path: root/65042-0.txt

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 65042 ***

  THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN

  IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS

  1914



  BY

  ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE

  AUTHOR OF
  "THE GREAT BOER WAR," ETC.



  SECOND EDITION



  HODDER AND STOUGHTON
  LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
  MCMXVI




  TO
  GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON
  THIS CHRONICLE OF THE GREAT WAR
  IN WHICH HE RENDERED
  SUCH INVALUABLE SERVICE TO HIS COUNTRY
  IS
  DEDICATED




{vii}

PREFACE

It is continually stated that it is impossible to bring out at the
present time any accurate history of the war.  No doubt this is true
so far as some points of the larger strategy are concerned, for the
motives at the back of them have not yet been cleared up.  It is true
also as regards many incidents which have exercised the minds of
statesmen and of many possibilities which have worried the soldiers.
But so far as the actual early events of our own campaign upon the
Continent are concerned there is no reason why the approximate truth
should not now be collected and set forth.  I believe that the
narrative in this volume will in the main stand the test of time, and
that the changes of the future will consist of additions rather than
of alterations or subtractions.

The present volume deals only with the events of 1914 in the British
fighting-line in France and Belgium.  A second volume dealing with
1915 will be published within a few months.  It is intended that a
third volume, covering the current year, shall carry on this
contemporary narrative of a tremendous episode.

From the first days of the war I have devoted much of my time to the
accumulation of evidence {viii} from first-hand sources as to the
various happenings of these great days.  I have built up my narrative
from letters, diaries, and interviews from the hand or lips of men
who have been soldiers in our armies, the deeds of which it was my
ambition to understand and to chronicle.  In many cases I have been
privileged to submit my descriptions of the principal incidents to
prominent actors in them, and to receive their corrections or
endorsement.  I can say with certainty, therefore, that a great deal
of this work is not only accurate, but that it is very precisely
correct in its detail.  The necessary restrictions which forbade the
mention of numbered units have now been removed, a change made
possible by the very general rearrangements which have recently taken
place.  I am able, therefore, to deal freely with my material.  As
that material is not always equally full, it may have occasionally
led to a want of proportion, where the brigade occupies a line and
the battalion a paragraph.  In extenuation of such faults, and of the
omissions which are unavoidable, I can only plead the difficulty of
the task and throw myself upon the reader's good nature.  Some
compensation for such shortcoming may be found in the fact that a
narrative written at the time reflects the warm emotions which these
events aroused amongst us more clearly than the more measured story
of the future historian can do.

It may seem that the political chapters are somewhat long for a
military work, but the reader will {ix} find that in subsequent
volumes there are no further politics, so that this survey of the
European conditions of 1914 is a lead up to the whole long narrative
of the actual contest.

I would thank my innumerable correspondents (whom I may not name) for
their very great help.  I would also admit the profit which I have
derived from reading Coleman's _Mons to Ypres_, and especially Lord
Ernest Hamilton's _The First Seven Divisions_.  These books added
some new facts, and enabled me to check many old ones.  Finally, I
desire to thank my friend Mr. P. L. Forbes for his kind and
intelligent assistance in arranging my material.

ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.

  WINDLESHAM, CROWBOROUGH,
      _October_ 1916.




CONTENTS


CHAPTER I

THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE


CHAPTER II

THE OPENING OF THE WAR


CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF MONS

The landing of the British in France--The British leaders--The
advance to Mons--The defence of the bridges of Nimy--The holding of
the canal--The fateful telegram--The rearguard actions of Frameries,
Wasmes, and Dour--The charge of the Lancers--The fate of the
Cheshires--The 7th Brigade at Solesmes--The Guards in action--The
Germans' rude awakening--The Connaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre


CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU

The order of battle at Le Cateau--The stand of the 2nd
Suffolks--Major Yate's V.C.--The fight for the quarries--The splendid
work of the British guns--Difficult retirement of the Fourth
Division--The fate of the 1st Gordons--Results of the
battle--Exhaustion of the Army--The destruction of the 2nd
Munsters--A cavalry fight--The news in Great Britain--The views of
General Joffre--Battery L--The action of Villars-Cotteret--Reunion of
the Army


CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The general situation--"Die grosse Zeit"--The turn of the tide--The
Battle of the Ourcq--The British advance--Cavalry fighting--The 1st
Lincolns and the guns--6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes--9th
Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly--The problem of the Aisne--Why
the Marne is one of the great battles of all time


CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The hazardous crossing of the Aisne--Wonderful work of the
sappers--The fight for the sugar factory--General advance of the
Army--The 4th (Guards) Brigade's difficult task--Cavalry as a mobile
reserve--The Sixth Division--Hardships of the Army--German breach of
faith--_Tâtez toujours_--The general position--Attack upon the West
Yorks--Counter-attack by Congreve's 18th Brigade--Rheims
Cathedral--Spies--The siege and fall of Antwerp


CHAPTER VII

THE LA BASSÉE--ARMENTIÈRES OPERATIONS

The great battle line--Advance of Second Corps--Death of General
Hamilton--The farthest point--Fate of the 2nd Royal Irish--The Third
Corps--Exhausted troops--First fight of Neuve Chapelle--The Indians
take over--The Lancers at Warneton--Pulteney's operations--Action of
Le Gheir


CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

The Seventh Division--Its peculiar excellence--Its difficult
position--A deadly ordeal--Desperate attacks on Seventh
Division--Destruction of 2nd Wilts--Hard fight of 20th
Brigade--Arrival of First Corps--Advance of Haig's Corps--Fight of
Pilken Inn--Bravery of enemy--Advance of Second Division--Fight of
Kruiseik cross-roads--Fight of Zandvoorde--Fight of
Gheluvelt--Advance of Worcesters--German recoil--General result--A
great crisis


CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (_continued_)

Attack upon the cavalry--The struggle at Messines--The London Scots
in action--Rally to the north--Terrible losses--Action of
Zillebeke--Record of the Seventh Division--Situation at Ypres--Attack
of the Prussian Guard--Confused fighting--End of the first Battle of
Ypres--Death of Lord Roberts--The Eighth Division


CHAPTER X

A RETROSPECT AND GENERAL SUMMARY

Position of Italy--Fall of German colonies--Sea affairs--Our Allies


CHAPTER XI

THE WINTER LULL OF 1914

Increase of the Army--Formation of the Fifth Corps--The visit of the
King--Third Division at Petit Bois--The fight at Givenchy--Heavy
losses of the Indians--Fine advance of Manchesters--Advance of the
First Division--Singular scenes at Christmas


INDEX




MAPS AND PLANS

Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France and Flanders, 1914

Position of Second Army Corps at Mons, August 23

First Morning of Retreat of Second Army Corps, August 24

Sketch of Battle of Le Cateau, August 26

Line of Retreat from Mons

L Battery Action, September 1, 1914

British Advance during the Battle of the Marne

British Advance at the Aisne

Diagram to illustrate Operations of Smith-Dorrien's Second Corps and
Pulteney's Third Corps from October 11 to October 19, 1914

Southern End of British Line

General View of Seat of Operations

Line of Seventh Division (Capper) and Third Cavalry Division (Byng)
from October 16 onwards

General Scene of Operations

Sketch of Battle of Gheluvelt, October 31



[Illustration: Map of north-east France and Belgium]




{1}

CHAPTER I

THE BREAKING OF THE PEACE

In the frank, cynical, and powerful book of General Bernhardi which
has been so often quoted in connection with the war there is one
statement which is both true and important.  It is, that no one in
Great Britain thought seriously of a war with Germany before the year
1902.  As a German observer he has fixed this date, and a British
commentator who cast back through the history of the past would
surely endorse it.  Here, then, is a point of common agreement from
which one can construct a scheme of thought.

Why then should the British people in the year 1902 begin to
seriously contemplate the possibility of a war with Germany?  It
might be argued by a German apologist that this date marks an
appreciation by Great Britain that Germany was a great trade rival
who might with advantage be crushed.  But the facts would not sustain
such a conclusion.  The growth of German trade and of German wealth
was a phenomenon with which the British were familiar.  It had been
constant since the days when Bismarck changed the policy of his
country from free trade to protection, and it had competed for twenty
years without the idea of war having entered British {2} minds.  On
the contrary, the prevailing economic philosophy in Great Britain
was, that trade reacts upon trade, and that the successful rival
becomes always the best customer.  It is true that manufacturers
expressed occasional irritation at the methods of German commerce,
such as the imitation of British trade-marks and shoddy reproductions
of British products.  The Fatherland can produce both the best and
the worst, and the latter either undersold us or forced down our own
standards.  But apart from this natural annoyance, the growing trade
of Germany produced no hostility in Great Britain which could
conceivably have led to an armed conflict.  Up to the year 1896 there
was a great deal of sympathy and of respect in Great Britain for the
German Empire.  It was felt that of all Continental Powers she was
the one which was most nearly allied to Britain in blood, religion,
and character.  The fact that in 1890 Lord Salisbury deliberately
handed over to Germany Heligoland--an island which blockaded her
chief commercial port and the harbour of her warships--must show once
for all how entirely Germany lay outside of any possible
world-struggle which could at that time be foreseen.  France has
always had its warm partisans in this country, but none the less it
can most truthfully be said that during all the years that Britain
remained in political isolation she would, had she been forced to
take sides, have assuredly chosen to stand by the Triple Alliance.
It is hard now to recall those days of French pinpricks and of the
evil effects which they produced.  Germany's foreign policy is her
own affair, and the German people are the judges of those who control
it, but to us it must appear absolutely {3} demented in taking a line
which has driven this great world-power away from her side--or,
putting it at its lowest, away from an absolute neutrality, and into
the ranks of her enemies.

In 1896 there came the first serious chill in the relations between
the two countries.  It arose from the famous telegram to Kruger at
the time of the Jameson Raid--a telegram which bore the name of the
Kaiser, but which is understood to have been drafted by Baron
Marschall von Bieberstein.  Whoever was responsible for it did his
country a poor service, for British feelings were deeply hurt at such
an intrusion into a matter which bore no direct relation to Germany.
Britons had put themselves thoroughly in the wrong.  Britain admitted
and deplored it.  Public opinion was the more sensitive to outside
interference, and the telegram of congratulation from the Emperor to
Kruger was felt to be an uncalled-for impertinence.  The matter
passed, however, and would have been forgiven and forgotten but for
the virulent agitation conducted against us in Germany during the
Boer War--an agitation which, it is only fair to say, appeared to
receive no support from the Kaiser himself, who twice visited England
during the course of the struggle.  It could not be forgotten,
however, that Von Bülow, the Chancellor, assumed an offensive
attitude in some of his speeches, that the very idea of an
Anglo-German Alliance put forward by Chamberlain in 1900 was scouted
by the German Press, and that in the whole country there was hardly a
paper which did not join in a chorus of unreasoned hatred and calumny
against ourselves, our policy, and our arms.  The incident was a
perfectly astounding revelation to the British, {4} who looked back
at the alliance between the two countries, and had imagined that the
traditions of such battles as Minden or Dettingen, where British
blood had been freely shed in Prussia's quarrel, really stood for
something in their present relations.  Britons were absolutely
unconscious of anything which had occurred to alter the bonds which
history had formed.  It was clear, once for all, that this was mere
self-deception, and as the British are a practical race, who are more
concerned with what is than why it is, they resigned themselves to
the situation and adjusted their thoughts to this new phase of their
relations.

But soon a new phenomenon engaged their attention.  They had already
realised that the Germans, for some motive which appeared to them to
be entirely inadequate, were filled with hatred, and would do the
British Empire an injury if they had the power.  Hitherto, they had
never had the power.  But now it was evident that they were forging a
weapon which might enable them to gratify their malevolence.  In 1900
was passed the famous German law regulating the increase of their
navy.  The British, preoccupied by their South African War, took no
great notice of it at the time, but from 1902 onwards it engaged
their attention to an ever-increasing degree.  The original law was
ambitious and far-reaching, but it was subjected to several
modifications, each of which made it more formidable.  By a system as
inexorable as Fate, year after year added to the force which was
being prepared at Wilhelmshaven and at Kiel--a force entirely out of
proportion to the amount of German commerce to be defended or of
German coast-line to be protected.  The greatest army in the world
was rapidly being supplemented by a fleet {5} which would be
dangerously near, both in numbers and quality, to our own.  The
British Admiralty, more influenced by party politics than the German,
showed at times commendable activity, and at other periods
inexcusable indifference.  On the whole, it was well ahead in its
building programmes, for a wide circle of the public had become
thoroughly awakened to the danger, and kept up a continual and most
justifiable agitation for a broader margin of safety.  Fortunately,
the two final rulers of the Navy--McKenna and Churchill--rose to
their responsibilities, and, in spite of a clamour from a section of
their own party, insisted upon an adequate preponderance of naval
construction.  A deep debt of gratitude is owed also to the action of
Lord Fisher, who saw the danger afar off and used all his remarkable
powers of organisation and initiative to ensure that his country
should be ready for the approaching struggle.

Great Britain, being much exercised in mind by the menacing tone of
Germany, expressed not only in her great and rapid naval
preparations, but in an astonishing outburst of minatory speeches and
literature from professors, journalists, and other leaders of the
people, began from 1902 onwards to look round her for allies.  Had
she continued to remain isolated, some turn of the political wheel
might have exposed her to a Continental coalition under the
leadership and inspiration of this bitter enemy.  But for the threats
of Germany, Britain would in all probability have been able to keep
aloof from entanglements, but as it was, the enemies of her enemy
became of necessity her friends.  In an attempt to preserve her
independence of action so far as was still possible, she refused to
form an alliance, and only committed {6} herself in a vague fashion
to an ill-defined _entente_.  By settling several outstanding causes
of friction with France, an agreement was come to in the year 1903
which was extended to Russia in 1907.  The general purport of such an
arrangement was, that the sympathies of Great Britain were with the
Dual Alliance, and that these sympathies would be translated into
action if events seemed to warrant it.  An aggressive policy on the
part of France or Russia would be absolutely discountenanced by
Britain, but if France were attacked Britain would pledge herself to
do her utmost to prevent her from being overwhelmed.  It was
recognised that a victorious Germany would constitute a serious
menace to the British Empire--a fact which neither the Pan-German
fanatics nor the German national Press would ever permit us to
forget.  In this policy of insuring against a German attack King
Edward VII. took a deep interest, and the policy is itself attributed
to him in Germany, but as a matter of fact it represented the only
sane course of action which was open to the nation.  Germans are fond
of representing King Edward's action as the cause of subsequent
events, whereas a wider knowledge would show them that it was really
the effect of five years of German irritation and menace.  This,
then, was the political situation up to the time of the actual
outbreak of war.  Upon the one side were the German and Austrian
Empires in a solid alliance, while Italy was nominally allied, but
obviously moved upon an orbit of her own.  On the other hand, Russia
and France were solidly allied, with Britain moving upon an
independent orbit which had more relation with that of her friends
than Italy's with that of Central Europe.  It might clearly {7} have
been foreseen that Britain's fate would be that of France, while
Italy would break away under any severe test, for a number of open
questions divided her vitally from her secular enemy to the
north-east, The whole story of the campaign of Tripoli in 1911 showed
very clearly how independent, and even antagonistic, were the
interests and actions of Italy.

Germany, in the meanwhile, viewed with considerable annoyance the
formation of the elastic but very real ties which united France and
Britain, while she did not cease to continue the course of action
which had encouraged them.  It had been one of the axioms of
Wilhelmstrasse that whilst the British occupied Egypt, no friendship
was possible between them and the French.  Even now they were
incredulous that such a thing could be, and they subjected it to a
succession of tests.  They desired to see whether the friendship was
a reality, or whether it was only for fair-weather use and would fly
to pieces before the stress of storm.  Twice they tried it, once in
1905 when they drove France into a conference at Algeciras, and again
in 1911, when in a time of profound peace they stirred up trouble by
sending a gunboat to Agadir in south-western Morocco, an event which
brought Europe to the very edge of war.  In each case the _entente_
remained so close and firm that it is difficult to imagine that they
were really surprised by our actions in 1914, when the enormous
provocation of the breach of the Belgian treaty was added to our
promise to stand by France in any trouble not of her own making.

Allusion has been made to the campaign of threats and abuse which had
been going on for many years in Germany, but the matter is of such
importance in its {8} bearing upon the outbreak of war that it
requires some fuller discussion.  For a long period before matters
became acute between the two countries, a number of writers, of whom
Nietzsche and Treitschke are the best known, had inoculated the
German spirit with a most mischievous philosophy, which grew the more
rapidly as it was dropped into the favourable soil of Prussian
militarism.  Nietzsche's doctrines were a mere general defence of
might as against right, and of violent brutality against everything
which we associate with Christianity and Civilisation.  The whooping
savage bulked larger in this perverted philosophy than the saint or
the martyr.  His views, however, though congenial to a certain class
of the German people, had no special international significance.  The
typical brute whom he exalted was blonde, but a brute of any other
tint would presumably suffice.  It was different in the case of
Treitschke.  He was a historian, not a philosopher, with nothing
indefinite or abstract about his teaching.  He used his high position
as Professor in the Berlin University to preach the most ardent
Chauvinism, and above all to teach the rising generation of Germans
that their special task was to have a reckoning with England and to
destroy the British Empire, which for some reason he imagined to be
degenerate and corrupt.  He has passed away before he could see the
ruin which he helped to bring about, for there is no doubt that his
deeds lived after him, and that he is one of half a dozen men who
were prominent in guiding their country along the path which has
ended in the abyss.  Scores of other lesser writers repeated and
exaggerated his message.  Prominent among these was General von
Bernhardi, a man of high standing and a very {9} great authority upon
theoretical warfare.  In the volume on _Germany and the Next War_,
which has been already quoted, he declared in the year 1911 that
Germany should and would do exactly what it has done in 1914.  Her
antagonists, her allies, and her general strategy are all set forth
with a precision which shows that German thinkers had entirely made
up their minds as to the course of events, and that the particular
pretext upon which war would be waged was a matter of secondary
importance.  These and similar sentiments naturally increased the
uneasiness and resentment in Great Britain, where the taxation had
risen constantly in the endeavour to keep pace with German
preparations, until it was generally felt that such a state of things
could not continue without some crisis being reached.  The cloud was
so heavy that it must either pass or burst.

The situation had been aggravated by the fact that in order to win
popular assent to the various increases of the naval estimates in
Germany, constantly recurring anti-British agitations were
deliberately raised with alarms of an impending attack.  As Britain
had never thought of attacking Germany during the long years when she
had been almost defenceless at sea, it was difficult to perceive why
she should do so now; but none the less the public and the
politicians were gulled again and again by this device, which, while
it achieved its purpose of obtaining the money, produced a
corresponding resentment in Great Britain.  Sometimes these
manoeuvres to excite public opinion in favour of an increased navy
went to extreme lengths which might well have justified an official
remonstrance from England.  A flagrant example was the arrest, trial,
and condemnation of Captain Stewart {10} for espionage upon the
evidence of a suborned and perjured criminal.  It is a story which is
little to the credit of the Imperial Government, of the High Court at
Leipzig, or of the British authorities who failed to protect their
fellow-countryman from most outrageous treatment.

So much for the causes which helped to produce an evil atmosphere
between the two countries.  Looking at the matter from the German
point of view, there were some root-causes out of which this
monstrous growth had come, and it is only fair that these should be
acknowledged and recorded.  These causes can all be traced to the
fact that Britain stood between Germany and that world-empire of
which she dreamed.  This depended upon circumstances over which this
country had no control, and which she could not modify if she had
wished to do so.  Britain, through her maritime power and through the
energy of her merchants, had become a great world-power when Germany
was still a collection of petty States.  When Germany became a
powerful Empire with a rising population and an immense commerce, she
found that the choice places of the world, and those most fitted for
the spread of a transplanted European race, were already filled up.
It was not a matter which Britain could help, nor could she alter it,
since Canada, Australasia, and South Africa would not, even if she
had desired it, be transferred to German rule.  And yet it formed a
national grievance, and if we can put ourselves in the place of the
Germans we may admit that it was galling that the surplus of their
manhood should go to build up the strength of an alien and possibly a
hostile State.  To this point we could fully see that grievance--or
rather that misfortune, since {11} no one was in truth to blame in
the matter.  It was forgotten by their people that the Colonial
Empire of the British and of the French had been built up by much
outlay of blood and treasure, extending over three centuries.
Germany had existed as a united State for less than half a century,
and already during that time had built up a very considerable oversea
dominion.  It was unreasonable to suppose that she could at once
attain the same position as her fully grown rivals.

Thus this German discontent was based upon fixed factors which could
no more be changed by Britain than the geographical position which
has laid her right across the German exit to the oceans of the world.
That this deeply rooted national sentiment, which for ever regarded
Britain as the Carthage to which they were destined to play the part
of Rome, would sooner or later have brought about war, is beyond all
doubt.  There are a score of considerations which show that a
European war had long been planned, and that finally the very date,
determined by the completion of the broadened Kiel Canal, had been
approximately fixed.  The importations of corn, the secret
preparations of giant guns, the formations of concrete gun-platforms,
the early distribution of mobilisation papers, the sending out of
guns for auxiliary cruisers, the arming of the German colonies, all
point to a predetermined rupture.  If it could not be effected on one
pretext, it certainly would on another.  As a matter of fact, an
occasion was furnished by means which have not yet been fully cleared
up.  It was one which admirably suited the German book, since it
enabled her to make her ally the apparent protagonist and so secure
her fidelity to the {12} bond.  At the same time, by making the cause
of quarrel one which affected only the Slavonic races, she hoped to
discourage and detach the more liberal Western Powers and so divide
the ranks of the Allies from the outset.  It is possible, though not
certain, that she might have effected this in the case of Great
Britain, but for her own stupendous blunder in the infraction of
Belgian neutrality, which left us a united nation in our agreement as
to the necessity of war.

The political balance of the Great Powers of Europe is so delicately
adjusted that any weakening of one means a general oscillation of
all.  The losses of Russia in a sterile campaign in East Asia in 1904
disturbed the whole peace of the world.  Germany took advantage of it
at once to bully France over Morocco; and in 1908, judging correctly
that Russia was still unfit for war, Austria, with the connivance and
help of Germany, tore up the Treaty of Berlin without reference to
its other signatories, and annexed the provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  Russia immediately issued a futile protest, as did
Great Britain, but the latter had no material interest at stake.  It
was otherwise with Russia.  She was the hereditary guardian of Slav
interests which were directly attacked by this incorporation of an
unwilling Slav population into the Austrian Empire.  Unable for the
moment to prevent it, she waited in silent wrath for the chance of
the future, humiliated and exasperated by the knowledge that she had
been bullied at the moment of her temporary weakness.  So great had
been the indignity that it was evident that were she to tolerate a
second one it would mean the complete abandonment of her leadership
of the race.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, {13} heir to the
throne of the Austrian Empire, made a state visit to Sarajevo in the
newly annexed provinces.  Here he was assassinated, together with his
wife.  The immediate criminals were two youths named Princip and
Cabrinovic, but what exact forces were at the back of them, or
whether they merely represented local discontent, have never yet been
clearly shown.  Austria was, however, naturally incensed against
Serbia, which was looked upon as the centre of all aggressive
Slavonic action.  Politics take fantastic shapes in this
south-eastern corner of Europe, and murder, abduction, forgery, and
perjury are weapons which in the past have been freely used by all
parties.  The provocation in this instance was so immense and the
crime so monstrous that had it been established after trustworthy
examination that Serbia had indeed been directly connected with it,
there is no doubt that the whole of Europe, including Russia, would
have acquiesced in any reasonable punishment which could be
inflicted.  Certainly the public opinion of Great Britain would have
been unanimous in keeping clear of any quarrel which seemed to uphold
the criminals.

Austria seems to have instantly made up her mind to push the matter
to an extreme conclusion, as is shown by the fact that mobilisation
papers were received by Austrians abroad, bearing the date June 30,
so that they were issued within two days of the crime.  An inquiry
was held in connection with the trial of the assassins, which was
reported to have implicated individual Serbians in the murder plot,
but no charge was made against the Serbian Government.  Had Austria
now demanded the immediate trial and punishment of these accomplices,
she would {14} once again have had the sympathy of the civilised
world.  Her actual action was far more drastic, and gave impartial
observers the conviction that she was endeavouring not to obtain
reparation but to ensure war.  It is inconceivable that so important
a document as her ultimatum was launched without the approval of
Berlin, and we have already seen that Germany was in a mood for war.
The German newspapers, even before the Austrian demands were made,
had begun to insist that in view of the distracted domestic politics
of Great Britain, and of the declaration by M. Humbert in the French
Senate that the army was unprepared, the hour for definite
settlements had arrived.

The Austrian ultimatum was such a demand as one nation has never yet
addressed to another.  Indeed, it could hardly be said that Serbia
would remain a nation if she submitted to it.  Some clauses, though
severe, were within the bounds of reason.  That papers should not be
allowed to incite hatred, and that secret societies which were
supposed to be connected with the crime should be forcibly
suppressed, were not unfair demands.  So, too, that all accessories
to the plot, some of whom are mentioned by name, should be tried, and
that certain measures to prevent a possible recurrence of such plots
should be adopted.  All these demands might be justified, and each of
them was, as a matter of fact, accepted by Serbia.  The impossible
conditions were that Austrian judges should sit in Serbia upon
political cases and that delegates of Austria should have partial
administrative control in the neighbouring kingdom.  Even these
outrageous demands were not rejected absolutely by the Serbian
Government, though it {15} proclaimed itself to be unable to accept
them in the crude form in which they were presented.  A humble and
conciliatory reply concluded with an expression of the desire to
submit any point still open to impartial arbitration.  The Austrian
Government--or the forces behind it--appeared, however, to have no
desire at all to find a peaceful solution.  So precipitate were they
in their action, that on the receipt of the Serbian reply, in less
than an hour the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade, and a
diplomatic rupture, the immediate prelude to war, had taken place
between the two countries.  So far only two figures were on the
stage, but already vast shadows were looming in the wings, and all
the world was hushed at the presentiment of coming tragedy.

It has been shown that Russia, the elder brother of the Slav races,
had once already been humiliated over Austrian policy and could not
be indifferent to this new attempt to coerce a Slavonic people.  The
King of Serbia in his sore need appealed to the Czar and received a
sympathetic reply.  A moderate castigation of Serbia might have been
condoned by Russia, but she could not contemplate unmoved a course of
action which would practically destroy a kindred State.  The Austrian
army was already mobilising, so Russia also began to mobilise in the
south.  Events crowded rapidly upon each other.  On July 28 came the
declaration of war from Austria to Serbia.  Three days later--days
which were employed by Great Britain in making every possible effort
to prevent the extension of the mischief--Germany as Austria's ally
declared war upon Russia.  Two days later Germany declared war upon
France.  The current ran swiftly as it drew nearer to Niagara.

{16}

The scope of this chronicle is more immediately concerned with the
doings of Great Britain in this sudden and frightful misfortune which
had fallen upon Europe.  Her peaceful efforts were thrust aside, for
she was dealing with those who had predetermined that there should be
no peace.  Even Austria, the prime mover in discord, had shown
herself inclined to treat at the last moment, but Germany had
hastened her onwards by a sudden ultimatum to Russia.  From that
instant the die was cast.  The attitude of France was never in doubt.
She was taken at a disadvantage, for her President was abroad when
the crisis broke out, but the most chivalrous of nations could be
relied upon to fulfil her obligations.  She took her stand at once by
the side of her ally.  The one all-important question upon which the
history of the world would depend, as so often before, was the action
of Great Britain.

Sir Edward Grey had proposed a conference of ambassadors to deal with
the situation, a suggestion which was set aside by Germany.  So long
as the matter was purely Balkan it was outside the sphere of special
British interests, but day by day it was becoming more clear that
France would be involved, and a large party in Great Britain held
that it would be impossible for us to stand by and witness any
further dismembering of our neighbour.  Thus the shadow which had
settled so heavily upon the south-east of Europe was creeping across
from east to west until it was already darkening the future of
Britain.  It was obviously the German game, whatever her ultimate
designs might be upon the British Empire, to endeavour to keep it
peaceful until she had disposed of her Continental opponents.  For
this reason a {17} strong bid was made for British neutrality upon
July 29, through the Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen.  In an
official conversation the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg,
declared that Germany was ready to pledge herself to take no
territory from France in case of victory.  He would make no promise
as regards the French colonies, nor was anything said as to the
French Fleet, nor as to the gigantic indemnity which was already
discussed in some of the German papers.  In a word, the proposition
was that Great Britain was to abandon her friend at the hour of her
need on condition that she should be robbed but not mutilated.
Subsequent experience of German promises may lead us to doubt,
however, whether they would really have insured France against the
worst that the victor could inflict.

Sir Edward Grey answered with as much warmth as the iced language of
diplomacy will permit.  His dispatch of July 30 begins as follows:

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
on such terms.

"What he asks us in effect is, to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for
France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her,
could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great Power, and
become subordinate to German policy.

"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany {18} at the expense of France, a disgrace
from which the good name of this country would never recover."

At a subsequent period the Premier, Mr. Asquith, voiced the sentiment
of the whole nation when he declared that the proposal was infamous.

The immediate concern of the British Government was to ascertain the
views of the rival Powers upon the question of Belgian neutrality,
which had been solemnly guaranteed by France, Prussia, and ourselves.
How faithfully this guarantee had been observed by France in the past
is shown by the fact that even when an infraction of the frontier at
Sedan in 1870 would have saved the French Army from total
destruction, it had not been attempted.  There were signs in advance,
however, that Germany proposed to turn the French defences by
marching through Belgium.  The arrangement of the new German
strategic railways upon the frontier all pointed to such a plan.  It
was evident that such an action must at once bring Britain into the
struggle, since it is difficult to see how she could ever hold up her
head again if, after promising protection to a smaller nation, she
broke her bond at the moment of danger.  The French, too, who had
left their northern frontier comparatively unfortified in reliance
upon the integrity of Belgium, would have rightly felt that they had
been betrayed by Britain if they suffered now through their
confidence in the British guarantee.  The Balkans were nothing to
Great Britain, but she had more than her interests, she had her
national honour at stake upon the Belgian frontier.

On July 31 the British Government asked France and Germany whether
they were still prepared to stand by their pledge.  France answered
promptly {19} that she was, and added that she had withdrawn her
armies ten kilometres from the frontier, so as to prove to the world
that her position was defensive only.  From Germany there came an
ominous silence.  Meanwhile, in Brussels the German representative,
Herr von Below-Saleske, was assuring the Belgian Government that
nothing was further from the intention of Germany than an infraction
of the frontier.  These assurances were continued almost to the
moment of the arrival of German troops in Belgium, and give one more
instance of the absolute want of truth and honour which from the days
of Frederick the Great has been the outstanding characteristic of
German diplomacy.  Just as the Seven Years' War was begun by an
attack upon an ally in times of peace, so her last two campaigns have
been opened, the one by the doctored telegram of Ems, and the other
by the perfidy to Belgium, which is none the less shameful because it
has been publicly admitted by the Chancellor.

Another incident of these crowded days deserves some record, as it
has been quoted in Germany as an instance of Great Britain having
stood in the way of a localisation of the war.  This impression is
produced by suppressing a telegram in which it is shown that the
whole episode arose from a mistake upon the part of Prince
Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.  On August 1 Sir Edward Grey,
still feeling round for some way in which the evil might be
minimised, suggested through the telephone to Prince Lichnowsky that
if both Germany and France could see their way to stand out, the
conflict would then be limited to Austria and Russia.  This practical
and possible suggestion was transmitted to Berlin in {20} the absurd
form that Britain would hold France out of the war, while Russia
would be abandoned to Germany and Austria.  The Kaiser lost no time
in assenting to so delightful a proposal.  It was at once pointed out
to Prince Lichnowsky that he had made a mistake, and the Prince
telegraphed to Berlin a correction of his previous message.  This
second telegram was suppressed by the German Government, while, some
weeks afterwards, they published the inaccurate dispatch in order to
give the world the impression that Britain had actually made a move
towards peace which had been withdrawn when it was found that it was
eagerly welcomed by Germany.  The very idea that Britain could in any
way pledge the actions of France is grotesque upon the face of it.
Whilst making this false suggestion as to the action of Britain, the
German Government carefully concealed the fact that Sir Edward Grey
had actually gone the extreme length in the interests of peace, of
promising that we should detach ourselves from our Allies if a
conference were held and their unreasonable attitude was an obstacle
to an agreement.

Whether, if Belgian neutrality had been honoured, Great Britain would
or would not have come into the war is an academic question which can
never be decided.  Certainly she would never have come in as a united
nation, for public opinion was deeply divided upon the point, and the
Cabinet is understood to have been at variance.  Only one thing could
have closed the ranks and sent the British Empire with absolute
unanimity into the fight.  This was the one thing which Germany did.
However great her military power may be, it seems certain that her
diplomatic affairs were grievously mismanaged, and {21} that, in
spite of that cloud of spies who have been the precursors of her
Uhlans in each of her campaigns, she was singularly ill-informed as
to the sentiments of foreign nations.  The columns of a single honest
British paper would have told her more of the true views and spirit
of the nation than all the eavesdroppers of her famous secret service.

We now come to the critical instant as regards Britain, leading to a
succession of incidents in Berlin so admirably described in Sir
Edward Goschen's classical report that it seems a profanation to
condense it.  Having received no reply to their request for a
definite assurance about Belgium, the British Government instructed
their Ambassador to ask for an immediate answer upon August 4.  The
startling reply from Von Jagow, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was
that the German troops had actually crossed the frontier.  With a
cynical frankness the German statesman explained that it was a matter
of life or death to the Imperial Army to get their blow in quickly by
the undefended route.  In answer to the shocked remonstrance of the
British Ambassador, he could only assert that it was now too late to
reconsider the matter.  About seven in the evening Sir Edward Goschen
conveyed an ultimatum upon the subject to the German Government,
declaring war unless by midnight a more satisfactory answer could be
given.

From Herr von Jagow the Ambassador passed to the Chancellor, whom he
found much agitated.  He broke into a harangue in which he used the
phrase, now become historic, that he could not understand the British
Government making such a fuss about a mere scrap of paper, and
declared that a breach of {22} territorial neutrality was a matter of
no great consequence.  A recollection of the history of his own
country would none the less have reminded him that it was precisely
on account of an infringement of their frontier by the troops of
Napoleon that Prussia had entered upon the ill-fated war of 1806.  He
continued by saying that he held Great Britain responsible for all
the terrible events which might happen.  Sir Edward pointed out that
it was a matter of necessity that Great Britain should keep her
engagements, and added with dignity that fear of the consequences
could hardly be accepted as a valid reason for breaking them.

Such in brief was the momentous interview which determined the
question of peace or war between these two great Empires.  Sir Edward
immediately forwarded a telegraphic summary of what had occurred to
London, but this telegram was never forwarded by the Berlin
authorities--one more of those actions for which the word "caddish"
is the most appropriate British adjective.  Throughout all our German
experiences both before the war and during it, we have always found
our rivals to be formidable; they have usually proved themselves to
be both brave and energetic; but hardly ever have we recognised them
as gentlemen.  Three centuries ago the leading nations of Europe had
attained something subtle and gracious which is still denied to the
Germans.

The populace of Berlin hastened to show these same unamiable
characteristics.  Whereas the retiring Ambassadors in London, Paris,
and also in Vienna, met with courteous treatment, the German mob
surrounded the British Embassy and hurled {23} vituperations, and
finally stones, at its occupants.  Defenceless people were hustled,
assaulted, and arrested in the streets.  A day or two previously the
Russian Embassy had been brutally insulted by the populace upon its
departure--a fact which produced some regrettable, but very natural,
reprisals in Petrograd, to use the new name for the Russian capital.
The French Ambassador and his suite had also been very badly treated
in their journey to the Dutch frontier.  Thus it was shocking, but
not surprising, to find that the Berlin mob indulged in excesses
towards the British representatives, and that shameful scenes marked
the final hours of Sir Edward Goschen's official duties.  Truly, as
Herr von Jagow admitted, such incidents leave an indelible stain upon
the reputation of Berlin.  It is pleasant to be able to add that Von
Jagow himself behaved with propriety, and did what he could to
mitigate the violence of the populace.

It is difficult for us to imagine how any German could possibly for
an instant have imagined that Great Britain would stand by in silent
acquiescence while the little country which she had sworn to protect
was overrun by German troops; but that such a delusion existed is
shown not only by the consternation of the Chancellor at Sir Edward's
message, but also by the extreme irritation of the Emperor.  What
part Emperor William had played in the events which led up to the war
may possibly remain for ever the subject of debate.  There are those
who argue that the Crown Prince and the military party had taken
advantage of his absence on one of his Norwegian tours, and had
hurried matters into such an impasse that he was unable to get them
back to more peaceful {24} lines.  One would wish to think that this
were true, and there is evidence that on previous occasions his
influence has been exerted upon the side of peace to an extent which
was unwelcome to many of his own subjects.  On the other hand, it is
very difficult to believe that such a situation, led up to by many
preparatory steps which included the _fons et origo mali_, the
provocative and impossible Austrian ultimatum, could have been
arranged without the assent of a man who has notoriously continually
interfered directly in all large, and many small, transactions of
state.  However this may be, it is beyond dispute that the action of
Great Britain deprived him for the instant of his usual dignity and
courtesy, and he dispatched a verbal message by one of his
aides-de-camp in the following terms:

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret
for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time
that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings
of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with
other nations against her old allies of Waterloo.  His Majesty also
begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles
of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence
of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those
titles."

The Ambassador adds feelingly that this message lost nothing of its
acerbity by the manner of its delivery.  Some artist of the future
will do justice to the scene where the benign and dignified old
diplomatist sat listening to the rasping utterances of the insolent
young Prussian soldier.  The actual departure of the Embassy was
effected without {25} molestation, thanks once more to the good
offices of Herr von Jagow.  On the same day, in the presence of a
large but silent crowd, the German Ambassador left London and
embarked for home in a vessel placed at his disposal by the British
Government.  His voyage back, _via_ Flushing, was safely
accomplished, but it is worth recording that it was only the warning
from a British warship which prevented him and his staff from being
blown up by the mines which had already, within a few hours of the
outbreak of hostilities, been strewn thickly by his countrymen in the
path of neutral shipping across the highway of commerce in the North
Sea.  Should our kinsmen of America ever find themselves in our
place, let them remember that it is "all in" from the beginning with
the Germans.

Let America also remember our experience that no pupil can go to a
German school, no scholar to a German university, and no invalid to a
German health-resort, without the chance of some sudden turn of
politics leaving them as prisoners in the country.  Even the elderly
heart patients at Nauheim were detained by the German authorities.
An old admiral among them, Admiral Neeld, made a direct appeal as
sailor to sailor to Prince Henry of Prussia, and was answered by the
proverb that "War is war."  Our contention is that such actions are
_not_ war, and that their perpetration will never be forgotten or
forgiven by the nations of the world, who can have no security that
when their subjects pass the German frontier they will ever get clear
again.  Such practices are, of course, entirely distinct from that of
interning reservists or males of fighting age, which was freely done
by the Allies.  It is only fair to say that after {26} a long delay
there was a release of schoolgirls, and afterwards one of doctors, by
the Germans, but many harmless travellers, students, and others were
held for a long period of the war at a time when tens of thousands of
Germans were free in Great Britain.

By a gross perversion of facts German publicists have endeavoured to
show that Great Britain was to blame for the final rupture.  The
pretence is too absurd to deceive any one, and one can hardly think
that they believe it themselves.  One has only to ask what had Great
Britain to do with the death of the Heir Apparent of Austria, with
the sending of the fatal ultimatum, with the declaration of war
against Russia and France, or, finally, with the infraction of the
Belgian frontier?  She had nothing to do with any one of these
things, which all, save the first, emanated from Vienna or Berlin,
and were the obvious causes of the war.  Britain was only involved
because she remained true to her solemn contract, a breach of which
would have left her dishonoured.  It is mere effrontery to pretend
that she desired war, or that she left anything undone which could
have prevented it.  We lay our record with confidence before foreign
nations and posterity.  We have nothing to conceal and nothing to
regret.

On the other hand, supposing that one were to grant the whole of the
German contention, suppose one were to admit that Germany did not
know of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum or foresee its effect
upon the other nations of Europe, that she took her stand by the side
of Austria purely out of motives of chivalrous loyalty to an ally,
and that she was forced, by so doing, to find herself at variance
with Russia and France--suppose so inconceivable a hypothesis {27} as
this, even then it cannot in any way condone the admitted wrong which
Germany did in invading Belgium, nor does it show any possible cause
why, because Germany was false to her word in this matter, Britain
should be so also.  This point is so unanswerable that the only
defence, if it can be called a defence, which Germany has ever put
forward is, that if she had not infringed Belgian neutrality,
somebody else would have done so.  Not one shadow of evidence has
ever been put forward to justify so monstrous an assertion, which is
certainly not endorsed by the Belgians themselves.

In this connection one may allude to the so-called secret military
engagements which were found and published by the Germans at Brussels
and which were supposed to show that Great Britain herself
contemplated the infraction of Belgian neutrality.  One can only
realise how bankrupt is Germany of all reason and argument when one
considers such a contention as this.  For years the German threats
had been obvious to all the world.  They had brought their strategic
railways to the frontier of Belgium, and erected their standing camps
there.  Naturally Belgium was alarmed at such preparations and took
counsel with Great Britain how her pledge should be redeemed and how
her soil could be defended in case Germany proved perfidious.  It was
a simple military precaution which involved not the breach of a
treaty but the fulfilment of one--not the invasion of Belgium but its
protection after it was invaded.  Each successive so-called
"revelation" about the actions of Great Britain has only proved once
more that--

  "Whatever record leaps to light
  She never shall be shamed."


{28}

These attempts to confuse the issue irresistibly recall the message
of Frederic to Podowils when he was about to seize Silesia even as
William seized Belgium.  "The question of right," he said, "is the
affair of ministers.  It is your affair.  It is time to work at it in
secret, for the orders to the troops are given."  March first and
find some justification later.

Germany would have stood higher in the world's esteem and in the
estimate of history if, instead of playing in most grotesque fashion
the wolf to the lamb, and accusing her unprepared and distracted
neighbours of making a surprise attack upon her at the moment when
she was at the height of her preparations, she had boldly stated her
true position.  Her dignity and frankness would have been undeniable
if she had said, "I am a great power.  I believe I am the greatest.
I am willing to put it to the test of war.  I am not satisfied with
my geographical position.  I desire a greater seaboard.  You must
give it to me or I shall take it.  I justify my action by the fact
that the position of every state rests ultimately upon its strength
in war, and that I am willing to undergo that test."

Such a contention would have commanded respect, however much we might
resent it.  But these repeated declarations from the Emperor himself,
the Chancellor, and so many others that they were deliberately
attacked, coupled with appeals to the Almighty, make up the most
nauseous mixture of falsehood and blasphemy which the world has ever
known.  The whole conception of religion became grotesque, and the
Almighty, instead of a universal Father of the human race, was
suddenly transformed into "our good {29} old God," a bloodthirsty
tribal deity worthy of those Prussian pagans who as late as the
fourteenth century offered human sacrifices to their idols in the
Eastern Mark.  The phenomenon was part of that general national
madness to which, it is to be hoped, the German of the future will
look back with bewilderment and shame.

One contention put forward by certain German apologists in connection
with the war would hardly be worth referring to, were it not for the
singular light which it casts upon the mental and moral position of a
large number of the German public.  It was that some special culture
had been evolved by Germany which was of such value that it should be
imposed by force upon the rest of the world.  Since culture must in
its nature be an international thing, the joint product of human
development, such a claim can only be regarded as a conspicuous sign
of its absence.  In spiritual and intellectual matters it could not
be asserted that Germany since 1870 had shown any superiority over
France or England.  In many matters she was conspicuously behind.  It
might fairly be claimed that in chemistry, in music, and in some
forms of criticism, notably biblical exegesis, she was supreme.  But
in how many fields was she inferior to Great Britain?  What name had
she in poetry to put against Tennyson and Browning, in zoology to
compare with Darwin, in scientific surgery to excel that of Lister,
in travel to balance Stanley, or in the higher human qualities to
equal such a man as Gordon?  The fruits of German culture do not bear
out the claim that it should forcibly supplant that of either of the
great Western nations.

We have now seen how the great cloud which had {30} hung so long over
Europe burst at last, and the blast of war swept the land from end to
end.  We have passed through the years of hopes and alarms, of the
_ententes_ of optimists and the _détentes_ of politicians, of
skirmishes between journals and wrestles of finance, until we reach
the end of it all--open primitive warfare between the two great
branches of the Germanic family.  In a purple passage Professor Cramb
spoke of the days when the high gods of virility would smile as they
looked down upon the chosen children of Odin, the English and the
Germans, locked in the joy of battle.  The hour had struck, and it is
a partial record of those crowded and heroic days which is here set
forth with such accuracy of detail as diligence may command and
circumstances allow.




{31}

CHAPTER II

THE OPENING OF THE WAR

There can be no doubt that if Germany had confined her operations to
an attack upon France without any infraction of Belgian neutrality,
the situation in Great Britain would have been extraordinarily
difficult.  The Government was the most democratic that has ever been
known in our political history, and it owed its power to an
electorate, many of whom were passionate advocates for peace at
almost any conceivable price.  The preparations for naval war,
necessitated by the ever-growing German power, had been accompanied
and occasionally retarded by a constant murmur of remonstrance which
swelled periodically into a menacing expostulation.  McKenna and
Churchill found their only opponents in the members of their own
party, who persistently refused to look obvious facts in the face,
and impatiently swept aside the figures of the German armaments while
they indulged in vague and amiable aspirations towards international
friendship.  This large and energetic party would certainly have most
strenuously resisted British interference in a Continental war.  The
statesmen who foresaw that the conquest of France would surely lead
to the conquest of Britain {32} might have carried the country with
them, but none the less they would have gone to war with such an
incubus upon them as the traitorous Charles James Fox and his party
had been in the days of Napoleon.  A disunited British against a
united German Empire would have been a grievous disadvantage, be our
allies who they might, for, as Shakespeare sang, "If England to
herself be true," it is then only that she is formidable.

This great misfortune, however, was obviated by the policy of
Germany.  The most peace-loving Briton could not face the national
dishonour which would have been eternally branded upon him had his
country without an effort allowed its guarantee to be treated as
waste paper by a great military nation.  The whole people were welded
into one, and save for a few freakish individuals who obeyed their
own perversity of mind or passion for notoriety, the country was
united as it has never been in history.  A just war seemed to touch
the land with some magic wand, which healed all dissensions and
merged into one national whole those vivid controversies which are,
in fact, a sign rather of intense vitality than of degeneration.  In
a moment the faddist forgot his fad, the capitalist his grievance
against taxation, the Labour man his feud against Capital, the Tory
his hatred of the Government, even the woman her craving for the
vote.  A political millennium seemed to have dawned.  Best and most
important of all was the evident sign that the work done of late
years to win the friendship of Ireland had not been in vain.  If the
mere promise of domestic institutions has ranged all responsible
Irishmen upon one side on the day of battle, what may we not hope for
ourselves {33} and for the Empire when they have been fully
established and Time has alleviated the last lingering memories of an
evil past?  It is true that at a later period of the war this fair
prospect was somewhat overcast by an insane rebellion, in which the
wrongs of Ireland, once formidable and now trivial, were allowed by a
colossal selfishness to outweigh the martyrdom of Belgium and the
mutilation of France.  Still the fact remains (and it must sustain us
in our future efforts for conciliation) that never before have we had
the representative nationalists of Ireland as our allies in a great
struggle.

The leaders of the Unionist party, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law,
had already, on August 2, signified to the Government that they
considered Britain to be honour-bound to France, and would support
without hesitation every practical step to give effect to the
alliance.  Fortified by this assurance, the Government could go
strongly forward.  But after the Belgian infraction, its position was
that of the executive of a united nation.  Sir Edward Grey's analysis
in Parliament of the causes which had brought us to war convinced the
reason and claimed the sympathy of every political party, and even
the most fervent advocates of peace found themselves silenced in the
presence of the huge German aggression which could never admit of a
peace founded upon mutual respect and equality, but only of that
which comes from ascendancy on the one side and helplessness upon the
other.

Should Britain ever be led into an unjust war, she will soon learn it
from the fearless voices of her children.  The independent young
nations which are rising under the red-crossed flag will not be
dragged, {34} in the train of the Mother-Country, into any enterprise
of which their conscience does not approve.  But
 now their assent was whole-hearted.  They were
vehement in their approval of the firm stand made for the pledged
word of the nation.  From every quarter of the world deep answered
deep in its assurance that the sword should not be sheathed until the
wrong was righted and avenged.

Strong, earnest Canada sent her 30,000 men, with her promise of more.
Fiery Australia and New Zealand prepared as many, Maori vying with
white man in his loyalty to the flag.  South Africa, under the
splendid leadership of Botha, began to arm, to speak with the foe in
her own gates.  India poured forth money and men with a lavish
generosity which can never be forgotten in this country.  The throb
of loyalty to the old land passed through every smallest Dependency,
and then beyond the frontier to those further lands which had known
us as a just and kindly neighbour.  Newfoundland voted a contingent.
Ceylon sent of her best.  Little Fiji mustered her company of
fighting men, and even the mountains of Nepaul and the inaccessible
plateaux of Thibet were desirous of swelling that great host,
gathered from many races, but all under the one banner which meant to
each a just and liberal rule.

On the very eve of the outbreak of hostilities one man was added to
the home establishment whose presence was worth many army corps.
This was Lord Kitchener, whose boat was actually lying with steam up
to bear him away upon a foreign mission, when, at the last instant,
either the universal public demand or the good sense of the
Government recalled him to take supreme charge of the war.  It was a
{35} strange and a novel situation that a soldier who was no party
politician should assume the role of War Minister in a political
Cabinet, but the times called for decided measures, and this was
among them.  From that day onwards until the dark hour which called
him from his uncompleted task the passer-by who looked up at the
massive front of the War Office was gladdened by the thought that
somewhere in the heart of it those stern, immutable eyes were looking
out at Britain's enemies, and that clear, calculating brain was
working for their downfall.  Slow, safe, methodical, remorseless,
carefully preparing the means at every stage that led him to the
distant but preordained end, he had shown, both in the Soudan and
South Africa, that the race of great British generals was not yet
extinct.  He knew and trusted his instrument even as it knew and
trusted him.

That instrument was an army which was remarkably well prepared for
its work.  It cannot be said that the Boer War had increased the
prestige of the British forces, though only those who have studied
the subject can realise how difficult was the task with which they
were then faced, or how considerable an achievement it was to bring
it to a success.  But the campaign had left behind it a valuable
legacy, all the richer because so great a proportion of the land
forces had been drawn into the struggle.  In 1914 a large proportion
of senior officers and a considerable number of non-commissioned
officers and reservists had passed through that ordeal, and learned
by experience what can be done, and, even more important, what cannot
be done, in face of modern rifles in skilful hands.

The lesson had been well pressed home after the {36} war, and every
general, from Lord Roberts downwards, had laid emphasis upon the
importance of cover and of accuracy of fire.  Apart from the sound
technical training of the soldiers, the administration of the Army
had, after an experimental period, fallen into the hands of Lord
Haldane, who has left his mark more deeply than any one since
Cardwell upon the formation of the land forces.  A debt of gratitude
is owing to him for his clear thought and his masterful dispositions.
Had he been a prophet as well as organiser, he would no doubt have
held his hand before he made the smallest decrease of our regular
forces; but, on the other hand, by turning our haphazard, amateurish
volunteers into the workman-like Territorials, in forming the
invaluable Officers' Training Corps which tapped our public schools
for something better than athletic talent, and in rigidly defining
our expeditionary corps and providing the special reserves for its
reinforcements, he did work for which he can never adequately be
thanked.  The weapon which he had fashioned was now thrust into the
strong right hand of the new Minister of War.

It is well to survey this weapon before we show how it was used.  The
total personnel of the Army with its reserves called up was about
370,000 men.  Of this 160,000 were set aside as an expeditionary
force, but only a portion of this number could be counted as
immediately available on the outbreak of war, though the system of
mobilisation had been brought to a fine point.  It was hoped that
three army corps numbering about 110,000 men, with two divisions of
cavalry, about 10,000 horsemen, would be immediately available, petty
numbers as compared with the millions of the Continent, but highly
trained {37} professional soldiers, capable, perhaps, of turning the
balance in the clash of equal hosts.  The rest of the Regular Army
had to provide garrisons for India, Egypt, Gibraltar, and other
dependencies, but it was hoped that in time nearly all of it would be
available for service.

Behind these first-line troops was the special reserve, something
under 100,000 in number, who were the immediate reinforcements to
fill the gaps of battle.  Next in order came the Territorials, whose
full complement was 340,000 men.  Unhappily at this time they were
nearly 100,000 under strength, and there are many who think that if
the National Service League in their earnest campaign, which was
inspired by a clear vision of the coming danger, had insisted upon a
great enlargement of this constitutional force, instead of agitating
for a complete change which presented practical and political
difficulties, their efforts would have been more fruitful.  These
troops were raw, inexperienced, and only enlisted for home service,
but with a fine spirit they set to work at once to make themselves
efficient, and the great majority signified their readiness to go
anywhere at the country's call.  Many brigades were sent abroad at
once to relieve the regulars in Egypt and India, while others were
ready to join the fighting line on the Continent after a few months,
where, as will be shown, they acquitted themselves remarkably well.
The enthusiasm for the war rapidly sent the numbers of the
Territorials up to nearly half a million.  In addition to these
troops there was the promise of 70,000 highly trained men (one
quarter of whom were British regulars) from India.  Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand came forward to offer some 60,000 {38} men
between them, with the promise of as many more as should be called
for.  Brave and hardy, these were splendid raw material, though their
actual technical training was not, save in some special corps, more
advanced than that of the British Territorials.  Altogether, the
British War Lord could see, at the very beginning of hostilities,
nearly 1,000,000 of men ready to his hand, though in very different
stages of efficiency.

But already he had conceived the idea of a campaign of attrition,
and, looking forward into the years, he was convinced that these
forces were insufficient.  Some entirely new cadres must be
organised, which should have no limitations, but be as reliable an
instrument as the regular forces of the Crown.  With a prescience
which found no counterpart either among our friends or our foes he
fixed three years as a probable term for the war, and he made
preparation accordingly.  Early in August he called for half a
million fresh volunteers for the war, and early in October he had got
them.  Still unsatisfied, he called for yet another half-million, and
before Christmas his numbers were again complete.  It was a wonderful
autumn and winter in Britain.  Every common and green was loud with
the cries of the instructors, and bare with the tramp of the men.
Nothing has ever been seen in the world's history which can compare
in patriotic effort with that rally to the flag, for no bounty was
offered, and no compulsion used.  The spirit of the men was
extraordinarily high.  Regiments were filled with gentlemen who gave
up every amenity of life in order to face an arduous and dangerous
campaign, while even greater patriotism was shown by the countless
thousands of {39} miners, artisans, and other well-paid workmen who
sacrificed high wages and a home life in order to serve for an
indefinite time upon the humble pay of the soldier, leaving, very
often, a wife and children in straitened circumstances behind them.
It is at such times that a democratic country reaps the rich fruits
of its democracy, for if you make the land such that it is good to
live in, so also does it become good to die for.  These forces could
not be ready, even with the best of wills, and the most intensive
culture, before the summer of 1915, but at that date, including her
sea forces, Great Britain had not less than 2,000,000 volunteers
under arms and ready for immediate use, a number which had risen to
4,000,000 by the end of that year, and 5,000,000 by the spring of
1916.

So much for the wise provisions of Lord Kitchener, which would have
been useless had they not been supported by a stern and
self-sacrificing national spirit.  The crisis was met with a cold
determination which gave some superficial observers the impression
that the nation was listless, when it was, in truth, far too earnest
for mere shoutings or flag-waving.  "Wakened at last!" cried some
foreign cartoon when a German outrage aroused the country for an
instant to some visible gleam of wrath.  A deeper observer might have
known that a country which finds 5,000,000 volunteer fighters, and
which, instead of putting the expenses of the war upon future
generations, as was done by Germany, elects to meet a considerable
proportion of them by present taxation, is in grim earnest from the
start.  The income tax was doubled without a remonstrance by a
unanimous vote of the Commons, thus finding an extra £40,000,000 a
year for the prosecution of the war.  Other taxes {40} were levied by
which the working classes bore their fair share of the burden, and
they also elicited no complaints.  Before Christmas no less than
£450,000,000 had been raised by a loan, a gigantic financial effort
which was easily borne at a charge of 4 per cent.

But if Britain was able to face the future with confidence, both in
finance and in her military preparation, it was entirely to her
silent, invisible, but most efficient Navy that she owed it.  By wise
foresight the Grand Fleet, numbering some 400 vessels, had been
assembled for Royal inspection before the storm broke and when it was
but a rising cloud-bank upon the horizon.  This all-important move
has been attributed to Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord of
the Admiralty, but it could not have been done without the hearty
concurrence and cooperation of Mr. Winston Churchill, who should
share the honour, even as he would have shared the blame had we been
caught unawares.  The so-called inspection had hardly been completed
at Spithead before war was upon us, and the Fleet, ready manned,
provisioned, and armed, moved straight away to take up its war
stations.  The main fighting squadrons vanished into a strategic mist
from which they did not emerge for very many months, but it was
understood that they were assembled at centres like Scapa Flow and
Cromarty Firth which were outside the radius of the German
torpedo-boats and smaller submarines, while they were near enough to
the enemy's ports to be able to bring him to action should he emerge.

Numerous patrols of small vessels were let loose in the North Sea to
keep in touch with our opponents, {41} who were well known to be both
daring and active.  It is said that no less than 3000 ships, large
and small, were flying the white ensign of St. George.  A portion of
these were told off for the protection of the great commercial
sea-routes, and for the hunting down of some score of German cruisers
which were known to be at sea.  Some of these gave a very good
account of themselves and others were innocuous; but the net result
in loss, which had been discounted in advance as 5 per cent of the
merchant fleet at sea, worked out at less than half that figure, and,
by the new year, the marauders had been practically exterminated.

Now as always--but now more than ever in the past--it was absolutely
vital to hold the seas.  Who wins the sea wins Britain.  Of every
five loaves in the country four come to us from abroad, and our
position in meat is no better.  It is victory or starvation when we
fight upon the sea.  It is ill to play for such stakes, however safe
the game--worse still when it is a game where the value of some of
the cards is unknown.  We have little to fear from a raid, nothing
from invasion, everything from interference with our commerce.  It is
one of the points in which our party politics, which blind so many
people to reason, might well have brought absolute ruin upon the
country.  The cultivation of British food supplies should never have
been a question of free trade or protection, but rather of vital
national insurance.

Had the war come ten years later we might have been in deadly danger,
owing to the rapidly growing power of the submarine.  These engines
turned upon our food-carriers might well have starved us out,
especially if we had continued our national folly in {42} being
scared by bogeys from building a Channel tunnel.  But by a merciful
Providence the struggle came at a moment when the submarine was half
developed, and had not yet reached either the speed or the range of
action which would make it the determining factor in a war.  As it
was, the fruits of submarine warfare, in spite of a wise and timely
warning on the eve of hostilities by Admiral Sir Percy Scott,
astonished the public, but the mischief done was a very small thing
compared to the possibilities which have to be most carefully guarded
against in the future.

