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-The Project Gutenberg eBook of Phrenology Examined, by P. Flourens
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
-will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before
-using this eBook.
-
-Title: Phrenology Examined
-
-Author: P. Flourens
-
-Translator: Charles De Lucena Meigs
-
-Release Date: April 09, 2021 [eBook #65041]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-Produced by: The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
-             https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images
-             generously made available by The Internet Archive)
-
-*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED ***
-
-
-
-
-
-PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.
-
-
-
-
-                          PHRENOLOGY EXAMINED.
-
-                             BY P. FLOURENS,
-     MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY, PERPETUAL SECRETARY OF THE ROYAL
-        ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (INSTITUTE OF FRANCE), MEMBER OF THE
-      ROYAL SOCIETIES OF LONDON AND EDINBURG, OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY
-      OF SCIENCES OF STOCKHOLM, OF MUNICH, AND OF TURIN, ETC. ETC.
-       PROFESSOR OF COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY AT THE NATURAL HISTORY
-                            MUSEUM AT PARIS.
-
-                “J’ai un sentiment clair de ma liberté.”
-
-                    BOSSUET, TRAITÉ DU LIBRE ARBITRE.
-
-             Translated from the Second Edition of 1845, by
-                      CHARLES DE LUCENA MEIGS, M.D.
-                    MEMB. AMER. PHIL. SOC. ETC. ETC.
-
-                              PHILADELPHIA:
-                            HOGAN & THOMPSON.
-                                  1846.
-
-         ENTERED ACCORDING TO ACT OF CONGRESS, IN THE YEAR 1845,
-                       BY CHARLES D. MEIGS, M. D.
-       IN THE CLERK’S OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
-                        DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
-
-
-
-
-TO DR. JAMES JACKSON, OF BOSTON.
-
-
-MY DEAR SIR:
-
-Perhaps I have taken too great a liberty in sending to you in this public
-manner, and in praying you to accept a copy of M. Flourens’ ingenious
-work. I have a very sincere desire that you should read the Inquiry;
-for I feel sure, that if you approve of it, the studious portion of our
-countrymen who may peruse it, will concur in the opinion of a gentleman
-so justly distinguished as yourself in every good word and work, and
-so capable of judging as to the salutary or evil tendency of the
-productions of our teeming press.
-
-Inasmuch as many of our countrymen have heretofore felt, and many do
-now feel, desirous to know the truth as to the question of the multiple
-nature of the human mind, I have here translated the Examination, in
-order that they might have an opportunity to learn what is thought of
-Gall’s doctrines by one of the best and most precise thinkers in Europe.
-
-Professor Flourens, by his writings on the brain and nervous system, by
-his courses of lectures at the Jardin des Plantes, by numerous writings
-on various scientific subjects, by his position in the Institute, has
-acquired a place among the literary and scientific celebrities of the
-present age. The amiable and elegant manners, and the fine disposition of
-this distinguished character, coincide with his acknowledged learning,
-and exactness, and zeal, to accumulate upon him the public respect and
-esteem. It is therefore with great confidence that I present to you this
-copy of his criticism upon Phrenology, since I suppose that every writing
-of so good a man might prove acceptable to you, and to the studious
-portion of our countrymen generally.
-
-I invoke your approbation of what I cannot but deem a masterly criticism
-of the doctrines of Gall. So highly have I appreciated it, that I cannot
-readily suppose it possible to rise from its perusal, without being
-convinced that Gall was wholly mistaken in his views of the human mind;
-and of course, that all the cranioscopists, mesmerizers, and diviners,
-who have followed his track, or risen up on the basis of his opinions,
-are equally in error.
-
-In order to have a just view of human responsibility, it is indispensable
-to entertain the justest notions of the nature of the human mind. If
-Phrenology _be an unsubstantial hypothesis_, no phrenologist is fit
-to be a juror, a judge, or a legislator: for since all human law—the
-whole social compact—and indeed all divine law, as relative to human
-propensities and actions—is founded on some real nature of the soul
-and mind, there is risk that manifestly erroneous conceptions of the
-freewill, of the conscience, of the judgment, and the perceptive powers,
-&c. may mislead the juror, the judge, and the legislator, in their vote,
-their opinion, and their notion of rights and wrongs.
-
-If I am correct in entertaining these apprehensions as to the influence
-of false metaphysics on the public characters I have enumerated, there is
-abundant cause to rejoice when a blow is struck, like that pulverizing
-blow which is given in this work, to so considerable an error. There are
-thousands among the young and ardent and curious of our countrymen and
-countrywomen, whose minds may be likewise led astray from the truth; but
-if it be mischievous for the judge and the juror and the legislator
-to entertain erroneous views upon the nature of the understanding, the
-mind, or the soul, it is equally to be deprecated where the error is sown
-broadcast in the land.
-
-Tares, if not in themselves poisonous, serve at best to choke up the
-useful or beautiful plants that ought to be cultivated in the fields of
-science or morals; but you will find that M. Flourens regards them as
-poisons.
-
-Has not M. Flourens clearly refuted the phrenologists? and has he not, in
-doing so, performed a useful and an acceptable service?
-
-I pray you to believe that I am, with the most grateful respect and the
-sincerest esteem,
-
-                   Your obliged and faithful servant,
-
-                                                        CHARLES D. MEIGS.
-
-PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 10, 1845.
-
-
-
-
-TO THE MEMORY OF DESCARTES.
-
-
-
-
-AUTHOR’S PREFACE.
-
-
-Having been a witness to the progress of phrenology, I was led to the
-composition of the following treatise.
-
-Each succeeding age has a philosophy of its own.
-
-The seventeenth century recovered from the philosophy of Descartes; the
-eighteenth recovered from that of Locke and Condillac: is the nineteenth
-to recover from that of Gall?
-
-This is a really important question.
-
-I propose, in this work, to examine phrenology as it appears in the
-writings of Gall, of Spurzheim, and of Broussais.
-
-My wish is to be brief. There is, however, one great secret in the art of
-being brief: it is to be clear.
-
-I frequently quote Descartes: I even go further; for I dedicate my work
-to his memory. I am writing in opposition to a bad philosophy, while I am
-endeavouring to recall a sound one.
-
-
-
-
-CONTENTS.
-
-
-         I. Of Gall.—Of his doctrine in general                 17
-
-        II. Of Gall.—Of the faculties                           47
-
-       III. Of Gall.—The organs                                 59
-
-        IV. Of Spurzheim                                        96
-
-         V. Of Broussais                                       115
-
-        VI. Broussais’s Psycology                              121
-
-       VII. Broussais’s Physiology                             125
-
-      VIII. Of Gall                                            127
-
-    Note I. Anatomical relations supposed by Gall to exist
-              between the organs of the external senses and
-              the organs of the intellectual faculties         131
-
-        II. Difference between instinct and understanding      133
-
-       III. Gall as an observer                                137
-
-        IV. The animal spirits                                 139
-
-         V. Exaggeration of Broussais, even in phrenology      140
-
-        VI. Contractility of Broussais                         142
-
-       VII. Real labours of Gall as to the brain               143
-
-
-
-
-I.
-
-OF GALL.
-
-OF HIS DOCTRINE IN GENERAL.
-
-
-The great work in which Gall sets forth his doctrine is well known.[1]
-That work shall serve as the groundwork of my examination. I shall
-examine in succession each of the questions studied by the author; merely
-introducing some slight changes in the order in which they are arranged.
-
-The entire doctrine of Gall is contained in two fundamental propositions,
-of which the first is, that understanding resides exclusively in the
-brain, and the second, that each particular faculty of the understanding
-is provided in the brain with an organ proper to itself.
-
-Now, of these two propositions, there is certainly nothing new in the
-first one, and perhaps nothing true in the second one.
-
-Let us commence our examination with the first proposition.
-
-I say that in the first proposition, namely, that the brain is the
-exclusive seat of the understanding, there is nothing new. Gall himself
-admits this to be the case.
-
-“For a long time,” says he, “both philosophers and physiologists, as
-well as physicians, have contended that the brain is the organ of the
-soul.”[2] The opinion that the brain, (as a whole, or such and such
-parts of the brain considered separately,) is the seat of the soul,
-is, in fact, as old as learning itself. Descartes placed the soul in
-the _pineal gland_, Willis in the _corpora striata_, Lapeyronie in the
-_corpus callosum_, &c. &c.
-
-As to the more recent authorities, Gall quotes Sœmmerring, who says
-precisely that, “the brain is the exclusive instrument of all sensation,
-all thought, and all will,”[3] &c. He quotes Haller, who proves (proves
-is the very expression made use of by Gall himself,) that “sensation does
-not take place at the point where the object touches the nerve, the point
-where the impression is made, but in the brain.”[4] He might have quoted
-many other authorities to the same effect.
-
-Were not Cabanis’s writings anterior to the time of Gall? and did not
-he say, “In order to obtain a just idea of those operations whose result
-is thought, the brain must be considered as a peculiar organ designed to
-produce it, just as the stomach and the bowels are designed to produce
-digestion, the liver to secrete the bile,” &c.?[5] a proposition so
-extravagant as to become almost ridiculous, but which is in truth the
-very proposition of Gall himself, except as to some exaggeration in the
-terms employed.
-
-Antecedently to the time of Gall, both Sœmmerring and Cuvier, in the
-comparative anatomy of the various classes of animals, had investigated
-the ratio existing between the development of the encephalon and that
-of the intellectual power. The following remarkable phrase is from the
-pen of Cuvier: “The proportion of the brain to the medulla oblongata, a
-proportion which is greater in man than in all other animals, is a very
-good index of the perfection of the creature’s intelligence, because
-it is the best index of the preeminence of the organs of reflection
-above the organs of the external senses.”[6] And this other still more
-remarkable phrase: “In animals the intelligence appears to be greater in
-proportion as the volume of the hemispheres is greater.”[7]
-
-Gall, in an especial manner, contends against the assertion of Bichat,
-who remarks that “The influence of the passions is exerted invariably
-upon the organic life, and not upon the animal life; all the signs that
-characterise them are referable to the former and not to the latter.
-Gestures, which are the mute exponents of the sentiments and the
-understanding, afford a remarkable proof of this truth. When we wish
-to signify something relative to the memory, the imagination, to our
-perception, to the judgment, &c. the hand moves involuntarily towards
-the head: if we wish to express love, joy, grief, hatred, it is directed
-towards the region of the heart, the stomach, or the bowels.”[8]
-
-Doubtless, there is much that might be criticised in the foregoing words
-of Bichat; nevertheless, to say that the passions expend their influences
-upon the organic life, is not the same thing as to say that they reside
-or exist there. Bichat had already remarked, that “Every species of
-sensation has its centre in the brain, for sensation always supposes both
-impression and perception.”[9] Furthermore, regarding this distinction,
-(which as yet has not been drawn with sufficient clearness,) between the
-parts that are the seats of the passions, and the parts that are affected
-by their action, Gall might have found in Descartes the following
-remark, which is not less judicious than acute.
-
-“Although,” says he, writing to Leroy, “the spirits that move the
-muscles come from the brain, we must, nevertheless, assign as seats of
-the passions, the places that are most considerably affected by them;
-hence, I say, the principal seat of the passions, as far as they relate
-to the body, is the heart, because it is the heart that is most sensibly
-affected by them; but their place is in the brain, in as far as they
-affect the soul, for the soul cannot suffer immediately, otherwise than
-through the brain.”[10]
-
-As I am quoting Descartes, who, I ask, more clearly than Descartes has
-perceived that the soul can have only a very circumscribed seat in the
-economy, and that that circumscribed seat is the brain itself?
-
-“We know,” says he, “that, properly speaking, it is not inasmuch as the
-soul is in the members that serve as organs to the exterior senses, that
-the soul feels, but inasmuch as she is in the brain, where she exercises
-the faculty denominated common sense.”[11]
-
-He elsewhere observes: “Surprise is expressed because I do not recognise
-any other point of sensation except that which exists in the brain; but
-all physicians and surgeons will, I hope, assist me in proving this
-point, for they are aware of the common fact that a person who has been
-subjected to amputation of a limb, continues to feel pain in a part that
-he no longer possesses.”[12]
-
-Here then, according to Descartes, we find that the soul is situated,
-that is to say, _feels_ in the brain, and only in the brain. The
-following passage shows with what precision he excluded even the
-external senses from any participation with the functions of the soul.
-
-“I have shown,” says he, “that size, distance, and form are perceived
-only by the reason; and that, by deducing them the one from the
-other.”[13]
-
-“I cannot agree with the assertion that this error (the error caused
-by the bent appearance of a stick partly plunged into water,) is not
-corrected by the understanding but by the touch; for, although the sense
-in question makes us judge that the stick is straight, yet that cannot
-correct the error of vision; but furthermore, it is requisite that reason
-should teach us to confide, in this case, rather to our judgment after
-touching, than to the judgment that we come to after using our eyes; but
-this reason cannot be attributed to the sense, but to the understanding
-alone; and in this very example, it is the understanding that corrects
-the error of the sense.”[14]
-
-The brain, then, is the exclusive seat of the soul; and all sensation,
-even those operations that appear to depend upon the simple external
-sense, is function of the soul.
-
-Gall falls back upon Condillac, who, much less rigorous in this
-particular than Descartes, says, that “all our faculties proceed from
-the senses.”[15] But when Condillac speaks thus, he evidently speaks
-by ellipsis, for he immediately adds these words: “The senses are only
-occasional causes. They do not feel; it is the soul that alone feels,
-through the medium of the organs.”[16]
-
-Now, if it be the _soul_ only that feels, _à fortiori_, it is the soul
-only that _remembers_, that _judges_, that _imagines_, &c. _Memory_,
-_judgment_, _imagination_, &c., in a word, all our faculties, are
-therefore of the soul, and therefore come from the soul, and not from the
-senses.
-
-There is no philosopher who has exaggerated more than Helvetius the
-influence of the senses upon the intelligence. But Helvetius says, “In
-whatsoever manner we interrogate experience, she always answers that any
-greater or lesser superiority of mind is independent of any greater or
-lesser perfection of the senses.”[17]
-
-But I leave Helvetius and Condillac, and I return to Descartes, to
-Willis, to Lapeyronie, to Haller, Sœmmerring, Cuvier, &c. They all
-perceived and all asserted that the brain is the seat of the soul,
-and that it is so to the exclusion of the senses. Therefore, the
-proposition that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul is not a
-new proposition, and hence does not originate with Gall. It belonged to
-science before it appeared in his Doctrine. The merit of Gall, and it is
-by no means a slender merit, consists in his having understood better
-than any of his predecessors the whole of its importance, and in having
-devoted himself to its demonstration. It existed in science before Gall
-appeared—it may be said to reign there ever since his appearance. Taking
-each particular sense, he excluded them all, one after another, from
-all immediate participation in the functions of the understanding.[18]
-Far from being developed in the direct ratio of the intellection, most
-of them are developed in an inverse ratio. Taste and smell are more
-developed in the quadruped than in man. Sight and hearing are more so
-in the bird than in the quadruped. The brain alone is in all classes
-developed in the ratio of the understanding. The loss of a sense does
-not lead to the loss of the intelligence. The understanding survives the
-loss of sight and hearing. It might survive the loss of all the senses.
