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Flourens</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online -at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you -are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the -country where you are located before using this eBook. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Phrenology Examined</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: P. Flourens</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Charles De Lucena Meigs</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: April 09, 2021 [eBook #65041]</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div> - -<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED ***</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_i"></a>[i]</span></p> - -<h1>PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.</h1> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ii"></a>[ii]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iii"></a>[iii]</span></p> - -<div class="front-matter"> - -<p class="titlepage larger">PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">BY P. FLOURENS,<br /> -<br /> -<span class="smaller">MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, PERPETUAL SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY -OF SCIENCES (INSTITUTE OF FRANCE), MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SOCIETIES OF -LONDON AND EDINBURG, OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF -STOCKHOLM, OF MUNICH, AND OF TURIN, ETC. ETC.<br /> -PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY AT THE NATURAL -HISTORY MUSEUM AT PARIS.</span></p> - -<p class="titlepage">“J’ai un sentiment clair de ma liberté.”</p> - -<p class="right">BOSSUET, <span class="smcap">Traité du Libre Arbitre</span>.</p> - -<p class="titlepage"><span class="smaller">Translated from the Second Edition of 1845, by</span><br /> -CHARLES DE LUCENA MEIGS, M.D.<br /> -<span class="smaller">MEMB. AMER. PHIL. SOC. ETC. ETC.</span></p> - -<p class="titlepage">PHILADELPHIA:<br /> -HOGAN & THOMPSON.<br /> -1846.</p> - -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_iv"></a>[iv]</span></p> - -<p class="titlepage smaller"><span class="smcap">Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845,<br /> -By CHARLES D. MEIGS, M. D.<br /> -in the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Eastern<br /> -District of Pennsylvania.</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v"></a>[v]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak"><span class="smaller">TO</span><br /> -DR. JAMES JACKSON,<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF BOSTON.</span></h2> - -</div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">My dear sir</span>:</p> - -<p>Perhaps I have taken too great a liberty in -sending to you in this public manner, and in -praying you to accept a copy of M. Flourens’ -ingenious work. I have a very sincere desire -that you should read the Inquiry; for I feel -sure, that if you approve of it, the studious -portion of our countrymen who may peruse it, -will concur in the opinion of a gentleman so -justly distinguished as yourself in every good -word and work, and so capable of judging as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vi"></a>[vi]</span> -to the salutary or evil tendency of the productions -of our teeming press.</p> - -<p>Inasmuch as many of our countrymen have -heretofore felt, and many do now feel, desirous -to know the truth as to the question of the -multiple nature of the human mind, I have -here translated the Examination, in order that -they might have an opportunity to learn what -is thought of Gall’s doctrines by one of the -best and most precise thinkers in Europe.</p> - -<p>Professor Flourens, by his writings on the -brain and nervous system, by his courses of -lectures at the Jardin des Plantes, by numerous -writings on various scientific subjects, by his -position in the Institute, has acquired a place -among the literary and scientific celebrities of -the present age. The amiable and elegant -manners, and the fine disposition of this distinguished -character, coincide with his acknowledged -learning, and exactness, and zeal, to -accumulate upon him the public respect and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii"></a>[vii]</span> -esteem. It is therefore with great confidence -that I present to you this copy of his criticism -upon Phrenology, since I suppose that every -writing of so good a man might prove acceptable -to you, and to the studious portion of our -countrymen generally.</p> - -<p>I invoke your approbation of what I cannot -but deem a masterly criticism of the doctrines -of Gall. So highly have I appreciated it, that -I cannot readily suppose it possible to rise -from its perusal, without being convinced that -Gall was wholly mistaken in his views of -the human mind; and of course, that all the -cranioscopists, mesmerizers, and diviners, who -have followed his track, or risen up on the -basis of his opinions, are equally in error.</p> - -<p>In order to have a just view of human -responsibility, it is indispensable to entertain -the justest notions of the nature of the human -mind. If Phrenology <i>be an unsubstantial -hypothesis</i>, no phrenologist is fit to be a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii"></a>[viii]</span> -juror, a judge, or a legislator: for since all -human law—the whole social compact—and -indeed all divine law, as relative to human -propensities and actions—is founded on some -real nature of the soul and mind, there is risk -that manifestly erroneous conceptions of the -freewill, of the conscience, of the judgment, -and the perceptive powers, &c. may mislead -the juror, the judge, and the legislator, in their -vote, their opinion, and their notion of rights -and wrongs.</p> - -<p>If I am correct in entertaining these apprehensions -as to the influence of false metaphysics -on the public characters I have enumerated, -there is abundant cause to rejoice when a blow -is struck, like that pulverizing blow which is -given in this work, to so considerable an error. -There are thousands among the young and -ardent and curious of our countrymen and -countrywomen, whose minds may be likewise -led astray from the truth; but if it be mischievous<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix"></a>[ix]</span> -for the judge and the juror and the -legislator to entertain erroneous views upon -the nature of the understanding, the mind, -or the soul, it is equally to be deprecated -where the error is sown broadcast in the land.</p> - -<p>Tares, if not in themselves poisonous, serve -at best to choke up the useful or beautiful -plants that ought to be cultivated in the fields -of science or morals; but you will find that -M. Flourens regards them as poisons.</p> - -<p>Has not M. Flourens clearly refuted the -phrenologists? and has he not, in doing so, -performed a useful and an acceptable service?</p> - -<p>I pray you to believe that I am, with the -most grateful respect and the sincerest esteem,</p> - -<p class="center">Your obliged and faithful servant,</p> - -<p class="right">CHARLES D. MEIGS.</p> - -<p class="smaller"><span class="smcap">Philadelphia</span>, Dec. 10, 1845.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_x"></a>[x]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi"></a>[xi]</span></p> - -<p class="dedication"><span class="smaller">TO</span><br /> -THE MEMORY<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF</span><br /> -DESCARTES.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii"></a>[xii]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii"></a>[xiii]</span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2 class="nobreak">AUTHOR’S PREFACE.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>Having been a witness to the progress of -phrenology, I was led to the composition of -the following treatise.</p> - -<p>Each succeeding age has a philosophy of -its own.</p> - -<p>The seventeenth century recovered from -the philosophy of Descartes; the eighteenth -recovered from that of Locke and Condillac: -is the nineteenth to recover from that of Gall?</p> - -<p>This is a really important question.</p> - -<p>I propose, in this work, to examine phrenology -as it appears in the writings of Gall, -of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv"></a>[xiv]</span></p> - -<p>My wish is to be brief. There is, however, -one great secret in the art of being brief: -it is to be clear.</p> - -<p>I frequently quote Descartes: I even go -further; for I dedicate my work to his memory. -I am writing in opposition to a bad -philosophy, while I am endeavouring to recall -a sound one.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv"></a>[xv]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak">CONTENTS.</h2> - -</div> - -<table summary="Contents"> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">I.</td> - <td>Of Gall.—Of his doctrine in general</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#I">17</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">II.</td> - <td>Of Gall.—Of the faculties</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#II">47</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">III.</td> - <td>Of Gall.—The organs</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#III">59</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">IV.</td> - <td>Of Spurzheim</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#IV">96</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">V.</td> - <td>Of Broussais</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#V">115</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VI.</td> - <td>Broussais’s Psycology</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#VI">121</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VII.</td> - <td>Broussais’s Physiology</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#VII">125</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VIII.</td> - <td>Of Gall</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#VIII">127</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr pt">Note I.</td> - <td class="pt">Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist between the organs - of the external senses and the organs of the intellectual faculties</td> - <td class="tdpg pt"><a href="#NOTE_I">131</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">II.</td> - <td>Difference between instinct and understanding</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_II">133</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">III.</td> - <td>Gall as an observer</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_III">137</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">IV.</td> - <td>The animal spirits</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_IV">139</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">V.</td> - <td>Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_V">140</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VI.</td> - <td>Contractility of Broussais</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_VI">142</a></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="tdr">VII.</td> - <td>Real labours of Gall as to the brain</td> - <td class="tdpg"><a href="#NOTE_VII">143</a></td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16"></a>[16]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17"></a>[17]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="I">I.<br /> -OF GALL.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.</span></h2> - -</div> - -<p>The great work in which Gall sets forth his -doctrine is well known.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> That work shall -serve as the groundwork of my examination. -I shall examine in succession each of the -questions studied by the author; merely introducing -some slight changes in the order in -which they are arranged.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18"></a>[18]</span></p> - -<p>The entire doctrine of Gall is contained in -two fundamental propositions, of which the -first is, that understanding resides exclusively -in the brain, and the second, that each particular -faculty of the understanding is provided -in the brain with an organ proper to itself.</p> - -<p>Now, of these two propositions, there is -certainly nothing new in the first one, and -perhaps nothing true in the second one.</p> - -<p>Let us commence our examination with the -first proposition.</p> - -<p>I say that in the first proposition, namely, -that the brain is the exclusive seat of the understanding, -there is nothing new. Gall himself -admits this to be the case.</p> - -<p>“For a long time,” says he, “both philosophers -and physiologists, as well as physicians, -have contended that the brain is the organ -of the soul.”<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> The opinion that the brain,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19"></a>[19]</span> -(as a whole, or such and such parts of the -brain considered separately,) is the seat of -the soul, is, in fact, as old as learning itself. -Descartes placed the soul in the <i>pineal gland</i>, -Willis in the <i>corpora striata</i>, Lapeyronie in -the <i>corpus callosum</i>, &c. &c.</p> - -<p>As to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes -Sœmmerring, who says precisely that, “the -brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation, -all thought, and all will,”<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> &c. He quotes -Haller, who proves (proves is the very expression -made use of by Gall himself,) that “sensation -does not take place at the point where -the object touches the nerve, the point where -the impression is made, but in the brain.”<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> -He might have quoted many other authorities -to the same effect.</p> - -<p>Were not Cabanis’s writings anterior to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20"></a>[20]</span> -time of Gall? and did not he say, “In order -to obtain a just idea of those operations whose -result is thought, the brain must be considered -as a peculiar organ designed to produce it, just -as the stomach and the bowels are designed -to produce digestion, the liver to secrete the -bile,” &c.?<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> a proposition so extravagant as -to become almost ridiculous, but which is in -truth the very proposition of Gall himself, -except as to some exaggeration in the terms -employed.</p> - -<p>Antecedently to the time of Gall, both -Sœmmerring and Cuvier, in the comparative -anatomy of the various classes of animals, -had investigated the ratio existing between -the development of the encephalon and that -of the intellectual power. The following remarkable -phrase is from the pen of Cuvier: -“The proportion of the brain to the medulla<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21"></a>[21]</span> -oblongata, a proportion which is greater in -man than in all other animals, is a very good -index of the perfection of the creature’s intelligence, -because it is the best index of the preeminence -of the organs of reflection above the -organs of the external senses.”<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> And this -other still more remarkable phrase: “In animals -the intelligence appears to be greater in -proportion as the volume of the hemispheres -is greater.”<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> - -<p>Gall, in an especial manner, contends against -the assertion of Bichat, who remarks that “The -influence of the passions is exerted invariably -upon the organic life, and not upon the animal -life; all the signs that characterise them are -referable to the former and not to the latter. -Gestures, which are the mute exponents of the -sentiments and the understanding, afford a remarkable -proof of this truth. When we wish<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22"></a>[22]</span> -to signify something relative to the memory, -the imagination, to our perception, to the -judgment, &c. the hand moves involuntarily -towards the head: if we wish to express love, -joy, grief, hatred, it is directed towards the region -of the heart, the stomach, or the bowels.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> - -<p>Doubtless, there is much that might be criticised -in the foregoing words of Bichat; nevertheless, -to say that the passions expend their -influences upon the organic life, is not the same -thing as to say that they reside or exist there. -Bichat had already remarked, that “Every -species of sensation has its centre in the brain, -for sensation always supposes both impression -and perception.”<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Furthermore, regarding this -distinction, (which as yet has not been drawn -with sufficient clearness,) between the parts -that are the seats of the passions, and the parts -that are affected by their action, Gall might<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23"></a>[23]</span> -have found in Descartes the following remark, -which is not less judicious than acute.</p> - -<p>“Although,” says he, writing to Leroy, “the -spirits that move the muscles come from the -brain, we must, nevertheless, assign as seats of -the passions, the places that are most considerably -affected by them; hence, I say, the principal -seat of the passions, as far as they relate -to the body, is the heart, because it is the heart -that is most sensibly affected by them; but -their place is in the brain, in as far as they -affect the soul, for the soul cannot suffer immediately, -otherwise than through the brain.”<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> - -<p>As I am quoting Descartes, who, I ask, more -clearly than Descartes has perceived that the -soul can have only a very circumscribed seat -in the economy, and that that circumscribed -seat is the brain itself?</p> - -<p>“We know,” says he, “that, properly speaking,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24"></a>[24]</span> -it is not inasmuch as the soul is in the -members that serve as organs to the exterior -senses, that the soul feels, but inasmuch as she -is in the brain, where she exercises the faculty -denominated common sense.”<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> - -<p>He elsewhere observes: “Surprise is expressed -because I do not recognise any other -point of sensation except that which exists in -the brain; but all physicians and surgeons -will, I hope, assist me in proving this point, -for they are aware of the common fact that a -person who has been subjected to amputation -of a limb, continues to feel pain in a part that -he no longer possesses.”<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> - -<p>Here then, according to Descartes, we find -that the soul is situated, that is to say, <i>feels</i> in -the brain, and only in the brain. The following -passage shows with what precision he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25"></a>[25]</span> -excluded even the external senses from any -participation with the functions of the soul.</p> - -<p>“I have shown,” says he, “that size, distance, -and form are perceived only by the -reason; and that, by deducing them the one -from the other.”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> - -<p>“I cannot agree with the assertion that this -error (the error caused by the bent appearance -of a stick partly plunged into water,) is -not corrected by the understanding but by the -touch; for, although the sense in question -makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet -that cannot correct the error of vision; but -furthermore, it is requisite that reason should -teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our -judgment after touching, than to the judgment -that we come to after using our eyes; but this -reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but -to the understanding alone; and in this very<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26"></a>[26]</span> -example, it is the understanding that corrects -the error of the sense.”<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> - -<p>The brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the -soul; and all sensation, even those operations -that appear to depend upon the simple external -sense, is function of the soul.</p> - -<p>Gall falls back upon Condillac, who, much -less rigorous in this particular than Descartes, -says, that “all our faculties proceed from -the senses.”<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> But when Condillac speaks -thus, he evidently speaks by ellipsis, for he -immediately adds these words: “The senses -are only occasional causes. They do not feel; -it is the soul that alone feels, through the -medium of the organs.”<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p> - -<p>Now, if it be the <i>soul</i> only that feels, <i>à<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27"></a>[27]</span> -fortiori</i>, it is the soul only that <i>remembers</i>, that -<i>judges</i>, that <i>imagines</i>, &c. <i>Memory</i>, <i>judgment</i>, -<i>imagination</i>, &c., in a word, all our -faculties, are therefore of the soul, and therefore -come from the soul, and not from the senses.</p> - -<p>There is no philosopher who has exaggerated -more than Helvetius the influence of the -senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius -says, “In whatsoever manner we interrogate -experience, she always answers that any -greater or lesser superiority of mind is independent -of any greater or lesser perfection of -the senses.”