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diff --git a/old/umem10h.htm b/old/umem10h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd69c22 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/umem10h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7222 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Unconscious Memory</title> +</head> +<body> +<h2> +<a href="#startoftext">Unconscious Memory, by Samuel Butler</a> +</h2> +<pre> +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Unconscious Memory, by Samuel Butler +(#15 in our series by Samuel Butler) + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Unconscious Memory + +Author: Samuel Butler + +Release Date: October, 2004 [EBook #6605] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on December 30, 2002] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII +</pre> +<p><a name="startoftext"></a></p> +<p>Transcribed from the 1910 A. C. Fifield edition by David Price, email +ccx074@coventry.ac.uk</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<h1>UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY</h1> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<p>“As this paper contains nothing which deserves the name either +of experiment or discovery, and as it is, in fact, destitute of every +species of merit, we should have allowed it to pass among the multitude +of those articles which must always find their way into the collections +of a society which is pledged to publish two or three volumes every +year. . . . We wish to raise our feeble voice against innovations, +that can have no other effect than to check the progress of science, +and renew all those wild phantoms of the imagination which Bacon and +Newton put to flight from her temple.” - <i>Opening Paragraph +of a Review of</i> <i>Dr. Young’s Bakerian Lecture. Edinburgh +Review</i>, <i>January</i> 1803, p. 450.</p> +<p>“Young’s work was laid before the Royal society, and +was made the 1801 Bakerian Lecture. But he was before his time. +The second number of the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> contained an article +levelled against him by Henry (afterwards Lord) Brougham, and this was +so severe an attack that Young’s ideas were absolutely quenched +for fifteen years. Brougham was then only twenty-four years of +age. Young’s theory was reproduced in France by Fresnel. +In our days it is the accepted theory, and is found to explain all the +phenomena of light.” - <i>Times Report of a Lecture by Professor +Tyndall on Light</i>, <i>April</i> 27, 1880.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This Book<br />Is inscribed to<br />RICHARD GARNETT, ESQ.<br />(Of +the British Museum)<br />In grateful acknowledgment of the unwearying +kindness with which he has so often placed at my disposal his varied +store of information.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Contents:<br /> Note by R. A. Streatfeild<br /> Introduction +by Marcus Hartog<br /> Author’s Preface<br /> Unconscious +Memory</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>NOTE</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>For many years a link in the chain of Samuel Butler’s biological +works has been missing. “Unconscious Memory” was originally +published thirty years ago, but for fully half that period it has been +out of print, owing to the destruction of a large number of the unbound +sheets in a fire at the premises of the printers some years ago. +The present reprint comes, I think, at a peculiarly fortunate moment, +since the attention of the general public has of late been drawn to +Butler’s biological theories in a marked manner by several distinguished +men of science, notably by Dr. Francis Darwin, who, in his presidential +address to the British Association in 1908, quoted from the translation +of Hering’s address on “Memory as a Universal Function of +Original Matter,” which Butler incorporated into “Unconscious +Memory,” and spoke in the highest terms of Butler himself. +It is not necessary for me to do more than refer to the changed attitude +of scientific authorities with regard to Butler and his theories, since +Professor Marcus Hartog has most kindly consented to contribute an introduction +to the present edition of “Unconscious Memory,” summarising +Butler’s views upon biology, and defining his position in the +world of science. A word must be said as to the controversy between +Butler and Darwin, with which Chapter IV is concerned. I have +been told that in reissuing the book at all I am committing a grievous +error of taste, that the world is no longer interested in these “old, +unhappy far-off things and battles long ago,” and that Butler +himself, by refraining from republishing “Unconscious Memory,” +tacitly admitted that he wished the controversy to be consigned to oblivion. +This last suggestion, at any rate, has no foundation in fact. +Butler desired nothing less than that his vindication of himself against +what he considered unfair treatment should be forgotten. He would +have republished “Unconscious Memory” himself, had not the +latter years of his life been devoted to all-engrossing work in other +fields. In issuing the present edition I am fulfilling a wish +that he expressed to me shortly before his death.</p> +<p>R. A. STREATFEILD.<br /><i>April</i>, 1910.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>INTRODUCTION By Marcus Hartog, M.A. D.Sc., F.L.S., F.R.H.S.</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>In reviewing Samuel Butler’s works, “Unconscious Memory” +gives us an invaluable lead; for it tells us (Chaps. II, III) how the +author came to write the Book of the Machines in “Erewhon” +(1872), with its foreshadowing of the later theory, “Life and +Habit,” (1878), “Evolution, Old and New” (1879), as +well as “Unconscious Memory” (1880) itself. His fourth +book on biological theory was “Luck? or Cunning?” (1887). +<a name="citation0a"></a><a href="#footnote0a">{0a}</a></p> +<p>Besides these books, his contributions to biology comprise several +essays: “Remarks on Romanes’ <i>Mental Evolution in Animals</i>, +contained in “Selections from Previous Works” (1884) incorporated +into “Luck? or Cunning,” “The Deadlock in Darwinism” +<i>(Universal Review</i>, April-June, 1890), republished in the posthumous +volume of “Essays on Life, Art, and Science” (1904), and, +finally, some of the “Extracts from the Notebooks of the late +Samuel Butler,” edited by Mr. H. Festing Jones, now in course +of publication in the <i>New Quarterly Review.</i></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Of all these, “LIFE AND HABIT” (1878) is the most important, +the main building to which the other writings are buttresses or, at +most, annexes. Its teaching has been summarised in “Unconscious +Memory” in four main principles: “(1) the oneness of personality +between parent and offspring; (2) memory on the part of the offspring +of certain actions which it did when in the persons of its forefathers; +(3) the latency of that memory until it is rekindled by a recurrence +of the associated ideas; (4) the unconsciousness with which habitual +actions come to be performed.” To these we must add a fifth: +the purposiveness of the actions of living beings, as of the machines +which they make or select.</p> +<p>Butler tells (“Life and Habit,” p. 33) that he sometimes +hoped “that this book would be regarded as a valuable adjunct +to Darwinism.” He was bitterly disappointed in the event, +for the book, as a whole, was received by professional biologists as +a gigantic joke - a joke, moreover, not in the best possible taste. +True, its central ideas, largely those of Lamarck, had been presented +by Hering in 1870 (as Butler found shortly after his publication); they +had been favourably received, developed by Haeckel, expounded and praised +by Ray Lankester. Coming from Butler, they met with contumely, +even from such men as Romanes, who, as Butler had no difficulty in proving, +were unconsciously inspired by the same ideas - “<i>Nur mit ein +bischen ander’n Wörter</i>.”</p> +<p>It is easy, looking back, to see why “Life and Habit” +so missed its mark. Charles Darwin’s presentation of the +evolution theory had, for the first time, rendered it possible for a +“sound naturalist” to accept the doctrine of common descent +with divergence; and so given a real meaning to the term “natural +relationship,” which had forced itself upon the older naturalists, +despite their belief in special and independent creations. The +immediate aim of the naturalists of the day was now to fill up the gaps +in their knowledge, so as to strengthen the fabric of a unified biology. +For this purpose they found their actual scientific equipment so inadequate +that they were fully occupied in inventing fresh technique, and working +therewith at facts - save a few critics, such as St. George Mivart, +who was regarded as negligible, since he evidently held a brief for +a party standing outside the scientific world.</p> +<p>Butler introduced himself as what we now call “The Man in the +Street,” far too bare of scientific clothing to satisfy the Mrs. +Grundy of the domain: lacking all recognised tools of science and all +sense of the difficulties in his way, he proceeded to tackle the problems +of science with little save the deft pen of the literary expert in his +hand. His very failure to appreciate the difficulties gave greater +power to his work - much as Tartarin of Tarascon ascended the Jungfrau +and faced successfully all dangers of Alpine travel, so long as he believed +them to be the mere “blagues de réclame” of the wily +Swiss host. His brilliant qualities of style and irony themselves +told heavily against him. Was he not already known for having +written the most trenchant satire that had appeared since “Gulliver’s +Travels”? Had he not sneered therein at the very foundations +of society, and followed up its success by a pseudo-biography that had +taken in the “Record” and the “Rock”? +In “Life and Habit,” at the very start, he goes out of his +way to heap scorn at the respected names of Marcus Aurelius, Lord Bacon, +Goethe, Arnold of Rugby, and Dr. W. B. Carpenter. He expressed +the lowest opinion of the Fellows of the Royal Society. To him +the professional man of science, with self-conscious knowledge for his +ideal and aim, was a medicine-man, priest, augur - useful, perhaps, +in his way, but to be carefully watched by all who value freedom of +thought and person, lest with opportunity he develop into a persecutor +of the worst type. Not content with blackguarding the audience +to whom his work should most appeal, he went on to depreciate that work +itself and its author in his finest vein of irony. Having argued +that our best and highest knowledge is that of whose possession we are +most ignorant, he proceeds: “Above all, let no unwary reader do +me the injustice of believing in me. In that I write at all I +am among the damned.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>His writing of “EVOLUTION, OLD AND NEW” (1879) was due +to his conviction that scant justice had been done by Charles Darwin +and Alfred Wallace and their admirers to the pioneering work of Buffon, +Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck. To repair this he gives a brilliant +exposition of what seemed to him the most valuable portion of their +teachings on evolution. His analysis of Buffon’s true meaning, +veiled by the reticences due to the conditions under which he wrote, +is as masterly as the English in which he develops it. His sense +of wounded justice explains the vigorous polemic which here, as in all +his later writings, he carries to the extreme.</p> +<p>As a matter of fact, he never realised Charles Darwin’s utter +lack of sympathetic understanding of the work of his French precursors, +let alone his own grandfather, Erasmus. Yet this practical ignorance, +which to Butler was so strange as to transcend belief, was altogether +genuine, and easy to realise when we recall the position of Natural +Science in the early thirties in Darwin’s student days at Cambridge, +and for a decade or two later. Catastropharianism was the tenet +of the day: to the last it commended itself to his Professors of Botany +and Geology, - for whom Darwin held the fervent allegiance of the Indian +scholar, or <i>chela</i>, to his <i>guru</i>. As Geikie has recently +pointed out, it was only later, when Lyell had shown that the breaks +in the succession of the rocks were only partial and local, without +involving the universal catastrophes that destroyed all life and rendered +fresh creations thereof necessary, that any general acceptance of a +descent theory could be expected. We may be very sure that Darwin +must have received many solemn warnings against the dangerous speculations +of the “French Revolutionary School.” He himself was +far too busy at the time with the reception and assimilation of new +facts to be awake to the deeper interest of far-reaching theories.</p> +<p>It is the more unfortunate that Butler’s lack of appreciation +on these points should have led to the enormous proportion of bitter +personal controversy that we find in the remainder of his biological +writings. Possibly, as suggested by George Bernard Shaw, his acquaintance +and admirer, he was also swayed by philosophical resentment at that +banishment of mind from the organic universe, which was generally thought +to have been achieved by Charles Darwin’s theory. Still, +we must remember that this mindless view is not implicit in Charles +Darwin’s presentment of his own theory, nor was it accepted by +him as it has been by so many of his professed disciples.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY” (1880). - We have already alluded +to an anticipation of Butler’s main theses. In 1870 Dr. +Ewald Hering, one of the most eminent physiologists of the day, Professor +at Vienna, gave an Inaugural Address to the Imperial Royal Academy of +Sciences: “Das Gedächtniss als allgemeine Funktion der organisirter +Substanz” (“Memory as a Universal Function of Organised +Matter”). When “Life and Habit” was well advanced, +Francis Darwin, at the time a frequent visitor, called Butler’s +attention to this essay, which he himself only knew from an article +in “Nature.” Herein Professor E. Ray Lankester had +referred to it with admiring sympathy in connection with its further +development by Haeckel in a pamphlet entitled “Die Perigenese +der Plastidule.” We may note, however, that in his collected +Essays, “The Advancement of Science” (1890), Sir Ray Lankester, +while including this Essay, inserts on the blank page <a name="citation0b"></a><a href="#footnote0b">{0b}</a> +- we had almost written “the white sheet” - at the back +of it an apology for having ever advocated the possibility of the transmission +of acquired characters.</p> +<p>“Unconscious Memory” was largely written to show the +relation of Butler’s views to Hering’s, and contains an +exquisitely written translation of the Address. Hering does, indeed, +anticipate Butler, and that in language far more suitable to the persuasion +of the scientific public. It contains a subsidiary hypothesis +that memory has for its mechanism special vibrations of the protoplasm, +and the acquired capacity to respond to such vibrations once felt upon +their repetition. I do not think that the theory gains anything +by the introduction of this even as a mere formal hypothesis; and there +is no evidence for its being anything more. Butler, however, gives +it a warm, nay, enthusiastic, reception in Chapter V (Introduction to +Professor Hering’s lecture), and in his notes to the translation +of the Address, which bulks so large in this book, but points out that +he was “not committed to this hypothesis, though inclined to accept +it on a <i>prima facie</i> view.” Later on, as we shall +see, he attached more importance to it.</p> +<p>The Hering Address is followed in “Unconscious Memory” +by translations of selected passages from Von Hartmann’s “Philosophy +of the Unconscious,” and annotations to explain the difference +from this personification of “<i>The Unconscious</i>” as +a mighty all-ruling, all-creating personality, and his own scientific +recognition of the great part played by <i>unconscious processes</i> +in the region of mind and memory.</p> +<p>These are the essentials of the book as a contribution to biological +philosophy. The closing chapters contain a lucid statement of +objections to his theory as they might be put by a rigid necessitarian, +and a refutation of that interpretation as applied to human action.</p> +<p>But in the second chapter Butler states his recession from the strong +logical position he had hitherto developed in his writings from “Erewhon” +onwards; so far he had not only distinguished the living from the non-living, +but distinguished among the latter <i>machines</i> or <i>tools</i> from +<i>things at large</i>. <a name="citation0c"></a><a href="#footnote0c">{0c}</a> +Machines or tools are the external organs of living beings, as organs +are their internal machines: they are fashioned, assembled, or selected +by the beings for a purposes so they have a <i>future purpose</i>, as +well as a <i>past history</i>. “Things at large” have +a past history, but no purpose (so long as some being does not convert +them into tools and give them a purpose): Machines have a Why? as well +as a How?: “things at large” have a How? only.</p> +<p>In “Unconscious Memory” the allurements of unitary or +monistic views have gained the upper hand, and Butler writes (p. 23):-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“The only thing of which I am sure is, that the distinction +between the organic and inorganic is arbitrary; that it is more coherent +with our other ideas, and therefore more acceptable, to start with every +molecule as a living thing, and then deduce death as the breaking up +of an association or corporation, than to start with inanimate molecules +and smuggle life into them; and that, therefore, what we call the inorganic +world must be regarded as up to a certain point living, and instinct, +within certain limits, with consciousness, volition, and power of concerted +action. <i>It is only of late, however, that I have come to this +opinion</i>.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I have italicised the last sentence, to show that Butler was more +or less conscious of its irreconcilability with much of his most characteristic +doctrine. Again, in the closing chapter, Butler writes (p. 275):-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“We should endeavour to see the so-called inorganic as living +in respect of the qualities it has in common with the organic, rather +than the organic as non-living in respect of the qualities it has in +common with the inorganic.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>We conclude our survey of this book by mentioning the literary controversial +part chiefly to be found in Chapter IV, but cropping up elsewhere. +It refers to interpolations made in the authorised translation of Krause’s +“Life of Erasmus Darwin.” Only one side is presented; +and we are not called upon, here or elsewhere, to discuss the merits +of the question.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“LUCK, OR CUNNING, as the Main Means of Organic Modification? +an Attempt to throw Additional Light upon the late Mr. Charles Darwin’s +Theory of Natural Selection” (1887), completes the series of biological +books. This is mainly a book of strenuous polemic. It brings +out still more forcibly the Hering-Butler doctrine of continued personality +from generation to generation, and of the working of unconscious memory +throughout; and points out that, while this is implicit in much of the +teaching of Herbert Spencer, Romanes, and others, it was nowhere - even +after the appearance of “Life and Habit” - explicitly recognised +by them, but, on the contrary, masked by inconsistent statements and +teaching. Not Luck but Cunning, not the uninspired weeding out +by Natural Selection but the intelligent striving of the organism, is +at the bottom of the useful variety of organic life. And the parallel +is drawn that not the happy accident of time and place, but the Machiavellian +cunning of Charles Darwin, succeeded in imposing, as entirely his own, +on the civilised world an uninspired and inadequate theory of evolution +wherein luck played the leading part; while the more inspired and inspiring +views of the older evolutionists had failed by the inferiority of their +luck. On this controversy I am bound to say that I do not in the +very least share Butler’s opinions; and I must ascribe them to +his lack of personal familiarity with the biologists of the day and +their modes of thought and of work. Butler everywhere undervalues +the important work of elimination played by Natural Selection in its +widest sense.</p> +<p>The “Conclusion” of “Luck, or Cunning?” shows +a strong advance in monistic views, and a yet more marked development +in the vibration hypothesis of memory given by Hering and only adopted +with the greatest reserve in “Unconscious Memory.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Our conception, then, concerning the nature of any matter +depends solely upon its kind and degree of unrest, that is to say, on +the characteristics of the vibrations that are going on within it. +The exterior object vibrating in a certain way imparts some of its vibrations +to our brain; but if the state of the thing itself depends upon its +vibrations, it [the thing] must be considered as to all intents and +purposes the vibrations themselves - plus, of course, the underlying +substance that is vibrating. . . . The same vibrations, therefore, +form the substance remembered, introduce an infinitesimal dose of it +within the brain, modify the substance remembering, and, in the course +of time, create and further modify the mechanism of both the sensory +and the motor nerves. Thought and thing are one.</p> +<p>“I commend these two last speculations to the reader’s +charitable consideration, as feeling that I am here travelling beyond +the ground on which I can safely venture. . . . I believe they +are both substantially true.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>In 1885 he had written an abstract of these ideas in his notebooks +(see <i>New Quarterly Review</i>, 1910, p. 116), and as in “Luck, +or Cunning?” associated them vaguely with the unitary conceptions +introduced into chemistry by Newlands and Mendelejeff. Judging +himself as an outsider, the author of “Life and Habit” would +certainly have considered the mild expression of faith, “I believe +they are both substantially true,” equivalent to one of extreme +doubt. Thus “the fact of the Archbishop’s recognising +this as among the number of his beliefs is conclusive evidence, with +those who have devoted attention to the laws of thought, that his mind +is not yet clear” on the matter of the belief avowed (see “Life +and Habit,” pp. 24, 25).</p> +<p>To sum up: Butler’s fundamental attitude to the vibration hypothesis +was all through that taken in “Unconscious Memory”; he played +with it as a pretty pet, and fancied it more and more as time went on; +but instead of backing it for all he was worth, like the main theses +of “Life and Habit,” he put a big stake on it - and then +hedged.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The last of Butler’s biological writings is the Essay, “THE +DEADLOCK IN DARWINISM,” containing much valuable criticism on +Wallace and Weismann. It is in allusion to the misnomer of Wallace’s +book, “Darwinism,” that he introduces the term “Wallaceism” +<a name="citation0d"></a><a href="#footnote0d">{0d}</a> for a theory +of descent that excludes the transmission of acquired characters. +This was, indeed, the chief factor that led Charles Darwin to invent +his hypothesis of pangenesis, which, unacceptable as it has proved, +had far more to recommend it as a formal hypothesis than the equally +formal germ-plasm hypothesis of Weismann.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The chief difficulty in accepting the main theses of Butler and Hering +is one familiar to every biologist, and not at all difficult to understand +by the layman. Everyone knows that the complicated beings that +we term “Animals” and “Plants,” consist of a +number of more or less individualised units, the cells, each analogous +to a simpler being, a Protist - save in so far as the character of the +cell unit of the Higher being is modified in accordance with the part +it plays in that complex being as a whole. Most people, too, are +familiar with the fact that the complex being starts as a single cell, +separated from its parent; or, where bisexual reproduction occurs, from +a cell due to the fusion of two cells, each detached from its parent. +Such cells are called “Germ-cells.” The germ-cell, +whether of single or of dual origin, starts by dividing repeatedly, +so as to form the <i>primary embryonic cells</i>, a complex mass of +cells, at first essentially similar, which, however, as they go on multiplying, +undergo differentiations and migrations, losing their simplicity as +they do so. Those cells that are modified to take part in the +proper work of the whole are called tissue-cells. In virtue of +their activities, their growth and reproductive power are limited - +much more in Animals than in Plants, in Higher than in Lower beings. +It is these tissues, or some of them, that receive the impressions from +the outside which leave the imprint of memory. Other cells, which +may be closely associated into a continuous organ, or more or less surrounded +by tissue-cells, whose part it is to nourish them, are called “secondary +embryonic cells,” or “germ-cells.” The germ-cells +may be differentiated in the young organism at a very early stage, but +in Plants they are separated at a much later date from the less isolated +embryonic regions that provide for the Plant’s branching; in all +cases we find embryonic and germ-cells screened from the life processes +of the complex organism, or taking no very obvious part in it, save +to form new tissues or new organs, notably in Plants.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Again, in ourselves, and to a greater or less extent in all Animals, +we find a system of special tissues set apart for the reception and +storage of impressions from the outer world, and for guiding the other +organs in their appropriate responses - the “Nervous System”; +and when this system is ill-developed or out of gear the remaining organs +work badly from lack of proper skilled guidance and co-ordination. +How can we, then, speak of “memory” in a germ-cell which +has been screened from the experiences of the organism, which is too +simple in structure to realise them if it were exposed to them? +My own answer is that we cannot form any theory on the subject, the +only question is whether we have any right to <i>infer</i> this “memory” +from the <i>behaviour</i> of living beings; and Butler, like Hering, +Haeckel, and some more modern authors, has shown that the inference +is a very strong presumption. Again, it is easy to over-value +such complex instruments as we possess. The possessor of an up-to-date +camera, well instructed in the function and manipulation of every part, +but ignorant of all optics save a hand-to-mouth knowledge of the properties +of his own lens, might say that <i>a priori</i> no picture could be +taken with a cigar-box perforated by a pin-hole; and our ignorance of +the mechanism of the Psychology of any organism is greater by many times +than that of my supposed photographer. We know that Plants are +able to do many things that can only be accounted for by ascribing to +them a “psyche,” and these co-ordinated enough to satisfy +their needs; and yet they possess no central organ comparable to the +brain, no highly specialised system for intercommunication like our +nerve trunks and fibres. As Oscar Hertwig says, we are as ignorant +of the mechanism of the development of the individual as we are of that +of hereditary transmission of acquired characters, and the absence of +such mechanism in either case is no reason for rejecting the proven +fact.</p> +<p>However, the relations of germ and body just described led Jäger, +Nussbaum, Galton, Lankester, and, above all, Weismann, to the view that +the germ-cells or “stirp” (Galton) were <i>in</i> the body, +but not <i>of</i> it. Indeed, in the body and out of it, whether +as reproductive cells set free, or in the developing embryo, they are +regarded as forming one continuous homogeneity, in contrast to the differentiation +of the body; and it is to these cells, regarded as a continuum, that +the terms stirp, germ-plasm, are especially applied. Yet on this +view, so eagerly advocated by its supporters, we have to substitute +for the hypothesis of memory, which they declare to have no real meaning +here, the far more fantastic hypotheses of Weismann: by these they explain +the process of differentiation in the young embryo into new germ and +body; and in the young body the differentiation of its cells, each in +due time and place, into the varied tissue cells and organs. Such +views might perhaps be acceptable if it could be shown that over each +cell-division there presided a wise all-guiding genie of transcending +intellect, to which Clerk-Maxwell’s sorting demons were mere infants. +Yet these views have so enchanted many distinguished biologists, that +in dealing with the subject they have actually ignored the existence +of equally able workers who hesitate to share the extremest of their +views. The phenomenon is one well known in hypnotic practice. +So long as the non-Weismannians deal with matters outside this discussion, +their existence and their work is rated at its just value; but any work +of theirs on this point so affects the orthodox Weismannite (whether +he accept this label or reject it does not matter), that for the time +being their existence and the good work they have done are alike non-existent. +<a name="citation0e"></a><a href="#footnote0e">{0e}</a></p> +<p>Butler founded no school, and wished to found none. He desired +that what was true in his work should prevail, and he looked forward +calmly to the time when the recognition of that truth and of his share +in advancing it should give him in the lives of others that immortality +for which alone he craved.</p> +<p>Lamarckian views have never lacked defenders here and in America. +Of the English, Herbert Spencer, who however, was averse to the vitalistic +attitude, Vines and Henslow among botanists, Cunningham among zoologists, +have always resisted Weismannism; but, I think, none of these was distinctly +influenced by Hering and Butler. In America the majority of the +great school of palæontologists have been strong Lamarckians, +notably Cope, who has pointed out, moreover, that the transformations +of energy in living beings are peculiar to them.</p> +<p>We have already adverted to Haeckel’s acceptance and development +of Hering’s ideas in his “Perigenese der Plastidule.” +Oscar Hertwig has been a consistent Lamarckian, like Yves Delage of +the Sorbonne, and these occupy pre-eminent positions not only as observers, +but as discriminating theorists and historians of the recent progress +of biology. We may also cite as a Lamarckian - of a sort - Felix +Le Dantec, the leader of the chemico-physical school of the present +day.</p> +<p>But we must seek elsewhere for special attention to the points which +Butler regarded as the essentials of “Life and Habit.” +In 1893 Henry P. Orr, Professor of Biology in the University of Louisiana, +published a little book entitled “A Theory of Heredity.” +Herein he insists on the nervous control of the whole body, and on the +transmission to the reproductive cells of such stimuli, received by +the body, as will guide them on their path until they shall have acquired +adequate experience of their own in the new body they have formed. +I have found the name of neither Butler nor Hering, but the treatment +is essentially on their lines, and is both clear and interesting.</p> +<p>In 1896 I wrote an essay on “The Fundamental Principles of +Heredity,” primarily directed to the man in the street. +This, after being held over for more than a year by one leading review, +was “declined with regret,” and again after some weeks met +the same fate from another editor. It appeared in the pages of +“Natural Science” for October, 1897, and in the “Biologisches +Centralblatt” for the same year. I reproduce its closing +paragraph:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“This theory [Hering-Butler’s] has, indeed, a tentative +character, and lacks symmetrical completeness, but is the more welcome +as not aiming at the impossible. A whole series of phenomena in +organic beings are correlated under the term of <i>memory</i>, <i>conscious +and unconscious</i>, <i>patent and latent</i>. . . . Of the order +of unconscious memory, latent till the arrival of the appropriate stimulus, +is all the co-operative growth and work of the organism, including its +development from the reproductive cells. Concerning the <i>modus +operandi</i> we know nothing: the phenomena may be due, as Hering suggests, +to molecular vibrations, which must be at least as distinct from ordinary +physical disturbances as Röntgen’s rays are from ordinary +light; or it may be correlated, as we ourselves are inclined to think, +with complex chemical changes in an intricate but orderly succession. +For the present, at least, the problem of heredity can only be elucidated +by the light of mental, and not material processes.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>It will be seen that I express doubts as to the validity of Hering’s +invocation of molecular vibrations as the mechanism of memory, and suggest +as an alternative rhythmic chemical changes. This view has recently +been put forth in detail by J. J. Cunningham in his essay on the “Hormone +<a name="citation0f"></a><a href="#footnote0f">{0f}</a> Theory of Heredity,” +in the <i>Archiv für Entwicklungsmechanik</i> (1909), but I have +failed to note any direct effect of my essay on the trend of biological +thought.</p> +<p>Among post-Darwinian controversies the one that has latterly assumed +the greatest prominence is that of the relative importance of small +variations in the way of more or less “fluctuations,” and +of “discontinuous variations,” or “mutations,” +as De Vries has called them. Darwin, in the first four editions +of the “Origin of Species,” attached more importance to +the latter than in subsequent editions; he was swayed in his attitude, +as is well known, by an article of the physicist, Fleeming Jenkin, which +appeared in the <i>North British Review</i>. The mathematics of +this article were unimpeachable, but they were founded on the assumption +that exceptional variations would only occur in single individuals, +which is, indeed, often the case among those domesticated races on which +Darwin especially studied the phenomena of variation. Darwin was +no mathematician or physicist, and we are told in his biography that +he regarded every tool-shop rule or optician’s thermometer as +an instrument of precision: so he appears to have regarded Fleeming +Jenkin’s demonstration as a mathematical deduction which he was +bound to accept without criticism.</p> +<p>Mr. William Bateson, late Professor of Biology in the University +of Cambridge, as early as 1894 laid great stress on the importance of +discontinuous variations, collecting and collating the known facts in +his “Materials for the Study of Variations”; but this important +work, now become rare and valuable, at the time excited so little interest +as to be ‘remaindered’ within a very few years after publication.</p> +<p>In 1901 Hugo De Vries, Professor of Botany in the University of Amsterdam, +published “Die Mutationstheorie,” wherein he showed that +mutations or discontinuous variations in various directions may appear +simultaneously in many individuals, and in various directions. +In the gardener’s phrase, the species may take to sporting in +various directions at the same time, and each sport may be represented +by numerous specimens.</p> +<p>De Vries shows the probability that species go on for long periods +showing only fluctuations, and then suddenly take to sporting in the +way described, short periods of mutation alternating with long intervals +of relative constancy. It is to mutations that De Vries and his +school, as well as Luther Burbank, the great former of new fruit- and +flower-plants, look for those variations which form the material of +Natural Selection. In “God the Known and God the Unknown,” +which appeared in the <i>Examiner</i> (May, June, and July), 1879, but +though then revised was only published posthumously in 1909, Butler +anticipates this distinction:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Under these circumstances organism must act in one or other +of these two ways: it must either change slowly and continuously with +the surroundings, paying cash for everything, meeting the smallest change +with a corresponding modification, so far as is found convenient, or +it must put off change as long as possible, and then make larger and +more sweeping changes.</p> +<p>“Both these courses are the same in principle, the difference +being one of scale, and the one being a miniature of the other, as a +ripple is an Atlantic wave in little; both have their advantages and +disadvantages, so that most organisms will take the one course for one +set of things and the other for another. They will deal promptly +with things which they can get at easily, and which lie more upon the +surface; <i>those, however, which are more troublesome to reach, and +lie deeper, will be handled upon more cataclysmic principles, being +allowed longer periods of repose followed by short periods of greater +activity</i> . . . it may be questioned whether what is called a sport +is not the organic expression of discontent which has been long felt, +but which has not been attended to, nor been met step by step by as +much small remedial modification as was found practicable: so that when +a change does come it comes by way of revolution. Or, again (only +that it comes to much the same thing), it may be compared to one of +those happy thoughts which sometimes come to us unbidden after we have +been thinking for a long time what to do, or how to arrange our ideas, +and have yet been unable to come to any conclusion” (pp. 14, 15). +<a name="citation0g"></a><a href="#footnote0g">{0g}</a></p> +<p>We come to another order of mind in Hans Driesch. At the time +he began his work biologists were largely busy in a region indicated +by Darwin, and roughly mapped out by Haeckel - that of phylogeny. +From the facts of development of the individual, from the comparison +of fossils in successive strata, they set to work at the construction +of pedigrees, and strove to bring into line the principles of classification +with the more or less hypothetical “stemtrees.” Driesch +considered this futile, since we never could reconstruct from such evidence +anything certain in the history of the past. He therefore asserted +that a more complete knowledge of the physics and chemistry of the organic +world might give a scientific explanation of the phenomena, and maintained +that the proper work of the biologist was to deepen our knowledge in +these respects. He embodied his views, seeking the explanation +on this track, filling up gaps and tracing projected roads along lines +of probable truth in his “Analytische Theorie der organische Entwicklung.” +But his own work convinced him of the hopelessness of the task he had +undertaken, and he has become as strenuous a vitalist as Butler. +The most complete statement of his present views is to be found in “The +Philosophy of Life” (1908-9), being the Giffold Lectures for 1907-8. +Herein he postulates a quality (“psychoid”) in all living +beings, directing energy and matter for the purpose of the organism, +and to this he applies the Aristotelian designation “Entelechy.” +The question of the transmission of acquired characters is regarded +as doubtful, and he does not emphasise - if he accepts - the doctrine +of continuous personality. His early youthful impatience with +descent theories and hypotheses has, however, disappeared.</p> +<p>In the next work the influence of Hering and Butler is definitely +present and recognised. In 1906 Signor Eugenio Rignano, an engineer +keenly interested in all branches of science, and a little later the +founder of the international review, <i>Rivistà di Scienza</i> +(now simply called <i>Scientia</i>), published in French a volume entitled +“Sur la transmissibilité des Caractères acquis - +Hypothèse d’un Centro-épigenèse.” +Into the details of the author’s work we will not enter fully. +Suffice it to know that he accepts the Hering-Butler theory, and makes +a distinct advance on Hering’s rather crude hypothesis of persistent +vibrations by suggesting that the remembering centres store slightly +different forms of energy, to give out energy of the same kind as they +have received, like electrical accumulators. The last chapter, +“Le Phénomène mnémonique et le Phénomène +vital,” is frankly based on Hering.</p> +<p>In “The Lesson of Evolution” (1907, posthumous, and only +published for private circulation) Frederick Wollaston Hutton, F.R.S., +late Professor of Biology and Geology, first at Dunedin and after at +Christchurch, New Zealand, puts forward a strongly vitalistic view, +and adopts Hering’s teaching. After stating this he adds, +“The same idea of heredity being due to unconscious memory was +advocated by Mr. Samuel Butler in his “Life and Habit.”</p> +<p>Dr. James Mark Baldwin, Stuart Professor of Psychology in Princeton +University, U.S.A., called attention early in the 90’s to a reaction +characteristic of all living beings, which he terms the “Circular +Reaction.” We take his most recent account of this from +his “Development and Evolution” (1902):- <a name="citation0h"></a><a href="#footnote0h">{0h}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“The general fact is that the organism reacts by concentration +upon the locality stimulated for the <i>continuance</i> of the conditions, +movements, stimulations, <i>which are vitally beneficial</i>, and for +the cessation of the conditions, movements, stimulations <i>which are +vitally depressing</i>.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This amounts to saying in the terminology of Jenning (see below) +that the living organism alters its “physiological states” +either for its direct benefit, or for its indirect benefit in the reduction +of harmful conditions.</p> +<p>Again:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“This form of concentration of energy on stimulated localities, +with the resulting renewal through movement of conditions that are pleasure-giving +and beneficial, and the consequent repetition of the movements is called +‘circular reaction.’”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Of course, the inhibition of such movements as would be painful on +repetition is merely the negative case of the circular reaction. +We must not put too much of our own ideas into the author’s mind; +he nowhere says explicitly that the animal or plant shows its sense +and does this because it likes the one thing and wants it repeated, +or dislikes the other and stops its repetition, as Butler would have +said. Baldwin is very strong in insisting that no full explanation +can be given of living processes, any more than of history, on purely +chemico-physical grounds.</p> +<p>The same view is put differently and independently by H. S. Jennings, +<a name="citation0i"></a><a href="#footnote0i">{0i}</a> who started +his investigations of living Protista, the simplest of living beings, +with the idea that only accurate and ample observation was needed to +enable us to explain all their activities on a mechanical basis, and +devised ingenious models of protoplastic movements. He was led, +like Driesch, to renounce such efforts as illusory, and has come to +the conviction that in the behaviour of these lowly beings there is +a purposive and a tentative character - a method of “trial and +error” - that can only be interpreted by the invocation of psychology. +He points out that after stimulation the “state” of the +organism may be altered, so that the response to the same stimulus on +repetition is other. Or, as he puts it, the first stimulus has +caused the organism to pass into a new “physiological state.” +As the change of state from what we may call the “primary indifferent +state” is advantageous to the organism, we may regard this as +equivalent to the doctrine of the “circular reaction,” and +also as containing the essence of Semon’s doctrine of “engrams” +or imprints which we are about to consider. We cite one passage +which for audacity of thought (underlying, it is true, most guarded +expression) may well compare with many of the boldest flights in “Life +and Habit”:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“It may be noted that regulation in the manner we have set +forth is what, in the behaviour of higher organisms, at least, is called +intelligence [the examples have been taken from Protista, Corals, and +the Lowest Worms]. If the same method of regulation is found in +other fields, there is no reason for refusing to compare the action +to intelligence. Comparison of the regulatory processes that are +shown in internal physiological changes and in regeneration to intelligence +seems to be looked upon sometimes as heretical and unscientific. +Yet intelligence is a name applied to processes that actually exist +in the regulation of movements, and there is, <i>a priori</i>, no reason +why similar processes should not occur in regulation in other fields. +When we analyse regulation objectively there seems indeed reason to +think that the processes are of the same character in behaviour as elsewhere. +If the term intelligence be reserved for the subjective accompaniments +of such regulation, then of course we have no direct knowledge of its +existence in any of the fields of regulation outside of the self, and +in the self perhaps only in behaviour. But in a purely objective +consideration there seems no reason to suppose that regulation in behaviour +(intelligence) is of a fundamentally different character from regulation +elsewhere.” (“Method of Regulation,” p. 492.)</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Jennings makes no mention of questions of the theory of heredity. +He has made some experiments on the transmission of an acquired character +in Protozoa; but it was a mutilation-character, which is, as has been +often shown, <a name="citation0j"></a><a href="#footnote0j">{0j}</a> +not to the point.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>One of the most obvious criticisms of Hering’s exposition is +based upon the extended use he makes of the word “Memory”: +this he had foreseen and deprecated.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“We have a perfect right,” he says, “to extend +our conception of memory so as to make it embrace involuntary [and also +unconscious] reproductions of sensations, ideas, perceptions, and efforts; +but we find, on having done so, that we have so far enlarged her boundaries +that she proves to be an ultimate and original power, the source and, +at the same time, the unifying bond, of our whole conscious life.” +(“Unconscious Memory,” p. 68.)</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This sentence, coupled with Hering’s omission to give to the +concept of memory so enlarged a new name, clear alike of the limitations +and of the stains of habitual use, may well have been the inspiration +of the next work on our list. Richard Semon is a professional +zoologist and anthropologist of such high status for his original observations +and researches in the mere technical sense, that in these countries +he would assuredly have been acclaimed as one of the Fellows of the +Royal Society who were Samuel Butler’s special aversion. +The full title of his book is “DIE MNEME als erhaltende Prinzip +im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens” (Munich, Ed. 1, 1904; +Ed. 2, 1908). We may translate it “MNEME, a Principle of +Conservation in the Transformations of Organic Existence.”</p> +<p>From this I quote in free translation the opening passage of Chapter +II:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“We have shown that in very many cases, whether in Protist, +Plant, or Animal, when an organism has passed into an indifferent state +after the reaction to a stimulus has ceased, its irritable substance +has suffered a lasting change: I call this after-action of the stimulus +its ‘imprint’ or ‘engraphic’ action, since it +penetrates and imprints itself in the organic substance; and I term +the change so effected an ‘imprint’ or ‘engram’ +of the stimulus; and the sum of all the imprints possessed by the organism +may be called its ‘store of imprints,’ wherein we must distinguish +between those which it has inherited from its forbears and those which +it has acquired itself. Any phenomenon displayed by an organism +as the result either of a single imprint or of a sum of them, I term +a ‘mnemic phenomenon’; and the mnemic possibilities of an +organism may be termed, collectively, its ‘MNEME.’</p> +<p>“I have selected my own terms for the concepts that I have +just defined. On many grounds I refrain from making any use of +the good German terms ‘Gedächtniss, Erinnerungsbild.’ +The first and chiefest ground is that for my purpose I should have to +employ the German words in a much wider sense than what they usually +convey, and thus leave the door open to countless misunderstandings +and idle controversies. It would, indeed, even amount to an error +of fact to give to the wider concept the name already current in the +narrower sense - nay, actually limited, like ‘Erinnerungsbild,’ +to phenomena of consciousness. . . . In Animals, during the course +of history, one set of organs has, so to speak, specialised itself for +the reception and transmission of stimuli - the Nervous System. +But from this specialisation we are not justified in ascribing to the +nervous system any monopoly of the function, even when it is as highly +developed as in Man. . . . Just as the direct excitability of +the nervous system has progressed in the history of the race, so has +its capacity for receiving imprints; but neither susceptibility nor +retentiveness is its monopoly; and, indeed, retentiveness seems inseparable +from susceptibility in living matter.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Semen here takes the instance of stimulus and imprint actions affecting +the nervous system of a dog</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“who has up till now never experienced aught but kindness from +the Lord of Creation, and then one day that he is out alone is pelted +with stones by a boy. . . . Here he is affected at once by two +sets of stimuli: (1) the optic stimulus of seeing the boy stoop for +stones and throw them, and (2) the skin stimulus of the pain felt when +they hit him. Here both stimuli leave their imprints; and the +organism is permanently changed in relation to the recurrence of the +stimuli. Hitherto the sight of a human figure quickly stooping +had produced no constant special reaction. Now the reaction is +constant, and may remain so till death. . . . The dog tucks in +its tail between its legs and takes flight, often with a howl [as of] +pain.”</p> +<p>“Here we gain on one side a deeper insight into the imprint +action of stimuli. It reposes on the lasting change in the conditions +of the living matter, so that the repetition of the immediate or synchronous +reaction to its first stimulus (in this case the stooping of the boy, +the flying stones, and the pain on the ribs), no longer demands, as +in the original state of indifference, the full stimulus <i>a</i>, but +may be called forth by a partial or different stimulus, <i>b</i> (in +this case the mere stooping to the ground). I term the influences +by which such changed reaction are rendered possible, ‘outcome-reactions,’ +and when such influences assume the form of stimuli, ‘outcome-stimuli.’</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>They are termed “outcome” (“ecphoria”) stimuli, +because the author regards them and would have us regard them as the +outcome, manifestation, or efference of an imprint of a previous stimulus. +We have noted that the imprint is equivalent to the changed “physiological +state” of Jennings. Again, the capacity for gaining imprints +and revealing them by outcomes favourable to the individual is the “circular +reaction” of Baldwin, but Semon gives no reference to either author. +<a name="citation0k"></a><a href="#footnote0k">{0k}</a></p> +<p>In the preface to his first edition (reprinted in the second) Semon +writes, after discussing the work of Hering and Haeckel:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“The problem received a more detailed treatment in Samuel Butler’s +book, ‘Life and Habit,’ published in 1878. Though +he only made acquaintance with Hering’s essay after this publication, +Butler gave what was in many respects a more detailed view of the coincidences +of these different phenomena of organic reproduction than did Hering. +With much that is untenable, Butler’s writings present many a +brilliant idea; yet, on the whole, they are rather a retrogression than +an advance upon Hering. Evidently they failed to exercise any +marked influence upon the literature of the day.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This judgment needs a little examination. Butler claimed, justly, +that his “Life and Habit” was an advance on Hering in its +dealing with questions of hybridity, and of longevity puberty and sterility. +Since Semon’s extended treatment of the phenomena of crosses might +almost be regarded as the rewriting of the corresponding section of +“Life and Habit” in the “Mneme” terminology, +we may infer that this view of the question was one of Butler’s +“brilliant ideas.” That Butler shrank from accepting +such a formal explanation of memory as Hering did with his hypothesis +should certainly be counted as a distinct “advance upon Hering,” +for Semon also avoids any attempt at an explanation of “Mneme.” +I think, however, we may gather the real meaning of Semon’s strictures +from the following passages:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“I refrain here from a discussion of the development of this +theory of Lamarck’s by those Neo-Lamarckians who would ascribe +to the individual elementary organism an equipment of complex psychical +powers - so to say, anthropomorphic perception and volitions. +This treatment is no longer directed by the scientific principle of +referring complex phenomena to simpler laws, of deducing even human +intellect and will from simpler elements. On the contrary, they +follow that most abhorrent method of taking the most complex and unresolved +as a datum, and employing it as an explanation. The adoption of +such a method, as formerly by Samuel Butler, and recently by Pauly, +I regard as a big and dangerous step backward” (ed. 2, pp. 380-1, +note).</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Thus Butler’s alleged retrogressions belong to the same order +of thinking that we have seen shared by Driesch, Baldwin, and Jennings, +and most explicitly avowed, as we shall see, by Francis Darwin. +Semon makes one rather candid admission, “The impossibility of +interpreting the phenomena of physiological stimulation by those of +direct reaction, and the undeception of those who had put faith in this +being possible, have led many on the <i>backward path of vitalism</i>.” +Semon assuredly will never be able to complete his theory of “Mneme” +until, guided by the experience of Jennings and Driesch, he forsakes +the blind alley of mechanisticism and retraces his steps to reasonable +vitalism.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>But the most notable publications bearing on our matter are incidental +to the Darwin Celebrations of 1908-9. Dr. Francis Darwin, son, +collaborator, and biographer of Charles Darwin, was selected to preside +over the Meeting of the British Association held in Dublin in 1908, +the jubilee of the first publications on Natural Selection by his father +and Alfred Russel Wallace. In this address we find the theory +of Hering, Butler, Rignano, and Semon taking its proper place as a <i>vera +causa</i> of that variation which Natural Selection must find before +it can act, and recognised as the basis of a rational theory of the +development of the individual and of the race. The organism is +essentially purposive: the impossibility of devising any adequate accounts +of organic form and function without taking account of the psychical +side is most strenuously asserted. And with our regret that past +misunderstandings should be so prominent in Butler’s works, it +was very pleasant to hear Francis Darwin’s quotation from Butler’s +translation of Hering <a name="citation0l"></a><a href="#footnote0l">{0l}</a> +followed by a personal tribute to Butler himself.