-To interrupt the communication between the sense and the brain, is enough
-to insure the loss of the sense. The mere compression of the brain, which
-abolishes the intellection, abolishes all the senses. Far, therefore,
-from being organs of the intelligence, the organs of the senses are not
-even organs of the senses, they do not even exercise their functions as
-organs of the senses, except through the medium of the intelligence, and
-this intelligence resides only in the brain.
-
-The brain alone, therefore, is the organ of the soul;—is it the whole
-brain—the brain taken _en masse_? Gall thought so, and Spurzheim followed
-Gall’s opinion; and all the phrenologists who have come after them have
-followed the examples of Gall and Spurzheim.
-
-Yet, after all, it amounts to nothing. If we deprive an animal of its
-cerebellum, it loses only its locomotive action. If we deprive it of
-its tubercula quadrigemina, it loses its sight only; if we destroy its
-medulla oblongata, it loses its respiratory movements, and in consequence
-thereof, its life.[19] Neither of these parts, therefore, that is to say,
-the cerebellum, the tubercula quadrigemina, and the medulla oblongata, is
-the organ of the understanding.
-
-The brain, properly so called, is so, and it alone. If we remove from an
-animal the brain, properly so called, or the hemispheres, it immediately
-loses its understanding, and loses nothing but its understanding.[20]
-
-The brain, en masse, the _encephalon_, is then a multiple organ; and
-this multiple organ consists of four particular organs: the cerebellum,
-the seat of the principle that regulates the movements of locomotion; the
-tubercula quadrigemina, seats of the principle that regulates the sense
-of sight; the medulla oblongata, in which resides the principle that
-determines the respiratory motions; and the brain proper, the seat, and
-the exclusive seat of the intelligence.[21]
-
-Therefore, when the phrenologists promiscuously place the intellectual
-and moral faculties in the brain, considered en masse, they deceive
-themselves. Neither the cerebellum, the quadrigeminal tubercles, nor
-the medulla oblongata can be regarded as seats of these faculties. All
-these faculties dwell solely in the brain, properly so called, or the
-hemispheres.
-
-The question as to the precise seat of the intelligence, has undergone a
-great change since the time of Gall. Gall believed that the intelligence
-was seated indifferently in the whole encephalon, and it has been proved
-that it resides only in the hemispheres.
-
-Further, it is not the encephalon taken en masse that is developed in
-the ratio of the intelligence of the creature, but the hemispheres.
-The mammifera are the animals most highly endowed with intelligence;
-they have, other things being equal, the most voluminous hemispheres.
-Birds are the animals most highly endowed with power of motion; their
-cerebellum is, other things being equal, the largest. Reptiles are the
-most torpid and apathetic of animals; they have the smallest brain, &c.
-
-Every thing concurs then to prove, that the encephalon, in mass, is a
-multiple organ with multiple functions, consisting of different parts, of
-which some are destined to subserve the locomotive motions, others the
-motions of the respiration, &c., while one single one, the brain proper,
-is designed for the purposes of the intellection.
-
-This being conceded, it is evident that the entire brain cannot be
-divided, as the phrenologists divide it, into a number of small organs,
-each of which is the seat of a distinct intellectual faculty; for
-the entire brain does not serve the purposes of what is called the
-intelligence. The hemispheres alone are the seats of the intellectual
-power; and consequently, the question as to whether the organ, the seat
-of the intelligence may be divided into several distinct organs, is a
-question relative solely to the uses and powers of the hemispheres.
-
-Gall avers, and this is the second fundamental proposition of his
-doctrine, that the brain is divided into several organs, each one of
-which lodges a particular faculty of the soul. By the word _brain_, he
-understood the _whole brain_, and he thus deceived himself. Let us reduce
-the application of his proposition to the hemispheres alone, and we
-shall see that he has deceived himself again.
-
-It has been shown by my late experiments, that we may cut away, either
-in front, or behind, or above, or on one side, a very considerable slice
-of the hemisphere of the brain, without destroying the intelligence.
-Hence it appears, that quite a restricted portion of the hemispheres may
-suffice for the purposes of intellection in an animal.[22]
-
-On the other hand, in proportion as these reductions by slicing away the
-hemispheres are continued, the intelligence becomes enfeebled, and grows
-gradually less; and certain limits being passed, is wholly extinguished.
-Hence it appears, that the cerebral hemispheres concur, by their whole
-mass, in the full and entire exercise of the intelligence.[23]
-
-In fine, as soon as one sensation is lost, all sensation is lost; when
-one faculty disappears, all the faculties disappear. There are not,
-therefore, different seats for the different faculties, nor for the
-different sensations. The faculty of feeling, of judging, of willing any
-thing, resides in the same place as the faculty of feeling, judging, or
-willing any other thing, and consequently this faculty, essentially a
-unit, resides essentially in a single organ.[24]
-
-The understanding is, therefore, a unit.
-
-According to Gall, there are as many particular kinds of intellect as
-there are distinct faculties of the mind. According to him, each faculty
-has its perception, its memory, its judgment, will, &c., that is to say,
-all the attributes of the understanding, properly so called.[25]
-
-“All the intellectual faculties,” says he, “are endowed with the
-perceptive faculty, with attention, recollection, memory, judgment, and
-imagination.”[26]
-
-Thus each faculty perceives, remembers, judges, imagines, compares,
-creates; but these are trifles—for each faculty _reasons_. “Whenever,”
-says Gall, “a faculty compares and judges of the relations of analogous
-or different ideas, there is an act of comparison, there is an act of
-judgment: a sequence of comparisons and judgments constitutes reasoning,”
-&c.[27]
-
-Therefore, each and every faculty is an understanding by itself, and Gall
-says so expressly. “There are,” says he, “as many different kinds of
-intellect or understanding as there are distinct faculties.”[28] “Each
-distinct faculty,” says he, further, “is intellect or understanding—each
-_individual intelligence_ (the words are precise) has its proper
-organ.”[29]
-
-But, admitting all these _kinds of intellects_, all these _individual
-understandings_, where are we to seek for the General Intelligence, the
-understanding, properly so called? It must, as you may please, be either
-an _attribute_ of each faculty,[30] or the _collective expression_ of
-all the faculties, or even the mere simple _result_ of their common and
-simultaneous action;[31] in one word, it cannot be that positive and
-single faculty which we understand, conceive of, and feel in ourselves,
-when we pronounce the word _soul_ or _understanding_.
-
-Now here is the sum and the substance of Gall’s psycology. For the
-understanding, essentially a unit faculty, he substitutes a multitude
-of little understandings or faculties, distinct and isolate. And, as
-these faculties, which perform just as he wills them to do—which he
-multiplies according to his pleasure,[32] seem in his eyes to explain
-certain phenomena which are not well explained by the lights of ordinary
-philosophy, he triumphs!
-
-He does not perceive that an explanation, which is words merely, adapts
-itself to any and to every thing. In the time of Malebranche, every thing
-was explained by _animal spirits_; Barthez explained every thing by his
-_vital principle_, &c.
-
-“This,” says Gall, “explains how the same man may possess a judgment
-that is ready and sure as to certain objects, while it is imbecile
-as to certain others; how he may have the liveliest and most fruitful
-imagination upon some subjects, while it is cold and sterile upon
-others.”[33]
-
-“Grant,” says he, further, “to the animals certain fundamental faculties,
-and you have the dog that follows the chase with _passion_; the weasel
-that strangles the poultry with _rage_; the nightingale that sings with
-_fervour_ beside his mate,”[34] &c.
-
-No doubt of it. But what sort of philosophy is that, that thinks to
-explain a fact by a word? You observe such or such a penchant in an
-animal, such or such a taste or talent in a man; _presto_, a particular
-faculty is produced for each one of these peculiarities, and you suppose
-the whole matter to be settled. You deceive yourself; your _faculty_ is
-only a _word_,—it is the name of the fact,—and all the difficulty remains
-just where it was before.
-
-Besides, you speak only of the facts that you suppose yourself able
-to explain; you say nothing of those that you render by your system
-wholly inexplicable. You say not one word as to the unity of the
-understanding, the unity of the _me_, or you deny it. But the unity of
-the understanding, the unity of the _me_, is a fact of the conscious
-sense, and the conscious sense is more powerful than all the philosophies
-together.
-
-Gall is always talking about observation, and he was indeed, as an
-observer, full of ingenuity. But, in order to follow out an observation,
-it must be traced to the very end, and we must accept all that it yields
-to our research; and observation every where gives, and shows every
-where, and above all things else, the unity of the understanding, the
-unity of the _me_.
-
-Gall’s philosophy consists only in transmuting into a particular
-understanding each separate _mode_[35] of the understanding, properly so
-called.
-
-Descartes had already said, “There are in us as many faculties as there
-are truths to be known.... But I do not think that any useful application
-can be made of this way of thinking; and it seems to me rather more
-likely to be mischievous, by giving to the ignorant occasion for
-imagining an equal number of little entities in the soul.”[36]
-
-It may well be supposed that Gall, who in the word understanding sees
-nothing but an abstract word, expressive of the sum of our intellectual
-faculties, would also, in the word _will_, perceive nothing more than an
-abstract word, expressing the sum of our moral faculties.
-
-He had given a definition of _reason_: “The result of the simultaneous
-action of all the intellectual faculties.”[37] In the same way he defined
-_will_ to be “the result of the simultaneous action of the superior
-intellectual faculties.”[38] But Gall always deceives himself; for reason
-and will are not _results_—they are _powers_, and primary powers of
-thought.
-
-Gall, in a manner equally singular, defines _moral liberty_ or _free
-will_.
-
-“Moral liberty,” says he, “is nothing more than the faculty of _being
-determined_, and of determining under motive.”[39] Not so: liberty is
-precisely the power to determine against all motive. Locke well defined
-liberty as _power_: to be determined, is to allow one’s self to be
-determined—that is, to _obey_.
-
-Gall says again, “Unlimited liberty supposes not only that man governs
-himself independently of all law, but that he is the creator of his own
-nature.”[40] Not at all; it supposes that he may have choice—and in fact
-he does choose.
-
-Lastly, Gall says, “A phenomenon such as that of absolute liberty, would
-be a phenomenon occurring without any cause whatever.”[41] Why without
-cause? The cause is in the power of choosing—and this power is a fact.
-
-Gall’s whole doctrine is one series of errors, which press upon each
-other cumulatively. He resolves that the part of the brain in which
-the understanding resides shall be divided into many small organs,
-distinct from each other; a physiological error. He decries the unity
-of the understanding, and looks upon the will and the reason as mere
-results—psycological errors. In the free will he perceives merely a
-compulsory determination,[42] and consequently a mere result—this is a
-moral error.
-
-Man’s liberty is a positive faculty, and not the simple passive result of
-the preponderance of one _motive_ over another _motive_, of one _organ_
-over another _organ_.[43]
-
-Reason, will, liberty, are therefore, not as in Gall’s doctrine,
-_positive faculties_, _active powers_; or rather, they are
-the understanding itself. Reason, will, liberty, are in fact
-the understanding, as _conceiving_, _willing_, _choosing_, or
-_deliberating_.[44]
-
-The consciousness which feels itself to be one, feels itself free. And
-you will remark, that these two great facts given out by the inward
-sense, the consciousness, to wit, the unity of the understanding and the
-positive power of the free will, are precisely the two first facts denied
-by the philosophy of Gall.
-
-And take good care to observe further, that if there be in us any thing
-that belongs to the _consciousness_, it is evidently and par excellence
-the sense of our personal unity; or what is more, the consciousness of
-our moral liberty.
-
-Man is a moral force, only inasmuch as he is a free force. Any philosophy
-that attempts the liberty of man, attempts, without knowing it, morals
-itself. Man then is free, and as he is a moral agent only in proportion
-as he is free, it would seem that his liberty is the only attribute of
-his soul from which Providence has designed to remove all the boundaries.
-
-“What is here very remarkable,” says Descartes, “is that, of all within
-me, there is not one thing so perfect or so great, but that I know it
-might be greater and more perfect. Thus, for example, if I consider my
-faculty of conceiving, I find it of very small extent, and very limited.
-If, in the same manner, I examine the memory, the imagination, or any
-other one of my faculties, I find not one that is not very limited and
-very small. Within me there is only my will or my liberty of free will,
-which I feel to be so great that I conceive not the idea of another more
-full and of greater extent.”[45]
-
-
-
-
-II.
-
-OF GALL.
-
-OF THE FACULTIES.
-
-
-Gall’s philosophy consists wholly in the substitution of _multiplicity_
-for _unity_. In place of one general and single brain,[46] he substitutes
-a number of small brains: instead of one general sole understanding,
-he substitutes several individual understandings.[47] These pretended
-_individual understandings_ are the _faculties_.
-
-Now, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven of these faculties, each
-one of them (since each one is a peculiar understanding) endowed with its
-perceptive faculty, its memory, its judgment, its imagination; &c.[48]
-
-Hence, there are twenty-seven perceptive faculties, twenty-seven
-memories, twenty-seven judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c.
-
-For, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute is not less distinct than
-each faculty. The memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of one faculty
-are not the memory, judgment, or imagination of another faculty.
-
-“The sense of numbers,” says he, “possesses a judgment for the relations
-of numbers; the sense of the arts, a judgment for works of art; but where
-the fundamental faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to objects of
-that faculty must necessarily be wanting likewise.”[49]
-
-He says further: “It is impossible for an individual to possess
-imagination and judgment for any object with the fundamental faculty for
-which he has not been gifted by nature.”[50]
-
-Thus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven faculties; and as there
-are twenty-seven faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories,
-judgments, imaginations, &c.
-
-In one word, there is no such thing as a general understanding; but
-there are twenty-seven special understandings, with three or four times
-twenty-seven distinct attributes of each. Such is the entire psycology
-of Gall.
-
-To proceed. Gall’s twenty-seven faculties are: the instinct of
-propagation, love of offspring, self-defence, the carnivorous
-instinct, the sense of property, friendship, cunning, pride, vanity,
-circumspection, memory for things, memory for words, sense of locality,
-sense of persons, sense of language, of relations of colours, relations
-of sounds, relations of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative sagacity,
-the metaphysical genius, sarcasm, poetic talent, benevolence, imitation,
-religion, firmness.
-
-Gall says that these faculties are innate,[51] and this assertion
-certainly will not be contested.
