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diff --git a/old/65011-0.txt b/old/65011-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 8445313..0000000 --- a/old/65011-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31256 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 -Volume V (of 5), by Pat Meid - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume V (of 5) - Operations in West Korea - -Author: Pat Meid - James M. Yingling - -Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65011] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME V (OF 5) *** - - - - -[Illustration: KOREA] - -[Illustration: WESTERN KOREAN FRONT - -SITES OF MAJOR OUTPOST BATTLES - -1952–53] - - - - - U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA - - 1950–1953 - - VOLUME V - - _Operations in West Korea_ - - - by - - LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAT MEID, USMCR - - and - - MAJOR JAMES M. YINGLING, USMC - - - [Illustration] - - - Historical Division - Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps - Washington, D. C., 1972 - - - - - Preceding Volumes of - _U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_ - - - Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter” - Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Campaign” - Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign” - Volume IV, “The East-Central Front” - - - Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727 - - For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents - U.S. Government Printing Office - Washington, D.C. 20402--Price $4.50 (Cloth) - Stock Number 0855-0059 - - - - -Foreword - - -Mention the Korean War and almost immediately it evokes the memory of -Marines at Pusan, Inchon, Chosin Reservoir, or the Punchbowl. Americans -everywhere remember the Marine Corps’ combat readiness, courage, and -military skills that were largely responsible for the success of these -early operations in 1950–1951. Not as dramatic or well-known are the -important accomplishments of the Marines during the latter part of the -Korean War. - -In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division redeployed from the East-Central -front to West Korea. This new sector, nearly 35 miles in length, -anchored the far western end of I Corps and was one of the most -critical of the entire Eighth Army line. Here the Marines blocked -the enemy’s goal of penetrating to Seoul, the South Korean capital. -Northwest of the Marine Main Line of Resistance, less than five miles -distant, lay Panmunjom, site of the sporadic truce negotiations. - -Defense of their strategic area exposed the Marines to continuous and -deadly Communist probes and limited objective attacks. These bitter and -costly contests for key outposts bore such names as Bunker Hill, the -Hook, the Nevadas (Carson-Reno-Vegas), and Boulder City. For the ground -Marines, supported by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons, the fighting -continued until the last day of the war, 27 July 1953. - -The Korean War marked the first real test of Free World solidarity in -the face of Communist force. In repulsing this attempted Communist -aggression, the United Nations, led by the United States, served notice -that it would not hesitate to aid those nations whose freedom and -independence were under attack. - -As events have subsequently proven, holding the line against Communist -encroachment is a battle whose end is not yet in sight. Enemy -aggression may explode brazenly upon the world scene, with an overt -act of invasion, as it did in Korea in June 1950, or it may take the -form of a murderous guerrilla war as it has more recently, for over a -decade, in Vietnam. - -Whatever guise the enemy of the United States chooses or wherever he -draws his battleline, he will find the Marines with their age-old -answer. Today, as in the Korean era, Marine Corps readiness and -professionalism are prepared to apply the cutting edge against any -threat to American security. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - L. F. CHAPMAN, JR. - _General, U.S. Marine Corps,_ - _Commandant of the Marine Corps_ - -Reviewed and approved: 12 May 1971. - - - - -Preface - - -This is the concluding volume of a five-part series dealing with -operations of United States Marines in Korea between 2 August 1950 and -27 July 1953. Volume V provides a definitive account of operations -of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing during -1952–1953, the final phase of the Korean War. At this time the division -operated under Eighth U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK) control in the -far western sector of I Corps, while Marine aviators and squadrons -functioned as a component of the Fifth Air Force (FAF). - -The period covered by this history begins in March 1952, when the -Marine division moved west to occupy positions defending the approaches -to Seoul, the South Korean capital. As it had for most of the war the -1st Marine Aircraft Wing, operating under FAF, flew close support -missions not only for the Marines but for as many as 19 other Allied -frontline divisions. Included in the narrative is a detailed account of -Marine POWs, a discussion of the new defense mission of Marine units -in the immediate postwar period, and an evaluation of Marine Corps -contributions to the Korean War. - -Marines, both ground and aviation, comprised an integral part of the -United Nations Command in Korea. Since this is primarily a Marine Corps -history, actions of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are presented -only in sufficient detail to place Marine operations in their proper -perspective. - -Official Marine Corps combat records form the basis for the book. This -primary source material has been further supplemented by comments and -interviews from key participants in the action described. More than -180 persons reviewed the draft chapters. Their technical knowledge -and advice have been invaluable. Although the full details of these -comments could not be used in the text, this material has been placed -in Marine Corps archives for possible use by future historians. - -The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of Colonel -Frank C. Caldwell, Director of Marine Corps History, Historical -Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Production was accomplished -under the direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Deputy Director and -Chief Historian, who also outlined the volume. Preliminary drafts -were written by the late Lynn Montross, prime author of this series, -and Major Hubard D. Kuokka. Major James M. Yingling researched and -wrote chapters 1–6 and compiled the Command and Staff List. Lieutenant -Colonel Pat Meid researched and wrote chapters 7–12, prepared -appendices, processed photographs and maps, and did the final editing -of the book. - -Historical Division staff members, past or present, who freely lent -suggestions or provided information include Lieutenant Colonel John J. -Cahill, Captain Charles B. Collins, Mr. Ralph W. Donnelly, Mr. Benis -M. Frank, Mr. George W. Garand, Mr. Rowland P. Gill, Captain Robert J. -Kane, Major Jack K. Ringler, and Major Lloyd E. Tatem. Warrant Officer -Dennis Egan was Administrative Officer during the final stages of -preparation and production of this book. - -The many exacting administrative duties involved in processing the -volume from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form, -including the formidable task of indexing the book, were handled -expertly and cheerfully by Miss Kay P. Sue. Mrs. Frances J. Rubright -also furnished gracious and speedy assistance in obtaining the tomes -of official Marine Corps records. The maps were prepared by Sergeants -Kenneth W. White and Ernest L. Wilson. Official Department of Defense -photographs illustrate the book. - -A major contribution to the history was made by the Office of the -Chief of Military History, Department of the Army; the Naval History -Division, Department of the Navy; and the Office of Air Force History, -Department of the Air Force. Military history offices of England, -Canada, and South Korea provided additional details that add to the -accuracy and interest of this concluding volume of the Korean series. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - F. C. CALDWELL - _Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) - Director of Marine Corps History_ - - - - -Contents - - - _Page_ - - I Operations in West Korea Begin 1 - - From Cairo to JAMESTOWN--The Marines’ Home in West - Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division - Area--The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial - CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF Attacks--Strengthening the - Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the Division - and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem - - - II Defending the Line 51 - - UN Command Activities--Defense of East and West Coast - Korean Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952 - on JAMESTOWN--End of the Second Year of War--A Long - Fourth of July--Changes in the Lineup--Replacement and - Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952 - - - III The Battle of Bunker Hill 103 - - The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary - Action on Siberia--The Attack on Bunker - Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill--Company - B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker - Hill--In Retrospect - - - IV Outpost Fighting Expanded 145 - - From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September - Outpost Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy - Assaults in Late September--Chinese Intensify Their - Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More CAS, More - Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios - - - V The Hook 185 - - Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack - and Defense--Attack on the Hook--Reno - Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview - - - VI Positional Warfare 217 - - A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC - Line--Events on the Diplomatic Front--The Marine - Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW Operations - 1952–1953--Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes - in the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas - Battle - - - VII Vegas 263 - - The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense - Organization at the Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26 - March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed Counterattack - the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist - Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas - Consolidation Begins--Aftermath - - - VIII Marking Time (April-June 1953) 313 - - The Peace Talks Resume--Operation LITTLE - SWITCH--Interval Before the Marines Go Off the - Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve - and Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June - Fighting--Developments in Marine Air--Other Marine - Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered Back to the - Front - - - IX Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice 363 - - Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on - Outposts Berlin and East Berlin--Enemy Probes, - 11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of the - Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last - Day of the War - - - X Return of the Prisoners of War 399 - - Operation BIG SWITCH--Circumstances of Capture--The - Communist POW Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and - Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ Warfare - Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine - Escape Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath - - - XI While Guns Cool 445 - - The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the - Military Police Company--Organization of New Defense - Positions--Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM - - - XII Korean Reflection 475 - - Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean - War: Ground, Air, Helicopter--FMF and Readiness - Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean War--Korean - Lessons - - -Appendices - - - _Page_ - - A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 537 - - B Korean War Chronology 541 - - C Command and Staff List 549 - - D Effective Strength, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine - Aircraft Wing 573 - - E Marine Corps Casualties 575 - - F Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War 577 - - G Unit Citations (during 1952–1953 period) 579 - - H Armistice Agreement 587 - - Bibliography 611 - - Index 617 - - - - -Illustrations - - -_Photographs_ - -Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 212 and 436 - - -_Maps and Sketches_ - - _Page_ - 1 EUSAK Dispositions--15 March 1952 9 - - 2 Western Korea--I Corps Sector--1952–1953 14 - - 3 1st Marine Division Sector--30 April 1952 23 - - 4 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Dispositions--30 April 1952 25 - - 5 2/5 Sector--15–16 April 1952 35 - - 6 West Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 54 - - 7 East Coast Island Defense Element--Summer 1952 57 - - 8 Objectives for 1/5 Attack--9 May 1952 78 - - 9 1st Marines Sector of JAMESTOWN (Division Center)-- - 8 August 1952 110 - - 10 2/1 Sector--9–11 August 1952 115 - - 11 Bunker Hill Area--2300, 12 August 1952 120 - - 12 Combat Outposts and Ambush Sites--5th Marines Sector - (Division Right)--Early September 1952 151 - - 13 Combat Outposts--KMC Sector (Division Left)--5–7 - September 1952 154 - - 14 7th Marines Sector (Division Right)--Early October 1952 164 - - 15 “CCF Creeping Tactics”--March-October 1952 189 - - 16 Hook Sector of MLR--1800, 26 October 1952 198 - - 17 Hook Penetrations--26–27 October 1952 201 - - 18 Outpost Reno Attacks--27 October 1952 204 - - 19 CCF Attack Against KMC Sector (Division Left)-- - 31 October 1952 219 - - 20 Organization of Ground Defense--Winter 1952–1953 252 - - 21 Typical Hill Defense (Cross Section)--Winter 1952–1953 254 - - 22 5th Marines MLR Sector--26 March 1953 266 - - 23 1st Marines MLR Sector (Division Center)--26 March 1953 269 - - 24 COP Carson--March 1953 272 - - 25 COP Reno--March 1953 274 - - 26 COP Vegas--March 1953 277 - - 27 Attack on 5th Marines Front--26–30 March 1953 282 - - 28 25th Infantry Division Sector (Following Relief of the - 1st Marine Division)--5 May 1953 330 - - 29 Eighth Army Sector--1 January-27 July 1953 343 - - 30 7th Marines MLR Sector (Division Right)--Linear Defense-- - 19–20 July 1953 380 - - 31 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--20–21 July 1953 382 - - 32 7th Marines MLR Sector--Defense-in-Depth--22–23 July 1953 384 - - 33 Eighth Army Front--27 July 1953 395 - - 34 POW Camps in which Marines Were Held 417 - - 35 1st Marine Division Post-Armistice Main Battle Position-- - 30 September 1953 462 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -Operations in West Korea Begin - -_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN_--The Marines’ Home in West -Korea--Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area--The 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing--The Enemy--Initial CCF Attack--Subsequent CCF -Attacks--Strengthening the Line--Marine Air Operations--Supporting the -Division and the Wing--Different Area, Different Problem_ - - -_From Cairo to_ JAMESTOWN[1] - - [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: 1st Marine Division Staff Report, - titled “Notes for Major General J. T. Selden, Commanding - General, First Marine Division, Korea,” dtd 20 Aug 52, - hereafter Selden, _Div. Staff Rpt_; the four previous - volumes of the series _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, - 1950–1953_, namely, Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. - Canzona, _The Pusan Perimeter_, v. I; _The Inchon-Seoul - Operation_, v. II; _The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_, v. - III; Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman - W. Hicks, _The East-Central Front_, v. IV (Washington. - HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954–1962), hereafter Montross, - Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--Central Front_, v. - IV; Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. - Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_ (West Point, - N.Y.: 1956), hereafter USMA, _Korea_; David Rees, _Korea: - The Limited War_ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), - hereafter Rees, _Korea_, quoted with permission of the - publisher. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary - material cited is on file at, or obtainable through, the - Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. - Marine Corps. - -During the latter part of March 1952, the 1st Marine Division, a -component of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK), pulled out of its -positions astride the Soyang River in east-central Korea and moved to -the far western part of the country in the I Corps sector. There the -Marines took over the EUSAK left flank, guarding the most likely enemy -approaches to the South Korean capital city, Seoul, and improving the -ground defense in their sector to comply with the strict requirements -which the division commander, Major General John T. Selden, had set -down. Except for a brief period in reserve, the Marine division would -remain in the Korean front lines until a cease-fire agreement in July -1953 ended active hostilities. - -The division CG, Major General Selden,[2] had assumed command of the -25,000-man 1st Marine Division two months earlier, on 11 January, from -Major General Gerald C. Thomas while the Marines were still in the -eastern X Corps sector. The new Marine commander was a 37-year veteran -of Marine Corps service, having enlisted as a private in 1915, serving -shortly thereafter in Haiti. During World War I he was commissioned a -second lieutenant, in 1918, while on convoy duty. Between the two world -wars, his overseas service had included a second assignment to Haiti, -two China tours, and sea duty. When the United States entered World -War II, Lieutenant Colonel Selden was an intelligence officer aboard -the carrier _Lexington_. Later in the war Colonel Selden led the 5th -Marines in the New Britain fighting and was Chief of Staff of the 1st -Marine Division in the Peleliu campaign. He was promoted to brigadier -general in 1948 and received his second star in 1951, prior to his -combat assignment in Korea. - - [2] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen John T. Selden, Mar 54. - -American concern in the 1950s for South Korea’s struggle to preserve -its independence stemmed from a World War II agreement between the -United States, the United Kingdom, and China. In December 1943, the -three powers had signed the Cairo Declaration and bound themselves to -ensure the freedom of the Korean people, then under the yoke of the -Japanese Empire. At the Potsdam Conference, held on the outskirts of -Berlin, Germany in July 1945, the United States, China,[3] and Britain -renewed their Cairo promise. - - [3] China did not attend. Instead, it received an advance - copy of the proposed text. President Chiang Kai-shek - signified Chinese approval on 26 July. A few hours - later, the Potsdam Declaration was made public. _Foreign - Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo - and Teheran, 1943_ (Department of State publication - 7187), pp. 448–449; _The Conference of Berlin (The - Potsdam Conference)_, 1945, v. II (Department of State - publication 7163), pp. 1278, 1282–1283, 1474–1476. - -When the Soviet Union agreed to join forces against Japan, on 8 August, -the USSR also became a party to the Cairo Declaration. According to -terms of the Japanese capitulation on 11 August, the Soviets were to -accept surrender of the defeated forces north of the 38th Parallel in -Korea. South of that line, the commander of the American occupation -forces would receive the surrender. The Russians wasted no time and on -12 August had their troops in northern Korea. American combat units, -deployed throughout the Pacific, did not enter Korea until 8 September. -Then they found the Soviet soldiers so firmly established they even -refused to permit U.S. occupation officials from the south to cross -over into the Russian sector. A December conference in Moscow led to a -Russo-American commission to work out the postwar problems of Korean -independence. - -Meeting for the first time in March 1946, the commission was -short-lived. Its failure, due to lack of Russian cooperation, paved -the way for politico-military factions within the country that set up -two separate Koreas. In the north the Communists, under Kim Il Sung, -and in the south the Korean nationalists, led by Dr. Syngman Rhee, -organized independent governments early in 1947. In May of that year, -a second joint commission failed to unify the country. As a result -the Korean problem was presented to the United Nations (UN). This -postwar international agency was no more successful in resolving the -differences between the disputing factions. It did, however, recognize -the Rhee government in December 1948 as the representative one of the -two dissident groups. - -In June 1950, the North Koreans attempted to force unification of -Korea under Communist control by crossing the 38th Parallel with seven -infantry divisions heavily supported by artillery and tanks. Acting -on a resolution presented by the United States, the United Nations -responded by declaring the North Korean action a “breach of the peace” -and called upon its members to assist the South Koreans in ousting the -invaders. Many free countries around the globe offered their aid. In -the United States, President Harry S. Truman authorized the use of U.S. -air and naval units and, shortly thereafter, ground forces to evict the -aggressors and restore the status quo. Under the command of General of -the Army Douglas MacArthur, then Far East Commander, U.S. Eighth Army -occupation troops in Japan embarked to South Korea. - -The first combat unit sent from America to Korea was a Marine -air-ground team, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed at Camp -Pendleton, California on 7 July 1950, under Brigadier General Edward -A. Craig. The same day the UN Security Council passed a resolution -creating the United Nations Command (UNC) which was to exercise -operational control over the international military forces rallying -to the defense of South Korea. The Council asked the United States to -appoint a commander of the UN forces; on the 8th, President Truman -named his Far East Commander, General MacArthur, as Commander in Chief, -United Nations Command (CinCUNC). - -In Korea the Marines soon became known as the firemen of the Pusan -Perimeter, for they were shifted from one trouble spot to the next -all along the defensive ring around Pusan, the last United Nations -stronghold in southeastern Korea during the early days of the fighting. -A bold tactical stroke planned for mid-September was designed to -relieve enemy pressure on Pusan and weaken the strength of the North -Korean People’s Army (NKPA). As envisioned by General MacArthur, an -amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast, far to the enemy rear, -would threaten the entire North Korean position south of the 38th -Parallel. To help effect this coup, the UN Commander directed that the -Marine brigade be pulled out of the Pusan area to take part in the -landing at Inchon. - -MacArthur’s assault force consisted of the 1st Marine Division, less -one of its three regiments,[4] but including the 1st Korean Marine -Corps (KMC) Regiment. Marine ground and aviation units were to assist -in retaking Seoul, the South Korean capital, and to cut the supply line -sustaining the NKPA divisions. - - [4] The 7th Marines was on its way to Korea at the time of - the Inchon landing. The brigade, however, joined the 1st - Division at sea en route to the objective to provide - elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). - -On 15 September, Marines stormed ashore on three Inchon beaches. -Despite difficulties inherent in effecting a landing there,[5] it -was an outstandingly successful amphibious assault. The 1st and 5th -Marines, with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) assault squadrons -providing close air support, quickly captured the port city of Inchon, -Ascom City[6] to the east, and Kimpo Airfield. Advancing eastward the -Marines approached the Han River that separates Kimpo Peninsula from -the Korean mainland. Crossing this obstacle in amphibian vehicles, -1st Division Marines converged on Seoul from three directions. By -27 September, the Marines had captured the South Korean government -complex and, together with the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division, had -severed the enemy’s main supply route (MSR) to Pusan. In heavy, close -fighting near the city, other United Nations troops pursued and cut off -major units of the NKPA. - - [5] For a discussion of the hardships facing the - landing force, see Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops - Korea--Inchon_, v. II, _op. cit._, pp. 41–42, 59–60, - 62–64. - - [6] In World War II, the Japanese developed a logistical base - east of Inchon. When the Japanese surrendered, the Army - Service Command temporarily took over the installation, - naming it Ascom City. Maj Robert K. Sawyer, _Military - Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War_ (Washington: - OCMH, DA, 1962), p. 43_n_. - -Ordered back to East Korea, the Marine division re-embarked at Inchon -in October and made an administrative landing at Wonsan on the -North Korean coast 75 miles above the 38th Parallel. As part of the -U.S. X Corps, the 1st Marine Division was to move the 5th and 7th -Marines (Reinforced) to the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, from -where they were to continue the advance northward toward the North -Korean-Manchurian border. The 1st Marines and support troops were to -remain in the Wonsan area. - -While the bulk of the division moved northward, an unforeseen -development was in the making that was to change materially the -military situation in Korea overnight. Aware that the North Koreans -were on the brink of military disaster, Communist China had decided -to enter the fighting. Nine Chinese divisions had been dispatched -into the area with the specific mission of destroying the 1st Marine -Division.[7] Without prior warning, on the night of 27 November, hordes -of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF, or “Chinese People’s Volunteers” as -they called themselves) assaulted the unsuspecting Marines and nearly -succeeding in trapping the two Marine regiments. The enemy’s failure -to do so was due to the military discipline and courage displayed by -able-bodied and wounded Marines alike, as well as effective support -furnished by Marine aviation. Under conditions of great hardship, the -division fought its way out over 78 miles of frozen ground from Chosin -to the port of Hungnam, where transports stood by to evacuate the weary -men and the equipment they had salvaged. - - [7] Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops Korea--Chosin_, v. III, - p. 161. - -This Chinese offensive had wrested victory from the grasp of General -MacArthur just as the successful completion of the campaign seemed -assured. In the west, the bulk of the Eighth Army paced its withdrawal -with that of the X Corps. The UNC established a major line of defense -across the country generally following the 38th Parallel. On Christmas -Day, massed Chinese forces crossed the parallel, and within a week the -UN positions were bearing the full brunt of the enemy assault. Driving -southward, the Communists recaptured Seoul, but by mid-February 1951 -the advance had been slowed down, the result of determined Eighth Army -stands from a series of successive defensive lines.[8] - - [8] On 9 January 1951, General MacArthur was “directed to - defend himself in successive positions, inflicting - maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea subject to the - primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his - basic mission of protecting Japan.” Carl Berger, _The - Korea Knot--A Military-Political History_ (Philadelphia: - University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 131–132, - hereafter Berger, _Korea Knot_, quoted with permission of - the publisher. - -Following its evacuation from Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division early -in 1951 underwent a brief period of rehabilitation and training in -the vicinity of Masan, west of Pusan. From there, the division moved -northeast to an area beyond Pohang on the east coast. Under operational -control of Eighth Army, the Marines, with the 1st Korean Marine Corps -Regiment attached for most of the period, protected 75 miles of a -vital supply route from attack by bands of guerrillas. In addition, -the Marines conducted patrols to locate, trap, and destroy the enemy. -The Pohang guerrilla hunt also provided valuable training for several -thousand recently arrived Marine division replacements. - -In mid-February the 1st Marine Division was assigned to the U.S. IX -Corps, then operating in east-central Korea near Wonju. Initially -without the KMCs,[9] the Marine division helped push the corps line -across the 38th Parallel into North Korea. On 22 April, the Chinese -unleashed a gigantic offensive, which again forced UN troops back into -South Korea. By the end of the month, however, the Allies had halted -the 40-mile-wide enemy spring offensive. - - [9] The 1st KMC Regiment was again attached to the Marine - Division on 17 March 1951 and remained under its - operational control for the remainder of the war. - CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Rpt No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9-53, - hereafter _PacFlt EvalRpt_ with number and chapter. - -Once again, in May, the Marine division was assigned to the U.S. X -Corps, east of the IX Corps sector. Shortly thereafter the Communists -launched another major offensive. Heavy casualties inflicted by UNC -forces slowed this new enemy drive. Marine, Army, and Korean troops -not only repelled the Chinese onslaught but immediately launched a -counteroffensive, routing the enemy back into North Korea until the -rough, mountainous terrain and stiffening resistance conspired to slow -the Allied advance. - -In addition to these combat difficulties, the Marine division began -to encounter increasing trouble in obtaining what it considered -sufficient and timely close air support (CAS). Most attack and fighter -aircraft of the 1st MAW, commanded by Major General Field Harris[10] -and operating since the Chosin Reservoir days under Fifth Air Force -(FAF), had been employed primarily in a program of interdicting North -Korean supply routes. Due to this diversion of Marine air from its -primary CAS mission, both the division and wing suffered--the latter -by its pilots’ limited experience in performing precision CAS sorties. -Despite the difficulties, the Marine division drove northward reaching, -by 20 June, a grotesque scooped-out terrain feature on the east-central -front appropriately dubbed the Punchbowl. - - [10] Command responsibility of 1st MAW changed on 29 May - 51 when Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman succeeded - General Harris. - -Eighth Army advances into North Korea had caused the enemy to -reappraise his military situation. On 23 June, the Russian delegate to -the United Nations, Jacob Malik, hinted that the Korean differences -might be settled at the conference table. Subsequently, United Nations -Command and Communist leaders agreed that truce negotiations would -begin on 7 July at Kaesong, located in West Korea immediately south of -the 38th Parallel, but under Communist control. The Communists broke -off the talks on 22 August. Without offering any credible evidence, -they declared that UNC aircraft had violated the neutrality zone -surrounding the conference area.[11] Military and political observers -then realized that the enemy’s overture to peace negotiations had -served its intended purpose of permitting him to slow his retreat, -regroup his forces, and prepare his ground defenses for a new -determined stand. - - [11] The Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations - Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission, - Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, has described how the - Communists in Korea concocted incidents “calculated to - provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for - their basic propaganda objectives, or for both.” Examples - of such duplicity are given in Chapter IV of his book, - _How Communists Negotiate_ (New York: The MacMillan - Company, 1955), hereafter Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, - quoted with permission of the publisher. The quote above - appears on p. 30. - -The lull in military offensive activity during the mid-1951 truce talks -presaged the kind of warfare that would soon typify the final phase -of the Korean conflict. Before the fighting settled into positional -trench warfare reminiscent of World War I, the Marines participated -in the final UN offensive. In a bitter struggle, the division hacked -its way northward through, over, and around the Punchbowl, and in -September 1951 occupied a series of commanding terrain positions that -became part of the MINNESOTA Line, the Eighth Army main defensive line. -Beginning on the 20th of that month, it became the primary mission of -frontline units to organize, construct, and defend positions they held -on MINNESOTA. To show good faith at the peace table, the UNC outlawed -large-scale attacks against the enemy. Intent upon not appearing -the aggressor and determined to keep the door open for future truce -negotiations, the United Nations Command in late 1951 decreed a new -military policy of limited offensives and an aggressive defense of -its line. This change in Allied strategy, due to politico-military -considerations, from a moving battle situation to stabilized warfare -would affect both the tactics and future of the Korean War. - -Even as Allied major tactical offensive operations and the era -of fire and maneuver in Korea was passing into oblivion, several -innovations were coming into use. One was the Marine Corps employment -of helicopters. First used for evacuation of casualties from Pusan -in August 1950, the versatile aircraft had also been adopted by the -Marine brigade commander, General Craig, as an airborne jeep. On -13 September 1951, Marines made a significant contribution to the -military profession when they introduced helicopters for large-scale -resupply combat operations. This mission was followed one week later -by the first use of helicopters for a combat zone troop lift. These -revolutionary air tactics were contemporary with two new Marine Corps -developments in ground equipment--body armor and insulated combat -boots, which underwent extensive combat testing that summer and fall. -The latter were to be especially welcomed for field use during the -1951–1952 winter. - -Along the MINNESOTA Line, neither the freezing cold of a Korean winter -nor blazing summer heat altered the daily routine. Ground defense -operations consisted of dispatching patrols and raiding parties, -laying ambushes, and improving the physical defenses. The enemy seemed -reluctant to engage UN forces, and on one occasion to draw him into -the open, EUSAK ordered Operation CLAM-UP across the entire UN front, -beginning 10 February. Under cover of darkness, reserve battalions -moved forward; then, during daylight, they pulled back, simulating a -withdrawal of the main defenses. At the same time, frontline troops had -explicit orders not to fire or even show themselves.[12] - - [12] Col Franklin B. Nihart comments on draft MS, Sep 66, - hereafter _Nihart comments_. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 1 K. WHITE - -EUSAK DISPOSITIONS - -15 MARCH 1952] - -It was hoped that the rearward movement of units from the front line -and the subsequent inactivity there would cause the enemy to come out -of his trenches to investigate the apparent large-scale withdrawal of -UNC troops. Then Marine and other EUSAK troops could open fire and -inflict maximum casualties from covered positions. On the fifth day of -the operation, CLAM-UP was ended. The North Koreans were lured out of -their defenses, but not in the numbers expected. CLAM-UP was the last -action in the X Corps sector for the 1st Marine Division, which would -begin its cross-country relocation the following month. (See Map 1.) - -Code-named Operation MIXMASTER, the transfer of the 1st Marine Division -began on 17 March when major infantry units began to move out of their -eastern X Corps positions, after their relief on line by the 8th -Republic of Korea (ROK) Division. Regiments of the Marine division -relocated in the following order: the 1st KMCs, 1st, 7th, and 5th -Marines. The division’s artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, made -the shift by battalions at two-day intervals. In the motor march to -West Korea, Marine units traveled approximately 140 miles over narrow, -mountainous, and frequently mud-clogged primitive roads. Day and night, -division transport augmented by a motor transport battalion attached -from Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) and one company from the -1st Combat Service Group (CSG) rolled through rain, snow, sleet, and -occasional good weather. - -Marines employed 5,800 truck and DUKW (amphibious truck) loads to move -most of the division personnel, gear, and supplies. Sixty-three flatbed -trailers, 83 railroad cars, 14 landing ships, 2 transport aircraft, the -vehicles of 4 Army truck companies, as well as hundreds of smaller jeep -trailers and jeeps were utilized. The division estimated that these -carriers moved about 50,000 tons of equipment and vehicles,[13] with -some of the support units making as many as a dozen round trips. The -MIXMASTER move was made primarily by truck and by ship[14] or rail for -units with heavy vehicles. - - [13] Marine commanders and staff officers involved in the - planning and execution of the division move were alarmed - at the amount of additional equipment that infantry units - had acquired during the static battle situation. Many - had become overburdened with “nice-to-have” items in - excess of actual T/E (Table of Equipment) allowances. Col - William P. Pala comments on draft MS, 5 Sep 66, hereafter - _Pala comments_. - - [14] Heavy equipment and tracked vehicles were loaded aboard - LSDs and LSTs which sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon. - -Impressive as these figures are, they almost pall in significance -compared with the meticulous planning and precision logistics required -by the week-long move. It was made, without mishap, over main routes -that supplied nearly a dozen other divisions on the EUSAK line and -thus had to be executed so as not to interfere with combat support. -Although the transfer of the 1st Marine Division from the eastern to -western front was the longest transplacement of any EUSAK division, -MIXMASTER was a complicated tactical maneuver that involved realignment -of UNC divisions across the entire Korean front. Some 200,000 men and -their combat equipment had to be relocated as part of a master plan to -strengthen the Allied front and deploy more troops on line. - -Upon its arrival in West Korea, the 1st Marine Division was under -orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take over a sector at the -extreme left of the Eighth Army line, under I Corps control, where the -weaknesses of Kimpo Peninsula defenses had been of considerable concern -to EUSAK and its commander, General James A. Van Fleet. As division -units reached their new sector, they moved to locations pre-selected -in accordance with their assigned mission. First Marine unit into -the I Corps main defensive position, the JAMESTOWN Line, was the 1st -KMC Regiment attached to the division, with its organic artillery -battalion. The KMCs, as well as 1/11, began to move into their new -positions on 18 March. At 1400 on 20 March, the Korean Marines -completed the relief of the 15th Republic of Korea Regiment in the left -sector of the MLR (main line of resistance). Next into the division -line, occupying the right regimental sector adjacent to the 1st -Commonwealth Division, was Colonel Sidney S. Wade’s 1st Marines with -three battalions forward and 2/5 attached as the regimental reserve. -Relief of the 1st ROK Division was completed on the night of 24–25 -March. At 0400 on 25 March the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division -assumed responsibility for the defense of 32 miles of the JAMESTOWN -Line. That same date the remainder of the Marine artillery battalions -also relocated in their new positions. - -As the division took over its new I Corps mission on 25 March, the -Marine commander had one regiment of the 1st ROK Division attached -as division reserve while his 5th Marines was still in the east. -Operational plans originally had called for the 5th Marines, less -a battalion, to locate in the Kimpo Peninsula area where it was -anticipated Marine reserve units would be able to conduct extensive -amphibious training. So overextended was the assigned battlefront -position that General Selden realized this regiment would also be -needed to man the line. He quickly alerted the 5th Marines commanding -officer, Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., to deploy his regiment, then -en route to western Korea, to take over a section of the JAMESTOWN -front line instead of assuming reserve positions at Kimpo as originally -assigned. General Selden believed that putting another regiment on the -main line was essential to carrying out the division’s mission, to -aggressively _defend_ JAMESTOWN Line, not merely to _delay_ a Communist -advance. - -Only a few hours after the 5th Marines had begun its trans-Korea move, -helicopters picked up Colonel Culhane, his battalion commanders, and -key regimental staff officers and flew them to the relocated division -command post (CP) in the west. Here, on 26 March, the regimental -commander officially received the change in the 5th Marines mission. -Following this briefing, 5th Marines officers reconnoitered the newly -assigned area[15] while awaiting the arrival of their units. When -the regiment arrived on the 28th, plans had been completed for it -to relieve a part of the thinly-held 1st Marines line. On 29 March, -the 5th Marines took over the center regimental sector while the 1st -Marines, on the right regimental flank, compressed its ranks for a more -solid defense. - - [15] Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, - HQMC, dtd 16 Sep 59, hereafter _Culhane ltr_. - -Frontline units, from the west, were the 1st KMCs, the 5th, and -1st Marines. To the rear, the 7th Marines, designated as division -reserve, together with organic and attached units of the division, -had established an extensive support and supply area. As a temporary -measure, a battalion of the division reserve, 2/7, was detached for -defense of the Kimpo Peninsula pending a reorganization of forces in -this area. Major logistical facilities were the division airhead, -located at K-16 airfield, just southwest of Seoul, and the railhead at -Munsan-ni, 25 miles northwest of the capital city and about five miles -to the rear of the division sector at its nearest point. Forward of -the 1st Marine Division line, outposts were established to enhance the -division’s security. In the rear area the support facilities, secondary -defense lines, and unit command posts kept pace with development of -defensive installations on the MLR. Throughout the 1st Marine Division -sector outpost security, field fortifications, and the ground defense -net were thorough and intended to deny the enemy access to Seoul. - - -_The Marines’ Home in Western Korea_[16] - - [16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; CIA, _NIS - 41B_, South Korea, Chap I, Brief, Section 21, Military - Geographic Regions, Section 24, Topography (Washington: - 1957–1962); Map, Korea, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 751, - Sheets 6526 I and IV, 6527 I, II, III, and IV, 6528 II - and III, 6627 III and IV, and 6628 III (prepared by the - Engineer, HQ, AFFE, and AFFE/8A, 1952–1954). - -In western Korea, the home of the 1st Marine Division lay in a -particularly significant area. (See Map 2.) Within the Marine -boundaries ran the route that invaders through the ages had used in -their drive south to Seoul. It was the 1st Marine Division’s mission -to block any such future attempts. One of the reasons for moving the -Marines to the west[17] was that the terrain there had to be held at -all costs; land in the east, mountainous and less valuable, could -better be sacrificed if a partial withdrawal in Korea became necessary. -At the end of March 1952, the division main line of resistance -stretched across difficult terrain for more than 30 miles, from Kimpo -to the British Commonwealth sector on the east, a frontage far in -excess of the textbook concept. - - [17] The two other reasons were the weakness of the Kimpo - defenses and abandonment of plans for an amphibious - strike along the east coast. Montross, Kuokka, and - Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 253. Planning for - a Marine-led assault had been directed by the EUSAK - commander, General Van Fleet, early in 1952. The Marine - division CG, General Selden, had given the task to his - intelligence and operations deputies, Colonel James H. - Tinsley and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle. On 12 - March General Van Fleet came to the Marine Division CP - for a briefing on the proposed amphibious assault. At the - conclusion of the meeting the EUSAK commander revealed - his concern for a possible enemy attack down the Korean - west coast and told the Marine commander to prepare, in - utmost secrecy, to move his division to the west coast. - Lynn Montross, draft MS. - -Although Seoul was not actually within the area of Marine Corps -responsibility, the capital city was only 33 air miles south of the -right limiting point of the division MLR and 26 miles southeast of the -left. The port of Inchon lay but 19 air miles south of the western -end of the division sector. Kaesong, the original site of the truce -negotiations, was 13 miles northwest of the nearest part of the 1st -Marine Division frontline while Panmunjom was less than 5 miles away -and within the area of Marine forward outpost security. From the far -northeastern end of the JAMESTOWN Line, which roughly paralleled the -Imjin River, distances were correspondingly lengthened: Inchon, thus -being 39 miles southwest and Kaesong, about 17 miles west. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 2 K. WHITE - -WESTERN KOREA - -I CORPS SECTOR 1952–1953] - -The area to which the Marines had moved was situated in the western -coastal lowlands and highlands area of northwestern South Korea. On the -left flank, the division MLR hooked around the northwest tip of the -Kimpo Peninsula, moved east across the high ground overlooking the Han -River, and bent around the northeast cap of the peninsula. At a point -opposite the mouth of the Kongnung River, the MLR traversed the Han to -the mainland, proceeding north alongside that river to its confluence -with the Imjin. Crossing north over the Imjin, JAMESTOWN followed the -high ground on the east bank of the Sachon River for nearly two miles -to where the river valley widened. There the MLR turned abruptly to -the northeast and generally pursued that direction to the end of the -Marine sector, meandering frequently, however, to take advantage of key -terrain. Approximately 2½ miles west of the 1st Commonwealth Division -boundary, the JAMESTOWN Line intersected the 38th Parallel near the -tiny village of Madam-ni. - -Within the Marine division sector to the north of Seoul lay the -junction of two major rivers, the Imjin and the Han, and a portion of -the broad fertile valley fed by the latter. Flowing into the division -area from the east, the Imjin River snaked its way southwestward to the -rear of JAMESTOWN. At the northeastern tip of the Kimpo Peninsula, the -Imjin joined the Han. The latter there changed its course from south to -west, flowed past Kimpo and neighboring Kanghwa-do Island, and emptied -eventually into the Yellow Sea. At the far western end of the division -sector the Yom River formed a natural boundary, separating Kanghwa and -Kimpo, as it ran into the Han River and south to the Yellow Sea. To -the east, the Sachon River streamed into the Imjin, while the Kongnung -emptied into the Han where the MLR crossed from the mainland to Kimpo. - -In addition, two north-south oriented rivers flanked enemy positions -opposite the Marines and emptied into major rivers in the Marine -sector. Northwest of Kimpo, the Yesong River ran south to the Han; far -to the northeast, just beyond the March 1952 division right boundary, -the Samichon River flowed into the Imjin. - -Although the rivers in the Marine division were navigable, they were -little used for supply or transportation. The railroads, too, were -considered secondary ways, for there was but one line, which ran north -out of Seoul to Munsan-ni and then continued towards Kaesong. Below the -division railhead, located at Munsan-ni, a spur cut off to Ascom City. -Roads, the chief means of surface transport, were numerous but lacked -sufficient width and durability for supporting heavy military traffic. -Within the sector occupied by the Marines, the main route generally -paralleled the railroad. Most of the existing roads south of JAMESTOWN -eventually found their way to the logistic center at Munsan-ni. -Immediately across the Imjin, the road net was more dense but not of -any better construction. - -From the logistical point of view, the Imjin River was a critical -factor. Spanning it and connecting the division forward and rear -support areas in March 1952 were only three bridges, which were -vulnerable to river flooding conditions and possible enemy attack. -Besides intersecting the Marine sector, the Imjin formed a barrier to -the rear of much of the division MLR, thereby increasing the difficulty -of normal defense and resupply operations. - -When the Marines moved to the west, the winter was just ending. It had -begun in November and was characterized by frequent light snowfalls -but otherwise generally clear skies. Snow and wind storms seldom -occurred in western Korea. From November to March the mean daily -minimum Fahrenheit readings ranged from 15° to 30° above zero. The -mean daily maximums during the summer were between the upper 70s and -mid-80s. Extensive cloud cover, fog, and heavy rains were frequent -during the summer season. Hot weather periods were also characterized -by occasional severe winds. Spring and fall were moderate transitional -seasons. - -Steep-sided hills and mountains, which sloped abruptly into narrow -valleys pierced by many of the rivers and larger streams, predominated -the terrain in the I Corps sector where the Marines located. The -most rugged terrain was to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line; six miles -northeast of the Munsan-ni railhead was a 1,948-foot mountain, far -higher than any other elevation on the Marine or Chinese MLR but lower -than the rear area peaks supporting the Communist defenses. Ground -cover in the division sector consisted of grass, scrub brush, and, -occasionally, small trees. Rice fields crowded the valley floors. -Mud flats were prevalent in many areas immediately adjacent to the -larger rivers which intersected the division territory or virtually -paralleled the east and western boundaries of the Marine sector. - -The transfer from the Punchbowl in the east to western Korea thus -resulted in a distinct change of scene for the Marines, who went from -a rugged mountainous area to comparatively level terrain. Instead of -facing a line held by predominantly North Korean forces the division -was now confronted by the Chinese Communists. The Marines also went -from a front that had been characterized by lively patrol action to one -that in March 1952 was relatively dormant. With the arrival of the 1st -Marine Division, this critical I Corps sector would witness sharply -renewed activity and become a focal point of action in the UNC line. - - -_Organization of the 1st Marine Division Area_[18] - - [18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, - 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, Mar 52; 1st KMC - RCT Daily Intelligence and Operations Rpts, hereafter KMC - Regt UnitRpts, Mar 52; Kimpo ProvRegt ComdDs, hereafter - KPR ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52. - -“To defend” were the key words in the 1st Marine Division mission--“to -organize, occupy, and actively defend its sector of Line JAMESTOWN”--in -West Korea. General Selden’s force to prevent enemy penetration of -JAMESTOWN numbered 1,364 Marine officers, 24,846 enlisted Marines, -1,100 naval personnel, and 4,400 Koreans of the attached 1st KMC -Regiment. The division also had operational control of several I Corps -reinforcing artillery units in its sector. On 31 March, another major -infantry unit, the Kimpo Provisional Regiment (KPR) was organized. The -division then assumed responsibility for the Kimpo Peninsula defense on -the west flank with this Marine-Korean force. - -A major reason for transfer of the 1st Marine Division to the west, -it will be remembered, had been the weakness of the Kimpo defense. -Several units, the 5th KMC Battalion, the Marine 1st Armored Amphibian -Battalion, and the 13th ROK Security Battalion (less one company), had -been charged with the protection of the peninsula. Their operations, -although coordinated by I Corps, were conducted independently. The -fixed nature of the Kimpo defenses provided for neither a reserve -maneuver element to help repel any enemy action that might develop nor -a single commander to coordinate the operations of the defending units. - -These weaknesses become more critical in consideration of the type of -facilities at Kimpo and their proximity to the South Korean Capital. -Seoul lay just east of the base of Kimpo Peninsula, separated from it -only by the Han River. Located on Kimpo was the key port of Inchon and -two other vital installations, the logistical complex at Ascom City and -the Kimpo Airfield (K-14). All of these facilities were indispensable -to the United Nations Command. - -To improve the security of Kimpo and provide a cohesive, integrated -defense line, CG, 1st Marine Division formed the independent commands -into the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr., -was named the first KPR commander. His small headquarters functioned -in a tactical capacity only without major administrative duties. The -detachments that comprised the KPR upon its formation were: - - Headquarters and Service Company, with regimental and company - headquarters and a communication platoon; - - 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, as supporting artillery; - - 5th KMC Battalion; - - 13th ROK Security Battalion (-); - - One battalion from the reserve regiment of the 1st Marine - Division (2/7), as the maneuver element; - - Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; - - Company B, 1st Shore Party Battalion, as engineers; - - Company D, 1st Medical Battalion; - - Reconnaissance Company (-), 1st Marine Division; - - Detachment, Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 1st - Signal Battalion; - - Detachment, 181st Counterintelligence Corps Unit, USA; - - Detachment, 61st Engineer Searchlight Company, USA; and the - - 163rd Military Intelligence Service Detachment, USA. - -The Kimpo Regiment, in addition to maintaining security of the division -left flank, was assigned the mission to “protect supporting and -communication installations in that sector against airborne or ground -attack.”[19] Within the division, both the artillery regiment and -the motor transport battalion were to be prepared to support tactical -operations of Colonel Staab’s organization. - - [19] KPR ComdD, Mar 52, p. 13. - -For defense purposes, the KPR commander divided the peninsula into -three sectors. The northern one was manned by the KMC battalion, -which occupied commanding terrain and organized the area for defense. -The southern part was defended by the ROK Army battalion, charged -specifically with protection of the Kimpo Airfield and containment of -any attempted enemy attack from the north. Both forces provided for -the security of supply and communication installations within their -areas. The western sector, held by the amphibian tractor company, less -two platoons, had the mission of screening traffic along the east bank -of the Yom River, that flanked the western part of the peninsula. -Providing flexibility to the defense plan was the maneuver unit, the -battalion assigned from the 1st Marine Division reserve. - -The unit adjacent to the KPR[20] in the division line in late March -was the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had been the first -division unit to deploy along JAMESTOWN. The KMC Regiment, command by -Colonel Kim Dong Ha,[21] had assumed responsibility for its portion of -JAMESTOWN at 0400 on 20 March with orders to organize and defend its -sector. The regiment placed two battalions, the 3d and 1st, on the MLR -and the 2d in the rear. Holding down the regimental right of the sector -was the 1st Battalion, which had shared its eastern boundary with that -of Colonel Wade’s 1st Marines until 29 March when the 5th Marines was -emplaced on the MLR between the 1st KMC and 1st Marines. - - [20] The following month the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion - would be added to the four regiments on line, making a - total of five major units manning the 1stMarDiv front. It - was inserted between the Kimpo and 1st KMC regiments. - - [21] Commandant, Korean Marine Corps ltr to CMC, dtd 20 Sep - 66, hereafter _CKMC ltr_. - -The 1st Marines regimental right boundary, which on the MLR was 1,100 -yards north of the 38th Parallel, separated the 1st Marine Division -area from the western end of the 1st Commonwealth Division, then held -by the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. In late March, Colonel Wade’s -2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher) and 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel -Spencer H. Pratt) manned the frontline positions while 1/1 (Lieutenant -Colonel John H. Papurca), less Company A, was in reserve. The regiment -was committed to the defense of its part of the division area and -improvement of its ground positions. In the division center sector -Colonel Culhane’s 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart) and -3/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin) manned the left and -right battalion MLR positions, with 2/5 (Lieutenant Colonel William -H. Cushing) in reserve. The latter unit was to be prepared either to -relieve the MLR battalions or for use as a counterattack force. - -It did not take the Marines long to discover the existence of serious -flaws in the area defense which made it questionable whether the Allied -line here could have successfully withstood an enemy attack. While -his Marine units were effecting their relief of JAMESTOWN, Colonel -Wade noted that “field fortifications were practically nonexistent in -some sections.”[22] General Selden later pointed out that “populated -villages existed between opposing lines. Farmers were cultivating -their fields in full view of both forces. Traffic across the river was -brisk.”[23] A member of the division staff reported that there was -“even a school operating in one area ahead of the Marine lines.”[24] -In addition to these indications of sector weakness, there was still -another. Although the ROK division had placed three regiments in the -line, when the two Marine regiments relieved them there were then more -men on JAMESTOWN due to the greater personnel strength of a Marine -regiment. Nevertheless, the division commander was still appalled at -the width of the defense sector assigned to so few Marines. - - [22] 1stMar ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2. - - [23] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App IX, p. 1. - - [24] LtCol Harry W. Edwards comments on preliminary draft MS, - _ca._ Sep 59. - -At division level, the reserve mission was filled by Colonel Russell -E. Honsowetz’, 7th Marines, minus 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Noel C. -Gregory), which on 30 March became the maneuver force for the Kimpo -Regiment. As the division reserve, the regiment was to be prepared -to assume at any time either a defensive or offensive mission of any -of the frontline regiments. In addition, the reserve regiment was -to draw up counterattack plans, protect the division rear, improve -secondary line defenses, and conduct training, including tank-infantry -coordination, for units in reserve. The 7th Marines, with 3/7 -(Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff) on the left and 1/7 (Lieutenant -Colonel George W. E. Daughtry) on the right, was emplaced in the -vicinity of the secondary defense lines, WYOMING and KANSAS, to the -rear of the 5th and 1st Marines. - -Another regiment located in the rear area was the 11th Marines. Its -artillery battalions had begun displacement on 17 March and completed -their move by 25 March. Early on the 26th, the 11th Marines resumed -support of the 1st Marine Division. While the Marine artillery had been -en route, U.S. Army artillery from I Corps supported the division. With -the arrival on the 29th of the administrative rear echelon, the Marine -artillery regiment was fully positioned in the west. - -For Colonel Frederick P. Henderson, who became the division artillery -commander on 27 March, operational problems in western Korea differed -somewhat from those experienced in the east by his predecessor, -Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill. The most critical difficulty, however, was -the same situation that confronted General Selden--the vast amount -of ground to be covered and defended, and the insufficient number of -units to accomplish this mission. To the artillery, the wide division -front resulted in spreading the available fire support dangerously -thin. Placement of 11th Marines units to best support the MLR -regiments created wide gaps between each artillery battalion, caused -communication and resupply difficulties, prevented a maximum massing of -fires, and made redeployment difficult.[25] - - [25] Col Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, - HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59, hereafter _Henderson ltr I_. - -In making use of all available fire support, the artillery regiment -had to guard not only against the duplication of effort in planning -or delivery of fires, but also against firing in the Panmunjom peace -corridor restricted areas, located near the sector held by the Marine -division’s center regiment. Moreover, the artillerymen had to maintain -a flexibility sufficient to place the weight of available fire support -on call into any zone of action. - -Other difficulties were more directly associated with the nature of -the sector rather than with its broad expanse. The positioning of the -division in the west, although close to the coast, put the Marines -beyond the range of protective naval gunfire. The sparse and inadequate -road net further aggravated the tactical and logistical problems caused -by wide separation of units. Finally, the cannoneers had exceptionally -heavy demands placed on them due to the restricted amount of close air -support allocated to frontline troops under operational procedures -employed by Fifth Air Force. This command had jurisdiction over the -entire Korean air defense system, including Marine squadrons. - -Manning the main line of resistance also frequently presented -perplexing situations to the infantry. There had been little time for -a thorough reconnaissance and selection of positions by any of the -frontline regiments. When the 1st Marines moved into its assigned -position on the MLR, the troops soon discovered many minefields, “some -marked, some poorly marked, and some not marked at all.”[26] Uncharted -mines caused the regiment to suffer “some casualties the first night -of our move and more the second and third days.”[27] As it was to turn -out, during the first weeks in the I Corps sector, mines of all types -caused 50 percent of total Marine casualties. - - [26] Col Sidney S. Wade ltr to Deputy AsstCofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd - 25 Aug 59. - - [27] _Ibid._ - -A heavy drain on the limited manpower of Marine infantry regiments -defending JAMESTOWN was caused by the need to occupy an additional -position, an outpost line of resistance (OPLR). This defensive line to -the front of the Marine MLR provided additional security against the -enemy, but decreased the strength of the regimental reserve battalion, -which furnished the OPLR troops. The outposts manned by the Marines -consisted of a series of strongpoints built largely around commanding -terrain features that screened the 1st Marine Division area. The OPLR -across the division front was, on the average, about 2,500 yards -forward of the MLR. (See Map 3.) - -To the rear of the main line were two secondary defensive lines, -WYOMING and KANSAS. Both had been established before the Marines -arrived and both required considerable work, primarily construction -of bunkers and weapons emplacements, to meet General Selden’s strict -requirement for a strong defensive sector. Work in improving the lines, -exercises in rapid battalion tactical deployment by helicopter, and -actual manning of the lines were among the many tasks assigned to the -division reserve regiment. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 3 K. White - -1st MARINE DIVISION SECTOR - -30 APRIL 1952] - -Rear and frontline units alike found that new regulations affected -combat operations with the enemy in West Korea. These restrictions were -a result of the truce talks that had taken place first at Kaesong and, -later, at Panmunjom. In line with agreements reached in October 1951: - - Panmunjom was designated as the center of a circular neutral zone - of a 1,000 yard radius, and a three mile radius around Munsan and - Kaesong was also neutralized, as well as two hundred meters on - either side of the Kaesong-Munsan road.[28] - - [28] Rees, _Korea_, p. 295. - -To prevent the occurrence of any hostile act within this sanctuary, -Lieutenant General John W. O’Daniel, I Corps commander, ordered -that an additional area, forward of the OPLR, be set aside. This -megaphone-shaped zone “could not be fired into, out of, or over.”[29] -It was adjacent to the OPLR in the division center regimental sector, -near its left boundary, and took a generally northwest course. -Marines reported that the Communists knew of this restricted zone and -frequently used it for assembly areas and artillery emplacements. - - [29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52, p. 7. - - -_The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing_[30] - - [30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Mar 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52. - -When the 1st Marine Division moved to western Korea in March 1952, the -two 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units that had been in direct support -of the ground Marines also relocated. Marine Observation Squadron -6 (VMO-6) and Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161) -completed their displacements by 24 March from their eastern airfield -(X-83) to sites in the vicinity of the new division CP. HMR-161, headed -by Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, set up headquarters at A-17,[31] on a -hillside 3½ miles southeast of Munsan-ni, the division railhead, “using -a couple of rice paddies as our L. Z. (Landing Zone).”[32] The squadron -rear echelon, including the machine shops, was maintained at A-33, near -Ascom City. About 2½ miles south of the helicopter forward site was an -old landing strip, A-9, which Lieutenant Colonel William T. Herring’s -observation squadron used as home field for its fixed and rotary wing -aircraft. (For location of 1st MAW units see Map 4.) In West Korea, -VMO-6 and HMR-161 continued to provide air transport for tactical and -logistical missions. Both squadrons were under operational control of -the division, but administered by the wing. - - [31] In Korea, fields near U.S. Army installations were known - as “A”; major airfields carried a “K” designation; and - auxiliary strips were the “X” category. - - [32] MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon comments on draft MS, dtd 1 - Sep 66. - -Commanding General of the 1st MAW, since 27 July 1951, was Major -General Christian F. Schilt,[33] a Marine airman who had brought to -Korea a vast amount of experience as a flying officer. Entering the -Marine Corps in June 1917, he had served as an enlisted man with the -1st Marine Aeronautical Company in the Azores during World War I. -Commissioned in 1919, he served in a variety of training and overseas -naval air assignments. As a first lieutenant in Nicaragua, he had -been awarded the Medal of Honor in 1928 for his bravery and “almost -superhuman skill” in flying out Marines wounded at Quilali.[34] During -World War II, General Schilt had served as 1st MAW Assistant Chief of -Staff, at Guadalcanal, was later CO of Marine Aircraft Group 11, and -participated in the consolidation of the Southern Solomons and air -defense of Peleliu and Okinawa. - - [33] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of General Christian F. Schilt, - USMC (Ret.), Jun 59 rev. - - [34] Robert Sherrod, _History of Marine Corps Aviation in - World War II_ (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p. - 26, hereafter Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 4 E. WILSON - -1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING DISPOSITIONS - -30 APRIL 1952] - -As in past months, the majority of General Schilt’s Marine aircraft -in Korea during March 1952 continued to be under operational control -of Fifth Air Force. In turn, FAF was the largest subordinate command -of Far East Air Forces (FEAF), headquartered at Tokyo. The latter was -the U.S. Air Force component of the Far East Command and encompassed -all USAF installations in the Far East. The FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations -Center (JOC) at Seoul coordinated and controlled all Allied air -operations in Korea. Marine fighter and attack squadrons were employed -by FAF to: - - Maintain air superiority. - - Furnish close support for ground units. - - Provide escort [for attack aircraft]. - - Conduct day and night reconnaissance and fulfill requests. - - Effect the complete interdiction of North Korean and Chinese - Communist forces and other military targets that have an - immediate effect upon the current tactical situation.[35] - - [35] 1st MAW ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2. - -Squadrons carrying out these assignments were attached to Marine -Aircraft Groups (MAGs) 12 and 33. Commanded by Colonel Luther S. -Moore, MAG-12 and its two day attack squadrons (VMF-212 and VMF-323) -in March 1952 was still located in eastern Korea (K-18, Kangnung). -The Marine night-fighters of VMF(N)-513 were also here as part of -the MAG-12 group. Farther removed from the immediate battlefront was -Colonel Martin A. Severson’s MAG-33, located at K-3 (Pohang), with its -two powerful jet fighter squadrons (VMFs-115 and -311) and an attack -squadron (VMA-121). A new MAG-33 unit was Marine Photographic Squadron -1 (VMJ-1), just formed in February 1952 and commanded by Major Robert -R. Read. - -In addition to its land-based squadrons, one 1st MAW unit was assigned -to Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group, designated -Commander, Task Group 95.1 (CTG 95.1). He in turn assigned this -Marine unit to Commander, Task Element 95.11 (CTE 95.11), whose ships -comprised the West Coast Carrier Element. Marine Attack Squadron -312 (VMA-312) was at this time assigned to CTE 95.11. In late March -squadron aircraft were based on the escort carrier USS _Bairoko_ but -transferred on 21 April to the light carrier _Bataan_.[36] Operating -normally with a complement of 21 F4U-4 propeller-driven Corsair -aircraft, VMA-312 had the following missions: - - To conduct armed air reconnaissance of the West Coast of Korea - from the United Nations front lines northward to latitude 39°/15´ - N. - - Attack enemy shipping and destroy mines. - - Maintain surveillance of enemy airfields in the Haeju-Chinnampo - region.[37] - - Provide air spot services to naval units on request. - - Provide close air support and armed air reconnaissance services - as requested by Joint Operations Center, Korea (JOC KOREA). - - Conduct air strikes against coastal and inland targets of - opportunity at discretion. - - Be prepared to provide combat air patrol to friendly naval forces - operating off the West Coast of Korea. - - Render SAR [search and rescue] assistance. - - [36] Unit commanders also changed about this time. Lieutenant - Colonel Robert E. Smith, Jr. assumed command of the - Checkerboard squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Joe H. - McGlothlin, on 9 April. - - [37] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-75. The Haeju-Chinnampo - region, noted in the surveillance mission, is a coastal - area in southwestern North Korea between the 38th and - 39th Parallels. - -Because they were under operational control of Fifth Air Force, 1st -MAW flying squadrons, except those assigned to CTG 95.1 and 1st Marine -Division control, did not change their dispositions in March. Plans -were under way at this time, however, to relocate one of the aircraft -groups, MAG-12, to the west. - -On 30 March the ground element of the night-fighters redeployed from -its east coast home field to K-8 (Kunsan), on the west coast, 105 -miles south of Seoul. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Burnett’s VMF (N)-513 -completed this relocation by 11 April without loss of a single day of -flight operations. On 20 April the rest of MAG-12,[38] newly commanded -since the first of the month by Colonel Elmer T. Dorsey, moved to -K-6 (Pyongtaek), located 30 miles directly south of the South Korean -capital. - - [38] VMFs-212 (LtCol Robert L. Bryson) and -323 (LtCol - Richard L. Blume) left an east coast field for a flight - mission over North Korea and landed at K-6 thereafter, - also completing the move without closing down combat - operations. The relocation in airfields was designed to - keep several squadrons of support aircraft close to the - 1st Marine Division. Col E. T. Dorsey ltr to Hd, HistBr, - G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66. - -Marine aircraft support units were also located at K-3 and at Itami -Air Force Base, on Honshu, Japan. Under direct 1st MAW control were -four ground-type logistical support units with MAG-33, a Provisional -Automatic Weapons Battery from Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2), -and most of wing headquarters. This last unit, commanded by Colonel -Frederick R. Payne, Jr., included the 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion (based -at Pusan and led by Colonel Max C. Chapman), and a detachment of Marine -Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152), which had seven Douglas four-engine -R5D transports. This element and the wing service squadron were based -at Itami. - -Marines, and others flying in western Korea, found themselves -restricted much as Marines on the ground were. One limitation resulted -from a FAF-EUSAK agreement in November 1951 limiting the number of -daily close air support sorties across the entire Eighth Army line. -This policy had restricted air activity along the 155-mile Korean front -to 96 sorties per day. The curtailment seriously interfered with the -Marine type of close air support teamwork evolved during World War II, -and its execution had an adverse effect on Marine ground operations as -well. A second restriction, also detrimental to Marine division and -wing efficiency, was the prohibitive cushion Fifth Air Force had placed -around the United Nations peace corridor area north of the Marine -MLR. This buffer no-fly, no-fire zone which had been added to prevent -violation of the UN sanctuary by stray hits did not apply, of course, -to the Communists. - - -_The Enemy_[39] - - [39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52. - -Directly beyond the 1st Marine Division sector, to the west and north, -were two first-rate units of the Chinese Communist Forces, the 65th and -63d CCF Armies. Together, they totaled approximately 49,800 troops in -late March 1952. Opposite the west and center of the Marine division -front was the 65th CCF Army, with elements of the 193d Division across -from the KPR and the 194th Division holding positions opposing the -KMC regiment. Across from the Marine line in the center was the 195th -Division of the 65th CCF Army, which had placed two regiments forward. -North of the division right sector lay the 188th Division, 63d CCF -Army, also with two regiments forward. The estimated 15 infantry -battalions facing the Marine division were supported by 10 organic -artillery battalions, numbering 106 guns, and varying in caliber from -75 to 155mm.[40] In addition, intelligence reported that the 1st CCF -Armored Division and an unidentified airborne brigade were located near -enough to aid enemy operations. - - [40] The Korean Marine Corps placed the artillery count at 240 - weapons ranging from 57 to 122mm. _CKMC ltr._ - -Chinese infantry units were not only solidly entrenched across their -front line opposite the Marine division but were also in depth. Their -successive defensive lines, protected by minefields, wire, and other -obstacles, were supported by artillery and had been, as a result -of activities in recent months, supplied sufficiently to conduct -continuous operations. Not only were enemy ground units well-supplied, -but their CCF soldiers were well disciplined and well led. Their morale -was officially evaluated as ranging from good to excellent. In all, -the CCF was a determined adversary of considerable ability, with their -greatest strength being in plentiful combat manpower. - -Air opposition to Marine pilots in Korea was of unknown quantity -and only on occasion did the caliber of enemy pilots approach that -of the Americans. Pilots reported that their Chinese counterparts -generally lacked overall combat proficiency, but that at times their -“aggressiveness, sheer weight of numbers, and utter disregard for -losses have counterbalanced any apparent deficiencies.”[41] The -Communists had built their offensive potential around the Russian -MIG-15 jet fighter-interceptor. Use of this aircraft for ground support -or ground attack was believed to be in the training stage only. The -Chinese had also based their air defense on the same MIG plus various -types of ground antiaircraft (AA) weapons, particularly the mobile 37mm -automatic weapons and machine guns that protected their main supply -routes. In use of these ground AA weapons, enemy forces north of the -38th Parallel had become most proficient. Their defense system against -UNC planes had been steadily built up and improved since stabilization -of the battle lines in 1951, and by March 1952 was reaching a -formidable state. - - [41] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, p. 10-38. - -As the more favorable weather for ground combat approached toward the -end of March, the CCF was well prepared to continue and expand its -operations. Enemy soldiers were considered able to defend their sector -easily with infantry and support units. Division intelligence also -reported that Chinese ground troops had the capability for launching -limited objective attacks to improve their observation of Marine MLR -rear areas. - - -_Initial CCF Attack_[42] - - [42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; KMC Regt - UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52. - -Whether by intent or default, the Chinese infantry occupying the enemy -forward positions did not interfere with the Marine relief. With -assumption of sector responsibility by the division early on 25 March, -the initial enemy contact came from Chinese supporting weapons. Later -that day the two division frontline regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines, -received 189 mortar and artillery shells in their sectors which wounded -10 Marines. One man in the 1st Marines was killed by sniper fire on 25 -March; in the same regiment, another Marine was fatally wounded the -following day. Forward of the lines, the day after the division took -over, there was no ground action by either side. - -During the rest of the month, the tempo of activities on both sides -increased. Marines began regular patrol actions to probe and ambush the -enemy. Division artillery increased its number of observed missions by -the end of the month. By this time the CCF had also begun to probe -the lines of the Marine regimental sectors. In these ground actions to -reconnoiter and test division defenses, the Chinese became increasingly -bold, with the most activity on 28 March. Between 25–31 March, the -first week on JAMESTOWN, some 100 Chinese engaged in 5 different -probing actions. Most of these were against the 1st KMC Regiment on the -left flank of the division MLR. - -It was no wonder that the Chinese concentrated their effort against -the Korean Marines, for they held the area containing Freedom Gate, -the best of the three bridges spanning the Imjin. Both of the other -two, X-Ray and Widgeon, were further east in the division sector. If -the enemy could exploit a weak point in the KMC lines, he could attack -in strength, capture the bridge, and turn the division left flank, -after which he would have a direct route to Seoul.[43] Without the -bridge in the KMC sector, the division would be hard pressed, even with -helicopter lift, to maneuver or maintain the regiments north of the -Imjin. - - [43] _Henderson ltr I._ - -On 1 April, at about 2130, the CCF began pounding the frontline -companies in the KMC area with an artillery preparation. A half hour -later, the enemy attacked an outpost and the main line. First to engage -the Chinese were the OPLR troops of the KMC 1st Company; 1st Battalion, -on the regimental right. There, a Chinese company forced an opening -between friendly outposts and reached a point about 200 yards short of -the MLR and just north of a road leading to the main bridge over the -Imjin. While this attack was in progress, another CCF company hit the -outpost line further south. This attack, less successful, ended far -short of the MLR and about a half-mile south of the bridge road. Both -enemy companies withdrew at about 2345. - -To the left of the 1st Battalion, the 3d was receiving the brunt of -this initial CCF attack. The 9th, 11th, and 10th Companies (deployed in -that order from west to east, in the left battalion sector), had been -engaged by the same preliminary 30-minute shelling. At 2200, when four -CCF squads attacked the two companies on the left, an enemy company hit -the left end of the 10th Company, occupied by the 2d Platoon. About -midnight the South Koreans, under fire from both flanks and under heavy -frontal assault, were forced to withdraw. In the rear, the company -commander pulled the 1st Platoon from the line, ordered the 3d to -extend left to cover both sectors, and led a counterattack with the 1st -Platoon and elements of the 2d. Positions were quickly restored by the -KMC action. - -Soon after it had hurled the Chinese back across the OPLR, the 1st -Battalion was subjected to a second attack. An enemy unit, estimated -to be a company, engaged a 1st Company platoon briefly. When the KMCs -returned heavy defensive fires, the Communists pulled back but struck -again at 0300. After a 20-minute fire fight, the Chinese company -retreated. - -This action on 1–2 April cost the attackers 2 killed, 34 estimated -killed, and 10 estimated wounded. For the KMC, casualties were 2 -killed, 10 wounded. To all 1st Division Marines, the successful defense -by the 1st KMC regimental Marines was heartening. It had preserved not -only the division western flank but also the vital link over the Imjin. - - -_Subsequent CCF Attacks_[44] - - [44] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, KPR ComdDs, Apr - 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 35, dtd 16 Apr 52. - -Following his attempted assault against the KMC regiment, the enemy -opposite the 1st Marine Division reverted to a passive defense. Except -for a probe late on 2 April of the far eastern line held by Lieutenant -Colonel Pratt’s 3/1 and two patrols that scouted MLR positions in the -western Korean Marine area that same date, Communist offensive measures -consisted largely of artillery and mortar fire. Chinese line units -appeared to concentrate on improving their dugouts and trench systems. -Marines reported frequent sightings of enemy groups working in and -around their forward trenches. - -Marine division troops, too, were busy fortifying their defensive -positions. On the Kimpo Peninsula they dug gun emplacements and erected -camp facilities for the newly activated Kimpo Provisional Regiment. -North of the Han, mine clearance and construction of trenchworks and -fortifications was the order of the day for most Marines. Other Marines -patrolled forward of the lines as a major aspect of the division’s -continuous active defense. During daylight hours, MLR regiments -dispatched reconnaissance and combat patrols and sent out snipers, -armed with telescope-equipped M-1 rifles. Division tanks firing from -temporary gun slots on the main line and artillery batteries emplaced -in rear area dugouts hammered away at enemy positions and disposed of -his patrols. At night, harassing and interdicting (H&I) artillery fires -and infantry raids continued to keep the Communists off-balance. - -A combat raid on 5 April typified the extensive Marine division night -activities forward of the line. Conducted by three platoons, less a -squad, of the KMC 10th Company, the raiding party had the mission of -capturing prisoners. Departing the MLR at 2300, the Korean Marines -worked their way over the low ground and then crossed the Sachon River. -Immediately thereafter the raid leader, who was the 10th Company -commander (First Lieutenant No Won Keun) dispatched two squad-sized -ambushes along the patrol route. The raiders then continued northwest -toward their objective, an area near the village of Tonggang-ni, a -half mile beyond the river. When about 50 yards from its objective, -the patrol ran into tactical wire and an enemy sentry, who alerted his -unit by rifle fire. The KMC raiders opened up and called in pre-planned -mortar and artillery support. The CCF defenders replied immediately -with rifles and machine gun fire. - -To complete the maneuver, the patrol leader positioned his machine guns -to fire on the Communist flanks and directed one platoon to prepare -for a frontal assault on the defenders. At 0148, the 1st Platoon -attacked from the right. A minute later the 2d Platoon charged headlong -at the defenders. Hand-to-hand fighting followed until the Chinese -broke contact and disappeared into bunkers within the trenchline. -From inside, the CCF soldiers continued the battle, firing through -gun revetments and wounding several KMC pursuers in the legs. After -30 minutes had passed, the South Korean assault troops observed enemy -reinforcements moving in from the northwest. At 0230, the Marine patrol -withdrew under the cover of artillery, reaching its battalion MLR at -0400. The raiders brought back seven civilians found in the area and -several Russian-made carbines. At the cost of 2 killed and 18 wounded, -the KMCs inflicted casualties totaling 12 counted killed and 25 -estimated wounded. - -Other division patrols similarly took into custody civilians living -between the MLR and OPLR. It was also the job of these patrols to -destroy buildings that the enemy had used. On the night of 5 April, 5th -Marines patrols apprehended 34 civilians, and a wounded enemy soldier. -The day before, a patrol from 2/1 had also captured a Chinese soldier. - -On 12 and 13 April, the enemy stepped up his ground actions. He -launched two probes against the 5th Marines occupying the center -regimental sector. Both attempts were beaten back. The 1st Marines on -the extreme right flank encountered little hostile activity, but in -the western KMC sector, Chinese shelling increased noticeably. The -following day the artillery picked up again, accompanied by several -infantry probes directed against the two KMC frontline battalions. To -the right, the Chinese also tested 5th Marines lines again. On the far -right, in the area held by the 1st Marines, an air alert was sounded -from 0410 to 0726, but no enemy aircraft appeared. By mid-month, the -Chinese were dispatching fewer infantry probes but firing a greater -number of artillery and mortar shells toward the division line. The -enemy even sent 25 rounds to Kimpo, where a total of only 4 had fallen -during the first two weeks in April. - -Ushering in the second half of April was another Communist attack, -this one on 15–16 April and to be the last that month against the -central part of the Marine Division sector. This attempt to breach the -Marine lines was directed against Company E of 2/5, manning an outpost -position on the OPLR. The rest of the battalion was now holding the -left sector of the center regimental front, having assumed its new -mission on line three days earlier in relief of 1/5, which reverted -to the role of regimental reserve. Northwest of the 5th Marines MLR, -the Company E commander, Captain Charles C. Matthews, had placed a -reinforced rifle platoon. His Marines had occupied several dug-in -positions near the top of a 400-foot hill, known as Outpost 3 (OP 3). -(See Map 5.) The platoon had been improving this outpost area and -fortifications so that the bunkers could be employed for living and -fighting.[45] During the afternoon and again at dusk on 15 April the -Communists had shelled this location. One Marine was wounded in the -second firing. - - [45] Chapter III discusses in detail the construction of - bunkers. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 5 K. WHITE - -2/5 SECTOR - -15–16 APRIL 1952] - -At 2330 on 15 April, Company E reported that a green flare cluster had -just burst over Hill 67, approximately 1,900 yards southwest of OP -3 and just beyond the OPLR. This signal triggered a 20-minute heavy -enemy preparation of 76mm artillery and 120mm mortars on the friendly -outpost and its supporting mortar position. Ten minutes before -midnight, another green flare exploded over the same height, and the -shelling stopped. After five minutes the signal reappeared. Immediately -thereafter, the Chinese shifted their artillery and mortar fire to an -area west of the OP 3 mortar site and north of a Company F observation -post. At the same time, the enemy attacked Outpost 3. - -Initially, the Chinese struck the Marine defenses in a frontal -assault, but as the fighting progressed enemy forces quickly enveloped -the outpost and charged it simultaneously from three sides. The -vastly outnumbered Marine defenders withdrew into a tight perimeter -at the southeastern corner of the outpost where their defending -firepower prevented the enemy from seizing the position. Within 15 -minutes the enemy had surrounded the Marines and severed the outpost -communications, but could not take the outpost. The CCF soldiers then -pulled back and let their artillery soften OP 3 while they regrouped -for another assault. The Chinese soon stormed the outpost a second -time, but were again unsuccessful. Moreover, they lost three of their -men who were captured by the tenacious 2/5 defenders. - -The fighting continued until 0315, reaching a hand-to-hand clash at one -stage. In addition to mortar and artillery fire, the enemy employed -small arms, automatic weapons, hand and stick-type grenades, bangalore -torpedoes, and 57mm recoilless rifles. During the attack, patrols were -sent out from the MLR and OP 2, to the west, to reestablish contact and -help with casualty evacuation. - -Well to the rear of the outpost and unknown to its occupants, -intelligence personnel intercepted a Chinese message ordering the -Communists to withdraw. Immediately, friendly artillery fired on -all known escape routes available to the attackers. Despite this -interdicting fire, the enemy soldiers managed to withdraw without -further loss. Their unsuccessful thrust against the 2/5 OPLR cost the -Chinese 25 known killed, 25 estimated killed, 45 known wounded, and 3 -prisoners. Marine casualties were 6 killed, 5 missing, and 25 wounded -and evacuated.[46] - - [46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a - machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the - second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had - rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow - survived, and the following March, after release from - the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he - received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by - the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey - Biog. File) - -Why the Chinese had selected OP 3 for their mid-April attack is not -known. Several theories, however, have been advanced by those involved -in the action. Colonel Culhane, the regimental commander, believed that -the enemy incursion “was the direct result of the aggressive patrols -that frequently used the outpost as a point of departure....”[47] -Brigadier General Merrill B. Twining, the assistant division commander -since 22 March, declared that the position was too large for a -reinforced platoon to hold.[48] Perhaps the Chinese had harbored the -same thoughts before the night of 15–16 April. - - [47] _Culhane ltr._ - - [48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G-3, - HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54. - -Just before its OPLR was withdrawn in favor of an observation line, the -1st Korean Regiment was struck by the Chinese in the area immediately -north of the 1–2 April clash. Beginning at 0100 on 17 April, the -enemy placed a 15-minute preparatory fire on the left flank of the -3d Battalion, occupying the regimental right sector. The CCF then -probed friendly lines in and around the area pounded during the -preliminary fires. Three separate attacks took place before 0400, when -the Communists withdrew. In these probes, the Chinese made free use -of automatic weapons; the enemy’s well-coordinated action attested -to their training and discipline. Confirmed casualties were 36 CCF -and 2 Koreans killed. The KMCs suffered 5 wounded and estimated that -70 Chinese had been wounded. Although the South Koreans frequently -called down artillery support during the attack, most of the casualties -inflicted on the enemy were from rifle and machine gun fire. The 17 -April probe was to mark the last major infantry action for the 1st -Marine Division during its second month on JAMESTOWN. - -Throughout the month a total of 5,000 rounds of artillery fire and -3,786 rounds of mortar fire fell in the division sector. On 2 April -the greatest volume for any single day was received: 3,000 artillery -and 118 mortar rounds. An average day’s incoming, during April, was -approximately 167 artillery and 125 mortar rounds. - - -_Strengthening the Line_[49] - - [49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 46, dtd 17 Apr 52. - -Even before the Communists had launched their mid-April attacks -against JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marine Division had implemented plans to -strengthen its line in western Korea. Besides the digging, timbering, -and sandbagging to accomplish a major improvement of the physical -defenses, General Selden required Marine infantry regiments to conduct -an aggressive defense of their sector of responsibility. He ordered -MLR units to employ snipers all along JAMESTOWN and to dispatch daily -patrols forward of the line to ambush, raid, kill, or capture Chinese -and their positions. The division commander further directed that -supporting arms such as artillery, tank, and air, when available, be -used to destroy hostile defenses, harass the enemy, and break up his -assemblies as well as to protect Marine positions. - -As a result of an I Corps directive, the 1st Marine Division assumed -responsibility for an additional 6,800 yards of front on 14 April from -the 1st Commonwealth Division sector to the right of the division. -In preparation, the 5th Marines had taken over the western end of -the 1st Marines sector, held by 2/1, two days earlier. On the 14th -the 1st Marines, newly commanded by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy,[50] -extended its line eastward to assume new limiting points and part of -the MLR in the western part of the Canadian Brigade sector. Relief of -the Commonwealth unit was completed without any difficulty or enemy -interference. This additional yardage, plus the Kimpo Peninsula front, -now stretched the Marine division MLR to 35½ miles. - - [50] Colonel Flournoy became regimental CO on 10 April, - succeeding Colonel Wade. - -As a result, General Selden found it necessary to withdraw the division -general outpost line in order to build up his main line of resistance. -On 17 April, the 1st KMC Regiment reduced its OPLR to an OPLO (outpost -line of observation) and the left battalion pulled its MLR back to -more defensible ground. The Marine division center and right regiments -withdrew their outpost lines on 23 and 24 April. Both regiments then -established forward outposts and listening posts which, in many cases, -utilized former OPLR positions. Many of these posts were manned during -daylight hours only. - -Abandonment of the forward OPLR added strength to the main line, but it -also meant that frontline battalions had to commit all their companies -on line, thus losing their reserve. To prevent Chinese occupation of -desirable terrain features on the former OPLR, the division dispatched -combat and reconnaissance patrols forward of its line. In the KMC -sector, the only Marine area favorable for tank operations forward of -JAMESTOWN, tank-infantry patrols were periodically employed. - -To the west of the KMC sector, the Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor -Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Michiel Dobervich) was assigned a -section of the KANSAS Line to defend, beginning 16 April. Reinforced -by attachment of the Division Reconnaissance Company (Major Ephraim -Kirby-Smith) that same day, Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich employed -Company C (two platoons), the headquarters LVT platoon, and the -reconnaissance unit to man 30 defensive positions from the Han River -eastward to the KMC western boundary.[51] - - [51] Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been - attached to the Kimpo Provisional Regiment since 31 March - and Company B was supporting MAG-33 at Pohang. - -Two other measures to strengthen his sector of JAMESTOWN were utilized -by the Marine division commander. On 18 April, he asked General -O’Daniel to reconsider the no-fire zone recently established by the -corps commander. General Selden, who had received reports of Chinese -use of the sanctuary located within Marine Corps territory--for firing -positions and assembly areas primarily--recommended, after I Corps -had refused him permission to fire into the haven, a redrawing of the -O’Daniel line to coincide more closely with the boundaries established -by the UN. Approval along the lines submitted by the division was -given by I Corps that same day. The second measure employed by General -Selden was use of an additional defensive line, WYOMING FORWARD. This -position, closely paralleling JAMESTOWN in the KMC and 5th Marines -sectors, added depth to the sector defenses. - -A unique rescue and recovery operation also came into existence about -this time. On 19 April the division ordered the 5th Marines, occupying -the center regimental sector, to organize a tank-infantry force for -rescue of the United Nations Truce Team, should such action become -necessary. The regimental plan, published on 22 April, utilized a -reinforced rifle company-tank company organization directly supported -by organic 5th Marines 4.2-inch mortars and 1/11. The Everready Rescue -Force, from the regimental reserve, occupied the high ground (OP 2) -east of and dominating Panmunjom. - -In addition to setting forth organizational details of the task unit, -the 5th Marines Operational Plan 6-52 specified the method of operation -for the rescue force. Taking advantage of the peace corridor in the -western end of the center sector, a Forward Covering Force would -speed tank-riding infantry to the high ground one-half mile beyond -the objective, Panmunjon. Following would be the Pick-Up Force, from -the 1st Tank Battalion Headquarters Platoon, which would retrieve the -principal UN delegates and take them quickly to the assembly area -two miles to the rear of the MLR. A Rear Covering Force, composed of -a tank-infantry element, would follow the Pick-Up force both on its -way towards the objective and on the return trip. Withdrawal of both -covering forces was regulated by a series of phase lines. - - -_Marine Air Operations_[52] - - [52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; - 1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross, - _Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U. S. Marine Combat - Helicopters_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), - hereafter Montross, _SkyCav_, quoted with permission of - the publishers. - -Even though the Marine air-ground team had been shorn of much of its -tactical aviation, what remained was well utilized. Helicopter troop -operations had become commonplace by the end of April 1952. That month -there were three exercises to further evaluate tactical concepts of -helicopter employment. Operation PRONTO, conducted on 5 April, was the -first major troop lift in the new I Corps sector. In this maneuver -approximately 670 troops of 2/7 and 10,000 pounds of rations were -transported by helicopter and truck from the Munsan-ni vicinity across -the Han River to the Kimpo Peninsula. Here the reserve battalion -served as a counterattack force in a hypothetical enemy landing. Due -to the necessity for avoiding the neutrality zone in the Munsan area, -round-trip flights averaged about 57 miles. - -The exercise combined the shortest notice and longest distance of any -large-scale helicopter troop movement conducted by HMR-161. It pointed -to the fact that a helicopter unit could successfully lift a troop -organization virtually as an “on call” tactical tool and without the -benefit of previous liaison. - -Operation LEAPFROG, on 18–19 April, transported one KMC battalion -across the Han to the peninsula and lifted out another the following -day. The purpose of this test was to determine the feasibility of a -replacement movement conducted over water, with “consideration given to -the language barrier existing between the troops and the transporting -facility.”[53] The six-mile round trip was the shortest troop haul yet -made by the transport chopper squadron. Consequently, it took the 12 -HRS-1 single-engine Sikorsky aircraft only 3 hours and 26 minutes to -complete the exchange of the 1,702 KMC troops. - - [53] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, 10-73. - -Colonel McCutcheon’s HMR-161 pilots found that their helicopters could -carry six combat-equipped Korean Marines instead of five American -Marines, due to the smaller size and weight of the average Korean. -Since the U.S. and KMC Marine battalions were the same size, the larger -load factor for the Korean Marines enabled their unit to be moved -faster. In LEAPFROG the language difference proved to be no handicap, -since there were sufficient interpreters on hand and the troops were -cooperative. Helicopter pilots could use landing sites close together -because the terrain was open and the area of operations beyond the -reach of Chinese artillery. - -Close on the heels of LEAPFROG came a third airlift. Operation CIRCUS, -conducted on 23 April, provided for the air deployment of the 7th -Marines reserve regiment, minus two battalions, across the Imjin to -landing sites just to the rear of the secondary defensive line, WYOMING -FORWARD. Ten helicopters carried 1,185 Marines over the river barrier -to blocking positions in 90 minutes. The CIRCUS exercise illustrated -that a minimum distance should be maintained between loading and -unloading sites for a safe and efficient transport operation. It also -pointed up that “consideration must be given to the number of aircraft -assigned to each traffic pattern during short hops over a river.”[54] -This successful maneuver came three days before all HRS-1 aircraft were -grounded due to a defect in the tail rotors. By mid-May the problem had -been corrected and the aircraft returned to flying status. - - [54] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-50. - -During April, Lieutenant Colonel Herring’s VMO-6 employed its 11 -single-engine OE-1 observation planes for a total of 508 fixed-wing -combat flights. More than half of these, 275, were for artillery -spotting; of the remainder, 166 were flown for reconnaissance and 67 -represented photo, weather, liaison, and area check-out maneuvers. -Combat flights by the squadron helicopters[55] during the month were -110 liaison, 45 reconnaissance, and 93 evacuations. Of the total 756 -combat flights performed by both fixed-wing and rotary craft, 511 were -over enemy territory. - - [55] Rotary wing aircraft assigned were two types, HTL-4 and - H03S-1. The former is a two-place, plastic-dome Bell - product; the latter, the first helicopter operated by the - Marine Corps, is an observation-utility, three-passenger - Sikorsky-made craft. HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, _Marine Corps - Aircraft, 1913–1965_, Marine Corps Historical Reference - Pamphlet (Washington: 1967 ed.) pp. 34, 38. - -During that same month, Marine squadrons operating under the Fifth Air -Force put a total of 2,708 planes into the air despite restrictive or -prohibitive weather on 20 days. Continuing its emphasis on attacking -the North Korean transportation system, the Air Force command -dispatched 1,397 Marine planes on interdiction missions. Marine-piloted -close air support sorties flown to assist the 1st Marine Division -numbered only 56 throughout April; those piloted by Marines for 16 -other UN divisions totaled 547. - -Not all the air sortie records were made by land-based Marine -squadrons. On 18 April, VMA-312, the CTE 95.11 squadron provided by -the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, flew 80 sorties, a Korean record for a -carrier-based squadron to that date and twice the daily average for the -initial six months of 1952. - -By 20 April the three tactical squadrons of MAG-12--VMF(N)-513, -VMF-212, and VMF-323--had completed their relocations on the Korean -west coast. Two days later, combined MAG-12 attack and -33 jet aircraft -participated in what was a Fifth Air Force one-day combat record: 1,049 -sorties. - -One MAG-33 unit, the newly-formed Marine Photographic Squadron 1, -was already flying a large number of aerial reconnaissance missions -directed by Fifth Air Force. It provided almost one-third of the -daylight photo effort required by FAF with but one-quarter of the -aircraft.[56] VMJ-1’s complement of a dozen 550 mph McDonnell twin-jet -Banshee F2H-2P aircraft mounted three cameras and were capable both of -high altitude work and good speed. Introduction of this single-seat jet -was considered the “first important development in aerial photography -in the Korean War,”[57] since the Banshee could outproduce any photo -plane in Korea. - - [56] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, pp. 10-2, 10-108. This record was - established despite the fact that the Marine squadron, - with 10 jets, flying out of K-3 (Pohang) was more than - 150 miles further from most targets than the other major - photo unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron - of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at K-14 - (Kimpo). - - [57] _Ibid._, p. 10-59. - -The month of April also marked change of command ceremonies for the -1st Marine Aircraft Wing. On 11 April at K-3, General Schilt turned -over wing responsibility to Brigadier General Clayton C. Jerome. Among -the numerous civilian and military dignitaries attending the ceremony -at the Pohang 1st MAW headquarters were the Honorable John J. Muccio, -U.S. Ambassador to Korea; Air Force Lieutenant Generals Otto P. Weyland -and Frank F. Everest, commanders of FEAF and FAF respectively; and the -Marine division CG, Major General Selden. - -The new wing commander, General Jerome, like his predecessor, had a -distinguished flight career. A 1922 graduate of the Naval Academy, -he had served in various foreign and U.S. aviation billets and was -a veteran of five World War II campaigns. In 1943 Colonel Jerome -was operations officer for Commander, Aircraft, Solomon Islands. -Later he was named Chief of Staff, Commander, Aircraft, Northern -Solomons and Commander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau, in the -northern Solomons. Before returning to the States, Colonel Jerome had -participated in the recapture of the Philippines, commanding MAG-32 -and directing all Marine air support in the Luzon fighting. Brigadier -General Jerome became Director of Aviation and Assistant Commandant of -the Marine Corps for Air in September 1950 and served in this capacity -until taking command of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.[58] - - [58] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Clayton C. Jerome, Jul - 58, rev. - -During the command ceremonies the outgoing 1st MAW commander, General -Schilt, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal for his -outstanding leadership of the wing. The award was made by Lieutenant -General Weyland. Shortly before his Korean tour ended, General Schilt -had also received from ROK President Syngman Rhee the Order of Military -Merit Taiguk, for his contribution to the military defense of South -Korea. - - -_Supporting the Division and the Wing_[59] - - [59] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; - 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, 1st CSG, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, - Mar-Apr 52; 1st CSG UnitRpts, Apr 52. - -Because of the command relationships existing in Korea, with all -ground units under operational control of CG, EUSAK, the majority of -the logistical support to the Marines was handled by the Army. Eighth -Army, 2d Logistical Command (2d LogCom) provided for resupply of items -used commonly by both Marine and Army personnel; the Marine Corps -(Commanding General, FMFPac) furnished those supplies and equipment -used by Marine units only. - -When the division moved to the west, the 1st Shore Party Battalion -opened a rear service area at Ascom City. Here the division established -and maintained Class II (organizational equipment) and IV (special -equipment) dumps for its units, as well as Class I (rations) and III -(petroleum products) facilities for both the Kimpo regiment and the -service units stationed at Ascom. Class I shipments were forwarded -to the Munsan-ni railhead and stored there. Fuels and lubricants and -Class V items (ordnance) were received from the U.S. Army. A forward -ammunition supply point (ASP) was located north of the Imjin to assure -a steady flow of ammunition to frontline combat units in the event that -either an enemy attack or emergency flooding conditions of the river -prevented use of the bridges. For the same reason a truck company was -positioned near this supply point each night. - -Reinforcing the division logistic effort was the 1st Combat Service -Group. Commanded by Colonel Russell N. Jordahl, the 1st CSG in late -April had nearly 1,400 Marines and Navy medical personnel stationed at -various points between Japan and Korea. At Kobe, Japan, the Support -Company processed Marine drafts arriving and departing Korea. At Masan, -the Supply Company, 1st CSG, requisitioned for the division those -Class II and IV items peculiar to the Marine Corps needs and forwarded -them upon request. Heavy maintenance of all technical equipment -was performed by the Maintenance Company. Supporting the 1st Motor -Transport Battalion operation was the Motor Transport Company, 1st -CSG. Most of the group, including Headquarters Company, was based at -Masan.[60] Splinter detachments from the group also operated transport -facilities at other locations in Korea. - - [60] The Support Company moved to Ascom City on 14 Jun 52. - -In western Korea, good rail transport into Munsan-ni and an adequate -but not all-weather road system improved the division’s logistical -situation. Greater storage facilities also existed in the JAMESTOWN -rear supply areas than in the X Corps sector just vacated by the -Marines. Division motor equipment did not suffer any appreciable damage -due to the rigors of the MIXMASTER transplacement. Vehicle maintenance -also presented a favorable outlook, due to the expected decreased use -during the period of positional warfare. On the other hand, an unduly -large number of tanks developed engine troubles in March, which were -traced back to defective oil cooling fans. This condition was corrected -in April and May by installation of new fan assemblies. - -Guns of the 1st Tank Battalion immediately began to render valuable -support to Marine frontline regiments with the division’s new -assignment in the west. Companies A, B, and C were placed in direct -support of the three forward infantry regiments. Company D drew the -reserve mission, which included tank-infantry training with the 7th -Marines and preparation for reinforcing division artillery fires. Tank -companies were used almost daily in the forward sectors for destruction -by direct fire of the Chinese MLR fortifications. For such missions the -M-46 tanks, equipped with high-velocity 90mm guns, lumbered forward -from secure assembly areas to the rear of JAMESTOWN to temporary firing -positions on the line. - -After pouring direct fire on preselected targets and completion of the -fire mission, the armored vehicles then returned to the rear. Less -frequently, a five-vehicle tank platoon accompanied a reinforced rifle -platoon and conducted daylight reconnaissance missions of forward areas -to engage the Chinese and to gain intelligence about enemy positions -and terrain. During April six such tank-infantry patrols, all in the -KMC regimental area, failed to establish direct contact with the enemy -but did draw mortar and artillery fire. - -Marine artillery, which had been receiving its share of attention -from Communist field guns,[61] was faced by problems in two other -respects. Although the enemy held only four more artillery weapons -than did the Marines, General Seiden still lacked the ability to -mass artillery fires to the same degree as did the Chinese.[62] This -limitation stemmed directly from the wide physical separation of 11th -Marines batteries and the frontline infantry regiments being supported. -A second problem, the loss of qualified forward observers--reserve -officers due to return to the States for release from active -service--forced the 11th Marines to begin a school to train infantry -officers for this function. To make the course realistic, all firing -was done at live targets.[63] - - [61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the - Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese - counterfire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army - 8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese - defensive positions, generally brought down on their own - emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were - enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. _Pala - comments._ - - [62] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-39. - - [63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66, - hereafter _Henderson ltr II_. - -In April 1952, the 11th Marines organization had three light 105mm -howitzer battalions (54 guns), one medium 155mm howitzer battalion (12 -guns), the KMC 105mm howitzer battalion (18 pieces), and a 4.5-inch -rocket battery (6 launchers). Attached to the 1st Marine Division and -located in its sector were one battalion and one battery of the I Corps -field artillery. The mission of the Marine artillery regiment was to -provide accurate and timely fires in support of both the MLR and OPLR -defenses, until withdrawal of the latter late in April. Batteries -of the 11th Marines also fired on known and suspected Chinese gun -emplacements and on targets of opportunity. The regiment also provided -intelligence on enemy artillery. - -Throughout April, Colonel Henderson’s units continued to improve -their tactical and administrative areas, concentrating on field -fortifications, wire communications, and road trafficability. In the -last category, the artillery dozers and dump trucks not only did -nearly all of this work for the 11th Marines but also provided “a fair -amount of ‘direct support’ bulldozing to the infantry regiments and -occasionally loaned dozers and operators to the engineers.”[64] - - [64] _Ibid._ - -Within a Marine aircraft wing, personnel and equipment for logistic -support are purposely limited to carrying out the wing primary -mission--providing air support during an amphibious operation. The wing -T/O (Table of Organization) provides a streamlined organization with -light, transportable organic equipment. Additional logistical support -personnel and equipment are not included since this would result in (1) -a duplication of support effort between the wing and landing force -and (2) a great increase in wing transport shipping requirements. When -the wing moves ashore, organic units render support necessary for -operations on the airfield only. Responsibility for activities beyond -this basic mission--airfield construction, maintenance of runways, -and movement of supplies to the airfield--must come from more senior -commands. Usually such assistance is obtained by attaching elements of -a naval construction battalion and other logistical support units. - -In April 1952, Naval Construction Battalion Unit 1804 assisted in -the construction and maintenance received by MAG-33 at K-3. Here at -the port of Pohang, a detachment from the 1st Combat Service Group -controlled the movement of fuels, oils, lubricants, and ordnance to -wing dumps. Amphibian tractors (LVTs) of Company B, 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion, provided most of the transportation required for -these supplies excepting ordnance. Assistance in the form of amphibious -trucks (DUKWs) was furnished by a platoon from the 1st Amphibian Truck -Company. When required, Marines of these two companies manhandled the -supplies. - -Logistical support for the Marine wing was governed by the same general -procedures that applied to the division; 1st MAW supply requirements -beyond its augmented capability became the responsibility of Eighth -Army (2d LogCom) which furnished items common to both Marine and Army -units. If this EUSAK agency did not stock the requisitioned item, -it provided a substitute. Responsibility for resupply of aviation -items rested with the U.S. Navy. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East -(ComNavFE) replaced unserviceable aviation technical equipment such as -aircraft parts and special maintenance tools. Commander, Service Force, -Pacific (ComServPac) replenished aviation ordnance. Responsibility for -supplying items peculiar to the Marine Corps rested with CG, FMFPac. - -The repair and maintenance of 1st MAW equipment posed far less of a -problem than the construction and upkeep of airfields. Major repair -work on aircraft was satisfactorily performed in Japan by the wing -support squadron at Itami, and by the U.S. Navy Fleet Air Service -Squadron 11 (FASRon-11), located at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi. -The establishment in Japan of the wing heavy maintenance facility -depended, in part, upon its proximity to the wing flying squadrons. -Other considerations were the availability to the wing commander of -adequate air transport for continuous resupply of both routine and -emergency items and reliable communications between the users and the -maintenance unit. Because these conditions favoring removal of the -heavy maintenance facility from the immediate combat area existed -throughout Korean hostilities, it was possible for the maintenance -units to operate successfully in Japan away from the combat zone. - -Air base construction and maintenance of airfield runways and taxiways -had plagued wing operations since the early days of the Korean War. -During the first winter these problems had appeared repeatedly at those -installations where Marine air was either not properly supported or -insufficiently augmented by the operational commander. Shortly after -MAG-33 had moved to K-3 in early 1951, the wing commander requested -emergency repairs for the runway and a permanent solution to the -airfield maintenance difficulties. Assistance was made available, but -it was insufficient. The repair force had to be augmented by Marines -pulled away from their own vital jobs and by native laborers. Later, in -the spring of 1952, when the Air Force assigned some of its engineers -to assist, the maintenance problem almost disappeared. - -Motor transport within the wing was a continuing source of logistical -problems. Vehicles for handling the heavier aviation ordnance were -unsatisfactory because their configuration, of World War II vintage, -did not permit them to service the newer aircraft. Other trucks lacked -engine power or rigidity to withstand sustained use under primitive -airfield conditions. World War II vehicles that had been preserved and -placed in open storage required reconditioning before their use in -Korea. Mechanics’ general and special tools had a high replacement rate -throughout the entire period of wing operations in Korea. - -Aircraft fuel handling in April 1952 followed outmoded World War -II methods. For K-3, amphibian vehicles received drummed fuel from -ships and landed it at the beach. There MAG-33 personnel transferred -the gasoline to 1,200-gallon fuel trucks, which then moved it to the -airfield servicing area, where other Marines transferred it again, -this time to 3,200-gallon stationary refuelers for dispensing into -the aircraft. Although this method became highly developed, it was -extremely slow and wasteful of manpower and vehicles in comparison to -the tank farm system, which was soon to reach K-3. - -Two areas of logistics continued to remain almost trouble free for -division and wing Marines. Medical problems existed but were not -extensive. During a five-day period in late March, Marine Air Control -Group 2 experienced 13 cases of scarlet fever but no fatalities. That -same month, the Pacific Fleet Medical Officer noted that MAG-12 sick -bays were in excellent condition and that medical “personnel have shown -great ingenuity in fabricating various items of medical equipment from -scrap metal and lumber.”[65] - - [65] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 12, p. 12-8. The medical - officer’s report to CinCPac noted that a vast improvement - “in the spaces allocated for the care of the sick and - wounded” had been made. - -Evacuation of casualties and the utilization of air vehicles for -transport of passengers and cargo proved to be the second asset in -logistical operations. The Itami-based detachment of VMR-152 moved -7,757 personnel from the division and wing and 738.7 tons of cargo -during April 1952. In addition, the R5D craft hauled a total of 325.2 -tons of U.S. mail that month for the two Marine organizations. Speedy -removal of patients to better equipped facilities in the rear by -VMO-6 and HMR-161 helicopters was a giant step forward in life-saving -techniques. VMO-6 usually provided this service, but early in April, -Colonel McCutcheon’s squadron was assigned emergency medical evacuation -duties to augment the observation squadron.[66] Pilots flew these -evacuation missions with almost total disregard for adverse weather or -darkness, and without radar control or adequate instrumentation for -all-weather operations.[67] - - [66] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-69, p. 10-73. - - [67] _Ibid._, p. 10-68. Flights were not made in heavy fog. - Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of - the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of - reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development - cycle. - - -_Different Area, Different Problem_[68] - - [68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53, - Subj: Type “C” Rpt: “Civilian Affairs and the Korean - Service Corps, Mar 52-May 53,” hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv - ltr, _Civ Afrs and KSC_; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52; - HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52. - -An additional responsibility the 1st Marine Division inherited -when it moved to western Korea was control of civilians within the -division boundary. In eastern Korea, all nonmilitary personnel had -been evacuated from the vicinity of the MINNESOTA Line in the division -sector; they had not been removed from the JAMESTOWN area. Prior to -the arrival of the division in the west, the STAYBACK Line, averaging -seven miles to the rear of the Imjin River and running in a generally -northeast-southwest direction, had been established to limit the -movement of civilian personnel in the forward areas. The Marines soon -found that their predecessors must have been lax, however, in requiring -that Korean civilians remain behind STAYBACK. What seemed equally -unsuitable to the division was the poor military-civilian relationship -that had apparently existed for some time. - -To correct the situation, General Selden cautioned his units to avoid -unnecessary damage or destruction to the civilian economy. He directed -his commanding officers to keep unauthorized Koreans away from Marine -installations. Military police set up check points and instituted -roving patrols to enforce division controls. Civil violators were -turned over to Korean authorities or held for investigation before -release. Civilians who lived in the forward areas were removed to the -rear. They were prevented from going beyond STAYBACK until August 1952, -when a controlled passage system was instituted. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -Defending the Line - -_UN Command Activities--Defense of West and East Coast Korean -Islands--Marine Air Operations--Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN--_End -of the Second Year of War--A Long Fourth of July--Changes in the -Lineup--Replacement and Rotation--Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_ - - -_UN Command Activities_[69] - - [69] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank - A. Manson, USN, _The Sea War in Korea_ (Annapolis, Md.: - U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson, - _Sea War, Korea_; James A. Field, Jr., _History of United - States Naval Operations_, Korea (Washington: [Div. of - Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, _NavOps, Korea_; - John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret - E. Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_ (Washington: OCMH, DA, - 1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea, - 1951–1953_. - -Movement of the 1st Marine Division to the west was part of an Eighth -Army master plan to strengthen UN defenses and at the same time to -enable South Korean forces to assume increased responsibility in the -defense of their homeland. The tactical realignment in the spring -of 1952 put more South Korean infantry units on the main line of -resistance and buttressed the fighting front with five corps sectors -instead of four. In the far west, the I Corps positions were newly -manned (left to right) by the 1st Marine, 1st Commonwealth, 1st ROK, -and the U.S. 45th Infantry Divisions. Next in line was IX Corps, whose -left boundary General Van Fleet[70] had shifted further west, which now -had a divisional line up of the ROK 9th on the left, the U.S. 7th in -the center, and the U.S. 40th on the right. - - [70] General Van Fleet, CG, EUSAK since April 1951, had - advocated a program in which South Korean troops would be - rigorously trained to take over an increasingly greater - part of the UNC defense efforts in Korea. See Mark W. - Clark, _From the Danube to the Yalu_ (New York: Harper - & Brothers, 1954), p. 185, hereafter Clark, _Danube to - Yalu_, quoted with permission of the publishers. - -To fill in the central part of the EUSAK front where the change of -IX Corps boundary had created a gap in the line, the UN commander -inserted the ROK II Corps with three divisions (ROK 6th, ROK Capital, -and ROK 3d) forward. Immediately to the right of this new ROK corps -sector, the X Corps continued in approximately its same position on -the east-central front. Its ROK 7th and U.S. 25th Divisions remained -on line, while the ROK 8th had advanced to the former sector of the -Marine division in the wild Punchbowl country. At the far right of the -UN line, the ROK I Corps front was held by the ROK 11th Division at the -X Corps boundary and the ROK 5th along the Sea of Japan. By 1 May 1952, -nine Republic of Korea divisions had been emplaced on the UNC main -defense line, three more than had been there in mid-March. - -Throughout Korea in March and April there had been a general stagnation -of offensive action on both sides because of fog, rain, and mud. In -May, however, the Chinese launched no less than 30 probing attacks -against the ROK 1st Division in the I Corps sector, without gaining -any significant advantage. To the right, the enemy and the U.S. 45th -Division traded blows in several patrol actions. In June, major -EUSAK combat action was still centered in the 45th’s sector, but the -following month was marked by sharp battlefront clashes in nearly all -Eighth Army division areas. For a two-week period in July and August, -heavy seasonal rains limited both ground and air action. With the -return of normal weather, heavy fighting again broke out, this time -concentrated in the I Corps sector. This action did not abate until -late August, when the onset of the heaviest rains of the season again -drastically reduced military operations. - -Communist ground activity in the spring of 1952 was marked by increased -artillery support which resulted in telling damage to UN infantry and -artillery positions. Thus, during May, the enemy expended approximately -102,000 artillery and mortar rounds against the Allied front, roughly -12 times the number fired the previous July, just prior to the -period of stabilized battlelines in Korea. The artillery buildup was -accompanied by a sharp decrease in hostile air support activities. -While the Chinese had flown 3,700 jet sorties during the first month of -1952, by June the monthly total had dropped to 308. - -As part of the balanced military forces, Allied air and sea units -continued their active defense in support of UN ground units. Beginning -in late May, Fifth Air Force shifted the emphasis of its destructive -effort from interdiction of communication routes to the bombing of -selected industrial targets. Naval air was committed to support the -FAF programs. At sea, ships steamed almost at will to sustain the -U.S. lifeline. Underscoring the complete UN control of Korean waters, -large naval vessels offshore fired their big guns in support of -ground troops. Off both the west and east coasts, Task Force (TF) 95 -maintained its blockade of North Korean ports and reduced the extent of -water travel that enemy craft could safely undertake. This same naval -force was responsible for the Allied defense of islands located off the -east and west coasts of Korea. - - -_Defense of West and East Coast Korean Islands_[71] - - [71] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9; No. - 5, Chap. 8; West Coast Island Defense Element ComdDs, - Feb-Oct 52, hereafter _WCIDE ComdD_, with date; East - Coast Island Defense ComdDs, Jan-Oct 52, hereafter _ECIDE - ComdD_, with date; Col William K. Davenport ltr to CMC, - dtd 27 Jun 52, Subj: Type D Report of duty as Commander - West Coast Island Defense Element (CTE 95.15); Cagle and - Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_. - -Just off the northwest Korean mainland a string of islands extends -from the mouth of the Yalu River down around the peninsula to Pusan in -the southeast. Most of these islands are tiny and are located south of -the 38th Parallel. Only a few lie off the east coast, and these are -clustered primarily in the North Korean harbor of Wonsan. By early -1951, UN forces exercised control over most of the Korean islands. -Their tactical importance is shown from their diverse use as sites for -UN Command intelligence activities, USAF radar installations, locations -for the emergency landing strips used by Allied planes, bases for U.S. -search and rescue operations, and as springboards for possible thrusts -into enemy rear areas.[72] - - [72] Evidence of Chinese concern about such rear area attacks - is apparent in the countermeasures taken: “Order of - Battle reports indicated that a total of three North - Korean Corps and three Chinese Communist Armies were - engaged in coastal defense operations on the east and - west coasts of North Korea.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, p. - 8-79. - -Another reason for holding some of the islands had come to light -during truce negotiations in December 1951. At that time, in an -attempt to expedite the successful conclusion of the truce meetings, -UN representatives had offered the Communists all the islands north of -the 38th Parallel. Brushing aside the tactical value of the proposal, -the enemy boasted that he could capture the islands at any time. -In November 1951 the Communists had, in fact, seized two western -islands near the mouth of the Yalu. The 1,000 defending guerrillas -there--former North Koreans working for the UNC--had been unable to -stem the assault. The UN Command promptly reviewed the island situation -and on 6 January 1952 gave TF 95, the United Nations Blockading and -Escort Force, responsibility for both overall defense and local ground -defense for the 11 coastal islands north of the 38th Parallel and the -4 islands immediately south of this boundary. Two subordinate blockade -task groups, one in the west and another in the east, were responsible -for the defense of these islands. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 6 K. White - -WEST COAST ISLAND DEFENSE ELEMENT - -SUMMER 1952] - -In the west, Task Group (TG) 95.1 was charged with the defense of six -islands. (See Map 6.) Two of these, Sok-to and Cho-do, lie between the -38th and 39th Parallels; the four remaining islands, Paengyong-do, -Taechong-do, Yongpyong-do, and Tokchok-to, are above the 37th Parallel. -In the east, TG 95.2 was responsible for keeping nine islands north -of the 38th Parallel in friendly hands. Situated in Wonsan harbor -are Mo-do, Sin-do, So-do, Tae-do, Hwangto-do, Ung-do, and Yo-do, the -largest. (See Map 7.) Another island, Yang-do, actually a two-island -group further north in the area of the 41 st Parallel, is 18 miles -northeast of the coastal city of Songjin. The southernmost island, -tiny Nan-do, is below Wonsan and the 39th Parallel and lies 10 miles -northeast of Kojo, another coastal city. - -Ground defense of the islands had been, at best, a haphazard -arrangement before TF 95 took over the responsibility. Many of the -islands, especially those inhabited by friendly guerrillas, had neither -plans for a proper defense nor commanders experienced in organizing -resistance to enemy attack. Soon after the two islands near the mouth -of the Yalu were taken, ROK Marines were rushed to those islands -considered most strategic for South Korean defense. Late in 1951, U.S. -Marines had been assigned to the area in an advisory capacity. By early -1952, Marine Corps detachments were in command of the island defense -activities for both task groups. Korean Marines provided a majority of -the actual defending forces. - -Although the 1st Marine Division initially had supplied the officers -and men for the island security missions, in January 1952 FMFPac took -on direct responsibility for furnishing personnel and providing for -their administrative and logistical support through the 1st Provisional -Casual Company, FMFPac. Located at Otsu, Japan, the company was the -administrative headquarters for seriously wounded Marine division and -wing personnel recuperating in service hospitals in Japan. Recovered -patients who volunteered for duty with the offshore commands provided -the bulk of the Marines used in this defense. Major responsibilities -were to plan, organize, and conduct the defense of these islands off -the Korean west and east coasts. A task element under each task group -was created for this purpose. - -With its headquarters at Paengyang-do, Task Element (TE) 95.15, the -West Coast Island Defense Element (WCIDE), was organized early in -January 1952. The following month, the initial complement of U.S. -Marines arrived. Colonel William K. Davenport, Jr., element commander, -assigned his 5 officers and 29 enlisted men to the 4 most critical -islands and to his staff. Those islands garrisoned were Cho-do and -Sok-to, north of the Parallel and both within range of enemy mainland -guns, and Paengyang-do and Yongpyong-do, to the south. Taechong-do, -near the command island, and Tokchok-to, southwest of Inchon, were both -considered secure and not provided with U.S. Marine commanders. At each -of the four occupied islands, Marines reconnoitered the terrain, drew -up plans for preparation of defensive positions, organized and trained -the troops available, and began the laborious task of constructing -the defense. Protection against long-range hostile artillery fire was -emphasized for the northern Sok-to and Cho-do garrisons. - -Off the other long coast of Korea, TE 95.23, the East Coast Island -Defense Element (ECIDE), commanded until early May 1952 by Colonel -Frank M. Reinecke, had an almost entirely different situation. Eight of -the nine islands in the vicinity of Wonsan Harbor or north of Songjin -that ECIDE was responsible for were within range of Communist shore -batteries and thus frequently fired upon. Even before the January -1952 decision, the U.S. Navy had been charged with the security of -these east coast islands north of the 38th Parallel. For these reasons -ECIDE defenses had to maintain a greater state of readiness and were -more advanced than in the west. Fire support ships and land based -U.S. Marine naval gunfire spotting teams from 1st ANGLICO (Air and -Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), FMF, which also provided forward air -controllers for the KMC regiment, stood by at all times to silence -unfriendly artillery fire emanating from the mainland. The Marines had -also trained Korean Marines to handle the spotting missions. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 7 K. WHITE - -EAST COAST DEFENSE ELEMENT - -SUMMER 1952] - -A number of events of major interest occurred during those first -difficult weeks following organization of the two offshore island -commands. On 19 and 20 February, elements of two North Korean infantry -battalions launched an unsuccessful assault against the two Yang-do -islands. The combined “action of the island garrison and UN surface -forces”[73] repulsed the enemy attempt, which had been planned to gain -intelligence and kill as many of the defenders as possible.[74] On the -heels of this action, with the first enemy effort to take an east coast -island, came an unexpected bonus in the form of a defector. Brigadier -General Lee Il, NKPA, came ashore on 21 February at Tae-do “in a stolen -sampan with a briefcase full of top secret papers, a head full of top -secret plans, and a strong desire to make himself useful.”[75] He was -rushed immediately to Eighth Army intelligence officers. - - [73] CinPac Weekly Intel Digest No. 23-52, dtd 6 Jun 52, - included as App. 17 to _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-110. - - [74] First Lieutenant Joseph S. Bartos, Jr., a former - All-American football great, also distinguished himself - during the Yang-do action. His cool, resourceful, and - valiant leadership during the two-day defense earned him - the Silver Star Medal. BGen Frank M. Reinecke comments on - draft MS, dtd 25 Aug 66. - - [75] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 426. - -The next day command personnel of the west coast TE 95.15 were treated -to a surprise, though not so pleasant as the unforeseen defection of -the NKPA general. Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, Commander Task Force -(CTF) 95, and his staff were engaged in an inspection of the WCIDE -islands. While the party was looking over the antiaircraft defenses at -Paengyong-do: - - ... an aircraft of VMA-312 made a pass at the CP, followed - closely by a second plane. The second aircraft made a message - drop and accidentally released a 500-pound bomb, which landed - from 75–100 feet west of the CP, shattering all windows and - blowing all the doors off their hinges. Personnel harbored - within the CP were thrown to the floor by the concussion, a - few sustaining minor cuts and bruises, but no fatalities were - incurred.... Commanding Officer, USS _Bairoko_ [the carrier to - which VMA-312 was assigned], sent a note of apology to CTE 95.15 - and later followed up with material to repair the CP.[76] - - [76] CTE 95.15 ComdD, 1 Feb-31 May 52, p. 8. - -In March, CTG 95.1 directed the occupation of Ho-do, barely more than -a speck of dirt 4,000 yards south of Sok-to and within 400 yards -of the Communist mainland. Despite Colonel Davenport’s objection -that the proposed action was beyond the defensive mission of his -command and that the proximity of Ho-do to the enemy shore made the -island untenable,[77] the task group commander would not rescind the -directive. After a detailed reconnaissance by First Lieutenant Wallace -E. Jobusch, Colonel Davenport ordered a reinforced Korean Marine Corps -platoon to occupy the island. This order was carried out, but during -the night of 25–26 March the platoon lost its newly gained objective to -a well-coordinated enemy amphibious attack. Not a single Korean Marine -survivor could be accounted for at daylight. On 2 April, however, -after the enemy force had departed Ho-do, six of the platoon turned -up on Sok-to. They had survived by hiding out at Ho-do. None of the -others were ever seen again. After the island was overrun, it was not -reoccupied by Allied forces. - - [77] Colonel Davenport later pointed out that the enemy - could easily employ high-powered rifles against Ho-do - occupants, that resupply posed problems to his command, - and that at times the enemy could even walk to Ho-do - over the winter ice. Col William K. Davenport ltr to Hd, - HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66. - -After this latest offensive action in the west, the Communists -made no further attempts to seize any of the islands. U.S. and ROK -Marines enjoyed a period of relative freedom from enemy harassment, -except for frequent shore battery shelling directed against the east -coast islands. For WCIDE command members the quiet island duty was -interrupted only occasionally by hostile artillery fire although rumors -of imminent enemy landings abounded. On 13 October, however, the enemy -bombed Cho-do in the first air attack made against an island garrison -since the U.S. Marines had been assigned the west coast island command -responsibility. No casualties resulted from this raid. The lull in -enemy activity that then ensued enabled island personnel to devote -increased efforts towards improvement of their defenses. - -Marines instructed, drilled, and conducted tactical exercises for -the island forces. Island commanders supervised the construction and -improvement of gun pits and other defense installations. At the ECIDE -command island, Yo-do, a 2,700-foot airstrip (Briscoe Field) for -emergency landings and intelligence flights had been completed by June. -Since much of the labor was performed by Koreans, the language barrier -sometimes created difficulties. In all these activities the Marines -found that they were hampered but not unduly burdened by this problem. - -One condition, however, did handicap operations of the island Marines. -This was the supply situation which was prevented from becoming -desperate only because the Marines were able to borrow and obtain -necessities from other service activities. The inability of the island -Marines to draw needed supplies from the responsible U.S. Army agency -developed as a result of the slowness of the Marines in approving the -task element tables of equipment (T/E),[78] and from insistence of -the supplying activity that it would deal only with those units that -had approved tables of equipment. The urgency of the situation was -alleviated in May when weekly supply flights were begun by the 1st MAW. -Even when surface ships did arrive with provisions, Marines frequently -discovered that items which had been invoiced were missing.[79] -Consumables, especially, had a high rate of disappearance. - - [78] A T/E is a listing of equipment that a unit needs to - accomplish its mission. Tables vary according to type of - unit and its mission. - - [79] Commenting on logistical matters, Colonel Kenneth A. - King, who during 1952 commanded first the WCIDE and then - 1st CSG, was of the opinion that the main difficulty - lay “not in getting requisitions filled, but in getting - delivery of what was approved” due to the fact Marines - were not assigned to processing of requisitions and - delivery of supplies. He had high praise for the concern - and assistance of 1st MAW units as well as Captain G. L. - G. Evans (RN) of HMS _Ocean_ and various other United - Kingdom ship captains. Colonel King further commented - that “for the benefit of Marines who may have to serve - in isolated areas, and I imagine this often prevails in - Vietnam today, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that - the Marine Corps should be very reluctant to leave the - support of any of its elements, no matter how small, to - other services or nationalities.” Col Kenneth A. King ltr - to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Aug 66. - - -_Marine Air Operations_[80] - - [80] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section has - been derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10; No. - 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, May-Aug 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, - Jun, Aug 52; Robert F. Futrell, _The United States Air - Force in Korea, 1950–1953_ (New York: Duell, Sloan, and - Pearce, 1961), hereafter Futrell, _USAF, Korea_. - -Close air support of ground troops remained an almost forgotten mission -of Fifth Air Force tactical aircraft. When planes were allotted for -close support, both their customary late arrival over the target -area and pilot inefficiency left Marine ground commanders less than -satisfied.[81] The particular concern of General Jerome, the new -1st MAW commander, was the continuing limited opportunity for his -Marines to execute their normal primary mission--close air support of -frontline troops. Although FAF assigned Marine pilots to support the -1st Marine Division whenever possible, the infrequent number of close -air support missions performed under the existing sortie limit was -beginning to detract from the quality of delivery. General Jerome set -out to remedy this unfavorable situation. - - [81] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, - p. 10-45. - -Working with General Selden, the Marine wing commander prevailed upon -the Air Force to permit close air support training of wing pilots and -of forward air controllers with the Marine division. On 19 May, CG, -FAF lifted the close air support restriction that he had imposed in -front of General Selden’s MLR. By agreement between the FAF and the -two Marine commanders, Fifth Air Force would permit the scheduling of -12 close air support sorties daily for a one-month period, MAG-12 was -given this training mission, to begin on 21 May.[82] - - [82] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training - pilots in close air support techniques.... Initially, - all training missions for this division were flown by - Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to - specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG, - 1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum - for pd 1 Jan-30 Apr 52, cited in _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. - 4, p. 10-196. These flights ceased just before the ones - from MAG-12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st - MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of - General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the - new close air support training program, has credited the - two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated - personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col - Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter - _McGill comments_. - -The objective of the CAS program, in addition to providing operational -training and practice for Marine ground officers, air controllers, -and pilots, was to inflict maximum casualties on Chinese troops and -to increase the destruction and damage to their positions. Before -assigning a pilot to the actual training flights, MAG-12 sent him -on a tour of the front lines to become better familiarized with the -topography, the restricted (“no-fly”) areas, and probable enemy -targets. Air strikes requested by the division went directly to MAG-12. -Initially, a limitation of 12 sorties per day was established, but on -17 July--the program having already been extended beyond its original -30-day limit--a new ceiling of 20 daily sorties went into effect. The -division was also allowed additional flights above this prescribed -daily sortie number when air support was needed to repel a large-scale -enemy attack or to assist in a major Marine ground assault. - -Almost as soon as the Marines began to derive the benefit of the -training program, the flights were terminated by FAF. On 3 August -1952, following a complaint by CG, Eighth Army that Marines were -getting a disproportionate share of the close air support sorties, -the Fifth Air Force notified General Jerome that the special program -would end the next day. General Selden was instructed to request air -support “in the same manner as other divisions on the Army front.”[83] -Despite the abrupt termination of the training program, the division -had derived substantial benefits from the 12 weeks of Marine-type close -air support. “Air attacks were the most useful weapon for dealing with -enemy dug-in on the reverse slopes,”[84] according to an official -analysis. One regimental commander reported that the 1,000-pound -bombs were effective in destroying enemy bunkers and further noted -that the strikes had produced good results in the “destruction or -damaging of enemy artillery and mortar pieces.”[85] Another senior -officer commented that air overhead kept the Communists “buttoned up,” -which permitted Marines greater freedom of movement for tactical and -logistical operations.[86] - - [83] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-54. - - [84] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-36. - - [85] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2. - - [86] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, - HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66. - -A second type of Marine close air support aided the mission of Marine -infantrymen in western Korea during the summer of 1952. This was -controlled radar bombing, which permitted delivery of aviation ordnance -at night or under other conditions of limited or poor visibility. The -Air Force had introduced the concept into Korea in January 1951, had -tested and evaluated it in combat, and shortly thereafter had put it -to good use against the Communist spring offensives that year. Based -on a concept oriented towards deep support of troops in extended land -campaigns, the Air Force system made use of 20-ton vans to house its -ground components.[87] - - [87] As an Air Force spokesman noted, “... the AN/MPQ-2 radars - introduced into Korea in January 1951 were Strategic Air - Command bomb scoring radars and not tactical equipment. - This would explain the large vans.” Robert C. Futrell, - Historian, Hist Studies Br USAF Hist Div, comments - on draft MS, dtd 12 Oct 66. Dr. Futrell authored the - definitive unclassified history of Air Force operations - in Korea, previously cited as _USAF, Korea_. - -The Marine equipment, on the other hand, was more mobile since it was -to be employed close to friendly lines. Referred to as the MPQ-14,[88] -the Marine radar bombing system was designed so that the largest -piece could be put into a one-ton trailer. Major ground items were a -generator power supply, a tracking radar, and a computer; the last -essential component, an automatic bombing control, was mounted in the -aircraft. - - [88] These letters indicate first, the type of installation; - next, the kind of electronic equipment; and finally, its - purpose. In this case, M-mobile ground installation, - P-radar, and Q-intended for a combination of purposes. - The figure indicates the model number in the - developmental history of the equipment. - -Developed and hand built after World War II by Marines under Major -Marion C. Dalby at the Naval Air Materiel Test Center, Point Mugu, -California, the MPQ-14 was first used in Korea in September 1951. -Initially, considerable mechanical difficulty was experienced with -radar bombing, which affected the accuracy of the bombs, but later the -system became sufficiently reliable to permit bomb drops within one -mile of friendly lines. Subsequent use confirmed the tactical precision -of the MPQ-14. By the middle of summer 1952, the Marines had obtained -Fifth Air Force permission to use radar bombing, controlled by a -forward observer on the ground, in a close support role. - -Before this policy change took place another one, at a still higher -command level, had occurred. On 23 June, FAF planes struck at eight -North Korean hydroelectric plants in the central and northwestern part -of the country. The attack represented a departure from the intense -interdiction of enemy lines of communication (Operation STRANGLE) -which, since May 1951, had characterized FAF support operations. The -shift came about after a Far East Air Forces study on the effectiveness -of the interdiction campaign had concluded, in part, that the program -had been indecisive.[89] - - [89] HistDiv; Air Univ, USAF, _United States Air Force - Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 - June 1952_, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955), - p. 159, hereafter USAF, _Ops in Korea_, with appropriate - number. The Air Force operations were published in three - books, numbered 72, 73, and 127. - -For more than a year preceding the 23 June attack, the Fifth Air Force -had concentrated its ground support efforts on the disruption of -Communist communication lines so that the enemy would be unable “to -contain a determined offensive ... or to mount a sustained offensive -himself.”[90] During the lifetime of the doctrine, no major offensive -had been launched by the enemy, and on this fact was based the claim -for success of the interdiction program. Opponents, however, pointed -out that despite this maximum FAF air effort, the Communists had built -up their strength, including support areas immediately to the rear -of their front lines and resupply installations. As the recent UN -commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway,[91] told members of the Senate -Committee on Armed Services on 21 May 1952, the same month that FAF had -begun to shift its air effort away from interdiction, “I think that the -hostile forces opposing the Eighth Army ... have a substantially greater -offensive potential than at any time in the past....”[92] - - [90] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 435–436. - - [91] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN - Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the - new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing - General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was - returning to the United States. - - [92] Cited in Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 435. - -A number of factors contributed to the reduced emphasis on the -interdiction strategy. Three, however, appear to have most influenced -the inauguration of Operation PRESSURE, the name given the new policy -of concentrating aerial attacks on major industrial targets considered -of greatest value to the North Korean economy. Mounting FAF aircraft -losses due to enemy flak (fire from ground-based antiaircraft weapons) -and an insufficient number of replacements helped shape the new -program. By April 1952 FEAF had received “only 131 replacement aircraft -of the types engaged in rail interdiction against the 243 it had lost -and the 290 major-damaged aircraft on interdiction sorties.”[93] These -heavy losses had resulted from the increasing accuracy of Communist -antiaircraft ground weapons, a capability Air Force planners had failed -to consider sufficiently.[94] - - [93] USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 72, p. 156. - - [94] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 436–437. - -Although significant, this loss factor was not the final consideration -in executing PRESSURE attacks against the power plants. More directly -responsible were two other recent developments. These were the decision -of the new UN commander, General Mark W. Clark, to take forceful -action to bring the Communists around to an armistice agreement and a -top-level Defense Department change of policy that had removed a major -North Korean hydroelectric facility from the restricted bombing list. -This was the Suiho plant, fourth largest in the world. Adjacent to -the Yalu River, about 75 miles northeast of its mouth, Suiho supplied -approximately 25 percent of the electrical power used in nearby -northeast China.[95] - - [95] _Ibid._, pp. 452–453 and Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, - Korea_, pp. 443–445. - -Results of the PRESSURE strikes, carried on from 23–27 June, were -highly successful. Marine, Navy, and Air Force planes flew 1,654 attack -and escort sorties in these raids. Of the 13 target plants attacked -during this period, 11 were put out of commission and 2 others were -presumably destroyed. North Korea was almost blacked out for two weeks. -Chinese and Russian experts were rushed to North Korea to lend a hand -in restoration. The hydroelectric strikes marked the first time that -Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots had flown a combined mission in -Korea. The 23 June strike, moreover, was of particular significance -to 1st MAW since it was also the first time that MAGs-12 and -33 were -assigned group strikes at specific adjacent targets at the same time. - -Led by Colonel Robert E. Galer, the new MAG-12 commander since 25 May, -group pilots struck and leveled the single power complex, Chosin 3, in -the 23–24 June runs. Colonel John P. Condon, who had taken over MAG-33 -on 24 May, put 43 jets from VMFs-311 and -115 into the air during the -two-day mission. The first time that its F9Fs had ever been massed for -a strike of this type, the MAG-33 jets similarly destroyed the Chosin 4 -plant, 11 miles northwest of Hamhung. - -Although the jets carried a smaller payload than the Corsairs and ADs -of MAG-12 (approximately 37 gross tons to more than 150 tons), the -extremely precise bombing record made by the Grumman Panther jet pilots -forever put to rest the doubts about jet accuracy that had been held by -some in 1st MAW. As the group commander later recalled, “The capability -of jet strike aircraft for extremely accurate bombing, an item of -open discussion prior to this time, was never questioned in the 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing after this mission.”[96] Another gratifying result -was that flight personnel on all of the 150 Marine aircraft returned -safely. In fact, of the total 1,645 FAF sorties, only 2 aircraft were -downed; rescue aircraft successfully picked up these two pilots, both -U.S. Navy officers. - - [96] MajGen John P. Condon ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, - dtd 1 Oct 66. - -It was the high probability of being rescued, if forced to abandon -their aircraft, that not only eased the minds of pilots on missions -north of the 38th Parallel but also permitted the fliers a greater -degree of success. As the MAG-12 commander, Colonel Galer, who was -shortly to escape imminent capture by the enemy, later declared, “I do -know that every pilot flying in this theatre should have the highest -possible morale with the knowledge that so many are ready and willing -to risk so much to get them.”[97] - - [97] MAG-12 ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-4. - -A Medal of Honor holder from World War II, Colonel Galer was leading -a flight of 31 aircraft on 5 August. His objective was the supply area -and tungsten mines in the mountainous northeastern part of North Korea, -just below the 39th Parallel and 35 miles southwest of Wonsan. After -several hits had killed his engine, the MAG-12 commander, preparing -to parachute, climbed out over the side of his plane, but found that -he had one foot stuck inside the cockpit, probably on the shoulder -straps or the loop of the belt. He then pulled himself partially back -towards the cockpit, freed his foot with a vigorous kick, cleared the -plane, and headed in spread-eagle fashion towards the ground. Almost -immediately the plane, falling in a nose dive, caught the descending -pilot on the shoulder and pulled him into a spin. Colonel Galer -recovered in time, however, to pull the ripcord and thus ease his -impact onto enemy terrain. He landed within ten feet of his crashed -AU.[98] - - [98] The AU is the attack version of the Marines’ famed World - War II fighter, the F4U Corsair. - -“Immediately upon getting free of the chute, I ran as rapidly as -possible, staying low, down through a corn field.”[99] At the end of -the field, the Marine aviator paused momentarily to survey the terrain -for an escape route. Spotting a dry stream bed nearby, Colonel Galer -dashed toward it and quickly but cautiously moved up it some 100 -yards. Then he halted to put into operation a small survivor radio to -report his position. The message was received by the rescue air patrol -orbiting overhead which relayed the information to pickup aircraft. The -patrol advised the downed pilot that a rescue helicopter had already -departed for the crash area. - - [99] MAG-12, ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-2. - -Before breaking radio contact, Colonel Galer told the air patrol his -planned movements in order to facilitate pickup. He then quickly left -the area which was located too near the crashed aircraft for a rescue -attempt. Evading detection by enemy soldiers and curious teenagers -moving towards the wreckage, the Marine worked his way to higher -ground, keeping the air patrol advised of his changing position. By -1845, a search of the area was underway. Of the events that followed: -Colonel Galer wrote: - - At 1908 I heard the helicopter go down the next valley and saw it - disappear. I called, told them to make a 180-degree turn since - I was in the valley to the southwest and on the north slope. I - did not get an answer but soon the helicopter came through a - saddle in the ridge.... I immediately let the red smoke (day - flare) go, and came out of the bushes ... calling the helicopter - on the radio also. They apparently saw me immediately and came - over and hovered. The mechanic leaned out and swung the hoisting - sling back and forth.... Finally, I grabbed it and got in ... and - the pilot took off.... The mechanic pulled me up and into the - helicopter as we crossed the valley.