diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/66178-0.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/66178-0.txt | 13523 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 13523 deletions
diff --git a/old/66178-0.txt b/old/66178-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index a9f09ea..0000000 --- a/old/66178-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13523 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Making of Modern Japan, by John -Harington Gubbins - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: The Making of Modern Japan - An Account of the Progress of Japan from Pre-feudal Days to - Constitutional Government & the Position of a Great Power, With - Chapters on Religion, the Complex Family System, Education, &c. - -Author: John Harington Gubbins - -Release Date: August 30, 2021 [eBook #66178] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Richard Tonsing, MFR, and the Online Distributed Proofreading - Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from - images generously made available by The Internet Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN *** - - - - - _BY THE SAME AUTHOR_ - - - A DICTIONARY OF CHINESE-JAPANESE WORDS IN THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE. (3 - Vols.) - - THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN. (2 Vols.) - - With an Introduction on the Japanese Family System. - - THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN (1853–71). - - THE JAPAN HANDBOOK - - (Published by Foreign Office.) - - REPORT ON TAXATION AND LAND TENURE - - (Parliamentary Papers Series). Etc. - - - - - THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN - - - - - _NEW & RECENT BOOKS_ - - -The Making of Modern Japan. - - An Account of the Progress of Japan from Pre-Feudal days to - Constitutional Government and the Position of a Great Power, with - Chapters on Religion, the Complex Family System, Education, &c. By - J. H. GUBBINS, C.M.G., First Secretary of British Embassy at Tōkiō. - With Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 21s. net. - - -The Sea Gypsies of Malaya. - - An Account of Nomadic Mawken People of the Mergui Archipelago, with - a Description of their Boats, Ways of Living, Customs, Habits, - Occupations, &c. &c. By WALTER WHITE, F.R.G.S. With Illustrations & - a Map. Demy 8vo. 21s. net. - - -The Hill Tribes of Fiji. - - A Record of Forty Years’ intimate connection with the Tribes of the - Mountainous Interior of Fiji, with a Description of their Habits in - War & Peace, Methods of Living, Characteristics, Mental & Physical, - from the Days of Cannibalism to the Present Time. By A. B. BREWSTER, - F.R.A.I. With Illustrations & Maps. Demy 8vo. 21s. net. - - -Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade. - - Describing its beauties, & the habits and customs, & gradual - rebuilding of a once downtrodden people. By C. E. TYNDALE-BISCOE, - M.A. (Cantab). 28 Illustrations & a Map. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net. - - -The Rift Valleys and Geology of East Africa. - - By Prof. J. W. GREGORY, D.Sc., F.R.S. With many Illustrations & - Maps. 32s. net. - - -A Diplomat in Japan. - - The Inner History of the Critical Years in the Evolution of Japan - when the Ports were Opened & the Monarchy Restored, Recorded by a - Diplomatist who took an active part in the events of the time. By - The Right Hon. Sir ERNEST SATOW, G.C.M.G., British Minister, Peking, - 1900–5; Formerly Secretary to the British Legation at Tōkiō. With - Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 32s. net. - - - _Second Edition._ - -The Life and Explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot. - - Authorised Biography of a Zealous Missionary & Intrepid Explorer. By - ERNEST BAKER. With many Illustrations & a Map. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. - net. - - - _Second Edition._ - -Unexplored New Guinea. - - Travels, Adventures & Experiences of a Resident Magistrate in the - Unexplored Interior of New Guinea. By WILFRED N. BEAVER, with an - Introduction by A. C. HADDON, M.A., Sc.D., F.R.S. With 24 - Illustrations & 4 Maps. Demy 8vo. 25s. net. - - - _Third Edition._ - -Prehistoric Man & His Story. - - A Sketch of the History of Mankind from the Earliest Times. By Prof. - G. F. SCOTT ELLIOT, M.A.(Cantab), B.Sc.(Edin.), F.R.S.E., F.L.S., - F.R.G.S. With 56 Illustrations. 10s. 6d. net. - - - SEELEY, SERVICE & CO. LTD. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -[Illustration: - - PRINCE IWAKURA. - - Descended from an ancient family of Court Nobles; he was a leading - figure in the Restoration Movement, and in the Government - subsequently formed. -] - - - - - THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN - AN ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN FROM PRE-FEUDAL DAYS TO -CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT & THE POSITION OF A GREAT POWER, WITH CHAPTERS - ON RELIGION, THE COMPLEX FAMILY SYSTEM, EDUCATION, &c. - - - BY - J. H. GUBBINS, C.M.G., HON. M.A.(OXON.) - - LATE FIRST SECRETARY & JAPANESE SECRETARY OF BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKIO, - AUTHOR OF “A DICTIONARY OF CHINESE-JAPANESE WORDS IN THE JAPANESE - LANGUAGE,” “THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN,” “THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN,” &c., &c., - &c. - - - WITH ILLUSTRATIONS - - - LONDON - SEELEY, SERVICE & CO. LIMITED - 38 GREAT RUSSELL STREET - 1922 - - - - - TO - THE MEMORY - OF - MY WIFE - - - - - PREFACE - - -The Author’s thanks are due to His Excellency Baron G. Hayashi, H.I.J.M.’s -Ambassador in London, for most kindly referring to a competent authority -in Japan, for confirmation, a doubtful point in feudal land tenure; to -Prince Iwakura, Marquis Ōkubo, and Marquis Kido for photographs of three -of the eminent statesmen whose portraits appear; to the Right Honorable -Sir Ernest Satow for the trouble he took in reading the MS. of the book; -to Sir E. F. Crowe, C.M.G., Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy -in Tōkiō, for very useful help given in various ways; and to Miss Maud -Oxenden for valuable assistance in proof-correcting. - - - - - CONTENTS - - - CHAPTER I - PAGE - - Early History—The Great Reform—Adoption of Chinese Culture 17 - - - CHAPTER II - - Establishment of Feudalism and Duarchy—The Shōgunate and the - Throne—Early Foreign Relations—Christian Persecution and Closure - of Country 24 - - - CHAPTER III - - The Tokugawa Shōguns—Consolidation of Duarchy 32 - - - CHAPTER IV - - Political Conditions—Reopening of Japan to Foreign - Intercourse—Conclusion of Treaties—Decay of Shōgunate 42 - - - CHAPTER V - - Anti-Foreign Feeling—Chōshiū Rebellion—Mikado’s Ratification of - Treaties—Prince Kéiki—Restoration Movement—Civil War—Fall of - Shōgunate 53 - - - CHAPTER VI - - Japanese Chronology—Satsuma and Chōshiū Clans—The “Charter Oath” 68 - - - CHAPTER VII - - New Government—Clan Feeling in Satsuma—Administrative - Changes—Reformers and Reactionaries 77 - - - CHAPTER VIII - - Abolition of Feudal System—Reconstitution of Classes—Effects of - Abolition of Feudalism 87 - - - CHAPTER IX - - Effects of Abolition of Feudalism on Agricultural Class—Changes in - Land Tenure—Land-Tax Revision 97 - - - CHAPTER X - - Missions to Foreign Government—Hindrances to Reform—Language - Difficulties—Attitude of Foreign Powers 107 - - - CHAPTER XI - - Changes and Reforms—Relations with China and Korea—Rupture in - Ministry—Secession of Tosa and Hizen Leaders—Progress of - Reforms—Annexation of Loochoo—Discontent of Former Military - Class 117 - - - CHAPTER XII - - Local Risings—Satsuma Rebellion—Two-Clan Government 129 - - - CHAPTER XIII - - Japanese Religions before Restoration: Shintō and Buddhism 139 - - - CHAPTER XIV - - Japanese Religions after Restoration: - Christianity—_Bushidō_—Religious Observances 145 - - - CHAPTER XV - - Political Unrest—The Press—Press Laws—Conciliation and - Repression—Legal Reforms—Failure of Yezo Colonization - Scheme—Ōkuma’s Withdrawal—Increased Political Agitation 152 - - - CHAPTER XVI - - Promise of Representative Government—Political Parties—Renewed - Unrest—Local Outbreaks 162 - - - CHAPTER XVII - - Framing of Constitution—New Peerage—Reorganization of - Ministry—English Influence—Financial Reform—Failure of - Conferences for Treaty Revision 172 - - - CHAPTER XVIII - - Imperial Authority—Privy Council—Local - Self-Government—Promulgation of Constitution—Imperial - Prerogatives—The Two Houses of Parliament—Features of - Constitution and First Parliamentary Elections 181 - - - CHAPTER XIX - - Working of Representative Government—Stormy Proceedings in - Diet—Legal and Judicial Reform—Political Rowdyism—Fusion of - Classes 192 - - - CHAPTER XX - - Working of Parliamentary Government—Grouping of Parties—Government - and Opposition—Formation of _Seiyūkai_—Increasing Intervention - of Throne—Decrease of Party Rancour—Attitude of Upper House 197 - - - CHAPTER XXI - - Treaty Revision—Great Britain takes Initiative—Difficulties with - China 204 - - - CHAPTER XXII - - China and Korea—War with China—Naval Reform—Defeat of China—Treaty - of Shimonoséki—Peace Terms 214 - - - CHAPTER XXIII - - Militarist Policy—Liaotung Peninsula—Intervention of Three - Powers—Leases of Chinese Territory by Germany, Russia, Great - Britain and France—Spheres of Interest 223 - - - CHAPTER XXIV - - American Protest against Foreign Aggression in China—Principle of - “Open Door and Equal Opportunity”—Financial Reform—Operation of - Revised Treaties—The Boxer Outbreak—Russia and Manchuria 234 - - - CHAPTER XXV - - Agreement between Great Britain and Germany—The Anglo-Japanese - Alliance 245 - - - CHAPTER XXVI - - War with Russia—Success of Japan—President Roosevelt’s - Mediation—Treaty of Portsmouth—Peace Terms 254 - - - CHAPTER XXVII - - Weakening of Cordiality with America—Causes of Friction—Expansion - and Emigration—Annexation of Korea—New Treaties 265 - - - CHAPTER XXVIII - - Rise of Japan and Germany Compared—Renewal of Anglo-Japanese - Alliance—Japan and the Great War—Military and Naval - Expansion—Japan and China—The Twenty-one Demands—Agreement with - Russia regarding China—Lansing-Ishii Agreement—Effects of Great - War on Situation in Far East 274 - - - CHAPTER XXIX - - The Japanese Family System 283 - - - CHAPTER XXX - - Education 292 - - - CHAPTER XXXI - - The Makers of Modern Japan—How Japan is Governed 300 - - Index 307 - - - - - LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS - - - PRINCE IWAKURA _Frontispiece_ - - PAGE - ŌKUBO ICHIZŌ 72 - - KIDO JUNICHIRŌ 80 - - MARQUIS INOUYÉ 104 - - MARQUIS ŌKUMA 104 - - PRINCE ITŌ 176 - - MARQUIS MATSUGATA 184 - - FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE ŌYAMA 184 - - FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE YAMAGATA 216 - - MARQUIS SAIONJI 248 - - GENERAL PRINCE KATSURA 248 - - - - - The Making of Modern Japan - - - - - CHAPTER I - Early History—The Great Reform—Adoption of Chinese Culture. - - -There is much speculation, but no certainty, regarding the origin of the -Japanese people. It is, however, generally held that the Japanese race -is made up of two main elements—one Mongolian, which came to Japan from -Northern Asia by way of Korea, and the other Malayan; a third strain -being possibly supplied to some small extent by the Ainu aborigines, -whom the invaders found in occupation of the country. The prevailing -type of feature is Mongolian, though scientific research claims to have -discovered traces of the physical characteristics of other Asiatic -races. - -If the earliest Japanese records provide little trustworthy material for -the historian, they show how the legendary heroes of oral tradition -became in the hands of successive chroniclers the deified ancestors of -the reigning dynasty, and indicate the process of transition by which -the feelings of respect and admiration they inspired developed into a -popular belief in the quasi-divinity of Japanese Sovereigns. It is in -this no-man’s-land, where no clear boundaries divide fable from history, -that we are from the first confronted with the primitive native -religion, and realize its weakness as a civilizing influence. From these -same records, nevertheless, as well as from scanty Chinese sources, we -glean certain general facts bearing on the early development of Japan. -Chinese culture is seen trickling in at a very early date; we hear of -the adoption at some time in the fifth century of Chinese ideographs, -the Japanese following in this respect the example of their Korean -neighbours, who, like themselves, had originally no written language of -their own; and we learn of the introduction of Buddhism a century later. -The advent of Buddhism was a notable factor in Japan’s progress. Its -missionaries assisted the spread of the Chinese written language, and -thus paved the way for the introduction in A.D. 645 of what is known as -the Great Reform. - -The Great Reform gave its name to the first year-period of Japanese -chronology, and to Japanese history its first certain date. It was the -outcome of a movement having for its object the repair of the authority -of the Throne, which had been weakened by the separatist tendencies of -the Sōga family. The new form of government then established, in -imitation of changes made under the T’ang dynasty in China, was a -centralized bureaucracy. The supreme control of affairs was vested in -the Council of State. In this Council the Prime Minister presided, and -with him were associated the two assistant Ministers of State and the -President of the Privy Council. Of the eight Boards, or Departments of -State, five dealt mainly, but by no means exclusively, with matters -relating to Ceremonial, Religion, the Army, Finance and Taxation -respectively; the other three having the direction of business connected -more immediately with the Imperial Court. There seems, however, to have -been no very clear-cut division of business, Court interests being -apparently mixed up with the affairs of every department. This change in -the form of government was only one of many results caused by the inrush -of Chinese ideas at this time. The influence of the wave of Chinese -culture which swept over the country permeated every part of the -national fabric, remodelling the social system, and laying the -foundations of Japanese law, education, industries and art. - -Later on provision was made for the establishment of a regency during -the minority of a reigning Sovereign, the regent (_Sesshō_) by virtue of -his office ranking at the head of the official hierarchy. When the -regency expired, the ex-regent assumed the title of _Kwambaku_ (or -_Sesshō-Kwambaku_), retaining his official precedence. The two posts -were subsequently separated, and, like all other Court offices, became, -as the authority of the Court declined, mere honorary titles. Both posts -and honorary titles were hereditary in certain branches of the Fujiwara -family, the only exception to this rule occurring in the sixteenth -century. - -It was not till the eighth century that the Japanese elaborated a -written language of their own. The Koreans had done so already, but the -two written languages thus superadded to what was borrowed from China -have nothing in common. That of the Japanese consists of two different -scripts, each adapted from Chinese characters. The Korean script bears -no resemblance to Chinese. Both countries have good reason to regard as -a very doubtful blessing the possession of two spoken and two written -languages. - -At this early stage in Japanese history three things stand out -prominently: the welcome given to foreign ideas; the duality of religion -and language; and the curious atmosphere of divinity surrounding the -Throne, which by an easy process of transition came to be regarded by -the people as a natural attribute of their country and of themselves. It -is not surprising, therefore, to find in the development of Japan two -opposite tendencies constantly at work—the assimilation of new ideas -from abroad, and reaction in favour of native institutions. Together -with the readiness to adopt foreign ideas, to which the seventh century -bears such striking witness, there existed an intense national pride—a -belief in the superiority of Japan, “the country of the Gods,” to all -other lands. The existence of these two contrary currents of popular -feeling, in which religion, politics and language all play their part, -may be traced through the whole course of Japanese history. - -The strengthening of the Throne’s authority, which was effected by the -Great Reform, lasted but a short time, the ruling power soon passing -again into the hands of another powerful family, the House of Fujiwara. -But the centralized bureaucratic form of government borrowed from China -survived, and with it the fiction of direct Imperial rule. - -During the long ascendancy, covering more than three centuries, of the -House of Fujiwara the Sovereigns, despite their assumption of the -recognized titles of Chinese Emperors, sank into the position of mere -puppets, removable at the will of the patrician rulers. It is important -to note, however, that neither the nominal authority of the occupant of -the Throne nor the power of the _de facto_ Government during this -period, and for many years after, extended much beyond the centre of -Japan. The loyalty of district governors in the south and west was -regulated by their distance from the seat of administration. To the -north and east, again, the country was in the possession of the Ainu -aborigines, with whom a desultory warfare was carried on until their -eventual expulsion to the northern island of Yezo. - -Early in the twelfth century the Fujiwara _régime_ came to an end. The -succeeding administrators were members of the Taira family, which had -gradually risen to importance, and wielded the predominant influence in -the country. Fifty years later their position was successfully -challenged by the rival House of Minamoto, which, like its two -predecessors, could claim royal descent. The long struggle between these -two houses ended in the final overthrow of the Taira family in the sea -battle of Dan-no-Ura (A.D. 1155) and the establishment of the feudal -system, in other words, of a military government. - -Yoritomo, the Minamoto leader, who then rose to power, received from the -Court the title of Shōgun (or General), a contraction of the fuller -appellation _Sei-i-Tai-Shōgun_. This may be rendered Barbarian-quelling -Generalissimo, and was the term originally applied to generals employed -in fighting the Ainu aborigines in the North-Eastern marches. With the -assumption of this title the term itself developed a new meaning, for it -was not as the general of an army that he thenceforth figured, but as -the virtual ruler of Japan. His advent to power marks a new phase in -Japanese history, the inception of a dual system of government based on -feudalism, which lasted, except for a short period in the sixteenth -century, until modern times. - -With the establishment of a military government the classification of -society was changed. Thenceforth there were three recognized divisions -of the people—the _Kugé_, or Court aristocracy, constituting the former -official hierarchy, which, becoming more and more impoverished as the -connection of its members with the land ceased, gradually sank into the -position of a negligible factor in the nation; the _Buké_, or military -class, which included both daimiōs and their retainers, and out of which -the new official hierarchy was formed; and the _Minké_, or general -public, which comprised farmers, artizans and tradesmen, or merchants, -ranking in the order named. - -Feudalism was no sudden apparition. It was no mushroom growth of a -night. The importance of the military class had been growing steadily -during the prolonged civil strife from which the Minamoto family had -emerged victorious. This and the increasing weakness of the Government -had brought about a change in provincial administration. Civil -governors, dependent on the Capital, had gradually given place to -military officials, with hereditary rights, who looked elsewhere for -orders; manorial estates were expanding into territories with castles to -protect them; and local revenues no longer flowed with regularity into -State coffers. Thus in more than one manner the way had been prepared -for feudalism. - -The same may be said of the dual system of administration, though here -the question is less simple. From all that history tells us, and from -its even more eloquent silence, there is good reason to question the -existence at any time of direct Imperial rule. We hear of no Mikado ever -leading an army in the field, making laws or dispensing justice, or -fulfilling, in fact, any of the various functions associated with -sovereignty, save those connected with public worship. This absence of -personal rule, this tendency to act by proxy, is in keeping with the -atmosphere of impersonality which pervades everything Japanese, and is -reflected in the language of the people. Everything tends to confirm the -impression that the prestige of sovereignty in Japan thus lay rather in -the institution itself than in the personality of the rulers. The casual -manner in which succession was regulated; the appearance on the Throne -of Empresses in a country where little deference was paid to women; the -preference repeatedly shown for the reign of minors; the _laisser-aller_ -methods of adoption and abdication; the easy philosophy which saw -nothing unusual in the association of three abdicated, or cloistered, -monarchs with a reigning sovereign; and the general indifference of the -public to the misfortunes which from time to time befel the occupant of -the Throne, all point in the same direction—the withdrawal of the -Sovereign at an early date from all active participation in the work of -government. In so far, therefore, as the personal rule of the Sovereign -was concerned it seems not unreasonable to regard the dual system of -government established at this time as the formal recognition of what -already existed. Its association with feudalism, however, brought about -an entirely new departure. Kiōto, indeed, continued to be the national -capital. There the former Ministers of State remained with all the empty -paraphernalia of an officialdom which had ceased to govern. But a new -seat of administration was set up at Kamakura, to which all men of -ability were gradually attracted. Thenceforth the country was -administered by a military government directed by the Shōgun at -Kamakura, while the Sovereign lived in seclusion in the Capital, -surrounded by a phantom Court, and an idle official hierarchy. - -In this question of government there is still something further to be -explained. It should be understood that the Shōgun did not personally -rule any more than the Mikado. What for want of a better name may be -termed the figure-head system of government is noticeable throughout the -whole course of Japanese history. Real and nominal power are rarely seen -combined either socially or politically. The family, which is the unit -of society, is nominally controlled by the individual who is its head. -But practically the latter is in most cases a figure-head, the real -power being vested in the group of relatives who form the family -council. The same principle applied to the administration of feudal -territories. These were not administered by the feudal proprietors -themselves. The control was entrusted to a special class of hereditary -retainers. Here again, however, the authority was more nominal than -real, the direction of affairs being left, as a rule, to the more active -intelligence of retainers of inferior rank. Similarly the Shōgun was -usually a mere puppet in the hands of his Council, the members of which -were in turn controlled by subordinate office-holders. This predilection -for rule by proxy was encouraged by the customs of adoption and -abdication, the effects of which, as regards Mikado and Shōgun alike, -were seen in shortness of reign, or administration, and the frequency of -the rule of minors. - -The highly artificial and, indeed, contradictory character which -distinguished all Japanese administration had certain advantages. -Abdication was found to be not incompatible in practice with an active, -though unacknowledged, supervision of affairs. It also provided a -convenient method of getting rid of persons whose presence in office was -for any reason inconvenient. In a society, too, where adoption was the -rule rather than the exception the failure of a direct heir to the -Throne, or Shōgunate, presented little difficulty. It was a thing to be -arranged by the Council of State, just as in less exalted spheres such -matters were referred to the family council. Questions of succession -were thus greatly simplified. In this contradiction, moreover, between -appearance and reality, in the retention of the shadow without the -substance of power, lay the strength of both monarchy and Shōgunate. It -was, in fact, the secret of their stability, and explains the unbroken -continuity of the dynasty on which the nation prides itself. Under such -a system the weakness or incompetence of nominal rulers produced no -violent convulsions in the body politic. The machinery of government -worked smoothly on, unaffected by the personality of those theoretically -responsible for its control; and as time went by the tendency of office -to divorce itself from the discharge of the duties nominally associated -with it increased everywhere, with the result that in the last days of -the Shōgunate administrative policy was largely inspired at the seat of -government by subordinate officials, and in the clans by retainers of -inferior standing. - -The question of dual government, which has led to this long digression, -was more or less of a puzzle to foreigners from the time when Jesuit -missionaries first mistook Shōguns for Mikados; and it was not until -after the negotiation of the first treaties with Western Powers that it -was discovered that the title of Tycoon given to the Japanese ruler in -these documents had been adopted for the occasion, in accordance with a -precedent created many years before, in order to conceal the fact that -the Shōgun, though ruler, was not the Sovereign. - - - - - CHAPTER II - Establishment of Feudalism and Duarchy—The Shōgunate and the - Throne—Early Foreign Relations—Christian Persecution and Closure of - Country. - - -The fortunes of the first line of Kamakura Shōguns, so called from the -seat of government being at that place, gave no indication of the -permanence of duarchy, though it may have encouraged belief in the truth -of the Japanese proverb that great men have no heirs. Neither of -Yoritomo’s sons who succeeded him as Shōgun showing any capacity for -government, the direction of affairs fell into the hands of members of -the Hōjō family, who, by a further extension of the principle of ruling -by proxy, were content to allow others to figure as Shōguns, while they -held the real power with the title of regents (_Shikken_). Some of these -puppet Shōguns were chosen from the Fujiwara family, which had governed -the country for more than three centuries. Others were scions of the -Imperial House. This connection of the Shōgunate with the Imperial -dynasty, though only temporary, is a point to be noted, since under -other circumstances it would suggest a devolution rather than a -usurpation of sovereign rights. - -It was in the thirteenth century, during the rule of the Hōjō regent -Tokimuné, that the Mongol invasions took place. The reigning Mikado was -a youth of nineteen; the Shōgun an infant of four. The six centuries -which had elapsed since the Great Reform had witnessed notable changes -in the countries which were Japan’s nearest neighbours. In China the -Mongol dynasty was established. In Korea the four states into which the -peninsula had originally been divided had disappeared one after the -other. In their place was a new kingdom, then called for the first time -by its modern name. The new kingdom did not retain its independence -long. It was attacked and overthrown by the armies of Kublai Khan, the -third Mongol Emperor. By the middle of the thirteenth century the King -of Korea had acknowledged the suzerainty of China. Kublai Khan then -turned his attention to Japan. - -It was customary in those times for congratulatory missions to be sent -by one country to another when a new dynasty was established or a new -reign began, the presents exchanged on these occasions being usually -termed gifts by the country offering them, and tribute by that which -received them. The relations between Japan and the new Kingdom of Korea -had been on the whole friendly, though disturbed from time to time by -the piratical forays which seem to have been of frequent occurrence. But -after Korea had lost her independence she was obliged to throw in her -lot with China. When, therefore, in 1268, Kublai Khan sent an envoy to -Japan to ask why since the beginning of his reign no congratulatory -mission had reached Peking from the Japanese Court, the messenger -naturally went by way of Korea, and was escorted by a suite of Koreans. -The ports in the province of Chikuzen, on the north of Kiūshiū, the -southernmost of the Japanese islands, were the places through which -communications between Japan and the mainland were then carried on; and -it was at Dazaifu in that province, the centre of local administration, -that the envoy delivered his letter. This was in effect a demand for -tribute, and the Regent’s refusal even to answer the communication was -met by the despatch in the summer of 1275 of a Mongol force, accompanied -by a Korean contingent. Having first occupied the islands of Tsushima -and Iki, which form convenient stepping-stones between Korea and Japan, -the invaders landed in Kiūshiū in the north-west of the province already -mentioned. After a few days’ fighting they were forced to re-embark. In -their retreat they encountered a violent storm, and only the shattered -remnants of the Armada returned to tell the tale. A second invasion, six -years later, planned on a far larger scale, and supported, as before, by -Korean auxiliaries, met with a similar fate. On this occasion severer -fighting occurred. The positions captured at the place of landing in the -province of Hizen were held by the invaders for some weeks. Thence, -however, they could make no headway. When they at length withdrew in -disorder a violent storm again came to the aid of the defenders and -overwhelmed the hostile fleets. The preparations begun by Kublai Khan -for a third invasion were abandoned at his death a few years later. From -that time Japan was left undisturbed. - -The circumstances attending the fall of the Hōjō regents in 1333, and -their replacement by the Ashikaga line of Shōguns, are noteworthy for -the light they throw on the state of the country, and the unstable and, -indeed, ludicrous conditions under which the government was carried on. -It seemed for a moment as if the authority of the Court was about to be -revived. But with the overthrow of the regents the movement in this -direction stopped. The military class was naturally reluctant to -surrender the power which had come into its hands; the position of the -Mikado was also weakened by a dispute regarding his rights to the -Throne. He had just returned from banishment, and had been at once -reinstated as Emperor. But during his absence another Emperor had been -placed on the Throne, and there were those who thought the latter had a -right to remain. In the previous century it had been arranged, in -accordance with the will of a deceased Emperor, that the Throne should -be occupied alternately by descendants of the senior and junior branches -of the Imperial House. This rule had been followed in filling the -vacancy caused by the banishment of the previous Mikado, and the branch -of the Imperial House which suffered by his reinstatement refused to -accept the decision. Each claimant to the Throne found partizans amongst -the feudal chieftains. Thus were formed two rival Courts, the Northern -and the Southern, which disputed the Crown for nearly sixty years. The -contest ended in the triumph in 1393 of the Northern Court. Having the -support of the powerful Ashikaga family, it had early in the course of -the struggle asserted its superiority, the Ashikaga leader becoming -Shōgun in 1338. - -The rule of the Ashikaga Shōguns lasted until the middle of the -sixteenth century, though for several years before it ended the control -of affairs was exercised by others in their name. During this period, -which was favourable to the growth of art and literature, the seat of -government kept changing from Kamakura to the Capital and back again. -The former city shared the fate of the dynasty, and after its -destruction was never rebuilt. - -A break then occurred in the sequence of Shōguns. The chief power passed -into the hands of two military leaders, Nobunaga and Hidéyoshi, neither -of whom founded a dynasty or bore the title of Shōgun. By their efforts -the country was gradually freed from the anarchy which had ensued during -the last years of Ashikaga administration. Though here and there -throughout the country there remained districts whose feudal lords -insisted on settling their quarrels themselves, a more stable condition -of things was introduced, and the work of the founder of the next and -last line of Shōguns was greatly facilitated. - - -Europe had long before heard of Japan through the writings of the -Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, who had visited the Court of Kublai Khan -and there learned the failure of the Mongol invasions. It was not, -however, till the middle of the sixteenth century, during the ascendancy -of the first of the two military leaders above mentioned, that -intercourse with European countries was established. The Portuguese were -the first to come, and for this reason. Portugal was then at the height -of her greatness as a maritime power; and by the Bulls of Pope Alexander -VI, which divided the new lands discovered in Asia and America between -her and Spain, those in Asia had fallen to her share. Some uncertainty -exists as to the exact date at which the new Western intercourse began, -and as to the identity of the first arrivals. Most authorities, however, -agree in thinking that the first European discoverers of Japan were -three Portuguese adventurers who, in the course of a voyage from Siam to -China in the summer or autumn of 1542, were driven by a storm on the -coast of Tanégashima, a small island lying midway between the southern -point of the province of Satsuma and Loochoo. The adventurers who landed -were successful in disposing of the cargo of their vessel, destined -originally for Chinese ports. Their knowledge of firearms made a -favourable impression, and the beginnings were thus laid of a trade with -the Portuguese possessions and settlements in the East and with the -mother country in Europe. Of greater interest and importance, however, -than this early trade is the fact that to Portuguese enterprise -Christianity owed its first introduction into Japan. - -Seven years after the arrival of these involuntary traders, who had -spread the news of the strange country they had discovered, one of the -numerous Portuguese trading vessels which were thus attracted to Japan -landed at Kagoshima, the capital of the Satsuma province, three -missionaries—Xavier, Torres and Fernandez. Thenceforth, until the -closing of the country to all but the Chinese and Dutch, it was the -propagation of the Christian faith, not the progress of trade, which was -the important factor in Japan’s foreign relations. - -The coming of the first missionaries took place at a time when the -widespread disorder which marked the closing years of the Ashikaga -administration was at its height. Though Nobunaga was rapidly acquiring -for himself a commanding position, the nation had not yet felt the full -weight of the hand which twenty years later was to take the first steps -towards the pacification of the country. The confusion of affairs -assisted the spread of the new religion, the opposition offered by some -of the leading daimiōs, such as the princes of Satsuma and Chōshiū, -being counterbalanced by the eagerness of others to profit by the -foreign trade which came with the missionaries; while Buddhist hostility -lost much of its sting after the power of the militant priesthood had -been crippled by Nobunaga. - -The latter’s successor, Hidéyoshi, whom the Japanese regard as their -greatest military genius, shared neither his sympathy with Christianity -nor his dislike of Buddhism. To matters of religion he seemed to be -indifferent, his one aim being apparently to make himself master of -Japan. In a series of campaigns conducted in different parts of the -country he overcame the resistance of one feudal chief after another, -the last to submit to his authority being the Daimiō of Satsuma. His -ascendancy deprived Christianity of the advantage it had previously -derived from the unsettled condition of the country. His aim -accomplished, Hidéyoshi changed his attitude suddenly, and in 1587 -issued an edict against Christianity. As a result of this edict the -missionaries were expelled from the Capital and the Christian church -there was pulled down. Though the Christian persecution dates from that -time, it was not prosecuted at first with much energy. Doubtless -Hidéyoshi was aware of the connection between Christianity and foreign -trade, and in his desire to profit by the latter was content not to push -matters to extremities. There may also be some truth in the suggestion -of the joint authors of _A History of Japan_ (1542–61) that he was -unwilling to incur the resentment of the numerous daimiōs in the south -of Japan who had welcomed the new religion. Be this as it may, the -initial stages of the persecution did not apparently affect missionary -activity very seriously. We do not hear of any falling off in the number -of converts, which is said to have attained about this time a total -little short of a million. - -For nearly half a century the Jesuits had the field of missionary -enterprise in Japan to themselves. To this fact was largely due the -spread of the new religion. In 1591, however, the state of things was -altered by the arrival of members of other religious orders, who came in -the train of a Spanish ambassador from the Philippines. This -intrusion—which later on received the formal sanction of the Pope—was -resented by the Jesuits; and the position of the Christian Church, -already weakened by persecution, was not improved by the quarrels which -soon broke out between them and the new-comers. What would have been the -outcome of this change in the situation, if Hidéyoshi’s attention had -not been directed elsewhere, it is impossible to say. At this moment, -however, his ambition found a new outlet. Supreme now at home, he -conceived the idea of gaining fresh glory by conquests abroad. With this -object, he embarked on an invasion of Korea, intending ultimately to -extend his operations to China. His pretext, it is said, for invading -the neighbouring peninsula, like that of Kublai Khan in the case of -Japan, was that Korea had refused or neglected to send the usual -periodical missions. According to another, and perhaps more correct -account, he demanded that Korea should assist him in the invasion of -China in the same way as she had two centuries before aided the Mongols -in their invasion of Japan, a request which, it is said, was scornfully -refused. - - -The Korean campaign, in the course of which a Christian daimiō—Konishi, -the owner of an extensive fief in the province of Higo—greatly -distinguished himself, began in the spring of 1592, the last land -engagement being fought in the autumn of 1598. The war thus lasted -nearly seven years. The preparations made by Hidéyoshi were on an -extensive scale. The army of invasion numbered, if the statistics of -that time can be trusted, nearly 200,000 fighting men. As reinforcements -were sent from time to time from Japan, the number of troops employed -from first to last in the course of the war must have reached a very -high total. Hidéyoshi did not lead his army in person, but directed the -general plan of operations from Japan. The Japanese were at first -successful on land everywhere, though at sea they met with some serious -reverses. The Koreans were driven out of their capital, and the invaders -overran more than half of the country. Then, however, the Emperor of -China intervened in the struggle. Chinese armies entered Korea, and the -tide of victory turned against Japan. The retreat of the invaders -towards the coast was followed by overtures of peace, which resulted in -the suspension of hostilities in 1594. But the negotiations, in which -China took a leading part, broke down, and three years later a second -Japanese army landed in Korea. On this occasion the Japanese forces met -with more stubborn resistance. Chinese armies again came to the help of -Korea, and when Hidéyoshi died in 1598 the Japanese Government was only -too willing to make peace. The results of the war for Korea were -disastrous. The complete devastation wrought wherever the Japanese -armies had penetrated left traces which have never been entirely -effaced. Nor did Japan come out of the struggle with any profit. When -the final accounts were balanced all she had to show for her lavish -expenditure in lives and money was the establishment in Japan of a -colony of Korean potters, who were the first to make the well-known -Satsuma faience, and the doubtful privilege of keeping a small trading -post at the southern end of the Korean peninsula. - - -For some years after the Korean war had been brought to an end by the -death of Hidéyoshi the position of the Christian Church showed little -change. It was not until 1614, by which time a new line of Shōguns was -ruling the country, that rigorous measures were adopted against the new -religion. The edict which then appeared ordered the immediate expulsion -of all missionaries, and its issue was followed by a fierce outbreak of -persecution in all parts of Japan where converts or missionaries were to -be found. - -Evidence of the contradictory state of things then existing is furnished -by the fact that in that very year an Embassy to the Pope and to the -King of Spain was sent by the Japanese Daimiō of Sendai, whose fief was -in the north-east of Japan. - -Meanwhile, in 1609, Dutch traders had established themselves in the -island of Hirado, where they were joined four years later by English -traders representing the East India Company. The latter had not the -resources necessary for so distant an undertaking, nor was the English -navy strong enough to support the Company’s enterprise against the -Dutch, who were then wresting from the Portuguese the supremacy in -Eastern waters. At the end of ten years, therefore, the trading station -was abandoned. - -The Christian persecution continued with varying intensity for more than -twenty years, culminating in the insurrection of Shimabara in 1638. With -the bloody suppression of that rising, due as much to local -misgovernment as to religious causes, the curtain falls on the early -history of Christianity in Japan. Two years earlier, in 1636, an edict -issued by the third Shōgun, Iyémitsu, forbade all Japanese to go abroad, -reduced the tonnage of native vessels so as to render them unfit for -ocean voyages, and closed the country to all foreigners except the -Chinese and Dutch. The Portuguese were chiefly affected by this measure, -for the English had abandoned their trading enterprise in Hirado in -1623, and in the following year the rupture of relations with Spain had -put an end to the residence of Spanish subjects, thus justifying -Xavier’s warning that the King of Spain should be careful how he -interfered with Japan, in case he burnt his fingers. The Dutch owed -their escape from expulsion to the fact that the Japanese did not regard -them as being Christians at all, because of their openly expressed -hostility to the form of Christianity professed by the missionaries. In -neither case was the lot of the two favoured nationalities at all -enviable. In 1641 the Dutch were removed from Hirado and interned in -Déshima, an artificial island quarter of the town of Nagasaki; and some -fifty years later the Chinese, who had traded at that port in -comparative liberty from a date which is uncertain, were confined in an -enclosure close to the Dutch settlement. Here, paying dearly as State -prisoners for the commercial privileges they enjoyed, these traders -carried on a precarious and gradually dwindling commerce until Japan was -opened for the second time to foreign intercourse in the middle of the -nineteenth century. - - - - - CHAPTER III - The Tokugawa Shōguns—Consolidation of Duarchy. - - -The rule of Hidéyoshi was followed by that of a new line of Shōguns. The -circumstances under which it was established are well known. At the -death of Hidéyoshi in 1598 the government of the country was, during the -minority of his son Hidéyori, entrusted to five feudal nobles who acted -as regents. Of these, the most prominent was Tokugawa Iyéyasu, who had -married Hidéyoshi’s daughter, and whose feudal territories consisted of -the eight provinces in the east of the main island known as the Kwantō. -Disputes soon arose between the regents, and an appeal to arms resulted -in the decisive victory of Iyéyasu at Séki-ga-hara, near Lake Biwa. This -was in October, 1600. In 1603 he was appointed Shōgun, and twelve years -later the death, in what is known as the Ōsaka summer campaign, of -Hidéyori, the only personage who could challenge his supremacy, left him -without any dangerous rival. Now for the first time in Japanese history -the authority of the Shōgunate extended throughout the whole of Japan. -The prestige of the previous ruler had been as great, and his reputation -in the field higher, but he was not, like his successor, of Minamoto -stock, nor could he trace his descent from an Emperor; there were remote -districts in the country where his influence had not penetrated, -out-of-the-way places where his writ had never run. In founding a fresh -line of Shōguns the new ruler had other circumstances in his favour. The -country was tired of civil war and exhausted; the fighting power and -resources of turbulent chiefs had been weakened by long-continued -hostilities; and much of the work of pacification had been already done. - -Although the Tokugawa Shōgunate was, in its main outlines, the -repetition of a government which had existed before, it differed in some -important respects from previous administrations. - -The third Shōgun, the ruler responsible for the closing of the country, -put the finishing touches to the new system of government; but it owed -more to the genius of his grandfather, the founder of the line, who -framed it, supervised its operation and left posthumous instructions, -known as “The Hundred Articles,” to ensure its observance by his -successors. Japanese writers agree in stating that “The Hundred -Articles” give a general idea of the system of government established by -Iyéyasu. But it is a very general idea, a mere outline of things, that -we are thus enabled to glean. To fill in the details of the picture it -is necessary to draw on other sources of information. - -The difference between the rule of Iyéyasu and that of previous Shōguns -lay in the more complete subjection of the Imperial Court, in the wider -range of his authority, which surpassed that of his two immediate -predecessors, and in the highly organized and stable character of the -administration he established. The changes he effected in the government -of the country may be conveniently considered under the following heads, -it being borne in mind that they were the work of several years, and -that many were made after his early abdication in 1605, when he was -governing the country, in the name of his son, the second Shōgun:— - - 1. Redistribution of feudal territories. - - 2. Position of feudal nobility. - - 3. Reorganization of central administration. - - 4. Relations between the Court and Shōgunate, and between the Court - and Court nobles and the feudal nobility. - -1. The new Shōgun in establishing his rule followed the example of his -predecessors. Maps which give the distribution of feudal territories -before and after the year 1600, and again after the fall of Ōsaka in -1615, show the sweeping character of the changes he carried out on both -occasions. As a result of these changes, the most extensive fiefs at the -outset of Tokugawa rule were those held by the three Tokugawa Houses in -the provinces of Kii, Owari and Hitachi (Mito), to which may be added -those in the possession of the Daimiōs of Satsuma, Hizen, Chōshiū, Aki, -Tosa, Kaga, Échizen, Sendai and Mutsu. - -2. Before the establishment of the Tokugawa Shōgunate the feudal nobles -were divided into three classes—lords of provinces, lords of territories -and lords of castles. In the organization of the feudal nobility, as -remodelled by Iyéyasu, this old division was retained, but he created -the three princely Houses of Owari, Kii and Mito (Hitachi), called -collectively the _Gosanké_, and placed them at the head of the new order -of precedence. It was from the two first-mentioned Houses, together with -the _Gosankiō_, a family group of later institution, that, failing a -direct heir, subsequent Shōguns were chosen. To the representative of -the third House—that of Mito—the position of Adviser to the Shōgunate -was assigned, and he was supposed to have a determining voice in the -selection of a new Shōgun when this became necessary. Another important -change was the separation of the feudal nobility into two broad -classes—the _Fudai_ daimiōs, or hereditary vassals, who had submitted to -the new ruler before the fall of Ōsaka, and the _Tozama_ daimiōs, who -had acknowledged his supremacy later. The former class alone had the -privilege of being employed in the Councils of State and the higher -administrative posts. Two new feudal groups also made their -appearance—the _Hatamoto_, or Bannermen, who filled the less important -administrative posts, besides supplying the personnel of the various -departments of State, and whose fiefs in some cases rivalled in extent -those of the smaller daimiōs; and the _Gokénin_, a kind of landed -gentry. - -Full use, too, was made by the new ruler of the custom of retaining -hostages from the feudatories as a guarantee of loyalty, a practice -expanded under the second and third Shōguns into the system known as -_San-kin Kō-tai_. This provided for the residence of daimiōs in -alternate years at Yedo and in their fiefs, some members of their -families being permanently detained in the Tokugawa capital, which owed -its selection as the seat of government to its favourable location for -the commerce of that day at the head of the bay of the same name. The -system of State services (_Kokuyéki_), moreover, to which all daimiōs -were liable, was a rich source of revenue to the Shōgunate, while at the -same time it strengthened the authority of the Yedo Government. By these -expedients, and by the encouragement of ostentation in every form, the -feudal nobles were kept in strict subjection, the steady drain on their -finances making it difficult for them to escape from a condition of -impecuniosity. The expense of their annual journeys to and from the -Capital alone constituted a severe tax on their resources, and was the -main cause of the financial distress which existed at a later date in -many of the daimiates. Further and quite independent proof of the -unquestioned supremacy of the new Shōgun is supplied by the bestowal of -his early family name of Matsudaira not only on all the heads of feudal -families connected with his own, but on many of the leading lords of -provinces. Amongst other recipients of this questionable privilege—which -set the seal on the submission of the feudal nobility—were the daimiōs -of Satsuma, Chōshiū, Hizen, Tosa and Awa, whose retainers took a -prominent part in the Restoration of 1868–69. In these latter cases, -however, the old surnames were used alternately with the new -designations. - -3. The main features of Tokugawa administration, as established by its -founder and modified by his immediate successors, remained practically -unchanged for two and a half centuries. Its form was a centralized -bureaucracy based on feudalism. The general direction of affairs was in -the hands of an upper and a lower Council of State, the members of which -were chosen from _Fudai_ daimiōs of varying distinction. There was -usually an inner circle of statesmen, with whom both initiative and -decision rested, while the lesser ranks of officials were recruited -chiefly from the _Hatamoto_. Decisions on grave matters of State in -times of emergency were referred, when necessary, to the _Gosanké_ and -other leading daimiōs, whose participation in these deliberations was, -however, often more nominal than real. A leading part in administration -was also played by the _Jisha-bugiō_, or Superintendents of Buddhist and -Shintō temples. In spite of the religious sound of their titles, these -executive officers had an important voice in State business of all -kinds. There was also the _Hiō-jō-sho_. This was an institution -resembling that originally created by the Kamakura Shōguns. Established -at a time when no clear distinction existed between executive and -judicial matters, it seems to have combined the functions of a Supreme -Administrative Board and a Superior Court of Justice. It took cognizance -of all sorts of questions, both executive and judicial, and, under the -latter head, of both civil and criminal cases, which were decided by a -special office known as the _Ketsudan-sho_, or Court of Decisions. The -matters which came before this Board ranged from disputes regarding -land, agriculture and taxation to questions concerning the boundaries of -fiefs and provinces; from complaints of the conduct of the feudal -nobility and Shōgunate officials to appeals from the decisions of local -authorities. The members of the Council of State had the right to attend -the sittings of the Board, being encouraged to make surprise visits in -order to ensure the rendering of impartial justice; and for the same -reason, apparently, in the earlier days of the Shōgunate, the attendance -of the Shōgun himself was not unusual. A similar Board at Ōsaka dealt -with questions referred to it from the provinces west of Kiōto, and with -appeals from the decisions of local authorities in the districts in -question. - -Provincial administration varied according to the locality concerned. -What were known as the Shōgun’s domains—amounting in extent to nearly -one-third of the total area of the country—were administered by -Governors (_Daikwan_) appointed by the Shōgunate, this system prevailing -also in many of the Fudai daimiates and in certain coast towns. The -feudal territories in the rest of the country, with the exception named, -were governed by the clan rulers. A general supervision of affairs -throughout the country was also exercised by a special class of -officials called _Métsuké_. Their varied functions comprised those of -travelling inspectors and circuit judges; they were appointed to enquire -into the administration of feudal territories; and they were frequently -employed as deputies or assistants to governors, delegates and -commissioners, when their duty was to watch and report on the conduct of -their superiors. Hence the description of them as spies by foreign -writers on Japan—a description which was often correct. The system of -local government was based on groups of five households, or families, -each under the direction of a headman, and was the development of an -earlier form of tribal, or patriarchal, government introduced from China -at the time of the Great Reform. The headman of each group was subject, -in towns, to the control of the senior alderman of the ward, and, in -villages, to that of the mayor. The duties of these local officials, -whose posts were often hereditary, were to make known the orders of the -Central Government, or feudal authorities, as the case might be, to -administer justice and to collect taxes. - -A noticeable feature of Tokugawa administration was the duplication of -offices. In this a resemblance may be traced to similar customs in other -Oriental countries such as Thibet, Siam and Nepal, the tendency which -inspired the practice being possibly one of the causes of the partiality -of the nation for dual government. The employment of _Métsuké_ in many -cases as supplementary officials has already been mentioned. The custom -was widespread, extending through all grades of the official class, and -survived in Loochoo until the annexation of that principality in 1879. A -curious proof of its prevalence was furnished at the time of the -negotiation by Great Britain of the Treaty of 1858. Struck by the double -title of the British negotiator, Lord Elgin and Kincardine, and arguing -from their own methods of procedure, the Japanese officials concluded -that two envoys had been sent, and when, in the course of the -negotiations, no second envoy appeared, they took occasion to enquire -after the missing Kincardine. - -4. In his dealings with the Imperial Court at Kiōto the new Shōgun was -content, so far as outward formalities were concerned, to follow the -example of previous administrations, introducing, nevertheless, under -cover of conformity with ancient usage, many important changes. The -empty dignities of the Court were maintained with some increase of -ceremonial etiquette, though without the lavish display which had -reconciled the Throne to the rule of his predecessor. He was at the same -time careful to curtail whatever vestiges of Imperial authority still -remained. The measures taken for this purpose included the appointment -of a Resident (_Shoshidai_) in Kiōto, and a Governor (_Jōdai_) in Ōsaka; -the confinement of the reigning Emperor and cloistered ex-monarch (or -ex-monarchs, for there were not infrequently several abdicated -sovereigns at the same time) to their palaces; and the cessation of -Imperial “progresses”—the name given to Imperial visits to shrines; the -isolation of the Court by the interdict placed on the visits of feudal -nobles to the Capital, even sight-seeing being only permitted to them -within certain specified limits, and on condition of applying for -permission for this purpose; the isolation of the _Kugé_, or Court -nobility, by the prohibition of marriages and all monetary transactions -between them and feudal families; and the reorganization of the official -establishment of the Court, so as to bring it more completely under the -control of the Shōgunate. Iyéyasu also arranged the betrothal of his -granddaughter to the heir-apparent, an alliance not without precedent in -the past, and he enforced a stricter supervision over the Imperial -Household, the movements of Court ladies, and the daily routine of the -palace. - -Some idea of the condition of subservience to which the Throne was -reduced, and of the arrogant position assumed by the new ruler, may be -gathered from a perusal of the “Law of the Court and Shōgunate,” which, -taken in conjunction with the “Law of the Imperial Court” and the -“Hundred Articles,” throws some light on the new order of things. One of -the provisions of the law in question transferred from the Court to the -Shōgunate the protection of the Throne against evil spirits by -abolishing the long-established _Riōbu Shintō_ processions in the -Capital, and by formally recognizing the Shintō deity, from whom this -protection was supposed to emanate, as the tutelary deity of the -Tokugawa family. The Shōgun was thus made responsible for the spiritual -guardianship of the Throne, the material protection over which he -already exercised in his capacity of supreme military ruler. - -Though nothing of the substance of power was left to the Crown, the mere -fact that authority was exercised in its name led to much friction in -the relations between Kiōto and Yedo, and created an atmosphere of -make-believe in which everything moved. The Crown still retained the -nominal privilege of conferring the much-coveted Court titles. Its -nominal approval was also necessary to the investiture of a new Shōgun, -as well as to other important measures of State. It claimed the right, -moreover, to be consulted in regard to ceremonial observances of all -kinds, to questions of marriage, adoption, abdication and succession. -Naturally, therefore, the large number of questions calling for -discussion between the Court of the Mikado in the Capital and the Yedo -Government gave rise to a voluminous correspondence, the official -importance of which, however, was diminished by the presence of the -Shōgun’s Resident at Kiōto. In the singular official relations recorded -in this correspondence there is evidence of a settled policy on the part -of the Shōgunate to divert the attention of the Throne from serious -affairs and keep it occupied with the details of complicated ceremonial, -and, on the other hand, of constant, though fruitless, attempts on the -part of the Court to encroach on what had become the prerogatives of the -Shōgun. - -One or two instances, taken at random from the history of the Tokugawa -period, will illustrate how the dual system of government worked in -practice; what little latitude was left to the Throne even in matters -which might be regarded as lying within its direct control; and how, -whenever friction arose, the Shōgunate invariably had its own way. - -The first trial of strength between Kiōto and Yedo occurred soon after -Iyéyasu’s death, when his son Hidétada was Shōgun. The trouble arose out -of some irregularities which had occurred in the Imperial Household. The -Tokugawa administration was still in its infancy, and the Court nobles -showed a disposition to dispute its authority, some of them being -indiscreet enough to speak of the Yedo authorities as being Eastern -barbarians. The Shōgun adopted a high-handed attitude. He threatened to -break off the match between his daughter and the Emperor, which had -already received the Imperial sanction, and he went so far as to -intimate that the Emperor might be required to abdicate. His attitude -had the desired effect. The Court hastened to admit itself in the wrong, -and the affair ended in the banishment of three of the Court nobles. - -Another and more serious quarrel occurred not long afterwards in the -reign of the same Emperor and during the rule of the third Shōgun, to -whom many of the later interpolations in the early Tokugawa laws are -generally ascribed. The cause of the dispute was a trivial matter—the -promotion by the Emperor, irregularly as the Shōgunate claimed, of -certain members of the Buddhist clergy connected with the Court. This -time it had a serious ending. The Emperor, mortified by what he regarded -as vexatious interference with his authority, resigned the Imperial -dignity, being succeeded on the Throne by his daughter, the child of the -Tokugawa princess already mentioned. - -A third instance, convenient for our purpose, is typical of the -complications caused both in the matter of succession to the Throne, and -in appointments to the office of Shōgun, by the difficulty of -reconciling the custom of adoption with the dictates of filial piety, as -laid down in Confucian doctrine. The time was the end of the eighteenth -century. There were then a boy-Emperor eight years of age and a -boy-Shōgun a few years older. Each had been adopted by his predecessor, -who in each case had died shortly afterwards, the young Emperor’s -succession to the Throne antedating the appointment of the young Shōgun -by some six years. It was necessary to appoint a guardian for the young -Shōgun, and some members of the Yedo ministry wished to appoint to this -post the father, who belonged to the Hitotsubashi branch of the Tokugawa -family. This course received the support of the boy-Shōgun, who, to show -his filial respect, desired to instal his father with the title of -ex-Shōgun (_Taigiōsho_) in the palace at Yedo set apart for the Shōgun’s -heir. The proposal was resisted by the other Ministers on the ground -that it was against precedent and would disturb public morals, in which -ceremonial propriety played, as we know, so important a part. In the -event of the adoptive parent dying in the lifetime of the real -father—which in this case actually happened—the latter might, it was -said, claim to be received in the former’s place into the adoptive -family, a contingency which would lead to inconvenience and confusion. -While the dispute was going on matters were complicated by the receipt -of a similar request from the boy-Emperor in Kiōto, who desired that his -father might be honoured by being given the title of ex-Emperor. There -were precedents for the favour requested in the latter instance, and it -would probably have been granted had the Government not felt that the -concession would weaken their position in regard to the young Shōgun. -Both requests were consequently refused; whereupon stormy scenes, we are -told, occurred at the Yedo palace, in the course of which the Shōgun -drew his sword on one of the offending Councillors, and an angry -correspondence continued for two or three years between Kiōto and Yedo. -In the end neither request was granted, and the Ministers whose counsel -prevailed had at least the satisfaction of feeling that the apprehended -danger to public morals had been averted. - -Before closing this chapter it may be convenient to dwell for a moment -on two points—the terms used to designate the Sovereign in Japan and the -titles of daimiōs. - -That the impersonality shrouding everything Japanese, to which reference -has already been made, should show itself in the terms used to designate -the Sovereign is not surprising. Nor is it in any way strange that these -should include such expressions as “The Palace,” “The Palace Interior” -and “The Household,” for sovereigns are commonly spoken of in this way, -the habit having its origin in respect. What is curious is that in the -case of a sovereign venerated from the first as a God, and so closely -associated with the native faith, the terms by which he is known to his -subjects should, with one exception, be borrowed from China, and that -this one exception, the name “Mikado,” which means “Honourable Gate,” -should be the term least used. - -The titles borne by the feudal nobility were of two kinds—territorial -titles, and the official titles conferred by the Court. The territorial -title of a daimiō consisted originally of the word _Kami_ joined to the -name of the province in which his territories lay. The title of a -daimiō, therefore, in early days had direct reference to the province in -which his fief was situated. In the course of time, however, though this -territorial title remained in general use, it by no means followed that -there was any connection between the particular province mentioned and -the territory actually possessed by a daimiō. This change in the -significance of the title was due to several causes: to the partition -amongst several daimiōs of lands originally held by a single individual, -to the removal of a daimiō to another fief, to which he often carried -his old title, and to the formation of cadet houses, which sometimes -retained the title of the senior branch. The multiplication of similar -titles led to much confusion, and in the later days of the Shōgunate, by -way of remedying this inconvenience, a daimiō on appointment to the -Council of State was obliged to change his title, if it were one already -borne by an older member. - -The history of the other, or official, titles is this. When the -government of the country passed out of the hands of the _Kugé_ or Court -nobles, into those of the military class, the official posts previously -held by the former were filled by members of the feudal nobility, who -accordingly assumed the official titles attached to those posts. In the -course of time, as successive changes in the details of administration -occurred, the duties of these posts became merely nominal, until at last -the titles, some of which had become hereditary, came to be merely -honourable distinctions, having no connection with the discharge of -official duties. There were in Iyéyasu’s time about sixty of these -official titles, which were, nominally, in the gift of the Crown. Until -the end of the Shōgunate there was much competition for these titles, -which were the cause of constant intrigue between the Imperial Court and -the Yedo Government. - - - - - CHAPTER IV - Political Conditions—Reopening of Japan to Foreign - Intercourse—Conclusion of Treaties—Decay of Shōgunate. - - -Much space has been given in the preceding chapter to the Tokugawa -period of administration. For this no apology is due to the reader. The -period in question, held in grateful remembrance by the nation as the -Era of Great Peace, is the most important in Japanese history. This -importance it owes to its long duration; to the singular character of -its government—a centralized and autocratic bureaucracy flavoured with -feudalism; to the progress which took place in literature, art and -industry; to its being the immediate predecessor of what is known as the -Meiji Era—the reign of the late Emperor, which began in 1868; and, -consequently, to the fact that the Japanese people, as we see them -to-day, are the product of that period more than of any other. Before -leaving the subject, therefore, it may perhaps be convenient to explain -very briefly what kind of feudal system it was which formed, as it were, -the basis of Tokugawa government, for one feature of it still survives. - -In his _History of the Civilization of Europe_, Guizot puts forward on -behalf of feudalism the claim that it constitutes an essential stage in -the evolution of nations. It certainly played a very noticeable part in -the development of Japan, lasting as it did from the close of the -twelfth century down to the middle of the nineteenth, a period of more -than seven hundred years. The French author and statesman in question, -however, might have been surprised had he known that one feature of -Japanese feudalism would survive its abolition, and that feature one not -known on the continent of Europe. - -Though in its general character Japanese feudalism resembled the feudal -systems prevailing at various times in the continental countries of -Europe, in one respect—the position of the population inhabiting the -fiefs—it came closer to the clan type of Scottish feudalism; with this -important distinction, however, that, whereas the Scottish clan was a -family, or tribal, organization, the basis of the Japanese clan was -purely territorial, the clansmen being held together by no family link. -The Japanese word _Han_ (borrowed from China), the usual English -rendering of which is “clan,” does not, in its feudal sense, refer to -the territory included in a fief, but to the people inhabiting it. In -unsettled times, which were the rule and not the exception before the -middle of the sixteenth century, the map of feudal Japan was constantly -changing. The area of a fief expanded, or contracted, according to the -military fortunes of the daimiō concerned; and at times both fief and -feudal owner disappeared altogether. Nor in the alterations thus -occurring from time to time in the feudal map was any consideration paid -to natural boundaries. A daimiō’s fief, or, in other words, the -territories of a clan, might consist of the whole or only part of a -province, of portions of two or three provinces, or even of several -whole provinces, as in the case of the founder of the Tokugawa line of -Shōguns, and, at one time, of Mōri, “the lord of ten provinces.” In -earlier days the word “clan” (_Han_) was not much used, the personality -of the daimiō of the fief being the chief consideration. As conditions -became more settled, however, under the peaceful sway of the Tokugawa -Shōguns, the boundaries of fiefs became more fixed and permanent. As a -result, too, of these unwarlike conditions, and of the spread to feudal -circles of the corrupt and effeminate atmosphere of the Imperial Court, -the personality of a daimiō counted for less, while the term “clan” -gradually came to be more commonly employed to express the idea of a -distinct feudal community, united solely by territorial associations. -These acted as provincial ties do everywhere, but where feudal and -provincial boundaries were the same, the tie uniting the population of a -fief was naturally stronger than elsewhere. Some idea of what the clan -really was in Japan is necessary in order to understand how it was that -clan spirit should have survived when feudalism died, and how it is that -Japan to-day, more than half a century after its abolition, should be -ruled by what the Japanese themselves speak of as a clan government -(_Hambatsu Séifu_). - -We now come to a new chapter in the history of Japan—the reopening of -the country to foreign intercourse. At the close of the drama which -ended in the expulsion, or death, of all missionaries and their converts -the Dutch and Chinese were, as we have seen, the only foreigners allowed -to trade with Japan, the reason being that neither, so far as the -Japanese could judge, had any connection with Christianity, or -missionaries. This was about the middle of the seventeenth century. -Things remained in this state until the beginning of the nineteenth, by -which time the commerce carried on by the traders of the two favoured -nationalities had dwindled to very small proportions. During the last -fifty years of this trade changes full of meaning for Japan, for the -continent of Asia and for the world at large were taking place. Russia -was extending her sphere of activity in Siberia, and threatening to -become an intrusive neighbour in Saghalin and the Kuriles. American -whalers had discovered a profitable field of enterprise in the Sea of -Okhotsk, while, further south, landing parties from these vessels were -making use of the Bonin islands to obtain water and fresh provisions. -The development of America’s seaboard on the Pacific had led to the -opening of a new trade route with the mainland of Asia, for which the -Japanese islands offered convenient ports of call. And, finally, the -governments of Great Britain and France were busily engaged in -demolishing the barriers of conservative prejudice behind which China -had for so long entrenched herself. These changes, due partly to the -introduction of steam navigation, caused a sudden and rapidly growing -increase in the visits of foreign vessels to Japan. The trend of affairs -was perceived by the Dutch, who warned the Japanese authorities that the -moment was approaching when the policy of isolation could no longer be -pursued without danger to the country. It needed little to arouse -Japanese apprehensions. A system of coast defence was at once organized. -The Bay of Yedo, and its vicinity, the inland sea, and the harbours in -Kiūshiū, including the immediate neighbourhood of Nagasaki, were places -to which special attention was given. It is clear from the experience of -foreign ships which accident or enterprise carried into Japanese waters, -from the detailed instructions issued periodically from Yedo, and from -the reports of movements of foreign vessels received by the authorities, -that there was no lack of vigilance in the working of the system. Yet it -was singularly ineffective; a result, under the circumstances, not -surprising, since the policy of the Yedo Government varied according to -the degree of apprehension existing at the moment in official circles, -and there was a general desire to evade responsibility. - -Three reasons inspired these visits of foreign vessels: the need of -provisions, looking for shipwrecked crews, or repatriating shipwrecked -Japanese, and a desire to engage in trade, or to establish friendly -relations which would lead to that result. In no case was the reception -accorded encouraging, though a clear discrimination was exercised -between merchant vessels and warships. To the former scant mercy was -shown; but warships were treated with more respect. They were towed into -and out of harbour free of charge, and were supplied with provisions for -which no money was accepted. - -America was the country most interested at that time in the opening of -Japan to foreign intercourse on account of the operations of her whalers -in the Pacific and her trade route to China. The United States -Government, therefore, decided to take the initiative in endeavouring to -put an end to the Japanese policy of isolation. Accordingly, in the year -1845, Commodore Biddle arrived in Yedo with two men-of-war for the -purpose of establishing trade relations between the two countries. He -failed, however, to induce the Japanese Government to enter into any -negotiations on the subject. Seven years later the matter was again -taken up by the Government at Washington, Commodore Perry receiving -orders to proceed to Japan on a mission to arrange for the more humane -treatment of American sailors shipwrecked on the coasts of Japan; to -obtain the opening of one or more harbours as ports of call for American -vessels and the establishment of a coal depôt; and to secure permission -for trade at such ports as might be opened. No secrecy surrounded the -intentions of the United States. They were known in Europe as well as in -America, as Macfarlane, writing in 1852, mentions, and the Dutch -promptly told the Japanese. - -On July 8th, 1853, Perry arrived in the harbour of Uraga, a small cove -in the Bay of Yedo, some thirty miles from the present capital. His -instructions were to obtain the facilities desired by persuasion, if -possible, but, if necessary, by force. He succeeded after some -difficulty in prevailing upon the Japanese authorities to receive the -President’s letter at a formal interview on shore. At the same time he -presented a letter from himself demanding more humane treatment for -shipwrecked sailors, and pointed out the folly of persistence in the -policy of seclusion. He would return next spring, he added, with more -ships to receive the answer to the President’s letter. - -With Perry’s arrival the Shōgun figures under a new title, that of -Tycoon (_Taikun_), or Great Lord, a term first used in correspondence -with Korea in order to conceal the fact that the Shōgun was not the -sovereign of Japan. This was the word chosen to designate the Shōgun in -the earlier treaties concluded with foreign Powers, and is the name by -which he was commonly known to foreigners until the Restoration put an -end to the government he represented. - -On Perry’s return in the following year, 1854, he insisted on anchoring -further up the Bay of Yedo, off what was then the post town and -afterwards the open port of Kanagawa. It was at a village close to this -spot, now known as the town of Yokohama, that on the 31st March he -signed the Treaty opening the ports of Shimoda (in Cape Idzu) and -Hakodaté (in Yezo) to American vessels—the former at once, the latter at -the end of a year. This Treaty, which was ratified in the following -year, was the first step in the reopening of Japan to foreign -intercourse. - -Perry’s Treaty was succeeded by similar arrangements with other -Powers—with the British in October of the same year (1854), and in the -year following with the Russians and Dutch. - -The Dutch benefited greatly by the new direction given to foreign -relations. By the provisional arrangement made in 1855 most of the -humiliating restrictions accompanying the privilege of trade were -removed; and two years later they were allowed “to practise their own or -the Christian religion,” a provision which seems to suggest that the -Japanese idea as to their not being Christians was inspired by the -Dutch. The orders, moreover, with regard to trampling on Christian -emblems were also at the same time rescinded. There was still some -difference between their position and that of other foreigners. This, -however, only lasted a year or two. With the operation of the later more -elaborate treaties the nation which had prided itself on its exclusive -trading privileges with Japan was glad to come in on the same footing as -other Western Powers. - -None of the arrangements above described were regular commercial -treaties. The first, concluded with America, was simply an agreement for -the granting of certain limited facilities for navigation and trade, the -latter being a secondary consideration. The object of the British -Treaty, made by Admiral Stirling during the Crimean war, was to assist -operations against Russia in Siberian waters. The Russians, for their -part, merely wished for political reasons to gain a footing in Japan; -while the Dutch were chiefly anxious to escape from the undignified -position they occupied. - -It was not until 1858 that regular commercial treaties were concluded. -Perry’s Treaty had stipulated for the appointment of an American -Consul-General to reside at Shimoda. Mr. Townsend Harris was selected -for the post. His arrival was unwelcome to the Japanese, who had not -expected the enforcement of the stipulation. They accordingly boycotted -him. He could get no trustworthy information. If he asked for anything, -it was withheld as being “contrary to the honourable country’s law”; and -his letters were not answered because “it was not customary to reply to -the letters of foreigners.” Harris, nevertheless, persevered in spite of -Japanese obstruction with his task of developing American relations with -Japan. In June, 1857, he was able to report the signature of a -convention which extended considerably the facilities conceded to Perry; -in the autumn of the same year he was received in audience by the Shōgun -as the first duly accredited representative of a Western Power; by the -following February negotiations for the new Treaty were practically -completed; and in July of that year (1858) the Treaty was signed in Yedo -Bay on board an American man-of-war. - -The delay of five months was caused by the Shōgunate’s decision to refer -the Treaty before signature to Kiōto for the approval of the Throne. -This reference was not necessary. The right of the Shōgun to act -independently in such matters had been recorded in the “Hundred -Articles,” and long custom had confirmed the rule thus recorded. But in -the embarrassment and trepidation caused by Perry’s unexpected visit, -and still less expected demands, the Shōgunate had departed from this -rule, and revived the obsolete formality of Imperial sanction, extending -at the same time its application. The Court refused its consent to the -proposed Treaty, but in spite of this refusal the Japanese negotiators -signed it; the Shōgun’s ministers being influenced by the news of the -termination of the war in China, and the impending arrival of British -and French ambassadors, as well as by the representations of the -American negotiator. - -Treaties with Great Britain, with Holland, with Russia, and with France -followed in rapid succession, the first three being signed in August, -the last-named in October. All four reproduced more or less closely the -substance of the American convention. The choice of open ports in -Perry’s Treaty—due to solicitude for American whalers, and -considerations connected with America’s new trade route to China—had in -the interests of general commerce been unfortunate. This defect was -remedied in the new treaties by provisions for the opening of additional -ports. A tariff and a system of tonnage dues were also established. In -other respects the new treaties merely confirmed, or amplified, the -provisions of earlier arrangements. They were useful, however, as the -forerunners of a whole series of practically uniform agreements, which -simplified Japan’s position, while enlarging the scope of foreign -relations. One of the last to be concluded was the Austro-Hungarian -Treaty of 1869, the English version of which was made the “original,” or -authoritative, text. By virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause, which -figured in all these conventions, it was this instrument which governed -the relations of Japan with Treaty Powers, until the new revised -treaties came into force in 1899. When the Japanese people became aware -that the character of these treaties was different from those made by -Western governments with each other, an early opportunity was taken to -protest against the provisions conceding ex-territoriality and fixing a -low customs tariff, and against the obstacle to revision presented by -the absence in the agreements of any fixed period of duration. The -irritation thus caused led later on to an agitation for treaty revision, -which did much to embitter Japanese feeling towards foreigners. The -complaint was not unnatural, but in making it there was a tendency to -overlook the fact that the position of foreigners in Japan under these -treaties was also very different from their position under other -treaties elsewhere. The residential and commercial rights of the -foreigner in Japan applied only to the “open ports,” while his right of -travel, except by special permission, not readily granted, did not -extend beyond a narrow area at the same ports known as “treaty limits.” -The rest of the country remained closed. This limitation of facilities -for commercial intercourse was, moreover, accentuated by the fact that -the choice of “open” or “treaty ports” was not, as has been pointed out, -the best that could have been made. Compelled against their will to -consent to foreign intercourse, it was only to be expected that the -Japanese should seek to render the concession worthless by selecting -harbours neither suitable nor safe for shipping, and places far from -markets, and that a similar spirit should dictate the choice of sites -for foreign settlements. That the early negotiators who represented -Japan were handicapped by ignorance of the principles regulating -international relations is undeniable. But the injustice, as they -considered it, of the conditions against which protest was made was -really a blessing in disguise; for, on the admission of the Japanese -themselves, it served as a powerful stimulus to progress on the lines of -Western civilization. - -In the course of five years from the date of Perry’s Treaty no less than -thirteen elaborate agreements, besides other arrangements of a less -formal character, had been concluded by Japan. So rapid an extension of -foreign intercourse might seem to point to a subsidence of anti-foreign -feeling, and a decrease of opposition to the establishment of friendly -relations with foreign countries. Such, however, was not the case. The -negotiations of these various covenants were carried on in the face of -growing anti-foreign clamour, and in the midst of political confusion -and agitation,—the precursors of a movement which was to end in the -collapse of Tokugawa government. - -In order that the subsequent course of events may be understood, some -reference, however brief, to the political situation which existed at -this time is necessary. It will be seen what complications—quite apart -from the embarrassments arising out of the reopening of foreign -intercourse—were caused by the inconsequence and ambition of the Court, -the weakness of the Shōgunate, and the jealousies of rival statesmen. -Some idea may also thus be formed of the ignorance of foreign matters -which then prevailed, except in a few official quarters, and of the -clumsy timidity of a policy which consisted chiefly of shutting the eyes -to facts patent to everyone. - -Ever since the establishment of Tokugawa rule there had been a party at -the Kiōto Court, consisting of Court nobles, which championed the -pretensions of the Throne, mourned over its lost glories, conducted its -intrigues, and felt a common resentment against what in its eyes was an -administration of usurpers. The fatal mistake of the Shōgunate in -referring to Kiōto Perry’s demands for the reopening of foreign -intercourse on new and strange conditions—a matter which, in accordance -with established precedent, was within its own competency—gave an -opportunity to this party to revive the long obsolete pretensions of the -Court. The opportunity was at once seized. The party had at this time -powerful adherents. Amongst them the chief figure was the ex-Prince of -Mito. Early in the previous century his grandfather, the second of his -line, had founded a school of literature and politics, which espoused -the Imperial cause, and encouraged the native religion and language in -opposition to what was borrowed from China,—a profession of principles -which sat curiously on a leading member of the Tokugawa House. Holding -the same views himself, the ex-Prince had been forced to abdicate some -years before in favour of his eldest son for having destroyed the -Buddhist temples in his fief, and made their bells into cannon, for the -alleged purpose of repelling a foreign invasion. With the ex-Prince were -ranged the Tokugawa Prince of Owari and the influential daimiōs of -Chōshiū, Échizen, Tosa and Uwajima, whilst a large measure of sympathy -with Imperial aims existed among the prominent clans of the south and -west. The anti-Shōgunate movement also derived help from the turbulent -class of clanless _samurai_, known as _rōnin_, which at this time was -rapidly increasing in numbers owing to economic distress in feudal -territories, and the growing weakness of the Shōgunate. The latter’s -supporters, on the other hand, were mostly to be found in the centre, -the north and the east, all of which were old Tokugawa strongholds. Its -chief strength, however, lay in its being _beatus possidens_,—having, -that is to say, the command of State resources, and being in a position -to speak for the Throne; and in the fact that Tokugawa government, by -its long duration and the completeness of its bureaucratic organization, -had taken so firm a hold of the country, that whatever sympathy might -possibly be evoked on behalf of revived Imperial pretensions might not -unreasonably be expected to fall short of material support. - -One other advantage the Shōgunate possessed was the presence in the -Government of a minister of distinguished ancestry, and of great ability -and courage, combined with, what was rare in those days, independence of -character. This was the famous Ïi Kamon no Kami, generally known as the -Tairō, or Regent, whose castle-town, Hikoné, near Kiōto, overlooked Lake -Biwa. The early associations of his family made him a staunch upholder -of Tokugawa rule. He quickly became the leading spirit of the Ministry, -and the liberal views he apparently held on the subject of treaty-making -and foreign intercourse brought him at once into collision with the -boldest and most uncompromising member of the Court party—the ex-Prince -of Mito. The disagreement between them first showed itself in the advice -called for by the Throne from the Council of State and the leading -feudal nobles on the question of the signature of the American Treaty of -1858. In the controversy which arose on this point they figured as the -chief protagonists. The policy of the Court in 1853 had been -non-committal. In 1855 it had formally approved of the treaties, the -Shōgun’s resident at Kiōto reporting that “the Imperial mind was now at -ease.” Nevertheless, in spite of this approval, and notwithstanding the -signature of fresh treaties, the crusade of the Court party against -foreign intercourse went on unabated. On the present occasion the -ex-Prince of Mito argued strongly against the Treaty, while the Council -of State, adopting the views of Ïi Kamon no Kami, who was not yet -Regent, recommended the signature of the Treaty as being the proper -course to follow. But the question which provoked the keenest rivalry -and the bitterest antagonism between the two statesmen concerned the -succession to the Shōgunate. - -The Shōgun Iyésada, appointed in 1853, was childless, and, in accordance -with custom in such cases, it was incumbent on him to choose and adopt a -successor. The ex-Prince of Mito wished the choice to fall on one of his -younger sons, Kéiki, then fifteen years of age, who having been adopted -into the Hitotsubashi family, was eligible for the appointment. But the -new Shōgun was only twenty-nine, and in no hurry to choose a successor -from another family. His relations, moreover, with the ex-Prince of Mito -were not cordial; and there were other objections. If he were -constrained to adopt a successor, his own choice would, it was known, -fall on a nearer kinsman, the young Prince of Kishiū, a boy of ten. The -heir preferred by the Shōgun was also the choice of Ïi. The parties -supporting the rival candidates were not unequally matched. Though the -weight of clan influence was on the side of Kéiki, fated a few years -later to be the last of the Tokugawa Shōguns, a section of the Court -nobles joined with the Council of State in favouring the candidature of -the young Kishiū prince, behind whom stood also the Shōgun. - -The two questions in dispute were thus quite distinct, the one being a -matter of foreign, the other of domestic policy. But the two -protagonists in each being the same, it looked as if the side that was -successful in one issue would gain the day in both. And this in fact is -what happened. In