</p> +<p>In commemoration of the centenary of the birth of Charles Darwin +and of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the “Origin +of Species,” at the suggestion of the Cambridge Philosophical +Society, the University Press published during the current year a volume +entitled “Darwin and Modern Science,” edited by Mr. A. C. +Seward, Professor of Botany in the University. Of the twenty-nine +essays by men of science of the highest distinction, one is of peculiar +interest to the readers of Samuel Butler: “Heredity and Variation +in Modern Lights,” by Professor W. Bateson, F.R.S., to whose work +on “Discontinuous Variations” we have already referred. +Here once more Butler receives from an official biologist of the first +rank full recognition for his wonderful insight and keen critical power. +This is the more noteworthy because Bateson has apparently no faith +in the transmission of acquired characters; but such a passage as this +would have commended itself to Butler’s admiration:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“All this indicates a definiteness and specific order in heredity, +and therefore in variation. This order cannot by the nature of +the case be dependent on Natural Selection for its existence, but must +be a consequence of the fundamental chemical and physical nature of +living things. The study of Variation had from the first shown +that an orderliness of this kind was present. The bodies and properties +of living things are cosmic, not chaotic. No matter how low in +the scale we go, never do we find the slightest hint of a diminution +in that all-pervading orderliness, nor can we conceive an organism existing +for one moment in any other state.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>We have now before us the materials to determine the problem of Butler’s +relation to biology and to biologists. He was, we have seen, anticipated +by Hering; but his attitude was his own, fresh and original. He +did not hamper his exposition, like Hering, by a subsidiary hypothesis +of vibrations which may or may not be true, which burdens the theory +without giving it greater carrying power or persuasiveness, which is +based on no objective facts, and which, as Semon has practically demonstrated, +is needless for the detailed working out of the theory. Butler +failed to impress the biologists of his day, even those on whom, like +Romanes, he might have reasonably counted for understanding and for +support. But he kept alive Hering’s work when it bade fair +to sink into the limbo of obsolete hypotheses. To use Oliver Wendell +Holmes’s phrase, he “depolarised” evolutionary thought. +We quote the words of a young biologist, who, when an ardent and dogmatic +Weismannist of the most pronounced type, was induced to read “Life +and Habit”: “The book was to me a transformation and an +inspiration.” Such learned writings as Semon’s or +Hering’s could never produce such an effect: they do not penetrate +to the heart of man; they cannot carry conviction to the intellect already +filled full with rival theories, and with the unreasoned faith that +to-morrow or next day a new discovery will obliterate all distinction +between Man and his makings. The mind must needs be open for the +reception of truth, for the rejection of prejudice; and the violence +of a Samuel Butler may in the future as in the past be needed to shatter +the coat of mail forged by too exclusively professional a training.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>MARCUS HARTOG<br /><i>Cork</i>, <i>April</i>, 1910</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>AUTHOR’S PREFACE</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Not finding the “well-known German scientific journal <i>Kosmos</i>” +<a name="citation0m"></a><a href="#footnote0m">{0m}</a> entered in the +British Museum Catalogue, I have presented the Museum with a copy of +the number for February 1879, which contains the article by Dr. Krause +of which Mr. Charles Darwin has given a translation, the accuracy of +which is guaranteed - so he informs us - by the translator’s “scientific +reputation together with his knowledge of German.” <a name="citation0n"></a><a href="#footnote0n">{0n}</a></p> +<p>I have marked the copy, so that the reader can see at a glance what +passages has been suppressed and where matter has been interpolated.</p> +<p>I have also present a copy of “Erasmus Darwin.” +I have marked this too, so that the genuine and spurious passages can +be easily distinguished.</p> +<p>I understand that both the “Erasmus Darwin” and the number +of <i>Kosmos</i> have been sent to the Keeper of Printed Books, with +instructions that they shall be at once catalogued and made accessible +to readers, and do not doubt that this will have been done before the +present volume is published. The reader, therefore, who may be +sufficiently interested in the matter to care to see exactly what has +been done will now have an opportunity of doing so.</p> +<p><i>October</i> 25, 1880.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Introduction - General ignorance on the subject of evolution at the +time the “Origin of Species” was published in 1859.</p> +<p>There are few things which strike us with more surprise, when we +review the course taken by opinion in the last century, than the suddenness +with which belief in witchcraft and demoniacal possession came to an +end. This has been often remarked upon, but I am not acquainted +with any record of the fact as it appeared to those under whose eyes +the change was taking place, nor have I seen any contemporary explanation +of the reasons which led to the apparently sudden overthrow of a belief +which had seemed hitherto to be deeply rooted in the minds of almost +all men. As a parallel to this, though in respect of the rapid +spread of an opinion, and not its decadence, it is probable that those +of our descendants who take an interest in ourselves will note the suddenness +with which the theory of evolution, from having been generally ridiculed +during a period of over a hundred years, came into popularity and almost +universal acceptance among educated people.</p> +<p>It is indisputable that this has been the case; nor is it less indisputable +that the works of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace have been the main agents +in the change that has been brought about in our opinions. The +names of Cobden and Bright do not stand more prominently forward in +connection with the repeal of the Corn Laws than do those of Mr. Darwin +and Mr. Wallace in connection with the general acceptance of the theory +of evolution. There is no living philosopher who has anything +like Mr. Darwin’s popularity with Englishmen generally; and not +only this, but his power of fascination extends all over Europe, and +indeed in every country in which civilisation has obtained footing: +not among the illiterate masses, though these are rapidly following +the suit of the educated classes, but among experts and those who are +most capable of judging. France, indeed - the country of Buffon +and Lamarck - must be counted an exception to the general rule, but +in England and Germany there are few men of scientific reputation who +do not accept Mr. Darwin as the founder of what is commonly called “Darwinism,” +and regard him as perhaps the most penetrative and profound philosopher +of modern times.</p> +<p>To quote an example from the last few weeks only, <a name="citation2"></a><a href="#footnote2">{2}</a> +I have observed that Professor Huxley has celebrated the twenty-first +year since the “Origin of Species” was published by a lecture +at the Royal Institution, and am told that he described Mr. Darwin’s +candour as something actually “terrible” (I give Professor +Huxley’s own word, as reported by one who heard it); and on opening +a small book entitled “Degeneration,” by Professor Ray Lankester, +published a few days before these lines were written, I find the following +passage amid more that is to the same purport:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Suddenly one of those great guesses which occasionally appear +in the history of science was given to the science of biology by the +imaginative insight of that greatest of living naturalists - I would +say that greatest of living men - Charles Darwin.” - <i>Degeneration</i>, +p. 10.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This is very strong language, but it is hardly stronger than that +habitually employed by the leading men of science when they speak of +Mr. Darwin. To go farther afield, in February 1879 the Germans +devoted an entire number of one of their scientific periodicals <a name="citation3"></a><a href="#footnote3">{3}</a> +to the celebration of Mr. Darwin’s seventieth birthday. +There is no other Englishman now living who has been able to win such +a compliment as this from foreigners, who should be disinterested judges.</p> +<p>Under these circumstances, it must seem the height of presumption +to differ from so great an authority, and to join the small band of +malcontents who hold that Mr. Darwin’s reputation as a philosopher, +though it has grown up with the rapidity of Jonah’s gourd, will +yet not be permanent. I believe, however, that though we must +always gladly and gratefully owe it to Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace that +the public mind has been brought to accept evolution, the admiration +now generally felt for the “Origin of Species” will appear +as unaccountable to our descendants some fifty or eighty years hence +as the enthusiasm of our grandfathers for the poetry of Dr. Erasmus +Darwin does to ourselves; and as one who has yielded to none in respect +of the fascination Mr. Darwin has exercised over him, I would fain say +a few words of explanation which may make the matter clearer to our +future historians. I do this the more readily because I can at +the same time explain thus better than in any other way the steps which +led me to the theory which I afterwards advanced in “Life and +Habit.”</p> +<p>This last, indeed, is perhaps the main purpose of the earlier chapters +of this book. I shall presently give a translation of a lecture +by Professor Ewald Hering of Prague, which appeared ten years ago, and +which contains so exactly the theory I subsequently advocated myself, +that I am half uneasy lest it should be supposed that I knew of Professor +Hering’s work and made no reference to it. A friend to whom +I submitted my translation in MS., asking him how closely he thought +it resembled “Life and Habit,” wrote back that it gave my +own ideas almost in my own words. As far as the ideas are concerned +this is certainly the case, and considering that Professor Hering wrote +between seven and eight years before I did, I think it due to him, and +to my readers as well as to myself, to explain the steps which led me +to my conclusions, and, while putting Professor Hering’s lecture +before them, to show cause for thinking that I arrived at an almost +identical conclusion, as it would appear, by an almost identical road, +yet, nevertheless, quite independently, I must ask the reader, therefore, +to regard these earlier chapters as in some measure a personal explanation, +as well as a contribution to the history of an important feature in +the developments of the last twenty years. I hope also, by showing +the steps by which I was led to my conclusions, to make the conclusions +themselves more acceptable and easy of comprehension.</p> +<p>Being on my way to New Zealand when the “Origin of Species” +appeared, I did not get it till 1860 or 1861. When I read it, +I found “the theory of natural selection” repeatedly spoken +of as though it were a synonym for “the theory of descent with +modification”; this is especially the case in the recapitulation +chapter of the work. I failed to see how important it was that +these two theories - if indeed “natural selection” can be +called a theory - should not be confounded together, and that a “theory +of descent with modification” might be true, while a “theory +of descent with modification through natural selection” <a name="citation4"></a><a href="#footnote4">{4}</a> +might not stand being looked into.</p> +<p>If any one had asked me to state in brief what Mr. Darwin’s +theory was, I am afraid I might have answered “natural selection,” +or “descent with modification,” whichever came first, as +though the one meant much the same as the other. I observe that +most of the leading writers on the subject are still unable to catch +sight of the distinction here alluded to, and console myself for my +want of acumen by reflecting that, if I was misled, I was misled in +good company.</p> +<p>I - and I may add, the public generally - failed also to see what +the unaided reader who was new to the subject would be almost certain +to overlook. I mean, that, according to Mr. Darwin, the variations +whose accumulation resulted in diversity of species and genus were indefinite, +fortuitous, attributable but in small degree to any known causes, and +without a general principle underlying them which would cause them to +appear steadily in a given direction for many successive generations +and in a considerable number of individuals at the same time. +We did not know that the theory of evolution was one that had been quietly +but steadily gaining ground during the last hundred years. Buffon +we knew by name, but he sounded too like “buffoon” for any +good to come from him. We had heard also of Lamarck, and held +him to be a kind of French Lord Monboddo; but we knew nothing of his +doctrine save through the caricatures promulgated by his opponents, +or the misrepresentations of those who had another kind of interest +in disparaging him. Dr. Erasmus Darwin we believed to be a forgotten +minor poet, but ninety-nine out of every hundred of us had never so +much as heard of the “Zoonomia.” We were little likely, +therefore, to know that Lamarck drew very largely from Buffon, and probably +also from Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and that this last-named writer, though +essentially original, was founded upon Buffon, who was greatly more +in advance of any predecessor than any successor has been in advance +of him.</p> +<p>We did not know, then, that according to the earlier writers the +variations whose accumulation results in species were not fortuitous +and definite, but were due to a known principle of universal application +- namely, “sense of need” - or apprehend the difference +between a theory of evolution which has a backbone, as it were, in the +tolerably constant or slowly varying needs of large numbers of individuals +for long periods together, and one which has no such backbone, but according +to which the progress of one generation is always liable to be cancelled +and obliterated by that of the next. We did not know that the +new theory in a quiet way professed to tell us less than the old had +done, and declared that it could throw little if any light upon the +matter which the earlier writers had endeavoured to illuminate as the +central point in their system. We took it for granted that more +light must be being thrown instead of less; and reading in perfect good +faith, we rose from our perusal with the impression that Mr. Darwin +was advocating the descent of all existing forms of life from a single, +or from, at any rate, a very few primordial types; that no one else +had done this hitherto, or that, if they had, they had got the whole +subject into a mess, which mess, whatever it was - for we were never +told this - was now being removed once for all by Mr. Darwin.</p> +<p>The evolution part of the story, that is to say, the fact of evolution, +remained in our minds as by far the most prominent feature in Mr. Darwin’s +book; and being grateful for it, we were very ready to take Mr. Darwin’s +work at the estimate tacitly claimed for it by himself, and vehemently +insisted upon by reviewers in influential journals, who took much the +same line towards the earlier writers on evolution as Mr. Darwin himself +had taken. But perhaps nothing more prepossessed us in Mr. Darwin’s +favour than the air of candour that was omnipresent throughout his work. +The prominence given to the arguments of opponents completely carried +us away; it was this which threw us off our guard. It never occurred +to us that there might be other and more dangerous opponents who were +not brought forward. Mr. Darwin did not tell us what his grandfather +and Lamarck would have had to say to this or that. Moreover, there +was an unobtrusive parade of hidden learning and of difficulties at +last overcome which was particularly grateful to us. Whatever +opinion might be ultimately come to concerning the value of his theory, +there could be but one about the value of the example he had set to +men of science generally by the perfect frankness and unselfishness +of his work. Friends and foes alike combined to do homage to Mr. +Darwin in this respect.</p> +<p>For, brilliant as the reception of the “Origin of Species” +was, it met in the first instance with hardly less hostile than friendly +criticism. But the attacks were ill-directed; they came from a +suspected quarter, and those who led them did not detect more than the +general public had done what were the really weak places in Mr. Darwin’s +armour. They attacked him where he was strongest; and above all, +they were, as a general rule, stamped with a disingenuousness which +at that time we believed to be peculiar to theological writers and alien +to the spirit of science. Seeing, therefore, that the men of science +ranged themselves more and more decidedly on Mr. Darwin’s side, +while his opponents had manifestly - so far as I can remember, all the +more prominent among them - a bias to which their hostility was attributable, +we left off looking at the arguments against “Darwinism,” +as we now began to call it, and pigeon-holed the matter to the effect +that there was one evolution, and that Mr. Darwin was its prophet.</p> +<p>The blame of our errors and oversights rests primarily with Mr. Darwin +himself. The first, and far the most important, edition of the +“Origin of Species” came out as a kind of literary Melchisedec, +without father and without mother in the works of other people. +Here is its opening paragraph:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“When on board H.M.S. ‘Beagle’ as naturalist, I +was much struck with certain facts in the distribution of the inhabitants +of South America, and in the geological relations of the present to +the past inhabitants of that continent. These facts seemed to +me to throw some light on the origin of species - that mystery of mysteries, +as it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers. On +my return home, it occurred to me, in 1837, that something might be +made out on this question by patiently accumulating and reflecting upon +all sorts of facts which could possibly have any bearing on it. +After five years’ work I allowed myself to speculate on the subject, +and drew up some short notes; these I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch +of the conclusions which then seemed to me probable: from that period +to the present day I have steadily pursued the same object. I +hope that I may be excused for entering on these personal details, as +I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a decision.” +<a name="citation8a"></a><a href="#footnote8a">{8a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>In the latest edition this passage remains unaltered, except in one +unimportant respect. What could more completely throw us off the +scent of the earlier writers? If they had written anything worthy +of our attention, or indeed if there had been any earlier writers at +all, Mr. Darwin would have been the first to tell us about them, and +to award them their due meed of recognition. But, no; the whole +thing was an original growth in Mr. Darwin’s mind, and he had +never so much as heard of his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin.</p> +<p>Dr. Krause, indeed, thought otherwise. In the number of <i>Kosmos</i> +for February 1879 he represented Mr. Darwin as in his youth approaching +the works of his grandfather with all the devotion which people usually +feel for the writings of a renowned poet. <a name="citation8b"></a><a href="#footnote8b">{8b}</a> +This should perhaps be a delicately ironical way of hinting that Mr. +Darwin did not read his grandfather’s books closely; but I hardly +think that Dr. Krause looked at the matter in this light, for he goes +on to say that “almost every single work of the younger Darwin +may be paralleled by at least a chapter in the works of his ancestor: +the mystery of heredity, adaptation, the protective arrangements of +animals and plants, sexual selection, insectivorous plants, and the +analysis of the emotions and sociological impulses; nay, even the studies +on infants are to be found already discussed in the pages of the elder +Darwin.” <a name="citation8c"></a><a href="#footnote8c">{8c}</a></p> +<p>Nevertheless, innocent as Mr. Darwin’s opening sentence appeared, +it contained enough to have put us upon our guard. When he informed +us that, on his return from a long voyage, “it occurred to” +him that the way to make anything out about his subject was to collect +and reflect upon the facts that bore upon it, it should have occurred +to us in our turn, that when people betray a return of consciousness +upon such matters as this, they are on the confines of that state in +which other and not less elementary matters will not “occur to” +them. The introduction of the word “patiently” should +have been conclusive. I will not analyse more of the sentence, +but will repeat the next two lines:- “After five years of work, +I allowed myself to speculate upon the subject, and drew up some short +notes.” We read this, thousands of us, and were blind.</p> +<p>If Dr. Erasmus Darwin’s name was not mentioned in the first +edition of the “Origin of Species,” we should not be surprised +at there being no notice taken of Buffon, or at Lamarck’s being +referred to only twice - on the first occasion to be serenely waved +aside, he and all his works; <a name="citation9a"></a><a href="#footnote9a">{9a}</a> +on the second, <a name="citation9b"></a><a href="#footnote9b">{9b}</a> +to be commended on a point of detail. The author of the “Vestiges +of Creation” was more widely known to English readers, having +written more recently and nearer home. He was dealt with summarily, +on an early and prominent page, by a misrepresentation, which was silently +expunged in later editions of the “Origin of Species.” +In his later editions (I believe first in his third, when 6000 copies +had been already sold), Mr. Darwin did indeed introduce a few pages +in which he gave what he designated as a “brief but imperfect +sketch” of the progress of opinion on the origin of species prior +to the appearance of his own work; but the general impression which +a book conveys to, and leaves upon, the public is conveyed by the first +edition - the one which is alone, with rare exceptions, reviewed; and +in the first edition of the “Origin of Species” Mr. Darwin’s +great precursors were all either ignored or misrepresented. Moreover, +the “brief but imperfect sketch,” when it did come, was +so very brief, but, in spite of this (for this is what I suppose Mr. +Darwin must mean), so very imperfect, that it might as well have been +left unwritten for all the help it gave the reader to see the true question +at issue between the original propounders of the theory of evolution +and Mr. Charles Darwin himself.</p> +<p>That question is this: Whether variation is in the main attributable +to a known general principle, or whether it is not? - whether the minute +variations whose accumulation results in specific and generic differences +are referable to something which will ensure their appearing in a certain +definite direction, or in certain definite directions, for long periods +together, and in many individuals, or whether they are not? - whether, +in a word, these variations are in the main definite or indefinite?</p> +<p>It is observable that the leading men of science seem rarely to understand +this even now. I am told that Professor Huxley, in his recent +lecture on the coming of age of the “Origin of Species,” +never so much as alluded to the existence of any such division of opinion +as this. He did not even, I am assured, mention “natural +selection,” but appeared to believe, with Professor Tyndall, <a name="citation10a"></a><a href="#footnote10a">{10a}</a> +that “evolution” is “Mr. Darwin’s theory.” +In his article on evolution in the latest edition of the “Encyclopaedia +Britannica,” I find only a veiled perception of the point wherein +Mr. Darwin is at variance with his precursors. Professor Huxley +evidently knows little of these writers beyond their names; if he had +known more, it is impossible he should have written that “Buffon +contributed nothing to the general doctrine of evolution,” <a name="citation10b"></a><a href="#footnote10b">{10b}</a> +and that Erasmus Darwin, “though a zealous evolutionist, can hardly +be said to have made any real advance on his predecessors.” <a name="citation11"></a><a href="#footnote11">{11}</a> +The article is in a high degree unsatisfactory, and betrays at once +an amount of ignorance and of perception which leaves an uncomfortable +impression.</p> +<p>If this is the state of things that prevails even now, it is not +surprising that in 1860 the general public should, with few exceptions, +have known of only one evolution, namely, that propounded by Mr. Darwin. +As a member of the general public, at that time residing eighteen miles +from the nearest human habitation, and three days’ journey on +horseback from a bookseller’s shop, I became one of Mr. Darwin’s +many enthusiastic admirers, and wrote a philosophical dialogue (the +most offensive form, except poetry and books of travel into supposed +unknown countries, that even literature can assume) upon the “Origin +of Species.” This production appeared in the <i>Press</i>, +Canterbury, New Zealand, in 1861 or 1862, but I have long lost the only +copy I had.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>How I came to write “Life and Habit,” and the circumstances +of its completion.</p> +<p>It was impossible, however, for Mr. Darwin’s readers to leave +the matter as Mr. Darwin had left it. We wanted to know whence +came that germ or those germs of life which, if Mr. Darwin was right, +were once the world’s only inhabitants. They could hardly +have come hither from some other world; they could not in their wet, +cold, slimy state have travelled through the dry ethereal medium which +we call space, and yet remained alive. If they travelled slowly, +they would die; if fast, they would catch fire, as meteors do on entering +the earth’s atmosphere. The idea, again, of their having +been created by a quasi-anthropomorphic being out of the matter upon +the earth was at variance with the whole spirit of evolution, which +indicated that no such being could exist except as himself the result, +and not the cause, of evolution. Having got back from ourselves +to the monad, we were suddenly to begin again with something which was +either unthinkable, or was only ourselves again upon a larger scale +- to return to the same point as that from which we had started, only +made harder for us to stand upon.</p> +<p>There was only one other conception possible, namely, that the germs +had been developed in the course of time from some thing or things that +were not what we called living at all; that they had grown up, in fact, +out of the material substances and forces of the world in some manner +more or less analogous to that in which man had been developed from +themselves.</p> +<p>I first asked myself whether life might not, after all, resolve itself +into the complexity of arrangement of an inconceivably intricate mechanism. +Kittens think our shoe-strings are alive when they see us lacing them, +because they see the tag at the end jump about without understanding +all the ins and outs of how it comes to do so. “Of course,” +they argue, “if we cannot understand how a thing comes to move, +it must move of itself, for there can be no motion beyond our comprehension +but what is spontaneous; if the motion is spontaneous, the thing moving +must he alive, for nothing can move of itself or without our understanding +why unless it is alive. Everything that is alive and not too large +can be tortured, and perhaps eaten; let us therefore spring upon the +tag” and they spring upon it. Cats are above this; yet give +the cat something which presents a few more of those appearances which +she is accustomed to see whenever she sees life, and she will fall as +easy a prey to the power which association exercises over all that lives +as the kitten itself. Show her a toy-mouse that can run a few +yards after being wound up; the form, colour, and action of a mouse +being here, there is no good cat which will not conclude that so many +of the appearances of mousehood could not be present at the same time +without the presence also of the remainder. She will, therefore, +spring upon the toy as eagerly as the kitten upon the tag.</p> +<p>Suppose the toy more complex still, so that it might run a few yards, +stop, and run on again without an additional winding up; and suppose +it so constructed that it could imitate eating and drinking, and could +make as though the mouse were cleaning its face with its paws. +Should we not at first be taken in ourselves, and assume the presence +of the remaining facts of life, though in reality they were not there? +Query, therefore, whether a machine so complex as to be prepared with +a corresponding manner of action for each one of the successive emergencies +of life as it arose, would not take us in for good and all, and look +so much as if it were alive that, whether we liked it or not, we should +be compelled to think it and call it so; and whether the being alive +was not simply the being an exceedingly complicated machine, whose parts +were set in motion by the action upon them of exterior circumstances; +whether, in fact, man was not a kind of toy-mouse in the shape of a +man, only capable of going for seventy or eighty years, instead of half +as many seconds, and as much more versatile as he is more durable? +Of course I had an uneasy feeling that if I thus made all plants and +men into machines, these machines must have what all other machines +have if they are machines at all - a designer, and some one to wind +them up and work them; but I thought this might wait for the present, +and was perfectly ready then, as now, to accept a designer from without, +if the facts upon examination rendered such a belief reasonable.</p> +<p>If, then, men were not really alive after all, but were only machines +of so complicated a make that it was less trouble to us to cut the difficulty +and say that that kind of mechanism was “being alive,” why +should not machines ultimately become as complicated as we are, or at +any rate complicated enough to be called living, and to be indeed as +living as it was in the nature of anything at all to be? If it +was only a case of their becoming more complicated, we were certainly +doing our best to make them so.</p> +<p>I do not suppose I at that time saw that this view comes to much +the same as denying that there are such qualities as life and consciousness +at all, and that this, again, works round to the assertion of their +omnipresence in every molecule of matter, inasmuch as it destroys the +separation between the organic and inorganic, and maintains that whatever +the organic is the inorganic is also. Deny it in theory as much +as we please, we shall still always feel that an organic body, unless +dead, is living and conscious to a greater or less degree. Therefore, +if we once break down the wall of partition between the organic and +inorganic, the inorganic must be living and conscious also, up to a +certain point.</p> +<p>I have been at work on this subject now for nearly twenty years, +what I have published being only a small part of what I have written +and destroyed. I cannot, therefore, remember exactly how I stood +in 1863. Nor can I pretend to see far into the matter even now; +for when I think of life, I find it so difficult, that I take refuge +in death or mechanism; and when I think of death or mechanism, I find +it so inconceivable, that it is easier to call it life again. +The only thing of which I am sure is, that the distinction between the +organic and inorganic is arbitrary; that it is more coherent with our +other ideas, and therefore more acceptable, to start with every molecule +as a living thing, and then deduce death as the breaking up of an association +or corporation, than to start with inanimate molecules and smuggle life +into them; and that, therefore, what we call the inorganic world must +be regarded as up to a certain point living, and instinct, within certain +limits, with consciousness, volition, and power of concerted action. +It is only of late, however, that I have come to this opinion.</p> +<p>One must start with a hypothesis, no matter how much one distrusts +it; so I started with man as a mechanism, this being the strand of the +knot that I could then pick at most easily. Having worked upon +it a certain time, I drew the inference about machines becoming animate, +and in 1862 or 1863 wrote the sketch of the chapter on machines which +I afterwards rewrote in “Erewhon.” This sketch appeared +in the <i>Press</i>, Canterbury, N.Z., June 13, 1863; a copy of it is +in the British Museum.</p> +<p>I soon felt that though there was plenty of amusement to be got out +of this line, it was one that I should have to leave sooner or later; +I therefore left it at once for the view that machines were limbs which +we had made, and carried outside our bodies instead of incorporating +them with ourselves. A few days or weeks later than June 13, 1863, +I published a second letter in the <i>Press</i> putting this view forward. +Of this letter I have lost the only copy I had; I have not seen it for +years. The first was certainly not good; the second, if I remember +rightly, was a good deal worse, though I believed more in the views +it put forward than in those of the first letter. I had lost my +copy before I wrote “Erewhon,” and therefore only gave a +couple of pages to it in that book; besides, there was more amusement +in the other view. I should perhaps say there was an intermediate +extension of the first letter which appeared in the <i>Reasoner</i>, +July 1, 1865.</p> +<p>In 1870 and 1871, when I was writing “Erewhon,” I thought +the best way of looking at machines was to see them as limbs which we +had made and carried about with us or left at home at pleasure. +I was not, however, satisfied, and should have gone on with the subject +at once if I had not been anxious to write “The Fair Haven,” +a book which is a development of a pamphlet I wrote in New Zealand and +published in London in 1865.</p> +<p>As soon as I had finished this, I returned to the old subject, on +which I had already been engaged for nearly a dozen years as continuously +as other business would allow, and proposed to myself to see not only +machines as limbs, but also limbs as machines. I felt immediately +that I was upon firmer ground. The use of the word “organ” +for a limb told its own story; the word could not have become so current +under this meaning unless the idea of a limb as a tool or machine had +been agreeable to common sense. What would follow, then, if we +regarded our limbs and organs as things that we had ourselves manufactured +for our convenience?</p> +<p>The first question that suggested itself was, how did we come to +make them without knowing anything about it? And this raised another, +namely, how comes anybody to do anything unconsciously? The answer +“habit” was not far to seek. But can a person be said +to do a thing by force of habit or routine when it is his ancestors, +and not he, that has done it hitherto? Not unless he and his ancestors +are one and the same person. Perhaps, then, they <i>are</i> the +same person after all. What is sameness? I remembered Bishop +Butler’s sermon on “Personal Identity,” read it again, +and saw very plainly that if a man of eighty may consider himself identical +with the baby from whom he has developed, so that he may say, “I +am the person who at six months old did this or that,” then the +baby may just as fairly claim identity with its father and mother, and +say to its parents on being born, “I was you only a few months +ago.” By parity of reasoning each living form now on the +earth must be able to claim identity with each generation of its ancestors +up to the primordial cell inclusive.</p> +<p>Again, if the octogenarian may claim personal identity with the infant, +the infant may certainly do so with the impregnate ovum from which it +has developed. If so, the octogenarian will prove to have been +a fish once in this his present life. This is as certain as that +he was living yesterday, and stands on exactly the same foundation.</p> +<p>I am aware that Professor Huxley maintains otherwise. He writes: +“It is not true, for example, . . . that a reptile was ever a +fish, but it is true that the reptile embryo” (and what is said +here of the reptile holds good also for the human embryo), “at +one stage of its development, is an organism, which, if it had an independent +existence, must be classified among fishes.” <a name="citation17"></a><a href="#footnote17">{17}</a></p> +<p>This is like saying, “It is not true that such and such a picture +was rejected for the Academy, but it is true that it was submitted to +the President and Council of the Royal Academy, with a view to acceptance +at their next forthcoming annual exhibition, and that the President +and Council regretted they were unable through want of space, &c., +&c.” - and as much more as the reader chooses. +I shall venture, therefore, to stick to it that the octogenarian was +once a fish, or if Professor Huxley prefers it, “an organism which +must be classified among fishes.”</p> +<p>But if a man was a fish once, he may have been a fish a million times +over, for aught he knows; for he must admit that his conscious recollection +is at fault, and has nothing whatever to do with the matter, which must +be decided, not, as it were, upon his own evidence as to what deeds +he may or may not recollect having executed, but by the production of +his signatures in court, with satisfactory proof that he has delivered +each document as his act and deed.</p> +<p>This made things very much simpler. The processes of embryonic +development, and instinctive actions, might be now seen as repetitions +of the same kind of action by the same individual in successive generations. +It was natural, therefore, that they should come in the course of time +to be done unconsciously, and a consideration of the most obvious facts +of memory removed all further doubt that habit - which is based on memory +- was at the bottom of all the phenomena of heredity.</p> +<p>I had got to this point about the spring of 1874, and had begun to +write, when I was compelled to go to Canada, and for the next year and +a half did hardly any writing. The first passage in “Life +and Habit” which I can date with certainty is the one on page +52, which runs as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“It is one against legion when a man tries to differ from his +own past selves. He must yield or die if he wants to differ widely, +so as to lack natural instincts, such as hunger or thirst, and not to +gratify them. It is more righteous in a man that he should ‘eat +strange food,’ and that his cheek should ‘so much as lank +not,’ than that he should starve if the strange food be at his +command. His past selves are living in him at this moment with +the accumulated life of centuries. ‘Do this, this, this, +which we too have done, and found out profit in it,’ cry the souls +of his forefathers within him. Faint are the far ones, coming +and going as the sound of bells wafted on to a high mountain; loud and +clear are the near ones, urgent as an alarm of fire.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This was written a few days after my arrival in Canada, June 1874. +I was on Montreal mountain for the first time, and was struck with its +extreme beauty. It was a magnificent Summer’s evening; the +noble St. Lawrence flowed almost immediately beneath, and the vast expanse +of country beyond it was suffused with a colour which even Italy cannot +surpass. Sitting down for a while, I began making notes for “Life +and Habit,” of which I was then continually thinking, and had +written the first few lines of the above, when the bells of Notre Dame +in Montreal began to ring, and their sound was carried to and fro in +a remarkably beautiful manner. I took advantage of the incident +to insert then and there the last lines of the piece just quoted. +I kept the whole passage with hardly any alteration, and am thus able +to date it accurately.</p> +<p>Though so occupied in Canada that writing a book was impossible, +I nevertheless got many notes together for future use. I left +Canada at the end of 1875, and early in 1876 began putting these notes +into more coherent form. I did this in thirty pages of closely +written matter, of which a pressed copy remains in my commonplace-book. +I find two dates among them - the first, “Sunday, Feb. 6, 1876”; +and the second, at the end of the notes, “Feb. 12, 1876.”</p> +<p>From these notes I find that by this time I had the theory contained +in “Life and Habit” completely before me, with the four +main principles which it involves, namely, the oneness of personality +between parents and offspring; memory on the part of offspring of certain +actions which it did when in the persons of its forefathers; the latency +of that memory until it is rekindled by a recurrence of the associated +ideas; and the unconsciousness with which habitual actions come to be +performed.</p> +<p>The first half-page of these notes may serve as a sample, and runs +thus:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Those habits and functions which we have in common with the +lower animals come mainly within the womb, or are done involuntarily, +as our [growth of] limbs, eyes, &c., and our power of digesting +food, &c. . . .</p> +<p>“We say of the chicken that it knows how to run about as soon +as it is hatched, . . . but had it no knowledge before it was hatched?</p> +<p>“It knew how to make a great many things before it was hatched.</p> +<p>“It grew eyes and feathers and bones.</p> +<p>“Yet we say it knew nothing about all this.</p> +<p>“After it is born it grows more feathers, and makes its bones +larger, and develops a reproductive system.</p> +<p>“Again we say it knows nothing about all this.</p> +<p>“What then does it know?</p> +<p>“Whatever it does not know so well as to be unconscious of +knowing it.</p> +<p>“Knowledge dwells upon the confines of uncertainty.</p> +<p>“When we are very certain, we do not know that we know. +When we will very strongly, we do not know that we will.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I then began my book, but considering myself still a painter by profession, +I gave comparatively little time to writing, and got on but slowly. +I left England for North Italy in the middle of May 1876 and returned +early in August. It was perhaps thus that I failed to hear of +the account of Professor Hering’s lecture given by Professor Ray +Lankester in <i>Nature</i>, July 13 1876; though, never at that time +seeing <i>Nature</i>, I should probably have missed it under any circumstances. +On my return I continued slowly writing. By August 1877 I considered +that I had to all intents and purposes completed my book. My first +proof bears date October 13, 1877.</p> +<p>At this time I had not been able to find that anything like what +I was advancing had been said already. I asked many friends, but +not one of them knew of anything more than I did; to them, as to me, +it seemed an idea so new as to be almost preposterous; but knowing how +things turn up after one has written, of the existence of which one +had not known before, I was particularly careful to guard against being +supposed to claim originality. I neither claimed it nor wished +for it; for if a theory has any truth in it, it is almost sure to occur +to several people much about the same time, and a reasonable person +will look upon his work with great suspicion unless he can confirm it +with the support of others who have gone before him. Still I knew +of nothing in the least resembling it, and was so afraid of what I was +doing, that though I could see no flaw in the argument, nor any loophole +for escape from the conclusion it led to, yet I did not dare to put +it forward with the seriousness and sobriety with which I should have +treated the subject if I had not been in continual fear of a mine being +sprung upon me from some unexpected quarter. I am exceedingly +glad now that I knew nothing of Professor Hering’s lecture, for +it is much better that two people should think a thing out as far as +they can independently before they become aware of each other’s +works but if I had seen it, I should either, as is most likely, not +have written at all, or I should have pitched my book in another key.</p> +<p>Among the additions I intended making while the book was in the press, +was a chapter on Mr. Darwin’s provisional theory of Pangenesis, +which I felt convinced must be right if it was Mr. Darwin’s, and +which I was sure, if I could once understand it, must have an important +bearing on “Life and Habit.” I had not as yet seen +that the principle I was contending for was Darwinian, not Neo-Darwinian. +My pages still teemed with allusions to “natural selection,” +and I sometimes allowed myself to hope that “Life and Habit” +was going to be an adjunct to Darwinism which no one would welcome more +gladly than Mr. Darwin himself. At this time I had a visit from +a friend, who kindly called to answer a question of mine, relative, +if I remember rightly, to “Pangenesis.” He came, September +26, 1877. One of the first things he said was, that the theory +which had pleased him more than anything he had heard of for some time +was one referring all life to memory. I said that was exactly +what I was doing myself, and inquired where he had met with his theory. +He replied that Professor Ray Lankester had written a letter about it +in <i>Nature</i> some time ago, but he could not remember exactly when, +and had given extracts from a lecture by Professor Ewald Hering, who +had originated the theory. I said I should not look at it, as +I had completed that part of my work, and was on the point of going +to press. I could not recast my work if, as was most likely, I +should find something, when I saw what Professor Hering had said, which +would make me wish to rewrite my own book; it was too late in the day +and I did not feel equal to making any radical alteration; and so the +matter ended with very little said upon either side. I wrote, +however, afterwards to my friend asking him to tell me the number of +<i>Nature</i> which contained the lecture if he could find it, but he +was unable to do so, and I was well enough content.</p> +<p>A few days before this I had met another friend, and had explained +to him what I was doing. He told me I ought to read Professor +Mivart’s “Genesis of Species,” and that if I did so +I should find there were two sides to “natural selection.” +Thinking, as so many people do - and no wonder - that “natural +selection” and evolution were much the same thing, and having +found so many attacks upon evolution produce no effect upon me, I declined +to read it. I had as yet no idea that a writer could attack Neo-Darwinism +without attacking evolution. But my friend kindly sent me a copy; +and when I read it, I found myself in the presence of arguments different +from those I had met with hitherto, and did not see my way to answering +them. I had, however, read only a small part of Professor Mivart’s +work, and was not fully awake to the position, when the friend referred +to in the preceding paragraph called on me.</p> +<p>When I had finished the “Genesis of Species,” I felt +that something was certainly wanted which should give a definite aim +to the variations whose accumulation was to amount ultimately to specific +and generic differences, and that without this there could have been +no progress in organic development. I got the latest edition of +the “Origin of Species” in order to see how Mr. Darwin met +Professor Mivart, and found his answers in many respects unsatisfactory. +I had lost my original copy of the “Origin of Species,” +and had not read the book for some years. I now set about reading +it again, and came to the chapter on instinct, where I was horrified +to find the following passage:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“But it would be a serious error to suppose that the greater +number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one generation and +then transmitted by inheritance to the succeeding generations. +It can be clearly shown that the most wonderful instincts with which +we are acquainted, namely, those of the hive-bee and of many ants, could +not possibly have been acquired by habit.” <a name="citation23a"></a><a href="#footnote23a">{23a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This showed that, according to Mr. Darwin, I had fallen into serious +error, and my faith in him, though somewhat shaken, was far too great +to be destroyed by a few days’ course of Professor Mivart, the +full importance of whose work I had not yet apprehended. I continued +to read, and when I had finished the chapter felt sure that I must indeed +have been blundering. The concluding words, “I am surprised +that no one has hitherto advanced this demonstrative case of neuter +insects against the well-known doctrine of inherited habit as advanced +by Lamarck,” <a name="citation23b"></a><a href="#footnote23b">{23b}</a> +were positively awful. There was a quiet consciousness of strength +about them which was more convincing than any amount of more detailed +explanation. This was the first I had heard of any doctrine of +inherited habit as having been propounded by Lamarck (the passage stands +in the first edition, “the well-known doctrine of Lamarck,” +p. 242); and now to find that I had been only busying myself with a +stale theory of this long-since exploded charlatan - with my book three +parts written and already in the press - it was a serious scare.</p> +<p>On reflection, however, I was again met with the overwhelming weight +of the evidence in favour of structure and habit being mainly due to +memory. I accordingly gathered as much as I could second-hand +of what Lamarck had said, reserving a study of his “Philosophie +Zoologique” for another occasion, and read as much about ants +and bees as I could find in readily accessible works. In a few +days I saw my way again; and now, reading the “Origin of Species” +more closely, and I may say more sceptically, the antagonism between +Mr. Darwin and Lamarck became fully apparent to me, and I saw how incoherent +and unworkable in practice the later view was in comparison with the +earlier. Then I read Mr. Darwin’s answers to miscellaneous +objections, and was met, and this time brought up, by the passage beginning +“In the earlier editions of this work,” <a name="citation24a"></a><a href="#footnote24a">{24a}</a> +&c., on which I wrote very severely in “Life and Habit”; +<a name="citation24b"></a><a href="#footnote24b">{24b}</a> for I felt +by this time that the difference of opinion between us was radical, +and that the matter must be fought out according to the rules of the +game. After this I went through the earlier part of my book, and +cut out the expressions which I had used inadvertently, and which were +inconsistent with a teleological view. This necessitated only +verbal alterations; for, though I had not known it, the spirit of the +book was throughout teleological.</p> +<p>I now saw that I had got my hands full, and abandoned my intention +of touching upon “Pangenesis.” I took up the words +of Mr. Darwin quoted above, to the effect that it would be a serious +error to ascribe the greater number of instincts to transmitted habit. +I wrote chapter xi. of “Life and Habit,” which is headed +“Instincts as Inherited Memory”; I also wrote the four subsequent +chapters, “Instincts of Neuter Insects,” “Lamarck +and Mr. Darwin,” “Mr. Mivart and Mr. Darwin,” and +the concluding chapter, all of them in the month of October and the +early part of November 1877, the complete book leaving the binder’s +hands December 4, 1877, but, according to trade custom, being dated +1878. It will be seen that these five concluding chapters were +rapidly written, and this may account in part for the directness with +which I said anything I had to say about Mr. Darwin; partly this, and +partly I felt I was in for a penny and might as well be in for a pound. +I therefore wrote about Mr. Darwin’s work exactly as I should +about any one else’s, bearing in mind the inestimable services +he had undoubtedly - and must always be counted to have - rendered to +evolution.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>How I came to write “Evolution, Old and New” - Mr Darwin’s +“brief but imperfect” sketch of the opinions of the writers +on evolution who had preceded him - The reception which “Evolution, +Old and New,” met with.</p> +<p>Though my book was out in 1877, it was not till January 1878 that +I took an opportunity of looking up Professor Ray Lankester’s +account of Professor Hering’s lecture. I can hardly say +how relieved I was to find that it sprung no mine upon me, but that, +so far as I could gather, Professor Hering and I had come to pretty +much the same conclusion. I had already found the passage in Dr. +Erasmus Darwin which I quoted in “Evolution, Old and New,” +but may perhaps as well repeat it here. It runs -</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Owing to the imperfection of language, the offspring is termed +a new animal; but is, in truth, a branch or elongation of the parent, +since a part of the embryon animal is or was a part of the parent, and, +therefore, in strict language, cannot be said to be entirely new at +the time of its production, and, therefore, it may retain some of the +habits of the parent system.” <a name="citation26"></a><a href="#footnote26">{26}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>When, then, the <i>Athenæum</i> reviewed “Life and Habit” +(January 26, 1878), I took the opportunity to write to that paper, calling +attention to Professor Hering’s lecture, and also to the passage +just quoted from Dr. Erasmus Darwin. The editor kindly inserted +my letter in his issue of February 9, 1878. I felt that I had +now done all in the way of acknowledgment to Professor Hering which +it was, for the time, in my power to do.</p> +<p>I again took up Mr. Darwin’s “Origin of Species,” +this time, I admit, in a spirit of scepticism. I read his “brief +but imperfect” sketch of the progress of opinion on the origin +of species, and turned to each one of the writers he had mentioned. +First, I read all the parts of the “Zoonomia” that were +not purely medical, and was astonished to find that, as Dr. Krause has +since said in his essay on Erasmus Darwin, “<i>he was the first +who proposed and persistently carried out a well-rounded theory with +regard to the development of the living world</i>” <a name="citation27"></a><a href="#footnote27">{27}</a> +(italics in original).</p> +<p>This is undoubtedly the case, and I was surprised at finding Professor +Huxley say concerning this very eminent man that he could “hardly +be said to have made any real advance upon his predecessors.” +Still more was I surprised at remembering that, in the first edition +of the “Origin of Species,” Dr. Erasmus Darwin had never +been so much as named; while in the “brief but imperfect” +sketch he was dismissed with a line of half-contemptuous patronage, +as though the mingled tribute of admiration and curiosity which attaches +to scientific prophecies, as distinguished from discoveries, was the +utmost he was entitled to. “It is curious,” says Mr. +Darwin innocently, in the middle of a note in the smallest possible +type, “how largely my grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, anticipated +the views and erroneous grounds of opinion of Lamarck in his ‘Zoonomia’ +(vol. i. pp. 500-510), published in 1794”; this was all he had +to say about the founder of “Darwinism,” until I myself +unearthed Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and put his work fairly before the present +generation in “Evolution, Old and New.” Six months +after I had done this, I had the satisfaction of seeing that Mr. Darwin +had woke up to the propriety of doing much the same thing, and that +he had published an interesting and charmingly written memoir of his +grandfather, of which more anon.