In their present stage of development, the submarine could only
annoy.  With the great fleet in existence and with the shipbuilding
facilities of Great Britain, nothing could vitally harm her save the
loss of a pitched battle.  The British superiority was rather in her
small craft than in her large ones, but in capital ships she was able
to place in line at the beginning of the war enough to give a
sufficient margin of insurance.  There was never any tendency to
under-rate the excellence of the hostile ships, nor the courage and
efficiency of the men.  It was well understood that when they came
out they would give a good account of themselves, and also that they
would not come out until the circumstances seemed propitious.  They
were under a disadvantage in that the Russian fleet, though small,
was not negligible, and therefore some portion of the German force on
sea as well as on land had always to face eastwards.  Also the
British had the French for their allies, and, though the great ships
of the latter were nearly all in the Mediterranean, a swarm of small
craft was ready to buzz out of her western ports should the war come
down-channel.

{43}

Yet another advantage lay with the British in that their geographical
position put a six-hundred-mile-long breakwater right across the
entrance to Germany, leaving only two sally-ports north and south by
which commerce could enter or raiders escape.  The result was the
immediate utter annihilation of Germany's sea-borne commerce.
Altogether it must be admitted that Germany was grievously
handicapped at sea, and that she deserves the more credit for
whatever she accomplished, save when, as on land, she transgressed
and degraded the recognised laws of civilised warfare.  It is time
now to turn to those military events upon the Continent which were
the precursors of that British campaign which is the subject of this
volume.

Want of space and accurate material make it impossible to do justice
here to the deeds of our Allies, but an attempt must be made to
indicate briefly the main phases of the struggle abroad, since its
course reacted continually upon the British operations.  It may be
shortly stated, then, that so far as the western theatre of war was
concerned, hostilities commenced by two movements, one an attack by
the French upon the occupants of those lost provinces for which they
had mourned during forty-four years, and the other the advance of the
Germans over the Belgian frontier.

The former was a matter of no great importance.  It took two distinct
lines, the one from the Belfort region into Alsace, and the other
from Nancy as a centre into Lorraine.  The Alsatian venture gained
some ground which was never wholly lost, and was adorned by one small
victory near Mulhausen before it was checked by the German defence.
The Lorraine {44} advance had also some initial success, but was
finally thrown back on August 20 in a severe action in which the
French were defeated.  Luneville, across the French frontier, was
occupied by the Germans, but they made no headway, and their
subsequent attempts upon Nancy were repulsed by the army of General
Castelnau.  General Pau, a fiery, one-armed septuagenarian, was the
French leader in the Alsatian invasion, but it was soon realised by
General Joffre that he and the bulk of his men would be more useful
at the vital point upon the northern frontier, to which early in
September they were transferred.

The main drama, however, quickly unfolded upon the Belgian frontier.
Speed and secrecy were vital to the German plans.  On July 31, before
any declaration of war, and while the German representative at
Brussels was perjuring his soul in his country's service by
representing that no infringement was possible, three German army
corps, the seventh, ninth, and tenth, fully mobilised and highly
equipped, were moving up from their quarters so as to be ready for a
treacherous pounce upon their little neighbour whom they were pledged
to defend.  Von Emmich was in command.  On the night of Saturday,
August 1, the vanguard of the German armies, using motor traffic
followed by trains, burst through the neutral Duchy of Luxemburg, and
on August 3 they were over the Belgian line at Verviers.  The
long-meditated crime had been done, and, with loud appeals to God,
Germany began her fatal campaign by deliberate perjury and arrogant
disdain for treaties.  God accepted the appeal, and swiftly showed
how the weakest State with absolute right upon its side may bring to
naught all the crafty plottings of the strong.

{45}

For time was the essence of the situation.  For this the innumerable
motors, for this the light equipment and the lack of transport.  It
was on, on, at top speed, that there be no hindrance in the path of
the great hosts that soon would be closing up behind.  But time was
life and death for the French also, with their slower mobilisation,
their backward preparation, and their expectations from Great
Britain.  Time was the precious gift which little Belgium gave to the
Allies.  She gave them days and days, and every day worth an army
corps.  The Germans had crossed the Meuse, had taken Vise, and then
had rushed at Liége, even as the Japanese had rushed at Port Arthur.
With all their military lore, they had not learned the lesson which
was taught so clearly in 1904--that a fortress is taken by skill and
not by violence alone.

Leman, a great soldier, defended the forts built by Brialmont.  Both
defender and designer were justified of their work.  On August 5 the
seventh German Corps attempted to rush the gaps between the forts.
These gaps were three miles wide, but were filled with entrenched
infantry.  The attack was boldly pressed home, but it completely
failed.  The German loss was considerable.  Two other corps were
called up, and again on August 7 the attack was renewed, but with no
better result.  The defenders fought as befitted the descendants of
those Belgae whom Caesar pronounced to be the bravest of the Gauls,
or of that Walloon Guard which had so great a mediaeval reputation.
There were 25,000 in the town and 120,000 outside, but they were
still outside at the end of the assault.

Liége, however, had one fatal weakness.  Its {46} garrison was far
too small to cover the ground.  With twelve forts three miles apart
it is clear that there were intervals of, roughly, thirty-six miles
to be covered, and that a garrison of 25,000 men, when you had
deducted the gunners for the forts, hardly left the thinnest skirmish
line to cover the ground.  So long as the Germans attacked upon a
narrow front they could be held.  The instant that they spread out
there were bound to be places where they could march almost unopposed
into the town.  This was what occurred.  The town was penetrated, but
the forts were intact.  General Leman, meanwhile, seeing that the
town itself was indefensible, had sent the garrison out before the
place was surrounded.  Many a Belgian soldier fought upon the Yser
and helped to turn the tide of that crowning conflict who would have
been a prisoner in Germany had it not been for the foresight and the
decision of General Leman.

The Germans were in the town upon the 8th, but the forts still held
out and the general advance was grievously impeded.  Day followed
day, and each beyond price to the Allies.  Germany had secretly
prepared certain monstrous engines of war--one more proof, if proof
were needed, that the conflict had been prearranged and deliberately
provoked.  These were huge cannon of a dimension never before
cast--42 centimetres in bore.  More mobile and hardly less effective
were some smaller howitzers of 28-centimetre calibre said to have
come from the Austrian foundries at Skoda.  Brialmont, when he
erected his concrete and iron cupolas, had not foreseen the Thor's
hammer which would be brought to crush them.  One after another they
were smashed like {47} eggs.  The heroic Leman was dug out from under
the debris of the last fort and lived to tell of his miraculous
escape.  Liége was at last in the hands of the invaders.  But already
the second week of August was at an end--the British were crowding
into France, the French line was thickening along the frontier--all
was well with the Allies.  Little David had left a grievous mark upon
Goliath.

The German mobilisation was now complete, and the whole vast host,
over a million strong, poured over the frontier.  Never was seen such
an army, so accurate and scientific in its general conception, so
perfect in its detail.  Nothing had been omitted from its equipment
which the most thorough of nations, after years of careful
preparation, could devise.  In motor transport, artillery, machine
guns, and all the technique of war they were unrivalled.  The men
themselves were of high heart and grand physique.  By some twisted
process of reasoning founded upon false information they had been
persuaded that this most aggressive and unnecessary of wars was in
some way a war of self-defence, for it was put to them that unless
they attacked their neighbours now, their neighbours would certainly
some day or other attack them.  Hence, they were filled with
patriotic ardour and a real conviction that they were protecting
their beloved Fatherland.  One could not but admire their
self-sacrificing devotion, though in the dry light of truth and
reason they stood forth as the tools of tyranny, the champions of
barbarous political reaction and the bullies of Europe.  It was an
ominous fact that the troops were provided in advance with incendiary
discs for the firing of dwellings, which shows that the orgy of
destruction {48} and cruelty which disgraced the name of the German
Army in Belgium and in the north of France was prearranged by some
central force, whose responsibility in this matter can only be
described as terrific.  They brought the world of Christ back to the
days of Odin, and changed a civilised campaign to an inroad of pagan
Danes.  This wicked central force could only be the Chief Staff of
the Army, and in the last instance the Emperor himself.  Had Napoleon
conducted his campaigns with as little scruple as William II., it can
safely be said that Europe as we know it would hardly exist to-day,
and the monuments of antiquity and learning would have been wiped
from the face of the globe.  It is an evil precedent to be expunged
from the records for ever--all the more evil because it was practised
by a strong nation on a weak one and on a defenceless people by one
which had pledged themselves to defend them.  That it was in no wise
caused by any actions upon the part of the Belgians is clearly proved
by the fact that similar atrocities were committed by the German Army
the moment they crossed the frontiers both of France and of Poland.

The Allies had more than they expected from Liége.  They had less
from Namur.  The grey-green tide of German invasion had swept the
Belgian resistance before it, had flooded into Brussels, and had been
dammed for only a very few days by the great frontier fortress,
though it was counted as stronger than Liége.  The fact was that the
Germans had now learned their lesson.  Never again would they imagine
that the _Furor Teutonicus_ alone could carry a walled city.  The
fatal guns were brought up again and the forts were crushed with
mechanical precision, while the defenders between the forts, after
{49} enduring for ten hours a severe shelling, withdrew from their
trenches.  On August 22 the fortress surrendered, some of General
Michel's garrison being taken, but a considerable proportion
effecting its retreat with the French Army which had come up to
support the town.  By the third week of August the remains of the
Belgian forces had taken refuge in Antwerp, and the Germans, having
made a wide sweep with their right wing through Brussels, were
descending in a two-hundred-mile line upon Northern France.

The French plans had in truth been somewhat disarranged by the
Belgian resistance, for the chivalrous spirit of the nation would not
permit that their gallant friends be unsupported.  Fresh dispositions
had been made, but the sudden fall of Namur brought them to naught.
Before that untoward event the French had won a small but indubitable
victory at Dinant, and had advanced their line from Namur on the
right to Charleroi on the left.  With the fall of Namur their long
wall had lost its corner bastion, and they were at once vigorously
attacked by all the German armies, who forced the Sambre on August
22, carried Charleroi, and pushed the French back with considerable
loss of guns and prisoners along the whole line.  There was defeat,
but there was nothing in the nature of a rout or of an envelopment.
The line fell back fighting tooth and nail, but none the less
Northern France was thrown open to the invaders.  In this general
movement the British forces were involved, and we now turn to a more
particular and detailed account of what befell them during these most
momentous days.




{50}

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF MONS

The landing of the British in France--The British leaders--The
advance to Mons--The defence of the bridges of Nimy--The holding of
the canal--The fateful telegram--The rearguard actions of Frameries,
Wasmes, and Dour--The charge of the Lancers--The fate of the
Cheshires--The 7th Brigade at Solesmes--The Guards in action--The
Germans' rude awakening--The Connaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre.


[Sidenote: The landing of the British in France]

The bulk of the British Expeditionary Force passed over to France
under cover of darkness on the nights of August 12 and 13, 1914.  The
movement, which included four infantry divisions and a cavalry
division, necessitated the transportation of approximately 90,000
men, 15,000 horses, and 400 guns.  It is doubtful if so large a host
has ever been moved by water in so short a time in all the annals of
military history.  There was drama in the secrecy and celerity of the
affair.  Two canvas walls converging into a funnel screened the
approaches to Southampton Dock.  All beyond was darkness and mystery.
Down this fatal funnel passed the flower of the youth of Britain, and
their folk saw them no more.  They had embarked upon the great
adventure of the German War.  The crowds in the streets saw the last
serried files vanish into the darkness of the docks, heard the
measured tramp upon the stone quays dying farther {51} away in the
silence of the night, until at last all was still and the great
steamers were pushing out into the darkness.

No finer force for technical efficiency, and no body of men more
hot-hearted in their keen desire to serve their country, have ever
left the shores of Britain.  It is a conservative estimate to say
that within four months a half of their number were either dead or in
the hospitals.  They were destined for great glory, and for that
great loss which is the measure of their glory.

Belated pedestrians upon the beach of the southern towns have
recorded their impression of that amazing spectacle.  In the clear
summer night the wall of transports seemed to stretch from horizon to
horizon.  Guardian warships flanked the mighty column, while swift
shadows shooting across the surface of the sea showed where the
torpedo-boats and scouts were nosing and ferreting for any possible
enemy.  But far away, hundreds of miles to the north, lay the real
protection of the flotilla, where the smooth waters of the Heligoland
Bight were broken by the sudden rise and dip of the blockading
periscopes.

It is well to state, once for all, the composition of this force, so
that in the succeeding pages, when a brigade or division is under
discussion, the diligent reader may ascertain its composition.  This,
then, is the First Army which set forth to France.  Others will be
chronicled as they appeared upon the scene of action.  It may be
remarked that the formation of units was greatly altered with the
progress of the campaign, so that it has been possible without
indiscretion to raise the veil of secrecy which was once so essential.

{52}

  THE FIRST ARMY CORPS--GENERAL HAIG

  DIVISION I.

  General LOMAX.

  1_st Infantry Brigade--General Maxse_.
        1st Coldstream Guards.
        1st Scots Guards.
        1st Black Watch.
        2nd Munster Fusiliers.

  2_nd Infantry Brigade--General Bulfin_.
        2nd Sussex.
        1st N. Lancs.
        1st Northampton.
        2nd K.R. Rifles.

  3_rd Infantry Brigade--General Landon_.
        1st West Surrey (Queen's).
        1st S. Wales Borderers.
        1st Gloucester.
        2nd Welsh.

  _Artillery--Colonel Findlay_.
        25th Brig. R.F.A. 113, 114, 115.
        26th Brig. R.F.A. 116, 117, 118.
        39th Brig. R.F.A. 46, 51, 54.
        43rd (How.) Brig. R.F.A. 30, 40, 57.

  _Engineers--Colonel Schreiber_.
        23 F. Co.
        26 F. Co.
        1 Signal Co.


  DIVISION II.

  General Munro.

  4_th Infantry Brigade--General Scott-Kerr_.
        2nd Grenadier Guards.
        2nd Coldstream Guards.
        3rd Coldstream Guards.
        1st Irish.

  5_th Infantry Brigade--General Haking_.
        2nd Worcester.
        2nd Ox. and Bucks L.I.
        2nd Highland L.I.
        2nd Connaught Rangers.

  6_th Infantry Brigade--General Davies_.
        1st Liverpool (King's).
        2nd S. Stafford.
        1st Berks.
        1st K.R. Rifles.

  _Artillery--General Perceval_.
        34th Brig. R.F.A. 22, 50, 70.
        36th Brig. R.F.A. 15, 48, 71.
        41st Brig. R.F.A. 9, 16, 17.
        How. Brig. R.F.A. 47, 56, 60.
        35th Batt. R.G.A.
        R.E. 5, 11, Field Cos.



  THE SECOND ARMY CORPS--GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN

  DIVISION III.

  General HAMILTON.

  7_th Infantry Brigade--General McCracken_.
        3rd Worcester.
        2nd S. Lancs.
        1st Wilts.
        2nd Irish Rifles.

  8_th Infantry Brigade--General B. Doran_.
        2nd Royal Scots.
        2nd Royal Irish.
        4th Middlesex.
        1st Gordon Highlanders.

  9_th Infantry Brigade--General Shaw_.
        1st North. Fusiliers.
        4th Royal Fusiliers.
        1st Lincoln.
        1st Scots Fusiliers.

  _Artillery--General Wing_.
        23rd Brigade 107, 108, 109.
        30th Brigade (How.) 128, 129, 130.
        40th Brigade 6, 23, 49.
        42nd Brigade 29, 41, 45.
        48th Batt. R.G.A.

  _R.E.--Colonel Wilson_.
        56, 57 F. Corps.
        3 Signal Co.


  DIVISION V.

  General FERGUSON.

  13_th Infantry Brigade--General Cuthbert_.
        2nd K.O. Scot. Bord.
        2nd West Riding.
        1st West Kent.
        2nd Yorks. Light Infantry.

  14_th Infantry Brigade--General Holt_.
        2nd Suffolk.
        1st East Surrey.
        1st D. of Cornwall's L.T.
        2nd Manchester.

  15_th Infantry Brigade--General Gleichen_.
        1st Norfolk.
        1st Bedford.
        1st Cheshire.
        1st Dorset.

  _Artillery--General Headlam_.
        15th Brig. R.F.A. 11, 52, 80
        27th Brig. R.F.A. 119, 120, 121
        28th Brig. R.F.A. 122, 123, 124
        8 How. Brig. 37, 61, 65.
        Heavy G.A. 108 Battery,

  _R.E.--Colonel Tulloch_.
        17th and 59th Field Cos.
        5 Signal Co.


The Cavalry consisted of four Brigades forming the first cavalry
division, and one extra Brigade.  They were made up thus:

1st Cavalry Brigade (Briggs).--2nd and 5th Dragoon Guards; 11th
Hussars.

2nd Cavalry Brigade (De Lisle).--4th Dragoon Guards; 9th Lancers;
18th Hussars

3rd Cavalry Brigade (Gough).--4th Hussars; 5th Lancers; 16th Lancers.

4th Cavalry Brigade (Bingham).--3rd Hussars; 6th Dragoon Guards;
Comp. Guards Re.

5th Cavalry Brigade (Chetwode).--Scots Greys; 12th Lancers; 20th
Hussars.

D, E, I, J, and L batteries of Horse Artillery were attached to these
Brigades.


{53}

Such was the Army which first set forth to measure itself against the
soldiers of Germany.  Prussian bravery, capacity, and organising
power had a high reputation among us, and yet we awaited the result
with every confidence, if the odds of numbers were not overwhelming.
It was generally known that during the period since the last war the
training of the troops had greatly progressed, and many of the men,
with nearly all the senior officers, had had experience in the
arduous campaign of South Africa.  They could also claim those
advantages which volunteer troops may hope to have over conscripts.
At the same time there was no tendency to underrate the earnest
patriotism of our opponents, and we were well aware that even the
numerous Socialists who filled their ranks were persuaded, incredible
as it may seem, that the Fatherland was really attacked, and were
whole-hearted in its defence.

The crossing was safely effected.  It has always been the traditional
privilege of the British public to grumble at their public servants
and to speak of "muddling through" to victory.  No doubt the
criticism has often been deserved.  But on this occasion the
supervising General in command, the British War Office, and the Naval
Transport Department all rose to a supreme degree of excellence in
their arrangements.  So too did the Railway Companies concerned.  The
details were meticulously correct.  Without the loss of man, horse,
or gun, the soldiers who had seen the sun set in Hampshire saw it
rise in Picardy or in Normandy.  Boulogne and Havre were the chief
ports of disembarkation, but many, including the cavalry, went up the
Seine and came ashore at Rouen.  The soldiers everywhere received a
rapturous {54} welcome from the populace, which they returned by a
cheerful sobriety of behaviour.  The admirable precepts as to wine
and women set forth in Lord Kitchener's parting orders to the Army
seem to have been most scrupulously observed.  It is no slight upon
the gallantry of France--the very home of gallantry--if it be said
that she profited greatly at this strained, over-anxious time by the
arrival of these boisterous over-sea Allies.  The tradition of
British solemnity has been for ever killed by these jovial invaders.
It is probable that the beautiful tune, and even the paltry words of
"Tipperary," will pass into history as the marching song, and often
the death-dirge, of that gallant host.  The dusty, poplar-lined roads
resounded with their choruses, and the quiet Picardy villages
re-echoed their thunderous and superfluous assurances as to the state
of their hearts.  All France broke into a smile at the sight of them,
and it was at a moment when a smile meant much to France.

[Sidenote: The British leaders.]

Whilst the various brigades were with some deliberation preparing for
an advance up-country, there arrived at the Gare du Nord in Paris a
single traveller who may be said to have been the most welcome
British visitor who ever set foot in the city.  He was a short, thick
man, tanned by an outdoor life, a solid, impassive personality with a
strong, good-humoured face, the forehead of a thinker above it, and
the jaw of an obstinate fighter below.  Overhung brows shaded a pair
of keen grey eyes, while the strong, set mouth was partly concealed
by a grizzled moustache.  Such was John French, leader of cavalry in
Africa and now Field-Marshal commanding the Expeditionary Forces of
Britain.  His defence of Colesberg at {55} a critical period when he
bluffed the superior Boer forces, his dashing relief of Kimberley,
and especially the gallant way in which he had thrown his exhausted
cavalry across the path of Cronje's army in order to hold it while
Roberts pinned it down at Paardeberg, were all exploits which were
fresh in the public mind, and gave the soldiers confidence in their
leader.

French might well appreciate the qualities of his immediate
subordinates.  Both of his army corps and his cavalry division were
in good hands.  Haig, like his leader, was a cavalry man by
education, though now entrusted with the command of the First Army
Corps, and destined for an ever-increasing European reputation.
Fifty-four years of age, he still preserved all his natural energies,
whilst he had behind him long years of varied military experience,
including both the Soudanese and the South African campaigns, in both
of which he had gained high distinction.  He had the advantage of
thoroughly understanding the mind of his commander, as he had worked
under him as Chief of the Staff in his remarkable operations round
Colesberg in those gloomy days which opened the Boer War.

The Second Army Corps sustained a severe loss before ever it reached
the field of action, for its commander, General Grierson, died
suddenly of heart failure in the train between Havre and Rouen upon
August 18.  Grierson had been for many years Military Attaché in
Berlin, and one can well imagine how often he had longed to measure
British soldiers against the self-sufficient critics around him.  At
the very last moment the ambition of his lifetime was denied him.
His place, however, was worthily filled by General Smith-Dorrien,
another South African {56} veteran whose brigade in that difficult
campaign had been recognised as one of the very best.  Smith-Dorrien
was a typical Imperial soldier in the world-wide character of his
service, for he had followed the flag, and occasionally preceded it,
in Zululand, Egypt, the Soudan, Chitral, and the Tirah before the
campaign against the Boers.  A sportsman as well as a soldier, he had
very particularly won the affections of the Aldershot division by his
system of trusting to their honour rather than to compulsion in
matters of discipline.  It was seldom indeed that his confidence was
abused.

Haig and Smith-Dorrien were the two generals upon whom the immediate
operations were to devolve, for the Third Army Corps was late,
through no fault of its own, in coming into line.  There remained the
Cavalry Division commanded by General Allenby, who was a column
leader in that great class for mounted tactics held in South Africa a
dozen years before.  It is remarkable that of the four leaders in the
initial operations of the German War--French, Smith-Dorrien, Haig,
and Allenby--three belonged to the cavalry, an arm which has usually
been regarded as active and ornamental rather than intellectual.
Pulteney, the commander of the Third Army Corps, was a product of the
Guards, a veteran of much service and a well-known heavy-game shot.
Thus, neither of the more learned corps were represented among the
higher commanders upon the actual field of battle, but brooding over
the whole operations was the steadfast, untiring brain of Joffre,
whilst across the water the silent Kitchener, remorseless as Destiny,
moved the forces of the Empire to the front.  The last word in each
case lay with the sappers.

{57}

The general plan of campaign was naturally in the hands of General
Joffre, since he was in command of far the greater portion of the
Allied Force.  It has been admitted in France that the original
dispositions might be open to criticism, since a number of the French
troops had engaged themselves in Alsace and Lorraine, to the
weakening of the line of battle in the north, where the fate of Paris
was to be decided.  It is small profit to a nation to injure its
rival ever so grievously in the toe when it is itself in imminent
danger of being stabbed to the heart.  A further change in plan had
been caused by the intense sympathy felt both by the French and the
British for the gallant Belgians, who had done so much and gained so
many valuable days for the Allies.  It was felt that it would be
unchivalrous not to advance and do what was possible to relieve the
intolerable pressure which was crushing them.  It was resolved,
therefore, to abandon the plan which had been formed, by which the
Germans should be led as far as possible from their base, and to
attack them at once.  For this purpose the French Army changed its
whole dispositions, which had been formed on the idea of an attack
from the east, and advanced over the Belgian frontier, getting into
touch with the enemy at Namur and Charleroi, so as to secure the
passages of the Sambre.  It was in fulfilling its part as the left of
the Allied line that on August 18 and 19 the British troops began to
move northwards into Belgium.  The First Army Corps advanced through
Le Nouvion, St. Remy, and Maubeuge to Rouveroy, which is a village
upon the Mons-Chimay road.  There it linked on to the right of the
Second Corps, which had moved up to the line of {58} the Condé-Mons
Canal.  On the morning of Sunday, August 23, all these troops were in
position.  The 5th Brigade of Cavalry (Chetwode's) lay out upon the
right front at Binche, but the remainder of the cavalry was brought
to a point about five miles behind the centre of the line, so as to
be able to reinforce either flank.  The first blood of the land
campaign had been drawn upon August 22 outside Soignies, when a
reconnoitring squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain Hornby
charged and overthrew a body of the 4th German Cuirassiers, bringing
back some prisoners.  The 20th Hussars had enjoyed a similar
experience.  It was a small but happy omen.

[Sidenote: The advance to Mons.]

The forces which now awaited the German attack numbered about 86,000
men, who may be roughly divided into 76,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry,
and 312 guns.  The general alignment was as follows: The First Army
Corps held the space between Mons and Binche, which was soon
contracted to Bray as the eastward limit.  Close to Mons, where the
attack was expected to break, since the town is a point of
considerable strategic importance, there was a thickening of the line
of defence.  From that point the Third Division and the Fifth, in the
order named, carried on the British formation down the length of the
Mons-Condé Canal.  The front of the Army covered nearly twenty miles,
an excessive strain upon so small a force in the presence of a
compact enemy.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{59}

[Illustration: POSITION OF 2nd ARMY CORPS AT MONS. AUG. 23rd]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

If one looks at the general dispositions, it becomes clear that Sir
John French was preparing for an attack upon his right flank.  From
all his information the enemy was to the north and to the east of
him, so that if they set about turning his position it must be from
the Charleroi direction.  Hence, his right {60} wing was laid back at
an angle to the rest of his line, and the only cavalry which he kept
in advance was thrown out to Binche in front of this flank.  The rest
of the cavalry was on the day of battle drawn in behind the centre of
the Army, but as danger began to develop upon the left flank it was
sent across in that direction, so that on the morning of the 24th it
was at Thulin, at the westward end of the line.

The line of the canal was a most tempting position to defend from
Condé to Mons, for it ran as straight as a Roman road across the path
of an invader.  But it was very different at Mons itself.  Here it
formed a most awkward loop.  A glance at the diagram will show this
formation.  It was impossible to leave it undefended, and yet troops
who held it were evidently subjected to a flanking artillery fire
from each side.  The canal here was also crossed by at least three
substantial road bridges and one railway bridge.  This section of the
defence was under the immediate direction of General Smith-Dorrien,
who at once took steps to prepare a second line of defence, thrown
back to the right rear of the town, so that if the canal were forced
the British array would remain unbroken.  The immediate care of this
weak point in the position was committed to General Beauchamp Doran's
8th Brigade, consisting of the 2nd Royal Scots, 2nd Royal Irish, 4th
Middlesex, and 1st Gordon Highlanders.  On their left, occupying the
village of Nimy and the western side of the peninsula, as well as the
immediate front of Mons itself, was the 9th Brigade (Shaw's),
containing the 4th Royal Fusiliers, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers,
and the 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, together with the 1st Lincolns.
To the left of this brigade, occupying the eastern end of {61} the
Mons-Condé line of canal, was Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, containing the
2nd Scottish Borderers, 2nd West Ridings, 1st West Kents, and 2nd
Yorkshire Light Infantry.  It was on these three brigades, and
especially on the 8th and 9th, that the impact of the German army was
destined to fall.  Beyond them, scattered somewhat thinly along the
line of the Mons-Condé Canal from the railway bridge west of St.
Ghislain, were the two remaining brigades of the Fifth Division, the
14th (Rolt's) and the 15th (Gleichen's), the latter being in
divisional reserve.  Still farther to the west the head of the newly
arrived 19th Brigade just touched the canal, and was itself in touch
with French cavalry at Condé.  Sundry units of artillery and field
hospitals had not yet come up, but otherwise the two corps were
complete.

Having reached their ground, the troops, with no realisation of
immediate danger, proceeded to make shallow trenches.  Their bands
had not been brought to the front, but the universal singing from one
end of the line to the other showed that the men were in excellent
spirits.  Cheering news had come in from the cavalry, detachments of
which, as already stated, had ridden out as far as Soignies, meeting
advance patrols of the enemy and coming back with prisoners and
trophies.  The guns were drawn up in concealed positions within half
a mile of the line of battle.  All was now ready, and officers could
be seen on every elevation peering northwards through their glasses
for the first sign of the enemy.  It was a broken country, with large
patches of woodland and green spaces between.  There were numerous
slag-heaps from old mines, with here and there a factory and here and
there a private dwelling, but the sappers {62} had endeavoured in the
short time to clear a field of fire for the infantry.  In order to
get this field of fire in so closely built a neighbourhood, several
of the regiments, such as the West Kents of the 13th and the
Cornwalls of the 14th Brigades, had to take their positions across
the canal with bridges in their rear.  Thrilling with anticipation,
the men waited for their own first entrance upon the stupendous
drama.  They were already weary and footsore, for they had all done
at least two days of forced marching, and the burden of the pack, the
rifle, and the hundred and fifty rounds per man was no light one.
They lay snugly in their trenches under the warm August sun and
waited.  It was a Sunday, and more than one have recorded in their
letters how in that hour of tension their thoughts turned to the old
home church and the mellow call of the village bells.

A hovering aeroplane had just slid down with the news that the roads
from the north were alive with the advancing Germans, but the
estimate of the aviator placed them at two corps and a division of
cavalry.  This coincided roughly with the accounts brought in by the
scouts and, what was more important, with the forecast of General
Joffre.  Secure in the belief that he was flanked upon one side by
the 5th French Army, and on the other by a screen of French cavalry,
whilst his front was approached by a force not appreciably larger
than his own, General French had no cause for uneasiness.  Had his
airmen taken a wider sweep to the north and west,[1] or had the
French commander among his many pressing {63} preoccupations been
able to give an earlier warning to his British colleague, the
trenches would, no doubt, have been abandoned before a grey coat had
appeared, and the whole Army brought swiftly to a position of
strategical safety.  Even now, as they waited expectantly for the
enemy, a vast steel trap was closing up for their destruction.


[1] An American correspondent, Mr. Harding Davis, actually saw a
shattered British aeroplane upon the ground in this region.  Its
destruction may have been of great strategic importance.  This
aviator was probably the first British soldier to fall in the
Continental War.


Let us take a glance at what was going on over that northern horizon.
The American Powell had seen something of the mighty right swing
which was to end the combat.  Invited to a conference with a German
general who was pursuing the national policy of soothing the United
States until her own turn should come round, Mr. Powell left Brussels
and chanced to meet Von Kluck's legions upon their western and
southerly trek.  He describes with great force the effect upon his
mind of those endless grey columns, all flowing in the same
direction, double files of infantry on either side of the road, and
endless guns, motor-cars, cavalry, and transport between.  The men,
as he describes them, were all in the prime of life, and equipped
with everything which years of forethought could devise.  He was
dazed and awed by the tremendous procession, its majesty and its
self-evident efficiency.  It is no wonder, for he was looking at the
chosen legions of the most wonderful army that the world had ever
seen--an army which represented the last possible word on the
material and mechanical side of war.  High in the van a Taube
aeroplane, like an embodiment of that black eagle which is the
fitting emblem of a warlike and rapacious race, pointed the path for
the German hordes.

A day or two before, two American correspondents, {64} Mr. Irvin Cobb
and Mr. Harding Davis, had seen the same great army as it streamed
westwards through Louvain and Brussels.  They graphically describe
how for three consecutive days and the greater part of three nights
they poured past, giving the impression of unconquerable energy and
efficiency, young, enthusiastic, wonderfully equipped.  "Either we
shall go forward or we die.  We do not expect to fall back ever.  If
the generals would let them, the men would run to Paris instead of
walking there."  So spoke one of the leaders of that huge invading
host, the main part of which was now heading straight for the British
line.  A second part, unseen and unsuspected, were working round by
Tournai to the west, hurrying hard to strike in upon the British
flank and rear.  The German is a great marcher as well as a great
fighter, and the average rate of progress was little less than thirty
miles a day.

It was after ten o'clock when scouting cavalry were observed falling
back.  Then the distant sound of a gun was heard, and a few seconds
later a shell burst some hundreds of yards behind the British lines.
The British guns one by one roared into action.  A cloud of smoke
rose along the line of the woods in front from the bursting shrapnel,
but nothing could be seen of the German gunners.  The defending guns
were also well concealed.  Here and there, from observation points
upon buildings and slag-heaps, the controllers of the batteries were
able to indicate targets and register hits unseen by the gunners
themselves.  The fire grew warmer and warmer as fresh batteries
dashed up and unlimbered on either side.  The noise was horrible, but
no enemy had been seen by the infantry, and little damage done.

{65}

But now an ill-omened bird flew over the British lines.  Far aloft
across the deep blue sky skimmed the dark Taube, curved, turned, and
sailed northwards again.  It had marked the shells bursting beyond
the trenches.  In an instant, by some devilish cantrip of signal or
wireless, it had set the range right.  A rain of shells roared and
crashed along the lines of the shallow trenches.  The injuries were
not yet numerous, but they were inexpressibly ghastly.  Men who had
hardly seen worse than a cut finger in their lives gazed with horror
at the gross mutilations around them.  "One dared not look sideways,"
said one of them.  Stretcher-bearers bent and heaved while wet, limp
forms were hoisted upwards by their comrades.  Officers gave short,
sharp words of encouragement or advice.  The minutes seemed very
long, and still the shells came raining down.  The men shoved the
five-fold clips down into their magazines and waited with weary
patience.  A senior officer peering over the end of a trench leaned
tensely forward and rested his glasses upon the grassy edge.
"They're coming!" he whispered to his neighbour.  It ran from lip to
lip along the line of crouching men.  Heads were poked up here and
there above the line of broken earth.  Soon, in spite of the crashing
shells overhead, there was a fringe of peering faces.  And there at
last in front of them was the German enemy.  After all the centuries,
Briton and Teuton faced each other at last for the test of battle.

A stylist among letter-writers has described that oncoming swarm as
grey clouds drifting over green fields.  They had deployed under
cover whilst the batteries were preparing their path, and now over an
extended front to the north-west of Mons they {66} were breaking out
from the woods and coming rapidly onwards.  The men fidgeted with
their triggers, but no order came to fire.  The officers were gazing
with professional interest and surprise at the German formations.
Were these the tactics of the army which had claimed to be the most
scientific in Europe?  British observers had seen it in peace-time
and had conjectured that it was a screen for some elaborate tactics
held up for the day of battle.  Yet here they were, advancing in what
in old Soudan days used to be described as the twenty-acre formation,
against the best riflemen in Europe.  It was not even a shoulder to
shoulder column, but a mere crowd, shredding out in the front and
dense to the rear.  There was nothing of the swiftly weaving lines,
the rushes of alternate companies, the twinkle and flicker of a
modern attack.  It was mediaeval, and yet it was impressive also in
its immediate display of numbers and the ponderous insistence of its
onward flow.  It was not many weeks before the stern lesson of war
taught very different formations to those of the grand Kaiser
manoeuvres.

The men, still fingering their triggers, gazed expectantly at their
officers, who measured intently the distance of the approaching
swarms.  The Germans had already begun to fire in a desultory
fashion.  Shrapnel was bursting thickly along the head of their
columns but they were coming steadily onwards.  Suddenly a rolling
wave of independent firing broke out from the British position.  At
some portions of the line the enemy were at eight hundred, at others
at one thousand yards.  The men, happy in having something definite
to do, snuggled down earnestly to their work and fired swiftly but
deliberately into {67} the approaching mass.  Rifles, machine-guns,
and field-pieces were all roaring together, while the incessant crash
of the shells overhead added to the infernal uproar.  Men lost all
sense of time as they thrust clip after clip into their rifles.  The
German swarms staggered on bravely under that leaden sleet.  Then
they halted, vacillated, and finally thinned, shredded out, and
drifted backwards like a grey fog torn by a gale.  The woods absorbed
them once again, whilst the rain of shells upon the British trenches
became thicker and more deadly.

There was a lull in the infantry attack, and the British, peering
from their shelters, surveyed with a grim satisfaction the patches
and smudges of grey which showed the effect of their fire.  But the
rest was not a long one.  With fine courage the German battalions
re-formed under the shelter of the trees, while fresh troops from the
rear pushed forward to stiffen the shaken lines.  "Hold your fire!"
was the order that ran down the ranks.  With the confidence bred of
experience, the men waited and still waited, till the very features
of the Germans could be distinguished.  Then once more the deadly
fire rippled down the line, the masses shredded and dissolved, and
the fugitives hurried to the woods.  Then came the pause under shell
fire, and then once again the emergence of the infantry, the attack,
the check, and the recoil.  Such were the general characteristics of
the action at Mons over a large portion of the British line--that
portion which extended along the actual course of the canal.

It is not to be supposed, however, that there was a monotony of
attack and defence over the whole of the British position.  A large
part of the force, {68} including the whole of the First Army Corps,
was threatened rather than seriously engaged, while the opposite end
of the line was also out of the main track of the storm.  It beat
most dangerously, as had been foreseen, upon the troops to the
immediate west and north of Mons, and especially upon those which
defended the impossible peninsula formed by the loop of the canal.

[Sidenote: The defence of the bridges of Nimy.]

There is a road which runs from Mons due north through the village of
Nimy to Jurbise.  The defences to the west of this road were in the
hands of the 9th Brigade.  The 4th Royal Fusiliers, with the Scots
Fusiliers, were the particular battalions which held the trenches
skirting this part of the peninsula, while half the Northumberland
Fusiliers were on the straight canal to the westward.  To the east of
Nimy are three road bridges--those of Nimy itself, Lock No. 5, and
Aubourg Station.  All these three bridges were defended by the 4th
Middlesex, who had made shallow trenches which commanded them.  The
Gordons were on their immediate right.  The field of fire was much
interfered with by the mines and buildings which faced them, so that
at this point the Germans could get up unobserved to the very front.
It has also been already explained that the German artillery could
enfilade the peninsula from each side, making the defence most
difficult.  A rush of German troops came between eleven and twelve
o'clock across the Aubourg Station Bridge.  It was so screened up to
the moment of the advance that neither the rifles nor the
machine-guns of the Middlesex could stop it.  It is an undoubted fact
that this rush was preceded by a great crowd of women and children,
through which the leading files of the {69} Germans could hardly be
seen.  At the same time, or very shortly afterwards, the other two
bridges were forced in a similar manner, but the Germans in all three
cases as they reached the farther side were unable to make any rapid
headway against the British fire, though they made the position
untenable for the troops in trenches between the bridges.  The whole
of the 8th Brigade, supported by the 2nd Irish Rifles from
McCracken's 7th Brigade, which had been held in reserve at Ciply,
were now fully engaged, covering the retirement of the Middlesex and
Gordons.  At some points the firing between the two lines of infantry
was across the breadth of a road.  Two batteries of the 40th
Artillery Brigade, which were facing the German attack at this point,
were badly mauled, one of them, the 23rd R.F.A., losing its gun
teams.  Major Ingham succeeded in reconstituting his equipment and
getting his guns away.

It is well to accentuate the fact that though this was the point of
the most severe pressure there was never any disorderly retirement,
and strong reserves were available had they been needed.  The 8th
Brigade, at the time of the general strategical withdrawal of the
Army, made its arrangements in a methodical fashion, and General
Doran kept his hold until after nightfall upon Bois la Haut, which
was an elevation to the east of Mons from which the German artillery
might have harassed the British retreat, since it commanded all the
country to the south.  The losses of the brigade had, however, been
considerable, amounting to not less than three hundred and fifty in
the case of the 4th Middlesex, many being killed or wounded in the
defence, and some cut off in the trenches between the various
bridge-heads.  Majors {70} Davey and Abell of the Middlesex were
respectively wounded and killed, with thirteen other officers.

It has already been said that the line of the 4th Royal Fusiliers
extended along the western perimeter up to Nimy Road Bridge, where
Colonel MacMahon's section ended and that of Colonel Hull, of the
Middlesex Regiment, began.  To the west of this point was the Nimy
Railway Bridge, defended also by Captain Ashburner's company of the
4th Royal Fusiliers.  This was assaulted early, and was held for
nearly five hours against an attack of several German battalions.
The British artillery was unable to help much in the defence, as the
town of Mons behind offered no positions for guns, but the 107th
Battery in the immediate rear did good work.  The defence was
continued until the Germans who had already crossed to the east were
advancing on the flank.  Lieutenant Maurice Dease, five times wounded
before he was killed, worked his machine-gun to the end, and every
man of his detachment was hit.  Lieutenant Dease and Private Godley
both received the Victoria Cross.  The occupants of one trench,
including Lieutenant Smith, who was wounded, were cut off by the
rush.  Captain Carey commanded the covering company and the
retirement was conducted in good order, though Captain Bowden Smith,
Lieutenant Mead, and a number of men fell in the movement.
Altogether, the Royal Fusiliers lost five officers and about two
hundred men in the defence of the bridge, Lieutenant Tower having
seven survivors in his platoon of sixty.  Captain Byng's company at
the Glin Bridge farther east had severe losses and was driven in in
the same way.  As the infantry retired a small party of engineers
under Captain Theodore {71} Wright endeavoured to destroy this and
other bridges.  Lieutenant Day was twice wounded in his attempt upon
the main Nimy Bridge.  Corporal Jarvis received the V.C. for his
exertions in preparing the Jemappes bridge for destruction to the
west of Nimy.  Captain Wright, with Sergeant Smith, made an heroic
endeavour under terrific fire to detonate the charge, but was wounded
and fell into the canal.  Lieutenant Holt, a brave young officer of
reserve engineers, also lost his life in these operations.

[Sidenote: The holding of the canal.]

Having held on as long as was possible, the front line of the 9th
Brigade fell back upon the prepared position on high ground between
Mons and Frameries, where the 107th R.F.A. was entrenched.  The 4th
Royal Fusiliers passed through Mons and reached the new line in good
order and without further loss.  The 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers,
however, falling back to the same point on a different route through
Flenu, came under heavy machine-gun fire from a high soil heap,
losing Captain Rose and a hundred men.

The falling back of the 8th and 9th Brigades from the Nimy Peninsula
had an immediate effect upon Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, which was on
their left holding the line up to the railway bridge just east of St.
Ghislain.  Of this brigade two battalions, the 1st West Kent on the
right and the 2nd Scottish Borderers on the left, were in the
trenches while the 2nd West Riding and the 2nd Yorkshire Light
Infantry were in support, having their centre at Boussu.  The day
began by some losses to the West Kent Regiment, who were probably,
apart from cavalry patrols, the first troops to suffer in the great
war.  A company of the regiment under Captain Lister was sent across
the canal early as a support to some advancing {72} cavalry, and was
driven in about eleven o'clock with a loss of two officers and about
a hundred men.

From this time onwards the German attacks were easily held, though
the German guns were within twelve hundred yards.  The situation was
changed when it was learned later in the day that the Germans were
across to the right and had got as far as Flenu on the flank of the
brigade.  In view of this advance, General Smith-Dorrien, having no
immediate supports, dashed off on a motor to Sir Douglas Haig's
headquarters some four miles distant, and got his permission to use
Haking's 5th Brigade, which pushed up in time to re-establish the
line.

It has been shown that the order of the regiments closely engaged in
the front line was, counting from the east, the 1st Gordons, the 4th
Middlesex, the 4th Royal Fusiliers, the 1st Scots Fusiliers, half the
1st Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st West Kents, and the 2nd
Scottish Borderers, the other regiments of these brigades being in
reserve.  The last-named battalion, being opposite a bridge, was
heavily engaged all day, losing many men, but holding its position
intact against repeated advances.  On the left hand or western side
of the Scottish Borderers, continuing the line along the canal, one
would come upon the front of the 14th Brigade (Rolfs), which was
formed by the 1st Surrey on the right and the 1st Duke of Cornwall's
on the left.  The German attack upon this portion of the line began
about 1 P.M., and by 3 P.M. had become so warm that the reserve
companies were drawn into the firing line.  Thanks to their good
work, both with rifles and with machine-guns, the regiments held
their own until about six o'clock in the evening, when the retirement
of the troops on {73} their right enabled the Germans to enfilade the
right section of the East Surreys at close range.  They were ordered
to retire, but lost touch with the left section, which remained to
the north of the canal where their trench was situated.  Captain
Benson of this section had been killed and Captain Campbell severely
wounded, but the party of one hundred and ten men under Lieutenant
Morritt held on most gallantly and made a very fine defence.  Being
finally surrounded, they endeavoured to cut their way out with cold
steel, Lieutenant Ward being killed and Morritt four times wounded in
the attempt.  Many of the men were killed and wounded, and the
survivors were taken.  Altogether the loss of the regiment was five
officers and one hundred and thirty-four men.

On the left of the East Surreys, as already stated, lay the 1st Duke
of Cornwall's of the same brigade.  About four o'clock in the
afternoon the presence of the German outflanking corps first made
itself felt.  At that hour the Cornwalls were aware of an advance
upon their left as well as their front.  The Cornwalls drew in across
the canal in consequence, and the Germans did not follow them over
that evening.

The chief point defended by the 14th Brigade upon this day had been
the bridge and main road which crosses the canal between Pommeroeul
and Thulin, some eight or nine miles west of Mons.  In the evening,
when the final order for retreat was given, this bridge was blown up,
and the brigade fell back after nightfall as far as Dour, where it
slept.

[Sidenote: The fateful telegram.]

By the late afternoon the general position was grave, but not
critical.  The enemy had lost very heavily, while the men in the
trenches were, in comparison, unscathed.  Here and there, as we have
{74} seen, the Germans had obtained a lodgment in the British
position, especially at the salient which had always appeared to be
impossible to hold, but, on the other hand, the greater part of the
Army, including the whole First Corps, had not yet been seriously
engaged, and there were reserve troops in the immediate rear of the
fighting line who could be trusted to make good any gap in the ranks
before them.  The German artillery fire was heavy and well-directed,
but the British batteries had held their own.  Such was the position
when, about 5 P.M., a telegram from General Joffre was put into Sir
John French's hand, which must have brought a pang to his heart.
From it he learned that all his work had been in vain, and that far
from contending for victory, he would be fortunate if he saved
himself from utter defeat.

There were two pieces of information in this fatal message, and each
was disastrous.  The first announced that instead of the two German
corps whom he had reason to think were in front of him, there were
four--the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Fourth Reserve Corps--forming,
with the second and fourth cavalry divisions, a force of nearly
200,000 men, while the Second Corps were bringing another 40,000
round his left flank from the direction of Tournai.  The second item
was even more serious.  Instead of being buttressed up with French
troops on either side of him, he learned that the Germans had burst
the line of the Sambre, and that the French armies on his right were
already in full retreat, while nothing substantial lay upon his left.
It was a most perilous position.  The British force lay exposed and
unsupported amid converging foes who far outnumbered it in men and
guns.  What was the profit of one {75} day of successful defence if
the morrow would dawn upon a British Sedan?  There was only one
course of action, and Sir John decided upon it in the instant, bitter
as the decision must have been.  The Army must be extricated from the
battle and fall back until it resumed touch with its Allies.

But it is no easy matter to disengage so large an army which is
actually in action and hard-pressed by a numerous and enterprising
enemy.  The front was extensive and the lines of retreat were
limited.  That the operation was carried out in an orderly fashion is
a testimony to the skill of the General, the talents of the
commanders, and the discipline of the units.  If it had been done at
once and simultaneously it would certainly have been the signal for a
vigorous German advance and a possible disaster.  The positions were
therefore held, though no efforts were made to retake those points
where the enemy had effected a lodgment.  There was no possible use
in wasting troops in regaining positions which would in no case be
held.  As dusk fell, a dusk which was lightened by the glare of
burning villages, some of the regiments began slowly to draw off to
the rear.  In the early morning of the 24th the definite order to
retire was conveyed to the corps commanders, whilst immediate
measures were taken to withdraw the impedimenta and to clear the
roads.

Such, in its bare outlines, was the action of Mons upon August 23,
interesting for its own sake, but more so as being the first clash
between the British and German armies.  One or two questions call for
discussion before the narrative passes on.  The most obvious of these
is the question of the bridges.  Why were they not blown up in the
dangerous peninsula?  {76} Without having any special information
upon the point, one might put forward the speculation that the reason
why they were not at once blown up was that the whole of Joffre's
advance was an aggressive movement for the relief of Namur, and that
the bridges were not destroyed because they would be used in a
subsequent advance.  It will always be a subject for speculation as
to what would have occurred had the battle been fought to a finish.
Considering the comparative merits of British and German infantry as
shown in many a subsequent encounter, and allowing for the advantage
that the defence has over the attack, it is probable that the odds
might not have been too great and that Sir John French might have
remained master of the field.  That, however, is a matter of opinion.
What is not a matter of opinion is that the other German armies to
the east would have advanced on the heels of the retiring French,
that they would have cut the British off from their Allies, and that
they would have been hard put to it to reach the coast.  Therefore,
win or lose, the Army had no possible course open but to retire.  The
actual losses of the British were not more than three or four
thousand, the greater part from the 8th, 9th, and 13th Brigades.
There are no means as yet by which the German losses can be taken out
from the general returns, but when one considers the repeated
advances over the open and the constant breaking of the dense
attacking formations, it is impossible that they should have been
fewer than from seven to ten thousand men.  Each army had for the
first time an opportunity of forming a critical estimate of the
other.  German officers have admitted with soldierly frankness that
the efficiency of the British came to them as a revelation, which is
{77} not surprising after the assurances that had been made to them.
On the other hand, the British bore away a very clear conviction of
the excellence of the German artillery and of the plodding bravery of
the German infantry, together with a great reassurance as to their
own capacity to hold their own at any reasonable odds.

[Sidenote: The rearguard actions of Frameries, Wasmes, and Dour.]

After a night of flames and of uproar the day dawned, a day of great
anxiety to the British commanders and of considerable pressure upon a
portion of the troops.  Sir John French had given instructions that
the First Corps, which had been only slightly engaged the day before,
should pretend to assume the offensive upon the extreme right wing in
the direction of Binche, whilst the Second Corps began its
retirement.  The enemy was following up rapidly, however, along the
whole length of the British line, both flanks of which were exposed.
Shortly after dawn the evacuated positions had been occupied, and
Mons itself was in the hands of the advancing Germans.  The Second
Corps began its retreat, helped by the feint which was carried out by
General Haig upon the right, and by the bulk of the batteries of both
corps, but the pursuit was vigorous and the shell-fire incessant.  A
shell from the rear is more intimidating than twenty in the front.
Hamilton's Third Division, including the 8th and 9th Brigades, who
had done such hard work the day before, sustained the most severe
losses, especially at Frameries, four miles south of Mons.  The 2nd
Royal Scots of the 8th Brigade about midnight had been attacked by a
heavy German column which got so near that the swish of their feet
through the long grass put the regiment on the alert.  The attack was
{78} blown back by a volley at close quarters.  The 9th Brigade
(Shaw's), which covered the retreat, was closely pressed from dawn by
the pursuing Germans, and was subjected to a very heavy shell-fire.
A barricade, erected in the village and manned by Captain Sandilands,
of the Northumberlands, with his company, held up the German advance,
and they were never permitted to reach the line nor to hustle the
retirement.  Butler's 23rd Artillery Brigade helped with its fire.
The chief losses in this skilful covering action fell upon the 1st
Lincolns and upon the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, each of which
lost about 150 men, including Captain Rose, Lieutenants Bulbe,
Welchman, and others.  There was a stational ambulance in the village
of Frameries, and a foreign nurse in its employ has left a vivid
picture of the wounded British rushing in grimy and breathless to
have their slighter wounds dressed and then running out, rifle in
hand, to find their place in the firing line.

The remaining brigade of the Third Division, McCracken's 7th Brigade,
had detached one regiment, the 2nd Irish Rifles, upon the day before
to reinforce the 8th Brigade, and this regiment had, as already
mentioned, some severe fighting, holding back the German advance
after the retirement from the Nimy Peninsula of the Middlesex and the
Gordons.  It did not find its way back to its brigade until the
evening of the 24th.  The brigade itself, during the first day of the
retreat, held a position near Ciply, to the south of Mons, where it
was heavily attacked in the early morning, and in some danger as its
flank was exposed.  At ten o'clock it was ordered to retire _via_
Genly towards Bavai, and it carried out this difficult movement in
the face of a pushful enemy in {79} perfect order, covered by the
divisional artillery.  The principal losses fell upon the 2nd South
Lancashire Regiment, which came under heavy fire from German
machine-guns posted upon slag-heaps.  This regiment was very hard
hit, losing several hundred men.  The brigade faced round near Bavai
and held off the pursuit.

Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, keeping in line with their comrades on the
right, halted at Wasmes, some four miles from the canal, where they
prepared some hasty entrenchments.  Here, at the dawn of day, they
were furiously attacked by the German vanguard at the same time that
the 9th Brigade was hustled in Frameries, but for two hours the
assailants were beaten back with heavy losses.  The brunt of the
fighting fell upon the 2nd West Riding Regiment, who lost heavily,
were at one time nearly surrounded, and finally, with dour Yorkshire
pertinacity, shook themselves clear.  Their losses included their
commander, Colonel Gibbs, their adjutant, 300 men, and all their
officers save five.  The 1st West Kents also lost about 100 men and
several officers, including Major Pack-Beresford.  For the remainder
of the day and for the whole of the 25th the brigade, with the rest
of the Fifth Division, fell back with little fighting _via_ Bavai to
the Le Cateau line.

On the evening of the 23rd the 14th Brigade, still farther to the
west, had fallen back to Dour, blowing up the bridge and road over
the canal.  After dark the Germans followed them, and Gleichen's 15th
Brigade, which had not yet been engaged, found itself in the position
of rearguard and immediately exposed to the pressure of the German
flanking movement.  This was now threatening to envelop the {80}
whole of Ferguson's Fifth Division.  The situation was particularly
difficult, since this General had to make a flank movement in the
face of the enemy in order to close up with his comrades of the Third
Division.  He was soon compelled to call for assistance, and Allenby,
with his cavalry division, was advanced to help him.  It was
evidently the intention of the enemy to strike in upon the western
side of the division and pin it to its ground until it could be
surrounded.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{81}

[Illustration: 1st MORNING OF RETREAT OF 2nd ARMY CORPS AUG 24th.]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Sidenote: The charge of the Lancers.]

The first menacing advance in the morning of the 24th was directed
against the flank of the British infantry who were streaming down the
Elouges-Dour high road.  The situation was critical, and a portion of
De Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge near Andregnies,
the hostile infantry being at that time about a thousand yards
distant, with several batteries in support.  The attack of the
cavalry was vigorously supported by L Battery of Horse Artillery.
The charge was carried out by three squadrons of the 9th Lancers,
Colonel Campbell at their head.  The 4th Dragoon Guards under Colonel
Mullens was in support.  The cavalry rode forward amidst a heavy but
not particularly deadly fire until they were within a few hundred
yards of the enemy, when, being faced by a wire fence, they swung to
the right and rallied under the cover of some slag-heaps and of a
railway embankment.  Their menace and rifle fire, or the fine work of
Major Sclater-Booth's battery, had the effect of holding up the
German advance for some time, and though the cavalry were much
scattered and disorganised they were able to reunite without any
excessive loss, the total casualties being a little over two hundred.
Some {82} hours later the enemy's pressure again became heavy upon
Ferguson's flank, and the 1st Cheshires and 1st Norfolks, of
Gleichen's 15th Brigade, which formed the infantry flank-guard,
incurred heavy losses.  It was in this defensive action that the
119th R.F.A., under Major Alexander, fought itself to a standstill
with only three unwounded gunners by the guns.  The battery had
silenced one German unit and was engaged with three others.  Only
Major Alexander and Lieutenant Pollard with a few men were left.  As
the horses had been destroyed the pieces had to be man-handled out of
action.  Captain the Hon. F. Grenfell, of the 9th Lancers, bleeding
from two wounds, with several officers, Sergeants Davids and Turner,
and some fifty men of the regiment, saved these guns under a terrible
fire, the German infantry being within close range.  During the whole
long, weary day the batteries and horsemen were working hard to cover
the retreat, while the surgeons exposed themselves with great
fearlessness, lingering behind the retiring lines in order to give
first aid to the men who had been hit by the incessant shell-fire.
It was in this noble task--the noblest surely within the whole range
of warfare--that Captain Malcolm Leckie, and other brave medical
officers, met with a glorious end, upholding to the full the
traditions of their famous corps.

[Sidenote: The fate of the Cheshires.]

It has been stated that the 1st Cheshires, in endeavouring to screen
the west flank of the Second Corps from the German pursuit, were very
badly punished.  This regiment, together with the Norfolks, occupied
a low ridge to the north-east side of the village of Elouges, which
they endeavoured to hold against the onflowing tide of Germans.
About three in the afternoon it was seen {83} that there was danger
of this small flank-guard being entirely cut off.  As a matter of
fact an order had actually been sent for a retreat, but had not
reached them.  Colonel Boger of the Cheshires sent several
messengers, representing the growing danger, but no answer came back.
Finally, in desperation, Colonel Boger went himself and found that
the enemy held the position previously occupied by the rest of
Gleichen's Brigade, which had retired.  The Cheshires had by this
time endured dreadful losses, and were practically surrounded.  A
bayonet charge eased the pressure for a short time, but the enemy
again closed in and the bulk of the survivors, isolated amidst a
hostile army corps, were compelled to surrender.  Some escaped in
small groups and made their way through to their retreating comrades.
When roll was next called, there remained 5 officers and 193 men out
of 27 officers and 1007 of all ranks who had gone into action.  It
speaks volumes for the discipline of the regiment that this remnant,
under Captain Shore, continued to act as a useful unit.  These
various episodes, including the severe losses of Gleichen's 15th
Brigade, the attack of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and the artillery
action in which the 119th Battery was so severely handled, group
themselves into a separate little action occurring the day after Mons
and associated either with the villages of Elouges or of Dour.  The
Second German Corps continued to act upon the western side of the
Second British Corps, whilst the rest of General von Kluck's army
followed it behind.  With three corps close behind him, and one
snapping at his flank, General Smith-Dorrien made his way southwards,
his gunners and cavalry labouring hard to relieve the ever-increasing
{84} pressure, while his rear brigades were continually sprayed by
the German shrapnel.

It is to be noted that Sir John French includes the Ninth German
Corps in Von Kluck's army in his first dispatch, and puts it in Von
Bülow's second army in his second dispatch.  The French authorities
are of opinion that Von Kluck's army consisted of the Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and Fourth Reserve Corps, with two divisions of
cavalry.  If this be correct, then part of Von Bulow's army was
pursuing Haig, while the whole of Von Kluck's was concentrated upon
Smith-Dorrien.  This would make the British performance even more
remarkable than it has hitherto appeared, since it would mean that
during the pursuit, and at the subsequent battle, ten German
divisions were pressing upon three British ones.

It is not to be supposed that so huge a force was all moving abreast,
or available simultaneously at any one point.  None the less a
General can use his advance corps very much more freely when he knows
that every gap can be speedily filled.

A tiny reinforcement had joined the Army on the morning after the
battle of Mons.  This was the 19th Brigade under General Drummond,
which consisted of the 1st Middlesex, 1st Scots Rifles, 2nd Welsh
Fusiliers, and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  This detached
brigade acted, and continued to act during a large part of the war,
as an independent unit.  It detrained at Valenciennes on August 23,
and two regiments, the Middlesex and the Cameronians, may be said to
have taken part in the battle of Mons, since they formed up at the
east of Condé, on the extreme left of the British position, {85} and
received, together with the Queen's Bays, who were scouting in front
of them, the first impact of the German flanking corps.  They fell
back with the Army upon the 24th and 25th, keeping the line
Jenlain--Solesmes, finally reaching Le Cateau, where they eventually
took up their position on the right rear of the British Army.