June, 1858, in the interval between the second and -third missions to Kiōto in connection with the signature of the American -Treaty, Ïi became Regent—an appointment tenable in times of emergency as -well as during a Shōgun’s minority. The end of the conflict, which had -lasted nearly five years, was then in sight. In July, as already stated, -the American Treaty was signed. Before another week had elapsed the -young Kishiū prince was proclaimed heir to the Shōgunate. Ten days later -the Shōgun Iyésada died. - - - - - CHAPTER V - Anti-Foreign Feeling—Chōshiū Rebellion—Mikado’s Ratification of -Treaties—Prince Kéiki—Restoration Movement—Civil War—Fall of Shōgunate. - - -The signature of the Treaty was loudly condemned by the Court party, the -ex-Prince of Mito being conspicuous amongst those who protested. He -addressed a violently worded remonstrance to the Council of State, -impugning the action of the Government, which was accused of disrespect -to the Throne, and disobedience to the Imperial commands. The Regent -retorted by striking at once at his enemies with all the force of his -newly acquired position, and the prestige of his success in the matter -of the succession. The ex-Prince of Mito and the Prince of Owari were -confined to their _yashikis_ (a term applied to the feudal residences -occupied by daimiōs during their period of service in Yedo); while the -latter, together with the daimiōs of Échizen, Tosa and Uwajima, was -forced to abdicate. And when the Court, growing uneasy at this sudden -reassertion of authority on the part of the Shōgunate, summoned the -Regent, or one of the Gosanké, to Kiōto to report on the situation, a -reply was sent to the effect that the Regent was detained by State -affairs, and that the ex-Prince of Mito and the Prince of Owari were -confined to their clan _yashikis_. A mission, however—the third in -succession—proceeded to Kiōto from Yedo. This submitted a report on the -subject of the Treaty, which explained the reasons for its signature in -advance of Imperial sanction as being the arrival of more Russian and -American ships; the defeat of China by the English and French; the news -that these two countries were sending to Japan special envoys instructed -to carry matters with a high hand; and the advice to sign at once given -by the American minister. The Court’s eventual pronouncement in favour -of the Treaty displayed in a striking manner the perverseness and -inconsequence which characterized Japanese official procedure at that -time. The decree conveying the Imperial approval expressed the -satisfaction with which the Throne had received the assurance that the -Shōgun, the Regent and the Council of State, were all in favour of -keeping foreigners at a distance; and urged on the attention of the -Shōgun “the Throne’s deep concern in regard to the sea in the -neighbourhood of the Imperial shrines and Kiōto, as well as the safety -of the Imperial insignia,” which, put into plainer language, meant that -no port should be opened near Isé, or the capital. Two suggestions have -been made on good authority regarding this decree: (1) that the Shōgun’s -agents in Kiōto were directed to accept anything which established the -fact of an understanding with the Court having been effected; and (2) -that the agents in question succeeded in persuading the Court that, -though the signature of this particular Treaty was unavoidable, the Yedo -Government was not really in favour of foreign intercourse. Both -suggestions are probably correct. In any case the Court’s action in -ignoring the Throne’s previous approval of earlier treaties was -calculated to stiffen opposition to the Shōgun’s diplomacy, and was thus -doubtless responsible for some of the subsequent difficulties attending -foreign intercourse, notably in connection with the opening of the port -of Hiogo, which, with the consent of the Treaty Powers, was postponed -until January, 1868. - -As showing how meaningless the Imperial approval, in reality, was it may -be well to note that the English text of the Treaty in question provided -for the exchange of ratifications at Washington on or before the 4th -July, 1859, failing which, however, the Treaty was, nevertheless, to -come into force on the date in question. The Treaty went into operation -on the date fixed, but the exchange of ratifications did not take place -until 1860. The ratification on the part of Japan is described as the -verification of “the name and seal of His Majesty the Tycoon.” - -Hostility to foreigners at this time, however, was a feeling common to -most Japanese, even Shōgunate officials being no exception to the rule. -Writers on Japan mention as one cause which served to increase this -feeling the drain of gold from Japan, which began as early as the -operations of the first Portuguese traders. Another—adduced by the -Japanese Government itself—was the great rise in prices which followed -upon the opening of Treaty ports. Sir Rutherford Alcock, in the _Capital -of the Tycoon_, adds a third—the memory of the troubles connected with -the Christian persecution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, -and of the serious alarm then entertained by the Japanese authorities at -the undisguised pretensions of the Pope. The understanding regarding the -Treaty question arrived at by the Regent with the Court did little to -check the growth of anti-foreign feeling, for the Court continued its -intrigues as before, and the Regent’s death, in the spring of 1860 at -the hands of assassins instigated by the ex-Prince of Mito, provided a -further opportunity. The effects of the fierce anti-foreign crusade upon -which it then embarked were seen in the murder of the Secretary of the -American Legation, in the successive attacks made on the British -Legation, and in other violent acts by which foreigners were not the -only sufferers. Yielding to the pressure of public opinion, the -Government itself became almost openly hostile. Placed in this difficult -position, the representatives of the Treaty Powers found both dignity -and safety compromised. What, they might well ask, was to be gained by -protests to the Japanese authorities in regard to acts with which the -latter’s sympathy was barely concealed, of which they not infrequently -gave warning themselves, but against which they were unable, or -unwilling, to afford protection? Under these circumstances it is not -surprising that the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany -and Holland should in 1862 have retired temporarily from the capital to -Yokohama—an example not followed by the American representative; nor -that the British Legation on its return, at the Japanese Government’s -request, four weeks later, should have been immediately attacked in -spite of a formal guarantee of protection. In respect of this attack, in -the course of which two sentries were murdered, an indemnity was -afterwards paid. Matters were further aggravated by the murder in -September of the same year (1862) of Mr. Richardson, a British subject, -on the high road near Yokohama by the bodyguard of a Satsuma noble, -Shimadzu Saburō, who was on his way back to Kiōto from the Shōgun’s -Court in Yedo. A formal apology for this outrage was demanded by the -British, together with the payment of an indemnity. - -The growing power of the Court and the anti-foreign party, for the two -were one, showed itself also in its behaviour to the Shōgunate after the -Regent’s death. - -The adherents of the ex-Prince of Mito—who survived his adversary by -only a few months—held up their heads again, while the late Regent’s -friends were, in their turn, dismissed from office, fined, imprisoned or -banished. Nor did the Shōgun’s marriage to the Mikado’s sister in the -spring of 1862 materially improve the relations between Kiōto and Yedo, -or moderate the high-handed attitude of the Court. In the summer of the -same year the Shōgun was peremptorily summoned to Kiōto, which had not -seen a Shōgun for two hundred and fifty years, to confer with the Court -regarding the expulsion of foreigners; Prince Kéiki, the unsuccessful -candidate for the office of Shōgun in 1858, was made Regent, and -appointed guardian to his rival on that occasion, the young Shōgun -Iyémochi, in the place of a nearer and older relative; while the -ex-Prince of Échizen, one of the late Regent’s enemies, was made -President of the Council of State. That nothing should be wanting to -indicate its displeasure at the position taken up by the Shōgunate in -regard to foreign affairs, the Court went so far as to order the -Shōgun’s consort, who in accordance with custom had, on her marriage, -assumed the title usual in those circumstances, to revert to her -previous designation of princess. Other signs of the times, showing not -only the anti-foreign spirit of the Court, but its determination to -strike at the root of Tokugawa authority, could be noted in such -incidents as the relaxation of the conditions of the residence of feudal -nobles in Yedo, and the release of the hostages formerly exacted for -their good conduct whilst in their fiefs; the solemn fixing at a Council -of princes, attended by the Shōgun and his guardians, of a date for the -cessation of all foreign intercourse; the revival of the State -processions of the Mikado to shrines, which had been discontinued at the -beginning of the Tokugawa rule; and the residence for long periods at -Kiōto of feudal nobles, in defiance of the Tokugawa regulation which -forbade them even to visit the Capital without permission—a step which -showed that they were not afraid of its being known that they sided -openly with the Court against the Shōgunate. The same spirit accounted -for the attempt to associate the Shōgun and his Regent-guardian with the -taking of a religious oath to expel foreigners, and, finally, for the -fact that while so much that was incompatible with friendly relations -with Treaty Powers was taking place, a mission sent to those very powers -was engaged in persuading them to consent to the postponement for five -years of the dates fixed for the opening of certain ports and places to -foreign trade and residence. This consent was given, and was recorded, -in so far as Great Britain was concerned, in the London Protocol of June -6th, 1862. - -The communication to the foreign representatives of the decision to -close the country duly took place on the 24th June, as arranged. But -nothing came of it. The foreign governments refused to take the matter -seriously, merely intimating that steps would be taken to protect -foreign interests, and five months later the Shōgunate asked for the -return of the Note. - -Sir Rutherford Alcock in the course of a lengthy review of the -situation, in which he seems to have foreseen clearly that the reopening -of the country would eventually lead to civil war, came, though -unwillingly, to the conclusion that foreign governments, if they wished -to ensure the observance of the treaties, must be prepared to use force, -and make reprisals; in fact, that opposition to foreign intercourse -would not cease until the nation should, by drastic measures, have been -persuaded of the ability of foreign Powers to make their Treaty rights -respected. The effect of the reprisals made by the British Government in -the Richardson case, in the course of which the town of Kagoshima was -bombarded, and partly destroyed, besides the exaction of an indemnity, -went some way to prove the correctness of this view. Its truth was -further demonstrated when a second and graver incident occurred. This -was the firing upon foreign vessels in the Straits of Shimonoséki by -Chōshiū forts on June 24th, 1863. The date on which the outrage occurred -was that fixed at the Council of feudal nobles, attended by the Shōgun -and the Regent, his guardian, in Kiōto for the opening of negotiations -with the foreign representatives for the closing of the country. It was -also that on which, in accordance with the decision then taken, a -communication had been made to them by the Council of State. The -coincidence of dates gave a more serious aspect to the affair, though -the complicity of the Shōgunate was never whole-hearted. In this case, -also, it became necessary to take the drastic measures which to the -British Minister in question had seemed to be inevitable sooner or -later. Neither the first reprisals, however, instituted at once by the -French and American naval authorities, nor the lengthy negotiations with -the Japanese Government which followed, were of any effect in obtaining -redress. For more than a year the straits remained closed to navigation. -Eventually joint operations against the hostile forts conducted in -August, 1864, by a combined squadron of the four Powers immediately -concerned, accomplished the desired result. The forts were attacked and -destroyed, an undertaking that they should be left in a dismantled -condition was extorted, and an indemnity of $3,000,000 exacted. The -lessons thus administered lost none of their force from the fact that -the clans punished were the two most powerful, and those in which -hostility to foreigners was perhaps most openly displayed. Both this and -the Kagoshima indemnity were paid by the Yedo Government, and not by the -offending clans. Were further proof needed of the strange condition of -affairs at this time in Japan it is supplied by the fact that in both -cases the drastic measures taken resulted in the establishment of quite -amicable relations with the clans in question. This unlooked-for result -points to the existence, both in the nation at large, and in individual -clans, of a small minority which did not share the prevailing hostility -to foreigners. - -Towards the end of 1863 the British and French Governments came to the -conclusion that the unsettled state of things in Japan, and the -anti-foreign feeling, which showed no signs of decreasing, made it -advisable to station troops in Yokohama for the protection of foreign -interests. Accordingly contingents of British and French troops were -landed, and established in quarters on shore, by arrangement with the -Japanese authorities. Their presence served admirably the purpose -intended; no collision or friction occurred between these garrisons and -the Japanese, and in 1875, when their presence was no longer needed, -they were withdrawn. - -The Shōgun had been very reluctant to comply with the Imperial summons -to Kiōto. His ministers had endeavoured to arrange for the visit to be -limited to ten days. Once there, however, he was detained on various -pretexts until June in the following year, by which time the Court had -already embarked on its anti-foreign policy, and the Shimonoséki -incident had occurred. His return to Yedo was the signal for the -outbreak of further bickering between the Court and the Shōgunate, which -revealed the same disposition on both sides to shut the eyes to facts, -and change position with startling inconsistency. Ignoring its recent -co-operation with the Imperial Court and feudal nobles in the -anti-foreign policy initiated at the Capital, the fixing of a date for -the expulsion of the foreigner, and the communication of its decision to -the foreign representatives, the Shōgunate presented a memorial to the -Throne pointing out how unfavourable was the present moment for pushing -matters to extremity in the matter of foreign intercourse. The Court, -for its part, while testifying its pleasure at the revival of the -ancient practice of visits to the Capital, rebuked the Shōgun for not -keeping the Throne more fully informed of his movements, for having gone -back to Yedo _in a steamer_, and for his unsatisfactory behaviour in -regard to foreign relations. Further indications of the general -confusion of ideas and vacillation of purpose which characterized the -proceedings of persons in authority appear in the expulsion of Chōshiū -clansmen from Kiōto as a mark of the Court’s strong disapproval of the -action of the Chōshiū clan in the Shimonoséki affair, as well as in the -startling pronouncement made by the Échizen clan—whose chief’s enforced -abdication has already been mentioned—in favour of foreign intercourse, -and of the “new Christian religion,” and condemning alike both the -policy pursued by the Court, and that of the Shōgunate. - -That a definite rupture of foreign relations did not take place at this -juncture was due to the promptness of the Shōgunate to repudiate its own -acts and to the patience and good-humour of foreign governments; -possibly also to the division of opinion in the country itself, where -the centre of authority was beginning to shift, though the process was -still incomplete. In its place there occurred the first threatenings, -the beginnings, in fact, of the civil war which an attentive observer -had prophesied. Conscious of the Government’s weakness, while piqued by -the Court’s inconsistency, the Chōshiū clan brought matters to an issue -in the summer of 1864 by making a sudden raid on Kiōto with the object -of abducting the Mikado and raising the Imperial standard. The attempt -was defeated; nor did the clan fare better in its efforts to repel the -invasion of its territory by the Government forces. The resistance -offered was soon overcome. Early in the following year (1865) the -rebellion was suppressed, the severity of the terms imposed on the clan -exciting widespread dissatisfaction. When, shortly afterwards, the same -clan again rebelled, owing, it is said, to the excessive character of -the punishment imposed, it was perceived that the success of the -Tokugawa troops on the previous occasion was due, not to the Shōgunate’s -military strength, but to the co-operation of other clans—notably that -of Satsuma—in the punitive measures directed against the rebels. On this -latter occasion the support of the other clans was withheld, with the -result that the second campaign, though conducted under the eye of the -Shōgun, who made Kiōto his headquarters for the purpose, was a complete -failure. By the end of the year 1866 a compromise, designed to save the -faces of both parties, had been effected. Hostilities then ceased. In -the course of the negotiations by which this conclusion was reached the -weakness of the Shōgunate was still further exposed. The prominent part -taken by _rōnin_, both in the raid on the Capital and in the subsequent -proceedings of the clan, as well as the incapacity of the feudal prince -and his son, came also to light, together with the fact that the affairs -of the fief were controlled by clan retainers, who were divided into two -mutually hostile factions, each of which in turn gained the ascendancy. - -The ignominy of defeat at the hands of a rebellious clan, added to a -bankrupt exchequer, not to speak of the acceptance of a compromise which -in itself was a confession of impotence, hastened the crumbling away of -what was left of Tokugawa prestige. Fresh energy, at the same time, was -instilled into the Court party. The situation became increasingly -troubled and confused. While the Imperialists, as they now came to be -called, clamoured more loudly than ever for the expulsion of foreigners, -the ministers of the young Shōgun—soon to be succeeded very unwillingly -by his cousin and guardian, the regent Prince Kéiki—busied themselves -with explanations to the Court on the subject of the treaties, and to -the foreign representatives on the political situation and the bearing -of the Court. - -In the meantime, in the summer of 1865, while the Chōshiū imbroglio was -at its height, Sir Harry Parkes had arrived in Japan as British -Minister. Soon after his arrival his attention had been drawn to the -anomalous position of the Shōgun (or Tycoon), who was not the Sovereign -of Japan, as described in the treaties, to the difficult situation -created by the revival of Imperial pretensions, and to the encouragement -afforded to the anti-foreign party by the fact that the Mikado had not -yet given his formal sanction to the treaties of 1858, though they had -been ratified by the Shōgun’s Government. The foreign representatives, -who had already received instructions from their Governments to ask for -a modification of the tariff of import and export duties annexed to the -treaties of 1858, decided to press both questions together and, at the -same time, to communicate to the Shōgunate, on behalf of their -Governments, an offer to remit two-thirds of the Shimonoséki indemnity -in return for (1) the immediate opening of the port of Hiogo and the -city of Ōsaka, and (2) the revision of the Customs tariff on a basis of -5 per cent _ad valorem_. Accordingly, in November, 1865, a combined -squadron visited Ōsaka for that purpose. - -Reference has already been made to the constant anxiety of the Court to -keep foreigners away from the neighbourhood of the Capital. The -sensation created, therefore, by the appearance of foreign ships of war -in the Bay of Ōsaka can readily be imagined. It was a repetition of what -had occurred when Perry came. The action taken by the Court was the -same. The demands of the foreign representatives were referred, as in -Perry’s case, to a council of feudal nobles. These having concurred in -the view already put forward by the Shōgun, and strengthened by his -offer to resign, should this be desired, the Court intimated its -intention to accept the advice. When, however, the necessary decree was -issued, it was found to contain a clause making the sanction dependent -on the alteration of certain points in the treaties which did not -harmonize with the Imperial views, and insisting on the abandonment of -the stipulation for the opening of Hiogo. The decree was duly -communicated to the foreign representatives. But the Shōgunate in doing -so, baffled it may be by the task of endeavouring to reconcile Imperial -instructions with the fulfilment of Treaty obligations, or using, -perhaps unconsciously, the disingenuous methods of the time, concealed -the clause which robbed the sanction of much of its force. The treaties -were sanctioned, it explained, but the question of the port of Hiogo -could not be discussed for the moment. As for the tariff, instructions -would be sent to Yedo to negotiate the amendment desired. This omission -on the part of the Shōgunate to represent things as they really were -misled foreign governments, and caused serious misunderstanding in the -sequel. - -The promise regarding the tariff was duly kept. It was fulfilled in the -following year (1866) by the signature in Yedo of the Tariff Convention. -A point to be noted in this instrument is the declaration regarding the -right of individual Japanese merchants, and of daimiōs and persons in -their employ, to trade at the Treaty Ports and go abroad, and trade -there, without being subject to any hindrances, or undue fiscal -restrictions, on the part of the Japanese Government or its officials. -Its insertion was due to the determination of foreign governments to put -an end to official interference with trade—a relic of the past, when all -foreign commerce was controlled by the Shōgunate—and to their wish, in -view of the reactionary measures threatened by the Court, to place on -record their resolve to maintain the new order of things established by -the treaties. Owing to the Shōgunate’s monopoly of foreign trade, which -was what its control had virtually amounted to, the profits of commerce -had swelled the coffers of the Government to the detriment of clan -exchequers—a feudal grievance which was not the least of the causes -responsible for hostility to the Yedo Government, and, indirectly, for -anti-foreign feeling. - -The course of affairs during the fifteen years which followed the -conclusion of Perry’s Treaty has been described with some minuteness. -This has been necessary owing to the complex character of the political -situation, both foreign and domestic, during this time, and also because -an acquaintance with certain details is essential to the comprehension -of subsequent events. One of the features of the struggle between the -Court and Shōgunate, to which attention has been called, was the gradual -movement of several of the leading clans to the side of the Court. The -stay of the chiefs of these clans in Kiōto, in defiance of Tokugawa -regulations, led to the gradual loosening of the ties which bound the -territorial nobility to Yedo, and to the shifting of the centre of -action to the Capital, where the final scene of the drama was to be -enacted. - -At the end of the year 1866 both the Shōgun and his guardian, Prince -Kéiki, were in Kiōto. There the Emperor Kōmei died early in the ensuing -spring, his death being followed within a few days by that of the young -Shōgun. The Emperor Mutsuhito, who was only fifteen years of age, -succeeded to the Throne, and Prince Kéiki became Shōgun much against his -will. Far from inheriting the forceful character of his father, the -ex-Prince of Mito, the new Shōgun was of a retiring disposition. Though -possessed of great intelligence and no small literary ability, he had a -distaste for public affairs. Well aware of the difficulties of the time, -and of the trend of tendencies unfavourable to the continuance of dual -government, he was reluctant to undertake the responsibilities of the -high office to which he was appointed. Not improbably, too, he may have -inherited some portion at least of his father’s political doctrines. -When, therefore, in October of that year (1867) the ex-daimiō of Tosa -(whose abdication had been enforced eight years before by the Regent Ïi) -presented a memorial to the Government, advising “the restoration of the -ancient form of direct Imperial government,” the Shōgun took the advice -tendered, and resigned. His decision was communicated in writing by the -Council of State to the foreign representatives. In this document, which -explains briefly the origin of feudal duarchy and of Tokugawa rule, the -Shōgun dwells on the inconvenience attending the conduct of foreign -relations under a system of dual government involving the existence of -what were virtually two Courts, and announces his decision to restore -the direct rule of the Mikado; adding, however, the assurance that the -change will not disturb the harmonious relations of Japan with foreign -countries. The statement also, it should be noted, contains an explicit -declaration of the liberal views of the retiring ruler, who does not -hesitate to express his conviction that the moment has come to make a -new departure in national policy, and introduce constitutional changes -of a progressive character. - -Very possibly the retirement of the Shōgun might have been arranged in a -peaceable manner, for his views were no secret to his supporters, though -few shared them. Unfortunately, the Court, acting under the influence of -leading clans hostile to the Yedo Government, and bent on a rupture, -suddenly issued a decree abolishing the office of Shōgun, and making a -change in the guardianship of the palace, which was transferred from -Tokugawa hands to those of the opposition. This decree was followed by -others proclaiming the restoration of direct Imperial rule; establishing -a provisional government of Court nobles, daimiōs and the latter’s -retainers; remitting the punishment imposed on the Chōshiū clan; and -revoking the order expelling it from the Capital. The action of the -Court made compromise impossible. The Shōgun withdrew to Ōsaka, whence, -after a half-hearted effort to reassert his authority by force of arms, -he returned to Yedo. The civil war that ensued was of short duration. -The Tokugawa forces were no match for the Imperial troops, who were -superior both in numbers and discipline. Although a small remnant of the -ex-Shōgun’s adherents held out for some months in certain northern -districts of the main island, and still longer in the island of Yezo, by -the spring of 1869 peace was everywhere restored. - -It has been said by a leading authority on Japan, as one reason for the -fall of the Shōgunate, that dual government was an anachronism. This in -itself presented no insuperable obstacle to its continuance; for the -figure-head system of government, which flourished in an atmosphere of -make-believe, was one which had grown up with the nation and was -regarded as the normal condition of things. To its inconvenience, -however, in the conduct of foreign relations the use of the title of -_Taikun_ (Tycoon) in the eighteenth century, and a resort to the same -device in the nineteenth, bear witness. And it is reasonable to suppose -that a system of administration so cumbrous would have failed to satisfy -for long the practical exigencies of modern international intercourse. -In no case, however, could the Tokugawa Government have lasted much -longer. It carried within itself the seeds of its dissolution. It was -almost moribund when Perry came. The reopening of the country simply -hastened the end. It fell, as other governments have done, because it -had ceased to govern. - -Before its rule ceased the Tokugawa House had abandoned its dynasty. The -three main branches—Mito, Owari and Kishiū—each in turn deserted the -Tokugawa cause; their example being followed by leading feudal families, -such as the Échizen clan, which were connected with the ruling House. - -When the long line of Tokugawa rulers came to an end, it had been in -power for more than two and a half centuries. Of the fifteen Shōguns of -the line, only the founder and his grandson, the third Shōgun, showed -any real capacity. The former was brilliant, both as soldier and -statesman; the latter had administrative talent. None of the others was -in any way distinguished. Nor was this surprising. The enervating Court -life of Kiōto had been copied in Yedo. Brought up in Eastern fashion -from childhood in the corrupt atmosphere of the women’s apartments, -Mikado and Shōgun alike grew up without volition of their own or -knowledge of the outside world, ready for the rôle of puppets assigned -to them. The last of the Shōguns was no exception to the rule. Had it -been otherwise, there might have been another and quite different story -to tell. - -On the short but decisive struggle which ended in the Restoration -nothing in the nature of foreign official influence was brought to bear. -The foreign Powers concerned preserved an attitude of strict neutrality, -which was reflected in the action of their representatives. The task of -maintaining neutrality was rendered easier by the fact that the -interests of all the Powers, with one exception, were commercial rather -than political. The two leading Powers in the Far East at that time were -Great Britain and France, the former’s commercial interests far -outweighing those of her neighbour on the Asiatic continent. Germany had -not yet attained the position of an empire which she was to reach as the -result of the war of 1870, the responsibilities connected with her -slowly growing trade being undertaken by the North German Confederation, -which was then being formed under the hegemony of Prussia. America, -inclined from the first to regard Japan as her protégé, had not yet -fully recovered from the effects of the Civil War; and though she had -opened up a new avenue of trade with the Far East, the development of -her Pacific seaboard was in its infancy. She prided herself on having no -foreign policy to hamper her independence, nor had she any organized -diplomatic and consular service. The interests of Russia, the exception -referred to, were merely political, and of small importance; for neither -the Amur Railway nor the Chinese Eastern Railway had been even -projected, and the development of Eastern Siberia had hardly begun. The -interests of other Treaty Powers were negligible. While, however, under -these circumstances the conflict between the Tokugawa Government and the -Imperialists lay beyond the sphere of foreign official influence, there -were certain unavoidable tendencies which manifested themselves before -the Civil War broke out. The presence of French military instructors -engaged by the Shōgun’s Government was regarded as possibly attracting a -certain extent of French sympathy with the Tokugawa cause—an idea which -was strengthened by the attitude of the French representative and the -conduct of one or two of these officers, who accompanied the Tokugawa -naval expedition to Yezo, where a last stand was made. There was, -moreover, quite apart from their official action, a natural bias on the -part of most of the foreign representatives in favour of the Shōgunate -as being the _de facto_ government, a position it had occupied for two -and a half centuries. On the other hand, the formal sanction given in -1865 by the Mikado at the demand of the foreign representatives to the -treaties of 1858 had undoubtedly encouraged the Imperialist party in -proportion as it had impaired the prestige of the Tokugawa Government. -This demand had arisen out of the gradual realization of the fact that -the Shōgun was not, as represented in the treaties in question, the real -sovereign of Japan. But there was a further reason. From the moment that -the Tokugawa Government had at the time of Commodore Perry’s arrival -referred the question of reopening the country to the Throne, instead of -using the full power of dealing with foreign affairs vested in the -Shōgun, there had grown up two centres of authority, one in Kiōto, which -was steadily increasing in influence, the other in Yedo. As was pointed -out in the letters addressed by the foreign representatives in the -autumn of 1864 to the Tycoon (the title given to the Shōgun in the -official correspondence of the time), the existence of these two -different centres of authority had been at the bottom of most of the -complications which had arisen in respect of foreign relations. The -representatives were, therefore, it was said, obliged to insist upon the -Mikado’s recognition of the treaties, “in order that future difficulties -might be avoided, and that relations with foreigners might be placed -upon a more satisfactory and durable basis.” In other words, the -recognition of the treaties by the Mikado was sought in order to put a -stop to the anti-foreign agitation which was paralyzing the Shōgunate’s -conduct of affairs and creating a highly dangerous situation. The -reluctance of the Shōgunate to comply with this demand did not tend to -improve its position with the foreign representatives, while this -position was further weakened by its persistence in adhering to the -false status given to the Shōgun. The continued use of the term “His -Majesty” in official correspondence between the Shōgun’s Ministers and -the diplomatic body long after doubts had arisen as to its correctness -was productive of mistrust; and their confidence in the Government’s -sincerity was shaken by its strenuous efforts for various reasons to -isolate foreigners as much as possible, and by proof of its complicity -in the matter of the Court’s order for the expulsion of foreigners, as -well as in the Shimonoséki affair. - -Under these circumstances—and as a result, also, of the friendly -communications established with the two leading clans after the carrying -out of reprisals—it is not surprising that some time before an appeal to -arms took place a tendency to sympathize with the cause of the Sovereign -_de jure_ should have shown itself in certain diplomatic quarters. The -busy intrigues carried on by both contending parties, which were by no -means confined to domestic circles, may have led, and probably did lead, -those whose acquaintance with Japanese history, though imperfect, far -exceeded that of others, to attach undue weight to the doctrine of -active and unimpaired Imperial supremacy sedulously inculcated by the -Court party, and thus to arrive at the not illogical conclusion that the -Tokugawa Shōguns were the wrongful usurpers they were described as being -by Imperialist historians. That this pronounced sympathy, before -hostilities began, in favour of what proved to be the winning side was a -material factor in the issue of the struggle there is some reason to -believe. - -Another point claims passing attention. When the Shōgunate ceased to -rule, the wide territory known as the Shōgun’s domains came under the -control of the new Government. The classification of lands throughout -the country for administrative purposes thus fell temporarily into four -divisions—the small area known under the Shōgunate as the Imperial -domains, the feudal revenue of which had been quite inadequate for the -maintenance of the Court; the former Shōgun’s domains, the final -disposition of which was in abeyance; the territories of the clans, as -modified by the measures taken in respect of those which, having -espoused the Tokugawa cause, had held out to the last against the -Imperialist forces; and the large cities of Yedo, Kiōto and Ōsaka, which -formed a group by themselves. - - - - - CHAPTER VI - Japanese Chronology—Satsuma and Chōshiū Clans—The “Charter Oath.” - - -In the movement which swept away the Tokugawa Shōguns two cries were -raised by the Imperialists: “Honour the Sovereign” and “Expel the -foreigner.” They constituted the programme of the party. No sooner had -the revolution been crowned with success than the second part of the -programme was abandoned. The bulk of the military class had been led to -believe that the downfall of the Shōgunate would carry with it the -withdrawal of foreigners and the closure of the country. But the wiser -heads among the revolutionary leaders recognized that this plan was -unrealizable. They had at one time, regardless of consequences, -encouraged the cry in order to stir up popular feeling against the -Shōgunate. But with the disappearance of the Yedo Government the -situation had changed. Moreover, in the course of the fifteen years -which had elapsed since Perry’s Treaty the first bitterness of -anti-foreign feeling had begun to wear off. Earlier ignorance of the -outside world had given way to better knowledge. Closer association with -foreigners had revealed the prospect of certain benefits to be derived -from foreign trade, while the fighting at Kagoshima and Shimonoséki had -been an object-lesson to many, whose reading of history had given them -inflated ideas of the strength of their country. There were, also, among -the leaders men who were aware not only of the military weakness of -Japan, as compared with foreign nations with whom treaties had been -concluded, but of the importance of introducing changes on the lines of -Western civilization in many branches of administration. So the -foreigner remained, and the foreign policy of the Shōgunate was -continued. The other cry of “Honour the Sovereign” permitted much -latitude of interpretation. The talk about establishing direct Imperial -rule, in which Imperialists so freely indulged, was scarcely intended to -be taken literally, any more than the vague phrases in the manifestos of -the time regarding the abolition of dual government, for the personal -rule of the Sovereign was in historical times unknown. It simply -expressed indirectly the main object in view—the cessation of Tokugawa -rule. This aim was achieved, and more easily than had been anticipated; -but the dual system of administration, and the figure-head method of -government, were too deeply rooted to be removed all at once, even had -there been a desire to do so. The Shōgunate was, therefore, replaced by -a government of the clans which had taken a leading part in the -Restoration, while the figure-head method of rule worked on as before. - -The Restoration ushered in what is known as the “Meiji Era,” or “Era of -Enlightened Government,” this being the name given to the new -year-period then created. The point is one of no little significance. -This year-period marked the beginning of a reign more fruitful in rapid -and far-reaching changes than any which had preceded it; it synchronized -with the rise of Japan from the position of an obscure Asiatic, country -to that of a Great Power; and it was chosen with undeniable fitness as -the posthumous name of the monarch with whose death it ended. In -dwelling on it, it will be necessary to go somewhat fully into the -rather complicated question of Japanese chronology, which calls for -explanation. - -There were formerly four ways in Japan of reckoning time. These were: -(1) By the reigns of Mikados; (2) by year-periods (_Nengō_), which -constantly overlapped, one ending and the other beginning in the same -year of our chronology, so that the last year of the former was the -first year of the latter, the year in question, which never began on the -first day of the first month, having, therefore, two designations; (3) -by the Chinese sexagenary cycle; and (4) by computation from the first -year of the reign of _Jimmu Tennō_, the mythical founder of Japan. The -first was used at an early date in historical compilations. It ceased to -be employed long ago, and the records based on it are unreliable. The -second was borrowed from China at the time of the “Great Reform” in the -seventh century, which gave its name to the first Japanese year-period. -This and the third, the sexagenary cycle, were used both alone and in -conjunction with each other. The fourth system (based on the imaginary -reign of the mythical founder of Japan about the year 660 B.C.) is of -comparatively recent origin, its adoption being due to the same somewhat -far-fetched patriotism which encourages belief in the divinity of -Japanese sovereigns. - -The year-period, or _Nengō_, copied from China, had in that country a -special _raison d’être_, for it changed with the accession of a new -Emperor, its duration being consequently that of the reign with which it -began. In Japan, owing probably to the seclusion of the Sovereign and -the absence of personal rule, the year-period had no direct connection -with the reign of a Mikado or the rule of a Shōgun, the correspondence, -when it occurred, being, with few exceptions, merely fortuitous. As a -rule, some unusual or startling event was made the reason for a change, -but in Japan, as in China, great care was bestowed on the choice of -propitious names for new year-periods. Since the Restoration, however, -it has been decided to follow the old Chinese practice, and create a -fresh year-period on the accession of a new sovereign. This decision was -put into force for the first time on the death of the late Emperor in -1912. The _Meiji_ year-period then came to an end, and a new -year-period, _Taishō_, or “Great Righteousness,” began. Owing to the -overlapping of year-periods, to which attention has been called, the new -year-period dates from the same year as that in which the preceding -_Meiji_ period ceased. - -The sexagenary cycle was formed by combining the twelve Chinese signs of -the Zodiac, taken in their fixed order, namely, “Rat,” “Bull,” “Tiger,” -“Hare,” etc., with what are known as the “ten celestial stems.” These -ten stems, again, were formed by arranging the five primitive -elements—earth, water, fire, metal and wood—into two sections, or -classes, called respectively “elder” and “younger brother.” This -arrangement fitted in exactly with a cycle of sixty years, a number -divisible by ten and twelve, the numbers of its two component factors. -When the year-period and the sexagenary cycle were used in conjunction -with each other, it was customary to mention first of all the name of -the year-period, then the number of the year in question in that period, -and then, again, the position of the year in the sexagenary cycle. - -Formerly, too, the month in Japan was a lunar month. Of these there were -twelve. Every third year an intercalary month was added in order to -supply the correction necessary for the exact computation of time. There -was no division of time corresponding to our week. This, however, came -gradually into use after the Restoration, the days being called after -the sun and moon and the five primitive elements. The weekly holiday is -now a Japanese institution. There are also in each year twenty-four -periods of nominally fifteen days each, regulated according to climate -and the season of the year, which are closely connected with -agricultural operations, and bear distinctive names, such as “Great -Cold,” “Lesser Cold,” “Rainy Season,” etc. Each month, too, is divided -into three periods of ten days each, called respectively _Jōjun_, -_Chiūjun_ and _Géjun_, or first, middle and last periods. - -With the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar, which came into force on -January 1st, 1873, the sexagenary cycle and lunar month disappeared, and -with them, of course, the quaint Zodiacal appellations of the years. The -other distinctive features of Japanese chronology have survived. There -are now three recognized ways of computing time annually—by -year-periods, by the Christian Calendar and by the National Calendar, -dating from the year 660 B.C. The year 1921 may therefore be spoken of -either as we do, or as the tenth year of _Taishō_;, or as the year 2581 -of the National Calendar. - -The adoption of the Gregorian Calendar caused some grumbling, as it did -when introduced in England in the eighteenth century, where it was -received with the cry: “Give us back our eleven days.” In Japan there -was more reason for complaint, for the year 1872 was shortened by no -less than twenty-nine days, what would, under the old calendar, have -been the third day of the twelfth month of the fifth year of _Meiji_ -being altered so as to become the first day of the first month of the -sixth year of Meiji (January 1st, 1873). Much inconvenience and even -hardship were occasioned by the change, since the end of the year, the -time chosen, is the time fixed for the settling of all accounts between -debtors and creditors. - -The Restoration was the work of four clans—Satsuma, Chōshiū, Hizen and -Tosa—whose territories lay in each case in the south-west of the -country, though they had no common frontiers. The formation by feudal -chiefs of alliances of short duration for definite objects had been the -distinguishing characteristic of the unsettled times which preceded the -establishment of Tokugawa rule. This was put an end to by the Tokugawa -Shōguns, who by various measures, already described, kept the feudal -aristocracy in complete subjection. As soon, however, as the power of -the Shōgunate began to decline, the independent spirit of the clans -reasserted itself. This tendency was encouraged by the attitude of the -leading Tokugawa families. On Perry’s arrival the House of Mito had -supported the Court against the Shōgunate on the Treaty question; while -the House of Owari a few years later sided with Chōshiū in its second -and successful struggle against the Yedo Government, thus definitely -abandoning the Tokugawa cause. The alliances formed in this regrouping -of the clans were of the same artificial kind as those which had taken -place in earlier feudal days. Apart from the common object which brought -them together, the overthrow of Tokugawa rule, there was no real -sympathy between any of the four clans which took the chief part in the -Restoration. It would have been strange if there had been, for it was no -part of the policy of any clan, whose frontiers were jealously guarded -to prevent the entry of strangers, to cultivate friendly relations with -another. In the case of two of the allied clans, Satsuma and Chōshiū, -special difficulties stood in the way of an understanding. They had long -been rivals for the confidence of the Court, while the constant changes -in the relations between Kiōto and Yedo gave opportunities for further -friction and jealousy. More recently, too, the sinking of a Satsuma -steamer by Chōshiū forts, the Chōshiū raid on the Imperial palace and -the subsequent invasion of Chōshiū territory by the Shōgunate, on both -of which occasions Chōshiū clansmen found themselves fighting against -those of Satsuma, had created a feeling of active hostility. The author -of “_Ishin Shi_,” or “History of the Restoration,” explains how these -difficulties were eventually removed by the exertions of men in the -Satsuma clan, whom the critical position of affairs brought to the -front, by the mediation of men of influence in the Tosa, Hizen and other -clans, whose political sympathies lay in the same direction, and by the -co-operation of certain Court nobles, whose knowledge of domestic -affairs gained in the conduct of relations between the Court and -Shōgunate, and whose position at the Court were of great value to the -Imperialist party. Some of these Court nobles had been placed in the -custody of the daimiō of Chikuzen after the suppression of the first -Chōshiū rising, and through their efforts, and those of the other -mediators already mentioned, a friendly understanding was at length -established between Satsuma and Chōshiū clansmen. This obstacle having -been removed, a plan of campaign was discussed and settled by the four -clans. The military strength of the alliance thus formed was soon proved -in the short struggle which ended in the fall of the Shōgunate. - -[Illustration: - - ŌKUBO ICHIZŌ. - - A leading figure in the Restoration Movement and, until his early - death, a member of the Government subsequently formed. His death - occurred before the creation of the new peerage, but his son, the - present Marquis, was ennobled in recognition of his father’s - services. - -] - -There remained other problems of a political kind. These were solved by -degrees in the sequence of events. Not the least of these was the form -of the Government which should replace that which had fallen. On this -point there had before the Restoration been much divergence of opinion. -According to the author of _The Awakening of Japan_ the Satsuma -“Federalists,” as he calls them, wished to reorganize the feudal system -much on the lines existing in the half century that preceded the -Tokugawa domination. The Chōshiū leaders, we are told, sought their -ideal further back. They advocated the restoration of the Imperial -bureaucracy of pre-feudal days. This view, supported by the Court -nobles, who perhaps hoped by increasing Imperial prestige to strengthen -their own position, was the one which ultimately prevailed. There were -two powerful arguments in favour of its adoption. One was the -inadvisability of attempting to retain the constitution of the previous -Government, even had it been possible to do so. Another lay in the -necessity of taking full advantage of the current of popular feeling in -favour of the Restoration, and at the same time, while as yet the -influence of the rising men was small, to work as far as possible -through the class of Court nobles who had administered this system in -early days. - -The form chosen for the new administration was that of the bureaucratic -system of pre-feudal days, modified to some extent by innovations copied -from abroad. The chief feature in this administration was its division -into eight departments. Two of these, the Department of Supreme -Administration and the Department of Shintō (which dealt only with -matters concerning the native faith, Shintō), ranked together, and -before the other six, one of which dealt with legislation, while the -remaining five corresponded in a general way to similar Departments in -Western countries. As between the two senior Departments, however, -though authority was nominally equal, the greater prestige lay with the -Department of Shintō. - -It will be seen that the new Government, formed in the spring of 1868 -before the final surrender of the Tokugawa forces, was at best a -patchwork attempt at administrative reconstruction. Its pre-feudal form -had little in common with the feudalism that still survived, nor was it -possible to harmonize innovations borrowed from the West with an ancient -system in which the highest place was reserved for the department which -controlled all matters connected with the primitive Shintō cult. In the -autumn of the same year, and at various times in the course of -succeeding years, many administrative changes were introduced. Into the -details of these it is unnecessary to enter at length. They will be -referred to, when essential, subsequently in the course of this -narrative. It will suffice for the present to note that a Council of -State, the constitution and functions of which were modified from time -to time so frequently as to puzzle the administrators themselves, was -substituted in place of the Department of Supreme Administration, thus -reducing the number of departments to seven; and that the Department of -the Shintō cult underwent many vicissitudes, being eventually reduced to -the comparatively humble status of a bureau in the Home Department, a -position which it occupies to-day. As might have been expected in the -case of a Government which came in on the cry of the restoration of -Imperial power, at a time when an atmosphere of semi-divinity still -surrounded the Court, the new Ministry included several Imperial princes -and Court nobles. Prince Arisugawa became President of the new -Government, while the two Court nobles, Sanjō and Iwakura, who had been -largely instrumental from the first in promoting the clan alliance which -overthrew the Shōgunate, were appointed Vice-Presidents. Two other -Imperial princes and five Court nobles were placed at the head of the -remaining seven departments, the second position in three of these being -given to the daimiōs of Échizen, Aki and Higo. Among those who held -offices in minor capacities were Ōkubo and Terashima of Satsuma, Kido of -Chōshiū, Gotō of Tosa, Itō and Inouyé, the two young Chōshiū clansmen, -who, on their return from England in 1864, had tried without success to -prevent the Shimonoséki hostilities, Ōkuma of Hizen and others whose -names are household words in Japan. - -In the group of princes and other notabilities above mentioned the only -outstanding personality was Iwakura, who at once took a leading place in -the direction of affairs. The rest took no active part in the -administration. They were simply convenient figure-heads, lending -stability and prestige to the new order of things, their presence also -carrying with it the assurance that the main object of the Restoration -had been accomplished. - -In spite of the Western innovations embodied in its constitution the -form assumed by the new Government gave little indication of the radical -reforms which were destined to be accomplished in the course of the new -reign. In the very year of its birth the murderous attack on the British -Minister and his suite when on the way to an audience of the Emperor in -Kiōto furnished incontestable proof of the existence still of much -anti-foreign feeling. In view, however, of the fact that the cry of -“Expel the foreigner” had continued until the eve of the downfall of the -Shōgunate, and that up to the last moment the bulk of the military class -in many districts was led to believe that the Restoration would be -accompanied by the closure of the country, it was not surprising that -the survival of anti-foreign feeling should show itself in fanatical -outbursts of this nature. On the other hand, the employment in -subordinate posts under the new Ministry of men of the military class -who were known to be convinced reformers furnished good evidence that -the policy of the new Government would, if their views prevailed, be -progressive and not reactionary. And further proof of the new and -radical departure contemplated by those active spirits in the Government -was supplied by what is spoken of as the “Charter Oath” taken by the -young Mikado on the 6th April, 1868, after the new Government had been -formed. - -In this Oath he announced his intentions in unmistakable language which -undoubtedly reflected the ideas and aspirations of the reformers. The -first of the five clauses of the Oath furnished the keynote of the -whole, pointing, as it did, to the creation of parliamentary -institutions. “Deliberative Assemblies”—so it ran—“shall be established -on an extensive scale, and all measures of government shall be decided -by public opinion.” And the last clause reinforced the resolution -expressed by stating that “knowledge shall be sought for throughout the -world,” a phrase which indicated indirectly the intention to draw on the -resources of Western civilization. The other passages in the manifesto -simply expounded the time-worn and vague principles of Chinese -statecraft, which had long ago been adopted by Japanese administrators. - -The general correspondence of the Imperial intentions, as set forth in -the Oath, with the views of the last of the Shōguns, as expressed in the -statement announcing his resignation which was communicated to the -foreign representatives in the autumn of the previous year, is -noteworthy. It shows that the liberal policy enunciated was no monopoly -of the party of progress in the new ministry, but that a feeling in -favour of reform was very widely entertained. There was, of course, no -idea at that time of giving the masses a voice in the government of the -country, for the feudal system was still in existence, and the bulk of -the population had no interest in public affairs. It was, nevertheless, -clear that representative institutions of some kind, however imperfect -the popular conception of these might be, were the goal towards which -men’s thoughts were turning. - - - - - CHAPTER VII -New Government—Clan Feeling in Satsuma—Administrative Changes—Reformers - and Reactionaries. - - -In the spring of the following year (1869), when order was finally -restored and the young Mikado had held his first audience of foreign -representatives, an attempt was made to give practical effect to the -Imperial intentions by establishing a deliberative assembly, to which -the name of _Kōgisho_, or parliament, was given. It consisted of 276 -members, one for each clan. Here, again, we are struck by the wide range -of progressive opinion in the country, irrespective of party feeling and -anti-foreign prejudice, for in a manifesto issued by the ex-Shōgun two -months before his resignation he had stated his desire “to listen to the -voice of the majority and establish a deliberative assembly, or -parliament”—the very word _Kōgisho_ being used. - -As might have been foreseen, this first experiment, made in an -atmosphere of feudalism, was a failure; but Sir Harry Parkes, then -British Minister, describing a debate on the subject of foreign trade -which took place, said that the result of the discussion, and its -general tone, were creditable to the discernment of this embryo -parliament. - -The treatment accorded to the adherents of the Tokugawa cause when -hostilities finally ceased in the spring of 1869, was marked by a -generosity as wise as it was unlooked for. In Japan up to that time -little consideration had been shown to the defeated party in civil wars. -The defeated side, moreover, in opposing the Imperialists had earned the -unfortunate title of rebels (_Chōteki_), reserved for those who took up -arms against the Crown. In this instance moderate counsels prevailed. -The territories of the daimiō of Aidzu, the backbone of Tokugawa -resistance, and those of another northern chieftain, were confiscated; -eighteen other daimiōs were transferred to distant fiefs with smaller -revenues; while in a few cases the head of a clan was forced to abdicate -in favour of some near relative. Retribution went no further. Later on, -when the feudal system was abolished, the same liberality was displayed -in the matter of feudal pensions, being especially noticeable in the -case of two large sections of the military class, the _Hatamoto_ and the -_Gokénin_, who formed the hereditary personal following of the Tokugawa -Shōguns. - -The generosity shown by the Government led to much discontent in the -military class in many clans. This was notably the case in Satsuma, -where there were other grounds for dissatisfaction. The position of the -Satsuma clan had always been somewhat different from that of other -clans. Its situation at the south-western extremity of the kingdom, far -from the seat of authority, had favoured the growth of an independent -spirit, and the clan had long been noted for warlike qualities. Though -subdued by the military ruler who preceded the Tokugawa Shōguns, and -professing fealty to the Tokugawa House, the clan had preserved an -appreciable measure of importance and prestige, if not independence, -which the Shōguns in question had been careful to respect. The previous -head of the clan had before his death in 1859 adopted as his heir his -brother’s son, then a child of five years. The affairs of the clan had -been to a large extent controlled ever since by this brother, Shimadzu -Saburō, a name familiar to foreigners in connection with the outrage -which led to the bombardment of Kagoshima; but he was in poor health, -and at the time when the new Government was formed the control of clan -matters had largely passed into the hands of the elder Saigō, a man of -commanding personality, whose daring defiance of the Tokugawa -authorities in the stormy days preceding the Restoration had made him a -popular hero, and of other influential clansmen. Both Shimadzu and the -elder Saigō were thorough conservatives, opposed to all foreign -innovations. But there was a strong progressive group in the clan led by -such men as Ōkubo and the younger Saigō, who were far from sharing the -reactionary tendencies of the older leaders. This division of feeling in -the clan was one of the causes of the dissensions in the ministry which -arose in 1870, and it had important consequences, which were seen a few -years later in the tragic episode of the Satsuma Rebellion. - -The first note of discord came from Satsuma. One of the first acts of -the new Government had been to transfer the Capital from Kiōto to Yedo, -which was renamed Tōkiō, or “Eastern Capital.” The Satsuma troops which -had been stationed in Tōkiō as a guard for the Government suddenly -petitioned to be released from this service. The ground put forward was -that the finances of the clan, which had suffered from the heavy outlay -incurred during the civil war, did not permit of this expensive garrison -duty. But the real reasons undoubtedly were a feeling of disappointment -on the part of a majority of the clansmen at what was regarded as the -small share allotted to Satsuma in the new administration, and some -jealousy felt by the two leaders who presented the petition towards -their younger and more active colleagues, combined with distrust of -their enthusiasm for reform. - -The garrison was allowed to go home, and the elder Saigō also returned -to his province. The moment was critical. The Government could not -afford to lose the support of the two most prominent Satsuma leaders, -nor, at this early stage in the work of reconstruction which lay before -it, to acquiesce in the defection of so powerful an ally. In the -following year (1871), therefore, a conciliatory mission, in which -Iwakura and Ōkubo were the leading figures, was sent to the offended -clan to present in the Mikado’s name a sword of honour at the tomb of -Shimadzu’s brother, the late daimiō of Satsuma. The mission was also -entrusted with a written message from the Throne to Shimadzu urging him -to come forward in support of the Mikado’s Government. By this step clan -feeling was appeased for the moment, and Saigō returned to the Capital, -and became a member of the Government. - -How unstable was the condition of things at that time was illustrated by -the changes in the personnel of the Ministry which took place in -September of the same year, and the administrative revision which -followed within a few months. The effect of the first was to strengthen -the progressive element in the administration at the expense of the old -feudal aristocracy. The Cabinet, as reorganized, consisted of Sanjō as -Prime Minister and Iwakura as Minister for Foreign Affairs; four -Councillors of State, Saigō, Kido, Itagaki and Ōkuma, represented the -four clans of Satsuma, Chōshiū, Tosa and Hizen, while another Satsuma -man, Ōkubo, became Minister of Finance. The effect of the revision of -the constitution was to divide the _Dajōkwan_, or Central Executive, -established in the previous year, into three branches, the _Sei-in_, a -sort of Council of State presided over by the Prime Minister; the -_Sa-in_, a Chamber exercising deliberative functions, which before long -took the place of the _Kōgisho_; and the _U-in_, a subordinate offshoot -of the Council of State, which was shortly afterwards merged in that -body. These administrative changes had little real significance. Their -chief interest lies in the fact that they show how obsessed some -enthusiastic reformers were with the idea of deliberative institutions, -of parliamentary methods of some kind, being embodied in the framework -of the new constitution; and in the further fact that the new chief -Ministers of State, under this reorganization, the Daijō Daijin, -Sadaijin, and Udajin, borrowed their official titles from the Chambers -over which they presided. Sir Francis Adams, describing these changes in -his _History of Japan_ mentions that the deliberative Chamber was -regarded at the time as “a refuge for political visionaries, who had -thus an opportunity of ventilating their theories without doing any -harm,” and that “the members of the subordinate executive Chamber (the -_U-in_), who were supposed to meet once a week for the execution of -business, never met at all.” He added that he had never been able to -learn what the functions of this Chamber were supposed to be, or what -its members ever did. The real work of administration was carried on by -the small but active group of reformers of the four clans, who were -gradually concentrating all authority in their own hands. - -The high ministerial offices thus created were filled by Sanjō, Shimadzu -and Iwakura. The last-named, the junior in rank of the three, shared -with Kido and Ōkubo the main direction of affairs. The other two were -mere figure-heads, though their positions at Court and in Satsuma, -respectively, gave strength to the Government. - -[Illustration: - - KIDO JUNICHIRŌ. - - In recognition of the services rendered to the state before the - creation of the new peerage his son was ennobled after his father’s - death. His death occurred before the creation of the new peerage, - but his son, the present Marquis, was ennobled in recognition of his - father’s services. - -] - -Shimadzu’s appointment was a further step in the conciliation of -Satsuma, a development of the policy of timely concessions which had -averted a rupture with that clan. The conclusion of the alliance between -the four clans, which made the Restoration possible, had, as we have -seen, been a difficult matter. A still harder task confronted the new -Government. This was to maintain the alliance for future purposes,—to -ensure the further co-operation of the same clans in the work of -reconstruction. The first step in the new direction, the formation of a -Government to fill the place of the Shōgunate, had been taken. Even if -this Government had the defects of its purely artificial character, even -if it were nothing better than a jejune attempt to combine things so -incompatible as Eastern and Western institutions, feudal and pre-feudal -systems, it had at least the merit of being the outcome of a genuine -compromise brought about by the pressure of political need. Of the grave -difficulties attending the work of reconstruction both the conservative -and anti-foreign, as well as the progressive elements in the -Ministry—the two parties to the compromise—must have been more or less -conscious. The discontent in Satsuma was only one of many symptoms of -grave unrest which showed themselves throughout the country. A sinister -indication of the gradual decay of Tokugawa authority had been furnished -by the discontinuance in 1862 of the enforced residence of feudal nobles -at Yedo, with all its attendant results. This decay had carried with it -the weakening of feudal ties. Laxity of clan administration, its natural -consequence, had given opportunities for mischief to the dangerous class -of clanless _samurai_, or _rōnin_. Of these they were not slow to avail -themselves, as was shown by the frequency of murderous attacks on -Japanese and foreigners alike; and the fear of combined action on the -part of these ruffians which might at any moment threaten the safety of -the whole foreign community had led to the stationing of foreign troops -in Yokohama, The action, moreover, of the Imperialists in encouraging -anti-foreign feeling for their own immediate purposes had brought its -own nemesis by giving rein to the turbulent impulses in the national -character. Clan jealousies, too, which the alliance of four clans had -stifled for a time, began to reassert themselves. - -With the downfall of the Tokugawa Government these disturbing influences -came into full play, while the resources of the new rulers for coping -with them were very inadequate. From the wreckage of the complicated -system of Tokugawa administration little indeed which was of material -value to the builders of the new framework of state survived. The -hand-to-mouth methods of Tokugawa finance, largely dependent on -irregular feudal contributions, had resulted in a depleted Exchequer, -more debts than assets being left for the Shōguns’ successors. Nor were -the finances of the clans in a better condition. The currency of the -country was in a state of hopeless confusion due to the great variety of -note and metallic issues in circulation throughout the country, the -Shōgunate and most of the clans having their own paper money, which were -at a premium, or discount, according to circumstances. Trade and -industry were also hampered in their development by the rigid rules -which closed the frontiers of clans and provinces to strangers, and by -the numerous impediments in the shape of barriers and tolls which -obstructed intercourse and the exchange of commodities between different -parts of the country. To crown matters, the navy consisted of only a few -ships, all of obsolete type with the exception of a monitor bought by -the Tokugawa Government from America, and there was no regular army at -the service of the State. - -The military forces at the disposal of the Shōgunate in former days -constituted on paper at least a respectable army for those times, -sufficient, coupled with the policy of _divide et impera_ systematically -followed by Tokugawa Shōguns, to overawe the feudal nobility whose -allegiance was doubtful. The total number of these troops may be -reckoned roughly at about 400,000. They consisted of levies from the -clans. By a law passed in the middle of the seventeenth century the -clans were bound to furnish to the Government fixed quotas of troops, -when occasion demanded, the number of men to be supplied being regulated -by the revenue of a clan—this revenue, again, being the value of the -assessed annual produce of its territories. But the efficiency of these -troops had naturally deteriorated during the long period of peace -coincident with Tokugawa rule, nor in later Tokugawa days could much -dependence be placed on their loyalty to Yedo. The military weakness of -the Shōgunate had been exposed in the course of the operations against -the Chōshiū clan, nor had sufficient time elapsed for the services of -the few foreign instructors employed by the Tokugawa Government to -reorganize the army to have any good effect. During the civil war the -Imperialists had recourse to the formation of small bodies of irregular -troops called _shimpei_, or “New Soldiers,” recruited mainly from the -class of _rōnin_ already mentioned, some of whom were armed with rifles; -but these hastily raised troops were untrained, and their lack of -discipline was shown when they acted as a voluntary escort to the Mikado -on his first visit to the new Capital. From their conduct on that -occasion it was obvious that they might easily become a danger to the -authorities employing them. - -Encouraged by the success which had attended its efforts in Satsuma the -mission of conciliation sent to that clan proceeded under instructions -to Chōshiū, where a message from the Mikado of import similar to that -addressed to the Satsuma noble, Shimadzu, was delivered. Here it was -joined by another leading member of the Government, Kido. The mission, -thus reinforced, visited in succession, Tosa, Owari and other clans. -Besides its general purpose of conciliation, elsewhere, as well as in -Satsuma, for the attainment of which it was necessary to enquire into -the state of clan feeling, and take what steps might be advisable to -allay the prevailing discontent, the chief object of the mission was to -enlist the support of the clans concerned for the Government, and -organize a provisional force to uphold central authority. The result of -its efforts, so far as the chief object was concerned, was the formation -of a force of some eight or nine thousand troops, which was obtained -from various clans. A favourable augury for the future lay in the fact -that it included not only clansmen who had taken part in the Restoration -movement, but others who had supported the Tokugawa cause. By this means -was formed the first nucleus of what was to develop by slow degrees into -a national army. - -In view of the slender financial resources at the disposal of the new -Government it was decided to exact a forced contribution for the purpose -of meeting the immediate needs of the Exchequer. This contribution, to -which the term of “tribute” was given, was levied on all classes of the -people, officials being called upon to pay a tax amounting to -one-thirtieth of their salaries. - -The important points to be noted in the foregoing imperfect sketch of -the situation which confronted the new rulers at this time is that the -revolution was planned and carried out by the military class of certain -clans, with the aid of the Court, the rest of the nation taking no part -in it; and that the leading men in that class who came to the front and -assumed control of affairs were divided into two groups, whose views on -future policy were in the main different. On one side were those who -clung to the old traditional methods of administration, amongst whom -were to be found, nevertheless, men of moderate views. In numbers and -influence they were as superior to their opponents as they were inferior -in vigour, ability and insight. The other group consisted of a few men -of more enlightened and progressive views, who were convinced that the -time had come for the nation to break with its past, and that in the -establishment of a new order of things, visible as yet only in the -vaguest outline, lay the best hope for the future. The conservative, or -reactionary, party, as it may now be called, had long obstinately -opposed foreign intercourse in any form save that which had kept Dutch -traders in the position, virtually, of prisoners of State. Driven by the -force of circumstances from that position, they fell back on a second -line of entrenchments—resistance to changes of any kind when those -changes meant the adoption of foreign customs. There was a fatal flaw of -inconsistency in their attitude of which, perhaps, they were not -unconscious themselves. They made an exception in favour of foreign -innovations which appealed to the nation at large, such as steamships -and material of war. Time, too, was on the side of their opponents, not -on theirs. The doctrines they upheld were part of an order of things -which the nation had outgrown, and was preparing to discard. New ideas -were taking hold of men’s minds, and deserters from their ranks were one -by one joining the standard raised by the party of reform. Never, even -in pre-Tokugawa days, had the nation lacked enterprise. Intercourse with -the Dutch had quickened appreciation of what was known as “Western -Learning,” and provoked secret rebellion against the Tokugawa edicts of -seclusion. Now the spirit of progress was in the air. The tide of -reform, which later on was to sweep the less moderate reformers off -their feet, had set in. - -Fortunately for the country at this juncture there was one point on -which both parties were in agreement. Between the leading men on each -side there was a general understanding that the abolition of feudalism, -repugnant as it was to many, could not well be avoided. The Tokugawa -administration had, as we have seen, been established on a feudal basis. -The survival of this feudal foundation may well have appeared compatible -neither with the removal of the rest of the administrative structure, -nor with the avowed principles of the Restoration, however broadly the -latter might be interpreted. The Shōgunate, moreover, had filled two -rôles, so to speak. Itself part of the feudal system, it was also the -central government. The extensive territories, situated in different -parts of the kingdom, known as the Shōgun’s domains, the feudal revenues -of which amounted to one-third of the total revenue of the country, had, -under the Tokugawa _régime_, been administered by the central -government. There were also, as has already been explained, other feudal -territories which, for various reasons, had also been subject, either -from time to time or permanently, to the same central administration. -How to deal with the large area represented by these domains and -territories if the feudal system were to continue, would have been a -difficult problem. The Shōgun’s domains themselves had for the time -being passed into the hands of the new Government which was responsible -for their administration, but there were obvious objections to giving to -them the permanent character of Imperial domains. Apart from the -difficulty of disposing of so wide an area in this way, the adoption of -this course would have perpetuated an undesirable arrangement, the dual -capacity of ruler and feudal lord having been one of the weak points in -the Tokugawa system of administration. It would also have lowered the -dignity of the Throne, which in principle at least had been upheld -through all vicissitudes, by placing it on the same feudal plane as the -defunct Shōgunate, not to speak of the reproach of treading in the -footsteps of their predecessors which the new rulers would have -incurred. To have made them Crown Lands would have entailed still more -awkward consequences. On the other hand, a redistribution of this wide -extent of territory amongst new or old feudatories would have occupied -much time, and time was of importance in the work of reconstruction in -hand. Any step, moreover, in this direction, however carefully designed -to reconcile conflicting claims, would have opened the door to grave -dissension at a moment when clan rivalry was reasserting itself. These -and other considerations, in which questions of national finance—and -perhaps also the idea, borrowed from abroad, that feudalism implied a -backward state of civilization—may have played a part, doubtless -contributed to the unanimity of the decision to cut the Gordian knot by -abolishing the feudal system. - -That this solution was one which had already found acceptance in many -quarters there is clear evidence. It is true that no direct reference to -the measure appears in the Charter Oath of April, 1868. But the -manifesto announcing the Shōgun’s resignation, issued in the autumn of -the previous year, contained the suggestion that the old order of things -should be changed, and that administrative authority should be restored -to the Imperial Court. The language of the Tosa memorial which inspired -this resignation was still plainer. It spoke of the danger to which the -country was exposed by the discord existing between the Court, the -Shōgun and the feudal nobility, and advocated “the discontinuance of the -dual system of administration” and “a return to the ancient form of -government.” Making due allowance for the vagueness of the phrases used, -if “the discontinuance of the dual system of administration” meant, as -it clearly did, the cessation of Tokugawa rule, “the restoration of the -ancient” (namely pre-feudal) “form of government” pointed no less -plainly to the abolition of feudalism. The same sequence of ideas -appears in the letter addressed by the Shōgun at the time of his -resignation to the _hatamoto_, the special class of feudal vassals -created by the founder of Tokugawa rule, and in the communication on -this subject presented by his Ministers to the foreign representatives -on the same occasion. - - - - - CHAPTER VIII - Abolition of Feudal System—Reconstitution of Classes—Effects of - Abolition of Feudalism. - - -The abolition of the feudal system formed one of the subjects of -discussion in the embryo parliament, the _Kōgisho_, soon after its -creation in 1869. The way had been prepared for this discussion by the -presentation of memorials on the subject at the time of the Shōgun’s -resignation eighteen months before from several clans representing both -of the parties which were so soon to be engaged in active hostilities. -Memorials of this kind to the Throne and Shōgunate, and Edicts and -Notifications issued in response to them, were common methods in those -days of arriving at decisions in grave matters of State. Borrowed -originally, like so many other things, from China, they were part of the -machinery of central government. The recommendations offered in these -Memorials revealed a considerable divergence of opinion. But they also -showed, what has already been pointed out, namely, the recognition of -the close connection between feudalism and the Shōgunate; and the -existence of a very general feeling that, in spite of the serious -disturbance of the whole administrative structure which so sweeping a -change must necessarily involve, nothing short of the surrender of -feudal fiefs to the Crown would be a satisfactory solution of the -problem presented by the fall of the Shōgunate. This conviction had -taken root in the minds of men like Kido, Iwakura and Ōkubo, whose -mission to the clans, mentioned in a previous chapter, was a proof of -their leading position in the new Government. - -The method adopted for giving effect to the decision arrived at was the -_voluntary_ surrender of feudal fiefs to the Throne, the lead in this -matter being taken by the same four clans which had planned and carried -out the Restoration. In March, 1869—a memorable date for the nation—a -Memorial in this sense, the authorship of which is generally ascribed to -Kido, was presented to the Throne by the daimiōs of Satsuma, Chōshiū, -Tosa and Hizen. The chief point emphasized in the Memorial was the -necessity of a complete change of administration in order that “one -central body of government and one universal authority” might be -established; and, in accordance with the intentions of the Memorialists, -the Sovereign was asked to dispose as he might think fit of the land and -the people of the territories surrendered. The circumstances under which -dual government had grown up were explained, stress being laid on the -defect of that system, “the separation of the name from the reality of -power,” and the Tokugawa Shōguns were denounced as usurpers. In this -denunciation of the last line of Japanese rulers, due to political -reasons, the fact that the system of dual government had grown up long -before the Tokugawa family appeared upon the scene was conveniently -ignored. As to “the separation of the name from the reality of power,” -the expression is a reference to an old Chinese phrase, “the name -without the substance,” a metaphor applied, amongst other things, to -figure-head government. This is a stock phrase with Chinese and Japanese -writers, who constantly appeal to a rule of conduct more honoured in the -breach than in the observance. - -The example set by the four clans was followed by others. By the end of -the year out of 276 feudatories there were only seventeen abstainers -from the movement, these being daimiōs of eastern territories who had -taken the Shōgun’s side in the civil war. One of the earliest and most -enthusiastic Memorialists was the daimiō of Kishiū, the Tokugawa prince -who had succeeded to that fief by the promotion of his relative, Prince -Kéiki, to be Shōgun. Only three years before he had been an advocate of -the continuance of the Shōgunate. This change of attitude on the part of -a prince who ranked with the daimiōs of Owari and Mito at the head of -the feudal nobility may be interpreted as showing how natural was the -association of feudalism with the Shōgunate in men’s minds, and how -difficult for him, as for others, was the conception of a feudal system -without a Shōgun. - -The reply of the Throne to the Memorialists was of a non-committal -nature. They were told that the question would be submitted to a Council -of feudal nobles shortly to be held in the new Capital. There is no -reason to suppose that the caution displayed in this answer implied any -hesitation on the part of the Government to carry out the measure -contemplated. The drastic character of the proposal justified caution in -dealing with it, and the variety of the interests involved called for -careful consideration. The proposal having been submitted to the -assembly of daimiōs for their formal approval, a Decree was issued in -August of the same year announcing its acceptance by the Throne, which -felt, it was said, “that this course would consolidate the authority of -the Government.” As a preliminary step, the administration of clan -territories was remodelled so as to correspond with the new order of -things; the daimiōs called together to pronounce on their own destinies -returned in the altered rôle of governors (_Chihanji_) to the -territories over which they had hitherto ruled; and the Government -settled down to consider and determine in detail the various -arrangements rendered necessary by the new conditions about to be -created. - -Two years later, on the 29th August, 1871, the Imperial Decree -abolishing the feudal system appeared. “The clans,” so it ran, “are -abolished, and prefectures are established in their place.” The brevity -of the Decree, singular even for such documents, the length of which -often ranged from one extreme to another, may in this instance be -accounted for by the fact that an Imperial message was at the same time -addressed to the new clan governors. In this reference was made to the -sanction already accorded by the Throne to the proposal for the -surrender of feudal fiefs, and it was pointed out that the sanction then -expressed was not to be regarded as another instance of the common -defect of “the name without the substance,” but that the Decree now -issued must be understood in its literal sense, namely, the abolition of -the clans and their conversion into prefectures. The message was -followed by an order directing the ex-daimiōs to reside in future, with -their families, in Yedo, their territories being entrusted temporarily -to the care of former clan officers. This measure, while undoubtedly -strengthening the hands of the Government, must have forcibly reminded -the nobles concerned of the precautionary methods of Tokugawa days. - -A further step in the same direction was taken by the amalgamation of -the Court and feudal nobility into one class, to which the new name of -_kwazoku_ (nobles) was given. The abolition of feudalism, moreover, -entailed the disappearance of the _samurai_, the fighting men of the -clans, and the rearrangement of existing classes. Under the feudal -system there had been, outside of the nobility, four classes—the -two-sworded men, or _samurai_, the farmers, the artizans and the -merchants, or tradesmen. The new arrangement now introduced comprised -only two classes—the gentry (_shizoku_), who replaced the _samurai_, and -the common people (_heimin_). What also had formed a pariah class by -itself, consisting of social outcasts known as _éta_ and _hinin_, was -abolished, its members being merged into the class of _heimin_. A -further innovation was introduced in the shape of a proclamation -permitting members of the former military class to discontinue the -practice of wearing their swords, which had been a strict feudal rule. - -The Decree abolishing the clans was anticipated in one or two feudal -territories, the authorities concerned acting on the previous -announcement of the Imperial sanction having been given to the proposal -of the Memorialists, and amalgamating, of their own accord, the -_samurai_ with the rest of the population. The example was not generally -followed, but ever since the issue of that announcement memorials and -petitions had been flowing in from the military class in many districts -asking for early effect to be given to the measure in contemplation, and -for permission to lay aside their swords and take up agricultural -occupations. Nor was there wanting the stimulus in the same direction -supplied by inspired writers in the Press that was just coming into -existence under official auspices. One of these observed that what the -nation needed was an Imperial army and uniformity in land tenure, -taxation, currency, education and penal laws—aspirations all destined to -be fulfilled in the near future. The general feeling thus shown -doubtless influenced the Government in taking the final step. - -Shortly before the issue of the Decree there occurred a reconstruction -of the Ministry, strengthening the position of the leaders of the party -of reform, and that of the clans they represented, while the influence -of the aristocratic element in the Government was diminished. In the -reconstituted Cabinet, as we may now call it, Prince Sanjō remained -Prime Minister, Prince Iwakura became Minister for Foreign Affairs, -replacing a Court noble, while four prominent clansmen whom the -Restoration had, as we have seen, brought to the front, took office as -Councillors of State. These four were Saigō, Kido, Itagaki and Ōkuma. - -To this date also belongs a troublesome incident which called for the -intervention of the foreign representatives. The Japanese authorities, -fearing a recurrence of the disturbances connected with the Christian -propaganda of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had always -regarded with misgiving the treaty clause permitting the erection of -Christian places of worship at the open ports. This apprehension was -increased by the renewal of missionary effort when the country was -reopened to foreign trade and intercourse. As a precautionary measure, -the old official notices denouncing Christianity as a pernicious -doctrine had continued to be displayed in all parts of the country, and -at Nagasaki, which had at one time been a Christian centre, the -population had been forced annually to trample upon emblems of the -proscribed faith. On the erection in 1865 of a Roman Catholic Church at -that place, which had in the meantime become an open port, people from -the neighbourhood attended it in such numbers as to attract the -attention of the authorities. It was then discovered that Christian -doctrines had not been completely stamped out there, as had been the -case elsewhere. The offending individuals were consequently ordered to -be banished to remote districts, the foreign representatives being with -difficulty successful in obtaining a temporary suspension of the orders. -After the Restoration the official notices proscribing the Christian -religion were, with the substitution of the Mikado’s authority for that -of the Shōgun, deliberately renewed, and in 1870 the orders for the -banishment of the offenders were carried out in spite of repeated -remonstrances on the part of the foreign representatives. Otherwise, -however, judged by the standard of those days, the treatment to which -the exiles were subjected appears on the whole to have been free from -excessive cruelty. It was not till the year 1873 that the practice of -Christianity ceased to be forbidden. The notices proscribing the -Christian religion were then withdrawn, and the banished persons were -restored to their homes. In curious contrast to this recrudescence of -persecution was the suggestion, made in a pamphlet about the same time, -that Christianity should be officially recognized, a suggestion which is -said to have been carried still further some years later, when the -attraction for Western civilization was at its height, by a prominent -member of the Ministry. - -To return to the subject of feudalism, from which this digression in the -interests of chronological order has led us away, its abolition was the -first, as it was also the most radical, of the reforms on which the new -Government embarked. It struck at the root of old-established things and -cleared the way for all future progress. It is a pity that Marquis Ōkuma -in his _Fifty Years of New Japan_ has dismissed the subject in a few -lines. Himself one of the chief actors in the scene, no one was better -qualified to deal with it. Foreign writers less well equipped for the -task have given it more attention. Some of these have taken the -superficial view, founded on the signatures appended to the Memorials, -that the voluntary surrender of fiefs was due to the initiative of the -feudal nobles themselves, and have praised their action for what they -regarded as its exalted patriotism and unique self-sacrifice. This view -is quite erroneous. Occasion has already been taken to point out how the -surroundings in which the daimiōs of those days were brought up had the -effect of depriving them of all character and initiative, and how they, -like the Mikado and