[100] - - [100] _Ibid._, p. D-3. - -The colonel was not yet out of the woods. The trip to a rescue ship at -Wonsan was marked by intermittent bursts of enemy antiaircraft fire. -On one occasion the chopper was hit hard enough to spin it completely -around. As the rescue craft neared the coast patches of fog added -to the hazards of night flying. About this time the warning light -indicating low fuel supply came on but “the pilot gambled on making the -sea at the risk of having to autorotate through the overcast into the -mountains.”[101] It was a correct decision. The fuel lasted until the -helicopter landed on the rescue vessel. It was then 2100. - - [101] _Ibid._, p. D-4. - -Quite naturally the episode brought forth high praise for the -rescue system, and particularly for those individuals whose skills, -initiative, and courage made downed crew rescues of this type possible. -But Colonel Galer also saw some weaknesses. He pointed out that rescue -helicopter pilots should be kept up to date on changing enemy flak -positions. The Marine group commander also stressed the need for rescue -helicopters to establish and maintain a minimum safe fuel level which -would depend largely upon the position of the downed aircraft. One -final suggestion, not about the system but the aircraft itself, was -that fixed-wing aircraft have ejection-type seats. Remembering his -own difficulties, the MAG-12 commander further cautioned pilots to be -certain they were free of all straps and cords before bailing out. - -In addition to attack missions by tactical aircraft and rescue work by -its helicopters, the Marine wing was also responsible for providing -antiaircraft defense. It was not until July 1951, 13 months after -the NKPA invasion of South Korea, that a formal air defense had been -established for the country. Fifth Air Force was given the command -responsibility of coordinating the aerial defense net for South Korea -and its adjacent sea frontiers. In mid-November 1951, the FAF commander -had revised the defensive system, dividing his area into a northern -and southern sector, at a point exactly halfway between the 36th and -37th Parallels. - -FAF commanded the northern air defense sector while the southern sector -became the responsibility of CG, 1st MAW. In turn, these two sectors -were further divided into subsectors. Each of these, through a tactical -air direction center (TADC), maintained radar surveillance of its -assigned area and performed plotting and identification functions. Each -subsector was charged with being “directly responsible for sector air -defense.”[102] - - [102] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 616. - -Although the 1st MAW commander had been designated as the Air Defense -Commander, Southern Sector, Korea, he was not actually given the means -to carry out this responsibility. He still did not have command over -his tactical squadrons, nor could he exercise control over operations -of his tactical air coordination center (TACC) or TADC.[103] Moreover, -his southern sector could not originate practice air warning messages. -The wing commander had to obtain permission from JOC before he could -begin practice intercepts for training his radar intercept controllers. - - [103] TACC is the senior agency for controlling all tactical - aircraft and air warning functions; the TADC performs - similar functions in an area controlled by the TACC. JCS, - _Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint - Usage_ (Short title: JD). JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1964), - p. 141, hereafter _JCS, JD_. - -Several other deficiencies existed in the air defense system that -the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had inherited. There were no ground -antiaircraft weapons at the Marine fields until a .50 caliber automatic -weapons battery was detached from the 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery -Battalion, FMF, early in 1952 and sent to K-3, the home field of -MAG-33. Other inadequacies were deficient equipment--a search radar -limited to 30 miles out and 20,000 feet up--and lack of an interceptor -aircraft capable of rising to meet the faster swept-wing jets the -enemy was employing. Airfields housing Marine air groups did not have -revetments for either aircraft parking areas or ordnance dumps. - -Not all of these weaknesses were acquired with assumption of the air -defense mission. There had been a general lack of concern about air -defense throughout South Korea. This attitude had resulted from the air -supremacy which the Fifth Air Force had quickly established. Camouflage -was seldom practiced. Dispersal of aircraft, supply dumps, and -servicing facilities was employed only rarely. In fact, at K-6, there -was not sufficient land to properly scatter installations and aircraft. - -Defense of the southern sector was commanded from K-3 (Pohang), -the site of the TACC (Major Fred A. Steel). Marine Ground Control -Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1) was set up on the west coast at K-8 and -MGCIS-3 (Lieutenant Colonel Owen M. Hines), on the east coast, near -Pohang. Each of these intercept units had an early warning detachment -operating off the mainland. Antiaircraft artillery was provided by the -90mm AAA battalion, which was controlled, however, by EUSAK. The 1st -MAW commander specified a ready alert status for two aircraft during -daylight hours. Just before sunrise and sunset, four planes were put on -strip alert. Aircraft for night alert were provided by VMF(N)-513 until -April, when the requirement was withdrawn. By 30 June 1952, 1st MAW -air defense operations had destroyed a total of five enemy planes. The -F7F night fighters flown by VMF(N)-513, moreover, had frequently been -scrambled to intercept hostile night intruders that had penetrated into -the Seoul area, or northern sector. - -This low kill rate did little to atone for the steadily increasing -number of Marine aircraft lost to enemy flak. Although the number -of friendly planes destroyed or damaged in air-to-air combat during -the latter half of Korean hostilities diminished sharply compared to -the early period, losses due to ground fire were reaching alarming -proportions in early and mid-1952. In May 1952 Navy and Marine air -losses to enemy action were twice the total for April, and the June -figure was even higher. By June, the Communists had massed more than -half of their antiaircraft artillery along communication routes that -FAF struck nearly every day. - -Remedial action was soon taken. Stress on flak evasion was emphasized -in pilot briefings and debriefings. The MAG-33 intelligence section -came up with a program that attempted to reduce losses by a detailed -analysis of flak information. The originator of this system, First -Lieutenant Kenneth S. Foley, based his method on: - - ... photo interpretation of an up-to-date flak map, scale - 1:50,000, and an intelligent utilization of flak reports - disseminated by the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the - 5th Air Force. Frequent briefings were given to each squadron - on the enemy AA capabilities. Elaborate overlays were drawn up - and displayed. Target maps, clearly showing AA positions and - flak clocks [danger areas], were given to flight leaders to aid - them in evading known AA guns in their target area. Through flak - analysis, the safest route to the target area was determined - and an actual attack and retirement route was suggested. These - recommendations appeared in a flak summary presented at each - combat briefing.[104] - - [104] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak - analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records - of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the - program was not applicable to CAS missions) dropped - for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley - transferred to the night squadron, he took his system - with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol - Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 - Mar 66. - -Other measures attempted to reduce mounting losses of personnel -and aircraft. In all Marine air units, evasion and escape tactics -were stressed. In addition to the FAF de-emphasis on interdiction -of communication routes that had come about, in part, due to heavy -aircraft losses, Fifth Air Force decreed that beginning 3 June, “with -the exception of the AD and F4U aircraft [1st MAW types] only one run -will be made for each type of external ordnance carried and no strafing -runs will be made.”[105] CTF 77 ordered that in all attack runs, -aircraft would pull out by the 3,000-foot altitude level. The Marines, -combining their air and ground efforts, came up with a positive program -of their own. It was to become the first known instance of Marine -ground in support of Marine air. - - [105] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, _PacFlt - EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199. - -Although the originator of the idea cannot be positively identified, -the time that artillery flak suppression firing was first employed -can be traced back to late 1951, when the division was still in East -Korea.[106] It was not until June 1952, however, that a published -procedure for conducting flak suppression firing appeared in Marine -division records. That same month another type of flak suppression, -this by an aircraft, was utilized by the 1st Marines, commanded at the -time by Colonel Walter N. Flournoy. The procedure called for the FAC -[forward air controller] to relay gun positions to friendly strike -planes which temporarily diverted their attack to silence the located -gun. Although the method “worked with good results,”[107] it was not -destined to become the system adopted by the Marines. - - [106] _Paid comments_; _Nihart comments_. Both of these - officers, the former artillery, the latter infantry, - recall flak suppression firing late in 1951 or early in - 1952 when the division was on the eastern front. Colonel - Nihart pointed out, in addition, that “such expedients - and new tactics went on for some time before getting into - the regimental commander’s reports.” - - [107] 1stMar ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2. - -The more frequently used flak suppression called for artillery to fire -on hostile gun positions that could impede the success of a friendly -close air support strike. Several Marine officers appear to have had -a major role in the development and employment of this technique. -Among them were Brigadier General Frank H. Lamson-Scribner, Assistant -Commanding General, 1st MAW; Colonel Henderson, the 11th Marines -commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Gerald T. Armitage, 3/1 commander. - -The 1st Marines battalion commander explained how the system operated -in late spring 1952: - - I was in an outpost watching an air strike. I asked Captain - Shoden [John C., the battalion forward air controller] to work - out some idea of flak suppression. Shoden, G-2, and others worked - two or three weeks to complete the first plot of antiaircraft - positions. My idea was to have a plane start a run and then pull - up before finishing the dive. The enemy antiaircraft gunners - could not tell that the pilot was pulling out at an extremely - high level. The batteries would fire and Marine observers would - plot their positions from their fires. Then, the Marine artillery - would lay a heavy barrage on these positions.[108] - - [108] LtCol Gerald T. Armitage interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, - dtd 15 Aug 61. - -While observing an air strike from the Marine division sector, -General Lamson-Scribner noted that prior to the strike there had been -no preparatory firing on enemy antiaircraft artillery positions. -After the strike he discussed this matter with General Selden, who -“directed me to discuss with his chief of staff what I had observed -and my suggestions that division firepower for ‘flak suppression’ be -coordinated with air strikes.”[109] The upshot of this was that the -division chief of staff suggested that the 11th Marines regimental -commander and his staff members develop an SOP[110] for using artillery -flak suppression fires in support of close air support strikes. It was -believed that proper utilization of these fires would reduce aircraft -losses and further increase the opportunity for a successful close air -support mission by destruction of enemy antiaircraft weapons.[111] - - [109] MajGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 - Div, HQMC, dtd 12 Oct 66. - - [110] An SOP, standing operating procedure, is a set of - instructions for conducting operations that lend - themselves to established procedures. _JCS, JD_, p. 133. - - [111] With respect to the effect of enemy fire on attack - aircraft, the CO, MAG-33 later commented that - “Antiaircraft artillery has a direct deterioration effect - on pilot accuracy, particularly with regard to care in - getting on target and doing a precise job.” CO, MAG-33 - ltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 25 Jul 52, quoted in _PacFlt - EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-76. - -On 30 June 1952, the 11th Marines published the SOP. Since the -objective was to prevent enemy fire from interfering with friendly -strike planes, the key to the entire procedure was the precise -coordination of artillery fire with the delivery of aircraft ordnance. -As Colonel Henderson described the system: - - When the infantry regiment received word of an air strike, the - air liaison officer plotted on the map ... the target of the - strike, the orbit point, the direction of approach, and the - altitude ... and direction of pullout. Then the artillery liaison - officer, by looking at the map, could determine which of the - Chinese positions could bring effective fire on the strike - aircraft. The artillery battalion had prearranged code names - and numbers for every antiaircraft position. All the artillery - liaison officer had to do was pick up the phone and tell the - F.D.C. [fire direction center] ‘flak suppression’ and read off - what targets he wanted covered. - - These fires were then delivered on the request of a forward - observer who was with the forward air controller.... When there - was a forward air controller up in the front lines controlling - the strike, we would put a forward observer with him. When the - planes were ... ready to go, the F.O. [forward observer] got the - word ‘Batteries laid and loaded,’ and he would tell them to fire. - The minute the FO would get the word, ‘On the way,’ the forward - air controller would tell the planes to start their run. As a - result, we had cases where the planes were in their bombing run - within 30 seconds after the flak suppression was fired, which - meant that they were in on the target while the positions were - still neutralized. The question of control and split second - timing is of exceeding importance because the aircraft are going - 300 to 400 miles an hour....[112] - - [112] _Henderson ltr II._ - -Early in the program the MAG-12 commander reported that although the -flak suppression procedure was not flawless, it was proving “very -capable and workable.”[113] An indication of the success of 1st Marine -Division pioneering efforts in flak suppression is seen in the fact -that shortly after it was put into operation “there was a steady stream -of visitors to the 11th Marines CP to find out what [it was] and how -we were doing it and to get copies of our SOP.”[114] The procedure was -eventually adopted by other Eighth Army units. - - [113] CO, MAG-12 Spdltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 2 Jul 52, Subj: - Comments on 11th Mar Flak Suppression SOP, cited in - _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 5, Chap. 9, p. 9-78. - - [114] _Henderson ltr II._ - -Marine air losses from hostile ground fire during CAS strikes -immediately began to drop from the June peak and never again reached -this level. In 124 close support sorties flown by 1st MAW on 13 August, -not one plane was shot down and only four received minor damage from -enemy flak. Although there were some complaints as to execution of the -flak suppression program these would be corrected, in the main, by a -revised procedure which the 11th Marines would undertake in the winter -of 1952. - - -_Spring 1952 on_ JAMESTOWN[115] - - [115] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, - Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 5thMar ComdDs, - Apr-Jun 52; 7thMar ComdD, Jun 52; 11thMar ComdDs, Apr-May - 52; 1/5 ComdD May 52; 1/7, 2/7 ComdDs, May 52. - -Earlier in the year the Marines had revised their estimate of enemy -capabilities after the lengthening of the division MLR by I Corps and -the subsequent heavy enemy attack. The re-evaluation placed the most -likely course of Chinese action as defending their present positions -with the 21 infantry battalions assigned and also cautioned that the -Communists could mount a limited objective attack at any time of their -choosing. Division intelligence estimated that the Chinese could muster -up to “57 infantry battalions supported by 12 artillery battalions -and 40 tanks and/or self-propelled guns” for a thrust into the Marine -sector.[116] - - [116] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52, p. 1. - -The enemy, however, showed little disposition for any concerted ground -attack during the remainder of April. But before the month ended, -Marines, in conjunction with other I Corps divisions, had deluged the -enemy with artillery and tank fire in Operation CLOBBER. The purpose of -this shoot was to inflict maximum casualties and damage by employment -of the element of tactical surprise. The reinforced 11th Marines, -augmented for this occasion by Company D, 1st Tank Battalion and nine -of the battalion’s 105mm howitzer and flame tanks, blasted Chinese CPs, -bivouac areas, artillery and mortar positions, and observation posts. -Marine frontline regiments joined in with their organic mortars. Since -most of the firing took place at night when results were unobserved, no -estimate could be made as to the effect of the operation on the enemy. - -A new Marine artillery tactic about this time was the -counter-counterbattery program instituted by the 11th Marines. The -regiment had developed this technique to counter superior enemy -artillery strength. This situation, as well as the fact that I Corps -artillery available to the division was considered inadequate for -counterbattery support, led the Marine division to adopt the new -program in May 1952. One provision required a battery in each battalion -to select counter-counterbattery positions and occupy them for 24 -consecutive hours each week. Another proviso of the program was the -selection by each battalion of 10 roving gun positions that were to -be occupied by a single weapon rotated to each place at least once -weekly. By these tactics, the artillery regiment hoped not only to -mislead the Chinese in their estimate of the strength and location of -Marine artillery but also to dilute enemy counterbattery intelligence -by causing him to fire into areas just vacated by friendly guns. “The -effectiveness of the program was demonstrated on numerous occasions -when the enemy fired counterbattery into unoccupied positions.”[117] An -added advantage was that of providing deeper supporting fires on target -areas.[118] - - [117] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-51. - - [118] LtCol Bruce F. Hillam comments on draft MS, dtd 31 Aug 66. - -Still another concept regarding the employment of artillery developed -during the early days of the JAMESTOWN defense. The 11th Marines had -advised the infantry regiments that it could effectively fire on -enemy troops attacking friendly positions if the Marines had overhead -cover. The idea was to use variable time (VT) fuzes[119] with the -standard high explosive (HE) shells. Artillery battalions supporting -the frontline regiments registered on positions occupied frequently by -patrols going forward from JAMESTOWN. - - [119] A type of proximity fuze, the V.T. depends upon an - external source, such as an electronic signal, rather - than the force of ground impact, to detonate the shell at - a predetermined height over the target. - -According to the recollections of veteran artillery and infantrymen in -the division, the first occasion that pre-planned artillery fire was -placed on friendly positions occurred in May 1952.[120] The episode -involved a 2/7 platoon patrol that late on 18 May was ordered to return -to the MLR from an outpost on the former OPLR. Operating forward of the -center regimental sector,[121] the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant -Theodore H. Watson, directed that two of the three Marine squads return -to the MLR. The remaining unit, surrounded by about 50 Chinese, engaged -them in a brisk fire fight. - - [120] 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 4. - - [121] The 7th Marines advanced to the line to relieve the 5th - Marines in the center sector on 11 May. - -When the artillery fired to seal off the enemy and box-in the defensive -position failed to discourage the hostile force, Lieutenant Watson -ordered his men into the shelter of two nearby bunkers. He then -requested the artillery to place VT directly over his positions.[122] -The volleys of overhead fire and effective Marine small arms fire then -forced the enemy to call off his assault. Although the exact number -of Chinese casualties could not be determined, the new fire technique -fully accomplished its purpose--repelling the enemy force. - - [122] The artillery regiment had earlier developed the - “box-me-in” fires for outpost defense. If under heavy - attack the outpost could call for these pre-planned - close-in fires that completely surrounded the position. - In event of radio or wire communication failures, the - outpost could call for “box-me-in” or “Fire VT on my - position” by signal flare or other pyrotechnic device. - _Henderson ltr II._ - -Initiating the infantry action in May was the 1st KMC Regiment, holding -the division left flank, with its 2d and 1st Battalions on line. At -dusk on 3 May a platoon-size raiding party, under Second Lieutenant -Kim Young Ha, left an outpost forward of the 1st Battalion line on a -prisoner-taking mission and headed for the objective, Hill 34, adjacent -to the rail line to Kaesong and about a half-mile west of the Sachon -River. When the platoon was within approximately 1,000 yards of its -goal, a support squad was detached near a trail and stream juncture to -ambush any enemy attempting to attack the raiders from the rear.[123] -The remainder of the platoon, two assault squads, then continued -towards the objective, moving cautiously and halting for an hour -because of the bright moonlight. - - [123] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The - heavy casualties it received prevented its further - participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May - 52. - -After midnight the moon disappeared behind the clouds, and the Koreans -again emerged. They advanced towards a village immediately south of -the objective. After searching a few houses and not finding any enemy, -the KMCs started on the last leg to Hill 34. As soon as the objective -came into view the raiders deployed for the assault. At 0410 the two -squads of Korean Marines charged the knoll, immediately drawing heavy -Chinese small arms fire. When the raiders continued their assault, the -enemy retreated to his trenchworks and bunkers where he continued to -fire on the KMCs. Since it now appeared to the patrol leader that the -probability of taking a prisoner was unlikely, he prepared to return to -friendly lines. He first arranged for artillery to cover the withdrawal -of the patrol, and then broke off the 18-minute fire fight, taking his -only casualty, a wounded rifleman, with him. The KMCs counted 12 enemy -dead. No prisoners were taken. In the preliminary action, the support -squad had also suffered three killed and seven wounded. - -As the KMC raiders were making their way back to the MLR, a combat -patrol from 1/5, the reserve battalion of the 5th Marines, prepared -to move out. This patrol was one of many dispatched by the battalion -during the first week of May in accordance with its mission of -patrolling in front of the OPLR, between the MLR and the OPLR, and -throughout the regimental sector. On this occasion, the patrol was to -occupy the high ground south of former Outpost 3, which had become the -focal point of activity in the center sector.[124] When used as a base -of fire, this ground provided a position from which automatic weapons -could readily cover enemy lines or tie in with adjacent friendly -defenses. In addition, the 1/5 patrol was to drop off friendly snipers -to cover the former OPLR position, to maintain surveillance, and to -ascertain to what extent the Chinese were developing the outpost. The -task went to a Company A platoon, which the unit commander, First -Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, reinforced with light and heavy machine guns. - - [124] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along - with several others had been abandoned when the division - withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments - dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage - the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR. - -At sunup the Marines crossed line JAMESTOWN and before 0900 had reached -the high ground they were to occupy. Here the patrol leader set up his -base of fire, then pushed on with the rest of his men to the outpost, -receiving occasional mortar fire before reaching the old position. -While organizing his men at the objective, Lieutenant Lee received word -by radio that the Chinese were preparing to attack. Almost immediately, -intense shelling struck the forward slope of the hill. A Marine aerial -observer (AO) detected 60–70 Chinese advancing from the next hill, some -800 yards to the front of the Marines. The AO also reported that the -enemy was firing mortars towards OP 3. - -Shortly thereafter the Chinese fire ceased. Moments before it lifted, -the patrol received a second warning that an enemy attack was imminent. -Even as this message was being received, about 30 Chinese rushed the -patrol. The Marines immediately took the hostile assault force under -fire, killing 14 CCF with well-placed small arms fire. Overhead, four -1947-vintage Marine Corsair fighters (F4U-4Bs) struck at troublesome -mortar positions previously located by the AO. At 1330 another aerial -strike against Chinese mortars and enemy positions on the hill north of -OP 3 was executed. These two air missions were credited with destroying -six mortars, damaging two others, and wrecking seven personnel bunkers. -During the second strike the 1/5 patrol began its withdrawal. - -On two occasions during the patrol’s return to its base the enemy -attempted to ambush it. Each time the attempt was thwarted, once by the -patrol itself and the second time, with the help of friendly artillery. -On the way back several loud explosions suddenly halted the patrol. -Investigation revealed that the Marines, carrying their casualties -of one dead and four wounded, had inadvertently stumbled onto a path -not cleared of mines. Two members of the stretcher bearer detail were -killed and three others wounded by the AP (anti-personnel) mines that -had not been charted on friendly maps by the Marines’ predecessors in -the defense sector. A mine clearance team promptly disposed of the -danger. With the aid of fires from a 2/5 patrol on the nose of a nearby -hill, the 1/5 platoon was able to break contact. After pulling back -several hundred yards, the patrol reached a forward medical aid station -where jeeps picked up the more seriously wounded and took them to -helicopters, which completed the evacuation. Patrol members reported 27 -known enemy dead, including one that had been propelled into the air by -a direct hit from an artillery round. - -The next major Marine ground action soon involved the same Company A -platoon, but this time as part of a larger force. Colonel Culhane, the -regimental commander, directed his 1st Battalion to launch a new raid -on the Outpost 3 area in an attempt to oust the Chinese and thereby -deny the enemy use of the critical terrain. Inflicting casualties and -capturing prisoners were additional tasks assigned. On 8 May Lieutenant -Colonel Nihart issued Operation Order 12-52, calling for 1/5 to seize a -series of three intermediate objectives (S, V and X) en route to OP 3 -(Y). (See Map 8.) The combat patrol, reinforced by regimental elements, -less Company B, was to be prepared to move north of OP 3 to occupy the -next hill mass (Z), if necessary. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 8 K. White - -OBJECTIVES FOR 1/5 ATTACK - -9 MAY 1952] - -Operational plans called for Lieutenant Lee’s Company A to do most of -the leg work as the assault unit. Captain Leland Graham’s Company C, -the diversionary force, was to make a feint against Hill 67, an enemy -position southwest of OP 3, and to neutralize it by fire. Weapons -Company, under First Lieutenant Ross L. Tipps, in support of the -Company A force, was to set up a base of fire at a designated position -(T), southeast of OP 3. Artillery support was to be furnished by 1/11, -4/11, and the attached 4.5-inch Rocket Battery. A section of regimental -4.2-inch mortars was also assigned. One platoon of Company B tanks was -to assist the assault force by firing both on designated positions and -targets of opportunity. Close air support flights were to be on station -at two periods during the 9 May daylight operation. - -In the early morning hours, under cover of darkness, all units moved -into position. At 0430 the 1st Platoon of Company A crossed the line -of departure heading for Objective S, a small ridge south and west of -OP 3. The 2d Platoon followed and moved out on the right, while the -3d Platoon covered the rear. This hill, lightly defended, was quickly -overrun by the Marines. The 1st Platoon then turned northeast towards -the four peaks (designated as V, X, Y, and Z), its main objectives. -These four positions were all situated at approximately the same -elevation, 450 feet. A distance of some 1,300 yards separated the first -and fourth hills in the north-south ridgeline. - -As the 1/5 platoon neared Objective V, friendly rockets lashed the -crest of the hill, which was held by a reinforced enemy platoon in -mutually supporting fighting holes. Assisted by this fire, Marine -two-man teams with rifles and grenades assaulted the fighting holes -occupied by the Chinese. As the Marines proceeded to clear the -objective, half of the Chinese were forced to retreat to safer ground. -Marines estimated that 15 enemy were killed and a like number wounded. -By this time, three hours after setting out on the raid, the platoon -had seized one prisoner and sustained five wounded. - -While reorganizing for the attack against Objectives X and Y, the 5th -Marines patrol came under a heavy artillery and mortar barrage that -killed one Marine and wounded three others. As the main body of the -assault force advanced towards Objective X to support the attack, the -lead elements of the company headed for OP 3. Throughout this maneuver, -the company remained under heavy artillery fire. - -Proceeding along the eastern slope of the ridgeline to assault knobs -X and Y, the platoon had a good view of the effectiveness of their -friendly supporting artillery fire. In fact, the combined rocket, -howitzer, mortar, tank, and machine gun fire threw up so much dust -that at times it restricted the vision of the Marine assault team. As -platoon members neared the summit of Objective X they encountered a -heavy stream of defending fire. A strong counterattack from the front -and left flank assailed the 1st Platoon, but the Marines repulsed the -enemy with accurate small arms fire, killing six CCF. Infiltrators then -attempted to envelop the Marine platoon and isolate it from the rest of -the Company A assault force. Successive waves of Chinese, employing a -wedge formation, tried to overrun the main body of the assault force. -In repulsing this latest counterattack, Company A killed 12 and wounded -5 enemy. - -Quickly sizing up the situation, the company commander ordered the -1st Platoon to rejoin the rest of the assault force. As the platoon -began to pull back at 1435 the Chinese blanketed the route with a -heavy barrage, firing “over four hundred rounds in a five minute -period.”[125] This intense shelling took the lives of three Marines, -wounded a number of others, and halted the assault force just short of -its final goal. Even though the Chinese had been driven from the three -intermediate objectives, the devastating enemy mortar and artillery -fire made the Marine position untenable. A third of the platoon moved -back to Objective V; the rest worked their way along a route east -of that objective. While the rest of Company A and Weapons Company -elements occupied Hill T, the diversionary force, Company C, reinforced -by other Weapons Company personnel, had remained at a strongpoint not -far from Objective S. All supporting ground weapons assisted in the -withdrawal. In addition to lending direct fire support, Marine tanks -brought forward emergency supplies and evacuated casualties. By 1730, -the assault force had returned to friendly lines, followed shortly by -the rest of the battalion. - - [125] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10. - -Although the battalion failed to seize and hold all of its objectives, -that part of the mission calling for inflicting casualties and taking -prisoners had been successfully executed.[126] Marines counted 35 -enemy dead, 53 wounded, and 1 POW, and estimated that an additional -70 CCF had been killed and 105 wounded. Seven Marines were killed -and 66 wounded in the action described by some observers as “the -largest offensive effort the 1st Marine Division [has] made since last -September.”[127] The battalion fire support was well controlled and -coordinated from an observation post on the MLR. Five air strikes, -including one MPQ-14 mission, were credited with destroying three -artillery pieces and an equal number of mortars, damaging two other -mortars, and demolishing six personnel bunkers. - - [126] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy - shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his - battalion, had been possible either because Chinese - mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged - that intelligence had not located them or else so well - protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to - destroy them. _Nihart comments._ - - [127] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9. - -As the regiment noted, the earlier withdrawal of the OPLR had “altered -to a considerable extent the tactics employed in this area. This is -especially apparent in the number of patrol contacts close to the MLR -and displayed the eagerness of the enemy to move in on any ground not -held by friendly forces.”[128] At the same time the increased number -of troops made available for the MLR defense considerably strengthened -the JAMESTOWN Line itself. Sector responsibility changed on 11 May. -Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz’ 7th Marines relieved the 5th Marines in -the center regimental sector, with 2/7 and 1/7 occupying the left and -right battalion positions, respectively. - - [128] _Ibid._, p. 1. - -When it took over the peace corridor sector the 7th Marines also -assumed the responsibility for emergency rescue of the Allied truce -delegates at Panmunjom.[129] The regiment advanced a mile nearer the -objective when it moved the pick-up force’s assembly area to within -400 yards of the line of departure. The 7th Marines also replaced the -tanks in the force with M-39 personnel carriers, a U.S. Army-developed -tracked vehicle similar in appearance to the Marine amphibian tractor. -Another vehicle the 7th Marines retained in its task force was a medium -tank equipped with additional radios. This armored communication and -control vehicle was used as a radio relay station on the MLR to assist -in liaison between moving infantry and tank units. Marine riflemen -dubbed this command tank the porcupine, to describe the effect of many -bristling antennas sticking out from its top. While the Marine division -right sector, occupied by the 1st Marines, remained relatively quiet -during the spring months on JAMESTOWN, the 7th Marines in the center -MLR would shortly be involved in the division’s major ground action in -late May. - - [129] This force and its mission at various times were known as - “Task Force Jig” or “Operation Snatch.” - -As part of the active defense of its JAMESTOWN line, Lieutenant Colonel -Daughtry, commanding 1/7, issued a directive on 26 May intended to -deny to the enemy key terrain remaining on the old OPLR. Operation -Plan 16-52 called for an attack to seize two parcels of high ground -to the regiment’s right front. At the same time, the battalion was to -neutralize two Chinese positions west of the main objectives, Hill 104 -(Objective 1) and the Tumae-ri Ridge (Objective 2), approximately a -half-mile further north. The designated attack force, Captain Earl W. -Thompson’s Company A, was heavily reinforced. While Company A pursued -its mission to the right, a Company C reinforced platoon under Second -Lieutenant Howard L. Siers would conduct a feint on a pair of enemy -positions to the left. Support for the operation would come from 2/11, -two tank platoons, and from air, which was to be on call. - -H-Hour was set for 0300 on 28 May. Attack and diversionary forces on -schedule crossed the line of departure, a half-mile north of the MLR. -Captain Thompson’s main force advanced nearly to the base of Hill 104 -before the Chinese, in estimated reinforced platoon strength, began to -counterattack. The fight came to an abrupt end when Second Lieutenant -John J. Donahue led his platoon to the top with bayonets fixed.[130] As -the Marines dug in they came under heavy mortar and artillery fire from -CCF strongholds to the north. On the left, meanwhile, Lieutenant Siers -had received orders to seize the closer of his two objectives, former -OPLR 5, instead of merely placing suppressive fire on it. - - [130] Maj Kenneth A. Seal comments on draft MS, dtd Oct 66. At - the time of this attack, Lieutenant Seal commanded the 2d - Platoon, A/1/7. - -Moving forward from its base of fire, the platoon soon established -contact with the enemy. At 0554 the platoon began its attack on the -objective. Despite the close-in, hand-to-hand fighting, when it became -apparent the assault could not be stopped the enemy gave way to Marine -persistence in seizing the hill. By 0700 the Company C, 7th Marines -platoon had secured its objectives and begun preparations for defense -of the positions as well as continued support of the main attack force. -Heavy casualties, however, forced Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry to recall -the platoon and it returned to the lines by 0930. - -Up on Hill 104, Company A, 1/7 faced practically the same situation. -Taking Objective 1 had been costly and the advance through withering -enemy fire was adding to the casualties. A reinforcing platoon was -sent from the MLR to help the company disengage and return to friendly -lines. Contact with the enemy was broken shortly after noon. With the -aid of air and artillery, the company was able to make its way to the -MLR by 1405. - -Advancing only as far as it did, the attack, like the one earlier that -month, failed to take all the designated objectives. Casualties to the -1/7 Marines were placed at 9 killed[131] and 107 wounded. Most of the -latter were evacuated for further treatment. Forty-five of the enemy -were counted dead and three wounded. Marines estimated another 40 enemy -killed and 40 more wounded.[132] The action resulted in a casualty toll -that was the highest to date for any Marine company in western Korea. -All three Company A rifle platoon leaders--Second Lieutenants Donahue, -Jules E. Gerding, and Kenneth A. Seal--were wounded. This battle also -became the occasion for another unwelcomed record--4,053 rounds of -enemy incoming, during a 24-hour period. - - [131] Two Marines killed in the action were later posthumously - awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B. Champagne, - A/1/7, was responsible for saving the lives of the - three other members of his fire team. When a grenade - fell in their midst, Champagne grabbed it to hurl back - to CCF positions. Just as it cleared his hand, the - grenade exploded, showering lethal shrapnel into the - body of the 19-year-old Rhode Islander. One of the C/1/7 - reinforcement Marines, Private First Class John D. Kelly, - had conducted a one-man assault against a dug-in Chinese - machine gun crew. Though painfully wounded during this - encounter, he disposed of the enemy, then reduced a - second weapons bunker. While firing point-blank into a - third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded. This - 1/7 action was the first in the western Korea defense to - result in multiple Medal of Honor awards. - - [132] 1/7 ComdD, May 52, pp. 17–18. - -Following this late May offensive, a brief period of relative calm -settled over the MLR. Marine and Chinese units continued the active -defense of their respective sectors, with generally only a limited -number of contacts. Fire fights between Marine patrols and CCF -defenders lasted only a short time and usually ended when artillery -fire caused the patrol to pull back. Even though this state of affairs -remained essentially unchanged through June, several other events that -month would affect Marine defense of the westernmost sector in I Corps. - - -_End of the Second Year of War_[133] - - [133] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, - Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52; 5th Mar ComdDs, Apr, - Jun 52; 7thMar ComdDs, May-Jun 52; 1/7 ComdD, May 52; KMC - Regt Unit Rpt 120, dtd 30 Jun 52. - -A second realignment of the Marine-Commonwealth boundary along Line -JAMESTOWN was made on 1 June. Part of the rear of the MLR was moved -eastward to enable the Marine division to assume full responsibility -for a key ridgetop. Prior to this date the hill mass had been divided -along its crest, a factor that made it a potential trouble spot for -both divisions. On 23 and 24 June, the 7th Marines MLR battalions -relocated their positions towards the enemy along JAMESTOWN. This -readjustment of the line varied from 1,300 yards in the center of the -regimental sector to 400 yards near its right. The additional terrain -strengthened the division front by placing the center regiment on -improved and more defensible ground. - -A week before this MLR change took place, there had been a shift in -occupants in its far right sector. Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines -replaced the 1st on line, which then went into division reserve. -Manning the MLR were 2/5 on the left and 1/5 to the right. - -In early June the recently appointed UN commander, General Clark, made -his first visit to the 1st Marine Division front. During his briefing, -General Selden reviewed the unusual combat difficulties confronting his -Marines. In addition to the unfavorable terrain, the division commander -noted the special operational restrictions caused by proximity to the -truce talk site. Presence of a large number of uncharted minefields -created another obstacle. Herculean efforts were required of the -Marines to simultaneously man and construct defenses over 35 miles of -JAMESTOWN. Adding to Marine problems were the facts that ground units -were not receiving sufficient close air support and the capabilities -of the Chinese were constantly increasing. - -Chinese order of battle (OOB) information was fed into the division -intelligence network by higher commands, I Corps and EUSAK, and -adjacent units, but a large part of the data about Communist forces -was produced by the division itself. Frontline units in contact with -the enemy, by observation of his activities, supplied the bulk of -intelligence about enemy defense tactics, employment of weapons, and -combat characteristics. Supporting Marine division units, particularly -artillery and armor, fed more facts into the system, mostly through -identification of the caliber of enemy shells fired at the Marines. As -a result of its missions forward of the line and actions in defense -of it, the division reconnaissance company also contributed to the -intelligence network. Individual Marines, performing as tactical air -observers and artillery air observers, as well as the VMO and HMR -pilots, were other important sources readily available to the 1st -Marine Division. - -G-2 directed the division intelligence effort, including processing of -raw material and supplying of updated reports to 1st Division units. -The G-2 section also maintained OOB and target identification data -on Chinese units and their commanders. Members of the G-2 staff also -assisted in interrogation of prisoners of war (POWs), screened the -civilians apprehended in unauthorized areas, debriefed Marines exposed -to enemy intelligence, and conducted inspections of division internal -security. In areas where the 1st Marine Division had only a limited -intelligence capability it turned to EUSAK for assistance. - -Eighth Army teams augmented the division counterintelligence efforts -and provided most of the translation service. In addition, three radio -intercept units furnished information to the Marines. The critical -importance of this service had been proven during several combat -patrols in May when additional information was instantly radioed to a -friendly unit under fire. - -Other intelligence activities were less beneficial to the Marines. -These operations were conducted by Tactical Liaison Officers (TLOs, -friendly Koreans trained by U.S. intelligence teams), and members of -a Higher Intelligence Detachment (HID), a Korean unit assigned from -EUSAK. Both the TLO and HID proved of limited value to the division, -due to the generally poor educational background of the agents, their -inadequate training, and frequent failure to return from assignments -behind enemy lines. Some Marines believed the basic fault in these -operatives lay in “an exaggerated opinion of their importance.”[134] - - [134] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-33. - -Several division intelligence Marines, in conjunction with training -and shore party personnel, took part in an informational activity of a -different type. These Marines reconnoitered several friendly islands -off western Korea to determine their suitability for division landing -exercises. The second one inspected, Tokchok-to, 30 miles southwest -of Inchon, was selected. By early June planning had progressed to -the point where a program had been developed for bimonthly battalion -landing team exercises. The KPR maneuver force, appropriately -reinforced, was designated as a participating unit. Landings were to -employ boat teams, amphibian tractors, and helicopters. The entire -program was designed to provide refresher training for Marines in -carrying out their primary mission of amphibious assault. By the end of -June, 3/5 and 3/1, in turn, had captured Tokchok-to. - -Other training concentrated more on the task at hand. Division units -in reserve rehearsed tactics for offensive and defensive warfare. Most -ground units conducted extensive schooling in both mine and booby -trap detection and clearance. Recognizing that patrolling was an -important part of a Marine’s life on the MLR, the division included -in its Noncommissioned Officers’ (NCO) Leadership School a thorough -indoctrination in patrolling tactics.[135] More than 50 percent of -the training at all levels was at night. In addition, an extensive -orientation was conducted for newly arrived combat replacements, -who could not be committed to action for 72 hours after joining the -division. - - [135] BGen Austin R. Brunelli ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, - dtd 13 Sep 66, hereafter _Brunelli ltr_. The division - chief of staff during more than half of 1952, Colonel - Brunelli later observed that the “school produced more - effective patrolling and ... contributed to reducing our - casualties.” - -A week after the division’s June replacements landed at Inchon, General -Selden’s headquarters received a directive that would affect a number -of these new Marines. On 10 June CG, EUSAK ordered his corps commanders -to make continuous efforts to secure the identification and changes in -the enemy order of battle. Two days later I Corps followed the Eighth -Army order with a letter of instruction which called for each I Corps -division to “prepare plans for launching swift, vigorous, and violent -large-scale raids to capture prisoners, to gain intelligence, to -destroy enemy positions and material and/or strong limited objective -attacks to improve and strengthen Line JAMESTOWN.”[136] Large scale -was defined as an “attacking force limited to battalion or regimental -(brigade) size with appropriate armor and artillery support.”[137] -Divisions were required to submit detailed proposals for future action -by 21 June. Marine division plans for limited objective attacks during -July by units of the 7th Marines and KMCs were subsequently prepared -and forwarded to I Corps. - - [136] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 8. - - [137] _Ibid._ - -One operation conducted north of the 2/5 left battalion sector early -on 22 June was not, however, in response to this enemy identification -mission. Late the previous day, Company G had sent out a 16-man -ambush. Before the Marines reached their destination, a small enemy -force, itself lying in wait, began to pour a heavy volume of fire on -the Marines. At this point the patrol was ordered to pull back. One -group of 10 made it back to the MLR; the remaining Marines headed for -a nearby combat outpost in friendly hands. Reports to the company -revealed one Marine not accounted for. The outpost commander was -directed to search the area for the missing Marine. This reconnaissance -by a fire team failed, but a reinforced squad sent out later brought -back the body of the Marine who had been killed by Chinese artillery. - -While this rescue effort was in progress, another similar action was -under way. Not long after its arrival on the MLR, Company E, 2/5 had -spotted in the No-Man’s-Land between the two main defensive lines a -figure that appeared to be the body of a Marine. Since one man had been -reported missing from an earlier 1st Marines patrol, recovery of the -body, which had been propped up against a mound of dirt in the open, -was undertaken. A special Company E patrol left the main line shortly -before dawn on the 22d and reached the recovery area at daybreak. After -artillery had laid down smoke, the patrol moved in, quickly recovered -the body, and set out for friendly territory. Before the Marines had -advanced very far on their return trip, the Chinese interdicted their -route with heavy mortar fire, which killed one member of the patrol and -wounded another. When the 5th Marines patrol returned to JAMESTOWN -shortly after 0700, it carried not only the body it had recovered but -also that of the Marine who had been killed on the recovery mission. - -By the end of June, major command changes had taken place within the -1st Marine Division as well as in several other UNC components. On -13 June, Brigadier General Robert O. Bare took over the second spot -from Brigadier General Twining. Both ADCs were graduates of the Naval -Academy and both were native mid-Westerners (General Bare--Iowa, -General Twining--Wisconsin). Before joining the 1st Marine Division in -Korea General Bare had served at Camp Pendleton, California where most -recently he had been commanding general of the Training and Replacement -Command. His World War II experience included participation in both -European and Pacific campaigns. He was the Staff Officer, Plans, -in the U.S. Naval Section for the Allied naval group that planned -the amphibious assault at Normandy, France. Later he served in the -Peleliu and Okinawa campaigns and, with the ending of hostilities, had -participated in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese in north -China. - -The outgoing ADC, General Twining, was being reassigned to the Office -of the Commandant, HQMC. For his outstanding service as assistant -division commander from March through May 1952, he received a Gold Star -in lieu of his second Legion of Merit with Combat “V.” - -Other high-level changes in command that had also recently taken place -had included the UNC commander himself, General Ridgway, who had been -succeeded in mid-May by General Clark. Major General Glenn O. Barcus, -USAF, had assumed command of Fifth Air Force, replacing Lieutenant -General Everest on 30 May. On 4 June, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe -had been named the new Commander, Naval Forces Far East to succeed Vice -Admiral C. Turner Joy who had held the position since August 1949. And -in I Corps, Major General Paul W. Kendall, USA, took over as corps -commander on 29 June from Lieutenant General O’Daniel. - -The end of the second year of the Korean fighting and the beginning of -the third was observed by the Chinese with an attack against the 2d -Battalion, 5th Marines, manning JAMESTOWN positions to the left of the -regimental sector. Commanded at that time by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas -J. Cross, 2/5 was new on line, having relieved 2/1 during the night of -15–16 June. - -Late in the afternoon of 24 June, the enemy began registering his -mortars and artillery on MLR company positions of 2/5 and a portion of -the rear area occupied by the battalion 81mm mortars. Chinese incoming, -sometimes intense, sometimes sporadic, continued until shortly after -2130. By this time the CCF were moving down their trenches toward a -key outpost, Yoke, known also as Hill 159, which was still occupied -on daytime basis by the Marines and lay north of the Company F Sector -(Captain Harold C. Fuson). Moments later, the 34 men temporarily -outposting Yoke saw the Chinese and opened with small arms fire, -but the Marine positions were quickly enveloped by the Chinese. The -Americans occupying the forward slopes of Yoke suffered many casualties -from the intense fires supporting the enemy rush. - -While the initial attack was in progress, the Chinese were able to -position and fire machine guns from behind the outpost and in trenches -on the forward slopes. Communist mortars interdicted the Marine supply -routes to make normal withdrawal and reinforcement measures difficult. -The Marines moved into bunkers, called down pre-planned fires, and -continued the defense. Although the Chinese had overrun Yoke, they -could not evict the Marines. At about 0300, the enemy withdrew. When -the 2/5 troops followed to reoccupy the forward slopes of Yoke, the -enemy renewed his attack and struck again. As before, the Marines took -to bunkers and called in defensive artillery fires. These boxing fires -fell around the outpost perimeter until first light when the attackers -withdrew for the second time. - -Four other outposts in the battalion area were involved in the -anniversary attack, but the action around Yoke was by far the heaviest. -It resulted in 10 Marines of 2/5 killed and 36 wounded. At Yoke alone, -9 were killed and 23 wounded. Enemy dead were 12 known and 50 estimated -killed. Chinese wounded were estimated at 100. At one point during the -attack on Yoke, the outpost commander reported that the enemy were -wearing gas masks and using tear-gas grenades. Investigation revealed -that the Chinese had carried and even worn the masks, but that they had -employed white phosphorus grenades rather than tear gas. This was the -first instance Marine division personnel had ever encountered of CCF -soldiers carrying gas masks in an attack and it was “believed part of -the enemy’s hate campaign to impress their troops with the possible -use by the UN Forces of CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological) -warfare.”[138] - - [138] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 16. - -This violent eruption of enemy activity on the night of 24 June was -followed by a brief period of greatly reduced ground action. Late on -the 29th, however, the battlefront lull was broken when the 1st KMC -Regiment sent out a raiding party to capture Chinese soldiers and their -weapons and equipment, to inflict casualties, and to destroy positions. -Second Lieutenant Kwak Sang In had his reinforced platoon from the 3d -Company, 1st Battalion, equipped with rifles, carbines, machine guns, -flamethrowers, and explosives. Target for the attack was an enemy -outpost four miles south of Panmunjom that overlooked the Sachon River. - -The patrol followed the general pattern of previous raids. It made -use of supporting elements positioned on high ground in front of the -objective. In this action the patrol struck from the rear, using -artillery fire for both the assault and the withdrawal. Another -similarity existed in that the results were nearly the same--no -prisoners taken but fewer casualties to the attackers. One difference -from earlier operations was that this patrol employed flamethrowers -and TNT for destroying bunkers and inflicting casualties. Both weapons -were credited in the killing of 12 and the wounding of 6 Chinese, in -destroying 1 mortar and 7 bunkers, and in burning 3 other bunkers and -numerous automatic weapons and rifles. Because of the heavy weight of a -loaded flamethrower and the small size of the Korean Marines carrying -these weapons, the flamethrower operators were fairly well exhausted by -the end of the patrol. - - -_A Long Fourth of July_[139] - - [139] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; and - 1stMarDiv, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, - 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 52. - -The approach of the American Fourth of July holiday marking an earlier -struggle for freedom was appropriately accompanied by ground action -initiated by all of the mainland MLR regiments. In the KMC area, a 3 -July raiding party struck at forward enemy positions before dawn, -killing nine Chinese. In the center regimental sector Colonel Thomas -C. Moore’s[140] 7th Marines were also engaged in an active sector -defense. In the left battalion spot 3/7, which had replaced 2/7 on -line, dispatched raids on each of the first three nights of the month. -Its Company G patrol on the night of 2–3 July was to be involved in one -of the most costly small unit actions in the western Korea tour of duty -for the Marine division. - - [140] Colonel Moore took over regimental command on 11 June. - The former CO, Colonel Honsowetz, had been named - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 of the 1st Marine Division. - -Operational plans called for the platoon night raid on the 2d to be -followed by a dawn attack the next morning. In both actions, the -prisoner-taking aspect of the mission was considered a primary one. -The early part of the operation was uneventful. One platoon moved -forward toward the objective, Hill 159 (Yoke), 1,200 yards beyond -combat outpost (COP) White, to the regimental left, without making -contact with the enemy. The platoon then established a base of fire on -favorable terrain from which the attack by the second platoon could be -supported. - -The second platoon passed through the forward position of the first -shortly before 0630 and moved out into enemy terrain. It advanced less -than 300 yards before its progress was halted by a Chinese force of -battalion strength occupying the objective, Hill 159. Heavy enemy rifle -and machine gun fire, hand grenades, mortar and artillery deluged the -advancing Marines. Many of them quickly became casualties, but the -operation continued, due in part to the determination and initiative -of the NCOs. One of these was Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr., -in charge of a machine gun squad. When the leader of one of the rifle -squads became a casualty, Sergeant Shuck assumed command of that squad -in addition to his own. Although wounded, he organized the two units -and led them against the objective. Nearing the summit of the hill, the -sergeant was hit a second time. Still he refused evacuation, remaining -well forward in the lines to direct his assault force. - -It was not until he had received orders to break contact with the enemy -that the sergeant pulled back from the attack. During the withdrawal -he looked after the other Marine casualties, making certain that all -dead and wounded had been evacuated from the zone of action. While -directing the last of the evacuation, Sergeant Shuck was struck by a -sniper’s bullet and killed by this third hit.[141] He was one of four -Marines killed in the engagement. Forty others were wounded. Although -no Chinese were captured, Marines estimated the enemy suffered losses -of 50 killed and an additional 150 wounded. - - [141] The leadership, bravery, and unselfish devotion to duty - earned for Sergeant Shuck the Medal of Honor, an award - made to 14 Marines during the fighting in West Korea. - During the earlier part of the war, 28 Marines had - received the Medal of Honor. Of these, 17 were awarded - posthumously. Five Navy hospital corpsmen, all attached - to the 1st Marine Division, also earned the MOH. These - awards, with one exception, were for heroism under combat - conditions during the 1952–1953 period of the Korean War. - -To the east of the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines in the right MLR sector -ordered a company-size patrol, also on the night of 2–3 July. Company -A, 1/5 was directed to attack successively three outposts in the -vicinity of the village of Samichon along the river bearing the same -name and two miles beyond the point where the MLR crossed the river. -After the reinforced company had taken the first two objectives, which -were unoccupied, it received orders from division to return to the -battalion area. Despite the fact the patrol had ventured far beyond the -Marine lines, it did not come into contact with any Chinese forces. - -A 2/5 combat patrol leaving the MLR just after dawn was successful in -inflicting casualties on the enemy, taking prisoners, and destroying -enemy field fortifications. The patrol made good progress until a -Marine inadvertently set off an enemy mine. This mishap gave away the -patrol’s location and prompted reprisal by the Chinese. A one-hour fire -fight followed. Then the patrol called in smoke and returned under its -cover to JAMESTOWN. Marine casualties were 1 killed and 11 wounded. -The second 2/5 patrol that same date was a successful ambush completed -10 minutes before midnight. In the brief clash that developed, Marine -ambushers killed 6 enemy and wounded 8 more. The Marine force suffered -no casualties. - -The ambush patrol returned 15 minutes after midnight on 4 July. -Even at that early hour division artillerymen had already initiated -an appropriate ceremony to mark the Fourth. On 2 July, I Corps had -directed the massing of fires on 4 July on the most remunerative -targets in each division area. All objectives in the corps sector were -to be attacked simultaneously at specified times for a one-minute -period by employing a firing technique known as time on target -(TOT).[142] Normal daily fires were also to be carried out. Designated -as Operation FIRECRACKER, the shoot expended 3,202 rounds in the -division sector. Light and medium battalions of the 11th Marines, plus -its 4.5-inch Rocket Battery destroyed some enemy trenches, bunkers, -mortar and artillery positions, and damaged others. The division -reported that the special fires on 4 July had also resulted in 44 known -CCF casualties, including 21 dead, and 12 more who were estimated to -have been injured. - - [142] In the TOT technique, participating units time their - initial volleys to ensure that their shells arrive on the - target at the same time. - -More casualties, however, resulted from the issuing of another I -Corps directive, this one dealing with the conduct of raids to seize -prisoners, obtain information about the enemy, and to destroy his -positions, supplies, and equipment. Back in June, the EUSAK commander -had first stressed to his corps commanders the increased importance of -combat raids to obtain additional intelligence during this period of -stabilized conflict. - -Although General Selden had submitted two division plans, he strongly -believed that smaller patrols could accomplish the objective with fewer -casualties and loss of life.[143] In particular, the division commander -pointed out to I Corps that adequate defense of the 35-mile-long -Marine division front did not permit the withdrawal of a sizable force -for patrol missions without endangering the security of the entire -Corps sector. The attack order was issued, however, on 3 July for -the first large-scale raid to be conducted prior to 7 July. The code -name BUCKSHOT 2B was assigned for this particular raid. As soon as he -received the date of execution for the proposed operation, the Marine -division commander advised I Corps that designation of 7 July as the -cut-off date for the raid precluded proper rehearsal of attack plans. -The operation would also conflict with rotation to the States of 2,651 -Marines, whose replacements would not be available until 11 July. Corps -turned a deaf ear; division then ordered a battalion-size attack for -the night of 6–7 July. - - [143] Among division commanders in the I Corps area, General - Selden was not alone in his grave misgivings of this - method of gaining information about the Chinese. Major - General A. J. H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division, - shared with the Marine commander the belief that such - operations were too costly for the intended purpose. - _McGill comments_ and Brigadier C. N. Barclay, _The first - Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth - Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953_ (Aldershot, England: - Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954), p. 127, hereafter Barclay, - _Commonwealth_. - -Before dusk on 6 July, Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry’s reinforced -1st Battalion, 7th Marines moved into position--on the left, a -tank-infantry force, A/1/7 (still under Captain Thompson), to create a -diversion; in the center, the main assault force, Company C (Captain -Robert A. Owens); and on the right, a reinforced platoon from Company -B (Captain Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr.) to support the attack by fire from -positions close to the objective, Yoke. Earlier, three reinforced -squads from Captain Thompson’s unit had occupied combat outposts in the -area of operations to deny the use of key terrain to the enemy and to -provide additional fire support in the attack. At 2200, Captain Owens’ -Company C crossed the line of departure and set its course for Yoke, -three-quarters of a mile northeast. Five minutes later the Company B -support unit moved out to occupy the intermediate objective, COP Green, -one-half mile southeast of Yoke. As it took up positions on COP Green, -Captain Whitmore’s Company B platoon discovered that no Chinese were -in its vicinity; in fact, the platoon was not to encounter any enemy -forces during BUCKSHOT. - -Even though Company B failed to engage any Chinese, the remainder -of the battalion encountered more than its share. About 450 yards -southwest of the objective the Company C attack force was hit by an -enemy ambush, which cut off Captain Owens’ lead element. Although the -Chinese directed strong efforts at halting the Marine advance, they -were unsuccessful in this attempt. The Marines pressed the attack and -seized Yoke 20 minutes after midnight. - -On the left, the diversionary attack unit, Company A supported by the -five tanks of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 1st Tank Battalion, and by a -section of flame tanks from the armored battalion headquarters, began -its mission at 2355. In three-quarters of an hour, the tank-infantry -unit reached its objective, the first high ground southwest of Yoke. -Tanks turned their 90mm guns on known Chinese positions on the hill to -the north. During the next hour, the big guns of the M-46 medium tanks -sent 49 rounds into enemy emplacements. The Marine tanks ceased fire at -0113 when Captain Thompson was alerted to assist Company C. He left one -rifle platoon with the tanks. - -Over on the high ground to the north and east, the attack force was -under heavy fire from Communist mortars and artillery and was also -receiving a number of enemy small-unit probes. At 0200, Company A made -contact with Company C. Captain Thompson found the main force somewhat -disorganized as a result of the wounding of the company commander, -Captain Owens, the loss of several key officers and NCOs, and the -effects of the lead element of Company C being ambushed and cut off. -After being briefed on the situation by Captain Owens and conducting a -reconnaissance, Captain Thompson recommended to the battalion commander -that the entire force be recalled before daylight. At 0310 the two -companies at Yoke began to disengage, returning to the MLR by 0636 on -the 7th, without further casualties. - -The one platoon of Company A and seven tanks of the diversion unit were -still in their forward positions on the left and had prepared to resume -firing. At dawn the M-46s relaid their guns on targets that had become -visible. Tank gunners destroyed two observation posts and three machine -gun positions and damaged many feet of trenchlines. At one point in -the firing, the tank platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Terry K. -Donk, using a power scope, observed “... two officers in forest green -uniforms without equipment. They were definitely giving orders to -machine gunners and infantry.”[144] These 2 were among the 19 counted -casualties (10 wounded) that the tankers inflicted during BUCKSHOT. - - [144] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 52. - -With the return at 0645 of the tank-infantry diversion force, the -special operation for obtaining prisoners and information ended. -No Chinese had been captured and no data gleaned from Communist -casualties, listed as the 19 reported by the tankers and an estimated -20 more wounded or killed. Marine casualties from the operation were -out of proportion to the results achieved--12 dead, 85 wounded, and 5 -missing. It had been a high price to pay for a venture of this type, -particularly when the primary objectives went unaccomplished. - -During the entire 4–7 July period, 22 Marines had lost their lives in -combat operations. Division reported that 268 Marines had been wounded -during the long Fourth of July. These figures were the highest since -September 1951 when large scale attacks by UN forces had first been -abolished in line with the new tactic of positional warfare that would -be waged until the truce talks resulted in an armistice. - - -_Changes in the Lineup_[145] - - [145] The material in this section is derived from the - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52. - -Division casualties were considerably higher during the first week in -July than they were for the rest of the month. Once the pace of combat -slowed, following the initial flurry of activity, the front again -settled down to the patrol, raid, and ambush routine that had marked -the static period of the Korean fighting. In accordance with the orders -previously issued by higher authority the division placed continued -emphasis on gathering all information it could about the enemy, his -dispositions, and tactics. To assist in this effort, General Selden -in July removed his reconnaissance company from defense of its small -sector of JAMESTOWN and directed the unit to conduct training for its -primary mission, obtaining intelligence about the enemy. Its place on -the MLR was assumed by the two amphibian tractor companies then on line. - -Another change of lineup took place on 14 July. At this time a -battalion from the 15th Regiment, U.S. 3d Infantry Division took over -the role of the maneuver element in the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, -then held by 1/1, thereby releasing that battalion to its parent unit. -With this change, the 1st Marine Division had a full regiment in -reserve for the first time since its arrival in western Korea. A later -shift in units occurred on 26 July when the 7th and 1st Marines traded -places and missions. At that time the MLR, from west to east, was -manned by the KPR, 1st AmTrac Bn, KMC, 1st Marines, and 5th Marines. - -Opposing them in mid-July were an estimated 27 infantry battalions, -whose primary missions were to defend the sectors assigned. The -division credited these units with the capability of launching limited -objective attacks at any time or of taking part in a major attack with -a force of up to 57 infantry and 16 artillery battalions, augmented -by 40 tanks or self-propelled guns. It was estimated also that the -enemy could cross the Han in battalion strength in the vicinity of -the northern shore of Kimpo Peninsula at any time and that Communist -aircraft could attack anywhere in the division sector. Enemy forces -identified at the end of July, from west to east, were the 193d, 195th, -and 194th Divisions of the 65th CCF Army; the 189th Division of the 63d -CCF Army; and the 118th Division, 40th CCF Army, which had recently -moved from a position opposite the Commonwealth and U.S. 3d Infantry -Divisions. Infantry strength of the Communists was established at -28,328. - - -_Replacement and Rotation_[146] - - [146] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; No. - 5, Chaps. 8, 9. - -Marine infantry strength at the end of July 1952 was little more -than half of the Chinese total. The division personnel strength was -maintained by the monthly replacement and rotation program of Marines -to fill vacancies created by the return of Marine combat personnel to -CONUS (Continental United States) and combat losses. In the second -quarter of 1952, the division rotated 433 officers and 6,280 enlisted -men from Korea. In exchange, 506 officers and 7,359 enlisted men -arrived from the States in replacement drafts. A new arrival could -expect to stay with the division about 10½ months. - -In the late spring of 1952 many of the division’s new replacements were -“dental cripples”--Marines requiring dental treatment, even emergency -care in some cases.[147] General Selden directed that contact teams be -formed to meet the replacement drafts in Japan. During the last leg of -the trip to Korea dental personnel screened the new combat Marines on -shipboard. By the time the division area had been reached, the dentists -knew what remedial work would be required by incoming troops. At the -end of the summer the problem was well under control. - - [147] _Brunelli ltr._ - -Even though the 1st Marine Division in July continued to be somewhat -in excess of its authorized strength in total personnel, it had -certain imbalances and was in rather short supply of certain ranks and -specialists. While the normal tour for most infantry officers ranged -from 9 to 12 months, an excess of company grade officers, particularly -lieutenants, had resulted in a reduction of the Korean tour for them -to just six months. This brief period of duty plus an intra-division -rotation policy that caused a mass shifting of duty assignments every -three-to-five months tended to reduce unit combat efficiency. On the -other hand the change of assignments had a favorable effect in that -it broadened the experience of individual Marines. Beginning in the -summer of 1952, however, the division modified this policy to reduce -its number of intra-division transfers. - -Personnel shortages existed in both the artillery and tank MOSs -(Military Occupational Speciality). Mass rotation of reservist company -grade artillery officers had necessitated the transfer of infantry -officers to the 11th Marines for training and reassignment within the -regiment. During the time when the supply of artillery officers was -limited, however, the quality of support rendered remained high.[148] -The other major shortage in the division was that of qualified -crewmen--both drivers and gunners--for the M-46 tanks. Neither tank -driving nor gunnery for the M-46 was taught in the tank crewmen’s -course conducted at Camp Pendleton, California. General Selden -requested of Lieutenant General Franklin A. Hart (CG, FMFPac) that -“tank crewmen be thoroughly trained prior to leaving the U.S.”[149] - - [148] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-27. - - [149] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4. - -Fundamental to the tank problem was a shortage of the M-46 itself. -At the training facility, Training and Replacement Command, Camp -Pendleton, M-46 engines had been available for maintenance instruction -but no tanks for the training of gunners and drivers.[150] General -Hart pointed out this deficiency to the Commandant, General Lemuel C. -Shepherd, Jr. On 13 August the Commandant directed the transfer of five -tanks to the training installation from the 7th Tank Battalion,[151] -also located at Camp Pendleton. At the same time General Shepherd -ordered an increase in the school quota for tank crewmen. The first -graduates would not reach the division in Korea, however, until the -November draft. - - [150] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E). - - [151] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Encl (35). - -The presence of not fully trained personnel in a combat zone was not -limited to the division. In the summer and fall of 1952, a large -number of volunteer reservists, both pilots and enlisted replacements -with little experience since the end of World War II, joined the 1st -MAW. It had not been possible for the Stateside training and tactical -squadrons, themselves short of personnel and aircraft, to qualify all -pilots as combat ready. It fell upon the wing in Korea, therefore, -to take the needed corrective action. The more experienced 1st MAW -pilots, after completing their combat missions, flew instructional -flights to help prepare the rusty fliers. Some reserve pilots, away -from regular daily flying since 1945, found the adjustment too -difficult and turned in their wings. MACG-2 operated “Pohang U,” a -training course for forward air controllers. In practically every -squadron, there were shortages of electronics personnel. Jet squadrons -found mechanics hard to come by. There were never enough motor -transport replacements. For unqualified enlisted Marines, squadrons -operated on-the-job training programs. - -To maintain a reasonable degree of unit proficiency, the wing limited -the monthly turnover of pilots to 25 percent. Like the division, -the wing employed split tours between an officer’s primary duty and -staff work to broaden his experience. In some cases the amount of -time required by administrative work as compared to a pilot’s actual -flying time reduced his proficiency in the air. In June, Task Force 95 -reported that the proportionately large number of take-off and landing -accidents on the carrier _Bataan_ was caused by the rapid turnover of -pilots and their need for frequent carrier qualification.[152] - - [152] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 10-198. - -A Marine pilot joining the wing could expect his assignment to last for -6 to 9 months. Personnel in a nonflight status had longer tours of 10 -months to a year. Wing replacements were made on an individual basis, -although there were plans that by mid-1953 a new policy of at least -partial squadron replacement would be in effect. That 1st MAW squadrons -were able to operate effectively on an individual replacement system -was attributable to the peculiarity of combat conditions in Korea. -Absence of real enemy aerial opposition permitted the use of basic, -parade-type flight formations and non-tactical approaches and attacks. -An unusually high-level of experienced pilots in each of the two wing -groups helped in the establishment of training programs and operational -doctrine. The FAF limitation of four aircraft per flight eliminated -the problem of large-scale, precombat squadron training as well as the -difficulty of controlling and coordinating a large number of planes in -a strike. - - -_Logistical Operations, Summer 1952_[153] - - [153] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_ - No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn - ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52. - -Logistical support of the division and wing remained largely unchanged -through July. Several modifications did take place, however, and these -were: - - (1) The change of responsibility for logistical support - of ground-based units in Korea from Commanding General, - 2d Logistical Command to the Commanding General, Korean - Communication Zone (CG, KComZ). - - (2) The opening of a pipeline system for resupply of aviation - fuel at K-3, beginning in May. - - (3) The beginning of increased support for airbase maintenance at - those airfields housing Marine squadrons. - -Resupply of common items used by both Marine and Army units was still -being hampered by the Marines’ limited knowledge of the Army supply -system in effect and by their inability to obtain the catalogues, -orders, and directives essential for requisitioning. - -Two logistical operations, both of an engineering nature, took -place between May and July 1952 in western Korea. One was Operation -TIMBER, undertaken to provide lumber required to complete the bunker -construction on the JAMESTOWN, WYOMING, and KANSAS lines. The division -had estimated that three million linear feet of 4 x 8-inch timbers -would be needed. Since lumber in this amount was not available -through supply channels or standing timber in the division sector, -Corps assigned the Marines a wooded area 50 miles to the east in the -U.S. 45th Infantry Division sector. On 12 May a reinforced engineer -platoon, under Second Lieutenant Roger E. Galliher, a truck platoon, -and 500 Korean Service Corps (KSC) laborers,[154] began the cutting, -processing, and hauling of timbers which were then trucked to the -railhead. Between 500 and 1,000 logs were cut daily. When the operation -ended in July a total of 35,194 sections of timber had been cut. This -was still not enough lumber to complete the required construction. -Eighth Army then made up the difference, mostly with 12 x 12-inch -timbers 30 feet long; these the Marine engineers cut to 4 x 8s for -standard bunker construction.[155] - - [154] The KSC was a ROK quasi-military organization for - logistical support of the UNC. Personnel were drafted - from those rejected for Army service. Each KSC unit had - a cadre of ROK officers and enlisted. All types of labor - except personal services were performed by these Koreans. - During its period in western Korea, the 1st Marine - Division was supported by the 103d KSC Regiment of 5,222 - men. CG, 1stMarDiv, _Civ Afrs and KSC_, pp. 8–9. - - [155] Col Harry D. Clarke ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd - 1 Sep 66. - -Operation AMAZON, published by I Corps on 12 June, ordered that -bridging preparations be made for the approaching summer flood season. -The previous August at the Honker Bridge, the one nearest the railhead, -the Imjin had crested some 27 feet above normal. One reason for the -precautionary efforts taken to insure bridge security during the -flood season was the potential damage the Chinese could cause. Since -they controlled the upriver area of the Imjin, before it entered the -division sector, they could introduce floatable debris or explosives -into the swift running flood waters. Another major concern was the -logistical problem that would be faced by forward MLR units in event -the bridges became impassable and the enormous strain that would thus -be placed on helicopter resupply operations. - -The I Corps directive specified that its divisions maintain a transport -capability that would enable medium tanks to pass safely over bridges -spanning the major rivers in their I Corps sector. The order also -called for the removal of debris that could cause damage to bridges. -Removal of those bridges vulnerable to flood conditions and the -erection of emergency river spans were also to take place on corps -order. - -To carry out the I Corps operational order, General Seiden put the -division’s own AMAZON plan into effect on 1 July. On this date -Companies A, B, and D of Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Clarke’s 1st -Engineer Battalion began extensive preparations for debris removal from -the four bridge sites in the division sector. Even before this, Marine -engineers and shore party personnel had been trained at special schools -to handle U.S. Army equipment provided for the AMAZON operation.[156] - - [156] This included employment of the 60-inch searchlight - for night illumination, maintenance of boats for - debris removal, and operation of the M-4 ferry. Other - preparations by the division, of a non-engineer nature, - included positioning of 13,000 life-saving floatation - devices for use by frontline troops should they become - shut off from planned evacuation. - -Beginning 1 June, division engineers began blasting away at objects -that flood waters could loosen and carry into the bridge supports. -Bridge approaches were improved and their supports strengthened. -Each company had a detail living at the bridge site for which it was -responsible. With the advent of heavy rains, these Marines were to -operate 24-hour boat patrols to keep the river free of debris. The -engineers were also to maintain a round-the-clock debris watch at the -four division bridges--Freedom Gate, or the Munsan-ni Railroad Bridge -in the left regimental sector; Honker and X-Ray in the center; and -finally, Widgeon, very close to the Commonwealth boundary. - -Heavy rains began on 27 July and continued until the 30th. On the first -day the decking of Widgeon Bridge was completely submerged and Honker -was removed to prevent its being carried away. Precipitation increased -on 28 July and reached its peak on 29 July when 3.66 inches of rainfall -were recorded. By the 30th, the rains had subsided but not before the -overflowing Imjin had collapsed the X-Ray bridge. During the height of -the four flood days, engineers fought the rains, flooding waters, and -floating debris. The major effort took place downstream to save the -Freedom Gate Bridge. - -Assigned personnel removed debris from the bridge supports, guided -large, dangerous pieces away with poles, while upriver the boat teams -blasted still larger sections into manageable chunks that would pass -between the bridge supports. These engineer efforts, in addition to -regular repair and maintenance of the large road net, constituted the -major ground activity in the 1st Marine Division sector in late July. -August would bring more rains and emergency demands on the engineers, -but the critical ground activity at that time would be directed against -the Communists in the area around Bunker Hill. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -The Battle of Bunker Hill - -_The Participants and the Battlefield--Preliminary Action on -Siberia--The Attack on Bunker Hill--Consolidating the Defense of Bunker -Hill--Company B Returns to Bunker Hill--Supporting Arms at Bunker -Hill--In Retrospect_ - - -_The Participants and the Battlefield_[157] - - [157] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv - ComdDs, Jul-Aug 52; 1stMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52; 1st - MAW ComdD, Aug 52. - -The torrential rains that had fallen just before the end of July -continued to affect ground operations into early August. Contacts -between opposing forces were few and brief, and casualties remained -correspondingly low. On 1 August, General Selden assigned the reserve -regiment, the 7th Marines, the task of developing the secondary defense -line, KANSAS, at the extreme right of the division sector. The 5th -Marines, manning this regimental area and originally responsible for -the construction, had been unable to reach the second line because -bridging across the Imjin to the rear of the sector was washed out. By -3 July the division put a ferry service into operation at the site of -the inoperable Honker Bridge for the purpose of feeding ammunition to -combat units north of the Imjin. The critical resupply problem began -to ease the next day when the waters overflowing the Widgeon Bridge -further upstream receded sufficiently to permit restoration of normal -vehicular crossings there. - -Traffic in the air had, quite naturally, been less affected by the -heavy rains and by the flooded, mucky terrain that was slowing ground -movement throughout the entire division area. Flight operations during -the first week of August produced a daily sortie rate that would -approximate the monthly average. In fact, the month of August was to -become the record one for 1st MAW attack and fighter pilots during -1952, with a total of 5,869 sorties flown. - -While the air people in August were maintaining a good weather pace -against the enemy following the July downpours, the Communist ground -troops apparently found the going too difficult to mount any sustained -attack. The enemy merely continued his active defense, with an average -of two contacts daily, while busily engaged in advancing his OPLR -by creeping tactics. Even the usually assiduous Chinese artillery -was strangely quiet. With respect to the enemy’s excellent artillery -capability, the 1st Marine Division in July learned that the Chinese -had introduced a 132mm Russian rocket in their combat operations. The -presence of this truck-mounted launcher, the _Katusha_, which could -fire 16 rockets simultaneously, was indicated by a POW who had been -informed by “his platoon leader that there were two _Katusha_ regiments -in the CCF.”[158] In addition to this new enemy weapon, the Marine -division reported the same month that positive sightings had been -made of self-propelled guns emplaced well forward, and that there was -an “indication that these guns were being used to fire direct fire -missions from frontline revetments.”[159] - - [158] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2. - - [159] _Ibid._, p. 1. - -Communist forward positions were gradually encroaching on JAMESTOWN. -Since April 1952 the division had noted every month that the enemy -was continuing to extend his trenches in the direction of the Marine -MLR. The Chinese technique was to occupy key, high terrain at night, -prepare the ground during darkness by digging trenches and constructing -bunkers, and then vacate the area before daybreak. After nightly -repetitions of this process had produced a tenable position, the -enemy moved in and occupied it. By means of these creeping tactics, -the Chinese hoped to acquire the dominating terrain necessary for -controlling access to Seoul. The ultimate goal of the Communist forces -was believed to be the 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill,[160] the Marine high -ground position also known as Hill 229, just over a mile east of the -road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong. - - [160] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5. - -During the four months that the 1st Marine Division’s mission had been -to conduct an aggressive defense of the EUSAK left flank, Marines -had become familiar with a number of Chinese small unit infantry -tactics. Shortly after assignment of the division to western Korea, -General Twining, the ADC, had observed that the Chinese first made a -diversionary frontal assault while the main force maneuvered around -UNC defenders to attack from the rear. Almost invariably the Chinese -employed this envelopment technique. Occasionally the enemy also used -more passive measures, such as attempting to demoralize Marines in the -front lines and subvert their allegiance by English language propaganda -broadcasts. These attempts represented wasted effort. Not one Marine -was swayed. - -In some cases the Chinese were imaginative in changing their tactics or -improvising new ones. This tendency had been noted as early as May by a -5th Marines battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Nihart, after 1/5 -had engaged the enemy in a limited, objective attack: - - ... when friendlies marked targets with WP [white phosphorus], - the enemy would immediately drop rounds of WP between the target - and friendly troops to conceal the target and to confuse friendly - FOs [artillery forward observers]; the enemy tried very hard - to take prisoners (rather than shoot a friendly, they would - often attempt to knock him out with a concussion type grenade); - counterattacks were made in waves of four to seven men deployed - in a formation somewhat similar to the Marine Corps wedge; - snipers were deployed in holes that were mutually supporting; - concerted efforts were made to knock out automatic weapons; ... - for close-in fighting, the enemy used PPSH [Soviet-made 7.62mm - submachine gun] guns and grenades rather than bayonets; the enemy - attacked behind well coordinated mortar fire; some enemy snipers - were observed to have bushes tied to their backs....[161] - - [161] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 12. - -On occasion 1st Division Marines found evidence that the enemy -had infiltrated their lines. It appeared the most likely spot for -line-crossers to make their way into the Marine rear area was from the -far bank of the Imjin between the Sachon and Han Rivers where the enemy -MLR was only a short distance from the sector held by the 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion. Two enemy agents “armed with pistols of German -manufacture, six hand grenades, and one set of field glasses”[162] had -been apprehended here by a Marine reconnaissance company patrol. The -prisoners had stated they were “part of a force of one thousand men -who were infiltrating to form a guerrilla force somewhere in South -Korea.”[163] Six days later, after a brief fire fight between a small -group of Chinese and a Marine outpost in the center of the division -sector, the defenders discovered that two of the three enemy dead wore -under their own clothing various articles of Marine uniforms. Neither -of the Chinese had identification or any papers whatsoever. It was -believed that both were enemy agents and that the attack on the outpost -was a diversion “for the express purpose of detracting attention from -infiltrators.”[164] - - [162] HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 27. - - [163] _Ibid._ - - [164] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 5. - -Even though enemy tactics and attempts to penetrate Marine positions -demonstrated a good deal of soldierly skills, his conduct of defensive -operations was nothing short of masterful. This was especially true of -Chinese construction of underground earthworks. It appeared that the -Chinese had no single pattern for this type of field fortification. -Like the Japanese in World War II, the Chinese Communists were experts -in organizing the ground thoroughly and in utilizing a seemingly -inexhaustible supply of manpower to hollow out tunnels, air-raid -shelters, living quarters, storage spaces, and mess halls. Americans -described the Chinese as industrious diggers,[165] who excavated -quickly and deeply for protection against UN bombardments. From -numerous reports of ground clashes in the 1st Marine Division sector -and from observations made by Marine pilots, it became known that the -enemy was quick to seek cover whenever he was exposed to sustained -artillery bombardment or air attack. - - [165] “The Chinese attack by ‘shovel’ proved effective and - difficult to combat. They burrowed forward almost - continuously, even under direct observation. Every foot - of advance provided added opportunity to attack Marine - COPs with greater impunity. While this activity possibly - provided Marines with target practice in both small arms - and mortars, these CCF working parties in a narrow trench - 7 to 10-feet deep probably took very few casualties.” Col - William R. Watson, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, - dtd 18 July 67. - -What was not known, however, was the extent of these subterranean -shelters. One Chinese account, allegedly written by a reconnaissance -staff officer named Li Yo-Yang, described the protection of a CCF -shelter to a recently captured UN prisoner as they were under Allied -artillery bombardment. While shells exploded all around the position -the enemy boasted: “There’s no danger of being killed on a position -fortified by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.... Don’t you know it’s -impossible for your shells to penetrate our air-raid shelters?”[166] An -American report on enemy field fortifications estimated that the amount -of earth cover in Chinese air-raid shelters was as high as 20 feet, and -in frontline defensive positions, up to 33 feet.[167] - - [166] _A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the - Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. - Aggression and Aid Korea_ (Peking: Foreign Languages - Press, 1961), p. 193, hereafter CPV, _Recollections_. - - [167] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-90. - -Marine defensive installations carved out of the ground were not so -extensive as those of the enemy opposing JAMESTOWN. “In spite of -orders, instructions, and inspections many bunkers were only half dug -in, then built up above the ground with sandbags,” observed one Marine -battalion commander.[168] Back in April, just after the Marine division -had settled in the west, its 1st Engineer Battalion, using U.S. Army -drawings, had published bunker construction plans. Express instructions -to frontline units were to “construct bunkers to provide simultaneously -living and fighting space. Overhead cover on all bunkers will be such -as to withstand direct hit from 105mm and to allow friendly VT fire -over position.”[169] - - [168] LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr., “Random Notes on Korea,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 55), p. 29, - hereafter Batterton, _Korea Notes_. - - [169] CO 5thMar msg to 5thMar units, dtd 20 Apr 52, in 5thMar - ComdD, Apr 52, #2, App. II, p. 6. - -Some officers felt it was, perhaps, the work-during-light, -patrol-at-night routine that resulted in the shallow draft Marine -bunkers. Others suggested that the relatively limited defensive -training received by the more offensive-minded Marines created a -natural apathy to digging elaborate fighting positions. - -It took a hole 12 feet square and 7 feet deep to house the Army, -Lincoln-logs-type bunker the Marines first used in the spring of 1952. -The fortification, using tree trunks up to eight inches in diameter, -had a cover of seven to eight feet. This consisted of four feet of -logs, and three-to-four more feet of rocks, sandbags, and earth fill. -By the summer of 1952, the division developed its own style of bunker, -a prefabricated timber structure designed to fit into a hole eight feet -square and somewhat less than seven feet deep. This size fortification -could accommodate a .50 caliber machine gun, crew members, or several -riflemen. Provision was also made for the inclusion of a sleeping shelf -in the rear of the bunker. Its construction required no saws, hammers, -or nails, only shovels to excavate. The major drawback to erection of -the prefab was the difficulty in manhandling the heavy roofing timbers, -11 feet long, 12 inches wide, and 4 inches thick. On top of this was -placed a two-foot layer of sandbags, tarpaper covering, and a four feet -high layer of earth that completed the structure and partly camouflaged -it. - -Battlefield construction was carried out by the infantry regiments to -the limit of unit capabilities. The division engineers, one company per -frontline regiment, augmented at times by shore party units, supplied -the technical know-how and engineering materials and equipment. These -combat support troops processed the lumber for bunker construction and -built fortifications for forward medical treatment and one bunker for -observation of battle action by civilian and military dignitaries, -irreverently called VIPs (Very Important Persons), who frequently -visited the division. Engineers also erected some of the barbed wire -barriers in the forward areas and, when necessary, cleared firing lanes -for weapons housed in bunkers. - -The processing of timbers for easier and faster bunker-construction had -begun on 28 July, but this was hardly in time for the most difficult -fighting the division had faced thus far in western Korea. Given the -name Bunker Hill,[170] this battle would take place in the center -sector of the division line manned since 27 July by Colonel Walter F. -Layer’s 1st Marines.[171] On that date Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s -battalion, 3/1, took over from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines on the -left, and 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Batterton, Jr.) relieved the -2d Battalion of the 7th Marines on the right.[172] - - [170] Since bunkers were in everyone’s mind and frontline units - were heavily involved in the bunker-construction program, - it is felt likely “someone in G-2 arbitrarily assigned - the name.” Col Gerald T. Armitage ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 - Div, HQMC, dtd 6 July 67, hereafter _Armitage ltr._ - - [171] Two days earlier Colonel Layer had taken over the command - from Colonel Flournoy. - - [172] Lieutenant Colonels Gerald F. Russell and Anthony Caputo, - respectively, commanded 3/7 and 2/7 at this time. - -Across No-Man’s-Land, units of two Chinese divisions faced the -3,603 men of the 1st Marines. From west to east opposite the Marine -regiment’s frontline battalions were elements of the 580th Regiment, -194th Division, 65th CCF Army and of both the 352d and 354th Regiments, -118th Division, 40th CCF Army. The 352d Regiment held most of the area -on which the battle would be fought.[173] Enemy combat efficiency -was rated as excellent and his forward units were well-supplied. The -Chinese conducted an active defense, using limited objective attacks, -numerous small-size probes, and creeping tactics to extend their -OPLR line. Communist soldiers offered well-coordinated and tenacious -resistance to Marine patrols, raids, and attacks. Within enemy lines a -775-foot elevation, known as Taedok-san, was situated directly north of -the Marine division center and commanded the entire Bunker Hill area. - - [173] 1stMarDiv PIR 657, dtd 13 Aug 52. - -On JAMESTOWN, the dominating height was Hill 201, 660 feet high[174] -and immediately to the rear of the MLR in the left battalion sector. -Southwest of this elevation was the Marine stronghold, Hill 229, just -23 feet lower than Taedok, and believed by the Marines to have been the -objective of the August battle. Directly north of Hill 201 was Hill -122, adjacent to the enemy OPLR, and called Bunker Hill by the Marines. -It was shortly to become the scene of bitter fighting. The crest of -Hill 122 was about 350 yards long. At a distance of about 700 yards, it -generally paralleled the northeast-southwest direction of JAMESTOWN in -the left of the 2/1 sector and adjoining 3/1 sector. - - [174] Frequently cartographers use elevations for names of - hills. Heights on the Korean maps are in meters, and - many of these hills derive their name (i.e., number) - from their elevation. For changing meters to feet, the - conversion factor 3.28 is used. - -Southwest of Bunker and a little more than 200 yards from the Marine -MLR was Hill 124. This Hill 124–122 axis, for tactical purposes, was -known as the Bunker Ridge. The ridgeline, roughly “cashew” in shape -almost anchored back into the MLR on the forward slopes of Hill 229. -To the northeast of Bunker Hill and separated from it by a wide -saddle[175] was another enemy position, Hill 120. (See Map 9, for -outposts and key hill positions in the 1st Marines center regimental -area in early August.) - - [175] A saddle, the low point in the crest line of a ridge, is - much in appearance like the side view of a riding saddle. - -Approximately one mile east of Hill 124 was Hill 56A, or Samoa, the -right flank limit of the immediate battlefield. It guarded the best -avenue of approach into the Bunker Hill area, the Changdan Road. -Another Marine position west of Samoa was Hill 58A, or Siberia, a -sentinel overlooking a long draw running down the east sides of Hills -122 and 120. Both Samoa and Siberia were outposted by squads. Another -1st Marines squad occupied Hill 52, on the other side of Changdan Road -and not quite a half-mile east of Samoa. The entire battlefield was cut -up by numerous gullies and draws, most of which paralleled Bunker Hill. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 9 K. White - -1ST MARINES SECTOR OF JAMESTOWN - -(Division Center) - -8 AUGUST 1952] - - -_Preliminary Action on Siberia_[176] - - [176] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section - is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 - Jnls, 9–11 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52. - -The first round in the battle of Bunker Hill began as the fight for -Siberia, Hill 58A. Just slightly more than a quarter of a mile from -JAMESTOWN, this squad-size outpost, the most western in the right -battalion sector, had been occupied in June when the division moved -its MLR forward. Since Siberia was located halfway between the Marine -MLR and the Communist OPLR, the Marine seizure of Siberia prevented -the Chinese from holding terrain suitable for employing 60mm mortars -against Marine frontline troops.[177] Strong enemy outposts on Hills -120 to the north and 110 to the northeast constantly threatened the -squad on 58A. From these two forward positions, Chinese troops early on -9 August 1952 streamed down to Siberia, launching in the process the -Bunker Hill battle. - - [177] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, App. VII, p. 1. - -Just before 0100 an estimated four enemy squads fell upon Hill 58A, -outposted by Company E Marines. Using assorted infantry weapons, the -raiding party forced the outnumbered Siberia occupants to withdraw. -By 0145 the outpost Marines returned to the MLR. At this time the -JAMESTOWN sector south of the outpost, also held by Captain Jesse F. -Thorpe’s Company E, was under attack by approximately 50 Chinese. - -After breaking up the enemy assault by well placed friendly mortar -fire, the Marines enjoyed a brief respite from Chinese pressure and -formulated plans to recapture Siberia. It was decided that a reinforced -Company E platoon would counterattack to regain the outpost. At 0355, -the 11th Marines fired a five-minute preparation against the objective. -On schedule, the platoon crossed JAMESTOWN at 0400 and in the darkness -headed towards the outpost. Advancing carefully to avoid detection as -long as possible, the Marines reached the area near the base of the -hill by 0525. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire again forced the -Marines to withdraw, and the platoon returned to its company CP at -0545. So far, the 58A action had resulted in the wounding of 32 Marines -and the killing of another. - -It became evident that more preparation, by Marine air and artillery, -would be required for the recapture of Siberia. At 0650, four Marine -F9F jet fighters worked the hill over with napalm and 500-pound -bombs. Three hours later, a flight of Air Force F-80 “Shooting Star” -jets dropped eight 1,000-pound bombs on the same target. With the -aerial attack complete, Marine artillery opened fire. Five minutes -later another Marine reinforced platoon launched a second ground -attack. This was made by a unit from Company A (Captain Robert W. -Judson) of the regimental reserve battalion, supported by a Company E -platoon. Again the Marines advanced to the open sector south of the -hill before the enemy reacted. As before, the Chinese response was -a devastating barrage from their supporting weapons. The stubborn -Marine assault against Siberia brought down the full weight of Chinese -firepower--rifle, machine gun, and hand grenades--but the attack force -would not be beaten off. At 1103 the Siberia hill again belonged to the -Marines. Quickly the Company A platoon began to organize a defense to -repulse the Chinese counterattack, which was certain to come. - -In anticipation of a prompt and violent retaliation by the Chinese, -and to help the speedily improvised defense efforts, the 2/1 -battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Batterton, had sent forward -the supporting platoon from Company E. This reinforcing unit reached -Siberia within seven minutes after the Marine attackers had gained -possession of the objective. The new arrivals scarcely had time to dig -in before a hail of mortar and artillery shells forced all the Marines -to seek cover in a defiladed position on the southern side of the -slope. From here, the 2/1 force directed counter mortar and artillery -fire onto the top and far side of Siberia and unleashed their own -assault weapons against the Chinese soldiers pressing for possession of -Siberia. By midafternoon, with heavy enemy counterfire on the position -and their casualties reaching nearly 75 percent, the Marines were -forced to withdraw and return to their own lines. The hill had changed -hands twice and the enemy had employed 5,000 rounds of artillery in the -contested ownership. - -Badly mauled by two actions against Hill 58A, Company E came off the -lines to reorganize, exchanging positions with Company A, of Lieutenant -Colonel Louis N. King’s 1st Battalion. About this time Company C, less -one platoon, had moved from the 1/1 rear area forward to an assembly -point behind 2/1 in preparation for a night counterattack to retake -the now battle-scarred outpost. Without the customary artillery -preparation, the attacking force at 2245 crossed the MLR at a point -directly south of the former outpost Samoa, which had been abandoned -earlier when Siberia fell. Working their way northwest towards Siberia, -the Company C Marines, commanded by Captain Casimir C. Ksycewski, -cautiously approached the assault line. Reaching it at 0105 on 10 -August the force deployed immediately and rushed the objective. - -At about this time the Chinese defenders opened fire but could not halt -the assaulting Marines. The struggle to regain the Siberia objective -was fierce; some of the Chinese refused to yield and fought to their -death. Most, however, held their defense positions only briefly before -retiring to the refuge offered by the reverse slope of the hill. -Gaining the crest of Hill 58A at 0116, the Company C commander ordered -a platoon to the other side of the objective to dispatch remaining -elements of the enemy force. The resulting fire fight lasted nearly -four hours. At daybreak, however, the enemy, in estimated company -strength, strenuously renewed his counterfire and, for a third time, -forced the 1st Marines to retire from the disputed hill and return to -the main line. - -Later that day, at the regimental CP, Colonel Layer called a staff -conference to decide on the best course of action. Successive Marine -withdrawals had been caused by the intense enemy shelling. The key to -its effectiveness was the observation provided the Chinese from Hills -122 and 110. Heavy enemy fire had also caused most of the casualties, -17 killed and 243 wounded, in 1st Marine ranks. It was decided to -shift the battle area to better restrict this enemy capability not -only to observe Marine troop movements but also to call down accurate -fire on friendly attacking units. Bunker Hill, an enemy outpost west -of Siberia, was selected. In the eyes of 1st Marines tacticians, -possession of Hill 122 instead of Hill 58A presented three major -advantages: - - Hill 122 offered excellent observation into the rear of enemy - outposts; - - Possession of Hill 122 would greatly strengthen the MLR in the - regimental sector, effectively neutralize Siberia, provide - dominating terrain that was more defensible than 58A; and - - Bunker offered an excellent opportunity for an attack employing - the element of surprise against the enemy. - -To help preserve this tactical surprise, the plan for the Bunker Hill -attack included a diversionary attack against Siberia. Making this -secondary effort would be a reinforced rifle platoon and a composite -unit of gun and flame tanks. For the main attack, Lieutenant Colonel -Batterton’s 2d Battalion would employ a reinforced rifle company with -supporting artillery and armor, if needed. The operation was to be -conducted at night, to further ensure the opportunity for tactical -surprise. For the same reason, the attack was not to be preceded by -artillery preparation on either objective. To the right of the 1st -Marines, however, Colonel Culhane’s 5th Marines would support the -diversion by artillery and tank fire placed on enemy strongpoints in -the Ungok area, about 1¼ miles northeast of Siberia. During daylight, -air, artillery, and tanks attacked targets on both 122 and 58A. -Priority of effort in the 1st Marines area went to units preparing for -the Siberia-Bunker offensive. - - -_The Attack on Bunker Hill_[178] - - [178] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is - derived from: Encl (1) to CG, FMFPac ltr 0762/161 over A9 - to CMC, dtd 25 Nov 52, Subj: “Summary of 1stMarDiv Sit - from 20 July-20 Oct 52,” hereafter FMFPac, _1stMarDiv - Sum, Jul-Oct 52_; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 2/1, 1st TkBn - ComdDs, Aug 52. - -At dusk on 11 August, 1,000 yards behind the MLR in the western sector -of the 2/1 line, the eight Company C tanks that were to provide much -of the diversionary effort at Hill 58A moved out of their assembly -area. Leading the column east of the MSR, Changdan Road, were four M-46 -mediums, mounting 90mm guns. They were followed by an equal number -of flame vehicles. Each M-46 was specially equipped with an 18-inch -fighting light, actually a searchlight with a shutter over the lens, to -be used for battlefield illumination. The flame vehicles, World War II -M4A3E8 mediums, mounted a 105mm howitzer in addition to the flame tube. -As the tanks reached the Changdan Road, they turned north, crossed the -MLR, and proceeded to preselected positions. (See Map 10.) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 10 K. WHITE - -2/1 SECTOR - -9–11 AUGUST 1952] - -When the M-46 gun tanks were in position to fire on Siberia and its -flanks, their powerful 90s opened up on the objective. At this time, -2110, the first section of flames (two tanks) made its way along the -stream bed between the MLR and Hill 56A (Samoa). Lighting their way -with very short bursts of flame, the two tanks advanced in this manner -to the base of Hill 58A. There the vehicles paused momentarily, then -began to move up the near slope, using longer spurts of flame to sear -the ground and sparse vegetation to the crest of the position. The gun -tanks, in the meantime, had shifted their fire from Siberia northeast -to neutralize Hill 110. When the flame vehicles reached the top of -Siberia, they lumbered down the far slope, firing then in shorter -bursts and sweeping the area with machine guns to discourage any enemy -infantry interference. - -With some fuel reserved to light their way on the return trip, the -flame section reversed its course from the far side of the objective, -mounted the crest, and clanked back to the Changdan Road. When the -first section had returned, the second departed, completing its mission -in much the same manner. Tank personnel of both groups observed that -the enemy artillery and mortar fire was medium to heavy on Siberia. -Some rifle fire was also received. Gun tanks, firing from Changdan Road -east of Siberia, experienced less fire from the Chinese. - -Although the flame vehicles had completed their mission and were on -their way home, the M-46s remained on position in support of the 3d -Platoon, Company D which, at 2230, was advancing from the MLR to -complete the infantry part of the diversion. Staying out of the low -ground that the tanks had used, the platoon swept over Hill 56A at 2255 -and immediately struck out for the further objective, Hill 58A. Gun -tanks firing their 90s on the Chinese OPLR on Hill 110 and on Siberia -illuminated the target area with their fighting lights, the shutter -of which the tankers flicked open and closed during each five-second -interval that the light remained on. - -Less than an hour after crossing JAMESTOWN, the platoon from Captain -George W. Campbell’s Company D reported the capture of Siberia. The -enemy quickly made his presence felt at the objective; a half hour -before midnight, he assaulted the hill in reinforced platoon strength. -Ten minutes later the Chinese withdrew and the Company D Marines, in -accordance with their battle plan, did likewise. At about the same -time the 5th Marines, having completed its part in the diversion, also -secured from the operation. - -Ten minutes after the diversionary infantry had cleared Samoa while -enroute to Siberia, the main attack force, Company B, which had come -under operational control of 2/1 at 1800, crossed the MLR, the line of -departure. Moving at a fast pace to preserve the element of anticipated -surprise, the attack force, commanded by Captain Sereno S. Scranton, -Jr., soon deployed two squads of the lead platoon against the near side -of the hill. By 2318 on 11 August the squads were moving up Bunker Hill -and, 10 minutes later, one platoon had gained the top of the objective -and one was at the base of the hill, both moving northward along the -forward slope. As the advancing units neared the end of their sweep -forward, they began to come under small amounts of rifle fire from -the front and left flank of the position.[179] The Company B platoons -continued to advance, returning well-placed small arms fire. - - [179] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3, - 1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking - these places was easy but holding them under heavy - Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly. - Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were - limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day, - depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of - an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS - comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter _Honsowetz ltr II_. - -Soon the intensity of Chinese small arms fire increased; at the same -time enemy mortars and artillery opened up on the company. Marines -attempting to assault the top of Hill 122 also came under a hail of -hand grenades hurled by the staunch Chinese defenders. After a brief -but vicious fight at point-blank range, the Chinese gave ground on the -eastern side, heading uphill. Several Marines pursued the fleeing enemy -to the summit, then joined the rest of the assault units of Company B -in organizing a defense. By 0300, 12 August the battle had quieted down -and for a short while all firing ceased. Then, as the Marines began to -dig in, a bypassed pocket of enemy resistance came to life. Two fire -teams in the 1st Platoon took these Chinese Communists under fire. - -Even as the fighting continued, Marines and KSC personnel were hauling -fortification materials towards Bunker to consolidate the precarious -foothold. For a while, enemy mortars unleashed a heavy fire against -the newly won position, but by 0230 Company B was able to report that -enemy shelling had stopped and that the objective was in friendly -hands. A new fire fight broke out at 0345 between a small force of -enemy soldiers occupying a draw forward of Bunker Hill and Marines -nearby. The exchange of fire continued for nearly two hours, but short -of harassing the Marines on Bunker Hill the enemy did not launch -a counterattack. Dawn on 12 August revealed that thus far in the -Bunker Hill fighting 1 Marine of Company B had been killed and 22 were -wounded. The earlier diversionary attack on Siberia had resulted in -only one Marine casualty, the wounding of the platoon commander, Second -Lieutenant James W. Dion. - -Personnel losses were kept to a minimum by the well-organized medical -support and the efficient service of medical and evacuation personnel. -A forward aid station was established in the vicinity of the Company -E CP. Casualties that were not ambulatory arrived at this two-bunker -installation usually by hand litter, other wounded men were transported -in armored personnel carriers, U.S. Army tracked vehicles similar in -appearance to the Marine LVT, that had accompanied the diversionary -unit and were part of the Panmunjom rescue force stationed in the -area of COP 2 on the 3/1 left flank. Wounded Marines were examined -immediately. Minor injury cases were treated and discharged; more -seriously injured personnel were given emergency treatment and -evacuated. Movement to the rear was accomplished by ambulance jeeps. -Helicopters, landing only 30 yards from the station, flew out the -critically wounded. A sandbag-protected squad tent was used to house -casualties waiting to be examined. This emergency aid station closed -down on 13 August, when action in the right battalion sector diminished. - -Even though the remainder of the morning of 12 August was practically -free of any retaliatory attempts by the Chinese against Bunker Hill, -the Marines occupying the new position were not idle, for they -anticipated an immediate and severe reaction for capturing the hill. -Quickly, but methodically, the company dug in. At noon, regiment -passed to 3/1[180] the responsibility for Bunker Hill and operational -control of Company B. Consolidation of Hill 122 continued until about -1500, when the Marines were forced to put down their entrenching tools -and grab their rifles instead. The Chinese had suddenly launched an -intense mortar and artillery attack against the hill. Defending Marines -expected to see enemy soldiers start up the western slopes at any -minute. - - [180] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and - subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by - Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On - 12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1 - as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of - responsibility of the left battalion sector. - -Actually, more than an hour elapsed before the Communists initiated -their first main ground attack to regain Bunker. By that time, heavy -casualties from the continued shelling had forced Company B to pull -back from the ridge and take up positions on the reverse (eastern) -slope of Bunker Hill. At this point, with reduced Company B forces -and with no radio communication between Captain Scranton’s unit and -3/1, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage sent I/3/1,[181] under Captain Howard -J. Connolly, forward from the MLR. Shortly before 1600, a force of -more than 350 Chinese lunged out of the low ground of Hill 123, west -of Bunker, to attack defensive positions along the ridge between -Hills 124–122. Striking in rapid succession first the west side and -then the northern end of the Company B position to find a weak spot -in the defense, the enemy counterattack finally concentrated on the -southwestern part of the hill. - - [181] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s - company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1 - sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J. - Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the - right to cover the Company I area. - -An intense exchange of fire raged here until 1715, when the defending -fire of Company B plus the added weight of the Company I reinforcements -combined to stall the enemy advance. Having failed to gain their -objective, the Communists abruptly broke off their artillery and mortar -fire and ordered their infantry to withdraw. They pulled back only to -the far side of the hill, however. By 1740 the enemy was occupying his -new post on the northern slope, while the Marines continued to hold -their positions on the reverse slope of Bunker Ridge. Enemy supporting -fires had lifted and a lull ensued in the fighting. - - -_Consolidating the Defense of Bunker Hill_[182] - - [182] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - 12–13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52. - -Even before the Chinese had made their coordinated attack against Hill -122 in the midafternoon of the 12th, the 1st Marines had implemented -a plan of action to assure that the critical position would remain -in Marine hands. In addition to the movement of Company I/3/1 to -reinforce Bunker Hill and of Company I/3/7 as its relief on the MLR, -a precautionary displacement was also made of the 3/1 reconnaissance -platoon to Hill 124 to tie in that terrain feature with both Bunker -and JAMESTOWN and thus consolidate the defense north of the MLR and -west of Bunker. (See Map 11.) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 11 K. WHITE - -BUNKER HILL AREA - -2300, 12 AUGUST 1952] - -Other activities behind the line aimed at making the Marine position -on the newly seized hill more tenable. As one step in this direction, -General Selden shifted most of his reserve into the zone of action. -Before the end of the day remaining units of 3/7 were placed under -operational control of 3/1, and 2/7 was attached to Colonel Layer’s -reserve. The 7th Marines was directed to place its 4.2-inch mortars -on call to the 1st Marines. Priority of artillery support went to the -Bunker Hill regiment. Within the 1st Marines, the regimental commander -moved two provisional platoons (118 Marines) of the reserve 1st -Battalion to the 3d Battalion sector. All 81mm mortars in 1/1 were sent -to the left battalion. The fire plan also called for employment of all -the 60mm mortars that could bear on the crest of 124–122, with 81mm and -artillery box-me-in barrage fires on the ridge and flanks. - -Machine guns from the MLR were assigned missions on the crest of Bunker -Ridge and 4.5-inch ripples were planned on the deep enemy approaches. -Gun and flame tanks were to protect the right flank of Hill 122 where -the steep draw between Bunker and the MLR offered the most dangerous -approach into Bunker Hill. Supplies and fortification materials, -meanwhile, were being carried forward and casualties taken to the rear -by the relief party. Although 3/1 initially reported that the Bunker -Hill fighting had resulted in 58 killed or wounded Marines, a later -battalion count showed this number to be 34--5 killed and 29 wounded. - -Most of the casualties had been caused by hostile shelling. Although -the Hill 122 reverse slope afforded some cover from the Chinese -artillery and mortars, the positions on the crest did not offer any -protection, so Marines continued their trenchworks and other defensive -preparations at a rapid pace and supporting fires were registered by -1900. The approach of night was certain to bring renewed Communist -attempts to capture Bunker Hill. - -At 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage reported to division that his -force on Hill 122 occupied the entire reverse slope and that the Marine -of I/3/1 and B/1/1 were digging in and consolidating their scant -defenses. Enemy shells were still falling on both Bunker and Hill 124. -Company commanders forward of the MLR estimated that as many as 400 -Chinese occupied the ridge on the other side of the slope from the -Marines. Since the crest of the long Hill 124–122 ridgeline was fairly -level, the gentle incline of the Bunker rear slope permitted defending -Marine units excellent fields of fire to the ridge crest, a major -consideration in the 3/1 battalion commander’s decision to adopt a -rear slope defense. Moreover, the top of the ridge could be swept with -direct fire from the MLR as well as supporting weapons from the two -nearest companies on JAMESTOWN. Opposing Marine and Chinese forces were -thus lined up for a continuation of the battle for Bunker Hill. - -It appeared that the Chinese wished to attempt a diversionary tactic -of their own. To draw attention away from Hill 122 they engaged a -Marine outpost east of Bunker and a KMC ambush far to the left before -attacking Bunker again. In the KMC sector, shortly after 2300, an enemy -infantry platoon walked into a trap near the eastern edge of the Sachon -and 500 yards south of the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line. The brief fire -fight lasted only 10 minutes before the Chinese broke contact. - -Perhaps the ambush was incidental to the forthcoming attack against -the Bunker complex, but this same reasoning cannot be applied to -the Communist-inspired action which broke out shortly at Hill 48A, -Stromboli, another friendly outpost far to the east of Hill 122. -Near the right limiting point of Colonel Layer’s 1st Marines and the -5th Marines boundary, Stromboli was another Marine fire-team-by-day, -squad-by-night position. It occupied a small rise 250 yards forward -of the MLR and commanded the immediate sector in all directions. The -entire MLR in the regimental right was dominated by the enemy-held Hill -104, a half-mile north of 48A. - -Communist infantry opened the attack without benefit of any supporting -arms preparation and rushed to seize Hill 48A early on the morning of -13 August, a few minutes after midnight. Defending Marines immediately -responded with small arms and automatic weapons fire. By the time the -outpost commander had informed battalion of the attack by radio, the -far right sector of the 1st Marines line, held by Captain Clarence G. -Moody, Jr.’s Company F, had also come under attack. Firing rifles and -submachine guns and hurling hand grenades as they assaulted the main -position, the Chinese attempted to penetrate the JAMESTOWN defenses. -In spite of the enemy’s concerted efforts, the Marine line remained -staunch. - -At Stromboli, the Communists met with no greater success, although -they did cause enough casualties to warrant the dispatch of a Company F -reinforcing squad. When this unit left the MLR, at 0106 on 13 August, -the Marine line was still under a heavy attack not only from Chinese -infantry but from hostile artillery and mortars as well. Out at Hill -48A the outpost remained in comparative quiet until the approach of the -reinforcing party. As the Company F squad neared the base of the hill, -Chinese infantry that earlier had been assaulting the Marine MLR turned -their rifle and machine gun fire from positions on the JAMESTOWN side -of the outpost. A heavy rain of devastating mortar fire engulfed the -reinforcing Marines. On order, they broke off the approach march and -returned to the company rear area. - -On the main line, meanwhile, Company F positions were still being -bombarded by Chinese artillery and assaulted by their infantry. -Casualties along the entire line forced Lieutenant Colonel Batterton to -order his 1st Provisional Platoon, Headquarters and Service Company, -2/1, to the Company F command post. After the clutch unit departed the -battalion area, at 0210, and approached Captain Moody’s CP, enemy fires -immediately intensified. A violent fight erupted to the left of the -Company F sector, but the Marines there held. The Chinese then tried to -punch holes in other parts of the company line, moving eastward along -JAMESTOWN. Each failure to breach the line seemed to signal a decrease -in the intensity of Chinese shelling. - -This easing of Communist pressure against the main line enabled -the Company F commander to put into operation a new attempt at the -reinforcement and rescue of Stromboli. After the initial enemy assault -in the early hours of 13 August had ended in failure, the Chinese made -repeated attempts to capture the outpost. At one time it appeared -that a company of Chinese had overrun the hill. Later, however, the -Stromboli stronghold radioed that the enemy force, subsequently -identified as only a platoon, had encircled the Marine position. To -relieve enemy pressure at Hill 48A, Captain Moody employed a rifle -platoon which set out for the outpost at 0325. - -Simultaneously, as if their intelligence had advance knowledge of the -1st Marines recovery plan, the Chinese stepped up the tempo of their -attack at Stromboli. A fresh assault by the enemy was stymied by Marine -superiority in hand-to-hand combat. Thereafter, close-in defensive -fires continued to ring the outpost and to discourage future assaults. -The approach of the second Marine rescue party eliminated much of -the pressure that Communist foot soldiers had maintained around the -hill position. After a 90-minute exchange of fire with the enemy, the -friendly platoon penetrated the encirclement and rushed to the besieged -outpost at the hill crest. At this point the Chinese disengaged and -withdrew towards the north. - -After their diversion against Stromboli had approached the proportions -of a full-scale attack, with the enemy having reinforced from platoon -to company size, the Chinese then initiated their main thrust, an -attempt to retake Bunker. Captain Connolly (I/3/1) had reported -that shortly before 0100 Communist mortar fire had begun falling on -his positions on the southern slope of Bunker Hill. Simultaneously, -Chinese artillery stepped up the rate of its barrage fires as did the -assaulting close-in enemy infantry. Captain Connolly then requested -the 11th Marines to place box-me-in fires around the Marine company -positions on Hill 122. Artillery furnished these defensive fires almost -immediately. - -Shortly after 0130, the Marines in the center and right of the I/3/1 -position observed a large number of Chinese, deployed into a skirmish -line, headed directly for their part of the hill. The attack was -accompanied by intense machine gun and rifle fire. It was countered by -an equally heavy reply from Marines on Bunker. For nearly four hours -the battle raged at Hill 122. Unsuccessful enemy frontal assaults were -followed by attempts to dislodge the defenders from the rear. In their -continuing thrust against the hill, the Chinese were repulsed by Marine -coordinated support fires--tank, rocket, artillery, and mortar. - -By firing on known or suspected assembly areas and Chinese infantry -units advancing up the draws towards Hill 122, these Marine -supporting weapons helped to preserve the status quo at Bunker. -Repeated box-me-ins were also fired by the 11th Marines during the -early-morning Communist attacks on 13 August. Exploding friendly mortar -shells increased the effectiveness of the hill defense; nine rocket -ripples[183] fired by the artillery regiment further supported Marines -at the critical terrain position. Tanks unleashed their deadly fire on -nearby enemy outposts to neutralize them; their 90mm guns, aided by the -battlefield illumination from tank fighting lights, helped eliminate -Chinese foot soldiers attempting to envelop Marine positions on Bunker. - - [183] A characteristic of 4.5-inch rocket launcher is the - discharge of 24 rounds in quick succession, called a - ripple. A battery of six launchers can fire 144 rounds on - target in less than a minute. - -It was in this direction that an enemy force, estimated at reinforced -battalion strength, headed during the early morning fighting on Hill -122. At 0330, the struggle for possession of the height had reached -the climax. For an hour the issue remained in doubt. Then, as the -Chinese small arms fire decreased, the tempo of the enemy’s artillery -shelling increased. This, the division correctly deduced, announced the -beginning of a temporary Communist withdrawal from Bunker Hill. - -Although the immediate danger of the enemy onslaught had ended for -the time being, Marines to the rear of the JAMESTOWN Line stepped up -their defensive preparations. Division, regimental, and battalion -operational plans were put into effect to prevent a Chinese victory. -The seriousness of the situation on the 1st Marines right flank at -Stromboli early on 13 August had resulted in the movement of one -company of 5th Marines into blocking positions behind the MLR near -the left regimental boundary. To the south of Bunker Hill, relief -and replacement units from the division reserve, ordered into action -late the previous day, maneuvered into position to strengthen the -regimental front. One of these relief units, G/3/7, under command of -Captain William M. Vanzuyen, had just deployed from its assembly area -to pass through the ranks of an MLR company and take over the Bunker -Hill positions. The Marines’ situation on Hill 122 had deteriorated so -rapidly, however, that the 3/1 commander rushed two reinforced squads -forward from I/3/7, the nearest MLR unit. - -The Company G reinforcement unit jumped off from JAMESTOWN and arrived -at Bunker shortly after sunup, where it reinforced Captain Connolly’s -positions during the height of the battle for possession of Hill 122. -Not long after, the Chinese initiated their withdrawal under cover of -increased artillery and mortar barrages. As they left, the Communists -policed the battlefield in their typically thorough manner. A Marine -platoon that swept the northern slope of Bunker failed to find any -enemy bodies in this area so recently abandoned by the Chinese, but did -take under fire and kill seven enemy that had remained on Hill 122. - -Before I/3/1 had sent one of its platoons to reconnoiter the far side -of Bunker Hill, Lieutenant Colonel Armitage ordered H/3/7, under -Captain John G. Demas, forward to relieve friendly forces at the -contested height. The exchange of units was completed before noon -of the 13th. By late afternoon, except for Company H, all 2d and 3d -Battalions, 7th Marines units that had moved up to reinforce the 1st -Marines were on their way back to the regimental reserve area. At this -time the 1st Marines CO, Colonel Layer, reported to General Selden -that the Bunker Hill action during 12–13 August had resulted in 24 -Marines killed and 214 wounded. On the right, in the 2d Battalion -sector, an additional 40 Marines were listed as casualties, including -7 killed in the Stromboli defense. Chinese known dead numbered 210, -plus an estimated 470 killed and 625 wounded.[184] Artillery and aerial -observers reported that between 1500 on the 12th and 0600 the following -morning an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 rounds of enemy fire had fallen -on 1st Marines positions, the “heaviest incoming fires received by the -Division since coming into the present sector.”[185] - - [184] 1stMarDiv PIR 658, dtd 14 Aug 52. - - [185] Selden, _Div Staff Rpt_, p. 19. - -The number of casualties from the Bunker Hill action was to increase -further that same day with a renewed attack on the outpost. Before -the Chinese again engaged Hill 122, however, they made a diversionary -attack on the western flank at the extreme left of the 3/1 sector. -At dusk on 13 August, the enemy shelled the Company G Marines at COP -2, the critical height overlooking the Panmunjom peace corridor. The -shelling caused several casualties and lasted 90 minutes. Towards the -end, Communist infantrymen moved forward and fired on the outpost. -At about the same time, Company H personnel emplaced on the MLR to -the rear of COP 2 began to receive artillery rounds in preassault -proportions. - -A ground attack in this western end of the 3/1 sector did not -materialize, however. Instead, the Chinese resumed their attack on -Bunker Hill. Since their temporary withdrawal early on the 13th, the -CCF had repeatedly sent mortar and artillery barrages against the -bastion to harass its new occupants. On occasion these well-aimed -mortar rounds found their mark. Mortars interdicting a trail used for -resupply of the Hill 122 defenders did inflict some casualties on two -groups rushing emergency supplies forward from the MLR. - -At 2100, while continuing his shelling of the left end of the 3/1 -sector, the enemy lifted his preparation on Hill 122 to permit a CCF -reinforced company to make a new assault there on the Marine defenders. -Captain Demas called for box-me-ins to seal off his positions and -illumination shells to help locate the enemy force. Utilizing the draw -to the east of Hill 58A, the Chinese proceeded west to Bunker where -they pitted one platoon against the center of the Company H, 3/7 line -and another against the right flank. Defensive fires momentarily held -off the intruders, although some were able to break through to the -Marines’ fighting positions. - -Those enemy troops who penetrated the Marine defenses were quickly -eliminated by grenades and small arms fire. Unable to weaken the Marine -defenses any further and by now sustaining sizable casualties from -unrelenting Marine artillery and mortar concentrations, the Communists -withdrew at 2215. Marine defenders estimated they had killed 175 enemy -during this latest encounter; a firm count of 20 bodies were found on -the shell-torn slopes. Company H casualties, all from enemy mortar and -artillery fire, were 7 killed and 21 wounded.[186] Enemy incoming was -again heavy during this period, with a reported 3,000 rounds falling in -the sector. - - [186] During the fighting on the 13th, Hospitalman John E. - Kilmer was mortally wounded while “administering aid to - the wounded and expediting their evacuation.” Though - wounded by enemy mortars, he continued his life-saving - efforts until another barrage took his life. He had - died shielding a wounded Marine undergoing emergency - treatment. Hospitalman Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet - Joyce Kilmer, became the first of four corpsmen serving - with the 1st Marine Division to be awarded the Medal of - Honor during the trench warfare in western Korea. - -In the 3d Battalion sector, Marine and KSC stretcher bearers brought -casualties to the I/3/1 CP, several hundred yards to the rear of the -front line. At the command post, the critically wounded were airlifted -by helicopter to the rear. Less seriously wounded casualties were -placed in jeep ambulances and carried to the battalion forward aid -station, about two miles away. Here a team of doctors and corpsmen -examined and treated patients, discharged a few, but prepared most for -further evacuation. At the 1st Marines forward aid station, patients -were reexamined and their wounds redressed when required; discharge or -further evacuation was also accomplished. Most of the Marines brought -to this forward facility had become exhausted from vigorous activity -in the high temperature and humidity which characterized the South -Korean summer. The regimental aid station treated these heat cases and -then released them to their units. - - -_Company B Returns to Bunker Hill_[187] - - [187] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 3/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs, - Aug 52. - -Division intelligence subsequently reported that the 2100 attack on 13 -August had been made by an enemy battalion with a reinforced company -in assault. This same unit again sent a small band of Chinese soldiers -against Hill 122 at 0225 the following morning. This clash was to be -the briefest of all offensives for control of Bunker Hill during the -11–17 August period. Prior to launching this four-minute fire fight, -an enemy machine gun at Siberia had attempted to harass the Marines at -Bunker Hill. In retaliation, Marine tanks illuminated this enemy weapon -with their searchlights and immediately took it under fire with their -90mm guns, knocking it out of action. At the same time, enemy artillery -attempted to shell friendly tanks. During this brief fire exchange, -one tanker was wounded slightly and the lens of one fighting light was -splintered by fragments from enemy shells bursting around the tanks. -The inconsequential probe was made, Marines believed, not so much to -seriously challenge Marines holding Hill 122 as it was to retrieve CCF -dead and wounded from the major attack a few hours earlier that night. - -Anticipating that a much heavier ground attack was close at hand, -the 1st Marines ordered a reinforcement of the Bunker Hill position. -Even before the heavy action on the 13th, this machinery had been set -in motion. To this end, the 3d Battalion was to reinforce the Bunker -defense by sending a 1/1 platoon to the hill and the 2d Battalion was -instructed to return Company A (minus this platoon) to the reserve -battalion. At 0415 on the 14th, Company E/2/1, led since 10 August -by Captain Stanley T. Moak, took over from A/1/1 the responsibility -for the 2d Battalion’s MLR “Siberia sector,” adjacent to the Bunker -Hill area held by the 3d Battalion. The Company A reinforcing platoon -arrived at Hill 122 just before dusk, preceding another CCF company -attack by only a few hours. - -At midnight the 1st Marines front was suspiciously quiet for a few -minutes. Forward on Hill 122, there was no apparent enemy activity. -Captain Demas sent out a two fire-team patrol from Bunker to -reconnoiter northwest of Bunker towards the Chinese lines. Shortly -after the eight Marines returned with a negative report of contact with -the enemy, the regiment received a report about the outbreak of a small -arms clash between defenders on the left flank of Bunker and an enemy -unit farther west. At 0118 on 15 August what had initially appeared to -be a minor contest suddenly erupted into a heated fire fight all along -the 124–122 Bunker Ridge complex. At the request of Captain Dumas, -Marine artillery fired protective boxes around the Bunker positions. -This defensive maneuver held the attackers in check. - -At this moment, Chinese infantrymen in the draw running alongside the -124–122–120 ridge system were massed for an assault on Bunker from the -northeast. The plan might have been successful had not a fighting light -from a tank on the main line intercepted the Communists in this state -of their preparations. In a matter of moments, friendly artillery, -mortar, and tank fire struck the Chinese and scattered the formation. - -After discovering he could not successfully pull a sneak attack, -the enemy reverted to his usual procedure, employing a preassault -bombardment prior to his infantry assault. This preparation began at -0206; it reached the rate of approximately 100 rounds of 82 and 122mm -mortar shells per minute. While supporting weapons pounded the Marines, -the Chinese assault commander reorganized his attack force that the -Marine shelling had scattered. Communist infantry then moved forward -and fired on the Bunker Marines, who replied with rifles and machine -guns and box-me-in fires. Unable to penetrate this protective mask -around the positions, the Chinese gradually decreased their small arms -and artillery fire until, at 0315, the rate of exploding shells at Hill -122 had dropped to only four or five per minute. Soon thereafter the -small arms fire slacked off entirely and by 0400 even the mortars had -stopped. Across the entire 1st Marines front, all was quiet again. - -During the Company H defense of the hill, enemy losses, caused mostly -by friendly artillery and mortar fire, were placed at 350, including 40 -counted dead. Captain Demas’ Marines suffered 35 casualties, of whom -7 were killed. En route to the MLR after relief by B/3/1, the company -suffered four more casualties, including two KIAs, all the victims of -Chinese mortars. - -It was not long before these weapons inflicted casualties on Company B, -which had six of its men wounded even before the H/3/7 unit had reached -JAMESTOWN. Another Marine at Bunker was wounded by enemy mortars later -that morning. At 1640 the Communists again probed Bunker Hill, this -time in company strength. Striking in daylight during a thunderstorm -and without any preparatory fires, the Chinese attackers failed to -achieve any tactical surprise. The defenders fired both infantry and -supporting weapons; some threw grenades at the few Communists who did -manage to get close to the fighting positions. At 1750, the Chinese -withdrew, this time leaving 35 of their dead in the attack area. Four -Marines had been wounded; five others suffering from battle fatigue -were later evacuated. - -Exactly when the enemy would strike next at Bunker Hill was not known -by the Marines. Most believed that the Communists would return but only -speculated as to when. Although the battalion felt that “the enemy was -not expected to attack again for some time,”[188] events were to prove -otherwise. In any case, the battalion was prepared, having an adequate -force on Bunker and sufficient local reserves to absorb an attack up -to the strength of any received so far. Division supporting arms were -readily available for commitment at critical points. - - [188] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4. - -The Chinese soon put an end to the conjecture about the next attack. -At 0040, 16 August, an enemy force, later estimated as a battalion, -came out of positions to the west and north of Hill 122. Supported -by mortars at first, and later on by artillery, the battalion sent -one company against the Marine outpost. Several attacking elements -were able to penetrate the defensive fires. These Chinese reached the -crest of the hill and began using their rifles, automatic weapons, -and hand grenades against the defenders. Captain Scranton called for -reinforcements. A platoon from I/3/7 was dispatched promptly from the -3/1 sector. The reinforcements departed JAMESTOWN just as the fire -fight on Bunker began to subside. By 0315, the enemy had begun his -withdrawal, and another reinforcing element, I/3/1, had moved forward, -this time from regiment to Lieutenant Colonel Armitage’s CP. - -About two hours later a brief fire fight flared up in the Company B -sector. No ground assault was made on Marine positions. The enemy -force, of undetermined strength, never closed with the Marines and -within 10 minutes, the firing stopped. No casualties to the Marines -resulted during this exchange. The earlier clash had resulted in the -death of 3 Marines and the wounding of 27. Enemy losses were estimated -at 40 killed and 30 wounded. - -Before it came off the hill, Company B was engaged by enemy fire three -more times. At 1945, Chinese mortars (82mm) wounded two Marines. -Later, heavier mortars placed 20 rounds on Hill 122, but these caused -no casualties. There were some losses, however, early on the morning -of the 17th when C/1/1 was relieving the Bunker defenders. Captain -Scranton’s Marines sustained five more wounded from automatic weapons, -five during the relief. - -The second relief of Company B on Bunker brought to a close the battle -that had been waged for possession of the vital hill complex. During -the Hill 122 tours of Company C and other 1st Marines units that -followed in August, seven more ground actions tested the Bunker Hill -defenses. Only one of them, during the night of 25–26 August, was of -significant size. This attack also failed to dislodge the Marines from -the hill. - - -_Supporting Arms at Bunker Hill_[189] - - [189] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4–16 Aug 52; - 1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, - Aug 52. - -It was quite natural that the flurry of ground activity during the -battle of Bunker Hill created a need for increased participation from -Marine supporting arms. The magnitude of infantry action during the -contest for Hill 122 resulted in a monthly record to date in 1952 -for the amount of air support received as well as the volume of both -artillery and tank fires supporting the division. During this critical -9–16 August period, the 11th Marines played a part in every ground -action except the feint attack on Siberia and the seizure of Bunker -Hill, both of which were purposely executed without an artillery -preparation. Medium tanks fired day and night missions during most of -the infantry action. Close air support at times amounted to a strike -every 20 minutes. - -During the ground action around Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli, the -division received close air support in amounts unparalleled for -JAMESTOWN Marines to that time. Marine and U.S. Air Force pilots flew -a total of 458 missions (including 27 ground controlled MPQ-14 radar -bombing attacks) during five of the most critical days, 9–13 August. -On two of them, the 1st Marine Division received priority of close air -support along the whole EUSAK front. Fifth Air Force assigned 1st MAW -aircraft to Marine requests for close air support as long as Marine -aircraft were available. - -The initial air strike by Marines in the Bunker fighting was on 9 -August in support of counterattack plans for Siberia. MAG-33 provided -a morning and evening flight of four F9F jet fighters to destroy enemy -forces and defensive works on 58A (Siberia). USAF fighter-bombers -attacked Siberia and other outposts nearby and enemy artillery -positions supporting the Chinese forward line. On the next day, air -operations, concentrating on Siberia, were stepped up considerably -against enemy outposts. Thirty-five aircraft in nine missions attacked -58A with bombs, rockets, and napalm. These strikes were carried out by -MAG-12 and U.S. Air Force pilots at irregular intervals during daylight -hours. Air controllers reported good results. Other aircraft hit known -mortar locations capable of supporting the Chinese. During the morning, -Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Lieutenant Colonel Philip “L” Crawford) -bombed and burned Bunker Hill. Just before sunset, F-80 and -84 jets -of the U.S. Air Force dropped 15 tons of bombs on mortar positions and -troops on and around Hill 120. Four F-80s also participated with eight -Marine AD-2 propeller-driven attack aircraft in the morning attack on -Bunker. - -Air activity in support of the 1st Marines continued unabated on 11 -August. Before the diversionary ground attack just after dusk that day, -Marine and Fifth Air Force fliers repeated the treatment that Hills -58A and 122 had received the previous day. During daylight, supporting -weapons positions were hit by FAF fighter planes. At night, MAG-12 air -attacks guided by the MPQ-14 radar bombing system destroyed hostile -artillery and mortars. Also during the dark, the medium bombers of -the FEAF Bomber Command struck deeper in the rear at heavy weapons -locations. - -These Air Force bombers conducted four more controlled-bombing attacks -against Chinese artillery during the early hours of 12 August, when -Company B was consolidating its positions and hastily organizing the -defense of Bunker Hill. After daylight and until dusk, MAGs-12 and -33 -and USAF squadrons provided four-plane flights to strike troop assembly -areas, supporting weapons positions, and observation posts close to -Hill 122. In late afternoon, Marine pilots in four F9F Panther jets -and three ADs bombed and burned the enemy side of Bunker Hill during -the shelling and subsequent ground attack against the Marines on the -eastern slope. - -Marines flew, on 13 August, all of the daylight close air support -missions in support of the actions on both Bunker in the center and -Stromboli in the right of the 1st Marines sector. On 13 August, a total -of 94 aircraft were committed over the regimental sector to conduct -strikes in support of ground operations. Enemy Hill 104, commanding -the 2/1 outpost on 48A (Stromboli), received four attacks. Fighter -bombers (F4U propeller-driven Corsairs) carrying napalm, rockets, and -1,000-pound bombs, raided the hill mass at 0535. The other strikes -against this key terrain-feature were made by attack and fighter -aircraft during the afternoon. Other targets on the regimental right -were weapons positions beyond Hill 104 and an enemy outpost one -thousand yards west of Stromboli. - -Most of the air support received by the 1st Marines on the 13th was -directed against targets that were participating--or that were capable -of taking part--in the battle on Bunker Hill. Against the enemy on the -height itself, the Marines directed only three strikes, and these came -late in the morning. A majority of the air attacks were dispatched -against observation and command posts and the firing positions of both -automatic and large caliber weapons. Chinese artillery and mortar -fire had inflicted more casualties and punishment on the Marines than -the enemy infantry assaults. As a consequence, the main effort of the -close air support strikes was directed against these hostile supporting -weapons. - -After dark on the 13th, VMF(N)-513 commanded by Colonel Peter D. -Lambrecht,[190] took up the air offensive against the heavy firing -positions in the rear of the enemy line. The squadron conducted four -attacks with its night fighters. Two of its attacks were made just -before sunrise. - - [190] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet - night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant - James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The - last known position of the plane was over the Yellow - Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point - the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to - reestablish communications failed. It was reported that - observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about - this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any - trace of the Marines or their aircraft. - -During the remainder of the battle of Bunker Hill, the ground fighting -subsided and the requirement for close air support abated accordingly. -On the 14th, only four daylight strikes were flown in the 1st Marines -area. These, all by Marine squadrons, were against active artillery and -mortars in the defilade of Hill 120 and others to the west on the far -slope of Hill 123, and Chinese outpost positions, west of 48A, which -had been pestering the Stromboli garrison. There were no flights after -dark on the 14th, but on the following night, two MPQ missions were -flown by VMF(N)-513. Each was a single plane flight against a reported -artillery location. This was the final night air action in the battle -for Bunker Hill. Daylight missions in support of Hill 122 defense after -the sharp decrease of attacks on the 14th numbered only seven attacks, -each by four planes. These, flown by Marines, continued to emphasize -the destruction of enemy artillery. - -Marine artillery continued its support of ground troops and air -strikes. Cannoneers of the 11th Marines fired 21 flak suppression -missions during the five days beginning on 11 August. This type of -close coordination between Marine supporting arms further reduced -combat losses of aircraft providing CAS to the division. The Marine -artillerymen had played a vital part in the defense of the besieged -outposts. Lieutenant Colonel Armitage credited the box-me-in fires with -an important role in thwarting each enemy attack on Bunker.[191] - - [191] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3–4. - -In the 24-hour period beginning at 1800 on 12 August, Marine artillery -directly supporting the 1st Marines fired 10,652 rounds. Most of the -ammunition was expended in support of the Bunker Hill defense; some -was used in behalf of the Marines outposting Stromboli during the -Communists’ early morning diversion that day. On the 9th, the direct -support battalion, 3/11 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Rogers), had -fired about one-fourth of the 12–13 August total. Many of the shells -that first day of the Bunker battle were preparatory to counterattacks -for regaining Siberia. - -When the retaking of Hill 58A was discarded in favor of the surprise -attack on 122, the amount of artillery support was reduced, during -the 1st Marines infantry preparations on the 10th and 11th, in keeping -with the fire support plan. Upon seizure of Bunker, Lieutenant Colonel -Rogers’ business immediately picked up and quickly reached a crescendo -the following day, when the 10,652 shells fired became a Marine one-day -battalion record for western Korea until the last stages of fighting -in 1953. Other Marine artillery battalions fired reinforcing missions -during the critical period as did the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery which -fired a large number of on-call ripples. The regimental commander -later recalled that “during some of the crises every gun that could -bear on Bunker in the 11th Marines and reinforcing units was shooting -there.”[192] - - [192] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, - HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter _Henderson - ltr III_. - -After a sharp drop on the 14th, the artillery support gradually -decreased in proportion to the amount and strength of the enemy’s -action against Hill 122. By 20 August, 3/11 was firing only 244 rounds -a day. Only on the 26th, during a serious Chinese attempt to retake -Bunker, did the number of artillery rounds match the intensity of the -fire support rendered during the earlier part of the month. - -It was not only the quantity of 11th Marines support that the infantry -called for during the battle of Bunker Hill; quality was equally -important. A majority of the more than 28,000 rounds that 3/11 fired -during the eight days of Bunker Hill fell around the besieged outposts. -Many rounds were fired in defense of MLR positions. In both of these -types of protective fires, extreme accuracy and precision were required -due to the proximity of enemy and friendly lines in order to prevent -any “short” rounds from falling among Marine positions. Lieutenant -Colonel Armitage recalled that during the height of the battle on the -night of 12 August, “we did have a bad scare ... when Captain Connolly -reported that friendly mortar fire was falling short.”[193] The -battalion immediately ceased fire with its 60mms, 81mms, and 4.2s and -each piece was checked; the culprit was quickly located and within 5–10 -minutes 3/1 resumed fire. - - [193] _Armitage ltr_ and comments, p. 12. - -During the August battle, artillery in general support of the entire -division and I Corps artillery reinforcing the fires of Colonel -Henderson’s regiment, stepped up their efforts to destroy the distant -and more difficult targets, including mortars and artillery. These -continued to be the main cause of Marine casualties. Some of the labors -of the 11th Marines gun crews did silence enemy heavy weapons, but -personnel losses from enemy shellings still mounted, especially in the -infantry units. To assist in the location and destruction of the enemy -artillery, aerial observers spent considerable time in spotting and -fixing Chinese weapons positions. - -Besides these counterbattery efforts, the 11th Marines employed -other artillery means to provide the additional support the 1st -Marine Division requested during Bunker Hill. Two of these were the -counter-counterbattery and the countermortar programs, the former being -a passive defense-deception program to minimize Chinese counterbattery -fires against 11th Marines weapons. Nearly every day C Battery, 17th -Field Artillery Battalion, fired special request missions.