-
-Locke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine of innate ideas, never
-decried the _innateness_ of our faculties. He always regarded them as
-natural, that is to say, _innate_.[52]
-
-Condillac himself, who charges Locke with having considered the faculties
-of the soul as _innate_, in making these charges confounds the _faculties
-of the soul_ with the _operations of the soul_.[53]
-
-Now, that which is perfectly true as to the _operations of the soul_,
-is by no means so as regards her _faculties_. All the faculties of the
-soul are innate and contemporary, for they are nothing more than _modes_
-of the soul; indeed, they are the soul itself, viewed under different
-aspects. But the operations of the soul succeed each other, and beget
-each other. There can be no memory without previous perception; there can
-be no judgment without recollection. In order that there may be a will,
-there must have been a judgment, &c.
-
-After saying that the faculties are innate, Gall says also that they are
-_independent_.[54]
-
-And if, by the word _independent_, he means distinct, there is nothing
-less contestible. But if, by this word _independent_, he understood (as
-indeed he does understand) that each faculty is a real understanding, the
-question is altered and the difficulty begins.
-
-For, if each individual faculty is a proper understanding, it follows
-that there are as many understandings as there are faculties, and the
-understanding ceases to be _one_, and the _me_ is no longer _one_. I
-am well aware that this is exactly what Gall means; he says it, and
-reiterates it throughout his work. He says it, but does not prove it. And
-how should he prove it? Can we prove any thing against our consciousness?
-
-“I remark here, in the first place,” says Descartes, “that there is a
-great difference between the mind and the body, in that the body is, by
-its nature, always divisible, and the mind wholly indivisible. For, in
-fact, when I contemplate it—that is, when I contemplate my own self—and
-consider myself as a thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself any
-parts, but I clearly know and conceive that I am a thing absolutely one
-and complete.”[55]
-
-Gall reverses the common philosophy, and it is worthy of remark, that
-the whole of his philosophy, which he thinks so novel,[56] is, to the
-very letter, nothing more nor less than this very inversion. According to
-common philosophy, there is one general understanding—a unit; and there
-are faculties which are but modes of this understanding. Gall asserts
-that there are as many kinds of peculiar intelligences as there are
-faculties, and that the understanding in general is nothing more than a
-mode or attribute of each faculty. He says so expressly.
-
-His words are: “The intellectual faculty and all its subdivisions, such
-as perception, recollection, memory, judgment, and imagination, are not
-fundamental faculties, but merely their general attributes.”[57]
-
-Gall first inverts the common philosophy, and then contends for the
-existence of all the consequences of that common philosophy.
-
-He suppresses the _me_, but insists that there is a soul. He abolishes
-the freewill, and yet contends that there is such a thing as morals. He
-makes of the idea of God an idea that is merely relative and conditional,
-but yet asserts that there may be such a thing as religion.
-
-I say he abolishes the _me_; for the _me_ is the soul. The soul is the
-understanding, general and one; but if there be no understanding as
-general, there can be no soul.
-
-According to Gall, there is nothing real and positive except the
-_faculties_.
-
-And these faculties alone are possessed of organs. “None of my
-predecessors,” says he, “had any knowledge of those forces which alone
-are the functions of special cerebral organs.”[58]
-
-By the contrary reasoning, neither the will, nor the reason, nor the
-understanding, are possessed of any organs, for they are nothing but
-forces; they are nothing but nouns collective—words.
-
-“These observations may suffice,” says Gall, “to convince the reader that
-there cannot exist any special organ of the will, or the freewill.”[59]
-He adds: “It is equally impossible that there should be any peculiar
-organ of the reason.”[60]
-
-Finally he says: “From all that I have now said it follows, that the idea
-of an organ of the intellect or understanding is quite as inadmissible as
-the idea of an organ of the instinct.”[61]
-
-Hence there can be nought but the faculties; and, according to Gall,
-these faculties are so distinct, that he attributes to each particular
-one a separate organ.[62] He divides the understanding into little
-understandings.
-
-Descartes expressed himself in the following words: “We do not conceive
-of any body, except as divisible; whereas the human mind cannot conceive
-of itself except as indivisible; for in fact we are incapable of
-conceiving of half a soul.”[63] Gall, however, settles that point. He
-makes half souls. He retrenches or adds as many faculties as suits his
-plan. These faculties are separated by material limits. He goes so far
-as to say that such or such a faculty acts with greater or less facility
-upon such or such another faculty, according as one happens to be
-situated nearer to or farther off from the other.
-
-“As the organ of the arts,” says he, “is located far from that of the
-sense of colour, the circumstance explains why historical painters have
-rarely been colourists.”[64]
-
-Thus, we find that the faculties alone are possessed of _forces_. These
-forces alone are endowed with organs; and these organs, by which they are
-kept separate from each other, separate them to distances sufficiently
-great to hinder, in certain cases, one given faculty from exercising any
-influence over another. Therefore, there is no such thing as unity; there
-is no unit faculty, no unit understanding; there is no _me_; and if there
-be no _me_, there can be no soul.
-
-In the same way he abolishes the _freewill_. Will, liberty, reason, in
-his view,[65] are nothing but _results_, as I have already stated.
-
-“To the end,” says he, “that man may not be confined merely to the
-ability to wish—in order that he may actually will—the concurrence of
-several superior faculties is requisite. The motives must be weighed,
-compared, and judged; the decision resulting from this operation is
-denominated will.”[66]
-
-“Reason,” he further adds, “supposes a concerted action of the superior
-faculties. It is the judgment pronounced by the superior intellectual
-faculties.”[67]
-
-Hence, the will is nothing but a _decision_; reason is nothing but a
-_judgment_. The faculties _concert together_. What a singular philosophy,
-which always substitutes the fictions of language for the facts of the
-conscious sense, and which is satisfied with those fictions!
-
-Freewill is either a power, a force, or it is nothing. He resolves that
-it is merely a _result_. Gall therefore abolishes the freewill.
-
-Indeed, he makes of the idea of God nothing but a relative and
-conditional idea, for he supposes that this idea comes from a particular
-organ; and he supposes that that organ may possibly, in some case, be
-wanting.
-
-“It cannot be doubted,” says Gall, “that the human race are endowed with
-an organ by means of which it recognises and admires the Author of the
-universe.”[68]
-
-“God exists,” adds he, “for there is an organ to know and adore him.”[69]
-
-But he continues: “Climate and other circumstances may obstruct the
-development of the cerebral part, by means of which the Creator designed
-to reveal himself to his creature man.”[70]
-
-Again: “If there were a people whose organization should be altogether
-defective in this respect, they would be as little susceptible as any
-other kinds of animal, of the religious idea or sentiment.”[71]
-
-Further: “There is no God for beings whose organization does not bear the
-original stamp of determinate faculties.”[72]
-
-What! If I happen not to possess a little peculiar organ, (for it
-may be wanting,) can I not feel that God exists! And how can I be an
-intelligence, knowing myself, and yet not knowing that God is? I do not
-more strongly feel that I am, than that God is. “This idea,” (the idea of
-God) says Descartes, “is born and produced along with me, just as is the
-idea of myself.”[73]
-
-My understanding, which perceives itself and feels itself to be an
-effect, necessarily perceives the intelligent Cause which produced it.
-“It is a very evident thing,” says Descartes again, “that there must
-be at least as much reality in a cause as in the effect it produces;
-and since I am a thing that thinks, whatsoever be in fact the cause of
-my being, I am compelled to confess, that _it also_ is something that
-thinks.”[74]
-
-Hitherto I have considered Gall’s philosophy only under its speculative
-points of view; what would it be, if considered in a practical relation?
-
-In one of his happy moments, Diderot wrote the following very remarkable
-phrase: “The ruin of liberty overthrows all order and all government,
-confounds vice and virtue together, sanctions every monstrous infamy,
-extinguishes all shame and all remorse, and degrades and deforms without
-recovery the whole human race.”[75]
-
-Nothing astonishes a phrenologist.
-
-“Let us imagine,” says Gall, “a woman in whom the love of offspring is
-but little developed, ... if, unfortunately, the organ of murder be very
-much developed in her, need we be surprised if her hand....”[76] &c.
-
-Organization explains every thing.
-
-“These last named facts show us,” says Gall, “that this detestable
-inclination (the inclination to commit murder) has its source in a vice
-of the organization.”[77]
-
-“Let those haughty men,” says he again, “who cause nations to be
-slaughtered by thousands, know that they do not act of their own
-accord, but that Nature herself has filled their hearts with rage and
-destructiveness.”[78]
-
-No, indeed! This is not what they must know; for, thanks be to God, it is
-not true. What they ought to know, what they ought to be told, is, that
-although Providence has left to man the power to do evil, he has also
-endowed him with the power to do good. That which man ought to know, that
-which should be instilled into his mind and heart is, that he has a free
-power, and that this power ought not to be misdirected; and that he who
-in his own nature misdirects it, no matter under what form of philosophy
-he takes refuge, is a being who degrades his nature.
-
-Under the title of _fundamental faculties_, Gall confounds all things
-together—the passions, the instinct, the intellectual faculties. These
-faculties, which are at the basis of his whole philosophy, he knows not
-even how to denominate them. He calls them instincts,[79] inclinations,
-senses, memories, &c. There is a memory or sense of things, a memory
-or sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct that leads certain
-animals to live in elevated regions with pride, which is a moral
-sentiment in man;[80] the carnivorous instinct with courage;[81] he
-believes that conscience, (which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing
-but a modification of a particular sense, the sense of benevolence,
-&c.[82]
-
-The hesitation of his mind is visible every where.
-
-“I leave it to the reader,” says he, “to decide whether the fundamental
-faculty to which this penchant relates, should be denominated sense of
-elevation, self-esteem,” &c.[83]
-
-“To speak correctly,” continues he, “firmness is neither a penchant nor
-a faculty; it is a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive
-quality, which is called character.”[84]
-
-Finally, he writes the following paragraph, perhaps the most singular
-one that he ever wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner how little
-confidence he had in his own psycology.
-
-“If we are materialists because we do not admit the existence of a
-unit-faculty of the soul, but recognise several primitive faculties,
-we ask whether the ordinary division of the faculties of the soul
-into understanding, will, attention, memory, judgment, imagination,
-and affections and passions, expresses nothing more than a primitive
-unit-faculty? If it be asserted that all these faculties are merely
-modifications of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder us from making
-the same assertion as to the faculties whose existence we do admit.”[85]
-
-To be sure, nothing prevents you. Or rather every thing constrains you
-to do so. There is therefore one sole faculty, of which all the other
-faculties are but moods. You return then to the common philosophy, and
-consequently you no longer possess a peculiar philosophy.
-
-The problem proposed by Gall is at the same time physiological,
-psycological, and anatomical.
-
-In our first article an account has been given of Gall’s _physiology_,
-and it has been shown to be generally disproved by direct experiment.
-In the present one his _psycology_ has been examined, and it is confuted
-by the consciousness (_le sens intime_). It only remains for us now to
-examine his _anatomy_.
-
-
-
-
-III.
-
-OF GALL.
-
-THE ORGANS.
-
-
-Of all Gall’s writings, his anatomy is that which has been most talked
-of, and yet it is the part least known.
-
-In the year 1808, Gall read to the first class of the Institute a memoir
-on the anatomy of the brain;[86] and M. Cuvier made a report upon that
-memoir. But neither in that memoir nor in the report do we find one
-word of _special anatomy_, of _secret anatomy_, of what might be called
-_anatomy of the Doctrine_; or, in other terms, and as it would be
-expressed at the present day, of _phrenological anatomy_.
-
-The anatomy of Gall’s memoir is nothing but a very ordinary anatomy.
-He insists that the cerebral nerves, all of them without exception,
-rise upwards from the medulla oblongata towards the encephalon; that
-the cineritious matter produces the white matter: he divides the fibres
-of the brain into _divergent_ and _convergent_; he supposes that each
-convolution of this organ, instead of being a full and solid mass, as is
-generally thought, is merely a fold[87] of nervous or medullary fibres,
-&c. &c.
-
-Such are the questions discussed by Gall; and it is sufficiently clear
-that, whatever side we take upon these questions, his doctrine assuredly
-would neither gain nor lose any thing.
-
-Whether such or such a nerve ascends or descends; whether the white
-matter is produced by the gray; or whether, which is, to say the least,
-quite as probable, this be nonsense; whether this or that fibre goes out
-or comes in, diverges or converges, &c. &c. the doctrine of the plurality
-of brains, the doctrine of individual intelligences, will be neither more
-nor less true, more nor less doubtful.[88]
-
-M. Cuvier, in his report, observed: “It is essential to repeat, were it
-merely for the information of the public, that the anatomical questions
-we have been considering, have no immediate and necessary connexion with
-the physiological doctrines taught by M. Gall, as to the functions and
-relative volume of different parts of the brain; and that all that we
-have inquired into as to the structure of the brain, might be either true
-or false, without affording the least conclusion in favour of or against
-the doctrine.”[89]
-
-It is necessary not to make any mistake as to the real point of the
-question. Gall’s doctrine goes to establish one and only one thing, to
-wit, _the plurality of intelligences_ and _the plurality of brains_.[90]
-That is what constitutes the special and peculiar doctrine; that
-is to say, different from the common doctrine, which admits but one
-understanding and a single brain. Whatever goes to prove the plurality
-of understandings and brains belongs to Gall’s doctrine; and whatever
-does not tend to prove the plurality of understandings and brains is in
-opposition to that doctrine.
-
-Gall’s works then really contain two very distinct anatomies: one is
-a _general anatomy_, which has nothing in particular to do with his
-doctrine; the other is a _special anatomy_, which, supposing it to be
-true, would constitute the basis of his doctrine.
-
-Now, a great deal has been said about Gall’s general anatomy; but as to
-his special anatomy, I know of no one who has spoken of it. Gall himself
-says as little as possible about it. In other matters he tells his
-opinions both very clearly and very positively: in this particular we are
-obliged to guess at them.
-
-When Gall, in his _psycology_, substitutes the _faculties_ for the
-understanding, he defines those _faculties_. He defines them, as we have
-already seen, to be _individual intelligences_. How happens it, then,
-that in his anatomy, when he substitutes the organs of the brain for the
-brain itself, he does not define these organs? How strange! Gall’s whole
-doctrine, all _phrenology_, rests upon the _organs of the brain_; for,
-without distinct cerebral organs, there can be no independent faculties;
-and without independent faculties there can be no phrenology: and Gall
-does not say, nor has any phrenologist said for him, what is the thing
-called a _cerebral organ_.
-
-The truth is: Gall never had any settled opinion upon what he called the
-organs of the brain; he never saw those _organs_, and he imagined them
-for the use of his _faculties_. He did what so many others have done. He
-commenced with imagining a hypothesis, and then he imagined an anatomy
-to suit his hypothesis.
-
-When the doctrine of animal spirits was believed, the brain was composed
-of pipes and tubes to convey these spirits.
-
-“The cortical substance which is found in the hemispheres of the brain,”
-says Pourfour du Petit, “furnishes the whole of the medullary portion,
-which is a mere collection of an infinite number of pipes.”[91]
-
-“The small arteries of the cortical part of the brain,” says Haller,
-“transmit a spirituous liquor into the medullary and nervous tubes.”[92]
-
-It is evident that the _organs_ of Gall have no more real existence than
-the _pipes_ of Pourfour du Petit, or the _tubes_ of Haller. They are two
-structures that have been imagined, as suitable for two hypotheses.