Shōgun, were mere puppets in the hands of others, -unfitted for responsibility of any kind, unaccustomed to the direction -of affairs. Lest it be thought that the picture has been overdrawn, it -may be well to quote the words of a Japanese writer of the time. They -occur in an anonymous pamphlet published in 1869, extracts from which -are given by Sir Francis Adams in his _History of Japan_. - -“The great majority of feudal lords,” the writer says, “are generally -persons who have been born and nurtured in the seclusion of the women’s -apartments: ... who even when they have grown up to man’s estate still -exhibit all the traits of childhood. Leading a life of leisure, they -succeed to the inheritance of their ancestors.... And in the same -category are those who, though designated vassals, are born of good -family on the great estates.” - -Of the truth of this statement there is abundant evidence. There were, -indeed, a few instances of feudal chiefs who had some share of power and -influence. But they were exceptions to the general rule, and the -authority they exercised was brought to bear rather on the affairs of -the State than on the administration of their own territories. Long -before the Restoration the government of feudal fiefs had passed out of -the hands of the nominal rulers, and their hereditary chief retainers, -into those of clansmen of inferior status. These were the real authors -of the measure of reform which swept away the feudal system. They were -the same men who carried out the Restoration. Throughout all the -negotiations for the surrender of their fiefs the feudal nobility -counted for nothing, and, as a class, were only dimly conscious, if -aware at all, of what was going on before their eyes. - -In return for the voluntary surrender of their fiefs the dispossessed -daimiōs received pensions amounting to one-tenth of their former -revenues, the payment of the small hereditary incomes of the _samurai_, -in their altered status of gentry, being continued for the present by -the Government. From this arrangement, however, the _samurai_ of one or -two clans who had offered a prolonged resistance to the Imperialist -forces were excluded, a distinction which caused much suffering and -hardship. - -The surrender of the clan territories involved, of course, the rendition -of the lands, varying greatly in extent, that were held by the two large -sections of the military class already mentioned, the _hatamoto_ and -_gokénin_. Their pensions were regulated on a scale similar to that -adopted for the feudal nobility. - -The amount of the revenues acquired by the Government in consequence of -the surrender of all feudal territories, including the Shōgun’s domains, -the administration of which had previously been taken over, is not easy -to determine. A very rough estimate is all that is possible. The extent -of the latter has already been noticed. Still more remarkable was its -wide distribution. Out of the sixty-eight provinces into which Japan at -the time of the Restoration was divided no less than forty-seven, by -reasons of lands owned therein by the Shōgunate, contributed towards the -Tokugawa exchequer. In the Tokugawa law known as “The Hundred Articles” -the total assessed yield of the country is given as 28,000,000 _koku_ of -rice, the yield of all land, whatever the nature of its produce, being -stated in terms of that cereal. Of this, 20,000,000 _koku_ represented -the produce of the lands of the feudal nobility and gentry, and the -balance the yield of the Shōgun’s estates. This statement was made in -the seventeenth century, and it is natural to suppose that by the time -the Restoration took place the revenues in question may have increased -with the general progress of the nation. In the absence of exact data we -shall probably not be far wrong if we estimate the gross revenue which -came into the possession of the Government by the abolition of the -Shōgunate and the feudal system, of which it formed a part, as not much -under 35,000,000 _koku_ of rice, equivalent, at the average price of -rice at that time, to about £35,000,000. From this had to be deducted -the share of the cultivators, which varied according to the locality. -Out of the residue, again, the pensions due to the feudal nobility, and -other members of the military class, had to be paid, so that the net -balance accruing to the national exchequer in the first years of the new -administration could not have been large. - -The effects on the various classes of the nation caused by the abolition -of feudalism were very different, the benefit derived from it by some -contrasting sharply with the hardship inflicted upon others. These -effects, however, were for the most part gradual in their operation. -They were not realized in their full extent until some years later, when -the multifarious details connected with the carrying out of this great -undertaking had been laboriously worked out. - -With the exception of the _fudai_ daimiōs and the feudal groups of -_hatamoto_ and _gokénin_—which constituted the hereditary personal -following of the Tokugawa Shōguns, standing between the higher feudal -aristocracy and the bulk of the military class—there is no reason to -think that the territorial nobility suffered very greatly by the change, -save, at once, in loss of dignity, and, later on, in the compulsory -commutation of their pensions. Denied by custom all share in the -management of clan affairs, they had little call to object to a measure -the true import of which was imperfectly appreciated, or do anything -else but silently acquiesce in the decisions of the masterful retainers -by whose counsels they and their ancestors were accustomed to be guided. -As a matter of State policy the change was as much beyond their control -as it was above their powers of comprehension, which rarely strayed -outside the orbit of trivial pursuits and pleasures in which they were -content to move. Some, indeed, may have welcomed the change as a release -from irksome conditions of existence, and as offering a prospect of -wider fields of action. The case of the _fudai_ daimiōs, and others in -the same category, was different. To them the abolition of the feudal -system was a severe blow, for it meant the loss of official emoluments -which, under the Shōgunate, they had enjoyed as a special privilege for -generations. - -To the two classes of artizans and merchants the immediate effect may -very naturally have been unwelcome in so far as it entailed disturbance -of existing conditions of livelihood, of old-established usages of -industry and trade. Under feudalism not only had a close system of clan -guilds grown up, but, as in Europe during the Middle Ages, artizans and -tradesmen engaged in the same handicraft or business were restricted to -separate quarters of a town. The former may also have had reason to -regret the liberal patronage of feudal customers, which allowed leisure -and scope for the exercise of individual skill, and to view with concern -the pressure of open competition in the industrial market. But as the -new conditions became stabilized, and the benefits of uniformity of -administration became apparent, neither class had any reason to be -dissatisfied with the alteration in their circumstances. Certainly not -the merchants and tradesmen. The disappearance of the barriers between -provinces and between clans was all to their advantage, while the -opening up of new channels of commercial activity must have more than -compensated for any drawbacks attending the new order of things. - -One class—the most important at that time—the _samurai_, suffered -greatly by the change. Accustomed for centuries to high rank in the -social order, to a position of superiority over the rest of the people, -from whom they were distinguished by privileges and customs of long -standing, as well as by a traditional code of chivalry in which they -took a legitimate pride, the _samurai_ found themselves suddenly -relegated to a status little differing from that of their former -inferiors. It is true that the military class, as a whole, had long been -in an impoverished condition owing to the embarrassment of clan -finances, which had led in several cases to the reduction of feudal -establishments, and to the rigid rule which kept the members of this -class from engaging in any of the profitable occupations open to the -rest of the nation; and that the unrest and discontent which resulted -from this state of things may have induced them to regard with favour -any change which held out the prospect of a possible amelioration in -their circumstances. There is some truth also in the view that the eager -enthusiasm of the party of reform, inspired with a belief in the -fulfilment of their cherished aspirations, may have found an echo in the -minds of the military class and stirred the patriotic impulses so -conspicuous in the nation; while, at the same time, the sentiment of -feudal loyalty may have dictated implicit obedience to the decision of -clan authorities. Making allowance for the influence of considerations -of this nature, there can, nevertheless, be little doubt that the sudden -change in the fortunes of the military class aroused a bitter feeling, -which showed itself later in the outbreak of grave disturbances. - -The unpopularity of the measure was increased by the commutation of -pensions, which bore very hardly on the military class. In introducing -in 1873 a scheme for this purpose the Government was influenced mainly -by the pressing needs of the national exchequer. Under this scheme -Government bonds bearing 8 per cent interest were issued. _Samurai_ with -hereditary incomes of less than 100 _koku_ of rice were enabled to -commute their pensions, if they chose to do so, on the basis of six -years’ purchase, receiving half of the sum to which they were entitled -in cash, and the remainder in bonds; while the basis for those in -receipt of annuities was fixed at four and a half years’ purchase, the -low rates of purchase in both cases being accounted for by the high -rates of interest then prevailing. - -Three years later the voluntary character of commutation was made -compulsory, and extended to all members of the military class -irrespective of the amount of income involved. The current rate of -interest having by that time fallen, the basis of commutation was -increased to ten years’ purchase for all alike, a slight reduction being -made in the rate of interest payable on the bonds, which varied -according to the amount of the income commuted. Indirectly this -commutation resulted in further misfortune for the military class. -Unversed in business methods, without experience in trading operations, -many _samurai_ were tempted to employ the little capital they had -received in unremunerative enterprises, the failure of which brought -them to extreme poverty. - - - - - CHAPTER IX -Effects of Abolition of Feudalism on Agricultural Class—Changes in Land - Tenure—Land-Tax Revision. - - -The abolition of feudalism came as a boon to the peasantry. If it -inflicted much hardship on the _samurai_, who formed the bulk of the -military class, while the verdict as to its results in other cases -depended on the conclusion to be reached after balancing the gain and -loss attending its operation, to the farmers it was a veritable -blessing. Its full significance was, however, not felt until after the -lapse of several years. - -Under the feudal system the position of the farmer varied to some extent -according to locality. In Satsuma, for instance, besides the ordinary -farming class, there were _samurai_ farmers. Again, in certain parts of -the province of Mito, and elsewhere, there was a special class of yeoman -farmers who enjoyed some of the privileges of the _samurai_. But -throughout the country generally the bulk of the agricultural class -consisted of peasant farmers, who, while cultivating their land on -conditions similar to what is known in Europe as the _métayage_ system, -were in many respects little better than serfs. The peasant farmer could -not leave his holding, and go elsewhere, as he pleased; nor could he -dispose of his interest in it, though by means of mortgages it was -possible to evade the law in this respect. To the frequent call for -forced labour he was obliged to respond. He was subject to restrictions -in regard to the crops to be cultivated, and their rotation, while in -the disposal of his produce he was hampered by the interference of clan -guilds. The farmer had also to bear the expense and risk of conveying -the tax-produce of his land to the receiving stations, besides being -obliged to deliver on each occasion an extra amount to cover the loss -supposed to occur in its transportation. On the other hand, though under -the feudal form of land tenure he was tied to the soil and transferable -with it when it changed hands, he was practically free from disturbance -in his holding so long as he paid his rent, which took the form of a -share of the produce of the land, and other imposts exacted from time to -time by feudal bailiffs. Fixity of tenure, therefore, he certainly -enjoyed; and, looking at the peculiar nature of his association with the -feudal landlord, it seems questionable whether his rights in the land he -cultivated may not be regarded as having much of the character of -ownership. Holdings, it may be added, descended from father to son, or, -failing direct heirs, in the same family, the right of adoption being, -of course, recognized. - -The interests of the peasantry were affected in many ways by the -abolition of the feudal system. The abrupt change in the position of the -cultivator caused by the disappearance of his feudal landlord opened up -the whole question of land tenure and land taxation, not only as it -affected the peasant cultivator, but in its bearing on the occupiers of -all agricultural land throughout the country, as well as other land not -included in this category. To enable the Government to cope with a task -of this magnitude, and at the same time to carry out their declared aims -in the direction of uniformity of administration, far-reaching -legislation was necessary. - -In view of the singular character of the feudal tenure we have -described, under which landlord and tenant were associated in a kind of -joint ownership, it might have been supposed that advantage would be -taken of the opportunity offered by the surrender of fiefs to place the -question of land tenure on a clear footing by defining accurately the -position of the people, and more especially the cultivators, with regard -to the land. This, however, was not done. No Decree affecting the broad -issue raised by the abolition of the feudal system was promulgated. It -was only by degrees that the intentions of the Government became -apparent. Step by step the policy in view was manifested by the removal -of the various restrictions which had curtailed the tenants’ rights, -until at length it became clear that, while retaining the theory that -the ownership of all land was vested as of right in the Crown, the -intention was that each occupier of land should become virtually the -proprietor of his holding. - -One of the first acts of the Government at the end of the civil war had -been to place all land as far as possible on a common footing, the -earliest step in this direction being taken in the spring of 1869. It -was then enacted that all land held in grant from previous governments -should be liable to taxation. This measure affected all grantees of -land, the _yashikis_, or feudal residences of the territorial nobility -in Yedo, coming under the new rule. The ground covered by these -_yashikis_, some of which were extensive, forming separate parks in the -neighbourhood of the castle and in other quarters of the city, had -originally, like other grants of land, been handed over in free gift, -neither rent nor land-tax being paid. - -An essential point in the uniformity of administration contemplated by -the new Government was the reform of all taxation, precedence being -given to the revision of the land-tax. No hesitation was shown in taking -up this task. Finance was the weak point in the administrative -situation, as it had been that of the previous Government; and land -having since early days been the main source of revenue, it was natural -that the question of the land-tax should be the first to receive -attention. Before the abolition of feudalism, and while the clans still -retained their own provincial administration, it was not possible to -take practical steps towards fiscal changes that should apply to all -parts of the country. But the movement in favour of the surrender of -feudal fiefs had begun almost as soon as the triumph of the Imperialist -forces was assured, and by the time the feudal system was abolished by -the Decree of August, 1871, the subject had been examined by the new -Government in all its bearings, and the shape which the revision of the -land-tax should take had been determined. It was, therefore, possible -for a complete scheme of revision to be brought forward by the Finance -Department before the end of the same year, that is to say, within four -months after the disappearance of the clans. - -Before dwelling on the main features of this proposal, for which Marquis -Ōkuma and Marquis Inouyé, then Minister and Vice-Minister of Finance -respectively, and Baron Kanda, an authority on all questions of -administration, were mainly responsible, it may be well to glance for a -moment at the previous system of land taxation in order that a clear -idea of the changes introduced may be formed. - -Put shortly, the position of holders of land in regard to taxation in -the last days of Tokugawa rule was this. Only land under cultivation was -taxed. The land-tax was payable everywhere in rice, whatever the crop -cultivated might be, and was based on the assessed yield of the land. -But the methods of estimating this yield varied greatly. In one place -this would be done by taking the measurement of the land bearing the -crop; in another the appearance and condition of the crop would be the -decisive factors; while in a third there would be “assessment by -sample,” as it was called, specimens of the growing crop being selected -for the purpose. The land measures, too, were not everywhere the same. -Moreover, the principle which governed the distribution of the produce -of the land between the cultivator and the landlord—the latter’s share -being, in effect, the former’s land-tax—varied in different provinces, -and in different districts of the same province. In some places -seven-tenths of the yield of land went to the landlord, and three-tenths -to the cultivator; in others these proportions were reversed; there were -districts, such as the Shōgun’s domains, where the cultivator received -three-fifths, and other, again, where the proportions were equal. There -was a general resemblance, dating back to the time of the Great Reform, -between the taxation systems in force throughout the country. The old -classification, under which there were three main heads of taxation, the -land-tax, the industrial-tax and forced labour—all payable by the -cultivator—was retained everywhere in a modified form. But each clan -went its own way in other respects, having its own methods of assessment -and collection, as well as its own rules of exemption from, and -remission of, taxation. Except in the Shōgun’s domains, where matters, -generally, were regulated on a somewhat better basis than elsewhere, -there was no very definite distinction between central and local -taxation; and, whether it was a clan or the Shōgunate itself to which -taxes were due, there was a constant liability to irregular exactions -imposed at the pleasure of the authorities. - -The main features of the new scheme show the importance of the changes -proposed. - -A new official survey of land throughout the country was to be carried -out. Title-deeds were to be issued for all land, whether cultivated or -not. Land everywhere was to be valued, and the value stated in the -title-deed. In the case of cultivated land the land-tax was to be made -payable in money, instead of in rice, as before, and was to be based on -the selling value of the land, as declared in the title-deed, and not, -as before, on the assessed yield of the holding. The proprietor—for -this, in effect, the farmer became when the revision was -accomplished—was to be free to cultivate his land in all respects as he -pleased, and could sell or otherwise dispose of it as he chose. - -The _Sei-in_—that curious body in the reorganized Government of 1869 -which represented an attempt to combine in one branch of authority -legislative, deliberative and executive powers—signified its approval of -the scheme, and arrangements were made to give effect to some of its -provisions. In January, 1872, as a tentative measure, title-deed -regulations were issued. These were made operative at first only in the -Tōkiō prefecture, but their operation was gradually extended to other -places. Shortly afterwards further regulations providing for the annual -payment of land-tax at the rate of 2 per cent on the value of land, as -entered in the title-deed, were published. And in March of the same year -the restrictions on the alienation of land, which had previously -prevented all transfers of land between the military class and other -classes of the people, as well as between members of the latter, were -removed. - -Before, however, this scheme for the revision of the land-tax assumed -its final legislative shape it underwent various modifications. It was -submitted early in 1873 to a conference of the chief administrative -officials in the provinces which took place in the Capital. The -necessity of reform on the lines suggested was admitted by all -concerned. The main point on which opinions differed was whether the -revision of the land-tax should be carried out as soon as possible, or -gradually. The advocates of prompt action urged that the question should -be dealt with quickly and decisively, arguing that whatever -disadvantages might attend this course would be more than -counterbalanced by the benefits resulting from a uniform system of -taxation. The other side held that it would be unwise to do away -suddenly with old customs and usages, and that it would be better to -carry out the contemplated changes very gradually, taking care not to -offend local prejudice. In the end the views of the advocates of prompt -action prevailed, and a draft law was prepared. This, having received -the sanction of the Throne, was notified to the country by Imperial -Decree in July of the same year. No direct reference was made in the -Decree either to the change of government, or to the abolition of -feudalism, which were the real causes that had inspired the measure. It -may have been thought inadvisable to refer to a past so full of -dangerous memories, and so recent as to invite inconvenient comparisons. - -The Decree itself merely stated the object of the measure, which was “to -remedy the existing harsh and unequal incidence of taxation,” and the -fact that local authorities, besides other officials, had been consulted -in its preparation. In the notification accompanying it further -information was given. It was explained that the old system of paying -taxes on cultivated land in rice was abolished; that as soon as fresh -title-deeds had been prepared land-tax would be paid at the rate of 3 -per cent on the value of the land; and that the same course would be -followed in the case of local land taxation, with the proviso that the -local land rate should not exceed one-third of the Imperial land-tax. - -By a looseness of wording, which may have escaped notice at the time, -both the Decree and the Notification spoke of the land-tax as having -been revised. It needed more than a stroke of the pen to do this. -Neither those who in the conference objected to hasty measures, nor -those who were in favour of prompt action, had foreseen the length of -time that would be occupied in the execution of the reform. It was left -to the practical exigencies of the situation to effect a compromise -between the two parties which the conference had failed to bring about. -The original estimate of the time needed to carry out the measure was -found to be quite inadequate. Though the task was set about at once, -several years elapsed before it was completed; and eventually it was -decided to allow the new scheme to come into operation in each district, -as soon as the requisite arrangements had been made, without waiting for -its adoption in other places. - -Voluminous regulations were appended to the Notification. In one of -these a promise was given that the rate of land-tax would be reduced to -1 per cent whenever the total annual revenue from other sources should -have reached the sum of _Yen_ 2,000,000 (£400,000). This promise was -never fulfilled. By the time the revenue from other sources had reached -the amount stated the needs of the new Government had so outgrown its -resources that reduction to the extent contemplated was not possible. A -reduction from 3 to 2½ per cent was, however, made a few years later, -while the work of revision was still proceeding. - -Some other points may be noted in passing which throw light on the -principles underlying the measure. - -All holders of land were required to remeasure it, and furnish a -statement of its value. These estimates were then to be checked by -comparison with similar estimates made by official experts. In the case -of a holder of land refusing to agree to the value fixed by the -assessors, the land was to be sold. - -The land-tax of 3 per cent was to be levied only on cultivated land, -this category including both rice land and other arable land. The tax on -house land was higher, while that on other classes of land, such as land -covered by forests, pasture or moorland, was almost nominal. - -The plan adopted, wherever possible, in fixing the value of land in a -district was to take a certain village as a specimen, and, having fixed -the value of the land in it, to make that value the basis for -determining the value of all other land in the district, the guiding -principle being to ascertain the actual profit it yielded to the -cultivator. With this principle in view, the method employed for -determining the value of cultivated land was as follows: Land was first -of all divided into two classes, rice land, and land on which other -crops were grown. The official assessors having, with the assistance of -the cultivator, estimated the annual yield of the holding, this yield -was, in the case of rice, wheat and beans, converted into money by -taking the average market price per _koku_ (about five bushels) of each -of these articles of produce for the five years 1870–4 inclusive. In -fixing this average market price it would have been impossible to have -taken one price for the whole country, since the prices of all staple -articles varied in many districts. The difficulty was, therefore, met by -fixing several market values, to be used as the separate bases of -valuation wherever local conditions and circumstances required special -consideration. Thus in some cases one market price for rice, or for -wheat, was made the basis for valuing land in a whole province; whereas -in other cases separate market prices had to be determined for -particular districts, or even villages. In the case of land on which -other produce, such as tea, silk, hemp and indigo, etc., was grown, the -method adopted was to estimate what crops of wheat, or beans, land of -the same kind in the same place yielded. This yield was then taken as -that of the land in question, and converted into money in the usual way. -Up to this point the method followed was the same for all land, whether -a man cultivated his own holding, or held it on lease from the -proprietor. In the former case the next step in the process of fixing -land values was to deduct from the total value of the yield of the land -15 per cent, as cost of seed and manure. From the sum that remained the -land-tax and local taxes were again deducted, as well as the cost of -wages, if these were paid, for labour employed. The balance remaining -over was taken to represent the net value of the yield of the land. And, -as the Government decided to regard 6 per cent as the average rate of -profit accruing to a cultivator, the value of a holding was determined -by a simple calculation. This value, so determined, became the assessed -or taxable value of the land, and on this the land-tax was levied. The -process by which the value was arrived at in the case of a cultivator -who held his land on lease was a little more complicated. Stated in -other words, the taxable value of cultivated land, as determined by the -revision, was in all cases the net value of its yield to the cultivator, -whether the latter was owner, or only tenant. - -To the question of the periods of payment of the land-tax much attention -was given. The three instalments in which it was at first made payable -were afterwards reduced to two, the dates of payment varying according -to the nature of the crop cultivated. It should be noted, also, that in -making the revised land-tax uniform throughout the country an exception -was introduced in favour of Yezo, or the Hokkaidō, to give it its -administrative name. There, in order to encourage the development of -what was then the northernmost island, the rate of tax was fixed at 1 -per cent. - -Four years after the work of revision had begun the land-tax was, as -already stated, reduced to 2½ per cent. In the Decree announcing this -reduction allusion was made to the growing needs of the country, which -had not yet been able, it was said, to adjust itself to the changed -conditions brought about by the Restoration, and to the distress still -prevailing amongst the agricultural classes. The apparent slowness with -which the work of revision proceeded was brought to the notice of the -local authorities by the Government, and the year 1876 was fixed as the -date by which the revision must be concluded. Neither that year, -however, nor the next saw the end of the undertaking. It lasted five -years longer, being eventually completed in 1881. - -[Illustration: - - MARQUIS INOUYÉ. - - Took an active part in the Government formed after the Restoration, - and was an outstanding figure in Foreign as well as Financial - affairs. -] - -[Illustration: - - MARQUIS ŌKUMA. - - Was prominent in the formation of the new Government subsequent to the - Restoration; was for some time in Opposition, returning to the - Ministry later. Conspicuous as an advocate of constitutional - government, as an author, and as an educationalist, he was the most - versatile of all the statesmen of his day. -] - -By a very rough computation, which is all that the unreliability of -statistics in those days will permit, the extent of taxable land -occupied, or owned, by the people previous to the revision may be -estimated at about ten million acres. As the result of the revision this -area was more than quadrupled. On the other hand, the revenue derived -from the land showed a falling off of 5 per cent. This result is -explained by the fact that some of the land had before been over-taxed, -while a large portion of the new taxable area consisted of uncultivated -land paying only a nominal tax, and, therefore, contributing little to -the revenue. - -The total cost of the revision of the land-tax, according to official -estimates, was about £7,500,000. Of this sum about £6,000,000 were -repaid by the people, the balance being defrayed by the provincial -authorities, with the exception of an item of some £100,000 which was -charged to the central government. Heavy as this expense was, the gain -to Japan would have justified a greater cost. For the first time in her -history there was one uniform system of land taxation for the whole -country, and, with the exception above mentioned, one uniform rate. - -Since the completion of the task of revision the system of land taxation -has _in its main features_ remained unchanged. But the heavy expenditure -entailed by the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–5 made it necessary for the -Government to increase taxation of all kinds. Special war taxes were -then imposed. Amongst these was an additional land-tax. When the war -came to an end this additional tax was retained, as was the case with -our own income-tax, and the Chinese transit tax on commodities -(_lekin_), both of which were also originally war taxes. - -A feature to be noted in connection with this land reform is the change -that was made in the title to land. Hitherto the registration of land in -the local land register, in accordance with the practice of centuries, -as well as entries regarding the transfer of land recorded in the same -land register, had constituted the holder’s title. Henceforth the title -to land was determined by the possession of a title-deed. The new -system, however, did not come to stay. After a trial of over fifteen -years it was abandoned in March, 1889, in favour of the old method of -registration in the land books of a district which, with certain later -modifications in matters of detail, is now in force. - -The reclassification of land—one of the results of the land reform—was -set forth in an elaborate schedule, into the details of which it is -unnecessary to enter. A reference to the various classes into which land -was divided establishes two facts: - - 1. All cultivated land, with a few exceptions, belongs to the people. - - 2. All waste land, with a few exceptions, belongs to the Government. - -To these we may add a third, that all land in Japan is subject to -land-tax, with three exceptions: - - (_a_) Government land. - - (_b_) Land held for religious purposes. - - (_c_) Land used for purposes of irrigation, drainage, and roads. - - - - - CHAPTER X - Missions to Foreign Governments—Hindrances to Reform—Language - Difficulties—Attitude of Foreign Powers. - - -The numerous measures called for by the abolition of feudalism did not -prevent the new Government from turning their attention to foreign -affairs. In the same year (1871) which saw the issue of the Decree -giving practical effect to the surrender of feudal fiefs a mission -composed of Iwakura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and two Councillors -of State, Kido and Ōkubo, was despatched to Europe and the United -States. The suite of the mission, which numbered more than fifty -persons, included Mr. (afterwards Prince) Itō. - -This was the third mission sent from Japan to the Courts of Treaty -Powers, and by far the most important. The first of these, despatched by -the Tokugawa Government early in 1862, when the conditions surrounding -foreign intercourse were rendered precarious by the open hostility of -the Court party, had achieved some measure of success in obtaining a -postponement for five years of the dates fixed for the opening of the -ports of Hiogo and Niigata, and the towns of Yedo and Ōsaka; the reasons -by which the request was supported, as well as the conditions on which -consent was given, being recorded so far as Great Britain was concerned, -in the London Protocol of June, 1862. The reasons were: “the -difficulties experienced by the Tycoon and his Ministers in giving -effect to their engagements with foreign Powers having treaties with -Japan in consequence of the opposition offered by a party in Japan which -was hostile to all intercourse with foreigners.” The conditions, shortly -stated, were: the strict observance of all other Treaty stipulations; -the revocation of the old law outlawing foreigners; and the cessation in -future of official interference of any kind with trade and intercourse. - -The second was sent by the same Government in February, 1864. Its -ostensible object was to apologize to the French Government for the -murder of the French officer, Lieutenant Camus, which had taken place in -October of the previous year. Its real objects, however, were to -endeavour to obtain the consent of Treaty Powers to the closing of the -port of Yokohama, a matter in regard to which the Shōgun’s Ministers had -already appealed in vain to the foreign representatives; and, -incidentally, to take an opportunity if it offered, of purchasing war -material. The mission, which never went beyond Paris, returned to Japan -in the following August at the moment when arrangements were being -completed for the forcing of the Straits of Shimonoséki by a combined -foreign squadron. It brought for the approval of the Shōgun’s Government -a convention concluded by the members of the mission with the French -Government. This somewhat singular instrument, which bore the signature -of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided -that it was—after its acceptance by the Shōgun’s Government—to come into -force at once, and was to be regarded as forming an integral part of the -existing Treaty between France and Japan. It contained, amongst other -things, a stipulation for the reopening of the Straits within three -months after the return of the mission to Japan, and also provided for -the co-operation, if necessary, of the French naval squadron in Japanese -waters with the Shōgun’s forces in the attainment of this object. The -Shōgun’s repudiation of the agreement prevented the occurrence of what -might have been troublesome complications, the only result of the -incident being a delay of a few days in the departure for Shimonoséki of -the allied squadron. - -The ostensible object of this third mission, like that of the first, -related to Treaty stipulations. By a clause of the treaties of 1858—the -texts of which were more or less identical, while their interpretation -was governed by the stipulation regarding “most-favoured-nation” -treatment—provision was made for revision _by mutual consent_ in 1872. -This consent it was the purpose of the mission to obtain. The number of -Treaty Powers had by this time increased to fifteen, but the interests -of most of them being very small, it was recognized that if the consent -of the chief Powers could be obtained, no difficulties would be raised -by others. - -The working of the treaties had been on the whole satisfactory, as -satisfactory, that is to say, as it was reasonable to expect from the -exceptional circumstances attending their negotiation; and there seemed -to be no special points in regard to which revision was in any way -urgent. This, however, was not the view taken by the Japanese -Government. Very soon after the coming into operation of the treaties of -1858 the Japanese authorities and people seem to have taken umbrage at -the extra-territorial privileges enjoyed by foreigners in Japan under -Treaty stipulations. It is more than probable that this feeling with -regard to extra-territoriality may not have been altogether spontaneous, -but may have been inspired at this time by foreigners actuated by mixed -motives, and inclined to draw hasty conclusions. In any case, the -Japanese early became aware that the enjoyment of extra-territoriality -was regarded generally as a privilege conceded under pressure to the -subjects of countries possessing, or claiming to possess, a civilization -more advanced in some respects than that of the country from which the -concession was obtained. The pride of the nation rebelled against the -discrimination thus exercised, and not unnaturally it was eager to seize -the first opportunity that presented itself to get rid of the obnoxious -extra-territorial clauses that stood in the way of the exercise of -Japanese jurisdiction over foreigners in Japan. This was the main motive -underlying the desire for revision of the treaties. - -There were, however, additional objects in view in sending the mission. -To the foreign representatives the Government explained their anxiety to -communicate to the Governments of Treaty Powers details of the internal -history of their country during the years preceding the revolution of -1868, and their wish to inform them of the actual state of affairs, and -the future policy it was intended to pursue. They also considered it -important, it was added, to study the institutions of other countries -and to gain a precise knowledge of their laws, of the measures in force -regarding commerce and education, as well as of their naval and military -systems. - -So far as these minor objects were concerned, the proceedings of the -mission were attended with success. This was shown not only by the -period of its absence abroad, which extended over two years, far longer -than had been intended, but also by the rapid progress of the work of -reform after its return. The information gained by its members, amongst -whom were some of the most talented men of the day, was later on of much -service to their country; while the insight they gained into foreign -affairs, and the disposition of foreign Governments towards Japan, was -of the greatest value. In the matter of the ostensible purpose of the -mission, however, nothing was accomplished. The efforts of the -ambassadors in this direction met with no encouragement. The foreign -Governments concerned were indisposed to overlook the constant -obstructions to the fulfilment of Treaty stipulations caused by -indifference and ill-will on the part of Japanese officials. Nor, in -view of the short interval that had elapsed since Japan had emerged from -feudalism, were they in any haste to gratify the aspirations expressed -in the Letter of Credence presented by the head of the mission to the -President of the United States—the first country visited—which spoke of -an “intention to reform and improve the treaties, so that Japan might -stand on an equality with the most enlightened nations.” They -accordingly declined to enter into any discussion on the subject on the -ground that the moment had not arrived when the discussion could be -useful. - -The rebuff thus administered caused disappointment and ill-feeling, and -led before long to the beginning of an agitation for Treaty revision, -which did much mischief to foreign relations; was frequently used as a -convenient cry by politicians in the course of attacks directed against -the Government of the day; and lasted until the first of the new revised -treaties was signed by Great Britain in the summer of 1894. Its chief -effect, however, so far as foreigners were concerned, was to strengthen -the Japanese Government in its determination to resist all efforts on -the part of foreign Powers to obtain further access to the interior of -the country, and to restrict in every way possible the granting of any -additional facilities for foreign trade and intercourse under existing -treaties. - - -Much space has been devoted in previous chapters to the abolition of -feudalism as being the starting-point of Japan’s modern progress. The -immediate effect of that step, as well as the various measures relating -to land tenure and land taxation, which were its natural sequel, have -also been explained in some detail. There is, however, no intention to -trace with the same minuteness, or in strict chronological order, the -successive stages of the work of reform. Our purpose being to give a -general idea of the process which brought about the gradual -transformation of an Oriental country into a progressive modern Empire, -we shall pass lightly over many matters, dwelling mainly on such -conspicuous and outstanding features as will illustrate most clearly the -character and course of Japan’s modern development. - -Before touching on other measures of reform undertaken in the first -years following the Restoration, it may be well to glance at the -conditions under which the work of reform proceeded. The initial -difficulty which hampered the reformers at the outset was the absence of -any definite scheme of reconstruction. Beyond the surrender of feudal -fiefs nothing in the nature of a detailed programme had been thought -out. They had to feel their way. As one of the leading figures in the -events of the Restoration said some years later, “They could not look -far ahead; it was sufficient if they could agree on the next step to be -taken.” Another difficulty with which they had to contend was the -question of language. The spread of Christianity in the sixteenth and -seventeenth centuries had not been accompanied by the introduction, to -any appreciable extent, of any of the languages of the three -nationalities—Portuguese, Spanish and Italian—to which the early -missionaries belonged. The use of Latin in the religious services, and -the study of Japanese by the missionaries, had rendered this -unnecessary. And when Christianity disappeared, what little Portuguese, -or other Latin language, had come with it disappeared too. But with the -advent of the Dutch things were changed. The Dutch language became the -medium of commerce, and also the medium through which all Western -learning, and indeed all knowledge of the West, was received. A class of -Dutch-speaking interpreters, who found employment in foreign trade, grew -up; and with the enterprise, unsubdued by constant official repression, -and the curiosity for what is new, which have always distinguished the -Japanese people, men took to learning Dutch in order to educate -themselves. - -So, when foreign relations were renewed on a wider basis in the middle -of the nineteenth century, Dutch was the language to which Japanese and -foreigners naturally turned as the medium for the conduct of the newly -established intercourse. All communications were carried on in this -language, and it became the authentic text of all the earlier treaties, -including those of 1858. Harris, the first American representative in -Japan, in his diary gives us some idea of the trouble and vexation -involved on both sides in wrestling with the language problem. The Dutch -the Japanese had learnt was, he tells us, a mercantile patois, the -correct Dutch spoken by the Dutch interpreters attached to his mission -being quite strange to them. When it came to drawing up written -agreements in both languages, they insisted that every word in the Dutch -version should stand in the same order as its equivalent in the Japanese -version. This, he says, occasioned some difficulty, and we feel that he -is not overstating the case. - -The employment of Dutch as the medium of communication in the early days -of renewed foreign intercourse, though inevitable, was unfortunate. And -for this reason. During many years of the Dutch monopoly—so far as -Western nations were concerned—of trade with Japan, Holland was at the -zenith of her power. If not actually mistress of the seas, she occupied -a position of pre-eminence as a maritime state. But by the time the -first treaties with Japan were negotiated Holland had lost this high -position. She was no longer a great Power, and consequently the -knowledge of Dutch possessed by many Japanese ceased to be useful to -Japan. It was necessary for some other language to take its place. -Thanks to the growing commerce and power of Great Britain and the United -States, English was the language which stepped naturally into the -breach, and it became necessary for the Japanese to abandon Dutch, and -turn their attention to the acquisition of the new language which had -superseded it. - -So far we have dwelt on the difficulty connected with the languages of -the foreigners who had made their more or less unwelcome appearance on -the scene, and from whom Japan was intent on borrowing the materials of -the contemplated reforms. If we now turn to the other side of the -question, the difficulty arising from the Japanese language itself, it -will be seen how serious an obstacle to Japan’s modern progress her own -language presented. - -Until the seventh century of our era Japan had, as we have seen, her own -language. This was spoken, not written. Then by one of those -unaccountable impulses which affect the destinies of nations, she -followed the example of Korea, which had also spoken dialects of her -own, and adopted the written language of China. Later on, from the -Chinese characters thus borrowed, she evolved syllabaries, filling the -place for her of our alphabet for us, and so developed native scripts of -her own. But this native written language never prospered in its -competition with the Chinese characters from which it was derived. -Though it was employed in poetry, and other native classical literature -and served a useful purpose as a literary vehicle for women of the upper -classes, in whose hands it displayed unexpected potentialities, and for -the uneducated masses, it eventually found its most usual place in -literature as a simple adjunct to the use of Chinese. - -This incubus of two languages, disguised as one, was rendered still more -irksome by the fact that the borrowed Chinese written language never -became thoroughly assimilated and incorporated with the Japanese spoken -language to which it was joined, but preserved a more or less separate -identity. It would have simplified matters if the Japanese had given up -their spoken language and adopted Chinese in its place. There would then -have been a natural harmony and relation between the spoken and written -tongues, such as exists in China to-day. Japanese would then have -written as they spoke, and spoken as they wrote. But this they did not -do. Their own spoken language was there, and had sufficient vitality to -resent the intrusion of the alien tongue, though not enough to enable -the nation to shake itself free of the incubus it had voluntarily -imposed upon itself by this wholesale importation of Chinese characters. -In these considerations lies the explanation of the constantly recurring -agitation in favour of the adoption of the Roman alphabet in the place -of Chinese. - -In justice to Chinese characters it is well not to overlook the -advantage which a knowledge of them gives to the Japanese people over -foreign competitors in their intercourse and trade with China. It should -also be borne in mind that the Chinese side, so to speak, of the -Japanese language lends itself with peculiar facility to the formation -of new words to express new ideas. In this respect it has served to -encourage the introduction of Western civilization. These advantages -are, nevertheless, counterbalanced to a large extent by the addition to -the language of a countless host of dissyllabic words, only to be -distinguished one from the other by the attendant hieroglyphs. The -result is the creation of a cumbrous vocabulary, based on Chinese, which -is growing so fast as to discourage scholarship, thus hampering the very -progress it is employed to promote. - -One other difficulty remains to be considered. In turning to the West -for inspiration in the work of reconstruction Japan was borrowing not -from one country, as before, but from several. Nor was there any natural -affinity between her and them, as in the case of the first country, -China, which she had laid under contribution. The new ideas, moreover, -she was assimilating belonged not to the same, but to different periods -of time. There was as great diversity of date, as there was of origin. -But they all came together, and had to be harmonized, in some degree, -with a foundation of things in its origin Chinese. Japan has been -generally regarded as having deliberately embarked on a policy of -eclecticism. No other course lay open to her. Out of the crowd of new -things which presented themselves she had to make a choice. And the -urgency of the moment left her little time in which to make it. - -We have noticed some of the difficulties which lay in the path of -Japan’s progress, and tended to complicate the work of reconstruction. -Let us see what advantages she had to help her. There were not many, and -some were moral and not material. The reforming statesmen were helped by -the feeling of exaltation common to all political revolutions, as well -as by the wave of enthusiasm for what was hailed as the restoration of -the direct rule of the Sovereign, though what this would mean, when -accomplished, beyond the disappearance of the Shōgunate, none of its -advocates had any clear notion. The general feeling in favour of reform -which, with exceptions in the case of the former military class, existed -throughout the country was also in their favour. Japan, too, in these -early years was conscious of the sympathy of Treaty Powers. It has been -the fashion amongst a certain class of writers to decry the attitude of -foreign Powers, who are represented as unsympathetic and as having held -out no helping hand to the young Government then on its trial. This is -an erroneous view. Even before the Restoration, at the time when the -Court was openly hostile to foreign intercourse, and the Shōgunate, in -its extremity, was facing both ways—announcing to the Throne its -determination to expel the hated barbarian, while assuring the latter in -the same breath of the friendliness of its feelings; conniving at -obstruction it would have liked to direct more openly and then feigning -indignation at its own misdeeds—the forbearance of foreign Governments, -and the patience of their agents, are things of which the West may well -be proud. And as soon as the sincerity of Japanese reforms was clearly -understood, the sympathy of foreign Governments took a more active -shape. - -Perhaps, also, we shall be safe in assuming that the new Government was -assisted to some extent in the introduction of reforms by the -submissiveness of the people they were called upon to rule. Under the -influence of Chinese ideas the dividing line separating rulers from -ruled was very sharply drawn. Both in Confucian ethics, and in Buddhist -teaching, the two foundations of Japanese morality, the greatest weight -is given to the virtue of loyalty to superiors, which comprises—and this -is an essential point—obedience to constituted authorities. Equal -prominence in the same ethics and teaching is assigned to the -corresponding duty of the ruler to govern wisely, or, as the phrase -runs, “with benevolence.” The conception of the relationship between -governors and governed, as it presented itself to the Japanese mind of -those days, was that it was the business, the duty, of the Government to -govern, the privilege, or right, of the subject to be ruled. The latter -looked to those in authority for light and leading. So long as the -government was in accordance with Confucian doctrine, conducted with -“benevolence,” that is to say, without glaring injustice and tyranny, he -was satisfied. The establishment later on of constitutional government -and the practical working of a Diet and local assemblies have somewhat -modified this habit of mind. But even in the most stormy and tumultuous -sessions which have of recent years characterized the development of -parliamentary institutions the influence of this old idea has been -apparent; while in the earlier periods of which we are now speaking it -was a dominant and salutary factor, lightening very materially the task -of the administrator. - -There was still another agency working in the same direction. This was -the new field of activity opened by the changes accompanying the -Restoration to the energies of the people, more especially those of the -commercial and industrial classes. Their attention was engrossed in a -large measure by their own concerns, which were rendered of increased -and more varied interest by the upheaval caused by the revolution in -national life. They had thus little time, even had the wish been there, -to enquire closely into the direction of public affairs. - -There was advantage, too, in the fact that Japan had borrowed before, -and had, therefore, gained experience in the art of assimilating foreign -ideas. She was not new to the work. She was only doing now on a less -extensive scale what she had done on a previous occasion. And her task -was rendered more simple because what she was now taking from the West -lent itself to her immediate requirements, perhaps, in a more practical -way than her borrowings of former days from a sister nation. - -Finally, we must not overlook the immense advantage she had in the -adoption of all reforms which were based on Western models. At no cost -to herself, without expenditure of time, thought, labour or money, she -took the fruit of generations of toil in Europe and America. She levied -toll on all the Western world. Profiting, at once, by the discoveries -and improvements made in the course of centuries in every field of human -energy, she began in her career of constructive progress at the point -which other countries had already reached. - - - - - CHAPTER XI - Changes and Reforms—Relations with China and Korea—Rupture in - Ministry—Secession of Tosa and Hizen Leaders—Progress of - Reforms—Annexation of Loochoo—Discontent of Former Military Class. - - -The changes introduced after the Restoration group themselves broadly -into two kinds—those borrowed from abroad, and those due to the -inspiration of the reformers themselves. The reforms affecting the land, -which we have already considered, fall essentially into the latter -category. Though some colouring of Western ideas may be apparent in the -stress laid on uniformity of tenure and taxation, and in some other -respects, the land reform, viewed as a whole, was the logical outcome of -the abolition of feudalism. It was thus from the first a matter into -which domestic considerations alone entered, one that was free, -therefore, from any marked foreign influences. - -Of a different kind, and bearing the manifest impress of importation -from the West, were the introduction of conscription on European—mainly -German—lines; the creation of a postal system, and the opening of a -mint; the construction of the first railways, telegraphs and dockyards; -the suppression of anti-Christian edicts, and the cessation of religious -persecution; the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar; the formation of a -Board for the development of Yezo; the establishment of treaty relations -with China in accordance with Western usages; the creation of the Tōkiō -University; and the removal of the prohibition regarding the use, in -speech or writing, of the Mikado’s name. All these changes occurred in -rapid succession in the short space of five years. - -With regard to the change, or reform, last mentioned—the removal of the -interdict regarding the use of the Emperor’s name—to foreigners the -permission seems as strange as the prohibition. It sounds like an echo -from remote ages. But it is difficult to exaggerate the gulf which had -hitherto separated the Throne from the people. Only in an ironical sense -could the phrase “the fierce light that beats upon a throne” have been -applied to a Japanese monarch. Both the throne and its occupant were -veiled in mysterious shadow, and to the respect due to royalty was added -the veneration paid to a God. In the case of the Mikado, his name never -appeared in writing until 1868, when the Message dated the 3rd February -of that year, announcing to foreign Governments his assumption of -“supreme authority,” in consequence of the Shōgun’s voluntary -resignation of “the governing power,” was delivered to the foreign -representatives. This Message bore the signature “Mutsuhito,” which -purported to be the sign-manual of the Sovereign. The change introduced -was, however, of no practical importance, for no one wished to make use -of the permission vouchsafed. It is interesting only from the fact of -its being a significant departure from traditional custom, and also -because it illustrates the spirit in which all reform was conceived. - -The establishment in 1871 of a new Board, or minor department, for the -development of the then northernmost island of Yezo, thenceforth to be -known as the _Hokkaidō_, or Northern Sea Circuit—one of the many -geographical areas distinguished by this name into which Japan is -divided—calls for notice chiefly from the fact that it was one of the -few instances of reforms which were unsuccessful. For the enterprise in -question the services of American experts were engaged. The project, on -which in all some £10,000,000 are stated to have been spent, languished -from the outset, though some benefit was ultimately derived from the -horse-breeding industry which was then created; and ten years later the -Board was dissolved. It was in connection with the abandonment of this -undertaking, the direction of which was entrusted to General Kuroda, a -leading Satsuma clansman, that Marquis (then Mr.) Ōkuma left the -Ministry, which he did not rejoin until seven years later. - -Various reasons were assigned for this failure, charges of official -corruption being freely made. As to one contributory cause there can be -little doubt—the distaste, or, it may be, the constitutional unfitness, -of the Japanese people for what may be called the pioneer work of -colonization. Those who differ from this view may point to the success -achieved by Japan elsewhere, in Formosa, for instance, which she -received as part of the fruits of her victory over China in the war of -1894–95. The conditions in that case, however, were exceptionally -favourable. The secret of her success there lay in the great natural -riches of the island, due to virtues of climate and soil, in a plentiful -supply of cheap labour, and in the still, industry and organizing talent -which distinguish the Japanese people. Formosa produces nearly the whole -of the world’s supply of camphor, of which Japan has made a State -monopoly. Among other notable products are cane sugar, now also a State -monopoly, tea and rice. The development of these staple products is a -tribute to the thoroughness of Japanese administrative methods. But the -Japanese were never pioneers there; nor did they create the industries -they developed. These owe their inception to the Chinese population, -originally settlers from the mainland, which was disputing the hill -country with the aborigines when the Japanese arrived. Ten years after -the Japanese occupation of the island the Japanese inhabitants, -including many officials, numbered only 40,000, as compared with some -100,000 aborigines, with whom an intermittent warfare is still being -carried on, and about 3,000,000 Chinese. These figures speak for -themselves. - -The less favourable conditions of climate and soil under which similar -operations have been conducted in the northernmost Japanese islands have -led to very different results. Of recent years, owing to the -exploitation of coal mines and the general growth of shipping and -commerce, there has been a marked advance in the development of Yezo. As -compared, however, with the great strides made by Japan in other -directions, the record of what has been accomplished there in the half -century which has elapsed since the Restoration is disappointing. Viewed -in conjunction with other facts, it justifies the inference that while -the industry and enterprise of the Japanese people ensure remarkable -results in favourable conditions, where no pioneer work is demanded,—as -in Formosa, Hawaii, and the Pacific coasts of Canada and America—neither -by physique nor by temperament are they fitted to cope under adverse -circumstances with the strenuous toil and severe hardships of pioneer -colonization. And this conclusion is supported by what we know of the -Japanese occupation of Manchurian territory. The point is of importance -as bearing on the question of finding an outlet for the surplus -population of Japan, a subject which is frequently discussed in the -Japanese Press, and which will be referred to again in a later chapter. - -If the importance of a subject in public affairs were measured merely by -the amount of attention and labour bestowed upon it, religion would -occupy an inconspicuous place in the list of reforms of the Meiji era. -Only to a limited extent, and then only as identified in a general way -with progressive ideas of Western origin, can the measures taken in -regard to religion be regarded as coming under the head of reforms -borrowed from abroad. Apart from slight changes in the details of -ceremonial observances at religious festivals, adopted later on, and -designed to bring such popular celebrations more into keeping with -Western notions of propriety and decorum, religious reform had from the -first a merely negative character. It did not extend beyond the -withdrawal of the anti-Christian measures that were a survival of the -Christian persecutions of the seventeenth century. It is generally -admitted that the anti-Christian feeling which then arose, and the cruel -penal laws it inspired, were due to political more than to religious -causes. In the toleration extended to Christianity, which found -expression in the withdrawal of anti-Christian edicts, we again see the -operation of political rather than religious motives. Political -expediency, not religious animosity, was thus associated with the -beginning and end of the anti-Christian movement. This is in accordance -with all that we know of the Japanese character. All accounts of Japan, -whether written by Japanese or foreigners, testify to the absence of -anything approaching to religious fanaticism. - -As for the other measures affecting religion taken by the new -Government, they were not even progressive in intention, for they were -avowedly a return to what had existed centuries before. They were, -however, in accordance with the principles professed by the Imperialists -at the time of the Restoration; and this was the reason for their -adoption. It will be more convenient to consider these changes under the -head of Religion, which will be treated in subsequent chapters. - - -On the return of the Iwakura Mission from abroad in 1873 its members -became aware of the serious crisis in domestic affairs which had -occurred in their absence. A difference of opinion had arisen on the -subject of Korea. Since the ultimate failure of the Japanese invasion of -that country, towards the close of the sixteenth century, which was due -to the intervention of China at a moment when Japan had exhausted -herself in the long struggle, the relations between the two countries -had been restricted to the conduct of a trifling trade, and to formal -missions of courtesy sent to announce the accession of a new Sovereign, -or to offer congratulations on the occasion. This trade was carried on -by the Japanese at the port of Pusan, on the southern coast of Korea -opposite the Japanese island of Tsushima. Here there was a small -commercial establishment doing business with the Koreans much in the -same way as the Dutch had previously traded with the Japanese through -their factory at Déshima (Nagasaki). There was a further resemblance -between the former Dutch position in Japan and that of the Japanese in -Korea in the fact that through ill-will, or lack of enterprise on the -part of the Koreans, the trading operations of the Japanese merchants -had become gradually more and more restricted. At the time in question -the attitude of the Koreans towards the residents in the tiny settlement -was the reverse of friendly, and the Japanese authorities had withdrawn -from Pusan all but subordinate officials. According to Japanese -accounts, the Koreans appear to have continued to send periodical -missions of courtesy during the whole period of Tokugawa rule. But when -the Restoration took place they refused to send the customary envoy to -Tōkiō, and also declined to receive the envoy despatched by the new -Japanese Government. Their refusal to have any further intercourse with -Japan was based on the ground that by adopting a new and progressive -policy she had shown herself to be in league with Western barbarians, -thus abandoning the traditions of the Far East to which China and Korea -remained faithful. This affront to Japanese dignity caused great -resentment throughout the country. It came at a moment when there was -already a good deal of friction and smouldering ill-feeling amongst the -leading members of the Government, and the Cabinet, if we may so regard -the inner political group which controlled affairs, became at once -divided into two parties. One of these, led by the elder Saigō, -Soyéshima, Itō Shimpei, Itagaki and Gotō, urged the immediate despatch -of a strong remonstrance. Of this Saigō was anxious to be the bearer, a -course which, as everyone who knew the then temper of the nation, and -the character of the suggested envoy, was aware, must, if followed, lead -to war. The other party, consisting of Chōshiū and other clansmen -centred round the Prime Minister, though little disposed to condone any -deliberate discourtesy on the part of a neighbouring State which had -played so prominent a part in Japanese history, felt that the moment was -inopportune for war. They also probably distrusted—and not without -reason—the motives which actuated the advocates of an aggressive policy. - -The matter was referred to Iwakura and his colleagues in the mission. -Their influence turned the scale in favour of a peaceful solution of the -difficulty, with the result that the leaders of the war party resigned -their positions in the Government, their example being followed by many -subordinate office-holders. Saigō and one or two others retired to their -native provinces, the rest remaining in the Capital. This took place in -October, 1873. - -The rupture in the Ministry—the first to occur since the formation of -the new Government five years before—had ostensibly arisen over the -Korean question. But in reality there were other issues at stake. This -much is clear from the Memorial presented to the Government in January -of the following year by four of the retiring statesmen, Soyéshima, Itō -Shimpei, Itagaki and Gotō, together with five other officials of lesser -note, whose names do not concern us. Neither in the Memorial itself, nor -in the joint letter in which it was enclosed, is there a word about -Korea. The Memorialists complain in their letter of the delay of the -Government in taking steps for the establishment of representative -institutions. One of the objects of the Iwakura Mission was, it is -pointed out, to gain information for this purpose. Since its return, -however, the promised measures had not been introduced. The continued -withholding from the people of opportunities for public discussion had -created a dangerous situation, calculated to lead to grave trouble in -the country. - -It will be seen from this letter that the grievance of the Ministers who -resigned—with the exception of the elder Saigō—related to the question -not of war with Korea, but of the establishment of some form of -representative institutions, as foreshadowed in the Imperial Oath. Their -quarrel with the Government was based on the view that the latter had -broken its promise to take steps in the desired direction. - -The Memorial was a repetition of this charge in very prolix form. It -dwelt on the right of the people to a share in the direction of public -affairs, and on the urgency of establishing representative institutions. - -The absence of Saigō’s signature both from the letter and Memorial is -not surprising. He had no sympathy with popular reforms of Western -origin. His association in the act of resignation with men whose -political views were so different from his own, and with whom he could -have little in common except dissatisfaction with the conduct of public -affairs, simply indicates the existence of a general spirit of unrest. - -The answer of the Government to the memorialists was not unfavourable. -They were told that the principle of an assembly to be chosen by the -people was an excellent one. The question of the establishment of local -assemblies must, however, take precedence, and this matter was already -occupying the Government’s attention. - -When discussing in a previous chapter the effects of the abolition of -feudalism it was pointed out what great hardship this measure inflicted -on the military class. That the _ex-samurai_, or _shizoku_, to give them -their new name, should as a class be dissatisfied with the sudden change -in their fortunes was not surprising. It would have been strange if they -had not resented the loss of their many privileges: the superior social -status they enjoyed, their permanent incomes hereditary in the family; a -house and garden free of rent; exemption from all taxation; and the -advantage, appreciated by so poor a class, of being able to travel at -cheaper rates than other people. In the course of the inevitable -reaction which followed on the accomplishment of the common object which -had united the Western clans, and which, it should not be forgotten, was -the work of the military class, there was ample occasion for the -_shizoku_ to realize all that they had lost by the disappearance of -feudalism. The haste, too, with which the new Government had embarked in -their course of reform, copied from abroad, gave umbrage to the -conservatives in that class who still outnumbered those who were in -favour of progress. Nor was the engagement of foreigners, whose services -were indispensable in the execution of these reforms, less unwelcome. -The foreign experts needed were drawn from various countries. The -assistance of France was invoked for the army, and for legal reforms; -that of Germany for the army and for medical science; that of Great -Britain for the navy, for railway construction, telegraphs and -lighthouses, as well as for technical instruction in engineering; -Americans were called in to help in the matter of education and in -agriculture; while experts from Italy and Holland acted as advisers on -questions concerning silk culture and embankments. - -Speaking of the craze for imitating the West which prevailed at this -period, the _History of Japan_, compiled under official direction for -the Chicago Exposition of 1893, says: “During the early years of the -Meiji era any knowledge, however slight, of Western science was regarded -as a qualification for official employment. Students who had shown -themselves intelligent were sent to Europe and America to inspect and -report on the conditions existing there, and, as each of these -travellers found something new to endorse and import, the mania for -Occidental innovations constantly increased. To preserve or revere old -customs and fashions was regarded with contempt, and so far did the -fancy run that some gravely entertained the project of abolishing the -Japanese language, and substituting English for it.” - -Captain Brinkley, a friendly critic, in his _History of Japan_ confirms -this statement. “In short,” he says, “the Japanese undertook in the most -lighthearted manner possible to dress themselves in clothes such as they -had never worn before, and which had been made to fit other people. The -spectacle looked strange enough to justify the apprehensions of foreign -critics who asked whether it was possible that so many novelties should -be successfully assimilated, or that a nation should adapt itself to -systems planned by a motley band of aliens who knew nothing of its -characters or customs.” - -Nevertheless, in many respects the inner life of the people remained -unaffected by the Western innovations so eagerly adopted. The nation was -not called upon to make such sweeping sacrifices as appearances -suggested. But the dissatisfied conservative of the former military -class who watched the rapid progress of reform in the hands of -enthusiastic reformers was not likely to make any fine discriminations; -nor was it surprising if the zeal he witnessed, and perhaps also the -employment of unwelcome foreigners at what to him seemed extravagant -salaries, served to increase his dissatisfaction with the new order of -things. - -In January, 1874, a few days after the presentation of the Memorial -above mentioned, the smouldering discontent burst into flame. Itō -Shimpei, one of the memorialists, who had retired to Saga, the chief -town in his native province of Hizen, collected there a considerable -body of disaffected _shizoku_ and made a successful raid on the -prefectural offices. The Government quickly despatched troops against -the rebels. Driven out of the town, they fled to Satsuma, hoping to -receive assistance from Saigō. No aid, however, was forthcoming from -this quarter, and Itō and the other insurgent leaders were arrested and -executed. - -The Hizen insurrection, and the existence of much discontent throughout -the country, which showed itself, among other incidents, in the -attempted assassination of Iwakura, suggested the advisability of -finding some outlet for the mischievous energies of the disbanded -_samurai_, and of diverting their attention from home politics. At this -moment there arose an unlooked-for difficulty in connection with -Loochoo, which furnished the desired opportunity. - -Loochoo will be remembered as the place which Perry made his base of -operations before negotiating the Treaty of 1853. The principality—for -in those days there was a prince to whom his own subjects, the Chinese, -and even the Japanese, gave the title of King—consisted of the large -island of Okinawa and nine outlying groups which are situated some two -hundred miles south of Japan, according to the latter’s geographical -limits at that time. By a curious “Box and Cox” sort of arrangement, -which lent itself to the relations then existing between Loochoo and her -more powerful neighbours, and seems to have had the tacit sanction of -each suzerain, the principality regarded itself as a dependency of both -China and Japan, paying tribute to each as its “parents,” in the -phraseology of the day. The payment of tribute to China dated from the -fourteenth century; that to Japan from the beginning of the seventeenth, -when the islands were conquered by the Satsuma clan. In the winter of -1872–3 some Loochooans who were shipwrecked on the coast of Formosa -(then a part of China) had met with ill-treatment at the hands of -savages in that island. When news of the outrage reached Japan, which -was not for some months, the Japanese Government made representations at -Peking. As the Chinese authorities refused to accept responsibility for -the acts of the savages, an expedition was fitted out in Japan in May, -1894, with the object of exacting reparation from the offending tribe. -General Saigō Tsugumichi, the younger brother of the ex-Councillor of -State, from whom he was distinguished by his progressive views, was -placed in command of the Japanese forces, which consisted of some three -thousand men. China retaliated by sending troops of her own to Formosa, -and for a time there was every prospect of a collision. The difficulty -was eventually settled through the intervention of the British Minister -at Peking. The Chinese Government agreed to pay an indemnity, and the -expedition returned to Japan after an absence of six months. - -The dispute with China over Loochoo was thus settled for the time being, -but a few years later, in 1879, when Japan formally annexed the islands -and the King was removed to Tōkiō, the Chinese Government impugned her -action on the ground that Loochoo was a tributary state owing allegiance -to China. The incident became the subject of lengthy discussion between -Peking and Tōkiō, in the course of which the advice of General Grant, -ex-President of the United States, who was then visiting Japan, is said -to have been sought by Japanese Ministers; but in the end the matter was -allowed to drop without any definite understanding being arrived at. - -The difficulty with Korea, which had been the ostensible cause of the -first rupture in the new Government, was also settled by a show of force -without recourse to actual hostilities. In the summer of 1875 a Japanese -surveying vessel was fired at whilst surveying the river leading to the -Korean capital. General (later Count) Kuroda and Mr. (afterwards -Marquis) Inouyé, who was a native of Chōshiū, were sent with ships of -war to demand satisfaction. The Korean Government offered apologies, and -the envoys concluded a Treaty which opened two Korean ports to Japanese -trade. - -An incident in Japan’s foreign relations occurring about this time, -which calls for passing notice, is the arrangement made with Russia in -regard to Saghalien. In the Treaty of 1858 between Russia and Japan the -island was declared to be a joint possession of the two Powers. The -Tokugawa Government subsequently proposed the 50th parallel of north -latitude as the boundary between the two countries, but no final -decision was arrived at. After the Restoration the Japanese Government -reopened negotiations on the subject through the medium of the United -States, proposing the same boundary. The Russian Government, however, -would not accept this solution of the difficulty. Eventually the two -Powers concluded an agreement at the Russian capital by which Russia -gave the Kurile islands, to which her claim was doubtful, to Japan in -exchange for Saghalien. - -Neither the Formosan expedition, nor the resolute measures taken in -regard to Korea, had any salutary effect upon the general discontent -amongst the _shizoku_, the pacific settlement of both matters having -frustrated any hopes which might have been formed of military employment -in a foreign campaign. The settlement of the Korean question was -denounced as a weak surrender, and the Ministry were condemned for -making a Treaty on a footing of equality with a country which -acknowledged the suzerainty of China, thus compromising the dignity of -Japan. Nor, in spite of the appointment of prominent Satsuma men to the -chief command of each expedition, and the inclusion of the Satsuma noble -Shimadzu in the Government in the high position of _Sadaijin_, or second -Minister of State, was there any improvement in the attitude of the -clan. - -In the course of 1876 there were two other risings, both promptly -suppressed, in Chōshiū and Higo, and by this time the state of affairs -in Satsuma caused great anxiety to the Government. The tone of -semi-independence assumed, as has already been pointed out, by that clan -during the Tokugawa rule was maintained after the Restoration. In other -provinces the work of administrative unification had progressed quickly -and smoothly, local officials being now frequently chosen from other -parts of the country. But in Satsuma there was a refusal to accept any -official who was not a native of the province. Some comfort there might -be for the Government in the fact that the clan had abstained from -making common cause with the rebellious clansmen in other provinces, and -that the relations between the two chief leaders, Shimadzu and the elder -Saigō, continued to be strained. But these considerations were -outweighed by others. - -Of all the measures introduced, or contemplated, by the new Government, -those to which the strongest objection was felt by the _shizoku_ -everywhere were the establishment of conscription, the compulsory -commutation of pensions, and the prohibition of the practice of wearing -swords. The last of these measures came into force in January, 1877. -That conscription should be viewed with disfavour by the former military -class was only natural, if only for the reason that its adoption by -opening a military career to all classes of the nation offended ancient -prejudices, besides being a death-blow to any hope entertained by -reactionary clansmen of reviving feudalism. The commutation of pensions -had, as we have seen, been arranged in 1871, when feudalism was -abolished. But the system then introduced was voluntary. Now it was made -compulsory. Occurring when it did, it provoked resentment. The wearing -of swords had also at the same date been made optional. The prohibition -now enforced mattered little to the _shizoku_ of the towns, many of whom -had welcomed the opportunity of relinquishing a custom not without -inconvenience to town-dwellers, and offering no longer any advantage. -But to those in the provinces, with whose traditions and habits the -wearing of swords was intimately associated, the change was most -distasteful. It was, moreover, precisely in Satsuma and one or two -neighbouring clans that the option of not wearing swords had been -availed of least. To the Satsuma malcontents, whose military -preparations included sword exercise, it might well appear that the -prohibition was aimed specially at them. - - - - - CHAPTER XII - Local Risings—Satsuma Rebellion—Two-Clan Government. - - -When mentioning in a previous chapter the occurrence of dissensions in -the Ministry soon after the Restoration, attention was drawn to a point -of some importance—the division of feeling which existed in several of -the clans. This was most conspicuous in Satsuma, Chōshiū and Mito. Even -before the Restoration the contentions of rival parties had led in -Chōshiū to grave disorders, which had weakened that clan in its conflict -with the Tokugawa Government; while in Mito the struggle of opposing -factions, supporting, respectively, the Shōgunate, and the Court party -represented by the old Prince of Mito, had resulted in prolonged and -fierce fighting. Though in Satsuma the rivalry of individual leaders had -stopped short of open hostilities, the division of feeling was not less -marked. There, as has been pointed out, the situation was complicated by -the existence of no less than three parties—two conservative groups led, -respectively, by the old noble Shimadzu, the father of the young -ex-daimiō, and by the elder Saigō, the latter being at once the most -influential and most numerous; and a third—the party of reform—which -looked for guidance, amongst other prominent men, to Ōkubo, Kuroda, -Matsugata, Kawamura and the younger Saigō. After the Restoration the -condition of things became less unsettled in Mito, and to some extent -also in Chōshiū. But in Satsuma the division of feeling remained -unaltered, a circumstance which, added to separatist tendencies that -stood in the way of combined action, was, in the sequel, of much benefit -to the Government. - -We have touched on the general and special causes which brought about, -first a rupture in the Ministry, then the earlier risings in Hizen, -Chōshiū and Higo, and lastly the Satsuma rebellion. One other reason, -not yet mentioned, was personal and clan jealousies and ambitions. What -the disaffected clans and individuals wanted was a larger share of -power. All, perhaps, over-estimated their share in the accomplishment of -the Restoration. They had, they considered, paid the piper, and they -wished to call the tune. - -Ever since his retirement from office, and his withdrawal to his native -province in 1873, the elder Saigō had remained in Kagoshima, the chief -town of Satsuma. Here he had established an institution which, in order -to disguise its object, was called a “private school.” In reality it was -a military college. In its central quarters in that town, and in -branches elsewhere, the youth of the clan received a military training. -In the autumn of 1875 it was already in a flourishing condition, and in -the course of the following year there were in Kagoshima alone some -seven thousand pupils, or associates. By this time much uneasiness -prevailed. Public apprehension found free expression in the Press, which -said that the nation was divided into two parties, one being for the -Government, the other for Satsuma, and asked what could be done to -preserve peace. - -The coming into force in January, 1877, of the edict, issued in the -previous year, prohibiting the wearing of swords, was followed by -Shimadzu’s resignation of the high office he held in the Ministry. In -disgust at this latest move of a Government with which he had never from -the first been in sympathy, he left Tōkiō. Not being allowed to travel -by sea, he went back to Satsuma by land, following the historic route he -and other nobles had so often taken before. The members of his retinue -carried in cotton bags the swords they were no longer allowed to wear; -and when, at the end of his journey, the gates of the _yashiki_ at -Kagoshima closed upon his palanquin, he may have realized that he had -passed for ever out of the political life in which he had at one time -played so conspicuous a rôle. In the hostilities which followed he took -no part, being content to show his disapproval of the new _régime_ by -withdrawing into a retirement from which he never again emerged. - -Early in 1877 the rebellion broke out. Some excitement had been caused -in Satsuma by the rumour of a plot to murder Saigō, and the Government -thought it prudent to endeavour to remove a part at least of the stores -in the Kagoshima arsenal. The execution of this plan was prevented by -cadets of the “private school,” and an officer sent from Tōkiō in the -middle of January to arrange matters met with a hostile reception, and -was obliged to return without landing. War was now certain. A few days -later Saigō took the field, and, marching north rapidly, besieged the -castle of Kumamoto, the chief town of the province of Higo. This step is -generally held to have been fatal to his success. His proper course, it -is thought, would have been to have crossed over at once to the main -island and move straight on Tōkiō, trusting to the magic of his name to -secure fresh adherents on his way. The rebels had some advantages on -their side. Their preparations had been made; their leader was a popular -hero; and the reputation of the clan for fighting qualities was -unrivalled. So universal was the respect inspired by Satsuma swordsmen -in those days that mothers in districts further north would quiet -fractious infants by warnings of the coming of the dreaded Satsuma men, -just as women in Europe in the last century made use, for the same -purpose, of Bonaparte’s name. It was doubtful, moreover, what reliance -could be placed on the mixed force sent by the Government to encounter -the rebels. But in all other respects the Government was far better -equipped for the struggle than its opponents. It had large military -supplies, accumulated in anticipation of what was coming, besides money -and credit. It had the exclusive use of railways and telegraphs, a small -fleet, shipping facilities, and the command of the sea. The Crown, too, -was on its side, an important point, as we have seen, in Japanese -warfare; and it had the further and somewhat singular advantage of being -assisted by the co-operation in army, navy, and civil administration of -the picked men, intellectually speaking, of the rebel clan, who had -thrown in their lot with the Government, and knew the Satsuma resources -better, possibly, than the rebels themselves. One other factor in the -struggle remains to be noted—the numerous recruits who flocked to the -Imperial standard from districts which had formerly supported the -Tokugawa cause. Amongst these Aidzu clansmen were conspicuous. Filled -with hatred of their late foes in the Civil War of 1868–9, and eager to -take revenge for the disaster which had then overtaken them, they fought -with a dogged courage and tenacity, and, as swordsmen, in the close -hand-to-hand fighting which was a feature of the war, they more than -held their own against their redoubtable antagonists. - -The investment of Kumamoto by the rebels gave time for the Imperial -forces to concentrate, and the relief of that place in the early summer -was the turning-point of the struggle. It closed in September of the -same year with the death of Saigō in Kagoshima, to which place he had -doubled back with a few followers through the Imperial lines. He died in -true _samurai_ fashion. Driven by shellfire from a hill fort in the -Satsuma capital, he was retiring to another part of the town, when a -bullet struck him in the thigh, inflicting a dangerous wound. He fell, -calling on a friend at his side to cut off his head, so as to avoid the -disgrace which, according to the military code of the day, would be -incurred were it to come into the hands of the enemy. His friend did as -he was asked, and made his escape with the head. - -The war was a heavy drain on the Government exchequer. An official -estimate of its cost, made in 1893, placed it as high as £82,000,000, an -estimate which seems excessive. But the benefits resulting from the -dangerous crisis through which the nation had safely passed far -outweighed the sacrifice in lives and treasure. Nor is it easy to see -how they could have been gained in any other way. The suppression of the -rebellion was more than a mere victory for the Government. It meant the -triumph of a progressive policy over the mediævalism of old Japan. The -reactionary and disturbing elements in the country had been taught that -the new order of things must be accepted. The new conscript army had -dispelled all doubts of its efficiency and had demonstrated, to the -surprise of everybody, that the fighting spirit was not the inheritance -solely of the former military class, but that an army recruited from all -classes of the people was an institution on which the State could safely -depend. Moreover, the administrative organization having successfully -passed the severest test to which it could have been put, the Government -felt that it had acquired the confidence of the nation, and also of -foreign Powers, to a degree unknown before. One result, therefore, of -the rebellion was that the Government emerged from the struggle stronger -and more compact than before. To this must be added another even more -striking: the fact that the Satsuma influence in the Government remained -unimpaired in spite of recent events. This may be explained partly by -the circumstance, already