[194] Another -type of fire, flak suppression, aided the cause of close air support -pilots delivering ordnance against those Chinese positions taking -Bunker Hill and Stromboli under fire. At night, illumination shells -helped outpost and frontline Marines in locating groups of enemy -massing for assault on Hill 122. - - [194] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps, - and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and - confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air - spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery - evaluation, and POW interrogation. - -Mortars (4.2-inch) of the 1st Marines contributed heavily to the -defense of the outposts. Operations reached a peak on 12–13 August -when, in a 24-hour period, Captain Carl H. Benson’s mortar company -fired 5,952 rounds--4,084 high explosive and 1,868 illuminating. In -addition to their defensive fires, these hard-hitting weapons attacked -Chinese mortars, automatic weapons, defensive positions, and troop -formations with deadly accuracy. - -No less precise and lethal were the fires of Captain Gene M. McCain’s -gun tanks (Company C, 1st Tank Battalion), and the battalion flame -tanks. Three of the latter had fired their 105s in support of the KMC -on the morning of the 9th before the vehicles received orders to move -east to join Company C temporarily. On the next day, 90s fired on enemy -bunkers, observation posts, and trenches in the vicinity of Siberia -and Stromboli. During 11 August, two gun tanks blasted at targets -immediately beyond Siberia and others to the west of that outpost. - -Towards the end of the 11th, the critical part of Bunker battle began -for the tankers also. Those elements of Lieutenant Colonel John I. -Williamson’s battalion supporting the diversion and the subsequent -main attack pulled into positions south of Hill 122 on the MLR and to -the right in the Company F sector. It was not until the next day that -the tanks operating with the 1st Marines reached a peak in gun support -for the Bunker fight. Beginning with the defense of Hill 122 from 1600 -that day, and for the next 26 hours, the tankers placed 817 shells -on targets effecting the Chinese capability of capturing Bunker and -Stromboli. In addition to the heavy ammunition, the Company C tanks, -augmented by the 1st Marines antitank platoon and five tanks from the -division tank reserve, fired 32,000 rounds of .30 caliber machine gun -ammunition. - -Except on the 11th, most of the tank firing in the fight for Bunker -Hill through 14 August was accomplished during the hours of darkness. -On the latter date, the cannons and machine guns of the mediums blasted -directly at Chinese outposts opposite Colonel Layer’s regiment. The -number of rounds that day fell off considerably from the high on the -13th; on the 15th the tanks in the 1st Marines area did not fire at -all. Heavy rain that had accompanied the late afternoon thundershower -that day made movement forward to firing positions impractical. By -the next day, however, the ground was solid enough to permit some -maneuvering by the tracked vehicles. They fired 52 rounds of 90mm -shells and 14,750 machine gun rounds at automatic weapons positions and -bunkers on the western slope of Hill 122. This marked the final tank -mission in support of the 1st Marines in the battle for Bunker Hill. - -During the early part of the August fighting, tanks of the -division were able to get the first real test of a technique of -night support,[195] and at the same time experiment with a towing -device to permit retrieval of disabled vehicles under fire without -getting outside the tank. The use of the lights to support both the -diversionary force and the defense of Hill 122 showed the value of -these instruments. Lieutenant Colonel Williamson recommended that -tanks be employed in pairs, one to spot and adjust fire and the other -to fire. With respect to the towing device, he considered the new -piece of equipment an improvement over the manual hook-up method, but -noted that the device limited tank maneuverability and had a tendency -when bouncing up and down over rough terrain to dig into the ground, -impeding the forward progress of the vehicle. - - [195] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank - gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were - inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the - two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl. - 2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia - was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank - battle lights which we were using for the first time.” - _Honsowetz ltr II._ - - -_In Retrospect_[196] - - [196] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_; - _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar - ComdDs, Aug 52. - -Whether the sacrifice of Siberia in favor of the seizure of Bunker -justified the outcome can be determined, in part, by looking back -to the division commander’s reasons for this decision. He had cited -three advantages in seizing and occupying Hill 122 instead of 58A. -One, tactical surprise achieved by an attack on the former, was an -unqualified success. That Bunker Hill would provide more defensible -terrain and at the same time add strength to the main line were two -sound judgments that the test of time would bear out. The third point, -that observation into the enemy’s outpost line would be increased from -the higher hill, also proved to be correct. - -Only the inability to neutralize Hill 58A effectively from Bunker -cast any doubt on the considerations. At night the enemy could occupy -Siberia both for firing positions and flank security to attack friendly -forces moving down the corridor east of Hill 122. Action to counter -these two enemy actions came mainly from MLR forces. - -One measure of the results of the Bunker Hill fighting is seen in the -price paid. Chinese losses were estimated by the 1st Marine Division -at approximately 3,200, including more than 400 known dead. Marine -casualties in the action were 48 killed and 313 seriously wounded. -Several hundred additional wounded were treated at 1st Marines medical -facilities and returned to duty shortly thereafter. - -To replace combat losses in the infantry regiment, General Selden on -12 August directed that rear area service and support units fill the -vacancies. Two hundred Marines, nearly all of them volunteers, were -provided to Colonel Layer by the 14th. To offset other losses within -the division, its commander similarly had requested on 12 August -that the Commandant, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., authorize an -air-lifting of 500 enlisted Marine infantrymen to the 1st Marine -Division as soon as possible. Pointing out that mounting battle -casualties had reduced the effective strength of the division, General -Selden also urged that each of the next two monthly replacement drafts -scheduled for the division be increased by 500 more enlisted men. After -some debate at the next senior administrative headquarters,[197] the -request was granted by General Shepherd, and the emergency replacements -were made available from the 3d Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, -California. The initial replacement of 500 Marines arrived on 21 August. - - [197] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the - Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could - survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft - availability. After a quick evaluation of both these - factors, General Hart on the 14th recommended approval. - FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift - of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for - Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This - general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the - total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground - forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, - HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter _Jack ltr_. - -More men to replace divisional combat losses might have been required -had not the medical support been such an efficient operation. After -the battle, the regimental surgeon, Lieutenant Robert E. Murto, -called for a review of the medical facilities in effect during the -Bunker, Siberia, and Stromboli fighting. In attendance were the -battalion doctors and the division surgeon, Captain Lawrence E. -Bach. Participants discussed both the major difficulties and routine -procedures involved in medical care of the wounded. Problem areas -were the high incidence of heat exhaustion, ground transportation of -the wounded, enemy artillery fire that interfered with helicopter -evacuations, and the need for increased medical support under battle -conditions. - -Regarding the last category, the surgeons noted that medical supplies -during the heavy fighting of 9–16 August were never at a dangerously -low level. The only shortage that had developed was in stretchers, due -to the normal delay in transfer of stretchers from medical stations -along the evacuation route to the company forward medical facilities. -To help combat the Chinese artillery problem, medical officers had -placed aid stations on the reverse slopes of hills. There was no -available or known solution to hastening and easing the movement of -battlefield casualties over the ground. The armored personnel carrier -offered some protection from ground fire and a ride less painful than -one in a truck, but the wheeled vehicles remained the most widely used. - -There was little that could be done about the number of heat exhaustion -cases. High temperature and humidity, vigorous activity, and the -wearing of the armored vest (and to some degree, the steel helmet), -combined to produce the casualties. All the surgeons agreed that -regardless of the number of heat casualties, the wearing of these two -items must continue. Regimental doctors credited the armored vest with -saving the lives of 17 Marines. Several other Marines, they noted, had -received only slight head wounds from bullets that had spent most of -their velocity penetrating the steel helmet. - -Helicopter evacuation saved the lives of other Marines. The doctors -credited the flying skills and bravery of the evacuation pilots -for these rescues. Immediate response to day and night calls was -instrumental in the recovery of numerous Marines. Rear Admiral Lamont -Pugh, Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy, commented upon the value of the -helicopter and on other reasons for success of medical support. After -a Far East inspection trip, which included a visit to the 1st Marine -Division during the battle of Bunker Hill, Admiral Pugh expressed the -following opinion: - - ... [I] attributed the new low record “2% mortality” of - those men wounded in action to the bullet resistant vest, to - skillful frontline surgery with availability of whole blood, - the utilization of helicopters for casualty evacuation direct - to hospital ships and rear area hospitals, and the efficient - manner in which the Hospital Corpsmen of the Navy fulfilled their - mission with the Marines.[198] - - [198] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8. - -In another logistical area, the performance was not quite -as satisfactory, for the level of supply of one important -item--illuminating shells--fell dangerously low during the Bunker -fighting. On 16 August, 3/1 reported early in the morning that -“artillery illumination was exhausted and 81mm mortar illumination -was fast diminishing.”[199] To replace the shell-produced light, the -regiment used a flare plane.[200] - - [199] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4. - - [200] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st - Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and - dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line. - 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 13 Aug 52. - -Ammunition supply appeared to be no problem to the Chinese. The rate -and frequency of mortar and artillery fire proved that the enemy had -a vast store of these shells. During the heavy fighting, the division -observed that the enemy expended approximately 17,000 mortar and -artillery rounds in the 11–16 August period of the battle. It was -noted for the first time that the Chinese used mortars primarily in -support of limited attacks. - -About the enemy’s reliance on mortars and the technique of their -employment, the 1st Marine Division reported: - - This was particularly true of his 60 and 82mm mortars, which are - easily displaced forward and shifted to alternate positions. - These light mortars were difficult to locate by our observers - mainly because of the small size and limited development of - their positions, and the fact that they are moved frequently. A - large number of enemy mortars were fired from bunkers deep in - the ground with only a narrow aperture at the top through which - to fire. There were some instances, during the Battle of Bunker - Hill, when the enemy brought his 60mm mortars out from cover on - the forward slope and set them up in the open near the crest of - the ridge. After delivering several rounds, the mortars would - then displace quickly back to a covered position. During August, - mortar fire averaged between 50 and 60 percent of the total - incoming received by the 1st Marine Division.[201] - - [201] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2. - -Further information about the Chinese was also derived at this time, -although not always directly associated with the battle. Deserters -picked up in the left sectors of the 1st and 5th Marines on 12 and -13 August and papers taken from enemy dead on the 13th confirmed -earlier-reported dispositions of Chinese units. One prisoner, from -the artillery regiment of the 118th Division, the unit facing the -major part of the 1st Marines line, indicated that another artillery -regiment had been assigned to support his division. If true, this extra -unit would account for both the increased Chinese fires in the Bunker -area and the additional artillery emplacements that photo planes had -spotted in the 118th Division sector. Infantry units of this division, -the Marines observed, introduced no new techniques or equipment during -the battle. Prior intelligence had provided the 1st Marines with -typical enemy ground attack tactics. Neither the Chinese envelopment -of Siberia, Stromboli, and Bunker nor the diversion against Hill 48A -before the main attack on Hill 122 represented a departure from normal -CCF practice. - -Nor was the earlier Marine diversion new, but unlike the Chinese -attempt, the 1st Marines tactic was successful. Just before the -maneuver, the division pulled off another strategem, described by -General Selden in a letter to General Shepherd: - - I worked a ruse that morning which proved to be very profitable. - Throughout the Eighth Army front, it had been routine to put on - a strike, this to be followed by smoke, then a good artillery - barrage, with troops following for the assault. This was done - with the exception that there were no troops. The enemy, - thinking that there were troops, opened up with everything. The - only damage inflicted was on their own forces.... While they - were firing on their own troops, we again opened fire with our - artillery, just to help the situation along.[202] - - [202] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., - dtd 14 Aug 52. - -One technique the Marines employed in the Bunker Hill battle was -defense of the reverse (protected) side of the hill. Although counter -to the usual American military practice, the reverse slope defense was -required by the intense artillery and mortar fire massed upon the front -slope defenders. As the 3/1 battalion commander later commented: - - It’s true, we suffered from the heavy incoming--but had we had to - work replacements, casualties, and supplies all the way up to the - (forward) military crest of Bunker--the losses would have been - prohibitive. With the weight of the incoming and our inability - to get greater infantry mass onto the battlefield at one time, a - conventional defense would have been far more costly ... [after] - the damage done to Baker Company in the [12 August] afternoon - attack ... had we not gone into a reverse slope defense, we could - not [have held] with the strength at hand.[203] - - [203] _Armitage ltr_ and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further - details of the Bunker Hill action, see _Armitage ltr_ in - v. V, Korean comment file. - -On the other hand, a tactical weakness of the reverse slope defense, -that “plagued us until the end of the battle,”[204] was the fact that -the 1st Marines initial gain was not more fully exploited. As the -battalion commander explained: - - [204] _Ibid._, p. 8. - - To be successful, in a reverse slope defense, the defender - must immediately counterattack, retake and reoccupy the - _forward_ slope of the position as soon as enemy pressure - diminishes. Because of the incoming and primarily because of - our overextension in regiment, we ... [employed] piecemeal - commitment ... and fed units into the battle by company, where we - should have employed our entire battalion in counterattacks to - punish the withdrawing force and restore the forward slope. To - the very end, lack of decisive strength prevented this. We stayed - on the reverse slope all the way, except for brief forays to the - forward slope.[205] - - [205] _Ibid._ - -Some officers felt, in retrospect, that a more feasible solution during -the August battle might have been to move all three battalions on -line--3/1, 1/1, and 2/1, with the reserve battalion (1/1) deployed on -a narrow front. This would have provided decisive strength on Bunker -and the MLR behind it to give greater depth counterattack capability, -and better control at the point where needed.[206] Departure from -standard doctrine by employment of the reverse slope defense furthered -the existing controversy as to the best method of ground organization -in the division sector. But it was to be some months before a change -would be effected.[207] - - [206] _Ibid._, p. 9. - - [207] As the military situation changed in Korea to become - increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition, - the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum - was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of - positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain - evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and - defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night - counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense, - and even tasks of “research into WW I--and the American - Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse - Slope defense.” _Armitage ltr._ - -Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines participating in the battle -of Bunker Hill gave up one outpost but took another, one that added -strength not only to the outpost defense but also to the main line. A -well thought-out plan and its skillful execution permitted Marines to -take the critical terrain quickly without crippling casualties. Defense -of the position on Hill 122 was complicated not so much by the Chinese -infantry action but by the intensive mortar and artillery shelling. -The Marines’ capability to defend was enhanced by close coordination -among artillery, air, and tank units. Chinese casualties, by estimate, -were 500 percent more than the losses actually suffered by the Marines. -The battle of Bunker Hill resulted in the first major Marine action -and victory in West Korea. It ushered in two straight months of hard -fighting, the most difficult ones yet for Marines on the western -front. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -Outpost Fighting Expanded - -_From the Center Sector to the Right--Early September Outpost -Clashes--Korean COPs Hit Again--More Enemy Assaults in Late -September--Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks--More PRESSURE, More -CAS, More Accomplishments--Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_ - - -_From the Center Sector to the Right_[208] - - [208] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs - 661–675, dtd 18–31 Aug 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1 - ComdDs, Aug 52. - -Following the progressively faltering Chinese attacks against Bunker -Hill in mid-August, the 1st Marines in the center MLR sector witnessed -a period of decreased enemy activity. By sunup on the 17th, Captain -Ksycewski’s Company C, from Lieutenant Colonel King’s 1st Battalion had -relieved B/1/1, marking the second complete tour of duty at Hill 122 -for Company B that month. In two days on the shell-torn crest, Company -C received only a single enemy probe and only a few rounds of artillery -and mortar fire. In the early morning hours of the 19th, D/2/1 assumed -responsibility for Bunker and Hill 124. These new occupants of the -disputed property almost immediately were subjected to larger and more -frequent Chinese probes as well as increased fire from CCF supporting -weapons. - -Enemy ground action was directed against the Marine flank, especially -the right. Four Chinese infantrymen attempted to infiltrate this corner -of the Bunker Hill defenses just before sunrise on 23 August. One even -made his way to the top of Hill 122 where he fired downhill at several -Marine defenders, wounding one. A moment later this lone Chinese’s -reconnaissance efforts was rewarded by a fatal hit from a Marine -sniper’s rifle. - -Captain Moody’s Company F next took over the two-hill complex. That -night, the 24th, the Chinese shelled the two hills and probed their -defenses but again showed no inclination to press an attack. On the -following night, however, the Chinese became more aggressive. At dusk, -two squads charged the right flank of Bunker Hill, threw hand grenades, -and fired their submachine guns briefly at the Marines. The enemy then -retired, but about an hour afterwards, a force estimated at two-company -strength assaulted the outpost defenses from the center to the right. -At the same time, enemy shells began exploding around these Marine -positions. Captain Moody called for artillery and tank fire on the -attackers. Pushing forward, the Communist infantrymen forced a small -opening in the defense perimeter; by this time, a standby platoon on -the MLR was moving forward to strengthen the Bunker garrison. Upon -arrival of the Marine reinforcements, at midnight, the Chinese soldiers -withdrew. Simultaneously, the incoming artillery and mortar fire -diminished, and in less than a half hour all firing had ceased. - -After the enemy had pulled back, Company F sent its platoon out to -reoccupy a forward listening position temporarily abandoned during the -second attack. Chinese soldiers immediately contested this advance -and, after a local fire fight, caused the Marines to retire once more. -That action ended the significant Bunker Hill action in August. In the -spirited infantry fighting and artillery dueling during the night of -25–26 August, Marines suffered 65 casualties, including 8 killed. The -Chinese losses were estimated at 100 killed and 170 wounded. Supporting -arms fire had contributed largely to the high casualty figures on both -sides. - -During August, whenever a lull had occurred in Colonel Layer’s 1st -Marines embattled sector, it almost invariably signaled a step-up -of Chinese action elsewhere along the 1st Marine Division MLR. When -frustrated in their attacks against the positions held by the 1st -Marines, the enemy invariably turned his attention to the right of the -line, manned since June by the 5th Marines. During August the Chinese -seized three outposts forward of the 2/5[209] right battalion line, -which it had been the Marine practice to man during daylight hours -only. The trio, forming a diagonal line southwest to northeast, in -front of the battalion sector were Elmer, Hilda, and Irene. - - [209] Command responsibility for this sector changed on 20 - August, when Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin - took over the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Cross. - -After dusk on 6 August the enemy had advanced to COP Elmer, on the -far southwest end, and by skillful coordination of their infantry and -supporting fires denied the position to the Marines approaching to -reoccupy the outpost early the next morning. An hour before midnight -on 11 August, another 2/5 patrol had attempted to temporarily occupy -Hilda, in the center, during the diversionary fires supporting the -Bunker Hill attack. As the Marines neared the outpost, however, they -discovered the Chinese had already occupied it. Enemy mortar and -artillery fire drove the patrol back to its own lines. - -A similar situation occurred at dawn on 17 August, when the Marine -outpost detail moved forward to occupy Irene during daylight hours -and found the Chinese already on the position. Enemy troops fired at -the Marines, pinning them down.[210] Although two rescue units were -dispatched to support the Marines, CCF fire interdicted their route of -approach. When it became evident the second reinforcement party could -not reach its objective, the outpost detail was ordered to pull back to -the MLR. The Chinese continued to occupy Irene, the last outpost lost -in August, for the remainder of the 2/5 tour on line. - - [210] To escape the murderous hostile fire, the Marines - sought shelter in a trench nearby. During the ensuing - clash, a Chinese grenade landed in the midst of the - Marines. Private First Class Robert E. Simanek, E/2/5, - unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly missile an - instant before it exploded. Although gravely wounded, his - courageous action prevented injury or death to fellow - patrol members. The following year, President Dwight D. - Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to the Detroit, - Michigan Marine for his “daring initiative and great - personal valor.” - -For the remainder of August the Chinese were apparently content to hold -what they had gained without immediately seeking additional positions. -As a result, operations along the front were mostly limited to patrol -action. Chinese infantry units, usually no larger than a squad, -regularly fired on Marine patrols, engaging them for a short period -from afar, and then quickly breaking off the contact. Seldom was this -small unit action supported by artillery or mortars. - -On two occasions late in the month, however, the Chinese showed more -spirit. Both encounters took place during the early evening hours of 22 -August when Chinese patrols came upon two different Company F ambushes -operating forward of the 2/5 sector. Heavy casualties were suffered by -both sides. - -The next day a brief but heavy period of rainfall began with nine -inches recorded between 23–25 August. Although the flooding conditions -in the division sector were not so extensive as the July rains, they -curtailed ground activity considerably and air action to a lesser -degree. Division roads were badly damaged but not trenches and bunkers, -strengthened as a result of the experience with the July floods. High -waters made the ferry inoperable at the Honker Bridge site and also -washed out Widgeon Bridge, where the Imjin crested to 42.5 feet. If -the sudden flash floods wreaked havoc with some of the Marine division -installations, the Chinese were the recipients of similar disfavors; -intelligence indicated that damage to the CCF frontline positions was -even more severe than to the JAMESTOWN defenses.[211] - - [211] 1stMarDiv PIR 669, dtd 25 Aug 52. - -The end of August saw the relief of General Selden as Commanding -General, 1st Marine Division. He was succeeded on the 29th by Major -General Edwin A. Pollock. A brief ceremony at division headquarters, -attended by senior officers of EUSAK and KMC, marked the event. Earlier -that month, in recognition of his services to the Korean defense, -President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, had awarded General -Selden the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, the highest Korean award. - -The new division commander, General Pollock[212] had commanded the -2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina just prior to his -Korean tour. He had more than 30 years of military experience. During -World War II, he had participated in no fewer than five major campaigns -in the Pacific, including the first at Guadalcanal, where he earned -a Navy Cross, and one of the war’s most costly battles, Iwo Jima. -Following the war, he had served at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in -command and staff assignments, and later at Headquarters Marine Corps -where in July 1949, he had received his first star. - - [212] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Jan - 56, rev. - - -_Early September Outpost Clashes_[213] - - [213] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1, 2/5, - 3/5 ComdDs, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 188–189, dtd 6–7 - Sep 52. - -The new division commander shortly received a first-hand demonstration -of the ferocity and persistence of the Chinese Communists opposite his -division. On 4 September, the enemy suddenly stepped up his activities -which had recently been limited to sporadic probes and occasional -artillery fire against Bunker Hill. At 2030 that date Captain Moak, -E/2/1, commanding officer at the Bunker outpost, reported that an -artillery preparation was falling on his positions. Ten minutes later -he radioed 3/1[214] that an enemy platoon was vigorously probing his -right flank. When Company E Marines returned a heavy volume of small -arms fire, the enemy retired. - - [214] Normally a component of the 2d Battalion, Company E - had been attached to the 3d Battalion on 1 September - when the company took over the Bunker Hill outpost. The - relieved Company H was then attached to 2/1, the reserve - battalion, from 1–3 September. - -This Chinese withdrawal was only temporary, for the initial probe -proved the forerunner of more serious activity. Again at 0100 on -5 September a heavy deluge of Chinese mortar and artillery began -raining on Hill 122. The intense preparation had apparently convinced -the Chinese attacking force that they had eliminated resistance at -the Marine outpost, for their soldiers walked upright toward Marine -positions, without bothering to make any attempts at concealment. After -discovering that a stout defense was still being maintained at Bunker, -the Chinese again withdrew and reorganized. - -When they resumed the attack, the Chinese used considerably greater -caution. This time, in addition to small arms, automatic weapons fire, -and a hail of grenades, their assault was supported by artillery and -mortars. The results of this concerted effort were not too rewarding, -however. Assaults on the center of Hill 122 were repulsed and attempts -to crack the left perimeter of Company E’s defenses were even more -speedily beaten back. A number of Chinese attempting to outflank the -E/2/1 defenders inadvertently strayed too far to the right of the -outpost and found themselves advancing against the MLR south of Hill -122. - -When JAMESTOWN forces engaged these wanderers by fire, the latter -quickly realized their mistake and wheeled left for a hasty retreat. -They immediately came under fire of their own troops, some of whom -had meanwhile penetrated 60 yards into the extreme right of the -Bunker positions. At this point, Captain Moak’s Company E launched -a counterattack and restored its positions on the right. This -action forced a general withdrawal of the Chinese force, which the -Marines estimated at battalion strength. Lieutenant Colonel Sidney -J. Altman[215] subsequently advised division headquarters that his -men had killed 30 enemy soldiers and estimated that as many as 305 -were probably wounded. This high rate of casualties was attributed, -in part, to the enemy’s mistaken sense of direction, their direct -walking approach which had made them easy standing targets, and to -the box-me-in artillery fires supporting the defenders. Marine losses -were 12 killed and 40 wounded, caused mostly by Chinese mortars and -artillery. - - [215] On 20 August Lieutenant Colonel Altman became the - commander of 3/1 in relief of Lieutenant Colonel Armitage. - -Although the left battalion area was the center of attention in the -1st Marines line early on 5 September, the far right sector was not -entirely neglected either. Five minutes after their initial attack -on Bunker, other Chinese units also lunged at the Hill 48A outpost, -Stromboli. An estimated reinforced platoon, supported by three active -machine guns on Hill 104, 850 yards to the north, employed submachine -guns, rifles, and grenades in their attack. This battle lasted for -nearly two hours, until the Chinese soldiers withdrew at 0240. There -were no Marine losses. No tally or estimate was made on the number -of enemy KIA or WIA. It was presumed that some of the Communists did -become casualties since the three machine guns that had been chattering -away to support the attacker’s ground action suddenly went silent after -Marines called down mortar and artillery fire on the Hill 104 positions. - -The probes of 1st Marines positions at Bunker Hill and, to a lesser -degree, at Stromboli were repeated in the 5th Marines right regimental -sector. At almost exactly the same time Colonel Eustace R. Smoak’s -regiment[216] was struck at five of its forward outposts. In the case -of OP Gary, on the right, the enemy merely shelled the position for -40 minutes. Against the four other outposts, known as Allen, Bruce, -Clarence, and Felix, the Chinese employed both fire and assault -troops. (See Map 12.) At Felix the action had begun at 0130, a half -hour later than at the adjacent outposts. The difference was probably -due to a C/1/5 ambush[217] which had engaged an enemy force operating -between Donald and Felix. After a brief five minute fire fight the -Marines broke off the action, pulling back to Felix. The other three -outposts, clustered to the left of the 3/5 sector, received the brunt -of the enemy thrust which lasted for an hour and 20 minutes before the -Communists withdrew. - - [216] Colonel Smoak had relieved Colonel Culhane on 15 August. - - [217] Although 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman) - was the regimental reserve at this time, the regiment had - assigned one company to 2/5, manning the right sector. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 12 K. WHITE - -COMBAT OUTPOSTS AND AMBUSH SITES - -5TH MARINES SECTOR - -(Division Right) - -Early September 1952] - -Employing a squad against both Allen and Clarence, and sending a -reinforced company against Bruce, the enemy alternately assaulted and -shelled the positions until 0420, after which the Communist units -policed the battlefield for casualties and withdrew to the north. - -Although there was no official estimate of enemy losses, one Marine at -outpost Bruce was credited with inflicting approximately 200 casualties -by fire from two machine guns, a carbine, and grenades. He was Private -First Class Alford L. McLaughlin, of I/3/5, who was later to receive -the Medal of Honor for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.” Another -Marine from the same company was posthumously awarded the medal. -Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia, although gravely wounded, had -thrown himself on a hostile grenade to save the life of his platoon -sergeant during the Chinese rush to take OP Bruce. - -At daybreak the I/3/5 defenders at Bruce, commanded by Captain -Edward Y. Holt, Jr., were confronted by an almost unbelievable -scene of destruction. All of the bunkers on the forward side of the -hill had been destroyed by Chinese mortar and artillery; on the -reverse slope, only two had escaped ruination. Marine losses were 32 -dead and wounded.[218] To restore the position the 3/5 commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., directed replacements forward -immediately. Carrying emergency supplies, including building materials, -the relief element reached Bruce about 1000. Evacuation of casualties -was the first task and at 1045 the relieved detail was on its way back -to the MLR. Later that day a supply party reached the outpost, having -been temporarily delayed by Chinese interdicting fire. - - [218] Still another award of the Medal of Honor was to come - out of the action that ended on 5 September. Hospitalman - Third Class Edward C. Benfold had ministered aid to - several wounded Marines and was searching for others - who needed medical attention when he saw two wounded - Marines in a shell crater. Just as he neared its edge two - grenades fell into it and two Chinese prepared to assault - the Marines. “Picking up a grenade in each hand, Benfold - leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the - onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against - their chests and killing both.... He gallantly gave his - life for his country.” Medal of Honor citation, case of - Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold, USN, - 4168234. - -Reinforcement of Bruce and the repair of its defenses were considerably -slowed by the continuous rain of enemy projectiles during daylight. -Marine and USAF pilots bombed and napalmed enemy bunkers and troops -north of JAMESTOWN in the 5th Marines sector. Ten air strikes were -executed in support of the 5th Marines that day. - -Early on 6 September, 10 minutes after midnight, long-range machine gun -fire, buttressed by artillery and mortars, hit outpost Bruce. After 35 -minutes the firing subsided, but again at 0305 the outpost experienced -a heavy rate of incoming. At about this time, the Communist soldiers -massed for an assault on the battered position. Marine defenders called -down the artillery box, and the Chinese dispersed. - -That evening, at 1915, the outpost commander reported that the Chinese -had again resumed a steady shelling of the position. The bombardment -continued for an hour. After these heavy preparatory fires, a wave of -enemy infantry began scrambling up the sides of Bruce. At the same -time, outpost Allen to the left came under long-range fire from enemy -strongholds to the west and north. After the Chinese made their initial -rush against Bruce, a second and third attack fared no better. Each was -met and repulsed by the 5th Marines. - -After the third abortive attack, a period of deathly stillness -descended upon the contested hill. Occasionally, an enemy mortar round -found its mark among the scattered, splintered bunker timbers and the -caved-in trenches, which connected the sandbag and lumber positions. -At 0145 on the 7th, the Chinese interrupted the uneasy peace that had -settled upon Bruce with a brief, heavy preparatory fire. - -Exactly an hour later, an estimated two Chinese companies advanced up -the forward slopes, using demolitions to destroy any friendly bunkers -their artillery and mortar had not earlier completely wrecked. By the -time this newest assault had raged for 30 minutes, nearly every 3/5 -defender had become a casualty. Still the Marines refused to give -ground, dealing first with the forward slope assault by the Chinese and -later with those who attempted to envelop the Marines on the reverse -side. On the MLR Marines first observed enemy flares falling between -outpost Bruce and Line JAMESTOWN. Soon thereafter the Chinese policed -the battlefield. By 0400 the Communists retired, and the fight for this -key outpost had ended in failure. - -During the 51-hour siege of Outpost Bruce, 19 Marines had been killed -and 38 wounded. At the adjacent 5th Marines outposts, additional losses -were 5 killed and 32 wounded. More than 200 enemy dead were counted. -During the last eight hours of the vicious, close-in fighting at Bruce, -it was estimated that another 200 Chinese had been wounded. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 13 K. White - -COMBAT OUTPOSTS - -KMC SECTOR - -(Division Left) - -5–7 September 1952] - -The Korean Marines, holding down the western flank of the three -mainland regimental sectors in the 1st Marine Division line, also -received a share of the enemy’s attention. At dusk on 5 September, -Chinese barrages began to smash Outpost 37,[219] the first of a trio -of positions that would merit hostile attention for the next 22 hours. -Throughout the following day the Chinese continued their mortar -and artillery fire against Outposts 37 and 36, and the regimental -observation post located on Hill 155 (also called Hill 167) to the rear -of the MLR. (See Map 13.) The heaviest enemy fire was directed against -OP 36, a small rise in the low land terrain midway between the Sachon -River, on the west and the Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line, 600 yards to -the east. - - [219] Contemporary records of the 1st KMC Regiment for - 1952–1953 identify this as Outpost 37. Current reviewer - comments refer to this hill as OP 67. LtCol Kim Yong Kyu, - ROKMC, ltr to CMC, HQMC, dtd 5 Jul 67. - -At 1605 a 50-round barrage struck OP 36. After this harassing fire -there was a lull until 1810 when Chinese artillery and mortars again -resumed a steady pounding of the three positions. One hour later enemy -soldiers hit both outposts. Twice the attacking company assaulted OP 37 -but neither effort represented, in the view of the defenders, a serious -attempt at capture. Less than a mile south at OP 36, however, the enemy -motive appeared to be quite different. - -Crossing the Sachon just north of the Freedom Gate Bridge (also known -as the highway bridge), the Communist infantry moved to assault -positions on the west, north, and northeast sides of the outpost. At -1910, the Chinese began their first rush. It was repulsed, as was a -second one. Another artillery barrage, joined this time by tank fire, -preceded the third attempt. At this point communications went out at -the besieged outpost. At 2150, a squad leader from OP 36 reached the -10th Company CP to report that his position had fallen. In 30 minutes a -communications link was reestablished with the outpost. The defending -Koreans reported that although enemy troops had overrun much of the -hill, they had subsequently withdrawn, apparently because their losses -had been so heavy. - -Casualties and damage were severe. The Korean regiment estimated -that 110 enemy had been killed or wounded. An early morning KMC -reconnaissance patrol counted 33 dead Chinese in the vicinity of OP 36. -The attacking force had also left behind much equipment, including more -than 100 grenades and several automatic weapons. No papers were found -on the dead Communist soldiers, but many propaganda leaflets had been -dropped around the outpost. Korean Marine losses at OP 36 were nine -killed and seven wounded. At OP 37 there were four casualties; at the -regimental CP, one Korean and two U.S. Marines had been killed by enemy -artillery. Chinese incoming, estimated at 2,500 rounds during the two -actions, had also caused major damage to part of the OP 36 defenses, -but inflicted less harm to the other two positions. Repairs were begun -before daylight. - - -_Korean COPS Hit Again_[220] - - [220] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts - 195–202, dtd 13–20 Sep 52. - -After the stepped-up enemy ground activity in early September, both -Chinese and Marine frontline units resumed their earlier pattern -of combat patrols, probes, and ambushes. Possession of Bunker Hill -remained the immediate objective of the enemy and his activities in -the middle of the Marine line were directed to this goal. Once again -on 9 September a marauding Chinese platoon, employing grenades and -submachine guns, sounded out the Bunker defenses, now manned by G/3/1 -(Captain William F. Whitbeck, Jr.). After a tentative investigation, -the enemy withdrew. That same day, expanded patrol and raiding -activities were undertaken by Marine line battalions. - -These sharply increased offensive measures resulted, in part, from the -Communist interest, as evinced during the summer truce negotiations, in -certain forward positions held by UNC units. On 7 September, the CG, I -Corps had alerted his division commanders to the fact that the enemy -“may attempt to seize and hold certain key terrain features ... over -which there was extensive disagreement during [the 1952 summer truce] -negotiations for the present line of demarcation.”[221] Since much of -the critical land was in his sector, Major General Kendall further -warned his division commanders “to take the necessary action within -your means to hold all terrain now occupied by your divisions.”[222] -Critical terrain features in the 1st Marine Division area of -responsibility were Bunker Hill and the height on which COP Bruce had -been established (Hill 148), in the center and right regimental sectors -respectively. - - [221] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52, App. I, # 8. - - [222] _Ibid._ - -Two days later, General Pollock amplified this directive by -underscoring the necessity for holding these two positions, plus eight -more he considered vital for sound tactical defense. These additional -positions, from west to east, were Hills 86 and 37 in the KMC sector; -Hills 56 and 48A in the center sector; and the outposts then known as -Allen, Clarence, Felix, and Jill, all the responsibility of the right -regiment.[223] - - [223] When the 7th Marines took over this sector from the 5th - in early September, the names changed to Carson, Vegas, - Detroit, and Seattle respectively. COP Bruce was also - redesignated as Reno. Since the old names of the outposts - were well known to the enemy, for purposes of security - it was decided to identify them differently. U.S. cities - were selected. - -Although the eastern part of the division main line thus contained -at this time more key hills than any other Marine sector, much of -the increase in Marine patrol and ambush activity took place in -No-Man’s-Land forward of the middle frontline regiment. Of the two -JAMESTOWN sectors manned by U.S. Marines, the one in the center of the -division area offered better ground for infantry operations. - -On the divisional western flank, the Korean Marines conducted frequent -infantry-tank patrols during the second and third weeks of September, -but the enemy opposite the KMCs initiated little ground activity. -Instead, the Chinese relied upon their supporting weapons to provide -the contact. For a seven-day period ending 19 September, a total of -2,375 enemy rounds had fallen in that regimental sector, an average of -339 per day. Nearly a third had been in the vicinity of Hill 36. - -Before sunrise on the 19th, a Chinese infantry company had crossed the -Sachon in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. Once on the east side, -the enemy soldiers concealed themselves in caves and holes, remaining -there until dusk. Then, when they came out of hiding, the Communists -held a briefing and organized themselves into three attack groups. As -these advance infantry elements approached their objective, OP 36, -other reinforcing units were prepared to seize OP 37, to the east, and -OPs 33 and 31, to the south. Artillery and mortar preparation supported -these diversionary attacks. - -The main assault was accompanied by even heavier shelling. As the three -assault units reached the bottom of the hill at OP 36, artillery, -mortars, and tanks had fired more than 400 rounds. Approaching from -the north, east, and west, the Chinese scrambled up the hill, gaining -control of the wrecked defenses by 2000. Sporadic exchanges of fire -lasted until nearly midnight. At 0115 the Korean Marines attempted -to retake the hill. The counterattack was cut short, however, upon -discovery of another enemy unit moving towards the outpost and then -only one-half mile away. Three hours later the enemy came back in -strength when a CCF platoon successfully overthrew the outpost at -0520. This new assault occurred without any warning and was so swiftly -executed that a number of the KMC defenders found themselves encircled -and trapped at their posts. Most managed to escape, but several were -captured and later evacuated when the Chinese removed their own battle -casualties. - -Another attempt to regain the outpost was made by the Koreans at 1400, -following artillery preparation and two air strikes. Three Marine -attack squadrons, VMAs-323, -121, and -212 blasted the Chinese on the -front slope of OP 36. The contour of the far side of the hill had -provided the enemy a defiladed position and safety from 1st Marine -Division organic weapons. But the MAG-12 air sorties, destroying -many CCF automatic weapons and mortars and breaking up a company -strongpoint, helped the Koreans counterattack and overrun the dazed -defenders. Two KMC platoons, supported by artillery, mortar, and tank -fire, then carried the OP after overcoming token Chinese resistance. -After the enemy vacated OP 36, he still continued to remain in the low -area to the northwest, close to the east side of the Sachon River. No -serious attempt was made by the enemy to occupy the position for the -rest of the month. - -The 20-hour clash for control of OP 36 was believed to have developed -from the Chinese ambition to occupy the position and thereby eliminate -the harassing fires from Hill 36 that had struck CCF mainline troops. -The 19–20 September attempts to wrest the outpost from Korean control -resulted in an estimated 150 Chinese casualties, including 20 counted -dead. KMC losses were placed at 16 killed, 47 wounded, and 6 missing. - -On the day that the second September battle for OP 36 had ended, the -Commandant of the Marine Corps had also just concluded his three-day -visit and inspection of General Pollock’s troops. Visiting every -battalion in the division, General Shepherd was impressed by the -morale and proficiency of the Marines, including the attached 1st KMC -Regiment. During his visit to Korea, the Marine Corps Commandant was -also presented the Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, by President Rhee. -General Shepherd ended his Korean battlefront visit after a two-day -inspection of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing units commanded by Major General -Jerome (he had received his second star on 6 August). - - -_More Enemy Assaults in Late September_[224] - - [224] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 7thMar, 2/1 ComdDs, Sep - 52. - -Even though the enemy had concentrated his strongest infantry attack -in late September against the Korean Marines, his most frequent probes -were launched against center regimental positions held by Colonel -Layer’s 1st Marines. Here the enemy was more consistent in conducting -his defense. Chinese troops doggedly held on to the northern slopes -of several Marine outposts, notably Hills 124 and 122. In this center -regimental sector, the enemy initiated several attacks, the most -significant of these occurring on the 20th. - -This action against the left sector manned by 2/1 centered about Hill -124, where Lieutenant Colonel Batterton’s battalion had established a -24-hour, squad-size outpost three days earlier. At 0345, Marines on -Hill 124 observed two green flares fired from a hill about 1,100 yards -to their front. At the same time the men of 2/1 observed numerous -figures moving about downhill from their own position. It soon became -evident that four enemy groups were converging on Hill 124 and -preparing to assault the Marine defenses which shortly came under fire -from enemy submachine guns and rifles. The main probe was a frontal -assault against Batterton’s men; it was made by about 20 Chinese and -lasted only five minutes. Afterwards, all four assault groups withdrew -but continued firing intermittently at the Marine squad. Nearly every -Marine on the hill suffered wounds, most of these minor. Enemy losses -for the action were placed at 22. - -In this same sector Marines in late September attacked the northern -slope of Hill 122, where the enemy still maintained a foothold. The -proximity of Marine defenses at Bunker Hill to enemy positions, -separated in some places by as little as 30 yards, was the cause of -frequent contact and clashes. Marines raided the enemy side of Bunker, -using demolitions and portable flamethrowers to destroy trenches and -bunkers, and their occupants. Tanks and artillery assisted in these -brief offensive actions, usually undertaken at night. Flares were used -frequently to aid in identifying and striking targets and in assessing -the results. - -It became routine during the last days of September for the Chinese -to probe the Marine defenses at the Hills 124–122 axis. There did not -appear to be a serious or determined assault to take either outpost, -however. The Marines considered the infantry probes as just another -form of harassment, although perhaps more personal and direct than -the Chinese shelling, which inflicted daily losses. On the division -right, Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines, which had moved into this sector on -7 September, found enemy activities about the same. Artillery rounds -caused the greatest number of casualties, although these attacks were -not particularly spirited. Many enemy contacts occurred during the -Marine combat patrols that largely characterized frontline operations -at the end of September. - - -_Chinese Intensify Their Outpost Attacks_[225] - - [225] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_; - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–7 Oct 52; - 1stMarDiv PIRS 706–713, dtd 1–8 Oct 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, - 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdDs, Oct 52; KMC - Regt UnitRpts 214–220, dtd 2–8 Oct. 52. - -With the beginning of October, the 1st Marine Division became aware of -certain changes that were occurring to its front. In the center sector, -for the first time in two weeks there was no significant enemy ground -activity, yet across the entire Marine front there was a build-up of -enemy shelling. Part of the increased bombardment was directed at Hill -86 in the KMC sector, one of the positions recently cited as integral -to the defense line in this area. Beginning at 2000 on 1 October, the -Chinese broadcast a warning that they would knock down the outpost -bunkers there unless the Korean Marines surrendered. When the KMCs -manning the position did not, of course, surrender in reaction to -this blatant propaganda tactic, the Chinese began showering Hill 86 -with artillery rounds. During the next 20 hours, 145 rounds fell on -and around the outpost. This incident marked the first time that the -Chinese mainline forces had carried out an announced threat. - -This type of operational tactic--first to warn, then to carry out -the threat--was not, however, the reason for the increased Chinese -shelling. Rather, as it turned out, the enemy was about to embark on -a series of limited objective attacks against the division flanks, -starting first with major outposts guarding the most critical terrain -on the MLR. The artillery and mortar fire of the 1st had been but an -initial step. At 1830 on 2 October, Communist direct fire weapons -opened up from an area 2,800 yards northwest of OP 36, lashing all the -KMC outposts within range. A tank platoon, dispatched to counter the -fire, returned at 1915 without having located the hostile emplacements. -Shortly after the tanks returned, an extremely heavy artillery barrage -again fell upon all of the KMC regimental outposts. Ten minutes later, -seemingly on the signal of one red and one green flare, the enemy guns -lifted their preparatory fires to permit an infantry attack. The ground -action simultaneously struck OPs 37, 36, and 86, the forward positions -closest to the Sachon River. - -At OP 37, the defending Korean Marine platoon fought valiantly for more -than an hour against the assault of two enemy platoons, each of which -required a company-size reinforcement before the Korean Marines were -finally ousted. Although temporarily dislodged, they reorganized at the -base of the position for a counterattack. Two counterattacks were made -the next day, the second one carrying the Koreans to the top of the -hill. Fierce enemy mortar and artillery shelling forced them to seek -the shelter of the reverse slope before again renewing their assault. -On 4–5 October, the outpost changed hands four times. At 1340 on the -latter date, a heavy enemy artillery and ground attack compelled the -KMCs to abandon their ravaged outpost; this withdrawal ended friendly -control of OP 37 for the rest of the month. - -Nearby OP 36 was also lost. In the course of the night the Korean -Marines on OP 36 turned back two Communist assaults, but fell under -the weight of the third. By sunup on 3 October, the exhausted Korean -Marines were forced to give ground; the Chinese immediately occupied OP -36 and held it. - -One more KMC outpost was to fall during the first week. OP 86 guarded -the southwestern two-thirds of the regimental sector and frequently was -the target of artillery shelling and ground attacks. This position was -also the most distant from the main line and the closest to the Sachon -River. - -The heaviest Communist attack on 2 October was against the KMC platoons -defending Hill 86. Nearly a battalion of Chinese took part in this -action, finally overpowering the outpost just before midnight. The -defenders withdrew south to the bottom of the hill, where they were -comparatively safe from enemy fire. Resting, receiving reinforcements, -and regrouping during the early morning hours of the 3d, the Korean -Marine force observed friendly artillery and air pound the outpost -preparatory to their counterattack. It was made at 1015 and succeeded, -after two hours fighting, in routing the Chinese from the outpost. - -While the enemy was counteracting the ground loss with artillery and -mortars, Marine air flushed out the Chinese, who had retreated only a -short distance from the outpost. From atop the hill, Korean Marines -witnessed many of the enemy hurriedly leaving the area under attack. -This scattering of the enemy force prevented the Chinese from launching -an immediate counterattack for control of OP 86 and gave the Korean -Marines additional time in which to prepare their defenses. At 2200 on -6 October, an enemy force of undetermined size assaulted the position -and wrested it from the Koreans before the end of the day. Early the -next morning a KMC counterattack was successful, but at 0640 the -Koreans were again compelled to withdraw, due to devastating blows from -Chinese artillery. Loss of the third key outpost during the first week -of October, ended for a time the flare-up of outpost fighting in the -left regimental sector of the division front. - -The middle part of the MLR, held in early October by the 1st Marines, -received the least enemy attention in this period. Although frequent -contacts were made with the enemy during the first part of the month, -no outposts were lost. Most of the action was minor, _i.e._, patrol -engagements and Communist probes centered around Bunker Hill and Hill -124. Late on 5 October, a combat patrol from H/3/1 became involved in -the most important ground action in Colonel Layer’s area during early -October. These Marines were surprised by a larger Chinese force lying -in wait. The ambushers held their fire until the Marine combat patrol -had cleared a small hilltop. At 2230, after a 20-minute fire fight, the -patrol withdrew to the reverse slope of the rise, called in 81mm mortar -fire, then broke contact, and returned to the MLR. There were 4 Marine -casualties, and by count, 13 dead Chinese. - -By far the greatest number of personal losses at this time occurred -in the right area held by the 7th Marines, where the Chinese began -a series of limited objective attacks against outposts guarding the -division right flank. These offensives to obtain critical terrain -in this sector, and others manned by the 1st Marine Division, would -continue intermittently right up to the brink of the cease-fire, in -July 1953. - -In early October, Colonel Moore’s troops manned nine permanent combat -outposts. (See Map 14.) Seven of these had been taken over when -the regiment relieved the 5th Marines in September. Two additional -ones--Frisco and Verdun--had been established by the 7th Marines on -the 14th and 26th, respectively. Of these nine forward positions, the -Communists chose to concentrate on four, which formed a diagonal line -roughly paralleling the center sector of the MLR at an average distance -of about 450 yards. This quartet--Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and -Warsaw--together with Verdun,[226] at the 1st Commonwealth boundary, -comprised the easternmost permanent outposts of the division. The first -four positions were, on the average, slightly lower in elevation than -the COPs in the regimental area to the west. - - [226] The outpost at the extreme right flank was given the name - “Verdun” because of its World War I connotation of “They - shall not pass.” Col. Leo J. Dulacki ltr to Hd, HistBr, - G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2 Jun 67, hereafter _Dulacki ltr_. - -The frontline contest began with little forewarning other than a -slight increase in enemy artillery and machine gun fire against -Frisco and a light probe against Detroit. At 1836 on 2 October, the -Communists launched a heavy artillery and mortar barrage against -Seattle and Warsaw, and that part of the MLR nearest Seattle. Exactly -one hour later, the preparation on the outposts lifted, permitting the -enemy attack force to strike. Not less than a company assaulted the -reinforced platoon on Warsaw, while a squad moved against the Seattle -defenders. Warsaw fell in about 45 minutes,[227] Seattle held out five -minutes longer. - - [227] During the latter stage of the fight for Warsaw, a - Chinese soldier tossed a grenade into a bunker shared by - five Marines. Private Jack W. Kelso, of I/3/7, quickly - picked up the missile and ran outside with it. As he was - throwing the grenade back to the Chinese, it went off in - his hand. Disregarding his wounds, the Marine moved back - inside the shelter, directed the other four to return to - the MLR and went outside to cover their exit. As he was - firing at the advancing Chinese soldiers, Private Kelso - was hit several times by enemy bullets. His “conspicuous - gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life” was - later recognized in the posthumous award of the Medal of - Honor. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 14 K. WHITE - -7TH MARINES SECTOR - -(Division Right) - -EARLY OCTOBER 1952] - -Immediately, plans for the recapture of both were made. At 2047, -Captain John H. Thomas dispatched a platoon from his company, I/3/7, -from the MLR to counterattack Warsaw. The platoon quickly took the -position, for the enemy had withdrawn. At Seattle, the result was -different. On 3 October, two squads from Company I departed JAMESTOWN -at 0340, but came under enemy artillery fire en route to the objective. -The squads worked their way forward nevertheless, but were unable -to take the outpost. Captain Thomas then recalled the force, which -reached JAMESTOWN at dawn. Later that day, just before dusk, air and -artillery placed a smoke screen on Seattle while two squads advanced -toward the outpost. When the counterattack met stiff resistance, a -squad-size reinforcement[228] was sent from the MLR. Together the -three units attempted to retake the position, but were forced to pull -back because of heavy casualties. As the infantry again regrouped, -Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis, Jr.’s 2/11 fired preparatory barrages -on the Chinese occupying Seattle. At 2225 the Marines assaulted the -outpost again; as before, overpowering Chinese artillery and grenades -inflicted such high casualties that the counterattackers were compelled -to withdraw. - - [228] This squad was from Company A (Captain Frederick C. - McLaughlin), which came under the operational control of - 3/7 at 1130 on 3 October, relieving Company C (Captain - Paul B. Byrum). The latter company had reported to the 3d - Battalion from regimental reserve at 2130 the previous - day. Company D was sent immediately to reinforce the - hard-pressed Company I. - -By this time, action at the two outposts had resulted in 101 Marine -casualties, including 13 killed. By sundown on 3 October, the regiment -had been forced off the two COPs and had been able to retake only one -of them. Against Warsaw, the one that the Marines had recaptured, the -Chinese immediately launched a counterattack. At 0145 on 4 October -a platoon struck the position. This time the Warsaw garrison held, -inflicting losses on the CCF and receiving none. The Chinese made an -unsuccessful attempt against Frisco at 2300 on 5 October, when a squad -attempted to drive the Marines from the outpost. - -The enemy’s repeated attacks and apparent determination to seize -commanding terrain, plus the heavy casualties suffered by 3/7, led the -7th Marines to reinforce its MLR at 1200 on 5 October. At this time the -right battalion sector then held by 3/7, was split into two sectors and -the regimental reserve, 1/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki) took -over the far right of the 3/7 line, assuming responsibility for Warsaw -and Verdun.[229] The 7th Marines thus had all three of its battalions -on line with the regimental front manned, from the left, by 2/7, 3/7, -and 1/7. - - [229] At the same time one company, I/3/7, became the - regimental reserve, having been relieved on the MLR at - 1500 the previous day by A/1/7. - -During the next 30 hours, the Communists launched a series of strong -probing actions against the regimental outposts of the 7th Marines. -Although the numerical strength used in these widespread limited -objective attacks did not exceed that employed in previous large-scale -outpost offensives, the scope of the operation on 6 and 7 October and -the well-coordinated attacks indicated careful and detailed planning. -Each move against the five outposts and two MLR positions attacked -was preceded by unusually close attention to artillery and mortar -preparation. This was to a degree unprecedented even when measured -against those massive concentrations that had characterized Communist -operations since the Chinese intervention in the war late in 1950. - -Prior to the Communist general attack, the Marines made another attempt -to retake Seattle. Leaving JAMESTOWN at 0600 on 6 October, a C/1/7 -reinforced platoon was halted by solid resistance in the form of -exploding artillery and mortar rounds. The forces returned to the MLR, -reorganized, and jumped off again. At 0815, a two-squad reinforcement -was dispatched from the main line. Meanwhile, the enemy, estimated -at platoon reinforced strength, doubled his garrison, using troops -from his outpost line. By 0900, a heavy fire fight was in progress, -supported by artillery and mortars on both sides. Marines called on -air in support of the attack, but the combined air and infantry action -was unable to penetrate enemy defenses. Finally, at 1100, after five -hours of close heavy fighting, the Marines broke contact and retired, -bringing with them 12 dead and 44 wounded. Estimates of enemy losses -totaled 71. - -That evening, at dusk, artillery and mortar fire began falling on -outpost positions across the entire regimental front and at two -locations on the MLR. At the same time an estimated Chinese reinforced -battalion in a coordinated effort advanced toward the Marine line -and at 1930 assaulted the seven positions that had just been under -artillery preparation. By midnight an estimated 4,300 rounds of -artillery fire and 104 rounds of counterbattery fire had fallen on -Marine positions. In the regimental left manned by 2/7 (Lieutenant -Colonel Caputo) the attacks appeared to be more of a diversion--merely -probes by small units, which showed little inclination to press the -attack. Carson, the most western COP held by the regiment, reported -that the enemy soldiers withdrew at 2050. Two hours later Reno, the -next outpost to the east, radioed to the MLR that the Chinese had just -ceased their attacks at that forward post. A total of 12 Marines were -wounded in these two actions. - -On the far right, in Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector, a reinforced -CCF platoon poured over the Warsaw defenses at 1930. Immediately -the outpost Marines called for the friendly artillery box. As these -protective fires were being delivered all communication at the outpost -was severed by hostile fire. Enemy artillery continued at a heavy rate. -By 2000, however, communication was reestablished between the COP and -MLR. The first message from the besieged outpost was a request for more -artillery. With additional fire support and continued stiff outpost -resistance, the Chinese at 2055 relinquished their quest to regain -Warsaw. - -The enemy’s most determined assaults on the night of 6–7 October were -made upon a pair of outposts, Detroit and Frisco, manned by the middle -battalion, 3/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell). Two JAMESTOWN -areas in this sector were also attacked, but only briefly. The assault -against the outposts was executed by a Chinese battalion which sent one -company against Detroit and another against Frisco, east of Detroit. -Both outposts were manned by two squads of Marines. - -At Detroit, the Company G Marines reported that the initial attack -made at 1940 on 6 October by a Chinese company had been rebuffed. The -enemy did succeed, however, in advancing to the outpost trenchline. -Strong defensive fires prevented him from exploiting this initial gain -by occupying any of the bunkers, and the attackers were forced to pull -back. After regrouping, the Chinese returned at 2100 and again were -able to secure a foothold at the main trench. - -Marine artillery assisted the outpost defenders in repulsing this -new attack, but not before Chinese interdictory fires had disrupted -all communications between the COP and its MLR support company. Some -Chinese had also moved south in the vicinity of the MLR, but these -attacks were neither persistent nor heavily supported. At 2115 the last -of the enemy intruders had withdrawn from the MLR. At about this same -time, 3/7 heard Detroit request overhead VT fires, but shortly after -this the battalion again lost contact with the outpost. - -Two squads were then sent out to reinforce the position. They were -stopped, however, by heavy Chinese artillery barrages. At the outpost, -Marine artillery fires had forced the Chinese to retreat, but at 0015 -the enemy reappeared at the trenchline. The artillery regiment once -again applied the overhead fire remedy, but with less success--the -Chinese, neither retreating nor advancing, took cover in the trenches. -During the long night, attempts to reestablish communications with -Detroit had proved fruitless, although battalion radio operators -reported that they had heard Chinese language coming over one of the -Marine radio nets used by the COP. A six-man reconnaissance detail was -sent forward to investigate. It returned at 0355 with the information -that Detroit was now held by the enemy. Two wounded Marines had -escaped; the rest of the Detroit garrison had fallen to the enemy. At -0630 the Marines withdrew after heavy fighting that had lasted more -than 10 hours. - -During the earlier part of the night, while the battle for outpost -control raged at Detroit, reinforcements had also been dispatched to -Frisco to help stabilize the situation at this adjacent Company H/3/7 -outpost. Like Detroit, it had been attacked by a Chinese company, -beginning about 2000. An hour and a half later some of the enemy had -made their way into the trenchline, but were repulsed with the help of -friendly artillery VT. Shortly after midnight the enemy again probed -Frisco and reached the trenchline. At 0115, two squads jumped off from -JAMESTOWN, but a rain of Chinese artillery interrupted their progress. -Throughout the early morning hours of 7 October, Company H and I units -were sent out from the MLR to buttress the Frisco defense and stem the -enemy attack. At 0510, a reinforced platoon from the reserve company -was sent to renew the counterattack. It was this Company I unit that -finally restored control of the COP to the Marines.[230] Another -reinforcing platoon arrived at the outpost just as the Marines there -had evicted the remaining Chinese assault forces. At 0715, 7 October, -Frisco was declared secure. - - [230] During the predawn attempt to retake Frisco on 7 October, - Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, I/3/7, although already - wounded, led his rifle platoon in the assault against - Frisco. When an enemy machine gun impeded their progress, - Staff Sergeant Watkins grabbed a wounded man’s automatic - rifle to help get the assault moving forward again. At - that instant, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the - Marines. Staff Sergeant Watkins immediately seized it. - Just as he was about to hurl it away it exploded in his - hand. The grenade took the sergeant’s life but he had - saved his fellow Marines. For his bravery Staff Sergeant - Watkins was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. - -Its precarious position, however, demanded either an investment of more -outpost troops to retain possession of it or else its abandonment, in -conjunction with other measures to neutralize loss of the position. -At 1804 that day the latter course was instituted. The 7th Marines -reported that the enemy had suffered an estimated 200 KIA and unknown -WIA as a result of the bitterly contested outpost attacks on 6–7 -October. Marine casualties were listed as 10 killed, 22 missing, 105 -wounded and evacuated, and 23 not-seriously wounded. - -In all, during the first week in October, the 1st Marine Division gave -up six outposts, or forward positions, that had been sited on some of -the commanding ground in the Marine area. On the division left, COPs -37, 36, and 86 were the ones most removed from the Korean MLR and thus -easily susceptible to being overrun by the enemy at will and to his -early reinforcement.[231] The division theorized that near winter and -the subsequent freezing of the Sachon would facilitate the movement -of Chinese troops and supplies across the river to new positions. -The enemy was now able to operate patrols east of the river without -interference. At the opposite side of the division MLR, on its right -flank, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle had been lost. By gaining this -string of outposts, the enemy was better able to exert pressure against -other Marine positions forward of the line and the critical ground on -JAMESTOWN. - - [231] FMFPac, _1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52_. - -To counter this threat, General Pollock strengthened the outposts close -to the MLR and increased his patrolling requirements. It was decided -that in some cases the mission of the COP--that of providing early -warning of impending attack and slowing it down--could be accomplished -as effectively by using patrols and listening posts at night. - -By these activities, the Marines hoped to minimize the Chinese gains -and prevent the launching of new attacks against either division COPs -or JAMESTOWN. The serious situation on the outposts was compounded by -existing political considerations, which prevented the Marines from -initiating any real offensive campaigns. Moreover, any hill taken was -invariably backed up by a still higher one, controlled by the enemy. -The key factor was not so much holding an individual outpost as it was -to insure that the enemy was unable to penetrate the JAMESTOWN line. - - -_More_ PRESSURE, _More CAS, More Accomplishments_[232] - - [232] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW - ComdDs, Jun-Oct 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, Jun, Sep 52; MAG-33 - ComdD, Aug 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Sep 52; VMA-312 ComdDs, - Sep-Oct 52; VMA-323 ComdDs, Jun-Jul, Sep 52; VMF(N)-513 - ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52; VMJ-1 ComdD, Jul 52; Cagle and - Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Field, - _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Rees, _Korea_. - -Some of the enemy ground pressure against the outposts in September -and October had been relieved by the increase in the number of air -strikes received by the 1st Marine Division. De-emphasis of the Air -Force interdiction strategy in favor of striking the enemy wherever -(and whenever) it hurt him most had made available more aircraft for -close support of ground operations.[233] The UN commander, General -Clark, who had given the green light to the shift in USAF policy and -targets, followed the giant hydroelectric strike in June with a mass -attack the next month on 30 military targets located near the North -Korean Capital. During a year’s freedom from air attack (July 1951-July -1952) Pyongyang had become not only the major logistics center for -combat equipment and personnel but also the focal point for command and -control of Communist ground and air defense efforts. - - [233] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then - Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that “the - Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division - requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The - Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be - the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air - in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements - that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC - constituted a major factor in Wing response.” _Jack ltr._ - -Designated Operation PRESSURE PUMP, the 11 July strike against -Pyongyang called for three separate attacks during daylight and a -fourth at night. This extended time over the target would give enemy -fighters more than ample time to take to the skies in defense of the -Capital. Because Pyongyang “was defended by 48 guns and more than -100 automatic weapons, making it one of the worst ‘flak traps’ in -Korea,”[234] there was considerable hazard in the operation. Added -danger to the pilots resulted from the decision to forewarn the North -Korean civilian population of the air assault. General Clark explained -the reason for dropping warning leaflets prior to the attack on -Pyongyang: - - [234] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482. - - The objective was in part humanitarian and in part practical. We - had to hit Pyongyang because the Communists had made it a major - military headquarters and stockpile area. We wanted to warn the - people away from danger areas. By warning them away we disrupted - their daily lives and made it difficult for the Communists to - maintain any kind of schedules in their work in the city.[235] - - [235] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 208–209. - -Results indicated that both the destructive and the psychological -aspects of the mission were successful. American, British, and ROK -planes completely destroyed 3 of the 30 military targets attacked. Of -the rest, only two escaped major damage: - - According to ... reports, the North Korean Ministry of Industry’s - underground offices were destroyed and a direct hit on another - shelter was said to have killed 400 to 500 Communist officials. - Off the air for two days, Radio Pyongyang finally announced - that the ‘brutal’ strikes had destroyed 1,500 buildings and had - inflicted 7,000 casualties.[236] - - [236] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 482. - -Of the far-reaching effect of the leaflets, the UN commander later -wrote: - - The warning leaflets, coupled with the bombing, hurt North Korean - civilian morale badly. The very audacity of the United Nations - in warning the Communists where bombers would strike hurt morale - because it emphasized to the North Koreans just how complete was - UN mastery of the air. Contrarily, it made them see even more - clearly that the Communists were ineffectual in their efforts to - ward off our air blows.... - - As a result of the warnings, the bombings, the failure of - the Communists to provide protection, and the refusal of the - Communists to permit evacuation of the clearly defined target - areas, civilian resentment was channeled away from the UNC - bombers and towards the Communist rulers.[237] - - [237] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 209. “I told you so” leaflets - were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants - with the importance of believing the warning leaflets. - USAF, _Ops in Korea_, No. 127, pp. 36, 37. - -The record set by the 1,254 sorties flown in this 11 July operation was -to last only seven weeks. On 29 August, 1,403 sorties were employed in -a new strike against the Capital. The massed raids against military -targets in Pyongyang, known as the “All United Nations Air Effort” -turned out to be the largest one-day air assault during the entire -three years of the Korean War. Again attacking at four-hour intervals -three times during daylight, Allied aircraft blasted a list of targets -that “read like a guide to public offices in Pyongyang and included -such points of interest as the Ministry of Rail Transportation, the -Munitions Bureau, Radio Pyongyang, plus many factories, warehouses, -and troop billets.”[238] Of the 45 military targets in the city, 31 -received moderate-to-severe damage according to post-strike photographs. - - [238] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 489. - -Substitution of the previous interdiction strategy by PRESSURE attacks -brought increased close air support to frontline troops. As a result -of this expanded number of CAS sorties, wing pilots and ground forward -air controllers greatly increased their operational proficiency.[239] -The Marines were still not satisfied with the close support picture, -however, and neither were a number of U.S. Army commanders. Some of the -latter regarded General Clark as the champion of more extensive close -air support missions for frontline units, but he quickly dispelled -this view. Instead, he cautioned these supporters of Marine-type close -air support to accept the existing procedures, which were derived from -the “vast reservoir of experience ... [representing] the composite view -of senior members of the Armed Forces [with] the longest and most -responsible experience in close support during World War II.”[240] At -the same time the UN commander, on 11 August 1952, had advised his -force commanders to study the factors affecting the close air support -situation in Korea and comment on certain UNC proposals for improving -the CAS system. - - [239] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-53. - - [240] _Ibid._, p. 9-143. - -In the close air support picture for the Marines, October was a bright -month. In the outpost battles of early October, the 1st MAW put 319 -sorties in the air during both day and night to strike, strafe, bomb, -and burn enemy positions and troops facing General Pollock’s division. -A new level of achievement had been reached during the Bunker Hill -battle in August. That month nearly 1,000 aircraft, predominantly -Marine, loosed ordnance at targets on and near the Chinese MLR and OPLR. - -During the first six months of Marine ground operations in defense of -JAMESTOWN, wing squadrons and pilots had made major contributions to -the U.S. air effort in Korea. On 7 June 1952, First Lieutenant John W. -Andre, VMF(N)-513, piloting a World War II model Corsair on a night -armed reconnaissance mission over the west coast of North Korea, shot -down an enemy piston-driven Yak fighter. It was the first time that a -Russian-built plane of that model had been knocked out of the skies at -night by another plane. This aircraft was also the fifth kill for the -lieutenant, making him the first Marine nightfighter ace in Korea.[241] - - [241] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who - shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and 14 July - 1945. Sherrod, _Marine Aviation_, p. 404. Lieutenant - Andre’s first four planes were also downed during World - War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the - Korean War. - -Nearly three months after that record, another one emerged: the first -Marine to down an enemy jet with a propeller-driven aircraft. Late -on the afternoon of 10 September, Captain Jesse G. Folmar and First -Lieutenant Willie L. Daniels, both of VMA-312, had taken off from the -_Sicily_ to attack an enemy troop concentration reported to be south -of Chinnampo, on the west coast just below the 39th Parallel. Shortly -after reaching the vicinity of the target, the Marine Corsairs were -jumped by a pair of MIG-15s. Two more Russian-made jets tore into the -fight. During a fast exchange of cannon and machine gun fire, the -Marine captain was able to score lethal hits on one of the MIGs. When -four more of them picked up the chase, the vastly outnumbered Marines -broke for home, heading westward in a diving turn. - -Captain Folmar’s return to the _Sicily_ was delayed almost immediately: - - I had just started picking up good diving speed when I saw balls - of tracer ammo passing on my left and at the same instant felt a - severe explosion in my left wing ... I saw that the left aileron - and four feet of my left wing were gone.[242] - - [242] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52. - -This damage caused the plane to rapidly go out of control. While still -able to maneuver, the Marine aviator headed for the sea and as he -neared it, bailed out of his Corsair and parachuted into the ocean. -A rescue plane out of Cho-do picked him up and returned the captain, -who had sustained a slight shoulder injury, to the carrier. Lieutenant -Daniels, who had alerted the rescue force, circled his descending -flight leader until he hit the water. After ascertaining that the -waterborne flier’s condition was satisfactory, the lieutenant turned -his plane towards the _Sicily_. In a short while he was safely home. - -In late September, Major Alexander J. Gillis, VMF-311, assigned earlier -that summer to the Air Force’s 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, -4th Fighter Group, as an exchange pilot.[243] distinguished himself -by becoming not only the first naval aviator to destroy three enemy -aircraft in Korea but also the second one to get a multiple killing -in a single day.[244] Flying in a four-plane Sabrejet formation near -the vicinity of the mouth of the Yalu on 28 September, Major Gillis -led another plane after two MIG-15s. By superior pilot technique and -aggressive tactics, he forced one of the enemy to crash during a low -altitude chase. Later on during the sortie, the Marine initiated an -attack on a solo MIG, closing on it and scoring hits that caused the -plane to become uncontrollable and the pilot to eject. Major Gillis -also had to eject from his F-86 after it became disabled by the MIG. -The incident had occurred on the Marine aviator’s 50th combat mission -with the Air Force. He spent nearly four hours in the Yellow Sea before -a rescue helicopter picked him up. - - [243] The exchange program “appears to have originated with the - participation--at Tactical Air Command’s invitation--of - two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots ... in the fall - of 1947.” Within two years, the program designed to - “indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the - air operational and air training activities of each - other’s service, had received Department of Defense - approval.” On 1 October 1949 the program went into - effect. Initially the exchange period was one year, - but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period - was reduced to approximately three months. Marine - participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF - (AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67 - in v. V, Korean comment file. - - [244] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15. - -Another feat, this one a study in determination and perseverance, -had occurred early in the summer. On 22 July, the VMJ-1 commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Vernon O. Ullman, had taken to the air for a photo -mission over North Korea in the vicinity of Sinanju, located near -the Yellow Sea 40 miles above Pyongyang. During the first of seven -scheduled flights, he encountered heavy flak but nevertheless completed -his first mapping run in the area. Further, the Marine flier decided -that the antiaircraft menace was not going to force him to abandon the -remaining part of his task. He continued. On the second of his seven -runs, some 40 enemy jets (MIG-15s) appeared on the scene. These were -dissuaded from close-in interference, however, by the photo escort of -24 USAF single-engine Sabrejet fighters. Thereafter, the Russian-made -aircraft disappeared; Lieutenant Colonel Ullman continued, despite -the intense, accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, until he concluded his -mission. - -The type of determination displayed by Lieutenant Colonel Ullman -helped Marine tactical squadrons achieve some kind of distinction -nearly every month from late spring to the fall of 1952. In May, -VMF-323 (“the Death Rattlers”), then commanded by Major William A. -Weir, established a squadron one-month record for number of combat -sorties, 1,160, and total combat hours, 2,362.7. A high percentage of -aircraft availability, 95.6, helped make this mark possible. On 1 June, -VMA-312 received the congratulations of CTF 95 for its “outstanding -performance under difficult conditions” during the spring months. -During this period the squadron, based on board the USS _Bataan_, -had been particularly hampered by excessive turnover of key squadron -officers and flight leaders. This continual squadron rotation resulted -in considerable variation in pilot indoctrination and need for field -carrier landing qualification, due to the “close tolerances in pilot -skill required by carrier operations.”[245] Despite these difficulties, -VMA-312 had scored an impressive 80-sortie mission, flown by 24 -aircraft, on 18 April. - - [245] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77. - -Additional recognition of professional excellence was conferred upon -Marine squadrons in July. On the 17th, the senior advisor to the -ROK I Corps expressed the gratitude of the corps commander for the -magnificent support the 1st MAW pilots had provided during the second -week of the month. All four attack squadrons in MAG-12 and both fighter -units in MAG-33 had taken part in these CAS missions. A week later, -eight planes from Lieutenant Colonel Henry S. Miller’s VMA-323, (which, -along with Lieutenant Colonel Graham H. Benson’s VMA-212, had been -redesignated from fighter to attack squadrons the previous month), -completed an unusually successful interdiction mission at Hago. - -Located 25 miles northwest of Kaesong, the village reportedly was -the site of heavy troop concentrations, active mortar positions, and -antitank weapons. Leaving K-6 at 1725, the eight Marine VMA-323 pilots -were soon over the target. Comprising the Death Rattler’s flight were -Majors John M. Dufford, Raymond C. Holben, William H. Irvin, Jr., and -Curtis E. Knudson; Captain John Church, Jr.; First Lieutenant William -A. Poe, Jr.; and Second Lieutenants Stuart L. Spurlock and James S. -Thompson. At 1810 their attacks were launched, using 1,000-pound bombs, -napalm, rockets, and 20mm ammunition. The strike was over almost as -soon as it had started, and when the Marines departed, not one building -remained in useful condition. But it was not until several days later -that the final results of the strike were known. Intelligence sources -reported that the raid had caught the enemy troops at the evening meal; -more than 500 had been killed by the Corsairs, aptly called “Whistling -Death” by the Japanese in World War II. - -For the remainder of the summer and into the fall Marine groups and -squadrons continued their record-breaking and efficient support of -ground troops and naval forces. With four squadrons (two day, one -night-fighter, and one photo), MAG-33 sent 141 sorties against the -enemy on 6 August. This one-day group record occurred just before -the departure of Colonel Condon, who turned over the reins of the -organization to Colonel Herbert H. Williamson on the 11th, and then -took command of MAG-12. - -Shortly before Colonel Condon relinquished command, he was particularly -pleased by the success of a four-plane strike by VMF-311 (Major William -J. Sims) in support of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division commanded by -Brigadier General Samuel T. Williams. Major Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., -strike leader, was accompanied in this flight by Captain George R. -Brier and Second Lieutenants Charles E. Pangburn and Whitlock N. -Sharpe. Up until this time the infantry had been particularly harassed -by several enemy frontline fortifications and supporting artillery. The -four pilots destroyed three bunkers and two heavy guns and also caved -in approximately 50 feet of trenchline on the 7 August strike. Upon -learning of the success of the Marine pilots and the conditions under -which the attacks were carried out--dangerous terrain and constant -ground fire directed towards the planes--the general dispatched a -letter, commending the “skill, courage, and determination displayed by -these pilots....”[246] - - [246] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16. - -Another congratulatory message was received in September, this one -from General Pollock for the excellent support given by MAG-12 on the -20th. With three attack squadrons participating, Colonel Condon’s group -had neutralized Chinese weapons and troops at OP 36 to help prevent -a takeover of the Korean position. The pilots reported well over -100 Chinese casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Chamberlain’s -VMA-323 contributed most of the 23 Marine sorties. The other attacking -squadrons were VMA-121 (Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Cargill, who 10 -days earlier had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Crawford), and VMA-212, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maurice W. Fletcher. - -September was a month of mixed fortunes in the air war over Korea. -The successful CAS strikes of the 20th followed only a few days after -another high point set on 14 September, when Lieutenant Colonel -Cargill’s attack squadron flew its 5,000th combat sortie since -arrival in the Korean theater in October 1951. Then on 15 September, -General Jerome commissioned a new kind of unit in the wing, Marine -Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1), whose mission was to provide electronic -counter-measures (ECM) for UN aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence F. -Fox headed the squadron, the only one in the naval service with an ECM -primary mission in Korea. - -Three days after the commissioning, a strange incident transpired. -North of the UN line and at an altitude of 9,500 feet, a F-84 -Thunderjet fighter, with U.S. Air Force markings and insignia, attacked -a propeller-driven Air Force trainer. The slower plane immediately -began defensive maneuvering, flying in tight circles. After making five -turns, the trainer pilot saw the supposedly friendly jet fly off. - -It was believed that such a paradoxical occurrence was due to -the substantial number of F-84 losses and the enemy’s ability to -piece together and fly an aircraft of that model. A few similar -episodes--attacks by apparently friendly aircraft on UN planes--had -previously taken place. In each case, the impostor was a model of U.S. -aircraft that had suffered particularly heavy losses. - -Another incident in September had dire consequences. On the 10th, -MAG-33 dispatched 22 fighter aircraft from VMF-115 (Lieutenant Colonel -Royce W. Coln) to attack reported troop concentrations near Sariwon, 35 -miles directly south of Pyongyang. The F9F Panther jets had completed -the strike and were returning to their K-3 base when they were diverted -to land at K-2, Taegu, where the weather was better. Fog had suddenly -swept over the field at K-3, reducing visibility to zero. Sixteen -Panthers landed safely at K-2, 45 miles southwest of the Marine field -at Pohang. The remaining six, piloted by Majors Raymond E. Demers and -Donald F. Givens, First Lieutenant Alvin R. Bourgeois, and by Second -Lieutenants John W. Hill, Jr., Carl R. Lafleur, and Richard L. Roth, -flying in formation in poor weather, crashed into the side of a -3,000-foot mountain while descending.[247] They would have required -only an additional 600 feet of altitude to clear the summit. - - [247] Although not definitely proven, there were “some - indications of false radio beacons being used by the - enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area.” _Jack - ltr._ - -Losses of Marine pilots and aircraft had been of growing concern to the -wing command. The initial success of the flak suppression fires had -eliminated the one successful Communist source of air defense, accurate -antiaircraft firing. One result was that noncombat accidents for a -while during the summer became the principal cause of pilot and plane -attrition. To help reduce these operational accidents as well as the -combat losses, the two Marine air groups instituted squadron training -programs and also directed the adoption of several new corrective -procedures. In MAG-12, for example, a study of results from the FAF -policy that limited bombing runs to one for interdiction and two for -CAS targets revealed a sharp reduction in hits from flak. Tactical -squadron commanders in MAG-12 drew up a syllabus during September to -test proposed defensive tactics for their propeller aircraft to employ -against enemy jets. The carrier squadron, VMA-312, began that same -month the additional practice of field carrier landing qualification at -K-6 for new pilots before permitting them to operate from the carriers. - -In spite of these efforts, pilot losses spiralled alarmingly in -October. For the rest of 1952, the monthly totals remained near that -month’s level. On the other hand, aircraft losses during October -dropped sharply to 10 from the September total of 22. This lower figure -was not to be exceeded until May 1953. These remedial procedures were -considered at least partially responsible for the substantial decrease -in aircraft losses. - -In another area, a mid-October landing at Kojo, on the east coast -immediately south of the 39th Parallel, did not work out as planned. -The amphibious operation was in reality a feint intended to draw troops -away from frontline positions and expose them to naval air and gunfire -as they rushed in reinforcements. The enemy failed to rise to the bait, -and actually only a few Communist troops were sighted. VMA-312 provided -armed reconnaissance, tactical air operation, and naval gunfire -spotting during the feint. Although they made little enemy contact, the -Marine “Checkerboard” pilots operating off the _Sicily_ gained much -experience in landings and take-offs under the adverse conditions of -rough seas and high winds. - - -_Rockets, Resupply, and Radios_[248] - - [248] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st - MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52. - -Through October 1952, operational control of Korean based Marine -fighter and attack squadrons was still vested in commanders other than -General Jerome. Tactical squadrons continued to be directed by the FAF -or Navy in their missions; the observation and helicopter squadrons -were under operational control of the 1st Marine Division and utilized, -as before, at its discretion. - -HMR-161, commanded since 8 August by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Carey, -continued its primary mission of evaluating rotary wing aircraft -and their methods of employment. One tactical innovation, movement -of elements of the 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, was undertaken during -August soon after the Bunker Hill battle. With ground-fired rockets, -the problem of a tell-tale cloud of dust and brilliant flash of the -rockets after each salvo had always plagued the artillerymen. This -seldom went unnoticed by the enemy, who often showered the marked area -with counterbattery fire. On 19 and 20 August, in Operation RIPPLE, -HMR-161 and the rocket battery proved that these two units could -successfully shoot and scoot to a new location and fire effectively -again without drawing an enemy reprisal. This Marine Corps innovation -in air mobility--the first displacement of field artillery under combat -conditions--offered a major time-saving advantage. Whereas previously -it took approximately a half-hour for rocket launchers to move from -their bivouac area to firing position,[249] deployment by helicopter -could be made in a matter of minutes, a time factor that could be -critical in event of an enemy attempted breakthrough. - - [249] _Henderson ltr III._ - -The operation demonstrated that helicopters not only could transport -rocket crews with weapons and ammunition to firing areas far more -rapidly than conventional wheeled vehicles, but that the rotary craft -could airlift these weapons into places inaccessible by road. The -nature of the mountainous terrain proved advantageous in that hills -and valleys provided defiladed areas for loading and firing the weapons -as well as protected routes for helicopter movements. An observation -made by pilots for operations in other types of environment, not -offering as much cover and concealment, was that the shiny blue paint -on their birds would make detection easy in most surroundings and that -camouflage paint would lessen the risk from enemy AA. - -Transport helicopters of HMR-161 continued to augment those of VMO-6 in -casualty evacuation and ferrying Marines and other frontline troops. -The observation squadron maintained its policy and outstanding record -of emergency flights of the wounded under any weather conditions except -dense fog (electronic navigational aids still were not available). In -August, various mechanical failures developed among the newly received -HO5S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. These three-place observation aircraft -were underpowered but superior in many flight characteristics to the -HTL-4 helicopters then in the squadron. Mechanical difficulties with -the newer aircraft increased until it became necessary to ground them -late in October until replacement parts became available in the supply -system. - -Employment of transport helicopters for logistical support continued -to be a principal use of such rotary wing aircraft as the end of -1952 approached. Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory -that this versatile aircraft could resupply a battalion manning the -MLR. The next step was to determine if the logistical support for an -entire combat regiment could be accomplished by helicopter. Operation -HAYLIFT, conducted during 22–26 September, the last of five operations -that month for HMR-161, was to test and evaluate helicopter resupply -of Colonel Moore’s 7th Marines. Plans called for delivering all -Class I, III, and V items and such Class II and IV items as could be -accommodated. Two loading and four unloading sites were prescribed. -All but extremely valuable cargo, such as mail, was to be carried -externally in slings or wire baskets. - -HAYLIFT did show that at least for a short period of time--five days--a -helicopter squadron, utilizing 40 percent of its aircraft, could -sustain a MLR regiment. Following the general procedures employed -previously with the battalion, HMR-161 found that no great changes were -necessary for resupply of the regiment. Two recommendations emerged -from an evaluation of HAYLIFT. One stressed the need for establishment -of an operations center manned by representatives of each unit -participating in the exercise. The second called for development of -a more flexible loading system, one that would permit rapid weight -increases or decreases of 50 pound increments, as the situation -demanded. Such a method would make possible a more efficient payload -for each lift.[250] - - [250] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard - cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each - preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other - hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As - the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase - in cargo could have been carried. - -Transport on a larger scale in the 1st MAW was accomplished by General -Jerome’s few transport aircraft reinforced by the eight R5Ds from the -VMR-152 detachment. In June, the passenger-carrying operations reached -the peak for the entire Korean War; that month, 17,490 troops and -military-associated civilians utilized the reinforced wing transport -aircraft. June 1952 was also the second busiest month in freight -transportation (7,397,824 pounds, nearly double the figure for June -1951). - -Squadrons that were unable to better their performance records in some -cases could trace their trouble to the inability to get all of their -planes off the ground. Several models were subject to spare parts -shortages.[251] New aircraft, the F3D-2s and the AU-1s received in -June by VMF(N)-513 and VMA-212, respectively, had preceded an adequate -stocking of normal replacements for worn out or defective parts. The -night fighter squadron was handicapped also by introduction into the -supply system of inadequate radio tubes, which burned out rapidly. The -most critical shortage, however, was parts for starter units of jet -engines. This deficiency was not corrected until summer. One problem -never quite eliminated was the confusion of supply orders intended for -the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6. It was believed that the close -resemblance of Sikorsky HRS and HO5S part numbers and nomenclatures had -caused the improperly-marked requisitions and mix-up. - - [251] Spare parts shortages are “inherent in the introduction - of new equipment into the field and prior to the - development of usage data.” a major effort was made at - this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts - support by improved stock control procedures and complete - inventory. _Jack ltr._ - -The 1st Marine Division logistical situation during the summer and fall -of 1952 was generally excellent. General Pollock’s units did not suffer -from the shortage of spare parts experienced by the 1st MAW whose -aircraft sometimes had to be grounded because of a missing spare part. -U.S. Army support in the replacement of worn-out Marine vehicles for -new Army ones proved satisfactory. No major problems arose in engineer -support. Medical evacuation and treatment and the level of supplies in -the five companies of the 1st Medical Battalion remained excellent. - -There were two significant changes in the logistical support provided -the Marine division early in the fall. One dealt with employment of -the division’s 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, located in -the rear support areas. Beginning in September, the companies were -placed in direct support of the four infantry regiments, with liaison -by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Martin, division motor transport -officer. It was believed this decentralization would have the following -advantages: - - 1. Decreased vehicle mileage and therefore less driver fatigue - and prolonged vehicle life. - - 2. Increased dispersal as a safeguard against loss of wheeled - vehicle support in event of an unexpected and successful enemy - attack. - -The other change was a shift in the emphasis of support rendered by -the Korean Service Corps. During October, each of the three frontline -regiments received 300 more laborers, raising the total to 800. Rear -area units paid for the increase, since the KSCs were detached from -support units and sent forward to the MLR. - -Logistical support from the 1st Signal Battalion left little to be -desired. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Morris[252] when the -Marines moved to western Korea, the signalmen helped establish and -maintain an extensive communications net, with 5,200 miles of wire -within the division and several vital links to adjacent and higher -commands.[253] Wiremen worked around the clock to lay and maintain the -telephone lines, which suffered considerable damage from the artillery -and mortar barrages. When possible, the signalmen raised the wires off -the ground. The battalion set in more than 1,400 telephone poles. After -the system had been installed and was working efficiently, the July -floods washed away part of the major communications. By improvising -and by setting up emergency equipment, the battalion was able to -maintain the flow of communications traffic at a satisfactory level. -Replacement items were provided by the U.S. Army on a reimbursable -basis in accordance with existing directives. - - [252] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed - command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E. - Glick relieved him on 3 August. - - [253] Communication with General Kendall’s I Corps consisted of - radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane, - and motor messenger. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-68. - The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of - communication wire. _Henderson ltr III._ - -In September it became apparent that the signal equipment used to -maintain division communications was no longer equal to the demands -placed upon it. The extensive ground area plus the number and size of -reinforcing units had not only put a heavy burden on radio, telephone, -and teletype equipment but also caused the depletion of reserve stocks. -With the spare equipment in use, there was no pool to draw upon when -units turned in defective equipment for repair. Neither were there -available replacements for materiel destroyed by enemy action. Items -most urgently needed were flown in from the States. Other critical -parts came from Army sources in Japan and Korea. By the end of October, -the communication resupply had returned to a more normal condition. - -Before the month ended a different type of critical situation was to -confront the division. It appeared that the enemy’s success in seizing -a half-dozen outposts earlier in October had only whetted his appetite -for more. Chinese eyes were turned towards positions that held still -more potential value than the stepping-stones just acquired. The -extreme right battalion in the division front held by the 7th Marines -was the focal point of the new effort. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -The Hook - -_Before the Battle--Preparations for Attack and Defense--Attack on the -Hook--Reno Demonstration--Counterattack--Overview_ - - -_Before the Battle_[254] - - [254] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, _Info for CG, FMFPac_; - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31 - Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. - memo to Dir, MarCorHist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes - on 7th Marines’ Action (Defense of “The Hook”), 26–27 Oct - 52, hereafter Heinl, _memo_. - -After the heavy fighting in early October, there was a change in the -1st Marine Division dispositions. On the 12th, the 5th Marines relieved -the 1st in the center sector and the latter regiment went into reserve. -For the next two weeks the lull that prevailed across the regimental -front was in sharp contrast to the intense fighting there earlier -in the month. On the division left, the Korean Marines, not engaged -in any sizable Communist action, conducted frequent tank-infantry -reconnaissance patrols and ambushes forward of their MLR. In the -center of the division line the 5th Marines, too, found their Chinese -opponent seemingly reluctant to pursue any combat offensives, though -his harassment of the Bunker Hill area represented the strongest action -against the Marine division at this time. The 7th Marines, holding -down the right sector, similarly encountered the enemy for only brief -periods, these contacts during patrol actions lasting no more than 15 -to 30 minutes. - -Upon its relief from the MLR, the 1st Marines took over the division -rear area. There the regiment continued the improvement of the -secondary defensive lines, conducted extensive training, and dispatched -numerous security patrols throughout the regimental area. These -routine reserve roles were in addition to the primary mission of -augmenting units on the Marine MLR in order to counterattack and defeat -any attempted penetration of JAMESTOWN in the division area. As part -of its counterattack mission, the divisional reserve regiment was to -be prepared for employment anywhere in the I Corps sector to block an -enemy advance. - -On the division right, the 7th Marines remained on position in defense -of JAMESTOWN. Following the bitter outpost contests on 6 October, -Colonel Moore continued to retain all three battalions on line: 2/7 -on the left, 3/7 in the center, and 1/7 on the right. The regimental -commander had found it necessary to commit his three battalions on line -due to the vastly overextended six-mile front, the rugged terrain, -and the very real possibility of a major Communist attack anywhere -along the MLR. With all battalions forward, Colonel Moore was left -with a very small reserve, one company from 3/7. This battalion had to -use as its reserve what had become known as “clutch platoons”--units -composed of cooks, bakers, clerks, motor transport, and other -Marine headquarters personnel. These local reserves, and even the -reserve company from 3/7, could be employed only with the regimental -commander’s approval. - -Line JAMESTOWN, in the 7th Marines area, meandered from the vicinity -of the burned-out village of Toryom, on the left, to the Hook salient -in the right battalion sector and from there southeast to the Samichon -River, the boundary with the 1st Commonwealth Division. From the left -battalion sector to the right, the terrain gradually grew more rugged -until the hills finally spilled over into the Samichon Valley. To the -rear of the MLR, the ground was less jagged; forward of the line, the -hills were more precipitous in character. The steepest heights were -in the right battalion sector. Highest terrain feature along Colonel -Moore’s MLR was Hill 146, located not far from the Hook. Throughout -the 7th Marines sector rice paddies covered the narrow valley floors -between the hills. Vegetation was sparse. A series of dirt roads and -trails served the regimental area. - -Combat outposts varied greatly as to their distance from JAMESTOWN. -Farthest from the line were the three in the left battalion sector, -manned by Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7. This trio, Carson, Reno, and -Vegas, were approximately 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. Berlin and -East Berlin (a new outpost established on 13 October) were the forward -positions in the center line outposted by Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. -Barrett’s[255] Marines. To the right Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s 1/7 -sector held three--COPs Ronson, Warsaw, and Verdun, the latter near the -Commonwealth border. - - [255] Responsibility for this part of the 7th Marines line - changed on 13 October, when Lieutenant Colonel Barrett - took command of 3/7 from Lieutenant Colonel Russell. - The latter then was assigned as division senior liaison - officer to the KMC regiment. - -Ronson was the outpost nearest to the Hook, a major defensive position -of the regiment. The importance of this part of the MLR, in the extreme -eastern sector, lay not in its strength but rather in its weakness. -Jutting as it did towards the Communist lines, the salient formed a -J-shaped bulge in the main line, which not only gave the Hook its -nickname but also established the vulnerability of the position. Its -susceptibility to capture derived both from violation of a defensive -axiom that the “MLR should not have sharp angles and salients”[256] and -to the fact that the ridgeline on which the Hook was located continued -northwest into Communist-held territory. Seattle, which the Chinese had -seized on 2 October, lay only about 500 yards northwest of the Hook. - - [256] Heinl, _memo_. The originator of this memo, Lieutenant - Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was an experienced Marine - officer and military historian who had just been assigned - to the division for duty. Temporarily attached to the 7th - Marines as an observer, his brief visit there happened to - coincide with the beginning of the Hook battle. - -In spite of its vulnerability, the Hook could not be abandoned. There -was no other terrain feature held by the Marines that could command the -critical Samichon Valley, a major avenue of approach from the northeast -directly to Seoul. The salient also dominated the entire nearby area -of the Imjin River to the south. Possession of the Hook and adjoining -ridge would give the Communists observation of a substantial portion -of the Marine rear areas beyond the Imjin, as well as the vital river -crossings. In the opinion of Major General M. M. Austin-Roberts-West, -whose 1st Commonwealth Division was soon to take over the Hook sector, -had the salient been lost, “a withdrawal of 4,000 yards would have been -necessary.”[257] - - [257] Quoted in LtCol Herbert F. Wood, _Strange Battleground: - The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense - Policy of Canada_ (Ottawa: The Army Historical Section, - Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1966), p. 213. - -At the beginning of October, this vital area had been protected by COPs -Seattle and Warsaw. When the former was overrun, it became necessary -to establish a new position. This was directed by Lieutenant Colonel -Dulacki, and on 16 October Ronson was established 200 yards southeast -of Seattle and 275 yards west of the Hook. About 600 yards northeast of -the salient the remaining position, COP Warsaw, commanded the lowlands -to the east and the narrow, east-west oriented valley of a Samichon -tributary immediately to the front. - -Opposite the three MLR battalions of the 7th Marines were the 356th -and 357th Regiments of the 119th Division, 40th CCF Army. In addition -to these infantry units, numbering close to 7,000, an estimated 10 -battalions (120 guns) of Chinese artillery[258] were facing Colonel -Moore’s regiment. Personnel strength of the American unit consisted -of 3,844 Marines, 11 medical officers and 133 corpsmen, 3 U.S. Army -communicators, and 764 Koreans (746 KSCs and 18 interpreters). - - [258] The Marine division artillery regiment reported that - in late October nine battalions of Chinese artillery, - ranging from 75 or 76mm guns or howitzers to 122mm - howitzers, opposed the 7th Marines. It was estimated - that one other 122mm battalion was also emplaced north - of the right division sector. In addition to these CCF - units, elements of a 152mm self-propelled howitzer unit - were also believed to be in the area. Late in November - two batteries of 152mm howitzers were tentatively located - about 4,000 yards west northwest of the Hook. Disposition - had been determined “as a result of crater analysis, - shell reports, sound plots, and capabilities of the - weapon.” 11thMar ComdD, Nov 52, “Enemy Artillery Activity - Rpts,” Nos. 21, 23, dtd 1, 21 Nov. 52. - -During the summer and early fall, the 7th Marines had amassed -considerable information about the enemy, including Chinese strength -and composition of forces and many of their combat characteristics. -Encroachment on Marine ground positions by steadily creeping the CCF -trenchline forward continued to be the enemy’s major ground-gaining -tactic. In fact, the Chinese units facing the Marine division -concentrated their digging during the fall of 1952 in the sector north -of the 7th Marines MLR. (See Map 15.) Other intelligence, however, -seemed open to question. For example, there was the reported frontline -presence of women among the 90 Chinese who had engaged a 2/1 patrol -on 5 October as well as the sighting in the KMC sector on the 17th of -enemy “super soldiers” far taller than the ordinary Chinese. Many in -the division found it difficult to believe the statements of enemy -prisoners. During interrogation they invariably maintained that the -mission of Chinese Communist Forces in Korea was a “defensive” one. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 15 K. WHITE - -“CCF CREEPING TACTICS” - -MARCH-OCTOBER 1952] - -The static battle situation encouraged the use of psychological -warfare. In attempting to influence the minds of their opponents and -weaken morale, the Chinese depended upon loudspeakers to carry their -propaganda barrage across No-Man’s-Land. Enemy employment of this -technique was especially heavy during October. To Marines, for example, -Chinese directed pleas of “Go home and have peace,” “Surrender, we -treat POWs well,” “Leave Korea,” “Marines, come and get your buddies’ -bodies,” and the like, often to the accompaniment of music. On -occasion, Chinese patrols left propaganda pamphlets behind them in the -KMC sector. Infrequently, the enemy displayed signs along patrol routes -urging Marines to surrender. Most of the Chinese psychological efforts -were directed against the Korean Marines. - -In enemy employment of artillery, Marine frontline units and division -intelligence had become well aware of the vast improvements the -Communists had made in recent months. Aided by a plentiful supply -of ammunition, enemy guns and howitzers, including the heavy 152mm -weapon, frequently delivered concentrated fires on critical positions -in the division area. Marines felt the effects of how well the Chinese -had learned to mass their fires against a single target for maximum -destructive power. From the Marines, moreover, the enemy had picked -up the artillery box tactic, employing it for the first time in their -sector opposite Colonel Moore’s regiment during the early October -outpost battles. - -During those same clashes, the 11th Marines had observed how the -Chinese displaced some of their batteries well forward for more -effective artillery support of their attacking infantry. One enemy -artillery innovation had been noted the previous month by a Marine AO; -on 19 September a Chinese artillery piece was detected firing in the -open. Previous observations had indicated that the Chinese generally -used wooded areas or extensive bunker-type positions to conceal their -supporting weapons. - -By the middle of October, 62.5 percent of the Chinese artillery -opposing General Pollock’s division was located in positions north -of the 7th Marines. The importance the enemy put on the principle of -massed artillery fire and the improvement of their ammunition supply -can be seen in a remark attributed to a Chinese division commander: - - The enemy had organized an attack of two-battalion strength on - our first-line platoon. As the enemy were getting into their - assembly area I directed several volleys of rapid fire against - them with a total expenditure of about 120 rounds. That very - evening the army commander rang me up and said disapprovingly, - ‘You’ve expended a bit too much ammunition today!’ It seemed as - though the army commander had detected precisely what was in my - mind. There was an instant change in his voice as he said: ‘Oh, - comrade, it really could not be accounted as waste, but you must - know we are short of supplies.’ - - Scarcely two years had passed but the situation was completely - altered. In the present we had emplaced 120 guns to each - kilometre of front line so that in a rapid-fire bombardment of - 25 minutes more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition could be hurled - against the enemy positions. If the fire used in supporting - attacks and in repulsing enemy counterattacks were taken into - account the total would reach 70,000 rounds.[259] - - [259] _CPV, Recollections_, p. 360. - -Exaggerated as the numbers of guns and rounds may be, the basic massing -technique was in line with U.S. intelligence estimates at the time. The -remark also pointed to the importance the Chinese had learned to place -on employment of artillery, a shift in emphasis that Colonel Moore’s -regiment was soon to experience in unprecedented volume. - - -_Preparations for Attack and Defense_[260] - - [260] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 - Jnls, 24–26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 729–732, dtd 24–27 Oct - 52; 7th Mar, 1/7, VMA-323 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_. - -Before the Hook battle erupted, the defensive fires that the 7th -Marines could draw upon were not overpowering in terms of numbers of -units available. Only one battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Bert Davis’ -2/11, was in direct support of Colonel Moore’s regiment. In this -mission, the 2/11 fires were reinforced by those of 1/11 (Lieutenant -Colonel David S. Randall). In addition to these organic units, the -batteries of the 623d Field Artillery Battalion (155mm howitzers) -and one platoon of C Battery, 17th Field Artillery Battalion (8-inch -self-propelled howitzers) were readily available to the 7th Marines. -In all, 38 light, medium, and heavy pieces constituted the artillery -support of the right sector.[261] General support was available from -Lieutenant Colonel Raymond D. Wright’s 4/11 and from the 4.2-inch -Rocket Battery (Captain Donald G. Frier). The 159th Field Artillery -Battalion (155mm howitzers) and B Battery, 204th Field Artillery -Battalion (155mm guns), like the other Army units positioned in the -Marine Division sector, reinforced the fires of division artillery. -Fire support from 1st Commonwealth Division weapons within range of the -Hook area could also be depended upon. - - [261] 11thMar ComdD, Oct 52, App III, Sheet 3. Eighteen of the - weapons (the 623d Field Artillery Battalion) had just - moved into the Marine sector and begun operating on 14 - October. The unit remained under I Corps operational - control, with the mission of providing general support - reinforcing fire. - -Although the Army artillery units satisfied the heavy punch requirement -of the 11th Marines, commanded since 21 September by Colonel Harry N. -Shea, there was one basic element the regiment lacked. This missing -ingredient was a sufficient amount of ammunition for the howitzers. -Defense of outposts and mainline positions along the EUSAK front in -early and mid-October 1952 consumed a great deal of this type of -ammunition. This heavy expenditure was brought to the attention of the -corps commanders by Eighth Army. General Van Fleet pointed out that -ammunition consumption rates for both the 105mm and 155mm howitzers -during these two critical weeks in October not only exceeded the -expenditures of the massive Communist spring offensive in 1951 but also -the UN counterstroke that followed.[262] - - [262] Later in 1951, during the UN Summer-Fall offensive, - ammunition consumption had again risen sharply, creating - concern among corps commanders and occasioning one of - them to remark to a subordinate, “We have the distinct - impression that two of your battalions are trying to - compete for a world’s record.” Capt Edward C. Williamson, - _et al._, “Bloody Ridge,” ms OCMH, 1951, cited in - James A. Huston, _The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, - 1775–1953--The Army Historical Series_ (Washington: OCMH, - 1966), v. II, p. 632. - -To help remedy the situation, the EUSAK commander urged “continuous -command supervision to insure the maximum return for all ammunition -expended.”[263] The general made it plain that he was not changing his -policy of exacting a heavy toll whenever the enemy began an attack. -This course had been followed by the 1st Marine Division, but the -Marines’ ability to both restrict the enemy’s creeping tactics and -simultaneously fight a siege-type war was noticeably impeded.[264] - - [263] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App I, No. 19. - - [264] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-71. - -As the end of October approached, the shortage of ammunition was -becoming a subject of increased concern to the frontline Marine units. -Daily allowances established for the last 11 days of the month were -20 rounds of 105mm high explosive (HE) and 4.3 rounds of 155mm high -explosive for each tube.[265] With such small quantities to fire -and further restricted by an equally critical shortage of both hand -grenades and 81mm mortar rounds, Colonel Moore was almost powerless to -spike the Chinese preparations for assault of the Hook.[266] Artillery -fires were reserved for only the most urgent situations or for large -bodies of troops. It was one observer’s opinion that the “enemy could -show himself almost at will without receiving fire, and that it was -impossible either to harass or neutralize his continual fortification -activity, let alone embark upon systematic destructive fires of the -kind he was carrying out.”[267] - - [265] _Ibid._ - - [266] For example, during the latter part of the month each - rifle company in the Hook battalion was limited to 150 - hand grenades. The total 11-day allowance for Lieutenant - Colonel Dulacki’s 81mm mortars was 475 rounds. 1/7 ComdD, - Oct 52, App. III. - - [267] Heinl, _memo_. - -As a means of compensating for the shortage of 81mm mortar and 105mm -howitzer ammunition, the Marines reverted to a former method of using -machine guns. This technique, employed during the trench warfare days -of World War I but seldom thereafter, was considered a useful expedient -to discourage enemy defensive creeping tactics as well as to deter his -preparations for objective attacks. The system required emplacing heavy -machine guns both on and to the rear of the MLR to fire into areas that -troops used for assembly or as check points. If the target was visible -to the machine gunner, he could take it under direct fire. At night, -when the enemy operated under cover of darkness, the machine guns fired -into zones which had already been registered in the daytime. Colonel -Moore directed his units on 23 October to resort to this expedient. - -A 1st Marine Division daily intelligence report covering the 24-hour -period beginning at 1800 on 24 October noted that there was “a -marked increase in enemy artillery and mortar fire with an estimated -twelve hundred rounds falling in the CT 1010 area of the 7th Marines -sector.”[268] According to the division PIR there was also an increased -number of enemy troops observed that same day in locations west and -northwest of the Hook. Most of the fire was directed against the Hook -area of the MLR and on the two sentinels, Ronson and Warsaw. Efforts by -Marines and some 250 KSCs to repair the damaged or destroyed bunkers, -trenches, communications lines, and tactical wire, during brief -periods of relief from the artillery deluges, were wiped out again by -subsequent shellings. - - [268] 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. Ronson, the Hook, - and Warsaw are within the 1,000-meter square, CT 1010. - -It would not be correct to say that 1/7 remained entirely passive at -this time. Battalion weapons replied, though in faint voices barely -audible in the din created by Chinese firing. Regimental mortars chimed -in and so did 2/11, which fired 416 rounds in the 24 hours ending at -1800 on the 24th. For that same period, tanks expended 137 rounds at -active weapon positions firing on the Hook. One air strike was directed -against the enemy opposing the Hook battalion. This attack by a quartet -of Marine F9Fs from VMF-311 (Lieutenant Colonel Arthur H. Adams) bombed -and napalmed a troublesome group of Chinese entrenched on the enemy MLR -750 yards east of the Hook. - -During the next 48 hours, the enemy continued his preparations for an -attack, concentrating his artillery fire on the Hook area. Colonel -Moore’s battalions received approximately 2,850 artillery and mortar -rounds, most of which rained down on 1/7 to the right. There, the heavy -and continuous fire slowed Marine efforts to restore their wrecked -bunkers and trenches. Late on the 25th there was some relief from the -artillery bombardment, but by that time many of the prophets on the -line and in the rear area were uncertain only as to the precise time of -the unexpected Chinese attack. - -Colonel Clarence A. Barninger, the division intelligence officer, -had himself alerted General Pollock to the implications of “the -intensification and character of enemy fires”[269] being received in -the 1/7 sector. The intelligence evaluation was not based only on -recent events. A detailed study of Chinese capabilities and possible -courses of action had just been completed by the G-2 and his staff. In -its discussion of the early October outpost attacks in the division -right, the report concluded that Chinese interests lay in gaining the -“terrain dominating the Samichon Valley....”[270] - - [269] Heinl, _memo_. - - [270] 1stMarDiv Intell. Est., dtd 19 Oct 52, p. 8, filed with - the divisions PIRs for that month. - -Since 5 October when 1/7 had been moved into the line as the regiment’s -third MLR battalion, the enemy had begun a regular shelling of 1/7 -positions adjacent to the Hook. Incoming rounds had increased almost -daily. “Troops, vehicles, and tanks moving in daylight even behind the -MLR almost invariably brought down enemy artillery or mortars upon -them. It was apparent that the enemy was making preparation for a -large scale assault in this portion of the MLR,”[271] the battalion -commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki, later recalled. Matters took -an even more ominous turn about 23 October when the Chinese “began a -deliberate, deadly accurate precision fire aimed at destruction of the -major fortifications in the Hook’s system of dug-in defense.”[272] -As the tempo of this fire stepped up daily, the destruction of the -battalion’s carefully prepared defenses exceeded the Marines’ ability -to repair the damage. The artillery build-up was believed preparatory -to an attempt to either seize or breach the MLR. - - [271] _Dulacki ltr._ - - [272] Heinl, _memo_. - -In late October, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki had two companies on the -MLR to protect this important area. On the 23d, Captain Frederick C. -McLaughlin’s Company A was assigned the left part of the battalion -sector, which included the Hook. A squad outposted Ronson and a -reinforced platoon was stationed at Warsaw. At 0200 on the 26th, -Company C (Captain Paul B. Byrum) departed the battalion reserve area -to take over responsibility as the left MLR company. Relief of Company -A was completed at 0410.[273] Holding down the right flank of the main -line during this time was Company B (Captain Dexter E. Evans). This -area was larger but somewhat less rugged than the western part of the -1/7 sector. - - [273] Due to the width of the Hook sector, it was necessary to - keep all three rifle platoons in the line. A reinforced - platoon from the battalion reserve outposted Warsaw. - While Company A was on line, a Company C platoon manned - the outpost; when Company C was relieved on 26 October, - a Company A platoon was sent to Warsaw. Maj Frederick - C. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan 70, - hereafter _McLaughlin ltr_. - -In the two days immediately preceding the Chinese attack of 26 -October, 1/7 received a limited amount of support intended to harass -the enemy and throw him off balance, if possible. Tanks fired their -90s at bunkers, caves, trenches, and direct fire weapons in the enemy -sector. On the 25th, Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion blasted away -54 times at these targets; on the next day, Captain Clyde W. Hunter’s -gunners more than tripled their previous day’s output, firing 173 high -explosive shells. Artillery, in the meantime, stepped up its rate -of fire on the 25th, when Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ 2/11 fired 575 -rounds, followed by 506 more the next day. The division general support -battalion, 4/11, fired a total of 195 rounds on these two days.[274] -Nearly half were to assist the 7th Marines. On both days the regiment -received the benefit of 4.5-inch rocket ripples. - - [274] On 24 October, Battery M of the battalion was temporarily - relaid to provide additional support to Colonel Moore’s - regiment. - -Air support just prior to the attack was increased slightly, but only -two strikes were flown for the Hook battalion. At 1535 on the 25th, -two Corsair fighters and a pair of AUs, the attack version of the -Corsair, dive-bombed a section of Chinese trench that housed a number -of weapons bothersome to the Marines nearby.[275] The four VMA-323 -aircraft claimed destruction of 40 yards of trench and damage to 35 -yards more. The target was 1,000 yards southwest of the Hook. Next -morning the squadron sent three of its famed fighters against bunker -positions on a hill 900 yards west of the 1/7 salient. This mission had -been prebriefed to attack enemy artillery positions opposite the KMC -line. Instead, the flight was diverted to take on the bunkers, which -represented, at that time, more of a menace to the division. The attack -destroyed one bunker, damaged another, and produced an estimated seven -casualties. - - [275] The flight had been scheduled to attack active artillery - positions 3½ miles north of the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. - When some of their ordnance was unexpended after putting - these guns out of action, the planes, were ordered to - take on the trench target. - -Hidden nearby the area of this air strike in the early morning hours -of 26 October was the Chinese infantry unit which later that same -day would attack the Hook. Before daybreak the 3d Battalion, 357th -Regiment, had moved from an area nearly two miles west of the Hook. The -forward elements, two companies, with two day’s rations for each man, -halted about a mile from their objective. There the Chinese remained -throughout most of the 26th, carefully concealing themselves from -observation by friendly forces.[276] While the enemy troops were lying -low, their mortars and artillery began the final preparatory fires. - - [276] Within the division there were no reports of sightings - of unusually large groups of enemy soldiers in this - area. In fact, there were fewer enemy seen on the 26th - than any other day since 18 October. During the 23d and - 24th, about 100 enemy had been observed almost a half - mile closer to the Hook than the hideout area used on the - 26th. 11thMar ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 12; 1stMarDiv PIR 729, - dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. - - -_Attack on the Hook_[277] - - [277] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - 26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 723, 734, dtd 27, 29 Oct 52; - 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, - Oct 52; Heinl, _memo_. - -On the morning of 26 October, Chinese artillery and mortar fire -striking the MLR slackened a bit but was still sufficiently heavy in -the vicinity of the Hook to prevent visitors in the area any direct -observation from the salient. During his inspection of Hook defenses -that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki was knocked to the ground by -the concussion of an enemy artillery round exploding nearby.[278] In -the afternoon, enemy shelling continued at a steady pace, but towards -the end of the day intense mixed artillery and mortar fire increased -to preattack proportions. Dusk brought no relief from the enemy’s -supporting weapons. - - [278] The 1/7 commander, who was uninjured by the blast, - might have become a believer that day in the military - cliche, “Rank hath its privileges,” for Brigadier A. - H. G. Ricketts (29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st - Commonwealth Division), who was standing near Lieutenant - Colonel Dulacki, was untouched. The British division was - scheduled to take over responsibility for the Hook sector - in early November. - -Out at the flanking positions, Ronson and Warsaw, there was little -change in the intensity of the enemy shelling for the remainder of the -afternoon. Bunkers and trenches were caved in, just as they were on the -Hook[279] from the preparatory fires that had been building up over a -period of days. (For a sketch of the Hook battle area on 26 October, -see Map 16.) Enemy shelling had also produced a number of casualties. -Marines at Ronson were the first to experience the enemy’s ground -assault. At 1810 the outpost reported an increased rate of mortar -and artillery rounds exploding on the position. Two groups of enemy -soldiers were seen moving towards the outpost, one from the east and -the other from the west. Ronson Marines took these advancing soldiers -under fire immediately. - - [279] Prior to the enemy’s steady shelling of the Hook, the - trenches were six feet deep. The preparatory fires of the - past several days had been so intense that in nearly all - areas the trenchline had been leveled by the time of the - Chinese attack. “I am convinced that the Chinese didn’t - realize that they had penetrated our MLR or they would - have exploited the penetration.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz - ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 26 Jan 70. - -Initially, the radio messages from Ronson reported that the attacking -force was a company, but a later estimate of approximately 50 Chinese -appeared to be more nearly correct. Communist infantry made their way -through the defensive artillery barrages requested by the COP garrison -and into the rifle and machine gun fire of the Marines. By 1838 the -enemy had overrun the squad of Marines and was in possession of Ronson. -No one had escaped from the outpost. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 16 K. White - -HOOK SECTOR OF MLR - -1800, 26 October 1952] - -At this time, 800 yards northeast, the 9th Company, 357th Battalion -was working its way towards Warsaw. Striking at the COP from both east -and west, the enemy company was momentarily halted by extremely heavy -Marine mortar and artillery fire. By 1820, the platoon at Warsaw had -requested the protective box around its position; this fire the 11th -Marines delivered promptly. Still the Chinese continued to besiege -the position and Company A defending Marines, under outpost commander -Second Lieutenant John Babson, Jr., were locked in a hand-to-hand -struggle. As a platoon was being readied to reinforce Warsaw the -outpost reported, at 1907, that enemy soldiers had reached the Marine -bunkers and that the defenders were using bayonets, pistols, hand -grenades, and both ends of their rifles to repel the Communist invaders. - -Three minutes later came the word, “We’re being overrun.” With this -message all communication from the outpost temporarily ceased, but -at 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s CP heard Warsaw report heavy -fighting still in progress there. The outpost first stated that enemy -soldiers were on top of the bunkers; then called for “VT on own -position” which the 11th Marines furnished. - -The seriousness of the situation was immediately apparent at higher -commands. One outpost had been lost; a second was in jeopardy. At about -this time, a veritable avalanche of enemy artillery and mortar fire -began to blanket the Hook. Colonel Moore released Captain McLaughlin’s -company to 1/7. The 7th Marines commander also ordered regimental -ammunition supplies be allotted to Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s area. -Shortly after that, division lifted ammunition restrictions on 1/7. - -To counter the impending ground attack, at 1859 Lieutenant Colonel -Dulacki ordered Captain McLaughlin’s Company A forward to reinforce the -Hook sector and to assist Company C in containing the enemy attack. One -platoon, the 1st, departed immediately for the MLR. As the remainder -of the company prepared to move out, the enemy struck in estimated -battalion strength. By 1938 some of the CCF infantry had advanced to -the main trenches immediately south of the Hook. Within a few minutes, -a second wave of Communist soldiers, following closely the preparatory -barrages, hit JAMESTOWN just east of the 1/7 salient and frontally at -the Hook itself. It appeared that the Communists had come to stay, for -many cargo carriers--Chinese with construction materials for bunkers -and trenches--accompanied the attacking infantry. - -Fire fights raged during the early phase of the struggle, with -continuous support furnished the assault troops by Chinese artillery -and mortars. The momentum of the enemy’s three-pronged attack, aided -by heavy rear area fire support, enabled the Chinese to overrun the -trenches and push on along the crest of the ridge, its slope near the -spine, and across the segments formed by the spurs that jutted south -from the crest. Marine defenders pulled back while a small rear guard -covered their movement with fire. Along the MLR, about 400 yards south -of the Hook, the Chinese had slipped around the flanks of the COP and -at 2030 forced a penetration in the C/1/7 line. Second Lieutenant -John W. Meikle (1st Platoon, Company C) organized the Marines into a -perimeter defense adjacent to the MLR. At 2130, remaining elements of -the company formed another defense blocking area 550 yards east of the -Hook near the crest of the ridge. - -Between these two positions small groups of Marines continued the heavy -close fight to repulse the enemy while inching their way forward to -tie-in with the rest of the unit. (See Map 17 for penetration limits -during the Hook battle.) To the northeast, the platoon at Warsaw had -not been heard from since 1945, and at 2330, Colonel Moore reluctantly -declared the outpost to be in enemy hands. - -At the time the loss of Warsaw was announced, counter-measures designed -to halt the enemy assault were in various stages of preparation or -completion. The initial reinforcing element sent forward to strengthen -the main line had linked up with Lieutenant Meikle’s 1st Platoon, -Company C, in the perimeter near the 3d Battalion boundary. The -remainder of Company A was en route to the crest of the east-west ridge -to thwart what appeared to be the main enemy drive. Colonel Moore had -released his meager reserve, H/3/7, at 0300 on the 27th, and General -Pollock had ordered one of the division reserve battalions, 3/1, to the -7th Marines area, although still retaining operational control of the -unit. - -As the forward battalion of the division reserve, 3/1 (Lieutenant -Colonel Altman) had prepared counterattack plans for critical -locations in the division sector and had previously made a -reconnaissance of the Hook area. The battalion immediately displaced -from its bivouac site north of the Imjin (Camp Rose) to an assembly -area behind the 7th Marines on the MLR. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 17 K. White - -HOOK PENETRATIONS - -26–27 October 1952] - -All possible support for 1/7 was made available, since the critical -situation resulting from the major enemy assault automatically -suspended previous restrictions on use of artillery and mortar -allowances. At Warsaw, 2/11 blanketed the position with a continuous -barrage in order to limit the enemy’s ability to effectively hold and -consolidate the captured COP. Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ cannoneers also -blasted enemy formations in response to fire missions from forward -observers. Artillery rounds fell on Chinese outposts supporting the -attack, on approach routes to the battleground, on assembly areas, and -on known and suspected Chinese artillery locations. - -Marine aviation and tanks were employed as part of the plan to first -limit the penetration made by the enemy before the counterattack to -expel him. A section of tanks had been firing since 1930 against the -enemy main line; a second section joined the direct fire assault a -half hour later. At 2113, one F7F, with 1,300 pounds of bombs, hit -a portion of the enemy’s MSR. At 2306, another twin-engine Grumman -Tigercat blasted the same area, about three-quarters of a mile west of -the Hook. These initial one-plane strikes in support of the defense of -the salient were flown by Captain Leon C. Cheek, Jr. and Major Laurel -M. Mickelson, respectively, of VMF(N)-513. - - -_Reno Demonstration_[280] - - [280] The material in this section has been derived from - 7thMar, “Summary of Action, 26 Oct-1 Nov 52, Hook, Reno, - Ronson”; 2/7 ComdD, Oct 52. - -At 0030 on the 27th, Major Mickelson, returning from his MPQ attack, -touched his Tigercat down at K-8 (Kunsan). At the very moment that -the plane set down on the Kunsan runway, the Chinese launched another -assault against the 7th Marines, the second in less than six hours. -This later action, in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector, nearly -two miles west of the Hook, was not a surprise move either. In fact, an -attack against the Carson-Reno-Vegas area had been anticipated for some -time, and it was this state of preparedness that throttled the enemy’s -attempt to seize an outpost here. - -Division intelligence had accumulated considerable evidence that the -Chinese buildup in late October was intended to ultimately clear the -way to the 2/7 outposts rather than those of 1/7 in the eastern Hook -area. A majority of the Marine supporting arms effort immediately prior -to 1800 on the 26th had gone to the left battalion of Colonel Moore’s -regiment. Aware of the interest the enemy had shown in the outposts -earlier in the month, the battalion commander had strengthened the -defense of this key area. One measure, increasing the size of the -ambush force maintained at night near Reno from a squad to a platoon, -was to pay handsome dividends before October was over. - -Just after dark on the 26th, a reinforced platoon from Captain James -R. Flores’ Company E departed the MLR on a combat patrol and ambush -mission. After reaching its assigned area, about 300 yards short of -the hill that housed COP Reno, the ambush platoon disappeared into -camouflaged dug-in positions and waited. At midnight, the Marines were -alerted by faint noises to the front. There, elements of two Chinese -companies, which had stealthily maneuvered into the ambush area, were -organizing for a sneak assault by an envelopment on Reno from the rear. -(See Map 18.) The waiting platoon apprised the outpost of the enemy’s -presence in the area; then when it appeared that the Chinese were about -to launch their assault, the ambushers opened fire. - -As the surprised Chinese turned to take on the hidden ambush -platoon, the two defending squads at Reno began firing. It took 10 -minutes before the Chinese were sufficiently recovered to organize -a withdrawal. At 0040, enemy elements quickly began to pull back -towards the north. The outpost had been spared a major action, but its -occupants were to be again engaged by the Chinese before daybreak. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 18 K. White - -OUTPOST RENO ATTACKS - -27 October 1952] - -At 0400, one platoon from a third CCF company, approaching from an -enemy hill to the northeast, hit Reno. The attack was conducted in a -fashion not previously experienced by the 1st Marine Division in West -Korea--platoons echeloned in depth, assaulting in successive waves. -The first unit to reach Reno was composed of grenade throwers and -supporting riflemen. This advance element was followed immediately -by the rest of the platoon, infantry armed with submachine guns and -rifles. Marines on Reno were not troubled by the initial platoon -assault, but the second one made some inroads before the defenders’ -fires forced the enemy to pull back. A third two-phased attack -succeeded, however, in cracking the defenses at the northeast section -of the position. The outpost commander then ordered his Marines into -the bunkers and called for overhead artillery fire. Caught in the open, -the Chinese were forced to withdraw at 0440 and did not return. - - -_Counterattack_[281] - - [281] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - dtd 27–28 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, - VMAs-121, -212, -323 ComdDs, Oct. 52. - -After the Marines in Lieutenant Colonel Caputo’s 2/7 sector had dealt -with the demonstration force, the action shifted back to the Hook. -Early on the morning of the 27th, Captain McLaughlin’s unit, sent -to the Hook-Hill 146 crest to block the penetration of the MLR, had -established contact with Captain Byrum’s Company C, passed through -its lines, and pressed on to the Hook. Suddenly, enemy small arms and -machine guns opened up on lead elements of Company A. Artillery and -mortar fire then began to hit the company. The Marines continued their -advance and made some progress in arresting the Chinese thrust at the -ridge. Shortly thereafter the enemy called in heavy supporting fires, -forcing Company A to halt its attack temporarily. When the company -commander ordered his men to resume the advance, overwhelming enemy -fire again slowed the movement. McLaughlin then ordered his men to hold -and dig in. - -When report of the Company A situation reached the regimental CP, -Colonel Moore ordered into action his last reserve unit, Captain -Bernard B. Belant’s Company H.[282] He was directed to report to 1/7, -then to pass through the depleted ranks of Company A, and take up the -attack downridge towards the salient. At 0340 the regiment attached -H/3/7 to 1/7 for operational control; at 0505 the company arrived at -the 1st Battalion CP. Forty minutes later, Company H reached Captain -McLaughlin’s area, where it regrouped and then deployed toward the -ridgeline for the counterattack. - - [282] At 0545 on the 25th, Company I (Captain John Thomas), - then the regimental reserve, and Captain Belant’s Company - H, responsible for the right sector of 3/7, had exchanged - roles. - -When Captain Belant led his Marines towards the Hook to oust the -Chinese, the enemy drive had reached the point of its deepest -penetration. By this time the Chinese had seized control of slightly -more than a mile of the meandering MLR. Most of the captured main -defense line extended from the Hook east along the ridge towards Hill -146. (One-third of the Communist advance was from the Hook southwest, -in the direction of the 3d Battalion boundary.) Between 0545 and 0800, -H/3/7 worked its way towards the Hook-Hill 146 crest. After two hours -the company was at the ridgeline, and at 0800 Captain Belant was ready -to move forward towards the salient, a straight-line distance of about -a half-mile. On the hour, the push downridge started. After having -advanced about 200 yards, the H/3/7 Marines were assailed by small -arms fire and the rain of heavy caliber rounds supporting the enemy’s -thrust. Captain Belant signalled his Marines to attack. - -Immediately, Second Lieutenant George H. O’Brien, Jr. leaped up from -his position and shouted for his platoon to follow. On the run, he -zigzagged across the exposed ridge and continued down the front slope -towards the main trench. Before reaching this objective, the platoon -commander was knocked to the ground by the impact of a single bullet. -Scrambling quickly to his feet he motioned for his men to follow -and took off on the run for the enemy-occupied trenchline. Again he -stopped, this time to assist an injured Marine. - -As he neared the trenchline, Lieutenant O’Brien started to throw a -hand grenade into the enemy-occupied bunkers, but was stopped by -the Chinese. With his carbine, the officer methodically eliminated -this resistance, then hurled the grenades. Overcoming this position, -the Texas Marine and his platoon advanced towards the Hook, but the -enemy, now partly recovered, was able to slow and ultimately stop the -counterattack. A profusion of artillery and mortar fire was primarily -responsible for halting the advance, which had carried Company H very -close to the Hook bunkers. - -Spurred on by the leadership of Lieutenant O’Brien, who later received -the Medal of Honor,[283] the company was able to execute a limited -advance. Despite the heavy artillery and mortar fire, the company drove -a wedge into the Communist position, thereby retaking the initiative -from the enemy. Company H also took three prisoners in the southeast -end of the Hook before being forced by a deadly enemy mortar and -artillery barrage to withdraw upridge. - - [283] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action - was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. - Skinner, Jr. for “conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity.” - Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine - officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward - observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the - MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines - in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the - enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the - assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position. - Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and - get more ammunition. - - When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant - Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend - they were dead; during the next three hours several - different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without - discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy - soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant - Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile, - shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing - the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life - for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File) - -The attack by Company H had been well supported from the air. At -0840, a flight of four ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Cargill’s VMA-121 -assaulted the former Marine COP Seattle, where enemy reinforcements -were being funneled through on the way to the Hook. Bombs and napalm -took a heavy toll of the troops, bunkers, and weapons pouring fire on -the counterattacking Marines. One hour later, a division (four planes) -from VMA-323 struck another trouble spot, a former Marine outpost known -as Irene (later, Rome). Aircraft of Lieutenant Colonel Chamberlain’s -squadron hit this objective with three tons of bombs and more than -4,000 pounds of burning napalm. Thirty minutes later, another foursome, -these from VMA-212, (Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Dobson, Jr.),[284] -delivered bombs, napalm, and 20mm shells on enemy soldiers moving on -the MSR towards JAMESTOWN. - - [284] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant - Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This flight - was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook - forces that the new commanding officer participated in - that day. - -While these three squadrons were bombing enemy strongpoints and other -targets of opportunity, division artillery and tanks continued their -destructive fire missions. Between 0930 and 1300, two tanks from -Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, blasted away at Chinese bunkers and -trenches, at an enemy 76mm gun on Seattle, and at positions southwest -of the Hook. Artillery--2/11, 4/11, and the rocket battery--contributed -the weight of its support. The 11th Marines, in an effort to stop the -heavy hostile shelling of the Hook sector, fired 60 counterbattery -missions on Chinese gun emplacements during the first 24 hours of the -attack. - -In the early afternoon of the 27th, 1st MAW attack squadrons continued -their bombing and strafing of enemy troops engaged in the assault -against the Hook. Before sundown, 30 aircraft had taken part in 8 -additional strikes in support of Marine counterattacks along the ridge. -The number of aircraft involved in close air support sorties for the -Hook was approximately half the number received by the division all -day. Of the 72 aircraft flying CAS strikes during the first 24 hours of -the Hook action, 67 were Marine planes, all from MAG-12. - -As in the morning’s close air support flights, Lieutenant Colonel -Cargill’s ADs provided the bulk of air support for ground action -that afternoon. Striking first a command post southeast of the 1/7 -salient, at 1410, VMA-121 came back a half-hour later with four more -Skyraiders against CCF troops pressing to envelop the right flank of -the counterattack force. At 1635, two squadron aircraft flew in quickly -in response to a sighting of troops moving forward in the Samichon -tributary 1,000 yards north of the Hook. Twenty minutes after this -successful attack, four more Skyraiders attacked bunkers opposite the -left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s sector. The final daylight -strike for 1/7 was again made by four ADs from -121. These planes took -under attack a target that had been bombarded just 25 minutes earlier -by Corsairs from VMA-323. - -Another Marine attack squadron, VMA-212, participated in the Hook -support that afternoon. At 1344, a four-plane flight assaulted troops -moving through Frisco to reinforce the Chinese drive on the Hook. Two -of the planes dropped three 1,000-pound bombs and two 250-pounders -on the enemy soldiers. The other pair of attack Corsairs released -six 780-pound napalm tanks over the position. It was estimated that -25 Chinese casualties resulted from this air attack. Wrapping up the -VMA-212 CAS for the Hook sector on the 27th was a strike, at 1440, on -camouflaged positions and another at 1520 against caves and bunkers. -Each of these air assaults took place about 950 yards from the Hook. -The earlier one was a napalm attack from 50 feet above the ground. One -of the six tanks would not release and three did not ignite. Four caves -were destroyed and one bunker was damaged in the latter strikes. - -Between the morning and afternoon air strikes, the ground commanders -put together the final plans for recapture and defense of the Hook. -When General Pollock had released I/3/1 to the regiment during an -inspection trip to the 1/7 area that morning, the company was already -en route to the ridge to make the counterattack. The ground commanders -agreed that after I/3/1 regained the salient, H/3/1 would take over the -right sector of 1/7 and the relieved company, B/1/7, would then occupy -both the critical MLR sector and Warsaw. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s -scheme to recapture the positions and ground lost on 26 October was a -continuation of the attack from atop the ridge directly towards the -objective. It was to be a hard-nosed, frontal assault, but the only -maneuver deemed advisable. - -Clearing the Company C command post about noon, the lead elements of -Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr.’s Company I, the 1st Platoon, continued -its route to the ridge. After the 40 Marines had gained the crest, -they quickly reoriented themselves to the new direction, and at 1350, -led the I/3/1 assault. Artillery preparation by the 11th Marines had -preceded the crossing of the line of departure, and these supporting -fires were partially responsible for the substantial initial advance -made by the counterattacking Marines. But Chinese artillery was not -idle at this time either, and the volume of enemy fire matched that of -the Marines. The I/3/1 movement forward was also slowed by Communist -soldiers, estimated at about a company, who fired from protected -positions along the perimeter of the Hook. - -Inch by inch the company crawled forward. The vicious Chinese -supporting barrages were exacting many casualties among Captain -Harlan’s troops,[285] yet they crept on, and ultimately reached the -artillery forward observer bunker atop the ridge but 150 yards short of -the Hook trenches. At this time, 1635, the enemy supporting fires were -directed not only on the advancing Marines and the MLR defenses but -extended as far back as the regimental CP.