-
-In searching for the primary idea, the secret notion that led Gall to
-his doctrine of the _plurality of the intelligences_, I detect it in the
-analogy that he supposed to exist between the functions of the senses and
-the faculties of the soul.
-
-He sees the functions of the senses constituting distinct functions, and
-insists that the faculties of the soul must constitute equally distinct
-faculties; he sees each particular sense possessing an organ proper to
-itself, and thinks that each faculty of the soul must have its proper
-organ;[93] in one word, he looks upon the outer man, and constructs the
-inner man after the image of the outer man.
-
-According to Gall, every thing between an organ of a sense and an organ
-of a faculty, between a faculty and sense, is similar. A faculty is a
-sense. His words are: the _memory or the sense of things_, the _memory
-or the sense of persons_, the _memory or the sense of numbers_. He talks
-of the _sense of language_, the _sense of mechanics_, the _sense of the
-relations of colours_, &c. &c.
-
-“As we must admit,” says he, “five different external senses, since their
-functions are essentially different, ... so we must agree, after all, to
-acknowledge the different faculties and the different inclinations as
-being essentially different moral and intellectual forces, and likewise
-connected with organic apparatuses, which are special to each and
-independent of each other.”[94]
-
-“Who,” says he, “can dare to say that sight, hearing, taste, smell, and
-touch, are simple modifications of faculties? Who could dare to derive
-them from a single and same source, from a single and same organ? In
-the same way, the twenty-seven qualities and faculties which I recognise
-as fundamental or primary forces, ... cannot be regarded as the simple
-modifications of any one faculty.”[95]
-
-On the one hand, Gall gives to the _faculties_ all the independence of
-the _senses_; and on the other, he gives the _senses_ all the attributes
-of the _faculties_.
-
-“Here,” says he, “are new reasons why I have always maintained in my
-public discourses, though these assertions are in opposition to the ideas
-that prevail among philosophers, that each organ of a sense possesses
-absolutely its own functions; that each of these organs has its peculiar
-faculty of receiving and even of perceiving impressions, its own
-conscience, its own faculty of reminiscence,”[96] &c.
-
-Gall did not foresee that a physiological experiment (and a very sure one
-it is) would one day demonstrate that the sense receives the impression
-but does not perceive it, and that, consequently, it is endowed neither
-with _conscience_ nor _reminiscence_, &c.
-
-When the cerebral lobes or hemispheres[97] are removed from an animal,
-the animal immediately loses its sight.
-
-And yet nothing, as regards the eyes themselves, has been changed;
-objects continue to be depicted upon the retina, the iris retains its
-contractility, and the optic nerve its excitability. The retina continues
-to be sensible of light, for the iris contracts or dilates according as
-the light admitted to it is more or less intense.
-
-No change has taken place as to the structure of the eye, and yet the
-animal does not see! Therefore it is not the eye that perceives, nor is
-it the eye that sees.[98]
-
-The eye does not see; it is the understanding that sees by means of the
-eyes.[99]
-
-When Gall concludes from the independence of the external senses to
-the independence of the faculties of the soul, he confounds, as to the
-sense itself, two things that are essentially distinct, impression and
-perception. Impression is multiple; perception is single.
-
-When the hemispheres are removed, the animal instantly loses its
-perception; it no longer sees nor hears,[100] &c. notwithstanding all the
-organs of the senses, the eye, the ear, &c. subsist, and the impressions
-take place.
-
-Therefore the principle that perceives is _one_. Lost for one sense, it
-is lost for all the senses. And if it be _one_ for the external senses,
-how can it be other than _one_ for the faculties of the soul?
-
-Gall therefore cannot suppose the existence of several distinct
-principles for the faculties of the soul, otherwise than because he
-supposes several distinct principles for the perceptions; and he only
-supposes several principles for the perceptions because he confounds
-impression with perception. The whole of his psycology arises from a
-mistake; and the whole of his anatomy is constructed for the sake of his
-psycology.
-
-In psycology he endeavours to prove that the faculties of the soul are
-merely _internal senses_; in anatomy, he endeavours to prove that the
-organs of the faculties of the soul only repeat and reproduce the organs
-of the _external senses_.
-
-Now an _organ_, that is to say, under the present point of view, the
-_nerve_ of an _external sense_, is nothing more than a _fascicle_ of
-_nervous fibres_. Therefore the brain, under the theory, can be nothing
-but a collection of _fascicles_ of _fibres_.[101]
-
-According to Gall, the origin, the development, the structure and mode of
-termination, as to the organs of the faculties of the soul and the organs
-of the external senses, every thing is similar, every thing is in common.
-And yet the primitive difficulty remains unsolved.
-
-When I say an _organ of the senses_, I speak of a very determinate
-nervous apparatus. But is the same thing true when I say an organ of the
-brain? What is an organ of the brain? Is it a _fascicle_ of _fibres_?
-Is it each particular fibre? But if it be a _fascicle_ of _fibres_,
-there are too few of them, for there are not twenty-seven of them; and
-twenty-seven are necessary, for there are twenty-seven faculties. If it
-be each particular fibre, then there are too many of them, and far too
-many, because there are only twenty-seven faculties. What are we to do in
-this difficulty? We must do as Gall does: sometimes say it is a fascicle
-of fibres; at other times, that it is each fibre in particular.
-
-In one place he says: “The brain consisting of several divisions whose
-functions are totally different, there are several primary bundles, which
-contribute by their development to produce it. Among these bundles we
-place the anterior and posterior pyramids, the bundles that come off
-direct from the corpora olivaria, and some others that are concealed in
-the interior of the medulla oblongata.”[102]
-
-_And there are yet some others_; be it so; but they never can amount to
-twenty-seven.
-
-Again he says: “A more extensive development of the same conjecture,
-might perhaps dispose the reader to consider each nervous fibrilla,
-whether in the nerves or in the brain itself, as a little special
-organ.”[103]
-
-Even this is not all. For the sake of Gall’s doctrine, the anatomy of the
-brain must have a connexion with cranioscopy. And Gall takes great care
-to place all his organs upon the surface of the brain.
-
-“The possibility of a solution of the problem under consideration,” says
-he, “supposes the organs of the soul to be situated at the surface of the
-brain.”[104] Indeed, were they not situated at the surface of the brain,
-how could the cranium bear the impression of them? and what would become
-of cranioscopy?
-
-Cranioscopy has nothing to fear. Gall has made provision for it; all the
-organs of the brain are placed at the surface of the brain; and Gall most
-judiciously adds, “This explains the relation or the correspondence that
-exists between craniology and the doctrine of the cerebral functions
-(cerebral physiology), the sole aim and end of my researches.”[105]
-
-But as to the pretended _organs of the brain_, are they really situated
-at the surface of the brain, as Gall asserts? In plain terms, is the
-surface of the brain the only active part of the organ? Here is a
-physiological experiment that shows how very much mistaken Gall is.
-
-You can slice off a considerable portion of an animal’s brain, either in
-front, behind, on one side, or on the top, without his losing anyone of
-his faculties.[106]
-
-The animal may, therefore, lose all that Gall calls surface of the brain,
-without losing any of his faculties. Therefore it cannot be that the
-organs of the faculties reside at the _surface of the brain_.
-
-And comparative anatomy is not less opposite to Gall’s opinions than
-is direct experiment itself. I shall not follow him here in the detail
-of his localizations. How could these localizations have any meaning?
-He does not even know whether an organ is a _fascicle of fibres_, or a
-_fibre_.[107]
-
-For example; he places what he calls the instinct of propagation in the
-cerebellum, and what he calls the _instinct of the love of offspring_, in
-the posterior cerebral lobes; and he looks upon these two localizations
-as the very surest in his book.
-
-“I should wish,” says he, “that all young naturalists might begin their
-researches with the study of these two organs. They are both easily to be
-recognised,”[108] &c.
-
-What! The cerebellum, so different in its structure from the great brain,
-is the cerebellum, like the brain,[109] to be considered an organ of
-instinct? And what is more, is it to be regarded as the organ of a single
-instinct only, while the brain shall have twenty-six of them?
-
-I have already said that the cerebellum is the seat of the principle that
-presides over the locomotion[110] of the animal, and that it is not the
-seat of any instinct.
-
-Gall places the love of offspring in the posterior lobes of the
-brain.[111] Now, the love of offspring, and especially maternal love,
-is every where to be found among the superior animals; it is found in
-all the mammifera, in all the birds.[112] The posterior lobes of the
-brain, therefore, ought to be found in all these beings. Not at all: the
-posterior lobes are wanting in most of the mammifera; they are wanting in
-all the birds.
-
-Gall locates the faculties that are common to both man and animals,
-in the posterior part of the brain; in the anterior part he places
-those[113] that are peculiar to man alone. According to this plan, the
-most _persistent_ portion of the brain will be the posterior portion,
-and the least persistent the anterior portion. But the inverse of the
-proposition holds. The parts that are most frequently wanting are the
-_posterior parts_, and those that are most invariably present are the
-_anterior parts_.[114]
-
-If, from the brain, I pass on to consider the cranium, all the foregoing
-is found to be of still greater force. How can the localizations that
-are destitute of meaning as to the brain—how can they, I say, have any
-meaning as relative to the cranium itself?
-
-The cranium, especially the external surface of it, represents the
-superficial configuration of the brain but very imperfectly. Gall knows
-it. “I was the first,” says he, “to maintain that it is impossible for us
-to determine with exactitude the development of certain circumvolutions,
-by the inspection of the external surface of the cranium. In certain
-cases, the exterior lamina of the cranium is not parallel with the
-internal lamina.”[115] “There are certain species in which there is no
-frontal sinus; in others, the cells betwixt the two bony laminæ are found
-throughout the whole skull,”[116] &c. &c.
-
-The cranium represents the convolutions of the brain only upon its
-inner surface; it does not represent them upon its external superficies.
-And as to the _fibres_, as to the _bundles of fibres_, it does not even
-represent them on its inner surface; for the fibres are covered with
-a layer of gray matter, and the bundles of fibres are situated in the
-interior of the nervous mass.
-
-Gall is aware of all this, and nevertheless he inscribes his twenty-seven
-faculties upon the skulls.[117] Such confidence surprises one. Nothing
-is known of the intimate structure of the brain,[118] and yet people
-are bold enough to trace upon it their circumscriptions, their circles,
-their boundaries. The external surface of the skull does not represent
-the brain’s surface, it is admitted; and yet they inscribe upon this
-surface twenty-seven names, each of which names is written within a small
-circle, each little circle corresponding to one precise faculty! And what
-is stranger yet, people are to be found who, under each of these names
-inscribed by Gall, imagine that there is concealed something more than a
-name!
-
-Those who, seeing the success of Gall’s doctrine, imagine that the
-doctrine therefore rests upon some solid foundation, know very little of
-mankind. Gall knew mankind better. He studied them in his own way, but he
-studied them very closely. Let us hear his own words:
-
-“In society, I employ many expedients to find out the talents and
-inclinations of people. I start the conversation upon a variety of
-topics. In general, we let fall in conversation whatsoever has little or
-no concern with our faculties and penchants; but when the interlocutor
-touches upon one of our favourite subjects, we at once become interested
-in it.... Do you wish to spy out the character of a person, without the
-fear of being misled as to your conclusions, even though he might be
-on his guard? Set him to talking about his childhood and boyhood; make
-him relate his schoolboy exploits; his conduct towards his parents, his
-brothers and sisters, and his playfellows, and his emulators.... Ask
-him about his games, &c. Few persons think it necessary to dissemble
-upon these points; they do not suspect they are dealing with one who
-knows perfectly well that the basis of character remains ever the same;
-and that the objects only that interest us change with the progress of
-years.... Besides, when I discover what it is that a person admires or
-despises; when I see him act; when he is an author, and I merely read his
-book, &c. &c. the whole man stands unveiled before me.”[119]
-
-Descartes _shut himself up in a stove_,[120] in order that he might
-meditate. According to Gall, there is no necessity for one’s shutting
-himself up in a stove.
-
-Descartes says: “Now I shall shut my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall
-turn my senses aside; I shall even efface from my memory every image
-of corporeal objects, or at least, as that can hardly be done, I will
-repute them as vain and false; and thus, shut up within myself, and
-contemplating what is within me, I shall endeavour gradually to become
-more and more familiarly acquainted with my own real nature.”[121]
-
-According to Gall, there is no occasion for this absolute gathering
-one’s self together within. All that is needful is to look at and touch
-the skulls of people. Gall’s doctrine succeeded just as Lavater’s did.
-Men will always be looking out for external signs by which to discover
-secret thoughts and concealed inclinations: it is vain to confound their
-curiosity upon this point: after Lavater came Gall; after Gall some one
-else will appear.
-
-We soon become wearied of a true philosophy, because it is true; because
-the search after truth, of whatsoever kind, requires strenuous and
-continual efforts. It is impossible, moreover, always to have the very
-same philosophy: even the same philosopher cannot be always approved of.
-Approbation must change its object, especially in France.
-
-It was for the French that Fontenelle wrote these words: “The approbation
-of mankind is a sort of forced state, which seeks nothing so much as to
-come to an end.”[122]
-
-Descartes goes off to die in Sweden, and Gall comes to reign in France.
-
-
-
-
-IV.
-
-OF SPURZHEIM.
-
-
-Spurzheim published two works; the first of which is entitled,
-“Observations sur la Phrénologie, ou la connaissance de l’homme moral
-et intellectuel, fondée sur les fonctions du système nerveux:”[123]
-the title of the second is, “Essai philosophique sur la nature morâle
-et intellectuelle de l’homme;”[124] and these two works are merely a
-reproduction of the doctrine of Gall. Spurzheim makes Gall’s book over
-again—the same book that they commenced together—and abridges it.
-
-Spurzheim tells us how he heard Gall, and having heard him, felt himself
-drawn to participate in his labours, and propagate his doctrine.
-
-“In 1800, I attended for the first time a course of lectures which
-M. Gall had from time to time repeated at Vienna for four years. He
-spoke then of the necessity there was for a brain to give out the
-manifestations of the soul; and of the plurality of organs; ... but he
-had not as yet begun to examine into the structure of the brain.[125]
-From the very first, I found myself much attracted by the doctrine of the
-brain; and from the period of my first attention to that subject to the
-present moment, I have never lost sight of it as an object of study.
-After finishing my studies in 1800, I joined M. Gall, in order to pursue
-in a special manner the anatomical part of the researches.[126] In 1805,
-we left Vienna for the purpose of travelling together; from which time,
-up to the year 1813, we made our observations in common,” &c.[127]
-
-In fact, the two authors, uniting their labours, first published,
-in 1808, their fine memoir upon the anatomy of the brain,[128] and
-subsequently, in 1810 and 1812, the two first volumes of Gall’s great
-work.[129]
-
-In the year 1813 they separated, and that separation even proved useful.