noted, that the party in the rebel clan in -favour of progress had never wavered in its allegiance to the -Government, and, perhaps also, partly by the generosity shown to the -vanquished by the victors. The liberal policy, quite opposed to the -traditions and the spirit of that day, adopted by the Imperialists at -the close of the war of the Restoration was again followed after the -Satsuma rebellion. No stigma, when hostilities had ceased, attached to -the men who had fought for the clan. The temple dedicated shortly -afterwards to those who had fallen in the conflict was erected to the -common memory of all, both loyalists and rebels. From that moment, -too—though the tendency in this direction had shown itself earlier—the -administration, instead of being, as after the Restoration, a government -of the four leading clans, became frankly a government of the two clans -of Satsuma and Chōshiū, a character it retains to-day. - -The leading fact which emerges from the foregoing account of events is -the grave difficulties with which the Government established after the -Restoration had to contend. One sees the contest going on between old -and new Japan, and the conflict of views which divided the men who -carried out the revolution; one notices how tenaciously, in spite of -edicts and regulations, old feudal instincts survived; and one realizes -what courage and skill were needed to enable the Ministry of reformers -to steer a middle course between those who wished to put back the hands -of the clock and those who wanted the rate of progress to be still -faster. - - -During the period of civil commotion, which ended with the suppression -of the Satsuma rebellion, the work of reconstruction did not stand still -altogether. To this period belong the birth of the Press and the -formation of the _Mitsu Bishi_, the earliest Japanese steamship company; -the first assembly of provincial governors, which, after the suppression -of the Satsuma rebellion, became a yearly feature of administrative -procedure; the issue of regulations which were the first step in the -revision of local administration in towns and villages; and the creation -of a High Court of Justice (_Daishinin_) and a Legislative Chamber, or -Senate (_Genrō-in_), composed of officials, that continued in existence -until 1890. The Imperial message delivered at the opening of the first -session announced the desire to establish representative government -gradually, and described the creation of the Senate as a first step in -this direction. In some respects the functions of this Chamber were more -those of an Advisory Council than a Senate of the character found in -Western Constitutions. It had no power to initiate legislation, nor to -give it final effect. But it filled a useful place as a provisional -institution in the machinery of administration. It facilitated the work -of government by drafting new laws, and by discussing and suggesting -alterations in any measures submitted for its consideration. In the -domain of foreign affairs, too, by the establishment of treaty relations -with Korea, and the conclusion of an agreement with Russia regarding -Saghalien and the Kurile islands, to which reference has already been -made, controversies of a troublesome nature were definitely settled. -With the restoration of order the work of reconstruction proceeded more -rapidly. A Stock Exchange and a Chamber of Commerce were formed in the -Capital, where also the first National Industrial Exhibition was held; a -bimetallic system of currency was introduced; while the complications -attending the double allegiance of Loochoo were put an end to by the -annexation, already recorded, of that island. A further step was also -taken in the direction of appeasing popular clamour for representative -government by the promise made in 1878 of introducing prefectural -assemblies at an early date. - -It will be remembered that in its answer to the Memorials of impatient -reformers in 1873, when the first rupture in the Ministry took place, -the Government had explained that the introduction of prefectural -assemblies must necessarily precede the creation of a National -Parliament. Its attitude at that time in regard to the demands of the -advanced section of reformers, who were agitating for the establishment -forthwith of representative institutions, was clearly expressed in an -inspired article which appeared in a Tōkiō newspaper. In this it was -pointed out that outside of the official class there was very little -knowledge of public affairs, that the immediate need of the country was -education, and that the Government could work to better purpose by -increasing educational facilities through the establishment of schools -than by the hasty creation of a Representative Assembly. The definite -promise now made after the lapse of five years was in accordance with -the view then expressed as to the necessity of giving precedence to -local assemblies, and was fulfilled two years later. - -It seems desirable to explain more fully how the Government directed by -the four clans which effected the Restoration became a Government of -only two of these. When referring to the concentration of administrative -authority, after the suppression of the Satsuma rebellion, in the hands -of the two clans of Satsuma and Chōshiū, mention was made of an earlier -tendency in that direction. This was in 1873, when dissensions in the -Ministry first occurred. The opposition then encountered by the -Government came from two opposite quarters—from reactionaries on the one -hand, and, on the other, from the section of advanced reformers. In each -case the jealousies and ambitions of clans and individuals played, as we -have seen, a certain part. But whereas the aim of the reactionaries -barred the door to compromise, since they were opposed to Western -innovations of any kind, all that distinguished the views of the more -eager reformers from those of the Government was the question of -expediency—in other words, the rate at which progress on modern lines, -equally the object of both, should proceed. The reactionaries relied on -force to gain their ends. They were met by force, and were crushed. -After the failure of local risings, and of the more formidable Satsuma -rebellion, it became clear that the Government was not to be deterred -from pursuing its policy of gradual reform by the open menace of armed -forces. Thenceforth, beyond the isolated attacks of fanatical assassins, -to one of which Ōkubo, one of the strongest of the new Ministers, fell a -victim in the spring of 1878, the Government had nothing to fear from -the reactionary elements in the country. There remained the weapon of -political agitation, open to all who disagreed with the Government. To -this the advanced reformers resorted. - -The charge they brought against the Government of failing to fulfil the -promise regarding the creation of representative assemblies made in the -Imperial Oath was not wholly unfounded. There was, as we have seen, no -obscurity in the wording of the Imperial Oath in this respect. For a -document drawn up in a language which lacks the precision of European -tongues, the Imperial announcement was singularly clear. It has been -stated by more than one writer on Japan, who has dealt with this -question, that the Imperial Oath did not mean what it said, and that it -is a mistake to suppose that the establishment of representative -institutions was seriously contemplated at that time. There is no -reason, it is true, to credit the men to whose hands the shaping of the -new Government was committed with anything but crude ideas of what the -Imperial announcement was intended to convey; for the Oath was not a -declaration of rights, but simply a statement of intentions, of the -principles on which the new Government was to be conducted. Nor is it -likely that at a time when the feudal system was in operation any -clear-cut notions of popular rights, as they came afterwards to be -conceived, could have existed. Without doubt, too, those responsible for -the language of the Imperial Oath purposed to impose class restrictions -on the deliberative rights to be granted. This much is clear from the -character given to the deliberative element in the new administration. -What, however, is equally certain is that in a general, though vague, -way there was a hope widely entertained, and supported by the terms of -the Imperial Oath, of broadening, and, in a sense, popularizing the -basis of administration; and that the fact of representative government -and public discussion being important features of administration in -certain Western countries was well known to many leading Japanese, who -understood them to be typical of advanced conditions of progress, and -desired the early establishment of similar conditions in Japan. - -From this point of view the action of the advanced reformers was not -without some justification. The Government, on the other hand, in -deciding to move cautiously in the matter of establishing representative -institutions was probably guided by the conviction that the promise in -the Imperial Oath made, as it was, in the first flush of revolutionary -enthusiasm, should not, in the interests of the country, be construed -too literally; and in the light of subsequent events the correctness of -its decision was abundantly proved. - -The views on the subject of representative government held by advanced -reformers, amongst whom Tosa clansmen predominated, had, as we have -seen, received substantial recognition from those in authority. A -deliberative element had been introduced into the new administration -formed after the Restoration; and the principle, thus recognized, had -been retained throughout all subsequent administrative changes. After -the rupture in the Ministry, which took place in 1873, the Government -had again showed itself anxious to meet the wishes of the advanced -reformers, who had, meanwhile, formed in the Capital the first political -association in Japan, to which the name of “Association of Patriots” -(_Aikoku-tō_) was given. About the same time the chief Tosa leader, -Itagaki, had formed in his native province the first local political -society called the _Risshi-sha_ or “Association of men with a definite -purpose.” In the chapter on “Political Parties” in _Fifty Years of New -Japan_ this society is described as a political school similar to the -Cadet College established by the elder Saigō before the Satsuma -rebellion. Early in 1875 overtures for a reconciliation had been made by -the Ministry, and at a Conference in Ōsaka, attended by Itagaki, and by -Kido who had resigned from office on another question in the previous -year, an understanding was arrived at, both Itagaki and Kido rejoining -the Government. So far as the former was concerned, one of the -conditions of reconciliation was the creation of the Senate -(_Genrō-in_), to which reference has already been made. - -The reconciliation effected with the Tosa party was of short duration. -At the assembly of prefects, already noted, which was held a few weeks -later, the question of representative government was discussed. The -opinion of the prefects was in favour of the Government’s previous -decision, announced in its answer to the memorialists in 1873, that the -establishment of prefectural assemblies must precede the creation of a -National Parliament. The prefects’ endorsement of the attitude already -adopted by the Government on this point, and the latter’s final decision -not only to withhold from the Senate the elective character desired by -the advanced reformers, but to restrict membership to officials only, -caused much dissatisfaction in the Tosa party, and in March, 1876, -Itagaki again severed his connection with the Government, to which he -did not return until several years after parliamentary government had -been established. Ever since the first rupture in the Ministry there had -been much sympathy between the Tosa party and those Hizen clansmen who -entertained similar advanced views on reform. Itagaki’s final withdrawal -from the Government led to the establishment of still closer relations. -From this moment dates the formation of a regular opposition party of -advanced Radicals, and the commencement of a vigorous political -agitation in favour of popular reforms, which continued, with intervals -of quiescence, for many years. - -As the estrangement of Tosa and Hizen clansmen from the Government grew -more pronounced in the course of this agitation, the relations between -the other two more conservative, and at the same time more warlike, -clans, which supplied the military strength essential to the -administration, became naturally closer. After the suppression of the -Satsuma rebellion—which, as we have seen, in no way impaired Satsuma -influence in the Ministry—a more definite understanding in regard to -general policy was gradually evolved, with the result, already noted, -that the direction of affairs passed into the hands of Satsuma and -Chōshiū, where it still remains. - - - - - CHAPTER XIII - Japanese Religions before Restoration: Shintō and Buddhism. - - -In the previous chapter the outbreak and suppression of the Satsuma -rebellion were recorded. An outline was also given of the course of -events by which the administration assumed a new character, the -direction of affairs passing into the hands of the Satsuma and Chōshiū -clans. The point now reached, when the new Government is seen at length -firmly seated in the saddle, seems to furnish a suitable opportunity for -dealing with the subject of religion. Though not in all respects very -closely connected with the development of Japan on modern lines, it was, -as we have seen, indirectly associated with the work of reconstruction -and reform; and this association continues, being noticeable from time -to time in various ceremonial changes and other innovations. - -In the moulding of Japanese life and character four religions have -played a part, Shintō, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. To these a -fifth, Christianity in different forms, has in recent times been added. -There is nothing peculiar in this, for other countries have more than -one religion. But in Japan the existence side by side of religions quite -separate in character has had curious results. Not only have the four -earliest of these different religions influenced each other in a marked -degree, this interaction resulting in one case in a fusion of two faiths -which might almost be classified as a fresh religion, or sect, but the -singular habit of professing two religions at the same time has been -evolved—a circumstance without parallel elsewhere. Every Japanese house, -no matter whether the occupant is an adherent of the Shintō, or -Buddhist, faith, has both Shintō and Buddhist altars, at which daily -offerings are made. To the persons concerned this dual worship conveys -no sense of incongruity, nor, strangely enough, is it regarded as -incompatible with acknowledged adherence to one of the two faiths. When -questioned as to the religion they profess, they will reply that it is -Shintō, or Buddhism, as the case may be. And there the matter is left. - -Referring to this point the _Japan Year Book_ for 1915 admits that most -Japanese are dualist in the matter of religion. “A new-born child,” it -says, “is taken to a Shintō”—[the words “or Buddhist” should here have -been added]—“temple to invoke the help of the guardian deity for its -prosperity or success in life. When it dies, it is taken to a Buddhist -temple for burial.” - -The foregoing facts seem to confirm the statement made by the author of -_Fifty Years of New Japan_ as to the freedom of the Japanese people from -sectarian prejudice. “Whereas in China,” Marquis Ōkuma says, “the -co-existence of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism resulted in a war of -creeds which weakened that empire, and was the cause of its present -condition, the presence side by side of four different beliefs in Japan” -[not counting Christianity] “gave rise to no sectarian strife whatever.” -Marquis Ōkuma’s assertion applies, indeed, with more accuracy to present -than to past times. He appears to overlook more than one instance in -Japanese history where excess of religious zeal has caused not only -sectarian strife, but popular commotion, which has led in its turn to -interference on the part of the authorities. There can be little doubt, -however, that the matter of religion has, on the whole, never been taken -so seriously by the Japanese as by other peoples. It is equally clear -that the authorities in their attitude towards religion have invariably -been guided by political expediency, rather than by religious motives. - -How far political considerations have affected religious development in -Japan will be seen later on in the course of the next chapter, when it -will also be more convenient to deal with the latest of Japanese -religions, Christianity, as being specially identified with the nation’s -modern progress. Let us first dwell briefly on the distinctive features -of the religions themselves, as they existed before the reopening of -Japan to foreign intercourse, beginning with Shintō the native faith. - -Originally a form of nature-worship, Shintō at an early date came to -include ancestor-worship. This was due to the influence of Buddhism and -Confucianism. The cult of natural deities known by the general -designation of _kami_—a word of many meanings—was thus extended so as to -include deified heroes, deceased sovereigns, and, finally, abdicated and -reigning Mikados, as being of divine descent. Shintō ritual, as handed -down from ancient times, is limited to formulas of prayer to natural -deities; its ceremonial is concerned solely with purification for -wrong-doing, or for defilement by contact, real or imaginary, with the -dead. It had no authorized funeral rites, nor were there any Shintō -cemeteries. It has no sacred books, no dogmas, no moral code. All these -it was left to other religions, chiefly Buddhism, to supply. -Notwithstanding the absence of these features, common to most religions, -the author of a work on Buddhism, _The Creed of Half Japan_ (the Rev. -Arthur Lloyd), speaks of it as having “a slight flavour of philosophy, a -vague but deepseated religiosity,” and as making “a strong appeal to -Japanese pride.” The correctness of this last statement no one will be -inclined to dispute, for to the influence of Shintō ideas regarding the -semi-divinity of Japanese monarchs the unbroken character of the dynasty -is largely due. - -A peculiar feature of the Japanese native religion, namely, its -connection with the worship of animals, is described by Mr. Aston in his -“Shintō”:— - -“Animals,” he says, “may be worshipped for their own sakes, as -wonderful, terrible, or uncanny beings. The tiger, the serpent, and the -wolf are for this reason called _kami_. But there are no shrines in -their honour, and they have no regular cult. A more common reason for -honouring animals is their association with some deity as his servants, -or messengers. Thus the deer is sacred at” [the shrine of] “Kasuga, the -monkey at” [that of] “Hiyoshi, the pigeon to the god (of war), the white -egret at the shrine of Kébi no Miya, the tortoise at Matsunöo, and the -crow at Kumano.... The pheasant is the messenger of the Gods generally. -The best known case of the worship of an associated animal is that of -Inari, the rice-god, whose attendant foxes are mistaken by the ignorant” -[namely, the uneducated masses] “for the god himself, and whose effigies -have offerings made to them.” The “Korean dogs,” he adds, seen in front -of many Shintō shrines, are meant not as gods but as guardians, like the -great figures on each side of the entrance to Buddhist temples. - -Japanese writers fix the date of the introduction of Buddhism into Japan -at about the middle of the sixth century. The Buddhism then introduced -was that of the so-called Northern School, the doctrines of which are -based on what is known as the “Mahayana Vehicle.” One of its earliest -adherents was the Imperial Prince Shōtoku Taishi, who, though he never -occupied the throne, virtually ruled the country for many years as -deputy, or Vice-Regent, for his aunt the Empress Suiko. He it was who -carried out the “Great Reform,” which revolutionized Japanese -administration in imitation of Chinese models. He also did much to -propagate Buddhism, which at that time was unsectarian. It was not till -after his death in A.D. 620 that the first sects came into existence. By -the end of the eighth century there were eight sects, of which two only, -the Tendai and Shingon, now survive. The chief sects, in addition to -these two, are the _Zen_, _Jōdo_, _Shin_ and _Nichiren_, all of which -were founded during the rule of the Hōjō Regents in the twelfth and -thirteenth centuries. Into the question of the tenets which distinguish -these different sects, one from another, it is unnecessary to enter. It -will be sufficient to indicate the main characteristics of the three, -the _Zen_, _Shin_ and _Nichiren_ sects, which have by far the most -numerous adherents. - -The _Zen_ sect, the earliest of the three, which has six sub-sects, was -established in the first years of the thirteenth century, its founder -being the Buddhist priest Eisai Zenshi. It has, Mr. Lloyd tells us, -always been more or less influenced by Confucianism, and is opposed to -what its followers regard as the anthropomorphic tendencies of other -sects. It recognizes a supreme being, but refuses to personify him, -holding that personification of this kind is but a pious device to adapt -the truth to the weakness of human intellect. Apart from actual -doctrine, the main feature of the _Zen_ sect is the practice of silent -meditation for the purpose of acquiring by introspective contemplation a -detached and philosophic habit of mind. Before the abolition of -feudalism it was the favourite sect of the military class, and to this -day it includes more naval and military men among its adherents than -other sects, while its influence on _Bushidō_ has been very marked. - -The _Shin_ sect, which has also six sub-sects, was founded by the priest -Shinran Shōnin. The position which it holds in regard to other Buddhist -sects is in some respects similar to that of Protestantism in regard to -Roman Catholicism. Its followers eat meat, and the clergy are free to -marry. The chief point in its doctrine is salvation by faith through the -mercy of Buddha, and, in Mr. Lloyd’s opinion, the whole system of the -founder “savours strongly of Nestorianism,” which was propagated in -China as far back as the seventh century. - -There remains to be noticed the _Nichiren_ sect. This, the most active -and indeed aggressive, and, it may be added, the noisiest in the conduct -of religious festivals, of all Buddhist sects, was established by the -priest Nichiren. His object, as we learn from the author previously -quoted, was to purge Japanese Buddhism from the errors which, in his -view, had crept into it, and restore the primitive character imparted to -the Buddhist faith by its Indian founder. The ardour with which he -pursued his object led him to trench on political matters, and brought -him into collision with the authorities. He was a fierce opponent of the -_Zen_ sect, and its Confucian tendencies, describing it as “a doctrine -of demons and fiends.” - -Owing to the circumstances attending its introduction the traces of -Chinese influence in Japanese Buddhism are naturally very marked. This -influence was increased by the frequent visits paid by Japanese monks to -China, where they came into direct contact with Chinese religious -thought. Nevertheless, the fact that the three sects most prominent -to-day owe their origin and development to Japanese priests is evidence -of a certain tendency towards national independence in religious -matters. Buddhism, it may be added, has more adherents in Japan than -Shintō, though the difference in numbers is not great. - -The fusion of Shintō and Buddhism under the name of _Riōbu Shintō_, -which, according to the best authorities, took place in the ninth -century, is generally regarded as the work of the _Shingon_ sect of -Buddhists, though the _Tendai_ sect appears to have been associated in -the movement. By this fusion, which seems to have been copied from -earlier attempts in China to amalgamate Buddhism and Confucianism, the -Shintō _Kami_, or deities, were—by a pious fraud known to Japanese -Buddhists by the term _hōben_—received into the Buddhist pantheon as -avatars of ancient Buddhas. Its Buddhist character is sufficiently -indicated by the qualifying prefix in its name of _Riōbu_, which means -“two parts,” namely, the two mystical worlds that figure in the doctrine -of the _Shingon_ sect; its Shintō connection is shown by the worship of -Shintō deities under Buddhist names. “Despite its professions of -eclecticism,” says Mr. Aston in his book already quoted, “the soul of -_Riōbu Shintō_ was essentially Buddhist.” He speaks, also, of the -movement as the formation of a new sect, a view in which Professor -Chamberlain in his _Things Japanese_ does not seem altogether to concur. -The point may be left to Shintō and Buddhist scholars to determine. The -result of the fusion, in any case, was that most Shintō shrines became -_Riōbu Shintō_ temples. In many of these Buddhist priests alone -officiated, but in some cases such temples had separate establishments -of Shintō and Buddhist clergy, who conducted services alternately in the -same buildings. - -Although Confucianists can point to the existence of a temple of that -religion in Tōkiō, neither Confucianism nor Taoism—both of which came to -Japan with the adoption of the written language of China—had ever quite -the status of established religions. It would be difficult to -overestimate the part played by Confucian ethics in the development of -Japanese character and thought. Those, moreover, who have studied the -subject profess to see both in Shintō and Buddhism the impress of Taoist -philosophy. In both cases, however, the influence of these cults on the -Japanese people has been exercised indirectly, by the infiltration of -Confucian and Taoist principles into other faiths, and not directly, as -would have been the case had they operated in the character of separate -and distinct religions. - - - - - CHAPTER XIV - Japanese Religions after Restoration: Christianity—Bushidō—Religious - Observances. - - -The political considerations which have affected religious development -in Japan are chiefly, though by no means entirely, connected with her -modern progress. Under the Tokugawa administration matters concerning -religion were entrusted to official dignitaries called _Jisha-bugiō_ -who, as their name, “Controllers of Buddhist and Shintō temples,” -implies, took charge, in addition to other and more important -administrative duties, of all business connected with these two -religions. Both religions were thus recognized by the State, and were -equally matters of concern to the Tokugawa Government, though its -leanings were towards Buddhism. The Imperial Court, on the other hand, -during this period favoured Shintō. This it had not always done. Until -the advent to power of the military ruler Nobunaga in the middle of the -sixteenth century Buddhism had for several centuries been the dominating -religion. The Jesuit missionaries who then reached Japan found Buddhism -at the high tide of its power. At the Imperial Court, and everywhere -throughout the country, it exercised a supreme influence. Its military -strength, too, at that time was formidable. The abbots of Buddhist -monasteries in the vicinity of the Capital and elsewhere, like militant -bishops in the Middle Ages in Europe, kept garrisons of fighting monks, -which constituted a serious menace to administrative authority. A -ruthless campaign conducted by the ruler in question put an end to this -state of things. From the blow then dealt to it the Buddhist militant -clergy never recovered. As a result of the movement in the eighteenth -century, known as “The Revival of Pure Shintō,” to which reference was -made in a previous chapter, Buddhism for a time came under a cloud. But -its influence was subsequently re-established, Shintō sinking back again -into the secondary place it had occupied before. - -When the Restoration took place the respective positions of the two -religions were entirely changed. The professed aim of the revolution -being to restore the system of direct Imperial rule, the new Government -naturally adopted every means of accomplishing this object. And, as -belief in the divine descent of the Mikados was a part of Shintō -doctrine, the encouragement of the native religion became an important -point in the programme of the reformers. In the organization of the new -administration, therefore, formed on an ancient bureaucratic model, -prominence was given to religion in the single form of Shintō by the -creation of a separate department of State for the control of Shintō -affairs. To this the name of _Jinji-jimu-Kioku_, shortly afterwards -changed to _jingikwan_, was given. Shintō thus became a synonym, as it -were, for religion; while Buddhism was left out in the cold, and, as a -Church, was practically disestablished. Nor did the zeal of the -reformers, who had thus in effect created a State religion, end here. - -A form of abdication of frequent occurrence in Japan had been retirement -into the Buddhist priesthood. The custom was common to the whole nation, -and its practice by Mikados, princes of the Imperial House, Court nobles -and the feudal aristocracy, had increased the prestige of Buddhism, -while enriching the sects whose temples were thus favoured. The new -Government prohibited this custom, so far as the Imperial House and the -nobility were concerned; all _Riōbu Shintō_ temples were restored to -their ancient status of Shintō shrines; and at the same time many -Buddhist temples throughout the country were deprived of the lands from -which their revenues were largely drawn. This act of spoliation served a -double purpose. It benefited the depleted national exchequer and -discouraged the adherents of the ex-Shōgun, whose family had always -patronized Buddhism. - -An innovation introduced at this time, with the object apparently of -popularizing Shintō and bringing it into line, so to speak, with -religions elsewhere, was the institution of Shintō funerals; the -performance of funeral rights, as well as the care of cemeteries, having -been entrusted hitherto to Buddhist priests. - -That these steps were dictated by policy, and were not due to sectarian -feeling, is evident from the whole course of subsequent action in regard -to religious matters. In 1871 the _jingikwan_ was abolished, and Shintō -ceased to be the only State religion, though retaining to some extent -its privileged character. The place of the defunct department which had -ranked with the Council of State was taken by the _Kiōbusho_, or -Department of Religion, in which both Shintō and Buddhism enjoyed -official recognition, as before. For convenience of administration a -distinction was made between secular matters and religious worship, the -latter being placed under the control of a Bureau of Rites and -Ceremonies. This distinction is still maintained. The official -recognition enjoyed by each religion has been tacitly extended to -Christianity; but the principle of State policy regarding Shintō -survives. It is still _par excellence_ the Court religion, though the -fact that on the accession of a new Sovereign his robes are blessed at a -certain Buddhist temple in Kiōto shows that Buddhism has still an -accepted position at Court. There is a Shintō bureau in the Imperial -Household Department, and a Shintō shrine stands in the Palace. - -The services in the Palace shrine at which the Emperor personally -officiates, and the worship by members of the Imperial family, or their -proxies, at the chief shrines in the country, secure for the Shintō -faith the first place in public esteem. The erection, moreover, in the -Capital, since the Restoration, of a national shrine to the memory of -all who have died fighting at home, or abroad, has established a new -centre of Shintō worship, where the native religion, in direct -association with military and patriotic sentiment, gains a fresh hold on -popular sympathy. More recently, too, the functions of the Shintō clergy -have been extended so as to include the ceremony of marriage, which was -formerly unconnected with religion of any kind, while since the -annexation of Korea a Shintō shrine has been established in Seoul. - -The purely national character of the Japanese native religion excludes -the idea of its propagation in foreign countries. No such obstacle -exists in the case of Buddhism. After the Restoration several Buddhist -sects turned their attention to missionary effort abroad. A more or less -active propaganda has since then been carried on in Asiatic countries, -and the right of Japanese subjects to engage in missionary work in China -is recognized in the Treaty concluded with that country in 1905 after -the Russo-Japanese War. The activity of the Buddhist clergy in recent -times has shown itself in two ways quite unconnected with religious -propaganda. Extensive journeys in Central Asia for political and -scientific purposes have been undertaken by Buddhist travellers, who in -the course of their wanderings have gained much valuable information; -while others have done useful work in supplying the spiritual needs of -Japanese communities abroad. - - -The reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse added another to the list -of Japanese religions, though it was not till after the withdrawal of -the anti-Christian edicts in 1870 that the Japanese people were -permitted to adopt openly the new faith. If the progress Christianity -has made since then compares unfavourably with its rapid spread when -first introduced in the sixteenth century, this is explained by the less -favourable circumstances attending its reintroduction. When introduced -by Jesuit missionaries, it was regarded in some places as being simply a -new form of Buddhism, the authorities being misled by a certain -resemblance in ritual. On its later reintroduction it had to contend -against official and popular prejudice due to the previous persecution, -while, instead of being preached, as formerly, in the single form of -Roman Catholicism, it came under several forms, the number of which -increased as more missionaries arrived. A somewhat similar advantage, -however, marked its introduction on each occasion. Just as Christianity, -when introduced under Jesuit auspices, was at first encouraged for the -sake of the trade which came with it, so, on its reintroduction, it was -welcomed as a means of learning English. This advantage it still -retains. An account, written in 1917, of the religious work carried on -by the “Young Men’s Christian Association” since its establishment in -the Capital in 1880 contains the following statement: “One of the most -fruitful phases of the movement has been the securing of Christian -college graduates from Canada and the United States to teach English in -Japanese schools. While these teachers are appointed and salaried by the -schools, they are free to use their leisure for Christian work among the -students. There are now twenty-seven such teachers.” Evidence, moreover, -of the close connection between Christianity and the modern progress of -Japan, and of the benefit derived by the former from the increased study -of foreign languages, which is one of the results of this progress, is -supplied by a Japanese bishop, the Rev. Y. Honda, and Mr. Y. Yamaji in -the chapter on Christianity contributed by them to the book already -mentioned, _Fifty Years of New Japan_. - -Opinions differ as to the future of Christianity in Japan. The Reports -of foreign missionary societies furnish encouraging data regarding the -results of missionary efforts during the last half century. -Nevertheless, a feeling of uncertainty regarding the prospects of -Christianity prevails both in Japanese and foreign circles. There is a -tendency to regard the eventual Christianization of the country as -doubtful, though the progress already made is freely admitted. To enter -into the various considerations which influence opinion on this point -would require more space than is at our disposal. An idea, however, -which is entertained by not a few attentive observers is that, in the -event of Christianity becoming in the distant future the dominant -religion of Japan, it will be Christianity in a new form evolved by the -people for themselves. They will do, it is thought, with Christianity as -they have done with the Buddhism imported from abroad, and mould it to -suit their own taste. This view derives some support from the two -separate movements—one towards independence, namely, freedom from -foreign control; the other towards amalgamation—which have taken place -in recent years in several Japanese Christian churches. A notable -instance of the first of these movements occurred some years ago in the -case of the Congregationalist University in Kiōto. In that case the -agitation for independence resulted in the control of the college -passing into the hands of the Japanese directors, the American -missionaries connected with the institution remaining simply as -advisers. American influence predominates to-day in foreign missionary -enterprise, the outstanding feature in the work of American missions -being the establishment of educational institutions on a Christian -basis. According to official statistics for 1917 the number of Japanese -Christians amounted in that year to a little over 200,000. - -No account of Japanese religions can be complete without some mention of -_Bushidō_, the religion of the warrior, as its name implies. A product -of Japanese feudalism, round which a good deal of romantic sentiment, -and still more philosophical literature, has grown up, it may be -described as an unwritten rule of conduct to be observed by members of -the military class. Its best known exponent is Yamaga Sokō, whose -lectures and writings in the middle of the seventeenth century on -Bushidō, Confucianism and military strategy, as understood in those -days, gained for him a great reputation. Ōishi, the famous leader of the -Forty-Seven _rōnin_, was one of his pupils. The virtues on which stress -was laid in _Bushidō_ ethics were chiefly feudal loyalty, -self-sacrifice, filial piety and simple living, all of which might, -perhaps, be summed up in the one word duty. The endeavour of the -_samurai_ who was true to _Bushidō_ ideals was to live a life of -self-restraint, so as to be ready to answer the call of duty at any -moment. This explains the attraction for the adherents of _Bushidō_ -which lay in the _Zen_ sect of Buddhism with its practice of silent -meditation. It helped them to cultivate the austere and detached habit -of mind that was supposed to be essential to the proper observance of -the Spartan rules of _Bushidō_. At the same time the strong, though -unacknowledged, influence of the Sung school of Confucianism on _Zen_ -doctrine indirectly affected _Bushidō_ ideas, imparting to them a tinge -of the abstruse philosophy of that school. The association of the _Zen_ -sect, moreover, with the quaint ceremonial of tea-drinking known as -“_Cha-no-yu_,” resulted in the practice of this ceremonial being widely -adopted in _Bushidō_ circles. In no sense a religion in the strict -meaning of the word, despite its connection with Buddhism and -Confucianism, _Bushidō_ in the course of its later development came to -be identified with patriotism. It is this aspect of it which has been -most conspicuous since the disappearance of feudalism. Constant -reference is made by modern Japanese writers on the subject to the -_Yamato Damashii_, or Japanese spirit, which it is considered to -represent; and though much of what is said is far-fetched, and possibly -meant for foreign consumption, the simple precepts of _Bushidō_ have -undoubtedly served a useful purpose in stimulating in all classes of the -people the exercise of the virtues it inculcates. Quick to recognise the -usefulness of its ethical teaching, the Japanese Government has availed -itself of the services of _Bushidō_, in conjunction with Shintō, to -strengthen the fabric of monarchy. Its action in this direction, due, -apparently, to motives similar to those which influenced German policy -before the Great War in encouraging a creed of State worship, was -criticized shrewdly, though somewhat harshly, a few years ago in a -magazine article entitled “The Invention of a new Religion.” - -The Japanese people may, as has been suggested, be disposed to take -religion less seriously than other nations. As to the great part, -nevertheless, which it plays in the national life, in the shape of -pilgrimages and religious festivals, there can be no question. At -certain periods of the year, regulated by custom so as to cause the -least interference with agricultural operations, thousands of pilgrims -of both sexes, not content with visiting less remote shrines, make long -journeys to noted shrines throughout the country. The pilgrim who has -thus visited the Great Shrine at Isé, ascended one of Japan’s many -sacred mountains, or worshipped at other distant shrines, not only -“acquires virtue” thereby, but gains social prestige in his home circle -in town, or village, much in the same way as the Mussulman _hadji_ who -has been to Mecca, or the Russian peasant who has seen the sacred places -in the Holy Land. These pilgrimages also serve indirectly an educational -purpose. Among the countless religious festivals which vary the monotony -of daily life in Japan, the flower fairs are those which are most -typically Japanese. On every evening of the year a flower fair, -associated with the festival of a local shrine, takes place in some -quarter of the city of Tōkiō. Nor are these fairs peculiar to the -Capital. They are to be seen in most provincial towns of importance, -though the smaller number of urban shrines precludes their daily -occurrence. Neither pilgrimages nor religious festivals, it should be -noted, are due entirely to religious sentiment. They appeal to the love -of ceremonies, and the passion for sight-seeing, which distinguish the -nation. - -Before leaving the subject of religion it may be well to emphasize a -point which has received only passing attention. In all the three -religions which have had most to do with the moulding of Japanese -character and thought, Buddhism, Shintō and Confucianism, the principle -of ancestor-worship is imbedded. The result has been that a closer, a -more intimate, association of the past with the present, of the dead -with the living, is, perhaps, possible in Japan than elsewhere. The -beautiful Buddhist festival of departed spirits; the simpler, if more -primitive, services at Shintō shrines in memory of deceased relatives; -the daily worship at family altars decorated with ancestral tablets; the -careful keeping of the anniversaries of deaths; the religious care -bestowed on graves; and the idea, not to say belief, in the -participation of departed spirits in National Festivals—all tend not -only to keep fresh in men’s minds the memory of their dead, but to -encourage the feeling of their continued existence in spirit land. Thus -the mischief wrought by time is lessened, while death is robbed of a -part of its terrors. - - - - - CHAPTER XV -Political Unrest—The Press—Press Laws—Conciliation and Repression—Legal -Reforms—Failure of Yezo Colonization Scheme—Ōkuma’s Withdrawal—Increased - Political Agitation. - - -When the main thread of our narrative was interrupted in order to enable -the reader to form some idea of Japanese religions, and their relation -to the modern progress of the country, the train of events which -resulted in the concentration of authority in the hands of the Satsuma -and Chōshiū clans, and the formation of a regular opposition party of -advanced reformers, had been briefly described. At this time, as was -pointed out, there was no great difference of principle, so far as -domestic reforms were concerned, between progressive politicians in the -Government and those outside. Both were agreed on the importance of -widening the basis of administration and of associating the people in -the work of government. The idea, also, of what was meant by _the -people_ had grown so as to include all classes of the nation. The point -of disagreement was simply the rate at which progress in the shape of -reform on Western lines should proceed. As between moderate and advanced -reformers, therefore, matters should have been open to compromise. But -the situation was not so simple as it appeared to be. One circumstance -that stood in the way of compromise between the two sections of -reformers was the large number of disbanded _samurai_ which the -abolition of feudalism had thrown upon the country, and for the -absorption of which in other occupations under the new order of things -there had not yet been time. Many men of this class had really nothing -in common with the advanced reformers save in the matter of discontent. -Idle and impecunious, they were ready for mischief of any kind, and -joined eagerly in an agitation for things of which they were mostly -ignorant. Moved by the mere desire to fish in troubled waters, these -people did much harm to the cause they espoused, giving to it a -character of turbulence which excited the apprehension of the -authorities. A further consideration which may have influenced the -situation was the reaction following upon the troubled period through -which the country had passed. Fully alive to the serious nature of the -crisis it had successfully surmounted, and, at the same time, conscious -of its newly found strength, the Government was probably in no mood to -brook any opposition, however well-intentioned, to its now settled -policy of gradual reform. The fact, too, that the Ministry was now one -of two clans, and not, as originally, of four, sharpened the line of -cleavage between those who directed affairs and those who, perforce, -looked on from outside. Clan feeling embittered the movement set on foot -by the advanced reformers not only at the outset, but throughout its -whole course. Much of the sympathy and support they received from many -quarters, as the agitation progressed, had little connection with their -declared objects, being due largely to dislike and jealousy of the -continued predominance of men of these two clans in the Ministry, which -was nicknamed the “Satchō Government.” - -The final withdrawal of Itagaki from the Government in the spring of -1876 has been mentioned as the moment from which the organized agitation -for representative government may be considered to have commenced. It is -difficult to assign exact dates for political movements of this kind. It -may with equal correctness be considered as having begun in 1873, when -the Tosa leader first resigned office, which is the view taken by Mr. -Uyéhara in _The Political Development of Japan_. The point is of small -importance, but it seems permissible to regard the agitation as not -having assumed the form of an organized movement until after Itagaki’s -final secession from the Ministry. - -Before that happened the Government, doubtless well informed of the -intentions of the advanced reformers, had taken the first step in a -series of repressive measures designed to check the agitation. This was -the Press law promulgated in July, 1875. It is difficult to see how the -Government could at this time have done otherwise, and remained in -power. The attempted assassination of Iwakura by Tosa malcontents had -revealed the danger to be feared from extremists of a dangerous class, -whose dissatisfaction at the pacific settlement of the Korean difficulty -had, it was known, been shared by the Tosa leader. The disturbed -condition of the country had also been shown by the abortive provincial -risings, and was to be demonstrated still more clearly by the Satsuma -rebellion. - -Up to that time there had been little interference with the Press. The -first newspapers had appeared in the late ’sixties. These were of an -ephemeral kind, but a few years later the press in its more developed -and permanent form came into existence. It increased very rapidly, while -its vitality may be gauged by the fact that some of the papers which -then made their appearance are in circulation to-day. In the Capital -alone there were soon six or seven daily papers of some standing, all of -which, with one exception, lent their aid to the agitation. Into the -crusade for popular rights the young Press flung itself with enthusiasm, -finding its advantage in the very circumstances which were embarrassing -to the Government. Amongst the former military class—the educated -section of the nation—which the abolition of feudalism had left stranded -with but scanty means of subsistence, there were many men of literary -attainments, as such were understood in those days. From these the Press -could draw an ample supply of writers, all with real or fancied -grievances, some with a bias in favour of popular reforms, others again -with a veneer of Western knowledge which did duty for learning. The -political articles which appeared in the newspapers of that time were -hardly of the quality noticeable to-day. They were full of quotations -from European writers on the subject of equality and the rights of man, -interspersed with phrases from the Chinese classics, which were the -stock-in-trade of all journalists; and, strange as was the contrast -presented by materials culled from sources so different, they were all -equally effective for the purpose intended, which was to denounce what -was described as the tyrannical policy of the Government. - -Educational influences, other than those working through the medium of -the Press, lent force to the agitation. The fusion of classes, one of -the first results of the Restoration, had the effect of opening public -and private schools alike to all sections of the people, thus bringing -within reach of everyone the education which before had been the -privilege only of the military class and Buddhist clergy. By teachers in -these schools, by educationalists writing for the express purpose of -disseminating Western ideas, and by lecturers, the work of educating the -nation proceeded apace. - -By none were greater services rendered in this direction than by -Fukuzawa Yūkichi. Conspicuous in each of these rôles, as schoolmaster, -author and lecturer, as well as in the double capacity of founder of a -school, which has attained the dimensions of a university, and chief -teacher therein; and as the proprietor and editor of one of the best -Japanese newspapers, the _Jiji Shimpō_, his name will always be famous -in the history of his time. The “Sage of Mita,” as he was called from -the quarter of the city in which he lived, will be remembered as one -who, besides helping the cause of education, strove from the first to -give effect to the fusion of classes by encouraging a spirit of -independence in those sections of the people whose self-respect had been -weakened by centuries of feudalism. For purely party politics Fukuzawa -had little taste, owing perhaps to the fact that he had no clan -connection with political affairs, nor was his newspaper ever identified -with any political association. But it was an active champion of popular -rights, and his voluminous writings, the popularity of which was so -great that of one book more than three million copies were printed, gave -much indirect encouragement to the agitation for popular reforms. - -The public indignation excited by the Press law was succeeded by -consternation at the rigorous manner in which it was enforced. -Imprisonment of editors for what would now be regarded as trifling -infringements of the law was of common occurrence, while journals -publishing any matter considered by the authorities to be objectionable -were promptly suspended. To such lengths was interference with the Press -carried that at one time more than thirty journalists were in prison in -Tōkiō alone. The constant depletion of the staffs of newspapers which -incurred official displeasure resulted in the evolution of a class of -dummy editors, whose duty it was to be the “whipping boys” of the papers -they represented, and undergo the sentences of imprisonment imposed. The -agitation, nevertheless, continued unabated, and political associations, -in whose programmes a demand for representative government—never very -clearly defined—occupied the first place, sprang up in various places. A -leading figure in the movement, who came into notice soon after its -inception, and for several years took a prominent part, in company with -Itagaki both as a lecturer and in the formation of political clubs, was -Kataoka Kenkichi, also a native of Tosa. His arrest and that of other -members of the party at the height of the political disturbances which -culminated in the Satsuma rebellion, brought about a temporary cessation -of agitation, and checked for a time the growth of political clubs. But -with the restoration of order in the country the agitators resumed their -activity. The leaders made tours of the provinces to stimulate local -effort, as a result of which twenty-seven provincial associations, -representing some 90,000 members, were formed; and at a meeting held in -Ōsaka these were amalgamated under the name of “Union for the -establishment of a parliament.” The Government replied by promulgating -in 1880 the Law of Public Meetings, which restricted considerably the -rights hitherto enjoyed by the public in this respect. But the agitators -continued to work with undiminished energy, and the fact that, in spite -of the issue of this law, a meeting held in Tōkiō in the autumn of the -same year was attended by representatives from more than half of the -prefectures into which Japan was then divided shows how strong a hold on -the country the movement had by this time acquired. - -We have seen how the work of reconstruction carried on by the -Government, though hindered, never stopped during the period of civil -commotions. It was the same during the long course of popular agitation -which followed it. Side by side with repression there went always -reform. Steady progress was made with the long and difficult business of -land-tax revision. Involving, as it did, a resurvey and the valuation of -all land, as well as the investigation of titles to land, and -boundaries, this was a task of the first magnitude. At the same time -attention was given to the reorganization of local government. This -included, besides the readjustment of local taxation, the arrangements -necessary for the eventual establishment of the prefectural and other -local assemblies, forming part of the general scheme of local -self-government, which, it was considered, must necessarily precede the -creation of a national parliament. It was not until after the -restoration of order, when it was at length possible for the task of -reconstruction to proceed more rapidly, that the results of this tedious -and little-noticed work became apparent. - -In the spring of 1878 the first of these results was seen in the -completion at the second conference of Prefects, to which reference has -already been made, of drafts of the “three great laws,” as they were -called at the time. These, which conceded a large measure of local -autonomy, concerned local taxation, prefectural assemblies, and similar -smaller bodies to be created in urban and rural districts, towns and -villages. - -The law establishing prefectural assemblies came into force in 1880; the -arrangements relating to smaller bodies not until some years later. -These measures will be referred to again when we come to deal with the -whole question of the revision of local government. - -It has been said that in the earlier stages of agitation for popular -reforms no concession was ever made by the Government till it was -compelled to do so by the force of circumstances. And the assertion has -been supported by the suggestion of a connection in point of time -between certain manifestations of popular feeling, and some of the -liberal measures adopted by the Government. The attempted assassination -of Iwakura was certainly followed shortly afterwards by the decree -establishing the annual conferences of Prefects. On the other hand the -completion of the drafts of the three laws above mentioned at the second -of these conferences occurred only a month before Ōkubo’s assassination. -In that case there was no possible connection. Nor in subsequent years -does it seem possible to establish any connection of the kind suggested. -If traceable at all, it may be regarded as due simply to coincidence. - -A somewhat similar view as to the pressure put upon the Government by -the agitation is taken by Mr. Uyéhara, the author already quoted, who -does not conceal his sympathy with the advanced reformers. He speaks of -the movement as being from its inception a struggle for constitutional -reform, in which the agitators were successful, and regards the -introduction of representative government when it came as a proof of -their success. It is indeed more than probable that the agitation they -conducted for so long, fortified as it was by an increasing measure of -support from the public, hastened in some degree the establishment of -the representative institutions for which they clamoured. But the -impression one derives from studying the course of action adopted by the -Government is that, while not hesitating to control the agitation by -repressive measures, as occasion demanded, they were ready to conciliate -public feeling by meeting the views of the advanced party whenever it -seemed expedient to do so; thus pursuing on the whole, consistently, -under circumstances of unusual difficulty, the policy of gradual reform -which it had marked out for itself. Assuming the correctness of this -impression, the progressive stages by which the establishment of -representative government was eventually reached may with more reason be -regarded as a successful vindication of that policy, than as a triumph -for the agitators. It is important to bear in mind that the latter were -not the only advocates of reform. The Government itself was a government -of reformers, who had more than justified their title to be regarded as -such. Some of its members had thought of representative institutions -even before the Restoration. The men in power were in a better position -than others to estimate correctly the extent of preparation, the -spade-work which was necessary before any step of practical reform could -be accomplished; and if they were reluctant to move as fast as more -eager, and, possibly, ill-balanced enthusiasm desired, their hesitation -may not unfairly be ascribed to prudent statesmanship. - -Nevertheless, in the adoption by the Government of this twofold policy -of conciliation and repression the influence of the conservative element -in the Ministry should not be overlooked. It doubtless modified earlier -ministerial impulses towards a more advanced programme; increased the -hesitation to make what were regarded as dangerous experiments in view -of the nation’s recent emergence from feudalism; and created the -tendency which ultimately showed itself in the decision to look for -guidance in framing representative institutions, as well as in other -matters of administrative reorganization, to countries less governed by -democratic ideas than those from which the leaders of the Restoration -movement had drawn their first inspiration. Another reason for the -cautious trend of ministerial policy may also be found in the experience -gained by some, at least, of the members of the Government in studying -the growth and development of the Western institutions it was proposed -to copy. - -The year 1880 saw the completion of the first legal reforms. In the -course of that year a new Penal Code, and a Code of Criminal Procedure, -in the preparation of which the services of a French jurist, Monsieur -Boissonade, had been utilized, were promulgated. The first steps in the -framing of these important laws, based, it should be noted, on French -models, had been taken seven years before, when a committee of -investigation had been formed in the Department of Justice. Both of -these Codes came into operation early in 1882. The Code of Criminal -Procedure was replaced by a later Code in 1890. The Penal Code also -underwent subsequent revision, coming into force in its revised form in -1908. - -In the autumn of 1881 the ranks of the advanced party were reinforced by -the retirement from the Ministry of Ōkuma. Since the rupture of 1873, -when the leading Tosa and Hizen politicians withdrew from office, he had -been the sole representative of the province and clan of Hizen. Rumour -assigned more than one reason for his withdrawal. Disagreement on -various questions with Chōshiū statesmen, whose influence was -increasing; umbrage at the conduct of affairs by two clans; the holding -of views on reform which were in advance of those of the Government as a -body; and intrigues with the Court were points to which prominence was -given in the political gossip of the day. That Ōkuma’s liberalism was of -a more pronounced type than that of his colleagues seems very probable -in the light of after events. Personal considerations, however, had -possibly something to do with his leaving the Government. The force of -character, coupled with exceptional and versatile talent, which marked -him out as a leader, made it hard for him to accept the leadership of -others, and detracted from his usefulness as a colleague. - -Shortly before his resignation an administrative scandal had occurred in -connection with the abolition of the Board for the development of the -_Hokkaidō_, to which reference has already been made. Its abolition -involved the disposal of Government property, and in the course of the -examination of a scheme for this purpose which had been submitted to the -Government grave official irregularities were disclosed. The scheme, -which he had been among the first to condemn, was consequently -abandoned, but the incident brought discredit on the Ministry. - -The retirement of Ōkuma was followed almost immediately by the issue of -a decree fixing the year 1890 as the date for the establishment of a -Parliament. - -This definite promise at this juncture of a Parliament was interpreted -in some quarters as a concession necessitated by the discredit which the -Government had incurred through the administrative scandal, and from its -position being weakened by Ōkuma’s retirement. But the almost -simultaneous issue of the law imposing restrictions on public meetings, -and freedom of speech, seems to justify the view that both measures were -simply an illustration of the twofold policy of repression alternating -with reform which the Government was pursuing. - -With the important concession now made by the Government the first -period, so to speak, of the agitation for popular rights may be regarded -as drawing to its close. The chief features of this period have been -noted; the outbreak and suppression of grave disorders, which at one -time threatened to put a stop to all national progress; the creation of -a strong Government of two clans; the growth of a political movement -which derived a large measure of support from public feeling; and the -measures taken for its control by the Government. We have also seen how -little homogeneous in its character was the opposition party conducting -the movement; how it comprised genuine reformers, others actuated mainly -by clan jealousy, disappointed politicians, and impecunious _shizoku_, -the wreckage of the feudal system, who were long a disturbing element in -politics, and developed later on into the class of political rowdies -known as _sōshi_. - -For all of these ill-assorted associates the demand for popular rights -was a convenient rallying cry. To the opposition thus formed, which grew -gradually more compact as it shed its less desirable elements, the -withdrawal of Ōkuma from the Ministry meant the accession of a powerful -ally, though his independence of thought and somewhat uncompromising -temperament never allowed him to identify himself too closely with the -views of other politicians. With the energy and versatility that marked -all his actions he threw himself into the movement led by the advanced -reformers, and soon appeared in the new rôle of educationalist. -Following the example set by Fukuwaza fifteen years earlier, he -established the Waséda College, now a University, which remains a -monument to his abilities. Like his predecessor, he was a voluminous -author, never, however, writing himself but dictating to an amanuensis, -and founded a daily paper which is still in circulation. Like him, -again, he could lay claim to having trained a very large number of those -who now fill official posts in Japan. - -The political creeds of the advanced reformers, with whom Ōkuma was to -be associated for the seven years during which he remained in -opposition, were necessarily shaped to some extent by the foreign -influences with which the Japanese people first came into touch after -the reopening of the country to foreign intercourse. Western political -literature of all kinds, in which the product of advanced American -thought figured largely, was then eagerly studied by a people shut out -for centuries from contact with the outside world. Under these -circumstances it is only natural that the republican atmosphere of -Japan’s nearest Western neighbour—the first to enter into Treaty -relations with her—should have coloured in some degree the political -aspirations of those who were clamouring for popular reforms, and have -even affected the studies of students in the educational institutions to -which attention has been drawn. - - - - - CHAPTER XVI - Promise of Representative Government—Political Parties—Renewed - Unrest—Local Outbreaks. - - -The decree announcing the Imperial decision to establish a Parliament in -1890 was issued on the 12th October, 1881. In this decree the Emperor -refers to his intention from the first to establish gradually a -constitutional form of government, evidence of which had already been -furnished by the creation of a Senate (_Genrō-in_) in 1875, and the -drafting, three years later, of the laws concerning local -government-measures designed, it is explained, to serve as a foundation -for the further reforms contemplated. Conscious, His Majesty proceeds to -observe, of his responsibility in the discharge of his duties as -Sovereign to the Imperial ancestors, whose spirits were watching his -actions, he declares his determination to proceed with the work of -reform, and charges his Ministers to make preparations for the -establishment of a Parliament at the time appointed; reserving to -himself the task of deciding, later on, the questions of the limitations -to be imposed on the Imperial prerogative, and the character of the -Parliament to be created. The decree dwells on the undesirability of -sudden and startling changes in administration, and concludes with a -warning to the people, under pain of the Imperial displeasure, not to -disturb the public peace by pressing for innovations of this nature. - -Although the granting of a Constitution was not expressly mentioned in -the decree, the reference in it to the limitations to be imposed on the -Imperial prerogative clearly implied that the creation of a Parliament, -and the granting of a Constitution, would go together. That the latter, -when promulgated, would be a written Constitution was also clear both -from the circumstances of the time and from the methods already followed -by the Government in carrying out its policy of legislative reforms. - -No time was lost in beginning the preparations mentioned in the Imperial -announcement. In March of the following year, as we read in the -reminiscences contributed by him to _Fifty Years of New Japan_, the late -Prince (then Mr.) Itō was ordered by the Emperor to prepare a draft of a -Constitution, and on the fifteenth of the same month he set out, he -tells us, on “an extended journey in different constitutional countries -to make as thorough a study as possible of the actual workings of -different systems of constitutional government, of their various -provisions, as well as of theories and opinions actually entertained by -influential persons on the actual stage itself of constitutional life.” -In the prosecution of this enquiry into constitutional matters, which -occupied his attention for eighteen months, Prince Itō was assisted by a -numerous staff of assistants. - -By the definite promise of a Parliament, to be accompanied by a -Constitution, the position of the agitators was changed. With the -disappearance of their chief grievance the ground had been cut from -under their feet. It was no longer a question of whether there should be -a Parliament or not, but what sort of Parliament the one to be -established in 1890 should be. Neither on this point, however, nor on -the framing of the Constitution, was there any intention of consulting -the nation. The decree had expressly stated that these questions would -be reserved for the Imperial decision later on. While the Government, -therefore, proceeded with its preparations for the establishment of -representative institutions, it was incumbent on the leaders of the -opposition party to prepare on their side for the time when -constitutional government of a kind would be an accomplished fact, and -complete their organization in readiness for the Parliament, whose -opening would furnish them with the desired field for their activities. -Thus, the effect of the Imperial decree was to hasten the development of -political parties. For these, when formed, there was little to do until -representative institutions came actually into operation; and their -restricted sphere of utility was still further reduced by the increasing -severity of the repressive measures adopted by the Government. -Nevertheless, the same things which had previously assisted the progress -of the agitation for popular reforms now encouraged the development of -political parties. These were: the magic of the expressions “public -discussion” and “public opinion,” first heard at the time of the -Restoration, which had captivated the public ear all the more, perhaps, -from their being imperfectly understood; and the novelty, always -attractive to the Japanese people, of the methods adopted by the -advanced reformers in the shape of public meetings and public addresses -which were a new phenomenon in the history of the country. - -Political associations had, as we have seen, been formed before, in -connection with the agitation for popular reforms, both in the Capital -and in the provinces. Owing their creation chiefly to the leader of the -Tosa party and his lieutenants, most of them had led a rather precarious -existence, flourishing or dying down in response to the degree of -severity characterizing the measures of control taken by the -authorities. Neither in point of organization, nor in definiteness of -aim, could they be regarded quite as political parties. The latest and -most important of these associations had been the Union for the -establishment of a Parliament, formed in 1880, which, as already -mentioned, represented between twenty and thirty societies in various -parts of the country. Out of this unwieldy body the first political -party grew, taking the place of the parent society which was dissolved. -This was the _Jiyūtō_, or Liberal Party, established by Itagaki in -October, 1881, a few days only after the issue of the Imperial decree. -Its birth was signalized by collision with the authorities, a misfortune -which might not incorrectly have been interpreted as an omen of a stormy -career. The party managers had, it seems, omitted to give notice to the -police of gatherings of the party, thereby infringing the Law of Public -Meetings. For their omission to do so the managers were fined, and a -further result of the infringement was that, though actually founded on -the date above mentioned, the party did not receive official recognition -until July of the following year. Itagaki was elected President of the -party, and one of the four Vice-Presidents was Gotō Shōjirō, whose -connection with the resignation of the last of the Shōguns will be -remembered. - -The programme of the Liberal Party was comprehensive, if rather vague. -Its intentions, as announced in the manifesto issued, were “to endeavour -to extend the liberties of the people, maintain their rights, promote -their happiness and improve their social condition.” The manifesto also -expressed the party’s desire “to establish a constitutional government -of the best type,” and its readiness to co-operate with all who were -inspired by similar aims. Its President, Itagaki Taisuké, had from the -first been the prime mover in the agitation for popular reforms, which -without his inspiration and guidance would never have attained the -dimensions it did; both in and out of season he had pressed upon the -attention of the Government and the country the desirability of -broadening whenever and wherever possible the basis of administration; -and he shared with Ōkuma the distinction of being a pioneer in the -organization of political parties in preparation for the Parliament to -be established and a successful party leader after representative -institutions had come into operation. Lacking the versatility of his -Hizen contemporary and colleague, he was nevertheless a leading figure -in political circles, where his sincerity and tenacity of purpose -commanded much respect. The public indignation excited by the -unsuccessful attempt on his life made in the spring of 1882 was a -tribute to his popularity, and the words he is said to have uttered when -stabbed, “Itagaki may die, but not liberty,” are still quoted. Had he, -like other politicians of his time, lived more in Tōkiō and less in his -native province, he might have been better known outside of Japan. - -In the spring of 1882 two other political parties came into existence. -One of these was the “_Rikken-Kaishintō_,” or Constitutional Reform -Party, which was established by Ōkuma with the co-operation of a number -of well-known men who had followed him into retirement when he left the -Ministry in the previous year. Prominent among these ex-officials were -Shimada Saburō, a distinguished writer, who afterwards became President -of the House of Representatives; Yano Fumiō, another distinguished -writer, who later on filled the post of Japanese Minister to China; and -Ozaki Yukiō, who was afterwards Minister of Education, as well as Mayor -of Tōkiō, and now occupies a foremost position as speaker, writer and -parliamentarian. The programme of the _Kaishintō_ was more definite than -that of the Liberal Party. Besides the usual stock phrases as to -upholding the dignity of the Throne and promoting the happiness of the -people, it dwelt on the necessity of internal progress as a preliminary -step to “the extension of national rights and prestige,” and advocated -the development of local self-government, the gradual extension of the -franchise _pari passu_ with the progress of the nation, the -encouragement of foreign trade, and financial reform. - -The points of difference between the Liberal Party and the _Kaishintō_, -or Moderate Liberals, as we may call them, were of the kind that -distinguished the two party leaders from each other. The greater culture -and refinement, as well as the moderation, of the Hizen statesman were -reflected in the more sober views of his party, which appealed to a more -educated section of the people than the cruder and more radical -doctrines and methods of the _Jiyūtō_. - -The third party established at this time was the _Rikken Teisei-to_, or -Constitutional Imperialist Party. Fukuchi, editor of the _Nichi Nichi -Shimbun_, which was then a semi-official organ, took an active part in -its formation. Its _raison d’être_ was support of the Government, which -the other two parties opposed. It was, therefore, usually known as the -Government party. Some of the items of its elaborate programme were in -themselves a sufficient indication of its official sympathies. Approval -was expressed of the date (1890) fixed for the establishment of a -parliament; of whatever form of Constitution might be decided upon by -the Government with the Imperial sanction; of there being two Chambers; -of the necessity of qualifications for members; and of the final -decision in all matters resting with the Emperor. But other points in -the programme suggested some independence of opinion. The party favoured -the separation of the army and navy from politics; the independence of -judges; freedom of public meetings in so far as was consonant with -national tranquillity; as well as freedom of public speech, of -publication and of the Press within legal limits, and financial reform. - -The same spirit which led to the formation of these three political -parties in the Capital inspired the birth of many more in the provinces. -More than forty of these sprang up like mushrooms, and the confusion -naturally attending the sudden appearance of so many was increased by -the rule which made it necessary for each to be registered as a separate -organization, even when name and associations clearly indicated its -connection with the parent party in the Capital. Almost every prefecture -could boast of its own political party, usually affiliated to one of the -three chief parties in Tōkiō, whose example was generally followed in -the inclusion of the word “Constitutional” in the title, a fact which -shows what importance was attached to constitutional principles as a -basis of government. Occasionally, too, the dearth of fixed political -ideas was shown by the comprehensive vagueness of the name chosen. An -instance of this occurred in the case of the political party formed in -the province of Noto, which assumed the non-committal designation of the -_Jiyū-Kaishintō_, which was intended to mean the Party of Liberty and -Reform, but lent itself to the interpretation of being the Liberal and -Moderate Liberal Party. In this, as in many other instances, the name -was a mere label without much meaning. - -In spite of the flourish of trumpets which accompanied the formation of -these three political parties, and their numerous branches—for such they -mostly were—in the provinces, the movement collapsed as suddenly as it -arose. Before eighteen months had passed one of the three, the -Imperialist Party, had decided to dissolve. A year later its example was -followed by the Liberal Party; while the third, the party of Moderate -Liberals, led by Ōkuma, though it escaped dissolution, was by the end of -1884 in a moribund condition, without either president or -vice-president. - -For this sudden blighting of the hopes of the newly formed class of -politicians there were several reasons. In the first place, in pursuance -of what had been termed its settled policy of alternate conciliation and -repression, the Government, after the issue of the Imperial decree -promising a parliament, had embarked upon a course of further repressive -legislation. The law restricting the right of public meeting and speech, -which had been issued in 1880, was in 1882 revised and made much more -stringent. Under this revised law the powers of the police for -inquisitorial purposes were increased; political parties were bound to -furnish full particulars concerning the rules of association and lists -of members; no meeting could be held unless permission from the police -had been obtained three days before; it was forbidden to advertise the -subjects of political lectures and debates, or to invite attendance at a -meeting; political associations were not only debarred from having -branches in other places, but from holding communications, or carrying -on any kind of relations with other political parties—a provision which -was said to be inspired by fear of the amalgamation of parties opposed -to the Government; and, on the simple ground of its being necessary for -the preservation of the public peace, the police had power at any time -to close a public meeting. And yet, strange to say, the Government which -did these things, which left no stone unturned in its efforts to thwart -the designs of suspected politicians, was itself a Government of -reformers, and betrayed at moments no little sympathy with the popular -cause it was fighting. - -The severity of the policy adopted by the Government extended to the -Press. In the spring of 1883 the Press law of 1875, the operation of -which had given rise to a special class of “prison editors,” was revised -in a spirit of increasing harshness. In cases falling under what was -known as the “Law of Libel,” not the editor of a paper only, as before, -but the proprietor and manager also, were held jointly responsible; the -law itself was construed so as to leave no loophole of escape for the -suspected offender; and the conditions imposed on journalistic -enterprise made it almost impossible to start a newspaper or to carry it -on when started. - -The newly formed political parties were also at a disadvantage as -regards the place which was of necessity their centre of operations. We -have seen how before the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse -Tōkiō, then called Yedo, had for nearly three centuries been the seat of -administration; how with the gradual decay of Tokugawa authority the -centre of political activity had shifted for a time to the former -capital, Kiōto; and how after the Restoration of 1868–9 Tōkiō, now -called by its changed name, had more than regained its position, -becoming as the new Capital the place where the new life of the nation -and its interests were focussed. Its position was now stronger than -ever, for the abolition of feudalism had put an end to all separatist -tendencies, and provincial towns had lost much of their former -importance. The change was not without its effect on the organization of -political parties. However great the local influence of the leaders -might be, it was in Tōkiō that the constitution of parties took place. -The provinces counted for little. They might supply the leaders, but the -Capital was the centre of operations. There, as being the seat of -administration, the Government was at its strongest, while the party -politicians on the other hand were at a disadvantage. Beyond the reach -of the local ties in clan or province, on which they depended for -support, they worked in strange and uncongenial surroundings. Moreover, -the enforcement of the rule forbidding the formation of provincial -branches and combination with other political bodies, condemned them to -a position of comparative isolation. - -Another difficulty with which political parties had to contend was the -absence of any concrete and well-defined issues upon which politicians -could concentrate. As, in the early ministerial rupture of 1873, in -which political parties had their genesis, no broad question of -principle, so far as reforms were concerned, had divided the retiring -statesmen from their colleagues who remained at the head of affairs, so -it was with political parties at this time, and for many years -afterwards. No clear line of demarcation separated one from another. All -alike were in favour of progress and reform, all anxious, though not -altogether in equal measure, for the extension of the people’s rights. -It is true that the programmes issued by the different parties at the -time of their formation, as well as the speeches of party leaders, -showed some divergencies, but the views therein expressed were pious -opinions, and nothing more. They dealt with things in the abstract, not -with practical issues, which had not yet arisen. It is not surprising, -therefore, that in the absence of more material concerns time should -have been wasted in vague and futile controversy on such abstract -subjects as sovereign rights and their exercise; the Liberals declaring -that sovereignty lay with the people, the Imperialists that it rested -with the Sovereign; while the party of Constitutional Reform contended -that it resided in something representing both, namely, a parliament, -which had as yet no existence. Under such circumstances popular -enthusiasm declined, and even serious politicians lost interest in the -welfare of their party. - -Much mischief was, also, caused by disunion, the result of inexperience -and lack of discipline. This was aggravated in the case of the Liberal -Party by the departure on a tour of observation in Europe and America of -its president, Itagaki, and Gotō, one of its vice-presidents. The -Government was accused of arranging this tour with the double object of -weakening the _Jiyūtō_ by depriving it of the services of its ablest -politicians, and of creating discord between the Liberals and the Party -of Constitutional Reform. If this was its plan, it certainly succeeded. -Not only was the _Jiyūtō_ weakened by internal dissensions, but the -relations of the two parties became at once estranged. The one accused -the other of receiving bribes from the Government, and when they both -practically disappeared from the scene, the feud was bequeathed to their -successors. - -One reason alone, however, in the absence of any others, would probably -have sufficed to render futile this first experiment at party making for -parliamentary purposes. There was no parliament, and no one knew what -sort of parliament there would be. In these circumstances the -proceedings of political parties lacked reality, and gave the impression -of a stage performance. - -The results of the political activity of the nation in the direction we -have described were certainly not encouraging. All that was left of the -three parties after two or three years of strenuous endeavour was a -shattered and leaderless remnant of one, the other two having melted -away altogether; and of their work nothing survived save a faint tracing -of lines along which the subsequent development of political parties -proceeded. - -More than once in the preceding pages attention has been called to the -embarrassment and danger caused to the country by the large numbers of -ex-_samurai_ with little means and less occupation, whom the abolition -of the feudal system had left stranded, and who now lay like a blight -upon the land. For some of the better educated of these former members -of the military class the rapidly developing Press had furnished -employment. The restless energies of the remainder had found occupation -for a time in the movement for the formation of political parties. As -soon, however, as the first impulse of the movement had spent its force, -and before the actual dissolution of any of the parties, their attention -was diverted to other channels of political activity which promised more -immediate results; and the occurrence of several outbreaks and plots -following one another at short intervals, testified to the serious -mischief still to be apprehended from this unruly class. - -The first of these to call for the intervention of the authorities was a -rising which took place in 1883 in a prefecture to the north of the -Capital. The cause of the trouble was a dispute between the officials -and the people of the district in regard to the construction of roads. -Into the question of road construction, as into that of all other public -works, entered the question of the _corvée_. This was an important -feature of rural administration, dating back to ancient times, and -consisted of personal service, or its commutation by a money payment. It -opened the door to many abuses, but, if imposed in the form of personal -service at seasons when there was little outdoor work to be done, it was -preferred by the peasant to other modes of taxation. In the case in -question there was no objection in principle to the _corvée_, but the -action of the authorities was resented on the ground that the roads it -was intended to construct were not required. Consequently, when the -governor called for labour on the roads, the people refused to work, and -the disturbances which ensued became so serious as to require the use of -troops for their suppression. In pre-Restoration days the trouble would -not have extended beyond the compass of a simple agrarian riot. What -made it more important, and gave it a political aspect, was the -admixture of the _shizoku_, or ex-_samurai_, element, which in feudal -times could never have occurred. One of the ringleaders in this rising, -who escaped with a term of imprisonment for an offence which a few years -before would have cost him his head, afterwards became President of the -House of Representatives. In this capacity he speedily earned fresh -notoriety by headstrong action leading to the immediate dissolution of -Parliament, and the extinction of his parliamentary career. - -Other risings and plots which had no connection with local grievances, -but were the outcome of discontent and lawlessness, occurred in various -parts of the country. The most singular, as it was the last of the -series, was a fantastic attempt made in 1885 to stir up trouble in -Korea, in the hope that this might react on the political situation in -Japan, and hasten the establishment of representative government. Those -concerned in the plot were all of _samurai_ origin, and subsequently -took a prominent part in the proceedings of parliamentary parties. - -The complicity of many members of the Liberal Party, both before and -after its dissolution, in these insurrectionary movements is admitted by -Japanese writers, who are disposed to attribute it mainly to the -excessive severity of the measures of repression taken by the -authorities. - - - - - CHAPTER XVII - Framing of Constitution—New Peerage—Reorganization of Ministry—English - Influence—Financial Reform—Failure of Conferences for Treaty Revision. - - -With the return of the Itō mission in September, 1883, the task of -framing a Constitution was commenced. By that time the conservative -tendencies in the Ministry had become more marked. They were to increase -still further as a result of the study of Western political systems in -which the mission had been engaged. Most of its time had been spent in -Germany. The rapid progress of that country since its expansion into an -Empire, the bureaucratic basis of its administration, the conservative -bias of its rulers, and the personality of Bismarck, were presumably -reasons that pointed to the adoption of German models in constitutional, -as well as other administrative matters, as those best suited to a -nation which had just emerged from feudalism. For a Government, too, -which wished to retain as much power as possible in the hands of the -Crown, a Constitution, such as those of German States, under which the -Sovereign and his ministers were independent of Parliament, had a -natural attraction. And there may have been a conviction of the -necessity of some counterpoise to the democratic ideas derived from -intercourse with republican countries, and from Western literature of an -advanced type, whose mischievous effects had been shown in the extreme -views, and still more extreme methods, of the political agitators who -clamoured for representative institutions. - -In the spring of 1884 Itō became Minister of the Imperial Household, and -a special bureau was formed in that department for the purpose of -drawing up a Constitution under his direction. The choice of the -Household Department for this task was determined by political -considerations. It was desired to emphasize the point that the -constitution was granted of his own accord by the Sovereign, not wrested -from him by his subjects. There was also a wish to impress upon the -nation the fact that the Throne was the source of all authority. The -arrangement had also the advantage of disarming criticism, while the -privacy associated with the proceedings of a department representing the -Court removed all risk of interference from outside. - -Soon after Itō’s appointment as Minister of the Household new orders of -nobility were created, the model adopted being that of the continent of -Europe. With the fall of the Shōgunate, and the abolition of the feudal -system, all territorial titles had disappeared. Gone also were the empty -Court, or official, titles, so eagerly sought, the bestowal of which had -been one of the last surviving prerogatives of the Crown. - -An account of these ancient titles has already been given. Many of them -had become hereditary in the families which held them, and their -disappearance had been viewed with regret in many quarters. The creation -of the new orders of nobility, therefore, gained much popularity for the -new Minister of the Household. There was indeed a special reason for the -measure. It was the first step towards the establishment of a -constitutional _régime_. A House of Peers was to be a leading feature of -the Constitution now in course of preparation, and it was essential to -create a new nobility before the institution of which it was to form a -part came into operation. Some five hundred peers in all were created, -the number including 12 princes, 24 marquises, 74 counts, 321 viscounts -and 69 barons. The recipients of these new titles were the ex-_Kugé_, or -Court nobles, the ex-daimiōs, who