. von Gwinner placed at the disposal of the author many of -the records of the _Deutsche Bank_ and of the Bagdad Railway Company, -and Sir Henry Babington Smith graciously volunteered to answer many -puzzling questions. - -[10] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 121 (1903), pp. -271–272. - -[11] The British banking houses interested in the Bagdad enterprise -were Baring Brothers, Sir Ernest Cassel, and Morgan-Grenfell Company. -_Cf._ _The Westminster Gazette_, April 24, 1903; _Stenographische -Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), p. -2181d. The bankers, of course, were not bound by the decision of the -Cabinet to withdraw from the negotiations; they still would have been -at liberty to invest in Bagdad Railway securities, as did the French -bankers. However, it has been the practice of British financiers -to accept the “advice” of the Foreign Office in the case of loans -which may lead to international complications. An analogous case in -American experience was the decision of prominent New York financial -institutions to withdraw from the Chinese consortium in 1913 because -of the avowed opposition of President Wilson to the terms of the loan -contract. - -[12] _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1090–1091. - -[13] _Supra_, pp. 30, 59–60. - -[14] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 120, pp. -1360–1361; Volume 126, p. 108. The opinions of Mr. Gibson Bowles were -not cordially received by _The Scotsman_, which said, April 9, 1903, -“Mr. Gibson Bowles carried the House in imagination to the banks of the -Euphrates and Tigris. Germany is there seeking by means of a railway to -supersede our trade, and to serve herself heir to the wealth and empire -of ancient Babylon and Assyria. The member for King’s Lynn was, as -usual, not very well posted up on his facts. On this occasion he was so -entirely wrong-headed that no one on the opposition bench would agree -with him.... The outstanding moral of the debate was, indeed, that the -honorable member for King’s Lynn was much in want of a holiday.” - -[15] Fraser, _op. cit._, pp. 42–43. The senior member of the firm of -Lynch Brothers was H. F. B. Lynch (1862–1913), who was widely known -as an authority on the Near East and who, as a Liberal member of -Parliament, 1906–1910, was able to call official attention to the -necessity for safeguarding British interests in Persia and Mesopotamia. -That he succeeded in convincing the Government of the importance -of his navigation concession is evidenced by the vigorous protests -filed by the British Government with the Young Turks in 1909, when -the latter attempted to operate competing vessels on the Tigris and -the Shatt-el-Arab. On this point see _Stenographische Berichte, XII -Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), pp. 2174d _et seq._ -Again in 1913–1914, the British Government refused to consider any -settlement of the Bagdad Railway question which did not adequately -protect the interests of the Lynch Brothers. _Infra_, pp. 258–265. Mr. -Lynch, however, was not an irreconcilable opponent of the _Deutsche -Bank_. He took the point of view that the Germans had rendered Turkey -a great service by the construction of the Anatolian Railways because -of the total lack of natural means of communication in the Anatolian -plateau. He urged that they were making a great mistake, however, to -extend the Anatolian system into Mesopotamia, where the Tigris and -Euphrates provided natural and logical avenues of trade for the Valley -of the Two Rivers. In Mesopotamia, he maintained, what was needed was -a development of the river traffic, not the construction of railways. -_Cf._ H. F. B. Lynch, “The Bagdad Railway,” _Fortnightly Review_, March -1, 1911, pp. 384–386. - -[16] It will be recalled that the Hamburg-American Line established -a Persian Gulf service in 1906. _Supra_, pp. 108–109. Regarding the -activities of British shipping and commercial interests in opposing the -Bagdad Railway see _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 2950 (1902), -pp. 25 _et seq._, No. 3140 (1904), pp. 24 _et seq._; _The Times_, April -24, 1903. - -[17] G. N. Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_ (2 volumes, -London, 1892), Volume I, p. 635; a similar view was set forth by Sir -Thomas Sutherland, of the P. & O., in a letter to _The Times_, April -27, 1903. - -[18] E. Banse, _Auf den Spuren der Bagdadbahn_ (Weimar, 1913), Chapter -XI, _Die Wahrheit über die Bagdadbahn_, a critical analysis of the -value of the Railway in Eastern trade, pp. 145–146. _Cf._, also, -Dr. R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des Suez- und des -Bagdad-Weges,” in _Geographische Zeitschrift_, Volume 22 (1916), pp. -649–656. - -[19] _Specifications_, Articles 24–25. It might be added that the -Company loyally observed this restriction; C. W. Whittall & Co., -largest British merchants in Turkey so testified. _Anatolia_, p. 103; -von Gwinner, _loc. cit._, p. 1090. Sir Edward Grey said no complaints -of discrimination against British goods had come to the attention -of the Foreign Office. _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons,_ 5 -Series, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–393. - -[20] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140, p. 30. - -[21] Consider the dedication of Lord Curzon’s _Persia and the Persian -Question_: “To the officials, military and civil, in India, whose hands -uphold the noblest fabric yet reared by the genius of a conquering -nation, I dedicate this work, the unworthy tribute of the pen to a -cause, which by justice or the sword, it is their high mission to -defend, but whose ultimate safeguard is the spirit of the British -people.” - -[22] Woolf, _op. cit._, p. 24. - -[23] Regarding the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, _cf._ -Rose, _op. cit._, Part II, Chapters I-IV; Curzon, _Persia and the -Persian Question_, Volume II, Chapter XXX. - -[24] See a statement by Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, -_Parliamentary Debates_, fourth series, Volume 121 (1903), p. 1347, and -a statement by Lord Curzon, _ibid._, fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), -pp. 583–587; also Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume -II, Chapter XXVII. The strategic importance of the Persian Gulf to the -British Empire was realized by foreign observers, as well as by English -statesmen. Writing in 1902, Admiral A. T. Mahan, an American, said, -“The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign state of considerable -naval potentiality, a ‘fleet in being’ there based upon a strong -military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, -and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to -the farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually -internal to the Empire, regarded as a political system; and although -at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet, so -placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment -large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval -position.” A. T. Mahan, _Retrospect and Prospect_ (New York, 1902), -pp. 224–225. Lord Curzon is said to have remarked that he “would not -hesitate to indict as a traitor to his country any British minister who -would consent to a foreign Power establishing a station on the Persian -Gulf.” A. J. Dunn, _British Interests in the Persian Gulf_ (London, -1907), p. 7. See also _The Persian Gulf_ (No. 76 of the Foreign Office -Handbooks); _Handbook of Arabia_, Volume I (Admiralty Intelligence -Division, London, 1916); Lovat Fraser, _India under Curzon and After_ -(London, 1911). - -[25] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fourth series, Volume -121 (1903), pp. 1347–1348. Two observations should be made regarding -this quotation. First, it is included in every book I have consulted -on the Bagdad Railway, written since 1903, but in every instance the -last sentence has been omitted—a sentence which considerably alters -the spirit of the statement. Second, the German press, at the time, -considered that the warning was directed, not at the Bagdad Railway, -but at the rapid and alarming advance of Russia in Persia. _Cf._ an -analysis of foreign press comments in an article by J. I. de La Tour, -“Le chemin de fer de Bagdad et l’opinion anglaise,” in _Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 609–614—an -excellent digest. - -[26] _Cf._ a statement by Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary of State -for Foreign Affairs, in _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, -fourth series, Volume 101 (1902), p. 129. Although he was less than -forty years of age at the time of his appointment as Governor-General -of India (1898), the Right Honorable George Nathaniel Curzon, Baron -Curzon of Kedleston, even at that early age, had had wide experience -and training of the type so common among the masters of British -imperial destiny. He was educated at Eton and Oxford, and he traveled -widely in the Near East. He served as a member of Parliament from 1886 -until 1898. He was Under-Secretary of State for India, 1891–1892; -Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1895–1898; Privy -Councillor, 1895. - -[27] _Supra_, p. 34; _The Annual Register_, 1901, pp. 304–305; K. -Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 129. - -[28] Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London, 1920), pp. 48–51; -Viscount Morley, _Recollections_ (New York, 1917), p. 238. - -[29] _Infra_, pp. 239–244; _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, -fifth series, Volume 7 (1911), pp. 583–587, 589. It is interesting to -contrast this opinion of a German trans-Mesopotamian railway with that -held by the same man when it was proposed that British capitalists -should construct such a line. Writing in 1892, Lord Curzon had this to -say regarding the project: “Its superficial attractions judiciously -dressed up in a garb of patriotism, were such as to allure many -minds; and I confess to having felt, without ever having succumbed -to, the fascination. Closer study, however, and a visit to Syria and -Mesopotamia have convinced me both that the project is unsound, and -that it does not, for the present, at any rate, lie within the domain -of practical politics.” Lord Curzon believed that a Mesopotamian -railway would be practically valueless for military purposes: “The -temperature of these sandy wastes is excessively torrid and trying -during the summer months and I decline to believe that during half the -year any general in the world would consent to pack his soldiers into -third class carriages for conveyance across those terrible thousand -miles, at least if he anticipated using them in any other capacity than -as hospital inmates at the end.” _Persia and the Persian Question_, -Volume I, pp. 633–635. - -[30] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 -(1911), pp. 241–242. - -[31] _Infra_, pp. 258–265. - -[32] For the views of a typical British imperialist on the Persian -situation, _cf._, Curzon, _Persia and the Persian Question_, Volume -II, Chapter XXX; a later account is that of the American, W. Morgan -Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912); _cf._, also, H. -F. B. Lynch, “Railways in the Middle East,” in _Proceedings of the -Central Asian Society_ (London), March 1, 1911. - -[33] See P. Rohrbach, _Die Bagdadbahn_, p. 18; Reventlow, _op. cit._, -pp. 338–343. That Rohrbach’s frank avowal of the menace of the Bagdad -Railway to India and Egypt was not without influence in Great Britain -is evidenced by the fact that long quotations from _Die Bagdadbahn_ -were read into the records of the House of Commons by the Earl of -Ronaldshay, on March 23, 1911. _Parliamentary Debates_, fifth series, -Volume 23, p. 628. - -[34] Herr Scheidemann, in an eloquent speech to the Reichstag, March -30, 1911, pleaded with the German Government to be sympathetic with -the position in which Great Britain found herself. No nation with the -imperial responsibilities of Great Britain could afford to neglect to -take precautionary steps against the possibility of the Bagdad Railway -being used as a weapon of offense against Egypt, the Suez Canal, and -India. “Complications upon complications,” he said, “are certain to -arise as a result of the construction of the Bagdad Railway. But -we expect of our Government, at the very least, that in the course -of protecting the legitimate German economic interests which are -involved in the Bagdad Railway, it will leave no stone unturned to -prevent the development of Anglo-German hostility over the matter. -We want to do everything possible to effect a thorough understanding -with England. Only by such a policy can we hope to quiet the fears -of British imperialists that the Railway is a menace to the Empire.” -_Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume -266 (1911), pp. 5980c-5984b. - -[35] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 -(1911), pp. 241–242. - -[36] _Cf._ H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, Chapter III, -“The Egyptian Model.” - -[37] _Supra_, pp. 181–182. - -[38] André Tardieu, _France and the Alliances_ (New York, 1908), p. 46. -For M. Tardieu’s analysis of the causes of the growing Anglo-German -hostility, _cf._ pp. 48–57. It was in the latter part of April, 1903, -that the Bagdad Railway negotiations fell through. In May, Edward VII -paid an official visit to Paris; in October, an arbitration agreement -was signed by France and Great Britain. The following spring the -treaties constituting the Entente Cordiale were executed. Sir Thomas -Barclay, _Thirty Years’ Reminiscences_ (London, 1906), pp. 175 _et -seq._ For the text of these agreements _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_, -Volume 103 (1905), No. Cd. 2384. - -[39] For the text of the Anglo-Russian Entente, _cf._ _British and -Foreign State Papers_, Volume 100, pp. 555 _et seq._ Regarding the -nature of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East and the effect -of the Bagdad Railway in hastening a settlement of that rivalry, _cf._ -Edouard Driault, _La question d’Orient depuis ses origines jusqu’à la -paix de Sèvres_ (Paris, 1921), Chapter VIII, and pp. 273 _et seq._; -also Tardieu, _op. cit._, pp. 239–252, and Curzon, _op. cit._, Volume -II, Chapter XXX. - -[40] Ernst Jäckh, _Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft_ -(Stuttgart, 1915), pp. 17–18. - -[41] Sir William Willcocks (1852- ) is one of the foremost authorities -on Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia. As a young man he was employed in -India by the Department of Public Works and for a period of eleven -years, 1872–1883, was engaged in the construction of the famous -irrigation works there. From 1883–1893, he was employed in a similar -capacity by the Egyptian Public Works and was largely responsible for -the development of irrigation in the Nile Valley. In 1898, he planned -and projected the Assuan Dam, which turned out to be the greatest -irrigation work in the East. In 1909, Sir William Willcocks became -consulting engineer to the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, and was -responsible for the construction, 1911–1913, by the British firm of Sir -John Jackson, Ltd., of the famous Hindie barrage, the first step in the -irrigation of the Valley of the Two Rivers. - -[42] _Mesopotamia_, p. 54, and _The Geographical Journal_, August, 1912. - -[43] _The Recreation of Chaldea_ (Cairo, 1902). This suggestion led -to the absurd charge by Dr. Rohrbach that Sir William Willcocks was -actively promoting the establishment of a British colonial empire in -southern Mesopotamia. _German World Policies_, pp. 160–161. _Cf._, -also, _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (1903), p. 27. - -[44] H. H. Johnston, _Common Sense in Foreign Policy_ (London, 1913), -pp. v-vii. A similar opinion was expressed by Colonel A. C. Yate, at -a meeting of the Central Asian Society, May 22, 1911. In answer to an -alarmist paper on the Bagdad Railway which had been read to the society -by André Chéradame, Colonel Yate made a spirited speech in which he -warned his countrymen that M. Chéradame proposed that they should -follow the same mistaken policy which had guided Lord Palmerston in -resistance to the construction of the Suez Canal. “We cannot pick up -every day,” he said, “a Lord Beaconsfield, who will repair the errors -of his blundering predecessors.... Because the German Emperor and his -instruments have adopted and put into practice the plans which Great -Britain rejected [for a trans-Mesopotamian railway], we are now, -forsooth, to pursue a policy which savours partly of ‘sour grapes’ -and partly of ‘dog-in-the-manger,’ and which in either aspect will do -nothing to strengthen British hands and promote British interests.” -_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_ (London), May 22, 1911, p. -19. - -[45] Johnston, _op. cit._, pp. 50–51, 61. Sir Harry Johnston made an -extended lecture tour through Germany during 1912 for the purpose -of promoting Anglo-German friendship. For details of this trip see -Schmitt, _op. cit._, pp. 355–356. It is interesting to note how nearly -Sir Harry’s proposals corresponded with the terms of the treaties of -1913–1914. _Infra_, Chapter X. For a similar point of view, _cf._ -Angus Hamilton, _Problems of the Middle East_ (London, 1909), pp. -178–180. - -[46] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords_, fifth series, Volume 7 -(1911), pp. 601–602. The italics are mine. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -THE YOUNG TURKS ARE WON OVER - - -A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF TO THE ENTENTE POWERS - -The Young Turk revolutions of 1908 and 1909, which ended the reign of -Abdul Hamid in the Ottoman Empire, offered France and Great Britain an -unprecedented opportunity to assume moral and political leadership in -the Near East. Many members of the Committee of Union and Progress, -the revolutionary party, had been educated in western European -universities—chiefly in Paris—and had come to be staunch admirers of -French and English institutions. “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” -the slogan of Republican France, became the watch-cry of the new era -in Turkey. Parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility -under a constitutional monarch, the political contribution of -Britain to Western civilization, became the aim of the reformers at -Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire was to be modernized politically, -industrially, and socially according to the best of western European -traditions.[1] - -Into this scheme of things German influence fitted not at all. From -the Young Turk point of view the Kaiser was an autocrat who not only -had blocked democratic reform in Germany, but also had propped up -the tottering regime of Abdul Hamid and thus had aided suppression -of liberalism in the Ottoman Empire. As for Baron Marschall von -Bieberstein, he had hobnobbed with the ex-Sultan and was considered -as much a representative of the old order of things as Abdul Hamid -himself. As Dr. Rohrbach described the situation, “the Young Turks, -liberals of every shade, believed that Germany had been a staunch -supporter of Abdul Hamid’s tyrannical government and that the German -influence constituted a decided danger for the era of liberalism. That -thought was zealously supported by the English and French press in -Constantinople. The Young Turkish liberalism showed in the beginning a -decided leaning toward a certain form of Anglomania. England, the home -of liberty, of parliaments, of popular government—such were the catch -phrases promulgated in the daily papers.”[2] - -German prestige suffered still further because of the unseemly -conduct of Germany’s allies toward the Young Turk Government. The -revolution of 1908 was less than three months old when Austria-Hungary -annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Almost simultaneously, Ferdinand of -Bulgaria—presumably at the instigation and with the connivance of -Austria—declared the independence of Bulgaria from the Sultan and -assumed for himself the title of tsar. To cap the climax, Italy was -intriguing in Tripoli and Cyrenaica with a view to the eventual seizure -of those provinces. Baron Marschall found it impossible to explain -away these hostile moves of the allies of Germany, and he protested -vehemently against the failure of the Foreign Office at Berlin to -restrain Austria-Hungary and Italy. He warned Prince von Bülow that -vigorous action must be taken if Germany’s influence in the Near East -were not to be totally destroyed.[3] - -The decline of German prestige at Constantinople could not have been -without effect upon the Bagdad Railway and the other activities of the -_Deutsche Bank_. The Bagdad enterprise, in fact, was looked upon as a -concrete manifestation of German hegemony at the Sublime Porte and as -the crowning achievement of the friendship of those two autocrats of -the autocrats, Abdul Hamid and William II. As such, it was certain to -draw the fire of the reformers. The concession of 1903 had never been -published in Turkey. Only fifty copies had been printed, and these had -been distributed only among high officials of the Palace, the Sublime -Porte, and the Ministries of War, Marine, and Public Works. It was -generally supposed by the Union and Progress party, therefore, that -the summaries published in the European press were limited to what -the Sultan chose to make public. “The secrecy which thus enveloped -the Bagdad Railway concession gave rise to the conviction that the -contract contained, apart from detrimental financial and economic -clauses, provisions which endangered the political independence of -the State.”[4] And Young Turks were determined to tolerate no such -additional limitations on the sovereignty of their country. - -The opening, in the autumn of 1908, of the first parliament under -the constitutional regime in Turkey gave the opponents of the Bagdad -Railway their chance. A bitter attack on the project—in which hardly a -single provision of the contract of 1903 escaped scathing criticism—was -delivered by Ismail Hakki Bey, representative from Bagdad, editor of -foreign affairs for a well-known reform journal, and a prominent member -of the Union and Progress party. Hakki Bey denounced the Railway as a -political and economic monstrosity which could have been possible only -under an autocratic and corrupt government; in any event, he believed, -it could have no place in the New Turkey. He proposed complete -repudiation of the existing contracts with the _Deutsche Bank_. In this -proposal he received considerable support from other members of the -parliament. - -An equally ringing, but more reasoned, speech was delivered by the -talented Djavid Bey, subsequently to become Young Turk Minister of -Finance. He agreed that the concession of 1903 infringed upon the -economic and administrative independence of the Ottoman Empire; he -condemned the scheme of kilometric guarantees as an unwarranted and -indefensible drain upon the Treasury; he denounced the preponderance -of strategic over business considerations in the construction of the -line; he made it plain that he had no wish to see the extension of -German influence in Turkey. He believed that the Bagdad concession -should be revised in the interest of Ottoman finance and Ottoman -sovereignty. But there must be no repudiation. “We must accept the -Bagdad Railway contract, because there should exist a continuity and -a solidarity between generations and governments. If a revolutionary -government remains true to the obligations of its predecessor—even if -those obligations be contracted by a government of the worst and most -despotic kind—it will arouse among foreigners admiration of the moral -sense of the nation and will accordingly increase public confidence. -Just now, more than at any other time in our history, we Turks need -the confidence of the world.” Everything should be done to effect a -revision of the Bagdad Railway concession, however, and a firm resolve -should be taken never again to commit the nation to such an engagement. - -The anti-German and pro-Entente proclivities of the Young Turks were -expressed in tangible ways. In 1909, for example, the Ottoman Navy was -placed under the virtual command of a British admiral, and British -officers continued to exercise comprehensive powers of administration -over the ships and yards almost to the declaration of war in 1914. -In 1909, also, Sir Ernest Cassel accepted an invitation to establish -the National Bank of Turkey, for the purpose of promoting more -generous investment of British capital in the Ottoman Empire. During -the same year Sir William Willcocks was appointed consulting engineer -to the Minister of Public Works, and his plans for the irrigation -of Mesopotamia were put into immediate operation. Sir Richard -Crawford, a British financier, was appointed adviser to the Minister -of Finance; a British barrister was made inspector-general of the -Ministry of Justice; a member of the British consular service became -inspector-general of the Home Office. Later, serious consideration -was given to a proposal to invite Lord Milner to head a commission -to suggest reforms in the political and economic administration -of Anatolia. A French officer was made inspector-general of the -gendarmerie. In June, 1910, a French company was awarded a valuable -concession for the construction of a railway from Soma to Panderma, and -the following year the lucrative contract for the telephone service in -Constantinople was granted to an Anglo-French syndicate.[5] - -The Young Turk Government likewise was desirous of doing everything -possible to remove French and British objections to the construction of -railways in the Ottoman Empire. With this end in view they prevailed -upon Dr. von Gwinner to reopen negotiations with Sir Ernest Cassel -regarding British participation in the Bagdad Railway, and they secured -the consent of the _Deutsche Bank_ to a rearrangement of the terms of -the concession of 1903. The latter was to be undertaken in accordance -with British wishes and with due regard to the financial situation of -Turkey. This was followed up, on November 8, 1909, by a formal request -of the Ottoman ambassador at London for a statement of the terms upon -which the British Government would withdraw its diplomatic objections -to the Bagdad enterprise. Simultaneously negotiations were initiated -for “compensations” to French interests, represented by the Imperial -Ottoman Bank. - -Until the end of the year 1909, then, the political situation in the -Ottoman Empire under the revolutionary government had been almost -altogether to the advantage of the Entente Powers. During 1910, -however, German prestige began to revive in the Near East, and by the -spring of 1911 German influence in Turkey had won back its former -preëminent position. - - -THE GERMANS ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH - -The Young Turk program, in its political aspects, was not only -liberal, but nationalist. In the fresh enthusiasm of the early months -of the revolution, emphasis was laid upon modernizing the political -institutions of the empire—parliamentary government and ministerial -responsibility and equality before the law were the concern of the -reformers. As time went on, however, liberalism was eclipsed by -nationalism and modernizing by Ottomanizing. By the autumn of 1909 -Turkish nationalist activities were in full swing. Revolts in Macedonia -and Armenia were suppressed with an iron hand; there were massacres in -Adana and elsewhere in Anatolia and Cilicia; restrictions were imposed -upon personal liberties and upon freedom of the press; martial law -was declared. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were revived as political -movements.[6] - -The development of an aggressive Turkish nationalism was not viewed -with equanimity by the Entente nations. The newspapers of France and -England roundly denounced the Adana massacres and came to adopt a -hostile attitude toward the Young Turk Revolution, which only a short -time previously they had extravagantly praised. Great Britain looked -with apprehension upon Ottoman support of the nationalist movements -in Egypt and India, and France was disturbed at the prospect of a -Pan-Islamic revival in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. Russia demanded -“reform” in Macedonia and Armenia and encouraged anti-Turk propaganda -in the Balkans. English interference in Cretan affairs and British -support of the insolent Sheik of Koweit still further complicated the -situation.[7] - -For Germany, on the other hand, Turkish nationalism held no menace. -So far from desiring a weak Turkey—as did most of the other European -Powers—her policy in the Near East was based upon the strengthening -of Turkey. If Turkey was to be strong, she must suppress dissentient -nationalist and religious minorities; therefore Germany raised no voice -of protest against the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities. If Turkey -sought to recover territories which formerly had acknowledged the -suzerainty of the Sultan, Germany had nothing to fear; the Kaiser ruled -over no such territories. If Turkey chose to arouse the Moslem world -by a Pan-Islamic revival, that was no concern of Germany; the German -Empire had a comparatively insignificant number of Mohammedan subjects. -If the Turkish program discomfited the Entente Powers, that was to -Germany’s advantage in the great game of world politics; therefore -Germany could afford to support the Young Turk Government. As in the -days of Abdul Hamid, Germany appeared to be the only friend of the -Ottomans.[8] - -The improvement in the German political position at Constantinople was -reflected in a changing Turkish attitude toward the Bagdad Railway. -Among revolutionary leaders there was a growing realization of the -great economic and political importance of railways and, particularly, -of the Bagdad system. It became apparent upon examination, also, -that others than Germans had obtained monopolistic concessions in -the Ottoman Empire—in this respect the Lynch Brothers came in for a -good deal of attention. The Ottoman General Staff—which had recalled -General von der Goltz as chief military adviser—insisted that the -early construction of a trans-Mesopotamian railway at whatever cost, -was essential to the defence of the empire. In spite of serious -financial difficulties resulting from strikes, increased cost of -materials, and general economic paralysis which followed upon the -heels of the revolutions of 1908 and 1909, the Anatolian and Bagdad -Railway Companies advanced large sums to the Minister of Finance -toward the ordinary expenses of running the Government. In addition, -the concessionaires evinced a desire to meet all Turkish financial and -diplomatic objections to the provisions of the concession of 1903.[9] - -It was the financial needs of the Young Turk administration which -enabled German diplomacy and the _Deutsche Bank_ to reëstablish -themselves thoroughly in the good graces of the Ottoman Government. But -here again the Germans were given their chance only after England and -France had turned the Turks away empty handed. - -During the summer of 1910, Djavid Bey, as Ottoman Minister of Finance, -went to Paris to raise a loan of $30,000,000, secured by the customs -receipts of the Ottoman Empire. The negotiations with the Parisian -bankers were complicated by a bitter anti-Turk campaign on the part of -the press and by the frequent interference of the French Government. -Nevertheless, Djavid Bey succeeded in signing a satisfactory contract -with a French syndicate, and his task appeared to be accomplished. At -this juncture, however, M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, -informed the bankers that official sanction for the proposed loan -would be withheld unless the Ottoman Government would consent to have -its budget administered by a resident French adviser. The Young Turk -ministry, determined to tolerate no further foreign intervention in -the administrative affairs of the empire, flatly refused to consider -any such proposal, and Djavid Bey was instructed to break off all -negotiations. “As a true and loyal friend of France,” wrote Djavid, “I -regretted this incident as one likely to strain the future relations -between the two countries.” - -From Paris Djavid Bey went to London. Sir Ernest Cassel appeared to be -willing to negotiate a loan to Turkey of the desired amount, but, upon -representations from M. Cambon, the French ambassador at London, Sir -Edward Grey persuaded Cassel not to put in a bid for the bonds. This -decision was reached largely, as Djavid Bey was informed by the British -Foreign Office, because the Bagdad Railway was considered to be “an -enterprise which under the existing concession has not been conceived -in the best interests of the Ottoman Empire, while it offers, as at -present controlled, an undoubted menace to the legitimate position of -British trade in Mesopotamia.” To the Turkish Government this statement -was a piece of gratuitous impertinence, for, as Djavid Bey replied, “It -was a prerogative only of the Ottoman Government to determine whether -the conditions of construction and management of the Bagdad Railway -were beneficial or detrimental to Turkey. England had no more right to -object to the Bagdad Railway than Germany had to object to the British -and French lines in operation in Turkey.” - -The collapse of the financial negotiations in Paris and London offered -the _Deutsche Bank_ an opportunity which its directors were too -shrewd to overlook. Dr. Helfferich was despatched to Constantinople -and within a few weeks had secured the contract for the entire issue -of $30,000,000 of the Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of 1910, upon terms -almost identical with those agreed upon with the French syndicate -before M. Pichon’s interference. “On this occasion,” writes Djavid -Bey, “the Germans handled the business with great intelligence and -tact. They brought up no points which were not related directly or -indirectly to the loan, and they made no conditions which would have -been inconsistent with the dignity of Turkey. This attitude of Germany -met with great approval on the part of the Turkish Government, which -was then in a very difficult position. The result was the greatest -diplomatic victory in the history of the Ottoman Empire between the -revolution of 1908 and the outbreak of the Great War.”[10] - -The purchase of the loan of 1910 by the _Deutsche Bank_, however, -did not solve the financial problems of the Young Turk Government. -It was essential that measures be taken to increase the revenues of -the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, negotiations had been conducted -during 1910, and were continued until midsummer of 1911, to secure the -consent of the Powers to an increase of 4% in the customs duties. It -was apparent from the outset that the British Government would block -any project for an increase in Turkish taxes, unless it were granted -important compensations of a political and economic character and -unless it could determine, in large measure, the purposes for which -the additional revenues would be expended. In this respect, also, it -appeared that Entente policy was standing in the way of the success of -the Revolution in Turkey! - -British objections to the proposed increase in the Ottoman customs -duties were founded in large part upon British opposition to the -Bagdad Railway and, more particularly, to the sections of the Railway -between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. In the spring of 1910, the British -Government proposed that a concession for a railway from Bagdad to -Basra _via_ Kut-el-Amara should be awarded to British financiers, -in order that British economic interests in Mesopotamia might be -adequately safeguarded. In May of that year Sir Edward Grey wrote the -British ambassador at Constantinople, “Please explain quite clearly -to the Turkish Government that the British Government will not agree -to any addition to the taxes until this claim for a concession is -taken into favorable consideration, and also that Great Britain’s -attitude towards Turkey will depend largely upon how she meets this -demand of yours.” Upon the refusal of the Ottoman Government to accede -to this demand, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Henry Babington Smith, -English representative on the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, -that England must be awarded at least a 55% participation in the -Bagdad-Basra section of the Bagdad Railway, as well as concessions for -the construction and control of port works at Koweit. In addition, -Turkey should be made to understand that Great Britain could approve no -agreement without the sanction of the French and Russian Governments. - -When Djavid Bey was in London in July, 1910, he submitted two -counterproposals to Sir Edward Grey: first, that the portion of the -Bagdad Railway from Bagdad to Basra should be internationalized upon -terms agreeable to Sir Ernest Cassel and Dr. Arthur von Gwinner; -or, second, that the Ottoman Government itself should undertake the -construction of the line beyond Bagdad. The British Foreign Office -indicated that it might consent to an increase in the Ottoman customs -duties until April, 1914, upon some such terms, provided the consent of -the other Powers were forthcoming, and provided Turkey would surrender -her right of veto over the borrowing powers of Egypt. Because of the -collapse of the loan negotiations, however, nothing further came of -these proposals. - -On March 7, 1911, the Ottoman ministers at London and Paris presented -to the British and French Governments respectively a proposition that -the Bagdad-Basra section of the Bagdad Railway should be constructed -by an Ottoman company, to the capital of which the Turkish Government -should subscribe 40%, and German, French, and British capitalists 20% -each. The Sublime Porte expressed a willingness, furthermore, to confer -with representatives of France and Great Britain for the purpose of -satisfying the legitimate political demands of those two nations in -Syria and Mesopotamia. The following day, nevertheless, Sir Edward -Grey informed the House of Commons that His Majesty’s Government was -not prepared to consent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties, -because it was not clear that the Ottoman Government was ready to -guarantee adequate protection to British commercial interests in -Mesopotamia and the region of the Persian Gulf.[11] - -This decision was received in Constantinople with undisguised -animosity. Young Turks were as little disposed to tolerate British, -as they were French, supervision of Ottoman finances and economic -policies. The press roundly denounced the British and said that once -again Turkey had been shown the wisdom of friendship for Germany.