[286] Chinese soldiers still -clung to some of the Hook positions and trenches of the MLR just below -the crest on the northern sides. Marines closest to the Hook could see -the virtual ruination caused by enemy artillery and mortar shells to -the trench system within the salient. - - [285] During this action, the company suffered 15 killed, 71 - seriously wounded, and 6 slightly wounded. 3/1 ComdD, - Oct. 52, p. 3. - - [286] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Oct 52. - -Nearing their objective, elements of Company I pressed on with even -more determination. By 1700 a few had made it to the shell-torn -ditches, where they sought momentary refuge to reorganize. Several more -joined, and together they reconnoitered the trenches and bunkers for -enemy soldiers. Just then the Communists reacted with an even heavier -supporting arms assault, which forced these few Marines to pull back -with their platoon to the reverse slope of the ridge. To the right, -about 250 yards away, the main body of Company I Marines occupied the -reverse side of the hill, riding out the onslaught of artillery and -mortar rounds while they waited for a lull before making the final dash -to recapture the lost area of JAMESTOWN. - -While Captain Harlan’s company was exposed to this extremely heavy -enemy artillery fire, another unit, B/1/7, was on the move from -Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s command post to the ridge to strike what -was intended as a lethal blow to the Communist invaders. At 1932, -Company B began its march forward. By midnight, the 1st Platoon was -nearing its assault position close to the left flank of Company I of -3/1. Simultaneously, the 3d Platoon closed in on its jump-off point. -The going was extremely difficult, complicated by a moonless night and -the many shell craters that pockmarked the terrain. But at 0019, 28 -October, the platoons mounted their assault, firing their rifles and -machine guns, and hurling grenades to silence enemy automatic weapons -and to reach dug-in Communist soldiers occupying the trenchline. - -The Marine charge was met by a burst of small arms fire and a shower -of grenades. Weapons supporting the Chinese defense were still very -active. After a standoff of 90 minutes the Marines pulled back, calling -on their mortars and artillery to lay precise fire concentrations on -the trouble spots. The weapons also fired on enemy approach routes -through Ronson and Warsaw. After this preparation, Company B again -made an assault against the enemy, at 0340. This advance was contested -vigorously by the Chinese, but their resistance this time was not -lasting. Quickly B/1/7 Marines deployed throughout the entire area, and -by 0600 the Hook was again in Marine hands. - -Before the victors could permit themselves the luxury of a breathing -spell, there were a number of critical tasks that demanded immediate -attention. Defense of the MLR had to be quickly and securely shored -up for a possible enemy counterattack. The newly rewon area had to be -searched for Marines, both casualties and holdouts, and for Chinese -diehards or wounded. The company had to be reorganized. In addition to -these missions, there were two others, regaining Ronson and Warsaw. As -it turned out, the duties were discharged nearly at the same time. COPs -Ronson and Warsaw were reoccupied by the 7th Marines at 0630 and 0845, -respectively, on 28 October. - -In organizing the recaptured position, the Marines were hampered to -some extent by a dense ground fog. Nevertheless, work still went ahead -on these necessary tasks. Most of the Hook area was held by Company B; -the western part of the 1/7 line, south of the Hook, was still manned -by the platoon from Company A and one from Company C. The 1st Platoon -of Company B quickly searched the retaken area of the MLR (except the -caved in parts of the trenchline and bunkers, which were investigated -later), but found no enemy soldiers. During the day, as Company B -expanded its responsibility along the Marine main line, the platoons -from A/1/7 and C/1/7 were relieved to rejoin their companies.[287] -Supplies began to move in, once the permanency of the defense had been -established. - - [287] As a part of the reorganization, H/3/1 remained in the - right sector, and Company C, of the Hook battalion, - filled in the middle. Company A was in position on the - friendly side of that part of the ridge held by Captain - Byrum’s Company C. During the afternoon of the 28th, - I/3/1 and H/3/7 also left Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki’s - area to rejoin their parent organizations. - - -_Overview_[288] - - [288] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs - 734–735, 741, dtd 29–30 Oct 52, 5 Nov. 52. - -In evaluating the battle for the Hook, it would appear that the Chinese -assault against Reno was merely a demonstration or feint. By making a -sizable effort near the primary objective after the attack there was -well under way, the Communists expected not to obscure the real target -but rather to cause the Marines to hesitate in moving higher echelon -reserves to influence the action at the Hook. It was to the credit of -the ambush force that the Chinese ruse was unsuccessful. - -Including losses from the Reno ambush, Marines estimated that the -Chinese actions against that outpost cost the enemy 38 killed and 51 -wounded. The COP defenders and the platoon that had surprised the enemy -counted 22 dead Communist soldiers during and after the Reno action. -Together with the Hook casualties, confirmed at 274 killed and 73 -wounded and estimated at 494 killed and 370 wounded,[289] the figure -represented more than a third of an enemy battalion permanently lost in -addition to about a battalion and a half put out of action temporarily. -Distributed among the number of battalions that participated in the two -actions, the total number of casualties lost some impact. What remains -significant, however, are the cost and results--369 counted and 953 -estimated casualties for not one inch of ground. - - [289] The CCF casualty figures were derived from a comparison - of reports of participating Marine battalions, the 7th - Marines, and division. In addition to these losses caused - by Marine infantry units were enemy casualties listed - by the artillery and tank battalion command diaries and - records of participating air squadrons; these supporting - arms figures amount to 468 casualties, more than - one-third the total number. - -Marine losses in the Hook battle were 70 killed, 386 wounded (286 -evacuated), and 39 missing, of whom 27 were later definitely known -to have been captured. This was the second highest number of Marines -taken prisoner in any single action during the Korean fighting.[290] -Such a large number was attributed to the tactics of the Chinese -infantry, which followed the preparatory barrages so closely--at times -even advancing into the rolling barrages--that the enemy was able to -surprise and capture a considerable number of Marine outpost defenders. -Nearly all of the 27 were captured in the enemy’s first rushes against -the two outposts and MLR. In the diversion on Reno, an additional 9 -Marines were killed and 49 wounded (29 evacuated). - - [290] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November - 1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy. - Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., “The Problems of U.S. - Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea” (M.A. thesis, - Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261–262, hereafter - MacDonald, _POW_. - -Perhaps as significant as any result of the Hook fighting is the amount -of supporting fires the Chinese provided their infantry. Calculations -of total incoming ran from 15,500 to 34,000 rounds during the 36-hour -engagement. The 1st Marine Division reported conservatively that the -enemy expended between 15,500–16,000 artillery and mortar rounds; -estimates by supporting arms units put the total at the higher level. -In any event, the 12,500 rounds the 7th Marines received during the -first 24 hours represented the heaviest bombardment any Marine regiment -had been subjected to up to that time. Moreover, it had now become -clearly evident that the enemy could stockpile a plentiful supply of -ammunition, despite attempts of UN aircraft to interfere with the -enemy’s flow of supplies to the frontline.[291] - - [291] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in - ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: “The Air Force - position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline - units was that by exercising supply discipline and - refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build - supply over a period of time.” - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160346] - - _Marine Division Redeploys to West Korea--5th Marines units en - route to new sector in April 1952 are slowed by muddy roads and - spring thaws. Below, Korean washwomen labor at daily tasks while - 1st Tank Battalion convoy moves up to new fighting area._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 160984] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164524] - - _Surveillance of the Enemy--Men of the Reconnaissance Company, - 1st MarDiv, scan CCF positions across the Imjin River. Below, - Marines empty 75mm shell cases from armored amphibian after a - shoot-out on Independence Day, 1952._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162962] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173690] - - _Scene of See-Saw Fighting--View of enemy-held outpost Yoke as - seen from Marine trenches. Below, clothing and equipment packed - in a “survival bomb” dropped to Marine pilots awaiting rescue. - Pilots of VMJ-1 are briefed on the day’s mission over North - Korea._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 134927 DOD Photo A 134103] - -[Illustration: Official USN Photo] - - _Island Marines--Korean Marine platoon undergoes instruction at - Yo-do, ECIDE. Damaged AD-4 had crash landed at Briscoe Field - nearby and was awaiting salvage. Below, Marine tank-infantry unit - in stand-by position during truce sessions at Panmunjom._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162782] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162952] - - _Amphibious Exercise--Caterpillars of 1st Shore Party Battalion - pull floating dock ashore during 1st Marines training at - Tokchok-to. Below, HMR-161 choppers airlift 1st 4.5-inch Rocket - Battery to new firing positions during August 1952 maneuver._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163906] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16448] - - _Main Logistic Link to the Front--View of the Freedom Gate Bridge - from eastern shore of Imjin. This bridge was the only one left - standing after August 1952 floods. Below, the FDC bunker of 1st - Battalion, 11th Marines CP. From this nerve center, fire missions - are relayed to the batteries by radio._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 163812] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162984 DOD Photo A 165569] - - _On Guard at Critical Site--Korean Marines clean their 3.5-inch - bazooka at blocking position near Hill 155. Gen Lemuel C. - Shepherd, Jr., CMC, observes fire placed on CCF position during - frontline visit to 1st MarDiv. Below, AU Corsair of Deathrattler - Squadron ready for action._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349270] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164153 DOD Photo A 164151] - - _Battle Humor--Marine replacements moving up to front at Bunker - Hill get friendly warning of occupational hazards. The versatile - “Weasel” hauls ammo and supplies to the MLR. Below, Marine OP - reports on Chinese dispositions during August 1952 battle._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165141] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166041] - - _Operation Haylift--Cargo lift from 1st Air Delivery Platoon area - to MLR sector occupied by 7th Marines. Cargo net slung under - copter body greatly increased airlift capability. Below, BGen - Robert O. Bare, ADC, inspects pre-fabricated bunker at Marine - outpost._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 167201] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133865] - - _Debriefing--Marine pilots of MAG-33 report to BGen Clayton - C. Jerome, 1st MAW CG, upon return from June 1952 air strike, - biggest to date. Below, aerial shot of 1stMarDiv CP at Yong-ri, - as viewed from mess hall, looking north._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164363] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 162261] - - _River Patrol--Amtracs of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, - Kimpo Provisional Regiment, on the Imjin River. Below, F7F - Tigercat of 1st MAW, carrying napalm bomb, approaches target._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 133537] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166423 DOD Photo A 167466] - - _Support for Battle of the Hook--Marines heading for embattled - Hook carry machine gun ammunition. Note bandoliers. Captured - CCF equipment taken in October 1952 battle included prima cord, - cartridges, Soviet hand grenades. Below, VMO-6 helicopter - returning from front lines lands at Field #19._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346322] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168980] - - KANSAS _Line--This recently completed secondary line is occupied - by 1/7 while in reserve in late 1952. Below, tactical problems - are reviewed (from left) by MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, CG, 1st - MarDiv; LtGen Paul A. Kendall, I Corps Commander; and Col Russell - E. Honsowetz, AC/S, G-3, 1st MarDiv._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165743] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171273] - - _Combat Surveillance--Marine counter mortar radar crew receives - instruction on adjustment of electronic equipment. Below, - regimental inspection of KMC troops by Col Kim Suk Bom, CO, 1st - Regiment._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 165936] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168468] - - _Combat Interlude--Cardinal Spellman celebrates Christmas Mass - before 2,500 bareheaded Marines in December 1952. Below, the - Black Watch Pipe and Drum Corps honors Marines during their 177th - Anniversary celebration, November 1952._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 166804] - -[Illustration: USN Photo 447570] - - _Truce Talks Resumed--Marine helicopter approaches truce site - at Panmunjom as negotiations reopen in October 1952. Below, - Master Sergeant Theodore H. Hughes, 1st MAW, presents 900,000 won - (equivalent to $150,000) to Bishop Mousset, of Little Flower’s - Orphanage in Pohang. Money was donated by MAG 33 Staff NCO Club._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 132432] - -With regard to combat tactics, the attacks during 26–27 October -confirmed earlier reports that extremely heavy use of preparatory -barrages by the enemy signalled an imminent infantry attack on the -area. Defensive concentrations of apparently unlimited quantity -typified Communist artillery support for their attacking forces. -Meticulous policing of the battlefield, an established Chinese -practice, was also apparent during the Hook battle. In order to prevent -identification of his combat units, the enemy also took pains to ensure -that assault troops remove all papers and unit insignia before going -forward of their own lines. - -Two other previously reported tactics were corroborated during the late -October battle for the Hook. One was the presence of cargo carriers -with the attacking force. These soldiers, estimated by the division -to comprise as high as 75 percent of the total number of Chinese -troops committed, carried shovels, lumber, extra rations, medical aid -equipment, and stocks of ammunition. One Marine evacuated from a bunker -reported on a method of bunker searching by the Chinese. “English -speaking Chinese were yelling into bunkers for Marines to ‘Come out -and surrender.’ When there was no evidence of surrender, the Chinese -would use bangalore torpedoes and satchel charges to destroy and seal -bunkers.”[292] - - [292] 1stMarDiv PIR 738, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 3. The Chinese also - used hand grenades in searching the bunkers. All of these - explosives had been widely employed during World War II. - -In one respect the enemy deviated from his usual tactics. During the -battle for the Hook Marines who took prisoners made the discovery that -the Chinese employed close-up relief forces. Prior to an offensive -action, the enemy positioned a reserve just to the rear of the assault -unit. After the attack had started, and at the appropriate time, the -commander would signal the fresh force forward to take over the mission -of the old unit. In this manner, the enemy hoped to sustain his drive -or to retain a newly-won position. - -Though the foresight appeared appropriate, the result was not always -what had been anticipated. In the earlier part of the month, during a -fight in another I Corps sector, the Communists had rushed a reserve -force forward to consolidate the defense of an outpost immediately -after its capture. In the Hook fighting, a fresh unit, which had been -placed immediately to the rear of the assault troops, was ordered -forward to keep the attack alive. Both attempts failed. Marines -attributed this lack of success to the Communists’ apparent inability -to organize or reorganize quickly, a difficulty which was believed to -have resulted from the scarcity of officers in forward areas.[293] - - [293] 1stMarDiv PIR 741, dtd 5 Nov 52, Encl. 2, p. 2. - -Discussing the defense of the Hook area, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki -commented shortly after the battle ended: - - The Chinese seemed to gain their greatest tactical advantage - during action on “The Hook” by assaulting friendly positions - directly under their own artillery and mortar barrages. The - effects on defending Marines were two-fold: heavy incoming either - physically trapped them in their bunkers, or the Chinese, having - overrun our positions through their own barrages, took the - defenders by surprise as they left their bunkers to man their - fighting holes. It is therefore considered imperative that in - future instances of heavy enemy supporting fires, all Marines - physically occupy an individual shelter from which their fighting - positions are readily accessible. - - Marines gained a false sense of security by taking cover, in - groups, inside bunkers. In some cases, groups of three or four - Marines were killed when a bunker caved in on top of them. Had - they been spread out along the trenchline, but under individual - cover, it is believed that far fewer casualties would have - resulted, and also the position would have been better prepared - for defense. The false sense of security gained by being with - comrades inside a bunker must be overcome.[294] - - [294] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI. - -Another factor bothered the 1/7 commander. He directed unit leaders to -exercise closer control over the care and cleaning of weapons under -their custody. During the Hook fighting, the malfunctioning of weapons -due to improper cleaning and loss of some rifles “in the excitement to -gain cover” caused the Marines to take casualties that might otherwise -have been prevented. - -These same deficiencies were also observed by General Pollock, and -he ordered their immediate correction. Lieutenant General Hart, CG -FMFPac, whose inspection of the division coincided with the Hook battle -and who saw the trenches after they had been leveled, noted that -shallow trenches and bunkers built above the ground did not offer -sufficient protection from intensive enemy shelling. He directed that -more emphasis be placed on the digging of field fortifications and -bunkers.[295] - - [295] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4. - During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed - the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He - was impressed with the progress that had been made in - this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the - speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be - set up to fire and then displaced to a new position. - -In considering not only how the fight was conducted but why, one has -only to go back to the first part of October and recall the situation -that existed along the 1st Marine Division line. During the hotly -contested outpost battles early in the month, the Chinese had attempted -to outflank the division by seizing key terrain in the left and right -sectors. Where the enemy had been unsuccessful, he returned later in -the month for another major assault. On the night of the 26th the -endeavor was in the division right. A new blow against the left was not -far off. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -Positional Warfare - -_A Successful Korean Defense--Six Months on the UNC Line--Events on the -Diplomatic Front--The Marine Commands During the Third Winter--1st MAW -Operations 1952–1953 Behind the Lines--The Quiet Sectors--Changes in -the Concept of Ground Defense--Before the Nevadas Battle_ - - -_A Successful Korean Defense_[296] - - [296] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct-Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs - 737–738, dtd 31 Oct-1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244, - dtd 24–30 Oct 52. - -In both the early and late October outpost battles the Chinese had -attempted to seize critical terrain on the flanks of the 1st Marine -Division. Although the majority of these attacks failed, the enemy had -acquired six outposts early in the month--three in the western Korean -Marine Corps sector and three north of the right regimental line. On -the last day of October, two hours before midnight, the CCF again -struck the Marine left flank. This time their efforts were directed -against four outposts that screened Hill 155, the most prominent -terrain feature in the entire KMC regimental zone. The fighting that -developed was brief but very sharp and would be the most costly of all -KMC clashes during this third winter of the war. - -The latest enemy attack came as no real surprise to Korean Marines -of the 5th Battalion, occupying COPs 39, 33, and 31 in the northern -regimental sector, or 2d Battalion personnel at COP 51 in the southern -(western) half of the MLR. (Map 19.) The four outposts assisted in -defense of the MLR (particularly Hill 155 just inside the MLR), -afforded observation of CCF approach routes, and served as a base -for friendly raids and offensive operations. Hill 155 overlooked both -the wide Sachon Valley and Chinese frontline positions to the west. -This critical Korean hill also commanded a view of the Panmunjom peace -corridor, Freedom Gate Bridge, and the Marine division area east -of Line JAMESTOWN in the KMC sector. Hill 155 had further tactical -importance in that it protected the left flank of Paekhak Hill, the key -ground in the entire 34-mile expanse of JAMESTOWN within 1st Marine -Division territory. - -Actually, the probability of a determined enemy attack against the four -outposts had been anticipated since early October following CCF seizure -of three positions (former COPs 37, 36, and 86) in their strike against -the KMC regimental OPLR. The enemy had then proceeded to organize an -OPLR of his own with the two northern outposts, COPs 37 and 36, and -informally occupied another position to the south and one toward the -north in the vicinity of COP 39. “With this OPLR once firmly organized, -the enemy will have an excellent jump-off point towards our OPs 39 and -33, his next probable objectives,” KMC officers reasoned.[297] - - [297] KMC Regt UnitRpt 216, dtd 4 Oct 52, p. 2. - -Sporadic probes throughout the month in the COP 39 and 33 areas -indicated continued enemy interest in the positions. COP 51, to the -south, was considered another likely target because of its location -immediately east of COP 86, previously annexed by the CCF. - -Prior to attacking the four outposts on 31 October, the Chinese had -signaled their intentions by sharply stepping up artillery and tank -fire against the sector. During the 24-hour period ending 1800 on 30 -October, a total of 1,881 rounds crashed on KMC positions, most of -these against the two northern outposts, COPs 39 and 33. Nearly 1,500 -rounds fell the next day. More than 50 sightings of enemy troops and -weapons in the forward area were also reported. By contrast, during the -previous week less than 15 observations of enemy activity had been made -daily and, on the average, only about 200–340 rounds of fire had fallen -in the entire sector. Despite this comparatively moderate rate of -hostile fire, at least one Korean Marine was killed and three wounded -in late October from well-placed Chinese mortar or artillery rounds -striking the outposts. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 19 K. White - -CCF ATTACK AGAINST KMC SECTOR - -(Division Left) - -31 October 1952] - -After the two days of heavy shelling, the regiment warned in its daily -report issued only two hours before the full-scale attack began: - - The enemy has made a consistent two-day effort to destroy - friendly outpost positions. Last night, at 1830, two enemy - companies were observed in an apparent attempt to attack OPs 39 - and 33. Artillery fire broke up the attempt, but continued enemy - artillery today indicates further attack is probable tonight. - If enemy artillery preparation is indicative, a simultaneous - attack against outposts 39, 51, 33, and 31 can be considered - probable....[298] - - [298] KMC Regt UnitRpt 243, dtd 31 Oct 52, pp. 5–6. - -These earlier observations and predictions as to the enemy’s action -were shortly confirmed when the CCF launched its new ground attack. - -Beginning at 2200,[299] the enemy delivered an intensive eight-minute -76mm and 122mm artillery preparation against the four outposts. Chinese -assault forces from four different infantry regiments then launched a -simultaneous attack on the positions. Moving in from the north, west, -and south, two CCF companies (3d Company, 1st Battalion, 581st Regiment -and 2d Company, 1st Battalion, 582d Regiment) virtually enveloped the -northern outpost, COP 39. Two more CCF companies (unidentified) lunged -against the two central outposts, COPs 33 and 31, a company at each -position.[300] The southern and most-heavily defended post, COP 51, -where a company of Korean Marines was on duty, was assailed by four -Chinese companies (4th Company, 2d Battalion, 584th Regiment; 4th and -6th Companies, 2d Battalion, 585th Regiment; and 1st Company, 1st -Battalion, 585th Regiment). Even though the enemy exerted his strongest -pressure against COP 51, the position held and the Chinese broke off -the attack there earlier than at the other outposts. - - [299] The attack on the 31st took place after the KMC 5th - Battalion had taken over the right regimental sector, - at 1700, from the 3d Battalion. The Chinese often - deliberately timed their outpost attacks to coincide with - a relief of lines. Company personnel of both the 5th and - 3d Battalions were on line during the fighting. KMC Regt - UnitRpts dtd 1 Nov 52, p. 4; 245, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 4. - - [300] KMC Regt UnitRpt 244, dtd 1 Nov 52, pp. 1, 4. A different - account as to size of attacking units is given in Maj - Kang Shin Ho, ROKMC ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 30 Apr - 70, which states two reinforced enemy companies assaulted - COP 33 and an estimated enemy battalion struck COP 31. - -At COP 31 a heavy fire fight raged until 0155, when the defending -KMC platoon halted the Chinese and forced them to make a partial -withdrawal. To the northwest, at COP 33, the enemy encountered less -resistance from the two squads manning the outpost. The Chinese -achieved some success in penetrating the defenses and occupied several -positions. After heavy close fighting and friendly artillery support, -the Koreans expelled the invaders at 0515. - -The enemy’s efforts appeared to have been most successful, temporarily, -at COP 39, the northern post and one nearest to Hill 155. Although -the Chinese wrested some ground from the KMC platoon, artillery fires -continued to punish the enemy and by 0410 had forced him to pull back. -A small hostile force returned at 0600 but after a 15-minute exchange -of small arms it left, this time for good. At about this same time the -last of the Chinese had also withdrawn from the two central outposts, -33 and 31. - -In terms of sheer numbers, the enemy’s strongest effort was made -against COP 51. This was the most isolated of the Korean positions and, -at 2,625 yards, the one farthest from the MLR. Ironically, in the week -preceding the attack COP 51 was least harassed by hostile artillery -although it had received 20 rounds of 90mm. tank fire, more than any -other position. On the 31st, elements of three companies struck the -southwestern trenches and defenses, while a fourth attempted to break -through from the north. As it turned out the action here was the least -intense of the outpost clashes. After initial heavy fighting the -Chinese seemed reluctant to press the assault even though they vastly -outnumbered the Korean company deployed at the outpost. In the early -morning hours the enemy broke contact and by 0330 had withdrawn from -COP 51. - -During the night approximately 2,500 rounds of CCF artillery and -mortar fire lashed the positions. Korean Marines, aided by friendly -artillery, repelled the assault and inflicted heavy casualties on the -enemy. Supporting fires included more than 1,200 rounds of HE shells -from the KMC 4.2-inch Mortar Company. Chinese casualties were listed -as 295 known killed, 461 estimated wounded, and 9 POWs. Korean Marine -losses were 50 killed, 86 wounded, and 18 missing.[301] By first light -the Korean outposts had thrown back the enemy’s latest well-coordinated -attack. This ended the last significant action of October in the 1st -Marine Division sector. - - [301] _Ibid._ - - -_Six Months on the UNC Line_[302] - - [302] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Cagle and - Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; - Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Walter - G. Hermes, _Truce Tent and Fighting Front--United States - Army in the Korean War_ (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966), - hereafter Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and - Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_. - -The KMC Regiment’s battle in late October marked the end of two months -of heavy fighting in the division sector. October had witnessed the -most intense combat in more than a year. As the third Korean winter -approached outpost clashes and small unit actions along the rest of the -UNC frontline began to slacken. During November and December, neither -side appeared eager to pursue the offensive. Chinese aggressiveness -declined noticeably. - -Despite other action initiated by the enemy, the I Corps sector -remained the chief Communist target. On 19 November, the British 1st -Commonwealth Division successfully withstood what was initially a -company-size attempt to capture the Hook. In sharp fighting between -1900 and 0430, Black Watch and reinforcing Canadian units repulsed -a determined battalion-strength CCF assault, killing more than -100 Chinese.[303] Marine and I Corps artillery units fired almost -continuously throughout the night in support of the Hook defenders. -Fighting flared again, briefly, in December in the I Corps sector when -Chinese soldiers attempted to overrun outposts on the Imjin River line, -but were thrown back by the ROK 1st Division. The enemy then tried -to seize key terrain forward of the U.S. 2nd Division, but was again -halted. - - [303] For details of this action see Canadian Department of - National Defence ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70 - in v. V, Korean comment file. - -Elsewhere before the end of the year, the CCF captured one outpost in -the IX Corps area, to the right of I Corps, but suffered a telling -defeat at the hands of the Ethiopian battalion during an attempt to -crack this sector of the U.S. 7th Division line. After a brief fire -fight the Chinese were forced to withdraw, leaving 131 CCF dead in the -Ethiopian positions. North Korean efforts to seize critical ground in -the X and ROK I Corps sectors, at the far eastern end of the EUSAK -line, was similarly broken up by the U.S. 40th and ROK 5th Divisions. - -By the end of 1952 General Van Fleet had not only revitalized his -defenses with recent rotation of frontline units but had also -strengthened his line by inserting another division in the critical -and long-troublesome Chorwon-Kumhwa sector of IX Corps, on the I Corps -right flank. With these changes by late December there were 16 EUSAK -divisions on line--11 Korean, 3 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 British -Commonwealth--plus 4 divisions in reserve (1 Korean and 3 U.S. Army). -Nearly 75 percent of the UNC line had been entrusted to Republic of -Korea units. Their performance was a tribute to growing ROK military -proficiency and justified the EUSAK decision to assign to ROK troops a -greater role in the Allied ground defense. - -The slow pace of infantry action during the last two months of 1952 -continued into the new year. Raids by small UNC units highlighted the -limited combat during January and February. During the following month -the battlefront tempo accelerated, due in part to expanded patrol -activities. A number of sharp clashes in No-Man’s-Land resulted in -several Communist setbacks but led the enemy to make an increased use -of ambushes. These traps initially caught the UNC troops by surprise, -inflicting heavy casualties on them. But by far the most severe -fighting of the new year resulted when the Chinese renewed their fierce -outpost and main line of resistance attacks in March. - -Again, the western I Corps sector was the major combat area as enemy -pressure mounted along the front. This was believed due, in part, to -the “growing Chinese sensitivity to the I Corps raids”[304] as well as -an attempt by the CCF to regain the initiative as they began to send -out larger forces to probe and assault UNC positions. On 17 March, -the Chinese launched a battalion-size attack against Hill 355 (Little -Gibraltar). This MLR position was defended by elements of the U.S. 2d -Infantry Division, on line immediately east of the Marine division, in -the sector customarily occupied by the 1st Commonwealth Division. (The -Army unit had relieved the British division on 30 January.) A second -large-scale assault on the hill that month was also turned back. - - [304] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 392. - -On 23 March, a Chinese Communist regiment attempted to capture three -outposts manned by the U.S. 7th Division, at the far right of the -I Corps line. Hills 225 (Pork Chop Hill) and 191 held. The enemy’s -main effort was against Hill 266 (Old Baldy), defended by units of -the division’s Colombian battalion. One attack carried the position, -despite company strength reinforcements of the original defenders. Two -strong UN counterattacks the next day to retake the outpost failed, -and the Chinese retained the crest of Old Baldy. Although the CCF had -gained their objective in Hill 266, the battles on the three hillocks -had cost the enemy 750 casualties, according to 7th Division records. - -In one respect, the nature and extent of ground operations affected the -type of air activity over North and South Korea during the winter of -1952–1953. Introduction of PRESSURE strategy, which had embodied the -policy of the Far East Air Forces since mid-1952, brought more aircraft -in close support of Eighth Army ground troops, a change that pleased -the corps commanders. When the heavy outpost fighting throughout -October diminished to only occasional skirmishes in November, there -was temporarily a decreased need for large numbers of CAS sorties. -As a result more planes became available for PRESSURE attacks. These -strikes at first appeared to be reverting to the previous STRANGLE -strategy since railroads were often the targets. But interdiction -of the transportation system was only part of the PRESSURE aerial -concept which also called for striking enemy production, repair, and -storage facilities. The Allied strategy in conducting its air offensive -remained the same: to make the bombing hurt the Communists so that they -would end their deliberate delaying tactics in the truce sessions and -join the UNC in effecting a Korean settlement. - -During the winter FEAF maintained a steady air pressure against the -Communists. Major raids were made from time to time, but the number of -strategic targets was gradually disappearing due to repeated UNC air -attacks. Further, much of the enemy logistical net had gone so deeply -underground during the prolonged stalemate that UN bombing and rocket -attacks were having only a limited destructive effect. The U.S. B-29s, -which had carried the fight to the enemy since the first week of the -Korean conflict, found their last worthwhile objectives in stockpiles -hidden in North Korean towns and villages. For the Fifth Air Force -fighters there was little opportunity to increase their skill in -air-to-air combat, since the Communist fliers continued to take evasive -action and avoid “dogfights.” - -Naval aviation contributed importantly to UNC air operations from -September 1952 to March 1953. On the first day of this period, three -carriers staged the largest all-Navy Korean air strike to date, which -simultaneously attacked an oil refinery at Aoji and other targets -in the northeastern corner of Korea. Less than two weeks later, two -carriers launched another assault in the same part of the country. -The significance of these September strikes stemmed from the almost -complete lack of enemy response. Apparently the Communists in this -area had felt secure and protected, their territory being next to the -Chinese border. In fact, their location close to the sanctuary had -ruled out bombings proposed earlier. Strikes in this part of Korea -were particularly suited to carrier planes of the Seventh Fleet, whose -mobile airfields brought the targets within easy striking range along -approaches that would not violate the Manchurian haven. - -Perhaps the greatest naval contribution to the air war were the -Cherokee strikes, so named after the commander of the Seventh Fleet, -Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, because of his Indian ancestry. This -new type of deep air support attack, which came into use in October -1952, employed the maxim of mass delivery of ordnance. Usually, -targets were immediately behind the enemy MLR but beyond the range of -friendly artillery. In May 1952, when the rail interdiction program -was being phased out and Admiral Clark’s pilots were faced with a -decreasing number of prime industrial targets, the fleet commander had -theorized that he could most effectually damage the enemy by bombing -supply dumps, artillery positions, and reserve forces immediately to -the rear of the Chinese MLR. As the admiral reasoned, the enemy could -not fight the kind of war he was waging “and still have _all_ his -forces, supplies, and equipment underground. _Some_ of his stocks of -supplies had to be above ground, out of sight and out of range of our -artillery.”[305] - - [305] Quoted in Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 461. - -Eighth Army welcomed the increased support that would result from -the strikes, but FEAF expressed concern about the lack of top-level -coordination. Admiral Clark had proposed that a EUSAK corps commander -be allowed to authorize the attacks, which employed 24 to 36 aircraft. -The Fifth Air Force initially maintained that it should control -Cherokee strikes, just as it did the CAS missions. The matter was -finally resolved in November. - -Following a high-level conference it was decided that attacks inside -the bombline would be subjected to FAF coordination and that a minimal -amount of tactical control would be exercised by the corps commander. -Eighth Army gave a big assist to the Navy by moving the bombline to -within 3,000 meters (nearly two miles) of the outpost line. A line was -also drawn approximately 25 miles beyond the bombline, separating the -area of “general support” from “interdiction.” Thereafter, the Cherokee -strikes were effectively conducted against enemy installations outside -the 3,000-meter line but within 20,000 meters of the ground front. -General Clark, CinCUNC, had high praise for the strikes, which the -Seventh Fleet employed until the end of the war. - -Surface ships of the fleet were in much the same static warfare -situation as the ground and air components of the United Nations -Command. Aside from the Kojo demonstration in mid-October, the -fleet had little diversification in its daily routine other than -to maintain the siege around Wonsan. This operation had started in -mid-February 1951 and had grown from the original plan to seize certain -strategically-placed islands on both coasts into an attempt to isolate -the entire port and city of Wonsan. Each day Allied minesweepers -cleared the harbor; at night the enemy sampan fleet resowed the fields. -Daily, usually during mine-clearing operations, ships of Task Force -95 fired on batteries in the mountains beyond the city and at other -military targets in and around Wonsan. From time to time heavy units -of the Seventh Fleet bombarded the area to keep the enemy off-balance -and to partially deter the solid buildup of Communist arms and defenses -just north of the 39th Parallel. - - -_Events on the Diplomatic Front_[306] - - [306] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Dec 52; Berger, _Korea - Knot_; Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; - Robert Leckie, _Conflict--The History of the Korean - War, 1950–1953_ (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), - hereafter Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_. - -For many of the UNC military personnel, the stalemated combat situation -in Korea had become a depressing, no-win daily routine by the end of -1952. Back in the States, the Korean War was not only unpopular and -ill-supported, but the slow progress of the conflict had also dulled -public interest. In the course of the Presidential election campaign -the question of Korea had become increasingly a matter of widespread -national concern. Two weeks before election day the Republican -candidate, former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,[307] had -vowed to bring the Korean fighting to an end. As a first step toward -accomplishing this he had pledged, if elected, to visit the battlefront. - - [307] Eisenhower had resigned his commission, following his - return to the States in April to seek election. - -Some had labeled Eisenhower’s statement, “I will go to Korea” as a mere -pre-election gesture. The general intended to act on this pledge and, -following his election, began a four-day visit to Korea on 2 December -1952. Part of the President-elect’s brief tour in Korea was spent -at General Pollock’s command post. Here, on 3 December, the Marine -ground chief briefed his future Commander in Chief on current Marine -division operations. Generals Clark, Van Fleet, and Kendall accompanied -Eisenhower and his party. This included General of the Army Omar -Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Charles E. -Wilson and Herbert Brownell, Jr., the new designates for Secretary of -Defense and Attorney General, respectively. - -Though General Eisenhower’s promise to visit Korea personally to see -the situation first-hand and his subsequent election had renewed -American hopes for an early peace in Korea, negotiations there had been -deadlocked since 1951 on the exchange of prisoners. Disagreement on -this issue thus became the major obstacle which was not overcome until -the truce was signed nearly 20 months later. The Communists insisted on -repatriation to their native land of all NKPA and CCF prisoners held -by the United Nations Command. More than 60,000 of the 132,000 enemy -captives held by the UNC in South Korean POW camps did not wish to -return to Communism, a fact which had been borne out by a UN survey. - -To draw attention from this unpopular position the Communists, through -the civil and military links existing in the POW camps, had staged a -series of riots in the spring of 1952. The worst, at Koje Island (just -off the coast of Pusan) lasted six days, largely because the Communist -prisoners planned for, and successfully carried out, the capture of the -UN camp commander. His release, on 12 May, was effected only after the -new commander signed, under duress, a statement which the Communists -immediately exploited in an effort to discredit the validity of the -prisoner survey. - -The propaganda gains had enabled the Communists to occupy a commanding -position at the truce talks. In the meantime, the UN had offered -several plans until, on 28 April, Admiral Joy presented “what we called -our final package proposal.”[308] By instituting the tactic of calling -a recess whenever the Communists had nothing constructive to offer, a -recommendation of Admiral Joy’s, the UN regained the advantage of the -conference table. The talks continued but with no appreciable progress. -On 8 October 1952, after continued Communist intransigence, Brigadier -General William K. Harrison, who had become the senior UN delegate -in late May, took the initiative in recessing the truce talks. This -unexpected action, which caught the enemy off-guard, followed three -separate proposals made by Harrison for ending the POW controversy. -All had been promptly rejected by the Communist delegation. As General -Harrison had informed one of its spokesmen, the North Korean General -Nam Il: - - [308] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 156. The proposal was a - “complete armistice agreement,” not merely another offer - to solve the prisoner question. - - We are not terminating the armistice negotiations, we are merely - recessing them. We are willing to meet with you at any time - that you are ready to accept one of our proposals or to make a - constructive proposal of your own, in writing, which could lead - to an honorable armistice ... Since you have offered nothing - constructive, we stand in recess.[309] - - [309] Quoted in Berger, _Korea Knot_, p. 153. - -After October, while the truce negotiations were in a period of -indefinite recess, liaison officers at Panmunjom kept the channels -of communication open between the Communist and UNC sides. Several -developments along other diplomatic lines about this time were to prove -more fruitful and lead the way to solution of the POW dispute and, in -fact, to the end of the war. - -In mid-November, an attempt was made to end the prisoner exchange -impasse through a resolution introduced by India at the United Nations -session. The compromise measure recognized the United States position, -namely, that force should not be used in returning prisoners to -their homeland. This principle was to become known as the concept of -voluntary repatriation. - -To reconcile the widely conflicting Communist and UNC views on -handling of prisoners, the Indian proposal suggested that a -repatriation commission be established. This body was to be composed -of representatives of two Communist and two Allied nations. It would -function within a designated demilitarized zone in Korea through which -all prisoners would be received and processed. Each prisoner was to be -given a choice of being returned to his homeland or not. Both sides -would have the opportunity of explaining to reluctant nationals “their -rights” of repatriation. If these persuasive efforts failed and a man -still chose not to return to his country, he would then be referred to -a special political conference established by the armistice agreement. - -Should this four-member repatriation commission still not agree on -settlement of the nonrepatriates, a final determination was then to be -made by an official named by the commission or UN General Assembly. -Many UNC nations favored the Indian proposal. U.S. official reaction -was frankly skeptical and critical, well aware that the many vague -aspects of the proposal could easily be exploited by the Communists to -the disadvantage of the individual POW. Despite the promise of a good -many headaches in its implementation, the UN adopted the compromise -Indian resolution in December 1952 by a vote of 54 to 5. - -Later that same month the Executive Committee of the League of Red -Cross Societies, meeting in Geneva, adopted another feature of the -Indian resolution proposing an exchange of sick and wounded POWs in -advance of a truce. As General Clark observed, “It was hardly an -auspicious omen for an armistice, yet it was the action which set in -motion a chain of events which finally resulted in cease-fire.”[310] - - [310] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 240. - -On another front, State Department officials advised the Joint -Chiefs of Staff that a resolution similar to that of the Red Cross -would probably be introduced when the UN reconvened on 24 February. -Following a JCS suggestion that a “feeler” proposition be first made -to the Communists, General Clark wrote the NKPA and CCF leaders on -22 February. His letter was addressed to North Korean Premier Kim Il -Sung and General Peng Teh-huai, the CCF military commander. Delivered -through the Panmunjom liaison officers, it requested the immediate -exchange of sick and wounded POWs. As both diplomatic and military -leaders doubtfully awaited the results, a totally unexpected and -far-reaching event, the death of the Russian leader, Premier Joseph -Stalin, jolted the Communist world. Its repercussions soon extended to -the truce tent at Panmunjom and decisively affected the progress of -negotiations there. - - -_The Marine Commands During the Third Winter_[311] - - [311] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Nov 52-Jan 53; 1stMar - ComdDs, Nov 52-Feb 53; 5thMar ComdD, Dec 52; 7thMar - ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53; 11th Mar ComdDs, Jan-Feb 53; 2/1 - ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Jan 53; MAG-12 ComdD, Jan - 53; MAG-33 ComdD, Oct 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Feb 53. - -Although renewed negotiations to bring the war to a close were -under way with the enemy in late 1952 and early 1953, action on the -battlefield continued the tedious routine of the war. An exception -to the general lethargy across the front occurred on 22 November in -the right regimental sector. A predawn raid was conducted by the 1st -Marines, which had advanced to the front upon relief of the 7th Marines -after their battle of the Hook. With the left and right battalion -sectors manned by 1/1 and 3/1, respectively, Lieutenant Colonel Charles -E. Warren’s 2/1, in regimental reserve, had been ordered to provide -a company to raid Chinese positions across from COPs Reno and Vegas. -Drawing the assignment was Company D (Captain Jay V. Poage). - -Code-named WAKEUP, the raid was conducted in a manner typical of many -earlier forays against Chinese strongpoints. Its results, too, in most -respects were similar to the outcome of previous raids. Artillery -preparation of the objective area was accomplished, the infantry -assaults were somewhat short of the targets due to heavy CCF defensive -fires, and the prisoner-taking part of the mission was unfulfilled. -Counterbalancing this, and what made the raid of value to the regiment, -was the information gained about enemy defenses and Chinese reaction to -the raid. It was one of the rare occasions during which the CCF did not -employ artillery fire while their positions were under attack, using -instead mortars and automatic weapons against Marine assault forces. - -Raids such as WAKEUP, patrols, and ambushes became the pattern of -action in late November and in December. Earlier in November some -changes in the MLR dispositions had taken place. On 3 November, -at 2345, the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch, 29th Infantry -Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division, had relieved 1/7 of the Hook -sector responsibility, ending Marine occupation of that part of -JAMESTOWN.[312] And, on 16 November, the 7th Marines itself had been -replaced in line by the 1st Marines. In between these changes of -command on the frontlines, Generals Pollock and Jerome had received -many congratulations and well wishes from combat commands and from -government officials in the States. The occasion was the 177th birthday -of the Marine Corps. Both of these senior commanders passed on to their -Marines not only the Commandant’s Anniversary message but also the -congratulations of the UNC commander, General Clark. - - [312] At this time a new limiting point between the division - and British division was also established. This slightly - reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed - the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain - somewhat larger reserve units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, - Chap. 8, p. 8-23. - -Though the Commonwealth division had taken over the Hook area from -the infantry Marines, the division’s participation in defense of -the British sector had not completely ended. On 18–19 November, -the 11th Marines expended more than 2,000 rounds to repel Chinese -attacks on the Hook. This firing by the artillery regiment helped to -repay the British for their “cooperation and outstanding artillery -and tank support during the engagements of 26–28 October....”[313] -And as the Commonwealth division commander, Major General M. M. -Austin-Roberts-West, had himself reported to General Pollock the day -following the Hook attack, “All hands on the Hook much appreciated the -prompt and effective support given last night. Grateful if you would -pass on their thanks to all concerned.”[314] - - [313] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6. - - [314] GOC, 1stComWelDiv msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 19 Nov 52, in - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52, App. I, p. 3. - -Throughout December 1952 and January 1953, the lull in ground fighting -continued. Mass Cherokee strikes by Admiral Clark’s Navy and Marine -fliers had begun for the Marine division on 17 December, when the -bombline was moved in nearer to the MLR for expanded operations. In -noncombat activities, later that month Francis Cardinal Spellman, -Archbishop of New York and Vicar for Catholic Chaplains of the Armed -Forces, conducted a Christmas Mass at the division CP. On the 31st, -His Eminence visited the 1st MAW at K-3 (Pohang). There he delivered -an address to about 1,000 Marines, shook hands with nearly all of -them, and later heard confessions for many. Another special guest, not -long afterward, was Episcopal Bishop Austin Pardue, of the Pittsburgh -Diocese, who held Holy Communion at the division chapel. - -The passing of 1952 and the arrival of the new year was not marked by -any special observance on the battlefield. For that matter there was, -it seemed, no change to note; the Marines, like the rest of the Eighth -Army troops, maintained much the same regular, reduced, wintertime -schedule. Activity of Marine infantry units consisted of aggressive -patrolling and raids, and improvement of the secondary defenses of -Lines WYOMING and KANSAS. Units in division reserve, during January, -also participated in MARLEX (Marine Landing Exercise) operations. - -No major ground action had taken place in December, although Marine -patrols, on a half dozen occasions, had engaged as many as 50 enemy -for brief clashes and fire fights. January was a different story, -however. On 8 January, a 7th Marines raiding party, reinforced by -air, artillery, and tank support, skirmished with 85 Chinese in the -Hill 134 area not far from COP 2, overlooking Panmunjom. Ten days -later, the 1st and 7th Marines, together with the artillery regiment, -took part in Operation BIMBO. This was another attempt, by combined -infantry-artillery-tank-air action, to create the impression that CCF -objective areas were under attack. - -BIMBO began with heavy preparatory fires by the 11th Marines, including -the 155mm projectiles hurled by 4/11, that inflicted early damage -to CCF personnel and materiel. At 0630, on 18 January, frontline -battalions of the two participating infantry regiments opened -fire; reserve battalions assisted with indirect machine gun fire. -Armored vehicles added to the effect of the ruse by shelling Chinese -emplacements from prepared MLR positions. Marine attack planes streaked -in to unload flaming napalm. In response to the BIMBO mock attack, the -Chinese directed mortar fire into suspected Marine avenues of approach -and assembly areas. Forward observers on JAMESTOWN could detect some -enemy troop movement. (Marine artillery took these formations under -intensive fire), but as in similar feint operations in the past, -the enemy again failed to pick up the bait. The operation lasted -approximately an hour and a half. - -During the winter months, a number of command changes had occurred in -the Marines’ combat organizations in Korea. In the 1st Marine Aircraft -Wing, the rotation of commanders began at the very top when, on 8 -January, General Jerome handed over the wing colors to Major General -Vernon E. Megee. During a ceremony at wing headquarters that day, Air -Force Generals Weyland and Barcus paid tribute to General Jerome’s -“exceptionally meritorious service” as 1st MAW CG since April 1952 by -presenting him with the Distinguished Service Medal. - -The incoming wing commander, General Megee, had been a Marine flyer for -20 years, having received his wings in 1932. His Marine Corps career -began more than a decade earlier, with enlistment in 1919. Commissioned -in 1922, he served in infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets -before undergoing pilot training in 1931. Following school, staff, and -command assignments, Major Megee was named advisor to the Peruvian -Minister of Aviation from 1940–1943. During World War II, Colonel Megee -was sent overseas as 3d MAW Chief of Staff in early 1944. As Commander, -Control Unit One, he participated in the Iwo Jima campaign, earning -the Legion of Merit. Later, at Okinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps -Landing Force Air Support Control Units. After promotion to brigadier -general in 1949, General Megee was named Chief of Staff, FMFLant. -Receiving his second star in 1951, he served as Commanding General -at Cherry Point, El Toro, and Air FMFPac prior to his assignment in -Korea.[315] - - [315] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Vernon E. Megee, 1959. - -Within the wing and the division, every one of the top commands -experienced changes of commanding officers in late 1952 and early 1953: - - 1st Marines--Colonel Hewitt D. Adams took over from Colonel Layer - on 21 November; - - 5th Marines--Colonel Lewis W. Walt relieved Colonel Smoak on 10 - December; - - 7th Marines--Colonel Loren E. Haffner took command from Colonel - Moore on 5 November; - - 11th Marines--Colonel James E. Mills vice Colonel Sea on 22 - February; - - MACG-2--Colonel Kenneth D. Kerby relieved Colonel Jack R. Cram on - 16 February; - - MAG-12--Colonel George S. Bowman, Jr. vice Colonel Condon on 13 - January; - - MAG-33--Colonel Louis B. Robertshaw succeeded Colonel Herbert - Williamson on 22 October. - - -_1st MAW Operations 1952–1953_[316] - - [316] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5, Chap. 9 and No. - 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, - Oct 52, Jan-Feb 53; MAG-12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar - 53; MAG-33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan-Mar 53; VMA-121 ComdDs, - Nov-Dec 52, VMF-115 ComdDs, Nov-Dec 52; VMF(N)-513 - ComdDs, Oct 52-Jan 53; HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov-Dec - 52, Jan 53; Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Montross, _SkyCav_. - -The heavy ground fighting across the Eighth Army front in October 1952 -had drawn heavily upon units of the 1st MAW. That month Marine pilots -logged their greatest number of sorties--3,897--since June 1951.[317] -As a result of the intense infantry action in the 1st Marine Division -sector another air record was established--365 casualty evacuations -by HMR-161 during October. This was a peak number to that time for -the helicopter transport squadron for which med evac was a secondary -mission. These “mercy missions” were not limited only to wounded Marine -infantrymen or downed aviators. - - [317] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443 - for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions - numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air - reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52. - -Whenever and wherever immediate air rescue was needed, the choppers -were sent. In July 1952, HMR-161 evacuated “650 Army and Air Force -troops as well as 150 Koreans”[318] from a flooded river island. On the -night of 18 January 1953, a helicopter retrieved five Marines from an -uncharted minefield after one of the group had accidentally stepped on -a mine. On 13 March, HMR-161 sent three helicopters aloft in an attempt -to save five men from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion who had -become trapped in mud near the edge of the Imjin, and later that month -the squadron dispatched a chopper to rescue a hunter marooned in the -middle of the Han River. - - [318] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 189. - -Almost obscured in the magnificent record of the mercy missions, -especially the hazardous casualty evacuations by the VMO-6 pilots, were -the problems encountered by the observation and helicopter squadrons. -Under operational control of the division and administrative control of -the wing, the squadrons found themselves exposed to overlapping command -authority which sometimes resulted in conflicting directives from -higher headquarters. Some squadron personnel felt that establishment -of a helicopter group under the 1st MAW might have solved many of the -organizational problems, but such a unit was never established in -Korea, partly because only one helicopter squadron (plus half of the -observation squadron) existed. - -Another organizational difficulty beset VMO-6. With two types of -aircraft and two unrelated missions (med evac for the HTL and HO5S -copters; observation and artillery spotting for its little OYs and, -later, OE-1s), the squadron found supply and maintenance problems -doubled and operational control of its rotary and fixed wing sections -extremely complex. Attachment of the VMO-6 choppers (for evacuation, -administrative, and liaison missions) to HMR-161 was suggested as a -possible solution to these difficulties, but was never done. - -Other problem areas became apparent during the winter of 1952–1953. -Accompanying the freezing weather were difficulties in starting and, -for a brief time, in flying the helicopters. In order to overcome the -engine starting problem on emergency evacuation missions, HMR-161 -preheated its number one standby aircraft every two hours during the -extreme cold. Dilution of engine oil with gasoline and use of warming -huts (the latter, a scarcity) were also employed to cut down cold -weather starting time. - -Not related to freezing Korean temperatures were two additional -problems, one navigational and the other mechanical. In January, the -helicopter squadron put into use a jeep-mounted homing device for -operations in reduced visibility. It proved unsatisfactory due to -interference from other radio transmitters in the area, a difficulty -never resolved during the rest of the war. The mechanical problem -lay with the rotary winged aircraft in HMR-161. On 27 March, all of -its HRS-2 choppers with more than 200 hours on the main rotor blades -were grounded. Discovery in the States that minute .002-inch cuts on -the blade surface had occurred during fabrication resulted in the -grounding. New blades were promptly flown to Korea from both Japan and -the United States, and the squadron again became fully operational on 2 -April. - -Evaluation of transport helicopter techniques continued during the -period despite ever-present minor difficulties. At least one new -HMR-161 tactical maneuver was scheduled each month to evaluate existing -procedures and determine full operational capabilities of the aircraft. -During these landing exercises both the infantry and helicopter -commanders and their staffs had the opportunity to further develop -vertical envelopment techniques that would soon be the new trademark of -U.S. Marine Corps operations. - -Most of the time HMR-161 operations drew more attention than those of -VMO-6, but pilots in the latter unit had a host of division Marines who -could attest to the skills and critical role performed by helicopter -fliers in the composite observation squadron. VMO-6 had pioneered the -night casualty evacuation service, and during the active fighting in -Korea, had flown out more than 1,000 Marines from frontline medical -facilities to better-equipped ones in the rear areas. These flights -were made in all kinds of weather and without the benefit of adequate -instrumentation or a homing device. No other Eighth Army helicopter -unit made regularly scheduled night frontline evacuations.[319] - - [319] A relatively small number of night med evac flights was - also being flown by HMR-161. During March 1953, for - example, in transferring 283 casualties to the hospital - ships, squadron helicopters made only 15 flights at night. - -The courage of these VMO-6 pilots was recalled nearly 15 years later by -a former executive officer of the 1st Marines: - - The flying of the evacuation helicopters from the jury-rigged - and inadequate landing sites was nothing short of miraculous. - I’ve always contended those pilots of the observation squadron - received far less credit than they deserved. They used to fly - at night, to frontline landing strips, where I had difficulty - walking without barking my shins.[320] - - [320] Col Glenn R. Long ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd - 11 Jun 67. - -During the latter part of 1952 and the first months of 1953, 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing command relationships underwent a significant -change. On 26 January 1953, General Megee forwarded a memorandum -request to General Barcus. The paper outlined specific recommendations -for restoring 1st MAW tactical elements to wing operational control, -even though the Marine wing would continue as a tactical component -of Fifth Air Force. In the proposal, CG, 1st MAW pointed out (as had -his predecessors) that the existing command structure, in effect, -completely bypassed the Marine wing commander. It had prevented him -from exercising normal tactical command functions, even though he was -fully responsible for the performance of his air groups and squadrons -to FEAF/FAF orders. The 1st MAW commander’s proposal was intended -to counter previous Air Force objections and demonstrate that more -normal command relations would “enhance, rather than reduce [1st MAW] -operational efficiency and effectiveness.”[321] - - [321] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-76. - -At the same time, having been informally advised in an earlier -conversation that CG, FAF would approve at least some of the requests -made, General Megee implemented changes in his G-2 and G-3 staff -sections. This reorganization was aimed at carrying out the increased -functions which would result from approval of the request. Operational -control of Marine tactical squadrons by FAF since 1951 had “relegated -1st MAW to the status of an administrative headquarters, forcing its -G-2 and G-3 sections partially to atrophy.”[322] To effect the changes -in command relationships and establish the wing on an operational -basis, the G-2 and G-3 sections were expanded. By the nature of -their organization these were not capable of either targeting or -tactical planning. In the intelligence section, a Target Information -Sub-section was established to compile data on the mission targets (and -accompanying photographs) received from FAF and to evaluate the desired -objectives. - - [322] _Ibid._ - -Upon receipt of this information, the G-3 planning group accomplished -the target solution, prepared general tactics for conducting the -strike, (number of planes, amount and kind of ordnance, approach routes -to be used) and provided post-strike target evaluation. The chiefs -of these sections jointly presented the completed information to the -wing commander each afternoon. He selected the targets and forwarded -via teletype and air courier to the wing G-3 representative at FAF -headquarters a report of intended operations, providing a lead time of -36–48 hours. - -As soon as the OP INTENT (Operations Intentions Report) was on its way -to General Barcus for approval, the 1st MAW intelligence section began -to prepare the target dossiers (including photographs, flak analysis, -and related identification information) on each of the approved -targets. The compiled dossiers were then sent to the appropriate -tactical squadron. At this point, still perhaps a half-day before -issuance of the FAF orders, the squadrons received two major advantages -over the previous system: - - (1) Adequate photo intelligence employed for the first time since - FAF had assumed operational control of 1st MAW; and - - (2) A substantial lead time advantage for proper briefing of - pilots and arming of aircraft. - -After the strike, and usually within an hour, Marine planes -photographed the targets for damage assessment. These photos were -annotated and an assessment report prepared. This information was -then presented by the G-2 and G-3 to the wing commander. Immediately -thereafter, prints of the photographs were distributed to the -appropriate tactical units, thus making post-strike photography more -freely available on a regular basis to the participating tactical units. - -In a letter dated 18 February, General Barcus approved most of the -1st MAW commander’s specific requests, but retained full control over -General Megee’s squadrons used in close air support. This was due to -the fact that EUSAK-FAF joint policy required CAS mission requests to -be approved by JOC, in accordance with daily Eighth Army priorities, -which allocated the aircraft for each request. Returned to operational -control of the Marine wing were planes used on interdiction, armed -reconnaissance and general support activities--the planes on strikes -beyond the bombline, the photo, and all-weather (night) squadrons. -FAF also retained control over assignment of missions to VMC-1, the -electronics unit. - -Although some of the Marine wing tactical squadrons thus newly enjoyed -the advantages of flying under their own commander’s wings, 1st MAW -headquarters staff members had to pay for these benefits. An increased -work load swamped the G-2 section, where 7 photo interpreters were -kept busy 16 hours a day, 7 days a week. Marine personnel processed -and reviewed an average of 100,000 prints per month and these were -“only those from that portion of the VMJ-1 effort devoted to 1st -MAW operations.”[323] Expansion of 1st MAW headquarters to set up -a tactical planning capability pointed to a deficiency in the wing -organization T/O, a weakness that existed during the rest of the war. - - [323] _Ibid._, p. 10-80. - -While General Barcus earlier had General Megee’s recommendations -under study, a radio news broadcast back in the States momentarily -resulted in poor publicity for the Marine Corps. On 1 February a -nationally syndicated columnist reported instances in which friendly -troops had been bombed and strafed by U.S. aircraft. Marine Corps -planes were the most careless, the broadcaster alleged, basing his -statement on incomplete information. The news story had developed from -an unfortunate publicity release issued by FEAF dealing with a MAG-33 -incident. The phrasing implied that Marine aviators were “guilty of -gross carelessness resulting in casualties among their own ground -troops.”[324] - - [324] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-81. - -Actually, of the 63 incidents in which friendly casualties had resulted -from aircraft flown by FAF units between January and October 1952, -1st MAW pilots were responsible for 18, or 28.5 percent of the total -number of incidents and majority of casualties. What was left unsaid, -however, in the unfavorable publicity was that with approximately 14.5 -percent of the aircraft represented in FEAF, Marine fliers had been -accomplishing monthly totals of between 30 to 40 percent of all Eighth -Army CAS missions. They also performed virtually all of the very close -air support jobs (50 to 100 yards out from the MLR) which further -reduced the comparative percentage of Marine “carelessness.” - -It was true, of course, that on rare occasions freak accidents did -kill and injure UN troops, despite the continual training of pilots -and controllers in strike procedures and target identification. The -position taken by the two senior Marine commanders in Korea was -that although any CAS incident involving friendly troops was highly -regrettable, it was in the same category as “short” mortar and -artillery rounds and just as unavoidable. - -Target identification, low visibility flying conditions, and ballistic -computations made the task of precision close air support an enormous -one. If anything, it was almost a wonder that more accidents did -not happen. Despite the similarity of Korean geography, an unending -panorama of almost identical hilltops, ridges, and streams, the pilot -had to release ordnance at the proper altitude and speed, and in a -balanced (trim) flight. While conducting his dive the pilot’s view -could be blocked by cloud formations and his attention distracted by -antiaircraft fire which required evasive action. Even when the ordnance -had been properly released, prevailing wind conditions could affect -the flight path of the bombs. This, in addition to human error and -mechanical factors, such as the occasional malfunctioning of parts, -also affected the accuracy of bombing. - -Throughout the November 1952-March 1953 period, 1st MAW squadrons -continued to provide the bulk of close air sorties to the 1st Marine -Division, in keeping with General Barcus’ policy stated earlier in -1952. Between November and January there had been a lull in the heavy -ground fighting that had prevailed in October and little need to -request air strikes. When enemy forces opposing the division began to -grow more active in February, however, the requirement for air support -to 1st MarDiv greatly increased. During this month 1st MAW aviators -reached an all-time high in the percentage of their total CAS sorties -devoted to the division--two of every three wing close support sorties -went to General Pollock’s infantry regiments. - -On the critical issue of close air support, the Marine division had -become better satisfied by the end of 1952 with the quantity of air -support received from FAF. A continuing difficulty, however, was the -delayed response to requests for immediate CAS. For the wing, several -other conditions existed which bothered General Megee. One was that the -VMA-312 carrier-based squadron was not utilized to any great extent -in execution of CAS missions. This detrimental condition saddled the -wing commander with an “unqualified” squadron. It also prevented pilots -from practicing a highly developed skill they were responsible for -maintaining, although later in the war this condition was gradually -alleviated. Two other difficulties--centralized control of CAS -mission assignments by JOC and the prevailing differences between -the Marine and Air Force/Army CAS communications systems and request -procedures--were never rectified.[325] - - [325] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-80. - -One long-standing difficulty, though not a CAS matter, had been solved -early in the winter. Following a series of mechanical troubles with the -F3D-2 aircraft in VMF(N)-513 and prolonged delay in receipt of blast -tube extensions for its 20mm guns, the squadron finally became fully -operational on 1 November with its complement of 12 of the new jet -Skyknight aircraft. Almost as soon as the F3D-2s were ready for night -work, FEAF had put them to escorting B-29s on bombing runs over North -Korea. With the F3D escort and changes in B-29 tactics, bomber losses, -which had been severe, decreased sharply. Enemy attackers became fewer -and fewer so that by February, air-to-air opposition was encountered -only infrequently. Instead of sending up groups of night fighters at -the escorted B-29s, the enemy would fly a single jet across the bomber -formation. If a Skyknight followed, one or two MIG-15s, well to the -rear and higher than the decoy, would attempt to gun down the Skyknight -in its pursuit. But because of the F3D tail warning radar, the Marine -radar operator could detect the enemy plane in its approach for the -kill before it got within effective firing range. - -Lieutenant Colonel Hutchinson’s VMF(N)-513 pilots soon established -an enviable record for Marine aviation, netting by 31 January five -enemy jets without loss of a single F3D. In addition to the jets, the -squadron downed a piston engine plane and scored a probable destruct on -another. During its first three months of operations with the Douglas -Skyknights--the first Navy-Marine jet night-fighter to arrive in the -Korean combat theater--the squadron earned two night-kill records. It -also quickly proved the design theory and proposed tactics for the -Skyknights that enemy aircraft could be located, intercepted, and -destroyed purely by electronic means. - -While on a night combat air patrol in the vicinity of Sinuiju airfield -early on 3 November, Master Sergeant H. C. Hoglind picked up a contact -on his intercept radar, which a ground radar station had passed on -to him, and notified the pilot, Major William T. Stratton, Jr. After -losing and reestablishing radar contact, Major Stratton made a visual -sighting of a jet exhaust straight ahead. When he had been cleared to -proceed, the Flying Nightmare’s pilot sent three bursts of 20mm into -the other plane, identified as a YAK-15. Three explosions followed and -the aircraft plunged towards the airfield directly below. This marked -the first time that an enemy jet had been destroyed at night by use of -airborne intercept radar equipment in a jet fighter. - -Five days later the team of Captain Oliver R. Davis and Warrant Officer -Dramus F. Fessler bagged the first MIG-15 for the squadron. Captain -Davis expended only 20 rounds of 20mm cannon fire in his aerial -victory, which took place northwest of Pyongyang near the Yellow Sea. - -The next two months brought new distinction to Marines in -513. Shortly -after dark on 10 December, First Lieutenant Joseph A. Corvi had -departed on a night combat patrol mission. About 35 miles northwest of -Chinnampo, his radar operator, Master Sergeant D. R. George, picked up -a target on his scope. Since the “bogey” (an unidentified aircraft, -believed to be hostile) was three miles distant, the pilot quickly -closed on the contact and shot it down. Almost immediately another -blip appeared on the radar screen. Lieutenant Corvi turned to the new -attack and began approaching it, but because of the slower speed of -the enemy plane the Marine pilot was able to fire only one short burst -before overtaking it. An instant before passing the enemy aircraft, -Lieutenant Corvi saw it disappear from the radar screen, but neither -member of the Flying Nightmares crew had made a visual sighting with -the plane itself, listed as a probable kill. What these two Marines -had accomplished with their earlier encounter was the first attempt to -destroy an enemy aircraft without use of a visual sighting by means of -lock-on radar gear. - -All-weather squadron crews continued to demonstrate the F3D-2 -capability for destruction of hostile aircraft by electronic intercept -during January. The first MIG-15 downed was by Major Elswin P. (Jack) -Dunn and Master Sergeant Lawrence J. Fortin, his radar operator. On 28 -January Captain James R. Weaver and Master Sergeant Robert P. Becker -destroyed another of the Russian fighter-interceptors in an aerial -duel. The final kill came on the 31st when the new squadron commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Conley (who had taken over VMF(N)-513 on -the 20th) accompanied by Master Sergeant James M. Scott bagged the -Marine fighter pilots’ 12th MIG of the war. - -While VMF(N)-513 wrote several records in the sky, other MAG-33 and --12 squadrons also made their contribution during the winter of -1952–1953. In MAG-12, a highly successful noontime strike was launched -on 16 November by 21 attack planes from VMAs-121 and -212 against a -hydroelectric plant 25 miles southeast of Wonsan. For this exploit the -group received the plaudits of the Fifth Air Force CG, General Barcus. -Lieutenant Colonel John B. Maas, Jr.’s VMF-115 (he had succeeded -Lieutenant Colonel Coin as CO on 29 September) helped all Marines -celebrate their 177th birthday by sending 22 Panthers against enemy -troops and supply shelters. On these strikes each MAG-33 aircraft -was armed with 760 rounds of 20mm and 4 napalm tanks (500 pounds -each), the first time that 4 tanks that large had been dropped from -a fighter-bomber. This was part of the 98 sorties flown by 1st MAW -against 21 enemy targets on the 10 November anniversary date. During -December 1952, the frequency of combat flights by VMF-115 enabled the -squadron to surpass its old (August 1951) monthly sortie record. The -Panther jet fliers set this new mark of 726 effective sorties in the -last 31 days of the year. - -More honors came to wing pilots in the new year. On 8 January, three -MAG-12 squadrons flew more than 28 combat sorties. Some, in support -of the 1st Marine Division near the Panmunjom corridor, by VMAs-121, --212, and -323, produced outstanding results, earning the praise of -General Pollock. Among the participating pilots was Lieutenant Colonel -Barnett Robinson (VMA-212), who a week earlier had taken command of the -squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Dobson. - -Between 9–14 January, MAG-33 participated in a USAF-USMC joint -operation to strike the rail system at Sinanju, 45 miles north of -the enemy capital, and at Yongmi-dong, to the northwest across both -the Chongchon and Taedong Rivers. During the six-day Operation -PARALYSIS, Marine and Air Force jet squadrons flew flak suppression and -interdiction missions, knocking out ground-based air defense weapons -and damaging and destroying bridges, rails, and rolling stock. At night -FEAF Bomber Command, with Flying Nightmare escorts, worked over the -communications net, including repair facilities; during daylight, the -fighter-bombers attacked marshalling yards near Sinanju, where railroad -cars were stacked up awaiting repair of the river bridges. Bomb -assessments and intelligence reports showed that two major rail lines -were inoperative for 16 days and that, as General Barcus had predicted, -the Chinese “hurriedly increased their antiaircraft defenses in the -Chongchon estuary and shot down seven fighter-bombers.”[326] - - [326] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 582. - -Following this operation, Colonel Robertshaw’s jets from VMFs-115 and --311 achieved extremely effective close air support in strikes flown -24 January in the I Corps area. About a month later, with an F9F as -an airborne command post and with Lieutenant Colonel Walt Bartosh on -his wing, the MAG-33 commander directed the operations of 208 USAF and -Marine aircraft on another mass strike. The two-day mission was flown -on 18–19 February against the North Korean tank and infantry school -southwest of Pyongyang. More than 240 buildings were destroyed in 379 -sorties. The attack was one of the largest all-jet fighter-bomber -strikes of the war. Colonel Robertshaw thereby became the first Marine -to lead such a large joint air-strike force from a CP aloft. And the -next month, on 8 March, the Group CO flew the first Marine jet night -MPQ mission, dropping six 250-pound bombs from an F9F-2 Panther on an -enemy ammunition dump. - - -_Behind the Lines_[327] - - [327] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. - 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs. Jan-Feb 53; 1/1 ComdD, - Feb 53; HMR-161 ComdD, Feb 53; Montross, _SkyCav_. - -The Marine aviation command, like the division, found that its -commitment to a large-scale land campaign in Korea considerably -increased its requirements for nonorganic support, compared with -normal amphibious combat operations. The wing fell heir to more of the -permanent problems because its organization was less suited to the -heavy support requirements of prolonged combat. Whereas the 1st Marine -Division received adequate support through the FMFPac Service Command, -the wing did not since the service command had been tailored more -for support of ground organizations. Moreover, the command relations -established in Korea underscored this situation, with the 1st Combat -Service Group placed under CG, 1st Marine Division. The wing received -emergency logistical support from VMR (Marine transport squadron) -units. This was not an adequate substitute for the various ground -support agencies essential for employment of the wing’s full combat -potential. - -Major problems pertaining to service and support functions of 1st -MAW units resulted from the use of amphibious Tables of Organization -throughout the period of prolonged land combat without making a T/O -adjustment for the actual combat mission being performed. What the -wing had recommended to solve its longstanding support and supply -problems was either to strengthen its organic logistical structure -or to increase it by the attachment of appropriate units. It was -emphasized that “prolonged Wing operations under Air Force control with -logistical support derived from four different services, each at the -end of its supply pipeline, brought clearly into focus the requirement -for centralized control and monitoring of Wing requisitions and -supplies.”[328] - - [328] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-133. - -A step toward expanding the amphibious T/O of the wing was made in 1953 -with the request from CG, 1st MAW to CG, FMFPac for a detachment of the -1st Combat Service Group to provide electronics logistical support. It -was further recommended that the electronics section be made organic to -the wing to meet its need for this type of service unit. - -Unlike the division, existing T/Os made it impossible for the wing to -consolidate and control resupply requests from subordinate units and -then to monitor the requisitions until parts or supplies were received -by the users. This lack of a central wing supply agency had, for some -time, impaired the effective, sustained performance of 1st MAW ground -electronics equipment in Korea. CG, FMFPac concurred with the proposal. -He requested an increase in the wing T/O of four additional electronics -supply personnel to be attached to the wing for this purpose. The basic -problem of establishment of a combat service group tailored to fully -meet 1st MAW needs in the field remained unresolved, however. - -Supply problems in the division were less complicated. On 11 November -1952, General Pollock submitted a letter to the theater commander -requesting approval of a special list of equipment in excess of -certain Tables of Organization and Equipment within the division. The -requirements of the Marine land war mission in Korea dictated the need -for additional equipment, primarily crew-served weapons and automatic -rifles. Approval was given on 19 January 1953 by CG, AFFE (Army Forces, -Far East). All equipment received through this program was to be -returned upon the departure of the Marine division from Korea. - -During the cold months that ended in March 1953, the division continued -its evaluation of experimental clothing and equipment. Items of winter -wear generally proved to be highly satisfactory. The thermal boot, in -particular, gave excellent service. On the other hand, the leather -combat boot did not fully measure up to expectations. Most of its -deficiencies were caused by the rapid wearing of the composition sole. -One clothing item, the armored vest, had undergone further testing. In -November, delivery of the vests to the division had been completed, -including 400 sets of the new lower torso armor. Recent issue of this -additional type of body armor appeared highly effective in reducing -combat casualties; its extended coverage also raised morale. - -Though their ability to halt successfully a Chinese bullet or exploding -shell was being improved on, thanks to armored wear, the Marines’ -opportunity to keep the enemy from division outposts or MLR areas was -still being hampered by occasional ammunition shortages. From time to -time during the winter months there was some relief from the grenade -and howitzer firing restrictions that had been in effect before the -Hook fighting. The cutback on use of 81mm mortar shells continued, -however, as the supply level of these projectiles remained dangerously -low. - -A new shortage, this one in fuel, developed during the winter. In -January 1953 it became necessary to reduce the distribution of -gasoline for motor vehicles to .829 gallons per man per day, a drop -of 17 percent from the previous month’s allocation. Diesel fuel was -cut back to 1.41 gallons, or 7 percent less than the December ration. -By February, however, the crisis had passed and vehicles returned to -a less restricted operating schedule. No extreme hardship had been -experienced by the Marines during the fuel drought. It was considered -that “prolonged operation under such restrictions would result in a -marked decrease in efficiency since many essential activities may be -temporarily postponed, although not entirely eliminated.”[329] - - [329] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3. - -The month of February also witnessed the largest helicopter supply lift -in Korea, HAYLIFT I, the previous September, had tested the feasibility -of transporting Class I, III, and V supplies to a frontline infantry -regiment for five consecutive days. HMR-161 and the 7th Marines had -turned out an excellent test performance of the rotary craft in this -logistical operation. It then became the task for the infantry and -helicopters to run a resupply operation for two frontline regiments for -a five-day period. HAYLIFT II, conducted 23–27 February, was the code -name for this test. - -Both the planning and execution of the February operation followed -the general pattern of HAYLIFT I, but on a much larger scale. As in -September, division ordnance and service battalions moved the supplies -to helicopter loading zones near Lieutenant Colonel Carey’s HMR-161 -air strip. It had been estimated that 130 tons each day would have to -be lifted to supply the two MLR regiments, the 7th and 5th Marines. -On the first day, this figure was exceeded by 30 tons. A request -by A/1/5 on 24 February for support during an emergency operation -necessitated additional ammunition[330] and helicopters to be diverted -from those resupplying the 7th Marines. By the third day, a backlog of -supplies had accumulated in the loading areas. In order to eliminate -this buildup and to replace ammunition expended that morning by 1/5, -HMR-161 on 25 February transported 200 tons in a single day, thereby -establishing a new record. This represented 392 lifts made in 138.4 -hours flying time. Maximum time for unloading a chopper was 54 seconds; -the minimum, 28 seconds. - - [330] The following month, HMR-161 engaged in a four-day - ammunition resupply operation for the division. Except - for one day, the 22d, all available helicopters were - assigned to that mission, beginning 20 March. HMR-161 - also had a new CO by that time, Colonel Owen A. Chambers - who had taken over from Lieutenant Colonel Carey on 15 - March. - -The last two days of HAYLIFT II, although less eventful, contributed -to a resupply tonnage record five times greater than that set by -HAYLIFT I. On the last day, when fog grounded their aircraft for a -second time during the morning, Marines were again reminded of an -operational limitation of the helicopters. In the end, though, the -accomplishments far out-weighed this shortcoming. During the five -days, a total of 1,612,406 pounds of supplies had been lifted to the -two frontline regiments. Not one crewman or helicopter was lost. The -operation contributed significantly to the February record for the -greatest number of combat hours (765), total hours (1,275.5), combat -flights (575), and total flights (1,183) flown by HMR-161 for any -one-month period during the Korean fighting. For the rest of the war, -the February 1953 gross lift of 2,018,120 pounds would also rank as the -largest amount transported by HMR-161 for a single month. - - -_The Quiet Sectors_[331] - - [331] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: KPR ComdDs, Jun, Aug, Oct-Dec 52, Jan-Mar - 53; 1st AmTracBn ComdDs, Mar-Dec 52, Jan-Mar 53. - -Two frontline units in the division MLR seldom became involved in -setting records or bitter contests with the enemy, even though they -carried out important roles in the sector defense. These were the -Kimpo Provisional Regiment and 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, both -located on the left flank of the Marine line. The Kimpo Provisional -Regiment had been organized as a component of the 1st Marine Division -a week after its arrival in the west, specifically for defending that -vital sector at the extreme left of the UNC line. The next month the -1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been assigned part of Line KANSAS -between the KPR and KMC sectors. - -Because it was set apart from the Korean mainland on the north and east -by the Han River,[332] Kimpo Peninsula afforded little opportunity -for its occupants to engage the enemy directly in infantry clashes. -Artillery thus became the normal medium for carrying on the limited -hostilities as they existed in this sector between the Communists -and UNC opponents. Hostile forces opposing the KPR were deployed -in company-sized strongpoints across the river, occupying numerous -fortified heights on the north bank of the Han estuary. Enemy -strength[333] was estimated to be 7 infantry companies, supported by -7 artillery batteries and 40 mortar positions. Sporadic mortar and -artillery rounds fell in the sector, with little harm. Occasionally, -enemy counterbattery fire caused minor damage to the LVTs of the -command. During 1952, the first year of the existence of the Kimpo -regiment, 15 June had stood as the record day for the number of enemy -artillery rounds received. Between 1900–2100 a total of 588 shells had -fallen in the sector. - - [332] On the west, the Yom River similarly separates the Kimpo - Peninsula from Kanghwa-do Island, second in size of all - Korean islands and a base for friendly intelligence - operations. - - [333] Identified as elements of the 195th CCF Division of the - 65th CCF Army and an unidentified CCF division, in a - revised EOOB issued in December. Previously, units of the - 193d CCF Division were at the front in this far western - sector. KPR ComdDs, Oct-Dec 52. - -As part of its normal defense mission, personnel of the regiment -spent a large part of their time controlling civilians and regulating -traffic, especially water travel. Certain counterintelligence -problems confronted the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. A large civilian -population, numbering nearly 80,000 natives, lived within the -regimental sector. Local restrictions set by the National Police on -Kimpo (who cooperated with the KPR in security matters) included the -STAYBACK LINE to the north of the peninsula. As a rule, no civilians -other than those with daytime farming permits, were allowed beyond this -line. Numerous regulations were also issued to control boat traffic. -Surrounded by rivers on three sides, there was ample opportunity for -enemy agents or line crossers to infiltrate the defense line, despite -continuous screening by friendly outposts and waterborne patrols. - -Two months after the “heavy” June shelling came the August floods, -which were more destructive than the artillery had been. The rest of -the summer and fall followed a fairly regular, uneventful pattern with -customary defense duties, rotation of frontline units, and training -exercises. Among the latter were four helicopter demonstrations in -October and a five-hour communication CPX (Command Post Exercise) the -following month. - -One episode toward the end of the year created a temporary stir in -the daily routine. In late November, two Communist espionage agents -and their North Korean guides were apprehended on the west bank of -the Han, almost directly east of the Kimpo Airfield. They had crossed -the Imjin-Han Rivers by boat, using this normal infiltration route to -penetrate the Marine defense net. The agents were seized by National -Police on 22 November and their North Korean guides two days later. It -was unusual for agents and guides to be captured so closely together. -Normal defense measures of the peninsula had assigned separate -northern, western, and southern sector units for protection against -possible amphibious or overland attacks or--far more likely--enemy -infiltration. - -The following month four more “roving” two-man outposts were -established in the western coastal area of the southern sector. -Manned from sunset to 30 minutes after sunrise daily by either KPR -military personnel or National Police, the outposts occupied different -positions each night. They were responsible for checking for proper -identification and enforcing the rigid 2100–0500 curfew hours. Another -unusual occurrence took place the last four nights of December when a -single-engine light aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets in Colonel -Harvey C. Tschirgi’s[334] sector. - - [334] Colonel Tschirgi had taken command of the KPR on 1 - December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who previously - relieved Colonel Staab (the original KPR commander) on 31 - August. - -Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dobervich, the 1st Amphibian Tractor -Battalion (minus Company A at KPR, and Company B at Pohang), reinforced -by the Division Reconnaissance Company, had manned positions on the -KANSAS line since April 1952. By the end of May, the battalion had -inserted an additional unit, a provisional company,[335] in the -KANSAS secondary defense line. In July, the amtrac company relieved -the reconnaissance company on line, the latter then becoming part of -Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. All amphibian tractor -battalion units assigned to ground defense missions received special -refresher training in infantry operations, including the employment of -forward observers. - - [335] Comprising a platoon from Company B and several - headquarters elements, the provisional company was - disbanded on 14 June when Company B that had been - supporting MAG-33 at Pohang was reassigned to the - battalion. - -During the first summer in the west, the mainland-based amphibian -organization continued its KANSAS defense mission. The battalion also -instituted a training program for patrolling the Han River by tractor. -(Company A, attached to the KPR, had conducted waterborne patrols of -the Yom since June. The unit also manned outposts along that river.) -Headquarters and Service Company assisted the U.S. Army in laying a -signal cable across the river during August, the same month Lieutenant -Colonel Dobervich relinquished unit command to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin -B. Wheeler. In late August the battalion sent 58 of its members to help -augment 1st Marines ranks, thinned by the fierce Bunker Hill fighting. - -Through the end of 1952, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion continued -its KANSAS mission. Although the sector had witnessed relatively -little action for some months, several incidents about this time -varied the generally quiet daily routine. In October, Company B (Major -Charles W. Fitzmaurice) sent out an amphibious patrol to capture -prisoners (Operation CAT WHISKER). The plan was to cross the Han in -a rubber boat and set up an ambush after reaching the enemy shore, -but a storm-angered river, with a strong tide boosted by heavy winds, -prevented landing of the boat. Two months later, another snare--this -one set by the enemy--was partially successful. Several hours after -dark on 1 December, the jeep assigned to the battalion commander, Major -George S. Saussy, Jr.,[336] was being driven on the MSR by Private -First Class Billy J. Webb, its operator and only occupant. - - [336] Formerly the executive officer, Major Saussy took over - unit command on 7 November, when Lieutenant Colonel - Wheeler was transferred to the 5th Marines. Lieutenant - Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., became the next - commanding officer on 16 March 1953. - -Suddenly shots rang out from the side of the road. Within a few -seconds, 23 bullets from a Russian-made submachine gun had struck the -jeep; the driver, astonishingly, received only a knee wound. No trace -of the ambushers could be found by the friendly patrol dispatched to -investigate the incident. An activity of an entirely different nature -that same month was the assignment of battalion LVTs to break up the -heavily encrusted ice that had formed around and endangered supports of -three bridges in the I Corps area. A rash of minor incidents involving -would-be, but unsuccessful, enemy infiltrators also took place during -the winter months in the amtrac sector. In November, three agents -attempted to cross the Imjin on their way to the division area, but -were engaged by a battalion patrol. After a brief fire fight, friendly -artillery was called down on the retreating boat and it was believed -destroyed. Enemy agents on foot were engaged by National Police or -Marine listening posts again in January and March and deterred from -their espionage missions. - -Commitment to an infantry role in the KANSAS line, meanwhile, had -permitted little time for operation of the battalion tractors. In -December, construction began on a storage park for those LVTs not in -use. By placing the non-operating tracked vehicles in a single area, -the battalion could handle routine maintenance with just a few men. -This facility, located at Ascom City, was completed early in 1953. -By March, a total of 34 tractors had been placed there in caretaker -status. Implicit in this economy measure was the requirement that all -stowed tractors could revert to combat status, if necessary, on a -48-hour alert. - - -_Changes in the Concept of Ground Defense_[337] - - [337] The material in this section is derived from: _PacFlt - EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8. - -During the winter months of 1952–1953, the 1st Marine Division modified -the organization of its tactical defense, although it retained the -basic concept of the combat outpost system as the backbone of MLR -defense.[338] Development of much of the KANSAS line and parts of the -Marine MLR during this period reflected several new ideas on how the -ground defense could be better organized. Recent experience during -Communist attacks had shown that defensive emplacements and positions -could be dug deeper and below ground to withstand massed enemy fires. -Contrary to traditional concepts, it had also been found that centering -the defense on the military crest[339] of a hill was not always the -best procedure. Emplacement of machine guns downslope or in low firing -positions to cover draws or flat ground was not entirely suitable to -the Korean terrain, enemy, or nature of positional warfare. - - [338] The 1st Commonwealth Division, to the Marine right, - utilized a different defense system. Instead of relying - on the COPs forward of the main line of defense as major - deterrent positions, the British preferred to include all - strategic terrain features within the MLR itself. They - followed a policy of active patrolling to the front and, - at night, occupied selected ground sites, preferring to - fight the enemy from their main battle positions rather - than from more isolated COP positions. _PactFlt EvalRpt_ - No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-92, 9-93. - - [339] The military crest is that point along the slope of a - hill from which maximum observation up and down the hill - can be obtained. The topographical crest is the highest - point on a hill or ridge. - -[Illustration: - - MAP DIAGRAM 20 K. White - -ORGANIZATION OF GROUND DEFENSE - -WINTER 1952–1953] - -Altered defense concepts, beginning in October, took the following form: - - (1) The trace of defensive positions followed the topographical - crest (A) rather than military crest (B) of key terrain features. - (Map diagrams 20 and 21 illustrate these changes.) - - (2) Fighting positions and emplacements were dug a short distance - downslope (C) from the topographical crest. - - (3) Trenches on the topographical crest permitted easier, faster, - and more protected access to fighting positions from the reverse - slope and support area (D). - - (4) Positions on the topographical crest were less vulnerable to - enemy artillery because it was more difficult for the enemy to - adjust his fire on these positions than on trenches dug along the - military crest. Many shells simply passed over the top (E) of the - hill. - - (5) Certain hills and noses were selected and organized so that - trenches and gun emplacements, encircling the crest, would form - mutually supporting positions (X). - - (6) Machine guns were moved from the draws (Y) to hilltops and - noses (Z) where better long-range observation and fields of fire - existed. - -[Illustration: - - MAP DIAGRAM 21 K. WHITE - -TYPICAL HILL DEFENSE - -(Cross Section) - -WINTER 1952–1953] - -Another change in the improvement of field fortifications came into use -during the winter months. A different type of barbed wire obstacle, -called “Canadian,” “random,” or “double-apron” wire, began to find -favor with Marine infantrymen. Canadian wire consisted of two parallel -rows of three-strand barbed wire fencing, erected about three feet -apart. The void was filled in with additional barbed wire, placed -at random, but connected to the parallel fences.[340] The new type -barbed wire appeared more effective for several reasons. Besides being -simple and fast to emplace, Canadian wire merely became more entangled -by artillery shelling, which quickly ripped apart the standard -double-apron barbed wire previously used in COP slope defenses. - - [340] Commenting on the heavy destruction of Hook - fortifications by CCF preparation, one 7th Marine company - commander stated: “Enemy artillery and mortars did tend - to destroy the protective wire. We noted especially that - the Canadian ‘Random Wire,’ although it tended to move - about under fire, did hold together and continue to offer - good protection.” _McLaughlin ltr._ - - -_Before the Nevadas Battle_[341] - - [341] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdDs, Feb-Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdDs, - Feb-Mar 53; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7 - ComdDs, Feb 53. - -As the Marine division continued to revamp and strengthen its primary -defenses, a change of pace on the battlefront was gradually being felt. -Only a few major raids had taken place during November, December, and -January, and these involved no transfer of real estate. Casualties had -been light. Artillery rounds, both incoming and outgoing, had dropped -substantially. By February, however, it became apparent that the period -of winter inactivity was nearing an end. - -Taking the initiative in the renewed action was the 5th Marines, -occupants of the right regimental sector since 25 January. The next -month the regiment conducted three successful daytime raids against -fortified enemy positions. Targets for the initial action, on 3 -February, were two consistently troublesome hills, 31 and 31A in the -Ungok Hill mass, north of the left battalion sector. - -Since all battalions of the 5th Marines were to be involved either -directly or indirectly in Operation CLAMBAKE, the initial planning and -actual execution of the raid was to be carried out by the regimental -commander, Colonel Walt. CLAMBAKE required especially thorough -coordination of the heavy fire support since it was to be launched with -a tank-artillery feint against several CCF positions (Hill 104, Kumgok, -and Red Hill) generally west of the Ungok objective area. The two -target hills were to be assaulted by reinforced platoons from Company -A (Captain Don H. Blanchard) of the reserve battalion, 1/5, commanded -by Lieutenant Colonel Jonas M. Platt, who was responsible for the later -planning stages of the raid. It was anticipated that intensive air and -artillery preparation on the feint objectives and movement of gun and -flame tanks during the diversion would gain the element of surprise for -the assault platoons. Thus the Marines hoped to take prisoners, the -main purpose of the raid, and to kill enemy troops and destroy their -defenses. - -During the five weeks of preparation, every aspect of the maneuver was -thoroughly reviewed and rehearsed. All participating units took part -in the planning conferences. Routes were reconnoitered, mines cleared, -and fire concentrations plotted and registered. MAG-12 pilots studied -the target areas from the nearby Marine MLR. Six rehearsals, including -practice in casualty evacuation, uncovered potential problem areas. -Final rehearsal was held 1 February, with artillery and air preparation -made against the feint objectives. Four close air support strikes were -conducted that day and the next as part of the plan to divert enemy -attention from the CLAMBAKE destruction mission. - -Shortly after first light on 3 February, three platoons of tanks -rumbled across the MLR to assault the feint area. A heavy “false” -artillery preparation by 1/11 was also placed on the three western -enemy hills as well as direct fire from gun and flame tanks. The two -Marine assault forces, one against each hill, moved out armed with -flamethrowers, 3.5-inch rockets, machine guns, grenades, satchel -charges, bangalore torpedoes, and automatic weapons. Enemy forces -occupying the positions made three separate counterattack attempts, -which were blunted by Marine supporting arms. During the infantry -attack, friendly air hovered on station and artillery fired continuous -counterbattery and countermortar fire. - -With the exception of the change of withdrawal route of one of the -assault teams, the 5th Marines reported that the operation was carried -out according to plan. Company A tanks had swung left across the frozen -rice paddies to provide left flank security for the infantry and to -interdict trenchlines that connected with the Ungok objective. Intense -enemy fire lashed the armored vehicles as they approached Kumgok -and Red Hill as well as those supporting tanks that remained on the -MLR.[342] Air, artillery, infantry, and tanks produced an estimated -390 Chinese casualties (including 90 known KIA) in addition to damaged -or destroyed trenchlines, tunnels, caves, bunkers, and weapons of the -enemy. Marine losses were 14 killed and 91 wounded. One flame tank was -lost. - - [342] For a detailed account of the tank action in the CLAMBAKE - raid see Col Clyde W. Hunter ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd - 6 Jun 70, in v. V, Korean comment file. - -As in the case of the 1st Marines WAKEUP raid in November 1952, -CLAMBAKE was important not so much in accomplishing its primary -mission (actually, no POWs were taken) as in lessons learned. One of -these was to reemphasize the fact that thorough preparation helped -to ensure smooth coordination of infantry and supporting arms. In -his report of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Platt wrote, “minute -planning to the last detail along with carefully executed rehearsals -are basic to success in actions of this type.”[343] He further noted -that “confidence and enthusiasm stimulated by the rehearsals are -assets which cannot be overlooked.”[344] The battalion commander also -commented on the importance of planning for both troop withdrawal and -maintaining a flexible schedule of fires by supporting arms. Air,[345] -artillery, and tanks all employed fire plans that could be readily -adjusted to meet the changing tactical situation. - - [343] 1/5 ComdD, Feb. 53, App. IVc, dtd 19 Feb 53, p. 5. - - [344] _Ibid._ - - [345] In order to assure better close air support during the - assault; an SOP for the airborne tactical controller was - proposed and drafted by MAG-12 for 1st MAW approval. - The plan utilized the marking of targets by rocket and - subsequent corrections to be made by the FAC. This - enabled MAG-12 aircraft “to scramble, fly a CAS mission - at the Division front and be back at the field at K-6 in - approximately 40 minutes.” Col Wayne M. Cargill ltr to - Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70. - -On the ground, flame was found to be the best weapon for neutralizing -the well-fortified CCF caves. From Company A, 1st Tank Battalion -(Captain Hunter) came information about Chinese 3.5-inch rocket -launcher teams used in antitank defense. Several of these tank-killer -teams had run down the trenchline holding small bushes in front of -them. The enemy then boldly advanced through a hail of bullets to -within 15–20 yards of the Marine tank before opening fire with their -rockets. Short bursts of flame from headquarters tanks soon caused even -the most intrepid to beat a hurried retreat. - -Concluding his after-action report of CLAMBAKE, the regimental -commander, Colonel Walt, observed: - - In addition to inflicting large numbers of casualties and - destruction upon the enemy, the operation served a secondary - purpose, none the less important. It provided excellent training - and experience for the various infantry and supporting arms - staffs involved, helping to develop them into a smoothly - functioning infantry-air-artillery-tank team.[346] - - [346] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3. - -Shortly before the end of the month, the 5th Marines made another -major assault. As in the earlier CLAMBAKE, this raid was again in -two-reinforced-platoon size and made during the early daylight hours -of 25 February. This time the objective was a single height, Hill 15 -(Detroit), two miles east of the CLAMBAKE objective. Lieutenant Colonel -Oscar F. Peatross’[347] 2/5, manning the extreme right sector of the -division, gave the assignment to Company F, then under Captain Harold -D. Kurth, Jr. Planning for Operation CHARLIE, a standard-type kill, -capture, and destroy raid, was carried out in much the same detailed -manner as the earlier 1/5 raid. - - [347] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant - Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52. - -CHARLIE differed somewhat in concept in that the 2/5 operational plan -attempted to gain surprise by launching the attack during the BMNT[348] -period as well as in use of smoke to screen enemy observation. -Supporting arms preparatory fires had been carefully plotted, including -the precision destruction aerial bombing that had proved so effective -in the CLAMBAKE assault. In actual execution of CHARLIE, however, bad -weather prevented the use of almost all the planned pre-D-Day and D-Day -air strikes. Upon reaching the Detroit objective area assault Marines -“found the majority of enemy installations were relatively undamaged, -even though subjected to heavy bombardment by other supporting -arms.”[349] Artillery preparatory fires had been employed successfully -to isolate the battle area and howitzer and tank missions supported the -raid.[350] - - [348] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period - before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning - evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to - approximately 300 yards. - - [349] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5. - - [350] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and - its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st - Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds. - Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an - operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of - this raid, 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53. - -Between the time of CLAMBAKE and CHARLIE a series of Marine and enemy -small units actions erupted which were soon to become a way of life -for the MLR combatants. By sporadic outpost attacks and increasing -their use of artillery, the Chinese were beginning to demonstrate a -more aggressive attitude than in recent months. On the night of 12–13 -February, a CCF platoon supported by mortars and artillery probed -COP Hedy (Hill 124), in the right battalion of the center regimental -sector, held by Lieutenant Colonel Barrett’s 3/7. On the next night, -it was the Korean Marines who turned aggressor. Two of their platoons -raided Hill 240, on the west bank of the Sachon, nearly three miles -north of the mouth of the river. The following night, a 7th Marines -patrol moving into ambush positions was itself stalked by a large CCF -patrol. When reinforcements, including armored vehicles, moved out from -the MLR to support the Marines, the Chinese hastily withdrew. - -Three more contacts were made before the end of the month along the -division front. On 19 February CCF soldiers, in two-platoon strength, -engaged KMC sentries forward of COP 33, located about a mile east of -the action the previous week. After the initial exchange of small arms -fire, the Koreans moved back to the outpost and called down supporting -fires on the Chinese. Artillery and mortars tore into the attackers -causing numerous casualties and forcing the enemy to withdraw. On the -morning of 22 February, a raiding party from the 5th Marines assaulted -a smaller enemy force at Hill 35A, approximately 1,300 yards southwest -of the Ungok hills. In this second raid staged by the 5th Marines that -month, assault troops (H/3/5) used flamethrowers in the early stages of -the action to help clear enemy trenches of hostile grenade throwers. - -Late the next night a 7th Marines unit, consisting of a reinforced -platoon and four M-46 tanks, set out to raid Yoke, located near the -peace corridor five miles north of Freedom Bridge. The assault against -that position never came off. At 2137 as the B/1/7 platoon moved into -preliminary positions on Hill 90, north of the ultimate objective, a -Chinese company ambushed the patrol from three sides. When the Marines -closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, a support platoon was -sent from the MLR. After an intense 30 minute fire fight, the CCF began -withdrawing at 0138. Enemy losses were listed as 45 counted KIA, 33 -estimated KIA, and 35 estimated WIA. As a result of the assault, orders -for the 7th Marines raid on Yoke were cancelled. Marine casualties -numbered 5 killed, 22 wounded. - -Whereas February was characterized by a marked increase in ground -contacts between Marines and their CCF adversaries, during the first -part of March the Chinese again assumed an inactive posture. Marine -patrols reported few contacts. Except for a KMC raid on 3 March, little -action that could be considered a sizable engagement took place until -after midmonth. On the 16th there was a brief skirmish involving a 5th -Marines combat patrol near Reno and a short fire fight between Carson -defenders and an enemy squad. The next night a Chinese platoon, waiting -near Vegas for a Marine patrol to pass by, was itself put to flight by -the patrol. - -Two encounters with the CCF on 19 March marked the heaviest action -yet of the month. Early that morning, a predawn raid was staged by -B/1/5 (Captain Theodore J. Mildner) at Hill 31A, one of the Ungok twin -objectives in CLAMBAKE the previous month. The March ITEM raid employed -111 Marines. One platoon was to make the assault and the second platoon -to support the operation and assist in casualty evacuation. Following -a series of nearly a dozen air strikes on the objective and artillery -preparation, Captain Mildner’s two assault platoons jumped off from -the MLR check point at 0518. As usually happened in such operations, -the preliminary fire drove the Chinese to reverse slope defenses. No -enemy POWs were taken and at 0700 the Marine units disengaged, due to -casualties sustained from enemy shelling and machine gun fire.[351] - - [351] Prior to the raid various combinations of flamethrower - fuels and pressure were extensively used. The purpose - was to determine the maximum effective range of - the flamethrower teams in order to “neutralize the - hand-grenade throwing potential of the enemy, this being - one of the major problems confronting assault elements on - other raids.” Final tests resulted in flame being thrown - more than 40 yards up hill. 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, App. IVf, - p. 3. - -Earlier that same date, two attacks had been made simultaneously by -the enemy on outposts in the center regimental sector, where the 1st -Marines had relieved the 7th on 10 March. At 0105 one CCF company -struck in the vicinity of Hedy while a second lunged at Esther, about -1½ miles east. When a G/3/1 reconnaissance patrol operating forward -of COP Esther observed enemy movement, the Marines pulled back to -the outpost, alerting it to the impending attack. After a heavy -incoming artillery barrage, the enemy assaulted the outpost, but when -a three-hour effort failed to carry the position, the attackers -withdrew. By that time the Chinese company which had hit COP Hedy had -also broken off the attack. - -Actually the fight in Captain Carl R. Gray’s Company H sector, to the -rear of Hedy, was mainly at the MLR, for the Chinese indulged in merely -a brief fire fight at the latter outpost, bypassing it in favor of a -crack at JAMESTOWN. The main line of resistance failed to yield to -the enemy thrust, which was supported by 2,400 rounds of mortar and -artillery fire along the MLR and outposts. - -After being thwarted by Hedy-Esther defenses, the enemy shifted his -efforts westward to the 1st KMC area. The Korean regiment received -the brunt of the enemy’s minor infantry probes immediately preceding -the Nevada Cities battle. Late on 25 March a series of skirmishes -broke out in the 1st Marines sector between one-or-two platoon size -Chinese infantry forces and Marine outpost defenders. Following a quiet -daylight spell on the 26th, the Chinese resumed the offensive with a -probe at COP Dagmar. This coincided with what developed into a massive -regimental assault unleashed against Carson, Reno, and Vegas, outposts -in the 5th Marines sector, to the right. There Colonel Walt’s regiment -would shortly be the target of the bloodiest Chinese attack to date on -the 1st Marine Division in West Korea. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Vegas - -_The Nevada Cities--Supporting Arms--Defense Organization at the -Outposts--Chinese Attack on 26 March--Reinforcements Dispatched--Massed -Counterattack the Next Day--Push to the Summit--Other Communist -Probes--Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost--Vegas Consolidation -Begins--Aftermath_ - - -_The Nevada Cities_[352] - - [352] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; - 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 - ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdD, Apr 53, Special Action Rpt - Period 26–30 Mar 53, “Battle of the Cities,” hereafter - 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Maj Norman W. Hicks, “U.S. Marine - Operations in Korea, 1952–1953 with Special Emphasis - on Outpost Warfare” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland, - 1962), hereafter Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; 1stLt Peter - Braestrup, “Outpost Warfare,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. - 37, no. 11 (Nov 53) and “Back to the Trenches,” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 3 (Mar 55); MSgt Robert T. - Fugate, “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36, - no. 6 (Jun 53), hereafter Fugate, “Vegas.” - -As the third winter of war in Korea began to draw to an inconclusive -end in late March 1953, some 28,000 Marines of the 1st Division -stationed on the western front suspected that coming weeks would bring -a change of pace. Consider just the matter of basic logistics. Rising -temperatures, tons of melting snow, and the thawing of the Imjin River, -located north of the rear Marine support and reserve areas, would turn -vital road nets into quagmires to tax the patience and ingenuity of men -and machinery alike. - -With the arrival of another spring in Korea there was strong likelihood -that the Chinese Communists facing the Marines across a 33-mile front -of jagged peaks and steep draws would launch a new offensive. This -would enable them to regain the initiative and end the stalemate that -had existed since October when they were rebuffed in the battle for the -Hook. - -Winning new dominating hill or ridge positions adjacent to the Marine -MLR, in that uneasy No-Mans-Land buffer zone between the CCF and UN -lines, would be both militarily and psychologically advantageous to -the Communists. Any new yardage or victory, no matter how small, -could be exploited as leverage against the “Wall Street capitalists” -when truce talks resumed at the Panmunjom bargaining table. Further, -dominant terrain seized by the CCF would remain in Communist hands -when the truce went into effect. Although wise to the tactics of -the Chinese,[353] UN intelligence had not anticipated the extent or -intensity of the surprise CCF attack that opened up at 1900 on 26 March -when the Communists sent battalions of 700 to 800 men against Marine -outposts of 50 men. - - [353] Since the first of the year division intelligence reports - had given the CCF the capability of mounting limited - objective attacks ranging from company to regimental - size. _PacFlt EvalRpt_, p. 9-28, quoting 1stMarDiv PIR - 860, dtd 4 Mar 53. - -The late March attack centered primarily on a trio of peaks where -Marines had dug in three of their key outposts--Carson, Reno, and -Vegas. Rechristened from earlier, more prosaic names of Allen, Bruce, -and Clarence, respectively, the Nevada Cities hill complex was located -approximately 1,500 yards north of the MLR fronting the 5th Marines -right sector. The trio was the province of 1/5, which manned the -western (left) part of the regimental area. Ultimately, however, -reverberations ran through nearly 10,000 yards of division front, -from the two Berlin outposts, 1,000 yards east of Vegas, to COP Hedy, -midpoint in the 1st Marines center sector. Continuous attacks and -counterattacks for possession of the key Vegas outpost raged unabated -for five days. The action escalated into the bloodiest fighting to -date in western Korea, resulted in loss of a major outpost, and the -killing or wounding of nearly 1,000 Marines. It was a partial success -for the enemy, but he paid a high price for the real estate: casualties -amounting to more than twice the Marine losses, including 800 known -killed and a regiment that was decimated by the Marine defenders. - -The three Nevada outposts lay just below the 38th Parallel, -approximately 10 miles northeast of Panmunjom and the same distance -north of the Marine railhead at Munsan-ni. Possession of the area would -give the Communists improved observation of I Corps MLR positions -to the west. Indeed, the enemy had cast covetous eyes (an ambition -translated into action through his well-known creeping tactics) on the -semi-circular net of outposts since the preceding summer. - -Mindful of this, the I Corps commanding general back in September had -stressed the importance of holding key terrain features that could be -of major tactical value to the enemy. This included Bunker Hill and -COP Reno, both considered likely targets for renewed enemy aggression -in the future. Particularly, the enemy had indicated he wanted to -annex Reno. The object of increasing hostile attacks since July 1952, -Reno was the closest of the three Nevadas to CCF lines and tied in -geographically with two of the enemy’s high ground positions--Hill 190, -to the northeast, and Hill 101, overlooking the site of the destroyed -village of Ungok. (See Map 22.) - -Reno’s companion outpost on the right, Vegas, at 175 meters, was the -highest of the three while Carson, on the left flank, was nearest -JAMESTOWN and also assisted in defense of Reno and Vegas. Each of the -three outposts was manned by a rifle platoon (40 Marines plus two Navy -hospital corpsmen), heavily reinforced with weapons company personnel. -A small hill between Reno and Vegas, known as the Reno Block, further -supported the Nevada Cities complex and at night was defended by a -reinforced squad. - -Since they commanded the historic Korean invasion route to Seoul, 30 -air miles south, the strategic importance of the Nevada outposts had -been one of the reasons for transfer of the Marines from East Korea to -the West, in 1952. Both Reno and Vegas, moreover, overlooked Chinese -rear area supply routes. This was a matter of special concern to the -enemy at this time since he had recently doubled his stockpiling -efforts and wanted to prevent UNC intelligence from learning about the -build-up. Possession of the Nevada hills would enable the Chinese to -harass the Marines at even closer range and--hopefully--to conduct new -thrusts at the MLR which would ultimately weaken the UNC position. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 22 K. WHITE - -5TH MARINES MLR SECTOR - -26 March 1953] - -In mid- and late March, the units forward in the 1st Marine Division -sector of the main defense line, JAMESTOWN, remained much as they had -been in recent months. Left to right, the defending components were -the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st -Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (1st KMC/RCT),[354] 1st -Marines, and 5th Marines. One change had occurred when the 1st Marines -relieved the 7th in the center sector earlier in the month. The latter -was now in division reserve in the Camp Rose rear area. Before long, -this regiment was to see more offensive action in a hotly contested, -five-day period than it had during its entire recent tour on line. -Overall, the 1st Marine Division continued as one of the four infantry -divisions in the I Corps sector of EUSAK[355] and, in fact, the month -itself marked exactly one year since the Marines had arrived on the -western front. - - [354] The 1st KMC Regiment had been redesignated the 1st - KMC/RCT on 15 Dec 52. Continuing under opcon of the - 1stMarDiv, the Korean RCT consisted of four infantry - battalions, plus attached artillery, armor, engineer, and - service units. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-64. - - [355] To the Marine division right were the U.S. 2d Infantry, - ROK 1st, and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions. - -Occupying the far eastern end of the division sector, the 5th Marines, -under command of Colonel Walt,[356] had been assigned to the MLR since -late January. The regiment manned six miles of the JAMESTOWN front. -It was flanked on the left by the 1st Marines while to the right its -neighbor was the 38th Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, U.S. Army. - - [356] No stranger to the 5th Marines, Colonel Walt had served - with this regiment during World War II at Guadalcanal, - Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. He had commanded, on - separate occasions, 2/5 and 3/5 and had earned two Navy - Crosses for combat leadership and bravery. - -Since 20 February, the western part of the 5th regimental sector had -been held by Lieutenant Colonel Platt’s 1/5, with Companies A, B, and -C on line, from left to right. The battalion area held four outposts. -COP Ava was tucked down near the boundary between the 1st and 5th -Regiments, while the Nevada, or Three Cities, triangle screened the -central part of the latter regimental sector. A Company A squad[357] -outposted Ava, some 325 yards forward of the main line. Personnel of -Company C were stationed on Carson and Reno. Vegas had a unique command -situation. Due to its proximity to the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5, -Vegas came under operational control of the former battalion while -personnel charged with its defense belonged to Company H of 3/5. - - [357] Normally Ava was a squad-size outpost. Prior to and - during the late March attacks, all 5th Marine COPs were - strengthened. - -The right flank of the regimental sector was the responsibility of 3/5, -which had moved to the front on 23 March, under Lieutenant Colonel -Robert J. Oddy. Companies H, G, and I were forward, in that order -from the west, with George personnel on duty at the two reinforced -squad size outposts, Berlin and East Berlin. In regimental reserve was -Lieutenant Colonel James H. Finch’s 2/5. - -Westward along JAMESTOWN from Colonel Walt’s 5th Marines was the center -regimental sector, held by the 1st Marines commanded by Colonel Adams. -(See Map 23.) The extreme western part of the regimental line came to -a juncture with KMC territory just as it looped around the critical -Panmunjom peace corridor. This left battalion sector was manned by -Lieutenant Colonel George A. Gililland’s 2/1. Companies E, D, B from -1/1,[358] and F were forward, outposting COPs 1, 2, Marilyn, Kate, -and Ingrid. To the right 3/1, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ernest -G. Atkin, defended Hedy, Bunker, Ginger, Esther, Dagmar, and Corinne, -with Companies H, G, and I on line. Occupying the area adjacent to the -secondary defense installations, WYOMING and the western part of the -KANSAS line, was Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Findtner’s reserve -1/1. And located to the rear of the 1st and 5th Regiments was the 7th -Marines (Colonel Haffner), in reserve,[359] and the division rear -support units, also south of the Imjin. - - [358] Company B from 1/l had been assigned to operational - control of 2/1 when the latter unit relieved 1/7 on - line on 10 March. The increased personnel enabled the - battalion to position a company-size detachment at the - strategic high ground, COP 2, that overlooked Panmunjom - and the critical truce talk site. - - [359] Regimental command changed 27 March when Colonel Glenn C. - Funk, former commanding officer of the 1st Shore Party - Battalion, was assigned to the 7th Marines, succeeding - Colonel Haffner, who became G-2. - - -_Supporting Arms_[360] - - [360] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; - 1stMarDiv, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1st MAW, - MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Mar 53. - -In support of the three infantry regiments were the artillerymen, -guns, and howitzers of Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines. Two of its three -light battalions, 1/11 and 3/11, provided 105mm direct fires to the -5th and 1st Marines, respectively. The general support battalion was -2/11, prepared to reinforce the fires of 1/11. The regimental medium -battalion, 4/11, was in general support of the division, as was the 1st -4.5-inch Rocket Battery. To the southwest of the division sector, the -75mm guns of the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion, also attached to the 11th -Marines, were in direct support of the 1st KMC/RCT. Newly formed the -preceding month, the 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery-Automatic -Weapons Platoon had the mission of defending two of the Imjin River -Bridges--Freedom and Spoonbill--in the division sector. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 23 K. WHITE - -1ST MARINES MLR SECTOR - -(Division Center) - -26 March 1953] - -In addition to organic and attached units of the 11th, four I Corps -artillery components, located within division territory, further -reinforced 11th Marines capabilities. The 623d Field Artillery -Battalion, with batteries in the 5th and 7th Marines sectors, like 4/11 -consisted of 155mm howitzers. Three heavy artillery units were also -available for counterbattery missions. These 8-inch howitzers belonged -to Battery C of the 17th Field Artillery, Battery B of the 204th -Field Artillery, and the 158th Field Artillery Battalion. These Army -units were assigned to general support of I Corps, reinforcing Marine -fires on call, and were under operational control of the 159th Field -Artillery Battalion Group. - -Active armored support for the division’s ground troops during -March was provided by three of the four companies from the 1st Tank -Battalion. Company A’s M-46s, flame tanks, and retrievers, well forward -in the right sector, were in direct support of the 5th Marines; Company -D tanks were assigned to the 1st Marines. Company B functioned as the -forward reserve unit, ready to move into firing positions on the MLR if -the tactical situation called for it. The rear reserve unit, Company C, -conducted refresher training and performed equipment checks on the rest -of the battalion tanks. The battalion commander, since May 1952, was -Lieutenant Colonel John I. Williamson. - -The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with a personnel strength of 6,400, was -located throughout Korea. Wing headquarters, Marine Air Control Group -2, and Marine Air Group 33, with its F9F day jet fighters and the VMJ-1 -photo reconnaissance squadron operated from K-3, Pohang. VMF(N)-513, -with all weather jet fighters, flew out of K-8, Kunsan, on the west -coast, 105 miles below Seoul. MAG-12 and its squadrons of attack ADs -and Corsairs was relatively near the 1st Marine Division sector, at -K-6, Pyongtaek, 30 miles southeast of Inchon. Marine Wing Service -Squadron 1, with its heavy maintenance capability, remained at Itami, -Japan. - -Tactical control had been altered radically the previous month when -the Fifth Air Force had relinquished its command of Marine pilots and -planes and they returned to operational control of the 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing for the first time since the early days of the war. -Direction of the helicopters in HMR-161 and VMO-6 used in transport -and reconnaissance missions had for some time been closer to home; -both squadrons were under 1st Marine Division operational control. -HMR-161 was based at A-17, in the vicinity of the 1st Marine Division -command post. VMO-6, a composite unit consisting of single-engine -OE-1 observation planes and a copter section of the HTL-4 and the new -larger HO5S-1 craft, was located at A-9, three miles south of division -headquarters. The squadron provided regularly scheduled helicopter -evacuation of night frontline combat-casualties, artillery spotting -flights, and airborne control of air strikes. Both squadrons performed -routine liaison and reconnaissance, administrative, and resupply -flights. - - -_Defense Organization on the Outposts_[361] - - [361] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR - “Cities.” - -Carson (Hill 27), furthest west of the three Nevada Cities was, at 820 -yards, also nearest the Marine main line of resistance. It overlooked -enemy terrain to the northwest and dominated an important approach -from that same direction--the Seoul road. Organized as a perimeter -defense position, Carson security was oriented toward two major Chinese -strongpoints. These were the twin-peaked Ungok Hill mass (31-31A), -approximately 650 yards west of the Seoul road which lay between Ungok -and Carson, and Hill 67 (Arrowhead), an equal distance due northwest. -Other critical features in the immediate Carson vicinity included, on -the right, the west finger of Reno; the ridgeline south from Reno to a -point known as “Ambush Alley,” in the vicinity of enemy Hill 47; and -the ridgeline approaches by the two listening posts--Fox finger and -George finger. (See Map 24.) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 24 K. WHITE - -COP CARSON - -March 1953] - -Little cover or concealment existed, other than that offered by -the trenchline and a cave used as living quarters. Four weapons -positions--light machine guns and Browning automatic rifles--covered -main enemy avenues of approach. These and two listening posts were each -manned by two men after 1800 and throughout the night. Of Carson’s -customary strength of 38 (1 officer and 37 enlisted), 28 stood watch -and worked on fortifications at night. A six-man security team was on -duty during the day. All posts connected by land line to battalion -headquarters, where a 24-hour phone watch was maintained. Sound power -phones and radios also provided communication with the company CP. - -Nearly 350 yards of trenchline encircled the outpost. Most was in good -condition, five or more feet deep and two feet wide. The main trench on -the reverse slope was in spots shallow, only three to five feet, and a -new trench was being dug. Fields of fire for small arms protection were -considered good, although some of the 28 fighting holes were overly -close to culvert and sandbag overheading, which prevented complete -fire coverage of forward slopes. Adequate fire support could be given -along the southern slope of the west finger extending from COP Reno, -which was also mutually supporting with that of the Reno Block. Forward -observer teams for the 60mm and 81mm mortars provided observation for -supporting arms. The arsenal of weapons at Carson included 4 A-4 light -machine guns, 2 flamethrowers, 2 3.5-inch rocket launchers, 9 Browning -automatic rifles, 36 M-1 rifles, 2 carbines, 2 pistols, and 4 grenade -launchers. - -Some 450 yards northeast, COP Reno (Hill 25) was dug in on a ridgeline -that fronted enemy Hill 25A (also known as Hill 150), immediately -north. Approximately 1,600 yards away from the MLR, Reno was the -central of the three outposts and also the one most distant from -Marine lines. West to east, critical terrain consisted of five enemy -positions--Hills 31, 67, 25A, 190, and 153--and friendly companion -outpost Vegas, on the right flank. (See Map 25.) - -Two main trenches led into the outpost, a reverse slope fortification. -The forward trench, perpendicular to the ridgeline fronting the -position, was approximately 20 yards long and 8 feet deep. The second, -to the rear and about the same length, traversed the outpost in an -east-west direction. Approaching from the entrance, or “Gate” of the -MLR, the two trenches joined on the left, forming a 90 degree angle. -A cave, located in the arc between the trenches, provided overcrowded -living quarters where personnel slept either on the dirt floor or atop -sandbags, since there were no bunkers at Reno. Ammunition supplies, as -well as the corpsman’s first aid facilities, were cached in the cave. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 25 K. WHITE - -COP RENO - -March 1953] - -A major blocking position, some 100 yards south, and to the rear of -Reno itself was covered by troops posted in the trenchline. Left of the -forward trench, protective wire was placed across the topographical -crest. This left finger had good observation to Ungok and Arrowhead -but also served as an approach to Carson. Most likely enemy approach, -however, was considered to be the ridgeline from Hill 150, on the -north. The Seoul road, rear trenchline, and valley to the right were -alternate approaches. Twenty-four hour security at Reno included an -automatic rifleman at the Gate, at Post 1, on the forward trench, and -Post 2, which was at the extreme right of the rear trench. Ten machine -gunners were also detailed as night watch on the guns. During the -daytime they were responsible for maintenance of ammunition and weapons -which consisted of 18 M-1 rifles, 6 BARs, 5 A-4 LMGs, 2 flamethrowers, -1 carbine, and 7 pistols. - -The biggest defense problem at Reno stemmed from restricted fields of -fire. Able gun, for instance, covered the rear of the topographical -crest and Hills 31 and 67, on the left. But dead space masked its -effectiveness practically from the base of Hill 67 to the gun itself. -The Baker gun, protecting the reverse slope, had a lateral firing range -of from 10 to 30 feet. Charlie gun maintained an unlimited sector of -fire, approximately 180 degrees, and Dog gun covered the rear. As -there were no prepared machine gun positions, they were fired from the -parapet protecting both the fighting holes and firing positions in the -trenchline. Two fighting holes were manned by BARs and two were used as -machine gun posts. - -Customarily 40 to 43 men were on duty at COP Reno. In fact this number -had been viewed dubiously as being “far too many to man defensive -positions at any one time,” by the commanding officer of the 1/5 -Weapons Company during a survey earlier in the month, noting that -“about 20 could adequately defend the position.”[362] A six-man force -was detailed as a permanent working party for the improvement of -fortifications. Sound power phones linked all positions and field -phones connected the forward observer with gun positions. Overall, for -proper defense, Reno depended heavily upon support fires from Carson -and Vegas, on its right flank. Morale was considered “very good to -excellent” with Reno personnel being relieved every 8 to 10 days. - - [362] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt - Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4. - -Vegas (Hill 21), the highest of the three outposts, was located -approximately 1,310 yards in front of the MLR. Observation of the -surrounding terrain from the east slope of enemy Hill 190 on the north, -clockwise to the ridge south of Reno had been pronounced “excellent” -on an inspection trip made earlier the day the outposts were attacked. -From north to south this observation included in its 180-degree sweep, -enemy hill mass 57 to the right, friendly outpost Berlin, the MLR, key -Marine defense highpoints, Hills 229 and 181 in the 1st Marines rear -sector, and intervening terrain. (See Map 26.) - -The north-south ridge leading to COP Reno masked the view from Vegas -on the west. To the north full observation was partially limited by -outpost Reno itself and enemy Hills 150, 153, and 190. The latter was -particularly strategic for two reasons. First, it shielded a major -assembly area. And, although the Chinese had observation of the entire -right battalion MLR from Hill 190 on the north, Vegas prevented enemy -close-in view of Marine rear areas. It also dominated the approach to -a major Marine observation point, Hill 126, to the rear of the front -lines in the western part of the 3/5 sector. - -Organized as a perimeter defense, Vegas was surrounded by 250 yards -of trenchline. The forward, or north trench, averaged four feet in -depth but deepened to about eight feet as it progressed to the rear. -The most solidly constructed part was the western portion. A center -communication trench was in good condition between the rear and -topographical crest. From this point to the forward trench its depth -decreased to about four feet. The trench leading back to the MLR, about -five feet deep and two wide, was in good condition. A total of 13 -fighting holes had been constructed. - -Outpost troops, numbering approximately 40, consisted of six fire -teams, heavy weapons and machine gunners, two 81mm mortar crews and two -artillery observers, one corpsman, and a wireman at night. Strength -was reduced during the day, with replacements to make up the normal -complement arriving on position early each evening. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 26 K. WHITE - -COP VEGAS - -March 1953] - -Major approaches to Vegas included the large draws to the west and -north of the outpost, the ridgeline to the COP from Hill 153 to the -northwest, and the rear trenchline. Several ancillary trenchlines to -the east tended to reinforce this latter approach. A hindrance to the -enemy, however, was the slope leading into the draw west of the -outpost. For security purposes, the perimeter was divided into three -sectors, each manned by two fire teams augmented by heavy weapons -personnel. The outpost detachment stood nighttime posts on a 50 percent -basis and remained within the several living bunkers or other shelters -during daylight hours because of heavy shelling and sniper fire. -Incessant enemy pressure at the exposed outpost made it expedient to -rotate infantry Marines at Vegas every three days and observers, at the -end of four or five days. - -Weapons on position included two flamethrowers, one 3.5-inch bazooka, -four machine guns, three pistols, and other small arms. Fields of fire -at Vegas, rated fair to good, were generally restricted due to the -proximity of overheading. Most of the light machine guns had plunging -fields of fire except for the approach along the ridgeline from Hill -153, covered by grazing fire. A fighting hole to the left of Able Gate, -which overlooked the trenchline leading to the MLR, was manned during -the day. No other sentries or listening posts were in effect. Nine -sound power phones were operative. Three were located in the CP bunker -(connecting to C/1/5, G/3/5, and the CP net); one, each, at the four -main posts, the rear Able Gate, and the cave. - -Other than periodic work being done by 10 Korean Service Corps -personnel in clearing out the trenches, no construction was in process -at Vegas. KSCs, lugging their traditional A-frames and guided by -Marines, also ran a nightly “supply train” to Vegas as they did to -Carson and Reno. Sufficient personnel manned the outpost for adequate -defense, although an inspecting officer opined that the “one 3.5 rocket -launcher on position did not appear to be necessary for defense of this -type position.”[363] - - [363] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Vegas Report, by - Capt Henry A. Checklou, on 26 Mar, dtd 31 Mar 53, p. 4. - - -_The Chinese Assault of 26 March_[364] - - [364] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv - PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 86-53, dtd 27 - Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, - 11thMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, - 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR, 18–28 - Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Fugate, “Vegas.” - -Until the final days of March, the CCF units opposite the 5th Marines -had shown little aggressiveness. Regimental reports had officially -cited Chinese actions as having been “extremely limited” other than -their expected resistance to patrols and the Marine ITEM raid staged -earlier in the month by the 1/5 two-platoon unit on Hill 31A, part of -the Ungok complex. The enemy posture had, in fact, been described as -one “reluctant to meet our patrols except in their positions.”[365] - - [365] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, dtd 4 Apr 53, p. 2. - -A regimental patrol policy early in March established as SOP a minimum -of four reconnaissance and two combat patrols in each MLR battalion -sector daily. Nevertheless, 3/5 had reported no contact with the enemy -for the three-day period prior to the attack which was launched at 1900 -on 26 March. Since the middle of the month, 1/5 had conducted nearly a -dozen night combat patrols and ambushes in one- and two-squad strength -to test the enemy in the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. Terminology of the -operation orders read that the Marines were to make contact, capture -prisoners, and deny the ground to the enemy, an injunction that--in -view of events shortly to transpire--was to turn out more prophetic -than anticipated. - -That last Thursday in March 1953 was clear, almost unseasonably warm. -Just after darkness had settled down over the Korean ridges, gullies, -MLR, outposts, and rice paddies, the enemy suddenly made his presence -known. Up until that time it had been an average day of activity, and -there had been no especially ominous overtones to the start of the -night. - -Suddenly, at 1900, small arms and machine gun fire cracked from enemy -strongholds on Hills 44, 40, 35, and 33, and tore into the left and -center part of the 1/5 sector. Almost immediately, a heavy mortar and -artillery preparation of 15 minutes duration exploded all along the 5th -Marines MLR. A Chinese rifle platoon and half a dozen machine guns on -Hill 140, about 500 yards west of Kumgok, directed additional fire on -the sector. - -At the same time 5th Marines outposts Carson and Reno, each manned by -a reinforced rifle platoon from C/1/5, came under attack from Chinese -mortars and 76mm artillery. Approximately 1,200 mortar rounds struck -COP Carson by 1920. As men of D/2/5, some of whom had been detailed -to Carson earlier that night for an ambush, reported, “one round per -second from Chinese 60mm and 82mm landed in or around [our] position -during the first 20 minutes of the engagement. Thereafter, one round -was received every 40 seconds until about 2200.”[366] Interdiction -fires also raked Marine rear areas and supply routes. Counterbattery -fire struck Marine direct support artillery positions in the 5th’s -regimental sector while heavy shelling of the MLR and its battalion -CPs shattered wire communication between those installations and their -advance outposts. - - [366] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, p. 10. - -Within ten minutes, Vegas, furthest east of the four OPs in 1/5 -territory, became the object of serious enemy attention. Outposts -Berlin and East Berlin, meanwhile, still further east in the 3/5 sector -proper were also engaged by fire from hostile small arms and mortars -from Chinese occupying Hills 15 (Detroit), 13 (Frisco), and 98 to the -northeast. As the coordinated fire attack raged throughout the 5th -Marines regimental front, preparatory fire and diversionary probes hit -the 1st Marines sector. Outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar, in -the center regimental area, were struck by small arms, mortars, and -artillery shells a few minutes before 1900. Platoon and squad strength -limited attacks were conducted against Dagmar, Hedy, and Esther, and -enemy units were sighted moving in front of the KMC, further west along -the MLR. - -At precisely 1910, a force of 3,500 Chinese from the 358th Regiment, -120th Division, 46th CCF Army began to swarm down from Ungok, -Arrowhead, Hill 25A, and Hill 190 and launched a massive assault in -regimental strength against the 5th Marines sector. (Map 27.) Elements -of six companies from three battalions converged on the area from -three directions. Two enemy platoons of the 1st Company, 1st Battalion -from Ungok struck Carson while one infantry company each, initially, -began a direct assault on Reno and Vegas. Units from the 3d Company, -1st Battalion, from Arrowhead and Hill 29, crossed the Seoul road to -hit Reno in a direct frontal assault. Elements of the 7th Company, 3d -Battalion moved down from Hill 190, a mile north, to encircle the left -flank of Reno and thus strike from the rear of the Marine position. -Other Chinese soldiers of the 8th Company, 3d Battalion, supported -by the 9th Company, moved some 500 yards south of their ridgeline -positions on Hill 25A and 155 immediately north of Vegas to attack the -outpost head-on. - -Another enemy unit, the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, swept south from -Hill 57A and made diversionary probes of the two most remote outposts -of the entire 1st Marine Division line, Berlin and East Berlin in the -3d Battalion sector. These two smaller positions, each manned by a -reinforced squad-size detachment from G/3/5, were to be successful in -driving off the enemy’s less determined efforts there with a rain of -small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. - -As the enemy regiment advanced toward its objectives in a coordinated -three-pronged attack, Marine artillery fired protective boxes and -VT on the outposts and routes of approach from the west, north, and -east. Defending infantry also called down organic 60mm and 81mm mortar -barrages. Actually, prior to the Chinese onslaught at 1900, 1/11, -the direct support battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin W. Jones, Jr.) -for the 5th Marines, began a registration and had laid its howitzer -fires on the active area. The artillery regiment had also set up -conference calls linking its four organic battalions and supporting -Army units. The fire plan for the 11th Marines provided for its three -light battalions (1/11, 2/11, and 3/11) to cover enemy approaches and -assembly areas, deliver protective boxing and VT fires requested by -the outposts, and furnish countermortar missions called in by forward -observers. Medium battalions (4/11 and the 623d Field Artillery) -were to reinforce defensive fires and destroy hostile mortars and -artillery emplacements. Heavy 8-inch howitzer support (Battery C, -17th FA Battalion and Battery A, of the 204th) would silence enemy -counterbattery weapons. - -As it happened on the night of the 26th, Marine tanks, in addition -to artillery, were also registered before the time of the actual -attack. Eleven of Captain Hunter’s Company A tanks had earlier rumbled -into firing position on the MLR to provide mechanized support for an -infantry raid scheduled at dawn the next morning. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 27 K. WHITE - -ATTACKS ON 5TH MARINES FRONT - -26–30 MARCH 1953] - -Despite this immediate response of Marine fire support, the Chinese -invaders outnumbered the platoons holding the outposts by a 20 to 1 -ratio. The sheer weight of numbers was the decisive factor. By 1935 the -enemy had penetrated the lower trenches of both Carson and Reno. An -hour after the onset of the attack, at 2000, the Marines were throwing -back Chinese forces with bayonets, knives, rifles, and bare fists in -the close, heavy fighting at Carson. There, where 54 men had been -on duty at the time of initial attack, the outpost was successfully -holding off the Communists. Four reinforcing squads quickly dispatched -by battalion were designed to further strengthen the position. At 2000, -just when D/1/5 and C/1/5 relief squads were leaving for the outpost, -the Chinese unexpectedly began to release their grip on Carson as they -concentrated on the two more isolated COPs, Reno and Vegas, that were -further from the MLR. - -No other attempt was made by the enemy to occupy Carson that night or -the next day. Barrage fires gradually ceased as the enemy began to -withdraw about 2135. Sporadic bursts of his 60mm and 82mm mortars and -76mm guns, however, continued to rock the position until midnight. - -Developments at Reno and Vegas, by 2000, were vastly more ominous. -At Reno, two companies of CCF soldiers thrust into the position from -a frontal and flank attack. Within a half hour they made their way -into the trench defenses. Although VT fires placed on the outposts -and WP flare shells outlined the enemy for the gunners, Chinese in -overpowering numbers continued to batter the Marine post. Due to the -lack of fighting trenches, bunkers, and to limited fields of fire, -Reno defenders fell back on a cave defense within a half hour of the -assault.