</p> +<p>Not that Dr. Darwin was the first to catch sight of a complete theory +of evolution. Buffon was the first to point out that, in view +of the known modifications which had been effected among our domesticated +animals and cultivated plants, the ass and the horse should be considered +as, in all probability, descended from a common ancestor; yet, if this +is so, he writes - if the point “were once gained that among animals +and vegetables there had been, I do not say several species, but even +a single one, which had been produced in the course of direct descent +from another species; if, for example, it could be once shown that the +ass was but a degeneration from the horse, then there is no further +limit to be set to the power of Nature, and we should not be wrong in +supposing that, with sufficient time, she has evolved all other organised +forms from one primordial type” <a name="citation28a"></a><a href="#footnote28a">{28a}</a> +(<i>et l’on n’auroit pas tort de supposer</i>, <i>que d’un +seul être elle a su tirer avec le temps tous les autres êtres +organisés</i>)<i>.</i></p> +<p>This, I imagine, in spite of Professor Huxley’s dictum, is +contributing a good deal to the general doctrine of evolution; for though +Descartes and Leibnitz may have thrown out hints pointing more or less +broadly in the direction of evolution, some of which Professor Huxley +has quoted, he has adduced nothing approaching to the passage from Buffon +given above, either in respect of the clearness with which the conclusion +intended to be arrived at is pointed out, or the breadth of view with +which the whole ground of animal and vegetable nature is covered. +The passage referred to is only one of many to the same effect, and +must be connected with one quoted in “Evolution, Old and New,” +<a name="citation28b"></a><a href="#footnote28b">{28b}</a> from p. 13 +of Buffon’s first volume, which appeared in 1749, and than which +nothing can well point more plainly in the direction of evolution. +It is not easy, therefore, to understand why Professor Huxley should +give 1753-78 as the date of Buffon’s work, nor yet why he should +say that Buffon was “at first a partisan of the absolute immutability +of species,” <a name="citation29a"></a><a href="#footnote29a">{29a}</a> +unless, indeed, we suppose he has been content to follow that very unsatisfactory +writer, Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire (who falls into this error, and +says that Buffon’s first volume on animals appeared 1753), without +verifying him, and without making any reference to him.</p> +<p>Professor Huxley quotes a passage from the “Palingénésie +Philosophique” of Bonnet, of which he says that, making allowance +for his peculiar views on the subject of generation, they bear no small +resemblance to what is understood by “evolution” at the +present day. The most important parts of the passage quoted are +as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Should I be going too far if I were to conjecture that the +plants and animals of the present day have arisen by a sort of natural +evolution from the organised beings which peopled the world in its original +state as it left the hands of the Creator? . . . In the outset +organised beings were probably very different from what they are now +- as different as the original world is from our present one. +We have no means of estimating the amount of these differences, but +it is possible that even our ablest naturalist, if transplanted to the +original world, would entirely fail to recognise our plants and animals +therein.” <a name="citation29b"></a><a href="#footnote29b">{29b}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>But this is feeble in comparison with Buffon, and did not appear +till 1769, when Buffon had been writing on evolution for fully twenty +years with the eyes of scientific Europe upon him. Whatever concession +to the opinion of Buffon Bonnet may have been inclined to make in 1769, +in 1764, when he published his “Contemplation de la Nature,” +and in 1762 when his “Considérations sur les Corps Organes” +appeared, he cannot be considered to have been a supporter of evolution. +I went through these works in 1878 when I was writing “Evolution, +Old and New,” to see whether I could claim him as on my side; +but though frequently delighted with his work, I found it impossible +to press him into my service.</p> +<p>The pre-eminent claim of Buffon to be considered as the father of +the modern doctrine of evolution cannot be reasonably disputed, though +he was doubtless led to his conclusions by the works of Descartes and +Leibnitz, of both of whom he was an avowed and very warm admirer. +His claim does not rest upon a passage here or there, but upon the spirit +of forty quartos written over a period of about as many years. +Nevertheless he wrote, as I have shown in “Evolution, Old and +New,” of set purpose enigmatically, whereas there was no beating +about the bush with Dr. Darwin. He speaks straight out, and Dr. +Krause is justified in saying of him “<i>that he was the first +who proposed and persistently carried out a well-rounded theory</i>” +of evolution.</p> +<p>I now turned to Lamarck. I read the first volume of the “Philosophie +Zoologique,” analysed it and translated the most important parts. +The second volume was beside my purpose, dealing as it does rather with +the origin of life than of species, and travelling too fast and too +far for me to be able to keep up with him. Again I was astonished +at the little mention Mr. Darwin had made of this illustrious writer, +at the manner in which he had motioned him away, as it were, with his +hand in the first edition of the “Origin of Species,” and +at the brevity and imperfection of the remarks made upon him in the +subsequent historical sketch.</p> +<p>I got Isidore Geoffroy’s “Histoire Naturelle Générale,” +which Mr. Darwin commends in the note on the second page of the historical +sketch, as giving “an excellent history of opinion” upon +the subject of evolution, and a full account of Buffon’s conclusions +upon the same subject. This at least is what I supposed Mr. Darwin +to mean. What he said was that Isidore Geoffroy gives an excellent +history of opinion on the subject of the date of the first publication +of Lamarck, and that in his work there is a full account of Buffon’s +fluctuating conclusions upon <i>the same subject</i>. <a name="citation31"></a><a href="#footnote31">{31}</a> +But Mr. Darwin is a more than commonly puzzling writer. I read +what M. Geoffroy had to say upon Buffon, and was surprised to find that, +after all, according to M. Geoffroy, Buffon, and not Lamarck, was the +founder of the theory of evolution. His name, as I have already +said, was never mentioned in the first edition of the “Origin +of Species.”</p> +<p>M. Geoffroy goes into the accusations of having fluctuated in his +opinions, which he tells us have been brought against Buffon, and comes +to the conclusion that they are unjust, as any one else will do who +turns to Buffon himself. Mr. Darwin, however, in the “brief +but imperfect sketch,” catches at the accusation, and repeats +it while saying nothing whatever about the defence. The following +is still all he says: “The first author who in modern times has +treated” evolution “in a scientific spirit was Buffon. +But as his opinions fluctuated greatly at different periods, and as +he does not enter on the causes or means of the transformation of species, +I need not here enter on details.” On the next page, in +the note last quoted, Mr. Darwin originally repeated the accusation +of Buffon’s having been fluctuating in his opinions, and appeared +to give it the imprimatur of Isidore Geoffroy’s approval; the +fact being that Isidore Geoffroy only quoted the accusation in order +to refute it; and though, I suppose, meaning well, did not make half +the case he might have done, and abounds with misstatements. My +readers will find this matter particularly dealt with in “Evolution, +Old and New,” Chapter X.</p> +<p>I gather that some one must have complained to Mr. Darwin of his +saying that Isidore Geoffroy gave an account of Buffon’s “fluctuating +conclusions” concerning evolution, when he was doing all he knew +to maintain that Buffon’s conclusions did not fluctuate; for I +see that in the edition of 1876 the word “fluctuating” has +dropped out of the note in question, and we now learn that Isidore Geoffroy +gives “a full account of Buffon’s conclusions,” without +the “fluctuating.” But Buffon has not taken much by +this, for his opinions are still left fluctuating greatly at different +periods on the preceding page, and though he still was the first to +treat evolution in a scientific spirit, he still does not enter upon +the causes or means of the transformation of species. No one can +understand Mr. Darwin who does not collate the different editions of +the “Origin of Species” with some attention. When +he has done this, he will know what Newton meant by saying he felt like +a child playing with pebbles upon the seashore.</p> +<p>One word more upon this note before I leave it. Mr. Darwin +speaks of Isidore Geoffroy’s history of opinion as “excellent,” +and his account of Buffon’s opinions as “full.” +I wonder how well qualified he is to be a judge of these matters? +If he knows much about the earlier writers, he is the more inexcusable +for having said so little about them. If little, what is his opinion +worth?</p> +<p>To return to the “brief but imperfect sketch.” +I do not think I can ever again be surprised at anything Mr. Darwin +may say or do, but if I could, I should wonder how a writer who did +not “enter upon the causes or means of the transformation of species,” +and whose opinions “fluctuated greatly at different periods,” +can be held to have treated evolution “in a scientific spirit.” +Nevertheless, when I reflect upon the scientific reputation Mr. Darwin +has attained, and the means by which he has won it, I suppose the scientific +spirit must be much what he here implies. I see Mr. Darwin says +of his own father, Dr. Robert Darwin of Shrewsbury, that he does not +consider him to have had a scientific mind. Mr. Darwin cannot +tell why he does not think his father’s mind to have been fitted +for advancing science, “for he was fond of theorising, and was +incomparably the best observer” Mr. Darwin ever knew. <a name="citation33a"></a><a href="#footnote33a">{33a}</a> +From the hint given in the “brief but imperfect sketch,” +I fancy I can help Mr. Darwin to see why he does not think his father’s +mind to have been a scientific one. It is possible that Dr. Robert +Darwin’s opinions did not fluctuate sufficiently at different +periods, and that Mr. Darwin considered him as having in some way entered +upon the causes or means of the transformation of species. Certainly +those who read Mr. Darwin’s own works attentively will find no +lack of fluctuation in his case; and reflection will show them that +a theory of evolution which relies mainly on the accumulation of accidental +variations comes very close to not entering upon the causes or means +of the transformation of species. <a name="citation33b"></a><a href="#footnote33b">{33b}</a></p> +<p>I have shown, however, in “Evolution, Old and New,” that +the assertion that Buffon does not enter on the causes or means of the +transformation of species is absolutely without foundation, and that, +on the contrary, he is continually dealing with this very matter, and +devotes to it one of his longest and most important chapters, <a name="citation33c"></a><a href="#footnote33c">{33c}</a> +but I admit that he is less satisfactory on this head than either Dr. +Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck.</p> +<p>As a matter of fact, Buffon is much more of a Neo-Darwinian than +either Dr. Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck, for with him the variations are +sometimes fortuitous. In the case of the dog, he speaks of them +as making their appearance “<i>by some chance</i> common enough +with Nature,” <a name="citation33d"></a><a href="#footnote33d">{33d}</a> +and being perpetuated by man’s selection. This is exactly +the “if any slight favourable variation <i>happen</i> to arise” +of Mr. Charles Darwin. Buffon also speaks of the variations among +pigeons arising “<i>par hasard</i>.” But these expressions +are only ships; his main cause of variation is the direct action of +changed conditions of existence, while with Dr. Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck +the action of the conditions of existence is indirect, the direct action +being that of the animals or plants themselves, in consequence of changed +sense of need under changed conditions.</p> +<p>I should say that the sketch so often referred to is at first sight +now no longer imperfect in Mr. Darwin’s opinion. It was +“brief but imperfect” in 1861 and in 1866, but in 1876 I +see that it is brief only. Of course, discovering that it was +no longer imperfect, I expected to find it briefer. What, then, +was my surprise at finding that it had become rather longer? I +have found no perfectly satisfactory explanation of this inconsistency, +but, on the whole, incline to think that the “greatest of living +men” felt himself unequal to prolonging his struggle with the +word “but,” and resolved to lay that conjunction at all +hazards, even though the doing so might cost him the balance of his +adjectives; for I think he must know that his sketch is still imperfect.</p> +<p>From Isidore Geoffroy I turned to Buffon himself, and had not long +to wait before I felt that I was now brought into communication with +the master-mind of all those who have up to the present time busied +themselves with evolution. For a brief and imperfect sketch of +him, I must refer my readers to “Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p>I have no great respect for the author of the “Vestiges of +Creation,” who behaved hardly better to the writers upon whom +his own work was founded than Mr. Darwin himself has done. Nevertheless, +I could not forget the gravity of the misrepresentation with which he +was assailed on page 3 of the first edition of the “Origin of +Species,” nor impugn the justice of his rejoinder in the following +year, <a name="citation34"></a><a href="#footnote34">{34}</a> when he +replied that it was to be regretted Mr. Darwin had read his work “almost +as much amiss as if, like its declared opponents, he had an interest +in misrepresenting it.” <a name="citation35a"></a><a href="#footnote35a">{35a}</a> +I could not, again, forget that, though Mr. Darwin did not venture to +stand by the passage in question, it was expunged without a word of +apology or explanation of how it was that he had come to write it. +A writer with any claim to our consideration will never fall into serious +error about another writer without hastening to make a public apology +as soon as he becomes aware of what he has done.</p> +<p>Reflecting upon the substance of what I have written in the last +few pages, I thought it right that people should have a chance of knowing +more about the earlier writers on evolution than they were likely to +hear from any of our leading scientists (no matter how many lectures +they may give on the coming of age of the “Origin of Species”) +except Professor Mivart. A book pointing the difference between +teleological and non-teleological views of evolution seemed likely to +be useful, and would afford me the opportunity I wanted for giving a +<i>résumé</i> of the views of each one of the three chief +founders of the theory, and of contrasting them with those of Mr. Charles +Darwin, as well as for calling attention to Professor Hering’s +lecture. I accordingly wrote “Evolution, Old and New,” +which was prominently announced in the leading literary periodicals +at the end of February, or on the very first days of March 1879, <a name="citation35b"></a><a href="#footnote35b">{35b}</a> +as “a comparison of the theories of Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, +and Lamarck, with that of Mr. Charles Darwin, with copious extracts +from the works of the three first-named writers.” In this +book I was hardly able to conceal the fact that, in spite of the obligations +under which we must always remain to Mr. Darwin, I had lost my respect +for him and for his work.</p> +<p>I should point out that this announcement, coupled with what I had +written in “Life and Habit,” would enable Mr. Darwin and +his friends to form a pretty shrewd guess as to what I was likely to +say, and to quote from Dr. Erasmus Darwin in my forthcoming book. +The announcement, indeed, would tell almost as much as the book itself +to those who knew the works of Erasmus Darwin.</p> +<p>As may be supposed, “Evolution, Old and New,” met with +a very unfavourable reception at the hands of many of its reviewers. +The <i>Saturday Review</i> was furious. “When a writer,” +it exclaimed, “who has not given as many weeks to the subject +as Mr. Darwin has given years, is not content to air his own crude though +clever fallacies, but assumes to criticise Mr. Darwin with the superciliousness +of a young schoolmaster looking over a boy’s theme, it is difficult +not to take him more seriously than he deserves or perhaps desires. +One would think that Mr. Butler was the travelled and laborious observer +of Nature, and Mr. Darwin the pert speculator who takes all his facts +at secondhand.” <a name="citation36"></a><a href="#footnote36">{36}</a></p> +<p>The lady or gentleman who writes in such a strain as this should +not be too hard upon others whom she or he may consider to write like +schoolmasters. It is true I have travelled - not much, but still +as much as many others, and have endeavoured to keep my eyes open to +the facts before me; but I cannot think that I made any reference to +my travels in “Evolution, Old and New.” I did not +quite see what that had to do with the matter. A man may get to +know a good deal without ever going beyond the four-mile radius from +Charing Cross. Much less did I imply that Mr. Darwin was pert: +pert is one of the last words that can be applied to Mr. Darwin. +Nor, again, had I blamed him for taking his facts at secondhand; no +one is to be blamed for this, provided he takes well-established facts +and acknowledges his sources. Mr. Darwin has generally gone to +good sources. The ground of complaint against him is that he muddied +the water after he had drawn it, and tacitly claimed to be the rightful +owner of the spring, on the score of the damage he had effected.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding, however, the generally hostile, or more or less +contemptuous, reception which “Evolution, Old and New,” +met with, there were some reviews - as, for example, those in the <i>Field</i>, +<a name="citation37a"></a><a href="#footnote37a">{37a}</a> the <i>Daily +Chronicle</i>, <a name="citation37b"></a><a href="#footnote37b">{37b}</a> +the <i>Athenæum</i>, <a name="citation37c"></a><a href="#footnote37c">{37c}</a> +the <i>Journal</i> of <i>Science</i>, <a name="citation37d"></a><a href="#footnote37d">{37d}</a> +the <i>British Journal of Homæopathy</i>, <a name="citation37e"></a><a href="#footnote37e">{37e}</a> +the <i>Daily News</i>, <a name="citation37f"></a><a href="#footnote37f">{37f}</a> +the <i>Popular Science Review</i> <a name="citation37g"></a><a href="#footnote37g">{37g}</a> +- which were all I could expect or wish.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>The manner in which Mr. Darwin met “Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p>By far the most important notice of “Evolution, Old and New,” +was that taken by Mr. Darwin himself; for I can hardly be mistaken in +believing that Dr. Krause’s article would have been allowed to +repose unaltered in the pages of the well-known German scientific journal, +<i>Kosmos</i>, unless something had happened to make Mr. Darwin feel +that his reticence concerning his grandfather must now be ended</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin, indeed, gives me the impression of wishing me to understand +that this is not the case. At the beginning of this year he wrote +to me, in a letter which I will presently give in full, that he had +obtained Dr. Krause’s consent for a translation, and had arranged +with Mr. Dallas, before my book was “announced.” “I +remember this,” he continues, “because Mr. Dallas wrote +to tell me of the advertisement.” But Mr. Darwin is not +a clear writer, and it is impossible to say whether he is referring +to the announcement of “Evolution, Old and New” - in which +case he means that the arrangements for the translation of Dr. Krause’s +article were made before the end of February 1879, and before any public +intimation could have reached him as to the substance of the book on +which I was then engaged - or to the advertisements of its being now +published, which appeared at the beginning of May; in which case, as +I have said above, Mr. Darwin and his friends had for some time had +full opportunity of knowing what I was about. I believe, however, +Mr. Darwin to intend that he remembered the arrangements having been +made before the beginning of May - his use of the word “announced,” +instead of “advertised,” being an accident; but let this +pass.</p> +<p>Some time after Mr. Darwin’s work appeared in November 1879, +I got it, and looking at the last page of the book, I read as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“They” (the elder Darwin and Lamarck) “explain +the adaptation to purpose of organisms by an obscure impulse or sense +of what is purpose-like; yet even with regard to man we are in the habit +of saying, that one can never know what so-and-so is good for. +The purpose-like is that which approves itself, and not always that +which is struggled for by obscure impulses and desires. Just in +the same way the beautiful is what pleases.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I had a sort of feeling as though the writer of the above might have +had “Evolution, Old and New,” in his mind, but went on to +the next sentence, which ran -</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Erasmus Darwin’s system was in itself a most significant +first step in the path of knowledge which his grandson has opened up +for us, but to wish to revive it at the present day, as has actually +been seriously attempted, shows a weakness of thought and a mental anachronism +which no one can envy.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“That’s me,” said I to myself promptly. I +noticed also the position in which the sentence stood, which made it +both one of the first that would be likely to catch a reader’s +eye, and the last he would carry away with him. I therefore expected +to find an open reply to some parts of “Evolution, Old and New,” +and turned to Mr. Darwin’s preface.</p> +<p>To my surprise, I there found that what I had been reading could +not by any possibility refer to me, for the preface ran as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“In the February number of a well-known German scientific journal, +<i>Kosmos</i>, <a name="citation39"></a><a href="#footnote39">{39}</a> +Dr. Ernest Krause published a sketch of the ‘Life of Erasmus Darwin,’ +the author of the ‘Zoonomia,’ ‘Botanic Garden,’ +and other works. This article bears the title of a ‘Contribution +to the History of the Descent Theory’; and Dr. Krause has kindly +allowed my brother Erasmus and myself to have a translation made of +it for publication in this country.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Then came a note as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Mr. Dallas has undertaken the translation, and his scientific +reputation, together with his knowledge of German, is a guarantee for +its accuracy.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I ought to have suspected inaccuracy where I found so much consciousness +of accuracy, but I did not. However this may be, Mr. Darwin pins +himself down with every circumstance of preciseness to giving Dr. Krause’s +article as it appeared in <i>Kosmos</i>, - the whole article, and nothing +but the article. No one could know this better than Mr. Darwin.</p> +<p>On the second page of Mr. Darwin’s preface there is a small-type +note saying that my work, “Evolution, Old and New,” had +appeared since the publication of Dr. Krause’s article. +Mr. Darwin thus distinctly precludes his readers from supposing that +any passage they might meet with could have been written in reference +to, or by the light of, my book. If anything appeared condemnatory +of that book, it was an undesigned coincidence, and would show how little +worthy of consideration I must be when my opinions were refuted in advance +by one who could have no bias in regard to them.</p> +<p>Knowing that if the article I was about to read appeared in February, +it must have been published before my book, which was not out till three +months later, I saw nothing in Mr. Darwin’s preface to complain +of, and felt that this was only another instance of my absurd vanity +having led me to rush to conclusions without sufficient grounds, - as +if it was likely, indeed, that Mr. Darwin should think what I had said +of sufficient importance to be affected by it. It was plain that +some one besides myself, of whom I as yet knew nothing, had been writing +about the elder Darwin, and had taken much the same line concerning +him that I had done. It was for the benefit of this person, then, +that Dr. Krause’s paragraph was intended. I returned to +a becoming sense of my own insignificance, and began to read what I +supposed to be an accurate translation of Dr. Krause’s article +as it originally appeared, before “Evolution, Old and New,” +was published.</p> +<p>On pp. 3 and 4 of Dr. Krause’s part of Mr. Darwin’s book +(pp. 133 and 134 of the book itself), I detected a sub-apologetic tone +which a little surprised me, and a notice of the fact that Coleridge +when writing on Stillingfleet had used the word “Darwinising.” +Mr. R. Garnett had called my attention to this, and I had mentioned +it in “Evolution, Old and New,” but the paragraph only struck +me as being a little odd.</p> +<p>When I got a few pages farther on (p. 147 of Mr. Darwin’s book), +I found a long quotation from Buffon about rudimentary organs, which +I had quoted in “Evolution, Old and New.” I observed +that Dr. Krause used the same edition of Buffon that I did, and began +his quotation two lines from the beginning of Buffon’s paragraph, +exactly as I had done; also that he had taken his nominative from the +omitted part of the sentence across a full stop, as I had myself taken +it. A little lower I found a line of Buffon’s omitted which +I had given, but I found that at that place I had inadvertently left +two pair of inverted commas which ought to have come out, <a name="citation41"></a><a href="#footnote41">{41}</a> +having intended to end my quotation, but changed my mind and continued +it without erasing the commas. It seemed to me that these commas +had bothered Dr. Krause, and made him think it safer to leave something +out, for the line he omits is a very good one. I noticed that +he translated “Mais comme nous voulons toujours tout rapporter +à un certain but,” “But we, always wishing to refer,” +&c., while I had it, “But we, ever on the look-out to refer,” +&c.; and “Nous ne faisons pas attention que nous altérons +la philosophie,” “We fail to see that thus we deprive philosophy +of her true character,” whereas I had “We fail to see that +we thus rob philosophy of her true character.” This last +was too much; and though it might turn out that Dr. Krause had quoted +this passage before I had done so, had used the same edition as I had, +had begun two lines from the beginning of a paragraph as I had done, +and that the later resemblances were merely due to Mr. Dallas having +compared Dr. Krause’s German translation of Buffon with my English, +and very properly made use of it when he thought fit, it looked <i>primâ +facie</i> more as though my quotation had been copied in English as +it stood, and then altered, but not quite altered enough. This, +in the face of the preface, was incredible; but so many points had such +an unpleasant aspect, that I thought it better to send for <i>Kosmos</i> +and see what I could make out.</p> +<p>At this time I knew not one word of German. On the same day, +therefore, that I sent for <i>Kosmos</i> I began acquire that language, +and in the fortnight before <i>Kosmos</i> came had got far enough forward +for all practical purposes - that is to say, with the help of a translation +and a dictionary, I could see whether or no a German passage was the +same as what purported to be its translation.</p> +<p>When <i>Kosmos</i> came I turned to the end of the article to see +how the sentence about mental anachronism and weakness of thought looked +in German. I found nothing of the kind, the original article ended +with some innocent rhyming doggerel about somebody going on and exploring +something with eagle eye; but ten lines from the end I found a sentence +which corresponded with one six pages from the end of the English translation. +After this there could be little doubt that the whole of these last +six English pages were spurious matter. What little doubt remained +was afterwards removed by my finding that they had no place in any part +of the genuine article. I looked for the passage about Coleridge’s +using the word “Darwinising”; it was not to be found in +the German. I looked for the piece I had quoted from Buffon about +rudimentary organs; but there was nothing of it, nor indeed any reference +to Buffon. It was plain, therefore, that the article which Mr. +Darwin had given was not the one he professed to be giving. I +read Mr. Darwin’s preface over again to see whether he left himself +any loophole. There was not a chink or cranny through which escape +was possible. The only inference that could be drawn was either +that some one had imposed upon Mr. Darwin, or that Mr. Darwin, although +it was not possible to suppose him ignorant of the interpolations that +had been made, nor of the obvious purpose of the concluding sentence, +had nevertheless palmed off an article which had been added to and made +to attack “Evolution, Old and New,” as though it were the +original article which appeared before that book was written. +I could not and would not believe that Mr. Darwin had condescended to +this. Nevertheless, I saw it was necessary to sift the whole matter, +and began to compare the German and the English articles paragraph by +paragraph.</p> +<p>On the first page I found a passage omitted from the English, which +with great labour I managed to get through, and can now translate as +follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Alexander Von Humboldt used to take pleasure in recounting +how powerfully Forster’s pictures of the South Sea Islands and +St. Pierre’s illustrations of Nature had provoked his ardour for +travel and influenced his career as a scientific investigator. +How much more impressively must the works of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, with +their reiterated foreshadowing of a more lofty interpretation of Nature, +have affected his grandson, who in his youth assuredly approached them +with the devotion due to the works of a renowned poet.” <a name="citation43"></a><a href="#footnote43">{43}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I then came upon a passage common to both German and English, which +in its turn was followed in the English by the sub-apologetic paragraph +which I had been struck with on first reading, and which was not in +the German, its place being taken by a much longer passage which had +no place in the English. A little farther on I was amused at coming +upon the following, and at finding it wholly transformed in the supposed +accurate translation</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“How must this early and penetrating explanation of rudimentary +organs have affected the grandson when he read the poem of his ancestor! +But indeed the biological remarks of this accurate observer in regard +to certain definite natural objects must have produced a still deeper +impression upon him, pointing, as they do, to questions which hay attained +so great a prominence at the present day; such as, Why is any creature +anywhere such as we actually see it and nothing else? Why has +such and such a plant poisonous juices? Why has such and such +another thorns? Why have birds and fishes light-coloured breasts +and dark backs, and, Why does every creature resemble the one from which +it sprung?” <a name="citation44a"></a><a href="#footnote44a">{44a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I will not weary the reader with further details as to the omissions +from and additions to the German text. Let it suffice that the +so-called translation begins on p. 131 and ends on p. 216 of Mr. Darwin’s +book. There is new matter on each one of the pp. 132-139, while +almost the whole of pp. 147-152 inclusive, and the whole of pp. 211-216 +inclusive, are spurious - that is to say, not what the purport to be, +not translations from an article that was published in February 1879, +and before “Evolution, Old and New,” but interpolations +not published till six months after that book.</p> +<p>Bearing in mind the contents of two of the added passages and the +tenor of the concluding sentence quoted above, <a name="citation44b"></a><a href="#footnote44b">{44b}</a> +I could no longer doubt that the article had been altered by the light +of and with a view to “Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p>The steps are perfectly clear. First Dr. Krause published his +article in <i>Kosmos</i> and my book was announced (its purport being +thus made obvious), both in the month of February 1879. Soon afterwards +arrangements were made for a translation of Dr. Krause’s essay, +and were completed by the end of April. Then my book came out, +and in some way or other Dr. Krause happened to get hold of it. +He helped himself - not to much, but to enough; made what other additions +to and omissions from his article he thought would best meet “Evolution, +Old and New,” and then fell to condemning that book in a finale +that was meant to be crushing. Nothing was said about the revision +which Dr. Krause’s work had undergone, but it was expressly and +particularly declared in the preface that the English translation was +an accurate version of what appeared in the February number of <i>Kosmos</i>, +and no less expressly and particularly stated that my book was published +subsequently to this. Both these statements are untrue; they are +in Mr. Darwin’s favour and prejudicial to myself.</p> +<p>All this was done with that well-known “happy simplicity” +of which the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, December 12, 1879, declared that +Mr. Darwin was “a master.” The final sentence, about +the “weakness of thought and mental anachronism which no one can +envy,” was especially successful. The reviewer in the <i>Pall +Mall Gazette</i> just quoted from gave it in full, and said that it +was thoroughly justified. He then mused forth a general gnome +that the “confidence of writers who deal in semi-scientific paradoxes +is commonly in inverse proportion to their grasp of the subject.” +Again my vanity suggested to me that I was the person for whose benefit +this gnome was intended. My vanity, indeed, was well fed by the +whole transaction; for I saw that not only did Mr. Darwin, who should +be the best judge, think my work worth notice, but that he did not venture +to meet it openly. As for Dr. Krause’s concluding sentence, +I thought that when a sentence had been antedated the less it contained +about anachronism the better.</p> +<p>Only one of the reviews that I saw of Mr. Darwin’s “Life +of Erasmus Darwin” showed any knowledge of the facts. The +<i>Popular Science Review</i> for January 1880, in flat contradiction +to Mr. Darwin’s preface, said that only part of Dr. Krause’s +article was being given by Mr. Darwin. This reviewer had plainly +seen both <i>Kosmos</i> and Mr. Darwin’s book.</p> +<p>In the same number of the <i>Popular Science Review</i>, and immediately +following the review of Mr. Darwin’s book, there is a review of +“Evolution, Old and New.” The writer of this review +quotes the passage about mental anachronism as quoted by the reviewer +in the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, and adds immediately: “This anachronism +has been committed by Mr. Samuel Butler in a . . . little volume now +before us, and it is doubtless to this, <i>which appeared while his +own work was in progress</i> [italics mine] that Dr. Krause alludes +in the foregoing passage.” Considering that the editor of +the <i>Popular Science Review</i> and the translator of Dr. Krause’s +article for Mr. Darwin are one and the same person, it is likely the +<i>Popular Science Review</i> is well informed in saying that my book +appeared before Dr. Krause’s article had been transformed into +its present shape, and that my book was intended by the passage in question.</p> +<p>Unable to see any way of escaping from a conclusion which I could +not willingly adopt, I thought it best to write to Mr. Darwin, stating +the facts as they appeared to myself, and asking an explanation, which +I would have gladly strained a good many points to have accepted. +It is better, perhaps, that I should give my letter and Darwin’s +answer in full. My letter ran thus:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p><i>January 2</i>, 1880.</p> +<p>CHARLES DARWIN, ESQ., F.R.S., &c.</p> +<p>Dear Sir, - Will you kindly refer me to the edition of <i>Kosmos</i> +which contains the text of Dr. Krause’s article on Dr. Erasmus +Darwin, as translated by Mr. W. S. Dallas?</p> +<p>I have before me the last February number of <i>Kosmos</i>, which +appears by your preface to be the one from which Mr. Dallas has translated, +but his translation contains long and important passages which are not +in the February number of <i>Kosmos</i>, while many passages in the +original article are omitted in the translation.</p> +<p>Among the passages introduced are the last six pages of the English +article, which seem to condemn by anticipation the position I have taken +as regards Dr. Erasmus Darwin in my book, “Evolution, Old and +New,” and which I believe I was the first to take. The concluding, +and therefore, perhaps, most prominent sentence of the translation you +have given to the public stands thus:-</p> +<p>“Erasmus Darwin’s system was in itself a most significant +first step in the path of knowledge which his grandson has opened up +for us, but to wish to revive it at the present day, as has actually +been seriously attempted, shows a weakness of thought and a mental anachronism +which no man can envy.”</p> +<p>The <i>Kosmos</i> which has been sent me from Germany contains no +such passage.</p> +<p>As you have stated in your preface that my book, “Evolution, +Old and New,” appeared subsequently to Dr. Krause’s article, +and as no intimation is given that the article has been altered and +added to since its original appearance, while the accuracy of the translation +as though from the February number of <i>Kosmos</i> is, as you expressly +say, guaranteed by Mr. Dallas’s “scientific reputation together +with his knowledge of German,” your readers will naturally suppose +that all they read in the translation appeared in February last, and +therefore before “Evolution, Old and New,” was written, +and therefore independently of, and necessarily without reference to, +that book.</p> +<p>I do not doubt that this was actually the case, but have failed to +obtain the edition which contains the passage above referred to, and +several others which appear in the translation.</p> +<p>I have a personal interest in this matter, and venture, therefore, +to ask for the explanation which I do not doubt you will readily give +me. - Yours faithfully,</p> +<p>S. BUTLER.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The following is Mr. Darwin’s answer:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p><i>January 3</i>, 1880.</p> +<p>My Dear Sir, Dr. Krause, soon after the appearance of his article +in <i>Kosmos</i> told me that he intended to publish it separately and +to alter it considerably, and the altered MS. was sent to Mr. Dallas +for translation. This is so common a practice that it never occurred +to me to state that the article had been modified; but now I much regret +that I did not do so. The original will soon appear in German, +and I believe will be a much larger book than the English one; for, +with Dr. Krause’s consent, many long extracts from Miss Seward +were omitted (as well as much other matter), from being in my opinion +superfluous for the English reader. I believe that the omitted +parts will appear as notes in the German edition. Should there +be a reprint of the English Life I will state that the original as it +appeared in <i>Kosmos</i> was modified by Dr. Krause before it was translated. +I may add that I had obtained Dr. Krause’s consent for a translation, +and had arranged with Mr. Dallas before your book was announced. +I remember this because Mr. Dallas wrote to tell me of the advertisement. +- I remain, yours faithfully,</p> +<p>C. DARWIN.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This was not a letter I could accept. If Mr. Darwin had said +that by some inadvertence, which he was unable to excuse or account +for, a blunder had been made which he would at once correct so far as +was in his power by a letter to the <i>Times</i> or the <i>Athenæum</i>, +and that a notice of the erratum should be printed on a flyleaf and +pasted into all unsold copies of the “Life of Erasmus Darwin,” +there would have been no more heard about the matter from me; but when +Mr. Darwin maintained that it was a common practice to take advantage +of an opportunity of revising a work to interpolate a covert attack +upon an opponent, and at the same time to misdate the interpolated matter +by expressly stating that it appeared months sooner than it actually +did, and prior to the work which it attacked; when he maintained that +what was being done was “so common a practice that it never occurred,” +to him - the writer of some twenty volumes - to do what all literary +men must know to be inexorably requisite, I thought this was going far +beyond what was permissible in honourable warfare, and that it was time, +in the interests of literary and scientific morality, even more than +in my own, to appeal to public opinion. I was particularly struck +with the use of the words “it never occurred to me,” and +felt how completely of a piece it was with the opening paragraph of +the “Origin of Species.” It was not merely that it +did not occur to Mr. Darwin to state that the article had been modified +since it was written - this would have been bad enough under the circumstances +but that it did occur to him to go out of his way to say what was not +true. There was no necessity for him to have said anything about +my book. It appeared, moreover, inadequate to tell me that if +a reprint of the English Life was wanted (which might or might not be +the case, and if it was not the case, why, a shrug of the shoulders, +and I must make the best of it), Mr. Darwin might perhaps silently omit +his note about my book, as he omitted his misrepresentation of the author +of the “Vestiges of Creation,” and put the words “revised +and corrected by the author” on his title-page.</p> +<p>No matter how high a writer may stand, nor what services he may have +unquestionably rendered, it cannot be for the general well-being that +he should be allowed to set aside the fundamental principles of straightforwardness +and fair play. When I thought of Buffon, of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, +of Lamarck and even of the author of the “Vestiges of Creation,” +to all of whom Mr. Darwin had dealt the same measure which he was now +dealing to myself; when I thought of these great men, now dumb, who +had borne the burden and heat of the day, and whose laurels had been +filched from them; of the manner, too, in which Mr. Darwin had been +abetted by those who should have been the first to detect the fallacy +which had misled him; of the hotbed of intrigue which science has now +become; of the disrepute into which we English must fall as a nation +if such practices as Mr. Darwin had attempted in this case were to be +tolerated; - when I thought of all this, I felt that though prayers +for the repose of dead men’s souls might be unavailing, yet a +defence of their work and memory, no matter against what odds, might +avail the living, and resolved that I would do my utmost to make my +countrymen aware of the spirit now ruling among those whom they delight +to honour.</p> +<p>At first I thought I ought to continue the correspondence privately +with Mr. Darwin, and explain to him that his letter was insufficient, +but on reflection I felt that little good was likely to come of a second +letter, if what I had already written was not enough. I therefore +wrote to the <i>Athenæum</i> and gave a condensed account of the +facts contained in the last ten or a dozen pages. My letter appeared +January 31, 1880. <a name="citation50"></a><a href="#footnote50">{50}</a></p> +<p>The accusation was a very grave one; it was made in a very public +place. I gave my name; I adduced the strongest <i>primâ +facie</i> grounds for the acceptance of my statements; but there was +no rejoinder, and for the best of all reasons - that no rejoinder was +possible. Besides, what is the good of having a reputation for +candour if one may not stand upon it at a pinch? I never yet knew +a person with an especial reputation for candour without finding sooner +or later that he had developed it as animals develop their organs, through +“sense of need.” Not only did Mr. Darwin remain perfectly +quiet, but all reviewers and <i>littérateurs</i> remained perfectly +quiet also. It seemed - though I do not for a moment believe that +this is so - as if public opinion rather approved of what Mr. Darwin +had done, and of his silence than otherwise. I saw the “Life +of Erasmus Darwin” more frequently and more prominently advertised +now than I had seen it hitherto - perhaps in the hope of selling off +the adulterated copies, and being able to reprint the work with a corrected +title page. Presently I saw Professor Huxley hastening to the +rescue with his lecture on the coming of age of the “Origin of +Species,” and by May it was easy for Professor Ray Lankester to +imply that Mr. Darwin was the greatest of living men. I have since +noticed two or three other controversies raging in the <i>Athenæum</i> +and <i>Times</i>; in each of these cases I saw it assumed that the defeated +party, when proved to have publicly misrepresented his adversary, should +do his best to correct in public the injury which he had publicly inflicted, +but I noticed that in none of them had the beaten side any especial +reputation for candour. This probably made all the difference. +But however this may be, Mr. Darwin left me in possession of the field, +in the hope, doubtless, that the matter would blow over - which it apparently +soon did. Whether it has done so in reality or no, is a matter +which remains to be seen. My own belief is that people paid no +attention to what I said, as believing it simply incredible, and that +when they come to know that it is true, they will think as I do concerning +it.</p> +<p>From ladies and gentlemen of science I admit that I have no expectations. +There is no conduct so dishonourable that people will not deny it or +explain it away, if it has been committed by one whom they recognise +as of their own persuasion. It must be remembered that facts cannot +be respected by the scientist in the same way as by other people. +It is his business to familiarise himself with facts, and, as we all +know, the path from familiarity to contempt is an easy one.</p> +<p>Here, then, I take leave of this matter for the present. If +it appears that I have used language such as is rarely seen in controversy, +let the reader remember that the occasion is, so far as I know, unparalleled +for the cynicism and audacity with which the wrong complained of was +committed and persisted in. I trust, however, that, though not +indifferent to this, my indignation has been mainly roused, as when +I wrote “Evolution, Old and New,” before Mr. Darwin had +given me personal ground of complaint against him, by the wrongs he +has inflicted on dead men, on whose behalf I now fight, as I trust that +some one - whom I thank by anticipation - may one day fight on mine.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Introduction to Professor Hering’s lecture.</p> +<p>After I had finished “Evolution, Old and New,” I wrote +some articles for the <i>Examiner</i>, <a name="citation52"></a><a href="#footnote52">{52}</a> +in which I carried out the idea put forward in “Life and Habit,” +that we are one person with our ancestors. It follows from this, +that all living animals and vegetables, being - as appears likely if +the theory of evolution is accepted - descended from a common ancestor, +are in reality one person, and unite to form a body corporate, of whose +existence, however, they are unconscious. There is an obvious +analogy between this and the manner in which the component cells of +our bodies unite to form our single individuality, of which it is not +likely they have a conception, and with which they have probably only +the same partial and imperfect sympathy as we, the body corporate, have +with them. In the articles above alluded to I separated the organic +from the inorganic, and when I came to rewrite them, I found that this +could not be done, and that I must reconstruct what I had written. +I was at work on this - to which I hope to return shortly - when Dr. +Krause’s’ “Erasmus Darwin,” with its preliminary +notice by Mr. Charles Darwin, came out, and having been compelled, as +I have shown above, by Dr. Krause’s work to look a little into +the German language, the opportunity seemed favourable for going on +with it and becoming acquainted with Professor Hering’s lecture. +I therefore began to translate his lecture at once, with the kind assistance +of friends whose patience seemed inexhaustible, and found myself well +rewarded for my trouble.</p> +<p>Professor Hering and I, to use a metaphor of his own, are as men +who have observed the action of living beings upon the stage of the +world, he from the point of view at once of a spectator and of one who +has free access to much of what goes on behind the scenes, I from that +of a spectator only, with none but the vaguest notion of the actual +manner in which the stage machinery is worked. If two men so placed, +after years of reflection, arrive independently of one another at an +identical conclusion as regards the manner in which this machinery must +have been invented and perfected, it is natural that each should take +a deep interest in the arguments of the other, and be anxious to put +them forward with the utmost possible prominence. It seems to +me that the theory which Professor Hering and I are supporting in common, +is one the importance of which is hardly inferior to that of the theory +of evolution itself - for it puts the backbone, as it were, into the +theory of evolution. I shall therefore make no apology for laying +my translation of Professor Hering’s work before my reader.</p> +<p>Concerning the identity of the main idea put forward in “Life +and Habit” with that of Professor Hering’s lecture, there +can hardly, I think, be two opinions. We both of us maintain that +we grow our limbs as we do, and possess the instincts we possess, because +we remember having grown our limbs in this way, and having had these +instincts in past generations when we were in the persons of our forefathers +- each individual life adding a small (but so small, in any one lifetime, +as to be hardly appreciable) amount of new experience to the general +store of memory; that we have thus got into certain habits which we +can now rarely break; and that we do much of what we do unconsciously +on the same principle as that (whatever it is) on which we do all other +habitual actions, with the greater ease and unconsciousness the more +often we repeat them. Not only is the main idea the same, but +I was surprised to find how often Professor Hering and I had taken the +same illustrations with which to point our meaning.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, we have each of us left undealt with some points which +the other has treated of. Professor Hering, for example, goes +into the question of what memory is, and this I did not venture to do. +I confined myself to saying that whatever memory was, heredity was also. +Professor Hering adds that memory is due to vibrations of the molecules +of the nerve fibres, which under certain circumstances recur, and bring +about a corresponding recurrence of visible action.</p> +<p>This approaches closely to the theory concerning the physics of memory +which has been most generally adopted since the time of Bonnet, who +wrote as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“The soul never has a new sensation but by the inter position +of the senses. This sensation has been originally attached to +the motion of certain fibres. Its reproduction or recollection +by the senses will then be likewise connected with these same fibres.” +. . . <a name="citation54a"></a><a href="#footnote54a">{54a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>And again:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“It appeared to me that since this memory is connected with +the body, it must depend upon some change which must happen to the primitive +state of the sensible fibres by the action of objects. I have, +therefore, admitted as probable that the state of the fibres on which +an object has acted is not precisely the same after this action as it +was before I have conjectured that the sensible fibres experience more +or less durable modifications, which constitute the physics of memory +and recollection.” <a name="citation54b"></a><a href="#footnote54b">{54b}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Professor Hering comes near to endorsing this view, and uses it for +the purpose of explaining personal identity. This, at least, is +what he does in fact, though perhaps hardly in words. I did not +say more upon the essence of personality than that it was inseparable +from the idea that the various phases of our existence should have flowed +one out of the other, “in what we see as a continuous, though +it may be at times a very troubled, stream” <a name="citation55"></a><a href="#footnote55">{55}</a> +but I maintained that the identity between two successive generations +was of essentially the same kind as that existing between an infant +and an octogenarian. I thus left personal identity unexplained, +though insisting that it was the key to two apparently distinct sets +of phenomena, the one of which had been hitherto considered incompatible +with our ideas concerning it. Professor Hering insists on this +too, but he gives us farther insight into what personal identity is, +and explains how it is that the phenomena of heredity are phenomena +also of personal identity.</p> +<p>He implies, though in the short space at his command he has hardly +said so in express terms, that personal identity as we commonly think +of it - that is to say, as confined to the single life of the individual +- consists in the uninterruptedness of a sufficient number of vibrations, +which have been communicated from molecule to molecule of the nerve +fibres, and which go on communicating each one of them its own peculiar +characteristic elements to the new matter which we introduce into the +body by way of nutrition. These vibrations may be so gentle as +to be imperceptible for years together; but they are there, and may +become perceived if they receive accession through the running into +them of a wave going the same way as themselves, which wave has been +set up in the ether by exterior objects and has been communicated to +the organs of sense.