under the feudal system had -constituted the territorial nobility, and ex-_samurai_, still in office, -who had rendered eminent service to the State at the time of the -Restoration. Not unnaturally the lion’s share of the titles received by -commoners fell to Satsuma and Chōshiū men. Assuming the number of -ex-_Kugé_ to be 150, and that of the ex-daimiōs to be 300, it will be -seen that the number of commoners ennobled amounted to only one-tenth of -the whole. The disproportionately large number of viscounts created is -explained by the fact that there was little difference in the positions -of most of the territorial nobility, although each had his fixed place -in the table of official precedence. It was, therefore, difficult to -make any discrimination in these cases when the old system of things was -translated into the new. It would appear, moreover, that this was also -the case with the old Court nobility. Among the ex-_samurai_ to be -ennobled were the Chōshiū statesmen, Itō, Yamagata and Inouyé, and three -Satsuma members of the Government, Kuroda, the younger Saigō, and -Matsugata, all of whom became Counts. The services of other ex-_samurai_ -who had distinguished themselves at the time of the Restoration, but -were in opposition when the new nobility was created, were recognized -some years later, Ōkuma, Itagaki and Gotō then receiving the same title -of Count. - -In the reorganization of the administrative system which took place in -the following year the hand of the new Minister of the Household could -again be seen. The previous reorganization of the Ministry had occurred -in 1871. The changes then made had been of two kinds: the substitution -in the new Government of the leading spirits of the Restoration in place -of representatives of the feudal aristocracy, thus strengthening the -progressive element in the Ministry; and the separation of the Central -Executive into three branches directed by the three chief Ministers of -State (the _Daijō Daijin_, or Prime Minister, the _Sadaijin_, or -Minister of the Left, and the _Udaijin_, or Minister of the Right). -Under this system, which, in its main outlines, had continued ever -since, there was no clear division between the different departments of -State, nor had the Prime Minister, in whose name all decrees were -issued, proper control over the ministers in charge of them, who were -all independent of each other. The effect of the change now introduced, -in imitation of the German Cabinet system, was to give increased -importance and authority to the post of Premier who received the new -designation of Minister President of the Cabinet. By the creation of a -new Department of Agriculture and Commerce the number of State -Departments was increased to nine. The Ministers of these Departments, -together with the Minister President, constituted the Cabinet. The -Imperial Household formed a separate department, the Minister of the -Household not being included in the Cabinet. Under the new arrangement -the Premier virtually directed the policy of the State, and was eligible -for a portfolio, if he chose to hold one. Like the German Chancellors -under Hohenzollern rule, he was responsible for the whole -administration, while exercising a general control over all Departments. -The changes involved in this administrative reorganization, which is -still in existence, had also another and deeper signification. They -meant the final triumph of Western ideas, and the open assumption of the -reins of Government by the men who had up to that time been working -behind the scenes. - -Other changes effected about this time, and due to the initiative of the -same statesman, were the creation of the office of Lord Keeper of the -Seals (_Naidaijin_) who presided over a body of fifteen Court -Councillors (_Kiūchiū-Komonkwan_), whose duties were to give advice -regarding Court ceremonies and usages; and the establishment of a system -of competitive examinations for employment in the Civil Service. This -reform, which one is tempted to regard as the application of one of the -principles mentioned in the Imperial Oath, though the motive may have -been simply the same that prompted other Western innovations, put an end -to much of the favouritism which had previously influenced official -appointments, and had furnished political agitators with a useful cry. A -further indication of progressive tendencies was furnished by the -adoption of English as a subject of study in primary schools. This step -was an official recognition of the influence it had exercised and was -still exercising upon the modern development of Japan. That influence -has been fully recognized by Japanese writers. In _Fifty Years of New -Japan_, a book to which reference has been made more than once in these -pages, Professor Haga, speaking of the effects of the reopening of Japan -to foreign intercourse, tells us that it has always been through books -in the English language that the Japanese people formed their -conceptions of things European, and obtained glimpses of the general -features of the outside world. Elsewhere in the same work Professor -Nitobé, who studied chiefly in the United States, remarks that “the -effect of the English tongue on the mental habits [? mentality] of the -Japanese people is incalculable”; and he adds that “the moral influence -of some of the simple text-books used in our schools cannot be -overrated.” - -The year 1886 is associated with a financial reform of the first -importance—the resumption of specie payments, in other words, the -substitution of convertible for inconvertible paper money. When dwelling -for a moment in a previous chapter on the financial difficulties -confronting the new Government that was formed after the Restoration, -mention was made of the confused state of the monetary system at that -time, and more especially the chaotic condition of the paper money then -in circulation. From a _History of the Currency_ published by the -Government in the above mentioned year we learn that the money in use at -the beginning of the Meiji era (1868) included four kinds of gold coins -(one being a coin not in general use); two kinds of silver coins, -besides bars and balls of silver of fixed weights; six kinds of copper, -brass and iron coins, known by the general term of _zeni_, or “cash” -(one of these being merely a money token, and not an actual coin); and -no less than 1600 different currencies of paper money. Much of the -coinage was debased. The paper currencies emanated partly from the -central Tokugawa Government and partly from the local feudal -authorities. More than two-thirds of the 270 odd clans then in -existence, and eight _hatamoto_ territories, had paper currencies of -their own, and in many cases issues of different dates were in -circulation together. This paper money, too, was of various kinds. There -were gold notes, silver notes, _sen_ notes, notes representing fixed -amounts in copper, brass and iron “cash,” as well as rice notes -representing definite quantities of rice, and used in the payment of -taxes, which were levied chiefly in kind. There were also what were -called “credit notes”—issued in return for money deposited by the -commercial establishments which did duty for banks in those -days—representing gold, silver, cash, or rice, as the case might be. The -mischief was intensified by the erroneous ideas then held as to the -proper ratio between gold and silver, and between these two metals and -copper, which enabled the foreign trader to make illegitimate profits, -and caused great loss to the country. The steps taken by the Government, -after the establishment of a mint, and the abolition of the feudal -system, to remedy this state of things included the withdrawal of -current issues of coin and paper money, and the issue of other currency -in their place. The first effect, therefore, of these measures was to -increase the existing confusion. The issue of the new coinage struck at -the Ōsaka mint also tended to obscure the situation. Though the standard -adopted was nominally a gold one, in its working it became bimetallic; -for in 1878 the Government allowed one-yen silver coins to come into -general and unrestricted circulation, a step which was tantamount to -changing the monometallic standard into a bimetallic one. - -[Illustration: - - PRINCE ITŌ. - - Took an active part in the Government formed after the Restoration; he - was the chief framer of the Japanese Constitution and parliamentary - institutions, and founder of the Seiyūkai. His last post was that of - Governor General of Korea. - -] - -Meanwhile, by the establishment in 1872 of National Banks, empowered to -issue notes in a certain proportion to their capital, it was sought to -facilitate the withdrawal of the old paper money, encourage banking -enterprise on a modern system, and place matters generally on a more -satisfactory footing. At the end of four years only four National Banks, -the pioneers in Japan of modern banking, having come into existence, it -was found necessary to revise the National Bank regulations. The -revision had immediate effect. Within five years the number of National -Banks had increased from four to one hundred and fifty-one, many of -which, however, as Baron Shibusawa, the well-known banker, explains in -his chapter on banking in _Fifty Years of New Japan_, were local -undertakings of limited importance. One of the objects of the -establishment of National Banks, the encouragement of banking -enterprise, had thus been achieved. Progress had also been made in the -attainment of another object, the redemption of previous paper -currencies by the issue of Paper Money (_Kinsatsu_) Exchange Bonds and -Pension Bonds, which the National Banks were allowed to hold as security -for their note issue. But the permission given to the National Banks to -issue notes had been made use of too freely, with the result that paper -money depreciated considerably in value; and when during the Satsuma -rebellion the Government had recourse to a further large issue of notes -in order to meet increased expenditure, a further fall in value -occurred. The lowest level in the price of paper money was reached in -the spring of 1881, when it stood at a discount of over 70 per cent. The -creation of the Bank of Japan in the following year furnished the -country with a banking centre independent of the National Banks, in a -position to exercise a check on their operations, and empowered to issue -convertible notes on the basis of a specie reserve which the National -Banks were required to deposit with it; and a year later the then -Minister of Finance, Mr. (afterwards Marquis) Matsugata, introduced a -scheme for the cessation of the privilege of issuing notes given to -these banks, the gradual withdrawal of their note issue in circulation, -and the alteration of their status to that of private banks. The -adoption of these and other steps, into the details of which it is -unnecessary to enter, rendered it at last possible to effect specie -resumption on a silver basis. A Notification to this effect was issued -in June, 1885, and the measure came into force on the 1st January, 1886. -The gold standard now in existence was not established until eleven -years later. - -The same year (1886) witnessed a revival of political agitation. This -had, as we have seen, died down after the failure of the first attempt -to organize political parties in preparation for the promised -parliament, and the extremist members of the now numerous party of -advanced reformers had been tempted to employ more violent methods to -attain their ends, with results already described. In September of that -year a meeting of politicians of all shades of liberal and radical -opinion was held in the Capital to concert measures for the taking of -united action. Simultaneously with this renewed activity the field of -operations was extended. Ever since the agitation had assumed a more or -less organized form the politicians conducting it had confined their -attention almost exclusively to domestic affairs. Now, however, an -important foreign question came before the public in a shape more -definite than before. This was the question of Treaty Revision. - -It has already been explained in a previous chapter, in connection with -the mission of Iwakura to Europe and America in 1872 for the ostensible -purpose of obtaining a revision of the treaties with foreign Powers, how -soon after the reopening of foreign intercourse, and how strongly, the -Japanese nation resented the exemption of foreigners from Japanese -jurisdiction under the treaties of 1858; what importance was attached by -the Japanese Government to a revision of those treaties which would do -away with extra-territorial privileges; and what disappointment and -ill-feeling, as well as other unwelcome results, were caused by the -failure of the mission to persuade the foreign Governments concerned to -enter into negotiations on the subject. It will be more convenient to -give this important question a place to itself later on, when the course -of our narrative has reached the point at which the object of the -long-continued negotiations was at length successfully accomplished. For -the present it will be sufficient to mention that the question was not -allowed to drop because of the ill-success of the Iwakura Mission: that -negotiations were reopened by the Japanese Government in 1882, when a -Preliminary Conference was held in Tōkiō; that a further and more formal -Conference took place in the same Capital four years later; and that on -neither of these occasions was a definite result reached. - -Such was the position of affairs when in the course of the revival of -political agitation this question, so embarrassing to the Government, -and so irritating to the susceptibilities of the nation, came to play a -more prominent part in public controversies. A national grievance of -this kind felt by all educated persons was naturally shared by -politicians. It was rendered more acute by the recognition of the fact, -now become common knowledge, that the absence of any fixed term for the -duration of existing treaties constituted a serious obstacle to their -revision. Treaty revision, therefore, became a chief feature in the -programme of political agitators, and increased importance was given to -it by the failure of the second Conference to achieve any definite -results, and by the resignation, as a result of this failure, of the -then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count (afterwards Marquis) Inouyé, -who, as chief Japanese delegate, had presided over its meetings. - -Some increase of confusion in the country, and a general sense of -instability, were caused too at this time by the pro-foreign tendencies -which for some years had characterized the policy of the Government. -Associated in its origin with a desire for the revision of the treaties -which should relieve Japanese susceptibilities, and with the -well-grounded conviction that the adoption of Western institutions, laws -and customs would enlist the sympathies of foreign countries, and thus -assist the attainment of the end desired, the movement assumed such -proportions in official and Court circles in the Capital as to lead to -the supposition that nothing less than the Europeanization of Japan was -intended. More serious than some in its character, and in its effects -more lasting, it ran its course like other similar movements, the -recurrence of which is a testimony to the impulsive character of the -people; and when it died out the process was so silent and gradual that -no reactionary wave came to swell the normal tide of anti-foreign -sentiment. - -The failure in 1887 of the second Conference, which had lasted more than -a year, furnished a welcome opportunity to political agitators. The -moment was favourable for the stirring up of trouble. The renewal of -political activity was signalized by the formation of a confederation of -men of all parties, including even a sprinkling of conservatives, under -the name of General Agreement Union (_Daidō-Shō-i Danketsu_), a title -which was intended to convey the meaning that it was an association of -persons whose opinions agreed in the main and differed only in -non-essentials. It was not a political party in the strict sense of the -term, but a loose conglomeration of persons united only by -dissatisfaction with the Government. Encouraged by the birth of this new -and powerful association, the class of political rowdies increased in -numbers; the law which imposed restrictions on the organization of -political parties was evaded by the formation of secret societies; and -eventually the condition of affairs became so serious that the -Government took the strongest step adopted since the Restoration and -issued what are known as the Peace Preservation Regulations (_Hō-an -Jōrei_). These regulations prohibited under severe penalties the holding -of secret meetings, the formation of secret societies, and the -publication of books or pamphlets of any kind of a nature to disturb the -public peace. They also armed the authorities with power to arrest and -banish for three years from the district in which he lived any person -suspected of disturbing the public peace who resided within a radius of -seven miles from the Imperial Palace in the Capital. - -The regulations were put into force on the date of their promulgation, -the 25th December, 1887. More than five hundred persons were arrested -and banished at twenty-four hours’ notice from the Capital and its -neighbourhood, the number including several prominent men, who -afterwards filled high positions as Cabinet Ministers or Presidents of -the Lower House. The precautions taken by the authorities did not end -here. The garrison of Tōkiō was increased, the departments of State and -the official residences of Ministers were guarded by police patrols, and -the Ministers themselves never ventured out without an escort of two or -three armed detectives. The nature of the precautionary measures taken -indicates that it was not popular disorders so much as dangerous -political trouble that was feared. That they were needed is proved by -the fact that during the year 1889 one Cabinet Minister was murdered, -while another was dangerously wounded by political malcontents. - -As before, conciliation went hand in hand with repression. Three days -after the Peace Preservation Regulations were promulgated the issue of a -new and more lenient Press law encouraged the freer expression of -popular views. And in February of the following year (1888) public -opinion was further conciliated by the inclusion in the Cabinet of -Ōkuma, whose views on constitutional questions had always been in -advance of those of the Ministry which he rejoined. His return to the -Cabinet was of great service to the country at a critical time, helping -the Government to tide over an uncomfortable interval which still -remained before the promulgation of the Constitution. - - - - - CHAPTER XVIII - Imperial Authority—Privy Council—Local Self-Government—Promulgation of -Constitution—Imperial Prerogatives—The Two Houses of Parliament—Features - of Constitution and First Parliamentary Elections. - - -The Peace Preservation Regulations provided, as we have seen, amongst -other things, for the removal of persons suspected of designs to disturb -the public peace from areas in the Capital, and its suburbs, within a -radius of seven miles from the Imperial Palace. This mention of the -Imperial Palace shows how strong the force of habit was, and still is, -in Japan. The maintenance of “the security of the Throne,” a phrase -borrowed from the Chinese classics, was for centuries a leading idea in -Japanese administration. The expression, usually to be found in -association with another classical phrase, “the tranquillity of the -people,” recurs from an early date in all official literature, in -Decrees, Memorials and Manifestos. As remarkable as the continuity of -the dynasty, of which the nation is not unnaturally proud, this constant -solicitude for the Imperial welfare, this manifestation of what to -foreign eyes may seem a somewhat excessive degree of reverence for the -Throne, was often in inverse ratio to the authority it wielded. We have -seen, for instance, how the policy of the founder of the Tokugawa line -of Shōguns was to increase the outward respect paid to the Court by -surrounding it with an enhanced semblance of dignity, while at the same -time its authority was sensibly diminished. At no time was the -ceremonial governing relations between what was left of the Court and -the Shōgunate more elaborate than under the rule of the Shōguns of this -line; never, perhaps, was the authority of the Throne less effective. -This was, however, the effect of deliberate policy, in which may be -traced a desire to hoodwink the nation, and conceal the ambitious -designs of its rulers. When in the closing years of Shōgunate rule its -prestige declined, the reassertion of Imperial authority was accompanied -by a tendency to lay additional emphasis on the immemorial respect due -to the Throne. It was this feeling which led the Court party before the -Restoration to insist on no “treaty port” being opened in the five “home -provinces” because of the vicinity of Kiōto, where the Emperor resided. -When the opening of the port of Hiogo could no longer be withstood, the -same feeling inspired the narrowing of “treaty limits”—the name given to -the area in the neighbourhood of a “treaty port” in which foreigners -were allowed under the treaties to make excursions—in the direction of -the old Capital; now, several years later, after the personal rule of -the Sovereign had, in name at least, been re-established, we notice the -same anxiety for the security of the Throne still closely connected with -the maintenance of public tranquillity. And evidence of the same exalted -respect for the Throne will be seen in the Constitution which was -shortly to be promulgated, and in the official “Commentaries” which -accompanied its promulgation. But the unusual context in which the -indirect allusion to the Throne appeared in the Peace Preservation -Regulations showed that a further reason lay behind this mention of the -Imperial Palace. It was customary then, as now, for the official -measurement of all distances from the new Capital to be taken from a -central point in the city. This was the _Nihonbashi_, or Bridge of -Japan, situated in the centre of the old town. It being generally -understood, however, that all distances were measured from this centre, -it was considered unnecessary to mention the point. The fact that in the -present instance the point from which distances were to be measured was -mentioned at all, coupled with the substitution of the Imperial Palace -for the bridge in question, could not fail to attract attention. The -public was thereby reminded both of its duty in the matter of solicitude -for the security of the Throne, and of the Imperial authority that -supported the course adopted by the Government. Throughout the stormy -times which followed the establishment of parliamentary institutions in -Japan, the invocation of the Imperial authority, either directly or -indirectly, served as a political barometer by which the seriousness of -a political crisis might be definitely gauged. - -In April, 1888, two months after the return of Ōkuma to the Ministry -with the title of Count, the Privy Council (_Sūmitsu-in_) was -established. The decree announcing its creation stated that the Emperor -found it expedient “to consult personages who had rendered signal -service to the State” in regard to important matters, thus making it -clear that the functions of the Council would be of a purely advisory -nature—a point confirmed later on by the Constitution—and that its -members would be chosen from officials of wide experience. The scope of -its duties, as defined in the rules governing its organization, covered -a wide field, including, amongst other matters, the drafting and -consideration of new administrative measures, the revision of existing -laws, amendments to the Constitution, the presentation of its views on -treaties with foreign countries and financial questions. - -With functions in some few respects similar to those of the -corresponding body in Great Britain, the Japanese Privy Council fills a -larger place in the political machinery of the State and takes a more -active part in legislation, though it has no judicial functions. Even -more so than with us is it the final goal to which all public servants -aspire, and where their services are still available for the State. But -it is something else, too. It has a political influence which does not -exist in the case of our own institution of the same name; its members -are eligible for re-entry into the Ministry or for other State -employment; and they are in constant and close touch with public -affairs. - -The need for something of the kind in Japan was far greater than in -Europe. To realize its necessity it must be remembered that the same -tendencies in Japan which encouraged the system of figure-head -government favoured the existence of advisory councils, whose duties -were to suggest or offer an opinion on administrative policy, the -carrying out of which was entrusted to executive officials. When the -whole system of government was reorganized on a Western basis, the -opportunity of introducing this feature of Western administrative -systems was eagerly seized, as it was felt that it would in some sense -fill the embarrassing gap caused by the disappearance of the groups of -advisers which had played so leading a part under the old _régime_. - -Prompt use was made of the services of the new Council. The Constitution -had by this time been drafted, and was ready for the consideration of -the Privy Council. Accordingly, within a fortnight of its coming into -existence the new Privy Councillors were, in accordance with the duties -assigned to them, discussing the draft Constitution at a series of -meetings, to which the attendance of the Emperor gave an increased -importance. - -The year 1888 was marked by the enactment of another important measure. -This was the local Self-government Act, known as the Law of Cities, -Towns and Villages (_Shi-chō-som-pō_). The first step in the reform of -local government, by which a representative character was given to it, -had been taken in 1878, when drafts of the “Three Great Laws,” as they -were popularly called, were prepared by the Conference of Prefects. One -of these, the law creating Prefectural Assemblies, came into force, as -we have seen, two years later. The operation of the other arrangements -drafted at the same time, and affecting smaller areas of local -administration, had been postponed. These now came into force in the -spring of 1889, some changes having in the meantime been made. In the -following year these arrangements, as well as the whole system of local -government, underwent further revision. The revised system then -introduced is now in operation in forty-five of the forty-six -prefectures into which Japan proper is divided, the exception being -Loochoo, known since its annexation as the Okinawa prefecture. The basis -of the present system is the separation of local administration into two -main branches, urban and rural. Each of these prefectures—three of which -(Tōkiō, Kiōto and Ōsaka) have a separate status as urban prefectures -(_Fu_), the rest being rural prefectures (_Ken_)—is now divided into -urban districts, or “cities” (_Shi_), and rural districts, or counties -(_Gun_). A rural district, or county (_Gun_), is again subdivided into -towns (_Chō_) and villages (_Son_). The classification of a town as an -urban district, or “city” (_Shi_), or a “town” (_Chō_), depends on its -population. Unless otherwise determined by the Minister of the Interior, -with whom the final decision rests, all towns of over 25,000 inhabitants -have the status of “cities,” enjoying as such a somewhat larger measure -of self-government than those not in this category. In each prefecture -there is a prefectural assembly (_Kenkwai_ or _Fukwai_, as the case may -be), and an executive council (_Sanjikwai_). Similar assemblies and -executive councils exist in each rural district and “city,” but towns -and villages, though they are provided with assemblies, have no -executive councils, the duties of these latter bodies being entrusted to -the mayors. - -[Illustration: - - MARQUIS MATSUGATA. - - Took an active part in the Government formed after the Restoration. As - Finance Minister he carried out specie resumption on a silver basis - in 1886, and introduced the present gold standard in 1897. -] - -[Illustration: - - FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE ŌYAMA. - - Rendered distinguished services in the war with China, and was - Commander-in-Chief in the Russo-Japanese war. -] - -The system of election to local administrative bodies is more or less -the same in each administrative unit. In prefectures where the -population does not exceed 700,000 an assembly has thirty members. Where -the population is larger another member may be elected for each -additional 50,000 inhabitants. “City” assemblies contain more members, -the number varying from thirty to sixty, the latter number being the -maximum. The _Sanjikwai_, or executive council, of a prefecture consists -of ten councillors chosen by the assembly from amongst its members. The -prefect presides, and is assisted by two prefectural officials. In rural -districts the presiding official is the _Gunchō_, or district -administrator, who, as in the case of prefects, is appointed by the -Minister of the Interior. In “cities” the mayor of the city presides, -being assisted by a deputy, or deputies, as the case may be. The chief -duty of all these assemblies is to regulate expenditure, and apportion -the taxation required to meet it. In the scheme of local taxation the -_corvée_ still occupies a prominent place, though, except on occasions -of emergency, substitutes may be provided, or money payments made in -commutation. In the election of members voting is by secret ballot. The -property qualification for electors, and for those eligible as members, -is determined by the annual amount of national, or Imperial, taxes paid -by an individual. The age qualification is fixed at twenty-five years, -the legal age at which majority is attained. The possession of civil -rights is also necessary. - -The legislative activity displayed in the series of administrative -measures above mentioned shows how wide an effect was produced by the -decision to create a Parliament, to which a Constitution became under -the circumstances an essential corollary. In some cases this legislation -was the direct offspring of that decision. The new peerage, the -reorganization of the Ministry, the Privy Council, all had their -separate places in the scheme of the Constitution. In other cases the -connection, though not so close, was still obvious; for it was not -possible to make a Constitution and fit it into the existing framework -of government, put together, as the latter had been, piece by piece, -without some sensible alterations of administrative machinery. From this -point of view it will be seen that the reform of local government, and -even the institution of Court Councillors, who might be chosen to sit in -the Upper House, had a definite, albeit indirect, bearing on the -Constitution, and on the National Parliament about to be established. - -The Constitution having been considered and approved by the Privy -Council, to whose deliberations on the subject an increased dignity had, -as we have seen, been given by the attendance of the Sovereign, was -promulgated by the Emperor in person on the 11th February, 1889. The -ceremony took place in the Throne Room of the newly built palace in -Tōkiō, a building of Japanese architecture, modified in some of its -features by a slight admixture of foreign designs. The Emperor and -Empress occupied daises of unequal height at one end of the hall, which -was filled with the dignitaries of the Empire, and officials of senior -grades. Seats outside the Court circle were arranged according to the -new rules of precedence. The three first places were assigned to the -ex-daimiōs of Satsuma and Chōshiū and to the new head of the Tokugawa -family, in the order named, all three having the rank of princes in the -new nobility. The head of the Tokugawa House was the cousin and adopted -heir of the ex-Shōgun Kéiki, and succeeded to the headship of the family -on the enforced retirement at the close of the civil war of the last of -the Shōguns. The dignitaries and officials present all wore modern Court -costume of European style, with the marked exception of Prince Shimadzu -of Satsuma, whose appearance in Japanese costume, with hair dressed in -the old-fashioned cue, bore witness to the ingrained conservatism of the -clan he represented. Never before in the country’s history had a scene -more impressive occurred, nor, indeed, one less in keeping with Japanese -traditional ideas. Great as had always from time immemorial been the -reverence felt by all classes of the people for the Crown, it was a -reverence tinged with political expediency, which showed itself in the -fixed policy of screening from public view the object of veneration. The -atmosphere of mystery and seclusion which surrounded the monarch had -naturally extended to the palace and its precincts, and in a still -greater degree, for reasons common to all Oriental countries, to the -person of the Imperial Consort. Now for the first time the palace was -thrown open to a gathering so large as to deprive it of any very select -or exclusive character, and the tradition of centuries was broken in a -manner contrary, not to say repugnant, to all previous ideas by the -attendance of the Sovereign and his Consort in person, the former taking -an active part in the proceedings. The ceremony, therefore, in a certain -sense symbolized the new spirit which inspired the nation, ushering in a -different order of things. Apart from the pomp and magnificence of its -surroundings, it set the seal on the new departure in State policy, and -represented the final bridging of the gulf between old and new Japan. - -The speech read by the Emperor on this occasion was couched in the vague -and grandiloquent style common to all utterances from the Throne. It -spoke of the Constitution as “an immutable fundamental law,” and -described the foundations of the Empire as having been laid by the -Founder of the Imperial House and other Imperial ancestors, with the -help of their subjects, on a basis that was to last for ever, an -achievement due to the glorious virtues of the Imperial ancestors and -the bravery and loyalty of the people; and it expressed the hope that -the same loyal co-operation between Sovereign and subject would for ever -secure the stability of the fabric of State bequeathed by the Imperial -ancestors. - -The Imperial Decree, or Rescript, issued on the same day as that on -which the Constitution was promulgated, and bearing the sign-manual of -the Sovereign and the signatures of the nine Ministers of State, appears -as a Preamble in the official English text of the “Commentaries on the -Constitution,” though it is not found in the original Japanese text. It -provided that the Imperial Diet (the name given to the new Parliament) -should be convoked for the first time in 1890, and that the date of its -opening should be that on which the Constitution should come into force. -The date thus fixed was the 29th November, 1890. In this Decree, which -contained a reference to the promise of a Parliament made in 1881, the -Emperor stated his intention to exercise his Sovereign rights in -accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, for the execution of -which the Ministers of State would be responsible. Stress was also laid -on the important condition that any proposal for the amendment of the -Constitution in the future must proceed from the Throne, and that in no -other way would any attempt on the part of the Emperor’s descendants, or -subjects, to alter it be permitted. - -Additional solemnity was given to the promulgation of the Constitution -by an Oath taken by the Emperor in the Shintō Shrine (called the -“Sanctuary” in the English official text of the “Commentaries”) attached -to the palace. In this Oath—the second of its kind, the first having, as -we have seen, been taken in 1869—the Emperor bound himself “to maintain -and secure from decline the ancient form of government,” and, while -acknowledging the help received from the Imperial ancestors in the past, -implored the continuance of their support in the future. - -The Constitution, as promulgated, consisted of seventy-six articles -divided into seven chapters, dealing, respectively, with the position -and prerogatives of the Sovereign, the rights and duties of the people, -the functions of the Diet, the relations between the Cabinet and the -Privy Council, the judicature and finance; and one of the supplementary -rules attached to it provided for its revision, a point reserved, as we -have seen, for the initiative of the Crown. Simultaneously with its -promulgation various accessory laws were enacted. These were the -Imperial House Law, mentioned in the Imperial Oath, the Imperial -Ordinance concerning the House of Peers, the Law of the Houses, the Law -of Election of the members of the House of Representatives and the Law -of Finance. - -The general lines of the Constitution follow those of the Bavarian -Constitution, which was taken as the model. Its leading principles are -the small limitations placed on the Imperial prerogative and the -independence of the Cabinet, which is responsible to the Sovereign -alone, and not in any way to the Diet. No mention either of the Cabinet, -or of the Minister President, occurs in the Constitution, though they -are referred to in Prince Itō’s “Commentaries.” But Article LXXVI of the -Constitution provides that all existing enactments, in so far as they do -not conflict with it, shall continue in force. The enactment of 1885 -reorganizing the Ministry comes under this rule. Consequently the -position of the Minister President, and of the Cabinet over which he -presided, remained unaltered after the Constitution came into operation. - -The enumeration of the Imperial prerogatives occupies much space in the -Constitution. The chief points to be noted are that the Sovereign -exercises the legislative powers with the consent of the Diet; that his -sanction is necessary for all laws; that he is empowered on occasions of -emergency which arise when the Diet is not sitting to issue “Imperial -Ordinances” which have provisionally the force of law, but which require -the approval of the Diet at its next session, when, if not approved, -they cease to be operative; that he determines the peace standing of -both army and navy; and that the authority to declare war, make peace, -announce a state of siege and conclude treaties rests with him. All of -these matters are removed from the control of the Diet, which has also -no voice in any future modifications of the Law of the Imperial House. -The remarkable reverence for the Throne which is characteristic of the -people is illustrated by the declaration, in one of the early articles, -of the sacredness and inviolability of the person of the Emperor. This, -we are told in the “Commentaries,” is a consequence of his divine -descent. He must, indeed, it is explained, “pay due respect to the law, -but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it”—a statement -which seems to involve a contradiction in terms, for it is difficult to -understand how a Sovereign who is not accountable to law can be bound to -respect it. - -Among the duties of Japanese subjects, as defined in the Constitution, -is liability to service in the army or navy. It should be explained, -however, that whereas service in the army is based on conscription -alone, recruiting for the navy is, in practice, based on the volunteer -system, supplemented by conscription. Their rights include immunity from -arrest, trial or punishment, except in accordance with the provisions of -the law; similar immunity in the matter of the entry or search of -houses, and as regards private correspondence; and freedom of religious -belief. With regard to the omission to place on record the fact that -there are two officially recognized religions, Shintō and Buddhism, one -may, after reading the explanations on this point given in the -“Commentaries,” be tempted to think that the last word has not been said -on the subject. At the same time it will be recognized that the course -adopted represents the simplest solution of the question. - -The Diet, or Parliament—for Japanese writers, when writing in English, -use both terms indifferently—comprises two Chambers, a House of Peers -and a House of Representatives. The House of Peers is composed of -members of five different categories: (1) Members of the Imperial family -who have attained majority, fixed in such cases at twenty years; (2) -princes and marquises who have attained legal majority, namely, -twenty-five years; (3) other members of the nobility chosen by their -respective orders; (4) distinguished persons specially nominated by the -Emperor; and (5) persons (one for each urban and rural district) elected -by and from the highest taxpayers. Those coming under the first, second -and fourth categories are life members; those coming under the third and -fifth categories are elected for seven years. The number of members of -the House of Representatives, as originally fixed by the Constitution, -was 300, and there was a property qualification for membership. They are -elected by voters who have attained legal majority, and pay annually -direct national taxes amounting to about £1. Under the revised Electoral -Law which came into force in 1902 there is no longer any property -qualification for membership, the only conditions now being an age limit -of thirty years and the possession of civil rights. The same law reduced -both property and age qualifications in the case of electors, this -extension of the franchise resulting in the number of electors being -increased to 1,700,000; substituted the secret ballot for open voting; -and raised the number of members of the Lower House to 381, urban -districts returning 73 and rural districts 308. The large majority of -members in this Chamber have always belonged to the agrarian class. The -natural term of the House of Representatives is four years. Dissolution, -which is one of the Imperial prerogatives, applies only to the Lower -House. When it occurs, the Upper House (or House of Peers) is prorogued. -New elections must take place within five months from the date of -dissolution, the next session of the Diet becoming what is known as an -Extraordinary Session. - -The Imperial House Law contains various provisions relating to the -succession to the Throne, which is limited to the male line; the -appointment of a Regent, for which post in certain circumstances the -Empress, Empress Dowager and other ladies of the Court are eligible, -and, during the minority of the Sovereign, of a governor, or guardian; -and the age (18) at which a Sovereign attains majority. A point to be -noted is the restriction of the custom of adoption in the case of the -Imperial Family, no member of which is allowed to adopt a son. - -In concluding this brief sketch of the Constitution and accessory laws, -it may be well to mention a point which has an important bearing on the -practical working of the Japanese parliamentary system, namely, the -control exercised by the Diet over the Budget. This to some extent -remedies the weakness of parliamentary opposition parties—as compared -with similar parties elsewhere—which arises out of the fact that the -Cabinet is independent of the Diet. When conflicts over the Budget take -place, the Diet may by withholding supplies force a dissolution. In -these cases by the terms of the Constitution the Government is obliged -to substitute, in place of the rejected Budget, the Budget of the -previous financial year passed in the preceding session. Any new -financial programme, therefore, to which the Government may have -committed itself in the rejected Budget is consequently held up, and -cannot be proceeded with until a fresh Budget has been passed in a -subsequent extraordinary session of Parliament. This means a delay of at -least several months. The Government is, however, not necessarily always -the sufferer financially thereby, for, as Marquis Ōkuma points out in -his book already referred to, the effect of dissolutions occurring -through this cause has usually been to reduce expenditure rather than -revenue. - -The first parliamentary elections were held in the summer of 1890, the -first session of the Diet taking place in the following autumn. - - - - - CHAPTER XIX - Working of Representative Government—Stormy Proceedings in Diet—Legal - and Judicial Reform—Political Rowdyism—Fusion of Classes. - - -The simultaneous creation in Japan of a Parliament and a Constitution -offers a contrast to the sequence of political history elsewhere. There -is no essential connection between the two. Some countries have enjoyed -parliamentary rights of various kinds before being endowed with -Constitutions. In others, again, the order of precedence has been -reversed. The fact that in Japan the two came together may be regarded -as the natural outcome of the decision of the new Government formed at -the Restoration to reorganize the general administration of the country -on Western lines. The establishment of parliamentary institutions of -some kind was the fixed idea of all reformers. The working of this -leading idea may be traced throughout the whole course of administrative -reconstruction. Reference to it was made in the Imperial Oath of -1869—spoken of by Japanese, when writing in English, as the “Charter -Oath of the nation.” It is seen in the introduction of a deliberative -element into the otherwise archaic form given to the new administration; -in the subsequent creation of a Senate (_Genrō-in_); in the creation of -prefectural assemblies in 1880; in the definite promise of a Parliament, -to be accompanied by a Constitution, in 1881; in the creation in 1890 of -smaller local assemblies on the same representative basis as the -prefectural assemblies; and, finally, in the promulgation in 1889 of the -Constitution which came into operation in the following year, -simultaneously with the Diet, signalizing the accomplishment of the -purpose in view from the first. That the Constitution, when promulgated, -was of a less liberal kind than that which had been originally intended, -and was still desired by advanced reformers, was due to the pressure of -reactionary influences already described. This, as well as the short -space of years covered by the transition from feudalism to -constitutional government, of the working of which the nation had no -experience, save what little had been acquired in connection with the -revision of local government, accounts to a large extent for the stormy -character which marked the proceedings of the Diet for several years -after it came into existence. - -The final establishment of representative government was accompanied in -the same year by evidence of further substantial progress in the -direction of legal and judicial reform. The Code of Civil Procedure and -the Commercial Code were completed. Of these, the first came into -operation immediately; the latter not until eight years later, by which -time it had undergone careful revision. The law of the organization of -Judicial Courts was also promulgated, and the Criminal Code and the Code -of Criminal Procedure, which had been in force since 1882, appeared in -new and revised forms. In the preparation of all these laws, as in the -framing of the Constitution and other subsidiary measures, much -assistance was rendered by foreign jurists, amongst whom the names of -Mr. (now Sir Francis) Piggott and the late Mr. Feodor Satow may be -mentioned. - -The interval of nearly two years which elapsed between the promulgation -of the Constitution and its coming into operation was a period of -increased political agitation and unrest. On the very morning of the -promulgation of the Constitution the Minister of Education, Viscount -Mōri, whose pro-foreign tendencies had caused much irritation in -reactionary circles, was murdered by a Shintō priest in the presence of -his guards as he was stepping into his carriage to proceed to the -Palace. It was to his initiative that the addition of the English -language to the curriculum of elementary schools had been due. It was -reported at the time that his assassination was the result of some real, -or fancied, slight on the part of the deceased statesman when paying an -official visit of inspection to the national shrines at Isé. What truth -there was in this rumour will probably never be known. - -The resumption at this time of negotiations for the revision of the -treaties with foreign Powers led to further agitation also on this -subject. When it became known that in the new proposals put forward by -the Japanese Government the appointment of foreign judges was -contemplated, popular indignation at what was regarded as a slight to -the dignity of Japan found vent in an attempt in the autumn of the same -year on the life of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count -(afterwards Marquis) Ōkuma. Though escaping with his life, he was so -severely injured by the explosion of a bomb thrown by a political -fanatic, a native of his own province of Hizen, that he was forced to -resign. Nor did the opening of the first session of the Diet have any -calming effect on the general unrest which prevailed. So serious, -indeed, was the recrudescence of anti-foreign feeling that in the spring -of 1891 the late Tsar of Russia, Nicholas II, who, as Crown Prince, was -on a visit to Japan, had a narrow escape from injury at the hands of a -policeman on duty, who attacked him with a sword. If, however, the state -of things both on the eve of the opening of the Diet, and after -parliamentary institutions were in full operation, wore a disquieting -aspect, the anxieties of the Government were lessened by the want of -unity among the various political factions in opposition. The -dissolution of the General Agreement Union, one of whose prominent -leaders, Count Gotō, rejoined the Government, showed that internal -dissensions were stronger than the motives which brought its adherents -together, and its example was followed by other equally ephemeral -associations. In the reconstruction of political parties which -subsequently took place the _Jiyūtō_ was revived under the leadership of -Count Itagaki, its numbers being reduced to very small dimensions; the -General Agreement Union reappeared in the form of an organized political -party, a character it had not possessed before, and under the changed -name of the _Daidō_ Club; while the _Kaishintō_ which had narrowly -escaped dissolution, retained its original constitution, but without its -most prominent leaders. - -Meanwhile the first elections for the Diet had taken place in the summer -of 1890. The result was in accordance with what might have been -anticipated in view of the confusion of ideas then existing in the -political world, and the local feeling which stood in the way of -combined action. The members who were returned to the first Parliament -owed allegiance to ten different political groups, the most numerous of -all being the free lances, who belonged to no party and were grouped -together under the name of Independents. It was not, therefore, an -organized nor, in any sense, a united Opposition which confronted -Ministers in the Diet; but, much as they might differ among themselves -on questions of the day, the various groups were capable of forming -temporary alliances, which, owing to the uncertainty resulting from the -large number of independent members, caused no little embarrassment to -the “Two-Clan” Government which had called them into parliamentary life. -The general tone of the first House of Representatives was unmistakably -democratic. - -Buckle, in his _History of Civilization_, makes some remarks on the -social conditions prevailing in France on the eve of the French -Revolution which are applicable to those existing in Japan at the time -of which we are speaking. In the latter country, however, these -conditions were the result, not the forerunner, of revolution. “As -long,” he says, “as the different classes confined themselves to -pursuits peculiar to their own sphere they were encouraged to preserve -their separate habits; and the subordination or, as it were, the -hierarchy of society was easily maintained. But when the members of the -various orders met in the same place with the same object, they became -knit together by a new sympathy. The highest and most durable of all -pleasures, the pleasure caused by the perception of fresh truths, was -now a link which banded together those social elements that were -formerly wrapped up in the pride of their own isolation.” And he goes on -to point out how the new eagerness for the study of science at this time -in France stimulated democratic feeling. - -In Japan the separation of pursuits, to which Buckle alludes, had been a -striking feature of pre-Restoration days. Not only were there the class -distinctions, rigidly maintained, between the _samurai_, the farmer, the -artizan and the merchant; but two of these classes, those of the -merchants and artizans, were split up into guilds of an exclusive -character. The towns, moreover, like those of mediæval Europe, were -divided into quarters inhabited by those following the same trade, or -handicraft. The fusion of classes had begun even before the Restoration. -The first impulse in this direction had arisen out of the economic -situation which existed towards the close of the Tokugawa -administration. The distress of the farmer, and the poverty of the -_samurai_, caused breaches in the barriers separating class from class, -and notably in those which divided the two classes mentioned from the -rest of the nation. These were, however, only premonitory symptoms. The -real fusion of classes came after the Restoration, when the abolition of -feudalism put an end to the privileged position of the _samurai_, -diminishing at the same time, though not wholly extinguishing, class -prejudice. The various reforms which followed: the establishment of -schools and colleges which brought education within the reach of -everyone; the measures affecting land tenure and taxation; the -codification of laws; and conscription—to name only a few—all tended to -promote uniformity; the final factor in the process being the creation -of parliamentary institutions, which supplied a meeting-ground for all -sections of the nation, and a common field of interest for all. - -An increase of democratic feeling was thus a logical consequence of the -policy of reform on Western lines, on which the Government had embarked -after the Restoration. When the Monarch and his Ministers proclaimed -with one voice their intention to associate the people in the work of -government, when local autonomy was by degrees introduced, when a -Constitution was in operation, and a Parliament in session, it would -have been strange indeed if the general stream of popular tendencies had -not set in the direction of democratic ideas. Nor were such tendencies -incompatible with Imperialist sentiment, the feeling that had counted -for so much in the overthrow of the previous _régime_. For this latter -feeling was simply a habit of mind, a passive tradition, a principle -which, so far as politics were concerned, had rarely been translated -into practice, though it formed the groundwork for a more active, if -somewhat artificial, loyalty, and an exaggerated patriotism. - -With the coming into force of the Constitution the ancient monarchy -entered upon a new phase in its existence. During the long period of -Tokugawa ascendancy the Crown had slumbered, as before, in complete -security, its repose guarded by the Shōgunate. Removed from all contact -with outside influences, it was free from all possibility of collision -with the people. Although after the Restoration the severity of its -seclusion was relaxed, the personality of the Monarch made little or no -impression beyond the select inner circle of statesmen who constituted -the governing oligarchy. The representative institutions now -established, while limiting Imperial prerogatives, enabled the Sovereign -to come more prominently into view, and to be brought into direct -association with his people within the forms prescribed by the -Constitution. - - - - - CHAPTER XX - Working of Parliamentary Government—Grouping of Parties—Government and - Opposition—Formation of _Seiyūkai_—Increasing Intervention of - Throne—Decrease of Party Rancour—Attitude of Upper House. - - -The stage now reached in our narrative seems to be a suitable moment for -giving a sketch of the main features which marked the proceedings of the -Diet from the date of its first session up to the present time. By the -adoption of this course, instead of adhering strictly to chronological -sequence, it may be possible to convey a clearer idea of the character -and working of parliamentary government in Japan. - -We have seen that the results of the first elections were unfavourable -to the Government, the majority of successful candidates belonging to -one or other of the Opposition factions. While no single party could -point to any decisive numerical superiority as evidence of the favour of -the electors, three of the groups—the _Daidō_ Club, the _Kaishintō_, or -Progressives, and the Independents—were nearly equal in numbers, the -others being much less strongly represented. Between the date of the -elections, however, and the opening of Parliament a further -reconstruction of parties took place. Both the _Daidō_ Club and the -revived _Jiyūtō_ were dissolved, to reappear in an amalgamated form -under the name of Constitutional Liberals. A Conservative Party -supporting the Government was also organized. It is unnecessary to refer -to the various party manifestos issued at this time further than to say -that they covered a wide range of subjects; reduction of expenditure, -naval and military policy, finance, questions of local government and -taxation constituting the chief points on which attention was -concentrated. Owing to the sudden changes which had altered the -constitution of parties since the elections, when the Diet met, the new -Association of Constitutional Liberals, whose ranks had meanwhile been -further strengthened by the adhesion of many independent members, became -by far the strongest party in the House of Representatives, the only two -others of any prominence being the Progressives and the Conservatives. -By the time, therefore, that the first Parliament had settled down to -business the members of the Lower House were divided into three main -groups: the Liberals, the Progressives, and a Conservative Party, -without much cohesion, which supported the Government. This grouping -has, in spite of kaleidoscopic changes occurring with bewildering -frequency, in membership, nomenclature and political programmes, -survived more or less to this day, although both the Liberal and -Progressive parties are now known by other names, while the foundations -on which they rest have to some extent shifted. - -The first session of the Diet passed without a dissolution. Early in its -proceedings the question which has furnished the predominant note of all -parliamentary sessions, that of finance, came to the front. The -Opposition attacked the Budget. In the debates which ensued a crisis was -only averted by a compromise involving a recasting of the Budget and a -large reduction of expenditure. It was Japan’s first essay in -parliamentary government; the new order of things was on its trial. Both -sides, therefore, were probably disinclined to push matters to -extremities. In the remarks on the Constitution made in a previous -chapter it was pointed out that the comparative weakness of -parliamentary Opposition parties in Japan was in some degree remedied by -the control over the Budget exercised by the Diet, which could force a -dissolution by refusing to vote supplies. This is what happened in the -second session. No such moderate counsels as those which had led to a -compromise before prevailed on this occasion. The Budget was again -attacked, the attitude of the Opposition being so hostile and -uncompromising that the House of Representatives was dissolved soon -after the opening of Parliament. This was the first instance of -dissolution. The first Japanese Parliament had thus lasted for only two -years. - -The history of these two earliest sessions—a record, that is to say, of -sustained conflict—is the history of many others, and, indeed, viewed in -not too critical a light, it is the history of thirty years of -constitutional government. We see the same tactics pursued by the -Opposition on each occasion, financial questions being almost invariably -the issue which is raised; and the attacks are met in one of two ways—by -dissolution or compromise. The aims of popular parties also continue -from year to year with little change. Financial retrenchment, taxation, -naval and military establishments, education, as well as constitutional -reform in the shape of party government and the responsibility of -Ministers to the Diet, all figure repeatedly in party programmes; but, -with the gradual rise of Japan to the position of a world Power, foreign -politics, and the development of national resources, come to occupy a -larger share of the Diet’s attention. - -Although the conflicts which occurred between the Diet and the -Government in the first two sessions continued to be a constantly -recurring feature of parliamentary proceedings, in the course of a few -years a marked change in the relations between the Government and -parliamentary parties took place. The Government began to display more -tolerance of popular views which did not altogether coincide with their -own, while resistance to Government measures on the part of the -Opposition became less uncompromising. The reason for this change of -attitude on both sides lay in the fact that the statesmen in power had -begun to realize that, in spite of the Constitution having been framed -on the principle of the responsibility of Ministers to the Sovereign and -their independence of the Diet, as a matter of practical politics the -maintenance of this principle on too rigid lines was attended by serious -disadvantages. In other words, the position of the Government might be -rendered very uncomfortable, and the conduct of affairs seriously -hampered, by the constant antagonism of an unfriendly Diet. Consequently -from the time of the eighth session (1894–5) a tendency on the part of -one of the Opposition parties to draw nearer to the Government was -observable, and in the course of the next session the Liberals announced -the conclusion of an understanding with the Ministry, and appeared -openly as its supporters. From the original standpoint the Government -had occupied to reliance on the support of a political party was a -significant advance. Two years later the normal routine of parliamentary -government was interrupted by a still more significant departure in -administrative policy. The two chief Opposition parties, which the -Government had, as we have seen, succeeded in holding in check by -playing off one against the other, combined against it. Confronted by an -overwhelming hostile majority in the Lower House, the Ministry resigned, -the formation of a new Cabinet being entrusted to the leaders of those -parties, Counts Ōkuma and Itagaki. Since the reconstruction of the -Ministry in 1873 the direction of affairs had rested with the Satsuma -and Chōshiū clans, this policy being continued without change after the -Constitution came into operation. Now, for the first time since the year -in question, the government of the country was placed in the hands of -men of other clans. But with the important reservation that the control -of the army and navy was still confided to Satsuma and Chōshiū clansmen, -and that decisions on important questions of State still rested with the -inner circle of statesmen who guided affairs. The experiment, for such -it was, was not successful. Within a few weeks after the new Ministers -entered upon their duties serious dissensions broke out, and the -Coalition Cabinet resigned in the autumn of the same year before the -opening of Parliament, although the result of the General Elections had -assured it of a majority not less than before. - -The desire to establish party government has been mentioned as one of -the aims kept constantly in view by the parties in opposition. By party -government was meant the party system of government as it exists in -Great Britain and elsewhere. It is interesting to note that, while the -Government in the building up of modern Japan went to Germany mainly for -its materials, there was all the time in unofficial circles a noticeable -undercurrent of opinion in favour of British ideas and institutions. The -establishment of party government would, of course, involve an amendment -of the Constitution, nor would it be possible so long as the principle -of clan government in its present form survived. Of this the Opposition -leaders have always been well aware, and in making the question of party -government so prominent a point in their programmes their object has -probably been to carry on indirectly a persistent crusade against the -two chief obstacles which lie in their path. Although Japanese Cabinets -are in theory independent of the Diet, they have, as we have seen, from -time to time, like German Cabinets, found it necessary to rely on -parliamentary support, the withdrawal of which has usually resulted in -the fall of the Ministry. Further than that, however, and the occasional -replacement of the outgoing Ministry by one with stronger democratic -leanings, the influence of political parties has never extended. - -An event of great importance which lent a new aspect to parliamentary -affairs was the reconstitution in 1900 of the Liberal Party as the -“Society of Political Friends” (_Seiyūkai_)—a name which it still -retains—under the leadership of Prince (then Marquis) Itō, with the -avowed object of perfecting constitutional government. The Yamagata -Ministry had just resigned, and had been succeeded by a Ministry in -which Prince Itō occupied the position of Premier. Coming as it did from -one who was the framer of the Constitution, and had identified himself -with the doctrine of ministerial independence of Parliament, though he -was the first to recognize the necessity of working in the Diet with -party support, the step thus taken by Japan’s leading statesman was a -surprise to the country. Its futility in the face of existing conditions -of administration was evident from the moment his Ministry was formed, -for the control of the army and navy being reserved, as before, for the -two dominant clans, those departments were virtually independent of the -Cabinet. The new Ministry, in fact, found itself in much the same -position as that formed in 1898. Its success was scarcely greater. It -survived, it is true, one session of Parliament, but it remained in -office for only eight months, its resignation being hastened by the -hostile attitude of the Upper House. Marquis Itō was not more successful -in opposition in the next two sessions than he had been when combining -the functions of Premier and Leader of the _Seiyūkai_; and in the summer -of the year 1903 he withdrew from the party he may be said to have -created and resumed his former post of President of the Privy Council. - -A feature of some importance in the prolonged constitutional struggle -which has characterized parliamentary government in Japan has been the -increasing tendency of the Government to have recourse to the -intervention of the Throne for the solution of ministerial crises -arising out of conflicts between the Cabinet and the Lower House, or out -of questions that indirectly affect the Diet. This intervention has -taken the form of Imperial Decrees recognizable through the -circumstances attending their issue as being more or less measures of -emergency. Though, as we have seen, the influence of the Throne, as a -silent factor in affairs, had counted for much in the Restoration -movement, and in the consolidation of the new Government which came into -being, the direct intervention of the Sovereign was but rarely invoked. -It was otherwise after the Constitution came into operation. The -difficulties accompanying parliamentary government rendered appeal for -the direct support of the Throne more necessary than had been the case -before, although the Government was doubtless fully aware that the -influence of the Throne must inevitably diminish in proportion to the -frequency of its invocation. The most recent instance of direct Imperial -intervention took place when the third Katsura Ministry was formed. The -grave crisis then occurring, which had defied all other remedies, was -brought about by the resignation of the previous Ministry in consequence -of the resistance of the military party to certain projected economies -in the Budget. - -A very noticeable feature of Japanese parliamentary government is the -increasing tendency towards moderation observable in the political -world—shown, that is to say, at elections, in parliamentary proceedings, -and in the Press. During the earlier years of the Diet’s existence -elections were conducted amidst scenes of violence and disorder. Party -polemics both inside and outside of Parliament were carried on with an -absence of decorum and self-restraint which augured badly for the future -working of parliamentary institutions; political passions were inflamed -by the recriminations of party journals; and a new class of political -rowdies, called _sōshi_, stood ready to intervene whenever their -services might be required. Bands of these rowdies carrying wooden clubs -escorted popular leaders in the Lower House through the streets of the -Capital, and during two or three of the stormiest sessions the precincts -of the Diet presented the singular spectacle of rows of gendarmes and -police confronted by regiments of _sōshi_. The political rowdy of those -days is fast disappearing, his occupation, like that of his predecessor, -the _rōnin_, having gone; while turbulence, riotous conduct, and -intemperate writing are no longer regarded as the necessary -accompaniments of parliamentary life. One of the moderating influences -in Japanese public life has been the existence usually of a general -understanding, more tacit, perhaps, than expressed, between the -Government and people on broad questions of national policy. Another may -be found in the rapid progress of the nation. A people so busily engaged -as the Japanese have been in making up for the time lost by centuries of -seclusion is disinclined to pay too much attention to such matters as -jealousy of “clan government,” or objections to naval and military -expansion, more especially if the policy pursued in both respects is -attended with success, as in Japan’s case. - -From this brief sketch of Japanese parliamentary history it will be seen -that circumstances have conspired to focus attention on the proceedings -of the Lower House. It is there that the struggles between rival -factions, and between the Diet and the Government have chiefly been -conducted, and issues involving the fate of parties and of Cabinets -decided. Although, however, the Upper House has consequently played a -less conspicuous part in parliamentary affairs, this has not been due to -any hesitation to assert its authority when necessary. It has never -shrunk from joining issue with the Lower House in regard to matters -within its competency, pushing its claims so far as to assert -successfully its right to amend money bills. Differing from the other -Chamber in its composition, in the grouping of its members which has no -relation to parties in the Lower House, and in its greater exposure, -through the class of Imperial nominees, to powerful bureaucratic -influences, the Upper House has never concealed the fact that its -sympathies are with the Government; and it was its whole-hearted support -that brought the latter safely through the parliamentary crisis of 1901 -and 1902. - -In view of the short interval which separated the establishment of -representative institutions from feudalism, and the unsettled condition -of affairs that prevailed for some years after the Restoration, the -nation has good reason to be satisfied with the results which have so -far attended the working of parliamentary government. - - - - - CHAPTER XXI -Treaty Revision—Great Britain Takes Initiative—Difficulties with China. - - -The year 1894 marks a memorable stage in the rise of Japan to the -position in the world she has since attained. It witnessed two events of -far-reaching importance: the revision of the Treaty between Great -Britain and Japan, which, though only the first of a series, practically -solved the long-pending question of Treaty revision; and the outbreak of -war with China. The new Treaty with Great Britain was signed on the 16th -July, and within a fortnight of its signature Japan was at war with her -continental neighbour. Both events, it may be noted in passing, had a -calming effect on parliamentary proceedings, the Diet then in existence, -though not actually in session, being the only one which lasted for the -full constitutional term of four years. - -The question of the revision of the treaties with foreign Powers has -been referred to more than once in previous chapters. These treaties, as -we have seen, formed part of a series of Conventions concluded between -the years 1858 and 1869, which were framed on the same lines, while -their effect was rendered uniform by the “most-favoured-nation” clause -contained in each. As has already been pointed out, the features of the -treaties which caused dissatisfaction in Japan were the concession of -extra-territoriality, and the absence of any fixed period for their -duration. Revision being subject to the consent of both parties, it was -felt that Japan might be indefinitely deprived of tariff autonomy and -the right of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners in her own -territory. It was not unnatural that the Japanese Government, while -overlooking the many disadvantages attaching to foreign residence and -trade in what was a mere fringe of the country, should, as soon as it -became aware that the character of the treaties was different from that -of those made by Western Governments with each other, have taken an -early opportunity to protest against conditions which were regarded as -derogatory to the dignity of the nation, nor that it should have made -repeated attempts to secure their removal by negotiation with the Powers -concerned. We have seen how the failure of these efforts roused popular -feeling, supplied political agitators with a weapon used with effect in -the campaigns they directed from time to time against the Government, -and eventually led to a serious recrudescence of the anti-foreign -feeling of pre-Restoration days; so that by the time that the -Constitution came into operation Treaty revision was no longer regarded -as a mere matter of departmental policy, with which the public at large -had little concern, but had become, so to speak, a national question. - -In view of the importance which this question gradually came to assume -in public affairs, affecting as it did both domestic policy and foreign -relations, it may be well, at the risk of some repetition, to give a -succinct account of the lengthy negotiations on this subject, asking the -indulgence of the reader, should he be taken over ground traversed -before. - -Undeterred by the failure, already recorded, of Prince Iwakura’s mission -in 1872, the Japanese Government made another attempt two years later to -negotiate a new Treaty which would, it was hoped, be the forerunner of -others. The relations between the United States and Japan were at this -time, if anything, more friendly than those of Japan with other Powers. -This was to a great extent the natural result of circumstances. By -taking the initiative in the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse, -America had given evidence of an intention to pursue an independent -policy in regard to foreign questions. Having been the first Western -Power to appear on the scene, her influence had been the first to be -felt in Japan. Moreover, her great commercial expansion being still in -its infancy, she had fewer interests to protect in Japan than older -countries. American representatives were thus spared much of the -friction with the Japanese authorities which fell to the lot of other -foreign representatives. Influenced probably by these considerations, it -was to the United States that the Japanese Government addressed its -overtures on this occasion. They were favourably received, and a new -Treaty was negotiated with little difficulty. But the Treaty remained a -dead letter owing to the inclusion of a clause providing that it should -come into operation only when similar treaties had been concluded with -other Powers. - -For several years no further steps were taken by the Japanese -Government in the matter of Treaty revision. Ministerial dissensions -and the disturbed state of the country, which culminated in the -Satsuma rebellion, called for the concentration of attention on -domestic affairs. Foreign questions, therefore, ceased for a time to -be a subject of public interest. By this time also it is probable that -the Government began to realize more clearly than before the nature of -the objections entertained by foreign Powers to the revision of their -treaties with Japan; and to understand that, so far as the point of -extra-territoriality was concerned, the unwillingness of foreign -Governments to accede to Japanese demands was based on the reasonable -ground that, until some substantial evidence of progress in the -direction, at least, of legal reforms, was forthcoming, they must -naturally hesitate to make their subjects amenable to Japanese -jurisdiction. The energy and determination with which the Japanese -Government set to work to carry out legal and judicial reforms showed -that it was alive to the necessity of meeting the objections of -foreign Powers in the direction indicated. One result of the -progressive spirit displayed was, as we have seen, the promulgation of -a Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, framed in accordance -with Western ideas, which came into operation early in 1882. In the -autumn of that year negotiations for Treaty revision were reopened, -and a preliminary conference of the representatives of Japan and the -leading Treaty Powers was held in Tōkiō. No definite result was then -reached, but the ground was cleared for subsequent discussion, which -took place four years later, the Japanese Capital being, as before, -the seat of negotiations. At this second and more formal conference, -at which no less than seventeen Treaty Powers were represented, and -which lasted from May, 1886, to June, 1887, definite progress was -made. In the end, however, negotiations were abruptly broken off by -the Japanese delegates, in consequence, as was understood at the time, -of popular dissatisfaction with the proposed employment of foreign -judges in Japanese Courts of First Instance and Courts of Appeal in -cases where foreigners were defendants. In 1889 negotiations were -again reopened in Tōkiō. The proposals then submitted by Count -(afterwards Marquis) Ōkuma, as Foreign Minister, were accepted by the -American and Russian Governments; but public feeling again showed -itself hostile to the appointment of foreign judges, even on the -reduced scale contemplated by the new proposals. The attempted -assassination of the Minister who had brought them forward once more -put a stop to negotiations, and arrangements were made for the -cancellation of the two treaties that had been concluded. - -On all these occasions discussion had centred chiefly round the question -of Japanese jurisdiction over foreigners. The main difficulty had always -been the same: to reconcile the natural desire of foreign Governments to -secure such guarantees in the matter of the administration of justice as -would safeguard the surrender of extra-territorial privileges with the -equally natural wish of Japan to recover the right of jurisdiction over -foreigners in her territories. And it will be seen that even when a -compromise satisfactory to both negotiating parties had been, or was -about to be, reached, the sensitiveness of the public in Japan -concerning any point which it regarded as detrimental to Japanese -dignity prevented its acceptance by the nation. - -In the following year Lord Salisbury presented to the Japanese -Government in Tōkiō proposals for Treaty revision which were based on -the results achieved during the second conference, and on the general -experience gained in the long course of negotiations. These British -proposals conceded the principle of territorial jurisdiction on the -condition that all the new Japanese Codes of Law should be in operation -before the revised Treaty came into force, and offered an increase of 3 -per cent in the Customs Import Tariff. The period of duration of the -proposed Treaty and tariff was fixed at twelve years, at the end of -which time Japan would recover complete tariff autonomy. The proposed -Treaty further provided for the opening of the whole of Japan to British -trade and intercourse, and for her adhesion to the International -Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright. -This latter provision was called for by the frequent imitation of -foreign trademarks, and the issue of cheap copies of foreign -publications. In order to avoid offending Japanese susceptibilities -careful attention was given to the form in which these proposals were -framed. It might have been expected that proposals so liberal could not -fail of acceptance. The fact that they were so far in advance of the -views regarding Treaty revision entertained by the majority of foreign -Governments implied a recognition of the progress made by Japan, and -confidence in her future, which could hardly fail to be gratifying to -the Government to which they were presented. The favourable impression -they at first produced justified the hope that negotiations might result -in an agreement on this long-pending question. Again, however, popular -agitation stood in the way of a settlement. Objection was raised to the -ownership of land by foreigners, a point which had figured in all -previous schemes of Treaty revision, and the matter was quietly shelved -without ever reaching the stage of negotiations. One explanation of the -attitude assumed by Japanese Ministers at this time may be found in the -jealousy prevailing in political circles which made it difficult for any -single statesman, or party, to gain the credit of disposing of a -problem, which had defied solution for so long. Any official jealousy of -this kind which may have existed would tend to encourage agitation on -the subject irrespective of the merits of the question at issue. Another -reason likely to influence public opinion in a nation in whose character -pride is so predominant a trait may have been the feeling that it was -desirable for the country’s prestige that proposals which should furnish -the basis of the new treaties should emanate from Japan. - -Treaty revision had thus become a national question in which political -parties, as well as the Press, took an active interest, and in -succeeding years the Diet was frequently the scene of animated -discussions, which caused no little embarrassment to the Government. -Fortunately for both Government and people, and for relations between -Japan and foreign Powers, the long looked-for solution came in sight in -1894. In the spring of that year negotiations were resumed by the -Japanese Government in London. The proposals then submitted to the -British Government were practically the same both in form and substance -as the previous British proposals, the chief difference lying in the -substitution of a right of lease only in place of the right of ownership -of land by British subjects. The Japanese Government had reason -subsequently to regret this alteration, for it gave rise to a -controversy, which, on being referred for arbitration to the Hague -Tribunal in 1905, was decided against Japan. The negotiations proceeded -smoothly, and ended in the signature on the 16th July of that year of a -new Treaty and Protocol, some minor matters being regulated by an -exchange of Notes. By the new Treaty arrangements consular jurisdiction -was abolished, and the whole of Japan was opened to British trade and -intercourse. It was also provided that before the new Treaty came into -operation the new Japanese Codes should have been brought into force, -and Japan should have notified her adhesion to the International -Conventions for the Protection of Industrial Property and Copyright. It -was also agreed between the two parties that the new Treaty should not -come into operation before the expiration of five years from the date of -signature, the object of this stipulation being to allow time for the -negotiation of similar treaties with other foreign Powers. The _ad -valorem_ duties in the tariff accompanying the agreement were -subsequently converted into specific rates by delegates of the two -Governments who met in Tōkiō for that purpose. - -It is not surprising that the new Treaty should have met with scanty -approval from the British mercantile community in Japan. In the wide -areas over which the interests of the British Empire are spread it is -inevitable that there should at times be some points of divergence -between Imperial policy and local views, between the appreciation of a -situation by the Government with its wider outlook and far-reaching -responsibilities in matters of Imperial concern, and by British -communities abroad. Nor was it unnatural for British residents in the -Far East, accustomed by long experience to regard extra-territorial -privileges in Oriental countries almost as part of the British -Constitution, to view with unwillingness their surrender. But there can -be no doubt that the time had come for a concession of this kind to be -made. The progress of Japan in the thirty-six years that had elapsed -since the treaties of 1858 had been attended by evidences of stability -in administration and policy which invited the confidence as it evoked -the admiration of the world. The conditions of foreign residence in -Japan compared more than favourably with those in other countries where -there was no exemption from territorial jurisdiction. Nor in any case -would it have been right, or even, under the circumstances, possible, -from the point of the position which Japan had already attained, for -Treaty revision to be longer deferred. Subsequent events have -established the wisdom of the course taken by Great Britain. It is true -that Great Britain gained little material advantage from the agreement. -But Japan had very little to offer in return for what she received. -Circumstances precluded anything in the nature of a bargain. The opening -of the whole country—already rendered accessible to travellers, and -indirectly to merchants, by means of a passport system—was of little, if -any, benefit to British commerce, which was unlikely to diverge from the -trade routes already established. But by being the first to revise her -Treaty on terms practically identical with those she had herself offered -two years before, Great Britain showed her frank recognition of the -changed conditions resulting from the steady progress of more than -thirty years. And she thereby retained her position as the leading -Western Power in the Far East, and gained the goodwill of Japan, thus -paving the way for the future Anglo-Japanese Alliance. - -Lest it should be thought that in the foregoing account of Treaty -revision too much importance has been attached to it, and possibly too -close a connection traced between negotiations on this subject and the -development of Japan on Western lines, it may be well to conclude these -remarks with a quotation from a speech delivered by Viscount Chinda, -then Japanese Ambassador in London, at the Sheffield University on June -29th, 1918. - -In the course of his speech Viscount Chinda said: “Perhaps no one except -a Japanese will be able to appreciate truly and fully the great -importance attached to the question of Treaty revision. For the -Japanese, however, the question was a matter of paramount importance, -connoting as it did nothing less than a national emancipation. The first -treaties of Japan with foreign Powers were signed while the nation was -still in a state of torpor from a long slumber of seclusion, and in the -circumstances amounted almost to duress.... So defective indeed were -these treaties that Japan was in effect deprived of the two essential -attributes of a Sovereign State. The redemption of her judicial and -fiscal autonomy became henceforth the dream of Japanese national -aspiration, and her policies, both foreign and domestic, ever shaped -principally with this one supreme end in view. Innovation after -innovation, often involving sacrifices of traditional sentiments, were -introduced for the purpose of assimilating the country and its -institutions to the standard of Western civilization.” - -Similar language has been held by other prominent Japanese statesmen, -notably by Viscount Kato, at one time ambassador in London, and now the -leader of a powerful political party, whose experience as a Cabinet -Minister qualifies him to speak with authority on the subject. - - -The outbreak of war with China within a few days of the signature of the -revised British Treaty has already been mentioned. To foreign residents -in the Far East, who had opportunities of observing the relations -between Japan and China during the previous years, the event caused -little surprise. At no period of history had their relations been -cordial, except perhaps for a time in the seventh century, when China -became the model on which Japan remoulded her institutions. The Mongol -invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century had left unpleasant -memories in both countries, and relations were not improved by the -intervention of China in support of Korea when the Japanese in their -turn invaded that country. On neither side, however, was the -recollection of past hostilities allowed to stand in the way of the -customary intercourse between neighbouring Oriental States, which was -limited to the despatch at irregular intervals of complimentary -missions, and the occasional visits of Chinese traders. By the time that -Japan embarked on a policy of seclusion, in consequence of the domestic -troubles which arose in connection with the first efforts of foreign -missionary enterprise, Chinese traders had, as we have seen, established -a small centre of commerce in the south-west of Japan. There, after the -country was closed, they, and the Dutch traders, were allowed to remain, -though under conditions which deprived the privilege of much of its -value, and eventually reduced the commerce thus conducted to small and -rapidly dwindling proportions. Prior to the issue of the edict which put -an end to maritime enterprise the Japanese had shown no lack of -seafaring spirit. Even then, however, the pursuit of trade as a definite -object never seems to have attracted the nation, the visits of Japanese -vessels to the mainland of Asia being undertaken more with an eye to the -prosecution of piratical raids than the conduct of peaceful commerce. - -With the reopening of Japan to foreign intercourse the situation -underwent a complete change. The establishment of “treaty ports” and the -development of Japanese trade with foreign countries had the natural -effect of drawing Japan and China more closely together, though for some -years circumstances conspired to prevent the growth of more intimate -relations between the two peoples. Much of the new commercial -intercourse between them was conducted not directly between Chinese and -Japanese merchants, but indirectly through the medium of merchants of -other nationalities, who acted as the middlemen of foreign commerce in -the Far East. Incompatibility of temperament, moreover, and of ideas—the -result of a fundamental difference in conditions of national -development—acted as a barrier between the two peoples. Nor was the -state of affairs in either country such as to favour a recognition of -the common interests which pointed to the desirability of a closer -understanding. The decay of China under spiritless Manchu rule had -already begun. Resting in fancied security on the traditions of past -greatness, and unconscious of her own decadence, she was too proud to -make advances to a smaller though near neighbour, whose existence she -had hitherto found it convenient to ignore. Japan, for her part, in the -throes of a revolution which was to usher in a new order of things, was -too busy for a time to pay much attention to intercourse with China, of -whose attitude