[12] - -Entente actions were contrasted with the more conciliatory policy -of the Germans. As early as November, 1910, Baron Marschall von -Bieberstein had notified the Sublime Porte that Germany would place -no obstacles in the way of an increase in the Ottoman customs duties -and that, furthermore, his Government was prepared to urge that -the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies forego any additional -assignment of Turkish revenues. During the first week of March, 1911, -Dr. von Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich informed the Ottoman Government -that the Bagdad Railway Company was willing to abandon its right to -construct the sections of the line from Bagdad to Basra and the Persian -Gulf, including the concessions for port and terminal facilities -at Basra. The Turkish Government was to be given a free hand as to -the disposition of the portion of the railway beyond Bagdad, with -the single reservation that the _Deutsche Bank_ should be awarded a -share in the enterprise equal to that granted any non-Ottoman group -of financiers. The German proposals were accepted and incorporated in -a formal convention of March 21, 1911, by which the Bagdad Railway -Company abandoned its claims to further commitments from the Ottoman -Treasury and agreed, at the pleasure of the Turkish Government, to -surrender its concession for the Bagdad-Basra-Persian Gulf sections to -an Ottoman company internationally owned and controlled.[13] - -The outcome of the negotiations for an increase in the customs duties -was a keen disappointment to the Young Turks. Desirous as they were of -carrying the Bagdad enterprise to a successful conclusion, they could -not help resenting its political implications. “We tried,” writes -Djavid Bey, “to better our relations with the English; they talked to -us of the Bagdad Railway! We tried to introduce financial and economic -reforms in Turkey; we found before us the Bagdad Railway! Every time an -occasion arose, the French stirred up the Bagdad Railway question. Even -the Russians, notwithstanding the Potsdam Agreement,[14] constantly -waved in their hands the Bagdad weapon.” This resentment was fortified -by the knowledge that those who opposed the Bagdad Railway were those -who believed that the Sick Man would die and were interested in the -division of his inheritance. From these Powers Turkey could accept no -tutelage! - - -THE GERMAN RAILWAYS JUSTIFY THEIR EXISTENCE - -From the Turkish point of view, the best test of the wisdom of -supporting the German railway concessions in Turkey was an examination -of the results achieved in improving political and economic conditions -in the Ottoman Empire. By 1914 the Anatolian Railways and part of the -Bagdad Railway had been in existence a sufficient length of time to -appraise their worth to Asia Minor, and the appraisal thus arrived at -would be a fair prognostication of the value of the entire system when -it should be opened to operation. - -Dr. von Gwinner, in justification of the Bagdad Railway enterprise, -summarized what he believed to be the chief services of the Anatolian -Railways to Turkey. “More than twenty years ago,” he wrote in 1909, -“my predecessor, the late George von Siemens, conceived the idea -of restoring to civilization the great wastes of Asia Minor and -Mesopotamia, once and for long the center of the history of humanity. -The only means of achieving that end was by building railways; this -was undertaken, slowly but persistently, and with marvelous results. -Constantinople and the Turkish army at that time were eating bread made -from Russian flour; they are now eating grain of their own country’s -growth. Security in Asia Minor at that time was hardly greater than it -is to-day in Kurdistan. When the _Deutsche Bank’s_ engineers reached -a station a little beyond Ismid (Nikomedia) on the Sea of Marmora, -the neighborhood was infested by Tscherkess robbers; the chief of -those robbers is now a stationmaster of the Anatolian Railway Company, -drawing about £100 _per annum_, a party as respectable as the late Mr. -Micawber after his conversion to thrift. The railways brought ease to -the peasantry, who are obtaining for their harvest twice to four times -the price formerly paid, and the railways have brought revenue to the -Treasury. The Anatolian Railway’s lines are in as good condition as any -line in the United Kingdom, and their transportation charge is less -than half the rates of any railway in England.”[15] - -Although this was the statement of an avowed protagonist of the -Anatolian Railway, the testimony of other observers must lead to -the conclusion that it was not an overestimate of the value of -the Anatolian system. As early as 1903, for example, the British -Consul General at Constantinople wrote: “There is no doubt that the -agricultural production of the districts traversed by the Angora -Railway has increased largely. Before the Angora Railway was opened -there was no export of grain from that district; the annual export of -wheat and barley is now from £1,500,000 to £2,000,000. The Railway -has attracted a large number of immigrants from Bulgaria and Russia, -who have settled in the most fertile parts. They form a hardworking -and intelligent population, accustomed to more civilized methods -of cultivation than the Anatolian peasantry. Population, improved -communications and security are the essentials required for the -development of Asia Minor. The Railway attracts the one and creates the -others. All agree that the country along the Railway is much safer than -elsewhere. It would be surprising, therefore, if the production of the -country did not increase.”[16] - -The improvement in economic conditions in Anatolia became more marked -as time went on. The Anatolian Railway Company established a special -agricultural department for the education of the peasantry in more -improved methods of farming; nurseries and experimental stations were -maintained; demonstrations were given of the best systems of irrigation -and drainage; attention was paid to the development of markets for -surplus products of various kinds. American agricultural machinery was -introduced and promised to become widely adopted. As a result of these -improvements, the agricultural output of the country increased by leaps -and bounds, and the cultivated areas in some districts were more than -doubled. Famine, formerly a common occurrence, became a thing of the -past, because irrigation eliminated the danger of recurrent droughts -and floods. Increased production assured a plentiful food supply, and -improved transportation enabled the surplus of one district to be -transferred, in case of need, to another. All in all, the peasantry -were developing qualities of industry, thrift, and adaptability which -seemed to forecast great things for the future of Asia Minor.[17] - -Furthermore, the German railways in Turkey, the failure of which had -been freely prophesied, proved to be successful business enterprises. -The directors took all possible steps to build up the earning power of -the lines, rather than depend upon the minimum return guaranteed by the -Ottoman Government. The railways were efficiently and intelligently -administered—the operating expenses of the Anatolian and Bagdad lines -never exceeded 47% of the gross receipts, although the operating -expenses of the chief European railways, under much more favorable -conditions, varied from 54% to 62% of gross receipts during the same -period. Occasional dividends of 5% or 6% were paid by the Anatolian -and Bagdad Railway Companies between 1906 and 1914, but only when the -disbursements were warranted by earnings. In 1911, a notable advance -was made by the introduction of oil-burning locomotives on the Bagdad -lines; henceforth the German railways in Turkey were operated with fuel -purchased from the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey![18] - -This scrupulously careful management eventually brought its reward. In -1911, the earnings of the Angora line exceeded the kilometric guarantee -and, in accordance with the terms of the concession, the Ottoman -Government received a share of the receipts. In 1912, the returns of -the Eski Shehr-Konia line also exceeded the sum guaranteed by the -Government, the Ottoman Treasury receiving a share of the earnings of -the Anatolian system to an amount of more than $200,000. After 1913, no -further payments to the Anatolian Railway Company were required under -the kilometric guarantees.[19] - -The results on the completed sections of the Bagdad Railway were -equally promising, as will be indicated by the following table:[20] - - _Year_ _Kilometres_ _Passengers_ _Freight_ _Gross_ _Total_ - _in_ _Tons_ _Receipts per_ _Government_ - _Operation_ _Kilometre_ _Subsidy_ - (_Francs_) (_Francs_) - - 1906 200 29,629 13,693 1,368.83 624,028.21 - 1907 200 37,145 23,643 1,754.44 546,129.77 - 1908 200 52,759 15,941 1,839.86 529,443.12 - 1909 200 57,026 15,364 1,936.72 509,565.45 - 1910 200 71,665 27,756 2,571.43 381,135.58 - 1911 238 95,884 38,046 3,379.34 238,166.59 - 1912 609 288,833 57,670 5,315.67 278,785.25 - 1913 609 407,474 78,645 3,786.53 216,295.17 - 1914 887 597,675 116,194 8,177.97 2,939,983.00 - - Figures in italics indicate payments _to_ the Turkish Government of - its share of the receipts in excess of the guarantee of 4,500 francs - per kilometre. - - -The improvement in the economic conditions of Anatolia, and the success -of the German railways as business enterprises, were sources of great -satisfaction and profit to the Imperial Ottoman Government. Not only -was the Treasury receiving revenue from the railway lines which had -formerly been a drain upon the financial resources of the empire, but -the receipts from taxes in the regions traversed by the railways were -constantly increasing. As early as 1893 the Ottoman Ministry of Public -Works announced that the increase in tithes and the increased value of -farm lands in Asia Minor had more than justified expenditures by the -Sultan’s Government in subsidies to the Anatolian Railway.[21] For -those portions of Anatolia which were served by the Railway, the amount -of the tithes had almost doubled in twenty years: in 1889, the year -after the award of the Anatolian concession, $639,760 was collected; in -1898, $948,070; in 1908, $1,240,450. In certain districts the amount -of the tithes collected in 1908 was five or six times as great as the -yield before the construction of the Railway.[22] - -The economic prospects of Turkey never were brighter than they were -just before the outbreak of the Great War. The new régime had removed -many of the vexatious restrictions on individual initiative which had -characterized the rule of Abdul Hamid. The country’s losses in men -in the Italian and Balkan wars had been made up by an immigration of -Moslem refugees from the ceded territories. Numerous concessions had -been granted for the exploitation of mines, the construction of public -utilities, and the improvement of the means of communication. “There -was a feeling abroad in the land that an era of exceptional commercial -and industrial activity was about to dawn upon Turkey.” The Ottoman -Empire was in a fair way to become modernized according to Western -standards.[23] - -Thus the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways achieved all that was claimed -for them by their sponsors. They increased political security in Asia -Minor; they brought about an economic renaissance in the homeland -of the Turks; they justified the investment of public funds which -was necessary to bring the system to completion. Beyond the Amanus -Mountains lay the plains of Syria and the great unexploited wealth -of Mesopotamia. A development of Mesopotamia, even as modest as that -achieved in Anatolia, would pay the cost of the Bagdad Railway many -times over. Were the Ottoman statesmen who supported this great project -to be condemned for so great a service to their country? Or would -they have been short-sighted had they failed to realize the great -potentialities of railway construction in Asiatic Turkey? That the -Bagdad Railway contributed to the causes of Turkish participation in -the Great War—and to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire—was not -so much the fault of the Turks themselves as it was the blight laid -upon Turkey, a “backward nation,” by European imperialism. - - -THE YOUNG TURKS HAVE SOME MENTAL RESERVATIONS - -Although the revolutionary party in Turkey had come to look with favor -upon German influence in the Near East, and particularly to support the -Bagdad Railway, there is little reason for accepting the too hastily -drawn conclusion that the Young Turks had sold their country to the -Kaiser or that they were under a definite obligation to subscribe to -German diplomatic policies. They were too strongly nationalistic for -that. They believed that the Ottoman Empire must eventually rid itself -of foreign administrative assistance, foreign capital invested under -far-reaching economic concessions, and foreign interference in Ottoman -political affairs. But for a period of transition—during which Turkey -could learn the secrets of Western progress and adapt them to her own -purposes—it was the obvious duty of a forward-looking government to -utilize European capital and European technical assistance for the -welfare of the empire. Patriotism and modernism went hand in hand in -the Young Turk program.[24] - -The Young Turks were not unaware of the menace of the Bagdad Railway -to their own best hopes. As Djavid Bey appropriately says: “The great -drawback of this enterprise was its political character, which clung -to it and became a source of endless toil and anxiety for the country. -In a word, it poisoned the political life of Turkey. If the Bagdad -concession had not been granted, the revolutionary government could -have solved much more easily pending political and economic problems. -But one must admire the courage of Abdul Hamid in granting the -concession, no matter what the cost, because the construction of the -Bagdad line was essential for the defence and the economic progress of -the empire. Unfortunately for Turkey, she has always had to suffer from -such politico-economic concessions. - -“The Bagdad Railway did not escape the malady of politics. When one -entered the meeting room of the company, one breathed the atmosphere of -the ministerial chamber in _Wilhelmstrasse_ and felt in both Gwinner -and Helfferich the presence of undersecretaries for foreign affairs. -This state of affairs, instead of simplifying the negotiations and -relations between Germany and Turkey, served only to envenom them.” - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] For accounts of the Young Turk Revolutions see René Pinon, -_L’Europe et la jeune Turquie_ (Paris, 1911); V. Bérard, _La révolution -turque_ (Paris, 1909); C. R. Buxton, _Turkey in Revolution_ (London, -1909); Ernst Jäckh, _Der aufsteigende Halbmond_ (Berlin, 1911); A. -H. Lybyer, “The Turkish Parliament,” in _Proceedings of the American -Political Science Association_, Volume VII (1910), pp. 66 _et seq._; -S. Panaretoff, _Near Eastern Affairs and Conditions_ (New York, -1922), Chapter V; A. Kutschbach, _Die türkische Revolution_ (Halle, -1909); Baron C. von der Goltz, _Der jungen Türkei Niederlage und die -Möglichkeit ihrer Wiedererhebung_ (Berlin, 1913). - -[2] Paul Rohrbach, _Germany’s Isolation_, p. 50. - -[3] Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, p. 21. - -[4] This quotation, together with many other facts in this chapter, is -from a lengthy memorandum of Djavid Bey on the Bagdad Railway, prepared -especially for the use of the author in the writing of this book. It is -dated January 3, 1923, and was forwarded from the Lausanne Conference -for Peace in the Near East. Unless otherwise specified, quotations -from Djavid Bey here given are from this memorandum. There probably is -no person who knows more of the Ottoman point of view on the Bagdad -Railway than Djavid, who as Young Turk Minister of Finance and, later, -as Turkish delegate to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration has had -perhaps an unprecedented opportunity to observe the financial and -economic ramifications of European imperialism in the Near East. - -[5] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), p. 16; -_Mesopotamia_, p. 41; _The Annual Register_, 1911, pp. 364–365; -_Armenia and Kurdistan_, p. 62; _Turkey in Europe_, pp. 72–73; -_Anatolia_, pp. 51–52, 81; _infra_, pp. 244–246. - -[6] Pan-Turkism, or Pan-Turanianism, started as a cultural movement -among Ottoman intellectuals. It assumed political aspects as a result -of three important circumstances: 1. Aggressions against Turkey -by foreign powers; 2. The ardent nationalism of the Balkan states -bordering on Turkey; 3. The existence within Turkey of vigorous -dissident nationalities, such as the Armenians and the Arabs. -Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, although separate movements, had much -in common. In 1911, at any rate, the Young Turks adopted Pan-Islamism -as part of their program. Pinon, _op. cit._, pp. 134 _et seq._; -_Mohammedan History_, pp. 89–96; Sir Thomas Barclay, _The Turco-Italian -War and Its Problems_ (London, 1912), pp. 100 _et seq._ - -[7] For an excellent statement of the reaction of Turkish nationalism -upon European politics see _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 228 (1917), -pp. 511 _et seq._ - -[8] Regarding the coincidence of German and Turkish interests during -the reign of Abdul Hamid _cf._ _supra_, pp. 64–65, 125–130. - -[9] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1908 and 1909, pp. -8–9; _The Annual Register_, 1909, pp. 337 _et seq._; _Stenographische -Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 260 (1910), pp. -2174d _et seq._ - -[10] From Djavid Bey’s memorandum. For scattered details of these -negotiations see _The Annual Register_, 1910, pp. 336–340; _Report -of the Deutsche Bank_, 1910, pp. 13 _et seq._; K. Helfferich, _Die -deutsche Türkenpolitik_, pp. 23 _et seq._; Ostrorog, _op. cit._, pp. -60–61. - -[11] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume -22 (1911), pp. 1284–1285. For further details of the negotiations -of 1909–1911 _cf._ B. von Siebert, _Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur -Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre_ (Berlin and Leipzig, -1921), Chapters VIII and IX. Hereinafter cited as _de Siebert_ -documents. - -[12] _Cf._ foreign correspondence of _The Times_, March 21, 1911. - -[13] _Troisième convention additionelle à la convention du 5 Mars, -1903, relative au chemin de fer de Bagdad_ (Constantinople, 1911); -_supra_, pp. 111–113. - -[14] _Cf._ _infra_, Chapter X. - -[15] _The Nineteenth Century_, Volume 65 (1909), pp. 1083–1084. - -[16] _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (1903), p. 29. - -[17] _Société du chemin de fer d’Anatolie-Jahresbericht des -Agrikultur-Dienstes_ (Berlin, 1899 _et seq._), _passim_. - -[18] _Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen_, Volume 31 (Berlin, 1908), pp. -207–211, 1485–1491; _Commerce Reports_, No. 18d (Washington, 1915), p. -9; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 4835 (1911), p. 17; _Report -of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1910–1913, _passim_. - -[19] _Report of the Anatolian Railway_, 1911–1914, _passim_. - -[20] Compiled from the _Report of the Bagdad Railway Company_, -1903–1914. Figures for the years 1904 and 1905 are incomplete and have -therefore been omitted. It should be kept in mind in reading this table -that the years 1912–1914 were abnormal, especially as regards passenger -traffic, because of the two Balkan Wars and the Great War. - -[21] _The Levant Herald_ (Constantinople), October 25, 1893. - -[22] Caillard, _loc. cit._, p. 439. - -[23] _Commerce Reports_, No. 18d (1915), pp. 1–2. - -[24] _Cf._ _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 26 (1908), -pp. 475–477. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -BARGAINS ARE STRUCK - - -THE KAISER AND THE TSAR AGREE AT POTSDAM - -During the early days of November, 1910, William II entertained at -the Potsdam palace his fellow sovereign Nicholas II, Tsar of all the -Russias. He extended his royal hospitality, also, to the recently -chosen foreign ministers of Germany and Russia respectively—Herr -von Kiderlen-Waechter, next to the ambassador at Constantinople the -Kaiser’s most competent expert on the tortuous affairs of the Near -East; and M. Sazonov, subsequently to guide Russian foreign policy -during the critical days of July, 1914. It was apparent even to the -untutored that there was some political significance to the conference -between the German Emperor and his distinguished guests, and the -press was rife with speculation as to what the outcome would be. The -answer was forthcoming on November 4, when it was announced that the -Kaiser and the Tsar, with the advice and assistance of their foreign -ministers, had reached an agreement on the Bagdad Railway question. - -A short time later the terms of this Potsdam Agreement were made -public. As outlined by the German Chancellor, with some subsequent -modifications, they were as follows: 1. Germany recognized the Russian -sphere of interest in northern Persia, as defined by the Anglo-Russian -agreement of 1907, and undertook not to seek or support concessions -for railways, roads, telegraphs, or other means of communication in -the region; in other words, there was to be no change in the _status -quo_. 2. Russia recognized the rights of the _Deutsche Bank_ in the -Bagdad Railway and agreed to withdraw all diplomatic opposition to the -construction of the line and to the participation of foreign capital -therein. 3. Russia agreed to obtain from Persia, as soon as possible, a -concession for the construction of a railway from Teheran, the capital -city, to Khanikin, an important commercial city on the Turco-Persian -frontier. This new railway was to be linked with a branch of the Bagdad -system to be constructed in accordance with the terms of the concession -of 1903 from Sadijeh, on the Tigris, to Khanikin. Both lines were to -be planned for through international traffic. If, for any reason, the -Russian Government should fail to build the proposed railway from -Teheran to Khanikin, it was understood that German promoters might -then apply for the concession. 4. The policy of the economic open door -was to be observed by both nations. Russia agreed not to discriminate -against German trade in Persia, and the two nations pledged reciprocal -equality of treatment on the new railway lines from Sadijeh to -Teheran.[1] - -Russia had a great deal to gain and little to lose by the Potsdam -Agreement. Whether Russia liked it or not, the Bagdad Railway had -become a going concern, and there was every indication that another -decade would see its completion. When finished, the Bagdad system, -together with projected Persian lines, would provide Russian trade -with direct communications with the Indies (_via_ Bagdad and the -Persian Gulf) and with the Mediterranean (_via_ Mosul, Aleppo, and the -Syrian coast). By the entente of 1907 with Great Britain the Tsar had -renounced his imperial interests in southern Persia; therefore he had -little to gain by a dog-in-the-manger attitude toward the development -of Mesopotamia by the Germans. Under these circumstances continued -resistance to the Bagdad Railway appeared to be short-sighted and -futile. Cheerful acquiescence, on the other hand, might bring tangible -diplomatic compensations. In addition, it has been suggested, Russian -reactionaries were delighted at the prospect of a _rapprochement_ -with Prussia, in which they saw the last strong support of a dying -autocracy.[2] - -From the German point of view the agreement with Russia was a -diplomatic triumph. All that Germany conceded was recognition of -Russia’s special position in Persia, which affected no important German -interests and exerted no appreciable influence on the balance of -power in the Near East. In return, German trade was to be admitted to -the markets of Persia, heretofore an exclusively British and Russian -preserve; the sphere of the Bagdad Railway was to be considerably -enlarged; Russian political obstruction of the Bagdad enterprise was -to cease. Russian objections had been the first stumbling block in the -way of the Railway; Russian protests had been the instigation of French -opposition; now Russian recognition held out high promise for the -final success of the Great Plan. The first breach had been made in the -heretofore solid front presented by the Entente.[3] - -Outside of Germany and Russia, however, the Potsdam Agreement met -with a heated reception. The Ottoman press complained that Turkey -was being politely ignored by two foreign powers in the disposition -of her rights. One Constantinople daily said it was a sad commentary -on Turkish “sovereignty” that in an important treaty on the Bagdad -Railway “there is no mention of us, as if we had no connection with -that line, and we were not masters of Bagdad and Basra and the ports -of the Persian Gulf.”[4] M. Hanotaux, a former French minister of -foreign affairs, expressed his belief that “the negotiations at Potsdam -have created a situation which, from every point of view, obliges -us to ask, now, if Russia has dissolved the Triple Entente.”[5] Mr. -Lloyd George delivered a particularly venomous attack upon Russia for -having disregarded her diplomatic engagements, and he announced in -clarion tones that this desertion from the ranks of the Entente—even -if condoned by France—would not cause Great Britain to alter one iota -her former policy.[6] The “Slav peril” appeared to be more keenly -appreciated, for the moment, in France and England than in Germany! - -M. Jaurès, the brilliant French Socialist parliamentarian, believed -that the Potsdam Agreement was an admirable instance of the menace -of the Russian Alliance to the security of France and the peace of -Europe. During the course of a bitter debate in the Chamber of Deputies -he confronted the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, with this -dilemma: “What is the situation in which you find yourself? You are -going to be faced, you already are faced, with a _fait accompli_, a -Russo-German convention on the Bagdad question. What do you propose -to do? Well, you may pursue an independent course and continue to -oppose the Bagdad Railway. In that event you will be in the unenviable -position of opposing Germany in an enterprise to which Russia—whose -interests are more directly involved—has given her support. Or, on -the other hand, you may subscribe with good grace to this enterprise -which Russia commends to you. What then will be your situation? For -some years France has successfully resisted the Bagdad Railway. If -during this time we have sulked at the enterprise, it was not of our -own choice, but out of regard for Russia, because Russia believed her -interests to be menaced. In short, we arrive at this paradox. You have -created an extremely delicate situation between France and Germany -by opposing the Bagdad Railway, in which you had no interests other -than those of Russia. And now it is this same Russia which, without -previously consulting you, places at the disposal of Germany the -moral advantage of compelling you—you who resisted only on behalf of -Russia—to accede to the Bagdad Railway.” Was this the sort of ally to -whom France should entrust her national safety?[7] - -In the midst of the storm over the Potsdam Agreement, M. Stephen Pichon -and Sir Edward Grey alone appeared to be unruffled. Both of these -gentlemen, interpolated in the Chamber of Deputies and the House of -Commons respectively, averred that they saw no reason for becoming -disturbed or alarmed at the new Russo-German understanding. This point -of view was incomprehensible to the average citizen, unskilled in -the niceties of professional diplomacy, until on January 31, 1911, -M. Jaurès forced M. Pichon to admit that the French Foreign Office -had been informed of the character of the Potsdam negotiations before -they took place. Less than a month later Mr. Lloyd George severely -criticized his fellow-minister Sir Edward Grey for having taken no -action against the policy of Russia at Potsdam, although, as Foreign -Secretary, Sir Edward had been fully posted on the nature of the -negotiations. Apparently, then, Russia had come to the agreement with -Germany only after having consulted France and Great Britain and, -perhaps, after having received their consent.[8] - -There were a few persons who hoped that the Potsdam Agreement might -be the first step in a general settlement of the Bagdad Railway -entanglement. One humble member of the House of Commons, Mr. -Pickersgill, said, for example, “I cannot understand the policy of -continued antagonism to Germany. Ex-President Roosevelt recently gave -much good advice to our Foreign Minister, and amongst other things he -said that the presence of Germany on the Euphrates would strengthen the -position of Great Britain on the Nile.... The action of Russia in the -recent meeting at Potsdam has brought matters to a head, and I hope -the Foreign Office will approach Turkey with a view to an arrangement -for the completion of the Bagdad Railway which might be agreeable to -Turkey, Germany and ourselves.”[9] - -The hope of Mr. Pickersgill was fulfilled, for the agreement of -November 4, 1910, proved to be the first of a series of conventions -regarding the Near East negotiated between 1911 and 1914 by Germany, -Turkey, Great Britain and France. On the eve of the Great War the -Bagdad Railway controversy had been all but settled! - - -FRENCH CAPITALISTS SHARE IN THE SPOILS - -France, relieved of the necessity of supporting Russia’s strategic -objections to the Bagdad Railway, was glad to compromise with Turkey—in -return for compensatory concessions to French investors. The sharp -rebuff given M. Pichon by the Young Turks in the loan negotiations of -the spring and summer of 1910 had convinced French diplomatists and -business men alike that a policy of bullying the new administration -at Constantinople would be futile.[10] Continued obstruction of -Ottoman economic rehabilitation could have but two effects: to injure -French prestige and prejudice the interests of French business; to -drive the Young Turks into still closer association with the German -Government and still greater dependence upon German capitalists. On -the other hand, a conciliatory policy might be rewarded by profitable -participation of French bankers in the economic development of -Turkey-in-Asia and by a revival of French political influence at the -Sublime Porte. - -Even before the negotiation of the Potsdam Agreement the Young Turks -had smiled upon French financial interests in the hope that the French -Government might adopt a more friendly attitude toward the new régime -in Turkey. In June, 1910, for example, the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway was -authorized to extend its existing line from Soma, in western Anatolia, -to Panderma, on the Sea of Marmora. The concession carried with it the -highest kilometric guarantee (18,800 francs) ever granted a railway in -the Ottoman Empire, although the construction of the line offered fewer -engineering and financial difficulties than other railways which had -been constructed under less favorable terms. From the standpoint of the -Turkish Government, however, the Soma-Panderma railway offered economic -and strategic returns commensurate with the investment, for it was part -of a comprehensive plan for the improvement of commercial and military -communications in Asia Minor.[11] - -The acceptance of this concession by French capitalists—presumably -with the approval, certainly without the opposition, of their -Government—was an interesting commentary on the official attitude of -the French Republic toward the Bagdad Railway. If it was unprincipled -for Germans to accept a guarantee for the construction and operation -of their railways in Turkey, it is difficult to ascertain what -dispensation exempted Frenchmen from the same stigma. If the Anatolian -and Bagdad systems were anathema because of their possible utilization -for military purposes, little justification can be offered for the -Soma-Panderma line, which, completed in 1912, was one of the principal -factors in the stubborn defence of the Dardanelles three years later. - -Shortly after the promulgation of the Soma-Panderma convention -additional steps were taken by the Ottoman Government toward the -further extension of French railway interests in Anatolia and Syria. -Negotiations were initiated with the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the -award to a French-owned company, _La Société pour la Construction -et l’Exploitation du Réseau de la Mer Noire_, of a concession for a -comprehensive system of railways in northern Anatolia. It was proposed -to construct elaborate port works at the Black Sea towns of Heraclea, -Samsun, and Trebizond, and to connect the new ports by railway with -the inland towns of Erzerum, Sivas, Kharput, and Van. Connections were -to be established at Boli and Sivas with extensions to the Anatolian -Railways, and at Arghana with a branch of the Bagdad line to Nisibin -and Diarbekr. Thus adequate rail communications would be provided from -the Ægean to the Persian Gulf, from the Black Sea to the Syrian shore -of the Mediterranean.[12] - -Simultaneously, negotiations were being carried on between the Ottoman -Ministry of Public Works and the Imperial Ottoman Bank for extensive -concessions to the French Syrian Railways, owned and operated by _La -Société du Chemin de Fer de Damas-Hama et Prolongements_. Provision was -made for the construction of port and terminal facilities at Jaffa, -Haifa, and Tripoli-in-Syria; a traffic agreement was negotiated with -the Ottoman-owned Hedjaz Railway, pledging both parties to abstain -from discriminatory rates and other unfair competition; tentative -arrangements were made for the construction of a line from Homs to -the Euphrates. Provisional agreements embodying the Black Sea and -Syrian railway and port concessions were signed in 1911, but technical -difficulties of surveying the lines, together with the political -instability occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, postponed the -definitive contract.[13] - -After the Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913, the Ottoman Government -was more determined than ever to do everything in its power to -eliminate French opposition to railway construction in Asia Minor and -to secure French aid in the further economic development of Turkey. -Crushing defeats at the hands of the Italians and the Balkan states had -emphasized the deficiencies of Ottoman communications, Ottoman economic -and military organization, Ottoman financial resources. The national -treasury, emptied by the drain of three wars, needed replenishment by -an increase in the customs duties, to which French sanction would have -to be obtained, and by a foreign loan, for which it was hoped French -bankers would submit a favorable bid. All of these questions were so -closely associated with the question of political influence in the Near -East, however, that it was obviously desirable to arrive at some _modus -vivendi_ between French and German interests in Ottoman railways and -in Ottoman financial affairs. Accordingly, the Young Turk Government -prevailed upon the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the _Deutsche Bank_ to -discuss a basis for a Franco-German agreement, and Djavid Bey was -despatched to Paris to conduct whatever negotiations might be necessary -with the French Government. - -On August 19 and 20 and September 24, 25, 26, 1913, a series of -important meetings was held in Berlin to ascertain upon what terms -French and German investments in Turkey might be apportioned with the -least possibility of conflict. German interests were represented by Dr. -von Gwinner and Dr. Helfferich; the chief of the French negotiators -were Baron de Neuflize, a Regent of the Bank of France, and M. de -Klapka, Secretary-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Supposedly the -conferences were conducted only between the interested financiers, -but the discussions were participated in by representatives of the -French, German, and Ottoman foreign offices. Obstacles which, at the -start, seemed insurmountable were overcome at the Berlin meetings and -a series of minor conferences which followed. The result was one of -the most important international agreements of the years immediately -preceding the Great War—the secret Franco-German convention of February -15, 1914. The terms of this agreement, heretofore unpublished, may be -summarized as follows:[14] - - 1. Northern Anatolia was recognized as a sphere of French influence - for purposes of railway development. Arrangements were concluded for - linking the Anatolian and Bagdad systems with the proposed Black Sea - Railways, and traffic agreements satisfactory to all of the companies - were ratified and appended to the convention. It was agreed that the - port and terminal facilities at Heraclea should be constructed by a - Franco-German company. - - 2. Syria, likewise, was recognized as a French sphere of influence. In - particular, the right of the Syrian Railways to construct a line from - Tripoli-in-Syria to Deir es Zor, on the Euphrates, was confirmed. A - traffic agreement between the Bagdad and Syrian companies was ratified - and appended to the convention. - - 3. The regions traversed by the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways - were defined as a German sphere of influence. A neutral zone was - established in Northern Syria to avoid infringement upon German or - French rights in that region. - - 4. The _Deutsche Bank_ and the Imperial Ottoman Bank each pledged - itself to respect the concessions of the other, to seek no railway - concessions within the sphere of influence of the other, and to - do nothing, directly or indirectly, to hinder the construction or - exploitation of the railway lines of the other in Asiatic Turkey. - - 5. It was agreed that appropriate diplomatic and financial measures - should be taken to bring about an increase in the revenues of the - Ottoman Empire, sufficient, at least, to finance all of the projected - railways, both French and German. Construction of the lines already - authorized, or to be authorized, should be pursued, as far as - possible, _pari passu_, each group to receive subsidies from the - Ottoman Treasury in about the same proportion. - - 6. The _Deutsche Bank_ agreed to repurchase from the Imperial Ottoman - Bank all of the latter’s shares and debentures of the Bagdad Railway - and its subsidiary enterprises, amounting to Fr. 69,400,000. Payment - was to be made in like value of Imperial Ottoman bonds of the Customs - Loan of 1911, Second Series, which had been underwritten by a German - syndicate. - -Certain observations should be made regarding the character of this -convention, if its full significance is to be appreciated. It was an -agreement between two great financial groups in France and Germany; as -such it was signed by M. Sergent, Sub-Governor of the Bank of France; -M. de Klapka, Secretary-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank; and Dr. -Karl Helfferich, Managing Director of the _Deutsche Bank_. In addition, -it was an understanding between the Governments of France and Germany; -as such it was signed by M. Ponsot, of the French Embassy in Berlin, -and by Herr von Rosenberg, of the German Foreign Office. A speech of -Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, December 9, 1913, -acknowledged the official character of the negotiations being conducted -by the French and German bankers. That the French Government considered -the convention a binding international agreement is made perfectly -clear by a despatch of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to -M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914, -in which the attention of the Belgian Government is officially called -to the existence of the convention.