</p> +<p>As these pages are on the point of leaving my hands, I see the following +remarkable passage in <i>Mind</i> for the current month, and introduce +it parenthetically here:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“I followed the sluggish current of hyaline material issuing +from globules of most primitive living substance. Persistently +it followed its way into space, conquering, at first, the manifold resistances +opposed to it by its watery medium. Gradually, however, its energies +became exhausted, till at last, completely overwhelmed, it stopped, +an immovable projection stagnated to death-like rigidity. Thus +for hours, perhaps, it remained stationary, one of many such rays of +some of the many kinds of protoplasmic stars. By degrees, then, +or perhaps quite suddenly, <i>help would come to it from foreign but +congruous sources. It would seem to combine with outside complemental +matter</i> drifted to it at random. Slowly it would regain thereby +its vital mobility. Shrinking at first, but gradually completely +restored and reincorporated into the onward tide of life, it was ready +to take part again in the progressive flow of a new ray.” <a name="citation56"></a><a href="#footnote56">{56}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>To return to the end of the last paragraph but one. If this +is so - but I should warn the reader that Professor Hering is not responsible +for this suggestion, though it seems to follow so naturally from what +he has said that I imagine he intended the inference to be drawn, - +if this is so, assimilation is nothing else than the communication of +its own rhythms from the assimilating to the assimilated substance, +to the effacement of the vibrations or rhythms heretofore existing in +this last; and suitability for food will depend upon whether the rhythms +of the substance eaten are such as to flow harmoniously into and chime +in with those of the body which has eaten it, or whether they will refuse +to act in concert with the new rhythms with which they have become associated, +and will persist obstinately in pursuing their own course. In +this case they will either be turned out of the body at once, or will +disconcert its arrangements, with perhaps fatal consequences. +This comes round to the conclusion I arrived at in “Life and Habit,” +that assimilation was nothing but the imbuing of one thing with the +memories of another. (See “Life and Habit,” pp. 136, +137, 140, &c.)</p> +<p>It will be noted that, as I resolved the phenomena of heredity into +phenomena of personal identity, and left the matter there, so Professor +Hering resolves the phenomena of personal identity into the phenomena +of a living mechanism whose equilibrium is disturbed by vibrations of +a certain character - and leaves it there. We now want to understand +more about the vibrations.</p> +<p>But if, according to Professor Hering, the personal identity of the +single life consists in the uninterruptedness of vibrations, so also +do the phenomena of heredity. For not only may vibrations of a +certain violence or character be persistent unperceived for many years +in a living body, and communicate themselves to the matter it has assimilated, +but they may, and will, under certain circumstances, extend to the particle +which is about to leave the parent body as the germ of its future offspring. +In this minute piece of matter there must, if Professor Hering is right, +be an infinity of rhythmic undulations incessantly vibrating with more +or less activity, and ready to be set in more active agitation at a +moment’s warning, under due accession of vibration from exterior +objects. On the occurrence of such stimulus, that is to say, when +a vibration of a suitable rhythm from without concurs with one within +the body so as to augment it, the agitation may gather such strength +that the touch, as it were, is given to a house of cards, and the whole +comes toppling over. This toppling over is what we call action; +and when it is the result of the disturbance of certain usual arrangements +in certain usual ways, we call it the habitual development and instinctive +characteristics of the race. In either case, then, whether we +consider the continued identity of the individual in what we call his +single life, or those features in his offspring which we refer to heredity, +the same explanation of the phenomena is applicable. It follows +from this as a matter of course, that the continuation of life or personal +identity in the individual and the race are fundamentally of the same +kind, or, in other words, that there is a veritable prolongation of +identity or oneness of personality between parents and offspring. +Professor Hering reaches his conclusion by physical methods, while I +reached mine, as I am told, by metaphysical. I never yet could +understand what “metaphysics” and “metaphysical” +mean; but I should have said I reached it by the exercise of a little +common sense while regarding certain facts which are open to every one. +There is, however, so far as I can see, no difference in the conclusion +come to.</p> +<p>The view which connects memory with vibrations may tend to throw +light upon that difficult question, the manner in which neuter bees +acquire structures and instincts, not one of which was possessed by +any of their direct ancestors. Those who have read “Life +and Habit” may remember, I suggested that the food prepared in +the stomachs of the nurse-bees, with which the neuter working bees are +fed, might thus acquire a quasi-seminal character, and be made a means +of communicating the instincts and structures in question. <a name="citation58"></a><a href="#footnote58">{58}</a> +If assimilation be regarded as the receiving by one substance of the +rhythms or undulations from another, the explanation just referred to +receives an accession of probability.</p> +<p>If it is objected that Professor Hering’s theory as to continuity +of vibrations being the key to memory and heredity involves the action +of more wheels within wheels than our imagination can come near to comprehending, +and also that it supposes this complexity of action as going on within +a compass which no unaided eye can detect by reason of its littleness, +so that we are carried into a fairy land with which sober people should +have nothing to do, it may be answered that the case of light affords +us an example of our being truly aware of a multitude of minute actions, +the hundred million millionth part of which we should have declared +to be beyond our ken, could we not incontestably prove that we notice +and count them all with a very sufficient and creditable accuracy.</p> +<p>“Who would not,” <a name="citation59a"></a><a href="#footnote59a">{59a}</a> +says Sir John Herschel, “ask for demonstration when told that +a gnat’s wing, in its ordinary flight, beats many hundred times +in a second? or that there exist animated and regularly organised beings +many thousands of whose bodies laid close together would not extend +to an inch? But what are these to the astonishing truths which +modern optical inquiries have disclosed, which teach us that every point +of a medium through which a ray of light passes is affected with a succession +of periodical movements, recurring regularly at equal intervals, no +less than five hundred millions of millions of times in a second; that +it is by such movements communicated to the nerves of our eyes that +we see; nay, more, that it is the <i>difference</i> in the frequency +of their recurrence which affects us with the sense of the diversity +of colour; that, for instance, in acquiring the sensation of redness, +our eyes are affected four hundred and eighty-two millions of millions +of times; of yellowness, five hundred and forty-two millions of millions +of times; and of violet, seven hundred and seven millions of millions +of times per second? <a name="citation59b"></a><a href="#footnote59b">{59b}</a> +Do not such things sound more like the ravings of madmen than the sober +conclusions of people in their waking senses? They are, nevertheless, +conclusions to which any one may most certainly arrive who will only +be at the pains of examining the chain of reasoning by which they have +been obtained.”</p> +<p>A man counting as hard as he can repeat numbers one after another, +and never counting more than a hundred, so that he shall have no long +words to repeat, may perhaps count ten thousand, or a hundred a hundred +times over, in an hour. At this rate, counting night and day, +and allowing no time for rest or refreshment, he would count one million +in four days and four hours, or say four days only. To count a +million a million times over, he would require four million days, or +roughly ten thousand years; for five hundred millions of millions, he +must have the utterly unrealisable period of five million years. +Yet he actually goes through this stupendous piece of reckoning unconsciously +hour after hour, day after day, it may be for eighty years, <i>often +in each second</i> of daylight; and how much more by artificial or subdued +light I do not know. He knows whether his eye is being struck +five hundred millions of millions of times, or only four hundred and +eighty-two millions of millions of times. He thus shows that he +estimates or counts each set of vibrations, and registers them according +to his results. If a man writes upon the back of a British Museum +blotting-pad of the common <i>nonpareil</i> pattern, on which there +are some thousands of small spaces each differing in colour from that +which is immediately next to it, his eye will, nevertheless, without +an effort assign its true colour to each one of these spaces. +This implies that he is all the time counting and taking tally of the +difference in the numbers of the vibrations from each one of the small +spaces in question. Yet the mind that is capable of such stupendous +computations as these so long as it knows nothing about them, makes +no little fuss about the conscious adding together of such almost inconceivably +minute numbers as, we will say, 2730169 and 5790135 - or, if these be +considered too large, as 27 and 19. Let the reader remember that +he cannot by any effort bring before his mind the units, not in ones, +<i>but in millions of millions</i> of the processes which his visual +organs are undergoing second after second from dawn till dark, and then +let him demur if he will to the possibility of the existence in a germ, +of currents and undercurrents, and rhythms and counter rhythms, also +by the million of millions - each one of which, on being overtaken by +the rhythm from without that chimes in with and stimulates it, may be +the beginning of that unsettlement of equilibrium which results in the +crash of action, unless it is timely counteracted.</p> +<p>If another objector maintains that the vibrations within the germ +as above supposed must be continually crossing and interfering with +one another in such a manner as to destroy the continuity of any one +series, it may be replied that the vibrations of the light proceeding +from the objects that surround us traverse one another by the millions +of millions every second yet in no way interfere with one another. +Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the difficulties of the theory +towards which I suppose Professor Hering to incline are like those of +all other theories on the same subject - almost inconceivably great.</p> +<p>In “Life and Habit” I did not touch upon these vibrations, +knowing nothing about them. Here, then, is one important point +of difference, not between the conclusions arrived at, but between the +aim and scope of the work that Professor Hering and I severally attempted. +Another difference consists in the points at which we have left off. +Professor Hering, having established his main thesis, is content. +I, on the other hand, went on to maintain that if vigour was due to +memory, want of vigour was due to want of memory. Thus I was led +to connect memory with the phenomena of hybridism and of old age; to +show that the sterility of certain animals under domestication is only +a phase of, and of a piece with, the very common sterility of hybrids +- phenomena which at first sight have no connection either with each +other or with memory, but the connection between which will never be +lost sight of by those who have once laid hold of it. I also pointed +out how exactly the phenomena of development agreed with those of the +abeyance and recurrence of memory, and the rationale of the fact that +puberty in so many animals and plants comes about the end of development. +The principle underlying longevity follows as a matter of course. +I have no idea how far Professor Hering would agree with me in the position +I have taken in respect of these phenomena, but there is nothing in +the above at variance with his lecture.</p> +<p>Another matter on which Professor Hering has not touched is the bearing +of his theory on that view of evolution which is now commonly accepted. +It is plain he accepts evolution, but it does not appear that he sees +how fatal his theory is to any view of evolution except a teleological +one - the purpose residing within the animal and not without it. +There is, however, nothing in his lecture to indicate that he does not +see this.</p> +<p>It should be remembered that the question whether memory is due to +the persistence within the body of certain vibrations, which have been +already set up within the bodies of its ancestors, is true or no, will +not affect the position I took up in “Life and Habit.” +In that book I have maintained nothing more than that whatever memory +is heredity is also. I am not committed to the vibration theory +of memory, though inclined to accept it on a <i>primâ facie</i> +view. All I am committed to is, that if memory is due to persistence +of vibrations, so is heredity; and if memory is not so due, then no +more is heredity.</p> +<p>Finally, I may say that Professor Hering’s lecture, the passage +quoted from Dr. Erasmus Darwin on p. 26 of this volume, and a few hints +in the extracts from Mr. Patrick Mathew which I have quoted in “Evolution, +Old and New,” are all that I yet know of in other writers as pointing +to the conclusion that the phenomena of heredity are phenomena also +of memory.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Professor Ewald Hering “On Memory.”</p> +<p>I will now lay before the reader a translation of Professor Hering’s +own words. I have had it carefully revised throughout by a gentleman +whose native language is German, but who has resided in England for +many years past. The original lecture is entitled “On Memory +as a Universal Function of Organised Matter,” and was delivered +at the anniversary meeting of the Imperial Academy of Sciences at Vienna, +May 30, 1870. <a name="citation63"></a><a href="#footnote63">{63}</a> +It is as follows:-</p> +<p>“When the student of Nature quits the narrow workshop of his +own particular inquiry, and sets out upon an excursion into the vast +kingdom of philosophical investigation, he does so, doubtless, in the +hope of finding the answer to that great riddle, to the solution of +a small part of which he devotes his life. Those, however, whom +he leaves behind him still working at their own special branch of inquiry, +regard his departure with secret misgivings on his behalf, while the +born citizens of the kingdom of speculation among whom he would naturalise +himself, receive him with well-authorised distrust. He is likely, +therefore, to lose ground with the first, while not gaining it with +the second.</p> +<p>The subject to the consideration of which I would now solicit your +attention does certainly appear likely to lure us on towards the flattering +land of speculation, but bearing in mind what I have just said, I will +beware of quitting the department of natural science to which I have +devoted myself hitherto. I shall, however, endeavour to attain +its highest point, so as to take a freer view of the surrounding territory.</p> +<p>It will soon appear that I should fail in this purpose if my remarks +were to confine themselves solely to physiology. I hope to show +how far psychological investigations also afford not only permissible, +but indispensable, aid to physiological inquiries.</p> +<p>Consciousness is an accompaniment of that animal and human organisation +and of that material mechanism which it is the province of physiology +to explore; and as long as the atoms of the brain follow their due course +according to certain definite laws, there arises an inner life which +springs from sensation and idea, from feeling and will.</p> +<p>We feel this in our own cases; it strikes us in our converse with +other people; we can see it plainly in the more highly organised animals; +even the lowest forms of life bear traces of it; and who can draw a +line in the kingdom of organic life, and say that it is here the soul +ceases?</p> +<p>With what eyes, then, is physiology to regard this two-fold life +of the organised world? Shall she close them entirely to one whole +side of it, that she may fix them more intently on the other?</p> +<p>So long as the physiologist is content to be a physicist, and nothing +more - using the word “physicist” in its widest signification +- his position in regard to the organic world is one of extreme but +legitimate one-sidedness. As the crystal to the mineralogist or +the vibrating string to the acoustician, so from this point of view +both man and the lower animals are to the physiologist neither more +nor less than the matter of which they consist. That animals feel +desire and repugnance, that the material mechanism of the human frame +is in chose connection with emotions of pleasure or pain, and with the +active idea-life of consciousness - this cannot, in the eyes of the +physicist, make the animal or human body into anything more than what +it actually is. To him it is a combination of matter, subjected +to the same inflexible laws as stones and plants - a material combination, +the outward and inward movements of which interact as cause and effect, +and are in as close connection with each other and with their surroundings +as the working of a machine with the revolutions of the wheels that +compose it.</p> +<p>Neither sensation, nor idea, nor yet conscious will, can form a link +in this chain of material occurrences which make up the physical life +of an organism. If I am asked a question and reply to it, the +material process which the nerve fibre conveys from the organ of hearing +to the brain must travel through my brain as an actual and material +process before it can reach the nerves which will act upon my organs +of speech. It cannot, on reaching a given place in the brain, +change then and there into an immaterial something, and turn up again +some time afterwards in another part of the brain as a material process. +The traveller in the desert might as well hope, before he again goes +forth into the wilderness of reality, to take rest and refreshment in +the oasis with which the Fata Morgana illudes him; or as well might +a prisoner hope to escape from his prison through a door reflected in +a mirror.</p> +<p>So much for the physiologist in his capacity of pure physicist. +As long as he remains behind the scenes in painful exploration of the +details of the machinery - as long as he only observes the action of +the players from behind the stage - so long will he miss the spirit +of the performance, which is, nevertheless, caught easily by one who +sees it from the front. May he not, then, for once in a way, be +allowed to change his standpoint? True, he came not to see the +representation of an imaginary world; he is in search of the actual; +but surely it must help him to a comprehension of the dramatic apparatus +itself, and of the manner in which it is worked, if he were to view +its action from in front as well as from behind, or at least allow himself +to hear what sober-minded spectators can tell him upon the subject.</p> +<p>There can be no question as to the answer; and hence it comes that +psychology is such an indispensable help to physiology, whose fault +it only in small part is that she has hitherto made such little use +of this assistance; for psychology has been late in beginning to till +her fertile field with the plough of the inductive method, and it is +only from ground so tilled that fruits can spring which can be of service +to physiology.</p> +<p>If, then, the student of nervous physiology takes his stand between +the physicist and the psychologist, and if the first of these rightly +makes the unbroken causative continuity of all material processes an +axiom of his system of investigation, the prudent psychologist, on the +other hand, will investigate the laws of conscious life according to +the inductive method, and will hence, as much as the physicist, make +the existence of fixed laws his initial assumption. If, again, +the most superficial introspection teaches the physiologist that his +conscious life is dependent upon the mechanical adjustments of his body, +and that inversely his body is subjected with certain limitations to +his will, then it only remains for him to make one assumption more, +namely, <i>that this mutual interdependence between the spiritual and +the material is itself also dependent on law</i>, and he has discovered +the bond by which the science of matter and the science of consciousness +are united into a single whole.</p> +<p>Thus regarded, the phenomena of consciousness become functions of +the material changes of organised substance, and inversely - though +this is involved in the use of the word “function” - the +material processes of brain substance become functions of the phenomena +of consciousness. For when two variables are so dependent upon +one another in the changes they undergo in accordance with fixed laws +that a change in either involves simultaneous and corresponding change +in the other, the one is called a function of the other.</p> +<p>This, then, by no means implies that the two variables above-named +- matter and consciousness - stand in the relation of cause and effect, +antecedent and consequence, to one another. For on this subject +we know nothing.</p> +<p>The materialist regards consciousness as a product or result of matter, +while the idealist holds matter to be a result of consciousness, and +a third maintains that matter and spirit are identical; with all this +the physiologist, as such, has nothing whatever to do; his sole concern +is with the fact that matter and consciousness are functions one of +the other.</p> +<p>By the help of this hypothesis of the functional interdependence +of matter and spirit, modern physiology is enabled to bring the phenomena +of consciousness within the domain of her investigations without leaving +the <i>terra firma</i> of scientific methods. The physiologist, +as physicist, can follow the ray of light and the wave of sound or heat +till they reach the organ of sense. He can watch them entering +upon the ends of the nerves, and finding their way to the cells of the +brain by means of the series of undulations or vibrations which they +establish in the nerve filaments. Here, however, he loses all +trace of them. On the other hand, still looking with the eyes +of a pure physicist, he sees sound waves of speech issue from the mouth +of a speaker; he observes the motion of his own limbs, and finds how +this is conditional upon muscular contractions occasioned by the motor +nerves, and how these nerves are in their turn excited by the cells +of the central organ. But here again his knowledge comes to an +end. True, he sees indications of the bridge which is to carry +him from excitation of the sensory to that of the motor nerves in the +labyrinth of intricately interwoven nerve cells, but he knows nothing +of the inconceivably complex process which is introduced at this stage. +Here the physiologist will change his standpoint; what matter will not +reveal to his inquiry, he will find in the mirror, as it were, of consciousness; +by way of a reflection, indeed, only, but a reflection, nevertheless, +which stands in intimate relation to the object of his inquiry. +When at this point he observes how one idea gives rise to another, how +closely idea is connected with sensation and sensation with will, and +how thought, again, and feeling are inseparable from one another, he +will be compelled to suppose corresponding successions of material processes, +which generate and are closely connected with one another, and which +attend the whole machinery of conscious life, according to the law of +the functional interdependence of matter and consciousness.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>After this explanation I shall venture to regard under a single aspect +a great series of phenomena which apparently have nothing to do with +one another, and which belong partly to the conscious and partly to +the unconscious life of organised beings. I shall regard them +as the outcome of one and the same primary force of organised matter +- namely, its memory or power of reproduction.</p> +<p>The word “memory” is often understood as though it meant +nothing more than our faculty of intentionally reproducing ideas or +series of ideas. But when the figures and events of bygone days +rise up again unbidden in our minds, is not this also an act of recollection +or memory? We have a perfect right to extend our conception of +memory so as to make it embrace involuntary reproductions, of sensations, +ideas, perceptions, and efforts; but we find, on having done so, that +we have so far enlarged her boundaries that she proves to be an ultimate +and original power, the source, and at the same time the unifying bond, +of our whole conscious life.</p> +<p>We know that when an impression, or a series of impressions, has +been made upon our senses for a long time, and always in the same way, +it may come to impress itself in such a manner upon the so-called sense-memory +that hours afterwards, and though a hundred other things have occupied +our attention meanwhile, it will yet return suddenly to our consciousness +with all the force and freshness of the original sensation. A +whole group of sensations is sometimes reproduced in its due sequence +as regards time and space, with so much reality that it illudes us, +as though things were actually present which have long ceased to be +so. We have here a striking proof of the fact that after both +conscious sensation and perception have been extinguished, their material +vestiges yet remain in our nervous system by way of a change in its +molecular or atomic disposition, <a name="citation69"></a><a href="#footnote69">{69}</a> +that enables the nerve substance to reproduce all the physical processes +of the original sensation, and with these the corresponding psychical +processes of sensation and perception.</p> +<p>Every hour the phenomena of sense-memory are present with each one +of us, but in a less degree than this. We are all at times aware +of a host of more or less faded recollections of earlier impressions, +which we either summon intentionally or which come upon us involuntarily. +Visions of absent people come and go before us as faint and fleeting +shadows, and the notes of long-forgotten melodies float around us, not +actually heard, but yet perceptible.</p> +<p>Some things and occurrences, especially if they have happened to +us only once and hurriedly, will be reproducible by the memory in respect +only of a few conspicuous qualities; in other cases those details alone +will recur to us which we have met with elsewhere, and for the reception +of which the brain is, so to speak, attuned. These last recollections +find themselves in fuller accord with our consciousness, and enter upon +it more easily and energetically; hence also their aptitude for reproduction +is enhanced; so that what is common to many things, and is therefore +felt and perceived with exceptional frequency, becomes reproduced so +easily that eventually the actual presence of the corresponding external +<i>stimuli</i> is no longer necessary, and it will recur on the vibrations +set up by faint <i>stimuli</i> from within. <a name="citation70"></a><a href="#footnote70">{70}</a> +Sensations arising in this way from within, as, for example, an idea +of whiteness, are not, indeed, perceived with the full freshness of +those raised by the actual presence of white light without us, but they +are of the same kind; they are feeble repetitions of one and the same +material brain process - of one and the same conscious sensation. +Thus the idea of whiteness arises in our mind as a faint, almost extinct, +sensation.</p> +<p>In this way those qualities which are common to many things become +separated, as it were, in our memory from the objects with which they +were originally associated, and attain an independent existence in our +consciousness as <i>ideas</i> and <i>conceptions</i>, and thus the whole +rich superstructure of our ideas and conceptions is built up from materials +supplied by memory.</p> +<p>On examining more closely, we see plainly that memory is a faculty +not only of our conscious states, but also, and much more so, of our +unconscious ones. I was conscious of this or that yesterday, and +am again conscious of it to-day. Where has it been meanwhile? +It does not remain continuously within my consciousness, nevertheless +it returns after having quitted it. Our ideas tread but for a +moment upon the stage of consciousness, and then go back again behind +the scenes, to make way for others in their place. As the player +is only a king when he is on the stage, so they too exist as ideas so +long only as they are recognised. How do they live when they are +off the stage? For we know that they are living somewhere; give +them their cue and they reappear immediately. They do not exist +continuously as ideas; what is continuous is the special disposition +of nerve substance in virtue of which this substance gives out to-day +the same sound which it gave yesterday if it is rightly struck. <a name="citation71"></a><a href="#footnote71">{71}</a> +Countless reproductions of organic processes of our brain connect themselves +orderly together, so that one acts as a stimulus to the next, but a +phenomenon of consciousness is not necessarily attached to every link +in the chain. From this it arises that a series of ideas may appear +to disregard the order that would be observed in purely material processes +of brain substance unaccompanied by consciousness; but on the other +hand it becomes possible for a long chain of recollections to have its +due development without each link in the chain being necessarily perceived +by ourselves. One may emerge from the bosom of our unconscious +thoughts without fully entering upon the stage of conscious perception; +another dies away in unconsciousness, leaving no successor to take its +place. Between the “me” of to-day and the “me” +of yesterday lie night and sleep, abysses of unconsciousness; nor is +there any bridge but memory with which to span them. Who can hope +after this to disentangle the infinite intricacy of our inner life? +For we can only follow its threads so far as they have strayed over +within the bounds of consciousness. We might as well hope to familiarise +ourselves with the world of forms that teem within the bosom of the +sea by observing the few that now and again come to the surface and +soon return into the deep.</p> +<p>The bond of union, therefore, which connects the individual phenomena +of our consciousness lies in our unconscious world; and as we know nothing +of this but what investigation into the laws of matter teach us - as, +in fact, for purely experimental purposes, “matter” and +the “unconscious” must be one and the same thing - so the +physiologist has a full right to denote memory as, in the wider sense +of the word, a function of brain substance, whose results, it is true, +fall, as regards one part of them, into the domain of consciousness, +while another and not less essential part escapes unperceived as purely +material processes.</p> +<p>The perception of a body in space is a very complicated process. +I see suddenly before me, for example, a white ball. This has +the effect of conveying to me more than a mere sensation of whiteness. +I deduce the spherical character of the ball from the gradations of +light and shade upon its surface. I form a correct appreciation +of its distance from my eye, and hence again I deduce an inference as +to the size of the ball. What an expenditure of sensations, ideas, +and inferences is found to be necessary before all this can be brought +about; yet the production of a correct perception of the ball was the +work only of a few seconds, and I was unconscious of the individual +processes by means of which it was effected, the result as a whole being +alone present in my consciousness.</p> +<p>The nerve substance preserves faithfully the memory of habitual actions. +<a name="citation72"></a><a href="#footnote72">{72}</a> Perceptions +which were once long and difficult, requiring constant and conscious +attention, come to reproduce themselves in transient and abridged guise, +without such duration and intensity that each link has to pass over +the threshold of our consciousness.</p> +<p>We have chains of material nerve processes to which eventually a +link becomes attached that is attended with conscious perception. +This is sufficiently established from the standpoint of the physiologist, +and is also proved by our unconsciousness of many whole series of ideas +and of the inferences we draw from them. If the soul is not to +ship through the fingers of physiology, she must hold fast to the considerations +suggested by our unconscious states. As far, however, as the investigations +of the pure physicist are concerned, the unconscious and matter are +one and the same thing, and the physiology of the unconscious is no +“philosophy of the unconscious.”</p> +<p>By far the greater number of our movements are the result of long +and arduous practice. The harmonious cooperation of the separate +muscles, the finely adjusted measure of participation which each contributes +to the working of the whole, must, as a rule, have been laboriously +acquired, in respect of most of the movements that are necessary in +order to effect it. How long does it not take each note to find +its way from the eyes to the fingers of one who is beginning to learn +the pianoforte; and, on the other hand, what an astonishing performance +is the playing of the professional pianist. The sight of each +note occasions the corresponding movement of the fingers with the speed +of thought - a hurried glance at the page of music before him suffices +to give rise to a whole series of harmonies; nay, when a melody has +been long practised, it can be played even while the player’s +attention is being given to something of a perfectly different character +over and above his music.</p> +<p>The will need now no longer wend its way to each individual finger +before the desired movements can be extorted from it; no longer now +does a sustained attention keep watch over the movements of each limb; +the will need exercise a supervising control only. At the word +of command the muscles become active, with a due regard to time and +proportion, and go on working, so long as they are bidden to keep in +their accustomed groove, while a slight hint on the part of the will, +will indicate to them their further journey. How could all this +be if every part of the central nerve system, by means of which movement +is effected, were not able <a name="citation74a"></a><a href="#footnote74a">{74a}</a> +to reproduce whole series of vibrations, which at an earlier date required +the constant and continuous participation of consciousness, but which +are now set in motion automatically on a mere touch, as it were, from +consciousness - if it were not able to reproduce them the more quickly +and easily in proportion to the frequency of the repetitions - if, in +fact, there was no power of recollecting earlier performances? +Our perceptive faculties must have remained always at their lowest stage +if we had been compelled to build up consciously every process from +the details of the sensation-causing materials tendered to us by our +senses; nor could our voluntary movements have got beyond the helplessness +of the child, if the necessary impulses could only be imparted to every +movement through effort of the will and conscious reproduction of all +the corresponding ideas - if, in a word, the motor nerve system had +not also its memory, <a name="citation74b"></a><a href="#footnote74b">{74b}</a> +though that memory is unperceived by ourselves. The power of this +memory is what is called “the force of habit.”</p> +<p>It seems, then, that we owe to memory almost all that we either have +or are; that our ideas and conceptions are its work, and that our every +perception, thought, and movement is derived from this source. +Memory collects the countless phenomena of our existence into a single +whole; and as our bodies would be scattered into the dust of their component +atoms if they were not held together by the attraction of matter, so +our consciousness would be broken up into as many fragments as we had +lived seconds but for the binding and unifying force of memory.</p> +<p>We have already repeatedly seen that the reproductions of organic +processes, brought about by means of the memory of the nervous system, +enter but partly within the domain of consciousness, remaining unperceived +in other and not less important respects. This is also confirmed +by numerous facts in the life of that part of the nervous system which +ministers almost exclusively to our unconscious life processes. +For the memory of the so-called sympathetic ganglionic system is no +less rich than that of the brain and spinal marrow, and a great part +of the medical art consists in making wise use of the assistance thus +afforded us.</p> +<p>To bring, however, this part of my observations to a close, I will +take leave of the nervous system, and glance hurriedly at other phases +of organised matter, where we meet with the same powers of reproduction, +but in simpler guise.</p> +<p>Daily experience teaches us that a muscle becomes the stronger the +more we use it. The muscular fibre, which in the first instance +may have answered but feebly to the stimulus conducted to it by the +motor nerve, does so with the greater energy the more often it is stimulated, +provided, of course, that reasonable times are allowed for repose. +After each individual action it becomes more capable, more disposed +towards the same kind of work, and has a greater aptitude for repetition +of the same organic processes. It gains also in weight, for it +assimilates more matter than when constantly at rest. We have +here, in its simplest form, and in a phase which comes home most closely +to the comprehension of the physicist, the same power of reproduction +which we encountered when we were dealing with nerve substance, but +under such far more complicated conditions. And what is known +thus certainly from muscle substance holds good with greater or less +plainness for all our organs. More especially may we note the +fact, that after increased use, alternated with times of repose, there +accrues to the organ in all animal economy an increased power of execution +with an increased power of assimilation and a gain in size.</p> +<p>This gain in size consists not only in the enlargement of the individual +cells or fibres of which the organ is composed, but in the multiplication +of their number; for when cells have grown to a certain size they give +rise to others, which inherit more or less completely the qualities +of those from which they came, and therefore appear to be repetitions +of the same cell. This growth, and multiplication of cells is +only a special phase of those manifold functions which characterise +organised matter, and which consist not only in what goes on within +the cell substance as alterations or undulatory movement of the molecular +disposition, but also in that which becomes visible outside the cells +as change of shape, enlargement, or subdivision. Reproduction +of performance, therefore, manifests itself to us as reproduction of +the cells themselves, as may be seen most plainly in the case of plants, +whose chief work consists in growth, whereas with animal organism other +faculties greatly preponderate.</p> +<p>Let us now take a brief survey of a class of facts in the case of +which we may most abundantly observe the power of memory in organised +matter. We have ample evidence of the fact that characteristics +of an organism may descend to offspring which the organism did not inherit, +but which it acquired owing to the special circumstances under which +it lived; and that, in consequence, every organism imparts to the germ +that issues from it a small heritage of acquisitions which it has added +during its own lifetime to the gross inheritance of its race.</p> +<p>When we reflect that we are dealing with the heredity of acquired +qualities which came to development in the most diverse parts of the +parent organism, it must seem in a high degree mysterious how those +parts can have any kind of influence upon a germ which develops itself +in an entirely different place. Many mystical theories have been +propounded for the elucidation of this question, but the following reflections +may serve to bring the cause nearer to the comprehension of the physiologist.</p> +<p>The nerve substance, in spite of its thousandfold subdivision as +cells and fibres, forms, nevertheless, a united whole, which is present +directly in all organs - nay, as more recent histology conjectures, +in each cell of the more important organs - or is at least in ready +communication with them by means of the living, irritable, and therefore +highly conductive substance of other cells. Through the connection +thus established all organs find themselves in such a condition of more +or less mutual interdependence upon one another, that events which happen +to one are repeated in others, and a notification, however slight, of +a vibration set up <a name="citation77"></a><a href="#footnote77">{77}</a> +in one quarter is at once conveyed even to the farthest parts of the +body. With this easy and rapid intercourse between all parts is +associated the more difficult communication that goes on by way of the +circulation of sap or blood.</p> +<p>We see, further, that the process of the development of all germs +that are marked out for independent existence causes a powerful reaction, +even from the very beginning of that existence, on both the conscious +and unconscious life of the whole organism. We may see this from +the fact that the organ of reproduction stands in closer and more important +relation to the remaining parts, and especially to the nervous system, +than do the other organs; and, inversely, that both the perceived and +unperceived events affecting the whole organism find a more marked response +in the reproductive system than elsewhere.</p> +<p>We can now see with sufficient plainness in what the material connection +is established between the acquired peculiarities of an organism, and +the proclivity on the part of the germ in virtue of which it develops +the special characteristics of its parent.</p> +<p>The microscope teaches us that no difference can be perceived between +one germ and another; it cannot, however, be objected on this account +that the determining cause of its ulterior development must be something +immaterial, rather than the specific kind of its material constitution.</p> +<p>The curves and surfaces which the mathematician conceives, or finds +conceivable, are more varied and infinite than the forms of animal life. +Let us suppose an infinitely small segment to be taken from every possible +curve; each one of these will appear as like every other as one germ +is to another, yet the whole of every curve lies dormant, as it were, +in each of them, and if the mathematician chooses to develop it, it +will take the path indicated by the elements of each segment.</p> +<p>It is an error, therefore, to suppose that such fine distinctions +as physiology must assume lie beyond the limits of what is conceivable +by the human mind. An infinitely small change of position on the +part of a point, or in the relations of the parts of a segment of a +curve to one another, suffices to alter the law of its whole path, and +so in like manner an infinitely small influence exercised by the parent +organism on the molecular disposition of the germ <a name="citation78"></a><a href="#footnote78">{78}</a> +may suffice to produce a determining effect upon its whole farther development.</p> +<p>What is the descent of special peculiarities but a reproduction on +the part of organised matter of processes in which it once took part +as a germ in the germ-containing organs of its parent, and of which +it seems still to retain a recollection that reappears when time and +the occasion serve, inasmuch as it responds to the same or like stimuli +in a like way to that in which the parent organism responded, of which +it was once part, and in the events of whose history it was itself also +an accomplice? <a name="citation79"></a><a href="#footnote79">{79}</a> +When an action through long habit or continual practice has become so +much a second nature to any organisation that its effects will penetrate, +though ever so faintly, into the germ that lies within it, and when +this last comes to find itself in a new sphere, to extend itself, and +develop into a new creature - (the individual parts of which are still +always the creature itself and flesh of its flesh, so that what is reproduced +is the same being as that in company with which the germ once lived, +and of which it was once actually a part) - all this is as wonderful +as when a grey-haired man remembers the events of his own childhood; +but it is not more so. Whether we say that the same organised +substance is again reproducing its past experience, or whether we prefer +to hold that an offshoot or part of the original substance has waxed +and developed itself since separation from the parent stock, it is plain +that this will constitute a difference of degree, not kind.</p> +<p>When we reflect upon the fact that unimportant acquired characteristics +can be reproduced in offspring, we are apt to forget that offspring +is only a full-sized reproduction of the parent - a reproduction, moreover, +that goes as far as possible into detail. We are so accustomed +to consider family resemblance a matter of course, that we are sometimes +surprised when a child is in some respect unlike its parent; surely, +however, the infinite number of points in respect of which parents and +children resemble one another is a more reasonable ground for our surprise.</p> +<p>But if the substance of the germ can reproduce characteristics acquired +by the parent during its single life, how much more will it not be able +to reproduce those that were congenital to the parent, and which have +happened through countless generations to the organised matter of which +the germ of to-day is a fragment? We cannot wonder that action +already taken on innumerable past occasions by organised matter is more +deeply impressed upon the recollection of the germ to which it gives +rise than action taken once only during a single lifetime. <a name="citation80a"></a><a href="#footnote80a">{80a}</a></p> +<p>We must bear in mind that every organised being now in existence +represents the last link of an inconceivably long series of organisms, +which come down in a direct line of descent, and of which each has inherited +a part of the acquired characteristics of its predecessor. Everything, +furthermore, points in the direction of our believing that at the beginning +of this chain there existed an organism of the very simplest kind, something, +in fact, like those which we call organised germs. The chain of +living beings thus appears to be the magnificent achievement of the +reproductive power of the original organic structure from which they +have all descended. As this subdivided itself and transmitted +its characteristics <a name="citation80b"></a><a href="#footnote80b">{80b}</a> +to its descendants, these acquired new ones, and in their turn transmitted +them - all new germs transmitting the chief part of what had happened +to their predecessors, while the remaining part lapsed out of their +memory, circumstances not stimulating it to reproduce itself.</p> +<p>An organised being, therefore, stands before us a product of the +unconscious memory of organised matter, which, ever increasing and ever +dividing itself, ever assimilating new matter and returning it in changed +shape to the inorganic world, ever receiving some new thing into its +memory, and transmitting its acquisitions by the way of reproduction, +grows continually richer and richer the longer it lives.</p> +<p>Thus regarded, the development of one of the more highly organised +animals represents a continuous series of organised recollections concerning +the past development of the great chain of living forms, the last link +of which stands before us in the particular animal we may be considering. +As a complicated perception may arise by means of a rapid and superficial +reproduction of long and laboriously practised brain processes, so a +germ in the course of its development hurries through a series of phases, +hinting at them only. Often and long foreshadowed in theories +of varied characters, this conception has only now found correct exposition +from a naturalist of our own time. <a name="citation81"></a><a href="#footnote81">{81}</a> +For Truth hides herself under many disguises from those who seek her, +but in the end stands unveiled before the eyes of him whom she has chosen.</p> +<p>Not only is there a reproduction of form, outward and inner conformation +of body, organs, and cells, but the habitual actions of the parent are +also reproduced. The chicken on emerging from the eggshell runs +off as its mother ran off before it; yet what an extraordinary complication +of emotions and sensations is necessary in order to preserve equilibrium +in running. Surely the supposition of an inborn capacity for the +reproduction of these intricate actions can alone explain the facts. +As habitual practice becomes a second nature to the individual during +his single lifetime, so the often-repeated action of each generation +becomes a second nature to the race.</p> +<p>The chicken not only displays great dexterity in the performance +of movements for the effecting of which it has an innate capacity, but +it exhibits also a tolerably high perceptive power. It immediately +picks up any grain that may be thrown to it. Yet, in order to +do this, more is wanted than a mere visual perception of the grains; +there must be an accurate apprehension of the direction and distance +of the precise spot in which each grain is lying, and there must be +no less accuracy in the adjustment of the movements of the head and +of the whole body. The chicken cannot have gained experience in +these respects while it was still in the egg. It gained it rather +from the thousands of thousands of beings that have lived before it, +and from which it is directly descended.</p> +<p>The memory of organised substance displays itself here in the most +surprising fashion. The gentle stimulus of the light proceeding +from the grain that affects the retina of the chicken, <a name="citation82"></a><a href="#footnote82">{82}</a> +gives occasion for the reproduction of a many-linked chain of sensations, +perceptions, and emotions, which were never yet brought together in +the case of the individual before us. We are accustomed to regard +these surprising performances of animals as manifestations of what we +call instinct, and the mysticism of natural philosophy has ever shown +a predilection for this theme; but if we regard instinct as the outcome +of the memory or reproductive power of organised substance, and if we +ascribe a memory to the race as we already ascribe it to the individual, +then instinct becomes at once intelligible, and the physiologist at +the same time finds a point of contact which will bring it into connection +with the great series of facts indicated above as phenomena of the reproductive +faculty. Here, then, we have a physical explanation which has +not, indeed, been given yet, but the time for which appears to be rapidly +approaching.</p> +<p>When, in accordance with its instinct, the caterpillar becomes a +chrysalis, or the bird builds its nest, or the bee its cell, these creatures +act consciously and not as blind machines. They know how to vary +their proceedings within certain limits in conformity with altered circumstances, +and they are thus liable to make mistakes. They feel pleasure +when their work advances and pain if it is hindered; they learn by the +experience thus acquired, and build on a second occasion better than +on the first; but that even in the outset they hit so readily upon the +most judicious way of achieving their purpose, and that their movements +adapt themselves so admirably and automatically to the end they have +in view - surely this is owing to the inherited acquisitions of the +memory of their nerve substance, which requires but a touch and it will +fall at once to the most appropriate kind of activity, thinking always, +and directly, of whatever it is that may be wanted.</p> +<p>Man can readily acquire surprising kinds of dexterity if he confines +his attention to their acquisition. Specialisation is the mother +of proficiency. He who marvels at the skill with which the spider +weaves her web should bear in mind that she did not learn her art all +on a sudden, but that innumerable generations of spiders acquired it +toilsomely and step by step - this being about all that, as a general +rule, they did acquire. Man took to bows and arrows if his nets +failed him - the spider starved. Thus we see the body and - what +most concerns us - the whole nervous system of the new-born animal constructed +beforehand, and, as it were, ready attuned for intercourse with the +outside world in which it is about to play its part, by means of its +tendency to respond to external stimuli in the same manner as it has +often heretofore responded in the persons of its ancestors.</p> +<p>We naturally ask whether the brain and nervous system of the human +infant are subjected to the principles we have laid down above? +Man certainly finds it difficult to acquire arts of which the lower +animals are born masters; but the brain of man at birth is much farther +from its highest development than is the brain of an animal. It +not only grows for a longer time, but it becomes stronger than that +of other living beings. The brain of man may be said to be exceptionally +young at birth. The lower animal is born precocious, and acts +precociously; it resembles those infant prodigies whose brain, as it +were, is born old into the world, but who, in spite of, or rather in +addition to, their rich endowment at birth, in after life develop as +much mental power as others who were less splendidly furnished to start +with, but born with greater freshness of youth. Man’s brain, +and indeed his whole body, affords greater scope for individuality, +inasmuch as a relatively greater part of it is of post-natal growth. +It develops under the influence of impressions made by the environment +upon its senses, and thus makes its acquisitions in a more special and +individual manner, whereas the animal receives them ready made, and +of a more final, stereotyped character.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, it is plain we must ascribe both to the brain and body +of the new-born infant a far-reaching power of remembering or reproducing +things which have already come to their development thousands of times +over in the persons of its ancestors. It is in virtue of this +that it acquires proficiency in the actions necessary for its existence +- so far as it was not already at birth proficient in them - much more +quickly and easily than would be otherwise possible; but what we call +instinct in the case of animals takes in man the looser form of aptitude, +talent, and genius. <a name="citation84"></a><a href="#footnote84">{84}</a> +Granted that certain ideas are not innate, yet the fact of their taking +form so easily and certainly from out of the chaos of his sensations, +is due not to his own labour, but to that of the brain substance of +the thousands of thousands of generations from whom he is descended. +Theories concerning the development of individual consciousness which +deny heredity or the power of transmission, and insist upon an entirely +fresh start for every human soul, as though the infinite number of generations +that have gone before us might as well have never lived for all the +effect they have had upon ourselves, - such theories will contradict +the facts of our daily experience at every touch and turn.