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diff --git a/6605-h/6605-h.htm b/6605-h/6605-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7788b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/6605-h/6605-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,8677 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=US-ASCII" /> +<title>Unconscious Memory, by Samuel Butler</title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + P.gutsumm { margin-left: 5%;} + P.poetry {margin-left: 3%; } + .GutSmall { font-size: 0.7em; } + H1, H2 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + } + H3, H4, H5 { + text-align: center; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + table { border-collapse: collapse; } +table {margin-left:auto; margin-right:auto;} + td { vertical-align: top; border: 1px solid black;} + td p { margin: 0.2em; } + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-weight: normal; + color: gray; + } + img { border: none; } + img.dc { float: left; width: 50px; height: 50px; } + p.gutindent { margin-left: 2em; } + div.gapspace { height: 0.8em; } + div.gapline { height: 0.8em; width: 100%; border-top: 1px solid;} + div.gapmediumline { height: 0.3em; width: 40%; margin-left:30%; + border-top: 1px solid; } + div.gapmediumdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 40%; margin-left:30%; + border-top: 1px solid; border-bottom: 1px solid;} + div.gapshortdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 20%; + margin-left: 40%; border-top: 1px solid; + border-bottom: 1px solid; } + div.gapdoubleline { height: 0.3em; width: 50%; + margin-left: 25%; border-top: 1px solid; + border-bottom: 1px solid;} + div.gapshortline { height: 0.3em; width: 20%; margin-left:40%; + border-top: 1px solid; } + .citation {vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + img.floatleft { float: left; + margin-right: 1em; + margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + img.floatright { float: right; + margin-left: 1em; margin-top: 0.5em; + margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + img.clearcenter {display: block; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; margin-top: 0.5em; + margin-bottom: 0.5em} + --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> +</head> +<body> +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Unconscious Memory, by Samuel Butler + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most +other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of +the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have +to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. + + + + +Title: Unconscious Memory + + +Author: Samuel Butler + + + +Release Date: November 4, 2014 [eBook #6605] +[This file was first posted on December 30, 2002] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY*** +</pre> +<p>Transcribed from the 1910 A. C. Fifield edition by David +Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org</p> +<h1>Unconscious Memory</h1> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">By</span><br +/> +Samuel Butler</p> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">Author of +“Life and Habit,” “Erewhon,” “The +Way of All Flesh,” etc.</span></p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center">New Edition, entirely reset, with +an Introduction<br /> +by Marcus Hartog, <span class="GutSmall">M.A.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">D.SC.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">F.L.S.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">F.R.H.S.</span>, Pro-<br /> +fessor of Zoology in University College, Cork.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="smcap">Op</span>. +5</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center">London<br /> +A. C. Fifield, 13 Clifford’s Inn, E.C.<br /> +1910</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<blockquote><p>“As this paper contains nothing which +deserves the name either of experiment or discovery, and as it +is, in fact, destitute of every species of merit, we should have +allowed it to pass among the multitude of those articles which +must always find their way into the collections of a society +which is pledged to publish two or three volumes every year. . . +. We wish to raise our feeble voice against innovations, +that can have no other effect than to check the progress of +science, and renew all those wild phantoms of the imagination +which Bacon and Newton put to flight from her +temple.”—<i>Opening Paragraph of a Review of Dr. +Young’s Bakerian Lecture</i>. <i>Edinburgh +Review</i>, <i>January</i> 1803, p. 450.</p> +<p>“Young’s work was laid before the Royal society, +and was made the 1801 Bakerian Lecture. But he was before +his time. The second number of the <i>Edinburgh Review</i> +contained an article levelled against him by Henry (afterwards +Lord) Brougham, and this was so severe an attack that +Young’s ideas were absolutely quenched for fifteen +years. Brougham was then only twenty-four years of +age. Young’s theory was reproduced in France by +Fresnel. In our days it is the accepted theory, and is +found to explain all the phenomena of +light.”—<i>Times Report of a Lecture by Professor +Tyndall on Light</i>, <i>April</i> 27, 1880.</p> +</blockquote> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center">This Book</p> +<p style="text-align: center">Is inscribed to</p> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="smcap">Richard +Garnett</span>, <span class="smcap">Esq</span>.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">(Of the British Museum)</p> +<p style="text-align: center">In grateful acknowledgment of the +unwearying kindness<br /> +with which he has so often placed at my disposal<br /> +his varied store of information.</p> +<h2>Contents</h2> +<table> +<tr> +<td><p> </p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span +class="GutSmall">PAGE</span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Note</span>. By R. A. +Streatfeild</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#pageviii">viii</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Introduction</span>. By +Professor Marcus Hartog</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#pageix">ix</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Author’s Preface</span></p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#pagexxxvii">xxxvii</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> I. +Introduction—General ignorance on the subject of evolution +at the time the “Origin of Species” was published in +1859</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page1">1</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> II. How I came to +write “Life and Habit,” and the circumstances of its +completion</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page12">12</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> III. How I came +to write “Evolution, Old and New”—Mr +Darwin’s “brief but imperfect” sketch of the +opinions of the writers on evolution who had preceded +him—The reception which “Evolution, Old and +New,” met with</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page26">26</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> IV. The manner in +which Mr. Darwin met “Evolution, Old and New”</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page38">38</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> V. Introduction +to Professor Hering’s lecture</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page52">52</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> VI. Professor +Ewald Hering “On Memory”</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page63">63</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> VII. Introduction +to a translation of the chapter upon instinct in Von +Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious”</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page87">87</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> VIII. Translation +of the chapter on “The Unconscious in Instinct,” from +Von Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the +Unconscious”</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page92">92</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> IX. Remarks upon +Von Hartmann’s position in regard to instinct</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page137">137</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> X. Recapitulation +and statement of an objection</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page146">146</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> XI. On Cycles</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page156">156</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> XII. +Refutation—Memory at once a promoter and a disturber of +uniformity of action and structure</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page161">161</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td><p><span class="smcap">Chapter</span> XIII. +Conclusion</p> +</td> +<td><p style="text-align: right"><span class="indexpageno"><a +href="#page173">173</a></span></p> +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<h2><a name="pageviii"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +viii</span>Note</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">For</span> many years a link in the chain +of Samuel Butler’s biological works has been missing. +“Unconscious Memory” was originally published thirty +years ago, but for fully half that period it has been out of +print, owing to the destruction of a large number of the unbound +sheets in a fire at the premises of the printers some years +ago. The present reprint comes, I think, at a peculiarly +fortunate moment, since the attention of the general public has +of late been drawn to Butler’s biological theories in a +marked manner by several distinguished men of science, notably by +Dr. Francis Darwin, who, in his presidential address to the +British Association in 1908, quoted from the translation of +Hering’s address on “Memory as a Universal Function +of Original Matter,” which Butler incorporated into +“Unconscious Memory,” and spoke in the highest terms +of Butler himself. It is not necessary for me to do more +than refer to the changed attitude of scientific authorities with +regard to Butler and his theories, since Professor Marcus Hartog +has most kindly consented to contribute an introduction to the +present edition of “Unconscious Memory,” summarising +Butler’s views upon biology, and defining his position in +the world of science. A word must be said as to the +controversy between Butler and Darwin, with which Chapter IV is +concerned. I have been told that in reissuing the book at +all I am committing a grievous error of taste, that the world is +no longer interested in these “old, unhappy far-off things +and battles long ago,” and that Butler himself, by +refraining from republishing “Unconscious Memory,” +tacitly admitted that he wished the controversy to be consigned +to oblivion. This last suggestion, at any rate, has no +foundation in fact. Butler desired nothing less than that +his vindication of himself against what he considered unfair +treatment should be forgotten. He would have republished +“Unconscious Memory” himself, had not the latter +years of his life been devoted to all-engrossing work in other +fields. In issuing the present edition I am fulfilling a +wish that he expressed to me shortly before his death.</p> +<p style="text-align: right">R. A. <span +class="smcap">Streatfeild</span>.</p> +<p><i>April</i>, 1910.</p> +<h2><a name="pageix"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +ix</span>Introduction<br /> +By Marcus Hartog, <span class="GutSmall">M.A.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">D.Sc.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">F.L.S.</span>, <span +class="GutSmall">F.R.H.S.</span></h2> +<p><span class="smcap">In</span> reviewing Samuel Butler’s +works, “Unconscious Memory” gives us an invaluable +lead; for it tells us (Chaps. II, III) how the author came to +write the Book of the Machines in “Erewhon” (1872), +with its foreshadowing of the later theory, “Life and +Habit,” (1878), “Evolution, Old and New” +(1879), as well as “Unconscious Memory” (1880) +itself. His fourth book on biological theory was +“Luck? or Cunning?” (1887). <a +name="citation0a"></a><a href="#footnote0a" +class="citation">[0a]</a></p> +<p>Besides these books, his contributions to biology comprise +several essays: “Remarks on Romanes’ <i>Mental +Evolution in Animals</i>, contained in “Selections from +Previous Works” (1884) incorporated into “Luck? or +Cunning,” “The Deadlock in Darwinism” +(<i>Universal Review</i>, April-June, 1890), republished in the +posthumous volume of “Essays on Life, Art, and +Science” (1904), and, finally, some of the “Extracts +from the Notebooks of the late Samuel Butler,” edited by +Mr. H. Festing Jones, now in course of publication in the <i>New +Quarterly Review</i>.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>Of all these, “LIFE AND HABIT” (1878) is the most +important, the main building to which the other writings are +buttresses or, at most, annexes. Its teaching has been +summarised in “Unconscious Memory” in four main +principles: “(1) the oneness of personality between parent +and offspring; (2) memory on the part of the offspring of certain +actions which it did when in the persons of its forefathers; (3) +the latency of that memory until it is rekindled by a recurrence +of the associated ideas; (4) the unconsciousness with which +habitual actions come to be performed.” To these we +must add a fifth: the purposiveness of the actions of living +beings, as of the machines which they make or select.</p> +<p>Butler tells (“Life and Habit,” p. 33) that he +sometimes hoped “that this book would be regarded as a +valuable adjunct to Darwinism.” He was bitterly +disappointed in the event, for the book, as a whole, was received +by professional biologists as a gigantic joke—a joke, +moreover, not in the best possible taste. True, its central +ideas, largely those of Lamarck, had been presented by Hering in +1870 (as Butler found shortly after his publication); they had +been favourably received, developed by Haeckel, expounded and +praised by Ray Lankester. Coming from Butler, they met with +contumely, even from such men as Romanes, who, as Butler had no +difficulty in proving, were unconsciously inspired by the same +ideas—“<i>Nur mit ein bischen ander’n +Wörter</i>.”</p> +<p>It is easy, looking back, to see why “Life and +Habit” so missed its mark. Charles Darwin’s +presentation of the evolution theory had, for the first time, +rendered it possible for a “sound naturalist” to +accept the doctrine of common descent with divergence; and so +given a real meaning to the term “natural +relationship,” which had forced itself upon the older +naturalists, despite their belief in special and independent +creations. The immediate aim of the naturalists of the day +was now to fill up the gaps in their knowledge, so as to +strengthen the fabric of a unified biology. For this +purpose they found their actual scientific equipment so +inadequate that they were fully occupied in inventing fresh +technique, and working therewith at facts—save a few +critics, such as St. George Mivart, who was regarded as +negligible, since he evidently held a brief for a party standing +outside the scientific world.</p> +<p>Butler introduced himself as what we now call “The Man +in the Street,” far too bare of scientific clothing to +satisfy the Mrs. Grundy of the domain: lacking all recognised +tools of science and all sense of the difficulties in his way, he +proceeded to tackle the problems of science with little save the +deft pen of the literary expert in his hand. His very +failure to appreciate the difficulties gave greater power to his +work—much as Tartarin of Tarascon ascended the Jungfrau and +faced successfully all dangers of Alpine travel, so long as he +believed them to be the mere “blagues de +réclame” of the wily Swiss host. His brilliant +qualities of style and irony themselves told heavily against +him. Was he not already known for having written the most +trenchant satire that had appeared since “Gulliver’s +Travels”? Had he not sneered therein at the very +foundations of society, and followed up its success by a +pseudo-biography that had taken in the “Record” and +the “Rock”? In “Life and Habit,” at +the very start, he goes out of his way to heap scorn at the +respected names of Marcus Aurelius, Lord Bacon, Goethe, Arnold of +Rugby, and Dr. W. B. Carpenter. He expressed the lowest +opinion of the Fellows of the Royal Society. To him the +professional man of science, with self-conscious knowledge for +his ideal and aim, was a medicine-man, priest, +augur—useful, perhaps, in his way, but to be carefully +watched by all who value freedom of thought and person, lest with +opportunity he develop into a persecutor of the worst type. +Not content with blackguarding the audience to whom his work +should most appeal, he went on to depreciate that work itself and +its author in his finest vein of irony. Having argued that +our best and highest knowledge is that of whose possession we are +most ignorant, he proceeds: “Above all, let no unwary +reader do me the injustice of believing in me. In that I +write at all I am among the damned.”</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>His writing of “EVOLUTION, OLD AND NEW” (1879) was +due to his conviction that scant justice had been done by Charles +Darwin and Alfred Wallace and their admirers to the pioneering +work of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck. To repair this +he gives a brilliant exposition of what seemed to him the most +valuable portion of their teachings on evolution. His +analysis of Buffon’s true meaning, veiled by the reticences +due to the conditions under which he wrote, is as masterly as the +English in which he develops it. His sense of wounded +justice explains the vigorous polemic which here, as in all his +later writings, he carries to the extreme.</p> +<p>As a matter of fact, he never realised Charles Darwin’s +utter lack of sympathetic understanding of the work of his French +precursors, let alone his own grandfather, Erasmus. Yet +this practical ignorance, which to Butler was so strange as to +transcend belief, was altogether genuine, and easy to realise +when we recall the position of Natural Science in the early +thirties in Darwin’s student days at Cambridge, and for a +decade or two later. Catastropharianism was the tenet of +the day: to the last it commended itself to his Professors of +Botany and Geology,—for whom Darwin held the fervent +allegiance of the Indian scholar, or <i>chela</i>, to his +<i>guru</i>. As Geikie has recently pointed out, it was +only later, when Lyell had shown that the breaks in the +succession of the rocks were only partial and local, without +involving the universal catastrophes that destroyed all life and +rendered fresh creations thereof necessary, that any general +acceptance of a descent theory could be expected. We may be +very sure that Darwin must have received many solemn warnings +against the dangerous speculations of the “French +Revolutionary School.” He himself was far too busy at +the time with the reception and assimilation of new facts to be +awake to the deeper interest of far-reaching theories.</p> +<p>It is the more unfortunate that Butler’s lack of +appreciation on these points should have led to the enormous +proportion of bitter personal controversy that we find in the +remainder of his biological writings. Possibly, as +suggested by George Bernard Shaw, his acquaintance and admirer, +he was also swayed by philosophical resentment at that banishment +of mind from the organic universe, which was generally thought to +have been achieved by Charles Darwin’s theory. Still, +we must remember that this mindless view is not implicit in +Charles Darwin’s presentment of his own theory, nor was it +accepted by him as it has been by so many of his professed +disciples.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>“UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY” (1880).—We have already +alluded to an anticipation of Butler’s main theses. +In 1870 Dr. Ewald Hering, one of the most eminent physiologists +of the day, Professor at Vienna, gave an Inaugural Address to the +Imperial Royal Academy of Sciences: “Das Gedächtniss +als allgemeine Funktion der organisirter Substanz” +(“Memory as a Universal Function of Organised +Matter”). When “Life and Habit” was well +advanced, Francis Darwin, at the time a frequent visitor, called +Butler’s attention to this essay, which he himself only +knew from an article in “Nature.” Herein +Professor E. Ray Lankester had referred to it with admiring +sympathy in connection with its further development by Haeckel in +a pamphlet entitled “Die Perigenese der +Plastidule.” We may note, however, that in his +collected Essays, “The Advancement of Science” +(1890), Sir Ray Lankester, while including this Essay, inserts on +the blank page <a name="citation0b"></a><a href="#footnote0b" +class="citation">[0b]</a>—we had almost written “the +white sheet”—at the back of it an apology for having +ever advocated the possibility of the transmission of acquired +characters.</p> +<p>“Unconscious Memory” was largely written to show +the relation of Butler’s views to Hering’s, and +contains an exquisitely written translation of the Address. +Hering does, indeed, anticipate Butler, and that in language far +more suitable to the persuasion of the scientific public. +It contains a subsidiary hypothesis that memory has for its +mechanism special vibrations of the protoplasm, and the acquired +capacity to respond to such vibrations once felt upon their +repetition. I do not think that the theory gains anything +by the introduction of this even as a mere formal hypothesis; and +there is no evidence for its being anything more. Butler, +however, gives it a warm, nay, enthusiastic, reception in Chapter +V (Introduction to Professor Hering’s lecture), and in his +notes to the translation of the Address, which bulks so large in +this book, but points out that he was “not committed to +this hypothesis, though inclined to accept it on a <i>prima +facie</i> view.” Later on, as we shall see, he +attached more importance to it.</p> +<p>The Hering Address is followed in “Unconscious +Memory” by translations of selected passages from Von +Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” and +annotations to explain the difference from this personification +of “<i>The Unconscious</i>” as a mighty all-ruling, +all-creating personality, and his own scientific recognition of +the great part played by <i>unconscious processes</i> in the +region of mind and memory.</p> +<p>These are the essentials of the book as a contribution to +biological philosophy. The closing chapters contain a lucid +statement of objections to his theory as they might be put by a +rigid necessitarian, and a refutation of that interpretation as +applied to human action.</p> +<p>But in the second chapter Butler states his recession from the +strong logical position he had hitherto developed in his writings +from “Erewhon” onwards; so far he had not only +distinguished the living from the non-living, but distinguished +among the latter <i>machines</i> or <i>tools</i> from <i>things +at large</i>. <a name="citation0c"></a><a href="#footnote0c" +class="citation">[0c]</a> Machines or tools are the +external organs of living beings, as organs are their internal +machines: they are fashioned, assembled, or selected by the +beings for a purposes so they have a <i>future purpose</i>, as +well as a <i>past history</i>. “Things at +large” have a past history, but no purpose (so long as some +being does not convert them into tools and give them a purpose): +Machines have a Why? as well as a How?: “things at +large” have a How? only.</p> +<p>In “Unconscious Memory” the allurements of unitary +or monistic views have gained the upper hand, and Butler writes +(p. 23):—</p> +<blockquote><p>“The only thing of which I am sure is, that +the distinction between the organic and inorganic is arbitrary; +that it is more coherent with our other ideas, and therefore more +acceptable, to start with every molecule as a living thing, and +then deduce death as the breaking up of an association or +corporation, than to start with inanimate molecules and smuggle +life into them; and that, therefore, what we call the inorganic +world must be regarded as up to a certain point living, and +instinct, within certain limits, with consciousness, volition, +and power of concerted action. <i>It is only of late</i>, +<i>however</i>, <i>that I have come to this +opinion</i>.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I have italicised the last sentence, to show that Butler was +more or less conscious of its irreconcilability with much of his +most characteristic doctrine. Again, in the closing +chapter, Butler writes (p. 275):—</p> +<blockquote><p>“We should endeavour to see the so-called +inorganic as living in respect of the qualities it has in common +with the organic, rather than the organic as non-living in +respect of the qualities it has in common with the +inorganic.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>We conclude our survey of this book by mentioning the literary +controversial part chiefly to be found in Chapter IV, but +cropping up elsewhere. It refers to interpolations made in +the authorised translation of Krause’s “Life of +Erasmus Darwin.” Only one side is presented; and we +are not called upon, here or elsewhere, to discuss the merits of +the question.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>“LUCK, OR CUNNING, as the Main Means of Organic +Modification? an Attempt to throw Additional Light upon the late +Mr. Charles Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection” +(1887), completes the series of biological books. This is +mainly a book of strenuous polemic. It brings out still +more forcibly the Hering-Butler doctrine of continued personality +from generation to generation, and of the working of unconscious +memory throughout; and points out that, while this is implicit in +much of the teaching of Herbert Spencer, Romanes, and others, it +was nowhere—even after the appearance of “Life and +Habit”—explicitly recognised by them, but, on the +contrary, masked by inconsistent statements and teaching. +Not Luck but Cunning, not the uninspired weeding out by Natural +Selection but the intelligent striving of the organism, is at the +bottom of the useful variety of organic life. And the +parallel is drawn that not the happy accident of time and place, +but the Machiavellian cunning of Charles Darwin, succeeded in +imposing, as entirely his own, on the civilised world an +uninspired and inadequate theory of evolution wherein luck played +the leading part; while the more inspired and inspiring views of +the older evolutionists had failed by the inferiority of their +luck. On this controversy I am bound to say that I do not +in the very least share Butler’s opinions; and I must +ascribe them to his lack of personal familiarity with the +biologists of the day and their modes of thought and of +work. Butler everywhere undervalues the important work of +elimination played by Natural Selection in its widest sense.</p> +<p>The “Conclusion” of “Luck, or +Cunning?” shows a strong advance in monistic views, and a +yet more marked development in the vibration hypothesis of memory +given by Hering and only adopted with the greatest reserve in +“Unconscious Memory.”</p> +<blockquote><p>“Our conception, then, concerning the nature +of any matter depends solely upon its kind and degree of unrest, +that is to say, on the characteristics of the vibrations that are +going on within it. The exterior object vibrating in a +certain way imparts some of its vibrations to our brain; but if +the state of the thing itself depends upon its vibrations, it +[the thing] must be considered as to all intents and purposes the +vibrations themselves—plus, of course, the underlying +substance that is vibrating. . . . The same vibrations, +therefore, form the substance remembered, introduce an +infinitesimal dose of it within the brain, modify the substance +remembering, and, in the course of time, create and further +modify the mechanism of both the sensory and the motor +nerves. Thought and thing are one.</p> +<p>“I commend these two last speculations to the +reader’s charitable consideration, as feeling that I am +here travelling beyond the ground on which I can safely venture. +. . . I believe they are both substantially +true.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>In 1885 he had written an abstract of these ideas in his +notebooks (see <i>New Quarterly Review</i>, 1910, p. 116), and as +in “Luck, or Cunning?” associated them vaguely with +the unitary conceptions introduced into chemistry by Newlands and +Mendelejeff. Judging himself as an outsider, the author of +“Life and Habit” would certainly have considered the +mild expression of faith, “I believe they are both +substantially true,” equivalent to one of extreme +doubt. Thus “the fact of the Archbishop’s +recognising this as among the number of his beliefs is conclusive +evidence, with those who have devoted attention to the laws of +thought, that his mind is not yet clear” on the matter of +the belief avowed (see “Life and Habit,” pp. 24, +25).</p> +<p>To sum up: Butler’s fundamental attitude to the +vibration hypothesis was all through that taken in +“Unconscious Memory”; he played with it as a pretty +pet, and fancied it more and more as time went on; but instead of +backing it for all he was worth, like the main theses of +“Life and Habit,” he put a big stake on it—and +then hedged.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>The last of Butler’s biological writings is the Essay, +“THE DEADLOCK IN DARWINISM,” containing much valuable +criticism on Wallace and Weismann. It is in allusion to the +misnomer of Wallace’s book, “Darwinism,” that +he introduces the term “Wallaceism” <a +name="citation0d"></a><a href="#footnote0d" +class="citation">[0d]</a> for a theory of descent that excludes +the transmission of acquired characters. This was, indeed, +the chief factor that led Charles Darwin to invent his hypothesis +of pangenesis, which, unacceptable as it has proved, had far more +to recommend it as a formal hypothesis than the equally formal +germ-plasm hypothesis of Weismann.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>The chief difficulty in accepting the main theses of Butler +and Hering is one familiar to every biologist, and not at all +difficult to understand by the layman. Everyone knows that +the complicated beings that we term “Animals” and +“Plants,” consist of a number of more or less +individualised units, the cells, each analogous to a simpler +being, a Protist—save in so far as the character of the +cell unit of the Higher being is modified in accordance with the +part it plays in that complex being as a whole. Most +people, too, are familiar with the fact that the complex being +starts as a single cell, separated from its parent; or, where +bisexual reproduction occurs, from a cell due to the fusion of +two cells, each detached from its parent. Such cells are +called “Germ-cells.” The germ-cell, whether of +single or of dual origin, starts by dividing repeatedly, so as to +form the <i>primary embryonic cells</i>, a complex mass of cells, +at first essentially similar, which, however, as they go on +multiplying, undergo differentiations and migrations, losing +their simplicity as they do so. Those cells that are +modified to take part in the proper work of the whole are called +tissue-cells. In virtue of their activities, their growth +and reproductive power are limited—much more in Animals +than in Plants, in Higher than in Lower beings. It is these +tissues, or some of them, that receive the impressions from the +outside which leave the imprint of memory. Other cells, +which may be closely associated into a continuous organ, or more +or less surrounded by tissue-cells, whose part it is to nourish +them, are called “secondary embryonic cells,” or +“germ-cells.” The germ-cells may be +differentiated in the young organism at a very early stage, but +in Plants they are separated at a much later date from the less +isolated embryonic regions that provide for the Plant’s +branching; in all cases we find embryonic and germ-cells screened +from the life processes of the complex organism, or taking no +very obvious part in it, save to form new tissues or new organs, +notably in Plants.</p> +<p>Again, in ourselves, and to a greater or less extent in all +Animals, we find a system of special tissues set apart for the +reception and storage of impressions from the outer world, and +for guiding the other organs in their appropriate +responses—the “Nervous System”; and when this +system is ill-developed or out of gear the remaining organs work +badly from lack of proper skilled guidance and +co-ordination. How can we, then, speak of +“memory” in a germ-cell which has been screened from +the experiences of the organism, which is too simple in structure +to realise them if it were exposed to them? My own answer +is that we cannot form any theory on the subject, the only +question is whether we have any right to <i>infer</i> this +“memory” from the <i>behaviour</i> of living beings; +and Butler, like Hering, Haeckel, and some more modern authors, +has shown that the inference is a very strong presumption. +Again, it is easy to over-value such complex instruments as we +possess. The possessor of an up-to-date camera, well +instructed in the function and manipulation of every part, but +ignorant of all optics save a hand-to-mouth knowledge of the +properties of his own lens, might say that <i>a priori</i> no +picture could be taken with a cigar-box perforated by a pin-hole; +and our ignorance of the mechanism of the Psychology of any +organism is greater by many times than that of my supposed +photographer. We know that Plants are able to do many +things that can only be accounted for by ascribing to them a +“psyche,” and these co-ordinated enough to satisfy +their needs; and yet they possess no central organ comparable to +the brain, no highly specialised system for intercommunication +like our nerve trunks and fibres. As Oscar Hertwig says, we +are as ignorant of the mechanism of the development of the +individual as we are of that of hereditary transmission of +acquired characters, and the absence of such mechanism in either +case is no reason for rejecting the proven fact.</p> +<p>However, the relations of germ and body just described led +Jäger, Nussbaum, Galton, Lankester, and, above all, +Weismann, to the view that the germ-cells or “stirp” +(Galton) were <i>in</i> the body, but not <i>of</i> it. +Indeed, in the body and out of it, whether as reproductive cells +set free, or in the developing embryo, they are regarded as +forming one continuous homogeneity, in contrast to the +differentiation of the body; and it is to these cells, regarded +as a continuum, that the terms stirp, germ-plasm, are especially +applied. Yet on this view, so eagerly advocated by its +supporters, we have to substitute for the hypothesis of memory, +which they declare to have no real meaning here, the far more +fantastic hypotheses of Weismann: by these they explain the +process of differentiation in the young embryo into new germ and +body; and in the young body the differentiation of its cells, +each in due time and place, into the varied tissue cells and +organs. Such views might perhaps be acceptable if it could +be shown that over each cell-division there presided a wise +all-guiding genie of transcending intellect, to which +Clerk-Maxwell’s sorting demons were mere infants. Yet +these views have so enchanted many distinguished biologists, that +in dealing with the subject they have actually ignored the +existence of equally able workers who hesitate to share the +extremest of their views. The phenomenon is one well known +in hypnotic practice. So long as the non-Weismannians deal +with matters outside this discussion, their existence and their +work is rated at its just value; but any work of theirs on this +point so affects the orthodox Weismannite (whether he accept this +label or reject it does not matter), that for the time being +their existence and the good work they have done are alike +non-existent. <a name="citation0e"></a><a href="#footnote0e" +class="citation">[0e]</a></p> +<p>Butler founded no school, and wished to found none. He +desired that what was true in his work should prevail, and he +looked forward calmly to the time when the recognition of that +truth and of his share in advancing it should give him in the +lives of others that immortality for which alone he craved.</p> +<p>Lamarckian views have never lacked defenders here and in +America. Of the English, Herbert Spencer, who however, was +averse to the vitalistic attitude, Vines and Henslow among +botanists, Cunningham among zoologists, have always resisted +Weismannism; but, I think, none of these was distinctly +influenced by Hering and Butler. In America the majority of +the great school of palæontologists have been strong +Lamarckians, notably Cope, who has pointed out, moreover, that +the transformations of energy in living beings are peculiar to +them.</p> +<p>We have already adverted to Haeckel’s acceptance and +development of Hering’s ideas in his “Perigenese der +Plastidule.” Oscar Hertwig has been a consistent +Lamarckian, like Yves Delage of the Sorbonne, and these occupy +pre-eminent positions not only as observers, but as +discriminating theorists and historians of the recent progress of +biology. We may also cite as a Lamarckian—of a +sort—Felix Le Dantec, the leader of the chemico-physical +school of the present day.</p> +<p>But we must seek elsewhere for special attention to the points +which Butler regarded as the essentials of “Life and +Habit.” In 1893 Henry P. Orr, Professor of Biology in +the University of Louisiana, published a little book entitled +“A Theory of Heredity.” Herein he insists on +the nervous control of the whole body, and on the transmission to +the reproductive cells of such stimuli, received by the body, as +will guide them on their path until they shall have acquired +adequate experience of their own in the new body they have +formed. I have found the name of neither Butler nor Hering, +but the treatment is essentially on their lines, and is both +clear and interesting.</p> +<p>In 1896 I wrote an essay on “The Fundamental Principles +of Heredity,” primarily directed to the man in the +street. This, after being held over for more than a year by +one leading review, was “declined with regret,” and +again after some weeks met the same fate from another +editor. It appeared in the pages of “Natural +Science” for October, 1897, and in the “Biologisches +Centralblatt” for the same year. I reproduce its +closing paragraph:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“This theory [Hering-Butler’s] has, +indeed, a tentative character, and lacks symmetrical +completeness, but is the more welcome as not aiming at the +impossible. A whole series of phenomena in organic beings +are correlated under the term of <i>memory</i>, <i>conscious and +unconscious</i>, <i>patent and latent</i>. . . . Of the +order of unconscious memory, latent till the arrival of the +appropriate stimulus, is all the co-operative growth and work of +the organism, including its development from the reproductive +cells. Concerning the <i>modus operandi</i> we know +nothing: the phenomena may be due, as Hering suggests, to +molecular vibrations, which must be at least as distinct from +ordinary physical disturbances as Röntgen’s rays are +from ordinary light; or it may be correlated, as we ourselves are +inclined to think, with complex chemical changes in an intricate +but orderly succession. For the present, at least, the +problem of heredity can only be elucidated by the light of +mental, and not material processes.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>It will be seen that I express doubts as to the validity of +Hering’s invocation of molecular vibrations as the +mechanism of memory, and suggest as an alternative rhythmic +chemical changes. This view has recently been put forth in +detail by J. J. Cunningham in his essay on the “Hormone <a +name="citation0f"></a><a href="#footnote0f" +class="citation">[0f]</a> Theory of Heredity,” in the +<i>Archiv für Entwicklungsmechanik</i> (1909), but I have +failed to note any direct effect of my essay on the trend of +biological thought.</p> +<p>Among post-Darwinian controversies the one that has latterly +assumed the greatest prominence is that of the relative +importance of small variations in the way of more or less +“fluctuations,” and of “discontinuous +variations,” or “mutations,” as De Vries has +called them. Darwin, in the first four editions of the +“Origin of Species,” attached more importance to the +latter than in subsequent editions; he was swayed in his +attitude, as is well known, by an article of the physicist, +Fleeming Jenkin, which appeared in the <i>North British +Review</i>. The mathematics of this article were +unimpeachable, but they were founded on the assumption that +exceptional variations would only occur in single individuals, +which is, indeed, often the case among those domesticated races +on which Darwin especially studied the phenomena of +variation. Darwin was no mathematician or physicist, and we +are told in his biography that he regarded every tool-shop rule +or optician’s thermometer as an instrument of precision: so +he appears to have regarded Fleeming Jenkin’s demonstration +as a mathematical deduction which he was bound to accept without +criticism.</p> +<p>Mr. William Bateson, late Professor of Biology in the +University of Cambridge, as early as 1894 laid great stress on +the importance of discontinuous variations, collecting and +collating the known facts in his “Materials for the Study +of Variations”; but this important work, now become rare +and valuable, at the time excited so little interest as to be +‘remaindered’ within a very few years after +publication.</p> +<p>In 1901 Hugo De Vries, Professor of Botany in the University +of Amsterdam, published “Die Mutationstheorie,” +wherein he showed that mutations or discontinuous variations in +various directions may appear simultaneously in many individuals, +and in various directions. In the gardener’s phrase, +the species may take to sporting in various directions at the +same time, and each sport may be represented by numerous +specimens.</p> +<p>De Vries shows the probability that species go on for long +periods showing only fluctuations, and then suddenly take to +sporting in the way described, short periods of mutation +alternating with long intervals of relative constancy. It +is to mutations that De Vries and his school, as well as Luther +Burbank, the great former of new fruit- and flower-plants, look +for those variations which form the material of Natural +Selection. In “God the Known and God the +Unknown,” which appeared in the <i>Examiner</i> (May, June, +and July), 1879, but though then revised was only published +posthumously in 1909, Butler anticipates this +distinction:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Under these circumstances organism must act +in one or other of these two ways: it must either change slowly +and continuously with the surroundings, paying cash for +everything, meeting the smallest change with a corresponding +modification, so far as is found convenient, or it must put off +change as long as possible, and then make larger and more +sweeping changes.</p> +<p>“Both these courses are the same in principle, the +difference being one of scale, and the one being a miniature of +the other, as a ripple is an Atlantic wave in little; both have +their advantages and disadvantages, so that most organisms will +take the one course for one set of things and the other for +another. They will deal promptly with things which they can +get at easily, and which lie more upon the surface; <i>those</i>, +<i>however</i>, <i>which are more troublesome to reach</i>, +<i>and lie deeper</i>, <i>will be handled upon more cataclysmic +principles</i>, <i>being allowed longer periods of repose +followed by short periods of greater activity</i> . . . it may be +questioned whether what is called a sport is not the organic +expression of discontent which has been long felt, but which has +not been attended to, nor been met step by step by as much small +remedial modification as was found practicable: so that when a +change does come it comes by way of revolution. Or, again +(only that it comes to much the same thing), it may be compared +to one of those happy thoughts which sometimes come to us +unbidden after we have been thinking for a long time what to do, +or how to arrange our ideas, and have yet been unable to come to +any conclusion” (pp. 14, 15). <a name="citation0g"></a><a +href="#footnote0g" class="citation">[0g]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>We come to another order of mind in Hans Driesch. At the +time he began his work biologists were largely busy in a region +indicated by Darwin, and roughly mapped out by Haeckel—that +of phylogeny. From the facts of development of the +individual, from the comparison of fossils in successive strata, +they set to work at the construction of pedigrees, and strove to +bring into line the principles of classification with the more or +less hypothetical “stemtrees.” Driesch +considered this futile, since we never could reconstruct from +such evidence anything certain in the history of the past. +He therefore asserted that a more complete knowledge of the +physics and chemistry of the organic world might give a +scientific explanation of the phenomena, and maintained that the +proper work of the biologist was to deepen our knowledge in these +respects. He embodied his views, seeking the explanation on +this track, filling up gaps and tracing projected roads along +lines of probable truth in his “Analytische Theorie der +organische Entwicklung.” But his own work convinced +him of the hopelessness of the task he had undertaken, and he has +become as strenuous a vitalist as Butler. The most complete +statement of his present views is to be found in “The +Philosophy of Life” (1908–9), being the Giffold +Lectures for 1907–8. Herein he postulates a quality +(“psychoid”) in all living beings, directing energy +and matter for the purpose of the organism, and to this he +applies the Aristotelian designation +“Entelechy.” The question of the transmission +of acquired characters is regarded as doubtful, and he does not +emphasise—if he accepts—the doctrine of continuous +personality. His early youthful impatience with descent +theories and hypotheses has, however, disappeared.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>In the next work the influence of Hering and Butler is +definitely present and recognised. In 1906 Signor Eugenio +Rignano, an engineer keenly interested in all branches of +science, and a little later the founder of the international +review, <i>Rivistà di Scienza</i> (now simply called +<i>Scientia</i>), published in French a volume entitled +“Sur la transmissibilité des Caractères +acquis—Hypothèse d’un +Centro-épigenèse.” Into the details of +the author’s work we will not enter fully. Suffice it +to know that he accepts the Hering-Butler theory, and makes a +distinct advance on Hering’s rather crude hypothesis of +persistent vibrations by suggesting that the remembering centres +store slightly different forms of energy, to give out energy of +the same kind as they have received, like electrical +accumulators. The last chapter, “Le +Phénomène mnémonique et le +Phénomène vital,” is frankly based on +Hering.</p> +<p>In “The Lesson of Evolution” (1907, posthumous, +and only published for private circulation) Frederick Wollaston +Hutton, F.R.S., late Professor of Biology and Geology, first at +Dunedin and after at Christchurch, New Zealand, puts forward a +strongly vitalistic view, and adopts Hering’s +teaching. After stating this he adds, “The same idea +of heredity being due to unconscious memory was advocated by Mr. +Samuel Butler in his “Life and Habit.”</p> +<p>Dr. James Mark Baldwin, Stuart Professor of Psychology in +Princeton University, U.S.A., called attention early in the +90’s to a reaction characteristic of all living beings, +which he terms the “Circular Reaction.” We take +his most recent account of this from his “Development and +Evolution” (1902):—<a name="citation0h"></a><a +href="#footnote0h" class="citation">[0h]</a></p> +<blockquote><p>“The general fact is that the organism +reacts by concentration upon the locality stimulated for the +<i>continuance</i> of the conditions, movements, stimulations, +<i>which are vitally beneficial</i>, and for the cessation of the +conditions, movements, stimulations <i>which are vitally +depressing</i>.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This amounts to saying in the terminology of Jenning (see +below) that the living organism alters its “physiological +states” either for its direct benefit, or for its indirect +benefit in the reduction of harmful conditions.</p> +<p>Again:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“This form of concentration of energy on +stimulated localities, with the resulting renewal through +movement of conditions that are pleasure-giving and beneficial, +and the consequent repetition of the movements is called +‘circular reaction.’”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Of course, the inhibition of such movements as would be +painful on repetition is merely the negative case of the circular +reaction. We must not put too much of our own ideas into +the author’s mind; he nowhere says explicitly that the +animal or plant shows its sense and does this because it likes +the one thing and wants it repeated, or dislikes the other and +stops its repetition, as Butler would have said. Baldwin is +very strong in insisting that no full explanation can be given of +living processes, any more than of history, on purely +chemico-physical grounds.</p> +<p>The same view is put differently and independently by H. S. +Jennings, <a name="citation0i"></a><a href="#footnote0i" +class="citation">[0i]</a> who started his investigations of +living Protista, the simplest of living beings, with the idea +that only accurate and ample observation was needed to enable us +to explain all their activities on a mechanical basis, and +devised ingenious models of protoplastic movements. He was +led, like Driesch, to renounce such efforts as illusory, and has +come to the conviction that in the behaviour of these lowly +beings there is a purposive and a tentative character—a +method of “trial and error”—that can only be +interpreted by the invocation of psychology. He points out +that after stimulation the “state” of the organism +may be altered, so that the response to the same stimulus on +repetition is other. Or, as he puts it, the first stimulus +has caused the organism to pass into a new “physiological +state.” As the change of state from what we may call +the “primary indifferent state” is advantageous to +the organism, we may regard this as equivalent to the doctrine of +the “circular reaction,” and also as containing the +essence of Semon’s doctrine of “engrams” or +imprints which we are about to consider. We cite one +passage which for audacity of thought (underlying, it is true, +most guarded expression) may well compare with many of the +boldest flights in “Life and Habit”:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“It may be noted that regulation in the +manner we have set forth is what, in the behaviour of higher +organisms, at least, is called intelligence [the examples have +been taken from Protista, Corals, and the Lowest Worms]. If +the same method of regulation is found in other fields, there is +no reason for refusing to compare the action to +intelligence. Comparison of the regulatory processes that +are shown in internal physiological changes and in regeneration +to intelligence seems to be looked upon sometimes as heretical +and unscientific. Yet intelligence is a name applied to +processes that actually exist in the regulation of movements, and +there is, <i>a priori</i>, no reason why similar processes should +not occur in regulation in other fields. When we analyse +regulation objectively there seems indeed reason to think that +the processes are of the same character in behaviour as +elsewhere. If the term intelligence be reserved for the +subjective accompaniments of such regulation, then of course we +have no direct knowledge of its existence in any of the fields of +regulation outside of the self, and in the self perhaps only in +behaviour. But in a purely objective consideration there +seems no reason to suppose that regulation in behaviour +(intelligence) is of a fundamentally different character from +regulation elsewhere.” (“Method of +Regulation,” p. 492.)</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Jennings makes no mention of questions of the theory of +heredity. He has made some experiments on the transmission +of an acquired character in Protozoa; but it was a +mutilation-character, which is, as has been often shown, <a +name="citation0j"></a><a href="#footnote0j" +class="citation">[0j]</a> not to the point.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>One of the most obvious criticisms of Hering’s +exposition is based upon the extended use he makes of the word +“Memory”: this he had foreseen and deprecated.</p> +<blockquote><p>“We have a perfect right,” he says, +“to extend our conception of memory so as to make it +embrace involuntary [and also unconscious] reproductions of +sensations, ideas, perceptions, and efforts; but we find, on +having done so, that we have so far enlarged her boundaries that +she proves to be an ultimate and original power, the source and, +at the same time, the unifying bond, of our whole conscious +life.” (“Unconscious Memory,” p. 68.)</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This sentence, coupled with Hering’s omission to give to +the concept of memory so enlarged a new name, clear alike of the +limitations and of the stains of habitual use, may well have been +the inspiration of the next work on our list. Richard Semon +is a professional zoologist and anthropologist of such high +status for his original observations and researches in the mere +technical sense, that in these countries he would assuredly have +been acclaimed as one of the Fellows of the Royal Society who +were Samuel Butler’s special aversion. The full title +of his book is “<span class="smcap">Die Mneme</span> als +erhaltende Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens” +(Munich, Ed. 1, 1904; Ed. 2, 1908). We may translate +it “<span class="smcap">Mneme</span>, a Principle of +Conservation in the Transformations of Organic +Existence.”</p> +<p>From this I quote in free translation the opening passage of +Chapter II:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“We have shown that in very many cases, +whether in Protist, Plant, or Animal, when an organism has passed +into an indifferent state after the reaction to a stimulus has +ceased, its irritable substance has suffered a lasting change: I +call this after-action of the stimulus its ‘imprint’ +or ‘engraphic’ action, since it penetrates and +imprints itself in the organic substance; and I term the change +so effected an ‘imprint’ or ‘engram’ of +the stimulus; and the sum of all the imprints possessed by the +organism may be called its ‘store of imprints,’ +wherein we must distinguish between those which it has inherited +from its forbears and those which it has acquired itself. +Any phenomenon displayed by an organism as the result either of a +single imprint or of a sum of them, I term a ‘mnemic +phenomenon’; and the mnemic possibilities of an organism +may be termed, collectively, its ‘<span +class="smcap">Mneme</span>.’</p> +<p>“I have selected my own terms for the concepts that I +have just defined. On many grounds I refrain from making +any use of the good German terms ‘Gedächtniss, +Erinnerungsbild.’ The first and chiefest ground is +that for my purpose I should have to employ the German words in a +much wider sense than what they usually convey, and thus leave +the door open to countless misunderstandings and idle +controversies. It would, indeed, even amount to an error of +fact to give to the wider concept the name already current in the +narrower sense—nay, actually limited, like +‘Erinnerungsbild,’ to phenomena of consciousness. . . +. In Animals, during the course of history, one set of +organs has, so to speak, specialised itself for the reception and +transmission of stimuli—the Nervous System. But from +this specialisation we are not justified in ascribing to the +nervous system any monopoly of the function, even when it is as +highly developed as in Man. . . . Just as the direct +excitability of the nervous system has progressed in the history +of the race, so has its capacity for receiving imprints; but +neither susceptibility nor retentiveness is its monopoly; and, +indeed, retentiveness seems inseparable from susceptibility in +living matter.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Semen here takes the instance of stimulus and imprint actions +affecting the nervous system of a dog</p> +<blockquote><p>“who has up till now never experienced aught +but kindness from the Lord of Creation, and then one day that he +is out alone is pelted with stones by a boy. . . . Here he +is affected at once by two sets of stimuli: (1) the optic +stimulus of seeing the boy stoop for stones and throw them, and +(2) the skin stimulus of the pain felt when they hit him. +Here both stimuli leave their imprints; and the organism is +permanently changed in relation to the recurrence of the +stimuli. Hitherto the sight of a human figure quickly +stooping had produced no constant special reaction. Now the +reaction is constant, and may remain so till death. . . . +The dog tucks in its tail between its legs and takes flight, +often with a howl [as of] pain.”