[15] The agreement, furthermore, -was acceptable to the Ottoman Government, for the Sultan promptly -confirmed the concessions for the new Black Sea and Syrian lines and -for the necessary extensions to the Anatolian Railways. Much has been -written about governmental support of investors in foreign countries, -but, so far as the author has been able to ascertain, this is the first -instance in which a financial pact and an international agreement have -been combined in one document. No longer are treaties negotiated by -diplomatists alone, but by diplomatists and bankers! - -From the standpoint of the French interests involved, the February -convention of 1914 was an eminently satisfactory settlement of the -Bagdad Railway controversy. French capitalists secured concessions for -more than 2,000 miles of railways in Asiatic Turkey, thus eliminating -the danger of eventual German control of all communications in the -Ottoman Empire. The Imperial Ottoman Bank was relieved of the risk -of carrying an investment of almost seventy million francs in the -Bagdad enterprise—an investment which had been a “frozen asset” -because of the persistent refusal of the French Government to admit -the Bagdad securities to the Bourse. In return, the Bank received a -large block of Imperial Ottoman bonds, which were readily negotiable -and which materially increased French influence in the Ottoman Public -Debt Administration. Furthermore, as a result of a tacit agreement -with the _Deutsche Bank_, the Imperial Ottoman Bank was awarded the -Imperial Ottoman Five Per Cent Loan of 1914, amounting to $100,000,000, -upon terms affording a handsome profit to the underwriters.[16] As -for the French Government, it was enabled to emerge gracefully from -the difficult situation in which it found itself after the Potsdam -Agreement. France no longer was obliged to pursue a purely Russian -policy in the Near East, for the Tsar’s Government—in addition to -withdrawing its objections to German railways in Asiatic Turkey—gave -its consent to the construction of the French Black Sea Railways -with the sole proviso that the system should not be completed in its -entirety until Russia had constructed certain strategic railways -necessary to assure the safety of the Caucasus frontier.[17] - -German diplomacy, on the other hand, had strengthened its position in -the Near East by securing definite recognition of central and southern -Anatolia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia as German spheres of interest. -German financiers acquired exclusive control of the Bagdad enterprise -and were assured that there would be no further obstruction of their -plans by the French Government. The French promise to coöperate in -improving the financial situation in Turkey meant that funds would -be forthcoming for continued construction of uncompleted sections of -the Bagdad Railway. The Young Turks were delighted at the prospect -that the Powers might finally consent to the much-needed increase in -the customs duties. They were no less delighted to know that railway -construction in Asia Minor—which held out so much promise for the -economic development and the political stability of the country—was to -go on unimpeded by Franco-German rivalry and antagonism.[18] - -There was some harsh criticism in Great Britain, however, of the -advantages which France had obtained for herself in the Ottoman Empire. -Sir Mark Sykes, an eminent student of Near Eastern affairs, believed -that the new state of affairs was worse than the old. Speaking in the -House of Commons, March 18, 1914, he warned the Foreign Office that -“the policy of French financiers will produce eventually the collapse -of the Ottoman Empire.... Take the proposed loan arranged with the -French Government, for something over £20,000,000. In order to get this -there are concessions which I cannot help feeling are more brazen and -more fatal than any I have seen. The existing railways in Syria meander -for miles to avoid legitimate profits in order to extort a guarantee. -Alongside these railways you can see the merchants’ merchandise and the -peasants’ produce rotting because the railway people do not trouble to -warehouse the stuff or to shift it. They have got their guarantee, and -they do not care. These concessions, which have been extracted from -Turkey, mean a monopoly of all Syrian transit; and, further, a native -press is to be subventioned practically in the interest of these -particular monopolies.... In practice, loans, kilometric guarantees, -monopolies, and a financed native press must, whether the financiers -desire it or not, pave the way to annexation. I submit that this is not -the spirit of the _entente_. The British people did not stand by the -French people at Agadir to fill the pockets of financiers whose names -are unknown outside Constantinople or the Paris Bourse.... The Ottoman -Empire is shaken, and the cosmopolitan financier is now staking out the -land into spheres of interest. An empire may survive disaster, but it -cannot survive exploitation. A country like Turkey, without legislative -capacity, without understanding what the economics of Europe mean and -at the same time rich, is a lamb for the slaughter.”[19] - -This trenchant criticism of French policy might have been taken more -seriously had Great Britain herself been actuated by magnanimous -impulses. Instead, British financiers were joining the common scramble -for concessions, and British statesmen were pursuing with ruthless -avidity every means of protecting British imperial interests. - - -THE YOUNG TURKS CONCILIATE GREAT BRITAIN - -The Bagdad negotiations of 1910–1911 between Sir Ernest Cassel and Dr. -von Gwinner, on the one hand, and the British and Ottoman Governments, -on the other, came to naught, it will be recalled, because of the -refusal of Sir Edward Grey to consent to an increase in the Turkish -customs duties. The Sublime Porte was unwilling to grant the economic -concessions demanded by Great Britain as the price of her assistance in -Ottoman financial stabilization. But the Young Turks were shrewd enough -to keep the door open for further negotiations by removing the chief -political objection of England to the Bagdad enterprise—namely, that it -menaced British imperial interests in the region of the Persian Gulf. -In the convention of March 21, 1911, with the Bagdad Railway Company, -the Ottoman Government reserved to itself considerable latitude in the -disposition of the sections of the line beyond Bagdad.[20] - -Conversations were resumed in July, 1911, when the Turkish minister -in London solicited of the Foreign Office a further statement of the -conditions upon which British objections to the Bagdad Railway might be -waived. He was informed that English acquiescence might be forthcoming -if the Bagdad-Basra section of the railway were constructed by a -company in which British, French, German, Russian, and Turkish capital -should share equally; if adequate guarantees were obtained regarding -the protection of British imperial interests in southern Mesopotamia -and Persia; if English capital were granted important navigation rights -on the Shatt-el-Arab, including complete exemption of British ships and -British goods from Ottoman tolls; if safeguards were provided against -discriminatory and differential tariffs on the Bagdad system. - -These proposals met with only partial acceptance by the Ottoman -Government. Turkey was willing to internationalize the southernmost -sections of the Bagdad Railway, but under no circumstances would she -permit Russian participation in an enterprise which was so vital to the -defence of the Sultan’s Empire. Turkey was prepared to discuss with -England measures for the protection of legitimate British interests -in the Middle East, provided there be no further infringement on the -sovereign rights of the Sultan in southern Mesopotamia. Turkey agreed -that the principle of the economic open door should be scrupulously -observed throughout the Ottoman Empire; therefore she could not agree -to discriminatory treatment in favor of British commerce on the -Shatt-el-Arab, the Tigris, and the Euphrates. Upon these conditions -the Ottoman minister at London was authorized to continue negotiations -in the most friendly spirit.[21] - -The Agadir crisis, which threatened war between England and Germany, -and the Tripolitan War, which diverted Turkish attention from domestic -reform to defence of the Empire, unfortunately led to a suspension of -the Anglo-Turkish conversations. They were not resumed until 1913, when -Turkey found a breathing spell between the first and second phases of -the First Balkan War. - -During the interim, however, steps were taken to remove the obstacles -which stood in the way of an Anglo-German understanding. In February, -1912, Lord Haldane visited Berlin as the guest of the Kaiser to -discuss curtailment of the naval programs of the two Powers and to -agree upon other measures which would effect a _rapprochement_ between -_Wilhelmstrasse_ and Downing Street. As regards the Bagdad Railway, -Lord Haldane informed the German Government that he stood upon the -position he had taken in 1907—that Great Britain was prepared to -grant its consent to the enterprise if British political interests -in Mesopotamia were adequately safeguarded.[22] A few months later, -Baron Marschall von Bieberstein—who for fifteen years had guided -Germany’s destiny in the Near East—was transferred from Constantinople -to the embassy at London, as the first step in an attempt to reconcile -British imperial interests with German diplomatic hegemony in Turkey. -Almost simultaneously, Sir Harry Johnston, whose enthusiasm for -German ventures in Asia Minor has already been mentioned,[23] began a -quasi-official lecture tour in Germany to urge a sane settlement of the -Near Eastern tangle. Another important development was the appointment -as German Minister of Foreign Affairs, in January, 1913, of Herr von -Jagow, who believed that a great European war was inevitable unless -England and Germany could come to terms on the Turkish question.[24] - -In this manner the stage was set for a resumption of Anglo-Turkish -conversations on the Bagdad Railway. In February, 1913, Hakki Pasha, -minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary of the Ottoman Government, -arrived in London with instructions to leave no stone unturned to -settle outstanding differences with Great Britain. For almost four -months Hakki Pasha and Sir Edward Grey discussed the problems of the -Near East and conferred with Herr von Kühlmann and Prince Lichnowsky, -of the German embassy at London, regarding the general terms of a -tripartite settlement of the economic and political questions at issue. -In May, 1913, a full agreement was reached upon the following wide -range of subjects: regularization of the legal position in Turkey of -British religious, educational, and medical institutions; pecuniary -claims of Great Britain against the Ottoman Empire; the Turkish veto -on the borrowing powers of Egypt; Turco-Persian boundary disputes, -particularly in so far as they affected oil lands; navigation of the -Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt-el-Arab; irrigation of the Mesopotamian -valley; the status of Koweit. The settlements agreed upon were ratified -by a series of treaties between Great Britain and Turkey, notably those -of July 29, and October 21, 1913, and of June, 1914. Reconciliation of -British and German interests was reserved for discussion between London -and Berlin.[25] - -In so far as concerned the Bagdad Railway, the substance of the -Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913 is as follows: - - 1. Turkey recognized the special position of Great Britain in the - region of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, although Great Britain - acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan over Koweit, the Ottoman - Government pledged a policy of non-interference in the affairs of - the principality. The existing treaties between the Sheik and Great - Britain were confirmed. - - 2. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra, unless and - until Great Britain should give consent to an extension of the line to - the Persian Gulf. - - 3. In order to assure equality of treatment for all, regardless of - nationality or other considerations, the Ottoman Government agreed - that two British citizens should be elected to the Board of Directors - of the Bagdad Railway Company. - - 4. Exclusive rights of navigation by steamers and barges on the - Tigris, Euphrates, and Shatt-el-Arab were granted to the Ottoman - River Navigation Company, to be formed by Baron Inchcape, chairman of - the Peninsular and Oriental and the British India Steam Navigation - Companies. The Navigation Company, in which Turkish capital was to - be offered a fifty per cent participation, was to have wide powers - for the improvement and regulation of all navigable streams in - Mesopotamia, in cooperation with a commission to be appointed by the - Ottoman Government. Lord Inchcape’s concession was for a period of - sixty years, with optional renewals for ten-year periods. - - 5. It was agreed, however, that the Bagdad Railway and Inchcape - concessions were without prejudice to the rights of the Lynch - Brothers, which were specifically reaffirmed. The Lynch Brothers, in - fact, were granted the privilege of adding another steamer to their - equipment, with the single restriction that it fly the Turkish flag. - - 6. The British Government agreed that no navigation rights of its - nationals would be construed as permitting interference with the - development of Mesopotamia by irrigation, and the Ottoman Government - guaranteed that no irrigation works would be permitted to divert - navigable streams from their course. - - 7. In return for these, and other, assurances and concessions, Great - Britain consented to support an increase of 4% in the customs duties - of the Ottoman Empire. - -The terms of this settlement were hailed by the English press as an -admirable solution of the Mesopotamian imbroglio. _The Times_ of May -17, 1913, for example, said: “Great Britain will have no further -reason for looking askance at a project which should do much for the -development of Asiatic Turkey. Our interests will be safeguarded; -we have always said that a terminus at Basra offered no menace to -specific British interests in the Persian Gulf; and the German -promoters will be free to complete their great project with the -benevolent acquiescence of Great Britain. There will be no official -participation in the construction of the line, but there will also -be nothing to deter British capital from being associated with the -scheme. We believe that if some such solution is adopted, a fertile -source of international misunderstanding will disappear. It is a -solution which should receive the approval of France and Russia and -should give gratification to Germany. It appears to leave no room for -subsequent differences of opinion, while it wipes out a whole series -of obscure disputes. It will be a further demonstration of that spirit -of coöperation among the Great Powers which has done so much of late -to preserve the peace of Europe. It should convince Germany that Great -Britain does not oppose the essential elements of the Bagdad Railway -scheme provided her own special interests are protected. Above all, -it will relieve the financial disabilities of Turkey and will enable -her to press forward the great task of binding with bonds of steel the -great Asiatic territories in which her future chiefly lies.” Other -press opinion was in accord with Sir Edward Grey that the agreement -“justifies us in saying that it is no longer in British interests to -oppose the line.”[26] - -In Germany, likewise, the Anglo-Turkish agreement was favorably -received. The _Berliner Tageblatt_ of December 29, 1913, hailed it as -a triumph of German diplomacy. “For years,” it said, “this undertaking -has threatened to become a bone of contention between Russia, England, -and Germany. The German Government has now, through its cleverness -and tenacity, succeeded in removing all differences and in bringing -the line altogether into German possession.” In the Reichstag, as -well, the general tenor of the comments was favorable, although Herr -Bassermann and other National Liberals were somewhat vociferous about -the great “sacrifices” which Germany had made to propitiate Great -Britain. Among the Social Democrats and the Centrists, however, the -sentiment was obviously in accord with one member who said, “We share -the general satisfaction at this _rapprochement_, which is an aid to -world peace, but we also are of the opinion that there is no occasion -for over-exuberance or patriotic bombast.”[27] - -As usual, the rôle of the Turks themselves was slighted. A casual -observer might have remarked that whatever “benevolent acquiescence” -was included in the settlement originated in Constantinople rather than -in London, and that the “sacrifices” involved were much more painful to -Turkey than to Germany! - - -BRITISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS ARE FURTHER SAFEGUARDED - -In the Speech from the Throne, February 10, 1914, King George V -informed Parliament that the Near Eastern question was approaching a -solution. “My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly,” -he said. “I am happy to say that my negotiations, both with the German -Government and the Ottoman Government as regards matters of importance -to the commercial and industrial interests of this country in -Mesopotamia are rapidly approaching a satisfactory issue.” Nothing was -said to indicate the character of the negotiations or to identify the -“commercial and industrial interests” which were the objects of royal -solicitude. - -Before the British Government would give its consent to a final -agreement with Turkey and Germany regarding the Bagdad Railway, the -King might have added, it was determined to acquire for certain worthy -Britons a share in some of the choicest economic plums in the Ottoman -Empire. Heading the interests which were thus to be favored was the -Right Honorable James Lyle Mackay, Baron Inchcape of Strathnaver, who -had been the beneficiary of the aforementioned Mesopotamian navigation -concession of July, 1913. Lord Inchcape is perhaps the foremost -shipping magnate in the British Empire. He is chairman and managing -director of the Peninsular and Oriental and the British India Steam -Navigation Companies; chairman and director of the Australasian United -Steam Navigation Company and the Eastern and Australian Steamship -Company; a director of the Steamship Owners’ Coal Association, -the Australasia and China Telegraph Company, the Marine Insurance -Company, the Central Queensland Meat Export Company, and various other -commercial enterprises. He is a vice-president of the Suez Canal -Company. He has extensive interests in the petroleum industry as a -director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Scottish Oils, Ltd., and the -D’Arcy Exploration Company. - -Lord Inchcape’s interests were given ample consideration in the -Anglo-German negotiations of 1914. On February 23, a contract was -signed at London between the Bagdad Railway Company and Lord Inchcape, -the signatures to which were witnessed by Herr von Kühlmann, of -the German embassy, and Sir Eyre Crowe, of the British Foreign -Office. Under the terms of this contract the Bagdad Railway Company -acknowledged the monopolistic privileges in Mesopotamian river -navigation conferred upon Lord Inchcape’s interests by the Ottoman -Government; agreed to cancel its outstanding engagements with the Lynch -Brothers for the transportation of railway materials between Basra and -points along the Tigris; and guaranteed Lord Inchcape a minimum amount -of 100,000 tons of freight, at a figure of 22–1/2 shillings per ton, in -the transportation on the Tigris of supplies for the construction of -the Bagdad Railway and its subsidiary enterprises.[28] - -This contract was so obviously in contravention of earlier rights of -the Lynch Brothers, which had been specifically reaffirmed by the -negotiations with Turkey, that it was amended by an agreement of March -27, 1914, between Lord Inchcape, Mr. John F. Lynch, and the Bagdad -Railway Company. The latter arrangement provided: 1. That Lord Inchcape -should immediately organize the Ottoman Navigation Company to take -over the concession of July, 1913, and the rights conferred upon Lord -Inchcape by his agreement of February 23, 1914, with the Bagdad Railway -Company; 2. That the Lynch Brothers should be admitted to participation -in the new Navigation Company and that Mr. John F. Lynch should be -elected a director thereof; 3. That the Bagdad Railway should assign to -a new Ottoman Ports Company—in which Mr. Lynch and Lord Inchcape should -be granted a 40% participation—all of the rights of the Railway to the -construction of port and terminal facilities at Bagdad and Basra; 4. -That the Bagdad Railway Company should be granted a 20% participation -in the new Ottoman Navigation Company. Thus were Lord Inchcape’s -powerful interests further propitiated! Thus did the Lynch Brothers -cease to be big fish in a small pond, to become small fish in a big -lake! - -Measures were now taken to protect another vested interest, the -British-owned Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company. On March 26, a draft -agreement, subsequently confirmed as part of the Anglo-German -convention of June 15, was executed by Dr. Carl Bergmann, of the Bagdad -Railway Company, and Lord Rathmore, of the Smyrna-Aidin Company. It -provided for important extensions of over 200 miles to the existing -Smyrna-Aidin line (including a junction with the Anatolian-Bagdad -system at Afiun Karahissar), granted to British interests valuable -navigation rights on the lakes of Asia Minor, and protected each -railway from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the other. This -settlement was approved by Herr von Kühlmann, on behalf of the German -Government; Mr. Alwyn Parker, of the British Foreign Office; and Hakki -Pasha, minister plenipotentiary of the Sultan to the Court of St. -James.[29] - -Oil—the magic word which has become the open sesame of so many -diplomatic mysteries—was of no inconsiderable importance in 1914. Early -in that eventful year the British Government—in order to insure an -uninterrupted supply of fuel to the fleet—had purchased a controlling -interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. As a necessary step in -the negotiations regarding Turkish oilfields the German Government -was obliged, in March, 1914, to recognize southern Mesopotamia, -as well as central and southern Persia, as the exclusive field of -operations of the Anglo-Persian Company, and, in addition, to agree -to the construction of a railway from Kut-el-Amara to Mendeli for the -purpose of facilitating petroleum shipments. Thereupon an Anglo-German -syndicate organized the Turkish Petroleum Company for the acquisition -and exploitation of the oil resources of the vilayets of Mosul and -Bagdad. Half of the stock of the new company was assigned to the -National Bank of Turkey (controlled by Sir Ernest Cassel) and the -D’Arcy group (in which Lord Inchcape was interested); one quarter was -assigned to the Royal Dutch Company, and the remainder was reserved -for the _Deutsche Bank_. Upon joint representations by the British -and German ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, the Sultan, in June, -1914, conferred upon the Turkish Petroleum Company exclusive rights of -exploitation of the oil resources of the Mesopotamian valley from Mosul -to Bagdad.[30] - -The vested interests of certain of its citizens having thus been -amply protected, the British Government proceeded to complete its -negotiations with the German ambassador in London. On June 15, 1914, -Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky initialed an important convention -regarding the delimitation of English and German interests in Asiatic -Turkey. The following day _The Times_ announced that the terms of -an Anglo-German agreement had been incorporated in a draft treaty, -and on June 29, Sir Edward Grey informed the House of Commons that -formal ratification of the convention was being postponed only “until -Turkey and Germany have completed their own separate negotiations.” -By mid-July all was in readiness for the definitive signing of the -treaty, but the widening importance of the Austro-Serbian dispute -and the outbreak of the Great War put an end to the Bagdad Railway -conversations.[31] - -The terms of the convention of June 15, 1914—which might have meant so -much to the future of Anglo-German relations—constituted a complete -settlement of the controversy which had waged for more than ten years -over German railway construction in the Mesopotamian valley. The -reconciliation of the divergent interests of the two Powers was based -upon the following considerations:[32] - - 1. “In recognition of the general importance of the Bagdad Railway - in international trade” the British Government bound itself not “to - adopt or to support any measures which might render more difficult - the construction or management of the Bagdad Railway by the Bagdad - Railway Company or to prevent the participation of capital in the - enterprise.” Great Britain further agreed that under no circumstances - would it “undertake railway construction on Ottoman territory in - direct competition with lines of the Bagdad Railway Company or in - contravention of existing rights of the Company or support the efforts - of any persons or companies directed to this end,” unless in accord - with the expressed wishes of the German Government. - - 2. His Britannic Majesty’s Government pledged itself to support an - increase in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire from 11% to - 15% _ad valorem_ and, furthermore, to “raise no objection to the - assignment to the Bagdad Railway Company of already existing Turkish - State revenues, or of revenues from the intended increase in tariff - duties, or of the proposed monopolies or taxes on the consumption of - alcohol, petroleum, matches, tinder, cigarette-paper, playing cards, - and sugar to the extent necessary for the completion of the Railway.“ - - 3. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was to be Basra. Both of the - signatory Powers declared that under no circumstances would they - “support the construction of a branch from Basra or any other point - on the main line of the Bagdad Railway to the Persian Gulf, unless - a complete understanding be previously arrived at between the - Imperial Ottoman, the Imperial German, and His Britannic Majesty’s - Governments.” The German Government furthermore pledged itself under - no circumstances to “undertake the construction of a harbor or a - railway station on the Persian Gulf or support efforts of any persons - or companies directed toward that end, unless a complete agreement be - previously arrived at with His Britannic Majesty’s Government.” - - 4. The German Government undertook to see that “on the lines of - the Bagdad Railway Company, as hitherto, no direct or indirect - discrimination in transit facilities or freight rates shall be made in - the transportation of goods of the same kind between the same places, - either on account of ownership or on account of origin or destination - of the goods or because of any other consideration.” In other words, - the German Government agreed to enforce Articles 24 and 25 of the - Specifications of March 5, 1903, which provided that “all rates, - whether they be general, special, proportional, or differential, shall - be applicable to all shippers and passengers without distinction,” - and which prohibited the Company to enter into any agreement for the - purpose of granting reductions in the rates announced in its published - tariffs. - - 5. In order further to protect British interests the German Government - assumed responsibility for the election to the Board of Directors of - the Bagdad Railway Company of “two English members acceptable to His - Britannic Majesty’s Government.” - - 6. Both Powers pledged themselves unreservedly to observe the - principle of the economic open door in the operation of railway, - ports, irrigation, and navigation enterprises in Turkey-in-Asia. - - 7. Great Britain recognized German interests in the irrigation of - the Cilician plain, and Germany recognized British interests in the - irrigation of the lower Mesopotamian valley. - - 8. Both signatory Powers took cognizance of and agreed to observe the - Anglo-Turkish agreement of July, 1913, conferring important navigation - rights in Mesopotamia upon British subjects; the agreements between - Lord Inchcape and the Bagdad Railway Company, regarding navigation - and port and terminal facilities on the Tigris and Euphrates; the - agreement between the Smyrna-Aidin Railway and the Bagdad Railway - regarding important extensions to the former line. - - 9. Great Britain and Germany agreed to “use their good offices with - the Imperial Ottoman Government to the end that the Shatt-el-Arab - shall be brought into a satisfactory navigable condition and - permanently maintained in such condition, so that ocean-going ships - may always be assured of free and easy access to the port of Basra, - and, further, that the shipping on the Shatt-el-Arab shall always be - open to ocean-going ships under the same conditions to ships of all - nations, regardless of the nationality of the ships or their cargo.” - - 10. It was agreed, finally, that any differences of opinion resulting - from the convention or its appended documents should be subject to - arbitration. If the signatory Powers were unable to agree upon an - arbitrator or a special court of arbitration, the case was to be - submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. - -From both the German and the British points of view the foregoing -convention was an admirable solution of the Turkish problem. Had -the agreement been reached ten years earlier, it might have avoided -estrangement between the two nations. Had it come at almost any other -time than on the eve of the Great War, it would have been a powerful -stimulus to an Anglo-German _rapprochement_. - -Germany, it is true, was obliged to abandon any hope of establishing -a port on the Persian Gulf. But there were grave uncertainties that -Koweit could ever be developed as a commercially profitable terminus -for the Bagdad Railway, whereas its very possession by a German company -would have been a constant source of irritation to Great Britain. -Basra, on the other hand, had obvious advantages. Like many of the -great harbors of the world—Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, London, New -York—it was on a river, rather than the open sea; and inasmuch as Great -Britain had agreed that the freedom of the open sea should be applied -to the Shatt-el-Arab, German ships were assured unrestricted access to -the southern terminus of the Bagdad Railway. In return for surrendering -the Basra-Persian Gulf section of the Bagdad system and for admitting -British capitalists to participation in the Bagdad and Basra ports -company, Germany received full recognition of her economic rights in -Anatolia, Syria, and northern Mesopotamia, together with a minor share -in Lord Inchcape’s navigation enterprises and in the newly formed -Turkish Petroleum Company. Above all, British opposition to the Bagdad -Railway, which had been so stubbornly maintained since 1903, was to be -a thing of the past. For these considerations Germany could well afford -to accept a subordinate place in southern Mesopotamia and to recognize -British interests in the Persian Gulf. - -Great Britain gained even more than Germany. She abandoned her policy -of obstruction of the Bagdad Railway and consented to an increase -in the customs duties of the Ottoman Empire. These considerations -had never been ends in themselves, but rather pawns in the great -game of diplomacy, to be surrendered in return for other valuable -considerations. For them England secured guarantees of equality of -treatment for British citizens and British goods on the German railway -lines in Turkey. In addition, English capitalists received a monopoly -of navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates, a 40% interest in port and -terminal facilities at Bagdad and Basra, control of the oil resources -of the Mesopotamian valley, extensions to British-owned railways in -southern Anatolia, and other valuable economic concessions. British -political control was recognized as dominant in southern Mesopotamia; -therefore the Bagdad Railway no longer could be said to be a menace to -the safety of India. As for Britain’s new position in the Persian Gulf, -one of her own publicists said, “England has virtually annexed another -sea, one of the world’s highways.”[33] - - -DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING FAILS TO PRESERVE PEACE - -It is one of the tragedies of pre-War diplomacy that the negotiations -of 1910–1914 failed to preserve peace in the Near East or, at least, to -prevent the entry of Turkey into the Great War. But the failure of the -treaties between Germany and the Entente Powers regarding the Ottoman -Empire can be traced, in general, to the same reasons that contributed -to the collapse of all diplomacy in the crisis of 1914. Imperialism, -nationalism, militarism—these were the causes of the Great War; these -were the causes of Ottoman participation in the Great War. - -One obvious defect of the Potsdam Agreement, the Franco-German -agreement regarding Anatolian railways, the Anglo-Turkish settlement -of 1913, and the Anglo-German convention regarding Mesopotamia, -was the fact that they were founded upon the principle of imperial -compensations. Each of the Great Powers involved made “sacrifices”—but -in return for important considerations. And throughout all of the -bargaining the rights of Turkey, a “backward nation,” were completely -ignored. As the German ambassador in London wrote: “The real purpose -of these treaties was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of interest, -although this expression was anxiously avoided, out of regard for the -rights of the Sultan.... By virtue of the treaties all Mesopotamia as -far as Basra became our sphere of interest, without prejudice to older -British rights in the navigation of the Tigris and in the Willcocks -irrigation works. Our sphere further included the whole region of the -Bagdad and Anatolian Railways. The British economic domain was to -include the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin line; the -French, Syria; the Russian, Armenia.”[34] - -In the scramble for concessions in Asia Minor, Italy had been -overlooked. The proposed extension of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway met with -vehement denunciation on the part of patriotic Italians who looked -forward to the further development of Italian economic influence in the -hinterland of the port of Adalia. The Italian press loudly demanded -that energetic action be taken by the Government to secure from Turkey -compensatory concessions or, in default of that, to announce to the -Sublime Porte that Italy would not return to Turkey the Dodecanese -Islands, of which Italy was in temporary occupation under the terms of -the Treaty of Lausanne (1912). A formal demand of this character was -made by King Victor Emmanuel’s ambassador at Constantinople, but was -met with a curt refusal on the part of the Turks to bargain for the -return of their own property.[35] - -The Young Turks were not unaware of the true character of the -agreements they had entered into with the respective European Powers, -but they considered themselves impotent to act otherwise at the time. -They knew full well that there was grave danger in an extension of -British influence in Mesopotamia, French interests in Syria, and -Franco-Russian enterprise in northern Anatolia. They had not forgotten -the spoliation of their empire by Austria-Hungary and Italy. They -were not altogether unsuspicious about the intentions of Germany. But -they believed they could never emancipate their country from foreign -domination until they had modernized it. They needed foreign capital -and foreign technical assistance, and they had to pay the price. In -order to throw off the yoke of European imperialism they had to consent -temporarily to be victimized by it.[36] - -Nationalistic fervor added to the difficulties created by imperialist -rivalry. M. André Tardieu, political editor at the time of _Le Temps_, -did not let a single opportunity pass during February and March, 1914, -to denounce the French Government for its pro-German policy in the -Bagdad Railway question. When M. Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin, -was asked whether the Franco-German agreement on Turkish railways would -improve the relations between his country and the German Empire, he -said: “Official relations, yes, perhaps to some extent, but I do not -think that the agreement will affect the great body of public opinion -on both sides of the Vosges. It will not, unfortunately, change the -tone of the French press towards the Germans.... There is no doubt -whatever that the majority, both of Germans and Frenchmen, desire to -live at peace; but there is a powerful minority in each country that -dreams of nothing but battles and wars, either of conquest or revenge. -That is the peril that is always with us; it is like living alongside -a barrel of gunpowder which may explode on the slightest provocation.” -Herr von Jagow, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed a -similar opinion when he said that he was watching for a favorable -moment for the publication of the Anglo-German convention of June 15, -1914—“an appropriate moment when the danger of adverse criticism was -no longer so acute.”