-Gall, when writing independently, has a freer movement. Had he continued
-united with Spurzheim, he either would not have written the last chapter
-of his fourth volume, or he would have written it very differently, and
-we should not have obtained the definite expression of his doctrine.
-
-That chapter, entitled “Philosophy of Man,” is Gall’s philosophy entire.
-It is in that chapter that he says what he does understand by faculties,
-by understanding, by will, &c. &c. and it is there that he defines
-the faculties of the individual understandings;[130] understanding, a
-simple _attribute of each faculty_;[131] will, a simple result of the
-simultaneous action of superior faculties, &c.[132]
-
-Spurzheim never would have imagined the doctrine: he found it already
-concocted; he follows it, and in doing so, always hesitates. He did not
-imagine it; and perhaps never could have had the facilities enjoyed
-by Gall for carrying it successfully into the world. Gall’s mind was
-full of address. We have seen his method of studying men.[133] In his
-great work there is a dominant tone of philosophy; for the doctrine was
-already established at the period of the publication of that work. When
-the doctrine was inchoate, Gall’s tone was not quite so grave, for it
-is above all things necessary to awaken the public curiosity, and the
-philosophic tone does not answer for that purpose.
-
-Charles Villers has preserved some of his souvenirs, touching the first
-impressions produced by the doctrine.[134] “If,” writes Gall at the
-period in question, “the exterminating angel was under my orders, wo to
-Kæstner, to Kant, to Wieland, and others like them.... Why is it, that
-no one has ever preserved for our times, the skulls of Homer, Virgil,
-Cicero, &c.?”[135]
-
-“At one time,” says Charles Villers, “every body in Vienna was trembling
-for his head, and fearing that after his death it would be put in
-requisition to enrich Dr. Gall’s cabinet. He announced his impatience
-as to the skulls of extraordinary persons—such as were distinguished
-by certain great qualities or by great talents—which was still greater
-cause for the general terror. Too many people were led to suppose
-themselves the objects of the doctor’s regards, and imagined their
-heads to be especially longed for by him, as a specimen of the utmost
-importance to the success of his experiments. Some very curious stories
-are told on this point. Old M. Denis, the Emperor’s librarian, inserted a
-special clause in his will, intended to save his cranium from M. Gall’s
-scalpel.”[136]
-
-Gall and Spurzheim differ from each other upon several points: upon the
-offices of the external senses; upon the names of the faculties of the
-soul; upon their number; and upon the classification of the faculties,
-&c. Let us examine a few of the points more particularly.
-
-1. _Offices of the external senses._ “M. Gall is disposed,” says
-Spurzheim, “to attribute to the external senses, as well as to each
-and every internal faculty, not only perception, but also memory,
-reminiscence, and judgment.... It seems to me that such facts (the facts
-cited by Gall) do not prove the conclusion. In the first place, memory,
-being nothing more than the repetition of knowledge, must have its seat
-in the point where perception takes place. The impressions of the nerves
-that give rise to the sensation of hunger, &c. are indisputably perceived
-in the head, which likewise has the reminiscence of hunger.... I do
-not believe we can conclude that the eyes or the ears are the seats of
-reminiscence.”[137]
-
-Spurzheim is right, as we have sufficiently seen;[138] perception is not
-in the organ of the sense.
-
-But the error that Spurzheim combats is not the whole of Gall’s error; it
-is only a particular and secondary error:[139] the error that he does not
-perceive, the error that he follows, is a general and capital one. From
-the independence of the external senses, Gall concludes the independence
-of the faculties of the soul: he reasons upon an apparent analogy, which
-conceals a profound dissimilitude; and Spurzheim reasons just as Gall
-does.
-
-“In the nervous system,” says he, “we find the five external senses
-separate and independent of each other.”[140] “The faculties of the
-external senses are attached to different organs; they may exist
-separately. The same holds true of the internal senses.”[141] “We assert
-that there is a particular organ for each species of sentiment or
-thought, as there is for each species of exterior sensation.”[142]
-
-Like Gall, Spurzheim denominates the faculties of the soul _internal
-senses_; in the same spirit he says: “The _sense of colour_, the _sense
-of number_, _sense of language_, _sense of comparison_, _sense of
-causality_,”[143] &c. &c.
-
-Both authors begin by calling the faculties of the soul _internal
-senses_; and then, misled by the word, they conclude from the
-_independence of the external senses_, to the _independence_ of their
-_internal senses_; that is to say, the independence of the faculties of
-the soul.
-
-2. _Names of the faculties._ Spurzheim accuses Gall of having given
-denominations only to actions, and not to the principles of those actions.
-
-“Finding,” says he, “a relation betwixt the development of a cerebral
-part and a sort of action, M. Gall denominated the cerebral part from the
-action; thus, he spoke of the organs of music, poetry, &c.”[144] “The
-nomenclature,” says he further, “ought to be conformed to the faculties,
-without regard to any action whatever.... When we attribute to an organ
-cunning, management, hypocrisy, intrigue, &c. we do not make known the
-primary faculty which contributes to all these modified actions.”[145]
-
-Gall replies: “M. Spurzheim cannot have forgotten how often we reasoned
-without end, with a view to determine the primitive destination of an
-organ.... I confess, that there are several organs, with whose primary
-faculties I am not yet acquainted; and I continue to denominate them from
-the degree of activity that led me to the discovery of them. M. Spurzheim
-thinks himself more fortunate: his metaphysical temperament has led him
-to the discovery of the fundamental or primitive faculty of every one of
-the organs. Let us put it to the proof.”[146]
-
-Indeed, Spurzheim’s expedient for rendering himself master of the primary
-faculties is very simple. He creates a word: he calls the instinct of
-propagation _amativity_, the propensity to steal, _convoitivity_; courage
-is _combativity_, &c. &c.
-
-Gall and Spurzheim talk a great deal about nomenclature; but they do not
-perceive, that as to nomenclature, the first difficulty, and indeed the
-only one, is to get at simple facts. Whoever has come to simple facts, is
-very nigh to a good nomenclature.
-
-Descartes says: “Had some one clearly explained the simple ideas that
-exist in the imagination of men, and which constitute all that they
-think, I should venture to hope for a language that it would be very easy
-to learn, ... and, which is the principal matter, that would assist the
-judgment, representing to it things so distinctly that it would be almost
-impossible for it to be deceived; whereas, on the contrary, the words we
-now have possess, so to speak, only confused significations, to which the
-human mind has been so long accustomed, that it therefore understands
-scarcely any thing perfectly well.”[147]
-
-3. _Number of the faculties._ Spurzheim adds eight faculties to those
-established by Gall, and Gall is vexed by it. One does not see why.
-
-What! Shall Gall endow twenty-seven faculties, and Spurzheim not have the
-same privilege for seven or eight?[148] Shall Gall have a faculty for
-_space_, one for _number_, &c. and Spurzheim be refused one for _time_,
-one for _extent_, &c.? Is not Spurzheim half right, when he says:
-
-“One does not readily perceive why M. Gall should desire to suggest to
-his readers that his method of treating the doctrine of the brain is the
-only admissible one, and that there are no other organs than those he has
-recognised; that the organs do nothing but what he attributes to them;
-... that all he says and all he does (and that only) bears the stamp of
-perfection; and that his decision constitutes the supreme law.”[149]
-
-4. _Classification and attributes of the faculties._ Gall, by giving
-the same attributes to all the faculties, and to each faculty all the
-attributes of the understanding, in fact forms out of the faculties only
-two groups: the group of faculties that he supposes common to man and the
-animals, and the group of faculties that he supposes to be proper to man
-alone. Spurzheim divides and subdivides them.
-
-None of the formulas required for the classification agreed upon are
-omitted.[150]
-
-In the first place, there are two _orders_ of faculties: the _affective_
-and the _intellectual faculties_; then each of these _orders_ is divided
-into _genera_. The first _order_ has two _genera_: the affective
-faculties common to man and animals,[151] and the affective faculties
-peculiar to man alone.[152] The second has three genera: the faculties
-or _internal senses_ which make external objects known;[153] the
-faculties or internal senses which make known the relations of objects in
-general;[154] and the faculties or internal senses that _reflect_.[155]
-
-What an apparatus for saying very simple things; for saying that there
-are _propensities_,[156] _sentiments_,[157] and _intellectual faculties_!
-What singular personification of all these faculties: faculties that
-know; faculties that reflect![158] Spurzheim elsewhere speaks of _happy
-faculties_.[159] Indeed, what arbitrariness in the distribution of facts!
-And Gall, too, is he not half right?
-
-“By what right,” says he, “does M. Spurzheim exclude from the
-intellectual faculties imitation, wit, ideality or poetry,
-circumspection, secretivity, constructivity? How are perseverance,
-circumspection, imitation; how are they sentiments? What reason have we
-for counting among the propensities constructivity rather than melody,
-benevolence, or imitation?”[160]
-
-Gall, by endowing each faculty with all the attributes of an
-understanding, makes as many understandings as faculties. Spurzheim makes
-several kinds of understandings: understandings that know, understandings
-that reflect, &c. He restores the _sensitive_ and _rational souls_.
-
-In fine, Gall and Spurzheim rarely agree as to their faculties. In
-_hope_ Gall sees nothing more than an attribute; Spurzheim beholds it
-as a primary faculty. In _conscience_ Gall sees nothing but an effect
-of _benevolence_; Spurzheim looks upon it as a peculiar faculty. Gall
-resolves that there is only one organ of _religion_, and Spurzheim
-insists upon three—the organ of causality, that of supernaturality, and
-that of veneration, &c. &c.
-
-We should never end, were we to follow them throughout their debates. I
-have said enough to show the case, and I now pass on to Broussais.
-
-
-
-
-V.
-
-OF BROUSSAIS.
-
-
-Broussais appears to have been born solely for the purpose of imagining
-or propagating systems.
-
-Guided by facts which he seized upon with a rare sagacity, Broussais
-begins by bringing back certain affections to their real seats;[161] but
-soon, by an immoderate generalization of this fine result, he perceives
-all affections in the same affection, all diseases in the same malady;
-he imagines one _abstract affection_, by means of which he explains all
-other affections: _fevers_ are nothing but irritations of the digestive
-apparatus; _insanity_ is nothing but an _irritation_ of the brain;[162]
-and he who is so intolerant of the _personifications_ proposed by others,
-makes one _personification_ more; in fine, his exclusive and headstrong
-genius carries him beyond himself, and, as if merely to amuse him after
-the fatigue of forming his systems, plunges him into the question of
-_phrenology_, where he enjoys himself so much the more, because he finds
-in it his own accustomed method, his own ideas, and his own language:
-there are plenty of faculties to bring back to their organs, plenty of
-localizations to establish.
-
-Broussais ought not to be judged of by his “Cours de Phrénologie.”[163]
-The five or six first _lessons_, or, as he calls them, _generalities_,[164]
-are merely a confused mixture of ideas: the notions of Condillac rejected
-by Cabanis, and the ideas of the phrenologists.
-
-He says that sensibility is the _common origin_ of the faculties;[165] he
-calls _perception_ a _primary faculty_,[166] &c. &c.; and Condillac would
-not speak differently.
-
-But, on the other hand, he says that there are as many _memories_ as
-there are organs;[167] that the instincts and the sentiments possess a
-memory, as the _external perceptions_[168] have theirs; that the mind
-is the _sum of the faculties_,[169] &c.; and Gall could not say it more
-clearly.
-
-Broussais is particularly opposed to the _moi_ of Descartes. “Seduced,”
-says he, “by the _moi_ of Descartes, philosophers have been led to reason
-according to the testimony of their consciousness....”[170] And according
-to what testimony does Broussais think they ought to reason?
-
-He thinks it very funny to call the _moi_ an _intra-cranial entity_,[171]
-_intra-cranial central being_,[172] _person_ par excellence, &c.[173]
-
-He laughs at the _moi_ of Descartes; he forgets that the _moi_ of Gall
-is either nothing else than the sum (_ensemble_) of the intellectual
-faculties, or nothing else than a word; and he makes for himself a
-_peculiar moi_,[174] which he locates in the organ of _comparison_. “We
-owe,” says he, “to the organ of general comparison the distinction of one
-person expressed by the sign _me_.”[175]
-
-Broussais was never designed for compliance with the ideas of others; a
-yoke oppresses him; he is never truly Broussais, except in the midst of
-conflict. In 1816 he publishes a volume,[176] and the medical doctrines
-are shook for half a century: we ought to read that volume over again,
-and forget the “Cours de Phrénologie.”
-
-
-
-
-VI.
-
-BROUSSAIS’S PSYCOLOGY.
-
-
-The fact is, Broussais is busier with his own opinions than with what
-Gall thought; and here is a specimen of his way of thinking: “The
-understanding and its different manifestations are,” says he, “the
-phenomena of the nervous actions.”[177] “The faculties,” says he further,
-“are the actions of the material organs,”[178] &c.
-
-Broussais’s whole psycology is contained in these words. The organ, and
-the phenomenon produced by the organ. To speak more clearly, the organ
-and the action of the organ. To speak like Cabanis, the organ and the
-_secretion_ of the organ, or _thought_.[179] That’s all!
-
-The understanding, therefore, is merely a _phenomenon_, a product, an
-act. But if this be the case, how can there be a _continuity of the
-moi_? Now, the consciousness which gives me the _unity_ of the _moi_,
-gives me not less assuredly the _continuity_ of the _moi_. Descartes’
-admirable words are: “I find that there is in us an _intellectual
-memory_.”[180]
-
-The consciousness tells me that I am _one_, and Gall insists that I
-am _multiple_; the consciousness tells me I am _free_, and Gall avers
-that there is no _moral liberty_; the consciousness endows me with the
-continuity of my understanding, but Cabanis and Broussais tell me that
-my understanding is nothing but an _act_.
-
-Philosophers will talk.
-
-
-
-
-VII.
-
-BROUSSAIS’S PHYSIOLOGY.
-
-
-The whole of Broussais’s physiology is founded upon _irritation_.
-He says, “Irritation constitutes the basis of the physiological
-doctrine.”[181] But what is irritation? Broussais replies: “It is the
-exaggeration of contractility.”[182] But then, what is _contractility_?
-
-In Haller, the term _irritability_ (for that is his term for
-_contractility_) possesses a precise meaning and import. _Irritability_
-is a property of muscular fibre, by which it shortens or contracts
-itself when touched.
-
-Haller demonstrated, and it is his glory, that the muscle alone _moves_
-when it is touched. What is that to Broussais? He goes back again to
-the vague irritability of Glisson and de Gorter: like those authors, he
-assigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he explains every thing by
-means of it.
-
-Broussais’s _irritation_ is merely Haller’s _irritability_ exaggerated
-and deformed.
-
-The genius of Broussais was too impatient to allow him to proceed step by
-step up to the idea—too impassioned to hinder him from being satisfied
-with the name—and for that very reason he appears to have been by nature
-fitted for success in a school where the name is every thing.