</p> +<p>“Here we gain on one side a deeper insight into the +imprint action of stimuli. It reposes on the lasting change +in the conditions of the living matter, so that the repetition of +the immediate or synchronous reaction to its first stimulus (in +this case the stooping of the boy, the flying stones, and the +pain on the ribs), no longer demands, as in the original state of +indifference, the full stimulus <i>a</i>, but may be called forth +by a partial or different stimulus, <i>b</i> (in this case the +mere stooping to the ground). I term the influences by +which such changed reaction are rendered possible, +‘outcome-reactions,’ and when such influences assume +the form of stimuli, ‘outcome-stimuli.’”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>They are termed “outcome” (“ecphoria”) +stimuli, because the author regards them and would have us regard +them as the outcome, manifestation, or efference of an imprint of +a previous stimulus. We have noted that the imprint is +equivalent to the changed “physiological state” of +Jennings. Again, the capacity for gaining imprints and +revealing them by outcomes favourable to the individual is the +“circular reaction” of Baldwin, but Semon gives no +reference to either author. <a name="citation0k"></a><a +href="#footnote0k" class="citation">[0k]</a></p> +<p>In the preface to his first edition (reprinted in the second) +Semon writes, after discussing the work of Hering and +Haeckel:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“The problem received a more detailed +treatment in Samuel Butler’s book, ‘Life and +Habit,’ published in 1878. Though he only made +acquaintance with Hering’s essay after this publication, +Butler gave what was in many respects a more detailed view of the +coincidences of these different phenomena of organic reproduction +than did Hering. With much that is untenable, +Butler’s writings present many a brilliant idea; yet, on +the whole, they are rather a retrogression than an advance upon +Hering. Evidently they failed to exercise any marked +influence upon the literature of the day.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This judgment needs a little examination. Butler +claimed, justly, that his “Life and Habit” was an +advance on Hering in its dealing with questions of hybridity, and +of longevity puberty and sterility. Since Semon’s +extended treatment of the phenomena of crosses might almost be +regarded as the rewriting of the corresponding section of +“Life and Habit” in the “Mneme” +terminology, we may infer that this view of the question was one +of Butler’s “brilliant ideas.” That +Butler shrank from accepting such a formal explanation of memory +as Hering did with his hypothesis should certainly be counted as +a distinct “advance upon Hering,” for Semon also +avoids any attempt at an explanation of +“Mneme.” I think, however, we may gather the +real meaning of Semon’s strictures from the following +passages:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“I refrain here from a discussion of the +development of this theory of Lamarck’s by those +Neo-Lamarckians who would ascribe to the individual elementary +organism an equipment of complex psychical powers—so to +say, anthropomorphic perception and volitions. This +treatment is no longer directed by the scientific principle of +referring complex phenomena to simpler laws, of deducing even +human intellect and will from simpler elements. On the +contrary, they follow that most abhorrent method of taking the +most complex and unresolved as a datum, and employing it as an +explanation. The adoption of such a method, as formerly by +Samuel Butler, and recently by Pauly, I regard as a big and +dangerous step backward” (ed. 2, pp. 380–1, +note).</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Thus Butler’s alleged retrogressions belong to the same +order of thinking that we have seen shared by Driesch, Baldwin, +and Jennings, and most explicitly avowed, as we shall see, by +Francis Darwin. Semon makes one rather candid admission, +“The impossibility of interpreting the phenomena of +physiological stimulation by those of direct reaction, and the +undeception of those who had put faith in this being possible, +have led many on the <i>backward path of +vitalism</i>.” Semon assuredly will never be able to +complete his theory of “Mneme” until, guided by the +experience of Jennings and Driesch, he forsakes the blind alley +of mechanisticism and retraces his steps to reasonable +vitalism.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>But the most notable publications bearing on our matter are +incidental to the Darwin Celebrations of 1908–9. Dr. +Francis Darwin, son, collaborator, and biographer of Charles +Darwin, was selected to preside over the Meeting of the British +Association held in Dublin in 1908, the jubilee of the first +publications on Natural Selection by his father and Alfred Russel +Wallace. In this address we find the theory of Hering, +Butler, Rignano, and Semon taking its proper place as a <i>vera +causa</i> of that variation which Natural Selection must find +before it can act, and recognised as the basis of a rational +theory of the development of the individual and of the +race. The organism is essentially purposive: the +impossibility of devising any adequate accounts of organic form +and function without taking account of the psychical side is most +strenuously asserted. And with our regret that past +misunderstandings should be so prominent in Butler’s works, +it was very pleasant to hear Francis Darwin’s quotation +from Butler’s translation of Hering <a +name="citation0l"></a><a href="#footnote0l" +class="citation">[0l]</a> followed by a personal tribute to +Butler himself.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>In commemoration of the centenary of the birth of Charles +Darwin and of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the +“Origin of Species,” at the suggestion of the +Cambridge Philosophical Society, the University Press published +during the current year a volume entitled “Darwin and +Modern Science,” edited by Mr. A. C. Seward, Professor of +Botany in the University. Of the twenty-nine essays by men +of science of the highest distinction, one is of peculiar +interest to the readers of Samuel Butler: “Heredity and +Variation in Modern Lights,” by Professor W. Bateson, <span +class="GutSmall">F.R.S.</span>, to whose work on +“Discontinuous Variations” we have already +referred. Here once more Butler receives from an official +biologist of the first rank full recognition for his wonderful +insight and keen critical power. This is the more +noteworthy because Bateson has apparently no faith in the +transmission of acquired characters; but such a passage as this +would have commended itself to Butler’s +admiration:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“All this indicates a definiteness and +specific order in heredity, and therefore in variation. +This order cannot by the nature of the case be dependent on +Natural Selection for its existence, but must be a consequence of +the fundamental chemical and physical nature of living +things. The study of Variation had from the first shown +that an orderliness of this kind was present. The bodies +and properties of living things are cosmic, not chaotic. No +matter how low in the scale we go, never do we find the slightest +hint of a diminution in that all-pervading orderliness, nor can +we conceive an organism existing for one moment in any other +state.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>We have now before us the materials to determine the problem +of Butler’s relation to biology and to biologists. He +was, we have seen, anticipated by Hering; but his attitude was +his own, fresh and original. He did not hamper his +exposition, like Hering, by a subsidiary hypothesis of vibrations +which may or may not be true, which burdens the theory without +giving it greater carrying power or persuasiveness, which is +based on no objective facts, and which, as Semon has practically +demonstrated, is needless for the detailed working out of the +theory. Butler failed to impress the biologists of his day, +even those on whom, like Romanes, he might have reasonably +counted for understanding and for support. But he kept +alive Hering’s work when it bade fair to sink into the +limbo of obsolete hypotheses. To use Oliver Wendell +Holmes’s phrase, he “depolarised” evolutionary +thought. We quote the words of a young biologist, who, when +an ardent and dogmatic Weismannist of the most pronounced type, +was induced to read “Life and Habit”: “The book +was to me a transformation and an inspiration.” Such +learned writings as Semon’s or Hering’s could never +produce such an effect: they do not penetrate to the heart of +man; they cannot carry conviction to the intellect already filled +full with rival theories, and with the unreasoned faith that +to-morrow or next day a new discovery will obliterate all +distinction between Man and his makings. The mind must +needs be open for the reception of truth, for the rejection of +prejudice; and the violence of a Samuel Butler may in the future +as in the past be needed to shatter the coat of mail forged by +too exclusively professional a training.</p> +<p style="text-align: right">MARCUS HARTOG</p> +<p><i>Cork</i>, <i>April</i>, 1910</p> +<h2><a name="pagexxxvii"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +xxxvii</span>Author’s Preface</h2> +<p><span class="smcap">Not</span> finding the “well-known +German scientific journal <i>Kosmos</i>” <a +name="citation0m"></a><a href="#footnote0m" +class="citation">[0m]</a> entered in the British Museum +Catalogue, I have presented the Museum with a copy of the number +for February 1879, which contains the article by Dr. Krause of +which Mr. Charles Darwin has given a translation, the accuracy of +which is guaranteed—so he informs us—by the +translator’s “scientific reputation together with his +knowledge of German.” <a name="citation0n"></a><a +href="#footnote0n" class="citation">[0n]</a></p> +<p>I have marked the copy, so that the reader can see at a glance +what passages has been suppressed and where matter has been +interpolated.</p> +<p>I have also present a copy of “Erasmus +Darwin.” I have marked this too, so that the genuine +and spurious passages can be easily distinguished.</p> +<p>I understand that both the “Erasmus Darwin” and +the number of <i>Kosmos</i> have been sent to the Keeper of +Printed Books, with instructions that they shall be at once +catalogued and made accessible to readers, and do not doubt that +this will have been done before the present volume is +published. The reader, therefore, who may be sufficiently +interested in the matter to care to see exactly what has been +done will now have an opportunity of doing so.</p> +<p><i>October</i> 25, 1880.</p> +<h2><a name="page1"></a><span class="pagenum">p. 1</span>Chapter +I</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Introduction—General ignorance on the +subject of evolution at the time the “Origin of +Species” was published in 1859.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">There</span> are few things which strike +us with more surprise, when we review the course taken by opinion +in the last century, than the suddenness with which belief in +witchcraft and demoniacal possession came to an end. This +has been often remarked upon, but I am not acquainted with any +record of the fact as it appeared to those under whose eyes the +change was taking place, nor have I seen any contemporary +explanation of the reasons which led to the apparently sudden +overthrow of a belief which had seemed hitherto to be deeply +rooted in the minds of almost all men. As a parallel to +this, though in respect of the rapid spread of an opinion, and +not its decadence, it is probable that those of our descendants +who take an interest in ourselves will note the suddenness with +which the theory of evolution, from having been generally +ridiculed during a period of over a hundred years, came into +popularity and almost universal acceptance among educated +people.</p> +<p>It is indisputable that this has been the case; nor is it less +indisputable that the works of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace have +been the main agents in the change that has been brought about in +our opinions. The names of Cobden and Bright do not stand +more prominently forward in connection with the repeal of the +Corn Laws than do those of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace in +connection with the general acceptance of the theory of +evolution. There is no living philosopher who has anything +like Mr. Darwin’s popularity with Englishmen generally; and +not only this, but his power of fascination extends all over +Europe, and indeed in every country in which civilisation has +obtained footing: not among the illiterate masses, though these +are rapidly following the suit of the educated classes, but among +experts and those who are most capable of judging. France, +indeed—the country of Buffon and Lamarck—must be +counted an exception to the general rule, but in England and +Germany there are few men of scientific reputation who do not +accept Mr. Darwin as the founder of what is commonly called +“Darwinism,” and regard him as perhaps the most +penetrative and profound philosopher of modern times.</p> +<p>To quote an example from the last few weeks only, <a +name="citation2"></a><a href="#footnote2" +class="citation">[2]</a> I have observed that Professor Huxley +has celebrated the twenty-first year since the “Origin of +Species” was published by a lecture at the Royal +Institution, and am told that he described Mr. Darwin’s +candour as something actually “terrible” (I give +Professor Huxley’s own word, as reported by one who heard +it); and on opening a small book entitled +“Degeneration,” by Professor Ray Lankester, published +a few days before these lines were written, I find the following +passage amid more that is to the same purport:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Suddenly one of those great guesses which +occasionally appear in the history of science was given to the +science of biology by the imaginative insight of that greatest of +living naturalists—I would say that greatest of living +men—Charles Darwin.”—<i>Degeneration</i>, p. +10.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This is very strong language, but it is hardly stronger than +that habitually employed by the leading men of science when they +speak of Mr. Darwin. To go farther afield, in February 1879 +the Germans devoted an entire number of one of their scientific +periodicals <a name="citation3"></a><a href="#footnote3" +class="citation">[3]</a> to the celebration of Mr. Darwin’s +seventieth birthday. There is no other Englishman now +living who has been able to win such a compliment as this from +foreigners, who should be disinterested judges.</p> +<p>Under these circumstances, it must seem the height of +presumption to differ from so great an authority, and to join the +small band of malcontents who hold that Mr. Darwin’s +reputation as a philosopher, though it has grown up with the +rapidity of Jonah’s gourd, will yet not be permanent. +I believe, however, that though we must always gladly and +gratefully owe it to Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace that the public +mind has been brought to accept evolution, the admiration now +generally felt for the “Origin of Species” will +appear as unaccountable to our descendants some fifty or eighty +years hence as the enthusiasm of our grandfathers for the poetry +of Dr. Erasmus Darwin does to ourselves; and as one who has +yielded to none in respect of the fascination Mr. Darwin has +exercised over him, I would fain say a few words of explanation +which may make the matter clearer to our future historians. +I do this the more readily because I can at the same time explain +thus better than in any other way the steps which led me to the +theory which I afterwards advanced in “Life and +Habit.”</p> +<p>This last, indeed, is perhaps the main purpose of the earlier +chapters of this book. I shall presently give a translation +of a lecture by Professor Ewald Hering of Prague, which appeared +ten years ago, and which contains so exactly the theory I +subsequently advocated myself, that I am half uneasy lest it +should be supposed that I knew of Professor Hering’s work +and made no reference to it. A friend to whom I submitted +my translation in MS., asking him how closely he thought it +resembled “Life and Habit,” wrote back that it gave +my own ideas almost in my own words. As far as the ideas +are concerned this is certainly the case, and considering that +Professor Hering wrote between seven and eight years before I +did, I think it due to him, and to my readers as well as to +myself, to explain the steps which led me to my conclusions, and, +while putting Professor Hering’s lecture before them, to +show cause for thinking that I arrived at an almost identical +conclusion, as it would appear, by an almost identical road, yet, +nevertheless, quite independently, I must ask the reader, +therefore, to regard these earlier chapters as in some measure a +personal explanation, as well as a contribution to the history of +an important feature in the developments of the last twenty +years. I hope also, by showing the steps by which I was led +to my conclusions, to make the conclusions themselves more +acceptable and easy of comprehension.</p> +<p>Being on my way to New Zealand when the “Origin of +Species” appeared, I did not get it till 1860 or +1861. When I read it, I found “the theory of natural +selection” repeatedly spoken of as though it were a synonym +for “the theory of descent with modification”; this +is especially the case in the recapitulation chapter of the +work. I failed to see how important it was that these two +theories—if indeed “natural selection” can be +called a theory—should not be confounded together, and that +a “theory of descent with modification” might be +true, while a “theory of descent with modification through +natural selection” <a name="citation4"></a><a +href="#footnote4" class="citation">[4]</a> might not stand being +looked into.</p> +<p>If any one had asked me to state in brief what Mr. +Darwin’s theory was, I am afraid I might have answered +“natural selection,” or “descent with +modification,” whichever came first, as though the one +meant much the same as the other. I observe that most of +the leading writers on the subject are still unable to catch +sight of the distinction here alluded to, and console myself for +my want of acumen by reflecting that, if I was misled, I was +misled in good company.</p> +<p>I—and I may add, the public generally—failed also +to see what the unaided reader who was new to the subject would +be almost certain to overlook. I mean, that, according to +Mr. Darwin, the variations whose accumulation resulted in +diversity of species and genus were indefinite, fortuitous, +attributable but in small degree to any known causes, and without +a general principle underlying them which would cause them to +appear steadily in a given direction for many successive +generations and in a considerable number of individuals at the +same time. We did not know that the theory of evolution was +one that had been quietly but steadily gaining ground during the +last hundred years. Buffon we knew by name, but he sounded +too like “buffoon” for any good to come from +him. We had heard also of Lamarck, and held him to be a +kind of French Lord Monboddo; but we knew nothing of his doctrine +save through the caricatures promulgated by his opponents, or the +misrepresentations of those who had another kind of interest in +disparaging him. Dr. Erasmus Darwin we believed to be a +forgotten minor poet, but ninety-nine out of every hundred of us +had never so much as heard of the “Zoonomia.” +We were little likely, therefore, to know that Lamarck drew very +largely from Buffon, and probably also from Dr. Erasmus Darwin, +and that this last-named writer, though essentially original, was +founded upon Buffon, who was greatly more in advance of any +predecessor than any successor has been in advance of him.</p> +<p>We did not know, then, that according to the earlier writers +the variations whose accumulation results in species were not +fortuitous and definite, but were due to a known principle of +universal application—namely, “sense of +need”—or apprehend the difference between a theory of +evolution which has a backbone, as it were, in the tolerably +constant or slowly varying needs of large numbers of individuals +for long periods together, and one which has no such backbone, +but according to which the progress of one generation is always +liable to be cancelled and obliterated by that of the next. +We did not know that the new theory in a quiet way professed to +tell us less than the old had done, and declared that it could +throw little if any light upon the matter which the earlier +writers had endeavoured to illuminate as the central point in +their system. We took it for granted that more light must +be being thrown instead of less; and reading in perfect good +faith, we rose from our perusal with the impression that Mr. +Darwin was advocating the descent of all existing forms of life +from a single, or from, at any rate, a very few primordial types; +that no one else had done this hitherto, or that, if they had, +they had got the whole subject into a mess, which mess, whatever +it was—for we were never told this—was now being +removed once for all by Mr. Darwin.</p> +<p>The evolution part of the story, that is to say, the fact of +evolution, remained in our minds as by far the most prominent +feature in Mr. Darwin’s book; and being grateful for it, we +were very ready to take Mr. Darwin’s work at the estimate +tacitly claimed for it by himself, and vehemently insisted upon +by reviewers in influential journals, who took much the same line +towards the earlier writers on evolution as Mr. Darwin himself +had taken. But perhaps nothing more prepossessed us in Mr. +Darwin’s favour than the air of candour that was +omnipresent throughout his work. The prominence given to +the arguments of opponents completely carried us away; it was +this which threw us off our guard. It never occurred to us +that there might be other and more dangerous opponents who were +not brought forward. Mr. Darwin did not tell us what his +grandfather and Lamarck would have had to say to this or +that. Moreover, there was an unobtrusive parade of hidden +learning and of difficulties at last overcome which was +particularly grateful to us. Whatever opinion might be +ultimately come to concerning the value of his theory, there +could be but one about the value of the example he had set to men +of science generally by the perfect frankness and unselfishness +of his work. Friends and foes alike combined to do homage +to Mr. Darwin in this respect.</p> +<p>For, brilliant as the reception of the “Origin of +Species” was, it met in the first instance with hardly less +hostile than friendly criticism. But the attacks were +ill-directed; they came from a suspected quarter, and those who +led them did not detect more than the general public had done +what were the really weak places in Mr. Darwin’s +armour. They attacked him where he was strongest; and above +all, they were, as a general rule, stamped with a +disingenuousness which at that time we believed to be peculiar to +theological writers and alien to the spirit of science. +Seeing, therefore, that the men of science ranged themselves more +and more decidedly on Mr. Darwin’s side, while his +opponents had manifestly—so far as I can remember, all the +more prominent among them—a bias to which their hostility +was attributable, we left off looking at the arguments against +“Darwinism,” as we now began to call it, and +pigeon-holed the matter to the effect that there was one +evolution, and that Mr. Darwin was its prophet.</p> +<p>The blame of our errors and oversights rests primarily with +Mr. Darwin himself. The first, and far the most important, +edition of the “Origin of Species” came out as a kind +of literary Melchisedec, without father and without mother in the +works of other people. Here is its opening +paragraph:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“When on board H.M.S. ‘Beagle’ +as naturalist, I was much struck with certain facts in the +distribution of the inhabitants of South America, and in the +geological relations of the present to the past inhabitants of +that continent. These facts seemed to me to throw some +light on the origin of species—that mystery of mysteries, +as it has been called by one of our greatest philosophers. +On my return home, it occurred to me, in 1837, that something +might be made out on this question by patiently accumulating and +reflecting upon all sorts of facts which could possibly have any +bearing on it. After five years’ work I allowed +myself to speculate on the subject, and drew up some short notes; +these I enlarged in 1844 into a sketch of the conclusions which +then seemed to me probable: from that period to the present day I +have steadily pursued the same object. I hope that I may be +excused for entering on these personal details, as I give them to +show that I have not been hasty in coming to a decision.” +<a name="citation8a"></a><a href="#footnote8a" +class="citation">[8a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>In the latest edition this passage remains unaltered, except +in one unimportant respect. What could more completely +throw us off the scent of the earlier writers? If they had +written anything worthy of our attention, or indeed if there had +been any earlier writers at all, Mr. Darwin would have been the +first to tell us about them, and to award them their due meed of +recognition. But, no; the whole thing was an original +growth in Mr. Darwin’s mind, and he had never so much as +heard of his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin.</p> +<p>Dr. Krause, indeed, thought otherwise. In the number of +<i>Kosmos</i> for February 1879 he represented Mr. Darwin as in +his youth approaching the works of his grandfather with all the +devotion which people usually feel for the writings of a renowned +poet. <a name="citation8b"></a><a href="#footnote8b" +class="citation">[8b]</a> This should perhaps be a +delicately ironical way of hinting that Mr. Darwin did not read +his grandfather’s books closely; but I hardly think that +Dr. Krause looked at the matter in this light, for he goes on to +say that “almost every single work of the younger Darwin +may be paralleled by at least a chapter in the works of his +ancestor: the mystery of heredity, adaptation, the protective +arrangements of animals and plants, sexual selection, +insectivorous plants, and the analysis of the emotions and +sociological impulses; nay, even the studies on infants are to be +found already discussed in the pages of the elder Darwin.” +<a name="citation8c"></a><a href="#footnote8c" +class="citation">[8c]</a></p> +<p>Nevertheless, innocent as Mr. Darwin’s opening sentence +appeared, it contained enough to have put us upon our +guard. When he informed us that, on his return from a long +voyage, “it occurred to” him that the way to make +anything out about his subject was to collect and reflect upon +the facts that bore upon it, it should have occurred to us in our +turn, that when people betray a return of consciousness upon such +matters as this, they are on the confines of that state in which +other and not less elementary matters will not “occur +to” them. The introduction of the word +“patiently” should have been conclusive. I will +not analyse more of the sentence, but will repeat the next two +lines:—“After five years of work, I allowed myself to +speculate upon the subject, and drew up some short +notes.” We read this, thousands of us, and were +blind.</p> +<p>If Dr. Erasmus Darwin’s name was not mentioned in the +first edition of the “Origin of Species,” we should +not be surprised at there being no notice taken of Buffon, or at +Lamarck’s being referred to only twice—on the first +occasion to be serenely waved aside, he and all his works; <a +name="citation9a"></a><a href="#footnote9a" +class="citation">[9a]</a> on the second, <a +name="citation9b"></a><a href="#footnote9b" +class="citation">[9b]</a> to be commended on a point of +detail. The author of the “Vestiges of +Creation” was more widely known to English readers, having +written more recently and nearer home. He was dealt with +summarily, on an early and prominent page, by a +misrepresentation, which was silently expunged in later editions +of the “Origin of Species.” In his later +editions (I believe first in his third, when 6000 copies had been +already sold), Mr. Darwin did indeed introduce a few pages in +which he gave what he designated as a “brief but imperfect +sketch” of the progress of opinion on the origin of species +prior to the appearance of his own work; but the general +impression which a book conveys to, and leaves upon, the public +is conveyed by the first edition—the one which is alone, +with rare exceptions, reviewed; and in the first edition of the +“Origin of Species” Mr. Darwin’s great +precursors were all either ignored or misrepresented. +Moreover, the “brief but imperfect sketch,” when it +did come, was so very brief, but, in spite of this (for this is +what I suppose Mr. Darwin must mean), so very imperfect, that it +might as well have been left unwritten for all the help it gave +the reader to see the true question at issue between the original +propounders of the theory of evolution and Mr. Charles Darwin +himself.</p> +<p>That question is this: Whether variation is in the main +attributable to a known general principle, or whether it is +not?—whether the minute variations whose accumulation +results in specific and generic differences are referable to +something which will ensure their appearing in a certain definite +direction, or in certain definite directions, for long periods +together, and in many individuals, or whether they are +not?—whether, in a word, these variations are in the main +definite or indefinite?</p> +<p>It is observable that the leading men of science seem rarely +to understand this even now. I am told that Professor +Huxley, in his recent lecture on the coming of age of the +“Origin of Species,” never so much as alluded to the +existence of any such division of opinion as this. He did +not even, I am assured, mention “natural selection,” +but appeared to believe, with Professor Tyndall, <a +name="citation10a"></a><a href="#footnote10a" +class="citation">[10a]</a> that “evolution” is +“Mr. Darwin’s theory.” In his article on +evolution in the latest edition of the “Encyclopædia +Britannica,” I find only a veiled perception of the point +wherein Mr. Darwin is at variance with his precursors. +Professor Huxley evidently knows little of these writers beyond +their names; if he had known more, it is impossible he should +have written that “Buffon contributed nothing to the +general doctrine of evolution,” <a +name="citation10b"></a><a href="#footnote10b" +class="citation">[10b]</a> and that Erasmus Darwin, “though +a zealous evolutionist, can hardly be said to have made any real +advance on his predecessors.” <a name="citation11"></a><a +href="#footnote11" class="citation">[11]</a> The article is +in a high degree unsatisfactory, and betrays at once an amount of +ignorance and of perception which leaves an uncomfortable +impression.</p> +<p>If this is the state of things that prevails even now, it is +not surprising that in 1860 the general public should, with few +exceptions, have known of only one evolution, namely, that +propounded by Mr. Darwin. As a member of the general +public, at that time residing eighteen miles from the nearest +human habitation, and three days’ journey on horseback from +a bookseller’s shop, I became one of Mr. Darwin’s +many enthusiastic admirers, and wrote a philosophical dialogue +(the most offensive form, except poetry and books of travel into +supposed unknown countries, that even literature can assume) upon +the “Origin of Species.” This production +appeared in the <i>Press</i>, Canterbury, New Zealand, in 1861 or +1862, but I have long lost the only copy I had.</p> +<h2><a name="page12"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +12</span>Chapter II</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">How I came to write “Life and +Habit,” and the circumstances of its completion.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">It</span> was impossible, however, for Mr. +Darwin’s readers to leave the matter as Mr. Darwin had left +it. We wanted to know whence came that germ or those germs +of life which, if Mr. Darwin was right, were once the +world’s only inhabitants. They could hardly have come +hither from some other world; they could not in their wet, cold, +slimy state have travelled through the dry ethereal medium which +we call space, and yet remained alive. If they travelled +slowly, they would die; if fast, they would catch fire, as +meteors do on entering the earth’s atmosphere. The +idea, again, of their having been created by a +quasi-anthropomorphic being out of the matter upon the earth was +at variance with the whole spirit of evolution, which indicated +that no such being could exist except as himself the result, and +not the cause, of evolution. Having got back from ourselves +to the monad, we were suddenly to begin again with something +which was either unthinkable, or was only ourselves again upon a +larger scale—to return to the same point as that from which +we had started, only made harder for us to stand upon.</p> +<p>There was only one other conception possible, namely, that the +germs had been developed in the course of time from some thing or +things that were not what we called living at all; that they had +grown up, in fact, out of the material substances and forces of +the world in some manner more or less analogous to that in which +man had been developed from themselves.</p> +<p>I first asked myself whether life might not, after all, +resolve itself into the complexity of arrangement of an +inconceivably intricate mechanism. Kittens think our +shoe-strings are alive when they see us lacing them, because they +see the tag at the end jump about without understanding all the +ins and outs of how it comes to do so. “Of +course,” they argue, “if we cannot understand how a +thing comes to move, it must move of itself, for there can be no +motion beyond our comprehension but what is spontaneous; if the +motion is spontaneous, the thing moving must he alive, for +nothing can move of itself or without our understanding why +unless it is alive. Everything that is alive and not too +large can be tortured, and perhaps eaten; let us therefore spring +upon the tag” and they spring upon it. Cats are above +this; yet give the cat something which presents a few more of +those appearances which she is accustomed to see whenever she +sees life, and she will fall as easy a prey to the power which +association exercises over all that lives as the kitten +itself. Show her a toy-mouse that can run a few yards after +being wound up; the form, colour, and action of a mouse being +here, there is no good cat which will not conclude that so many +of the appearances of mousehood could not be present at the same +time without the presence also of the remainder. She will, +therefore, spring upon the toy as eagerly as the kitten upon the +tag.</p> +<p>Suppose the toy more complex still, so that it might run a few +yards, stop, and run on again without an additional winding up; +and suppose it so constructed that it could imitate eating and +drinking, and could make as though the mouse were cleaning its +face with its paws. Should we not at first be taken in +ourselves, and assume the presence of the remaining facts of +life, though in reality they were not there? Query, +therefore, whether a machine so complex as to be prepared with a +corresponding manner of action for each one of the successive +emergencies of life as it arose, would not take us in for good +and all, and look so much as if it were alive that, whether we +liked it or not, we should be compelled to think it and call it +so; and whether the being alive was not simply the being an +exceedingly complicated machine, whose parts were set in motion +by the action upon them of exterior circumstances; whether, in +fact, man was not a kind of toy-mouse in the shape of a man, only +capable of going for seventy or eighty years, instead of half as +many seconds, and as much more versatile as he is more +durable? Of course I had an uneasy feeling that if I thus +made all plants and men into machines, these machines must have +what all other machines have if they are machines at all—a +designer, and some one to wind them up and work them; but I +thought this might wait for the present, and was perfectly ready +then, as now, to accept a designer from without, if the facts +upon examination rendered such a belief reasonable.</p> +<p>If, then, men were not really alive after all, but were only +machines of so complicated a make that it was less trouble to us +to cut the difficulty and say that that kind of mechanism was +“being alive,” why should not machines ultimately +become as complicated as we are, or at any rate complicated +enough to be called living, and to be indeed as living as it was +in the nature of anything at all to be? If it was only a +case of their becoming more complicated, we were certainly doing +our best to make them so.</p> +<p>I do not suppose I at that time saw that this view comes to +much the same as denying that there are such qualities as life +and consciousness at all, and that this, again, works round to +the assertion of their omnipresence in every molecule of matter, +inasmuch as it destroys the separation between the organic and +inorganic, and maintains that whatever the organic is the +inorganic is also. Deny it in theory as much as we please, +we shall still always feel that an organic body, unless dead, is +living and conscious to a greater or less degree. +Therefore, if we once break down the wall of partition between +the organic and inorganic, the inorganic must be living and +conscious also, up to a certain point.</p> +<p>I have been at work on this subject now for nearly twenty +years, what I have published being only a small part of what I +have written and destroyed. I cannot, therefore, remember +exactly how I stood in 1863. Nor can I pretend to see far +into the matter even now; for when I think of life, I find it so +difficult, that I take refuge in death or mechanism; and when I +think of death or mechanism, I find it so inconceivable, that it +is easier to call it life again. The only thing of which I +am sure is, that the distinction between the organic and +inorganic is arbitrary; that it is more coherent with our other +ideas, and therefore more acceptable, to start with every +molecule as a living thing, and then deduce death as the breaking +up of an association or corporation, than to start with inanimate +molecules and smuggle life into them; and that, therefore, what +we call the inorganic world must be regarded as up to a certain +point living, and instinct, within certain limits, with +consciousness, volition, and power of concerted action. It +is only of late, however, that I have come to this opinion.</p> +<p>One must start with a hypothesis, no matter how much one +distrusts it; so I started with man as a mechanism, this being +the strand of the knot that I could then pick at most +easily. Having worked upon it a certain time, I drew the +inference about machines becoming animate, and in 1862 or 1863 +wrote the sketch of the chapter on machines which I afterwards +rewrote in “Erewhon.” This sketch appeared in +the <i>Press</i>, Canterbury, N.Z., June 13, 1863; a copy of it +is in the British Museum.</p> +<p>I soon felt that though there was plenty of amusement to be +got out of this line, it was one that I should have to leave +sooner or later; I therefore left it at once for the view that +machines were limbs which we had made, and carried outside our +bodies instead of incorporating them with ourselves. A few +days or weeks later than June 13, 1863, I published a second +letter in the <i>Press</i> putting this view forward. Of +this letter I have lost the only copy I had; I have not seen it +for years. The first was certainly not good; the second, if +I remember rightly, was a good deal worse, though I believed more +in the views it put forward than in those of the first +letter. I had lost my copy before I wrote +“Erewhon,” and therefore only gave a couple of pages +to it in that book; besides, there was more amusement in the +other view. I should perhaps say there was an intermediate +extension of the first letter which appeared in the +<i>Reasoner</i>, July 1, 1865.</p> +<p>In 1870 and 1871, when I was writing “Erewhon,” I +thought the best way of looking at machines was to see them as +limbs which we had made and carried about with us or left at home +at pleasure. I was not, however, satisfied, and should have +gone on with the subject at once if I had not been anxious to +write “The Fair Haven,” a book which is a development +of a pamphlet I wrote in New Zealand and published in London in +1865.</p> +<p>As soon as I had finished this, I returned to the old subject, +on which I had already been engaged for nearly a dozen years as +continuously as other business would allow, and proposed to +myself to see not only machines as limbs, but also limbs as +machines. I felt immediately that I was upon firmer +ground. The use of the word “organ” for a limb +told its own story; the word could not have become so current +under this meaning unless the idea of a limb as a tool or machine +had been agreeable to common sense. What would follow, +then, if we regarded our limbs and organs as things that we had +ourselves manufactured for our convenience?</p> +<p>The first question that suggested itself was, how did we come +to make them without knowing anything about it? And this +raised another, namely, how comes anybody to do anything +unconsciously? The answer “habit” was not far +to seek. But can a person be said to do a thing by force of +habit or routine when it is his ancestors, and not he, that has +done it hitherto? Not unless he and his ancestors are one +and the same person. Perhaps, then, they <i>are</i> the +same person after all. What is sameness? I remembered +Bishop Butler’s sermon on “Personal Identity,” +read it again, and saw very plainly that if a man of eighty may +consider himself identical with the baby from whom he has +developed, so that he may say, “I am the person who at six +months old did this or that,” then the baby may just as +fairly claim identity with its father and mother, and say to its +parents on being born, “I was you only a few months +ago.” By parity of reasoning each living form now on +the earth must be able to claim identity with each generation of +its ancestors up to the primordial cell inclusive.</p> +<p>Again, if the octogenarian may claim personal identity with +the infant, the infant may certainly do so with the impregnate +ovum from which it has developed. If so, the octogenarian +will prove to have been a fish once in this his present +life. This is as certain as that he was living yesterday, +and stands on exactly the same foundation.</p> +<p>I am aware that Professor Huxley maintains otherwise. He +writes: “It is not true, for example, . . . that a reptile +was ever a fish, but it is true that the reptile embryo” +(and what is said here of the reptile holds good also for the +human embryo), “at one stage of its development, is an +organism, which, if it had an independent existence, must be +classified among fishes.” <a name="citation17"></a><a +href="#footnote17" class="citation">[17]</a></p> +<p>This is like saying, “It is not true that such and such +a picture was rejected for the Academy, but it is true that it +was submitted to the President and Council of the Royal Academy, +with a view to acceptance at their next forthcoming annual +exhibition, and that the President and Council regretted they +were unable through want of space, &c., +&c.”—and as much more as the reader +chooses. I shall venture, therefore, to stick to it that +the octogenarian was once a fish, or if Professor Huxley prefers +it, “an organism which must be classified among +fishes.”</p> +<p>But if a man was a fish once, he may have been a fish a +million times over, for aught he knows; for he must admit that +his conscious recollection is at fault, and has nothing whatever +to do with the matter, which must be decided, not, as it were, +upon his own evidence as to what deeds he may or may not +recollect having executed, but by the production of his +signatures in court, with satisfactory proof that he has +delivered each document as his act and deed.</p> +<p>This made things very much simpler. The processes of +embryonic development, and instinctive actions, might be now seen +as repetitions of the same kind of action by the same individual +in successive generations. It was natural, therefore, that +they should come in the course of time to be done unconsciously, +and a consideration of the most obvious facts of memory removed +all further doubt that habit—which is based on +memory—was at the bottom of all the phenomena of +heredity.</p> +<p>I had got to this point about the spring of 1874, and had +begun to write, when I was compelled to go to Canada, and for the +next year and a half did hardly any writing. The first +passage in “Life and Habit” which I can date with +certainty is the one on page 52, which runs as +follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“It is one against legion when a man tries +to differ from his own past selves. He must yield or die if +he wants to differ widely, so as to lack natural instincts, such +as hunger or thirst, and not to gratify them. It is more +righteous in a man that he should ‘eat strange food,’ +and that his cheek should ‘so much as lank not,’ than +that he should starve if the strange food be at his +command. His past selves are living in him at this moment +with the accumulated life of centuries. ‘Do this, +this, this, which we too have done, and found out profit in +it,’ cry the souls of his forefathers within him. +Faint are the far ones, coming and going as the sound of bells +wafted on to a high mountain; loud and clear are the near ones, +urgent as an alarm of fire.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This was written a few days after my arrival in Canada, June +1874. I was on Montreal mountain for the first time, and +was struck with its extreme beauty. It was a magnificent +Summer’s evening; the noble St. Lawrence flowed almost +immediately beneath, and the vast expanse of country beyond it +was suffused with a colour which even Italy cannot surpass. +Sitting down for a while, I began making notes for “Life +and Habit,” of which I was then continually thinking, and +had written the first few lines of the above, when the bells of +Notre Dame in Montreal began to ring, and their sound was carried +to and fro in a remarkably beautiful manner. I took +advantage of the incident to insert then and there the last lines +of the piece just quoted. I kept the whole passage with +hardly any alteration, and am thus able to date it +accurately.</p> +<p>Though so occupied in Canada that writing a book was +impossible, I nevertheless got many notes together for future +use. I left Canada at the end of 1875, and early in 1876 +began putting these notes into more coherent form. I did +this in thirty pages of closely written matter, of which a +pressed copy remains in my commonplace-book. I find two +dates among them—the first, “Sunday, Feb. 6, +1876”; and the second, at the end of the notes, “Feb. +12, 1876.”</p> +<p>From these notes I find that by this time I had the theory +contained in “Life and Habit” completely before me, +with the four main principles which it involves, namely, the +oneness of personality between parents and offspring; memory on +the part of offspring of certain actions which it did when in the +persons of its forefathers; the latency of that memory until it +is rekindled by a recurrence of the associated ideas; and the +unconsciousness with which habitual actions come to be +performed.</p> +<p>The first half-page of these notes may serve as a sample, and +runs thus:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Those habits and functions which we have in +common with the lower animals come mainly within the womb, or are +done involuntarily, as our [growth of] limbs, eyes, &c., and +our power of digesting food, &c. . . .</p> +<p>“We say of the chicken that it knows how to run about as +soon as it is hatched, . . . but had it no knowledge before it +was hatched?</p> +<p>“It knew how to make a great many things before it was +hatched.</p> +<p>“It grew eyes and feathers and bones.</p> +<p>“Yet we say it knew nothing about all this.</p> +<p>“After it is born it grows more feathers, and makes its +bones larger, and develops a reproductive system.</p> +<p>“Again we say it knows nothing about all this.</p> +<p>“What then does it know?</p> +<p>“Whatever it does not know so well as to be unconscious +of knowing it.</p> +<p>“Knowledge dwells upon the confines of uncertainty.</p> +<p>“When we are very certain, we do not know that we +know. When we will very strongly, we do not know that we +will.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I then began my book, but considering myself still a painter +by profession, I gave comparatively little time to writing, and +got on but slowly. I left England for North Italy in the +middle of May 1876 and returned early in August. It was +perhaps thus that I failed to hear of the account of Professor +Hering’s lecture given by Professor Ray Lankester in +<i>Nature</i>, July 13 1876; though, never at that time seeing +<i>Nature</i>, I should probably have missed it under any +circumstances. On my return I continued slowly +writing. By August 1877 I considered that I had to all +intents and purposes completed my book. My first proof +bears date October 13, 1877.</p> +<p>At this time I had not been able to find that anything like +what I was advancing had been said already. I asked many +friends, but not one of them knew of anything more than I did; to +them, as to me, it seemed an idea so new as to be almost +preposterous; but knowing how things turn up after one has +written, of the existence of which one had not known before, I +was particularly careful to guard against being supposed to claim +originality. I neither claimed it nor wished for it; for if +a theory has any truth in it, it is almost sure to occur to +several people much about the same time, and a reasonable person +will look upon his work with great suspicion unless he can +confirm it with the support of others who have gone before +him. Still I knew of nothing in the least resembling it, +and was so afraid of what I was doing, that though I could see no +flaw in the argument, nor any loophole for escape from the +conclusion it led to, yet I did not dare to put it forward with +the seriousness and sobriety with which I should have treated the +subject if I had not been in continual fear of a mine being +sprung upon me from some unexpected quarter. I am +exceedingly glad now that I knew nothing of Professor +Hering’s lecture, for it is much better that two people +should think a thing out as far as they can independently before +they become aware of each other’s works but if I had seen +it, I should either, as is most likely, not have written at all, +or I should have pitched my book in another key.</p> +<p>Among the additions I intended making while the book was in +the press, was a chapter on Mr. Darwin’s provisional theory +of Pangenesis, which I felt convinced must be right if it was Mr. +Darwin’s, and which I was sure, if I could once understand +it, must have an important bearing on “Life and +Habit.” I had not as yet seen that the principle I +was contending for was Darwinian, not Neo-Darwinian. My +pages still teemed with allusions to “natural +selection,” and I sometimes allowed myself to hope that +“Life and Habit” was going to be an adjunct to +Darwinism which no one would welcome more gladly than Mr. Darwin +himself. At this time I had a visit from a friend, who +kindly called to answer a question of mine, relative, if I +remember rightly, to “Pangenesis.” He came, +September 26, 1877. One of the first things he said was, +that the theory which had pleased him more than anything he had +heard of for some time was one referring all life to +memory. I said that was exactly what I was doing myself, +and inquired where he had met with his theory. He replied +that Professor Ray Lankester had written a letter about it in +<i>Nature</i> some time ago, but he could not remember exactly +when, and had given extracts from a lecture by Professor Ewald +Hering, who had originated the theory. I said I should not +look at it, as I had completed that part of my work, and was on +the point of going to press. I could not recast my work if, +as was most likely, I should find something, when I saw what +Professor Hering had said, which would make me wish to rewrite my +own book; it was too late in the day and I did not feel equal to +making any radical alteration; and so the matter ended with very +little said upon either side. I wrote, however, afterwards +to my friend asking him to tell me the number of <i>Nature</i> +which contained the lecture if he could find it, but he was +unable to do so, and I was well enough content.</p> +<p>A few days before this I had met another friend, and had +explained to him what I was doing. He told me I ought to +read Professor Mivart’s “Genesis of Species,” +and that if I did so I should find there were two sides to +“natural selection.” Thinking, as so many +people do—and no wonder—that “natural +selection” and evolution were much the same thing, and +having found so many attacks upon evolution produce no effect +upon me, I declined to read it. I had as yet no idea that a +writer could attack Neo-Darwinism without attacking +evolution. But my friend kindly sent me a copy; and when I +read it, I found myself in the presence of arguments different +from those I had met with hitherto, and did not see my way to +answering them. I had, however, read only a small part of +Professor Mivart’s work, and was not fully awake to the +position, when the friend referred to in the preceding paragraph +called on me.</p> +<p>When I had finished the “Genesis of Species,” I +felt that something was certainly wanted which should give a +definite aim to the variations whose accumulation was to amount +ultimately to specific and generic differences, and that without +this there could have been no progress in organic +development. I got the latest edition of the “Origin +of Species” in order to see how Mr. Darwin met Professor +Mivart, and found his answers in many respects +unsatisfactory. I had lost my original copy of the +“Origin of Species,” and had not read the book for +some years. I now set about reading it again, and came to +the chapter on instinct, where I was horrified to find the +following passage:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“But it would be a serious error to suppose +that the greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit +in one generation and then transmitted by inheritance to the +succeeding generations. It can be clearly shown that the +most wonderful instincts with which we are acquainted, namely, +those of the hive-bee and of many ants, could not possibly have +been acquired by habit.” <a name="citation23a"></a><a +href="#footnote23a" class="citation">[23a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>This showed that, according to Mr. Darwin, I had fallen into +serious error, and my faith in him, though somewhat shaken, was +far too great to be destroyed by a few days’ course of +Professor Mivart, the full importance of whose work I had not yet +apprehended. I continued to read, and when I had finished +the chapter felt sure that I must indeed have been +blundering. The concluding words, “I am surprised +that no one has hitherto advanced this demonstrative case of +neuter insects against the well-known doctrine of inherited habit +as advanced by Lamarck,” <a name="citation23b"></a><a +href="#footnote23b" class="citation">[23b]</a> were positively +awful. There was a quiet consciousness of strength about +them which was more convincing than any amount of more detailed +explanation. This was the first I had heard of any doctrine +of inherited habit as having been propounded by Lamarck (the +passage stands in the first edition, “the well-known +doctrine of Lamarck,” p. 242); and now to find that I had +been only busying myself with a stale theory of this long-since +exploded charlatan—with my book three parts written and +already in the press—it was a serious scare.</p> +<p>On reflection, however, I was again met with the overwhelming +weight of the evidence in favour of structure and habit being +mainly due to memory. I accordingly gathered as much as I +could second-hand of what Lamarck had said, reserving a study of +his “Philosophie Zoologique” for another occasion, +and read as much about ants and bees as I could find in readily +accessible works. In a few days I saw my way again; and +now, reading the “Origin of Species” more closely, +and I may say more sceptically, the antagonism between Mr. Darwin +and Lamarck became fully apparent to me, and I saw how incoherent +and unworkable in practice the later view was in comparison with +the earlier. Then I read Mr. Darwin’s answers to +miscellaneous objections, and was met, and this time brought up, +by the passage beginning “In the earlier editions of this +work,” <a name="citation24a"></a><a href="#footnote24a" +class="citation">[24a]</a> &c., on which I wrote very +severely in “Life and Habit”; <a +name="citation24b"></a><a href="#footnote24b" +class="citation">[24b]</a> for I felt by this time that the +difference of opinion between us was radical, and that the matter +must be fought out according to the rules of the game. +After this I went through the earlier part of my book, and cut +out the expressions which I had used inadvertently, and which +were inconsistent with a teleological view. This +necessitated only verbal alterations; for, though I had not known +it, the spirit of the book was throughout teleological.