<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p> - -<p>But I leave Helvetius and Condillac, and I -return to Descartes, to Willis, to Lapeyronie, -to Haller, Sœmmerring, Cuvier, &c. They -all perceived and all asserted that the brain -is the seat of the soul, and that it is so to -the exclusion of the senses. Therefore, the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28"></a>[28]</span> -proposition that the brain is the exclusive seat -of the soul is not a new proposition, and hence -does not originate with Gall. It belonged to -science before it appeared in his Doctrine. -The merit of Gall, and it is by no means a -slender merit, consists in his having understood -better than any of his predecessors the whole -of its importance, and in having devoted himself -to its demonstration. It existed in science -before Gall appeared—it may be said to reign -there ever since his appearance. Taking each -particular sense, he excluded them all, one -after another, from all immediate participation -in the functions of the understanding.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Far -from being developed in the direct ratio of the -intellection, most of them are developed in an -inverse ratio. Taste and smell are more developed -in the quadruped than in man. Sight<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29"></a>[29]</span> -and hearing are more so in the bird than in the -quadruped. The brain alone is in all classes -developed in the ratio of the understanding. -The loss of a sense does not lead to the loss of -the intelligence. The understanding survives -the loss of sight and hearing. It might survive -the loss of all the senses. To interrupt the -communication between the sense and the -brain, is enough to insure the loss of the -sense. The mere compression of the brain, -which abolishes the intellection, abolishes all -the senses. Far, therefore, from being organs -of the intelligence, the organs of the senses are -not even organs of the senses, they do not even -exercise their functions as organs of the senses, -except through the medium of the intelligence, -and this intelligence resides only in the brain.</p> - -<p>The brain alone, therefore, is the organ of -the soul;—is it the whole brain—the brain -taken <i>en masse</i>? Gall thought so, and Spurzheim -followed Gall’s opinion; and all the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30"></a>[30]</span> -phrenologists who have come after them have -followed the examples of Gall and Spurzheim.</p> - -<p>Yet, after all, it amounts to nothing. If we -deprive an animal of its cerebellum, it loses -only its locomotive action. If we deprive it of -its tubercula quadrigemina, it loses its sight -only; if we destroy its medulla oblongata, it -loses its respiratory movements, and in consequence -thereof, its life.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> Neither of these parts, -therefore, that is to say, the cerebellum, the -tubercula quadrigemina, and the medulla oblongata, -is the organ of the understanding.</p> - -<p>The brain, properly so called, is so, and it -alone. If we remove from an animal the -brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres, -it immediately loses its understanding, and -loses nothing but its understanding.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> - -<p>The brain, en masse, the <i>encephalon</i>, is then<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31"></a>[31]</span> -a multiple organ; and this multiple organ consists -of four particular organs: the cerebellum, -the seat of the principle that regulates the -movements of locomotion; the tubercula quadrigemina, -seats of the principle that regulates -the sense of sight; the medulla oblongata, in -which resides the principle that determines the -respiratory motions; and the brain proper, the -seat, and the exclusive seat of the intelligence.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p> - -<p>Therefore, when the phrenologists promiscuously -place the intellectual and moral faculties -in the brain, considered en masse, they -deceive themselves. Neither the cerebellum, -the quadrigeminal tubercles, nor the medulla -oblongata can be regarded as seats of these -faculties. All these faculties dwell solely in the -brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres.</p> - -<p>The question as to the precise seat of the -intelligence, has undergone a great change<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32"></a>[32]</span> -since the time of Gall. Gall believed that the -intelligence was seated indifferently in the -whole encephalon, and it has been proved that -it resides only in the hemispheres.</p> - -<p>Further, it is not the encephalon taken en -masse that is developed in the ratio of the intelligence -of the creature, but the hemispheres. -The mammifera are the animals most highly -endowed with intelligence; they have, other -things being equal, the most voluminous hemispheres. -Birds are the animals most highly -endowed with power of motion; their cerebellum -is, other things being equal, the largest. -Reptiles are the most torpid and apathetic of -animals; they have the smallest brain, &c.</p> - -<p>Every thing concurs then to prove, that the -encephalon, in mass, is a multiple organ with -multiple functions, consisting of different parts, -of which some are destined to subserve the -locomotive motions, others the motions of the -respiration, &c., while one single one, the brain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33"></a>[33]</span> -proper, is designed for the purposes of the -intellection.</p> - -<p>This being conceded, it is evident that the -entire brain cannot be divided, as the phrenologists -divide it, into a number of small organs, -each of which is the seat of a distinct intellectual -faculty; for the entire brain does not serve -the purposes of what is called the intelligence. -The hemispheres alone are the seats of the -intellectual power; and consequently, the question -as to whether the organ, the seat of the -intelligence may be divided into several distinct -organs, is a question relative solely to the uses -and powers of the hemispheres.</p> - -<p>Gall avers, and this is the second fundamental -proposition of his doctrine, that the -brain is divided into several organs, each one -of which lodges a particular faculty of the -soul. By the word <i>brain</i>, he understood the -<i>whole brain</i>, and he thus deceived himself. -Let us reduce the application of his proposition<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34"></a>[34]</span> -to the hemispheres alone, and we shall see -that he has deceived himself again.</p> - -<p>It has been shown by my late experiments, -that we may cut away, either in front, or -behind, or above, or on one side, a very -considerable slice of the hemisphere of the -brain, without destroying the intelligence. -Hence it appears, that quite a restricted -portion of the hemispheres may suffice for -the purposes of intellection in an animal.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> - -<p>On the other hand, in proportion as these -reductions by slicing away the hemispheres -are continued, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, -and grows gradually less; and certain -limits being passed, is wholly extinguished. -Hence it appears, that the cerebral hemispheres -concur, by their whole mass, in the -full and entire exercise of the intelligence.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35"></a>[35]</span></p> - -<p>In fine, as soon as one sensation is lost, all -sensation is lost; when one faculty disappears, -all the faculties disappear. There are not, -therefore, different seats for the different faculties, -nor for the different sensations. The -faculty of feeling, of judging, of willing any -thing, resides in the same place as the faculty -of feeling, judging, or willing any other thing, -and consequently this faculty, essentially a -unit, resides essentially in a single organ.<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> - -<p>The understanding is, therefore, a unit.</p> - -<p>According to Gall, there are as many particular -kinds of intellect as there are distinct -faculties of the mind. According to him, each -faculty has its perception, its memory, its -judgment, will, &c., that is to say, all the -attributes of the understanding, properly so -called.<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36"></a>[36]</span></p> - -<p>“All the intellectual faculties,” says he, “are -endowed with the perceptive faculty, with -attention, recollection, memory, judgment, and -imagination.”<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> - -<p>Thus each faculty perceives, remembers, -judges, imagines, compares, creates; but these -are trifles—for each faculty <i>reasons</i>. “Whenever,” -says Gall, “a faculty compares and -judges of the relations of analogous or different -ideas, there is an act of comparison, there is an -act of judgment: a sequence of comparisons -and judgments constitutes reasoning,” &c.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> - -<p>Therefore, each and every faculty is an -understanding by itself, and Gall says so expressly. -“There are,” says he, “as many -different kinds of intellect or understanding as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37"></a>[37]</span> -there are distinct faculties.”<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> “Each distinct -faculty,” says he, further, “is intellect or -understanding—each <i>individual intelligence</i> -(the words are precise) has its proper organ.”<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a></p> - -<p>But, admitting all these <i>kinds of intellects</i>, -all these <i>individual understandings</i>, where -are we to seek for the General Intelligence, the -understanding, properly so called? It must, -as you may please, be either an <i>attribute</i> of -each faculty,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> or the <i>collective expression</i> of -all the faculties, or even the mere simple <i>result</i> -of their common and simultaneous action;<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> in -one word, it cannot be that positive and single -faculty which we understand, conceive of, and -feel in ourselves, when we pronounce the -word <i>soul</i> or <i>understanding</i>.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38"></a>[38]</span></p> - -<p>Now here is the sum and the substance -of Gall’s psycology. For the understanding, -essentially a unit faculty, he substitutes a -multitude of little understandings or faculties, -distinct and isolate. And, as these faculties, -which perform just as he wills them to do—which -he multiplies according to his pleasure,<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> -seem in his eyes to explain certain phenomena -which are not well explained by the lights of -ordinary philosophy, he triumphs!</p> - -<p>He does not perceive that an explanation, -which is words merely, adapts itself to any -and to every thing. In the time of Malebranche, -every thing was explained by <i>animal -spirits</i>; Barthez explained every thing by his -<i>vital principle</i>, &c.</p> - -<p>“This,” says Gall, “explains how the same -man may possess a judgment that is ready and -sure as to certain objects, while it is imbecile<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39"></a>[39]</span> -as to certain others; how he may have the -liveliest and most fruitful imagination upon -some subjects, while it is cold and sterile upon -others.”<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> - -<p>“Grant,” says he, further, “to the animals -certain fundamental faculties, and you have -the dog that follows the chase with <i>passion</i>; -the weasel that strangles the poultry with -<i>rage</i>; the nightingale that sings with <i>fervour</i> -beside his mate,”<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> &c.</p> - -<p>No doubt of it. But what sort of philosophy -is that, that thinks to explain a fact by a -word? You observe such or such a penchant -in an animal, such or such a taste or talent in -a man; <i>presto</i>, a particular faculty is produced -for each one of these peculiarities, and you -suppose the whole matter to be settled. You -deceive yourself; your <i>faculty</i> is only a <i>word</i>,—it -is the name of the fact,—and all the difficulty -remains just where it was before.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40"></a>[40]</span></p> - -<p>Besides, you speak only of the facts that you -suppose yourself able to explain; you say -nothing of those that you render by your -system wholly inexplicable. You say not one -word as to the unity of the understanding, the -unity of the <i>me</i>, or you deny it. But the -unity of the understanding, the unity of the -<i>me</i>, is a fact of the conscious sense, and -the conscious sense is more powerful than all -the philosophies together.</p> - -<p>Gall is always talking about observation, -and he was indeed, as an observer, full of -ingenuity. But, in order to follow out an -observation, it must be traced to the very -end, and we must accept all that it yields to -our research; and observation every where -gives, and shows every where, and above all -things else, the unity of the understanding, the -unity of the <i>me</i>.</p> - -<p>Gall’s philosophy consists only in transmuting -into a particular understanding each<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41"></a>[41]</span> -separate <i>mode</i><a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> of the understanding, properly -so called.</p> - -<p>Descartes had already said, “There are in -us as many faculties as there are truths to be -known.... But I do not think that any useful -application can be made of this way of thinking; -and it seems to me rather more likely to -be mischievous, by giving to the ignorant -occasion for imagining an equal number of -little entities in the soul.”<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p> - -<p>It may well be supposed that Gall, who in -the word understanding sees nothing but an -abstract word, expressive of the sum of our -intellectual faculties, would also, in the word -<i>will</i>, perceive nothing more than an abstract -word, expressing the sum of our moral -faculties.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42"></a>[42]</span></p> - -<p>He had given a definition of <i>reason</i>: “The -result of the simultaneous action of all the -intellectual faculties.”<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> In the same way he -defined <i>will</i> to be “the result of the simultaneous -action of the superior intellectual faculties.”<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> -But Gall always deceives himself; for -reason and will are not <i>results</i>—they are -<i>powers</i>, and primary powers of thought.</p> - -<p>Gall, in a manner equally singular, defines -<i>moral liberty</i> or <i>free will</i>.</p> - -<p>“Moral liberty,” says he, “is nothing more -than the faculty of <i>being determined</i>, and of -determining under motive.”<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> Not so: liberty -is precisely the power to determine against all -motive. Locke well defined liberty as <i>power</i>: -to be determined, is to allow one’s self to be -determined—that is, to <i>obey</i>.</p> - -<p>Gall says again, “Unlimited liberty supposes -not only that man governs himself independently<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43"></a>[43]</span> -of all law, but that he is the creator of -his own nature.”<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> Not at all; it supposes -that he may have choice—and in fact he does -choose.</p> - -<p>Lastly, Gall says, “A phenomenon such -as that of absolute liberty, would be a phenomenon -occurring without any cause whatever.”<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> -Why without cause? The cause -is in the power of choosing—and this power -is a fact.</p> - -<p>Gall’s whole doctrine is one series of errors, -which press upon each other cumulatively. -He resolves that the part of the brain in which -the understanding resides shall be divided into -many small organs, distinct from each other; -a physiological error. He decries the unity of -the understanding, and looks upon the will -and the reason as mere results—psycological -errors. In the free will he perceives merely a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44"></a>[44]</span> -compulsory determination,<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> and consequently -a mere result—this is a moral error.</p> - -<p>Man’s liberty is a positive faculty, and not -the simple passive result of the preponderance -of one <i>motive</i> over another <i>motive</i>, of one -<i>organ</i> over another <i>organ</i>.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> - -<p>Reason, will, liberty, are therefore, not as -in Gall’s doctrine, <i>positive faculties</i>, <i>active -powers</i>; or rather, they are the understanding -itself. Reason, will, liberty, are in fact -the understanding, as <i>conceiving</i>, <i>willing</i>, -<i>choosing</i>, or <i>deliberating</i>.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> - -<p>The consciousness which feels itself to be -one, feels itself free. And you will remark, -that these two great facts given out by the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45"></a>[45]</span> -inward sense, the consciousness, to wit, the -unity of the understanding and the positive -power of the free will, are precisely the two -first facts denied by the philosophy of Gall.</p> - -<p>And take good care to observe further, that -if there be in us any thing that belongs to -the <i>consciousness</i>, it is evidently and par -excellence the sense of our personal unity; -or what is more, the consciousness of our -moral liberty.</p> - -<p>Man is a moral force, only inasmuch as he -is a free force. Any philosophy that attempts -the liberty of man, attempts, without knowing -it, morals itself. Man then is free, and as he -is a moral agent only in proportion as he is -free, it would seem that his liberty is the only -attribute of his soul from which Providence -has designed to remove all the boundaries.</p> - -<p>“What is here very remarkable,” says -Descartes, “is that, of all within me, there is -not one thing so perfect or so great, but that<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46"></a>[46]</span> -I know it might be greater and more perfect. -Thus, for example, if I consider my faculty of -conceiving, I find it of very small extent, and -very limited. If, in the same manner, I examine -the memory, the imagination, or any -other one of my faculties, I find not one that is -not very limited and very small. Within me -there is only my will or my liberty of free -will, which I feel to be so great that I conceive -not the idea of another more full and of -greater extent.”<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47"></a>[47]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="II">II.<br /> -OF GALL.<br /> -<span class="smaller">OF THE FACULTIES.</span></h2> - -</div> - -<p>Gall’s philosophy consists wholly in the -substitution of <i>multiplicity</i> for <i>unity</i>. In -place of one general and single brain,<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> he -substitutes a number of small brains: instead -of one general sole understanding, he substitutes -several individual understandings.<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48"></a>[48]</span> -These pretended <i>individual understandings</i> -are the <i>faculties</i>.</p> - -<p>Now, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven -of these faculties, each one of them -(since each one is a peculiar understanding) -endowed with its perceptive faculty, its memory, -its judgment, its imagination; &c.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a></p> - -<p>Hence, there are twenty-seven perceptive -faculties, twenty-seven memories, twenty-seven -judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c.</p> - -<p>For, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute -is not less distinct than each faculty. The -memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of -one faculty are not the memory, judgment, -or imagination of another faculty.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49"></a>[49]</span></p> - -<p>“The sense of numbers,” says he, “possesses -a judgment for the relations of numbers; -the sense of the arts, a judgment for -works of art; but where the fundamental -faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to -objects of that faculty must necessarily be -wanting likewise.”<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p> - -<p>He says further: “It is impossible for an -individual to possess imagination and judgment -for any object with the fundamental faculty -for which he has not been gifted by nature.”<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> - -<p>Thus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven -faculties; and as there are twenty-seven -faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories, -judgments, imaginations, &c.</p> - -<p>In one word, there is no such thing as a -general understanding; but there are twenty-seven -special understandings, with three or -four times twenty-seven distinct attributes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50"></a>[50]</span> -of each. Such is the entire psycology of -Gall.</p> - -<p>To proceed. Gall’s twenty-seven faculties -are: the instinct of propagation, love of offspring, -self-defence, the carnivorous instinct, -the sense of property, friendship, cunning, -pride, vanity, circumspection, memory for -things, memory for words, sense of locality, -sense of persons, sense of language, of relations -of colours, relations of sounds, relations -of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative -sagacity, the metaphysical genius, sarcasm, -poetic talent, benevolence, imitation, religion, -firmness.</p> - -<p>Gall says that these faculties are innate,<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> -and this assertion certainly will not be contested.