[367] - - [367] At both Reno and Vegas the Marines had moved into the - caves for protection from VT fire. This was the plan in - event of an overwhelming enemy attack. In contrast, the - detachment at Carson fought from covered fighting holes - and employed the cave there only to get their wounded out - of direct fire. 5thMar SAR “Cities,” pp. 2–3. - -A message received at 2030, requesting more VT rounds and -reinforcements, indicated that the enemy had sealed all entrances to -the cave and that the men were suffering from lack of air. Of the 40 -Company C Marines on the outpost at the time of attack an hour and -a half earlier, only 7 were then reported still able to fight. More -illumination to enable friendly machine guns and rockets to chop up -the enemy was furnished by artillery and a flare plane that arrived -on station at 2205. Two Marine tanks, in position behind Reno, were -alerted and put their 90mm fires to good use on the enemy and his -weapons emplacements. - -Meanwhile, at Vegas, the situation was also deteriorating. More than a -hundred Chinese had moved up under the perimeter of exploding shells -and Marine defensive fires into the lower trenches by 1950, less than -an hour after the enemy’s first volley. Ten minutes later, the Marines -were forced to give way to the overwhelming number of enemy soldiers -which began to swarm over the outpost. - -In addition to the sudden force and onslaught of the enemy, -communication difficulties also plagued Marine detachments on the -outposts, particularly at Vegas. Enemy mortar and artillery, aimed -at the mainline CPs, had wrecked the ground lines. As early as 1940, -communications between the 1st Battalion CP and Vegas went dead and -continued to be broken despite repeated attempts to reestablish -contact. Carson and Reno also had wire troubles about this time, but -radio contact was shortly established. For the most part, operational -reports and orders during the night and early morning hours were sent -over company and battalion tactical nets. The intensity of the Chinese -fire was not restricted just to forward positions; the 1/5 CP, a mile -south of the MLR, at one point received up to 100 rounds per minute. - - -_Reinforcements Dispatched_[368] - - [368] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - 26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW - PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 1/5, - 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR; 5thMar - SAR “Cities”; VMO-6, HMR-161 ComDs, Mar 53; MacDonald, - _POW_; USMC Biog. - -While the Marines on the outposts were trying to drive off the enemy, -reinforcements back at the MLR and in the reserve ranks quickly saddled -up. A F/2/5 advance platoon dispatched to Reno at 2015 by way of the -Reno Block was ambushed near Hill 47 an hour later by two enemy squads -which had moved south to cut off Marine reinforcements. After a fire -exchange, the platoon made its way to the blocking position. Another -relief unit, from Company C, 1st Battalion, that jumped off for Reno 15 -minutes later had poorer luck. The men had scarcely gone a half mile -before being shelled. After briefly taking cover the Marines moved out -again, only to draw fire from the enemy at Hill 47. Advancing for a -third time, the Company C two-squad unit was again halted by fire from -two hostile platoons. By this time 10 Marines had been wounded and -evacuated. - -A D/2/5 reinforcement platoon ordered to Vegas, at 2129, encountered -strong opposition in the Block vicinity, but it threw back the enemy -in hand-to-hand fighting and prevented him from gaining fire supremacy -at the position. Leading units of F/2/5, meanwhile, had been ordered -to operational control of 1/5 to augment the earlier Company C platoon -at the Block and then move north with them to Reno. After being issued -ammunition and hand grenades at the Company C supply point, the “F” 1st -Platoon left the MLR at 2227, with the 2d Platoon filing out in column -400 yards behind them. Under a constant rain of 76mm artillery and 82mm -and 122mm mortar shells--and with casualties for one platoon reaching -as high as 70 percent within minutes--the F/2/5 men fought their way -into the trenches at the Block. Here they joined the depleted ranks of -Company C which had established a base of fire. Despite the incessant -barrage of Chinese incoming that continued to inflict heavy casualties, -the Marines maintained their precarious grip on the Block and cleared -out large numbers of Chinese attempting to infiltrate the trenches and -approaches from the north and south to the Marine position. - -While the Reno and Vegas relief units were pinned down at the Block, -the situation at the outposts remained critical. Throughout the night -new waves of Communist soldiers poured out from their positions behind -Chogum-ni, Hills 31 and 31D. When a company of enemy troops were -observed at 2100 massing near Chogum-ni for a new assault, it was -quickly disposed of by Marine artillery and Company A tankers. At Reno -where the immediate situation was the most grim, a message at 2145 -reported the enemy still in the trenches, trying to dig down into the -cave while the Marines were attempting to work their way out by hand. -The final report from Reno received late that night, about 2300, was -weak and could not be understood. - -At Vegas, meanwhile, communications failure continued to complicate -defensive measures at the outpost. Because of this, on the order of -regimental commander, Colonel Walt, operational control had been -transferred, at 2119, from 1/5 to 3/5. Three minutes before midnight -all contact with Vegas was lost. As with Reno, reinforcements sent out -with the mission of buttressing the Vegas detachment had been delayed. -When it became evident that the Company D platoon had been pinned down -at the Block, a platoon from E/2/5 jumped off at 2323 for the Vegas -position. - -Shored up to reinforced company strength, the composite unit at the -Block had prepared to move on for the ultimate relief of C/1/5 forces -at Reno. Chinese firepower and troops continued to lash the position, -however. There seemed to be no limit to the number of reserve troops -the enemy could throw into the attack. At 2157, two Chinese platoons -had hit the Block. Twenty minutes later, another two platoons struck. -By 2300, the Marines had repulsed three attacks, numbering more than -200 troops, amid a continuing withering avalanche of bullets and -shells. Shortly before midnight, a full enemy company had deployed -south from Reno to the Block, but had been largely cut down by friendly -90mm tank fire and VT rounds from 1/11. Reinforced and reorganized, the -Marines again prepared for a counterpunch on Reno. - -By midnight on the 26th, after five blistering hours of battle--to -develop into five days of intense conflict and continuing -counterattacks--the early efforts of the enemy were partly successful. -Two of the Nevada Hill outposts had fallen, and Marine attempts to -strengthen them were initially being thwarted by Chinese troops that -had overflowed the Block and southward toward the MLR. COP Carson was -holding. But the enemy was in control of Reno and Vegas and was using -the Reno position to mass troops and firepower to further brace his -continuing assault on Vegas. - -Initially, the 5th Marines had expected to launch an immediate -counterattack to regain Reno. In the early hours of the 27th, however, -it became apparent this plan would have to be revised. Reinforcing -elements from the 5th Marines, composed largely of F/2/5, had been -unable to mount out effectively from the Block for Reno. At 0144, the -commanding officer of Company F, Captain Ralph L. Walz, reported he -had one platoon left. Between then and 0220 his diminishing unit had -rallied for attack three times. It had successively engaged the enemy -in fire fights, one of 30 minutes’ duration, evacuated its wounded, -regrouped, and then had come under heavy incoming again. Countermortar -fire had been requested and delivered on active enemy positions at -Arrowhead, Hills 29, 45, and 21B, some 500 yards northwest of Vegas. - -But as the Marines girded their defending platoon at the Block -to company-plus size, the Chinese had done likewise, throwing in -continuous rounds of new mortar attacks and additional troops. When, -at 0246, another hostile company was seen spreading south from Reno -toward the Block, the 1st Battalion directed artillery fires on the -enemy and ordered its troops to disengage and return to the MLR. By -0300, early efforts to retake Reno were suspended. Relief forces from -Companies F and C were on their way back to the battalion area. Ground -action had ceased. - -During these early attempts to rescue Reno and its defenders on the -night of 26–27 March, Marine elements had struggled for more than four -hours trying to get to Reno, but the enemy had completely surrounded -it. At Reno itself, the Marine in command of the outpost when the -Chinese struck, Second Lieutenant Rufus A. Seymour, machine gun platoon -commander of C/1/5, had been taken prisoner along with several of his -men. Of the Marines originally on duty there, all but five had been -killed. Casualties of the Reno reinforcing units were later estimated -by the regimental commander as being “as high as 35 percent, with many -dead.”[369] - - [369] Statement by LtGen Lewis W. Walt, as cited in Eloise - Engle, _Medic_ (New York, N.Y.: John Day, May 1967), p. - 211. - -A 21-year-old Navy hospital corpsman from Alexandria, Virginia,[370] -attached to a Company C relief platoon from 1/5, helped save many -Marine lives that night in the Reno Block area. He was Hospitalman -Francis C. Hammond, who lost his own life but was awarded posthumously -the nation’s highest honor for bravery under fire. For more than four -exhausting hours the young hospitalman helped others to safety, even -though he had been struck early in the fighting and was hobbling around -with a leg injury. When his unit was ordered to withdraw from its -attack against a strongly fortified CCF position, Hammond skillfully -directed the evacuation of wounded Marines and remained behind to -assist other corpsmen. Shell fragments from a mortar blast struck him, -this time, fatally. - - [370] In 1956, a newly-completed school in Alexandria, Virginia - was named the Francis C. Hammond High School and - dedicated in his memory. - -The Vegas reinforcing units, in those dark early hours of the 27th, -had come closer to their objective. Shortly after midnight two -platoons, composed of elements from D/2/5 and C/1/5, had reached a -point 400 yards from the outpost, in the vicinity of the entrance -to the communication trench. When the enemy threw in powerful new -assault forces at Vegas, F/2/7, a company from the regimental reserve, -came under operational control of 3/5 and moved out from the MLR to -reinforce the position. By 0300 the first relief platoon, despite -heavy and continuing Chinese barrages, got to within 200 yards of the -outpost. At this time, however, it was found that the enemy was in -control of Vegas as well as Reno. Marines from D/2/5, C/1/5, E/2/5, and -F/2/7 relief forces, on order, began to pull back to the MLR at 0417. -Initial attempts to regain control of the two outposts were temporarily -halted, and instead it was decided to launch a coordinated daylight -attack. - -At about the same time, 0430, the boundary between 1/5 and 3/5 was -moved 250 yards westward to give 3/5 total responsibility for Vegas, -although operational control had been transferred seven hours earlier -the previous night. - -Enemy casualties for the eight hours of action were heavy. An estimated -600 Chinese had been wounded and killed. Marine losses were also heavy. -In the action First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Taft, Jr., Officer-in-Charge -at Vegas, was killed and, as it was later learned, some of his H/3/5 -defenders had been captured by the Chinese. By midnight the two -line battalions, 3/5 and 1/5, had reported a total of nearly 150 -casualties,[371] and this figure did not include those wounded or -killed from the relief platoons and companies being shuttled into -action from the 2/5 reserve battalion. One platoon from E/2/5 had -arrived at the Company C supply point about 0210 and, together with a -provisional unit from Headquarters and Service Company, 1/5, began to -evacuate casualties in front of the MLR. By 0325, a total of 56 wounded -had passed through the C/1/5 aid station and a cryptic entry in the -G-3 journal noted that “more who are able are going back to assist in -evacuation of casualties.” - - [371] 1/5 and 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53. At this time 1/5 had suffered - 5 killed, 30 wounded, 21 wounded not evacuated, 39 - missing (personnel at Reno), or 95. Reports from 3/5 - showed 1 killed, 8 wounded/evacuated, and 40 missing (at - Vegas), or 49. - -Similar recovery efforts were being made at the same time in the -3d Battalion. Two alternate routes for evacuation were in effect. -From a checkpoint located just south of the MLR in the H/3/5 sector, -casualties were taken to the Company H supply point and thence to -the battalion aid station, or else to the KSC camp from which they -were evacuated to the 1st Battalion aid station. VMO-6 and HMR-161 -helicopters flew out the critically-injured to USS _Haven_ and -_Consolation_ hospital ships at Inchon Harbor and transported blood -from supply points to Medical Companies A, E, and C forward stations. -Excepting the original personnel killed or missing at Reno and Vegas, -1st Battalion forces from Companies C and F dispatched to Reno had -returned to the MLR by 0445. Vegas units, ordered to disengage later -than the Reno reinforcements, were back by 0530. - -Diversionary probes by the Chinese during the night of the 26th at the -3/5 right flank outposts Berlin and East Berlin, as well as in the 1st -Marines sector, had been beaten back by the Marines. Following the -preassault fire at 1900, a CCF company had sent two platoons against -Berlin and one against satellite East Berlin, both manned by Company -G. These reinforced squad outposts, both only about 325 yards forward -of the MLR, had stymied the enemy’s attempts. Boxing fires and VT on -approach routes had forced the Chinese to retreat at 2115. Ten minutes -later Company G reported that communication, which had temporarily gone -out, had been restored. One squad dispatched by the 3d Battalion to -Berlin and a second, to East Berlin an hour later, further buttressed -the companion positions. - -Action in the 1st Marines center regimental sector had also been -relatively brief. Immediately after the 1900 mortar and artillery -preparation, the Chinese in company strength attempted to penetrate -outposts Hedy, Bunker, Esther, and Dagmar. Shelling had been heaviest -at Dagmar and, shortly after 1900, two squads of Chinese began to -assault the outpost with automatic weapons and satchel charges. Machine -guns positioned on enemy Hills 44, 114, and 116 and small arms fire -from Hill 108 supported the attack. The enemy was hurled back at all -places except Dagmar where approximately 25 Chinese breached the wire -entanglement. - -Two hours of intense, close fighting in the trenches followed as the -27 defending Marines, directed by outpost commander Second Lieutenant -Benjamin H. Murray of I/3/1, strongly resisted the invaders. More -than 300 rounds of mortar and artillery fire supported the action. A -counterattack from the MLR led by the I/3/1 executive officer, Second -Lieutenant John J. Peeler, restored the position, and at 2120 the CCF -finally withdrew. Less determined efforts had been made by the enemy -at Esther and Bunker. By 2200 the Chinese had departed from the scene -there, too. Altogether, the 1st Marines sector skirmishes had cost the -CCF 10 killed, 20 estimated killed, and 17 estimated wounded to Marine -casualties of 4 killed and 16 wounded. - - -_Massed Counterattack the Next Day_[372] - - [372] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 - Jnls, 27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR Nos. 882–4, dtd 26–28 - Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86-53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87-53, dtd 28 - Mar 53, 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, - 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn - ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar “Artillery - in the Defense of Outpost Vegas, 26–30 Mar 53,” hereafter - 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, - -323; VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, - “Vegas”; USMC Biog. - -While the 5th Marines reorganized during the morning hours of the -27th for a new attack to recapture the lost outposts, General Pollock -ordered mortars, tanks, and artillery, including rockets, to neutralize -the Reno and Vegas areas and enemy approaches. - -From the time of the 1900 attack the preceding evening until the -temporary break in fighting eight hours later, at 0300, early estimates -indicated 5,000 rounds of enemy mixed fire had been received in the -“Wild” sector (code name for the 5th Marines, and appropriate it was -for this late-March period). And this did not include the vast number -of shells that had fallen on the three Nevada COPs. During the same -period 1/11, in direct support of the 5th, reported it had delivered -some 4,209 rounds on the enemy. Throughout the early hours, two -battalions from the 11th Marines continued to pound away at Reno and -Vegas with neutralizing fires to soften enemy positions, deter his -resupply efforts, and silence those mortars and batteries that were -troubling the Marines. - -By 0330 observation planes from VMO-6 had made 28 flights behind -enemy lines which enabled artillery spotters to direct nearly 60 fire -missions on CCF active artillery, mortars, and self-propelled guns. -From nightfall on the 26th through 0600 the following morning a total -of 10,222 rounds of all calibers had been fired by Marine cannoneers -supporting the 1st Division in its ground battles from Berlin to Hedy. - -Revised intelligence reports from the 5th Marines S-2, Major Murray -O. Roe, meanwhile, indicated that between 1900 on the 26th and 0400 -the next day the Chinese had sent 14,000 rounds of mixed mortar and -artillery crashing into Marine positions. It was also determined that a -reinforced regiment had initially hit the Carson, Reno, and Vegas posts. - -Early on the 27th, at 0345 as the 5th Marines prepared for the -counterattack, the division reserve, 2/7 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander -D. Cereghino), was placed under operational control of the 5th Marines. -(Previously put on alert the battalion had moved into an assembly area -behind 1/5 shortly after midnight, and its F/2/7 had taken part in the -predawn relief attempt.) During the early morning hours a section of -Skyknights, from Lieutenant Colonel Conley’s night fighter squadron, -VMF(N)-513, had made radar controlled bombing runs to strike CCF -artillery positions in the Hill 190 area and enemy troops at Hill 98. -Precisely at 0650, friendly Panthers from VMF-115 began arriving on -station to help the neutralizing artillery fire on Reno and Vegas. -Originally, a dawn ground attack had been envisioned for Reno, but that -was delayed to wait for air support. - -A tentative H-Hour was set for 0900 with a dual jump-off for both -Reno and Vegas. At 0930 the attacks still had not begun due to -communication difficulties. While division Marines were waiting to get -off the ground, 1st MAW pilots were enjoying a busy morning. By 0930, -six four-plane air strikes had been completed by VMF-115 (Lieutenant -Colonel Stoddard G. Cortelyou) and -311 (Lieutenant Colonel Francis -K. Coss) plus sorties by Air Force Thunderjets. Tankers from Company -A had also gotten in a few licks when two groups of Chinese were seen -carrying logs for bunker support into Reno; one group was wiped out, -the other got by. - -Shortly after 1100, friendly artillery batteries began delivering -smoke on Hills 57A and 190, two enemy high points of observation. The -fire plan was modified to eliminate an early 10-minute preparation on -objective areas. (Basically, the artillery plan for counterattack was -that employed in the 19 March Operation ITEM raid on Ungok, because -of the proximity of Ungok to the Vegas hills. This plan consisted of -massed fires on the objective, with countermortar and counterbattery -fires on known artillery positions. To this prearranged plan were added -those new mortar and counterbattery targets located by air observers -during the night of 26–27 March.) This time, the preparatory fires were -to be on call, as was the 90mm fire support from the tankers. A further -change was made when it was decided to limit the assault to Vegas and -not retake Reno but rather neutralize it by fire. - -While artillery, air, mortars, and tanks pounded the objective, assault -elements of D/2/5 from the regimental reserve, under Captain John B. -Melvin, prepared for jump-off. At 1120 the company crossed the line -of departure in the 3/5 sector of the MLR and immediately came under -heavy fires from enemy infantry and artillery units. Within a half -hour after leaving the battalion front for Vegas, Dog Company had -been pinned down by Chinese 76mm artillery, had picked itself up, and -been stopped again by a plastering of 60mm and 82mm shells falling -everywhere in its advance. By 1210 only nine men were left in Captain -Melvin’s 1st Platoon to carry on the fight. The Marine unit continued -to claw its way through the rain-swollen rice paddies and up the muddy -slopes leading from the MLR to within 200 yards of the outpost. In 10 -minutes, heavy incoming began to take its inevitable toll and enemy -reinforcements were flowing towards Vegas from the CCF assembly point -on Hill 153. - -Between noon and 1300, four enemy groups of varying size had pushed -south from Hill 153 to Vegas. At this time still another group, -of company size, moved in with its automatic weapons and mortars. -Within the next 15 minutes, a reinforced CCF platoon made its -way from the Reno trench to Vegas while still another large unit -attempted to reinforce from Hill 21B. As enemy incoming swept the -slopes and approaches to Vegas, Marine artillery and tank guns fired -counterbattery missions to silence the Chinese weapons. In the skies, -VMA-121 ADs and the sleek jet fighters from MAG-33 squadrons VMF-115 -and -311 continued to pinpoint their target coordinates for destruction -of enemy mortars, trenches, personnel bunkers, and troops. - -Back at the battalion CP two more companies were being readied to -continue the Vegas assault. The Provisional Company of 2/5, commanded -by Captain Floyd G. Hudson, moved out at 1215. Close on its heels, -E/2/5 left the Company H checkpoint in the 3/5 sector for the zone of -action. At 1305 the counterattack for Vegas was raging in earnest, with -Company D riflemen on the lower slopes, chewing into the enemy with -their grenades, BARs, M-1s, and carbines. Two hours after the original -jump off time, four Marines crawled out of the trenches at Vegas and by -1322 were going over the top, despite incoming that “literally rained -on the troops.” Assault commander Melvin recalled: - - It was so intense at times that you couldn’t move forward or - backward. The Chinese 60mm mortars began to bother us about - as much as firecrackers. It was the 120mm mortars and 122mm - artillery that hurt the most. The noise was deafening. They - would start walking the mortars toward us from every direction - possible. You could only hope that the next round wouldn’t be on - target.[373] - - [373] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 20. - -Meanwhile, Company E, 5th Marines, under Captain Herbert M. Lorence, -had moved up from the rear and, at 1440, was ordered to pass through -Company D ranks, evacuate casualties, continue the attack, and secure -the crest of Vegas. Although Captain Lorence’s men succeeded in moving -into Company D positions, the deluge of Chinese mortar and artillery -was so heavy that Company E was unable to advance beyond this point. -At 1530, a new Marine company, F/2/7 (Captain Ralph F. Estey), was -dispatched from the MLR to buttress the assault. By this time elements -of D/2/5 had reached the right finger of Vegas but were again pinned -down by intensive enemy artillery and mortars. - -Within the first hour after leaving the battalion line, the Company F -Marines nearly reached the advanced positions of 2/5, and Company D, -which had been in the vanguard since 1100, returned to the regimental -CP. During the next hour, however, heavy shelling slowed the Marine -advance. At 1730, as Company F prepared to make its first major -assault, a deluge of 60mm and 82mm mortar shells, 76mm and 122mm -bursts, and machine gun bullets rained on the troops. As the men -crawled forward slowly, planes from VMA-323 which had arrived on scene -two hours earlier, continued to smoke the enemy’s posts on Hills 190 -and 139. Captain Hunter’s tanks also moved into their MLR positions to -zero in their 90mm rifles on the CCF stronghold at the Vegas northern -crest. - -By 1800, Company F was continuing the Marine counterattack to regain -Vegas and was approximately 400 yards from the outpost summit. -Combining with Company E Marines, for a total strength of three -platoons in position, Captain Estey was able to retake part of the -objective. After an intense 90-minute fire fight and hand-to-hand -fighting in the lower trenches, E/2/7 advanced to the right of the -outpost where at 1930 it began to consolidate. In the next half hour, -two platoons of Company F moved out from the right finger of Vegas -to within 50 yards of the peak, before being forced back by Chinese -machine gun fire and mortars lobbed from the Able (left) gate on -Vegas. The enemy company occupying the outpost resisted the attacking -Marines with mortars, grenades, and small arms fire. In addition, the -CCF employed firing positions at Reno for their machine guns, heavy -mortars, and artillery supporting the Vegas defense and periodically -reinforced their troops from the newly captured Reno outpost. - -It was a busy night for Marines and corpsmen alike. One, whose -split-second improvisations in the blazing zone of action were in the -best Hippocratic tradition, was Hospital Corpsman Third Class William -R. Charette. Attached to F/2/7, he was assisting a Marine when an -enemy grenade landed but a few feet away. Charette immediately threw -himself on the injured man, taking the full shock of the missile with -his own body. Since the force of the blast had ripped away his helmet -and medical aid kit, he tore off his clothing to make bandages. Another -time, while attending a seriously wounded Marine whose armored vest -had been blown off, the hospitalman removed his own to place around -the injured man. Without armored vest or helmet, Charette continued -to accompany his platoon in the assault. As a Marine observer, Staff -Sergeant Robert S. Steigerwald, commented, “HM3 Charette was everyplace -seemingly at the same time, performing inexhaustibly.”[374] - - [374] Statement cited in personnel record of HMC(SS) William - R. Charette, USN. He was the only corpsman during the - Korean War who was awarded the Medal of Honor and lived - to receive it. - -Throughout the night the enemy counterattacked but was unsuccessful -in driving the Marines off the outpost. Between 1830 and midnight, -F/2/7 repulsed three enemy onslaughts and engaged in sporadic fire -fights. Although pushed back from the summit, Company F Marines set up -a perimeter defense at the base of Vegas where the troops dug in for -the rest of the night. Their opposite numbers, from 1st MAW, were also -on the scene. As follow-up to the day’s unremitting air bombardment of -enemy installations, night fighters of VMF(N)-513 and MAG-12 Corsairs -from VMAs-212 and -323 made nine MPQ strikes between 1830 and 0115 -unleashing 24½ tons of explosives on CCF hill defenses and supply -strongpoints. - -Gradually, heavy incoming on Vegas began to lift, and from midnight -through the early hours of the following morning most of the enemy’s -artillery and mortar fires switched from Vegas to the Marine companies -on the MLR. Intermittent small arms fire still cracked and punctuated -the night from enemy positions on Hills 57A, Detroit, and Frisco, to -the northeast of Vegas. - - -_Push to the Summit_[375] - - [375] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - 28 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 884, annex 340-MISP-53-12, POW - Rpt and 1stMarDiv PIR 885, annex 340-MISP-53-13, POW Rpt; - 1st MAW PIRs 88-53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 89-53, dtd 30 Mar - 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, - 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR - “Arty Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, -323, VMFs-115, - -311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas”; USMC Biog. - -Although the composite two-platoon unit of Marines from F/2/7 and -E/2/5 had partially won Vegas back in 10 hours of savage fighting on -27 March, after earlier groundwork by D/2/5, it was a precarious hold. -Marines had attained the lower slopes but the Chinese still clung to -the northern crest. As it turned out, three separate company-sized -assaults were going to be needed to dislodge the enemy. - -The initial Marine action on the 28th began at 0335 when 105mm and -155mm howitzers of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, -belched forth their streams of fire at the pocket of enemy troops on -the northern slopes preparatory to the forthcoming Marine infantry -assault. This 2,326-round pounding was aimed at Chinese assembly areas -and weapon emplacements, with much of the preparation zeroed in on -active mortars. - -Within a half hour the weary men of F/2/7, who had spent a wakeful -night in the lower Vegas trenches, moved to within hand grenade range -of the objective in their first attempt to gain the summit. An intense -shower of small arms and mortar fire, however, forced them to pull -back to the south slopes. While Captain Estey’s troops reorganized -for the next assault, air strikes joined the big guns, mortars, and -tanks in battering the enemy’s position on the outpost and supply -routes thereto. Shortly after sunup, a lone AU from VMA-213, followed -a half hour later by a VMA-323 Corsair, arrived on station. They laid -a smoke screen three miles across the front between Arrowhead and the -far eastern Marine-U.S. Army boundary to assist four early-morning air -strikes. Soon afterwards, eight ADs from Lieutenant Colonel John E. -Hughes’ VMA-121 were in the skies to support the Vegas attack in the -opening round of aerial activity that would see day-long bombing and -strafing runs by five 1st MAW squadrons. - -A new Marine assault at 0600 was repulsed and Company F pulled back -to a defilade position 375 yards south of Vegas and regrouped. Again -friendly planes from VMA-121 and -323, tanks, artillery, and mortars -plastered the enemy in a new series of preparatory fires, beginning at -0920; and again Captain Estey’s F/2/7 men jumped off in attack. By 1015 -the Marines had made their way across the height to within 15 yards -of the trench line on the left finger of Vegas. There they came under -continuous small arms and grenade bursts from the crest and battled the -Chinese in an intense 22-minute fire fight. - -It was during this onslaught by Company F for the crest of Vegas that -Sergeant Daniel P. Matthews so defiantly routed the enemy to save the -life of a wounded comrade that his action gave renewed spirit to those -witnessing it. A squad leader of F/2/7, Matthews was in the thick of -a counterpunch against solidly dug-in hill defenses that had repelled -six previous assaults by Marine forces. The 21-year-old California -Marine was coolly leading his men in the attack when the squad suddenly -was pinned down by a hostile machine gun located on the Vegas crest. -When he saw that its grazing fire prevented a corpsman from removing -to safety a wounded Marine who had fallen in full range of the weapon, -Matthews acted instinctively. - -Quickly working his way around to the base of the enemy machine gun -position, he leaped onto the rock fortification that surrounded it. -Taking the enemy by surprise, he charged the emplacement with his -own rifle. Severely wounded within moments, the Marine continued his -assault, killed two of the enemy, dispatched a third, and silenced the -weapon. By this action, Sergeant Matthews enabled his comrades on the -ground to evacuate the injured Marine, although Matthews died before -aid could reach him.[376] - - [376] The Marine NCO was to be posthumously awarded the Medal - of Honor, presented a year after the action, on 29 March - 1954. - -Back at battalion, E/2/5, with D/2/7 in column behind it, had moved out -to relieve Captain Estey’s redoubtable F/2/7 forces. By noon, Captain -Lorence’s Company E had completed passage of lines through Company F. -The latter unit, now numbering 43 effectives after its six assaults on -27–28 March to regain the Vegas high ground, returned to base camp. - -Heavy air attacks, meanwhile, were assisting the artillery in blasting -out Communist defenses of the Vegas area. Between 0950 and 1300, -seven four-plane strikes by pilots of Colonel Bowman’s MAG-12 had -swept the outpost area and hill lairs of the enemy at 57A, the east -slope of Reno, Tumae-ri (40D), 190, and resupply points. Within one -23-minute period alone, 28 tons of bombs were laid squarely on the -Vegas position. Supported by air, mortars, and artillery, Company E was -400 yards from the objective, and, by 1245, forward elements had moved -up to within 150 yards of the crest. As Marine supporting fires lifted -from Vegas to enemy assembly areas on Hills 150, 153, and 190, E/2/5 -launched its final assault at 1301. Although small arms, bursts of -mortar and enemy artillery fire traced their every move, the Marines’ -hard-hitting attack brought them to the top of Vegas where they -literally dug the Chinese out of their defenses. - -At 1307, the Marines had secured their position and recaptured the -Vegas outpost. At approximately the same time the Marine reinforcing -unit, D/2/7, was ordered to return to MLR, since the objective had been -gained. The Marine in charge of the E/2/5 platoon that retook Vegas was -Staff Sergeant John J. Williams, who had taken over the 1st Platoon -after its leader, Second Lieutenant Edgar R. Franz, had been wounded -and evacuated. Almost immediately after securing Vegas at 1320, the -Chinese launched a counterattack and Company E came under a renewed -barrage of incessant artillery and mortar shells, exploding at the rate -of one round per second in the Marines’ newly gained trenches. - -Marine firepower from the tankers’ 90mm rifles and the protective fire -curtain placed around the outpost by the artillery batteries, however, -deterred this heavy enemy effort. For the next hour Captain Lorence’s -men continued with mopping up chores. Gradually and fitfully the -Chinese resistance began to slacken. By 1401 definite control of Vegas -was established, except for the topographical crest at the northernmost -point. Resupply and consolidation of the outpost began at once, with -Vegas under 3/5 administration and Major Benjamin G. Lee, operations -officer of 2/5, in command. - -Two prisoners had been taken during the day’s action, one by E/2/5 -during its afternoon assault and the other by F/2/7 early in the day. -The soldier seized by a fire team from Company E was a 21-year-old -wounded litter bearer attached to the attacking force, 3rd Battalion, -358th Regiment. He told 5th Marines interrogators that for the -preceding three months the mission of the 358th Regiment (a component -of the 40th CCF Army, under operational control of the 46th CCF Army) -had been to prepare to occupy the Vegas and Reno outposts before -the expected UN spring offensive could be launched. The two key -installations overlooked CCF supply routes. Furthermore, occupation -of these two hills, the Chinese believed, would serve as a valuable -tactical example to the 46th Army, whose ranks at this time were -composed of nearly 65 percent recruits. The POW also reported that -prior to the CCF attack on Reno and Vegas, men of his regiment had -practiced throwing hand grenades every day for the past two weeks. -No political classes had been held during this period as practical -proficiency, apparently, took priority over theoretical indoctrination. - -The other Chinese prisoner, captured by Company F at 0610, was a -grenadier with the 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 358th Regiment. Prior -to the attack, his unit had occupied reverse slope positions on -Hills 25A and 155 as reinforcements for the 8th Company. Each CCF -battalion, he revealed, “held a front of approximately 1,000 meters, -utilizing one company on line with two in support.”[377] This remark -interested interrogators since it contradicted the normal pattern of -enemy employment. According to the grenadier, the mission of the 3d -Battalion had been to attack Vegas, while the 1st Battalion (to the -west of the 3d on the Chinese MLR) was to secure Reno. Hill 190.5, an -enemy strongpoint, had several antiaircraft machine guns on its reverse -slope, he declared, and was the location as well of the forward CP of -the 3d Battalion, 358th Regiment. - - [377] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 28 Mar 53. - -For the next five hours, from 1440 to 1930, the Marines dug in on the -crest and slopes of Vegas, buttressing their positions for the new -Chinese attack sure to come. A muster of the rag-tag group left from -the day’s 10 hours of fighting revealed a total strength of only five -squads--58 effectives from E/2/5 and 8 from F/2/7. Uppermost in the -minds of all the men, regardless of their diminished numbers, was the -ironclad conviction that “we intend to stay.”[378] - - [378] _Ibid._ - -Their leader, Major Lee, was no less determined. At 42, he was a -Marine veteran of 19 years, a former sergeant major from World War -II and holder of the Silver Star and Purple Heart for service at -Guadalcanal. Now he had volunteered for this hazardous duty of holding -together segments of the Vegas enclave until the Marines could once -again possess the entire hilltop outpost. Under his direction the -troops promptly began to prepare individual fighting holes in the best -possible tactical positions and to emplace their weapons. Personnel -from Captain Lorence’s E/2/5 held the hard-won Vegas crest, while 150 -men from F/2/5 committed later in the afternoon strengthened the rear -trenches. - -Air bombardment, prior to the 28th, had not been employed extensively -against Vegas itself. The goal had been to recapture the outpost and -drive the Communists out without unnecessarily destroying its defenses. -Chinese tenacity in exploiting the Marine weapons positions at COP 21, -while augmenting them, had made it apparent that the Vegas defense -network would have to be reduced to retake the position. Altogether, -during the day 33 missions (more than 100 CAS sorties) were flown by -AUs, ADs, F4Us, and F9Fs of the 1st Marine Air Wing to support division -ground action in regaining the advance outpost. All morning long, -powerful attack planes from three MAG-12 squadrons had winged in from -nearby K-6. Pilots from VMA-121, VMA-212 (Lieutenant Colonel Louis R. -Smunk), and VMA-323 (Lieutenant Colonel William M. Frash) had flown the -bombing runs. - -In the early afternoon they were joined by the speedy, stable Panther -jets from VMF-115 and VMF-311, of MAG-33 (Colonel Robertshaw), -based further away at K-3. Between 1300 and 1800, a series of three -four-plane F9F assaults were launched north of the Marine MLR by -VMF-311, while another strike was made further east in support of -the Army 2d Infantry Division’s Old Baldy operations. These planes, -together with two divisions from VMF-115, dumped a total of 23 tons -of bombs and 3,100 rounds of 20mm shells on CCF trenches, bunkers, -mortars, and caves at Vegas, Reno, and Hill 25A. Additionally, VMF-115 -Panthers flew four single-sortie daytime MPQ missions north of the -bombline to damage and destroy enemy resupply points. - - -_Other Communist Probes_[379] - - [379] The material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884-5, dtd 28–29 Mar 53; - 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR. - -Although the Chinese made it plain that their main interest was in the -Vegas outpost area, spotty probes also took place in Colonel Adams’ -1st Marines sector. On the 27th, at about 2310, two enemy squads milled -around the wire defense at outpost Kate, but Marine small arms, BARs, -and mortars routed them after a 15-minute fire fight. At midnight, a -CCF reinforced platoon reconnoitered Dagmar and Esther, for the second -successive night, supported by small arms and automatic weapons fire -from Chinese Hills 114 and 44. The enemy platoon started to rush the -forward slope at Dagmar, but Company I defenders pulled back to the -reverse side and directed VT-fuzed shells on the enemy. - -Following this barrage the Marines reoccupied their position, with -the help of MLR machine guns, mortars, and artillery from the 3/11 -direct support battalion. (Now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alfred -L. Owens, who had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Pregnall on 25 March.) -The enemy reinforced with a second platoon, as did the Marines. After -intense close-in fighting in the Dagmar trenches for two hours, the -Chinese withdrew. An enemy squad also engaged Bunker and Hedy; but -again, 3/11 VT-fuzed concentrations and the organic outpost defenses -sent him off handily. Enemy casualties for the evening’s activity were -15 dead, 25 more estimated killed, and 23 estimated wounded. - -The following night the Chinese briefly harassed outpost Hedy, using -as cover an abandoned Marine tank just east of the outpost, as well as -the MLR to the rear of COP Bunker. Marine bullets and mortar shells -dictated a quick retreat, however. Several minor contacts with the -enemy had also been made during the two-day period in the 1st KMC -sector. The most menacing were heavy enemy sightings on the 27th of -some 200 Chinese in the area west of the old outposts 36 and 37, but no -major action developed. - - -_Three CCF Attempts for the Outpost_[380] - - [380] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, - 28–29 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884-6, dtd 29–31 Mar 53; - 1st MAW PIR 89-53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5th Mar, 7thMar, 11th - Mar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 3/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; - 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; Fugate, - “Vegas.” - -As darkness blanketed No-Man’s-Land on the night of the 28th, ground -fighting flared up anew at 1955. The Chinese had begun another one of -their nightly rituals, the first of three counterattacks to win back -the disputed territory from the Marines. Vegas reported heavy incoming, -including not only the usual assortment of mortar and artillery fires -but direct 3.5-inch rocket hits. Enemy troops, estimated at nearly a -battalion, began approaching from Reno. By way of answer two Marine -light artillery battalions, 1/11 and 2/11, together with the medium -155mm howitzers of 4/11 and the Army 623d Field Artillery, lashed a -4,670-round barrage to interdict the approaching enemy. Ripples from -the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery reinforced the howitzers in thwarting -this initial enemy assault. On the right flank of the outpost an -intense 20-minute fire fight broke out at 2023, but the Vegas defenders -beat back the intruders. For an hour the enemy, supported by heavy -mortar and artillery fires from Reno and his own positions at Vegas, -tried unsuccessfully to force the Marines to withdraw. - -Carson, which had been relatively undisturbed for the past two days, -also came under attack at this time from automatic weapons and mortars -directed on its north slope by the enemy holed up behind Hills 67 and -31. For the rest of the night an enemy company prowled around the area, -but the defense at Carson, plus artillery and mortar fire support from -JAMESTOWN, sent the Chinese off in the early morning hours with their -ambitions thwarted. - -At Vegas, meanwhile, outpost commander Major Lee at 2130 radioed -battalion headquarters that he was preparing for a new enemy -counterattack. It was not long in coming. Less than an hour later, the -Chinese were again storming from Hill 153, and Marine boxing fires -picked off the advancing enemy. At 2230 Major Lee’s riflemen, deployed -about 25 yards from the peak, were holding Vegas, surrounded by Chinese -on the southern face of the position. For a brief period the enemy took -the high ground but then gave it up under pressure from the defending -Marines. Close by, another sharp fire fight erupted; then subsided -for about an hour. At 2300 a new onslaught of Chinese reinforcements -made the third major attempt of the evening to recapture the Vegas -position. Two enemy companies descended. Within a half hour another -massive fire fight had broken out, and the battle was raging across the -shell-scarred hilltop. Major Lee reported to G-3 heavy enemy sightings -of at least 200 Chinese on the top slopes challenging Marine possession -of the Vegas crest and attempting to smoke their positions. At 0045, -hostile forces had surrounded the outpost and seized part of the Vegas -height, but 11th Marines fires walled off the enemy and prevented -penetration. Flare planes circling overhead lighted the target and -cannoneers of both sides concentrated on the crest. The heaviest Marine -shoot of the night-long artillery duel, a 6,108-round barrage, rained -down on enemy troops and trenches shortly before midnight. - -Altogether, during the night of 28–29 March, two battalions of Chinese -troops had made three separate, unsuccessful ventures to retake the -Vegas crest, but were thrown back by Marine mortar, artillery, and -tank fires. At 0130, following a heavy 37-minute artillery and mortar -concentration, the enemy began to withdraw, but not before venting his -displeasure with a resounding blast of small arms and bazooka fire from -the Reno hill. In their departure, the Chinese were given an assist by -Company E, 7th Marines, which had broken through the enemy encirclement -of Vegas in the early morning hours to join E/2/5 and F/2/5 defending -forces and help drive the invaders off all but the northern tip of the -hill. Now under Captain Thomas P. Connolly, E/2/7 ascended the high -ground, passing through F/2/5 ranks in preparation for the ultimate -relief of E/2/5. - -For the next two hours the 11th Marines battalions, together with the -1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, sealed off the outpost and blistered enemy -fortifications at Reno with a total of 4,225 rounds. Air observers on -station fired 10 missions between midnight and 0430. Twenty minutes -later, the artillerymen unleashed still another preparation to dislodge -the unyielding CCF dug in at the Vegas topographical crest. Heavier -fires from the 155mm howitzers of 4/11 and the 623d Field Artillery -Battalions followed on more than two dozen active mortar and artillery -targets. - -A new assault by Marine infantrymen (E/2/7, E/2/5, and F/2/5) at 0450 -recaptured the critical northern segment of the outpost. Elation over -this encouraging turn of events was dampened, however, by loss of -several Marine leaders in the early morning foray. Shortly before 0500, -Major Lee and Captain Walz were killed instantly by a 120mm mortar -round during an intensive enemy shelling. Another Marine casualty early -on the 29th was First Lieutenant John S. Gray. A forward observer from -C/1/11, he was mortally wounded by an enemy mortar blast when he left -his foxhole to crawl closer to the Vegas peak and thus better direct -artillery fires on the enemy. At the time of his death, Lieutenant Gray -was reported to have been at Vegas longer than any other officer. - - -_Vegas Consolidation Begins_[381] - - [381] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 29–31 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv - PIRs 885–887, dtd 29–31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 8-53, dtd 29 - Mar 53 and 90-53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, - 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn - ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty - Defense”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-212, -323, VMFs-115, -311 - ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas.” - -Only a few surviving enemy were seen when Marines of F/2/5 and E/2/7 -moved out to consolidate the position after daybreak. This task was -completed without contact by 0830. In the meantime, the Vegas defense -was reorganized with two reinforced platoons on the main portion and a -third occupying the high ground. A smoke haze placed around the outpost -screened the work of the Marines. Individual foxholes were dug and -automatic weapons emplaced. Major Joseph S. Buntin, executive officer -of 3/5, had taken over as the new outpost commander. Corpsmen and -replacement weapons--machine guns, mortars, BARs, rockets--had arrived. -The morning supply train brought KSC personnel and Marines with -engineering tools to begin work on trenches, fighting holes, weapons -dugouts, and bunker fortifications. - -By noon, excavation work on the shell-pocked trench system was well -under way, with all of it dug waist deep and the majority as deep as -a man’s shoulder. Daylight hours between 1000 and 1600 on the 29th -were relatively quiet with only light ground activity. Rainy weather -that turned road nets and fighting trenches into boot-high muck and -giant mud holes further slowed the action. Artillerymen completed -countermortar and smoke missions, and in the skies air observers -directed fire throughout the day on 19 enemy resupply and target points -until dusk when rain and light snow forced them to return to base. - -At 1850, the Chinese launched what in some respects was a carbon -copy action of the night of the 26th. Once again there was sudden -heavy incoming and then shortly after dusk the CCF struck in a new -three-pronged attack to overrun Vegas. This time three companies of -Chinese approached both flanks of the outpost from their positions on -Reno and Hill 153. In addition to his infantry weapons, the enemy was -supported by heavy mortars and artillery. But the Marines’ mortars, -illuminating shells, and big guns replied immediately. Ten minutes -after the enemy’s latest incursion, a massed counterfire from five -artillery battalions joined in the heaviest single barrage of the -entire Vegas defense action. This massed fire of 6,404 rounds blasted -the Chinese assault battalion and sent it reeling back with heavy -losses. Two rocket ripples also tore into the Chinese troops. - -In addition to the medium and heavy firing batteries, two heavy mortar -units, Companies A and C of the 461st Infantry Battalion, had that -day gone into position in the 5th Marines sector in general support -of 1/11. Other fires came from the 8-inch howitzer unit, Battery C, -424th Field Artillery Battalion, also newly assigned to the 17th Field -Artillery Battalion that day in general support of the 1st Marine -Division. - -Although another enemy attack was quickly repulsed at 2045 in a brisk, -savage fight, shortly before midnight the Chinese reappeared, moving -up from behind the right finger of Hill 153. This was believed to be -an attempt to recover their casualties, but Marine artillery, mortars, -and rocket bursts sent them fleeing within ten minutes. Still the enemy -obstinately refused to give up his goal of retaking the high ground -at COP 21. In the early morning hours of the 30th, he again returned -to hit the outpost in his second battalion-strength attack within six -hours. Again he struck from Reno and Hill 153, and again he attempted -to cut off the outpost Marines by encircling the position. Heavy -pounding by artillery, mortar, and boxing fires snuffed out the enemy’s -attack and by 0215 the Chinese had left the Vegas domain--this time, it -was to prove, for good. Their casualties for this latest attempt had -been 78 counted killed, 123 more estimated killed, and 174 estimated -wounded. - -With sunup, the Marines at the battered outpost again repaired the -damage of the night’s visits from the Chinese and continued work to -improve their trenches and gun emplacements. Clearing weather enabled -air observers and pilots to follow a full flight schedule. VMA-212 and -VMA-323 were again over the Vegas skies during the morning hours and -shortly before noon a joint mission by eight AU’s, a division from each -squadron, dumped nearly 10 tons of bombs on enemy trenches, mortars, -bunkers, and troops at Hill 25A across from Reno to discourage Chinese -rebuilding efforts. Both flew afternoon sorties to destroy strongholds -at Hill 21B, at Reno, now in possession of the enemy, and to make smoke -screen runs. Early in the day, Company F of 2/5 came up from the 2/5 -CP to fill in on the MLR and Berlin outposts for Company G from 3/5. -Later in the afternoon, G/3/5 relieved E/2/7 on Vegas and Major George -E. Kelly, S-3 of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, succeeded Major Buntin as -the new outpost commander. - -Two comments, casually made at the time, perhaps typify the grim -staying power of the Marines who defended Vegas. As Corporal George -C. Demars, Company F platoon guide, 5th Marines, observed, “The guys -were like rabbits digging in. The fill-ins [reinforcements] gotten by -the Company during the reorganization, jumped right in. We didn’t know -half the people on the fire teams, but everybody worked together.”[382] -Second Lieutenant Irvin B. Maizlish, assigned as a rifle platoon -commander of F/2/5 on the 25th, the day before the fighting broke out, -and who had the dubious distinction of being one of the few officers -of those originally attached to the company not wounded or killed, -recalled: “I checked the men digging in at Vegas ... I’ve never seen men -work so hard ... I even heard some of them singing the Marine Corps Hymn -as they were digging....”[383] - - [382] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 74. - - [383] _Ibid._ - -The last direct confrontation with the enemy at Vegas had occurred that -morning, about 1100, when five Chinese unconcernedly walked up to the -outpost, apparently to surrender. Then, suddenly, they began throwing -grenades and firing their automatic weapons. The little delegation was -promptly dispatched by two Marine fire teams. Three CCF soldiers were -killed and two taken prisoners, one of whom later died. - -As darkness fell on the 30th, Marine artillery fired heavy harassing -and interdiction missions and regimental TOTs on enemy supply routes -and assembly areas. Although the shoot was dual-purposed, both -to prevent another Chinese attempt at retaking Vegas and to foil -a possible diversionary probe elsewhere in the division sector, -neither situation developed. For the fourth consecutive night, giant -searchlights from the Army’s 2d Platoon, 61st Field Artillery Battery -illuminated the battlefield to spotlight the enemy withdrawal routes. -Two of the quadruple .50 caliber machine gun mounts from the 1st -Provisional AAA-AW Battery were also displaced to MLR positions in -anticipation of trouble, but the CCF had apparently had enough of a -thoroughly bloodied nose from the Marine fighters and decided to call -it quits. - -By daybreak, the Vegas sentry forces could report that things had been -relatively quiet--the first time in five interminably long nights--and -Companies D and E, 5th Marines, which had been watchdogging it at the -outpost moved back to the MLR. At 0800, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, -reverted to parent control, and by noon, reliefs were under way not -only for Vegas but for Corinne, Dagmar, Hedy, and Bunker in the 1st -Marines sector. A 5th Marines body recovery detail, meanwhile, had -moved out to search the draws. - -If ground action was light on the 31st, supporting arms activity was -a different story, starting with seven MPQ drops on enemy artillery -positions and ammunition caves in the early hours of darkness. Between -0650 and 1900, 23 air strikes were flown in the Vegas-Reno area by -VMA-121 ADs and AUs of -212 and -323, MAG-12 squadrons, as well as -three quartets of Air Force Thunderjets dispatched by Fifth Air Force. -Artillery fired a total of 800 rounds on 156 enemy concentrations, -again with 4.2-inch mortars from the 461st Infantry Battalion -reinforcing 1/11 fires on hostile mortars, ammunition dumps, and supply -points. If the outgoing was aimed at discouraging Communist plans -for new acquisitions, _their_ incoming had dropped to a new low in -comparison with the heightened activity of the past five days. A total -of 699 rounds was reported in the division sector, most of it falling -in 5th Marines territory. - - -_Aftermath_[384] - - [384] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 887, dtd 31 Mar 53; 5thMar, - 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 11thMar SAR “Arty - Defense”; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; MacDonald _POW_; - Jane Blakeney, _Heroes--U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955_ - (Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957); Leckie, _Conflict_; - Fugate, “Vegas”; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “A Year in Korea,” - _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53); _New York Times_, - 29–31 Mar 53; _Washington Post_, 29–31 Mar 53. - -Recapture and defense of the Vegas outpost was one of the intense, -contained struggles which came to characterize the latter part of -the Korean War. The action developed into a five-day siege involving -over 4,000 ground and air Marines and was the most bloody action that -Marines on the western front had yet engaged in. Its cost can be seen, -in part, by the casualties sustained by the 1st Marine Division. The -infantry strength of two battalions was required to retake Outpost -Vegas and defend it against successive Chinese counterattacks. A total -of 520 Marine replacements were received during the operation. Marine -casualties totaled 1,015, or 116 killed, 441 wounded/evacuated, 360 -wounded/not evacuated, and 98 missing, of which 19 were known to be -prisoners. Losses for the critical five-day period represented 70 -percent of division casualties for the entire month--1,488 killed, -wounded, and missing (not including 128 in the KMC sector). - -Enemy casualties were listed conservatively as 2,221. This represented -536 counted killed, 654 estimated killed, 174 counted wounded, 853 -estimated wounded, and 4 prisoners. The Marines, moreover, in the -five days of furious fighting had knocked out the 358th CCF Regiment, -numbering between 3,000 and 3,500 men, and destroyed its effectiveness -as a unit. - -Throughout the Vegas operation, the 1st Marine Air Wing had flown 218 -combat missions against the Nevada Cities hills (63 percent of the -entire month’s total 346 CAS missions), bombing and strafing enemy -weapons positions, bunkers, ammunition dumps, trenches, and troops. -On the 27th and 28th, while heavy fighting raged in both the Marine -and 7th Army Division sectors, Marine Air Group 33 pilots flew 75 -sorties--resulting in their highest daily sortie rate and air hours -since December 1952. The March 28th date was a noteworthy one for -MAG-12, too. It established a new record for combat sorties and bomb -tonnage unloaded on the enemy in a single day; the group executed 129 -sorties and dropped 207.64 tons of bombs and napalm. - -Although restricted on two days by weather conditions, close air -support was effectively used throughout the Vegas Cities operation. A -total of 81 four-aircraft flights dropped approximately 426 tons of -explosives in CAS missions. Smoke and flare planes--despite a shortage -of both flare planes and flares[385]--were employed throughout the -period as were the rotary aircraft of the two helicopter squadrons, the -latter for casualty evacuation operations. - - [385] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, KMC, - KPR, dtd 31 Mar 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. II, - p. 9. - -Tanks, provided by the Company A direct support tank company, were -used day and night, firing from nine positions along the MLR. Their -effective use to mark air targets was of particular importance in -connection with their support role, while the tank light also helped -to provide illumination of the objective area in hours of darkness. -Approximately 7,000 rounds of 90mm tank ammunition were fired. - -During these five tense days the enemy deluged Marine positions with -45,000 rounds of artillery, mortar, and mixed fire. Indicative of the -savage pounding the Vegas area took is the fact that incoming Chinese -artillery for the full two-week period from 1–15 March totaled only -3,289 rounds. Marine efforts to defend, counterattack, secure, and -hold the Vegas outpost against repeated Chinese assaults were “marked -by maximum use of and coordination with various supporting arms and -organic weapons.”[386] Three light artillery battalions, two medium -battalions, two 8-inch batteries, one 4.5-inch rocket battery, and two -companies of 4.2-inch mortars fired a combined total of 104,864 rounds -between 27–31 March; the 11th Marines and its heavy Army reinforcing -elements, in support of 5th and 7th Marines units, executed 332 -counterbattery and 666 countermortar missions. Of the total number -fired, 132 were air observed. - - [386] 5thMar SAR “Cities,” p. 8. - -The artillery shelling was the hottest during a 24-hour period ending -at 1600 on 28–29 March. During this time 35,809 rounds were fired -(33,041 from the four Marine battalions). This even surpassed the -previous record of 34,881 rounds fired during a one-day period in the -Bunker Hill defense of August 1952. A new one-day battalion total -for West Korean fighting was also set on the 28th; 1/11 fired 11,079 -rounds, exceeding the record of 10,652 set by 3/11 during the Bunker -Hill fighting. - -Marines at a rear area supply point achieved another record. In a -24-hour period, during the heavy fighting on 28–29 March, 130 men -handled 2,841 tons of ammunition. Second Lieutenant Donald E. Spangler, -an ammunition platoon commander with the 1st Ordnance Battalion, who -had but 13 hours’ sleep in the entire five days of fighting, proudly -noted that his unit had “more than doubled the tonnage that the U.S. -Army says a man can handle in 14 hours.”[387] - - [387] Heinecke, _op. cit._, p. 50. - -As for the men on the front line, besides the Medal of Honor winners, -10 Marines were awarded the Navy Cross, the nation’s second highest -combat award. Nine citations were for the Vegas action and one for the -1st Marines defense of Dagmar, in staving off an enemy penetration on -the night of the 26th. - -Battlefront tactics employed by the CCF in its assault of the Vegas -Cities outposts were largely consistent with their previous strategy. -As in the past, the enemy launched simultaneous attacks against -several Marine positions in attempt to fragment defensive artillery -firepower. Characteristically, the enemy preceded his thrust with heavy -preassault concentrations of artillery and mortar fire. He also took -advantage of the twin ploys of surprise and overwhelming strength, -with wave after wave of Chinese rolling over the objective. Innovative -techniques consisted of scaling ladders, fashioned from lightweight but -sturdy bamboo, which were used to traverse Marine wire defenses, and -of having an artillery liaison officer attached to infantry squads to -better direct supporting fires during the attack. Analysis of Chinese -firepower tactics indicated deliberate counterbattery efforts by the -CCF, although this employment of artillery was secondary to its support -of ground troops. - -Actually, the Chinese attack on the forward Marine outposts the night -of the 26th appeared to have been part of an overall reinvigorated -spring assault. Opening gun of this offense had been fired three nights -earlier, on the 23d, when they swept over an Army hill defense at Old -Baldy, 25 miles northeast of the Marine Vegas Hills. Despite heavy -Allied gunfire and bombing by Air Force and Marine planes under Fifth -Air Force flight orders, the Chinese had clung to the hill, burrowed -deeply, and resisted all efforts to be dislodged. After three days of -fighting, U.S. 7th Division troops had abandoned the Old Baldy hill -at dawn on the 26th. The CCF, apparently emboldened by this success, -that same night had launched a series of probes at nine UN outposts -on the Korean far western front in an attempt to further extend their -frontline acquisitions. - -Following the loss of Reno, a new outpost, Elko, was established on -Hill 47, southeast of Carson and 765 yards from the MLR, to prevent the -enemy from using the Hill 47 position as an attack and patrol route to -the MLR. In addition to this new platoon-strength outpost, the Marines -substantially shored up Vegas from its former platoon garrison to a -detachment consisting of 2 officers and 133 enlisted men. - -Headlines had told Americans at home and the free peoples around the -world the story of the “Nevada Cities” in Korea and the Marines’ -five-day stand there to prevent loss of critical UNC territory. The -event that marked an official “well done” to the Marines themselves -was a message from the Commandant, General Shepherd, who on 30 March -sent the following dispatch to General Pollock, CG, 1st Marine Division: - - Have followed the reports of intensive combat in the First Marine - Division sector during the past week with greatest sense of - pride and confidence. The stubborn and heroic defense of Vegas, - Reno, and Carson Hills coupled with the superb offensive spirit - which characterized the several counterattacks are a source of - reassurance and satisfaction to your fellow Marines everywhere. - On their behalf please accept for yourself and pass on to every - officer and man of your command my sincere congratulations on a - task accomplished in true Marine Corps fashion.[388] - - [388] CMC msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 30 Mar 53, cited in - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. I, p. 7. - -In turn, General Pollock congratulated the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing -of General Megee and its six participating squadrons (VMAs-121, -212, --323, VMFs-115, -311, and VMF(N)-513). Citing the close air support -missions of the Marine flyers during the operation, General Pollock -noted that the air strikes of the 28th were “particularly well executed -and contributed materially to the success of the 1st Marine Division in -retaking and holding the objective.”[389] - - [389] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 31 Mar 53, in - MAG-12 ComdD, Mar 53, App. VII-3. - -Plaudits had also come to the 1st Marine Division from the Korean -Minister of Defense, Pai Yung Shin,[390] the day immediately preceding -the Vegas attack. On 25 March, the Korean Presidential Unit Citation -streamer,[391] for action from 26 October 1950 to 15 February 1953, -had been placed on the division colors in ceremonies at the division -command post, attended by the Korean Defense Minister; Vice Admiral -Woon Il Sohn, Chief of Korean Naval Operations; Major General Hyan Zoon -Shin, Commandant of the Korean Marine Corps; General Pollock, division -commander, and his troops. The event marked the fourth Korean PUC -awarded to Marine units since the beginning of the war. - - [390] CROKMC ltr to CMC, dtd 2 Feb 1971, hereafter ROKMC - _Comments_. - - [391] See Appendix G for complete text of citation. Previous - awards were as follows: 1stProvMarBrig (for 2 Aug-6 Sep - 50 period), 1st MAW (3 Aug 50–26 Feb 51), and 1stMarDiv - (15–27 Sep 50). - -A directive at the end of the month put the 7th Marines on the alert -to move into 5th Marines positions in the right regimental sector. -This was to be accomplished on 4–5 April when, after 68 days on line, -the 5th Marines moved south to Camp Rose to become the division -reserve regiment. The prospect of a new stage in the off-and-on -truce negotiations had also come late in the month. On 28 March, the -Communists informed the UN of their willingness to discuss the Allied -proposal for return of sick and wounded prisoners. This exchange -had originally been suggested by the UN more than a year earlier, -in December 1951. Notification of the new Chinese intentions came, -ironically, on a day when the Vegas outpost fighting was at its height. - -As the month closed on the Vegas chapter, Marines on line and in the -reserve companies who had just sweated through the bloodiest exchange -of the war on the I Corps front to date added their own epitaph. With a -touch of ungallantry that can be understood, they called the disputed -crest of Vegas “the highest damn beachhead in Korea.” - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -Marking Time - -(April-June 1953) - -_The Peace Talks Resume--Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH_--Interval Before the -Marines Go Off the Line--The May Relief--Training While in Reserve and -Division Change of Command--Heavy May-June Fighting--Developments in -Marine Air--Other Marine Defense Activities--The Division Is Ordered -Back to the Front_ - - -_The Peace Talks Resume_[392] - - [392] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, - 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, _Korea Knot_; - Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, - _Conflict_; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, “Freedom Village,” - _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate, - “Freedom Village.” - -It was April 1953, but it wasn’t an April Fool’s mirage. On 6 April, -representatives of the United Nations Command and the Communist -delegation sat down at the Panmunjom truce tents to resume the peace -talks that had been stalemated six months--since October 1952. If there -was a word that could be said to reflect the attitude of American -officials and private citizens alike--for that matter, the atmosphere -at Panmunjom itself--it was one of caution--not real optimism, not an -unbridled hopefulness, but a wearied caution born of the mountains of -words, gulfs of free-flowing dialogue and diatribe, and then ultimate -plateaus of intransigence that had marked negotiations with Communist -leaders since the original truce discussions had begun in July 1951. - -Diplomatic maneuverings had been underway since the end of 1952 for -the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of both sides. This was -considered a first step towards ending the prisoner of war dispute and -achieving an ultimate truce. A resolution introduced in mid-November -by India at the United Nations session dealing with settlement of -nonrepatriate prisoners had been adopted in early December. Later that -month the Red Cross international conference had officially gone on -record favoring the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in advance -of a truce. A letter written on 22 February by the UNC commander, -General Clark, calling for the immediate exchange of ailing prisoners -had been delivered to the NKPA and CCF leaders. - -Initially, the Communist answer was an oppressive silence that lasted -for more than a month. During this time the Communist hierarchy had -been stunned by the death, on 5 March, of Premier Stalin. Then, on 28 -March, in a letter that reached General Clark at Tokyo in the middle -of the night, came an unexpected response from the two Communist -spokesmen. They not only agreed unconditionally to an exchange of the -sick and injured prisoners but further proposed that “the delegates -for armistice negotiations of both sides immediately resume the -negotiations at Panmunjom.”[393] - - [393] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 373. - -This favorable development astonished not only the United Nations -Commander but the rest of the Free World as well. Several steps were -quickly put in motion. The UN Commander’s reply to the Kim-Peng offer -was expressed in such a way that resumption of full negotiations was -not tied in as a condition for the preliminary exchange of ailing POWs. -President Eisenhower, commenting on the new Communist proposals at his -2 April press conference, stated he thought the country should “now -take at face value every offer made to us until it is proved unworthy -of our confidence.”[394] He also further enjoined major military -commanders and subordinates to avoid anything that might be contrary to -this view when they made public remarks or issued press releases. - - [394] CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4 - Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1. - -In Korea, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was established on 5 April -under the Commanding General, Eighth Army, in the vicinity of the 1st -Marine Division railhead at Munsan-ni. The command was to prepare for -the many housekeeping details involved in the receiving and orderly -processing of all UNC prisoners. The anticipated exchange itself was -dubbed Operation LITTLE SWITCH. Two Army officers, one Marine Corps, -and one ROKA representative were designed to direct the administrative -machinery of the provisional command. Heading the organization was -Colonel Raymond W. Beggs, USA. - -The Marine representative, Colonel Wallace M. Nelson, was named -commanding officer of the United Nations Personnel and Medical -Processing Unit. His responsibility was not limited to the obvious -medical aspects of the exchange, but extended to other details -involving clothing issue, personnel, security, chaplains, food, -communication, motor transport, engineering, and the operation of -unit headquarters. Among those matters to which the Munsan-ni command -directed its immediate attention was the setting up of a temporary -facility for Communist prisoners currently held in UNC camps at Koje, -Cheju, and Yongcho Islands and a hospital near Pusan. Arrangements were -also made for in interpreter pool, debriefing teams, and press center -facilities. - -As the new week began on Monday, 6 April, and the world looked to -Panmunjom for the next set of signals in the war, a new stage developed -in the truce negotiations. Within five days after the talks had begun, -both sides agreed to return the disabled prisoners in their custody. -Final papers for the preliminary exchange were signed at noon on 11 -April by Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, USN, for the United Nations -Command, and Major General Lee Sang Cho, of the Communist delegation. -The week-long transfer of sick and wounded POWs was scheduled to begin -20 April, at Panmunjom. - -The Communists announced they intended to release 600 sick and wounded -UNC prisoners (450 Korean, 150 non-Korean), a figure which Admiral -Daniel called “incredibly small.”[395] For its part, the UNC indicated -that it planned to free nearly ten times that number of North Korean -and Chinese POWs. Communist and Allied representatives also agreed that -truce talks would be resumed at Panmunjom, once the prisoner exchange -was completed. - - [395] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 415. - -Security precautions went into effect at both Panmunjom[396] and the -entire Munsan-ni area, 10 miles southeast, on the first day of the -prisoner talks. All facilities at both Panmunjom and Munsan-ni were -placed off limits to Eighth Army personnel not directly involved in -the operations. Regulations were strictly enforced. Even before the -negotiations opened at Panmunjom, actual construction work for LITTLE -SWITCH was well under way by Marine engineers. “Operation RAINBOW,” as -the building of the facilities for the POW exchange was called, began 5 -April. - - [396] With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines, - whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to - the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines, - took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set - up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan - and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on - alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in - the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to - security. While the talks were in session, a forward - covering group, composed of a reinforced rifle company - and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground - east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue - force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the - Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and - departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter - or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App. - II, pp. 1–4. - -In a little over a day--actually 31 working hours--a task force of less -than 100 Marine construction personnel had erected the entire Freedom -Village POW recovery station at Munsan-ni. The special work detachment -was composed of men from Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, under -Major Charles E. Gocke, and attached to the engineer battalion; utility -personnel from Headquarters and Service Companies; and a Company D -platoon, 1st Engineer Battalion.[397] - - [397] The battalion’s new commanding officer was Lieutenant - Colonel Francis “X” Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had - succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine. - -Early Sunday morning the Marines moved their giant bulldozers, earth -movers, pans, and other heavy duty equipment into Munsan-ni. Ground -leveling started at 0800 and work continued around the clock until -0100 Monday. After a five-hour break the men dug in again at 0600 and -worked uninterruptedly until 2000 that night. Furniture, tentage, -and strongbacking stored at the 1st Engineer Battalion command post, -meanwhile, had been transported and emplaced. When it was all done -the Freedom Village complex, like ancient Gaul, had been divided into -three parts. The command area comprised receiving lines, processing and -press tents, and related facilities for United Nations troops. Adjacent -to this was the 45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital tent, completely -wood-decked, equipped for mass examinations and emergency treatment. -Across the road from the UN site proper was the area reserved for -returning South Korean prisoners, who would form the bulk of the -repatriates. - -Altogether the three camp areas represented some 35,100 square feet of -hospital tentage, 84 squad tents, and 5 wall tents. Gravel to surface -three miles of standard combat road, plus two miles of electrical -wiring, was hauled and installed. More than 100 signs, painted in -Korean and English, were erected, as well as the large one that -stretched clear across the road at the Freedom Village entrance. Six -welcome signs were raised above the UN and ROK processing tents, while -another mammoth Korean-English sign was installed at the Panmunjom -exchange site. - -Special areas for ambulance parking; helicopter landing strips; five -50-foot flagpoles; graded access roads and foot paths; sanitation -facilities; and storage areas for food, blankets, and medical -supplies were also constructed. And timing was important. It had been -anticipated that the prisoner exchange might take place on short -notice. For this reason 1st Marine Division work and processing teams -had conducted their rehearsals so that they could complete all duties -within 36 hours after first receiving the “go ahead” signal for the -switch. - - -_Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH[398] - - [398] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap 9; Commander - Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), “Operation Little - Switch--Apr 53”; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing; - ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1); - FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG, - FMFPac, subj, “Debriefing of Returned POWs”; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, _POW_; Clark, _Danube to - Yalu_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Fugate, - “Freedom Village”; _New York Times_, 19–21 Apr 53; - _Washington Post_, 19–21 Apr 53. - -Nine days after the truce talks were temporarily suspended, 11 April, -Operation LITTLE SWITCH (code-named Little Swap) began the morning of -Monday, 20 April. By the time it ended on 26 April, a total of 6,670 -North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners had been returned by the -UNC. The enemy released 684 captives,[399] of whom 149 were Americans. -Among them were 15 Marines, 3 Navy corpsmen who had been attached to -the 1st Marine Division, and a Navy aviator. The first day Allied -prisoners--walking, some hobbling along on crutches, and others carried -on litters--were delivered in two groups. The initial 50 men reached -Panmunjom at 0825, and the second group, two hours later. The first -Marine freed was Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez, H/3/7, a Puerto Rican, -who had been captured at Frisco in the early October 1952 outpost -clashes. Later that day, another POW taken in the same action, Private -Louis A. Pumphrey, was also released. - - [399] The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH - represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British, - 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 - Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino, and 1 Netherlander. - -Early moments of the exchange were tense as UNC sick and wounded -captives were shipped in a long line of CCF ambulances from Kaesong, -five miles northwest of Panmunjom, down the neutral corridor past enemy -lines to the exchange point. Despite the fact that all official papers -and agreements had been concluded more than a week earlier, no one was -absolutely sure until the last moment that the prisoner exchange would -actually take place. The mechanics of the transfer operation itself, as -it turned out, went off practically without hitch. One minor unsavory -incident had occurred when 50 North Korean prisoners in UNC custody en -route from Pusan to Panmunjom, had dumped their mess kits into garbage -cans, noisily complaining about breakfast. - -There was also a long taut moment of uneasy silence when the first -Communist ambulance pulled up in front of the Panmunjom receiving -center. An American MP, who in the excitement had gotten his orders -confused, forgot to tell the enemy driver where to turn. The ambulance -almost went past the center. A UN officer raced out to the road and -motioned to the driver, who backed around and pulled into the parking -lot. - -One of the first things the liberated POWs saw was the big sign -“Welcome Gate to Freedom” raised the preceding night over the Panmunjom -receiving tents. Here they could get a cup of coffee and momentarily -relax before starting the long one-and-a-half hour ambulance trip south -to Freedom Village. The returnees were outfitted in blue Communist -greatcoats, utilities, caps, and tennis shoes. Some of the men were -bearded; some wore thin smiles; some had half-hidden tears in their -eyes. Primarily, there was a subdued and businesslike air to the day’s -proceedings, however, with a marked absence of levity. Admiral Daniel, -whose UNC liaison group had negotiated the exchange, in commenting on -the smoothness of the first day’s operation observed: “It’s been a -tremendous emotional experience for us all. Not much was said between -us here, but we are all very happy.”[400] - - [400] _New York Times_, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1. - -From Panmunjom all Allied prisoners were taken to Freedom Village at -Munsan where they received a medical check, and the more seriously -wounded were flown to a field hospital near Seoul. The first American -prisoner to reach Freedom Village was an Army litter patient, Private -First Class Robert C. Stell, a Negro. Helicoptered in from Panmunjom -at 1007, he was treated “like a 5-star general by all hands, including -General Clark, UN commander.”[401] By noon the routine, agreed upon -in the earlier exchange talks, was moving along evenly and would be -in effect throughout the week-long exchange. The Communist quota was -100 prisoners freed daily, in two groups of 50 each, while the Allies -returned 500. Thirty Americans were among the 100 UNC men released that -first day. - - [401] _Ibid._, p. 3. - -Upon their arrival at Freedom Village the Marine POWs, all of whom had -been wounded prior to being captured, were greeted by representatives -of the 1st Marine Division. In addition to General Clark, other ranking -officials on hand included Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, -new EUSAK commander, Major General Pollock, 1st Marine Division CG, -Brigadier General Joseph C. Burger, in one of his first public duties -since assuming the post of assistant division commander on 1 April, and -Dr. Otto Lehner, head of the International Red Cross inspection teams. - -Each Marine prisoner was met by a 1st Division escort who gave -him physical assistance, if necessary, as well as a much-prized -possession--a new utility cap with its Marine Corps emblem. Recovered -personnel received a medical examination. Waiting helicopters stood -by to transport seriously sick or wounded Marines to the hospital -ships _Haven_ and _Consolation_ riding at anchor in the Inchon harbor. -Chaplains chatted as informally or seriously as a returnee desired. -Newspapers and magazines gave the ex-prisoners their first opportunity -in months to read unslanted news. And a full set of utility uniforms, -tailored on the spot for proper fit, were quickly donned by Marines -happy to discard their prison blues. - -Although returnees received their initial medical processing at -Freedom Village, no intelligence processing was attempted in Korea. -Within 24 hours after their exchange, returned personnel were flown to -K-16 (Seoul) and from there to Haneda Air Force Base at Tokyo. Upon -arrival at the Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, a more detailed medical exam -was conducted, including a psychiatric interview by officials from -the newly formed Special Liaison Group of Commander, Naval Forces, -Far East. Lieutenant Colonel Regan Fuller, USMC, was designated by -ComNavFE as OIC of the detailed briefing of all returned personnel at -Tokyo. Other Marine officers participating in the debriefings included -Lieutenant Colonel Thell H. Fisher and Major James D. Swinson, of -FMFPac headquarters; Major Jack M. Daly, representing the 1st Marine -Division; and Captain Richard V. Rich, of the 1st Marine Air Wing. - -Each Marine returnee was interviewed by a two-man debriefing team -that consisted of a Marine and a Navy officer, the latter usually a -counterintelligence expert. The three-phase interrogation averaged 9–12 -hours and covered personal data, counterintelligence, and a detailed -military questionnaire. The latter, particularly, sought information -about UN personnel still held captive by the enemy. Since all of the -15 Marine POWs had been captured relatively recently (either in the -October outpost contests or the Vegas battle the previous month), the -information they had about the enemy was of limited intelligence value. -From debriefing reports of Marine returnees, many of whom brought -address books with them, it was learned that at least 115 more USMC and -Navy prisoners were alive and still held in POW camps. - -Upon completion of counterintelligence processing, returned personnel -were available for press interviews. Long-distance telephone calls to -parents or other family members were arranged by the Red Cross. Summer -service uniforms and campaign ribbons were issued, pay provided, and -administrative records updated by representatives dispatched by Colonel -John F. Dunlap, Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Yokosuka. - -All of the 19 Marine and Navy POWs had been released by 25 April. -After final processing and clearance for return to the U.S. the men -were flown home, via Hawaii, in three groups that departed 28 April, -30 April, and 4 May. Each was accompanied by a Marine Corps officer. -Members of the first contingent of POWs arrived at Travis Air Force -Base, California, on 29 April, thereby completing their 7,000-mile -journey from Communist prison camps. Another small group of POWs -considered possible security risks were airlifted directly from Japan -to Valley Forge Hospital, near Philadelphia, for further interviewing. -No Marines were among them. With the initial prisoner exchange -completed, staffs of the major Far East commands began to prepare for -the final return of all POWs. Operation BIG SWITCH would take place -after the ceasefire that, hopefully, was not too far away. - -On the day that Operation LITTLE SWITCH ended, 26 April, plenary -truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. The stormy issue of repatriation of -prisoners, which had already prolonged the war by more than a year, -was still the one major problem preventing final agreement. There was -indication, however, that the Communists appeared to be softening on -their rigid insistence of forced repatriation. And, on 7 May, the -Communists accepted the UN proposal that nonrepatriate prisoners be -kept in neutral custody within Korea (rather than being removed to a -foreign neutral nation) and offered an eight-point armistice plan. With -modifications, this ultimately became the basis for the armistice. -While discussions and disagreements continued on this proposal, another -real problem developed from a totally different source. - -Since early in April rumblings had been heard, through the polite -ambassadorial circuits, that Syngman Rhee, the aging South Korean -president, was dissatisfied with major truce issues. In particular, he -was disturbed over the possibility that Korea would not become reunited -politically. Further, Rhee gave indication that he might take some -kind of action on his own. The Korean leader had advised President -Eisenhower that if any armistice was signed that permitted Chinese -Communist troops to remain south of the Yalu, with his country divided, -he would withdraw ROK military forces from the UN command. Since South -Korean troops, backed by American specialized units, presently manned -the bulk of the UNC front line, Rhee’s threat to remove them from -General Clark’s command presented harrowing possibilities. - -Meanwhile, on 13 May, General Harrison, senior UN representative -at Panmunjom, made a counterproposal to the Communist plan. This -incorporated three measures aimed at reconciling differences in the -long-controversial repatriation issue.[402] Arguments flew back and -forth at Panmunjom, with a temporary recess called in the talks; but -on 4 June the Communists accepted this UN final offer. The dispute of -18 months’ duration had ended and the Allied principle of voluntary -repatriation had won out in the end. About the only homework left for -the negotiating teams was to map out final details of the Demilitarized -Zone. - - [402] In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations - Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese - nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of - settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished; - (2) that troops from just one country (India) be used - to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy - five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists; - and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly - spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to - returning prisoners who refused repatriation. - -President Rhee now even more violently denounced the projected -armistice plan. He declared that he and the Koreans would fight on -alone, if necessary. South Korean delegates boycotted the Panmunjom -truce meetings, and Rhee began a campaign to block the cease-fire. -Final agreement on the POW issue was reached 8 June. It provided that -the NNRC offer a “civilian status” to former POWs who did not exercise -their right of repatriation within four months after being taken into -custody by the commission. Those POWs who desired asylum would be set -free. The South Korean National Assembly unanimously rejected the truce -terms the following day. - -Revision of the truce line, to correspond to current battle positions, -and other concluding details of the truce were being settled by 17 -June. On 18 June, chaos suddenly replaced progress. Acting on orders -from Rhee, during early morning hours ROK guards at the South Korean -prisons released approximately 27,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW -inmates (the majority of the large group of NKPA who did not wish to -be repatriated). They quickly escaped and became absorbed into the -civilian populace of South Korea. Immediately the Communists charged -the Americans with complicity and demanded to know whether the United -Nations Command was able to control its South Korean ally or not. - -For the next two weeks the American ambassadorial and military team -tried to restore some measure of international good grace and hope to -the crisis. Daily talks (and pressure) took place with Rhee, as well -as with the Communist negotiators, to set the course back on track -again in the direction of a final truce agreement. At the end of June, -UNC Commander Clark was authorized by Washington to work out a way in -which it would be possible to sign the tenuous armistice--without the -Koreans, if necessary. - - -_Interval Before the Marines Go Off the Line_[403] - - [403] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896–900, dtd 8–12 Apr 53; - 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn - ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, - VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53. - -Shortly after the heavy Vegas fighting in late March, Colonel Funk’s -7th Marines, which had been in reserve, exchanged positions with the -5th Marines. The new line regiment assumed responsibility for the -critical, action-prone right sector of the MLR on 4–5 April. In the -center part of JAMESTOWN, the 1st Marines of Colonel Adams continued to -man the MLR and its 12 outposts, including the strategic COP-2 tucked -down by the Panmunjom peace corridor. With the resumption of truce -talks on 6 April, this position had again taken on renewed importance -with its tank-infantry covering force of 5 armored vehicles and 245 -Marines on call at all times. - -After its relief from the MLR in early April the 5th Marines, as the -new division reserve unit, assumed the regular missions of serving -as a counterforce for Marines in the I Corps sector, if required; -maintenance of the secondary KANSAS line; and a rigorous training -program. On 10 April, the 3d Battalion moved out to the KANSAS position -for a two-day field exercise. By midmonth, spring thaws and heavy rains -had so weakened the trench and bunker fortifications of KANSAS that -an all-out effort was temporarily diverted from refresher training -to reconstruction. The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, under Operation Plan -24-53, pursued an intensive five-day shore-based training program, -7–11 April, in preparation for its coming amphibious exercise, MARLEX -XX. On the 13th, BLT 2/5 under Lieutenant Colonel Finch, with armored -amphibian, tank, amtrac, and 1/11 detachments, proceeded to the landing -area, Tokchok-to, one of the WCIDE command offshore islands southwest -of Inchon. Battalion assault companies hit the southern Tokchok-to -beaches on D-Day, 15 April, according to schedule, although high winds -and rough seas subsequently modified the exercise.[404] - - [404] Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5 - command diary indicates that the battalion continued the - exercise on 16–17 April, returning the latter date. The - 5th Marines report categorically indicates that MARLEX XX - was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather. - -Not long afterward a training exercise involving UNC personnel got -underway when the 5th[405] and 1st Marines, together with the -artillerymen, combined with the Army, ROK, and Commonwealth Division on -20 April for a four-day I Corps command post exercise (CPX) EVEREADY -GEORGE, not far from Seoul. - - [405] Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi, - who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding - Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3. - -Along the division front the war was still a daily survival contest, -despite the promising outlook at Panmunjom. The most ambitious attempt -by the Chinese during the month took place over a three-day period -in the right regimental sector, not long after the 7th Marines had -moved to the MLR. On 9 April, following a heavy two-hour ballistic -downpour of 2,000 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery, a reinforced -company of about 300 Chinese soldiers launched a strong probe against -Carson at 0345. Attacking in two echelons, the enemy approached from -the direction of Arrowhead on the north and the Reno ridgeline. In an -hour’s time, the enemy had reached the Marine trenches and protective -wire, at some places, and was being unceremoniously repulsed by the 1/7 -detachment at Carson. For an hour and a half a heavy fire fight raged -at the outpost while intruders and defenders battled at point-blank -range to settle the dispute. - -A reinforcement platoon, from 4/2/7, dispatched from the MLR at 0530, -made it as far as the newly established Marine outpost at Elko, about -400 yards southeast of Carson, before being held up by a heavy shower -of mortar rounds, and small arms fire. Tankers from the Company A -direct element[406] plus a section (two tanks) from the regiment’s -armored platoon leveled their lethal 90mm fires to discourage the -enemy, as did the defender’s barrage of 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch -mortars. - - [406] Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies - A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental - antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm - shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons. - -Two rocket ripples and 22 defensive fire concentrations unleashed by -2/11, also in direct support of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Lawrence -Jr.’s 1st Battalion, plus additional reinforcing fires by batteries of -1/11 and 4/11 drove off the enemy at 0700. As a security measure, a -company from the regimental reserve (E/2/7) was assigned to Carson to -buttress the position and assist in reorganizing the outpost defense. -The enemy’s activity had cost him 60 known dead. Additional casualties -were estimated to be 90 killed and 70 wounded. Marine losses numbered -14 killed, 4 missing, 44 wounded/evacuated, and 22 non-seriously -wounded. Meanwhile, beginning at 0715, Marine prop-driven attack AUs -from VMAs-212 and -323 and ADs from VMA-121 were aloft over prime -Chinese targets to perform CAS missions and MPQ drops. - -Between the morning’s first strike and midafternoon the three MAG-12 -squadrons completed 43 sorties and blasted enemy hills and weapons -positions north of Carson with a total of 67½ tons of bombs. Later that -night three Chinese platoons, operating in small units, reappeared in -the Carson-Elko-Vegas vicinity to recover casualties. Although they -reached an unoccupied caved-in bunker 50 feet from Carson, the enemy’s -nocturnal activity only cost him more casualties from the COP’s defense -fires: 15 known dead, 15 estimated killed, 7 known wounded, and 27 -estimated wounded. - -The following day, Panther jets from Marine Fighter Squadrons 311 and -115 contributed to the further destruction of hostile emplacements, -but the enemy himself was nowhere to be seen. Again that night, -ground-controlled radar bombing runs were made by VMA-121 and -VMF(N)-513 to help keep the enemy off balance. In the early-morning -hours of the 11th, however, a band of 30 grenade-slinging Chinese -renewed the assault on 7th Marines positions by attacking the reverse -slope of Elko. This ambition was deterred by outpost organic weapons -and box-me-in fires. After a brief fire fight the CCF withdrew, and -the two MAG-33 squadrons later that morning returned to station for -CAS strikes against CCF trouble spots. Another raid on Carson began at -2115 that night when 70 Chinese moved out from Ungok to the west ridge -of the Marine position. Ten minutes later, Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch -mortars, artillery, machine guns, and tanks forced them back with -approximately 20 CCF killed and wounded to show for their efforts. - -A brief repeat action occurred the following night when two squads -of Chinese reappeared at Elko, but they were dispatched by Marine -infantry, artillery, and armor direct fires following a 15-minute -spirited exchange. During the night of the 12th[407] Chinese probes -and harassing efforts diminished. Other than a few spotty, abortive -skirmishes in the KMC sector, this pattern of reduced enemy effort -would continue for the next several weeks, until after the change of -the Marine line in early May. As the peace talks at Panmunjom were -beginning to show some progress, enemy psychological warfare efforts -in the KMC, 1st, and 7th regimental sectors became more zealous, -an indication of the Chinese attempt to increase their propaganda -offensive. This included not only loudspeaker broadcasts and propaganda -leaflet fired in mortar shells but a more unusual tactic, on 6 April, -of enemy messages dropped over the COP Vegas area by airplane. - - [407] This same date was significant because it marked the - first time a searchlight-guided night close air support - mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector. - -Little ground action took place in the division sector throughout -the rest of the month. During the last three days of April, as the -operational period for the Marines drew to an end, both infantry and -artillery units noticed an unusual lull across the front. Marine -patrols made few contacts, and there was a sharp decrease in the -heavy enemy sightings of midmonth. Chinese incoming, in fact, during -the latter part of the month decreased markedly, with a total of 873 -rounds compared to the 4,149 tallied during the 1–15 April period. An -average of 58.2 rounds daily made it, in fact, the quietest period in -the Marine division sector since the holiday calm of late December when -only 84.2 rounds had fallen the last 10 days of the month. - - -_The May Relief_[408] - - [408] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr-13 May - 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr-May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar - ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr-May 53; Hermes, - _Truce Tent_. - -By late April, plans had moved into high gear for relief of the 1st -Marine Division by the 25th U.S. Infantry Division and transfer of the -Marines to U.S. I Corps reserve at Camp Casey. Although the Marine -division had been in active defense positions for 20 months (first in -the eastern X Corps and, for the past year, on the western front), -some observers noted that there was a reluctance to turn over their -presently occupied positions and that the Marines were coming out -“under protest from commanders who wanted the Division to remain on the -line.”[409] - - [409] News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53, - 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1. - -For its part, the 25th Division, commanded by Major General Samuel T. -Williams, was to shift over to the I Corps far west coastal area from -its own neighboring IX Corps sector on the right. Marine association -with the Army division went back to the early days of the war.[410] -In August 1950, when the Korean Conflict was then only a few weeks -old, the 25th Division, with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and -the Army’s RCT-5, had spearheaded the first UN counteroffensive on the -far southern front, in the Sachon-Chinju area. Now fresh from its own -recent period in reserve[411] the 25th Division, including its attached -Turkish Brigade, was to take over the 33-mile 1st Marine Division line, -effective 5 May. Marine armor and artillery, however, would remain in -support of the 25th Division and transfer to I Corps control. - - [410] The two divisions had also seen combat together early in - WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. ltr to Dir, - MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter _Heinl ltr_. - - [411] Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in - mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need - for a complete eight-week training program for reserve - divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal - of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery - battalions to maintain their basic mobility. Hermes, - _Truce Tent_, p. 391. - -Another change at this time affected the designation of the United -Nations MLR. Called Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps sector (and variously -in other parts of the EUSAK front as MISSOURI, DULUTH, MINNESOTA, -and CAT), the Allied front was redesignated simply as “main line of -resistance,” beginning 28 April, and was to be so known in all future -orders and communications throughout the entire Eighth Army. A further -modification dropped the reference “in Korea” from the acronym EUSAK, -the title becoming “Eighth U.S. Army.” - -In the Marine sector, the last few days of April were a study in -contrasts. While Marine frontline infantrymen and cannoneers were -having a comparatively peaceful interlude during this period of minimal -CCF activity, division engineers were the proverbial colony of beavers. -Following up their rigorous schedule in early April of building Freedom -Village from scratch within 36 hours, engineer personnel moved out from -the division sector late that month to begin construction of the rear -area camps that would shortly be occupied by the Marines while in I -Corps reserve. - -Located approximately 15 miles east of the Marine MLR, the Camp Casey -reserve complex consisted of three major areas. They were: the central -one, Casey, which gave its name to the entire installation and would -house the new division CP and 5th Marines; Indianhead, to the north, -where the 7th Marines, 1st KMC Regiment, Division Reconnaissance -Company, machine gun and NCO schools were to be established; and -Britannia, to the south, assigned to the 1st Marines. Motor transport, -engineer, and medical units in support of the respective regiments were -to locate nearby. - -On 27 April, the day after resumption of truce talks at Panmunjom, -Company A engineers began the work of clearing the camp site, erecting -prefabricated buildings, and pioneering roads in the 7th Marines -northern area. Two days later the 1st KMC Engineer Company was also -detailed to Indianhead for work on the 1st KMC Regimental camp. Company -C engineers and Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, attached to the -Engineer Battalion, meanwhile moved into the Casey sector to ready the -relocated Division CP and the 5th Marines camp. - -Tactical relief of the 1st Marine Division officially began 1 May. -By the time it was over, four days later, more than 2,370 truckloads -of Marine personnel and equipment had been used in the transfer to -Camp Casey. Described another way: if placed bumper to bumper in a -continuous convoy, this would have extended more than six miles, the -length of the MLR held by a Marine regiment in any major defense -sector. As a preliminary step in the relief, on 29 April the division -assumed operational control of several incoming Army artillery units -(the 8th, 64th, 69th, and 90th Field Artillery Battalions, and the 21st -Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion) plus elements of the Turkish -command, including the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. By midafternoon, -the first of the Army infantry relief personnel had also arrived in -the division sector, when elements of the three battalions of the 35th -Infantry Regiment had reported in to respective 1st Marines[412] host -units, preparatory to assuming responsibility for the center sector of -the Marine line. - - [412] The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the - former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer, - who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May. - -On 1 May the 5th Marines, then in reserve at Camp Rose, took over -responsibility for the 14th Infantry Regiment, designated as the -Army maneuver unit. Later that day, when Colonel Tschirgi’s regiment -closed its headquarters and moved out by motor march to Casey, control -of the Army unit transferred to the division. The same day, the 1st -KMC/RCT artillery battalion--which, like the 11th Marines units, was to -remain on line although KMC infantry personnel were to move to I Corps -reserve--came under control of I Corps; two days later an Army armored -unit, the 89th Tank Battalion, rolled into position in the KMC rear -support area and came under division command. - -The 7th Marines right regimental sector, with its critical Nevada -Cities and two Berlin positions, became the new home for the Turkish -battalions of Brigadier General Sirri Acar in a four-day phased -operation, beginning 0115 on 3 May. Actual bulk displacement of the -first Marine MLR units and their respective outposts got underway on -this date, when responsibility for the 7th Marines left battalion -sector transferred from 2/7[413] to the 1st Battalion, TAFC, and the -7th Marines battalion began displacing to Indianhead. On the same day -the division opened its advance command post at Camp Casey. - - [413] On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion - sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was - no change in 3/7’s location in the right sector. These - were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops - in early May. - -The first Marine sector to complete the relief was the 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion, to the south of the Munsan-ni railhead; at midnight -on 4 May, with the assumption of sector responsibility by the Army -Task Force Track, it moved to the logistical complex at Ascom City -where it opened its new CP. Throughout the BMNT hours of 4 and 5 May, -Marine positions were transferred to the incoming organic and/or -attached units of the U.S. Army 25th Division. Relief of three of the -major sectors in the Marine division line was thus well under way by -the early hours of the 5th. Final relief and its elaborate phasing -operations were completed that morning. On the left flank, the 1st KMC -was relieved at 1030 by the incoming U.S. Army 27th Infantry;[414] 30 -minutes later, the 1st Marines was replaced in the line by the Army -35th Infantry; and on the right, the 7th Marines sector was taken over -by the TAFC. (See Map 28.) - - [414] _ROKMC Comments._ - -Sharply at 1120 on 5 May,[415] the U.S. Army 25th Division assumed -responsibility for defense of the MLR in what had been the 1st Marine -Division sector for more than 13 months. At the same time all 25th -Infantry Division units under operational direction of the division -also reverted to parent control. In addition to the Kimpo Regiment, -several small Korean Service Corps and medical units retained in the -sector also came under Army command. - - [415] Final relief was largely complete at this time. - Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7, - relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a - few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed - out the sector on 7 May. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 28 K. White - -25th INFANTRY DIVISION SECTOR - -FOLLOWING RELIEF OF THE 1st MARINE DIVISION - -5 MAY 1953] - -I Corps Operation Orders No. 31 and 32 had directed that the 11th -Marines remain on line in the sector attached to I Corps Artillery, -with a general support mission of reinforcing the fires of the 25th -Division artillery, and a secondary task of coordinating counterbattery -support. The medium battalion, 4/11, and the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket -Battery, furnished general support for I Corps. Regimental and -battalion CPs, as well as the rocket battery, continued to occupy their -same locations. A change affected the KMC artillery battalion, however; -when transferred to I Corps artillery control it displaced from the -Marine sector, with a new general support role of reinforcing the I -Corps line. - -Also on 5 May, at 1130, the 1st Tank Battalion[416] passed to 25th -Division control. Two companies, C and B, were assigned to the TAFC -(which had no armored units) in the left and right battalion areas, -respectively. Company D vehicles came under command of the 35th -Infantry Regiment, in the center sector; while A, the remaining -company, was designated as the single reserve unit. This was a -modification of the Marine system of maintaining two tank companies -in reserve, one a short distance behind the MLR and the other, at the -armored battalion CP near Munsan-ni. A change in tactics also took -place when the Marine tanks came under Army operational control. It -had been the Marine practice to retain the tanks at the company CP -from where they moved to prepared firing slots at the request of the -supported infantry unit. - - [416] The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant - Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant - Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953. - -When the 1st Tank Battalion was attached to the 25th Division, the -armored vehicles were shifted to firing slots near the MLR where they -occupied semifixed positions.[417] Armored personnel carriers (APCs) -were assigned by the Army to Company B and used by both B and C as -resupply vehicles to haul food, water, fuel, and ammunition to the -tanks on line. Also as part of the relief, control of the KMC tank -company was transferred from the Marine 1st Tank Battalion to I Corps, -although the company still continued in its same location in the old -KMC sector. - - [417] The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions - at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade - revetments and were periodically driven into the firing - slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank - might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of - major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol - Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, - hereafter _Post ltr_. - -Also remaining in their same positions were MASRT-1 (Marine Air Support -Radar Team One), in support of the 25th Infantry Division, MTACS-2 -(Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two), and VMO-6. The mobile air -support section of the observation squadron, however, had moved with -the 1st Marine Division to the new Casey area for participation in the -coming MARLEX operations scheduled during the reserve training period. - -Thus with the relief completed, components of the old Marine division -front, from left to right, were: the Kimpo Provisional Regiment; Task -Force Track; the 27th Infantry Regiment; 35th Infantry Regiment in the -center sector, including its armor and heavy mortar company and 2d and -3d Battalions forward, replacing the 1st Marines 3d and 1st Battalions; -and in the right sector, the Turkish Brigade 4.2-inch mortar company -and its 1st and 3d Battalions initially located[418] in the MLR -positions vacated by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines. - - [418] Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions - forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve. - -In addition to the 1st Marine Division railhead and truckhead at -Munsan-ni and Ascom City, a subsidiary railhead/truckhead was opened -at Tongduchon-ni, two miles southwest of the new division CP at Casey. -No change was made in the airhead at K-16. Effective with the 5 May -change, remaining elements of the division CP staff at Yongji-ri joined -the advance elements at Casey. As the Marines moved off the front -lines they received “well-done” messages from the Commandant, General -Shepherd, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief, Admiral -Arthur W. Radford, as well as the new I Corps Commander, Lieutenant -General Bruce C. Clarke[419] who cited the “excellence of the planning, -coordination and cooperation which enabled the operation of the past -few days to be successfully accomplished.”[420] - - [419] General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April - 1953. - - [420] CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May - 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2. - - -_Training While in Reserve and Division Change of Command_[421] - - [421] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt Eval Rpts_ No. 5. Chap 6, No. 6, - Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 - Jnls, 22 Apr-30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, - 1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May-June 53; Field, - _NavOps, Korea_. - -While the division was in reserve, its tactical mission consisted of -preparation for commitment on I Corps order as a counterattack force -in any of the four division sectors of I Corps. Division Operation -Plan 7-53 implemented this I Corps Plan “RESTORE” and set forth the -designated blocking positions in the 25th Army, Commonwealth, 1st ROK, -and 7th Army Division sectors in event of threatened or actual enemy -penetration of the MLR. - -The 1st Marine Division’s Training Order 8-53, issued on 6 May, the -day after the relief was officially effected, outlined the training -to be accomplished during the eight-week reserve period, 10 May-5 -July. Following a few days’ interval devoted to camp construction -and improvement of facilities, an active training program commenced. -Its objective was the continued improvement of amphibious and ground -offensive combat potential of all personnel. Three major regimental -combat team MARLEXES were scheduled.[422] The training syllabus -called for a four-phased progressive schooling from individual to -battalion and regimental level conducted in all phases of offensive, -defensive, and amphibious warfare. Weaponry familiarization, small unit -tactics, and combined unit training, with tank-infantry deployment and -integration of helicopters at company-level exercises, were emphasized, -culminating in a week-long field maneuver. - - [422] Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the - first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine - Division amphibious training to regimental level. - Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had - been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the - Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in - fact, “produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious - retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in - the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the - enemy.” Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 430. - -Lectures were to be kept to a minimum, with at least 50 percent of -the tactical training conducted at night. Specialty training in -intelligence, signal communications, antitank and mortar, machine gun, -mine warfare, and staff NCO schools was also prescribed. Numerous -command post exercises were programmed to obtain a high standard of -efficiency in both battalion and regimental-level staff functioning. -It was the first time the division had been in reserve since a brief -two-week period in late July-August of 1951. A brisk 40–44 hour week, -plus organized athletics, insured that the training period was to be -fully utilized. - -No time was lost getting under way. At a staff conference with -battalion commanders on 11 May, General Pollock, division CG, stressed -the importance of using the time they were in reserve for enhancing -division combat-readiness. Even as he spoke, his 5th Marines had the -day before boarded ships at Inchon and were en route to the Yongjong-ni -landing area for MARLEX I. Since the 5th Marines, in division reserve, -had been the first of the regiments to displace and on 1 May had turned -its sector over to the incoming 14th Infantry Regiment, it got the jump -on training during the reserve period. Regimental Operation Plan 12-53, -of 28 April, had outlined requirements for the 5th Marines RCT LEX -1; from 2–9 May the regiment had participated in a week of intensive -amphibious training, including reduced and normal distance CPX dry runs -for the coming MARLEX. - -With ships from CTE 90.85,[423] and air defense by VMFs-311 and -115, -Colonel Tschirgi’s RCT-5 made the D-Day landing on 13 May with its two -assault BLTs securing the objective. An unexpectedly shallow beach -gradient and difficulties encountered in unloading vehicles from the -causeway resulted in less than a 100 percent performance rating. These -were deficiencies that might have been prevented had not the customary -rehearsal been cancelled the previous day when a heavy fog obscured the -landing beaches. Besides regimental antitank and 4.2-inch mortar units, -participating support elements included Company D, 1st Tank Battalion; -Company A, 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; Company C, 1st Engineer -Battalion; 1/11; and helicopters from HMR-161 and VMO-6. - - [423] CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of - TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated Amphibious - Group Western Pacific earlier that month. - -Meanwhile, on 15 May, command post and subordinate units from the 1st, -5th (less RCT-5 currently deployed in MARLEX I), and 7th Marines and -support elements took part in a one-day division CPX at Camp Casey -stressing mobility, security and operational procedures. Another CPX on -22–23 May by 11th Marines and engineer personnel emphasized dispersion, -camouflage, and message handling under simulated combat conditions. -Units of the three infantry regiments plus the KMCs training with the -7th Marines at Indianhead combined in a CPX-FEX (command post-firing -exercise) on 26–27 May. Realism bowed to current ordnance supply -economics in that ammunition was carried for individual weapons, but it -would “not be loaded except on specific orders from an officer.”[424] - - [424] 1stMarDiv msg to addees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 22 May - 53. - -The CPX-FEX was held as a trial exercise for an Eighth Army CPX -scheduled later in the month, which was postponed indefinitely on -29 May because of the critical battlefront situation and continuing -enemy attacks across the EUSAK front. Extensive preparations were also -underway for MARLEX II, with RCT-7, from 2–10 June; and concluding -MARLEX III, scheduled 14–23 June, with RCT-1. - -Armor and advance regimental elements had left for the Ascom -City-Inchon staging area by 1 June, preparatory for departure to the -Yongjong-ni beaches on the Korean west coast in the vicinity of Kunsan. -The troop list included approximately 250 officers and 4,450 enlisted -from Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines and support units, including USN and -KMC. Infantry personnel from the regiment’s three battalions formed the -three assault teams plus a reserve battalion composed of 475 Korean -Marines designated as BLT 5/KMC. Regimental support units included -Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical Battalion; -Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion; Company B, 1st Armored Amphibian -Battalion, and various motor transport, amphibian truck, military -police, and helicopter detachments. - -R-Day on 5 June went off per schedule. Despite intelligence estimates -which cheerily predicted that only “nine days of rain can be expected -during the month of June”,[425] RCT-7 drew one out of the barrel with -its D-Day landing, 6 June. This took place during heavy rains and -decreased visibility which threw the boat waves off phase by minutes -and required more than the allotted time for HMR-161 troop and cargo -lifts. - - [425] MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May - 53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53. - -Use of a 144-foot-long M-2 steel treadway pontoon bridge loaned by the -Army, emplaced from the end of the causeway to the beach high water -mark, was considered highly successful. It solved unloading problems -encountered in the earlier MARLEX, in that all heavy equipment and -vehicles were landed on the designated beaches. Further experimentation -with this novel employment of the M-2 was recommended to test the -coupling system of bridge and causeway during periods of heavy surf. -On the minus side, shore party officers noted that night transfer -operations had been hindered because of the lack of running lights on -the amtracs. - -On 9 June, as RCT-7 was on the way back from its amphibious exercise, -a directive from ComNavFE (Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe) notified -the division of cancellation of the forthcoming RCT MARLEX III. All -available shipping was being held on 24-hour readiness for the expected -final repatriation of POWs (Operation BIG SWITCH). All afloat training -exercises by Marine, Army, and Navy units between 6 June and 15 October -were to be cancelled. - -The division was host to ranking I Corps, Eighth Army, Korean, and 1st -Commonwealth officials when a special helicopter assault demonstration -was staged 11–12 June at Camp Casey. Two rocket launcher sections, 14 -HMR-161 copters, and 2/5 infantrymen were deployed to show the diverse -combat capabilities of the aerial workhorse. While in I Corps reserve, -the division was also host--and winner--of the I Corps Pistol Matches. -And 3/11, which the previous month had taken the Army Training Test 6-2 -(a) Modified, was notified the battalion had scored 92.91 percent and -received congratulations from the CGs, I Corps Artillery and Eighth -Army. - -A change of command within the 1st Marine Division took place on 15 -June with the arrival of Major General Randolph McC. Pate. The retiring -CG, General Pollock, was presented the Distinguished Service Medal by -the I Corps commander, General Clarke, for his “outstanding success in -the defense of Carson, Vegas, and Elko.” The previous month, General -Pollock had received the Korean Order of Military Merit, Taiguk for his -active part in the formation, development, and training of the Korean -Marine Corps. Attending the change of command ceremonies were General -Megee, CG 1st MAW, General Schilt, CG AirFMFPac, and other Marine, I -Corps, Commonwealth, and Korean senior officers. - -The new 1st Marine Division CG was coming to his Korean post from Camp -Lejeune, N. C. where (like General Pollock before him) he had most -recently commanded the 2d Marine Division. Commissioned originally -in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1921, General Pate was to later rise -to four-star rank. Prior to World War II, he had seen expeditionary -service in Santo Domingo, in 1923–1924, and in China from 1927–1929, -and also served in Hawaii. For his outstanding service and skill in -complicated staff duties, first at Guadalcanal, and later during -amphibious operations at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, General Pate -had been awarded the Legion of Merit and a Gold Star in lieu of a -second Legion of Merit. - -After the war, he had served two tours as head of the Division Reserve, -in 1946 and 1951. Other assignments included Director of the Marine -Corps Educational Center at Quantico and Deputy Director of Logistic -Plans in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[426] - - [426] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan - 56, rev. - - -_Heavy May-June Fighting_[427] - - [427] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28–30 - May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st - MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14–15 May 53 - and PIR 150-53, dtd 28–29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, - VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, _Truce Tent_; - Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, _Korea, 1951–1953_. - -After the early May change of lines, the Chinese lost little time -in testing the new UNC defenses. Shortly after 0200 on 15 May, the -CCF directed a two-battalion probe on the Carson-Elko-Vegas trio and -the Berlin-East Berlin outposts newly held by the Turkish brigade. -Supported by heavy concentrations of mortar and artillery, one -battalion of enemy soldiers moved against each of the two major defense -complexes. Marine Company C tanks, occupying the firing slots that -night, accounted for heavy enemy losses in the action, estimated at -200 CCF killed and 100 wounded. Assisting the TAFC Field Artillery -Battalion in throwing back the attack were 1/11, 2/11, and 4/11 which -sent 3,640 rounds into the sharp four-hour engagement. - -The TAFC defense was further reinforced later that day with 21 air -strikes against hostile personnel and weapons positions north of the -Turkish sector. Adding their weight to the clash, 3/11 and the rocket -battery also brought their guns into action, for a combined 5,526 -Marine rounds[428] dispatched against the enemy. - - [428] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the - 25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds, - to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds. - 11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13. - -It was not until 25 May, after the UNC had made its final offer at the -truce talks, however, that CCF artillery really began to open up on -the Nevada complex. The increased activity by hostile pieces, during -the 25–27 May period, was duly noted by the artillery Marines who -laconically reported, “Operations followed the recent pattern: enemy -shelling of the Turkish Brigade increased during the afternoon; no -contacts were reported.”[429] - - [429] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19. - -This latter situation changed abruptly on 28 May. Beginning at 1800, -major elements of the Chinese 120th Division launched simultaneous -attacks over 17,500 yards of I Corps front that stretched from COP-2 -eastward to that consistent trouble-spot, the Nevada Cities, on to -the Berlins, and finally the Hook area in the adjacent Commonwealth -Division sector. Supported by heavy artillery fires, one CCF battalion -moved in towards Carson and Elko. Another battalion,[430] under cover -of smoke, attacked central COP Vegas, while a third struck Berlin and -East Berlin on the right flank. Three hours after the initial attack, -defenders at Carson and Elko were engaged in hand-to-hand combat with -the Chinese. - - [430] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division - initially sent four battalions forward in the action, - with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes, - _Truce Tent_, p. 463. - -By midnight the men of the 35th Infantry had beaten back the attack at -COP-2. The Turks, likewise, were still in possession of the two Berlin -(platoon-strength) outposts, but Commonwealth forces were involved in -a pitched battle at Ronson and Warsaw. The situation was even grimmer -at this time in the Nevada Cities area outposted by the TAFC. Although -the Turkish troops continued to hold Vegas, where 140 men were dug -in, Carson (two-platoon size) had fallen and Elko (platoon-strength) -was heavily besieged. Shortly thereafter, the 25th Division ordered -that the TAFC withdraw from the latter position to its own MLR. The -diversionary attack against Berlin-East Berlin had been broken off and -the twin positions were secured. - -During the first six hours of the attack, the night of 28–29 May, -Colonel Mills’ 11th Marines, now under I Corps command, had sent 9,500 -rounds crashing into Chinese strongpoints, while Marine air observers -directed eight missions against active enemy artillery positions. -Ripples from the 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, transferred to the -Commonwealth sector to support the Hook defense, were fired on CCF -troop activity there. Another curtain of flame engulfed the Carson -intruders. When the fighting started, 15 Marine tanks were positioned -in the Turkish sector. Company B and C vehicles, under Captains James -M. Sherwood and Robert J. Post, relentlessly pounded the approaching -CCF columns, while Company D was put on a 30-minute standby. As the -action developed, additional tanks were committed until 33 were on line -at one time or another.[431] - - [431] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR - positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although - many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this - procedure, “I am forced to confess that it worked well - in that static defensive situation.” A major advantage - resulting from this change was that tanks effectively - linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and - radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out - the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was - “generally the only reliable means of communications with - the scene of action.” _Post ltr._ - -When savage Chinese pummeling of the 25th Division outposts continued -the following day, Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines was transferred at -1315 to operational control of I Corps. The regiment’s three infantry -battalions, antitank, and heavy mortar companies promptly moved out -from their Britannia headquarters and within two hours had relocated at -25th Division bivouac areas south of the KANSAS line in readiness for -counterattack orders. The 1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company -was similarly ordered to 25th Division control to relieve a 14th -Infantry Regiment reserve company in position along the east bank Imjin -River defenses. - -Overhead, close air support runs were being conducted by pilots of -Marine Attack Squadrons 212, 121, and 323. A series of seven 4-plane -strikes hit repeatedly from noon on those Chinese troops, hardware, -and resupply areas north of the 25th Division line. The aerial assault -continued late into the night with MPQ missions executed by VMA-121 and -VMF-311. - -During the 29th, control of the Vegas outposts--where 1st Division -Marines had fought and died exactly two months earlier--changed hands -several times between the indomitable Turkish defenders and the -persistent Chinese. By dark, the CCF had wrested the northern crest -from the TAFC which still held the southeastern face of the position. -In the 24-hour period from 1800 on the 28th through the 29th, the 11th -Marines had expended 41,523 rounds in 531 missions. At one point in -the action Chinese counterbattery fire scored a direct hit on Turkish -gun emplacements, knocking six howitzers out of action from the -explosions of charges already loaded. As a result 2/11, under its new -battalion commander, Major Max Berueffy, Jr., took over the direct -support mission of the TAFC Brigade. Marine artillery spotters on -station from 0450 to midnight directed 42 fire missions on CCF guns, -while the rocket battery unleashed 20 ripples against troop activity, -one of which caused 50 WIAs. Although an Allied counterattack early in -the day had restored Elko to friendly control, the enemy refused to be -dislodged from Carson. - -I Corps had previously regarded the defensive positions of the Nevada -complex as “critical,” with the TAFC having been “instructed to hold -them against all enemy attacks.”[432] By midday on the 29th, however, -the I Corps commander, General Clarke, and 25th Division CG, General -Williams, had apparently had a change of mind. The Vegas strength was -down to some 40 Turks. Altogether more than 150 men under the 25th -command had been killed and another 245 wounded in defense of Nevada -positions. It appeared that the Chinese, constantly reinforcing with -fresh battalions despite estimated losses of 3,000, intended to retain -the offensive until the outposts were taken. - - [432] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 462. - -With Carson and Vegas both occupied by the enemy, the Elko position -became untenable without the support of its sister outposts. Six times -the CCF had crossed over from Carson to Elko to try to retake the -latter position, but had been thus far deterred by Allied firepower. -Accordingly, at 2300, the 25th Division ordered its reserve 14th -Regiment, earlier committed to the Elko-Carson counterattack, to -withdraw from Elko and the Turks to pull back from Vegas to the MLR. -By daybreak the withdrawal was completed and 25th Division and Turkish -troops had regrouped on the MLR. - -The Army reported that more than 117,000 rounds of artillery and 67 -close air support missions had buttressed the UNC ground effort. -Official estimates indicated that in the three-day action the Chinese -had fired 65,000 rounds of artillery and mortar, “up to this point an -unprecedented volume in the Korean War.”[433] The Marine artillery -contribution from its four active battalions during this 28–30 May -period totaled 56,280 rounds in 835 missions. - - [433] _Ibid._, p. 464. - -During the three-day siege, 15 to 33 Marine tanks poured their lethal -90mm projectiles on the enemy from MLR firing slots. At times the -action was so heavy that the tanks were refueled on line. As they ran -out of ammunition and fuel, “armored utility vehicles of the battalion, -with a basic load of ammunition aboard, maneuvered beside the tanks -in position and rearmed them on the spot,”[434] to permit virtual -uninterrupted tank firing. One Marine was killed in the action the -first night. Although 4,162 rounds of Chinese fire fell near the tank -positions, no damage to materiel was reported. For their part the M-46s -and flames were responsible for 721 enemy deaths, an estimated 137 more -killed, 141 wounded, and an estimated 1,200 injured. - - [434] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3. - -During the second day of action, nearly 20 missions were flown by -Corsairs and Skyraiders of the three Marine attack squadrons and the -jet fighters of VMF-311 and -115. Altogether throughout 28–30 May, -Marine aircraft had flown no less than 119 sorties for the inflamed -sectors of the U.S. Army 25th Division and adjacent British 1st -Commonwealth Division. Of these, 99 were in support of the sagging -Carson-Elko-Vegas-Berlins line. - -Ground action ceased the following day as rain drenched the -battlefield, although the 11th Marines reported sightings of more than -200 Chinese soldiers, most of them on the three recently lost outposts. -Benched while the fierce battle was going on, the 1st Marines remained -under operational control of I Corps as a possible contingency force -from 29 May to 5 June. On the latter date, following the Eighth Army -decision not to retake the Carson-Elko-Vegas outposts, the regiment -reverted to Marine control and returned to Camp Britannia. The previous -day the Communists had agreed on all major points of the UNC final -offer and it appeared that a ceasefire was close at hand. - -Diplomats and military leaders both felt this latest Chinese assault -was to show a strong military hand and win dominating terrain features -along the MLR. Thus the enemy would be able to improve his defensive -posture when final battlelines were adjusted at the truce. It was not -believed that the CCF effort was an attempt to expand their operations -into a general offensive. In any event, the Nevada positions were -downgraded from their previous designation as major outposts. I Corps -also decreed no further effort would be made to retake them and that a -“revaluation of the terrain in view of the destruction of the defensive -work indicates these hills are not presently essential to defense of -the sector.”[435] - - [435] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG, - 1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun - 53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. 1, p. 1. - -If things were now relatively quiet along the battlefront of the -I Corps coastal sector, the situation had begun to heat up in the -central part of the UNC defense line. On 10 June, following a CCF -realignment of troops and supply buildup that had not gone unnoticed -by Eighth Army intelligence officials, elements of the CCF 60th and -68th Armies struck the ROK II Corps area, on the east-central front. -(See Map 29.) Advancing south along both sides of the Pukhan River with -two divisions, the Chinese struck at the ROK II defense line which -originally had bulged out to form a salient in the Kumsong vicinity. -Within six days the ROK line had been forced back 4,000 yards. In -subsequent assaults the enemy made new penetrations further west in the -ROK II MLR. Although the main Communist thrust was directed against the -ROK II Corps, secondary attacks were also made in the X Corps sector -east of ROK II, in the Punchbowl area manned by the ROK 20th Division. -It was the heaviest, all-out drive since the CCF spring offensive of -April-May 1951, when the UNC had been pushed south approximately 30 -miles across the entire Korean front. - -By 18 June, the CCF assaults started to settle down. During the nine -days of flaming action, ROK units had suffered some 7,300 casualties -to enemy losses of 6,600. Boundaries had been redrawn and three ROK -divisions had been redeployed in counterattacks to plug holes in the -line that the Chinese had punched open. Nearly 15,000 yards of ROK -front had been pushed 4,000 yards south and several hill positions east -of the Pukhan had been lost. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 29 K. WHITE - -EIGHTH ARMY SECTORS - -1 JANUARY-27 JULY 1953] - -The brief respite ended 24 June when the CCF again directed heavy blows -against the ROK troops, ignoring other UN forces in the Eighth Army -line. It was generally considered a retaliatory move for the 18 June -mass release of anti-Communist prisoners by South Korean President -Rhee. This time the major target of the renewed Chinese offensive was -the ROK 9th Division, in the IX Corps sector immediately west of the -ROK II Corps. On 25 June the 1st ROK Division on the eastern flank of -I Corps, to the right of the 1st Commonwealth Division, was pounded -by another Chinese division. Significantly, the date was the third -anniversary of the invasion of South Korea.[436] The 7th Marines, -training in I Corps reserve, was put on standby status. The regiment -was removed the following day when the 1st KMC/RCT (minus its 3d -Battalion) was instead placed in readiness,[437] and subsequently moved -out from its Indianhead area to be committed as a relief force in the -left sector of the 1st ROK line. - - [436] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time - had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued - the previous day that reminded all commanders to be - “particularly alert” at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to - CG, 1stMarDiv and addees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53. - - [437] This change was due to the existing policy of not having - a United States unit serving under operational control - of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S. - unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional - task force would have been created for the assignment, - under a non-Korean commander. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, - Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the - 25th was of such short duration that no mention of it - appears in the regimental command diary, although the - fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT - was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630 - on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK - Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it - had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. _ROKMC Comments._ - -By the 26th, the persistent Chinese probes of the 1st ROK sector had -resulted in several forward outposts being overrun. To help stem the -action the Marine 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery was displaced on I Corps -Artillery order from its regular position (in the right regimental -sector) 20 miles east to support the hard-pressed ROK division. On at -least two occasions the battery placed ripples between ROK positions -only 600 yards apart and it was felt that these “continued requests -for fire close to friendly troops attested to the gunnery of the -unit.”[438] Between that date and the 30th, the rocket battery remained -in the ROK sector, firing a total of 25 ripples. For the 25th Infantry -Division sector, however, the front continued undisturbed throughout -the entire month of June. - - [438] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15. - - -_Developments in Marine Air_[439] - - [439] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5, - Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7 - ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st - MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, - VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs, - Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53; - Futrell, _USAF, Korea_; Hermes, _Truce Tent_. - -While the division was in I Corps reserve during the greater part -of the April-June period, the 6,800-man 1st Marine Aircraft Wing -continued its missions as an operational component of Fifth Air Force. -For the Marine air arm it was a time of a major tactical innovation, -a number of new air records set, and rapid personnel changes in the -squadrons. - -Shortly before the Marine division went off the line, a new method of -close air support at night was introduced. This employed the use of two -or more ground controlled 24-inch searchlights located on prominent -terrain features along the MLR in the 7th Marines left battalion sector -where the missions were to be flown. Enemy-held reverse slopes--in -some cases less than 500 yards from Marine positions--were thereby -pinpointed by the powerful intersecting searchlight beams. These long -pencil-shaped beams created an excellent artificial horizon and enabled -pilots to make bombing or strafing runs with a high degree of accuracy -even on the blackest of nights. Manned by ANGLICO personnel, the lights -were employed either for target location or illumination (both shadow -and direct). A tactical airborne observer in an OE light liaison plane -of VMO-6 directed the searchlight teams and controlled the missions. - -A week of experimentation and trial runs to perfect the night close -air support (NCAS) was conducted by several VMF(N)-513 pilots under -direction of Colonel Jack R. Cram. Formerly CO of Marine Air Control -Group Two at K-3, he had extended his tour in Korea to complete work -on the new program. On 12 April, the first night of operations, Major -Charles L. Schroeder and Second Lieutenant Thomas F. St. Denis flew two -night support missions in F7F Tigercats. Although employed only a few -weeks prior to the division going into reserve on 5 May, the new system -rated an enthusiastic response from both pilots and ground commanders, -all the way up to the division CG. As the latter reported to the -Commandant following the first week of night close support missions, -“results ... exceeded all expectations.”[440] - - [440] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2. - -Between 12 April and 5 May, the night fighter squadron conducted 58 -NCAS sorties in the division right sector employing this new control -system with excellent results.[441] The procedure was a marked success -and made it possible to provide continuous 24-hour-a-day close support -to Marine infantry units. It was considered a supplement to, not a -replacement for the MPQ (radar controlled bombing) missions of MASRT-1. -Plans called for F9F aircraft to be integrated into the program, since -the F7F Tigercats were being replaced by jets. Allied psychological -warfare teams on 17 April introduced a different theme in their -broadcasts to the enemy: that of the dangers to the CCF from the new -searchlight marking of targets. As a Marine training bulletin noted: -“It is believed that this method of attack by aircraft is particularly -demoralizing to the enemy because he is unable to anticipate where -the strike will hit, and therefore has no means of defending himself -against it.”[442] - - [441] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy - KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar - positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition - bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1 supply area, - 3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed; - and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating - conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of - the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results. - VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53. - - [442] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting - 1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53. - -Another tactical improvement about this same time dealt with artillery -flak suppression in support of close support aircraft. Two refinements -made in the procedure in the late spring of 1953 involved firing of -HE rounds during the actual run of planes over the target. Basically, -the plan consisted of releasing a TOT or VT concentration on the most -lucrative enemy antiaircraft positions within a 2,500-yard circle -around the strike area. A continuous rain of HE-fuzed projectiles was -placed on these targets for a three-minute period, during which Marine -planes made their runs. - -Favorable results were achieved in that new system tended to keep enemy -antiaircraft gunners off-balance for a longer period of time and thus -decreased the danger to friendly attacking aircraft. On the other hand, -pilots quickly noted that this became an “unimaginative employment of -an unvarying flak suppression schedule which Communist AA gunners soon -caught onto and turned to their own advantage.”[443] - - [443] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70. - -With respect to squadron hardware, Marine combat potential increased -substantially during the spring months with the phasing out of F7Fs in -Night Fighter Squadron 513 and introduction of the new F3D-2 twin-jet -Skyknight intruder. By late May the Allocation of 24 of these jet -night fighters had been augmented by 4 more jets from the carrier USS -_Lake Champlain_ and the squadron “assumed its primary night-fighter -mission for the first time in the Korean War.”[444] While the sturdy, -dependable Tigercats[445] made their final contribution to the United -Nations air effort early in May with the experimental NCAS program, the -new Skyknights continued the squadron’s unique assignment inaugurated -in late 1952 as night escort to Air Force B-29 bombers on their strike -missions. Not a single B-29 was lost to enemy interceptors after 29 -January 1953. The capabilities of the skilled Marine night-fighters -were noted in a “well done” message received by the CO, VMF(N)-513 in -April from the Air Force.[446] - - [444] _Ibid._, p. 10-99. - - [445] Also characterized by squadron members as the “tired old - Tigercats” in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage - aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6. - - [446] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF) - msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d., - reading: “19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews - participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11 - April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All - feel that without their protection severe damage or loss - of B-29’s would have resulted.” VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53, - p. 6. - -Organizational changes within the wing included the arrival, on 29 -May, of a new MAG-12 unit to replace the “Checkerboard” squadron. -VMA-332 (Lieutenant Colonel John B. Berteling) was slated to operate -on board the USS _Bairoko_ (CVE-115) for the F4U carrier-based -squadron VMA-312[447] due for return to CONUS. Veteran of 33 months of -combat while attached to the wing as West Coast (CTE 95.1.1) aerial -reconnaissance and blockade squadron, VMA-312 (Lieutenant Colonel -Winston E. Jewson) was officially relieved 10 June. The change, -moreover, was the first phase of a new personnel policy, carrier unit -rotation, that was expected to implement a unit rotation program for -land-based squadrons. It was anticipated that the new unit rotation -program would eliminate inherent weakness of the individual pilot -rotation system and thus increase the combat effectiveness of the -wing.[448] - - [447] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS - _Bataan_ (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for - relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new - afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was - made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May. - - [448] Comments _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33: - “Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout - the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the - individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are - inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit - training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which - they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated - further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat - trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so - rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree - which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency.” - -During the period other organizational changes included transfer -of administrative control of VMF(N)-513 on 15 May from MAG-33 to -MAG-12.[449] The squadron, with its new twin-engined jet fighters, -moved from K-8 (Kunsan) further up the coast to the MAG-12 complex at -K-6 (Pyongtaek), upon completion of the new 8,000-foot concrete runway -there. This phased redeployment of nightfighter personnel and equipment -began in late May and was concluded on 6 June without any interim -reduction of combat commitments. Replacement of the squadron F7F-3Ns -with F3D-2s was also completed in early June. - - [449] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B. - Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel - Bowman to the States. - -Late that month, plans were underway for two additional changes: -the Marine photographic squadron, VMJ-1, was due to be separated -administratively and operationally from MAG-33 on 1 July and revert -to 1st MAW; and Marine Wing Service Squadron One (MWSS-1) was to be -deactivated, effective 1 July. - -The change of command relationships between CG, FAF and CG, 1st MAW -earlier in the year[450] which had restored operational control of -certain designated Marine air units to the wing commander, increased -the efficiency of 1st MAW operations. Despite the fact that VMJ-1 at -times contributed nearly 40 percent to the total FAF input of all -daylight combat photographs,[451] aerial intelligence (both pre- -and post-strike photos) supplied to wing and group headquarters was -considered inadequate. As a MAG-33 intelligence officer commented with -some exasperation as late in the war as May 1953: - - [450] See Chapter VI. - - [451] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load “can be gauged by - one day’s peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid - end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one - half miles long.” _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, Chap. 10, p. - 10-67. - - The Section continued to experience difficulty in obtaining - 1:50,000 scale overlays of friendly MLR and OP positions. These - overlays are important for making up target maps for close - support missions, but they are continually held up for long - periods by higher echelons, and, if received here at all, are - then often too old to be considered reliable.[452] - - [452] MAG-33 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2. - -Similarly, at the individual squadron level, the carrier unit VMA-312 -shortly before its relief, reported: “The one limitation on squadron -activities continued to be photo coverage of the strikes. With limited -facilities available, the squadron has no clear cut pictures of strike -results.”[453] Return of VMJ-1 to operational control of General Megee -ultimately “gave the Wing adequate photo-intelligence for the first -time since commencement of combat operations in Korea.”[454] - - [453] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2. - - [454] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65. - -Indoctrination of new replacement personnel within the 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing took a swift upturn during the spring period. Pilots -who had completed 100 combat missions were transferred to staff duty -elsewhere in the wing in Korea or rotated Stateside. The average -squadron personnel strength ran to 88 percent of T/O for enlisted; and -officer strength, considerably less, frequently dipped as low as 61 -percent. Under the 100-missions policy, it was a time of rapid turnover -of unit commanders, too, as witnessed from the following squadron diary -entries: - - _VMA-212_--Lieutenant Colonel James R. Wallace assumed command - from Major Edward C. Kicklighter, effective 19 June; the latter - had been squadron ExO and acting CO in interim period following - 30 April departure of former CO, Lieutenant Colonel Smunk; - - _VMA-323_--Lieutenant Colonel Clarence H. Moore vice Lieutenant - Colonel Frash, on 11 April; and Major Robert C. Woten succeeding - Lieutenant Colonel Moore on 27 June; - - _VMA-121_--Major Richard L. Braun vice Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, - on 21 April; - - _VMF(N)-513_--Lieutenant Colonel Ross S. Mickey vice Lieutenant - Colonel Conley, on 6 May; in June, Lieutenant Colonel Robert - L. Conrad, acting CO, named CO for Lieutenant Colonel Mickey, - hospitalized for injuries received in a May aircraft accident; - - _VMJ-1_--Lieutenant Colonel Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. vice Lieutenant - Colonel William M. Ritchey, on 15 May; - - _VMF-311_--Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Moran vice Lieutenant - Colonel Coss, on 21 April; Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane - vice Lieutenant Colonel Moran, on 1 June; - - _VMF-115_--Lieutenant Colonel Lynn H. Stewart vice Lieutenant - Colonel Warren, 5 June. - -With respect to CAS activities, excellent weather in April--only a -single day of restricted flying--brought the 1st MAW air tally that -month for its land-based squadrons to 3,850 effective combat sorties -(440 more by VMA-312) and 7,052.8 combat hours. This was a substantial -increase over the preceding months. Not surprisingly, the average daily -sortie rate for the month was correspondingly high: 128.3. Of 1,319 -CAS sorties the largest proportion, 579 and 424 (43.9 percent, 32.1 -percent), were for Marine and ROK operations, respectively. - -The outstanding day of the month was 17 April. During the 24-hour -reporting period, 262 sorties were completed by MAGs-33 and -12 -pilots,[455] who expended a combined total of 228.3 tons of bombs -and 28,385 rounds of 20mm ammunition. For the two MAG-33 fighter -bomber squadrons, it represented maximum effort day. Preparation had -been made a week earlier to devise the targeting and best all-round -flight schedules for ordnance and line sections. Objective areas for -the mass attack were picked by the wing G-3 target selection branch -and approved by the EUSAK-Fifth Air Force JOC. It was decided that -“flights of eight aircraft staggered throughout the day would offer the -best efficiency in expediting reloading and refueling with not more -than sixteen aircraft inactive on the flight line at one time.”[456] -Throughout the day, from 0410 to 2030, VMFs-311 and -115 continuously -pounded designated targets in support of the U.S. 7th and 3d Infantry -Divisions.[457] Commented MAG-33: - - [455] Between 15–18 April the west coast carrier squadron - was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction - missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs - in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange - at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS - along the bombline. “Marine fliers of the ‘Checkerboard’ - squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support - missions along the front lines], and received a ‘well - done’ from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100 - close air support sorties from 16–18 April.” _PacFlt - EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110. - - [456] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51. - - [457] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the - extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the - 3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX - Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division - targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to - the 3d Division. - - Hitting an all-time high in the annals of memorable days, this, - the seventeenth of April not only further proved MAG-33’s ability - to cripple the enemy’s already diminishing strength but it also - allowed VMF-115 to set records in total airborne sorties launched - in a single day plus a record total ordnance carried and expended - in one day by jet type aircraft.[458] - - [458] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51. - -VMF-115 alone, with 30 pilots and 23 aircraft, had flown 114 sorties -and delivered 120 tons of bombs on North Korean targets. - -A sample of the intensity of this maximum day was a series of three -early-morning interdiction strikes led by three VMF-115 pilots that -launched the effort. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Joe L. Warren, Major -Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., and Major John F. Bolt, the 23 attacking Panther -jets lashed the objective with 22.35 tons of ordnance and 4,630 rounds -of 20mm ammunition. The three missions destroyed half of the buildings -and inflamed 95 percent of the target area in the enemy supply -concentration point T’ongch’on on the Korean east coast. - -By contrast, wing operations in May were considerably hampered by the -bad weather peculiar to this time of the year in Korea. Restricted -flying conditions were recorded for 18 days of the month. A total of -153 CAS sorties were flown for the Marine division before its 5 May -relief from the front lines. Of the wing’s 3,359 sorties[459] during -the month, 1,405 were for close support to forward units beating back -Communist encroachment efforts. The allocation of CAS sorties was -412 for U.S. infantry divisions (including 211 for the 25th Division -occupying the customary Marine sector); 153 for the 1st Commonwealth -Division at the Hook which the Communists assaulted on 27–28 May as -part of their overall thrust against western I Corps defenses; 412 -sorties for ROK units; and 63, miscellaneous. Heaviest action for -Marine aviators took place towards the end of the month to thwart -enemy blows in the I Corps sector where Army and Turkish units were -attempting to repulse the Chinese. - - [459] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312 - (carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under - operational control of the 1st Marine Division. - -The renewed effort of the Chinese Communists against UNC ground forces -in late May continued sporadically the following month. A number of new -records were set by Marines flying CAS assignments under the Fifth Air -Force. During the intense mid-June attacks on the ROK II Corps area -and adjacent X Corps sector, MAGs-12 and -33 pilots chalked up some -busy days. Between 10–17 June, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft -had flown 8,359 effective sorties, the bulk of this massive FAF -effort to buttress the crumbling ROK defense. Of this number, Marine -sorties totaled 1,156, or nearly 14 percent. (Combat sorties for the -1st MAW throughout June came to 3,276 despite 23 days of marginal to -nonoperational weather.) Marine pilots scored as high as 48 percent -of a single day’s interdiction strikes made by FAF. This occurred 15 -June when the 1st MAW flew a record-breaking 283 sorties, followed by -another peak 227 sorties the next day. - -Actually, when the ground situation in the ROK II Corps front began to -deteriorate on 12 June, the new Fifth Air Force commander, Lieutenant -General Samuel E. Anderson, “waived the [3,000 foot] minimum-altitude -restrictions on his fighter-bombers and ordered his wings to give -all-out support to the Eighth Army.”[460] The Seventh Fleet commander, -Admiral Clark, likewise kept his carriers on line for seven days and -ordered its naval pilots to “team with Marine and Fifth Air Force -airmen for a close-support effort exceeding anything up to that -time.”[461] When the ROK II Corps defenses cracked open on 15 June, -temporary clearing weather “allowed General Anderson and Admiral Clark -to hit the Reds with everything they had. FEAF planes flew a total of -2,143 sorties of all kinds for the largest single day’s effort of the -war.”[462] - - [460] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 631. - - [461] _Ibid._ - - [462] _Ibid._ - -Commenting on this heavy action period, 14–17 June, a dispatch to -General Megee from the new FAF commander, who had succeeded General -Barcus the previous month, noted: - - The figures are now in. From 2000, 14 Jun 53, to 0001, 17 Jun - 53, Fifth Air Force units flew a total of 3,941 combat sorties. - The cost was 9 pilots lost, 11 aircraft lost, 11 aircraft major - damage, 42 aircraft minor damage. The results: 1 enemy offensive - stopped cold. I very deeply appreciate the splendid efforts of - all members of the 5th AF at all levels. Only a concerted team - effort made the foregoing possible.[463] - - [463] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW - ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App., IV (Vol III). - -This came, incidentally, only five days after receipt by the 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing of the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.[464] The award -cited the wing’s “outstanding and superior performance of duty” between -27 February 1951 and 11 June 1953. During this period Marine fliers -executed more than 80,000 combat sorties for UNC divisions. - - [464] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW - was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive - ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among - the many ranking military officials attending the - ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and - newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. - -The fighter-bombers of MAG-33 and the MAG-12 attack planes saw heavy -action during 24–30 June when the Chinese again concentrated their -attention on ROK divisions in the UNC line. Peak operational day was 30 -June. Marine squadrons alone executed 301 sorties, including 28 percent -of the CAS and 24 percent of total FAF interdiction missions. It was -also an outstanding day for MAG-12 which “outdid itself by flying 217 -combat sorties against enemy forces. The 30th of this month saw MAG-12 -establish a new ordnance record when an all-time high of 340 tons of -bombs and napalm were dropped on North Korea.”