</p> +<p>The brain processes and phenomena of consciousness which ennoble +man in the eyes of his fellows have had a less ancient history than +those connected with his physical needs. Hunger and the reproductive +instinct affected the oldest and simplest forms of the organic world. +It is in respect of these instincts, therefore, and of the means to +gratify them, that the memory of organised substance is strongest - +the impulses and instincts that arise hence having still paramount power +over the minds of men. The spiritual life has been superadded +slowly; its most splendid outcome belongs to the latest epoch in the +history of organised matter, nor has any very great length of time elapsed +since the nervous system was first crowned with the glory of a large +and well-developed brain.</p> +<p>Oral tradition and written history have been called the memory of +man, and this is not without its truth. But there is another and +a living memory in the innate reproductive power of brain substance, +and without this both writings and oral tradition would be without significance +to posterity. The most sublime ideas, though never so immortalised +in speech or letters, are yet nothing for heads that are out of harmony +with them; they must be not only heard, but reproduced; and both speech +and writing would be in vain were there not an inheritance of inward +and outward brain development, growing in correspondence with the inheritance +of ideas that are handed down from age to age, and did not an enhanced +capacity for their reproduction on the part of each succeeding generation +accompany the thoughts that have been preserved in writing. Man’s +conscious memory comes to an end at death, but the unconscious memory +of Nature is true and ineradicable: whoever succeeds in stamping upon +her the impress of his work, she will remember him to the end of time.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Introduction to a translation of the chapter upon instinct in Von +Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious.”</p> +<p>I am afraid my readers will find the chapter on instinct from Von +Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” which +will now follow, as distasteful to read as I did to translate, and would +gladly have spared it them if I could. At present, the works of +Mr. Sully, who has treated of the “Philosophy of the Unconscious” +both in the <i>Westminster Review</i> (vol. xlix. N.S.) and in his work +“Pessimism,” are the best source to which English readers +can have recourse for information concerning Von Hartmann. Giving +him all credit for the pains he has taken with an ungrateful, if not +impossible subject, I think that a sufficient sample of Von Hartmann’s +own words will be a useful adjunct to Mr. Sully’s work, and may +perhaps save some readers trouble by resolving them to look no farther +into the “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” Over and +above this, I have been so often told that the views concerning unconscious +action contained in the foregoing lecture and in “Life and Habit” +are only the very fallacy of Von Hartmann over again, that I should +like to give the public an opportunity of seeing whether this is so +or no, by placing the two contending theories of unconscious action +side by side. I hope that it will thus be seen that neither Professor +Hering nor I have fallen into the fallacy of Von Hartmann, but that +rather Von Hartmann has fallen into his fallacy through failure to grasp +the principle which Professor Hering has insisted upon, and to connect +heredity with memory.</p> +<p>Professor Hering’s philosophy of the unconscious is of extreme +simplicity. He rests upon a fact of daily and hourly experience, +namely, that practice makes things easy that were once difficult, and +often results in their being done without any consciousness of effort. +But if the repetition of an act tends ultimately, under certain circumstances, +to its being done unconsciously, so also is the fact of an intricate +and difficult action being done unconsciously an argument that it must +have been done repeatedly already. As I said in “Life and +Habit,” it is more easy to suppose that occasions on which such +an action has been performed have not been wanting, even though we do +not see when and where they were, than that the facility which we observe +should have been attained without practice and memory (p. 56).</p> +<p>There can be nothing better established or more easy, whether to +understand or verify, than the unconsciousness with which habitual actions +come to be performed. If, however, it is once conceded that it +is the manner of habitual action generally, then all <i>à priori</i> +objection to Professor Hering’s philosophy of the unconscious +is at an end. The question becomes one of fact in individual cases, +and of degree.</p> +<p>How far, then, does the principle of the convertibility, as it were, +of practice and unconsciousness extend? Can any line be drawn +beyond which it shall cease to operate? If not, may it not have +operated and be operating to a vast and hitherto unsuspected extent? +This is all, and certainly it is sufficiently simple. I sometimes +think it has found its greatest stumbling-block in its total want of +mystery, as though we must be like those conjurers whose stock in trade +is a small deal table and a kitchen-chair with bare legs, and who, with +their parade of “no deception” and “examine everything +for yourselves,” deceive worse than others who make use of all +manner of elaborate paraphernalia. It is true we require no paraphernalia, +and we produce unexpected results, but we are not conjuring.</p> +<p>To turn now to Von Hartmann. When I read Mr. Sully’s +article in the <i>Westminster Review</i>, I did not know whether the +sense of mystification which it produced in me was wholly due to Von +Hartmann or no; but on making acquaintance with Von Hartmann himself, +I found that Mr. Sully has erred, if at all, in making him more intelligible +than he actually is. Von Hartmann has not got a meaning. +Give him Professor Hering’s key and he might get one, but it would +be at the expense of seeing what approach he had made to a system fallen +to pieces. Granted that in his details and subordinate passages +he often both has and conveys a meaning, there is, nevertheless, no +coherence between these details, and the nearest approach to a broad +conception covering the work which the reader can carry away with him +is at once so incomprehensible and repulsive, that it is difficult to +write about it without saying more perhaps than those who have not seen +the original will accept as likely to be true. The idea to which +I refer is that of an unconscious clairvoyance, which, from the language +continually used concerning it, must be of the nature of a person, and +which is supposed to take possession of living beings so fully as to +be the very essence of their nature, the promoter of their embryonic +development, and the instigator of their instinctive actions. +This approaches closely to the personal God of Mosaic and Christian +theology, with the exception that the word “clairvoyance” +<a name="citation89"></a><a href="#footnote89">{89}</a> is substituted +for God, and that the God is supposed to be unconscious.</p> +<p>Mr. Sully says:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“When we grasp it [the philosophy of Von Hartmann] as a whole, +it amounts to nothing more than this, that all or nearly all the phenomena +of the material and spiritual world rest upon and result from a mysterious, +unconscious being, though to call it being is really to add on an idea +not immediately contained within the all-sufficient principle. +But what difference is there between this and saying that the phenomena +of the world at large come we know not whence? . . . The unconscious, +therefore, tends to be simple phrase and nothing more . . . No doubt +there are a number of mental processes . . . of which we are unconscious +. . . but to infer from this that they are due to an unconscious power, +and to proceed to demonstrate them in the presence of the unconscious +through all nature, is to make an unwarrantable <i>saltus</i> in reasoning. +What, in fact, is this ‘unconscious’ but a high-sounding +name to veil our ignorance? Is the unconscious any better explanation +of phenomena we do not understand than the ‘devil-devil’ +by which Australian tribes explain the Leyden jar and its phenomena? +Does it increase our knowledge to know that we do not know the origin +of language or the cause of instinct? . . . Alike in organic creation +and the evolution of history ‘performances and actions’ +- the words are those of Strauss - are ascribed to an unconscious, which +can only belong to a conscious being. <a name="citation90a"></a><a href="#footnote90a">{90a}</a></p> +<p>. . . . .</p> +<p>“The difficulties of the system advance as we proceed. <a name="citation90b"></a><a href="#footnote90b">{90b}</a> +Subtract this questionable factor - the unconscious from Hartmann’s +‘Biology and Psychology,’ and the chapters remain pleasant +and instructive reading. But with the third part of his work - +the Metaphysic of the Unconscious - our feet are clogged at every step. +We are encircled by the merest play of words, the most unsatisfactory +demonstrations, and most inconsistent inferences. The theory of +final causes has been hitherto employed to show the wisdom of the world; +with our Pessimist philosopher it shows nothing but its irrationality +and misery. Consciousness has been generally supposed to be the +condition of all happiness and interest in life; here it simply awakens +us to misery, and the lower an animal lies in the scale of conscious +life, the better and the pleasanter its lot.</p> +<p>. . . . .</p> +<p>“Thus, then, the universe, as an emanation of the unconscious, +has been constructed. <a name="citation90c"></a><a href="#footnote90c">{90c}</a> +Throughout it has been marked by design, by purpose, by finality; throughout +a wonderful adaptation of means to ends, a wonderful adjustment and +relativity in different portions has been noticed - and all this for +what conclusion? Not, as in the hands of the natural theologians +of the eighteenth century, to show that the world is the result of design, +of an intelligent, beneficent Creator, but the manifestation of a Being +whose only predicates are negatives, whose very essence is to be unconscious. +It is not only like ancient Athens, to an unknown, but to an unknowing +God, that modern Pessimism rears its altar. Yet surely the fact +that the motive principle of existence moves in a mysterious way outside +our consciousness no way requires that the All-one Being should be himself +unconscious.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I believe the foregoing to convey as correct an idea of Von Hartmann’s +system as it is possible to convey, and will leave it to the reader +to say how much in common there is between this and the lecture given +in the preceding chapter, beyond the fact that both touch upon unconscious +actions. The extract which will form my next chapter is only about +a thirtieth part of the entire “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” +but it will, I believe, suffice to substantiate the justice of what +Mr. Sully has said in the passages above quoted.</p> +<p>As regards the accuracy of the translation, I have submitted all +passages about which I was in the least doubtful to the same gentleman +who revised my translation of Professor Hering’s lecture; I have +also given the German wherever I thought the reader might be glad to +see it.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Translation of the chapter on “The Unconscious in Instinct,” +from Von Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious.”</p> +<p>Von Hartmann’s chapter on instinct is as follows:-</p> +<p>Instinct is action taken in pursuance of a purpose but without conscious +perception of what the purpose is. <a name="citation92a"></a><a href="#footnote92a">{92a}</a></p> +<p>A purposive action, with consciousness of the purpose and where the +course taken is the result of deliberation is not said to be instinctive; +nor yet, again, is blind aimless action, such as outbreaks of fury on +the part of offended or otherwise enraged animals. I see no occasion +for disturbing the commonly received definition of instinct as given +above; for those who think they can refer all the so-called ordinary +instincts of animals to conscious deliberation <i>ipso facto</i> deny +that there is such a thing as instinct at all, and should strike the +word out of their vocabulary. But of this more hereafter.</p> +<p>Assuming, then, the existence of instinctive action as above defined, +it can be explained as -</p> +<p>I. A mere necessary consequence of bodily organisation. <a name="citation92b"></a><a href="#footnote92b">{92b}</a></p> +<p>II. A mechanism of brain or mind contrived by nature.</p> +<p>III. The outcome of an unconscious activity of mind.</p> +<p>In neither of the two first cases is there any scope for the idea +of purpose; in the third, purpose must be present immediately before +the action. In the two first cases, action is supposed to be brought +about by means of an initial arrangement, either of bodily or mental +mechanism, purpose being conceived of as existing on a single occasion +only - that is to say, in the determination of the initial arrangement. +In the third, purpose is conceived as present in every individual instance. +Let us proceed to the consideration of these three cases.</p> +<p>Instinct is not a mere consequence of bodily organisation; for -</p> +<p>(<i>a</i>.) Bodies may be alike, yet they may be endowed with +different instincts.</p> +<p>All spiders have the same spinning apparatus, but one kind weaves +radiating webs, another irregular ones, while a third makes none at +all, but lives in holes, whose walls it overspins, and whose entrance +it closes with a door. Almost all birds have a like organisation +for the construction of their nests (a beak and feet), but how infinitely +do their nests vary in appearance, mode of construction, attachment +to surrounding objects (they stand, are glued on, hang, &c.), selection +of site (caves, holes, corners, forks of trees, shrubs, the ground), +and excellence of workmanship; how often, too, are they not varied in +the species of a single genus, as of <i>parus</i>. Many birds, +moreover, build no nest at all. The difference in the songs of +birds are in like manner independent of the special construction of +their voice apparatus, nor do the modes of nest construction that obtain +among ants and bees depend upon their bodily organisation. Organisation, +as a general rule, only renders the bird capable of singing, as giving +it an apparatus with which to sing at all, but it has nothing to do +with the specific character of the execution . . . The nursing, defence, +and education of offspring cannot be considered as in any way more dependent +upon bodily organisation; nor yet the sites which insects choose for +the laying of their eggs; nor, again, the selection of deposits of spawn, +of their own species, by male fish for impregnation. The rabbit +burrows, the hare does not, though both have the same burrowing apparatus. +The hare, however, has less need of a subterranean place of refuge by +reason of its greater swiftness. Some birds, with excellent powers +of flight, are nevertheless stationary in their habits, as the secretary +falcon and certain other birds of prey; while even such moderate fliers +as quails are sometimes known to make very distant migrations.</p> +<p>(<i>b</i>.) Like instincts may be found associated with unlike organs.</p> +<p>Birds with and without feet adapted for climbing live in trees; so +also do monkeys with and without flexible tails, squirrels, sloths, +pumas, &c. Mole-crickets dig with a well-pronounced spade +upon their fore-feet, while the burying-beetle does the same thing though +it has no special apparatus whatever. The mole conveys its winter +provender in pockets, an inch wide, long and half an inch wide within +its cheeks; the field-mouse does so without the help of any such contrivance. +The migratory instinct displays itself with equal strength in animals +of widely different form, by whatever means they may pursue their journey, +whether by water, land, or air.</p> +<p>It is clear, therefore, that instinct is in great measure independent +of bodily organisation. Granted, indeed, that a certain amount +of bodily apparatus is a <i>sine quâ non</i> for any power of +execution at all - as, for example, that there would be no ingenious +nest without organs more or less adapted for its construction, no spinning +of a web without spinning glands - nevertheless, it is impossible to +maintain that instinct is a consequence of organisation. The mere +existence of the organ does not constitute even the smallest incentive +to any corresponding habitual activity. A sensation of pleasure +must at least accompany the use of the organ before its existence can +incite to its employment. And even so when a sensation of pleasure +has given the impulse which is to render it active, it is only the fact +of there being activity at all, and not the special characteristics +of the activity, that can be due to organisation. The reason for +the special mode of the activity is the very problem that we have to +solve. No one will call the action of the spider instinctive in +voiding the fluid from her spinning gland when it is too full, and therefore +painful to her; nor that of the male fish when it does what amounts +to much the same thing as this. The instinct and the marvel lie +in the fact that the spider spins threads, and proceeds to weave her +web with them, and that the male fish will only impregnate ova of his +own species.</p> +<p>Another proof that the pleasure felt in the employment of an organ +is wholly inadequate to account for this employment is to be found in +the fact that the moral greatness of instinct, the point in respect +of which it most commands our admiration, consists in the obedience +paid to its behests, to the postponement of all personal well-being, +and at the cost, it may be, of life itself. If the mere pleasure +of relieving certain glands from overfulness were the reason why caterpillars +generally spin webs, they would go on spinning until they had relieved +these glands, but they would not repair their work as often as any one +destroyed it, and do this again and again until they die of exhaustion. +The same holds good with the other instincts that at first sight appear +to be inspired only by a sensation of pleasure; for if we change the +circumstances, so as to put self-sacrifice in the place of self-interest, +it becomes at once apparent that they have a higher source than this. +We think, for example, that birds pair for the sake of mere sexual gratification; +why, then, do they leave off pairing as soon as they have laid the requisite +number of eggs? That there is a reproductive instinct over and +above the desire for sexual gratification appears from the fact that +if a man takes an egg out of the nest, the birds will come together +again and the hen will lay another egg; or, if they belong to some of +the more wary species, they will desert their nest, and make preparation +for an entirely new brood. A female wryneck, whose nest was daily +robbed of the egg she laid in it, continued to lay a new one, which +grew smaller and smaller, till, when she had laid her twenty-ninth egg, +she was found dead upon her nest. If an instinct cannot stand +the test of self-sacrifice - if it is the simple outcome of a desire +for bodily gratification - then it is no true instinct, and is only +so called erroneously.</p> +<p>Instinct is not a mechanism of brain or mind implanted in living +beings by nature; for, if it were, then instinctive action without any, +even unconscious, activity of mind, and with no conception concerning +the purpose of the action, would be executed mechanically, the purpose +having been once for all thought out by Nature or Providence, which +has so organised the individual that it acts henceforth as a purely +mechanical medium. We are now dealing with a psychical organisation +as the cause instinct, as we were above dealing with a physical. psychical +organisation would be a conceivable explanation and we need look no +farther if every instinct once belonging to an animal discharged its +functions in an unvarying manner. But this is never found to be +the case, for instincts vary when there arises a sufficient motive for +varying them. This proves that special exterior circumstances +enter into the matter, and that these circumstances are the very things +that render the attainment of the purpose possible through means selected +by the instinct. Here first do we find instinct acting as though +it were actually design with action following at its heels, for until +the arrival of the motive, the instinct remains late and discharges +no function whatever. The motive enters by way of an idea received +into the mind through the instrumentality of the senses, and there is +a constant connection between instinct in action and all sensual images +which give information that an opportunity has arisen for attaining +the ends proposed to itself by the instinct.</p> +<p>The psychical mechanism of this constant connection must also be +looked for. It may help us here to turn to the piano for an illustration. +The struck keys are the motives, the notes that sound in consequence +are the instincts in action. This illustration might perhaps be +allowed to pass (if we also suppose that entirely different keys can +give out the same sound) if instincts could only be compared with <i>distinctly +tuned</i> notes, so that one and the same instinct acted always in the +same manner on the rising of the motive which should set it in action. +This, however, is not so; for it is the blind unconscious purpose of +the instinct that is alone constant, the instinct itself - that is to +say, the will to make use of certain means - varying as the means that +can be most suitably employed vary under varying circumstances.</p> +<p>In this we condemn the theory which refuses to recognise unconscious +purpose as present in each individual case of instinctive action. +For he who maintains instinct to be the result of a mechanism of mind, +must suppose a special and constant mechanism for each variation and +modification of the instinct in accordance with exterior circumstances, +<a name="citation97"></a><a href="#footnote97">{97}</a> that is to say, +a new string giving a note with a new tone must be inserted, and this +would involve the mechanism in endless complication. But the fact +that the purpose is constant notwithstanding all manner of variation +in the means chosen by the instinct, proves that there is no necessity +for the supposition of such an elaborate mental mechanism - the presence +of an unconscious purpose being sufficient to explain the facts. +The purpose of the bird, for example, that has laid her eggs is constant, +and consists in the desire to bring her young to maturity. When +the temperature of the air is insufficient to effect this, she sits +upon her eggs, and only intermits her sittings in the warmest countries; +the mammal, on the other hand, attains the fulfilment of its instinctive +purpose without any co-operation on its own part. In warm climates +many birds only sit by night, and small exotic birds that have built +in aviaries kept at a high temperature sit little upon their eggs or +not at all. How inconceivable is the supposition of a mechanism +that impels the bird to sit as soon as the temperature falls below a +certain height! How clear and simple, on the other hand, is the +view that there is an unconscious purpose constraining the volition +of the bird to the use of the fitting means, of which process, however, +only the last link, that is to say, the will immediately preceding the +action falls within the consciousness of the bird!</p> +<p>In South Africa the sparrow surrounds her nest with thorns as a defence +against apes and serpents. The eggs of the cuckoo, as regards +size, colour, and marking, invariably resemble those of the birds in +whose nests she lays. Sylvia<i> ruja</i>, for example, lays a +white egg with violet spots; <i>Sylvia hippolais</i>, a red one with +black spots; <i>Regulus ignicapellus</i>, a cloudy red; but the cuckoo’s +egg is in each case so deceptive an imitation of its model, that it +can hardly be distinguished except by the structure of its shell.</p> +<p>Huber contrived that his bees should be unable to build in their +usual instinctive manner, beginning from above and working downwards; +on this they began building from below, and again horizontally. +The outermost cells that spring from the top of the hive or abut against +its sides are not hexagonal, but pentagonal, so as to gain in strength, +being attached with one base instead of two sides. In autumn bees +lengthen their existing honey cells if these are insufficient, but in +the ensuing spring they again shorten them in order to get greater roadway +between the combs. When the full combs have become too heavy, +they strengthen the walls of the uppermost or bearing cells by thickening +them with wax and propolis. If larvæ of working bees are +introduced into the cells set apart for drones, the working bees will +cover these cells with the flat lids usual for this kind of larvæ, +and not with the round ones that are proper for drones. In autumn, +as a general rule, bees kill their drones, but they refrain from doing +this when they have lost their queen, and keep them to fertilise the +young queen, who will be developed from larvæ that would otherwise +have become working bees. Huber observed that they defend the +entrance of their hive against the inroads of the sphinx moth by means +of skilful constructions made of wax and propolis. They only introduce +propolis when they want it for the execution of repairs, or for some +other special purpose. Spiders and caterpillars also display marvellous +dexterity in the repair of their webs if they have been damaged, and +this requires powers perfectly distinct from those requisite for the +construction of a new one.</p> +<p>The above examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but they are +sufficient to establish the fact that instincts are not capacities rolled, +as it were, off a reel mechanically, according to an invariable system, +but that they adapt themselves most closely to the circumstances of +each case, and are capable of such great modification and variation +that at times they almost appear to cease to be instinctive.</p> +<p>Many will, indeed, ascribe these modifications to conscious deliberation +on the part of the animals themselves, and it is impossible to deny +that in the case of the more intellectually gifted animals there may +be such a thing as a combination of instinctive faculty and conscious +reflection. I think, however, the examples already cited are enough +to show that often where the normal and the abnormal action springs +from the same source, without any complication with conscious deliberation, +they are either both instinctive or both deliberative. <a name="citation99"></a><a href="#footnote99">{99}</a> +Or is that which prompts the bee to build hexagonal prisms in the middle +of her comb something of an actually distinct character from that which +impels her to build pentagonal ones at the sides? Are there two +separate kinds of thing, one of which induces birds under certain circumstances +to sit upon their eggs, while another leads them under certain other +circumstances to refrain from doing so? And does this hold good +also with bees when they at one time kill their brethren without mercy +and at another grant them their lives? Or with birds when they +construct the kind of nest peculiar to their race, and, again, any special +provision which they may think fit under certain circumstances to take? +If it is once granted that the normal and the abnormal manifestations +of instinct - and they are often incapable of being distinguished - +spring from a single source, then the objection that the modification +is due to conscious knowledge will be found to be a suicidal one later +on, so far as it is directed against instinct generally. It may +be sufficient here to point out, in anticipation of remarks that will +be found in later chapters, that instinct and the power of organic development +involve the same essential principle, though operating under different +circumstances - the two melting into one another without any definite +boundary between them. Here, then, we have conclusive proof that +instinct does not depend upon organisation of body or brain, but that, +more truly, the organisation is due to the nature and manner of the +instinct.</p> +<p>On the other hand, we must now return to a closer consideration of +the conception of a psychical mechanism. <a name="citation100"></a><a href="#footnote100">{100}</a> +And here we find that this mechanism, in spite of its explaining so +much, is itself so obscure that we can hardly form any idea concerning +it. The motive enters the mind by way of a conscious sensual impression; +this is the first link of the process; the last link <a name="citation101"></a><a href="#footnote101">{101}</a> +appears as the conscious motive of an action. Both, however, are +entirely unlike, and neither has anything to do with ordinary motivation, +which consists exclusively in the desire that springs from a conception +either of pleasure or dislike - the former prompting to the attainment +of any object, the latter to its avoidance. In the case of instinct, +pleasure is for the most part a concomitant phenomenon; but it is not +so always, as we have already seen, inasmuch as the consummation and +highest moral development of instinct displays itself in self-sacrifice.</p> +<p>The true problem, however, lies far deeper than this. For every +conception of a pleasure proves that we have experienced this pleasure +already. But it follows from this, that when the pleasure was +first felt there must have been will present, in the gratification of +which will the pleasure consisted; the question, therefore, arises, +whence did the will come before the pleasure that would follow on its +gratification was known, and before bodily pain, as, for example, of +hunger, rendered relief imperative? Yet we may see that even though +an animal has grown up apart from any others of its kind, it will yet +none the less manifest the instinctive impulses of its race, though +experience can have taught it nothing whatever concerning the pleasure +that will ensue upon their gratification. As regards instinct, +therefore, there must be a causal connection between the motivating +sensual conception and the will to perform the instinctive action, and +the pleasure of the subsequent gratification has nothing to do with +the matter. We know by the experience of our own instincts that +this causal connection does not lie within our consciousness; <a name="citation102a"></a><a href="#footnote102a">{102a}</a> +therefore, if it is to be a mechanism of any kind, it can only be either +an unconscious mechanical induction and metamorphosis of the vibrations +of the conceived motive into the vibrations of the conscious action +in the brain, or an unconscious spiritual mechanism.</p> +<p>In the first case, it is surely strange that this process should +go on unconsciously, though it is so powerful in its effects that the +will resulting from it overpowers every other consideration, every other +kind of will, and that vibrations of this kind, when set up in the brain, +become always consciously perceived; nor is it easy to conceive in what +way this metamorphosis can take place so that the constant purpose can +be attained under varying circumstances by the resulting will in modes +that vary with variation of the special features of each individual +case.</p> +<p>But if we take the other alternative, and suppose an unconscious +mental mechanism, we cannot legitimately conceive of the process going +on in this as other than what prevails in all mental mechanism, namely, +than as by way of idea and will. We are, therefore, compelled +to imagine a causal connection between the consciously recognised motive +and the will to do the instinctive action, through unconscious idea +and will; nor do I know how this connection can be conceived as being +brought about more simply than through a conceived and willed purpose. +<a name="citation102b"></a><a href="#footnote102b">{102b}</a> +Arrived at this point, however, we have attained the logical mechanism +peculiar to and inseparable from all mind, and find unconscious purpose +to be an indispensable link in every instinctive action. With +this, therefore, the conception of a mental mechanism, dead and predestined +from without, has disappeared, and has become transformed into the spiritual +life inseparable from logic, so that we have reached the sole remaining +requirement for the conception of an actual instinct, which proves to +be a conscious willing of the means towards an unconsciously willed +purpose. This conception explains clearly and without violence +all the problems which instinct presents to us; or more truly, all that +was problematical about instinct disappears when its true nature has +been thus declared. If this work were confined to the consideration +of instinct alone, the conception of an unconscious activity of mind +might excite opposition, inasmuch as it is one with which our educated +public is not yet familiar; but in a work like the present, every chapter +of which adduces fresh facts in support of the existence of such an +activity and of its remarkable consequences, the novelty of the theory +should be taken no farther into consideration.</p> +<p>Though I so confidently deny that instinct is the simple action of +a mechanism which has been contrived once for all, I by no means exclude +the supposition that in the constitution of the brain, the ganglia, +and the whole body, in respect of morphological as well as molecular-physiological +condition, certain predispositions can be established which direct the +unconscious intermediaries more readily into one channel than into another. +This predisposition is either the result of a habit which keeps continually +cutting for itself a deeper and deeper channel, until in the end it +leaves indelible traces whether in the individual or in the race, or +it is expressly called into being by the unconscious formative principle +in generation, so as to facilitate action in a given direction. +This last will be the case more frequently in respect of exterior organisation +- as, for example, with the weapons or working organs of animals - while +to the former must be referred the molecular condition of brain and +ganglia which bring about the perpetually recurring elements of an instinct +such as the hexagonal shape of the cells of bees. We shall presently +see that by individual character we mean the sum of the individual methods +of reaction against all possible motives, and that this character depends +essentially upon a constitution of mind and body acquired in some measure +through habit by the individual, but for the most part inherited. +But an instinct is also a mode of reaction against certain motives; +here, too, then, we are dealing with character, though perhaps not so +much with that of the individual as of the race; for by character in +regard to instinct we do not intend the differences that distinguish +individuals, but races from one another. If any one chooses to +maintain that such a predisposition for certain kinds of activity on +the part of brain and body constitutes a mechanism, this may in one +sense be admitted; but as against this view it must be remarked -</p> +<p>1. That such deviations from the normal scheme of an instinct +as cannot be referred to conscious deliberation are not provided for +by any predisposition in this mechanism.</p> +<p>2. That heredity is only possible under the circumstances of +a constant superintendence of the embryonic development by a purposive +unconscious activity of growth. It must be admitted, however, +that this is influenced in return by the predisposition existing in +the germ.</p> +<p>3. That the impressing of the predisposition upon the individual +from whom it is inherited can only be effected by long practice, consequently +the instinct without auxiliary mechanism <a name="citation105a"></a><a href="#footnote105a">{105a}</a> +is the originating cause of the auxiliary mechanism.</p> +<p>4. That none of those instinctive actions that are performed +rarely, or perhaps once only, in the lifetime of any individual - as, +for example, those connected with the propagation and metamorphoses +of the lower forms of life, and none of those instinctive omissions +of action, neglect of which necessarily entails death - can be conceived +as having become engrained into the character through habit; the ganglionic +constitution, therefore, that predisposes the animal towards them must +have been fashioned purposively.</p> +<p>5. That even the presence of an auxiliary mechanism <a name="citation105b"></a><a href="#footnote105b">{105b}</a> +does not compel the unconscious to a particular corresponding mode of +instinctive action, but only predisposes it. This is shown by +the possibility of departure from the normal type of action, so that +the unconscious purpose is always stronger than the ganglionic constitution, +and takes any opportunity of choosing from several similar possible +courses the one that is handiest and most convenient to the constitution +of the individual.</p> +<p>We now approach the question that I have reserved for our final one, +- Is there, namely, actually such a thing as instinct, <a name="citation105c"></a><a href="#footnote105c">{105c}</a> +or are all so-called instinctive actions only the results of conscious +deliberation?</p> +<p>In support of the second of these two views, it may be alleged that +the more limited is the range of the conscious mental activity of any +living being, the more fully developed in proportion to its entire mental +power is its performance commonly found to be in respect of its own +limited and special instinctive department. This holds as good +with the lower animals as with men, and is explained by the fact that +perfection of proficiency is only partly dependent upon natural capacity, +but is in great measure due to practice and cultivation of the original +faculty. A philologist, for example, is unskilled in questions +of jurisprudence; a natural philosopher or mathematician, in philology; +an abstract philosopher, in poetical criticism. Nor has this anything +to do with the natural talents of the several persons, but follows as +a consequence of their special training. The more special, therefore, +is the direction in which the mental activity of any living being is +exercised, the more will the whole developing and practising power of +the mind be brought to bear upon this one branch, so that it is not +surprising if the special power comes ultimately to bear an increased +proportion to the total power of the individual, through the contraction +of the range within which it is exercised.</p> +<p>Those, however, who apply this to the elucidation of instinct should +not forget the words, “in proportion to the entire mental power +of the animal in question,” and should bear in mind that the entire +mental power becomes less and less continually as we descend the scale +of animal life, whereas proficiency in the performance of an instinctive +action seems to be much of a muchness in all grades of the animal world. +As, therefore, those performances which indisputably proceed from conscious +deliberation decrease proportionately with decrease of mental power, +while nothing of the kind is observable in the case of instinct - it +follows that instinct must involve some other principle than that of +conscious intelligence. We see, moreover, that actions which have +their source in conscious intelligence are of one and the same kind, +whether among the lower animals or with mankind - that is to say, that +they are acquired by apprenticeship or instruction and perfected by +practice; so that the saying, “Age brings wisdom,” holds +good with the brutes as much as with ourselves. Instinctive actions, +on the contrary, have a special and distinct character, in that they +are performed with no less proficiency by animals that have been reared +in solitude than by those that have been instructed by their parents, +the first essays of a hitherto unpractised animal being as successful +as its later ones. There is a difference in principle here which +cannot be mistaken. Again, we know by experience that the feebler +and more limited an intelligence is, the more slowly do ideas act upon +it, that is to say, the slower and more laborious is its conscious thought. +So long as instinct does not come into play, this holds good both in +the case of men of different powers of comprehension and with animals; +but with instinct all is changed, for it is the speciality of instinct +never to hesitate or loiter, but to take action instantly upon perceiving +that the stimulating motive has made its appearance. This rapidity +in arriving at a resolution is common to the instinctive actions both +of the highest and the lowest animals, and indicates an essential difference +between instinct and conscious deliberation.</p> +<p>Finally, as regards perfection of the power of execution, a glance +will suffice to show the disproportion that exists between this and +the grade of intellectual activity on which an animal may be standing. +Take, for instance, the caterpillar of the emperor moth (<i>Saturnia +pavonia minor</i>). It eats the leaves of the bush upon which +it was born; at the utmost has just enough sense to get on to the lower +sides of the leaves if it begins to rain, and from time to time changes +its skin. This is its whole existence, which certainly does not +lead us to expect a display of any, even the most limited, intellectual +power. When, however, the time comes for the larva of this moth +to become a chrysalis, it spins for itself a double cocoon, fortified +with bristles that point outwards, so that it can be opened easily from +within, though it is sufficiently impenetrable from without. If +this contrivance were the result of conscious reflection, we should +have to suppose some such reasoning process as the following to take +place in the mind of the caterpillar:- “I am about to become a +chrysalis, and, motionless as I must be, shall be exposed to many different +kinds of attack. I must therefore weave myself a web. But +when I am a moth I shall not be able, as some moths are, to find my +way out of it by chemical or mechanical means; therefore I must leave +a way open for myself. In order, however, that my enemies may +not take advantage of this, I will close it with elastic bristles, which +I can easily push asunder from within, but which, upon the principle +of the arch, will resist all pressure from without.” Surely +this is asking rather too much from a poor caterpillar; yet the whole +of the foregoing must be thought out if a correct result is to be arrived +at.</p> +<p>This theoretical separation of instinct from conscious intelligence +can be easily misrepresented by opponents of my theory, as though a +separation in practice also would be necessitated in consequence. +This is by no means my intention. On the contrary, I have already +insisted at some length that both the two kinds of mental activity may +co-exist in all manner of different proportions, so that there may be +every degree of combination, from pure instinct to pure deliberation. +We shall see, however, in a later chapter, that even in the highest +and most abstract activity of human consciousness there are forces at +work that are of the highest importance, and are essentially of the +same kind as instinct.</p> +<p>On the other hand, the most marvellous displays of instinct are to +be found not only in plants, but also in those lowest organisms of the +simplest bodily form which are partly unicellular, and in respect of +conscious intelligence stand far below the higher plants - to which, +indeed, any kind of deliberative faculty is commonly denied. Even +in the case of those minute microscopic organisms that baffle our attempts +to classify them either as animals or vegetables, we are still compelled +to admire an instinctive, purposive behaviour, which goes far beyond +a mere reflex responsive to a stimulus from without; all doubt, therefore, +concerning the actual existence of an instinct must be at an end, and +the attempt to deduce it as a consequence of conscious deliberation +be given up as hopeless. I will here adduce an instance as extraordinary +as any we yet know of, showing, as it does, that many different purposes, +which in the case of the higher animals require a complicated system +of organs of motion, can be attained with incredibly simple means.</p> +<p><i>Arcella vulgaris</i> is a minute morsel of protoplasm, which lives +in a concave-convex, brown, finely reticulated shell, through a circular +opening in the concave side of which it can project itself by throwing +out <i>pseudopodia</i>. If we look through the microscope at a +drop of water containing living <i>arcellæ</i>, we may happen +to see one of them lying on its back at the bottom of the drop, and +making fruitless efforts for two or three minutes to lay hold of some +fixed point by means of a <i>pseudopodium</i>. After this there +will appear suddenly from two to five, but sometimes more, dark points +in the protoplasm at a small distance from the circumference, and, as +a rule, at regular distances from one another. These rapidly develop +themselves into well-defined spherical air vesicles, and come presently +to fill a considerable part of the hollow of the shell, thereby driving +part of the protoplasm outside it. After from five to twenty minutes, +the specific gravity of the <i>arcella</i> is so much lessened that +it is lifted by the water with its <i>pseudopodia</i>, and brought up +against the upper surface of the water-drop, on which it is able to +travel. In from five to ten minutes the vesicles will now disappear, +the last small point vanishing with a jerk. If, however, the creature +has been accidentally turned over during its journey, and reaches the +top of the water-drop with its back uppermost, the vesicles will continue +growing only on one side, while they diminish on the other; by this +means the shell is brought first into an oblique and then into a vertical +position, until one of the <i>pseudopodia</i> obtains a footing and +the whole turns over. From the moment the animal has obtained +foothold, the bladders become immediately smaller, and after they have +disappeared the experiment may be repeated at pleasure.</p> +<p>The positions of the protoplasm which the vesicles fashion change +continually; only the grainless protoplasm of the <i>pseudopodia</i> +develops no air. After long and fruitless efforts a manifest fatigue +sets in; the animal gives up the attempt for a time, and resumes it +after an interval of repose.</p> +<p>Engelmann, the discoverer of these phenomena, says (Pflüger’s +Archiv für Physologie, Bd. II.): “The changes in volume in +all the vesicles of the same animal are for the most part synchronous, +effected in the same manner, and of like size. There are, however, +not a few exceptions; it often happens that some of them increase or +diminish in volume much faster than others; sometimes one may increase +while another diminishes; all the changes, however, are throughout unquestionably +intentional. The object of the air-vesicles is to bring the animal +into such a position that it can take fast hold of something with its +<i>pseudopodia</i>. When this has been obtained, the air disappears +without our being able to discover any other reason for its disappearance +than the fact that it is no longer needed. . . . If we bear these +circumstances in mind, we can almost always tell whether an <i>arcella</i> +will develop air-vesicles or no; and if it has already developed them, +we can tell whether they will increase or diminish . . . The <i>arcellæ</i>, +in fact, in this power of altering their specific gravity possess a +mechanism for raising themselves to the top of the water, or lowering +themselves to the bottom at will. They use this not only in the +abnormal circumstances of their being under microscopical observation, +but at all times, as may be known by our being always able to find some +specimens with air-bladders at the top of the water in which they live.”</p> +<p>If what has been already advanced has failed to convince the reader +of the hopelessness of attempting to explain instinct as a mode of conscious +deliberation, he must admit that the following considerations are conclusive. +It is most certain that deliberation and conscious reflection can only +take account of such data as are consciously perceived; if, then, it +can be shown that data absolutely indispensable for the arrival at a +just conclusion cannot by any possibility have been known consciously, +the result can no longer be held as having had its source in conscious +deliberation. It is admitted that the only way in which consciousness +can arrive at a knowledge of exterior facts is by way of an impression +made upon the senses. We must, therefore, prove that a knowledge +of the facts indispensable for arrival at a just conclusion could not +have been thus acquired. This may be done as follows: <a name="citation111"></a><a href="#footnote111">{111}</a> +for, Firstly, the facts in question lie in the future, and the present +gives no ground for conjecturing the time and manner of their subsequent +development.</p> +<p>Secondly, they are manifestly debarred from the category of perceptions +perceived through the senses, inasmuch as no information can be derived +concerning them except through experience of similar occurrences in +time past, and such experience is plainly out of the question.</p> +<p>It would not affect the argument if, as I think likely, it were to +turn out, with the advance of our physiological knowledge, that all +the examples of the first case that I am about to adduce reduce themselves +to examples of the second, as must be admitted to have already happened +in respect of many that I have adduced hitherto. For it is hardly +more difficult to conceive of <i>à priori</i> knowledge, disconnected +from any impression made upon the senses, than of knowledge which, it +is true, does at the present day manifest itself upon the occasion of +certain general perceptions, but which can only be supposed to be connected +with these by means of such a chain of inferences and judiciously applied +knowledge as cannot be believed to exist when we have regard to the +capacity and organisation of the animal we may be considering.</p> +<p>An example of the first case is supplied by the larva of the stag-beetle +in its endeavour to make itself a convenient hole in which to become +a chrysalis. The female larva digs a hole exactly her own size, +but the male makes one as long again as himself, so as to allow for +the growth of his horns, which will be about the same length as his +body. A knowledge of this circumstance is indispensable if the +result achieved is to be considered as due to reflection, yet the actual +present of the larva affords it no ground for conjecturing beforehand +the condition in which it will presently find itself.</p> +<p>As regards the second case, ferrets and buzzards fall forthwith upon +blind worms or other non-poisonous snakes, and devour them then and +there. But they exhibit the greatest caution in laying hold of +adders, even though they have never before seen one, and will endeavour +first to bruise their heads, so as to avoid being bitten. As there +is nothing in any other respect alarming in the adder, a conscious knowledge +of the danger of its bite is indispensable, if the conduct above described +is to be referred to conscious deliberation. But this could only +have been acquired through experience, and the possibility of such experience +may be controlled in the case of animals that have been kept in captivity +from their youth up, so that the knowledge displayed can be ascertained +to be independent of experience. On the other hand, both the above +illustrations afford evidence of an unconscious perception of the facts, +and prove the existence of a direct knowledge underivable from any sensual +impression or from consciousness.</p> +<p>This has always been recognised, <a name="citation113"></a><a href="#footnote113">{113}</a> +and has been described under the words “presentiment” or +“foreboding.” These words, however, refer, on the +one hand, only to an unknowable in the future, separated from us by +space, and not to one that is actually present; on the other hand, they +denote only the faint, dull, indefinite echo returned by consciousness +to an invariably distinct state of unconscious knowledge. Hence +the word “presentiment,” which carries with it an idea of +faintness and indistinctness, while, however, it may be easily seen +that sentiment destitute of all, even unconscious, ideas can have no +influence upon the result, for knowledge can only follow upon an idea. +A presentiment that sounds in consonance with our consciousness can +indeed, under certain circumstances, become tolerably definite, so that +in the case of man it can be expressed in thought and language; but +experience teaches us that even among ourselves this is not so when +instincts special to the human race come into play; we see rather that +the echo of our unconscious knowledge which finds its way into our consciousness +is so weak that it manifests itself only in the accompanying feelings +or frame of mind, and represents but an infinitely small fraction of +the sum of our sensations. It is obvious that such a faintly sympathetic +consciousness cannot form a sufficient foundation for a superstructure +of conscious deliberation; on the other hand, conscious deliberation +would be unnecessary, inasmuch as the process of thinking must have +been already gone through unconsciously, for every faint presentiment +that obtrudes itself upon our consciousness is in fact only the consequence +of a distinct unconscious knowledge, and the knowledge with which it +is concerned is almost always an idea of the purpose of some instinctive +action, or of one most intimately connected therewith. Thus, in +the case of the stag-beetle, the purpose consists in the leaving space +for the growth of the horns; the means, in the digging the hole of a +sufficient size; and the unconscious knowledge, in prescience concerning +the future development of the horns.</p> +<p>Lastly, all instinctive actions give us an impression of absolute +security and infallibility. With instinct the will is never hesitating +or weak, as it is when inferences are being drawn consciously. +We never find instinct making mistakes; we cannot, therefore, ascribe +a result which is so invariably precise to such an obscure condition +of mind as is implied when the word presentiment is used; on the contrary, +this absolute certainty is so characteristic a feature of instinctive +actions, that it constitutes almost the only well-marked point of distinction +between these and actions that are done upon reflection. But from +this it must again follow that some principle lies at the root of instinct +other than that which underlies reflective action, and this can only +be looked for in a determination of the will through a process that +lies in the unconscious, <a name="citation115a"></a><a href="#footnote115a">{115a}</a> +to which this character of unhesitating infallibility will attach itself +in all our future investigations.</p> +<p>Many will be surprised at my ascribing to instinct an unconscious +knowledge, arising out of no sensual impression, and yet invariably +accurate. This, however, is not a consequence of my theory concerning +instinct; it is the foundation on which that theory is based, and is +forced upon us by facts. I must therefore adduce examples. +And to give a name to the unconscious knowledge, which is not acquired +through impression made upon the senses, but which will be found to +be in our possession, though attained without the instrumentality of +means, <a name="citation115b"></a><a href="#footnote115b">{115b}</a> +I prefer the word “clairvoyance” <a name="citation115c"></a><a href="#footnote115c">{115c}</a> +to “presentiment,” which, for reasons already given, will +not serve me. This word, therefore, will be here employed throughout, +as above defined.