</p> - -<p>Locke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine -of innate ideas, never decried the <i>innateness</i><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51"></a>[51]</span> -of our faculties. He always regarded -them as natural, that is to say, <i>innate</i>.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p> - -<p>Condillac himself, who charges Locke with -having considered the faculties of the soul as -<i>innate</i>, in making these charges confounds the -<i>faculties of the soul</i> with the <i>operations of -the soul</i>.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p> - -<p>Now, that which is perfectly true as to the -<i>operations of the soul</i>, is by no means so as -regards her <i>faculties</i>. All the faculties of the -soul are innate and contemporary, for they are -nothing more than <i>modes</i> of the soul; indeed,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52"></a>[52]</span> -they are the soul itself, viewed under different -aspects. But the operations of the soul succeed -each other, and beget each other. There -can be no memory without previous perception; -there can be no judgment without recollection. -In order that there may be a will, -there must have been a judgment, &c.</p> - -<p>After saying that the faculties are innate, -Gall says also that they are <i>independent</i>.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p> - -<p>And if, by the word <i>independent</i>, he means -distinct, there is nothing less contestible. But -if, by this word <i>independent</i>, he understood -(as indeed he does understand) that each -faculty is a real understanding, the question -is altered and the difficulty begins.</p> - -<p>For, if each individual faculty is a proper -understanding, it follows that there are as -many understandings as there are faculties, -and the understanding ceases to be <i>one</i>, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53"></a>[53]</span> -the <i>me</i> is no longer <i>one</i>. I am well aware -that this is exactly what Gall means; he says -it, and reiterates it throughout his work. He -says it, but does not prove it. And how -should he prove it? Can we prove any thing -against our consciousness?</p> - -<p>“I remark here, in the first place,” says -Descartes, “that there is a great difference -between the mind and the body, in that the -body is, by its nature, always divisible, and -the mind wholly indivisible. For, in fact, -when I contemplate it—that is, when I contemplate -my own self—and consider myself as a -thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself -any parts, but I clearly know and conceive that -I am a thing absolutely one and complete.”<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p> - -<p>Gall reverses the common philosophy, and -it is worthy of remark, that the whole of his -philosophy, which he thinks so novel,<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> is, to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54"></a>[54]</span> -the very letter, nothing more nor less than -this very inversion. According to common -philosophy, there is one general understanding—a -unit; and there are faculties which are -but modes of this understanding. Gall asserts -that there are as many kinds of peculiar intelligences -as there are faculties, and that the -understanding in general is nothing more than -a mode or attribute of each faculty. He says -so expressly.</p> - -<p>His words are: “The intellectual faculty and -all its subdivisions, such as perception, recollection, -memory, judgment, and imagination, are -not fundamental faculties, but merely their -general attributes.”<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> - -<p>Gall first inverts the common philosophy, -and then contends for the existence of all the -consequences of that common philosophy.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55"></a>[55]</span></p> - -<p>He suppresses the <i>me</i>, but insists that there -is a soul. He abolishes the freewill, and yet -contends that there is such a thing as morals. -He makes of the idea of God an idea that is -merely relative and conditional, but yet asserts -that there may be such a thing as religion.</p> - -<p>I say he abolishes the <i>me</i>; for the <i>me</i> is the -soul. The soul is the understanding, general -and one; but if there be no understanding as -general, there can be no soul.</p> - -<p>According to Gall, there is nothing real and -positive except the <i>faculties</i>.</p> - -<p>And these faculties alone are possessed of -organs. “None of my predecessors,” says he, -“had any knowledge of those forces which -alone are the functions of special cerebral -organs.”<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p> - -<p>By the contrary reasoning, neither the will, -nor the reason, nor the understanding, are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56"></a>[56]</span> -possessed of any organs, for they are nothing -but forces; they are nothing but nouns collective—words.</p> - -<p>“These observations may suffice,” says Gall, -“to convince the reader that there cannot exist -any special organ of the will, or the freewill.”<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> -He adds: “It is equally impossible that there -should be any peculiar organ of the reason.”<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p> - -<p>Finally he says: “From all that I have now -said it follows, that the idea of an organ of -the intellect or understanding is quite as inadmissible -as the idea of an organ of the -instinct.”<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> - -<p>Hence there can be nought but the faculties; -and, according to Gall, these faculties are so -distinct, that he attributes to each particular -one a separate organ.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> He divides the understanding -into little understandings.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57"></a>[57]</span></p> - -<p>Descartes expressed himself in the following -words: “We do not conceive of any body, -except as divisible; whereas the human mind -cannot conceive of itself except as indivisible; -for in fact we are incapable of conceiving of -half a soul.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Gall, however, settles that -point. He makes half souls. He retrenches -or adds as many faculties as suits his plan. -These faculties are separated by material -limits. He goes so far as to say that such -or such a faculty acts with greater or less -facility upon such or such another faculty, -according as one happens to be situated nearer -to or farther off from the other.</p> - -<p>“As the organ of the arts,” says he, “is -located far from that of the sense of colour, -the circumstance explains why historical -painters have rarely been colourists.”<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p> - -<p>Thus, we find that the faculties alone are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58"></a>[58]</span> -possessed of <i>forces</i>. These forces alone are -endowed with organs; and these organs, by -which they are kept separate from each other, -separate them to distances sufficiently great to -hinder, in certain cases, one given faculty from -exercising any influence over another. Therefore, -there is no such thing as unity; there is -no unit faculty, no unit understanding; there -is no <i>me</i>; and if there be no <i>me</i>, there can be -no soul.</p> - -<p>In the same way he abolishes the <i>freewill</i>. -Will, liberty, reason, in his view,<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> -are nothing but <i>results</i>, as I have already -stated.</p> - -<p>“To the end,” says he, “that man may not -be confined merely to the ability to wish—in -order that he may actually will—the concurrence -of several superior faculties is requisite. -The motives must be weighed, compared, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59"></a>[59]</span> -judged; the decision resulting from this operation -is denominated will.”<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> - -<p>“Reason,” he further adds, “supposes a -concerted action of the superior faculties. It -is the judgment pronounced by the superior -intellectual faculties.”<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p> - -<p>Hence, the will is nothing but a <i>decision</i>; -reason is nothing but a <i>judgment</i>. The faculties -<i>concert together</i>. What a singular philosophy, -which always substitutes the fictions -of language for the facts of the conscious sense, -and which is satisfied with those fictions!</p> - -<p>Freewill is either a power, a force, or it is -nothing. He resolves that it is merely a <i>result</i>. -Gall therefore abolishes the freewill.</p> - -<p>Indeed, he makes of the idea of God nothing -but a relative and conditional idea, for he supposes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60"></a>[60]</span> -that this idea comes from a particular -organ; and he supposes that that organ may -possibly, in some case, be wanting.</p> - -<p>“It cannot be doubted,” says Gall, “that -the human race are endowed with an organ -by means of which it recognises and admires -the Author of the universe.”<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p> - -<p>“God exists,” adds he, “for there is an -organ to know and adore him.”<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p> - -<p>But he continues: “Climate and other circumstances -may obstruct the development of -the cerebral part, by means of which the -Creator designed to reveal himself to his creature -man.”<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a></p> - -<p>Again: “If there were a people whose -organization should be altogether defective in -this respect, they would be as little susceptible -as any other kinds of animal, of the religious -idea or sentiment.”<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61"></a>[61]</span></p> - -<p>Further: “There is no God for beings whose -organization does not bear the original stamp -of determinate faculties.”<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> - -<p>What! If I happen not to possess a little -peculiar organ, (for it may be wanting,) can I -not feel that God exists! And how can I be -an intelligence, knowing myself, and yet not -knowing that God is? I do not more strongly -feel that I am, than that God is. “This idea,” -(the idea of God) says Descartes, “is born and -produced along with me, just as is the idea of -myself.”<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> - -<p>My understanding, which perceives itself -and feels itself to be an effect, necessarily perceives -the intelligent Cause which produced -it. “It is a very evident thing,” says Descartes -again, “that there must be at least as -much reality in a cause as in the effect it -produces; and since I am a thing that thinks,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62"></a>[62]</span> -whatsoever be in fact the cause of my being, -I am compelled to confess, that <i>it also</i> is -something that thinks.”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> - -<p>Hitherto I have considered Gall’s philosophy -only under its speculative points of view; -what would it be, if considered in a practical -relation?</p> - -<p>In one of his happy moments, Diderot wrote -the following very remarkable phrase: “The -ruin of liberty overthrows all order and all -government, confounds vice and virtue together, -sanctions every monstrous infamy, -extinguishes all shame and all remorse, and -degrades and deforms without recovery the -whole human race.”<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p> - -<p>Nothing astonishes a phrenologist.</p> - -<p>“Let us imagine,” says Gall, “a woman in -whom the love of offspring is but little developed, ... if, -unfortunately, the organ of murder<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63"></a>[63]</span> -be very much developed in her, need we be -surprised if her hand....”<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> &c.</p> - -<p>Organization explains every thing.</p> - -<p>“These last named facts show us,” says -Gall, “that this detestable inclination (the -inclination to commit murder) has its source -in a vice of the organization.”<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a></p> - -<p>“Let those haughty men,” says he again, -“who cause nations to be slaughtered by thousands, -know that they do not act of their own -accord, but that Nature herself has filled their -hearts with rage and destructiveness.”<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p> - -<p>No, indeed! This is not what they must -know; for, thanks be to God, it is not true. -What they ought to know, what they ought -to be told, is, that although Providence has -left to man the power to do evil, he has also -endowed him with the power to do good. -That which man ought to know, that which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64"></a>[64]</span> -should be instilled into his mind and heart is, -that he has a free power, and that this power -ought not to be misdirected; and that he who -in his own nature misdirects it, no matter -under what form of philosophy he takes refuge, -is a being who degrades his nature.</p> - -<p>Under the title of <i>fundamental faculties</i>, -Gall confounds all things together—the passions, -the instinct, the intellectual faculties. -These faculties, which are at the basis of his -whole philosophy, he knows not even how to -denominate them. He calls them instincts,<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> -inclinations, senses, memories, &c. There is -a memory or sense of things, a memory or -sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct -that leads certain animals to live in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65"></a>[65]</span> -elevated regions with pride, which is a moral -sentiment in man;<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> the carnivorous instinct -with courage;<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> he believes that conscience, -(which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing -but a modification of a particular sense, the -sense of benevolence, &c.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> - -<p>The hesitation of his mind is visible every -where.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66"></a>[66]</span></p> - -<p>“I leave it to the reader,” says he, “to -decide whether the fundamental faculty to -which this penchant relates, should be denominated -sense of elevation, self-esteem,” &c.<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p> - -<p>“To speak correctly,” continues he, “firmness -is neither a penchant nor a faculty; it is -a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive -quality, which is called character.”<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p> - -<p>Finally, he writes the following paragraph, -perhaps the most singular one that he ever -wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner -how little confidence he had in his own -psycology.</p> - -<p>“If we are materialists because we do not -admit the existence of a unit-faculty of the -soul, but recognise several primitive faculties, -we ask whether the ordinary division of the -faculties of the soul into understanding, will, -attention, memory, judgment, imagination, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67"></a>[67]</span> -affections and passions, expresses nothing more -than a primitive unit-faculty? If it be asserted -that all these faculties are merely modifications -of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder -us from making the same assertion as to the -faculties whose existence we do admit.”<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p> - -<p>To be sure, nothing prevents you. Or -rather every thing constrains you to do so. -There is therefore one sole faculty, of which -all the other faculties are but moods. You -return then to the common philosophy, and -consequently you no longer possess a peculiar -philosophy.</p> - -<p>The problem proposed by Gall is at the -same time physiological, psycological, and -anatomical.</p> - -<p>In our first article an account has been -given of Gall’s <i>physiology</i>, and it has been -shown to be generally disproved by direct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68"></a>[68]</span> -experiment. In the present one his <i>psycology</i> -has been examined, and it is confuted by the -consciousness (<i>le sens intime</i>). It only remains -for us now to examine his <i>anatomy</i>.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69"></a>[69]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="III">III.<br /> -OF GALL.<br /> -<span class="smaller">THE ORGANS.</span></h2> - -</div> - -<p>Of all Gall’s writings, his anatomy is that -which has been most talked of, and yet it is -the part least known.</p> - -<p>In the year 1808, Gall read to the first class -of the Institute a memoir on the anatomy of -the brain;<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> and M. Cuvier made a report upon -that memoir. But neither in that memoir nor<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70"></a>[70]</span> -in the report do we find one word of <i>special -anatomy</i>, of <i>secret anatomy</i>, of what might -be called <i>anatomy of the Doctrine</i>; or, in -other terms, and as it would be expressed at -the present day, of <i>phrenological anatomy</i>.</p> - -<p>The anatomy of Gall’s memoir is nothing -but a very ordinary anatomy. He insists that -the cerebral nerves, all of them without exception, -rise upwards from the medulla oblongata -towards the encephalon; that the cineritious -matter produces the white matter: he divides -the fibres of the brain into <i>divergent</i> and <i>convergent</i>; -he supposes that each convolution of -this organ, instead of being a full and solid -mass, as is generally thought, is merely a fold<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> -of nervous or medullary fibres, &c. &c.</p> - -<p>Such are the questions discussed by Gall; -and it is sufficiently clear that, whatever side<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71"></a>[71]</span> -we take upon these questions, his doctrine -assuredly would neither gain nor lose any -thing.</p> - -<p>Whether such or such a nerve ascends or -descends; whether the white matter is produced -by the gray; or whether, which is, to -say the least, quite as probable, this be nonsense; -whether this or that fibre goes out or -comes in, diverges or converges, &c. &c. the -doctrine of the plurality of brains, the doctrine -of individual intelligences, will be neither -more nor less true, more nor less doubtful.<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p> - -<p>M. Cuvier, in his report, observed: “It is -essential to repeat, were it merely for the -information of the public, that the anatomical<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72"></a>[72]</span> -questions we have been considering, have no -immediate and necessary connexion with the -physiological doctrines taught by M. Gall, as -to the functions and relative volume of different -parts of the brain; and that all that we -have inquired into as to the structure of the -brain, might be either true or false, without -affording the least conclusion in favour of or -against the doctrine.”<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> - -<p>It is necessary not to make any mistake -as to the real point of the question. Gall’s -doctrine goes to establish one and only one -thing, to wit, <i>the plurality of intelligences</i> -and <i>the plurality of brains</i>.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> That is what -constitutes the special and peculiar doctrine;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73"></a>[73]</span> -that is to say, different from the common doctrine, -which admits but one understanding and -a single brain. Whatever goes to prove the -plurality of understandings and brains belongs -to Gall’s doctrine; and whatever does not tend -to prove the plurality of understandings and -brains is in opposition to that doctrine.</p> - -<p>Gall’s works then really contain two very -distinct anatomies: one is a <i>general anatomy</i>, -which has nothing in particular to do with -his doctrine; the other is a <i>special anatomy</i>, -which, supposing it to be true, would constitute -the basis of his doctrine.</p> - -<p>Now, a great deal has been said about -Gall’s general anatomy; but as to his special -anatomy, I know of no one who has spoken -of it. Gall himself says as little as possible -about it. In other matters he tells his opinions -both very clearly and very positively: in this -particular we are obliged to guess at them.</p> - -<p>When Gall, in his <i>psycology</i>, substitutes the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_74"></a>[74]</span> -<i>faculties</i> for the understanding, he defines -those <i>faculties</i>. He defines them, as we -have already seen, to be <i>individual intelligences</i>. -How happens it, then, that in his -anatomy, when he substitutes the organs of -the brain for the brain itself, he does not -define these organs? How strange! Gall’s -whole doctrine, all <i>phrenology</i>, rests upon the -<i>organs of the brain</i>; for, without distinct -cerebral organs, there can be no independent -faculties; and without independent faculties -there can be no phrenology: and Gall does -not say, nor has any phrenologist said for -him, what is the thing called a <i>cerebral -organ</i>.</p> - -<p>The truth is: Gall never had any settled -opinion upon what he called the organs of the -brain; he never saw those <i>organs</i>, and he -imagined them for the use of his <i>faculties</i>. -He did what so many others have done. He -commenced with imagining a hypothesis, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75"></a>[75]</span> -then he imagined an anatomy to suit his -hypothesis.