As the Army fell back, the border fortress of Maubeuge with its heavy
guns offered a tempting haven of rest for the weary and overmatched
troops, but not in vain had France lost her army in Metz.  Sir John
French would have no such protection, however violently the Germans
might push him towards it.  "The British Army invested in Maubeuge"
was not destined to furnish the head-line of a Berlin special
edition.  The fortress was left to the eastward, and the tired troops
snatched a few hours of rest near Bavai, still pursued by the guns
and the searchlights of their persistent foemen.  At an early hour of
the 25th the columns were again on the march for the south, and for
safety.

It may be remarked that in all this movement what made the operation
most difficult and complicated was, that in the retirement the Army
was not moving direct to the rear, but diagonally away to the west,
thus making the west flank more difficult to cover as well as
complicating the movements of transport.  It was this oblique
movement which caused the Third Division to change places with the
Fifth, so that from now onwards it was to the west of the Army.

The greater part of the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps,
coming up from the lines of communication, brought upon this day a
welcome {86} reinforcement to the Army and did yeoman work in
covering the retirement.  The total composition of this division was
as follows:--

  THIRD ARMY CORPS

  GENERAL PULTENEY.

  DIVISION IV.--General SNOW.

  10_th Infantry Brigade--General Haldane_.
        1st Warwicks.
        2nd Seaforths.
        1st Irish Fusiliers.
        2nd Dublin Fusiliers.

  11_th Infantry Brigade--General Hunter-Weston_.
        1st Somerset L. Infantry.
        1st East Lancashires.
        1st Hants.
        1st Rifle Brigade.

  12_th Infantry Brigade--General Wilson_.
        1st Royal Lancaster Regiment.
        2nd Lancs. Fusiliers.
        2nd Innis. Fusiliers.
        2nd Essex.

  _Artillery--General Milne_.
  XIV. Brig. R.F.A. 39, 68, 88.
  XXIX. Brig. R.F.A. 125, 126, 127.
  XXXII. Brig. R.F.A. 27, 134, 135.
  XXXVII. Brig. (How.) 31, 35, 55.
  Heavy R.G.A. 31 Battery.
  R.E. 7, 9 Field Cos.


These troops, which had been quartered in the Ligny and Montigny
area, received urgent orders at one in the morning of the 25th that
they should advance northwards.  They marched that night to Briastre,
where they covered the retreat of the Army, the Third Division
passing through their lines.  The Fourth Division then retired south
again, having great difficulty in getting along, as the roads were
choked with transport and artillery, and fringed with exhausted men.
The 12th Brigade (Wilson's) was acting as rearguard, and began to
experience pressure from the pursuers, the Essex men being {87}
shelled out of the village of Bethencourt, which they held until it
was nearly surrounded by the German cavalry.  The line followed by
the division was Briastre-Viesly-Bethencourt-Caudry-Ligny and
Haucourt, the latter village marking the general position which they
were to take up on the left of the Army at the line of Le Cateau.
Such reinforcements were mere handfuls when compared with the
pursuing hosts, but their advent heartened up the British troops and
relieved them of some of the pressure.  It has been remarked by
officers of the Fourth Division that they and their men were
considerably taken aback by the worn appearance of the weary
regiments from Mons which passed through their ranks.  Their
confidence was revived, however, by the undisturbed demeanour of the
General Headquarters Staff, who came through them in the late
afternoon of the 25th.  "General French himself struck me as being
extremely composed, and the staff officers looked very cheerful."
These are the imponderabilia which count for much in a campaign.

Tuesday, August 25, was a day of scattered rearguard actions.  The
weary Army had rested upon the evening of the 24th upon the general
line Maubeuge-Bavai-Wargnies.  Orders were issued for the retirement
to continue next day to a position already partly prepared, in front
of the centre of which stood the town of Le Cateau.  All rearguards
were to be clear of the above-mentioned line by 5.30 A.M.  The
general conception was that the inner flanks of the two corps should
be directed upon Le Cateau.

The intention of the Commander-in-Chief was that the Army should
fight in that position next day, {88} the First Corps occupying the
right and the Second Corps the left of the position.  The night of
the 25th found the Second Corps in the position named, whilst their
comrades were still at Landrecies, eight miles to the north-east,
with a cavalry brigade endeavouring to bridge the gap between.  It is
very certain, in the case of so ardent a leader as Haig, that it was
no fault upon his part which kept him from Smith-Dorrien's side upon
the day of battle.  It can only be said that the inevitable delays
upon the road experienced by the First Corps, including the rearguard
actions which it fought, prevented the ensuing battle from being one
in which the British Army as a whole might have stemmed the rush of
Von Kluck's invading host.

[Sidenote: The 7th Brigade at Solesmes.]

Whilst the whole Army had been falling back upon the position which
had been selected for a stand, it was hoped that substantial French
reinforcements were coming up from the south.  The roads were much
blocked during the 25th, for two divisions of French territorials
were retiring along them, as well as the British Army.  As a
consequence progress was slow, and the German pressure from the rear
became ever more severe.  Allenby's cavalry and horse-guns covered
the retreat, continually turning round and holding off the pursuers.
Finally, near Solesmes, on the evening of the 25th, the cavalry were
at last driven in, and the Germans came up against McCracken's 7th
Brigade, who held them most skilfully until nightfall with the
assistance of the 42nd Brigade R.F.A. and the 30th Howitzer Brigade.
Most of the fighting fell upon the 1st Wiltshires and 2nd South
Lancashires, both of which had substantial losses.  The Germans could
make no further progress, {89} and time was given for the roads to
clear and for the artillery to get away.  The 7th Brigade then
followed, marching, so far as possible, across country and taking up
its position, which it did not reach until after midnight, in the
village of Caudry, on the line of the Le Cateau-Courtrai road.  As it
faced north once more it found Snow's Fourth Division upon its left,
while on its immediate right were the 8th and the 9th Brigades, with
the Fifth Division on the farther side of them.  One unit of the 7th
Brigade, the 2nd Irish Rifles, together with the 41st R.F.A., swerved
off in the darkness and confusion and went away with the cavalry.
The rest were in the battle line.  Here we may leave them in position
while we return to trace the fortunes of the First Army Corps.

Sir Douglas Haig's corps, after the feint of August 24, in which the
Second Division appeared to be attacking with the First in support,
was cleverly disengaged from the enemy and fell back by alternate
divisions.  It was not an easy operation, and it was conducted under
a very heavy shell-fire, which fell especially upon the covering guns
of Colonel Sandilands' 34th Artillery Brigade.  These guns were
exposed to a concentration of fire from the enemy, which was so
intense that a thick haze of smoke and dust blotted out the view for
long periods at a time.  It was only with difficulty and great
gallantry that they were got away.  An officer of the 6th Brigade,
immediately behind them, writes: "Both going in and coming back the
limbers passed my trench at a tearing gallop, the drivers lying low
on the horses' necks and screaming at them to go faster, while on the
return the guns bounded about on the stubble {90} field like so many
tin cans behind a runaway dog."  The guns having been drawn in, the
corps retired by roads parallel to the Second Corps, and were able to
reach the line Bavai-Maubeuge by about 7 P.M. upon that evening,
being on the immediate eastern flank of Smith-Dorrien's men.  It is a
striking example of the historical continuity of the British Army
that as they marched that day many of the regiments, such as the
Guards and the 1st King's Liverpool, passed over the graves of their
predecessors who had died under the same colours at Malplaquet in
1709, two hundred and six years before.

[Sidenote: The Guards in action.]

On August 25 General Haig continued his retreat.  During the day he
fell back to the west of Maubeuge by Feignies to Vavesnes and
Landrecies.  The considerable forest of Mormal intervened between the
two sections of the British Army.  On the forenoon of this day the
vanguard of the German infantry, using motor transport, overtook
Davies' 6th Brigade, which was acting as rearguard to the corps.
They pushed in to within five hundred yards, but were driven back by
rifle-fire.  Other German forces were coming rapidly up and
enveloping the wings of the British rearguard, but the brigade,
through swift and skilful handling, disengaged itself from what was
rapidly becoming a dangerous situation.  The weather was exceedingly
hot during the day, and with their heavy packs the men were much
exhausted, many of them being barely able to stagger.  In the
evening, footsore and weary, they reached the line of Landrecies,
Maroilles, and Pont-sur-Sambre.  The 4th Brigade of Guards,
consisting of Grenadiers, Coldstream, and Irish, under General
Scott-Kerr, occupied the town of Landrecies.  During {91} the day
they had seen little of the enemy, and they had no reason to believe
that the forest, which extended up to the outskirts of the town, was
full of German infantry pressing eagerly to cut them off.  The
possession of vast numbers of motor lorries for infantry transport
introduces a new element into strategy, especially the strategy of a
pursuit, which was one of those disagreeable first experiences of
up-to-date warfare which the British Army had to undergo.  It ensures
that the weary retreating rearguard shall ever have a perfectly fresh
pursuing vanguard at its heels.

The Guards at Landrecies were put into the empty cavalry barracks for
a much-needed rest, but they had hardly settled down before there was
an alarm that the Germans were coming into the town.  It was just
after dusk that a column of infantry debouched from the shadow of the
trees and advanced briskly towards the town.  A company of the 3rd
Coldstream under Captain Monck gave the alarm, and the whole regiment
stood to arms, while the rest of the brigade, who could not operate
in so confined a space, defended the other entrances of the town.
The van of the approaching Germans shouted out that they were French,
and seemed to have actually got near enough to attack the officer of
the picket and seize a machine-gun before the Guardsmen began to
fire.  There is a single approach to the village, and no means of
turning it, so that the attack was forced to come directly down the
road.

[Sidenote: The Germans' rude awakening.]

Possibly the Germans had the impression that they were dealing with
demoralised fugitives, but if so they got a rude awakening.  The
advance party, who were endeavouring to drag away the {92}
machine-gun, were all shot down, and their comrades who stormed up to
the houses were met with a steady and murderous fire which drove them
back into the shadows of the wood.  A gun was brought up by them, and
fired at a range of five hundred yards with shrapnel, but the
Coldstream, reinforced by a second company, lay low or flattened
themselves into the doorways for protection, while the 9th British
Battery replied from a position behind the town.  Presently,
believing that the way had been cleared for them, there was a fresh
surge of dark masses out of the wood, and they poured into the throat
of the street.  The Guards had brought out two machine-guns, and
their fire, together with a succession of volleys from the rifles,
decimated the stormers.  Some of them got near enough to throw hand
bombs among the British, but none effected a lodgment among the
buildings.

From time to time there were fresh advances during the night,
designed apparently rather to tire out the troops than to gain the
village.  Once fire was set to the house at the end of the street,
but the flames were extinguished by a party led by Corporal Wyatt, of
the 3rd Coldstream.  The Irish Guards after midnight relieved the
Coldstream of their vigil, and in the early morning the tired but
victorious brigade went forward unmolested upon their way.  They had
lost 170 of their number, nearly all from the two Coldstream
companies.  Lord Hawarden and the Hon. Windsor Clive of the
Coldstream and Lieut. Vereker of the Grenadiers were killed, four
other officers were wounded.  The Germans in their close attacking
formation had suffered very much more heavily.  Their enterprise {93}
was a daring one, for they had pushed far forward to get command of
the Landrecies Bridge, but their audacity became foolhardy when faced
by steady, unshaken infantry.  History has shown many times before
that a retreating British Army still retains a sting in its tail.

At the same time as the Guards' Brigade was attacked at Landrecies
there was an advance from the forest against Maroilles, which is four
miles to the eastward.  A troop of the 15th Hussars guarding a bridge
over the Sambre near that point was driven in by the enemy, and two
attempts on the part of the 1st Berkshires, of Davies' 6th Brigade,
to retake it were repulsed, owing to the fact that the only approach
was by a narrow causeway with marshland on either side, where it was
not possible for infantry to deploy.  The 1st Rifles were ordered to
support the Berkshires, but darkness had fallen and nothing could be
done.  The casualties in this skirmish amounted to 124 killed,
wounded, or missing.  The Landrecies and Maroilles wounded were left
behind with some of the medical staff.  At this period of the war the
British had not yet understood the qualities of the enemy, and
several times made the mistake of trusting surgeons and orderlies to
their mercy, with the result that they were inhumanly treated, both
by the authorities at the front and by the populace in Germany,
whither they were conveyed as starving prisoners of war.  Five of
them, Captains Edmunds and Hamilton, Lieut. Danks (all of the Army
Medical Corps), with Dr. Austin and Dr. Elliott, who were exchanged
in January 1915, deposed that they were left absolutely without food
for long periods.  It is only fair to state that at a later date,
with a few {94} scandalous exceptions, such as that of Wittenberg,
the German treatment of prisoners, though often harsh, was no longer
barbarous.  For the first six months, however, it was brutal in the
extreme, and frequently accompanied by torture as well as neglect.  A
Spanish prisoner, incarcerated by mistake, has given very clear
neutral evidence of the abominable punishments of the prison camps.
His account reads more like the doings of Iroquois than of a
Christian nation.

[Sidenote: The Connnaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre.]

A small mishap--small on the scale of such a war, though serious
enough in itself--befell a unit of the First Army Corps on the
morning after the Landrecies engagement.  The portion of the German
army who pursued General Haig had up to now been able to effect
little, and that little at considerable cost to themselves.  Early on
August 26, however, a brisk action was fought near Pont-sur-Sambre,
in which the 2nd Connaughts, of Haking's Fifth Brigade, lost six
officers, including Colonel Abercrombie, who was taken prisoner, and
280 men.  The regiment was cut off by a rapidly advancing enemy in a
country which was so thickly enclosed that there was great difficulty
in keeping touch between the various companies or in conveying their
danger to the rest of the brigade.  By steadiness and judgment the
battalion was extricated from a most difficult position, but it was
at the heavy cost already quoted.  In this case again the use by the
enemy of great numbers of motor lorries in their pursuit accounts for
the suddenness and severity of the attacks which now and afterwards
fell upon the British rearguards.

Dawn broke upon August 26, a day upon which the exhausted troops were
destined to be tried to the {95} limit of human endurance.  It was
the date of Von Kluck's exultant telegram in which he declared that
he held them surrounded, a telegram which set Berlin fluttering with
flags.  On this day the First Army Corps was unmolested in its march,
reaching the Venerolles line that night.  There was woody country
upon the west of it, and from beyond this curtain of trees they heard
the distant roar of a terrific cannonade, and knew that a great
battle was in progress to the westward.  It was on Smith-Dorrien's
Second Corps and upon the single division of the Third Corps that the
full storm of the German attack had broken.  In a word, a corps and a
half of British troops, with 225 guns, were assailed by certainly
four and probably five German corps, with 600 guns.  It is no wonder
that the premature tidings of a great German triumph were forwarded
that morning to make one more item in that flood of good news which
from August 21 to the end of the month was pouring in upon the German
people.  A glittering mirage lay before them.  The French lines had
been hurled back from the frontier, the British were in full retreat,
and now were faced with absolute disaster.  Behind these breaking
lines lay the precious capital, the brain and heart of France.  But
God is not always with the big battalions, and the end was not yet.




{96}

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU

The order of battle at Le Cateau--The stand of the 2nd
Suffolks--Major Yate's V.C.--The fight for the quarries--The splendid
work of the British guns--Difficult retirement of the Fourth
Division--The fate of the 1st Gordons--Results of the
battle--Exhaustion of the Army--The destruction of the 2nd
Munsters--A cavalry fight--The news in Great Britain--The views of
General Joffre--Battery L--The action of Villars-Cotteret--Reunion of
the Army.


Reference has already been made to the retirement of Smith-Dorrien's
Second Corps, covered by Allenby's cavalry, throughout the 25th.  The
heads of the columns arrived at the Le Cateau position at about 3
P.M., but the rearguards were fighting into the night, and came in
eventually in an exhausted condition.  The Fourth Division, which was
still quite fresh, did good and indeed vital service by allowing the
tired units to pass through its ranks and acting as a pivot upon
which the cavalry could fall back.

Sir John French had reconsidered the idea of making a stand at Le
Cateau, feeling, no doubt, that if his whole Army could not be
consolidated there the affair would be too desperate.  He had moved
with his staff during the evening of the 25th to St. Quentin, leaving
word that the retirement should be continued early next morning.
Smith-Dorrien spent the afternoon and evening going round the
position, but it was {97} not until 2 A.M. upon the morning of the
26th that he was able to ascertain the whereabouts of all his
scattered and weary units.  About that time General Allenby reported
that his cavalry had been widely separated, two and a half brigades
being at Chatillon, six miles east of Le Cateau, the other one and a
half brigades being near Ligny, four miles west of the same town.
General Smith-Dorrien was in the position that his troops were
scattered, weary, and in danger of losing their morale through
continued retreat in the presence of an ever-pressing enemy.  Even
with the best soldiers such an experience too long continued may turn
an army into a rabble.  He therefore made urgent representations by
telephone to the Commander-in-Chief, pointing out that the only hope
of checking the dangerous German pursuit was to stagger them by a
severe counter.  "The only thing for the men to do when they can't
stand is to lie down and fight," said he.  Sir John assented to the
view, with the proviso that the retirement should be continued as
soon as possible.  Smith-Dorrien, taking under his orders the
cavalry, the Fourth Division, and the 19th Brigade, as well as his
own corps, issued instructions for the battle which he knew must
begin within a few hours.

Owing to the gap of eight miles between the nearest points of the two
corps, both flanks of the position were in the air.  Smith-Dorrien
therefore requested the cavalry brigades from Chatillon to move in
and guard the east flank, while the rest of the cavalry watched the
west.  He was less anxious about the latter, as he knew that Sordet's
French cavalry was in that direction.

[Sidenote: The order of battle at Le Coteau.]

The exhausted infantry, who had now been {98} marching for about a
week, and fighting for three days and the greater part of three
nights, flung themselves down where best they could, some to the
north-east of Le Cateau, some in the town, and some along the line of
very inadequate trenches hastily prepared by civilian labour.  In the
early dawn they took up their position, the Fifth Division being to
the right near the town.  Of this division, the 14th Brigade (Rolt's)
was on the extreme right, the 13th (Cuthbert's) to the left of it,
and the 15th (Gleichen's) to the left again.  To the west of the
Fifth Division lay the Third, their trenches covering the villages of
Troisville (9th Brigade), Audencourt (8th Brigade), and Caudry (7th
Brigade).  Behind Caudry one and a half brigades of cavalry were in
reserve to strengthen the left wing.  From Caudry the line was thrown
back to meet a flanking movement and extended to Haucourt.  This
portion was held by Snow's Fourth Division.  Sordet's cavalry had
passed across the rear of the British position the day before, and
lay now to the left flank and rear of the Army.  There were rumours
of approaching French forces from the south, which put heart into the
weary men, but, as a matter of fact, they had only their own brave
spirits upon which to depend.  Their numbers, putting every unit at
its full complement, were about 70,000 men.  Their opponents were
four army corps at the least, with two divisions of cavalry--say,
170,000 men with an overpowering artillery.  Subsequent reports
showed that the guns of all five army corps had been concentrated for
the battle.

It has been said that Rolt's 14th Brigade was at the extreme right of
the line.  This statement needs some expansion.  The 14th Brigade
consisted of the {99} 1st East Surrey, 2nd Suffolk, 2nd Manchester,
and 1st Cornwalls.  Of these four regiments, half of the East Surrey
had been detached on escort duty and the other half, under Colonel
Longley, with the whole of the Cornwalls, bivouacked in the northern
suburbs of Le Cateau on the night of the 25th.  In the early morning
of the 26th the enemy's advanced guard got into the town, and this
detachment of British troops were cut off from their comrades and
fired upon as they assembled in the streets of the town.  They made
their way out, however, in orderly fashion and took up a position to
the south-east of the town, where they fought an action on their own
account for some hours, quite apart from the rest of the Army, which
they could hear but not see.  Eventually the division of cavalry fell
back from Chatillon to join the Army and picked up these troops _en
route_, so that the united body was able to make its way safely back
to their comrades.  These troops were out of the main battle, but did
good work in covering the retreat.  The whole signal section of the
14th Brigade was with them, which greatly hampered the brigade during
the battle.  Two companies of the 1st East Surreys under Major Tew
had become separated from their comrades after Mons, but they
rejoined the British line at Troisville, and on the morning of August
26 were able to fall in on the rear of the 14th Brigade, where, as
will be seen later, they did good service.

The 19th Brigade had also bivouacked in Le Cateau and was nearly cut
off, as the two regiments of the 14th Brigade had been, by the sudden
intrusion of the enemy.  It had been able to make its way out of the
town, however, without being separated from the rest of the Army, and
it took up its position on {100} the right rear of the infantry line,
whence it sent help where needed and played the part of a reserve
until towards the close of the action its presence became very vital
to the Fifth Division.  At the outset the 2nd Argyll and Sutherlands
were in the front line of this brigade and the 1st Middlesex
supporting them, while the other two battalions, the 2nd Welsh
Fusiliers and 1st Scots Rifles, with a battery of artillery had been
taken as a reserve by the force commander.  No trenches had been
prepared at this point, and the losses of the two front battalions
from shell-fire were, from the beginning, very heavy.  The other two
battalions spent a day of marching rather than fighting, being sent
right across to reinforce the Fourth Division and then being brought
back to the right flank once more.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{101}

[Illustration: Sketch of the Battle of Le Cateau, Aug. 26th]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Sidenote: The stand of the 2nd Suffolks.]

It was the Fifth Division, on the right of the line, who first
experienced the full effect of the heavy shelling which about seven
o'clock became general along the whole position, but was always most
severe upon the right.  There was a dangerous salient in the trenches
at the cross-roads one mile west of Le Cateau which was a source of
very great weakness.  Every effort was made to strengthen the
trenches, the 15th Brigade and 59th Company R.E. working especially
hard in the Troisville section.  The Germans were moving round upon
this right wing, and the murderous hail of missiles came from the
flank as well as from the front, being supplemented by rifle and
machine-gun fire.  The 2nd Suffolks and 2nd Manchesters, the
remaining half of Rolfs 14th Brigade, being on the extreme right of
the line, suffered the most.  The guns immediately supporting them,
of the 28th Artillery Brigade, were quite overmatched and were {102}
overwhelmed by the devastating rain of shells, many of them being put
out of action.  A heavy battery, the 108th, some little distance
behind the line, kept up a steady and effective fire which long held
back the German advance.  The pressure, however, was extreme, and
growing steadily from hour to hour until it became well-nigh
intolerable.  Especially it fell upon the 2nd Suffolks, who held
their shallow trenches with splendid tenacity.  Their colonel, Brett,
was killed, Major Doughty was wounded in three places, Captains
Orford and Cutbill, with eight lieutenants, were on the ground.
Finally, when the position of the brigade became untenable and it was
ordered to retreat, the gallant Suffolks held on to their line with
the desire of saving the disabled guns, and were eventually all
killed, wounded, or taken, save for about 250 men, while their
neighbours, the 2nd Manchesters, lost 14 officers and 350 of their
men.  In this way the extreme right of the British line was
practically destroyed.

The 19th Brigade, in the rear of the 14th, were able to observe the
fate of their comrades, and about mid-day the 2nd Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, who had already lost a good many men from
shell-fire, advanced in the chivalrous hope of relieving the
pressure.  The battalion went forward as if on parade, though the
casualties were numerous.  They eventually gained the shelter of some
trenches near the remains of the 14th Brigade, but their gallant
effort, instead of averting the threatened destruction, ended by
partially involving them in the same fate.  They could do nothing
against the concentrated and well-directed artillery fire of the
enemy.  When eventually they fell back, part of two companies were
cut {103} off in their trench and taken.  The rest of the regiment,
together with the 1st Middlesex and two companies of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers from the 9th Brigade, formed a covering line on a ridge in
the rear and held back the German advance for a long time.  This line
did not retire until 5 P.M., when it was nearly enveloped.  General
Drummond, commanding the 19th Brigade, had met with an injury in the
course of the action, and it was commanded during the latter part by
Colonel Ward, of the Middlesex.

[Sidenote: Major Yate's V.C.]

The retirement or destruction of the 14th Brigade exposed the flank
of the 13th (Cuthbert's) to a murderous enfilade fire, which fell
chiefly upon the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry.  This brigade had
defended itself successfully for six hours against various frontal
attacks, but now the flank-fire raked it from end to end and
practically destroyed the Yorkshiremen, who were the most exposed to
it.  On them and on the 2nd Scottish Borderers fell the great bulk of
the losses, for the West Rents and the survivors of the West Ridings
were in reserve.  Of the two companies of the Yorkshire Light
Infantry who held the foremost trenches, that on the right had only
fifteen men left, with whom Major Yate attempted a final charge,
finding his Victoria Cross in the effort, while the next company,
under Major Trevor, had only forty-one survivors, the whole losses of
the battalion being 600 men, with 20 officers.  Both the Yorkshire
and the Scottish Border battalions lost their colonels in the action.
Their losses were shared by the two companies of the 1st East Surreys
under Major Tew, who had been placed between the 14th and 13th
Brigades, and {104} who fought very steadily in shallow trenches,
holding on to the last possible moment.

Whilst the battle was going badly on the right, the Third Division in
the centre and the Fourth Division on the left had held their own
against a succession of attacks.  The 8th and 9th Brigades drove off
the German infantry with their crushing rifle-fire, and endured as
best they might the shelling, which was formidable and yet very much
less severe than that to which the Fifth Division had been exposed.
In the case of the 7th Brigade (McCracken's) the village of Caudry,
which it defended, formed a salient, since the Fourth Division on the
left was thrown back.  The attack upon this brigade from daylight
onwards was very severe, but the assailants could neither drive in
the line nor capture the village of Caudry.  They attacked on both
flanks at short rifle range, inflicting and also enduring heavy
losses.  In this part of the field the British guns held their own
easily against the German, the proportion of numbers being more equal
than on the right of the line.

Whilst the right flank was crumbling before the terrific
concentration of German guns, and while the centre was stoutly
holding its own, farther to the west, in the Haucourt-Ligny
direction, the Second German Army Corps was beating hard against
Snow's Fourth Division, which was thrown back to protect the left
flank of the Army, and to cover the Cambrai-Esnes road.
Hunter-Weston's 11th Brigade was on the right, south of Fontaine,
with Wilson's 12th upon its left, and Haldane's 10th in reserve at
Haucourt.  As the German attack came from the left, or western flank,
the 12th Brigade received the {105} first impact.  The artillery of
the division had not yet come up, and the 1st Royal Lancasters,
stretched in a turnip patch, endured for some time a severe fire
which cost them many casualties, including their Colonel Dykes, and
to which little reply could be made.  There were no cavalry scouts in
front of the infantry, so that working parties and advanced posts
were cut up by sudden machine-gun fire.  Some of the covering parties
both of the Lancasters and of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers were never
seen again.  At about seven the British guns came up, the 14th
Brigade R.F.A. on the left, the 29th in the centre, and the 32nd on
the right, with the howitzers of the 37th behind the right centre on
the high ground near Selvigny.  From this time onward they supported
the infantry in the most self-sacrificing way.  The German infantry
advance began shortly afterwards, and was carried out by wave after
wave of men.  A company of the 2nd Essex Regiment, under Captain
Vandeleur, upon the British left, having good cover and a clear field
of fire, inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, though they were
finally overwhelmed, their leader having been killed.  The 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers in the front line were also heavily attacked,
and held their own for several hours.  About ten o'clock the pressure
was so great that the defence was driven in, and two battalions lost
their machine-guns, but a new line was formed in the Haucourt-Esnes
road, the retirement being skilfully covered by Colonel Anley, of the
Essex, and Colonel Griffin, of the Lancashire Fusiliers.  There the
2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Royal Lancasters, the 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 2nd Essex held firmly on until the
afternoon under very heavy and {106} incessant fire, while the 11th
Brigade upon their right were equally involved in the fight.  Two
battalions of the 10th Brigade (Haldane's), the 1st Irish Fusiliers
and 2nd Seaforths, had dug themselves in on the high ground just
north of Selvigny and repulsed every attack, but two others, the 2nd
Dublins and 1st Warwicks, had got involved with the 12th Brigade and
could not be retrieved.  The Signal Corps had not yet arrived, and
the result was that General Snow had the greatest difficulty in
ensuring his connections with his brigadiers, the orders being
carried by his staff officers.  At two o'clock, as there was a lull
in the German advance, Wilson of the 12th Brigade made a spirited
counter-attack, recovering many of the wounded, but being finally
driven back to the old position by intense artillery and machine-gun
fire.

It is worth recording that during this advance the Essex men found
among the German dead many Jaeger with the same Gibraltar badge upon
their caps which they bore themselves.  It was a Hanoverian battalion
who had been comrades with the old 56th in the defence of the
fortress one hundred and fifty years before.

[Sidenote: The fight for the quarries.]

The 11th Brigade (Hunter-Weston), on the right of the 12th, had
meanwhile played a very vital part in the fight.  This brigade was
defending a position called Les Carrières, or the quarry pits, which
was east of Fontaine and to the north of the village of Ligny.  It
was a desperate business, for the British were four times driven out
of it and four times came back to their bitter work amid a sleet of
shells and bullets.  Parties of the 1st Somersets and of the 1st East
Lancashires held the quarries with the 1st {107} Hants and 1st Rifle
Brigade in immediate support, all being eventually drawn into the
fight.  Major Bickman, of the latter regiment, distinguished himself
greatly in the defence, but was seriously wounded and left behind in
the final retirement.  Besides incessant gun-fire, the defenders were
under infantry fire of a very murderous description from both flanks.
In spite of this, the place was held for six hours until the
retirement of the line in the afternoon caused it to be untenable, as
the enemy was able to get behind it.  The brigade then fell back upon
Ligny under heavy shrapnel-fire, moving steadily and in good order.
The Germans at once attacked the village from the east and
north-east.  Could they have taken it, they would have been upon the
flank of the British line of retirement.  They were twice driven
back, however, by the fire of the infantry, losing very heavily upon
both occasions.  About four o'clock, the Army being in full retreat,
the brigade received orders to abandon Ligny and march upon
Malincourt.  The effect of a heavy shrapnel-fire was minimised by
this movement being carried out in small columns of fours.  A loss of
30 officers and 1115 men in a single day's fighting showed how severe
had been the work of Hunter-Weston's brigade.  The 12th Brigade had
also lost about a thousand men.  Many of the guns had run short of
shells.  A spectator has described how he saw the British gunners
under a heavy fire, sitting in gloomy groups round the guns which
they had neither the shells to work, nor the heart to abandon.

Such was the general fortune of the British left.  At the extreme
edge of it, in the gap between the left of the Fourth Division and
the town of Cambrai, {108} Sordet's French cavalry had been fighting
to prevent the British wing from being turned.  There was some
misconception upon this point at the time, but in justice to our Ally
it should be known that General Smith-Dorrien himself galloped to
this flank in the course of the afternoon and was a witness of the
efforts of the French troopers, who had actually marched 40 miles in
order to be present at the battle.  The narrative has now taken the
movements of the left wing up to the point of its retirement, in
order to preserve the continuity of events in that portion of the
field, but the actual abandonment of their position by Snow's Fourth
Division was due to circumstances over which they had no control, and
which had occurred at a considerable distance.  Both the centre and
the left of the Army could have held its own, though it must be
admitted that the attack to which they were exposed was a very
violent one gallantly pushed home.

All might have gone well had the Germans not been able to mass such
an overpowering artillery attack upon the right of the line.  It was
shortly after mid-day that this part of the position began to weaken,
and observers from the centre saw stragglers retiring over the low
hill in the Le Cateau direction.  At that hour the artillery upon the
right of the British line was mostly silenced, and large masses of
the German infantry were observed moving round the right flank.  The
salient of the Suffolks was in the possession of the enemy, and from
it they could enfilade the line.  It was no longer possible to bring
up ammunition or horses to the few remaining guns.  The greater part
of the troops held on none the less most doggedly to their positions.
A steady downpour {109} of rain was a help rather than a discomfort,
as it enabled the men to moisten their parched lips.  But the
situation of the Fifth Division was growing desperate.  It was plain
that to remain where they were could only mean destruction.  And yet
to ask the exhausted men to retire under such a rain of shells would
be a dangerous operation.  Even the best troops may reach their
snapping point.  Most of them had by the afternoon been under
constant shrapnel-fire for eight hours on end.  Some were visibly
weakening.  Anxious officers looked eagerly over their shoulders for
any sign of reinforcement, but an impassable gap separated them from
their comrades of the First Army Corps, who were listening with
sinking hearts to the rumble of the distant cannonade.  There was
nothing for it but to chance the retirement.  About three o'clock
commanders called to officers and officers to men for a last great
effort.  It was the moment when a leader reaps in war the love and
confidence which he has sown in peace.  Smith-Dorrien had sent his
meagre reserve, which consisted of one battery and two battalions, to
take up a rearguard position astride the Le Cateau-St. Quentin road.
Every available detail, that could pull a trigger, down to
Hildebrand's signallers of the Headquarters Staff, who had already
done wonderful work in their own particular line, were thrust into
the covering line.  One by one the dishevelled brigades were drawn
off towards the south.  One section of the heavy guns of the 108th
Heavy Battery was ordered back to act with two battalions of the 19th
Brigade in covering the Reumont-Maritz road, while the 1st Norfolks
were put in echelon behind the right flank for the same purpose.

{110}

[Sidenote: The splendid work of the British guns.]

The Fifth Division, with the 15th Brigade as rearguard, considerably
disorganised by its long hammering, retreated along the straight
Roman road via Maritz and Estrees.  The Third Division fell back
through Berthy and Clary to Beaurevoir, the 9th Brigade forming a
rearguard.  The cavalry, greatly helped by Sordet's French cavalry
upon the west, flung itself in front of the pursuit, while the guns
sacrificed themselves to save the retiring infantry.  Every British
battery was an inferno of bursting shells, and yet every one fought
on while breech-block would shut or gunner could stand.  Many
batteries were in the state of the 61st R.F.A., which fired away all
its own shells and then borrowed from the limbers of other
neighbouring batteries, the guns of which had been put out of action.
Had the artillery gone the Army would have gone.  Had the Army gone
the Germans had a clear run into Paris.  It has been said that on the
covering batteries of Wing, Milne, and Headlam may, on that wet
August afternoon, have hung the future history of Europe.

Wing's command included the 23rd, 30th, 40th, and 42nd Brigades, with
the 48th Heavy Battery; Headlam's were the 15th, 27th, 28th, and 8th,
with the 108th Heavy; Milne's, the 14th, 29th, 32nd, and 37th, with
the 31st Heavy.  These numbers deserve to be recorded, for every gun
of them did great service, though many were left in ruins on the
field.  Some, like those of the 37th R.F.A., were plucked from under
the very noses of the Germans, who were within a hundred yards of
them when they were withdrawn, a deed of valour for which Captain
Reynolds of that battery received the Cross.  One by one those
batteries which could move were drawn off, the cavalry covering {111}
the manoeuvre by their rifle-fire, and sometimes man-handling the gun
from the field.  Serving one day as charging cavaliers, another as
mounted infantry in covering a retreat, again as sappers in making or
holding a trench, or when occasion called for it as gun-teams to pull
on the trace of a derelict gun, the cavalry have been the general
utility men of the Army.  The days of pure cavalry may have passed,
but there will never be a time when a brave and handy fighting man
who is mobile will not be invaluable to his comrades.

[Sidenote: Difficult retirement of the Fourth Division.]

It was about four o'clock that the Fourth Division, on the left
flank, who had been maintaining the successful defensive already
described, were ordered to begin their retirement.  The 12th Brigade
was able to withdraw with no great difficulty along the line
Walincourt-Villiers-Vendhuile, reaching the latter village about
nine-thirty.  The doings of the 11th Brigade have been already
described.  There was considerable disintegration but no loss of
spirit.  One of the regiments of the 12th, the 2nd Royal Lancasters,
together with about three hundred Warwicks, from the 10th Brigade,
and some detachments of other regiments, were by some mischance,
isolated in the village of Haucourt with no definite orders, and held
on until ten o'clock at night, when the place was nearly surrounded.
They fought their way out, however, in a most surprising fashion, and
eventually made good their retreat.  One party, under Major Poole of
the Warwicks, rejoined the Army next day.  Captain Clutterbuck, with
a small party of Royal Lancasters, wandered into Haumont after it was
occupied by the Germans.  Summoned to surrender the gallant officer
refused, and was shot {112} dead, but his men charged with the
bayonet and fought their way clear to a post which was held by Major
Parker of the same regiment, to the immediate south of the village.
This officer, finding that he was the last rearguard, withdrew in the
face of heavy German forces.  Being joined by Major Christie of the
Warwicks with 200 men, they followed the Army, and, finally, by a
mixture of good luck and good leadership, picked their way through
the German advance guards, and on the third day rejoined the colours
at Noyon.

Haldane's 10th Brigade had got split up during the confused fighting
of the day, half of it, the 1st Warwicks and 2nd Dublins, getting
involved with the 12th Brigade in the fighting on the Haucourt Ridge.
The other two battalions, the 2nd Seaforths and 1st Royal Irish
Fusiliers, kept guard as a reserve over the left flank of the
division.  Towards evening General Haldane, finding it hopeless to
recover control of his lost regiments, collected the rest of his
brigade, and endeavoured to follow the general line of retreat.  He
lost touch with the remainder of the Army, and might well have been
cut off, but after a most exhausting experience he succeeded in
safely rejoining the division at Roisel upon the 27th.  It may be
said generally that the reassembling of the Fourth Division after the
disintegration they had experienced was a remarkable example of
individualism and determination.

It is impossible to doubt that the Germans, in spite of their
preponderating numbers, were staggered by the resistance which they
had encountered.  In no other way can one explain the fact that their
pursuit, which for three days had been incessant, {113} should now,
at the most critical instant, have eased off.  The cavalry and guns
staved off the final blow, and the stricken infantry staggered from
the field.  The strain upon the infantry of the Fifth Division may be
gathered from the fact that up to this point they had lost, roughly,
143 officers, while the Third Division had lost 92 and the Fourth 70.
For the time they were disorganised as bodies, even while they
preserved their moral as individuals.

When extended formations are drawn rapidly in under the conditions of
a heavy action, it is often impossible to convey the orders to men in
outlying positions.  Staying in their trenches and unconscious of the
departure of their comrades, they are sometimes gathered up by the
advancing enemy, but more frequently fall into the ranks of some
other corps, and remain for days or weeks away from their own
battalion, turning up long after they have helped to swell some list
of casualties.  Regiments get intermingled and pour along the roads
in a confusion which might suggest a rout, whilst each single soldier
is actually doing his best to recover his corps.  It is
disorganisation--but not demoralisation.

[Sidenote: The fate of the 1st Gordons.]

It has been remarked above that in the widespread formations of
modern battles it is difficult to be sure of the transmission of
orders.  An illustration of such a danger occurred upon this
occasion, which gave rise to an aftermath of battle nearly as
disastrous as the battle itself.  This was the episode which
culminated in the loss of a body of troops, including a large portion
of the 1st Gordon Highlanders.  This distinguished corps had been
engaged with the rest of Beauchamp Doran's 8th Brigade at Mons and
again upon the following day, after which they {114} retreated with
the rest of their division.  On the evening of the 25th they
bivouacked in the village of Audencourt, just south of the Cambrai-Le
Cateau highway, and on the morning of the 26th they found themselves
defending a line of trenches in front of this village.  From nine
o'clock the Gordons held their ground against a persistent German
attack.  About 3.30 an order was given for the battalion to retire.
This message only reached one company, which acted upon it, but the
messenger was wounded _en route_, and failed to reach battalion
headquarters.  Consequently the remainder of the battalion did not
retire with the Army, but continued to hold its trenches, greatly
helped by the flank (D) Company of Royal Scots, until long after
nightfall, when the enemy in great force had worked round both of its
flanks.  It should be understood that the withdrawal of the Royal
Scots was under direct order emanating from brigade headquarters, but
an officer of the Gordons, not knowing that such an order had been
issued, and perceiving that their flank would be exposed if D Company
left their trench, said a few words to them which had such an effect
upon their fiery souls that they rushed back to stand by the
Highlanders, their Captain being shot dead as he waved his men back
into their trench.  From that time onwards this company of Royal
Scots, finely led by two young lieutenants, Graves and Graham Watson,
shared all the dangers and the ultimate fate of the Gordons, as did a
handful of Royal Irish upon the other flank.  When it was dusk it
became clear to Colonel Gordon, who was now in command of the mixed
detachment, that he and his men were separated from the Army and
surrounded {115} on every side by the advancing Germans.  At that
time the men, after supreme exertion for several days, had been in
action for twelve hours on end.  He therefore decided, as against
annihilation in the morning, that retreat was the only course open.
The wounded were left in the trenches.  The transport, machine-guns,
and horses had already been destroyed by the incessant shelling.  The
detachment made a move towards the south, the operation being a most
difficult one in pitch darkness with the enemy within a few hundred
yards.  The success attained in this initial stage was largely due to
the way in which the Master of Saltoun conveyed the orders which drew
in the flanks to the centre.  Having made good the Audencourt-Caudry
road at 1 A.M. on August 27, the troops managed to traverse some
miles of road, with blazing villages all about them, and had a fair
chance of reaching safety when unfortunately at Montigny they took a
wrong turn, which brought them into Bertry which was held by the
Germans.  Some confusion was caused by the latter challenging in
French.  A confused fight followed in the darkness, in the course of
which many individual acts of great bravery and devotion were
performed.  The enemy were now all round the Highlanders, and though
the struggle continued for fifty minutes, and there was no official
surrender, the little body of men was embedded in Von Kluck's army,
and no escape could be found.  The utmost discipline and gallantry
were shown by all ranks.  It must be some consolation to the
survivors to know that it is freely admitted that their resistance in
the trenches for so long a period undoubtedly facilitated the safe
withdrawal of the Third, and to some extent of the Fourth Divisions.
{116} Major Leslie Butler, Brigade-Major of the 8th Brigade, who had
made a gallant effort to ride to the Gordons and warn them of their
danger, was entangled among the Germans, and only succeeded six days
later in regaining the British lines.

[Sidenote: Results of the battle.]

So ended the perilous, costly, and almost disastrous action of Le
Cateau.  The loss to the British Army, so far as it can be extracted
from complex figures and separated from the other losses of the
retreat, amounted to between seven and eight thousand killed,
wounded, and missing, while at the time of the action, or in the
immediate retreat, a considerable quantity of transport and
thirty-six field-pieces, mostly in splinters, were abandoned to the
enemy.  It was an action which could hardly have been avoided, and
from which the troops were extricated on better terms than might have
been expected.  It will always remain an interesting academic
question what would have occurred had it been possible for the First
Corps to line up with the rest of the Army.  The enemy's
preponderance of artillery would probably have prevented a British
victory, and the strategic position would in any case have made it a
barren one, but at least the Germans would have been hard hit and the
subsequent retreat more leisurely.  As it stood, it was an engagement
upon which the weaker side can look back without shame or dishonour.
One result of it was to give both the Army and the country increased
confidence in themselves and their leaders.  Sir John French has
testified to the splendid qualities shown by the troops, while his
whole-hearted tribute to Smith-Dorrien, in which he said, "The saving
of the left wing of the Army could never have been accomplished
unless a commander of rare and unusual {117} coolness, intrepidity,
and determination had been present to personally conduct the
operation," will surely be endorsed by history.

It is difficult to exaggerate the strain which had been thrown upon
this commander.  On him had fallen the immediate direction of the
action at Mons; on him also had been the incessant responsibility of
the retreat.  He had, as has been shown in the narrative, been hard
at work all night upon the eve of the battle; he superintended that
trying engagement, he extricated his forces, and finally motored to
St. Quentin in the evening, went on to Noyon, reached it after
midnight, and was back with his Army in the morning, encouraging
every one by the magnetism of his presence.  It was a very remarkable
feat of endurance.

[Sidenote: Exhaustion of the Army]

Exhausted as the troops were, there could be no halt or rest until
they had extricated themselves from the immediate danger.  At the
last point of human endurance they still staggered on through the
evening and the night time, amid roaring thunder and flashing
lightning, down the St. Quentin road.  Many fell from fatigue, and
having fallen, continued to sleep in ditches by the roadside,
oblivious of the racket around them.  A number never woke until they
found themselves in the hands of the Uhlan patrols.  Others slumbered
until their corps had disappeared, and then, regaining their senses,
joined with other straggling units so as to form bands, which
wandered over the country, and eventually reached the railway line
about Amiens with wondrous Bill Adams tales of personal adventures
which in time reached England, and gave the impression of complete
disaster.  But the main body were, as a matter of fact, holding well
{118} together, though the units of infantry had become considerably
mixed and so reduced that at least four brigades, after less than a
week of war, had lost 50 per cent of their personnel.  Many of the
men threw away the heavier contents of their packs, and others
abandoned the packs themselves, so that the pursuing Germans had
every evidence of a rout before their eyes.  It was deplorable that
equipment should be discarded, but often it was the only possible
thing to do, for either the man had to be sacrificed or the pack.
Advantage was taken of a forked road to station an officer there who
called out, "Third Division right, Fifth Division left," which
greatly helped the reorganisation.  The troops snatched a few hours
of rest at St. Quentin, and then in the breaking dawn pushed upon
their weary road once more, country carts being in many cases
commandeered to carry the lame and often bootless infantry.  The
paved _chaussées_, with their uneven stones, knocked the feet to
pieces, and caused much distress to the tired men, which was
increased by the extreme heat of the weather.

In the case of some of the men the collapse was so complete that it
was almost impossible to get them on.  Major Tom Bridges, of the 4th
Royal Irish Dragoons, being sent to round up and hurry forward 250
stragglers at St. Quentin, found them nearly comatose with fatigue.
With quick wit he bought a toy drum, and, accompanied by a man with a
penny whistle, he fell them in and marched them, laughing in all
their misery, down the high road towards Ham.  When he stopped he
found that his strange following stopped also, so he was compelled to
march and play the whole way to Roupy.  Thus by one man's compelling
{119} personality 250 men were saved for the Army.  But such complete
collapse was rare.  The men kept their _moral_.  "Beneath the dirt
and grime and weariness I saw clear eyes and grim jaws even when the
men could hardly walk."  So spoke Coleman, the gallant American
volunteer.

Up to now nothing had been seen of the French infantry, and the
exposed British force had been hustled and harried by Von Kluck's
great army without receiving any substantial support.  This was
through no want of loyalty, but our gallant Allies were themselves
hard pressed.  Sir John French had sent urgent representations,
especially to General Sordet, the leader of the cavalry operating
upon the western side, and he had, as already shown, done what he
could to screen Smith-Dorrien's flank.  Now at last the retiring Army
was coming in touch with those supports which were so badly needed.
But before they were reached, on the morning of the 27th, the Germans
had again driven in the rearguard of the First Corps.

[Sidenote: The destruction of the 2nd Munsters.]

Some delay in starting had been caused that morning by the fact that
only one road was available for the whole of the transport, which had
to be sent on in advance.  Hence the rearguard was exposed to
increased pressure.  This rearguard consisted of the 1st Brigade.
The 2nd Munsters were the right battalion.  Then came the 1st
Coldstream, the 1st Scots Guards, and the 1st Black Watch in reserve.
The front of the Munsters, as it faced round to hold back the too
pushful Germans, was from the north of Fesmy to Chapeau Rouge, but
Major Charrier, who was in command, finding no French at Bergues, as
he had been led to expect, sent B and D {120} Companies of Munsters
with one troop of the 15th Hussars to hold the cross-roads near that
place.

At about 12.30 a message reached Major Charrier to the effect that
when ordered to retire he should fall back on a certain line and act
as flank-guard to the brigade.  He was not to withdraw his two
companies from Chapeau Rouge until ordered.  The Germans were already
in force right on the top of the Irishmen, the country being a broken
one with high hedges which restricted the field of fire.  A section
of guns of the 118th R.F.A. were served from the road about fifty
yards behind the line of the infantry.  A desperate struggle ensued,
in the course of which the Munsters, suffering heavily, overlapped on
each flank, and utterly outnumbered, held on bravely in the hope of
help from the rest of the brigade.  They did not know that a message
had already been dispatched to them to the effect that they should
come on, and that the other regiments had already done so.  Still
waiting for the orders which never came, they fell back slowly
through Fesmy before the attack, until held up at a small village
called Etreux, where the Germans cut off their retreat.  Meanwhile
the Brigadier, hearing that the Munsters were in trouble, gave orders
that the Coldstream should reinforce them.  It was too late, however.
At Oisy Bridge the Guards picked up sixty men, survivors of C
Company.  It was here at Oisy Bridge that the missing order was
delivered at 3 P.M., the cycle orderly having been held up on his
way.  As there was no longer any sound of firing, the Coldstream and
remnant of Munsters retired, being joined some miles back by an
officer and some seventy men.  Together with the transport guard this
brought the {121} total survivors of that fine regiment to 5 officers
and 206 men.  All the rest had fought to the end and were killed,
wounded, or captured, after a most desperate resistance, in which
they were shot down at close quarters, making repeated efforts to
pierce the strong German force at Etreux.  To their fine work and
that of the two lost guns and of a party of the 15th Hussars, under
Lieutenant Nicholson, who covered the retreat it may have been due
that the pursuit of the First Corps by the Germans from this moment
sensibly relaxed.  Nine gallant Irish officers were buried that night
in a common grave.  Major Charrier was twice wounded, but continued
to lead his men until a third bullet struck him dead, and deprived
the Army of a soldier whose career promised to be a brilliant one.
Among others who fell was Lieutenant Chute, whose masterly handling
of a machine-gun stemmed again and again the tide of the German
attack.  One of the most vivid recollections of the survivors was of
this officer lying on his face in six inches of water--for the action
was partly fought in tropical rain--and declaring that he was having
"the time of his life."  The moral both of this disaster and that of
the Gordons must be the importance of sending a message in duplicate,
or even in triplicate, where the withdrawal of a regiment is
concerned.  This, no doubt, is a counsel of perfection under
practical conditions, but the ideal still remains.

[Sidenote: A cavalry fight.]

During the retreat of the First Corps its rear and right flank had
been covered by the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Chetwode).  On August 28 the
corps was continuing its march towards La Fère and the cavalry found
itself near Cerizy.  At this point the pursuing German horsemen came
into touch with it.  At about {122} five in the afternoon three
squadrons of the enemy advanced upon one squadron of the Scots Greys,
which had the support of J Battery.  Being fired at, the Germans
dismounted and attempted to advance upon foot, but the fire was so
heavy that they could make no progress and their led horses
stampeded.  They retired, still on foot, followed up by a squadron of
the 12th Lancers on their flank.  The remainder of the 12th Lancers,
supported by the Greys, rode into the dismounted dragoons with sword
and lance, killing or wounding nearly all of them.  A section of guns
had fired over the heads of the British cavalry during the advance
into a supporting body of German cavalry, who retired, leaving many
dead behind them.  The whole hostile force retreated northwards,
while the British cavalry continued to conform to the movements of
the First Corps.  In this spirited little action the German regiment
engaged was, by the irony of fate, the 1st Guard Dragoons, Queen
Victoria's Own.  The British lost 43 killed and wounded.  Among the
dead were Major Swetenham and Captain Michell of the 12th Lancers.
Colonel Wormald of the same regiment was wounded.  The excited
troopers rode back triumphantly between the guns of J Battery, the
cavalrymen exchanging cheers with the horse-gunners as they passed,
and brandishing their blood-stained weapons.

On the evening before this brisk skirmish, the flank-guards of the
British saw a considerable body of troops in dark clothing upon their
left, and shortly afterwards perceived the shell-bursts of a rapid
and effective fire over the pursuing German batteries.  It was the
first contact with the advancing French.  These men consisted of the
Sixty-first and Sixty-second {123} French Reserve Divisions, and were
the van of a considerable army under General D'Amade.  From that
moment the British forces were at last enabled, after a week of
constant marching, covering sometimes a good thirty miles a day, and
four days of continual fighting against extreme odds, to feel that
they had reached a zone of comparative quiet.

[Sidenote: The news in Great Britain.]

The German cavalry still followed the Army upon its southerly march,
but there was no longer any fear of a disaster, for the main body of
the Army was unbroken, and the soldiers were rather exasperated than
depressed by their experience.  On the Friday and Saturday, however,
August 28 and 29, considerable crowds of stragglers and fugitives,
weary and often weaponless, appeared upon the lines of communication,
causing the utmost consternation by their stories and their
appearance.  Few who endured the mental anxiety caused in Great
Britain by the messages of Sunday, August 30, are likely to forget
it.  The reports gave an enormous stimulus to recruiting, and it is
worthy of record and remembrance that, in the dark week which
followed before the true situation was clearly discerned, every
successive day brought as many recruits to the standards as are
usually gained in a year.  Such was the rush of men that the
authorities, with their many preoccupations, found it very difficult
to deal with them.  A considerable amount of hardship and discomfort
was the result, which was endured with good humour until it could be
remedied.  It is to be noted in this connection that it was want of
arms which held back the new armies.  He who compares the empty
arsenals of Britain with the huge extensions of Krupp's, undertaken
during the years before the war, will {124} find the final proof as
to which Power deliberately planned it.

To return to the fortunes of the men retreating from Le Cateau, the
colonels and brigadiers had managed to make order out of what was
approaching to chaos on the day that the troops left St. Quentin.
The feet of many were so cut and bleeding that they could no longer
limp along, so some were packed into a few trains available and
others were hoisted on to limbers, guns, wagons, or anything with
wheels, some carts being lightened of ammunition or stores to make
room for helpless men.  In many cases the whole kits of the officers
were deliberately sacrificed.  Many men were delirious from
exhaustion and incapable of understanding an order.  By the evening
of the 27th the main body of the troops were already fifteen miles
south of the Somme river and canal, on the line Nesle-Ham-Flavy.  All
day there was distant shelling from the pursuers, who sent their
artillery freely forward with their cavalry.

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{125}

[Illustration: Line of Retreat from Mons]

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On the 28th the Army continued its retreat to the line of the Oise
near Noyon.  Already the troops were re-forming, and had largely
recovered their spirits, being much reassured by the declarations of
the officers that the retreat was strategic to get them in line with
the French, and that they would soon turn their faces northwards once
more.  As an instance of reorganisation it was observed that the
survivors of a brigade of artillery which had left its horses and
guns at Le Cateau still marched together as a single disciplined unit
among the infantry.  All day the enemy's horse artillery, cavalry,
and motor-infantry hung on the skirts of the British, but were unable
to make much impression.  The work of the Staff was excellent, for
{126} it is on record that many of them had not averaged two hours'
sleep in the twenty-four for over a week, and still they remained the
clear and efficient brain of the Army.

On the next day, the 29th, the remainder of the Army got across the
Oise, but the enemy's advance was so close that the British cavalry
was continually engaged.  Gough's 3rd Cavalry Brigade made several
charges in the neighbourhood of Plessis, losing a number of men but
stalling off the pursuit and dispersing the famous Uhlans of the
Guard.  On this day General Pulteney and his staff arrived to take
command of the Third Army Corps, which still consisted only of the
Fourth Division (Snow) with the semi-independent 19th Infantry
Brigade, now commanded by Colonel Ward, of the 1st Middlesex.  It was
nearly three weeks later before the Third Corps was made complete.

[Sidenote: The views of General Joffre.]

There had been, as already mentioned, a French advance of four corps
in the St. Quentin direction, which fought a brave covering action,
and so helped to relieve the pressure upon the British.  It cannot be
denied that there was a feeling among the latter that they had been
unduly exposed, being placed in so advanced a position and having
their flank stripped suddenly bare in the presence of the main German
army.  General Joffre must have recognised that this feeling existed
and that it was not unreasonable, for he came to a meeting on this
day at the old Napoleonic Palace at Compiégne, at which Sir John
French, with Generals Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and Allenby, was present.
It was an assemblage of weary, overwrought men, and yet of men who
had strength enough of mind and sufficient sense of justice to
realise that whatever {127} weight had been thrown upon them, there
was even more upon the great French engineer whose spirit hovered
over the whole line from Verdun to Amiens.  Each man left the room
more confident of the immediate future.  Shortly afterwards Joffre
issued his kindly recognition of the work done by his Allies,
admitting in the most handsome fashion that the flank of the long
French line of armies had been saved by the hard fighting and
self-sacrifice of the British Army.

On August 30, the whole Army having crossed the Oise, the bridges
over that river were destroyed, an operation which was performed
under a heavy shell-fire, and cost the lives of several sapper
officers and men.  No words can exaggerate what the Army owed to
Wilson's sappers of the 56th and 57th Field Companies and 3rd Signal
Company, as also to Tulloch's, of the 17th and 59th Companies and 5th
Signal Company, whose work was incessant, fearless, and splendid.

The Army continued to fall back on the line of the Aisne, the general
direction being almost east and west through Crépy-en-Valois.  The
aeroplanes, which had conducted a fine service during the whole of
the operations, reported that the enemy was still coming rapidly on,
and streaming southwards in the Compiégne direction.  That they were
in touch was shown in dramatic fashion upon the early morning of
September 1.  The epic in question deserves to be told somewhat
fully, as being one of those incidents which are mere details in the
history of a campaign, and yet may live as permanent inspirations in
the life of an army.

[Sidenote: Battery L.]

The 1st Cavalry Brigade, greatly exhausted after screening the
retreat so long, was encamped near Nery, {128} to the south of
Compiégne, the bivouac being a somewhat extended one.  Two units were
close to each other and to the brigade headquarters of General
Briggs.  These were the hard-worked 2nd Dragoon Guards (the Bays) and
L Battery of Horse Artillery.  _Réveillé_ was at four o'clock, and
shortly after that hour both troopers and gunners were busy in
leading their horses to water.  It was a misty morning, and, peering
through the haze, an officer perceived that from the top of a low
hill about seven hundred yards away three mounted men were looking
down upon them.  They were the observation officers of three four-gun
German batteries.  Before the British could realise the situation the
guns dashed up and came into action with shrapnel at point-blank
range.  The whole twelve poured their fire into the disordered
bivouac before them.  The slaughter and confusion were horrible.
Numbers of the horses and men were killed or wounded, and three of
the guns were dismounted.  It was a most complete surprise, and
promised to be an absolute disaster.  A body of German cavalry had
escorted the guns, and their rifles added to the volume of fire.