[37] Hatred, suspicion, fear, and other unbridled -passions were the stock-in-trade of the Continental press during the -months preceding the outbreak of the Great War. Patriotic bombast, -not international conciliation, was demanded by the imperialist and -nationalist minorities, who exerted only too much influence upon the -Governments and made politicians fear lest their efforts at peace be -misconstrued as treason! - -A situation which was made bad by imperial rivalries and national -antagonisms was made intolerable by militarism. During the year -1913–1914, when the diplomatists were working for peace, preparations -were being made for war. In the month of August, 1913, while -conversations were being held in Berlin to reconcile French and German -interests in the Near East, General Joffre was on his way to Russia -to confer with the Tsar’s general staff regarding the reorganization -of the Russian army. In October of the same year, while tripartite -negotiations were being conducted by England, Turkey, and Germany -regarding Mesopotamia, General Liman von Sanders was despatched to -Constantinople by the Kaiser as head of a German military mission to -rebuild the Ottoman army and improve the Ottoman system of defence. -Considerations of military strategy were vitiating the efforts of -conciliatory diplomacy. - -The mission of Liman von Sanders created a crisis at Constantinople. -The Russian, French, and British ambassadors protested against -such an obvious menace to the interests of the Entente. Russia, in -particular, objected to the announced intention of the German general -to strengthen the defences of the Straits. All three of the Powers -expressed opposition to the further proposal that Field Marshal von -Sanders be placed in command of the First Army Corps, with headquarters -at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government replied that it meant no -offence to England or France, but that it could not allow its military -policy to be determined by Russia. It called attention to the fact -that the improvement of the navy was in the hands of a British mission -and that the reorganization of the gendarmerie was going on under the -direction of a French general. German officers were being asked to -perform similar services for the army because the great majority of -Turkish officers had completed their training in Germany, and the rest, -since the days of General von der Goltz Pasha, had been educated and -experienced in German methods. To change from German to French or -British technique appeared to the Ottoman Minister of War an extremely -inadvisable procedure.[38] - -Although the storm over Liman von Sanders cleared by February, 1914, -it left behind it certain permanent effects. It strengthened German -influence at Constantinople, indirectly because of the increased -Turkish hostility to Russia and suspicion of France and England, -directly because of the presence of hundreds of German staff and -regimental officers who used every opportunity to increase German -prestige in the army and the civil services. The German ambassador -at the Sublime Porte, Baron von Wangenheim, readily capitalized this -prestige in the interest of German diplomacy. A formal Turco-German -alliance was rapidly passing from the realm of the possible to the -realm of the probable. - -In the meantime feverish efforts were being made to complete -Turkey’s military preparations. In March, 1914, at the request of -the Minister of War, a conference was held of representatives of all -railways in Asiatic Turkey to discuss the utilization of Ottoman rail -communications for mobilization in the event of war. Under the guidance -of German and Turkish staff officers a plan was adopted by which the -respective railways agreed to merge their services into a unified -national system for the transportation of troops. Throughout the spring -of 1914 the defences of the Dardanelles were being strengthened, -schools were being conducted for junior officers and non-commissioned -officers, the General Staff was reorganized, new plans for mobilization -were in process of completion. On July 23, 1914, the handiwork of Field -Marshal Liman von Sanders Pasha was exhibited in a great national -military review. On that occasion Baron von Wangenheim said to the -Ottoman Minister of Marine: “Djemal Pasha, just look at the amazing -results achieved by German officers in a short time. You have now -a Turkish army which can be compared with the best organized armies -in the world! All German officers are at one in praising the moral -strength of the Turkish soldier, and indeed it has proved itself beyond -all expectation. We could claim we have won a great victory if we could -call ourselves the ally of a Government which has such an army at its -disposal!”[39] - -A few days later the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Triple -Alliance—with the consent of Austria, but without even the knowledge of -Italy. The die was cast for Turkey’s participation in the War of the -Nations![40] - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Statement of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg to the Reichstag, -December 10, 1910, in _Stenographische Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, -2 Session_, Volume 262, pp. 3561b _et seq._ _Cf._, also, _The Annual -Register_, 1910, pp. 314–315, 335–336; Shuster, _op. cit._, pp. 225 -_et seq._ The informal agreement reached at Potsdam was confirmed by a -treaty of August 19, 1911. _The Annual Register_, 1911, pp. 357–358. -For the diplomatic correspondence arising out of the Potsdam Agreement -_cf._ de Siebert, _op. cit._, Chapter IX. - -[2] Korff, _op. cit._, pp. 163–164. Baron Korff believes, also, that -the Potsdam Agreement was forced upon the weak and vacillating Nicholas -II by the unscrupulous and bullying William II. - -[3] _Supra_, pp. 65–66, 147–153. For German estimates of the importance -of the Potsdam Agreement see a reasoned and temperate speech by Dr. -Spahn, of the Catholic Centre, and an impassioned and boisterous -speech by Herr Bassermann, of the National Liberals. _Stenographische -Berichte, XII Legislaturperiode, 2 Session_, Volume 266 (1911), PP. -5973 _et seq._, 5984 _et seq._ - -[4] _The Times_, January 18, 1911. - -[5] Quoted by W. M. Fullerton, _Problems of Power_ (new and revised -edition, New York, 1915), p. 171. - -[6] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume 21 -(1911), pp. 241–244. - -[7] _Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés_, -January 13, 1911, pp. 33–34. M. Jaurès was one of the Frenchmen who -felt that their Government never should have opposed the Bagdad Railway -in the first instance. - -[8] _Ibid._, January 16, pp. 64 _et seq._; _Parliamentary Debates, -House of Commons_, Volume 21 (1911), pp. 82 _et seq._, 243–244; _The -Times_, January 17 and 19, 1911. - -[9] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 21 (1911), p. 82. - -[10] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 224–225. - -[11] _Cf._ G. Saint-Yves, “Les chemins de fer français dans la Turquie -d’Asie,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), -pp. 526–531; _Anatolia_, pp. 51–52. - -[12] It was proposed that the Anatolian Railways should construct three -branches: one from a point east of Bulgurlu north and north-east to -Kaisarieh and Sivas; a second from Angora east to the aforementioned -branch, joining it near Kaisarieh; a third from Adabazar to Boli. The -branch of the Bagdad Railway from Nisibin to Diarbekr and Arghana was -authorized by the concession of 1903. - -[13] Much of the present account of the negotiations of the years -1910–1914 is based upon documentary material furnished by Dr. von -Gwinner and upon additional information supplied by Sir Henry Babington -Smith and Djavid Bey. Almost everything heretofore published has been -very general in character, but one may find some illuminating details -in the following: R. de Caix, “La France et les chemins de fer de -l’Asie turque,” in _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume -36 (1913), pp. 386–387; _Armenia and Kurdistan_, p. 36; _Commerce -Reports_, No. 18a (1915), pp. 2–3; _Stenographische Berichte, XIII -Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume 291 (1913), pp. 6274c _et seq._; -_American Journal of International Law_, April, 1918; Commandant -de Thomasson, “Les négotiations franco-allemandes,” in _Questions -diplomatiques et coloniales_, Volume 37 (1914), pp. 257 _et seq._ - -[14] For certified copies of the minutes of the meetings of August -19–20 and September 24–26, 1913, and for the text of the convention of -February 15, 1914, the author is indebted to Dr. von Gwinner. - -[15] _Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, -Volume 291 (1913), p. 6274c. No. 111 of a series of despatches -published by the German Foreign Office (Berlin, 1915), an English -translation of which is to be found in E.D. Morel’s _Diplomacy -Revealed_ (London, 1921), pp. 282–283. - -[16] _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 964 (1920). - -[17] _Cf._ de Caix, _op. cit._, pp. 386–387. - -[18] It should be made clear that not all the terms of the -Franco-German agreement were carried out before the beginning of the -Great War. Because of the delay in the negotiations with Great Britain -(_cf._ _infra_) the exchange of Bagdad Railway securities for Imperial -Ottoman Bonds was not completed, with the result that, when the War -came, French bankers still held an interest in the Bagdad Railway -Company. - -[19] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, fifth series, Volume -59 (1914), pp. 2179–2189. Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919) had traveled -extensively in the Near and Far East and was the author of many books -on the political and economic problems of those regions. During the -Great War he was commissioned by the British Government to negotiate -with France regarding the delimitation of the Allies’ interests in -Mesopotamia and Syria. He was one of the authors of the Sykes-Picot -Treaty of 1916. - -[20] _Supra_, pp. 111–112, 228–229. - -[21] Memorandum of Djavid Bey, cited in Chapter IX, _supra_. - -[22] Haldane, _op. cit._, _passim_; W. von Hohenzollern, _My Memoirs, -1878–1918_, pp. 142–156; _supra_, pp. 198–199; _The Annual Register_, -1912, pp. 16, 332; Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, to M. -Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 9 and 16, 1912, -despatches Nos. 88 and 90, translated in Morel, _op. cit._, pp. 228–230. - -[23] _Supra_, pp. 205–207. - -[24] Baron Marschall died in September, 1912, after only a few weeks -of service at his new post. He was succeeded by Prince Lichnowsky, who -took up his duties in London in November. Regarding the lecture tour -of Sir Harry Johnston see the authentic account by Bernadotte Schmitt, -_England and Germany, 1740–1914_, pp. 355–356. Herr von Jagow’s opinion -of the importance of an Anglo-German understanding on the Near East is -to be found in his reply to Prince Lichnowsky, in the _Norddeutsche -Allgemeine Zeitung_ of March 23, 1918, translated by Munroe Smith, _The -Disclosures from Germany_, pp. 130–131. - -[25] Regarding the Anglo-Turkish negotiations _cf._ _Parliamentary -Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 53 (1913), pp. 392–395; -_Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, Volume -291 (1913), pp. 6274c-6294d; Karl Helfferich, _Die Vorgeschichte des -Weltkrieges_, pp. 143 _et seq._; _Mesopotamia_, pp. 97–98; _The Times_ -(London), May 17 and May 31, 1913; _The Quarterly Review_, Volume 228 -(1917), pp. 517–521; de Siebert, _op. cit._, Chapter XX. - -[26] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 53 (1913), p. -393. - -[27] _Stenographische Berichte, XIII Legislaturperiode, 1 Session_, -Volume 289 (1913), p. 4744d. _Cf._, also, _ibid._, pp. 4744c-4746c; -Volume 290 (1913), p. 5326a-c. - -[28] For copies of this and other agreements the author is indebted to -Dr. von Gwinner, of the _Deutsche Bank_. - -[29] For the text of the agreement _cf._ E.M. Earle, “The Secret -Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey,” in the -_Political Science Quarterly_ (New York), Volume XXXVIII (1923), pp. -41–44. - -[30] “Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government and the United -States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories,” -_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 675 (1921); _The Daily News_ (London), -June 26, 1920; G. Slocombe, “The Oil Behind the War Scare,” in _The -Daily Herald_ (London), October 12 and 13, 1922; _The Disclosures from -Germany_, p. 238. - -[31] _Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons_, Volume 64 (1914), pp. -116–117. - -[32] For the complete text of the convention, _cf._ E. M. Earle, “The -Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 regarding Asiatic Turkey,” _loc. -cit._, pp. 24–44. - -[33] Fullerton, _op. cit._, p. 307. - -[34] Prince Lichnowsky, quoted from _The Disclosures from Germany_, pp. -71–72. - -[35] Saint-Yves, _loc. cit._, pp. 526–531; _Anatolia_, pp. 49 _et seq._ -Regarding the earlier development of Italian economic interests in -Turkey _cf._ _supra_, pp. 105–107. - -[36] For an interesting discussion of this point see Ahmed Djemal -Pasha, _Erinnerungen eines türkischen Staatsmannes_ (Munich, 1922), -translated into English under the title, _Memories of a Turkish -Statesman, 1913–1919_ (New York, 1923), pp. 107–115 of the translation, -pp. 113–122 of the German text. (Hereafter page references are given -for the translation only). - -[37] Baron Beyens, Belgian minister in Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian -Minister of Foreign Affairs, No. 111 of the Belgian documents, -translated in Morel’s _Diplomacy Revealed_, p. 283. The quotation from -von Jagow is from _The Disclosures from Germany_, p. 251. - -[38] Regarding the German military mission to Turkey _cf._ Djemal -Pasha, _op. cit._, pp. 65–70, 101–102; Liman von Sanders, _Fünf Jahre -Türkei_ (Berlin, 1919); Field Marshal von der Goltz, _Die Militärische -Lage der Türkei nach dem Balkankriege_ (Berlin, 1913); _The Disclosures -from Germany_, pp. 57 _et seq._ - -[39] Djemal Pasha, _op. cit._, p. 108. - -[40] _Ibid._, pp. 107–115. Regarding other aspects of German military -and diplomatic successes in Turkey during 1914, _cf._ _Anatolia_, pp. -44–45; Henry Morgenthau, _Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story_ (New York, -1918); Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_, pp. 28 _et seq._, -and _Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, _passim_; André Chéradame, -_The Pan German Plot Unmasked_ (New York, 1917)—all representing widely -divergent points of view. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -TURKEY, CRUSHED TO EARTH, RISES AGAIN - - -NATIONALISM AND MILITARISM TRIUMPH AT CONSTANTINOPLE - -The outbreak of the Great War precipitated a serious political crisis -at Constantinople. Decisions of the utmost moment to the future of -the Ottoman Empire had to be taken. Chief among these was the choice -between neutrality and entry into the war in coöperation with the -Central Powers. Pacifists and Entente sympathizers, of whom Djavid -Bey was perhaps the foremost, counseled non-intervention in the -struggle. Militarists and Germanophiles, headed by Enver Pasha, the -distinguished Minister of War, advocated early and complete observance -of the alliance with Germany, which called for active military measures -against the Entente. In support of the pacifists were the great mass of -the people, overburdened with taxes, worn out with military service, -and weary of the sacrifices occasioned by the Tripolitan and Balkan -Wars. In support of the militarists were German economic power, German -military prestige, and the powerful emotion of Turkish nationalism. - -The case of the pacifists, like that of their opponents, was based -frankly upon national self-interest. A great European war seemed to -them to offer an unprecedented opportunity for setting Ottoman affairs -in order without the perennial menace of foreign interference. Ottoman -neutrality would be solicited by some of the belligerents, Ottoman -intervention by others; during the war, however, no nation could -afford to bully Turkey. By clever diplomatic bargaining economic and -political privileges of the greatest importance might be obtained—the -Capitulations, for example, might be abolished. Neutral Turkey might -grow prosperous by a thriving commerce with the belligerents. After the -peace both victor and vanquished would be too exhausted to think of -aggression against a revivified Ottoman Empire. To remain neutral was -to assure peace, security, and prosperity. To intervene was to invite -defeat and dismemberment. - -Militarists, however, appraised the situation differently. National -honor demanded that Turkey go to the assistance of her allies. But, -more than that, national security demanded the decisive defeat of the -Entente Powers. As contrasted with the firm friendship of Germany -for Turkey, it was pointed out, there was the traditional policy of -Russia to dismember the Ottoman Empire and of France and Great Britain -to infringe upon Ottoman sovereignty whenever opportunity presented -itself. A victorious Russia would certainly appropriate Constantinople, -and as “compensations” France would take Syria and England Mesopotamia. -By closing the Dardanelles and declaring war, Turkey could deal Russian -economic and military power a blow from which the empire of the -Tsars might never recover. By associating herself with the seemingly -irresistible military forces of Germany, Turkey might once and for -all eliminate Russia—the feared and hated enemy of both Turks and -Germans—from Near Eastern affairs. In addition, British security in -Egypt might be shaken, and the French colonial empire in North Africa -might be menaced by a Pan-Islamic revival. In these circumstances -the war might be for Turkey a war of liberation, from which only the -craven-hearted would shrink. - -For a time, however, practical considerations led to the maintenance -of Ottoman neutrality. “To Germany the ‘sphere of influence’ in -Turkey was of far greater economic and political importance than all -her ‘colonies’ in Africa and in the South Seas put together. The -latter, under the German flag, were an obvious and quick prey to Great -Britain’s naval superiority, but so long as Turkey remained out of -the war the German sphere of influence in Anatolia and Mesopotamia -was protected by the neutral Crescent flag. As soon as Turkey entered -the war, however, Great Britain’s naval superiority could be brought -to bear upon Germany’s interests in the Near East as well as upon her -interests in Africa and Oceanica. If German imperialists were devoted -to a Berlin-to-Bagdad _Mittel-Europa_ project, there were British -imperialists whose hearts and minds were set upon a Suez-to-Singapore -South-Asia project. The Ottoman Empire occupied a strategic position -in both schemes. A neutral Turkey, on the whole, was favorable to -German imperialism. A Turkey in armed alliance with Germany presented a -splendid opportunity for British imperialism.”[1] - -Turkish mobilization, furthermore, was a tediously slow process. The -construction of the Bagdad Railway, as we have seen, had not been -completed before the outbreak of the Great War.[2] There were wide -gaps in northern Mesopotamia and in the Amanus mountains which made -difficult the transportation of troops for the defence of Irak, an -attack on the Suez, an offensive in the Caucasus, or the fortification -of the Dardanelles. The entry of Turkey into the war before the -completion of mobilization would have been of no material advantage -to Germany and would almost certainly have brought disaster to the -Ottoman Empire. Therefore, while the war went well for Germany on the -French and Russian fronts, German influence at Constantinople was -more concerned with creating sentiment for war and with speeding up -mobilization than with encouraging premature intervention. After the -Teutonic defeats at the Marne and in Galicia, however, active Turkish -support was needed for the purpose of menacing Russian security in -the Caucasus and British security in Egypt, as well as for bolstering -up German morale. During the latter part of September and the month -of October, Marshal Liman von Sanders, Baron von Wangenheim, the -commanders of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, and other German -influences at Constantinople exerted the strongest possible pressure on -the Ottoman Government to bring Turkey into the war on the side of her -Teutonic allies. - -On October 31, 1914, the Turkish Government took the fatal step -of precipitating war with the Entente Powers, after Enver Pasha, -Minister of War, and Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, were satisfied -that Ottoman preparations were sufficiently advanced to warrant the -beginning of hostilities. The outcome of the Bagdad Railway concession -of 1903 was the entry of Turkey into the War of 1914![3] - -Discouraged by their failure to maintain the peace, and fearful of -impending disaster to their country, Djavid Bey and three other -members of the Ottoman ministry resigned their posts. There were other -indications, also, that intelligent public opinion at Constantinople -was not whole-hearted in support of war. But the nationalists—playing -upon the “traditional enmity” toward Russia—had their way, and with -an outburst of patriotic fervor Turkey began hostilities. In a -proclamation to the army and navy the Sultan affirmed that the war was -being waged for the defence of the Caliphate and the “emancipation” -of the Fatherland: “During the last three hundred years,” he said, -“the Russian Empire has caused our country to suffer many losses in -territory. And when we finally arose to a sentiment of awakening and -regeneration which was to increase our national welfare and our power, -the Russian Empire made every effort to destroy our attempts, either -with war or with numerous machinations and intrigues. Russia, England, -and France never for a moment ceased harboring ill-will against our -Caliphate, to which millions of Mussulmans, suffering under the tyranny -of foreign domination, are religiously and wholeheartedly devoted. And -it was always these powers that started every misfortune that came -upon us. Therefore, in this mighty struggle which we are undertaking, -we once and for all will put an end to the attacks made from one side -against the Caliphate and from the other against the existence of our -country.”[4] - -Turcophiles in Germany were enthusiastic over Ottoman participation -in the Great War. The Turkish military contribution to a Teutonic -victory might not be decisive, but neither would it be insignificant. -And German coöperation in Ottoman military ventures would certainly -strengthen German economic penetration in the Near East, even though -Turkish arms might not drive Britain out of Egypt or Russia out of the -Caucasus. “Over there in Turkey,” wrote Dr. Ernest Jäckh, “stretch -Anatolia and Mesopotamia—Anatolia, the ‘land of sunrise,’ Mesopotamia, -an ancient paradise. Let these names be to us a symbol. May this world -war bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and the paradise of a new -era. May it confer upon a strengthened Turkey and a greater Germany -the blessings of fruitful Turco-Teutonic cooperation in peace after -victorious Turco-Teutonic collaboration in war.”[5] - - -ASIATIC TURKEY BECOMES ONE OF THE STAKES OF THE WAR - -Whatever may have been the European origins of the Great War, there was -no disposition on the part of the belligerents to overlook its imperial -possibilities. A war which was fought for the protection of France -against German aggression, for the defence of Belgian neutrality, -for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, for the democratizing of a -bureaucratic German Empire—this war was fought not only in Flanders and -Picardy and the Vosges, but in Africa and Asia and the South Seas; not -only in Poland and Galicia and East Prussia, but in Mesopotamia and -Syria and the Dardanelles. Anatolia, Palestine, and the region of the -Persian Gulf were as much the stakes of the war as _Italia irredenta_, -the lost provinces of France, or the Serbian “outlet” to the Adriatic. - -Of all the spoils of the war, Turkey was among the richest. Her -undeveloped wealth in minerals and fuel; her potentialities as a -producer of foodstuffs, cotton, and other agricultural products; her -possibilities as a market—these were alluring as war-time necessities -and peace-time assets. Her strategic position was of inestimable -importance to any nation which hoped to establish colonial power in the -eastern Mediterranean. Her future as a sphere of influence promised -unusual opportunities for the investment of capital and the acquisition -of exclusive economic rights. It was no accident, therefore, that -brought men from Berlin and Bombay, Stuttgart and Sydney, Munich -and Marseilles, to fight bitterly for possession of the cliffs of -Gallipoli, the deserts of Mesopotamia, and the coast of Syria. -Turkey-in-Asia was a rich prize upon which imperialists in Berlin and -Vienna, London and Paris and Petrograd, had set their hearts. - -No sooner had Turkey entered the war than the imperial aspects of -the struggle became apparent. Germany was deluged with literature -designed to show that Ottoman participation in the war would assure -Germany and Austria their legitimate “place in the sun.” Business men -and diplomatists, missionaries and Oriental scholars[6] combined in -prophesying that the Turco-German brotherhood-in-arms would fortify -the Teutonic economic position in the Near East, disturb Russian -equanimity in the Caucasus, menace Britain’s communications with -India, and end once and for all French pretensions in Syria. Moslem -sympathizers predicted that the Holy War would shake the Entente -empires to their foundations. Pan-Germans frankly avowed that the war -offered an opportunity to make Berlin-to-Bagdad a reality rather than -a dream—some went so far as to believe that German domination could be -extended from the North Cape to the Persian Gulf! Mercantilists foresaw -the possibility of creating a politically unified and an economically -self-sufficient Middle Europe.[7] - -As a means of promoting closer relationships with Turkey numerous -societies were established in Germany for the purpose of disseminating -information on the Near East and its importance in the war. For -example, Dr. Hugo Grothe conducted at Leipzig the work of the -_Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee_—_Vereinigung zur Förderung deutscher -Kulturarbeit im islamischen Orient_. This organization published -and distributed hundreds of thousands of books, pamphlets, and -maps regarding Asiatic Turkey; conducted a Near East Institute, at -which lectures and courses of instruction were given; maintained an -information bureau for business men interested in commercial and -industrial opportunities in the Ottoman Empire; and established German -libraries in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Konia, and elsewhere -along the line of the Bagdad Railway. A similar organization, the -_Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung_, was maintained at Berlin under the -honorary presidency of Dr. von Gwinner of the _Deutsche Bank_ and the -active supervision of Dr. Ernest Jäckh. The two societies numbered -among their members and patrons Herr Ballin, of the Hamburg-American -Line, General von der Goltz, Baron von Wangenheim, and the Ottoman -ambassador at Berlin.[8] - -The watchdogs of British imperial welfare, however, were not asleep. -Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, was busily engaged in -plans for safeguarding British economic and strategic interests in -Mesopotamia. Early in September, 1914, General Sir Edmund Barrow, -Military Secretary of the India Office, prepared a memorandum, -“The Rôle of India in a Turkish War,” which proposed the immediate -occupation of Basra on the grounds that it was “the psychological -moment to take action” and that “so unexpected a stroke at this moment -would have a startling effect” in checkmating Turkish intrigues, -encouraging the Arabs to revolt and thus forestalling an Ottoman attack -on the Suez, and in protecting the oil installations at the head of the -Persian Gulf.[9] Supporters of a pro-Balkan policy, in the meantime, -were urging an attack on Turkey from the Mediterranean. Winston -Churchill, Chief Lord of the Admiralty, for example, in a memorandum of -August 19, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey, advocated an alliance with Greece -against Turkey; by September 4 he had completed plans for a military -and naval attack on the Dardanelles; on September 21 he telegraphed -Admiral Carden, at Malta, to “sink the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, no -matter what flag they fly, if they come out of the Straits.” Mr. -Churchill, with whose name will ever be associated the disastrous -expedition to the Dardanelles, believed that, whatever the outcome -of the war on the Western Front, the success or failure of Germany -would be measured in terms of her power in the Near East after the -termination of hostilities. To destroy German economic and political -domination of Turkey it was necessary to have an expedition at the head -of the Persian Gulf and, possibly, another in Syria, but the commanding -strategic position was the Straits. The capture of Constantinople would -win the war.[10] - -There were others who considered that a purely defensive policy should -be followed in the Near East. Lord Kitchener, for example, believed in -concentrating the maximum possible man power in France and advocated -restricting Eastern operations to the protection of the Suez Canal and -other essential communications. Influential military critics, like -Colonel Repington, were firmly opposed to “side shows” in Mesopotamia, -at the Dardanelles, or elsewhere, which would divert men, matériel, -and popular attention from the Western Front. Sir Edward Grey appeared -to be more interested in Continental than in colonial questions. Lord -Curzon was swayed between fear of a Moslem uprising in India and the -hope that British prestige in the East might be materially enhanced by -outstanding military successes at the expense of the Turks.[11] - -The Near Eastern imperialists, however, had their way. During -September, 1914, the Government of India was ordered to prepare an -expeditionary force for service in the region of the Persian Gulf. -Early in October, almost four weeks before Turkey entered the war, -Indian Expeditionary Force “D,” under General Delamain, sailed from -Bombay under sealed orders. It next appeared on October 23, at -Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf, where General Delamain learned -the purposes of the expedition which he commanded. His army was to -occupy Adaban Island, at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, “with the -object of protecting the oil refineries, tanks and pipe lines [of the -Anglo-Persian Company], covering the landing of reënforcements should -these be required, and assuring the local Arabs of support against -Turkey.” For the last-named purpose Sir Percy Cox, subsequently British -High Commissioner in Irak, was attached to the army as “political -officer.” In addition, General Delamain was to “take such military -and political action as he should consider feasible to strengthen his -position and, if necessary, occupy Basra.” Nevertheless, he was warned -that the rôle of his force was “that of demonstrating at the head of -the Persian Gulf” and that on no account was he “to take any hostile -action against the Turks without orders from the Government of India, -_except in the case of absolute military necessity_”![12] - -Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, subsequently first High -Commissioner in Egypt under the Protectorate, entered into an -agreement, dated October 23, 1914, with the Sherif of Mecca, assuring -the latter that Great Britain was prepared “to recognize and support -the independence of the Arabs within territories in which Great Britain -is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France,” -it being understood that “the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and -portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, -Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab.” In other words, an -independent Arab state was considered to be feasible insofar as it did -not conflict with the sphere of interest in Syria developed by French -railway-builders and recognized by the Franco-German agreement of -February 15, 1914.[13] - -Even before Turkey formally entered the war, therefore, a British army -was “demonstrating” in the Shatt-el-Arab; Sir Percy Cox was coöperating -with the Sheik of Koweit for the purpose of precipitating a rebellion -among the Arabs of Mesopotamia, and a British representative had sown -the seeds of a separatist movement in the Hedjaz. It was a short step -from this, after the declaration of hostilities, to the occupation of -Basra, on November 22, and of Kurna, on December 9. The close of the -year 1914 saw Turkey in the unenviable position of having to choose -between increasing German economic and political domination, on the one -hand, and dismemberment by the Entente Allies, on the other. - -The political and military situation of Turkey did not improve during -the year 1915. By mid-January, the rigors of a Caucasian winter and -the absence of adequate means of communication and supply brought to a -standstill Enver Pasha’s drive against the Russians. Early in February, -Djemal Pasha’s army, which had crossed the Sinai Peninsula in the face -of seemingly insuperable obstacles, attacked the Suez Canal only to -be decisively defeated by its British and French defenders. During -March a secret agreement was reached between Great Britain, France, -and Russia for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, including the -assignment of Constantinople to the Tsar. On April 26, by the Treaty -of London which brought Italy into the war, the Entente Powers bound -themselves to “preserve the political balance in the Mediterranean” by -recognizing the right of Italy “to receive on the division of Turkey an -equal share with Great Britain, France and Russia in the basin of the -Mediterranean, and more specifically in that part of it contiguous to -the province of Adalia, where Italy already had obtained special rights -and developed certain interests”; likewise the Allies agreed to protect -the interests of Italy “in the event that the territorial inviolability -of Asiatic Turkey should be sustained by the Powers” or that “only a -redistribution of spheres of interest should take place.”[14] To give -greater effect to these secret imperialistic agreements British troops -were landed at the Dardanelles on April 28. The bargains were sealed -with the blood of those heroic Britons and immortal Anzacs who went -through the tortures of hell—and worse—at Gallipoli![15] - -In the meantime, British activities were resumed in Mesopotamia. In -March, 1915, General J. E. Nixon was ordered to Basra with renewed -instructions “to secure the safety of the oilfields, pipe line and -refineries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,” as well as with orders -to consolidate his position for the purpose of “retaining complete -control of lower Mesopotamia” and of making possible a subsequent -advance on Bagdad. On May 29, in accordance with these instructions, -the Sixth Division, under General Sir Charles Townshend, occupied -Amara, a town of 12,000 lying about fifty miles north of Basra on -the Tigris, seat of the Turkish provincial administration and one -of the principal entrepôts of Mesopotamian trade. Beyond this point -General Nixon refused to extend his operations unless assured adequate -reënforcements, which were not forthcoming. Nevertheless, because of -the insistence of Sir Percy Cox that some outstanding success was -necessary to retain support of the Arabs, another advance was ordered -in the early autumn. On September 29, General Townshend occupied -Kut-el-Amara, 180 miles north of his former position. - -Then followed the decision to advance on Bagdad—a move which will go -down in history as one of the chief blunders of the war, as well as a -conspicuous instance of the manner in which political desiderata were -allowed to outweigh military considerations. The soldiers on the ground -were opposed to the move. General Nixon believed it would be disastrous -to advance farther than Kut without substantial reënforcements. General -Townshend was convinced that “Mesopotamia was a secondary theatre of -war, and on principle should be held on the defensive with a minimum -force,” and he warned his superiors that his troops “were tired, and -their tails were not up, but slightly down,” that they were fearful -of the distance from the sea and “were going down, in consequence, -with every imaginable disease.” But the statesmen at London were -thinking not only of winning the war but of eliminating Germany from -all future political and economic competition in the backward areas of -the world. “Because of the great political and military advantages to -be derived from the capture of Bagdad,” and because the “uncertainty” -of the situation at the Dardanelles made apparent “the great need of -a striking success in the East,” Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of -State for India, telegraphed the Viceroy on October 23, 1915, that -an immediate advance should be begun. Fearful of the consequences, -but faithful to his trust, General Townshend began the hundred-mile -march to Bagdad. Worn out, but heroic beyond words, his troops drove -the Turkish forces back and, on November 22, occupied Ctesiphon, only -eighteen miles from their goal. This, however, marked the high tide of -Allied success in the Near East during 1915, for General Townshend was -destined to reach Bagdad only as a prisoner of war.[16] - - -GERMANY WINS TEMPORARY DOMINATION OF THE NEAR EAST - -Allied military successes in Turkey were not looked upon with -equanimity in Germany. There was a realization in Berlin, as well as -London and Paris and Petrograd, that the stakes of the war were as -much imperial as Continental. Nothing had as yet occurred which had -lessened the importance of establishing an economically self-sufficient -Middle European _bloc_ of nations. In the event that the German -oversea colonies could not be recovered, Asiatic Turkey—because of -its favorable geographical position, its natural resources, and its -potentialities as a market—would be almost indispensable in the German -imperial scheme of things. As Paul Rohrbach wrote in _Das grössere -Deutschland_ in August, 1915, “After a year of war almost everybody in -Germany is of the opinion that victory or defeat—at least political -victory or defeat—depends upon the preservation of Turkey and the -maintenance of our communications with her.” - -The dogged defence of the Dardanelles had convinced Germany that, -granted proper support, Turkey could be depended upon to give a good -account of herself. The problem was one of supplementing Ottoman man -power with Teutonic military genius, technical skill, and organizing -ability. The enlistment of Bulgaria and the obliteration of Serbia made -possible more active German assistance to Turkey, and during the latter -months of 1915 and the early months of 1916 strenuous efforts were made -to bring the Turkish military machine to a high point of efficiency. -Large numbers of German staff officers were despatched to Mesopotamia, -Syria, and Anatolia, and Turkish officers were brought to the French -and Russian fronts to learn the methods of modern warfare. The -Prussian system of military service was adopted throughout the Ottoman -Empire, and exemptions were reduced to a minimum. Liberal credits were -established with German banks for the purchase of supplies for the new -levies of troops. Field Marshal von der Goltz was sent to Mesopotamia -as commander-in-chief of the Turkish troops in that region.