towards herself she was, nevertheless, well aware. - -It was not until after the Restoration that the relations between the -two countries were placed on a formal Treaty basis. The Treaty concluded -at Peking in 1871, on the initiative of the new Japanese Government, was -framed on simple lines, something both as to form and substance being -borrowed from the treaties in existence between the two nations and -Western Powers. By the most important of its stipulations it was -arranged that the Consuls, or “administrators,” as they were termed, of -each country should exercise supervision and control over their -nationals resident therein; that these officials should endeavour to -settle amicably all disputes that might arise between the subjects of -the two countries; and that, failing a settlement in this manner, the -questions at issue should be referred to the Consuls and local -authorities for joint decision—the latter having, moreover, the right of -arrest and punishment in all criminal cases. Trade regulations and an -_ad valorem_ tariff were attached to the Treaty, but no period of -duration was mentioned. - -Not long after the conclusion of this Treaty the friendly relations thus -formally established between the two countries were disturbed, as we -have seen, by the quarrel which arose out of the ill-treatment received -by natives of Loochoo in Formosa. The adoption by Japan of Western -innovations had already given offence to the Chinese Government, which -viewed with strong disapproval this departure from the traditional -policy hitherto followed by Far Eastern States. The forcible measures -taken by Japan in connection with this incident to obtain redress caused -both surprise and irritation. These feelings were intensified by the -controversy which took place a few years later over the annexation of -Loochoo by Japan. On this occasion China contented herself with making a -formal protest. No definite understanding was effected in the course of -the negotiations that ensued, and the incident was closed by China’s -tacit acquiescence in the new situation. Thenceforth, however, the -relations between the two countries assumed a character of estrangement, -which only needed the stimulus of some further dispute to ripen into -hostility. - -This further cause of quarrel was supplied by Korea. - - - - - CHAPTER XXII - China and Korea—War with China—Naval Reform—Defeat of China—Treaty of - Shimonoséki—Peace Terms. - - -Those who are at all familiar with Chinese history will scarcely have -failed to notice one persistent feature of it—the suzerainty that China -has either exercised, or claimed to exercise, over neighbouring States -which at one time or another have fallen under her domination. This has -been the common experience of nearly all countries whose situation on -the frontiers of the Chinese Empire has exposed them to invasion by -their restless and powerful neighbour. At the time of which we are -speaking some of these States had already recovered their independence, -which was not, however, always recognized formally by China; in others -Chinese suzerainty had been replaced by that of another Power; while in -a few instances China, in the wish to evade the responsibilities of a -protectorate, had of late years allowed her suzerainty to become almost -nominal. This last-mentioned position was that of Korea, when Japan in -1876 concluded the Treaty with that country, to which reference has -already been made. For many years previously Chinese suzerainty had -ceased to be effective, but it was still asserted by China, and -acknowledged by Korea. The despatch from time to time of missions to -Peking bearing presents, which the Chinese were justified in regarding -as tribute, the form given to correspondence between the two countries, -and the ceremonies observed on official occasions, constituted an -admission of the status of vassalage. With this acknowledged status the -Treaty of 1876 was inconsistent, since its first Article contained the -declaration that Korea was an independent State; and in 1882—when Great -Britain and America followed Japan’s example by negotiating treaties -with that country—China, with an inconsistency equal to that displayed -by Korea, weakened her own position as suzerain by making a Treaty with -her nominal vassal on the lines of those already concluded between Korea -and the three Powers above mentioned. This false step on the part of -China strengthened the attitude adopted by Japan in declining to -recognize Chinese suzerainty. At the outset, therefore, of Japan’s new -relations with Korea the situation as between herself, Korea, and the -latter’s nominal suzerain, China, was anomalous and contradictory. In -this fact alone lay the seeds of future trouble. Nor was the aspect of -affairs in Korea itself such as to offer any assurance that the -difficulties which there was every reason to anticipate would not -shortly occur. - -Its condition was that of an Oriental State in complete decay. Long -years of misrule had broken the spirit of the people; the occupant of -the Throne was a nonentity in the hands of unscrupulous and incompetent -Ministers, who were supported by rival factions struggling with each -other for power; there were no regular forces, nor police, worthy of the -name; intrigue and corruption prevailed everywhere unchecked; and the -resources of the country were wasted by swarms of rapacious officials -intent only on enriching themselves. - -In these circumstances the appearance on the scene of two neighbouring -Powers, each bent on obtaining a predominant influence in the peninsula, -could only result in making matters worse than they were before. The -introduction of foreign elements into the intrigues of contending -factions gave fresh force to domestic quarrels, until increasing -disorder in the country culminated in anti-foreign disturbances, in the -course of which the Japanese, against whom popular feeling was chiefly -directed, were driven out of Seoul, and their Legation destroyed. The -puppet King, accused of favouring Japan, was also compelled to abdicate, -his father, the Tai-wön-kun, one of the few Koreans who possessed both -character and ability, assuming charge of the administration. Thereupon -China intervened. Exercising her acknowledged authority as suzerain, she -sent a military force, supported by some men-of-war, to Korea to restore -order. The Korean capital (Seoul) was occupied, and the Tai-wön-kun -arrested and taken to China. This was in 1883. It was then that Yuan -Shih-kai, afterwards President of the Chinese Republic, first came into -public notice on his appointment as Chinese Resident in Seoul. For a -short time after the reassertion of her authority by China, and the -restoration of order in the Korean capital, affairs remained quiet, both -the Chinese and Japanese Governments maintaining garrisons in Seoul; but -in the following year a conspiracy fomented by the pro-Japanese party -led to the outbreak of further disturbances, in the course of which a -collision occurred between the Chinese and Japanese garrisons, the -latter, which was greatly outnumbered, withdrawing to the port of -Chemulpo. - -The critical situation produced by this collision between the troops of -the two Powers in the Korean capital impressed on both Governments the -necessity, if further and more serious trouble were to be avoided, of -arriving at some understanding in regard to action in Korea. With this -object negotiations were opened early in 1885, and in the spring of that -year a convention was signed at Tientsin between China and Japan, by -which the independence of Korea was recognized. Both Governments agreed -to withdraw their forces from Korea, leaving only small detachments as -guards for their Legations, and to give each other previous notice “in -writing,” should the despatch of troops by either to that country become -necessary at any time in the future. A further stipulation provided that -the King of Korea should be asked to organize an armed force for the -preservation of order and public security, and to engage the services of -foreign military experts for this purpose from a foreign country other -than China and Japan. - -This was still the position of affairs in 1894 under the _modus vivendi_ -established by the Tientsin Convention. Though by that agreement China -had abandoned her pretensions to suzerainty, the rivalry between the two -Powers continued unabated. The interval since 1885 had been marked by -constant strife among Korean factions, and the prosecution of busy -intrigues between the latter and the Chinese and Japanese, to which the -growing interest now taken by Russia in the affairs of the peninsula -gave fresh impetus. The Chinese representative in Korea retained the -title of Resident, which conveyed, as was intended, the impression of -the superiority of his position to those of other foreign -representatives; and the influence of China at the Capital—exercised -through the masterful Queen, who did not conceal her pro-Chinese -sympathies—was predominant. Nevertheless, what advantage China enjoyed -in these respects over her rival was more than counterbalanced by the -political and commercial activity displayed by Japan. Proof of this had -already been given by the prompt action of the Japanese Government in -obtaining redress for the results of the disturbances of 1882 and 1884, -and by the steadily increasing volume of Japanese trade. - -[Illustration: - - FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE YAMAGATA. - - Distinguished himself in the Restoration campaign; took an active part - in the Government subsequently formed, in the reorganization of the - Japanese army, and in the wars with China and Russia; he wielded - throughout great influence in State affairs. -] - -In the spring of 1894 the value of the arrangement under which the two -Powers had agreed to conduct their relations with Korea was put to the -test by the outbreak of an insurrection in the south of Korea. The -Korean troops sent from the Capital to quell the revolt having been -worsted in several encounters with the insurgents, the Min party, to -which the Queen belonged, appealed to China for assistance. The Chinese -Government responded to the appeal by sending troops to Asan, the scene -of the revolt, informing Japan at the same time, in accordance with the -terms of the Tientsin Convention, of its intention to do so. The -Japanese Government replied by taking similar action. The tenour of the -correspondence that ensued between the two Governments gave little hope -of an amicable settlement of the difficulty, China reasserting the -suzerainty she had previously waived, and seeking to impose limits upon -Japanese action; while Japan insisted on her right to interfere, and -supported it by reinforcing the troops she had already despatched. China -at once took similar measures, but the reinforcements sent never reached -their destination. The British vessel conveying them, under convoy of -Chinese men-of-war, was met and sunk at sea by a Japanese squadron -commanded by Admiral (then Captain) Tōgō. A day or two later the Chinese -and Japanese forces at Asan came into conflict, with the result that the -Chinese troops were defeated and were withdrawn to China. Hostilities -had, therefore, already commenced on land and sea when simultaneous -declarations of war were made by both Governments on the 1st August. - -These first encounters were a true presage of what was to follow. The -war thus begun was disastrous for China. By the wide extent of her -territories, her vast population, her seemingly inexhaustible resources -and her traditions of conquest, not to mention her industrial and -commercial activities, she had for centuries filled a big place in the -world. Japan, on the other hand, was a comparatively small country, -little known, that had just emerged from a long era of seclusion, and -was regarded abroad with feelings which at the best, apart from the -interest her art inspired, did not extend beyond sympathetic curiosity. - -It was quite natural, therefore, that foreigners outside Japan who knew -little of the silent progress made since the Restoration should have -wondered at her audacity in challenging a neighbour who in all respects -appeared to be so much more powerful than herself. In reality, however, -the prospects of success for China were hopeless from the first. She was -in an advanced stage of decadence. Her foremost statesman, Li Hung -Chang, and the whole official hierarchy were notoriously corrupt, the -arrogant policy the Government still pursued serving as a cloak to hide -the real weakness that lay behind. Her ill-paid army, led by incompetent -officers, was without training of a modern kind, or discipline; while -her navy was a house divided against itself, the southern squadron -refusing to fight on the ground that the war was not a national war, but -one into which the country had been drawn through the self-seeking -policy of Li Hung Chang. To the Japanese there was nothing that savoured -of audacity in confronting an adversary of whose weakness they were well -assured. Into the policy of reform which the Government had steadily -pursued since the Restoration many considerations had entered. The -course of recent events in China had been an object-lesson by which it -had profited. Having realized that a chief cause of China’s troubled -relations with Western Powers lay in her military inefficiency, it set -to work to reorganize the army. This work was entrusted to Marshal -Prince Yamagata (then a young officer), who had distinguished himself in -the fighting which took place at the time of the Restoration. He and the -younger Saigō (afterwards created a Marquis) were the chief members of a -mission appointed to enquire into military matters which visited Europe -in 1870. The results of this mission were the engagement of foreign -military instructors and the establishment of conscription, which came -into operation for the first time in 1873. A few years later the -discipline and fighting qualities of the new conscript troops were -tested to the satisfaction of the Government in the Satsuma rebellion. -In 1884 a second military mission, at the head of which was the late -Marshal Prince Ōyama, visited Europe. It was then that the services of a -Prussian officer, the late General Meckel, were secured. The improvement -in the Japanese army which showed itself from that time is generally -ascribed to the ability and energy which that officer brought to the -performance of his duties as military adviser. In consequence of the -sedulous attention thus paid for several years to military organization, -Japan, when military operations against China commenced, had at her -disposal a conscript army of over 200,000 men, with a corresponding -strength of artillery and a supply of efficient officers. Against an -army of this quality, and of these dimensions, China, who was content to -rely on troops recruited on the voluntary system, could do little, even -had she not laboured under other disadvantages already mentioned. - -For obvious reasons the development of the Japanese navy had lagged -behind that of the army. The finances of the country did not permit of -any large expenditure on both services. While the feudal system had kept -alive the warlike spirit of the nation in spite of a prolonged period of -peace, the closing of the country to foreign intercourse, accompanied as -it was by the rigid limitations imposed on the size of vessels, had -stifled maritime enterprise. Japanese naval training, therefore, had to -begin with the rudiments of a sailor’s education. Service at sea did not -at first appeal to a people whose military class, before it disappeared -with the abolition of feudalism, had been brought up mainly in -traditions of land fighting. There was another reason. Partly by design, -partly, also, as the result of circumstances, the military control -exercised by the two clans which virtually governed the country soon -after the Restoration had from the first been arranged so as to give -Chōshiū clansmen the larger share of army administration, the direction -of the navy, on the other hand, being left chiefly to Satsuma clansmen, -whose intelligence and energy fell short of the standard of their -colleagues in the Government. - -The same year (1872) in which the reorganization of the army began saw -the first steps taken in the direction of naval reform. In that year the -single department which had hitherto been responsible for the -administration of both army and navy was replaced by separate -departments for each of the two services. It was, as already noted, to -Great Britain that Japan turned for assistance in the measures -subsequently taken for the building up of a navy. British naval advisers -and instructors, amongst whom were the late Admiral Sir Archibald -Douglas and Admiral Ingles were engaged, and the first vessels of the -new Japanese navy were constructed in England. In 1892 the determination -of the Government to persevere in the task of creating a navy was shown -by the Emperor’s decision to contribute £30,000 annually for eight years -towards naval construction, the funds required for this purpose being -obtained by proportionate reductions in the expenditure of the Court. -When war was declared, it was the Japanese navy that struck the first -blow. It then consisted of twenty-eight ships, aggregating roughly some -57,000 tons, besides twenty-four torpedo-boats. The day of destroyers -had not yet come. The Chinese fleet at this time was stronger -numerically than that of Japan, and had also an advantage in the fact -that it included one or two ships of a more powerful class than any -Japanese vessel. But this superiority was counterbalanced by the refusal -of the Chinese Southern Squadron, for the reason already given, to take -any part in hostilities; and early in the war the portion of the Chinese -fleet which came into action showed that it had little stomach for -fighting. - -Though the war lasted for eight months—from August 1st, 1894, till the -conclusion of an armistice on the 30th March in the following year—its -result was never in doubt. The Chinese troops in the south of Korea had, -as we have seen, been withdrawn to China after their defeat at Asan. -Further north the Japanese at once made the port of Chemulpo the base of -preliminary operations, and having, on the strength of a treaty of -alliance, concluded at the outset of hostilities with the Korean -Government, occupied the Korean capital, compelled the Chinese forces -remaining in Korea to retire towards the frontier. The only engagement -of any consequence in this early stage of the campaign occurred at -Ping-yang, a town occupying a position of some strategic value in the -north-west of the peninsula sixty miles from the Yalu river, which -formed for some distance the boundary between China and Korea. This -place was held in strength by the Chinese forces, and its capture by the -Japanese on the 17th September involved some severe fighting, in the -course of which a Chinese Mohammedan regiment distinguished itself by a -stubborn resistance, which was in marked contrast to the behaviour of -other Chinese troops. On the same day the Chinese northern fleet was -beaten in the only important naval action of the war. In this engagement -the two Chinese battleships, each more than a match for any Japanese -vessel, suffered little damage, but the Chinese lost several smaller -vessels, while no Japanese ships were damaged beyond repair. The beaten -Chinese fleet made its way to Ta-lien-Wan, which lies at the neck of the -Kwantung peninsula. There it stayed for some weeks until the landing of -a Japanese army close to that port, which the Chinese made no attempt to -defend, obliged it to take refuge in Weihaiwei. Thence it never again -emerged, thus leaving to the Japanese until the end of the war the -undisputed command of the sea. - -The further course of the war is well known, the general control of -operations remaining, as before, in the hands of Marshal Prince -Yamagata. Nowhere were the Chinese forces able to offer any effective -resistance to the Japanese advance, their experience, whenever they -tried to make a stand, being a repetition of what occurred at Ping-yang, -where their losses, as compared with those of the enemy (6000 to 200), -told their own tale. Towards the end of October the two Japanese -divisions operating on parallel lines in Korea crossed the Chinese -frontier, driving before them the Chinese forces, which made but a -feeble resistance. The Japanese divisions (some 40,000 strong), which -had early in November driven the Chinese from Ta-lien-wan and occupied -the isthmus of Chinchou, thus severing communications between the -Kwantung peninsula and the northern portion of the Fêng-t’ien province, -proceeded to invest Port Arthur. Later on in the month a Chinese army -moving from the north was completely defeated in an attempt to relieve -the fortress. On the 21st November, Port Arthur was stormed with small -loss to the Japanese, considering the natural strength of the position, -and its powerful fortifications. Early in December the Japanese forces -operating from Korea, assisted by a third division detached for the -purpose, continued their advance, occupying successively the towns of -Kaiping and Haicheng. In the course of February and March, 1895, this -army, now under the command of General (afterwards Prince) Katsura, -pushed still further west, defeated the Chinese in three successive -engagements in the neighbourhood of Newchwang and occupied that port, -the Chinese retreating northwards along the course of the Liao river. -Meanwhile an expeditionary force despatched from Ta-lien-wan in January -had landed in Yung-chêng bay to the east of Weihaiwei, and, acting in -co-operation with the Japanese fleet, had laid siege to that place. Its -gallant defence by Admiral Ting was for China the only redeeming feature -of the war. On 16th March it surrendered, after a siege of three months, -its gallant defender dying by his own hand. The fall of Weihaiwei, and -the uninterrupted success of the Japanese armies on the Liao river, -convinced China of the hopelessness of further resistance, though she -had still large military reserves in the vicinity of the Capital. An -armistice was accordingly concluded on the 30th March. The Chinese -Government had previously made informal overtures for peace through a -foreign adviser in the Chinese Customs service, but these had come to -nothing owing to Japan’s insistence upon treating directly with the -responsible Chinese authorities. The peace negotiations which followed -the armistice resulted in the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoséki on -the 17th April. In the course of these negotiations a slight -modification in its demands was granted by the Japanese Government as -reparation for a fanatical attack made on the Chinese Plenipotentiary, -Li Hung Chang, who fortunately escaped without serious injury. - -The main provisions of this Treaty, some of which were altered by the -subsequent intervention of Russia, France and Germany, were the -recognition by China of Korea’s independence; the cession to Japan of -the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t’ien, Formosa and the -Pescadores; the payment by China of an indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping -taels—equivalent, roughly, at the then rate of exchange, to £40,000,000; -and the opening to foreign trade of four new towns in China. These were -Shasi, Chungking, Soochow and Hangchow. The Treaty also established the -right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing enterprises in China, and -provided for the subsequent conclusion of a Commercial Convention, and -of arrangements regarding frontier intercourse and trade. And it was -agreed that Weihaiwei should be occupied by Japan until the indemnity -had been paid. Under the Commercial Convention, duly concluded three -months later, Japan secured for her subjects extra-territorial rights in -China, but these were withheld from Chinese subjects in Japan. In the -following October a supplementary Protocol of four articles was added to -this Commercial Convention. - -It will be seen that Japan in making with China this one-sided -arrangement regarding extra-territorial rights, which limited their -enjoyment expressly to the subjects of one of the contracting parties, -followed the example of Western Powers in their early treaties with -Japan, which were still in existence, the revised Treaty with Great -Britain not coming into operation until 1899. Apart from the question -whether this caution on her part was justified or not by the conditions -of Chinese jurisdiction, it is not easy to reconcile her action in this -respect with her repeated protests against the extra-territorial -stipulations of her own treaties with Western Powers and with the -national agitation for their revision which resulted therefrom. - - - - - CHAPTER XXIII -Militarist Policy—Liaotung Peninsula—Intervention of Three Powers—Leases - of Chinese Territory by Germany, Russia, Great Britain and - France—Spheres of Interest. - - -The origin of the activity displayed by Japan in the reorganization of -her army and navy, the efficiency of which was so strikingly -demonstrated in the war with China, may be traced to the military -tendencies of the two clans which had practically governed the country -since the Restoration. It was the military strength of these clans which -was, as we have seen, the determining factor in the struggle preceding -the Restoration; it was this, again, that carried the new Government -safely through the earlier internal troubles, and enabled it to pursue -successfully in the face of many difficulties its policy of gradual -reform. In the process of surmounting these difficulties, and even more, -perhaps, in the very work of reconstruction, in so far as this related -to naval and military reorganization, it was only natural that the -tendencies in question should be developed. Other influences which -worked in the same direction were the desire to attain equality with -Western Powers, to assert the independence of the nation, still -impaired, in public opinion, by offensive Treaty stipulations, and the -wish to be in a position to act vigorously in matters concerning the -nation’s intercourse with its neighbours on the continent of Asia. Even, -therefore, before the war with China something very near to a militarist -spirit had become apparent in administrative circles. The signal success -achieved by both army and navy in the course of the campaign favoured -the growth of this feeling. It became clear to all attentive observers -that henceforth the existence of a militarist party in the country was a -factor to be reckoned with in any estimate of the future course of -Japanese policy. The leading exponents of this militarist policy were, -of course, to be found amongst naval and military officers, but their -views were shared by the Japanese statesmen who had taken a prominent -part in military reforms; by others, whose declarations on foreign -policy from time to time were tinged with a Chauvinism that deepened -with the increase of Japan’s position in the world; and by a section of -the Japanese Press. - -During the Shimonoséki negotiations the influence of the military party, -fresh from its success in the war, had been exerted to secure an even -larger cession of territory on the mainland than that eventually agreed -upon. The discussions which took place on this point between the -military leaders and the Japanese plenipotentiary, the late Prince Itō, -whose enemies could never accuse him of any leaning towards Chauvinism, -resembled those which took place between Bismarck and von Moltke at the -close of the Franco-German war of 1870. In this instance Prince Itō’s -more moderate views prevailed, with the result recorded in the Treaty. - -Had the Japanese Government been gifted with a prescience enabling it to -anticipate the series of aggressive acts on the part of European Powers -for which its attempt to annex territory on the Chinese mainland gave -the signal, the attempt might, possibly, never have been made. Had it -even foreseen the determined opposition of certain European Powers to -the cession of even this extent of Chinese territory on the mainland, it -is probable that its demands would have undergone still further -modification. The ambition of the German Emperor to play a more active -part in foreign questions, and to secure for Germany an influence abroad -commensurate, as it seemed to him, with its dignity as an Empire, not to -mention the steps he was taking about this time to give effect to his -intentions by commencing the construction of what was soon to become a -powerful navy, had not escaped the attention of Japanese Ministers. Nor -had his warning in regard to what he described as the Yellow Peril -passed unnoticed. Of the general trend of European diplomacy they were -not ignorant, but of its special bearing on Far Eastern matters they -were, apparently, not fully aware, in spite of the indication of -Russia’s interest in Manchuria furnished by her Circular Note to the -Great Powers in February, 1895, and the warning of impending trouble -said to have been given by Germany to Japan in the following month -before the armistice was concluded. The possible extension to the Far -East of the mischievous activity of the Kaiser, the designs of Russia, -and the results which might be expected to follow the conclusion of the -recent Entente between that Power and France, were points that seem to -have been insufficiently realized. - -The Treaty of Shimonoséki was signed, as we have seen, on the 17th -April. Eight days later the Russian and French Ministers in Tōkiō -presented to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (the late Count -Mutsu) identical Notes advising the Japanese Government “to renounce the -definite possession of the Liaotung peninsula,” on the ground that “its -possession by Japan would be a menace to Peking, and render illusory the -independence of Korea.” On the same day a similar Note was presented by -the German Minister. For the sudden intervention of these three Powers -the Japanese Government was unprepared. The quickness with which it -followed the signature of the Treaty, no less than the form of procedure -adopted, left no doubt as to the serious intentions of the Powers -concerned; while the association of Germany in the matter lent an -ominous weight to the protest. Convinced that this was no idle threat, -and realizing the futility of opposing a demand made by the three chief -military Powers of Europe, the Japanese Government at once gave way, and -consented to relinquish this portion of Chinese territory in return for -an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 Kuping taels, equivalent to about -£6,000,000. A Convention to this effect was signed at Peking on November -8th, 1895. It provided for the payment of the additional indemnity by -the 25th of that month, and for the evacuation of the Liaotung peninsula -to be completed within three months from that date. - -The mention of “the Liaotung peninsula” in the protest of the three -Powers is the first we hear of the term. It was not used by the Chinese, -nor did it occur in the Shimonoséki Treaty. There the ceded territory is -called “the southern portion of the province of Fêng-t’ien” (otherwise -known as Shengking, and Moukden, though the latter is really the name of -the provincial Capital), the Treaty frontier (never delimited) running -roughly from Yingkow on the river Liao to the Yalu river, and to the -north of the towns of Fenghwangcheng and Haicheng. But the Chinese used -the term Liaotung, which means “East of the river Liao,” in a vague way -to signify the territory which lies to the left of that river; and -foreign geographers, in ignorance of the meaning of the term, had -applied it to the bay into which the river flows, which appears in -atlases as the “Liaotung Gulf.” When the intervention took place, it was -probably found convenient to make use in the Notes of protest of a term -already given in foreign atlases to the bay that forms the western -boundary of the territory in question. Hence the adoption of the term -“the Liaotung peninsula,” which was an error in geographical -nomenclature. Once adopted, or, as may be said, invented, the -convenience of the term led to its employment again when the -Russo-Chinese Agreement for the lease of Port Arthur was made in 1898, -though the territory then leased was limited to what is now known as the -peninsula of Kwantung. It reappears in the additional Russo-Chinese -Agreement of the same year. From that time the term seems to have passed -into general use, for we find it in the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905. - -The intervention of the three Powers had far-reaching consequences, none -of which, in all probability, were foreseen at the time by any of the -Governments concerned, though each may have felt that it had established -a claim to the goodwill of China. Four months after Japan had agreed to -the retrocession of the territory ceded to her by the Shimonoséki Treaty -Russia, who had been the prime mover in the matter, proceeded to lay -China under further obligations by rendering her financial assistance -which facilitated the liberation of her territory. This took the form of -a Chinese loan of £15,000,000, floated in Paris under Russia’s -guarantee. - -In January, 1896, one of the consequences above mentioned was seen in -the settlement of various questions which the French Government had been -pressing on the attention of the Government of China for some time. -These questions related to the rectification of the Tonkin frontier, and -to railway and mining concessions in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi -and Kwantung. This was only an instalment of the recompense for her -services which France was to obtain. The arrangement with France -regarding the Tonkin frontier constituted a breach of the Burma -Convention of 1886, and of a later Convention of 1894, regulating the -boundaries separating British and Chinese territories, which provided, -_inter alia_, that no portion of two small States assigned to China -should be alienated to any other Power without previous agreement with -Great Britain. The dispute which arose over this question was eventually -settled—as between Great Britain and France—by the joint Declaration of -January 15th, 1896, fixing the boundary between the possessions, or -spheres of influence, of the two Powers as far as the Chinese frontier, -and arranging for all privileges conceded by China in the provinces of -Yunnan and Szechwan to the two Powers, respectively, under their -Agreements with China of 1894 and 1895 to be made common to both Powers -and their nationals; and—as between Great Britain and China—by an -Agreement signed on February 4th, 1897, modifying the previous boundary -in favour of Great Britain, and opening the West river, which flows into -the sea at Canton, to foreign trade. - -Russia was the next to profit. She had already decided in 1892 to -construct what is now the Trans-Siberian Railway with the object of -linking up the eastern and western extremities of the Empire, and thus -aiding the development of Siberia, as well as strengthening her position -on the Pacific coast. The line, as then projected, was to run from -Chiliabinsk in the Ural Mountains to the south-western shore of Lake -Baikal, and from the south-eastern shore of the lake to Vladivostok, -following for some distance the course of the Amur river; communication -across the lake to be maintained by vessels specially constructed for -the purpose. Work was commenced at both ends of the railway, and when -the Shimonoséki Treaty was signed the line had been finished as far east -as Chita, a town south-east of Lake Baikal, and within two hundred miles -of the Chinese frontier. - -The war between China and Japan had served a useful purpose for Russia -in revealing both the weakness of China and the strength and ambitions -of Japan. To check these ambitions in the direction of Manchuria, and -forestall Japan by establishing herself in the coveted territory, was -the task to which she now directed her energies. In the preliminary step -by which the retrocession of the Liaotung peninsula was effected she -was, as we have seen, aided by both France and Germany. Between the -latter and herself some sort of roughly formulated understanding seems -to have been arrived at, described by Reventlow in his _Deutschland’s -Auswärtige Politik_ as a secret agreement between the Kaiser and the -Tsar, the results of which were to be seen later. With France she worked -throughout in the closest accord in the development of the new line of -policy she had marked out for herself in the Far East, to which Belgian -financiers also lent their co-operation. In return for Russia’s support -in European affairs, as arranged by the Entente concluded between the -two countries, France, for her part, was only too willing to encourage -Russian aims in the Far East; and she was the more ready to do so, since -this course assured her of reciprocal help in the prosecution of her own -interests in China. Russia had been the connecting link between the -three Powers whose intervention had restored the Liaotung peninsula to -China. It was the relations she continued to maintain with her two -associates after that incident—in the one case an informal -understanding, in the other definite concerted action—which shaped the -course of subsequent events in the Far East. - -In _Ma Mission en Chine_, M. Gérard, who was French Minister in Peking -during the period 1893–7, gives an account of the secret negotiations -with China by means of which Russia succeeded in forestalling Japan in -Manchuria. His book supplies the key to a correct understanding of the -course of events, and throws much light on the political situation at -the time of which he speaks. We learn how close was the accord then -maintained between France and Russia; how skilfully Russia made use of -the complaisant attitude of her two associates; and with what -unscrupulous determination to compass her ends she traded on the -weakness of China, on the claims she had established on the latter’s -goodwill, and on the vanity and corruption of Chinese officials. - -In May, 1896, according to M. Gérard, a secret Treaty was signed at St. -Petersburg by Prince Lobanoff, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Li -Hung Chang, Viceroy of Chihli, who had been sent to Russia as China’s -representative at the Coronation of the late Tsar Nicholas II. The full -text of this Treaty has never been published, but it promised to China -Russian protection against Japan; China, in return for this guarantee of -assistance, granting to Russia the privilege of using, in time of war, -the harbours of Ta-lien Wan, in the Kwantung peninsula, and Kiaochow, in -the province of Shantung, as bases for her fleet. Three months later -(August 27th) a secret Railway Agreement was signed at St. Petersburg by -Li Hung Chang and the representatives of the Russo-Chinese Bank. This -institution, half the capital of which was French, had been created at -the end of the previous year. M. Gérard explains that, in consequence of -so large a portion of the bank’s capital being furnished by a French -syndicate, the French Government insisted on receiving definite -information regarding the negotiations in question. His statements -regarding the French financial interest in the Russo-Chinese Bank are -confirmed by other writers: by Chéradame, in his interesting book, _Le -Monde et La Guerre Russo-Japonaise_, and by Débidour in _Histoire -Diplomatique de l’Europe_. We learn also from M. Gérard that the Chinese -Government had contributed, under the title of a deposit, 5,000,000 -taels to the capital of the bank, explaining at the time, in answer to -enquiries, that this sum represented China’s share of the cost of -construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway; that for the building of -this line a company called the Chinese Eastern Railway Company was -formed, which, although Russo-Chinese in name, was a purely Russian -concern; and that it was agreed that on the completion of the line in -question the sum “deposited” by China should be returned to her. He adds -that the President of the bank was Prince Ouchtomsky, who afterwards -visited Peking at the head of a Russian Mission. - -Both the Treaty and the Railway Agreement were ratified by the Chinese -Government on the 18th September, and came into force on that date. The -popular rumour which credited the Russian Minister in Peking with the -negotiation of these two instruments was, it appears, due to the -presence of M. Cassini at the Chinese Capital, where it was considered -necessary for him to remain in order to secure their ratification by -China. As a glance at a map of North-Eastern Asia will show, the Railway -Agreement constituted a concession of the greatest importance to Russia. -The Chinese Eastern Railway, the name of the new line which Russia -obtained leave to construct, became the eastern section of the -Trans-Siberian Railway, connecting Lake Baikal with Vladivostok, -Russia’s outlet to the Pacific. The new line, which would traverse -Northern Manchuria via Kharbin, Tsitsihar and Hailar, would shorten the -distance by more than 300 miles. Moreover, the more level country -through which the line was to pass presented few engineering -difficulties, as compared with the Amur route, a fact which would -greatly diminish the period and the cost of construction. The Agreement -was subsequently rendered complete in every detail by the elaboration of -what were termed the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These were -confirmed by the Tsar on the 4th December in the same year. Although -these Statutes (given in Rockhill’s _Treaties and Conventions_) provided -that the President of this railway company should be Chinese, the -stipulation was purely nominal. The Chinese Eastern Railway, like the -Russo-Chinese Bank, was an exclusively Russian undertaking, the raising -of the capital required, as well as the construction of the line, being -entirely in Russian hands. - -Meanwhile the Kaiser, who personally directed the foreign policy of -Germany, was forming plans for claiming his share of reward for the -triple intervention, and he had, it appears, already approached the -Peking Government on this subject, though without any success. What, -assuming its existence, was the nature of the understanding arrived at -between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin in regard to Far Eastern -affairs will probably remain for ever a State secret. In any case, -however, it is clear, from his own repeated declarations as to Germany’s -need for “a place in the sun,” and from the proceedings of the German -Minister at Peking, that he was bent on obtaining a foothold of some -sort in China, whence Germany’s future expansion in the Far East might -be conveniently developed. His opportunity came in 1897. In the autumn -of that year two German missionaries were murdered in the province of -Shantung. A few weeks later a German force landed in that province at -Kiaochow, one of the two harbours the use of which in time of war Russia -had acquired eighteen months before under her secret Treaty with China. -M. Gérard in his book above mentioned states that the German Emperor had -before the departure of the German ships on this errand informed the -Tsar by telegraph of his intentions, and, receiving no reply objecting -to the proposed step, took the Tsar’s silence for consent. Germany’s -occupation of this strategic position, which had the further advantage -of being in a region of the Chinese mainland sufficiently distant from -points where other foreign interests were centred to obviate objections -on the part of other Powers, and, at the same time, ensure an ample and -undisturbed field for German enterprise, was confirmed by a Treaty -concluded with China on March 6th, 1898. By this Treaty China granted to -Germany a lease for ninety-nine years of the port of Kiaochow and a -considerable stretch of “hinterland.” Germany also acquired under it -certain rights of railway construction in the neighbourhood of the port. - -The author of _Japan: The Rise of a Modern Power_, tells us, on the -authority of a statement said to have been made by Prince Henry of -Hohenzollern, that the Kaiser’s next step was to invite the Tsar to take -Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan. Whatever truth there may be in the -statement attributed to Prince Henry—M. Gérard thinks the suggestion may -have been made in the telegram announcing his own intentions—the fact -remains that Germany’s abrupt action resulted in an immediate scramble -on the part of several European Powers for various portions of Chinese -territory. Russia led the way in these undignified proceedings, for -which a harsher word might with justice be substituted. Two months after -the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany, Russian men-of-war anchored in -Port Arthur. Thither they were followed by British cruisers, and for a -moment it looked as if history would repeat itself, and that Russia -might have to reckon with British interference in her designs. Other -counsels, however, prevailed. The British ships were withdrawn, and on -March 27th, three weeks after the conclusion of the Kiaochow Agreement, -a similar Treaty was signed at Peking by Li Hung Chang and the Russian -Chargé d’Affaires. This Treaty, the text of which was not published by -the Russian Government, provided for the lease to Russia of Port Arthur, -Ta-lien Wan and adjacent waters for a period of twenty-five years, -renewable by arrangement at the expiration of the term. It was further -agreed that the right to construct the Chinese Eastern Railway across -Northern Manchuria, secured by Russia under the secret Railway Agreement -of August 27th, 1896, should be extended so as to include the -construction of branch lines from a point on that railway to Ta-lien Wan -and other places in the Liaotung peninsula. The Treaty also provided for -a subsequent definition of the boundaries of the leased area and—a point -of some importance in the light of after events—of a neutral strip of -territory separating the Chinese and Russian spheres. Port Arthur, -moreover, was declared to be a naval port, and as such closed to all -vessels save those of the two contracting parties. Subsequently, on May -7th, a supplementary Agreement, signed at St. Petersburg, defined the -boundaries of the leased area, and arranged for their delimitation. - -It was not long before France, whose services to China at the time of -the triple intervention had, as we have seen, already met with -recognition in the shape of the prompt settlement of various outstanding -questions, obtained, in her turn, a territorial concession of the same -nature—though, perhaps, not so important—as those granted to Germany and -Russia. By a Convention signed at Peking on May 27th, 1898, China -granted to her a ninety-nine years’ lease for the purpose of a naval -station and coaling depôt of the Bay of Kwang-chow and adjacent -territory in the peninsula of Leichow, together with the right to -construct a railway connecting the bay with the peninsula. The area of -this concession was in the province of Kwangsi, which adjoins the French -territory of Tonkin. - -Unlike the three Powers associated in the triple intervention, whose -subsequent action justifies the supposition that they regarded -themselves as brokers entitled to a commission for services rendered, -Great Britain had no special claim on the goodwill of China. -Nevertheless, she joined in the scramble for Chinese territory. A -Convention, signed at Peking on June 9th, 1898, gave her an extension of -territory at Hongkong under lease for a period of ninety-nine years, the -reason assigned for the concession being that this extension was -necessary for the proper protection and defence of that colony. Three -weeks later (July 1st), by another Convention, signed also at Peking, it -was agreed that the Chinese Government, “in order to provide Great -Britain with a suitable naval harbour and for the protection of British -commerce in the neighbouring seas,” should lease to her Weihaiwei and -the adjacent waters “for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in -the occupation of Russia.” The area thus leased comprised the island of -Liu-kung, and all other islands in the bay of Weihaiwei. - -In defence of Great Britain’s action it may fairly be pleaded that her -interests in China, and in the Far East generally, which were more -extensive than those of any other Power, with the possible exception of -Japan, made it necessary for her Government to take prompt measures to -counteract the effect of any proceedings on the part of other Powers -which might be prejudicial to those interests. The political situation -created in the Far East by the actions of the three Powers associated in -the triple intervention was the reverse of reassuring. Russia’s -occupation of Port Arthur was in direct contradiction to the grounds of -the joint protest against the annexation of the Liaotung peninsula by -Japan. Neither with France nor with Russia at that time were our -relations what they afterwards became. Between British and Russian -policy there was a scarcely veiled antagonism, while the French and -ourselves had long been rivals in China, as elsewhere. The concerted -action of these two Powers, not to speak of their support by a third, -whose exact relation to her associates was dubious, was thus calculated -to give rise to apprehensions which would doubtless have been increased -had British Ministers then known all that has since come to light. -Additional gravity was given to Germany’s sudden appearance on the scene -in a new rôle by, to use M. Gérard’s words, her “occupation by force and -at a moment of complete peace of a port belonging to the Empire the -integrity of whose territory she claimed to have safeguarded against -Japan.” Under these circumstances the British Government may well have -felt that it was justified in regarding these proceedings as fraught -with possibilities of injury to British interests and prestige, and in -adopting what in the light of these occurrences might reasonably be held -to assume the character of precautionary measures. Such, beyond a doubt, -was the general interpretation given by impartial observers to Great -Britain’s action in arranging for her occupation of Weihaiwei. It was, -as the terms of the Agreement clearly indicated, a direct counter-move -to Russia’s occupation of Port Arthur. As such it was welcomed by Japan, -who, when the time for the evacuation of Weihaiwei arrived, willingly -handed it over to the Power who was shortly to become her ally. - - - - - CHAPTER XXIV -American Protest against Foreign Aggression in China—Principle of “Open - Door and Equal Opportunity”—Financial Reform—Operation of Revised - Treaties—The Boxer Outbreak—Russia and Manchuria. - - -In addition to the various Agreements for the occupation of Chinese -territory mentioned in the preceding chapter, negotiations were -conducted with the Chinese Government about the same time by the -European Powers concerned, and also by Japan, for the purpose of -obtaining Declarations regarding the non-alienation by China of certain -territories which were regarded by them as coming, respectively, within -their special spheres of interest. As a result of these negotiations the -French Minister at Peking received in March, 1897, a verbal assurance, -confirmed later in writing, that the Chinese Government would “in no -case, nor under any form, alienate to another Power the island of Hainan -off the coast of the province of Kwantung.” In February, 1898, a similar -Declaration concerning the riverain provinces of the Yangtse was made to -Great Britain. In the following April the assurance previously given to -France was extended so as to include the three southern provinces of -Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwantung bordering on Tonkin; while Japan in the -same month received an assurance of a corresponding nature regarding the -province of Fukien, the Chinese Government signifying its intention -“never to cede or lease it to any Power whatsoever.” In thus obtaining -from China a Declaration of non-alienation respecting the province of -Fukien, similar to those given to Great Britain and France regarding -other portions of Chinese territory, Japan established her claim to rank -as one of the leading Powers in the Far East, a position which, as will -be seen, received further recognition in the following year. Her success -in this respect—due to her victory in the war with China, and to the -alteration in her status as a nation which resulted from the conclusion -of revised treaties with several foreign Powers—was rendered the more -noticeable by the failure of Italy, after prolonged negotiations, to -gain China’s consent to a territorial concession similar to those -granted to other European Powers. - -The years 1898 and 1899 witnessed the negotiation by European Powers -with each other of two other arrangements relating to China of a -somewhat different character. One of these was the Declaration made by -Great Britain to Germany on April 19th, 1898, binding herself not to -construct any railway connecting Weihaiwei, and the adjoining leased -territory, with the interior of the province of Shantung. The other was -the Agreement, effected through an exchange of Notes at St. Petersburg -on April 28th, 1899, by which the British and Russian Governments -recorded their intention to regard, for the purpose of railway -concessions, the basin of the Yangtse and the region north of the Great -Wall as the special spheres of interest of the two Powers, respectively, -confirming, at the same time, the understanding arrived at between them -in regard to the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang. - -The outbreak of war between the United States and Spain in the spring of -1898 led to the introduction of a new factor into the situation created -in the Far East by the events above described. One of the results of the -war was the cession of the Philippine Islands to America, who had -already, by annexing Hawaii, secured a stepping-stone across the -Pacific. By the acquisition of these former Spanish possessions, which -provided her with a naval base in the Eastern Pacific for the protection -of her commerce in Far Eastern waters, America’s attitude towards Far -Eastern questions was at once affected. Hitherto in her relations with -the Far East—with China, Japan and Korea—she had maintained a detached -attitude in keeping with her traditional policy of non-interference in -foreign questions. In China, where she came late into the field, she had -been content to follow, at a distance, in the wake of other Powers; -sharing in whatever commercial or extra-territorial privileges might be -obtained, but never breaking the ice for herself, nor—to her credit, be -it said—betraying any aggressive tendencies. As the pioneer of Western -nations in putting an end to the seclusion of Japan and Korea, she had -opportunities for exercising a powerful influence, of which her -traditional policy forbade her to make full use. Regarding both -countries somewhat in the light of protégés, her policy in respect to -each soon settled down into one of benevolent inaction, varied only by -occasional half-hearted opposition to the less complaisant policy of -other Governments, whenever the duty of a patron, so to speak, seemed to -call for her interposition. We have seen how she was thus led on two -occasions in the matter of Treaty revision into a premature -encouragement of Japanese ambitions, which was the cause of -embarrassment both to herself, and to the nation whose wishes she was -willing to further. The course thus pursued by America, which precluded -concerted action with other Powers, was in some respects simply an -extension to the Far East of the policy she had previously adopted in -regard to European questions. Well as the traditional principle of -holding aloof from affairs outside of the American continent, through -fear of political entanglements, may have suited the conditions of her -earlier existence as a nation, a too rigid adherence to this principle, -when those conditions were fast disappearing, might lead to consequences -more unpleasant than those she sought to avoid. An attitude of -detachment carried too far might result in her exclusion from a voice in -the regulation of matters of international interest. Towards some such -position America appeared to be drifting, when, to borrow the phrase -used by Mr. Hornbeck in _Contemporary Politics of the Far East_, she -suddenly “stumbled into World Politics” through her occupation of the -Philippines. From that moment her political isolation was ended. She -began to take a more active and intelligent interest in Far Eastern -questions, though the reluctance to abandon her traditional policy, -which was still noticeable in her action when she did move, was liable -to be mistaken for timidity. - -The territorial concessions obtained, one after the other, by Germany, -Russia, France and Great Britain, and the ear-marking of other Chinese -territory by arrangements made either by the Powers concerned, as well -as by Japan, with China, or by certain of those European Powers between -themselves, caused uneasiness in Washington. There was a fear lest the -new activity displayed by various Governments might result in the -closure, or restriction, of Chinese markets hitherto open to all -countries, in which case serious injury might accrue to American -commerce and enterprise. The apprehension was not unfounded, even so far -as the Declarations regarding the non-alienation of Chinese territory -were concerned. Although the actual wording of these Declarations did -not of itself justify an inference of this nature, from the fact that -they were made at all it was generally held that their effect was to -establish, in each instance, a sort of priority of right—a position of -exceptional advantage in favour of the Power to whom the Declaration was -made. The inference derived support from the vagueness of the term -“spheres of interest” applied to the regions affected by the -Declarations in question, and was also strengthened by the common -impression formed at the time that this ear-marking of Chinese territory -portended an eventual partition of China. This seems to have been the -view taken by the United States Government. - -In September, 1899, the American Secretary of State addressed Circular -Notes to the British, French, German and Russian Governments, expressing -the hope that they would “make a formal declaration of an ‘open door’ -policy in the territories held by them in China.” An assurance was -sought from each Power: that it would “in no way interfere with any -treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of -interest, or leased territory, it might have in China”; “that the -Chinese Treaty tariff of the time being should apply to all merchandise -landed or shipped to all such ports as are within the said ‘sphere of -interest’” ... and “that duties so leviable should be collected by the -Chinese Government”; and that it “would levy no higher harbour dues on -vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such ‘sphere’ -than should be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher -railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its -‘sphere’ on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other -nationalities transported through such ‘sphere’ than should be levied on -similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over like -distances.” In the following November similar, though not identical, -Notes were addressed to the Governments of France, Italy and Japan, -asking them to join in these formal declarations of policy. - -The reason for the distinction thus made both in the dates and tenor of -the two series of communications may, perhaps, be found in the fact that -the territories leased by the three first-named Powers, besides their -greater strategic importance, were situated in a part of China where -American interests were more closely concerned than in the region -further south affected by French action, and that Japan, though -interested in the Declaration regarding Fukien, had neither sought nor -obtained any cession of territory; while Italy had failed in her -endeavour to emulate the example of her nearest continental neighbours. - -The assurance received from China by Japan regarding the non-alienation -of the province of Fukien was, as we have seen, in effect, an admission -of the position of power and influence she had by this time acquired. -Her inclusion in the list of States consulted by America on this -occasion was indirectly an endorsement of this admission, and is the -first public recognition of her new status as a leading Power in the Far -East. - -Favourable replies were received from all the Powers consulted; each, -however, with the exception of Italy, making the reservation that assent -to the proposals was subject to the condition that all the Powers -interested should participate in the Declarations. Thereupon, in March, -1900, the American Secretary of State sent instructions to the American -representative at each of the capitals of the Powers consulted to inform -the Government to which he was accredited that, in his opinion, the six -Powers in question and the United States were mutually pledged to the -policy of maintaining the commercial _status quo_ in China, and of -refraining, each within what might be considered its sphere of -influence, “from measures calculated to destroy equality of -opportunity.” - -The Notes thus exchanged between the United States and the six other -Powers above mentioned explain the origin, as they also constitute “the -formal basis” (to use Mr. Hornbeck’s words) of what has ever since been -known as the policy of the “Open door and equal opportunity” in China. -The latter part of the phrase was afterwards used in the Anglo-Japanese -Treaty of Alliance to designate the policy of Great Britain and Japan in -Korea as well as in China. To the former country, now annexed to Japan, -it no longer applies; but the policy has theoretically, if not always -practically, been in force as regards China, for the last twenty-one -years, and there is reason to think that more may yet be heard both of -the phrase, and of the policy it represents, in connection with affairs -in China, and possibly in other parts of Eastern Asia. - - -In touching on the subject of financial reform in a previous chapter -attention was called to the monetary confusion which existed after the -abolition of the feudal system, when the new Government which had come -into power found itself saddled with clan debts and with clan paper -money, mostly depreciated and of many different kinds. It was pointed -out how, as a natural consequence of this monetary confusion and of -financial embarrassments due to other causes, the monetary transactions -of the country were for many years conducted on the basis of an -inconvertible paper currency; and how by successive steps, taken as -opportunity offered, to remedy this state of things, specie resumption -on a silver basis was at length effected in 1886. - -It was not till eleven years later, in 1897, that Japan adopted her -present gold standard. The reasons for this step are given in the -chapter on Finance contributed to Marquis Ōkuma’s book, already -mentioned, by Marquis Matsugata, who also explains the means by which it -was accomplished. - -“When,” says this authority on Japanese financial matters, “the -Government opened places for the redemption of paper money in 1886, -silver coins only were offered in exchange. Such being the case, the -currency of Japan at that time was based practically on a silver -standard, although legally the system was bimetallic. The price of -silver, however, owing to various reasons, gradually fell, and -artificial checks to its fall were effective only for a short time. -Fluctuation after fluctuation in foreign exchange seemed to follow each -other in endless succession. In the meantime Western countries commenced -to adopt gold monometallism. Our authorities knew very well that, to -insure a healthy growth of finance, Japan must adopt, sooner or later, a -monometallic gold standard, and this was impressed on the minds of -financiers so keenly that the Government determined to effect the reform -as soon as possible. The desired opportunity came with the Peace Treaty -of 1895, when China began to pay to our country an indemnity of -200,000,000 taels” [_sic_ the amount was really 230,000,000 taels]. -“Further negotiations between our Government and the Chinese authorities -resulted in the payment of the indemnity, not in Chinese money, but in -pounds sterling. This was important, since a large gold reserve was -indispensable for the establishment of gold monometallism.” - -The experience of 1886, referred to by Marquis Matsugata, proved that -confidence in the Government’s ability to meet its obligations in paper -money was all that was needed. This confidence once established, no -further difficulty presented itself in the passage from an inconvertible -to a convertible paper currency. Prepared for heavy calls on the specie -resources of the Treasury, the Government had on that occasion -accumulated a reserve of £5,000,000. When, at the end of a few days -after the date fixed for the resumption of specie payments, the demand -for specie ceased, it was found that the total value of notes presented -for conversion did not exceed £30,000. The change from a silver to a -gold standard in 1897 was conducted with equal facility, a large portion -of the Chinese indemnity being transferred abroad. There it served a -useful purpose in maintaining Japan’s financial credit, and, as a -natural consequence, the market price of the Bonds of her numerous -foreign loans, which for several years, to the surprise of private -investors, were quoted at higher rates abroad than at home. - - -The year 1899, when the revised treaties came into operation, marked a -fresh stage in the progress of Japan towards attaining a footing of -equality with Western Powers—the aim which her statesmen had set before -themselves ever since the Restoration, and which had in so many ways -been the guiding principle of both domestic and foreign policy. With the -object of allowing time for the negotiation of similar treaties with -other foreign Powers, the revised British Treaty, signed in London in -1894, had, as already mentioned, provided that it should not come into -force until five years after the date of signature. Before the -expiration of the period named similar treaties had been concluded with -all the other Powers concerned, those with France and Germany containing -a few modifications of minor importance. In the meantime, moreover, the -conditions specified in the Treaty regarding the new Japanese Codes and -Japan’s adhesion to the International Conventions concerning Copyright -and Industrial Property had been fulfilled. The way was thus cleared for -the operation of the new revised treaties, which, accordingly, came into -force on the 17th July, 1899, the earliest date possible. Though in -these new treaties, recognizing the territorial jurisdiction of Japan, -the stipulation of previous conventions which chiefly offended Japanese -susceptibilities found no place, she still remained bound for a further -period of twelve years—the term of the revised treaties—by a tariff of a -unilateral character. Only when that period expired would she recover -full tariff autonomy and be free to negotiate reciprocal treaties with -the various Powers concerned on a footing of complete equality. This -opportunity came to her in 1911, and she at once availed herself of it. - - -In the spring of the following year (1900) what is known as the Boxer -Rising took place. In its inception it was a protest against missionary -enterprise. As it developed, it became the expression of a feeling of -exasperation among the official and lettered classes of Northern China -engendered by the action of European Powers in occupying under the guise -of leases various portions of Chinese territory in that region. During -the previous autumn a society called I-Ho-C’uan (Patriot Harmony Fists) -had been formed in the province of Shantung. Its formation was -encouraged by the reactionary tendencies which made their appearance -about this time at Peking, where the Empress Dowager, after the -successful _coup d’état_ by which she had crushed the ill-conducted -reform movement in 1898, was again in power. The magical powers claimed -by its members produced on the ignorant masses an impression that was -heightened by the incantations they performed. As the movement grew, it -attracted the attention of the Governor of the province, who supported -it with, apparently, the twofold idea of utilizing it against foreign -aggression, and gaining favour at Court. As a result of his outspoken -sympathy the Boxer movement assumed formidable dimensions. Though -eventually, through the energy of Yuan Shih-k’ai, who was at one time, -as we have seen, Chinese Resident in Korea, order was restored in -Shantung, the movement spread northwards towards Peking. There, as Mr. -Campbell explains in the China Handbook prepared under the direction of -the Foreign Office, it gained the powerful support of the ignorant and -reactionary statesman Prince Tuan, the selection of whose son as -Heir-Apparent to the Throne gave him a commanding influence in the -councils of the Empire. In April, 1900, bands of Boxers were drilling in -the outskirts of the Capital, their appearance in every district they -invaded being accompanied by murders of missionaries and massacres of -native converts. Some weeks later the situation became so threatening -that arrangements were made for bringing up to Peking small contingents -of foreign troops for the protection of the Legations and such portion -of the foreign community as still remained. These guards arrived -opportunely at the end of May, by which time swarms of Boxers infested -the Capital, and the Legations were practically isolated. Prince Tuan -chose this moment for openly espousing the Boxer cause. This step on his -part was followed by the murders of the Chancellor of the Japanese -Legation and the German Minister, the two outrages occurring within a -few days of each other. The subsequent course of events is well known: -the storming of the Taku forts (June 16th); the siege of the Legations -by Chinese troops and Boxers; the failure of Admiral Seymour’s attempt -to re-establish communications with the Capital; the equipment of -foreign expeditionary forces to operate against Peking; the issue of an -Imperial Decree ordering a general massacre of foreigners in the Chinese -dominions; the attack on the foreign settlements at Tientsin; the -arrival of Russian and British reinforcements, and the taking of -Tientsin city (July 14th); the relief of the Legations, and occupation -of the Chinese capital on the 13th and 14th August by the allied forces; -and the flight of the Chinese Court to Sian-fu, the ancient capital in -the province of Shensi. With the flight of the Court from the capital -Chinese resistance collapsed, and when Count Waldersee arrived in -September with several thousand German troops to take supreme command of -the allied expeditionary forces, there was no enemy to fight. -Hostilities gave place to negotiations between the foreign Governments -concerned and China for the settlement of the various issues raised by -the Boxer outbreak. The negotiations resulted in two preliminary -exchanges of Notes, dated, respectively, December 22nd, 1900, and -January 16th, 1901, embodying the conditions for the re-establishment of -normal relations with China, and in the signature of a final Protocol on -September 7th, 1901. Three days before its signature Prince Ch’un, who -had proceeded on a mission to Berlin to apologize for the murder of the -German Minister, was received in audience by the Kaiser. - -The chief conditions imposed on China by these arrangements were the -payment of an indemnity of 450,000,000 Haikwan taels (equivalent at the -rate fixed—3s. per tael—to £67,500,000); the permanent occupation of -certain places, including Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, for the purpose of -preserving free communications between Peking and the sea; the razing of -the Taku and other forts which threatened those communications; and the -construction of a separate fortified quarter in the Capital for the -foreign Legations, for the further protection of which permanent foreign -guards were to be retained. Other terms included special reparation for -the murders of the German Minister and the Chancellor of the Japanese -Legation and the desecration of cemeteries; the punishment of Prince -Tuan, as well as other personages and officials responsible for the -attacks on foreigners; and the prohibition of the import of arms. - -Thanks, as we learn from the Handbook already quoted, to the good sense -of the leading provincial authorities, such as the Viceroys of Nanking -and Wuchang and the new Governor of Shantung, who had the courage to -disobey the Imperial Decree, the Boxer movement was stifled in the -central and southern regions of China. There, in spite of considerable -unrest, order was preserved. But further north in Manchuria the -Governors were not so judicious. In obedience to instructions from the -Court they declared war on the Russians. The sudden attacks made by -Chinese forces created a panic on the Amur, and brought about the savage -reprisals which occurred at Blagovestchensk on that river, and the -occupation of the whole of Manchuria by Russian troops. The folly of the -Empress Dowager and of the ignorant clique by whose counsels she was -guided gave Russia the opportunity she desired for pursuing her designs -of aggression in the Far East. Her subsequent conduct throughout the -negotiations, and after their conclusion, destroyed the good effect -produced by her valuable co-operation in the fighting at Tientsin, where -the Russian reinforcements were, undoubtedly, the chief factor in saving -the foreign settlements from destruction. - -In the military operations against Peking, and in the protracted -negotiations which succeeded them, Japan played a conspicuous part. She -had suffered injury similar to that sustained by other foreign Powers in -connection with the Boxer Rising, and she had a common interest with -them in adopting whatever measures might be necessary in the -international emergency which had arisen. Her proximity to China and her -military resources enabled her to strike quickly, and with effect. To -the invitation to take part in the expeditionary force in process of -organization, which was addressed to her by the other interested Powers, -with the exception of Russia, she responded with alacrity; and in a -short space of time a well-equipped Japanese force took its place with -the troops of other Powers, and joined in the march on Peking for the -relief of the besieged Legations. The discipline and efficiency of the -Japanese contingent won well-deserved praise from those best qualified -to judge. In the subsequent negotiations the readiness shown by Japan to -act in harmony with other Powers, whose attitude was influenced by -consideration for the general interests of all concerned, facilitated -the solution of many difficulties; and, when the question of claims for -indemnity came to be discussed, the moderation of her demands was -equalled only by that of Great Britain and the United States. - - - - - CHAPTER XXV -Agreement between Great Britain and Germany—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. - - -Soon after the opening of negotiations for the re-establishment of -friendly relations with China the Governments of Great Britain and -Germany concluded an Agreement of a self-denying character which -confirmed, though in different words and with special application to the -situation then existing in China, the principle of the “open door and -equal opportunity,” as set forth by the United States, and accepted by -the Powers consulted, in the autumn of 1899 and the spring of the year -following. By this Agreement, signed in London on October 16th, 1900, -the two Powers bound themselves to support the principle above -mentioned; to abstain from making use of the existing troubles in China -to “obtain for themselves any territorial advantages”; and to co-operate -for the protection of their interests in the event of any attempt on the -part of another Power to obtain such advantages under existing -conditions. The Agreement was, as prearranged, communicated to other -interested Powers, who were invited “to accept the principles recorded -in it.” Replies more or less favourable were received from the Powers -addressed. The French Government referred to its prompt adhesion to the -proposals of the United States in the previous year as a proof of its -long-entertained wishes in the direction indicated; while the Russian -reply, which, like the French, took the form of a Memorandum, went so -far as to say that Russia had been “the first to lay down the -maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental -principle of her policy in China.” The Japanese Government, in its -answer, stated that, in view of the assurance received that in adhering -to the Agreement Japan would be placed in the same position as she would -have occupied had she been a signatory instead of an adhering State, it -had no hesitation in adhering to the Agreement, and accepting the -principles embodied therein. - -Subsequently, when it became apparent that Russia had no idea of -evacuating the territory she occupied in Manchuria, the German -Government explained that the Agreement was never intended to apply to -that territory. - -The course pursued by Russia from the outset of the negotiations in -Peking was in marked contrast to the attitude adopted by the other -Powers concerned, and in direct contradiction to the principles embodied -in the Anglo-German Agreement in which she professed to acquiesce. From -some of the demands made by the other Powers conjointly she dissociated -herself, while her conduct in keeping her troops stationed in the -furthest positions to which they had penetrated during the Boxer -outbreak indicated an intention to give a permanent character to her -occupation of Manchuria. Her attitude in this latter respect was -doubtless encouraged by the fact that, whereas the Final Protocol -provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops, under certain conditions, -from Peking, and the province of Chihli, it contained no reference to -the evacuation of Manchuria. Further proof of her designs was furnished -by the conclusion in January, 1901 (subject to confirmation by the -Peking Government), of an Agreement between Admiral Alexeieff and the -Tartar General at Moukden, placing the province of Fêng-t’ien (Shenking) -under Russian control, and by the subsequent opening of negotiations at -St. Petersburg for a formal Convention, which would have established a -Russian Protectorate over the whole of Manchuria, besides giving her -exclusive, or preferential, rights in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. -These attempts to obtain China’s consent to her occupation of Manchuria, -and to secure for herself a position of exceptional advantage elsewhere, -were frustrated by the vigilance of Great Britain, the United States and -Japan, and by the general indignation they aroused in China. The -Government at Peking, yielding to the pressure thus brought to bear upon -it, withheld its confirmation of the Moukden Agreement; the Chinese -Minister at the Russian capital was forbidden to sign the Convention -under negotiation; and eventually, in August, 1901, the Russian -Government issued an official _communiqué_ announcing the shelving of -the proposed Convention owing, as it was explained, to the -misrepresentation of Russia’s intentions. Russian troops, nevertheless, -remained in Manchuria, and it was not until after the conclusion of the -Anglo-Japanese Alliance that Russia at length made an Agreement with -China for the evacuation of the territory she had occupied, an Agreement -which, as M. Witte afterwards explained to the British Ambassador in St. -Petersburg, she never intended to observe. - -On the 30th January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was -signed in London by the Marquess of Lansdowne and the Japanese Minister -there, the late Count (then Baron) Hayashi, who was afterwards Japanese -Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Treaty related to affairs in “the -Extreme East,” and came into effect immediately after signature. It was -terminable after five years’ duration, at one year’s notice on either -side, subject to the condition that should either of the contracting -parties be at war when the period of the Treaty came to an end it should -remain in force until peace was concluded. By this Agreement the -contracting parties recognized the independence of China and Korea, and -the special interests therein of Great Britain and Japan respectively. -They bound themselves to maintain strict neutrality in the event of -either of them being involved in war, and to come to one another’s -assistance in the event of either being confronted by the opposition of -more than one hostile Power. The Treaty also, as we have seen, affirmed -the principle of “equal opportunity.” - -In his despatch to the British Minister in Tōkiō notifying the signature -of the Agreement the Marquess of Lansdowne observed that it might be -regarded as the outcome of the events which had taken place during the -last two years in the Far East, and of the part taken by Great Britain -and Japan in dealing with them. Count Hayashi, in his _Secret Memoirs_, -published in London in 1915 after his death, confirms this statement, -but puts the date at which tendencies began to take shape in this -direction somewhat further back. The idea of an alliance between the two -countries first came, he says, into the minds of Japanese statesmen soon -after the triple intervention of 1895, and was favoured by Count Mutsu, -who was at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs. The effect of that -intervention, he explains, was to cause a regrouping of Powers in the -Far East: France, Russia and Germany forming one group, while Great -Britain, Japan and the United States represented another. Having this -regrouping in view, he himself, in the summer of that year, suggested -the desirability of such an alliance, should the unfriendly attitude of -certain Powers towards Japan be continued. The suggestion was made in -articles contributed to a leading Tōkiō journal after he had ceased to -be Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and on the eve of his appointment -as Japanese Minister to China. - -The following extracts from a summary of these articles, which is given -in the Memoirs, show how, undismayed by the retrocession of the Liaotung -peninsula, Japanese statesmen still held firmly to their settled policy -of attaining for the nation a footing of equality with Western Powers, -realizing perhaps more clearly than before that the increase of Japan’s -naval and military strength was the only means of attaining their -object. - -“We must,” the writer of the articles says, “continue to study according -to Western methods, for the application of science is the most important -item of warlike preparations that civilized nations regard. If new ships -of war are considered necessary, we must build them at any cost. If the -organization of the army is found to be wrong ... the whole military -system must be entirely changed. We must build docks to be able to -repair our ships. We must establish a steel factory to supply guns and -ammunition. Our railways must be extended so that we can mobilize our -troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping must be developed so that we can -provide transports to carry our armies abroad. This is the programme -that we have to keep always in view.... What Japan has now to do is to -keep perfectly quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against -her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her -national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one -day surely come in the Orient. When that day comes, she will be able to -follow her own course.” - -How sedulously all the steps indicated were subsequently carried out is -now common knowledge. Preparations on a scale so extended could mean -only one thing—provision against the possible eventuality of war with -the Power that might stand in the way of Japan’s “following her own -course.” - -[Illustration: - - MARQUIS SAIONJI. - - Descended from an ancient family of Court Nobles. A prominent figure - in diplomacy and parliamentary life. He was chief delegate for Japan - at the Versailles Conference. -] - -[Illustration: - - GENERAL PRINCE KATSURA. - - Rendered distinguished services in the war with China and Russia; he - was conspicuous both as soldier and statesman. -] - -The idea of an alliance, or some sort of understanding, between the two -countries thus put forward in 1895 seems to have gradually made way both -in Japan and in Great Britain. We learn from the same Memoirs that in -1898 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Minister, expressed to -Viscount (then Mr.) Kato, who was at that time Japanese Minister in -London, the readiness of Great Britain to enter into an agreement with -Japan for the settlement of affairs in the Far East, and that the -latter, in reporting the conversation to the Foreign Minister in Tōkiō, -strongly supported the suggestion. The subject, it appears, was again -discussed in the course of a conversation which Count Hayashi had with -the late Marquis Itō and with Marquis (then Count) Inouyé in Tōkiō in -1899, prior to his (Count Hayashi’s) appointment as Minister in London. -His account of what passed on this occasion shows that the Japanese -Government was at that time hesitating between two opposite courses—an -agreement, or alliance, with Great Britain, and an understanding with -Russia; and it seems to have been thought that the latter Power was in a -position to offer better terms. Soon after his arrival, early in -January, 1900, to take up his post in London the new Minister met the -late Dr. Morrison, then _Times_ correspondent in Peking, with whom he -discussed the question of an alliance between the two countries. He -seems then to have formed the impression that most British journalists -were in favour of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. - -It was not, however, until the following year that the question began to -assume a practical aspect. The first move came from an unexpected -quarter, the German Embassy in London. In March, 1901, Freiherr von -Eckhardstein, who was then, owing to the illness of the German -Ambassador, in the position of Chargé d’Affaires, called on Count -Hayashi and expressed the opinion that a triple alliance between -Germany, Great Britain and Japan was the best means of maintaining peace -in the Far East. He suggested that he (Count Hayashi) should take the -initiative in proposing this alliance. The latter, who had, as we know, -been one of the first to advocate an Anglo-Japanese alliance, reported -the suggestion to his Government, and was instructed to sound the -British Government unofficially on the subject. Much light is thrown on -the subsequent course of negotiations by the Memoirs already mentioned, -and Freiherr von Eckhardstein’s “Reminiscences” (_Lebens Erinnerungen -und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten_), published in Leipzig in 1920. The -ball thus set rolling, the question was, we learn, discussed informally -from time to time, on the one hand between the Japanese Minister and -Lord Lansdowne, and, on the other, between the latter and the German -Chargé d’Affaires; but it was never reopened by the German Embassy with -the Japanese Minister. - -There seems to have been little enthusiasm for the project of a triple -alliance on the part of any of the foreign Ministries concerned. Great -Britain appears to have shown more inclination in this direction than -the other two Powers, for until a late stage in the negotiations with -Japan the point would seem to have been kept in view by the British -Cabinet. If the German Government ever seriously entertained the -idea—which is very doubtful—it was merely for the reasons mentioned by -the Foreign Office in Berlin, that the inclusion of Japan might be -acceptable to her on general grounds, since she would “find herself in -good company,” and might make negotiations with Great Britain easier, -“as Japan was popular in Germany.” The alliance with Great Britain was -regarded as the main consideration; and even in this matter there is no -reason to think that the German overtures were sincere, for Berlin’s -insistence on Austria’s being brought into the business, though not as a -contracting party, added to the difficulties already in existence. Nor, -on the side of Japan, where the part played by Germany in the Liaotung -incident was not forgotten, does there seem to have been any marked -desire for the inclusion of that Power in any understanding between -herself and Great Britain. This explains the separate character of the -negotiations carried on in London. As between Great Britain and Germany, -they lasted no longer than a few weeks, during which time they appear to -have been kept alive only by the efforts of the German Chargé -d’Affaires, to whose initiative the project was due. After the -resumption of his duties by the German Ambassador the negotiations were -transferred to Berlin, where they soon came to an end. Their failure is -described by the author of the Reminiscences as “the starting-point of -the encirclement [_Einkreisung_] of Germany, and of the world-war which -was the mathematical consequence.” - -The parallel negotiations between Great Britain and Japan were not -interrupted by the inability of the British and German Governments to -arrive at an understanding. No obstacles of the kind that stood in the -way of an agreement between the two other Powers existed. The cordial -relations which had been established as a result of the settlement of -the long-pending question of Treaty revision had been improved by the -close co-operation of the two countries in the international measures in -which both had joined at the time of the Boxer outbreak, and by the -harmony of views that was developed during the Peking negotiations. The -only difficulty which presented itself lay in the fact, already referred -to, that the Japanese Government was hesitating between two opposite -courses—an understanding with Russia and an agreement with Great -Britain. The decision rested with the leading statesmen, who on this -point were divided into two parties, one led by the late Prince Itō and -the late Marquis Inouyé, the other by Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata and -the late Prince Katsura. Itō, whose pro-German tendencies were well -known, was in favour of coming to an understanding, if possible, with -Russia, and his opinion was shared by Inouyé. Yamagata and Katsura, on -the other hand, were inclined towards an alliance with Great Britain. -Fortunately for the London negotiations, the cleavage of opinion did not -follow clan lines. The Chōshiū party, to which the four statesmen in -question all belonged, was itself divided. Fortunately, also, Katsura -was then Premier. His and Yamagata’s policy was adopted by the Cabinet, -and finally prevailed. In his opposition to the Cabinet’s policy Itō -went so far as to arrange that a visit he was about to make to America -in connection with celebrations at the University of Yale should be -extended to Russia, where he seems to have exchanged views with Russian -statesmen. His action threatened at one moment to imperil the success of -the London negotiations, and it became necessary for the Japanese -Government to explain that his visit to Russia had no official -character. In the face of this disavowal he could do little. Whatever -plans he and those who supported him may have formed came to nothing, -and in the end he was forced to content himself with criticizing -unfavourably the draft of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which embodied the -final amendments proposed by Japan. The strength of his position in the -country at the time, as well as his influence with the late Japanese -Emperor, may be gathered from the fact that these last amendments were -transmitted by the Government to him in Russia by special messenger, -with a request for his opinion. - -It is unnecessary to emphasize the importance of the Anglo-Japanese -alliance. Count Hayashi, in speaking of it as “an epoch-making event,” -does not overstate the case. For both countries it was a new and grave -departure in policy, ending an isolation which was a source of weakness -to each in the quarter of the world to which it applied. For Japan it -had a treble value. It practically assured her against a repetition of -the