</p> +<p>Let us now consider examples of the instincts of self-preservation, +subsistence, migration, and the continuation of the species. Most +animals know their natural enemies prior to experience of any hostile +designs upon themselves. A flight of young pigeons, even though +they have no old birds with them, will become shy, and will separate +from one another on the approach of a bird of prey. Horses and +cattle that come from countries where there are no lions become unquiet +and display alarm as soon as they are aware that a lion is approaching +them in the night. Horses going along a bridle-path that used +to leave the town at the back of the old dens of the carnivora in the +Berlin Zoological Gardens were often terrified by the propinquity of +enemies who were entirely unknown to them. Sticklebacks will swim +composedly among a number of voracious pike, knowing, as they do, that +the pike will not touch them. For if a pike once by mistake swallows +a stickleback, the stickleback will stick in its throat by reason of +the spine it carries upon its back, and the pike must starve to death +without being able to transmit his painful experience to his descendants. +In some countries there are people who by choice eat dog’s flesh; +dogs are invariably savage in the presence of these persons, as recognising +in them enemies at whose hands they may one day come to harm. +This is the more wonderful inasmuch as dog’s fat applied externally +(as when rubbed upon boots) attracts dogs by its smell. Grant +saw a young chimpanzee throw itself into convulsions of terror at the +sight of a large snake; and even among ourselves a Gretchen can often +detect a Mephistopheles. An insect of the genius <i>bombyx</i> +will seize another of the genus <i>parnopæa</i>, and kill it wherever +it finds it, without making any subsequent use of the body; but we know +that the last-named insect lies in wait for the eggs of the first, and +is therefore the natural enemy of its race. The phenomenon known +to stockdrivers and shepherds as “das Biesen des Viehes” +affords another example. For when a “dassel” or “bies” +fly draws near the herd, the cattle become unmanageable and run about +among one another as though they were mad, knowing, as they do, that +the larvae from the eggs which the fly will lay upon them will presently +pierce their hides and occasion them painful sores. These “dassel” +flies - which have no sting - closely resemble another kind of gadfly +which has a sting. Nevertheless, this last kind is little feared +by cattle, while the first is so to an inordinate extent. The +laying of the eggs upon the skin is at the time quite painless, and +no ill consequences follow until long afterwards, so that we cannot +suppose the cattle to draw a conscious inference concerning the connection +that exists between the two. I have already spoken of the foresight +shown by ferrets and buzzards in respect of adders; in like manner a +young honey-buzzard, on being shown a wasp for the first time, immediately +devoured it after having squeezed the sting from its body. No +animal, whose instinct has not been vitiated by unnatural habits, will +eat poisonous plants. Even when apes have contracted bad habits +through their having been brought into contact with mankind, they can +still be trusted to show us whether certain fruits found in their native +forests are poisonous or no; for if poisonous fruits are offered them +they will refuse them with loud cries. Every animal will choose +for its sustenance exactly those animal or vegetable substances which +agree best with its digestive organs, without having received any instruction +on the matter, and without testing them beforehand. Even, indeed, +though we assume that the power of distinguishing the different kinds +of food is due to sight and not to smell, it remains none the less mysterious +how the animal can know what it is that will agree with it. Thus +the kid which Galen took prematurely from its mother smelt at all the +different kinds of food that were set before it, but drank only the +milk without touching anything else. The cherry-finch opens a +cherry-stone by turning it so that her beak can hit the part where the +two sides join, and does this as much with the first stone she cracks +as with the last. Fitchets, martens, and weasels make small holes +on the opposite sides of an egg which they are about to suck, so that +the air may come in while they are sucking. Not only do animals +know the food that will suit them best, but they find out the most suitable +remedies when they are ill, and constantly form a correct diagnosis +of their malady with a therapeutical knowledge which they cannot possibly +have acquired. Dogs will often eat a great quantity of grass - +particularly couch-grass - when they are unwell, especially after spring, +if they have worms, which thus pass from them entangled in the grass, +or if they want to get fragments of bone from out of their stomachs. +As a purgative they make use of plants that sting. Hens and pigeons +pick lime from walls and pavements if their food does not afford them +lime enough to make their eggshells with. Little children eat +chalk when suffering from acidity of the stomach, and pieces of charcoal +if they are troubled with flatulence. We may observe these same +instincts for certain kinds of food or drugs even among grown-up people, +under circumstances in which their unconscious nature has unusual power; +as, for example, among women when they are pregnant, whose capricious +appetites are probably due to some special condition of the fœtus, +which renders a certain state of the blood desirable. Field-mice +bite off the germs of the corn which they collect together, in order +to prevent its growing during the winter. Some days before the +beginning of cold weather the squirrel is most assiduous in augmenting +its store, and then closes its dwelling. Birds of passage betake +themselves to warmer countries at times when there is still no scarcity +of food for them here, and when the temperature is considerably warmer +than it will be when they return to us. The same holds good of +the time when animals begin to prepare their winter quarters, which +beetles constantly do during the very hottest days of autumn. +When swallows and storks find their way back to their native places +over distances of hundreds of miles, and though the aspect of the country +is reversed, we say that this is due to the acuteness of their perception +of locality; but the same cannot be said of dogs, which, though they +have been carried in a bag from one place to another that they do not +know, and have been turned round and round twenty times over, have still +been known to find their way home. Here we can say no more than +that their instinct has conducted them - that the clairvoyance of the +unconscious has allowed them to conjecture their way. <a name="citation119a"></a><a href="#footnote119a">{119a}</a></p> +<p>Before an early winter, birds of passage collect themselves in preparation +for their flight sooner than usual; but when the winter is going to +be mild, they will either not migrate at all, or travel only a small +distance southward. When a hard winter is coming, tortoises will +make their burrows deeper. If wild geese, cranes, etc., soon return +from the countries to which they had betaken themselves at the beginning +of spring, it is a sign that a hot and dry summer is about to ensue +in those countries, and that the drought will prevent their being able +to rear their young. In years of flood, beavers construct their +dwellings at a higher level than usual, and shortly before an inundation +the field-mice in Kamtschatka come out of their holes in large bands. +If the summer is going to be dry, spiders may be seen in May and April, +hanging from the ends of threads several feet in length. If in +winter spiders are seen running about much, fighting with one another +and preparing new webs, there will be cold weather within the next nine +days, or from that to twelve: when they again hide themselves there +will be a thaw. I have no doubt that much of this power of prophesying +the weather is due to a perception of certain atmospheric conditions +which escape ourselves, but this perception can only have relation to +a certain actual and now present condition of the weather; and what +can the impression made by this have to do with their idea of the weather +that will ensue? No one will ascribe to animals a power of prognosticating +the weather months beforehand by means of inferences drawn logically +from a series of observations, <a name="citation119b"></a><a href="#footnote119b">{119b}</a> +to the extent of being able to foretell floods. It is far more +probable that the power of perceiving subtle differences of actual atmospheric +condition is nothing more than the sensual perception which acts as +motive - for a motive must assuredly be always present - when an instinct +comes into operation. It continues to hold good, therefore, that +the power of foreseeing the weather is a case of unconscious clairvoyance, +of which the stork which takes its departure for the south four weeks +earlier than usual knows no more than does the stag when before a cold +winter he grows himself a thicker pelt than is his wont. On the +one hand, animals have present in their consciousness a perception of +the actual state of the weather; on the other, their ensuing action +is precisely such as it would be if the idea present with them was that +of the weather that is about to come. This they cannot consciously +have; the only natural intermediate link, therefore, between their conscious +knowledge and their action is supplied by unconscious idea, which, however, +is always accurately prescient, inasmuch as it contains something which +is neither given directly to the animal through sensual perception, +nor can be deduced inferentially through the understanding.</p> +<p>Most wonderful of all are the instincts connected with the continuation +of the species. The males always find out the females of their +own kind, but certainly not solely through their resemblance to themselves. +With many animals, as, for example, parasitic crabs, the sexes so little +resemble one another that the male would be more likely to seek a mate +from the females of a thousand other species than from his own. +Certain butterflies are polymorphic, and not only do the males and females +of the same species differ, but the females present two distinct forms, +one of which as a general rule mimics the outward appearance of a distant +but highly valued species; yet the males will pair only with the females +of their own kind, and not with the strangers, though these may be very +likely much more like the males themselves. Among the insect species +of the <i>strepsiptera</i>, the female is a shapeless worm which lives +its whole life long in the hind body of a wasp; its head, which is of +the shape of a lentil, protrudes between two of the belly rings of the +wasp, the rest of the body being inside. The male, which only +lives for a few hours, and resembles a moth, nevertheless recognises +his mate in spite of these adverse circumstances, and fecundates her.</p> +<p>Before any experience of parturition, the knowledge that it is approaching +drives all mammals into solitude, and bids them prepare a nest for their +young in a hole or in some other place of shelter. The bird builds +her nest as soon as she feels the eggs coming to maturity within her. +Snails, land-crabs, tree-frogs, and toads, all of them ordinarily dwellers +upon land, now betake themselves to the water; sea-tortoises go on shore, +and many saltwater fishes come up into the rivers in order to lay their +eggs where they can alone find the requisites for their development. +Insects lay their eggs in the most varied kinds of situations, - in +sand, on leaves, under the hides and horny substances of other animals; +they often select the spot where the larva will be able most readily +to find its future sustenance, as in autumn upon the trees that will +open first in the coming spring, or in spring upon the blossoms that +will first bear fruit in autumn, or in the insides of those caterpillars +which will soonest as chrysalides provide the parasitic larva at once +with food and with protection. Other insects select the sites +from which they will first get forwarded to the destination best adapted +for their development. Thus some horseflies lay their eggs upon +the lips of horses or upon parts where they are accustomed to lick themselves. +The eggs get conveyed hence into the entrails, the proper place for +their development, - and are excreted upon their arrival at maturity. +The flies that infest cattle know so well how to select the most vigorous +and healthiest beasts, that cattle-dealers and tanners place entire +dependence upon them, and prefer those beasts and hides that are most +scarred by maggots. This selection of the best cattle by the help +of these flies is no evidence in support of the conclusion that the +flies possess the power of making experiments consciously and of reflecting +thereupon, even though the men whose trade it is to do this recognise +them as their masters. The solitary wasp makes a hole several +inches deep in the sand, lays her egg, and packs along with it a number +of green maggots that have no legs, and which, being on the point of +becoming chrysalides, are well nourished and able to go a long time +without food; she packs these maggots so closely together that they +cannot move nor turn into chrysalides, and just enough of them to support +the larva until it becomes a chrysalis. A kind of bug (<i>cerceris +bupresticida</i>), which itself lives only upon pollen, lays her eggs +in an underground cell, and with each one of them she deposits three +beetles, which she has lain in wait for and captured when they were +still weak through having only just left off being chrysalides. +She kills these beetles, and appears to smear them with a fluid whereby +she preserves them fresh and suitable for food. Many kinds of +wasps open the cells in which their larvæ are confined when these +must have consumed the provision that was left with them. They +supply them with more food, and again close the cell. Ants, again, +hit always upon exactly the right moment for opening the cocoons in +which their larvæ are confined and for setting them free, the +larva being unable to do this for itself. Yet the life of only +a few kinds of insects lasts longer than a single breeding season. +What then can they know about the contents of their eggs and the fittest +place for their development? What can they know about the kind +of food the larva will want when it leaves the egg - a food so different +from their own? What, again, can they know about the quantity +of food that will be necessary? How much of all this at least +can they know consciously? Yet their actions, the pains they take, +and the importance they evidently attach to these matters, prove that +they have a foreknowledge of the future: this knowledge therefore can +only be an unconscious clairvoyance. For clairvoyance it must +certainly be that inspires the will of an animal to open cells and cocoons +at the very moment that the larva is either ready for more food or fit +for leaving the cocoon. The eggs of the cuckoo do not take only +from two to three days to mature in her ovaries, as those of most birds +do, but require from eleven to twelve; the cuckoo, therefore, cannot +sit upon her own eggs, for her first egg would be spoiled before the +last was laid. She therefore lays in other birds’ nests +- of course laying each egg in a different nest. But in order +that the birds may not perceive her egg to be a stranger and turn it +out of the nest, not only does she lay an egg much smaller than might +be expected from a bird of her size (for she only finds her opportunity +among small birds), but, as already said, she imitates the other eggs +in the nest she has selected with surprising accuracy in respect both +of colour and marking. As the cuckoo chooses the nest some days +beforehand, it may be thought, if the nest is an open one, that the +cuckoo looks upon the colour of the eggs within it while her own is +in process of maturing inside her, and that it is thus her egg comes +to assume the colour of the others; but this explanation will not hold +good for nests that are made in the holes of trees, as that of <i>sylvia +phænicurus</i>, or which are oven-shaped with a narrow entrance, +as with <i>sylvia rufa</i>. In these cases the cuckoo can neither +slip in nor look in, and must therefore lay her egg outside the nest +and push it inside with her beak; she can therefore have no means of +perceiving through her senses what the eggs already in the nest are +like. If, then, in spite of all this, her egg closely resembles +the others, this can only have come about through an unconscious clairvoyance +which directs the process that goes on within the ovary in respect of +colour and marking.</p> +<p>An important argument in support of the existence of a clairvoyance +in the instincts of animals is to be found in the series of facts which +testify to the existence of a like clairvoyance, under certain circumstances, +even among human beings, while the self-curative instincts of children +and of pregnant women have been already mentioned. Here, however, +<a name="citation124"></a><a href="#footnote124">{124}</a> in correspondence +with the higher stage of development which human consciousness has attained, +a stronger echo of the unconscious clairvoyance commonly resounds within +consciousness itself, and this is represented by a more or less definite +presentiment of the consequences that will ensue. It is also in +accord with the greater independence of the human intellect that this +kind of presentiment is not felt exclusively immediately before the +carrying out of an action, but is occasionally disconnected from the +condition that an action has to be performed immediately, and displays +itself simply as an idea independently of conscious will, provided only +that the matter concerning which the presentiment is felt is one which +in a high degree concerns the will of the person who feels it. +In the intervals of an intermittent fever or of other illness, it not +unfrequently happens that sick persons can accurately foretell the day +of an approaching attack and how long it will last. The same thing +occurs almost invariably in the case of spontaneous, and generally in +that of artificial, somnambulism; certainly the Pythia, as is well known, +used to announce the date of her next ecstatic state. In like +manner the curative instinct displays itself in somnambulists, and they +have been known to select remedies that have been no less remarkable +for the success attending their employment than for the completeness +with which they have run counter to received professional opinion. +The indication of medicinal remedies is the only use which respectable +electro-biologists will make of the half-sleeping, half-waking condition +of those whom they are influencing. “People in perfectly +sound health have been known, before childbirth or at the commencement +of an illness, to predict accurately their own approaching death. +The accomplishment of their predictions can hardly be explained as the +result of mere chance, for if this were all, the prophecy should fail +at least as often as not, whereas the reverse is actually the case. +Many of these persons neither desire death nor fear it, so that the +result cannot be ascribed to imagination.” So writes the +celebrated physiologist, Burdach, from whose chapter on presentiment +in his work “Bhicke in’s Leben” a great part of my +most striking examples is taken. This presentiment of deaths, +which is the exception among men, is quite common with animals, even +though they do not know nor understand what death is. When they +become aware that their end is approaching, they steal away to outlying +and solitary places. This is why in cities we so rarely see the +dead body or skeleton of a cat. We can only suppose that the unconscious +clairvoyance, which is of essentially the same kind whether in man or +beast, calls forth presentiments of different degrees of definiteness, +so that the cat is driven to withdraw herself through a mere instinct +without knowing why she does so, while in man a definite perception +is awakened of the fact that he is about to die. Not only do people +have presentiments concerning their own death, but there are many instances +on record in which they have become aware of that of those near and +dear to them, the dying person having appeared in a dream to friend +or wife or husband. Stories to this effect prevail among all nations, +and unquestionably contain much truth. Closely connected with +this is the power of second sight, which existed formerly in Scotland, +and still does so in the Danish islands. This power enables certain +people without any ecstasy, but simply through their keener perception, +to foresee coming events, or to tell what is going on in foreign countries +on matters in which they are deeply interested, such as deaths, battles, +conflagrations (Swedenborg foretold the burning of Stockholm), the arrival +or the doings of friends who are at a distance. With many persons +this clairvoyance is confined to a knowledge of the death of their acquaintances +or fellow-townspeople. There have been a great many instances +of such death-prophetesses, and, what is most important, some cases +have been verified in courts of law. I may say, in passing, that +this power of second sight is found in persons who are in ecstatic states, +in the spontaneous or artificially induced somnambulism of the higher +kinds of waking dreams, as well as in lucid moments before death. +These prophetic glimpses, by which the clairvoyance of the unconscious +reveals itself to consciousness, <a name="citation126"></a><a href="#footnote126">{126}</a> +are commonly obscure because in the brain they must assume a form perceptible +by the senses, whereas the unconscious idea can have nothing to do with +any form of sensual impression: it is for this reason that humours, +dreams, and the hallucinations of sick persons can so easily have a +false signification attached to them. The chances of error and +self-deception that arise from this source, the ease with which people +may be deceived intentionally, and the mischief which, as a general +rule, attends a knowledge of the future, these considerations place +beyond all doubt the practical unwisdom of attempts to arrive at certainty +concerning the future. This, however, cannot affect the weight +which in theory should be attached to phenomena of this kind, and must +not prevent us from recognising the positive existence of the clairvoyance +whose existence I am maintaining, though it is often hidden under a +chaos of madness and imposture.</p> +<p>The materialistic and rationalistic tendencies of the present day +lead most people either to deny facts of this kind <i>in toto</i>, or +to ignore them, inasmuch as they are inexplicable from a materialistic +standpoint, and cannot be established by the inductive or experimental +method - as though this last were not equally impossible in the case +of morals, social science, and politics. A mind of any candour +will only be able to deny the truths of this entire class of phenomena +so long as it remains in ignorance of the facts that have been related +concerning them; but, again, a continuance in this ignorance can only +arise from unwillingness to be convinced. I am satisfied that +many of those who deny all human power of divination would come to another, +and, to say the least, more cautious conclusion if they would be at +the pains of further investigation; and I hold that no one, even at +the present day, need be ashamed of joining in with an opinion which +was maintained by all the great spirits of antiquity except Epicurus +- an opinion whose possible truth hardly one of our best modern philosophers +has ventured to contravene, and which the champions of German enlightenment +were so little disposed to relegate to the domain of old wives’ +tales, that Goethe furnishes us with an example of second sight that +fell within his own experience, and confirms it down to its minutest +details.</p> +<p>Although I am far from believing that the kind of phenomena above +referred to form in themselves a proper foundation for a superstructure +of scientific demonstration, I nevertheless find them valuable as a +completion and further confirmation of the series of phenomena presented +to us by the clairvoyance which we observe in human and animal instinct. +Even though they only continue this series <a name="citation128"></a><a href="#footnote128">{128}</a> +through the echo that is awakened within our consciousness, they as +powerfully support the account which instinctive actions give concerning +their own nature, as they are themselves supported by the analogy they +present to the clairvoyance observable in instinct. This, then, +as well as my desire not to lose an opportunity of protesting against +a modern prejudice, must stand as my reason for having allowed myself +to refer, in a scientific work, to a class of phenomena which has fallen +at present into so much discredit.</p> +<p>I will conclude with a few words upon a special kind of instinct +which has a very instructive bearing upon the subject generally, and +shows how impossible it is to evade the supposition of an unconscious +clairvoyance on the part of instinct. In the examples adduced +hitherto, the action of each individual has been done on the individual’s +own behalf, except in the case of instincts connected with the continuation +of the species, where the action benefits others - that is to say, the +offspring of the creature performing it.</p> +<p>We must now examine the cases in which a solidarity of instinct is +found to exist between several individuals, so that, on the one hand, +the action of each redounds to the common welfare, and, on the other, +it becomes possible for a useful purpose to be achieved through the +harmonious association of individual workers. This community of +instinct exists also among the higher animals, but here it is harder +to distinguish from associations originating through conscious will, +inasmuch as speech supplies the means of a more perfect intercommunication +of aim and plan. We shall, however, definitely recognise <a name="citation129"></a><a href="#footnote129">{129}</a> +this general effect of a universal instinct in the origin of speech +and in the great political and social movements in the history of the +world. Here we are concerned only with the simplest and most definite +examples that can be found anywhere, and therefore we will deal in preference +with the lower animals, among which, in the absence of voice, the means +of communicating thought, mimicry, and physiognomy, are so imperfect +that the harmony and interconnection of the individual actions cannot +in its main points be ascribed to an understanding arrived at through +speech. Huber observed that when a new comb was being constructed +a number of the largest working-bees, that were full of honey, took +no part in the ordinary business of the others, but remained perfectly +aloof. Twenty-four hours afterwards small plates of wax had formed +under their bellies. The bee drew these off with her hind-feet, +masticated them, and made them into a band. The small plates of +wax thus prepared were then glued to the roof of the hive one on the +top of the other. When one of the bees of this kind had used up +her plates of wax, another followed her and carried the same work forward +in the same way. A thin rough vertical wall, half a line in thickness +and fastened to the sides of the hive, was thus constructed. On +this, one of the smaller working-bees whose belly was empty came, and +after surveying the wall, made a flat half-oval excavation in the middle +of one of its sides; she piled up the wax thus excavated round the edge +of the excavation. After a short time she was relieved by another +like herself, till more than twenty followed one another in this way. +Meanwhile another bee began to make a similar hollow on the other side +of the wall, but corresponding only with the rim of the excavation on +this side. Presently another bee began a second hollow upon the +same side, each bee being continually relieved by others. Other +bees kept coming up and bringing under their bellies plates of wax, +with which they heightened the edge of the small wall of wax. +In this, new bees were constantly excavating the ground for more cells, +while others proceeded by degrees to bring those already begun into +a perfectly symmetrical shape, and at the same time continued building +up the prismatic walls between them. Thus the bees worked on opposite +sides of the wall of wax, always on the same plan and in the closest +correspondence with those upon the other side, until eventually the +cells on both sides were completed in all their wonderful regularity +and harmony of arrangement, not merely as regards those standing side +by side, but also as regards those which were upon the other side of +their pyramidal base.</p> +<p>Let the reader consider how animals that are accustomed to confer +together, by speech or otherwise, concerning designs which they may +be pursuing in common, will wrangle with thousandfold diversity of opinion; +let him reflect how often something has to be undone, destroyed, and +done over again; how at one time too many hands come forward, and at +another too few; what running to and fro there is before each has found +his right place; how often too many, and again too few, present themselves +for a relief gang; and how we find all this in the concerted works of +men, who stand so far higher than bees in the scale of organisation. +We see nothing of the kind among bees. A survey of their operations +leaves rather the impression upon us as though an invisible master-builder +had prearranged a scheme of action for the entire community, and had +impressed it upon each individual member, as though each class of workers +had learnt their appointed work by heart, knew their places and the +numbers in which they should relieve each other, and were informed instantaneously +by a secret signal of the moment when their action was wanted. +This, however, is exactly the manner in which an instinct works; and +as the intention of the entire community is instinctively present in +the unconscious clairvoyance <a name="citation131a"></a><a href="#footnote131a">{131a}</a> +of each individual bee, so the possession of this common instinct impels +each one of them to the discharge of her special duties when the right +moment has arrived. It is only thus that the wonderful tranquillity +and order which we observe could be attained. What we are to think +concerning this common instinct must be reserved for explanation later +on, but the possibility of its existence is already evident, inasmuch +<a name="citation131b"></a><a href="#footnote131b">{131b}</a> as each +individual has an unconscious insight concerning the plan proposed to +itself by the community, and also concerning the means immediately to +be adopted through concerted action - of which, however, only the part +requiring his own co-operation is present in the consciousness of each. +Thus, for example, the larva of the bee itself spins the silky chamber +in which it is to become a chrysalis, but other bees must close it with +its lid of wax. The purpose of there being a chamber in which +the larva can become a chrysalis must be present in the minds of each +of these two parties to the transaction, but neither of them acts under +the influence of conscious will, except in regard to his own particular +department. I have already mentioned the fact that the larva, +after its metamorphosis, must be freed from its cell by other bees, +and have told how the working-bees in autumn kill the drones, so that +they may not have to feed a number of useless mouths throughout the +winter, and how they only spare them when they are wanted in order to +fecundate a new queen. Furthermore, the working-bees build cells +in which the eggs laid by the queen may come to maturity, and, as a +general rule, make just as many chambers as the queen lays eggs; they +make these, moreover, in the same order as that in which the queen lays +her eggs, namely, first for the working-bees, then for the drones, and +lastly for the queens. In the polity of the bees, the working +and the sexual capacities, which were once united, are now personified +in three distinct kinds of individual, and these combine with an inner, +unconscious, spiritual union, so as to form a single body politic, as +the organs of a living body combine to form the body itself.</p> +<p>In this chapter, therefore, we have arrived at the following conclusions:-</p> +<p>Instinct is not the result of conscious deliberation; <a name="citation132"></a><a href="#footnote132">{132}</a> +it is not a consequence of bodily organisation; it is not a mere result +of a mechanism which lies in the organisation of the brain; it is not +the operation of dead mechanism, glued on, as it were, to the soul, +and foreign to its inmost essence; but it is the spontaneous action +of the individual, springing from his most essential nature and character. +The purpose to which any particular kind of instinctive action is subservient +is not the purpose of a soul standing outside the individual and near +akin to Providence - a purpose once for all thought out, and now become +a matter of necessity to the individual, so that he can act in no other +way, though it is engrafted into his nature from without, and not natural +to it. The purpose of the instinct is in each individual case +thought out and willed unconsciously by the individual, and afterwards +the choice of means adapted to each particular case is arrived at unconsciously. +A knowledge of the purpose is often absolutely unattainable <a name="citation133"></a><a href="#footnote133">{133}</a> +by conscious knowledge through sensual perception. Then does the +peculiarity of the unconscious display itself in the clairvoyance of +which consciousness perceives partly only a faint and dull, and partly, +as in the case of man, a more or less definite echo by way of sentiment, +whereas the instinctive action itself - the carrying out of the means +necessary for the achievement of the unconscious purpose - falls always +more clearly within consciousness, inasmuch as due performance of what +is necessary would be otherwise impossible. Finally, the clairvoyance +makes itself perceived in the concerted action of several individuals +combining to carry out a common but unconscious purpose.</p> +<p>Up to this point we have encountered clairvoyance as a fact which +we observe but cannot explain, and the reader may say that he prefers +to take his stand here, and be content with regarding instinct simply +as a matter of fact, the explanation of which is at present beyond our +reach. Against this it must be urged, firstly, that clairvoyance +is not confined to instinct, but is found also in man; secondly, that +clairvoyance is by no means present in all instincts, and that therefore +our experience shows us clairvoyance and instinct as two distinct things +- clairvoyance being of great use in explaining instinct, but instinct +serving nothing to explain clairvoyance; thirdly and lastly, that the +clairvoyance of the individual will not continue to be so incomprehensible +to us, but will be perfectly well explained in the further course of +our investigation, while we must give up all hope of explaining instinct +in any other way.</p> +<p>The conception we have thus arrived at enables us to regard instinct +as the innermost kernel, so to speak, of every living being. That +this is actually the case is shown by the instincts of self-preservation +and of the continuation of the species which we observe throughout creation, +and by the heroic self-abandonment with which the individual will sacrifice +welfare, and even life, at the bidding of instinct. We see this +when we think of the caterpillar, and how she repairs her cocoon until +she yields to exhaustion; of the bird, and how she will lay herself +to death; of the disquiet and grief displayed by all migratory animals +if they are prevented from migrating. A captive cuckoo will always +die at the approach of winter through despair at being unable to fly +away; so will the vineyard snail if it is hindered of its winter sleep. +The weakest mother will encounter an enemy far surpassing her in strength, +and suffer death cheerfully for her offspring’s sake. Every +year we see fresh cases of people who have been unfortunate going mad +or committing suicide. Women who have survived the Cæsarian +operation allow themselves so little to be deterred from further childbearing +through fear of this frightful and generally fatal operation, that they +will undergo it no less than three times. Can we suppose that +what so closely resembles demoniacal possession can have come about +through something engrafted on to the soul as a mechanism foreign to +its inner nature, <a name="citation135"></a><a href="#footnote135">{135}</a> +or through conscious deliberation which adheres always to a bare egoism, +and is utterly incapable of such self-sacrifice for the sake of offspring +as is displayed by the procreative and maternal instincts?</p> +<p>We have now, finally, to consider how it arises that the instincts +of any animal species are so similar within the limits of that species +- a circumstance which has not a little contributed to the engrafted-mechanism +theory. But it is plain that like causes will be followed by like +effects; and this should afford sufficient explanation. The bodily +mechanism, for example, of all the individuals of a species is alike; +so again are their capabilities and the outcomes of their conscious +intelligence - though this, indeed, is not the case with man, nor in +some measure even with the highest animals; and it is through this want +of uniformity that there is such a thing as individuality. The +external conditions of all the individuals of a species are also tolerably +similar, and when they differ essentially, the instincts are likewise +different - a fact in support of which no examples are necessary. +From like conditions of mind and body (and this includes like predispositions +of brain and ganglia) and like exterior circumstances, like desires +will follow as a necessary logical consequence. Again, from like +desires and like inward and outward circumstances, a like choice of +means - that is to say, like instincts - must ensue. These last +two steps would not be conceded without restriction if the question +were one involving conscious deliberation, but as these logical consequences +are supposed to follow from the unconscious, which takes the right step +unfailingly without vacillation or delay so long as the premises are +similar, the ensuing desires and the instincts to adopt the means for +their gratification will be similar also.</p> +<p>Thus the view which we have taken concerning instinct explains the +very last point which it may be thought worth while to bring forward +in support of the opinions of our opponents.</p> +<p>I will conclude this chapter with the words of Schelling: “Thoughtful +minds will hold the phenomena of animal instinct to belong to the most +important of all phenomena, and to be the true touchstone of a durable +philosophy.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER IX</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Remarks upon Von Hartmann’s position in regard to instinct.</p> +<p>Uncertain how far the foregoing chapter is not better left without +comment of any kind, I nevertheless think that some of my readers may +be helped by the following extracts from the notes I took while translating. +I will give them as they come, without throwing them into connected +form.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Von Hartmann defines instinct as action done with a purpose, but +without consciousness of purpose.</p> +<p>The building of her nest by a bird is an instinctive action; it is +done with a purpose, but it is arbitrary to say that the bird has no +knowledge of that purpose. Some hold that birds when they are +building their nest know as well that they mean to bring up a family +in it as a young married couple do when they build themselves a house. +This is the conclusion which would be come to by a plain person on a +<i>primâ facie</i> view of the facts, and Von Hartmann shows no +reason for modifying it.</p> +<p>A better definition of instinct would be that it is inherited knowledge +in respect of certain facts, and of the most suitable manner in which +to deal with them.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Von Hartmann speaks of “a mechanism of brain or mind” +contrived by nature, and again of “a psychical organisation,” +as though it were something distinct from a physical organisation.</p> +<p>We can conceive of such a thing as mechanism of brain, for we have +seen brain and handled it; but until we have seen a mind and handled +it, or at any rate been enabled to draw inferences which will warrant +us in conceiving of it as a material substance apart from bodily substance, +we cannot infer that it has an organisation apart from bodily organisation. +Does Von Hartmann mean that we have two bodies - a body-body, and a +soul-body?</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>He says that no one will call the action of the spider instinctive +in voiding the fluids from its glands when they are too full. +Why not?</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>He is continually personifying instinct; thus he speaks of the “ends +proposed to itself by the instinct,” of “the blind unconscious +purpose of the instinct,” of “an unconscious purpose constraining +the volition of the bird,” of “each variation and modification +of the instinct,” as though instinct, purpose, and, later on, +clairvoyance, were persons, and not words characterising a certain class +of actions. The ends are proposed to itself by the animal, not +by the instinct. Nothing but mischief can come of a mode of expression +which does not keep this clearly in view.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>It must not be supposed that the same cuckoo is in the habit of laying +in the nests of several different species, and of changing the colour +of her eggs according to that of the eggs of the bird in whose nest +she lays. I have inquired from Mr. R. Bowdler Sharpe of the ornithological +department at the British Museum, who kindly gives it me as his opinion +that though cuckoos do imitate the eggs of the species on whom they +foist their young ones, yet one cuckoo will probably lay in the nests +of one species also, and will stick to that species for life. +If so, the same race of cuckoos may impose upon the same species for +generations together. The instinct will even thus remain a very +wonderful one, but it is not at all inconsistent with the theory put +forward by Professor Hering and myself.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Returning to the idea of psychical mechanism, he admits that “it +is itself so obscure that we can hardly form any idea concerning it,” +<a name="citation139a"></a><a href="#footnote139a">{139a}</a> and then +goes on to claim for it that it explains a great many other things. +This must have been the passage which Mr. Sully had in view when he +very justly wrote that Von Hartmann “dogmatically closes the field +of physical inquiry, and takes refuge in a phantom which explains everything, +simply because it is itself incapable of explanation.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>According to Von Hartmann <a name="citation139b"></a><a href="#footnote139b">{139b}</a> +the unpractised animal manifests its instinct as perfectly as the practised. +This is not the case. The young animal exhibits marvellous proficiency, +but it gains by experience. I have watched sparrows, which I can +hardly doubt to be young ones, spend a whole month in trying to build +their nest, and give it up in the end as hopeless. I have watched +three such cases this spring in a tree not twenty feet from my own window +and on a level with my eye, so that I have been able to see what was +going on at all hours of the day. In each case the nest was made +well and rapidly up to a certain point, and then got top-heavy and tumbled +over, so that little was left on the tree: it was reconstructed and +reconstructed over and over again, always with the same result, till +at last in all three cases the birds gave up in despair. I believe +the older and stronger birds secure the fixed and best sites, driving +the younger birds to the trees, and that the art of building nests in +trees is dying out among house-sparrows.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>He declares that instinct is not due to organisation so much as organisation +to instinct. <a name="citation140"></a><a href="#footnote140">{140}</a> +The fact is, that neither can claim precedence of or pre-eminence over +the other. Instinct and organisation are only mind and body, or +mind and matter; and these are not two separable things, but one and +inseparable, with, as it were, two sides; the one of which is a function +of the other. There was never yet either matter without mind, +however low, nor mind, however high, without a material body of some +sort; there can be no change in one without a corresponding change in +the other; neither came before the other; neither can either cease to +change or cease to be; for “to be” is to continue changing, +so that “to be” and “to change” are one.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Whence, he asks, comes the desire to gratify an instinct before experience +of the pleasure that will ensue on gratification? This is a pertinent +question, but it is met by Professor Hering with the answer that this +is due to memory - to the continuation in the germ of vibrations that +were vibrating in the body of the parent, and which, when stimulated +by vibrations of a suitable rhythm, become more and more powerful till +they suffice to set the body in visible action. For my own part +I only venture to maintain that it is due to memory, that is to say, +to an enduring sense on the part of the germ of the action it took when +in the persons of its ancestors, and of the gratification which ensued +thereon. This meets Von Hartmann’s whole difficulty.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The glacier is not snow. It is snow packed tight into a small +compass, and has thus lost all trace of its original form. How +incomplete, however, would be any theory of glacial action which left +out of sight the origin of the glacier in snow! Von Hartmann loses +sight of the origin of instinctive in deliberative actions because the +two classes of action are now in many respects different. His +philosophy of the unconscious fails to consider what is the normal process +by means of which such common actions as we can watch, and whose history +we can follow, have come to be done unconsciously.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>He says, <a name="citation141"></a><a href="#footnote141">{141}</a> +“How inconceivable is the supposition of a mechanism, &c., +&c.; how clear and simple, on the other hand, is the view that there +is an unconscious purpose constraining the volition of the bird to the +use of the fitting means.” Does he mean that there is an +actual thing - an unconscious purpose - something outside the bird, +as it were a man, which lays hold of the bird and makes it do this or +that, as a master makes a servant do his bidding? If so, he again +personifies the purpose itself, and must therefore embody it, or be +talking in a manner which plain people cannot understand. If, +on the other hand, he means “how simple is the view that the bird +acts unconsciously,” this is not more simple than supposing it +to act consciously; and what ground has he for supposing that the bird +is unconscious? It is as simple, and as much in accordance with +the facts, to suppose that the bird feels the air to be colder, and +knows that she must warm her eggs if she is to hatch them, as consciously +as a mother knows that she must not expose her new-born infant to the +cold.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>On page 99 of this book we find Von Hartmann saying that if it is +once granted that the normal and abnormal manifestations of instinct +spring from a single source, then the objection that the modification +is due to conscious knowledge will be found to be a suicidal one later +on, in so far as it is directed against instinct generally. I +understand him to mean that if we admit instinctive action, and the +modifications of that action which more nearly resemble results of reason, +to be actions of the same ultimate kind differing in degree only, and +if we thus attempt to reduce instinctive action to the prophetic strain +arising from old experience, we shall be obliged to admit that the formation +of the embryo is ultimately due to reflection - which he seems to think +is a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> of the argument.</p> +<p>Therefore, he concludes, if there is to be only one source, the source +must be unconscious, and not conscious. We reply, that we do not +see the absurdity of the position which we grant we have been driven +to. We hold that the formation of the embryo <i>is</i> ultimately +due to reflection and design.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The writer of an article in the <i>Times</i>, April 1, 1880, says +that servants must be taught their calling before they can practise +it; but, in fact, they can only be taught their calling by practising +it. So Von Hartmann says animals must feel the pleasure consequent +on gratification of an instinct before they can be stimulated to act +upon the instinct by a knowledge of the pleasure that will ensue. +This sounds logical, but in practice a little performance and a little +teaching - a little sense of pleasure and a little connection of that +pleasure with this or that practice, - come up simultaneously from something +that we cannot see, the two being so small and so much abreast, that +we do not know which is first, performance or teaching; and, again, +action, or pleasure supposed as coming from the action.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Geistes-mechanismus” comes as near to “disposition +of mind,” or, more shortly, “disposition,” as so unsatisfactory +a word can come to anything. Yet, if we translate it throughout +by “disposition,” we shall see how little we are being told.</p> +<p>We find on page 114 that “all instinctive actions give us an +impression of absolute security and infallibility”; that “the +will is never weak or hesitating, as it is when inferences are being +drawn consciously.” “We never,” Von Hartmann +continues, “find instinct making mistakes.” Passing +over the fact that instinct is again personified, the statement is still +incorrect. Instinctive actions are certainly, as a general rule, +performed with less uncertainty than deliberative ones; this is explicable +by the fact that they have been more often practised, and thus reduced +more completely to a matter of routine; but nothing is more certain +than that animals acting under the guidance of inherited experience +or instinct frequently make mistakes which with further practice they +correct. Von Hartmann has abundantly admitted that the manner +of an instinctive action is often varied in correspondence with variation +in external circumstances. It is impossible to see how this does +not involve both possibility of error and the connection of instinct +with deliberation at one and the same time. The fact is simply +this - when an animal finds itself in a like position with that in which +it has already often done a certain thing in the persons of its forefathers, +it will do this thing well and easily: when it finds the position somewhat, +but not unrecognisably, altered through change either in its own person +or in the circumstances exterior to it, it will vary its action with +greater or less ease according to the nature of the change in the position: +when the position is gravely altered the animal either bungles or is +completely thwarted.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Not only does Von Hartmann suppose that instinct may, and does, involve +knowledge antecedent to, and independent of, experience - an idea as +contrary to the tendency of modern thought as that of spontaneous generation, +with which indeed it is identical though presented in another shape +- but he implies by his frequent use of the word “unmittelbar” +that a result can come about without any cause whatever. So he +says, “Um für die unbewusster Erkenntniss, welche nicht durch +sinnliche Wahrnehmung erworben, <i>sondern als unmittelbar Besitz</i>,” +&c. <a name="citation144a"></a><a href="#footnote144a">{144a}</a> +Because he does not see where the experience can have been gained, he +cuts the knot, and denies that there has been experience. We say, +Look more attentively and you will discover the time and manner in which +the experience was gained.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Again, he continually assumes that animals low down in the scale +of life cannot know their own business because they show no sign of +knowing ours. See his remarks on <i>Saturnia pavonia minor</i> +(page 107), and elsewhere on cattle and gadflies. The question +is not what can they know, but what does their action prove to us that +they do know. With each species of animal or plant there is one +profession only, and it is hereditary. With us there are many +professions, and they are not hereditary; so that they cannot become +instinctive, as they would otherwise tend to do.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>He attempts <a name="citation144b"></a><a href="#footnote144b">{144b}</a> +to draw a distinction between the causes that have produced the weapons +and working instruments of animals, on the one hand, and those that +lead to the formation of hexagonal cells by bees, &c., on the other. +No such distinction can be justly drawn.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>The ghost-stories which Von Hartmann accepts will hardly be accepted +by people of sound judgment. There is one well-marked distinctive +feature between the knowledge manifested by animals when acting instinctively +and the supposed knowledge of seers and clairvoyants. In the first +case, the animal never exhibits knowledge except upon matters concerning +which its race has been conversant for generations; in the second, the +seer is supposed to do so. In the first case, a new feature is +invariably attended with disturbance of the performance and the awakening +of consciousness and deliberation, unless the new matter is too small +in proportion to the remaining features of the case to attract attention, +or unless, though really new, it appears so similar to an old feature +as to be at first mistaken for it; with the second, it is not even professed +that the seer’s ancestors have had long experience upon the matter +concerning which the seer is supposed to have special insight, and I +can imagine no more powerful <i>à priori</i> argument against +a belief in such stories.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Close upon the end of his chapter Von Hartmann touches upon the one +matter which requires consideration. He refers the similarity +of instinct that is observable among all species to the fact that like +causes produce like effects; and I gather, though he does not expressly +say so, that he considers similarity of instinct in successive generations +to be referable to the same cause as similarity of instinct between +all the contemporary members of a species. He thus raises the +one objection against referring the phenomena of heredity to memory +which I think need be gone into with any fulness. I will, however, +reserve this matter for my concluding chapters.</p> +<p>Von Hartmann concludes his chapter with a quotation from Schelling, +to the effect that the phenomena of animal instinct are the true touchstone +of a durable philosophy; by which I suppose it is intended to say that +if a system or theory deals satisfactorily with animal instinct, it +will stand, but not otherwise. I can wish nothing better than +that the philosophy of the unconscious advanced by Von Hartmann be tested +by this standard.