-
-But here is the great difference. Gall and Broussais laboured for the
-School: Descartes toiled for the human mind.
-
-
-
-
-VIII.
-
-
-I return to Gall.
-
-Those who wish to learn Gall’s doctrine, will always go up to Gall
-himself. Spurzheim already alters the spirit of that doctrine, and Gall
-complains of it. “M. Spurzheim,” says he, “knows my discoveries better
-than any body else, but he tries to introduce among them a spirit quite
-foreign to that in which they were begun, continued and perfected.”[183]
-
-Gall, moreover, was a great anatomist. His idea of tracing the fibres
-of the brain is, as to the anatomy of that organ, the fundamental idea.
-The idea is not his own: two French anatomists, Vieussens and Pourfour
-du Petit, had admirably understood it long before his time; but at the
-period of his appearance it had been long forgotten. The brain was not
-then dissected by any one: it was cut in slices.
-
-It was a great merit in Gall to have recalled the true method of
-dissecting the brain; and there was still greater address on his part,
-in connecting with his labours in positive anatomy, his doctrine of
-independent faculties and multiple brain.
-
-This strange doctrine has had a fortune still more strange. Gall and
-Spurzheim forgot to place _curiosity_ among their primary faculties. They
-were wrong. But for the credulous curiosity of mankind, how could they
-have explained the success of their doctrine?
-
-Fortunately, a system never lives otherwise than as a system lives. That
-of the moment is abandoned for the sake of another: and almost always
-for a perfectly opposite one. Systems multiply and pass away; and we are
-indebted to the systems themselves for an escape from the mischiefs of
-systems.
-
-
-
-
-NOTES.
-
-
-
-
-NOTE I.
-
-ANATOMICAL RELATIONS SUPPOSED BY GALL TO EXIST BETWEEN THE ORGANS OF THE
-EXTERNAL SENSES, AND THE ORGANS OF THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.
-
-    Page 82. _According to Gall, the origin, the development, the
-    structure and mode of termination, as to the organs of the
-    faculties of the soul and the organs of the external senses,
-    every thing is similar, every thing is in common._
-
-
-It is known that two substances compose the nervous system—the gray
-matter, and the white or fibrous matter. Well, according to Gall, one
-of these substances produces the other. The _gray matter_ produces the
-_white matter_.
-
-Wherever, therefore, there happens to be any _gray matter_, white matter
-must appear; that is to say, _nervous fibres_,[184] _nervous filaments_,
-nerves. All the nerves in the body must arise in this way. The spinal
-nerves arise from the gray matter which is in the interior of the spinal
-marrow; the cerebral nerves from the gray matter that is in the interior
-of the medulla oblongata.
-
-Hence, the nerves of the body are _organs of the senses_.
-
-On the other hand, the brain and the cerebellum,[185] which are _the
-organs of the faculties of the soul_, must arise like the nerves: the
-brain from the gray matter of the _pyramidal eminences_; the cerebellum
-from the gray matter that surrounds the _restiform bodies_.
-
-In the second place, whenever a nerve traverses a mass of gray matter, it
-receives from it, according to Gall, certain new nervous filaments; and
-in this way it grows and developes itself. The cerebrum and cerebellum
-will not fail therefore to grow and be developed likewise. The primitive
-bundles of the cerebellum, (_the restiform bodies_,) will grow by means
-of the filaments which will be imparted to them by the gray matter of the
-_ciliary body_: the primitive bundles of the cerebrum, (the _pyramidal
-eminences_,) by the filaments imparted to them by, first, the gray matter
-of the _pons varolii_; secondly, by that of the _optic strata_; and then
-by that of the olivary bodies, _corpora striata_, &c. &c.
-
-Finally, in the same manner as a nerve of sense expands at its
-termination, and by means of such expansion forms the organ of the
-sense, so the primitive bundles of fibres of the brain and of the
-cerebellum terminate in expansions, and constitute the _organs of the
-internal senses_; that is to say, the lobes of the cerebellum and the
-hemispheres of the brain.[186]
-
-
-
-
-NOTE II.
-
-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INSTINCT AND UNDERSTANDING.
-
-    Page 64 (Note). _And he does not see that as to the instincts
-    and the understanding all is contrast._
-
-
-Here is what I have elsewhere said upon this question, so long debated,
-of the _instinct and understanding of animals_.
-
-“There is a most complete difference between _instinct_ and
-_understanding_.
-
-“In _instinct_ all is blind, necessary, and invariable. In
-_understanding_ every thing is elective, conditional, and modifiable.
-
-“The beaver which builds its house, and the bird that constructs its
-nest, act only by instinct.
-
-“The dog and the horse, that learn even the meaning of several of our
-words, and who pay obedience to us, do so by understanding.
-
-“In _instinct_ all is innate. The beaver builds without having learned
-to build: all that he does is from fatality. The beaver builds under the
-impulsion of a constant and irresistible force.
-
-“In _understanding_, every thing results from experience and
-_instruction_. The dog obeys only because he has learned to obey: he is
-perfectly free in this respect; for he obeys only because he will obey.
-
-“Finally, in regard to _instinct_ every thing is particular. That
-admirable industry that the beaver exhibits in the construction of his
-hut, can be employed in no other occupation than the building of his hut.
-Now, in _understanding_ every thing is general; for the dog could apply
-the same flexibility of attention, and of conception, which he uses in
-obeying, to do any other thing.
-
-“In animals there are, therefore, two distinct and primary
-forces—_instinct_ and _understanding_. As long as our conceptions of
-these forces were confused, all our views and opinions in regard to
-the actions of animals remained obscure and contradictory. Among these
-actions, some exhibited man every where superior to the brute; while
-others appeared to accord to the brute creation the superiority over
-man—a contradiction almost as deplorable as absurd! By the distinction
-that separates blind and necessary actions from elective and conditional
-ones—or, in a word, instinct from intelligence—all contradiction
-disappears, and order succeeds to confusion. Whatever in animals is
-_understanding_, does not in any degree approach the excellence of
-the human understanding; and whatsoever, under the appearance of
-_understanding_, seemed superior to the human understanding, is in fact a
-mere result of a mechanical and blind force.”[187]
-
-Here is what I say as to the boundaries between the intelligence of man
-and of animals.
-
-“Animals receive, through their senses, impressions similar to those that
-we receive through the medium of our senses; like ourselves, they retain
-the traces of these impressions: these impressions, when preserved, form
-for them, as well as for us, numerous and various associations: they
-combine them, they draw from them inferences, and deduce judgments from
-them: therefore they possess understanding.
-
-“But the whole of their understanding stops at that point. The
-understanding they possess is not one that can consider itself: it cannot
-see itself, does not know itself. They do not possess _reflection_, that
-supreme faculty with which the mind of man is endowed, and which enables
-him to turn his intellectual power inwards, so as to study and know the
-nature of his own understanding.
-
-“Reflection, thus defined, is then the boundary that separates human
-intelligence from that of the brute creation: and in fact it cannot be
-denied that this furnishes a strong line of demarcation between them.
-Thought, which contemplates itself; understanding, which sees itself and
-studies itself; knowledge, which knows itself; these evidently constitute
-an order of determinate phenomena of a decided character, and to which no
-brute animal can ever attain. This is, if one might so speak, a purely
-intellectual domain; and it appertains to man alone. In one word, animals
-feel, know, think; but man is the only one of all created beings to whom
-has been given the power of feeling that he feels, of knowing that he
-knows, and of thinking that he thinks.”[188]
-
-I will quote, also, the following passage from my work sur _l’instinct et
-l’intelligence des animaux_, p. 178, et seq.
-
-“ ... There are three facts: _instinct_, _understanding of brutes_, and
-_human understanding_; and each of these facts has its definite limits.
-
-“Instinct acts without knowing; understanding knows in order to act; the
-human understanding alone knows, and knows itself.
-
-“Reflection, closely defined, is the _knowledge of thought by thought_.
-And this power of thought over thought gives us a whole order of new
-relations. As soon as the mind perceives itself it judges itself; as
-soon as it can act upon itself it is free; as soon as it becomes free it
-becomes moral.
-
-“Man is only moral because he is free.
-
-“The brute animal follows its body; in the midst of this body, which
-shrouds it completely in matter, the human mind is free, and so free that
-it can, whenever it prefers to do so, immolate its very body.
-
-“‘The great power of the will over the body,’ says Bossuet, ‘consists in
-this prodigious effect, that man is so completely master of his frame,
-that he can even sacrifice it for the sake of some greater good in view.
-To rush into the midst of blows, and plunge into a flight of arrows from
-a blind impetuosity, as happens among brute creatures, shows nothing
-superior to the body itself; but to resolve to die with understanding,
-and for reasons, notwithstanding the whole disposition of the body to the
-contrary, evinces a principle superior to the body; and among all the
-tribes of animals, man is the only one in whom this principle exists.’”
-
-
-
-
-NOTE III.
-
-GALL, AS AN OBSERVER.
-
-    Page 93. _He studied them (mankind) in his own way, but he
-    studied them very closely._
-
-
-Gall was a practical observer. He observed and studied always, and with
-so much the greater success because “people never suspected that they
-had to do (these are his own words) with a man who knew perfectly well
-that the basis of human character continues to be always the same, and
-that merely the objects that interest us change with the progress of
-years.”[189]
-
-He examined “families, schools, hospitals, &c.”[190] And he never was
-satisfied with appearances only. “The occupations that we pursue as our
-business, generally prove nothing either as to our faculties or our
-propensities: but those which we engage in as recreation are almost
-always in conformity with our tastes and our talents.”[191]
-
-His observations on men were more serviceable to him in judging of and
-describing their characters, than the _bumps on the skull_.
-
-“I often said to my friends, show me the fundamental forces of the soul,
-and I will find the organ and the seat for each one of them.[192] ...
-When I had become convinced that a distinguished talent, and one fully so
-recognised, was especially the work of nature, I examined the head of the
-individual, ... &c.”[193]
-
-Gall’s progression, then, was from _observation_ to the _cranium_; he
-first proceeded from _observation_ to the _cranium_, and next from the
-_cranium_ to the _brain_.
-
-Furthermore, Gall began by studying the _physiognomy_—the _features_ of
-the _countenance_—like Lavater.
-
-He at first thought that a good memory was connected with a certain
-_conformation of the eyes_: “I remarked,” says he, “that they all had
-large projecting eyes.... I suspected, therefore, that there ought
-to exist some connexion between memory and this conformation of the
-eyes.”[194] Again he says, “It may be perceived, from the progress of
-these researches, that the first step consisted in the discovery of
-certain organs; that it was by degrees only that we allowed facts to
-speak in order to deduce from them general principles; and that it was
-subsequently, and towards the close, that we had learned to know the
-brain.”[195]
-
-Thus it appears that the study of the brain came later than the doctrine;
-and that is the reason why the anatomy of the brain is a mere series of
-mistakes and conjectures—I mean here the _special anatomy_, the _secret
-anatomy_, the _phrenological anatomy_; I mean the anatomy made out to
-suit the doctrine. I have already sufficiently discriminated between it
-and the _real anatomy_.[196]
-
-
-
-
-NOTE IV.
-
-OF THE ANIMAL SPIRITS.
-
-    Page 116. _He who is so intolerant of the personifications
-    proposed by others makes one personification more._
-
-
-Broussais explains every thing by the word _irritation_, just as Gall
-explains every thing by the word _faculties_, and as Malebranche
-explained them by _animal spirits_.
-
-After serving Descartes, the _animal spirits_ were in the service of
-Malebranche; they served all the authors of the seventeenth century.
-
-Malebranche commences one of his chapters with these words: “Every body
-agrees that the _animal spirits_....”[197] He had no idea that every body
-would agree some day, that the _animal spirits_ is mere nonsense.
-
-There were animal spirits of all sorts; as Gall had _faculties_ of all
-sorts: there were _agitated_[198] animal spirits, _languid_ animal
-spirits.[199] There were even _libertine_ animal spirits.
-
-“Wine is so spirituous,” says Malebranche, “that it is _animal spirits_
-almost completely formed, but libertine spirits.”[200]
-
-The animal spirits seemed to have become the _ultima ratio_ of the
-philosophers.
-
-The author of a book, in other respects to be esteemed, thus defined
-_imagination_: “Imagination is a perception of the soul’s caused by the
-internal motion of the animal spirits.”[201]
-
-That author had no doubt that he was saying something.
-
-
-
-
-NOTE V.
-
-EXAGGERATION OF BROUSSAIS, EVEN IN PHRENOLOGY.
-
-    Page 120. _We ought to read that volume over again, and forget
-    the Cours de Phrénologie._
-
-
-Broussais does not adopt merely the general ideas of the phrenologists—he
-adopts even the smallest of them.
-
-Gall had located the _instinct_ of _murder_ in a given part of the brain;
-and he supposed, be it understood, that this part existed only in the
-brain of the carnivorous animals. But see, it is found in the brain of
-the herbivora; and one would suppose that the phrenologists would be in
-trouble about it. Don’t deceive yourself, the _instinct of murder_ is
-the _instinct of destruction_. Spurzheim denominates it _destructivity_;
-and the herbivorous animals must possess it, for they eat plants and
-consequently _destroy_ them.
-
-“The herbivora” says Broussais, “effect a real destruction among
-plants.[202] An attempt has been made to turn these ideas into ridicule,
-even in an Academy.... It was in a learned society of this kind
-considered ridiculous in the phrenologists to compare the destruction of
-vegetables to that of animals. For my own part I do not see why the idea
-should be rejected, if the fundamental object of the organ be to procure
-the means of alimentation, which seems to be quite certain.”[203]
-
-Gall imagines an organ for religion; he thinks it peculiar to man, and
-denominates it the _Organ of Theosophy_. The same organ is found quite
-down in the scale as low as the sheep;[204] and do not suppose that
-Broussais is at all shocked by the discovery. If necessary he will go
-further than all the phrenologists taken together.
-
-“The phrenologists” says he, “have denied that this sentiment (the
-sentiment of veneration) belongs to the animals. I am not of that
-opinion. A certain shade of _veneration_ exists in many species, among
-the vertebrate, that choose their leaders, and march according to a
-signal given by their chiefs and obey them. Thus even among the sheep you
-may see a chief.”[205]
-
-Who would have believed it? Broussais finds Gall too timorous.
-
-“There is,” says he, “no central organ. This is considered as one of the
-most powerful objections to Gall. As far as I know he never answered it.
-As for me, I shall be more frank, perhaps more bold: I shall say it is
-impossible that there should be one, &c.”[206]
-
-
-
-
-NOTE VI.
-
-CONTRACTILITY OF BROUSSAIS.