</p> +<p>I now saw that I had got my hands full, and abandoned my +intention of touching upon “Pangenesis.” I took +up the words of Mr. Darwin quoted above, to the effect that it +would be a serious error to ascribe the greater number of +instincts to transmitted habit. I wrote chapter xi. of +“Life and Habit,” which is headed “Instincts as +Inherited Memory”; I also wrote the four subsequent +chapters, “Instincts of Neuter Insects,” +“Lamarck and Mr. Darwin,” “Mr. Mivart and Mr. +Darwin,” and the concluding chapter, all of them in the +month of October and the early part of November 1877, the +complete book leaving the binder’s hands December 4, 1877, +but, according to trade custom, being dated 1878. It will +be seen that these five concluding chapters were rapidly written, +and this may account in part for the directness with which I said +anything I had to say about Mr. Darwin; partly this, and partly I +felt I was in for a penny and might as well be in for a +pound. I therefore wrote about Mr. Darwin’s work +exactly as I should about any one else’s, bearing in mind +the inestimable services he had undoubtedly—and must always +be counted to have—rendered to evolution.</p> +<h2><a name="page26"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +26</span>Chapter III</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">How I came to write “Evolution, Old and +New”—Mr Darwin’s “brief but +imperfect” sketch of the opinions of the writers on +evolution who had preceded him—The reception which +“Evolution, Old and New,” met with.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">Though</span> my book was out in 1877, it +was not till January 1878 that I took an opportunity of looking +up Professor Ray Lankester’s account of Professor +Hering’s lecture. I can hardly say how relieved I was +to find that it sprung no mine upon me, but that, so far as I +could gather, Professor Hering and I had come to pretty much the +same conclusion. I had already found the passage in Dr. +Erasmus Darwin which I quoted in “Evolution, Old and +New,” but may perhaps as well repeat it here. It +runs—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Owing to the imperfection of language, the +offspring is termed a new animal; but is, in truth, a branch or +elongation of the parent, since a part of the embryon animal is +or was a part of the parent, and, therefore, in strict language, +cannot be said to be entirely new at the time of its production, +and, therefore, it may retain some of the habits of the parent +system.” <a name="citation26"></a><a href="#footnote26" +class="citation">[26]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>When, then, the <i>Athenæum</i> reviewed “Life and +Habit” (January 26, 1878), I took the opportunity to write +to that paper, calling attention to Professor Hering’s +lecture, and also to the passage just quoted from Dr. Erasmus +Darwin. The editor kindly inserted my letter in his issue +of February 9, 1878. I felt that I had now done all in the +way of acknowledgment to Professor Hering which it was, for the +time, in my power to do.</p> +<p>I again took up Mr. Darwin’s “Origin of +Species,” this time, I admit, in a spirit of +scepticism. I read his “brief but imperfect” +sketch of the progress of opinion on the origin of species, and +turned to each one of the writers he had mentioned. First, +I read all the parts of the “Zoonomia” that were not +purely medical, and was astonished to find that, as Dr. Krause +has since said in his essay on Erasmus Darwin, “<i>he was +the first who proposed and persistently carried out a +well-rounded theory with regard to the development of the living +world</i>” <a name="citation27"></a><a href="#footnote27" +class="citation">[27]</a> (italics in original).</p> +<p>This is undoubtedly the case, and I was surprised at finding +Professor Huxley say concerning this very eminent man that he +could “hardly be said to have made any real advance upon +his predecessors.” Still more was I surprised at +remembering that, in the first edition of the “Origin of +Species,” Dr. Erasmus Darwin had never been so much as +named; while in the “brief but imperfect” sketch he +was dismissed with a line of half-contemptuous patronage, as +though the mingled tribute of admiration and curiosity which +attaches to scientific prophecies, as distinguished from +discoveries, was the utmost he was entitled to. “It +is curious,” says Mr. Darwin innocently, in the middle of a +note in the smallest possible type, “how largely my +grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, anticipated the views and +erroneous grounds of opinion of Lamarck in his +‘Zoonomia’ (vol. i. pp. 500–510), published in +1794”; this was all he had to say about the founder of +“Darwinism,” until I myself unearthed Dr. Erasmus +Darwin, and put his work fairly before the present generation in +“Evolution, Old and New.” Six months after I +had done this, I had the satisfaction of seeing that Mr. Darwin +had woke up to the propriety of doing much the same thing, and +that he had published an interesting and charmingly written +memoir of his grandfather, of which more anon.</p> +<p>Not that Dr. Darwin was the first to catch sight of a complete +theory of evolution. Buffon was the first to point out +that, in view of the known modifications which had been effected +among our domesticated animals and cultivated plants, the ass and +the horse should be considered as, in all probability, descended +from a common ancestor; yet, if this is so, he writes—if +the point “were once gained that among animals and +vegetables there had been, I do not say several species, but even +a single one, which had been produced in the course of direct +descent from another species; if, for example, it could be once +shown that the ass was but a degeneration from the horse, then +there is no further limit to be set to the power of Nature, and +we should not be wrong in supposing that, with sufficient time, +she has evolved all other organised forms from one primordial +type” <a name="citation28a"></a><a href="#footnote28a" +class="citation">[28a]</a> (<i>et l’on n’auroit pas +tort de supposer</i>, <i>que d’un seul être elle a su +tirer avec le temps tous les autres êtres +organisés</i>).</p> +<p>This, I imagine, in spite of Professor Huxley’s dictum, +is contributing a good deal to the general doctrine of evolution; +for though Descartes and Leibnitz may have thrown out hints +pointing more or less broadly in the direction of evolution, some +of which Professor Huxley has quoted, he has adduced nothing +approaching to the passage from Buffon given above, either in +respect of the clearness with which the conclusion intended to be +arrived at is pointed out, or the breadth of view with which the +whole ground of animal and vegetable nature is covered. The +passage referred to is only one of many to the same effect, and +must be connected with one quoted in “Evolution, Old and +New,” <a name="citation28b"></a><a href="#footnote28b" +class="citation">[28b]</a> from p. 13 of Buffon’s first +volume, which appeared in 1749, and than which nothing can well +point more plainly in the direction of evolution. It is not +easy, therefore, to understand why Professor Huxley should give +1753–78 as the date of Buffon’s work, nor yet why he +should say that Buffon was “at first a partisan of the +absolute immutability of species,” <a +name="citation29a"></a><a href="#footnote29a" +class="citation">[29a]</a> unless, indeed, we suppose he has been +content to follow that very unsatisfactory writer, Isidore +Geoffroy St. Hilaire (who falls into this error, and says that +Buffon’s first volume on animals appeared 1753), without +verifying him, and without making any reference to him.</p> +<p>Professor Huxley quotes a passage from the +“Palingénésie Philosophique” of Bonnet, +of which he says that, making allowance for his peculiar views on +the subject of generation, they bear no small resemblance to what +is understood by “evolution” at the present +day. The most important parts of the passage quoted are as +follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Should I be going too far if I were to +conjecture that the plants and animals of the present day have +arisen by a sort of natural evolution from the organised beings +which peopled the world in its original state as it left the +hands of the Creator? . . . In the outset organised beings +were probably very different from what they are now—as +different as the original world is from our present one. We +have no means of estimating the amount of these differences, but +it is possible that even our ablest naturalist, if transplanted +to the original world, would entirely fail to recognise our +plants and animals therein.” <a name="citation29b"></a><a +href="#footnote29b" class="citation">[29b]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>But this is feeble in comparison with Buffon, and did not +appear till 1769, when Buffon had been writing on evolution for +fully twenty years with the eyes of scientific Europe upon +him. Whatever concession to the opinion of Buffon Bonnet +may have been inclined to make in 1769, in 1764, when he +published his “Contemplation de la Nature,” and in +1762 when his “Considérations sur les Corps +Organes” appeared, he cannot be considered to have been a +supporter of evolution. I went through these works in 1878 +when I was writing “Evolution, Old and New,” to see +whether I could claim him as on my side; but though frequently +delighted with his work, I found it impossible to press him into +my service.</p> +<p>The pre-eminent claim of Buffon to be considered as the father +of the modern doctrine of evolution cannot be reasonably +disputed, though he was doubtless led to his conclusions by the +works of Descartes and Leibnitz, of both of whom he was an avowed +and very warm admirer. His claim does not rest upon a +passage here or there, but upon the spirit of forty quartos +written over a period of about as many years. Nevertheless +he wrote, as I have shown in “Evolution, Old and +New,” of set purpose enigmatically, whereas there was no +beating about the bush with Dr. Darwin. He speaks straight +out, and Dr. Krause is justified in saying of him “<i>that +he was the first who proposed and persistently carried out a +well-rounded theory</i>” of evolution.</p> +<p>I now turned to Lamarck. I read the first volume of the +“Philosophie Zoologique,” analysed it and translated +the most important parts. The second volume was beside my +purpose, dealing as it does rather with the origin of life than +of species, and travelling too fast and too far for me to be able +to keep up with him. Again I was astonished at the little +mention Mr. Darwin had made of this illustrious writer, at the +manner in which he had motioned him away, as it were, with his +hand in the first edition of the “Origin of Species,” +and at the brevity and imperfection of the remarks made upon him +in the subsequent historical sketch.</p> +<p>I got Isidore Geoffroy’s “Histoire Naturelle +Générale,” which Mr. Darwin commends in the +note on the second page of the historical sketch, as giving +“an excellent history of opinion” upon the subject of +evolution, and a full account of Buffon’s conclusions upon +the same subject. This at least is what I supposed Mr. +Darwin to mean. What he said was that Isidore Geoffroy +gives an excellent history of opinion on the subject of the date +of the first publication of Lamarck, and that in his work there +is a full account of Buffon’s fluctuating conclusions upon +<i>the same subject</i>. <a name="citation31"></a><a +href="#footnote31" class="citation">[31]</a> But Mr. Darwin +is a more than commonly puzzling writer. I read what M. +Geoffroy had to say upon Buffon, and was surprised to find that, +after all, according to M. Geoffroy, Buffon, and not Lamarck, was +the founder of the theory of evolution. His name, as I have +already said, was never mentioned in the first edition of the +“Origin of Species.”</p> +<p>M. Geoffroy goes into the accusations of having fluctuated in +his opinions, which he tells us have been brought against Buffon, +and comes to the conclusion that they are unjust, as any one else +will do who turns to Buffon himself. Mr. Darwin, however, +in the “brief but imperfect sketch,” catches at the +accusation, and repeats it while saying nothing whatever about +the defence. The following is still all he says: “The +first author who in modern times has treated” evolution +“in a scientific spirit was Buffon. But as his +opinions fluctuated greatly at different periods, and as he does +not enter on the causes or means of the transformation of +species, I need not here enter on details.” On the +next page, in the note last quoted, Mr. Darwin originally +repeated the accusation of Buffon’s having been fluctuating +in his opinions, and appeared to give it the imprimatur of +Isidore Geoffroy’s approval; the fact being that Isidore +Geoffroy only quoted the accusation in order to refute it; and +though, I suppose, meaning well, did not make half the case he +might have done, and abounds with misstatements. My readers +will find this matter particularly dealt with in +“Evolution, Old and New,” Chapter X.</p> +<p>I gather that some one must have complained to Mr. Darwin of +his saying that Isidore Geoffroy gave an account of +Buffon’s “fluctuating conclusions” concerning +evolution, when he was doing all he knew to maintain that +Buffon’s conclusions did not fluctuate; for I see that in +the edition of 1876 the word “fluctuating” has +dropped out of the note in question, and we now learn that +Isidore Geoffroy gives “a full account of Buffon’s +conclusions,” without the “fluctuating.” +But Buffon has not taken much by this, for his opinions are still +left fluctuating greatly at different periods on the preceding +page, and though he still was the first to treat evolution in a +scientific spirit, he still does not enter upon the causes or +means of the transformation of species. No one can +understand Mr. Darwin who does not collate the different editions +of the “Origin of Species” with some attention. +When he has done this, he will know what Newton meant by saying +he felt like a child playing with pebbles upon the seashore.</p> +<p>One word more upon this note before I leave it. Mr. +Darwin speaks of Isidore Geoffroy’s history of opinion as +“excellent,” and his account of Buffon’s +opinions as “full.” I wonder how well qualified +he is to be a judge of these matters? If he knows much +about the earlier writers, he is the more inexcusable for having +said so little about them. If little, what is his opinion +worth?</p> +<p>To return to the “brief but imperfect +sketch.” I do not think I can ever again be surprised +at anything Mr. Darwin may say or do, but if I could, I should +wonder how a writer who did not “enter upon the causes or +means of the transformation of species,” and whose opinions +“fluctuated greatly at different periods,” can be +held to have treated evolution “in a scientific +spirit.” Nevertheless, when I reflect upon the +scientific reputation Mr. Darwin has attained, and the means by +which he has won it, I suppose the scientific spirit must be much +what he here implies. I see Mr. Darwin says of his own +father, Dr. Robert Darwin of Shrewsbury, that he does not +consider him to have had a scientific mind. Mr. Darwin +cannot tell why he does not think his father’s mind to have +been fitted for advancing science, “for he was fond of +theorising, and was incomparably the best observer” Mr. +Darwin ever knew. <a name="citation33a"></a><a +href="#footnote33a" class="citation">[33a]</a> From the +hint given in the “brief but imperfect sketch,” I +fancy I can help Mr. Darwin to see why he does not think his +father’s mind to have been a scientific one. It is +possible that Dr. Robert Darwin’s opinions did not +fluctuate sufficiently at different periods, and that Mr. Darwin +considered him as having in some way entered upon the causes or +means of the transformation of species. Certainly those who +read Mr. Darwin’s own works attentively will find no lack +of fluctuation in his case; and reflection will show them that a +theory of evolution which relies mainly on the accumulation of +accidental variations comes very close to not entering upon the +causes or means of the transformation of species. <a +name="citation33b"></a><a href="#footnote33b" +class="citation">[33b]</a></p> +<p>I have shown, however, in “Evolution, Old and +New,” that the assertion that Buffon does not enter on the +causes or means of the transformation of species is absolutely +without foundation, and that, on the contrary, he is continually +dealing with this very matter, and devotes to it one of his +longest and most important chapters, <a name="citation33c"></a><a +href="#footnote33c" class="citation">[33c]</a> but I admit that +he is less satisfactory on this head than either Dr. Erasmus +Darwin or Lamarck.</p> +<p>As a matter of fact, Buffon is much more of a Neo-Darwinian +than either Dr. Erasmus Darwin or Lamarck, for with him the +variations are sometimes fortuitous. In the case of the +dog, he speaks of them as making their appearance “<i>by +some chance</i> common enough with Nature,” <a +name="citation33d"></a><a href="#footnote33d" +class="citation">[33d]</a> and being perpetuated by man’s +selection. This is exactly the “if any slight +favourable variation <i>happen</i> to arise” of Mr. Charles +Darwin. Buffon also speaks of the variations among pigeons +arising “<i>par hasard</i>.” But these +expressions are only ships; his main cause of variation is the +direct action of changed conditions of existence, while with Dr. +Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck the action of the conditions of +existence is indirect, the direct action being that of the +animals or plants themselves, in consequence of changed sense of +need under changed conditions.</p> +<p>I should say that the sketch so often referred to is at first +sight now no longer imperfect in Mr. Darwin’s +opinion. It was “brief but imperfect” in 1861 +and in 1866, but in 1876 I see that it is brief only. Of +course, discovering that it was no longer imperfect, I expected +to find it briefer. What, then, was my surprise at finding +that it had become rather longer? I have found no perfectly +satisfactory explanation of this inconsistency, but, on the +whole, incline to think that the “greatest of living +men” felt himself unequal to prolonging his struggle with +the word “but,” and resolved to lay that conjunction +at all hazards, even though the doing so might cost him the +balance of his adjectives; for I think he must know that his +sketch is still imperfect.</p> +<p>From Isidore Geoffroy I turned to Buffon himself, and had not +long to wait before I felt that I was now brought into +communication with the master-mind of all those who have up to +the present time busied themselves with evolution. For a +brief and imperfect sketch of him, I must refer my readers to +“Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p>I have no great respect for the author of the “Vestiges +of Creation,” who behaved hardly better to the writers upon +whom his own work was founded than Mr. Darwin himself has +done. Nevertheless, I could not forget the gravity of the +misrepresentation with which he was assailed on page 3 of the +first edition of the “Origin of Species,” nor impugn +the justice of his rejoinder in the following year, <a +name="citation34"></a><a href="#footnote34" +class="citation">[34]</a> when he replied that it was to be +regretted Mr. Darwin had read his work “almost as much +amiss as if, like its declared opponents, he had an interest in +misrepresenting it.” <a name="citation35a"></a><a +href="#footnote35a" class="citation">[35a]</a> I could not, +again, forget that, though Mr. Darwin did not venture to stand by +the passage in question, it was expunged without a word of +apology or explanation of how it was that he had come to write +it. A writer with any claim to our consideration will never +fall into serious error about another writer without hastening to +make a public apology as soon as he becomes aware of what he has +done.</p> +<p>Reflecting upon the substance of what I have written in the +last few pages, I thought it right that people should have a +chance of knowing more about the earlier writers on evolution +than they were likely to hear from any of our leading scientists +(no matter how many lectures they may give on the coming of age +of the “Origin of Species”) except Professor +Mivart. A book pointing the difference between teleological +and non-teleological views of evolution seemed likely to be +useful, and would afford me the opportunity I wanted for giving a +<i>résumé</i> of the views of each one of the three +chief founders of the theory, and of contrasting them with those +of Mr. Charles Darwin, as well as for calling attention to +Professor Hering’s lecture. I accordingly wrote +“Evolution, Old and New,” which was prominently +announced in the leading literary periodicals at the end of +February, or on the very first days of March 1879, <a +name="citation35b"></a><a href="#footnote35b" +class="citation">[35b]</a> as “a comparison of the theories +of Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, and Lamarck, with that of Mr. +Charles Darwin, with copious extracts from the works of the three +first-named writers.” In this book I was hardly able +to conceal the fact that, in spite of the obligations under which +we must always remain to Mr. Darwin, I had lost my respect for +him and for his work.</p> +<p>I should point out that this announcement, coupled with what I +had written in “Life and Habit,” would enable Mr. +Darwin and his friends to form a pretty shrewd guess as to what I +was likely to say, and to quote from Dr. Erasmus Darwin in my +forthcoming book. The announcement, indeed, would tell +almost as much as the book itself to those who knew the works of +Erasmus Darwin.</p> +<p>As may be supposed, “Evolution, Old and New,” met +with a very unfavourable reception at the hands of many of its +reviewers. The <i>Saturday Review</i> was furious. +“When a writer,” it exclaimed, “who has not +given as many weeks to the subject as Mr. Darwin has given years, +is not content to air his own crude though clever fallacies, but +assumes to criticise Mr. Darwin with the superciliousness of a +young schoolmaster looking over a boy’s theme, it is +difficult not to take him more seriously than he deserves or +perhaps desires. One would think that Mr. Butler was the +travelled and laborious observer of Nature, and Mr. Darwin the +pert speculator who takes all his facts at secondhand.” <a +name="citation36"></a><a href="#footnote36" +class="citation">[36]</a></p> +<p>The lady or gentleman who writes in such a strain as this +should not be too hard upon others whom she or he may consider to +write like schoolmasters. It is true I have +travelled—not much, but still as much as many others, and +have endeavoured to keep my eyes open to the facts before me; but +I cannot think that I made any reference to my travels in +“Evolution, Old and New.” I did not quite see +what that had to do with the matter. A man may get to know +a good deal without ever going beyond the four-mile radius from +Charing Cross. Much less did I imply that Mr. Darwin was +pert: pert is one of the last words that can be applied to Mr. +Darwin. Nor, again, had I blamed him for taking his facts +at secondhand; no one is to be blamed for this, provided he takes +well-established facts and acknowledges his sources. Mr. +Darwin has generally gone to good sources. The ground of +complaint against him is that he muddied the water after he had +drawn it, and tacitly claimed to be the rightful owner of the +spring, on the score of the damage he had effected.</p> +<p>Notwithstanding, however, the generally hostile, or more or +less contemptuous, reception which “Evolution, Old and +New,” met with, there were some reviews—as, for +example, those in the <i>Field</i>, <a name="citation37a"></a><a +href="#footnote37a" class="citation">[37a]</a> the <i>Daily +Chronicle</i>, <a name="citation37b"></a><a href="#footnote37b" +class="citation">[37b]</a> the <i>Athenæum</i>, <a +name="citation37c"></a><a href="#footnote37c" +class="citation">[37c]</a> the <i>Journal of Science</i>, <a +name="citation37d"></a><a href="#footnote37d" +class="citation">[37d]</a> the <i>British Journal of +Homæopathy</i>, <a name="citation37e"></a><a +href="#footnote37e" class="citation">[37e]</a> the <i>Daily +News</i>, <a name="citation37f"></a><a href="#footnote37f" +class="citation">[37f]</a> the <i>Popular Science Review</i> <a +name="citation37g"></a><a href="#footnote37g" +class="citation">[37g]</a>—which were all I could expect or +wish.</p> +<h2><a name="page38"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +38</span>Chapter IV</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">The manner in which Mr. Darwin met +“Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p><span class="smcap">By</span> far the most important notice of +“Evolution, Old and New,” was that taken by Mr. +Darwin himself; for I can hardly be mistaken in believing that +Dr. Krause’s article would have been allowed to repose +unaltered in the pages of the well-known German scientific +journal, <i>Kosmos</i>, unless something had happened to make Mr. +Darwin feel that his reticence concerning his grandfather must +now be ended.</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin, indeed, gives me the impression of wishing me to +understand that this is not the case. At the beginning of +this year he wrote to me, in a letter which I will presently give +in full, that he had obtained Dr. Krause’s consent for a +translation, and had arranged with Mr. Dallas, before my book was +“announced.” “I remember this,” he +continues, “because Mr. Dallas wrote to tell me of the +advertisement.” But Mr. Darwin is not a clear writer, +and it is impossible to say whether he is referring to the +announcement of “Evolution, Old and New”—in +which case he means that the arrangements for the translation of +Dr. Krause’s article were made before the end of February +1879, and before any public intimation could have reached him as +to the substance of the book on which I was then engaged—or +to the advertisements of its being now published, which appeared +at the beginning of May; in which case, as I have said above, Mr. +Darwin and his friends had for some time had full opportunity of +knowing what I was about. I believe, however, Mr. Darwin to +intend that he remembered the arrangements having been made +before the beginning of May—his use of the word +“announced,” instead of “advertised,” +being an accident; but let this pass.</p> +<p>Some time after Mr. Darwin’s work appeared in November +1879, I got it, and looking at the last page of the book, I read +as follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“They” (the elder Darwin and Lamarck) +“explain the adaptation to purpose of organisms by an +obscure impulse or sense of what is purpose-like; yet even with +regard to man we are in the habit of saying, that one can never +know what so-and-so is good for. The purpose-like is that +which approves itself, and not always that which is struggled for +by obscure impulses and desires. Just in the same way the +beautiful is what pleases.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I had a sort of feeling as though the writer of the above +might have had “Evolution, Old and New,” in his mind, +but went on to the next sentence, which ran—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Erasmus Darwin’s system was in itself +a most significant first step in the path of knowledge which his +grandson has opened up for us, but to wish to revive it at the +present day, as has actually been seriously attempted, shows a +weakness of thought and a mental anachronism which no one can +envy.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>“That’s me,” said I to myself +promptly. I noticed also the position in which the sentence +stood, which made it both one of the first that would be likely +to catch a reader’s eye, and the last he would carry away +with him. I therefore expected to find an open reply to +some parts of “Evolution, Old and New,” and turned to +Mr. Darwin’s preface.</p> +<p>To my surprise, I there found that what I had been reading +could not by any possibility refer to me, for the preface ran as +follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“In the February number of a well-known +German scientific journal, <i>Kosmos</i>, <a +name="citation39"></a><a href="#footnote39" +class="citation">[39]</a> Dr. Ernest Krause published a sketch of +the ‘Life of Erasmus Darwin,’ the author of the +‘Zoonomia,’ ‘Botanic Garden,’ and other +works. This article bears the title of a +‘Contribution to the History of the Descent Theory’; +and Dr. Krause has kindly allowed my brother Erasmus and myself +to have a translation made of it for publication in this +country.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Then came a note as follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Mr. Dallas has undertaken the translation, +and his scientific reputation, together with his knowledge of +German, is a guarantee for its accuracy.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I ought to have suspected inaccuracy where I found so much +consciousness of accuracy, but I did not. However this may +be, Mr. Darwin pins himself down with every circumstance of +preciseness to giving Dr. Krause’s article as it appeared +in <i>Kosmos</i>,—the whole article, and nothing but the +article. No one could know this better than Mr. Darwin.</p> +<p>On the second page of Mr. Darwin’s preface there is a +small-type note saying that my work, “Evolution, Old and +New,” had appeared since the publication of Dr. +Krause’s article. Mr. Darwin thus distinctly +precludes his readers from supposing that any passage they might +meet with could have been written in reference to, or by the +light of, my book. If anything appeared condemnatory of +that book, it was an undesigned coincidence, and would show how +little worthy of consideration I must be when my opinions were +refuted in advance by one who could have no bias in regard to +them.</p> +<p>Knowing that if the article I was about to read appeared in +February, it must have been published before my book, which was +not out till three months later, I saw nothing in Mr. +Darwin’s preface to complain of, and felt that this was +only another instance of my absurd vanity having led me to rush +to conclusions without sufficient grounds,—as if it was +likely, indeed, that Mr. Darwin should think what I had said of +sufficient importance to be affected by it. It was plain +that some one besides myself, of whom I as yet knew nothing, had +been writing about the elder Darwin, and had taken much the same +line concerning him that I had done. It was for the benefit +of this person, then, that Dr. Krause’s paragraph was +intended. I returned to a becoming sense of my own +insignificance, and began to read what I supposed to be an +accurate translation of Dr. Krause’s article as it +originally appeared, before “Evolution, Old and New,” +was published.</p> +<p>On pp. 3 and 4 of Dr. Krause’s part of Mr. +Darwin’s book (pp. 133 and 134 of the book itself), I +detected a sub-apologetic tone which a little surprised me, and a +notice of the fact that Coleridge when writing on Stillingfleet +had used the word “Darwinising.” Mr. R. Garnett +had called my attention to this, and I had mentioned it in +“Evolution, Old and New,” but the paragraph only +struck me as being a little odd.</p> +<p>When I got a few pages farther on (p. 147 of Mr. +Darwin’s book), I found a long quotation from Buffon about +rudimentary organs, which I had quoted in “Evolution, Old +and New.” I observed that Dr. Krause used the same +edition of Buffon that I did, and began his quotation two lines +from the beginning of Buffon’s paragraph, exactly as I had +done; also that he had taken his nominative from the omitted part +of the sentence across a full stop, as I had myself taken +it. A little lower I found a line of Buffon’s omitted +which I had given, but I found that at that place I had +inadvertently left two pair of inverted commas which ought to +have come out, <a name="citation41"></a><a href="#footnote41" +class="citation">[41]</a> having intended to end my quotation, +but changed my mind and continued it without erasing the +commas. It seemed to me that these commas had bothered Dr. +Krause, and made him think it safer to leave something out, for +the line he omits is a very good one. I noticed that he +translated “Mais comme nous voulons toujours tout rapporter +à un certain but,” “But we, always wishing to +refer,” &c., while I had it, “But we, ever on the +look-out to refer,” &c.; and “Nous ne faisons pas +attention que nous altérons la philosophie,” +“We fail to see that thus we deprive philosophy of her true +character,” whereas I had “We fail to see that we +thus rob philosophy of her true character.” This last +was too much; and though it might turn out that Dr. Krause had +quoted this passage before I had done so, had used the same +edition as I had, had begun two lines from the beginning of a +paragraph as I had done, and that the later resemblances were +merely due to Mr. Dallas having compared Dr. Krause’s +German translation of Buffon with my English, and very properly +made use of it when he thought fit, it looked <i>primâ +facie</i> more as though my quotation had been copied in English +as it stood, and then altered, but not quite altered +enough. This, in the face of the preface, was incredible; +but so many points had such an unpleasant aspect, that I thought +it better to send for <i>Kosmos</i> and see what I could make +out.</p> +<p>At this time I knew not one word of German. On the same +day, therefore, that I sent for <i>Kosmos</i> I began acquire +that language, and in the fortnight before <i>Kosmos</i> came had +got far enough forward for all practical purposes—that is +to say, with the help of a translation and a dictionary, I could +see whether or no a German passage was the same as what purported +to be its translation.</p> +<p>When <i>Kosmos</i> came I turned to the end of the article to +see how the sentence about mental anachronism and weakness of +thought looked in German. I found nothing of the kind, the +original article ended with some innocent rhyming doggerel about +somebody going on and exploring something with eagle eye; but ten +lines from the end I found a sentence which corresponded with one +six pages from the end of the English translation. After +this there could be little doubt that the whole of these last six +English pages were spurious matter. What little doubt +remained was afterwards removed by my finding that they had no +place in any part of the genuine article. I looked for the +passage about Coleridge’s using the word +“Darwinising”; it was not to be found in the +German. I looked for the piece I had quoted from Buffon +about rudimentary organs; but there was nothing of it, nor indeed +any reference to Buffon. It was plain, therefore, that the +article which Mr. Darwin had given was not the one he professed +to be giving. I read Mr. Darwin’s preface over again +to see whether he left himself any loophole. There was not +a chink or cranny through which escape was possible. The +only inference that could be drawn was either that some one had +imposed upon Mr. Darwin, or that Mr. Darwin, although it was not +possible to suppose him ignorant of the interpolations that had +been made, nor of the obvious purpose of the concluding sentence, +had nevertheless palmed off an article which had been added to +and made to attack “Evolution, Old and New,” as +though it were the original article which appeared before that +book was written. I could not and would not believe that +Mr. Darwin had condescended to this. Nevertheless, I saw it +was necessary to sift the whole matter, and began to compare the +German and the English articles paragraph by paragraph.</p> +<p>On the first page I found a passage omitted from the English, +which with great labour I managed to get through, and can now +translate as follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Alexander Von Humboldt used to take +pleasure in recounting how powerfully Forster’s pictures of +the South Sea Islands and St. Pierre’s illustrations of +Nature had provoked his ardour for travel and influenced his +career as a scientific investigator. How much more +impressively must the works of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, with their +reiterated foreshadowing of a more lofty interpretation of +Nature, have affected his grandson, who in his youth assuredly +approached them with the devotion due to the works of a renowned +poet.” <a name="citation43"></a><a href="#footnote43" +class="citation">[43]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>I then came upon a passage common to both German and English, +which in its turn was followed in the English by the +sub-apologetic paragraph which I had been struck with on first +reading, and which was not in the German, its place being taken +by a much longer passage which had no place in the English. +A little farther on I was amused at coming upon the following, +and at finding it wholly transformed in the supposed accurate +translation:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“How must this early and penetrating +explanation of rudimentary organs have affected the grandson when +he read the poem of his ancestor! But indeed the biological +remarks of this accurate observer in regard to certain definite +natural objects must have produced a still deeper impression upon +him, pointing, as they do, to questions which hay attained so +great a prominence at the present day; such as, Why is any +creature anywhere such as we actually see it and nothing +else? Why has such and such a plant poisonous juices? +Why has such and such another thorns? Why have birds and +fishes light-coloured breasts and dark backs, and, Why does every +creature resemble the one from which it sprung?” <a +name="citation44a"></a><a href="#footnote44a" +class="citation">[44a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>I will not weary the reader with further details as to the +omissions from and additions to the German text. Let it +suffice that the so-called translation begins on p. 131 and ends +on p. 216 of Mr. Darwin’s book. There is new matter +on each one of the pp. 132–139, while almost the whole of +pp. 147–152 inclusive, and the whole of pp. 211–216 +inclusive, are spurious—that is to say, not what the +purport to be, not translations from an article that was +published in February 1879, and before “Evolution, Old and +New,” but interpolations not published till six months +after that book.</p> +<p>Bearing in mind the contents of two of the added passages and +the tenor of the concluding sentence quoted above, <a +name="citation44b"></a><a href="#footnote44b" +class="citation">[44b]</a> I could no longer doubt that the +article had been altered by the light of and with a view to +“Evolution, Old and New.”</p> +<p>The steps are perfectly clear. First Dr. Krause +published his article in <i>Kosmos</i> and my book was announced +(its purport being thus made obvious), both in the month of +February 1879. Soon afterwards arrangements were made for a +translation of Dr. Krause’s essay, and were completed by +the end of April. Then my book came out, and in some way or +other Dr. Krause happened to get hold of it. He helped +himself—not to much, but to enough; made what other +additions to and omissions from his article he thought would best +meet “Evolution, Old and New,” and then fell to +condemning that book in a finale that was meant to be +crushing. Nothing was said about the revision which Dr. +Krause’s work had undergone, but it was expressly and +particularly declared in the preface that the English translation +was an accurate version of what appeared in the February number +of <i>Kosmos</i>, and no less expressly and particularly stated +that my book was published subsequently to this. Both these +statements are untrue; they are in Mr. Darwin’s favour and +prejudicial to myself.</p> +<p>All this was done with that well-known “happy +simplicity” of which the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, December +12, 1879, declared that Mr. Darwin was “a +master.” The final sentence, about the +“weakness of thought and mental anachronism which no one +can envy,” was especially successful. The reviewer in +the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i> just quoted from gave it in full, +and said that it was thoroughly justified. He then mused +forth a general gnome that the “confidence of writers who +deal in semi-scientific paradoxes is commonly in inverse +proportion to their grasp of the subject.” Again my +vanity suggested to me that I was the person for whose benefit +this gnome was intended. My vanity, indeed, was well fed by +the whole transaction; for I saw that not only did Mr. Darwin, +who should be the best judge, think my work worth notice, but +that he did not venture to meet it openly. As for Dr. +Krause’s concluding sentence, I thought that when a +sentence had been antedated the less it contained about +anachronism the better.</p> +<p>Only one of the reviews that I saw of Mr. Darwin’s +“Life of Erasmus Darwin” showed any knowledge of the +facts. The <i>Popular Science Review</i> for January 1880, +in flat contradiction to Mr. Darwin’s preface, said that +only part of Dr. Krause’s article was being given by Mr. +Darwin. This reviewer had plainly seen both <i>Kosmos</i> +and Mr. Darwin’s book.</p> +<p>In the same number of the <i>Popular Science Review</i>, and +immediately following the review of Mr. Darwin’s book, +there is a review of “Evolution, Old and New.” +The writer of this review quotes the passage about mental +anachronism as quoted by the reviewer in the <i>Pall Mall +Gazette</i>, and adds immediately: “This anachronism has +been committed by Mr. Samuel Butler in a . . . little volume now +before us, and it is doubtless to this, <i>which appeared while +his own work was in progress</i> [italics mine] that Dr. Krause +alludes in the foregoing passage.” Considering that +the editor of the <i>Popular Science Review</i> and the +translator of Dr. Krause’s article for Mr. Darwin are one +and the same person, it is likely the <i>Popular Science +Review</i> is well informed in saying that my book appeared +before Dr. Krause’s article had been transformed into its +present shape, and that my book was intended by the passage in +question.</p> +<p>Unable to see any way of escaping from a conclusion which I +could not willingly adopt, I thought it best to write to Mr. +Darwin, stating the facts as they appeared to myself, and asking +an explanation, which I would have gladly strained a good many +points to have accepted. It is better, perhaps, that I +should give my letter and Darwin’s answer in full. My +letter ran thus:—</p> +<blockquote><p style="text-align: right"><i>January</i> 2, +1880.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">Charles Darwin</span>, <span +class="smcap">Esq</span>., F.R.S., &c.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">Dear Sir</span>,—Will you kindly +refer me to the edition of <i>Kosmos</i> which contains the text +of Dr. Krause’s article on Dr. Erasmus Darwin, as +translated by Mr. W. S. Dallas?</p> +<p>I have before me the last February number of <i>Kosmos</i>, +which appears by your preface to be the one from which Mr. Dallas +has translated, but his translation contains long and important +passages which are not in the February number of <i>Kosmos</i>, +while many passages in the original article are omitted in the +translation.</p> +<p>Among the passages introduced are the last six pages of the +English article, which seem to condemn by anticipation the +position I have taken as regards Dr. Erasmus Darwin in my book, +“Evolution, Old and New,” and which I believe I was +the first to take. The concluding, and therefore, perhaps, +most prominent sentence of the translation you have given to the +public stands thus:—</p> +<p>“Erasmus Darwin’s system was in itself a most +significant first step in the path of knowledge which his +grandson has opened up for us, but to wish to revive it at the +present day, as has actually been seriously attempted, shows a +weakness of thought and a mental anachronism which no man can +envy.”</p> +<p>The <i>Kosmos</i> which has been sent me from Germany contains +no such passage.</p> +<p>As you have stated in your preface that my book, +“Evolution, Old and New,” appeared subsequently to +Dr. Krause’s article, and as no intimation is given that +the article has been altered and added to since its original +appearance, while the accuracy of the translation as though from +the February number of <i>Kosmos</i> is, as you expressly say, +guaranteed by Mr. Dallas’s “scientific reputation +together with his knowledge of German,” your readers will +naturally suppose that all they read in the translation appeared +in February last, and therefore before “Evolution, Old and +New,” was written, and therefore independently of, and +necessarily without reference to, that book.</p> +<p>I do not doubt that this was actually the case, but have +failed to obtain the edition which contains the passage above +referred to, and several others which appear in the +translation.</p> +<p>I have a personal interest in this matter, and venture, +therefore, to ask for the explanation which I do not doubt you +will readily give me.—Yours faithfully, S. <span +class="smcap">Butler</span>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>The following is Mr. Darwin’s answer:—</p> +<blockquote><p style="text-align: right"><i>January</i> 3, +1880.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">My Dear Sir</span>,—Dr. Krause, soon +after the appearance of his article in <i>Kosmos</i> told me that +he intended to publish it separately and to alter it +considerably, and the altered MS. was sent to Mr. Dallas for +translation. This is so common a practice that it never +occurred to me to state that the article had been modified; but +now I much regret that I did not do so. The original will +soon appear in German, and I believe will be a much larger book +than the English one; for, with Dr. Krause’s consent, many +long extracts from Miss Seward were omitted (as well as much +other matter), from being in my opinion superfluous for the +English reader. I believe that the omitted parts will +appear as notes in the German edition. Should there be a +reprint of the English Life I will state that the original as it +appeared in <i>Kosmos</i> was modified by Dr. Krause before it +was translated. I may add that I had obtained Dr. +Krause’s consent for a translation, and had arranged with +Mr. Dallas before your book was announced. I remember this +because Mr. Dallas wrote to tell me of the advertisement.—I +remain, yours faithfully, C. <span +class="smcap">Darwin</span>.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>This was not a letter I could accept. If Mr. Darwin had +said that by some inadvertence, which he was unable to excuse or +account for, a blunder had been made which he would at once +correct so far as was in his power by a letter to the +<i>Times</i> or the <i>Athenæum</i>, and that a notice of +the erratum should be printed on a flyleaf and pasted into all +unsold copies of the “Life of Erasmus Darwin,” there +would have been no more heard about the matter from me; but when +Mr. Darwin maintained that it was a common practice to take +advantage of an opportunity of revising a work to interpolate a +covert attack upon an opponent, and at the same time to misdate +the interpolated matter by expressly stating that it appeared +months sooner than it actually did, and prior to the work which +it attacked; when he maintained that what was being done was +“so common a practice that it never occurred,” to +him—the writer of some twenty volumes—to do what all +literary men must know to be inexorably requisite, I thought this +was going far beyond what was permissible in honourable warfare, +and that it was time, in the interests of literary and scientific +morality, even more than in my own, to appeal to public +opinion. I was particularly struck with the use of the +words “it never occurred to me,” and felt how +completely of a piece it was with the opening paragraph of the +“Origin of Species.” It was not merely that it +did not occur to Mr. Darwin to state that the article had been +modified since it was written—this would have been bad +enough under the circumstances but that it did occur to him to go +out of his way to say what was not true. There was no +necessity for him to have said anything about my book. It +appeared, moreover, inadequate to tell me that if a reprint of +the English Life was wanted (which might or might not be the +case, and if it was not the case, why, a shrug of the shoulders, +and I must make the best of it), Mr. Darwin might perhaps +silently omit his note about my book, as he omitted his +misrepresentation of the author of the “Vestiges of +Creation,” and put the words “revised and corrected +by the author” on his title-page.</p> +<p>No matter how high a writer may stand, nor what services he +may have unquestionably rendered, it cannot be for the general +well-being that he should be allowed to set aside the fundamental +principles of straightforwardness and fair play. When I +thought of Buffon, of Dr. Erasmus Darwin, of Lamarck and even of +the author of the “Vestiges of Creation,” to all of +whom Mr. Darwin had dealt the same measure which he was now +dealing to myself; when I thought of these great men, now dumb, +who had borne the burden and heat of the day, and whose laurels +had been filched from them; of the manner, too, in which Mr. +Darwin had been abetted by those who should have been the first +to detect the fallacy which had misled him; of the hotbed of +intrigue which science has now become; of the disrepute into +which we English must fall as a nation if such practices as Mr. +Darwin had attempted in this case were to be +tolerated;—when I thought of all this, I felt that though +prayers for the repose of dead men’s souls might be +unavailing, yet a defence of their work and memory, no matter +against what odds, might avail the living, and resolved that I +would do my utmost to make my countrymen aware of the spirit now +ruling among those whom they delight to honour.</p> +<p>At first I thought I ought to continue the correspondence +privately with Mr. Darwin, and explain to him that his letter was +insufficient, but on reflection I felt that little good was +likely to come of a second letter, if what I had already written +was not enough. I therefore wrote to the +<i>Athenæum</i> and gave a condensed account of the facts +contained in the last ten or a dozen pages. My letter +appeared January 31, 1880. <a name="citation50"></a><a +href="#footnote50" class="citation">[50]</a></p> +<p>The accusation was a very grave one; it was made in a very +public place. I gave my name; I adduced the strongest +<i>primâ facie</i> grounds for the acceptance of my +statements; but there was no rejoinder, and for the best of all +reasons—that no rejoinder was possible. Besides, what +is the good of having a reputation for candour if one may not +stand upon it at a pinch? I never yet knew a person with an +especial reputation for candour without finding sooner or later +that he had developed it as animals develop their organs, through +“sense of need.” Not only did Mr. Darwin remain +perfectly quiet, but all reviewers and <i>littérateurs</i> +remained perfectly quiet also. It seemed—though I do +not for a moment believe that this is so—as if public +opinion rather approved of what Mr. Darwin had done, and of his +silence than otherwise. I saw the “Life of Erasmus +Darwin” more frequently and more prominently advertised now +than I had seen it hitherto—perhaps in the hope of selling +off the adulterated copies, and being able to reprint the work +with a corrected title page. Presently I saw Professor +Huxley hastening to the rescue with his lecture on the coming of +age of the “Origin of Species,” and by May it was +easy for Professor Ray Lankester to imply that Mr. Darwin was the +greatest of living men. I have since noticed two or three +other controversies raging in the <i>Athenæum</i> and +<i>Times</i>; in each of these cases I saw it assumed that the +defeated party, when proved to have publicly misrepresented his +adversary, should do his best to correct in public the injury +which he had publicly inflicted, but I noticed that in none of +them had the beaten side any especial reputation for +candour. This probably made all the difference. But +however this may be, Mr. Darwin left me in possession of the +field, in the hope, doubtless, that the matter would blow +over—which it apparently soon did. Whether it has +done so in reality or no, is a matter which remains to be +seen. My own belief is that people paid no attention to +what I said, as believing it simply incredible, and that when +they come to know that it is true, they will think as I do +concerning it.</p> +<p>From ladies and gentlemen of science I admit that I have no +expectations. There is no conduct so dishonourable that +people will not deny it or explain it away, if it has been +committed by one whom they recognise as of their own +persuasion. It must be remembered that facts cannot be +respected by the scientist in the same way as by other +people. It is his business to familiarise himself with +facts, and, as we all know, the path from familiarity to contempt +is an easy one.</p> +<p>Here, then, I take leave of this matter for the present. +If it appears that I have used language such as is rarely seen in +controversy, let the reader remember that the occasion is, so far +as I know, unparalleled for the cynicism and audacity with which +the wrong complained of was committed and persisted in. I +trust, however, that, though not indifferent to this, my +indignation has been mainly roused, as when I wrote +“Evolution, Old and New,” before Mr. Darwin had given +me personal ground of complaint against him, by the wrongs he has +inflicted on dead men, on whose behalf I now fight, as I trust +that some one—whom I thank by anticipation—may one +day fight on mine.</p> +<h2><a name="page52"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +52</span>Chapter V</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Introduction to Professor Hering’s +lecture.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">After</span> I had finished +“Evolution, Old and New,” I wrote some articles for +the <i>Examiner</i>, <a name="citation52"></a><a +href="#footnote52" class="citation">[52]</a> in which I carried +out the idea put forward in “Life and Habit,” that we +are one person with our ancestors. It follows from this, +that all living animals and vegetables, being—as appears +likely if the theory of evolution is accepted—descended +from a common ancestor, are in reality one person, and unite to +form a body corporate, of whose existence, however, they are +unconscious. There is an obvious analogy between this and +the manner in which the component cells of our bodies unite to +form our single individuality, of which it is not likely they +have a conception, and with which they have probably only the +same partial and imperfect sympathy as we, the body corporate, +have with them. In the articles above alluded to I +separated the organic from the inorganic, and when I came to +rewrite them, I found that this could not be done, and that I +must reconstruct what I had written. I was at work on +this—to which I hope to return shortly—when Dr. +Krause’s’ “Erasmus Darwin,” with its +preliminary notice by Mr. Charles Darwin, came out, and having +been compelled, as I have shown above, by Dr. Krause’s work +to look a little into the German language, the opportunity seemed +favourable for going on with it and becoming acquainted with +Professor Hering’s lecture. I therefore began to +translate his lecture at once, with the kind assistance of +friends whose patience seemed inexhaustible, and found myself +well rewarded for my trouble.</p> +<p>Professor Hering and I, to use a metaphor of his own, are as +men who have observed the action of living beings upon the stage +of the world, he from the point of view at once of a spectator +and of one who has free access to much of what goes on behind the +scenes, I from that of a spectator only, with none but the +vaguest notion of the actual manner in which the stage machinery +is worked. If two men so placed, after years of reflection, +arrive independently of one another at an identical conclusion as +regards the manner in which this machinery must have been +invented and perfected, it is natural that each should take a +deep interest in the arguments of the other, and be anxious to +put them forward with the utmost possible prominence. It +seems to me that the theory which Professor Hering and I are +supporting in common, is one the importance of which is hardly +inferior to that of the theory of evolution itself—for it +puts the backbone, as it were, into the theory of +evolution. I shall therefore make no apology for laying my +translation of Professor Hering’s work before my +reader.</p> +<p>Concerning the identity of the main idea put forward in +“Life and Habit” with that of Professor +Hering’s lecture, there can hardly, I think, be two +opinions. We both of us maintain that we grow our limbs as +we do, and possess the instincts we possess, because we remember +having grown our limbs in this way, and having had these +instincts in past generations when we were in the persons of our +forefathers—each individual life adding a small (but so +small, in any one lifetime, as to be hardly appreciable) amount +of new experience to the general store of memory; that we have +thus got into certain habits which we can now rarely break; and +that we do much of what we do unconsciously on the same principle +as that (whatever it is) on which we do all other habitual +actions, with the greater ease and unconsciousness the more often +we repeat them. Not only is the main idea the same, but I +was surprised to find how often Professor Hering and I had taken +the same illustrations with which to point our meaning.