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{129}

[Illustration: "L" Battery Action, Sept. 1st, 1914]

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It is at such moments that the grand power of disciplined valour
comes to bring order out of chaos.  Everything combined to make
defence difficult--the chilling hour of the morning, the suddenness
of the attack, its appalling severity, and the immediate loss of guns
and men.  A sunken road ran behind the British position, and from the
edge of this the dismounted cavalrymen brought their rifles and their
machine-gun into action.  They suffered heavily from the pelting
gusts of shrapnel.  Young Captain de Crespigny, the gallant cadet of
a gallant family, {130} and many other good men were beaten down by
it.  The sole hope lay in the guns.  Three were utterly disabled.
There was a rush of officers and men to bring the other three into
action.  Sclater-Booth, the major of the battery, and one lieutenant
were already down.  Captain Bradbury took command and cheered on the
men.  Two of the guns were at once put out of action, so all united
to work the one that remained.  What followed was Homeric.
Lieutenant Giffard in rushing forward was hit in four places.
Bradbury's leg was shattered, but he lay beside the trail encouraging
the others and giving his directions.  Lieutenant Mundy, standing
wide as observation officer, was mortally wounded.  The limber could
not be got alongside and the shell had to be man-handled.  In
bringing it up Lieutenant Campbell was shot.  Immediately afterwards
another shell burst over the gun, killed the heroic Bradbury, and
wounded Sergeant Dorell, Driver Osborne, and Gunners Nelson and
Derbyshire, the only remaining men.  But the fight went on.  The
bleeding men served the gun so long as they could move, Osborne and
Derbyshire crawling over with the shells while Nelson loaded and
Dorell laid.  Osborne and Derbyshire fainted from loss of blood and
lay between limber and gun.  But the fight went on.  Dorell and
Nelson, wounded and exhausted, crouched behind the shield of the
thirteen-pounder and kept up an incessant fire.  Now it was that the
amazing fact became visible that all this devotion had not been in
vain.  The cluster of Bays on the edge of the sunken road burst out
into a cheer, which was taken up by the staff, who, with General
Briggs himself, had come into the firing-line.  Several of the German
pieces had gone out of action.  {131} The dying gun had wrought good
work, as had the Maxim of the Bays in the hands of Lieutenant Lamb.
Some at least of its opponents had been silenced before the two brave
gunners could do no more, for their strength had gone with their
blood.  Not only had the situation been saved, but victory had been
assured.

About eight in the morning news of the perilous situation had reached
the 19th Brigade.  The 1st Middlesex, under Colonel Rowley, was
hurried forward, followed by the 1st Scottish Rifles.  Marching
rapidly upon the firing, after the good old maxim, the Middlesex
found themselves in a position to command the German batteries.
After two minutes of rapid fire it was seen that the enemy had left
their guns.  Eight guns were captured, two of them still loaded.
About a dozen German gunners lay dead or wounded round them.
Twenty-five of the escort were captured, as was an ambulance with
some further prisoners a mile in the rear.  The cavalry, notably the
11th Hussars, endeavoured to follow up the success, but soon found
themselves in the presence of superior forces.  New wheels and new
wheelers were found for the injured guns, and Battery L came intact
out of action--intact save for the brave acolytes who should serve
her no more.  Bradbury, Nelson, and Dorell had the Victoria Cross,
and never was it better earned.  The battery itself was recalled to
England to refit and the guns were changed for new ones.  It is safe
to say that for many a long year these shrapnel-dinted
thirteen-pounders will serve as a monument of one of those deeds
which, by their self-sacrifice and nobility, do something to mitigate
the squalors and horrors of war.

The success was gained at the cost of many valuable {132} lives.  Not
only had the personnel of the battery been destroyed, but the Bays
lost heavily, and there were some casualties among the rest of the
brigade who had come up in support.  The 5th Dragoon Guards had 50 or
60 casualties, and lost its admirable commander, Colonel Ansell, who
was shot down in a flanking movement which he had initiated.  Major
Cawley, of the staff, also fell.  The total British loss was not far
short of 500 killed and wounded, but the Germans lost heavily also,
and were compelled to abandon their guns.[1]


[1] The German cavalry were the Fourth Cavalry Division, including
the 2nd Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans, 17th and 18th Dragoons.  They
published in their losses for the "Combat of Néry" 643 casualties.
This is not the complete loss, as the artillery does not seem to have
been included.


[Sidenote: The action of Villars-Cotteret.]

The German advance guards were particularly active upon this day,
September 1, the anniversary of Sedan.  Although the Soissons Bridge
had been destroyed they had possession of another at Vic, and over
this they poured in pursuit of the First Corps, overtaking about 8
A.M. near Villars-Cotteret the rearguard, consisting of the Irish
Guards and the 2nd Coldstream.  The whole of the 4th Guards Brigade
was drawn into the fight, which resolved itself into a huge rifle
duel amid thick woods, Scott-Kerr, their Brigadier, riding up and
down the firing line.  The Guards retired slowly upon the 6th
Infantry Brigade (Davies), which was aided by Lushington's 41st
Brigade of Artillery, just south of Pisseleux.  The Germans had
brought up many guns, but could make no further progress, and the
British position was held until 6 P.M., when the rearguard closed up
with the rest of the Army.  Lushington's guns had fought with no
infantry in front of them, and it was a matter of great difficulty in
the end to get them off, but it was {133} accomplished by some very
brilliant work under an infernal fire.  After this sharp action, in
which Colonel Morris of the Irish Guards lost his life, the retreat
of the First Army Corps was not seriously interfered with.  The
losses at that date in this corps amounted to 81 officers and 2180 of
all ranks.

So much attention is naturally drawn to the Second Army Corps, which
both at Mons and at Le Cateau had endured most of the actual
fighting, that there is some danger of the remarkable retreat
effected by the First Corps having less than its fair share of
appreciation.  The actual fighting was the least of the difficulties.
The danger of one or both flanks being exposed, the great mobility of
the enemy, the indifferent and limited roads, the want of rest, the
difficulty of getting food cooked, the consequent absolute exhaustion
of the men, and the mental depression combined to make it an
operation of a most trying character, throwing an enormous strain
upon the judgment and energy of General Haig, who so successfully
brought his men intact and fit for service into a zone of safety.

[Sidenote: Reunion of the Army.]

On the night of September 1, the First and Second Army Corps were in
touch once more at Betz, and were on the move again by 2 A.M. upon
the 2nd.  On this morning the German advance was curiously
interlocked with the British rear, and four German guns were picked
up by the cavalry near Ermenonville.  They are supposed to have been
the remaining guns of the force which attacked Battery L at Nery.
The movements of the troops during the day were much impeded by the
French refugees, who thronged every road in their flight before the
German terror.  In spite of these obstructions, the rearward services
{134} of the Army--supply columns, ammunition columns, and medical
transport--were well conducted, and the admiration of all independent
observers.  The work of all these departments had been greatly
complicated by the fact that, as the Channel ports were now
practically undefended and German troops, making towards the coast,
had cut the main Calais-Boulogne line at Amiens, the base had been
moved farther south from Havre to St. Nazaire, which meant shifting
seventy thousand tons of stores and changing all arrangements.  In
spite of this the supplies were admirable.  It may safely be said
that if there is one officer more than another for whom the whole
British Army felt a glow of gratitude, it was for Sir William
Robertson, the Chief of the Commissariat, who saw that the fighting
man was never without his rations.  Greatly also did they appreciate
the work of his subordinates, who, wet or fine, through rainfall or
shell-fall, passed the food forward to the weary men at the front.

A difficult movement lay in front of the Army which had to cross the
Marne, involving a flank march in the face of the enemy.  A
retirement was still part of the general French scheme of defence,
and the British Army had to conform to it, though it was exultantly
whispered from officer to sergeant and from sergeant to private that
the turn of the tide was nearly due.  On this day it was first
observed that the Germans, instead of pushing forward, were swinging
across to the east in the direction of Chateau-Thierry.  This made
the task of the British a more easy one, and before evening they were
south of the Marne and had blown up the bridges.  The movement of the
Germans brought them down to the river, {135} but at a point some ten
miles east of the British position.  They were reported to be
crossing the river at La Ferté, and Sir John French continued to fall
back towards the Seine, moving after sundown, as the heat had been
for some days very exhausting.  The troops halted in the
neighbourhood of Presles, and were cheered by the arrival of some
small drafts, numbering about 2000, a first instalment towards
refilling the great gaps in the ranks, which at this date could not
have been less than from 12,000 to 15,000 officers and men.  Here for
a moment this narrative may be broken, since it has taken the Army to
the farthest point of its retreat and reached that moment of advance
for which every officer and man, from Sir John French to the
drummer-boys, was eagerly waiting.  With their left flank resting
upon the extreme outer forts of Paris, the British troops had finally
ended a retreat which will surely live in military history as a
remarkable example of an army retaining its cohesion and courage in
the presence of an overpowering adversary, who could never either cut
them off or break in their rearguard.  The British Army was a small
force when compared with the giants of the Continent, but when tried
by this supreme test it is not mere national complacency for us to
claim that it lived up to its own highest traditions.  "It was not to
forts of steel and concrete that the Allies owed their strength,"
said a German historian, writing of this phase of the war, "but to
the magnificent qualities of the British Army."  We desire no
compliments at the expense of our brothers-in-arms, nor would they be
just, but at least so generous a sentence as this may be taken as an
advance from that contemptuous view of the British Army with which
the campaign had begun.

{136}

Before finally leaving the consideration of this historical retreat,
where a small army successfully shook itself clear from the long and
close pursuit of a remarkably gallant, mobile, and numerous enemy, it
may be helpful to give a chronology of the events, that the reader
may see their relation to each other.


  HAIG'S FIRST CORPS.             SMITH-DORRIEN'S SECOND CORPS.

  _August_ 22.

  Get into position to the        Get into position to the
  east of Mons, covering the      west of Mons, covering the
  line Mons-Bray.                 line Mons-Condé.

  _August_ 23.

  Artillery engagement, but       Strongly attacked by Von
  no severe attack.  Ordered      Kluck's army.  Ordered to
  to retreat in conformity with   abandon position and fall
  Second Corps.                   back.

  _August_ 24.

  Retreat with no serious         Retreat followed up by the
  molestation upon Bavai.         Germans.  Severe rearguard
  Here the two Corps diverged     actions at Dour, Wasmes,
  and did not meet again till     Frameries.  Corps shook
  they reached Betz upon          itself clear and fell back on
  September 1.                    Bavai.

  _August_ 25.

  Marching all day.  Overtaken    Marching all day.  Reinforced
  in evening at Landrecies        by Fourth Division.
  and Maroilles by the German     Continual rearguard action
  pursuit.  Sharp fighting.       becoming more serious towards
                                  evening, when Cambrai-Le Cateau
                                  line was reached.

  _August_ 26.

  Rearguard actions in morning.   Battle of Le Cateau.  German
  Marching south all day,         pursuit stalled off at
  halting at the Venerolles       heavy cost of men and guns.
  line.                           Retreat on St. Quentin.

{137}

  _August_ 27.

  Rearguard action in which       Marching south.  Reach
  Munsters lost heavily.          the line Nesle-Ham-Flavy.
  Marching south all day.

  _August_ 28.

  Cavalry actions to stop         Marching south, making
  German pursuit.  Marching       for the line of the Oise near
  south on La Fere.               Noyon.  Light rearguard
                                  skirmishes.

  _August_ 29, 30, and 31.

  Marching on the line of the     Crossed Oise.  Cavalry
  Aisne, almost east and west.    continually engaged.  General
                                  direction through
                                  Crépy-en-Valois.

  _September_ 1.

  Sharp action at Nery with       Retreat upon Paris continued.
  German vanguard.  Later in      Late this night the
  the day considerable infantry   two Corps unite once more at
  action at Villars-Cotteret.     Betz.
  Unite at Betz.

  _September_ 2.

  Crossed the Marne and began     Crossed the Marne and began
  to fall back on the Seine.      to fall back on the Seine.
  Halted near Presles.




{138}

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The general situation--"Die grosse Zeit"--The turn of the tide--The
Battle of the Ourcq--The British advance--Cavalry fighting--The 1st
Lincolns and the guns--6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes--9th
Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly--The problem of the Aisne--Why
the Marne is one of the great battles of all time.


[Sidenote: The general situation.]

There are several problems connected with the strategical opening of
the great war which will furnish food for debate among military
critics for many years to come.  One of these, already alluded to, is
the French offensive taken in Alsace and Lorraine.  It ended in check
in both cases, and yet its ultimate effects in confusing the German
plans and deflecting German armies which might have been better used
elsewhere may be held to justify the French in their strategy.

Another remarkable and questionable move now obtrudes itself, this
time upon the part of the Germans.  Very shortly after the outbreak
of war, the Russians had pushed their covering armies over the
frontier of East Prussia, and had defeated a German force at
Gumbinnen, with a loss of prisoners and guns.  A few days later the
left wing of the widespread, and as yet only partially mobilised,
Russian army struck {139} heavily at the Austrians in the south near
Lemberg, where after a week of fighting they gained a great victory,
with prisoners, which amounted to over 70,000 men and a large booty
of guns and supplies.  Before this blow had befallen their cause, and
influenced only by the fact that the Russian right wing was
encroaching upon the sacred soil of the Fatherland, a considerable
force was detached from the invading armies in France and dispatched
to the Eastern front.  These men were largely drawn from the Third
(Saxon) Army of Von Haussen.  Such a withdrawal at such a time could
only mean that the German general staff considered that the situation
in France was assured, and that they had still sufficient means to
carry on a victorious invasion.  Events were to show that they were
utterly mistaken in their calculation.  It is true that, aided by
these reinforcements, Von Hindenburg succeeded on August 31 in
inflicting a severe defeat upon the Russians at the battle of
Tannenberg, but subsequent events proved that such a victory could
have no decisive result, while the weakening of the armies in France
may have had a permanent effect upon the whole course of the war.  At
the very moment that the Germans were withdrawing troops from their
Western front the British and French were doing all they could to
thicken their own line of resistance, especially by the transference
of armies from Alsace and the south.  Thus the net result was that,
whereas the Germans had up to August 25 a very marked superiority in
numbers, by the beginning of September the forces were more equal.
From that moment the chance of their taking Paris became steadily
more and more remote.

The first month of the war represented a very {140} remarkable
military achievement upon the part of Germany.  In her high state of
preparation as compared with the Allies, it was to be expected that
the beginning of hostilities would be all in her favour, but the
reality exceeded what could have been foreseen.  Her great armies
were ready to the last button.  Up to the eve of war the soldiers did
not themselves know what their field uniform was like.  At the last
moment two millions of men filed into the depots and emerged in half
an hour clad in grey, with new boots, equipment, and every possible
need for the campaign.  On her artillery surprises she set special
store, and they were upon a vast scale.  The machine-gun had been
developed to an extent unknown by other armies, and of these deadly
little weapons it is certain that very many thousands were available.
From the tiny quick-firer, carried easily by two men upon a
stretcher, to the vast cannon with a diameter of sixteen and a half
inches at the mouth, taking three railway trucks for its majestic
portage, every possible variety of man-killing engine was ready in
vast profusion.  So, too, was the flying service, from the little
Taube to the huge six-hundred-foot Zeppelin.  From these latter
devices great results were expected which were not destined to
materialise, for, apart from reconnaissances, they proved themselves
to be machines rather for the murder of non-combatants than for
honest warfare.

[Sidenote: "Die grosse Zeit."]

Making every allowance for the huge advantage which the nation that
knows war is coming must always enjoy over those which merely fear
that it may come, it would be foolish to deny the vast military
achievement of Germany in the month of August.  It reflects great
credit upon the bravery {141} and energy of her troops, as well as
upon the foresight of her organisers and the capacity of her leaders.
Though we are her enemies, our admiration would have been
whole-hearted were it not for the brutalities which marked her
advance both in Poland, in Belgium, and in France.  Consider that
wonderful panorama of victory which was known all over the Fatherland
as "Die grosse Zeit."  On August 10 fell the great fortress of Liége,
on the 22nd the great fortress of Namur, early in September that of
Maubeuge, while the smaller strongholds went down as if they were
open cities.  On August 10 was a considerable victory at Mülhausen,
on the 20th the Belgians were defeated at Tirlemont, on the same day
Brussels was occupied.  On the 22nd the French central army of ten
corps was defeated in a great battle near Charleroi, losing,
according to the Germans, some 20,000 prisoners and 200 guns.  On the
left flank the Crown Prince's army won the battle of Longwy, taking
10,000 prisoners and many more guns.  On August 23 the Duke of
Würtemberg won a battle in the Ardennes.  Upon the same date the
British were driven from their position at Mons.  Upon the 26th they
were defeated at Le Cateau.  Most of Belgium and the North of France
were overrun.  Scattered parties of Uhlans made their way to the
shores of the Atlantic spreading terror along the Channel coast.  The
British bases were in such danger that they had to be moved.

Finally, upon the last day of the month, a great battle took place at
Tannenberg in East Prussia, in which the Russian invading army was
almost completely destroyed.  I do not know where in history such a
succession of victories is to be found, and our {142} horror of the
atrocities of Louvain, Aerschot, Dinard, and so many other places
must not blind us to the superb military achievement.

It was not, it is true, an unbroken series of successes even in the
West.  The French in the early days won a victory at Dornach in
Alsace, and another smaller one at Dinant in the Ardennes.  They held
the enemy in the neighbourhood of Nancy, fought a fairly equal battle
at St. Quentin in taking the pressure off the British at the end of
August, and had a success at Guise.  These, however, were small
matters as compared with the sweeping tide of German victory.  But
gradually the impetus of the rush was being stayed.  Neither the
French nor the British lines were broken.  They grew stronger from
compression, whilst the invaders grew weaker from diffusion.  Even as
they hoped to reach the climax of their success, and the huge
winning-post of the Eiffel Tower loomed up before their racing
armies, the dramatic moment arrived, and the dauntless, high-hearted
Allies had the reward of their constant, much-enduring valour.

[Sidenote: The turn of the tide.]

September 6 was a day of great elation in the armies of the Allies,
for it marked the end of the retreat and the beginning of their
victorious return.  It is clear that they could in no case have gone
farther south without exposing Paris to the danger of an attack.  The
French Government had already been transferred to Bordeaux and the
city put into a state which promised a long and stubborn defence, but
after the surprising rapidity of the capture of Namur there was a
general distrust of fortresses, and it was evident that if only one
or two of the outer ring of forts should be overwhelmed by the German
fire, {143} the enemy would be in a position to do terrible damage to
the city, even if they failed to occupy it.  The constant dropping of
bombs from German aeroplanes, one of which had already injured the
Cathedral of Notre Dame, gave a sinister forecast of the respect
which the enemy was likely to show to the monuments of antiquity.

Fortunately, the problem of investing Paris while the main French
armies remained unbeaten in the field proved to be an insuperable
one.  The first German task, in accordance with the prophet
Clausewitz, was to break the French resistance.  Everything would
follow after that, and nothing could precede it.  Von Kluck, with his
army, comprising originally something over 200,000 men, had lost
considerably in their conflicts with the British, and were much
exhausted by rapid marching, but they were still in good heart, as
the roads over which they passed seemed to offer ample evidence that
their enemy was in full flight before them.  Knowing that they had
hit the British hard, they hoped that, for a time at least, they
might disregard them, and, accordingly, they ventured to close in, by
a flank march, on to the other German armies to the east of them, in
order to combine against the main line of French resistance and to
make up the gaps of those corps which had been ordered to East
Prussia.  But the bulldog, though weary and somewhat wounded, was
still watching with bloodshot eyes.  He now sprang suddenly upon the
exposed flank of his enemy and got a grip which held firm for many a
day to come.

Without going into complicated details of French strategy, which
would be outside the scope of this work, it may be generally stated
that the whole {144} French line, which had stretched on August 22
from Namur along the line of the Sambre to Charleroi and had retired
with considerable loss before the German advance, was now extended in
seven separate armies from Verdun to the west of Paris.

General Joffre had assembled Maunoury's Sixth Army, which consisted
of the Seventh Regular Corps, one reserve corps, and three
territorial divisions, with Sordet's cavalry, in the neighbourhood of
Amiens, and at the end of the month they lay with their right upon
Roye.  Thus, when Von Kluck swerved to his left, this army was on the
flank of the whole great German line which extended to Verdun.  Next
to this Sixth Army and more to the south-east were the British, now
no longer unsupported, but with solid French comrades upon either
side of them.  Next to the British, counting from the left or
westward end of the defensive line, was the Fifth French Army under
General d'Esperey, of four corps, with Conneau's cavalry forming the
link between.  These three great bodies, the French Sixth, the
British, and the French Fifth, were in touch during the subsequent
operations, and moved forward in close co-operation upon September 6.
Their operations were directed against the First (Von Kluck's) and
Second (Von Bülow's) Armies.  On the right of the Fifth French Army
came another extra, produced suddenly by the prolific Joffre and
thrust into the centre of the line.  This was General Foch's Seventh,
three corps strong, which joined to the eastward General Langlé de
Cary's Fourth Army.  Opposed to them were the remains of Von
Haussen's Third Saxon Army and the Prince of Würtemberg's Fourth
Army.  Eastward of this, on the farther side of the great plain of
{145} Chalons, a place of evil omen for the Huns, were the Third
(Sarrail), Second (Castelnau), and First (Dubail) French Armies,
which faced the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German, commanded
respectively by the Crown Prince of Prussia, the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, and General von Heeringen.  Such were the mighty lines which
were destined to swing and sway for an eventful week in the strain of
a close-locked fight.

[Sidenote: The Battle of the Ourcq.]

The eastern portion of this great battle is outside the scope of this
account, but it may briefly be stated that after murderous fighting
neither the French nor the German lines made any marked advance in
the extreme east, but that the Crown Prince's army was driven back by
Dubail, Sarrail, and Castelnau from all its advanced positions, and
held off from Nancy and Verdun, which were his objectives.  It was at
the western end of the Allied line that the strategical position was
most advantageous and the result most marked.  In all other parts of
that huge line the parallel battle prevailed.  Only in the west were
the Germans outflanked, and the shock of the impact of the Sixth
French Army passed down from Meaux to Verdun as the blow of the
engine's buffer sends the successive crashes along a line of trucks.
This French army was, as already stated, upon the extreme outside
right of Von Kluck's army, divided from it only by the River Ourcq.
This was the deciding factor in the subsequent operations.

By mid-day upon September 6, according to the dispatch of Sir John
French, the Germans had realised their dangerous position.  The
British Army, consisting of five divisions and five cavalry brigades,
with its depleted ranks filled up with reinforcements and some of its
lost guns replaced, was advancing {146} from the south through the
forest of Crécy, men who had limped south with bleeding feet at two
miles an hour changing their gait to three or four now that they were
bound northward.  The general movement of the Army cannot, however,
be said to have been rapid.  Von Kluck had placed nothing more
substantial than a cavalry screen of two divisions in front of them,
while he had detached a strong force of infantry and artillery to
fight a rearguard action against the Sixth French Army and prevent it
from crossing the Ourcq.

The desperate struggle of September 6, 7, 8, and 9 between Von Kluck
and Maunoury may be looked upon as the first turning-point of the
war.  Von Kluck had originally faced Maunoury with his Fourth Reserve
Corps on the defensive.  Recognising how critical it was that
Maunoury should be crushed, he passed back two more army corps--the
Seventh and Second--across the Ourcq, and fell upon the French with
such violence that for two days it was impossible to say which side
would win.  Maunoury and his men fought magnificently, and the
Germans showed equal valour.  At one time the situation seemed
desperate, but 20,000 men, odds and ends of every kind--Republican
Guards, gendarmes, and others--were rushed out from Paris in a
five-mile line of automobiles, and the action was restored.  Only on
the morning of the 10th did the Germans withdraw in despair, held in
their front by the brave Maunoury, and in danger of being cut off by
the British to the east of them.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{147}

[Illustration: British Advance during the Battle of the Marne]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Sidenote: The British advance.]

The advance of the British upon September 6 was made in unison with
that of the Fifth French Army (D'Esperey's) upon the right, and was
much facilitated {148} by the fact that Von Kluck had to detach the
strong force already mentioned to deal with Maunoury upon the left.
The British advanced with the Fourth Division upon the left, the
Second Corps in the centre and the First Corps upon the right.  The
high banks of the Grand Morin were occupied without serious fighting,
and the whole line pushed forward for a considerable distance,
halting on the Coulommiers-Maisoncelles front.  The brunt of the
fighting during the day was borne by the French on either wing, the
Third and Fourth German Corps being thrown back by D'Esperey's men,
among whom the Senegal regiments particularly distinguished
themselves.  The fighting in this section of the field continued far
into the night.

On September 7 the British and the Fifth French were still moving
northwards, while the Sixth French were continuing their bitter
struggle upon the Ourcq.  The British infantry losses were not heavy,
though a hidden battery cost the South Lancashires of the 7th Brigade
forty-one casualties.  Most of the fighting depended upon the
constant touch between the British cavalry and the German.  It was
again the French armies upon each flank who did the hard work during
this eventful day, the first of the German retreat.  The Sixth Army
were all day at close grips with Von Kluck, while the Fifth drove the
enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River, carrying
Vieux-Maisons at the point of the bayonet.  Foch's army, still
farther to the east, was holding its own in a desperate defensive
battle.

[Sidenote: Cavalry fighting.]

Of the cavalry skirmishes upon this day one deserves some special
record.  The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (De Lisle) was acting at the time as
flank {149} guard with the 9th Lancers in front.  Coming into contact
with some German dragoons near the village of Moncel, there followed
a face-to-face charge between two squadrons, each riding through the
other.  The American, Coleman, who saw the encounter, reckons the
odds in numbers to have been two to one against the Lancers.  The
British Colonel Campbell was wounded, and the adjutant, Captain
Reynolds, transfixed through the shoulder by a lance.  While drawing
the weapon out Captain Allfrey was killed.  The other casualties were
slight, and those of the German dragoons were considerably greater.
This example of shock tactics was almost instantly followed by an
exhibition of those mounted rifleman tactics which have been
cultivated of late years.  A squadron of the 18th Hussars, having
dismounted, was immediately charged by a German squadron in close
order.  About 70 Germans charged, and 32 were picked up in front of
the dismounted Hussars, while the few who passed through the firing
line were destroyed by the horse-holders.  It may fairly be argued
that had the two squadrons met with shock tactics, no such crushing
effect could possibly have been attained.  It is interesting that in
one morning two incidents should have occurred which bore so directly
upon the perennial dispute between the partisans of the _arme
blanche_ and those of the rifle.

On the 8th the orders were to advance towards Chateau-Thierry and to
endeavour to reach the Marne.  The Germans were retreating fast, but
rather on account of their generally faulty strategical position than
from tactical compulsion, and they covered themselves with continual
rearguard actions, especially along the line of the Petit Morin.  It
is one of {150} the noticeable results, however, of the use of
aircraft that the bluff of a rearguard has disappeared and that it is
no longer possible to make such a retreat as Massena from Torres
Vedras, where the pursuer never knew if he were striking at a
substance or a shadow.  Gough's Second Cavalry Division, which
consisted of the 3rd and 5th Brigades, swept along, and the infantry
followed hard at the heels of the horses, Doran's 8th Brigade
suffering the loss of about 100 men when held up at the crossing of
the Petit Morin River near Orly, which they traversed eventually
under an effective covering fire from J Battery, R.H.A.

The First Army Corps upon this day forced the Petit Morin at two
places, both near La Trétoire, north of Rebaix.  The First Division
secured the passage at Sablonnières, where the Black Watch seized the
heights, causing the German rearguard some losses and taking 60
prisoners.  The Second Division met with considerable resistance, but
the 2nd Worcesters got over at Le Gravier and the 2nd Grenadier
Guards at La Forge.  The enemy was then driven from the river bank
into the woods, where they were practically surrounded and had
eventually to surrender.  Eight machine-guns and 350 prisoners, many
of them from the Guards' Jaeger Battalion, were captured.  Six of
these machine-guns fell to the Irish Guards.

The Second Army Corps passed the Petit Morin near St. Cyr and St.
Ouen, the 13th Brigade attacking the former and the 14th the latter,
both being villages on the farther side of the river.  Such fighting
as there was in this quarter came largely to the 1st East Surrey and
1st Cornwalls, of the 14th Brigade, {151} but the resistance was not
great, and was broken by the artillery fire.  To the soldiers engaged
the whole action was more like a route march with occasional
deployments than a battle.

On the 9th the Army was up to the Marne and was faced with the
problem of crossing it.  The operations extending over many miles
were unimportant in detail, though of some consequence in the mass.
The real hard fighting was falling upon the Sixth French Army north
of Ligny, which was still in desperate conflict with the German
right, and upon Foch's army, which was fighting magnificently at
Fère-Champenoise.  The advance of the British, and their own
exertions, caused the Germans to retire and cleared the passage over
the Ourcq for our Allies.  The chief losses during the day upon the
British side fell upon the Guards' Brigade, the 1st Lincolns, and the
1st Cornwalls, most of which were inflicted by invisible quick-firing
batteries shrouded by the woods which flank the river.  The latter
regiment lost Colonel Turner, Major Cornish-Bowden, and a number of
other killed or wounded in a brilliant piece of woodland fighting,
where they drove in a strong German rearguard.  The 1st East Surrey,
who were very forward in the movement, were also hard hit, having 6
officers and about 120 men out of action.

[Sidenote: The 1st Lincolns and the guns.]

The British infantry was able on this day to show that woods may
serve for other purposes besides hiding batteries.  The 1st Lincolns,
being held up a rapid and accurate fire from invisible guns,
dispatched two companies, C and D, to make in single file a detour
under the shelter of the trees.  Coming behind the battery, which
appears to have had no immediate support, they poured in a rapid fire
at {152} two hundred and fifty yards, which laid every man of the
German gunners upon the ground.  The whole battery was captured.  The
casualties of the Lincolns in this dashing exploit, which included
Captains Hoskyns and Ellison, with Lieutenant Thruston, were
unavoidably caused by British shrapnel, our gunners knowing nothing
of the movement.

On this date (September 9) both the First and the Second Army Corps
were across the Marne, and advanced some miles to the north of it,
killing, wounding, or capturing many hundreds of the enemy.  The
Sixth French Army was, as stated, fighting hard upon the Ourcq, but
the Fifth had won a brilliant success near Montmirail and driven the
enemy completely over the river.

Pulteney's Third Corps, still a division short, had been held up by
the destruction of the bridges at La Ferté, but on September 10 they
were across and the whole Army sweeping northwards.  The cavalry
overrode all resistance and rounded up a number of prisoners, over
2000 in all.  It was a strange reversal of fortune, for here within a
fortnight were the same two armies playing the converse parts, the
British eagerly pushing on with a flushed consciousness of victory,
while the Germans, tired and dispirited, scattered in groups among
the woods or were gathered up from the roadsides.  It was a day of
mist and rain, with muddy, sodden roads, but all weather is fine
weather to the army that is gaining ground.  An impression of
complete German demoralisation became more widespread as transport,
shells, and even guns were found littering the high-roads, and yet
there was really even less cause for it than when the same delusion
was held by the Germans.  The {153} enemy were actually making a
hurried but orderly retreat, and these signs of disaster were only
the evidence of a broken rearguard resistance.  German armies do not
readily dissolve.  There is no more cohesive force in the world.  But
they were undoubtedly hard pressed.

[Sidenote: 6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes.]

About eight o'clock upon the morning of the 10th the 6th Brigade
(Davies') observed a column of the enemy's infantry on a parallel
road near the village of Hautvesnes.  Artillery fire was at once
opened upon them, and a vigorous infantry attack, the 1st Rifles
advancing direct with the 1st Berkshires on their right, whilst the
1st King's Liverpool worked round each flank in Boer fashion.  The
2nd Staffords were in support.  The Germans had taken refuge in a
sunken road, but they were mercilessly lashed by shrapnel, and 400 of
them ran forward with their hands up.  The sunken road was filled
with their dead and wounded.  Some hundreds streamed away across
country, but these were mostly gathered up by the Third Division on
the left.

In this brisk little action the 50th R.F.A., and later the whole of
the 34th Brigade R.F.A., put in some fine work, the shrapnel-fire
being most deadly and accurate.  The British had pushed their guns
freely forward with their cavalry and did much execution with them,
though they had the misfortune on this same date, the 10th, to lose,
by the answering shell-fire of the enemy, General Findlay, artillery
commander of the First Division.  In this second action, in which the
German rearguard, infantry as well as artillery, was engaged, the 2nd
Sussex Regiment, which was leading the First Division, sustained
considerable losses near Courchamps or {154} Priez, as did the 1st
Northamptons and the 1st North Lancashires.  Some 300 of Bulfin's 2nd
Brigade were hit altogether, among whom was Colonel Knight, of the
North Lancashires.  The enemy came under heavy fire, both from the
infantry and from the guns, so that their losses were considerable,
and several hundred of them were captured.  The country was very
hilly, and the roads so bad that in the exhausted state of men and
horses the pursuit could not be sufficiently pressed.  Thirty large
motor cars were seen at Priez in front of the 2nd Brigade, carrying
the enemy's rearguard.

[Sidenote: 9th Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly.]

On this same date the 9th Brigade captured 600 German infantry, the
survivors of a battalion, at the village of Vinly.  This seems to
have been an incident of the same character as the loss of the
Cheshires or of the Munsters in the British retreat, where a body of
troops fighting a covering action was left too long, or failed to
receive the orders for its withdrawal.  The defence was by no means a
desperate one, and few of the attacking infantry were killed or
wounded.  On this date the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were hardly
engaged at all, and the whole Allied Force, including General Foch's
Seventh French Army on the right of the Fifth, were all sweeping
along together in a single rolling steel-crested wave, composed of at
least twelve army corps, whilst nine German corps (five of Von Kluck
and four of Bülow) retired swiftly before them, hurrying towards the
chance of re-forming and refitting which the Aisne position would
afford them.

On September 11 the British were still advancing upon a somewhat
narrowed front.  There was no opposition and again the day bore a
considerable {155} crop of prisoners and other trophies.  The weather
had become so foggy that the aircraft were useless, and it is only
when these wonderful scouters are precluded from rising that a
general realises how indispensable they have become to him.  As a wit
expressed it, they have turned war from a game of cards into a game
of chess.  It was still very wet, and the Army was exposed to
considerable privation, most of the officers and men having neither
change of clothing, overcoats, nor waterproof sheets, while the
blowing up of bridges on the lines of communication had made it
impossible to supply the wants.  The undefeatable commissariat,
however, was still working well, which means that the Army was doing
the same.  On the 12th the pursuit was continued as far as the River
Aisne.  Allenby's cavalry occupied Braine in the early morning, the
Queen's Bays being particularly active, but there was so much
resistance that the Third Division was needed to make the ground
good.  Gough's Cavalry Division also ran into the enemy near
Chassemy, killing or capturing several hundred of the German
infantry.  In these operations Captain Stewart, whose experience as
an alleged spy has been mentioned, met with a soldier's death.  On
this day the Sixth French Army was fighting a considerable action
upon the British left in the vicinity of Soissons, the Germans making
a stand in order to give time for their impedimenta to get over the
river.  In this they succeeded, so that when the Allied Forces
reached the Aisne, which is an unfordable stream some sixty yards
from bank to bank, the retiring army had got across it, had destroyed
most of the bridges, and showed every sign of being prepared to
dispute the crossing.

{156}

[Sidenote: The problem of the Aisne.]

Missy Bridge, facing the Fifth Division, appeared at first to be
intact, but a daring reconnaissance by Lieutenant Pennecuick, of the
Engineers, showed that it was really badly damaged.  Condé Bridge was
intact, but was so covered by a high horse-shoe formation of hills
upon the farther side that it could not be used, and remained
throughout under control of the enemy.  Bourg Bridge, however, in
front of the First Army Corps, had for some unexplained reason been
left undamaged, and this was seized in the early morning of September
13 by De Lisle's cavalry, followed rapidly by Bulfin's 2nd Brigade.
It was on the face of it a somewhat desperate enterprise which lay
immediately in front of the British general.  If the enemy were still
retreating he could not afford to slacken his pursuit, while, on the
other hand, if the enemy were merely making a feint of resistance,
then, at all hazards, the stream must be forced and the rearguard
driven in.  The German infantry could be seen streaming up the roads
on the farther bank of the river, but there were no signs of what
their next disposition might be.  Air reconnaissance was still
precluded, and it was impossible to say for certain which alternative
might prove to be correct, but Sir John French's cavalry training
must incline him always to the braver course.  The officer who rode
through the Boers to Kimberley and threw himself with his weary men
across the path of the formidable Kronje was not likely to stand
hesitating upon the banks of the Aisne.  His personal opinion was
that the enemy meant to stand and fight, but none the less the order
was given to cross.

September 13 was spent in arranging this dashing {157} and dangerous
movement.  The British got across eventually in several places and by
various devices.  Bulfin's men, followed by the rest of the First
Division of Haig's Army Corps, passed the canal bridge of Bourg with
no loss or difficulty.  The 11th Brigade of Pulteney's Third Corps
got across by a partially demolished bridge and ferry at Venizel.
They were followed by the 12th Brigade, who established themselves
near Bucy.  The 13th Brigade was held up at Missy, but the 14th got
across and lined up with the men of the Third Corps in the
neighbourhood of Ste. Marguerite, meeting with a considerable
resistance from the Germans.  Later, Count Gleichen's 15th Brigade
also got across.  On the right Hamilton got over with two brigades of
the Third Division, the 8th Brigade crossing on a single plank at
Vailly and the 9th using the railway bridge, while the whole of
Haig's First Corps had before evening got a footing upon the farther
bank.  So eager was the advance and so inadequate the means that
Haking's 5th Brigade, led by the Connaught Rangers, was obliged to
get over the broad and dangerous river, walking in single file along
the sloping girder of a ruined bridge, under a heavy, though distant,
shell-fire.  The night of September 13 saw the main body of the Army
across the river, already conscious of a strong rearguard action, but
not yet aware that the whole German Army had halted and was turning
at bay.  On the right De Lisle's cavalrymen had pushed up the slope
from Bourg Bridge and reached as far as Vendresse, where they were
pulled up by the German lines.

It has been mentioned above that the 11th and 12th Brigades of the
Fourth Division had passed the {158} river at Venizel.  These troops
were across in the early afternoon, and they at once advanced, and
proved that in that portion of the field the enemy were undoubtedly
standing fast.  The 11th Brigade, which was more to the north, had
only a constant shell-fall to endure, but the 12th, pushing forward
through Bucy-le-long, found itself in front of a line of woods from
which there swept a heavy machine-gun- and rifle-fire.  The advance
was headed by the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, supported by the 2nd
Inniskilling Fusiliers.  It was across open ground and under heavy
fire, but it was admirably carried out.  In places where the
machine-guns had got the exact range the stricken Fusiliers lay dead
or wounded with accurate intervals, like a firing-line on a
field-day.  The losses were heavy, especially in the Lancashire
Fusiliers.  Colonel Griffin was wounded, and 5 of his officers with
250 men were among the casualties.  It should be recorded that fresh
supplies of ammunition were brought up at personal risk by Colonel
Seely, late Minister of War, in his motor-car.  The contest continued
until dusk, when the troops waited for the battle of next day under
such cover as they could find.

The crossing of the stream may be said, upon the one side, to mark
the end of the battle and pursuit of the Marne, while, on the other,
it commenced that interminable Battle of the Aisne which was destined
to fulfil Bloch's prophecies and to set the type of all great modern
engagements.  The prolonged struggles of the Manchurian War had
prepared men's minds for such a development, but only here did it
first assume its full proportions and warn us that the battle of the
future was to be the siege of the past.  {159} Men remembered with a
smile Bernhardi's confident assertion that a German battle would be
decided in one day, and that his countrymen would never be
constrained to fight in defensive trenches.

The moral effect of the Battle of the Marne was greater than its
material gains.  The latter, so far as the British were concerned,
did not exceed 5000 prisoners, 20 guns, and a quantity of transport.
The total losses, however, were very heavy.  The Germans had
perfected a method of burning their dead with the aid of petrol.
These numerous holocausts over the country-side were found afterwards
by the peasants to have left mounds of charred animal matter which
were scattered by their industrious hands on the fields which they
might help to fertilise.  The heat of cremation had dissolved the
bones, but the teeth in most cases remained intact, so that over an
area of France it was no uncommon thing to see them gleaming in the
clods on either side of the new-cut furrow.  Had the ring of
high-born German criminals who planned the war seen in some
apocalyptic vision the detailed results of their own villainy, it is
hard to doubt that even their hearts and consciences would have
shrunk from the deed.

Apart from the losses, the mere fact that a great German army had
been hustled across thirty miles of country, had been driven from
river to river, and had finally to take refuge in trenches in order
to hold their ground, was a great encouragement to the Allies.  From
that time they felt assured that with anything like equal numbers
they had an ascendancy over their opponents.  Save in the matter of
heavy guns and machine-guns, there was not a single arm {160} in
which they did not feel that they were the equals or the superiors.
Nor could they forget that this foe, whom they were driving in the
open and holding in the trenches, was one who had rushed into the war
with men and material all carefully prepared for this day of battle,
while their own strength lay in the future.  If the present was
bright, it would surely be incomparably brighter when the reserves of
France and the vast resources of the British Empire were finally
brought into line.  There had never from the beginning been a doubt
of final victory, but from this time on it became less an opinion and
more a demonstrable and mathematical certainty.

[Sidenote: Why the Marne is one of the great battles of all time.]

The battle must also be regarded as a fixed point in military
history, since it was the first time since the days of the great
Napoleon that a Prussian army had been turned and driven.  In three
successive wars--against the Danes, the Austrians, and the
French--they had lived always in the warm sunshine of success.  Now,
at last, came the first chill of disaster.  Partly from their
excellent military qualities, but even more on account of their
elaborate and methodical preparations, joined with a want of scruple
which allowed them to force a war at the moment when they could take
their adversary at a disadvantage, they had established a legend of
invincibility.  This they left behind them with their cannon and
their prisoners between the Marne and the Aisne.  It had been feared
that free men, trained in liberal and humane methods, could never
equal in military efficiency those who had passed through the savage
discipline which is the heritage of the methods that first made
Prussia great at the expense {161} of her neighbours.  This shadow
was henceforth for ever lifted from men's minds, and it was shown
that the kindly comradeship which exists in the Western armies
between officers and men was not incompatible with the finest
fighting qualities of which any soldiers are capable.




{162}

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The hazardous crossing of the Aisne--Wonderful work of the
sappers--The fight for the sugar factory--General advance of the
Army--The 4th (Guards) Brigade's difficult task--Cavalry as a mobile
reserve--The Sixth Division--Hardships of the Army--German breach of
faith--_Tâtez toujours_--The general position--Attack upon the West
Yorks--Counter-attack by Congreve's 18th Brigade--Rheims
Cathedral--Spies--The siege and fall of Antwerp.


[Sidenote: The hazardous crossing of the Aisne.]

The stretch of river which confronted the British Army when they set
about the hazardous crossing of the Aisne was about fifteen miles in
length.  It lay as nearly as possible east and west, so that the
advance was from south to north.  As the British faced the river the
First Army Corps was on the right of their line, together with half
the cavalry.  In the centre was the Second Corps, on the left the
Third Corps, which was still without one of its divisions (the
Sixth), but retained, on the other hand, the 19th Brigade, which did
not belong to it.  Each of these British corps covered a front of,
roughly, five miles.  Across the broad and swift river a considerable
German army with a powerful artillery was waiting to dispute the
passage.  On the right of the British were the French Fifth and
Seventh Armies, and on their left, forming the extremity of the
Allied line, was the French Sixth Army, acting in such close
co-operation {163} with the British Third Corps in the Soissons
region that their guns were often turned upon the same point.  This
Sixth French Army, with the British Army, may be looked upon as the
left wing of the huge Allied line which stretched away with many a
curve and bend to the Swiss frontier.  During all this hurried
retreat from the Marne, it is to be remembered that the Eastern
German armies had hardly moved at all.  It was their four armies of
the right which had swung back like a closing door, the Crown
Prince's Fifth Army being the hinge upon which it turned.  Now the
door had ceased to swing, and one solid barrier presented itself to
the Allies.  It is probable that the German preponderance of numbers
was, for the moment, much lessened or even had ceased to exist, for
the losses in battle, the detachments for Russia, and the operations
in Belgium had all combined to deplete the German ranks.

The Belgian Army had retired into Antwerp before the fall of
Brussels, but they were by no means a force to be disregarded, being
fired by that sense of intolerable wrong which is the most formidable
stimulant to a virile nation.  From the shelter of the Antwerp
entrenchments they continually buzzed out against the German lines of
communication, and although they were usually beaten back, and were
finally pent in, they still added to the great debt of gratitude
which the Allies already owed them by holding up a considerable body,
two army corps at least, of good troops.  On the other hand, the
fortress of Maubeuge, on the northern French frontier, which had been
invested within a few days of the battle of Mons, had now fallen
before the heavy German guns, with the result that at least a corps
of troops under {164} Von Zwehl and these same masterful guns were
now released for service on the Aisne.

[Sidenote: Wonderful work of the sappers.]

The more one considers the operation of the crossing of the Aisne
with the battle which followed it, the more one is impressed by the
extraordinary difficulty of the task, the swift debonair way in which
it was tackled, and the pushful audacity of the various commanders in
gaining a foothold upon the farther side.  Consider that upon the
12th the Army was faced by a deep, broad, unfordable river with only
one practicable bridge in the fifteen miles opposite them.  They had
a formidable enemy armed with powerful artillery standing on the
defensive upon a line of uplands commanding every crossing and
approach, whilst the valley was so broad that ordinary guns upon the
corresponding uplands could have no effect, and good positions lower
down were hard to find.  There was the problem.  And yet upon the
14th the bulk of the Army was across and had established itself in
positions from which it could never afterwards be driven.  All arms
must have worked well to bring about such a result, but what can be
said of the Royal Engineers, who built under heavy fire in that brief
space nine bridges, some of them capable of taking heavy traffic,
while they restored five of the bridges which the enemy had
destroyed!  September 13, 1914, should be recorded in their annals as
a marvellous example of personal self-sacrifice and technical
proficiency.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{165}

[Illustration: British Advance at the Aisne]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Sir John French, acting with great swiftness and decision, did not
lose an hour after he had established himself in force upon the
northern bank of the river in pushing his men ahead and finding out
what was in front of him.  The weather was still very wet, {166} and
heavy mists drew a veil over the German dispositions, but the advance
went forward.  The British right wing, consisting of the First
Division of the First Corps, had established itself most securely, as
was natural, since it was the one corps which had found an unbroken
bridge in front of it.  The First Division had pushed forward as far
as Moulins and Vendresse, which lie about two miles north of the
river.  Now, in the early hours of the 14th, the whole of the Second
Division got over.  The immediate narrative, therefore, is concerned
with the doings of the two divisions of the First Corps, upon which
fell the first and chief strain of the very important and dangerous
advance upon that date.

On the top of the line of chalk hills which faced the British was an
ancient and famous highway, the Chemin-des-dames, which, like all
ancient highways, had been carried along the crest of the ridge.
This was in the German possession, and it became the objective of the
British attack.  The 2nd Infantry Brigade (Bulfin's) led the way,
working upwards in the early morning from Moulins and Vendresse
through the hamlet of Troyon towards the great road.  This brigade,
consisting of the 2nd Sussex, 1st Northamptons, 1st North Lancashire,
and 2nd Rifles, drawn mostly from solid shire regiments, was second
to none in the Army.  Just north of Troyon was a considerable
deserted sugar factory, which formed a feature in the landscape.  It
lay within a few hundred yards of the Chemin-des-dames, while another
winding road, cut in the side of the hill, lay an equal distance to
the south of it, and was crossed by the British in their advance.
This road, which was somewhat sunken in the chalk, and thus offered
some cover {167} to a crouching man, played an important part in the
operations.

[Sidenote: The fight for the sugar factory.]

Lieutenant Balfour and a picket of the 2nd Rifles, having crept up
and reconnoitred the factory, returned with the information that it
was held by the Germans, and that twelve guns were in position three
hundred yards to the east of it.  General Bulfin then--it was about
3.30 in the morning of a wet, misty day--sent the 2nd Rifles, the 2nd
Sussex Regiment, and the 1st Northamptons forward, with the factory
and an adjoining whitewashed farmhouse as their objective.  The 1st
North Lancashires remained in reserve at Vendresse.  The attacking
force was under the immediate command of Colonel Serocold of the
Rifles.  The three advanced regiments drove in the pickets of the
Germans, and after a severe fight turned the enemy out of his front
trench, A Company of the Sussex capturing several hundred prisoners.
A number of men, however, including Colonel Montresor and Major
Cookson, were shot while rounding up these Germans and sending them
to the rear.  The advanced line had suffered severely, so the North
Lancashires were called up and launched at the sugar factory, which
they carried with a magnificent bayonet attack in spite of a fierce
German resistance.  Their losses were very heavy, including Major
Lloyd, their commander, but their victory was a glorious one.  The
two batteries of the enemy were now commanded by machine-guns,
brought up to the factory by Lieutenant Dashwood of the Sussex.  The
enemy made a brave attempt to get these guns away, but the teams and
men were shot down, and it was a German Colenso.  The British,
however, unlike the Boers, were unable to get away the prizes of
their victory.  The factory {168} was abandoned as it was exposed to
heavy fire, and the four regiments formed a firing-line, taking such
cover as they could find, but a German shell fire developed which was
so deadly that they were unable to get forward.

A small party of Rifles, under Cathcart and Foljambe, clung hard to
the captured guns, sending repeated messages: "For God's sake bring
horses and fetch away these pieces!"  No horses were, however,
available, and eventually both the guns and the buildings were
regained by the Germans, the former being disabled before they were
abandoned by their captors, and the factory being smashed by the
shells.  Major Green and a company of the Sussex, with some of the
Coldstream under Major Grant, had got as far forward as the
Chemin-des-dames, but fell back steadily when their flank was finally
exposed.  Two companies of the 1st Coldstream, under Colonel
Ponsonby, had also pushed on to the road, and now came back.  Nothing
could exceed the desperate gallantry of officers and men.  Major
Jelf, severely wounded, cheered on his riflemen until evening.  Major
Warre of the same regiment and Major Phillips rallied the
hard-pressed line again and again.  Lieutenant Spread, of the
Lancashires, worked his machine-gun until it was smashed, and then,
wounded as he was, brought up a second gun and continued the fight.
Major Burrows rallied the Lancashires when their leader, Major Lloyd,
was hit.  Brigade-Major Watson, of the Queen's, was everywhere in the
thick of the firing.  No men could have been better led, nor could
any leaders have better men.  A large number of wounded, both British
and Germans, lay under the {169} shelter of some haystacks between
the lines, and crawled slowly round them for shelter, as the fire
came from one side or the other--a fitting subject surely for a
Verestschagin!

[Sidenote: General advance of the Army.]

Meanwhile, it is necessary to follow what had been going on at the
immediate left of Bulfin's Brigade.  Maxse's 1st Brigade had moved up
in the face of a considerable fire until it came to be nearly as far
north as the factory, but to the west of it.  The 1st Coldstream had
been sent across to help the dismounted cavalry to cover Bulfin's
right, since the main German strength seemed to be in that quarter.
The 1st Scots Guards was held in reserve, but the other regiments of
the 1st Brigade, the 1st Black Watch and the 1st Camerons, a
battalion which had taken the place of the brave but unfortunate
Munsters, lined up on the left of the factory and found themselves
swept by the same devastating fire which had checked the advance.
This fire came from the fringe of the woods and from a line of
trenches lying north-east of the factory on the edge of the
Chemin-des-dames.  Up to this time the British had no artillery
support on account of the mist, but now Geddes' 25th Brigade R.F.A.,
comprising the 113th, 114th, and 115th Batteries, was brought to its
assistance.  It could do little good in such a dim light, and one
battery, the 115th, under Major Johnstone, which pushed up within
eight hundred yards of the enemy's position, was itself nearly
destroyed.  The 116th R.F.A., under Captain Oliver, also did great
work, working its way up till it was almost in the infantry line, and
at one time in advance of it.  The whole infantry line, including a
mixture of units, men of the Rifles, Sussex, and {170} North
Lancashires, with a sprinkling of Guardsmen and Black Watch from the
1st Brigade, came slowly down the hill--"sweating blood to hold their
own." as one of them described it--until they reached the sunken road
which has been already mentioned.  There General Bulfin had stationed
himself with the reserve, and the line steadied itself, re-formed,
and, with the support of the guns, made head once more against the
advancing Germans, who were unable to make any progress against the
fire which was poured into them.  With such spades and picks as could
be got, a line of shallow trenches was thrown up, and these were held
against all attacks for the rest of the day.[1]  It was the haphazard
line of these hurriedly dug shelters which determined the position
retained in the weeks to come.  As this was the apex of the British
advance and all the corps upon the left were in turn brought to a
standstill and driven to make trenches, the whole line of the First
Corps formed a long diagonal slash across the hillside, with its
right close to the Chemin-des-dames and its left upon the river in
the neighbourhood of Chavonne.  The result was that now and always
the trenches of the 2nd Brigade were in an extremely exposed
position, for they were open not only to the direct fire of the
Germans, which was not very severe, but to an enfilading fire from
more distant guns upon each flank.  Their immediate neighbours upon
the right were the 1st Queen's Surrey, acting as {171} flank-guard,
and a Moroccan corps from the Fifth French Army, which had not
reached so advanced a position, but was in echelon upon their right
rear.


[1] Until an accurate German military history of the war shall
appear, it is difficult to compute the exact rival forces in any
engagement, but in this attack of the 2nd Brigade, where six British
regiments may be said to have been involved, there are some data.  A
German officer, describing the same engagement, says that, apart from
the original German force, the reinforcements amounted to fourteen
battalions, from the Guards' Jaeger, the 4th Jaeger Battalion, 65th,
13th Reserve, and 13th and 16th Landwehr Regiments.


It has already been shown how the 1st Brigade was divided up, the 1st
Coldstream being on the right of the 2nd Brigade.  The rest of the
1st Brigade had carried out an advance parallel to that described,
and many of the Black Watch, who were the right-hand regiment, got
mixed with Bulfin's men when they were driven back to what proved to
be the permanent British line.  This advance of the 1st Brigade
intercepted a strong force of the enemy which was creeping round the
left flank of the 2nd Brigade.  The counter-stroke brought the flank
attack to a standstill.  The leading regiments of the 1st Brigade
suffered very severely, however, especially the Cameron Highlanders,
whose gallantry carried them far to the front.  This regiment lost
Lieutenant-Colonel MacLachlan, 2 majors, Maitland and Nicholson, 3
captains, 11 lieutenants, and about 300 rank and file in the action.
Some of these fell into the hands of the enemy, but the great
majority were killed or wounded.  The 1st Scots Guards upon the left
of the brigade had also heavy casualties, while the Black Watch lost
their Colonel, Grant Duff, their Adjutant, Rowan Hamilton, and many
men.  When the line on their right fell back, they conformed to the
movement until they received support from two companies of the 1st
Gloucesters from the 3rd Brigade upon their left rear.

[Sidenote: The 4th (Guards) Brigade's difficult task.]

The 4th (Guards) Brigade, forming the left of the Second Division,
was across the river in battle array by ten o'clock in the morning
and moving northwards towards the village of Ostel.  {172} Its task
was a supremely difficult one.  Dense woods faced it, fringed with
the hostile riflemen, while a heavy shell-fire tore through the
extended ranks.  It is safe to say that such an advance could not
have been carried out in the heavy-handed German fashion without
annihilating losses.  As it was, the casualties were heavy, but not
sufficient to prevent a continuance of the attack, which at one
o'clock carried the farm and trenches which were its objective.  The
steep slopes and the thick woods made artillery support impossible,
though one section of a battery did contrive to keep up with the
infantry.  The 3rd Coldstream being held up in their advance on the
Soupir front, the 1st Irish were moved up on their right flank, but
the line could do little more than hold its own.  Captain Berners,
Lord Guernsey, Lord Arthur Hay, and others were killed at this point.
The German infantry advanced several times to counter-attack, but
were swept back by the fire of the Guards.

At one period it was found that the general German advance, which had
followed the holding of the British attack, was threatening to flow
in between the two divisions of the First Army Corps.  The 3rd
Brigade (Landon's) was therefore deployed rapidly from the point
about a mile south of Vernesse where it had been stationed.  Two
regiments of the brigade, the 2nd Welsh and the 1st South Wales
Borderers, were flung against the heavy German column advancing down
the Beaulne ridge and threatening to cut Haig's corps in two.  The
Welshmen, worthy successors of their ancestors who left such a name
on the battlefields of France, succeeded in heading it off and
driving it back so that they were {173} able to extend and get in
touch with the right of the Second Division.  This consisted of the
5th Brigade (Haking's) with the 6th (Davies') upon its left.  Both of
these brigades had to bear the brunt of continual German
counter-attacks, involving considerable losses, both from shell and
rifle fire.  In spite of this they won their way for a mile or more
up the slopes, where they were brought to a standstill and dug
themselves into temporary shelter, continuing the irregular diagonal
line of trenches which had been started by the brigades upon the
right.

[Sidenote: Cavalry as a mobile reserve.]

It is impossible not to admire the way in which the German general in
command observed and attempted to profit by any gap in the British
line.  It has already been shown how he tried to push his column
between the two divisions of the First Corps and was only stopped by
the deployment of the 3rd Brigade.  Later, an even fairer chance
presented itself, and he was quick to take advantage of it.  The
advance of the Guards Brigade to the Ostel ridge had caused a
considerable gap between them and the nearest unit of the Second
Corps, and also between the First Corps and the river.  A German
attack came swarming down upon the weak spot.  From Troyon to Ostel,
over five miles of ground, Haig's corps was engaged to the last man
and pinned down in their positions.  It was not possible to fill the
gap.  Not to fill it might have meant disaster--disaster under heavy
shell-fire with an unfordable river in the rear.  Here was a supreme
example of the grand work that was done when our cavalry were made
efficient as dismounted riflemen.  Their mobility brought them
quickly to the danger spot.  Their training turned them in an instant
from {174} horsemen to infantry.  The 15th Hussars, the Irish Horse,
the whole of Briggs' 1st Cavalry Brigade, and finally the whole of De
Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigade, were thrown into the gap.  The German
advance was stayed and the danger passed.  From now onwards the
echelon formed by the units of the First Corps ended with these
cavalry brigades near Chavonne to the immediate north of the river.

The Third Division of the Second Corps, being on the immediate left
of the operations which have been already described, moved forward
upon Aizy, which is on about the same level as Ostel, the objective
of the Guards.  The 8th (Doran's) Brigade moved north by a tributary
stream which runs down to the Aisne, while the 9th (Shaw's) tried to
advance in line with it on the plateau to the right.  Both brigades
found it impossible to get any farther, and established themselves in
entrenchments about a mile north of Vailly, so as to cover the
important bridge at that place, where the 7th Brigade was in reserve.
The three Fusilier regiments of the 9th Brigade all lost heavily, and
the Lincolns had at one time to recross the river, but recovered
their position.

The attack made by the Fifth Division near Missy was held up by a
very strong German position among the woods on the Chivres heights
which was fronted by wire entanglements.  The regiments chiefly
engaged were the Norfolks and Bedfords of the 15th Brigade, with the
Cornwalls and East Surreys of the 14th Brigade, the remains of the
Cheshires being in close support.  They crossed the wire and made
good progress at first, but were eventually brought to a stand by
heavy fire at close range from a trench upon their right front.  It
was already dusk, so the {175} troops ended by maintaining the
position at Missy and Ste. Marguerite, where there were bridges to be
guarded.

The Fourth Division of Pulteney's Third Corps had no better success,
and was only able to maintain its ground.  It may be remarked, as an
example of valiant individual effort, that this division was largely
indebted for its ammunition supply to the efforts of Captain Johnston
of the Sappers, who, upon a crazy raft of his own construction, aided
by Lieutenant Flint, spent twelve hours under fire ferrying over the
precious boxes.  The familiar tale of stalemate was to be told of the
Sixth French Army in the Soissons section of the river.  Along the
whole Allied line the position was the same, the greatest success and
probably the hardest fighting having fallen to the lot of the
Eighteenth French Corps, which had taken, lost, and finally retaken
Craonne, thus establishing itself upon the lip of that formidable
plateau which had been the objective of all the attacks.