</p> - -<p>When the doctrine of animal spirits was -believed, the brain was composed of pipes -and tubes to convey these spirits.</p> - -<p>“The cortical substance which is found in -the hemispheres of the brain,” says Pourfour -du Petit, “furnishes the whole of the medullary -portion, which is a mere collection of an -infinite number of pipes.”<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> - -<p>“The small arteries of the cortical part of -the brain,” says Haller, “transmit a spirituous -liquor into the medullary and nervous tubes.”<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> - -<p>It is evident that the <i>organs</i> of Gall have -no more real existence than the <i>pipes</i> of Pourfour -du Petit, or the <i>tubes</i> of Haller. They -are two structures that have been imagined, -as suitable for two hypotheses.</p> - -<p>In searching for the primary idea, the secret<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76"></a>[76]</span> -notion that led Gall to his doctrine of the -<i>plurality of the intelligences</i>, I detect it in -the analogy that he supposed to exist between -the functions of the senses and the faculties of -the soul.</p> - -<p>He sees the functions of the senses constituting -distinct functions, and insists that the -faculties of the soul must constitute equally -distinct faculties; he sees each particular sense -possessing an organ proper to itself, and thinks -that each faculty of the soul must have its -proper organ;<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a> in one word, he looks upon -the outer man, and constructs the inner man -after the image of the outer man.</p> - -<p>According to Gall, every thing between an -organ of a sense and an organ of a faculty, -between a faculty and sense, is similar. A<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77"></a>[77]</span> -faculty is a sense. His words are: the <i>memory -or the sense of things</i>, the <i>memory or the -sense of persons</i>, the <i>memory or the sense -of numbers</i>. He talks of the <i>sense of language</i>, -the <i>sense of mechanics</i>, the <i>sense of -the relations of colours</i>, &c. &c.</p> - -<p>“As we must admit,” says he, “five different -external senses, since their functions -are essentially different, ... so we must -agree, after all, to acknowledge the different -faculties and the different inclinations as being -essentially different moral and intellectual -forces, and likewise connected with organic -apparatuses, which are special to each and -independent of each other.”<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> - -<p>“Who,” says he, “can dare to say that -sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, are -simple modifications of faculties? Who could -dare to derive them from a single and same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78"></a>[78]</span> -source, from a single and same organ? In -the same way, the twenty-seven qualities and -faculties which I recognise as fundamental or -primary forces, ... cannot be regarded as the -simple modifications of any one faculty.”<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> - -<p>On the one hand, Gall gives to the <i>faculties</i> -all the independence of the <i>senses</i>; and on the -other, he gives the <i>senses</i> all the attributes of -the <i>faculties</i>.</p> - -<p>“Here,” says he, “are new reasons why -I have always maintained in my public -discourses, though these assertions are in -opposition to the ideas that prevail among -philosophers, that each organ of a sense possesses -absolutely its own functions; that each -of these organs has its peculiar faculty of -receiving and even of perceiving impressions, -its own conscience, its own faculty of reminiscence,”<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> -&c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79"></a>[79]</span></p> - -<p>Gall did not foresee that a physiological -experiment (and a very sure one it is) would -one day demonstrate that the sense receives -the impression but does not perceive it, and -that, consequently, it is endowed neither with -<i>conscience</i> nor <i>reminiscence</i>, &c.</p> - -<p>When the cerebral lobes or hemispheres<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> -are removed from an animal, the animal immediately -loses its sight.</p> - -<p>And yet nothing, as regards the eyes themselves, -has been changed; objects continue to -be depicted upon the retina, the iris retains its -contractility, and the optic nerve its excitability. -The retina continues to be sensible of -light, for the iris contracts or dilates according -as the light admitted to it is more or less -intense.</p> - -<p>No change has taken place as to the structure -of the eye, and yet the animal does not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80"></a>[80]</span> -see! Therefore it is not the eye that perceives, -nor is it the eye that sees.<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p> - -<p>The eye does not see; it is the understanding -that sees by means of the eyes.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> - -<p>When Gall concludes from the independence -of the external senses to the independence of -the faculties of the soul, he confounds, as to -the sense itself, two things that are essentially -distinct, impression and perception. Impression -is multiple; perception is single.</p> - -<p>When the hemispheres are removed, the -animal instantly loses its perception; it no -longer sees nor hears,<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a> &c. notwithstanding -all the organs of the senses, the eye, the ear, -&c. subsist, and the impressions take place.</p> - -<p>Therefore the principle that perceives is <i>one</i>. -Lost for one sense, it is lost for all the senses.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81"></a>[81]</span> -And if it be <i>one</i> for the external senses, how -can it be other than <i>one</i> for the faculties of -the soul?</p> - -<p>Gall therefore cannot suppose the existence -of several distinct principles for the faculties of -the soul, otherwise than because he supposes -several distinct principles for the perceptions; -and he only supposes several principles for the -perceptions because he confounds impression -with perception. The whole of his psycology -arises from a mistake; and the whole of his -anatomy is constructed for the sake of his -psycology.</p> - -<p>In psycology he endeavours to prove that -the faculties of the soul are merely <i>internal -senses</i>; in anatomy, he endeavours to prove -that the organs of the faculties of the soul -only repeat and reproduce the organs of the -<i>external senses</i>.</p> - -<p>Now an <i>organ</i>, that is to say, under the -present point of view, the <i>nerve</i> of an <i>external<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82"></a>[82]</span> -sense</i>, is nothing more than a <i>fascicle</i> of -<i>nervous fibres</i>. Therefore the brain, under -the theory, can be nothing but a collection -of <i>fascicles</i> of <i>fibres</i>.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p> - -<p>According to Gall, the origin, the development, -the structure and mode of termination, -as to the organs of the faculties of the soul -and the organs of the external senses, every -thing is similar, every thing is in common. -And yet the primitive difficulty remains unsolved.</p> - -<p>When I say an <i>organ of the senses</i>, I speak -of a very determinate nervous apparatus. But -is the same thing true when I say an organ of -the brain? What is an organ of the brain? -Is it a <i>fascicle</i> of <i>fibres</i>? Is it each particular -fibre? But if it be a <i>fascicle</i> of <i>fibres</i>, there -are too few of them, for there are not twenty-seven -of them; and twenty-seven are necessary,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83"></a>[83]</span> -for there are twenty-seven faculties. If -it be each particular fibre, then there are too -many of them, and far too many, because -there are only twenty-seven faculties. What -are we to do in this difficulty? We must do -as Gall does: sometimes say it is a fascicle -of fibres; at other times, that it is each fibre -in particular.</p> - -<p>In one place he says: “The brain consisting -of several divisions whose functions are totally -different, there are several primary bundles, -which contribute by their development to produce -it. Among these bundles we place the -anterior and posterior pyramids, the bundles -that come off direct from the corpora olivaria, -and some others that are concealed in the -interior of the medulla oblongata.”<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84"></a>[84]</span></p> - -<p><i>And there are yet some others</i>; be it so; -but they never can amount to twenty-seven.</p> - -<p>Again he says: “A more extensive development -of the same conjecture, might perhaps -dispose the reader to consider each nervous -fibrilla, whether in the nerves or in the brain -itself, as a little special organ.”<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> - -<p>Even this is not all. For the sake of Gall’s -doctrine, the anatomy of the brain must have -a connexion with cranioscopy. And Gall -takes great care to place all his organs upon -the surface of the brain.</p> - -<p>“The possibility of a solution of the problem -under consideration,” says he, “supposes -the organs of the soul to be situated at the -surface of the brain.”<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> Indeed, were they -not situated at the surface of the brain, how<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85"></a>[85]</span> -could the cranium bear the impression of -them? and what would become of cranioscopy?</p> - -<p>Cranioscopy has nothing to fear. Gall has -made provision for it; all the organs of the -brain are placed at the surface of the brain; -and Gall most judiciously adds, “This explains -the relation or the correspondence that -exists between craniology and the doctrine of -the cerebral functions (cerebral physiology), -the sole aim and end of my researches.”<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> - -<p>But as to the pretended <i>organs of the brain</i>, -are they really situated at the surface of the -brain, as Gall asserts? In plain terms, is the -surface of the brain the only active part of -the organ? Here is a physiological experiment -that shows how very much mistaken -Gall is.</p> - -<p>You can slice off a considerable portion of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86"></a>[86]</span> -an animal’s brain, either in front, behind, on -one side, or on the top, without his losing anyone -of his faculties.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p> - -<p>The animal may, therefore, lose all that Gall -calls surface of the brain, without losing any -of his faculties. Therefore it cannot be that -the organs of the faculties reside at the <i>surface -of the brain</i>.</p> - -<p>And comparative anatomy is not less opposite -to Gall’s opinions than is direct experiment -itself. I shall not follow him here in the -detail of his localizations. How could these -localizations have any meaning? He does -not even know whether an organ is a <i>fascicle -of fibres</i>, or a <i>fibre</i>.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p> - -<p>For example; he places what he calls the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87"></a>[87]</span> -instinct of propagation in the cerebellum, and -what he calls the <i>instinct of the love of -offspring</i>, in the posterior cerebral lobes; and -he looks upon these two localizations as the -very surest in his book.</p> - -<p>“I should wish,” says he, “that all young -naturalists might begin their researches with -the study of these two organs. They are both -easily to be recognised,”<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a> &c.</p> - -<p>What! The cerebellum, so different in its -structure from the great brain, is the cerebellum, -like the brain,<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> to be considered an -organ of instinct? And what is more, is it to -be regarded as the organ of a single instinct<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88"></a>[88]</span> -only, while the brain shall have twenty-six of -them?</p> - -<p>I have already said that the cerebellum is -the seat of the principle that presides over -the locomotion<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> of the animal, and that it is -not the seat of any instinct.</p> - -<p>Gall places the love of offspring in the posterior -lobes of the brain.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a> Now, the love of -offspring, and especially maternal love, is -every where to be found among the superior -animals; it is found in all the mammifera, -in all the birds.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a> The posterior lobes of the -brain, therefore, ought to be found in all these -beings. Not at all: the posterior lobes are -wanting in most of the mammifera; they are -wanting in all the birds.</p> - -<p>Gall locates the faculties that are common to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89"></a>[89]</span> -both man and animals, in the posterior part -of the brain; in the anterior part he places -those<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> that are peculiar to man alone. According -to this plan, the most <i>persistent</i> portion of -the brain will be the posterior portion, and the -least persistent the anterior portion. But the -inverse of the proposition holds. The parts -that are most frequently wanting are the <i>posterior -parts</i>, and those that are most invariably -present are the <i>anterior parts</i>.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a></p> - -<p>If, from the brain, I pass on to consider the -cranium, all the foregoing is found to be of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90"></a>[90]</span> -still greater force. How can the localizations -that are destitute of meaning as to the brain—how -can they, I say, have any meaning as -relative to the cranium itself?</p> - -<p>The cranium, especially the external surface -of it, represents the superficial configuration -of the brain but very imperfectly. Gall knows -it. “I was the first,” says he, “to maintain -that it is impossible for us to determine with -exactitude the development of certain circumvolutions, -by the inspection of the external -surface of the cranium. In certain cases, the -exterior lamina of the cranium is not parallel -with the internal lamina.”<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> “There are certain -species in which there is no frontal -sinus; in others, the cells betwixt the two -bony laminæ are found throughout the whole -skull,”<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> &c. &c.</p> - -<p>The cranium represents the convolutions of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91"></a>[91]</span> -the brain only upon its inner surface; it does -not represent them upon its external superficies. -And as to the <i>fibres</i>, as to the <i>bundles -of fibres</i>, it does not even represent them on -its inner surface; for the fibres are covered -with a layer of gray matter, and the bundles -of fibres are situated in the interior of the -nervous mass.</p> - -<p>Gall is aware of all this, and nevertheless -he inscribes his twenty-seven faculties upon -the skulls.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> Such confidence surprises one. -Nothing is known of the intimate structure of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92"></a>[92]</span> -the brain,<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> and yet people are bold enough -to trace upon it their circumscriptions, their -circles, their boundaries. The external surface -of the skull does not represent the brain’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93"></a>[93]</span> -surface, it is admitted; and yet they inscribe -upon this surface twenty-seven names, each of -which names is written within a small circle, -each little circle corresponding to one precise -faculty! And what is stranger yet, people -are to be found who, under each of these -names inscribed by Gall, imagine that there -is concealed something more than a name!</p> - -<p>Those who, seeing the success of Gall’s doctrine, -imagine that the doctrine therefore rests -upon some solid foundation, know very little -of mankind. Gall knew mankind better. He -studied them in his own way, but he studied -them very closely. Let us hear his own words:</p> - -<p>“In society, I employ many expedients to -find out the talents and inclinations of people. -I start the conversation upon a variety of -topics. In general, we let fall in conversation -whatsoever has little or no concern with our -faculties and penchants; but when the interlocutor -touches upon one of our favourite<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94"></a>[94]</span> -subjects, we at once become interested in it.... -Do you wish to spy out the character of a -person, without the fear of being misled as to -your conclusions, even though he might be -on his guard? Set him to talking about his -childhood and boyhood; make him relate his -schoolboy exploits; his conduct towards his -parents, his brothers and sisters, and his playfellows, -and his emulators.... Ask him about -his games, &c. Few persons think it necessary -to dissemble upon these points; they -do not suspect they are dealing with one -who knows perfectly well that the basis of -character remains ever the same; and that -the objects only that interest us change with -the progress of years.... Besides, when I -discover what it is that a person admires or -despises; when I see him act; when he is an -author, and I merely read his book, &c. &c. -the whole man stands unveiled before me.”<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95"></a>[95]</span></p> - -<p>Descartes <i>shut himself up in a stove</i>,<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a> in -order that he might meditate. According to -Gall, there is no necessity for one’s shutting -himself up in a stove.</p> - -<p>Descartes says: “Now I shall shut my eyes, -I shall stop my ears, I shall turn my senses -aside; I shall even efface from my memory -every image of corporeal objects, or at least, -as that can hardly be done, I will repute them -as vain and false; and thus, shut up within -myself, and contemplating what is within me, -I shall endeavour gradually to become more -and more familiarly acquainted with my own -real nature.”<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a></p> - -<p>According to Gall, there is no occasion for -this absolute gathering one’s self together -within. All that is needful is to look at -and touch the skulls of people. Gall’s doctrine -succeeded just as Lavater’s did. Men<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96"></a>[96]</span> -will always be looking out for external signs -by which to discover secret thoughts and concealed -inclinations: it is vain to confound their -curiosity upon this point: after Lavater came -Gall; after Gall some one else will appear.</p> - -<p>We soon become wearied of a true philosophy, -because it is true; because the search -after truth, of whatsoever kind, requires -strenuous and continual efforts. It is impossible, -moreover, always to have the very same -philosophy: even the same philosopher cannot -be always approved of. Approbation must -change its object, especially in France.</p> - -<p>It was for the French that Fontenelle wrote -these words: “The approbation of mankind -is a sort of forced state, which seeks nothing -so much as to come to an end.”<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">[122]</a></p> - -<p>Descartes goes off to die in Sweden, and -Gall comes to reign in France.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97"></a>[97]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="IV">IV.<br /> -OF SPURZHEIM.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>Spurzheim published two works; the first -of which is entitled, “Observations sur la -Phrénologie, ou la connaissance de l’homme -moral et intellectuel, fondée sur les fonctions -du système nerveux:”<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">[123]</a> the title of the second -is, “Essai philosophique sur la nature morâle -et intellectuelle de l’homme;”<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">[124]</a> and these two -works are merely a reproduction of the doctrine<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98"></a>[98]</span> -of Gall. Spurzheim makes Gall’s book -over again—the same book that they commenced -together—and abridges it.</p> - -<p>Spurzheim tells us how he heard Gall, and -having heard him, felt himself drawn to participate -in his labours, and propagate his -doctrine.</p> - -<p>“In 1800, I attended for the first time a -course of lectures which M. Gall had from -time to time repeated at Vienna for four years. -He spoke then of the necessity there was -for a brain to give out the manifestations of -the soul; and of the plurality of organs; ... -but he had not as yet begun to examine into -the structure of the brain.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">[125]</a> From the very -first, I found myself much attracted by the -doctrine of the brain; and from the period of -my first attention to that subject to the present -moment, I have never lost sight of it as an<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99"></a>[99]</span> -object of study. After finishing my studies in -1800, I joined M. Gall, in order to pursue in -a special manner the anatomical part of the -researches.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> In 1805, we left Vienna for the -purpose of travelling together; from which -time, up to the year 1813, we made our -observations in common,” &c.