[465] Contributing -heavily to this accomplishment was Marine Attack Squadron 121. It -unleashed 156 tons of ordnance, a squadron record. It was believed this -also established an all-time record for tonnage expended on the enemy -by a Marine single-engine propeller squadron. - - [465] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1. - - -_Other Marine Defense Activities_[466] - - [466] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No. - 6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U) - ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, - Korea_; Field, _NavOps, Korea_. - -Like their counterparts on the Korean mainland, the Marines, naval -gunfire teams, and ROK security troops comprising the West Coast and -East Coast Island Defense Commands felt the alternating pressure -build-up and slow-down that typified the closing months of the war. -At both installations the defense had been recently strengthened, -more or less by way of response to a CINCPacFleet intelligence -evaluation in December 1952. This alerted the isolated island forces -to the possibility of a renewed Communist attempt to recapture their -positions. The Allied east coast defense structure at Wonsan, right at -the enemy’s own front door just above the 39th Parallel, was considered -particularly vulnerable. - -As in the preceding months, the mission of the west coast island group -remained unchanged--namely, the occupation, defense, and control of -its six island components. These, it will be remembered, were: Sok-to, -Cho-do, Paengyong-do (command headquarters), Yongpyong-do, and the two -lesser islands at Taechong-do and Tokchok-to.[467] Formal designation -of the island commands was modified on 1 January 1953. At this time -the West Coast and East Coast Island Defense Elements (TE 95.15 and -TE 95.23) were redesignated as Task Units (TU 95.1.3 and TU 95.2.3) -respectively. Korean Marines, who represented the bulk of these task -units, were provided from the 2d KMC Regiment, the island security -force. This unit constituted the main defense for the important U.S. -Marine-controlled islands off the Korean west and east coasts. - - [467] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II. - -Approximately 17 Marine officers and 100 enlisted men were assigned -to the western coastal complex, with two battalions of Korean Marines -fleshing out the garrison defense. The primary mission of this -island group was to serve as offshore bases for UNC intelligence -activities, including encouragement of friendly guerrilla operations -conducted by anti-Communist North Korean personnel. Artillery based -on the Marine-controlled islands provided both defensive fires and -counterbattery missions against enemy guns sited on the nearby mainland. - -The secondary mission of WCIDU, that of training Korean troops in -infantry and weapons firing exercises, continued to be hampered -somewhat by faulty communication. As one officer observed, the training -program to qualify selected KMCs for naval gunfire duties “met with -only modest success, due primarily to the language barrier and lack -of communications equipment in the Korean Marine Corps. Personnel -who had received this training did prove to be extremely helpful in -accompanying raiding parties on the mainland in that they were able to -call for and adjust fires.”[468] - - [468] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also - Chapter II. - -Enemy pressure against the West Coast Islands, both from Communist -shore guns and bombing, had increased during the fall and winter of -1952. Cho-do, shaped roughly like a giant downward-plunging fish, as -previously noted had been bombed in October for the first time in the -history of the command. This new trend was repeated for the next two -months. By way of response, two 90mm guns were transferred to Cho-do -from Kanghwa-do (a more peaceful guerrilla-controlled island northwest -of Inchon) for use there as counterbattery fire against aggressive -mainland batteries. The islands of Sok-to and Paengyong-do had -likewise been bombed during this period, although no damage or serious -casualties resulted. In December, enemy shore guns fired 752 rounds -against Task Force 95 (United Nations Blockading and Escort Force) -ships charged with responsibility for the island defense, in contrast -to the 156 rounds of the preceding month. - -Intelligence in December from “Leopard,” the friendly Korean guerrilla -unit at Paengyong-do, also reported the presence of junks, rubber -boats, and a nearby enemy artillery battalion off Chinnampo, believed -to be in readiness to attack the island. A captured POW, moreover, -on 22 December reported that elements of the 23d NKPA Brigade located -on the mainland across from Sok-to would attempt to seize the island -group before the end of the year. The next day, shortly after dusk, -when a concentration of 200 rounds[469] of 76mm suddenly fell on -Sok-to, and another 125 rounds struck neighboring Cho-do, it looked as -if it might be the beginning of trouble. Naval gunfire (NGF) spotters -on the islands directed the fire from UNC patrol boats cruising the -Yellow Sea. This counterbattery fire quickly silenced the enemy guns. -Again, at the end of the month, West Coast islands were alerted for an -invasion, but it never materialized. - - [469] An average day’s enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10, - or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE - ComdDs, _passim_. - -A matter of continuing concern to the command during the fall and -winter months was the North Korean refugee problem. So serious was the -situation, in fact, that it had warranted a directive from the TF 95 -commander (Rear Admiral John E. Gingrich). In the early fall, a large -number of refugees had filtered into the West Coast Islands, raising -serious doubts as to their feeding and ultimate survival during the -Korean winter. Through the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, a -tentative date of September had been set for evacuating these North -Korean refugees to South Korea. By November the question of their -relocation was still not settled, although the feeding problem had been -eased somewhat by two LST-resupply loads of emergency rations and grain -by CTF 90. - -Activities followed a fairly consistent pattern during early 1953, -with harassing fire striking the islands from the North Korean shore -batteries and sporadic bomb and propaganda drops. Periodically USAF -pilots who had strayed off course, planes from the nearby British -carriers HMS _Glory_ or _Ocean_, or Marine fliers from USS _Badoeng -Strait_ or _Bataan_ made emergency landings on the beach airstrips -at Paengyong-do for engine repairs or refueling. Logistical support -continued to be a problem, due to the peculiarities of the joint -ordering system through the Army. In January the western islands had -unfilled requisitions dated from as early as February 1952. Official -unit reports also noted the difficulty of obtaining medical supplies -either promptly or in full. - -In April, with the hot-cold cease-fire talks again taking one of their -spasmodic upswings, WCIDU commander, Colonel Harry N. Shea, conferred -with American and British naval officials regarding CTG 95.1’s (Royal -Navy Commander, West Coast Blockading and Patrol Group) Operation -PANDORA. This called for the evacuation of Sok-to and Cho-do, the two -WCIDU islands north of the 38th Parallel, at the time of the armistice. - -Increased naval gunfire and artillery missions against active -enemy mainland targets, caves, and observation posts gave the two -new 90mm guns delivered to the Sok-to garrison the month before -and the pair already at Cho-do, as well as their gun crews, some -unscheduled practice. Marine garrison personnel at the two islands -and nearby patrol ships were busy 25 days of the month knocking out -or neutralizing Communist mainside batteries. Late that month, the -battleship USS _New Jersey_ stationed off the east coast, sailed around -the Korean peninsula to add its 16-inch guns to the bombardment. Enemy -shelling of the two western islands increased in June, with 1,815 -rounds expended in response by the two Marine gun sections. - -During June, as it appeared the end of the war was in sight, the -first phase of PANDORA got underway with the evacuation by CTF 95 of -approximately 19,425 partisans, their families, and refugees from -Sok-to and Cho-do to islands south of the 38th Parallel. A new WCIDU -commander, Colonel Alexander B. Swenceski, had also arrived by this -time, since the average tour of duty was but a brief four months at -both island commands. - -Across the Korean peninsula, the east coast Allied offshore island -defense centered on a cluster of islands in Wonsan Harbor. Situated -more than 100 miles north of the battleline, these strategically-placed -islands comprised the northernmost UN-held territory in Korea. The East -Coast Island Defense Command numbered approximately 35 Marines, 1,270 -Korean Marines, and 15 Naval personnel. Headquarters for TU 95.2.3 was -Yo-do, the largest installation, which was garrisoned by approximately -300 Korean Marines and a limited detachment of USMC and USN personnel. -Smaller defense forces were located on the other islands under ECIDU -command.[470] In addition, an improvised NGF spotting team was also -stationed at the three forward islands (Mo-do, Tae-do, and Hwangto-do). -Mission of the ECIDU was a defensive one: to hold the islands as a -base for covert intelligence activities. The island defense system -existed for the purpose of “containing and destroying any enemy forces -who escape detection or who press home an attack in the face of Navy -attempts at their destruction.”[471] - - [470] See Chapter II and ECIDE map. - - [471] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1. - -Individual island commanders were responsible for the defense of their -small parcels of seaborne real estate, control of both defensive and -offensive NGF missions in the area, and evaluation of intelligence -regarding enemy troop locations, the movement of supplies north, or -new emplacements of hostile guns. Fire support for the ECIDU islands, -exposed to the enemy shore batteries above the 39th Parallel, was -available from Task Force 95, which maintained a task, group of ships -off both the east and west coasts. Aircraft and ships of Task Force -77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force), operating off the East Korean -coastline, were also on call. In December, for instance, the Corsairs -of TF 77 had resumed their rail-bridge interdiction. All-out attacks on -railroad and highway bridges, as well as bombing runs on the 90-mile -stretch of east coast railroad from Hungnam to Songjin, were undertaken -to cut off supplies being moved north for Communist industrial use. - -February marked the second anniversary of the siege of Wonsan by the -UNC, the longest blockade of a port in recent U.S. history. Some -naval authorities by this time argued that the venture had become one -of doubtful merit which “should never have been undertaken, but its -long history made it difficult to abandon without apparent admission -of defeat.”[472] In any event, the month also signaled increasing -attention paid by hostile shore batteries to the little island enclave. -For seven consecutive days, 9–15 February, the harbor islands were -targets for enemy mixed artillery and mortar shells. Minor materiel -damage and casualties were sustained at Yo-do during a Valentine’s Day -bombardment, 14 February. - - [472] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, p. 434. - -Altogether, the enemy harassed the harbor islands for 16 days during -the month, expending 316 rounds, compared with 11 days in January. -Hostile fire, not limited to the Wonsan Harbor islands, was also -directed against friendly ships USS _DeHaven_ and USS _Moore_. These -provided counterbattery fire and were, in turn, fired upon, the nearest -shells landing only 400 yards from the two vessels. This attack, -also on 14 February, was described as an “unusually determined and -precise”[473] effort. The enemy, moreover, did not appear to take his -usual precautions with respect to disclosing his positions. The fact -that a Communist shore battery would cease fire when subjected to -friendly counterbattery, with other positions then immediately taking -up the delivery, “indicated some sort of central control for the first -time.”[474] The I Corps, NKPA artillery units across from the Wonsan -Island command revealed the “heavy, effective artillery capability of -enemy batteries which encircle Wonsan Harbor.”[475] - - [473] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5. - - [474] _Ibid._ - - [475] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence - estimated that there were no less than “21 active - batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our - islands.” _Heinl ltr._ - -Unseasonably good weather the latter part of February improved the -transportation and supply situation. With the bitter cold and wind -subsiding, maintenance crews could repair the ravages of the past -several months. Craft, up to LCVP size, were hoisted in on a large -pontoon for repair. For most of December and January, “this small, -physically remote Marine Corps command,”[476] as the ECIDU commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr. himself described it, had -been snowbound. Winds howled in excess of 40 knots, and temperatures -dropped to 10° below at night. Personnel at the command island, -Yo-do, subsisted on C rations for eight days. With boating operations -suspended because of the high winds, it was not possible to send -supplies or water to Hwangto-do which for several days relied solely on -melted snow. - - [476] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3. - -The prolonged foul weather, moreover, interrupted all classified radio -communications between the ECIDU and the outside world. Crypto guard -for the Wonsan islands was maintained by elements of the East Coast TG -95. Coded and decoded security radio messages had to be picked up by -patrol boat which could not reach the islands during extreme conditions -of icy seas and heavy snows. - -As with the men on the front line, the Communists stepped up their -pressure and gunfire against the island command Marines during -March. The record[477] 524 rounds which fell on the ECIDU islands -in March doubled the following month when the command received 1,050 -rounds from active mainland batteries. In April the persistent NKPA -artillerymen kept up a continuing bombardment of the eastern coastal -UNC islands, missing only three days of the entire month, that caused -nine casualties when a direct hit was made on the Tae-do CP bunker. It -was the highest rate of incoming since UN occupation of the islands. -Another April record was enemy mine laying, which increased sharply -in both the WCIDU and ECIDU command areas. A total of 37 mines were -sighted, the highest number since August 1952. Communist shore gunners, -in addition to harassment of the island themselves, fired 2,091 rounds -against TF 95 ships, another all-time high. - - [477] Another record at this time was the spate of senior - visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less - than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn - inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do. - Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army, - Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. “One local - statistician computed the total number of stars for the - month (one side of the collar only) as 38,” the monthly - report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an - all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater, - short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1. - -With respect to personnel, the situation had improved markedly. An -increase in ECIDU command strength authorized by CG, FMFPac in March -provided for an additional 9 Marine officers, 38 enlisted Marines, -and 6 Navy personnel. These were exclusive of the current detachments -of 1st ANGLICO shore party and naval maintenance personnel, and -represented nearly a 40 percent strength increase.[478] Not long -afterward the new ECIDU commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt U. Bookhart, -Jr., arrived to succeed Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, who had held the -position since the preceding November. - - [478] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30 - enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy - maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs. - -As with the WCIDU force, by late spring it appeared that the days of -UNC control and occupation of the east coast islands were numbered. -In view of the imminent armistice, a CinCFE directive of 11 June -called for the evacuation of all civilians, supplies, and equipment -“in excess of immediate needs.”[479] This was a preliminary step -towards full evacuation of the islands once the armistice agreement was -reached. Accordingly, on 11 June, as evacuation of the friendly west -coast partisans got under way, villagers from Yo-do, the largest and -ECIDU headquarters site, and the far northern island of Yang-do were -similarly moved south. The evacuation was completed by mid-June. - - [479] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1. - - -_The Division is Ordered Back to the Front_[480] - - [480] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, - 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53. - -A rash of political activity in June markedly affected the tenor -of military operations in Korea. Intensified Communist aggression -broke out north of ROK sectors in the Eighth Army line, largely as -a reaction to President Rhee’s unprecedented action on 18 June of -freeing, with the help of ROK guards, approximately 25,000 North -Korean anti-Communist prisoners at POW camps in the south. Other -anti-Communist POWs at Camp No. 10, near Ascom City, staged violent -break-out attempts at that same time and Company A, 1st Amphibian -Tractor Battalion passed to operational control of the camp commanding -officer there to help prevent a repetition of any such incidents in the -future. Following a recess of truce talks, pending a clarification of -the status of the current military-diplomatic agreements, key delegates -held crisis meetings at Panmunjom and Tokyo to get the beleaguered -talks back on track. - -Despite the furor, signing of the armistice agreement was expected -shortly. As a result, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command was -reorganized with the 1st Marine Division assigned the responsibility -of reactivating the United Nations Personnel and Medical Processing -Unit for the anticipated post-truce exchange of prisoners of war. This -was to be conducted along lines similar to that for Operation LITTLE -SWITCH, the initial limited exchange. The Division Inspector was named -processing unit commander and functional sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, -interpreters, messing, medical, engineer) were also activated. As the -division training tour in I Corps reserve drew to a close, a number of -regimental CPXs were held during June. And the 5th Marines drew a new -assignment: training in riot control. Following civilian demonstrations -that had erupted in various populated areas of Eighth Army, including -the I Corps sector, the regiment was ordered “to be prepared to move -in battalion size increments, to be employed as army service area -reserve in suppression of civil disturbances anywhere in army service -area.”[481] - - [481] 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1. - -While the Marine infantry regiments concluded their training period, -the 1st Tank Battalion, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, and Division -Reconnaissance Company remained under operational control of the -frontline U.S. 25th Infantry Division. Marine artillerymen likewise -continued under orders of CG, I Corps Artillery, in the forward area, -reinforcing division artillery fires. Tentative plans were underway for -movement of the 1st Marine Division back to its former position on the -MLR in early July. After the signing of the cease-fire, the division -would comply with provisions of the truce agreement by closing out its -former MLR and withdrawing to designated positions two kilometers south -of the former defensive positions. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice - -_Relief of the 25th Division--Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and -East Berlin--Enemy Probes, 11–18 July--Marine Air Operations--Fall of -the Berlins--Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July--Last Day of the War_ - - -_Relief of the 25th Division_[482] - - [482] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _Pac Flt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; - 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin - and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary - of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127, - 61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter _CG, - 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; - 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, - 11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53. - -For the first week of July the 1st Marine Division continued its -mission as I Corps Reserve and its two-month period of intensive combat -training that had begun on 5 May. Planning got under way on 1 July, -however, for return of the division to its former sector of the MLR, as -the western anchor of I Corps, in relief of the 25th Infantry Division. - -Marine infantry components were directed by I Corps to effect the -transfer of operational control during the night of 7–8 July. Tank and -artillery units--already in the division sector throughout the reserve -period--were to make whatever minor relocations were necessary at -suitable times thereafter. Division Operation Plan 10-53 ordered the -7th Marines to reassume its responsibility for the right regimental -sector of the MLR, eastward to the 1st Commonwealth boundary. The 5th -Marines, which had been in reserve at the time of the May relief of -lines, was assigned to the center sector of the MLR, while the 1st -Marines was designated as divisional reserve. - -Relief of the 25th Infantry Division by Marine units got underway on -6 July when the first incoming elements of Colonel Funk’s 7th Marines -moved up to the right regimental sector manned jointly by the U.S. -14th Infantry Regiment and the Turkish Armed Forces Command. Advance -personnel reported into the left sector, to be taken over by the Marine -1st Battalion, and at 1400 the 3d Battalion relieved the TAFC reserve -battalion in the rear area. - -Two platoons from the Marine regiment’s 4.2-inch Mortar Company, -meanwhile, also began their phased relief of the Turkish Heavy Mortar -Company. The incoming mortar crews had some unexpected early target -practice. As the men took up their active MLR firing positions in the -right battalion sector, they were promptly forced to put their tubes -into action to silence a troublesome machine gun, enemy mortars, and -hostile troops behind the Jersey Ridge to the north and Reno and Elko -on the west. That evening the 2d Battalion opened its new command post -in the eastern sector, occupied by two TAFC battalions. - -Sharply at 0455 on 7 July, the 7th Marines assumed responsibility for -the right regimental sector and came under operational control of -the 25th Division. Shortly after noon that day, forward units of 1/7 -reached the 25th Division sector after a three hour motor march from -Camp Indianhead, through driving rains in their second day without -letup. At the battalion sector, 1/7 joined the advance echelon of 40 -men who had arrived the previous day and took over its MLR positions -from the 14th Infantry. Additional 7th Marines units reporting in -throughout the day and assuming new locations were the weapons, mortar, -and antitank companies. - -The first of Colonel Tschirgi’s 5th Marines returned to their center -regimental sector before dawn that same day to begin their relief of -the Army 35th Infantry Regiment. At 0300 the 3d Battalion assumed -responsibility for the eastern half of the MLR. By late afternoon, -antitank personnel and the 2d Battalion were in line, the latter taking -over the western battalion sector at 1716. In the rear regimental area, -early elements of Colonel Nelson’s 1st Marines, locating just south of -the Imjin River, had begun to arrive by 1300. The regiment would assume -ground security for the Spoonbill and Libby (formerly X-Ray) bridges in -the sector as well as MASRT #1. - -No one needed to remind the 1st Marine Division that the territory it -was moving back into was not the same--with respect to defense posts -in the right regimental sector--that it had left two months earlier. -Three of its six outposts there (Carson, Elko, Vegas) had fallen to -the enemy in the late-May battle, despite the formidable resistance -of the defending Turks. Outpost Ava remained at the far western end of -the line, with the Berlin-East Berlin complex in the right battalion -area. Some 6,750 yards of intervening MLR--more than four miles--lay -in between, bereft of any protective outposts to screen and alert the -defending line companies to sudden enemy assaults. The Marines were -thus returning to a main line of resistance considerably weakened in -its right regimental sector. - -As the 1st Division CG, General Pate, observed: - - Vegas [had] dominated the enemy approaches to Berlin from the - north and northwest and therefore made Berlin relatively secure. - Berlin, in turn, dominated the enemy approaches from the north - and northwest to East Berlin and made East Berlin relatively - secure. The loss of Outpost Vegas to the CCF placed Berlin and - East Berlin in very precarious positions and negated their being - supported by ground fire except from the MLR.[483] - - [483] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_., p. 1. - -Ground support fire from the MLR, moreover, tended to be only -moderately successful in supporting the outposts because of the nature -of the terrain. A major Communist stronghold, Hill 190, lay northeast -of the Carson-Elko-Vegas complex. Since Berlin (COP 19) and East Berlin -(COP 19-A) were sited on extensions of this same hill mass, the enemy -could make sudden “ridgeline” attacks against the Berlins. With buffer -outpost Vegas now lost, the likelihood of CCF success in such attacks -was “immeasurably increased.”[484] - - [484] _Ibid._, p. 2. - - -_Initial Attacks on Outposts Berlin and East Berlin_[485] - - [485] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; - _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53; - 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1–10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd - 8–9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, - 2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311, - VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; - MacDonald, _POW_. - -It did not take the Chinese long to exploit this situation. At about -2100 on 7 July, while the relief of lines was in progress, the two -Berlin outposts and newly-located MLR companies of Lieutenant Colonel -Cereghino’s 2d Battalion (from the left: D, F, and E), were greeted -by a heavy volume of Chinese mortar and artillery fire. The barrage -continued unremittingly, followed by waves of a reinforced Chinese -battalion that swept over the two platoon-sized outposts, from the -direction of Vegas. By 2345 defending Marines at both outposts were -engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, identified as elements -of the 407th Regiment, 136th Division, 46th CCF Army. - -Berlin, manned at the time by TAFC[486] and Marine personnel, was -unexpectedly strengthened by a Company F reinforced squad that had been -dispatched on an earlier ambush patrol in the vicinity of the outpost. -At East Berlin, however, the overwhelming hordes of Chinese soldiers -advanced to the trenchline of the steep forward slope and quickly -locked with the Marines at point-blank range. Despite the coordination -of MLR machine gun, 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortar, and artillery -fires from 2/11[487] and 4/11, the enemy overran the outpost at 2355 -after heavy, close fighting. Chinese mortar and artillery barrages, by -midnight, had continuously disrupted the Marine communications net at -East Berlin, and by 0130 radio relay was also out at Berlin proper. - - [486] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander - stated: “As it turned out we were in great shape with - both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some - instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that - they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made - us honorary members of their battalions, giving each - 2/7 Marine one of the unit patches.” Col Alexander D. - Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70. - - [487] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion - for the 7th Marines. - -A provisional platoon from Headquarters and Service Company of 2/7 -was quickly ordered to reinforce the main line against any attempted -breakthrough by the Chinese. This was a distinct possibility since the -Berlins were only 325 yards from the MLR, nearer than most outposts. -Men from Companies H and I of the rear reserve 3d Battalion (since 26 -May commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Jones) were also placed -under operational control of 2/7 and ordered to forward assembly areas -in readiness for a thrust against the enemy at East Berlin. - -At 0355 a Company F squad jumped off for the initial counterattack. -This was made at 0415, without artillery preparation, in an attempt to -gain surprise for the assault. It was thrown back. A second Company F -unit, by 0440, was on its way to reinforce the first but got caught by -25 rounds of incoming, with 15 men wounded. It continued on, however, -but an hour later the Marines were ordered to disengage so that the -artillerymen could place TOT fire on the area preparatory to a fresh -attempt to dislodge the enemy soldiers. - -During the early morning hours of 8 July, large numbers of Chinese -were seen at their new Vegas and Reno strongholds. Marines of the -1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery blanketed hostile troops there and -at the Berlin outposts with four ripples. On another occasion, a -time-on-target mission launched by the 2/11 direct support battalion, -landed in the midst of an enemy company assembled on Vegas. Friendly -firepower by this time consisted of all four battalions of the 11th -Marines, as well as seven Army and Turkish artillery battalions still -emplaced in the area during the relief period and thus under tactical -control of 25th Division Artillery. - -Throughout 7–8 July, 11 Marine tanks from Company B placed 800 shells -on enemy installations and troops. In the characteristic pattern, -use of Marine armor heightened unfriendly response. The tanks drew -in return 2,000 rounds of Chinese mortar and artillery on their own -positions, but without any serious damage. Elements of the Army 14th -Infantry Regiment Tank Company, still in the area, also opened up with -some additional shells and bullets. - -Despite the Chinese attack, the relief of lines continued during -the night. In the center MLR sector, the 5th Marines had taken over -regimental responsibility at 2130, with 3/11 becoming its direct -supporting unit. And in the western half of the 7th Marines line--about -the only undisturbed part of the regimental sector--1/7 had routinely -completed is battalion relief at 0335 on 8 July. - -At 0630 it was confirmed that East Berlin, an extension of the ridge on -which Berlin was located, was under enemy control. Better news at first -light was that Berlin,[488] 500 yards west, had repulsed the enemy, -a fact not definitely known earlier due to communication failure. At -this time, G-3 reported that 18 effectives were holding Berlin, and 2/7 -assigned an 18-man reinforced squad to buttress the defense. It was not -considered feasible to send a larger reinforcement “since the Berlin -area [could] accommodate only a small garrison.”[489] - - [488] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by - two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served - as approaches to the Marine MLR. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, - Chap. 9, p. 9-169. - - [489] _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, p. 2. - -Meanwhile, another 7th Marines counterforce was being organized for -a massed assault to retake East Berlin. At 1000, under cover of a -thundering 1,600-round mortar and artillery preparation by Marine and -TAFC gunners, a reinforced two-platoon unit from Companies George -and How, launched the attack. The unlucky H/3/7 platoon, in the lead, -got caught between well-aimed Chinese shells and the Marines’ own -protective wire. In less than 15 minutes the platoon had been reduced -to 20 effectives, with Company G passing through its ranks to continue -the attack. By 1123 the Marines were in a violent fire fight and -grenade duel in the main trenchline at East Berlin. - -Tank guns, meanwhile, blasted away at Chinese troops, bunkers, active -weapons, and trenches. On call they placed their fire “only a few yards -in front of the friendly attacking infantry and moved this fire forward -as the foot troops advanced.”[490] Heavy countermortar and artillery -rounds were also hitting their mark on forward, top, and reverse slopes -of East Berlin to soften the Chinese defenses. A few minutes later -the 3d Battalion men had formed for the assault. During the heavy -hand-to-hand fighting of the next hour the Marines “literally threw -some of the Chinese down the reverse slope.”[491] Gaining the crest of -the hill, the Marines by force and fire dispatched the enemy intruders. -At 1233 they were again in possession of East Berlin. With just 20 men -left in fighting condition at the outpost, a reinforcing platoon from -I/3/7 was dispatched to buttress the assault force. - - [490] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. - - [491] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 136. - -North of the 7th Marines sector four F9F Panthers, led by the -commanding officer of VMF-311, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard McShane, -found their way through the rainy skies that had restricted aerial -support efforts nearly everywhere. In a noon MPQ mission, the quartet -delivered five tons of ordnance on Chinese reinforcement troops and -bunkers. - -Promptly at 1300--a half hour after retaking the outpost--the 7th -Marines effected the relief of the last Turkish elements at Berlin and -occupied the twin defense positions. And by 1500 on 8 July, the 1st -Marine Division assumed operational control of the entire division -sector from the Army 25th Infantry Division. Relief of individual units -would continue, however, through several more days. At the same time, -the mission of the 11th Marines, since 5 July under a new regimental -commander, Colonel Manly L. Curry, changed from general support of -U.S. I Corps, reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery, -to direct support of the Marine Division. The 1st Tank Battalion -similarly took over its regular direct support role. Other units under -temporary Army jurisdiction, such as the Kimpo Provisional Regiment and -Division Reconnaissance Company, reverted to Marine control. - -During the rest of the day, gunners of the 11th Marines continued their -fire missions despite reduced visibility that hindered surveillance -by the OY spotting planes and forward observers. Only 42 Chinese were -sighted during the daytime, although shortly before dusk a CCF group -reportedly heading toward the Berlins area southwest from Frisco was -taken under fire. Estimates of enemy incoming throughout the 7–8 July -action from 17-odd battalions of Chinese artillery dug in across the -division sector was placed at 19,000 rounds of all types. Marine and -Army-controlled battalions, for their part, pounded Chinese strongholds -with a total of 20,178 rounds. - -That night Colonel Funk authorized a 3d Battalion platoon to bolster -the MLR. Five tanks were also ordered to locate in the Hill 126 area, -the Marine high-ground terrain feature to the rear of the frontlines. -This foresight was well rewarded. During the late evening hours strange -motor noises “sounding like a convoy pulling in and then back out -again”[492] floated over the Korean hills and the tanks immediately -swept suspected hostile installations with their 90mm guns. Later that -night of 8–9 July, the Chinese suddenly renewed their probing efforts -at the battered Marine outposts. Moving in from Vegas, an estimated -reinforced enemy company attacked Berlin at 0104, then brushed on -to East Berlin. An intense fire fight ensued off and on for nearly -two hours at the two posts. Marine 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars, plus -artillery illumination, boxing fires, and tanks blunted the assaults. -At 0315 the enemy broke contact and action quieted down at both -locations. - - [492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53. - -Throughout the rest of the day, eight Company C[493] armored vehicles -assisted the infantrymen in consolidation of positions. A total of 25 -rounds of shells and 19,140 rounds of .30 and .50 caliber machine gun -bullets were expended on CCF strongpoints and troops during a 24-hour -firing period that ended at 1700. - - [493] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in - support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been - in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period - the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation - system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer - and transferred to the rear ranks for a “much needed rest - and rehabilitation.” 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3. - -Because of the casualties at Berlin, an H/3/7 reinforcement squad was -sent to augment the Marine force there. Losses suffered by the 7th -Marines for the two successive nights were 9 killed, 12 missing,[494] -126 wounded and evacuated, and 14 with minor wounds. The cost to the -CCF was 30 known dead, and an estimated 200 killed and 400 wounded. - - [494] Later it was determined that only two were actually - captured and they were subsequently repatriated. - MacDonald, _POW_, p. 211. - -With the Marines back on line, VMO-6 and HMR-161 which were under -division operational control again resumed normal combat routine. -Returning on 8 July to their forward airstrip in the center regimental -sector, VMO-6 helicopters made eight frontline helicopter evacuations. -Observation planes that same day conducted four artillery spotting -missions behind enemy lines. HMR-161, assuming normal operations on 10 -July, resupplied Marine division outposts with 1,200 pounds of rations, -water, and gear as part of its 25.3 hours flight time this first day -back in full service. - - -_Enemy and Marine Probes, 11–18 July_[495] - - [495] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10–17 Jul 53; - 1stMarDiv PIRs 923–930, dtd 10–17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, - 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; - Hermes, _Truce Tent_. - -After the flare-up on the Berlin front, there was relatively little -action for the next 10 days. Marines continued the relief of the last -of the outgoing 25th Division units. When this was completed on 13 -July, 1st Marine Division units, including the 1st KMC/RCT[496] and -1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, were all back in their accustomed -sectors. They thus rejoined the 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, Kimpo -Regiment, and Division Reconnaissance Company which had remained on -line throughout the period. The July relief was one that could hardly -be characterized as routine. Interfering elements had included not only -the Chinese but torrential summer rains. These had continued virtually -nonstop from 5–8 July causing bridge and road washouts, rerouting of -supply trucks, and juggling of manifests at a time when the regiments -were using an average of 90 transport vehicles daily. - - [496] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK - Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July - and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July. - _ROKMC Comments._ - -Forward of the MLR the regular nightly patrols probed enemy territory, -often with no contact. On at least three occasions division -intelligence reported entire 24-hour periods during which the elusive -Chinese could not be sighted anywhere in No-Man’s-Land by friendly -patrols operating north of the Marine division front. - -More rain,[497] continual haze, and ground fog for 6 of the 10 days -between 9–18 July not only reduced the activity of air observers and -Marine pilots, but apparently inspired the ground-digging Chinese to -pursue--at least across from the division sector of I Corps--a more -mole-like existence than ever. Enemy troop sightings during the daytime -decreased from as many as 310 CCF to a new low of 14. Incoming, for one -24-hour period, totaled no more than 48 rounds of Chinese artillery and -228 of mortar fire that struck Marine positions, causing only slight -damage. - - [497] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and - destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood - conditions existed again on 14–15 July when the Imjin - crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity - were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward - companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary - writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made - by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor - when he observed, “During the month, it seemed as if the - Battalion was constantly on the move.... Rain hampered - these moves considerably. The weather between moves was - generally clear and dry.” 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st - TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11–12, 23; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ - No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136. - -The same could not be said for their mines. One 7th Marines -reconnaissance patrol located a new minefield staked out with Soviet -antipersonnel mines (POMZ-2) of an unfamiliar type with both pull and -tension fuses. It appeared that mines which had lain dormant during the -winter months had suddenly come to life with the warm weather, or else -been recently re-laid. Nearly a dozen were uncovered by 5th and 7th -Marines patrols, soon after their return to the front, and sometimes -the discovery came too late. Probably the worst day was 12 July when -four Marines were killed and eight wounded as a result of accidentally -detonating mines. - -At the same time, in the 5th Marines sector near the vicinity of truce -corridor COP-2, the persistent voice of the Dragon Lady taunted Marines -with such lackluster gambits as “Surrender now! What is your girl -doing back home?” in the stepped-up pace of its midnight propaganda -broadcasts. - -The regular nightly patrols checked in and out, performing their -mission routinely. Even during this last month of the war, when word -of the final truce agreement was expected daily, fire fights ensued. -On 12 July, a 5th Marines 13-man reconnaissance patrol clashed briefly -north of COP Esther, while a 7th Marines platoon-size combat patrol -brushed with a Chinese squad west of Elko in an 18-minute fire fight. -The same night the 11th Marines reported increased enemy sightings of -318 CCF soldiers--the most seen since the Berlin probe of 7–8 July. -No follow-up was made. The Chinese were busy with major offensives -elsewhere along the UNC front, devoting their primary efforts to ROK -divisions on the central and eastern sectors of the Eighth Army line. -Apparently they fully intended to demonstrate to the South Koreans that -continuation of the war would be a costly business.[498] - - [498] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 470. - -Along the Marine front, three patrol contacts took place on the night -of 16–17 July. Two of them were grim reminders that despite the -promising look (and sound) of the peace talks, for those men lost the -toll of the war was as final and unremitting as it had been at any time -during the past three years of combat. The first was a routine maneuver -for a 5th Marines 13-man combat patrol that, at 2252, engaged an enemy -squad just north of outpost Hedy. After an eight-minute fire fight the -enemy withdrew, with two Chinese soldiers counted dead and one wounded -and no friendly casualties. - -Not so lucky was a 2/5 reconnaissance patrol. At midnight, its 15 -members encountered a band of 30 to 40 Chinese, deployed in a V-shaped -ambush in the Hill 90 area, an enemy stronghold two miles east of -Panmunjom. The Marines set up a base of fire, beating off the enemy -with their rifles, BARs, mortars, and bare fists. Reinforcements and -artillery fires were called in. The first relief unit was intercepted -by vicious mortar shelling which wounded the entire detail. A second -relief squad, also taken under mortar fire, continued the action in an -intense fire contest that lasted nearly two hours. In the meantime, the -direct support artillery battalion, 3/11, reinforced by 1/11, showered -280 rounds of countermortar on Chinese long-range machine guns and -mortars barking from the surrounding hills. - -During the engagement the Chinese made several attempts to capture -prisoners. When the enemy finally began to withdraw, CCF casualties -were 10 known dead, an estimated 9 more dead, and 3 wounded. Seven -Marines were found to be missing after the Chinese broke contact. A 5th -Marines platoon that extensively screened the battalion front during -the hours of darkness on the 17th returned at 2210 with six bodies. - -The third encounter took place not long after midnight in the 7th -Marines territory. This brief skirmish was also to have an unpleasant -aftermath and, inadvertently, fulfill the psywar broadcast of the -previous day that had warned Marines “not to go on patrols or be -killed.” As it was leaving the Ava Gate (250 yards northwest of the -outpost proper) at 0045, a 30-man combat patrol from Company A was -challenged on three sides by 40–50 CCF employing small arms, automatic -weapons, grenades, and mortars. After a 15-minute fire exchange, during -which the patrol lost communications with its MLR company, the enemy -withdrew. Six CCF had been counted dead, and 12 more estimated killed -or wounded. - -Upon returning to the outpost, a muster of the men engaged in the -action showed four Marines were missing. A rescue squad recovered three -bodies. When, several hours later, daylight hampered movements of the -search party, 2/11 laid down a smoke screen to isolate the sector. -Between 0050 and 0455, its gunners also directed 529 rounds of close -support and countermortar fire on Chinese troops and active weapons -in the area. The recovery unit continued to sweep the area for the -last missing man until 0545 when it was decided that the search would -have to be terminated with negative results. Marine casualties from -the encounter were 3 killed, 1 missing, 19 wounded (evacuated), and 2 -nonseriously wounded. - -The following day patrol activity and enemy contacts quieted down. -Action shifted to the 1st KMC/RCT sector. Here, during the late hours -of the 18th, four Korean combat patrols brushed quickly and briefly -with Chinese squad and platoon units in light skirmishes of but a -few minutes duration. The Korean Marines killed 2 of the enemy and -estimated they accounted for 16 more.[499] - - [499] _ROKMC Comments._ - -The only activity in the Marine right regimental sector occurred when -a 7th Marines 36-man combat patrol, on prowl the night of 17–18 -July, advanced at 0112 as far as hand-grenade range of the Chinese -trenchline at Ungok. Undetected by the enemy, a patrol member fired a -white phosphorus rifle grenade squarely at the CCF machine gun that -was harassing the friendly MLR. The Marines then engaged 15 Chinese -defending the position in a brief 20-minute skirmish. Although two men -were wounded,[500] the Company C patrol members in a somewhat roguish -gesture as they left also planted a Marine Corps recruiting sign at -their FPOA (Farthest Point of Advance), facing the enemy. - - [500] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant - Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross. - Also awarded the nation’s second highest combat medal - for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17 - July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th - Marines. - - -_Marine Air Operations_[501] - - [501] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 10, No. - 5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; - 1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs-12, - -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, -323, VMF(N)-153, VMF-311 - ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, _NavOps, Korea_; Futrell, _USAF, - Korea_. - -If the monsoon rains of July hung like a shroud over the infantryman, -they were an even more serious impediment to air operations of MAGs-12 -and -33. There were 24 days of restricted flying when the weather at -home base or target area was recorded as marginal to non-operational. -On 12 full days air operations were cancelled entirely. Precipitation -for July rose to 7.38 inches, with 22 days of rain recorded throughout -the month. The generally unfavorable weather conditions not only -limited the normal support missions flown by 1st MAW but delayed the -arrival of VMA-251[502] en route from Japan to relieve VMA-323. - - [502] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A. - Harwood) administratively joined MAG-12 on 6 July for - 323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days - earlier. Movement of -251 aircraft to Korea could not - take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA-323 (Major - Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the - distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air - squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The - unit’s final combat mission on 2 July brought its total - Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours. - On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the - USS _Badoeng Strait_, the VMA-323 Corsairs (then VMF-323) - had launched their opening blow against North Korean - installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The - initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had - been flown three days earlier by VMF-214. This unit was - reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death - Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record. - Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; _USMC Ops Korea-Pusan_, v. - I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF-214 Squadron History, HRB. - -During July the wing’s nearly 300 aircraft (250 operational, 43 -assigned to pool status in Korea) flew 2,688 combat sorties[503] -and 5,183.1 combat hours. The bulk of the sorties, 1,497, were CAS -operations flown for 19 different UNC divisions. Nearly 900 supported -the 12 ROK divisions involved in the heavy fighting on the central UNC -sector. Approximately 250 of the CAS sorties were for the 1st Marine -Division, with more than 200 being day or night MPQ drops and the rest, -daytime CAS runs. No night close support missions were conducted. - - [503] Individual reports by the two groups result in a - slightly higher figure. MAG-12 recorded 2,001 combat - sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based - VMA-332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG-33 listed - 945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the - month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG-12, p. C-1 and MAG-33, p. I. - -When nearly a week of inclement weather finally lifted, Colonel Arthur -R. Stacy’s[504] MAG-33 pilots based at Pohang welcomed a brisk change -in the tempo of operations. In seven MPQ strikes on 11 July, they -hurled 13 tons of ordnance on Chinese fortifications north of the 7th -Marines sector. It was the wing’s first active day in support missions -for the 1st Marine Division, newly back on the line. - - [504] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he - was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief - of Staff, G-2. He was succeeded at MAG-33 by Colonel John - L. Smith. - -During the interim period of 9–18 July, between the two Berlin outpost -attacks, F9F jet fighters from MAG-13 again carried out approximately -35 MPQ missions for the division. (MAG-12 attack planes, during this -time, were assigned to the flaming central Allied line.) Nearly 20 of -these were on a single day, 14 July, when VMFs-311 and -115 Panther -jets roared over enemy country from morning to sundown unleashing 25 -tons north of the Marine troubled right regimental sector and 9 more -tons on hostile emplacements near the western end of the division line. - -In middle and late July, however, the majority of missions by Marine -fliers bolstered UNC operations in the central part of the Allied front -where a major enemy counterthrust erupted. The peak operational day for -MAG-33 pilots during this period occurred 17 July when 40 interdiction -and MPQ missions (136 combat sorties) were executed for Army and ROK -divisions. The corresponding record day for Colonel Carney’s MAG-12 -aviators was 19 July when 162 combat sorties were flown on heavy -destruction missions to support UNC action. - -Marine exchange pilot Major John F. Bolt, of VMF-115, chalked up a -record of a different kind on 11 July. Attached to the Fifth Air Force -51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, he shot down his fifth and sixth MIG-15 -(the previous four having been bagged since 16 May) to become the first -Marine jet ace in history. Major Bolt was leading a four-plane F-86 -flight in the attack on four MIGs east of Sinuiju and required only -1,200 rounds of ammunition and five minutes to destroy the two enemy -jet fighters. Bolt thereby became the 37th jet ace of the Korean War. - -Earlier in the month, Navy Lieutenant Guy P. Bordelon won a Silver Star -medal and gold star in lieu of a second Silver Star. Attending the K-6 -ceremonies were General Megee and Admiral Clark, 1st Wing and Seventh -Fleet commanders. Bordelon, flying with the Marine Corsair night -fighters, had downed four of the harassing “Bedcheck Charlie” planes. A -member of VC-3 attached to MAG-12, Lieutenant Bordelon on 17 July made -his fifth night kill and was subsequently awarded the Navy Cross. - -On the minus side, the 1st Marine Air Wing this last month of the war -suffered a higher rate of personnel losses on combat flights than in -any month since June 1952.[505] Captain Lote Thistlethwaite and Staff -Sergeant W. H. Westbrook, of VMF(N)-513, were killed in an air patrol -flight on 4 July. (Two nights earlier, the same squadron had lost a -Navy pilot and crewman on temporary duty with the night-fighters when -their F3D-2 similarly failed to return to Pyongtaek.) Another MAG-12 -casualty was Captain Carl F. Barlow, of VMA-212, killed 13 July on a -prebriefed CAS mission when he crashed while flying instruments. - - [505] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three - killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names - of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given - in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies. - -On 17 July, Captain Robert I. Nordell, VMF-311, flying his third -mission that day, and wingman First Lieutenant Frank L. Keck, Jr. -were hit by intense automatic weapons fire while on an interdiction -flight. Their planes reportedly went down, at 2000, over the Sea of -Japan. After a four-day air and surface search conducted by JOC, they -were declared missing and subsequently reclassified killed in action. -Another MAG-33 pilot listed KIA was Major Thomas M. Sellers, VMF-115, -on exchange duty with the Air Force, shot down 20 July in a dogfight -after he had scored two MIG-15s. Two days earlier a VMO-6 pilot, First -Lieutenant Charles Marino, and his artillery spotter, First Lieutenant -William A. Frease, flying a flak suppression mission, were struck -by enemy fire and crashed with their ship in the 5th Marines center -regimental sector. - - -_Fall of the Berlins_[506] - - [506] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; - _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; - 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934, - dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, - 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, - 1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action - Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter - 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212 - ComdDs, Jul 53. - -Despite their preoccupation with other corps sectors on the central -front of the Eighth Army line, the Chinese had not forgotten about the -Berlin complex held by the Marines. On the night of 19–20 July,[507] -the enemy lunged against the two Marine outposts in reinforced -battalion strength to renew his attack launched 12 days earlier. -Beginning at 2200, heavy Chinese mortar and artillery fire struck the -two COPs and supporting MLR positions of the 3d Battalion, which had -advanced to the front on 13 July in relief of 2/7.[508] In the center -regimental sector, 5th Marines outposts Ingrid and Dagmar, and the line -companies were also engaged by small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. -An attempted probe at Dagmar was repulsed, aided by 3/11. - - [507] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce - negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final - agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff - officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details - of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the - demilitarized zone. USMA, _Korea_, p. 51. - - [508] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon - from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were - attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command - changed. - -Concentrating their main assault efforts on the Berlins, however, the -Chinese forces swarmed up the slopes of the outposts at 2230, with more -troops moving in from enemy positions on Jersey, Detroit, and Hill -139, some 700 yards north of Berlin. The Chinese struck first at East -Berlin, where 37 Marines were on duty, and then at Berlin, held by 44 -men. Both positions were manned by First Lieutenant Kenneth E. Turner’s -Company I personnel and employed the maximum-size defenses which could -be effectively utilized on these terrain features. - -By 2300 hostile forces were halfway up Berlin. Continuous volumes -of small arms and machine gun fire poured from the defending MLR -companies. Defensive boxes were fired by 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch -mortars. Eight Company C tanks augmented the close-in fires, with their -lethal direct-fire 90mm guns tearing into Chinese troops and weapons. -Within two hours after the initial thrust, the 11th Marines had fired -20 counterbattery and 31 countermortar missions. Artillerymen from 2/11 -and 1/11 had expended 1,750 rounds. In addition, 4/11 had unleashed -124 of its 155mm medium projectiles. More countermortar fire came from -the TAFC Field Artillery Battalion. Despite the heavy fire support, -by midnight the situation was in doubt and at 0146 the twin outposts -were officially declared under enemy control. Nearly 3,000 rounds of -incoming were estimated to have fallen on division positions by that -time, most of it in the 7th Marines sector. - -During the early morning hours of the 20th, Marine tank guns and -continuous shelling by six[509] artillery battalions wreaked havoc -on Chinese hardware, reinforcing personnel, supply points, and -fortifications. Reserve units from 2/7 were placed on 30-minute -standby, with Companies D, E, and F already under 3/7 operational -control. Battalion Operation Order 20-53, issued at 0400 by Lieutenant -Colonel Jones, called for Easy and Dog to launch a two-company -counterattack at 0730 to restore Berlin and East Berlin respectively. -Incoming, meanwhile, continued heavy on the MLR; at 0520, Company I, -located to the rear of the contested outposts, reported receiving one -round per second. - - [509] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions. - -The Marine assault was cancelled by I Corps a half hour before it was -scheduled to take place. A decision subsequently rendered from I Corps -directed that the positions not be retaken.[510] - - [510] At a routine conference that same morning attended by - CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General - Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision - about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General - Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held - should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure - against them” and recommended instead that the sector - be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually, - following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a - discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine - sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A - staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint” - concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be - adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials - on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the - study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps - when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19 - July. _CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt_, pp. 3–4. - -Since the outposts were not to be recaptured,[511] efforts that day -were devoted to making the two hills as untenable as possible for -their new occupants. Heavy destruction missions by air, armor, and -artillery blasted CCF defenses throughout the day. Air observers were -on station from 0830 until after dark, with nine CAS missions conducted -by MAG-12 pilots from VMA-121 and -212. The day’s series of air strikes -on the Berlin-East Berlin positions (and Vegas weapons emplacements) -began at 1145 when a division of ADs from Lieutenant Colonel Harold -B. Penne’s[512] -121 hurled nine and a half tons of ordnance on enemy -bunkers and trenches at East Berlin. - - [511] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted: - “The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost - their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and - the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made - their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.” - Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which - the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate - for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue - casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir, - MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70. - - [512] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from - Major Braun. - -The artillery was having an active day, too. Six firing battalions had -sent more than 3,600 rounds crashing against the enemy by nightfall. -The 1st 4.5-inch rocketeers also contributed four ripples to the melee. -Heavy fire missions were requested and delivered by the Army 159th -Field Artillery Battalion (240mm howitzers) and 17th Field Artillery -Battalion (8-inch howitzers) using 11th Marines airborne spotters. The -precision fire on enemy positions, which the air spotters reported -to be “the most effective missions they had conducted in Korea”[513] -continued for several hours. By 1945 the big guns had demolished the -bunkers and all but 15 yards of trenchline at East Berlin. For their -part the Chinese had fired an estimated 4,900 rounds of mortar and -artillery against the 3d Battalion right hand sector in the 24-hour -period ending at 1800 on the 20th. - - [513] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May - 70, hereafter _Curry ltr_. - -Armored vehicles, meanwhile, during 19–20 July had expended 200 -rounds of HE and WP shells and 6,170 machine gun rounds.[514] Tank -searchlights had also effectively illuminated enemy positions on the -East Berlin hill. The tankers’ performance record included: 20 Chinese -bunkers and 2 57mm recoilless rifles destroyed; an estimated 30 enemy -soldiers killed; a dozen more firing apertures, caves, and trenchworks -substantially damaged. - - [514] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut - 50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent - reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination - of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p. - 4 and 1/11, p. 5. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 30 K. White - -7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR - -(Division Right) - -LINEAR DEFENSE - -19–20 July 1953] - -Between noon and the last flight of the day, when a trio of AUs from -Lieutenant Colonel Wallace’s VMA-212 attacked a northern enemy mortar -and automatic weapons site, 35 aircraft had repeatedly streaked over -the Berlin territory and adjacent Chinese strongpoints. Strikes by -VMA-121 at 1145, 1320, 1525, 1625, 1700, 1750; and VMA-212 at 1413, -1849, and 1930 had released a combined total of 69½ tons of bombs and -6,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition on hostile locations. - -The Chinese casualty toll during this renewed flareup in the fighting -on 19–20 July was conservatively placed by 3/7 at 75 killed and 300 -wounded. It was further believed that “the enemy battalion was so -weakened and disorganized by the attacks that it was necessary for -the CCF to commit another battalion to hold the area captured.”[515] -Regimental reports indicated that 6 Marines had been killed, 56 listed -missing,[516] 86 wounded and evacuated, and 32 not seriously wounded. - - [515] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number - of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental, - artillery support, and division command diaries given - differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF - killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630 - estimated wounded. - - [516] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines - unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured. - They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men - from 1st Marines units under operational control of the - 7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. - 212, 268–269. - -As a result of the critical tactical situation and number of casualties -suffered during the Berlins operation, the 7th Marines regimental -commander requested that units of the division reserve be placed under -his control to help check any further aggressive moves of the enemy. -For it now appeared that the Chinese might continue their thrust and -attempt to seize Hill 119 (directly south of Berlin and East Berlin) in -order to be in position to deny part of the Imjin River to UNC forces -after signing of the armistice. - -While the lost outposts were being neutralized on the morning of -the 20th, the CO of the incoming 1st Marines, Colonel Nelson, also -ordered an immediate reorganization and strengthening of the MLR. This -employed the defense in depth concept, used by the British Commonwealth -Division in the sector adjacent to the Marines on the east. The wide -front defense concept was fully developed with one company occupying -a portion of the MLR to the rear of the Berlin complex, known as Hill -119 or more informally, Boulder City. Three companies organized the -high ground to the right rear of the MLR east to Hill 111, the limiting -point on the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. -Three more companies fortified the Hill 126 area to the rear and left -of Berlin to its juncture with the western battalion sector held by -Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd’s 1/7. (See Maps 30 and 31.) - -[Illustration: - - MAP 31 K. WHITE - -7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR - -Defense-in-depth - -20–21 July 1953] - -The afternoon of the 20th, 2/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Long) was -transferred to 7th Marines control and positioned in the center of -the regimental MLR, as the first step in the scheduled relief of the -7th, due off the line on 26 July. For the next three days the regiment -continued to develop the sector defense to the rear of the MLR. -Elements of the regimental reserve, 2/7, were employed to reinforce the -3/7 sector. Initially, on 20–21 July, F/2/7, under operational command -of 3/7, was assigned the mission of reinforcing Hill 119. Later a 2/1 -platoon was also ordered to strengthen the position. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 32 K. WHITE - -7TH MARINES MLR SECTOR - -Defense-in-depth - -22–23 July 1953] - -Incoming 1st Marines platoons and companies from the 2d and 3d -(Lieutenant Colonel Roy D. Miller) Battalions augmented the forces at -the two critical Hill 119 and 111 locations. As it turned out, 1st -Marines personnel returning to the front from division reserve were to -see the last of the war’s heavy fighting in the course of their relief -of the 7th Marines. Ultimately, the regimental forward defense, instead -of being divided into two battalion sectors as before, now consisted -of three--a left, center, and right sector. By 23 July the depth -reorganization had been completed and these sectors were manned by 1/7, -2/1, and 3/7. (See Map 32.) - - -_Renewal of Heavy Fighting, 24–26 July_[517] - - [517] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv - ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53; - 1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7 - Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, - 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; - 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -251, - VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; - Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, - _Korea, 1951–1953_; Martin Russ, _The Last Parallel: A - Marine’s War Journal_ (New York: Rinehart and Company, - 1957); USMA, _Korea_. - -Sightings of enemy troops for the next few days were light. A large -scale attack expected on the 21st by the 5th Marines at Hedy and Dagmar -failed to materialize. Instead, a token force of a dozen Chinese -dressed in burlap bags made a limited appearance at Hedy before -departing, minus three of its party, due to Marine sharp-shooting -skills. In the skies, MAG-33 fliers from VMF-115 and -311 had been -transferred by Fifth Air Force from exclusive missions for the central -and eastern UNC front (the IX, ROK II, and X Corps sectors) to join -VMA-121 in MPQ flights supporting the 1st Marine Division. During the -21–23 July period, despite layers of thick stratus clouds and rain that -turned off and on periodically like a water spigot, more than 15 radar -missions were executed by the three squadrons.[518] They unleashed a -gross 33-ton bomb load on CCF mortar and 76mm gun positions, supply -areas, CPs, bunkers, and trenches. - - [518] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs - was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement - squadron VMA-251. This was the unit’s first combat - sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its - indoctrination flights. VMA-251 also flew four MPQ - flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24 - July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA-251 - ComdD, Jul 53. - -The lull in ground fighting lasted until late on the 24th. Then, at -1930, a heavy preparation of 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars combined -with 76mm and 122mm artillery shells began to rain down on Boulder -City. Men of G/3/1, under command of First Lieutenant Oral R. Swigart, -Jr., were deployed at that time in a perimeter defense of the position -having that morning completed the relief of G/3/7. - -Enemy troops were reported massing for an assault. One regiment located -by forward observers behind Hill 139, some 700 yards northwest of -Berlin, was taken under fire at 1940 by artillery and rocket ripple. At -2030, following their usual pattern of laying down a heavy mortar and -artillery barrage, the CCF began to probe the MLR at Hills 119 and 111 -in the Marine right battalion sector. They hit first at Hill 111, the -far right anchor of the division line, currently held by 7th Marines -personnel. Then the CCF moved westward to Hill 119. Their choice of -time for the attack once again coincided with the relief of 7th Marines -units by the 1st Marines.[519] When the assault began, H/3/1 was moving -up to relieve H/3/7 at the easternmost point of the line in the Hill -111 vicinity, and Company I was preparing to relieve I/3/7, to its left. - - - [519] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th - Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a - regiment of the 25th Infantry. _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. - 9-58. - -The Communist troops temporarily penetrated Hill 111 positions. At -Boulder City, where the main force of the CCF two-battalion unit -had struck, they occupied a portion of the trenchline. Attempting to -exploit this gain, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted the Berlin Gate, -on the left flank of Company G’s position and the East Berlin Gate, to -its right. Marine units of the two regiments posted at the two citadel -hills were heavily supported by MLR mortar, artillery, and tank fires. -No artillery spotter or CAS flights were flown through the night, once -again due to weather conditions. - -By 2120, the bulk of Chinese soldiers had begun to withdraw from Hill -111, this attack apparently being a diversionary effort. But the -enemy’s main thrust continued against the central Hill 119 position. -Here the close, heavy fighting raged on through the morning hours, -with enemy troops steadily reinforcing from the Jersey Ridge and -East Berlin, by way of the Berlin Gate, the best avenue of approach -to forward positions of Hill 119. At approximately 2100, the Chinese -hurled a second attack against Hill 119 in the strength of two -companies, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire. An hour -later hand-to-hand combat had developed all along the 700 yards of the -forward trenches. Company G men of the 1st Marines were down to half -their original number, ammunition was running low, and evacuation of -casualties was slowed by the fact that two of the eight corpsmen had -been killed and most of the rest were themselves casualties. - -By midnight, the front, left, and right flanks of the perimeter had -been pushed back to the reverse slope of the hill and a 1st Marines -participant commented “... only a never-say-die resistance was keeping -the enemy from seizing the remainder of the position.”[520] At 0015, -the thinning ranks of G/3/1 Marines (now down to 25 percent effectives) -were cheered by the news that Company I men were about to reinforce -their position. This latter unit itself suffered 35 casualties while -moving into the rear area, when the Chinese intercepted a coded message -and shifted a substantial amount of their mortar and artillery fires to -the rear approaches of Hill 119. - - [520] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4. - -In response to the enemy bombardment, Marine artillery fires crashed -against the Chinese continuously from 2100 to midnight. Four ripples -were launched in support of the Hill 119 defenders. In one of the -regiment’s most intense counterbattery shoots on record, the 11th -Marines in three hours had fired 157 missions. By 2400, an estimated -6,000 to 8,000 hostile rounds had fallen in the division sector. - -Meanwhile, the Chinese were also attempting to punch holes in the 5th -regimental sector. In a second-step operation, rather than striking -simultaneously as was customary, the enemy at 2115 had jabbed at -outposts Esther and Dagmar in the right battalion of the 5th Marines. -The reinforced Chinese company from the 408th Regiment quickly began to -concentrate its attention on Esther, outposted by Company H Marines. -During the heavy fighting both Marines and Chinese reinforced. By -early morning, the enemy had seized part of the front trenchline, but -the Marines controlled the rear trenches and reorganized the defense -under rifle platoon commander, Second Lieutenant William H. Bates. -The Chinese unsuccessfully attempted to isolate the position by heavy -shelling and patrolled vigorously between Esther and the MLR. - -Marines replied with flamethrowers and heavy supporting fires from the -MLR, including machine guns, 81mm and 4.2-inch mortar boxes. Three -tanks--a section from the regimental antitank platoon and one from -Company A--neutralized enemy targets with 153 rounds to assist the 3d -and 2d Battalions. The 3/11 gunners supporting the 5th Marines also -hurled 3,886 rounds against the Chinese in breaking up the attack. -After several hours of strong resistance, the Chinese loosened their -grip, and at 0640 on the 25th, Esther was reported secured. - -By this time an enemy battalion had been committed piecemeal at the -position. The action had developed into the heaviest encounter of the -month in the 5th Marines sector. During that night of 24–25 July, more -than 4,000 artillery and mortar rounds fell in the outpost vicinity; -total incoming for the regimental sector throughout July was recorded -at 8,413 rounds. Twelve Marines lost their lives in the battle, with 35 -wounded and evacuated, and 63 suffering minor injuries. A total of 85 -CCF were counted dead, 110 more estimated killed, and an estimated 250 -wounded. - -Back at the Berlin Complex area of the 7th Marines where the major -action centered, intense shelling, fire fights, and close hand-to-hand -combat continued through the early morning of the 25th. Chinese -infiltrators had broken through a substantial part of the trenchwork -on the forward slope of Boulder City. For a while they temporarily -occupied the rocky, shrub-grown hill crest as well. - -A swift-moving counterattack launched at 0130 by 1st Marines from -Companies G and I, led by Captain Louis J. Sartor, of I/3/1, began to -restore the proper balance to the situation. At 0330 the MLR had been -reestablished and the Marines had the controlling hand. By 0530 the -Hill 119 area was secured, with four new platoons from Companies E of -the 7th and 1st Marines aiding the defense. Scattered groups of Chinese -still clung to the forward slopes, and others vainly tried to reinforce -by the Berlin-to-Hill 119 left flank trenchline. - -Direct fire from the four M-46s on position at Boulder City[521] had -helped disperse hostile troop concentrations. The tanks had also played -a major communication role. Although surrounded by enemy forces during -the peak of the fighting, two of the armored vehicles were still able -to radio timely tactical information to higher echelons. This Company -C quartet, plus another vehicle from the 7th Marines antitank unit, -between the time of the enemy assault to 0600 when it stabilized, had -pumped 109 HE, 8 marking shells, and 20,750 .30 caliber machine gun -bullets into opposition forces.[522] Five tanks from the 1st Marines -AT company located to the west of the Berlin site meted out further -punishment to enemy soldiers, gun pits, and trenches. - - [521] One participant remarked: “I think the Boulder City - action ... is the classic example of where the Army system - worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for - saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to - have done the job under the previous system which would - have required the tanks to move to the scene after the - action had begun.” _Post ltr._ - - [522] In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at - Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery. - -Sporadic fighting and heavy incoming (at the rate of 60–70 rounds per -minute for 10 minutes duration) also rained down on eastern Hill 111 -in the early hours of the 25th. Assault teams with flamethrowers and -3.5-inch rocket launchers completed the job of clearing the enemy out -of Marine bunkers. - -Altogether the Communists had committed 3,000 troops across the Marine -division front during the night of 24–25 July. Between 2200 and 0400, -a total of 23,725 rounds had been fired by the 11th Marines and 10 -battalions under its operational control in the division sector. This -included batteries from the 25th Division Artillery, I Corps Artillery, -and 1st Commonwealth Division Artillery.[523] The artillery outgoing -represented 7,057 rounds to assist the 5th Marines at outpost Esther -and 16,668 in defense of Boulder City. - - [523] The British were not hampered by any ammunition - restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between - the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery - resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of - 24–25 July, a young British artillery officer arrived - at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as - being from the unit that had provided artillery support - to the Marines the previous night, for which he was - profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then - unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill - enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles - fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When - he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he - grinned and conceded waggishly: “But I am authorized to - settle for two bottles of your best whiskey!” _Curry ltr._ - -On the morning of 25 July, the Chinese at 0820 again assaulted Hill -119 in company strength. Marine mortar and artillery fire repulsed the -attack, with heavy enemy losses. See-saw action continued for most of -the rest of the day on the position. No major infantry attempt was -made at Hill 111. Intense hostile shelling was reported here at 1100, -however, when the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, still in operational -control of the area, began receiving 125 to 150 rounds per minute. The -last of the Chinese marauders were forced off the forward slope at -Boulder City at 1335. For some welcomed hours both Marine positions -remained quiet. A conservative estimate by 3/7 of the toll for the -enemy’s efforts were 75 CCF killed and 425 wounded. - -Air support that morning was provided by 32 of the sleek, hard-hitting -F9Fs from VMF-115 and -311. Working in tandem over Chinese terrain -directly north of the right regimental sector, the two squadrons, -between 0616 and 1036, flew nine MPQ missions. In the aerial assault, -they bombarded the enemy with more than 32 tons of explosives. - -Twelve Marine tanks had a workout, expending 480 HE and 33 WP shells -and 21,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition in direct fire missions. -The traditional inequity of battlefront luck was plainly demonstrated -between a section (two) of armored vehicles near the Hill 111 company -CP and a trio located at Boulder City. It was practically a standoff -for the former. Together they were able to fire only 71 high explosive -shells, drawing a return of 1,000 rounds of CCF 60mm mortar and 122mm -cannon shells. Blazing guns of the three tanks in the Hill 119 area, -meanwhile, during the 24-hour firing period had sent 158 HE, 10 WP, -and 17,295 bullets to destroy hostile weapons and installations and -received but 120 mortar and another 120 rounds of artillery fire. - -The 11th Marines were also busy as heavy firing continued on Chinese -policing parties and those enemy batteries actively shelling MLR -positions. By late afternoon, 13,500 rounds of Chinese mortar and -artillery had crashed against the 7th Marines right sector--the highest -rate of incoming for any 24-hour period during the entire Berlin -action. For its part, the regiment and its medium and heavy support -units completed 216 counterbattery missions and sent 36,794 rounds of -outgoing into Chinese defenses between 2200 on 24 July and 1600 on the -25th. - -Meanwhile, during 25 July, Colonel Nelson’s men continued with their -relief of the 7th Marines. At 1100 Major Robert D. Thurston, S-3 of -3/1, assumed command of Hill 119 and reorganized the embattled Company -G and Company I personnel, 1st Marines. That night, at 1940, E/2/1 and -F/2/7 effected the relief of the composite George-Item men. At the -eastern Hill 111 Company H, 1st Marines had assisted Company H, 7th -Marines during the day in clearing the trenchworks of the enemy; then -at 1815, the 1st Marines unit completed its relief of H/3/7 and took -over responsibility for the MLR right company sector. Not long after, -beginning at 2130, 1st and 7th Marines at the critical Hill 119 complex -were attacked by two enemy companies. MLR fire support plus artillery -and tank guns lashed at the enemy and he withdrew. Between 0130 and -0300 the Chinese again probed Hills 111 and 119, gaining small parts of -the trenchline before being driven out by superior Marine firepower. -Marine casualties were 19 killed and 125 wounded. The CCF had suffered -30 known dead, an estimated 84 killed, and 310 estimated wounded. - -With dawn on the 26th came the first real quiet the battlefield had -known for two days. Small enemy groups tried to reinforce by way of the -Berlin trenchline, only to be stopped by Marine riflemen and machine -gunners. Hostile incoming continued spasmodically. At 1330 the 1st -Marines assumed operational control of the right regimental sector, -as scheduled, and of the remaining 7th Marines units still in the -area.[524] By this time Marine casualties since 24 July numbered 43 -killed and 316 wounded. - - [524] Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and - elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company. - -That night the Communists, knowing the armistice was near and that -time was running out for seizing the Boulder City objective, made -their final attempts at the strongpoint. Again they attacked at 2130. -Defending 1st Marines were now under Captain Esmond E. Harper, CO -of E/2/1, who had assumed command when Major Thurston was seriously -wounded and evacuated. They fought off the Chinese platoon-size drive -when the enemy advanced from Berlin to the wire at Hill 119. Shortly -after midnight another Chinese platoon returned to Hill 119 in the last -skirmish for the territory, but Marine small arms and artillery handily -sent it home. At 0045, a CCF platoon nosed about the Hill 111 area for -an hour and twenty minutes. Again the Marines discouraged these last -faltering enemy efforts. Action at both hills ceased and what was to -become the concluding ground action for the 1st Marine Division in -Korea had ended. - -Despite impressive tenacity and determination, the Chinese Communist -attacks throughout most of July on the two Berlin outposts and Hills -119 and 111 achieved no real gain. Their repetitive assaults on -strongly-defended Boulder City up until the last day of the war was an -attempt to place the Marines (and the United Nations Command) in as -unfavorable a position as possible when the armistice agreement was -signed. While talking at Panmunjom, the Communists pressed hungrily on -the battlefront for as much critical terrain as they could get under -their control before the final ceasefire line was established. - -Had the enemy succeeded in his assaults on the two hill defenses after -his earlier seizure of the Berlins, under terms of the agreement UNC -forces would have been forced to withdraw southward to a point where -they no longer had free access to all of the Imjin River. If the -Chinese had taken Boulder City this would have also provided the CCF -a major high ground position (Hill 126) with direct observation into -Marine rear areas and important supply routes. - -From the standpoint of casualties, the last month of the Korean War -was a costly one, with 181 infantry Marines killed in action and -total losses of 1,611 men.[525] This was the highest rate for any -month during 1953. It was second only to the October 1952 outpost -battles[526] for any month during the year the 1st Marine Division -defended the line in West Korea. The closing days of the war produced -the last action for which Marines were awarded the Navy Cross. These -Marines were Second Lieutenant Bates, H/3/5; First Lieutenant Swigart, -G/3/1; Second Lieutenant Theodore J. Lutz, Jr., H/3/1; and Sergeant -Robert J. Raymond, F/2/7, who was mortally wounded. - - [525] Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded - and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10 - non-battle deaths. - - [526] During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798 - listed as casualties. - -The 7th and 1st Marines, as the two regiments involved during July in -the Berlin sector defense, sustained high monthly losses: 804 and 594, -respectively. Forty-eight men from the 7th Marines and 70 from the -1st Marines were killed in action. In contrast, the 5th Marines which -witnessed little frontline action during the month (except for a sharp -one-night clash at Outpost Esther), suffered total monthly casualties -of 150 men, of whom 26 lost their lives. Chinese losses were also high: -405 counted killed, 761 estimated killed, 1,988 estimated wounded, 1 -prisoner, or 3,155 for the month of July. - -In their unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the Marines from their MLR -positions the Chinese had pounded the right regimental flank with -approximately 22,200 artillery and mortar shells during the last 24–27 -July battle. In reply, 11th Marines gunners and supporting units had -expended a total of 64,187 rounds against CCF strongpoints. The enemy’s -increased counterbattery capabilities in July, noted by division -intelligence, also received particular attention from the artillerymen. -A record number of 345 counterbattery missions were conducted during -the period by Marine and Army cannoneers. - -More than 46,000 rounds of outgoing had been fired by the Chinese in -their repeated attempts of 7–9, 19–20, and 24–27 July to seize the -Berlin posts and key MLR terrain. Operations during this final month, -as the 2/11 commander was to point out later, on numerous occasions had -verified the wisdom of leaving “direct support artillery battalions in -place during frequent changes of frontline infantry units.”[527] - - [527] Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul - 70, hereafter _West ltr_. - -Armored support throughout the 24–27 July period consisted of more than -30 tanks (Company C, AT Company elements of the 1st and 7th Marines, a -section of flames, and Company D platoon) on line or in reserve. Marine -tankers used a record 1,287 shells and 54,845 bullets against the CCF, -while drawing 4,845 rounds of enemy mixed mortar and artillery. - -The enemy’s attack on Marine MLR positions, beginning 24 July, -constituted the major action in the I Corps sector the final 10 days -of the war. During this period the Chinese probed I Corps positions 25 -times (8 in the Marine, 5 in the 1st Commonwealth, 6 in the 1st ROK, -and 6 in the 7th Infantry Division sectors). - -In other parts of the Eighth Army line, the last large-scale action -had broken out east of the Marine sector beginning 13 July when major -elements of six Chinese Communist divisions penetrated a ROK unit to -the right of the IX Corps. As the division’s right and center fell -back, units withdrew into the zones of the IX and ROK II Corps on the -east. General Taylor directed that a new MLR be established south of -the Kumsong River, and a counterattack 17–20 July by three II Corps -divisions attained this objective. - -Since the armistice agreement was imminent, no attempt was made -to restore the original line. The Chinese had achieved temporary -success[528] but at heavy cost. Eighth Army officials estimated that -CCF casualties in July reached 72,000 men, with more than 25,000 of -these dead. The enemy had lost the equivalent of seven divisions of -the five Chinese armies committed in attacks upon the II and IX Corps -sectors. - - [528] Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation - were made in the center sector to include a few miles - of territory gained by the Communists in their massive - July offensive there. Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 292; - Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 640; Leckie, _Conflict_, p. - 385. - - -_The Last Day of the War_[529] - - [529] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9; - 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26–28 Jul - 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul - 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11 - ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; HRS Log Sheet, dtd - 21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared - on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie, - _Conflict_; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers, - “Land of the Morning Calm,” _Midwest Reporter_ (Jul 68). - -Representatives of the Communist Forces and the United Nations Command -signed the armistice agreement that marked the end of the Korean War -in Panmunjom at 1000 on Monday, 27 July 1953. The cease-fire, ending -two years of often fruitless and hostile truce negotiations, became -effective at 2200 that night. After three years, one month, and two -days the so-called police action in Korea had come to a halt. - -Actually, final agreement on the armistice had been expected since -late June. By mid-July it was considered imminent, even though the -CCF during these waning days of the war had launched several major -counteroffensives against ROK troops defending the central part of the -Eighth Army line as well as the Marines in the western I Corps sector. - -With the final resolution of hostilities at 1000, a flash message -went out immediately to the 26,000 Marines of General Pate’s division -directing that there be “no celebration firing related in any way to -the advent of the armistice.”[530] Fraternization or communication with -the enemy was expressly forbidden. Personnel were reminded that firing -of all weapons was to be “restricted to the minimum justified by the -tactical situation.”[531] No defensive firing was to take place after -2145 unless the Marines were actually attacked by enemy infantry. Each -frontline company was authorized to fire one white star cluster at -2200, signalling the cease fire. - - [530] Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire - and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53. - - [531] _Ibid._ - -The signing of the armistice agreement on 27 July thus ended 36 months -of war for the Marines in Korea. On that date, the 1st Marine Division -initiated plans for its withdrawal to defensive positions south of the -Imjin River. One regiment, the 5th Marines, was left north of the river -to man the general outpost line across the entire division front. A -transition was made at this time from the customary wide-front linear -defense to a defense in depth, similar to that employed in the July -Boulder City battle. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 33 K. WHITE - -EIGHTH ARMY FRONT - -27 JULY 1953] - -Briefly, the armistice agreement decreed that both UNC and Communist -forces: - - Cease fire 12 hours (at 2200, 27 July) after signing of agreement; - - Withdraw all military forces, supplies, and equipment from the - demilitarized zone (2,000 yards from line of contact) within 72 - hours after effective time of ceasefire; - - Locate and list all fortifications and minefields in the DMZ - within 72 hours, to be dismantled during a subsequent salvage - period; - - Replace combat personnel and supplies on a one-for-one basis, to - prevent any build-up; and - - Begin repatriation of all POWs, with exchange to be completed - within two months. - -The 1st Marine Division began that afternoon to close out its existing -MLR[532] and withdraw to its designated post-armistice main battle -position located two kilometers to the south, in the vicinity of the -KANSAS Line. This tactical withdrawal was to be completed no later than -2200 on 30 July. - - [532] See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day - of the war. - -By early afternoon the three infantry regiments had been ordered to -furnish mine teams to mark, remove, and clear minefields. For units of -the 1st and 7th Marines deployed at the Boulder Hill Outpost--quiet -only since 0300 that morning--the cease-fire news understandably -carried a “let’s see” reaction as the men “waited cautiously throughout -the day in their fortifications for the White Star Cluster which would -signify the end ...”[533] Convincing the men at shell-pocked Boulder -City that a cease-fire was to take place within a few hours would have -been a difficult task that day, however, even for the Commandant. - - [533] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5. - -The Marine infantrymen who had been the target of the last heavy -Communist attacks of the war might well have had a special sense of -realism about the end of hostilities. Between the skirmish with Chinese -attacking units in the early hours of the 27th and mine accidents, a -total of 46 Marines had been wounded and removed from duty that last -day of the war and 2 others declared missing in action. - -For the more free-wheeling artillerymen of the 11th Marines, that -final day was one of fairly normal operations. During the day, 40 -counterbattery missions had been fired, the majority in reply to -Communist batteries that came alive at dusk.[534] A total of 102 -countermortar missions were also completed, bringing the total outgoing -that last month to 75,910 rounds. Action of the regiment continued -until 2135, just ten minutes before the preliminary cease-fire which -preceded the official cease-fire at 2200. - - [534] The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the - defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening - of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11 - received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed - at the batteries. Of the many rounds ... 80% were duds and - no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated - hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they - were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back - north.” _West ltr._ - -For the 7,035 Marine officers and men on duty with General Megee’s 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing, the day was also an active one. That final day of -the war Corsairs, Skyraiders, and Pantherjets from the wing mounted 222 -sorties and blasted the enemy with 354 tons of high explosives along -the front. Banshees from VMJ-1 flew 15 reconnaissance sorties during -the day for priority photographs of enemy airfields and railroads. -Last Marine jet pilot in action was Captain William I. Armagost of -VMF-311. He smashed a Communist supply point with four 500-pounders, at -1835, declaring his flight felt “just like the last winning play of a -football game.”[535] - - [535] 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE, - dtd 27 Jul 53. - -The wing closed out its share of the Korean War 35 minutes before -the cease-fire. A VMA-251 aviator, Captain William J. Foster, Jr., -dropped three 2,000-pound bombs at 2125 in support of UN troops. The -distinction of flying this final Marine mission over the bombline had -gone, fittingly, to the wing’s newly-arrived “Black Patch” squadron. -At sea, U.S. and British warships ended the 17-month naval siege by -shelling Wonsan for the last time, and at 2200 the ships in the harbor -turned on their lights. In compliance with the terms of the armistice, -full evacuation of the WCIDU and ECIDU islands north of the 38th -Parallel started at 2200. Island defense forces off both coasts at this -time began a systematic destruction of their fortifications as they -prepared to move south. - -As early as 2100 Marine line units reported seeing Chinese soldiers -forward of their own positions, policing their areas. An hour later -large groups of enemy were observed along the division sector. Some -“waved lighted candles, flashlights, and banners while others removed -their dead and wounded, and apparently looked for souvenirs.”[536] -A few attempts were made by the Chinese to fraternize. One group -approached a Marine listening post and asked for water and wanted to -talk. Others hung up gift bags at the base of outpost Ava and shouted, -“How are you? Come on over and let’s have a party,” while the Marines -stared at them in silence.[537] The last hostile incoming in the 1st -Marine Division sector was reported at 2152 when five rounds of 82mm -mortar landed on a Korean outpost, COP Camel. - - [536] 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major - General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive - Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices - of the Chinese Communists’ singing and cheering drifted - across the Han River that night. “It was an eerie - thing ... and very depressing.” MajGen Louis Metzger - comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter _Metzger - comments_. - - [537] 1stMarDiv ComdD, _op. cit._, and Rees, _Korea_, p. 434. - -Marines on line that night warily scanned the darkness in front of -their trenches. Slowly at first, then with increasing rapidity the -white star cluster shells began to burst over positions all along the -line. Thousands of flares illuminated the sky and craggy hills along -the 155-mile front, from the Yellow Sea to Sea of Japan. The war in -Korea was over. Of the men from the one Marine Division and air wing -committed in Korea during the three-year conflict, 4,262 had been -killed in battle. An additional 26,038 Marines were wounded. No fewer -than 42 Marines would receive the Nation’s highest combat decoration, -the Medal of Honor, for outstanding valor--26 of them posthumously. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -Return of the Prisoners of War - -_Operation_ BIG SWITCH--_Circumstances of Capture--The Communist POW -Camps--CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts--The Germ -Warfare Issue--Problems and Performance of Marine POWs--Marine Escape -Attempts--Evaluation and Aftermath_ - - -_Operation_ BIG SWITCH[538] - - [538] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, - 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 - Jnls, Jul-Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar, - MAG-33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8 - “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File #1 - “Prisoners of War--Korea--General”; HRS Subject Files - “Prisoners of War--Korea--News Clippings, folders #1, - #2, #3”; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical - Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA, - HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Berger, _Korea Knot_; Clark, - _Danube to Yalu_; T. R. Fehrenbach, _This Kind of War--A - Study in Unpreparedness_ (New York: The Macmillan Co., - 1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, quoted with - permission of the publisher; Field, _NavOps, Korea_; - Hermes, _Truce Tent_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_; - USMA, _Korea_; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “Big Switch,” - _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter - Heinecke, “Big Switch”; _Life_ Magazine, Jul-Aug 53 - issues; _New York Times_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53; _Washington - Post_, 5 Aug-6 Sep 53. - -Between August 1950, the month that the first Marine was taken prisoner -and July 1953, when 18 Marine infantrymen were captured in final rushes -by the CCF, a total of 221 U.S. Marines became POWs.[539] The majority -of them--nearly 90 percent--ultimately returned. After the conclusion -of hostilities, Marine POWs were among the UNC fighting men returned in -Operation BIG SWITCH. - - [539] Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations - and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald, - _POW_, pp. 249–273. - -The new mission of the 1st Marine Division, with the cease-fire, -called for organization of the Post Armistice Battle Positions and -establishment of a No-Pass Line approximately 200 yards south of the -Demilitarized Zone boundary. In addition to maintaining a defensive -readiness posture for full-scale operations if hostilities resumed, -the Marine division was charged with control of the Munsan-ni area -and assisting in repatriation of prisoners of war. Obviously, since -the Panmunjom release point for receiving the POWs was located in the -Marine zone of action, the division--as in the earlier LITTLE SWITCH -prisoner exchange--would play a major part in the final repatriation. - -With the armistice and ending of the war expected almost daily, the -Munsan-ni Provisional Command was activated and reorganized in June. -Once again, the 1st Marine Division was responsible for the United -Nations Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, organized along lines -similar to those used during the preliminary exchange. The division -inspector, Colonel Albert F. Metze, was designated Processing Unit -Commander. Sections under his direction were staffed by Marine and -naval personnel. The normal command structure was reinforced by special -engineer, medical, interpreter, food service, chaplain, security, -signal, supply, and motor transport teams. Planning for the project, -like all military operations, was thorough and continuous. - -As in April, the Munsan-ni Provisional Command assumed responsibility -for handling the UN repatriation at Panmunjom as well as supervision of -the receiving and processing of ROKA personnel. Brigadier General Ralph -M. Osborne, USA, was placed in charge of the command, with headquarters -at the United Nations Base Camp. The RCT landing exercise for the -1st Marines, scheduled in July, was cancelled because of shipping -commitments for Operation BIG SWITCH, as the Navy Amphibious Force -readied itself for the repatriation of prisoners. By the end of July, -the 1st Marine Division was supporting “approximately 42,400 troops -with Class I [rations] and 48,600 with Class III [petroleum products] -due to the influx of units and personnel participating in Operation BIG -SWITCH.”[540] - - [540] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-134. - -Several days before the exchange, however, it became evident that the -old site of the Gate to Freedom used in the April exchange would have -to be abandoned. It was found inadequate to handle the larger number of -returning prisoners--approximately 400 daily--to be processed in the -new month-long operation. The new site, Freedom Village, near Munsan-ni -contained an old Army warehouse which was renovated by the 1st Division -engineers and transformed into the 11th Evacuation Hospital where the -UN Medical and Processing Unit was located. Members of the division -Military Police Company provided security for the exchange area. -Marines from practically every unit of the division were assigned -duties at the United Nations Processing Center. As General Clark, UNC -Commander later recalled: - - Preparations for Big Switch were necessarily elaborate. At Munsan - we had a huge warehouse stocked high with clothing, blankets, - medical equipment and other supplies for the returning POWs. At - Freedom Village nearby we had a complete hospital unit ready. It - was one of the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) which had - done such magnificent work close to the front through most of the - war.[541] - - [541] Clarke, _Danube to Yalu_, pp. 298–299. - -On 5 August, the first day of BIG SWITCH, Colonel Metze took a final -look around the processing center. Readiness of this camp was his -responsibility. If anyone had real understanding of a prisoner’s -relieved and yet shaken reaction to new freedom it was this Marine -Colonel. Chosen by the United Nations Command to build and direct the -enlarged Freedom Village, Colonel Metze himself had been a prisoner of -war in World War II. He knew from personal experience how men should be -treated and what should be done for them early in their new freedom. -For many, this was after nearly three long years in Communist prison -camps. That morning, as described by an observer: - - Members of his [Colonel Metze’s] command stood by their cubicles, - awaiting the first signal. The 129 enlisted Marines, corpsmen, - doctors and other UN personnel had held a dress rehearsal only - the day before. Everything was ready.[542] - - [542] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 44. - -Fifteen miles northwest another group of Marines assigned to the -Provisional Command Receipt and Control section waited almost in the -shadow of the famous “peace pagoda” at Panmunjom. UNC receiving teams, -each headed by a Marine Corps major, “watched the road to the north for -the first sign of a dust cloud which would herald the approach of the -Communist convoy.”[543] The United Nations POWs had been assembled at -Kaesong and held there in several groups, preparatory to the return. -The exchange agreement had specified that the repatriation would -begin at 0900. Precisely at 0855 the Communist convoy, led by three -Russian-made jeeps, each carrying one CCF and two _NKPA_ officers, -moved out from the Communist side of the peace corridor. Trucks and -ambulances followed the jeeps. - - [543] _Ibid._ - -As they approached the exchange site, “a Marine officer bellowed the -familiar naval command, ‘Marines, man your stations!’”[544] Rosters -of the UNC prisoners in the trucks and ambulances were then presented -to the Marine team captains who checked the lists. As they called the -names, “thin, wan, but smiling men shuffled from the trucks to the -medical tents.”[545] - - [544] _Ibid._, p. 45. - - [545] _Ibid._ - -Official receipt of the POWs at Panmunjom was by the Munsan-ni -Provisional Command Receipt and Control Officer, assisted by 35 -officers and enlisted men from the 1st Marine Division. After their -screening by medical officers, UN returnees not in need of immediate -medical aid were transferred by ambulance to Freedom Village at -Munsan-ni for further processing. Helicopter priority went to litter -patients too weak to travel by ambulance. POWs requiring prompt -treatment were loaded aboard the HMR-161 carriers and flown to the 11th -Evacuation Hospital at Freedom Village. - -Seriously injured men were transferred directly to the Inchon hospital -ships for embarkation to the United States, or were air-evacuated to -Japan. South Korean repatriates were processed and went their way to -freedom through nearby Liberty Village, the ROK counterpart of Freedom -Village. A huge map was used to check progress of the POW convoys en -route from Panmunjom to Freedom Village. The departure of ambulances -and helicopters from Panmunjom was radioed ahead to Freedom Village, -where medical personnel and vehicles lined the landing mat. - -At Munsan-ni, the newly-freed men received a more thorough physical -exam and the rest of their processing. Here they were again screened -by medical officers to determine their physical condition. Able-bodied -POWs were escorted to the personnel data section where necessary -administrative details were recorded and their military records -brought up to date. Those medically cleared were available for press -interviews. New clothing issue, individually tailored, probably as much -as anything emphasized to a prisoner that his particular Korean War was -over. And nearly all of them found news[546] awaiting them in letters -from home. When all basic details were completed, returnees went into -the recreation and refreshment section. Commonplace iced tea, coffee, -ice cream (the favorite), milk, sandwiches, cigarettes, and the latest -periodicals were luxuries. In their weakened condition, the POWs could -be served only light fare; the big steaks would come later. - - [546] For at least two Marines their return home was news in - itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF-323, had been - reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, of - division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier - General George J. O’Shea (Ret), had also been thought - dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July - 1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list - released the following December. - -The first Marine and fifth man in the processing line on the initial -day, 5 August, was Private First Class Alfred P. Graham, Jr., of H/3/5. -Although too weak to enter the press room, the 21-year-old repatriate -told newsmen later in Tokyo of being fed a diet of cracked corn during -his prison camp stay and of being forced to carry firewood 11 miles -each day. The second Marine returned that day, and the 34th man to -enter Freedom Village, was Sergeant Robert J. Coffee, of the 1st Signal -Battalion. Captured in November 1950, he had been wounded just before -being taken prisoner and had received little medical treatment. Like -other returnees, Coffee stated that the treatment had been very poor -while he was in the hands of the North Koreans but that it had improved -somewhat after he was turned over to the Chinese. - -Third and last Marine to come through the line was Private First -Class Pedron E. Aviles, previously with the Reconnaissance Company -of Headquarters Battalion. Knocked unconscious with a rifle butt -while battling the enemy on a patrol on 7 December 1952, he regained -consciousness to find himself a prisoner of the CCF. - -On the second day, three more USMC infantrymen traveled that final -road to freedom. They were Private First Class Francis E. Kohus, Jr., -of A/1/7; Corporal Gethern Kennedy, Jr., I/3/1; and Private First -Class Bernard R. Hollinger, H/3/5. Like the preceding three, their -stories bore a similar pattern: usually they had been captured only -after having been wounded or clubbed unconscious. As with other UNC -prisoners being released daily, they told of the physical cruelty of -their North Korean captors and the mental strain under the Chinese. -Observers noted that many of the men released this second day were in -much poorer physical condition than the initial returnees. In fact, one -ROK prisoner was found to have died in an ambulance while en route to -Liberty Village. - -Mostly the repatriates asked questions about their old outfits: “Do you -know if any of the other guys on the outpost got back off the hill?” -and “Did we finally take the damn thing?” “Where’s the 24th Division -now?”[547] - - [547] HRB Subject File: “#1, ‘Prisoners Of War--Korea--General,’” - HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t. - -Technical Sergeant Richard E. Arnold was one of the two Marine combat -correspondents at Freedom Village during BIG SWITCH. He described his -impressions of the returning men--in some cases, coming home after 30 -months’ confinement in North Korean POW camps, and others, as little as -30 days: - - All are relieved and some a little afraid ... It’s their - first hour of freedom, and most tell you that they can still - hardly believe it’s true. Some are visibly shaken, some are - confused--and all are overwhelmed at the thought of being free - men once again.[548] - - [548] _Ibid._ - -As in prison life everywhere, the POWs told of the hated stool pigeons, -the so-called “progressives.” These were the captives who accepted (or -appeared to accept) the Communist teachings and who, in turn, were -treated better than the “reactionary” prisoners who resisted the enemy -“forced feeding” indoctrination. Continued the Marine correspondent: - - They don’t talk much. When they do, it’s ... mainly of - progressives and reactionaries--the two social groups of prisoner - life under the rule of Communism, the poor chow and medical care, - and of the desire to fight Communism again. - - When you ask, they tell you of atrocities committed during - the early years of the war with a bitterness of men who have - helplessly watched their friends and buddies die. Of forced - marches, the bitter cold, and the endless political lectures they - were forced to attend.[549] - - [549] _Ibid._ - -One of the last--possibly _the last_--Marine captured by the Chinese -was Private First Class Richard D. Johnson, of G/3/1. The 20-year-old -machine gunner had been in the final battle of the war, the Boulder -City defense, and was taken 25 July, just two days before the signing -of the truce. Private First Class Johnson was returned the 19th day of -the exchange. Another Marine seized in that same action was Private -First Class Leonard E. Steege, H/3/7. As he entered the gate, he -momentarily shook up Corporal James E. Maddell, a military policeman -on duty at Freedom Village. Maddell said the last time he saw Steege -was during the fighting for the outpost. “He was a dead Marine then,” -Maddel said, “but I guess it was just a case of mistaken identity.”[550] - - [550] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 48. - -Captain Jesse V. Booker of Headquarters Squadron 1, the first Marine -POW of the war, who had been captured on 7 August 1950, was also one -of the earliest MAW personnel released. Booker and First Lieutenant -Richard Bell, VMF-311, were returned to UNC jurisdiction on 27 August, -the first Marine aviators to be sent back. - -In addition to the regular issue of Marine utilities, gold naval -aviator’s wings, donated by 1st MAW fliers, were pinned on the chests -of returning pilots by Wing General Megee and Division General Pate. -Also welcoming Marine returnees at Freedom Village were Brigadier -General Verne J. McCaul, the new Assistant Wing Commander; General -Burger, ADC; and Colonel Metze, who also “found time during the busy -days to greet and talk with every Marine and Navy Corpsman who passed -through.”[551] Among those dignitaries[552] present for the occasion -were General Taylor, EUSAK CG; General Clarke, I Corps Commander; -Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens; and various U.S. senators. - - [551] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12. - - [552] As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a - trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners, - as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a - welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet - especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a - quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may - have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee. - _Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3. - -During August enlisted POWs were recovered in large numbers. -Officers, generally, did not arrive at Kaesong--the first step to -Panmunjom--until about 21 August. After that date they were gradually -returned to friendly control. - -Even as late as 26 August there was considerable concern over the -fate of hundreds of Allied officers not yet repatriated. Some early -returning officers told of colonels, majors and captains who had been -sentenced up to ten years for forming “reactionary groups” in camp. One -field grade officer had been sentenced to a long prison term on the -eve of the armistice.[553] A similar thing nearly happened to Captain -John P. Flynn, VMF(N)-513, long a thorn in the side of his Communist -captors. Like a number of UNC airmen falsely charged with waging germ -warfare, he vigorously denounced these allegations. “Even as late as -the end of August the Marine was threatened with nonrepatriation, and -his experience formed the basis for an episode in the novel _A Ride to -Panmunjom_.”[554] - - [553] HRS Subject File: “#1. “PRISONERS OF - WAR--Korea--General,” _Washington News_ article, dtd 26 - Aug 53 from Panmunjom, “Officers’ Fate Worries Army,” by - Jim G. Lucas. - - [554] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 225. - -Between 5 August-6 September, 3,597 U.S. servicemen were returned -during Operation BIG SWITCH, including 129 ground and 28 air Marines. -This 157 figure represents a total of 42 officers and 115 enlisted -repatriated during this second and final POW exchange. Of the 27 Naval -personnel freed, at least 6 were hospital corpsmen serving with the 1st -Marine Division when they were taken. Counting the 157 Marines released -in Operation BIG SWITCH and the 15 wounded POWs sent back in April, a -total of 172 division and wing Marines were returned in the two POW -exchanges. - -Although the switch took place over a five-week period, 38 Marines, -or 24 percent, were not released until late in the proceedings, in -September. As one author noted, “It was Communist policy to hold the -‘reactionaries’ ... to the last.”[555] - - [555] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651. - -Two of the best-known Marine “reactionaries” who had openly defied -their Communist jailers during their entire period of captivity, -were then-Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, a VMA-121 pilot, and -then-Major John N. McLaughlin, taken POW in November 1950. McLaughlin -was released on 1 September and Thrash on 5 September in a group of 275 -Americans returned, the largest number for any single day’s transfer -since the exchange began. The most famous U.S. prisoner held by the -Communists was Major General William F. Dean. Formerly commander of the -U.S. Army 24th Division, he had been captured in August 1950 after the -fall of Taejon. - -Ever since Operation BIG SWITCH got under way, every returnee had -been asked if he had seen or heard of General Dean. None had. Many UN -officers felt--uneasily--that he would probably be the last officer to -be sent back. In fact, he emerged from imprisonment on 4 September “to -be greeted with cheers at Freedom Village.”[556] Major Walter R. Harris -and the most senior Marine captured during the war, Colonel Frank H. -Schwable, later to be the central figure in a Court of Inquiry, were -among the last nine Marines returned on 6 September, the final day -of the switch. And so, one by one, the last 160 American POWs passed -through Panmunjom. All were men marked by the enemy as “war criminals.” - - [556] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42. - -One Army sergeant, who freely admitted he could “never adequately -describe how he felt when he knew he was going home”[557] recalled -those final moments as a newly-freed prisoner: - - [557] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, p. 651. - - At 1100 his truck pulled up at Panmunjom, the last convoy of - American POWs to be exchanged. A huge, moustached Marine master - sergeant walked up beside the truck, called out: “I will call - out your last name. You will answer with your first name, middle - initial, and Army serial number ...” - - “Schlichter!” - - Schlichter [Charles B., Sgt.], barked out his response, and - stepped down. - - “Sergeant,” the big Marine said gravely, “glad to have you home.” - - “Fella, you don’t know how glad _I_ am,” Schlichter said.[558] - - [558] _Ibid._ - -In the preliminary prisoner exchange, the week-long “LITTLE SWITCH” -in April 1953, all of the returned Marine personnel were men who had -been wounded at the time of their capture. They were recently-captured -POWs, deliberately segregated by the enemy from early captives. All of -these home-coming Marines had been captured since May 1952. Generally -speaking, they had all been fairly well-treated. - -During Operation BIG SWITCH, by contrast, 41 Marines were repatriated -who had spent nearly three years as Communist prisoners of war. The -majority of USMC returnees in this second exchange, however--a total of -91--had been captured relatively recently, in 1952 and 1953, and 25 had -been held since 1951. - -Throughout Operation BIG SWITCH, the Allied Command transferred a total -of 75,799 prisoners (70,159 NKPA and 5,640 CCF) seeking repatriation. -The Communist returned 12,757 POWs. In addition to the 3,597 Americans, -this total represented 1,312 other UNC troops (including 947 Britons, -228 Turks, and small numbers of Filipinos, Australians, and Canadians) -and 7,848 South Koreans. - -The BIG SWITCH exchange went relatively smoothly, marred for a while -only by the unruly behavior of some Communist diehard POWs. In a manner -reminiscent of their earlier camp riots, the Communist POWs put on -a blatant propaganda show for the benefit of world newsreel cameras. -As the train carrying CCF and North Korean prisoners moved into the -Panmunjom exchange point, enemy POWs noisily shouted Communist slogans, -defiantly waved Communist flags, and hurled insults at UN forces. -Some POWs stripped off their [U.S. provided] uniforms, “tossing them -contemptuously to the ground.”[559] Others spat in the faces of U.S. -supervising officers, threw their shoes at jeep windshields, and sang -in Korean and Chinese “We will return in the Fall.”[560] - - [559] _Life_ Magazine, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22. - - [560] _Metzger comments._ - -Marine division and wing elements were designated responsible for -the security of nonrepatriated enemy POWs. By terms of the armistice -agreement, these were held by UNC custodial forces from India. In -commenting on the airlift operations, performed largely by HMR-161, the -UNC Commander noted: - - We had to go to great lengths to live up to our pledge to Syngman - Rhee that no Indian troops would set foot on South Korean soil. - Therefore, we set up an airlift operation which carried more than - six thousand Indians from the decks of our carriers off Inchon by - helicopter to the Demilitarized Zone. It was a major undertaking - which just about wore out our helicopter fleet in Korea.[561] - - [561] Clark, _Danube to Yalu_, p. 299. - -One of the recommendations made by military officials after the April -LITTLE SWITCH exchange was that all interrogation of returning POWs -be done either in America or on board ship en route home, rather than -in Tokyo. This system was followed and worked out well. The POWs -boarded ships at Inchon, following their clearance at Freedom Village. -Interrogation teams, in most cases, completed this major part of their -repatriation processing before docking at San Francisco. Two weeks -of recuperation, good food and rest aboard ship enabled many POWs to -arrive home in far better shape for reunion with their families than -they had been in when received initially at Panmunjom. - -As in LITTLE SWITCH, Marine and Navy personnel were processed by -members of the Intelligence Department of Commander, Naval Forces -Far East, augmented by officers from other Marine staffs. Marine -officers who conducted the shipboard interrogations again included -Lieutenant Colonel Fisher, ComNavFE liaison officer, as well as -Lieutenant Colonel William A. Wood, Major Stewart C. Barber, and First -Lieutenant Robert A. Whalen. All returning POWs were queried in depth -by counterintelligence personnel about enemy treatment and atrocities, -questionable acts committed by that small proportion of our own men -whose conduct was reprehensible, and routine military matters. A -security dossier was prepared on each prisoner, and all data about -him went into his file case. The LITTLE SWITCH reports had indicated -earlier--and this was subsequently confirmed--that some U.S. servicemen -were definitely marked for further detailed questioning and scrutiny. - - -_Circumstances of Capture_[562] - - [562] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 “CMC - Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File: - “Korea--Korean War--General”; MacDonald, _POW_; Montross, - Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_, - v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, _The Korean War_ (Garden City: - Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, _Korean - War_; Heinecke, “Big Switch.” - -As the Commandant, General Shepherd, was to testify later during an -investigation, “the prisoner of war question had never been a major -problem [in the Marine Corps] due to the extremely limited number of -Marines taken prisoner.”[563] As one returnee at BIG SWITCH bluntly -put it: “You fought until they reached you with a bullet or a rifle -butt--that was the end.”[564] - - [563] HRS Subject File: “VE 23.2.S8--CMC Statements on Korean - POWs,” CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2. - - [564] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 58. - -Of the 221 U.S. Marines captured during the Korean War, more than -half--121--were seized after 20 September 1951. For the Marine Corps -this date marked the time when “warfare of position replaced a warfare -of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in -Korea.”[565] Both in the X Corps sector in eastern Korea where the -1st Marine Division was located at that time, as well as later on the -Korean western front, the Marine Corps was denied its traditional -aggressive fighting role. The Marines (along with the rest of the UNC -forces) ceased offensive operations, were reduced to making limited -attacks, and were under order from higher echelons to “firm up the -existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[566] - - [565] Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. - 201. - - [566] _Ibid._ - -The mission of the Marine division thereby evolved into “an aggressive -defense of their sector of responsibility” as records duly phrased it. -On a larger scale, the nature of the Korean War, from about November -1951 on, reverted to that of July and August,[567] characterized -primarily by minor patrol clashes and small unit struggles for key -outpost positions. This became the pattern for the remainder of the -war. It changed only when the decreed mission of an “active defense -of its sector” by a UNC unit became this in fact. Normal defense -then escalated into sharp, vigorous fighting to retain friendly key -ground positions being attacked by the enemy. One American writer, in -a discussion of the British defense in depth concept (adopted by the -Marine Corps late in the war), went so far as to blame heavy Marine -casualties in Korea on EUSAK’s outpost system.[568] - - [567] In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the - UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the - Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that - time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The - lull in ground fighting continued until late August when - the truce negotiations were suspended. - - [568] HRS Subject file “Korea--Korean War--General,” article - _Washington Times-Herald_, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter - Simmons, p. 27. - -Approximately half of the 100 Marines taken prisoner by September -1951--43--had fallen into enemy hands during the last two days -of November 1950. They had been part of the ill-fated Task Force -Drysdale,[569] a composite Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy that was -ambushed by the Chinese en route to the Chosin Reservoir. These facts -are relevant to a better understanding of the Commandant’s statement -that, traditionally, few Marines become prisoners of war. - - [569] For further details of this action, see MacDonald, - _POW_, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, _USMC Ops - Korea--Chosin_, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese, - _Korea_, p. 162. - -Overall, the survival rate for Marines taken captive during the -Korean War was 87.8 percent. Even for the worst year, 1950, when NKPA -treatment was more ruthless and brutal than the CCF (and in any event, -for those men longest-held), the Marine survival rate was 75 percent. -Marine Corps statistics show that of 221 Marines captured, 194 (43 -officers, 151 enlisted) returned, and 27 or 12.2 percent died.[570] -Only a few Marines were afflicted with “give-up-itis,” the malady -that struck countless POWs and took a heavy toll of lives. Included -among these 194 returnees were the 172 men from the two POW exchanges, -as previously noted; plus a group of 18 Marines captured in 1950 who -escaped and rejoined USMC units in May 1951; two enlisted men who -escaped less than a week after being taken; and two others released by -the enemy after less than a month’s captivity. - - [570] Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died - while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs - were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. - 257–259. - -In a pure statistical oddity, the survival percentage for both Marine -officers and enlisted (as well as the overall return rate) turned out -to be the same: 87 percent. - -Without going into an analysis here of the possible relevant factors, -it is interesting to note that 62 percent of all U.S. captured military -personnel returned after the Korean War and that roughly 38 percent -died while imprisoned.[571] During World War II, the death rate for -U.S. prisoners held by the Axis powers was approximately 11 percent. - - [571] The number of American servicemen returned was - approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war. - _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, 1966 edition, “Prisoners - of War--Korean War,” p. 519B. Earlier DOD “Tentative - Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean - War,” cited by MacDonald, _POW_, p. 230, indicated 7,140 - Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died. - Either way, the percentages remain the same. - -Circumstances accounting for the capture of Marines during the Korean -War were, as in every war, an occupational hazard. In most cases, -prisoners were taken in one of two situations. One occurred when -overwhelming numbers of hostile forces suddenly surrounded and overran -a small outpost, and either killed or captured a high proportion of its -defenders. The second resulted from the well-known increasing accuracy -of CCF antiaircraft fire. Halfway through the war it began to take its -toll of 1st MAW pilots with similarly predictable results: either death -or capture. Simple mischance and the human error of confused directions -caused at least two ground Marines to blunder into enemy territory.[572] - - [572] A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major - General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he - was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a - compass he walked to the southwest--and thereby into NKPA - hands--instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were - then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan - Perimeter. - -A brief review of the Korean War, chronologically, illustrates how -some of the men of the 1st Marine Division wound up as prisoners. In -the first week of August 1950, leading elements of the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade and the 1st MAW air squadrons arrived in Korea. Soon -thereafter the Marine Corps was in the thick of these early-moving -offensives: at the Pusan Perimeter; the September Inchon-Seoul -amphibious landings; Fox Hill at Toktong Pass, Yudam-ni, the Task Force -Drysdale operation, all in November; and the October-December Chosin -Reservoir campaign, including the two-day movement from Hagaru to -Koto-ri in early December. Marine infantry, military police, tankers, -motor transport personnel, and artillerymen were listed MIA in these -operations. - -Altogether, 79 Marines were captured during the first year. November -1950, when 58 Marines were lost to the enemy, would rank as the most -costly month of the entire war in terms of Marines seized in combat. -The first air POW, Captain Booker, was shot down 7 August while flying -a reconnaissance mission from the USS _Valley Forge_. (This was the -same date that infantrymen of the Marine Provisional Brigade saw their -initial heavy fighting in what was then considered only a “police -action.”) Captain Booker was to remain the only Marine pilot in enemy -hands until April 1951. - -One ground Marine captured during the hectic days of August 1950 -escaped before ever becoming listed as a casualty. Although Private -First Class Richard E. Barnett thus does not technically qualify as a -POW statistic, he still holds the distinction of being both one of the -first Marine captives and one of the few to escape.[573] - - [573] A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was - returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and, - instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy - fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett - prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine - was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days - he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third - night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an - attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed - that all but one of his NKPA guards had gotten ahead of - him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face - of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully - eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later - rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 8–10. - -Few Marines were taken during 1951. Of the 31 seized throughout the -entire year, 13 were from the division and 18 from the wing. The -Marines were engaged in antiguerrilla activities until late February -when a general advance was ordered by U.S. IX and X Corps to deny -positions to the enemy. The 1st Marine Division was committed near -Wonju, as part of the IX Corps. A second offensive, Operation RIPPER, -was launched in March, and for the next six weeks small inroads were -made against CCF forces. Relieved in the Hongchon area the next month -by elements of the U.S. 2d and 7th Divisions, the Marines continued to -operate as part of the IX Corps. Their mission was to secure objectives -north of the 38th Parallel. On 21 April the 1st Marine Division -launched its attack, on IX Corps order, encountering moderate to -heavy resistance. Throughout the first half of 1951, only five Marine -infantrymen were captured. - -Truce negotiations, as earlier noted, began at Kaesong on 10 July -1951 and ground fighting slowed. When the Communists broke off the -truce sessions in late August General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander, -ordered an offensive by the X Corps to seize the entire Punchbowl. -Along with other X Corps divisions, the Marines attacked on 31 -August. They secured initial objectives, and then moved north to the -Soyang River to seize additional designated objectives. Following the -bitter action in the Punchbowl area, the Marines were involved in -consolidating and improving their defenses. - -As the battle lines became comparatively stabilized in 1951, the enemy -began to develop his AA defenses to peak efficiency. Marine pilots -engaged in CAS, observation, interdiction, and armed reconnaissance -missions began to encounter accurate and intense ground fire.[574] -Aircraft losses increased, and with them, the number of USMC aviators -who fell into enemy hands. More than half of the Marine POWs taken -during the year--18 of 31--were on 1st MAW station lists. Captive -airmen represented VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, Hedron MAG-33 (Headquarters -Squadron 33), VMO-6, VMF-312, VMF-311, and VMA-121. - - [574] One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance - missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles - W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951 - he was lost in such a mission--the same flight in which - Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA-121, was captured. - MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd - 14 Sep 66. - -The year 1952, like 1950, saw a large number of Marines taken into -hostile custody--a total of 70. As the year began, CCF and UNC ground -forces had settled down to a bunker warfare system often compared to -the trench warfare of World War I. Air activity remained much as it -had the preceding year. Air losses decreased, however, with only 11 -pilots becoming POWs, in contrast to the 59 infantry Marines captured. -In March, the 1st Marine Division moved from the X Corps zone of -action on the east-central front to the I Corps western coastal flank. -Here the Marines encountered “steadily increasing aggressiveness as -the enemy launched larger and more frequent attacks against outpost -positions.”[575] Probes, patrol actions, and aggressive defense of the -MLR and its outposts took their toll. - - [575] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 139. - -Enemy pressure reached its height in October, when 41 Marine -infantrymen were seized, the second highest number taken in any month -during the war. In the COPs Detroit and Frisco defense of 6–7 October, -the 7th Marines listed 22 MIA, of whom 13 became POWs, practically all -of them being wounded prior to capture. On 26 October, the Communists -lunged at 7th Marines COPs Ronson and Warsaw, adjacent to the main -battle position, the Hook. In the ensuing action, 27 Marines were -“marched, carried, or dragged off the hill and taken into the Chinese -lines.”[576] Surprisingly, all 27 were recovered alive in the prisoner -exchanges the following year. - - [576] _Ibid._, p. 149. - -Of the 11 Marine airmen who became statistics on a POW list in 1952, 4 -were shot down in an ill-fated 10-day period beginning 6 May. Again, -all-too-accurate hostile AA fire was the villain. In similar incidents -during the year, two Marines engaged in “good Samaritan” aerial -activities became POWs for their efforts. In February, First Lieutenant -Kenneth W. Henry, an AO assigned to the Marine detachment aboard the -light cruiser USS _Manchester_, and Lieutenant Edwin C. Moore, USN, -whirled off in the cruiser’s HO3S to attempt rescue of a downed Navy -fighter pilot, Ensign Marvin Broomhead. In the bright early afternoon, -as Henry was maneuvering the helicopter sling, their ship suddenly -crashed--apparently from enemy machine gun fire intended for a combat -air patrol operating in the vicinity. Two of the three men--Broomhead -and Henry--were injured, but managed to drag themselves to a hidden -position and waited to be rescued. Instead, they were discovered -shortly before midnight by a Chinese patrol. - -A similar mishap occurred on 16 May to First Lieutenant Duke Williams, -Jr., of VMF-212. Searching for a crashed pilot, his plane was struck by -AA and he managed to jump. His parachute blossomed down into the midst -of 15 waiting Koreans who had gathered to take him prisoner. - -During the last seven months of hostilities in Korea, from January-July -1953, 41 Marines were captured. These included a VMO-6 pilot and air -observer in the little OE-1 spotting planes shot down in two separate -incidents, plus 39 ground Marines trapped in the vicious outpost -struggles of March and July. Except for two Marines who died, the rest -were freed a few months after their capture during Operation BIG SWITCH. - -Summarizing it another way, of the 221 Marines captured during the -three-year conflict: - - -- 49 were officers and 172 enlisted; - -- 190 were ground personnel and 31 aviators; - -- of the 190 ground troops, 19 were officers and 171 enlisted; - -- of the 31 aviators, 30 were officer pilots and 1 was enlisted. - -The 7th Marines, which was the unit on line at the time of several -major CCF attacks, had the highest number of POWs in the division. -A total of 70 men, or 59.3 percent[577] of the 118 infantry Marines -taken, were from the 7th. The record during this 1950–1953 period for -the others is as follows: 1st Marines, 15 POWs; 5th Marines, 33; and -the division artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, 14. Six pilots from -Marine Fighter Squadron 312 found themselves unwilling guests in North -Korea. Four other units--VMO-6, VMF-323, VMF-311, and VMF(N)-513--each -had five members who served out the rest of the war as POWs. - - [577] Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, _POW_, pp. - 260–269 and _passim_. - - -_The Communist POW Camps_[578] - - [578] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Montross, Kuokka, - and Hicks, _USMC Ops Korea--East-Central Front_, v. IV; - Barclay, _Commonwealth_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; - Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_. - -The Communist POW camp system, under Chinese direction, began in late -December 1950. Marines captured in November and December, along with -U.S. Army troops, British Commandos, and other Allied personnel, -were forced-marched north to Kanggye, not far from the Manchurian -border.[579] In the bitter cold, while winter howled through North -Korea, the column of prisoners limped its way to its final destination, -arriving the day after Christmas. Several of the group, including -Marines, perished during the four-day march--victims of malnutrition, -untreated combat wounds, pneumonia, the stinging, freezing wind, -and subzero temperatures. Usually, “the Communists moved them [the -prisoners] by night, because they feared the United Nations air power -which ... ranged over the whole of North Korea.”[580] - - [579] Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer - of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large - numbers of men taken in several major engagements created - a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, _Korea_, - p. 330. - - [580] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 423–424. - -During the first three months of 1951, a network of POW camps was -developed along the southern shores of the Yalu River. Occupants of -the forlorn villages were evacuated, and newly captured UNC prisoners -moved in. The main camp operation at this time was in the Kanggye area. -This was a temporary indoctrination center established in October -1950 before the development of regular POW camps. (For various CCF -camp locations, see Map 34.) Ultimately a group of a half dozen or so -permanent camps were developed northeast of Sinuiju, along a 75-mile -stretch of the Yalu. - -By early 1951, Major McLaughlin, a captured Marine staff officer -previously attached to X Corps, was senior officer among the Kanggye -prisoners which included a heterogeneous collection of U.S. 7th -Division soldiers, U.S. Marines, 18 Royal Marine Commandos, and Navy -hospitalmen. UN personnel were scattered throughout several farmhouses, -with no attempt made to segregate the enlisted and officers. The -Chinese designated prisoner squads of 8–12 men, depending on the size -of the room to which they were assigned. CCF-appointed squad leaders -were those prisoners who appeared more cooperative. - -In direct opposition to orders, Major McLaughlin set about establishing -communication between the small scattered POW groups, despite -ever-present surveillance. He tried to achieve effective control of -the POWs so that a united front of resistance against the enemy could -be maintained. At mass indoctrination meetings, held regularly every -few days, the Marine officer issued instructions to enlisted personnel -through five Marine noncommissioned officers. As one ex-prisoner -recalled, the “cold, smoke-filled barn was the locale for wide-spread -exchange of information between the many little groups.”[581] Daily -routine at Kanggye stressed study and political indoctrination. Squad -leaders were responsible for lectures and discussions on assigned -topics in Marxian dialectical materialism. The curriculum was more -intense than most college courses. On the other hand, physical -treatment of inmates--except for chronic malnutrition and grossly -inadequate medical care--at Kanggye was less brutal than at most of the -other prisoner compounds. - - [581] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 63. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 34 K. White - -POW CAMPS IN WHICH MARINES WERE HELD] - -Interrogations went hand-in-hand with indoctrination. Prisoners were -grilled regularly on order of battle, close air support, naval gunfire -methods, UN aircraft, weapons, unit locations, and other tactical -information. The Chinese were even more interested in the life -histories and biographical data of their captives. POWs were required -to answer “economic questionnaires” and at frequent intervals compelled -to write elaborate self-criticisms of their political attitudes and -class backgrounds. The CCF were satisfied only when prisoners--whose -original truthful answers had been rejected--revised their own family -status and income statistics downward. POWs, being interrogated, often -found the Chinese arguing with them over such far-away matters as the -prisoner’s parents or his own family annual income and social level. - -In March 1951, after an indoctrination period of about eight weeks, the -Kanggye POWs were transferred, and the camp itself was later abandoned. -The officers were relocated at Camp 5, Pyoktong, while the majority -continued the march westward to the newly opened Camp 1, at Chongsong. - -Despite its numerical designation as Camp 5, the Pyoktong compound had -been organized two months earlier and was the first of the permanent -CCF centers. It became the headquarters of the entire prison-camp -system. Approximately 2,000 UNC prisoners were interned here by the -early part of the year. They were housed in native huts. New inmates -arrived regularly from temporary collection centers in the south, where -they had been held for months. Sometimes they were marched to the Yalu -during the Korean winter while still wearing their summer fatigues. -Pyoktong offered little chance for escape. The compound, situated on a -barren peninsula that jutted out into the Yalu Reservoir, was so secure -that the Communists did not even surround it with barbed wire or employ -searchlights. It was hemmed in on three sides by fast water currents, -while the one exit from the peninsula was closely guarded. - -Conditions were far more severe here than at Kanggye. A starvation diet -and complete lack of medical care quickly had their inevitable effect. -Pneumonia, dysentery, and malnutrition were rampant. The basic diet of -boiled corn or millet resulted in associated deficiency diseases, such -as beriberi and pellagra. Between 20 and 30 prisoners died daily. Many -experts, nonetheless, felt that “if the Chinese during the winter of -1950–51 killed their prisoners by deliberate neglect, the North Koreans -who had handled the captives before they became primarily a Chinese -responsibility killed them by calculated brutality.”[582] - - [582] Rees, _Korea_, p. 330. - -Although now junior to some Army and Air Force officers, Major -McLaughlin was elected by his fellow officer-prisoners to represent -them. Recognized by the Chinese as a staunch non-cooperative and -dedicated trouble-maker, the enemy concentrated their pressure on the -Marine officer--and he was subjected to intimidation, maltreatment, and -threats of death. - -As they had at Kanggye, the CCF attempted to organize progressive -groups to write peace appeals, propaganda leaflets, and articles -condemning the United States for the war. Typically, progressive -POWs (usually weaker, less resilient members) who went along with -the Communist propaganda conditioning, received better rations and -treatment. Rugged resisters, on the other hand, could dependably expect -to stand a considerable amount of solitary confinement, usually in an -unspeakably foul, vermin-infested “hole.” Here a POW was forced to -remain in a debilitating, crouched position usually 56 hours or more. -Throughout the war a good many Marines were to know this particular -enemy treatment. One Marine artilleryman, Second Lieutenant Roland L. -McDaniel, tied to a Korean POW in the hole for 10 days, emerged with -pneumonia and tuberculosis. - -In addition to the POW compounds at Pyoktong and Chongsong, other sites -where Marines were held were Camp 3, at Changsong (nearby and with a -nearly identical name to Camp 1), primarily for enlisted personnel, and -at “The Valley.” This was a temporary medical processing center in the -Kanggye area. Marine inmates here were often confined to a pig pen. -Largely because of the filthy conditions of this camp, the death rate -quickly earned the Valley the opprobrious name of Death Valley. - -Another cluster of POW camps was located further south. These were -primarily run by the North Koreans, and were transit camps where -prisoners were collected and interrogated before being moved north -by truck or on foot to the permanent establishments. Among them were -collection centers at Kung Dong and Chorwon, and Camp 10, south of the -North Korean Capital Pyongyang. The latter was also known variously -as the Mining Camp, the Gold Mine, or Bean Camp--this due to its -prevailing diet. At this southernmost Communist camp, POWs were -required to dig coal in the nearby mine shafts. Loads of coal were then -hauled in small hand carts over icy roads to the camp, a task made more -difficult by the prisoners’ skimpy mealtime fare. - -The most notorious of all the camps, however, was Pak’s Palace,[583] -the interrogation center near Pyongyang. POWs also called it Pak’s -Death Palace for its chief interrogator, a sadistic North Korean -officer, Major Pak. Captain Martelli, a F4U fighter pilot from VMF-323 -shot down in April 1951, was the first Marine processed through Pak’s, -where POWs were continuously threatened and beaten with little or no -provocation. Another Marine aviator, Captain Gerald Fink, VMF-312, -upon being asked during interrogation here why he had come to Korea -won a sentence of several days solitary confinement in the hole for -his forthright answer: “to kill Communists.” Second Lieutenant Carl -R. Lindquist, also of VMF-312, was the only one of 18 Marine officers -captured in 1951 not processed through Pak’s before being sent north. - - [583] The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners - of War later adjudged Pak’s to have been “the worst camp - endured by American POWs in Korea.” MacDonald, _POW_, p. - 104. - -Gradually the Chinese developed the policy of segregating officer and -enlisted personnel. Commenting on this procedure, one British observer -offered the following: - - By this means the lower ranks were deprived of their leaders - and for a short time this had a depressing, and generally bad, - effect. It was not long, however, before the natural leaders - among the rank and file asserted themselves. The standard of - leadership naturally varied in different compounds; but in all - there was some organization and in some it was highly efficient. - It was ... the policy of the Chinese ... to discourage the - emergence of thrustful leaders.... Consequently, clandestine - rather than open leadership was usual.[584] - - [584] Barclay, _Commonwealth_, p. 190. - -By midyear, noncommissioned officers were also separated from the -enlisted men, in an attempt to better control prisoners. In October -of 1951 another one of the Yalu River Camps was set up. This was Camp -2, at Pi-chong-ni, which thereafter served as the main officers camp. -The next month a POW column of nearly 50 men, including 6 Marines, left -Kung Dong for these northern camps on a death march that covered 225 -miles in two weeks. During the excruciating march, prisoners had been -forced to strip naked and wade across the Chongsong River, a procedure -which caused several deaths and cases of frostbite. One British -participant, however, recalled that the “Marines banded together during -the terrible march, and the Royal Marines were drawn close to the U.S. -Marines.”[585] - - [585] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 127. - -In December 1951 the Communist and UNC forces exchanged lists of -captured personnel. The list of 3,198 American POWs (total UNC: 11,559) -revealed that 61 Marines were in enemy hands. Nine others, captured -late in the year, were still in temporary collection points and thus -not listed. Although Marines represented only a small portion of the -total POWs, they were present in most of the nearly dozen regular camps -or collection points then in existence. In any event the 1951 POW -list[586] gave a picture of the growing Communist camp system. - - [586] Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was - offered by Communist officials until the first exchange - of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953 - LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, - _USMC Ops Korea_, v. IV, p. 223. - -As 1951 was drawing to an end, the Camp 2 commandant, a fanatical -Communist named Ding, ordered UNC prisoners to prepare and send -a New Year’s greeting to the commander of the CCF, General Peng -Teh-huai. Senior UN officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF, -was determined that the prisoners would not sign the spurious holiday -message. Major McLaughlin voluntarily organized Marine resistance, and -senior officers of other nationality groups followed suit. No greetings -were sent. As usually happened, an informer reported the organized -resistance and furnished names of the reactionary leaders. The -following month, the six ranking officers were sentenced to solitary -confinement, ranging from three to six months, for their “subversive -activities.” - -The episode marked the first really organized resistance to the -Chinese. “Although the principals were subjected to months of solitary -confinement, coercion, torture, and very limited rations during the -bitterly cold months of early 1952, their joint effort laid the -foundation for comparatively effective resistance within Camp 2 during -the remainder of the war.”[587] - - [587] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 138. - -In January 1952, Major McLaughlin and the other five officers were -removed to begin their long tours of solitary confinement. Although the -remaining Marine officers at Pi-chong-ni had “formed a tightly knit -group and consulted among themselves on every major issue,”[588] the -atmosphere within the camp itself became highly charged and strained. -Suspicion of informers and opportunists was rampant. The officers at -Camp 2 were generally agreed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, -who arrived in June, was largely responsible for restoring discipline. -He issued an all-inclusive order about camp behavior for all personnel -which read, in part: - - [588] _Ibid._, p. 164. - - Study of Communist propaganda would not be countenanced. If study - was forced on them, POWs were to offer passive resistance and no - arguments. - - If prisoners were subject to trial or punishment they were to - involve no one but themselves. - - There would be no letters written using any titles or return - address which might prove beneficial to the Communists for - propaganda value.[589] - - [589] _Ibid._, pp. 165–166. - -Expectedly, it was not long before Lieutenant Colonel Thrash’s efforts -to influence and organize his fellow officers outraged CCF officials. -In September he was removed from the compound, charged with “Criminal -Acts and Hostile Attitude against the Chinese People’s Volunteers.” -The Marine airman spent the next eight months in solitary. Here he -was subjected to constant interrogation, harassment, and duress. On -one occasion he was bound, severely beaten, and thrown outside half -naked in sub-zero weather. Shock of the severe temperature rendered -him unconscious, and he nearly died. Throughout his eight-month ordeal -there were demands that he cooperate with the “lenient” Chinese upon -his return to the compound. - -During 1952, the Communists developed the system of keeping -newly-captured Marines (and other UNC troops) apart from those taken -prior to January 1952 who had suffered more brutal treatment. Beginning -in August, noncommissioned officers were also segregated. They were -removed from Chongsong (Camp 1) and taken further north along the Yalu -to the “Sergeants Camp” (Camp 4) at Wiwon. Although a few Marines had -been interned at the Camp 2 Annex, at Obul, from late 1951 on, they -were not sent there in any sizable number until mid-1952. - -Adjacent to a steeply-walled valley, the Obul camp was also known as -“No Name Valley.” Although the inmates of the annex were aware of -other POWs in the main compound and throughout the valley, they were -under heavy guard to prevent contact between the groups. An Air Force -officer, the senior member, and Major Harris, the ranking Marine, -went about organizing the prisoners in a military manner. In order to -exchange information, notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing -points or latrines. Messages were baked in bread by POWs on kitchen -detail, and songs were loudly sung to convey information. Hospitalized -POWs, meanwhile, were held at the Pyoktong (Camp 5) hospital or, in the -southern sector, at a second hospital a few miles north of Pyongyang. -Other locations where prisoners were confined in 1952 were “Pike’s -Peak,” also in the same general southern area, and the Manpo Camp on -the Yalu. - -For POWs incarcerated behind the bamboo curtain, 1952 marked several -other developments. It was the year that American airmen began to -receive special grilling and threats from their Communist captors. This -was in connection with the germ warfare hoax, to be discussed later. -It was also the year that Marine POWs at Pi-chong-ni (Camp 2) observed -their own traditional 10 November Marine Corps birthday ceremony. -Eggs, sugar, and flour were stolen for a cake surreptitiously baked -and suitably decorated with the Marine Corps globe and anchor. Another -group accomplished the task of bootlegging rice wine. When the special -date arrived, the Marine officers toasted the President, Commandant, -and Marine Corps and spiritedly sang the National Anthem and Marine -Corps hymn. One of the invited guests, Quartermaster Sergeant James Day -of the Royal Marines, later recalled the reaction of other prisoners: - - Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the - Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol [jail] victims. - Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble - of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel - that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of - USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing - quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any - consequence.[590] - - [590] _Ibid._, p. 190. - -This same month the Chinese staged a “Prisoner of War Command Olympics” -at Pyoktong. Although most Marines opposed the idea of participation -in the event, because of its inevitable propaganda exploitation by -the CCF, the decision rendered by the senior UN officer was that POW -athletes would be represented. Much improved quality food was served -for the occasion, Communist photographers were everywhere, and a CCF -propaganda brochure (with articles written by POW turncoats) was later -distributed in Geneva purportedly to show the healthy recreational -activities available to UNC prisoners. An Air force pilot, in -describing the performance of Major McLaughlin, noted that “his skill -as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by -the enemy’s propaganda.”