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, we have each of us left undealt with some points +which the other has treated of. Professor Hering, for +example, goes into the question of what memory is, and this I did +not venture to do. I confined myself to saying that +whatever memory was, heredity was also. Professor Hering +adds that memory is due to vibrations of the molecules of the +nerve fibres, which under certain circumstances recur, and bring +about a corresponding recurrence of visible action.</p> +<p>This approaches closely to the theory concerning the physics +of memory which has been most generally adopted since the time of +Bonnet, who wrote as follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“The soul never has a new sensation but by +the inter position of the senses. This sensation has been +originally attached to the motion of certain fibres. Its +reproduction or recollection by the senses will then be likewise +connected with these same fibres.” . . . <a +name="citation54a"></a><a href="#footnote54a" +class="citation">[54a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>And again:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“It appeared to me that since this memory is +connected with the body, it must depend upon some change which +must happen to the primitive state of the sensible fibres by the +action of objects. I have, therefore, admitted as probable +that the state of the fibres on which an object has acted is not +precisely the same after this action as it was before I have +conjectured that the sensible fibres experience more or less +durable modifications, which constitute the physics of memory and +recollection.” <a name="citation54b"></a><a +href="#footnote54b" class="citation">[54b]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>Professor Hering comes near to endorsing this view, and uses +it for the purpose of explaining personal identity. This, +at least, is what he does in fact, though perhaps hardly in +words. I did not say more upon the essence of personality +than that it was inseparable from the idea that the various +phases of our existence should have flowed one out of the other, +“in what we see as a continuous, though it may be at times +a very troubled, stream” <a name="citation55"></a><a +href="#footnote55" class="citation">[55]</a> but I maintained +that the identity between two successive generations was of +essentially the same kind as that existing between an infant and +an octogenarian. I thus left personal identity unexplained, +though insisting that it was the key to two apparently distinct +sets of phenomena, the one of which had been hitherto considered +incompatible with our ideas concerning it. Professor Hering +insists on this too, but he gives us farther insight into what +personal identity is, and explains how it is that the phenomena +of heredity are phenomena also of personal identity.</p> +<p>He implies, though in the short space at his command he has +hardly said so in express terms, that personal identity as we +commonly think of it—that is to say, as confined to the +single life of the individual—consists in the +uninterruptedness of a sufficient number of vibrations, which +have been communicated from molecule to molecule of the nerve +fibres, and which go on communicating each one of them its own +peculiar characteristic elements to the new matter which we +introduce into the body by way of nutrition. These +vibrations may be so gentle as to be imperceptible for years +together; but they are there, and may become perceived if they +receive accession through the running into them of a wave going +the same way as themselves, which wave has been set up in the +ether by exterior objects and has been communicated to the organs +of sense.</p> +<p>As these pages are on the point of leaving my hands, I see the +following remarkable passage in <i>Mind</i> for the current +month, and introduce it parenthetically here:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“I followed the sluggish current of hyaline +material issuing from globules of most primitive living +substance. Persistently it followed its way into space, +conquering, at first, the manifold resistances opposed to it by +its watery medium. Gradually, however, its energies became +exhausted, till at last, completely overwhelmed, it stopped, an +immovable projection stagnated to death-like rigidity. Thus +for hours, perhaps, it remained stationary, one of many such rays +of some of the many kinds of protoplasmic stars. By +degrees, then, or perhaps quite suddenly, <i>help would come to +it from foreign but congruous sources</i>. <i>It would seem +to combine with outside complemental matter</i> drifted to it at +random. Slowly it would regain thereby its vital +mobility. Shrinking at first, but gradually completely +restored and reincorporated into the onward tide of life, it was +ready to take part again in the progressive flow of a new +ray.” <a name="citation56"></a><a href="#footnote56" +class="citation">[56]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>To return to the end of the last paragraph but one. If +this is so—but I should warn the reader that Professor +Hering is not responsible for this suggestion, though it seems to +follow so naturally from what he has said that I imagine he +intended the inference to be drawn,—if this is so, +assimilation is nothing else than the communication of its own +rhythms from the assimilating to the assimilated substance, to +the effacement of the vibrations or rhythms heretofore existing +in this last; and suitability for food will depend upon whether +the rhythms of the substance eaten are such as to flow +harmoniously into and chime in with those of the body which has +eaten it, or whether they will refuse to act in concert with the +new rhythms with which they have become associated, and will +persist obstinately in pursuing their own course. In this +case they will either be turned out of the body at once, or will +disconcert its arrangements, with perhaps fatal +consequences. This comes round to the conclusion I arrived +at in “Life and Habit,” that assimilation was nothing +but the imbuing of one thing with the memories of another. +(See “Life and Habit,” pp. 136, 137, 140, +&c.)</p> +<p>It will be noted that, as I resolved the phenomena of heredity +into phenomena of personal identity, and left the matter there, +so Professor Hering resolves the phenomena of personal identity +into the phenomena of a living mechanism whose equilibrium is +disturbed by vibrations of a certain character—and leaves +it there. We now want to understand more about the +vibrations.</p> +<p>But if, according to Professor Hering, the personal identity +of the single life consists in the uninterruptedness of +vibrations, so also do the phenomena of heredity. For not +only may vibrations of a certain violence or character be +persistent unperceived for many years in a living body, and +communicate themselves to the matter it has assimilated, but they +may, and will, under certain circumstances, extend to the +particle which is about to leave the parent body as the germ of +its future offspring. In this minute piece of matter there +must, if Professor Hering is right, be an infinity of rhythmic +undulations incessantly vibrating with more or less activity, and +ready to be set in more active agitation at a moment’s +warning, under due accession of vibration from exterior +objects. On the occurrence of such stimulus, that is to +say, when a vibration of a suitable rhythm from without concurs +with one within the body so as to augment it, the agitation may +gather such strength that the touch, as it were, is given to a +house of cards, and the whole comes toppling over. This +toppling over is what we call action; and when it is the result +of the disturbance of certain usual arrangements in certain usual +ways, we call it the habitual development and instinctive +characteristics of the race. In either case, then, whether +we consider the continued identity of the individual in what we +call his single life, or those features in his offspring which we +refer to heredity, the same explanation of the phenomena is +applicable. It follows from this as a matter of course, +that the continuation of life or personal identity in the +individual and the race are fundamentally of the same kind, or, +in other words, that there is a veritable prolongation of +identity or oneness of personality between parents and +offspring. Professor Hering reaches his conclusion by +physical methods, while I reached mine, as I am told, by +metaphysical. I never yet could understand what +“metaphysics” and “metaphysical” mean; +but I should have said I reached it by the exercise of a little +common sense while regarding certain facts which are open to +every one. There is, however, so far as I can see, no +difference in the conclusion come to.</p> +<p>The view which connects memory with vibrations may tend to +throw light upon that difficult question, the manner in which +neuter bees acquire structures and instincts, not one of which +was possessed by any of their direct ancestors. Those who +have read “Life and Habit” may remember, I suggested +that the food prepared in the stomachs of the nurse-bees, with +which the neuter working bees are fed, might thus acquire a +quasi-seminal character, and be made a means of communicating the +instincts and structures in question. <a name="citation58"></a><a +href="#footnote58" class="citation">[58]</a> If +assimilation be regarded as the receiving by one substance of the +rhythms or undulations from another, the explanation just +referred to receives an accession of probability.</p> +<p>If it is objected that Professor Hering’s theory as to +continuity of vibrations being the key to memory and heredity +involves the action of more wheels within wheels than our +imagination can come near to comprehending, and also that it +supposes this complexity of action as going on within a compass +which no unaided eye can detect by reason of its littleness, so +that we are carried into a fairy land with which sober people +should have nothing to do, it may be answered that the case of +light affords us an example of our being truly aware of a +multitude of minute actions, the hundred million millionth part +of which we should have declared to be beyond our ken, could we +not incontestably prove that we notice and count them all with a +very sufficient and creditable accuracy.</p> +<p>“Who would not,” <a name="citation59a"></a><a +href="#footnote59a" class="citation">[59a]</a> says Sir John +Herschel, “ask for demonstration when told that a +gnat’s wing, in its ordinary flight, beats many hundred +times in a second? or that there exist animated and regularly +organised beings many thousands of whose bodies laid close +together would not extend to an inch? But what are these to +the astonishing truths which modern optical inquiries have +disclosed, which teach us that every point of a medium through +which a ray of light passes is affected with a succession of +periodical movements, recurring regularly at equal intervals, no +less than five hundred millions of millions of times in a second; +that it is by such movements communicated to the nerves of our +eyes that we see; nay, more, that it is the <i>difference</i> in +the frequency of their recurrence which affects us with the sense +of the diversity of colour; that, for instance, in acquiring the +sensation of redness, our eyes are affected four hundred and +eighty-two millions of millions of times; of yellowness, five +hundred and forty-two millions of millions of times; and of +violet, seven hundred and seven millions of millions of times per +second? <a name="citation59b"></a><a href="#footnote59b" +class="citation">[59b]</a> Do not such things sound more +like the ravings of madmen than the sober conclusions of people +in their waking senses? They are, nevertheless, conclusions +to which any one may most certainly arrive who will only be at +the pains of examining the chain of reasoning by which they have +been obtained.”</p> +<p>A man counting as hard as he can repeat numbers one after +another, and never counting more than a hundred, so that he shall +have no long words to repeat, may perhaps count ten thousand, or +a hundred a hundred times over, in an hour. At this rate, +counting night and day, and allowing no time for rest or +refreshment, he would count one million in four days and four +hours, or say four days only. To count a million a million +times over, he would require four million days, or roughly ten +thousand years; for five hundred millions of millions, he must +have the utterly unrealisable period of five million years. +Yet he actually goes through this stupendous piece of reckoning +unconsciously hour after hour, day after day, it may be for +eighty years, <i>often in each second</i> of daylight; and how +much more by artificial or subdued light I do not know. He +knows whether his eye is being struck five hundred millions of +millions of times, or only four hundred and eighty-two millions +of millions of times. He thus shows that he estimates or +counts each set of vibrations, and registers them according to +his results. If a man writes upon the back of a British +Museum blotting-pad of the common <i>nonpareil</i> pattern, on +which there are some thousands of small spaces each differing in +colour from that which is immediately next to it, his eye will, +nevertheless, without an effort assign its true colour to each +one of these spaces. This implies that he is all the time +counting and taking tally of the difference in the numbers of the +vibrations from each one of the small spaces in question. +Yet the mind that is capable of such stupendous computations as +these so long as it knows nothing about them, makes no little +fuss about the conscious adding together of such almost +inconceivably minute numbers as, we will say, 2730169 and +5790135—or, if these be considered too large, as 27 and +19. Let the reader remember that he cannot by any effort +bring before his mind the units, not in ones, <i>but in millions +of millions</i> of the processes which his visual organs are +undergoing second after second from dawn till dark, and then let +him demur if he will to the possibility of the existence in a +germ, of currents and undercurrents, and rhythms and counter +rhythms, also by the million of millions—each one of which, +on being overtaken by the rhythm from without that chimes in with +and stimulates it, may be the beginning of that unsettlement of +equilibrium which results in the crash of action, unless it is +timely counteracted.</p> +<p>If another objector maintains that the vibrations within the +germ as above supposed must be continually crossing and +interfering with one another in such a manner as to destroy the +continuity of any one series, it may be replied that the +vibrations of the light proceeding from the objects that surround +us traverse one another by the millions of millions every second +yet in no way interfere with one another. Nevertheless, it +must be admitted that the difficulties of the theory towards +which I suppose Professor Hering to incline are like those of all +other theories on the same subject—almost inconceivably +great.</p> +<p>In “Life and Habit” I did not touch upon these +vibrations, knowing nothing about them. Here, then, is one +important point of difference, not between the conclusions +arrived at, but between the aim and scope of the work that +Professor Hering and I severally attempted. Another +difference consists in the points at which we have left +off. Professor Hering, having established his main thesis, +is content. I, on the other hand, went on to maintain that +if vigour was due to memory, want of vigour was due to want of +memory. Thus I was led to connect memory with the phenomena +of hybridism and of old age; to show that the sterility of +certain animals under domestication is only a phase of, and of a +piece with, the very common sterility of hybrids—phenomena +which at first sight have no connection either with each other or +with memory, but the connection between which will never be lost +sight of by those who have once laid hold of it. I also +pointed out how exactly the phenomena of development agreed with +those of the abeyance and recurrence of memory, and the rationale +of the fact that puberty in so many animals and plants comes +about the end of development. The principle underlying +longevity follows as a matter of course. I have no idea how +far Professor Hering would agree with me in the position I have +taken in respect of these phenomena, but there is nothing in the +above at variance with his lecture.</p> +<p>Another matter on which Professor Hering has not touched is +the bearing of his theory on that view of evolution which is now +commonly accepted. It is plain he accepts evolution, but it +does not appear that he sees how fatal his theory is to any view +of evolution except a teleological one—the purpose residing +within the animal and not without it. There is, however, +nothing in his lecture to indicate that he does not see this.</p> +<p>It should be remembered that the question whether memory is +due to the persistence within the body of certain vibrations, +which have been already set up within the bodies of its +ancestors, is true or no, will not affect the position I took up +in “Life and Habit.” In that book I have +maintained nothing more than that whatever memory is heredity is +also. I am not committed to the vibration theory of memory, +though inclined to accept it on a <i>primâ facie</i> +view. All I am committed to is, that if memory is due to +persistence of vibrations, so is heredity; and if memory is not +so due, then no more is heredity.</p> +<p>Finally, I may say that Professor Hering’s lecture, the +passage quoted from Dr. Erasmus Darwin on p. 26 of this volume, +and a few hints in the extracts from Mr. Patrick Mathew which I +have quoted in “Evolution, Old and New,” are all that +I yet know of in other writers as pointing to the conclusion that +the phenomena of heredity are phenomena also of memory.</p> +<h2><a name="page63"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +63</span>Chapter VI</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Professor Ewald Hering “On +Memory.”</p> +<p>I <span class="smcap">will</span> now lay before the reader a +translation of Professor Hering’s own words. I have +had it carefully revised throughout by a gentleman whose native +language is German, but who has resided in England for many years +past. The original lecture is entitled “On Memory as +a Universal Function of Organised Matter,” and was +delivered at the anniversary meeting of the Imperial Academy of +Sciences at Vienna, May 30, 1870. <a name="citation63"></a><a +href="#footnote63" class="citation">[63]</a> It is as +follows:—</p> +<p>“When the student of Nature quits the narrow workshop of +his own particular inquiry, and sets out upon an excursion into +the vast kingdom of philosophical investigation, he does so, +doubtless, in the hope of finding the answer to that great +riddle, to the solution of a small part of which he devotes his +life. Those, however, whom he leaves behind him still +working at their own special branch of inquiry, regard his +departure with secret misgivings on his behalf, while the born +citizens of the kingdom of speculation among whom he would +naturalise himself, receive him with well-authorised +distrust. He is likely, therefore, to lose ground with the +first, while not gaining it with the second.</p> +<p>The subject to the consideration of which I would now solicit +your attention does certainly appear likely to lure us on towards +the flattering land of speculation, but bearing in mind what I +have just said, I will beware of quitting the department of +natural science to which I have devoted myself hitherto. I +shall, however, endeavour to attain its highest point, so as to +take a freer view of the surrounding territory.</p> +<p>It will soon appear that I should fail in this purpose if my +remarks were to confine themselves solely to physiology. I +hope to show how far psychological investigations also afford not +only permissible, but indispensable, aid to physiological +inquiries.</p> +<p>Consciousness is an accompaniment of that animal and human +organisation and of that material mechanism which it is the +province of physiology to explore; and as long as the atoms of +the brain follow their due course according to certain definite +laws, there arises an inner life which springs from sensation and +idea, from feeling and will.</p> +<p>We feel this in our own cases; it strikes us in our converse +with other people; we can see it plainly in the more highly +organised animals; even the lowest forms of life bear traces of +it; and who can draw a line in the kingdom of organic life, and +say that it is here the soul ceases?</p> +<p>With what eyes, then, is physiology to regard this two-fold +life of the organised world? Shall she close them entirely +to one whole side of it, that she may fix them more intently on +the other?</p> +<p>So long as the physiologist is content to be a physicist, and +nothing more—using the word “physicist” in its +widest signification—his position in regard to the organic +world is one of extreme but legitimate one-sidedness. As +the crystal to the mineralogist or the vibrating string to the +acoustician, so from this point of view both man and the lower +animals are to the physiologist neither more nor less than the +matter of which they consist. That animals feel desire and +repugnance, that the material mechanism of the human frame is in +chose connection with emotions of pleasure or pain, and with the +active idea-life of consciousness—this cannot, in the eyes +of the physicist, make the animal or human body into anything +more than what it actually is. To him it is a combination +of matter, subjected to the same inflexible laws as stones and +plants—a material combination, the outward and inward +movements of which interact as cause and effect, and are in as +close connection with each other and with their surroundings as +the working of a machine with the revolutions of the wheels that +compose it.</p> +<p>Neither sensation, nor idea, nor yet conscious will, can form +a link in this chain of material occurrences which make up the +physical life of an organism. If I am asked a question and +reply to it, the material process which the nerve fibre conveys +from the organ of hearing to the brain must travel through my +brain as an actual and material process before it can reach the +nerves which will act upon my organs of speech. It cannot, +on reaching a given place in the brain, change then and there +into an immaterial something, and turn up again some time +afterwards in another part of the brain as a material +process. The traveller in the desert might as well hope, +before he again goes forth into the wilderness of reality, to +take rest and refreshment in the oasis with which the Fata +Morgana illudes him; or as well might a prisoner hope to escape +from his prison through a door reflected in a mirror.</p> +<p>So much for the physiologist in his capacity of pure +physicist. As long as he remains behind the scenes in +painful exploration of the details of the machinery—as long +as he only observes the action of the players from behind the +stage—so long will he miss the spirit of the performance, +which is, nevertheless, caught easily by one who sees it from the +front. May he not, then, for once in a way, be allowed to +change his standpoint? True, he came not to see the +representation of an imaginary world; he is in search of the +actual; but surely it must help him to a comprehension of the +dramatic apparatus itself, and of the manner in which it is +worked, if he were to view its action from in front as well as +from behind, or at least allow himself to hear what sober-minded +spectators can tell him upon the subject.</p> +<p>There can be no question as to the answer; and hence it comes +that psychology is such an indispensable help to physiology, +whose fault it only in small part is that she has hitherto made +such little use of this assistance; for psychology has been late +in beginning to till her fertile field with the plough of the +inductive method, and it is only from ground so tilled that +fruits can spring which can be of service to physiology.</p> +<p>If, then, the student of nervous physiology takes his stand +between the physicist and the psychologist, and if the first of +these rightly makes the unbroken causative continuity of all +material processes an axiom of his system of investigation, the +prudent psychologist, on the other hand, will investigate the +laws of conscious life according to the inductive method, and +will hence, as much as the physicist, make the existence of fixed +laws his initial assumption. If, again, the most +superficial introspection teaches the physiologist that his +conscious life is dependent upon the mechanical adjustments of +his body, and that inversely his body is subjected with certain +limitations to his will, then it only remains for him to make one +assumption more, namely, <i>that this mutual interdependence +between the spiritual and the material is itself also dependent +on law</i>, and he has discovered the bond by which the science +of matter and the science of consciousness are united into a +single whole.</p> +<p>Thus regarded, the phenomena of consciousness become functions +of the material changes of organised substance, and +inversely—though this is involved in the use of the word +“function”—the material processes of brain +substance become functions of the phenomena of +consciousness. For when two variables are so dependent upon +one another in the changes they undergo in accordance with fixed +laws that a change in either involves simultaneous and +corresponding change in the other, the one is called a function +of the other.</p> +<p>This, then, by no means implies that the two variables +above-named—matter and consciousness—stand in the +relation of cause and effect, antecedent and consequence, to one +another. For on this subject we know nothing.</p> +<p>The materialist regards consciousness as a product or result +of matter, while the idealist holds matter to be a result of +consciousness, and a third maintains that matter and spirit are +identical; with all this the physiologist, as such, has nothing +whatever to do; his sole concern is with the fact that matter and +consciousness are functions one of the other.</p> +<p>By the help of this hypothesis of the functional +interdependence of matter and spirit, modern physiology is +enabled to bring the phenomena of consciousness within the domain +of her investigations without leaving the <i>terra firma</i> of +scientific methods. The physiologist, as physicist, can +follow the ray of light and the wave of sound or heat till they +reach the organ of sense. He can watch them entering upon +the ends of the nerves, and finding their way to the cells of the +brain by means of the series of undulations or vibrations which +they establish in the nerve filaments. Here, however, he +loses all trace of them. On the other hand, still looking +with the eyes of a pure physicist, he sees sound waves of speech +issue from the mouth of a speaker; he observes the motion of his +own limbs, and finds how this is conditional upon muscular +contractions occasioned by the motor nerves, and how these nerves +are in their turn excited by the cells of the central +organ. But here again his knowledge comes to an end. +True, he sees indications of the bridge which is to carry him +from excitation of the sensory to that of the motor nerves in the +labyrinth of intricately interwoven nerve cells, but he knows +nothing of the inconceivably complex process which is introduced +at this stage. Here the physiologist will change his +standpoint; what matter will not reveal to his inquiry, he will +find in the mirror, as it were, of consciousness; by way of a +reflection, indeed, only, but a reflection, nevertheless, which +stands in intimate relation to the object of his inquiry. +When at this point he observes how one idea gives rise to +another, how closely idea is connected with sensation and +sensation with will, and how thought, again, and feeling are +inseparable from one another, he will be compelled to suppose +corresponding successions of material processes, which generate +and are closely connected with one another, and which attend the +whole machinery of conscious life, according to the law of the +functional interdependence of matter and consciousness.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p>After this explanation I shall venture to regard under a +single aspect a great series of phenomena which apparently have +nothing to do with one another, and which belong partly to the +conscious and partly to the unconscious life of organised +beings. I shall regard them as the outcome of one and the +same primary force of organised matter—namely, its memory +or power of reproduction.</p> +<p>The word “memory” is often understood as though it +meant nothing more than our faculty of intentionally reproducing +ideas or series of ideas. But when the figures and events +of bygone days rise up again unbidden in our minds, is not this +also an act of recollection or memory? We have a perfect +right to extend our conception of memory so as to make it embrace +involuntary reproductions, of sensations, ideas, perceptions, and +efforts; but we find, on having done so, that we have so far +enlarged her boundaries that she proves to be an ultimate and +original power, the source, and at the same time the unifying +bond, of our whole conscious life.</p> +<p>We know that when an impression, or a series of impressions, +has been made upon our senses for a long time, and always in the +same way, it may come to impress itself in such a manner upon the +so-called sense-memory that hours afterwards, and though a +hundred other things have occupied our attention meanwhile, it +will yet return suddenly to our consciousness with all the force +and freshness of the original sensation. A whole group of +sensations is sometimes reproduced in its due sequence as regards +time and space, with so much reality that it illudes us, as +though things were actually present which have long ceased to be +so. We have here a striking proof of the fact that after +both conscious sensation and perception have been extinguished, +their material vestiges yet remain in our nervous system by way +of a change in its molecular or atomic disposition, <a +name="citation69"></a><a href="#footnote69" +class="citation">[69]</a> that enables the nerve substance to +reproduce all the physical processes of the original sensation, +and with these the corresponding psychical processes of sensation +and perception.</p> +<p>Every hour the phenomena of sense-memory are present with each +one of us, but in a less degree than this. We are all at +times aware of a host of more or less faded recollections of +earlier impressions, which we either summon intentionally or +which come upon us involuntarily. Visions of absent people +come and go before us as faint and fleeting shadows, and the +notes of long-forgotten melodies float around us, not actually +heard, but yet perceptible.</p> +<p>Some things and occurrences, especially if they have happened +to us only once and hurriedly, will be reproducible by the memory +in respect only of a few conspicuous qualities; in other cases +those details alone will recur to us which we have met with +elsewhere, and for the reception of which the brain is, so to +speak, attuned. These last recollections find themselves in +fuller accord with our consciousness, and enter upon it more +easily and energetically; hence also their aptitude for +reproduction is enhanced; so that what is common to many things, +and is therefore felt and perceived with exceptional frequency, +becomes reproduced so easily that eventually the actual presence +of the corresponding external <i>stimuli</i> is no longer +necessary, and it will recur on the vibrations set up by faint +<i>stimuli</i> from within. <a name="citation70"></a><a +href="#footnote70" class="citation">[70]</a> Sensations +arising in this way from within, as, for example, an idea of +whiteness, are not, indeed, perceived with the full freshness of +those raised by the actual presence of white light without us, +but they are of the same kind; they are feeble repetitions of one +and the same material brain process—of one and the same +conscious sensation. Thus the idea of whiteness arises in +our mind as a faint, almost extinct, sensation.</p> +<p>In this way those qualities which are common to many things +become separated, as it were, in our memory from the objects with +which they were originally associated, and attain an independent +existence in our consciousness as <i>ideas</i> and +<i>conceptions</i>, and thus the whole rich superstructure of our +ideas and conceptions is built up from materials supplied by +memory.</p> +<p>On examining more closely, we see plainly that memory is a +faculty not only of our conscious states, but also, and much more +so, of our unconscious ones. I was conscious of this or +that yesterday, and am again conscious of it to-day. Where +has it been meanwhile? It does not remain continuously +within my consciousness, nevertheless it returns after having +quitted it. Our ideas tread but for a moment upon the stage +of consciousness, and then go back again behind the scenes, to +make way for others in their place. As the player is only a +king when he is on the stage, so they too exist as ideas so long +only as they are recognised. How do they live when they are +off the stage? For we know that they are living somewhere; +give them their cue and they reappear immediately. They do +not exist continuously as ideas; what is continuous is the +special disposition of nerve substance in virtue of which this +substance gives out to-day the same sound which it gave yesterday +if it is rightly struck. <a name="citation71"></a><a +href="#footnote71" class="citation">[71]</a> Countless +reproductions of organic processes of our brain connect +themselves orderly together, so that one acts as a stimulus to +the next, but a phenomenon of consciousness is not necessarily +attached to every link in the chain. From this it arises +that a series of ideas may appear to disregard the order that +would be observed in purely material processes of brain substance +unaccompanied by consciousness; but on the other hand it becomes +possible for a long chain of recollections to have its due +development without each link in the chain being necessarily +perceived by ourselves. One may emerge from the bosom of +our unconscious thoughts without fully entering upon the stage of +conscious perception; another dies away in unconsciousness, +leaving no successor to take its place. Between the +“me” of to-day and the “me” of yesterday +lie night and sleep, abysses of unconsciousness; nor is there any +bridge but memory with which to span them. Who can hope +after this to disentangle the infinite intricacy of our inner +life? For we can only follow its threads so far as they +have strayed over within the bounds of consciousness. We +might as well hope to familiarise ourselves with the world of +forms that teem within the bosom of the sea by observing the few +that now and again come to the surface and soon return into the +deep.</p> +<p>The bond of union, therefore, which connects the individual +phenomena of our consciousness lies in our unconscious world; and +as we know nothing of this but what investigation into the laws +of matter teach us—as, in fact, for purely experimental +purposes, “matter” and the “unconscious” +must be one and the same thing—so the physiologist has a +full right to denote memory as, in the wider sense of the word, a +function of brain substance, whose results, it is true, fall, as +regards one part of them, into the domain of consciousness, while +another and not less essential part escapes unperceived as purely +material processes.</p> +<p>The perception of a body in space is a very complicated +process. I see suddenly before me, for example, a white +ball. This has the effect of conveying to me more than a +mere sensation of whiteness. I deduce the spherical +character of the ball from the gradations of light and shade upon +its surface. I form a correct appreciation of its distance +from my eye, and hence again I deduce an inference as to the size +of the ball. What an expenditure of sensations, ideas, and +inferences is found to be necessary before all this can be +brought about; yet the production of a correct perception of the +ball was the work only of a few seconds, and I was unconscious of +the individual processes by means of which it was effected, the +result as a whole being alone present in my consciousness.</p> +<p>The nerve substance preserves faithfully the memory of +habitual actions. <a name="citation72"></a><a href="#footnote72" +class="citation">[72]</a> Perceptions which were once long +and difficult, requiring constant and conscious attention, come +to reproduce themselves in transient and abridged guise, without +such duration and intensity that each link has to pass over the +threshold of our consciousness.</p> +<p>We have chains of material nerve processes to which eventually +a link becomes attached that is attended with conscious +perception. This is sufficiently established from the +standpoint of the physiologist, and is also proved by our +unconsciousness of many whole series of ideas and of the +inferences we draw from them. If the soul is not to ship +through the fingers of physiology, she must hold fast to the +considerations suggested by our unconscious states. As far, +however, as the investigations of the pure physicist are +concerned, the unconscious and matter are one and the same thing, +and the physiology of the unconscious is no “philosophy of +the unconscious.”</p> +<p>By far the greater number of our movements are the result of +long and arduous practice. The harmonious cooperation of +the separate muscles, the finely adjusted measure of +participation which each contributes to the working of the whole, +must, as a rule, have been laboriously acquired, in respect of +most of the movements that are necessary in order to effect +it. How long does it not take each note to find its way +from the eyes to the fingers of one who is beginning to learn the +pianoforte; and, on the other hand, what an astonishing +performance is the playing of the professional pianist. The +sight of each note occasions the corresponding movement of the +fingers with the speed of thought—a hurried glance at the +page of music before him suffices to give rise to a whole series +of harmonies; nay, when a melody has been long practised, it can +be played even while the player’s attention is being given +to something of a perfectly different character over and above +his music.</p> +<p>The will need now no longer wend its way to each individual +finger before the desired movements can be extorted from it; no +longer now does a sustained attention keep watch over the +movements of each limb; the will need exercise a supervising +control only. At the word of command the muscles become +active, with a due regard to time and proportion, and go on +working, so long as they are bidden to keep in their accustomed +groove, while a slight hint on the part of the will, will +indicate to them their further journey. How could all this +be if every part of the central nerve system, by means of which +movement is effected, were not able <a name="citation74a"></a><a +href="#footnote74a" class="citation">[74a]</a> to reproduce whole +series of vibrations, which at an earlier date required the +constant and continuous participation of consciousness, but which +are now set in motion automatically on a mere touch, as it were, +from consciousness—if it were not able to reproduce them +the more quickly and easily in proportion to the frequency of the +repetitions—if, in fact, there was no power of recollecting +earlier performances? Our perceptive faculties must have +remained always at their lowest stage if we had been compelled to +build up consciously every process from the details of the +sensation-causing materials tendered to us by our senses; nor +could our voluntary movements have got beyond the helplessness of +the child, if the necessary impulses could only be imparted to +every movement through effort of the will and conscious +reproduction of all the corresponding ideas—if, in a word, +the motor nerve system had not also its memory, <a +name="citation74b"></a><a href="#footnote74b" +class="citation">[74b]</a> though that memory is unperceived by +ourselves. The power of this memory is what is called +“the force of habit.”</p> +<p>It seems, then, that we owe to memory almost all that we +either have or are; that our ideas and conceptions are its work, +and that our every perception, thought, and movement is derived +from this source. Memory collects the countless phenomena +of our existence into a single whole; and as our bodies would be +scattered into the dust of their component atoms if they were not +held together by the attraction of matter, so our consciousness +would be broken up into as many fragments as we had lived seconds +but for the binding and unifying force of memory.</p> +<p>We have already repeatedly seen that the reproductions of +organic processes, brought about by means of the memory of the +nervous system, enter but partly within the domain of +consciousness, remaining unperceived in other and not less +important respects. This is also confirmed by numerous +facts in the life of that part of the nervous system which +ministers almost exclusively to our unconscious life +processes. For the memory of the so-called sympathetic +ganglionic system is no less rich than that of the brain and +spinal marrow, and a great part of the medical art consists in +making wise use of the assistance thus afforded us.</p> +<p>To bring, however, this part of my observations to a close, I +will take leave of the nervous system, and glance hurriedly at +other phases of organised matter, where we meet with the same +powers of reproduction, but in simpler guise.</p> +<p>Daily experience teaches us that a muscle becomes the stronger +the more we use it. The muscular fibre, which in the first +instance may have answered but feebly to the stimulus conducted +to it by the motor nerve, does so with the greater energy the +more often it is stimulated, provided, of course, that reasonable +times are allowed for repose. After each individual action +it becomes more capable, more disposed towards the same kind of +work, and has a greater aptitude for repetition of the same +organic processes. It gains also in weight, for it +assimilates more matter than when constantly at rest. We +have here, in its simplest form, and in a phase which comes home +most closely to the comprehension of the physicist, the same +power of reproduction which we encountered when we were dealing +with nerve substance, but under such far more complicated +conditions. And what is known thus certainly from muscle +substance holds good with greater or less plainness for all our +organs. More especially may we note the fact, that after +increased use, alternated with times of repose, there accrues to +the organ in all animal economy an increased power of execution +with an increased power of assimilation and a gain in size.</p> +<p>This gain in size consists not only in the enlargement of the +individual cells or fibres of which the organ is composed, but in +the multiplication of their number; for when cells have grown to +a certain size they give rise to others, which inherit more or +less completely the qualities of those from which they came, and +therefore appear to be repetitions of the same cell. This +growth, and multiplication of cells is only a special phase of +those manifold functions which characterise organised matter, and +which consist not only in what goes on within the cell substance +as alterations or undulatory movement of the molecular +disposition, but also in that which becomes visible outside the +cells as change of shape, enlargement, or subdivision. +Reproduction of performance, therefore, manifests itself to us as +reproduction of the cells themselves, as may be seen most plainly +in the case of plants, whose chief work consists in growth, +whereas with animal organism other faculties greatly +preponderate.</p> +<p>Let us now take a brief survey of a class of facts in the case +of which we may most abundantly observe the power of memory in +organised matter. We have ample evidence of the fact that +characteristics of an organism may descend to offspring which the +organism did not inherit, but which it acquired owing to the +special circumstances under which it lived; and that, in +consequence, every organism imparts to the germ that issues from +it a small heritage of acquisitions which it has added during its +own lifetime to the gross inheritance of its race.</p> +<p>When we reflect that we are dealing with the heredity of +acquired qualities which came to development in the most diverse +parts of the parent organism, it must seem in a high degree +mysterious how those parts can have any kind of influence upon a +germ which develops itself in an entirely different place. +Many mystical theories have been propounded for the elucidation +of this question, but the following reflections may serve to +bring the cause nearer to the comprehension of the +physiologist.</p> +<p>The nerve substance, in spite of its thousandfold subdivision +as cells and fibres, forms, nevertheless, a united whole, which +is present directly in all organs—nay, as more recent +histology conjectures, in each cell of the more important +organs—or is at least in ready communication with them by +means of the living, irritable, and therefore highly conductive +substance of other cells. Through the connection thus +established all organs find themselves in such a condition of +more or less mutual interdependence upon one another, that events +which happen to one are repeated in others, and a notification, +however slight, of a vibration set up <a name="citation77"></a><a +href="#footnote77" class="citation">[77]</a> in one quarter is at +once conveyed even to the farthest parts of the body. With +this easy and rapid intercourse between all parts is associated +the more difficult communication that goes on by way of the +circulation of sap or blood.</p> +<p>We see, further, that the process of the development of all +germs that are marked out for independent existence causes a +powerful reaction, even from the very beginning of that +existence, on both the conscious and unconscious life of the +whole organism. We may see this from the fact that the +organ of reproduction stands in closer and more important +relation to the remaining parts, and especially to the nervous +system, than do the other organs; and, inversely, that both the +perceived and unperceived events affecting the whole organism +find a more marked response in the reproductive system than +elsewhere.</p> +<p>We can now see with sufficient plainness in what the material +connection is established between the acquired peculiarities of +an organism, and the proclivity on the part of the germ in virtue +of which it develops the special characteristics of its +parent.</p> +<p>The microscope teaches us that no difference can be perceived +between one germ and another; it cannot, however, be objected on +this account that the determining cause of its ulterior +development must be something immaterial, rather than the +specific kind of its material constitution.</p> +<p>The curves and surfaces which the mathematician conceives, or +finds conceivable, are more varied and infinite than the forms of +animal life. Let us suppose an infinitely small segment to +be taken from every possible curve; each one of these will appear +as like every other as one germ is to another, yet the whole of +every curve lies dormant, as it were, in each of them, and if the +mathematician chooses to develop it, it will take the path +indicated by the elements of each segment.</p> +<p>It is an error, therefore, to suppose that such fine +distinctions as physiology must assume lie beyond the limits of +what is conceivable by the human mind. An infinitely small +change of position on the part of a point, or in the relations of +the parts of a segment of a curve to one another, suffices to +alter the law of its whole path, and so in like manner an +infinitely small influence exercised by the parent organism on +the molecular disposition of the germ <a name="citation78"></a><a +href="#footnote78" class="citation">[78]</a> may suffice to +produce a determining effect upon its whole farther +development.</p> +<p>What is the descent of special peculiarities but a +reproduction on the part of organised matter of processes in +which it once took part as a germ in the germ-containing organs +of its parent, and of which it seems still to retain a +recollection that reappears when time and the occasion serve, +inasmuch as it responds to the same or like stimuli in a like way +to that in which the parent organism responded, of which it was +once part, and in the events of whose history it was itself also +an accomplice? <a name="citation79"></a><a href="#footnote79" +class="citation">[79]</a> When an action through long habit +or continual practice has become so much a second nature to any +organisation that its effects will penetrate, though ever so +faintly, into the germ that lies within it, and when this last +comes to find itself in a new sphere, to extend itself, and +develop into a new creature—(the individual parts of which +are still always the creature itself and flesh of its flesh, so +that what is reproduced is the same being as that in company with +which the germ once lived, and of which it was once actually a +part)—all this is as wonderful as when a grey-haired man +remembers the events of his own childhood; but it is not more +so. Whether we say that the same organised substance is +again reproducing its past experience, or whether we prefer to +hold that an offshoot or part of the original substance has waxed +and developed itself since separation from the parent stock, it +is plain that this will constitute a difference of degree, not +kind.</p> +<p>When we reflect upon the fact that unimportant acquired +characteristics can be reproduced in offspring, we are apt to +forget that offspring is only a full-sized reproduction of the +parent—a reproduction, moreover, that goes as far as +possible into detail. We are so accustomed to consider +family resemblance a matter of course, that we are sometimes +surprised when a child is in some respect unlike its parent; +surely, however, the infinite number of points in respect of +which parents and children resemble one another is a more +reasonable ground for our surprise.</p> +<p>But if the substance of the germ can reproduce characteristics +acquired by the parent during its single life, how much more will +it not be able to reproduce those that were congenital to the +parent, and which have happened through countless generations to +the organised matter of which the germ of to-day is a +fragment? We cannot wonder that action already taken on +innumerable past occasions by organised matter is more deeply +impressed upon the recollection of the germ to which it gives +rise than action taken once only during a single lifetime. <a +name="citation80a"></a><a href="#footnote80a" +class="citation">[80a]</a></p> +<p>We must bear in mind that every organised being now in +existence represents the last link of an inconceivably long +series of organisms, which come down in a direct line of descent, +and of which each has inherited a part of the acquired +characteristics of its predecessor. Everything, +furthermore, points in the direction of our believing that at the +beginning of this chain there existed an organism of the very +simplest kind, something, in fact, like those which we call +organised germs. The chain of living beings thus appears to +be the magnificent achievement of the reproductive power of the +original organic structure from which they have all +descended. As this subdivided itself and transmitted its +characteristics <a name="citation80b"></a><a href="#footnote80b" +class="citation">[80b]</a> to its descendants, these acquired new +ones, and in their turn transmitted them—all new germs +transmitting the chief part of what had happened to their +predecessors, while the remaining part lapsed out of their +memory, circumstances not stimulating it to reproduce itself.</p> +<p>An organised being, therefore, stands before us a product of +the unconscious memory of organised matter, which, ever +increasing and ever dividing itself, ever assimilating new matter +and returning it in changed shape to the inorganic world, ever +receiving some new thing into its memory, and transmitting its +acquisitions by the way of reproduction, grows continually richer +and richer the longer it lives.</p> +<p>Thus regarded, the development of one of the more highly +organised animals represents a continuous series of organised +recollections concerning the past development of the great chain +of living forms, the last link of which stands before us in the +particular animal we may be considering. As a complicated +perception may arise by means of a rapid and superficial +reproduction of long and laboriously practised brain processes, +so a germ in the course of its development hurries through a +series of phases, hinting at them only. Often and long +foreshadowed in theories of varied characters, this conception +has only now found correct exposition from a naturalist of our +own time. <a name="citation81"></a><a href="#footnote81" +class="citation">[81]</a> For Truth hides herself under +many disguises from those who seek her, but in the end stands +unveiled before the eyes of him whom she has chosen.</p> +<p>Not only is there a reproduction of form, outward and inner +conformation of body, organs, and cells, but the habitual actions +of the parent are also reproduced. The chicken on emerging +from the eggshell runs off as its mother ran off before it; yet +what an extraordinary complication of emotions and sensations is +necessary in order to preserve equilibrium in running. +Surely the supposition of an inborn capacity for the reproduction +of these intricate actions can alone explain the facts. As +habitual practice becomes a second nature to the individual +during his single lifetime, so the often-repeated action of each +generation becomes a second nature to the race.</p> +<p>The chicken not only displays great dexterity in the +performance of movements for the effecting of which it has an +innate capacity, but it exhibits also a tolerably high perceptive +power. It immediately picks up any grain that may be thrown +to it. Yet, in order to do this, more is wanted than a mere +visual perception of the grains; there must be an accurate +apprehension of the direction and distance of the precise spot in +which each grain is lying, and there must be no less accuracy in +the adjustment of the movements of the head and of the whole +body. The chicken cannot have gained experience in these +respects while it was still in the egg. It gained it rather +from the thousands of thousands of beings that have lived before +it, and from which it is directly descended.</p> +<p>The memory of organised substance displays itself here in the +most surprising fashion. The gentle stimulus of the light +proceeding from the grain that affects the retina of the chicken, +<a name="citation82"></a><a href="#footnote82" +class="citation">[82]</a> gives occasion for the reproduction of +a many-linked chain of sensations, perceptions, and emotions, +which were never yet brought together in the case of the +individual before us. We are accustomed to regard these +surprising performances of animals as manifestations of what we +call instinct, and the mysticism of natural philosophy has ever +shown a predilection for this theme; but if we regard instinct as +the outcome of the memory or reproductive power of organised +substance, and if we ascribe a memory to the race as we already +ascribe it to the individual, then instinct becomes at once +intelligible, and the physiologist at the same time finds a point +of contact which will bring it into connection with the great +series of facts indicated above as phenomena of the reproductive +faculty. Here, then, we have a physical explanation which +has not, indeed, been given yet, but the time for which appears +to be rapidly approaching.</p> +<p>When, in accordance with its instinct, the caterpillar becomes +a chrysalis, or the bird builds its nest, or the bee its cell, +these creatures act consciously and not as blind machines. +They know how to vary their proceedings within certain limits in +conformity with altered circumstances, and they are thus liable +to make mistakes. They feel pleasure when their work +advances and pain if it is hindered; they learn by the experience +thus acquired, and build on a second occasion better than on the +first; but that even in the outset they hit so readily upon the +most judicious way of achieving their purpose, and that their +movements adapt themselves so admirably and automatically to the +end they have in view—surely this is owing to the inherited +acquisitions of the memory of their nerve substance, which +requires but a touch and it will fall at once to the most +appropriate kind of activity, thinking always, and directly, of +whatever it is that may be wanted.</p> +<p>Man can readily acquire surprising kinds of dexterity if he +confines his attention to their acquisition. Specialisation +is the mother of proficiency. He who marvels at the skill +with which the spider weaves her web should bear in mind that she +did not learn her art all on a sudden, but that innumerable +generations of spiders acquired it toilsomely and step by +step—this being about all that, as a general rule, they did +acquire. Man took to bows and arrows if his nets failed +him—the spider starved. Thus we see the body +and—what most concerns us—the whole nervous system of +the new-born animal constructed beforehand, and, as it were, +ready attuned for intercourse with the outside world in which it +is about to play its part, by means of its tendency to respond to +external stimuli in the same manner as it has often heretofore +responded in the persons of its ancestors.