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a></p> - -<p>In fact, the two authors, uniting their -labours, first published, in 1808, their fine -memoir upon the anatomy of the brain,<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">[128]</a> and -subsequently, in 1810 and 1812, the two first -volumes of Gall’s great work.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">[129]</a></p> - -<p>In the year 1813 they separated, and that -separation even proved useful. Gall, when -writing independently, has a freer movement. -Had he continued united with Spurzheim, he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100"></a>[100]</span> -either would not have written the last chapter -of his fourth volume, or he would have written -it very differently, and we should not have -obtained the definite expression of his doctrine.</p> - -<p>That chapter, entitled “Philosophy of Man,” -is Gall’s philosophy entire. It is in that chapter -that he says what he does understand by faculties, -by understanding, by will, &c. &c. and -it is there that he defines the faculties of the -individual understandings;<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> understanding, a -simple <i>attribute of each faculty</i>;<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">[131]</a> will, a -simple result of the simultaneous action of -superior faculties, &c.<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a></p> - -<p>Spurzheim never would have imagined the -doctrine: he found it already concocted; he -follows it, and in doing so, always hesitates. -He did not imagine it; and perhaps never -could have had the facilities enjoyed by Gall -for carrying it successfully into the world.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101"></a>[101]</span> -Gall’s mind was full of address. We have -seen his method of studying men.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">[133]</a> In his -great work there is a dominant tone of philosophy; -for the doctrine was already established -at the period of the publication of that -work. When the doctrine was inchoate, Gall’s -tone was not quite so grave, for it is above -all things necessary to awaken the public -curiosity, and the philosophic tone does not -answer for that purpose.</p> - -<p>Charles Villers has preserved some of his -souvenirs, touching the first impressions produced -by the doctrine.<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">[134]</a> “If,” writes Gall at -the period in question, “the exterminating -angel was under my orders, wo to Kæstner, -to Kant, to Wieland, and others like them.... -Why is it, that no one has ever preserved<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102"></a>[102]</span> -for our times, the skulls of Homer, Virgil, -Cicero, &c.?”<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">[135]</a></p> - -<p>“At one time,” says Charles Villers, “every -body in Vienna was trembling for his head, -and fearing that after his death it would be -put in requisition to enrich Dr. Gall’s cabinet. -He announced his impatience as to the skulls -of extraordinary persons—such as were distinguished -by certain great qualities or by great -talents—which was still greater cause for the -general terror. Too many people were led to -suppose themselves the objects of the doctor’s -regards, and imagined their heads to be especially -longed for by him, as a specimen of the -utmost importance to the success of his experiments. -Some very curious stories are told -on this point. Old M. Denis, the Emperor’s -librarian, inserted a special clause in his will, -intended to save his cranium from M. Gall’s -scalpel.”<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103"></a>[103]</span></p> - -<p>Gall and Spurzheim differ from each other -upon several points: upon the offices of the -external senses; upon the names of the faculties -of the soul; upon their number; and upon -the classification of the faculties, &c. Let -us examine a few of the points more particularly.</p> - -<p>1. <i>Offices of the external senses.</i> “M. Gall -is disposed,” says Spurzheim, “to attribute to -the external senses, as well as to each and -every internal faculty, not only perception, -but also memory, reminiscence, and judgment.... -It seems to me that such facts (the facts -cited by Gall) do not prove the conclusion. -In the first place, memory, being nothing more -than the repetition of knowledge, must have -its seat in the point where perception takes -place. The impressions of the nerves that -give rise to the sensation of hunger, &c. are -indisputably perceived in the head, which -likewise has the reminiscence of hunger....<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104"></a>[104]</span> -I do not believe we can conclude that the eyes -or the ears are the seats of reminiscence.”<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">[137]</a></p> - -<p>Spurzheim is right, as we have sufficiently -seen;<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a> perception is not in the organ of the -sense.</p> - -<p>But the error that Spurzheim combats is not -the whole of Gall’s error; it is only a particular -and secondary error:<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">[139]</a> the error that he -does not perceive, the error that he follows, is -a general and capital one. From the independence -of the external senses, Gall concludes -the independence of the faculties of the soul: -he reasons upon an apparent analogy, which -conceals a profound dissimilitude; and Spurzheim -reasons just as Gall does.</p> - -<p>“In the nervous system,” says he, “we -find the five external senses separate and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105"></a>[105]</span> -independent of each other.”<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> “The faculties -of the external senses are attached to different -organs; they may exist separately. The same -holds true of the internal senses.”<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">[141]</a> “We -assert that there is a particular organ for -each species of sentiment or thought, as there -is for each species of exterior sensation.”<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">[142]</a></p> - -<p>Like Gall, Spurzheim denominates the faculties -of the soul <i>internal senses</i>; in the same -spirit he says: “The <i>sense of colour</i>, the -<i>sense of number</i>, <i>sense of language</i>, <i>sense of -comparison</i>, <i>sense of causality</i>,”<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">[143]</a> &c. &c.</p> - -<p>Both authors begin by calling the faculties -of the soul <i>internal senses</i>; and then, misled -by the word, they conclude from the <i>independence -of the external senses</i>, to the <i>independence</i> -of their <i>internal senses</i>; that is to say, -the independence of the faculties of the soul.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106"></a>[106]</span></p> - -<p>2. <i>Names of the faculties.</i> Spurzheim accuses -Gall of having given denominations only -to actions, and not to the principles of those -actions.</p> - -<p>“Finding,” says he, “a relation betwixt -the development of a cerebral part and a -sort of action, M. Gall denominated the cerebral -part from the action; thus, he spoke of -the organs of music, poetry, &c.”<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">[144]</a> “The -nomenclature,” says he further, “ought to -be conformed to the faculties, without regard -to any action whatever.... When we attribute -to an organ cunning, management, hypocrisy, -intrigue, &c. we do not make known the -primary faculty which contributes to all these -modified actions.”<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">[145]</a></p> - -<p>Gall replies: “M. Spurzheim cannot have -forgotten how often we reasoned without end, -with a view to determine the primitive destination<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107"></a>[107]</span> -of an organ.... I confess, that there -are several organs, with whose primary faculties -I am not yet acquainted; and I continue -to denominate them from the degree of activity -that led me to the discovery of them. M. -Spurzheim thinks himself more fortunate: his -metaphysical temperament has led him to the -discovery of the fundamental or primitive -faculty of every one of the organs. Let us -put it to the proof.”<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">[146]</a></p> - -<p>Indeed, Spurzheim’s expedient for rendering -himself master of the primary faculties is -very simple. He creates a word: he calls the -instinct of propagation <i>amativity</i>, the propensity -to steal, <i>convoitivity</i>; courage is <i>combativity</i>, -&c. &c.</p> - -<p>Gall and Spurzheim talk a great deal about -nomenclature; but they do not perceive, that -as to nomenclature, the first difficulty, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108"></a>[108]</span> -indeed the only one, is to get at simple facts. -Whoever has come to simple facts, is very -nigh to a good nomenclature.</p> - -<p>Descartes says: “Had some one clearly -explained the simple ideas that exist in the -imagination of men, and which constitute all -that they think, I should venture to hope for -a language that it would be very easy to -learn, ... and, which is the principal matter, -that would assist the judgment, representing to -it things so distinctly that it would be almost -impossible for it to be deceived; whereas, on -the contrary, the words we now have possess, -so to speak, only confused significations, to -which the human mind has been so long accustomed, -that it therefore understands scarcely -any thing perfectly well.”<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a></p> - -<p>3. <i>Number of the faculties.</i> Spurzheim -adds eight faculties to those established by<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109"></a>[109]</span> -Gall, and Gall is vexed by it. One does not -see why.</p> - -<p>What! Shall Gall endow twenty-seven -faculties, and Spurzheim not have the same -privilege for seven or eight?<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">[148]</a> Shall Gall have -a faculty for <i>space</i>, one for <i>number</i>, &c. and -Spurzheim be refused one for <i>time</i>, one for -<i>extent</i>, &c.? Is not Spurzheim half right, -when he says:</p> - -<p>“One does not readily perceive why M. Gall -should desire to suggest to his readers that his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110"></a>[110]</span> -method of treating the doctrine of the brain -is the only admissible one, and that there are -no other organs than those he has recognised; -that the organs do nothing but what he attributes -to them; ... that all he says and all -he does (and that only) bears the stamp of -perfection; and that his decision constitutes -the supreme law.”<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">[149]</a></p> - -<p>4. <i>Classification and attributes of the -faculties.</i> Gall, by giving the same attributes -to all the faculties, and to each faculty all the -attributes of the understanding, in fact forms -out of the faculties only two groups: the group -of faculties that he supposes common to man -and the animals, and the group of faculties -that he supposes to be proper to man alone. -Spurzheim divides and subdivides them.</p> - -<p>None of the formulas required for the classification -agreed upon are omitted.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111"></a>[111]</span></p> - -<p>In the first place, there are two <i>orders</i> of -faculties: the <i>affective</i> and the <i>intellectual -faculties</i>; then each of these <i>orders</i> is divided -into <i>genera</i>. The first <i>order</i> has two <i>genera</i>: -the affective faculties common to man and -animals,<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> and the affective faculties peculiar -to man alone.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">[152]</a> The second has three genera: -the faculties or <i>internal senses</i> which make -external objects known;<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">[153]</a> the faculties or -internal senses which make known the relations -of objects in general;<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">[154]</a> and the faculties -or internal senses that <i>reflect</i>.<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112"></a>[112]</span></p> - -<p>What an apparatus for saying very simple -things; for saying that there are <i>propensities</i>,<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">[156]</a> -<i>sentiments</i>,<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">[157]</a> and <i>intellectual faculties</i>! -What singular personification of all these -faculties: faculties that know; faculties that -reflect!<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a> Spurzheim elsewhere speaks of -<i>happy faculties</i>.<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">[159]</a> Indeed, what arbitrariness -in the distribution of facts! And Gall, too, -is he not half right?</p> - -<p>“By what right,” says he, “does M. Spurzheim -exclude from the intellectual faculties -imitation, wit, ideality or poetry, circumspection, -secretivity, constructivity? How are perseverance, -circumspection, imitation; how are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113"></a>[113]</span> -they sentiments? What reason have we for -counting among the propensities constructivity -rather than melody, benevolence, or -imitation?”<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">[160]</a></p> - -<p>Gall, by endowing each faculty with all the -attributes of an understanding, makes as many -understandings as faculties. Spurzheim makes -several kinds of understandings: understandings -that know, understandings that reflect, -&c. He restores the <i>sensitive</i> and <i>rational -souls</i>.</p> - -<p>In fine, Gall and Spurzheim rarely agree -as to their faculties. In <i>hope</i> Gall sees nothing -more than an attribute; Spurzheim beholds it -as a primary faculty. In <i>conscience</i> Gall sees -nothing but an effect of <i>benevolence</i>; Spurzheim -looks upon it as a peculiar faculty. -Gall resolves that there is only one organ of -<i>religion</i>, and Spurzheim insists upon three—the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114"></a>[114]</span> -organ of causality, that of supernaturality, -and that of veneration, &c. &c.</p> - -<p>We should never end, were we to follow -them throughout their debates. I have said -enough to show the case, and I now pass -on to Broussais.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115"></a>[115]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="V">V.<br /> -OF BROUSSAIS.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>Broussais appears to have been born solely -for the purpose of imagining or propagating -systems.</p> - -<p>Guided by facts which he seized upon with -a rare sagacity, Broussais begins by bringing -back certain affections to their real seats;<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> -but soon, by an immoderate generalization of -this fine result, he perceives all affections in -the same affection, all diseases in the same<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116"></a>[116]</span> -malady; he imagines one <i>abstract affection</i>, -by means of which he explains all other -affections: <i>fevers</i> are nothing but irritations -of the digestive apparatus; <i>insanity</i> is nothing -but an <i>irritation</i> of the brain;<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">[162]</a> and he who -is so intolerant of the <i>personifications</i> proposed -by others, makes one <i>personification</i> -more; in fine, his exclusive and headstrong -genius carries him beyond himself, and, as if -merely to amuse him after the fatigue of forming -his systems, plunges him into the question -of <i>phrenology</i>, where he enjoys himself so -much the more, because he finds in it his -own accustomed method, his own ideas, and -his own language: there are plenty of faculties -to bring back to their organs, plenty of localizations -to establish.</p> - -<p>Broussais ought not to be judged of by his -“Cours de Phrénologie.”<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">[163]</a> The five or six<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117"></a>[117]</span> -first <i>lessons</i>, or, as he calls them, <i>generalities</i>,<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">[164]</a> -are merely a confused mixture of ideas: the -notions of Condillac rejected by Cabanis, and -the ideas of the phrenologists.</p> - -<p>He says that sensibility is the <i>common -origin</i> of the faculties;<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">[165]</a> he calls <i>perception</i> -a <i>primary faculty</i>,<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">[166]</a> &c. &c.; and Condillac -would not speak differently.</p> - -<p>But, on the other hand, he says that there -are as many <i>memories</i> as there are organs;<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">[167]</a> -that the instincts and the sentiments possess -a memory, as the <i>external perceptions</i><a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">[168]</a> have -theirs; that the mind is the <i>sum of the faculties</i>,<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">[169]</a> -&c.; and Gall could not say it more -clearly.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118"></a>[118]</span></p> - -<p>Broussais is particularly opposed to the <i>moi</i> -of Descartes. “Seduced,” says he, “by the -<i>moi</i> of Descartes, philosophers have been led -to reason according to the testimony of their -consciousness....”<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> And according to what -testimony does Broussais think they ought to -reason?</p> - -<p>He thinks it very funny to call the <i>moi</i> an -<i>intra-cranial entity</i>,<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">[171]</a> <i>intra-cranial central -being</i>,<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a> <i>person</i> par excellence, &c.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a></p> - -<p>He laughs at the <i>moi</i> of Descartes; he -forgets that the <i>moi</i> of Gall is either nothing -else than the sum (<i>ensemble</i>) of the -intellectual faculties, or nothing else than a -word; and he makes for himself a <i>peculiar<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119"></a>[119]</span> -moi</i>,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">[174]</a> which he locates in the organ of <i>comparison</i>. -“We owe,” says he, “to the organ -of general comparison the distinction of one -person expressed by the sign <i>me</i>.”<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">[175]</a></p> - -<p>Broussais was never designed for compliance -with the ideas of others; a yoke oppresses -him; he is never truly Broussais, except in -the midst of conflict. In 1816 he publishes a -volume,<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">[176]</a> and the medical doctrines are shook<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120"></a>[120]</span> -for half a century: we ought to read that -volume over again, and forget the “Cours -de Phrénologie.”</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121"></a>[121]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="VI">VI.<br /> -BROUSSAIS’S PSYCOLOGY.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>The fact is, Broussais is busier with his -own opinions than with what Gall thought; -and here is a specimen of his way of thinking: -“The understanding and its different -manifestations are,” says he, “the phenomena -of the nervous actions.”<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">[177]</a> “The faculties,” -says he further, “are the actions of the material -organs,”<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">[178]</a> &c.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122"></a>[122]</span></p> - -<p>Broussais’s whole psycology is contained in -these words. The organ, and the phenomenon -produced by the organ. To speak more -clearly, the organ and the action of the -organ. To speak like Cabanis, the organ -and the <i>secretion</i> of the organ, or <i>thought</i>.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">[179]</a> -That’s all!</p> - -<p>The understanding, therefore, is merely a -<i>phenomenon</i>, a product, an act. But if this -be the case, how can there be a <i>continuity<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123"></a>[123]</span> -of the moi</i>? Now, the consciousness which -gives me the <i>unity</i> of the <i>moi</i>, gives me -not less assuredly the <i>continuity</i> of the <i>moi</i>. -Descartes’ admirable words are: “I find that -there is in us an <i>intellectual memory</i>.”<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a></p> - -<p>The consciousness tells me that I am <i>one</i>, -and Gall insists that I am <i>multiple</i>; the consciousness -tells me I am <i>free</i>, and Gall avers -that there is no <i>moral liberty</i>; the consciousness -endows me with the continuity of my<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124"></a>[124]</span> -understanding, but Cabanis and Broussais tell -me that my understanding is nothing but -an <i>act</i>.</p> - -<p>Philosophers will talk.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125"></a>[125]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="VII">VII.<br /> -BROUSSAIS’S PHYSIOLOGY.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>The whole of Broussais’s physiology is -founded upon <i>irritation</i>. He says, “Irritation -constitutes the basis of the physiological -doctrine.”<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">[181]</a> But what is irritation? Broussais -replies: “It is the exaggeration of contractility.”<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">[182]</a> -But then, what is <i>contractility</i>?