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER X</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Recapitulation and statement of an objection.</p> +<p>The true theory of unconscious action, then, is that of Professor +Hering, from whose lecture it is no strained conclusion to gather that +he holds the action of all living beings, from the moment of their conception +to that of their fullest development, to be founded in volition and +design, though these have been so long lost sight of that the work is +now carried on, as it were, departmentally and in due course according +to an official routine which can hardly now be departed from.</p> +<p>This involves the older “Darwinism” and the theory of +Lamarck, according to which the modification of living forms has been +effected mainly through the needs of the living forms themselves, which +vary with varying conditions, the survival of the fittest (which, as +I see Mr. H. B. Baildon has just said, “sometimes comes to mean +merely the survival of the survivors” <a name="citation146"></a><a href="#footnote146">{146}</a>) +being taken almost as a matter of course. According to this view +of evolution, there is a remarkable analogy between the development +of living organs or tools and that of those organs or tools external +to the body which has been so rapid during the last few thousand years.</p> +<p>Animals and plants, according to Professor Hering, are guided throughout +their development, and preserve the due order in each step which they +take, through memory of the course they took on past occasions when +in the persons of their ancestors. I am afraid I have already +too often said that if this memory remains for long periods together +latent and without effect, it is because the undulations of the molecular +substance of the body which are its supposed explanation are during +these periods too feeble to generate action, until they are augmented +in force through an accession of suitable undulations issuing from exterior +objects; or, in other words, until recollection is stimulated by a return +of the associated ideas. On this the eternal agitation becomes +so much enhanced, that equilibrium is visibly disturbed, and the action +ensues which is proper to the vibration of the particular substance +under the particular conditions. This, at least, is what I suppose +Professor Hering to intend.</p> +<p>Leaving the explanation of memory on one side, and confining ourselves +to the fact of memory only, a caterpillar on being just hatched is supposed, +according to this theory, to lose its memory of the time it was in the +egg, and to be stimulated by an intense but unconscious recollection +of the action taken by its ancestors when they were first hatched. +It is guided in the course it takes by the experience it can thus command. +Each step it takes recalls a new recollection, and thus it goes through +its development as a performer performs a piece of music, each bar leading +his recollection to the bar that should next follow.</p> +<p>In “Life and Habit” will be found examples of the manner +in which this view solves a number of difficulties for the explanation +of which the leading men of science express themselves at a loss. +The following from Professor Huxley’s recent work upon the crayfish +may serve for an example. Professor Huxley writes:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“It is a widely received notion that the energies of living +matter have a tendency to decline and finally disappear, and that the +death of the body as a whole is a necessary correlate of its life. +That all living beings sooner or later perish needs no demonstration, +but it would be difficult to find satisfactory grounds for the belief +that they needs must do so. The analogy of a machine, that sooner +or later must be brought to a standstill by the wear and tear of its +parts, does not hold, inasmuch as the animal mechanism is continually +renewed and repaired; and though it is true that individual components +of the body are constantly dying, yet their places are taken by vigorous +successors. A city remains notwithstanding the constant death-rate +of its inhabitants; and such an organism as a crayfish is only a corporate +unity, made up of innumerable partially independent individualities.” +- <i>The Crayfish</i>, p. 127.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Surely the theory which I have indicated above makes the reason plain +why no organism can permanently outlive its experience of past lives. +The death of such a body corporate as the crayfish is due to the social +condition becoming more complex than there is memory of past experience +to deal with. Hence social disruption, insubordination, and decay. +The crayfish dies as a state dies, and all states that we have heard +of die sooner or later. There are some savages who have not yet +arrived at the conception that death is the necessary end of all living +beings, and who consider even the gentlest death from old age as violent +and abnormal; so Professor Huxley seems to find a difficulty in seeing +that though a city commonly outlives many generations of its citizens, +yet cities and states are in the end no less mortal than individuals. +“The city,” he says, “remains.” Yes, but +not for ever. When Professor Huxley can find a city that will +last for ever, he may wonder that a crayfish does not last for ever.</p> +<p>I have already here and elsewhere said all that I can yet bring forward +in support of Professor Hering’s theory; it now remains for me +to meet the most troublesome objection to it that I have been able to +think of - an objection which I had before me when I wrote “Life +and Habit,” but which then as now I believe to be unsound. +Seeing, however, as I have pointed out at the end of the preceding chapter, +that Von Hartmann has touched upon it, and being aware that a plausible +case can be made out for it, I will state it and refute it here. +When I say refute it, I do not mean that I shall have done with it - +for it is plain that it opens up a vaster question in the relations +between the so-called organic and inorganic worlds - but that I will +refute the supposition that it any way militates against Professor Hering’s +theory.</p> +<p>Why, it may be asked, should we go out of our way to invent unconscious +memory - the existence of which must at the best remain an inference +<a name="citation149"></a><a href="#footnote149">{149}</a> - when the +observed fact that like antecedents are invariably followed by like +consequents should be sufficient for our purpose? Why should the +fact that a given kind of chrysalis in a given condition will always +become a butterfly within a certain time be connected with memory, when +it is not pretended that memory has anything to do with the invariableness +with which oxygen and hydrogen when mixed in certain proportions make +water?</p> +<p>We assume confidently that if a drop of water were decomposed into +its component parts, and if these were brought together again, and again +decomposed and again brought together any number of times over, the +results would be invariably the same, whether decomposition or combination, +yet no one will refer the invariableness of the action during each repetition, +to recollection by the gaseous molecules of the course taken when the +process was last repeated. On the contrary, we are assured that +molecules in some distant part of the world, which had never entered +into such and such a known combination themselves, nor held concert +with other molecules that had been so combined, and which, therefore, +could have had no experience and no memory, would none the less act +upon one another in that one way in which other like combinations of +atoms have acted under like circumstances, as readily as though they +had been combined and separated and recombined again a hundred or a +hundred thousand times. It is this assumption, tacitly made by +every man, beast, and plant in the universe, throughout all time and +in every action of their lives, that has made any action possible, lying, +as it does, at the root of all experience.</p> +<p>As we admit of no doubt concerning the main result, so we do not +suppose an alternative to lie before any atom of any molecule at any +moment during the process of their combination. This process is, +in all probability, an exceedingly complicated one, involving a multitude +of actions and subordinate processes, which follow one upon the other, +and each one of which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, though +they all come to pass in what appears to be an instant of time. +Yet at no point do we conceive of any atom as swerving ever such a little +to right or left of a determined course, but invest each one of them +with so much of the divine attributes as that with it there shall be +no variableness, neither shadow of turning.</p> +<p>We attribute this regularity of action to what we call the necessity +of things, as determined by the nature of the atoms and the circumstances +in which they are placed. We say that only one proximate result +can ever arise from any given combination. If, then, so great +uniformity of action as nothing can exceed is manifested by atoms to +which no one will impute memory, why this desire for memory, as though +it were the only way of accounting for regularity of action in living +beings? Sameness of action may be seen abundantly where there +is no room for anything that we can consistently call memory. +In these cases we say that it is due to sameness of substance in same +circumstances.</p> +<p>The most cursory reflection upon our actions will show us that it +is no more possible for living action to have more than one set of proximate +consequents at any given time than for oxygen and hydrogen when mixed +in the proportions proper for the formation of water. Why, then, +not recognise this fact, and ascribe repeated similarity of living action +to the reproduction of the necessary antecedents, with no more sense +of connection between the steps in the action, or memory of similar +action taken before, than we suppose on the part of oxygen and hydrogen +molecules between the several occasions on which they may have been +disunited and reunited?</p> +<p>A boy catches the measles not because he remembers having caught +them in the persons of his father and mother, but because he is a fit +soil for a certain kind of seed to grow upon. In like manner he +should be said to grow his nose because he is a fit combination for +a nose to spring from. Dr. X---’s father died of <i>angina +pectoris</i> at the age of forty-nine; so did Dr. X---. Can it +be pretended that Dr. X--- remembered having died of <i>angina pectoris</i> +at the age of forty-nine when in the person of his father, and accordingly, +when he came to be forty-nine years old himself, died also? For +this to hold, Dr. X---’s father must have begotten him after he +was dead; for the son could not remember the father’s death before +it happened.</p> +<p>As for the diseases of old age, so very commonly inherited, they +are developed for the most part not only long after the average age +of reproduction, but at a time when no appreciable amount of memory +of any previous existence can remain; for a man will not have many male +ancestors who become parents at over sixty years old, nor female ancestors +who did so at over forty. By our own showing, therefore, recollection +can have nothing to do with the matter. Yet who can doubt that +gout is due to inheritance as much as eyes and noses? In what +respects do the two things differ so that we should refer the inheritance +of eyes and noses to memory, while denying any connection between memory +and gout? We may have a ghost of a pretence for saying that a +man grew a nose by rote, or even that he catches the measles or whooping-cough +by rote during his boyhood; but do we mean to say that he develops the +gout by rote in his old age if he comes of a gouty family? If, +then, rote and red-tape have nothing to do with the one, why should +they with the other?</p> +<p>Remember also the cases in which aged females develop male characteristics. +Here are growths, often of not inconsiderable extent, which make their +appearance during the decay of the body, and grow with greater and greater +vigour in the extreme of old age, and even for days after death itself. +It can hardly be doubted that an especial tendency to develop these +characteristics runs as an inheritance in certain families; here then +is perhaps the best case that can be found of a development strictly +inherited, but having clearly nothing whatever to do with memory. +Why should not all development stand upon the same footing?</p> +<p>A friend who had been arguing with me for some time as above, concluded +with the following words:-</p> +<p>“If you cannot be content with the similar action of similar +substances (living or non-living) under similar circumstances - if you +cannot accept this as an ultimate fact, but consider it necessary to +connect repetition of similar action with memory before you can rest +in it and be thankful - be consistent, and introduce this memory which +you find so necessary into the inorganic world also. Either say +that a chrysalis becomes a butterfly because it is the thing that it +is, and, being that kind of thing, must act in such and such a manner +and in such a manner only, so that the act of one generation has no +more to do with the act of the next than the fact of cream being churned +into butter in a dairy one day has to do with other cream being churnable +into butter in the following week - either say this, or else develop +some mental condition - which I have no doubt you will be very well +able to do if you feel the want of it - in which you can make out a +case for saying that oxygen and hydrogen on being brought together, +and cream on being churned, are in some way acquainted with, and mindful +of, action taken by other cream and other oxygen and hydrogen on past +occasions.”</p> +<p>I felt inclined to reply that my friend need not twit me with being +able to develop a mental organism if I felt the need of it, for his +own ingenious attack on my position, and indeed every action of his +life was but an example of this omnipresent principle.</p> +<p>When he was gone, however, I thought over what he had been saying. +I endeavoured to see how far I could get on without volition and memory, +and reasoned as follows:- A repetition of like antecedents will be certainly +followed by a repetition of like consequents, whether the agents be +men and women or chemical substances. “If there be two cowards +perfectly similar in every respect, and if they be subjected in a perfectly +similar way to two terrifying agents, which are themselves perfectly +similar, there are few who will not expect a perfect similarity in the +running away, even though ten thousand years intervene between the original +combination and its repetition.” <a name="citation153"></a><a href="#footnote153">{153}</a> +Here certainly there is no coming into play of memory, more than in +the pan of cream on two successive churning days, yet the action is +similar.</p> +<p>A clerk in an office has an hour in the middle of the day for dinner. +About half-past twelve he begins to feel hungry; at once he takes down +his hat and leaves the office. He does not yet know the neighbourhood, +and on getting down into the street asks a policeman at the corner which +is the best eating-house within easy distance. The policeman tells +him of three houses, one of which is a little farther off than the other +two, but is cheaper. Money being a greater object to him than +time, the clerk decides on going to the cheaper house. He goes, +is satisfied, and returns.</p> +<p>Next day he wants his dinner at the same hour, and - it will be said +- remembering his satisfaction of yesterday, will go to the same place +as before. But what has his memory to do with it? Suppose +him to have entirely forgotten all the circumstances of the preceding +day from the moment of his beginning to feel hungry onward, though in +other respects sound in mind and body, and unchanged generally. +At half-past twelve he would begin to be hungry; but his beginning to +be hungry cannot be connected with his remembering having begun to be +hungry yesterday. He would begin to be hungry just as much whether +he remembered or no. At one o’clock he again takes down +his hat and leaves the office, not because he remembers having done +so yesterday, but because he wants his hat to go out with. Being +again in the street, and again ignorant of the neighbourhood (for he +remembers nothing of yesterday), he sees the same policeman at the corner +of the street, and asks him the same question as before; the policeman +gives him the same answer, and money being still an object to him, the +cheapest eating-house is again selected; he goes there, finds the same +<i>menu</i>, makes the same choice for the same reasons, eats, is satisfied, +and returns.</p> +<p>What similarity of action can be greater than this, and at the same +time more incontrovertible? But it has nothing to do with memory; +on the contrary, it is just because the clerk has no memory that his +action of the second day so exactly resembles that of the first. +As long as he has no power of recollecting, he will day after day repeat +the same actions in exactly the same way, until some external circumstances, +such as his being sent away, modify the situation. Till this or +some other modification occurs, he will day after day go down into the +street without knowing where to go; day after day he will see the same +policeman at the corner of the same street, and (for we may as well +suppose that the policeman has no memory too) he will ask and be answered, +and ask and be answered, till he and the policeman die of old age. +This similarity of action is plainly due to that - whatever it is - +which ensures that like persons or things when placed in like circumstances +shall behave in like manner.</p> +<p>Allow the clerk ever such a little memory, and the similarity of +action will disappear; for the fact of remembering what happened to +him on the first day he went out in search of dinner will be a modification +in him in regard to his then condition when he next goes out to get +his dinner. He had no such memory on the first day, and he has +upon the second. Some modification of action must ensue upon this +modification of the actor, and this is immediately observable. +He wants his dinner, indeed, goes down into the street, and sees the +policeman as yesterday, but he does not ask the policeman; he remembers +what the policeman told him and what he did, and therefore goes straight +to the eating-house without wasting time: nor does he dine off the same +dish two days running, for he remembers what he had yesterday and likes +variety. If, then, similarity of action is rather hindered than +promoted by memory, why introduce it into such cases as the repetition +of the embryonic processes by successive generations? The embryos +of a well-fixed breed, such as the goose, are almost as much alike as +water is to water, and by consequence one goose comes to be almost as +like another as water to water. Why should it not be supposed +to become so upon the same grounds - namely, that it is made of the +same stuffs, and put together in like proportions in the same manner?</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER XI</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>On Cycles.</p> +<p>The one faith on which all normal living beings consciously or unconsciously +act, is that like antecedents will be followed by like consequents. +This is the one true and catholic faith, undemonstrable, but except +a living being believe which, without doubt it shall perish everlastingly. +In the assurance of this all action is taken.</p> +<p>But if this fundamental article is admitted, and it cannot be gainsaid, +it follows that if ever a complete cycle were formed, so that the whole +universe of one instant were to repeat itself absolutely in a subsequent +one, no matter after what interval of time, then the course of the events +between these two moments would go on repeating itself for ever and +ever afterwards in due order, down to the minutest detail, in an endless +series of cycles like a circulating decimal. For the universe +comprises everything; there could therefore be no disturbance from without. +Once a cycle, always a cycle.</p> +<p>Let us suppose the earth, of given weight, moving with given momentum +in a given path, and under given conditions in every respect, to find +itself at any one time conditioned in all these respects as it was conditioned +at some past moment; then it must move exactly in the same path as the +one it took when at the beginning of the cycle it has just completed, +and must therefore in the course of time fulfil a second cycle, and +therefore a third, and so on for ever and ever, with no more chance +of escape than a circulating decimal has, if the circumstances have +been reproduced with perfect accuracy.</p> +<p>We see something very like this actually happen in the yearly revolutions +of the planets round the sun. But the relations between, we will +say, the earth and the sun are not reproduced absolutely. These +relations deal only with a small part of the universe, and even in this +small part the relation of the parts <i>inter se</i> has never yet been +reproduced with the perfection of accuracy necessary for our argument. +They are liable, moreover, to disturbance from events which may or may +not actually occur (as, for example, our being struck by a comet, or +the sun’s coming within a certain distance of another sun), but +of which, if they do occur, no one can foresee the effects. Nevertheless +the conditions have been so nearly repeated that there is no appreciable +difference in the relations between the earth and sun on one New Year’s +Day and on another, nor is there reason for expecting such change within +any reasonable time.</p> +<p>If there is to be an eternal series of cycles involving the whole +universe, it is plain that not one single atom must be excluded. +Exclude a single molecule of hydrogen from the ring, or vary the relative +positions of two molecules only, and the charm is broken; an element +of disturbance has been introduced, of which the utmost that can be +said is that it may not prevent the ensuing of a long series of very +nearly perfect cycles before similarity in recurrence is destroyed, +but which must inevitably prevent absolute identity of repetition. +The movement of the series becomes no longer a cycle, but spiral, and +convergent or divergent at a greater or less rate according to circumstances. +We cannot conceive of all the atoms in the universe standing twice over +in absolutely the same relation each one of them to every other. +There are too many of them and they are too much mixed; but, as has +been just said, in the planets and their satellites we do see large +groups of atoms whose movements recur with some approach to precision. +The same holds good also with certain comets and with the sun himself. +The result is that our days and nights and seasons follow one another +with nearly perfect regularity from year to year, and have done so for +as long time as we know anything for certain. A vast preponderance +of all the action that takes place around us is cycular action.</p> +<p>Within the great cycle of the planetary revolution of our own earth, +and as a consequence thereof, we have the minor cycle of the phenomena +of the seasons; these generate atmospheric cycles. Water is evaporated +from the ocean and conveyed to mountain ranges, where it is cooled, +and whence it returns again to the sea. This cycle of events is +being repeated again and again with little appreciable variation. +The tides and winds in certain latitudes go round and round the world +with what amounts to continuous regularity. - There are storms of wind +and rain called cyclones. In the case of these, the cycle is not +very complete, the movement, therefore, is spiral, and the tendency +to recur is comparatively soon lost. It is a common saying that +history repeats itself, so that anarchy will lead to despotism and despotism +to anarchy; every nation can point to instances of men’s minds +having gone round and round so nearly in a perfect cycle that many revolutions +have occurred before the cessation of a tendency to recur. Lastly, +in the generation of plants and animals we have, perhaps, the most striking +and common example of the inevitable tendency of all action to repeat +itself when it has once proximately done so. Let only one living +being have once succeeded in producing a being like itself, and thus +have returned, so to speak, upon itself, and a series of generations +must follow of necessity, unless some matter interfere which had no +part in the original combination, and, as it may happen, kill the first +reproductive creature or all its descendants within a few generations. +If no such mishap occurs as this, and if the recurrence of the conditions +is sufficiently perfect, a series of generations follows with as much +certainty as a series of seasons follows upon the cycle of the relations +between the earth and sun. Let the first periodically recurring +substance - we will say A - be able to recur or reproduce itself, not +once only, but many times over, as A1, A2, &c.; let A also have +consciousness and a sense of self-interest, which qualities must, <i>ex +hypothesi</i>, be reproduced in each one of its offspring; let these +get placed in circumstances which differ sufficiently to destroy the +cycle in theory without doing so practically - that is to say, to reduce +the rotation to a spiral, but to a spiral with so little deviation from +perfect cycularity as for each revolution to appear practically a cycle, +though after many revolutions the deviation becomes perceptible; then +some such differentiations of animal and vegetable life as we actually +see follow as matters of course. A1 and A2 have a sense of self-interest +as A had, but they are not precisely in circumstances similar to A’s, +nor, it may be, to each other’s; they will therefore act somewhat +differently, and every living being is modified by a change of action. +Having become modified, they follow the spirit of A’s action more +essentially in begetting a creature like themselves than in begetting +one like A; for the essence of A’s act was not the reproduction +of A, but the reproduction of a creature like the one from which it +sprung - that is to say, a creature bearing traces in its body of the +main influences that have worked upon its parent.</p> +<p>Within the cycle of reproduction there are cycles upon cycles in +the life of each individual, whether animal or plant. Observe +the action of our lungs and heart, how regular it is, and how a cycle +having been once established, it is repeated many millions of times +in an individual of average health and longevity. Remember also +that it is this periodicity - this inevitable tendency of all atoms +in combination to repeat any combination which they have once repeated, +unless forcibly prevented from doing so - which alone renders nine-tenths +of our mechanical inventions of practical use to us. There is +no internal periodicity about a hammer or a saw, but there is in the +steam-engine or watermill when once set in motion. The actions +of these machines recur in a regular series, at regular intervals, with +the unerringness of circulating decimals.</p> +<p>When we bear in mind, then, the omnipresence of this tendency in +the world around us, the absolute freedom from exception which attends +its action, the manner in which it holds equally good upon the vastest +and the smallest scale, and the completeness of its accord with our +ideas of what must inevitably happen when a like combination is placed +in circumstances like those in which it was placed before - when we +bear in mind all this, is it possible not to connect the facts together, +and to refer cycles of living generations to the same unalterableness +in the action of like matter under like circumstances which makes Jupiter +and Saturn revolve round the sun, or the piston of a steam-engine move +up and down as long as the steam acts upon it?</p> +<p>But who will attribute memory to the hands of a clock, to a piston-rod, +to air or water in a storm or in course of evaporation, to the earth +and planets in their circuits round the sun, or to the atoms of the +universe, if they too be moving in a cycle vaster than we can take account +of? <a name="citation160"></a><a href="#footnote160">{160}</a> +And if not, why introduce it into the embryonic development of living +beings, when there is not a particle of evidence in support of its actual +presence, when regularity of action can be ensured just as well without +it as with it, and when at the best it is considered as existing under +circumstances which it baffles us to conceive, inasmuch as it is supposed +to be exercised without any conscious recollection? Surely a memory +which is exercised without any consciousness of recollecting is only +a periphrasis for the absence of any memory at all.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER XII</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Refutation - Memory at once a promoter and a disturber of uniformity +of action and structure.</p> +<p>To meet the objections in the two foregoing chapters, I need do little +more than show that the fact of certain often inherited diseases and +developments, whether of youth or old age, being obviously not due to +a memory on the part of offspring of like diseases and developments +in the parents, does not militate against supposing that embryonic and +youthful development generally is due to memory.</p> +<p>This is the main part of the objection; the rest resolves itself +into an assertion that there is no evidence in support of instinct and +embryonic development being due to memory, and a contention that the +necessity of each particular moment in each particular case is sufficient +to account for the facts without the introduction of memory.</p> +<p>I will deal with these two last points briefly first. As regards +the evidence in support of the theory that instinct and growth are due +to a rapid unconscious memory of past experiences and developments in +the persons of the ancestors of the living form in which they appear, +I must refer my readers to “Life and Habit,” and to the +translation of Professor Hering’s lecture given in this volume. +I will only repeat here that a chrysalis, we will say, is as much one +and the same person with the chrysalis of its preceding generation, +as this last is one and the same person with the egg or caterpillar +from which it sprang. You cannot deny personal identity between +two successive generations without sooner or later denying it during +the successive stages in the single life of what we call one individual; +nor can you admit personal identity through the stages of a long and +varied life (embryonic and postnatal) without admitting it to endure +through an endless series of generations.</p> +<p>The personal identity of successive generations being admitted, the +possibility of the second of two generations remembering what happened +to it in the first is obvious. The <i>à priori</i> objection, +therefore, is removed, and the question becomes one of fact - does the +offspring act as if it remembered?</p> +<p>The answer to this question is not only that it does so act, but +that it is not possible to account for either its development or its +early instinctive actions upon any other hypothesis than that of its +remembering, and remembering exceedingly well.</p> +<p>The only alternative is to declare with Von Hartmann that a living +being may display a vast and varied information concerning all manner +of details, and be able to perform most intricate operations, independently +of experience and practice. Once admit knowledge independent of +experience, and farewell to sober sense and reason from that moment.</p> +<p>Firstly, then, we show that offspring has had every facility for +remembering; secondly, that it shows every appearance of having remembered; +thirdly, that no other hypothesis except memory can be brought forward, +so as to account for the phenomena of instinct and heredity generally, +which is not easily reducible to an absurdity. Beyond this we +do not care to go, and must allow those to differ from us who require +further evidence.</p> +<p>As regards the argument that the necessity of each moment will account +for likeness of result, without there being any need for introducing +memory, I admit that likeness of consequents is due to likeness of antecedents, +and I grant this will hold as good with embryos as with oxygen and hydrogen +gas; what will cover the one will cover the other, for time writs of +the laws common to all matter run within the womb as freely as elsewhere; +but admitting that there are combinations into which living beings enter +with a faculty called memory which has its effect upon their conduct, +and admitting that such combinations are from time to time repeated +(as we observe in the case of a practised performer playing a piece +of music which he has committed to memory), then I maintain that though, +indeed, the likeness of one performance to its immediate predecessor +is due to likeness of the combinations immediately preceding the two +performances, yet memory plays so important a part in both these combinations +as to make it a distinguishing feature in them, and therefore proper +to be insisted upon. We do not, for example, say that Herr Joachim +played such and such a sonata without the music, because he was such +and such an arrangement of matter in such and such circumstances, resembling +those under which he played without music on some past occasion. +This goes without saying; we say only that he played the music by heart +or by memory, as he had often played it before.</p> +<p>To the objector that a caterpillar becomes a chrysalis not because +it remembers and takes the action taken by its fathers and mothers in +due course before it, but because when matter is in such a physical +and mental state as to be called caterpillar, it must perforce assume +presently such another physical and mental state as to be called chrysalis, +and that therefore there is no memory in the case - to this objector +I rejoin that the offspring caterpillar would not have become so like +the parent as to make the next or chrysalis stage a matter of necessity, +unless both parent and offspring had been influenced by something that +we usually call memory. For it is this very possession of a common +memory which has guided the offspring into the path taken by, and hence +to a virtually same condition with, the parent, and which guided the +parent in its turn to a state virtually identical with a corresponding +state in the existence of its own parent. To memory, therefore, +the most prominent place in the transaction is assigned rightly.</p> +<p>To deny that will guided by memory has anything to do with the development +of embryos seems like denying that a desire to obstruct has anything +to do with the recent conduct of certain members in the House of Commons. +What should we think of one who said that the action of these gentlemen +had nothing to do with a desire to embarrass the Government, but was +simply the necessary outcome of the chemical and mechanical forces at +work, which being such and such, the action which we see is inevitable, +and has therefore nothing to do with wilful obstruction? We should +answer that there was doubtless a great deal of chemical and mechanical +action in the matter; perhaps, for aught we knew or cared, it was all +chemical and mechanical; but if so, then a desire to obstruct parliamentary +business is involved in certain kinds of chemical and mechanical action, +and that the kinds involving this had preceded the recent proceedings +of the members in question. If asked to prove this, we can get +no further than that such action as has been taken has never yet been +seen except as following after and in consequence of a desire to obstruct; +that this is our nomenclature, and that we can no more be expected to +change it than to change our mother tongue at the bidding of a foreigner.</p> +<p>A little reflection will convince the reader that he will be unable +to deny will and memory to the embryo without at the same time denying +their existence everywhere, and maintaining that they have no place +in the acquisition of a habit, nor indeed in any human action. +He will feel that the actions, and the relation of one action to another +which he observes in embryos is such as is never seen except in association +with and as a consequence of will and memory. He will therefore +say that it is due to will and memory. To say that these are the +necessary outcome of certain antecedents is not to destroy them: granted +that they are - a man does not cease to be a man when we reflect that +he has had a father and mother, nor do will and memory cease to be will +and memory on the ground that they cannot come causeless. They +are manifest minute by minute to the perception of all sane people, +and this tribunal, though not infallible, is nevertheless our ultimate +court of appeal - the final arbitrator in all disputed cases.</p> +<p>We must remember that there is no action, however original or peculiar, +which is not in respect of far the greater number of its details founded +upon memory. If a desperate man blows his brains out - an action +which he can do once in a lifetime only, and which none of his ancestors +can have done before leaving offspring - still nine hundred and ninety-nine +thousandths of the movements necessary to achieve his end consist of +habitual movements - movements, that is to say, which were once difficult, +but which have been practised and practised by the help of memory until +they are now performed automatically. We can no more have an action +than a creative effort of the imagination cut off from memory. +Ideas and actions seem almost to resemble matter and force in respect +of the impossibility of originating or destroying them; nearly all that +are, are memories of other ideas and actions, transmitted but not created, +disappearing but not perishing.</p> +<p>It appears, then, that when in Chapter X. we supposed the clerk who +wanted his dinner to forget on a second day the action he had taken +the day before, we still, without perhaps perceiving it, supposed him +to be guided by memory in all the details of his action, such as his +taking down his hat and going out into the street. We could not, +indeed, deprive him of all memory without absolutely paralysing his +action.</p> +<p>Nevertheless new ideas, new faiths, and new actions do in the course +of time come about, the living expressions of which we may see in the +new forms of life which from time to time have arisen and are still +arising, and in the increase of our own knowledge and mechanical inventions. +But it is only a very little new that is added at a time, and that little +is generally due to the desire to attain an end which cannot be attained +by any of the means for which there exists a perceived precedent in +the memory. When this is the case, either the memory is further +ransacked for any forgotten shreds of details, a combination of which +may serve the desired purpose; or action is taken in the dark, which +sometimes succeeds and becomes a fertile source of further combinations; +or we are brought to a dead stop. All action is random in respect +of any of the minute actions which compose it that are not done in consequence +of memory, real or supposed. So that random, or action taken in +the dark, or illusion, lies at the very root of progress.</p> +<p>I will now consider the objection that the phenomena of instinct +and embryonic development ought not to be ascribed to memory, inasmuch +as certain other phenomena of heredity, such as gout, cannot be ascribed +to it.</p> +<p>Those who object in this way forget that our actions fall into two +main classes: those which we have often repeated before by means of +a regular series of subordinate actions beginning and ending at a certain +tolerably well-defined point - as when Herr Joachim plays a sonata in +public, or when we dress or undress ourselves; and actions the details +of which are indeed guided by memory, but which in their general scope +and purpose are new - as when we are being married or presented at court.</p> +<p>At each point in any action of the first of the two kinds above referred +to there is a memory (conscious or unconscious according to the less +or greater number of times the action has been repeated), not only of +the steps in the present and previous performances which have led up +to the particular point that may be selected, but also of the particular +point itself; there is, therefore, at each point in a habitual performance +a memory at once of like antecedents and of a like present.</p> +<p>If the memory, whether of the antecedent or the present, were absolutely +perfect; if the vibration (according to Professor Hering) on each repetition +existed in its full original strength and without having been interfered +with by any other vibration; and if, again, the new wave running into +it from exterior objects on each repetition of the action were absolutely +identical in character with the wave that ran in upon the last occasion, +then there would be no change in the action and no modification or improvement +could take place. For though indeed the latest performance would +always have one memory more than the latest but one to guide it, yet +the memories being identical, it would not matter how many or how few +they were.</p> +<p>On any repetition, however, the circumstances, external or internal, +or both, never are absolutely identical: there is some slight variation +in each individual case, and some part of this variation is remembered, +with approbation or disapprobation as the case may be.</p> +<p>The fact, therefore, that on each repetition of the action there +is one memory more than on the last but one, and that this memory is +slightly different from its predecessor, is seen to be an inherent and, +<i>ex hypothesi</i>, necessarily disturbing factor in all habitual action +- and the life of an organism should be regarded as the habitual action +of a single individual, namely, of the organism itself, and of its ancestors. +This is the key to accumulation of improvement, whether in the arts +which we assiduously practise during our single life, or in the structures +and instincts of successive generations. The memory does not complete +a true circle, but is, as it were, a spiral slightly divergent therefrom. +It is no longer a perfectly circulating decimal. Where, on the +other hand, there is no memory of a like present, where, in fact, the +memory is not, so to speak, spiral, there is no accumulation of improvement. +The effect of any variation is not transmitted, and is not thus pregnant +of still further change.</p> +<p>As regards the second of the two classes of actions above referred +to - those, namely, which are not recurrent or habitual, <i>and at no +point of which is there a memory of a past present like the one which +is present now</i> - there will have been no accumulation of strong +and well-knit memory as regards the action as a whole, but action, if +taken at all, will be taken upon disjointed fragments of individual +actions (our own and those of other people) pieced together with a result +more or less satisfactory according to circumstances.</p> +<p>But it does not follow that the action of two people who have had +tolerably similar antecedents and are placed in tolerably similar circumstances +should be more unlike each other in this second case than in the first. +On the contrary, nothing is more common than to observe the same kind +of people making the same kind of mistake when placed for the first +time in the same kind of new circumstances. I did not say that +there would be no sameness of action without memory of a like present. +There may be sameness of action proceeding from a memory, conscious +or unconscious, of like antecedents, and <i>a presence only of like +presents without recollection of the same.</i></p> +<p>The sameness of action of like persons placed under like circumstances +for the first time, resembles the sameness of action of inorganic matter +under the same combinations. Let us for the moment suppose what +we call non-living substances to be capable of remembering their antecedents, +and that the changes they undergo are the expressions of their recollections. +Then I admit, of course, that there is not memory in any cream, we will +say, that is about to be churned of the cream of the preceding week, +but the common absence of such memory from each week’s cream is +an element of sameness between the two. And though no cream can +remember having been churned before, yet all cream in all time has had +nearly identical antecedents, and has therefore nearly the same memories, +and nearly the same proclivities. Thus, in fact, the cream of +one week is as truly the same as the cream of another week from the +same cow, pasture, &c., as anything is ever the same with anything; +for the having been subjected to like antecedents engenders the closest +similarity that we can conceive of, if the substances were like to start +with.</p> +<p>The manifest absence of any connecting memory (or memory of like +presents) from certain of the phenomena of heredity, such as, for example, +the diseases of old age, is now seen to be no valid reason for saying +that such other and far more numerous and important phenomena as those +of embryonic development are not phenomena of memory. Growth and +the diseases of old age do indeed, at first sight, appear to stand on +the same footing, but reflection shows us that the question whether +a certain result is due to memory or no must be settled not by showing +that combinations into which memory does not certainly enter may yet +generate like results, and therefore considering the memory theory disposed +of, but by the evidence we may be able to adduce in support of the fact +that the second agent has actually remembered the conduct of the first, +inasmuch as he cannot be supposed able to do what it is plain he can +do, except under the guidance of memory or experience, and can also +be shown to have had every opportunity of remembering. When either +of these tests fails, similarity of action on the part of two agents +need not be connected with memory of a like present as well as of like +antecedents, but must, or at any rate may, be referred to memory of +like antecedents only.</p> +<p>Returning to a parenthesis a few pages back, in which I said that +consciousness of memory would be less or greater according to the greater +or fewer number of times that the act had been repeated, it may be observed +as a corollary to this, that the less consciousness of memory the greater +the uniformity of action, and <i>vice versa</i>. For the less +consciousness involves the memory’s being more perfect, through +a larger number (generally) of repetitions of the act that is remembered; +there is therefore a less proportionate difference in respect of the +number of recollections of this particular act between the most recent +actor and the most recent but one. This is why very old civilisations, +as those of many insects, and the greater number of now living organisms, +appear to the eye not to change at all.</p> +<p>For example, if an action has been performed only ten times, we will +say by A, B, C, &c., who are similar in all respects, except that +A acts without recollection, B with recollection of A’s action, +C with recollection of both B’s and A’s, while J remembers +the course taken by A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I - the possession of +a memory by B will indeed so change his action, as compared with A’s, +that it may well be hardly recognisable. We saw this in our example +of the clerk who asked the policeman the way to the eating-house on +one day, but did not ask him the next, because he remembered; but C’s +action will not be so different from B’s as B’s from A’s, +for though C will act with a memory of two occasions on which the action +has been performed, while B recollects only the original performance +by A, yet B and C both act with the guidance of a memory and experience +of some kind, while A acted without any. Thus the clerk referred +to in Chapter X. will act on the third day much as he acted on the second +- that is to say, he will see the policeman at the corner of the street, +but will not question him.</p> +<p>When the action is repeated by J for the tenth time, the difference +between J’s repetition of it and I’s will be due solely +to the difference between a recollection of nine past performances by +J against only eight by I, and this is so much proportionately less +than the difference between a recollection of two performances and of +only one, that a less modification of action should be expected. +At the same time consciousness concerning an action repeated for the +tenth time should be less acute than on the first repetition. +Memory, therefore, though tending to disturb similarity of action less +and less continually, must always cause some disturbance. At the +same time the possession of a memory on the successive repetitions of +an action after the first, and, perhaps, the first two or three, during +which the recollection may be supposed still imperfect, will tend to +ensure uniformity, for it will be one of the elements of sameness in +the agents - they both acting by the light of experience and memory.</p> +<p>During the embryonic stages and in childhood we are almost entirely +under the guidance of a practised and powerful memory of circumstances +which have been often repeated, not only in detail and piecemeal, but +as a whole, and under many slightly varying conditions; thus the performance +has become well averaged and matured in its arrangements, so as to meet +all ordinary emergencies. We therefore act with great unconsciousness +and vary our performances little. Babies are much more alike than +persons of middle age.</p> +<p>Up to the average age at which our ancestors have had children during +many generations, we are still guided in great measure by memory; but +the variations in external circumstances begin to make themselves perceptible +in our characters. In middle life we live more and more continually +upon the piecing together of details of memory drawn from our personal +experience, that is to say, upon the memory of our own antecedents; +and this resembles the kind of memory we hypothetically attached to +cream a little time ago. It is not surprising, then, that a son +who has inherited his father’s tastes and constitution, and who +lives much as his father had done, should make the same mistakes as +his father did when he reaches his father’s age - we will say +of seventy - though he cannot possibly remember his father’s having +made the mistakes. It were to be wished we could, for then we +might know better how to avoid gout, cancer, or what not. And +it is to be noticed that the developments of old age are generally things +we should be glad enough to avoid if we knew how to do so.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<h2>CHAPTER XIII</h2> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Conclusion.</p> +<p>If we observed the resemblance between successive generations to +be as close as that between distilled water and distilled water through +all time, and if we observed that perfect unchangeableness in the action +of living beings which we see in what we call chemical and mechanical +combinations, we might indeed suspect that memory had as little place +among the causes of their action as it can have in anything, and that +each repetition, whether of a habit or the practice of art, or of an +embryonic process in successive generations, was an original performance, +for all that memory had to do with it. I submit, however, that +in the case of the reproductive forms of life we see just so much variety, +in spite of uniformity, as is consistent with a repetition involving +not only a nearly perfect similarity in the agents and their circumstances, +but also the little departure therefrom that is inevitably involved +in the supposition that a memory of like presents as well as of like +antecedents (as distinguished from a memory of like antecedents only) +has played a part in their development - a cyclonic memory, if the expression +may be pardoned.</p> +<p>There is life infinitely lower and more minute than any which our +most powerful microscopes reveal to us, but let us leave this upon one +side and begin with the amœba. Let us suppose that this +structureless morsel of protoplasm is, for all its structurelessness, +composed of an infinite number of living molecules, each one of them +with hopes and fears of its own, and all dwelling together like Tekke +Turcomans, of whom we read that they live for plunder only, and that +each man of them is entirely independent, acknowledging no constituted +authority, but that some among them exercise a tacit and undefined influence +over the others. Let us suppose these molecules capable of memory, +both in their capacity as individuals, and as societies, and able to +transmit their memories to their descendants, from the traditions of +the dimmest past to the experiences of their own lifetime. Some +of these societies will remain simple, as having had no history, but +to the greater number unfamiliar, and therefore striking, incidents +will from time to time occur, which, when they do not disturb memory +so greatly as to kill, will leave their impression upon it. The +body or society will remember these incidents, and be modified by them +in its conduct, and therefore more or less in its internal arrangements, +which will tend inevitably to specialisation. This memory of the +most striking events of varied lifetimes I maintain, with Professor +Hering, to be the differentiating cause, which, accumulated in countless +generations, has led up from the amœba to man. If there +had been no such memory, the amœba of one generation would have +exactly resembled time amœba of the preceding, and a perfect cycle +would have been established; the modifying effects of an additional +memory in each generation have made the cycle into a spiral, and into +a spiral whose eccentricity, in the outset hardly perceptible, is becoming +greater and greater with increasing longevity and more complex social +and mechanical inventions.</p> +<p>We say that the chicken grows the horny tip to its beak with which +it ultimately pecks its way out of its shell, because it remembers having +grown it before, and the use it made of it. We say that it made +it on the same principles as a man makes a spade or a hammer, that is +to say, as the joint result both of desire and experience. When +I say experience, I mean experience not only of what will be wanted, +but also of the details of all the means that must be taken in order +to effect this. Memory, therefore, is supposed to guide the chicken +not only in respect of the main design, but in respect also of every +atomic action, so to speak, which goes to make up the execution of this +design. It is not only the suggestion of a plan which is due to +memory, but, as Professor Hering has so well said, it is the binding +power of memory which alone renders any consolidation or coherence of +action possible, inasmuch as without this no action could have parts +subordinate one to another, yet bearing upon a common end; no part of +an action, great or small, could have reference to any other part, much +less to a combination of all the parts; nothing, in fact, but ultimate +atoms of actions could ever happen - these bearing the same relation +to such an action, we will say, as a railway journey from London to +Edinburgh as a single molecule of hydrogen to a gallon of water. +If asked how it is that the chicken shows no sign of consciousness concerning +this design, nor yet of the steps it is taking to carry it out, we reply +that such unconsciousness is usual in all cases where an action, and +the design which prompts it, have been repeated exceedingly often. +If, again, we are asked how we account for the regularity with which +each step is taken in its due order, we answer that this too is characteristic +of actions that are done habitually - they being very rarely misplaced +in respect of any part.