-
-    Page 126. _He assigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he
-    explains every thing by means of it._
-
-
-He assigns it to every tissue. Haller attributed this property to the
-muscles alone, “but it is a common property of the tissues.”[207]
-
-He explains every thing by means of it: every thing, even _innervation_
-itself. But he is constrained to add: “Doubtless _something more occurs_
-in the interior of the nervous tissue; doubtless we are unacquainted and
-ignorant as to how _that other thing_ is connected with the motions in
-question, and how it may employ them in the act of innervation,” &c.[208]
-
-So we perceive, in the first place, _contractility_ explains
-_innervation_; and then, that _something more_ is wanting. And as nervous
-contractility is nothing but a mental fiction (a nerve never moves, never
-_contracts_, when it is touched) the whole matter tapers down to this
-_something more_, or to _that other thing_.
-
-See how very far from being rigorous are those who construct systems.
-
-
-
-
-NOTE VII.
-
-REAL LABOURS OF GALL AS TO THE BRAIN.
-
-    Page 128. _Gall, moreover, was a great anatomist._
-
-
-He found that the medullary substance of the brain was fibrous
-throughout;[209] he saw the fibres of the medulla oblongata decussate
-before they form the pyramidal eminences,[210] those of the corpora
-olivaria, &c.; that is to say, all the ascending fibres of the medulla
-oblongata across the pons varolii, thalami nervor opticorum, and the
-corpora striata, as far as the vault of the hemispheres; he saw the
-bundles formed by these fibres increased in magnitude at each of these
-passages; he distinguished the fibres which go out in order to expand
-in the hemispheres, from those that go in in order to give birth to the
-commissures: many nerves that were regarded as coming out immediately
-from the brain, were by him traced even into the medulla oblongata, &c.
-
-And I repeat that all these facts, with the discovery of which he has
-enriched the science of anatomy, all of them are the results of a happy
-thought of his—the idea of _tracing_ the fibres of the brain, or to use
-a common expression, of substituting in the dissection of the brain the
-method of _developments_ for that of _sections_.
-
-Those of Gall’s opinions which it seems ought not to be adopted, are:
-that in which he supposes the nerve fibres to be born (he understands
-the word to the letter) of the gray matter; that in which he contends
-that the convolutions of the brain are merely foldings of the medullary
-fibres, and can therefore be _unfolded_; that in which he compares the
-rete mucosum of the skin to the gray matter of the encephalon, &c., &c.
-
-Gall had a mind which impelled him to the formation of hypotheses; and
-even in his real anatomy there is a decided smack of a system-author.
-
-
-THE END.
-
-
-
-
-FOOTNOTES
-
-
-[1] Anatomie et Physiologie du système nerveux en général, et du cerveau
-en particulier, avec des observations sur la possibilité de reconnaître
-plusieurs dispositions intellectuelles et morales de l’homme et des
-animaux par la configuration de leurs têtes; 4 vol. 4to, avec planches.
-Paris, de 1810 à 1819.
-
-[2] T. ii. p. 217. “It is generally understood,” says he further, “that
-the brain is the peculiar organ of the soul.” T. ii. p. 14.
-
-[3] Gall, t. ii. p. 221.
-
-[4] Gall, t. ii. p. 222. Haller, Elem. Physiolog. etc., t. iv. p. 304.
-Sensus præterea sedem in cerebro esse, atque ad cerebrum per nervos
-mandari, alia sunt quæ ostendunt.
-
-[5] Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l’homme, IIe Mémoire, § vii.
-
-[6] Leçons d’Anat. Comp. t. ii. p. 153.
-
-[7] Ibid. p. 173.
-
-[8] Recherches Phys. sur la Vie et la Mort, art. vi. § ii.
-
-[9] Ibid.
-
-[10] Descartes, Lettre à Regius ou Leroy, t. viii. p. 515, edit, par M.
-Cousin.
-
-[11] T. v. p. 34. “I remark,” says he again, “that the mind does not
-receive the impression from all parts of the body, but from the brain
-only.”—T. i. p. 344.
-
-[12] T. vi. p. 347.
-
-[13] T. ii. p. 357.
-
-[14] T. ii. p. 358.
-
-[15] “The principal object of this work,” says he, “is to show how all
-our knowledge, and all our faculties come from the senses.”—Traité des
-Sensations, préambule de l’Extrait Raisonné.
-
-[16] Traité des Sensations, préam. de l’Extrait Raisonné.
-
-[17] De l’homme, de ses facultés intellectuelles, etc. t. i. p. 186.
-Liege, 1774.
-
-[18] He very properly distinguishes the senses from the understanding;
-but, as will be elsewhere seen, he endows each sense with all the
-attributes of the understanding. He escapes from one error only to fall
-into another.
-
-[19] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions
-du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.
-
-[20] Ibid.
-
-[21] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions
-du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. Paris, 1842.
-
-[22] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions
-du Système Nerveux.
-
-[23] Ibid.
-
-[24] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions
-du Système Nerveux.
-
-[25] “From what I have now said, it clearly follows that the aperceptive
-faculty, the faculty of reminiscence, and that of memory, are nothing but
-attributes common to all the fundamental faculties.”—Gall, t. iv. p. 319.
-“All that I have just said, is also applicable to the judgment and the
-imagination,” &c.—Ibid. p. 325. “The sentiments and the propensities also
-have their judgment, their imagination, their recollection, and their
-memory.”—Ibid. p. 327.
-
-[26] Ibid. 328.
-
-[27] Ibid. 327.
-
-[28] Gall, t. iv. p. 339.
-
-[29] Ibid. p. 341.
-
-[30] “The _intellectual faculty_ and all its subdivisions, such as
-perception, recollection, memory, judgment, imagination, &c. are not
-fundamental faculties, but merely general attributes of them.”—Gall, t.
-iv. p. 327.
-
-[31] “Reason,” says Gall, “is the result of the simultaneous action of
-all the intellectual faculties.”—Gall, t. iv. p. 341.
-
-[32] Gall enumerates twenty-seven of these faculties, Spurzheim
-enumerates twenty-five, &c.
-
-[33] Gall, t. iv. p. 325.
-
-[34] Ibid. p. 330.
-
-[35] “I find in myself,” says Descartes, “divers faculties of thought,
-that have each their own way, ... whence I conclude, they are distinct
-from me, as modes are distinct from things.”—T. i. p. 332.
-
-[36] T. viii. p. 169.
-
-[37] Gall, iv. p. 341.
-
-[38] Ibid.
-
-[39] Ibid. t. ii. p. 100.
-
-[40] Gall, t. ii. p. 97.
-
-[41] Ibid.
-
-[42] “It is a law of moral liberty, that man shall be always determined,
-and that he shall himself determine from the most numerous and most
-powerful motives.”—T. ii. p. 137.
-
-[43] “But an organ may act with greater energy, and furnish a more
-powerful motive.”—T. ii. p. 104.
-
-[44] “There is no person who, upon contemplating himself, does not feel
-and experience that will and liberty are one and the same; or rather,
-that there is no difference between that which is voluntary and that
-which is free.”—T. i. p. 496.
-
-[45] Descartes, t. i. p. 299. “It is always in our power to prevent
-ourselves from pursuing a good which is clearly known to us, provided we
-should think it a good to show in that way our free will.”—Descartes,
-t. vi. p. 133. “The fulness of liberty consists in the great use of
-our positive ability to follow the worse, while we truly know the
-better.”—Ibid. p. 138.
-
-[46] The question here relates solely to the brain, properly so called,
-(the lobes or cerebral hemispheres.) The rest of the encephalon does not
-serve in the operations of the understanding. See the preceding article,
-p. 29, et seq.
-
-[47] _Individual intelligences_—an expression of Gall’s. “Each individual
-intelligence has its own proper organ.”—iv. 341.
-
-[48] Even the instincts, according to Gall, have their memory,
-imagination, &c. “The instinct of propagation, that of the love of
-offspring, pride, vanity, possess, beyond contradiction, their perceptive
-faculty, their recollection, their memory, judgment, imagination, and
-their own attention.”—T. iv. p. 331. “The propensities and the sentiments
-likewise possess their judgment, their taste, their imagination, their
-recollection, and their memory.”—iv. 344.
-
-[49] Gall, t. iv. p. 325.
-
-[50] Ibid.
-
-[51] See particularly t. ii. p. 5.
-
-[52] “Had I to do with readers wholly free from prejudice, I should, in
-order to convince them of this, (the supposition of innate ideas,) have
-nothing to do but show them that mankind acquire all the knowledge they
-possess by the simple use of their natural faculties.”—Philos. Essay on
-the Human Understanding.
-
-[53] “Locke contents himself,” says he, “with acknowledging that the soul
-perceives, doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, and reflects: that we
-are convinced of the existence of these _operations_; ... but he seems to
-have regarded them as something innate.” A short time before he had said,
-“We shall see that all the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be
-innate qualities.”—Traité des Sensations. (Extrait raisonné.)
-
-[54] See t. iii. p. 81.
-
-[55] T. i. p. 343.
-
-[56] “I may now flatter myself,” says he, “that the reader is
-sufficiently prepared for quite a new philosophy, deduced directly from
-the fundamental forces.”—T. iii. p. 11.
-
-[57] T. iv. p. 327.
-
-[58] T. iv. p. 319.
-
-[59] T. iv. p. 341.
-
-[60] Ibid.
-
-[61] Ibid.
-
-[62] “Each individual understanding possesses its own proper organ.”—T.
-iv. p. 341.
-
-[63] T. i. p. 230.
-
-[64] T. iv. p. 105.
-
-[65] See the preceding articles.
-
-[66] T. iv. p. 340. “From all these faculties comes at last decision. It
-is this decision ... which is really will and wishing.”—T. ii. p. 105.
-
-[67] T. iv. p. 341.
-
-[68] T. iv. p. 269.
-
-[69] T. iv. p. 271.
-
-[70] T. iv. p. 252.
-
-[71] T. iv. p. 252.
-
-[72] T. iv. p. 10.
-
-[73] T. i. p. 290.
-
-[74] T. i. p. 287.
-
-[75] Article “Liberté,” Diction. Encyclop.
-
-[76] T. iii. p. 155. Such phrases cannot be concluded.
-
-[77] T. iii. p. 213.
-
-[78] Ibid. 219.
-
-[79] “This term, instinct, is applicable,” says he, “to all the
-fundamental forces.”—T. iv. p. 334. And he does not see that as to the
-instincts and the understanding all is contrast. Upon this difference
-of instinct and understanding, see my work De l’Instinct et de
-l’Intelligence des Animaux, etc. Paris, 1845, 2d edit.
-
-[80] It is true that this approximation astonishes him. “The predilection
-of animals for elevated places depends,” says he, “upon the same parts
-as pride, which is in man a moral sentiment! Let the reader imagine the
-astonishment excited in my mind by such a phenomenon.”—T. iii. 311.
-
-[81] “Co-existing with the love of war, it (the carnivorous instinct)
-constitutes the intrepid warrior.”—T. iii. p. 258. “I know a head which,
-as to the organ of murder, approaches that of Madeline Albert, and the la
-Bouhours, except only that nature has executed it upon a grander scale.
-To witness suffering, is for this person to have the keenest enjoyment.
-Whoever does not love blood, is in his eyes contemptible.”—T. iii. p.
-259. The pen refuses to transcribe such things, which fortunately,
-however, are pure extravagances.
-
-[82] “From my reflections it follows that conscience is nothing but a
-modification, an affection of the moral sense,” (organ.)—T. iv. p. 210.
-“From all that I have said as to conscience, it follows that it can by
-no means be regarded as a fundamental quality: that it is really only an
-affection of the moral sense—or benevolence.”—T. iv. p. 217.
-
-[83] T. iii. p. 321.
-
-[84] T. iv. p. 272.
-
-[85] T. ii. p. 287.
-
-[86] Recherches sur le système nerveux en général et sur celui du cerveau
-en particulier; mémoire présenté à l’Institut de France, le 14 Mars,
-1808; suivi d’Observations sur le rapport qui en a été fait à cette
-compagnie par ses commissaires, par F. J. Gall et G. Spurzheim. Paris,
-1809.
-
-[87] “The nervous membrane of the brain forms these folds, which are
-denominated its convolutions.”—Anat. et Physiol. du Système Nerveux, t.
-iii. p. 82.
-
-[88] Spurzheim justly remarks: “Admitting that the direction of the
-fibres is known, that we know their consistence to be greater or less,
-that their colour is more or less white, that their magnitude is more
-or less considerable, &c. what conclusions can we, from all these
-circumstances, draw as to their functions? None at all.”—Obser. sur la
-Phrénologie, ou la connaissance de l’homme moral et intellectuel fondée
-sur les fonctions du Système Nerveux, p. 83. Paris, 1818.
-
-[89] Rapport sur un Mémoire de MM. Gall et Spurzheim, rélatif à l’anat.
-du cerveau. Séances des 25 Avril et 2 Mai, 1808.
-
-[90] “The determination of the fundamental forces and the seat of
-their organs constitutes the most striking portion of my discoveries.
-The knowledge of the primary faculties and qualities, and the seat of
-their material conditions, constitutes precisely the phrenology of the
-brain.”—Gall, Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. p. 4.
-
-[91] Lettre d’un Médecin des Hôpitaux du Roi. Namur. 1710.
-
-[92] Elementa Physiologiæ, t. iv. p. 384.
-
-[93] “But if it be supposed that each fundamental faculty, as well as
-each particular sense, is dependent on a particular part of the brain,”
-&c. Gall, Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., t. iii. p. 392.
-
-[94] T. iv. p. 9.
-
-[95] T. iv. p. 9.
-
-[96] T. ii. p. 234.
-
-[97] The brain, properly so called.
-
-[98] _I_ see with _my_ eyes.—M.
-
-[99] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les fonctions
-du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.
-
-[100] Ibid.
-
-[101] See at the end of this work the first Note on Gall’s Anatomy.
-
-[102] T. i. p. 271. Spurzheim explains himself in like manner. “The
-organs of the internal faculties are as separate as the bundles of the
-nerves of the five senses.”—Observ. sur la Phrénol., &c. p. 74. “It is
-found that the brain is composed of many bundles, which must have their
-functions.”—Ibid. p. 94. “The organs ... are composed of divergent
-bundles, of convolutions, and of the commissures.”—Ibid.
-
-[103] T. iv. p. 8. “Bonnet believes, and it is probable, that each nerve
-fibre has its own proper action.”—Ibid.
-
-[104] T. iii. p. 2.
-
-[105] T. iii. p. 4.
-
-[106] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les
-fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842. See also the first article
-of this work.
-
-[107] It must, however, be one or the other; for it must be something.
-Might it be a convolution, as has been since said? But there are not
-seven and twenty convolutions, &c. &c.
-
-[108] T. ii. p. 163.
-
-[109] Gall, as we have seen, confounds understanding with instinct.
-Literally, he divides understanding into many instincts, and then out of
-each instinct constructs an intellectual faculty. See the second article
-of this work. “The term instinct suits all the fundamental faculties.”—T.
-iv. p. 334. For the characters peculiar to the instincts, see my work
-entitled “De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux,” 2d edit. 1845.
-
-[110] See my Recherches Expérimentales sur les propriétés et les
-fonctions du Système Nerveux, 2d edit. 1842.