</p> - -<p>In Haller, the term <i>irritability</i> (for that is -his term for <i>contractility</i>) possesses a precise -meaning and import. <i>Irritability</i> is a property<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126"></a>[126]</span> -of muscular fibre, by which it shortens -or contracts itself when touched.</p> - -<p>Haller demonstrated, and it is his glory, -that the muscle alone <i>moves</i> when it is -touched. What is that to Broussais? He -goes back again to the vague irritability of -Glisson and de Gorter: like those authors, he -assigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he -explains every thing by means of it.</p> - -<p>Broussais’s <i>irritation</i> is merely Haller’s -<i>irritability</i> exaggerated and deformed.</p> - -<p>The genius of Broussais was too impatient -to allow him to proceed step by step up to -the idea—too impassioned to hinder him from -being satisfied with the name—and for that -very reason he appears to have been by nature -fitted for success in a school where the name -is every thing.</p> - -<p>But here is the great difference. Gall and -Broussais laboured for the School: Descartes -toiled for the human mind.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127"></a>[127]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="VIII">VIII.</h2> - -</div> - -<p>I return to Gall.</p> - -<p>Those who wish to learn Gall’s doctrine, -will always go up to Gall himself. Spurzheim -already alters the spirit of that doctrine, -and Gall complains of it. “M. Spurzheim,” -says he, “knows my discoveries better than -any body else, but he tries to introduce among -them a spirit quite foreign to that in which -they were begun, continued and perfected.”<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">[183]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128"></a>[128]</span></p> - -<p>Gall, moreover, was a great anatomist. His -idea of tracing the fibres of the brain is, as to -the anatomy of that organ, the fundamental -idea. The idea is not his own: two French -anatomists, Vieussens and Pourfour du Petit, -had admirably understood it long before his -time; but at the period of his appearance it -had been long forgotten. The brain was not -then dissected by any one: it was cut in slices.</p> - -<p>It was a great merit in Gall to have recalled -the true method of dissecting the brain; and -there was still greater address on his part, in -connecting with his labours in positive anatomy, -his doctrine of independent faculties and -multiple brain.</p> - -<p>This strange doctrine has had a fortune still -more strange. Gall and Spurzheim forgot to -place <i>curiosity</i> among their primary faculties. -They were wrong. But for the credulous -curiosity of mankind, how could they have -explained the success of their doctrine?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129"></a>[129]</span></p> - -<p>Fortunately, a system never lives otherwise -than as a system lives. That of the moment -is abandoned for the sake of another: and -almost always for a perfectly opposite one. -Systems multiply and pass away; and we -are indebted to the systems themselves for an -escape from the mischiefs of systems.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130"></a>[130]</span></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131"></a>[131]</span></p> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="NOTES">NOTES.</h2> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_I">NOTE I.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="hanging"><span class="smcap">Anatomical Relations supposed by Gall to exist -between the Organs of the External Senses, -and the Organs of the Intellectual Faculties.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_82">Page 82.</a> <i>According to Gall, the origin, the development, -the structure and mode of termination, as to -the organs of the faculties of the soul and the organs -of the external senses, every thing is similar, every -thing is in common.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>It is known that two substances compose the nervous -system—the gray matter, and the white or fibrous matter. -Well, according to Gall, one of these substances -produces the other. The <i>gray matter</i> produces the -<i>white matter</i>.</p> - -<p>Wherever, therefore, there happens to be any <i>gray -matter</i>, white matter must appear; that is to say, -<i>nervous fibres</i>,<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">[184]</a> <i>nervous filaments</i>, nerves. All the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132"></a>[132]</span> -nerves in the body must arise in this way. The spinal -nerves arise from the gray matter which is in the interior -of the spinal marrow; the cerebral nerves from -the gray matter that is in the interior of the medulla -oblongata.</p> - -<p>Hence, the nerves of the body are <i>organs of the senses</i>.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the brain and the cerebellum,<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a> -which are <i>the organs of the faculties of the soul</i>, must -arise like the nerves: the brain from the gray matter -of the <i>pyramidal eminences</i>; the cerebellum from the -gray matter that surrounds the <i>restiform bodies</i>.</p> - -<p>In the second place, whenever a nerve traverses a -mass of gray matter, it receives from it, according to -Gall, certain new nervous filaments; and in this way -it grows and developes itself. The cerebrum and cerebellum -will not fail therefore to grow and be developed -likewise. The primitive bundles of the cerebellum, -(<i>the restiform bodies</i>,) will grow by means of the filaments -which will be imparted to them by the gray -matter of the <i>ciliary body</i>: the primitive bundles of -the cerebrum, (the <i>pyramidal eminences</i>,) by the filaments -imparted to them by, first, the gray matter of the -<i>pons varolii</i>; secondly, by that of the <i>optic strata</i>; -and then by that of the olivary bodies, <i>corpora striata</i>, -&c. &c.</p> - -<p>Finally, in the same manner as a nerve of sense -expands at its termination, and by means of such expansion<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133"></a>[133]</span> -forms the organ of the sense, so the primitive -bundles of fibres of the brain and of the cerebellum -terminate in expansions, and constitute the <i>organs -of the internal senses</i>; that is to say, the lobes of the -cerebellum and the hemispheres of the brain.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">[186]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_II">NOTE II.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Difference between Instinct and Understanding.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Footnote_79">Page 64 (Note).</a> <i>And he does not see that as to -the instincts and the understanding all is contrast.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>Here is what I have elsewhere said upon this question,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134"></a>[134]</span> -so long debated, of the <i>instinct and understanding -of animals</i>.</p> - -<p>“There is a most complete difference between -<i>instinct</i> and <i>understanding</i>.</p> - -<p>“In <i>instinct</i> all is blind, necessary, and invariable. -In <i>understanding</i> every thing is elective, conditional, -and modifiable.</p> - -<p>“The beaver which builds its house, and the bird -that constructs its nest, act only by instinct.</p> - -<p>“The dog and the horse, that learn even the meaning -of several of our words, and who pay obedience -to us, do so by understanding.</p> - -<p>“In <i>instinct</i> all is innate. The beaver builds without -having learned to build: all that he does is from -fatality. The beaver builds under the impulsion of a -constant and irresistible force.</p> - -<p>“In <i>understanding</i>, every thing results from experience -and <i>instruction</i>. The dog obeys only because -he has learned to obey: he is perfectly free in this -respect; for he obeys only because he will obey.</p> - -<p>“Finally, in regard to <i>instinct</i> every thing is particular. -That admirable industry that the beaver exhibits -in the construction of his hut, can be employed in -no other occupation than the building of his hut. Now, -in <i>understanding</i> every thing is general; for the dog -could apply the same flexibility of attention, and of -conception, which he uses in obeying, to do any other -thing.</p> - -<p>“In animals there are, therefore, two distinct and -primary forces—<i>instinct</i> and <i>understanding</i>. As long -as our conceptions of these forces were confused, all<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135"></a>[135]</span> -our views and opinions in regard to the actions of animals -remained obscure and contradictory. Among -these actions, some exhibited man every where superior -to the brute; while others appeared to accord to the -brute creation the superiority over man—a contradiction -almost as deplorable as absurd! By the distinction -that separates blind and necessary actions from elective -and conditional ones—or, in a word, instinct from intelligence—all -contradiction disappears, and order succeeds -to confusion. Whatever in animals is <i>understanding</i>, -does not in any degree approach the excellence -of the human understanding; and whatsoever, -under the appearance of <i>understanding</i>, seemed superior -to the human understanding, is in fact a mere result -of a mechanical and blind force.”<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">[187]</a></p> - -<p>Here is what I say as to the boundaries between the -intelligence of man and of animals.</p> - -<p>“Animals receive, through their senses, impressions -similar to those that we receive through the medium of -our senses; like ourselves, they retain the traces of -these impressions: these impressions, when preserved, -form for them, as well as for us, numerous and various -associations: they combine them, they draw from them -inferences, and deduce judgments from them: therefore -they possess understanding.</p> - -<p>“But the whole of their understanding stops at that -point. The understanding they possess is not one that -can consider itself: it cannot see itself, does not know<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136"></a>[136]</span> -itself. They do not possess <i>reflection</i>, that supreme -faculty with which the mind of man is endowed, and -which enables him to turn his intellectual power -inwards, so as to study and know the nature of his own -understanding.</p> - -<p>“Reflection, thus defined, is then the boundary that -separates human intelligence from that of the brute -creation: and in fact it cannot be denied that this furnishes -a strong line of demarcation between them. -Thought, which contemplates itself; understanding, -which sees itself and studies itself; knowledge, which -knows itself; these evidently constitute an order of -determinate phenomena of a decided character, and to -which no brute animal can ever attain. This is, if one -might so speak, a purely intellectual domain; and it -appertains to man alone. In one word, animals feel, -know, think; but man is the only one of all created -beings to whom has been given the power of feeling -that he feels, of knowing that he knows, and of thinking -that he thinks.”<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">[188]</a></p> - -<p>I will quote, also, the following passage from my -work sur <i>l’instinct et l’intelligence des animaux</i>, p. -178, et seq.</p> - -<p>“ ... There are three facts: <i>instinct</i>, <i>understanding -of brutes</i>, and <i>human understanding</i>; and -each of these facts has its definite limits.</p> - -<p>“Instinct acts without knowing; understanding -knows in order to act; the human understanding alone -knows, and knows itself.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137"></a>[137]</span></p> - -<p>“Reflection, closely defined, is the <i>knowledge of -thought by thought</i>. And this power of thought over -thought gives us a whole order of new relations. As -soon as the mind perceives itself it judges itself; as -soon as it can act upon itself it is free; as soon as it -becomes free it becomes moral.</p> - -<p>“Man is only moral because he is free.</p> - -<p>“The brute animal follows its body; in the midst -of this body, which shrouds it completely in matter, the -human mind is free, and so free that it can, whenever -it prefers to do so, immolate its very body.</p> - -<p>“‘The great power of the will over the body,’ says -Bossuet, ‘consists in this prodigious effect, that man -is so completely master of his frame, that he can even -sacrifice it for the sake of some greater good in view. -To rush into the midst of blows, and plunge into a -flight of arrows from a blind impetuosity, as happens -among brute creatures, shows nothing superior to the -body itself; but to resolve to die with understanding, -and for reasons, notwithstanding the whole disposition -of the body to the contrary, evinces a principle superior -to the body; and among all the tribes of animals, -man is the only one in whom this principle exists.’”</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_III">NOTE III.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Gall, as an Observer.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_93">Page 93.</a> <i>He studied them (mankind) in his own -way, but he studied them very closely.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>Gall was a practical observer. He observed and -studied always, and with so much the greater success<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138"></a>[138]</span> -because “people never suspected that they had to do -(these are his own words) with a man who knew perfectly -well that the basis of human character continues -to be always the same, and that merely the objects that -interest us change with the progress of years.”<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p> - -<p>He examined “families, schools, hospitals, &c.”<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> -And he never was satisfied with appearances only. -“The occupations that we pursue as our business, generally -prove nothing either as to our faculties or our -propensities: but those which we engage in as recreation -are almost always in conformity with our tastes -and our talents.”<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">[191]</a></p> - -<p>His observations on men were more serviceable to -him in judging of and describing their characters, than -the <i>bumps on the skull</i>.</p> - -<p>“I often said to my friends, show me the fundamental -forces of the soul, and I will find the organ and -the seat for each one of them.<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">[192]</a> ... When I had become -convinced that a distinguished talent, and one fully so -recognised, was especially the work of nature, I examined -the head of the individual, ... &c.”<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">[193]</a></p> - -<p>Gall’s progression, then, was from <i>observation</i> to the -<i>cranium</i>; he first proceeded from <i>observation</i> to the -<i>cranium</i>, and next from the <i>cranium</i> to the <i>brain</i>.</p> - -<p>Furthermore, Gall began by studying the <i>physiognomy</i>—the -<i>features</i> of the <i>countenance</i>—like Lavater.</p> - -<p>He at first thought that a good memory was connected -with a certain <i>conformation of the eyes</i>: “I -remarked,” says he, “that they all had large projecting<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139"></a>[139]</span> -eyes.... I suspected, therefore, that there ought -to exist some connexion between memory and this conformation -of the eyes.”<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">[194]</a> Again he says, “It may be -perceived, from the progress of these researches, that -the first step consisted in the discovery of certain organs; -that it was by degrees only that we allowed facts -to speak in order to deduce from them general principles; -and that it was subsequently, and towards the -close, that we had learned to know the brain.”<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">[195]</a></p> - -<p>Thus it appears that the study of the brain came -later than the doctrine; and that is the reason why the -anatomy of the brain is a mere series of mistakes and -conjectures—I mean here the <i>special anatomy</i>, the -<i>secret anatomy</i>, the <i>phrenological anatomy</i>; I mean -the anatomy made out to suit the doctrine. I have -already sufficiently discriminated between it and the -<i>real anatomy</i>.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">[196]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_IV">NOTE IV.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Of the Animal Spirits.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_116">Page 116.</a> <i>He who is so intolerant of the personifications -proposed by others makes one personification -more.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>Broussais explains every thing by the word <i>irritation</i>, -just as Gall explains every thing by the word -<i>faculties</i>, and as Malebranche explained them by <i>animal -spirits</i>.</p> - -<p>After serving Descartes, the <i>animal spirits</i> were in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140"></a>[140]</span> -the service of Malebranche; they served all the authors -of the seventeenth century.</p> - -<p>Malebranche commences one of his chapters with -these words: “Every body agrees that the <i>animal -spirits</i>....”<a id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> He had no idea that every body would -agree some day, that the <i>animal spirits</i> is mere nonsense.</p> - -<p>There were animal spirits of all sorts; as Gall had -<i>faculties</i> of all sorts: there were <i>agitated</i><a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">[198]</a> animal -spirits, <i>languid</i> animal spirits.<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">[199]</a> There were even -<i>libertine</i> animal spirits.</p> - -<p>“Wine is so spirituous,” says Malebranche, “that it -is <i>animal spirits</i> almost completely formed, but libertine -spirits.”<a id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a></p> - -<p>The animal spirits seemed to have become the <i>ultima -ratio</i> of the philosophers.</p> - -<p>The author of a book, in other respects to be esteemed, -thus defined <i>imagination</i>: “Imagination is a perception -of the soul’s caused by the internal motion of the -animal spirits.”<a id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">[201]</a></p> - -<p>That author had no doubt that he was saying something.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_V">NOTE V.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Exaggeration of Broussais, even in Phrenology.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_120">Page 120.</a> <i>We ought to read that volume over -again, and forget the Cours de Phrénologie.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>Broussais does not adopt merely the general ideas of -the phrenologists—he adopts even the smallest of them.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141"></a>[141]</span></p> - -<p>Gall had located the <i>instinct</i> of <i>murder</i> in a given -part of the brain; and he supposed, be it understood, -that this part existed only in the brain of the carnivorous -animals. But see, it is found in the brain of the -herbivora; and one would suppose that the phrenologists -would be in trouble about it. Don’t deceive yourself, -the <i>instinct of murder</i> is the <i>instinct of destruction</i>. -Spurzheim denominates it <i>destructivity</i>; and -the herbivorous animals must possess it, for they eat -plants and consequently <i>destroy</i> them.</p> - -<p>“The herbivora” says Broussais, “effect a real destruction -among plants.<a id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">[202]</a> An attempt has been made to -turn these ideas into ridicule, even in an Academy.... -It was in a learned society of this kind considered -ridiculous in the phrenologists to compare the destruction -of vegetables to that of animals. For my own -part I do not see why the idea should be rejected, if -the fundamental object of the organ be to procure the -means of alimentation, which seems to be quite certain.”<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">[203]</a></p> - -<p>Gall imagines an organ for religion; he thinks it -peculiar to man, and denominates it the <i>Organ of -Theosophy</i>. The same organ is found quite down in -the scale as low as the sheep;<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a> and do not suppose -that Broussais is at all shocked by the discovery. If -necessary he will go further than all the phrenologists -taken together.</p> - -<p>“The phrenologists” says he, “have denied that this -sentiment (the sentiment of veneration) belongs to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142"></a>[142]</span> -animals. I am not of that opinion. A certain shade -of <i>veneration</i> exists in many species, among the vertebrate, -that choose their leaders, and march according -to a signal given by their chiefs and obey them. Thus -even among the sheep you may see a chief.”<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">[205]</a></p> - -<p>Who would have believed it? Broussais finds Gall -too timorous.</p> - -<p>“There is,” says he, “no central organ. This is -considered as one of the most powerful objections to -Gall. As far as I know he never answered it. As for -me, I shall be more frank, perhaps more bold: I shall -say it is impossible that there should be one, &c.”<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">[206]</a></p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_VI">NOTE VI.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Contractility of Broussais.