</p> +<p>When I wrote “Life and Habit,” I had arrived at the conclusion +that memory was the most essential characteristic of life, and went +so far as to say, “Life is that property of matter whereby it +can remember - matter which can remember is living.” I should +perhaps have written, “Life is the being possessed of a memory +- the life of a thing at any moment is the memories which at that moment +it retains”; and I would modify the words that immediately follow, +namely, “Matter which cannot remember is dead”; for they +imply that there is such a thing as matter which cannot remember anything +at all, and this on fuller consideration I do not believe to be the +case; I can conceive of no matter which is not able to remember a little, +and which is not living in respect of what it can remember. I +do not see how action of any kind is conceivable without the supposition +that every atom retains a memory of certain antecedents. I cannot, +however, at this point, enter upon the reasons which have compelled +me to this conclusion. Whether these would be deemed sufficient +or no, at any rate we cannot believe that a system of self-reproducing +associations should develop from the simplicity of the amœba to +the complexity of the human body without the presence of that memory +which can alone account at once for the resemblances and the differences +between successive generations, for the arising and the accumulation +of divergences - for the tendency to differ and the tendency not to +differ.</p> +<p>At parting, therefore, I would recommend the reader to see every +atom in the universe as living and able to feel and to remember, but +in a humble way. He must have life eternal, as well as matter +eternal; and the life and the matter must be joined together inseparably +as body and soul to one another. Thus he will see God everywhere, +not as those who repeat phrases conventionally, but as people who would +have their words taken according to their most natural and legitimate +meaning; and he will feel that the main difference between him and many +of those who oppose him lies in the fact that whereas both he and they +use the same language, his opponents only half mean what they say, while +he means it entirely.</p> +<p>The attempt to get a higher form of a life from a lower one is in +accordance with our observation and experience. It is therefore +proper to be believed. The attempt to get it from that which has +absolutely no life is like trying to get something out of nothing. +The millionth part of a farthing put out to interest at ten per cent, +will in five hundred years become over a million pounds, and so long +as we have any millionth of a millionth of the farthing to start with, +our getting as many million pounds as we have a fancy for is only a +question of time, but without the initial millionth of a millionth of +a millionth part, we shall get no increment whatever. A little +leaven will leaven the whole lump, but there must be <i>some</i> leaven.</p> +<p>I will here quote two passages from an article already quoted from +on page 55 of this book. They run:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“We are growing conscious that our earnest and most determined +efforts to make motion produce sensation and volition have proved a +failure, and now we want to rest a little in the opposite, much less +laborious conjecture, and allow any kind of motion to start into existence, +or at least to receive its specific direction from psychical sources; +sensation and volition being for the purpose quietly insinuated into +the constitution of the ultimately moving particles.” <a name="citation177a"></a><a href="#footnote177a">{177a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>And:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“In this light it can remain no longer surprising that we actually +find motility and sensibility so intimately interblended in nature.” +<a name="citation177b"></a><a href="#footnote177b">{177b}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>We should endeavour to see the so-called inorganic as living, in +respect of the qualities it has in common with the organic, rather than +the organic as non-living in respect of the qualities it has in common +with the inorganic. True, it would be hard to place one’s +self on the same moral platform as a stone, but this is not necessary; +it is enough that we should feel the stone to have a moral platform +of its own, though that platform embraces little more than a profound +respect for the laws of gravitation, chemical affinity, &c. +As for the difficulty of conceiving a body as living that has not got +a reproductive system - we should remember that neuter insects are living +but are believed to have no reproductive system. Again, we should +bear in mind that mere assimilation involves all the essentials of reproduction, +and that both air and water possess this power in a very high degree. +The essence of a reproductive system, then, is found low down in the +scheme of nature.</p> +<p>At present our leading men of science are in this difficulty; on +the one hand their experiments and their theories alike teach them that +spontaneous generation ought not to be accepted; on the other, they +must have an origin for the life of the living forms, which, by their +own theory, have been evolved, and they can at present get this origin +in no other way than by the <i>Deus ex machinâ</i> method, which +they reject as unproved, or a spontaneous generation of living from +non-living matter, which is no less foreign to their experience. +As a general rule, they prefer the latter alternative. So Professor +Tyndall, in his celebrated article (<i>Nineteenth Century</i>, November +1878), wrote:-</p> +<p>“It is generally conceded (and seems to be a necessary inference +from the lessons of science) that <i>spontaneous generation must at +one time have taken place</i>” (italics mine).</p> +<p>No inference can well be more unnecessary or unscientific. +I suppose spontaneous generation ceases to be objectionable if it was +“only a very little one,” and came off a long time ago in +a foreign country. The proper inference is, that there is a low +kind of livingness in every atom of matter. Life eternal is as +inevitable a conclusion as matter eternal.</p> +<p>It should not be doubted that wherever there is vibration or motion +there is life and memory, and that there is vibration and motion at +all times in all things.</p> +<p>The reader who takes the above position will find that he can explain +the entry of what he calls death among what he calls the living, whereas +he could by no means introduce life into his system if he started without +it. Death is deducible; life is not deducible. Death is +a change of memories; it is not the destruction of all memory. +It is as the liquidation of one company, each member of which will presently +join a new one, and retain a trifle even of the old cancelled memory, +by way of greater aptitude for working in concert with other molecules. +This is why animals feed on grass and on each other, and cannot proselytise +or convert the rude ground before it has been tutored in the first principles +of the higher kinds of association.</p> +<p>Again, I would recommend the reader to beware of believing anything +in this book unless he either likes it, or feels angry at being told +it. If required belief in this or that makes a man angry, I suppose +he should, as a general rule, swallow it whole then and there upon the +spot, otherwise he may take it or leave it as he likes. I have +not gone far for my facts, nor yet far from them; all on which I rest +are as open to the reader as to me. If I have sometimes used hard +terms, the probability is that I have not understood them, but have +done so by a slip, as one who has caught a bad habit from the company +he has been lately keeping. They should be skipped.</p> +<p>Do not let him be too much cast down by the bad language with which +professional scientists obscure the issue, nor by their seeming to make +it their business to fog us under the pretext of removing our difficulties. +It is not the ratcatcher’s interest to catch all the rats; and, +as Handel observed so sensibly, “Every professional gentleman +must do his best for to live.” The art of some of our philosophers, +however, is sufficiently transparent, and consists too often in saying +“organism which must be classified among fishes,” instead +of “fish,” <a name="citation179a"></a><a href="#footnote179a">{179a}</a> +and then proclaiming that they have “an ineradicable tendency +to try to make things clear.” <a name="citation179b"></a><a href="#footnote179b">{179b}</a></p> +<p>If another example is required, here is the following from an article +than which I have seen few with which I more completely agree, or which +have given me greater pleasure. If our men of science would take +to writing in this way, we should be glad enough to follow them. +The passage I refer to runs thus:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Professor Huxley speaks of a ‘verbal fog by which the +question at issue may be hidden’; is there no verbal fog in the +statement that <i>the ætiology of crayfishes resolves itself into +a gradual evolution in the course of the mesosoic and subsequent epochs +of the world’s history of these animals from a primitive astacomorphous +form</i>? Would it be fog or light that would envelop the history +of man if we said that the existence of man was explained by the hypothesis +of his gradual evolution from a primitive anthropomorphous form? +I should call this fog, not light.” <a name="citation180"></a><a href="#footnote180">{180}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>Especially let him mistrust those who are holding forth about protoplasm, +and maintaining that this is the only living substance. Protoplasm +may be, and perhaps is, the <i>most</i> living part of an organism, +as the most capable of retaining vibrations, but this is the utmost +that can be claimed for it.</p> +<p>Having mentioned protoplasm, I may ask the reader to note the breakdown +of that school of philosophy which divided the <i>ego</i> from the <i>non +ego</i>. The protoplasmists, on the one hand, are whittling away +at the <i>ego</i>, till they have reduced it to a little jelly in certain +parts of the body, and they will whittle away this too presently, if +they go on as they are doing now.</p> +<p>Others, again, are so unifying the <i>ego</i> and the <i>non ego</i>, +that with them there will soon be as little of the <i>non ego</i> left +as there is of the <i>ego</i> with their opponents. Both, however, +are so far agreed as that we know not where to draw the line between +the two, and this renders nugatory any system which is founded upon +a distinction between them.</p> +<p>The truth is, that all classification whatever, when we examine its +<i>raison d’être</i> closely, is found to be arbitrary - +to depend on our sense of our own convenience, and not on any inherent +distinction in the nature of the things themselves. Strictly speaking, +there is only one thing and one action. The universe, or God, +and the action of the universe as a whole.</p> +<p>Lastly, I may predict with some certainty that before long we shall +find the original Darwinism of Dr. Erasmus Darwin (with an infusion +of Professor Hering into the bargain) generally accepted instead of +the neo-Darwinism of to-day, and that the variations whose accumulation +results in species will be recognised as due to the wants and endeavours +of the living forms in which they appear, instead of being ascribed +to chance, or, in other words, to unknown causes, as by Mr. Charles +Darwin’s system. We shall have some idyllic young naturalist +bringing up Dr. Erasmus Darwin’s note on <i>Trapa natans</i>, +<a name="citation181a"></a><a href="#footnote181a">{181a}</a> and Lamarck’s +kindred passage on the descent of <i>Ranunculus hederaceus</i> from +<i>Ranunculus aquatilis</i> <a name="citation181b"></a><a href="#footnote181b">{181b}</a> +as fresh discoveries, and be told, with much happy simplicity, that +those animals and plants which have felt the need of such or such a +structure have developed it, while those which have not wanted it have +gone without it. Thus, it will be declared, every leaf we see +around us, every structure of the minutest insect, will bear witness +to the truth of the “great guess” of the greatest of naturalists +concerning the memory of living matter.</p> +<p>I dare say the public will not object to this, and am very sure that +none of the admirers of Mr. Charles Darwin or Mr. Wallace will protest +against it; but it may be as well to point out that this was not the +view of the matter taken by Mr. Wallace in 1858 when he and Mr. Darwin +first came forward as preachers of natural selection. At that +time Mr. Wallace saw clearly enough the difference between the theory +of “natural selection” and that of Lamarck. He wrote:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“The hypothesis of Lamarck - that progressive changes in species +have been produced by the attempts of animals to increase the development +of their own organs, and thus modify their structure and habits - has +been repeatedly and easily refuted by all writers on the subject of +varieties and species, . . . but the view here developed tenders such +an hypothesis quite unnecessary. . . . The powerful retractile +talons of the falcon and the cat tribes have not been produced or increased +by the volition of those animals, neither did the giraffe acquire its +long neck by desiring to reach the foliage of the more lofty shrubs, +and constantly stretching its neck for this purpose, but because any +varieties which occurred among its antitypes with a longer neck than +usual <i>at once secured a fresh range of pasture over the same ground +as their shorter-necked companions, and on the first scarcity of food +were thereby enabled to outlive them</i>” (italics in original). +<a name="citation182a"></a><a href="#footnote182a">{182a}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>This is absolutely the neo-Darwinian doctrine, and a denial of the +mainly fortuitous character of the variations in animal and vegetable +forms cuts at its root. That Mr. Wallace, after years of reflection, +still adhered to this view, is proved by his heading a reprint of the +paragraph just quoted from <a name="citation182b"></a><a href="#footnote182b">{182b}</a> +with the words “Lamarck’s hypothesis very different from +that now advanced”; nor do any of his more recent works show that +he has modified his opinion. It should be noted that Mr. Wallace +does not call his work “Contributions to the Theory of Evolution,” +but to that of “Natural Selection.”</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin, with characteristic caution, only commits himself to +saying that Mr. Wallace has arrived at <i>almost</i> (italics mine) +the same general conclusions as he, Mr. Darwin, has done; <a name="citation182c"></a><a href="#footnote182c">{182c}</a> +but he still, as in 1859, declares that it would be “a serious +error to suppose that the greater number of instincts have been acquired +by habit in one generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to succeeding +generations,” <a name="citation183a"></a><a href="#footnote183a">{183a}</a> +and he still comprehensively condemns the “well-known doctrine +of inherited habit, as advanced by Lamarck.” <a name="citation183b"></a><a href="#footnote183b">{183b}</a></p> +<p>As for the statement in the passage quoted from Mr. Wallace, to the +effect that Lamarck’s hypothesis “has been repeatedly and +easily refuted by all writers on the subject of varieties and species,” +it is a very surprising one. I have searched Evolution literature +in vain for any refutation of the Erasmus Darwinian system (for this +is what Lamarck’s hypothesis really is) which need make the defenders +of that system at all uneasy. The best attempt at an answer to +Erasmus Darwin that has yet been made is “Paley’s Natural +Theology,” which was throughout obviously written to meet Buffon +and the “Zoonomia.” It is the manner of theologians +to say that such and such an objection “has been refuted over +and over again,” without at the same time telling us when and +where; it is to be regretted that Mr. Wallace has here taken a leaf +out of the theologians’ book. His statement is one which +will not pass muster with those whom public opinion is sure in the end +to follow.</p> +<p>Did Mr. Herbert Spencer, for example, “repeatedly and easily +refute” Lamarck’s hypothesis in his brilliant article in +the <i>Leader</i>, March 20, 1852? On the contrary, that article +is expressly directed against those “who cavalierly reject the +hypothesis of Lamarck and his followers.” This article was +written six years before the words last quoted from Mr. Wallace; how +absolutely, however, does the word “cavalierly” apply to +them!</p> +<p>Does Isidore Geoffroy, again, bear Mr. Wallace’s assertion +out better? In 1859 - that is to say, but a short time after Mr. +Wallace had written - he wrote as follows:-</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Such was the language which Lamarck heard during his protracted +old age, saddened alike by the weight of years and blindness; this was +what people did not hesitate to utter over his grave yet barely closed, +and what indeed they are still saying - commonly too without any knowledge +of what Lamarck maintained, but merely repeating at secondhand bad caricatures +of his teaching.</p> +<p>“When will the time come when we may see Lamarck’s theory +discussed - and, I may as well at once say, refuted in some important +points <a name="citation184a"></a><a href="#footnote184a">{184a}</a> +- with at any rate the respect due to one of the most illustrious masters +of our science? And when will this theory, the hardihood of which +has been greatly exaggerated, become freed from the interpretations +and commentaries by the false light of which so many naturalists have +formed their opinion concerning it? If its author is to be condemned, +let it be, at any rate, not before he has been heard.” <a name="citation184b"></a><a href="#footnote184b">{184b}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>In 1873 M. Martin published his edition of Lamarck’s “Philosophie +Zoologique.” He was still able to say, with, I believe, +perfect truth, that Lamarck’s theory has “never yet had +the honour of being discussed seriously.” <a name="citation184c"></a><a href="#footnote184c">{184c}</a></p> +<p>Professor Huxley in his article on Evolution is no less cavalier +than Mr. Wallace. He writes:- <a name="citation184d"></a><a href="#footnote184d">{184d}</a></p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“Lamarck introduced the conception of the action of an animal +on itself as a factor in producing modification.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>[Lamarck did nothing of the kind. It was Buffon and Dr. Darwin +who introduced this, but more especially Dr. Darwin.]</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>“But <i>a little consideration showed</i>” (italics mine) +“that though Lamarck had seized what, as far as it goes, is a +true cause of modification, it is a cause the actual effects of which +are wholly inadequate to account for any considerable modification in +animals, and which can have no influence whatever in the vegetable world, +&c.”</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines1"><br /></div> +<p>I should be very glad to come across some of the “little consideration” +which will show this. I have searched for it far and wide, and +have never been able to find it.</p> +<p>I think Professor Huxley has been exercising some of his ineradicable +tendency to try to make things clear in the article on Evolution, already +so often quoted from. We find him (p. 750) pooh-poohing Lamarck, +yet on the next page he says, “How far ‘natural selection’ +suffices for the production of species remains to be seen.” +And this when “natural selection” was already so nearly +of age! Why, to those who know how to read between a philosopher’s +lines, the sentence comes to very nearly the same as a declaration that +the writer has no great opinion of “natural selection.” +Professor Huxley continues, “Few can doubt that, if not the whole +cause, it is a very important factor in that operation.” +A philosopher’s words should be weighed carefully, and when Professor +Huxley says “few can doubt,” we must remember that he may +be including himself among the few whom he considers to have the power +of doubting on this matter. He does not say “few will,” +but “few can” doubt, as though it were only the enlightened +who would have the power of doing so. Certainly “nature,” +- for this is what “natural selection” comes to, - is rather +an important factor in the operation, but we do not gain much by being +told so. If, however, Professor Huxley neither believes in the +origin of species, through sense of need on the part of animals themselves, +nor yet in “natural selection,” we should be glad to know +what he does believe in.</p> +<p>The battle is one of greater importance than appears at first sight. +It is a battle between teleology and non-teleology, between the purposiveness +and the non-purposiveness of the organs in animal and vegetable bodies. +According to Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck, and Paley, organs are purposive; +according to Mr. Darwin and his followers, they are not purposive. +But the main arguments against the system of Dr. Erasmus Darwin are +arguments which, so far as they have any weight, tell against evolution +generally. Now that these have been disposed of, and the prejudice +against evolution has been overcome, it will be seen that there is nothing +to be said against the system of Dr. Darwin and Lamarck which does not +tell with far greater force against that of Mr. Charles Darwin and Mr. +Wallace.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines2"><br /><br /></div> +<p>Footnotes:</p> +<p><a name="footnote0a"></a><a href="#citation0a">{0a}</a> This +is the date on the title-page. The preface is dated October 15, +1886, and the first copy was issued in November of the same year. +All the dates are taken from the Bibliography by Mr. H. Festing Jones +prefixed to the “Extracts” in the <i>New Quarterly Review</i> +(1909).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0b"></a><a href="#citation0b">{0b}</a> I.e. +after p. 285: it bears no number of its own!</p> +<p><a name="footnote0c"></a><a href="#citation0c">{0c}</a> The +distinction was merely implicit in his published writings, but has been +printed since his death from his “Notebooks,” <i>New +Quarterly Review</i>, April, 1908. I had developed this thesis, +without knowing of Butler’s explicit anticipation in an article +then in the press: “Mechanism and Life,” <i>Contemporary +Review</i>, May, 1908.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0d"></a><a href="#citation0d">{0d}</a> The +term has recently been revived by Prof. Hubrecht and by myself (<i>Contemporary +Review</i>, November 1908).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0e"></a><a href="#citation0e">{0e}</a> See +<i>Fortnightly Review</i>, February 1908, and <i>Contemporary Review</i>, +September and November 1909. Since these publications the hypnosis +seems to have somewhat weakened.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0f"></a><a href="#citation0f">{0f}</a> A “hormone” +is a chemical substance which, formed in one part of the body, alters +the reactions of another part, normally for the good of the organism.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0g"></a><a href="#citation0g">{0g}</a> Mr. +H. Festing Jones first directed my attention to these passages and their +bearing on the Mutation Theory.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0i"></a><a href="#citation0i">{0i}</a> He +says in a note, “This general type of reaction was described and +illustrated in a different connection by Pfluger in ‘Pfluger’s +Archiv. f.d. ges. Physiologie,’ Bd. XV.” +The essay bears the significant title “Die teleologische Mechanik +der lebendigen Natur,” and is a very remarkable one, as coming +from an official physiologist in 1877, when the chemico-physical school +was nearly at its zenith.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0j"></a><a href="#citation0j">{0j}</a> “Contributions +to the Study of the Lower Animals” (1904), “Modifiability +in Behaviour” and “Method of Regulability in Behaviour and +in other Fields,” in <i>Journ. Experimental Zoology</i>, vol. +ii. (1905).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0h"></a><a href="#citation0h">{0h}</a> See +“The Hereditary Transmission of Acquired Characters” in +<i>Contemporary Review</i>, September and November 1908, in which references +are given to earlier statements.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0k"></a><a href="#citation0k">{0k}</a> Semon’s +technical terms are exclusively taken from the Greek, but as experience +tells that plain men in England have a special dread of suchlike, I +have substituted “imprint” for “engram,” “outcome” +for “ecphoria”; for the latter term I had thought of “efference,” +“manifestation,” etc., but decided on what looked more homely, +and at the same time was quite distinctive enough to avoid that confusion +which Semon has dodged with his Græcisms.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0l"></a><a href="#citation0l">{0l}</a> “Between +the ‘me’ of to-day and the ‘me’ of yesterday +lie night and sleep, abysses of unconsciousness; nor is there any bridge +but memory with which to span them.” - <i>Unconscious Memory</i>, +p. 71.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0m"></a><a href="#citation0m">{0m}</a> Preface +by Mr. Charles Darwin to “Erasmus Darwin.” The Museum +has copies of a <i>Kosmos</i> that was published 1857-60 and then discontinued; +but this is clearly not the <i>Kosmos</i> referred to by Mr. Darwin, +which began to appear in 1878.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0n"></a><a href="#citation0n">{0n}</a> Preface +to “Erasmus Darwin.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote2"></a><a href="#citation2">{2}</a> May 1880.</p> +<p><a name="footnote3"></a><a href="#citation3">{3}</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, +February 1879, Leipsic.</p> +<p><a name="footnote4"></a><a href="#citation4">{4}</a> Origin +of Species, ed. i., p. 459.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8a"></a><a href="#citation8a">{8a}</a> Origin +of Species, ed. i., p. 1.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8b"></a><a href="#citation8b">{8b}</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, +February 1879, p. 397.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8c"></a><a href="#citation8c">{8c}</a> Erasmus +Darwin, by Ernest Krause, pp. 132, 133.</p> +<p><a name="footnote9a"></a><a href="#citation9a">{9a}</a> Origin +of Species, ed. i., p. 242.</p> +<p><a name="footnote9b"></a><a href="#citation9b">{9b}</a> Ibid., +p. 427.</p> +<p><a name="footnote10a"></a><a href="#citation10a">{10a}</a> +<i>Nineteenth Century</i>, November 1878; Evolution, Old and New, pp. +360. 361.</p> +<p><a name="footnote10b"></a><a href="#citation10b">{10b}</a> +Encyclopædia Britannica, ed. ix., art. “Evolution,” +p. 748.</p> +<p><a name="footnote11"></a><a href="#citation11">{11}</a> Ibid.</p> +<p><a name="footnote17"></a><a href="#citation17">{17}</a> Encycl. +Brit., ed. ix., art. “Evolution,” p. 750.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23a"></a><a href="#citation23a">{23a}</a> +Origin of Species, 6th ed., 1876, p. 206.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23b"></a><a href="#citation23b">{23b}</a> +Ibid., p. 233.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24a"></a><a href="#citation24a">{24a}</a> +Origin of Species, 6th ed., p. 171, 1876.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24b"></a><a href="#citation24b">{24b}</a> +Pp. 258-260.</p> +<p><a name="footnote26"></a><a href="#citation26">{26}</a> Zoonomia, +vol. i. p. 484; Evolution, Old and New, p. 214.</p> +<p><a name="footnote27"></a><a href="#citation27">{27}</a> “Erasmus +Darwin,” by Ernest Krause, p. 211, London, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote28a"></a><a href="#citation28a">{28a}</a> +See “Evolution, Old and New,” p. 91, and Buffon, tom. iv. +p. 383, ed. 1753.</p> +<p><a name="footnote28b"></a><a href="#citation28b">{28b}</a> +Evolution, Old and New, p. 104.</p> +<p><a name="footnote29a"></a><a href="#citation29a">{29a}</a> +Encycl. Brit., 9th ed., art. “Evolution,” p. 748.</p> +<p><a name="footnote29b"></a><a href="#citation29b">{29b}</a> +Palingénésie Philosophique, part x. chap. ii. (quoted +from Professor Huxley’s article on “Evolution,” Encycl. +Brit., 9th ed., p. 745).</p> +<p><a name="footnote31"></a><a href="#citation31">{31}</a> The +note began thus: “I have taken the date of the first publication +of Lamarck from Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s (Hist. Nat. Générale +tom. ii. p. 405, 1859) excellent history of opinion upon this subject. +In this work a full account is given of Buffon’s fluctuating conclusions +upon the same subject.” - <i>Origin of Species</i>, 3d ed., 1861, +p. xiv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33a"></a><a href="#citation33a">{33a}</a> +Life of Erasmus Darwin, pp. 84, 85.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33b"></a><a href="#citation33b">{33b}</a> +See Life and Habit, p. 264 and pp. 276, 277.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33c"></a><a href="#citation33c">{33c}</a> +See Evolution, Old and New, pp. 159-165.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33d"></a><a href="#citation33d">{33d}</a> +Ibid., p. 122.</p> +<p><a name="footnote34"></a><a href="#citation34">{34}</a> See +Evolution, Old and New, pp. 247, 248.</p> +<p><a name="footnote35a"></a><a href="#citation35a">{35a}</a> +Vestiges of Creation, ed. 1860, “Proofs, Illustrations, &c.,” +p. lxiv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote35b"></a><a href="#citation35b">{35b}</a> +The first announcement was in the <i>Examiner</i>, February 22, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote36"></a><a href="#citation36">{36}</a> <i>Saturday +Review</i>, May 31, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37a"></a><a href="#citation37a">{37a}</a> +May 26, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37b"></a><a href="#citation37b">{37b}</a> +May 31, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37c"></a><a href="#citation37c">{37c}</a> +July 26, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37d"></a><a href="#citation37d">{37d}</a> +July 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37e"></a><a href="#citation37e">{37e}</a> +July 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37f"></a><a href="#citation37f">{37f}</a> +July 29, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37g"></a><a href="#citation37g">{37g}</a> +January 1880.</p> +<p><a name="footnote39"></a><a href="#citation39">{39}</a> How +far <i>Kosmos</i> was “a well-known” journal, I cannot determine. +It had just entered upon its second year.</p> +<p><a name="footnote41"></a><a href="#citation41">{41}</a> Evolution, +Old and New, p. 120, line 5.</p> +<p><a name="footnote43"></a><a href="#citation43">{43}</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, +February 1879, p. 397.</p> +<p><a name="footnote44a"></a><a href="#citation44a">{44a}</a> +<i>Kosmos</i>, February 1879, p. 404.</p> +<p><a name="footnote44b"></a><a href="#citation44b">{44b}</a> +Page 39 of this volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote50"></a><a href="#citation50">{50}</a> See +Appendix A.</p> +<p><a name="footnote52"></a><a href="#citation52">{52}</a> Since +published as “God the Known and God the Unknown.” +Fifield, 1s. 6d. net. 1909.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54a"></a><a href="#citation54a">{54a}</a> +“Contemplation of Nature,” Engl. trans., Lond. 1776. +Preface, p. xxxvi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54b"></a><a href="#citation54b">{54b}</a> +<i>Ibid</i>., p. xxxviii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote55"></a><a href="#citation55">{55}</a> Life +and Habit, p. 97.</p> +<p><a name="footnote56"></a><a href="#citation56">{56}</a> “The +Unity of the Organic Individual,” by Edward Montgomery, <i>Mind</i>, +October 1880, p. 466.</p> +<p><a name="footnote58"></a><a href="#citation58">{58}</a> Life +and Habit, p. 237.</p> +<p><a name="footnote59a"></a><a href="#citation59a">{59a}</a> +Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. Lardner’s +Cab. Cyclo., vol. xcix. p. 24.</p> +<p><a name="footnote59b"></a><a href="#citation59b">{59b}</a> +Young’s Lectures on Natural Philosophy, ii. 627. See also +Phil. Trans., 1801-2.</p> +<p><a name="footnote63"></a><a href="#citation63">{63}</a> The +lecture is published by Karl Gerold’s Sohn, Vienna.</p> +<p><a name="footnote69"></a><a href="#citation69">{69}</a> See +quotation from Bonnet, p. 54 of this volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote70"></a><a href="#citation70">{70}</a> Professor +Hering is not clear here. Vibrations (if I understand his theory +rightly) should not be set up by faint <i>stimuli</i> from within. +Whence and what are these <i>stimuli</i>? The vibrations within +are already existing, and it is they which are the <i>stimuli</i> to +action. On having been once set up, they either continue in sufficient +force to maintain action, or they die down, and become too weak to cause +further action, and perhaps even to be perceived within the mind, until +they receive an accession of vibration from without. The only +“stimulus from within” that should be able to generate action +is that which may follow when a vibration already established in the +body runs into another similar vibration already so established. +On this consciousness, and even action, might be supposed to follow +without the presence of an external stimulus.</p> +<p><a name="footnote71"></a><a href="#citation71">{71}</a> This +expression seems hardly applicable to the overtaking of an internal +by an external vibration, but it is not inconsistent with it. +Here, however, as frequently elsewhere, I doubt how far Professor Hering +has fully realised his conception, beyond being, like myself, convinced +that the phenomena of memory and of heredity have a common source.</p> +<p><a name="footnote72"></a><a href="#citation72">{72}</a> See +quotation from Bonnet, p. 54 of this volume. By “preserving +the memory of habitual actions” Professor Hering probably means, +retains for a long while and repeats motion of a certain character when +such motion has been once communicated to it.</p> +<p><a name="footnote74a"></a><a href="#citation74a">{74a}</a> +It should not be “if the central nerve system were not able to +reproduce whole series of vibrations,” but “if whole series +of vibrations do not persist though unperceived,” if Professor +Hering intends what I suppose him to intend.</p> +<p><a name="footnote74b"></a><a href="#citation74b">{74b}</a> +Memory was in full operation for so long a time before anything like +what we call a nervous system can be detected, that Professor Hering +must not be supposed to be intending to confine memory to a motor nerve +system. His words do not even imply that he does, but it is as +well to be on one’s guard.</p> +<p><a name="footnote77"></a><a href="#citation77">{77}</a> It +is from such passages as this, and those that follow on the next few +pages, that I collect the impression of Professor Hering’s meaning +which I have endeavoured to convey in the preceding chapter.</p> +<p><a name="footnote78"></a><a href="#citation78">{78}</a> That +is to say, “an infinitely small change in the kind of vibration +communicated from the parent to the germ.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote79"></a><a href="#citation79">{79}</a> It +may be asked what is meant by responding. I may repeat that I +understand Professor Hering to mean that there exists in the offspring +certain vibrations, which are many of them too faint to upset equilibrium +and thus generate action, until they receive an accession of force from +without by the running into them of vibrations of similar characteristics +to their own, which last vibrations have been set up by exterior objects. +On this they become strong enough to generate that corporeal earthquake +which we call action.</p> +<p>This may be true or not, but it is at any rate intelligible; whereas +much that is written about “fraying channels” raises no +definite ideas in the mind.</p> +<p><a name="footnote80a"></a><a href="#citation80a">{80a}</a> +I interpret this, “We cannot wonder if often-repeated vibrations +gather strength, and become at once more lasting and requiring less +accession of vibration from without, in order to become strong enough +to generate action.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote80b"></a><a href="#citation80b">{80b}</a> +“Characteristics” must, I imagine, according to Professor +Hering, resolve themselves ultimately into “vibrations,” +for the characteristics depend upon the character of the vibrations.</p> +<p><a name="footnote81"></a><a href="#citation81">{81}</a> Professor +Hartog tells me that this probably refers to Fritz Müller’s +formulation of the “recapitulation process” in “Facts +for Darwin,” English edition (1869), p. 114. - R.A.S.</p> +<p><a name="footnote82"></a><a href="#citation82">{82}</a> This +is the passage which makes me suppose Professor Hering to mean that +vibrations from exterior objects run into vibrations already existing +within the living body, and that the accession to power thus derived +is his key to an explanation of the physical basis of action.</p> +<p><a name="footnote84"></a><a href="#citation84">{84}</a> I interpret +this: “There are fewer vibrations persistent within the bodies +of the lower animals; those that there are, therefore, are stronger +and more capable of generating action or upsetting the <i>status in +quo</i>. Hence also they require less accession of vibration from +without. Man is agitated by more and more varied vibrations; these, +interfering, as to some extent they must, with one another, are weaker, +and therefore require more accession from without before they can set +the mechanical adjustments of the body in motion.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote89"></a><a href="#citation89">{89}</a> I am +obliged to Mr. Sully for this excellent translation of “Hellsehen.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote90a"></a><a href="#citation90a">{90a}</a> +<i>Westminster Review</i>, New Series, vol. xlix. p. 143.</p> +<p><a name="footnote90b"></a><a href="#citation90b">{90b}</a> +Ibid., p. 145.</p> +<p><a name="footnote90c"></a><a href="#citation90c">{90c}</a> +Ibid., p. 151.</p> +<p><a name="footnote92a"></a><a href="#citation92a">{92a}</a> +“Instinct ist zweckmässiges Handeln ohne Bewusstsein des +Zwecks.”<i> - Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., Berlin, +1871, p. 70.</p> +<p><a name="footnote92b"></a><a href="#citation92b">{92b}</a> +“1. Eine blosse Folge der körperlichen Organisation.</p> +<p>“2. Ein von der Natur eingerichteter Gehirn-oder Geistesmechanismus.</p> +<p>“3. Eine Folge unbewusster Geistesthiitigkeit.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 70.</p> +<p><a name="footnote97"></a><a href="#citation97">{97}</a> “Hiermit +ist der Annahme das Urtheil gesprochen, welche die unbewusste Vorstellung +des Zwecks in jedem einzelnen Falle vorwiegt; denn wollte man nun noch +die Vorstellung des Geistesmechanismus festhalten so müsste für +jede Variation und Modification des Instincts, nach den äusseren +Umständen, eine besondere constante Vorrichtung . . . eingefügt +sein.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i> 3d ed., p. 74.</p> +<p><a name="footnote99"></a><a href="#citation99">{99}</a> “Indessen +glaube ich, dass die angeführten Beispiele zur Genüge beweisen, +dass es auch viele Fälle giebt, wo ohne jede Complication mit der +bewussten Ueberlegung die gewöhnliche und aussergewöhnliche +Handlung aus derselben Quelle stammen, dass sie entweder beide wirklicher +Instinct, oder beide Resultate bewusster Ueberlegung sind.”<i> +- Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote100"></a><a href="#citation100">{100}</a> +“Dagegen haben wir nunmehr unseren Blick noch einmal schärfer +auf den Begriff eines psychischen Mechanismus zu richten, und da zeigt +sich, dass derselbe, abgesehen davon, wie viel er erklärt, so dunke +list, dass man sich kaum etwas dabei denken kann.” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote101"></a><a href="#citation101">{101}</a> +“Das Endglied tritt als bewusster Wille zu irgend einer Handlung +auf; beide sind aber ganz ungleichartig und haben mit der gewöhnlichen +Motivation nichts zu thun, welche ausschliesslich darin besteht, dass +die Vorstellung einer Lust oder einer Unlust das Begehren erzeugr, erstere +zu erlangen, letztere sich fern zu halten.”<i> - Ibid</i>., p. +76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote102a"></a><a href="#citation102a">{102a}</a> +“Diese causale Verbindung fällt erfahrungsmässig, wie +wir von unsern menschlichen Instincten wissen, nicht in’s Bewussisein; +folglich kann dieselbe, wenn sie ein Mechanismus sein soll, nur entweder +ein nicht in’s Bewusstsein fallende mechanische Leitung und Umwandlung +der Schwingungen des vorgestellten Motivs in die Schwingungen der gewollten +Handlung im Gehirn, oder ein unbewusster geistiger Mechanismus sein.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i> 3d ed., p. 77.</p> +<p><a name="footnote102b"></a><a href="#citation102b">{102b}</a> +“Man hat sich also zwischen dem bewussten Motiv, und dem Willen +zur Insticthandlung eine causale Verbindung durch unbewusstes Vorstellen +und Wollen zu denken, und ich weiss nicht, wie diese Verbindung einfacher +gedacht werden könnte, als durch den vorgestellten und gewollten +Zweck. Damit sind wir aber bei dem allen Geistern eigenthümlichen +und immanenten Mechanismus der Logik angelangt, und haben die unbewusster +Zweckvorstellung bei jeder einzelnen Instincthandlung als unentbehrliches +Glied gefunden; hiermit hat also der Begrift des todten, äusserlich +prädestinirten Geistesmechanismus sich selbst aufgehoben und in +das immanente Geistesleben der Logik umgewandelt, und wir sind bei der +letzten Möglichkeit angekommen, welche für die Auffassung +eines wirklichen Instincts übrig bleibt: der Instinct ist bewusstes +Wollen des Mittels zu einem unbewusst gewollten Zweck.” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 78.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105a"></a><a href="#citation105a">{105a}</a> +“Also der Instinct ohne Hülfsmechanismus die Ursache der +Entstehung des Hülfsmechanismus ist.” - <i>Philosophy of +the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105b"></a><a href="#citation105b">{105b}</a> +“Dass auch der fertige Hülfsmechanismus das Unbewusste nicht +etwa zu dieser bestimmten Instincthandlung necessirt, sondern blosse +prädisponirt.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d +ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105c"></a><a href="#citation105c">{105c}</a> +“Giebt es einen wirklichen Instinct, oder sind die sogenannten +Instincthandlungen nur Resultate bewusster Ueberlegung?” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote111"></a><a href="#citation111">{111}</a> +“Dieser Beweis ist dadurch zu führen; erstens dass die betreffenden +Thatsachen in; der Zukunft liegen, und dem Verstande die Anhaltepunkte +fehlen, um ihr zukünftiges Eintreten aus den gegenwärtigen +Verhältnissen zu erschliessen; zweitens, dass die betreffenden +Thatsachen augenscheinlich der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung verschlossen liegen, +weil nur die Erfahrung früherer Fälle über sie belehren +kann, und diese laut der Beobachtung ausgeschlossen ist. Es würde +für unsere Interessen keinen Unterschied machen, wenn, was ich +wahrscheinlich halte, bei fortschreitender physiologischer Erkenntniss +alle jetzt für den ersten Fall anzuführenden Beispiele sich +als solche des zweiten Falls ausweisen sollten, wie dies unleugbar bei +vielen früher gebrauchten Beispielen schon geschehen ist; denn +ein apriorisches Wissen ohne jeden sinnlichen Anstoss ist wohl kaum +wunderbarer zu nennen, als ein Wissen, welches zwar <i>bei Gelegenheit</i> +gewisser sinnlicher Wahrnehmung zu Tage tritt, aber mit diesen nur durch +eine solche Kette von Schlüssen und angewandten Kenntnissen in +Verbindung stehend gedacht werden könnte, dass deren Möglichkeit +bei dem Zustande der Fähigkeiten und Bildung der betreffenden Thiere +entschieden geleugnet werden muss.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, +3d ed., p. 85.</p> +<p><a name="footnote113"></a><a href="#citation113">{113}</a> +“Man hat dieselbe jederzeit anerkannt und mit den Worten Vorgefühl +oder Ahnung bezeichnet; indess beziehen sich diese Wörte einerseits +nur auf zukünftiges, nicht auf gegenwärtiges, räumlich +getrenntes Unwahmehrnbares, anderseits bezeichnen sie nur die leise, +dumpfe, unbestimmte Resonanz des Bewusstseins mit dem unfehlbar bestimmten +Zustande der unbewussten Erkenntniss. Daher das Wort Vorgefühl +in Rücksicht auf die Dumpfheit und Unbestimmtheit, während +doch leicht zu sehen ist, dass das von allen, auch den unbewussten Vorstellungen +entblösste Gefühl für das Resultat gar keinen Einfluss +haben kann, sondern nur eine Vorstellung, weil diese allein Erkenntniss +enthält. Die in Bewusstsein mitklingende Ahnung kann allerdings +unter Umständen ziemlich deutlich sein, so dass sie sich beim Menschen +in Gedanken und Wort fixiren lässt; doch ist dies auch im Menschen +erfahrungsmässig bei den eigenthümlichen Instincten nicht +der Fall, vielmehr ist bei diesen die Resonanz der unbewussten Erkenntniss +im Bewusstsein meistens so schwach, dass sie sich wirklich nur in begleitenden +Gefühlen oder der Stimmung äussert, dass sie einen unendlich +kleinen Bruchtheil des Gemeingefühls bildet.” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 86.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115a"></a><a href="#citation115a">{115a}</a> +“In der Bestimmung des Willens durch einen im Unbewussten liegenden +Process . . . für welchen sich dieser Character der zweifellosen +Selbstgewissheit in allen folgenden Untersuchungen bewähren wird.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, p. 87.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115b"></a><a href="#citation115b">{115b}</a> +“Sondern als unmittelbarer Besitz vorgefunden wird.” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, p. 87.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115c"></a><a href="#citation115c">{115c}</a> +“Hellsehen.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote119a"></a><a href="#citation119a">{119a}</a> +“Das Hellsehon des Unbewussten hat sie den rechten Weg ahnen lassen.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious, p</i>. 90, 3d ed., 1871.</p> +<p><a name="footnote119b"></a><a href="#citation119b">{119b}</a> +“Man wird doch wahrlich nicht den Thieren zumuthen wollen, durch +meteorologische Schlüsse das Wetter auf Monate im Voraus zu berechnen, +ja sogar Ueberschwemmungen vorauszusehen. Vielmehr ist eine solche +Gefühlswahrnehmung gegenwärtiger atmosphärischer Einflüsse +nichts weiter als die sinnliche Wahrnehmung, welche als Motiv wirkt, +und ein Motiv muss ja doch immer vorhanden sein, wenn ein Instinct functioniren +soll. Es bleibt also trotzdem bestehen dass das Voraussehen der +Witterung ein unbewusstes Hellsehen ist, von dem der Storch, der vier +Wochen früher nach Süden aufbricht, so wenig etwas weiss, +als der Hirsch, der sich vor einem kalten Winter einen dickeren Pelz +als gewöhnlich wachsen lässt. Die Thiere haben eben +einerseits das gegenwärtige Witterungsgefühl im Bewusstsein, +daraus folgt andererseits ihr Handeln gerade so, als ob sie die Vorstellung +der zukünftigen Witterung hätten; im Bewusstsein haben sie +dieselbe aber nicht, also bietet sich als einzig natürliches Mittelglied +die unbewusste Vorstellung, die nun aber immer ein Hellsehen ist, weil +sie etwas enthält, was dem Thier weder dutch sinnliche Wahrnehmung +direct gegeben ist, noch durch seine Verstandesmittel aus der Wahrnehmung +geschlossen werden kann.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, +p. 91, 3d ed., 1871.</p> +<p><a name="footnote124"></a><a href="#citation124">{124}</a> +“Meistentheils tritt aber hier der höheren Bewusstseinstufe +der Menschen entsprechend eine stärkete Resonanz des Bewusstseins +mit dem bewussten Hellsehen hervor, die sich also mehr odor minder deutliche +Ahnung darstellt. Ausserdem entspricht es der grösseren Selbstständigkeit +des menschlichen Intellects, dass diese Ahnung nicht ausschliesslich +Behufs der unmittelbaren Ausführung einer Handlung eintritt, sondern +bisweilen auch unabängig von der Bedingung einer momentan zu leistenden +That als blosse Vorstellung ohne bewussten Willen sich zeigte, wenn +nur die Bedingung erfüllt ist, dass der Gegenstand dieses Ahnens +den Willen des Ahnenden im Allgemeinen in hohem Grade interessirt.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 94.</p> +<p><a name="footnote126"></a><a href="#citation126">{126}</a> +“Häufig sind die Ahnungen, in denen das Hellsehen des Unbewussten +sich dem Bewusstsein offenbart, dunkel, unverständlich und symbolisch, +weil sie im Gehirn sinnliche Form annehmen müssen, während +die unbewusste Vorstellung an der Form der Sinnlichkeit kein Theil haben +kann.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 96.</p> +<p><a name="footnote128"></a><a href="#citation128">{128}</a> +“Ebenso weil es diese Reihe nur in gesteigerter Bewusstseinresonanz +fortsetzt, stützt es jene Aussagen der Instincthandlungen üher +ihr eigenes Wesen ebenso sehr,” &c. - <i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 97.</p> +<p><a name="footnote129"></a><a href="#citation129">{129}</a> +“Wir werden trotzdem diese gomeinsame Wirkung eines Masseninstincts +in der Entstehung der Sprache und den grossen politischen und socialen +Bewegungen in der Woltgeschichte deutlich wieder erkennen; hier handelt +es sich um möglichst einfache und deutliche Beispiele, und darum +greifen wir zu niederen Thieren, wo die Mittel der Gedankenmittheilung +bei fehlender Stimme, Mimik und Physiognomie so unvollkommen sind, dass +die Uebereinstimmung und das Ineinandergreifen der einzelnen Leistungen +in den Hauptsachen unmöglich der bewussten Verständigung durch +Sprache zugeschrieben werden darf.” - <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, +3d ed., p. 98.</p> +<p><a name="footnote131a"></a><a href="#citation131a">{131a}</a> +“Und wie durch Instinct dot Plan des ganzen Stocks in unbewusstem +Hellsehen jeder einzelnen Biene einwohnt.” - <i>Philosophy of +the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 99.</p> +<p><a name="footnote131b"></a><a href="#citation131b">{131b}</a> +“Indem jedes Individuum den Plan des Ganzen und Sämmtliche +gegenwartig zu ergreifende Mittel im unbewussten Hellsehen hat, wovon +aber nut das Eine, was ihm zu thun obliegt, in sein Bewusstsein fällt.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 99.</p> +<p><a name="footnote132"></a><a href="#citation132">{132}</a> +“Der Instinct ist nicht Resultat bewusster Ueberlegung, nicht +Folge der körperlichen Organisation, nicht blosses Resultat eines +in der Organisation des Gehirns gelegenen Mechanismus, nicht Wirkung +eines dem Geiste von aussen angeklebten todten, seinem innersten Wesen +fremden Mechanismus, sondern selbsteigene Leistung des Individuum aus +seinem innersten Wesen und Character entspringend.” - <i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 100.</p> +<p><a name="footnote133"></a><a href="#citation133">{133}</a> +“Häufig ist die Kenntniss des Zwecks der bewussten Erkenntniss +durch sinnliche Wahrnehmung gar nicht zugänglich; dann documentirt +sich die Eigenthümlichkeit des Unbewussten im Hellsehen, von welchem +das Bewusstsein theils nar eine verschwindend dumpfe, theils auch namentlich +beim Menschen mehr oder minder deutliche Resonanz als Ahnung verspütt.” +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 100.</p> +<p><a name="footnote135"></a><a href="#citation135">{135}</a> +“Und eine so dämonische Gewalt sollte durch etwas ausgeübt +werden könnon, was als ein dem inneren Wesen fremder Mechanismus +dem Geiste aufgepfropft ist, oder gar durch eine bewusste Ueberlegung, +welche doch stets nur im kahlen Egoismus stecken bleibt,” &c. +- <i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 101.</p> +<p><a name="footnote139a"></a><a href="#citation139a">{139a}</a> +Page 100 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote139b"></a><a href="#citation139b">{139b}</a> +Pp. 106, 107 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote140"></a><a href="#citation140">{140}</a> +Page 100 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote141"></a><a href="#citation141">{141}</a> +Page 99 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote144a"></a><a href="#citation144a">{144a}</a> +See page 115 of this volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote144b"></a><a href="#citation144b">{144b}</a> +Page 104 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote146"></a><a href="#citation146">{146}</a> +The Spirit of Nature. J. A. Churchill & Co., 1880, p. 39.</p> +<p><a name="footnote149"></a><a href="#citation149">{149}</a> +I have put these words into the mouth of my supposed objector, and shall +put others like them, because they are characteristic; but nothing can +become so well known as to escape being an inference.</p> +<p><a name="footnote153"></a><a href="#citation153">{153}</a> +Erewhon, chap. xxiii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote160"></a><a href="#citation160">{160}</a> +It must be remembered that this passage is put as if in the mouth of +an objector.</p> +<p><a name="footnote177a"></a><a href="#citation177a">{177a}</a> +“The Unity of the Organic Individual,” by Edward Montgomery. +<i>Mind</i>, October 1880, p. 477.</p> +<p><a name="footnote177b"></a><a href="#citation177b">{177b}</a> +Ibid., p. 483.</p> +<p><a name="footnote179a"></a><a href="#citation179a">{179a}</a> +Professor Huxley, Encycl. Brit., 9th ed., art. Evolution, p. 750.</p> +<p><a name="footnote179b"></a><a href="#citation179b">{179b}</a> +“Hume,” by Professor Huxley, p. 45.</p> +<p><a name="footnote180"></a><a href="#citation180">{180}</a> +“The Philosophy of Crayfishes,” by the Right Rev. the Lord +Bishop of Carlisle. <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for October 1880, +p. 636.</p> +<p><a name="footnote181a"></a><a href="#citation181a">{181a}</a> +Les Amours des Plantes, p. 360. Paris, 1800.</p> +<p><a name="footnote181b"></a><a href="#citation181b">{181b}</a> +Philosophie Zoologique, tom. i. p. 231. Ed. M. Martin. Paris, +1873.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182a"></a><a href="#citation182a">{182a}</a> +Journal of the Proceedings of the Linnean Society. Williams & +Norgate, 1858, p. 61.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182b"></a><a href="#citation182b">{182b}</a> +Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, 2d ed., 1871, p. 41.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182c"></a><a href="#citation182c">{182c}</a> +Origin of Species, p. 1, ed. 1872.</p> +<p><a name="footnote183a"></a><a href="#citation183a">{183a}</a> +Origin of Species, 6th ed., p. 206. I ought in fairness to Mr. +Darwin to say that he does not hold the error to be quite as serious +as he once did. It is now “a serious error” only; +in 1859 it was “the most serious error.” - Origin of Species, +1st ed., p. 209.</p> +<p><a name="footnote183b"></a><a href="#citation183b">{183b}</a> +Origin of Species, 1st ed., p. 242; 6th ed., p. 233.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184a"></a><a href="#citation184a">{184a}</a> +I never could find what these particular points were.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184b"></a><a href="#citation184b">{184b}</a> +Isidore Geoffroy, Hist. Nat. Gen., tom. ii. p. 407, 1859.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184c"></a><a href="#citation184c">{184c}</a> +M. Martin’s edition of the “Philosophie Zoologique” +(Paris, 1873), Introduction, p. vi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184d"></a><a href="#citation184d">{184d}</a> +Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th ed., p. 750.</p> +<div class="GutenbergBlankLines3"><br /><br /><br /></div> +<p>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY ***</p> +<pre> + +******This file should be named umem10h.htm or umem10h.zip****** +Corrected EDITIONS of our EBooks get a new NUMBER, umem11h.htm +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, umem10ah.htm + +Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the US +unless a copyright notice is included. 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