[17] - -Perhaps the chief handicap of the Turks in all their campaigns was -inadequate means of transportation. The Ottoman armies operating -in the vicinity of Gaza and of Bagdad were dependent upon lines of -communication more than twelve hundred miles long; and had the Bagdad -Railway been non-existent, it is doubtful if any military operations at -all could have been conducted in those regions. But the Bagdad Railway -was uncompleted. Troops and supplies being despatched from or to -Anatolia had to be transported across the Taurus and Amanus mountains -by mule-back, wagon, or automobile, and then reloaded on cars south -or north of the unfinished tunnels. To remedy these deficiencies, -herculean efforts were made by Germans and Turks during 1915 to improve -the service on existing lines and to hurry the completion of the Bagdad -Railway. Locomotives and other rolling stock were shipped to Turkey, -and German railway experts coöperated with the military authorities -in utilizing transportation facilities to the best advantage. In -September, 1915, the Bagtché tunnel was pierced; and although through -service to Aleppo was not inaugurated until October, 1918, a temporary -narrow-gauge line was used, during the interim, to transport troops -and matériel through the tunnel. Commenting on the importance of the -Bagtché tunnel, the American Consul General at Constantinople wrote: -“With its completion the most serious difficulties connected with the -construction of the Bagdad Railway have been overcome, and the work of -connecting up many of the isolated stretches of track may be expected -to be completed with reasonable rapidity. In spite of delays occasioned -by the war, this most important undertaking in railway construction in -Turkey has passed the problematical stage and is now certain to become -an accomplished fact in the near future.”[18] - -The effects of German assistance to Turkey soon made themselves -apparent. Field Marshal von der Goltz, commanding a reënforced and -reinvigorated Ottoman army, supported by German artillery, compelled -General Townshend to abandon hope of occupying Bagdad and to fall back -toward Basra. By December 5, 1915, Townshend’s army was besieged in -Kut-el-Amara; and although the Turks failed to take the town by storm, -they did not fail to beat off every Russian and British force sent to -the relief of the beleaguered troops. About the same time, December 10, -evacuation of the Dardanelles was begun, and the last of the British -troops were withdrawn during the first week of January, 1916. On April -29, Townshend’s famished garrison surrendered. Shortly thereafter the -offensive of the Grand Duke Nicholas in Turkish Armenia was brought -to a standstill. During July and August a second Ottoman attack was -launched against the Suez Canal; and although it was unsuccessful, the -expedition reminded the British that Egypt was by no means immune from -danger. By the end of the year 1916 Turkey, with German assistance, had -completely cleared her soil of enemy troops, except for a retreating -Russian army in northern Anatolia and a defeated British expedition at -the head of the Persian Gulf.[19] - -As for Germany, she “was unopposed in her mastery of that whole -vast region of southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia which goes -by the name of the Near East.... She now enjoyed uninterrupted and -unmenaced communication and commerce with Constantinople not only, but -far away, over the great arteries of Asiatic Turkey [the Bagdad and -Hedjaz railways], with Damascus, Jerusalem, and Mecca, and with Bagdad -likewise.... If military exploits had been as conclusive as they had -been spectacular, Germany would have won the Great War in 1916 and -imposed a _Pax Germanica_ upon the world.... With the adherence of -Turkey and Bulgaria to the Teutonic Alliance, and the triumphs of those -states, a Germanized _Mittel-Europa_ could be said to stretch from the -North Sea to the Persian Gulf, from the Baltic to the Red Sea, from -Lithuania and Ukrainia to Picardy and Champagne. It was the greatest -achievement in empire-building on the continent of Europe since the -days of Napoleon Bonaparte.”[20] - -If Germany had been alarmed during the summer of 1915 at the prospect -that she might lose her preponderant position in Turkey, the world was -now alarmed at the prospect that she might maintain that position. -Nor was that alarm easily dispelled, for the Bagdad Railway and the -power and prestige it gave Germany in the Near East were pointed to by -statesmen as additional evidence of the manner in which the Kaiser and -his cohorts had plotted in secret against the peace of an unsuspecting -and unprepared world. In fact, the Bagdad Railway came to be considered -one of the fundamental causes of the war, as well as one of the chief -prizes for which the war was being fought. President Wilson, for -example, in his Flag Day speech, June 14, 1917, stated the case in the -following terms:[21] - - “The rulers of Germany ... were glad to go forward unmolested, - filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting - German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and - make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and - rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The - demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in a plan - which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad.... - - “The plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and - political control across the very centre of Europe and beyond the - Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be - as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the - ponderous states of the East.... The dream had its heart at Berlin. It - could have had a heart nowhere else!... - - “And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing - plan into execution.... The so-called Central Powers are in fact but - a single Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for - a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania - is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving - Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships - lying in the harbor at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every - day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin. - From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread!” - -As late as November 12, 1917, after some spectacular victories by the -Allies in Mesopotamia and Syria, President Wilson made it plain that no -peace was possible which did not destroy German military power in the -Near East. Addressing the American Federation of Labor, at Buffalo, N. -Y., he said:[22] - - “Look at the map of Europe now. Germany, in thrusting upon us - again and again the discussion of peace, talks about what? Talks - about Belgium—talks about Alsace-Lorraine. Well, these are deeply - interesting subjects to us and to them, but they are not talking about - the heart of the matter. Take the map and look at it. Germany has - absolute control of Austria-Hungary, practical control of the Balkan - States, control of Turkey, control of Asia Minor. I saw a map the - other day in which the whole thing was printed in appropriate black, - and the black stretched all the way from Hamburg to Bagdad—the bulk - of the German power inserted into the heart of the world. If she can - keep that, she has kept all that her dreams contemplated when the - war began. If she can keep that, her power can disturb the world as - long as she keeps it, always provided ... the present influences that - control the German Government continue to control it.” - -In the light of all the facts, this diagnosis of the situation is -incomplete, to say the least. Had President Wilson been cognizant -of the contemporaneous counter-activities of the Allied Powers, he -might not have been prepared to offer so simple an explanation of a -many-sided problem. For it was not German imperialism alone which -menaced the peace of the Near East and of the world, but _all_ -imperialism. - - -“BERLIN TO BAGDAD” BECOMES BUT A MEMORY - -Germany may have been determined to dominate the Ottoman Empire by -military force. But from the Turkish point of view domination by -Germany was hardly more objectionable than the dismemberment which was -certain to be the result of an Allied victory. - -Indeed, confident that they would eventually win the war, the Entente -Powers had proceeded far in their plans for the division of the Ottoman -Empire. During the spring of 1915, as has been indicated,[23] Russia -had been promised Constantinople, and Italy had been assigned a share -of the spoils equal to that of Great Britain, France, or Russia. To -give full effect to these understandings, further negotiations were -conducted during the autumn of 1915 and the spring of 1916, looking -toward a more specific delimitation of interests. - -Accordingly, on April 26, 1916—the first anniversary of the -Treaty of London with Italy—France and Russia signed the secret -Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty concerning their respective territorial -rights in Asiatic Turkey. Russia was awarded full sovereignty over the -vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis, and Van—a vast area of 60,000 -square miles (about one and one-fifth times the size of the State of -New York), containing valuable mineral and petroleum resources. This -handsome prize put Russia well on the road to Constantinople and in a -fair way to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake. And at the moment -the treaty was signed the armies of the Grand Duke Nicholas were -actually overrunning the territory which Russia had staked out for -herself! For her part, France was to receive adequate compensations in -the region to the south and southwest of the Russian acquisitions, the -actual delimitation of boundaries and other details to be the result of -direct negotiation with Great Britain.[24] - -Thus came into existence the famous Sykes-Picot Treaty of May 9, 1916, -defining British and French political and economic interests in the -hoped-for dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Syrian coast from -Tyre to Alexandretta, the province of Cilicia, and southern Armenia -(from Sivas on the north and west to Diarbekr on the south and east) -were allocated to France in full sovereignty. In addition, a French -“zone of influence” was established over a vast area including the -provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Deir, and Mosul. Administration of this -stretch of coast and its hinterland would give French imperialists -what they most wanted in the Near East—actual possession of a country -in which France had many religious and cultural interests, control -of the silk production of Syria and the potential cotton production -of Cilicia, ownership of the Arghana copper mines, and acquisition -of that portion of the Bagdad Railway lying between Mosul and the -Cilician Gates of the Taurus.[25] Aside from its satisfaction of French -imperial ambitions, however, “the French area defied every known law of -geographic, ethnographic, and linguistic unity which one might cite who -would attempt to justify it.”[26] - -Great Britain, by way of “compensation,” was to receive complete -control over lower Mesopotamia from Tekrit to the Persian Gulf and -from the Arabian boundary to the Persian frontier. In addition, -she was recognized as having special political and economic -interests—particularly the right “to furnish such advisers as the -Arabs might desire”—in a vast territory lying south of the French -“zone of influence” and extending from the Sinai Peninsula to the -Persian border. Palestine was to be internationalized, but was -subsequently established as a homeland for the Jews. In this manner -Britain, also, had adequately protected her imperial interests—she -had secured possession of the Bagdad Railway in southern Mesopotamia; -she had gained complete control of the head of the Persian Gulf, thus -fortifying her strategic position in the Indian Ocean; she was assured -the Mesopotamian cotton supply for the mills of Manchester and the -Mesopotamian oil supply for the dreadnoughts of the Grand Fleet; she -had erected in Palestine a buffer state which would block any future -Ottoman attacks on the Suez Canal. All in all, Sir Mark Sykes had -driven a satisfactory bargain.[27] - -Italian ambitions now had to be propitiated. For a whole year before -the United States entered the war—while the Allied governments were -professing unselfish war aims—secret negotiations were being conducted -by representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy to determine what -advantages and territories, equivalent to those gained by the other -Allies, might be awarded Italy. In April, 1917, by the so-called St. -Jean de Maurienne Agreement, Italy was granted complete possession of -almost the entire southern half of Anatolia—including the important -cities of Adalia, Konia, and Smyrna—together with an extensive “zone of -influence” nort-heast of Smyrna. With such a hold on the coast of Asia -Minor, Italian imperialists might realize their dream of dominating the -trade of the Ægean and of reëstablishing the ancient power of Venice in -the commerce of the Near East.[28] - -These inter-Allied agreements for the disposal of Asiatic Turkey were -instructive instances of the “old diplomacy” in coöperation with -the “new imperialism.” The treaties were secret covenants, secretly -arrived at; they bartered territories and peoples in the most approved -manner of Metternich and Richelieu. But they were less concerned with -narrowly political claims than with the exclusive economic privileges -which sovereignty carried with it; they determined boundaries with -recognition of their strategic importance, but with greater regard for -the location of oilfields, mineral deposits, railways and ports of -commercial importance. They left no doubt as to what were the real -stakes of the war in the Near East. - -It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the secret treaties -with the pronouncements of Allied statesmen regarding the origins -and purposes of the Great War. Certainly they were no part of the -American program for peace, which promised to “the Turkish portions -of the Ottoman Empire a secure sovereignty”; which demanded “a free, -open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial -claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in -determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the -populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims -of the government whose title is to be determined”; and which announced -in no uncertain terms that “the day of conquest and aggrandizement is -gone by” as is also “the day of secret covenants entered into in the -interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for -moment to upset the peace of the world.”[29] - -Allied diplomacy was to have its way in the Near East, however, for the -goddess of victory finally smiled upon the Allied armies and frowned -upon both Turks and Germans. As 1916 had been a year of Turco-German -triumphs at the Dardanelles and in Mesopotamia, 1917 brought -conspicuous Allied victories along the Tigris and in Syria, and 1918 -saw the complete collapse of the Ottoman Empire. On February 24, 1917, -General Sir Stanley Maude, in command of reënforced and rejuvenated -British forces in Mesopotamia, captured Kut-el-Amara, retrieving the -disaster which had befallen Townshend’s army a year before. Deprived -of the services of Field Marshal von der Goltz, who died during the -Caucasus campaign, the Turks retired in disorder, and on March 11 -British troops entered Bagdad—the ancient city which had bulked so -large in the German scheme of things in the Near East. Although the -capture of Bagdad was not in itself of great strategic importance, -its effect on morale in the belligerent countries was considerable. -British imperialists were in possession of the ancient capital of the -Arabian Caliphs, as well as the chief entrepôt of caravan trade in the -Middle East; therefore their prestige with both Arabs and Turks was -certain to rise. At home, pictures of British troops in the Bagdad of -the Arabian Nights appealed to the imagination of the war-weary, as -well as the optimistic, patriot. In the Central Powers, on the other -hand, the loss of Bagdad created scepticism as to whether the German -dream of “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” was not now beyond realization. -This scepticism became more confirmed when, on April 24, General Maude -captured Samarra, northern railhead of the uncompleted Bagdad line in -Mesopotamia.[30] - -Scepticism would have turned to alarm, however, had Germans been -fully aware of the significance of the British advance in the Land -of the Two Rivers. For behind the armies of General Maude came civil -officials by the hundreds to consolidate the victory and to lay the -foundations of permanent occupation. An Irrigation Department was -established to deal with the menace of floods, to drain marshes, and -to economize in the use of water. An Agricultural Department undertook -the cultivation of irrigated lands and conducted elaborate experiments -in the growing of cotton—the commodity which means so much in the -British imperial system. A railway was constructed from Basra to Bagdad -which, when opened to commerce in 1919, became an integral part of -the Constantinople-Basra system. There was every indication that the -British were in Mesopotamia to stay.[31] - -Germans and Turks were sufficiently aroused, however, to take strenuous -measures to counteract General Maude’s successes. In April, 1917, -Field Marshal von Mackensen, hero of the Balkan and Rumanian campaigns -and strong man of the Near East, was sent to Constantinople to confer -with Enver Pasha regarding the military situation. It was decided, -apparently, that Bagdad must be retaken at all costs, for throughout -the summer quantities of rolling stock for the Bagdad Railway were -shipped to Turkey, enormous supplies of munitions were accumulated -at Haidar Pasha, and a division of picked German troops (including -machine-gun and artillery units) made its appearance in Anatolia. -Command of all the Turkish armies in Mesopotamia was conferred upon -General von Falkenhayn, former German Chief of Staff. Germany was not -yet prepared to surrender her sphere of interest in Turkey. - -The great expedition against Bagdad, however, had to be abandoned. -In the first place, Turkish officers were loath to serve under von -Falkenhayn. Turkish nationalism was beginning to assert itself, and -German supervision of Ottoman military affairs was resented—Mustapha -Kemal Pasha, for example, refused to accept orders from German generals -and resigned his commission. Von Falkenhayn himself was disliked -because of his dictatorial methods and was held in light esteem -because of his responsibility for the disastrous Verdun offensive. -Furthermore, many Turks deemed it inadvisable to dissipate energy in -a Mesopotamian campaign, the avowed purpose of which was a recovery -of German prestige, when all available man power was required for the -defence of Syria. Djemal Pasha was so insistent on this point that he -received from the Kaiser an “invitation” to visit the Western Front! In -the second place, Providence or, perhaps, an Allied spy intervened to -thwart the German plans, for a great fire and a series of explosions -(September 23–26, 1917) destroyed the entire port and terminal of -Haidar Pasha, together with all the munitions and supplies which had -been accumulated there by months of patient effort. And finally, the -spectacular campaign of Field Marshal Allenby in Palestine, which -opened with the capture of Beersheba, on October 31, convinced even -von Falkenhayn that an expedition in Mesopotamia, while Aleppo was in -danger, would be the height of folly. German energies were thereupon -diverted to the defence of the Holy Land.[32] - -During the autumn of 1917, Great Britain and France, to assure their -possession of the territories assigned them by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, -began a Syrian campaign which was not to terminate until Turkey had -been put out of the war. Under Field Marshal Sir E. H. H. Allenby, -British troops, reënforced by French units and assisted by the -rebellious Arabs of the Hedjaz, captured Gaza (November 7), Jaffa -(November 16), and Jerusalem (December 9). The triumphal entry of -General Allenby into Jerusalem was hailed throughout Christendom as -marking the success of a modern crusade to rid Palestine of Ottoman -domination forever. Jericho was occupied, February 21, 1918, but -Turkish resistance, under Marshal Liman von Sanders, stiffened for a -time, and it was not until the autumn that large-scale operations were -resumed. On October 1, Damascus was occupied by a combined Arab and -British army; a week later Beirut was taken; and on October 25, Aleppo, -the most important junction point on the Bagdad Railway, capitulated. -Five days afterward, Turkey gave up the hopeless fight by signing the -Mudros armistice, terminating hostilities.[33] - -Thus ended a Great Adventure for both Turkey and Germany. Germany -lost all hope of retaining any economic or political influence in the -Ottoman Empire; the dream of Berlin-to-Bagdad became a nightmare. -Turkey faced dismemberment. “The Bagdad Railway had proved to be the -backbone of Turkish utility and power in the War. Were it not for -its existence, the Ottoman resistance in Mesopotamia and in Syria -could have been discounted as a practical consideration in the War, -and the sending of Turkish reënforcements to the Caucasus would have -been even more materially delayed than was in fact the case.”[34] -For Turkey, then, the war had come at a most inappropriate time. Had -hostilities begun ten years later, after the completion of the Bagdad -system, military operations in the Near East might have had an entirely -different result. As it was, the Bagdad Railway—and the international -complications arising from it—proved to be the ruination of the Ottoman -Empire. - - -TO THE VICTORS BELONG THE SPOILS - -During 1919, the Allied Governments set about possessing themselves of -the spoils which were theirs by virtue of the secret treaties and by -right of conquest. In April, Italian troops occupied Adalia and rapidly -extended their lines into the interior as far as Konia. In November, -French armies replaced the British forces in Syria and Cilicia. Great -Britain began the “pacification” of the tribesmen of Mesopotamia and -Kurdistan. And in the meantime there was plentiful evidence that German -rights in the Near East would be speedily liquidated in the interest -of the victorious Powers. For example, on March 26, the Interallied -Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways announced at Paris the -adoption of “a new transportation agreement designed to secure a route -to the Orient by railway without passing through the territories of -the Central Empires.” Accordingly, a fast train, the “Simplon-Orient -Express,” was to be run regularly from Calais to Constantinople _via_ -Paris, Lausanne, Milan, Venice, Trieste, Agram, and Vinkovce. Later -this service was to be extended into Asiatic Turkey, over the lines of -the Anatolian, Bagdad, and Syrian railways. To meet a changed situation -one must provide new paths of imperial expansion, and the French press -spoke glowingly of the prospect that the slogans “Hamburg to the -Persian Gulf” and “Berlin to Bagdad” would be speedily replaced by -“Calais to Cairo” and “Bordeaux to Bagdad”![35] - -All German rights in the Bagdad Railway and other economic enterprises -in the Near East were abrogated by the Treaty of Versailles, signed -June 28, 1919. The German Government was obligated to obtain and to -turn over to the Reparation Commission “any rights and interests of -German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any concession -operating in ... Turkey, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria” and agreed, as -well, “to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and -Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to -any rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be claimed by -Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria.”[36] - -The Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920—together with the accompanying -secret Tripartite Agreement of the same date between Great Britain, -France, and Italy—carried still further the liquidation of German -interests in the Near East. The Turkish Government was required to -dispose of all property rights in Turkey of Germany, Austria, Hungary, -Bulgaria, or their respective nationals and to turn over the proceeds -of all purchases and sales to the Reparation Commission established -under the treaties of peace with those Powers. The Anatolian and -Bagdad Railways were to be expropriated by Turkey and all of their -rights, privileges, and properties to be assigned—at a valuation to be -determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Council of the League of -Nations—to a Franco-British-Italian corporation to be designated by the -representatives of the Allied Powers. German stockholders were to be -compensated for their holdings, but the amount of their compensation -was to be turned over to the Reparation Commission; compensation due -the Turkish Government was to be assigned to the Allied Governments -toward the costs of maintaining their armies of occupation on Turkish -soil. German and Turkish property in ceded territories of the Ottoman -Empire was to be similarly liquidated. The Treaty of Versailles and the -Treaty of Sèvres left hardly a vestige of German influence in the Near -East.[37] - -The Sèvres settlement, furthermore, destroyed the Ottoman Empire -and sought to give the Allies a stranglehold upon the economic life -of Turkey. Great Britain and France received essentially the same -territorial privileges as they had laid out for themselves in the -Sykes-Picot Treaty, with the vague restrictions that they should -exercise in Mesopotamia and Palestine and in Syria and Cilicia -respectively only the rights of mandatory powers. Great Britain was -confirmed in her oil and navigation concessions in Mesopotamia, France -in her railway rights in Syria; in addition, the Hedjaz Railway was -turned over outright to their joint ownership and administration. Italy -received only a “sphere of influence” in southern Anatolia, including -the port of Adalia, but, as a consequence of one of the most sordid of -the transactions of the Paris Conference, she was deprived of the bulk -of the privileges guaranteed her under the Treaty of London and the St. -Jean de Maurienne Agreement.[38] Greece was installed in Smyrna—the -most important harbor in Asia Minor, a harbor the control of which was -vital to the peasantry of Anatolia for the free export of their produce -and for the unimpeded importation of farm machinery and other wares of -western industry. Constantinople was put under the jurisdiction of an -international commission for control of the Straits, and the balance -of the former Russian sphere of interest was assigned to the ill-fated -Armenian Republic. The Hedjaz was declared to be an independent Arab -state. The Ottoman Empire was no more. - -Even the Turkey that remained—a portion of Anatolia—enjoyed sovereignty -in name only. The Capitulations, which the Sultan had terminated in -the autumn of 1914, were reëstablished and extended. Concessions to -Allied nationals were confirmed in all the rights which they enjoyed -before Ottoman entry into the Great War. Because of the reparations, -and because of the high cost of the Allied armies of occupation, the -country was being loaded down with a still further burden of debt from -which there appeared to be no escape—and debts not only mortgaged -Turkish revenues but impaired Turkish administrative integrity. To -assure prompt payment of both old and new financial obligations of -the Turkish Government, an Interallied Financial Commission was -superimposed upon the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The Financial -Commission had full supervision over taxation, customs, loans, and -currency; exercised final control over the Turkish budget; and had -the right to veto any proposed concession. In control of its domestic -affairs the new Turkey was tied hand and foot. Here, indeed, was a -Carthaginian peace! And all of this was done in order “to help Turkey, -to develop her resources, and to avoid the international rivalries -which have obstructed these objects in the past!”[39] - - -“THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IS DEAD. LONG LIVE TURKEY!” - -In the meantime, however, while the Sèvres Treaty was still in -the making, there was a small handful of Turkish patriots who were -determined at all costs to win that complete independence for which -Turkey had entered the war. These Nationalists were outraged by the -Greek occupation of Smyrna, in May, 1919, which they considered a -forecast of the kind of peace to be dictated to Turkey. During the -summer of 1919 they held two conferences at Erzerum and Sivas and -agreed to reject any treaty which handed over Turkish populations to -foreign domination, which would reduce Turkey to economic servitude -to the victorious Powers, or which would impair the sovereignty of -their country. Upon this program they won a sweeping victory in the -parliamentary elections of 1919–1920. For leadership they depended -largely upon that brilliant soldier and staunch Turk, Mustapha Kemal -Pasha, who had distinguished himself by his quarrel with Liman von -Sanders at the Dardanelles and his defiance of von Falkenhayn in Syria. -Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had bitterly contested the growth of German -influence in Turkey during the war, was not likely to accept without a -struggle the extension of Allied control over Turkish affairs.[40] - -In Constantinople, January 28, 1920, the Nationalist members of the -Turkish Parliament signed the celebrated “National Pact”—frequently -referred to as a Declaration of Independence of the New Turkey. “The -Pact was something more than a statement of war-aims or a party -programme. It was the first adequate expression of a sentiment which -had been growing up in the minds of Western-educated Turks for three -or four generations, which in a half-conscious way had inspired the -reforms of the Revolution of 1908, and which may dominate Turkey and -influence the rest of the Middle East for many generations to come. -It was an emphatic adoption of the Western national idea.”[41] It -was based upon principles which had received wide acceptance among -peoples of the Allied nations during the war: self-determination of -peoples, to be expressed by plebiscite; protection of the rights of -minorities, but no further limitations of national sovereignty. As -regards the Capitulations and the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, -the Pact is explicit: “With a view to assuring our national and -economic development,” it reads, “and with the end of securing to the -country a more regular and more modern administration, the signatories -of the present pact consider the possession of complete independence -and liberty as the _sine qua non_ of our national existence. In -consequence, we oppose all juridical or financial restrictions of any -nature which would arrest our national development.” Rather that Turkey -should die free than live in slavery! Foreswearing any intention of -recovering the Sultan’s former Arab possessions, the Pact proceeded to -serve notice, however, that Cilicia, Mosul, and the Turkish portions -of Thrace must be reunited with the fatherland. “The Ottoman Empire is -dead! Long live Turkey!”[42] - -With this amazing program Mustapha Kemal Pasha undertook to liberate -Turkey. In April, 1920, the government of the Grand National Assembly -was instituted in Angora and proceeded to administer those portions of -Anatolia which were not under Allied or Greek occupation. The proposed -Treaty of Sèvres—which was handed to the Turkish delegates at Paris -on May 11—was condemned as inconsistent with the legitimate national -aspirations of the Turkish people. The Allies and the Constantinople -Government were denounced—the former as invaders of the sacred soil of -Turkey, the latter as tools of European imperialists. Then followed -a series of successful military campaigns: by October, 1920, the -French position in Cilicia had been rendered untenable, the Armenian -Republic had been obliterated, the British forces of occupation had -been forced back into the Ismid peninsula, and the Italians had -withdrawn their troops to Adalia. In the spring of 1921 separate -treaties were negotiated with Russia, Italy, and France, providing for -a cessation of military operations and for the evacuation of certain -Turkish territories.[43] Then came the long, bitter struggle against -the Greeks, terminating with the Mudania armistice of October 10, -1922, which assured to the Turks the return of Smyrna and portions -of Thrace. On November 1, the Sultanate was abolished, and Turkey -became a republic. Four days later the Turkish Nationalists entered -Constantinople in triumph. The struggle for the territorial and -administrative integrity of a New Turkey seemed to be won. - -The victory of the Nationalists scrapped the Treaty of Sèvres and -called for a complete readjustment of the Near Eastern situation. When -the first Lausanne Conference for Peace in the Near East assembled -on November 20, 1922, there were high hopes that a just and lasting -settlement might be arrived at. The conference was only a few days old, -however, when the time-honored obstacles to peace in the Levant made -their appearance: the rival diplomatic policies of the Great Powers; -the desire of the West, by means of the Capitulations, to maintain a -firm hold upon its vested interests in the East; the imperialistic -struggle of rival concessionaires, supported by their respective -governments, for possession of the raw materials, the markets, and the -communications of Asiatic Turkey. Once more the Bagdad Railway, with -its tributary lines in Anatolia and Syria, became one of the stakes of -diplomacy! - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] C. J. H. Hayes, _A Brief History of the Great War_ (New York, -1920), pp. 71–72; “A Rival to the Bagdad Line,” in _The Near East_, May -25, 1917. - -[2] _Supra_, Chapter V. - -[3] Regarding the diplomatic situation at Constantinople during the -critical months of July to November, 1914, _cf._ “Correspondence -respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey,” -_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cd. 7628 (1914); C. Mehrmann, _Der -diplomatische Krieg in Vorderasien_ (Dresden, 1916); J. Aulneau, -_La Turquie et la Guerre_ (Paris, 1916); C. Strupp, _Diplomatische -Aktenstücke zur orientalischen Frage_ (Berlin, 1916); Historicus, -“Origines de l’alliance turco-germanique,” in _Revue_, 7 series, Volume -III (Paris, 1915), pp. 267 _et seq._; Ostrorog, _op. cit._, Chapters -XII-XVI; footnote 40, Chapter X, _supra_. - -[4] Quoted from _Current History_, Volume I (New York, 1915), p. 1032. - -[5] _Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbrüderschaft_, p. 30. - -[6] Notably Dr. Ernst Jäckh and Dr. Hugo Grothe. - -[7] The following list of books is given without any pretence that it -is a complete bibliography of German publications on the Near Eastern -question during the year 1914–1915: A. Ritter, _Berlin-Bagdad, neue -Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik_ (Munich, 1915) and _Nordkap-Bagdad, -das politische Programm des Krieges_ (Frankfort a. M., 1914); Hugo -Grothe, _Die Türken und ihre gegnerkriegsgeographische Betrachtungen_ -(Frankfurt a. M., 1915), _Deutsch-türkische wirtschaftliche -Interessengemeinschaft_ (Munich, 1915), and _Deutschland, die Türkei -und der Islam_ (Leipzig, 1915); C. A. Schäfer, _Deutsch-türkische -Freundschaft_ (Stuttgart, 1915); Carl H. Becker, _Deutschland und -der Islam_ (Leipzig, 1914); J. Ritter von Riba, _Der türkische -Bundesgenosse_ (Berlin, 1915); J. Hall, _Der Islam und die -abendländische Kultur_ (Weimar, 1915); Ernst Marré, _Die Türken und -wir nach dem Kriege_ (Leipzig, 1916); Tekin Alp, _Türkismus und -Pantürkismus_ (Weimar, 1915); R. Schäfer, _Der deutsche Krieg, die -Türkei, Islam und Christentum_ (Leipzig, 1915); W. T. Vela, _Die -Zukunft der Türkei in Bundnis mit Deutschland_ (Berlin, 1915); W. -Blanckenburg, _Die Zukunftsarbeit der deutschen Schule in der Türkei_ -(Berlin, 1915); H. Schmidt, _Das Eisenbahnwesen in der asiatischen -Türkei_ (Berlin, 1914); H. Margulies, _Der Kampf zwischen Bagdad -und Suez in Altertums_ (Weimar, 1915); M. Horten, _Die islamische -Geisteskultur_ (Leipzig, 1915); Fritz Regel, _Die deutsche Forschung -in türkische Vordasien_ (Leipzig, 1915); M. Roloff, _Arabien und seine -Bedeutung für die Erstärkung des Osmanenreiches_ (Leipzig, 1915); -A. Paquet, _Die jüdische Kolonien in Palästina_ (Weimar, 1915); C. -Nawratzki, _Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas_ (Munich, 1914); D. -Trietsch, _Die Juden der Türkei_ (Leipzig, 1915). Two notable magazine -articles are: R. Hennig, “Der verkehrsgeographische Wert des Suez- und -des Bagdad-Weges,” in _Geographische Zeitschrift_, 1916, pp. 649–656; -A. Tschawisch, “Der Islam und Deutschland—Wie soll man sich die Zukunft -des Islams denken?”, in _Deutsche Revue_, 1915, Volume III, pp. 249 _et -seq._ - -[8] See advertisements regarding the society and its work in a series -of pamphlets _Länder und Völker der Turkei_, edited by Dr. Hugo Grothe -(Leipzig, 1915, _et seq._), and descriptions of similar organizations -in a series _Orientbücherei_, edited by Dr. Ernst Jäckh (Stuttgart and -Berlin, 1914, _et seq._). - -[9] “Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire -into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia,” _Parliamentary Papers_, -1917, No. Cd. 8610. - -[10] W. S. Churchill, _The World Crisis, 1910–1915_ (New York, 1923), -pp. 529–535; A. MacCallum Scott, _Winston Churchill in Peace and War_ -(London, 1916), Chapter X. - -[11] C. C. Repington, _The First World War, 1914–1918_ (2 volumes, -London, 1920), Volume I, pp. 42, 51, etc. _ad lib._; Churchill, _op. -cit._, pp. 537–538. - -[12] The italics are mine. The proposed debarkation of troops, -however, was certain to involve a breach of Persian neutrality. _Cf._ -_Parliamentary Papers_, 1917, No. Cd. 8610. - -[13] _Ibid._ Regarding the Franco-German agreement of February 15, -1914, _cf._ _supra_, pp. 246–250. - -[14] The text of the agreement between England, France and Russia -regarding the disposition of Constantinople and other portions of -Turkey is to be found in _Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed -at Petrograd_ (New York, _The Evening Post_, 1918); _cf._, also, R. S. -Baker, _Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement_ (3 volumes, Garden City, -1922), Volume I, Chapter III. The text of the Treaty of London between -Italy and the Allies is to be found in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1920, -No. Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7. - -[15] The best single work on military operations in Turkey during the -Great War is Edmund Dane’s _British Campaigns in the Nearer East, -1914–1918_ (2 volumes, London, 1919). Regarding the Caucasus campaigns -of 1914–1915 _cf._ M. P. Price, _War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia_ -(London, 1918), Chapter I; R. Machray, “The Campaign in the Caucasus,” -in the _Fortnightly Review_, Volume 97 (1915), pp. 458–471. Excellent -accounts of the first Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal are to -be found in G. Douin, _Un épisode de la guerre mondiale: l’attaque -du canal de Suez, 3 Fevrier, 1915_ (Paris, 1922); C. Stiénon, “Sur -le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in _Revue des deux mondes_, 6 series, -Volume 5 (1916), pp. 148–174; T. Wiegand, _Sinai_ (Berlin, 1920); N. -Moutran, _La Syrie de demain: France et Syrie_ (Paris, 1916); R. -Hennig, _Der Kampf um den Suezkanal_ (Stuttgart, 1915); E. Serman, -_Mit den Türken an der Front_ (Berlin, 1915); J. Walther, _Zum Kampf -in der Wüste am Sinai und Nil_ (Leipzig, 1916); P. Schweder, _Im -türkischen Hauptquartier_ (Leipzig, 1916); _Eine Geschichte der Türkei -im Weltkriege_ (Munich, 1919). For the Mesopotamian expedition of -1914–1915 consult _Despatches Regarding Operations in the Persian -Gulf and Mesopotamia_ (London, the War Office, 1915); G. M. Chesney, -“The Mesopotamian Breakdown,” in the _Fortnightly Review_, Volume -102 (1917), pp. 247–256; H. B. Reynardson, _Mesopotamia, 1914–1915_ -(London, 1919); C. H. Barber, _Besieged in Kut and After_ (Edinburgh, -1917). Of the great quantity of material available on the Dardanelles -campaign, _cf._, in particular, the following: _Gallipoli: der Kampf um -den Orient, von einem Offizier aus dem Stab des Marschalls Liman von -Sanders_ (Berlin, 1916); General Sir Ian Hamilton, _Gallipoli Diary_ -(London, 1920); H. W. Nevinson, _The Dardanelles Campaign_ (London, -1918); S. A. Moseley, _The Truth About the Dardanelles_ (London, 1916); -John Masefield, _Gallipoli_ (London, 1916). - -[16] _Parliamentary Papers_, 1917, No. Cd. 8610; C. V. F. Townshend, -_My Campaign in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1920). - -[17] Regarding renewed German activity and interest in the Near East -after the elimination of Serbia from the war seemed to bring the -_Drang nach Osten_ within the realm of practical politics, _cf._: -R. Zabel, _Im Kampfe um Konstantinopel und die wirtschaftliche Lage -der Türkei während des Weltkrieges_ (Leipzig, 1916); C. H. Müller, -_Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn_ (Hamburg, 1917); R. -Junge, _Die deutsch-türkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen_ (Weimar, -1916); E. Marré, _Die Türken und wir nach dem Kriege: ein praktisches -Wirtschaftsprogramm_ (Berlin, 1916); H. Rohde, _Deutschland in -Vorderasien_ (Berlin, 1916); H. W. Schmidt, _Auskunftsbuch für den -Handel mit der Türkei_ (Leipzig, 1917); E. Mygind, _Anatolien und seine -wirtschaftliche Bedeutung_ (Berlin, 1916); C. V. Bichtligen, “_Die -Bagdadbahn, eine Hochstrasse des Weltverkehrs in ihrer wirtschaftliche -Bedeutung_,” in _Soziale Revue_, 16 year (1916), pp. 1–11, 123–139; F. -C. Endres, _Die Türkei_ (Munich, 1916); A. Philippsohn, _Das türkische -Reich_ (Weimar, 1916); H. Kettner, _Vom Goldenen Tor zum Goldenen -Horn und nach Bagdad_ (Berlin, 1917). For the point of view of Allied -sympathizers, _cf._: E. F. Benson, _Deutschland über Allah_ (London, -1917), and _Crescent and Iron Cross_ (New York, 1918); E. A. Martel, -_L’emprise austro-allemande sur la Turquie et l’Asie Mineure_ (Paris, -1918); H. C. Woods, _The Cradle of the War_ (New York, 1919), and an -article, “The Bagdad Railway in the War,” in the _Fortnightly Review_, -Volume 102 (1917), pp. 235–247; J. Thureau, “La pénétration allemande -en Asie Mineure,” in _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Volume 86 -(1916), pp. 19–44; R. Lane, “Turkey under Germany’s Tutelage,” in -_Unpopular Review_, Volume 9 (1918), pp. 328 _et seq._; N. Markovitch, -_Le pangermanisme en Orient_ (Nice, 1916); A. J. Toynbee, _Turkey, a -Past and a Future_ (New York, 1917). - -[18] Quoted in _The Near East_, November 12, 1915. For other material -regarding construction of the Bagdad Railway during the war and its -utilization for military purposes, _cf._: _Report of the Bagdad Railway -Company_, 1914, pp. 6–7; 1915, pp. 3–6; _The Engineer_, February 4, -1915; “Transportation in the War—The Railways of Mesopotamia,” in -_Modern Transport_ (London), November, 1919; D. G. Heslop, “The Bagdad -Railway,” in _The Engineer_ (London), November 12 and 26 and December -3 and 17, 1920; “Railways of Mesopotamia,” in the _Railway Gazette_ -(London), War Transportation Number, September 21, 1920, pp. 129–140; -“Die Bagdadbahn und der Durchschlag des letzten grossen Tunnels,” in -_Asien_, 14 year (1917), pp. 97–101. - -[19] Dane, _op. cit._, Volume I, Chapters VIII-XII, inclusive; “The -German-Turkish Expedition Against the Suez Canal in 1916,” in _Journal -of the United Service Institution_, Volume 65 (London, 1920), pp. -353–357. - -[20] Hayes, _op. cit._, pp. 142–143. - -[21] Quoted from the official text as given in E. E. Robinson and V. -J. West, _The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1917_ (New York, -1917), pp. 403–405. - -[22] _The New York Times_, November 13, 1917. - -[23] _Supra_, p. 285. - -[24] Baker, _op. cit._, Volume I, Chapter IV, contains an excellent -account of the inter-Allied negotiations of 1916–1917 regarding Asiatic -Turkey, based upon the private papers of Woodrow Wilson. _Cf._, also, -_Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed at Petrograd_. - -[25] The Treaty provided that the Bagdad Railway should not be extended -southward from Mosul or northward from Samarra without the express -consent of both France and Great Britain and in no case before the -construction of a railway from Bagdad to Aleppo _via_ the Euphrates -Valley—the purpose being, as far as possible, to develop southern -Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast rather than Kurdistan. By a subsequent -agreement of December, 1918, between Messrs. Lloyd George and -Clémenceau, Mosul was transferred to Great Britain. - -[26] W. L. Westermann, “The Armenian Problem and the Disruption of -Turkey,” in _What Really Happened at Paris—The Story of the Peace -Conference, 1918–1919, by American Delegates_, edited by E. M. House -and C. Seymour (New York, 1921), pp. 176–203. _Cf._ p. 183. - -[27] The text of the Sykes-Picot Treaty was first published by _The -Manchester Guardian_, January 8, 1920, and was reprinted in _Current -History_, Volume XI (1920), pp. 339–341. _Cf._, also, Bowman, _The New -World_, pp. 100–104; Baker, _op. cit._, pp. 67–69. - -[28] Baker, _op. cit._, pp. 68–70. The negotiations concerning the St. -Jean de Maurienne Agreement extended from the autumn of 1916 to August, -1917. The agreement appears to have been negotiated with the Italians -by Mr. Lloyd George, in April, 1917, while Mr. Balfour was in America -with the British Mission. It was amended in August, as a result of the -insistence of the Italians that they had not received an adequate share -of the spoils. - -[29] President Wilson’s address to a joint session of the Congress of -the United States, January 8, 1918, setting forth the famous Fourteen -Points of a durable peace. Quoted from James Brown Scott, _President -Wilson’s Foreign Policy_ (New York, 1918), pp. 354–363. - -[30] Regarding General Maude’s brilliant campaign in Mesopotamia, -_cf._: Dane, _op. cit._, Volume II, Chapters II, III, XII; E. F. Eagan, -_The War in the Cradle of the World_ (London, 1918); Kermit Roosevelt, -_War in the Garden of Eden_ (New York, 1919); Sir Charles Collwell, -_Life of Sir Stanley Maude_ (London, 1920); E. Betts, _The Bagging of -Bagdad_ (London, 1920); E. Candler, _The Long Road to Bagdad_ (London, -1920); C. Cato (pseudonym), _The Navy in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1917); -F. Maurice, “The Mesopotamian Campaign,” in _Asia_, Volume 18 (New -York, 1918), pp. 933–936. - -[31] British intrenchment in Mesopotamia, 1917–1920, is described in -the following: “Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia,” -_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 1061 (1920); R. Thomas, _Report on -Cotton Experimental Work in Mesopotamia_ (Bagdad, 1919); “Cotton -Growing in Mesopotamia,” _Bulletin of the Imperial Institute_, Volume -18 (London, 1920), pp. 73–82; _Mesopotamia as a Country for Future -Development_ (Cairo, Ministry of Public Works, 1919); “Transportation -and Irrigation in Mesopotamia,” _Commerce Reports_, No. 50 (Washington, -1919), pp. 948–954; Sir H. P. Hewett, _Some Impressions of Mesopotamia_ -(London, 1919); C. R. Wimshurst, _The Wheats and Barleys of -Mesopotamia_ (Basra, 1920); _Review of the Civil Administration of -the Occupied Territories of Irak_ (Bagdad, 1918); L. J. Hall, _Inland -Water Transport in Mesopotamia_ (London, 1921); Sir Mark Sykes, _The -Commercial Future of Bagdad_ (London, 1917); “Turkish Rule and British -Administration in Mesopotamia,” in The Quarterly _Review_, Volume 232 -(1919), pp. 401 _et seq._; W. Ormsby Gore, “The Organization of British -Responsibilities in the Middle East,” in _Journal of the Central Asian -Society_, Volume 7 (1920), pp. 83–105; I. A. Shah, “The Colonization -of Mesopotamia,” in _United Service Magazine_, Volume 179 (1919), pp. -350 _et seq._ - -[32] Townshend, _op. cit._, pp. 375 _et seq._; Djemal Pasha, _op. -cit._, Chapter VII; _Current History_, Volume XII (1920), pp. 117–118; -A. D. C. Russell, _loc. cit._, pp. 325 _et seq._; F. C. Endres, _Der -Weltkrieg der Türkei_ (Berlin, 1919). - -[33] Regarding General Allenby’s campaigns in Palestine and Syria, -see: H. Pirie-Gordon, _A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian -Expeditionary Force_ (London, 1919); W. T. Massey, _Allenby’s Final -Triumph_ (London, 1920); C. C. R. Murphy, _Soldiers of the Prophet_ -(London, 1921); H. O. Lock, _The Conquerors of Palestine Through Forty -Centuries_ (New York, 1921); R. E. C. Adams, _The Modern Crusaders_ -(London, 1920); H. Dinning, _Nile to Aleppo: With the Light Horse in -the Near East_ (London, 1920); P. E. White, _The Disintegration of the -Turkish Empire_ (London, 1920); C. T. Atkinson, “General Liman von -Sanders and His Experiences in Palestine,” _Army Quarterly_, Volume 3 -(London, 1922), pp. 257–275; A. Aaronsohn, _Mit der türkischen Armee in -Palästina_ (Berne, 1918); J. Bourelly, _Campagne d’Égypte et de Syrie -contre les Turcs_ (Paris, 1919); G. Gautherot, _La France en Syrie -et en Cilicie_ (Paris, 1920); C. Stiénon, _Les campagnes d’Orient et -les intérêts de l’entente_ (Paris, 1918), and _La défense de l’Orient -et le rôle de l’Angleterre_ (Paris, 1918); A. Mandelstamm, _Le sort -de l’Empire Ottoman_ (Paris, 1917); G. A. Schreiner, _From Berlin to -Bagdad: Behind the Scenes in the Near East_ (New York, 1918). - -[34] H. Charles Woods, _The Cradle of the War_, p. 271. - -[35] See a suggestive article by Hilaire Belloc, “Europe’s New Paths -of Empire,” in _Our World_ (New York), October, 1922, pp. 41–46; _The -Evening Post_ (New York), January 3 and March 27, 1919. - -[36] _The Treaty of Peace with Germany_, Articles 155, 258, 260, 261, -297. - -[37] “Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sèvres August 10, 1920,” -_Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. 11, 1920; -“Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France, and Italy, -Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920,” _Parliamentary -Papers_, No. Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, 1920. An official summary -of the Sèvres treaty was published in _The Nation_ (New York), -International Relations Section, Volume 111 (1920), pp. 21–28, and -in _Current History_, Volume XIII (1921), pp. 164–184. An excellent -discussion of the main provisions of the treaty and its probable -effects is to be found in Bowman’s _The New World_, Chapters XXIV and -XXVI. - -[38] Regarding the negotiations at the Paris Conference by which the -claims of Italy were disregarded in favor of those of Greece, _cf._ -Baker, _op. cit._, Volume II, Chapter XXXII, and Volume III, Documents -Nos. 1, 31–41. - -[39] Preamble to the Tripartite Agreement of August 10, 1920. - -[40] Regarding the Turkish Nationalist movement, see: Major General -James G. Harbord, “Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His Party,” in the -_World’s Work_, Volume 36 (London, 1920), pp. 470–482; M. Paillarès -_La kémalisme devant les Alliés_ (Paris, 1922); “The Recovery of the -Sick Man of Europe,” an excellent review, with a colored map, in the -_Literary Digest_, November 11, 1922, pp. 17 _et seq._; M. K. Zia Bey, -“How the Turks Feel,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 857 _et seq._, -and “The New Turkish Democracy,” in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (New -York, 1922), pp. 546–548; Major General Sir Charles Townshend, “Great -Britain and the Turks,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 949–953; -Clair Price, “Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government,” in _Current -History_, Volume XVI (1922), pp. 790–800; Ludwell Denny, “The Turk -Comes Back,” in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 575–577; “The New -Epoch in Turkey,” in the _Muslim Standard_ (London), November 9, 1922. - -[41] A. J. Toynbee, _The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study -in the Contact of Civilizations_ (New York, 1922), p. 190. Professor -Toynbee’s book is the most noteworthy of recent contributions to the -history of Turkey since the Great War. - -[42] The text of the National Pact, as translated from the French, -is to be found in _The Nation_, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 447–448, in -_Current History_, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 280–281, and in Toynbee, -_op. cit._, pp. 207–211 (in both French and English). - -[43] _Infra._, pp. 316–317, 323–324. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGDAD RAILWAY IS RESUMED - - -GERMANY IS ELIMINATED AND RUSSIA WITHDRAWS - -The Great War has completely destroyed German influence in the Near -East. In the way of any resumption of German enterprise in Turkey -are formidable obstacles which are not likely to be removed for some -time. To begin with, the Turks themselves will not encourage German -attempts to recover the Bagdad Railway or other property rights which -were liquidated by the Treaty of Versailles. Among Turkish Nationalists -there is satisfaction that Turkey has “shaken off the yoke of the -ambitious leaders who dragged the country into the general war on the -side of Germany” and has got rid of the “arrogance” of the Germans who -infested the Near East during the last years of the war. Resentment at -German military domination of Turkey during 1917 and 1918 will not soon -disappear.[1] - -Furthermore, Germany possesses neither the disposition nor the power -to regain her former preëminence in the Near East. The confiscation by -the Treaty of Versailles of private property in foreign investments -has set a precedent which will make German investors—as well as -prudent investors everywhere—extremely chary of utilizing their funds -for the promotion of such enterprises as the Bagdad Railway. The -surplus production and surplus capital of Germany may be absorbed -by reparations payments or attracted to such enterprises as the -reconstruction of the German merchant marine. But the _Drang nach -Osten_ has become a thing of the past. The dismemberment of the -Austrian Empire and the erection of the Jugoslav Kingdom have shut -off German access, through friendly states, to the Balkan Peninsula -and Asiatic Turkey. Formidable customs barriers will stand in the way -of overland trade with the Near East and render railway traffic from -“Berlin to Bagdad” unprofitable. Defeat and disarmament have destroyed -German prestige in the Moslem world. Democratization of both Germany -and Turkey, it is hoped, will render increasingly difficult the kind of -secret intrigue that characterized Turco-German relations during the -régime of William II and of Abdul Hamid. If Germany returns to the Near -East in the next generation or two, it is not likely to be in the rôle -of an Imperial Germany promoting railway enterprises of great economic -and strategic importance. - -Russian diplomatic policy toward Turkey has likewise undergone -important changes. Imperial Russia had been a bitter opponent of -Imperial Germany in the Bagdad Railway project. Imperial Russia had -conspired with Great Britain and France to bring about the collapse -and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Imperial Russia was the -“traditional enemy” of the Turk. But Imperial Russia was destroyed -in 1917 by military defeat and social revolution. Regardless of the -pronunciamentos of bourgeois imperialists like Professor Milyukov, -revolutionary Russia was certain to look upon the Near Eastern question -in a new light. Political and economic disorganization incidental -to the war and the revolution would have made it imperative for any -government in Russia to curtail its imperialistic pretensions. And with -the advent of Bolshevism the outcome was certain. A government which -was anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist could not sanction Russian -“spheres of interest” or Russian territorial aggrandizement at the -expense of Turkey. A government which preached “self-determination of -peoples” and “no annexations” could not confirm the secret treaties of -1915–1916. A government which was engaged in repelling foreign invasion -and in resisting counter-revolutionary insurrections had to keep within -strict limits its military liabilities. Therefore, Soviet Russia -speedily foreswore any intention of occupying Constantinople, declared -unreservedly for a free Armenia, and proceeded forthwith to withdraw -its troops from Persia. These measures were considered “a complete -break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilization which built -the prosperity of the exploiters among the few chosen nations upon -the enslavement of the laboring population in Asia,” as well as an -expression of Bolshevist Russia’s “inflexible determination to wrest -humanity from the talons of financial capital and imperialism, which -have drenched the earth with blood in this most criminal of wars.”[2] - -Turkish Nationalist resistance to the Treaty of Sèvres met with a -sympathetic response on the part of Bolshevist Russia, and on March -16, 1921, the Government of the Grand National Assembly and the -Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic signed -at Moscow a treaty to confirm “the solidarity which unites them in -the struggle against imperialism.” By the terms of this treaty Russia -refused to recognize the validity of the Treaty of Sèvres or of any -other “international acts which are imposed by force.” Russia ceded -to Turkey the territories of Kars and Ardahan, in the Caucasus -region, as a manifestation of full accord with the principles of the -National Pact. The Soviet Republic, “recognizing that the régime of -the capitulations is incompatible with the national development of -Turkey, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, -considers null and void the exercise in Turkey of all functions and -all rights under the capitulatory régime.” In particular, Russia freed -Turkey “from any financial or other obligations based on international -treaties concluded between Turkey and the Government of the Tsar.” -As regards the construction of railways in Anatolia, the Soviet -Government completely reversed the former policy of Imperial Russia, -which was to oppose all such railways as a strategic menace.[3] It -was now provided that, “with the object of facilitating intercourse -between their respective countries, both Governments agree to take in -concert with each other all measures to develop and maintain within -the shortest possible time, railway, telegraphic, and other means of -communication,” as well as measures “to secure the free and unhampered -traffic of passengers and commodities between the two countries.” -Finally, both countries agreed to stand together in resisting all -foreign interference in their domestic affairs: “Recognizing that the -nationalist movements in the East,” reads the treaty, “are similar -to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian proletariat to -establish a new social order, the two contracting parties assert -solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free -choice of the forms of government under which they shall live.”[4] - -No more complete disavowal of Russian imperialism could be desired by -the New Turkey. It is by no means certain, however, that Russia will -continue indefinitely to pursue so magnanimous a policy in the Near -East. With the development of her natural resources and the extension -of industrialism, it is not improbable that Russia—in common with -the other Great Powers—will once again feel the urge to imperialism. -Raw materials, markets, the maintenance of unimpeded routes of -commercial communication, and opportunities for profitable investment -of capital are likely to be considered—in the present anarchic state -of international relations—as essential to an industrial state under -working-class government as to an industrial state under bourgeois -administration. If such be the case, Russian economic penetration in -Turkey and Persia may be resumed, and Russian eyes may once more be -cast covetously at Constantinople. “In Mongolia and Tibet, in Persia -and Afghanistan, in Caucasia and at Constantinople, the Russian has -been pressing forward for three hundred years,” writes an eminent -American geographer, “and no system of government can stand that denies -him proper commercial outlets.”[5] - -Nevertheless, whatever be the future policy of Russia in the Near East, -for the present the Russian Republic has no economic or strategic -interests which are inconsistent with the national development of the -Turkish people. Certainly Russia has neither the economic nor the -political resources to demand a share in the Bagdad Railway or to seek -for herself other railway concessions in Anatolia. And the Western -Powers are little likely to heed the wishes of the Soviet Government -until such time as those wishes are rendered articulate in a language -the Western Powers understand—the language of power. - - -FRANCE STEALS A MARCH AND IS ACCOMPANIED BY ITALY - -Those who believed that the defeat of Germany and the withdrawal of -Russia would solve all problems of competitive imperialism in the -Near East were destined to be disillusioned. For no sooner was the war -over than France and Great Britain took to pursuing divergent policies -regarding Turkey. The rivalry between these two powers—which had been -terminated for a time by the Entente of 1904—was resumed in all its -former intensity. The Entente, in fact, had been formed because of -common fear of Germany, rather than because of coincidence of colonial -interests; and with that fear removed, the foundation of effective -coöperation had been undermined.[6] The Great War may be said to have -terminated the first episode of the great Bagdad Railway drama—the rise -and fall of German power in the Near East; it opened a second episode, -which promises to be equally portentous—an Anglo-French struggle for -the right of accession to the exalted position which Germany formerly -occupied in the realm of the Turks. - -Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East will not be an unprecedented -phenomenon. “Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814, France and Great -Britain have never fought in the Levant with naval and military weapons -(though they have several times been on the verge of open war), but -their struggle has been real and bitter for all that, and though it has -not here gone the length of empire-building, it has not been confined -to trade. Its characteristic fields have been diplomacy and culture, -its entrenchments embassies, consulates, religious missions, and -schools. It has flared up on the Upper Nile, in Egypt, on the Isthmus -of Suez, in Palestine, in the Lebanon, at Mosul, at the Dardanelles, -at Salonica, in Constantinople. The crises of 1839–41 and 1882 over -Egypt and of 1898 over the Egyptian Sudan are landmarks on a road that -has never been smooth, for conflicts [of one sort or another] have -perpetually kept alive the combative instinct in French and English -missionaries, schoolmasters, consuls, diplomatists, civil servants, -ministers of state, and journalists. One cannot understand—or make -allowances for—the post-war relations of the French and British -Governments over the ‘Eastern Question’ unless one realizes this -tradition of rivalry and its accumulated inheritance of suspicion and -resentment. It is a bad mental background for the individuals who have -to represent the two countries. The French are perhaps more affected by -it than the English, because on the whole they have had the worst of -the struggle in the Levant as well as in India, and failure cuts deeper -memories than success.”[7] - -French statesmen were dissatisfied with the division of the spoils -of war in the Near East. They had a feeling that here, as elsewhere, -Britain had obtained the lion’s share. They believed that Mr. Lloyd -George had been guilty of sharp practice in his agreement of December, -1918, with M. Clémenceau, by the terms of which Mosul and Palestine -were to be turned over to Great Britain.[8] Frenchmen were suspicious -of British solicitude for the Arabs, which they believed was not based -upon disinterested benevolence; in fact, self-determination for the -Arabs came to be considered a political move to render precarious the -French mandate for Syria. French patriots chafed at British emphasis -upon the fact that “the British had done the fighting in Turkey almost -without French help” and that “there would have been no question of -Syria but for England and the million soldiers the British Empire had -put in the field against the Turks.” French pride was hurt by the -rapid rise of British prestige in a region where France had so many -interests. And prestige—diplomatic, military, religious, cultural, -and economic—has always been an important desideratum in Near Eastern -diplomacy.[9] - -French dissatisfaction with the Turkish settlement was one of the -issues of the San Remo Conference of April, 1920, at which were -assigned the mandates for the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. -Exclusive control by Great Britain of the oilfields of the Mosul -district was so vigorously contested that M. Philippe Berthelot, of -the French Foreign Office, and Professor Sir John Cadman, Director -of His Majesty’s Petroleum Department, were instructed to work out -a compromise. Thus came into existence the San Remo Oil Agreement -of April 24, 1920, by which Great Britain, in effect, assigned to -France the former German interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company’s -concession for exploitation of the oilfields in the vilayets of -Mosul and Bagdad.[10] But the British drove a shrewd bargain, for it -was provided, in consideration, that the French Government should -agree, “as soon as application is made, to the construction of two -separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction -and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and -Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the -Mediterranean.” The oil thus transported was to be free of all French -taxes.[11] - -French imperialists likewise were dissatisfied with the disposition of -the Bagdad Railway as provided for by the unratified Sèvres Treaty. -French bankers had held a thirty per cent interest in the Bagdad -line while it was under German control,[12] and they believed, for -this reason, that they were entitled to a controlling voice in the -enterprise when it should be reorganized by the Allies. Although the -settlement at Sèvres—the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Tripartite -Agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy—recognized the -special interests of France in the Bagdad Railway, and particularly -in the Mersina-Adana branch, it provided, as has been seen, for -international ownership, control, and operation.[13] Now, Frenchmen -were suspicious of internationalization, particularly where British -participation was involved. Had not the condominium in Egypt proved to -be a step in the direction of an eventual British protectorate? Might -not the history of the Suez Canal be repeated in the history of the -Bagdad Railway? Would Great Britain look with any greater equanimity -upon French, than upon German, interests in one of the great highways -to India? To answer these questions was but to increase the French -feeling of insecurity. - -French dissatisfaction with the distribution of the spoils in the Near -East and French fear of British imperial power and prestige—these -were factors in a new alignment of the diplomatic forces in Turkey -during 1920–1922. British imperialists were desirous of keeping Turkey -weak. A weak Turkey could never again menace Britain’s communications -in the Persian Gulf and at Suez; a weak Turkey could be of no moral -or material assistance to restless Moslems in Egypt and India. To -keep Turkey weak the Treaty of Sèvres had loaded down the Ottoman -Treasury with an enormous burden of reparations and occupation costs -(to which France could not object without repudiating the principle -of reparations); had taken away Turkish administration of Smyrna -and Constantinople, the two ports essential to the commercial life -of Anatolia; and had made possible a Greek war of devastation and -extermination in the homeland of the Turks. France, on the other -hand, would have preferred to see Turkey reasonably strong. A strong, -prosperous Turkey would the more readily pay off its pre-War debt, -of which French investors held approximately sixty per cent; payment -of this debt was more important to France than payment of Turkish -reparations. A strong Turkey, furthermore, might fortify the French -position in the Near East. As Germany had utilized Ottoman strength -against Russia and Great Britain, so France might utilize Nationalist -Turkey against a Bolshevist Russia which would not pay its debts or an -imperial Britain which might prove unfaithful to the Entente.[14] - -Anglo-French differences in the Near East were brought to a head by -the rapid rise of the military power of the Angora Government, for -it was against France that Mustapha Kemal’s troops launched their -principal early attacks. General Gouraud—his hands tied by an Arab -rebellion which had necessitated a considerable extension of his -lines in Syria—was unable to repulse the Turkish invasion of Cilicia, -which reached really serious proportions in the autumn of 1920. Time -and again French units were defeated and French garrisons massacred -by the victorious Nationalists. In these circumstances, France “had -to choose between the two following alternatives: either to maintain -her effectives and to continue the war in Cilicia, or to negotiate -with the _de facto_ authority which was in command of the Turkish -troops in that region.” The French armies in Syria and Cilicia already -numbered more than 100,000 men; to reënforce them would have been to -flout the opinion of the nation and the Chamber, “which had vigorously -expressed their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed and -to expenditure which it was particularly difficult to bear.” To -negotiate with Mustapha Kemal was, to all intents and purposes, to -scrap the unratified Treaty of Sèvres. The French Government chose -the latter alternative. It is said that during the London Conference -of February-March, 1921, “M. Briand declared to Mr. Lloyd George on -several occasions, without the British Prime Minister making the -slightest observation, that he would not leave England without having -concluded an agreement with the Angora delegation. M. Briand pointed -out that neither the Chamber nor French public opinion would agree to -the prolongation of hostilities, involving as they did losses which -were both heavy and useless.”[15] - -Accordingly, on March 9, 1921, there was signed at London a -Franco-Turkish agreement terminating hostilities in Cilicia. The -Turkish Nationalists recognized the special religious and cultural -interests of France in Turkey and granted priority to French -capitalists in the awarding of concessions in Cilicia and southern -Armenia. French interests in the Bagdad Railway were confirmed. In -return, France was to evacuate Cilicia, to readjust the boundary -between Turkey and Syria, and to adopt a more friendly attitude toward -the Government of the Grand National Assembly.[16] - -The Italian Government was only too glad to have so excellent an excuse -for throwing over the Treaty of Sèvres, which had thoroughly frustrated -Italian hopes in Asia Minor to the advantage of Greece. Italian troops, -furthermore, had been driven out of Konia and were finding their hold -in Adalia increasingly precarious; the Italian Government had neither -the disposition nor the resources to wage war. Therefore, on March -13, 1921, the Italian and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs signed -at London a separate treaty, providing for “economic collaboration” -between Turkey and Italy in the hinterland of Adalia, including part -of the sanjaks of Konia, Aidin, and Afiun Karahissar, as well as for -the award to an Italian group of the concession for the Heraclea coal -mines.[17] The Royal Italian Government pledged itself to “support -effectively all the demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the -peace treaty,” more especially the demands of Turkey for complete -sovereignty and for the restitution of Thrace and Smyrna. Italian -troops were to be withdrawn from Ottoman soil.[18] - -During the summer of 1921 further negotiations were conducted between -France and Turkey for the purpose of elaborating and confirming their -March agreement. The outcome was the so-called Angora Treaty, signed -October 20, 1921, by M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon, a special agent of the -French Government, and Yussuf Kemal Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs -in the Government of the Grand National Assembly. This treaty formally -brought to an end the state of war between the two countries, provided -for the repatriation of all prisoners, defined new boundaries between -Turkey and Syria, and awarded valuable economic privileges to French -capitalists. It obligated the French Government “to make every effort -to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to -the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”[19] - -The Bagdad Railway was given a great deal of consideration in the -Angora Treaty. The Turks wanted possession of the line because of its -great political and strategic value; French capitalists sought full -recognition of their previous investments in the railway, together with -a controlling interest in its operation. A solution was reached which -fully satisfied both Turkish Nationalists and French imperialists. -The Turco-Syrian boundary was so “rectified” that the Bagdad Railway -from Haidar Pasha to Nisibin was to lie within Turkish territory, -whereas formerly the sections from the Cilician Gates to Nisibin lay -within the French mandate for Cilicia and Syria.[20] In return for -these territorial readjustments the Turkish Government assigned to a -French group (to be nominated by the French Government) the _Deutsche -Bank’s_ concession for those sections of the railway, including -branches, between Bozanti and Nisibin, “together with all the rights, -privileges, and advantages attached to that concession.” The Government -of the Grand National Assembly, furthermore, declared itself “ready -to examine in the most favorable spirit all other desires that may -be expressed by French groups relative to mine, railway, harbor and -river concessions, on condition that such desires shall conform to -the reciprocal interest of Turkey and France.” In particular, the -Turkish Government agreed to take under advisement the award to French -capitalists of concessions for the exploitation of the Arghana copper -mines and for the development of cotton-growing in Cilicia.[21] - -Thus France sought to make herself heir to the former German estate in -Asiatic Turkey. Her capitalists became the recipients of the kilometric -guarantee for which German concessionaires had been so freely -criticized. And in some respects the conditions of French tenancy were -questionable. The old Bagdad Railway concession had prohibited the -Germans, under any and all circumstances to grant discriminatory rates -or service to any passenger or shipper.[22] The conditions of French -control of the line, however, recognized only a limited application of -the principle of the “open door”: “Over this section and its branches,” -reads Article 10 of the Angora Treaty, “no preferential tariff shall -be established _in principle_. Each Government, however, _reserves the -right to study in concert with the other any exception to this rule -which may become necessary. In case agreement proves impossible, each -party will be free to act as he thinks best._”[23] - -During the spring of 1922 the concession for the operation of the -French sections of the Bagdad Railway, as defined by the Angora Treaty, -was assigned to the Cilician-Syrian Railway Company (_La société -d’exploitation des chemins de fers de Cilicie-Nord Syrie_.) The -Mesopotamian sections of the line, from Basra to Bagdad and Samarra, -were under the jurisdiction of the British Civil Administration -for Irak. From Haidar Pasha to the Cilician Gates the Railway was -being operated by the Turkish Nationalist Government, although its -utilization for commercial purposes was seriously curtailed by the -Greco-Turkish War.[24] - - -BRITISH INTERESTS ACQUIRE A CLAIM TO THE BAGDAD RAILWAY - -The Angora Treaty met with a distinctly heated reception from the -British Government. During November and December, 1921, Lord Curzon -carried on a lengthy correspondence with the French Embassy at London, -in which he made it perfectly plain that the British Government -considered the Franklin-Bouillon treaty a breach of good faith on -the part of France, in the light of which Great Britain must possess -greater freedom of action than would otherwise be the case.[25] - -Lord Curzon called into question the moral right of the French -Government to enter into separate understandings with Turkey or to -recognize the Angora Assembly as the _de jure_ government of the -country. He insisted that a revision of the frontier of northern Syria -“could not be regarded as the concern of France alone”: - - “It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which - had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted - a common gage of allied victory, although by an arrangement between - the Allies the mandate has been awarded to France. The mandate is - now under consideration by the League of Nations, and this important - and far-reaching modification of the territory to which it applies - altogether ignores the League of Nations, while the return to Turkey - of territory handed over to the Allies in common without previous - notification to Great Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the - spirit and the letter of the treaties which all three have signed. - - “Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the - localities of Nisibin and Jezirit-ibn-Omar, both of which are of great - strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the same - consideration applies to the handing back to Turkey of the track of - the Bagdad Railway between Tchoban Bey and Nisibin.... His Majesty’s - Government cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic - importance to their position in Irak of the return to Turkey of the - Bagdad Railway or of the transfer to that power of the localities of - Jezirit-ibn-Omar and Nisibin.” - -In addition to disputing the territorial readjustments contemplated -by the Angora Treaty, the British Government challenged the transfer -to French capitalists of the former German concession for the -Bozanti-Nisibin sections of the Bagdad Railway. Lord Curzon pointed -out that Great Britain would not recognize the Franco-Turkish treaty -as overriding the Treaty of Sèvres, “whereby Turkey was herself to -liquidate the whole Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal -Allies”; neither would the British Government assent to the award to -France of “a large portion of the railway without regard to the claims -of her other allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of -Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres is the Allies’ common asset.”