</p> +<p>We naturally ask whether the brain and nervous system of the +human infant are subjected to the principles we have laid down +above? Man certainly finds it difficult to acquire arts of +which the lower animals are born masters; but the brain of man at +birth is much farther from its highest development than is the +brain of an animal. It not only grows for a longer time, +but it becomes stronger than that of other living beings. +The brain of man may be said to be exceptionally young at +birth. The lower animal is born precocious, and acts +precociously; it resembles those infant prodigies whose brain, as +it were, is born old into the world, but who, in spite of, or +rather in addition to, their rich endowment at birth, in after +life develop as much mental power as others who were less +splendidly furnished to start with, but born with greater +freshness of youth. Man’s brain, and indeed his whole +body, affords greater scope for individuality, inasmuch as a +relatively greater part of it is of post-natal growth. It +develops under the influence of impressions made by the +environment upon its senses, and thus makes its acquisitions in a +more special and individual manner, whereas the animal receives +them ready made, and of a more final, stereotyped character.</p> +<p>Nevertheless, it is plain we must ascribe both to the brain +and body of the new-born infant a far-reaching power of +remembering or reproducing things which have already come to +their development thousands of times over in the persons of its +ancestors. It is in virtue of this that it acquires +proficiency in the actions necessary for its existence—so +far as it was not already at birth proficient in them—much +more quickly and easily than would be otherwise possible; but +what we call instinct in the case of animals takes in man the +looser form of aptitude, talent, and genius. <a +name="citation84"></a><a href="#footnote84" +class="citation">[84]</a> Granted that certain ideas are +not innate, yet the fact of their taking form so easily and +certainly from out of the chaos of his sensations, is due not to +his own labour, but to that of the brain substance of the +thousands of thousands of generations from whom he is +descended. Theories concerning the development of +individual consciousness which deny heredity or the power of +transmission, and insist upon an entirely fresh start for every +human soul, as though the infinite number of generations that +have gone before us might as well have never lived for all the +effect they have had upon ourselves,—such theories will +contradict the facts of our daily experience at every touch and +turn.</p> +<p>The brain processes and phenomena of consciousness which +ennoble man in the eyes of his fellows have had a less ancient +history than those connected with his physical needs. +Hunger and the reproductive instinct affected the oldest and +simplest forms of the organic world. It is in respect of +these instincts, therefore, and of the means to gratify them, +that the memory of organised substance is strongest—the +impulses and instincts that arise hence having still paramount +power over the minds of men. The spiritual life has been +superadded slowly; its most splendid outcome belongs to the +latest epoch in the history of organised matter, nor has any very +great length of time elapsed since the nervous system was first +crowned with the glory of a large and well-developed brain.</p> +<p>Oral tradition and written history have been called the memory +of man, and this is not without its truth. But there is +another and a living memory in the innate reproductive power of +brain substance, and without this both writings and oral +tradition would be without significance to posterity. The +most sublime ideas, though never so immortalised in speech or +letters, are yet nothing for heads that are out of harmony with +them; they must be not only heard, but reproduced; and both +speech and writing would be in vain were there not an inheritance +of inward and outward brain development, growing in +correspondence with the inheritance of ideas that are handed down +from age to age, and did not an enhanced capacity for their +reproduction on the part of each succeeding generation accompany +the thoughts that have been preserved in writing. +Man’s conscious memory comes to an end at death, but the +unconscious memory of Nature is true and ineradicable: whoever +succeeds in stamping upon her the impress of his work, she will +remember him to the end of time.</p> +<h2><a name="page87"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +87</span>Chapter VII</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Introduction to a translation of the chapter +upon instinct in Von Hartmann’s “Philosophy of the +Unconscious.”</p> +<p>I <span class="smcap">am</span> afraid my readers will find +the chapter on instinct from Von Hartmann’s +“Philosophy of the Unconscious,” which will now +follow, as distasteful to read as I did to translate, and would +gladly have spared it them if I could. At present, the +works of Mr. Sully, who has treated of the “Philosophy of +the Unconscious” both in the <i>Westminster Review</i> +(vol. xlix. <span class="GutSmall">N.S.</span>) and in his work +“Pessimism,” are the best source to which English +readers can have recourse for information concerning Von +Hartmann. Giving him all credit for the pains he has taken +with an ungrateful, if not impossible subject, I think that a +sufficient sample of Von Hartmann’s own words will be a +useful adjunct to Mr. Sully’s work, and may perhaps save +some readers trouble by resolving them to look no farther into +the “Philosophy of the Unconscious.” Over and +above this, I have been so often told that the views concerning +unconscious action contained in the foregoing lecture and in +“Life and Habit” are only the very fallacy of Von +Hartmann over again, that I should like to give the public an +opportunity of seeing whether this is so or no, by placing the +two contending theories of unconscious action side by side. +I hope that it will thus be seen that neither Professor Hering +nor I have fallen into the fallacy of Von Hartmann, but that +rather Von Hartmann has fallen into his fallacy through failure +to grasp the principle which Professor Hering has insisted upon, +and to connect heredity with memory.</p> +<p>Professor Hering’s philosophy of the unconscious is of +extreme simplicity. He rests upon a fact of daily and +hourly experience, namely, that practice makes things easy that +were once difficult, and often results in their being done +without any consciousness of effort. But if the repetition +of an act tends ultimately, under certain circumstances, to its +being done unconsciously, so also is the fact of an intricate and +difficult action being done unconsciously an argument that it +must have been done repeatedly already. As I said in +“Life and Habit,” it is more easy to suppose that +occasions on which such an action has been performed have not +been wanting, even though we do not see when and where they were, +than that the facility which we observe should have been attained +without practice and memory (p. 56).</p> +<p>There can be nothing better established or more easy, whether +to understand or verify, than the unconsciousness with which +habitual actions come to be performed. If, however, it is +once conceded that it is the manner of habitual action generally, +then all <i>à priori</i> objection to Professor +Hering’s philosophy of the unconscious is at an end. +The question becomes one of fact in individual cases, and of +degree.</p> +<p>How far, then, does the principle of the convertibility, as it +were, of practice and unconsciousness extend? Can any line +be drawn beyond which it shall cease to operate? If not, +may it not have operated and be operating to a vast and hitherto +unsuspected extent? This is all, and certainly it is +sufficiently simple. I sometimes think it has found its +greatest stumbling-block in its total want of mystery, as though +we must be like those conjurers whose stock in trade is a small +deal table and a kitchen-chair with bare legs, and who, with +their parade of “no deception” and “examine +everything for yourselves,” deceive worse than others who +make use of all manner of elaborate paraphernalia. It is +true we require no paraphernalia, and we produce unexpected +results, but we are not conjuring.</p> +<p>To turn now to Von Hartmann. When I read Mr. +Sully’s article in the <i>Westminster Review</i>, I did not +know whether the sense of mystification which it produced in me +was wholly due to Von Hartmann or no; but on making acquaintance +with Von Hartmann himself, I found that Mr. Sully has erred, if +at all, in making him more intelligible than he actually +is. Von Hartmann has not got a meaning. Give him +Professor Hering’s key and he might get one, but it would +be at the expense of seeing what approach he had made to a system +fallen to pieces. Granted that in his details and +subordinate passages he often both has and conveys a meaning, +there is, nevertheless, no coherence between these details, and +the nearest approach to a broad conception covering the work +which the reader can carry away with him is at once so +incomprehensible and repulsive, that it is difficult to write +about it without saying more perhaps than those who have not seen +the original will accept as likely to be true. The idea to +which I refer is that of an unconscious clairvoyance, which, from +the language continually used concerning it, must be of the +nature of a person, and which is supposed to take possession of +living beings so fully as to be the very essence of their nature, +the promoter of their embryonic development, and the instigator +of their instinctive actions. This approaches closely to +the personal God of Mosaic and Christian theology, with the +exception that the word “clairvoyance” <a +name="citation89"></a><a href="#footnote89" +class="citation">[89]</a> is substituted for God, and that the +God is supposed to be unconscious.</p> +<p>Mr. Sully says:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“When we grasp it [the philosophy of Von +Hartmann] as a whole, it amounts to nothing more than this, that +all or nearly all the phenomena of the material and spiritual +world rest upon and result from a mysterious, unconscious being, +though to call it being is really to add on an idea not +immediately contained within the all-sufficient principle. +But what difference is there between this and saying that the +phenomena of the world at large come we know not whence? . . . +The unconscious, therefore, tends to be simple phrase and nothing +more . . . No doubt there are a number of mental processes . . . +of which we are unconscious . . . but to infer from this that +they are due to an unconscious power, and to proceed to +demonstrate them in the presence of the unconscious through all +nature, is to make an unwarrantable <i>saltus</i> in +reasoning. What, in fact, is this ‘unconscious’ +but a high-sounding name to veil our ignorance? Is the +unconscious any better explanation of phenomena we do not +understand than the ‘devil-devil’ by which Australian +tribes explain the Leyden jar and its phenomena? Does it +increase our knowledge to know that we do not know the origin of +language or the cause of instinct? . . . Alike in organic +creation and the evolution of history ‘performances and +actions’—the words are those of Strauss—are +ascribed to an unconscious, which can only belong to a conscious +being. <a name="citation90a"></a><a href="#footnote90a" +class="citation">[90a]</a></p> +<p style="text-align: center">. . . . .</p> +<p>“The difficulties of the system advance as we proceed. +<a name="citation90b"></a><a href="#footnote90b" +class="citation">[90b]</a> Subtract this questionable +factor—the unconscious from Hartmann’s ‘Biology +and Psychology,’ and the chapters remain pleasant and +instructive reading. But with the third part of his +work—the Metaphysic of the Unconscious—our feet are +clogged at every step. We are encircled by the merest play +of words, the most unsatisfactory demonstrations, and most +inconsistent inferences. The theory of final causes has +been hitherto employed to show the wisdom of the world; with our +Pessimist philosopher it shows nothing but its irrationality and +misery. Consciousness has been generally supposed to be the +condition of all happiness and interest in life; here it simply +awakens us to misery, and the lower an animal lies in the scale +of conscious life, the better and the pleasanter its lot.</p> +<p style="text-align: center">. . . . .</p> +<p>“Thus, then, the universe, as an emanation of the +unconscious, has been constructed. <a name="citation90c"></a><a +href="#footnote90c" class="citation">[90c]</a> Throughout +it has been marked by design, by purpose, by finality; throughout +a wonderful adaptation of means to ends, a wonderful adjustment +and relativity in different portions has been noticed—and +all this for what conclusion? Not, as in the hands of the +natural theologians of the eighteenth century, to show that the +world is the result of design, of an intelligent, beneficent +Creator, but the manifestation of a Being whose only predicates +are negatives, whose very essence is to be unconscious. It +is not only like ancient Athens, to an unknown, but to an +unknowing God, that modern Pessimism rears its altar. Yet +surely the fact that the motive principle of existence moves in a +mysterious way outside our consciousness no way requires that the +All-one Being should be himself unconscious.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I believe the foregoing to convey as correct an idea of Von +Hartmann’s system as it is possible to convey, and will +leave it to the reader to say how much in common there is between +this and the lecture given in the preceding chapter, beyond the +fact that both touch upon unconscious actions. The extract +which will form my next chapter is only about a thirtieth part of +the entire “Philosophy of the Unconscious,” but it +will, I believe, suffice to substantiate the justice of what Mr. +Sully has said in the passages above quoted.</p> +<p>As regards the accuracy of the translation, I have submitted +all passages about which I was in the least doubtful to the same +gentleman who revised my translation of Professor Hering’s +lecture; I have also given the German wherever I thought the +reader might be glad to see it.</p> +<h2><a name="page92"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +92</span>Chapter VIII</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Translation of the chapter on “The +Unconscious in Instinct,” from Von Hartmann’s +“Philosophy of the Unconscious.”</p> +<p><span class="smcap">Von Hartmann’s</span> chapter on +instinct is as follows:—</p> +<p>Instinct is action taken in pursuance of a purpose but without +conscious perception of what the purpose is. <a +name="citation92a"></a><a href="#footnote92a" +class="citation">[92a]</a></p> +<p>A purposive action, with consciousness of the purpose and +where the course taken is the result of deliberation is not said +to be instinctive; nor yet, again, is blind aimless action, such +as outbreaks of fury on the part of offended or otherwise enraged +animals. I see no occasion for disturbing the commonly +received definition of instinct as given above; for those who +think they can refer all the so-called ordinary instincts of +animals to conscious deliberation <i>ipso facto</i> deny that +there is such a thing as instinct at all, and should strike the +word out of their vocabulary. But of this more +hereafter.</p> +<p>Assuming, then, the existence of instinctive action as above +defined, it can be explained as—</p> +<p>I. A mere necessary consequence of bodily organisation. +<a name="citation92b"></a><a href="#footnote92b" +class="citation">[92b]</a></p> +<p>II. A mechanism of brain or mind contrived by +nature.</p> +<p>III. The outcome of an unconscious activity of mind.</p> +<p>In neither of the two first cases is there any scope for the +idea of purpose; in the third, purpose must be present +immediately before the action. In the two first cases, +action is supposed to be brought about by means of an initial +arrangement, either of bodily or mental mechanism, purpose being +conceived of as existing on a single occasion only—that is +to say, in the determination of the initial arrangement. In +the third, purpose is conceived as present in every individual +instance. Let us proceed to the consideration of these +three cases.</p> +<p>Instinct is not a mere consequence of bodily organisation; +for—</p> +<p>(<i>a</i>.) Bodies may be alike, yet they may be endowed +with different instincts.</p> +<p>All spiders have the same spinning apparatus, but one kind +weaves radiating webs, another irregular ones, while a third +makes none at all, but lives in holes, whose walls it overspins, +and whose entrance it closes with a door. Almost all birds +have a like organisation for the construction of their nests (a +beak and feet), but how infinitely do their nests vary in +appearance, mode of construction, attachment to surrounding +objects (they stand, are glued on, hang, &c.), selection of +site (caves, holes, corners, forks of trees, shrubs, the ground), +and excellence of workmanship; how often, too, are they not +varied in the species of a single genus, as of +<i>parus</i>. Many birds, moreover, build no nest at +all. The difference in the songs of birds are in like +manner independent of the special construction of their voice +apparatus, nor do the modes of nest construction that obtain +among ants and bees depend upon their bodily organisation. +Organisation, as a general rule, only renders the bird capable of +singing, as giving it an apparatus with which to sing at all, but +it has nothing to do with the specific character of the execution +. . . The nursing, defence, and education of offspring cannot be +considered as in any way more dependent upon bodily organisation; +nor yet the sites which insects choose for the laying of their +eggs; nor, again, the selection of deposits of spawn, of their +own species, by male fish for impregnation. The rabbit +burrows, the hare does not, though both have the same burrowing +apparatus. The hare, however, has less need of a +subterranean place of refuge by reason of its greater +swiftness. Some birds, with excellent powers of flight, are +nevertheless stationary in their habits, as the secretary falcon +and certain other birds of prey; while even such moderate fliers +as quails are sometimes known to make very distant +migrations.</p> +<p>(<i>b</i>.) Like instincts may be found associated with +unlike organs.</p> +<p>Birds with and without feet adapted for climbing live in +trees; so also do monkeys with and without flexible tails, +squirrels, sloths, pumas, &c. Mole-crickets dig with a +well-pronounced spade upon their fore-feet, while the +burying-beetle does the same thing though it has no special +apparatus whatever. The mole conveys its winter provender +in pockets, an inch wide, long and half an inch wide within its +cheeks; the field-mouse does so without the help of any such +contrivance. The migratory instinct displays itself with +equal strength in animals of widely different form, by whatever +means they may pursue their journey, whether by water, land, or +air.</p> +<p>It is clear, therefore, that instinct is in great measure +independent of bodily organisation. Granted, indeed, that a +certain amount of bodily apparatus is a <i>sine quâ non</i> +for any power of execution at all—as, for example, that +there would be no ingenious nest without organs more or less +adapted for its construction, no spinning of a web without +spinning glands—nevertheless, it is impossible to maintain +that instinct is a consequence of organisation. The mere +existence of the organ does not constitute even the smallest +incentive to any corresponding habitual activity. A +sensation of pleasure must at least accompany the use of the +organ before its existence can incite to its employment. +And even so when a sensation of pleasure has given the impulse +which is to render it active, it is only the fact of there being +activity at all, and not the special characteristics of the +activity, that can be due to organisation. The reason for +the special mode of the activity is the very problem that we have +to solve. No one will call the action of the spider +instinctive in voiding the fluid from her spinning gland when it +is too full, and therefore painful to her; nor that of the male +fish when it does what amounts to much the same thing as +this. The instinct and the marvel lie in the fact that the +spider spins threads, and proceeds to weave her web with them, +and that the male fish will only impregnate ova of his own +species.</p> +<p>Another proof that the pleasure felt in the employment of an +organ is wholly inadequate to account for this employment is to +be found in the fact that the moral greatness of instinct, the +point in respect of which it most commands our admiration, +consists in the obedience paid to its behests, to the +postponement of all personal well-being, and at the cost, it may +be, of life itself. If the mere pleasure of relieving +certain glands from overfulness were the reason why caterpillars +generally spin webs, they would go on spinning until they had +relieved these glands, but they would not repair their work as +often as any one destroyed it, and do this again and again until +they die of exhaustion. The same holds good with the other +instincts that at first sight appear to be inspired only by a +sensation of pleasure; for if we change the circumstances, so as +to put self-sacrifice in the place of self-interest, it becomes +at once apparent that they have a higher source than this. +We think, for example, that birds pair for the sake of mere +sexual gratification; why, then, do they leave off pairing as +soon as they have laid the requisite number of eggs? That +there is a reproductive instinct over and above the desire for +sexual gratification appears from the fact that if a man takes an +egg out of the nest, the birds will come together again and the +hen will lay another egg; or, if they belong to some of the more +wary species, they will desert their nest, and make preparation +for an entirely new brood. A female wryneck, whose nest was +daily robbed of the egg she laid in it, continued to lay a new +one, which grew smaller and smaller, till, when she had laid her +twenty-ninth egg, she was found dead upon her nest. If an +instinct cannot stand the test of self-sacrifice—if it is +the simple outcome of a desire for bodily +gratification—then it is no true instinct, and is only so +called erroneously.</p> +<p>Instinct is not a mechanism of brain or mind implanted in +living beings by nature; for, if it were, then instinctive action +without any, even unconscious, activity of mind, and with no +conception concerning the purpose of the action, would be +executed mechanically, the purpose having been once for all +thought out by Nature or Providence, which has so organised the +individual that it acts henceforth as a purely mechanical +medium. We are now dealing with a psychical organisation as +the cause instinct, as we were above dealing with a +physical. A psychical organisation would be a conceivable +explanation and we need look no farther if every instinct once +belonging to an animal discharged its functions in an unvarying +manner. But this is never found to be the case, for +instincts vary when there arises a sufficient motive for varying +them. This proves that special exterior circumstances enter +into the matter, and that these circumstances are the very things +that render the attainment of the purpose possible through means +selected by the instinct. Here first do we find instinct +acting as though it were actually design with action following at +its heels, for until the arrival of the motive, the instinct +remains late and discharges no function whatever. The +motive enters by way of an idea received into the mind through +the instrumentality of the senses, and there is a constant +connection between instinct in action and all sensual images +which give information that an opportunity has arisen for +attaining the ends proposed to itself by the instinct.</p> +<p>The psychical mechanism of this constant connection must also +be looked for. It may help us here to turn to the piano for +an illustration. The struck keys are the motives, the notes +that sound in consequence are the instincts in action. This +illustration might perhaps be allowed to pass (if we also suppose +that entirely different keys can give out the same sound) if +instincts could only be compared with <i>distinctly tuned</i> +notes, so that one and the same instinct acted always in the same +manner on the rising of the motive which should set it in +action. This, however, is not so; for it is the blind +unconscious purpose of the instinct that is alone constant, the +instinct itself—that is to say, the will to make use of +certain means—varying as the means that can be most +suitably employed vary under varying circumstances.</p> +<p>In this we condemn the theory which refuses to recognise +unconscious purpose as present in each individual case of +instinctive action. For he who maintains instinct to be the +result of a mechanism of mind, must suppose a special and +constant mechanism for each variation and modification of the +instinct in accordance with exterior circumstances, <a +name="citation97"></a><a href="#footnote97" +class="citation">[97]</a> that is to say, a new string giving a +note with a new tone must be inserted, and this would involve the +mechanism in endless complication. But the fact that the +purpose is constant notwithstanding all manner of variation in +the means chosen by the instinct, proves that there is no +necessity for the supposition of such an elaborate mental +mechanism—the presence of an unconscious purpose being +sufficient to explain the facts. The purpose of the bird, +for example, that has laid her eggs is constant, and consists in +the desire to bring her young to maturity. When the +temperature of the air is insufficient to effect this, she sits +upon her eggs, and only intermits her sittings in the warmest +countries; the mammal, on the other hand, attains the fulfilment +of its instinctive purpose without any co-operation on its own +part. In warm climates many birds only sit by night, and +small exotic birds that have built in aviaries kept at a high +temperature sit little upon their eggs or not at all. How +inconceivable is the supposition of a mechanism that impels the +bird to sit as soon as the temperature falls below a certain +height! How clear and simple, on the other hand, is the +view that there is an unconscious purpose constraining the +volition of the bird to the use of the fitting means, of which +process, however, only the last link, that is to say, the will +immediately preceding the action falls within the consciousness +of the bird!</p> +<p>In South Africa the sparrow surrounds her nest with thorns as +a defence against apes and serpents. The eggs of the +cuckoo, as regards size, colour, and marking, invariably resemble +those of the birds in whose nests she lays. Sylvia +<i>ruja</i>, for example, lays a white egg with violet spots; +<i>Sylvia hippolais</i>, a red one with black spots; <i>Regulus +ignicapellus</i>, a cloudy red; but the cuckoo’s egg is in +each case so deceptive an imitation of its model, that it can +hardly be distinguished except by the structure of its shell.</p> +<p>Huber contrived that his bees should be unable to build in +their usual instinctive manner, beginning from above and working +downwards; on this they began building from below, and again +horizontally. The outermost cells that spring from the top +of the hive or abut against its sides are not hexagonal, but +pentagonal, so as to gain in strength, being attached with one +base instead of two sides. In autumn bees lengthen their +existing honey cells if these are insufficient, but in the +ensuing spring they again shorten them in order to get greater +roadway between the combs. When the full combs have become +too heavy, they strengthen the walls of the uppermost or bearing +cells by thickening them with wax and propolis. If +larvæ of working bees are introduced into the cells set +apart for drones, the working bees will cover these cells with +the flat lids usual for this kind of larvæ, and not with +the round ones that are proper for drones. In autumn, as a +general rule, bees kill their drones, but they refrain from doing +this when they have lost their queen, and keep them to fertilise +the young queen, who will be developed from larvæ that +would otherwise have become working bees. Huber observed +that they defend the entrance of their hive against the inroads +of the sphinx moth by means of skilful constructions made of wax +and propolis. They only introduce propolis when they want +it for the execution of repairs, or for some other special +purpose. Spiders and caterpillars also display marvellous +dexterity in the repair of their webs if they have been damaged, +and this requires powers perfectly distinct from those requisite +for the construction of a new one.</p> +<p>The above examples might be multiplied indefinitely, but they +are sufficient to establish the fact that instincts are not +capacities rolled, as it were, off a reel mechanically, according +to an invariable system, but that they adapt themselves most +closely to the circumstances of each case, and are capable of +such great modification and variation that at times they almost +appear to cease to be instinctive.</p> +<p>Many will, indeed, ascribe these modifications to conscious +deliberation on the part of the animals themselves, and it is +impossible to deny that in the case of the more intellectually +gifted animals there may be such a thing as a combination of +instinctive faculty and conscious reflection. I think, +however, the examples already cited are enough to show that often +where the normal and the abnormal action springs from the same +source, without any complication with conscious deliberation, +they are either both instinctive or both deliberative. <a +name="citation99"></a><a href="#footnote99" +class="citation">[99]</a> Or is that which prompts the bee +to build hexagonal prisms in the middle of her comb something of +an actually distinct character from that which impels her to +build pentagonal ones at the sides? Are there two separate +kinds of thing, one of which induces birds under certain +circumstances to sit upon their eggs, while another leads them +under certain other circumstances to refrain from doing so? +And does this hold good also with bees when they at one time kill +their brethren without mercy and at another grant them their +lives? Or with birds when they construct the kind of nest +peculiar to their race, and, again, any special provision which +they may think fit under certain circumstances to take? If +it is once granted that the normal and the abnormal +manifestations of instinct—and they are often incapable of +being distinguished—spring from a single source, then the +objection that the modification is due to conscious knowledge +will be found to be a suicidal one later on, so far as it is +directed against instinct generally. It may be sufficient +here to point out, in anticipation of remarks that will be found +in later chapters, that instinct and the power of organic +development involve the same essential principle, though +operating under different circumstances—the two melting +into one another without any definite boundary between +them. Here, then, we have conclusive proof that instinct +does not depend upon organisation of body or brain, but that, +more truly, the organisation is due to the nature and manner of +the instinct.</p> +<p>On the other hand, we must now return to a closer +consideration of the conception of a psychical mechanism. <a +name="citation100"></a><a href="#footnote100" +class="citation">[100]</a> And here we find that this +mechanism, in spite of its explaining so much, is itself so +obscure that we can hardly form any idea concerning it. The +motive enters the mind by way of a conscious sensual impression; +this is the first link of the process; the last link <a +name="citation101"></a><a href="#footnote101" +class="citation">[101]</a> appears as the conscious motive of an +action. Both, however, are entirely unlike, and neither has +anything to do with ordinary motivation, which consists +exclusively in the desire that springs from a conception either +of pleasure or dislike—the former prompting to the +attainment of any object, the latter to its avoidance. In +the case of instinct, pleasure is for the most part a concomitant +phenomenon; but it is not so always, as we have already seen, +inasmuch as the consummation and highest moral development of +instinct displays itself in self-sacrifice.</p> +<p>The true problem, however, lies far deeper than this. +For every conception of a pleasure proves that we have +experienced this pleasure already. But it follows from +this, that when the pleasure was first felt there must have been +will present, in the gratification of which will the pleasure +consisted; the question, therefore, arises, whence did the will +come before the pleasure that would follow on its gratification +was known, and before bodily pain, as, for example, of hunger, +rendered relief imperative? Yet we may see that even though +an animal has grown up apart from any others of its kind, it will +yet none the less manifest the instinctive impulses of its race, +though experience can have taught it nothing whatever concerning +the pleasure that will ensue upon their gratification. As +regards instinct, therefore, there must be a causal connection +between the motivating sensual conception and the will to perform +the instinctive action, and the pleasure of the subsequent +gratification has nothing to do with the matter. We know by +the experience of our own instincts that this causal connection +does not lie within our consciousness; <a +name="citation102a"></a><a href="#footnote102a" +class="citation">[102a]</a> therefore, if it is to be a mechanism +of any kind, it can only be either an unconscious mechanical +induction and metamorphosis of the vibrations of the conceived +motive into the vibrations of the conscious action in the brain, +or an unconscious spiritual mechanism.</p> +<p>In the first case, it is surely strange that this process +should go on unconsciously, though it is so powerful in its +effects that the will resulting from it overpowers every other +consideration, every other kind of will, and that vibrations of +this kind, when set up in the brain, become always consciously +perceived; nor is it easy to conceive in what way this +metamorphosis can take place so that the constant purpose can be +attained under varying circumstances by the resulting will in +modes that vary with variation of the special features of each +individual case.</p> +<p>But if we take the other alternative, and suppose an +unconscious mental mechanism, we cannot legitimately conceive of +the process going on in this as other than what prevails in all +mental mechanism, namely, than as by way of idea and will. +We are, therefore, compelled to imagine a causal connection +between the consciously recognised motive and the will to do the +instinctive action, through unconscious idea and will; nor do I +know how this connection can be conceived as being brought about +more simply than through a conceived and willed purpose. <a +name="citation102b"></a><a href="#footnote102b" +class="citation">[102b]</a> Arrived at this point, however, +we have attained the logical mechanism peculiar to and +inseparable from all mind, and find unconscious purpose to be an +indispensable link in every instinctive action. With this, +therefore, the conception of a mental mechanism, dead and +predestined from without, has disappeared, and has become +transformed into the spiritual life inseparable from logic, so +that we have reached the sole remaining requirement for the +conception of an actual instinct, which proves to be a conscious +willing of the means towards an unconsciously willed +purpose. This conception explains clearly and without +violence all the problems which instinct presents to us; or more +truly, all that was problematical about instinct disappears when +its true nature has been thus declared. If this work were +confined to the consideration of instinct alone, the conception +of an unconscious activity of mind might excite opposition, +inasmuch as it is one with which our educated public is not yet +familiar; but in a work like the present, every chapter of which +adduces fresh facts in support of the existence of such an +activity and of its remarkable consequences, the novelty of the +theory should be taken no farther into consideration.</p> +<p>Though I so confidently deny that instinct is the simple +action of a mechanism which has been contrived once for all, I by +no means exclude the supposition that in the constitution of the +brain, the ganglia, and the whole body, in respect of +morphological as well as molecular-physiological condition, +certain predispositions can be established which direct the +unconscious intermediaries more readily into one channel than +into another. This predisposition is either the result of a +habit which keeps continually cutting for itself a deeper and +deeper channel, until in the end it leaves indelible traces +whether in the individual or in the race, or it is expressly +called into being by the unconscious formative principle in +generation, so as to facilitate action in a given +direction. This last will be the case more frequently in +respect of exterior organisation—as, for example, with the +weapons or working organs of animals—while to the former +must be referred the molecular condition of brain and ganglia +which bring about the perpetually recurring elements of an +instinct such as the hexagonal shape of the cells of bees. +We shall presently see that by individual character we mean the +sum of the individual methods of reaction against all possible +motives, and that this character depends essentially upon a +constitution of mind and body acquired in some measure through +habit by the individual, but for the most part inherited. +But an instinct is also a mode of reaction against certain +motives; here, too, then, we are dealing with character, though +perhaps not so much with that of the individual as of the race; +for by character in regard to instinct we do not intend the +differences that distinguish individuals, but races from one +another. If any one chooses to maintain that such a +predisposition for certain kinds of activity on the part of brain +and body constitutes a mechanism, this may in one sense be +admitted; but as against this view it must be remarked—</p> +<p>1. That such deviations from the normal scheme of an +instinct as cannot be referred to conscious deliberation are not +provided for by any predisposition in this mechanism.</p> +<p>2. That heredity is only possible under the +circumstances of a constant superintendence of the embryonic +development by a purposive unconscious activity of growth. +It must be admitted, however, that this is influenced in return +by the predisposition existing in the germ.</p> +<p>3. That the impressing of the predisposition upon the +individual from whom it is inherited can only be effected by long +practice, consequently the instinct without auxiliary mechanism +<a name="citation105a"></a><a href="#footnote105a" +class="citation">[105a]</a> is the originating cause of the +auxiliary mechanism.</p> +<p>4. That none of those instinctive actions that are +performed rarely, or perhaps once only, in the lifetime of any +individual—as, for example, those connected with the +propagation and metamorphoses of the lower forms of life, and +none of those instinctive omissions of action, neglect of which +necessarily entails death—can be conceived as having become +engrained into the character through habit; the ganglionic +constitution, therefore, that predisposes the animal towards them +must have been fashioned purposively.</p> +<p>5. That even the presence of an auxiliary mechanism <a +name="citation105b"></a><a href="#footnote105b" +class="citation">[105b]</a> does not compel the unconscious to a +particular corresponding mode of instinctive action, but only +predisposes it. This is shown by the possibility of +departure from the normal type of action, so that the unconscious +purpose is always stronger than the ganglionic constitution, and +takes any opportunity of choosing from several similar possible +courses the one that is handiest and most convenient to the +constitution of the individual.</p> +<p>We now approach the question that I have reserved for our +final one,—Is there, namely, actually such a thing as +instinct, <a name="citation105c"></a><a href="#footnote105c" +class="citation">[105c]</a> or are all so-called instinctive +actions only the results of conscious deliberation?</p> +<p>In support of the second of these two views, it may be alleged +that the more limited is the range of the conscious mental +activity of any living being, the more fully developed in +proportion to its entire mental power is its performance commonly +found to be in respect of its own limited and special instinctive +department. This holds as good with the lower animals as +with men, and is explained by the fact that perfection of +proficiency is only partly dependent upon natural capacity, but +is in great measure due to practice and cultivation of the +original faculty. A philologist, for example, is unskilled +in questions of jurisprudence; a natural philosopher or +mathematician, in philology; an abstract philosopher, in poetical +criticism. Nor has this anything to do with the natural +talents of the several persons, but follows as a consequence of +their special training. The more special, therefore, is the +direction in which the mental activity of any living being is +exercised, the more will the whole developing and practising +power of the mind be brought to bear upon this one branch, so +that it is not surprising if the special power comes ultimately +to bear an increased proportion to the total power of the +individual, through the contraction of the range within which it +is exercised.</p> +<p>Those, however, who apply this to the elucidation of instinct +should not forget the words, “in proportion to the entire +mental power of the animal in question,” and should bear in +mind that the entire mental power becomes less and less +continually as we descend the scale of animal life, whereas +proficiency in the performance of an instinctive action seems to +be much of a muchness in all grades of the animal world. +As, therefore, those performances which indisputably proceed from +conscious deliberation decrease proportionately with decrease of +mental power, while nothing of the kind is observable in the case +of instinct—it follows that instinct must involve some +other principle than that of conscious intelligence. We +see, moreover, that actions which have their source in conscious +intelligence are of one and the same kind, whether among the +lower animals or with mankind—that is to say, that they are +acquired by apprenticeship or instruction and perfected by +practice; so that the saying, “Age brings wisdom,” +holds good with the brutes as much as with ourselves. +Instinctive actions, on the contrary, have a special and distinct +character, in that they are performed with no less proficiency by +animals that have been reared in solitude than by those that have +been instructed by their parents, the first essays of a hitherto +unpractised animal being as successful as its later ones. +There is a difference in principle here which cannot be +mistaken. Again, we know by experience that the feebler and +more limited an intelligence is, the more slowly do ideas act +upon it, that is to say, the slower and more laborious is its +conscious thought. So long as instinct does not come into +play, this holds good both in the case of men of different powers +of comprehension and with animals; but with instinct all is +changed, for it is the speciality of instinct never to hesitate +or loiter, but to take action instantly upon perceiving that the +stimulating motive has made its appearance. This rapidity +in arriving at a resolution is common to the instinctive actions +both of the highest and the lowest animals, and indicates an +essential difference between instinct and conscious +deliberation.</p> +<p>Finally, as regards perfection of the power of execution, a +glance will suffice to show the disproportion that exists between +this and the grade of intellectual activity on which an animal +may be standing. Take, for instance, the caterpillar of the +emperor moth (<i>Saturnia pavonia minor</i>). It eats the +leaves of the bush upon which it was born; at the utmost has just +enough sense to get on to the lower sides of the leaves if it +begins to rain, and from time to time changes its skin. +This is its whole existence, which certainly does not lead us to +expect a display of any, even the most limited, intellectual +power. When, however, the time comes for the larva of this +moth to become a chrysalis, it spins for itself a double cocoon, +fortified with bristles that point outwards, so that it can be +opened easily from within, though it is sufficiently impenetrable +from without. If this contrivance were the result of +conscious reflection, we should have to suppose some such +reasoning process as the following to take place in the mind of +the caterpillar:—“I am about to become a chrysalis, +and, motionless as I must be, shall be exposed to many different +kinds of attack. I must therefore weave myself a web. +But when I am a moth I shall not be able, as some moths are, to +find my way out of it by chemical or mechanical means; therefore +I must leave a way open for myself. In order, however, that +my enemies may not take advantage of this, I will close it with +elastic bristles, which I can easily push asunder from within, +but which, upon the principle of the arch, will resist all +pressure from without.” Surely this is asking rather +too much from a poor caterpillar; yet the whole of the foregoing +must be thought out if a correct result is to be arrived at.</p> +<p>This theoretical separation of instinct from conscious +intelligence can be easily misrepresented by opponents of my +theory, as though a separation in practice also would be +necessitated in consequence. This is by no means my +intention. On the contrary, I have already insisted at some +length that both the two kinds of mental activity may co-exist in +all manner of different proportions, so that there may be every +degree of combination, from pure instinct to pure +deliberation. We shall see, however, in a later chapter, +that even in the highest and most abstract activity of human +consciousness there are forces at work that are of the highest +importance, and are essentially of the same kind as instinct.</p> +<p>On the other hand, the most marvellous displays of instinct +are to be found not only in plants, but also in those lowest +organisms of the simplest bodily form which are partly +unicellular, and in respect of conscious intelligence stand far +below the higher plants—to which, indeed, any kind of +deliberative faculty is commonly denied. Even in the case +of those minute microscopic organisms that baffle our attempts to +classify them either as animals or vegetables, we are still +compelled to admire an instinctive, purposive behaviour, which +goes far beyond a mere reflex responsive to a stimulus from +without; all doubt, therefore, concerning the actual existence of +an instinct must be at an end, and the attempt to deduce it as a +consequence of conscious deliberation be given up as +hopeless. I will here adduce an instance as extraordinary +as any we yet know of, showing, as it does, that many different +purposes, which in the case of the higher animals require a +complicated system of organs of motion, can be attained with +incredibly simple means.</p> +<p><i>Arcella vulgaris</i> is a minute morsel of protoplasm, +which lives in a concave-convex, brown, finely reticulated shell, +through a circular opening in the concave side of which it can +project itself by throwing out <i>pseudopodia</i>. If we +look through the microscope at a drop of water containing living +<i>arcellæ</i>, we may happen to see one of them lying on +its back at the bottom of the drop, and making fruitless efforts +for two or three minutes to lay hold of some fixed point by means +of a <i>pseudopodium</i>. After this there will appear +suddenly from two to five, but sometimes more, dark points in the +protoplasm at a small distance from the circumference, and, as a +rule, at regular distances from one another. These rapidly +develop themselves into well-defined spherical air vesicles, and +come presently to fill a considerable part of the hollow of the +shell, thereby driving part of the protoplasm outside it. +After from five to twenty minutes, the specific gravity of the +<i>arcella</i> is so much lessened that it is lifted by the water +with its <i>pseudopodia</i>, and brought up against the upper +surface of the water-drop, on which it is able to travel. +In from five to ten minutes the vesicles will now disappear, the +last small point vanishing with a jerk. If, however, the +creature has been accidentally turned over during its journey, +and reaches the top of the water-drop with its back uppermost, +the vesicles will continue growing only on one side, while they +diminish on the other; by this means the shell is brought first +into an oblique and then into a vertical position, until one of +the <i>pseudopodia</i> obtains a footing and the whole turns +over. From the moment the animal has obtained foothold, the +bladders become immediately smaller, and after they have +disappeared the experiment may be repeated at pleasure.</p> +<p>The positions of the protoplasm which the vesicles fashion +change continually; only the grainless protoplasm of the +<i>pseudopodia</i> develops no air. After long and +fruitless efforts a manifest fatigue sets in; the animal gives up +the attempt for a time, and resumes it after an interval of +repose.</p> +<p>Engelmann, the discoverer of these phenomena, says +(Pflüger’s Archiv für Physologie, Bd. II.): +“The changes in volume in all the vesicles of the same +animal are for the most part synchronous, effected in the same +manner, and of like size. There are, however, not a few +exceptions; it often happens that some of them increase or +diminish in volume much faster than others; sometimes one may +increase while another diminishes; all the changes, however, are +throughout unquestionably intentional. The object of the +air-vesicles is to bring the animal into such a position that it +can take fast hold of something with its +<i>pseudopodia</i>. When this has been obtained, the air +disappears without our being able to discover any other reason +for its disappearance than the fact that it is no longer needed. +. . . If we bear these circumstances in mind, we can almost +always tell whether an <i>arcella</i> will develop air-vesicles +or no; and if it has already developed them, we can tell whether +they will increase or diminish . . . The <i>arcellæ</i>, in +fact, in this power of altering their specific gravity possess a +mechanism for raising themselves to the top of the water, or +lowering themselves to the bottom at will. They use this +not only in the abnormal circumstances of their being under +microscopical observation, but at all times, as may be known by +our being always able to find some specimens with air-bladders at +the top of the water in which they live.”</p> +<p>If what has been already advanced has failed to convince the +reader of the hopelessness of attempting to explain instinct as a +mode of conscious deliberation, he must admit that the following +considerations are conclusive. It is most certain that +deliberation and conscious reflection can only take account of +such data as are consciously perceived; if, then, it can be shown +that data absolutely indispensable for the arrival at a just +conclusion cannot by any possibility have been known consciously, +the result can no longer be held as having had its source in +conscious deliberation. It is admitted that the only way in +which consciousness can arrive at a knowledge of exterior facts +is by way of an impression made upon the senses. We must, +therefore, prove that a knowledge of the facts indispensable for +arrival at a just conclusion could not have been thus +acquired. This may be done as follows: <a +name="citation111"></a><a href="#footnote111" +class="citation">[111]</a> for, Firstly, the facts in question +lie in the future, and the present gives no ground for +conjecturing the time and manner of their subsequent +development.</p> +<p>Secondly, they are manifestly debarred from the category of +perceptions perceived through the senses, inasmuch as no +information can be derived concerning them except through +experience of similar occurrences in time past, and such +experience is plainly out of the question.</p> +<p>It would not affect the argument if, as I think likely, it +were to turn out, with the advance of our physiological +knowledge, that all the examples of the first case that I am +about to adduce reduce themselves to examples of the second, as +must be admitted to have already happened in respect of many that +I have adduced hitherto. For it is hardly more difficult to +conceive of <i>à priori</i> knowledge, disconnected from +any impression made upon the senses, than of knowledge which, it +is true, does at the present day manifest itself upon the +occasion of certain general perceptions, but which can only be +supposed to be connected with these by means of such a chain of +inferences and judiciously applied knowledge as cannot be +believed to exist when we have regard to the capacity and +organisation of the animal we may be considering.</p> +<p>An example of the first case is supplied by the larva of the +stag-beetle in its endeavour to make itself a convenient hole in +which to become a chrysalis. The female larva digs a hole +exactly her own size, but the male makes one as long again as +himself, so as to allow for the growth of his horns, which will +be about the same length as his body. A knowledge of this +circumstance is indispensable if the result achieved is to be +considered as due to reflection, yet the actual present of the +larva affords it no ground for conjecturing beforehand the +condition in which it will presently find itself.</p> +<p>As regards the second case, ferrets and buzzards fall +forthwith upon blind worms or other non-poisonous snakes, and +devour them then and there. But they exhibit the greatest +caution in laying hold of adders, even though they have never +before seen one, and will endeavour first to bruise their heads, +so as to avoid being bitten. As there is nothing in any +other respect alarming in the adder, a conscious knowledge of the +danger of its bite is indispensable, if the conduct above +described is to be referred to conscious deliberation. But +this could only have been acquired through experience, and the +possibility of such experience may be controlled in the case of +animals that have been kept in captivity from their youth up, so +that the knowledge displayed can be ascertained to be independent +of experience. On the other hand, both the above +illustrations afford evidence of an unconscious perception of the +facts, and prove the existence of a direct knowledge underivable +from any sensual impression or from consciousness.</p> +<p>This has always been recognised, <a name="citation113"></a><a +href="#footnote113" class="citation">[113]</a> and has been +described under the words “presentiment” or +“foreboding.” These words, however, refer, on +the one hand, only to an unknowable in the future, separated from +us by space, and not to one that is actually present; on the +other hand, they denote only the faint, dull, indefinite echo +returned by consciousness to an invariably distinct state of +unconscious knowledge. Hence the word +“presentiment,” which carries with it an idea of +faintness and indistinctness, while, however, it may be easily +seen that sentiment destitute of all, even unconscious, ideas can +have no influence upon the result, for knowledge can only follow +upon an idea. A presentiment that sounds in consonance with +our consciousness can indeed, under certain circumstances, become +tolerably definite, so that in the case of man it can be +expressed in thought and language; but experience teaches us that +even among ourselves this is not so when instincts special to the +human race come into play; we see rather that the echo of our +unconscious knowledge which finds its way into our consciousness +is so weak that it manifests itself only in the accompanying +feelings or frame of mind, and represents but an infinitely small +fraction of the sum of our sensations. It is obvious that +such a faintly sympathetic consciousness cannot form a sufficient +foundation for a superstructure of conscious deliberation; on the +other hand, conscious deliberation would be unnecessary, inasmuch +as the process of thinking must have been already gone through +unconsciously, for every faint presentiment that obtrudes itself +upon our consciousness is in fact only the consequence of a +distinct unconscious knowledge, and the knowledge with which it +is concerned is almost always an idea of the purpose of some +instinctive action, or of one most intimately connected +therewith. Thus, in the case of the stag-beetle, the +purpose consists in the leaving space for the growth of the +horns; the means, in the digging the hole of a sufficient size; +and the unconscious knowledge, in prescience concerning the +future development of the horns.