-
-[111] “The organ of philogeniture, or the last convolution of the
-cerebral lobes.”—Spurzheim, Obser. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 117.
-
-[112] With very few exceptions.
-
-[113] “The qualities and faculties common to man and animals, are
-situated in the posterior portions,” &c.—T. iii. p. 79, and t. iv. p. 13.
-“The qualities and faculties that man exclusively enjoys, are situated
-in the cerebral portions, of which the brute creation is deprived; and
-we must consequently seek for them in the antero superior portion of the
-frontal bone.”—T. iii. page 79.
-
-[114] “The anterior parts of the brain are not wanting in the mammifera,
-but the posterior parts,” says Leuret, very justly, in his fine work
-on the circumvolutions of the brain, entitled, Anat. Compar. du Syst.
-Nerveux, consideré dans ses rapports avec l’Intelligence, t. i. p. 588.
-Paris, 1839.
-
-[115] T. iii. p. 20.
-
-[116] T. iii. p. 26.
-
-[117] It is curious to see how M. Vimont, a very decided phrenologist
-as well as an able anatomist, expresses himself on the subject of the
-_localizations_ of Gall and Spurzheim. “Gall’s work,” says M. Vimont,
-“is fitter to lead into error than to give a just idea of the seats of
-the organs.”—Traité de Phrén. t. ii. p. 12. “Gall says he has remarked,
-that horses whose ears are widely separated at the roots, are sure-footed
-and courageous. Possibly the fact may be true; but I cannot comprehend
-the connexion that may exist betwixt the outward mark and the quality of
-courage, whose seat, in the horse, Gall indicates at a point where there
-is no brain.”—Ibid. 281. “Spurzheim indicates the region of the frontal
-sinuses as the seat of gentleness, while courage is located upon the
-muscles that go to be inserted on the os occipitis.”—Ibid. p. 117. Such
-are M. Vimont’s remarks, yet this same M. Vimont inscribes the following
-twenty-nine names on the skull of a goose!
-
-    1. Conservation.
-    2. Choice of aliment.
-    3. Destruction.
-    4. Cunning.
-    5. Courage.
-    6. Choice of locality.
-    7. Concentration.
-    8. Attachment to life, or marriage.
-    9. Attachment.
-    10. Reproduction.
-    11. Attachment to the product of conception.
-    12. Property.
-    13. Circumspection.
-    14. Perception of substance.
-    15. Configuration.
-    16. Extent.
-    17. Distance.
-    18. Geometrical sense.
-    19. Resistance.
-    20. Localities.
-    21. Order.
-    22. Time.
-    23. Language.
-    24. Eventuality.
-    25. Construction.
-    26. Musical talent.
-    27. Imitation.
-    28. Comparison.
-    29. Gentleness.
-
-“All this upon the cranium of a goose!” says M. Leuret upon this
-occasion, (page 355.) “And there is no place so small but it is
-occupied.... The faculties are so crowded,” adds he, “that it would be a
-marvellous thing to be able to write their names upon the brain.... It
-would be a greater marvel to discover them.”
-
-[118] Gall himself says: “In whatever region we examine the two
-substances that compose the brain, it is with difficulty that we can
-discern any difference between them as to their structure, &c.”—T. iii.
-p. 70.
-
-[119] T. iii. p. 63.
-
-[120] “I remained a whole day shut up in an oven.”—T. i. 133.
-
-[121] T. i. p. 263.
-
-[122] Eloge de Tournefort.
-
-[123] One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1818. Phrenology is the very name given by
-Spurzheim to the doctrine of Gall.
-
-[124] One volume, 8vo. Paris, 1820.
-
-[125] Observ. sur la Phrénol. &c. p. 8.
-
-[126] Observ. sur la Phrén. p. 20.
-
-[127] Ibid. p. 22.
-
-[128] Rech. sur le Syst. Nerv. en général, &c. par F. J. Gall et G.
-Spurzheim.
-
-[129] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerveux, &c., the work which has been
-examined in the three preceding articles.
-
-[130] T. iv. p. 341.
-
-[131] Ibid. p. 327.
-
-[132] Ibid. p. 341.
-
-[133] In the preceding article, p. 93.
-
-[134] Lettre de Charles Villers à Georges Cuvier, sur une nouvelle
-théorie du cerveau, par le Docteur Gall, &c. Metz, 1802.
-
-[135] Lettre de Charles Villers, &c. p. 34.
-
-[136] Ibid.
-
-[137] Observ. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 10.
-
-[138] Especially in the last article.
-
-[139] And which was not taken up by Gall, except from the necessity he
-was under of assimilating at all points the external senses with the
-faculties of the soul.
-
-[140] Observ. sur la Phrén., &c. p. 65.
-
-[141] Ibid. p. 67.
-
-[142] Ibid. p. 75.
-
-[143] See particularly the Essai philosophique sur la morâle et
-intellectuelle de l’homme, p. 54, et seq.
-
-[144] Observ. sur la Phrén. p. 17.
-
-[145] Ibid. p. 127.
-
-[146] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv., &c. t. iii. p. 19. This volume came
-out the same year as Spurzheim’s Observ., &c.
-
-[147] T. iv. p. 67.
-
-[148] The eight organs added by Spurzheim, are the organs of
-habitativity, order, time, right, supernaturality, hope, extent,
-weight. Gall’s remarks upon these eight organs proposed by Spurzheim
-are as follows: “M. Spurzheim, it is true, recognises eight organs
-more than I admit. As to the organs of habitativity, order, time, and
-supernaturality, I have already spoken. I admit an organ of the moral
-sense, or sense of right (_juste_), but I have very strong reasons
-for believing that benevolence is nothing more than a very strong
-manifestation of the moral sense; therefore I treat these two organs
-under the rubric of a single organ. What M. Spurzheim says on the organs
-of hope, of extent, and of weight, has not as yet convinced me: and, in
-fact, he has hitherto proved nothing in respect to them.”—T. iii. p. 25.
-
-[149] Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 216.
-
-[150] See the Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 47, et seq.
-
-[151] The sense of Amativity, the sense of Philogeniture, the sense of
-Destructivity, the sense of Affectivity, the sense of Thievishness,
-the sense of Secretivity, the sense of Circumspection, the sense of
-Approbation, the sense of Self-love. (What a chaos, and what words!)
-
-[152] The sense of Benevolence, the sense of Veneration, the sense
-of Firmness, the sense of Duty, the sense of Hope, the sense of the
-Marvellous, the sense of Ideality, the sense of Gaiety, the sense of
-Imitation.
-
-[153] The sense of Individuality, of Extent, of Configuration, of
-Consistence, of Weight, of Colour.
-
-[154] The sense of Localities, of Numeration, of Order, of Phenomena, of
-Time, of Method, of Artificial Language.
-
-[155] The sense of Comparison, the sense of Causality.
-
-[156] “Some of the affective faculties produce only a desire, an
-inclination.... I shall call them propensities.”—Observ. sur la Phrénol.,
-&c. p. 124.
-
-[157] “Other affective faculties are not restricted to a simple
-inclination, but something beyond; which is what is called sentiment or
-feeling.”—Ibid.
-
-[158] “The intellectual faculties are also double: some of them know;
-others reflect.”—Essai Philosophique, &c. p. 225.
-
-[159] “The faculties peculiar to man are happy in themselves, per
-se.”—Ibid. p. 167.
-
-[160] Anat. et Phys. du Syst. Nerv. &c. t. iii. p. 27.
-
-[161] See his Histoire des Phlegmas. Chron. 1808.
-
-[162] See his work entitled, “De l’Irritation et de la Folie,” 1828.
-
-[163] Cours de Phrénologie, 1 vol. 8vo. 1836.
-
-[164] Cours de Phrénologie, p. 82.
-
-[165] Ibid. p. 140.
-
-[166] Ibid. p. 37.
-
-[167] “Memory is not an isolated faculty; and there are as many memories
-as organs.”—p. 131.
-
-[168] “The instincts and the sentiments have a memory as well as the
-external perceptions.”—p. 36.
-
-[169] “ ... The study of the human mind, not indeed that of a fictitious
-one bearing this mysterious appellation, but of the _ensemble_ of the
-mental faculties of man.”—p. 82.
-
-[170] Page 48.
-
-[171] “The favorers of the intra-cranial entity.”—p. 153.
-
-[172] “Their central intra-cranial being, to which they attribute all
-their faculties.”
-
-[173] “Suppose they had called this being _person par excellence_....”—p.
-75.
-
-[174] Let us examine, as to this particular (_moi_) ME, all Broussais’s
-_variorums_. In one place the _me_ comes from only one organ—the organ
-of general comparison: “We owe to the organ of general comparison the
-distinction of our person expressed by the sign _me_.”—Cours de Phrén.,
-p. 684. Further on it comes from two—the organ of comparison and the
-organ of causality: “The organ of causality is as necessary to the
-distinction of the _me_, and of the _person_, as the organ of general
-comparison.”—Ibid. p. 685. Next there is no organ at all: “To assign to
-the _me_ a special organ appears to me to be out of the question.”—Ibid.
-p. 119. And then it comes from every where: “There is no special and
-central organ, and our perception of ourselves has for its basis the
-sensitive perceptions.”—Ibid. p. 119.
-
-[175] Cours de Phrénologie, p. 684.
-
-[176] Examen de la Doctrine Médicale, etc. 1816.
-
-[177] Cours de Phrénologie, p. 717.
-
-[178] Cours de Phrénologie, p. 77. He also says, “Their central
-intra-cranial being, to which they attribute all the faculties of a
-man, is not cognisable by any of our senses, ... it is therefore a pure
-hypothesis.”—Ibid. p. 153. Thus there is no _mind_ (pure hypothesis);
-no _faculties_ but those of the _organs_ (the faculties are the acts
-of _material organs_); no understanding, except as a simple phenomenon
-of the nervous action (understanding and all its manifestations are
-_phenomena of nervous action_); consequently, there is no psycology;
-there is nothing but physiology; and even (for it should be clearly
-understood) nothing but Broussais’s physiology.
-
-[179] “In order to form for one’s self a just notion of the operations
-which result in the production of thought, it is necessary to conceive
-of the brain as a peculiar organ, specially designed for the production
-thereof, just as the stomach is designed to effect digestion, the liver
-to form the bile, &c.”—Cabanis, Rapports du Physique et du moral de
-l’homme, IIe mémoire, § vii.
-
-[180] Whence he concludes still more admirably, to the immortality of
-the soul. “I cannot,” says he, “conceive otherwise of those who die,
-than that they pass into a more pleasing and tranquil life than ours,
-even carrying with them the remembrance of the past: for I find there
-is within us an intellectual memory.... And although religion teaches
-us many things upon this subject, I must, notwithstanding, confess my
-infirmity on this point, which it appears to me that I possess in common
-with most people, which is, that although we might wish to believe, and
-even might suppose ourselves to be firm believers in the doctrines of
-religion, we are not so deeply touched with those things that are taught
-by faith alone, and which our mere reason cannot attain, as by those that
-are instilled into us by natural and very evident reasons.”—T. viii. p.
-684.
-
-[181] De l’Imitation et de la Folie, p. 4.
-
-[182] “The exaggeration of the phenomena of contractility is what
-constitutes irritation.”—Ibid. p. 77.
-
-[183] Anat. et Physiol. du Système Nerveux, &c. iii. 15.
-
-[184] The white matter is every where fibrous. No person has contributed
-more than Gall to the demonstration of this great fact. He justly
-remarks: “Those authors who, with Sœmmerring and Cuvier, &c., recognise
-the fibrous structure of the brain, in many of its parts, have
-nevertheless, not yet ventured to say that it is so in all its parts.”—T.
-i. 235.
-
-[185] The cerebellum serves only for the motions of locomotion. (See the
-first article of this work.) But, I am here setting forth Gall’s opinions.
-
-[186] “The particular systems of the brain terminate in fibrous
-expansions arranged in layers, just as the other nervous systems expand
-in fibres at their peripheral extremity.”—T. i. 318. “All the diverging
-bundles of the brain, after they come out from the last apparatus of
-reinforcement, expand in layers and form convolutions.”—T. i. 283. “The
-nerves of sensation and motion expand in the skin and the muscles; the
-nerves of the senses, each in the external instrument to which they
-belong: for example, the pituitary membrane upon the bones of the nose:
-the nerve of taste in the tongue, and the expansion of the optic nerve
-in the retina.... Nature obeys precisely the same law in the brain. The
-different parts of the brain originate and are reinforced at different
-points; they form fibrous bundles of various sizes, which terminate in
-expansions. All these expansions of the various bundles constitute, when
-reunited, the hemispheres of the brain.”—T. iii. p. 3.
-
-I here speak only of the _diverging fibres_. Coming from the interior,
-they proceed towards the exterior: the _converging fibres_ coming from
-the exterior, that is, according to Gall, from the gray matter that
-envelopes the brain and the cerebellum, are directed inwards. The
-former constitute the _convolutions_, while the latter compose the
-_commissures_. But I shall, further on, return to this subject.
-
-[187] See my work, De l’instinct et de l’intelligence des animaux, &c. p.
-46, 2d edit.
-
-[188] Opus citat. p. 49.
-
-[189] T. iii. p. 64.
-
-[190] T. iii. p. 64.
-
-[191] T. iii. p. 64.
-
-[192] T. iii. p. 58.
-
-[193] T. iii. p. 59.
-
-[194] T. i. p. 3.
-
-[195] T. i. p. 18.
-
-[196] T. i. p. 64 & 67.
-
-[197] De la Rech. de la Verité, liv. ii. chap. ii.
-
-[198] Ibid.
-
-[199] Ibid.
-
-[200] Du bel esprit, p. 80.
-
-[201] Ibid.
-
-[202] Cours de Phrén. 218.
-
-[203] P. 221.
-
-[204] See M. Leuret: Anat. Comp. du Syst. Nerv. &c. 1839.
-
-[205] Cours de Phrén. p. 350.
-
-[206] Ibid. p. 117.
-
-[207] De l’Irritation et de la Folie, p. 2.
-
-[208] Ibid. p. 76.
-
-[209] Steno had already said, “If the medullary substance be every where
-fibrous, as in fact, in most parts it appears to be, you must confess
-that the disposal of these fibres must be arranged with great skill,
-since the whole diversity of our feelings and motions depend upon them.
-We wonder at the artifice of the fibres in each muscle, but how much more
-are they worthy of admiration in the brain, where these fibres, enclosed
-within so small a space, perform each its own function without confusion
-and without disorder.”—_Discours sur l’anat. du cerveau_, 1668.
-
-[210] Long before his time the same had been seen by Mistichelli,
-Pourfour du Petit, Winslow, and several others, but it had been
-forgotten. “Each pyramidal body,” says Pourfour du Petit, “is divided at
-its inferior part into two large bundles of fibres, most frequently into
-three, and in some instances into four. Those of the right pass to the
-left side, and those of the left pass to the right side, mingling with
-each other.”—_Lettre d’un médecin des hôpitaux du Roi._ Namur 1710.
-
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