Liaotung incident, while the mere fact of her becoming the ally of -one of the leading Powers of the world added greatly to her prestige, -and it facilitated the floating of loans on the London market. If the -benefit accruing to Great Britain may seem to have been less, the -alliance was nevertheless opportune in view of the close understanding -between Russia and France in the Far East, the open menace to her -interests offered by Russian designs in Manchuria and the danger to be -apprehended from their further extension. The fact that the alliance was -renewed in an extended form three years later, was again renewed in -1911, and is still in force, shows that both Governments have reason to -be satisfied with its results. - -The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance drew from the Russian and -French Governments a Declaration, signed in St. Petersburg on March 3rd, -1902, which left no doubt as to the interpretation placed on it in St. -Petersburg and Paris. In this Declaration the two Governments, while -approving of the fundamental principles affirmed in the Anglo-Japanese -Agreement, reserved to themselves the right to consult each other, if -necessary, regarding the protection of their interests. The comment of -the author of _Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise_ on this -counter-move was that “it had almost no value as an answer to the -Anglo-Japanese Treaty.” - -The action of Russia in prolonging indefinitely her occupation of -Manchuria, in spite of the protests of other Powers, and her attempts to -strengthen her position there by secret arrangements with China, in -defiance of the principle of “the open door and equal opportunity” which -she had united with other Powers in accepting, caused fresh uneasiness -in Washington. On February 1st, 1901, almost simultaneously with the -signature of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the American Secretary of State, -to whose initiative in 1899 the acceptance of this principle had been -due, addressed Circular Notes to the Governments of China, Russia and -nine other Powers on the subject of the situation created in Manchuria -by the Russian occupation. Any agreement, he pointed out, by which China -ceded to corporations, or companies, exclusive industrial rights and -privileges in connection with the development of Manchuria constituted a -monopoly, and, being a distinct breach of the stipulations of treaties -between China and foreign Powers, seriously affected the rights of -American citizens. Such concessions would be followed by demands from -other Powers for similar exclusive advantages in other parts of the -Chinese Empire, and would result in “the complete wreck of the policy of -absolute equality of treatment of all nations in regard to trade, -navigation and commerce within the confines of the Empire.” - -Influenced, perhaps, by the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the written -protest of the United States, Russia at length, on the 8th April, 1902, -concluded at Peking an Agreement for the evacuation of Manchuria. The -Agreement was to come into force from the date of signature, and was to -be ratified within a period of three months, but this latter stipulation -was never observed. It provided for the evacuation to be conducted in -three stages, and to be completed in eighteen months—that is to say, by -October, 1903. The evacuation was, however, made dependent on two -conditions: the absence, meanwhile, of disturbances in the province, and -the abstention of other Powers from any action prejudicial to Russian -interests therein. The first stage fixed by the Agreement, the -withdrawal of Russian troops from the south-western portion of the -province of Moukden (Fêng-t’ien), was duly carried out by the date -agreed upon, the 8th October, 1902. Before, however, the date fixed for -the completion of the next stage of evacuation (March, 1903), the -withdrawal of Russian troops from the remainder of the province of -Moukden and from the province of Kirin, other and quite new conditions -were formulated by the Russian Government, one being that no “treaty -ports” should be opened in the evacuated territory. In the face of the -well-known fact that the fresh commercial treaties which America and -Japan were negotiating with China contemplated the opening of additional -places for foreign trade in Manchuria, these sudden demands indicated no -intention on Russia’s part to abide by the Agreement. If any doubt in -this respect existed, it was removed by her action in reoccupying early -in 1903 districts she had already evacuated, this step being followed by -the issue in July of the same year of an Imperial Ukase appointing -Admiral Alexeieff Viceroy of the Amur and Kwantung territories—the -latter being, as already mentioned, the name of the small peninsula in -which Port Arthur is situated. - - - - - CHAPTER XXVI -War with Russia—Success of Japan—President Roosevelt’s Mediation—Treaty - of Portsmouth—Peace Terms. - - -The threatening attitude of Russia, who no longer made any pretence of -masking her designs in China, was regarded with increasing anxiety in -Japan, where the necessity of preparing to meet force with force had -already been foreseen. But the high-handed proceedings of the Russians -in Manchuria were not the only cause of the tension that from this -moment began to appear in the relations between the two countries. -Mischief of a kind which had already led to war between China and Japan -was also brewing in Korea. By the Treaty of Shimonoséki, which ended the -war, the independence of that country was recognized. China in -relinquishing her claim to suzerainty no longer maintained Chinese -guards for her Legation in Seoul, and ceased from all political activity -in the peninsula, where the influence of Japan for a time became -predominant. But history was about to repeat itself. Into the place -vacated by China, Russia at once stepped, and Japan found herself -confronted by another and far more dangerous competitor. The positions -of the two new rivals in Korea were very different. The alliance forced -by Japan on the Korean Government at the outset of the war with China -had enabled her to strengthen her political influence, while the energy -she threw into the development of business projects of various kinds had -increased her material interests in the peninsula. The lion’s share of -Korea’s foreign trade and maritime transport was in the hands of Japan. -She had also constructed and was in charge of the working of telegraphic -communications in that country; she had secured a concession for the -construction of railways; and she had her own postal service. Russia, on -the other hand, took no part in business enterprise, and her trade with -Korea was insignificant. She could not, like China, point to traditions -of old-established intercourse, nor had she the latter’s plea of -suzerainty to justify interference in Korean affairs. Her position in -the peninsula was, nevertheless, not without some advantages. As in the -case of China, her territory was co-terminous for a considerable -distance with that of Korea. This supplied a reason for regarding with -disfavour the extension of Japanese influence on the mainland, as well -as a pretext for the activity she soon began to display in political -matters. Moreover, having gained the ear of the formerly pro-Chinese -Court party and—which was more important—the favour of the masterful -Queen, she acquired valuable support in the campaign of political -intrigue upon which both Powers embarked. - -The situation in Korea thus became in many ways similar to what it had -been before, when China and Japan were contending for supremacy in the -peninsula. We have seen in the former instance the attempts that were -made from time to time by the Chinese and Japanese Governments to arrive -at an understanding with regard to their respective interests which -should introduce more stable conditions into Korean administration, and -put an end to the dangerous outbreaks which disturbed the country and -threatened at any moment to produce a collision between the two Powers -concerned. The process was now repeated, Russia occupying the position -held by China before. In 1896 an arrangement was effected between the -Russian and Japanese representatives in Korea. This tided over the first -difficulties that had arisen, and later in the same year was confirmed -by a Convention signed at St. Petersburg by Prince Lobanoff, the Russian -Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata, who -had gone to the Russian capital to attend the late Tsar’s coronation. -Count de Witte, in his recently published Memoirs, referring to this -Convention, says that Prince Lobanoff “knew no more about the Far East -than the average schoolboy.” Two years later a more detailed Agreement -in the form of a Protocol was concluded at Tōkiō between Viscount (then -Baron) Nishi, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Russian -Minister to Japan, Baron Rosen. This Agreement resembled closely the -Convention negotiated at Tientsin in 1889 between China and Japan. - -The conclusion of the above mentioned Agreements did not prevent the -occurrence of disputes between the two rival Powers. These differences -were aggravated by the mischievous influence of Korean political -factions, which lost no opportunity of fomenting trouble between the two -Powers whose protection was sought. The harmony of relations was also -impaired by the presence of Russian and Japanese guards in the capital; -by the Russian efforts to obtain control of the Korean army and -finances; by the unfortunate implication of the Japanese Minister in -Seoul in the murder of the Queen; by the virtual imprisonment of the -King in one of the royal palaces; and by his subsequent escape from -confinement to the Russian Legation, where he remained for some time -under Russian protection. Matters were at length brought to a crisis by -the refusal of Russia in the spring of 1903 to evacuate Manchuria in -pursuance of her Agreement with China concluded in the previous October. -This refusal was followed by the appointment of Admiral Alexeieff as -Viceroy of the Russian Far Eastern Territories, and an increase of -activity in Korea, where large timber concessions were obtained, and -other Russian enterprises set on foot. For this renewal of aggressive -action on the part of Russia the way had been prepared by the -construction of railways in Siberia and Manchuria—a work of many years; -and it is significant that Russia should have timed her refusal to carry -out the Agreement for evacuation so as to coincide with the completion -of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which practically established direct -railway communication between Moscow and Port Arthur. There could no -longer be any doubt that the Russian Government had not abandoned the -far-reaching designs which her lease of Port Arthur had heralded, and -was bent on pursuing a provocative policy. Count de Witte, in the -Memoirs already quoted, holds the late Tsar directly responsible for the -course adopted, which he describes as “the Far Eastern adventure.” The -Tsar, he says, had no definite programme of conquest, but was anxious to -spread Russian influence in the Far East by acquiring fresh territory, -and he speaks of him as having a thirst for military glory and -conquests. He further explains that the Tsar at this time came under the -influence of Bezobrazov, Plehve and other unscrupulous officials, who -encouraged him to defy Japan. Had Russia at this stage of affairs been -content to limit her activity to Manchuria, leaving Japan a clear field -in Korea, the Russo-Japanese war would probably not have taken place, or -it might, at least, have been postponed. A proposal to this effect was, -indeed, made by Japan in the course of the negotiations between the two -Powers, which were commenced at the Russian capital about the time of -Alexeieff’s appointment, and continued until early in the following -year. Russia, however, refused to entertain it. The uncompromising and -obdurate attitude she displayed was in marked contrast to the -conciliatory disposition evinced by Japan. For the deadlock thus created -Russia alone was responsible. The Japanese Government, recognizing the -futility of any further attempt to arrive at a satisfactory -understanding with her, decided to take the bull by the horns, and -terminate negotiations. Accordingly, in two Notes addressed to the -Russian Government on the 5th February, 1904, it announced its intention -to break oil diplomatic relations, reserving to itself the right to take -what independent action might be necessary to defend its threatened -interests. At the same time the Japanese Government sent a circular -despatch to the same effect to its diplomatic representatives abroad for -the information of the Governments to which they were accredited. - -Hostilities were commenced by Japan at Port Arthur and Chemulpo two days -before her formal declaration of war, which was not made until the 10th -February. This action on her part evoked some unfavourable criticism, -though many precedents for this step existed. Her declaration of war was -followed a fortnight later by the signature at Seoul of a Protocol by -which Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of -Korea, who in return granted to her all facilities in the peninsula -which might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. It will be -remembered that a similar step was taken by Japan at the outset of her -war with China. - -When the latter conflict took place the world in general, for the most -part ignorant of the conditions existing in the two countries, -anticipated the defeat of Japan, an opinion governed to a great extent -by considerations of geography, population and visible resources. On the -same grounds a similar view, adverse to Japan’s chances of success in a -struggle with Russia, prevailed in most quarters. For a nation far -inferior in extent of territory, population, military organization, and -resources, to challenge a leading European Power seemed, on the face of -things, a proceeding which could only invite disaster. The two countries -were, nevertheless, not so unevenly matched as was supposed to be the -case. Without doubt Russia was an adversary with whom the strongest -military state would have preferred to keep on good terms. Her extensive -territories and large population, her apparently inexhaustible -resources, gave her great advantages over Japan. These advantages were, -however, counterbalanced by certain patent weaknesses. The war was -unpopular. The policy of adventure which provoked it was condemned by -her own wisest statesmen. There was much political unrest. She was -fighting not in Europe, but on a remote fringe of her vast empire. The -Amur Railway, projected with a view to consolidate her widely separated -dominions, was not completed east of Lake Baikal; nor had the railway -authorities yet finished the portion round the southern end of that -lake, communication across which was still maintained by specially built -steamers. It was doubtful, therefore, if the recently built Chinese -Eastern Railway, which served as a temporary substitute, would prove to -be a reliable line of communications for war purposes. In Japan, on the -other hand, the war was not only popular, but eagerly welcomed. The -efficiency of the army, no less than the fighting capacity and endurance -of the Japanese soldier, had been tested in the war with China, and in -the course of the eight years that had since elapsed the Government had -spared no effort to bring it to the level of European standards. Though -Japanese statesmen, conscious of Russia’s strength, might share the -apprehensions felt abroad as to the issue of the struggle, they derived -encouragement from the whole-hearted support given to the Government by -the people. All classes realized that the stake at issue for Russia was -very different from what it was for Japan. The former was fighting to -acquire fresh territory; the latter was fighting for her life. Under -these circumstances a warlike nation, fighting at its own doors, might -conceivably accomplish great things against a foe whose heart was not in -the struggle. The spirit which animated her people and her army was one -of the factors in Japan’s success. - -No time was lost by the Japanese in the conduct of military -operations. On the 8th February a Japanese squadron, escorting -transports, arrived off Chemulpo, where two Russian vessels were lying -at anchor unprepared for hostilities. Given the choice of being -attacked in the harbour or fighting outside, the Russian commander -chose the latter alternative. His two vessels were no match for the -squadron they encountered. Driven back into port badly damaged, one -was sunk and the other blown up by its crew. The same night Admiral -Tōgō, the Japanese naval Commander-in-Chief, delivered a torpedo -attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. In this action two Russian -battleships and a cruiser sustained severe damage. On the following -day the Japanese troops (some four battalions) which had arrived under -naval escort at Chemulpo landed, and occupied the Korean capital. The -first actions of the war thus resulted in favour of Japan. - -At this early stage it became apparent that Russia’s superiority at sea -was greatly nullified by the faulty disposition of her squadrons. While -her main fleet in Far Eastern waters was stationed at Port Arthur, a -powerful squadron remained isolated at Vladivostok. A large portion of -her navy, moreover, was kept at home, whence it only emerged late in the -war to be destroyed in the battle of Tsushima. Two other obstacles the -Russian commanders had to contend with: the ice-bound condition of -Vladivostok for several months in the year, and the almost -insurmountable difficulty of repairing vessels owing to the absence of -adequate dockyard facilities. In all these respects Japan had an -advantage. Her harbours were free from ice. She was well provided with -naval arsenals, and with dockyards for the repair of her ships. On the -outbreak of war, too, her fleet was at once concentrated at Sasébo, the -naval arsenal near Nagasaki, a detached squadron being posted in the -Korean straits, whence it could watch Vladivostok. From the first, -therefore, the Russian naval forces in the Far East were separated, nor -throughout the war were they ever able to effect a junction. Moreover, -whereas the Russian home fleet took no part in the war until it was -drawing to a close, the Japanese navy early in the struggle received a -welcome reinforcement in the shape of two new battleships acquired in -Europe from a neutral Power. - -In the naval operations which ensued at Port Arthur the Japanese, -besides resorting to vigorous bombardments, delivered repeated torpedo -attacks, and attempted on several occasions to seal up the harbour by -sinking vessels at the entrance. Neither of these courses was attended -with the success hoped for; nor had they the effect of inducing the -Russian fleet to come out and fight. Greater success resulted from the -laying of mines in front of Port Arthur. In April the Russian flagship -_Petropavlosk_ struck one of these mines and was blown up, the new -Russian admiral, Makharoff, who had just taken over command of the -fleet, being killed in the explosion. Another battleship was at the same -time seriously damaged. A little later the Japanese also laid mines at -the entrance of Vladivostok, thus restricting the movements of the -Russian squadron at that port, which had previously shown mischievous -activity in attacks on Japanese transports. When the Russians, copying -the methods of the enemy, took to laying mines themselves, the results -were disastrous for the Japanese, two of their best battleships and a -despatchboat being destroyed by this means in the month of May. These -losses were, however, so carefully concealed that the Russians knew -nothing of their occurrence till it was too late to take advantage of -them. - -The excessive caution displayed by the Russian naval commanders in the -opening stages of the war was no effective answer to the bold tactics of -their opponents. The inaction of the main fleet at Port Arthur, its -refusal for several months to accept the risks of a general engagement, -gave the Japanese navy thus early in the struggle a moral superiority -that was never lost. Furthermore, it enabled Japan to gain practically -the command of the sea, so essential to the prosecution of military -operations on the mainland. - -The Japanese operations on land began with the disembarkation of the 1st -Army of three divisions under General Kuroki at the mouth of the Ta-tong -river and the occupation of the important town of Ping-yang, where the -Chinese army had made its first stand in the war of 1894–5. The few -Russian troops in the neighbourhood fell back on the Yalu river, the -boundary at this point between Korea and China. Here in a strong -position on the Chinese side of that river, and at its junction with a -tributary stream, the Ai-ho, a Russian army of some 20,000 men under -General Zasulich awaited attack. This was delivered by the Japanese -after some preliminary skirmishing on the 30th April, and resulted in -the defeat of the Russians with the loss of over twenty guns, their -casualties being far greater than those of the victors. A few days later -the 2nd Japanese army under General Oku landed at Pitzuwo, a place on -the east coast of the Liaotung peninsula some sixty miles from Port -Arthur, and cut the railway line connecting that fortress with -Liao-yang, the town chosen by General Kuropatkin, the Russian -Commander-in-Chief, for the concentration of his forces. The -disembarkation of this army was covered by the Japanese fleet, which had -made the Elliot islands its advanced base. In the middle of May another -Japanese force, which afterwards formed part of the 4th Army led by -General Nodzu, landed at Takushan, midway between Pitzuwo and the mouth -of the Yalu. At the end of that month the 2nd Army, after a severe -struggle, defeated a Russian force entrenched in a formidable position -at Nanshan, on the isthmus of Chinchou, which connects the two -peninsulas of Liaotung and Kawn-tung. The position captured was of -importance, as guarding the approaches to Port Arthur. On this occasion -the Japanese took many siege guns, but their casualties were much -heavier than those of the Russians. The landing of Oku’s army was -followed early in June by that of the 3rd Army under General Nogi, to -whom was assigned the rôle of besieging Port Arthur. Soon afterwards the -repulse by General Oku of a Russian force sent to relieve the fortress -enabled the 3rd Army to begin the execution of its task. Meanwhile -further Japanese reinforcements had reached Takushan, and in July -General Nodzu arrived and took command of the 4th Army, the formation of -which was by this time complete. This, and the 1st Army under Kuroki, -then moved westwards on parallel lines through the mountain passes of -Southern Manchuria, driving before them the Russian forces which they -encountered; while General Oku with the 2nd Army moving from the -south-west struck northwards, the objective in each case being -Liao-yang, where General Kuropatkin had established his headquarters. At -this stage the campaign in Manchuria divided itself into two distinct -and independent operations: the advance north and west of the three -Japanese armies under Generals Oku, Kuroki and Nodzu in a converging -movement towards Liao-yang; and the investment of Port Arthur by the 3rd -Army under General Nogi. - -As the result of the converging movement of the northern armies, in the -course of which the treaty port of Newchwang was occupied, their total -length of front had in the beginning of August been reduced from 150 to -45 miles. This success was not gained without severe fighting at -different points, in which, however, the Japanese losses compared, on -the whole, favourably with those of the enemy. On the 10th of the same -month the Russian fleet at Port Arthur made its first and only sortie in -full strength, its object being to join forces with the squadron at -Vladivostok. The attempt failed. In the general engagement that ensued -four Russian ships succeeded in running the gauntlet of the Japanese -fleet and reaching neutral ports, but the other vessels were driven back -into harbour severely damaged. Of those which escaped, three were -interned at the ports where they arrived; while the fourth, the _Novik_, -which had put into Kiaochow, was subsequently intercepted and sunk on -her way to Vladivostok. A similar sortie made about the same time by the -Vladivostok squadron was equally unsuccessful. These two engagements put -an end to the activity of the Russian naval forces in the Far East. - -The battle of Liao-yang, the first big battle of the war, was fought -under the immediate direction of Marshal Ōyama, the Japanese -Commander-in-Chief, who had accompanied the 2nd Army on its march north. -There was little disparity in point of numbers between the forces -engaged on each side, but the Russians had an advantage in cavalry over -the Japanese, and were also much stronger in artillery. Beginning on the -23rd of August, it lasted until the morning of the 3rd September, when -Kuropatkin gave orders for the retirement of the whole army towards -Mukden. The losses on each side were about equal, a fact which, -considering the strength of the Russian position, was very creditable to -the Japanese. In the beginning of October the second big battle, that of -the Shaho, so called from the name of a river in the vicinity, took -place. On this occasion it was Kuropatkin who took the offensive. Again -the Japanese were successful, the Russians being driven back with twice -the loss sustained by their opponents. - -On the 2nd January Port Arthur fell. After the investment of the -fortress had become complete, three successive general assaults made in -August, October and November had failed. Eventually, on the 5th of -December, the Japanese succeeded in storming the position known as 203 -Metre Hill, which commanded the remaining defences, as well as the -harbour in which was contained what was left of the Russian main fleet. -A month later the commander of the fortress, General Stoessel, -surrendered. The siege had cost the Japanese between thirty and forty -thousand casualties, but the prize was well worth this cost. The Russian -main fleet had ceased to exist, and Nogi’s troops were free to march -north to reinforce the Japanese armies threatening Mukden. During the -short interval separating the fall of Port Arthur from the final battle -of the war Kuropatkin again assumed the offensive. But the attack was -not pushed vigorously, and after a few days of fighting the Russians at -the end of January retired, having sustained heavy losses. It was now -midwinter, but, in spite of the intense cold, the Japanese -Commander-in-Chief decided to continue his advance on Mukden. In this -decision he was influenced by the successful working of the single line -of railway by which the communications of the Russian armies were -maintained. The utility of this line had exceeded all expectations. By -this means constant reinforcements were reaching Kuropatkin. Delay until -spring, moreover, would help the Russians in several ways: it would give -time for the arrival of fresh troops; it would enable them to strengthen -their entrenchments at Mukden; and the break-up of winter would render -military operations difficult. A further consideration, which doubtless -had some weight in the resolution formed by Ōyama, lay in the fact that -his armies would shortly be strengthened by the addition of Nogi’s -troops from Port Arthur. - -The battle of Mukden resolved itself into a series of engagements -lasting from the last day of February until the 16th of March, when -Kuropatkin, acknowledging defeat, retreated up the railway to Tiehling -with an estimated loss of 140,000 men and a vast quantity of war -material. The Japanese losses were well under 50,000 killed and wounded. - -The final episode of the war took place at sea some two months later. -The fierce assaults delivered by the Japanese army besieging Port Arthur -in the previous autumn had been hastened by the news that the Russian -Baltic fleet was on its way to the Far East, having sailed on the 15th -October, 1904. Delayed by coaling difficulties and the necessity of -maintaining a uniform rate of progress, this fleet did not reach -Japanese waters until May, 1905. On the 27th of that month it was met in -the Tsushima straits by a Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō and -completely defeated, only two vessels escaping to tell the tale of -disaster. - -The exhaustion of both combatants in the long and arduous struggle -prepared the way for the termination of hostilities. Though she had been -successful on land as well as at sea, the military reserves at the -disposal of Japan were seriously depleted, and the people were tired of -war. Russia, on the other hand, though free from anxiety on this score, -was beset by internal difficulties of a kind which threatened grave -trouble were the war to be prolonged. In these circumstances the -overtures set on foot in the following June by President Roosevelt, -acting of his own accord as peacemaker, were welcomed by both Powers. -The negotiations, conducted at Portsmouth in the United States, resulted -in the conclusion of peace on the 5th day of September, 1905. By the -Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia acknowledged the preponderating interests -of Japan in Korea, ceded to Japan the southern half of Saghalien, which -the latter had exchanged in 1875 for the Kurile islands, and transferred -to her the larger and more valuable portion of the rights in Manchuria -acquired from China in connection with the lease of Port Arthur in 1898. -No war indemnity, however, was paid by Russia, though she undertook to -reimburse Japan for the cost of maintenance of the large number of -Russian prisoners taken during the war. The absence of any provision for -an indemnity caused considerable dissatisfaction in Japan, some slight -disturbances occurring in the Capital. Japan had, indeed, no reason to -be dissatisfied with the results of her success in the war, for it -placed her at once in the position of a first-class Power in the Far -East. - -The conclusion of peace was followed by the signature in the Korean -capital on the 17th of November of a Convention establishing a Japanese -protectorate over Korea. The formal consent of China to the provisions -of the Treaty of Portsmouth, ceding to Japan the lease of Port Arthur, -and transferring to her the southern portion of the Manchurian Railway, -was also obtained by a Treaty between China and Japan, which was signed -in Peking on the 22nd of December. And in the following June a Japanese -Imperial Ordinance was issued establishing the South Manchurian Railway -Company, by which, thenceforth, the administration of the line, and of -the strip of territory through which it passed, was conducted. - - - - - CHAPTER XXVII - Weakening of Cordiality with America—Causes of Friction—Expansion and - Emigration—Annexation of Korea—New Treaties. - - -Attention has already been called to the very friendly relations -existing for many years between Japan and the United States, relations -so cordial as to be responsible for the distinction made between the -British and American nations by the Japanese Press, which spoke of the -former as “Our Allies,” and of the latter as “Our best friends.” The -reasons for the friendly feeling of the Japanese people for America are -not far to seek. It was from America that the first ideas of Western -civilization came; it was her influence which was most felt in the -earlier years of reopened intercourse with foreign nations; and her -policy of diplomatic independence and isolation, illustrated strikingly -by her behaviour in the crucial question of Treaty Revision, gave to her -dealings with Japan an air of disinterested benevolence that contrasted -favourably with the less complaisant attitude of other Powers. - -The cordiality of American feeling towards Japan had of late years -diminished in some degree owing to various causes. Amongst them were the -unexpected disclosure of Japan’s military strength in the war with -China; her apparent willingness to associate herself with other Powers -in the aggressive policy in regard to China, which was one of the causes -of the Boxer Rising, and drew forth the remonstrances addressed by the -United States to the Governments concerned; her territorial expansion in -Manchuria at the expense of Russia; and the protectorate she had assumed -in Korea, which the United States Government had been inclined to regard -in the light of a protégé. The Japanese people were seemingly -unconscious of any change in the attitude of the American public; and no -serious differences had occurred to disturb the harmony of relations. In -1906, however, what is known as the School Question of California gave -rise to a troublesome controversy. - -In the autumn of that year the San Francisco Board of Education issued -an order excluding Japanese children from the ordinary public schools -which they had hitherto attended, and providing for their segregation in -the common Asiatic school established in 1872 in the Chinese quarter in -pursuance of a State Law setting up separate schools for children of -Mongolian or Chinese descent. The law had been enacted in consequence of -the great increase of Chinese immigration. Welcomed at first owing to -the demand for labour on the Pacific coast, this influx of Chinese was -attended by obvious drawbacks, both social and moral, which were -regarded by the people of California as detrimental to the interests of -the community. In considerations of this kind Labour Unions in the State -found their opportunity, and an agitation was fomented against “Chinese -cheap labour,” with the result that steps were taken by the United -States Government to reduce this immigration to comparatively small -proportions. - -Behind the question raised by the school authorities of San -Francisco—which was a mere pretext—the same forces were at work. The -segregation of Japanese school children produced serious resentment in -Japan, the ill-feeling evoked thereby being aggravated by -misunderstanding on the part of the public in both countries and by -intemperate writing in the Press. The incident, which led to some -diplomatic correspondence between the Governments concerned, was -eventually closed through the intervention of President Roosevelt -early in 1907. Apart from its international aspect, the difficulty had -involved the troublesome issue of Federal and State rights. By a -compromise arrived at between the President and the School Board it -was agreed that all alien children—no mention being made of -Japanese—above a certain age who, after examination, should be found -to be deficient in the elements of English, might be sent to special -schools; the President, at the same time, undertaking to secure some -limitation of Japanese immigration. In accordance with this -undertaking a clause, providing for the exclusion of certain classes -of immigrants, was inserted in the Immigration Act of February, 1907, -the right to legislate in such matters having been expressly reserved -by the United States in the revised Treaty with Japan of 1894. Further -negotiations between the two countries resulted in the conclusion in -1908 of what is known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement”—effected by an -exchange of confidential Notes—by which the Japanese Government -consented to co-operate in carrying out the purpose of the Act by -taking measures to restrict labour immigration from Japan to the -United States. When, therefore, in 1911 a new Treaty of commerce and -navigation between America and Japan was negotiated at Washington -there was good reason to regard it as putting an end to the -controversy. The United States Senate in ratifying it recorded the -understanding “that the Treaty should not be deemed to repeal or -affect any of the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1907”; and the -understanding was confirmed by a Declaration—appended to the -Treaty—stating the intention of the Japanese Government to maintain -with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which it had -exercised for the past three years in regulating the emigration of -labourers to the United States. - -The hope that nothing more would be heard of the difficulty was -frustrated by the action of the Californian Legislature. In May, 1913, -in spite of the opposition of the Federal Authorities, it passed a law -giving the right of owning land only to “aliens eligible to -citizenship.” The passing of this law caused renewed resentment in -Japan, where, notwithstanding the form in which it was worded, it was -correctly interpreted as being aimed at Japanese residents. The Japanese -Government at once protested on the ground that Japanese subjects being -debarred from naturalization in America the law in question -discriminated unfairly against them, and was in effect a violation of -Japan’s treaty rights. This view the American Government declined to -accept, supporting the action of the State by the argument that every -nation had the right to determine such questions for itself. The -correspondence between the two Governments continued for some time -without any settlement being reached. It was published at the request of -Japan in 1914. This discrimination between the Japanese and other -aliens, who, unlike them, are eligible for naturalization as American -citizens, remains a sore point with the Japanese people, and is a -stumbling-block in the relations between Japan and America. - -Opposition to Japanese labour immigration was not confined to the United -States. Similar anti-Japanese feeling arose in Canada. In consequence of -the outbreak of disturbances due to this cause a Canadian Mission was -sent to Japan in November, 1907, for the purpose of restricting this -emigration within what were described as proper limits, and thus -averting any renewal of the trouble that had occurred. The object of the -mission was attained by an exchange of Notes between the head of the -mission, Mr. Lemieux, and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. By -the arrangement arrived at—which may have facilitated that concluded, as -we have seen, in the following year between America and Japan—the -Japanese Government undertook to adopt effective measures for -restricting this immigration. - -Of late years there has been a tendency, both in the Press and in books -about Japan, to associate closely two things which are not necessarily -connected—Japanese expansion and emigration. For instance, the author of -_Contemporary Politics of the Far East_, speaking of Japanese emigration -to the United States, observes that “Japan required room for her excess -[_sic_] population, and outlets for her expanding commerce,” thus -linking the two questions together. And other writers have used similar -language. The tendency referred to is probably due to the fact that, -different as the two things are—one being simply a movement of -population, the other an enlargement of territory—there has in some -countries been a direct connection between them. In Japan this is not -the case. There, both movements have taken place, but they have remained -distinct and separate. - -Japanese expansion stands in a category by itself. It has attracted -attention for the reason that it was unexpected, the tendency of -Oriental countries in modern times being to contract rather than extend -their frontiers; from its rapidity and wide extent; and also because it -has been the result either of successful wars or of a policy of -aggrandisement justified, in Japanese opinion, by State necessity. - -Far otherwise is it with Japanese emigration. What importance it -possesses is derived not from the scale on which it has hitherto been -conducted—which by comparison with other movements of the kind elsewhere -is insignificant—but from the international difficulties it has -produced, from its association in people’s minds with national -expansion, and from fear of the dimensions it may assume in the future. -Into the many considerations involved in Japanese emigration it is -unnecessary to enter, the question being too wide to be discussed with -advantage within the limits of these pages. A few remarks on the subject -may, however, not be out of place. - -The movement is usually held to be due to an excess of population. This, -at least, is the view held by many writers. The increase of population -in Japan has certainly been rapid. In 1872 the population was -thirty-three millions. In 1916 it had risen to nearly fifty-six -millions. Assuming the rate of increase to be maintained, the total -population ten years hence should be well over sixty millions. In the -course of sixty years, therefore, the population will have very nearly -doubled itself. Striking as these figures are, the inference to be drawn -from them is not necessarily that Japan is no longer able to support her -people in their present numbers, and that some further outlet for her -surplus population is, therefore, a necessity. While the rapid increase -of population in a country may serve as a stimulus to emigration, it is -not the sole or even the governing factor in the question. That other -influences count for much is shown by what has taken place in Germany. -Fifty years ago German statesmen had good ground for anxiety in the -growing statistics of German emigration to the United States. Before the -end of the century the movement was arrested, and soon afterwards ceased -altogether. The two chief causes of this change were the increase of -wealth and industrial development. Japanese emigration to certain -countries may before long, for the same reasons, show a similar decline. -The industrial development of Japan has kept pace with her progress in -other respects. Her financial position has also changed. Instead of -being a debtor to the world, as she was before the Great War, she has -now become to an appreciable extent its creditor. Although, moreover, -parts of Japan may be overcrowded, there still remain large areas in the -northern islands, and in her newly acquired territories on the mainland, -which are still sparsely populated. The pressure of increasing -population alone does not seem likely to affect emigration in any marked -degree in the near future. A cause more powerful, and in its operation -more constant, may be found in the natural energy and enterprise of the -people, stimulated, perhaps, by their release from the enforced -isolation of the past. This supposition is supported by the wide -distribution of Japanese emigration, and by the varied nature of the -pursuits in which Japanese emigrants engage abroad. Though, as has -already been observed, the Japanese have not, as yet, disclosed any -special aptitude for colonization of the pioneering type, they are to be -met with to-day in South America and elsewhere as workers on the land, -and traders; in Australasia as pearl-fishers; in China, the Straits -Settlements and Java, as well as in India and Australia, as traders and -shopkeepers; in Manchuria as agricultural labourers and farmers, the -Korean immigrants there having since the annexation of Korea become -Japanese subjects; on the coasts of the northern and southern Pacific as -fishermen; in America and Canada as traders, farmers, shopkeepers, -market-gardeners and labourers; and in the Malay States as planters. - -In its inception, it may be added, Japanese emigration took the form of -indentured labour. The first labour emigrants went to Hawaii—not then -annexed to America—under conditions regulated by the Japanese and -Hawaiian Governments; and it was the surreptitious entry of many of -these labourers into California from Hawaii that first aroused American -hostility. The development of this branch of emigration—encouraged by -agencies established for the purpose, but still subject, as before, to a -certain measure of official supervision—would seem to be a mere question -of supply and demand. The future of other emigration will depend on the -degree of opposition, or competition, it encounters. So far, however, as -the United States and Canada are concerned, the hostility it has evoked, -and the willingness of the Japanese Government to co-operate in its -restriction, suggest that the number of emigrants to those countries -will gradually decline. - - -The immediate results of Japan’s success in the Russo-Japanese war were, -as we have seen, the establishment of a protectorate over Korea and the -negotiation of a Treaty with China, confirming certain provisions of the -Treaty of Portsmouth concerning the transfer to her of the Russian lease -of Port Arthur and of the southern portion of the Manchurian railway. -Anxious to devote herself to the task of consolidating her new position -in the Far East, Japan during the next few years was as busily engaged -in negotiating treaties and agreements with other Powers as she had been -in the fifteen years of treaty-making which followed the signature of -Perry’s Treaty. In 1907 she concluded an arrangement for safeguarding -peace in the Far East with France; a similar Agreement with Russia (in -the form of a Convention), which, however, included a mutual pledge to -respect the territorial integrity and the rights of each accruing from -arrangements in force between it and China; a Commercial Treaty, a -Fisheries Treaty and a Consular Protocol with the same country; an -Agreement with China regarding the Simmintun, Mukden and Kirin Railway; -and a fresh Treaty with Korea, which placed all administrative authority -in the peninsula in the hands of the Japanese Resident-General. The -following year witnessed the negotiation of an Arbitration Treaty with -the United States, as well as an exchange of Notes between the same two -Governments for the declared purpose of preserving the independence and -territorial integrity of China. Two other arrangements testified to her -treaty-making activity. One of these was another railway Agreement, made -in 1907, with China. On this occasion the railway in question was the -line now connecting Mukden with the port of Antung. It was presumably -this fresh railway Agreement which induced the American Government to -submit to other Powers interested in the Far East in the autumn of the -same year a proposal for the neutralization of Manchurian railways. Far -from being accepted by Russia and Japan—the two Powers chiefly -concerned—the proposal only resulted in the conclusion in the following -year of an Agreement by which each undertook to maintain, by joint -action, if necessary, the existing _status quo_ in Manchuria. - -The other, of a very different character, was a Treaty with Korea -annexing that country to Japan, which was signed at Seoul in August, -1910, by the Japanese Resident-General and the Korean Minister-Resident. -The annexation of a country by Treaty in the absence of prior -hostilities was an unusual procedure for which no precedent existed. No -less remarkable than the method adopted was the fact that Article 8 of -the instrument recorded with unconscious irony the consent of the -Sovereign of the annexed State to the loss of its independence. This -independence Japan had on several occasions announced her intention to -respect in engagements entered into with other Powers—with China, with -Russia and with Great Britain, as well as with Korea herself. Her -annexation of Korea, being for this reason unexpected, met with much -unfavourable criticism abroad. The course, however, that she had adopted -at the outset of her wars with China and Russia of making free use of -Korean territory showed that she was not disposed to let the wishes, or -convenience, of the Korean people stand in the way of military -operations. The protectorate she had already established over Korea in -1905, and her assumption of the control of administration in that -country two years later, were also ominous indications of what might -happen later. Some justification of the final act of annexation, -singular as the method employed may have been, is to be found in the -fact that the chronic disturbances in Korea, for which Japan was by no -means solely responsible, had led to two wars, and that there was some -blunt truth in the statement in the preamble to the Treaty, which -declared one of the objects of annexation to be the preservation of -peace in the Far East. It may even be said that an unprejudiced observer -of the condition of affairs in Korea in the years previous to the -establishment of the protectorate would have no hesitation in holding -the view that Japanese administration of that country is preferable, -even in the interests of the Koreans themselves, to the shocking -misgovernment of the past. - -The signature of the Treaty of Annexation was accompanied by a -Declaration on the part of the Japanese Government announcing certain -arrangements designed to lessen any irritation which the abrupt and -arbitrary annulment of Korea’s treaties with other countries might -occasion. These concessions to foreign feeling included matters relating -to jurisdiction, Customs, tonnage duties and the coasting trade. Four -years later the foreign settlements in Korea were abolished with the -consent of the Powers concerned. - -Her Revised Treaties with foreign Powers, which came into operation in -1899 for a term of twelve years, gave Japan the right to denounce them -at the end of that period—in other words, to announce her intention to -terminate them by giving the twelve months’ notice required. This notice -was given by Japan to all the Treaty Powers in July, 1910. The liberty -to conclude new treaties when the term of notice expired involved a -point of essential importance, the recovery of tariff autonomy—the -right, that is to say, to control her own tariff. Negotiations for the -conclusion of new treaties were at once set on foot, the first to be -concluded being that with the United States, which was signed in -February of the following year; the second, the Treaty with Great -Britain, which followed a few months later. The new treaties came into -force in July of the same year, the period of operation being twelve -years. The first public recognition of the increasing importance of -Japan in the Far East occurred, as we have seen, when she was included -in the list of Powers consulted by the American Government in 1899 in -regard to the observance of the principle of the “open door” and “equal -opportunity” in China. By her success in the Russo-Japanese war six -years later she established her claim to be regarded as a leading Power -in the Far East. Her position, nevertheless, was inferior in one respect -to that of the Western States, for she had not the entire control of her -tariff. With the conclusion of the new treaties, by which this last -disability was removed, she took rank on a footing of complete equality -with the great Powers of the world. - - - - - CHAPTER XXVIII - Rise of Japan and Germany Compared—Renewal of Anglo-Japanese -Alliance—Japan and the Great War—Military and Naval Expansion—Japan and - China—The Twenty-one Demands—Agreement with Russia regarding - China—Lansing-Ishii Agreement—Effects of Great War on Situation in Far - East. - - -The rise of Japan finds a parallel in that of Germany. There are, -indeed, in the circumstances attending the development of the two -countries not a few points of resemblance. In each case the direct cause -was military success, and in each the long existence of feudalism had -the effect of rendering a naturally warlike people submissive to the -will of its rulers and responsive to the teaching of tradition. In each -loyalty to the Throne was accompanied by an exaggerated form of -patriotism, which needed only opportunity to become aggressive. In each, -again, autocratic instincts, the centralization of authority, and the -pressure of a powerful bureaucracy, combined to exalt the State at the -expense of the individual. And though the personal rule of the -Sovereign, so conspicuous in German history, was lacking in Japan, its -absence was more than compensated for by the popular belief in the -divine descent of the monarch. - -Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Germany should have -been chosen as the model for so many of the new institutions established -in the course of the Meiji era, or that the modern Japan which -ultimately took shape should in many of its characteristics come to bear -a still closer resemblance to the country whence so much had been -borrowed. A nation that in the process of its evolution draws upon -others so freely as Japan has done inevitably imbibes ideas which affect -its whole outlook on the world. What happened in early days, when Japan -adopted the written language, ethics, and administrative system of -China, occurred again, though in a lesser degree, when she became the -pupil of Germany in matters relating to administration, law and military -science. Thus the Constitution itself, framed, as we have seen, on a -German model, reserved all real power in important matters of State to -the Crown; while the adoption of the German system of military -organization and training increased the influence of the army and -encouraged the growth of militarism. - -Describing the position acquired by Germany at the time when William II -succeeded to the Throne as King of Prussia and German Emperor, Mr. S. J. -Hill, at one time U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, in his _Impressions of the -Kaiser_, says: “The unity of the German States was secure ... and the -work of Bismarck was complete. That the Empire was an achievement of -superior military force on the part of Prussia, and in no sense a -creation of the German people, was universally understood.” His -statement is confirmed by an article which appeared in August, 1918, in -a German newspaper, the _Arbeiter Zeitung_. “It is,” it says, “to the -Monarchy, the Junkerdom and the Army that the German _bourgeoisie_ owes -the establishment of the new Empire, which was followed by so tremendous -a development of economic strength, wealth and power.” - -Japan at the moment of which we are speaking had, in like manner, -achieved a unity of a kind unknown before. In the realization of her -ambition to become a great Power she had triumphantly overcome all the -difficulties inherent in the process of transition from conditions -imposed by centuries of isolation to the new circumstances of a modern -State. The work of the group of statesmen successively engaged in the -task of reconstruction was, like that of Bismarck, complete. And it was -generally acknowledged that all that had been accomplished had been done -by the Government, and not by the Japanese people. - -The Government clothed with this prestige was still a Government of two -clans, which had gained their predominance by military strength, and -retained it for the same reason; the portfolios of War and the Navy, -and, with these, the control of the forces of the State, having become, -so to speak, a monopoly of Satsuma and Chōshiū clansmen, who, as heads -of these departments, were virtually independent of the Ministry of the -day. The results of the dominating influence of the two clans in the -administration, and the supremacy of German ideas in the army, had -already shown themselves in the growth of a strong military party; in a -cry for national expansion beyond existing frontiers, which seemed to -have less reason behind it than the Pan-Slavist and Pan-German racial -aspirations in Europe; in the development of the simple feudal maxims of -_Bushidō_ into what came near to being a national creed; and in the -increase of Chauvinistic writing in a section of the Press. Under these -circumstances it was not surprising if from this time forward a louder -note should be heard in diplomatic utterances, and a more aggressive -tone appear in foreign policy. - -This change of attitude in matters of foreign policy may be traced in -the successive alterations that took place in the terms of the -Anglo-Japanese alliance. The original Agreement of 1902 related only to -China and Korea, the contracting parties recognizing the independence of -both States and declaring themselves “to be entirely uninfluenced by any -aggressive tendencies in either country.” When the Agreement was renewed -in August, 1905, its application was extended so as to include Eastern -Asia and India. No more is heard of the independence of Korea, but -Japan’s paramount rights in that country are recognized, subject only to -the maintenance of the principle of “equal opportunity,” this -recognition being followed three months later by the establishment of a -Japanese protectorate. In the Agreement when renewed again in 1911 all -reference to Korea disappears, that country having the year before been -annexed to Japan. - -Nor was this change of attitude due entirely to a consciousness of new -power and increased prestige. In copying other countries as closely as -was done the process of imitation had been carried so far as to extend -to the adoption of principles which were not regarded with unqualified -approval even in the countries where they originated. An instance in -point is the enforcement by the Japanese Government in China of -extra-territoriality, against which, when applied to Japan by Western -Governments, it had constantly protested on the ground that the -principle was incompatible with the sovereignty of a State. - -The action of Japan on the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, at -once dispelled all doubt which may have existed as to her participation -in it. It also showed that she had no intention of playing a purely -passive rôle. Within a fortnight after the commencement of hostilities -between Great Britain and Germany the Japanese Government presented an -ultimatum to the latter Power demanding the immediate withdrawal from -Japanese and Chinese waters of all German vessels of war, and the -evacuation by a given date of the leased territory of Kiaochow, with a -view to its eventual restoration to China. The ultimatum was followed a -week later by a declaration of war. It has been suggested that this -swift action frustrated a design on the part of Germany to remove the -leased territory from the field of hostilities by handing it back to -China for the period of the war. Both in the ultimatum and in the -declaration of war reference was made to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, -which had been renewed in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese war, and again -in 1911, when an Arbitration Treaty was in process of negotiation -between Great Britain and the United States. This marked allusion to the -alliance pointed to the conclusion that Japan’s entry into the war was -in pursuance of a special understanding between the Governments -concerned. It was, however, no secret that the acquisition of Kiaochow -by Germany had been as displeasing to Japan as the Russian occupation of -Port Arthur, nor was it unreasonable to suppose that she would welcome -the first occasion that might come to get rid of the obnoxious intruder. -The opportunity furnished by her entry into the war was promptly seized. -A strong expeditionary force, which included a contingent of British -troops, was organized, and by the first week of November the German flag -had ceased to float at Kiaochow. The Japanese occupation in the previous -month of the Caroline, Marshall and Marianne, or Ladrone, groups of -islands contributed to the elimination of Germany from the Pacific. - -The war that gave Japan the excuse she needed to destroy the German -foothold in China presented her with other opportunities of -strengthening her position in the Far East. The magnitude of the -military operations in Europe absorbed all the energies of the -belligerent States which had interests in Eastern Asia. They were unable -to devote much attention to Far Eastern affairs. Japan thus acquired a -liberty of action which under other circumstances might possibly have -been denied to her. - -In an article contributed in 1914 to the November number of the _Shin -Nippon_, or “New Japan,” a magazine published in Tōkiō, Marquis Ōkuma, -who was then Premier, pointed out that the tendency of the times was -such as to justify the assumption that in the distant future a few -strong nations would govern the rest of the world, and that Japan must -prepare herself to become one of these governing nations. And when -addressing the Diet in the following month he stated, in explanation of -the programme of naval and military expansion submitted to Parliament, -that in order to make Japanese diplomatic dealings more effective an -increase of force was needed. The lengths to which the Japanese -Government was prepared to go in order to render its diplomacy more -effective were disclosed when in January, 1915, the Japanese Minister in -Peking presented directly to the President of the Chinese Republic the -well-known twenty-one Demands. - -Divided into several groups, the Demands in the first four included the -assent of China to whatever might afterwards be agreed upon between -Japan and Germany in regard to the German leased territory in Shantung -taken by the Japanese in the previous November; the non-alienation by -China to a third Power of any territory in that province or any island -along its coast; concessions for railway construction, and the opening -of further places for foreign trade in the same province; the extension -from twenty-five to ninety-nine years—the term of the German lease of -Kiaochow—of the terms of the former Russian leases of Port Arthur, Dalny -and the South Manchurian Railway, and of the subsequent Japanese lease -of the Antun-Mukden Railway; the control and management of the -Kirin-Changchun Railway, when completed, to be granted to Japan for the -same term of ninety-nine years; the grant of mining rights to Japan in -South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; the consent of Japan to be -obtained prior to permission being given to other foreigners to build -railways, or make loans for railway construction in the territories in -question, or prior to the pledging of local taxes in those territories -as security for loans made to China by a third Power; Japan to be -consulted before the employment by China in the same territories of any -political, financial, or military advisers; concessions giving Japan -practical control over the valuable coal and iron mines near Hankow -belonging to the Hanyeiping Company, which had borrowed money from -Japanese firms; and non-alienation to a third Power of any harbour, bay, -or island on the coast of China. A further fifth group of Demands -included an undertaking on the part of China to employ “influential -Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs”; to -grant to Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of -China the right of owning land—a right still withheld from foreigners in -Japan; to place the police administration of all important places in -China under joint Japanese and Chinese control, or, in lieu of this -concession, to employ a large number of Japanese in the police -departments of those places; to purchase from Japan 50 per cent, or -more, of all munitions of war needed by China, or, in lieu of this -concession, to arrange for the establishment in China of an arsenal -under the joint management of Japanese and Chinese, the material -required to be purchased from Japan; to grant further concessions for -railway construction in the interior of China; to consult Japan before -employing foreign capital for the working of mines, and the construction -of railways, harbours and dockyards in the province of Fuhkien; and to -grant to Japanese subjects the right to propagate religious doctrines in -China. This last point concerned, of course, only Buddhist missionary -propaganda, since the propagation of Shintō doctrine in a foreign -country was obviously impossible. Its inclusion in the list of demands -may seem strange in view of the religious indifference of the Japanese -people. The reasons for it may be found in the desire of the Japanese -Government to overlook no point which might serve to place Japan on a -footing of equality in all respects with Western countries, and its wish -to utilize the services of Buddhist missionaries to obtain information -about matters in the interior of China. - -The startling character of these Demands, no less than the peremptory -manner in which they were made, provoked some public criticism even in -Japan, and led to enquiries from more than one foreign Government. In -the course of the negotiations which ensued at Peking the Chinese raised -objections to several points. Eventually the last-mentioned group of -Demands was withdrawn for the time being, the Japanese Minister for -Foreign Affairs explaining that they were never points on which his -Government had intended to insist. Some modifications, moreover, were -made in the other groups in order to meet Chinese objections. The -Demands thus revised were presented afresh in April, a time limit being -named for their acceptance, and on the 9th May the Chinese Government -yielded to the pressure and signified its consent. The various points on -which the Japanese Government insisted were finally settled on the 25th -May by the conclusion of Treaties, the exchange of Notes and the making -of Declarations, all bearing that date, as suited the convenience of -Japan. - -It is difficult to reconcile the assurances repeatedly given by Japanese -statesmen as to the absence of any aggressive intentions in regard to -China with the policy represented by the Demands above mentioned. Nor is -it possible to deny that the pressure thus put upon China constituted -just such an interference in the internal affairs of a neighbouring -State as the Press of Japan had been the first to denounce. - -The various engagements entered into between Japan and Russia in the -years shortly following the Treaty of Portsmouth, more especially the -Agreement of 1907, to which reference has already been made, were in -themselves signs of a relaxation of the tension created by the -Russo-Japanese war. And when in 1910 the two Powers concluded the -Agreement for maintaining the _status quo_ in Manchuria, which blocked -the Knox proposal for neutralizing all railways in that region, it -became dear that they discerned the mutual advantage to be gained by -working together in the Far East. This common policy, if it may be so -called, was strengthened after the outbreak of the Great War by the -conclusion of a secret Treaty in the summer of 1916, a moment when the -war was not progressing very favourably for the Allies. By this Treaty, -signed in the Russian capital, the contracting parties recognized that -“the vital interests” of both required “the safeguarding of China from -the political domination of any third Power whatsoever having hostile -designs against Russia or Japan.” Whatever hopes may have been -entertained in either country from the closer co-operation in China -established by this Treaty were put an end to by the Russian revolution -in the spring of 1917. It is unnecessary to emphasize the important -bearing on Far Eastern affairs of this event, and of its sequel—the -military collapse of Russia. The mere fact that China was thus freed -from the danger of a combined aggression which she was powerless to -resist speaks for itself. - -In the autumn of the same year, by which time America had been drawn -into the war, Japan, still intent on consolidating her position in the -Far East, entered into negotiations at Washington with the United States -in regard to the policy to be pursued by the two countries in China. The -Japanese negotiator designated as special ambassador for this purpose -was Viscount Ishii, who had recently been Minister for Foreign Affairs, -and had previously visited America in an official capacity. By the -understanding arrived at in November of that year, known as the -Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the United States Government formally -recognized, though without defining them, the special interests of Japan -in China arising out of geographical propinquity—a concession which -tended to extend the liberty of action which Japan had already acquired -as a result of the war. The reason for the conclusion of this Agreement, -as stated in the Notes exchanged on this occasion, “was in order to -silence mischievous reports” that had from time to time been circulated. -Another reason may well have been the wish to clear the ground for -American and Japanese business co-operation in China, which had been -advocated for some time in the Japanese Press, and received some measure -of support from capitalists in both countries. The idea was not welcomed -by the American community in China, and the efforts made in this -direction do not appear to have been attended with any striking success -during the continuance of the war. - -In the military intervention of the Allied and Associated Powers in -Siberia Japan took a prominent part. The course of events in Russia -after the revolution caused uneasiness in Great Britain and France. When -the Bolsheviks gained control of affairs, the German and -Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, who, owing to the disintegration of -the former Russian armies had regained their liberty, and were free to -uphold German ambitions, made common cause with them; and it was felt -that there was danger of these combined forces spreading through Central -and Eastern Siberia. How best to meet this danger, and at the same time -to relieve the Czecho-Slovak troops, composed of ex-prisoners of war, -who had refused to join the Bolsheviks and were retreating along the -Trans-Siberian Railway, was a question which forced itself on the -attention of the Governments concerned. The idea of sending an -expeditionary force for this double purpose was first mooted in the -summer of 1917, but it was not until a year later that an understanding -was effected. In this military intervention six of the Allied and -Associated Powers were represented, Japan, owing to her nearness to the -scene of action, being the first to place troops on the spot. - -Meanwhile, in view of the same danger and for the same objects, the -Japanese and Chinese Governments had some months before (in May, 1918) -concluded a secret military Agreement for Common Defence for the -duration of the war, by which arrangements were made for the -co-operation of Japanese and Chinese troops both in Chinese and Russian -territory. In the following September “detailed stipulations” were -attached to the Agreement. One of these provided that Chinese troops -when operating in Russian territory should be under the control of a -Japanese commander. A similar Naval Agreement was concluded at the same -time. In pursuance of the Military Agreement considerable Japanese and -Chinese forces were mobilized and employed in operations in Chinese -territory and across the Russian border. - -The conspicuous services rendered by the navy of Japan throughout the -war earned the warm appreciation of her allies; the work done in -clearing the seas of predatory enemy craft, convoying troopships from -the British dominions to Europe and combating the submarine menace, -deserving, as indeed it received, the highest praise. If at times there -may have appeared to be a disposition in certain Japanese circles to -anticipate the success of German arms, and if the pro-German sympathies -of a section of the public may have seemed to assert themselves too -loudly, allowance should be made for the large extent to which German -ideas had been utilized in the making of modern Japan, and for the -natural tendency of army officers to believe in the invincibility of the -nation in whose military methods they had been trained. - -The Peace Conference which assembled in Paris in January, 1919, set the -seal on Japanese ambitions. The representatives of Japan took part in -all important deliberations on a footing of recognized equality with -those of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, while, as -one of the Great Powers composing the Supreme Council, Japan has had a -voice in the decisions that have guided the destinies of the world. - - - - - CHAPTER XXIX - The Japanese Family System. - - -More than once in the course of this narrative has reference been made -to the Japanese family system, the influence of which is responsible for -so much that is distinctive in the political and social life of the -people. A short sketch of this system, as it works to-day, may therefore -be not without interest for the reader. - -Prior to July, 1898, when the present Civil Code came into force, -matters concerning family law were governed by local custom, which -varied not only in each province, but often in different districts of -the same province. All such matters are now dealt with in accordance -with the provisions of Books IV and V of this Code, and in accordance -with the complementary Law of Registration, which came into operation in -a revised form on the same date as the Code. The working of the family -system since then has, therefore, been uniform throughout the country. - -Before going further it may be well to explain what is meant by the word -“family” in Japanese law. It denotes something to which we have nothing -analogous. It means a grouping of persons bearing the same surname and -subject to the authority of one who is the head of the family, and who -may or may not be the common parent, or ancestor; and it is in this -sense that the term “member of a family” is used in the Code, and in the -complementary law above mentioned. This family, which may be comprised -in one household, or may embrace several, may be the main branch of the -parent stock, or only a cadet branch. In either case it constitutes what -is known to the law as a family; succession to the headship of it is -regulated by strict provisions; and the person who is its head is -invested with certain well-defined authority. Kinship is not essential -to membership in this family group, for the law provides that a relative -of an adopted person may under certain circumstances become a member of -the family which the latter has entered. - -There is, however, another and larger family group which consists of all -those who stand towards each other in the position of kindred as defined -in Article 725 of the Code. In this latter group, which finds its -embodiment, so to speak, in family councils, lies to a great extent the -key to the real position of the individual in Japan. - -The Japanese family system is thus a combination of relatives into two -groups, and every Japanese, therefore, is to be regarded in two -capacities: first as a member of the smaller family group—the legal -family—and, as such, unless he is head of the family himself, subject to -the authority of its head; and, secondly, as a member of the wider group -of kindred, with whom he is closely connected by rights and duties, and -as such, whatever his position in the family may be, subject in certain -matters to the control of family councils. But the position of a -Japanese in his dual capacity as a member of both the smaller and larger -family groups has little in it of the permanency and stability which are -found in our family life. It is affected not only, as with us, by -marriage and divorce, but is also liable to constant change by -separation from the family through adoption, and its dissolution, -through abdication or other causes mentioned in the Code, and by the -conditional liberty given to a person to change his family allegiance, -so to speak, and transfer himself from the authority of one head of a -family to that of another. The artificial character of both groups is -likewise heightened by the frequency of adoption, which so closely -resembles kinship that no material difference exists between the two. - -In noting briefly the main features of the Japanese family system it -will be convenient to begin with those which have their counterpart in -Roman Law, namely, parental authority, the position of women, the custom -of adoption, and the religious rites of the family. - -PARENTAL AUTHORITY.—It is doubtful if at any time parental authority in -Japan ever approached the rigour of the Roman _patria potestas_, -although in the now obsolete Codes offences were punished more severely -when committed by children against parents than when the reverse was the -case. The doctrine of filial piety, however, which inspired this -discrimination, never in practice excluded the duties of parents to -children. In Japan, moreover, parental authority has always been subject -to two weakening influences—the intervention of family councils, and the -custom of abdication. It now includes both paternal authority, and, in -certain cases, maternal authority, a thing unknown to Roman law. This -authority, never of a joint nature, is exercised over children who are -“members of the family” of the parent in question during their minority, -and even afterwards so long as they do not earn an independent living. -Japanese law speaks of a person as a child, irrespective of age, as long -as either of the parents is alive, and a parent’s right to maintenance -by a son, or daughter, has precedence over the rights in that respect of -the latter’s children and spouse. - -POSITION OF WOMEN.—The legal position of women in Japan before modern -legislative changes is well illustrated by the fact that offences came -under different categories according to their commission by the wife -against the husband, or by the husband against the wife, and by the -curious anomaly that, while the husband stood in the first degree of -relationship to his wife, the latter stood to him only in the second. -The disabilities under which a woman formerly laboured shut her out from -the exercise of almost all rights. The maxim _Mulier est finis familiæ_ -(“The family ends with a woman”) was as true in Japan as in Rome, though -the observance may have been less strict owing to the greater frequency -of adoption. All this has been greatly changed. In no respect has -greater progress been made than in the improvement of the position of -women. Though, like those of her sex in other lands, she still labours -under certain disabilities, a woman can now become the head of a family; -she can inherit and own property, and manage it herself; she can -exercise parental authority; if single or a widow, she can adopt; she -can act as guardian, or curator; and she has a voice in family councils. - -ADOPTION.—The desire to preserve the continuity of a family is usually -the motive of adoption wherever the custom is found; and in countries -like Japan, where ancestor-worship has survived in the practice of -family rites, the anxiety to make due provision for the performance of -these rites has acted as an additional incentive. But nowhere else, -probably, has adoption been conducted on so large a scale, or played so -important a part in the social life of the community that has practised -it. It is not limited, as with us, to the adoption of minors, for the -adoption of adults is as common as that of children. Nor is it confined -to the adoption at any one time of a single individual, the adoption of -a married couple, though somewhat rare, being a recognized custom. Nor -does any character of finality attach to the act, for a person may -adopt, or be adopted, more than once, and adoption may be dissolved or -annulled. - -The elaborate treatment given to the custom in the Civil Code testifies -to its importance in Japanese social life, and at the same time shows -the extent to which the interests of the individual in this respect are -subordinated to those of the family. - -Before leaving the subject it may be well to remind the reader that in -the case of the Imperial Family the custom of adoption was, as already -mentioned, abolished some years ago. - -FAMILY RITES.—The characteristic attitude of mind towards religious -matters, referred to in an earlier chapter, which enables a Japanese -writer to describe his countrymen as being dualist in respect of -religion, is reflected in Japanese family, or household, rites. Before -the introduction of Buddhism in the sixth century each household had its -_kamidana_, or Shintō altar, which is a plain wooden shelf. On this the -cenotaphs of deceased members of the family were placed. The adoption of -Buddhism led to the introduction of a _butsudan_, or Buddhist altar, -which is a miniature shrine of wood, and to this the ancestral cenotaphs -were transferred. But the Shintō altar remained, and served as the -depository of charms from the chief Shintō shrine, the _Daijingū_ of -Isé, as well as of charms from the shrines dedicated to the various -tutelary deities of members of the family, and, in spite of the Shintō -revival that accompanied the Restoration of 1868–9, the two altars, with -their respective uses, have remained unchanged. - -The performance of family rites in the strictest manner is usually -confined to the upper classes and well-to-do farmers. In the worship of -Shintō deities these rites consist of reverential obeisances made every -morning before the Shintō altar, the lighting of a small lamp on it -every evening and the presentation of offerings of rice and _saké_ on -certain days of each month. From time to time also branches of the -_Cleyera japonica_ are laid on the altar. The ancestral rites conducted -before the Buddhist altar differ in some points of detail according to -the professed religion, Shintō or Buddhist, of the family. In each case, -however, the cenotaph of the deceased person, which is a small wooden -tablet bearing the posthumous name or date of death, is placed on, or in -front of, the Buddhist altar. When these cenotaphs become too numerous, -one or two are made to serve for all. Offerings of food are made, and -religious services held on various anniversaries of the death. On these -occasions a feast is also provided. In Buddhist households the Buddhist -altar is never without flowers, while offerings of tea and rice are -made, and incense sticks lighted, every morning. During the annual -“Festival of the Dead,” which is not recognized by the _Shin_, or -_Montō_, sect of Buddhists, more elaborate rites are performed. - -The other features of the family system which remain to be noticed are -the position occupied by the head of a family, succession thereto, -abdication, family councils, marriage and registration. - -HEADSHIP OF FAMILY.—In Japan the parental authority and the authority -exercised by the head of a family are quite distinct, but the two may be -vested in the same individual, who may be a woman. When vested in -different individuals, they represent a sort of _condominium_, as, for -instance, in cases where the consent not only of the parent, but of the -head of the family, is required. - -The head of a family exercises authority over all its members whom the -law recognizes as such. It is not necessary that these should form part -of his or her household, for, as has already been explained, the group -represented by the word family may embrace several households. Nor need -they be relatives, though usually some tie of kinship exists. This -authority includes the right of consent to the marriage and divorce, the -adoption, and the dissolution of adoption, of each member of the family; -the right of determining his or her place of residence; and the right of -expelling such person from the family, and of forbidding his or her -return to it. The head of a family has also the right of succession to -property in default of other heirs. But the headship of a family carries -with it also duties and responsibilities; the duty of supporting -indigent members of it; the duty, under certain circumstances, of -guardianship, and responsibility for the debts of all. - -Save in exceptional cases, succession to the headship of a family is -limited to persons who are “members of the family,” in the legal sense -of the term. These rank according to the degree of relationship. Failing -lineal descendants, an heir may be appointed in other ways defined by -the Code. - -ABDICATION.—What for want of a better word is generally known to -foreigners by the term abdication is the retirement of a person from the -position of head of a family. As women can under the Civil Code become -heads of families, it follows that abdication is no prerogative of the -male sex. - -Japanese scholars who have investigated the subject, notably Professors -Hozumi and Shigéno, agree in tracing the origin of the present custom to -the abdication of sovereigns, instances of which occur at an early -period of Japanese history. These earlier abdications were independent -of religious influences, but with the advent of Buddhism abdication -entered upon a new phase. In imitation, it would seem, of the retirement -of head priests of Buddhist monasteries, abdicating monarchs shaved -their heads and entered the priesthood; and when, later on, the custom -came to be employed for political purposes the cloak of religion was -retained. From the Throne the custom spread to regents and high officers -of State; and so universal had its observance, amongst officials of the -higher ranks, become in the twelfth century that, as Professor Shigéno -states, it was almost the rule for such persons to retire from the world -at the age of forty or fifty, and nominally enter the priesthood, both -the act and the person performing it being termed _niūdō_. In the course -of time the custom of abdication ceased to be confined to officials, and -extended to the feudal nobility, and the military class generally, -whence it spread through the nation. At this stage of its transition its -connection with the phase it finally assumed becomes clear. But with its -extension beyond the circle of official dignitaries, and its consequent -severance from tradition and religious associations, whether real or -nominal, abdication changed its name. It was no longer termed _niūdō_ -(entrance into religion), but _inkio_ (retirement), the old word being -retained only in its strictly religious meaning; and _inkio_ is the term -in use to-day. - -The connection of the custom with religion having long since vanished, -the Japanese of the present day who abdicates is in no way actuated by -the feeling that impelled European monarchs in past time to end their -days in the seclusion of the cloister, and which finds expression in the -phrase “to make one’s soul.” Apart from the influence of traditional -convention, which explains the great hold upon the nation acquired by -the custom, the motive seems to be somewhat akin to that which leads -people in other countries to retire from active life at an age when -bodily infirmity cannot be adduced as the reason. In the one case, -however, it is the business, or profession, the active work of life, -which is relinquished, while in Japan it is the position of head of a -family which is given up, the result being the effacement of the -individual so far as the family is concerned. Moreover, although -abdication usually implies the abandonment of business, this does not -necessarily follow. That in many cases the reason for abdication lies in -the wish to escape from the tyrannical calls of family life, encumbered -as it is with legal duties and responsibilities, as well as tedious -ceremonies, is shown by the fact that the period of a person’s greatest -activity not infrequently dates from the time of his withdrawal from the -headship of the family. - -As in the case of adoption, abdication is now more strictly regulated -than formerly. Women are permitted to abdicate irrespective of age; but -a man is not allowed to abdicate until he has attained sixty years of -age, except under certain conditions imposed by law. - -FAMILY COUNCILS.—Family councils represent, as has already been -explained, the larger of the two groups into which Japanese society may -be regarded as divided. They usurp many of the functions which we are -accustomed to associate with Courts of Law, and, though an appeal may -always be made to the latter from the decision of a council, apart from -the reluctance of most people to take this step, the chances of success -are too remote to favour its frequent adoption. - -Family councils are of two kinds: those convened for the determination -of some particular question; and those which are established for the -purpose of taking charge of the affairs of persons without legal -capacity. The former are dissolved when the question at issue has been -settled; the latter continue until the legal incapacity ceases. The -summoning of a council and the selection of its members rest with a -court of law, but in certain cases the members may be appointed by will. -The functions of family councils cover a wide field, ranging from giving -consent to marriage and adoption to protecting the interests of a minor -in cases where the interests of parent and child conflict. Their -authority in no way diminishes the influence brought to bear upon an -individual by the wide circle of relations from whom they are chosen, -but rather serves to increase it; nor does their existence as a species -of family tribunal preclude the settlement of family matters in an -informal manner without recourse to the elaborate machinery provided by -the law. - -MARRIAGE.—Before the present Civil Code came into operation the question -of marriage was regulated by fragmentary enactments issued from time to -time, which dealt with various points connected with marriage and -divorce, but never with the subject as a whole. Validity of marriage is -quite independent of the marriage ceremony, which is a purely social -function. Marriage is effected simply by registration. Notice is given -to a registrar by both parties and two witnesses who are of age. This -notice may be either verbal or written. When the registrar has satisfied -himself that the marriage is in accordance with the provisions of the -law, the name of the person entering the other’s family is inscribed in -the register of that family and is expunged from the register of the -family to which he, or she, previously belonged. The marriageable age -for men is seventeen years; that for women fifteen. No one who is not -the head of a family can marry without the consent of the head of the -family. In many cases, also, the consent of parents, or of a guardian, -or of a family council, is necessary. Japanese law recognizes two kinds -of divorce: judicial divorce; and divorce by arrangement between the -parties. - -FAMILY REGISTRATION.