In the Vailly region the 5th Cavalry Brigade found itself in a
difficult position, for it had crossed the stream as a mounted unit
in expectation of a pursuit, and now found itself under heavy fire in
the village of Vailly with no possibility of getting forward.  The
only alternative was to recross the river by the single narrow
bridge, which was done at a later date under very heavy fire, the
troopers leading their horses over in single file.  This difficult
operation was superintended by Captain Wright of the Engineers, the
same brave officer who had endeavoured to blow up the bridge at Mons.
Unhappily, he was mortally wounded on this occasion.  On the
afternoon of the 14th--it being found that the British artillery was
{176} shelling our own advanced trenches--Staff-Captain Harter of the
9th Brigade galloped across the bridge and informed the gunners as to
the true position.

Towards evening, in spite of the fact that there were no reserves and
that all the troops had endured heavy losses and great fatigue, a
general advance was ordered in the hope of gaining the high ground of
the Chemin-des-dames before night.  It was nearly sunset when the
orders were given, and the troops responded gallantly to the call,
though many of them had been in action since daybreak.  The fire,
however, was very heavy, and no great progress could be made.  The
First Division gained some ground, but was brought to a standstill.
The only brigade which made good headway was Haking's 5th, which
reached the crest of the hill in the neighbourhood of
Tilleul-de-Courtecon.  General Haking sent out scouts, and finding
German outposts upon both his flanks, he withdrew under cover of
darkness.

Thus ended the sharp and indecisive action of September 14, the
Germans holding their ground, but being in turn unable to drive back
the Allies, who maintained their position and opposed an impassable
obstacle to the renewed advance upon Paris.  The battle was marked by
the common features of advance, arrest, and entrenchment, which
occurred not only in the British front, but in that of the French
armies upon either flank.  When the action ceased, the 1st
Northamptons and the 1st Queen's, sent to guard the pressure point at
the extreme right of the line, had actually reached the
Chemin-des-dames, the British objective, and had dug themselves in
upon the edge of it.  From this very advanced spot the British line
extended diagonally across the hillside for many {177} miles until it
reached the river.  Several hundred prisoners and some guns were
taken in the course of the fighting.  When one considers the
predominant position of the Germans, and that their artillery was
able to give them constant assistance, whereas that of the British
and French was only brought up with the utmost difficulty, we can
only marvel that the infantry were able to win and to hold the ground.

The next day, September 15, was spent for the most part in making
good the position gained and deepening the trenches to get some
protection from the ever-growing artillery fire, which was the more
intense as the great siege guns from Maubeuge were upon this day, for
the first time, brought into action.  At first the terrific
explosions of these shells, the largest by far which had ever been
brought into an actual line of battle, were exceedingly alarming, but
after a time it became realised that, however omnipotent they might
be against iron or concrete, they were comparatively harmless in soft
soil, where their enormous excavations were soon used as convenient
ready-made rifle-pits by the soldiers.  This heavy fire led to a
deepening of the trenches, which necessitated a general levy of picks
and shovels from the country round, for a large portion of such
equipment had been lost in the first week of the campaign.

[Sidenote: The Sixth Division.]

Only two active movements were made in the course of the day, one
being that Hamilton's Third Division advanced once more towards Aizy
and established itself a mile or more to the north in a better
tactical position.  The 7th Brigade suffered considerable casualties
in this change, including Colonel Hasted, of the 1st Wilts.  The
other was that Ferguson's Fifth Division fell back from Chivres,
{178} where it was exposed to a cross fire, and made its lines along
the river bank, whence the Germans were never able to drive it,
although they were only four hundred yards away in a position which
was high above it.  For the rest, it was a day of navvy's toil,
though the men worked alternately with rifle and with pick, for there
were continual German advances which withered away before the volleys
which greeted them.  By the 16th the position was fairly secure, and
on the same day a welcome reinforcement arrived in the shape of the
Sixth Division, forming the missing half of Pulteney's Third Corps.

Its composition is here appended:

  DIVISION VI.--General KEIR.

  _16th Infantry Brigade--General Ing. Williams._
        1st East Kent.
        1st Leicester.
        1st Shropshire Light Infantry.
        2nd York and Lancaster.

  _17th Infantry Brigade--General Walter Doran._
        1st Royal Fusiliers.
        1st N. Stafford.
        2nd Leinsters.
        3rd Rifle Brigade.

  _18th Infantry Brigade--General Congreve, V.C._
        1st W. York.
        1st E. York.
        2nd Notts and Derby (Sherwood Foresters).
        2nd Durham Light Infantry.

  _Artillery._
        2nd Brig. 21, 42, 53.
        12th Brig. 43, 86, 87.
        24th Brig. 110, 111, 112.
        38th Brig. 24, 34, 72.
        R.G.A. 24.

[Sidenote: Hardships of the Army.]

This division was kept in reserve upon the south side of the river.
The French Commander-in-Chief had intimated that he intended to throw
in reinforcements upon the left of the Sixth French Army, and {179}
so, as he hoped, to turn the German right.  It was determined,
therefore, that there should be no attempt at a British advance, but
that the Allies should be content with holding the enemy to his
positions.  The two armies lay facing each other, therefore, at an
average distance of about five hundred yards.  The pressure was still
most severe upon the 2nd Brigade on the extreme right.  Bulfin's
orders were to hold on at all costs, as he was the pivot of the whole
line.  He and his men responded nobly to the responsibility, although
both they and their neighbours of Maxse's 1st Brigade had sustained a
loss of over 1000 men each upon the 14th--25 per cent of their
number.  The shell-fire was incessant and from several converging
directions.  German infantry attacks were constant by night and by
day, and the undrained trenches were deep in water.  The men lay
without overcoats and drenched to the skin, for the rain was
incessant.  Yet the sixth day found them on the exact ground upon
which they had thrown their weary bodies after their attack.  Nations
desire from time to time to be reassured as to their own virility.
Neither in endurance nor in courage have the British departed from
the traditions of their ancestors.  The unending strain of the
trenches reached the limits of human resistance.  But the line was
always held.

On September 16 occurred an incident which may be taken as typical of
the difference in the spirit with which the British and the Germans
make war.  Close to the lines of the Guards a barn which contained
fifty wounded Germans was ignited by the enemy's shells.  Under a
terrific fire a rescue party rushed forward and got the unfortunate
men to a place of safety.  {180} Several of the British lost their
lives in this exploit, including Dr. Huggan, the Scottish
International footballer.  The Germans mock at our respect for sport,
and yet this is the type of man that sport breeds, and it is the want
of them in their own ranks which will stand for ever between us.

September 17 was a day of incessant attacks upon the right of the
line, continually repulsed and yet continually renewed.  One can well
sympathise with the feelings of the German commanders who, looking
down from their heights, saw the British line in a most dangerous
strategical position, overmatched by their artillery, with a deep
river in their rear, and yet were unable to take advantage of it
because of their failure to carry the one shallow line of
extemporised trenches.  Naturally, they came again and again, by
night and by day, with admirable perseverance and daring to the
attack, but were always forced to admit that nothing can be done
against the magazine rifle in hands which know how to use it.  They
tried here and they tried there, these constant sudden outpourings of
cheering, hurrying, grey-clad men.  They were natural tactics, but
expensive ones, for every new attack left a fresh fringe of stricken
men in front of the British lines.

[Sidenote: German breach of faith.]

One incident upon the 17th stands out amid the somewhat monotonous
record of trench attacks.  On the extreme right of the British line a
company of the 1st Northamptons occupied a most exposed position on
the edge of the Chemin-des-dames.  The men in a German trench which
was some hundreds of yards in front hoisted a white flag and then
advanced upon the British lines.  It is well to be charitable in all
these white flag incidents, since it is always possible {181} on
either side that unauthorised men may hoist it and the officer in
command very properly refuse to recognise it; but in this case the
deception appears to have been a deliberate one.  These are the
facts.  On seeing the flag, Captain Savage, of B Company
Northamptons, got out of the trench and with Lieutenant Dimmer, of
the Rifles, advanced to the Germans.  He threw down his sword and
revolver to show that he was unarmed.  He found a difficulty in
getting a direct answer from the Germans, so he saluted their
officer, who returned his salute, and turned back to walk to his own
trench.  Dimmer, looking back, saw the Germans level their rifles, so
he threw himself down, crying out, "For God's sake get down."
Captain Savage stood erect and was riddled with bullets.  Many of the
Northamptons, including Lieutenant Gordon, were shot down by the same
volley.  The Germans then attempted an advance, which was stopped by
the machine-guns of the 1st Queen's.  Such deplorable actions must
always destroy all the amenities of civilised warfare.

On the afternoon of the same day, September 17, a more serious attack
was made upon the right flank of the advanced British position, the
enemy reoccupying a line of trenches from which they had previously
been driven.  It was a dismal day of wind, rain, and mist, but the
latter was not wholly an evil, as it enabled that hard-worked
regiment, the 1st Northamptons, under their Colonel, Osborne Smith,
to move swiftly forward and, with the help of the 1st Queen's, carry
the place at the bayonet point.  Half the Germans in the trench were
put out of action, thirty-eight taken, and the rest fled.  Pushing on
after their success, they found the ridge beyond held {182} by a
considerable force of German infantry.  The 2nd Rifles had come into
the fight, and a dismounted squadron of the composite cavalry
regiment put in some good work upon the flank.  The action was
continued briskly until dark, when both sides retained their ground
with the exception of the captured line of trenches, which remained
with the British.  Seven officers and about 200 men were killed or
wounded in this little affair.

[Sidenote: _Tâtez toujours._]

The 18th found the enemy still acting upon the Napoleonic advice of
_Tâtez toujours_.  All day they were feeling for that weak place
which could never be found.  The constant attempts were carried on
into the night with the same monotonous record of advance leading to
repulse.  At one time it was the line of the 1st Queen's--and no line
in the Army would be less likely to give results.  Then it was the
left flank of the First Division, and then the front of the Second.

Now and again there were swift counters from the British, in one of
which an enemy's trench was taken by the 1st Gloucesters with the two
machine-guns therein.  But there was no inducement for any general
British advance.  "We have nothing to lose by staying here," said a
General, "whereas every day is of importance to the Germans, so the
longer we can detain them here the better."  So it seemed from the
point of view of the Allies.  There is a German point of view also,
however, which is worthy of consideration.  They were aware, and
others were not, that great reserves of men were left in the
Fatherland, even as there were in France and in Britain, but that,
unlike France and Britain, they actually had the arms and equipment
for them, so that a second host could rapidly be called into the
field.  If these legions were {183} in Belgium, they could ensure the
fall of Antwerp, overrun the country, and seize the seaboard.  All
this could be effected while the Allies were held at the Aisne.
Later, with these vast reinforcements, the German armies might burst
the barrier which held them and make a second descent upon Paris,
which was still only fifty miles away.  So the Germans may have
argued, and the history of the future was to show that there were
some grounds for such a calculation.  It was in truth a second war in
which once again the Germans had the men and material ready, while
the Allies had not.

[Sidenote: The general position.]

This date, September 18, may be taken as the conclusion of the actual
Battle of the Aisne, since from that time the operations defined
themselves definitely as a mutual siege and gigantic artillery duel.
The casualties of the British at the Aisne amounted, up to that date,
to 10,000 officers and men, the great majority of which were suffered
by Haig's First Army Corps.  The action had lasted from the 13th, and
its outstanding features, so far as our forces were concerned, may be
said to have been the remarkable feat of crossing the river and the
fine leadership of General Haig in the dangerous position in which he
found himself.  It has been suggested that the single unbroken bridge
by which he crossed may have been a trap purposely laid by the
Germans, whose plans miscarried owing to the simultaneous forcing of
the river at many other points.  As it was, the position of the First
Corps was a very difficult one, and a reverse might have become an
absolute disaster.  It was impossible for General French to avoid
this risk, for since the weather precluded all air reconnaissance, it
was only by pushing his Army {184} across that he could be sure of
the enemy's dispositions.  The net result was one more demonstration
upon both sides that the defensive force has so great an advantage
under modern conditions that if there be moderate equality of
numbers, and if the flanks of each be guarded, a condition of
stalemate will invariably ensue, until the campaign is decided by
economic causes or by military movements in some other part of the
field of operations.

There is ample evidence that for the time the German Army, though
able with no great effort to hold the extraordinarily strong position
which had been prepared for it, was actually in very bad condition.
Large new drafts had been brought out, which had not yet been
assimilated by the army.  The resistance of Maubeuge had blocked one
of their supply railroads, and for some time the commissariat had
partially broken down.  Above all, they were mentally depressed by
meeting such resistance where they had been led to expect an easy
victory, by their forced retreat when almost within sight of Paris,
and by their losses, which had been enormous.  In spite of their own
great superiority in heavy guns, the French light field-pieces had
controlled the battlefields.  There is ample evidence in the letters
which have been intercepted, apart from the statements and appearance
of the prisoners, to show the want and depression which prevailed.
This period, however, may be said to mark the nadir of the German
fortunes in this year.  The fall of Maubeuge improved their supplies
of every sort, their reserves and Landwehr got broken in by the war
of the trenches, and the eventual fall of Antwerp and invasion of
Western Belgium gave them that moral stimulus which they badly needed.

{185}

Some wit amongst the officers has described the war as "months of
boredom broken by moments of agony."  It is the duty of the
chronicler to record, even if he attempts to alleviate, the former,
for the most monotonous procession of events form integral parts of
the great whole.  The perusal of a great number of diaries and
experiences leaves a vague and disconnected recollection behind it of
personal escapes, of the terror of high explosives, of the excellence
of the rear services of the Army, of futile shellings--with an
occasional tragic mishap, where some group of men far from the front
were suddenly, by some freak of fate, blown to destruction,--of the
discomforts of wet trenches, and the joys of an occasional relief in
the villages at the rear.  Here and there, however, in the monotony
of what had now become a mutual siege, there stand out some episodes
or developments of a more vital character, which will be recorded in
their sequence.

It may be conjectured that, up to the period of the definite
entrenchment of the two armies, the losses of the enemy were not
greater than our own.  It is in the attack that losses are incurred,
and the attack had, for the most part, been with us.  The heavier
guns of the Germans had also been a factor in their favour.  From the
18th onwards, however, the weekly losses of the enemy must have been
very much greater than ours, since continually, night and day, they
made onslaughts, which attained some partial and temporary success
upon the 20th, but which on every other occasion were blown back by
the rifle-fire with which they were met.  So mechanical and
half-hearted did they at last become that they gave the impression
that those who made them had no hope of {186} success, and that they
were only done at the bidding of some imperious or imperial voice
from the distance.  In these attacks, though any one of them may have
only furnished a few hundred casualties, the total effect spread over
several weeks must have equalled that of a very great battle, and
amounted, since no progress was ever made, to a considerable defeat.

Thus on September 19 there was a succession of attacks, made with
considerable vivacity and proportional loss.  About 4 P.M. one
developed in front of the 4th and 6th Brigades of the First Corps,
but was speedily stopped.  An hour later another one burst forth upon
the 7th and 9th Brigades of the Second Corps, with the same result.
The artillery fire was very severe all day and the broad valley was
arched from dawn to dusk by the flying shell.  The weather was still
detestable, and a good many were reported ill from the effects of
constant wet and cold.

The 20th was the date of two separate attacks, one of which involved
some hard fighting and considerable loss.  The first, at eight in the
morning, was upon Shaw's 9th Brigade and was driven off without great
difficulty.  The second was the more serious and demands some fuller
detail.

[Sidenote: Attack upon the West Yorks.]

On the arrival of the Sixth Division upon the 18th, Sir John French
had determined to hold them in reserve and to use them to relieve, in
turn, each of the brigades which had been so hard-worked during the
previous week.  Of these, there was none which needed and deserved a
rest more than Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, which, after their attack upon
the Chemin-des-dames upon the 14th, had made and held the trenches
which formed both the extreme right and the advanced point of the
British line.  For nearly a {187} week these men of iron had lain
where the battle had left them.  With the object of relieving them,
the 18th Brigade (Congreve's) of the Sixth Division was ordered to
take their places.  The transfer was successfully effected at night,
but the newcomers, who had only arrived two days before from England,
found themselves engaged at once in a very serious action.  It may
have been coincidence, or it may have been that with their remarkable
system of espionage the Germans learned that new troops had taken the
place of those whose mettle they had tested so often; but however
this may be, they made a vigorous advance upon the afternoon of
September 20, coming on so rapidly and in such numbers that they
drove out the occupants both of the front British trenches--which
were manned by three companies of the 1st West Yorkshires--and the
adjoining French trench upon the right, which was held by the Turcos.
The West Yorkshires were overwhelmed and enfiladed with machine-guns,
a number were shot down, and others were taken prisoners.

[Sidenote: Counter-attack by Congreve's 18th Brigade.]

Fortunately, the rest of the brigade were in immediate support, and
orders were given by General Congreve to advance and to regain the
ground that had been lost.  The rush up the hill was carried out by
the 2nd Notts and Derby Regiment (Sherwood Foresters) in the centre,
with the remainder of the West Yorks upon their right, and the 2nd
Durham Light Infantry upon their left.  They were supported by the
1st East Yorks and by the 2nd Sussex, who had just been called out of
the line for a rest.  The 4th Irish Dragoon Guards at a gallop at
first, and then dismounting with rifle and bayonet, were in the
forefront of the fray.  The advance was {188} over half a mile of
ground, most of which was clear of any sort of cover, but it was
magnificently carried out and irresistible in its impetus.  All the
regiments lost heavily, but all reached their goal.  Officers were
hit again and again, but staggered on with their men.  Captain
Popham, of the Sherwood Foresters, is said to have carried six wounds
with him up the slope.  Fifteen officers and 250 men were shot down,
but the lost trench was carried at the point of the bayonet and the
whole position re-established.  The total casualties were 1364, more
than half of which fell upon the West Yorkshires, while the majority
of the others were Sherwood Foresters, East Yorkshires, and Durhams.
Major Robb, of the latter regiment, was among those who fell.  The
Germans did not hold the trenches for an hour, and yet the engagement
may be counted as a success for them, since our losses were certainly
heavier than theirs.  There was no gain, however, in ground.  The
action was more than a mere local attack, and the British line was in
danger of being broken had it not been for the determined
counter-attack of the 18th Brigade and of the Irish dragoons.  To the
north of this main attack there was another subsidiary movement on
the Beaulne ridge, in which the 5th and 6th Brigades were sharply
engaged.  The 1st King's, the 2nd H.L.I., and the 2nd Worcesters all
sustained some losses.

About this period both the British and the French armies began to
strengthen themselves with those heavy guns in which they had been so
completely overweighted by their enemy.  On the 20th the French in
the neighbourhood of our lines received twelve long-range cannon,
firing a 35 lb. shell a distance of twelve kilometres.  Three days
later the {189} British opened fire with four new batteries of
six-inch howitzers.  From this time onwards there was no such great
disparity in the heavy artillery, and the wounded from the monster
shells of the enemy had at least the slight solace that their fate
was not unavenged.  The expenditure of shells, however, was still at
the rate of ten German to one of the Allies.  If the war was not won
it was no fault of Krupp and the men of Essen.  In two weeks the
British lost nearly 3000 men from shell-fire.

[Sidenote: Rheims Cathedral.]

It was at this time, September 20, that the Germans put a climax upon
the long series of outrages and vandalisms of which their troops had
been guilty by the bombardment of Rheims Cathedral, the Westminster
Abbey of France.  The act seems to have sprung from deliberate
malice, for though it was asserted afterwards that the tower had been
used as an artillery observation point, this is in the highest degree
improbable, since the summit of the ridge upon the French side is
available for such a purpose.  The cathedral was occupied at the time
by a number of German wounded, who were the sufferers by the
barbarity of their fellow-countrymen.  The incident will always
remain as a permanent record of the value of that Kultur over which
we have heard such frantic boasts.  The records of the French,
Belgian, and British Commissions upon the German atrocities,
reinforced by the recollection of the burned University of Louvain
and the shattered Cathedral of Rheims, will leave a stain upon the
German armies which can never be erased.  Their conduct is the more
remarkable, since the invasion of 1870 was conducted with a stern but
rigid discipline, which won the acknowledgment of the world.  In
{190} spite of all the material progress and the superficial show of
refinement, little more than a generation seems to have separated
civilisation from primitive barbarity, which attained such a pitch
that no arrangement could be made by which the wounded between the
lines could be brought in.  Such was the code of a nominally
Christian nation in the year 1914.

Up to now the heavier end of the fighting had been borne by Haig's
First Corps, but from the 20th onwards the Second and Third sustained
the impact.  The action just described, in which the West Yorkshires
suffered so severely, was fought mainly by the 18th Brigade of
Pulteney's Third Corps.  On the 21st it was the turn of the Second
Corps.  During the night the 1st Wiltshire battalion of McCracken's
7th Brigade was attacked, and making a strong counter-attack in the
morning they cleared a wood with the bayonet, and advanced the
British line at that point.  A subsequent attack upon the same
brigade was repulsed.  How heavy the losses had been in the wear and
tear of six days' continual trench work is shown by the fact that
when on this date the 9th Brigade (Shaw's) was taken back for a rest
it had lost 30 officers and 860 men since crossing the Aisne.

The German heavy guns upon the 21st set fire to the village of Missy,
but failed to dislodge the 1st East Surreys who held it.  This
battalion, in common with the rest of Ferguson's Division, were
dominated night and day by a plunging fire from above.  It is worth
recording that in spite of the strain, the hardship, and the wet
trenches, the percentage of serious sickness among the troops was
lower than the normal rate of a garrison town.  A few cases of {191}
enteric appeared about this time, of which six were in one company of
the Coldstream Guards.  It is instructive to note that in each case
the man belonged to the uninoculated minority.

[Sidenote: Spies.]

A plague of spies infested the British and French lines at this
period, and their elaborate telephone installations, leading from
haystacks or from cellars, showed the foresight of the enemy.  Some
of these were German officers, who bravely took their lives in their
hands from the patriotic motive of helping their country.  Others,
alas, were residents who had sold their souls for German gold.  One
such--a farmer--was found with a telephone within his house and no
less a sum than a thousand pounds in specie.  Many a battery
concealed in a hollow, and many a convoy in a hidden road, were
amazed by the accuracy of a fire which was really directed, not from
the distant guns, but from some wayside hiding-place.  Fifteen of
these men were shot and the trouble abated.

The attacks upon the British trenches, which had died down for
several days, were renewed with considerable vigour upon September
26.  The first, directed against the 1st Queen's, was carried out by
a force of about 1000 men, who advanced in close order, and, coming
under machine-gun fire, were rapidly broken up.  The second was made
by a German battalion debouching from the woods in front of the 1st
South Wales Borderers.  This attack penetrated the line at one point,
the left company of the regiment suffering severely, with all its
officers down.  The reserve company, with the help of the 2nd Welsh
Regiment, retook the trenches after a hot fight, which ended by the
wood being cleared.  {192} The Germans lost heavily in this struggle,
80 of them being picked up on the very edge of the trench.  The
Borderers also had numerous casualties, which totalled up to 7
officers and 182 men, half of whom were actually killed.

The Army was now in a very strong position, for the trenches were so
well constructed that unless a shell by some miracle went right in,
no harm would result.  The weather had become fine once more, and the
flying service relieved the anxieties of the commanders as to a
massed attack.  The heavy artillery of the Allies was also improving
from day to day, especially the heavy British howitzers, aided by
aeroplane observers with a wireless installation.  On the other hand,
the guns were frequently hit by the enemy's fire.  The 22nd R.F.A.
lost a gun, the 50th three guns, and other batteries had similar
losses.  Concealment had not yet been reduced to a science.

At this period the enemy seems to have realised that his attacks,
whether against the British line or against the French armies which
flanked it, and had fought throughout with equal tenacity, were a
mere waste of life.  The assaults died away or became mere
demonstrations.  Early in October the total losses of the Army upon
the Aisne had been 561 officers and 12,980 men, a proportion which
speaks well for the coolness and accuracy of the enemy's
sharp-shooters, while it exhibits our own forgetfulness of the
lessons of the African War, where we learned that the officer should
be clad and armed so like the men as to be indistinguishable even at
short ranges.  Of this large total the Second Corps lost 136 officers
and 3095 men, and the First Corps 348 officers and {193} 6073 men,
the remaining 77 officers and 3812 men being from the Third Corps and
the cavalry.

[Sidenote: The siege and fall of Antwerp.]

It was at this period that a great change came over both the object
and the locality of the operations.  This change depended upon two
events which had occurred far to the north, and reacted upon the
great armies locked in the long grapple of the Aisne.  The first of
these controlling circumstances was that, by the movement of the old
troops and the addition of new ones, each army had sought to turn the
flank of the other in the north, until the whole centre of gravity of
the war was transferred to that region.  A new French army under
General Castelnau, whose fine defence of Nancy had put him in the
front of French leaders, had appeared on the extreme left wing of the
Allies, only to be countered by fresh bodies of Germans, until the
ever-extending line lengthened out to the manufacturing districts of
Lens and Lille, where amid pit-shafts and slag-heaps the cavalry of
the French and the Germans tried desperately to get round each
other's flank.  The other factor was the fall of Antwerp, which had
released very large bodies of Germans, who were flooding over Western
Belgium, and, with the help of great new levies from Germany,
carrying the war to the sand-dunes of the coast.  The operations
which brought about this great change open up a new chapter in the
history of the war.  The actual events which culminated in the fall
of Antwerp may be very briefly handled, since, important as they
were, they were not primarily part of the British task, and hence
hardly come within the scope of this narrative.

The Belgians, after the evacuation of Brussels in August, had
withdrawn their army into the widespread {194} fortress of Antwerp,
from which they made frequent sallies upon the Germans who were
garrisoning their country.  Great activity was shown and several
small successes were gained, which had the useful effect of detaining
two corps which might have been employed upon the Aisne.  Eventually,
towards the end of September, the Germans turned their attention
seriously to the reduction of the city, with a well-founded
confidence that no modern forts could resist the impact of their
enormous artillery.  They drove the garrison within the lines, and
early in October opened a bombardment upon the outer forts with such
results that it was evidently only a matter of days before they would
fall and the fine old city be faced with the alternative of surrender
or destruction.  The Spanish fury of Parma's pikemen would be a small
thing compared to the _furor Teutonicus_ working its evil deliberate
will upon town-hall or cathedral, with the aid of fire-disc,
petrol-spray, or other products of culture.  The main problem before
the Allies, if the town could not be saved, was to ensure that the
Belgian army should be extricated and that nothing of military value
which could be destroyed should be left to the invaders.  No troops
were available for a rescue, for the French and British old
formations were already engaged, while the new ones were not yet
ready for action.  In these circumstances, a resolution was come to
by the British leaders which was bold to the verge of rashness and so
chivalrous as to be almost quixotic.  It was determined to send out
at the shortest notice a naval division, one brigade of which
consisted of marines, troops who are second to none in the country's
service, while the other two brigades were young {195} amateur sailor
volunteers, most of whom had only been under arms for a few weeks.
It was an extraordinary experiment, as testing how far the average
sport-loving, healthy-minded young Briton needs only his equipment to
turn him into a soldier who, in spite of all rawness and
inefficiency, can still affect the course of a campaign.  This
strange force, one-third veterans and two-thirds practically
civilians, was hurried across to do what it could for the failing
town, and to demonstrate to Belgium how real was the sympathy which
prompted us to send all that we had.  A reinforcement of a very
different quality was dispatched a few days later in the shape of the
Seventh Division of the Regular Army, with the Third Division of
Cavalry.  These fine troops were too late, however, to save the city,
and soon found themselves in a position where it needed all their
hardihood to save themselves.

The Marine Brigade of the Naval Division under General Paris was
dispatched from England in the early morning and reached Antwerp
during the night of October 3.  They were about 2000 in number.
Early next morning they were out in the trenches, relieving some
weary Belgians.  The Germans were already within the outer enceinte
and drawing close to the inner.  For forty-eight hours they held the
line in the face of heavy shelling.  The cover was good and the
losses were not heavy.  At the end of that time the Belgian troops,
who had been a good deal worn by their heroic exertions, were unable
to sustain the German pressure, and evacuated the trenches on the
flank of the British line.  The brigade then fell back to a reserve
position in front of the town.

{196}

On the night of the 5th the two other brigades of the division,
numbering some 5000 amateur sailors, arrived in Antwerp, and the
whole force assembled on the new line of defence.  Mr. Winston
Churchill showed his gallantry as a man, and his indiscretion as a
high official, whose life was of great value to his country by
accompanying the force from England.  The bombardment was now very
heavy, and the town was on fire in several places.  The equipment of
the British left much to be desired, and their trenches were as
indifferent as their training.  None the less they played the man and
lived up to the traditions of that great service upon whose threshold
they stood.  For three days these men, who a few weeks before had
been anything from schoolmasters to tram-conductors, held their
perilous post.  They were very raw, but they possessed a great asset
in their officers, who were usually men of long service.  But neither
the lads of the naval brigades nor the war-worn and much-enduring
Belgians could stop the mouths of those inexorable guns.  On the 8th
it was clear that the forts could no longer be held.  The British
task had been to maintain the trenches which connected the forts with
each other, but if the forts went it was clear that the trenches must
be outflanked and untenable.  The situation, therefore, was hopeless,
and all that remained was to save the garrison and leave as little as
possible for the victors.  Some thirty or forty German merchant ships
in the harbour were sunk and the great petrol tanks were set on fire.
By the light of the flames the Belgian and British forces made their
way successfully out of the town, and the good service rendered later
by our Allies upon the Yser and elsewhere is the best justification
of the {197} policy which made us strain every nerve in order to do
everything which could have a moral or material effect upon them in
their darkest hour.  Had the British been able to get away unscathed,
the whole operation might have been reviewed with equanimity if not
with satisfaction, but, unhappily, a grave misfortune, arising rather
from bad luck than from the opposition of the enemy, came upon the
retreating brigades, so that very many of our young sailors after
their one week of crowded life came to the end of their active
service for the war.

On leaving Antwerp it had been necessary to strike to the north in
order to avoid a large detachment of the enemy who were said to be
upon the line of the retreat.  The boundary between Holland and
Belgium is at this point very intricate, with no clear line of
demarcation, and a long column of British somnambulists, staggering
along in the dark after so many days in which they had for the most
part never enjoyed two consecutive hours of sleep, wandered over the
fatal line and found themselves in firm but kindly Dutch custody for
the rest of the war.  Some fell into the hands of the enemy, but the
great majority were interned.  These men belonged chiefly to three
battalions of the 1st Brigade.  The 2nd Brigade, with one battalion
of the 1st, and the greater part of the Marines, made their way to
the trains at St. Gilles-Waes, and were able to reach Ostend in
safety.  The remaining battalion of Marines, with a number of
stragglers of the other brigades, were cut off at Morbede by the
Germans, and about half of them were taken, while the rest fought
their way through in the darkness and joined their comrades.  The
total losses of the British in the whole {198} misadventure from
first to last were about 2500 men--a high price, and yet not too high
when weighed against the results of their presence at Antwerp.  On
October 10 the Germans under General Von Beseler occupied the city.
Mr. Powell, who was present, testifies that 60,000 marched into the
town, and that they were all troops of the active army.

It has already been described how the northern ends of the two
contending armies were endeavouring to outflank each other, and there
seemed every possibility that this process would be carried out until
each arrived at the coast.  Early in October Sir John French
represented to General Joffre that it would be well that the British
Army should be withdrawn from the Aisne and take its position to the
left of the French forces, a move which would shorten its line of
communications very materially, and at the same time give it the task
of defending the Channel coast.  General Joffre agreed to the
proposition, and the necessary steps were at once taken to put it
into force.  The Belgians had in the meanwhile made their way behind
the line of the Yser, where a formidable position had been prepared.
There, with hardly a day of rest, they were ready to renew the
struggle with the ferocious ravagers of their country.  The Belgian
Government had been moved to France, and their splendid King, who
will live in history as the most heroic and chivalrous figure of the
war, continued by his brave words and noble example to animate the
spirits of his countrymen.

From this time Germany was in temporary occupation of all Belgium,
save only the one little corner, the defence of which will be
recorded for ever.  Little did she profit by her crime or by the
excuses and {199} forged documents by which she attempted to justify
her action.  She entered the land in dishonour and dishonoured will
quit it.  William, Germany, and Belgium are an association of words
which will raise in the minds of posterity all that Parma, Spain, and
the Lowlands have meant to us--an episode of oppression, cruelty, and
rapacity, which fresh generations may atone for but can never efface.




{200}

CHAPTER VII

THE LA BASSÉE--ARMENTIÈRES OPERATIONS

(From October 11 to October 31, 1914)

The great battle line--Advance of Second Corps--Death of General
Hamilton--The farthest point--Fate of the 2nd Royal Irish--The Third
Corps--Exhausted troops--First fight of Neuve Chapelle--The Indians
take over--The Lancers at Warneton--Pulteney's operations--Action of
Le Gheir.


In accordance with the new plans, the great transference began upon
October 3.  It was an exceedingly difficult problem, since an army of
more than 100,000 men had to be gradually extricated by night from
trenches which were often not more than a hundred yards from the
enemy, while a second army of equal numbers had to be substituted in
its place.  The line of retreat was down an open slope, across
exposed bridges, and up the slope upon the southern bank.  Any alarm
to the Germans might have been fatal, since a vigorous night attack
in the middle of the operation would have been difficult to resist,
and even an artillery bombardment must have caused great loss of
life.  The work of the Staff in this campaign has been worthy of the
regimental officers and of the men.  Everything went without a hitch.
The Second Cavalry Division (Gough's) went first, followed {201}
immediately by the First (De Lisle's).  Then the infantry was
withdrawn, the Second Corps being the vanguard; the Third Corps
followed, and the First was the last to leave.  The Second Corps
began to clear from its trenches on October 3-4, and were ready for
action on the Aire-Bethune line upon October 11.  The Third Corps was
very little behind it, and the First had reached the new
battle-ground upon the 19th.  Cavalry went by road; infantry marched
part of the way, trained part of the way, and did the last lap very
often in motor-buses.  One way or another the men were got across,
the Aisne trenches were left for ever, and a new phase of the war had
begun.  From the chalky uplands and the wooded slopes there was a
sudden change to immense plains of clay, with slow, meandering,
ditch-like streams, and all the hideous features of a great
coal-field added to the drab monotony of Nature.  No scenes could be
more different, but the same great issue of history and the same old
problem of trench and rifle were finding their slow solution upon
each.  The stalemate of the Aisne was for the moment set aside, and
once again we had reverted to the old position where the ardent
Germans declared, "This way we shall come," and the Allies, "Not a
mile, save over our bodies."

[Sidenote: The great battle line.]

The narrator is here faced with a considerable difficulty in his
attempt to adhere closely to truth and yet to make his narrative
intelligible to the lay reader.  We stand upon the edge of a great
battle.  If all the operations which centred at Ypres, but which
extend to the Yser Canal upon the north and to La Bassée at the
south, be grouped into one episode, it becomes the greatest clash of
arms ever seen up {202} to that hour upon the globe, involving a
casualty list--Belgian, French, British, and German--which could by
no means be computed as under 250,000, and probably over 300,000 men.
It was fought, however, over an irregular line, which is roughly
forty miles from north to south, while it lasted, in its active form,
from October 12 to November 20 before it settled down to the
inevitable siege stage.  Thus both in time and in space it presents
difficulties which make a concentrated, connected, and intelligible
narrative no easy task.  In order to attempt this, it is necessary
first to give a general idea of what the British Army, in conjunction
with its Allies, was endeavouring to do, and, secondly, to show how
the operations affected each corps in its turn.

During the operations of the Aisne the French had extended the Allied
line far to the north in the hope of outflanking the Germans.  The
new Tenth French Army, under General Foch, formed the extreme left of
this vast manoeuvre, and it was supported on its left by the French
cavalry.  The German right had lengthened out, however, to meet every
fresh extension of the French, and their cavalry had been
sufficiently numerous and alert to prevent the French cavalry from
getting round.  Numerous skirmishes had ended in no definite result.
It was at this period that it occurred, as already stated, to Sir
John French that to bring the whole British Army round to the north
of the line would both shorten very materially his communications and
would prolong the line to an extent which might enable him to turn
the German flank and make their whole position impossible.  General
Joffre having endorsed these views, Sir John took the steps which we
have already seen.  {203} The British movement was, therefore, at the
outset an aggressive one.  How it became defensive as new factors
intruded themselves, and as a result of the fall of Antwerp, will be
shown at a later stage of this account.

As the Second Corps arrived first upon the scene it will be proper to
begin with some account of its doings from October 12, when it went
into action, until the end of the month, when it found itself brought
to a standstill by superior forces and placed upon the defensive.
The doings of the Third Corps during the same period will be
interwoven with those of the Second, since they were in close
co-operation; and, finally, the fortunes of the First Corps will be
followed and the relation shown between its doings and those of the
newly arrived Seventh Division, which had fallen back from the
vicinity of Antwerp and turned at bay near Ypres upon the pursuing
Germans.  Coming from different directions, all these various bodies
were destined to be formed into one line, cemented together by their
own dismounted cavalry and by French reinforcements, so as to lay an
unbroken breakwater before the great German flood.

The task of the Second Corps was to get into touch with the left
flank of the Tenth French Army in the vicinity of La Bassée, and then
to wheel round its own left so as to turn the position of those
Germans who were facing our Allies.  The line of the Bethune-Lille
road was to be the hinge, connecting the two armies and marking the
turning-point for the British.  On the 11th Gough's Second Cavalry
Division was clearing the woods in front of the Aire-Bethune Canal,
which marked the line of the Second Corps.  By {204} evening Gough
had connected up the Third Division of the Second Corps with the
Sixth Division of the Third Corps, which was already at Hazebrouck.
On the 12th the Third Division crossed the canal, followed by the
Fifth Division, with the exception of the 13th Brigade, which
remained to the south of it.  Both divisions advanced more or less
north before swinging round to almost due east in their outflanking
movement.  The rough diagram gives an idea of the point from which
they started and the positions reached at various dates before they
came to an equilibrium.  There were many weary stages, however,
between the outset and the fulfilment, and the final results were
destined to be barren as compared with the exertions and the losses
involved.  None the less it was, as it proved, an essential part of
that great operation by which the British--with the help of their
good allies--checked the German advance upon Calais in October and
November, even as they had helped to head them off from Paris in
August and September.  During these four months the little British
Army, far from being negligible, as some critics had foretold would
be the case in a Continental war, was absolutely vital in holding the
Allied line and taking the edge off the hacking German sword.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{205}

[Illustration: Diagram to illustrate operations of Smith-Dorrien's
2nd. Corps & Pulteney's 3rd Corps from Oct. 11 to Oct 19, 1914.]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

The Third Corps, which had detrained at St. Omer and moved to
Hazebrouck, was intended to move in touch with the Second, prolonging
its line to the north.  The First and Second British Cavalry
Divisions, now under the command of De Lisle and of Gough, with
Allenby as chief, had a role of their own to play, and the space
between the Second and Third Corps was now filled up by a French
Cavalry Division under Conneau, a whole-hearted soldier always ready
{206} to respond to any call.  There was no strong opposition yet in
front of the Third Corps, but General Pulteney moved rapidly
forwards, brushed aside all resistance, and seized the town of
Bailleul.  A German position in front of the town, held by cavalry
and infantry without guns, was rushed by a rapid advance of Haldane's
10th Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Seaforths particularly distinguishing
themselves, though the 1st Warwicks and 1st Irish Fusiliers had also
a good many losses, the Irishmen clearing the trenches to the cry of
"Faugh-a-Ballagh!" which has sounded so often upon battlefields of
old.  The 10th Brigade was on the left of the corps, and in touch
with the Second Cavalry Division to the north.  The whole action,
with its swift advance and moderate losses, was a fine vindication of
British infantry tactics.  On the evening of October 15 the Third
Corps had crossed the Lys, and on the 18th they extended from
Warneton in the north to almost within touch of the position of the
Second Corps at Aubers upon the same date.

[Sidenote: Advance of Second Corps.]

The country to the south in which the Second Corps was advancing upon
October 12 was an extraordinarily difficult one, which offered many
advantages to the defence over the attack.  It was so flat that it
was impossible to find places for artillery observation, and it was
intersected with canals, high hedgerows, and dykes, which formed
ready-made trenches.  The Germans were at first not in strength, and
consisted for the most part of dismounted cavalry drawn from four
divisions, but from this time onwards there was a constant fresh
accession of infantry and guns.  They disputed with great skill and
energy every position which could be defended, and the {207} British
advance during the day, though steady, was necessarily slow.  Every
hamlet, hedgerow, and stream meant a separate skirmish.  The troops
continually closed ranks, advanced, extended, and attacked from
morning to night, sleeping where they had last fought.  There was
nothing that could be called a serious engagement, and yet the
losses--almost entirely from the Third Division--amounted to 300 for
the day, the heaviest sufferers being the 2nd Royal Scots.

On the next day, the 13th, the corps swung round its left so as to
develop the turning movement already described.  Its front of advance
was about eight miles, and it met resistance which made all progress
difficult.  Again the 8th Brigade, especially the Royal Scots and 4th
Middlesex, lost heavily.  So desperate was the fighting that the
Royal Scots had 400 casualties including 9 officers, and the
Middlesex fared little better.  The principal fighting, however, fell
late in the evening upon the 15th Brigade (Gleichen's), who were on
the right of the line and in touch with the Bethune Canal.  The
enemy, whose line of resistance had been considerably thickened by
the addition of several battalions of Jaeger and part of the
Fourteenth Corps, made a spirited counter-attack on this portion of
the advance.  The 1st Bedfords were roughly handled and driven back,
with the result that the 1st Dorsets, who were stationed at a bridge
over the canal near Givenchy, found their flanks exposed and
sustained heavy losses, amounting to 400 men, including Major Roper.
Colonel Bols, of the same regiment, enjoyed one crowded hour of
glorious life, for he was wounded, captured, and escaped all on the
same evening.  It was in this {208} action also that Major Vandeleur
was wounded and captured.[1]  A section of guns which was involved in
the same dilemma as the Dorsets had to be abandoned after every
gunner had fallen.  The 15th Brigade was compelled to fall back for
half a mile and entrench itself for the night.  On the left the 7th
Brigade (McCracken's) had some eighty casualties in crossing the Lys,
and a detachment of Northumberland Fusiliers, who covered their left
flank, came under machine-gun fire, which struck down their adjutant,
Captain Herbert, and a number of men.  Altogether the losses on this
day amounted to about twelve hundred men.


[1] Major Vandeleur was the officer who afterwards escaped from
Crefeld and brought back with him a shocking account of the German
treatment of our prisoners.  Though a wounded man, the Major was
kicked by the direct command of one German officer, and his overcoat
was taken from him in bitter weather by another.


[Sidenote: Death of General Hamilton.]

On the 14th the Second Corps continued its slow advance in the same
direction.  Upon this day the Third Division sustained a grievous
loss in the shape of its commander, General Sir Hubert Hamilton, who
was standing conversing with the quiet nonchalance which was
characteristic of him, when a shell burst above him and a shrapnel
bullet struck him on the temple, killing him at once.  He was a grand
commander, beloved by his men, and destined for the highest had he
lived.  He was buried that night after dark in a village churchyard.
There was an artillery attack by the Germans during the service, and
the group of silent officers, weary from the fighting line, who stood
with bowed heads round the grave, could hardly hear the words of the
chaplain for the whiz and crash of the shells.  It was a proper
ending for a soldier.

{209}

His division was temporarily taken over by General Colin Mackenzie.
On this date the 13th Brigade, on the south of the canal, was
relieved by French troops, so that henceforward all the British were
to the north.  For the three preceding days this brigade had done
heavy work, the pressure of the enemy falling particularly upon the
2nd Scottish Borderers, who lost Major Allen and a number of other
officers and men.

The 15th was a day of spirited advance, the Third Division offering
sacrifice in the old warrior fashion to the shade of its dead leader.
Guns were brought up into the infantry line and the enemy was smashed
out of entrenched positions and loopholed villages in spite of a most
manful resistance.  The soldiers carried long planks with them and
threw them over the dykes on their advance.  Mile after mile the
Germans were pushed back, until they were driven off the high road
which connects Estaires with La Bassée.  The 1st Northumberland and
4th Royal Fusiliers of the 9th Brigade, and the 2nd Royal Scots and
4th Middlesex of the 8th, particularly distinguished themselves in
this day of hard fighting.  By the night of the 15th the corps had
lost 90 officers and 2500 men in the four days, the disproportionate
number of officers being due to the broken nature of the fighting,
which necessitated the constant leading of small detachments.  The
German resistance continued to be admirable.

On the 16th the slow wheeling movement of the Second Corps went
steadily though slowly forward, meeting always the same stubborn
resistance.  The British were losing heavily by the incessant
fighting, but so were the Germans, and it was becoming a {210}
question which could stand punishment longest.  In the evening the
Third Division was brought to a stand by the village of Aubers, which
was found to be strongly held.  The Fifth Division was instructed to
mark time upon the right, so as to form the pivot upon which all the
rest of the corps could swing round in their advance on La Bassée.
At this date the Third Corps was no great distance to the north, and
the First Corps was detraining from the Aisne.  As the Seventh
Division with Byng's Third Cavalry Division were reported to be in
touch with the other forces in the north, the concentration of the
British Army was approaching a successful issue.  The weather up to
now during all the operations which have been described was wet and
misty, limiting the use of artillery and entirely preventing that of
aircraft.

[Sidenote: The farthest point.]

On the 17th the advance was resumed and was destined to reach the
extreme point which it attained for many a long laborious month.
This was the village of Herlies, north-east of La Bassée, which was
attacked in the evening by Shaw's 9th Brigade, and was carried in the
dusk at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Lincolns and the 4th
Royal Fusiliers.  About the same time the Scots Fusiliers and
Northumberlands had stormed Aubers.  The 7th Brigade was less
fortunate at the adjoining village of Illies, where they failed to
make a lodgment, but the French cavalry on the extreme left, with the
help of the 2nd Royal Irish, captured Fromelles.  The Fifth Division
also came forward a little, the right flank still on the canal, but
the left bending round so as to get to the north of La Bassée.  The
1st Devons, who had taken the place of the Dorsets, {211} pushed
forward with such fire that they were half a mile ahead of the Army
and in great danger of being cut off, but by individual coolness and
resource they managed to get back to safety.

On the 18th, Sir Charles Ferguson, who had done good work with the
Army from the first gunshot of the war, was promoted to a higher rank
and the command of the Fifth Division passed over to General Morland.
Thus both divisions of the Second Corps changed their commanders
within a week.  On this date the infantry of the 14th Brigade, with
some of the 13th Brigade, were within eight hundred yards of La
Bassée, but found it so strongly held that it could not be entered,
the Scottish Borderers losing heavily in a very gallant advance.  The
village of Illies also remained impregnable, being strongly
entrenched and loopholed.  Shaw's 9th Brigade took some of the
trenches, but found their left flank exposed, so had to withdraw
nearly half a mile and to entrench.  In this little action the 1st
Royal Scots Fusiliers bore the brunt of the fighting and the losses.
Eight officers and nearly 200 men of this regiment were killed or
wounded.  A fresh German division came into action this day and their
artillery was stronger, so that the prospects of future advance were
not particularly encouraging.  The British artillery was worked very
hard, being overmatched and yet undefeatable.  The strain both upon
the men and the officers was constant, and the observation officers
showed great daring and tenacity.

[Sidenote: Fate of the 2nd Royal Irish.]

On the 19th neither the Third nor the Fifth Divisions made any
appreciable progress, but one battalion was heavily engaged and added
a fresh record to its ancient roll of valour.  This was the {212} 2nd
Royal Irish under Major Daniell, who attacked the village of Le Pilly
rather forward from the British left in co-operation with the French
cavalry.  The Irish infantry charged over eight hundred yards of
clear ground, carried the village by storm, and entrenched themselves
within it.  This advance and charge, which was carried out with the
precision of an Aldershot field day, although 130 men fell during the
movement, is said by experienced spectators to have been a great feat
of arms.  The 20th saw a strong counter-attack of the Germans, and by
the evening their two flanks had lapped round Le Pilly, pushing off
on the one side the French cavalry of Conneau, and on the other a too
small detachment of the Royal Fusiliers who were flanking the
Irishmen.  All day the defenders of Le Pilly were subjected to a
terrific shell-fire, and all attempts to get messages to them were
unavailing.  In the evening they were surrounded, and only two or
three men of the battalion were ever seen again.  The gallant Daniell
fell, and it is on record that his last audible words were a command
to fix bayonets and fight to the end, the cartridges of the battalion
being at that time exhausted.  A German officer engaged in this
attack and subsequently taken prisoner has deposed that three German
battalions attacked the Royal Irish, one in front and one on each
flank, after they had been heavily bombarded in enfilade.  Several
hundred Irish dead and wounded were taken out of the main trench.

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{213}

[Illustration: Southern End of British Line]

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There was now ample evidence that the Germans had received large
reinforcements, and that their line was too strong to be forced.  The
whole object and character of the operations assumed, therefore, a
{214} new aspect.  The Second and Third Corps had swung round,
describing an angle of ninety degrees, with its pivot upon the right
at the La Bassée Canal, and by this movement it had succeeded in
placing itself upon the flank of the German force which faced the
Tenth French Army.  But there was now no longer any flank, for the
German reinforcements had enabled them to prolong their line and so
to turn the action into a frontal attack by the British.  Such an
attack in modern warfare can only hope for success when carried out
by greatly superior numbers, whereas the Germans were now stronger
than their assailants, having been joined by one division of the
Seventh Corps, a brigade of the Third Corps, and the whole of the
Fourteenth Corps, part of which had already been engaged.

[Sidenote: The Third Corps.]

The increased pressure was being felt by the Third Corps on the Lys,
as well as by the Second to the south of them; indeed, as only a few
miles intervened between the two, they may be regarded as one for
these operations.  We have seen that, having taken the town of
Bailleul, Pulteney's Corps had established itself across the Lys, and
occupied a line from Warneton to Radinghem upon October 18.  The
latter village had been taken on that day by the 16th Brigade in an
action in which the 1st Buffs and 2nd York and Lancasters lost
heavily, the latter being ambushed as it pursued the enemy and losing
11 officers and 400 men.  Colonel Cobbold fell back upon the village
and held it successfully.  Pulteney was now strongly attacked, and
there was a movement of the Germans on October 20 as if to turn his
right and slip in between the two British corps.  The action was
carried on into the 21st, the enemy still {215} showing considerable
energy and strength.  The chief German advance during the day was
north of La Bassée.  It came upon the village of Lorgies, which was
the point where the South Lancashires, of McCracken's 7th Brigade,
forming the extreme right of the Third Division, were in touch with
the East Surreys and Duke of Cornwall's of the 14th Brigade, forming
the extreme left of the Fifth Division.  It is necessary to join
one's flats carefully in the presence of the Germans, for they are
sharp critics of such matters.  In this instance a sudden attack near
Illies drove in a portion of the 2nd South Lancashires.  This attack
also destroyed the greater part of a company of the 1st Cornwalls in
support.  An ugly gap was left in the line, but the remainder of the
Cornwalls, with the help of a company of the 1st West Kents and the
ever-constant artillery, filled it up during the rest of the day, and
the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry took it over the same night, the
Cornishmen retiring with heavy losses but a great deal of
compensating glory.  The temporary gap in the line exposed the right
flank of the 3rd Worcesters, who were next to the South Lancashires.
They lost heavily in killed and wounded, their colonel, Stuart, being
among the latter, though his injury did not prevent him from
remaining in the battle line.  Apart from this action at Lorgies, the
19th Brigade (Gordon's), upon the flank of Pulteney's Corps,
sustained a very heavy attack, being driven back for some distance.
It had been ordered to occupy Fromelles, and so close the gap which
existed at that time between the left of the Second and the right of
the Third Corps, situated respectively at Aubers and Radinghem.  The
chief fighting occurred {216} at the village of Le Maisnil, close to
Fromelles.  This village was occupied by the 2nd Argylls and half the
1st Middlesex, but they were driven out by a severe shell-fire
followed by an infantry advance.  The brigade fell back in good
order, the regiments engaged having lost about 300 men.  They took up
a position on the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade at La
Boutillerie, and there they remained until November 17, one severe
attack falling upon them on October 29, which is described under that
date.

On the morning of October 22 the Germans, still very numerous and
full of fight, made a determined attack upon the Fifth Division,
occupying the village of Violaines, close to La Bassée.  The village
was held by the 1st Cheshires, who, for the second time in this
campaign, found themselves in a terribly difficult position.  It is
typical of the insolent high spirits of the men, in spite of all that
they had endured, that upon the Germans charging forward with a
war-cry which resembled, "Yip, Yip, Yip!" the British infantry joined
in with "I-addy-ti-ay!" the whole forming the chorus of a once
popular Gaiety song.  The Cheshires inflicted heavy losses upon the
stormers with rifle-fire, but were at last driven out, involving in
their retirement the 1st Dorsets, who had left their own trenches in
order to help them.  Both regiments, but especially the Cheshires,
had grievous losses, in casualties and prisoners.  On advancing in
pursuit the Germans were strongly counter-attacked by the 2nd
Manchesters and the 1st Cornwalls, supported by the 3rd Worcesters,
who, by their steady fire, brought them to a standstill, but were
unable to recover the ground that had been lost, though the
Cornwalls, who had {217} been fighting with hardly a pause for
forty-eight hours, succeeded in capturing one of their machine-guns.
In the night the British withdrew their line in accordance with the
general rearrangement to be described.  Some rearguard stragglers at
break of day had the amusing experience of seeing the Germans making
a valiant and very noisy attack upon the abandoned and empty trenches.

On this date, October 22, not only had Smith-Dorrien experienced this
hold-up upon his right flank, but his left flank had become more
vulnerable, because the French had been heavily attacked at
Fromelles, and had been driven out of that village.  An equilibrium
had been established between attack and defence, and the position of
the Aisne was beginning to appear once again upon the edge of
Flanders.  General Smith-Dorrien, feeling that any substantial
advance was no longer to be hoped for under the existing conditions,
marked down and occupied a strong defensive position, from Givenchy
on the south to Fauquissart on the north.  This involved a retirement
of the whole corps during the night for a distance of from one to two
miles, but it gave a connected position with a clear field of fire.
At the same time the general situation was greatly strengthened by
the arrival at the front of the Lahore Division of the Indian Army
under General Watkis.  These fine troops were placed in reserve
behind the Second Corps in the neighbourhood of Locon.

[Sidenote: Exhausted troops.]

It is well to remember at this point what Smith-Dorrien's troops had
already endured during the two months that the campaign had lasted.
Taking the strength of the corps at 37,000 men, they had lost,
roughly, 10,000 men in August, 10,000 in {218} September, and 5000 up
to date in these actions of October.  It is certain that far less
than 50 per cent of the original officers and men were still with the
Colours, and drafts can never fully restore the unity and spirit of a
homogeneous regiment, where every man knows his company leaders and
his platoon.  In addition to this they had now fought night and day
for nearly a fortnight, with broken and insufficient sleep, laying
down their rifles to pick up their spades, and then once again
exchanging spade for rifle, while soaked to the skin with incessant
fogs and rain, and exposed to that most harassing form of fighting,
where every clump and hedgerow covers an enemy.  They were so
exhausted that they could hardly be woken up to fight.  To say that
they were now nearing the end of their strength and badly in need of
a rest is but to say that they were mortal men and had reached the
physical limits that mortality must impose.

The French cavalry divisions acting as links between Pulteney and
Smith-Dorrien were now relieved by the 8th (Jullundur) Indian
Infantry Brigade, containing the 1st Manchesters, 59th (Scinde)
Rifles, 15th and 47th Sikhs.  It may be remarked that each Indian
brigade is made up of three Indian and one British battalion.  This
change was effected upon October 24, a date which was marked by no
particular military event save that the Third Division lost for a
time the services of General Beauchamp Doran, who returned to
England.  General Doran had done great service in leading what was
perhaps the most hard-worked brigade in a hard-worked division.
General Bowes took over the command of the 8th Infantry Brigade.

{219}

On the night of October 24 determined attacks were made upon the
trenches of the Second Corps at the Bois de Biez, near Neuve
Chapelle, but were beaten off with heavy loss to the enemy, who had
massed together twelve battalions in order to rush a particular part
of the position.  The main attack fell upon the 1st Wiltshires and
the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, belonging to McCracken's 7th Brigade, and
also upon the 15th Sikhs, who seem to have been the first Indians to
be seriously engaged, having nearly two hundred casualties.  The 8th
Brigade were also involved in the fight.  The Germans had some
temporary success in the centre of the trenches of the Third
Division, where, in the darkness, they pushed back the 1st Gordon
Highlanders, who lost very heavily.  As the Highlanders fell back,
the 2nd Royal Scots, upon their right, swung back its flank
companies, covered the retirement, and then, straightening their
ranks again, flung the Germans, at the point of their bayonets, out
of the trenches.  It was one of several remarkable feats which this
fine battalion has performed in the war.  Next morning the captured
trenches were handed over to the care of the 4th Middlesex.

[Sidenote: First fight of Neuve Chapelle.]

The pressure upon the exhausted troops was extreme upon this day, for
a very severe attack was made also upon the Fifth Division, holding
the right of the line.  The soldiers, as already shown, were in no
condition for great exertions, and yet, after their wont, they rose
grandly to the occasion.  The important village of Givenchy, destined
for many a long month to form the advanced post upon the right of the
Army, was held by the 1st Norfolks and 1st Devons, who defied all
efforts of the enemy to dislodge them.  {220} Nevertheless, the
situation was critical and difficult for both divisions, and the only
available support, the 1st Manchesters from the Lahore Division, were
pushed up into the fighting line and found themselves instantly
engaged in the neighbourhood of Givenchy.  It was dreadful weather,
the trenches a quagmire, and the rifle-bolts often clogged with the
mud.  On the 26th Sir John French, realising how great was the task
with which the weary corps was faced, sent up two batteries of 4.7
guns, which soon lessened the volume of the German artillery attack.
At the same time General Maistre, of the Twenty-first French Corps,
sent two of his batteries and two of his battalions.  Thus
strengthened, there was no further immediate anxiety as to the line
being broken, especially as upon the 26th Marshal French, carefully
playing card after card from his not over-strong hand, placed the
Second Cavalry Division and three more Indian battalions in reserve
to Smith-Dorrien's corps.  The German advance had by no means spent
itself, as on this day they came to close grips with the 2nd Irish
Rifles and established themselves firmly in the village of Neuve
Chapelle, near the centre of the British line, inflicting heavy loss
upon the Royal Fusiliers, who tried to restore the position.  A
number of attacks were made to regain this village next day, in which
as strange a medley of troops were employed as could ever before have
found themselves as comrades in so minor an operation.  There were
South Lancashires, Royal Fusiliers, 9th Bhopal Infantry, 47th Sikhs,
Chasseurs Alpins, and other units.  In spite of--or possibly on
account of--this international competition the village remained with
the Germans, who were strongly reinforced, and {221} managed by their
shell-fire to clear some of the nearest trenches and gain some
additional ground, hitting the 1st Wiltshires and 2nd Irish Rifles
hard and making a number of prisoners, two or three hundred in all.
Again the times had become critical, the more so as the 8th Indian
Brigade to the north had also been attacked and roughly handled.  The
indomitable Smith-Dorrien was determined to have his village,
however, and in the neighbouring French cavalry commander, General
Conneau, he found a worthy colleague who was ready to throw his last
man into the venture.  The Second Cavalry, now under General Mullens,
was also ready, as our cavalry has always been, to spring in as a
makeweight when the balance trembled.  The German losses were known
to have been tremendous, and it was hoped that the force of their
attack was spent.  On the 28th the assault was renewed, prefaced by a
strong artillery preparation, but again it was brought to a
standstill.  The 47th Sikhs fought magnificently from loopholed house
to house, as did the Indian sappers and miners, while the cavalry
showed themselves to be admirable infantry at a pinch, but the
defence was still too strong and the losses too severe, though at one
time Colonel McMahon, with his Fusiliers, had seized the whole north
end of the village.