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_126">Page 126.</a> <i>He assigns it to every tissue, and, like -them, he explains every thing by means of it.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>He assigns it to every tissue. Haller attributed this -property to the muscles alone, “but it is a common -property of the tissues.”<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">[207]</a></p> - -<p>He explains every thing by means of it: every -thing, even <i>innervation</i> itself. But he is constrained to -add: “Doubtless <i>something more occurs</i> in the interior -of the nervous tissue; doubtless we are unacquainted -and ignorant as to how <i>that other thing</i> is connected -with the motions in question, and how it may employ -them in the act of innervation,” &c.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143"></a>[143]</span></p> - -<p>So we perceive, in the first place, <i>contractility</i> explains -<i>innervation</i>; and then, that <i>something more</i> is -wanting. And as nervous contractility is nothing but -a mental fiction (a nerve never moves, never <i>contracts</i>, -when it is touched) the whole matter tapers down to -this <i>something more</i>, or to <i>that other thing</i>.</p> - -<p>See how very far from being rigorous are those who -construct systems.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h3 class="nobreak" id="NOTE_VII">NOTE VII.</h3> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Real Labours of Gall as to the Brain.</span></p> - -<p><a href="#Page_128">Page 128.</a> <i>Gall, moreover, was a great anatomist.</i></p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<p>He found that the medullary substance of the brain -was fibrous throughout;<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">[209]</a> he saw the fibres of the medulla -oblongata decussate before they form the pyramidal -eminences,<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">[210]</a> those of the corpora olivaria, &c.;<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144"></a>[144]</span> -that is to say, all the ascending fibres of the medulla -oblongata across the pons varolii, thalami nervor opticorum, -and the corpora striata, as far as the vault of -the hemispheres; he saw the bundles formed by these -fibres increased in magnitude at each of these passages; -he distinguished the fibres which go out in order -to expand in the hemispheres, from those that go in in -order to give birth to the commissures: many nerves -that were regarded as coming out immediately from the -brain, were by him traced even into the medulla oblongata, -&c.</p> - -<p>And I repeat that all these facts, with the discovery -of which he has enriched the science of anatomy, all -of them are the results of a happy thought of his—the -idea of <i>tracing</i> the fibres of the brain, or to use -a common expression, of substituting in the dissection -of the brain the method of <i>developments</i> for that of -<i>sections</i>.</p> - -<p>Those of Gall’s opinions which it seems ought not to -be adopted, are: that in which he supposes the nerve -fibres to be born (he understands the word to the letter) -of the gray matter; that in which he contends that the -convolutions of the brain are merely foldings of the -medullary fibres, and can therefore be <i>unfolded</i>; that -in which he compares the rete mucosum of the skin -to the gray matter of the encephalon, &c., &c.</p> - -<p>Gall had a mind which impelled him to the formation -of hypotheses; and even in his real anatomy there -is a decided smack of a system-author.</p> - -<p class="titlepage">THE END.</p> - -<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop" /> - -<div class="footnotes"> - -<div class="chapter"> - -<h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Anatomie et Physiologie du système nerveux en général, -et du cerveau en particulier, avec des observations sur la possibilité -de reconnaître plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et -morales de l’homme et des animaux par la configuration de -leurs têtes; 4 vol. 4to, avec planches. Paris, de 1810 à 1819.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> T. ii. p. 217. “It is generally understood,” says he further, -“that the brain is the peculiar organ of the soul.” T. ii. p. 14.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> Gall, t. ii. p. 221.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> Gall, t. ii. p. 222. Haller, Elem. Physiolog. etc., t. iv. -p. 304. Sensus præterea sedem in cerebro esse, atque ad -cerebrum per nervos mandari, alia sunt quæ ostendunt.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l’homme, IIe Mémoire, -§ vii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> Leçons d’Anat. Comp. t. ii. p. 153.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> Ibid. p. 173.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> Recherches Phys. sur la Vie et la Mort, art. vi. § ii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="label">[9]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="label">[10]</a> Descartes, Lettre à Regius ou Leroy, t. viii. p. 515, edit, par -M. Cousin.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="label">[11]</a> T. v. p. 34. “I remark,” says he again, “that the mind -does not receive the impression from all parts of the body, but -from the brain only.”—T. i. p. 344.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="label">[12]</a> T. vi. p. 347.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="label">[13]</a> T. ii. p. 357.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="label">[14]</a> T. ii. p. 358.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="label">[15]</a> “The principal object of this work,” says he, “is to show -how all our knowledge, and all our faculties come from the -senses.”—Traité des Sensations, préambule de l’Extrait Raisonné.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="label">[16]</a> Traité des Sensations, préam. de l’Extrait Raisonné.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="label">[17]</a> De l’homme, de ses facultés intellectuelles, etc. t. i. p. 186. -Liege, 1774.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="label">[18]</a> He very properly distinguishes the senses from the understanding; -but, as will be elsewhere seen, he endows each sense -with all the attributes of the understanding. He escapes from -one error only to fall into another.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="label">[19]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="label">[20]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="label">[21]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="label">[22]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="label">[23]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="label">[24]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="label">[25]</a> “From what I have now said, it clearly follows that the -aperceptive faculty, the faculty of reminiscence, and that of -memory, are nothing but attributes common to all the fundamental -faculties.”—Gall, t. iv. p. 319. “All that I have just said, -is also applicable to the judgment and the imagination,” &c.—Ibid. -p. 325. “The sentiments and the propensities also have -their judgment, their imagination, their recollection, and their -memory.”—Ibid. p. 327.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="label">[26]</a> Ibid. 328.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="label">[27]</a> Ibid. 327.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="label">[28]</a> Gall, t. iv. p. 339.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="label">[29]</a> Ibid. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="label">[30]</a> “The <i>intellectual faculty</i> and all its subdivisions, such as -perception, recollection, memory, judgment, imagination, &c. -are not fundamental faculties, but merely general attributes of -them.”—Gall, t. iv. p. 327.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="label">[31]</a> “Reason,” says Gall, “is the result of the simultaneous -action of all the intellectual faculties.”—Gall, t. iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="label">[32]</a> Gall enumerates twenty-seven of these faculties, Spurzheim -enumerates twenty-five, &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="label">[33]</a> Gall, t. iv. p. 325.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="label">[34]</a> Ibid. p. 330.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="label">[35]</a> “I find in myself,” says Descartes, “divers faculties of -thought, that have each their own way, ... whence I conclude, -they are distinct from me, as modes are distinct from things.”—T. -i. p. 332.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="label">[36]</a> T. viii. p. 169.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="label">[37]</a> Gall, iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="label">[38]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="label">[39]</a> Ibid. t. ii. p. 100.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="label">[40]</a> Gall, t. ii. p. 97.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="label">[41]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="label">[42]</a> “It is a law of moral liberty, that man shall be always -determined, and that he shall himself determine from the most -numerous and most powerful motives.”—T. ii. p. 137.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="label">[43]</a> “But an organ may act with greater energy, and furnish -a more powerful motive.”—T. ii. p. 104.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="label">[44]</a> “There is no person who, upon contemplating himself, -does not feel and experience that will and liberty are one and -the same; or rather, that there is no difference between that -which is voluntary and that which is free.”—T. i. p. 496.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="label">[45]</a> Descartes, t. i. p. 299. “It is always in our power to -prevent ourselves from pursuing a good which is clearly known -to us, provided we should think it a good to show in that way -our free will.”—Descartes, t. vi. p. 133. “The fulness of -liberty consists in the great use of our positive ability to follow -the worse, while we truly know the better.”—Ibid. p. 138.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="label">[46]</a> The question here relates solely to the brain, properly so -called, (the lobes or cerebral hemispheres.) The rest of the -encephalon does not serve in the operations of the understanding. -See the preceding article, p. 29, et seq.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="label">[47]</a> <i>Individual intelligences</i>—an expression of Gall’s. “Each -individual intelligence has its own proper organ.”—iv. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="label">[48]</a> Even the instincts, according to Gall, have their memory, -imagination, &c. “The instinct of propagation, that of the -love of offspring, pride, vanity, possess, beyond contradiction, -their perceptive faculty, their recollection, their memory, judgment, -imagination, and their own attention.”—T. iv. p. 331. -“The propensities and the sentiments likewise possess their -judgment, their taste, their imagination, their recollection, and -their memory.”—iv. 344.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="label">[49]</a> Gall, t. iv. p. 325.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="label">[50]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="label">[51]</a> See particularly t. ii. p. 5.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="label">[52]</a> “Had I to do with readers wholly free from prejudice, I -should, in order to convince them of this, (the supposition of -innate ideas,) have nothing to do but show them that mankind -acquire all the knowledge they possess by the simple use of -their natural faculties.”—Philos. Essay on the Human Understanding.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="label">[53]</a> “Locke contents himself,” says he, “with acknowledging -that the soul perceives, doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, -and reflects: that we are convinced of the existence of these -<i>operations</i>; ... but he seems to have regarded them as something -innate.” A short time before he had said, “We shall -see that all the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be -innate qualities.”—Traité des Sensations. (Extrait raisonné.)</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="label">[54]</a> See t. iii. p. 81.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="label">[55]</a> T. i. p. 343.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="label">[56]</a> “I may now flatter myself,” says he, “that the reader is -sufficiently prepared for quite a new philosophy, deduced -directly from the fundamental forces.”—T. iii. p. 11.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="label">[57]</a> T. iv. p. 327.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="label">[58]</a> T. iv. p. 319.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="label">[59]</a> T. iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="label">[60]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="label">[61]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="label">[62]</a> “Each individual understanding possesses its own proper -organ.”—T. iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="label">[63]</a> T. i. p. 230.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="label">[64]</a> T. iv. p. 105.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="label">[65]</a> See the preceding articles.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="label">[66]</a> T. iv. p. 340. “From all these faculties comes at last -decision. It is this decision ... which is really will and wishing.”—T. -ii. p. 105.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="label">[67]</a> T. iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="label">[68]</a> T. iv. p. 269.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="label">[69]</a> T. iv. p. 271.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="label">[70]</a> T. iv. p. 252.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="label">[71]</a> T. iv. p. 252.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="label">[72]</a> T. iv. p. 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="label">[73]</a> T. i. p. 290.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="label">[74]</a> T. i. p. 287.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="label">[75]</a> Article “Liberté,” Diction. Encyclop.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="label">[76]</a> T. iii. p. 155. Such phrases cannot be concluded.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="label">[77]</a> T. iii. p. 213.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="label">[78]</a> Ibid. 219.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="label">[79]</a> “This term, instinct, is applicable,” says he, “to all the -fundamental forces.”—T. iv. p. 334. And he does not see -that as to the instincts and the understanding all is contrast. -Upon this difference of instinct and understanding, see my -work De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux, etc. -Paris, 1845, 2d edit.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="label">[80]</a> It is true that this approximation astonishes him. “The -predilection of animals for elevated places depends,” says he, -“upon the same parts as pride, which is in man a moral sentiment! -Let the reader imagine the astonishment excited in my -mind by such a phenomenon.”—T. iii. 311.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="label">[81]</a> “Co-existing with the love of war, it (the carnivorous -instinct) constitutes the intrepid warrior.”—T. iii. p. 258. “I -know a head which, as to the organ of murder, approaches that -of Madeline Albert, and the la Bouhours, except only that -nature has executed it upon a grander scale. To witness -suffering, is for this person to have the keenest enjoyment. -Whoever does not love blood, is in his eyes contemptible.”—T. -iii. p. 259. The pen refuses to transcribe such things, -which fortunately, however, are pure extravagances.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="label">[82]</a> “From my reflections it follows that conscience is nothing -but a modification, an affection of the moral sense,” (organ.)—T. -iv. p. 210. “From all that I have said as to conscience, it -follows that it can by no means be regarded as a fundamental -quality: that it is really only an affection of the moral sense—or -benevolence.”—T. iv. p. 217.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="label">[83]</a> T. iii. p. 321.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="label">[84]</a> T. iv. p. 272.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="label">[85]</a> T. ii. p. 287.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="label">[86]</a> Recherches sur le système nerveux en général et sur celui -du cerveau en particulier; mémoire présenté à l’Institut de -France, le 14 Mars, 1808; suivi d’Observations sur le rapport -qui en a été fait à cette compagnie par ses commissaires, par -F. J. Gall et G. Spurzheim. Paris, 1809.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="label">[87]</a> “The nervous membrane of the brain forms these folds, -which are denominated its convolutions.”—Anat. et Physiol. -du Système Nerveux, t. iii. p. 82.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="label">[88]</a> Spurzheim justly remarks: “Admitting that the direction -of the fibres is known, that we know their consistence to be -greater or less, that their colour is more or less white, that their -magnitude is more or less considerable, &c. what conclusions -can we, from all these circumstances, draw as to their functions? -None at all.”—Obser. sur la Phrénologie, ou la connaissance -de l’homme moral et intellectuel fondée sur les -fonctions du Système Nerveux, p. 83. Paris, 1818.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="label">[89]</a> Rapport sur un Mémoire de MM. Gall et Spurzheim, rélatif -à l’anat. du cerveau. Séances des 25 Avril et 2 Mai, 1808.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="label">[90]</a> “The determination of the fundamental forces and the -seat of their organs constitutes the most striking portion of my -discoveries. The knowledge of the primary faculties and -qualities, and the seat of their material conditions, constitutes -precisely the phrenology of the brain.”—Gall, Anat. et Phys. -du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. p. 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="label">[91]</a> Lettre d’un Médecin des Hôpitaux du Roi. Namur. 1710.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="label">[92]</a> Elementa Physiologiæ, t. iv. p. 384.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="label">[93]</a> “But if it be supposed that each fundamental faculty, as -well as each particular sense, is dependent on a particular part -of the brain,” &c. Gall, Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. -p. 392.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="label">[94]</a> T. iv. p. 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="label">[95]</a> T. iv. p. 9.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="label">[96]</a> T. ii. p. 234.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="label">[97]</a> The brain, properly so called.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="label">[98]</a> <i>I</i> see with <i>my</i> eyes.—M.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="label">[99]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="label">[100]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="label">[101]</a> See at the end of this work the first Note on Gall’s -Anatomy.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="label">[102]</a> T. i. p. 271. Spurzheim explains himself in like manner. -“The organs of the internal faculties are as separate as the bundles -of the nerves of the five senses.”—Observ. sur la Phrénol., &c. -p. 74. “It is found that the brain is composed of many bundles, -which must have their functions.”—Ibid. p. 94. “The organs -... are composed of divergent bundles, of convolutions, and of -the commissures.”—Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="label">[103]</a> T. iv. p. 8. “Bonnet believes, and it is probable, that each -nerve fibre has its own proper action.”—Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="label">[104]</a> T. iii. p. 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="label">[105]</a> T. iii. p. 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="label">[106]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842. See also the -first article of this work.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="label">[107]</a> It must, however, be one or the other; for it must be something. -Might it be a convolution, as has been since said? But -there are not seven and twenty convolutions, &c. &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="label">[108]</a> T. ii. p. 163.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="label">[109]</a> Gall, as we have seen, confounds understanding with -instinct. Literally, he divides understanding into many instincts, -and then out of each instinct constructs an intellectual -faculty. See the second article of this work. “The term -instinct suits all the fundamental faculties.”—T. iv. p. 334. -For the characters peculiar to the instincts, see my work -entitled “De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux,” 2d -edit. 1845.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="label">[110]</a> See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et -les fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="label">[111]</a> “The organ of philogeniture, or the last convolution of the -cerebral lobes.”