</p> +<p>Lastly, all instinctive actions give us an impression of +absolute security and infallibility. With instinct the will +is never hesitating or weak, as it is when inferences are being +drawn consciously. We never find instinct making mistakes; +we cannot, therefore, ascribe a result which is so invariably +precise to such an obscure condition of mind as is implied when +the word presentiment is used; on the contrary, this absolute +certainty is so characteristic a feature of instinctive actions, +that it constitutes almost the only well-marked point of +distinction between these and actions that are done upon +reflection. But from this it must again follow that some +principle lies at the root of instinct other than that which +underlies reflective action, and this can only be looked for in a +determination of the will through a process that lies in the +unconscious, <a name="citation115a"></a><a href="#footnote115a" +class="citation">[115a]</a> to which this character of +unhesitating infallibility will attach itself in all our future +investigations.</p> +<p>Many will be surprised at my ascribing to instinct an +unconscious knowledge, arising out of no sensual impression, and +yet invariably accurate. This, however, is not a +consequence of my theory concerning instinct; it is the +foundation on which that theory is based, and is forced upon us +by facts. I must therefore adduce examples. And to +give a name to the unconscious knowledge, which is not acquired +through impression made upon the senses, but which will be found +to be in our possession, though attained without the +instrumentality of means, <a name="citation115b"></a><a +href="#footnote115b" class="citation">[115b]</a> I prefer the +word “clairvoyance” <a name="citation115c"></a><a +href="#footnote115c" class="citation">[115c]</a> to +“presentiment,” which, for reasons already given, +will not serve me. This word, therefore, will be here +employed throughout, as above defined.</p> +<p>Let us now consider examples of the instincts of +self-preservation, subsistence, migration, and the continuation +of the species. Most animals know their natural enemies +prior to experience of any hostile designs upon themselves. +A flight of young pigeons, even though they have no old birds +with them, will become shy, and will separate from one another on +the approach of a bird of prey. Horses and cattle that come +from countries where there are no lions become unquiet and +display alarm as soon as they are aware that a lion is +approaching them in the night. Horses going along a +bridle-path that used to leave the town at the back of the old +dens of the carnivora in the Berlin Zoological Gardens were often +terrified by the propinquity of enemies who were entirely unknown +to them. Sticklebacks will swim composedly among a number +of voracious pike, knowing, as they do, that the pike will not +touch them. For if a pike once by mistake swallows a +stickleback, the stickleback will stick in its throat by reason +of the spine it carries upon its back, and the pike must starve +to death without being able to transmit his painful experience to +his descendants. In some countries there are people who by +choice eat dog’s flesh; dogs are invariably savage in the +presence of these persons, as recognising in them enemies at +whose hands they may one day come to harm. This is the more +wonderful inasmuch as dog’s fat applied externally (as when +rubbed upon boots) attracts dogs by its smell. Grant saw a +young chimpanzee throw itself into convulsions of terror at the +sight of a large snake; and even among ourselves a Gretchen can +often detect a Mephistopheles. An insect of the genius +<i>bombyx</i> will seize another of the genus +<i>parnopæa</i>, and kill it wherever it finds it, without +making any subsequent use of the body; but we know that the +last-named insect lies in wait for the eggs of the first, and is +therefore the natural enemy of its race. The phenomenon +known to stockdrivers and shepherds as “das Biesen des +Viehes” affords another example. For when a +“dassel” or “bies” fly draws near the +herd, the cattle become unmanageable and run about among one +another as though they were mad, knowing, as they do, that the +larvæ from the eggs which the fly will lay upon them will +presently pierce their hides and occasion them painful +sores. These “dassel” flies—which have no +sting—closely resemble another kind of gadfly which has a +sting. Nevertheless, this last kind is little feared by +cattle, while the first is so to an inordinate extent. The +laying of the eggs upon the skin is at the time quite painless, +and no ill consequences follow until long afterwards, so that we +cannot suppose the cattle to draw a conscious inference +concerning the connection that exists between the two. I +have already spoken of the foresight shown by ferrets and +buzzards in respect of adders; in like manner a young +honey-buzzard, on being shown a wasp for the first time, +immediately devoured it after having squeezed the sting from its +body. No animal, whose instinct has not been vitiated by +unnatural habits, will eat poisonous plants. Even when apes +have contracted bad habits through their having been brought into +contact with mankind, they can still be trusted to show us +whether certain fruits found in their native forests are +poisonous or no; for if poisonous fruits are offered them they +will refuse them with loud cries. Every animal will choose +for its sustenance exactly those animal or vegetable substances +which agree best with its digestive organs, without having +received any instruction on the matter, and without testing them +beforehand. Even, indeed, though we assume that the power +of distinguishing the different kinds of food is due to sight and +not to smell, it remains none the less mysterious how the animal +can know what it is that will agree with it. Thus the kid +which Galen took prematurely from its mother smelt at all the +different kinds of food that were set before it, but drank only +the milk without touching anything else. The cherry-finch +opens a cherry-stone by turning it so that her beak can hit the +part where the two sides join, and does this as much with the +first stone she cracks as with the last. Fitchets, martens, +and weasels make small holes on the opposite sides of an egg +which they are about to suck, so that the air may come in while +they are sucking. Not only do animals know the food that +will suit them best, but they find out the most suitable remedies +when they are ill, and constantly form a correct diagnosis of +their malady with a therapeutical knowledge which they cannot +possibly have acquired. Dogs will often eat a great +quantity of grass—particularly couch-grass—when they +are unwell, especially after spring, if they have worms, which +thus pass from them entangled in the grass, or if they want to +get fragments of bone from out of their stomachs. As a +purgative they make use of plants that sting. Hens and +pigeons pick lime from walls and pavements if their food does not +afford them lime enough to make their eggshells with. +Little children eat chalk when suffering from acidity of the +stomach, and pieces of charcoal if they are troubled with +flatulence. We may observe these same instincts for certain +kinds of food or drugs even among grown-up people, under +circumstances in which their unconscious nature has unusual +power; as, for example, among women when they are pregnant, whose +capricious appetites are probably due to some special condition +of the fœtus, which renders a certain state of the blood +desirable. Field-mice bite off the germs of the corn which +they collect together, in order to prevent its growing during the +winter. Some days before the beginning of cold weather the +squirrel is most assiduous in augmenting its store, and then +closes its dwelling. Birds of passage betake themselves to +warmer countries at times when there is still no scarcity of food +for them here, and when the temperature is considerably warmer +than it will be when they return to us. The same holds good +of the time when animals begin to prepare their winter quarters, +which beetles constantly do during the very hottest days of +autumn. When swallows and storks find their way back to +their native places over distances of hundreds of miles, and +though the aspect of the country is reversed, we say that this is +due to the acuteness of their perception of locality; but the +same cannot be said of dogs, which, though they have been carried +in a bag from one place to another that they do not know, and +have been turned round and round twenty times over, have still +been known to find their way home. Here we can say no more +than that their instinct has conducted them—that the +clairvoyance of the unconscious has allowed them to conjecture +their way. <a name="citation119a"></a><a href="#footnote119a" +class="citation">[119a]</a></p> +<p>Before an early winter, birds of passage collect themselves in +preparation for their flight sooner than usual; but when the +winter is going to be mild, they will either not migrate at all, +or travel only a small distance southward. When a hard +winter is coming, tortoises will make their burrows deeper. +If wild geese, cranes, etc., soon return from the countries to +which they had betaken themselves at the beginning of spring, it +is a sign that a hot and dry summer is about to ensue in those +countries, and that the drought will prevent their being able to +rear their young. In years of flood, beavers construct +their dwellings at a higher level than usual, and shortly before +an inundation the field-mice in Kamtschatka come out of their +holes in large bands. If the summer is going to be dry, +spiders may be seen in May and April, hanging from the ends of +threads several feet in length. If in winter spiders are +seen running about much, fighting with one another and preparing +new webs, there will be cold weather within the next nine days, +or from that to twelve: when they again hide themselves there +will be a thaw. I have no doubt that much of this power of +prophesying the weather is due to a perception of certain +atmospheric conditions which escape ourselves, but this +perception can only have relation to a certain actual and now +present condition of the weather; and what can the impression +made by this have to do with their idea of the weather that will +ensue? No one will ascribe to animals a power of +prognosticating the weather months beforehand by means of +inferences drawn logically from a series of observations, <a +name="citation119b"></a><a href="#footnote119b" +class="citation">[119b]</a> to the extent of being able to +foretell floods. It is far more probable that the power of +perceiving subtle differences of actual atmospheric condition is +nothing more than the sensual perception which acts as +motive—for a motive must assuredly be always +present—when an instinct comes into operation. It +continues to hold good, therefore, that the power of foreseeing +the weather is a case of unconscious clairvoyance, of which the +stork which takes its departure for the south four weeks earlier +than usual knows no more than does the stag when before a cold +winter he grows himself a thicker pelt than is his wont. On +the one hand, animals have present in their consciousness a +perception of the actual state of the weather; on the other, +their ensuing action is precisely such as it would be if the idea +present with them was that of the weather that is about to +come. This they cannot consciously have; the only natural +intermediate link, therefore, between their conscious knowledge +and their action is supplied by unconscious idea, which, however, +is always accurately prescient, inasmuch as it contains something +which is neither given directly to the animal through sensual +perception, nor can be deduced inferentially through the +understanding.</p> +<p>Most wonderful of all are the instincts connected with the +continuation of the species. The males always find out the +females of their own kind, but certainly not solely through their +resemblance to themselves. With many animals, as, for +example, parasitic crabs, the sexes so little resemble one +another that the male would be more likely to seek a mate from +the females of a thousand other species than from his own. +Certain butterflies are polymorphic, and not only do the males +and females of the same species differ, but the females present +two distinct forms, one of which as a general rule mimics the +outward appearance of a distant but highly valued species; yet +the males will pair only with the females of their own kind, and +not with the strangers, though these may be very likely much more +like the males themselves. Among the insect species of the +<i>strepsiptera</i>, the female is a shapeless worm which lives +its whole life long in the hind body of a wasp; its head, which +is of the shape of a lentil, protrudes between two of the belly +rings of the wasp, the rest of the body being inside. The +male, which only lives for a few hours, and resembles a moth, +nevertheless recognises his mate in spite of these adverse +circumstances, and fecundates her.</p> +<p>Before any experience of parturition, the knowledge that it is +approaching drives all mammals into solitude, and bids them +prepare a nest for their young in a hole or in some other place +of shelter. The bird builds her nest as soon as she feels +the eggs coming to maturity within her. Snails, land-crabs, +tree-frogs, and toads, all of them ordinarily dwellers upon land, +now betake themselves to the water; sea-tortoises go on shore, +and many saltwater fishes come up into the rivers in order to lay +their eggs where they can alone find the requisites for their +development. Insects lay their eggs in the most varied +kinds of situations,—in sand, on leaves, under the hides +and horny substances of other animals; they often select the spot +where the larva will be able most readily to find its future +sustenance, as in autumn upon the trees that will open first in +the coming spring, or in spring upon the blossoms that will first +bear fruit in autumn, or in the insides of those caterpillars +which will soonest as chrysalides provide the parasitic larva at +once with food and with protection. Other insects select +the sites from which they will first get forwarded to the +destination best adapted for their development. Thus some +horseflies lay their eggs upon the lips of horses or upon parts +where they are accustomed to lick themselves. The eggs get +conveyed hence into the entrails, the proper place for their +development,—and are excreted upon their arrival at +maturity. The flies that infest cattle know so well how to +select the most vigorous and healthiest beasts, that +cattle-dealers and tanners place entire dependence upon them, and +prefer those beasts and hides that are most scarred by +maggots. This selection of the best cattle by the help of +these flies is no evidence in support of the conclusion that the +flies possess the power of making experiments consciously and of +reflecting thereupon, even though the men whose trade it is to do +this recognise them as their masters. The solitary wasp +makes a hole several inches deep in the sand, lays her egg, and +packs along with it a number of green maggots that have no legs, +and which, being on the point of becoming chrysalides, are well +nourished and able to go a long time without food; she packs +these maggots so closely together that they cannot move nor turn +into chrysalides, and just enough of them to support the larva +until it becomes a chrysalis. A kind of bug (<i>cerceris +bupresticida</i>), which itself lives only upon pollen, lays her +eggs in an underground cell, and with each one of them she +deposits three beetles, which she has lain in wait for and +captured when they were still weak through having only just left +off being chrysalides. She kills these beetles, and appears +to smear them with a fluid whereby she preserves them fresh and +suitable for food. Many kinds of wasps open the cells in +which their larvæ are confined when these must have +consumed the provision that was left with them. They supply +them with more food, and again close the cell. Ants, again, +hit always upon exactly the right moment for opening the cocoons +in which their larvæ are confined and for setting them +free, the larva being unable to do this for itself. Yet the +life of only a few kinds of insects lasts longer than a single +breeding season. What then can they know about the contents +of their eggs and the fittest place for their development? +What can they know about the kind of food the larva will want +when it leaves the egg—a food so different from their +own? What, again, can they know about the quantity of food +that will be necessary? How much of all this at least can +they know consciously? Yet their actions, the pains they +take, and the importance they evidently attach to these matters, +prove that they have a foreknowledge of the future: this +knowledge therefore can only be an unconscious +clairvoyance. For clairvoyance it must certainly be that +inspires the will of an animal to open cells and cocoons at the +very moment that the larva is either ready for more food or fit +for leaving the cocoon. The eggs of the cuckoo do not take +only from two to three days to mature in her ovaries, as those of +most birds do, but require from eleven to twelve; the cuckoo, +therefore, cannot sit upon her own eggs, for her first egg would +be spoiled before the last was laid. She therefore lays in +other birds’ nests—of course laying each egg in a +different nest. But in order that the birds may not +perceive her egg to be a stranger and turn it out of the nest, +not only does she lay an egg much smaller than might be expected +from a bird of her size (for she only finds her opportunity among +small birds), but, as already said, she imitates the other eggs +in the nest she has selected with surprising accuracy in respect +both of colour and marking. As the cuckoo chooses the nest +some days beforehand, it may be thought, if the nest is an open +one, that the cuckoo looks upon the colour of the eggs within it +while her own is in process of maturing inside her, and that it +is thus her egg comes to assume the colour of the others; but +this explanation will not hold good for nests that are made in +the holes of trees, as that of <i>sylvia phænicurus</i>, or +which are oven-shaped with a narrow entrance, as with <i>sylvia +rufa</i>. In these cases the cuckoo can neither slip in nor +look in, and must therefore lay her egg outside the nest and push +it inside with her beak; she can therefore have no means of +perceiving through her senses what the eggs already in the nest +are like. If, then, in spite of all this, her egg closely +resembles the others, this can only have come about through an +unconscious clairvoyance which directs the process that goes on +within the ovary in respect of colour and marking.</p> +<p>An important argument in support of the existence of a +clairvoyance in the instincts of animals is to be found in the +series of facts which testify to the existence of a like +clairvoyance, under certain circumstances, even among human +beings, while the self-curative instincts of children and of +pregnant women have been already mentioned. Here, however, +<a name="citation124"></a><a href="#footnote124" +class="citation">[124]</a> in correspondence with the higher +stage of development which human consciousness has attained, a +stronger echo of the unconscious clairvoyance commonly resounds +within consciousness itself, and this is represented by a more or +less definite presentiment of the consequences that will +ensue. It is also in accord with the greater independence +of the human intellect that this kind of presentiment is not felt +exclusively immediately before the carrying out of an action, but +is occasionally disconnected from the condition that an action +has to be performed immediately, and displays itself simply as an +idea independently of conscious will, provided only that the +matter concerning which the presentiment is felt is one which in +a high degree concerns the will of the person who feels it. +In the intervals of an intermittent fever or of other illness, it +not unfrequently happens that sick persons can accurately +foretell the day of an approaching attack and how long it will +last. The same thing occurs almost invariably in the case +of spontaneous, and generally in that of artificial, +somnambulism; certainly the Pythia, as is well known, used to +announce the date of her next ecstatic state. In like +manner the curative instinct displays itself in somnambulists, +and they have been known to select remedies that have been no +less remarkable for the success attending their employment than +for the completeness with which they have run counter to received +professional opinion. The indication of medicinal remedies +is the only use which respectable electro-biologists will make of +the half-sleeping, half-waking condition of those whom they are +influencing. “People in perfectly sound health have +been known, before childbirth or at the commencement of an +illness, to predict accurately their own approaching death. +The accomplishment of their predictions can hardly be explained +as the result of mere chance, for if this were all, the prophecy +should fail at least as often as not, whereas the reverse is +actually the case. Many of these persons neither desire +death nor fear it, so that the result cannot be ascribed to +imagination.” So writes the celebrated physiologist, +Burdach, from whose chapter on presentiment in his work +“Bhicke in’s Leben” a great part of my most +striking examples is taken. This presentiment of deaths, +which is the exception among men, is quite common with animals, +even though they do not know nor understand what death is. +When they become aware that their end is approaching, they steal +away to outlying and solitary places. This is why in cities +we so rarely see the dead body or skeleton of a cat. We can +only suppose that the unconscious clairvoyance, which is of +essentially the same kind whether in man or beast, calls forth +presentiments of different degrees of definiteness, so that the +cat is driven to withdraw herself through a mere instinct without +knowing why she does so, while in man a definite perception is +awakened of the fact that he is about to die. Not only do +people have presentiments concerning their own death, but there +are many instances on record in which they have become aware of +that of those near and dear to them, the dying person having +appeared in a dream to friend or wife or husband. Stories +to this effect prevail among all nations, and unquestionably +contain much truth. Closely connected with this is the +power of second sight, which existed formerly in Scotland, and +still does so in the Danish islands. This power enables +certain people without any ecstasy, but simply through their +keener perception, to foresee coming events, or to tell what is +going on in foreign countries on matters in which they are deeply +interested, such as deaths, battles, conflagrations (Swedenborg +foretold the burning of Stockholm), the arrival or the doings of +friends who are at a distance. With many persons this +clairvoyance is confined to a knowledge of the death of their +acquaintances or fellow-townspeople. There have been a +great many instances of such death-prophetesses, and, what is +most important, some cases have been verified in courts of +law. I may say, in passing, that this power of second sight +is found in persons who are in ecstatic states, in the +spontaneous or artificially induced somnambulism of the higher +kinds of waking dreams, as well as in lucid moments before +death. These prophetic glimpses, by which the clairvoyance +of the unconscious reveals itself to consciousness, <a +name="citation126"></a><a href="#footnote126" +class="citation">[126]</a> are commonly obscure because in the +brain they must assume a form perceptible by the senses, whereas +the unconscious idea can have nothing to do with any form of +sensual impression: it is for this reason that humours, dreams, +and the hallucinations of sick persons can so easily have a false +signification attached to them. The chances of error and +self-deception that arise from this source, the ease with which +people may be deceived intentionally, and the mischief which, as +a general rule, attends a knowledge of the future, these +considerations place beyond all doubt the practical unwisdom of +attempts to arrive at certainty concerning the future. +This, however, cannot affect the weight which in theory should be +attached to phenomena of this kind, and must not prevent us from +recognising the positive existence of the clairvoyance whose +existence I am maintaining, though it is often hidden under a +chaos of madness and imposture.</p> +<p>The materialistic and rationalistic tendencies of the present +day lead most people either to deny facts of this kind <i>in +toto</i>, or to ignore them, inasmuch as they are inexplicable +from a materialistic standpoint, and cannot be established by the +inductive or experimental method—as though this last were +not equally impossible in the case of morals, social science, and +politics. A mind of any candour will only be able to deny +the truths of this entire class of phenomena so long as it +remains in ignorance of the facts that have been related +concerning them; but, again, a continuance in this ignorance can +only arise from unwillingness to be convinced. I am +satisfied that many of those who deny all human power of +divination would come to another, and, to say the least, more +cautious conclusion if they would be at the pains of further +investigation; and I hold that no one, even at the present day, +need be ashamed of joining in with an opinion which was +maintained by all the great spirits of antiquity except +Epicurus—an opinion whose possible truth hardly one of our +best modern philosophers has ventured to contravene, and which +the champions of German enlightenment were so little disposed to +relegate to the domain of old wives’ tales, that Goethe +furnishes us with an example of second sight that fell within his +own experience, and confirms it down to its minutest details.</p> +<p>Although I am far from believing that the kind of phenomena +above referred to form in themselves a proper foundation for a +superstructure of scientific demonstration, I nevertheless find +them valuable as a completion and further confirmation of the +series of phenomena presented to us by the clairvoyance which we +observe in human and animal instinct. Even though they only +continue this series <a name="citation128"></a><a +href="#footnote128" class="citation">[128]</a> through the echo +that is awakened within our consciousness, they as powerfully +support the account which instinctive actions give concerning +their own nature, as they are themselves supported by the analogy +they present to the clairvoyance observable in instinct. +This, then, as well as my desire not to lose an opportunity of +protesting against a modern prejudice, must stand as my reason +for having allowed myself to refer, in a scientific work, to a +class of phenomena which has fallen at present into so much +discredit.</p> +<p>I will conclude with a few words upon a special kind of +instinct which has a very instructive bearing upon the subject +generally, and shows how impossible it is to evade the +supposition of an unconscious clairvoyance on the part of +instinct. In the examples adduced hitherto, the action of +each individual has been done on the individual’s own +behalf, except in the case of instincts connected with the +continuation of the species, where the action benefits +others—that is to say, the offspring of the creature +performing it.</p> +<p>We must now examine the cases in which a solidarity of +instinct is found to exist between several individuals, so that, +on the one hand, the action of each redounds to the common +welfare, and, on the other, it becomes possible for a useful +purpose to be achieved through the harmonious association of +individual workers. This community of instinct exists also +among the higher animals, but here it is harder to distinguish +from associations originating through conscious will, inasmuch as +speech supplies the means of a more perfect intercommunication of +aim and plan. We shall, however, definitely recognise <a +name="citation129"></a><a href="#footnote129" +class="citation">[129]</a> this general effect of a universal +instinct in the origin of speech and in the great political and +social movements in the history of the world. Here we are +concerned only with the simplest and most definite examples that +can be found anywhere, and therefore we will deal in preference +with the lower animals, among which, in the absence of voice, the +means of communicating thought, mimicry, and physiognomy, are so +imperfect that the harmony and interconnection of the individual +actions cannot in its main points be ascribed to an understanding +arrived at through speech. Huber observed that when a new +comb was being constructed a number of the largest working-bees, +that were full of honey, took no part in the ordinary business of +the others, but remained perfectly aloof. Twenty-four hours +afterwards small plates of wax had formed under their +bellies. The bee drew these off with her hind-feet, +masticated them, and made them into a band. The small +plates of wax thus prepared were then glued to the roof of the +hive one on the top of the other. When one of the bees of +this kind had used up her plates of wax, another followed her and +carried the same work forward in the same way. A thin rough +vertical wall, half a line in thickness and fastened to the sides +of the hive, was thus constructed. On this, one of the +smaller working-bees whose belly was empty came, and after +surveying the wall, made a flat half-oval excavation in the +middle of one of its sides; she piled up the wax thus excavated +round the edge of the excavation. After a short time she +was relieved by another like herself, till more than twenty +followed one another in this way. Meanwhile another bee +began to make a similar hollow on the other side of the wall, but +corresponding only with the rim of the excavation on this +side. Presently another bee began a second hollow upon the +same side, each bee being continually relieved by others. +Other bees kept coming up and bringing under their bellies plates +of wax, with which they heightened the edge of the small wall of +wax. In this, new bees were constantly excavating the +ground for more cells, while others proceeded by degrees to bring +those already begun into a perfectly symmetrical shape, and at +the same time continued building up the prismatic walls between +them. Thus the bees worked on opposite sides of the wall of +wax, always on the same plan and in the closest correspondence +with those upon the other side, until eventually the cells on +both sides were completed in all their wonderful regularity and +harmony of arrangement, not merely as regards those standing side +by side, but also as regards those which were upon the other side +of their pyramidal base.</p> +<p>Let the reader consider how animals that are accustomed to +confer together, by speech or otherwise, concerning designs which +they may be pursuing in common, will wrangle with thousandfold +diversity of opinion; let him reflect how often something has to +be undone, destroyed, and done over again; how at one time too +many hands come forward, and at another too few; what running to +and fro there is before each has found his right place; how often +too many, and again too few, present themselves for a relief +gang; and how we find all this in the concerted works of men, who +stand so far higher than bees in the scale of organisation. +We see nothing of the kind among bees. A survey of their +operations leaves rather the impression upon us as though an +invisible master-builder had prearranged a scheme of action for +the entire community, and had impressed it upon each individual +member, as though each class of workers had learnt their +appointed work by heart, knew their places and the numbers in +which they should relieve each other, and were informed +instantaneously by a secret signal of the moment when their +action was wanted. This, however, is exactly the manner in +which an instinct works; and as the intention of the entire +community is instinctively present in the unconscious +clairvoyance <a name="citation131a"></a><a href="#footnote131a" +class="citation">[131a]</a> of each individual bee, so the +possession of this common instinct impels each one of them to the +discharge of her special duties when the right moment has +arrived. It is only thus that the wonderful tranquillity +and order which we observe could be attained. What we are +to think concerning this common instinct must be reserved for +explanation later on, but the possibility of its existence is +already evident, inasmuch <a name="citation131b"></a><a +href="#footnote131b" class="citation">[131b]</a> as each +individual has an unconscious insight concerning the plan +proposed to itself by the community, and also concerning the +means immediately to be adopted through concerted action—of +which, however, only the part requiring his own co-operation is +present in the consciousness of each. Thus, for example, +the larva of the bee itself spins the silky chamber in which it +is to become a chrysalis, but other bees must close it with its +lid of wax. The purpose of there being a chamber in which +the larva can become a chrysalis must be present in the minds of +each of these two parties to the transaction, but neither of them +acts under the influence of conscious will, except in regard to +his own particular department. I have already mentioned the +fact that the larva, after its metamorphosis, must be freed from +its cell by other bees, and have told how the working-bees in +autumn kill the drones, so that they may not have to feed a +number of useless mouths throughout the winter, and how they only +spare them when they are wanted in order to fecundate a new +queen. Furthermore, the working-bees build cells in which +the eggs laid by the queen may come to maturity, and, as a +general rule, make just as many chambers as the queen lays eggs; +they make these, moreover, in the same order as that in which the +queen lays her eggs, namely, first for the working-bees, then for +the drones, and lastly for the queens. In the polity of the +bees, the working and the sexual capacities, which were once +united, are now personified in three distinct kinds of +individual, and these combine with an inner, unconscious, +spiritual union, so as to form a single body politic, as the +organs of a living body combine to form the body itself.</p> +<p>In this chapter, therefore, we have arrived at the following +conclusions:—</p> +<p>Instinct is not the result of conscious deliberation; <a +name="citation132"></a><a href="#footnote132" +class="citation">[132]</a> it is not a consequence of bodily +organisation; it is not a mere result of a mechanism which lies +in the organisation of the brain; it is not the operation of dead +mechanism, glued on, as it were, to the soul, and foreign to its +inmost essence; but it is the spontaneous action of the +individual, springing from his most essential nature and +character. The purpose to which any particular kind of +instinctive action is subservient is not the purpose of a soul +standing outside the individual and near akin to +Providence—a purpose once for all thought out, and now +become a matter of necessity to the individual, so that he can +act in no other way, though it is engrafted into his nature from +without, and not natural to it. The purpose of the instinct +is in each individual case thought out and willed unconsciously +by the individual, and afterwards the choice of means adapted to +each particular case is arrived at unconsciously. A +knowledge of the purpose is often absolutely unattainable <a +name="citation133"></a><a href="#footnote133" +class="citation">[133]</a> by conscious knowledge through sensual +perception. Then does the peculiarity of the unconscious +display itself in the clairvoyance of which consciousness +perceives partly only a faint and dull, and partly, as in the +case of man, a more or less definite echo by way of sentiment, +whereas the instinctive action itself—the carrying out of +the means necessary for the achievement of the unconscious +purpose—falls always more clearly within consciousness, +inasmuch as due performance of what is necessary would be +otherwise impossible. Finally, the clairvoyance makes +itself perceived in the concerted action of several individuals +combining to carry out a common but unconscious purpose.</p> +<p>Up to this point we have encountered clairvoyance as a fact +which we observe but cannot explain, and the reader may say that +he prefers to take his stand here, and be content with regarding +instinct simply as a matter of fact, the explanation of which is +at present beyond our reach. Against this it must be urged, +firstly, that clairvoyance is not confined to instinct, but is +found also in man; secondly, that clairvoyance is by no means +present in all instincts, and that therefore our experience shows +us clairvoyance and instinct as two distinct +things—clairvoyance being of great use in explaining +instinct, but instinct serving nothing to explain clairvoyance; +thirdly and lastly, that the clairvoyance of the individual will +not continue to be so incomprehensible to us, but will be +perfectly well explained in the further course of our +investigation, while we must give up all hope of explaining +instinct in any other way.</p> +<p>The conception we have thus arrived at enables us to regard +instinct as the innermost kernel, so to speak, of every living +being. That this is actually the case is shown by the +instincts of self-preservation and of the continuation of the +species which we observe throughout creation, and by the heroic +self-abandonment with which the individual will sacrifice +welfare, and even life, at the bidding of instinct. We see +this when we think of the caterpillar, and how she repairs her +cocoon until she yields to exhaustion; of the bird, and how she +will lay herself to death; of the disquiet and grief displayed by +all migratory animals if they are prevented from migrating. +A captive cuckoo will always die at the approach of winter +through despair at being unable to fly away; so will the vineyard +snail if it is hindered of its winter sleep. The weakest +mother will encounter an enemy far surpassing her in strength, +and suffer death cheerfully for her offspring’s sake. +Every year we see fresh cases of people who have been unfortunate +going mad or committing suicide. Women who have survived +the Cæsarian operation allow themselves so little to be +deterred from further childbearing through fear of this frightful +and generally fatal operation, that they will undergo it no less +than three times. Can we suppose that what so closely +resembles demoniacal possession can have come about through +something engrafted on to the soul as a mechanism foreign to its +inner nature, <a name="citation135"></a><a href="#footnote135" +class="citation">[135]</a> or through conscious deliberation +which adheres always to a bare egoism, and is utterly incapable +of such self-sacrifice for the sake of offspring as is displayed +by the procreative and maternal instincts?</p> +<p>We have now, finally, to consider how it arises that the +instincts of any animal species are so similar within the limits +of that species—a circumstance which has not a little +contributed to the engrafted-mechanism theory. But it is +plain that like causes will be followed by like effects; and this +should afford sufficient explanation. The bodily mechanism, +for example, of all the individuals of a species is alike; so +again are their capabilities and the outcomes of their conscious +intelligence—though this, indeed, is not the case with man, +nor in some measure even with the highest animals; and it is +through this want of uniformity that there is such a thing as +individuality. The external conditions of all the +individuals of a species are also tolerably similar, and when +they differ essentially, the instincts are likewise +different—a fact in support of which no examples are +necessary. From like conditions of mind and body (and this +includes like predispositions of brain and ganglia) and like +exterior circumstances, like desires will follow as a necessary +logical consequence. Again, from like desires and like +inward and outward circumstances, a like choice of +means—that is to say, like instincts—must +ensue. These last two steps would not be conceded without +restriction if the question were one involving conscious +deliberation, but as these logical consequences are supposed to +follow from the unconscious, which takes the right step +unfailingly without vacillation or delay so long as the premises +are similar, the ensuing desires and the instincts to adopt the +means for their gratification will be similar also.</p> +<p>Thus the view which we have taken concerning instinct explains +the very last point which it may be thought worth while to bring +forward in support of the opinions of our opponents.</p> +<p>I will conclude this chapter with the words of Schelling: +“Thoughtful minds will hold the phenomena of animal +instinct to belong to the most important of all phenomena, and to +be the true touchstone of a durable philosophy.”</p> +<h2><a name="page137"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +137</span>Chapter IX</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Remarks upon Von Hartmann’s position in +regard to instinct.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">Uncertain</span> how far the foregoing +chapter is not better left without comment of any kind, I +nevertheless think that some of my readers may be helped by the +following extracts from the notes I took while translating. +I will give them as they come, without throwing them into +connected form.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Von Hartmann defines instinct as action done with a purpose, +but without consciousness of purpose.</p> +<p>The building of her nest by a bird is an instinctive action; +it is done with a purpose, but it is arbitrary to say that the +bird has no knowledge of that purpose. Some hold that birds +when they are building their nest know as well that they mean to +bring up a family in it as a young married couple do when they +build themselves a house. This is the conclusion which +would be come to by a plain person on a <i>primâ facie</i> +view of the facts, and Von Hartmann shows no reason for modifying +it.</p> +<p>A better definition of instinct would be that it is inherited +knowledge in respect of certain facts, and of the most suitable +manner in which to deal with them.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Von Hartmann speaks of “a mechanism of brain or +mind” contrived by nature, and again of “a psychical +organisation,” as though it were something distinct from a +physical organisation.</p> +<p>We can conceive of such a thing as mechanism of brain, for we +have seen brain and handled it; but until we have seen a mind and +handled it, or at any rate been enabled to draw inferences which +will warrant us in conceiving of it as a material substance apart +from bodily substance, we cannot infer that it has an +organisation apart from bodily organisation. Does Von +Hartmann mean that we have two bodies—a body-body, and a +soul-body?</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>He says that no one will call the action of the spider +instinctive in voiding the fluids from its glands when they are +too full. Why not?</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>He is continually personifying instinct; thus he speaks of the +“ends proposed to itself by the instinct,” of +“the blind unconscious purpose of the instinct,” of +“an unconscious purpose constraining the volition of the +bird,” of “each variation and modification of the +instinct,” as though instinct, purpose, and, later on, +clairvoyance, were persons, and not words characterising a +certain class of actions. The ends are proposed to itself +by the animal, not by the instinct. Nothing but mischief +can come of a mode of expression which does not keep this clearly +in view.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>It must not be supposed that the same cuckoo is in the habit +of laying in the nests of several different species, and of +changing the colour of her eggs according to that of the eggs of +the bird in whose nest she lays. I have inquired from Mr. +R. Bowdler Sharpe of the ornithological department at the British +Museum, who kindly gives it me as his opinion that though cuckoos +do imitate the eggs of the species on whom they foist their young +ones, yet one cuckoo will probably lay in the nests of one +species also, and will stick to that species for life. If +so, the same race of cuckoos may impose upon the same species for +generations together. The instinct will even thus remain a +very wonderful one, but it is not at all inconsistent with the +theory put forward by Professor Hering and myself.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Returning to the idea of psychical mechanism, he admits that +“it is itself so obscure that we can hardly form any idea +concerning it,” <a name="citation139a"></a><a +href="#footnote139a" class="citation">[139a]</a> and then goes on +to claim for it that it explains a great many other things. +This must have been the passage which Mr. Sully had in view when +he very justly wrote that Von Hartmann “dogmatically closes +the field of physical inquiry, and takes refuge in a phantom +which explains everything, simply because it is itself incapable +of explanation.”</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>According to Von Hartmann <a name="citation139b"></a><a +href="#footnote139b" class="citation">[139b]</a> the unpractised +animal manifests its instinct as perfectly as the +practised. This is not the case. The young animal +exhibits marvellous proficiency, but it gains by +experience. I have watched sparrows, which I can hardly +doubt to be young ones, spend a whole month in trying to build +their nest, and give it up in the end as hopeless. I have +watched three such cases this spring in a tree not twenty feet +from my own window and on a level with my eye, so that I have +been able to see what was going on at all hours of the day. +In each case the nest was made well and rapidly up to a certain +point, and then got top-heavy and tumbled over, so that little +was left on the tree: it was reconstructed and reconstructed over +and over again, always with the same result, till at last in all +three cases the birds gave up in despair. I believe the +older and stronger birds secure the fixed and best sites, driving +the younger birds to the trees, and that the art of building +nests in trees is dying out among house-sparrows.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>He declares that instinct is not due to organisation so much +as organisation to instinct. <a name="citation140"></a><a +href="#footnote140" class="citation">[140]</a> The fact is, +that neither can claim precedence of or pre-eminence over the +other. Instinct and organisation are only mind and body, or +mind and matter; and these are not two separable things, but one +and inseparable, with, as it were, two sides; the one of which is +a function of the other. There was never yet either matter +without mind, however low, nor mind, however high, without a +material body of some sort; there can be no change in one without +a corresponding change in the other; neither came before the +other; neither can either cease to change or cease to be; for +“to be” is to continue changing, so that “to +be” and “to change” are one.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Whence, he asks, comes the desire to gratify an instinct +before experience of the pleasure that will ensue on +gratification? This is a pertinent question, but it is met +by Professor Hering with the answer that this is due to +memory—to the continuation in the germ of vibrations that +were vibrating in the body of the parent, and which, when +stimulated by vibrations of a suitable rhythm, become more and +more powerful till they suffice to set the body in visible +action. For my own part I only venture to maintain that it +is due to memory, that is to say, to an enduring sense on the +part of the germ of the action it took when in the persons of its +ancestors, and of the gratification which ensued thereon. +This meets Von Hartmann’s whole difficulty.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>The glacier is not snow. It is snow packed tight into a +small compass, and has thus lost all trace of its original +form. How incomplete, however, would be any theory of +glacial action which left out of sight the origin of the glacier +in snow! Von Hartmann loses sight of the origin of +instinctive in deliberative actions because the two classes of +action are now in many respects different. His philosophy +of the unconscious fails to consider what is the normal process +by means of which such common actions as we can watch, and whose +history we can follow, have come to be done unconsciously.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>He says, <a name="citation141"></a><a href="#footnote141" +class="citation">[141]</a> “How inconceivable is the +supposition of a mechanism, &c., &c.; how clear and +simple, on the other hand, is the view that there is an +unconscious purpose constraining the volition of the bird to the +use of the fitting means.” Does he mean that there is +an actual thing—an unconscious purpose—something +outside the bird, as it were a man, which lays hold of the bird +and makes it do this or that, as a master makes a servant do his +bidding? If so, he again personifies the purpose itself, +and must therefore embody it, or be talking in a manner which +plain people cannot understand. If, on the other hand, he +means “how simple is the view that the bird acts +unconsciously,” this is not more simple than supposing it +to act consciously; and what ground has he for supposing that the +bird is unconscious? It is as simple, and as much in +accordance with the facts, to suppose that the bird feels the air +to be colder, and knows that she must warm her eggs if she is to +hatch them, as consciously as a mother knows that she must not +expose her new-born infant to the cold.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>On page 99 of this book we find Von Hartmann saying that if it +is once granted that the normal and abnormal manifestations of +instinct spring from a single source, then the objection that the +modification is due to conscious knowledge will be found to be a +suicidal one later on, in so far as it is directed against +instinct generally. I understand him to mean that if we +admit instinctive action, and the modifications of that action +which more nearly resemble results of reason, to be actions of +the same ultimate kind differing in degree only, and if we thus +attempt to reduce instinctive action to the prophetic strain +arising from old experience, we shall be obliged to admit that +the formation of the embryo is ultimately due to +reflection—which he seems to think is a <i>reductio ad +absurdum</i> of the argument.</p> +<p>Therefore, he concludes, if there is to be only one source, +the source must be unconscious, and not conscious. We +reply, that we do not see the absurdity of the position which we +grant we have been driven to. We hold that the formation of +the embryo <i>is</i> ultimately due to reflection and design.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>The writer of an article in the <i>Times</i>, April 1, 1880, +says that servants must be taught their calling before they can +practise it; but, in fact, they can only be taught their calling +by practising it. So Von Hartmann says animals must feel +the pleasure consequent on gratification of an instinct before +they can be stimulated to act upon the instinct by a knowledge of +the pleasure that will ensue. This sounds logical, but in +practice a little performance and a little teaching—a +little sense of pleasure and a little connection of that pleasure +with this or that practice,—come up simultaneously from +something that we cannot see, the two being so small and so much +abreast, that we do not know which is first, performance or +teaching; and, again, action, or pleasure supposed as coming from +the action.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>“Geistes-mechanismus” comes as near to +“disposition of mind,” or, more shortly, +“disposition,” as so unsatisfactory a word can come +to anything. Yet, if we translate it throughout by +“disposition,” we shall see how little we are being +told.</p> +<p>We find on page 114 that “all instinctive actions give +us an impression of absolute security and infallibility”; +that “the will is never weak or hesitating, as it is when +inferences are being drawn consciously.” “We +never,” Von Hartmann continues, “find instinct making +mistakes.” Passing over the fact that instinct is +again personified, the statement is still incorrect. +Instinctive actions are certainly, as a general rule, performed +with less uncertainty than deliberative ones; this is explicable +by the fact that they have been more often practised, and thus +reduced more completely to a matter of routine; but nothing is +more certain than that animals acting under the guidance of +inherited experience or instinct frequently make mistakes which +with further practice they correct. Von Hartmann has +abundantly admitted that the manner of an instinctive action is +often varied in correspondence with variation in external +circumstances. It is impossible to see how this does not +involve both possibility of error and the connection of instinct +with deliberation at one and the same time. The fact is +simply this—when an animal finds itself in a like position +with that in which it has already often done a certain thing in +the persons of its forefathers, it will do this thing well and +easily: when it finds the position somewhat, but not +unrecognisably, altered through change either in its own person +or in the circumstances exterior to it, it will vary its action +with greater or less ease according to the nature of the change +in the position: when the position is gravely altered the animal +either bungles or is completely thwarted.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Not only does Von Hartmann suppose that instinct may, and +does, involve knowledge antecedent to, and independent of, +experience—an idea as contrary to the tendency of modern +thought as that of spontaneous generation, with which indeed it +is identical though presented in another shape—but he +implies by his frequent use of the word “unmittelbar” +that a result can come about without any cause whatever. So +he says, “Um für die unbewusster Erkenntniss, welche +nicht durch sinnliche Wahrnehmung erworben, <i>sondern als +unmittelbar Besitz</i>,” &c. <a +name="citation144a"></a><a href="#footnote144a" +class="citation">[144a]</a> Because he does not see where +the experience can have been gained, he cuts the knot, and denies +that there has been experience. We say, Look more +attentively and you will discover the time and manner in which +the experience was gained.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Again, he continually assumes that animals low down in the +scale of life cannot know their own business because they show no +sign of knowing ours. See his remarks on <i>Saturnia +pavonia minor</i> (page 107), and elsewhere on cattle and +gadflies. The question is not what can they know, but what +does their action prove to us that they do know. With each +species of animal or plant there is one profession only, and it +is hereditary. With us there are many professions, and they +are not hereditary; so that they cannot become instinctive, as +they would otherwise tend to do.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>He attempts <a name="citation144b"></a><a href="#footnote144b" +class="citation">[144b]</a> to draw a distinction between the +causes that have produced the weapons and working instruments of +animals, on the one hand, and those that lead to the formation of +hexagonal cells by bees, &c., on the other. No such +distinction can be justly drawn.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>The ghost-stories which Von Hartmann accepts will hardly be +accepted by people of sound judgment. There is one +well-marked distinctive feature between the knowledge manifested +by animals when acting instinctively and the supposed knowledge +of seers and clairvoyants. In the first case, the animal +never exhibits knowledge except upon matters concerning which its +race has been conversant for generations; in the second, the seer +is supposed to do so. In the first case, a new feature is +invariably attended with disturbance of the performance and the +awakening of consciousness and deliberation, unless the new +matter is too small in proportion to the remaining features of +the case to attract attention, or unless, though really new, it +appears so similar to an old feature as to be at first mistaken +for it; with the second, it is not even professed that the +seer’s ancestors have had long experience upon the matter +concerning which the seer is supposed to have special insight, +and I can imagine no more powerful <i>à priori</i> +argument against a belief in such stories.</p> + +<div class="gapshortline"> </div> +<p>Close upon the end of his chapter Von Hartmann touches upon +the one matter which requires consideration. He refers the +similarity of instinct that is observable among all species to +the fact that like causes produce like effects; and I gather, +though he does not expressly say so, that he considers similarity +of instinct in successive generations to be referable to the same +cause as similarity of instinct between all the contemporary +members of a species. He thus raises the one objection +against referring the phenomena of heredity to memory which I +think need be gone into with any fulness. I will, however, +reserve this matter for my concluding chapters.