[591] - - [591] _Ibid._, p. 195. - -More important, he defied the guards by deliberately circulating -among the enlisted men (often younger, impressionable, less mature -individuals) to point out lies in enemy propaganda tactics designed to -slander the U.S. government and its leaders. The Marine officer also -collected names of American POWs held in isolated places who it was -suspected the enemy might attempt to hold as hostages at the end of the -war--possibly as a bargaining tool for the granting of a seat to Red -China in the UN. - -During the last year of the war although a number of prisoners were -still being captured in some of the most savage attacks unleashed by -the enemy, the lot of the average POW had improved. More attention -was being paid to the former pitiful medical care. The men were more -warmly clad, even though still huddled into filthy, crowded huts. And -the monotonous poor chow had improved. Most POWs, although carefully -kept from learning developments of the outside world, naturally -suspected that some reason lay behind the changes. And so there was: -the Communists had no desire to repatriate skeletonized prisoners. - - -_CCF “Lenient Policy” and Indoctrination Attempts_[592] - - [592] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Barclay, _Commonwealth_; - Clark, _Danube to Yalu_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; - Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_. - -As early in the war as July 1951, the CCF was seeking propaganda -benefits out of its so-called “lenient” policy toward captured -United Nations personnel. Basically, this could be described as -“calculated leniency in return for cooperation, harassment in return -for neutrality, and brutality in return for resistance.”[593] Others -have characterized the CCF psychological techniques of indoctrination -as monotonous and single-minded “repetition, harassment and -humiliation.”[594] - - [593] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented: - “The ‘lenient policy’ applied to the ‘liberated - soldiers,’ who had supposedly been ‘liberated’ from the - American capitalists by the Chinese People’s Volunteers. - Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a - ‘war criminal’ and subject to being treated as such. The - North Vietnamese use this same characterization (‘war - criminal’) in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by - U.S. representatives at the Paris talks.” MajGen John N. - McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70. - - [594] Rees, _Korea_, p. 337. - -In some respects, it is true that the Chinese treatment of prisoners -appeared to be more humane than that of the North Koreans. The latter -freely used physical cruelty and torture, to the point of being -barbaric.[595] Sometimes it appeared that Allied POWs did not receive -any harsher treatment from the CCF than did local civilian prisoners. - - [595] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were - being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough - that “Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners - from the North Koreans.” MacDonald, _POW_, p. 43. - -Whereas the NKPA regularly resorted to physical brutality, the Chinese -“introduced a more insidious form of cruelty.”[596] Although they -used physical violence less often, it was usually more purposeful and -combined with deliberate mental pressure. CCF officials announced that -treatment of captives would be “fair and lenient,” but that wrongdoers -would be publicly punished. Usually this CCF punishment took the form -of less drastic methods--solitary confinement, prolonged interrogation, -and a reduced diet. Even under this decreed lenient policy, however, no -relief parcels were delivered to POWs, nor were any neutral observers -ever allowed to inspect the prison camps. - - [596] _Ibid._, p. 60. - -In any event, the Chinese were considerably more effective than -the NKPA in their intelligence activities. Often their skilled -interrogators were officers who spoke excellent English. Occasionally, -they had even attended such U.S. schools as the University of Chicago -and had considerable insight into American psychology, customs, and -values--even slang. Interrogation sessions usually employed recording -devices and sometimes were further equipped with one-way mirrors. One -Marine, subjected to frequent interrogation, was kept awake by the -Chinese who slapped his face and blew smoke in his eyes. - -From early 1951 to the end of the war UNC prisoners were subjected to -a systematic attempt at mass conversion to Communism. This intensive -indoctrination effort--like the riots of Communist prisoners in Allied -POW camps and the CCF germ warfare fabrications--was designed to gain -a propaganda advantage. From highest-ranking officer to lowly private, -no one was immune to this thought-reform process. General Dean, -prize Communist captive, who was subject to three years of intense -Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, upon his release commented wryly, “I’m -an authority now on the history of the Communist Party and much of its -doctrine.”[597] - - [597] Rees, _Korea_, p. 334. - -English-speaking POWs, both American and British, particularly became -the target for Communist thought-control conditioning. Many experts -have discussed glowingly the superb example and iron discipline--both -on the battlefield and in POW camp--displayed by the Turkish soldiers. -This is true, and their outstanding performance is to their credit -as a national group. The fact remains, however, that the Turks were -long-term professional soldiers. Usually they were left alone by -the Communists who neither spoke their language nor needed them for -propaganda purposes. As a rule all non-American troops of the United -Nations received better treatment than American and British personnel. - -The basic tenet of the Communist party line was that this aggressive -war against the peace-loving people of Korea had been caused by -American imperialists seeking additional foreign markets. All UNC -soldiers were, therefore, by simple definition war criminals who -deserved no better treatment than death. But as most UN soldiers -were misguided and misled by their capitalist rulers they would “not -be shot if they admitted their mistakes and showed themselves to be -progressive”[598] by becoming properly indoctrinated. - - [598] _Ibid._, p. 335. - -Often, the thought-reform processing started long before prisoners -reached their permanent camps, while they were under initial -interrogation in the transit collection center. Captain Samuel J. -Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the British Gloucestershire Regiment,[599] -noted that lecture subjects presented to his officer group at one -North Korean temporary collection center included: - - Corruption of the UN by the American warmongers; - The Chinese Peoples’ right to Formosa; - The Stockholm Peace Appeal; - Progress in Peoples’ China; - Churchill, tool of the Truman-MacArthur-Dulles Fascist clique; - The Soviet Union heads the World Peace Camp.[600] - - [599] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC - chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment, - he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital - near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another - well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun, - Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food - and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to - distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest - in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs. - MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 77, 136. - - [600] Rees, _Korea_, p. 336. - -Systematically the enemy ground away at theory and practice of -Communism, with its superiority to American democracy. From emphasis on -the Korean War as imperialist aggression, the programmed thinking then -dealt with shortcomings of western countries (particularly Southern -lynchings, poor treatment of Negroes, and colonialism) to the idyllic -socialism in people’s democracies where “everyone is equal.” “Together -with the emotional pressures involved, this dramatic presentation of -Marxism-Leninism to prisoners who often not only failed to comprehend -why they had fought in Korea, but even the rudiments of democracy -itself, was bound to have some sort of effect.”[601] - - [601] _Ibid._, p. 337. - -Compulsory lectures and discussions often went on until 2200. Together -with the unceasing indoctrination efforts, the CCF attempted to -maintain complete control over every aspect of POW life. Each camp was -divided into POW companies (ranging from 60 to 300 men), platoons, and -squads. Squad leaders, appointed by the Chinese, reported regularly -to authorities the opinions of men in their group. “Converted” -progressives were responsible for much of the internal policing. -Every prisoner with reactionary tendencies was isolated. The varied -pressures of hunger, fear, constant threats of torture, coercion, -nonrepatriation, anxiety, and guilt[602] were used to break him down. - - [602] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy - with its “emphasis on confession and repentance, and - its propaganda exploitation” closely resembled POW - indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with - their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, _Korea_, p. - 338. - -In an attempt to convert the Marines and other prisoners to their -own beliefs, the Communists prohibited the use of the term “prisoner -of war.” Instead they used the phrase “newly liberated friends” and -insisted the POWs do likewise. They also denounced religion as a -superstition and device for controlling people’s minds. Curiously, POWs -were often permitted to retain whatever religious articles they had on -them when captured, so that Bibles, rosaries, etc., were available for -squad groups that sought to hold informal religious discussions and -readings. Such religious expression was, of course, strictly forbidden. -It might be noted here that Marines, as a group, did not appear to be -any more or less interested in religious services than other POWs. - -By mid-1952 the compulsory lectures were considered a failure, and the -emphasis shifted to “voluntary” study groups led by progressives. More -insidious methods of indoctrination were being used--books, papers, -and articles written by camp progressives. Personal interrogation and -indoctrination had proved it could have a more powerful effect than -attempts at mass conversion. Then, too, the Chinese had by this time -perfected another propaganda tool that admirably suited their purposes. -It was to have even still more effective, far reaching results. - - -_The Germ Warfare Issue_[603] - - [603] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of - War_; Leckie, _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_. - -Besides their routine interrogations and indoctrinations, by 1952 -the Communists had found a new angle to exploit. This was to have -strong repercussions on the treatment of some captured personnel. And, -ultimately, it was to affect American public reaction to the entire -Korean War and to shake the nation’s confidence in some of its fighting -men who became POWs. - -The germ warfare issue developed from an incident in January 1952 -when the Communists shot down a U.S. Air Force B-26 bomber. Several -months later, in May, the enemy propaganda campaign moved into high -gear when the navigator and pilot both purportedly confessed that they -took part in a raid in which germ bombs were dropped on North Korean -towns. After the CCF successfully extracted false confessions from the -two USAF officers, the enemy exposed both prisoners to a select group -of Oriental medical specialists and newspapermen. The two Americans -apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of -Communist propaganda was unleashed on the world. - -While the allegation of bacteriological warfare was not new in the -Korean War, it was not until 1952 that the Chinese successfully -exploited it. After suffering their first reverses in Korea in -September 1950, the Communists charged that Americans were waging germ -warfare. Even after they regained the tactical initiative in late 1950 -they continued their campaign of vilification. In early 1951, while -the UNC battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus, and amoebic dysentery -prevalent among the civil population and within the POW camps, the CCF -branded medical efforts to curb the diseases as experiments in germ -warfare. A formal complaint was made by the CCF to the United Nations -in May 1951; thereafter, the germ warfare charges lay dormant for the -rest of the year. - -The effect of the two airmen’s “confessions” in 1952 was far-reaching. -From that time until the end of hostilities “captured aviators of -all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion -previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year -aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in -Communists’ hands. After January 1952, aviators were singled out for a -special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare -confessions from them.”[604] North Korean officials joined the CCF -spokesmen in loudly denouncing American bacteriological attacks. As the -campaign gained momentum, an elaborate, cleverly-concocted “War Crimes -Exhibit” was set up in Peiping in May. Similar displays were later on -view at the UNC officers’ camp at Pi-chong-ni, including hand-written -and sound-recorded confessions by the two American pilots, as well as a -convincing array of photos depicting the lethal “bomb containers.” - - [604] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 175. - -All the while air personnel were being put under acute stress to -confess alleged war crimes. Captured Marine aviation personnel -encountered this new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant -Henry, captured in February, was asked about germ warfare. Major -Judson C. Richardson, of VMF(N)-513, during interrogations at Pak’s -was told he would never leave Korea when he denied that the U.S. was -waging bacteriological warfare. Master Sergeant John T. Cain, VMO-6, -a well-known Marine enlisted pilot whose plane was shot down in July -1952, was questioned, confined to the hole, and taken before a firing -squad when he refused to acknowledge American participation. Captain -Flynn was also subjected to intensive and brutal interrogation by -North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel who sought a -confession. Others were to meet similar pressure and be questioned -until their nerves shrieked. - -On 8 July 1952, the first of a chain of events occurred that was -to link the Marine Corps with the spurious bacteriological warfare -propaganda. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 1st MAW Chief of Staff and -Major Roy H. Bley, wing ordnance officer, were struck by Communist -ground fire while making a reconnaissance flight. The enemy had little -difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable’s biography. Although he -repeatedly maintained he had just arrived in Korea and had not yet -received an assignment, he was in uniform with insignia and full -personal identification. A Department of Defense press release issued -two days later gave considerable data, correctly identifying him as the -Marine Wing Chief of Staff. The Chinese knew they had a prize. - -Two weeks after his capture, the colonel was taken to an interrogation -center where he remained in solitary confinement until December. -He quickly became aware of CCF intentions to utilize him for their -propaganda mill. He was interrogated relentlessly, badgered, accused -of being a war criminal, fed a near-starvation diet, denied proper -latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected -to extremes of temperature. Ultimately the discomfort, almost constant -diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions, -fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. At the same time he was -also convinced that had he continued to resist Communist demands for -a confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a -document to achieve their ends. He later commented: - - In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my - primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my - country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda - than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or - remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter - over which they left me no doubt.[605] - - [605] _Ibid._, p. 180. - -General Dean, held in solitary confinement for much of his three years’ -captivity, stated the greatest problem facing a prisoner of war is -“maintaining his judgment--he has no one on whom he can try out his -ideas before turning them into decisions.”[606] Possibly this was also -Colonel Schwable’s problem. Many drafts of his confession were made -before the Chinese were satisfied that specific details reinforced the -information earlier obtained in other prisoners’ false statements. -The confession that finally evolved in December cleverly combined -factual order of battle data and technical terminology to create a -most convincing lie. It was more sophisticated than efforts of earlier -captives and was, unquestionably, damaging. - - [606] _Ibid._, p. 182. - - -_Problems and Performance of Marine POWs_[607] - - [607] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10; - MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_. - -Problems faced by Marine and other UNC prisoners ranged from the -fundamentals of sheer survival to more abstract questions involving -honor and duty that have less sharply defined interpretations. Was it, -for instance, a prisoner’s duty to overtly resist the enemy at all -costs and on all possible occasions? Or was an attitude of passive -resistance that created less hostility and attention better in the long -run? Were such passive techniques liable to render a POW unable to -continue making fine distinctions in his conduct and behavior so that -he unwittingly went over the line to become a collaborator with the -enemy? What about a ranking POW’s responsibility of leadership? - -In a practical, day-in, day-out way, every prisoner had to decide for -himself as to how actively or passively he would resist the enemy. In -a number of cases Marine (and other Allied) POWs gave deliberately -false or misleading information in response to threats, coercion, -or maltreatment. Three Marines at Pak’s regularly held counsel “to -determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false -stories.”[608] Captain Fink’s list of ships, all sunk in World Wars I -and II, was similar to the story told by an Air Force officer of the -new B-108 bomber (three B-36s). - - [608] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 121. - -Not infrequently a POW faced threats of death, reduced rations, still -worse medical care, solitary, or physical beatings and torture if he -failed to make some response to questions. Major Richardson finally -wrote untruthful answers to five questions about the Navy, although his -NKPA interrogators told him his lies were detected. Master Sergeant -Cain authored a fanciful report about the Fleet Logistic Wing, an -organization about which he knew nothing, not too surprisingly since -it did not exist. He later admitted, however, that he felt he’d “made -a mistake at that time [his first interrogation] by lying about -inconsequential things.”[609] - - [609] _Ibid._, p. 185. - -Expressed in simplistic terms, a spirit of cohesion and of group -identity seemed to be the key factor in--to use a bromide that is -particularly apt here--separating the men from the boys. Even when -avowed reactionary leaders were removed to serve one of their many -solitary tours, there seems little doubt that their example served to -instill a spirit of resistance (either open or underground) in fellow -POWs. This was particularly true when the leadership gap was filled by -the next senior man and the chain of command remained unbroken. - -Prisoners who were able to rise above their own personal situation -(_i.e._, to adjust, without giving in) and to assist others seemed, -unquestionably, to have gained greater resiliency and determination. -Whether this is a cause-or-effect reaction, however, might be a grey -area difficult to pinpoint precisely. In any event, glimpses of -Marines from behind the barbed wire indicated that steadfastness under -pressure, ingenuity, and outstanding leadership earned them the respect -of fellow prisoners as well as a place in Marine Corps history. - -Even in a situation as inhospitable and hazardous as a POW camp, it is -not surprising that characteristic behavior and certain distinctive -personality traits tend to show through, no matter what. Captain -Fink, captured early in the war, endured unspeakable humiliations at -the hands of the North Koreans. Although he felt his morale was at -its lowest point at this time, and was not sure he could go on, he -was later responsible for providing a high degree of civility for -POWs confined to Camp 2. His most notable artistic and mechanical -achievement was probably the construction of an artificial leg[610] -for USAF Major Thomas D. Harrison. This prosthetic was so expertly -fashioned that its owner could play volley ball using his new limb! -Fink also built stethoscopes for POW doctors, using resonant wood and -tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. After a discussion with other POWs -on the need for a religious symbol in camp, the resourceful Marine -made a 22-inch crucifix, christened “Christ in Barbed Wire.”[611] His -efforts on behalf of religion earned him a 10-day sentence in the hole. - - [610] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to - hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other - administrative data. Ultimately, the records were - brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a - cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce - negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 227, - and _Washington Post_, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1. - - [611] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs - and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in - Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, _POW_, p. 172. - -Captain Arthur Wagner, VMF(N)-513, spent an unusually long six-month -tour at Pak’s during 1951. For new captives headed in that direction, -the word via USMC grapevine was that he “could be trusted.”[612] -Captain Wagner counselled other prisoners at Pak’s, helped chop wood, -draw water, cook, ease the burden of sick POWs, and resisted the -Communists at every turn. - - [612] _Ibid._, p. 121. - -Another member of the same squadron, Captain Flynn, had completed 59 -combat missions against the enemy in North Korea before being shot -down in May 1952.[613] While captive, the veteran Marine fighter -pilot withstood intense interrogation, influenced others to suppress -CCF-inspired talks made by progressives, and strengthened morale by -planning a group escape. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a -mock court. Throughout it all, according to Master Sergeant Cain, the -POWs “owed much to Flynn who kept them amused.”[614] First Lieutenant -Robert J. Gillette’s “reactionary” attitude resulted in his being -placed in the hole on several occasions. Once, at No Name Valley, he -managed to scribble a novel on toilet paper which subsequently provided -some light moments for fellow prisoners. And First Lieutenant Felix L. -Ferranto, 1st. Signal Battalion, spent more than two years of his 33 -months’ imprisonment in solitary confinement or isolated with small -units of “non-cooperative” POWs. The CCF pronounced him a “hopeless -capitalist, an organizer with an ‘unsincere attitude.’”[615] - - [613] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck - by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier - action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out - of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat - patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC. - - [614] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 185. - - [615] _Ibid._, p. 122. - -The type of amiable accommodation that could sometimes be made, without -compromising one’s standards, was once successfully demonstrated by -Captain Jack E. Perry, VMF-311 briefing officer. On a bombing run -his F9F fuel tank was hit, and he parachuted down. Seized almost -immediately by the Chinese, his captors “showed him bomb holes from -numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded -soldiers. Then, as he describes it, ‘They laughed like hell.’ Although -Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with -them.’”[616] - - [616] _Ibid._, p. 109. - -Three Marines captured during the Korean War had suffered a similar -fate in World War II. Ironically, Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, -of the Military Police Company; Warrant Officer Felix J. McCool, of -1st Service Battalion; and Master Sergeant Frederick J. Stumpges, -Headquarters Company, were all captured in the same 29 November 1950 -action. Comparisons of treatment by the Communists and Japanese were -inevitable. A survivor of the Bataan Death March, Stumpges felt that -although the Japanese confinement was more difficult physically, -imprisonment in North Korea was a far worse mental ordeal. “They [the -Communists] were around all the time and you could never speak your -mind.”[617] - - [617] _New York Times_, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2. - -The other two Marines similarly thought that the Japanese were more -brutal but had more character. Harrison, captured at Wake Island, said -he admired them because “they really believed in their cause and were -loyal to it.”[618] The Chinese, on the other hand, he characterized as -employing “false friendship and deceit.”[619] McCool, who had spent 70 -hours in a slimy, lice-infested hole for refusing to confess to a phony -charge of rape and pillage, knew that he “hated the Chinese Communists -far more than he had hated the Japanese.”[620] - - [618] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 79. - - [619] _Ibid._ - - [620] _Ibid._, p. 167. - -Master Sergeant Cain had distinguished himself by flying little OE -reconnaissance planes 184 hours and had 76 combat missions in one -month. Just before his capture, Cain had paid for six months’ education -for nine Korean youngsters who lived near his air base. Because of his -graying hair and lack of rank insignia, Sergeant Cain was mistaken for -a senior officer. In fact, the Chinese insisted that he was Lieutenant -Colonel Cain, CO of VMF-121. His equal amount of insistence that he -was not a Marine officer, plus his refusal to reveal any significant -information, made him a particular nuisance to the CCF. He was -subjected to intensive interrogation sessions, confined to the hole, -and stood at attention for periods of five to eight hours. Describing -the occasion on which he thought it was all over, Sergeant Cain related -that he: - - ... was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of - a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the - firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all.[621] - - [621] _Ibid._, p. 186. - -When the Marine sergeant replied that he was not going to talk, the -Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. Eventually, after -questioning him for 84 days, the CCF gave up trying to indoctrinate -him in the ways of Communism. Major Harris, senior officer of the Obul -complex, freely acknowledged that Sergeant Cain “assumed more than his -share of duties and responsibilities and set an example for all to -follow.”[622] - - [622] _Ibid._, pp. 186–187. - - -_Marine Escape Attempts_[623] - - [623] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: MacDonald, _POW_; Korean War casualty cards - from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC. - -As the Korean War came to a close, assessments were being made of -America’s role in it. Operation BIG SWITCH swung into high gear and -national attention focused on the returning POWs and their experiences -in Communist camps. The widely-accepted statement was that no prisoners -had escaped. Even more discrediting was the prevailing belief that, -“worse, not a single American attempted to escape from captivity.”[624] -These reported facts are not borne out by the actual record. - - [624] Leckie, _Conflict_, p. 389. - -In May 1951, a group of 18 Marines and a U.S. Army interpreter found -their way back to American control through a combination of fortuitous -events and quick thinking. All of the Marines had been captured several -months earlier, in the 28 November-11 December period, the majority -on the night of 29–30 November. There were peculiar circumstances -connected with their escape. In early April, a group of nearly 60 -UNC prisoners had been brought south by the enemy from the Majon-ni -area. Presumably they were to perform working details in the rear of -Communist front lines. - -While a larger number of prisoners, both Army and Marine, were marched -westward to Pyoktong, First Lieutenant Frank E. Cold and a group of -17 enlisted were sent further south to the general Chorwon area, not -far from the 38th Parallel. In the meantime the Chinese launched their -spring counteroffensive on 22 April. It appears that, subsequently, the -Marines and Army interpreter, Corporal Saburo “Sam” Shimamura, who had -been attached to the 1st Marine Division, were told they would be taken -to the area in which the Marine division was operating and released -there. - -The group was then trucked southeast to Chunchon, just below the -Parallel, under guard, and marched toward the vicinity of the front -lines. On 24 May, while in proximity to the main battle area, an -artillery preparation suddenly registered nearby. The CCF guards fled, -while the prisoners ran in the opposite direction, heading for high -ground where they successfully eluded the guards. For the rest of that -day and night the escapees quietly watched Communist troops retreat -past them. The next day, 25 May, the Marines fashioned make-shift air -panels from wallpaper they stripped from a ruined Korean house in the -area. They spelled out “POWS--19 RESCUE.” Their signal attracted the -attention of an Army observation pilot who radioed their position to an -Army reconnaissance unit. - -Three Army tanks were dispatched and escorted the ex-prisoners to -safety. They entered friendly lines in the vicinity of Chunchon, -“the first and only group of prisoners to experience Communist -indoctrination and to reach freedom after a prolonged period of -internment.”[625] Two members of the unit[626] were of special -interest. One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who -had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late -December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously -introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war. - - [625] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 84, reporting news stories in _The - Washington Post_, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and _Saturday - Evening Post_, 25 Aug 51, p. 109. - - [626] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold, - H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison, - MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson, - 1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M. - Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl - Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Halcomb, - 11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore - R. Wheeler, 1stServBn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq, - 1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L. - Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC - Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring, - 5thMar. MacDonald, _POW_, pp. 260–263. - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 169702] - - _Ice-Breaker at Work--Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor - Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up - against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion - maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 168178] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 16373] - - _Captured Enemy Weapons--Various types of mortar and artillery - shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at - 1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Pantherjet fighter taxies down - runway for takeoff._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 346720] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170084] - - _Outpost Defense--Inside view of one of the many sleeping - caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson. - Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy - diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953._ - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 17096] - - _POW Exchange--Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first - UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation_ LITTLE SWITCH. - _Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day’s - truce talks, April 1953._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170778] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170795 DOD Photo A 170766] - - _Freedom Village--Marines of 1st Engineer Battalion raise - welcoming sign at entrance to camp. Rear Admiral John C. Daniel, - USN, senior delegate at truce talks, reports progress at press - conference. Below, KSC workers and Marine reroll barbed wire for - use at the front._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170106] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 13392] - - _Ready to Strike--Ground crew loads rockets on “Devilcat” Corsair - in preparation for day’s mission. Below, protective screen of - M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch - rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns - with the turret._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 170228] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171000] - - _Evacuation from MLR--Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d - Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below, - front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st - Engineer Battalion personnel._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171077] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171351] - - _Marine Relief--Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives - at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief - of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed - by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded - Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman - who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at - close range._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 172596 DOD Photo A 16050] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 171293 DOD Photo A 173207] - - _Street Signs--Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp - Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st - MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support - of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog - through flooded area on way back from day’s training._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173233] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173914] - - _Defense of Boulder City--Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive - supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City. - Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder - City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173886] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174359] - - _Cease-fire--1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following - cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position - at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line - being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173720] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174381] - - _Operation_ BIG SWITCH_--Road map of route taken by repatriated - UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points. - Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and - entered on map._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 174586] - - _UN Custodial Forces--Indian troops board Marine helicopter on - deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to - guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G. - Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom - Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349140] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 173860] - - _Dismantling the MLR--KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and - carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard - shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August - 1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by - annual summer rains, in July 1953._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 164548 DOD Photo A 173282] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 349563] - - _Shore-to-Ship Operation--F3D is hauled aboard ship after being - ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAW redeploys from Korea to Japan - in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as - security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions, - February 1955._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366097] - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366210] - - _Mission Completed--1st Marine Division equipment and records at - dockside prior to loading for division’s return to the States. - Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way - to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955._ - -[Illustration: DOD Photo A 366127] - -An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after -a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC -Bernard W. Insco, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while -the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps. -Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12 -May by the enemy after less than a month’s captivity. Another pair of -lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd, -both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only -Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return -to the division four days later. - -At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine -POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it -got under way. The incidents follow: - - #1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M. - Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady - attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He - vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine - and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path - leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a - hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed - sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate, - however, his genial host’s son was out contacting a military - patrol which even then was on Griffith’s trail. - - A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As - early punishment, Griffith’s shoe pacs were taken from him and - he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski - socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten - across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill - and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head - barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were - leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search. - - #2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member - of a large POW column being marched north. Although still - suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred - while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and - four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march. - All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement. - - #3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham, - Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a - divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed - slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they - approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half - dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were - beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind - their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance - at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and - interrogated them for three days. - - #4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak’s Palace, not long after - his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette - a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers’ camp in - Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron - member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a - mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of - reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the - two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely - clear the camp. - - The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in - a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although - the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the - Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered - little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox - planning nearly paid off. “Whereas most escapees were recaptured - within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was - free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway - across Korea.”[627] One Royal Marine described the attempt as - “the finest and most determined one he knew of.”[628] - - [627] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 169. - - [628] _Ibid._ - -#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive -escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major -McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA -Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get -back inside the compound, but the Chinese did identify Lieutenant -Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the -hole from which he later “emerged unbothered and steeled against the -Communists.”[629] - - [629] _Ibid._, p. 170. - -#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September -1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two -months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the -experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli, -like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in -Operation BIG SWITCH. - -#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British -Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and -survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were -held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick -priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body -for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first -group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was -brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice -began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine -prisoner escape committees--although unsuccessful in terms of actual -results achieved--had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant -Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul. -Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in -1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners -escape committee and senior officers’ organization within Camp 2. In -early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He -organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting -place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were -prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political -indoctrination was disseminated. - -The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked -out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior -that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were -directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy, -or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded -not to show any great enthusiasm upon their release, to prevent -the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another -propaganda victory. - - -_Evaluation and Aftermath_[630] - - [630] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC - Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv, - HQMC; MacDonald, _POW_; Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_; Elliot - Harris, _The “UnAmerican” Weapon--Psychological Warfare_ - (New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie, - _Conflict_; Rees, _Korea_. - -With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most -Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several -seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying -fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily -have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to -preparatory fire that preceded the enemy’s main assault. - -As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted: - - A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean - War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that - a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists - had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to - treasonable.[631] - - [631] MacDonald, _POW_, p. 3. - -Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War -and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW -issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S. -Senate report summarized its findings: - - The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the - Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted - upon them by the Communists and did not cooperate or collaborate - with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and - credit.[632] - - [632] _Ibid._, p. 237. - -In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed -to account for those men who became “survival types”, an Army -psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed: - - The Marines were a statistically significant group from the - standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing - I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I - think this is a function of discipline and morale and esprit; and - the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago, - that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of - me.[633] - - [633] _Ibid._, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain - School, 1957. - -In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to “that -certain ‘something’ that seems to weld men together prevailed -more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN -Troops.”[634] The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than -anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that “without USMC training I -would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking -strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is -something that causes you to think ... about what the other guy will -think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them.”[635] - - [634] _Ibid._, p. 88. - - [635] _Ibid._, p. 238. - -A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed -POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement, -declared: - - I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps - personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of - confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of - any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this - period.[636] - - [636] _Ibid._, p. 220. - -And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex, -who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A. -Michener’s _The Bridges of Toko-ri_, pointed out: - - The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent. - The Marines who left something to be desired were more than - compensated for by the majority of them.[637] - - [637] _Ibid._, p. 223. - -Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant -to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff. -After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr. -Wolff concluded they had not “behaved much differently from other men -in other armies and places” but that Americans had been made to appear -much worse “by the enemy’s propaganda devices and our own initial -ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda.”[638] - - [638] _Ibid._, p. 237. - -As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11 -January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving -as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were: - - Lieutenant Colonel Thrash--awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a - second Legion of Merit; - - Major McLaughlin--awarded the Legion of Merit; - - Major Harris--also awarded the Legion of Merit; - - Captain Flynn--awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; and - - Master Sergeant Cain--awarded a Letter of Commendation with - Ribbon. - -On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his -cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article. -A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a -court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a -month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court -opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture “to the -limit of his ability before giving in.”[639] Its final judgment was -that Schwable--a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years’ military -service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron -CO--not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court -held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was “seriously -impaired” by his conduct as a war prisoner. - - [639] _Ibid._, p. 233. - -On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct -against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the -enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000 -Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner -succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have -since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist -version of “people’s democracy” after getting a closer look at it. - -Investigations later showed that “only a handful of the POWs in Korea -were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. -Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva -Convention] ‘absolute’, name, rank, serial number, and date of birth -restriction.”[640] Although giving false or misleading information was -a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly -detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of -Conduct (1955) subsequently recommended against making untruthful -statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have -suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one -case a prisoner’s own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his -lie and increasing pressure was brought against him. - - [640] _Ibid._, p. 230. - -It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always -gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy (“progressives”) -and those who offered open or passive resistance (“reactionaries”). -One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW -tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish -“chain of command that was never broken” and which helped to mold -them together. He noted the “permissive” culture and background -of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are -basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and -discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so -strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on -responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his -action and values were put to a prolonged test--as in the POW compound. -The analyst concluded: - - Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great - spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for - one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their - minds and bodies.... They [the Turks] remained united against the - enemy, and they survived.[641] - - [641] Fehrenbach, _Kind of War_, pp. 541–542. - -This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -While Guns Cool - -_The Postwar Transition--Control of the DMZ and the Military Police -Company--Organization of New Defense Positions--Postwar Employment of -Marine Units in_ FECOM - - -_The Postwar Transition_[642] - - [642] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chaps. 9, - 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C” - Rpt--Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder - #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records - currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, - Md.); 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist - of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 - (contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1, - 4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector, - 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period, - Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5, - 4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53; - 7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief - histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7), - Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt--Defense of “C” Div - Sect, 27 Jul-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among - others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT - Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt). - -Terms of the Armistice Agreement required EUSAK components, including -the 1st Marine Division, to carry out a number of major tasks in the -months following the end of active hostilities. As stipulated by the -cease-fire, UNC troops all along the front withdrew to a new main -battle position (MBP) south of the main line of resistance. A military -demarcation line (MDL) was established between enemy and friendly -positions, corresponding to the end-of-war battle lines. Each side -pulled back 2,000 yards from this MDL, with the combined 4,000-yard -buffer strip on both sides being known as the demilitarized zone.(DMZ). - -A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass -Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern -boundary of the DMZ by infantry units manning the MLR at the time of -the cease-fire. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and -English, were placed at regular intervals along the fence, prohibiting -unauthorized entry into the Demilitarized Zone. - -Strict requirements by I Corps enjoined that the “fence on the southern -boundary of the DMZ must present a continuous unbroken line except for -gates and where it crosses large streams.”[643] Beginning late on 27 -July 1953, the 1st Marine Division’s modified mission became that of -withdrawal to and organization of the post-armistice MBP, establishment -of the No-Pass Line, and defense of the new position in readiness for -any possible resumption of hostilities by the enemy. - - [643] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53. - -Division officers, from commanding general to platoon leader level, -repeatedly emphasized that the armistice agreement was only a cessation -of active fighting. As such, it could be violated by the enemy at any -time. The armistice was not a peace, but had simply paved the way for a -political conference. As the UNC commander, General Mark W. Clark, had -stated, the 27 July document was merely “a military agreement between -opposing commanders to cease fire and to permit the opposing sides to -arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict.”[644] Since many felt -the cease-fire might be only temporary and not necessarily a permanent -peace, all hands showed an attitude of skepticism and watchful waiting. -There was little disposition or time for celebration. The response of -many men to the complete lack of noise across the front was one of -simple restlessness and expectancy. - - [644] 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to - IMARD-00-10-53, p. 2. - -From the 7th Marines just engaged in the vicious Boulder City battle, -the reaction - - ... was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the - enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling - of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July, - without any shots being fired, did the realism [reality] of the - truce become apparent, followed by a wide-spread sensation of - relief.[645] - - [645] 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5. - -A 5th Marines representative noted: - - The fact that negotiations had been going on for some time with - numerous false alarms dulled the edge for most people, and a - prior announcement that the agreement would be signed took most - of the steam away from the actual culmination of the fighting ... - in effect [the cease-fire] meant “we’re giving you ten dollars - but don’t spend it for we might take it back.”[646] - - [646] Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5 - ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder - #4. - -The view expressed by a Korean regimental commander was that: - - Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting - cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have - seen the fighting continue until the country could be united. - However, the officers and men accepted the cease-fire as a - military order and acted accordingly.[647] - - [647] 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type - “C” Rpt, Folder #6. - -Division MLR units on 27 July had been the 1st KMC, the 5th Marines, -and 1st Marines in the left, center, and right regimental sectors, -respectively. With the pullback of the division to new defensive -positions, the 5th Marines--the infantry regiment that had not been -heavily engaged in recent combat--was assigned the mission of defending -the forward general outpost (GOP) line across the division front. In -addition, the 5th Marines, or Northern Regiment as it came to be called -since it was the only one remaining north of the Imjin River, was also -charged with police duties and security of the UNC part of the DMZ -located in the division sector. - -Marine regiments, battalions, and companies began withdrawing from the -DMZ to move to their new MBP early on the morning of 28 July, less than -24 hours after the signing of the Korean armistice. To some extent, the -relocation of units was facilitated by the fact that the forward part -of the division sector had been defended by the three MLR regiments. -Since the lateral boundaries, initially, would remain the same, the -three 5th Marines battalions were to occupy positions held by the three -line regiments. Orders called for 2/5 to occupy the left regimental -sector previously held by the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat -Team; 1/5 to man the 5th Marines center sector; and 3/5 to assume the -right regimental sector. - -Whereas 5th Marines battalions were directed to occupy their new -positions by D+84 hours (or 2200, 30 July), other units in some cases -were not required to pull out of their respective positions until -positions by D+108 hours (2000, 1 August). This was done to insure -that no portion of the division front was left unmanned during this -very critical period. It did, however, force small units to make two -moves and “in one instance, a battalion and a regimental headquarters -were occupying the same area.”[648] Because of the need to move almost -immediately, only a hasty physical reconnaissance was made. Small unit -leaders were not always familiar with the area and this gave rise, in -some instances, to confusion about exact unit boundaries. This resulted -in a later relocation of several units. - - [648] 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4. - -For the first 72 hours after the armistice, Marines were engaged in -a maximum effort to tear down installations, salvage fortification -materials, and physically move out of the Demilitarized Zone. -Infantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage work -within assigned sectors, with 1st Engineer Battalion assistance and -supervision, as available. For the nearly 50 Marine infantry companies -and attached KMC units, the order of priorities for those first three -days generally appears to have been: - - (1) Recovery of ordnance and removal to company supply dumps; - - (2) Removal of all combat equipment to supply dumps; and - - (3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker - timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector. - -Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally -drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of all -military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ within 72 -hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications within -the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour deadline. -It subsequently became evident, however, that it would be impossible to -complete the entire job of dismantling and salvaging MLR fortifications -within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953, CinCUNC had advised major -commands that Communist and UNC negotiators had agreed to extend -the original 72 hours to an additional 45-day period, or until 13 -September.[649] - - [649] Other modifications and deadline extensions included: - (a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and - equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the - 38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) - Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only - through those ports of entry specified in the armistice - agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from - CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and - others, dtd 17 Jun 53. - -Division order 1MARD-OP-11-53, issued at 1600 on 27 July, clearly -stated that all “removable materials”[650] would be taken out of -the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the effective -date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war order further -directed that division personnel would “locate and list all valuable -materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this -prescribed time ... an additional period of 45 days, after the initial -72-hour period, will be used to complete salvage operations within the -Demilitarized Zone under the supervision of the Military Armistice -Commission....”[651] - - [650] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post - Armistice MBP 1MARD-OP-11-53-July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53. - - [651] _Ibid._ - -From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communications -seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders. At the pick -and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes to the effect of: - - Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of - here. If unable to salvage; then destroy.... No word was passed - that there would be a period following the truce in which we - could conduct a thorough salvage operation. Had this information - been available, a more systematic process could have been - devised....[652] - - [652] Co H Rpt, _op. cit._, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4. - -One regiment commented “that early directives from higher authorities -did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage -operations.”[653] More specifically, 1/7 related: - - [653] 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5. - - Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain - items of salvage as critical. This required revision of working - schedules and shifting of men to other jobs ... if all salvageable - material had been designated as critical at the commencement - of salvage operations, the work could have been completed more - expeditiously....[654] - - [654] 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5. - -A 5th Marines observer commented on the confusion in these words: - - It is evident, however, that in dissemination to some of the - lower echelons, pertinent information was either ignored or - improperly passed ... some Company Commanders were under the - impression that the entire job of dismantling and salvaging was - to be completed in 72 hours. The result of this misconception was - that in some areas bunkers were filled in with earth and then - later had to be evacuated [excavated] in order to salvage the - materials.[655] - - [655] 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4. - -Initial salvage operations were conducted from 28–30 July. Trenchlines -were filled in; tank slots dozed under; bunkers torn down and usable -timbers carried to salvage collecting points. - -Beginning on 28 July, 1st Marines line units on the division right -flank came under operational control of the 5th Marines, with their new -mission being to “man an outpost line on the most formidable ground -south of the southern boundary of the newly planned Demilitarized -Zone in the MLR regimental sector.”[656] Movement to the new outpost -positions was under way by 29 July. - - [656] 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3. - -As the Marine units moved south to establish their new outpost -positions in previously undeveloped areas, the limited engineering -equipment available for simultaneously dismantling bunkers and -constructing new camps tended to slow the latter job. Personnel of 1/1, -which had utilized 124 vehicles for the transfer, were among those -housed in widely scattered areas for several days during the moving and -setting up of new camps. Torrential rains, of several days’ duration, -which had engulfed the division’s transport operations on so many -occasions in the past, caused the new campsites to turn into a muddy -quagmire. Men of 2/5, during part of the relocation period, lived in -shelter tents until regular tentage became available. - -A short moratorium on salvage activities took place between 31 July-3 -August while the details for entry into the DMZ were being settled. -Marine division salvage efforts encompassed an area extending from the -MLR to the sector rear, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line, as far as -the Imjin River. Work in the areas south of the DMZ did not begin, in -most cases, until after 13 September, and fortifications of secondary -defense lines were left in place. - -All salvage materials removed from the DMZ were placed in battalion -and regimental dumps where they would be readily available for use -in building the new battle positions. Recovery of ammunition was -accomplished in some sectors early on the 28th. At the far right flank -of the division line, the scene of the Marines’ final action in the -Korean War, salvage efforts took on an additional task. Most of the -first day was allotted to recovery of the dead at Hills 119 and 111 and -the removal of their bodies to rear areas. - -Although the enemy had policed in front of Marine lines on the night -of 27–28 July, at first light the CCF indicated the desire to recover -their dead from Marine positions. Enemy parties were thus permitted to -temporarily enter 3/1 lines to retrieve these bodies. This procedure -provoked some consternation and renewed vigilance by Marine personnel -upon “seeing the enemy moving around within a stone’s throw of our -front lines so soon after his determined attacks.”[657] - - [657] 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3. - -As soon as the Marines’ own corresponding unhappy task was completed, -ammunition was removed to supply dumps, a laborious task not finished -in the 1st Marines sector until noon on 29 July. The fierce fighting -that had started after dark on 24 July and lasted until the morning -of the ceasefire also accounted for the large amount of salvageable -items found in the area including M-1 rifles, helmets, armored vests, -and quantities of blood serum. All ordnance, equipment, and building -materials were separated into stockpiles of good or nonrepairable -items. Ammunition in excess of a one-half a basic JAMESTOWN fire unit -(a unit of fire is the amount of ammunition a weapon will use in a day -of combat), was placed in company and battalion dumps for collection by -regimental ordnance teams. - -On occasion, salvage of friendly ammunition was made more difficult -because COP stockpiles struck by enemy mortar fire contained both -damaged and live, usable ammunition mixed together. Although 1st -Engineer Battalion ordnance disposal teams covered the positions -thoroughly, unexploded mortar and artillery rounds were often unearthed -by Marines filling in the old trenches, knocking down bunkers, or -recovering wire. Anti-personnel mines forward of the protective wire -prevented full salvage operations in some cases. - -Three Marine combat outposts required special attention. These were -Bunker Hill and Esther, in the central part of the MLR, and Ava, in -the right sector. Although occupied by Marines at the time of the -cease-fire, the COPs fell north of the MDL and thus became inaccessible -for salvage after the initial 72-hour period. The positions were -reduced and materials salvaged in the allotted time. - -During the first night, Marines of 3/5 (originally the right battalion, -center sector) removed more than 11 truckloads of ammunition. Outposts -Hedy and Bunker offered a particular problem due to the distance from -the MLR and nearest road. As described by some veterans of 24-hour work -crews, the trail to Bunker was “particularly tortuous and made the -packing of first the ammunition and later the fortification materials a -physical ordeal.”[658] - - [658] Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5 - ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder - #4. - -At Hedy the extreme proximity of CCF and Marine lines posed an -additional difficulty. On the afternoon of the 28th, an interval of 20 -yards separated the two; by the following day the enemy had completed -his work in the area and was never again that close. Operations here -were also somewhat delayed “by an influx of visitors: newspapermen and -newsreel cameramen all interested in the great numbers of enemy visible -to our front engaged in the same tasks that we were.”[659] - - [659] _Ibid._ - -Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire -salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was -not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more -than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in -the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12 -timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to -16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate -to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch -bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment -and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress -a demolition program of such magnitude. - -In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their -use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where -these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills, -however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the -generally prevailing situation. - -Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program “basic equipment -was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity.”[660] Effective -on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many “jury-rigged” levers -or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The -“Korean Sling Method,” with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often -used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped with winches and wreckers -were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only -after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement. -Division engineers experimented at some length with three different -ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams -were secured to columns with two-feet spikes. The least technical -approach which involved “winching the bunkers out of their positions -and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the -most successful and the quickest method.”[661] - - [660] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4. - - [661] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6. - -Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport -facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy -commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit -displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that -slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel -to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour -period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from -the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were -allowed “ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they -were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through -the darkness.”[662] During this three-day period alone, the 1st -Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification -material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks. - - [662] Co G Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5 - ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder - #4. - -At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led -to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3 -August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized -gear that could be construed as “combat equipment.” The 2½-ton trucks, -however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport -operations. - -By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its -withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines -continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the -Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st -KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the -division reserve. - -Between 3 August-13 September, each rifle company sent daily working -parties into the DMZ to excavate those sectors occupied by Marine -units on 27 July. Depending on available transportation, the size -of the working parties varied from 25 to 100 men. These shortages -were alleviated, to some extent, by KSC (Korean Service Corps) -personnel.[663] The heavy-duty, “pure drudgery without glamour,” -monotonous tasks performed in tropical weather, 103 degree-plus -temperatures and high humidity, caused one Marine infantryman to -comment ruefully: - - [663] KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following - a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the - Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced. - By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to - the division had been completely disbanded. - - Close officer supervision proved to be absolutely necessary due - to the nature of the work, which made the maintenance of interest - and enthusiasm in the average individual, very difficult.[664] - - [664] 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4. - -In another 5th Marines unit the motivation gap was partially solved by -“use of a graph posted on the bulletin board showing the money value -of materials salvaged each day, with the exhortation to better the -previous day’s total.”[665] - - [665] 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4. - -Throughout the month of August and until 13 September, destruction -of MLR positions and removal of materials took place concurrently -with organization of defensive positions in the new sector. After the -initial three-day period and its top priority of physical withdrawal -of troops from the DMZ, division tactical requirements called for -completion of the MBP as rapidly as possible. This now became the first -priority. New company perimeter defense sites, battalion blocking -positions, coordinated fire plans in event of attack, counterattack -orders, and evacuation routes were mapped out. Construction began -immediately. By 5 August, the new battalion camps had begun to take -form and work on the blocking positions was in progress. Marine units, -like other UNC forces, had to be prepared at all times for any act of -enemy aggression. Whether the Communists would continue to respect the -cease-fire agreement or not remained an open question. - -Stockpiling, meanwhile, had been accomplished at company, battalion, -and regimental dumps. All materials were stacked by size to facilitate -reissue during construction of new positions. As much as 90 percent of -the materials salvaged were usable in the new fortification. Although -a certain amount of inter-battalion exchange took place, battalion -stocks--with the exception of sandbags--were usually adequate to -provide sufficient fortification materials for the rebuilding. For 5th -Marines units that had the least distance to relocate, timbers moved -from the old MLR in the morning were sometimes emplaced in the new -defensive positions by late afternoon. Helicopters, as well as trucks, -were used extensively to move stockpiles from company and battalion -areas to rear regimental supply dumps. - -Division MLR supplies salvaged by the 5th Marines represented: - - T/E material 12 tons - - Signal equipment (wire) 2,000 miles - - Engineer items - barbed wire 2,850 rolls - concertina 340 rolls - pickets, 6-foot 11,000 - pickets, 3-foot 8,000 - sandbags 339,000 - timbers (from 3×8 to 12×12) 150,000 linear feet - - Total tonnage 2,000 short tons - -The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines estimated that wire rolls, sandbags, -timbers, and other materiel “recovered by this battalion and assisting -units was valued at approximately $150,000.”[666] - - [666] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4. - -By early September, the 1st Marine Division work priority once again -had reverted from camp construction to salvage operations. It had -become apparent that another maximum effort period would be necessary -if all salvageable materials were to be removed from the DMZ no later -than the 13 September deadline reaffirmed by I Corps on 2 September. -During this last phase of salvage work, participating battalions -again came under operational control of the 5th Marines. Elements of -the 1st and 11th Marines, neither of which at that time had a sector -of responsibility for salvage, as well as KMC troops, augmented the -organic units. One battalion alone, 1/1, detailed 400 men in work -parties. At 2130, on 13 September, the division completed its salvage -mission in the Demilitarized Zone, thus meeting the specified time -limit. Under terms of the armistice agreement, after 13 September all -personnel were prohibited from entering the Korean Demilitarized Zone. -The only exceptions were members of the DMZ police companies of the -Allied and Communist sides and other persons specifically authorized -passage by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). - - -_Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company_[667] - - [667] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; - Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in - 5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,” - _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin, - “DMZ Marines.” - -Since the late July signing of the armistice, one of the missions of -the 5th Marines GOP regiment had been the marking, control of entry, -and policing of the DMZ. At the time the No-Pass Fence was constructed, -roadblocks, called “crossing stations” were located at each route -leading into the DMZ. Initially, 21 crossing stations were opened -across the regimental front. When it later became apparent that not -all of these security points would be needed, some were closed and the -roads barricaded. Each crossing station was manned by a minimum of -two sentries who insured that no weapons were carried into the DMZ. -Along the fence itself, signs printed in three languages prohibited -unauthorized entry into the southern boundary of the DMZ. On roads and -trails approaching the southern boundary fence, additional signs placed -200 yards from the fence warned of the proximity to this southern end -of the military zone. Air panels and engineer tape also marked the DMZ. - -After 31 July, entry into the DMZ was limited to those persons holding -a valid pass, issued under the auspices of the Military Armistice -Commission. Authority was also delegated to CG, U.S. I Corps to issue -passes for the I Corps sector. With salvage operations requiring a -large number of passes, authority was further delegated to the CO, -5th Marines, to issue permits for the regimental sector, good only -for unarmed[668] working parties engaged in salvage operations. The -regimental S-2 established a pass control center, and anyone desiring -to enter the DMZ made application through that office. Each pass -contained the bearer’s name, rank, service number, organization, -number of personnel and vehicles in the working party, and reason for -entry. - - [668] With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons - entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their - weapons at the zone entry. - -Security procedures also required that a log book of all zone entries -and exits be kept by crossing station guards. This information was -ultimately telephoned or radioed to higher echelons. At battalion and -regimental levels a master log or “status board” indicated the number -of people, vehicles, passes, and pass identification numbers present -in the DMZ at all times. As the salvage program reached its height -in August and early September, just the “issuance and recording of -passes and the checking of the working parties into the zone became a -major operation.”[669] Between 4 August-13 September, a total of 3,523 -vehicle passes and an unknown number of personnel permits were issued. -With the ending of salvage operations on 13 September, the Marine -regiment no longer issued DMZ passes, although I Corps continued to -authorize MAC personnel entry permits. - - [669] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3. - -A stipulation set by the armistice agreement was that both the -Communist and UNC sides police their respective sections of the DMZ -with “civil police,” not to exceed 1,000 in the zone at any one time -across the entire front. With further allocation of police personnel -to army and I Corps units, the number of 1st Marine Division police on -duty within the DMZ at any one time was originally set at 50. Since -no civilian police were available to either side, requirements were -modified so that a specially designated military unit, in lieu of civil -police, could be employed and the original quota enlarged if this -became feasible. - -Due to the delicate political aspect of the DMZ as well as the -non-repatriated POWs in the custody of Indian forces, security measures -were of utmost importance. The Marine division activated a new unit, -the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company at 0800 on 4 -September. The new unit, charged with maintaining security throughout -the 1st Marine Division sector, became operational three days later. -Commanding officer was Captain Samuel G. Goich, formerly of F/2/7. Each -regiment from the division furnished 25 enlisted men and 1 officer to -form the company, including standby personnel. On 21 September, the -DMZ Police Company was attached to the 5th Marines. Police Company -personnel were required to have had at least three months’ Korean -service, a General Classification Test score of at least 95, a minimum -height of 5 feet 10 inches, and were “selected for physical stature -and mental capacity required in coping with the delicate situation -existing within the Demilitarized Zone.”[670] The average DMZ company -member was said to know “map-reading on an officer level, first aid, -radio, and understand the fine print of the cease-fire agreement like a -striped-trouser diplomat.”[671] - - [670] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2. - - [671] Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,” p. 23. - -The mission of the Marine provisional police company as set up by the -truce agreement was to furnish military police escort for special -personnel visiting the DMZ and to apprehend truce violators or enemy -line crossers. Visitors who rated a military escort were members of -MAC, Joint Observer Teams, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission -personnel,[672] NNSC inspection teams or agency assistants, or other -VIPs authorized to enter the UN half by the Military Armistice -Commission. - - [672] The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all - phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted - of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection - teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland, - Poland, and Czechoslovakia. - -Six Marine DMZ military policemen, each armed with a .45 caliber pistol -and M-1 rifle, accompanied UN joint observer teams to the demarcation -line, midpoint between enemy and friendly boundaries, but did not -cross the MDL. I Corps orders directed that military police were to be -“responsible for the safety of the United Nations members of the team -and, when meetings are held south of the demarcation line, they will be -responsible for the safety of the CCF members of the team as well.”[673] - - [673] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to - addees, dtd 31 Jul 53. - -Major tasks performed by the 104-man company operating within the -2,000-yard wide, 28-mile-long zone were: - - To maintain surveillance over civilians within the UN half of the - DMZ; - - To apprehend and deliver to the Division Provost Marshal any line - crossers encountered who did not possess an authorized pass, - regardless of the direction from which such persons entered the - DMZ; and - - To provide check points on known routes through the zone and - observation posts, especially during the hours of reduced - visibility, and telephone all suspicious incidents to Regimental - S-2. - -DMZ Police Company personnel operated in motorized patrol teams and -traveled the entire division sector in radio or cargo jeeps. One -platoon was kept on a standby basis at camp to serve as a mobile -reserve in the event of an emergency. The roving patrols submitted -reports of all incidents, which were then compiled in a company report. -A copy was submitted to the S-2, the Northern Regiment, and 1st Marine -Division G-2. - -UNC security measures at all times were strict and uncompromising in -the Korean DMZ buffer zone. This included the salvage period, the -BIG SWITCH prisoner exchange that took place within the division -sector at Freedom Village from 5 August-6 September, and the lengthy -nonrepatriate POW settlement that extended through January 1954. In -places where the military demarcation line was not marked on the ground -or clearly recognizable, the conservative ruling was to stay at least -500 yards south of its estimated location. This applied both to body -recovery and salvage operations. The No-Fly line was scrupulously -verified. - -Alleged violations charged by the CCF/NKPA were checked out with -the Marine ground observation posts set up in August to record all -movements of fixed-wing (reconnaissance) and rotary aircraft in the -area. Helicopters were allowed to fly in the DMZ but no closer than the -500 yard limit from the MDL. Helicopters operating forward of CPs of -5th Marines units having sector responsibility were required to obtain -clearance from the ground unit concerned for each flight. Medical -evacuation copters, generally, were exempted from this restriction and -authorized a standing clearance. - -Commitments for the DMZ Police Company increased substantially with -arrival of the nonrepatriated POWs at their camp in the DMZ corridor -west of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines area. The Communist “explainers,” -as well as Polish and Czech members of the neutral Nations Commission, -had to be escorted while in the UN half of the DMZ. This required that -a 24-hour checkpoint and escort cadre be established in the zone. As -the number of enemy sightings, a daily occurrence in the DMZ, continued -to increase, the size of the police patrols increased correspondingly. -A typical example was related by a member of the police company: - - It was common practice of the Communists to have a group of - their men, supposedly their DMZ Police, walk up to the Military - Demarcation Line and either stand close to it or step across. - When one of our patrols approached in superior numbers to - attempt to apprehend them, the Communists would immediately - reinforce with more men. This made it necessary to have our - patrols at sufficient strength that they could protect themselves - from being kidnapped.[674] - - [674] Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist, - Folder #4, _op. cit._ - -As these requirements for security increased, the original complement -of approximately 5 officers and 99 men became inadequate to patrol -the DMZ. By late October the T/O strength of the 1st Provisional -Demilitarized Zone Police Company had been increased to 6 officers and -314 men. Authorization for the number of police personnel on duty in -the DMZ had similarly been augmented from 50 to 175. - -During the September salvage operations, five Marines in the DMZ were -taken into custody by the Chinese Communists. Charged with being in -unauthorized territory and violating terms of the armistice agreement, -they were later returned to United Nations jurisdiction. - - -_Organization of New Defense Positions_[675] - - [675] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type - “C” Rpt Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder - #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records - retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar - Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder - #3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar - Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in - Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, - 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt - Defense of “C” Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 - (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, - 1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt). - -Upon withdrawal from the demilitarized zone and organization of the -MBP, the Eighth Army established its plan for defense on a wide front. -This was based on the organization of strongpoints disposed in depth, -with planned counterattacks by mobile reserves. - -As it had during active hostilities, the 1st Marine Division in the -post-armistice period continued as one of the four UNC divisions -manning the general outpost and MBP in the U.S. I Corps sector. -Immediately east of the division was its long-time neighbor, the 1st -Commonwealth Division. Still further east in I Corps were the 1st ROK -and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions. - -Since 1 August, the Marine division had continued to outpost the most -favorable terrain in its sector below the southern boundary of the -DMZ. The division manned the No-Pass Line and prepared its defenses -to resume full scale military operations, if necessary. The Munsan-ni -Provisional Command, composed of the Marine-Navy-Army personnel -responsible for implementing the final prisoner exchange, was also -headquartered in the 1st Marine Division sector. - -The strongpoint organization of the division’s main battle position -was accomplished by the deployment of the 5th Marines at the general -outpost line of resistance (or OPLR, a term and concept not in use -since April 1952). The outpost defense concept embodied a number -of forward positions, lightly held in actual numbers of men but -strongly defended in numbers of automatic weapons and firepower. -(This capability was possible due to the excess number of automatic -weapons on hand, above normal T/E allowances, which previously had -been required by MLR defenses.) In the organization of the positions, -emphasis was placed on construction of bunkered observation posts, the -emplacement of automatic weapons with flanking fires, and clearing of -fields of fire for these weapons. - -Basically, the general concept of OPLR defense was to establish -mutually supporting defensive positions across the front, as well as to -develop additional defense in depth positions whose strength increased -from front to rear. The positions thus formed successive defense lines, -from the southern DMZ boundary--the new Marine division front--south -to the KANSAS Line, the Main Battle Position. (These defense lines -were the old secondary defensive lines of WYOMING, KANSAS, and KANSAS -SWITCH.) The KMC, 1st Marines, 7th Marines, and other units located -in the KANSAS vicinity engaged in bunker construction and trench -improvement. Battalion fire plans coordinated the organic, attached, -and supporting weapons. Construction of the new positions and -development of the KANSAS Line would be a continuing process throughout -the rest of the year. - -The 1st Marines received the assignment of developing the blocking -positions, most of these battalion-sized strongpoints. As in the past, -division support units continued to be located in the old rear supply -areas south of the Imjin. In early August the division had stationed -the 7th Marines in the right sector; the 1st KMC in the center; and -the 1st Marines, to the south of the KMC sector. The 11th Marines, -to the rear of the 7th Marines, had displaced its artillery, relaid, -and was prepared to fire in support of the general outpost and MBP. -(Map 35.) Additional artillery battalions included I Corps and army -units. Essentially these were the positions held until early October -when, during a period of political unrest resulting from the prisoner -exchange, the 1st Marines relieved the 1st KMC/RCT in the center -sector (which held the southern approaches to Freedom Bridge and the -nonrepatriate war compound). The Korean unit then relocated to blocking -positions and assumed the mission of reserve regiment. - -[Illustration: - - MAP 35 K. WHITE - E. WILSON - -1st MARINE DIVISION - -POST-ARMISTICE MAIN BATTLE POSITION - -30 SEPTEMBER 1953] - -Marine support units--motor transport, tank, service, medical, aerial -liaison (VMO/HMR)--were in the same general rear area, as was the -headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Marine Division -CP continued to be located at Yongji-ri, although construction of a -new site further south at Chormyon was due to be completed by engineer -personnel on 1 October. The division railhead and truckhead remained, -respectively, at Munsan-ni and Ascom City. To the left of the KMC -sector was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Still further west, -separated from other units by the Han River, was the Kimpo Provisional -Regiment, in its former wartime sector. - -As the division OPLR regiment, the 5th Marines held a line 36,000 yards -in length--about 21 miles--roughly corresponding to the front manned -by three regiments during the war. The OPLR sector included the entire -area in the divisional zone of responsibility north of the Imjin. -Boundaries of the 5th Marines territory were the southern DMZ truce -line on the west and north, the Samichon River to the east, and that -major water barrier, the curving Imjin River, to the rear. - -After establishment of the DMZ, the division occupied unfavorable low -ground poorly suited to the defense and inferior to that held by the -enemy--continuing the same situation that had existed during the period -of stabilized combat operations in West Korea. Almost without exception -the southern boundary of the DMZ prohibited the Marines from moving -onto the commanding terrain, as the No-Pass Line was behind or along -the reverse slopes of the high ground. On the other hand, in most cases -the CCF had the advantage of having forward slope positions as well as -the crests plus most of the commanding terrain in the area. - -Communist territory in the northern DMZ sector included the former -strongholds of Yoke, Bunker Hill, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, East -Berlin and Warsaw. Within the Marine division postwar area were the -Panmunjom Corridor and outposts Marilyn, Kate, the Boulder City hills, -and the Hook. Much of the terrain between the major hill positions -along the 5th Marines regimental front and the Imjin River consisted of -low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of the rice paddies. - -Construction of new positions and the defense system of the 5th -Marines was based on several assumptions about enemy capabilities, -made by G-2 and the new regimental CO, Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins, -who had assumed command on 2 August. These were: that in the event -of resumption of hostilities by the CCF the enemy would use his jet -fighters and bombers in support of operations; that he would continue -to have numerical superiority in artillery; and that the northern -outpost regiment would have no reinforcement or surface resupply from -units south of the Imjin. - -The defense plan for the forward part of the 5th Marines sector in -event of a resumption of hostilities called for furnishing patrols -equipped with radios and FO teams to occupy Hills 155, 229, and 181. -(Hill 155 was directly south of the DMZ in the 2/5 left battalion -sector; Hills 229 and 181 were, respectively, just inside and just -outside the southern boundary of the truce line in the center 1/5 -sector.) From these three elevations the patrols would then have the -mission of bringing down artillery fire on enemy concentrations and -relaying communications about the situation to the friendly main attack -force. Other critical hill masses in the OPLR regimental sector were -Hill 126 (in the 3/5 eastern battalion sector, just inside the Marine -side of the DMZ) and Hill 163, in the Hook area. The latter hill was -not as suitable for defense since it was located south of the military -demarcation line and was thus less accessible. - -These hill masses so completely dominated the major enemy approaches -through the division sector to the Imjin, the lower river crossing -sites and bridges, that their occupation by Marine personnel was -considered essential in the event of any attack. Hill 229, adjacent to -the Chan-dang corridor and part of the 229-181 axis, was considered the -most critical terrain feature in the entire northern section. - -Key areas to the rear of the 5th Marines’ sector were the two operating -bridges (Freedom in 2/5 territory and Libby on the 3/5 right) and the -two interior crossing sites (Honker and Spoonbill). All provided access -to the Imjin and division support units deployed on the south side of -the river. In the event of threatened hostile attack, the Northern -Regiment was under orders to destroy the bridges to prevent their use -by the enemy on any attempted advance to the rear. - -Strong perimeter defenses, called “Bridgehead Positions” were to be -built by 5th Marines’ battalions. Two were to protect the two bridges -and a third, to include both ferry sites. Between the forward defended -localities and the rear bridgehead positions, alternate and secondary -sites were organized to create mutually supporting defenses in depth. -The bridgeheads were a combination of linear and strongpoint defense, -capable of withstanding severe pressure. - -Organization of the defensive positions in the 5th Marine sector -was complicated both by peculiarities of the terrain and political -restrictions due to proximity of the DMZ. In addition to the regiment’s -excess frontage, the demilitarized zone immediately to the front -precluded use of either aerial or motorized reconnaissance for early -warning. Security measures for the OPLR were less than ideal. Neither -proper patrols nor a covering force in front of the OPLR was possible; -the best that could be done was to maintain patrols along the friendly -side of the No-Pass Line. - -As the regimental left battalion pointed out: “Location of the DMZ and -the No-Pass Line made the trace of the OPLR follow an artificial and -arbitrary line rather than that of the best terrain.”[676] The most -critical terrain feature in the sector, Hill 155, was located just -outside the southern boundary of the DMZ. Although its possession was -essential to successful defense of the OPLR and the bridgehead defense -positions being developed to the interior and rear of the battalion -sector, Hill 155 could not be occupied because of the armistice -agreement. The solution to the problem was simply to occupy the best -ground adjacent to the No-Pass Line. - - [676] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4. - -Placement of automatic weapons was a factor of great importance in -organizing the defensive positions. In order to accomplish the mission -of an OPLR, weapons had to be situated to bring the enemy under fire at -maximum ranges. Accordingly, machine guns and other weapons were placed -on high ground well to the front. Some Marines commented that: - - Many individuals having the MLR concept in mind insisted that - weapons should be located forward on low ground to provide - grazing fire. A period of education was required. For the same - reason, it was necessary to place 81mm mortar and 4.2-inch mortar - positions further forward than they would normally be in support - of the MLR.[677] - - [677] _Ibid._ - -The problem of establishing depth to the defensive positions was never -solved to the satisfaction of everyone. This was due primarily to the -extended front which necessitated using more units for support elements -than would normally be done. This situation was partly alleviated by -establishing some unit defensive sectors further to the rear in the -company areas. - -Another difficulty was the inadequate allocation of ammunition: -one-half JAMESTOWN load on position, and another half-load available -at the regimental dump. The JAMESTOWN load unit had been developed for -use in a stabilized defense situation where automatic weapons were -aimed as the enemy came in close proximity to the MLR. On the other -hand, OPLR machine guns and weapons were required to open up at maximum -ranges and might well be fired for extended periods of time. It was -calculated that A4 machine guns firing at medium rate (75 rpm) would -expend the one-half JAMESTOWN load in 22 minutes, while an A1 machine -gun at medium rate (125 rpm) would exhaust the same load in 13 minutes. -A partial improvement was obtained by moving the ammunition loads from -regimental to battalion dumps although the basic problem of limited -allocation--shared also by rear infantry regiments--continued to exist. - -An unique situation that had confronted the 2d Battalion and at times -the adjoining 1st Battalion stemmed from the large numbers of Army -engineer personnel building the nonrepatriate POW camp in the DMZ -immediately west of the 2/5 sector. During August and the first part of -September, the area in front of 2/5 had been used as a base camp for -5,000–7,000 construction personnel. Although their area was crowded -with these additional units, the Marine battalions could not exercise -any control over them. The Marines were still responsible for security -of the sector, however. Presence of as many as 22,000 nonrepatriate -CCF and NKPA prisoners as well as the Indian custodial forces further -complicated the matter. It was noted that: - - At the same time the Army engineers were building the camp, the - prisoners were situated in the middle of the 2/5 area and the MSR - to Panmunjom led completely across the battalion position into - the 1/5 sector [and thence] into the DMZ. Upon completion of the - camp, the engineers withdrew from the area but as they withdrew - the 5,500 troops of the Custodial Forces India were brought in - to guard the nonrepatriate prisoners. With the arrival of the - prisoners, the number of personnel in the regiment’s sector - of responsibility rose to 28,000–30,000. Thus, the problem of - having a GOP mission and at the same time having never less than - 5,000 and as many as 30,000 friendly, neutral, and/or prisoner - personnel in front of our most forward defended localities was - always present.[678] - - [678] 5thMar Hist, pp. 6–7, Folder #3. - -Camp construction and development of the new positions south of the -river continued at a furious pace from August through early October. -Since the new camp sites were in civilian populated areas, “it was -necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be -occupied or improved.”[679] After clearance was obtained on 29 July, -division engineers immediately began work on five separate camps. -These camp building activities and reconnaissance of assigned blocking -positions continued until 10 August. At this time, construction began -on the major blocking positions, so organized and developed as to be -self-sustaining for several days. Whether squad, platoon, or company, -all positions were organized using a perimeter type defense and were -mutually supporting laterally and in depth. Connecting trenches, -bunkers, ammunition holes, and tank slots were also built. - - [679] 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd - 19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6. - -By early October, construction of the blocking positions was completed -by the 1st Marines despite the fierce summer heat, the numerous rock -formations in the area that were difficult to dig out with limited -tools and demolitions, and the shortage of personnel due to units -participating in the new series of division MARLEX exercises, resumed -in October. Within three months, the Marine division had thus largely -completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position. -The importance of maintaining combat readiness for any renewed -hostility on the part of the enemy demanded continuing vigilance at all -times. - -Defense specifications throughout the 5th Marines northern general -outpost sector called for some 1,560 individual fighting positions, -400 automatic weapons sites, 8 bunkered infantry OPs, 30 bunkered -CPs, 15,400 yards of trenchlines, and 70,000 yards of protective -and tactical wire. In construction of the MBP, all bunkers were so -blended and camouflaged with the natural terrain that they were almost -impossible to be seen. - -To the division rear, the location of recoilless rifle positions, FDC -bunkers, and tank slots in the blocking positions and bridgeheads was -the major priority. In the antimechanized defense plan, tanks covered -likely avenues of approach into the general outpost area and also -overlooked critical river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing -positions which had been previously prepared to support the secondary -lines WYOMING and KANSAS were utilized. By the end of the year, 204 -tank firing positions had been emplaced throughout the Marine division -sector. - -Three rehearsals for the occupation of the main battle position were -held by the 1st Marine Division in September. All division units, -both combat and service, participated in these exercises. Tactical -units were required to occupy the MBP and be fully prepared for combat -on four hours’ notice; service units were to provide additional -local security required for the elimination of enemy infiltrators or -guerrilla agents. Divisional and I Corps test exercises indicated -that three hours were necessary to man the MBP during daylight and -approximately three and one half hours at night. - - -_Postwar Employment of Marine Units in_ FECOM[680] - - [680] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, Chap. 10; AnlRpt - CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug 54; AnlRpt CMC - to SecNav for FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs, - Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E. - Heinecke, “Four Star Visit,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 1 - (Jan 54). - -The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Post-Armistice Plan, as part of Fifth -Air Force operations, was effective at 2200, on 27 July. Its purpose, -basically, was to insure that wing elements carried out provisions of -the armistice and yet continued to maintain a high level of combat -readiness in the uneasy truce period. - -Two major operational restrictions had been imposed on the UNC air -force by the armistice. The first was establishment of the “No-Fly -Line” south of the Allied southern boundary of the DMZ. Any flight -beyond that point had to be authorized by JOC and a barrier patrol was -maintained by FAF to apprehend any violators of the truce provisions. -The 1st MAW contribution to this aerial security team was night patrols -performed by F3D-2s from VMF(N)-513 and radar-configured AD aircraft -from VMC-1 (later, by the new VMA-251 squadron). - -The second post-truce restriction, which affected wing logistic -movements, limited the entry and departure of all Korean air traffic -to five airfields. These aerial ports were K-2, K-8, K-9, K-14, and -K-18. (K-16 was later added.) Neither K-3, the east coast home field of -MAG-33 nor K-6, located just inland from the west coast and the site of -MAG-12 operations, was included. All Marine traffic landed either at -K-9 or K-2 for inventory, a procedure which subsequently developed into -a bottleneck, and caused supply delays due to the substantial reduction -in payload made to accommodate the necessary extra fuel due to greater -overland distances between airfields. When the CG, 1st MAW requested -that K-3 be made a port of entry to avoid the difficulties involved in -use of the two FAF fields, ComNavFE disapproved the request with the -following rationale: - - ComNavFE feels that to ask for designation of K-3 as an - additional port of entry would be politically inadvisable. It - would provide the Communists with a basis for a propaganda claim - that the United Nations were attempting to further delay an - armistice agreement. Should the Communists propose an additional - port of entry for their side, COMNAVFE states the UN Military - Armistice Commission will offer designation of K-3 as a _quid pro - quo_.[681] - - [681] _PacFlt EvalRpt_, No. 6, p. 10-74. - -Removal from Korea to Japan of operational combat aircraft for routine -maintenance runs and their return thus had to be made through the same -port of exit and reentry. Inspections were conducted by the USAF combat -aircraft control officer at the port. - -The post-truce 1st MAW mission, in part, comprised the following: - - ... to maintain assigned forces in a state of combat - readiness, provide for security of assigned forces, areas, - and installations; observe the conditions of the Armistice - Agreement; support other elements of the United Nations Command - as required; be prepared to counter any attempt on the part - of the enemy to resume active hostilities; continue current - missions other than combat; insure that 1st MAW personnel and - combat material are not increased beyond the level present at - the instant of the effective time of the Armistice Agreement; - submit reports on 1st MAW personnel and controlled items of Wing - equipment entering or leaving Korea; be prepared to disperse - air units within or from Korea as necessary to provide maximum - security during an Armistice....[682] - - [682] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1. - -The strict interpretation of replacing combat aircraft, armored -vehicles, weapons, and ammunition that were destroyed, worn out, or -used up during the period of armistice was, of course, due to the -sensitive political considerations. It was felt that replacement of -combat equipment by UNC forces: - - ... would result in the Communists adopting the same liberal - interpretation which is undesirable since it will lessen the - control of combat material in North Korea and could permit - them to replace phenomenal unauthorized quantities of material - damaged, destroyed, worn out or used up prior to the effective - date of the Armistice Agreement.[683] - - [683] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all - units, dtd 16 Aug 53. - -In August, postwar procedures were mapped out for 1st MAW personnel, -as part of the overall quota limitations prescribed by FECOM (Far -East Command) through FEAF and FAF echelons. A 1st MAW headquarters -section, designated as 1st MAW, rear echelon, was established at Itami -AFB, Japan, two hours’ flight from Korea. All incoming or outgoing -aviation personnel on permanent change of station orders were to report -to the rear echelon, 1st MAW. Announcement of Marine Corps plans to -initiate future postwar rotation on a stretch-out basis (for both air -and ground personnel) was also made in August. Preliminary plans called -for changing the current 11-month combat tour in Korea to 14 months by -March 1954, and possibly 16-month tours by July 1954, if extension of -Korean service proved necessary. As with division personnel, monthly -cumulative arrivals were not to exceed the number of departing aviation -Marines. The quota set by FEAF for 1st MAW rotation for the month of -August was 600, compared to the Marine division quota of 3,000 for -ground personnel. - -With the 1st Marine Division engaged for an unknown length of time -in its postwar mission as an occupation force and 1st MAW units -continuing to operate under FAF in Korea, new Marine ground and -air units were assigned to the Far East theater shortly after the -conclusion of Korean hostilities. On 23 July, the 3d Marine Division, -together with supporting air units, was readied for deployment from -Camp Pendleton to Japan the following month. On 13 August the division -CP was opened afloat and units proceeded to Japan between 16–30 August. -The mission of this division and the two major air units, MAGs-11 -and -16, was to maintain a high state of readiness in the Far East -Command and to assist in the air defense of Japan. As explained by the -Commandant, their redeployment was accomplished “in order to provide -the amphibious capability which is an important element of national -strategy in that predominantly maritime theater.”[684] - - [684] AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p. II-2. - -The new Marine units thus joined in the Pacific, the 1st Provisional -Marine Air-Ground Task Force[685] that had been activated in Kaneohe, -Hawaii in January of 1953. Commanded by Brigadier General James P. -Risely, it was to include a headquarters company, reinforced regiment, -and reinforced aircraft group. The special task force was designated -as a hard-hitting, air-ground team that could respond immediately as a -force-in-readiness to any emergency in the Pacific area. - - [685] The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st - Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956. - -Commanded by Major General Robert H. Pepper, the 21,100-man 3d Marine -Division was called the “Three-Dimensional Division,” in reference -to its training in airborne, amphibious, and atomic warfare. Within -six months, its components were to stretch from Kobe to Tokyo, with -division headquarters and the 9th Marines at Gifu, the 4th Marines at -Nara, and other units at Otsu. - -New Marine air units, which included Marine Transport Squadron 253 -and Marine Observation Squadron 2, as well as MAGs-11 and -16, all -came under 1st MAW operational control. Commanded by Colonel John -D. Harshberger, the all-jet MAG-11, formerly based at Edenton, -N.C., arrived at NAS Atsugi on 10 September. It comprised three F9F -squadrons, VMFs-222, -224, and -314. Also at Atsugi, the Marine Corps -aerial gateway to Japan, was the new transport squadron, VMR-253, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Fleps, which reported in to -CG, 1st MAW, on 16 August. Following numerous FMFPac requests for -additional air transport capability, the Commandant had authorized -transfer of the squadron from El Toro to assist the veteran wartime -carrier VMR-152 in the enormous postwar airlift program. - -Flying new R4Q Fairchild Packets, which could carry 42 troops, the -squadron from August to May 1954 logged more than 5,000,000 passenger -miles in transporting Marine replacements for the 1st and 3d Marine -Divisions. Additional air capability was provided by Marine Helicopter -Transport Group 16 (at Hanshin AFB) under Colonel Harold J. Mitchener, -with its two HRS-2 (HMR-162, HMR-163) and service squadrons (MAMs-16, -MABS-16) and VMO-2, commanded by Major William G. MacLean (based at -Itami). Both units reported to 1st MAW and FECOM on 13 August. - -Major command changes within the 1st MAW that month were: Brigadier -General Verne J. McCaul, vice Brigadier General Alexander W. Kreiser, -Jr. as ACG, 1st MAW, effective 16 August; and Colonel William F. -Hausman, vice Colonel Carney, CO, MAG-12, on 8 August. (The new MAG-33 -CO, Colonel Smith, had succeeded Colonel Stacy in late July.) - -In the immediate post-armistice period, extensive training programs -were instituted by MAGs-12 and -33 to maintain high operational -efficiency. Marine aircraft remained on JOC alert as required by the -Fifth Air Force and flew training missions scheduled by 1st MAW and -FAF. These consisted of practice strikes against heavily-defended -targets, practice CAS for Eighth Army units, GCI (ground control -intercept) flights under MGCIS-3 control, and bombing practice using -the Naktong Bombing Range. Other training sorties were scheduled -in reconnaissance navigation, weather penetration, determining -fuel bingos,[686] target location and identification, air defense -patrolling, and coordination of tactical procedures in the target area. -The training schedules provided a well-balanced indoctrination program -for new squadron flight leaders, pilots, radar operators, and other -crew members arriving in Korea on the postwar personnel drafts. - - [686] A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to - reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to - an alternate airfield. - -A new work day schedule of 0700–1500 implemented in August made more -time available for athletics, swimming, studying, and R&R (Rest & -Recreation). That same month the MAG-12 softball team won the Fifth Air -Force “All Korea” softball championship. Following this achievement, -the team left for Japan to compete in the FAF “Far East” softball -tournament which included teams from all the major Pacific bases. -Subsequently, the K-6 players “disguised in Air Force uniforms, went -onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September.”[687] MAG-33 -pilots, meanwhile, participated in Operation SPYGLASS, a FAF training -exercise in August and Operation BACK DOOR, the following month. -Both emphasized interception flying and work with GCI squadrons. As -“aggressors,” the Pohang-based airmen made simulated attacks on South -Korean targets “defended” by Air Force and other land-based Marine -units. In October, MAG-33 pilots flew CAS missions for the 1st Marine -Division training problem, MARLEX IV, a battalion landing exercise -staged by 1/7 on Tokchok-to Island. Beginning that month a new -procedure was inaugurated by MAG-33 and the recently-arrived MAG-11. -Every week, four MAG-11 pilots came to Korea for a week of orientation -flying with a MAG-33 squadron to gain a better picture of typical -flying conditions in the Korean theater. - - [687] Field, _NavOps, Korea_, pp. 456–457. - -Early in 1955 the 1st Marine Division, which had been in the Korean -front lines almost continuously since September 1950, returned to -Camp Pendleton. Redeployment by echelons began in February. By June, -all units had returned to CONUS. The transfer from Korean occupation -duty was effected in order that the division’s “valuable capability -as a highly trained amphibious force in readiness may be fully -realized.”[688] Now under Major General Merrill B. Twining,[689] the -division had been a part of Eighth Army occupying postwar defense -positions in Korea until its relief on 17–18 March 1955 by the U.S. -24th Infantry Division. - - [688] AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3, - quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming - departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM. - - [689] Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major - General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and - served from 12 May 54–22 Jul 54; Major General Robert - E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54–17 Jan 55; and General Twining, - beginning 18 Jan 55. - -In addition to its official mission in the Eighth Army line, the 1st -Marine Division had conducted an active small-unit amphibious training -program during its postwar Korea duty. All but two of its infantry -battalions had carried out assault landings on Tokchok-to, off the -Korean west coast south of Inchon, prior to its departure for the -United States. The 3d Marine Division had also conducted an active -training program, with numerous small-unit exercises and regimental -landings staged at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as part of its continuous -readiness conditioning. - -For Marine air personnel, their official departure from Korea following -the 1st MAW wartime assignment there, came the next year. Beginning in -June 1956, initial units of the Marine aircraft wing were withdrawn -from Korea and relocated at NAS Iwakuni, Japan. Plans called for the -wing, then under Brigadier General Samuel S. Jack[690] and occupying -bases in both Korea and Japan, to be permanently headquartered at -Iwakuni and revert to CinCPacFlt control. The wing remained on station -in the Far East as a component of postwar United States defense -strength in that area. - - [690] CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period - were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major General - Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General - McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L. - Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack, - 25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56. - -The prewar Fifth Air Force and Eighth U.S. Army commands, under which -Marine Corps air and ground units had functioned during the Korean -War, were permanently deployed in the Far East as operative military -echelons. EUSAK-FAF transferred from its wartime JOC location at Seoul -to Osan-ni in January 1954 and in September of that year relocated to -Nagoya, Japan. Eighth Army headquarters remained at Seoul. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -Korean Reflection - -_Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War: Ground, Air, -Helicopter--FMF and Readiness Posture--Problems Peculiar to the Korean -War--Korean Lessons_ - - -_Marine Corps Role and Contribution to the Korean War: Ground_[691] - - [691] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports - of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter _Rpt - of SecDef_; _PacFlt EvalRpts_, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. - 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board - Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps - Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec - 50), vs. I and II, hereafter _USMC Board Rpt_, held in - James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A - Summary of the General Officers’ Conference, HQMC, 19–21 - Aug 53, hereafter _Generals’ Summary_, at Breckinridge - Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of - USMC Action in Korean War; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I, II, - III, IV, _passim_; Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; - Robert D. Heinl, Jr., _Soldiers of the Sea: The United - States Marine Corps, 1775–1962_ (Annapolis, Md.: United - States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, _Soldiers - of Sea_; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’” - from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline - of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in - Korea,” HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; _CheVron_, MCRD, San - Diego, Calif., V. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From - Camp Pendleton to Inchon--18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. - Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in - Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter _CheVron_. - -Ground operations of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can -be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense -(August-September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September-October 1950), -the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October-December 1950), East-Central -Korea (January 1951-March 1952), West Korea (March 1952-July 1953), and -the post-armistice period (July 1953-February 1955). - -Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective -deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks -following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a -time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback -to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being “mothballed”; personnel -of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest -possible effective manpower levels. - -From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of -475,600 in 1944–1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean -emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There -were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps -authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established -for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all -defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period -had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected -at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950. - -This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular -infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two -battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine -Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, -were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice -the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were -located in the Far East. - -Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once -again would be in the forefront of American military response to the -Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed -South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan -attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas -MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine -RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st -Division. Major components of the brigade--a balanced force of ground, -service, and aviation elements--were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five -days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to -answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide -engulfing Korea. - -The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan -Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy -breakthroughs--at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7 -August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack -toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS -to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action. -Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy bridgehead at the -Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first -victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict. - -Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the -Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the -JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between -10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests -for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing -determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of -the overextended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the -enemy. - -In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly -understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war -levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting -of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements -of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August. -Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of -15 September. - -Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed -by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming -Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A. -Craig, USMC, later reminisced: - - Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never - actually trained or worked together, they still combined and - executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the - fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by - the Marines.[692] - - [692] _CheVron_, pp. 4–5. - -Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it -a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the -face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had -operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade “marked the first time that the air and ground elements, -task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat.”[693] - - [693] _Ibid._ Even though Marine air and ground forces had - on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air - support in the early days was considered a subsidiary - rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of - Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not - fully employed before the end of hostilities. - -In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General -Oliver P. Smith’s 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack in the -first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Communist-held -territory. This maneuver was closely timed against enormous odds -of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal fluctuations of 31 -feet) which made 15 September the only suitable assault date until -mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning sessions by General -MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the operation had been so -unsettling that the designated Attack Force Commander for the landing, -Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed the view that “the best I can -say is that Inchon is not impossible.”[694] - - [694] Quoted in _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle - was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet. - -Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture of -Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield by the -Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke the backbone -of the North Korean People’s Army 1950 offensive. The 1st Marine -Division, in its successfully executed amphibious landing, had offered -UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy decisively before a -Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished under the most adverse -weather and geographic conditions, the assault proved anew the decisive -power of amphibious forces employed at a critical time and place. This -capability and readiness of the Marine Corps had totally reversed the -military situation, and a battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent -routing of the NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps -and the Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory -had not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean -counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander General -MacArthur’s early premise that: - - ... air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that - nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could - give any assurance of stopping the Communists and of later - regaining the lost ground.[695] - - [695] _Ibid._, p. 3. - -The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record -time--approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods -ever allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning, -assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of 29,000 -Marines and support personnel. - -With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division -(including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the -liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the -east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of -the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part -of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east -coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps -would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army -troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south. - -While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received -that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised -X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the -Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th -Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This -drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would -rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the -Marine Corps. - -Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North -Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA -resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered -the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950, -the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese -Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting, -the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF -Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit. - -When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir, -X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault -force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with -the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began -to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal -assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the -reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR -held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the -reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts -considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only -way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind. -Instead, the Marines seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path -through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its -way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding -mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on -15 December, it redeployed to South Korea. - -Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and -attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment -and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood -hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions. -The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division -properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable -equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical -integrity. - -Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or -reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the -division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy -in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF -9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly -three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and -reorganization. - -Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for -Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander, -General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division -led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on -the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring -offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational -control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive -position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine -Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern -Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor. - -Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951 -when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks -initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and -the Marine Division was engaged in new counterthrusts in the Punchbowl -area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in -some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed -that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November -1951, as a result of the truce talks and possibility of ending -hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth -Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the -front. - -The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare, -a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21 -months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952, -the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X -Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the -average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by -the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical -and resupply missions. - -In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern -X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth -Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the -path of the enemy’s invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in -the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front. -Here the division’s four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean -Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 35 miles of front line in the critical -Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations -negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector -of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the -best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high -regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the -Marines. - -West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had -the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more -manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role, -rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost -continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby -Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war -flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain -for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat -off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook, -Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until--literally--the final day of -the war, 27 July 1953. - -In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the -Navy commented: - - Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success - in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine - Division began its third year in Korea holding an active sector - of the United Nations front guarding the enemy’s invasion route - to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese - attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the - heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front - held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and - numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy - off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting - with numerous casualties on both sides.[696] - - [696] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 185. - -This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction -to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible -“mission accomplished.” The year of positional warfare in western Korea -was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered -approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine -Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional -244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During -this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air) -totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT. -Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent[697] of the infantry -Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the “static,” outpost -warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this -period--representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines -wounded during the three years of conflict. - - [697] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; - air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties - of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were - KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952-July 1953 period - cited above. - - * * * * * - -Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of -the war. The enemy’s improved capability in artillery during the latter -period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty -rate at this time. It has been noted that: - - Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing, - the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most - personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of - western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the - Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.[698] - - [698] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16. - -It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists -in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The -protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of -the Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war -period--from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms -of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though -not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of -warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation -fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of -weapons and personnel at hand. - -As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX, -and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions -representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed -its assigned mission--to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed -heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was -considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions--the other being the -Marines’ neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With -the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the -biggest and strongest division in EUSAK. - -Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made -possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military -experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only -in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the -Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff “had predicted publicly, hardly -six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale -amphibious landing.”[699] In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics, -however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the -tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver--envelopment -by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus -responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine -from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced -concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable, -established procedures. - - [699] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen - G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton, - _The Marine Officer’s Guide_ (Annapolis: United States - Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130. - -Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the -1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front -because of this capability. It was the UN commander’s desire to have -EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped division near the coast -in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or -defensive purposes. Again, in the division’s 1952 move to the western -coastal front in the Kimpo area, this fighting capability was a major -consideration. - -To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of -the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war--only five years -removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during -the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other -services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the -helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951. - -Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting -from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops -with specially insulated footgear. The new thermal boot virtually -eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored -utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but -were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the -experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight -body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the -Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the -prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a -request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000 -vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had -received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body -armor had also been put into production. - -Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity -missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from -30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent -after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties -were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the -cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been -extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could -the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the -money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine -armored vest to just $37.50. - - -_Air_[700] - - [700] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, - Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; _USMC Board Rpts_, vs. 1-11; - _Generals’ Summary_; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; _USMC Ops - Korea_ vs. I-IV, _passim_; Monograph, _A Brief History of - Marine Corps Aviation_, (HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960); - Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_; Sherrod, _Marine - Aviation_; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, - “1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The - Acid Test,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 5 (May - 57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. - Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the - Armistice,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun - 57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies, - 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW - folder, HRB ref. file. - -On 3 August 1950, eight VMF-214 Corsairs led by squadron executive -officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS -_Sicily_ to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action. -From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing -flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess -of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II. -Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the -Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots -were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These -included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue -operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure -Allied air superiority. - -With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units -were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris’ -1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG-33 elements were quickly readied -for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by -Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG-33 comprised Headquarters and -Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF-214 and -323, an echelon of -nightfighters from VMF(N)-513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control -Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus -the observation squadron, VMO-6. Forward elements were quickly on their -way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the -Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons -152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift -operations. - -After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the -fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following -214 into the -war, VMF-323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS _Badoeng -Strait_ in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade -mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG-33 carrier -squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound -bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)-513 began its regularly-scheduled night -tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply -and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea. -VMO-6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area -three days earlier. - -Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air -support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second -Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops -near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the -brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington: - - Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding - adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without - devastating losses ... The Marines on our left were a sight to - behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, - but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it - like artillery. It was, ‘Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the - left of that ridge in from Item Company.’ They had it _day and - night_.[701] - - [701] Quoted in Andrew Geer, _The New Breed--The Story of the - U.S. Marines in Korea_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, - 1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher. - -And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the -forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG-33’s little aerial Photo Unit (part of -Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of -the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver. - -During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG-33 was joined by three MAG-12 -fighter squadrons: VMF-212, VMF-312, and VMF(N)-542. After the -capture of Kimpo airfield, 212’s “Devilcats” and 542’s nightfighters -transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters, -Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried -dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew -its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from -the East Coast. While the MAG-12 land-based squadrons and the carrier -pilots functioned as the division’s flying artillery, MGCIS-1 set up a -radar warning system and MTACS-2 established a Tactical Air Direction -Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action. - -With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF-312 -and VMF(N)-542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF-212, -VMF(N)-513, VMO-6, HqSq-12, and carrier-based VMF-323) shifted to the -Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent -deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began -arriving at the port city’s airfield on 13 October. Division Marines, -meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000 -expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26 -October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was “one -of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed -ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn’t miss putting up a -big sign-board “_Welcome, 1st Division!_”[702] - - [702] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in - Korea,” Part I, _Marine Corps Gazette_, May 1957, p. 45. - -As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting -front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and -the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter -test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing -conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common -operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often -caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land at alternate -fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the -southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition -and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical -support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by -Air Force C-47s and C-119s. Later on, during the first step of the -grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized -steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over -a chasm. - -Beginning with the load-out for Wonsan in early October, the 1st MAW -was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air -Force.[703] Echelons of FAF air command and control initially slowed -operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice -communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped -improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG, -1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems -eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine -aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the -use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy -CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from -one to two per battalion. - - [703] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency - for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation - units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine - Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st - ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the - formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air - Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated - under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the - Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came - under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and - the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board - Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14. - -The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the -greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four -CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted -enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at -Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF-323 -flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown -daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction -missions beyond the bombline. Marine Panther jets of VMF-311, operating -with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo. -It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction -center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with -the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR-152 R5D -transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control -air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve -center. - -From late November to early December, as the division battled its way -from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated -more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most -critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S-1 helicopters -from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated -by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major -offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822 -sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units. - -From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of -FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids -to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefront, -general support sorties outside the bombline, and CAS flights to -support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF -focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that -Marine flyers participated in: - - In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW - undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist - supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th - Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system. - - On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of - the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at - Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu. - -Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction -effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May. -When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter, -MAG-12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the -MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began -in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of -MACG-2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion, -attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the -approaches to key military ports. - -New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War -advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for -versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine -aviation’s primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS, -regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ-14 radar-controlled -bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by -MASRT-1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general -support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding -and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a -bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen -the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing -methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle -situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC -components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April -1953 when VMF(N)-513 and the VMO-6 spotter planes evolved the new -searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage -for 1st Marine Division ground units. - -In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late -1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)-513’s new two-place jet-intruder -F3D Skyknights on Air Force B-29 night bombing missions. During a -four-month period from 1952–1953, the Marine night fighters downed -one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B-29s. Once the -F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became -negligible. - -A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter -was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground -controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft. -It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance -from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)-513 -direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron’s -planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B-29s. In -November 1952, the Marine squadron’s two night kills were the first -ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the -end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the -earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine -or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)-513 -were original in concept and required a high-level of training and -individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was -noted that: - - The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has - been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)-513 - had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a - mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an - important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more - important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber - formations.[704] - - [704] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-82. - -An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of -VMJ-1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force -escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ-1 was commissioned in -February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF -operational control until late in the war, the squadron’s 550-mph -F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy country--even -as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu--photographing positions, airfields, -power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the -photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were -rated so important that “24 Air Force F-86 jets flew an umbrella.”[705] -Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major -step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior -photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new -advanced-design view finder and operating range. - - [705] “1st MAW in Korea,” _op. cit._, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23. - -Coverage from VMJ-1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed -prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times -around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed -a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew -as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions. - -Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG-12 (VMAs-212, -251, --121; and -332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb -loads on CCF installations, while MAG-33’s two jet-fighter squadrons -(VMF-115 and -311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured -the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F-86s on fighter sweeps. - -During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs-214, -233, -312, and --251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved -techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of -Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its -value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF-214 and -323[706] -had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby -providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements -at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from -Japan. - - [706] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons - were subsequently redesignated as attack units. - -In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne -tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July -1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak -along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery, -the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front -of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a -similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands. By December, -apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK -had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The -antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs -per aircraft per mission,[707] had measurably decreased casualties -for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953 -this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no -corresponding reduction in the sortie rate. - - [707] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting - pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction - missions and two passes on CAS flights. - -Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing -use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were -instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the -commissioning of VMC-1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively -assigned to MACG-2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force -ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of -ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar -control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC-1 -remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as -its prime function. - -For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two -Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit -Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for -downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a -United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could -also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the -ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed -dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or -operational accidents. - -From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the -1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a -component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite -the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command -structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial -doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were -never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution -in providing really effective close, speedy tactical support during -the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953. -Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net -system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During -this final month of the war--and indicative of the enormous amount of -coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus--1st MAW -planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline -divisions. - -CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the -war, that “the Wing’s association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air -Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a -professionally broadening experience--teaching tolerance, teamwork, and -flexibility of operations.”