Some 60 officers and 1500 men had fallen in the day's venture,
including 70 of the cavalry.  The night fell with Neuve Chapelle
still in the hands of the enemy, and the British troops to the north,
east, and west of it in a semicircle.  The 14th Brigade, coming up
after dark, found the 1st West Kent Regiment reduced to 2 officers
and 150 men, and the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry at about the same
strength, still holding on {222} to positions which had been
committed to them three days before.  The conduct of these two grand
regiments upon that and the previous days excited the admiration of
every one, for, isolated from their comrades, they had beaten off a
long succession of infantry attacks and had been enfiladed by a most
severe shell-fire.  Second-Lieutenant White, with a still younger
officer named Russell, formed the whole staff of officers of the West
Kents.  Major Buckle, Captain Legard, and many others having been
killed or wounded, Penny and Crossley, the two sergeant-majors, did
great work, and the men were splendid.  These shire regiments, raised
from the very soil of England, reflect most nearly her national
qualities, and in their stolid invincibility form a fitting framework
of a great national army.  Speaking to the West Kents of this
episode, General Smith-Dorrien said: "There is one part of the line
which has never been retaken, because it was never lost.  It was the
particular trenches which your battalion held so grimly during those
terrific ten days."

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{223}

[Illustration: General View of Seat of Operations.]

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These determined efforts were not spent in vain, for the Germans
would not bide the other brunt.  Early on the 29th the British
patrols found that Neuve Chapelle had been evacuated by the enemy,
who must have lost several thousand men in its capture and fine
subsequent defence.  In this village fighting the British were much
handicapped at this time by the want of high explosive shells to
destroy the houses.  The enemy's artillery made it impossible for the
British to occupy it, and some time later it reverted to the Germans
once more, being occupied by the Seventh Westphalian Corps.  It was
made an exceedingly strong advance position by the Germans, {224} but
it was reoccupied by the British Fourth Corps (Rawlinson's) and the
Indian Corps (Willcocks') upon March 10 in an assault which lasted
three days, and involved a loss of 12,000 men to the attackers and at
least as many to the defenders.  This battle will be described among
the operations of the spring of 1915, but it is mentioned now to show
how immutable were the lines between these dates.

The southern or La Bassée end of the line had also been attacked upon
the 28th and 29th, and the 2nd Manchesters driven from their
trenches, which they instantly regained, killing seventy of the enemy
and taking a number of prisoners.  It was in this action that
Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan earned the V.C., capturing a
trench at the head of ten volunteers and disposing of some fifty
Germans.  Morland's Fifth Division had several other skirmishes
during these days, in which the Duke of Cornwall's, Manchesters, and
1st Devons, who had taken the place of the Suffolks in the 14th
Brigade, were chiefly engaged.  The Devons had come late, but they
had been constantly engaged and their losses were already as great as
the others.  For sixteen days they had held on with desperate
resolution, their Colonel Gloster and a considerable proportion of
the officers and men being hit.  When they were at last relieved they
received the applause of the Army.  On the whole, the general line
was held, though the price was often severe.  At this period General
Wing took command of the Third Division instead of General
Mackenzie--invalided home--the third divisional change within a
fortnight.

[Sidenote: The Indians take over.]

The arduous month of October was now drawing to a close, and so it
was hoped were the labours of the {225} weary Second Corps.  Already,
on the top of all their previous casualties, they had lost 360
officers and 8200 men since on October 12 they had crossed the La
Bassée Canal.  The spirit of the men was unimpaired for the most
part--indeed, it seemed often to rise with the emergency--but the
thinning of the ranks, the incessant labour, and the want of sleep
had produced extreme physical exhaustion.  Upon October 29 it was
determined to take them out of the front line and give them the rest
which they so badly needed.  With this end in view, Sir James
Willcocks' Indian Corps was moved to the front, and it was gradually
substituted for the attenuated regiments of the Second Corps in the
first row of trenches.  The greater part of the corps was drawn out
of the line, leaving two brigades and most of the artillery behind to
support the Indians.  That the latter would have some hard work was
speedily apparent, as upon this very day the 8th Gurkhas were driven
out of their trenches.  With the support of a British battalion,
however, and of Vaughan's Indian Rifles they were soon recovered,
though Colonel Venner of the latter corps fell in the attack.  This
warfare of unseen enemies and enormous explosions was new to the
gallant Indians, but they soon accommodated themselves to it, and
moderated the imprudent gallantry which exposed them at first to
unnecessary loss.

Here, at the end of October, we may leave the Second Corps.  It was
speedily apparent that their services were too essential to be
spared, and that their rest would be a very nominal one.  The Third
Corps will be treated presently.  They did admirably all that came to
them to do, but they were so placed that both flanks were covered by
British troops, and they {226} were less exposed to pressure than the
others.  The month closed with this corps and the Indians holding a
line which extended north and south for about twenty miles from
Givenchy and Festubert in the south to Warneton in the north.  We
will return to the operations in this region, but must turn back a
fortnight or so in order to follow the very critical and important
events which had been proceeding in the north.  Before doing so it
would be well to see what had befallen the cavalry, which, when last
mentioned, had, upon October 11, cleared the woods in front of the
Second Corps and connected it up with the right wing of the Third
Corps.  This was carried out by Gough's Second Cavalry Division,
which was joined next day by De Lisle's First Division, the whole
under General Allenby.  This considerable force moved north upon
October 12 and 13, pushing back a light fringe of the enemy and
having one brisk skirmish at Mont des Cats, a small hill, crowned by
a monastery, where the body of a Prince of Hesse was picked up after
the action.  Still fighting its way, the cavalry moved north to
Berthen and then turned eastwards towards the Lys to explore the
strength of the enemy and the passages of the river in that
direction.  Late at night upon the 14th General de Lisle, scouting
northwards upon a motor-car, met Prince Alexander of Teck coming
southwards, the first contact with the isolated Seventh Division.

[Sidenote: The Lancers at Warneton.]

On the night of the 16th an attempt was made upon Warneton, where the
Germans had a bridge over the river, but the village was too strongly
held.  The 3rd Cavalry Brigade was engaged in the enterprise, and the
16th Lancers was the particular regiment upon whom it fell.  The main
street of the village was {227} traversed by a barricade and the
houses loopholed.  The Germans were driven by the dismounted
troopers, led by Major Campbell, from the first barricade, but took
refuge behind a second one, where they were strongly reinforced.  The
village had been set on fire, and the fighting went on by the glare
of the flames.  When the order for retirement was at last given it
was found that several wounded Lancers had been left close to the
German barricade.  The fire having died down, three of the
Lancers--Sergeant Glasgow, Corporal Boyton, and Corporal
Chapman--stole down the dark side of the street in their stockinged
feet and carried some of their comrades off under the very noses of
the Germans.  Many, however, had to be left behind.  It is impossible
for cavalry to be pushful and efficient without taking constant risks
which must occasionally materialise.  The general effect of the
cavalry operations was to reconnoitre thoroughly all the west side of
the river and to show that the enemy were in firm possession of the
eastern bank.

From this time onwards until the end of the month the cavalry were
engaged in carrying on the north and south line of defensive
trenches, which, beginning with the right of the Second Corps (now
replaced by Indians) at Givenchy, was prolonged by the Third Corps as
far as Frelingham.  There the cavalry took it up and carried it
through Comines to Wervicq, following the bend of the river.  These
lines were at once strongly attacked, but the dismounted troopers
held their positions.  On October 22 the 12th Lancers were heavily
assaulted, but with the aid of an enfilading fire from the 5th
Lancers drove off the enemy.  That evening saw four more attacks, all
of them {228} repulsed, but so serious that Indian troops were
brought up to support the cavalry.  Every day brought its attack
until they culminated in the great and critical fight from October 30
to November 2, which will be described later.  The line was held,
though with some loss of ground and occasional setbacks, until
November 2, when considerable French reinforcements arrived upon the
scene.  It is a fact that for all these weeks the position which was
held in the face of incessant attack by two weak cavalry divisions
should have been, and eventually was, held by two army corps.

[Sidenote: Pulteney's operations.]

It is necessary now to briefly sketch the movements of the Third
Corps (Pulteney's).  Its presence upon the left flank of the Second
Corps, and the fact that it held every attack that came against it,
made it a vital factor in the operations.  It is true that, having
staunch British forces upon each flank, its position was always less
precarious than either of the two corps which held the southern and
northern extremities of the line, for without any disparagement to
our Allies, who have shown themselves to be the bravest of the brave,
it is evident that we can depend more upon troops who are under the
same command, and whose movements can be certainly co-ordinated.  At
the same time, if the Third Corps had less to do, it can at least say
that whatever did come to it was excellently well done, and that it
preserved its line throughout.  Its units were extended over some
twelve miles of country, and it was partly astride of the River Lys,
so that here as elsewhere there was constant demand upon the
vigilance and staunchness of officers and men.  On October 20 a very
severe attack fell upon the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, who held {229}
the most advanced trenches of Congreve's 18th Brigade.  They were
nearly overwhelmed by the violence of the German artillery fire, and
were enfiladed on each side by infantry and machine-guns.  The 2nd
Durhams came up in reinforcement, but the Foresters had already
sustained grievous losses in casualties and prisoners, the battalion
being reduced from 900 to 250 in a single day.  The Durhams also lost
heavily.  On this same day, the 20th, the 2nd Leinsters, of the 17th
Brigade, were also driven from their trenches and suffered severely.

[Sidenote: Action of La Gheir.]

On October 21 the Germans crossed the River Lys in considerable
force, and upon the morning of the 22nd they succeeded in occupying
the village of Le Gheir upon the western side, thus threatening to
outflank the positions of the Second Cavalry Division to the north.
In their advance in the early morning of the 22nd they stormed the
trenches held by the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, this regiment
enduring considerable losses.  The trenches on the right were held by
the 1st Royal Lancasters and 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers.  These two
regiments were at once ordered by General Anley, of the 12th Brigade,
to initiate a counter-attack under the lead of Colonel Butler.  Anley
himself, who is a hard-bitten soldier of much Egyptian fighting,
moved forward his men, while General Hunter-Weston, the indefatigable
blower-up of railway lines in South Africa, supported the
counter-attack with the Somerset Light Infantry and the 1st East
Lancashires.  The latter regiment, under Colonel Lawrence, passed
through a wood and reached such a position that they were able to
enfilade the Germans in the open, causing them very heavy losses.
The action was a brilliant success.  The positions lost {230} were
reoccupied and the enemy severely punished, over a thousand Germans
being killed or wounded, while 300 were taken prisoners.  These
belonged to the 104th and 179th Saxon regiments.  It was a strange
turn of fate which, after fifteen hundred years, brought tribesmen
who had wandered up the course of the Elbe face to face in deadly
strife with fellow-tribesmen who had passed over the sea to Britain.
It is worth remarking and remembering that they are the one section
of the German race who in this war have shown that bravery is not
necessarily accompanied by coarseness and brutality.

On October 25 the attacks became most severe upon the line of
Williams' 16th Brigade, and on that night the trenches of the 1st
Leicesters were raked by so heavy a gunfire that they were found to
be untenable, the regiment losing 350 men.  The line both of the 16th
and of the 18th Brigades was drawn back for some little distance.
There was a lull after this, broken upon the 29th, when Gordon's 19th
Brigade was attacked with great violence by six fresh
battalions--heavy odds against the four weak battalions which
composed the British Brigade.  The 1st Middlesex Regiment was driven
from part of its trenches, but came back with a rush, helped by their
comrades of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  The Germans
were thrown out of the captured trenches, 40 were made prisoners, and
200 were slain.  This attack was made by the 223rd and 224th
Regiments of the XXIV. German Reserve Corps.  It was not repeated.

On the 30th another sharp action occurred near St. Yves, when
Hunter-Weston's 11th Brigade was momentarily pierced after dusk by a
German rush, {231} which broke through a gap in the Hampshires.  The
Somerset Light Infantry, under Major Prowse, came back upon them and
the trenches were regained.  In all such actions it is to be
remembered that where a mass of men can suddenly be directed against
scattered trenches which will only hold a few, it is no difficult
matter to carry them, but at once the conditions reverse themselves
and the defenders mass their supports, who can usually turn the
intruders out once more.

This brings the general record of the doings of the Third Corps down
to the end of October, the date on which we cease the account of the
operations at the southern end of the British line.  We turn from
this diffuse and difficult story, with its ever-varying positions and
units, to the great epic of the north, which will be inseparably
united for ever with the name of Ypres.




{232}

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

(Up to the Action of Gheluvelt, October 31)

The Seventh Division--Its peculiar excellence--Its difficult
position--A deadly ordeal--Desperate attacks on Seventh
Division--Destruction of 2nd Wilts--Hard fight of 20th
Brigade--Arrival of First Corps--Advance of Haig's Corps--Fight of
Pilken Inn--Bravery of enemy--Advance of Second Division--Fight of
Kruiseik cross-roads--Fight of Zandvoorde--Fight of
Gheluvelt--Advance of Worcesters--German recoil--General result--A
great crisis.


It has already been seen that the Seventh Division (Capper's), being
the first half of Rawlinson's Fourth first Army Corps, had retired
south and west after the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Antwerp.  It
was made up as follows:--

[Sidenote: The Seventh Division]

  DIVISION VII.--General CAPPER.

  20_th Infantry Brigade--General Ruggles-Brise_.
        1st Grenadier Guards.
        2nd Scots Guards.
        2nd Border Regiment.
        2nd Gordon Highlanders.

  2l_st Infantry Brigade--General Walls_.
        2nd Bedfords.
        2nd Yorks.
        2nd Wilts.
        2nd Scots Fusiliers.

{233}

  22_nd Infantry Brigade--General Lawford_.
        1st South Staffords.
        2nd Warwicks.
        2nd Queen's West Surrey.
        1st Welsh Fusiliers.

  _Artillery._
        22nd Brigade R.F.A.
        35th Brigade R.F.A.
        3rd R.G.A.
        111th R.G.A.
        112th R.G.A.
        14th Brigade R.H.A. C.F.

  _Engineers._
        54, 55, F. Co.
        7 Signal Co.
        Divisional Cavalry.
        Northumberland Yeomanry.


[Sidenote: Its peculiar excellence.]

It is not too much to say that in an army where every division had
done so well no single one was composed of such fine material as the
Seventh.  The reason was that the regiments composing it had all been
drawn from foreign garrison duty, and consisted largely of soldiers
of from three to seven years' standing, with a minimum of reservists.
In less than a month from the day when this grand division of 18,000
men went into action its infantry had been nearly annihilated, but
the details of its glorious destruction furnish one more vivid page
of British military achievement.  We lost a noble division and gained
a glorious record.

The Third Cavalry Division under General Byng was attached to the
Seventh Division, and joined up with it at Roulers upon October 13.
It consisted of--

  6_th Cavalry Brigade--General Makings_.
  3rd Dragoon Guards.
  10th Hussars.
  1st Royals.

  7_th Cavalry Brigade--General Kavanagh_.
  1st Life Guards.
  2nd Life Guards.
  1st Horse Guards.
  1st Horse Guards.
  K Battery, R.H.A.

{234}

The First Army Corps not having yet come up from the Aisne, these
troops were used to cover the British position from the north, the
infantry lying from Zandvoorde through Gheluvelt to Zonnebeke, and
the cavalry on their left from Zonnebeke to Langemarck from October
16 onwards.  It was decided by Sir John French that it was necessary
to get possession of the town of Menin, some distance to the east of
the general British line, but very important because the chief
bridge, by means of which the Germans were receiving their
ever-growing reinforcements, was there.  The Seventh Division was
ordered accordingly to advance upon this town, its left flank being
covered by the Third Cavalry Division.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

{235}

[Illustration: LINE OF 7th DIVISION (CAPPER) & 3rd CAVALRY DIVISION
(BYNG) FROM OCT 17th. ONWARDS]

-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Sidenote: Its difficult position.]

The position was a dangerous one.  It has already been stated that
the pause on the Aisne may not have been unwelcome to the Germans, as
they were preparing reserve formations which might be suddenly thrown
against some chosen spot in the Allied line.  They had the equipment
and arms for at least another 250,000 men, and that number of drilled
men were immediately available, some being Landwehr who had passed
through the ranks, and others young formations which had been
preparing when war broke out.  Together they formed no less than five
new army corps, available for the extreme western front, more
numerous than the whole British and Belgian armies combined.  This
considerable force, secretly assembled and moving rapidly across
Belgium, was now striking the north of the Allied line, debouching
not only over the river at Menin, but also through Courtrai, Iseghem,
and Roulers.  It consisted of the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th, and 27th
reserve corps.  Of these the 22nd, and later the 24th, followed the
{236} Belgians to the line of the Yser, but the other corps were all
available for an attack upon the flank of that British line which was
faced by formidable opponents--a line which extended over thirty
miles and had already been forced into a defensive attitude.  That
was the situation when the Seventh Division faced round near Ypres.
Sir John French was doing all that he could to support it, and Sir
Douglas Haig was speeding up his army corps from the Aisne to take
his place to the north of Ypres, but there were some days during
which Rawlinson's men were in the face of a force six or seven times
larger than themselves.

Upon October 16th and 17th the division had advanced from Ypres and
occupied the line already mentioned, the right centre of which rested
about the ninth kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road, the order of the
brigades from the north being 22nd, 21st, and 20th.  On October 18
the division wheeled its left forward.  As the infantry advanced, the
covering cavalry soon became aware of grave menace from Roulers and
Courtrai in the north.  A large German force was evidently striking
down on to the left flank of the advance.  The division was engaged
all along the line, for the 20th Brigade upon the right had a brisk
skirmish, while the 21st Brigade in the centre was also under fire,
which came especially heavily upon the 2nd Bedfords, who had numerous
casualties.  About ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th the
pressure from the north increased, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade was
driven in, though it held its own with great resolution for some
time, helped by the fine work of K Battery, R.H.A.  The 6th Cavalry
Brigade was held up in front, while the danger on the {237} flank
grew more apparent as the hours passed.  In these circumstances
General Rawlinson, fortified in his opinion by the precise reports of
his airmen as to the strength of the enemy upon his left, came to the
conclusion that a further advance would place him in a difficult
position.  He therefore dropped back to his original line.  There can
be little doubt that, if he had persevered in the original plan, his
force would have been in extreme danger.  As it was, before he could
get it back the 1st Welsh Fusiliers were hard hit, this famous
regiment losing a major, 5 captains, 3 lieutenants, and about 200
men.  The order to retire had failed to reach it, and but for the
able handling of Colonel Cadogan it might well have been destroyed.

On October 20, the situation being still obscure, the 20th Brigade
carried out a reconnaissance towards Menin.  The 2nd Wilts and 2nd
Scots Fusiliers, of the 21st Brigade, covered their left flank.  The
enemy, however, made a vigorous attack upon the 22nd Brigade to the
north, especially upon the Welsh Fusiliers, so the reconnaissance had
to fall back again, the 1st Grenadier Guards sustaining some losses.
The two covering regiments were also hard pressed, especially the
Wiltshires, who were again attacked during the night, but repulsed
their assailants.

[Sidenote: A deadly ordeal.]

From this time onwards the Seventh Division was to feel ever more and
more the increasing pressure as the German army corps from day to day
brought their weight to bear upon a thin extended line of positions
held by a single division.  It will be shown that they were speedily
reinforced by the First Corps, but even after its advent the Germans
were still able {238} to greatly outnumber the British force.  The
story from this time onwards is one of incessant and desperate
attacks by day and often by night.  At first the division was holding
the position alone, with the help of their attendant cavalry, and
their instructions were to hold on to the last man until help could
reach them.  In the case of some units these instructions were
literally fulfilled.  One great advantage lay with the British.  They
were first-class trained soldiers, the flower of the Army, while
their opponents, however numerous, were of the newly raised reserve
corps, which showed no lack of bravery, but contained a large
proportion of youths and elderly men in the ranks.  Letters from the
combatants have described the surprise and even pity which filled the
minds of the British when they saw the stormers hesitate upon the
edge of the trenches which they had so bravely approached, and stare
down into them uncertain what they should do.  But though the
ascendancy of the British infantry was so great that they could
afford to disregard the inequality of numbers, it was very different
with the artillery.  The German gunners were as good as ever, and
their guns as powerful as they were numerous.  The British had no
howitzer batteries at all with this division, while the Germans had
many.  It was the batteries which caused the terrific losses.  It may
be that the Seventh Division, having had no previous experience in
the campaign, had sited their trenches with less cunning than would
have been shown by troops who had already faced the problem of how
best to avoid high explosives.  Either by sight or by aeroplane
report the Germans got the absolute range of some portions of the
British position, pitching their heavy shells exactly into the {239}
trenches, and either blowing the inmates to pieces or else burying
them alive, so that in a little time the straight line of the trench
was entirely lost, and became a series of ragged pits and mounds.
The head-cover for shrapnel was useless before such missiles, and
there was nothing for it but either to evacuate the line or to hang
on and suffer.  The Seventh Division hung on and suffered, but no
soldiers can ever have been exposed to a more deadly ordeal.  When
they were at last relieved by the arrival of reinforcements and the
consequent contraction of the line, they were at the last pitch of
exhaustion, indomitable in spirit, but so reduced by their losses and
by the terrific nervous strain that they could hardly have held out
much longer.

A short account has been given of what occurred to the division up to
October 20.  It will now be carried on for a few days, after which
the narrative must turn to the First Corps, and show why and how they
came into action to the north of the hard-pressed division.  It is
impossible to tell the two stories simultaneously, and so it may now
be merely mentioned that from October 21 Haig's Corps was on the
left, and that those operations which will shortly be described
covered the left wing of the division, and took over a portion of
that huge German attack which would undoubtedly have overwhelmed the
smaller unit had it not been for this addition of strength.  It is
necessary to get a true view of the operations, for it is safe to say
that they are destined for immortality, and will be recounted so long
as British history is handed down from one generation to another.

On the 21st the enemy got a true conception of {240} the salient in
front of the Seventh Division, and opened a vigorous attack, which
lasted all day and assumed several different phases at different
points.  The feature of the morning of the 21st was the severe and,
indeed, disastrous artillery fire upon Lawford's 22nd Brigade.  The
exact range of the British position seems to have been discovered
with deadly results.  Men, trenches, and machine-guns were all blown
to pieces together.  The 2nd Warwicks and the 1st Welsh Fusiliers
were the two battalions upon which the storm beat hardest, and each
of them had some hundreds of casualties.  In three days the Welsh
Fusiliers, who were on the exposed left flank, lost three-quarters of
their effectives, including twenty-three of their officers, and yet
preserved their military spirit.  It became clearer as experience
accumulated that the best trenches, if they are once fairly located,
can be made untenable or turned into the graves of their occupants by
the use of high explosives.  The German fire was so severe that it
was reckoned that one hundred and twenty shells an hour into or round
a trench was a not uncommon rate of fall.  The 2nd Queen's also lost
seven officers and many men in this day's fighting.  In spite of the
heavy losses from gun-fire the German infantry could make no
progress, being held up by a flanking fire of the South Staffords.

[Sidenote: Desperate attacks on Seventh Division.]

In the afternoon of October 21 a strong attack was made upon the 21st
Brigade in the centre of the line.  The brigade was holding a front
of two and a half miles, and, although the attack was generally
beaten back, a certain number of stormers got through between the
trenches and into the woods beyond.  Here they lurked for a couple of
days, during which time the 2nd Yorkshire Regiment, behind whose
{241} line they were lying, were often compelled to have each
alternate man facing a different way to keep down the fire.  The
battalion sent itself reinforcements by hurrying its right company
over to help to clear its left.  This movement was successful, but
was attended with heavy losses, including several officers.  Some of
the Royal Scots Fusiliers had been forced out of their trenches on
the right, and made, under Major Ian Forbes, a gallant attempt to
re-establish them, in which Captain Fairlie and many men were lost.
The Wiltshires also endured a very severe attack, which they repulsed
with great loss to the enemy.  On this same eventful day, the 21st,
the Second Cavalry Division had been pushed back at Holbeke, and the
Germans got round the right flank of the hard-pressed infantry.  It
was then that General Rawlinson brought his Third Cavalry Division
round and established it upon his right instead of his left flank.
From this time until October 30 this cavalry division was holding
Zandvoorde Ridge, sharing day by day in all the perils and the
glories of their comrades of the Seventh Division.  There was no more
dangerous point than that which was held by the cavalry, and their
losses, especially those of the 10th Hussars, were in proportion to
the danger.  In the course of a few days the Hussars lost Colonel
Barnes, Majors Mitford and Crichton and many officers and men.

On October 22 the Second Division of Haig's First Corps, which had
been fully occupied to the north with operations which will presently
be described, moved down to cover the ground vacated by the Third
Cavalry Division and to relieve the pressure upon the infantry of the
Seventh Division.  The 4th Guards Brigade took its position upon
their {242} immediate left.  It was time.  For four days they had
covered the enormous front of eight miles against at least four times
their own number, with more than six times their weight of artillery.
It was touch and go.  They were nearly submerged.  It was indeed a
vision of joy when the worn and desperate men, looking over their
shoulders down the Ypres-Menin road, saw the head of a British column
coming swiftly to the rescue.  It was the 2nd Highland Light Infantry
and the 2nd Worcesters, dispatched from the 5th Brigade, and never
was reinforcement more needed.  Shortly afterwards further help in
the shape of a detachment of the Munster Fusiliers, two troops of the
ever-helpful Irish Horse, and one section of artillery appeared upon
the scene.

[Sidenote: Destruction of 2nd Wilts.]

Upon this date (October 22) the 22nd Infantry Brigade of the Seventh
Division had fallen back to the railway crossings near Zonnebeke.
Thus the salient which the Germans had been attacking was
straightened out.  Unhappily, the change caused another smaller
salient farther south, at the point which was held by the 2nd
Wiltshires.  On the 22nd and 23rd there was a tremendous shelling of
this sector, which was followed on the 24th by an infantry advance,
in which the Wiltshires, who had been previously much reduced, were
utterly overwhelmed and practically destroyed.  The disastrous attack
broke upon the British line just after daybreak.  The enemy pushed
through behind each flank of the Wiltshires, elbowing off the Scots
Fusiliers on one side and the Scots Guards on the other.  The Germans
got in force into the Polygon Woods behind.  There were no reserves
available save the Northumberland Hussars, a corps which has the
honour of being the {243} first British territorial corps to fight
for its country.  With the aid of some divisional cyclists, this
handful of men held back the Germans until the 2nd Warwicks from the
north were brought to stem the advance.  The Warwicks charged through
the wood, their gallant Colonel Loring riding his horse beside them
without boot or legging, having been wounded some days before.
"Where my men go I go as well," was his answer to medical
remonstrance.  He was killed by a bullet, but he died at a moment of
victory, for his last earthly vision was that of his infantry driving
the last Germans out of the wood.  Besides their colonel, the
regiment lost many officers and men in this fine advance, which was
most vigorously supported by the 2nd Worcesters, the only
reinforcement within reach.  The Worcesters lost 6 officers and 160
men, but did much execution and took a number of prisoners.

[Sidenote: Hard fight of 20th Brigade.]

At this time the 20th Brigade, being the extreme right of the Seventh
Division, held an extended line from Kruiseik cross-roads, about a
mile east of Gheluvelt village, to near Zandvoorde, with a salient at
the village of Kruiseik.  On the night of the 25th the Germans
planned a furious attack upon the whole salient.  The assailants, who
were mostly Saxons, broke through the 2nd Scots Guards just north of
Kruiseik and got behind the line, which was pushed back for some
distance, though Captain Paynter, with the right-hand company, held
his position.  A counter-attack by the Guards retook the line,
together with 200 prisoners, including 7 officers.  On the morning of
the 26th the Germans were back on them, however, and began by blowing
in the trenches of the Border Regiment south of Kruiseik.  The German
{244} guns had found the exact range of the trenches, and the
defenders had the same terrible and intolerable experience which had
befallen some of their comrades two days before.  It was simply
impossible to stand up against the incessant shower of shattering
shells.  So great was the concussion and the nervous strain that many
of the men exposed to it got completely dazed or even became
delirious.  Grenadiers, Scots Guards, and South Staffords, of the
20th Brigade, held the line until the front trenches were carried by
the Germans and many of the occupants made prisoners.  It was pitch
dark, and it was impossible to tell friend from foe.  Major Fraser of
the Scots Guards, going forward to reconnoitre, was shot dead and his
party was destroyed.  A house in a field taken by the Guards yielded
no fewer than 200 prisoners, but in the confused fighting in the
darkness our losses were greater than our gains.  It was in this
night-fighting that Lord Dalrymple, Colonel Bolton, and other
officers, with some hundreds of men, fell into the hands of the enemy
after a most heroic resistance to overpowering numbers and to a
weight of artillery which was crushing in its effect.  The King's
Company of the 1st Grenadiers was isolated and in great danger, but
managed to link up with the British line.  The 1st South Staffords
also lost some hundreds of men, and was only saved by fine handling
on the part of Colonel Ovens.  Kruiseik was abandoned, and a new line
taken up half a mile farther back.  It was a critical night, during
which the energy and firmness of General Capper were splendidly
employed in reforming and stiffening his sorely tried division.  On
the 26th the 20th Brigade, which had been so heavily {245} hit the
day before, was drawn out of the line for a rest, and the two other
brigades closed up to cover a shorter line.  The work of the 20th at
Kruiseik had been magnificent, but their losses were appalling,
including their Brigadier, Ruggles-Brise, who was wounded.  Here, for
the instant, we shall leave the Seventh Division, though their ordeal
was by no means done, and we shall turn to those other forces which
had been forming in the northern or Ypres section of the long battle
line.

[Sidenote: Arrival of First Corps.]

The reader will remember, if he casts his mind back, that the whole
British line, as it extended from the south about October 18,
consisted of the Second Corps and the advance guard of the Indians
near La Bassée; then, in succession, the Third Corps in the
Armentières district, the First Cavalry and Second Cavalry near
Messines and Wytschaete, the Seventh Division near Gheluvelt, and
finally the Third Cavalry on their left, joining up with the French,
who carried the line to where the Belgians were reforming on the
Yser.  The First Corps had detrained from the Aisne, and was
concentrated between St. Omer and Hazebrouck upon October 18 and 19.
They represented a last British reserve of about thirty-five thousand
men to set against the large new armies who were advancing from the
north.  The urgent question to be decided was where they should be
placed, since there were so many points which needed reinforcement.

Sir John French has explained in his dispatch the reasons which
swayed him in deciding this question.  "I knew," he said, "that the
enemy were by this time in greatly superior strength upon the Lys and
that the Second and Third Cavalry and Fourth Corps {246} (Seventh
Division) were holding a much wider front than their strength and
numbers warranted.  Taking these facts alone into consideration, it
would have appeared wise to throw the First Corps in to strengthen
the line, but this would have left the country north and east of
Ypres and the Ypres Canal open to a wide turning movement by the
Third Reserve Corps and at least one Landwehr Division which I knew
to be operating in that region.  I was also aware that the enemy was
bringing large reinforcements up from the east, which could only be
opposed for several days by two or three French cavalry divisions,
some French Territorials, and the Belgian Army."

He proceeds to state his opinion that the Belgian Army was in no
condition to withstand unsupported such an attack, and that if it
were allowed to sweep past us it was very likely to wash away all
opposition before it, and get into the Channel ports in our rear.
With this consideration in his mind, Sir John French took the bold
and dangerous, but absolutely necessary, step of leaving the long,
thin, thirty-mile line to do the best it could, and prolonging it by
another ten or twelve miles by forming up the First Corps on the same
alignment, so as to present as long a British breakwater as possible
to the oncoming flood.  There was nothing else to be done, and the
stronger the flood the more need there was to do it, but it is safe
to say that seldom in history has so frail a barrier stood in the
direct track of so terrible a storm.

In accordance with this resolution, Haig's First Corps moved, on
October 20, through Poperinghe and Ypres and took their place upon
the north or left side of the Seventh Division.  On their own left in
this position was the French cavalry corps of {247} General de Mitry,
while the Third Division of British cavalry was on their right.  As
the movement commenced Sir John French had a personal interview with
General Haig, in which he held out hopes that the greater part of the
new German levies had been deflected to hold our southern advance,
and that he would only find the Third Reserve Corps and some Landwehr
in front of him to the north of Ypres.  His object was to advance
upon the line of Bruges and drive the enemy towards Ghent.  Meanwhile
the gallant little Belgian army, which was proving itself a glutton
at fighting, was entrenched along the line of the Ypres Canal and the
Yser River, where they held their own manfully in spite of all that
they had endured.

[Sidenote: Advance of Haig's Corps.]

The first large landmark in the direction of Bruges was Thorout, and
towards this the First Corps, with the Third Cavalry Division upon
its right, took its first steps, little thinking that it was butting
forward against an approaching army of at least double its own
strength.  It was very quickly made to realise its position, however,
and any dreams of a victorious entry into Bruges were speedily
dispelled.  Only too fortunate would it be if it could hold its own
line without retreat and disaster.  Upon the 21st Haig's men attacked
Poel-Chapelle and Passchendaale, French cavalry and Territorials (the
Eighty-seventh and Eighty-ninth Divisions) under General Bidon
advancing on their left, while the Seventh Division, as already
described, kept pace upon its right.  There was strong opposition
from the first, but the corps advanced in spite of it until the
pressure from the north became too severe for the French, whose flank
was exposed to the full force of it.

{248}

The British attack upon the morning in question was planned as
follows.  The Second Division was to advance upon Passchendaale.  The
First had orders to take Poel-Chapelle.  The latter movement was
headed by the 3rd Brigade, who were directed by General Landon to go
forward about nine o'clock, the 1st Queen's having the station for
their objective while the 1st South Wales Borderers attacked the
village.  The 1st Gloucesters were in reserve.  The enemy met the
attack with shell-fire, which it was difficult to locate, as the
country was flat and enclosed.  The progress of the movement,
however, was steady though slow.  About ten o'clock there were signs
of a considerable hostile infantry advance from the north.  The
attack, however, made good progress up to midday, when there was a
general retirement of the French Territorials, followed later by the
French cavalry upon the British left.  They moved back towards
Bixschote.  The Gloucester Regiment, who had been thrown out to
reinforce that flank, were also driven back, and were in turn
reinforced by the Coldstream Guards.  This battalion executed a
bayonet charge in clearing the small village of Koekuit, but later on
had to retire, finding their flank exposed.  It should be mentioned
that one French corps, the Seventh Cavalry Division, kept its
position upon the British left, and it is also only fair to point out
that as the German advance was mainly from the north, it was upon the
left flank, covered by the French, that it would fall.  The 1st
Camerons were now dispatched to the flank to stiffen the French
resistance, taking up their position near the inn which is midway
upon the road between Steenstraate and Langemarck, north of the
village {249} of Pilken--an inn with which they were destined to have
stirring associations.  With the support of the 46th Battery, the
Highlanders held up a German brigade which was thrusting through
behind our main line; but farther west, in the Steenstraate
direction, the defence against a northern advance was miserably thin,
consisting only of one company of the Sussex Regiment and the 116th
Battery.  In the circumstances the more success Haig's troops
attained in front, and the more they advanced, the more dangerous was
their position upon the flank.

About 2.30 the German advance from the north became more formidable,
and the 1st South Welsh Borderers, between Langemarck and
Poel-Chapelle, were heavily counter-attacked and suffered
considerable loss, between two and three hundred in all.  Two
companies of the 2nd Welsh were pushed up to their help.  It was
clear, however, that the advance could not be continued.  The 1st
Brigade was therefore ordered to hold the line between Steenstraate
and Langemarck, with their centre at the inn north of Pilken, so as
to face the German advance from the north.  Then from Langemarck the
British line turned southwards, being carried on for two miles by the
3rd Brigade to hold the enemy who were coming from the east.  The 2nd
Brigade was in reserve at Boesinghe.  During this long and difficult
day the Second Division, operating upon the right of the First, was
not subjected to the same anxiety about its flank.  It advanced upon
its objective in the face of severe opposition, ending more than once
in a brief bayonet encounter.  Several counter-attacks were made by
the Germans, but they were all beaten back with loss.  About two
o'clock, however, {250} the Second Division learned of the flank
pressure which was holding up the First Division, and also of the
extreme need for help experienced by the 22nd Brigade of the Seventh
Division on their right.  In these circumstances it was necessary to
abandon the idea of further advance and to send south those
reinforcements, the opportune arrival of which has been already
described.

As a net result of the two days' operations General Haig was not able
to attain the line of Passchendaale-Poel-Chapelle, as originally
planned, but he gained sufficient ground to establish himself from
Langemarck to Zonnebeke, more than half-way to his objective.  The
whole character of the operations during these days was more of the
familiar British type, being conducted upon the surface of the earth
rather than under it, and cavalry making its last appearance for many
a long day.  Many fine deeds of valour were done.  In one of these
Captain Rising, of the Gloucester Regiment, with ninety men, defended
some point with such heroic tenacity that when, some days afterwards,
the Brigadier attempted to get the names of the survivors for
commendation not one could be found.  Quaintly valorous also is the
picture of Major Powell, of the North Lancashires, leading his wing
with a badly-sprained ankle, and using a cottage chair for a crutch,
upon which he sat down between rushes.  It is hopeless, however, and
even invidious to pick instances where the same spirit animated all.
The result was definite.  It had been clearly shown that the enemy
were in considerably greater strength than had been imagined, and
instead of a rearguard action from weak forces the British found
themselves in the presence of a strong German {251} advance.  All day
large forces of the enemy were advancing from Roulers and were
impinging upon different points of the Franco-British line.  These
troops were composed of partially-trained men, volunteers and
reservists, but they attacked with the utmost determination, and
endured heavy losses with great bravery.  It is a remarkable proof of
the elaborate preparations for war made by Germany that, behind all
their original gigantic array, they still had ready within the
country sufficient arms and uniforms to fit out these five new army
corps.  He who plans finds it easy to prepare, and whoever will
compare this profusion of munitions in Germany with the absolute lack
of them in the Allied countries will have no further doubt as to
which Government conspired against the peace of the world.

On October 21, Sir John French began to feel that there were new
factors in his front.  In the evening, at a meeting with Haig and
Rawlinson, he discussed the unexpected strength of the German
reinforcements and admitted that the scheme of an advance upon Bruges
would become impossible in the face of such numbers.  Intelligence
reports indicated that there was already a German army corps in front
of each British division.  General Joffre had promised considerable
French reinforcements upon October 24, and all that could be done was
for the British troops to hold their ground to the last man and to
resist every pressure until the equality of the forces could be
restored.  Could they hold the line till then?  That was the
all-important question.

October 22 was the first day of that long ordeal of incessant attacks
which the First Corps was called {252} upon to endure, until by
constant attrition it had become almost as worn as the Seventh
Division to the south.  On this day the German attack, which had not
yet attained the full volume of later days, spent itself here and
there along the extended lines.  Only at one point did the enemy have
some success, which, however, was the prelude to disaster.

[Sidenote: Fight of Pilken Inn.]

The line from Steenstraate to Langemarck, defending the British left
flank, was held by the 1st Brigade, the Scots Guards upon the extreme
left, then the Cameron Highlanders, and the Black Watch in reserve.
In the middle of the line north of Pilken was a solitary inn, already
mentioned, round which trenches had been cut in horse-shoe fashion,
the concavity of the shoe pointing southwards.  This point marked the
junction between the Camerons and the Scots Guards.  About 3 P.M.
this position was driven in and captured by a sudden and determined
advance of the enemy.  The German charge was a fine feat of arms, for
it was carried out largely by _Einjahrige_, who may be roughly
compared to the Officers' Training Corps of our British system.
These high-spirited lads advanced singing patriotic songs, and
succeeded in carrying the trenches in the face of soldiers who are
second to none in the British Army--soldiers, too, who had seen, much
service, while the German cadets were new to the work.  The
performance was much appreciated by British officers and men.

The Black Watch endeavoured without success to restore the line, and
the 1st Northamptons were called upon from divisional reserve, while
from all parts troops converged towards the gap.  On the arrival of
the Northamptons they pushed up towards {253} the interval which now
existed between the Scots Guards and the remains of the Camerons, but
found the gap broader than had been thought, and strongly occupied.
It was then evening, and it was thought best to delay the
counter-attack until morning and so have time to bring up
reinforcements.  The 1st North Lancashires and the 2nd South
Staffords were accordingly ordered up, together with the 1st Queen's
Surrey and the 2nd Rifles, the whole operation being under the
immediate command of General Bulfin.  The advance began at six in the
morning, over very difficult ground which had been barb-wired during
the night.  The progress was slow but steady, and at eleven o'clock
an assault upon the inn was ordered.  The position was critical,
since the enemy was now firmly lodged in the very centre of the flank
of the British position, and was able to enfilade all the trenches of
the First Division.  The Queen's Surrey, the 2nd King's Royal Rifles,
and the 1st North Lancashires charged home with splendid energy,
capturing the trenches round the inn, besides releasing sixty
Camerons and taking over five hundred prisoners.  The trenches were
carried by the North Lancashires, led by Major Carter.  It was the
second time within six weeks that this battalion had made a decisive
bayonet charge.  The price paid was six officers and 150 men.  The
inn itself was rushed by Captain Creek's company of the Queen's,
while Major Watson, of the same regiment, organised the final
advance.  The fighting at this point was not finished for the day.
In the late evening the enemy, with fine tenacity of purpose,
attacked the inn once more and drove the Queen's out of a salient.
The line was then straightened on each side {254} of the inn and
remained firm.  Both the attack on the inn and the defence of the
line were splendidly supported by the field artillery.

Whilst the 1st Brigade had in this fashion got into and out of a
dangerous position, there had been a severe attack upon two regiments
of Landon's 3rd Brigade stationed at Langemarck.  The defending units
were the 2nd Welsh Regiment and the 1st Gloucesters.  Aided by a
strong artillery backing, they beat off these attacks and inflicted a
very heavy loss upon the enemy.  The Allied line to the north was
solid and unbroken.

[Sidenote: Bravery of enemy.]

The British losses during these operations of the First Corps
amounted to 1500 men, while those of the Germans were exceedingly
heavy.  These inexperienced troops advanced with an indiscriminating
enthusiasm which exposed them to severe retaliation.  It is doubtful
if at any time in the campaign the British fire found so easy a mark.
One thousand five hundred dead were counted in the vicinity of
Langemarck, and the total loss (including over six hundred prisoners)
could not have been less than 10,000 men.  Correspondence afterwards
captured showed that the Twenty-third Reserve Corps sustained such
losses that for a time at least it was out of action.  The
Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps was also hard hit.  A letter from a
soldier in the 246th Regiment mentions that only eighty men were left
of his battalion after the action of the 24th.

On October 24 and 25 the arrival of French reinforcements allowed the
British to shorten up their defensive line, which had been unduly
extended.  The Seventeenth Division of the Ninth French Army Corps
took over the line of the Second Division, which {255} was drawn back
to St. Jean, and in turn took over part of the front of the Seventh
Division.  French territorial troops, under General de Mitry,
relieved the First British Division on the line
Hannebeke-Langemarck-Steenstraate.  The First Division was drawn back
to Zillebeke.

[Sidenote: Advance of Second Division.]

Meantime the Second Division, having the French Ninth Corps upon its
left and the Seventh Division upon its right, made an attack towards
Bacelaer, taking two guns and some prisoners.  This advance was
renewed upon the 26th, this being the day upon which, as already
described, the Germans pushed back the 20th Brigade of the Seventh
Division at the Kruiseik salient, creating a situation which brought
the Second Division to a standstill.

In this movement forward of the Second Division from October 24 to
26, the Guards' 4th Brigade were on the right, the 6th Brigade on the
left, with the French to the left of them.  The 5th Brigade were in
reserve.  Two small villages were taken by storm, the Germans being
driven out of loopholed houses, though at a considerable cost of
officers and men.  It was in this operation that Colonel Bannatyne,
the gallant leader of the 1st King's Liverpool, was killed.  Ten
other officers and several hundred men of this corps were killed or
wounded.  The 1st Berkshires, fighting to the left of the King's,
shared in its losses and in its success.  The Irish Guards were held
up before Reutel and separated from the rest of the force, but
managed to extricate themselves after some anxious hours.

On October 27, Sir John French came in person to Hooge, at the rear
of the fighting line, and inquired into the state of the hard-pressed
troops.  He found {256} the Seventh to be now such a skeleton
division that it was thought best to join it with Haig's First Corps,
forming one single command.

The attendant Third Cavalry Division was also attached to the First
Corps.  These readjustments took place upon October 27.  They were,
of course, of a temporary character until the eagerly awaited Eighth
Division should arrive and so give General Rawlinson a complete
Fourth Corps.  At present there was a very immediate prospect that
half of it might be annihilated before the second half appeared.  The
general arrangement of this section of the battlefield was now as
depicted, the Seventh Division being entirely south of the
Ypres-Menin roadway.

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{257}

[Illustration: General Scene of Operations]

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This date, the 27th, was memorable only for an advance of the 6th
Brigade.  These continual advances against odds were wonderful
examples of the aggressive spirit of the British soldiers.  In this
instance ground was gained, but at the cost of some casualties,
especially to the 1st Rifles, who lost Prince Maurice of Battenberg
and a number of officers and men.

[Sidenote: Fight of Kruiseik cross-roads.]

And now the great epic of the first Battle of Ypres was rising to its
climax, and the three days of supreme trial for the British Army were
to begin.  Early upon October 29, a very heavy attack developed upon
the line of the Ypres-Menin road.  There is a village named
Gheluvelt, which is roughly half-way upon this tragic highway.  It
lay now immediately behind the centre of the British line.  About
half a mile in front of it the position ran through the important
cross-roads which lead to the village of Kruiseik, still in the
British possession.  The line through the {258} Kruiseik cross-roads
was that which was furiously assailed upon this morning, and the
attack marked the beginning of a great movement to drive in the front
continuing throughout the 30th and culminating in the terrible ordeal
of the 31st, the crisis of the Ypres battle and possibly of the
Western campaign.

FitzClarence's 1st Brigade lay to the north of the road, and the
battered, much-enduring 20th Brigade upon the south.  They were
destined together to give such an example of military tenacity during
that day as has seldom been equalled and never exceeded, so that the
fight for the Kruiseik crossroads may well live in history amongst
those actions, like Albuera and Inkermann, which have put the powers
of British infantry to an extreme test.  The line was held by about
five thousand men, but no finer units were to be found in the whole
Army.  The attack was conducted by an army corps with the eyes of
their Emperor and an overpowering artillery encouraging them from the
rear.  Many of the defending regiments, especially those of the 20th
Brigade, had already been terribly wasted.  It was a line of weary
and desperate men who faced the German onslaught.

The attack began in the mists of the early morning.  The opening was
adverse to the British, for the enemy, pushing very boldly forward
upon a narrow front and taking full advantage of the fog, broke a way
down the Menin road and actually got past the defending line before
the situation was understood.  The result was that the two regiments
which flanked the road, the 1st Black Watch and the 1st Grenadiers,
were fired into from behind and endured terrible {259} losses.  Among
the Grenadiers Colonel Earle, Majors Forrester and Stucley, Lord
Richard Wellesley, and a number of other officers fell, while out of
650 privates only 150 were eventually left standing, the 2nd Gordons,
upon the right of the Grenadiers, suffered nearly as heavily, while
the 1st Coldstream, upon the left of the Black Watch, was perhaps the
hardest hit of all, for at the end of that dreadful day it had not a
single officer fit for duty.  The right company of the 1st Scots
Guards shared the fate of the Coldstream.  The line was pushed back
for a quarter of a mile and Kruiseik was evacuated, but the dead and
wounded who remained in the trenches far exceeded in numbers those
who were able to withdraw.

Two small bodies who were cut off by the German advance did not fall
back with their comrades, and each of them made a splendid and
successful resistance.  The one near Kruiseik was a mixed party under
Major Bottomley of the 2nd Queen's West Surrey.  The other was C
Company of the 2nd Gordons under Captain B. G. R. Gordon and
Lieutenant Laurence Carr.  These small islands of khaki, in the midst
of a broad stream of grey, lay so tight and fired so straight that
they inflicted very great damage upon the enemy, and were able to
hold their own, in ever-diminishing numbers, until under the
protection of darkness the survivors regained the British line.

In the meantime, a number of small dashing counter-attacks by the
indomitable infantry was bringing the British line forward again.
South of the road the Gordons, under Colonel Uniacke, dashed
themselves again and again against the huge host which faced them,
driving them back, and then in their turn recoiling before the
ponderous advance of {260} the army corps.  They were maddened by the
sound of the rolling fire ahead of them, which showed that their own
C Company was dying hard.  In one of these counter-attacks Captain
Brooke brought every straggler into the fray, and died while trying
to cut his way through to his comrades.  To the north of the road
Captain Stephen, with the remains of the 1st Scots Guards, threw
themselves upon the German flank and staggered it by their fire.  The
Germans, who had almost reached Gheluvelt, were now worried in this
way on either flank, while the 2nd Border battalion and the Welsh
Borderers with the rallied remains of the broken regiments were still
facing them in front.  The enemy was held, was stricken front and
flank with a murderous fire, and recoiled back down the Menin road.
Imperial eyes and overmastering guns were equally powerless to drive
them through that iron defence.  Five thousand British soldiers had
driven back an army corps, but had left more than half their number
upon the scene of victory.

The Second Division, to the north of the road in the direction of
Reutel, had been ordered to counter-attack, and the other brigades of
the Seventh Division to the south did the same.  While Haig had a man
standing he was ready to hit back.  Between these two flanking forces
there was a movement in the centre to follow the Germans back and to
recover some of the lost ground.  Landon's Third Brigade, less the
Gloucester Regiment, was pushed forward.  These troops moved past
Gheluvelt and advanced along the line of the road, the 1st Queen's,
their right-hand unit, linking up by a happy chance with their own
2nd Battalion, who were now on the left of the 22nd Brigade of the
Seventh Division.  Left {261} of the Queen's were the 2nd Welsh to
the immediate south of the main road, while to their left again lay
the 1st South Wales Borderers, in front of the village of Gheluvelt.
By evening these troops had recovered some of the ground, but the
village of Kruiseik, which had always constituted a salient, was now
abandoned.  The cross-roads also remained in the hands of the enemy.
Landon's Brigade continued to bar the further German advance
preparing in stern resignation for the renewed and heavier blow which
all knew to be in readiness, and which was destined two days later to
bring them a glorious annihilation.

It was clear upon the evening of the 29th that serious mischief was
afoot, for there were great signs of movement on the German side, and
all night the continual rattle of wheels was heard to the eastward.
These menacing sounds were actually caused by a very strong
reinforcement, the Fifteenth German Corps (Strasburg) of the regular
army, which, followed by the Thirteenth Corps and the Second Bavarian
Corps, were coming into the battle line with the declared intention
of smashing their way through to Ypres.  Correspondence, afterwards
captured, showed that the German Emperor had issued a special appeal
to these troops, declaring that the movement was one which would be
of decisive importance to the war.  It was, of course, not the
venerable town of Ypres which had assumed such a place in the mind
both of the Emperor and his people, but it was Calais and the Channel
coast to which it was the door.  Once in the possession of these
points, it seemed to their perfervid minds that they would be in a
position to constrain Great Britain to an ignominious peace, a course
which {262} would surely have ruined the cause of the Allies and
placed the whole world under the German heel.  No less was the issue
at stake.  The British Army from Langemarck in the north to La Bassée
in the south were resolutely determined that the road was barred,
while to left and to right they had stout-hearted comrades of Belgium
and of France.

[Sidenote: Fight of Zandvoorde.]

At half-past six upon October 30 a very heavy attack developed, which
involved the whole line of the First Corps and also the French Ninth
Corps upon its left.  This attack upon the left was carried out by
the Reserve Corps 26 and 27, with whom we had had previous dealings,
and it was repulsed with considerable loss by the French and the 6th
British Brigade.  To the south, however, the British were very
violently engaged down the whole line of trenches from the position
of the Seventh Division near the Ypres-Menin road, through
Zandvoorde, where the Third Cavalry Division was holding on under
great difficulties, and on southward still, past the position of the
Second Cavalry down to Messines, where the First Cavalry Division was
also heavily engaged.  The front of battle was not less than twelve
miles in length, with one continuous long-drawn rattle of small arms
and roar of guns from end to end.

The British may have anticipated that the chief blow would fall at
the same spot as had been attacked the day before.  As a matter of
fact, it was directed farther south, at Zandvoorde, on the immediate
right of the Seventh Division.

The first sign of success for the strenuous German efforts upon
October 30 was the driving in of Kavanagh's 7th Guards' Cavalry
Brigade from their trenches at the Zandvoorde Ridge.  On this ridge,
{263} which is not more than a hundred and twenty feet high, the
Germans concentrated so tremendous and accurate a fire that the
trenches were in many places demolished and became entirely
untenable.  The survivors of the Life Guards and Blues who made up
this brigade withdrew steadily through the reserve trenches, which
were held by the 6th cavalry Brigade, and reformed at Klein Zillebeke
in the rear.  Two squadrons, however, and Lord Worsley's machine-gun
section were killed or taken by the assailants.  The unoccupied
trenches were seized by the Sixth Bavarian Reserve Division, who
advanced rapidly in order to improve their advantage, while their
artillery began to pound the reserves.  The cavalry had been
strengthened, however, by the Greys and 3rd Hussars upon the left,
while the 4th Hussars lined up on the right, and C, I, and K Horse
Artillery batteries vigorously supported.  In spite of great
pressure, the position was held.  Farther south the First Cavalry
Division was also at very close grips with the Twenty-sixth Division
of the Thirteenth German Army Corps, and was hard put to it to hold
its own.  Along the whole cavalry position there was extreme strain.
A squadron of the 1st Royals were forced to evacuate the chateau of
Holebeke, and the line in this quarter was pushed back as far as St.
Eloi, thus flattening a considerable salient.

The danger of a position which consists of so long a line with few
reserves is that any retirement at any point immediately exposes the
flanks of the neighbouring units to right and left.  Thus the
evacuation of Zandvoorde threw open the right flank of the Seventh
Division, even as its left had been in the air upon the day before.
On getting through, the Germans were {264} on the right rear of the
1st Welsh Fusiliers and enfiladed them badly, destroying all the
officers and a considerable proportion of the regiment, which had
already been greatly reduced.  Colonel Cadogan was among those who
fell.  The 22nd Brigade was forced to fall back, and the 2nd
Yorkshires and 2nd Scots Fusiliers, of the 21st Brigade, being left
in a salient, suffered heavily, especially the latter battalion, the
conduct of which from first to last was remarkable even among such
men as fought beside them.  These two regiments held on with the
greatest determination until orders to retire reached them, which
were somewhat belated, as several orderlies were killed in bringing
them.  The 2nd Bedfords, who had themselves sustained very severe
losses from the German artillery fire, covered the retirement of the
remains of these two gallant units.  The Seventh Division then
covered the line from the canal through Klein Zillebeke and along the
front of the woods to near Gheluvelt.

The position was now most critical.  The Germans were in possession
of Zandvoorde Ridge on the British right flank, a most important
position whence guns could command a considerable area.  Ypres was
only four miles distant.  There was nothing but a line of weary and
partially broken infantry to protect the flank from being entirely
pierced.  The whole of a German active army corps was attacking upon
this line.  The order was given to hold the new positions at all
costs, but on the evening of the 30th the situation was full of
menace for the morrow.  The German flood was still thundering against
the barrier, and the barrier seemed to be giving.  At about 2 P.M. on
October 30 the 1st Irish Guards and the 2nd Grenadiers, who were in
reserve to two battalions of the Coldstream {265} in trenches in the
Polygon Wood, near Reutel Village, were ordered to help the Seventh
Division.  General Capper subsequently directed them to take the
place of the cavalry on the right of his division.  The Irish Guards
were accordingly on the right of the Seventh Division from now
onwards, and the Grenadiers were on their right, extending down to
the canal in front of Klein Zillebeke.  The commander of the Ninth
French Corps also, with that fine loyalty which his comrades have
shown again and again during the war, easing many a difficult and
perhaps saving some impossible situations, put three battalions and
some cavalry at the disposal of the British.  Two regiments of
Bulfin's 2nd Brigade were also brought across and thrust into the
gap.  But the outlook that evening was not cheering.  The troops had
been fighting hard for two days without a break.  The losses had been
heavy.  The line had been driven back and was greatly strained.  It
was known that the Germans were in great strength and that the attack
would be renewed on the morrow.  The troops and their leaders faced
the immediate future in a spirit of sombre determination.

[Sidenote: Fight of Gheluvelt.]

During the 30th Landon's Brigade had strengthened their position near
Gheluvelt, and General Haig, realising that this was the key of his
line, moved up the 2nd King's Royal Rifles and the 1st North
Lancashires to form a reserve under the orders of General Landon.
These regiments took a position south-west of Gheluvelt and connected
up more closely between the Seventh Division and the 3rd Brigade of
the First Division.  It was well that a closely-knitted line had been
formed, for at the dawn of day upon the 31st a most terrific attack
was made, {266} which was pushed with unexampled fierceness during
the whole day, falling chiefly upon the centre and left of the
Seventh Division and upon the 1st Queen's and 2nd Welsh of the Third
Brigade.

A weak point developed, unfortunately, in the front line, for the
Seventh Division in its enfeebled condition was further weakened by
forming somewhat of a salient in the Kruiseik direction.  They
behaved with all their usual magnificent gallantry, but they were not
numerous enough to hold the ground.  The line was broken and the
remains of the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, after being exposed to
heavy fire from 5.30 A.M., were outflanked and surrounded in the
early afternoon.  The bulk of the survivors of this battalion had
been sent to reinforce the line elsewhere, but the remainder, some
sixty in number, were killed, wounded, or taken, including their
gallant colonel, Baird Smith, who had been hit the day before.  The
Picton tradition which disregards wounds unless they are absolutely
crippling was continually observed by these stern soldiers.  On the
left of the Scots Fusiliers the 2nd Bedfords were also involved in
the catastrophe, but drew off with heavy losses.

The left wing of the Seventh Division began to retire, and the 1st
Queen's upon the right of the 3rd Brigade had both their flanks
turned and were reduced to a handful under Major Watson and
Lieutenant Boyd, who still held together as a unit.  It was a great
morning in the history of this regiment, as the two battalions had
fought side by side, and their colonels, Pell and Coles, had both
fallen in the action.

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{267}

[Illustration: SKETCH OF BATTLE OF GHELUVELT OCT 31st.]