—Spurzheim, Obser. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 117.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="label">[112]</a> With very few exceptions.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="label">[113]</a> “The qualities and faculties common to man and animals, -are situated in the posterior portions,” &c.—T. iii. p. 79, and -t. iv. p. 13. “The qualities and faculties that man exclusively -enjoys, are situated in the cerebral portions, of which the brute -creation is deprived; and we must consequently seek for them -in the antero superior portion of the frontal bone.”—T. iii. -page 79.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="label">[114]</a> “The anterior parts of the brain are not wanting in the -mammifera, but the posterior parts,” says Leuret, very justly, -in his fine work on the circumvolutions of the brain, entitled, -Anat. Compar. du Syst. Nerveux, consideré dans ses rapports -avec l’Intelligence, t. i. p. 588. Paris, 1839.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="label">[115]</a> T. iii. p. 20.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="label">[116]</a> T. iii. p. 26.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="label">[117]</a> It is curious to see how M. Vimont, a very decided phrenologist -as well as an able anatomist, expresses himself on the -subject of the <i>localizations</i> of Gall and Spurzheim. “Gall’s -work,” says M. Vimont, “is fitter to lead into error than to -give a just idea of the seats of the organs.”—Traité de Phrén. -t. ii. p. 12. “Gall says he has remarked, that horses whose ears -are widely separated at the roots, are sure-footed and courageous. -Possibly the fact may be true; but I cannot comprehend the -connexion that may exist betwixt the outward mark and the -quality of courage, whose seat, in the horse, Gall indicates at a -point where there is no brain.”—Ibid. 281. “Spurzheim indicates -the region of the frontal sinuses as the seat of gentleness, -while courage is located upon the muscles that go to be inserted -on the os occipitis.”—Ibid. p. 117. Such are M. Vimont’s -remarks, yet this same M. Vimont inscribes the following -twenty-nine names on the skull of a goose!</p> - -<ul> -<li>1. Conservation.</li> -<li>2. Choice of aliment.</li> -<li>3. Destruction.</li> -<li>4. Cunning.</li> -<li>5. Courage.</li> -<li>6. Choice of locality.</li> -<li>7. Concentration.</li> -<li>8. Attachment to life, or marriage.</li> -<li>9. Attachment.</li> -<li>10. Reproduction.</li> -<li>11. Attachment to the product of conception.</li> -<li>12. Property.</li> -<li>13. Circumspection.</li> -<li>14. Perception of substance.</li> -<li>15. Configuration.</li> -<li>16. Extent.</li> -<li>17. Distance.</li> -<li>18. Geometrical sense.</li> -<li>19. Resistance.</li> -<li>20. Localities.</li> -<li>21. Order.</li> -<li>22. Time.</li> -<li>23. Language.</li> -<li>24. Eventuality.</li> -<li>25. Construction.</li> -<li>26. Musical talent.</li> -<li>27. Imitation.</li> -<li>28. Comparison.</li> -<li>29. Gentleness.</li> -</ul> - -<p>“All this upon the cranium of a goose!” says M. Leuret -upon this occasion, (page 355.) “And there is no place so -small but it is occupied.... The faculties are so crowded,” -adds he, “that it would be a marvellous thing to be able to -write their names upon the brain.... It would be a greater -marvel to discover them.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="label">[118]</a> Gall himself says: “In whatever region we examine the -two substances that compose the brain, it is with difficulty that -we can discern any difference between them as to their structure, -&c.”—T. iii. p. 70.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="label">[119]</a> T. iii. p. 63.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="label">[120]</a> “I remained a whole day shut up in an oven.”—T. i. 133.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="label">[121]</a> T. i. p. 263.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="label">[122]</a> Eloge de Tournefort.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="label">[123]</a> One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1818. Phrenology is the very -name given by Spurzheim to the doctrine of Gall.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="label">[124]</a> One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1820.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="label">[125]</a> Observ. sur la Phrénol. &c. p. 8.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="label">[126]</a> Observ. sur la Phrén. p. 20.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="label">[127]</a> Ibid. p. 22.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="label">[128]</a> Rech. sur le Syst. Nerv. en général, &c. par F. J. Gall et -G. Spurzheim.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="label">[129]</a> Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerveux, &c., the work which has -been examined in the three preceding articles.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="label">[130]</a> T. iv. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="label">[131]</a> Ibid. p. 327.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="label">[132]</a> Ibid. p. 341.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="label">[133]</a> In the preceding article, p. 93.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="label">[134]</a> Lettre de Charles Villers à Georges Cuvier, sur une -nouvelle théorie du cerveau, par le Docteur Gall, &c. Metz, -1802.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="label">[135]</a> Lettre de Charles Villers, &c. p. 34.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="label">[136]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="label">[137]</a> Observ. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 10.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="label">[138]</a> Especially in the last article.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="label">[139]</a> And which was not taken up by Gall, except from the -necessity he was under of assimilating at all points the external -senses with the faculties of the soul.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="label">[140]</a> Observ. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 65.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="label">[141]</a> Ibid. p. 67.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="label">[142]</a> Ibid. p. 75.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="label">[143]</a> See particularly the Essai philosophique sur la morâle et -intellectuelle de l’homme, p. 54, et seq.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="label">[144]</a> Observ. sur la Phrén. p. 17.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="label">[145]</a> Ibid. p. 127.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="label">[146]</a> Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., &c. t. iii. p. 19. This -volume came out the same year as Spurzheim’s Observ., &c.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="label">[147]</a> T. iv. p. 67.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="label">[148]</a> The eight organs added by Spurzheim, are the organs of -habitativity, order, time, right, supernaturality, hope, extent, -weight. Gall’s remarks upon these eight organs proposed by -Spurzheim are as follows: “M. Spurzheim, it is true, recognises -eight organs more than I admit. As to the organs of -habitativity, order, time, and supernaturality, I have already -spoken. I admit an organ of the moral sense, or sense of -right (<i>juste</i>), but I have very strong reasons for believing -that benevolence is nothing more than a very strong manifestation -of the moral sense; therefore I treat these two organs -under the rubric of a single organ. What M. Spurzheim -says on the organs of hope, of extent, and of weight, has -not as yet convinced me: and, in fact, he has hitherto proved -nothing in respect to them.”—T. iii. p. 25.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="label">[149]</a> Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 216.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="label">[150]</a> See the Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 47, et seq.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="label">[151]</a> The sense of Amativity, the sense of Philogeniture, the -sense of Destructivity, the sense of Affectivity, the sense of -Thievishness, the sense of Secretivity, the sense of Circumspection, -the sense of Approbation, the sense of Self-love. -(What a chaos, and what words!)</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="label">[152]</a> The sense of Benevolence, the sense of Veneration, the -sense of Firmness, the sense of Duty, the sense of Hope, the -sense of the Marvellous, the sense of Ideality, the sense of -Gaiety, the sense of Imitation.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="label">[153]</a> The sense of Individuality, of Extent, of Configuration, of -Consistence, of Weight, of Colour.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="label">[154]</a> The sense of Localities, of Numeration, of Order, of -Phenomena, of Time, of Method, of Artificial Language.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="label">[155]</a> The sense of Comparison, the sense of Causality.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="label">[156]</a> “Some of the affective faculties produce only a desire, an -inclination.... I shall call them propensities.”—Observ. sur la -Phrénol., &c. p. 124.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="label">[157]</a> “Other affective faculties are not restricted to a simple -inclination, but something beyond; which is what is called -sentiment or feeling.”—Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="label">[158]</a> “The intellectual faculties are also double: some of them -know; others reflect.”—Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 225.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="label">[159]</a> “The faculties peculiar to man are happy in themselves, -per se.”—Ibid. p. 167.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="label">[160]</a> Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv. &c. t. iii. p. 27.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="label">[161]</a> See his Histoire des Phlegmas. Chron. 1808.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="label">[162]</a> See his work entitled, “De l’Irritation et de la Folie,” 1828.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="label">[163]</a> Cours de Phrénologie, 1 vol. 8vo. 1836.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="label">[164]</a> Cours de Phrénologie, p. 82.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="label">[165]</a> Ibid. p. 140.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="label">[166]</a> Ibid. p. 37.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="label">[167]</a> “Memory is not an isolated faculty; and there are as many -memories as organs.”—p. 131.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="label">[168]</a> “The instincts and the sentiments have a memory as well -as the external perceptions.”—p. 36.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="label">[169]</a> “ ... The study of the human mind, not indeed that of a -fictitious one bearing this mysterious appellation, but of the -<i>ensemble</i> of the mental faculties of man.”—p. 82.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="label">[170]</a> Page 48.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="label">[171]</a> “The favorers of the intra-cranial entity.”—p. 153.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="label">[172]</a> “Their central intra-cranial being, to which they attribute -all their faculties.”</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="label">[173]</a> “Suppose they had called this being <i>person par excellence</i>....”—p. -75.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="label">[174]</a> Let us examine, as to this particular -(<i>moi</i>) <span class="smcap">me</span>, all Broussais’s -<i>variorums</i>. In one place the <i>me</i> comes from only one -organ—the organ of general comparison: “We owe to the -organ of general comparison the distinction of our person -expressed by the sign <i>me</i>.”—Cours de Phrén., p. 684. Further -on it comes from two—the organ of comparison and the organ -of causality: “The organ of causality is as necessary to the -distinction of the <i>me</i>, and of the <i>person</i>, as the organ of general -comparison.”—Ibid. p. 685. Next there is no organ at all: -“To assign to the <i>me</i> a special organ appears to me to be out -of the question.”—Ibid. p. 119. And then it comes from every -where: “There is no special and central organ, and our -perception of ourselves has for its basis the sensitive perceptions.”—Ibid. -p. 119.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="label">[175]</a> Cours de Phrénologie, p. 684.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="label">[176]</a> Examen de la Doctrine Médicale, etc. 1816.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="label">[177]</a> Cours de Phrénologie, p. 717.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="label">[178]</a> Cours de Phrénologie, p. 77. He also says, “Their central -intra-cranial being, to which they attribute all the faculties of a -man, is not cognisable by any of our senses, ... it is therefore a -pure hypothesis.”—Ibid. p. 153. Thus there is no <i>mind</i> (pure -hypothesis); no <i>faculties</i> but those of the <i>organs</i> (the faculties -are the acts of <i>material organs</i>); no understanding, except as -a simple phenomenon of the nervous action (understanding -and all its manifestations are <i>phenomena of nervous action</i>); -consequently, there is no psycology; there is nothing but physiology; -and even (for it should be clearly understood) nothing -but Broussais’s physiology.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="label">[179]</a> “In order to form for one’s self a just notion of the operations -which result in the production of thought, it is necessary -to conceive of the brain as a peculiar organ, specially designed -for the production thereof, just as the stomach is designed to -effect digestion, the liver to form the bile, &c.”—Cabanis, -Rapports du Physique et du moral de l’homme, IIe mémoire, -§ vii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="label">[180]</a> Whence he concludes still more admirably, to the immortality -of the soul. “I cannot,” says he, “conceive otherwise -of those who die, than that they pass into a more pleasing and -tranquil life than ours, even carrying with them the remembrance -of the past: for I find there is within us an intellectual -memory.... And although religion teaches us many things -upon this subject, I must, notwithstanding, confess my infirmity -on this point, which it appears to me that I possess in common -with most people, which is, that although we might wish to -believe, and even might suppose ourselves to be firm believers -in the doctrines of religion, we are not so deeply touched with -those things that are taught by faith alone, and which our mere -reason cannot attain, as by those that are instilled into us by -natural and very evident reasons.”—T. viii. p. 684.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="label">[181]</a> De l’Imitation et de la Folie, p. 4.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="label">[182]</a> “The exaggeration of the phenomena of contractility is -what constitutes irritation.”—Ibid. p. 77.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="label">[183]</a> Anat. et Physiol. du Système Nerveux, &c. iii. 15.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="label">[184]</a> The white matter is every where fibrous. No person has -contributed more than Gall to the demonstration of this great -fact. He justly remarks: “Those authors who, with Sœmmerring -and Cuvier, &c., recognise the fibrous structure of the brain, -in many of its parts, have nevertheless, not yet ventured to say -that it is so in all its parts.”—T. i. 235.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="label">[185]</a> The cerebellum serves only for the motions of locomotion. -(See the first article of this work.) But, I am here setting forth -Gall’s opinions.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="label">[186]</a> “The particular systems of the brain terminate in fibrous -expansions arranged in layers, just as the other nervous systems -expand in fibres at their peripheral extremity.”—T. i. 318. “All -the diverging bundles of the brain, after they come out from -the last apparatus of reinforcement, expand in layers and form -convolutions.”—T. i. 283. “The nerves of sensation and motion -expand in the skin and the muscles; the nerves of the -senses, each in the external instrument to which they belong: -for example, the pituitary membrane upon the bones of the nose: -the nerve of taste in the tongue, and the expansion of the optic -nerve in the retina.... Nature obeys precisely the same -law in the brain. The different parts of the brain originate and -are reinforced at different points; they form fibrous bundles of -various sizes, which terminate in expansions. All these expansions -of the various bundles constitute, when reunited, the hemispheres -of the brain.”—T. iii. p. 3.</p> - -<p>I here speak only of the <i>diverging fibres</i>. Coming from the -interior, they proceed towards the exterior: the <i>converging fibres</i> -coming from the exterior, that is, according to Gall, from the -gray matter that envelopes the brain and the cerebellum, are -directed inwards. The former constitute the <i>convolutions</i>, -while the latter compose the <i>commissures</i>. But I shall, further -on, return to this subject.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="label">[187]</a> See my work, De l’instinct et de l’intelligence des animaux, -&c. p. 46, 2d edit.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="label">[188]</a> Opus citat. p. 49.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="label">[189]</a> T. iii. p. 64.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="label">[190]</a> T. iii. p. 64.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="label">[191]</a> T. iii. p. 64.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="label">[192]</a> T. iii. p. 58.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="label">[193]</a> T. iii. p. 59.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194" class="label">[194]</a> T. i. p. 3.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195" class="label">[195]</a> T. i. p. 18.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196" class="label">[196]</a> T. i. p. 64 & 67.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197" class="label">[197]</a> De la Rech. de la Verité, liv. ii. chap. ii.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198" class="label">[198]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199" class="label">[199]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200" class="label">[200]</a> Du bel esprit, p. 80.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201" class="label">[201]</a> Ibid.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202" class="label">[202]</a> Cours de Phrén. 218.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203" class="label">[203]</a> P. 221.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204" class="label">[204]</a> See M. Leuret: Anat. Comp. du Syst. Nerv. &c. 1839.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205" class="label">[205]</a> Cours de Phrén. p. 350.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206" class="label">[206]</a> Ibid. p. 117.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207" class="label">[207]</a> De l’Irritation et de la Folie, p. 2.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208" class="label">[208]</a> Ibid. p. 76.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209" class="label">[209]</a> Steno had already said, “If the medullary substance be -every where fibrous, as in fact, in most parts it appears to be, -you must confess that the disposal of these fibres must be -arranged with great skill, since the whole diversity of our feelings -and motions depend upon them. We wonder at the artifice -of the fibres in each muscle, but how much more are they worthy -of admiration in the brain, where these fibres, enclosed within so -small a space, perform each its own function without confusion -and without disorder.”—<i>Discours sur l’anat. du cerveau</i>, 1668.</p> - -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210" class="label">[210]</a> Long before his time the same had been seen by Mistichelli, -Pourfour du Petit, Winslow, and several others, but it had been -forgotten. “Each pyramidal body,” says Pourfour du Petit, -“is divided at its inferior part into two large bundles of fibres, -most frequently into three, and in some instances into four. -Those of the right pass to the left side, and those of the left pass -to the right side, mingling with each other.”—<i>Lettre d’un médecin -des hôpitaux du Roi.</i> Namur 1710.</p> - -</div> - -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED ***</div> -<div style='text-align:left'> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will -be renamed. -</div> - -<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> -Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright -law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, -so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United -States without permission and without paying copyright -royalties. 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