</p> +<p>Von Hartmann concludes his chapter with a quotation from +Schelling, to the effect that the phenomena of animal instinct +are the true touchstone of a durable philosophy; by which I +suppose it is intended to say that if a system or theory deals +satisfactorily with animal instinct, it will stand, but not +otherwise. I can wish nothing better than that the +philosophy of the unconscious advanced by Von Hartmann be tested +by this standard.</p> +<h2><a name="page146"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +146</span>Chapter X</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Recapitulation and statement of an +objection.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">The</span> true theory of unconscious +action, then, is that of Professor Hering, from whose lecture it +is no strained conclusion to gather that he holds the action of +all living beings, from the moment of their conception to that of +their fullest development, to be founded in volition and design, +though these have been so long lost sight of that the work is now +carried on, as it were, departmentally and in due course +according to an official routine which can hardly now be departed +from.</p> +<p>This involves the older “Darwinism” and the theory +of Lamarck, according to which the modification of living forms +has been effected mainly through the needs of the living forms +themselves, which vary with varying conditions, the survival of +the fittest (which, as I see Mr. H. B. Baildon has just said, +“sometimes comes to mean merely the survival of the +survivors” <a name="citation146"></a><a href="#footnote146" +class="citation">[146]</a>) being taken almost as a matter of +course. According to this view of evolution, there is a +remarkable analogy between the development of living organs or +tools and that of those organs or tools external to the body +which has been so rapid during the last few thousand years.</p> +<p>Animals and plants, according to Professor Hering, are guided +throughout their development, and preserve the due order in each +step which they take, through memory of the course they took on +past occasions when in the persons of their ancestors. I am +afraid I have already too often said that if this memory remains +for long periods together latent and without effect, it is +because the undulations of the molecular substance of the body +which are its supposed explanation are during these periods too +feeble to generate action, until they are augmented in force +through an accession of suitable undulations issuing from +exterior objects; or, in other words, until recollection is +stimulated by a return of the associated ideas. On this the +eternal agitation becomes so much enhanced, that equilibrium is +visibly disturbed, and the action ensues which is proper to the +vibration of the particular substance under the particular +conditions. This, at least, is what I suppose Professor +Hering to intend.</p> +<p>Leaving the explanation of memory on one side, and confining +ourselves to the fact of memory only, a caterpillar on being just +hatched is supposed, according to this theory, to lose its memory +of the time it was in the egg, and to be stimulated by an intense +but unconscious recollection of the action taken by its ancestors +when they were first hatched. It is guided in the course it +takes by the experience it can thus command. Each step it +takes recalls a new recollection, and thus it goes through its +development as a performer performs a piece of music, each bar +leading his recollection to the bar that should next follow.</p> +<p>In “Life and Habit” will be found examples of the +manner in which this view solves a number of difficulties for the +explanation of which the leading men of science express +themselves at a loss. The following from Professor +Huxley’s recent work upon the crayfish may serve for an +example. Professor Huxley writes:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“It is a widely received notion that the +energies of living matter have a tendency to decline and finally +disappear, and that the death of the body as a whole is a +necessary correlate of its life. That all living beings +sooner or later perish needs no demonstration, but it would be +difficult to find satisfactory grounds for the belief that they +needs must do so. The analogy of a machine, that sooner or +later must be brought to a standstill by the wear and tear of its +parts, does not hold, inasmuch as the animal mechanism is +continually renewed and repaired; and though it is true that +individual components of the body are constantly dying, yet their +places are taken by vigorous successors. A city remains +notwithstanding the constant death-rate of its inhabitants; and +such an organism as a crayfish is only a corporate unity, made up +of innumerable partially independent +individualities.”—<i>The Crayfish</i>, p. 127.</p> +</blockquote> +<p>Surely the theory which I have indicated above makes the +reason plain why no organism can permanently outlive its +experience of past lives. The death of such a body +corporate as the crayfish is due to the social condition becoming +more complex than there is memory of past experience to deal +with. Hence social disruption, insubordination, and +decay. The crayfish dies as a state dies, and all states +that we have heard of die sooner or later. There are some +savages who have not yet arrived at the conception that death is +the necessary end of all living beings, and who consider even the +gentlest death from old age as violent and abnormal; so Professor +Huxley seems to find a difficulty in seeing that though a city +commonly outlives many generations of its citizens, yet cities +and states are in the end no less mortal than individuals. +“The city,” he says, “remains.” +Yes, but not for ever. When Professor Huxley can find a +city that will last for ever, he may wonder that a crayfish does +not last for ever.</p> +<p>I have already here and elsewhere said all that I can yet +bring forward in support of Professor Hering’s theory; it +now remains for me to meet the most troublesome objection to it +that I have been able to think of—an objection which I had +before me when I wrote “Life and Habit,” but which +then as now I believe to be unsound. Seeing, however, as I +have pointed out at the end of the preceding chapter, that Von +Hartmann has touched upon it, and being aware that a plausible +case can be made out for it, I will state it and refute it +here. When I say refute it, I do not mean that I shall have +done with it—for it is plain that it opens up a vaster +question in the relations between the so-called organic and +inorganic worlds—but that I will refute the supposition +that it any way militates against Professor Hering’s +theory.</p> +<p>Why, it may be asked, should we go out of our way to invent +unconscious memory—the existence of which must at the best +remain an inference <a name="citation149"></a><a +href="#footnote149" class="citation">[149]</a>—when the +observed fact that like antecedents are invariably followed by +like consequents should be sufficient for our purpose? Why +should the fact that a given kind of chrysalis in a given +condition will always become a butterfly within a certain time be +connected with memory, when it is not pretended that memory has +anything to do with the invariableness with which oxygen and +hydrogen when mixed in certain proportions make water?</p> +<p>We assume confidently that if a drop of water were decomposed +into its component parts, and if these were brought together +again, and again decomposed and again brought together any number +of times over, the results would be invariably the same, whether +decomposition or combination, yet no one will refer the +invariableness of the action during each repetition, to +recollection by the gaseous molecules of the course taken when +the process was last repeated. On the contrary, we are +assured that molecules in some distant part of the world, which +had never entered into such and such a known combination +themselves, nor held concert with other molecules that had been +so combined, and which, therefore, could have had no experience +and no memory, would none the less act upon one another in that +one way in which other like combinations of atoms have acted +under like circumstances, as readily as though they had been +combined and separated and recombined again a hundred or a +hundred thousand times. It is this assumption, tacitly made +by every man, beast, and plant in the universe, throughout all +time and in every action of their lives, that has made any action +possible, lying, as it does, at the root of all experience.</p> +<p>As we admit of no doubt concerning the main result, so we do +not suppose an alternative to lie before any atom of any molecule +at any moment during the process of their combination. This +process is, in all probability, an exceedingly complicated one, +involving a multitude of actions and subordinate processes, which +follow one upon the other, and each one of which has a beginning, +a middle, and an end, though they all come to pass in what +appears to be an instant of time. Yet at no point do we +conceive of any atom as swerving ever such a little to right or +left of a determined course, but invest each one of them with so +much of the divine attributes as that with it there shall be no +variableness, neither shadow of turning.</p> +<p>We attribute this regularity of action to what we call the +necessity of things, as determined by the nature of the atoms and +the circumstances in which they are placed. We say that +only one proximate result can ever arise from any given +combination. If, then, so great uniformity of action as +nothing can exceed is manifested by atoms to which no one will +impute memory, why this desire for memory, as though it were the +only way of accounting for regularity of action in living +beings? Sameness of action may be seen abundantly where +there is no room for anything that we can consistently call +memory. In these cases we say that it is due to sameness of +substance in same circumstances.</p> +<p>The most cursory reflection upon our actions will show us that +it is no more possible for living action to have more than one +set of proximate consequents at any given time than for oxygen +and hydrogen when mixed in the proportions proper for the +formation of water. Why, then, not recognise this fact, and +ascribe repeated similarity of living action to the reproduction +of the necessary antecedents, with no more sense of connection +between the steps in the action, or memory of similar action +taken before, than we suppose on the part of oxygen and hydrogen +molecules between the several occasions on which they may have +been disunited and reunited?</p> +<p>A boy catches the measles not because he remembers having +caught them in the persons of his father and mother, but because +he is a fit soil for a certain kind of seed to grow upon. +In like manner he should be said to grow his nose because he is a +fit combination for a nose to spring from. Dr. +X—’s father died of <i>angina pectoris</i> at the age +of forty-nine; so did Dr. X—. Can it be pretended +that Dr. X— remembered having died of <i>angina +pectoris</i> at the age of forty-nine when in the person of his +father, and accordingly, when he came to be forty-nine years old +himself, died also? For this to hold, Dr. X—’s +father must have begotten him after he was dead; for the son +could not remember the father’s death before it +happened.</p> +<p>As for the diseases of old age, so very commonly inherited, +they are developed for the most part not only long after the +average age of reproduction, but at a time when no appreciable +amount of memory of any previous existence can remain; for a man +will not have many male ancestors who become parents at over +sixty years old, nor female ancestors who did so at over +forty. By our own showing, therefore, recollection can have +nothing to do with the matter. Yet who can doubt that gout +is due to inheritance as much as eyes and noses? In what +respects do the two things differ so that we should refer the +inheritance of eyes and noses to memory, while denying any +connection between memory and gout? We may have a ghost of +a pretence for saying that a man grew a nose by rote, or even +that he catches the measles or whooping-cough by rote during his +boyhood; but do we mean to say that he develops the gout by rote +in his old age if he comes of a gouty family? If, then, +rote and red-tape have nothing to do with the one, why should +they with the other?</p> +<p>Remember also the cases in which aged females develop male +characteristics. Here are growths, often of not +inconsiderable extent, which make their appearance during the +decay of the body, and grow with greater and greater vigour in +the extreme of old age, and even for days after death +itself. It can hardly be doubted that an especial tendency +to develop these characteristics runs as an inheritance in +certain families; here then is perhaps the best case that can be +found of a development strictly inherited, but having clearly +nothing whatever to do with memory. Why should not all +development stand upon the same footing?</p> +<p>A friend who had been arguing with me for some time as above, +concluded with the following words:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“If you cannot be content with the similar +action of similar substances (living or non-living) under similar +circumstances—if you cannot accept this as an ultimate +fact, but consider it necessary to connect repetition of similar +action with memory before you can rest in it and be +thankful—be consistent, and introduce this memory which you +find so necessary into the inorganic world also. Either say +that a chrysalis becomes a butterfly because it is the thing that +it is, and, being that kind of thing, must act in such and such a +manner and in such a manner only, so that the act of one +generation has no more to do with the act of the next than the +fact of cream being churned into butter in a dairy one day has to +do with other cream being churnable into butter in the following +week—either say this, or else develop some mental +condition—which I have no doubt you will be very well able +to do if you feel the want of it—in which you can make out +a case for saying that oxygen and hydrogen on being brought +together, and cream on being churned, are in some way acquainted +with, and mindful of, action taken by other cream and other +oxygen and hydrogen on past occasions.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I felt inclined to reply that my friend need not twit me with +being able to develop a mental organism if I felt the need of it, +for his own ingenious attack on my position, and indeed every +action of his life was but an example of this omnipresent +principle.</p> +<p>When he was gone, however, I thought over what he had been +saying. I endeavoured to see how far I could get on without +volition and memory, and reasoned as follows:—A repetition +of like antecedents will be certainly followed by a repetition of +like consequents, whether the agents be men and women or chemical +substances. “If there be two cowards perfectly +similar in every respect, and if they be subjected in a perfectly +similar way to two terrifying agents, which are themselves +perfectly similar, there are few who will not expect a perfect +similarity in the running away, even though ten thousand years +intervene between the original combination and its +repetition.” <a name="citation153"></a><a +href="#footnote153" class="citation">[153]</a> Here +certainly there is no coming into play of memory, more than in +the pan of cream on two successive churning days, yet the action +is similar.</p> +<p>A clerk in an office has an hour in the middle of the day for +dinner. About half-past twelve he begins to feel hungry; at +once he takes down his hat and leaves the office. He does +not yet know the neighbourhood, and on getting down into the +street asks a policeman at the corner which is the best +eating-house within easy distance. The policeman tells him +of three houses, one of which is a little farther off than the +other two, but is cheaper. Money being a greater object to +him than time, the clerk decides on going to the cheaper +house. He goes, is satisfied, and returns.</p> +<p>Next day he wants his dinner at the same hour, and—it +will be said—remembering his satisfaction of yesterday, +will go to the same place as before. But what has his +memory to do with it? Suppose him to have entirely +forgotten all the circumstances of the preceding day from the +moment of his beginning to feel hungry onward, though in other +respects sound in mind and body, and unchanged generally. +At half-past twelve he would begin to be hungry; but his +beginning to be hungry cannot be connected with his remembering +having begun to be hungry yesterday. He would begin to be +hungry just as much whether he remembered or no. At one +o’clock he again takes down his hat and leaves the office, +not because he remembers having done so yesterday, but because he +wants his hat to go out with. Being again in the street, +and again ignorant of the neighbourhood (for he remembers nothing +of yesterday), he sees the same policeman at the corner of the +street, and asks him the same question as before; the policeman +gives him the same answer, and money being still an object to +him, the cheapest eating-house is again selected; he goes there, +finds the same <i>menu</i>, makes the same choice for the same +reasons, eats, is satisfied, and returns.</p> +<p>What similarity of action can be greater than this, and at the +same time more incontrovertible? But it has nothing to do +with memory; on the contrary, it is just because the clerk has no +memory that his action of the second day so exactly resembles +that of the first. As long as he has no power of +recollecting, he will day after day repeat the same actions in +exactly the same way, until some external circumstances, such as +his being sent away, modify the situation. Till this or +some other modification occurs, he will day after day go down +into the street without knowing where to go; day after day he +will see the same policeman at the corner of the same street, and +(for we may as well suppose that the policeman has no memory too) +he will ask and be answered, and ask and be answered, till he and +the policeman die of old age. This similarity of action is +plainly due to that—whatever it is—which ensures that +like persons or things when placed in like circumstances shall +behave in like manner.</p> +<p>Allow the clerk ever such a little memory, and the similarity +of action will disappear; for the fact of remembering what +happened to him on the first day he went out in search of dinner +will be a modification in him in regard to his then condition +when he next goes out to get his dinner. He had no such +memory on the first day, and he has upon the second. Some +modification of action must ensue upon this modification of the +actor, and this is immediately observable. He wants his +dinner, indeed, goes down into the street, and sees the policeman +as yesterday, but he does not ask the policeman; he remembers +what the policeman told him and what he did, and therefore goes +straight to the eating-house without wasting time: nor does he +dine off the same dish two days running, for he remembers what he +had yesterday and likes variety. If, then, similarity of +action is rather hindered than promoted by memory, why introduce +it into such cases as the repetition of the embryonic processes +by successive generations? The embryos of a well-fixed +breed, such as the goose, are almost as much alike as water is to +water, and by consequence one goose comes to be almost as like +another as water to water. Why should it not be supposed to +become so upon the same grounds—namely, that it is made of +the same stuffs, and put together in like proportions in the same +manner?</p> +<h2><a name="page156"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +156</span>Chapter XI</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">On Cycles.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">The</span> one faith on which all normal +living beings consciously or unconsciously act, is that like +antecedents will be followed by like consequents. This is +the one true and catholic faith, undemonstrable, but except a +living being believe which, without doubt it shall perish +everlastingly. In the assurance of this all action is +taken.</p> +<p>But if this fundamental article is admitted, and it cannot be +gainsaid, it follows that if ever a complete cycle were formed, +so that the whole universe of one instant were to repeat itself +absolutely in a subsequent one, no matter after what interval of +time, then the course of the events between these two moments +would go on repeating itself for ever and ever afterwards in due +order, down to the minutest detail, in an endless series of +cycles like a circulating decimal. For the universe +comprises everything; there could therefore be no disturbance +from without. Once a cycle, always a cycle.</p> +<p>Let us suppose the earth, of given weight, moving with given +momentum in a given path, and under given conditions in every +respect, to find itself at any one time conditioned in all these +respects as it was conditioned at some past moment; then it must +move exactly in the same path as the one it took when at the +beginning of the cycle it has just completed, and must therefore +in the course of time fulfil a second cycle, and therefore a +third, and so on for ever and ever, with no more chance of escape +than a circulating decimal has, if the circumstances have been +reproduced with perfect accuracy.</p> +<p>We see something very like this actually happen in the yearly +revolutions of the planets round the sun. But the relations +between, we will say, the earth and the sun are not reproduced +absolutely. These relations deal only with a small part of +the universe, and even in this small part the relation of the +parts <i>inter se</i> has never yet been reproduced with the +perfection of accuracy necessary for our argument. They are +liable, moreover, to disturbance from events which may or may not +actually occur (as, for example, our being struck by a comet, or +the sun’s coming within a certain distance of another sun), +but of which, if they do occur, no one can foresee the +effects. Nevertheless the conditions have been so nearly +repeated that there is no appreciable difference in the relations +between the earth and sun on one New Year’s Day and on +another, nor is there reason for expecting such change within any +reasonable time.</p> +<p>If there is to be an eternal series of cycles involving the +whole universe, it is plain that not one single atom must be +excluded. Exclude a single molecule of hydrogen from the +ring, or vary the relative positions of two molecules only, and +the charm is broken; an element of disturbance has been +introduced, of which the utmost that can be said is that it may +not prevent the ensuing of a long series of very nearly perfect +cycles before similarity in recurrence is destroyed, but which +must inevitably prevent absolute identity of repetition. +The movement of the series becomes no longer a cycle, but spiral, +and convergent or divergent at a greater or less rate according +to circumstances. We cannot conceive of all the atoms in +the universe standing twice over in absolutely the same relation +each one of them to every other. There are too many of them +and they are too much mixed; but, as has been just said, in the +planets and their satellites we do see large groups of atoms +whose movements recur with some approach to precision. The +same holds good also with certain comets and with the sun +himself. The result is that our days and nights and seasons +follow one another with nearly perfect regularity from year to +year, and have done so for as long time as we know anything for +certain. A vast preponderance of all the action that takes +place around us is cycular action.</p> +<p>Within the great cycle of the planetary revolution of our own +earth, and as a consequence thereof, we have the minor cycle of +the phenomena of the seasons; these generate atmospheric +cycles. Water is evaporated from the ocean and conveyed to +mountain ranges, where it is cooled, and whence it returns again +to the sea. This cycle of events is being repeated again +and again with little appreciable variation. The tides and +winds in certain latitudes go round and round the world with what +amounts to continuous regularity.—There are storms of wind +and rain called cyclones. In the case of these, the cycle +is not very complete, the movement, therefore, is spiral, and the +tendency to recur is comparatively soon lost. It is a +common saying that history repeats itself, so that anarchy will +lead to despotism and despotism to anarchy; every nation can +point to instances of men’s minds having gone round and +round so nearly in a perfect cycle that many revolutions have +occurred before the cessation of a tendency to recur. +Lastly, in the generation of plants and animals we have, perhaps, +the most striking and common example of the inevitable tendency +of all action to repeat itself when it has once proximately done +so. Let only one living being have once succeeded in +producing a being like itself, and thus have returned, so to +speak, upon itself, and a series of generations must follow of +necessity, unless some matter interfere which had no part in the +original combination, and, as it may happen, kill the first +reproductive creature or all its descendants within a few +generations. If no such mishap occurs as this, and if the +recurrence of the conditions is sufficiently perfect, a series of +generations follows with as much certainty as a series of seasons +follows upon the cycle of the relations between the earth and +sun. Let the first periodically recurring +substance—we will say A—be able to recur or reproduce +itself, not once only, but many times over, as A<sup>1</sup>, +A<sup>2</sup>, &c.; let A also have consciousness and a sense +of self-interest, which qualities must, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, be +reproduced in each one of its offspring; let these get placed in +circumstances which differ sufficiently to destroy the cycle in +theory without doing so practically—that is to say, to +reduce the rotation to a spiral, but to a spiral with so little +deviation from perfect cycularity as for each revolution to +appear practically a cycle, though after many revolutions the +deviation becomes perceptible; then some such differentiations of +animal and vegetable life as we actually see follow as matters of +course. A<sup>1</sup> and A<sup>2</sup> have a sense of +self-interest as A had, but they are not precisely in +circumstances similar to A’s, nor, it may be, to each +other’s; they will therefore act somewhat differently, and +every living being is modified by a change of action. +Having become modified, they follow the spirit of A’s +action more essentially in begetting a creature like themselves +than in begetting one like A; for the essence of A’s act +was not the reproduction of A, but the reproduction of a creature +like the one from which it sprung—that is to say, a +creature bearing traces in its body of the main influences that +have worked upon its parent.</p> +<p>Within the cycle of reproduction there are cycles upon cycles +in the life of each individual, whether animal or plant. +Observe the action of our lungs and heart, how regular it is, and +how a cycle having been once established, it is repeated many +millions of times in an individual of average health and +longevity. Remember also that it is this +periodicity—this inevitable tendency of all atoms in +combination to repeat any combination which they have once +repeated, unless forcibly prevented from doing so—which +alone renders nine-tenths of our mechanical inventions of +practical use to us. There is no internal periodicity about +a hammer or a saw, but there is in the steam-engine or watermill +when once set in motion. The actions of these machines +recur in a regular series, at regular intervals, with the +unerringness of circulating decimals.</p> +<p>When we bear in mind, then, the omnipresence of this tendency +in the world around us, the absolute freedom from exception which +attends its action, the manner in which it holds equally good +upon the vastest and the smallest scale, and the completeness of +its accord with our ideas of what must inevitably happen when a +like combination is placed in circumstances like those in which +it was placed before—when we bear in mind all this, is it +possible not to connect the facts together, and to refer cycles +of living generations to the same unalterableness in the action +of like matter under like circumstances which makes Jupiter and +Saturn revolve round the sun, or the piston of a steam-engine +move up and down as long as the steam acts upon it?</p> +<p>But who will attribute memory to the hands of a clock, to a +piston-rod, to air or water in a storm or in course of +evaporation, to the earth and planets in their circuits round the +sun, or to the atoms of the universe, if they too be moving in a +cycle vaster than we can take account of? <a +name="citation160"></a><a href="#footnote160" +class="citation">[160]</a> And if not, why introduce it +into the embryonic development of living beings, when there is +not a particle of evidence in support of its actual presence, +when regularity of action can be ensured just as well without it +as with it, and when at the best it is considered as existing +under circumstances which it baffles us to conceive, inasmuch as +it is supposed to be exercised without any conscious +recollection? Surely a memory which is exercised without +any consciousness of recollecting is only a periphrasis for the +absence of any memory at all.</p> +<h2><a name="page161"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +161</span>Chapter XII</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Refutation—Memory at once a promoter and +a disturber of uniformity of action and structure.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">To</span> meet the objections in the two +foregoing chapters, I need do little more than show that the fact +of certain often inherited diseases and developments, whether of +youth or old age, being obviously not due to a memory on the part +of offspring of like diseases and developments in the parents, +does not militate against supposing that embryonic and youthful +development generally is due to memory.</p> +<p>This is the main part of the objection; the rest resolves +itself into an assertion that there is no evidence in support of +instinct and embryonic development being due to memory, and a +contention that the necessity of each particular moment in each +particular case is sufficient to account for the facts without +the introduction of memory.</p> +<p>I will deal with these two last points briefly first. As +regards the evidence in support of the theory that instinct and +growth are due to a rapid unconscious memory of past experiences +and developments in the persons of the ancestors of the living +form in which they appear, I must refer my readers to “Life +and Habit,” and to the translation of Professor +Hering’s lecture given in this volume. I will only +repeat here that a chrysalis, we will say, is as much one and the +same person with the chrysalis of its preceding generation, as +this last is one and the same person with the egg or caterpillar +from which it sprang. You cannot deny personal identity +between two successive generations without sooner or later +denying it during the successive stages in the single life of +what we call one individual; nor can you admit personal identity +through the stages of a long and varied life (embryonic and +postnatal) without admitting it to endure through an endless +series of generations.</p> +<p>The personal identity of successive generations being +admitted, the possibility of the second of two generations +remembering what happened to it in the first is obvious. +The <i>à priori</i> objection, therefore, is removed, and +the question becomes one of fact—does the offspring act as +if it remembered?</p> +<p>The answer to this question is not only that it does so act, +but that it is not possible to account for either its development +or its early instinctive actions upon any other hypothesis than +that of its remembering, and remembering exceedingly well.</p> +<p>The only alternative is to declare with Von Hartmann that a +living being may display a vast and varied information concerning +all manner of details, and be able to perform most intricate +operations, independently of experience and practice. Once +admit knowledge independent of experience, and farewell to sober +sense and reason from that moment.</p> +<p>Firstly, then, we show that offspring has had every facility +for remembering; secondly, that it shows every appearance of +having remembered; thirdly, that no other hypothesis except +memory can be brought forward, so as to account for the phenomena +of instinct and heredity generally, which is not easily reducible +to an absurdity. Beyond this we do not care to go, and must +allow those to differ from us who require further evidence.</p> +<p>As regards the argument that the necessity of each moment will +account for likeness of result, without there being any need for +introducing memory, I admit that likeness of consequents is due +to likeness of antecedents, and I grant this will hold as good +with embryos as with oxygen and hydrogen gas; what will cover the +one will cover the other, for time writs of the laws common to +all matter run within the womb as freely as elsewhere; but +admitting that there are combinations into which living beings +enter with a faculty called memory which has its effect upon +their conduct, and admitting that such combinations are from time +to time repeated (as we observe in the case of a practised +performer playing a piece of music which he has committed to +memory), then I maintain that though, indeed, the likeness of one +performance to its immediate predecessor is due to likeness of +the combinations immediately preceding the two performances, yet +memory plays so important a part in both these combinations as to +make it a distinguishing feature in them, and therefore proper to +be insisted upon. We do not, for example, say that Herr +Joachim played such and such a sonata without the music, because +he was such and such an arrangement of matter in such and such +circumstances, resembling those under which he played without +music on some past occasion. This goes without saying; we +say only that he played the music by heart or by memory, as he +had often played it before.</p> +<p>To the objector that a caterpillar becomes a chrysalis not +because it remembers and takes the action taken by its fathers +and mothers in due course before it, but because when matter is +in such a physical and mental state as to be called caterpillar, +it must perforce assume presently such another physical and +mental state as to be called chrysalis, and that therefore there +is no memory in the case—to this objector I rejoin that the +offspring caterpillar would not have become so like the parent as +to make the next or chrysalis stage a matter of necessity, unless +both parent and offspring had been influenced by something that +we usually call memory. For it is this very possession of a +common memory which has guided the offspring into the path taken +by, and hence to a virtually same condition with, the parent, and +which guided the parent in its turn to a state virtually +identical with a corresponding state in the existence of its own +parent. To memory, therefore, the most prominent place in +the transaction is assigned rightly.</p> +<p>To deny that will guided by memory has anything to do with the +development of embryos seems like denying that a desire to +obstruct has anything to do with the recent conduct of certain +members in the House of Commons. What should we think of +one who said that the action of these gentlemen had nothing to do +with a desire to embarrass the Government, but was simply the +necessary outcome of the chemical and mechanical forces at work, +which being such and such, the action which we see is inevitable, +and has therefore nothing to do with wilful obstruction? We +should answer that there was doubtless a great deal of chemical +and mechanical action in the matter; perhaps, for aught we knew +or cared, it was all chemical and mechanical; but if so, then a +desire to obstruct parliamentary business is involved in certain +kinds of chemical and mechanical action, and that the kinds +involving this had preceded the recent proceedings of the members +in question. If asked to prove this, we can get no further +than that such action as has been taken has never yet been seen +except as following after and in consequence of a desire to +obstruct; that this is our nomenclature, and that we can no more +be expected to change it than to change our mother tongue at the +bidding of a foreigner.</p> +<p>A little reflection will convince the reader that he will be +unable to deny will and memory to the embryo without at the same +time denying their existence everywhere, and maintaining that +they have no place in the acquisition of a habit, nor indeed in +any human action. He will feel that the actions, and the +relation of one action to another which he observes in embryos is +such as is never seen except in association with and as a +consequence of will and memory. He will therefore say that +it is due to will and memory. To say that these are the +necessary outcome of certain antecedents is not to destroy them: +granted that they are—a man does not cease to be a man when +we reflect that he has had a father and mother, nor do will and +memory cease to be will and memory on the ground that they cannot +come causeless. They are manifest minute by minute to the +perception of all sane people, and this tribunal, though not +infallible, is nevertheless our ultimate court of +appeal—the final arbitrator in all disputed cases.</p> +<p>We must remember that there is no action, however original or +peculiar, which is not in respect of far the greater number of +its details founded upon memory. If a desperate man blows +his brains out—an action which he can do once in a lifetime +only, and which none of his ancestors can have done before +leaving offspring—still nine hundred and ninety-nine +thousandths of the movements necessary to achieve his end consist +of habitual movements—movements, that is to say, which were +once difficult, but which have been practised and practised by +the help of memory until they are now performed +automatically. We can no more have an action than a +creative effort of the imagination cut off from memory. +Ideas and actions seem almost to resemble matter and force in +respect of the impossibility of originating or destroying them; +nearly all that are, are memories of other ideas and actions, +transmitted but not created, disappearing but not perishing.</p> +<p>It appears, then, that when in Chapter X. we supposed the +clerk who wanted his dinner to forget on a second day the action +he had taken the day before, we still, without perhaps perceiving +it, supposed him to be guided by memory in all the details of his +action, such as his taking down his hat and going out into the +street. We could not, indeed, deprive him of all memory +without absolutely paralysing his action.</p> +<p>Nevertheless new ideas, new faiths, and new actions do in the +course of time come about, the living expressions of which we may +see in the new forms of life which from time to time have arisen +and are still arising, and in the increase of our own knowledge +and mechanical inventions. But it is only a very little new +that is added at a time, and that little is generally due to the +desire to attain an end which cannot be attained by any of the +means for which there exists a perceived precedent in the +memory. When this is the case, either the memory is further +ransacked for any forgotten shreds of details, a combination of +which may serve the desired purpose; or action is taken in the +dark, which sometimes succeeds and becomes a fertile source of +further combinations; or we are brought to a dead stop. All +action is random in respect of any of the minute actions which +compose it that are not done in consequence of memory, real or +supposed. So that random, or action taken in the dark, or +illusion, lies at the very root of progress.</p> +<p>I will now consider the objection that the phenomena of +instinct and embryonic development ought not to be ascribed to +memory, inasmuch as certain other phenomena of heredity, such as +gout, cannot be ascribed to it.</p> +<p>Those who object in this way forget that our actions fall into +two main classes: those which we have often repeated before by +means of a regular series of subordinate actions beginning and +ending at a certain tolerably well-defined point—as when +Herr Joachim plays a sonata in public, or when we dress or +undress ourselves; and actions the details of which are indeed +guided by memory, but which in their general scope and purpose +are new—as when we are being married or presented at +court.</p> +<p>At each point in any action of the first of the two kinds +above referred to there is a memory (conscious or unconscious +according to the less or greater number of times the action has +been repeated), not only of the steps in the present and previous +performances which have led up to the particular point that may +be selected, but also of the particular point itself; there is, +therefore, at each point in a habitual performance a memory at +once of like antecedents and of a like present.</p> +<p>If the memory, whether of the antecedent or the present, were +absolutely perfect; if the vibration (according to Professor +Hering) on each repetition existed in its full original strength +and without having been interfered with by any other vibration; +and if, again, the new wave running into it from exterior objects +on each repetition of the action were absolutely identical in +character with the wave that ran in upon the last occasion, then +there would be no change in the action and no modification or +improvement could take place. For though indeed the latest +performance would always have one memory more than the latest but +one to guide it, yet the memories being identical, it would not +matter how many or how few they were.</p> +<p>On any repetition, however, the circumstances, external or +internal, or both, never are absolutely identical: there is some +slight variation in each individual case, and some part of this +variation is remembered, with approbation or disapprobation as +the case may be.</p> +<p>The fact, therefore, that on each repetition of the action +there is one memory more than on the last but one, and that this +memory is slightly different from its predecessor, is seen to be +an inherent and, <i>ex hypothesi</i>, necessarily disturbing +factor in all habitual action—and the life of an organism +should be regarded as the habitual action of a single individual, +namely, of the organism itself, and of its ancestors. This +is the key to accumulation of improvement, whether in the arts +which we assiduously practise during our single life, or in the +structures and instincts of successive generations. The +memory does not complete a true circle, but is, as it were, a +spiral slightly divergent therefrom. It is no longer a +perfectly circulating decimal. Where, on the other hand, +there is no memory of a like present, where, in fact, the memory +is not, so to speak, spiral, there is no accumulation of +improvement. The effect of any variation is not +transmitted, and is not thus pregnant of still further +change.</p> +<p>As regards the second of the two classes of actions above +referred to—those, namely, which are not recurrent or +habitual, <i>and at no point of which is there a memory of a past +present like the one which is present now</i>—there will +have been no accumulation of strong and well-knit memory as +regards the action as a whole, but action, if taken at all, will +be taken upon disjointed fragments of individual actions (our own +and those of other people) pieced together with a result more or +less satisfactory according to circumstances.</p> +<p>But it does not follow that the action of two people who have +had tolerably similar antecedents and are placed in tolerably +similar circumstances should be more unlike each other in this +second case than in the first. On the contrary, nothing is +more common than to observe the same kind of people making the +same kind of mistake when placed for the first time in the same +kind of new circumstances. I did not say that there would +be no sameness of action without memory of a like present. +There may be sameness of action proceeding from a memory, +conscious or unconscious, of like antecedents, and <i>a presence +only of like presents without recollection of the same</i>.</p> +<p>The sameness of action of like persons placed under like +circumstances for the first time, resembles the sameness of +action of inorganic matter under the same combinations. Let +us for the moment suppose what we call non-living substances to +be capable of remembering their antecedents, and that the changes +they undergo are the expressions of their recollections. +Then I admit, of course, that there is not memory in any cream, +we will say, that is about to be churned of the cream of the +preceding week, but the common absence of such memory from each +week’s cream is an element of sameness between the +two. And though no cream can remember having been churned +before, yet all cream in all time has had nearly identical +antecedents, and has therefore nearly the same memories, and +nearly the same proclivities. Thus, in fact, the cream of +one week is as truly the same as the cream of another week from +the same cow, pasture, &c., as anything is ever the same with +anything; for the having been subjected to like antecedents +engenders the closest similarity that we can conceive of, if the +substances were like to start with.</p> +<p>The manifest absence of any connecting memory (or memory of +like presents) from certain of the phenomena of heredity, such +as, for example, the diseases of old age, is now seen to be no +valid reason for saying that such other and far more numerous and +important phenomena as those of embryonic development are not +phenomena of memory. Growth and the diseases of old age do +indeed, at first sight, appear to stand on the same footing, but +reflection shows us that the question whether a certain result is +due to memory or no must be settled not by showing that +combinations into which memory does not certainly enter may yet +generate like results, and therefore considering the memory +theory disposed of, but by the evidence we may be able to adduce +in support of the fact that the second agent has actually +remembered the conduct of the first, inasmuch as he cannot be +supposed able to do what it is plain he can do, except under the +guidance of memory or experience, and can also be shown to have +had every opportunity of remembering. When either of these +tests fails, similarity of action on the part of two agents need +not be connected with memory of a like present as well as of like +antecedents, but must, or at any rate may, be referred to memory +of like antecedents only.</p> +<p>Returning to a parenthesis a few pages back, in which I said +that consciousness of memory would be less or greater according +to the greater or fewer number of times that the act had been +repeated, it may be observed as a corollary to this, that the +less consciousness of memory the greater the uniformity of +action, and <i>vice versa</i>. For the less consciousness +involves the memory’s being more perfect, through a larger +number (generally) of repetitions of the act that is remembered; +there is therefore a less proportionate difference in respect of +the number of recollections of this particular act between the +most recent actor and the most recent but one. This is why +very old civilisations, as those of many insects, and the greater +number of now living organisms, appear to the eye not to change +at all.</p> +<p>For example, if an action has been performed only ten times, +we will say by A, B, C, &c., who are similar in all respects, +except that A acts without recollection, B with recollection of +A’s action, C with recollection of both B’s and +A’s, while J remembers the course taken by A, B, C, D, E, +F, G, H, and I—the possession of a memory by B will indeed +so change his action, as compared with A’s, that it may +well be hardly recognisable. We saw this in our example of +the clerk who asked the policeman the way to the eating-house on +one day, but did not ask him the next, because he remembered; but +C’s action will not be so different from B’s as +B’s from A’s, for though C will act with a memory of +two occasions on which the action has been performed, while B +recollects only the original performance by A, yet B and C both +act with the guidance of a memory and experience of some kind, +while A acted without any. Thus the clerk referred to in +Chapter X. will act on the third day much as he acted on the +second—that is to say, he will see the policeman at the +corner of the street, but will not question him.</p> +<p>When the action is repeated by J for the tenth time, the +difference between J’s repetition of it and I’s will +be due solely to the difference between a recollection of nine +past performances by J against only eight by I, and this is so +much proportionately less than the difference between a +recollection of two performances and of only one, that a less +modification of action should be expected. At the same time +consciousness concerning an action repeated for the tenth time +should be less acute than on the first repetition. Memory, +therefore, though tending to disturb similarity of action less +and less continually, must always cause some disturbance. +At the same time the possession of a memory on the successive +repetitions of an action after the first, and, perhaps, the first +two or three, during which the recollection may be supposed still +imperfect, will tend to ensure uniformity, for it will be one of +the elements of sameness in the agents—they both acting by +the light of experience and memory.</p> +<p>During the embryonic stages and in childhood we are almost +entirely under the guidance of a practised and powerful memory of +circumstances which have been often repeated, not only in detail +and piecemeal, but as a whole, and under many slightly varying +conditions; thus the performance has become well averaged and +matured in its arrangements, so as to meet all ordinary +emergencies. We therefore act with great unconsciousness +and vary our performances little. Babies are much more +alike than persons of middle age.</p> +<p>Up to the average age at which our ancestors have had children +during many generations, we are still guided in great measure by +memory; but the variations in external circumstances begin to +make themselves perceptible in our characters. In middle +life we live more and more continually upon the piecing together +of details of memory drawn from our personal experience, that is +to say, upon the memory of our own antecedents; and this +resembles the kind of memory we hypothetically attached to cream +a little time ago. It is not surprising, then, that a son +who has inherited his father’s tastes and constitution, and +who lives much as his father had done, should make the same +mistakes as his father did when he reaches his father’s +age—we will say of seventy—though he cannot possibly +remember his father’s having made the mistakes. It +were to be wished we could, for then we might know better how to +avoid gout, cancer, or what not. And it is to be noticed +that the developments of old age are generally things we should +be glad enough to avoid if we knew how to do so.</p> +<h2><a name="page173"></a><span class="pagenum">p. +173</span>Chapter XIII</h2> +<p class="gutsumm">Conclusion.</p> +<p><span class="smcap">If</span> we observed the resemblance +between successive generations to be as close as that between +distilled water and distilled water through all time, and if we +observed that perfect unchangeableness in the action of living +beings which we see in what we call chemical and mechanical +combinations, we might indeed suspect that memory had as little +place among the causes of their action as it can have in +anything, and that each repetition, whether of a habit or the +practice of art, or of an embryonic process in successive +generations, was an original performance, for all that memory had +to do with it. I submit, however, that in the case of the +reproductive forms of life we see just so much variety, in spite +of uniformity, as is consistent with a repetition involving not +only a nearly perfect similarity in the agents and their +circumstances, but also the little departure therefrom that is +inevitably involved in the supposition that a memory of like +presents as well as of like antecedents (as distinguished from a +memory of like antecedents only) has played a part in their +development—a cyclonic memory, if the expression may be +pardoned.</p> +<p>There is life infinitely lower and more minute than any which +our most powerful microscopes reveal to us, but let us leave this +upon one side and begin with the amœba. Let us +suppose that this structureless morsel of protoplasm is, for all +its structurelessness, composed of an infinite number of living +molecules, each one of them with hopes and fears of its own, and +all dwelling together like Tekke Turcomans, of whom we read that +they live for plunder only, and that each man of them is entirely +independent, acknowledging no constituted authority, but that +some among them exercise a tacit and undefined influence over the +others. Let us suppose these molecules capable of memory, +both in their capacity as individuals, and as societies, and able +to transmit their memories to their descendants, from the +traditions of the dimmest past to the experiences of their own +lifetime. Some of these societies will remain simple, as +having had no history, but to the greater number unfamiliar, and +therefore striking, incidents will from time to time occur, +which, when they do not disturb memory so greatly as to kill, +will leave their impression upon it. The body or society +will remember these incidents, and be modified by them in its +conduct, and therefore more or less in its internal arrangements, +which will tend inevitably to specialisation. This memory +of the most striking events of varied lifetimes I maintain, with +Professor Hering, to be the differentiating cause, which, +accumulated in countless generations, has led up from the +amœba to man. If there had been no such memory, the +amœba of one generation would have exactly resembled time +amœba of the preceding, and a perfect cycle would have been +established; the modifying effects of an additional memory in +each generation have made the cycle into a spiral, and into a +spiral whose eccentricity, in the outset hardly perceptible, is +becoming greater and greater with increasing longevity and more +complex social and mechanical inventions.</p> +<p>We say that the chicken grows the horny tip to its beak with +which it ultimately pecks its way out of its shell, because it +remembers having grown it before, and the use it made of +it. We say that it made it on the same principles as a man +makes a spade or a hammer, that is to say, as the joint result +both of desire and experience. When I say experience, I +mean experience not only of what will be wanted, but also of the +details of all the means that must be taken in order to effect +this. Memory, therefore, is supposed to guide the chicken +not only in respect of the main design, but in respect also of +every atomic action, so to speak, which goes to make up the +execution of this design. It is not only the suggestion of +a plan which is due to memory, but, as Professor Hering has so +well said, it is the binding power of memory which alone renders +any consolidation or coherence of action possible, inasmuch as +without this no action could have parts subordinate one to +another, yet bearing upon a common end; no part of an action, +great or small, could have reference to any other part, much less +to a combination of all the parts; nothing, in fact, but ultimate +atoms of actions could ever happen—these bearing the same +relation to such an action, we will say, as a railway journey +from London to Edinburgh as a single molecule of hydrogen to a +gallon of water. If asked how it is that the chicken shows +no sign of consciousness concerning this design, nor yet of the +steps it is taking to carry it out, we reply that such +unconsciousness is usual in all cases where an action, and the +design which prompts it, have been repeated exceedingly +often. If, again, we are asked how we account for the +regularity with which each step is taken in its due order, we +answer that this too is characteristic of actions that are done +habitually—they being very rarely misplaced in respect of +any part.</p> +<p>When I wrote “Life and Habit,” I had arrived at +the conclusion that memory was the most essential characteristic +of life, and went so far as to say, “Life is that property +of matter whereby it can remember—matter which can remember +is living.” I should perhaps have written, +“Life is the being possessed of a memory—the life of +a thing at any moment is the memories which at that moment it +retains”; and I would modify the words that immediately +follow, namely, “Matter which cannot remember is +dead”; for they imply that there is such a thing as matter +which cannot remember anything at all, and this on fuller +consideration I do not believe to be the case; I can conceive of +no matter which is not able to remember a little, and which is +not living in respect of what it can remember. I do not see +how action of any kind is conceivable without the supposition +that every atom retains a memory of certain antecedents. I +cannot, however, at this point, enter upon the reasons which have +compelled me to this conclusion. Whether these would be +deemed sufficient or no, at any rate we cannot believe that a +system of self-reproducing associations should develop from the +simplicity of the amœba to the complexity of the human body +without the presence of that memory which can alone account at +once for the resemblances and the differences between successive +generations, for the arising and the accumulation of +divergences—for the tendency to differ and the tendency not +to differ.