—If proof were needed that society in Japan centres -round the family, and not the individual, it would be supplied by the -institution known as Family Registration. The subject is too complicated -to justify any detailed reference to it in these pages. It will be -sufficient to mention that in every district a separate register is kept -for each house in which the head of a household is also the head of a -family; those whose names appear therein being regarded as having what -is called their “permanent register” (_honséki_) in the place in -question. Persons who are heads of households, but not of families, are -borne on other family registers. Thus the names entered in a family -register at the time it is prepared under the address of a certain house -are not necessarily those of persons who are members of the particular -household indicated. Nor are they necessarily those of persons who were, -or are, resident in the district. They are simply those of all persons -who, irrespective of their place of residence, are members of the family -of which the occupant of the house in question is the head _at the time -when the family register is prepared_. The family, therefore, and not -the household, is the basis of this registration, the house merely -supplying the address where the permanent register is established. -Family registers are prepared (1) when a person establishes a new -family, or (2) when the head of a family chooses to transfer his -permanent register to another place, in which case the previous register -is called “original permanent register” (_genséki_). Except in these -cases, family registration and residence are quite independent of one -another. - -As in the case of Status and Residential Registration, matters -concerning family registration are dealt with by the registrar of a -district. It is notice to this official that gives validity to marriage -and divorce, to adoption and its dissolution, to abdication and to -succession to the headship of a family. - - - - - CHAPTER XXX - Education. - - -Before the Restoration the State concerned itself little with education. -There were, indeed, in Yedo, as Tōkiō was then called, two or three -Government schools open to youths of the military class, and similar -institutions existed in the provinces, both in clan territories and in -those of the Shōgun. In these instruction was given in the Chinese -classics and in military accomplishments. Except for this slender -provision for educational needs, the matter was left, to a great extent, -in the hands of the people themselves. Such education as was thought to -be necessary for children other than those of the military class was -obtained in Buddhist temple schools (_terakoya_). In the case of the -military class private tuition took the place of these schools, both for -elementary instruction, and for such further education as might be -desired; it being customary for students above a certain age to become -pupils of some scholar of repute, in whose house they often resided -during their course of study. From the absence of any regular official -control of education it must not be inferred that learning was -discouraged in Japan. On the contrary, it was encouraged from early -times, both by the Court in pre-feudal days and by the later Tokugawa -rulers, with the result that the Japanese nation had, as is well known, -attained a high degree of culture of an Oriental kind before the -reopening of the country to foreign intercourse. But the interest taken -in education was only spasmodic. No attempt was made to systematize it, -and make it a branch of the general administration of the country. - -In the programme of the men who effected the Restoration educational -reform occupied a prominent place; but while feudalism lasted not much -could be done. Neither the control of education by one central -authority, nor the defiance of class prejudice by throwing education -open equally to all, was possible. The enlargement of the few existing -colleges, the opening of a few more in places where they were most -needed, the engagement of foreign teachers, and the selection of -students represented all that was attainable for the moment. The desired -opportunity came with the abolition of feudalism, and the disappearance -of the military class. It was in the summer of 1871 that the Decree -which swept away the feudal system was issued; a week or two later the -Department of Education was established; and in the following year -(1872) the first Educational Code was drawn up and promulgated. -Compulsory education for both sexes dates from this time. - -To the frankly utilitarian spirit disclosed in the preamble to the Code -the late Baron Kikuchi, at one time Minister of Education, drew -attention in his London lectures on the subject delivered in 1909. In it -there is no mention of religion, nor is anything said about moral -instruction. The Code provided for the creation of no less than eight -universities and a corresponding number of elementary and middle -schools, both being far in excess of the requirements of the country at -that time. No surprise, therefore, was felt when in 1879 this plan was -abandoned, and a scheme better suited to existing conditions adopted in -its place. Nevertheless, in these seven years a good beginning had been -made. The principle of compulsory education for all children between six -and fourteen years of age had been introduced. The Tōkiō University had -been established, and though expectations regarding the growth of middle -schools had not been realized, in the creation and working of elementary -schools satisfactory progress had been made. - -The Code of 1879, by which a simpler and more practical form was given -to elementary education, was in its turn replaced by the educational law -of 1886. Under the new measure elementary education was divided into two -courses; more attention was given to normal education; new features in -the shape of moral and physical training were introduced; and the method -of regulating educational affairs by means of Codes was discontinued. -Various changes were made in subsequent years, but the system then -established is, in its main outlines, in force to-day. - -At the threshold of the present system lies the kindergarten, formed on -the European model. - -The actual system begins with elementary schools. These are of two -kinds, the ordinary, and the higher, elementary schools. In the first -the course extends over six years, and is compulsory for all children -who have completed their sixth year. At thirteen years of age, -therefore, compulsory education ceases. Ordinary elementary education is -free, the cost being met by local taxation. - -From the ordinary elementary school the child, boy or girl, whose -education does not stop there, passes on to the higher elementary -school. Here the course lasts for two years, a supplementary course -being provided, as in the case of ordinary elementary schools, for those -desiring it whose education ceases at this stage. - -In elementary schools of both kinds boys and girls receive practically -the same education. They are taught in the same schools, and often in -the same classes. It is after this stage that the education of boys and -girls becomes distinct, both as regards the schools and the subjects -taught in them. Elementary schools established by the State are open to -the children of all classes; but there are also private elementary -schools of the same grades, which are recognized by law and are subject -to official supervision. - -At the age of fourteen or fifteen a boy enters what is known as a middle -school, where he remains for five years. With the termination of this -course, by which time he is about nineteen years of age, a Japanese -youth has completed his general education. If he elects to go further, -he must specialize, passing to a higher school in preparation for the -University, to a technical school, to the higher normal school, or to -what is termed a “special” (_semmon_) school, as the case may be. - -The educational training open to girls on leaving the higher elementary -schools is less extensive. They may enter a high school for girls, which -corresponds more or less to the middle school for boys. Here the course -is from four to five years, with a supplementary course spread over -another two. Or they may enter a normal, or technical school. With the -exception of some higher normal schools, no further provision for the -more advanced education of women is made by the State. - -Private enterprise and munificence have done much to supplement the -educational work of the State. Besides the private elementary schools -already mentioned, a certain proportion of the middle schools are also -in private hands, whilst educational facilities of a more advanced -standard are supplied by the flourishing colleges founded by Mr. -Fukuzawa and Marquis Ōkuma. There are also Buddhist schools, and -educational establishments of various kinds wholly or partly maintained -by foreign missionary societies. Nor is the aid thus directed by private -initiative confined to pupils of one sex. To what extent the education -of women has profited is shown by the existence in the Capital of -institutions so well known—to mention only a few—as the Women’s -University founded by Mr. Narusé; the Girls’ College, which owes its -creation to Mrs. Shimoda; and the schools for girls of the nobility, in -which the late Empress, its founder, took special interest. - -Let us now see what is taught under the present system of education. - -The course of instruction in elementary schools comprises morals; -reading, writing and letter writing, which are grouped together as one -subject called “the Japanese language”; arithmetic and the use of the -abacus, the counting-board of the ancients; gymnastics, drawing and -singing; and (for girls) needlework. In the higher elementary course -three additional subjects—history, geography and science—are included. - -What, it may be asked, is meant by instruction in “morals,” the first -subject mentioned in this curriculum? It is based on the principles laid -down in the Imperial Rescript on Education promulgated in 1890, a copy -of which, besides a portrait of the Emperor, hangs on the walls of -elementary schools. Speaking of this, Baron Kikuchi in the lectures -above mentioned says: “Our whole moral and civic education consists in -so imbuing our children with the spirit of the Rescript that it forms a -part of our national life.” No excuse is needed for dwelling at some -length on a point to which he attaches so much importance. - -The principles on which stress is laid in the Imperial Rescript are -mostly of a kind with which the reader is more or less familiar, showing -in the reference made to the duties of a Japanese subject to the -Imperial Ancestors, to the Sovereign, to the State, and to society, -their Confucian and Shintō origin. Attention has been drawn to the -absence of any reference to moral teaching in the preamble of the Code -of 1872. The fact that a different note is struck in the Rescript -published eighteen years later does not justify the inference that the -Government had seen reason to change its mind on the subject. For, only -a year before the Rescript appeared, the Department of Education had -issued a notification declaring it to be essential to keep religion and -education apart, and forbidding the teaching of any religious doctrine, -or the conduct of any religious ceremonies, in schools licensed by the -State. It seems correct, therefore, to suppose that the attitude of the -Government in regard to the relation of religion to education remained -unchanged, but that the official mind made a distinction between moral -teaching as identified with religious doctrines, and moral teaching of a -more general kind. This supposition derives support from the close -resemblance which the Rescript bears to a document entitled _A Short -Exhortation to the People_, which was, as we have seen, published and -circulated widely by the new Government in the early days of the -Restoration. The object then in view was to divert to the Sovereign the -old feudal feeling of devotion to the clan chief; to make the Throne, at -a time when the fabric of old Japan was crumbling to pieces, the centre -round which the nation could rally. The aim of the Rescript was the -same, allowing for the change in circumstances, namely, to strengthen -the framework of government by encouraging a fresh spirit of patriotism -and loyalty. That education should be chosen as the medium for -impressing upon the nation the spirit of precepts appealing with the -force of tradition to national sentiment was very natural. - -For the teaching of morals in elementary schools text-books are -provided. These contain a series of illustrated homilies designed to -inculcate the virtues to which prominence is given in Confucian ethics. -The children are also taught in conversations with the teachers matters -concerning the Emperor and the Court. They are brought to realize the -extent of the Imperial solicitude for the people; these lessons leading -up to the inevitable conclusion that the illustrious virtues of the -Sovereign must be reverenced. Similar lessons are given on the subject -of the national flag, with the object of promoting patriotism. In this -respect the Japanese are fortunate in possessing a word of Chinese -origin, which means literally “requiting the country for favours -received,” and thus conveys the sense of duty on which the virtue rests. -In their third school year the children learn about the Empress, and -acquire some general knowledge of her position and responsibilities. And -so they pass on to learn in succeeding courses, and always in the same -sequence of moral ideas, what is meant by “the fundamental character of -the Japanese Empire”—the relation, that is to say, of the Imperial House -to the people—and something of the nature of government and civic -duties. - -It is not till the middle schools are reached that the influence of -Western thought is noticeable in any marked degree. There the curriculum -embraces morals, the Japanese language and Chinese literature, foreign -languages, history, geography and mathematics. Moral instruction is -continued on the lines on which it was begun in the elementary schools. -It is not the fault of the teacher, nor of the system, if at the end of -this stage of his education the pupil has not acquired a general -perception of what is required of him in the way of his duty to -ancestor, parent and neighbour, of his obligations to himself, to the -family, to society and to the State, and if he is not also imbued with a -deep sense of the fortunate privilege of Japanese nationality. It will -be at once apparent how wide a field is covered by the subject of -morals, and how practical is the end it is designed to subserve. The -teaching of foreign languages in middle schools amounts practically to -the teaching of English, this being in most of such schools the only -foreign language taught. If, in spite of the prominence given to it, -progress in the study of English is disappointing, the result is due to -the false economy which substitutes for competent foreign teachers -Japanese, whose knowledge and pronunciation are often defective. - -The curriculum of the higher schools, the preparatory stage for the -University, varies according to the three sections—Law and Literature, -Science, and Medicine—into which they are divided. Four subjects, -however, are common to all three. These are Morals, the Japanese -language, Foreign Languages, and Gymnastics. Two of three foreign -languages—English, French, and German—are taught in each section. In the -Medical section German, and in the Science section English, is -compulsory. - -The course of University instruction does not call for any special -notice. It is sufficient to say that it is modelled on Western lines. - -Of late years the Government has given special attention to the -establishment of Technical and Normal Schools. The fact that the pupils -in these latter schools receive disciplinary training similar to that of -military schools shows the anxiety of the authorities to foster a -military spirit in the nation. - -It will be seen that at every stage in the present system of education -the Japanese language is one of the subjects of study. This is due not -less to its complicated character than to the high degree of skill -required in its writing, for which brushes and not pens are employed. In -alluding to this point in a previous chapter attention was drawn to the -difficulty created by the adoption of the Chinese written language by a -people who had a spoken language of their own, and to the confusion that -afterwards supervened when the borrowing nation devised written scripts -for itself. The final result of this process of linguistic growth was -the division of Japanese writing into three main branches—the Chinese -style, in which Chinese hieroglyphs are used much as the Chinese use -them; the native scripts, or syllabaries; and a third which is a mixture -of the other two, and in varying forms is the one most in use to-day. Of -the two elements that thus form the Japanese language of the present -time—Chinese characters and the Japanese syllabaries—the former has so -far proved itself the stronger and, in a sense, the more useful: -stronger because of its having been the means by which Chinese -civilization was introduced, and of its connection with the foundation -upon which education has always rested; more useful because its effect -on national culture has not only survived the reopening of Japan to -foreign intercourse, but, owing to the fact that the native scripts are -adapted for the writing only of native words, has increased twenty-fold. -Just as we go to Latin and Greek to coin new words when we want them, so -to Chinese the Japanese have always gone on the same quest; and for the -better part of a century they have been busily engaged in coining new -words for all the new things that have come to them in the train of -Western learning. Thus the language which served to introduce Chinese -institutions and culture many centuries ago is performing the same duty -to-day for institutions and culture of quite another order. In this -Japan seems to have been the sport of fate. She started with Chinese as -the chief factor in her culture. The exigencies of language and -circumstance drove her in later years, when her civilization was tending -in an opposite direction, to draw again under altered conditions on the -same resources as before, and thus expose herself afresh to the -operation of the very influences from which in the first flush of her -ardour for Western reforms she was striving to emancipate herself. - -How greatly education is hampered by the difficulty of the language will -be understood when it is mentioned that a Japanese youth who goes -through the whole educational course provided by the State is still -studying it when on the threshold of the University; and that if he -desires to attain any real literary scholarship he must continue this -study for some time after his education is completed. To show that the -difficulty has not been exaggerated it may be well to quote two -independent authorities, both Japanese. Baron Kikuchi tells us that “to -those who are engaged in education, especially elementary education, the -difficulty that a child has to encounter in learning Chinese characters -is an ever-present and pressing question; with so many subjects to be -learnt it is impossible to spend the enormous time that would be -necessary in the mere learning of ideographs.”... “When we come to -secondary education,” he adds, “the difficulty is increased still -further.” Marquis Ōkuma, who has held the same portfolio, and speaks -with the authority of a leading educationalist, is still more emphatic. -“The greatest difficulty of all connected with education is,” he says, -“the extreme complexity of the Japanese language. Japanese students -to-day are attempting what is possible only to the strongest and -cleverest of them, that is to say, two or three in every hundred. They -are trying to learn their own language, which is in reality two -languages ... while attempting to learn English and German, and, in -addition, studying technical subjects like law, medicine, engineering or -science.” - -It is a mistake to suppose that because foreign influences enter so -largely into the educational course Japan must necessarily end by -becoming Europeanized. The foundation of her culture is too deeply laid -for that. So long as elementary education remains, as it is now, -practically untouched by Western influences, no great change of the kind -in question is likely to happen. All that educational reform, as -illustrated in the present system, implies is the making of education -one of the chief concerns of the State and the diffusion of Western -knowledge. The first has affected the whole nation; the latter chiefly -the upper classes. - - - - - CHAPTER XXXI - The Makers of Modern Japan—How Japan is Governed. - - -In preceding pages some account has been given of the steps by which a -Far Eastern nation has risen to its present position of a Great Power. -The period occupied by this transformation is less than half a century. -For during the first two decades that followed the reopening of Japan to -foreign intercourse reactionary influences supported by anti-foreign -feeling were, as we have seen, in the ascendant; and it was not till -after the Restoration that the work of remoulding all branches of -administration commenced. While giving full credit to the Japanese -people for the possession of the qualities that made this great change -possible, the genius of the statesmen by whom they were guided should -not be overlooked. - -Although the new direction given to national policy, the consummation of -which is seen to-day, did not take place until after the Restoration, -the services rendered by some of the statesmen whose names are -associated with it date from before that time. The Restoration was not -the work of a day, the effect of a sudden impulse. Weak as the Shōgun’s -Government was, it was too firmly rooted by the mere length of its -duration, by the weight of time and usage, to be easily overthrown. -Before this could be done something in the nature of a united movement, -a combination of forces, was essential. And in the feudal conditions -then prevailing it was just this point which presented the greatest -difficulty. The military strength, as after events showed, was there, -but clan jealousies stood in the way of united effort. The first attempt -at rebellion made by the Chōshiū clan failed, it will be remembered, for -this reason, the Satsuma clan siding with the Yedo Government. Only when -these two clans were persuaded to work together, and were joined by two -others, as well as by disaffected members of the military class who -flocked to the Imperialist standard from all parts of the country, did -it become possible to organize insurrection on a scale that endangered -the continuance of Tokugawa rule. It was in the formation of this -alliance that the men who subsequently filled the chief offices under -the new Government first came into prominence. They form, as it were, a -group by themselves as the pioneers of the Imperialist movement. It was -another and later set of men who took up the work thus begun, and -accomplished the task of modernizing Japan. - -What Japanese writers tell us of the relations subsisting between the -Court at Kiōto and the Yedo administration brings out very clearly the -fact that the _Kugé_ or Court nobles, who had in former days governed -the country, never ceased to regard the Shōguns as usurpers, the Capital -serving as the focus of constant intrigues directed against the -Government of the day. It was only natural, therefore, that the -Imperialist movement should find strong support at Kiōto, and that the -men who undertook the delicate and dangerous project of uniting the -southern clans in organized resistance to the Shōgunate should be in a -position to vouch for the secret approval of the Throne, whose formal -sanction recorded in State edicts remained to the last days of Tokugawa -rule one of the few shreds of prestige still left to the Sovereign. -Though the _Kugé_, as a body, having long been excluded from active -participation in public affairs, were at the time in question little -better than nonentities, in view of the fact that the movement in -contemplation had for its avowed object the restoration of direct -Imperial rule, it seems to have been regarded as essential to establish -a close connection with the Court. This explains the inclusion of two -Court nobles, Sanjō and Iwakura, each of whom afterwards received the -title of Prince. The former, it is said, owed his selection mainly to -the accident of birth. As representative of one of the oldest _Kugé_ -families, his name alone gave weight to the Imperialist cause. Of him we -hear little subsequently, as the political situation developed, apart -from his filling the post of Prime Minister. Iwakura stood on a -different footing. His commanding abilities and natural talent for -affairs made his services indispensable, and for several years he was a -dominant figure in the Ministry. Two of the most notable clansmen who -were associated with Iwakura in this early period were Ōkubo (father of -the present Marquis), a native of Satsuma, whose death by the hands of -assassins in 1878 has already been mentioned, and Kido (father of the -present Marquis), a native of Chōshiū, who died of illness not long -after the new Government had been established. Both combined great -capacity with very liberal views, the adoption of Western ideas in the -reconstruction of the administrative system being largely due to their -initiative. Of the elder Saigō, at first the most influential member of -this group, the reader has already heard in connection with the Satsuma -rebellion. All three, it will be seen, belonged either to the Satsuma or -to the Chōshiū clan. The Ministerial dissensions which caused the -withdrawal from the Government of leading men of the two other clans -which had taken part in the Restoration led, as has already been -explained, to the disappearance from the scene of the Tosa and Hizen -clans at an early stage of the new _régime_, and to the direction of -affairs being assumed and continued till to-day by Satsuma and Chōshiū -statesmen. The list, however, of those who came into notice during this -critical period would be incomplete without the addition of the names of -Itagaki and Gotō of Tosa, and Soyéshima and Ōki of Hizen. - -The most conspicuous of the statesmen who have been mentioned as -composing the second and later set—a description not quite accurate, -since the careers of some overlapped those of their predecessors—are -Princes Yamagata, Itō, Ōyama and Katsura, and Marquises Inouyé, -Matsugata, Ōkuma and Saionji. Their names have long been familiar to the -public abroad, for all at one time or another have been recognized as -entitled to the popular appellation of _Genrō_, or Elders, a term never -applied to the earlier statesmen. To the part played by each in the rise -of Japan attention has already been drawn in the course of this -narrative. With the exception of the two last-named, all of these -so-called _Genrō_ were Satsuma or Chōshiū clansmen. - -In an undertaking so vast as the recasting of a nation’s institutions on -lines quite new, and in their nature so opposed to traditional usages, -many minds of necessity co-operated. The selection for the present -purpose only of the few whose names will always be household words in -Japan implies no lack of recognition of what was done by many others, -less conspicuous in their time, who rendered signal service to the -country. In estimating the difficulties encountered by the statesmen who -undertook the task of introducing Western reforms, and successfully -maintained and carried through the Liberal policy adopted after the -Restoration, regard should be paid to the dangerous conditions amidst -which much of this work was done. The opposition they met with came, as -we have seen, from two quarters—reactionaries, who for a time were very -hostile to foreigners, and those who were more advanced in their views -than Ministers themselves. The old ideas associated with vendettas, -which, so long as feudalism lasted, could be prosecuted under official -sanction, had produced an atmosphere of insecurity to life that survived -well into the Meiji era. The frequency of political assassinations, and -the precautions taken even in recent times to protect members of the -Government from attack, show how real were the risks to which prominent -statesmen were exposed. - -The influence in public affairs of the _Genrō_, and of the earlier -leaders of the Restoration movement who never received that appellation, -has never been questioned. The columns of the Japanese Press have -constantly borne witness to the position they have held in public -estimation. They seem to have assumed from the first the functions -formerly exercised by the Council of State in Tokugawa times, with this -difference, that, as a body, no official recognition was ever accorded -to them. The Japanese family system gave opportunities to the _Genrō_ of -strengthening their position by the tie of adoption as well as by that -of marriage; and in availing themselves of these they followed the -example of the feudal nobility and courtiers of earlier days. Several -were thus connected with each other by one, or both, of these ties, the -support thus obtained being independent of that which came from their -purely political followers. When in the course of administrative -reconstruction the Ministry was reorganized on European models, the -exact position they occupied was not inaccurately represented in popular -parlance by the expression _Kuromaku-daijin_, which, freely rendered, -means “unseen Ministers of State.” The anomalous and singular situation -thus created will be understood when it is explained that the Ministry -of the day might, according to circumstances, be composed entirely of -_Genrō_, though latterly this became unusual, or might include several -_Genrō_, or even none. In the last-mentioned case the Ministry without -_Genrō_ had very little to do with decisions on important questions. Of -recent years the number of surviving _Genrō_ has gradually decreased. -Other causes, too, than that of death—namely, increasing age, the lesser -prestige of later statesmen and the constitutional changes which -resulted in the creation of two consultative bodies, the Privy Council -and Court Councillors—have tended to diminish the influence of the -_Genrō_ who still remain. The institution of these two consultative -bodies has had an important bearing on the direction of affairs. The -idea prevailing at one time in political circles that the ranks of the -_Genrō_ would be reinforced from time to time, as occasion served, by -the introduction of younger and rising statesmen, as actually took place -in one or two instances, does not appear to have met with general -approval. The present tendency seems rather to lie in the direction of -enlarging the circle of influential statesmen so as to include those -members of the Privy Council and House of Peers as well as Court -Councillors, whose age (to which much respect is still paid), -experience, and clan connections mark them out for selection. This -tendency, if continued, will have the effect of perpetuating a state of -things under which the Cabinet will, as hitherto, be kept in a position -of subordination to higher though veiled authority; for the Constitution -works without excessive friction, and neither the Lower House nor the -political parties it represents have much real power. - -There are in the modern development of Japan a few salient points which -invite attention. The opening episode itself is one of these. Beyond the -fact that the Government which was overthrown had outlasted its time, -the Restoration bears no close resemblance to other revolutions. The -impulse that produced it did not come from the body of the people. It -was in no sense a popular uprising—due to class grievances, and aimed -against oppression which had become unbearable. The discontent that -existed was of a kind that is found everywhere when the machinery of -administration shows signs of breaking down. Nor was it altogether a -movement from above of the nature of those which elsewhere have put an -end to feudalism by a concentration of authority in the hands of a -monarch. In its inception it was simply a movement directed against the -Shōgun’s Government by a section of the military class belonging to the -Southern (or, as the Japanese would say, Western) clans. The cry of -“Honour the Sovereign” derived much of its efficacy from the appeal to -drive out foreigners which accompanied it. The abolition of feudalism -was mainly an afterthought. - -Other outstanding features, taken in the order of events, are the -Satsuma rebellion (in which the progressive element in the clan -supported the Government); the establishment of parliamentary -government; treaty revision, in which Great Britain took the lead; the -war with China and that with Russia; the annexation of Korea; and, more -recently, the Great War. - -Had the Satsuma insurgents triumphed when they rose in rebellion, the -new direction given to Japanese policy would have been arrested, with -results very different from anything we see to-day. With the -establishment of parliamentary government, which came into force -together with the Constitution, Japan broke finally with her past -traditions and came into line with Western countries. The conclusion of -the new Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, which was followed by -the conclusion of similar treaties with other foreign Powers, put a stop -to the mischievous agitation concerning Treaty revision which had long -troubled the Government. The war with China, which increased Japanese -territory and material resources, revealed a military strength -unsuspected abroad, and gave Japan a new and commanding position in the -Far East. Of still greater importance were the results of the -Russo-Japanese war. It changed the whole face of Far Eastern affairs, -and won for Japan admission to the ranks of Great Powers. By the -annexation of Korea Japan added to her military security, and removed -what in past years had been a constant source of disturbance in Far -Eastern affairs. How the financial position of Japan has been affected -by the Great War, and the expansion of territory she has acquired, we -have seen. As to what further consequences for her may result from the -defeat of Germany, the collapse of Russia and the newly awakened -interest of the United States in foreign questions, all that can safely -be said is that indulgence in speculations on this point will find -little assistance from analogies looked for in the past. - -To the question, How much in Japan has been changed? an answer is -difficult. Outwardly, of course, the effects of the wholesale adoption -of much of the material civilization of the West are very plain. Whether -these effects extend much deeper is another matter. Japan, it must be -borne in mind, is in a state of transition. The new ideas imported from -abroad exist side by side with the old, so that the former balance of -things has disappeared. Two instances taken from the highest and lowest -circles will serve to illustrate the conflict still going on between the -old and new cultures. The Gregorian Calendar adopted in 1873 for -official purposes counts for little in agricultural operations, and in -the pilgrimages and religious festivals which play so important a part -in Japanese life. These are still conducted according to the old -calendar. This is not surprising, for the interior of Japan has only -been open to foreign residence and trade since 1899, the date when the -revised treaties came into operation. Since then, moreover, foreign -trade has continued to move in the grooves first created, the so-called -Treaty ports, the rest of the country having been affected but little by -foreign intercourse. A similar contrast is noticeable in ceremonial -procedure. On certain State occasions the Sovereign performs the -functions of a European monarch in accordance with the formalities of -European Courts. On others, acting as high priest in the shrine attached -to the palace, he conducts a Shintō service according to a ritual so -ancient as to be almost unintelligible, and quite out of keeping with -the modern ideas which the nation has adopted. It would be in no way -surprising to those who have studied Japanese progress in the last fifty -years of foreign intercourse if in the not distant future the present -Civil Code, based on that of Saxony, were to be revised with the object -of bringing it more into harmony with Japanese tradition and sentiment. - - - - - INDEX - - - Abdication, 22, 287 - - Adams, Sir F., _History of Japan_, 80, 92 - - Administration, Tokugawa (_see_ Tokugawa Shōgunate) - - Administrative changes, 74; - system, reorganization of, 174 - - Adoption, 22, 285; - complications caused by, 39 - - Adviser to Shōgunate, position held by Head of Mito family, 34 - - Agreement, secret, between China and Japan for Common Defence, 281 - - Agreements (pre-Restoration Treaties) concluded by Japan with Foreign - Powers, 46, 47, 48, 49 - - Agricultural class, the, 97 - - Aidzu clansmen as fighters, 131 - - Aidzu, daimiō of, 77 - - Ainu aborigines, 19, 20 - - Aki, daimiō of, 33 - - Alcock, Sir Rutherford, 54, 57 - - Alexeieff, Admiral, 246, 253, 256 - - Alliance of four clans, 71, 72, 80 - - Altars, family, 151, 286 - - America and Japan, early relations, 45; - first treaty, 46; - other treaties, 54, 205, 207, 240; - foreign aggression in China and Declarations protest of U.S. - Government, 237; - friendly relations, 265; - friction, causes of, 266 - - American annexation of Philippines, 235; - interests in China, 237; - missionary enterprise, 149; - policy in regard to Restoration, 65; - Treaty of 1858, difficulties of negotiation, 51; - whalers in Sea of Okhotsk, 44 - - Ancestor-worship, 140, 151 - - Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, 247 - - Anti-Foreign feeling, 53, 54, 55, 75, 194 - - Anti-Japanese feeling in America and Canada, 267 - - Anti-Shōgunate movement, 50 - - _Arbeiter Zeitung_, the, 275 - - Arisugawa, Prince, 74 - - Armistice concluded with China, 221 - - Army of the Shōgunate, 82 - - Art and literature, 18, 26, 112, 113 - - Asan, conflict at, 217 - - Ashikaga Shōguns, 26 - - Assassinations, political, 302 - - Assimilation of foreign ideas, 115 - - “Association of men with a definite purpose” (_Risshi-sha_), 136 - - “Association of Patriots” (_Aikoku-tō_), 136 - - Aston, Mr., 143 - - Attack on Shimonoséki forts by four Powers, 58 - - Awa, daimiō of, 35 - - _Awakening of Japan, The_, 73 - - - Ballot, secret, 185 - - Bank of Japan, 177 - - Banks and banking, 177 - - Bavarian Constitution adopted as model, 188 - - “Benevolent” government, 115 - - Bezobrazov, 256 - - Biddle, Commodore, at Yedo, 45 - - Bimetallic standard, a, 176 - - Bismarck, 172 - - Biwa, L., 32, 50 - - Blagovestchensk, reprisals at, 243 - - Brinkley, Capt., 124 - - British Legation, attacks on the, 55 - - Boissonade, M., 158 - - Bolsheviks, the, 281 - - Boxer Rising, the, 241–243 - - Buckle’s _History of Civilization_, 195 - - Buddhism, 17, 139, 141, 145, 147, 292 - - Budget, the, 190, 198 - - _Buké_ or military class, 20 - - Bureaucratic system of pre-feudal days, 73 - - Burma Convention, the, 226 - - _Bushidō_, 149 - - _Butsudan_ or Buddhist altar, 286 - - - Calendar, changes in the, 71 - - Campbell, Mr., 241 - - Canada, anti-Japanese feeling in, 267 - - Capital, transference of, from Kiōto to Yedo, 79 - - _Capital of the Tycoon, the_, 54 - - “Cash,” 176 - - Cassini, M., 229 - - Cenotaphs, ancestral, 286 - - Centralized bureaucracy, 33, 35 - - _Cha-no-yu_, 150 - - Chamberlain, Professor, 143 - - Chamberlain, Mr. J., 248 - - “Charter Oath,” the, 75, 192 - - Chemulpo, 216, 257; - naval engagement off, 258 - - Chéradame, M., 228, 252 - - _Chihanji_, 89 - - Chikuzen province, 25; - daimiō of, 72 - - China, relations with, 211; - war with, 217; - Japan’s aggressive intentions in, 280; - Handbook, 241 - - Chinda, Viscount, 210 - - Chinese culture, influence of, 17, 18, 298; - Eastern Railway, 229, 231; - influence on Japanese Buddhism, 143; - influx of, in California, 266; - Navy, the, 220; - suzerainty over neighbouring states, 214; - sexagenary cycle, 69, 70; - written language, the, 112, 113 - - Chōshiū clan, the, 71, 72 - - Chōshiū clansmen expelled from Kiōtō, 59 - - Chōshiū, daimiō of, 33, 35, 50; - ex-daimiō of, 186 - - Chōshiū, disorders in, 129; - and Higo, risings in, 127; - forts, action by, 57; - leaders, ideals of the, 73; - mission of conciliation to, 82; - raids and attacks, 72; - rebellion, 59 - - _Chōteki_, or rebels, 77 - - Christian persecutions, 28, 30; - after-effect of, 55; - political character of, 120; - renewal of, 91 - - Christianity, edicts against, 28, 30; - withdrawal of, 91; - first introduction of, 27; - future of, in Japan, 149; - later encouragement of, as a means of learning English, 148; - official recognition of, 147 - - Chronology, Japanese, 69 - - Ch’un, Prince, 242 - - Civil Code, the, 283 - - Civil Service examinations, 175 - - Civil war and fall of Shōgunate, 63 - - Clan guilds, 94 - - Clan jealousies, 81, 129 - - Clans, independent spirit of, 72 - - Class distinctions, feudal, 195 - - Classes, effects of abolition of feudalism on, 94; - fusion of, 195; - rearrangement of, 90 - - Coalition Cabinet of Liberals, resignation of, 200 - - Coast defence before Restoration, 44 - - Code of Criminal Procedure, 158 - - Coinage, 176 - - Colonization of Yezo, failure of, 118 - - Commercial Convention with China, 222 - - Compulsory education, 293 - - Conferences of Prefects, annual, 157 - - Conferences on Treaty Revision at Tōkiō, 178 - - Confiscation of territories of Tokugawa adherents, 77 - - Confucianism, 144, 149, 151 - - Congratulatory missions, 25 - - Conscript army, efficiency of the new, 132 - - Conscription, establishment of, 218 - - Conservative Party, formation of, 197 - - Constitution, Prince Itō’s commentaries on, 182, 188; - framing of, 172; - the granting of a, 162; - promulgation of, 186 - - Constitutional Imperialist Party, 166; - Liberals, 197; - Reform Party, 165 - - Consuls, or “administrators” in China, 212 - - Copyright, Protection of, 207 - - _Corvée_, the, 170, 185 - - Council of State, upper and lower, 35, 74 - - Court, isolation of, 37 - - Court Councillors, 175 - - Court and feudal nobility, relations between, 37; - amalgamation of, 89 - - Court nobles, ideals of, 73 - - Court and Shōgunate, 33, 56, 59 - - “Credit notes,” 176 - - _Creed of Half Japan, The_, 141 - - Currency, confusion in the state of, 81, 176 - - Customs Import Tariff, 207 - - Czecho-Slovak troops in Asia, the, 281 - - - _Daidō_ Club, the, 197 - - _Daijingū_ of Isé, the, 286 - - Daijō Daijin, the, 80 - - _Daikwan_, or Governors, 36 - - _Dajōkwan_ or Central Executive, 79 - - Dan-no-Ura, sea fight of, 20 - - Dazaifu, 25 - - de Witte, Count, 255, 256 - - Débidour’s _Histoire Diplomatique de l’Europe_, 229 - - Declarations regarding the non-alienation of Chinese territory, 234 - - Deliberative Assemblies, 75 - - Democratic feeling, growth of, 196 - - Departments of new post-Restoration administration, 73 - - Déshima, the Dutch in, 31, 121 - - Development of Japan, outstanding features in, 304 - - Diet and Government, conflicts between, 199; - composition of, 189; - first session of, 198; - first dissolution of, 198 - - Discord between political parties, 169 - - Districts, rural and urban, 184 - - Divorce, 290 - - Douglas, Admiral Sir A., naval adviser, 219 - - Drouyn de Lhuys, M., 108 - - Dual system of government, 21, 38; - end of, 63, 64, 85 - - Duarchy, consolidation of, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37; - working of, 38, 39, 40 - - Duplication of offices, 36, 37 - - Dummy editors, the Press Law and, 155 - - Dutch traders, 30, 31; - treaties with the, 46, 47, 240; - language as a medium of communication, 111; - and “Western Learning,” 84 - - Duties, import and export, foreign Powers’ demand for modification of, - 60 - - - East India Company, 30 - - Échizen, daimiō of, 33, 50, 53; - ex-Prince, 56 - - Eckhardstein, von, _Reminiscences_, 249 - - Education, 292; - Department of, 293 - - Educational Code, 293; - influences, 154, 160 - - Eisai Zenshi, founder of Zen sect of Buddhists, 142 - - Election, system of, for local assemblies, etc., 184; - for Diet, 189 - - Elections, first, for Diet, 194 - - Electoral Law, revised, 190 - - Electors, qualifications of, for local assemblies, 185; - for Diet, 189 - - Elementary Schools, 293 - - Elgin and Kincardine, Lord, 37 - - Elliot Islands, Japanese naval base at, in war with Russia, 261 - - Emigration, Japanese, 269 - - Emperor and Court, teaching in schools concerning, 296 - - Emperor’s name, removal of interdict regarding use of, 117 - - Empress Dowager of China, 243 - - English language replaces Dutch as medium of communication, 112; - teaching of, in schools, 175, 297 - - English traders, 30 - - “Equal opportunity,” principle of, 276; - “open door” and, 238 - - “Era of Enlightened Government,” the, 69 - - Era of Great Peace, 42 - - _Éta_ and _Hinin_, or social outcasts, 90 - - Europe, early intercourse with, 27; - renewal of, 45 - - Ex-_samurai_ (_Shizoku_), 95, 96; - discontent of, 123; - restlessness of, 152, 160, 170 - - Ex-regent or _Kwambaku_, 18 - - Expansion, Japanese, 268 - - Extra-territoriality, 109, 204, 207 - - - Fall of Shōgunate, 63, 64 - - “Family,” the, in Japanese law, 283 - - Family councils, 289; - registration, 290; - rites, 286 - - Family System, Japanese, 283 - - Fanaticism, 75, 135, 165, 193, 194 - - Farmers, 97 - - Fernandez, 27 - - “Festival of the Dead,” 287 - - Feudal fiefs, surrender of, 87 - - Feudal nobles, three classes of, 33, 34; - early training, 92; - subjection of, under Shōgunate rule, 34 - - Feudal System, abolition of, 89; - classification of society, 20; - compared with Scottish, 43; - establishment of, 20; - hereditary retainers, 22; - provincial administration, 30; - tenure of land, 97; - territories and nobility under Iyéyasu, 33 - - Fief, a daimiō’s, 43 - - Fiefs under Shōgunate rule, 33 - - _Fifty Years of New Japan_, 137, 140, 148, 175, 177 - - Figure-head system of government, 22, 88 - - Financial reform, 175, 239 - - Flower fairs, 151 - - Foreign experts, engagement of, 123 - - Foreign intercourse, reopening of, 44; - opposition to, 51 - - Foreign judges, the question of, 206; - Powers, attitude of, 65, 114; - regrouping of, 247 - - Foreign troops in Yokohama, 58 - - Formosa, acquisition of, 222; - difficulty with China respecting, 125; - resources of, 118, 119 - - France and Russia, close accord between, 228 - - French legal models adopted for Criminal law, 158 - - _Fudai_ daimiōs, 34, 35, 94 - - Fujiwara family, the, 18, 19, 20 - - Fukien, non-alienation of, 238 - - Fukuchi, editor of _Nichi Nichi Shimbun_, 166 - - Fukuzawa Yūkichi, 154, 155, 295 - - - General Agreement Union, 179 - - “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” the, 267 - - _Genrō_, or Elders, 302, 303 - - _Genrō-in_, or Senate, creation of, 133; - Tosa clansmen’s dissatisfaction with constitution of, 137 - - Gérard, M., _Ma Mission en Chine_, 228, 229, 230, 233 - - German Emperor, mischievous activity of, 224 - - German influence in Pacific, elimination of, 277 - - German Minister in China, murder of, by Boxers, 242 - - German models adopted in constitutional and administrative matters, - 172, 174 - - Germany and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 249 - - Germany and Japan, progress of, compared, 274 - - Girls, education of, 294 - - _Gokénin_, or landed gentry, 34, 78, 93 - - Gold standard, adoption of, 239 - - _Gosanké_, the, 34, 35 - - Gotō Shōjirō, Count, 74, 121, 164, 169, 174, 194, 302 - - Governors and governed, Japanese idea of relationship between, 115 - - Grant, General, 126 - - Great Britain, first treaty with, 46; - Treaty of 1858, 47; - revised Treaty with, 207, 208, 209, 210 - - Great Reform, the, 18, 69, 142 - - Great War, Japan’s part in the, 276 - - Gregorian Calendar, adoption of, 71, 117, 305 - - Guizot’s _History of the Civilization of Europe_, 42 - - _Gunchō_, or district administrators, 185 - - - Haga, Prof., 175 - - Hague Tribunal, the, 208 - - Haicheng, 221 - - Hakodaté, opening of, 46 - - _Hambatsu Séifu_, or clan government, 43 - - _Han_, or clan, 43 - - Harris, Mr. Townsend, 47, 111 - - _Hatamoto_, or Bannermen, 34, 35, 78, 93 - - Hawaii, Japanese labour in, 270 - - Hayashi, Count, 247, 249 - - Headmen of household groups, 36 - - Headship of family, 287 - - _Heimin_, or common people, 90 - - Hereditary retainers, 22 - - Hidéyori, 32 - - Hidéyoshi, 26, 28; ambition of, 29 - - High Court of Justice (_Daishinin_), 133 - - Higher Schools, curriculum of, 297 - - Higo, province of, 131 - - Hikoné, 50 - - Hill, S. J., _Impressions of the Kaiser_, 275 - - _Hiō-jō-sho_, 35 - - Hiogo, port of, 54, 107 - - Hirado Islands, 30 - - _History of Japan (1542–61), A_, 28, 124 - - _History of the Currency, A_, 175, 176 - - “History of the Restoration,” 72 - - Hitachi (Mito), province of, 33, 34 - - Hitotsubashi family, the, 51 - - Hizen, province of, 25; - daimiō of, 33, 35; - clan, 71; - insurrection, 125 - - _Hōben, Hō-an Jōrei_, 180, 181; - (or pious fraud), 143 - - Hohenzollern, Prince Henry of, 230 - - Hōjō Regents, the, 24, 25, 142 - - _Hokkaidō_ (_Yezo_), the, or Northern Sea Circuit, 104, 118, 159 - - Honda, Rev. Y., 148 - - Hongkong, 232 - - Hornbeck, Mr., _Contemporary Politics of the Far East_, 236 - - Hostility to foreigners, 53, 54, 55, 75, 107, 179, 194 - - House of Peers, 173 - - House of Representatives, 189 - - Hozumi, Professor, 288 - - “Hundred Articles, The,” 33, 37, 93 - - - I-Ho-Ch’uan (Patriot Harmony Fists), 241 - - Ïi Kamon no Kami (_Tairō_ or Regent), 50, 52, 53, 55, 63 - - Iki Islands, 25 - - Immigration Act, American, 266 - - Imperial “progresses,” 37; - domains, 67; - Household, Minister of, 173; - House Law, 190; - Oaths, 135, 187; - “Ordinances,” 188; - prerogatives, 188 - - Impersonality, atmosphere of, pervading everything Japanese, 21 - - Indemnities, 58, 222, 225 - - Independents in Diet, 194 - - Ingles, Admiral, naval adviser, 219 - - _Inkio_, 288 - - Inouyé, Marquis, 74, 99, 126, 174, 179, 249, 251, 302 - - Instruction in Elementary Schools, 295 - - Insurrectionary movements, 124, 127, 130, 171 - - Interests of Treaty Powers, 65 - - Invasions by Mongols, 25 - - “Invention of a New Religion, The,” 150 - - Isé, Great Shrine at, 54, 151 - - Ishii, Viscount, 280 - - “_Ishin Shi_” (“History of the Restoration”), 72 - - Itagaki, 79, 121, 136, 137, 164, 169, 174, 194, 200, 302 - - Itō, Prince, 74, 163, 172, 174, 201, 224, 249, 251, 302 - - Itō Shimpei, 121, 124 - - Iwakura, Prince, 74, 79, 80, 87, 90, 122, 301 - - Iwakura Mission, objects of the, 122, 178, 205 - - Iyémitsu, Shōgun, repressive edicts of, 30 - - Iyémochi, Shōgun, 56 - - Iyésada, 52 - - Iyéyasu, the rule of, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 - - - Japan, bridging the gulf between old and new, 186; - contrast between old and new, 305, 306 - - _Japan: The Rise of a Modern Power_, 230 - - _Japan Year Book_, the, 140 - - Japanese Cabinets, independent of Diet, 200 - - Japanese language an obstacle to progress, 112 - - Japanese, origin of the, 17 - - Japanese subjects, rights and duties of, 189 - - Japanese writing, three branches of, 298 - - Jesuit missionaries, 28, 29 - - _Jiji Shimpō_, the, 155 - - Jimmu Tennō, the mythical founder of Japan, 69 - - _Jingikwan_, 146 - - _Jisha-bugiō_, 35, 145 - - _Jiyūtō_, or Liberal Party, 164; - dissolution of, 167; - revival of, 194 - - _Jōdai_, or Governor (of Ōsaka), 37 - - _Jōdo_ sect, the, 142 - - - Kaga, daimiō of, 33 - - Kagoshima, 27; - bombardment of, 57; - Shimadzu’s retirement to, 130; - Saigō’s death in, 132 - - Kaiping, 221 - - _Kaishintō_, or Progressives, 197 - - Kamakura, 21, 26 - - Kamakura Shōguns, the, 24 - - _Kami_, or natural deities, 40, 140 - - _Kamidana_, or Shintō altar, 286 - - Kanagawa, Perry at, 46 - - Kanda, Baron, 99 - - Kataoka Kenkichi, 155 - - Kato, Viscount, 211, 248 - - Katsura, General, 221, 251, 302 - - Kawamura, Admiral, 129 - - Kéiki, 51, 56, 60, 62, 88, 186 - - _Ketsudan-sho_, or Court of Decisions, 35 - - Kiaochow, 228; - leased to Germany, 230; - evacuated by Germany, 277 - - Kido, 74, 79, 80, 82, 87, 88, 137, 301 - - Kii (or Kishiū), prov. of, 33; - princely House of, 34; - Prince of, 51, 64, 88 - - Kikuchi, Baron, 293, 299 - - _Kiōbusho_, or Department of Religion, 147 - - Kiōto, 21; - and Yedo, 38; - intrigues at the Court of, 49; - Shōgun summoned to, 56; - raid on, 59, 62 - - Kishiū, prov. of (_see_ Kii) - - Kiūshiū, prov. of, 25 - - Knox proposal regarding Manchurian railways, 280 - - _Kōgisho_, or Parliament, 77, 87 - - Kōmei, Emperor, death of, 62 - - Konishi, Christian daimiō, 29 - - Korea, 17; - and China, 126; - annexation of, by Japan, 271, 272; - Chinese conquest of, 24, 25; - Chinese suzerainty over, 25, 214; - condition of, 215; - difficulties with China concerning, 120; - invasion by Hidéyoshi, 29; - Japan’s interests in, 254; - Japanese protectorate over, 264; - missions of courtesy to Japan, 121; - rivalry between Russia and Japan concerning, 255; - written language of, 19 - - Kublai Khan, 24, 27 - - _Kugé_, or Court aristocracy, 20, 37, 49, 301 - - Kumamoto, siege of the castle of, 131 - - Kurile Islands, acquisition of, 126 - - Kuroda, General, 118, 126, 129, 174 - - Kuroki, General, 260 - - _Kuromaku-daijin_, or “Unseen Ministers of State,” 303 - - Kuropatkin, General, 260, 262 - - Kwang-chow, Bay of, leased to France, 231 - - Kwantō, 32 - - _Kwazoku_, name of new class, including all nobles, 89 - - - Land, feudal tenure of, 97; - reform, 98; - official survey of, 100; - assessment of value, 103, 105; - ownership of, by foreigners, 208 - - Land-tax, revision of, 99, 104 - - Language difficulties in way of progress, 111; - in education, 298 - - Languages, written and spoken, Japanese, 112, 113 - - Lansdowne, Marquess of, 247 - - Lansing-Ishii Agreement, the, 281 - - Law of Cities, Towns and Villages (_Shi-chō-som-pō_), 184; - of the Court and Shōgunate, 37; - of the Imperial Court, 37; - of Libel, 168; - of Public Meetings, the, 156, 164 - - Laws accessory to the Constitution, 188 - - “_Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise_” (Chéradame), 228, 252 - - Leases of Chinese Territory, 227, 230, 231, 232 - - Legal and Judicial Reform, 158, 193, 240 - - Legations at Peking, siege of, 241 - - Legislative Chamber or Senate (_Genrō-in_), 133 - - Lemieux, Mr., 268 - - Li Hung Chang, 218, 228 - - Liaotung Peninsula, the, 225 - - Liao-yang, 260; - battle of, 262 - - Liberal Party, programme of the, 164 - - Lloyd, Rev. Arthur, 141, 142 - - Lobanoff, Prince, 228, 255 - - Local government, old system of, 36; - revised system of, 156, 184 - - London Protocol of 1862, 107 - - Loochoo, annexation of, 126; - difficulties in connection with, 125, 213; - Local Government Act inoperative in, 184 - - Lord Keeper of the Seals (_Naidaijin_), 175 - - Lower and Upper Houses of Diet, the, 203 - - - “Mahayana Vehicle,” the, 141 - - Makers of Modern Japan, the, 300 - - Makharoff, Admiral, 259 - - Manchuria, Russian intentions in, 246; - occupation of, 252; - American protest, 252 - - Marco Polo, 27 - - Marriage, 290 - - Matsudaira (Tokugawa family name), 35 - - Matsugata, Marquis, 129, 174; - financial measures introduced by, 177, 239, 302 - - Meckel, General, military adviser, 218 - - Meiji Era, the, 42, 69 - - Members of Parliament, qualifications of, 190 - - Memorials to the Throne, 87 - - _Métayage_ system, the, 97 - - _Métsuké_, 36 - - Middle schools, curriculum of, 297 - - Mikado (one of terms for Emperor of Japan), meaning of, 40 - - Mikado, attempt to abduct, 59; - first audience granted by, 220 - - Mikados, Shōguns mistaken for, 23 - - Militarist policy, 223 - - Military College in Satsuma, Saigō’s, 130 - - Military strength of Russia and Japan, comparison of, 258 - - Min Party, the, in Korea, 217 - - Minamoto family, the, 20 - - Minister President of the Cabinet, 174 - - Ministers of State, chief, 174 - - _Minké_, or general public, outside military class, 20 - - Missionaries, early, 27; - expulsion of, 28, 30 - - Missions to Europe and United States, and objects of, 107, 108, 109 - - Missions from Yedo to Kiōtō, 53 - - Mito, ex-Prince of, 50, 51, 53, 55, 64 - - Mito, disorders in, 129 - - Mito, Princely House of, 72 - - _Mitsu Bishi_, first s.s. company, the, 133 - - Moderation in politics, increasing tendency towards, 202 - - Moderation towards rebels, 77 - - Monarch, personality of, the, 196 - - Monetary system, confused state of, 175 - - Mongol invasions, 24, 25 - - Monopoly of foreign trade by Shōgunate, 62 - - Morals, instruction in, 295 - - Mōri, daimiō, 43; - murder of Viscount, 193 - - Morrison, Dr., 249 - - “Most-favoured-nation” treatment, 108 - - Mukden Agreement, the, 246, 253; - battle of, 263 - - Murder of Secretary of American Legation in Tōkiō, 55; - of German Minister and Chancellor of Japanese: Legation at Peking, - 242 - - Murders of British subjects and indemnities, 55 - - Mutsu, daimiō of, 33, 247 - - Mutsuhito, Emperor, succession of, 62; - message to foreign representatives, 118 - - - Nagasaki, Christianity at, 91 - - _Naidaijin_, 175 - - Nanshan, Russian defeat at, 261 - - Narusé, Mr., 295 - - National army, nucleus of, 82, 83 - - National banks, 176 - - National calendar, 71 - - National pride, 19 - - Naval reform, 219 - - Navy, conspicuous services of Japanese, during Great War, 282 - - Navy, state of, 82, 219 - - _Nengō_, or year-periods, 69, 70 - - New Government, form chosen for, 73; - first rupture in ministry, 122 - - Newchwang, occupation of, 221, 261 - - Newspaper editors and proprietors, responsibility of, 168 - - _Nichi Nichi Shimbun_, the, 166 - - Nichiren, Buddhist priest, 143 - - _Nichiren_ sect, the, 142 - - _Nihonbashi_, the, or Bridge of Japan, 182 - - Niigata, 107 - - Nitobé, Professor, 175 - - Nishi, Viscount, 255 - - _Niūdō_, 288 - - Nobunaga, 26–28, 145 - - Nodzu, General, 261 - - Nogi, General, 261 - - Normal schools, 297 - - Noto, province of, 166 - - - Oaths taken by the Emperor, 135, 187 - - Ōishi, leader of Forty-seven _rōnin_, 149 - - Ōki, 302 - - Oku, General, 260 - - Ōkubo, 74, 79, 80, 87, 129, 157, 301 - - Ōkuma, 74, 79, 99, 118, 140, 159, 165, 167, 174, 180, 182, 191, 193, - 200, 206, 239, 277, 299, 302 - - “Open door and equal opportunity,” principle of, 238, 245, 247, 252 - - “Open,” or “treaty,” “ports,” 48 - - Opposition, the, in first session of Diet, 194; - tactics of, 198 - - Origin of the Japanese, 17 - - Ōsaka Mint, the, 176 - - “Ōsaka summer campaign,” the, 32 - - Ōsaka combined squadron at, 61; - conference in, 137; - Governor of, 37; - postponed opening of, 107; - Shōgun’s withdrawal to, 63 - - Ouchtomsky, Prince, 229 - - Outstanding features in development of Japan, 304 - - Owari, Prince of, 50, 53, 64 - - Owari, province of, 33; - princely House of, 34, 72 - - Ōyama, Field-Marshal Prince, 218, 262, 302 - - Ozaki Yukiō, 165 - - - Paper money, 81, 175, 176, 177 - - Parental authority, 284 - - Parkes, Sir Harry, 60, 77 - - Parliament, decree to establish a, 162 - - Party government, desire for, and failure of, attempt to establish, 200 - - Party manifestos, 197 - - Peace Conference in Paris, Japan at the, 282 - - Peace Preservation Regulations (_Hō-an Jōrei_), 180, 181 - - Peerage, creation of new, 173 - - Penal Code, 158 - - Pensions, Feudal, 93; - commutation of, 96, 127 - - “Permanent Register,” the, 290 - - Perry, Commodore, 45, 49, 61, 62, 72 - - Persecutions, early Christian, 28, 30; - after-effect of, 55; - political character of, 120; - recrudescence of, 91 - - Philippine Islands, the, 235 - - Piggott, Sir Francis, 193 - - Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, 151 - - Ping-yang, Chinese defeat at, 220; - occupation of, in Russian war, 260 - - Pioneer colonization, Japanese failure in, 119 - - Plehve, 256 - - Political agitation, 155, 156, 178, 180, 194 - - Political Associations and Clubs, formation of, 155, 164 - - Political parties, formation of, 164; - collapse of first, 167; - reconstruction of, 194 - - Political rowdyism, 180 - - _Political Development of Japan, The_, 153 - - Pope, pretensions of the, 55 - - Pope Alexander VI, 27 - - Population, increase of, 269 - - Port Arthur, capture of, in Chinese war, 221; - investment of, 261; - in Russian war and fall of, 262; - leased to Russia, 231 - - Portsmouth Treaty, the, 264 - - Portugal, 27 - - Portuguese adventurers, 27 - - Powers, Foreign, attitude of, 65, 119; - regrouping of, 247 - - Prefects, annual conference of, 133, 156, 184 - - Prefectural assemblies, 134, 184 - - Prefectures, creation of, 89 - - Press, the, 154 - - Press law, 153, 180 - - “Prison Editors,” 167 - - Privy Council, the (_Sū-mitsu-in_), 182, 183 - - Pro-foreign tendencies, 123, 124, 179 - - Progressive opinion, 77; - and tendencies, 175 - - Provincial administration, feudal, 20, 36; - revision of, 134, 184 - - Public meetings and addresses, novelty of, 164 - - - Radical Party, beginnings of a, 137 - - Reactionaries and Reformers, aims of, 84, 135 - - Rebels, moderate treatment of, 77 - - Reclassification of land, 105 - - Reconstruction, work of, 134 - - Regent (Ïi Kamon no Kami), assassination of, 55 - - Regent, or _Sesshō_, 18 - - Regents, or _Shikken_, 24 - - Registration of land, 105 - - Registration, Law of, 283 - - Registration, status and residential, 291 - - Religion, Japanese attitude towards, 120, 140, 150 - - Religion, connection of, with reforms, 121, 139 - - Religions of Japan before Restoration, the four, 139 - - Religious festivals and pilgrimages, 305 - - Repression and reform, 158, 159 - - Residential and commercial rights of foreigners, limitations of, 48, - 204 - - Restoration, the, accomplishment of, 64; - movement for, 49, 50, 55, 61, 62, 63; - the work of four clans, 71, 83; - unique character of, 304 - - Restriction of public meeting and speech, 167 - - Resumption of specie payments, 175 - - Reventlow’s _Deutschland’s Auswärtige Politik_, 227 - - Revenues, feudal, acquired by Government, 93 - - Revised treaties put into force, 240 - - “Revival of Pure Shintō,” the, 145 - - Rice notes, 176 - - Richardson, Mr., murder of, 55 - - _Rikken-Kaishintō_, or Constitutional Reform Party, 165 - - _Rikken Teisei-to_, or Constitutional Imperialist Party, 166 - - _Riōbu Shintō_, fusion of Shintō and Buddhism, 143; - processions, 38 - - Rise of Japan and Germany compared, 274 - - Risings of ex-_Samurai_, 170 - - Rites and Ceremonies, Bureau of, 147 - - Rival Emperors, 26 - - Rockhill’s _Treaties and Conventions_, 229 - - _Rōnin_, 50, 60, 81 - - Roosevelt, President, mediation by, 264; - and school question, 266 - - Rosen, Baron, 255 - - Russia, activity of, in Siberia, 44; - attitude of, 65, 114; - war with, 257 - - Russian aims in Far East, 227; - Baltic fleet, 263; - loan to China, 226; - revolution, effect of, in Far East, 280 - - Russo-Chinese Bank, the, 228 - - - Sadaijin, 80 - - Saga, 124 - - “Sage of Mita, The,” 155 - - Saghalien, arrangement with Russia concerning, 126; - southern half ceded to Japan, 264 - - Saigō, the elder, 78, 79, 90, 121, 129, 132, 302 - - Saigō, the younger (General Marquis), 78, 125, 129, 174, 218 - - _Sa-in_, the, 80 - - Saionji, Marquis, 302 - - Salisbury, Lord, 207 - - _Samurai_, extinction of, as class, 89; - impoverished condition of, 95; - mischievous influence of disbanded, 152; - privileged position of, 195 - - Samurai, clanless (_see Rōnin_) - - San Francisco Board of Education, 266 - - _San-kin Kō-tai_, or system of alternate residence of daimiōs in Yedo - and their fiefs, 34; - cessation of, 81 - - Sanjikwai or Local Executive Councils, 185 - - Sanjō, Prince, 74, 79, 80, 90, 301 - - Sasébo, naval arsenal, 259 - - Satow, Feodor, Mr., 193 - - Satsuma and Chōshiū clans, alliance of, 172; - Japan ruled by, 133; - naval and military control vested in, 200 - - Satsuma clan, co-operation against Chōshiū, 59; - discontent in, 78, 79; - divided feeling in, 78; - federalists, 73; - mission of conciliation to, 82; - rebellion, 78, 130 - - Satsuma, daimiō of, 33; - ex-daimiō, 186 - - Satsuma faience, 30 - - “Satchō Government,” the, 153 - - School Question of California, the, 266 - - Schools, pre-Restoration, Buddhist, Government and private, 292 - - Schools, normal, “special” and technical, 294 - - _Secret Memoirs_, the, of Count Hayashi, 247 - - “Security of the Throne, The,” 181 - - _Sei-in_, or Council of State, 79, 101 - - _Sei-i-Tai-Shōgun_, 20 - - Séki-ga-hara, battle of, 32 - - Senate (_Genrō-in_), 137 - - Sendai, daimiō of, 30, 33 - - Seoul, 215 - - Shaho, River, battle of the, 262 - - Shibusawa, Baron, 177 - - Shigéno, Professor, 288 - - Shimabara, insurrection of, 30 - - Shimada Saburō, 165 - - Shimadzu Saburō, 55, 78, 79, 80, 127, 129, 130, 186 - - Shimoda, Mrs., 295 - - Shimoda, opening of, 46 - - Shimonoséki, Straits of, closing of, 57; - destruction of forts at, 58; - French arrangement regarding, 108 - - Shimonoséki, Treaty of, 222 - - _Shimpei_, or “New Soldiers,” 82 - - _Shin Nippon_, the, 277 - - _Shin_ sect, the, 142, 287 - - _Shingon_ sect, the, 143 - - Shinran Shōnin, Buddhist priest, 142 - - Shintō, Department of, 73; - Court religion, 147; - form of nature-worship, 139, 140; - funerals, 146 - - _Shizoku_, or gentry, 90; - discontent of, 126 - - Shōgun, the, creation of, 20; - absence of personal rule of, 21, 22, 23 - - Shōgunate, Tokugawa, authority of, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38; - decline of, 50; - fall of, 63, 64 - - Shōguns, mentioned, Yoritomo, 24; - Iyémitsu, 30; - Iyéyasu, 32; - Hidétada, 38; - Iyésada, 51; - Iyémochi, 56; - Kéiki, 62 - - Shōguns and Mikados, 23 - - Shōguns and Court nobles, relations between, 301 - - Shōgun’s domains, the, extent of, 36; - revenue from, 84 - - _Short Exhortation to the People, A_, 296 - - _Shoshidai_, or Shōguns, Resident in Kiōtō, 37 - - Shōtoku Taishi, Prince, 142 - - Sian-fu, flight of Chinese Court to, 242 - - Siberia, intervention of Allies in, in Great War, 281 - - Society, before Restoration, classification of, 20 - - “Society of Political Friends” (_Seiyūkai_), 201 - - Sōga family, the, 18 - - _Sōshi_, or political rowdies, 160, 202 - - Sovereign, impersonality of Japanese, 21 - - Sovereign, terms used to designate Japanese, 40 - - Soyéshima, Count, 121, 302 - - Spanish missionaries, 28 - - Specie payments, resumption of, 175 - - “Spheres of interest,” 237 - - State services, feudal (_Kokuyéki_), 34 - - Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 229 - - Stirling, Admiral, 46 - - Stoessel, General, 262 - - Succession to the throne, 190 - - Suiko, Empress, 142 - - Sung school of Confucianism, 150 - - Supreme administration, department of, 73 - - Surplus population, outlet for, 120 - - Swords, the wearing of, in Satsuma, 128 - - - Ta-lien-Wan leased to Russia, 231; - retreat of Chinese fleet to, 220, 228 - - _Taikun_ (_see_ Tycoon) - - Tai-wön-kun, the, Regent of Korea, 215 - - _Taigiōsho_, or ex-Shōgun, 39 - - Taira family, the, 20 - - Tairō, the, or Regent, 50, 52, 55 - - _Taishō_, or era of “Great Righteousness,” 70 - - Taku Forts, storming of the, 242 - - Takushan, 261 - - Tanégashima, 27 - - T’ang dynasty, the, 18 - - Taoism, 144 - - Tariff, amendment of, 61 - - Tariff autonomy, 272 - - Taxation, land, revision of, 99, 101, 104; - made uniform, 105 - - Technical schools, 297 - - _Tendai_ and _Shingon_, sects of Buddhism, 142, 143 - - Terashima, Count, 74 - - Territorial jurisdiction, the question of, 207 - - _Things Japanese_, 143 - - “Three Great Laws,” the, 156, 184 - - Throne, the, 18, 19; - constitutional prerogatives of, 188; - exalted respect for, 182; - ineffective authority of, 181; - intervention of, 201; - restricted rights of, 38; - subservience of, under Iyéyasu and his successors, 37 - - Tientsin Convention, the, 216 - - Tientsin, taking of, in Boxer campaign, 242 - - Time, methods of reckoning, 69, 70, 71 - - Ting, Admiral, 221 - - Title, to land, how determined, 105 - - Title-deeds, 100, 101, 105 - - Titles, in feudal times, territorial and official, 40, 42; - modern, 173 - - Tōgō, Admiral, 217, 259 - - Tokimuné (Hōjō Regent), 24 - - Tōkiō, or “Eastern Capital,” new name for Yedo, 79; - centre for political parties, 168 - - Tōkiō University, 293 - - Tokugawa Iyéyasu, first Tokugawa Shōgun, 32 - - Tokugawa Shōgunate, the, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37; - decline of, 50, 60; - fall of, 63, 64 - - Tonkin Frontier, rectification of the, 226 - - Torres, 27 - - Tosa clan, the, 71 - - Tosa, daimiō of, 33, 35, 50, 53, 63 - - Tosa and Hizen, political union of, 137 - - _Tozama_, daimiōs, 34 - - Trade, effect of, abolition of feudalism on, 94; - hampered state of, 82 - - Trade quarters in towns, 195 - - “Tranquillity of the People, The,” 181 - - Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 227 - - Transition, Japan in state of, 305 - - Treaties, first with Foreign Powers, 46; - revised treaties, 61; - new treaties, 209, 240, 272 - - Treaties, early working of, 108 - - “Treaty limits,” 48, 182 - - Treaty Ports, for foreign residence and trade, 48, 61 - - Treaty of Portsmouth, 264 - - Treaty Powers, sympathy of, with difficulties of Japanese Government, - 114 - - Treaty revision, agitation for, 110, 179; - early desire for, 48; - Conferences, 178; - course of negotiations, 204, 205, 206; - Great Britain takes initiative, 207, 209; - other Powers fall into line, 240 - - “Tribute,” exaction of, by new Government, 83 - - Tsarevitch, attempt on life of, 194 - - Tsushima Islands, 25 - - Tsushima Straits, naval battle in, 263 - - Tuan, Prince, 241 - - Twenty-one Demands, the, 278 - - Two-clan government, 133, 275 - - Tycoon, the (_Taikun_), 23, 46, 54, 64, 66 - - - _U-in_, 80 - - Udajin, 80 - - “Union for the establishment of a parliament,” 156 - - United States and Japan, friendly relations between, 265; - later friction, causes of, 265, 266 - - Universities, instruction in, 297 - - Uraga, Commodore Perry, at, 45 - - Uwajima, daimiō of, 50, 53 - - Uyéhara, Mr., 157 - - - Vendettas, 303 - - Vladivostok, Russian squadron at, 259, 262 - - - Waldersee, Count, 242 - - War taxes, imposed after Russian war, 105 - - Waséda College, the, 160 - - Weekly holiday, the, 71 - - Weihaiwei, retreat of Chinese fleet to, 220; - Japanese capture of, 221; - leased to Great Britain, 232 - - Western innovations, adoption of, 124 - - Western political literature, study of, 160 - - Western thought, the influence of, 297 - - Women, position of, 285; - education of, 294, 295 - - Women’s University, the, 295 - - Worship of animals, the, 141 - - Written language, Japanese, 18, 113, 268 - - - Xavier, 27; - his warning to Spain, 31 - - - Y.M.C.A. in Japan, 148 - - Yalu River, Russian defeat at the, 260 - - Yamaga Sokō, 149 - - Yamagata, Field-Marshal Prince, 174, 218, 221, 251, 255, 302 - - Yamaji, Mr. Y., 148 - - _Yamato Damashii_, or Japanese spirit, 150 - - Yano Fumiō, 165 - - _Yashikis_, or feudal residences, 53, 99 - - Yedo, seat of authority, 19, 66; - renamed Tōkiō, 79; - postponed opening of, 107 - - Yokohama, 46, 55, 58 - - Yoritomo, 20 - - Yuan Shih-kai, Chinese Resident in Seoul, 215, 241 - - - Printed in Great Britain at - _The Mayflower Press, Plymouth_. William Brendon & Son, Ltd. - 1922 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - _Demy 8vo. With Illustrations & Plans. Price 32s. Nett_ - - - - - A DIPLOMAT IN JAPAN - - The Inner History of the Critical Years in the Evolution of Japan when - the Ports were opened and the Monarchy restored, recorded by a - Diplomatist who took an active part in the events of the time, with an - account of his personal experiences during that period - - - BY - - THE RT. HON. SIR ERNEST SATOW - P.C., G.C.M.G., LL.D., D.C.L. - - British Minister at Peking, 1900–5 - Formerly Secretary of the British Legation at Tōkiō. - -[Illustration: - - The Family Crest of the TOKUGAWA SHŌGUNS. -] - - SOME EARLY REVIEWS. - - A truly remarkable series of impressions of memorable and notable - scenes. - _Sheffield - Independent._ - -“SIR ERNEST SATOW DESCRIBES ONE OF THE MOST FATEFUL CHAPTERS IN THE -HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST WITH THE AUTHORITY OF A CHIEF ACTOR in the -scenes that he narrates.... He played his part not infrequently at the -risk of his own life.”—_Times._ - -“The renascence of Japan is unique in modern history. Half a century -ago the country was governed by a feudal system more ancient than -mediævalism.... The story of this wonderful transformation is told by -Sir Ernest Satow who lived through it, and played a notable part in -bringing it about.... Sir Ernest Satow recalls and will preserve a -thousand details of a story the like of which has never been conceived -in fiction.... Like his friend and colleague, the late Lord Redesdale, -Sir Ernest Satow varied his official life in Japan with risky -excursions full of incident and unconventionality.... THE MOST -PICTURESQUE STORY OF A DIPLOMAT’S ADVENTURES THAT HAS APPEARED since -Lord Redesdale’s famous book, which was based in part upon Sir -Ernest’s lively diary.”—_Yorkshire Post._ - -“A REMARKABLE BOOK.... The author has the ability to make his history -interesting in the highest degree.... He saw everything that he wished -to see. He had business with all classes of people from the temporal and -spiritual rulers down to the humblest of the people.... Most -valuable.... A book to be read with interest and profit by all who have -to do with Japan.”—_Dundee Courier._ - -“Sir Ernest penetrated the veil.”—_London and China Express._ - -“Not the least interesting part of the book consists of the glimpses it -gives into the inner workings of diplomacy.”—_Manchester Guardian._ - - - - - AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES IN BORNEO - - A Description of the Lives, Habits & Customs of the Piratical - Head-Hunters of North Borneo, with an Account of Interesting Objects of - Prehistoric Antiquity discovered in the Island - - BY - - IVOR H. N. EVANS, B.A. - Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute. - -[Illustration: - - A BORNEAN HAT. -] - - _Demy 8vo._ _With Many Illustrations & a Map._ _21s. Net_ - - SOME EARLY REVIEWS. - -“Supremely absorbing.”—_Western Daily News._ - -“Contains an enormous amount of intensely interesting information about -North Borneo.”—_Sheffield Independent._ - -“AN ADMIRABLE BOOK FOR THE MANY WISTFUL WANDERERS WHOSE TRAVELLING MUST -PERFORCE BE DONE BY PROXY. A valuable contribution to anthropology, -handsomely Illustrated.”—_The Times._ - -“Amply stocked with most interesting and valuable information.”—_Glasgow -Herald._ - -“A BOOK OF RARE MERIT, full of quaint personal experiences, vivid -description, and shrewd comment.”—_Sunday Times._ - -“There are no more interesting primitive peoples than those in Borneo. -That they are or have been head-hunters makes them especially attractive -to the general reader, if not to their neighbours. Their tribal life, -moreover, is extraordinarily interesting. This is REALLY A VALUABLE -CONTRIBUTION to the study of these peoples.”—_Pall Mall Gazette._ - -“A valuable contribution to anthropology.”—_Scotsman._ - -“IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO QUOTE HERE THE HUNDRED AND ONE INTERESTING THINGS -WHICH ARE TO BE FOUND IN THIS BOOK. Messrs. Seeley, Service are to be -congratulated on publishing books which are so full of valuable -information, and at the same time so enjoyable to read.”—_Glasgow -Citizen._ - -“A fine volume. It presents the minutest details of the daily life and -habits, social conditions, superstitions etc., of a primitive people, -written by a man who had long experience of the people he describes. -There are many illustrations and a good map.”—_Newcastle Chronicle._ - - - - - IN UNKNOWN CHINA - - A Record of the Observations, Adventures and Experiences of a Pioneer of - Civilization During a Prolonged Sojourn Amongst the Wild and Unknown - Nosu Tribe of Western China - - - BY - - S. POLLARD - - Author of “In Tight Corners in China.” - -[Illustration] - - _Demy 8vo._ _With Many Illustrations & Maps._ _Price 25s. Nett_ - - SOME EARLY REVIEWS. - -“Fascinating, racy and humorous.”—_Aberdeen Journal._ - -“An amazing record of adventure. Mr. Pollard is delightful from every -point of view. By the valiance of his own heart and faith he wins -through.”—_Methodist Recorder._ - -“Mr. Pollard is not merely an interesting man, but a courageous one.... -The first white man to penetrate into Nosuland where live the bogey-men -of the Manchus.... This is a people that has struck terror into the -hearts of the neighbouring Chinese by the cruelty and the fierceness of -its valour.”—_Sketch._ - -“Mr. Pollard’s book is laid where dwell amid almost unpenetrable hills a -race the Chinese have never yet succeeded in subduing.”—_Western Morning -News._ - -“In addition to its engrossing matter, Mr. Pollard’s book has the -attraction of a bright and pleasant style, which reveals at times a -happy sense of humour, a characteristic feature not always very marked -in this branch of literature.”—_Glasgow Herald._ - -“Nosuland is a very interesting region.... Mr. Pollard has some awkward -experiences. That, of course, makes his narrative all the more lively -and interesting.”—_Liverpool Post._ - -“Mr. Pollard during his travels held his life in his hand from day to -day, and owed his ultimate safety to his own conciliatory -prudence.”—_Manchester Guardian._ - -“Full of adventure and strangeness, with many excellent -photographs.”—_Daily Mail._ - -“Very readable and valuable.... Admirably printed and generously -illustrated.”—_Bristol Times and Mirror._ - - - - - UNEXPLORED NEW GUINEA - - Travel, Adventure, and Observation amongst Head-Hunters and Cannibals of - the unexplored interior - - - BY - - WILFRID N. BEAVER - - For many years Resident Magistrate in Western New Guinea. - -[Illustration: - - A NEW GUINEA LAKATOI. -] - - _Demy 8vo._ _With 32 Illustrations & 4 Maps._ _Price 25s. Nett._ - - SOME EARLY REVIEWS. - -“A piquant and well illustrated book.”—_Graphic._ - -“A vivid and carefully detailed record in which humour and horror keep -company.”—_Dundee Advertiser._ - -“Mr. Beaver has contributed much of value and interest to the gradually -accumulating knowledge of New Guinea, and his premature death will prove -a great loss to the science of anthropology.”—A. C. HADDON, M.A., Sc.D., -F.R.S. - -“A most valuable and informing book describing a weirdly fascinating -country, and Mr. Beaver’s account is all the more valuable as it is the -only book that deals with the western division as a whole.”—_Aberdeen -Journal._ - -“A true explorer who achieved much. The book deals with its most -formidable division—the vast unknown West ... illustrated with unique -photographs, and told in simple, modest language which can hardly fail -to grip the reader.”—_Country Life._ - -“The Ukairavi people are cannibals who used literally to regard the -Morobai as a kind of larder from which supplies of fresh meat could be -obtained together with a little excitement in the hunting of their -victims.”—_Glasgow Herald._ - -“May be taken as the first standard work on the interior of New -Guinea ... contains a wealth of detail admirably illustrated. A really -valuable and at the same time an intensely interesting book.”—_Sheffield -Telegraph._ - - SEELEY, SERVICE & CO., LTD., 38 GREAT RUSSELL STREET, W.C. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- - - - - - TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES - - - 1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in - spelling. - 2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed. - 3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. - -*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN *** - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will -be renamed. - -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the -United States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part -of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm -concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, -and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following -the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use -of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for -copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very -easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation -of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project -Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away--you may -do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected -by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark -license, especially commercial redistribution. - -START: FULL LICENSE - -THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE -PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK - -To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free -distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work -(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full -Project Gutenberg-tm License available with this file or online at -www.gutenberg.org/license. - -Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to -and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property -(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all -the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or -destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your -possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a -Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound -by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the -person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph -1.E.8. - -1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be -used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who -agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few -things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See -paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this -agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below. - -1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the -Foundation" or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection -of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual -works in the collection are in the public domain in the United -States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the -United States and you are located in the United States, we do not -claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, -displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as -all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope -that you will support the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting -free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm -works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the -Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with the work. You can easily -comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the -same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg-tm License when -you share it without charge with others. - -1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern -what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are -in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, -check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this -agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, -distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any -other Project Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no -representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any -country other than the United States. - -1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: - -1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other -immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear -prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work -on which the phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the -phrase "Project Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, -performed, viewed, copied or distributed: - - This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and - most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no - restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it - under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this - eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the - United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where - you are located before using this eBook. - -1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is -derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not -contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the -copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in -the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are -redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase "Project -Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply -either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or -obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg-tm -trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted -with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution -must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any -additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms -will be linked to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works -posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the -beginning of this work. - -1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm -License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this -work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. - -1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this -electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without -prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with -active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project -Gutenberg-tm License. - -1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, -compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including -any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access -to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format -other than "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official -version posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm website -(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense -to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means -of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original "Plain -Vanilla ASCII" or other form. Any alternate format must include the -full Project Gutenberg-tm License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. - -1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, -performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works -unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. - -1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing -access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works -provided that: - -* You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from - the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method - you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed - to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he has - agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid - within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are - legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty - payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project - Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in - Section 4, "Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg - Literary Archive Foundation." - -* You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies - you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he - does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm - License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all - copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue - all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg-tm - works. - -* You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of - any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the - electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of - receipt of the work. - -* You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free - distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. - -1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work or group of works on different terms than -are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing -from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of -the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the Foundation as set -forth in Section 3 below. - -1.F. - -1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable -effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread -works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project -Gutenberg-tm collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may -contain "Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate -or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other -intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or -other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or -cannot be read by your equipment. - -1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right -of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project -Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project -Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all -liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal -fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT -LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE -PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE -TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE -LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR -INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH -DAMAGE. - -1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a -defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can -receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a -written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you -received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium -with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you -with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in -lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person -or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second -opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If -the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing -without further opportunities to fix the problem. - -1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth -in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS', WITH NO -OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT -LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. - -1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied -warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of -damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement -violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the -agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or -limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or -unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the -remaining provisions. - -1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the -trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone -providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in -accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the -production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm -electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, -including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of -the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this -or any Project Gutenberg-tm work, (b) alteration, modification, or -additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any -Defect you cause. - -Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm - -Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of -electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of -computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It -exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations -from people in all walks of life. - -Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the -assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's -goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will -remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project -Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure -and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future -generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see -Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at -www.gutenberg.org - -Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation - -The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit -501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the -state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal -Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification -number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by -U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. - -The Foundation's business office is located at 809 North 1500 West, -Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up -to date contact information can be found at the Foundation's website -and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact - -Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg -Literary Archive Foundation - -Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without -widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of -increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be -freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest -array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations -($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt -status with the IRS. - -The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating -charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United -States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a -considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up -with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations -where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND -DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular -state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate - -While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we -have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition -against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who -approach us with offers to donate. - -International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make -any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from -outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. - -Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation -methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other -ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To -donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate - -Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works - -Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project -Gutenberg-tm concept of a library of electronic works that could be -freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and -distributed Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of -volunteer support. - -Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed -editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in -the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not -necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper -edition. - -Most people start at our website which has the main PG search -facility: www.gutenberg.org - -This website includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, -including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary -Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to -subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. |