[26] - - “Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France - by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French - company in advance—and therefore possibly to the prejudice—of the - reciprocal allied arrangements contemplated by Article 294 of the - Treaty of Sèvres and Article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, it is - necessary to point out that these stretches of the railway which were - previously in Syria, but are now surrendered to Turkey, although - placed in the French zone of economic interest, ought naturally to - be divided among the Allies in accordance with the above mentioned - treaties.... The transfer to a French company of that part of the - railway which still remains in Syria does not in itself fulfil the - provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulates for liquidation - by the mandatory and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial - Commission as an allied asset.” - -The correspondence was concluded by Lord Curzon with emphatic -statements that “when peace is finally concluded the different -agreements which have been negotiated up to date, including the -Angora Agreement, will require to be adjusted with a view to taking -their place in a general settlement”; that he was obliged “explicitly -to reserve the attitude of His Majesty’s Government with regard to -the Angora Agreement”; and that there must especially be reserved for -further discussion “all articles of the Agreement which appear to -infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite -Agreement. - -Subsequent events did nothing to restore Anglo-French unity in the -Near East. At the Washington Conference in December, 1921, Lord Lee -and M. Briand engaged in a verbal war over submarines which created no -little hard feeling and suspicion in both Great Britain and France. -Differences of opinion regarding Russia and other questions discussed -at the Genoa Conference, together with a clash over reparations in -midsummer, 1922, strained relations still further. Charges by Greeks -and Englishmen that France and Italy were supplying munitions to the -Turkish Nationalists were received with counter-charges that British -officers were aboard Greek warships and that British “observers” were -directing Greek military operations in Asia Minor.[27] Feeling ran high -in September, 1922, when—seeking to avoid a Near Eastern war—the French -and Italian Governments withdrew their troops from the Neutral Zone of -the Straits, leaving the British forces to face, alone, the victorious -Nationalist army of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. British patriots were further -irritated by the mysterious activities of M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon -in the negotiations preceding the Mudania armistice and by the claims -of the Paris press to a great victory thereby for French prestige at -Angora and Constantinople. Fundamental differences of opinion regarding -reparations—culminating in the French invasion of the Ruhr in January, -1923—made still more difficult coöperation by the former Allies in -the Near East. In fact, it might be questioned whether the Entente -Cordiale any longer existed. - -This situation was brought into sharp relief at the first Lausanne -Conference for Peace in the East.[28] Great Britain’s interests were -chiefly territorial. She had abandoned all hope of destroying Turkish -power by creating a Greek empire in Asia Minor; Greece was gone from -Smyrna for good. But England was determined to maintain her hold in -Mesopotamia—particularly in the oilfields of Mosul—and to hold out for -neutralization of the Straits. These territorial questions occupied -the major part of the first six weeks of the Conference. France had no -interest in the decisions regarding the Straits and Mosul; therefore -she supported the Turks and placed Lord Curzon in the position of -appearing to be the real opponent of Turkish Nationalist ambitions and -the principal obstacle in the way of an equitable settlement. Lord -Curzon himself strengthened this impression, for many of his utterances -were provocative and bombastic in the extreme—apparently he would not -give up the idea that the Turks could be bluffed and bullied into -submission. - -While the conference as a whole was debating territorial questions -and problems concerning the rights of minorities, a member of the -French delegation was presiding over the sessions of the all-important -Committee on Financial and Economic Issues. It was in this committee -that questions of the Ottoman Public Debt and of concessions were -to be threshed out; therefore it was in this committee that French -imperialists hoped to achieve real successes. And while France was -framing the economic sections of the treaty, her co-worker Italy was -supervising the work of the Committee on the Status of Foreigners in -Turkey, to determine the conditions upon which French and Italian -schools and missions should continue their activities in Asia Minor. -In this manner France hoped to protect adequately her economic and -cultural interests in the Near East. - -As the work of these committees progressed, the Turks became more and -more suspicious of French aims. The Nationalist delegates—including -Djavid Bey—were mindful of the price which their country had had to -pay because of its economic exploitation by Germany, and they were -determined not to permit another European Power to succeed to the -position which Germany had left vacant. Friction developed, therefore, -as soon as concessions came up for consideration. The French delegation -asked for the incorporation in the treaty of provisions confirming all -concessions to Allied nationals whether granted by the old Ottoman -Government before the War, or by the Constantinople Government after -the armistice, or by mandatory powers in territory subsequently -evacuated (as in Cilicia, Smyrna, and Adalia). The Turks objected -that they were not aware of the nature, the number and extent, or the -beneficiaries of the concessions coming within the last two categories; -confirmation of such would have to be the subject of independent -investigation and negotiation, for the Turks would not sign any -blank checks at Lausanne. They doubted whether they could accept the -financial burden which would be involved in validating concessions -granted by the Sultan’s Government before the War, especially if the -National Assembly was to be obliged to honor Ottoman pre-War debts -in full. In any case, the Turkish delegates insisted, no concessions -would be confirmed if they in any way limited the sovereignty of -Turkey or infringed upon its financial and administrative integrity. -Between the French and Turkish views was a chasm which it would be -difficult, indeed, to bridge. The French stood upon the rock of the old -imperialism; the Turks were fortified in their new nationalism. The -French were seeking to intrench certain important vested interests; -the Turks were striving to preserve a precious independence, recently -won at great price. - -In these circumstances, it was to be expected that the British and -the Turks should seek to effect an understanding. The claims of Great -Britain, it appeared, were more easily reconcilable with the Turkish -program than were the claims of France. Concessions obtained by British -nationals between 1910 and 1914 were largely in areas detached from -Turkey during the War—chiefly in Mesopotamia—whereas many of the most -important French concessions were in Anatolia, the stronghold of the -Turkish Nationalists.[29] To Great Britain, therefore, it was a matter -of comparative indifference whether all concessions within Turkey -were specifically confirmed; to France it was a matter of the utmost -importance. According to the proposed Lausanne treaty the Turkish -Government was to expropriate the former German railways in Turkey, -with a view to incorporating them into a state-owned system, and was to -pay therefor to the Financial Commission, on reparations account, a sum -to be fixed by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.[30] It -suited British interests thus to prevent a rival Power from obtaining -control of the former Bagdad line; it suited French interests not -at all to be deprived of a considerable share in a highly important -enterprise. In the settlement of questions regarding the Ottoman Public -Debt, likewise, the French were more obdurate than the British. - -In the closing days of the conference, the question of Mosul and its -oilfields—the last question which stood in the way of an Anglo-Turkish -agreement—was temporarily settled by a decision to make it the subject -of “direct and friendly negotiations between the two interested -Powers.” But no agreement was possible between Turkey and France on -concessions and capitulations. When the first Lausanne Conference broke -up, therefore, it was because of the determination of the Turks not to -accept economic, financial, and judicial clauses which they believed -menaced their independence. “The treaty,” said Ismet Pasha, head of -the Turkish delegation, “would strangle Turkey economically. I refuse -to accept economic slavery for my country, and the demands of the -Allies remove all possibility of economic rehabilitation and kill all -our hopes.” On the other hand, the refusal of the Turks to sign was -characterized by the chief of the French delegates as “a crime.”[31] - -During the interim between the first and second Lausanne conferences -French prestige in the Near East was dealt some severe blows. The -Turkish press attacked the French Government for having insisted upon -concessions and capitulations which were designed to keep Turkey under -foreign domination in the interest of bondholders and promoters. Such -conduct, it was pointed out, was altogether inconsistent with the terms -of the Angora Treaty by which France agreed “to make every effort to -settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to the -independence and sovereignty of Turkey.”[32] In the National Assembly -hostility to French claims was so pronounced that no further action -was taken toward the ratification of the Angora Treaty—and without -such ratification the French title to certain sections of the Bagdad -Railway would be invalid. The Turkish army on the Syrian frontier was -reënforced for the purpose of bringing home to France the determination -of the Angora Government to tolerate no foreign interference in its -domestic affairs. The situation in Syria became so serious that M. -Poincaré saw fit to despatch to Beirut one of Marshal Foch’s right-hand -men, General Weygand, as commander-in-chief in Syria. - -The breach between France and Turkey was widened when, on April 10, -1923, the Angora Government awarded to an American syndicate headed -by Admiral Colby M. Chester, a retired officer of the United States -Navy, concessions for almost three thousand miles of railway, together -with valuable rights to the exploitation of the mineral resources -of Anatolia.[33] The Chester concessions conflicted with certain -French claims which had been under discussion at the first Lausanne -Conference: the concession for a Black Sea railway system, which had -been conferred upon French capitalists in 1913; and rights to the -Arghana copper mines, to which a French group had been given a kind -of priority under the Angora Treaty of 1921.[34] In part, at least, -the award of the Chester concessions at this particular time was a -shrewd political move on the part of the Nationalist Government. -It was designed to serve notice on France that no treaty would be -acceptable to Turkey which would require complete confirmation of -pre-War concessions; from this decision there could be no departure -without infringing upon American rights and without recognizing the -acts of a former Sultan as superior to acts of the new government -of Turkey. It was intended, also, to win for the Turks a measure of -American diplomatic support. That the French Government understood the -implications of the Chester concessions is evidenced by the fact that -the Foreign Office despatched to Angora a note which characterized -the award as “a deliberately unfriendly act, of a nature to influence -adversely the coming negotiations at Lausanne.”[35] - -When the second Lausanne Conference convened on April 22, 1923, -therefore, it was France, not Great Britain, which was on the -defensive. And the French position became steadily worse, rather than -better. On May 15, it was announced that a syndicate of British banks -had purchased a controlling interest in the _Bank für orientalischen -Eisenbahnen_, of Zurich, the _Deutsche Bank’s_ holding company for the -Anatolian and Bagdad Railway Companies. Ismet Pasha, it was said, was -kept fully informed of the British plans and expressed his pleasure -at the consummation of the transaction. Thus, after twenty years of -diplomatic bargaining, British imperialists had won possession of the -“short cut to India”![36] Should Great Britain succeed in establishing -her point that the _Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_ is a neutral -Swiss, rather than enemy German, corporation and therefore exempt from -seizure under the reparations provisions of the Treaty of Versailles; -and should the Chester concessions be recognized as superseding the -rights of the Black Sea Railways, French interests in the Levant will -face a powerful Anglo-American competition which it will be very -difficult for them to combat with any degree of success.[37] And the -power of the French Government is so heavily invested in the Ruhr -occupation that it is doubtful if it can do anything at all to coerce -the Turks into full recognition of French claims. - -Kaleidoscopic indeed have been the changes in the Near East since the -outbreak of the Great War in 1914. The economic and political power -of Germany in Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia has been completely -destroyed. The Ottoman Empire has disappeared, and in its place has -risen a republican Nationalist Turkey. Tsarist Russia, with its -consuming desire for aggrandizement in the Caucasus, in Asia Minor, and -at the Straits, has given way to a proletarian Russia which foreswears -imperialist ambition. Italy, which sought to transform the Adriatic and -the Ægean into Italian lakes, has finally been compelled to recognize -that she assumed imperial liabilities out of all proportion to her -economic resources. France, after achieving a temporary victory in -the New Turkey, has had to surrender her position to more powerful -competitors. But Great Britain has emerged from the conflict in all -her glory. She has obtained possession of another highway to the East. -Alongside the Suez Canal, in the collection of British imperial jewels, -will be placed the Bagdad Railway; alongside of Malta and Gibraltar and -Cyprus must be placed Jerusalem and Basra and Bagdad. - -No less remarkable than all these changes, however, is the entry of -American interests into the tangled problem of the Near East. - - -AMERICA EMBARKS UPON AN UNCHARTED SEA - -The Great War was accompanied by a definite growth of American prestige -in the Near East. After the entry of Turkey into the war against the -Allied Powers, American schools and missions were left practically a -free hand in the Ottoman Empire; and inasmuch as the United States -did not declare war against Turkey, American institutions were not -disturbed even after 1917. Carrying on their work under the most -trying circumstances, these educational and philanthropic enterprises -established a still greater reputation than they formerly possessed -for efficient and disinterested service. In consequence, an American -official mission to the Near East in 1919 was able to report that the -moral influence of the United States in that region of the world was -greater than that of any other Power. President Wilson was looked upon -as the champion of small nations and oppressed peoples. Americans were -considered to be charitable and generous to a fault. The United States -was hailed as the only nation which had entered the war for unselfish -purposes.[38] - -Since the armistice of 1918 events have not materially decreased the -prestige which the War built up. “From Adrianople to Amritsar, and -from Tiflis to Aden, America is considered a friend. It has become a -tradition in the Near East to interpret every action of the European -Powers as an attempt at political domination. America is the only power -considered strong enough to provide the Orient with the capital and -expert knowledge for its industrial development, without aiming at more -than a legitimate profit. The Oriental feels that he needs coöperation -with the West; but he is anxious to restrict that coöperation to the -economic field. And he considers the United States the only power which -would replace Europe’s political ambitions by a sound, matter-of-fact, -and sincere economic policy.”[39] - -During the Great War the economic situation of the United States -underwent certain fundamental changes which seem to forecast increasing -American interest in imperialism. Before the War, America was -practically self-sufficient in raw materials; its export trade was -composed very largely of foodstuffs and raw materials which found a -ready market in the great industrial nations of Europe; financially, -it was a debtor, not a creditor, nation. The enormous industrial -expansion of the United States during the Great War, however, has -changed these conditions. Raw materials have become an increasingly -greater proportion of the nation’s import trade, and American business -men are becoming concerned about foreign control of certain essential -commodities such as rubber, nitrates, chrome, and petroleum. American -export trade has experienced an unparalleled period of expansion, and -American manufactured articles are competing in world markets which -formerly were the exclusive preserves of European nations. Furthermore, -the export of American capital has almost kept pace with the export -of American goods, so that by 1920 the United States had taken its -place alongside Great Britain and France as one of the great creditor -nations of the world. As time goes on American business will be -reaching out over the world for a fair share of the earth’s resources -in raw materials, for new markets capable of development, and for -opportunities for the profitable investment of capital.[40] - -These new tendencies were quickly reflected in American relations -with the Near East. As early as the spring of 1920 the Government -of the United States was engaged in a lengthy correspondence with -His Britannic Majesty’s Government regarding the right of American -capital to participate in the exploitation of the oil resources of -Mesopotamia.[41] About the same time the Guaranty Trust Company of -New York—the second largest bank in the United States—established a -branch in Constantinople and proceeded to inform American business men -regarding the opportunities for commercial expansion in the Near East. -In a booklet entitled _Trading with the Near East—Present Conditions -and Future Prospects_, the bank had this to say: - - “The establishing of a Constantinople branch of the Guaranty Trust - Company of New York brings forcibly to mind the growing importance - of the Near East to American foreign trade. Up to the present time - American business in Constantinople has been seriously handicapped by - the absence of American banking facilities. Our traders were forced to - rely on British, French, or other foreign banks for their financial - transactions. This was not only inconvenient, but it was devoid of - that business secrecy which is so necessary in exploiting new fields. - - “Before the war merchandise from the United States was a negligible - factor in the business life of Constantinople, and a vessel flying - the Stars and Stripes was a rare sight. Today one will find four or - five American liners in the Golden Horn at all times.... Today a dozen - important American corporations have permanent offices there, and many - other American concerns are represented by local agents. - - “The future possibilities of imports from and exports to the Eastern - Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea ports from the - United States are of almost unbelievable proportions. These entire - sections must be fed, clothed, and largely rehabilitated. Roads, - ports, railways, and public works of all kinds are needed everywhere. - The merchants of the Near East have valuable raw products to send us - in exchange for the manufactured goods which they so urgently need.“ - -This estimate of the situation was confirmed by the American Chamber -of Commerce for the Levant when, in urging upon the Department of -State the vigorous defence of the “open door” in Turkey, it said: “The -opportunities for the expansion of American interests in the Near East -are practically unlimited, provided there is a fair field open for -individual enterprise.... In fact, with the conclusion of peace, there -is the economic structure of an empire to be developed.”[42] - -The rapid development of American economic interests in Turkey can -be most effectively presented by reference to the trade statistics. -American exports to Turkey at the opening of the twentieth century -amounted to only $50,000. In 1913 they had risen to $3,500,000. But -between 1913 and 1920 they showed a phenomenal increase of over twelve -hundred per cent, reaching the sum of $42,200,000. Nor was this trade -one sided, for during the period 1913–1920, American imports from -Turkey increased from $22,100,000 to $39,600,000.[43] - -The Chester concessions are another important step in the development -of a new American policy in the Near East. They provide for the -construction by the Ottoman-American Development Company—a Turkish -corporation owned and administered by Americans—of approximately 2800 -miles of railways, of which the following are the most important: - - 1. An extension of the old Anatolian Railway from Angora to Sivas, - with a branch to the port of Samsun, on the Black Sea. - - 2. A line from Sivas to Erzerum and on to the Persian and Russian - frontiers, with branches to the Black Sea ports of Tireboli and - Trebizond. - -[Illustration] - - - 3. A line from Oulu Kishla, on the Bagdad Railway, to Sivas _via_ - Kaisarieh. - - 4. A trans-Armenian railway from Sivas to Kharput, Arghana, Diarbekr, - Mosul, and Suleimanieh, including branches to Bitlis and Van. - - 5. A railway from Kharput to Youmourtalik, a port on the Gulf of - Alexandretta. - -No more elaborate project for railway construction in Asiatic Turkey -has ever been incorporated in a definitive concession. That it should -be entrusted to American promoters and American engineers is one of the -most significant developments in the long and involved history of the -Eastern Question. - -But the Chester concessions do not stop at railway construction -alone. As in the case of the Bagdad Railway, the Turkish Government -is obliged to offer the financiers powerful inducements to the -investment of capital in railway enterprises which, in themselves, -may be unremunerative for a time. The German promoters of the Bagdad -Railway obtained a kilometric guarantee, or subsidy; the American -promoters of the Chester lines are granted exclusive rights to the -exploitation of all mineral resources, including oil, lying within -a zone of twenty kilometres on each side of the railway lines. The -Bagdad Railway mortgaged the revenues of Imperial Turkey; the Chester -concessions mortgage the natural resources of Nationalist Turkey. The -Ottoman-American Development Company, furthermore, is authorized to -carry out important enterprises subsidiary to the construction of the -railway lines and the exploitation of the mines aforementioned. It -may, for example, lay such pipe lines as are necessary to the proper -development of the petroleum wells lying within its zone of operations. -It is permitted to utilize water-power along the line of its railways -and to install hydro-electric stations for the service of its mines, -ports, or railways. It is required to construct elaborate port and -terminal facilities at Samsun, on the Black Sea, and at Youmourtalik, -on the Gulf of Alexandretta. - -There are other respects in which the terms of the Chester grant -are strikingly similar to those of the Bagdad Railway concession of -March 5, 1903.[44] Lands owned by the Turkish Government and needed -for right-of-way, terminal facilities, or exploitation of mineral -resources are transferred to the Ottoman-American Development Company, -free of charge, for the period of the concession (ninety-nine years). -Public lands required for construction purposes—including sand-pits, -gravel-pits, and quarries—may be utilized without rental, and wood -and timber may be cut from State-owned forests without compensation. -As public utilities, the Chester enterprises are granted full rights -of expropriation of such privately owned land as may be necessary for -purposes of construction or operation. Like the _Deutsche Bank_, the -Ottoman-American Development Company is granted sweeping exemption -from taxation, as follows: “The materials, machines, coal, and other -commodities required for the construction operations of the Company, -whether purchased in Turkey or imported from abroad, shall be exempt -from all customs duties or other tax. The coal imported for the -operation of the [railway] lines shall be exempt from customs duties -for a period of twenty years, dating from the ratification of the -present agreement. For the entire duration of the concession the lines -and ports constructed by the Company, as well as its capital and -revenues, shall be exempt from all imposts.”[45] - -From the Turkish point of view, the Chester concessions may be -justified on the grounds that the new railways will bring political -stability to Anatolia[46] and will initiate an era of unprecedented -economic progress. From the point of view of those American interests -which believe in the stimulation of foreign trade, likewise, the -Chester project has much to commend it. Exploitation of the oilfields -of the vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, and Mosul, and the development -of the mineral resources of Armenia—including the valuable Arghana -copper mines—will provide rich sources of supply of raw materials. In -the construction of railways, ports, and pipe lines there will be a -considerable demand for American steel products. Economic development -of the vast region through which the new railways will pass promises -to furnish a market for American products, such as agricultural -machinery, and to offer ample opportunity for the profitable investment -of American capital. The Chester project may well become an imperial -enterprise of the first rank. - -With the exception of the temporary advantage which they hoped to gain -at the second Lausanne Conference, the Turkish Government wished no -political importance to be attached to the Chester concessions. As -Abdul Hamid had awarded the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions -to a German company because he believed Germans would be less likely -to associate political aims with their economic privileges, so the -Government of the National Assembly has awarded the Chester concessions -to an American syndicate because Turkish Nationalists are convinced -that Americans have no political interests in Turkey. This was made -clear by Dr. I. Fouad Bey, a member of the National Assembly, in a -semi-official visit to the United States during April, 1923. “We Turks -wish to develop our country,” he said. “We need foreign coöperation to -develop it. We cannot do without this coöperation. Now, there are two -kinds of foreign coöperation. There is the foreign coöperation that -is coupled with foreign political domination—coöperation that brings -profit only to the foreign investor. We have had enough of that kind. -There is another kind of coöperation—the kind we conceive the Chester -project and other American enterprises to be. This kind of coöperation -is a business enterprise and has no imperialistic aim. It is a form -of coöperation designed to profit both America and Turkey, and not -to invade Turkish sovereignty and Turkish political interests in any -way. That is why we prefer American coöperation. That is why the Grand -National Assembly at Angora is prepared to welcome American capital -with open arms and secure it in all its rights.”[47] - -These sentiments found a ready echo among American merchants. At a -dinner given in honor of Dr. Fouad Bey by the American Federated -Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, one of the speakers said: -“Turkey, in our opinion, is destined to have a magnificent future. -It is on the threshold of a new and great era. Its extraordinary -resources, amazingly rich, are practically untouched. Although in -remote ages of antiquity these vast regions played a great rôle in -history, they have for many centuries lain practically fallow. The -tools, appliances, machinery and methods which have been so highly -perfected in the United States are appropriate to and will be needed -for the development of this marvelous latent wealth. Our capital -likewise can be very helpful. The members of our Chamber of Commerce -have a keen interest in the furtherance of trade relations between -Turkey and the United States. We want both to increase the imports of -its raw materials into our country and to stimulate the export of our -manufactured articles to Turkey. We are inspired by no political aims. -We seek no annexation of territory. We desire no exclusive privileges. -Our motto, if we had one, would be ‘A fair field and no favors.’ In -the development of commercial relations with Turkey, in seeking the -investment of our capital there, we ask for nothing more than an open -door.”[48] - -The American press, likewise, is in accord with a policy of -governmental non-intervention in the ramifications of the Chester -project. The following editorial from the new York _World_ of April 23, -1923, is perhaps representative: - - “There is no reason why the State Department should make itself the - attorney for or the promoter of the Chester business enterprises. If - the Angora Government has granted privileges to the Admiral’s company, - then the Admiral’s business is with Angora and not with Washington. - - “Certainly the American people have no more interest in taking up - the Chester concessions diplomatically than they would have if - the Admiral were proposing to open a candy store in Piccadilly, a - dressmaking establishment in the Rue de la Paix, or a beauty parlor - on the Riviera. If the Admiral and his friends wish to invest money - in Turkey, they no doubt know what they are doing. They will expect - profits commensurate with the risks, and they should not expect the - United States Government, which will enjoy none of the profits, to - insure them against the risks.” - -It is difficult, nevertheless, to see how the Chester concessions, -and their affiliated enterprises can be kept scrupulously free from -political complications. The French Government, in defence of the -interests of its nationals, has announced semi-officially that American -support of the concessions might lead to “a diplomatic incident of the -first importance.”[49] Furthermore, the United States Navy is said -to be vitally interested in the Chester project. The oilfields to -which Admiral Chester’s Ottoman-American Development Company obtain -rights of exploitation may prove to be important sources of fuel -supply to American destroyers operating in the Mediterranean—Mr. -Denby, Secretary of the Navy, said apropos of the concessions that the -Navy “is always concerned with the possibility of oil supplies.”[50] -Furthermore, an American-built port at Youmourtalik, on the Gulf of -Alexandretta, might conceivably be utilized as an American naval base. -Such a station, less than 150 miles from Cyprus and less than 400 miles -from the Suez Canal, could hardly be expected to increase the British -sense of security in the Eastern Mediterranean. - -The American Navy has already been very active in the Near East. “Soon -after the armistice, Rear Admiral Bristol was sent to Constantinople -to command the small American naval forces there. A large part of -his efforts was immediately devoted to the promotion of American -business in that unsettled region, including the countries bordering -on the Black Sea. He soon established for himself such an influential -position by sheer force of character and by his intelligent grasp of -both the political and economic situations that he was appointed high -commissioner by the State Department. - -“Early in 1919 several American destroyers were ordered to -Constantinople for duty in the Near East. Although these destroyers -are good fighting ships, it costs some $4,000,000 a year to maintain -them on this particular duty, which does not train the crews for use -in battle.... The possible development of the economic resources of -this part of the world was carefully investigated by representatives -of American commercial interests. These representatives were given -every assistance by the Navy, transportation furnished them to various -places, and all information of commercial activities obtained by naval -officers in their frequent trips around the Black Sea given them. The -competition for trade in this part of the world is very keen, the -various European countries using every means at their disposal to -obtain preferential rates. The Navy not only assists our commercial -firms to obtain business, but when business opportunities present -themselves, American firms are notified and given full information on -the subject. One destroyer is kept continuously at Samsun, Turkey, to -look after the American tobacco interests at that port. ... The present -opportunities for development of American commerce in the Near East -are very great, and its permanent success will depend largely upon -the continued influence of the Navy in that region.”[51] This is the -situation as diagnosed by the Navy Department itself. - -“With the assistance of a small force of destroyers based on -Constantinople,” according to an instructor in the United States Naval -Academy, “our commercial representatives are establishing themselves -firmly in a trade which means millions of dollars to the farmers of -the American Middle West. By utilizing the wireless of destroyers in -Turkish ports, at Durazzo, and elsewhere, commercial messages have -been put through without delay.... Destroyers are entering Turkish -ports with ‘drummers’ as regular passengers, and their fantails piled -high with American samples. An American destroyer has made a special -trip at thirty knots to get American oil prospectors into a newly -opened field.” Here is “dollar diplomacy” with a vengeance! “If this -continues, we shall cease to take a purely academic interest in the -naval problems of the Near East. These problems are concerned with -the protection of commerce, the control of narrow places in the -Mediterranean waterways, and the naval forces which the interested -nations can bring to bear. They cannot be discussed without constant -reference to political and commercial aims.”[52] - -Americans would do well to take stock of this Near Eastern situation. -Mustapha Kemal Pasha invites the participation of American capital in -railway construction in Anatolia for substantially the same reasons -which prompted Abdul Hamid to award the Bagdad Railway concession to -German bankers. In 1888, Abdul Hamid considered Germany economically -powerful but politically disinterested. Today, Mustapha Kemal Pasha -believes that American promoters, engineers, and industrialists possess -the resources and the technical skill which are required to develop -and modernize Asia Minor. And, from the Turkish point of view, the -political record of the United States in the Near East is a good -record. America never has annexed Ottoman territory or staked out -spheres of interest on Turkish soil; America has not participated in -the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; America has few Mohammedan -subjects and therefore is not fearful of the political strength of -Pan-Islamism; America did not declare war on Turkey during the European -struggle; America was not a party to the hated treaty of Sèvres. -America alone among the Western Powers seems capable of becoming a -sincere and disinterested friend of Turkey.[53] The avowed foreign -policies of the United States appear to confirm the opinion of the -Turks that Americans can be depended upon not to infringe upon Turkish -sovereignty. America must be kept scrupulously free from all “foreign -entanglements”; therefore an American mandate for Armenia has been -firmly declined. Splendid isolation is declared to be the fundamental -American principle in international affairs. - -The political theory of isolation, however, is not altogether in -harmony with the economic fact of American world power. The enormous -expansion of American commercial and financial interests during and -since the Great War brings the United States face to face with new, -difficult, and complicated international problems. American business -men will be increasingly interested in the backward countries of the -world, in which they can purchase raw materials, to which they can sell -their finished products, and in which they can invest their capital. -American financiers, manufacturers, and merchants will look to their -government for assistance in the extension of foreign markets and -for protection in their foreign investments. Already there is grave -danger that the United States may “plunge into national competitive -imperialism, with all its profits and dangers, following its financiers -wherever they may lead.”[54] - -The situation is not unlike that which faced the German Empire in -1888. When the _Deutsche Bank_ initiated its Anatolian railway -enterprises, it inquired of the German Government whether it might -expect protection for its investments in Turkey. Bismarck—who desired -to avoid imperialistic entanglements and to limit German political -interests, as far as possible, to the continent of Europe—replied with -a warning that the risk involved “must be assumed exclusively by the -entrepreneurs” and that the Bank must not count upon the support of the -German Government in “precarious enterprises in foreign countries.” -But Bismarck’s policy did not take full cognizance of the phenomenal -industrial and commercial expansion of the German Empire, whose -nationals were acquiring economic interests in Asia and in Africa and -on the Seven Seas. William II was more sensitive than Bismarck to the -demands of German industrial, commercial, and financial interests that -they be granted active governmental support and protection abroad. -Bismarck tolerated German enterprises in Turkey; William II sponsored -them. It was under William II, not under Bismarck, that Germany -definitely entered the arena of imperial competition.