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The line of the 3rd Brigade had been drawn up across the Menin road
some four hundred yards to the east of the village.  The road itself
was held by {268} the 2nd Welsh Regiment, supported by the 54th
Battery (Major Peel), which was immediately behind the village.  Both
the battalion and the battery fought desperately in a most exposed
situation.  The Welsh Regiment were driven out of their trenches by a
terrific shell-fire followed by an infantry attack.  They lost during
the day nearly six hundred men, with sixteen officers, killed,
wounded, or missing.  Colonel Morland was killed and Major Prichard
badly wounded.  Finally, after being pushed back, holding every
possible point, they formed up under Captain Rees across the open in
a thin skirmishing line to cover the battery, which was doing great
work by holding back the German advance.  One German gun was in
action upon the Menin road.  Lieutenant Blewitt took a British gun
out on to the bare road to face it, and a duel ensued at five hundred
yards, which ended by the German gun being knocked out at the third
shot by a direct hit.

When the First Division at the centre of the British line were driven
in, as already described, and the Seventh Division were pushed back
into the woods, the situation became most critical, for there was a
general retirement, with a victorious enemy pressing swiftly on upon
the British centre.  The men behaved splendidly, and the officers
kept their heads, taking every opportunity to form up a new line.
The 2nd Rifles and 1st North Lancashires in immediate support of the
centre did all that men could to hold it firm.  The German artillery
lengthened their range as the British fell back, and the infantry,
with their murderous quick-firers scattered thickly in the front
line, came rapidly on.  Communications were difficult, and everything
for a time was chaos {269} and confusion.  It looked for an hour or
two as if Von Deimling, the German leader, might really carry out his
War Lord's command and break his road to the sea.  It was one of the
decisive moments of the world's history, for if the Germans at that
period had seized the Channel ports, it is difficult to say how
disastrous the result might have been both to France and to the
British Empire.  At that moment of darkness and doubt a fresh
misfortune, which might well have proved overwhelming, came upon the
hard-pressed forces.  About 1.30 a shell exploded in the headquarters
at the chateau of Hooge, and both General Lomax, of the First
Division, and General Munro, of the Second, were put out of action,
the first being wounded and the second rendered unconscious by the
shock.  It was a brain injury to the Army, and a desperately serious
one, for besides the two divisional commanders the single shell had
killed or wounded Colonels Kerr and Perceval, Major Paley, Captains
Ommany and Trench, and Lieutenant Giffard.  General Landon, of the
3rd Brigade, took the command of the First Division at a moment's
notice, and the battle went forward.  A line was hurriedly formed,
men digging as for their lives, whilst broken units threw themselves
down to hold off the rolling grey wave that thundered behind.  The
new position was three-quarters of a mile back and about four hundred
yards in advance of Veldhoek, which is the next village down the
Ypres road.  The Seventh Division had also been rolled back, but the
fiery Capper, their divisional chief, who has been described as a
British Samurai, was everywhere among his regiments, reforming and
bracing them.  The British soldiers, with their incomparable {270}
regimental officers, rose to the crisis, whilst General Haig was
behind the line at Hooge, directing and controlling, like a great
engineer who seeks to hold a dam which carries an overpowering head
of water.  By three o'clock the new line was firmly held.

[Sidenote: Advance of Worcesters.]

Now General Haig, seeking round for some means of making a
counter-attack, perceived that on his left flank he had some reserve
troops who had been somewhat clear of the storm and might be
employed.  The 2nd Worcesters were ordered to advance upon Gheluvelt,
the initiative in this vital movement coming from General
Fitz-Clarence of the 1st Brigade.  On that flank the troops had not
joined in the retirement, and, including the South Wales Borderers of
the 3rd Brigade, were still in their original trenches, being just
north of the swathe that had been cut in the British line, and just
south of where the Second Division, extended to cracking point, with
one man often for every eight or nine feet, and no supports, were
defending the left flank of the Army.

When the village of Gheluvelt and the trenches to the north of it had
been captured by the enemy, a gap had been left of about five hundred
yards between the northern edge of the village and these South Wales
Borderers.  This gap the 2nd Worcesters were ordered to fill.  They
were in reserve at the time in the south-west corner of the Polygon
Wood, but on being called upon they made a brilliant advance under
Major Hankey.  One company (A) was detached to guard the right flank
of the advance.  The other three companies came on for a thousand
yards.  At one point they had to cross two hundred and twenty yards
of open under heavy shrapnel-fire.  One hundred men fell, but the
momentum of the charge {271} was never diminished.  Their rapid and
accurate fire drove back the German infantry, while their open order
formation diminished their own losses.  Finally they dashed into the
trenches and connected up the village with the line of the Welsh
Borderers.  Their right platoons, under Captain Williams, held the
village until nearly midnight.  Altogether the advance cost the
battalion 187 casualties, including 3 officers, out of 550 who were
in the ranks that day.  Up to dusk the Worcesters were exposed to
heavy shrapnel-fire, and small detached parties of the enemy came
round their right flank, but their position was strengthened and
strongly held until the final readjustment of the line.  It was a
fine advance at a critical moment, and did much to save the
situation.  The whole movement was strongly supported by the guns of
the 42nd Battery, and by some of the 1st Scots Guards upon the left
of the Welsh Borderers.

It has been stated that a line had been formed near Veldhoek, but
this difficult operation was not performed in an instant, and was
rather the final equilibrium established after a succession of
oscillations.  The British were worn to a shadow.  The 2nd Queen's
had 2 officers and 60 men left that night, the 2nd Welsh had 3
officers and 93 men.  Little groups, who might have been fitted into
a large-sized drawing-room, were settling a contention upon which the
fate of the world might depend.  But the Germans also had spent all
their force.  The rattle of musketry behind their advance was enough
to tell them that the British were still in their trenches, and the
guns were for ever playing on them with deadly effect.  Gradually
they began to dissolve away among the thick woods which flank the
road.  They were {272} learning that to penetrate the line of a
resolute adversary is not necessarily the prelude to victory.  It may
mean that the farther you advance the more your flanks are exposed.
So it was now, when the infantry to the north on one side and the
Third Cavalry Division on the other were closing in on them.  That
long tentacle which was pushing its way towards Ypres had to be
swiftly withdrawn once more, and withdrawn under a heavy fire from
the 29th, 41st, and 45th field batteries.

[Sidenote: German recoil.]

The scattered German infantry who had taken refuge in the woods of
Hooge, which lie to the south of the road, were followed up by
mounted and dismounted men of the Royals, 10th Hussars, and 3rd
Dragoon Guards, aided by some French cavalry.  These troops advanced
through the woods, killing or taking a number of the enemy.  By
nightfall the Germans had fallen back along the whole debated line;
the various British units, though much disorganised, were in close
touch with each other, and the original trenches had in the main been
occupied, the Berkshire Regiment helping to close the gap in the
centre.  The flood had slowly ebbed away, and the shaken barrier was
steady once more, thanks to the master-hands which had so skilfully
held it firm.  The village of Gheluvelt remained in the hands of the
Germans, but the British trenches were formed to the west of it, and
the road to the sea was barred as effectually as ever.  These are the
main facts of the action of Gheluvelt, which may well be given a name
of its own, though it was only one supremely important episode in
that huge contention which will be known as the First Battle of Ypres.

In the southern portion of the Ypres area at {273} Klein Zillebeke a
very sharp engagement was going on, which swung and swayed with as
much violence and change as the main battle on the Menin road.  The
German attack here was hardly inferior in intensity to that in the
north.  Having pushed back Lawford's weak brigade (22nd) it struck
full upon part of Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, which had been detached from
the First Division and sent to cover the right of the Seventh
Division.  Its own flank was now exposed, and its situation for a
time was critical.  The German advance was sudden and impetuous,
coming through a wood which brought the dense mass of the enemy's
leading formation almost unseen right up to the British line.  The
position of the 2nd Brigade was pierced, and the two regiments
present, the 2nd Sussex and the 1st Northamptons, were driven back
with loss.  Their brigadier rallied them some hundreds of yards to
the rear, where they formed up into a skirmish line in the open, and,
though unable to advance, kept back the Germans with their
rifle-fire.  The losses still continued, however, and the enemy came
on again and again with numbers which seemed inexhaustible.  Suddenly
there was a charging yell from behind a low slope covering the rear,
and over the brow there appeared some three hundred survivors of the
2nd Gordons, rushing at full speed with fixed bayonets.  At the same
moment the dismounted troopers of the 6th Cavalry Brigade and a
company of sappers ran forward to join in the charge.  The whole
British force was not one to three of its opponents, but as the
reinforcing line swept on, cheering with all its might, the survivors
of the hard-pressed brigade sprang up with a shout and the united
wave burst over the Germans.  Next moment they had {274} broken and
were flying for their lives through the Zwartelen Wood.  The pursuit
lasted for some distance, and a great number of the enemy were
bayoneted, while several hundreds were taken prisoners.

[Sidenote: General result.]

There have been few more critical occasions in the British operations
than this action upon October 31, when the Germans so nearly forced
their way to Ypres.  It is the peculiarity of modern warfare that,
although vast armies are locked in a close struggle, the number of
men who can come into actual contact at any one point is usually far
more limited than in the old days, when each host could view the
other from wing to wing.  Thus the losses in such an action are small
as compared with the terrific death-roll of a Napoleonic battle.  On
the other hand, when the operations are viewed broadly and one groups
a series of actions into one prolonged battle, like the Aisne or
Ypres, then the resulting losses become enormous.  The old battle was
a local conflagration, short and violent.  The new one is a
widespread smoulder, breaking here and there into flame.  In this
affair of Gheluvelt the casualties of the British did not exceed 2000
or 3000, while those of the Germans, who were more numerous and who
incurred the extra loss which falls upon the attack, could not have
been less than twice that figure.  One thousand five hundred dead
were actually picked up and six hundred prisoners were taken.  Some
hundreds of prisoners were also taken by the enemy.  The British
artillery, which worked desperately hard all day, had many losses
both upon the 30th and the 31st.  The 12th Battery had all its guns
silenced but one, and many others were equally hard hit.

On the night of the 31st considerable French {275} reinforcements
began to arrive, and it was high time that they did so, for the First
Corps, including the Seventh Division, were likely to bleed to death
upon the ground that they were holding.  It had stood the successive
attacks of four German corps, and it had held its line against each
of them.  But its own ranks had been grievously thinned and the men
were weary to death.  The strain, it should be added, was equally
great upon the Ninth French Corps to the north, which had its own set
of assailants to contend with.  Now that the line of the Yser, so
splendidly guarded by the Belgians, had proved to be impregnable, and
that the French from Dixmude in the north had repulsed all attacks,
the whole German advance upon Calais, for which Berlin was screaming,
was centred upon the Ypres lines.  It was time, then, that some
relief should come to the hard-pressed troops.  For several days the
French on the right and the left took the weight of the attack upon
themselves, and although the front was never free from fighting,
there was a short period of comparative rest for Haig's tired men.
In successive days they had lost Kruiseik, Zandvoorde, and Gheluvelt,
but so long as they held the semicircle of higher ground which covers
Ypres these small German gains availed them nothing.

[Sidenote:  A great crisis.]

Looking back at the three actions of the 29th, 30th, and especially
of the 31st of October, one can clearly perceive that it was the
closest thing to a really serious defeat which the Army had had since
Le Cateau.  If the Germans had been able to push home their attack
once again, it is probable that they would have taken Ypres, and that
the results would have been most serious.  Sir John French is
reported {276} as having said that there was no time in the Mons
retreat when he did not see his way, great as were his difficulties,
but that there was a moment upon October 31 when he seemed to be at
the end of his resources.  To Sir John at Ypres converged all the
cries for succour, and from him radiated the words of hope and
encouragement which stiffened the breaking lines.  To him and to his
untiring lieutenant, Douglas Haig, the Empire owed more that day than
has ever been generally realised.  The latter was up to the firing
line again and again rallying the troops.  The sudden removal of the
two divisional commanders of the First Corps was a dreadful blow at
such a moment, and the manner in which General Landon, of the 3rd
Brigade, took over the command of the First Division at a moment's
notice was a most noteworthy performance.  The fact that three
divisions of infantry with brigades which resembled battalions, and
battalions which were anything from companies to platoons, destitute
of reserves save for a few dismounted cavalry, barred the path to a
powerful German army, is one of the greatest feats of military
history.  It was a very near thing.  There was a time, it is said,
when the breech-blocks had actually been taken from the heavy guns in
order to disable them, and some of the artillery had been passed back
through Ypres.  But the line held against all odds, as it has done so
often in the past.  The struggle was not over.  For a fortnight still
to come it was close and desperate.  But never again would it be
quite so perilous as on that immortal last day of October, when over
the green Flemish meadows, beside the sluggish water-courses, on the
fringes of the old-world villages, and in the heart of {277} the
autumn-tinted woods, two great Empires fought for the mastery.

Such was the British epic.  There was another to the north which was
no less wonderful, and which will be celebrated by the poets and
historians of the lands to which the victors belong.  It will tell of
the glorious stand during this critical ten days of the Belgians, so
weary, so battered, and yet so indomitable.  It will tell how they
made head against the hosts of the Duke of Würtemberg, and how in the
end they flooded their own best land with the salt water which would
sterilise it in order to cover their front.  It will tell also of the
splendid Frenchmen who fought at Dixmude, of Ronarch with his
invincible marines, and of Grossetti, the fat and debonair, seated in
an armchair in the village street and pointing the road to victory
with his cane.  Not least, perhaps, in that epic will be the tale of
the British monitors who, with the deadly submarines upon one side of
them and the heavy German batteries upon the other, ran into the
Flemish coast and poured their fire upon the right flank of the
attacking Germans.  Ten days the great battle swung and swayed, and
then here as at Ypres the wave of the invaders ebbed, or reached its
definite flood.  It would be an ungenerous foe who would not admit
that they had fought bravely and well.  Not all our hatred of their
national ideals nor our contempt for their crafty misleaders can
prevent us from saluting those German officers and soldiers who
poured out their blood like water in the attempt to do that which was
impossible.




{278}

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES (_continued_)

(From the Action of Gheluvelt to the Winter Lull)

Attack upon the cavalry--The struggle at Messines--The London Scots
in action--Rally to the north--Terrible losses--Action of
Zillebeke--Record of the Seventh Division--Situation at Ypres--Attack
of the Prussian Guard--Confused fighting--End of the First Battle of
Ypres--Death of Lord Roberts--The Eighth Division.


[Sidenote: Attack upon the cavalry.]

Whilst this severe fighting had been going on to the north of the
British position, the centre, where the dismounted cavalry were
holding the line of trenches, was so terribly pressed that it is an
extraordinary thing that they were able to hold their own.  The
Second Corps, which at that time had just been withdrawn for a rest
from the La Bassée lines, were the only available reinforcements.
When news was flashed south as to the serious state of affairs, two
regiments, the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 2nd Scottish
Borderers from the 13th Infantry Brigade, were sent up in motor-buses
by road to the relief.  Strange indeed was the sight of these
vehicles flying along the Flemish roads, plastered outside with the
homely names of London suburbs and crammed with the grimy,
much-enduring infantry.  The lines at Messines were in trouble, and
so also were those at Wytschaete farther to the north.  To this
latter place {279} went two battalions of Shaw's 9th Brigade, the 1st
Northumberland Fusiliers and the 1st Lincolns.  Hard work awaited the
infantry at Messines and at Wytschaete, for in both places Allenby's
troopers were nearly rushed off their feet.

It has already been shown that on October 30 a severe assault was
made upon the Third Cavalry Division, when the 7th Brigade
(Kavanagh's) was forced out of Zandvoorde by the Fifteenth German
Army Corps.  Upon this same date a most strenuous attack, made in
great force and supported by a terrific shell-fire, was directed
along the whole line of the cavalry from Wytschaete to Messines.  No
British troops have been exposed to a more severe ordeal than these
brave troopers, for they were enormously outnumbered at every point,
and their line was so thin that it was absolutely impossible for them
to prevent it from being pierced by the masses of infantry, from the
Twenty-fourth Corps and Second Bavarian Corps, which were hurled
against them.  From the extreme left of the Second Cavalry Division
near Wytschaete to the right of the First Cavalry Division south of
Messines the same reports came in to the anxious General, of trenches
overwhelmed or enfiladed, and of little isolated groups of men
struggling most desperately to keep a footing against an ever-surging
grey tide which was beating up against them and flowing through every
gap.  In the north Gough's men were nearly overwhelmed, the 5th Irish
Lancers were shelled out of a farmhouse position, and the 16th
Lancers, shelled from in front and decimated by rifles and
machine-guns from the flank, were driven back for half a mile until
three French battalions helped the line to reform.  The pressure,
however, {280} was still extreme, the Germans fighting with admirable
energy and coming forward in never-ending numbers.  An Indian
regiment of the 7th (Ferozepore) Brigade, the 129th Baluchis, had
been helping the cavalry in this region since October 23, but their
ranks were now much decimated, and they were fought almost to a
standstill.  Two more British regiments from the Second Corps, the
1st Lincolns and the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers of the 9th Brigade,
together with their Brigadier, Shaw, who was a reinforcement in
himself, were, as already stated, hurried off from the south in
motor-buses to strengthen Gough's line.  Advancing into what was to
them an entirely strange position these two veteran regiments
sustained very heavy losses, which they bore with extreme fortitude.
They were surprised by the Germans on the road between Kemmel and
Wytschaete on the night of October 31, the same night upon which the
London Scottish to the south of them were so heavily engaged.
Colonel Smith succeeded in extricating the Lincolns from what was a
most perilous position, but only after a loss of 16 officers and 400
men.  The Fusiliers were almost as hard hit.  For forty-eight hours
the battle swung backwards and forwards in front of Wytschaete, and
in the end the village itself was lost, but the defensive lines to
the west of it were firmly established.  By November the second
strong French reinforcements had appeared, and it was clear that this
desperate attempt to break through the very centre of the British
position had definitely failed.

[Sidenote: The struggle at Messines.]

The struggle at Messines, some five miles to the south, had been even
more severe and sanguinary than at Wytschaete.  In the early morning
of the 31st the Bays and the 5th Dragoon Guards upon the left of the
{281} Messines position, after a heavy shell-fire, were driven out of
their trenches by a sudden furious advance of the German infantry.
The front of the village of Messines was held by Wild's 57th Rifles,
who were driven in by the same attack, every officer engaged being
killed or wounded.  A reserve company of Wild's Rifles and a squadron
of the 5th Dragoon Guards endeavoured to restore the fight, but could
not hold the torrent.  The 9th Lancers, also in front of the village
and to the right of the Indians, held on for a long time, repulsing
the infantry attacks, until they were driven back by the deadly
shell-fire.  At one time they were enfiladed on both sides and heard
the Germans roaring their war-songs in the dark all round them; but
they were able, owing to the coolness of Colonel Campbell and the
discipline of his veteran troopers, to fall back and to reform upon
the western side of the village.  Lance-Corporal Seaton distinguished
himself by covering the retreat of his whole squadron, remaining
single-handed in his trench until his maxim was destroyed, after he
had poured a thousand shots into the close ranks of his assailants.

The situation was so serious after dawn upon the 31st that General De
Lisle had to call for help from Wilson's Fourth Infantry Division,
holding the line upon his right.  The Inniskilling Fusiliers were
extended so as to relieve his right flank.  The struggle within
Messines was still going forward with fighting from house to house,
but the Germans, who were coming on with overpowering numbers and
great valour, were gradually winning their way forward.  The
Oxfordshire Hussars, fresh from the base, were thrown into the
combat.  A second line of defence {282} had been arranged a mile or
so to the west, near Wulverghem, but if Messines must go the victors
should at least pay the price down to the last drop of blood which
could be wrung from them.  Reinforcements were within sight, both
French and British, but they were scanty in quantity though superb in
quality.  It was a most critical position, and one cannot but marvel
at the load of responsibility which Sir John French had to bear upon
this day, for from the left of Haig's First Corps in the north down
to Neuve Chapelle in the south, a stretch of twenty-five miles, there
was hardly a point which was not strained to the verge of cracking.
Cool and alert, he controlled the situation from his central post and
threw in such reinforcements as he could find, though, indeed, they
could only be got by taking them from places where they were wanted
and hurrying them to places where they were needed even more
urgently.  He was strengthened always by the knowledge that General
Joffre behind him was doing all that a loyal colleague could to find
fresh columns of his splendid infantrymen to buttress up the
hard-pressed line.

For the moment, however, none of these were available, and Messines
was still partly in British, partly in German hands.  Briggs's 1st
Brigade--Bays, 5th Dragoon Guards, and 11th Hussars--with the
Oxfords, held on to the western edge of the town.  To their left,
linking up with Gough's men in the Wytschaete sector, was the 4th
Dragoon Guards.  Late in the afternoon the 2nd Scots Borderers and
the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry, the joint detachment under Major
Coke, arrived from the south, and were at once advanced upon Messines
to stiffen the defence.  {283} Under heavy fire they established
themselves in the village.  Evening fell with desperate street
fighting and the relative position unchanged.  Twice the Bavarians
stormed into the central square, and twice they fell back after
littering it with their bodies.  It seemed hopeless to hold the
village against the ever-growing pressure of the Germans, and yet the
loss of the village entailed the loss of the ridge, which would leave
a commanding position in the hands of the enemy.  Village and ridge
were mutually dependent, for if either were lost the other could not
be held.

As it proved, it was the ridge and not the village which could no
longer sustain the pressure.  On the night of October 31 Mullen's 2nd
Cavalry Brigade--9th Lancers, 4th Dragoon Guards, and 11th
Hussars--took over the defence from Briggs.  Of these, the 4th
Dragoon Guards were to the left of the village upon the ridge.  The
London Scottish had been brought up, and they were placed upon the
left of the 4th Dragoon Guards, forming a link of the defence which
connected up the Second Cavalry Division with the First.  The
right-hand regiment of the latter, the 6th Carbineers, of Bingham's
4th Brigade, were upon the left of the London Scottish.  These two
regiments held the centre of the ridge.  The London Scottish had
already suffered considerable losses.  Hurried up from the lines of
communication to St. Eloi, they were pushed forward at once into
action, and were exposed for hours to all the nerve-racking horrors
of a heavy shell-fire endured in most insufficient trenches.  A more
severe ordeal was in store for them, however, during the grim night
which lay before them.  The admirable behaviour of Colonel Malcolm's
men excited the more attention as they {284} were the first
Territorial infantry to come into action, and they set a standard
which has been grandly sustained by the quarter-million of their
comrades who have from first to last come into the line.

[Sidenote: The London Scots in action.]

On the early morning of November 1 there had been a strong attempt
within the village to improve the British position, and some ground
was actually gained by the cavalrymen, the Yorkshire Light Infantry,
and the Scots Borderers.  What occurred, however, on the ridge to the
north made all further effort a useless waste of life.  The Bavarian
infantry had come with an irresistible rush against the thin British
line.  The order to hold their ground at all costs was given, and the
London Scots answered it in a way which gained the highest praise
from the many soldiers who saw it.  It is not claimed that they did
better than their Regular comrades.  That would be impossible.  The
most that can be said is that they proved themselves worthy to fight
in line with them.  After being exposed for several hours to heavy
shellfire, it was no light task for any troops to be called upon to
resist a direct assault.  From nine in the evening of October 31 to
two in the morning, under the red glare of burning houses, Colonel
Malcolm's Scottish and Colonel Annesley's Carbineers held back the
Bavarian advance, an advance which would have meant the piercing of
the British line.  At two o'clock the Bavarians in greatly
predominant force were all round the Scots, and even the reserve
companies found work for their bayonets, preventing the enemy from
encircling their companions.  The losses were very heavy--400 men and
9 officers, including their gallant doctor, M'Nab, who was
villainously stabbed as he bandaged a patient.  In spite of the great
pressure, {285} the ground was held all night, and it was not till
dawn, when the regiment found that it was outflanked on both sides
and nearly surrounded, that, under cover of the fire of E Battery
R.H.A., it fell back.  The Carbineers and the Scots were close
together, and the Germans, with their usual quick ingenuity,
approached the former with a cry of "We are the London Scots."  A
disaster might have occurred in the darkness but for the quickness
and bravery of a young officer, Lieutenant Hope Hawkins, who rushed
forward, discovered the identity of the Germans, and fell, riddled
with bullets, even while he gave warning to his comrades.

The Germans had won the ridge, but the British line was still intact
and growing stronger every hour.  The village was held by the Scots
Borderers and Yorkshiremen until nearly ten o'clock, when they were
ordered to fall back and help to man the new line.  The shock had
been a rude one, but the danger-hour was past here as in the north.

The fateful November 1 had come and gone.  The villages of Messines
and Wytschaete were, it is true, in German hands, but French
reinforcements of the Sixteenth Corps were streaming up from the
south, the line, though torn and broken, still held firm, and the
road to Calais was for ever blocked.  There was still pressure, and
on November 2 the 11th Hussars were badly cut up by shell-fire, but
the line was impregnable.  Sir John French summed up in a few terse
words the true meaning of the operations just described, when he said
afterwards, in addressing the 9th Lancers, "Particularly I would
refer to the period, October 31, when for forty-eight hours the
Cavalry Corps held at bay two German army corps.  {286} During this
period you were supported by only three or four battalions, shattered
and worn by previous fighting, and in so doing you rendered
inestimable service."  There have been few episodes in the war which
have been at the same time so splendid and so absolutely vital.  The
First Cavalry Division lost 50 per cent of its numbers between
October 30 and November 2, and the Second Division was hardly in
better case, but never did men give their lives to better purpose.
Their heroism saved the Army.

[Sidenote: Rally to the north.]

Meanwhile the current of operations was evidently running strongly
towards the northern end of the British line, where help was badly
needed, as Haig's men had been fought almost to exhaustion.  There
was no British reinforcement available save only the weary Second
Corps, the remains of which from this date began to be drafted
northwards.  It was already known that the German Emperor had
appeared in person in that region, and that a great concentration of
his troops was taking place.  At the same time the French were making
splendid exertions in order to stiffen their own line and help us in
those parts, like Messines, Wytschaete, and Ploegsteert, where the
attack was most formidable.  It was a great gathering towards the
north, and clearly some hard blows were to be struck.  Northwards
then went General Morland, of the Fifth Division, taking with him
four more weak battalions.  The whole line had moved upwards towards
the danger spot, and these troops now found themselves east of
Bailleul, close to the village of Neuve Eglise.  For the moment
General Smith-Dorrien was without an army, for half his men were now
supporting General Willcocks in the south {287} and half General
Allenby or General Haig in the north.  The British leaders all along
the line were, as usual, desperately endeavouring to make one man do
the work of three, but they were buoyed up by the knowledge that good
Father Joffre, like some beneficent earthly Providence, was watching
over them from the distance, and that fresh trainfuls of his brave
little men were ever steaming into the danger zone.  Day by day the
line was thickening and the task of the Kaiser becoming more
difficult.  It was hoped that the crisis was past.  If our troops
were exhausted so also, it was thought, were those of the enemy.  We
could feel elated by the knowledge that we had held our ground, while
they could hardly fail to be depressed by the reflection that they
had made little progress in spite of so many heroic efforts, and that
Calais was as far from them as ever.

The narrative must now return to the defenders of the Ypres
approaches, who were left in a state of extreme exhaustion by the
critical action of October 31.  On November 1 the First Corps was not
in a condition to do more than to hold its line.  This line was now
near to Veldhoek, to the west of Gheluvelt village, and to that
extent the Germans had profited by their desperate fighting, but this
was a detail of small consequence so long as an unbroken British Army
covered the town that was still the objective of the enemy.  The
Ninth French Corps to the north of the British had lost heavily, but
to the south of the canal lay the Sixteenth French Corps, which was
in comparatively good condition.  This corps now made an advance to
take some of the pressure off the British line, while Moussy's
regiments to the north of the canal were to co-operate with Bulfin's
men upon their {288} left.  Upon the left of Bulfin's 2nd Brigade
were two battalions of the 4th Brigade of Guards.

One of these battalions had a terrible experience upon this morning.
For some reason the trenches of the Irish Guards were exposed to an
enfilading fire from the high explosives of the Germans, which
wrought even more than their customary damage.  For hours the
Guardsmen lay under a terrific fire, to which they could make no
reply, and from which they could obtain no protection.  When at last,
in the afternoon, they were compelled to fall back, their losses had
been great, including their colonel, Lord Ardee, 7 other officers,
and over 300 men.  It is the hard fate of the side which is weaker in
artillery to endure such buffetings with no possibility of return.

The French attack of the Sixteenth Corps had been brought to a speedy
standstill, and a severe counter-attack, preceded by a heavy
shell-fire, had fallen upon General Moussy's men and upon the half of
the 2nd Brigade.  Help was urgently needed, so the remains of the 7th
Brigade from the Third Cavalry Division were hurried forward.  The
Germans were now surging up against the whole right and right-centre
of the line.  It seems to have been their system to attack upon
alternate days on the right and on the centre, for it will be
remembered that it was on October 29 that they gained the Gheluvelt
cross-roads, and on October 31 Gheluvelt village, both in the centre,
while on October 30 they captured the Zandvoorde ridge upon the
British right, and now, on November 1, were pressing hard upon the
right once more.

That morning the Army sustained a loss in the person of General
Bulfin, who was wounded in the {289} head by shrapnel.  Fortunately
his recovery was not a lengthy one, and he was able to return in
January as commander of the Twenty-eighth Division.  Upon his fall,
Lord Cavan, of the 4th Brigade, took over the command upon the
hard-pressed right wing.  At half-past one the hundred survivors of
the 2nd Gordons, on the right of the Seventh Division, and the 2nd
Oxford and Bucks, were desperately hard pressed by a strong German
infantry advance, and so were the remains of the Sussex and
Northamptons.  The only available help lay in the 23rd Field Company
of Royal Engineers.  Our sappers proved, as they have so often done
before, that their hearts are as sound as their heads.  They pushed
off the enemy, but incurred heavy losses.  The situation was still
critical when at the summons of Lord Cavan the 2nd Grenadiers
advanced and cleared the Germans from the woods in the front and
flank, while the 10th Hussars supported their advance.  A gap had
been left in the trenches from which the Irish Guards had been
pushed, but this was now filled up by cavalry, who connected up with
the French on their right and with the Guards upon their left.  The
general effect of the whole day's fighting was to drive the British
line farther westward, but to contract it, so that it required a
smaller force.  Two battalions--the Gordons and the Sussex--could be
taken out and brought into reserve.  The centre of the line had a
day's rest and dug itself into its new positions, but the units were
greatly mixed and confused.

November 2 brought no surcease from the constant fighting, though the
disturbance of these days, severe as it was, may be looked upon as a
mere ground swell after the terrific storm of the last days of
October.  {290} On the morning of the 2nd the Ninth French Corps upon
the British left, under General Vidal, sent eight battalions forward
to the south and east in the direction of Gheluvelt.  Part of this
village was actually occupied by them.  The Germans meanwhile, with
their usual courage and energy, were driving a fresh attack down that
Menin road which had so often been reddened by their blood.  It was
the day for a centre attack on their stereotyped system of alternate
pushes, and it came duly to hand.  An initial success awaited them
as, getting round a trench occupied by the Rifles, they succeeded in
cutting off a number of them.  The 3rd Brigade was hurried up by
General Landon to the point of danger, and a French Zouave regiment
helped to restore the situation.  A spirited bayonet charge, in which
the Gloucesters led, was beaten back by the enemy's fire.  After a
day of confused and desultory fighting the situation in the evening
was very much as it had been in the morning.  Both that night and the
next day there was a series of local and sporadic attacks, first on
the front of the Second Division and then of the Seventh, all of
which were driven back.  The Germans began to show their despair of
ever gaining possession of Ypres by elevating their guns and dropping
shells upon the old Cloth Hall of that historic city, a senseless act
of spiteful vandalism which exactly corresponds with their action
when the Allied Army held them in front of Rheims.

November 4 was a day of menaces rather than of attacks.  On this day,
units which had become greatly mixed during the incessant and
confused fighting of the last fortnight were rearranged and counted.
The losses were terrible.  The actual {291} strength of the infantry
of the First Division upon that date was: 1st Brigade, 22 officers,
1206 men; 2nd Brigade, 43 officers, 1315 men: 3rd Brigade, 27
officers, 970 men; which make the losses of the whole division about
75 per cent.  Those of the Second Division were very little lighter.
And now for the 25 per cent remainder of this gallant corps there was
not a moment of breathing space or rest, but yet another fortnight of
unremitting work, during which their thin ranks were destined to hold
the German army, and even the Emperor's own Guard, from passing the
few short miles which separated them from their objective.  Great was
the "will to conquer" of the Kaiser's troops, but greater still the
iron resolve not to be conquered which hardened the war-worn lines of
the soldiers of the King.

[Sidenote: Terrible losses.]

November 5 was a day of incessant shell-fire, from which the Seventh
Division, the 4th and the 6th Brigades were the chief sufferers.  On
this day the Seventh Division, which had now been reduced from 12,000
infantry to 2333, was withdrawn from the line.  In their place were
substituted those reinforcements from the south which have already
been mentioned.  These consisted of eleven battalions of the Second
Corps under General McCracken; this corps, however, was greatly worn,
and the eleven battalions only represented 3500 rifles.  The Seventh
Division was withdrawn to Bailleul in the south, but Lawford's 22nd
Brigade was retained in corps reserve, and was destined to have one
more trial before it could be spared for rest.  The day was memorable
also for a vigorous advance of the Gloucester Regiment, which was
pushed with such hardihood that they {292} sustained losses of nearly
half their numbers before admitting that they could not gain their
objective.  A description has been given here of the events of the
north of the line and of the cavalry positions, but it is not to be
supposed that peace reigned on the south of this point.  On the
contrary, during the whole period under discussion, while the great
fight raged at Ypres, there had been constant shelling and occasional
advances against the Third Corps in the Armentières section, and also
against the Indians and the Second Corps down to the La Bassée Canal.

The most serious of these occurred upon November 9.  Upon this date
the Germans, who had knocked so loudly at Messines and at Wytschaete
without finding that any opening through our lines was open to them,
thought that they might find better luck at Ploegsteert, which is a
village on the same line as the other two.  Wytschaete is to the
north, Messines in the middle, and Ploegsteert in the south, each on
the main road from Ypres to Armentières, with about four miles
interval between each.  The German attack was a very strong one, but
the hundredfold drama was played once more.  On the 3rd Worcesters
fell the brunt, and no more solid fighters have been found in the
Army than those Midland men from the very heart of England.  A
temporary set-back was retrieved and the line restored.  Major
Milward, of the Worcesters, a very gallant officer, was grievously
wounded in this affair.  The counter-attack which restored the
situation was carried out mainly by the 1st East Lancashires, who
lost Major Lambert and a number of men in the venture.

[Sidenote: Action of Zillebeke.]

Upon November 6, about 2 P.M., a strong German advance drove in those
French troops who were on {293} the right of Lord Cavan's
Brigade--4th--which occupied the extreme right of Haig's position.
point was between Klein Zillebeke and the canal, where a German
lodgment would have been most serious.  The retirement of the French
exposed the right flank of the 1st Irish Guards.  This flank was
strongly attacked, and for the second time in a week this brave
regiment endured very heavy losses.  No. 2 company was driven back to
the support trenches, and No. 1 company, being isolated, was
destroyed.  Their neighbours on the left, the 2nd Grenadiers stood
fast, but a great and dangerous alley-way was left for the Germans
round the British right wing.  The situation was splendidly saved by
Kavanagh's 7th Cavalry Brigade, who galloped furiously down the road
to the place where they were so badly needed.  This hard-worked
_corps d'élite_, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards supported
by the Blues, now dismounted and flung themselves into the gap, a
grimy line of weather-stained infantry with nothing left save their
giant physique and their spurs to recall the men who are the pride of
our London streets.  The retiring French rallied at the sight of the
sons of Anak.  An instant later the Germans were into them, and there
was a terrific _mêlée_ of British, French, and Prussians, which swung
and swayed over the marshland and across the road.  Men drove their
bayonets through each other or fired point-blank into each other's
bodies in a most desperate fight, the Germans slowly but surely
recoiling, until at last they broke.  It was this prompt and vigorous
stroke by Kavanagh's Brigade which saved a delicate situation.  Of
the three cavalry regiments engaged, two lost their colonels--Wilson
of the Blues and Dawnay {294} of the 2nd Life Guards.  Sixteen
officers fell in half an hour.  The losses in rank and file were also
heavy, but the results were great and indeed vital.  The whole
performance was an extraordinarily fine one.

[Sidenote: Record of the Seventh Division.]

Early on the morning of November 7 Lawford's 22nd Brigade, which was
now reduced to 1100 men, with 7 officers, was called upon to retake a
line of trenches which the enemy had wrested from a neighbouring
unit.  Unbroken in nerve or spirit by their own terrific losses, they
rushed forward, led by Lawford himself, a cudgel in his hand, carried
the trench, captured three machine-guns, held the trench till
evening, and then retired for a time from the line.  Captains
Vallentin and Alleyne, who led the two regiments into which the
skeleton brigade had been divided, both fell in this feat of arms.
After this action there remained standing the brigadier, 3 officers,
and 700 men.  The losses of the brigade work out at 97 per cent of
the officers and 80 per cent of the men, figures which can seldom
have been matched in the warfare of any age, and yet were little in
excess of the other brigades, as is shown by the fact that the whole
division on November 7 numbered 44 officers and 2336 men.  It is true
that many British regiments found themselves in this campaign with
not one single officer or man left who had started from England, but
these were usually the effects of months of campaigning.  In the case
of the Seventh Division, all these deadly losses had been sustained
in less than three weeks.  Britain's soldiers have indeed been
faithful to the death.  Their record is the last word in endurance
and military virtue.

The division was now finally withdrawn from the fighting line.  It
has already been stated that there {295} were reasons which made its
units exceptionally fine ones.  In General Capper they possessed a
leader of enormous energy and fire, whilst his three
brigadiers--Watts, Lawford, and Ruggles-Brise--could not be surpassed
by any in the Army.  Yet with every advantage of officers and men
there will always be wonder as well as admiration for what they
accomplished.  For three days, before the First Corps had come
thoroughly into line, they held up the whole German advance, leaving
the impression upon the enemy that they were faced by two army corps.
Then for twelve more days they held the ground in the very
storm-centre of the attack upon Ypres.  When at last the survivors
staggered from the line, they had made a name which will never die.

[Sidenote: Situation at Ypres.]

The bulk of Smith-Dorrien's Corps had now been brought north, so that
from this date (November 7) onwards the story of the First and Second
Corps is intimately connected.  When we last saw this corps it will
be remembered that it had been withdrawn from the front, having lost
some twelve thousand men in three weeks of La Bassée operations, and
that the Indian Corps had taken over their line of trenches.  Such
fighting men could not, however, be spared in the midst of such a
fight.  The hospital was the only rest that any British soldier could
be afforded.  Whilst they had still strength to stand they must line
up to the German flood or be content to see it thunder past them to
the coast.  They were brought north, save only Bowes' 8th Brigade and
Maude's 14th, which remained with the Indians in the south.  Although
the Seventh Division had been drawn out of the line, its attendant
cavalry division still remained to give its very efficient help to
General Haig.  {296} The British position, though by no means secure,
was getting stronger day by day, for General d'Urbal of the Eighth
French Army to the north, and General Maud'huy to the south, had both
been strongly reinforced, and with their usual good comradeship did
all they could to strengthen the flanks and shorten the front of the
British line.

The men of the Second Corps who had come north from the La Bassée
district were not left long unmolested in their new sphere of
operations.  On the afternoon of November 7 there was a hot German
attack upon that portion of the line which had just been vacated by
the Seventh Division.  The trenches were now held by the Fifth
Division (Morland's).

The enemy may have hoped for some advantage from a change which they
may well have observed, but they found that, though the units might
be different, the same old breed still barred their path.  On this
occasion, after the early rush had spent itself upon the 1st
Lincolns, it was the 2nd West Ridings who led the counter-charge.
The line, however, was never fully re-established.  A number of
smaller attacks broke upon the front of the Second Division on the
same day, leaving a few score of prisoners behind them as they ebbed.
On the same day, November 7, the enemy got into the trenches of the
2nd Highland Light Infantry and remained in them, for all of them
were bayoneted or taken.  Upon this day the London Scottish were
brought up into the Ypres line--a sign, if one were needed, that
after the action described they were accepted as the peers of their
comrades of the Regular Army, for no empty compliments are passed
when the breaking of a unit may mean the enfilading of a line.

{297}

November 8 was a quiet day, but it was well known from every report
of spy, scout, and aeroplane to be the lull before the storm.  One
German brigade came down the Menin road, and went up it again leaving
a hundred dead on or beside the causeway.  This attack inflicted some
loss upon the 1st North Lancashires and on the 1st Scots Guards.  The
1st Bedfords captured a trench that night.  The 9th and the 10th were
uneventful, and the tired troops rested on their arms, though never
free for an hour from the endless pelting of shells.  To the north
and east the Eagles were known to be gathering.  There were the
Emperor, the Emperor's Guard, and a great fresh battle of the Germans
ready for one grand final dash for Calais, with every rifle in the
firing line and every cannon to support it.  Grave messages came from
headquarters, warning words were passed to anxious brigadiers, who
took counsel with their colonels as to fire-fields and supports.
Batteries were redistributed, depleted limbers refilled, and
observation posts pushed to the front, while the untiring sappers
gave the last touches to traverse and to trench.  All was ready for
the fray.  So close were the lines that at many points the
conversations of the enemy could be heard.

[Sidenote: Attack of the Prussian Guard.]

The Germans had already concentrated a large number of troops against
this part of the British line, and they were now secretly reinforced
by a division of the Prussian Guard.  Documents found afterwards upon
the dead show that the Guard had had special orders from the Emperor
to break the line at all costs.  The brigades which attacked were
made up of the 1st and 2nd Foot Guards, the Kaiser Franz Grenadiers
No. 2, the Königin Augusta Grenadiers No. 4, and {298} the battalion
of Garde Jäger--13,000 men in all.  It was to be victory or death
with the _corps d'élite_ of the German army, but it was no less
victory or death with the men who opposed them.  After an artillery
preparation of appalling intensity for three hours along the line of
both the First and Second Divisions, the infantry advance began about
9.30 on the morning of November 11 amid a storm of wind and rain.
They are gregarious fighters, the Germans, finding comfort and
strength in the rush of serried ranks.  Even now the advance was made
in a close formation, but it was carried out with magnificent dash,
amazing valour, and a pedantic precision which caused, for example,
the leading officers to hold their swords at the carry.  The Prussian
Guardsmen seemed to have lost nothing, and also to have learned
nothing, since their famous predecessors lay dead in their ranks
before St. Privat, forty-four years before.  The attack was directed
against the front of the two divisions of the First British Army
Corps, but especially on the 1st Brigade, so that Guardsman faced
Guardsman, as at Fontenoy.  There were none of the chivalrous
greetings of 1745, however, and a stern hatred hardened the hearts of
either side.  The German Guard charged on the north of the Menin
road, while a second advance by troops of the line was made upon the
south, which withered away before the British fire.  Nothing could
stop the Guards, however.  With trenches blazing and crackling upon
their flank, for the advance was somewhat diagonal, they poured over
the British position and penetrated it at three different points
where the heavy shells had overwhelmed the trenches and buried the
occupants, who, in some cases, were {299} bayoneted as they struggled
out from under the earth.  It was a terrific moment.  The yells of
the stormers and the shrill whistles of their officers rose above the
crash of the musketry-fire and roar of the guns.  The British fought
in their customary earnest silence, save for the short, sharp
directions of their leaders.  "They did not seem angry--only
business-like," said a hostile observer.  The troops to the immediate
north of the Menin road, who had been shelled out of their trenches
by the bombardment, were forced back and brushed aside into the woods
to the north, while the Germans poured through the gap.  The 4th
Royal Fusiliers of the 9th Brigade, upon the right of the point where
the enemy had penetrated, were enfiladed and lost their gallant
colonel, MacMahon, a soldier who had done great service from the day
of Mons, and had just been appointed to a brigade.  The regiment,
which has worked as hard and endured as great losses as any in the
campaign, was reduced to 2 officers and 100 men.

The German Guard poured on into the woods which lay in the immediate
rear of the British position, but their formation was broken and the
individualism of the Briton began to tell.  Next to MacMahon's
regiment lay the 1st Scots Fusiliers, sister battalion to that which
had been destroyed upon October 31.  With fierce joy they poured
volleys into the flank of the Guard as the grey figures rushed past
them into the woods.  Four hundred dead Germans were afterwards
picked out from the underwood at this point.  The Scots Fusiliers
were also hard hit by the German fire.

At this period the Germans who had come through the line had skirted
the south of a large wood of {300} half-grown trees, called the
Polygon Wood, and had advanced into the farther one, named
Nonnebusch.  At this point they were close to the British artillery,
which they threatened to overwhelm.  The 41st Brigade R.F.A., and
especially the 16th Field Battery, were in the immediate line of
their advance, and the gunners looking up saw the grey uniforms
advancing amid the trees.  Colonel Lushington, who commanded the
artillery brigade, hurriedly formed up a firing line under his
adjutant, composed partly of his own spare gunners and partly of a
number of Engineers, reinforced by cooks, officers' servants, and
other odd hands who are to be found in the rear of the army, but
seldom expect to find themselves in the van of the fight.  It was a
somewhat grotesque array, but it filled the gap and brought the
advance to a halt, though the leading Germans were picked up
afterwards within seventy yards of the guns.  Whilst the position was
critical at this point of the front, it was no less so upon the
extreme right, where the French detachment, who still formed a link
between the canal on the south and the British right flank, were
shelled out of their trenches and driven back.  Lord Cavan's 4th
Brigade, their nearest neighbours, were too hard pressed to be able
to help them.  To the north of the Menin road a number of British
units were intact, and these held up the German flood in that region.
There are two considerable woods--the Polygon to the north and the
Nonnebusch to the south-west of the Polygon--the edges of which have
defined the British position, while their depths have harboured their
artillery.  Now the 1st King's Liverpool Regiment held firm to the
south of the Polygon Wood, while north of them were {301} the 2nd
Highland Light Infantry, with a field company of Engineers.  Farther
to the south-west were the 1st Connaught Rangers, while on the other
side of the Nonnebusch road was the 7th Cavalry Brigade.  In the
afternoon of this day the enemy, skirting the south of the Polygon
Wood, had actually entered the Nonnebusch Wood, in which it faced the
artillery as already described.  In the Polygon Wood, when they
penetrated the trenches of the 1st Brigade, they had the King's
Liverpool Regiment on their right, which refused to move, so that for
a long time the Prussian Guard and the King's lay side by side with a
traverse between them.  "Our right is supported by the Prussian
Guard," said the humorous adjutant of the famous Lancashire regiment.
While the main body of the Guard passed on, some remained all day in
this trench.

The German Guardsmen had been prevented from submerging the 41st
Brigade of Artillery, and also the 35th Heavy Battery, by the
resistance of an improvised firing line.  But a more substantial
defence was at hand.  The 2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, which
had been in divisional reserve near Ypres, had been brought forward
and found itself at Westhoek, near the threatened guns.  This
regiment is the old 52nd, of the Peninsular Light Division, a famous
corps which threw itself upon the flank of Napoleon's Guard at
Waterloo and broke it in the crisis of the battle.  Once again within
a century an Imperial Guard was to recoil before its disciplined
rush.  Under Colonel Davies the regiment swept through the wood from
north-west to south-east, driving the Germans, who had already been
badly shaken by the artillery fire, in a headlong rout.  {302} Many
threw down their arms.  The loss to the Oxfords was surprisingly
small, well under fifty in all.  As they emerged from the wood they
were joined by some of the 1st Northamptons from the 2nd Brigade upon
the right, while on the left there was a rush of Connaughts and
Highland Light Infantry from their own (Haking's) brigade and of
Engineers of the 25th Field Company, who showed extraordinary
initiative and gallantry, pushing on rapidly, and losing all their
officers save one and a number of their men without flinching for an
instant.  A party of the Gloucesters, too, charged with the
Northamptons upon the right, for by this time units were badly mixed
up, as will always happen in woodland fighting.  "It was all a
confused nightmare," said one who tried to control it.  The line of
infantry dashed forward, a company of the Oxfords under Captain H. M.
Dillon in the lead, and the khaki wave broke over a line of trenches
which the Germans had taken, submerging all the occupants.  There was
another line in front, but as the victorious infantry pushed forward
to this it was struck in the flank by a fire from French batteries,
which had been unable to believe that so much progress could have
been made in so short a time.

It was now nearly dark, and the troops were in the last stage of
exhaustion.  Of the 1st Brigade something less than 400 with 4
officers could be collected.  It was impossible to do more than hold
the line as it then existed.  Two brave attempts were made in the
darkness to win back the original front trenches, but it could not be
done, for there were no men to do it.  Save for one small corner of
the Polygon Wood, the Germans had been completely {303} cleared out
from the main position.  At twelve and at four, during the night, the
British made a forward movement to regain the advanced trenches, but
in each case the advance could make no progress.  At the very
beginning of the second attempt General FitzClarence, commanding the
1st Brigade, was killed, and the movement fizzled out.  Besides
General FitzClarence, the Army sustained a severe loss in General
Shaw of the 9th Brigade, who was struck by a shell splinter, though
happily the wound was not mortal.  The German losses were exceedingly
severe: 700 of their dead were picked up within a single section of
the British line, but the main loss was probably sustained in the
advance before they reached the trenches.  Killed, wounded, and
prisoners, their casualties cannot have been less than 10,000 men.[1]
It was a fine attack, bravely delivered by fresh troops against weary
men, but it showed the German leaders once for all that it was
impossible to force a passage through the lines.  The Emperor's
Guard, driven on by the Emperor's own personal impetus, had recoiled
broken, even as the Guard of a greater Emperor had done a century
before from the indomitable resistance of the British infantry.  The
constant fighting had reduced British brigades to the strength of
battalions, battalions to companies, and companies to weak platoons,
but the position was still held.  They had, it is true, lost about
five hundred yards of ground in the battle, but a shorter line was at
once dug, organised, and manned.  The barrier to Ypres was as strong
as ever.


[1] The German returns for the Guard alone at this battle are
reported at 1170 dead, 3991 wounded, 1719 missing.


The strain upon the men, however, had been terrific.  "Bearded,
unwashed, sometimes plagued {304} with vermin, the few who remained
in the front line were a terrible crew," says the American, Coleman.
"They were like fierce, wild beasts," says another observer.  They
had given their all, almost to their humanity, to save Britain.  May
the day never come when Britain will refuse to save them.

[Sidenote: Confused fighting.]

Glancing for a moment down the line to the south, there had been
continuous confused contention during this time, but no great attack
such as distinguished the operations in the north.  Upon November 7
two brisk assaults were made by the Germans in the Armentières area,
one upon the Fourth Division of the Third Corps and the other upon
the Seaforth Highlanders, who were brigaded with the Indians.  In
each case the first German rush carried some trenches, and in each
the swift return of the British regained them.  There were moderate
losses upon both sides.  On the same date the 13th Infantry Brigade
lost the services of Colonel Martyn of the 1st West Kents, who was
seriously wounded the very day after he had been appointed to a
brigade.

This attack upon November 11 represents the absolute high-water mark
of the German efforts in this battle, and the ebb was a rapid one.
Upon November 12 and the remainder of the week, half-hearted attempts
were made upon the British front, which were repulsed without
difficulty.  To the north of the line, where the French had held
their positions with much the same fluctuations which had been
experienced by their Allies, the German assault was more violent and
met with occasional success, though it was finally repelled with very
great loss.  The 14th was to the French what the 11th had been to the
British--the culmination of {305} violence and the prelude of rest.
The weather throughout this period was cold and tempestuous, which
much increased the strain upon the weary troops.  Along the whole
line from Ypres to Bethune there were desultory shellings with an
occasional dash by one side or the other, which usually ended in the
capture of a trench and its recapture by the supports in the rear.
It was in one of these sporadic German attacks in the Klein Zillebeke
section that the 2nd King's Royal Rifles held their trench against
heavy odds, and their machine-gun officer, Lieutenant Dimmer, thrice
wounded and still fighting, won the coveted Cross by his valour.
Each gallant advance and capture of the Germans was countered by an
equally gallant counter-attack and recapture by the British.  The
long line sagged and swayed, but never bent or broke.  The era of
battles had passed, but for thirty miles the skirmishes were
incessant.  So mixed and incessant had been the fighting that it was
a very difficult task during these days to tidy up the line and get
each scattered group of men back to its own platoon, company, and
battalion.

On Tuesday, November 17, the fighting suddenly assumed a more
important character.  The attack was again in the Ypres section and
fell chiefly upon the battalions of the Second Corps, if so dignified
a name as "battalion" can be given to bodies of men which consisted
very often of less than a normal company, commanded, perhaps, by two
junior officers.  The 4th Brigade of Guards was also heavily engaged
this day, and so were the cavalry of the Third Division.  The general
locale of the action was the same as that which had been so often
fought over before, the Second Corps being to the south of the
Ypres-Menin {306} road, with Lord Cavan's Guardsmen upon their right
and the cavalry upon the right of the Guards.  After a severe
shelling there was a serious infantry advance, about one o'clock,
which took some trenches, but was finally driven back and chased for
a quarter of a mile.  McCracken's 7th Brigade bore a chief part in
this fighting, and the 1st Wiltshires particularly distinguished
themselves by a fine charge led by Captain Cary-Barnard.  The 2nd
Grenadiers did great work during the day.

An even heavier advance was made in the afternoon to the south of
that which was broken in the morning.  This involved an oblique
advance across the British front, which was stopped and destroyed
before it reached the trenches by the deadly fire of rifles and
machine-guns.  Over a thousand dead were left as a proof of the
energy of the attack and the solidity of the resistance.  Farther to
the south a similar attack was beaten back by the cavalry after a
preliminary shelling in which the 3rd Dragoon Guards suffered
severely.  This attack was repelled by the Third Cavalry Division, to
which the Leicestershire and North Somerset Yeomanry were now
attached.  The latter did fine service in this action.  Altogether,
November 17 was a good day for the British arms and a most expensive
one for the Germans.

[Sidenote: End of the first Battle of Ypres.]

We have now reached the end of the Battle of Ypres, which attained
its maximum fury, so far as the British line was concerned, from
October 29 to November 11.  This great contest raged from the sand
dunes of the north, where the Belgians fought so well, through the
French Marine Brigade at Dixmude, and the Ninth French Corps, to
General Haig's Corps, which was buttressed on the right towards {307}
the latter part of the battle by the Sixteenth French Corps.  Farther
south yet another French corps supported and eventually took the
place of the British cavalry opposite the lost villages of Wytschaete
and Messines.  From there ran the unbroken lines of the imperturbable
Third Corps, which ended to the south in the trenches originally held
by the Second British Corps, and later by the Indians.  Across the La
Bassée Canal the French once again took up the defence.

It is not an action, therefore, which can be set down to the
exclusive credit of any one nation.  Our Allies fought gloriously,
and if their deeds are not set down here, it is from want of space
and of precise information, not from want of appreciation.  But,
turning to the merely British aspect of the fight--and beyond all
doubt the heavier share fell upon the British, who bore the brunt
from the start to the end,--it may be said that the battle lasted a
clear month, from October 12, when Smith-Dorrien crossed the La
Bassée Canal, to November 11, when the German Guard reeled out of the
Nonnebusch Wood.  We are so near these great events that it is hard
to get their true proportion, but it is abundantly clear that the
battle, in its duration, the space covered, the numbers engaged, and
the losses endured, was far the greatest ever fought up to that time
by a British Army.  At Waterloo the losses were under 10,000.  In
this great fight they were little short of 50,000.  The fact that the
enemy did not recoil and that there was no sensational capture of
prisoners and guns has obscured the completeness of the victory.  In
these days of nations in arms a beaten army is buttressed up or
reabsorbed by the huge forces of {308} which it is part.  One judges
victory or defeat by the question whether an army has or has not
reached its objective.  In this particular case, taking a broad view
of the whole action, a German force of at least 600,000 men set forth
to reach the coast, and was opposed by a force of less than half its
numbers who barred its way.  The Germans did not advance five miles
in a month of fighting, and they lost not less than 150,000 men
without any military advantage whatever, for the possession of such
villages as Gheluvelt, Wytschaete, or Messines availed them not at
all.  If this is not a great victory, I do not know what military
achievement would deserve the term.  Ypres was a Plevna--but a Plevna
which remained for ever untaken.

[Sidenote: Death of Lord Roberts.]

On November 15 Lord Roberts died whilst visiting the Army, having
such an end as he would have chosen, within earshot of the guns and
within the lines of those Indian soldiers whom he loved and had so
often led.  The last words of his greatest speech to his
fellow-countrymen before the outbreak of that war which he had
foreseen, and for which he had incessantly tried to prepare, were
that they should quit themselves like men.  He lived to see them do
so, and though he was not spared to see the final outcome, his spirit
must at least have been at rest as to the general trend of the
campaign.  The tradition of his fascinating character, with its
knightly qualities of gentleness, bravery, and devotion to duty, will
remain as a national possession.

[Sidenote: The Eighth Division.]

About this time, though too late for the severe fighting, there
arrived the Eighth Division, which would enable Sir Henry Rawlinson
to complete his Fourth Corps.

{309}

The Eighth Division was composed as follows:--

  DIVISIONAL GENERAL--General DAVIES.

  23_rd Infantry Brigade--General Penny._
        2nd Scots Rifles.
        2nd Middlesex.
        2nd West Yorkshires.
        2nd Devons.

  24_th Infantry Brigade--General Carter._
        1st Worcesters.
        2nd East Lancashires.
        1st Notts and Derby.
        2nd Northamptons.

  25_th Infantry Brigade--General Lowry Cole._
        2nd Lincolns.
        2nd Berkshires.
        1st Irish Rifles.
        2nd Rifle Brigade.
        13th London (Kensingtons).

  _Artillery._
        5th Brigade R.H.A., G.O.Z.
        45th Brigade R.F.A.
        33rd Brigade R.F.A.
        Heavy Batteries 118, 119.
        2, 5, F. Cos. R.E.
        8 Signal Co.
        Divisional Cavalry.
        Northampton Yeomanry.
        8th Cyclists.


We have now arrived at what may be called the great winter lull, when
the continuation of active operations was made impossible by the
weather conditions, which were of the most atrocious description.  It
was the season which in a more classic age of warfare was spent in
comfortable winter quarters.  There was no such surcease of hardship
for the contending lines, who were left in their trenches face to
face, often not more than fifty yards apart, and each always keenly
alert for any devilry upon the part of the other.  The ashes of war
were always redly smouldering, and sometimes, as will be seen, burst
up into sudden furious flame.  It was a period of rain-storms and of
frost-bites, of trench mortars and of {310} hand grenades, of weary,
muddy, goat-skinned men shivering in narrow trenches, and of depleted
brigades resting and recruiting in the rearward towns.  Such was the
position at the Front.  But hundreds of miles to the westward the
real future of the war was being fought out in the rifle factories of
Birmingham, the great gun works of Woolwich, Coventry, Newcastle, and
Sheffield, the cloth looms of Yorkshire, and the boot centres of
Northampton.  In these and many other places oversea the tools for
victory were forged night and day through one of the blackest and
most strenuous winters that Britain has ever known.  And always on
green and waste and common, from Cromarty to Brighton, wherever
soldiers could find billets or a village of log huts could be put
together, the soldier citizens who were to take up the burden of the
war, the men of the Territorials and the men of the new armies,
endured every hardship and discomfort without a murmur, whilst they
prepared themselves for that great and glorious task which the future
would bring.  Even those who were too old or too young for service
formed themselves into volunteer bands, who armed and clothed
themselves at their own expense.  This movement, which sprang first
from the small Sussex village of Crowborough, was co-ordinated and
controlled by a central body of which Lord Desborough was the head.
In spite of discouragement, or at the best cold neutrality from
Government, it increased and prospered until no fewer than a quarter
of a million of men were mustered and ready entirely at their own
expense and by private enterprise--one of the most remarkable
phenomena of the war.