</p> +<p>At parting, therefore, I would recommend the reader to see +every atom in the universe as living and able to feel and to +remember, but in a humble way. He must have life eternal, +as well as matter eternal; and the life and the matter must be +joined together inseparably as body and soul to one +another. Thus he will see God everywhere, not as those who +repeat phrases conventionally, but as people who would have their +words taken according to their most natural and legitimate +meaning; and he will feel that the main difference between him +and many of those who oppose him lies in the fact that whereas +both he and they use the same language, his opponents only half +mean what they say, while he means it entirely.</p> +<p>The attempt to get a higher form of a life from a lower one is +in accordance with our observation and experience. It is +therefore proper to be believed. The attempt to get it from +that which has absolutely no life is like trying to get something +out of nothing. The millionth part of a farthing put out to +interest at ten per cent, will in five hundred years become over +a million pounds, and so long as we have any millionth of a +millionth of the farthing to start with, our getting as many +million pounds as we have a fancy for is only a question of time, +but without the initial millionth of a millionth of a millionth +part, we shall get no increment whatever. A little leaven +will leaven the whole lump, but there must be <i>some</i> +leaven.</p> +<p>I will here quote two passages from an article already quoted +from on page 55 of this book. They run:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“We are growing conscious that our earnest +and most determined efforts to make motion produce sensation and +volition have proved a failure, and now we want to rest a little +in the opposite, much less laborious conjecture, and allow any +kind of motion to start into existence, or at least to receive +its specific direction from psychical sources; sensation and +volition being for the purpose quietly insinuated into the +constitution of the ultimately moving particles.” <a +name="citation177a"></a><a href="#footnote177a" +class="citation">[177a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>And:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“In this light it can remain no longer +surprising that we actually find motility and sensibility so +intimately interblended in nature.” <a +name="citation177b"></a><a href="#footnote177b" +class="citation">[177b]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>We should endeavour to see the so-called inorganic as living, +in respect of the qualities it has in common with the organic, +rather than the organic as non-living in respect of the qualities +it has in common with the inorganic. True, it would be hard +to place one’s self on the same moral platform as a stone, +but this is not necessary; it is enough that we should feel the +stone to have a moral platform of its own, though that platform +embraces little more than a profound respect for the laws of +gravitation, chemical affinity, &c. As for the +difficulty of conceiving a body as living that has not got a +reproductive system—we should remember that neuter insects +are living but are believed to have no reproductive system. +Again, we should bear in mind that mere assimilation involves all +the essentials of reproduction, and that both air and water +possess this power in a very high degree. The essence of a +reproductive system, then, is found low down in the scheme of +nature.</p> +<p>At present our leading men of science are in this difficulty; +on the one hand their experiments and their theories alike teach +them that spontaneous generation ought not to be accepted; on the +other, they must have an origin for the life of the living forms, +which, by their own theory, have been evolved, and they can at +present get this origin in no other way than by the <i>Deus ex +machinâ</i> method, which they reject as unproved, or a +spontaneous generation of living from non-living matter, which is +no less foreign to their experience. As a general rule, +they prefer the latter alternative. So Professor Tyndall, +in his celebrated article (<i>Nineteenth Century</i>, November +1878), wrote:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“It is generally conceded (and seems to be a +necessary inference from the lessons of science) that +<i>spontaneous generation must at one time have taken +place</i>” (italics mine).</p> +</blockquote> +<p>No inference can well be more unnecessary or +unscientific. I suppose spontaneous generation ceases to be +objectionable if it was “only a very little one,” and +came off a long time ago in a foreign country. The proper +inference is, that there is a low kind of livingness in every +atom of matter. Life eternal is as inevitable a conclusion +as matter eternal.</p> +<p>It should not be doubted that wherever there is vibration or +motion there is life and memory, and that there is vibration and +motion at all times in all things.</p> +<p>The reader who takes the above position will find that he can +explain the entry of what he calls death among what he calls the +living, whereas he could by no means introduce life into his +system if he started without it. Death is deducible; life +is not deducible. Death is a change of memories; it is not +the destruction of all memory. It is as the liquidation of +one company, each member of which will presently join a new one, +and retain a trifle even of the old cancelled memory, by way of +greater aptitude for working in concert with other +molecules. This is why animals feed on grass and on each +other, and cannot proselytise or convert the rude ground before +it has been tutored in the first principles of the higher kinds +of association.</p> +<p>Again, I would recommend the reader to beware of believing +anything in this book unless he either likes it, or feels angry +at being told it. If required belief in this or that makes +a man angry, I suppose he should, as a general rule, swallow it +whole then and there upon the spot, otherwise he may take it or +leave it as he likes. I have not gone far for my facts, nor +yet far from them; all on which I rest are as open to the reader +as to me. If I have sometimes used hard terms, the +probability is that I have not understood them, but have done so +by a slip, as one who has caught a bad habit from the company he +has been lately keeping. They should be skipped.</p> +<p>Do not let him be too much cast down by the bad language with +which professional scientists obscure the issue, nor by their +seeming to make it their business to fog us under the pretext of +removing our difficulties. It is not the ratcatcher’s +interest to catch all the rats; and, as Handel observed so +sensibly, “Every professional gentleman must do his best +for to live.” The art of some of our philosophers, +however, is sufficiently transparent, and consists too often in +saying “organism which must be classified among +fishes,” instead of “fish,” <a +name="citation179a"></a><a href="#footnote179a" +class="citation">[179a]</a> and then proclaiming that they have +“an ineradicable tendency to try to make things +clear.” <a name="citation179b"></a><a href="#footnote179b" +class="citation">[179b]</a></p> +<p>If another example is required, here is the following from an +article than which I have seen few with which I more completely +agree, or which have given me greater pleasure. If our men +of science would take to writing in this way, we should be glad +enough to follow them. The passage I refer to runs +thus:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Professor Huxley speaks of a ‘verbal +fog by which the question at issue may be hidden’; is there +no verbal fog in the statement that <i>the ætiology of +crayfishes resolves itself into a gradual evolution in the course +of the mesosoic and subsequent epochs of the world’s +history of these animals from a primitive astacomorphous +form</i>? Would it be fog or light that would envelop the +history of man if we said that the existence of man was explained +by the hypothesis of his gradual evolution from a primitive +anthropomorphous form? I should call this fog, not +light.” <a name="citation180"></a><a href="#footnote180" +class="citation">[180]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>Especially let him mistrust those who are holding forth about +protoplasm, and maintaining that this is the only living +substance. Protoplasm may be, and perhaps is, the +<i>most</i> living part of an organism, as the most capable of +retaining vibrations, but this is the utmost that can be claimed +for it.</p> +<p>Having mentioned protoplasm, I may ask the reader to note the +breakdown of that school of philosophy which divided the +<i>ego</i> from the <i>non ego</i>. The protoplasmists, on +the one hand, are whittling away at the <i>ego</i>, till they +have reduced it to a little jelly in certain parts of the body, +and they will whittle away this too presently, if they go on as +they are doing now.</p> +<p>Others, again, are so unifying the <i>ego</i> and the <i>non +ego</i>, that with them there will soon be as little of the +<i>non ego</i> left as there is of the <i>ego</i> with their +opponents. Both, however, are so far agreed as that we know +not where to draw the line between the two, and this renders +nugatory any system which is founded upon a distinction between +them.</p> +<p>The truth is, that all classification whatever, when we +examine its <i>raison d’être</i> closely, is found to +be arbitrary—to depend on our sense of our own convenience, +and not on any inherent distinction in the nature of the things +themselves. Strictly speaking, there is only one thing and +one action. The universe, or God, and the action of the +universe as a whole.</p> +<p>Lastly, I may predict with some certainty that before long we +shall find the original Darwinism of Dr. Erasmus Darwin (with an +infusion of Professor Hering into the bargain) generally accepted +instead of the neo-Darwinism of to-day, and that the variations +whose accumulation results in species will be recognised as due +to the wants and endeavours of the living forms in which they +appear, instead of being ascribed to chance, or, in other words, +to unknown causes, as by Mr. Charles Darwin’s system. +We shall have some idyllic young naturalist bringing up Dr. +Erasmus Darwin’s note on <i>Trapa natans</i>, <a +name="citation181a"></a><a href="#footnote181a" +class="citation">[181a]</a> and Lamarck’s kindred passage +on the descent of <i>Ranunculus hederaceus</i> from <i>Ranunculus +aquatilis</i> <a name="citation181b"></a><a href="#footnote181b" +class="citation">[181b]</a> as fresh discoveries, and be told, +with much happy simplicity, that those animals and plants which +have felt the need of such or such a structure have developed it, +while those which have not wanted it have gone without it. +Thus, it will be declared, every leaf we see around us, every +structure of the minutest insect, will bear witness to the truth +of the “great guess” of the greatest of naturalists +concerning the memory of living matter.</p> +<p>I dare say the public will not object to this, and am very +sure that none of the admirers of Mr. Charles Darwin or Mr. +Wallace will protest against it; but it may be as well to point +out that this was not the view of the matter taken by Mr. Wallace +in 1858 when he and Mr. Darwin first came forward as preachers of +natural selection. At that time Mr. Wallace saw clearly +enough the difference between the theory of “natural +selection” and that of Lamarck. He wrote:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“The hypothesis of Lamarck—that +progressive changes in species have been produced by the attempts +of animals to increase the development of their own organs, and +thus modify their structure and habits—has been repeatedly +and easily refuted by all writers on the subject of varieties and +species, . . . but the view here developed tenders such an +hypothesis quite unnecessary. . . . The powerful retractile +talons of the falcon and the cat tribes have not been produced or +increased by the volition of those animals, neither did the +giraffe acquire its long neck by desiring to reach the foliage of +the more lofty shrubs, and constantly stretching its neck for +this purpose, but because any varieties which occurred among its +antitypes with a longer neck than usual <i>at once secured a +fresh range of pasture over the same ground as their +shorter-necked companions</i>, <i>and on the first scarcity of +food were thereby enabled to outlive them</i>” (italics in +original). <a name="citation182a"></a><a href="#footnote182a" +class="citation">[182a]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>This is absolutely the neo-Darwinian doctrine, and a denial of +the mainly fortuitous character of the variations in animal and +vegetable forms cuts at its root. That Mr. Wallace, after +years of reflection, still adhered to this view, is proved by his +heading a reprint of the paragraph just quoted from <a +name="citation182b"></a><a href="#footnote182b" +class="citation">[182b]</a> with the words “Lamarck’s +hypothesis very different from that now advanced”; nor do +any of his more recent works show that he has modified his +opinion. It should be noted that Mr. Wallace does not call +his work “Contributions to the Theory of Evolution,” +but to that of “Natural Selection.”</p> +<p>Mr. Darwin, with characteristic caution, only commits himself +to saying that Mr. Wallace has arrived at <i>almost</i> (italics +mine) the same general conclusions as he, Mr. Darwin, has done; +<a name="citation182c"></a><a href="#footnote182c" +class="citation">[182c]</a> but he still, as in 1859, declares +that it would be “a serious error to suppose that the +greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one +generation, and then transmitted by inheritance to succeeding +generations,” <a name="citation183a"></a><a +href="#footnote183a" class="citation">[183a]</a> and he still +comprehensively condemns the “well-known doctrine of +inherited habit, as advanced by Lamarck.” <a +name="citation183b"></a><a href="#footnote183b" +class="citation">[183b]</a></p> +<p>As for the statement in the passage quoted from Mr. Wallace, +to the effect that Lamarck’s hypothesis “has been +repeatedly and easily refuted by all writers on the subject of +varieties and species,” it is a very surprising one. +I have searched Evolution literature in vain for any refutation +of the Erasmus Darwinian system (for this is what Lamarck’s +hypothesis really is) which need make the defenders of that +system at all uneasy. The best attempt at an answer to +Erasmus Darwin that has yet been made is “Paley’s +Natural Theology,” which was throughout obviously written +to meet Buffon and the “Zoonomia.” It is the +manner of theologians to say that such and such an objection +“has been refuted over and over again,” without at +the same time telling us when and where; it is to be regretted +that Mr. Wallace has here taken a leaf out of the +theologians’ book. His statement is one which will +not pass muster with those whom public opinion is sure in the end +to follow.</p> +<p>Did Mr. Herbert Spencer, for example, “repeatedly and +easily refute” Lamarck’s hypothesis in his brilliant +article in the <i>Leader</i>, March 20, 1852? On the +contrary, that article is expressly directed against those +“who cavalierly reject the hypothesis of Lamarck and his +followers.” This article was written six years before +the words last quoted from Mr. Wallace; how absolutely, however, +does the word “cavalierly” apply to them!</p> +<p>Does Isidore Geoffroy, again, bear Mr. Wallace’s +assertion out better? In 1859—that is to say, but a +short time after Mr. Wallace had written—he wrote as +follows:—</p> +<blockquote><p>“Such was the language which Lamarck heard +during his protracted old age, saddened alike by the weight of +years and blindness; this was what people did not hesitate to +utter over his grave yet barely closed, and what indeed they are +still saying—commonly too without any knowledge of what +Lamarck maintained, but merely repeating at secondhand bad +caricatures of his teaching.</p> +<p>“When will the time come when we may see Lamarck’s +theory discussed—and, I may as well at once say, refuted in +some important points <a name="citation184a"></a><a +href="#footnote184a" class="citation">[184a]</a>—with at +any rate the respect due to one of the most illustrious masters +of our science? And when will this theory, the hardihood of +which has been greatly exaggerated, become freed from the +interpretations and commentaries by the false light of which so +many naturalists have formed their opinion concerning it? +If its author is to be condemned, let it be, at any rate, not +before he has been heard.” <a name="citation184b"></a><a +href="#footnote184b" class="citation">[184b]</a></p> +</blockquote> +<p>In 1873 M. Martin published his edition of Lamarck’s +“Philosophie Zoologique.” He was still able to +say, with, I believe, perfect truth, that Lamarck’s theory +has “never yet had the honour of being discussed +seriously.” <a name="citation184c"></a><a +href="#footnote184c" class="citation">[184c]</a></p> +<p>Professor Huxley in his article on Evolution is no less +cavalier than Mr. Wallace. He writes:—<a +name="citation184d"></a><a href="#footnote184d" +class="citation">[184d]</a></p> +<blockquote><p>“Lamarck introduced the conception of the +action of an animal on itself as a factor in producing +modification.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>[Lamarck did nothing of the kind. It was Buffon and Dr. +Darwin who introduced this, but more especially Dr. Darwin.]</p> +<blockquote><p>“But <i>a little consideration +showed</i>” (italics mine) “that though Lamarck had +seized what, as far as it goes, is a true cause of modification, +it is a cause the actual effects of which are wholly inadequate +to account for any considerable modification in animals, and +which can have no influence whatever in the vegetable world, +&c.”</p> +</blockquote> +<p>I should be very glad to come across some of the “little +consideration” which will show this. I have searched +for it far and wide, and have never been able to find it.</p> +<p>I think Professor Huxley has been exercising some of his +ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear in the article +on Evolution, already so often quoted from. We find him (p. +750) pooh-poohing Lamarck, yet on the next page he says, +“How far ‘natural selection’ suffices for the +production of species remains to be seen.” And this +when “natural selection” was already so nearly of +age! Why, to those who know how to read between a +philosopher’s lines, the sentence comes to very nearly the +same as a declaration that the writer has no great opinion of +“natural selection.” Professor Huxley +continues, “Few can doubt that, if not the whole cause, it +is a very important factor in that operation.” A +philosopher’s words should be weighed carefully, and when +Professor Huxley says “few can doubt,” we must +remember that he may be including himself among the few whom he +considers to have the power of doubting on this matter. He +does not say “few will,” but “few can” +doubt, as though it were only the enlightened who would have the +power of doing so. Certainly +“nature,”—for this is what “natural +selection” comes to,—is rather an important factor in +the operation, but we do not gain much by being told so. +If, however, Professor Huxley neither believes in the origin of +species, through sense of need on the part of animals themselves, +nor yet in “natural selection,” we should be glad to +know what he does believe in.</p> +<p>The battle is one of greater importance than appears at first +sight. It is a battle between teleology and non-teleology, +between the purposiveness and the non-purposiveness of the organs +in animal and vegetable bodies. According to Erasmus +Darwin, Lamarck, and Paley, organs are purposive; according to +Mr. Darwin and his followers, they are not purposive. But +the main arguments against the system of Dr. Erasmus Darwin are +arguments which, so far as they have any weight, tell against +evolution generally. Now that these have been disposed of, +and the prejudice against evolution has been overcome, it will be +seen that there is nothing to be said against the system of Dr. +Darwin and Lamarck which does not tell with far greater force +against that of Mr. Charles Darwin and Mr. Wallace.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center">THE END.</p> + +<div class="gapspace"> </div> +<p style="text-align: center"><span class="GutSmall">WILLIAM +BRENDON AND SON, LTD.</span><br /> +<span class="GutSmall">PRINTERS, PLYMOUTH</span></p> +<h2>Footnotes</h2> +<p><a name="footnote0a"></a><a href="#citation0a" +class="footnote">[0a]</a> This is the date on the +title-page. The preface is dated October 15, 1886, and the +first copy was issued in November of the same year. All the +dates are taken from the Bibliography by Mr. H. Festing Jones +prefixed to the “Extracts” in the <i>New Quarterly +Review</i> (1909).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0b"></a><a href="#citation0b" +class="footnote">[0b]</a> I.e. after p. 285: it bears no +number of its own!</p> +<p><a name="footnote0c"></a><a href="#citation0c" +class="footnote">[0c]</a> The distinction was merely +implicit in his published writings, but has been printed since +his death from his “Notebooks,” <i>New +Quarterly Review</i>, April, 1908. I had developed this +thesis, without knowing of Butler’s explicit anticipation +in an article then in the press: “Mechanism and +Life,” <i>Contemporary Review</i>, May, 1908.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0d"></a><a href="#citation0d" +class="footnote">[0d]</a> The term has recently been +revived by Prof. Hubrecht and by myself (<i>Contemporary +Review</i>, November 1908).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0e"></a><a href="#citation0e" +class="footnote">[0e]</a> See <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, +February 1908, and <i>Contemporary Review</i>, September and +November 1909. Since these publications the hypnosis seems +to have somewhat weakened.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0f"></a><a href="#citation0f" +class="footnote">[0f]</a> A “hormone” is a +chemical substance which, formed in one part of the body, alters +the reactions of another part, normally for the good of the +organism.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0g"></a><a href="#citation0g" +class="footnote">[0g]</a> Mr. H. Festing Jones first +directed my attention to these passages and their bearing on the +Mutation Theory.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0i"></a><a href="#citation0i" +class="footnote">[0i]</a> He says in a note, “This +general type of reaction was described and illustrated in a +different connection by Pfluger in ‘Pfluger’s Archiv. +f.d. ges. Physiologie,’ Bd. XV.” +The essay bears the significant title “Die teleologische +Mechanik der lebendigen Natur,” and is a very remarkable +one, as coming from an official physiologist in 1877, when the +chemico-physical school was nearly at its zenith.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0j"></a><a href="#citation0j" +class="footnote">[0j]</a> “Contributions to the Study +of the Lower Animals” (1904), “Modifiability in +Behaviour” and “Method of Regulability in Behaviour +and in other Fields,” in <i>Journ. Experimental +Zoology</i>, vol. ii. (1905).</p> +<p><a name="footnote0h"></a><a href="#citation0h" +class="footnote">[0h]</a> See “The Hereditary +Transmission of Acquired Characters” in <i>Contemporary +Review</i>, September and November 1908, in which references are +given to earlier statements.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0k"></a><a href="#citation0k" +class="footnote">[0k]</a> Semon’s technical terms are +exclusively taken from the Greek, but as experience tells that +plain men in England have a special dread of suchlike, I have +substituted “imprint” for “engram,” +“outcome” for “ecphoria”; for the latter +term I had thought of “efference,” +“manifestation,” etc., but decided on what looked +more homely, and at the same time was quite distinctive enough to +avoid that confusion which Semon has dodged with his +Græcisms.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0l"></a><a href="#citation0l" +class="footnote">[0l]</a> “Between the +‘me’ of to-day and the ‘me’ of yesterday +lie night and sleep, abysses of unconsciousness; nor is there any +bridge but memory with which to span +them.”—<i>Unconscious Memory</i>, p. 71.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0m"></a><a href="#citation0m" +class="footnote">[0m]</a> Preface by Mr. Charles Darwin to +“Erasmus Darwin.” The Museum has copies of a +<i>Kosmos</i> that was published 1857–60 and then +discontinued; but this is clearly not the <i>Kosmos</i> referred +to by Mr. Darwin, which began to appear in 1878.</p> +<p><a name="footnote0n"></a><a href="#citation0n" +class="footnote">[0n]</a> Preface to “Erasmus +Darwin.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote2"></a><a href="#citation2" +class="footnote">[2]</a> May 1880.</p> +<p><a name="footnote3"></a><a href="#citation3" +class="footnote">[3]</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, February 1879, +Leipsic.</p> +<p><a name="footnote4"></a><a href="#citation4" +class="footnote">[4]</a> Origin of Species, ed. i., p. +459.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8a"></a><a href="#citation8a" +class="footnote">[8a]</a> Origin of Species, ed. i., p. +1.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8b"></a><a href="#citation8b" +class="footnote">[8b]</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, February 1879, p. +397.</p> +<p><a name="footnote8c"></a><a href="#citation8c" +class="footnote">[8c]</a> Erasmus Darwin, by Ernest Krause, +pp. 132, 133.</p> +<p><a name="footnote9a"></a><a href="#citation9a" +class="footnote">[9a]</a> Origin of Species, ed. i., p. +242.</p> +<p><a name="footnote9b"></a><a href="#citation9b" +class="footnote">[9b]</a> Ibid., p. 427.</p> +<p><a name="footnote10a"></a><a href="#citation10a" +class="footnote">[10a]</a> <i>Nineteenth Century</i>, +November 1878; Evolution, Old and New, pp. 360. 361.</p> +<p><a name="footnote10b"></a><a href="#citation10b" +class="footnote">[10b]</a> Encyclopædia Britannica, +ed. ix., art. “Evolution,” p. 748.</p> +<p><a name="footnote11"></a><a href="#citation11" +class="footnote">[11]</a> Ibid.</p> +<p><a name="footnote17"></a><a href="#citation17" +class="footnote">[17]</a> Encycl. Brit., ed. ix., +art. “Evolution,” p. 750.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23a"></a><a href="#citation23a" +class="footnote">[23a]</a> Origin of Species, 6th ed., +1876, p. 206.</p> +<p><a name="footnote23b"></a><a href="#citation23b" +class="footnote">[23b]</a> Ibid., p. 233.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24a"></a><a href="#citation24a" +class="footnote">[24a]</a> Origin of Species, 6th ed., p. +171, 1876.</p> +<p><a name="footnote24b"></a><a href="#citation24b" +class="footnote">[24b]</a> Pp. 258–260.</p> +<p><a name="footnote26"></a><a href="#citation26" +class="footnote">[26]</a> Zoonomia, vol. i. p. 484; +Evolution, Old and New, p. 214.</p> +<p><a name="footnote27"></a><a href="#citation27" +class="footnote">[27]</a> “Erasmus Darwin,” by +Ernest Krause, p. 211, London, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote28a"></a><a href="#citation28a" +class="footnote">[28a]</a> See “Evolution, Old and +New,” p. 91, and Buffon, tom. iv. p. 383, ed. 1753.</p> +<p><a name="footnote28b"></a><a href="#citation28b" +class="footnote">[28b]</a> Evolution, Old and New, p. +104.</p> +<p><a name="footnote29a"></a><a href="#citation29a" +class="footnote">[29a]</a> Encycl. Brit., 9th ed., +art. “Evolution,” p. 748.</p> +<p><a name="footnote29b"></a><a href="#citation29b" +class="footnote">[29b]</a> Palingénésie +Philosophique, part x. chap. ii. (quoted from Professor +Huxley’s article on “Evolution,” Encycl. Brit., +9th ed., p. 745).</p> +<p><a name="footnote31"></a><a href="#citation31" +class="footnote">[31]</a> The note began thus: “I +have taken the date of the first publication of Lamarck from +Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire’s (Hist. Nat. +Générale tom. ii. p. 405, 1859) excellent history +of opinion upon this subject. In this work a full account +is given of Buffon’s fluctuating conclusions upon the same +subject.”—<i>Origin of Species</i>, 3d ed., 1861, p. +xiv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33a"></a><a href="#citation33a" +class="footnote">[33a]</a> Life of Erasmus Darwin, pp. 84, +85.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33b"></a><a href="#citation33b" +class="footnote">[33b]</a> See Life and Habit, p. 264 and +pp. 276, 277.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33c"></a><a href="#citation33c" +class="footnote">[33c]</a> See Evolution, Old and New, pp. +159–165.</p> +<p><a name="footnote33d"></a><a href="#citation33d" +class="footnote">[33d]</a> Ibid., p. 122.</p> +<p><a name="footnote34"></a><a href="#citation34" +class="footnote">[34]</a> See Evolution, Old and New, pp. +247, 248.</p> +<p><a name="footnote35a"></a><a href="#citation35a" +class="footnote">[35a]</a> Vestiges of Creation, ed. 1860, +“Proofs, Illustrations, &c.,” p. lxiv.</p> +<p><a name="footnote35b"></a><a href="#citation35b" +class="footnote">[35b]</a> The first announcement was in +the <i>Examiner</i>, February 22, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote36"></a><a href="#citation36" +class="footnote">[36]</a> <i>Saturday Review</i>, May 31, +1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37a"></a><a href="#citation37a" +class="footnote">[37a]</a> May 26, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37b"></a><a href="#citation37b" +class="footnote">[37b]</a> May 31, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37c"></a><a href="#citation37c" +class="footnote">[37c]</a> July 26, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37d"></a><a href="#citation37d" +class="footnote">[37d]</a> July 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37e"></a><a href="#citation37e" +class="footnote">[37e]</a> July 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37f"></a><a href="#citation37f" +class="footnote">[37f]</a> July 29, 1879.</p> +<p><a name="footnote37g"></a><a href="#citation37g" +class="footnote">[37g]</a> January 1880.</p> +<p><a name="footnote39"></a><a href="#citation39" +class="footnote">[39]</a> How far <i>Kosmos</i> was +“a well-known” journal, I cannot determine. It +had just entered upon its second year.</p> +<p><a name="footnote41"></a><a href="#citation41" +class="footnote">[41]</a> Evolution, Old and New, p. 120, +line 5.</p> +<p><a name="footnote43"></a><a href="#citation43" +class="footnote">[43]</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, February 1879, p. +397.</p> +<p><a name="footnote44a"></a><a href="#citation44a" +class="footnote">[44a]</a> <i>Kosmos</i>, February 1879, p. +404.</p> +<p><a name="footnote44b"></a><a href="#citation44b" +class="footnote">[44b]</a> Page 39 of this volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote50"></a><a href="#citation50" +class="footnote">[50]</a> See Appendix A.</p> +<p><a name="footnote52"></a><a href="#citation52" +class="footnote">[52]</a> Since published as “God the +Known and God the Unknown.” Fifield, 1s. 6d. +net. 1909.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54a"></a><a href="#citation54a" +class="footnote">[54a]</a> “Contemplation of +Nature,” Engl. trans., Lond. 1776. Preface, p. +xxxvi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote54b"></a><a href="#citation54b" +class="footnote">[54b]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. xxxviii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote55"></a><a href="#citation55" +class="footnote">[55]</a> Life and Habit, p. 97.</p> +<p><a name="footnote56"></a><a href="#citation56" +class="footnote">[56]</a> “The Unity of the Organic +Individual,” by Edward Montgomery, <i>Mind</i>, October +1880, p. 466.</p> +<p><a name="footnote58"></a><a href="#citation58" +class="footnote">[58]</a> Life and Habit, p. 237.</p> +<p><a name="footnote59a"></a><a href="#citation59a" +class="footnote">[59a]</a> Discourse on the Study of +Natural Philosophy. Lardner’s Cab. Cyclo., vol. xcix. +p. 24.</p> +<p><a name="footnote59b"></a><a href="#citation59b" +class="footnote">[59b]</a> Young’s Lectures on +Natural Philosophy, ii. 627. See also Phil. Trans., +1801–2.</p> +<p><a name="footnote63"></a><a href="#citation63" +class="footnote">[63]</a> The lecture is published by Karl +Gerold’s Sohn, Vienna.</p> +<p><a name="footnote69"></a><a href="#citation69" +class="footnote">[69]</a> See quotation from Bonnet, p. 54 +of this volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote70"></a><a href="#citation70" +class="footnote">[70]</a> Professor Hering is not clear +here. Vibrations (if I understand his theory rightly) +should not be set up by faint <i>stimuli</i> from within. +Whence and what are these <i>stimuli</i>? The vibrations +within are already existing, and it is they which are the +<i>stimuli</i> to action. On having been once set up, they +either continue in sufficient force to maintain action, or they +die down, and become too weak to cause further action, and +perhaps even to be perceived within the mind, until they receive +an accession of vibration from without. The only +“stimulus from within” that should be able to +generate action is that which may follow when a vibration already +established in the body runs into another similar vibration +already so established. On this consciousness, and even +action, might be supposed to follow without the presence of an +external stimulus.</p> +<p><a name="footnote71"></a><a href="#citation71" +class="footnote">[71]</a> This expression seems hardly +applicable to the overtaking of an internal by an external +vibration, but it is not inconsistent with it. Here, +however, as frequently elsewhere, I doubt how far Professor +Hering has fully realised his conception, beyond being, like +myself, convinced that the phenomena of memory and of heredity +have a common source.</p> +<p><a name="footnote72"></a><a href="#citation72" +class="footnote">[72]</a> See quotation from Bonnet, p. 54 +of this volume. By “preserving the memory of habitual +actions” Professor Hering probably means, retains for a +long while and repeats motion of a certain character when such +motion has been once communicated to it.</p> +<p><a name="footnote74a"></a><a href="#citation74a" +class="footnote">[74a]</a> It should not be “if the +central nerve system were not able to reproduce whole series of +vibrations,” but “if whole series of vibrations do +not persist though unperceived,” if Professor Hering +intends what I suppose him to intend.</p> +<p><a name="footnote74b"></a><a href="#citation74b" +class="footnote">[74b]</a> Memory was in full operation for +so long a time before anything like what we call a nervous system +can be detected, that Professor Hering must not be supposed to be +intending to confine memory to a motor nerve system. His +words do not even imply that he does, but it is as well to be on +one’s guard.</p> +<p><a name="footnote77"></a><a href="#citation77" +class="footnote">[77]</a> It is from such passages as this, +and those that follow on the next few pages, that I collect the +impression of Professor Hering’s meaning which I have +endeavoured to convey in the preceding chapter.</p> +<p><a name="footnote78"></a><a href="#citation78" +class="footnote">[78]</a> That is to say, “an +infinitely small change in the kind of vibration communicated +from the parent to the germ.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote79"></a><a href="#citation79" +class="footnote">[79]</a> It may be asked what is meant by +responding. I may repeat that I understand Professor Hering +to mean that there exists in the offspring certain vibrations, +which are many of them too faint to upset equilibrium and thus +generate action, until they receive an accession of force from +without by the running into them of vibrations of similar +characteristics to their own, which last vibrations have been set +up by exterior objects. On this they become strong enough +to generate that corporeal earthquake which we call action.</p> +<p>This may be true or not, but it is at any rate intelligible; +whereas much that is written about “fraying channels” +raises no definite ideas in the mind.</p> +<p><a name="footnote80a"></a><a href="#citation80a" +class="footnote">[80a]</a> I interpret this, “We +cannot wonder if often-repeated vibrations gather strength, and +become at once more lasting and requiring less accession of +vibration from without, in order to become strong enough to +generate action.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote80b"></a><a href="#citation80b" +class="footnote">[80b]</a> “Characteristics” +must, I imagine, according to Professor Hering, resolve +themselves ultimately into “vibrations,” for the +characteristics depend upon the character of the vibrations.</p> +<p><a name="footnote81"></a><a href="#citation81" +class="footnote">[81]</a> Professor Hartog tells me that +this probably refers to Fritz Müller’s formulation of +the “recapitulation process” in “Facts for +Darwin,” English edition (1869), p. 114.—R.A.S.</p> +<p><a name="footnote82"></a><a href="#citation82" +class="footnote">[82]</a> This is the passage which makes +me suppose Professor Hering to mean that vibrations from exterior +objects run into vibrations already existing within the living +body, and that the accession to power thus derived is his key to +an explanation of the physical basis of action.</p> +<p><a name="footnote84"></a><a href="#citation84" +class="footnote">[84]</a> I interpret this: “There +are fewer vibrations persistent within the bodies of the lower +animals; those that there are, therefore, are stronger and more +capable of generating action or upsetting the <i>status in +quo</i>. Hence also they require less accession of +vibration from without. Man is agitated by more and more +varied vibrations; these, interfering, as to some extent they +must, with one another, are weaker, and therefore require more +accession from without before they can set the mechanical +adjustments of the body in motion.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote89"></a><a href="#citation89" +class="footnote">[89]</a> I am obliged to Mr. Sully for +this excellent translation of “Hellsehen.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote90a"></a><a href="#citation90a" +class="footnote">[90a]</a> <i>Westminster Review</i>, New +Series, vol. xlix. p. 143.</p> +<p><a name="footnote90b"></a><a href="#citation90b" +class="footnote">[90b]</a> Ibid., p. 145.</p> +<p><a name="footnote90c"></a><a href="#citation90c" +class="footnote">[90c]</a> Ibid., p. 151.</p> +<p><a name="footnote92a"></a><a href="#citation92a" +class="footnote">[92a]</a> “Instinct ist +zweckmässiges Handeln ohne Bewusstsein des +Zwecks.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d +ed., Berlin, 1871, p. 70.</p> +<p><a name="footnote92b"></a><a href="#citation92b" +class="footnote">[92b]</a> “1. Eine blosse +Folge der körperlichen Organisation.</p> +<p>“2. Ein von der Natur eingerichteter Gehirn-oder +Geistesmechanismus.</p> +<p>“3. Eine Folge unbewusster +Geistesthiitigkeit.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 70.</p> +<p><a name="footnote97"></a><a href="#citation97" +class="footnote">[97]</a> “Hiermit ist der Annahme +das Urtheil gesprochen, welche die unbewusste Vorstellung des +Zwecks in jedem einzelnen Falle vorwiegt; denn wollte man nun +noch die Vorstellung des Geistesmechanismus festhalten so +müsste für jede Variation und Modification des +Instincts, nach den äusseren Umständen, eine besondere +constante Vorrichtung . . . eingefügt +sein.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i> 3d ed., +p. 74.</p> +<p><a name="footnote99"></a><a href="#citation99" +class="footnote">[99]</a> “Indessen glaube ich, dass +die angeführten Beispiele zur Genüge beweisen, dass es +auch viele Fälle giebt, wo ohne jede Complication mit der +bewussten Ueberlegung die gewöhnliche und +aussergewöhnliche Handlung aus derselben Quelle stammen, +dass sie entweder beide wirklicher Instinct, oder beide Resultate +bewusster Ueberlegung sind.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote100"></a><a href="#citation100" +class="footnote">[100]</a> “Dagegen haben wir nunmehr +unseren Blick noch einmal schärfer auf den Begriff eines +psychischen Mechanismus zu richten, und da zeigt sich, dass +derselbe, abgesehen davon, wie viel er erklärt, so dunke +list, dass man sich kaum etwas dabei denken +kann.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., +p. 76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote101"></a><a href="#citation101" +class="footnote">[101]</a> “Das Endglied tritt als +bewusster Wille zu irgend einer Handlung auf; beide sind aber +ganz ungleichartig und haben mit der gewöhnlichen Motivation +nichts zu thun, welche ausschliesslich darin besteht, dass die +Vorstellung einer Lust oder einer Unlust das Begehren erzeugr, +erstere zu erlangen, letztere sich fern zu +halten.”—<i>Ibid.</i>, p. 76.</p> +<p><a name="footnote102a"></a><a href="#citation102a" +class="footnote">[102a]</a> “Diese causale Verbindung +fällt erfahrungsmässig, wie wir von unsern menschlichen +Instincten wissen, nicht in’s Bewussisein; folglich kann +dieselbe, wenn sie ein Mechanismus sein soll, nur entweder ein +nicht in’s Bewusstsein fallende mechanische Leitung und +Umwandlung der Schwingungen des vorgestellten Motivs in die +Schwingungen der gewollten Handlung im Gehirn, oder ein +unbewusster geistiger Mechanismus +sein.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i> 3d ed., +p. 77.</p> +<p><a name="footnote102b"></a><a href="#citation102b" +class="footnote">[102b]</a> “Man hat sich also +zwischen dem bewussten Motiv, und dem Willen zur Insticthandlung +eine causale Verbindung durch unbewusstes Vorstellen und Wollen +zu denken, und ich weiss nicht, wie diese Verbindung einfacher +gedacht werden könnte, als durch den vorgestellten und +gewollten Zweck. Damit sind wir aber bei dem allen Geistern +eigenthümlichen und immanenten Mechanismus der Logik +angelangt, und haben die unbewusster Zweckvorstellung bei jeder +einzelnen Instincthandlung als unentbehrliches Glied gefunden; +hiermit hat also der Begrift des todten, äusserlich +prädestinirten Geistesmechanismus sich selbst aufgehoben und +in das immanente Geistesleben der Logik umgewandelt, und wir sind +bei der letzten Möglichkeit angekommen, welche für die +Auffassung eines wirklichen Instincts übrig bleibt: der +Instinct ist bewusstes Wollen des Mittels zu einem unbewusst +gewollten Zweck.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 78.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105a"></a><a href="#citation105a" +class="footnote">[105a]</a> “Also der Instinct ohne +Hülfsmechanismus die Ursache der Entstehung des +Hülfsmechanismus ist.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105b"></a><a href="#citation105b" +class="footnote">[105b]</a> “Dass auch der fertige +Hülfsmechanismus das Unbewusste nicht etwa zu dieser +bestimmten Instincthandlung necessirt, sondern blosse +prädisponirt.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote105c"></a><a href="#citation105c" +class="footnote">[105c]</a> “Giebt es einen +wirklichen Instinct, oder sind die sogenannten Instincthandlungen +nur Resultate bewusster Ueberlegung?”—<i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 79.</p> +<p><a name="footnote111"></a><a href="#citation111" +class="footnote">[111]</a> “Dieser Beweis ist dadurch +zu führen; erstens dass die betreffenden Thatsachen in; der +Zukunft liegen, und dem Verstande die Anhaltepunkte fehlen, um +ihr zukünftiges Eintreten aus den gegenwärtigen +Verhältnissen zu erschliessen; zweitens, dass die +betreffenden Thatsachen augenscheinlich der sinnlichen +Wahrnehmung verschlossen liegen, weil nur die Erfahrung +früherer Fälle über sie belehren kann, und diese +laut der Beobachtung ausgeschlossen ist. Es würde +für unsere Interessen keinen Unterschied machen, wenn, was +ich wahrscheinlich halte, bei fortschreitender physiologischer +Erkenntniss alle jetzt für den ersten Fall +anzuführenden Beispiele sich als solche des zweiten Falls +ausweisen sollten, wie dies unleugbar bei vielen früher +gebrauchten Beispielen schon geschehen ist; denn ein apriorisches +Wissen ohne jeden sinnlichen Anstoss ist wohl kaum wunderbarer zu +nennen, als ein Wissen, welches zwar <i>bei Gelegenheit</i> +gewisser sinnlicher Wahrnehmung zu Tage tritt, aber mit diesen +nur durch eine solche Kette von Schlüssen und angewandten +Kenntnissen in Verbindung stehend gedacht werden könnte, +dass deren Möglichkeit bei dem Zustande der Fähigkeiten +und Bildung der betreffenden Thiere entschieden geleugnet werden +muss.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., +p. 85.</p> +<p><a name="footnote113"></a><a href="#citation113" +class="footnote">[113]</a> “Man hat dieselbe +jederzeit anerkannt und mit den Worten Vorgefühl oder Ahnung +bezeichnet; indess beziehen sich diese Wörte einerseits nur +auf zukünftiges, nicht auf gegenwärtiges, räumlich +getrenntes Unwahmehrnbares, anderseits bezeichnen sie nur die +leise, dumpfe, unbestimmte Resonanz des Bewusstseins mit dem +unfehlbar bestimmten Zustande der unbewussten Erkenntniss. +Daher das Wort Vorgefühl in Rücksicht auf die Dumpfheit +und Unbestimmtheit, während doch leicht zu sehen ist, dass +das von allen, auch den unbewussten Vorstellungen entblösste +Gefühl für das Resultat gar keinen Einfluss haben kann, +sondern nur eine Vorstellung, weil diese allein Erkenntniss +enthält. Die in Bewusstsein mitklingende Ahnung kann +allerdings unter Umständen ziemlich deutlich sein, so dass +sie sich beim Menschen in Gedanken und Wort fixiren lässt; +doch ist dies auch im Menschen erfahrungsmässig bei den +eigenthümlichen Instincten nicht der Fall, vielmehr ist bei +diesen die Resonanz der unbewussten Erkenntniss im Bewusstsein +meistens so schwach, dass sie sich wirklich nur in begleitenden +Gefühlen oder der Stimmung äussert, dass sie einen +unendlich kleinen Bruchtheil des Gemeingefühls +bildet.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d +ed., p. 86.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115a"></a><a href="#citation115a" +class="footnote">[115a]</a> “In der Bestimmung des +Willens durch einen im Unbewussten liegenden Process . . . +für welchen sich dieser Character der zweifellosen +Selbstgewissheit in allen folgenden Untersuchungen bewähren +wird.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, p. +87.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115b"></a><a href="#citation115b" +class="footnote">[115b]</a> “Sondern als +unmittelbarer Besitz vorgefunden wird.”—<i>Philosophy +of the Unconscious</i>, p. 87.</p> +<p><a name="footnote115c"></a><a href="#citation115c" +class="footnote">[115c]</a> “Hellsehen.”</p> +<p><a name="footnote119a"></a><a href="#citation119a" +class="footnote">[119a]</a> “Das Hellsehon des +Unbewussten hat sie den rechten Weg ahnen +lassen.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, p. 90, +3d ed., 1871.</p> +<p><a name="footnote119b"></a><a href="#citation119b" +class="footnote">[119b]</a> “Man wird doch wahrlich +nicht den Thieren zumuthen wollen, durch meteorologische +Schlüsse das Wetter auf Monate im Voraus zu berechnen, ja +sogar Ueberschwemmungen vorauszusehen. Vielmehr ist eine +solche Gefühlswahrnehmung gegenwärtiger +atmosphärischer Einflüsse nichts weiter als die +sinnliche Wahrnehmung, welche als Motiv wirkt, und ein Motiv muss +ja doch immer vorhanden sein, wenn ein Instinct functioniren +soll. Es bleibt also trotzdem bestehen dass das Voraussehen +der Witterung ein unbewusstes Hellsehen ist, von dem der Storch, +der vier Wochen früher nach Süden aufbricht, so wenig +etwas weiss, als der Hirsch, der sich vor einem kalten Winter +einen dickeren Pelz als gewöhnlich wachsen lässt. +Die Thiere haben eben einerseits das gegenwärtige +Witterungsgefühl im Bewusstsein, daraus folgt andererseits +ihr Handeln gerade so, als ob sie die Vorstellung der +zukünftigen Witterung hätten; im Bewusstsein haben sie +dieselbe aber nicht, also bietet sich als einzig natürliches +Mittelglied die unbewusste Vorstellung, die nun aber immer ein +Hellsehen ist, weil sie etwas enthält, was dem Thier weder +dutch sinnliche Wahrnehmung direct gegeben ist, noch durch seine +Verstandesmittel aus der Wahrnehmung geschlossen werden +kann.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, p. 91, +3d ed., 1871.</p> +<p><a name="footnote124"></a><a href="#citation124" +class="footnote">[124]</a> “Meistentheils tritt aber +hier der höheren Bewusstseinstufe der Menschen entsprechend +eine stärkete Resonanz des Bewusstseins mit dem bewussten +Hellsehen hervor, die sich also mehr odor minder deutliche Ahnung +darstellt. Ausserdem entspricht es der grösseren +Selbstständigkeit des menschlichen Intellects, dass diese +Ahnung nicht ausschliesslich Behufs der unmittelbaren +Ausführung einer Handlung eintritt, sondern bisweilen auch +unabängig von der Bedingung einer momentan zu leistenden +That als blosse Vorstellung ohne bewussten Willen sich zeigte, +wenn nur die Bedingung erfüllt ist, dass der Gegenstand +dieses Ahnens den Willen des Ahnenden im Allgemeinen in hohem +Grade interessirt.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 94.</p> +<p><a name="footnote126"></a><a href="#citation126" +class="footnote">[126]</a> “Häufig sind die +Ahnungen, in denen das Hellsehen des Unbewussten sich dem +Bewusstsein offenbart, dunkel, unverständlich und +symbolisch, weil sie im Gehirn sinnliche Form annehmen +müssen, während die unbewusste Vorstellung an der Form +der Sinnlichkeit kein Theil haben +kann.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., +p. 96.</p> +<p><a name="footnote128"></a><a href="#citation128" +class="footnote">[128]</a> “Ebenso weil es diese +Reihe nur in gesteigerter Bewusstseinresonanz fortsetzt, +stützt es jene Aussagen der Instincthandlungen üher ihr +eigenes Wesen ebenso sehr,” &c.—<i>Philosophy of +the Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 97.</p> +<p><a name="footnote129"></a><a href="#citation129" +class="footnote">[129]</a> “Wir werden trotzdem diese +gomeinsame Wirkung eines Masseninstincts in der Entstehung der +Sprache und den grossen politischen und socialen Bewegungen in +der Woltgeschichte deutlich wieder erkennen; hier handelt es sich +um möglichst einfache und deutliche Beispiele, und darum +greifen wir zu niederen Thieren, wo die Mittel der +Gedankenmittheilung bei fehlender Stimme, Mimik und Physiognomie +so unvollkommen sind, dass die Uebereinstimmung und das +Ineinandergreifen der einzelnen Leistungen in den Hauptsachen +unmöglich der bewussten Verständigung durch Sprache +zugeschrieben werden darf.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 98.</p> +<p><a name="footnote131a"></a><a href="#citation131a" +class="footnote">[131a]</a> “Und wie durch Instinct +dot Plan des ganzen Stocks in unbewusstem Hellsehen jeder +einzelnen Biene einwohnt.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 99.</p> +<p><a name="footnote131b"></a><a href="#citation131b" +class="footnote">[131b]</a> “Indem jedes Individuum +den Plan des Ganzen und Sämmtliche gegenwartig zu +ergreifende Mittel im unbewussten Hellsehen hat, wovon aber nut +das Eine, was ihm zu thun obliegt, in sein Bewusstsein +fällt.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, 3d +ed., p. 99.</p> +<p><a name="footnote132"></a><a href="#citation132" +class="footnote">[132]</a> “Der Instinct ist nicht +Resultat bewusster Ueberlegung, nicht Folge der körperlichen +Organisation, nicht blosses Resultat eines in der Organisation +des Gehirns gelegenen Mechanismus, nicht Wirkung eines dem Geiste +von aussen angeklebten todten, seinem innersten Wesen fremden +Mechanismus, sondern selbsteigene Leistung des Individuum aus +seinem innersten Wesen und Character +entspringend.”—<i>Philosophy of the Unconscious</i>, +3d ed., p. 100.</p> +<p><a name="footnote133"></a><a href="#citation133" +class="footnote">[133]</a> “Häufig ist die +Kenntniss des Zwecks der bewussten Erkenntniss durch sinnliche +Wahrnehmung gar nicht zugänglich; dann documentirt sich die +Eigenthümlichkeit des Unbewussten im Hellsehen, von welchem +das Bewusstsein theils nar eine verschwindend dumpfe, theils auch +namentlich beim Menschen mehr oder minder deutliche Resonanz als +Ahnung verspütt.”—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 100.</p> +<p><a name="footnote135"></a><a href="#citation135" +class="footnote">[135]</a> “Und eine so +dämonische Gewalt sollte durch etwas ausgeübt werden +könnon, was als ein dem inneren Wesen fremder Mechanismus +dem Geiste aufgepfropft ist, oder gar durch eine bewusste +Ueberlegung, welche doch stets nur im kahlen Egoismus stecken +bleibt,” &c.—<i>Philosophy of the +Unconscious</i>, 3d ed., p. 101.</p> +<p><a name="footnote139a"></a><a href="#citation139a" +class="footnote">[139a]</a> Page 100 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote139b"></a><a href="#citation139b" +class="footnote">[139b]</a> Pp. 106, 107 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote140"></a><a href="#citation140" +class="footnote">[140]</a> Page 100 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote141"></a><a href="#citation141" +class="footnote">[141]</a> Page 99 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote144a"></a><a href="#citation144a" +class="footnote">[144a]</a> See page 115 of this +volume.</p> +<p><a name="footnote144b"></a><a href="#citation144b" +class="footnote">[144b]</a> Page 104 of this vol.</p> +<p><a name="footnote146"></a><a href="#citation146" +class="footnote">[146]</a> The Spirit of Nature. J. +A. Churchill & Co., 1880, p. 39.</p> +<p><a name="footnote149"></a><a href="#citation149" +class="footnote">[149]</a> I have put these words into the +mouth of my supposed objector, and shall put others like them, +because they are characteristic; but nothing can become so well +known as to escape being an inference.</p> +<p><a name="footnote153"></a><a href="#citation153" +class="footnote">[153]</a> Erewhon, chap. xxiii.</p> +<p><a name="footnote160"></a><a href="#citation160" +class="footnote">[160]</a> It must be remembered that this +passage is put as if in the mouth of an objector.</p> +<p><a name="footnote177a"></a><a href="#citation177a" +class="footnote">[177a]</a> “The Unity of the Organic +Individual,” by Edward Montgomery. <i>Mind</i>, +October 1880, p. 477.</p> +<p><a name="footnote177b"></a><a href="#citation177b" +class="footnote">[177b]</a> Ibid., p. 483.</p> +<p><a name="footnote179a"></a><a href="#citation179a" +class="footnote">[179a]</a> Professor Huxley, Encycl. +Brit., 9th ed., art. Evolution, p. 750.</p> +<p><a name="footnote179b"></a><a href="#citation179b" +class="footnote">[179b]</a> “Hume,” by +Professor Huxley, p. 45.</p> +<p><a name="footnote180"></a><a href="#citation180" +class="footnote">[180]</a> “The Philosophy of +Crayfishes,” by the Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of +Carlisle. <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for October 1880, p. +636.</p> +<p><a name="footnote181a"></a><a href="#citation181a" +class="footnote">[181a]</a> Les Amours des Plantes, p. +360. Paris, 1800.</p> +<p><a name="footnote181b"></a><a href="#citation181b" +class="footnote">[181b]</a> Philosophie Zoologique, tom. i. +p. 231. Ed. M. Martin. Paris, 1873.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182a"></a><a href="#citation182a" +class="footnote">[182a]</a> Journal of the Proceedings of +the Linnean Society. Williams & Norgate, 1858, p. +61.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182b"></a><a href="#citation182b" +class="footnote">[182b]</a> Contributions to the Theory of +Natural Selection, 2d ed., 1871, p. 41.</p> +<p><a name="footnote182c"></a><a href="#citation182c" +class="footnote">[182c]</a> Origin of Species, p. 1, ed. +1872.</p> +<p><a name="footnote183a"></a><a href="#citation183a" +class="footnote">[183a]</a> Origin of Species, 6th ed., p. +206. I ought in fairness to Mr. Darwin to say that he does +not hold the error to be quite as serious as he once did. +It is now “a serious error” only; in 1859 it was +“the most serious error.”—Origin of Species, +1st ed., p. 209.</p> +<p><a name="footnote183b"></a><a href="#citation183b" +class="footnote">[183b]</a> Origin of Species, 1st ed., p. +242; 6th ed., p. 233.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184a"></a><a href="#citation184a" +class="footnote">[184a]</a> I never could find what these +particular points were.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184b"></a><a href="#citation184b" +class="footnote">[184b]</a> Isidore Geoffroy, Hist. Nat. +Gen., tom. ii. p. 407, 1859.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184c"></a><a href="#citation184c" +class="footnote">[184c]</a> M. Martin’s edition of +the “Philosophie Zoologique” (Paris, 1873), +Introduction, p. vi.</p> +<p><a name="footnote184d"></a><a href="#citation184d" +class="footnote">[184d]</a> Encyclopædia Britannica, +9th ed., p. 750.</p> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK UNCONSCIOUS MEMORY***</p> +<pre> + + +***** This file should be named 6605-h.htm or 6605-h.zip****** + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/6/6/0/6605 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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