[55] - -The development of American interests in Turkey puts the Government -of the United States to a test of statesmanship. The temptations will -be numerous to lend governmental assistance to American business men -against their European competitors; to utilize the new American -economic position in Turkey for the acquisition of political influence; -to use diplomatic pressure in securing additional commercial and -financial opportunities; to emphasize the economic, at the expense -of the moral, factors in Near Eastern affairs. To yield to these -temptations will be to destroy the great prestige which America -now possesses in the Levant by reason of disinterested social and -educational service. To yield will be to forfeit the trust which -Turkish nationalists have put in American hands. To yield will be to -intrench the system of economic imperialism which has been the curse -of the Near East for half a century. To yield will be to involve the -United States in foreign entanglements more portentous than those -connected with the League of Nations, or the International Court of -Justice, or any other plan which has yet been suggested for American -participation in the reconstruction of a devastated Europe and a -turbulent Asia. - -The Chester concessions may be either promise or menace. They will give -promise of a new era in the Near East insofar as they contribute to -the development and the prosperity of Asia Minor, without infringing -upon the integrity and sovereignty of democratic Turkey, and without -involving the Government of the United States in serious diplomatic -controversies with other Great Powers. They will be a menace—to Turkey, -to the United States, and to the peace of the world—if, unhappily, they -should lead republican America in the footsteps of imperial Germany. - - -BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES - -[1] Mufty-Zade Zia Bey, “How the Turks Feel,” in _Asia_, Volume XXII -(1922), p. 857. - -[2] “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People,” -Article III. Available in English translation in _International -Conciliation_, No. 136 (New York, 1919). - -[3] _Supra_, Chapter VII. - -[4] The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is given -as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, “Russia’s Treaty with -Turkey,” in _Current History_, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 276–279. - -[5] Bowman, _op. cit._, p. 398. - -[6] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 202–203. Professor Toynbee now speaks of this -feature of the Entente in terms of contempt: “Its direct motive was -covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial than -the precarious honor among thieves who find their business threatened -by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the thieves, at any -rate, never got out of the habit of picking their temporary partners’ -pockets.“ _Op. cit._, p. 46. - -[7] _Ibid._, pp. 45–46. - -[8] It seems to be established that Mr. Lloyd George compelled a -readjustment of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty by threatening -M. Clémenceau with a complete exposure and repudiation of all of the -secret treaties. _Cf._ Baker, _op. cit._, Volume I, pp. 70–72. - -[9] See Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, reported in -full by Baker, _op. cit._, Volume III, Document No. 1. - -[10] Regarding the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company, _cf._ -_supra_, p. 261. - -[11] _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 675 (1920). _Cf._, also, the -“Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on Certain Points -Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, and -Mesopotamia,” _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. 1195 (1921). For -a general discussion of the oil situation, see: H. Bérenger, _La -politique du pétrole_ (Paris, 1920); F. Delaisi, _Le pétrole—La -politique de la production_ (Paris, 1921); A. Apostol and A. Michelson, -_La lutte pour le pétrole_ (Paris, 1922). - -[12] _Cf._ _supra_, Chapter X, Note 18. - -[13] _Supra_, pp. 301–302. - -[14] Interesting sidelights on these points will be found in the -correspondence between the French and British Governments regarding the -Angora Treaty of October 20, 1921, _Parliamentary Papers_, No. Cmd. -1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922). _Cf._, also, Toynbee, _op. cit._, Chapter -III, “Greece and Turkey in the Vicious Circle”; Jean Lescure, “Faut-il -détruire la Turquie?” in _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Volume -103 (1920), pp. 42–48; “Where Diplomacy Failed,” _The Daily Telegraph_ -(London), September 19, 1922. - -[15] M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, November 17, -1921, in the official correspondence cited in Note 14. - -[16] _Cf._ a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and the -scope of the agreement, _Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, -Chambre des députés_, March 16, 1921, pp. 1272–1273. The text of the -agreement is available in _Current History_, Volume XIV (1921), pp. -203–204, and in the _Contemporary Review_, Volume 119 (1921), pp. -677–679. - -[17] Regarding the Heraclea coal mines _cf._ _supra_, p. 14. During -the War the mines were operated by Hugo Stinnes. - -[18] For the text of the Turco-Italian treaty see _L’Europe Nouvelle_ -(Paris), May 28, 1921, or _The Nation_, Volume 113 (New York, 1921), p. -214. _The New York Times_, April 13, 1921, contains a good summary of -the treaty and the circumstances of its negotiation. - -[19] The text of the Angora Treaty is given in _Parliamentary Papers_, -No. Cmd. 1556, Turkey No. 2 (1921). It has been reprinted in Current -History, January, 1922. For a statement by M. Briand regarding the -purposes and scope of the treaty, _cf._ _Journal officiel, Débats -parlementaires, Sénat_, October 28, 1921, pp. 818–819. - -[20] Aleppo remained within the French mandate for Syria, so that for -a time—until the Turks construct a substitute line—through trains will -have to pass through French territory for a short distance. Guarantees -against interruption of either military or commercial traffic were -exacted by the Turks, however. In addition, Turkey was guaranteed full -use of the port of Alexandretta on a basis of absolute equality with -Syria. - -[21] Most of the supplementary economic concessions are provided for in -a covering letter of Yussuf Kemal Bey and in an exchange of notes which -coincided with the signature of the treaty. These were kept absolutely -secret until December, when their contents were made known to the -British Government. - -[22] _Supra_, p. 83. - -[23] The italics are mine. Discrimination against British trade from -Mosul to Alexandretta, for example, might be used to force Great -Britain to abandon many of her claims in northern Mesopotamia. - -[24] _The Times_ (London), August 2, 1922; _Manchester Guardian -Commercial_, August 31, 1922; _Chicago Tribune_, Paris edition, August -21, 1922. - -[25] For the text of the correspondence, _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_, -No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922). - -[26] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 301–302. - -[27] A not unrepresentative Greek view is the following: “Nationalist -Turkey became, in a military sense, French territory. Political -missions, military missions, propaganda missions, financial missions, -found their way from Paris to Angora. The entire credit of the French -Republic was placed behind Kemal. The warships of France and the liners -of the _Messageries Maritimes_ became Turkish transports, and the -French arsenals were placed at the disposal of the Turks. Once the ally -of Kemal, France supported him to the fullest extent of its ability and -its resources.” A. T. Polyzoides, “The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor,” -in _Current History_, Volume XVII (1923), p. 35. - -[28] Material regarding the Lausanne Conference is scattered and -fragmentary. The text of the proposed treaty is to be found in -_L’Europe Nouvelle_ (Paris), February 24 and March 10, 1923; a summary -is given in _The Times_ (London), February 1, 1923. The newspaper -accounts which I have used are those of _The New York Times_, _The -Times_ (London), _The Manchester Guardian_, _The World_ (New York), -and the _Christian Science Monitor_ (Boston). For reports and -editorial comment in weekly periodicals I have consulted _The Near -East_, _L’Europe Nouvelle_, _Journal des Débats_, _The New Statesman_ -(London), _The Nation_ (New York). The following magazine articles have -proved useful: “The Lausanne Conference,” in _Current History_, Volume -XVII (1923), pp. 531–537, 743–748, 929–930; Saint-Brice, “De la Ruhr à -Lausanne,” in _Correspondance d’Orient_ (Paris), February, 1923; “The -Oriental Labyrinth at Lausanne,” in the _Literary Digest_, April 21, -1923, pp. 19–20; H. Froidevaux, “Les négociations de Lausanne et leur -suspension,” in _L’Asie Française_, 33 year, No. 208 (Paris, 1923), pp. -8–10; J. C. Powell, “Italy at Lausanne,” in _The New Statesman_, Volume -XX (1922), pp. 291–292; A. J. Toynbee, “The New Status of Turkey,” in -the _Contemporary Review_, Volume 123 (1923), pp. 281–289; P. Bruneau, -“La question de Mossoul,” in _L’Europe Nouvelle_, February 3, 1923, pp. -138–140. For some of my information regarding the Lausanne Conference I -am indebted to Djavid Bey. - -[29] _Cf._ _supra_, Chapters IX and X, _ad lib._ - -[30] Compare with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, _supra_, pp. -301–302. - -[31] _The New York Times_, February 5, 1923. - -[32] _Cf._ _supra_, pp. 324–325. - -[33] The Chester concessions will be treated more fully in the -succeeding pages. - -[34] _Supra_, pp. 245–249, 325–326. It was the Turkish contention that -the Black Sea concessions were invalid for the following reasons: they -were negotiated by a government for the acts of which the National -Assembly assumed no responsibility; they never had been ratified by -the Turkish Parliament; the French bankers had not fulfilled all the -conditions upon which the concessions were predicated. - -[35] _The New York Times_, April 12, 1923. - -[36] Regarding the _Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen_, _cf._ -_supra_, p. 32. Accounts of the purchase by British interests are to be -found in _The New York Times_, April 28, May 15 and 16, 1923, and _The -Times_ (London), May 18, 1923. - -[37] The Chester concessions conflict, to a degree, with the rights of -the British-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (_cf._ _supra_, Chapter X) -in the vilayet of Mosul. The area in conflict is so small, compared -to the total of the two concessions, however, that it is extremely -doubtful if there will be any serious difficulty in reaching a -satisfactory adjustment. - -[38] “Report of the King-Crane Mission to the Near East,” published as -a supplement to the _Editor and Publisher_, Volume 55 (New York, 1922), -pp. I-XXVIII. _Cf._, also, “Report of the American Military Mission to -Armenia,” Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session -(Washington, 1920). - -[39] E. J. Bing, “Chester and Turkey, Inc.,” in _The New Republic_, -Volume XXXIV (New York, 1923), pp. 290–292. - -[40] _Cf._ E. M. Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” in -the _Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_, -Volume CVIII (Philadelphia, 1923). - -[41] For the text of this correspondence, _cf._ _Parliamentary Papers_, -No. Cmd. 675 (1921). - -[42] _The New York Times_, October 29, 1922. - -[43] _Statistical Abstract of the United States_, 1921, _passim_; “The -Trade of Turkey During 1920,” _Commerce Reports_, Special Supplement -(Washington, 1921). - -[44] Compare with the terms of the Bagdad Railway concession, _supra_, -pp. 70–71, 77–84. - -[45] The text of the Chester concessions—in an English translation -which leaves much to be desired—is to be found in _Current History_, -Volume XVIII (1923), pp. 485–489. For an official copy of the -concessions, with a map, I am indebted to Mr. M. Zekeria, Secretary of -the Turkish Information Service in New York. - -[46] The Chester concessions contain the usual provisions for the -utilization of the railways by the gendarmerie and the military, both -in time of peace and in time of war. - -[47] _The World_ (New York), April 10, 1923. - -[48] The remarks are those of Mr. Ernest Filsinger, of the firm of -Lawrence & Company, exporters. Mr. Filsinger has been good enough to -supply me with a copy of his speech. - -[49] _The New York Times_, April 12, 1923. - -[50] _Ibid._, April 23, 1923. - -[51] _The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset_ (Washington, -Office of Naval Intelligence, 1923). _Cf._, also, C. Merz, “Bristol, -Quarterdeck Diplomat,” in _Our World_, December, 1922. - -[52] Allen Westcott, “The Struggle for the Mediterranean,” in _Our -World_, February, 1923, pp. 11–17. - -[53] _Cf._, _supra_, pp. 63–65. - -[54] _Cf._ W. E. Weyl, _American World Policies_ (New York, 1917), -Chapter V; A. Demangeon, _America and the Race for World Dominion_ -(Garden City, 1921), a translation of _Le Déclin de l’Europe_ (Paris, -1920). - -[55] _Supra_, pp. 40–42. - - - - -INDEX - - - Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 5, 23, 198; - problems of, 9; - interest in railway construction, 20, 30; - deposition of, 97. - - Adaban Island, 283. - - Adalia, 267, 285, 302, 324. - - Adana, 22, 72. (_See also_ Mersina-Adana Railway.) - - Adrianople, 29. - - Afiun Karahissar, 34, 53, 324. - - Agadir crisis, 170, 253. - - Agriculture in Turkey. (_See_ Turkey, agricultural conditions.) - - Aidin, 324. (_See also_ Smyrna-Aidin Railway.) - - Alashehr, 34. - - Aleppo, 2, 22, 62, 71, 73, 281, 299. - - Alexandretta, 19, 62, 73, 110, 112, 151. - - Allenby, Field Marshal Sir E. H. H., 298–299. - - _Alliance Israélite Universelle_, 133. - - Amanus Mountains, 22, 72, 94, 234, 277, 289; - Bagdad Railway tunnels through, 113, 119, 289. - - Amara, 286. - - America. (_See_ United States of America.) - - American Federated Chambers of Commerce for the Near East, 344. - - Anatolia, 280, 302, 305; - geography of, 10; - natural resources of, 13–14; - railways of, 29–30. - (_See also_ Anatolian Railway, Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Smyrna-Aidin - Railway, Black Sea Railways, etc.) - - Anatolian Railway, 34, 53, 61, 63, 224, 248, 339; - concession of 1888, 32; - concession of 1893, 33; - agreement with Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 59–60; - board of directors, 85; - irrigation enterprises, 98, 117; - economic achievements of, 230–232; - concessions of 1914, 248–249, 272. - - Andrew, Sir William, 176–177. - - Anglo-French Entente. (_See_ Entente Cordiale.) - - Anglo-French rivalry in the Near East, 318–329. - - Anglo-German Agreement of June 15, 1914, 261–265. - - Anglo-German rivalry, 138, 179–180, 203. - - Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 204. - - Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 259, 261, 283, 286. - - Anglo-Russian Agreement (1907), 204. - - Anglo-Turkish Agreements (1913), 254–258, 263–264. - - Angora, 31, 32, 33, 34, 305, 339. - - Angora Government. (_See_ Grand National Assembly.) - - Angora Treaty (October 20, 1921), 324–325, 333, 352. - - Arabs, 9–10, 15, 87, 196, 207, 282–284, 294, 297, 299, 302, 305, 320. - - Ardahan, 316. - - Arghana, 246, 340; - copper mines of, 326, 334, 343. - - Armenia, 2, 9, 44; - republic of, 302, 305; - proposed American mandate, 348. - - Asia Minor. (_See_ Anatolia.) - - Atlas Line, 107. - - Auguste Victoria, Kaiserin, 132. - - Austria-Hungary, policies in Near East, 11; - railways in Turkey, 58; - trade with Turkey, 105–106; - annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 218; - relations with Germany in Near East, 129–130. - (_See also Drang nach Osten._) - - - _Backshish_, 94. - - Bagdad, 2, 31, 32, 62, 71, 73–74, 261, 281, 286, 296, 336. - - Bagdad Railway, 3, 7, 21, 34; - factor in Great War, 4, 172, 278, 288–289, 291, 299–300; - strategic importance to Turkey, 22, 152–153; - mileage, 90; - construction, 94–95, 113–114, 289; - political importance to Germany, 126–131; - opponents and friends of enterprise in Germany, 137–142; - economic success, 233–234; - disposition of by Allies, 301; - Angora Treaty, 325–326; - status in 1922, 326; - purchase by British bankers, 334. - (_See also_ Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia.) - - Bagdad Railway Company, incorporation of, 70, 92; - concession of 1903, 22, 70–75, 77–84, 219; - attempt to internationalize (1903), 92–93; - board of directors, 93, 115, 256, 263; - preliminary concession of 1899, 61–65, 68; - financing concession of 1903, 77, 91, 93–94, 116; - concession of 1908, 96–97; - convention of March, 1911, 111–112, 228–229, 252; - Franco-German agreement of 1914, 170, 247–252; - contracts with Lord Inchcape, 259–260, 264; - agreement with Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, 260, 264; - proposed liquidation, 301. - - Bagtché tunnel, 289. - - Bahrein Island, 283. - - Balfour, A. J. (Earl Balfour), 93, 180–185, 202. - - Balfour of Burleigh, Lord, 117. - - Balkan States, 11, 152; - nationalism of, 7. - - Balkan Wars, 246–275. - - Ballin, Albert, 141, 281. - - Banditry, 9, 12. - - _Bank für Handel und Industrie_, 101, 116. - - _Bank für orientalische Eisenbahnen_, 32, 334. - - _Banque d’Orient_, 99. - - Barrow, General Sir Edmond, 282. - - Basra, 2, 19, 62, 74, 255, 263, 282, 284, 336. - - Bassermann, Herr, 120, 129, 170, 256. - - Beersheba, 298. - - Beirut, 30, 62, 72, 299. - - Belgium. Railway concessions of Belgians in Turkey, 30. - - Berger, Léon, 91, 115. - - Bergmann, Dr. Carl, 260. - - Berthelot, Philippe, 320. - - Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 249. - - Beyens, Baron, 249. - - Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, 43, 55, 170, 218, 254. - - Bismarck, 40–42, 54–55, 349. - - Bitlis, 340. - - Black Sea Basin Agreement, 65, 149. - - Black Sea Railways, 245–246, 248–249. - - Boer War, 61, 179, 203. - - Boli, 246. - - Bowles, Gibson, 190, 210. - - Bozanti, 325. - - _Breslau_ (Cruiser), 278, 282. - - Briand, Aristide, 329. - - Brusa, 14. - - Bulgaria, 288, 290. - - Bulgurlu, 94, 96. - - Bülow, Prince von, 48, 135. - - - Cadman, Sir John, 321. - - Caillard, Sir Vincent, 31, 32. - - Caliphate, 27, 64, 278–279, 296. - - Cambon, Jules, 268. - - Cambon, Paul, 225. - - Capitulations, 10–11, 82, 153–154, 276, 303–306, 316, 332. - - Carden, Admiral, 282. - - Cassel, Sir Ernest, 209, 220–221, 225. - - Chamberlain, Austen, 287. - - Chamberlain, Joseph, 67, 178–179, 185. - - Chéradame, André, 155, 215. - - Chesney, Francis R., 176. - - Chester, Rear Admiral Colby M., 15, 333. - - Chester concessions, 334, 339, 353; - compared with Bagdad Railway concessions, 340–343; - political significance of, 350. - - Chrome, 13, 337. - - Churchill, Winston, 282. - - Cilicia, 305, 325–326, 331; - French mandate for, 302, 325. - (_See also_ Mersina-Adana Railway.) - - Cilician Gates of the Taurus, 72, 113, 149, 325. - - Cilician-Syrian Railway Company, 326. - - Clémenceau, Georges, 310, 320, 351. - - Coal, Heraclea mines, 14, 324. - - Colonization, 84, 123–125. - - Combes, Émile, 167. - - Commercial Revolution, 1, 3–4, 73. (_See also_ Trade routes.) - - Committee of Union and Progress, 217, 219. - - Constans, M., 60, 155. - - Constantinople, 2, 10, 23, 281, 302. - - Cotton, 16, 50–51, 294, 297, 326. - - Cox, Sir Percy, 283–284, 286. - - Cranborne, Lord, 69. - - Crawford, Sir Richard, 221. - - _Crédit Lyonnais_, 158. - - Crewe, Lord, 282. - - Crowe, Sir Eyre, 259. - - Ctesiphon, 287. - - Curzon, Lord, 23, 113, 192, 197–198, 199, 212–213, 283, 327. - - Customs duties of Ottoman Empire, 95, 111, 180, 226–228, 256, 262. - - - Damascus, 12, 21, 30, 62, 72, 299. - - Damascus-Homs-Aleppo Railway, 34, 246. - - D’Arcy Exploration Company, 259, 261. - - Dardanelles, 245, 280, 282, 285, 288–289. - - Dawkins, Sir Clinton, 186. - - Deir, province of, 294. - - Deir es Zor, 248. - - Delamain, General, 283–284. - - Delcassé, Théophile, 66, 68, 155–157, 168–169. - - De Lesseps, Ferdinand, 177. - - Denby, Charles, 345. - - Deschanel, Paul, 159, 172. - - _Dette Publique._ (_See_ Ottoman Public Debt Administration.) - - _Deutsche Bank_, 32–33, 36, 99, 140, 141, 184–185, 261; - negotiations of 1899 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, 59–60, 155; - influential position in German industry, 100–101; - loans to Young Turks, 225; - negotiations of 1913–1914 with Imperial Ottoman Bank, 170, 247–252. - (_See also_ Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway Company, etc.) - - _Deutsche Levante Linie_, 36, 107. - - _Deutsche Mittelmeer Levante Linie_, 108. - - _Deutsche Orientbank_, 99. - - _Deutsche Orient Mission_, 132. - - _Deutsche Palästina Bank_, 37, 99, 158. - - _Deutsch-türkische Vereinigung_, 281. - - _Deutsches Vorderasienkomitee_, 281. - - _Deutschtum, das_, 135. - - Diarbekr, 12, 14, 31, 73, 246, 340. - - Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beaconsfield), 3, 178, 215. - - Djavid Bey, 95, 219–220, 224–229, 235–236, 247, 275, 278, 331. - - Djemal Pasha, 278, 285, 298. - - Dodecanese Islands, 267. - - Downing Street, 185, 201, 210, 254. - - _Drang nach Osten_, 51, 123, 129–130, 139, 141–142, 315. - - _Dresdner Bank_, 101, 116. - - - Eastern Bank, The, 117. - - Egypt, 3, 7, 21, 195, 201, 278, 319. - - El Helif, 96. - - Ellenborough, Lord, 102, 197. - - Entente Cordiale, 188, 203–204, 319. - - Enver Pasha, 275, 278, 285, 297. - - Eregli, 72. - - Erzerum, 12, 246, 303, 339. - - Eski Shehr, 14, 33. - - Euphrates River, 2, 74, 81. - (_See also_ Lynch Brothers.) - - Euphrates Valley Railway Company, 176. - - Euphrates & Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. (_See_ Lynch - Brothers.) - - - Falkenhayn, General von, 298–299. - - Fashoda incident, 61, 203. - - Fouad Bey, Dr. I., 343. - - France, 7, 23, 276, 293; - French railways in Turkey, 30, 34, 53, 59, 165–166, 245–246, - 248–249. (_See also_ Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, Damascus-Homs-Aleppo - Railway, etc.); - trade with Turkey, 104–106; - imperialism, 122, 294, 300, 330; - attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 66, 94, 153–169; - investments in Turkey, 154–155; - spheres of interest in Near East, 293–294, 302; - mandate for Syria and Cilicia, 302, 320, 325; - rivalry with Great Britain in Near East, 318–329; - treaty of March 9, 1921, with Turkish Nationalists, 323–324; - Angora Treaty, 324–326; - policy at Lausanne Conferences, 329–335; - attitude toward Chester concessions, 333–334, 345. - - Francis I, 154. - - Franco-German convention of 1914, 247–252, 272. - - Franco-Russian Alliance, 153, 158–159, 168. - - Franco-Turkish Treaty of March, 1921, 323–324. - - Franco-Turkish Treaty of October, 1921. (_See_ Angora Treaty.) - - Franklin-Bouillon, Henri, 324, 329. - - - Gallipoli, 8, 280, 285. - - Gaza, 288, 299. - - Genoa Conference, 329. - - George V, of Great Britain, 258. - - Germany, railways in Turkey. (_See_ Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway, - _Deutsche Bank_); - trade with Turkey, 101–106, 109, 118; - banks in the Near East, 98–101; - steamship lines in the Near East, 36, 107–110; - military missions to Turkey, 38, 269, 288, 297–298; - Near Eastern policies, 38–45, 64–65, 120–131, 261–265, 276–279, - 287–292, 297–300; - schools and missions, 131–136, 145; - imperialism, 39–40, 44–52, 56, 114, 125–135, 277, 280–281, 292; - anti-imperialism, 137–138; - rivalries with Great Britain, 138, 179–180, 203; - alliance with Turkey, 271; - propaganda, 281–282; - military campaigns in Turkey, 285–290, 296–299; - destruction of interests in Near East, 301–302, 314–315. - - _Goeben_ (cruiser), 278, 282. - - Golden Horn, 29, 338. - - Goltz, Field Marshal von der, 21, 38–39, 153, 223, 282, 288, 289, 296. - - Gouraud, General, 323. - - Grand National Assembly, 305, 316, 323, 325, 331, 333–334, 343. - - Great Britain, Near Eastern policies, 11, 23, 66–67, 68–69, 111, - 195–208, 225–228, 252–265, 282–287, 297, 322; - attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 66–67, 69, 182–201, 205–209, 261–265; - imperialism, 122, 195–197, 200, 277, 282, 294, 300; - trade with Turkey, 105–106; - economic enterprises in Near East, 30, 53, 60, 117, 189–192, 220, - 261 (_see also_ Lynch Brothers, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, - Inchcape, etc.); - spheres of interest in Ottoman Empire, 294, 302; - acquisition by Bagdad Railway, 334–335; - military campaigns in Near East, 283–285, 286–287, 296–297, 298–299. - (_See also_ headings under “Anglo,” Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, - Suez Canal, etc.) - - Great War, 234, 275–276; - rôle of Bagdad Railway in, 285–290, 296–299. - - Greece, 11, 302, 303, 306. - - Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922), 306, 329. - - Grey, Sir Edward (Viscount Grey), 111, 198, 225–227, 228, 243, 255, - 261–262, 282–283. - - Grothe, Dr. Hugo, 281, 307. - - Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 338. - - Gwinner, Dr. Arthur von, 114–115, 121, 125, 129, 141, 184, 186, 221, - 236, 247, 281. - - - Haidar Pasha, 298, 325. - - Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, 30, 31, 80. - - Haidar Pasha Port Company, 86, 112. - - Haifa, 246. - - Hakki Bey, Ismail, 219. - - Hakki Pasha, 254–255, 261. - - Haldane, Lord, 198, 254. - - Hama, 72. - - Hamburg-American Line, 108–109, 141. - - Hanotaux, Gabriel, 241–242. - - Hatzfeld, Count, 38. - - Hedjaz, 284, 299, 302. - - Hedjaz Railway, 21, 27, 246, 302. - - Helfferich, Dr. Karl, 52, 97, 141, 225, 236, 247, 249. - - Heraclea, 246; - coal mines of, 14, 324. - - _Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden_, 136. - - Hirsch, Baron, 32. - - Hittites, 12. - - Holy Land, 6, 299. - (_See also_ Palestine.) - - Holy War, 278–279, 281. - - Homs, 72, 246. - - Huguenin, M., 63. - - - Immigration, 234. - - Imperial Ottoman Bank, 59, 93, 117, 245, 246–248. - - Imperialism, 3, 5–8, 11–12, 45–52, 114, 235–236, 267, 279–280, - 292–296, 306, 316–318, 331, 337–338, 350. - (_See also_ Imperialism as sub-topic under France, Germany, - Great Britain, Italy, Russia, United States.) - - Inchcape, Lord, 109, 192, 256, 258–260. - - India, 7, 126, 178, 195, 196, 282, 283. - - Industrial Revolution, 13, 45–46. - - Industry in Turkey. (_See_ Turkey, industrial backwardness.) - - Interallied Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways, 300. - - Interallied Financial Commission, 303. - - International Court of Justice, 350. - - Irak, 16, 108, 277, 326. - (_See also_ Mesopotamia.) - - Irrigation, 16–17, 98, 117, 205, 221, 256, 263, 297. - - Ismet Pasha, 333–334. - - Ismid, 14, 305. - - Italy, trade with Turkey, 105–107; - imperialism, 11, 173–174, 218, 295, 300, 330; - Tripolitan War, 246; - economic interests in Turkey, 266–267; - spheres of interest in Near East as defined by secret treaties, - 285, 295, 302, 305; - treaty of 1921 with Turkish Nationalists, 324. - - - Jäckh, Ernst, 204–205, 279, 281, 307. - - Jaffa, 30, 72, 246, 299. - - Jagow, Gottlieb von, 254, 268. - - Jastrow, Morris, 142. - - Jaurès, Jean, 242. - - Jericho, 299. - - Jerusalem, 30, 72, 299. - - _Jerusalems-Verein_, 132, 135. - - Jezirit-ibn-Omar, 327. - - Joffre, Marshal, 268–269. - - Johnston, Sir Harry H., 205–206, 215, 254. - - - Kaisarieh, 272, 340. - - Kapnist, Count Vladimir I., 58. - - Kapp, Wolfgang, 141. - - Karaman, 72. - - Kars, 316. - - Kaulla, Dr. Alfred von, 31. - - Kemal Bey, Yussuf, 325. - - Kemal Pasha, Mustapha, 298, 303, 323, 347. - - Khanikin, 58, 75, 240. - - Kharput, 73, 246, 340. - - Kiderlen-Waechter, von, 239. - - Kilometric guarantees, 31, 33, 77–78, 85, 90, 245. - - Kipling, Rudyard, 137. - - Kitchener, Lord, 283. - - Klapka, M. de, 247, 249. - - Konia, 14, 33, 62, 72, 281. - - Koweit, 4, 180, 197–198, 255; - Sheik of, 181, 223, 255, 284. - - Kühlmann, Herr von, 255, 259, 261. - - Kurds, 9. - - Kurna, 284. - - Kut-el-Amara, 226, 261, 286, 289–291. - - - Land of the Two Rivers. (_See_ Mesopotamia.) - - Langénieux, Cardinal, 162–163. - - Lansdowne, Lord, 69, 93, 122, 184, 197. - - Lausanne Conferences (1922–1923), 306, 329–333, 334–343. - - League of Nations, 327, 350. - - Ledochowski, Cardinal M. H., 144. - - Lee, Lord, 329. - - Lichnowsky, Prince, 139–140, 146, 255, 262. - - Lloyd George, David, 199, 242–243, 310, 320, 351. - - Ludwig Loewe & Company, 37, 101. - - Lynch Brothers, 74, 81, 82, 111, 190–191, 210–211, 256, 260. - - - McMahon, Sir Arthur H., 284. - - Macedonian Railways Company, 113. - - Mackensen, Dr., 34. - - Mackensen, Field Marshal von, 297. - - Mahmoud Pasha, 60. - - Mandates, 302, 320, 325, 327, 348. - - Manissa, 30. - - Maude, General Sir Stanley, 296, 297. - - Meade, Colonel, 198. - - Mecca, 21, 62. - - Medina, 21. - - Mendeli, 261. - - Mersina, 19, 72, 110. - - Mersina-Adana Railway, 30, 109, 321. - - Mesopotamia, 32, 35, 51, 124, 140, 147, 152, 176, 180–181, 226, 234, - 256, 262–266, 277, 280, 282, 284, 288, 327; - trade routes, 1–2; - natural resources, 14–17; - Bagdad Railway in, 73–75; - German steamship service, 108–109; - military campaigns, 286–287, 289–290, 296–299; - British sphere of interest, 294–295; - British mandate for, 302, 320; - British Civil Administration, 297, 326. - (_See also_ Persian Gulf, Shatt-el-Arab, Koweit, Irak.) - - Metternich, 295. - - Middle East, 3, 178, 196. - - Militarism, 268–271, 275–276. - - Milyoukov, Professor, 315. - - Minerals in Turkey, 13–15, 50–51, 280, 340. - (_See also_ Chrome, Oil, Turkey, mineral resources.) - - Missions and missionaries, effect on Turkey, 6; - in support of the Bagdad Railway, 131–133, 141; - German, 132–133; - French, 133, 135, 160–165; - Italian, 133, 173–174; - American, 336. - - _Mittel-Europa_, 277, 290, 292. - - Mocha, 10. - - Moltke, General H. K. B., 145, 176. - - Morgen, Major, 34. - - Morley, Viscount, 207–208. - - Mosul, 2, 12, 62, 73, 261, 305, 321, 327, 332. - - Mount Stephen, Lord, 184, 209. - - Mudania armistice, 306. - - Mudros armistice, 299. - - Mutius, Herr von, 109. - - - National Bank of Turkey, 220, 261. - - National Pact, 304–305, 316. - - Nationalism, 267–268; - Balkan, 7; - German, 136–137, 163; - French, 136, 163; - Italian, 173–174; - English, 211; - Turkish, 222, 275, 278, 303–304, 314. - (_See also_ Young Turks, Pan-Turanianism, Kemal Pasha, etc.) - - Naumann, Friederich, 127. - - Near East. (_See_ Ottoman Empire, Turkey, Middle East.) - - Neuflize, Baron de, 247. - - Neutral Zone of the Straits, 329. - - Nicholas, Grand Duke, 290, 293. - - Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 239. - - Nineveh, 73, 137. - - Nisibin, 73, 246, 325, 327. - - Nixon, General J. E., 286. - - Northcote, Sir Stafford, 178. - - North German Lloyd Steamship Company, 107. - - - O’Connor, Sir Nicholas, 60. - - Oil, 14–15, 50–51, 147, 261, 282–283, 286, 294, 321, 332, 338, 340. - - Open Door, 83, 125, 263, 326, 339. - - Oriental Railways, 18, 29, 32, 113. - - Osmanie, 111. - - Ottoman-American Development Company. (_See_ Chester concessions.) - - Ottoman Civil List, 15. - - Ottoman Empire, economic, strategic, and religious importance, 4–17; - military system, 26; - partition of, 285, 293–295, 302–303; - abolition of Sultanate, 306. - (_See also_ Turkey, Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Public Debt Administration, - etc.) - - Ottoman General Staff, 22. - - Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, 31, 32, 81, 246. - - Ottoman Ports Company, 260. - (_See also_ Inchcape.) - - Ottoman Public Debt Administration, 11, 31, 32, 81, 303, 305; - railway policies, 17–20, 29. - - Ottoman River Navigation Company, 258. - (_See also_ Inchcape.) - - Oulu Kishla, 340. - - - _Palästinaverein_, 133. - - Palestine, 280, 294, 298, 319–320; - British mandate, 302. - - Palmerston, Viscount, 176–177. - - Panderma, 221, 245. - - Pan-Germanism, 35, 103, 281; - support of Bagdad Railway, 136–137. - - Pan-Islamism, 64, 87, 222, 276. - - Pan-Slavism, 164. - - Pan-Turanianism, 222, 237. - - Parker, Alwyn, 261. - - Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 192, 256. - - Persia, 73, 122, 196, 239–240, 255. - - Persian Gulf, 2, 74, 255, 263, 280, 282, 322; - British strategic interests, 196–199, 211–212. - (_See also_ Koweit, Shatt-el-Arab, Anglo-Persian Oil Company.) - - Petroleum. (_See_ Oil.) - - Pichon, Stephen, 224, 243. - - Pobêdonostsev, 58. - - Poincaré, Raymond, 333. - - Ponsot, M., 249. - - Potsdam Agreement, 199, 239–244. - - Pressel, Wilhelm von, 18, 26, 30. - - Propaganda, 281–282. - - - _Quai d’Orsay_, 169, 245, 247. - - - Radek, Karl, 130. - - Railways, military value of, 22, 176. - (_See_ Abdul Hamid, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, - Anatolian Railway, Bagdad Railway, etc.) - - Ras el Ain, 114. - - Rathmore, Lord, 260. - - Rechnitzer, Ernest, 60, 85–86, 87. - - Reparation Commission, 301–302. - - Repington, Colonel, 283. - - Revelstoke, Lord, 184, 209. - - Reventlow, Count zu, 140–141. - - Rhodes, Cecil, 67, 178. - - Richelieu, 295. - - Rohrbach, Dr. Paul, 15, 16, 27, 120, 125, 127, 128, 136, 213, 218, - 287. - - Roosevelt, Theodore, 243. - - Rosenberg, Baron von, 249. - - Rouvier, M., 157, 167, 169. - - Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 261. - - Russia, Near Eastern policies, 7, 11, 23, 42, 147–153, 239–244, - 315–318; - attitude toward Bagdad Railway, 65–66, 147–153; - Potsdam Agreement with Germany, 199, 239–244; - entente with Great Britain and France, 153, 158–159, 168, 204; - imperialism, 7, 9, 15, 23, 61, 65, 127, 151–153, 166–168, 177, - 183, 212, 240–241, 269, 276, 278–279; - spheres of interest defined by secret treaties, 285, 293; - Soviet Republic and the Near East, 315–318. - - Russo-Japanese War, 3, 153. - - Russo-Turkish War of 1877, 150, 152. - - - Sadijeh, 73, 75, 114, 240. - - Samarra, 73, 297. - - Samsun, 31, 246, 339. - - Sanders, Field Marshal Liman von, 269, 278, 299. - - San Remo Conference, 320. - - San Remo Oil Agreement, 321. - - Sarolea, Charles, 131. - - Sazonov, 239. - - Sazonov-Paléologue Treaty, 293. - - Scheidemann, Philip, 130, 137, 214. - - Schoen, Baron von, 93, 101–102, 120, 125, 130–131. - - Seljuk Turks, 72. - - Sericulture. (_See_ Silk.) - - Shatt-el-Arab, 2, 74, 81, 264. - - Sherif of Mecca, 87, 284. - - Siemens, Carl von, 141. - - Siemens, George von, 31, 41, 68, 121. - - Silk, 20, 158, 294. - - Simplon-Orient Express, 300. - - Sinai Peninsula, 4, 21, 27, 285. - - Sivas, 31, 246, 303, 339, 340. - - Slav Peril, 242. - - Smith, Sir Henry Babington, 188, 209, 227. - - Smyrna, 4, 19, 110, 302, 303, 306, 324. - - Smyrna-Aidin Railway, 30, 84, 189, 260, 264. - - Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 30, 34, 53, 59–60, 245. - - _Société d’exploitation des chemins de fer de Cilicie-Nord Syrie_, - 326. - - _Société du chemin de fer de Damas-Hama et prolongements_, 34, 246. - - _Société du chemin de fer ottomane d’Anatolie._ (_See_ Anatolian - Railway.) - - _Société française de Heraclée_, 14. - - _Société impériale ottomane du chemin de fer de Bagdad._ (_See_ - Bagdad Railway Company.) - - _Société pour la construction et l’exploitation du réseau de la Mer - Noire._ (_See_ Black Sea Railways.) - - _Société pour enterprises électriques en Orient_, 99. - - Soma, 30, 245. - - Soma-Panderma Railway, 221, 245. - - Speyer, Edward B. von, 141. - - Spheres of influence, 277, 294, 295, 302. - - St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, 295, 302, 311. - - _Stahlwerksverband_, 103. - - Standard Oil Company, 15, 232. - - Stemrich, Herr, 34. - - Sublime Porte, 43, 55, 149, 247, 252, 261. - - Subsidies, railroad, 75–80. - - Suez Canal, 2, 3, 4, 21, 27–28, 177, 178, 192, 195, 204, 259, 277, - 282, 283, 285, 290. - - Suleiman the Magnificent, 7. - - Suleimanieh, 340. - - Sykes, Sir Mark, 251, 272–273, 295. - - Sykes-Picot Treaty, 293–294, 310. - - Syria, 2, 11, 280, 288, 302, 320, 323, 328; - railways of, 30, 34, 245–246, 248–249, 326; - military campaigns, 299; - French sphere of interest, 293–294; - French mandate, 302, 320, 325. - - - Tardieu, André, 169–170, 203, 214, 267–268. - - Taurus Mountains, 72, 94, 113, 149, 288. - - Tchoban Bey, 327. - - Teheran, 75, 240. - - Tekrit, 73, 294. - - Thrace, 305, 306, 324. - - Tigris River, 2, 74, 81. - (_See also_ Lynch Brothers.) - - Tireboli, 239. - - Townshend, General Sir Charles, 286, 287, 289, 290. - - Trade routes, 2, 71. - - Trans-Caspian Railway, 2, 150. - - Trans-Caucasian Railways, 2, 150. - - Trans-Persian Railway, 2, 147. - - Trans-Siberian Railway, 2, 3, 4, 147, 150. - - Treaty of Berlin (1878), 149, 162–163. - - Treaty of Bucharest (1913), 246. - - Treaty of Lausanne (1912), 267. - - Treaty of London (1915), 285, 302. - - Treaty of Sèvres (1920), 301, 305, 306. - - Treaty of Versailles (1919), 301. - - Trebizond, 246, 339. - - Tripartite Agreement (Great Britain, France, Italy, 1920), 301. - - Triple Alliance, 107, 271. - - Triple Entente, 275. - - Tripoli-in-Syria, 72, 246. - - Tripolitan War, 246. - - Turco-Italian Treaty (March, 1921), 324. - - Turkey, agricultural conditions, 5, 12, 13, 15–16, 18, 20, 230–232; - industrial backwardness, 12–13; - general economic conditions, 12–17, 233–234; - finances (_see_ Ottoman Public Debt Administration); - mineral resources, 13–15, 50–51, 280, 340; - foreign trade, 36, 104–107, 339; - alliance with Germany and Austria, 271; - entry into Great War, 275–278; - as spoils of war, 280–281, 285, 292–295, 301–302; - military campaigns of 1920–1922, 305–306; - a republic, 306. - (_See also_ Ottoman Empire, Anatolia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia, - Grand National Assembly, Angora Treaty, Lausanne Conferences, - etc.) - - Turkish Petroleum Company, 261, 321, 353. - - - Union and Progress, Committee of, 217, 219. - - United States of America, railroad subsidies, 79; - economic changes since the Great War, 337–338; - American interests in the Near East, 336, 337–338 - (_see also_ Chester concessions); - naval activity in Near East, 346–347; - outlook for American imperialism, 337–338, 347–350. - - - Van, 246, 340. - - - Wangenheim, Baron von, 43, 270, 278, 282. - - Washington Conference (1921), 329. - - Weygand, General, 333. - - _Wilhelmstrasse_, 121, 133, 142, 201, 236, 247, 254. - - Willcocks, Sir William, 16, 205, 214–215, 220–221. - - William II, German Emperor, 142, 198, 298, 349; - imperialistic policies of, 39–40, 44–52, 349; - visits to Turkey, 41, 43–44, 55, 134–135; - and Bagdad Railway concession of 1899, 68. - - Wilson, Woodrow, 291, 336. - - Witte, Count, 58, 68, 149–150. - - _Württembergische Vereinsbank_, 31. - - - _Young Turks_, 5, 13, 17, 110–111, 217–218; - hostility to Germans, 220–224; - financial difficulties, 224–229; - efforts to conciliate France and Great Britain, 244, 252–261; - hostility to imperialism, 267. - - Young Turk Revolution, 27, 96. - - Youmourtalik, 340–341. - - - Zander, Dr. Kurt, 68. - - Zihni Pasha, 68. - - Zinoviev, M., 65, 149. - - Zubeir, 75. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TURKEY, THE GREAT POWERS, AND THE -BAGDAD RAILWAY *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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