{311}

CHAPTER X

A RETROSPECT AND GENERAL SUMMARY

Position of Italy--Fall of German colonies--Sea affairs--Our Allies.


There has been no opportunity during this somewhat breathless
narrative of the great events which will ever be associated with the
names of Mons, the Marne, the Aisne, and Ypres to indicate those
factors which were influencing the course of the war in other
regions.  They do not come properly within the scope of this
narrative, nor does the author profess to have any special
information concerning them, but they cannot be absolutely omitted
without interfering with a correct view of the general situation.
They will therefore be briefly summarised in retrospect before the
reader is carried on into a more particular account of the trench
warfare of the early winter of 1914.

[Sidenote: Position of Italy.]

The most important European event at the outbreak of the war, outside
the movement of the combatants, was the secession of Italy from the
Central Powers on the grounds that her treaty applied only to wars of
defence whilst this was manifestly one of aggression.  Italian
statesmen could speak with the more decision upon the point since the
plot had been unfolded before their eyes.  A year previously they had
been asked to join in an unprovoked {312} attack upon Serbia, and in
refusing had given clear warning to their allies how such an outrage
would be viewed.  The Central Powers, however, puffed up by their
vainglory and by the knowledge of their own secret preparations, were
persuaded that they had ample strength to carry out their intentions
without aid from their southern ally.  Italy, having denounced the
treaty, remained a neutral, but it was always clear that she would
sooner or later throw in her strength with those who were at war with
Austria, her secular enemy.  It was not, however, until May 1915 that
she was in a position to take a definite step.  It should be
remembered to her eternal honour that the time at which she did
eventually come in was one which was very overcast for the Allies,
and that far from fulfilling the cynical German prophecy that she
would "hasten to the assistance of the conqueror," she took grave
risks in ranging herself upon the side of her Latin sister.

[Sidenote: Fall of German colonies.]

Upon August 24 Japan also declared war, and by November 7 had
completed her share of the common task, for Tsingtau, the only German
colony in Eastern Asia, was captured by a Japanese expeditionary
force aided by a British contingent.  Already the vast Colonial
erection of Germany, those numerous places in the sun which she had
annexed all over the globe, were beginning to crumble.  The little
Togoland colony fell upon August 26.  New Zealand took over German
Samoa upon August 31.  The Australians occupied the Bismarck
Archipelago upon September 7, and New Guinea upon the 25th.  These
smaller twigs were easily lopped, but the main boughs were made of
tougher stuff.  A premature attack upon German East Africa by an
expeditionary force from India {313} met with a severe check
immediately after landing.  In South Africa the Germans succeeded in
blowing into a small flame the smouldering ashes of the old Boer War.
De Wet and others broke their oaths and took up arms, but the
majority remained splendidly loyal, and by the beginning of December
Botha had brought the insurrection to an end, and was able henceforth
to devote his grand powers of leadership and organisation to the
extinction of the enemy's south-western colony.

[Sidenote: Sea affairs.]

A word, too, about sea affairs before we turn to the further detailed
account of the British winter upon the Continent.  In good time the
Fleet had been ordered to her war-stations at the north and east of
Scotland, with the result that German ocean commerce was brought to
an immediate and absolute stop.  The German ships _Goeben_ and
_Breslau_, which were cut off at the outbreak of the war in the
Mediterranean, succeeded in a very clever fashion in reaching the
Dardanelles and safety.  Having taken refuge at Constantinople, these
ships played a prominent part in determining Turkey to take action
against the Allies on October 31, a most disastrous decision both for
Turkey, which met her ruin, and for the Allies, who found their task
greatly increased through the excellent fighting power of the Turkish
forces.

A brisk action was fought upon August 28 in the Heligoland Bight,
when Admiral Beatty with his cruiser-squadron and a number of light
craft visited the enemy in his own waters, sinking three German
warships and sustaining no losses himself.  Among the prisoners was
the son of Chief Admiral Von Tirpitz.  Numerous minor actions led to
no {314} noteworthy result, but the power of the submarine, already
prophesied before the war, speedily made itself manifest.  Several
small British cruisers were destroyed by these craft, and finally a
considerable disaster occurred through the sinking of the three
cruisers, _Hogue_, _Aboukir_, and _Cressy_, upon September 22.  This
dashing and cool-headed exploit was brought off by a young lieutenant
named Weddigen.  Much as we suffered from his action, it was
recognised in Britain as having been a remarkable deed of arms upon a
very different plane to those execrable murders of civilians with
which the German submarine service was afterwards associated.  Some
months later Weddigen's submarine rose amongst the Grand Fleet whilst
it was in motion, and was rammed and destroyed by the _Dreadnought_.

The outbreak of war had seen a considerable number of German cruisers
at large, and these would undoubtedly have been strongly reinforced
had it not been for the speed with which the British Fleet took up
its war-stations.  As it was, the amount of damage to commerce was
not serious, and by the New Year all the wanderers had been rounded
up.  The most successful raider was the _Emden_, under Captain
Müller, which captured and destroyed numerous British merchant-ships,
bombarded the Madras gas-works, and sank by a surprise attack a small
Russian cruiser and a French destroyer before it was finally cornered
and sunk by the Australian cruiser _Sydney_ off Cocos Island upon
November 10.  Captain Muller, though forced by circumstances to adopt
certain measures not recognised in honourable naval warfare, behaved
on the whole in the manner which one associates with the term naval
officer.  The {315} _Karlsruhe_ had also considerable success as a
naval raider, but met her end through an unexplained explosion some
little time after her consort the _Emden_.  On the whole, the damage
inflicted by German commerce destroyers was very much less summary.
than had been anticipated.

On November 1, Admiral Craddock's squadron, consisting of the
_Monmouth_, the _Good Hope_, and two small vessels, was engaged by a
superior squadron under Admiral von Spee at Coronel off the coast of
Chili.  The result was a British defeat, the two cruisers being sunk
by gun-fire with all hands.  This disaster was dramatically revenged,
as within six weeks, upon December 8, a special cruiser-squadron
dispatched from England under Admiral Sturdee entirely destroyed the
fleet of Von Spee in the Battle of the Falkland Islands.  The British
Fleet was considerably stronger, and little credit can be claimed
save for the admirable strategy which enabled Sturdee to find the
enemy in that vast waste of waters as promptly and directly as if the
meeting had been by appointment.

There were no other outstanding naval events in 1914 save a raid upon
Cuxhaven by aeroplanes, escorted by light cruisers, which probably
did little harm as the weather was misty.  This occurred upon
Christmas Day 1914.  It had been preceded by an attack by German
cruisers on December 16 upon West Hartlepool, Scarborough, and
Whitby.  As the two latter towns were open watering-places, and as
numerous civilians were the victims of the raid, it was recognised
from this time onwards that the German Navy was as little trammelled
by international law or by the feelings of humanity as the German
{316} Army had shown itself to be in France, Belgium, and Russia.

[Sidenote: Our Allies.]

The general movement of the French armies has been touched upon in
recording the experiences of the British, for after their glorious
victory at the Marne and the hold-up at the Aisne, it was at Ypres
that the real fighting was done, the rest of the long line down to
the Swiss frontier playing a subsidiary part.  The Russians, however,
had experienced both extremities of fortune, for their victory at
Lemberg over the Austrians upon September 2 was of a very glorious
character, while their defeat by the Germans at Tannenberg in East
Prussia was no less decisive.  All the events of the outset of the
war were inglorious for Austria, who received rapidly the punishment
which she deserved for her wanton disturbance of the world's peace.
Apart from the blows which she received from Russia, she was severely
defeated by the Serbians on August 17, and her invading army was
driven out of the country which she had wronged.  At the end of the
year she had lost the whole of Galicia to the Russians, who in turn
had been pushed out of East Prussia by the German armies under Von
Hindenburg.  An invasion of Poland by the Germans was held up after
very severe fighting, failing to reach Warsaw, which was its
objective.

These were the main incidents of the world's war during the months
which have been under review.  As those months passed the terrific
nature of the task which they had undertaken became more and more
clear to the British, but further reflection had confirmed them in
their opinion that the alternative course of abandoning their friends
and breaking their pledge to Belgium was an absolutely unthinkable
{317} one, so that however great the trials and sacrifices in blood
and treasure, they were not further embittered by the reflection that
they could possibly have been avoided.  Very greatly were they
cheered in that dark hour by the splendid, whole-hearted help from
India, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, help which was even more
valuable from a moral than from a material standpoint.  With this
brief synopsis we will now return to those operations which are the
proper subject of this volume.




{318}

CHAPTER XI

THE WINTER LULL OF 1914

Increase of the Array--Formation of the Fifth Corps--The visit of the
King--Third Division at Petit Bois--The fight at Givenchy--Heavy
losses of the Indians--Fine advance of 1st Manchesters--Advance of
the First Division--Singular scenes at Christmas.


The winter lull may be said to have extended from the great combats
at Ypres of the middle of November 1914 to the opening of the spring
campaign in March 1915; but we will only follow it here up to the end
of the year.  It was a period of alternate rest and discomfort for
the troops with an ever-present salt of danger.  For days they found
themselves billeted with some approach to comfort in the farmhouses
and villages of Flanders, but such brief intervals of peace were
broken by the routine of the trenches, when, in mud or water with a
clay cutting before their faces and another at their backs, they
waited through the long hours, listening to the crack of the sniper's
rifle, or the crash of the bursting shell, with an indifference which
bordered upon thankfulness for anything that would break the drab
monotony of their task.  It was a scene of warfare which was new to
military experience.  The vast plain of battle lay in front of the
observer as a flat and lonely wilderness, dotted with ruined houses
from which no homely wreath of smoke {319} rose into the wintry air.
Here and there was an untidy litter of wire; here and there also a
clump of bleak and tattered woodland; but nowhere was there any sign
of man.  And yet from the elevation of an aeroplane it might be seen
that the population of a large city was lurking upon that motionless
waste.  Everywhere the airman would have distinguished the thin brown
slits of the advance trenches, the broader ditches of the supports
and the long zigzags of the communications, and he would have
detected that they were stuffed with men--grey men and khaki, in
every weird garment that ingenuity could suggest for dryness and for
warmth--all cowering within their shelters with the ever-present
double design of screening themselves and of attacking their enemy.
As the German pressure became less, and as more regiments of the
Territorials began to arrive, taking some of the work from their
comrades of the Regulars, it was possible to mitigate something of
the discomforts of warfare, to ensure that no regiments should be
left for too long a period in the trenches, and even to arrange for
week-end visits to England for a certain number of officers and men.
The streets of London got a glimpse of rugged, war-hardened faces,
and of uniforms caked with the brown mud of Flanders, or supplemented
by strange Robinson Crusoe goatskins from the trenches, which brought
home to the least imaginative the nature and the nearness of the
struggle.

[Sidenote: Increase of the Army.]

Before noting those occasional spasms of activity--epileptic,
sometimes, in their sudden intensity--which broke out from the German
trenches, it may be well to take some note of the general development
of those preparations which meant so much for the {320} future.  The
Army was growing steadily in strength.  Not only were the old
regiments reinforced by fresh drafts, but two new divisions of
Regulars were brought over before the end of January.  These formed
the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-eighth Divisions under Generals Snow
and Bulfin, two officers who had won a name in the first phase of the
war.

[Sidenote: Formation of the Fifth Corps.]

The two Divisions together formed the Fifth Army Corps under General
Plumer, the officer who had worked so hard for the relief of Mafeking
in 1900.  The Divisions, composed of splendid troops who needed some
hardening after tropical service, were constituted as follows, the
list including territorial battalions attached, but excluding the
artillery as well as the four original regular units in each brigade:

  FIFTH ARMY CORPS

  GENERAL PLUMER.

  TWENTY-SEVENTH DIVISION.--General SNOW.

  80_th Brigade--General Fortescue._
        Princess Pat. Canadians.
        4th Rifle Brigade.
        3rd King's Royal Rifles.
        4th King's Royal Rifles.
        2nd Shrop. Light Infantry.

  81_st Brigade--General MacFarlane._
        9th Royal Scots (T.F.).
        2nd Cameron Highlanders.
        1st Argyll and Sutherlands.
        1st Royal Scots.
        2nd Gloucesters.
        9th Argyll and Sutherlands (T.F.).

  82_nd Brigade--General Longley._
        1st Leinsters.
        2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers.
        2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
        1st Royal Irish.
        1st Cambridge (T.F.).
        Army Troops, 6th Cheshires.

{321}

  TWENTY-EIGHTH DIVISION.--General BULFIN.

  83_rd Brigade--General Boyle._
        2nd E. Yorkshire.
        1st King's Own York. Light Infantry.
        1st Yorks. and Lancasters.
        2nd Royal Lancasters.
        3rd Monmouths (T.F.).
        5th Royal Lancasters (T.F.).

  84_th Brigade--General Winter._
        2nd Northumberland Fusiliers.
        1st Suffolks.
        1st Welsh.
        2nd Cheshires.
        12th London Rangers (T.F.).
        1st Monmouths (T.F.).

  85_th Brigade--General Chapman._
        2nd East Kent.
        2nd East Surrey.
        3rd Middlesex.
        3rd Royal Fusiliers.
        8th Middlesex (T.F.).

Besides this new Fifth Army Corps, there had been a constant dribble
of other territorial units to the front, where they were incorporated
with various regular brigades.  The London Scottish, which had done
so well, was honoured by admission to the 1st Brigade of Guards.  The
Artists' Rifles, 28th London, had the unique distinction of being set
aside as an officers' training corps, from which officers were
actually drawn at the rate of a hundred a month.  The Honourable
Artillery Company, brigaded with the 7th Brigade, was among the first
to arrive.  Conspicuous among the newcomers were the London Rifle
Brigade, the 4th Suffolk, the Liverpool Scottish, the 5th and 6th
Cheshires, the 1st Herts, the 2nd Monmouthshires, Queen Victoria
Rifles, and Queen's Westminsters.  These were among the earlier
arrivals, though it seems invidious to mention names where the spirit
of all was equally good.  Among the {322} yeomanry, many had already
seen considerable service--notably the North and South Irish Horse,
who had served from the beginning, the Northumberland Hussars, the
North Somersets, the Oxford Hussars, and the Essex Yeomanry.  Most of
the troops named above shared the discomfort of the winter campaign
before the great arrival of the new armies from England in the
spring.  There can be no better earned bar upon a medal than that
which stands for this great effort of endurance against nature and
man combined.

To take events in their order: beyond numerous gallant affairs of
outposts, there was no incident of importance until the evening of
November 23, when the Germans, who had seemed stunned for a week or
so, showed signs of returning animation.  On this day, some eight
hundred yards of trench held by Indian troops in the neighbourhood of
Armentières were made untenable by the German artillery, especially
by the _minen-werfer_--small mortars which threw enormous bombs by an
ingenious arrangement whereby the actual shell never entered the bore
but was on the end of a rod outside the muzzle.  Some of these
terrible missiles, which came through the air as slowly as a punted
football, were 200 lbs. in weight and shattering in their effects.
There was an advance of the 112th Regiment of the Fourteenth German
Corps, and the empty trenches were strongly occupied by them--so
strongly that the first attempt to retake them was unsuccessful in
the face of the rifle and machine-gun fire of the defenders.  A
second more powerful counter-attack was organised by General Anderson
of the Meerut Division, and this time the Germans were swept out of
their position and the line {323} re-established.  The fighting
lasted all night, and the Ghurkas with their formidable knives proved
to be invaluable for such close work, while a party of Engineers with
hand-bombs did great execution--a strange combination of the Asiatic
with the most primitive of weapons and the scientific European with
the most recent.  It was a substantial victory as such affairs go,
for the British were left with a hundred prisoners, including three
officers, three machine-guns, and two mortars.

[Sidenote: The visit of the King.]

The first week of December was rendered memorable by a visit of the
King to the Army.  King George reviewed a great number of his devoted
soldiers, who showed by their fervent enthusiasm that one need not be
an autocratic War-lord in order to command the fierce loyalty of the
legions.  After this pleasant interlude there followed a succession
of those smaller exploits which seem so slight in any chronicle, and
yet collectively do so much to sustain the spirit of the Army.  Now
this dashing officer, now that, attempted some deed upon the German
line, and never failed to find men to follow him to death.  On
November 24 it was Lieutenant Impey, with a handful of 2nd Lincolns;
on November 25, Lieutenants Ford and Morris with a few Welsh
Fusiliers and sappers; on November 26, Sir Edward Hulse with some
Scots Guards; on the same day, Lieutenant Durham with men of the 2nd
Rifle Brigade--in each case trenches were temporarily won, the enemy
was damaged, and a spirit of adventure encouraged in the trenches.
Sometimes such a venture ended in the death of the leader, as in the
case of Captain the Honourable H. L. Bruce of the Royal Scots.  Such
men died as the old knights did who rode out betwixt the {324} lines
of marshalled armies, loved by their friends and admired by their
foes.

December 9 was the date of two small actions.  In the first the 1st
Lincolns of the 9th Brigade, which had been commanded by Douglas
Smith since the wounding of General Shaw, made an attack upon the
wood at Wytschaete which is called Le Petit Bois.  The advance was
not successful, the three officers who led it being all wounded, and
forty-four men being hit.  The attempt was renewed upon a larger
scale five days later.  The other action was an attack by the enemy
upon some of the trenches of the Third Corps.  This Corps, though it
had not come in for the more dramatic scenes of the campaign, had
done splendid and essential work in covering a line of fourteen miles
or so against incessant attacks of the Germans, who never were able
to gain any solid advantage.  On this occasion the impact fell upon
Gordon's 19th Brigade, especially upon the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders and the 1st Middlesex.  It was driven back with heavy
loss.

[Sidenote: Third Division at Petit Bois.]

On December 14 the second and more sustained effort was made to get
possession of the Petit Bois at Wytschaete, which had been attacked
by the Lincolns upon the 9th.  D'Urbal's Eighth French Army was
co-operating upon the left.  The British attack was conducted by
Haldane's Third Division, and the actual advance was carried out,
after a considerable artillery preparation from the batteries of two
Corps, by Bowes' 8th Brigade, with the 2nd Royal Scots and the 1st
Gordons in the lead.  At 7.45 the guns were turned upon the big wood
beyond Petit Bois, through which the supports might be advancing, and
at the same hour the two regiments named swarmed forward, {325} the
Lowlanders on the left and the Highlanders on the right.  The Royal
Scots, under Major Duncan, carried Petit Bois with a rush, taking
fifty prisoners and two machine-guns, while the Germans fled out at
the other end of the wood.  The Scots at once entrenched themselves
and got their own machine-guns into position.  The Gordons, under
Major Baird, advanced with splendid dash and gained some ground, but
found the position such that they could not entrench upon it, so they
were forced to fall back eventually to their original position.  Both
they and the 4th Middlesex, who supported them, lost considerably in
the affair.  The total casualties in the Petit Bois action came to
over four hundred, with seventeen officers, figures which were
considerably swollen by the losses of the Suffolks and Irish Rifles,
who continued to hold the captured position in the face of continued
bombing.  The French in the north had no particular success and lost
600 men.  The importance of such operations is not to be measured,
however, by the amount of ground won, but by the necessity of beating
up the enemies' quarters, keeping them pinned to their positions, and
preventing them from feeling that they could at their own sweet wills
detach any reinforcements they chose to thicken their line upon the
Eastern frontier, where our Russian Allies were so insistently
pressing.

On the morning of December 19 an attack was made upon the German
lines in the Festubert region by Willcocks' Indian Corps, the Meerut
Division, under General Anderson, attacking upon the left, and the
Lahore, under General Watkis, upon the right.  The object of the
movement was to co-operate with the French in an advance which they
had {326} planned.  The Meerut attack was successful at first, but
was driven back by a counter-attack, and some hundreds of Indian
infantry were killed, wounded, or taken.  In the case of the Lahore
attack the storming party consisted of the 1st Highland Light
Infantry and the 4th Ghurkas.  Both of these units belong to the
Sirhind Brigade, but they were joined in the enterprise by the 59th
Scinde Rifles of the Jullundur Brigade.  These latter troops had a
long night march before reaching the scene of the operations, when
they found themselves upon the right of the attack and within two
hundred and fifty yards of the German trenches.  Judging the
operations from the standard reached at a later date, the whole
arrangement seems to have been extraordinarily primitive.  The
artillery preparation for a frontal attack upon a strong German line
of trenches lasted exactly four minutes, being rather a call to arms
than a bombardment.  The troops rushed most gallantly forward into
the dark of a cold wet winter morning, with no guide save the
rippling flashes of the rifles and machine-guns in front of them.
Many were so sore-footed and weary that they could not break into the
double.  Some of the Indians were overtaken from behind by a line of
British supports, which caused considerable confusion.  An officer of
Indians has left it on record that twice running he had a revolver
clapped to his head by a British officer.  All of the battalions
advanced with a frontage of two companies in columns of platoons.
Both the Ghurkas and Highlanders reached the trench in the face of a
murderous fire.  The left of the 59th, consisting of Punjabi
Mahomedans, also reached the trench.  The right, who were Sikhs, made
an {327} equally gallant advance, but were knee-deep in a wet
beetroot field and under terrific machine-gun fire.  Their gallant
leader, Captain Scale, was struck down, as was every Indian officer,
but a handful of the survivors, under a Sikh Jemadar, got into a
German sap, which they held for twenty-four hours, taking a number of
prisoners.

Day had dawned, and though the British and Indians were in the enemy
trenches, it was absolutely impossible to send them up reinforcements
across the bullet-swept plain.  The 59th discovered a sap running
from their left to the German line, and along this they pushed.  They
could not get through, however, to where their comrades were being
terribly bombed on either flank by the counter-attack.  It was an
heroic resistance.  Colonel Ronaldson, who led the party, held on all
day, but was very lucky in being able to withdraw most of the
survivors after nightfall.  Of the hundred Punjabis who held one
flank, only three returned, while thirteen wounded were reported
later from Germany.  The others all refused to surrender, declaring
that those were the last orders of their British officers, and so
they met their honoured end.  It had been a long and weary day with a
barren ending, for all that had been won was abandoned.  The losses
were over a thousand, and were especially heavy in the case of
officers.

[Sidenote: The fight at Givenchy.]

The Germans, elated by the failure of the attack, were in the mood
for a return visit.  In the early dawn of the next day, December 20,
they began a heavy bombardment of the Indian trenches, followed by an
infantry attack extending over a line of six miles from south of the
Bethune Canal to Festubert in the north.  The attack began by the
explosion of {328} a succession of mines which inflicted very heavy
losses upon the survivors of the Ghurkas and Highland Light Infantry.
The weight of the attack at the village of Givenchy fell upon the
exhausted Sirhind Brigade, who were driven back, and the greater part
of Givenchy was occupied by the enemy.  General Brunker fell back
with his Brigade, but his line was stiffened by the arrival of the
47th Sikhs of the 8th Jullundur Brigade, who were in divisional
reserve.  These troops prevented any further advance of the Germans,
while preparations were made for an effective counter-stroke.

[Sidenote: Heavy losses of the Indians.]

Little help could be given from the north, where the line was already
engaged, but to the south there were considerable bodies of troops
available.  The situation was serious, and a great effort was called
for, since it was impossible to abandon into the hands of the enemy a
village which was an essential bastion upon the line of defence.  The
German attack had flooded down south of Givenchy to the Bethune
Canal, and a subsidiary attack had come along the south of the Canal
with the object of holding the troops in their places and preventing
the reinforcement of the defenders of Givenchy.  But these advances
south of the village made no progress, being held up by the 9th
Bhopals and Wilde's 57th Rifles of the 7th Ferozepore Brigade between
Givenchy and the Canal, while the 1st Connaught Rangers of the same
brigade stopped it on the southern side of the Canal.  Matters were
for a moment in equilibrium.  To the south of the Canal energetic
measures were taken to get together a force which could come across
it by the Pont Fixe or road bridge, and re-establish matters in the
north.

{329}

[Sidenote: Fine advance of Manchesters.]

The struggle had broken out close to the point of junction between
the British forces and those of General Foch of the Tenth French
Army, so that our Allies were able to co-operate with us in the
counter-attack.  It was directed by General Carnegy, and the assault
was made by the 1st Manchesters, the 4th Suffolk Territorials, and
some French territorials.  The Manchesters, under the leadership of
Colonel Strickland, made a most notable attack, aided by two
companies of the Suffolks, the other companies remaining in reserve
on the north bank of the Canal.  So critical was the position that
the 3rd Indian Sappers and Miners were set the dangerous task, under
very heavy shell-fire, of mining the bridge over the Canal.  The
situation was saved, however, by Colonel Strickland's fine advance.
His infantry, with very inadequate artillery support, pushed its way
into Givenchy and cleared the village from end to end.  Three hundred
of the Manchesters fell in this deed of arms.  Not only did they win
the village, but they also regained some of the lost trenches to the
north-east of Givenchy.  This was the real turning-point of the
action.  There was at the time only the one very wet, very weary, and
rather cut-up Jullundur Brigade between the Germans and Bethune--with
all that Bethune stood for strategically.  To the east the 9th
Bhopals and 57th Rifles still held on to their position.  It was only
to the north that the enemy retained his lodgment.

But the fight to the north had been a bitter one all day, and had
gone none too well for the British forces.  The Indians were fighting
at an enormous disadvantage.  As well turn a tiger loose upon an
ice-floe and expect that he will show all his wonted {330} fierceness
and activity.  There are inexorable axioms of Nature which no human
valour nor constancy can change.  The bravest of the brave, our
Indian troops were none the less the children of the sun, dependent
upon warmth for their vitality and numbed by the cold wet life of the
trenches.  That they still in the main maintained a brave,
uncomplaining, soldierly demeanour, and that they made head against
the fierce German assaults, is a wonderful proof of their
adaptability.

About ten o'clock on the morning of the 20th the German attack,
driving back the Sirhind Brigade from Givenchy, who were the left
advanced flank of the Lahore Division, came with a rush against the
Dehra-Dun Brigade, who were the extreme right of the Meerut Division.
This Brigade had the 1st Seaforth Highlanders upon its flank, with
the 2nd Ghurkas upon its left.  The Ghurkas were forced to retire,
and the almost simultaneous retirement of the defenders of Givenchy
left the Highlanders in a desperate position with both flanks in the
air.  Fortunately the next Brigade of the Meerut Division, the
Garhwal Brigade, stood fast and kept in touch with the 6th Jats, who
formed the left of the Dehra-Dun Brigade, and so prevented the
pressure upon that side from becoming intolerable.  The 9th Ghurkas
came up to support the 2nd Ghurkas, who had not gone far from their
abandoned trenches, and the 58th Indian Rifles also came to the
front.  These battalions upon the left rear of the Highlanders gave
them some support.  None the less the position of the battalion was
dangerous and its losses heavy, but it faced the Germans with
splendid firmness, and nothing could budge it.  Machine-guns are
stronger {331} than flesh and blood, but the human spirit can be
stronger than either.  You might kill the Highlanders, but you could
not shift them.  The 2nd Black Watch, who had been in reserve,
established touch towards nightfall with the right of the Seaforths,
and also with the left of the Sirhind Brigade, so that a continuous
line was assured.

In the meantime a small force had assembled under General MacBean
with the intention of making a counter-attack and recovering the
ground which had been lost on the north side of Givenchy.  With the
8th Ghurkas and the 47th Sikhs, together with the 7th British Dragoon
Guards, an attack was made in the early hours of the 21st.  Colonel
Lempriere of the Dragoon Guards was killed, and the attack failed.
It was renewed in the early hours of the morning, but it again failed
to dislodge the Germans from the captured trenches.

[Sidenote: Advance of the First Division.]

December 21 dawned upon a situation which was not particularly rosy
from a British point of view.  It is true that Givenchy had been
recovered, but a considerable stretch of trenches were still in the
hands of the Germans, their artillery was exceedingly masterful, and
the British line was weakened by heavy losses and indented in several
places.  The one bright spot was the advance of the First Division of
Haig's Corps, who had come up in the night-time.  The three brigades
of this Division were at once thrown into the fight, the first being
sent to Givenchy, the second given as a support to the Meerut
Division, and the third directed upon the trenches which had been
evacuated the day before by the Sirhind Brigade.  All of these
brigades won their way forward, and by the morning of the 22nd much
of the ground which {332} had been taken by the Germans was
reoccupied by the British.  The 1st Brigade, led by the Cameron
Highlanders, had made good all the ground between Givenchy and the
Canal.  Meanwhile the 3rd Brigade had re-established the Festubert
position, where the 2nd Welsh and 1st South Wales Borderers had won
their way into the lost trenches of the Ghurkas.

This was not done without very stark fighting, in which of all the
regiments engaged none suffered so heavily as the 2nd Munsters (now
attached to the 3rd Brigade).  This regiment, only just built up
again after its practical extermination at Etreux in August, made a
grand advance and fought without cessation for nearly forty-eight
hours.  Their losses were dreadful, including their gallant Colonel
Bent, both Majors Day and Thomson, five other officers, and several
hundreds of the rank and file.  So far forward did they get that it
was with great difficulty that the survivors, through the exertions
of Major Ryan, were got back into a place of safety.  It was the
second of three occasions upon which this gallant Celtic battalion
gave itself for King and Country.  Let this soften the asperity of
politics if unhappily we must come back to them after the war.

Meanwhile the lines upon the flank of the Seaforths which had been
lost by the Dehra-Dun Brigade were carried by the 2nd Brigade
(Westmacott), the 1st North Lancashire and 1st Northamptons leading
the attack with the 2nd Rifles in support.  Though driven back by a
violent counter-attack in which both leading regiments, and
especially the Lancashire men, lost heavily, the Brigade came again,
and ended by making good the gap in the line.  Thus the situation on
the morning of the 22nd looked very {333} much better than upon the
day before.  On this morning, as so many of the 1st Corps were in the
advanced line, Sir Douglas Haig took over the command from Sir James
Willcocks.  The line had been to some extent re-established and the
firing died away, but there were some trenches which were not retaken
till a later date.

Such was the scrambling and unsatisfactory fight of Givenchy, a
violent interlude in the drab records of trench warfare.  It began
with a considerable inroad of Germans into our territory and heavy
losses of our Indian Contingent.  It ended by a general return of the
Germans to their former lines, and the resumption by the veteran
troops of the First Division of the main positions which we had lost.
Neither side had gained any ground of material value, but the balance
of profit in captures was upon the side of the Germans, who may
fairly claim that the action was a minor success for their arms,
since they assert that they captured some hundreds of prisoners and
several machine-guns.  The Anglo-Indian Corps had 2600 casualties,
and the First Corps 1400, or 4000 in all.  The Indian troops were now
withdrawn for a rest, which they had well earned by their long and
difficult service in the trenches.  To stand day after day up to his
knees in ice-cold water is no light ordeal for a European, but it is
difficult to imagine all that it must have been to a Southern
Asiatic.  The First Corps took over the La Bassée lines.

[Sidenote: Singular scenes at Christmas.]

About the same date as the Battle of Givenchy there was some fighting
farther north at Rouge Banc, where the Fourth Corps was engaged and
some German trenches were taken.  The chief losses in this affair
{334} fell upon those war-worn units, the 2nd Scots Guards and 2nd
Borderers of the 20th Brigade.  Henceforward peace reigned along the
lines for several weeks--indeed Christmas brought about something
like fraternisation between British and Germans, who found a sudden
and extraordinary link in that ancient tree worship, long anterior to
Christianity, which Saxon tribes had practised in the depths of
Germanic forests and still commemorated by their candle-lit firs.
For a single day the opposing forces mingled in friendly conversation
and even in games.  It was an amazing spectacle, and must arouse
bitter thoughts concerning those high-born conspirators against the
peace of the world, who in their mad ambition had hounded such men on
to take each other by the throat rather than by the hand.  For a day
there was comradeship.  But the case had been referred to the God of
Battles, and the doom had not yet been spoken.  It must go to the
end.  On the morning of the 26th dark figures vanished reluctantly
into the earth, and the rifles cracked once more.  It remains one
human episode amid all the atrocities which have stained the memory
of the war.

So ended 1914, the year of resistance.  During it the Western Allies
had been grievously oppressed by their well-prepared enemy.  They had
been over-weighted by numbers and even more so by munitions.  For a
space it had seemed as if the odds were too much for them.  Then with
a splendid rally they had pushed the enemy back.  But his reserves
had come up and had proved to be as superior as his first line had
been.  But even so he had reached his limit.  He could get no
further.  The danger hour was past.  There was now coming the long,
anxious year of {335} equilibrium, the narrative of which will be
given in the succeeding volume of 1915.  Finally will come the year
of restoration which will at least begin, though it will not finish,
the victory of the champions of freedom.




{337}

INDEX


Abell, Major, 70

Abercrombie, Colonel, 94

Agadir, 7

Aisne, battle of the, 162-199

Alexander, Major, 82

Algeciras, 7

Allen, Major, 209

Allenby, General, 56, 80, 88, 96, 97, 126, 155, 204, 226, 279, 287

Alleyne, Captain, 294

Allfrey, Captain, 149

Alsace, 43, 57

Anderson, General, 322, 325

Anley, Colonel, 105

Anley, General, 229

Annesley, Colonel, 284

Ansell, Colonel, 132

Antwerp, fall of, 193; Naval Division at siege of, 195

Ardee, Lord, 288

Army, the Russian, 138; at battle of Gumbinnen, 138; at battle of
Lemberg, 139; at battle of Tannenberg, 139

Ashburner, Captain, 70

Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., 18

Austin, Dr., 93

Australia, offer of service, 34, 37; Bismarck Archipelago captured
by, 312; German colony of New Guinea captured by, 312; 317

Austria, Archduke Francis Ferdinand of, assassinated at Sarajevo, 12

Austria-Hungary, annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1908, 2; presents
ultimatum to Serbia, 14; declares war against Serbia, 15



Baird, Major, 325

Balfour, Lieutenant, 167

Bannatyne, Colonel, 255

Barnes, Colonel, 241

Battenberg, Prince Louis of, 40

Battenberg, Prince Maurice of, 256

Bavaria, Crown Prince of, 145

Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 313

Belgians, King of the, 198

Belgium, infraction of neutrality, 12

Below-Saleske, von, 19

Benson, Captain, 73

Bent, Colonel, 332

Berners, Captain, 172

Bernhardi, General von, 1, 8, 159

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, 17, 21, 23, 28

Bidon, General, 247

Bingham, General, 283

Bismarck Archipelago, German colony, captured by Australian forces,
312

Blewitt, Lieutenant, 268

Boger, Colonel, 83

Bols, Colonel, 207

Bolton, Colonel, 244

Botha, Right Hon. Louis, 34, 313

Bottomley, Major, 259

Bowes, General, 218, 295, 324

Boyd, Lieutenant, 266

Bradbury, Captain, V.C., 130, 131

Brett, Colonel, 102

Bridges, Major Tom, 118

Briggs, General, 128, 130, 174, 282, 283

British Expeditionary Force: departure from England, 50; its
composition, 52, 86; its arrival in France, 53; its reception by the
French people, 54; advance into Belgium, 57

Brooke, Captain, 260

Bruce, Captain the Hon. H. L., 323

Brunker, General, 328

Buckle, Major, 222

Bulbe, Lieutenant, 78

Bulfin, General, 154, 156, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 179, 186, 265,
273, 287, 288, 320

Bülow, General von, 84, 144, 154

Bülow, Prince von, 3

Burrows, Major, 168

Butler, Colonel, 229

Butler, Major Leslie, 116

Byng, Captain, 70

Byng, General, 210, 233



Cadogan, Colonel, 237, 264

Campbell, Captain, 73

Campbell, Colonel (5th Dragoon Guards), 281

Campbell, Colonel (9th Lancers), 80, 149

Campbell, Lieutenant, 130

Campbell, Major, 227

Canada, offer of service, 34, 37; 317

Canneau, General, 144, 204, 212, 221

Capper, General, 232, 244, 265, 269, 295

Carey, Captain, 70

Carnegy, General, 329

Carr, Lieutenant Laurence, 259

Carter, Major, 253

Cary, General Langlé de, 144

Cary-Bernard, Captain, 306

Castelnau, General, 44, 145, 193

Cathcart, Captain, 168

Cavan, Lord, 289, 293, 300, 306

Cawley, Major, 132

Ceylon, offer of service, 34

Chapman, Corporal, 227

Charleroi, battle of, 141

Charrier, Major, 119, 120, 121

Chetwode, General, 58, 121

Christie, Major, 112

Churchill, Right Hon. Winston S., 5, 31, 40, 196

Chute, Lieutenant, 121

Clive, Hon. Windsor, 92

Clutterbuck, Captain, 111

Cobb, Irvin, American correspondent with German Army, 64

Cobbold, Colonel, 214

Coke, Major, 282

Coleman, American volunteer, quoted, 119, 149, 303

Coles, Colonel, 266

Congreve, General, V.C., 187, 229

Cookson, Colonel, 167

Cornish-Bowden, Major, 151

Coronel, naval battle off, 315

Craddock, Admiral, 315

Cramb, Professor, 30

Creek, Captain, 253

Crichton, Major, 241

Crossley, Sergeant-Major, 222

Cutbill, Captain, 102

Cuthbert, General, 71, 79, 98



Dalrymple, Lord, 244

D'Amade, General, 123

Daniell, Major, 212

Danks, Lieutenant, 93

Dashwood, Lieutenant, 167

Davey, Major, 70

Davies, Colonel, 301

Davies, General, 90, 93, 132, 153, 173

Davis, Harding, American correspondent with German Army, 62, 64

Dawnay, Colonel, 293

Day, Major, 332

Dease, Lieutenant Maurice, V.C., 70

De Crespigny, Captain, 128

Deimling, General von, 269

De Lisle, General, 80, 148, 156, 157, 174, 204, 226, 281

De Mitry, General, 247, 255

Denham, Lieutenant, 323

Derbyshhe, Gunner, 130

D'Esperey, General, 144, 146

Dillon, Captain H. M., 302

Dimmer, Lieutenant, V.C., 181, 305

Doran, General Beauchamp, 60, 69, 113, 150, 174, 218

Dorell, Sergeant, V.C., 130, 131

Doughty, Major, 102

Dour, action at, 79

Drummond, General.  84, 103

Dubail, General, 145

Duff, Colonel Grant, 171

D'Urbal, General, 296, 324

Dykes, Colonel, 105



Earle, Colonel, 259

East Africa, German colony of, attack on, fails, 312

East Coast, raid on, by German cruisers, 315

Edmunds, Captain, 93

Edward VII., 6

Elliott, Dr., 93

Ellison, Captain, 152

_Emden_, exploits of the, 314

Emmich, General von, 44



Fairlie, Captain, 241

Falkland Islands, naval battle off, 315

Ferguson, General, 80, 177, 190, 211

Findlay, General, 153

Fisher, Lord, 5

FitzClarence, General, 258, 270, 303

Flint, Lieutenant, 175

Foch, General, 144, 148, 150, 154, 202, 329

Foljambe, Captain, 168

Forbes, Major Ian, 241

Ford, Lieutenant, 323

Forrester, Major, 259

Frameries, action at, 77

Fraser, Major, 244

French, General Sir John, 54, 58, 62, 74, 75, 76, 77, 84, 87, 96, 97,
116, 119, 126, 135, 145, 156, 164, 183, 186, 198, 202, 220, 234, 236,
245, 246, 247, 251, 275, 276, 282, 285



Geddes, Lieutenant-Colonel, 169

George V. visits the Army in France, 323

Germany, Heligoland ceded to, 2; agitation in, against Great Britain
during Boer War, 3; navy bill of 1900, 4; anti-British agitations in,
9; root causes of hatred of Great Britain in, 10; and world-power,
10; preparations for war by, 11; declares war against Russia, 15;
against France, 15; proposes that Great Britain should remain
neutral, 17; and Belgian neutrality, 19; character of her diplomacy,
19, 20; invades Belgium, 21; Great Britain declares war on, 21;
treatment of the departing Embassies, 22; the claim for culture in, 29

_Germany and the Next War_, 9

Gheluvelt, battle of, 265

Gibbs, Colonel, 79

Giffard, Lieutenant, 269

Gifford, Lieutenant, 130

Givenchy, fight at, 327

Glasgow, Sergeant, 227

Gleichen, General Count, 61, 79, 82, 83, 98, 157, 207

Gloster, Colonel, 224

Godley, Private, V.C., 70

Gordon, Captain B. G. R., 259

Gordon, Colonel, 114

Gordon, General, 215, 230, 324

Gordon, Lieutenant, 181

Goschen, Sir Edward, ambassador at Berlin, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24

Gough, General, 126, 150, 155, 203, 204, 226, 279, 280, 282

Grant, Major, 168

Graves, Lieutenant, 114

Great Britain, cedes Heligoland to Germany, 2; sympathy and respect
for German Empire in, 2; agreement with France, 1903, 6; agreement
with Russia, 1907, 6; maritime power of, 10; efforts for peace by,
16; reply to German proposal of neutrality, 17; declares war against
Germany, 21; preparations for possible naval war in, 31; effect of
German war policy in, 32

Green, Major, 168

Grenfell, Captain the Hon. F., 82

Grey, Sir Edward (now Viscount), proposes a conference of
Ambassadors, 16; replies to German proposal of neutrality, 17;
suggests limitation of the conflict, 19; 20, 33

Grierson, General, 55

Griffin, Colonel, 105, 158

Guernsey, Lord, 172



Haig, General Sir Douglas, 55, 56, 72, 77, 84, 88, 89, 90, 126, 133,
157, 173, 183, 190, 236, 239, 241, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 256, 260,
265, 270, 275, 276, 282, 286, 287, 295, 306, 331, 333

Haking, General, 72, 94, 157, 173, 176, 302

Haldane, General, 104, 106, 112, 206, 324

Haldane, Lord, 36

Hamilton, Adjutant Rowan, 171

Hamilton, Captain, 93

Hamilton, General Sir Hubert, 77, 157, 177, 208

Hankey, Major, 270

Harter, Staff-Captain, 176

Hasted, Colonel, 177

Haussen, General von, 139, 144

Hautvesnes, action at, 153

Hawarden, Lord, 92

Hawkins, Lieutenant Hope, 285

Hay, Lord Arthur, 172

Headlam, General, 110

Heeringen, General von, 145

Heligoland Bight, battle in, 313

Heligoland ceded to Germany, 1890, 2

Herbert, Captain, 208

Hindenburg, General von, 139, 316

Hogan, Sergeant, V.C., 224

Holt, Lieutenant, 71

Hoskyns, Captain, 152

Huggan, Dr., 180

Hull, Colonel, 70

Hulse, Sir Edward, 323

Hunter-Weston, General, 104, 106, 107, 229, 230



Impey, Lieutenant, 323

India, offer of service, 34; 317

Ingham, Major, 69

Italy secedes from the Central Powers, 311



Jagow, von, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Berlin, 21, 23, 25

Japan declares war, 312; captures the German colony of Tsingtau, 312

Jarvis, Corporal, V.C., 71

Jelf, Major, 168

Joffre, General, 44, 57, 62, 74, 76, 126, 127, 144, 178, 198, 202,
251, 255, 282, 287

Johnston, Captain, 175

Johnstone, Major, 169



Kavanagh, General, 262, 279, 293

Kerr, Colonel, 269

Kitchener, Lord, becomes Secretary of State for War, 34; his estimate
of duration of war, 38; appeals for volunteers, 38; 54, 56

Kluck, General von, 83, 84, 88, 95, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 154

Knight, Colonel, 154

Kruseik cross-roads, fight for, 256



Lamb, Lieutenant, 131

Lambert, Major, 292

Landon, General, 172, 248, 254, 260, 265, 269, 276, 290

Landrecies, engagement at, 90

Lansdowne, Lord, 33

Law, Right Hon. A. Bonar, 33

Lawford, General, 273, 291, 294, 295

Lawrence, Colonel, 229

Leach, Lieutenant, V.C., 224

Le Cateau, battle of, 96-137, 141

Leckie, Captain Malcolm, 82

Legard, Captain, 222

Le Gheir, action of 229

Leman, General, 45, 46, 47

Lemberg, battle of, 139, 316

Lempriere, Colonel, 331

Lichnowsky, Prince, German ambassador to Great Britain, 19, 20, 25

Liége, 45, 46, 47, 141

Lister, Captain, 71

Lloyd, Major, 167, 168

Lomax, General, 269

Longley, Colonel, 99

Longwy, battle of, 141

Loring, Colonel, 243

Lorraine, 43, 57

Lushington, Lieutenant-Colonel, 132

Luxemburg, duchy of, 44



MacBean, General, 331

McCracken, General, 69, 78, 88, 104, 190, 208, 215, 219, 291, 306

McKenna, Right Hon. Reginald, 5, 31

Mackenzie, General Colin, 209

MacLachlan, Lieutenant-Colonel, 171

MacMahon, Colonel, 70, 221, 299

M'Nab, Captain, 284

Maistre, General, 220

Maitland, Major, 171

Malcolm, Colonel, 283, 284

Manoury, General, 144, 146, 148

Marne, battle of the, 138-161

Martyn, Colonel, 304

Maubeuge, fortress of, 85, 141, 163, 184

Maude, General, 295

Maud'huy, General, 296

Maxse, General, 169, 179

Messines, fight at, 280

Michel, General, 49

Michell, Captain, 122

Milne, General, 110

Milward, Major, 292

Mitford, Major, 241

Monck, Captain, 91

Mons, battle of, 50-95, 141

Mons, retreat from, chronology of events, 136-137

Montresor, Colonel, 167

Morland, Colonel, 268

Morland, General, 211, 224, 286, 296

Morris, Colonel, 133

Morris, Lieutenant, 323

Morritt, Lieutenant, 73

Moussy, General, 288

Mülhausen, battle of, 141

Mullens, General, 80, 221, 283

Mundy, Lieutenant, 130

Munro, General, 269



Namur, 48, 49, 76, 141

Navy, the, mobilisation of, 40

Neeld, Admiral, 25

Nelson, Gunner, V.C., 130, 131

Nery, combat of, 127

Neuve Chapelle, first fight of, 219

Newfoundland, offer of service, 34

New Guinea, German colony of, captured by Australian forces, 312

New Zealand, offer of service, 34, 37; captures German colony of
Samoa, 312; 317

Nicholson, Lieutenant, 121

Nicholson, Major, 171

Nietzsche, 8

Nimy, defence of the bridges of, 68



Oliver, Captain, 169

Ommany, Captain, 269

Orford, Captain, 102

Osborne, Driver, 130

Ourcq, battle of the, 145

Ovens, Colonel, 244



Pack-Beresford, Major, 79

Paley, Major, 269

Paris, General, 195

Parker, Major, 112

Pau, General, 44

Paynter, Captain, 243

Peel, Major, 268

Pell, Colonel, 266

Pennecuick, Lieutenant, 156

Penny, Sergeant-Major, 222

Perceval, Colonel, 269

Petit Bois, fight at, 324

Phillips, Major, 168

Pilken Inn, fight of, 252

Plumer, General, 320

Pollard, Lieutenant, 82

Ponsonby, Colonel, 168

Pont-sur-Sambre, action near, 94

Poole, Major, 111

Popham, Captain, 188

Powell, American journalist, quoted, 63, 198

Powell, Major, 250

Prichard, Major, 268

Prowse, Major, 231

Prussia, Crown Prince of, 145, 163

Prussia, Prince Henry of, 25

Prussian Guards, attack of, at Ypres, 297; Kaiser's order to, 297

Pulteney, General, 56, 126, 152, 157, 175, 178, 190, 206, 214, 215,
218, 227



Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 224, 232, 236, 237, 241, 251, 256, 308

Rees, Captain, 268

Regiments:

_Artillery--_

Royal Field Artillery, 69, 70, 71, 78, 82, 88, 89, 92, 100, 105, 110,
120, 153, 169, 192, 249, 268, 271, 272, 273, 300, 301

Royal Horse Artillery, 263; E Battery, 285; J Battery, 122, 150; K
Battery, 236; L Battery, 80, 128, 130, 131, 133

Heavy, 109, 110, 301

Howitzer, 88, 105

Honourable Artillery Company, 321

_Cavalry--_

1st Life Guards, 263, 293

2nd Life Guards, 263, 293

Royal Horse Guards (Blues), 263, 293

2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays), 85, 128, 131, 132, 155, 280, 282

3rd Dragoon Guards, 272, 306

4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards, 58, 80, 118, 187, 188, 282, 283

5th Dragoon Guards, 280, 281, 282

6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), 283, 284, 285

7th Dragoon Guards, 331

1st Dragoons (Royals), 263, 272

2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys), 122, 263

3rd Hussars, 263

4th Hussars, 263

10th Hussars, 241, 272

11th Hussars, 131, 282, 283, 285

15th Hussars, 93, 120, 121

18th Hussars, 149

20th Hussars, 58

5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, 227, 279

9th Lancers, 80, 82, 149, 281, 283, 285

12th Lancers, 122, 227

16th Lancers, 226, 279

Essex Yeomanry, 322

Irish Horse, 242, 322

Leicestershire Yeomanry, 306

North Somerset Yeomanry, 306, 322

Northumberland Hussars, 242, 322

Oxfordshire Hussars, 281, 282, 322

_Guards--_

Coldstream, 90, 91, 92, 119, 120, 132, 168, 169, 171, 172, 191, 248,
259, 265

Grenadier, 90, 92, 150, 237, 244, 258, 259, 265, 289, 293, 306

Irish, 90, 92, 132, 150, 172, 255, 265, 288, 289, 293

Scots, 119, 169, 171, 242, 243, 244, 252, 253, 259, 260, 271, 297,
323, 334

_Infantry--_

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 84, 100, 102, 216, 230, 324

Artists' Rifles (28th London), 321

Bedford, 174, 207, 236, 264, 266, 297

Berkshire, 93, 153, 255, 272

Black Watch, 119, 150, 169, 170, 171, 252, 258, 259, 331

Border, 243, 260

Buffs (East Kent), 214

Cameron Highlanders, 169, 171, 248, 252, 253, 332

Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 84, 100, 131

Cheshire, 82, 83, 154, 174, 216, 321

Connaught Rangers, 94, 157, 301, 302, 328

Devon, 210, 219, 224

Dorset, 207, 208, 210, 216

Dublin Fusiliers, 106, 112

Duke of Cornwall's, 62, 72, 73, 99, 150, 151, 174, 215, 216, 224

Durham Light Infantry, 187, 188, 229

East Lancashire, 106, 229, 292

East Surrey, 72, 73, 99, 103, 150, 151, 174, 190, 215

East Yorkshire, 187, 188

Essex, 105, 106

Gloucester, 171, 182, 248, 250, 254, 260, 290, 291, 302

Gordon Highlanders, 60, 69, 72, 78, 113, 114, 219, 259, 273, 289,
324, 325

Hampshire, 106, 231

Herts, 321

Highland Light Infantry, 188, 242, 296, 301, 302, 326

Inniskilling Fusiliers, 105, 158, 229, 281

Irish Fusiliers, 106, 206

King's Liverpool, 90, 153, 255, 300, 301

King's Own Scottish Borderers, 61, 71, 72, 103, 209, 211, 278, 282,
284, 285, 334

King's Royal Rifles, 93, 153, 166, 167, 168, 169, 182, 188, 253, 256,
265, 268, 290, 305, 332

Lancashire Fusiliers, 105, 158, 229

Leinster, 229, 230

Lincoln, 60, 151, 174, 210, 279, 280, 296, 324

Liverpool Scottish, 321

London Rifle Brigade, 321

London Scottish, 280, 283, 284, 285, 296, 321

Manchester, 99, 100, 102, 216, 218, 220, 224, 329

Middlesex, 60, 68, 69, 70, 72, 78, 84, 100, 103, 131, 207, 209, 216,
219, 230, 324, 325

Monmouthshire, 321

Munster Fusiliers, 119, 120, 154, 169, 242, 331

Norfolk, 82, 109, 174, 219, 323

Northampton, 154, 166, 167, 176, 180, 181, 252, 273, 289, 302, 332

North Lancashire, 154, 166, 167, 168, 170, 250, 253, 265, 268, 297,
332

Northumberland Fusiliers, 68, 72, 78, 208, 209, 210, 279, 280

Oxford and Bucks, 289, 301, 302

Queen Victoria Rifles, 321

Queen's Westminsters, 321

Queen's (West Surrey), 168, 170, 176, 181, 182, 191, 240, 248, 253,
259, 260, 261, 266, 271

Rifle Brigade, 106, 323

Royal Fusiliers, 60, 68, 70, 71, 72, 209, 210, 212, 220, 221, 299

Royal Irish, 60, 210, 212

Royal Irish Fusiliers, 112

Royal Irish Rifles, 69, 78, 89, 219, 220, 221, 235

Royal Lancaster, 105, 111, 229

Royal Scots, 60, 77, 114, 207, 209, 219, 323, 324, 325

Royal Scots Fusiliers, 60, 68, 71, 72, 103, 210, 211, 237, 241, 242,
264, 266, 299

Seaforth Highlanders, 106, 112, 206, 304, 330, 332

Sherwood Foresters, 187, 188, 227, 228, 229

Somerset Light Infantry, 106, 229, 231

South Lancashire, 79, 88, 148, 215, 220

South Staffordshire, 153, 240, 244, 253

South Wales Borderers, 172, 191, 192, 248, 249, 261, 270, 332

Suffolk, 99, 100, 102, 108, 224, 321, 325, 329

Sussex, 153, 166, 167, 169, 187, 249, 273, 289

Warwick, 106, 111, 112, 206, 240, 243

Welsh, 172, 191, 254, 261, 266, 268, 332

Welsh Borderers, 260, 271

Welsh Fusiliers, 84, 100, 237, 240, 264, 323

West Kent, 61, 62, 71, 72, 79, 103, 215, 221, 222, 304

West Riding, 61, 71, 79, 103, 296

West Yorkshire, 187, 188, 190

Wiltshire, 88, 177, 190, 219, 221, 237, 241, 242, 306

Worcester, 150, 188, 215, 216, 242, 243, 270, 271, 292

York and Lancaster, 214

Yorkshire, 240, 264

Yorkshire Light Infantry, 61, 71, 103, 215, 221, 278, 282, 284, 285


Royal Engineers, 70, 100, 127, 164, 175, 289, 300, 301, 302, 323


_Indian Army--_

129th Baluchis, 279

9th Bhopal Infantry, 220, 328, 329

2nd Gurkhas, 330

4th Gurkhas, 326, 328

8th Gurkhas, 225, 331

9th Gurkhas, 330

58th Indian Rifles, 330

3rd Indian Sappers and Miners, 329

6th Jats, 330

59th (Scinde) Rifles, 218, 326, 327

15th Sikhs, 218, 219

47th Sikhs, 218, 220, 221, 328, 331

Vaughan's Indian Rifles, 225

Wilde's 57th Rifles, 281, 328, 329

Reynolds, Captain (R.F.A.), V.C., 110

Reynolds, Captain (9th Lancers), 149

Rheims Cathedral, bombarded by Germans, 189

Rickman, Major, 106

Rising, Captain, 250

Robb, Major, 188

Roberts, Lord, death of, while visiting the Army in France, 308

Robertson, Sir William, 134

Rolt, General, 61, 72, 98, 100

Ronaldson, Colonel, 327

Roper, Major, 207

Rose, Captain (Northumberland Fusiliers), 78

Rose, Captain (Royal Scots Fusiliers), 71

Ruggles-Brise, General, 245, 295

Russell, Second Lieutenant, 222

Ryan, Major, 332



Salisbury, late Lord, 2

Saltoun, Master of, 115

Samoa, German colony, captured by New Zealand, 312

Sandilands, Captain, 78

Sandilands, Colonel, 89

Sarajevo, 13

Sarrail, General, 145

Savage, Captain, 181

Scale, Captain, 327

Sclater-Booth, Major, 80, 130

Scott, Admiral Sir Percy, 42

Scott-Kerr, General, 90, 132

Seaton, Lance-Corporal, 281

Seely, Colonel, 158

Serbia, reply to Austrian ultimatum, 15; King of, appeals to the
Czar, 15

Serocold, Colonel, 167

Shaw, General, 60, 78, 174, 186, 190, 210, 211, 279, 280, 303, 324

Shore, Captain, 83

Smith, Captain Bowden, 70

Smith, Colonel (Lincoln), 280

Smith, Colonel Baird (R.S.F.), 266

Smith, Colonel Osborne (Northampton), 181

Smith, General Douglas, 324

Smith, Lieutenant, 70

Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 55, 56, 60, 72, 83, 84, 88, 95,
96, 97, 108, 109, 116, 119, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 286, 295, 307

Snow, General, 89, 104, 106, 108, 126, 320

Solesmes, action at, 88

South Africa, offer of service, 34; insurrection in, 313

Spee, Admiral von, 315

Spread, Lieutenant, 168

Stephen, Captain, 260

Stewart, Captain, 9, 155

Strickland, Colonel, 329

Stucley, Major, 259

Sturdee, Admiral, 315

Swettenham, Major, 122



Tannenberg, battle of, 139, 141, 316

Teck, Prince Alexander of, 226

Tew, Major, 99, 103

Thomson, Major, 332

Thruston, Lieutenant, 152

Togoland, German colony, captured by British forces, 312

Tower, Lieutenant, 70

Treitschke, 8

Trench, Captain, 269

Trevor, Major, 103

Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 6

Tsingtau, German colony, captured by Japanese, 312

Tulloch, Colonel, 127

Turner, Colonel, 151



Uniacke, Colonel, 259



Vallentin, Captain, 294

Vandeleur, Captain, 102

Vandeleur, Major, 208

Venner, Colonel, 225

Vereker, Lieutenant, 92

Vidal, General, 290

Villars-Cotteret, action of, 132



Ward, Colonel, 103, 126

Ward, Lieutenant, 73

War Loan, success of the, 40

Warre, Major, 168

Wasme, action at, 79

Watkis, General, 217, 325

Watson, Lieutenant Graham, 114

Watson, Major, 168, 253, 266

Watts, General, 295

Welchmann, Lieutenant, 78

Wellesley, Lord Richard, 259

Westmacott, General, 332

White, Second Lieutenant, 222

Willcocks, General Sir James, 224, 225, 286, 325, 333

William II., Emperor of Germany, telegram to Kruger, 3; visits
England, 3; 20; his message to Sir Edward Goschen, 24; 28, 48;
special appeal to his troops at Ypres, 261

Williams, Captain, 271

Williams, General, 230

Wilson, Colonel (Blues), 293

Wilson, Colonel (R.E.), 127

Wilson, General, 86, 104, 106, 281

Wing, General, 110, 224

Wormald, Colonel, 122

Worsley, Lord, 263

Wright, Captain Theodore, 70, 175

Würtemberg, Duke of, 141, 144

Wyatt, Corporal, 92



Yate, Major, V.C., 103

Ypres, first battle of, 232-310



Zandvoorde, fight of, 262

Zillebeke, action of, 292



_Printed in Great Britain by_ R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, _Edinburgh._

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 65042 ***