[708] - - [708] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st - MAW, Part II, _op. cit._, p. 26. - -Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for frontline -units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing’s -skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine -ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean -action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the -helicopter--which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and -pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork. - - -_Helicopter_[709] - - [709] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section - is derived from _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chap. 9, - No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. - I; Generals’ _Summary_; _USMC Ops Korea_, vs. I-IV, - _passim_; Montross, _SkyCav_. - -A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter, -whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations. -A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and -Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate -their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947, -that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the -rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the -amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950, -the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S-1 Sikorsky -two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit, -HMX-1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade -observation squadron, VMO-6. These Marines had the distinction of -being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into -a unit for overseas duty. - -Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months’ experience with the -strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battlefield -tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying, -liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at -Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come -at the front. There, the helicopter’s military value would reflect and -“depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out -combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before.”[710] - - [710] Montross, _SkyCav_, p. 108. - -Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed -invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and -the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation, -the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands. -Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO-6 during the second battle -of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands -several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication -rigs, VMO-6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This -method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became -routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles -of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire -was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken -men on foot weeks--if it could have been done. - -Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO-6, however, was its night -casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and -out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily -maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate -injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the -war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his -revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing -from the waist in his Old World manner, replied: - - Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has - already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea - and the score is still mounting.[711] - - [711] _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61 - quoting Eugene E. Wilson, _Wings of the Dawn_ (Hartford, - Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955). - -With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed -between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS -_Repose_ or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport -copters arrived in Korea, HMR-161 pilots felt a new record had been -set when only 30 minutes[712] intervened between the time a frontline -Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the -zone of action. The _Consolation_ had been outfitted with a helicopter -loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had -such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the -trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the -wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat. - - [712] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary - of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital - ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use - when he commented, “I went aboard the _Samaritan_, where - Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the - casualties from the day and night before.” Capt Clifford - P. Morehouse, _The Iwo Jima Campaign_, (Washington: - HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139. - -Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by -helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night. -Records indicate that VMO-6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another -2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR-161, for which the task -ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were -important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even -more significant. - -In the fall of 1951, HMR-161 successfully executed the first combat -troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division -was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, “a glimpse -of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a -company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic -equipment.”[713] Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a -complement of 15 new 10-place HRS-1 transport vehicles, with cruising -speed of 60–85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps -combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne -support to ground troops. Both VMO-6 and HMR-161 came under operational -control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters -separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly -expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.) - - [713] HistBr outline, p. 4. - -The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission -most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept--that -of transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment--was -accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers -carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation -in history. A lift of one day’s supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang -River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of -2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds -of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles. - -HMR-161 first applied the Corps’ new concept of vertical envelopment -on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully -equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area -to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in -history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated -battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR-161 -effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of -nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in -overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time). - -The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor -craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were -Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine -helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army -to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280 -helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had “conclusively demonstrated that -the Army vitally needed helicopters,”[714] and he recommended that the -typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation -battalions. - - [714] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 533–534. - -Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the -early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur) -and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UNC Commander’s -enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing -for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The -scale of operations[715] envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a -“jurisdictional controversy”[716] about possible duplication of aerial -functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later. -Although both services had helicopters in limited use, “hostilities -were in their last stages before either the Army or the Air Force -began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in -1950 and 1951.”[717] - - [715] Hermes, _Truce Tent_, p. 184, comments: “In order to - insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] - suggested that procurement be started on a scale - that would permit manufacturers to expand production - immediately.” - - [716] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, p. 534. - - [717] _Ibid._ - -A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and -a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an -air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General -Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: “The cargo helicopter, employed -in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond -its normal capability.” He strongly recommended that the Army make -“ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the -future.”[718] - - [718] _Ibid._, p. 535. - -Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued -meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and -diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine -helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted -1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments -with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a -total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The -record day’s lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting -a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation -indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be -even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced. - -Other Marine innovations by HMR-161 included supplying ammunition -from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch -Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another. -And although VMO-6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport -squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions -throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of -HMR-161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops -from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped -by the heavy rains. - -With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR-161 -operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now -practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer -novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard -practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support, combat -helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They -had introduced a new infantry technique of “hit and run” tactics. -The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when -employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on -minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had -clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral -component of the modern-day balanced military force. - - -_FMF and Readiness Posture_[719] - - [719] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), - 1951–1955; _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, - Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6. Chaps. 9, 10; _USMC Board Rpt_, vs. - 1-11; _Generals’ Summary_; Brochure titled “Historical - Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - 1941–1950 (Preliminary),” held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of - Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., - HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization - of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, - 1950–1951_ (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), - hereafter Giusti, _Mobilization, MCR_; _USMC Ops Korea_, - vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, _The Marine Corps - Reserve--A History, 1916–1966_ (Washington: Division of - Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, “Men of Color,” - issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Historical - Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957_ - (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961). - -The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps -FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to -the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279 -officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of -FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac -included 7,779 men in General Smith’s 1st Marine Division at Camp -Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris’ 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El -Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately -8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air -personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point. - -Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with -the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and -then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting -aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk -due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands -placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and -effectively. In fact, “few achievements in the long history of the -Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed -between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of -the 1st Marine Division at Inchon.”[720] - - [720] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, - 1941–1950, p. 49. - -As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine -RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st -Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked. -With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st -Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459, -less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing -demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it -became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this -requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea,[721] its -reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages. - - [721] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, - even “had they been combined into a single unit, its - numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one - war-strength division.” Giusti, _Mobilization_, MCR, p. 9. - -Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly -twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized -Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648 -enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size -or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent -of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve -(Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept -squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized -at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588 -officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized -strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine -Volunteer (nondrill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately -90,000 on its rolls. - -A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General -Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered -to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was -authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20 -July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to -active duty on a schedule that took into account the unit’s state of -readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there -for handling the personnel overload. - -Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry, -artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended -active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los -Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report -in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The -following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived -at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had -reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist. - -While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first -of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at -El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were -ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had -furnished units and men for the MAG-33 component of the brigade. - -Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this -expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later: - - The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an - important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine - Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in - July 1950.[722] - - [722] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187. - -As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed MacArthur -that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even -December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNC’s third request for the -division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT, -and the Joint Chiefs were “adamant in their decision that MacArthur -must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT.”[723] - - [723] _USMC Ops Korea_, v. II, p. 23. - -The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its -division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10–15 -August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many -steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the -Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war -strength. - -Fleshing out personnel--against short-fuzed manpower and time -factors--for the 1st Marine Division and Wing, due to embark in -mid-August, a month after the brigade had left, was a round-the-clock -operation for all hands. Between 25 July-5 August, the Marine Corps -provided personnel for the expanded Division/Wing by: - - transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground - units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac; - - transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations - throughout the U.S.; - - mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units; and - utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for - the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. - -Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the -division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its -third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre -of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of -regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between -10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15 -August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O. -As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was -directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it -for departure to Korea no later than 1 September. - -While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of -its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The -6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this -new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from -Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal, -to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from -widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines -on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in -advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the -JCS. - -With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d -Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due -to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage), -the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength. -Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and -by the end of the year 58,480 men and women in this category were on -active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine -Corps rolls served during the Korean War. - -Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that “following -the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the -number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from -877 in December to 3,477 in January.”[724] - - [724] Giusti, _op. cit._, p. 36. - -Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been -accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous -estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground -reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent. -Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550 -officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded -rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the -30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCIs) had been activated and by October -of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active -duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders; -4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve, -air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization -schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention -(and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation’s entire Korean War -mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised. - -Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were -reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps -units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950 -and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and -veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps. - -Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34 -replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines -served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time -attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North -Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed -landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict. -Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed -the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to -implement a rotation and release policy. By March 1951, HQMC had -worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based -on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which -was put into effect in June 1951. - -During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and -15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six -months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from -1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel -needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines -assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually -somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and -MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not -always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted -by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst -deficiencies. - -During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine -pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground -officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC -study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual -pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted. -This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots[725] -and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron’s arrival in -the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the -continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release -system. Despite plans during 1952–1953 for replacement and rotation of -squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war -when carrier squadron VMA-312 was replaced by VMA-332 in June 1953. -With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14 -months for both aviation and ground Marines. - - [725] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III - volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate - recent precombat flying experience, had presented a - serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job - training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section. - As another measure to improve squadron operational - proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the - individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a - 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. - This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, - with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated - after 60 missions. - -Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June -1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures: - - June 1951 192,620 Marines on active duty - June 1952 231,967 Marines on active duty - June 1953 249,219 Marines on active duty - -Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of -hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of -Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965 -enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine -officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that -of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events -and legislation,[726] the Korean War marked the first time that Negro -personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast -to the segregated units before and during World War II. - - [726] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces - continued to expand as a result of the President’s 1948 - Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. - The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European - Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial - integration of combat units, followed by similar programs - for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun - 1952), p. 21. - -Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred -on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war, -33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea. -The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950–1953 appears to -have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered -35,306.[727] - - [727] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW - ComdDs, Apr 53 and _PacFlt Eval Rpt_ No. 6, Chap. 9, p. - 9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, - Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9-26. - -While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new -legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent -during the emergency, particularly the Nation’s recent experience -with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the -FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its -reserve component. - -Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major -advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine -Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings; -raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except -for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided -for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the Joint Chiefs -of Staff[728] on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In -reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of -advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval -campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of -“performing such other duties as the President may direct.” Commenting -on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: “Our views are considered. -Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited -greatly by these gains.”[729] General Shepherd further noted that the -new legislation “expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps -shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly -in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the -future there may be a series of continuing international crises--each -short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation ... to move shock -forces into action on the shortest of notice.”[730] - - [728] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at - the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO. - - [729] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 1. - - [730] Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, _op. cit._, p. 70. - -The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of -the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military -Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951; -and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved -9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder -mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces -Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either -a partial or total callup of the Nation’s reserve forces. In the -past, the M-Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited -war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been -envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for -dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the -existing legislation affecting reserve forces. - -Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories -of M-Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These -varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status -(OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e., -men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the -“Ready” category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall -in an emergency, regardless of prior service. - -The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a -future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least, -a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for -a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress, -as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine -Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total -mobilization. - -Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was -established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces -(whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June -1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year -active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided -the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received -their basic training but still had a reserve obligation. - -Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine -Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower -pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply, -service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type -of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past. -Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group -of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for -a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to -be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to -number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by -stricter requirements for participation. - -Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916, -had been defined as “providing trained personnel for integration into -the Marine Corps in time of national emergency.” The strengthened MCR -program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious -reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the -Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now -“assist in extending the ‘force-in-readiness’ concept to the Marine -Corps Reserve.”[731] More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to -make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment. - - [731] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 96. - - -_Problems Peculiar to the Korean War_[732] - - [732] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. - 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; _USMC Board - Rpt_ vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin - No. 5-53, “Lessons Learned,” dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter - _Lessons Learned 5-53_; _Generals’ Summary_; Futrell, - _USAF, Korea_; Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_. - -The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces -resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that -affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to -prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war, -the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not -strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce -negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was -changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an -active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one -of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the -38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the -enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these -restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory. -For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the -parallel. - -Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of -the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed -a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while -Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both -the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical -restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing -the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the -limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the -shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive -(“active defense”) concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the -protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics. - -For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier -while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division -assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically -non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine -unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his -particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment -did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on the part of -both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted -that “long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in -Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional -with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate -amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division.”[733] - - [733] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-2. - -Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st -Marine Division had noted that it would “require intensive training -and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days” upon release from -active combat in order to “reach a desirable standard of amphibious -readiness.”[734] Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June -1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off -the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were -important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of -course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive -and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and -regiment periodically in regular reserve status. - - [734] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the - division’s ground readiness was rated as excellent; a - conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious - readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated - a 30-day training period would bring the division to - complete amphibious readiness. _Generals’ Summary_, p. 53. - -Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR -frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the -I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration -and encirclement. “Normal” frontage for an infantry division in defense -with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be -8–9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT, -and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third -Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was -a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River -obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the -sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and -reserve units. - -Infantry battalions thus occupied “extremely wide fronts, as a -rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards,” while individual rifle companies were -assigned anywhere from “1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and -defend.”[735] Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of -the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far -right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions on -line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third -in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector -exceeded 10,000 yards, “more properly the frontage for a division -rather than a regiment.”[736] - - [735] _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 19. - - [736] Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_, p. 107. - -During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could -be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A -night 50 percent watch--with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to -COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and -the KSC nightly supply trains--not infrequently spread personnel to a -point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between -men.[737] Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive -strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult. - - [737] Lessons Learned, _op. cit_. - -Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector, -making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to -development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or -“roving guns”) devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately -mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional -artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the -four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch -howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also -led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat -hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional -personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar -defense requirements of the sustained battle situation. - -The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the -shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal -OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April -1952, shortly after the division’s arrival in West Korea. Ultimately, -as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified -and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a -defense-in-depth concept using a series of strongpoints, as in Boulder -City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In -contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions -in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division -beyond No-Man’s-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted -unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually -supporting key terrain features. The enemy had also developed an -artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they -held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine -front. - -As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in -which various military services and components were coordinated by -joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These -massive operational command structures accomplished the desired -goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to -be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and -aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain -the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense -measures. - -New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the -corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged -in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol -activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size -or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be -submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans -for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours -in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a -desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative -effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or -regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets -of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as -weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the -operation. - -Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local -initiative were so restrictive that “any independent action below the -level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent.”[738] -Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major -COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher -echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the -action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible -jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations. - - [738] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-84. - -Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and -I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many -directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire not to -upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing -the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories. -The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a -loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated “events” that suited -their purpose--whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong -neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare, -or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts. - -Neutrality restrictions[739] on supporting arms within the entire -Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical -situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the -1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine -regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the -no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the -Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable -scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward -of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting “no-fly, no-fire” -restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC -and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the -prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were -modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps, -“each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders.”[740] - - [739] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile - circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius - forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and - another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and - various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped - leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda - shell leaflets. - - [740] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, 9-78. - -The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became -readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means -of his tactics of “creeping” toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and -reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled -troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups, -including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.[741] Thus the restrictive -lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate -12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside -of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were -powerless to take any action. - - [741] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 4, p. 9-37. - -Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were -not considered optimum--for either the division or wing. While dug in -on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been -“seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war.”[742] Only 94 CCF -had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more -than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front.[743] -This deficiency was attributed to the “static defensive situation, the -reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire -placed on our reconnaissance patrols.”[744] - - [742] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39. - - [743] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division - took 2,445 _NKPA/CCF_, with an additional 656 enemy - seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of - 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters - Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three - infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An - additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division - in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53 - (Box 4), “Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94,” dtd 15–31 Aug - 53; _USMC Board Rpt_, v. I, p. II-B-46. - - [744] _Generals’ Summary_, p. 39. - -In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely -satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground -Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as -responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions -in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to -FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines’ own VMJ-1 -squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with -photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate -coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either -not flown or “delayed to the point where they were of no value”[745] -because the tactical situation had been changed. - - [745] _Ibid._ - -Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout -FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation. -Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was -consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an -average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As -an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and -oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO-6 -plane. - -Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point -of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground -components, trained to work as a team, were to a large extent -precluded from operating together. The separate missions of the wing -and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent UNC air and -ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving battles, Korean -hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war in which ground -and air tactical commands did not operate jointly and were never -coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the enemy. Since the -Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting was confined to the -stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval forces were viewed -largely as supporting arms for the ground operation. - -Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power had -been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear “overly -aggressive” and threaten an enlargement of the Korean hostilities into -a nuclear armageddon of World War III.[746] Since the earliest days of -the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese -rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that -much of the enemy’s logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian -border. - - [746] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against - full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the - desire to employ “humanitarian” standards in the UNC war - effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism - of the “moral wrong of massed air bombardment” as well - as employment of the atomic bomb by the U. S. to hasten - the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid - needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be - directed against purely military targets. Futrell, _USAF - Korea_, p. 41. - -Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing raids -within North Korea and close air support efforts of various types, -rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy’s primary supply -installation’s. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted -official Washington policy as “Don’t employ airpower so that the -enemy will get mad and won’t sign the armistice.”[747] Indeed, it was -not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called its -“final truce package,” in April 1952, that it was decided to exert -greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial -targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydroelectric power -facilities, previously exempted from air attack. - - [747] _Ibid._, p. 402. - -From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were assigned -directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no tactical control -over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine traditionally employed -close air support of ground operations as the primary role of its air -arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of -tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction -missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.[748] -As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, “when required, close air -support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other -FEAF programs.”[749] Interdiction, general support, and close support -missions were the normal order of priorities flown by _FEAF_-FAF. - - [748] Comments Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 430–431: “Despite - the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air - Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction - attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission - in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely - dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for - the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-_FAF_ - in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of - those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st - Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in - the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described - the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and - stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties - because its air support had not been adequate or timely.” - Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests - and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly - two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had - been filled within 30 minutes. - - [749] _Ibid._, p. 432. - -Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign -during 1951–1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of -the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had -been defined at first as a move to “paralyze enemy transportation in -the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front -lines.”[750] and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so -“disrupt the enemy’s lines of communication ... that he will be unable -to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces ... or to mount a -sustained offensive himself.”[751] - - [750] _Ibid._, p. 296. - - [751] _Ibid._, pp. 435–436. - -Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period, -CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of -the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the -summer of 1952 the enemy had “actually doubled in troop strength, -reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces, -developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability -for launching a general offensive.”[752] With UNC air and sea -superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping -their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in -as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing more fire power than -ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions -compared to only 8,000 the previous July. - - [752] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-58. - -Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted -before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater -offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, -Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: “The interdiction -program was a failure ... It did _not_ interdict.”[753] USAF spokesmen -felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: “Seen abstractly, -the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and -preventive rather than offensive and positive.”[754] In early 1952, CG, -FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots “had been so long -engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in -close support”[755] inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all -fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support -missions. - - [753] Cagle and Manson, _Sea War, Korea_, p. 270. - - [754] Futrell, _USAF, Korea_, pp. 437–438. - - [755] _Ibid._, p. 434. - -Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational -difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had -developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day -liaison operations at JOC CG, 1st MAW had “established his position -so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which -governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th -AF.”[756] The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked -excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine -Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters -were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a -12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to -the incredibly low figure of 1,956[757] or 15.8 percent of the wing’s -total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52). - - [756] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 9-45. - - [757] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for - 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 - percent; for FY 1953, the _figure_ was 4,912 of total - 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. _Generals’ Summary_, - Chart C, following p. 58. - -Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines, -Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO, -MAG-12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said “for the rest of -1951 and well into 1952 the major effort of my Group and of MAG-33 was -devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of -course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of -effort devoted to close support of the troops.”[758] And by the last -six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the -division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods -when a third or half of the division’s sorties were Marine-flown. As -the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between -Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately -“the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice -decentralized control to a marked degree.”[759] - - [758] Quoted in Heinl, _Soldiers of Sea_, p. 647. - - [759] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground - Forces,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), - p. 17. - -Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and -differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was -resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the -division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for -other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the -bombline[760] as “close air support” and those outside it as “general -support,” the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity -to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire -and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine -planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on -the MLR tactical situation. - - [760] The bombline had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000 - meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more - targets to the “mass” strike treatment. - -Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft “on air alert” -resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support -requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the -JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum -of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.[761] During -fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per -day, the “on station” system proved more tactically effective than the -FAF pre-planned “on call” procedure. - - [761] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1-15. - -Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type -of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than -in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy slammed against ROK -defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-war report noted: - - CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953, - brought clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air - Force-Army close air support (CAS) system during periods of fluid - operations. CCF eruption through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep - into friendly territory eliminated, as effective or practical, - the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned CAS strikes (using - aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting targets - or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are - considered normal during a fluid situation. - - The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of - air support requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the - impossibility of only four TACP’s per division (U.S. and ROK - Army) to keep up with frontline battalion battle actions in - order to control CAS strikes, and the over-centralization of - control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft allocation - were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground - operations in July.[762] - - [762] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 10-3. - -Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many of these -fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air support to -ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.[763] - - [763] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems - dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use - of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, - Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of - the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman - (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: - GPO, 1966. - -As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars are -fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never was a -war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational problems -of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a review of -them--and the solutions effected where possible--may help avoid their -repetition in a conflict of the future. - - -_Korean Lessons_[764] - - [764] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is - derived from: _PacFlt EvalRpts_ No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. - 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; _Generals’ Summary_; - _Lessons Learned 5-53_; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; - 1st MAW PIR 127-53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of - Enemy Ground Situation #1-53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st - MAW PIR 169-53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy - Air Situation 1-53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis); - 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics, - Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins, - _War in Peacetime--The History and Lessons of Korea_ - (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall, - _The Military History of the Korean War_ (New York: - Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, _Pork - Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, - Spring 1953_ (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), - quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, _Korean - War_; Hicks, _Outpost Warfare_; Batterton, _Korea Notes_. - -In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division -deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous -engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the “lessons” -learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain -in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when -the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive -situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire -Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction -of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the -battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines. -This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition -highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some -modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms. - -During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division -was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined -infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was -one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained -probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a -platoon-size outpost. - -Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF -characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable. -After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance -outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced -COP fortifications[765] so that the enemy could assail the position. -Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered -defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of -the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops -that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush -forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP -and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both a pullback by -the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the -outpost. - - [765] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely - following under heavy preparatory fires, he could - penetrate the position. At this close range, normal - box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break - up the attack. _Lessons Learned_ 5-53, p. 10. - -Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy -approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the -COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round -defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches -at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller -scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear -of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully -employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more -than one direction. - -Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to -reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked -superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts -during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were -not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own -ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This -enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range -of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as -a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP-2A, -adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same -tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to -extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them -observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively -the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were -aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC night-fighters and -bombers slowed with only moderate success. - -Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent -camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances -to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so -carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural -foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or -aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively -camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and -fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily -to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid -detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and -radial tunnels between forward and rear bunkers was sometimes as much -as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or -more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except -a direct aerial hit. - -Destruction of the enemy’s trenches, bunkers, and cave network by -medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was -generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF -ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were -virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy -ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy -CCF reverse slope positions. - -A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the -rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to -infiltrate CCF defenses would “require the penetration of a fortified -area to a minimum depth of 10 miles.”[766] Some Korean War analysts -maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched -the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy “could -have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that -distance.”[767] Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War -was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were -estimated to have “ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments -in World War I.”[768] Some areas had even been engineered for defense -against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope -positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of -terrain features. - - [766] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 5, p. 8-29. - - [767] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, p. 24. - - [768] _Ibid._, p. 116. - -Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly -indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting -them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would -not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand -a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of -which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches -proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above -ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy -rains or Korean spring thawing conditions. - -Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a -deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy proclivity -for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the -Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting -bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become -casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite -their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean -combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six- to -eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously -faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a -smaller target. - -A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war -stated categorically: - - As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate - more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there - is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their - fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or - ceases.[769] - - [769] _Lessons Learned_, 5-53, p. 11. - -UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for -improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were -conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him -off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit -action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in -night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent -breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved -a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some -regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic -small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier -supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar -or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous -practice which was being overused and that “_even in the defense the -spirit of the offensive must be maintained_.”[770] Meticulous planning -was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and -evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential. - - [770] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4. - -Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol -sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission -and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, -Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively -on “pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in -front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be -silhouetted.”[771] Some commanders declared that such circumstances -often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields--their own, -as well as the enemy’s. - - [771] Batterton, _Korea Notes_, p. 34. - -In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield -after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every -Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to -preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts -were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the -relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, -enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date -one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was -equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual -battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity -in intelligence activities. - -The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations -was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier -killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans: - - Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches, - and at the same time heavily bombard our positions. - - For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of - men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale - attacks, they intensely bombard our positions. - - An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance - indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack - within a short period.[772] - - [772] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army - PIR No. 948. - -As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of -established procedures: - - The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every - raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the - tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective - to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit - the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of - supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to - prevent indication of the objective.[773] - - [773] _Lessons Learned 5-53_, p. 2. - -Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct -fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in -location. - -Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself -dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing -both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum -effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry -weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and -mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in -Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often -more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep -main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides. -Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense -against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual -interlocking grazing fire. - -For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting -artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts -and unstretchable ranges”[774] of the weapons caused them to lose -a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one -artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the -1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often -effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the -ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180 -degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the -numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the -enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main -ridge line. - - [774] Col F. P. Henderson, “Amphibious Artillery of the - Future,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), - p. 30. - -As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept -about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical -crest, of forward slopes.[775] In view of CCF tactics, forward slope -positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of -fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and -approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions. - - [775] See Chapter VI. - -Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great -offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used -extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery -regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In -West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in -defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and ready to move -into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire -support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being -called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery. - -Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire, -they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough -to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually -supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of -hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that -the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer -teams. Often the Marine artillery observer’s knowledge of the terrain -and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be -effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such -targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the -target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from -that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and -lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan. - -The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better -rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable -tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and -muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the -tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting -targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on -the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective. - -Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus -characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp -battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation. -In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were -developed to the point where “both sides were incomparably stronger -than they had been in actual [moving] battle.”[776] - - [776] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 72. - -Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but -involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well -as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the -course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast -resources of manpower and, accordingly, was wholly indifferent to the -cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy -believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese -commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a -three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit. - -Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent. -Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well -schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units -had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of -positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability -(troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units. -Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of -the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese -stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy -was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period. - -By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective. -The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion -rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were -rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in -importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as -well as in the truce negotiations. - -Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of -standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or -ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign -manufacture--Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and -Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more -than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually -armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and -had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”[777] - - [777] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1. - -Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental -characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some -authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to: - - ... remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are - the main reasons for the success of his engagements. The enemy’s - successes which have resulted from his patience and stealth show - that our troops need more training in the same technique.[778] - - [778] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-41. - -The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of -the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded: - - The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit - level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger. - His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN - superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and - his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.[779] - - [779] _Ibid._, No. 5, p. 8-31. - -Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter -operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine -cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which -had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite -this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was -“placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”[780] because -of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The -weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb. -BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M-1 rifle, was felt to contribute -further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed -in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved -freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not -inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”[781] - - [780] _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 9-82. - - [781] _Ibid._ - -This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical -surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they -could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their -movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often -there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within -grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The -enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed -their presence from UN air reconnaissance. - -One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950 -and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills -during this period, as follows: - - In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to - pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and - protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along. - When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and - persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users - of hand weapons ... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They - had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that - lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war - in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training - ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the - techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.[782] - - [782] Marshall, _Pork Chop Hill_, pp. 20–21. - -The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who -essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to -learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception. - -As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the -experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table. -Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and -17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words -recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had -been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years -of the truce talks, from July 1951-July 1953, an additional 56,000 -Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses -to more than 136,000.[783] (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties -in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to -the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in -April 1952. - - [783] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, pp. 77, 78. - -Commenting on the Communist strategem that opened the truce talks -in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the -negotiations began: - - The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of - the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent - seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for - preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists - were acting in good faith.[784] - - [784] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187. - -Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to -which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an -extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident. - -A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of -passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and -national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast, -the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically -impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner -Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean -Armistice Conference, commented, “We are a people who like to get -things _done_.... The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks -to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience -through the imposition of endless delays.”[785] The American attitude -is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual -concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his -delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing -the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their -opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any -concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas -Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal -will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt -to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part. - - [785] Joy, _Truce Negotiations_, p. 39. - - * * * * * - -The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons: - - Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an] - armistice. Increase it. - - Armistice conferences should be brief ... to allow ... talks to - become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This - encourages your Communist opponents. - - The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the - area of conflict. - - Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to - make progress.[786] - - [786] _Ibid._, pp. 166–173, _passim_. - -Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the -enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps -staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to -27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between -the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings. -On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was -to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison -Officer, he was in charge of the UNC staff group that determined the -final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations -readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their -purpose, no matter how inconsistent. - -While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention -in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their -interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow -interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray: -“Having come to the conference table only because they were near -defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the -most of the negotiations to create ... a ‘climate of victory’.”[787] -This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of “stage -setting,” for maintaining “face,” and for practical advantages from -negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk -site. - - [787] Col J. C. Murray, “Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice - Negotiations,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep - 55), p. 30. - - * * * * * - -As the Marine officer further observed: - - A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the - truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea.... - An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as - a means to an end ... to this end they negotiate patiently and - skillfully ... temporary inconveniences must be borne for ... the - attainment of long-range political objectives.[788] - - [788] _Ibid._, p. 29. - -Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations -and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly -apparent during April-July 1953 as the war drew to an end. - -In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with -considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to -have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In -June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately -trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles -and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The -ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG -(Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000 -men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during -the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953 -totaled nearly 600,000 men. - -Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency -which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy -tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy -weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed -into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of -General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been -enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly -expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions, -most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had -assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line. - -Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive -and generally encouraging.[789] Organized in 1949 by the Republic of -Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment -had taken part in antiguerrilla operations until the NKPA invasion. -With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying -actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean -regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of -the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of -Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol. -After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early -1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine -Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir -fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs. - - [789] See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the - 1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt. - -The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating -the traditional offensive Marine _esprit de corps_ and overriding goal -to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong -resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited -by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions. - -During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division -with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth -regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the -2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island -security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine -division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and -enlisted personnel were conducted at the Korean Marine Corps Training -Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit -and officers’ basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel. -Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps -standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame -early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation -of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of -qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early -recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training -when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate -in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines’ first specialized -amphibious operation. - -Many of the hard lessons of Korea--as well as some of its unique -problems--resulted from the fact that this was America’s first major -experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the -tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the -fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as -well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.[790] - - [790] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and - static nature, had led to growing national apathy and - opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late - 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the - people were in favor of the war and seven months later - that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front - lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground - actions or large scale air attacks. _Washington Post_, - dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; _PacFlt EvalRpt_ No. 6, p. 1-16. - -Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had -prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed -aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective: -the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian -satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military -intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided -assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea. -Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or -less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite -the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled “only -44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the -collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort.”[791] Major -losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops. - - [791] Rees, _Korea_, p. 33. - -UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing. U.S. -losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and -103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces -played in Korea “may be judged from the fact that, of the total United -States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines -accounted for 97 percent.”[792] Casualties of other UNC countries, -exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although -no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were -listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF: -900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded). - - [792] Ridgway, _Korean War_, p. viii. - -For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects -represented a _status quo ante bellum_. Korea still remained -politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th -Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist -attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South -Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at -the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however, -“represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed -a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length.”[793] -The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north -of the 38th Parallel. - - [793] Rees, _Korea_, p. 431. In the three years of war, North - Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest - of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square - miles north of the original June 1950 boundary. - -Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean -War is that many of our nation’s military assumptions--and resulting -tactical decisions--tended to be based on a lack of appreciation -of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations -focused on “probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his -capabilities.”[794] - - [794] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, p. 175. - -While America put great military value and reliance on its massive -destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy -who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead -moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by -our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly -cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and substantial Communist -losses,[795] we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms -of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human -cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the -last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties -numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed. - - [795] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted - approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 - estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) - during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front. - For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were - approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT. - -In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean -War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict -enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own. -Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment, -or international _naiveté_, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly -indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more -hard-headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original -UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had -been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into -a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering -lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political -considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged -sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the -initiative. - -The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world -Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense -commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated -the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis -on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic -thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed -to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of -sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short -notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime -budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience -had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning. -Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based -on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus -sought, for the first time, a military strategy that would effectively -deter either a major war or local aggression. - -Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South -Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant -violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent -that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the -United States had signed during and after World War II, “any number -of alliances, if not supported by strong military preparedness, would -never restrain aggression.”[796] It had taken the Korean War to drive -home the harsh reality that military preparedness, possession of -superior power, and _the willingness to use that power_ were the only -deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world. - - [796] Marshall, _Military History of Korean War_, p. 2. - -The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their strategy -from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of gaining their -political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps Commandant, -General Shepherd, warned: “Their tactic is to use war by proxy, war by -satellite, war by threat and subversion.”[797] And, although it was not -fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack “was to prove to be one -of the first in a series of ‘wars of liberation’”[798] that the world -would be witness to. - - [797] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3. - - [798] Collins, _War in Peacetime_, pp. 3–4. - -In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged battle -of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating close to -their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United Nations -forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics. In -countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units committed -there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy that had -followed the rapid demobilization following World War II. As the Korean -War, originally visualized as a “police action” of brief duration, -ground on into a major effort spanning a period of three years and -one month, loud voices were raised on the home front to protest the -expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture that was not always -clearly understood by all Americans. - -Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront, it -was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its -sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into -the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war, -the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the -shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed -operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex -amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never -was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those -bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese -Communist intervention. - -In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations -in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing -executed their respective missions with professional skill and -dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that -characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen -combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken -them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the -Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to -the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as -in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and -readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps. - -Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the -image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so -mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all -Americans and the Free World can be proud. - - - - -APPENDIX A - -Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations - - - AAA--Antiaircraft Artillery - - AA--Antiaircraft - - AD--Douglas “Skyraider” Single-Engine Attack Aircraft - - ADC--Assistant Division Commander - - ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company - - AO--Aerial Observer - - ASP--Ammunition Supply Point - - AT--Antitank - - AU--Attack model of Vought F4U “Corsair” - - BAR--Browning Automatic Rifle - - BLT--Battalion Landing Team - - Bn--Battalion - - Brig--Brigade - - Btry--Battery - - CAS--Close Air Support - - CCF--Chinese Communist Forces - - CG--Commanding General - - CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East - - CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command - - CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet - - CMC--Commandant of the Marine Corps - - CNO--Chief of Naval Operations - - Co--Company - - CO--Commanding Officer - - ComdD--Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary) - - ComNavFE--Commander, Naval Forces, Far East - - ComServPac--Commander, Service Force, Pacific - - CONUS--Continental United States - - COP--Combat Outpost - - CP--Command Post - - CPX--Command Post Exercise - - CSG--Combat Service Group - - CTE--Commander Task Element - - CTF--Commander Task Force - - CTG--Commander Task Group - - CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier - - CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier - - Div--Division - - DMZ--Demilitarized Zone - - DOW--Died of Wounds - - Dtd--Dated - - DUKW--Marine Amphibious Truck - - ECIDE(U)--East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit) - - ECM--Electronic Countermeasures - - Engr--Engineer - - EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea - - F2H-2P--McDonnell “Banshee” Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model) - - F3D-2--Douglas “Skyknight” Two-Engine Jet Fighter - - F4U--Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter - - F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter - - F9F-2,4,5--Grumman “Panther” Single-Engine Jet Fighter - - F-80--Air Force “Shooting Star” Fighter Aircraft - - F-84--Air Force “Thunderjet” Fighter Aircraft - - FAC--Forward Air Controller - - FAF--Fifth Air Force - - FASRon--Fleet Air Service Squadron - - FDC--Fire Direction Center - - FEAF--Far East Air Forces - - FECOM--Far East Command - - FMFLant--Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic - - FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - - FO--Forward Observer (artillery) - - FY--Fiscal Year - - HE--High Explosive - - Hedron--Headquarters Squadron - - H&I--Harassing & Interdiction - - HMR--Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron - - H03S-1--Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter - - Hq--Headquarters - - HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps - - HRS-1--Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter - - H&S--Headquarters and Service - - HTL-4--Bell Two-Place Helicopter - - Interv--Interview - - JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff - - JOC--Joint Operations Center - - KCOMZ--Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ) - - KIA--Killed in Action - - KMAG--Korean Military Advisory Group - - KMC--Korean Marine Corps - - KMC/RCT--Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team - - KPR--Kimpo Provisional Regiment - - KSC--Korean Service Corps - - LogCom--Logistical Command - - Ltr--Letter - - LST--Landing Ship, Tank - - LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked - - M4A3E8--Flame Tank, Medium - - M-46--Medium Tank - - MAC--Military Armistice Commission - - MACG--Marine Air Control Group - - MAG--Marine Aircraft Group - - Mar--Marine(s) - - MARLEX--Marine Landing Exercise - - MASRT--Marine Air Support Radar Team - - MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing - - MBP--Main Battle Position - - MDL--Military Demarcation Line - - MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron - - MIA--Missing in Action - - MIG--Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor - - MLR--Main Line of Resistance - - MOH--Medal of Honor - - MOS--Military Occupation Specialty - - Mosquito--Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target - Spotting - - MP--Military Police - - MPQ--Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing - - MS--Manuscript - - Msg--Message - - MSR--Main Supply Route - - MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron - - MT--Motor Transport - - NCAS--Night Close Air Support - - NCO--Noncommissioned Officer - - NGF--Naval Gunfire - - NKPA--North Korean People’s Army - - N.d.--Date not given - - NNRC--Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission - - NNSC--Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission - - N.t.--Title not given - - OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA) - - OE-1--Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane - - OOB--Order of Battle - - OP--Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost) - - OPLR--Outpost Line of Resistance - - OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane - - PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report - - PO-2--Russian Trainer Aircraft - - POW--Prisoner of War - - PPSH--Soviet-made 7.62mm Sub-machine (“Burp”) Gun - - Prov--Provisional - - PUC--Presidential Unit Citation - - R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps - designation of C-47) - - R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps - designation of C-54) - - RCT--Regimental Combat Team - - ROK--Republic of Korea - - SAR--Special Action Report - - SecDef--Secretary of Defense - - SecNav--Secretary of Navy - - Serv--Service - - Sig--Signal - - SOP--Standing Operating Procedure - - TACC--Tactical Air Coordination Center - - TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center - - TAFC--Turkish Armed Forces Command - - TAO--Tactical Air Observer - - TE--Task Element - - T/E--Table of Equipment - - TF--Task Force - - TG--Task Group - - Tk--Tank - - T/O--Table of Organization - - TOT--Time on Target Fuze - - TU--Task Unit - - UN--United Nations - - UNC--United Nations Command - - USA--United States Army - - USAF--United States Air Force - - USMC--United States Marine Corps - - USN--United States Navy - - VMA--Marine Attack Squadron - - VMC--Marine Composite Squadron - - VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron - - VMF(N)--Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron - - VMJ--Marine Photographic Squadron - - VMO--Marine Observation Squadron - - VMR--Marine Transport Squadron - - VT--Variable Time Fuze - - WCIDE(U)--West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit) - - WIA--Wounded in Action - - WP--White Phosphorous Shell - - YAK--Russian Fighter Aircraft - - - - -APPENDIX B - -Korean War Chronology - - -_1950_ - - 25 Jun North Korean People’s Army, with 60,000 troops and 100 - Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South - Korea. - - 25 Jun United Nations Security Council calls for end of - aggression and withdrawal of NKPA troops. - - 27 Jun UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack - a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist - ROK in repelling invasion. - - 27 Jun Pres Truman orders U.S. air-sea units to support ROK - and for U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosan - Strait. - - 28 Jun NKPA captures Seoul, South Korean capital. - - 29 Jun Pres Truman orders naval blockade of Korean coast; - authorizes Far East Commander, Gen MacArthur, to send - U.S. ground troops into Korea. - - 30 Jun Pres Truman receives Congressional authorization - to order into active service any or all reserve - components of Armed Forces, for a period of 21 months. - - 2 Jul CNO directs that Marine reinforced regiment with - supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East. - - 2 Jul CinCFE requests Marine RCT-air unit for Far East. - This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, - formed less than a week later. - - 3 Jul Inchon captured by North Koreans. - - 5 Jul-4 Aug UNC fights series of delaying actions in Korea. - - 7 Jul U.N. Security Council authorizes formation of a - United Nations Command as counterforce against NKPA - aggression. - - 7 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under - BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man - Brigade are 5th Marines and MAG-33. - - 8 Jul Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC. - - 10 Jul CinCUNC asks Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize - expansion of Marine Brigade to full war-strength - division. - - 12–14 Jul 1st ProvMarBrig embarks for Korean theater. - - 12 Jul LtGen Walton H. Walker named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in - Korea. - - 19 Jul CinCUNC makes 2d request for Marine division. - - 19 Jul Pres Truman authorizes Defense Dept to call up reserve - units and individuals. - - 19 Jul CMC alerts Marine Corps organized reserve units - for call to active duty following Presidential - announcement. - - 20 Jul CMC, Gen Clifton B. Cates, orders to duty Organized - Marine Corps ground reserve units, consisting of 22 - units and 4,830 personnel. Partial callup for 6,000 - air reservists in 30 Marine VMF and 12 MGCI squadrons. - - 20 Jul Taejon, temporary ROK capital, captured. - - 21 Jul CinCUNC makes 3d request for Marine division. - - 25 Jul UNC defense at Pusan deteriorates. CinCUNC orders 1st - ProvMarBrig directly to Korea. - - 25 Jul JCS directs Marine Corps to build 1stMarDiv to - war-strength. - - 31 Jul Masan and Chinju fall to enemy. - - 2–3 Aug 1st ProvMarBrig arrives Pusan. Moves to bivouac area - near Masan. - - 3 Aug First Marine air strike launched by VMF-214. - - 4 Aug Pusan Perimeter established by UNC in southeastern end - of Korea. - - 4 Aug First evacuation of casualties from Pusan by Marine - VMO-6 helicopters. - - 6 Aug First air mission flown by VMF-323. - - 6–8 Aug CinCUNC confers with U.S. military-diplomatic - officials about proposed Inchon amphibious landing. - - 7–13 Aug Marine Brigade engaged in first combat operations at - Chinju. - - 10 Aug First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO-6 to - recover downed pilot. - - 10–24 Aug 1stMarDiv units embark for Korea. - - 16 Aug EUSAK X Corps activated for coming Inchon-Seoul - operation. Principal elements are 1stMarDiv and Army - 7thInfDiv. - - 17 Aug Marine Brigade opens battle for Obong-ni (“No Name”) - Ridge, leading way to destruction of enemy bridgehead - at Naktong and first UNC victory in Korea. - - 17 Aug 7th Marines activated at Camp Pendleton and on 1 Sep - embarks for Far East, arriving 21 Sep. - - 1–5 Sep NKPA launches all-out offensive to break UNC perimeter - defense at Pusan. In Second Naktong Battle, Brigade - contains enemy at Yongsan. - - 13 Sep 1st ProvMarBrig deactivated and absorbed by 1stMarDiv - for Inchon operation. - - 15 Sep D-Day, Inchon amphibious assault, spearheaded by - 1stMarDiv. - - 17 Sep 1stMarDiv (5th Marines) recaptures Kimpo Airfield. - - 19–25 Sep Enemy resistance at Pusan begins to collapse. NKPA - troops in retreat north from Pusan. - - 27 Sep 1stMarDiv recaptures Seoul. ROK Capital officially - liberated 29 Sep. - - 30 Sep Communist China Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns: - “The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate - seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the - imperialists.” - - 30 Sep-1 Oct ROK 3d Div crosses 38th Parallel in pursuit of - retreating NKPA. - - 7 Oct UN General Assembly authorizes UNC forces to cross - 38th Parallel to defeat NKPA. - - 10 Oct Wonsan, east coast port at 39th Parallel, captured by - ROK troops. - - 10 Oct Chinese repeat warning of intervention in Korean - conflict. - - 16 Oct First Chinese Communist troops secretly enter Korea - from Manchuria. - - 19 Oct Pyongyang, North Korean Capital at 39th Parallel, - captured by EUSAK. - - 26 Oct Chinese troops attack ROK units at Yalu River and - points south of Sino-Korean border. - - 26 Oct 1stMarDiv lands at Wonsan, establishes security for - port, and drives north. - - 1 Nov UNC forward elements reach positions along Yalu. First - Russian-built MIG appears along Yalu to attack U.S. - aircraft. - - 2 Nov Strong Chinese and NKPA forces attack EUSAK at Unsan, - causing withdrawal across Chongchon River. First - identification of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in - Korea. - - 3–7 Nov Initial Marine encounter with CCF. 7th Marines units - defeat major elements of 124th CCF Division. - - 6 Nov MacArthur warns JCS that movement of CCF across Yalu - threatens UNC position. - - 15 Nov Marine units reach Chosin Reservoir area in X Corps - drive north. - - 24 Nov MacArthur announced “win the war” offensive. EUSAK - begins advance toward Yalu. - - 26–27 Nov CCF, 200,000-strong, attack EUSAK troops forcing - withdrawal. 1stMarDiv isolated at Yudam-ni, west of - Chosin. MSR cut. - - 28 Nov-3 Dec 1stMarDiv turns back CCF attacks. Prepares to move - south. Regroups at Hagaru-ri for drive to Hungnam. - - 4 Dec Pyongyang recaptured by enemy. - - 5–7 Dec 1stMarDiv evacuates wounded by air and fights through - to Koto-ri. - - 6 Dec Innovation of using airborne TADC as tactical CP to - control air support. - - 10 Dec First Marine jet squadron to fly in combat, VMF-311, - begins operations. - - 11 Dec 1stMarDiv completes fighting breakout from Chosin - entrapment. Begins march to join rest of X Corps at - Hungnam. - - 15 Dec 1stMarDiv deployed from Hungnam to Pusan. - - 15 Dec UNC establishes new defensive line at 38th Parallel. - - 18 Dec-27 Jan Marine division routs enemy guerrilla forces in - Masan-Pohang-Sondong-Andong area. - - 23 Dec EUSAK CG Walker killed in jeep accident. Gen Matthew - B. Ridgway named to succeed him. - - 24 Dec Hungnam evacuation completed by X Corps. - - 29 Dec Large enemy buildup reported north of 38th Parallel, - preparing for new attack. - -_1951_ - - 31 Dec-1 Jan Enemy launches all-out offensive against UNC across - 38th Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10–12 miles. - - 4 Jan Seoul recaptured by Communists. - - 7–15 Jan Enemy offensive halted, UNC sets up new defense line - along Pyongtaek-Wonju axis, at 37th Parallel. - - 25 Jan UNC reassumes offensive. Operation THUNDERBOLT - launched by I and IX Corps to regain territory south - of Han River. - - Jan-Feb 1stMarDiv continues antiguerrilla operations in Masan - area. - - 7 Feb Communists forced north of Han River. UNC retakes - Inchon peninsula. - - mid-Feb 1stMarDiv reassigned from X to IX Corps. - - 21 Feb Operation KILLER, a general limited objective advance - by U.S. IX and X Corps, ordered by Gen Ridgway. - 1stMarDiv reenters frontlines for operation. - - 7 Mar Operation RIPPER begins in central and eastern zones, - with advance across Han by IX and X Corps. - - 14 Mar Seoul retaken by U.S. Eighth Army for second time. - - 27–31 Mar 1stMarDiv occupies 28,000-meter sector north of - Hongchon. UNC elements reach 38th Parallel. - - 1–21 Apr 1stMarDiv in general advance north to the Hwachon - Reservoir. - - 8 Apr Operation RIPPER clears enemy troops from South Korea - east of Imjin River. - - 11 Apr Pres Truman relieves Gen MacArthur as CinCUNC, - replacing him by Gen Ridgway, CG, EUSAK. LtGen James - A. Van Fleet named Commander, EUSAK. - - 15 Apr UNC establishes defensive line along 38th - Parallel, or KANSAS Line. Enemy heavily emplaced - in Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang (“The Iron Triangle”) - assembly area. - - 22 Apr-8 Jul CCF launches all-out “Spring Offensive.” - - 23–27 Apr 1stMarDiv halts CCF left flank breakthrough of IX - Corps, establishes defense line in Chunchon vicinity. - - 30 Apr UNC completes withdrawal to new defense line north of - Seoul. Intelligence reports indicate CCF plans renewed - attack. - - 1 May 1stMarDiv reassigned to X Corps. - - 9 May 1st MAW squadrons participate in FAF 300-plane strike - on Sinuiju, near Yalu. Biggest raid of war to date. - - 16 May Second phase of enemy offensive begins. CCF drives - south from Iron Triangle area, making penetrations - 15–20 miles deep along the front. - - 20 May FAF launches Operation STRANGLE, massive all-out - interdiction effort. - - 21 May UNC launches counter offensive, pushes enemy north of - 38th Parallel again. 1stMarDiv drives toward Yanggu at - eastern end of Hwachon Reservoir. - - 30 May Eighth Army back on KANSAS Line again. - - 1–16 Jun 1stMarDiv advances northeast from Hwachon Reservoir - to Punchbowl. Claws out daily gains of 1,000–2,000 - meters, reaching objective despite heavy NKPA fire. - - mid-Jun UNC forces consolidate positions at 38th Parallel. UNC - front approximately the same line as when Communist - spring offensive began. - - 23 Jun UN Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, proposes cease-fire - discussions. - - 30 Jun UN notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an - armistice. - - 10 Jul Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down - along front. UN delegation led by U.S. Vice Admiral C. - Turner Joy. Communists represented by LtGen Nam Il, - NKPA. - - 26 Jul Negotiators at Kaesong agree on preliminary agenda. - - 5 Aug UNC suspends truce talks because of armed enemy troops - in neutral area. Cease-fire talks resumed 10 Aug. - - 22 Aug Communists halt cease-fire talks, charge UN aircraft - has violated neutrality zone. - - 31 Aug In final UNC offensive action of war, 1stMarDiv opens - assault at Punchbowl. UN launches limited attacks to - straighten line. - - 5 Sep 1stMarDiv gains initial objectives in Punchbowl area, - new ridgeline to become part of Line MINNESOTA, - EUSAK defensive line. Heavy attacks by IX Corps at - Heartbreak and Bloody Ridge. - - 13 Sep HMR-161 effects first Marine mass helicopter combat - resupply maneuver, Operation WINDMILL I. - - 18 Sep Marines advance to Soyang River, north of Punchbowl. - - 21 Sep Operation SUMMIT, first helicopter deployment of a - combat unit, lands 224 fully-equipped troops and - 17,772 lbs of cargo in Punchbowl area. - - 25 Oct Following two weeks of discussion between liaison - officers, truce talks resumed at new site, Panmunjom. - - 28 Oct Cease-fire line agreed upon as present line of contact. - - 11 Nov HMR-161 conducts first frontline relief of a Marine - battalion, in Operation SWITCH. - - 12 Nov Gen Ridgway, CinCUNC, orders EUSAK Commander, Gen Van - Fleet to cease offensive operations and begin active - defense of UN front. - - Nov-Dec General stalemate along Korean battlefront during - truce discussions. - - 18 Dec Prisoner of war lists exchanged by UN and Communists. - -_1952_ - - 2 Jan UNC proposes principle of “voluntary repatriation” in - POW exchange. - - 3 Jan UNC proposal violently rejected by Communists. - - Jan-Apr Disorders in UNC prison camps as screening of - prisoners begins. - - 22 Feb Communist Korean Foreign Affairs Minister charges - America with renewed bacteriological warfare attacks - in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister - Chou En-Lai, issues similar statement on 8 Mar, - alleging U.S. flyers participate in “germ warfare.” - - 17 Mar 1stMarDiv reassigned from X Corps eastern-Korea - position to I Corps far western end of EUSAK line. - Takes over approximately 35 miles of Line JAMESTOWN on - 24 Mar. - - 28 Apr Adm Joy presents UN “final offer,” insists on - voluntary repatriation principle. - - 7–11 May Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize Gen Dodd and - hold him hostage, until order restored. - - 12 May Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon - latter’s departure to assume NATO command from Gen - Eisenhower. - - 22 May MajGen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief - of UN delegation at Panmunjom. - - Jun-Oct General stalemate along battlefront while truce talks - deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Sharp limited - objective attacks made by enemy against UNC defensive - line. - - 9–16 Aug First major Marine ground action in western Korea, - Battle of Bunker Hill (1st Marines). - - 19–20 Aug HMR-161 Operation RIPPLE introduces tactical - innovation of transporting 4.5-inch rocket battery - weapons and personnel to new firing position. - - 29 Aug Largest one-day FAF air assault of entire war, “All - United Nations Air Effort” sends 1,403 sorties against - North Korean Capital, Pyongyang. - - 22–26 Sep First resupply of MLR regiment by helicopter in - Operation HAYLIGHT. - - 8 Oct UNC adjourns armistice talks “indefinitely”; complete - deadlock on POW question. - - 26–28 Oct Battle of the Hook (7th Marines). - - 4 Nov Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President. - - 17 Nov India introduces compromise truce plan at United - Nations. - - 2 Dec President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of - Korea. - - 3 Dec UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian - resolution by 54 to 5 vote. -_1953_ - - Jan-Feb Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain - suspended. - - 2 Feb President Eisenhower, in State of Union message, ends - “neutralization” of Formosa Strait. - - 11 Feb Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK command from Gen - Van Fleet. - - 22 Feb UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as - preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners. - - 5 Mar Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies. Georgi Malenkov - named to succeed him. - - 26–30 Mar 1stMarDiv combat outposts Vegas-Reno-Carson (5th - Marines) under heavy attack. - - 28 Mar Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of - sick and wounded POWs. - - 30 Mar Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN - compromise proposal. Truce talks to be resumed. - - 12 Apr 1st MAW flies first night CAS missions, using - intersecting searchlight beams to mark enemy targets. - - 20–26 Apr Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, “Operation LITTLE - SWITCH,” takes place at Panmunjom, under direction of - Munsan-ni Provisional Command. - - 26 Apr Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. - - 5 May 1stMarDiv relieved by U.S. 25thInfDiv; 1st Division - assigned mission of I Corps Reserve. - - 7 May Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling - to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within - Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral - nation. - - 28–30 May Savage fighting while truce details worked out by - negotiators. CCF launches regimental-strength attack - against I Corps sector. Heavy action in Nevada Cities - and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery in - support of defending 25thInfDiv line units. - - 6 Jun ROK national Assembly demands freedom for - anti-Communist North Koreans held in South Korean POW - camps. Civilian demonstrations break out in various - EUSAK and I Corps localities. - - 8 Jun Agreement reached on POW question. POW nonrepatriates - to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to - decide disposition of POW cases. Pres Rhee declares - armistice terms unacceptable to South Korea. - - 9 Jun ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms. - - 10–17 Jun Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years - against ROK II Corps sector in Kumsong area. Heavy - penetrations, with ROK II Corps pushed 4000 yards - south to new MLR. - - 18 Jun Breakout of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist - prisoners from South Korean POW camps, assisted by - ROK guards. Release ordered by Pres Rhee as protest - against proposed armistice. - - 18–20 Jun Communists accuse UNC of complicity in freeing - prisoners; truce talks suspended. - - 23–25 Jun Pres Rhee continues opposition to truce terms. Walter - Robinson, U.S. Asst. Sec. of State for Far East and - Gen Mark Clark start confidential talks with Rhee. - - 7–8 Jul COPs Berlin-East Berlin (7th Marines right regimental - sector) under attack during Marine relief of - 25thInfDiv. - - 8 Jul 1stMarDiv assumes operational control of its former - MLR sector, relieving 25thInfDiv. - - 8 Jul Communists agree to resume armistice negotiations; - talks reconvened 10 July. - - 11 Jul Robertson announces that Pres Rhee will no longer - oppose truce terms. - - 11 Jul Maj John F. Bolt, VMF-115, becomes first Marine jet - ace with kill of his fifth and sixth MIGs. - - 13–20 Jul CCF launches even larger offensive than June attack - along central Korean front. IX and ROK II Corps MLR - reestablished south of Kumsong River. - - 19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on truce. - - 19 Jul Marine outposts Berlin-East Berlin overrun; I Corps - decrees positions should not be retaken. - - 24–27 Jul Heavy enemy attack in Berlin Complex (“Boulder City”) - area held by 7th and 1st Marines. - - 27 Jul Cease-fire agreement signed at Panmunjom at 1000. - Fighting ends. Armistice effective at 2200. - - 5 Aug-6 Sep Final exchange of prisoners in Operation BIG SWITCH, - at Panmunjom. - - - - -APPENDIX C - -Command and Staff List - - 1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED) - AND - 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING - MARCH 1952-JULY 1953 - - - _1st Marine Division_ - - Commanding General MajGen John T. Selden (to 28 Aug 1952) - MajGen Edwin A. Pollock (from 29 Aug) - MajGen Randolph McC. Pate (from 16 - Jun 1953) - Asst Division Commander BGen William J. Whaling (to 23 Mar - 1952) - BGen Merrill B. Twining (from 24 Mar) - BGen Robert O. Bare (from 13 Jun) - BGen Joseph C. Burger (from 31 Mar 1953) - Chief of Staff Col Austin R. Brunelli (to 10 Oct 1952) - Col Henry W. Buse, Jr. (from 11 Oct) - Col Lewis W. Walt (from 15 Jun 1953) - G-1 Col Walter N. Flournoy (to 31 Mar 1952) - Col John F. Dunlap (from 1 Apr) - Col Sidney M. Kelly (from 11 Sep) - Col Albert F. Metze (from 1 Jun 1953) - Col Wendell H. Duplantis (from 20 Jul) - G-2 LtCol James H. Tinsley (to 9 Apr 1952) - Col Sidney S. Wade (from 10 Apr) - LtCol William R. Watson, Jr. (from 24 - Apr) - Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from - 11 Oct) - Col William F. Prickett (from 20 Dec) - Col Loren E. Haffner (from 1 Apr 1953) - Col James E. Mills (from 10 Jul) - G-3 LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (to 22 Apr 1952) - LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 24 Apr) - Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 15 Jun) - Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Dec) - Col Lewis W. Walt (from 18 Apr 1953) - LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 15 Jun) - G-4 Col Robert A. McGill (to 27 Aug 1952) - Col Thomas A. Culhane (from 28 Aug) - Col Kenneth A. King (from 12 Nov) - Col Richard H. Crockett (from 15 Dec) - Col Thomas S. Ivey (from 15 May 1953) - - _Special Staff_ - - Adjutant Maj James K. Young (to 5 May 1952) - Maj Charles T. Lamb (from 6 May) - Maj Clyde W. Shealy (from 24 Feb 1953) - Maj George K. Acker (from 1 Jun) - Air Officer LtCol Edward V. Finn (to 14 Mar 1952) - LtCol Walter F. Cornnell (from 15 Mar) - LtCol William E. Abblitt (from 12 Feb - 1953) - Anti-Tank Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) - Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) - LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) - Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan - 1953) - Capt William F. Doehler (from 6 Apr) - Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug - 1952) - LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug) - LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 - Nov) - LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from - 16 Mar 1953) - Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun) - Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952) - Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug) - LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 - Aug) - LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec) - Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May - 1953) - LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 - Jul) - Artillery Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep - 1952) - Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep) - Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953) - Col Manley L. Curry (from 5 Jul) - Chaplain Cdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (to 16 - Apr 1952) - Cdr Edward A. Slattery, USN (from 17 - Apr) - Cdr Lonnie W. Meachum, USN (from 28 - Dec) - Chemical Warfare and - Radiological Defense - Officer Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952) - Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug) - LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov) - Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan - 1953) - Capt Gerald W. Gibson (from 30 Jan) - Dental Officer Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (to 26 - Apr 1952) - Cdr Clifford H. Rice, USN (from 27 - Apr) - Capt William M. Fowler, USN (from 26 - May) - Capt James R. Justice, USN (from 12 - Mar 1953) - Embarkation Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 1 Mar 1952) - LtCol James F. Coady (from 2 Mar) - LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 5 Sep) - Maj Edwin J. St. Peter (from 6 Nov) - LtCol John N. Rentz (from 24 Nov) - LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 12 May - 1953) - Engineer Officer Col August L. Vogt (to 5 Jul 1952) - (None listed for 6–16 July) - Col Robert E. Fojt (from 17 Jul) - LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 1 Feb - 1953) - Col Walter R. Lytz (from 1 Apr) - Exchange Officer Capt Benjamin Reed (to 28 Nov 1952) - Capt John H. Thomas (from 29 Nov) - Food Director 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (to 15 Jun - 1952) - Maj Louis P. Penny (from 16 Jun) - Maj Francis K. Bernardini (from 23 - Apr 1953) - Historical Officer 2dLt Francis X. Goss (to 22 Mar 1952) - Capt Robert F. Seward (from 23 Mar) - Capt William R. Smith (from 16 Jul) - 1stLt Virgil S. Price (from 8 Nov) - 2dLt John J. Creamer, Jr. (from 7 Dec) - Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 6 Apr 1953) - 2dLt Thomas A. MacCalla (from 22 Jul) - Inspector Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (to 17 - Mar 1952) - Col Thomas C. Moore (from 18 Mar) - Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 18 Jul) - Col Clayton O. Totman (from 9 Aug) - Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 5 Dec) - Col Albert F. Metze (from 29 Apr 1953) - Col Manley L. Curry (from 1 Jun) - Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 13 Jul) - Legal Officer LCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (to 12 Jan - 1953) - Cdr Earl C. Collins, USN (from 13 Jan) - LtCol Raymond G. Coyne (from 8 Jul) - Motor Transport Officer Maj Walter R. O Quinn (to 14 May 1952) - LtCol Kenneth E. Martin (from 15 May) - LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 12 Mar - 1953) - LtCol Jack F. McCollum (from 29 Jun) - Naval Gunfire Officer Maj John V. Downs (to 5 Aug 1952) - LtCol William P. Pala (from 6 Aug) - LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 16 Sep) - LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 20 - Dec) - LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 26 Apr - 1953) - Capt Robert J. Daeschler (from 15 Jul) - Ordnance Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952) - LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May) - Maj Joseph O. Weist (from 4 Jun) - Maj Stanley Tesko (from 21 Oct) - LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher (from 1 Apr - 1953) - LtCol Samuel L. Grigsby (from 1 Jun) - Postal Officer CWO George C. Hunter (to 25 Jun 1952) - 2dLt Frederick T. McNamara, Jr. (from - 26 Jun) - 2dLt Rudolph R. Hendrick (from 18 May - 1953) - CWO Emerson R. Murrell (from 2 Jun) - Provost Marshal LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar - 1952) - LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr) - LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 - Aug) - LtCol Jess P. Ferrill (from 12 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Harold R. Warner, Jr. (from 18 - Apr) - Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul) - Public Information Officer 1stLt Robert S. Gray (to 5 May 1952) - 1stLt Robert F. Coll (from 6 May) - Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 5 Jul) - Capt Bem Price (from 7 Nov) - Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 21 Jul - 1953) - Shore Party Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul - 1952) - Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul) - LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct) - Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec) - Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar - 1953) - Signal Officer LtCol Jino J. D’Allessandro (to 5 Apr - 1952) - LtCol John E. Morris (from 6 Apr) - LtCol Eugene A. Dueber (from 18 Aug) - LtCol Ralph M. Wismer (from 14 Nov) - LtCol Frank G. Casserly (from 27 Jul - 1953) - Supply Officer Col Chester R. Allen (to 27 Apr 1952) - Col Hawley C. Waterman (from 28 Apr) - Col LeRoy Hauser (from 1 Feb 1953) - Special Services Officer LtCol John E. Gorman (to 23 Jul 1952) - Maj Alfred A. Tillmann (from 24 Jul) - Maj William J. Kohler (from 8 Nov) - Capt Don H. Blanchard (from 20 Apr - 1953) - Surgeon Capt Louis P. Kirkpatrick, USN (to 18 - Jun 1952) - Capt Lawrence E. Bach, USN (from 19 Jun) - Capt Walter R. Miller, USN (from 25 - Apr 1953) - Tank Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 - May 1952) - LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr. (from - 21 May) - LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr - 1953) - - _Headquarters Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Col Robert T. Stivers, Jr. (to 5 Jul - 1952) - Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 6 Jul) - LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 12 Jul) - LtCol John F. Corbett (from 11 Sep) - Col Alexander W. Gentleman (from 21 Nov) - LtCol John C. Landrun (from 16 May 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Corbin L. West (to 16 Mar 1952) - Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 17 Mar) - Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 10 Nov) - Maj John K. Hogan (from 31 Jan 1953) - (None listed for 29Feb-14May) - Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 May) - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt “J” E. Hancey (to 9 Mar 1952) - Capt Robert J. McKay (from 10 Mar) - 1stLt George C. Schatteman (from 6 May) - Maj Louis A. Cortright (from 1 Jul) - 2dLt Neil O. Snepp (from 17 Jul) - Maj Val Price, Jr. (from 29 Aug) - Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 Jan 1953) - Capt Robert A. Hohmann (from 15 May) - Capt Martin S. Hauge (from 28 May) - Commanding Officer, - Military Police Company LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952) - LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr) - LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 - Aug) - LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 12 - Jan 1953) - LtCol Harold B. Warner, Jr. (from 18 - Apr) - Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul) - Commanding Officer, - Reconnaissance Company Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (to 10 Jun 1952) - Capt James O. Webb (from 11 Jun) - Capt James H. A. Flood (from 11 Sep) - Maj Dermott H. MacDonnell (from 3 Dec) - Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 21 Jun 1953) - - _1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Sidney S. Wade (to 9 Apr 1952) - Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 10 Apr) - Col Walter F. Layer (from 25 Jul) - Col Hewitt D. Adams (from 21 Nov) - Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 1 May 1953) - Executive Officer LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (to 26 Mar - 1952) - Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from - 27 Mar) - LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 2 May) - LtCol Glenn R. Long (from 16 Sep) - LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 4 Feb - 1953) - LtCol Lowell E. English (from 8 May) - LtCol Harold C. Boehm (from 2 Jul) - - _1st Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Papurca (to 2 Aug 1952) - LtCol Louis N. King (from 3 Aug) - LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 13 Sep) - Col Frederick R. Findtner (from 14 - Jan 1953) - LtCol Stanley M. Adams (from 5 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (to 5 Apr 1952) - Maj Leo V. Gross (from 6 Apr) - Maj John K. Logan (from 14 Jul) - Maj William C. Chip (from 20 Aug) - Maj John K. Hogan (from 30 Dec) - Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 4 Feb 1953) - Maj Roger D. Peterson (from 19 Jun) - - _2d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Thell H. Fisher (to 1 Apr 1952) - LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 2 Apr) - LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr. (from 23 - Jun) - LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 18 Oct) - LtCol George A. Gililland (from 9 Feb - 1953) - LtCol Frank A. Long (from 1 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Frank J. Harte (to 5 May 1952) - Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 6 May) - Maj John N. Rentz (from 29 Jul) - Maj John P. McNeill (from 21 Aug) - Maj Horace C. Reifel (from 9 Mar 1953) - Maj John B. Bristow (from 20 Apr) - Maj Albert S. Dooley, Jr. (from 1 Jul) - - _3d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (to 11 Apr 1952) - LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 12 Apr) - LtCol Gerard T. Armitage (from 2 May) - LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 20 Aug) - LtCol Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. (from 6 Dec) - LtCol Lowell E. English (from 1 Apr - 1953) - LtCol Roy D. Miller (from 6 May) - Executive Officer Maj Robert V. Perkins (to 2 Jul 1952) - Maj Wesley R. Christie (from 3 Jul) - Maj Charles S. Robertson (from 27 Oct) - Maj Norman C. Smyle (from 3 Jan 1953) - Maj Robert D. Thurston (from 26 Mar) - Maj Walter L. Williams (from 20 May) - Maj John T. Quinn (from 2 Jul) - - _5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (to 15 Aug - 1952) - Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Aug) - Col Lewis W. Walt (from 10 Dec) - Col Harvey C. Tschirgi (from 14 Apr - 1953) - Executive Officer LtCol John A. Saxten (to 1 Jun 1952) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 2 Jun) - LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 - Jul) - LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 21 - Aug) - LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Jan - 1953) - LtCol James H. Finch (from 23 May) - LtCol James Taul (from 18 Jul) - - _1st Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (to 24 May - 1952) - Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 25 May) - LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (from 15 - Jul) - LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 11 Nov) - LtCol Jonas M. Platt (from 26 Dec) - LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (from 29 - Apr 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (to 4 May - 1952) - Maj Lyle K. London (from 5 May) - Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 29 Aug) - Maj William C. Doty, Jr. (from 25 Jan - 1953) - Maj Thomas W. Pearson (from 2 Apr) - Maj George R. Burke (from 11 Jun) - Maj Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. (from - 22 Jun) - - _2d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Cushing (to 10 Jun - 1952) - LtCol Thomas J. Cross (from 11 Jun) - LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 - Aug) - LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 11 Sep) - LtCol James H. Finch (from 27 Feb - 1953) - LtCol Andrew C. Geer (from 14 May) - Executive Officer Maj Robert S. Hudson (to 10 Jun 1952) - Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 11 Jun) - Maj Philip H. McArdle (from 16 Jul) - Maj Paul C. Scofield (from 19 Dec) - Maj Thomas M. Fields (from 26 Jun - 1953) - - _3d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol William S. McLaughlin (to 15 - Jul 1952) - LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr. (from 16 Jul) - LtCol Robert J. Oddy (from 16 Nov) - LtCol John T. Hill (from 11 Apr 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (to 22 May - 1952) - Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr. (from - 23 May) - Maj Joseph A. Bruder, Jr. (from 7 Jul) - Maj Vernon Burtman (from 1 Nov) - Maj Joseph S. Buntin (from 7 Feb 1953) - - _7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Russell E. Honsowetz (to 10 Jun - 1952) - Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr. (from 11 Jun) - Col Loren E. Haffner (from 5 Nov) - Col Glenn C. Funk (from 27 Mar 1953) - Executive Officer LtCol John D. Wiggins (to 17 Jul 1952) - LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 18 Jul) - LtCol Richard D. Strickler (from 24 Nov) - LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 22 Mar - 1953) - LtCol Russell Duncan (from 26 May) - LtCol Stanley J. Nelson (from 31 Jul) - - _1st Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (to 2 Aug - 1952) - LtCol Leo J. Dulacki (from 3 Aug) - LtCol James C. Short (from 22 Nov) - LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 28 - Dec) - LtCol Harry A. Hadd (from 18 May 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Henry V. Joslin (to 14 Jul 1952) - Maj Theodore R. Cathey (from 15 Jul) - Maj James C. Short (from 23 Jul) - Maj Floyd M. Johnson, Jr. (from 2 Aug) - Maj Roy H. Thompson (from 1 Dec) - Maj Glenn E. Ferguson (from 3 Jun - 1953) - Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (from 25 Jun) - - _2d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Noel C. Gregory (to 18 Jul 1952) - LtCol Anthony Caputo (from 19 Jul) - LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 12 Nov) - LtCol Alexander D. Cereghino (from 19 - Mar 1953) - LtCol Joseph C. Missar (from 21 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Erwin Madsen (to 19 Apr 1952) - Maj William J. Zaro (from 20 Apr) - Maj James C. Fetters (from 8 Jun) - Maj Richard H. Mickle (from 24 Oct) - Maj Littleton K. Smith (from 16 Apr - 1953) - Maj Ralph E. June (from 17 Jun) - Maj Don P. Wyckoff (from 17 Jul) - - - _3d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Houston Stiff (to 26 Apr 1952) - Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 27 Apr) - LtCol Gerald F. Russell (from 17 Jun) - LtCol Charles D. Barrett, Jr. (from - 13 Oct) - LtCol Russell Duncan (from 14 Mar - 1953) - LtCol Paul M. Jones (from 26 May) - Executive Officer Maj Franklin C. Bacon (to 26 Apr 1952) - Maj Richard M. Remington (from 27 Apr) - Maj Harold T. Clemens (from 28 Aug) - Maj Guy L. Wade (from 13 Oct) - Maj Alfred A. Tillman (from 23 Oct) - Maj John Mesko (from 25 May 1953) - - _11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep - 1952) - Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep) - Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953) - Col Manly L. Curry (from 5 Jul) - Executive Officer LtCol Lewis A. Jones (to 4 Jun 1952) - LtCol Robert F. Steidtmann (from 5 - Jun) - LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 16 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. (from 6 - May) - Maj Joseph E. Fogg (from 6 Jul) - LtCol Wade H. Hitt (from 9 Jul) - _1st Battalion, 11th Marines_ - Commanding Officer LtCol James R. Haynes (to 24 Jun 1952) - LtCol David S. Randall (from 25 Jun) - LtCol Olin W. Jones, Jr. (from 2 Nov) - LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 8 May - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Harold E. Nelson (to 21 Jun 1952) - Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 22 Jun) - Maj Lee P. Vance (from 26 Jul) - Maj Harry L. Sherwood, Jr. (from 14 Nov) - Maj Thomas L. Randall (from 17 Dec) - Maj John J. Jarvis, Jr. (from 25 Mar - 1953) - - _2d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol George B. Thomas (to 2 May 1952) - LtCol William P. Pala (from 3 May) - LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 6 Aug) - LtCol Arthur J. Bachhuber (from 17 Nov) - LtCol William H. Atkinson (from 10 - Feb 1953) - Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 21 May) - LtCol Gordon H. West (from 18 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Morris R. Snead (to 10 Jun 1952) - Maj Edward L. Fossum (from 11 Jun) - LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 1 Jul) - Maj Roy E. Moffett (from 10 Aug) - Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 2 Sep) - Maj Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr. (from 24 - May 1953) - Maj Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (from 13 - Jul) - - _3d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (to 13 Jul - 1952) - LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from 14 Jul) - LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall (from 27 Nov) - LtCol Alfred L. Owens (from 25 Mar 1953) - Maj Dale D. Meyers (from 28 Jul) - Executive Officer LtCol Charles A. Lipot (to 5 Jul 1952) - Maj Joseph S. Gardner (from 6 Jul) - Maj William J. Kohler (from 27 Jul) - Maj Lawrence L. Graham (from 17 Nov) - Maj Robert M. Jenkins (from 15 Dec) - Maj Adoph J. Honeycutt (from 28 Mar - 1953) - Maj Robert C. Hilliard (from 7 May) - Maj Leslie L. Page (from 12 Jun to 26 - Jul) - - _4th Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol William M. Gilliam (to 11 Apr - 1952) - LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (from 12 Apr) - Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 16 Jun) - LtCol Raymond D. Wright (from 16 Jul) - Maj William J. Sullivan (from 18 Dec) - LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 20 Dec) - Maj David L. Moberly (from 23 Apr 1953) - LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 27 - Apr) - Executive Officer LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (to 16 Apr 1952) - Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 17 - Apr) - Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 11 Jun) - Maj Edward E. Davis (from 16 Jun) - Maj William J. Sullivan (from 17 Oct) - Maj David L. Moberly (from 22 Feb - 1953) - Maj Johnny Jennings (from 2 May) - Maj George W. Carrington, Jr. (from - 13 Jun) - - _7th Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Herbert E. Pierce (to 1 Jul 1952) - LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 2 Jul) - Maj John H. Faggart (from 27 Jul) - Maj Robert S. Anderson (from 16 Jun - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Ben Sutts (to 5 May 1952) - Maj John J. Howe (from 16 Aug) - Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 20 Nov) - Maj Alfred G. McCormick (from 26 Apr - 1953) - - _1st Ordnance Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952) - LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May) - Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 26 Aug) - Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 25 Mar - 1953) - Executive Officer Capt Frederick V. Osborn (to 5 May 1952) - Maj Harold C. Borth (from 6 May) - Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 16 Jul) - Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 26 Aug) - Maj Allen F. Stockdale (from 1 Sep) - Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 15 Sep) - Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 4 Nov) - Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 21 Dec) - Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 25 Mar - 1953) - Maj Jack G. Fitzgerald (from 4 Jul) - - _1st Service Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Bernard W. McLean (to 18 May 1952) - LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 19 May) - LtCol Edwin A. Law (from 1 Oct) - LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 5 Jul 1953) - Executive Officer Maj George E. Allison (to 27 Oct 1952) - Maj James C. Fetters (from 28 Oct) - Maj Robert “J” Vroegindewey (from 19 - Mar 1953) - - _1st Tank Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 - May 1952) - LtCol John I. Williamson (from 21 May) - LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (to 15 Jun - 1952) - Maj Robert B. Jeter (from 16 Jun) - Maj William W. Day (from 21 Feb 1953) - Maj Francis C. Hogan (from 6 May) - - _1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John T. O’Neill (to 5 Aug 1952) - Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug) - LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 - Aug) - LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec) - Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May - 1953) - LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 - Jul) - Executive Officer Maj James L. Jones (to 5 Aug 1952) - Maj David Young (from 6 Aug) - Maj James L. Jones (from 12 Aug) - Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 21 Nov) - Maj Robert S. Wilson (from 16 May 1953) - - _1st Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Howard E. Wertman (to 15 May 1952) - Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 16 May) - LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 27 Jul) - LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 24 Mar - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Raymond L. Luckel (to 2 Aug 1952) - Maj Marvin D. Grush (from 3 Aug) - Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 6 Sep) - Maj Gobe Smith, Jr. (from 4 Oct) - Maj Robert C. McNab, Jr. (from 17 Feb - 1953) - - _1st Combat Service Group_ - - Commanding Officer Col Russell N. Jordahl (to 29 Jun 1952) - Col Kenneth A. King (from 30 Jun) - LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Nov) - Col James T. Wilbur (from 8 Dec) - Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 8 Feb 1953) - Col James A. Moreau (from 8 Jul) - Executive Officer LtCol James G. Kelly (to 20 May 1952) - Col Frank M. Reinecke (from 21 May) - LtCol William H. Cushing (from 11 Jun) - LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Dec) - LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 28 Jan 1953) - LtCol Tillman N. Peters (from 15 Mar) - Maj Harvey B. Atkins (from 11 May) - - - _1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952) - LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug) - LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov) - LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from - 16 Mar 1953) - Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj William L. Eubank (to 3 Jun 1952) - Maj George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 4 Jun) - Maj William E. Lunn (from 7 Nov) - Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 24 Mar - 1953) - Maj John J. DePalma (from 20 Jun) - - _1st Shore Party Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul - 1952) - Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul) - LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct) - Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec) - Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Frederick F. Draper (to 3 Jun - 1952) - Maj William E. Buron (from 4 Jun) - LtCol Clyde P. Ford (from 12 Aug) - LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 3 - Mar 1953) - LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 18 - Apr) - LtCol James M. Joyner (from 8 Jul) - - _1st Engineer Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John V. Kelsey (to 5 May 1952) - LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 6 May) - LtCol Francis W. Augustine (from 1 Dec) - LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 20 - Apr 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Grover C. Williams, Jr. (to 5 Jun - 1952) - Maj Francis W. Augustine (from 6 Jun) - Maj George W. Torbert (from 1 Dec) - Maj Donald V. Nahrgang (from 26 Jun - 1953) - - _1st Medical Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (to 31 - Aug 1952) - Cdr William W. Ayres, USN (from 1 Sep) - Executive Officer Cdr James C. Luce, USN (to 12 May 1952) - (none listed from 13 May to 8 Jun) - LCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 9 - Jun) - Cdr Roald N. Grant, USN (from 24 Aug - to 21 Sep) - (none listed from 22 Sep to 25 Apr 1953) - Lt Roger D. Williams, USN (from 26 Apr) - - _1st Signal Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John E. Morris (to 3 Apr 1952) - LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 4 Apr) - LtCol Jacob E. Glick (from 3 Aug) - LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 16 - Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Ernest C. Bennett (to 4 Apr 1952) - Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 5 Apr) - Maj Mauro J. Padalino (from 12 Jul) - Maj Frederick J. Cramer (from 30 Dec) - Maj John J. Reber (from 8 Feb 1953 to - 22 Apr 1953) - - (This battalion was disbanded on 22 Apr 1953.) - - _1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)_ - - Commanding General MajGen Christian F. Schilt (to 11 Apr - 1952) - MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (from 12 Apr - 1952) - MajGen Vernon E. Megee (from 9 Jan - 1953) - Asst Commanding General BGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (to 30 - Aug 1952) - BGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. (from - 31 Aug) - Chief of Staff Col Arthur F. Binney (to 30 Apr 1952) - Col Frank H. Schwable (from 1 May) - Col John Wehle (from 9 Jul) - Col Samuel S. Jack (from 8 Sep) - Col John C. Munn (from 8 May 1953) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Robert O. Bisson (to 7 Sep 1952) - Col Lewis H. Delano, Jr. (from 8 Sep) - LtCol William M. Frash (from 11 May - 1953) - Col Lawrence B. Clark (from 29 May) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col John W. Stage (to 14 May 1952) - LtCol Chester A. Henry, Sr. (from 15 - May) - Maj Donald E. Kramer (from 22 Jul) - LtCol Harold Granger (from 16 Sep) - Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Jul 1953) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Stanley W. Trachta (to 8 Apr 1952) - Col William R. Wendt (from 9 Apr) - Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 2 Sep) - Col Charles H. Hayes (from 29 Sep) - Col William D. Roberson (from 30 May - 1953) - Col Frank H. Wirsig (from 5 Jul) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 Mar 1952) - Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 Mar) - Col Robert W. Clark (from 24 May) - Col Richard D. Hughes (from 11 Feb - 1953) - Col Richard M. Baker (from 4 Jul) - - _Headquarters Squadron, 1st MAW_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Earl C. Miles (to 29 May 1952) - Maj David R. Moak (from 30 May) - Maj Charles H. Woodley (from 1 Sep) - Maj Lionel D. Hastings (from 26 Sep) - Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. (from 1 Mar - 1953) - Maj Fred J. Gilhuly (from 1 Jul) - - _Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)_ - (Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953) - and - _Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)_ - (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer Col John Wehle (to 8 Apr 1952) - LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 9 Apr) - LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 17 Jul) - Col Lyle H. Meyer (from 21 Sep) - LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 11 May 1953) - Col Robert J. Johnson (from 30 Jun) - Executive Officer LtCol Birney B. Truitt (to 8 Apr 1952) - Maj William L. Woodruff (from 9 Apr) - Maj Edward L. Schnettler (from 4 Jun) - Maj Franklin L. Kemper (from 26 Aug) - LtCol William G. Voss (from 20 Dec) - LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 21 Apr 1953) - Maj Elswin P. Dunn (from 11 May) - LtCol Charles J. Prall (from 6 Jul) - - _Headquarters Squadron, MWSG-17_ - (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer Capt James D. Ireland (from 1 Jul 1953) - - _Marine Air Base Squadron 17 (MABS-17)_ - (Activated 1 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer Maj Bryce Howerton (from 1 Jul 1953) - - _Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17 (MARS-17)_ - (Activated 1 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer Maj Vincent Franano (from 1 Jul 1953) - Maj James G. Fox (from 29 Jul) - - _Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Frederick R. Payne (to 18 May 1952) - Col John W. Stage (from 19 May) - Col Jack R. Cram (from 11 Jul) - Col Kenneth D. Kerby (from 16 Feb 1953) - Executive Officer LtCol Russell D. Rupp (to 1 May 1952) - LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 2 May) - LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (from - 20 Jun) - LtCol Harold L. Lantz (from 11 Aug) - LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (from 24 Feb 1953) - LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from - 23 May) - LtCol John S. Flickinger (from 10 Jun) - LtCol Morris E. Flater (from 21 Jun) - - _Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Hensley Williams (to 2 Jun 1952) - Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 3 Jun) - LtCol William H. Whitaker, Jr. (from - 1 Aug) - LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from - 21 Aug) - LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 28 Jan - 1953) - Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr. (from 20 Feb) - LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from - 11 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Clinton E. Jones (to 2 Jun 1952) - Capt John F. Driftmier (from 3 Jun) - Maj George C. Henshaw (from 28 Aug) - Maj Thomas H. Hughes, Jr. (from 25 Sep) - LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 20 Feb - 1953) - (none listed from 15 Mar to 9 Jul) - Capt Robert L. Dietrichson (from 10 Jul) - - _Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 - (MGCIS-1)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Fred A. Steele (to 15 Aug 1952) - Maj Henry W. Hise (from 16 Aug) - Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 16 Oct) - LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 3 - Feb 1953) - Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 1 Jun) - LtCol Harold F. Brown (from 23 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr (to 11 Apr - 1952) - Capt William J. Wachsler (from 12 Apr) - Capt Francis K. McManus (from 22 May) - Maj William Sloane (from 1 Aug) - Maj Romeo F. Bordigon (from 4 Oct) - Maj Tolbert T. Gentry (from 2 Nov) - Maj Francis F. Rotter (from 8 Jan 1953) - Capt John E. Dixon (from 31 May) - Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 23 Jun) - - _Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 - (MGCIS-3)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Owen M. Hines (to 20 May 1952) - Maj James H. Foster (from 21 May) - LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 14 Jun) - LtCol Kenneth D. Frazier (from 16 Aug) - LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 3 Feb - 1953) - Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May) - Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 1 Jul) - LtCol Lowell D. Grow (from 27 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj James H. Foster (to 1 Jun 1952) - Capt Lee B. Swindall (from 2 Jun) - Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 21 Jun) - Maj Raleigh E. Fletcher (from 5 Sep) - Maj Francis E. Lee, Jr. (from 29 Oct) - Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 4 Feb - 1953) - Capt William K. Lebo (from 19 May) - Maj Thomas E. Archer (from 20 Jun) - Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 27 Jul) - - _Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1)_ - (Activated 15 Sep 1952) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (to 24 Jan 1953) - LtCol Ernest C. Fusan (from 25 Jan) - LtCol Thomas “H” Mann, Jr. (from 16 Mar) - Maj George H. Linnemeier (from 6 Apr) - LtCol Wilbur A. Free (from 1 Jun) - - _Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 May 1952) - Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 May) - Col John P. Condon (from 10 Aug) - Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 13 - Jan 1953) - Col Edward B. Carney (from 1 Apr) - Executive Officer LtCol Robert J. Hoey (to 5 Jun 1952) - LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 6 Jun) - Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 17 Aug) - LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 20 Feb - 1953) - Col Robert J. Johnson (from 19 Mar) - Col William F. Hausman (from 30 Jun) - - _Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12_ - - Commanding Officer Capt George Byers, Jr. (to 22 Apr 1952) - 1stLt Daniel F. McConnell (from 24 Apr) - Maj Godfrey Muller (from 1 Jul) - Capt William M. Crooks (from 18 Sep) - Capt Edgar F. Remington (from 21 Dec) - Capt Bradford N. Slenning (from 15 - May 1953) - - _Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Carl M. Longley (to 31 Mar 1952) - Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 1 Apr) - LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 25 Aug) - LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 11 Oct) - LtCol Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 1 Mar) - LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 1 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Robert A. Collett (to 31 Mar 1952) - Maj LeRoy T. Frey (from 1 Apr) - Maj Oscar C. Hauge, Jr. (from 26 May) - Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 18 Aug) - LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 18 Sep) - Maj Frank Hick (from 11 Oct) - Maj Harry J. Anderson (from 20 Jan 1953) - LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 14 Apr) - Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 11 Jul) - - - _Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph A. Gray (to 31 May 1952) - Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 1 Jun) - Maj William M. Johnston, Jr. (from 19 - Aug) - Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 29 Dec) - LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 20 Feb - 1953) - LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 27 Jun) - Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 18 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Will (to 26 Apr 1952) - Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 27 Apr) - Capt Robert T. Kinsey (from 1 Jun) - Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 19 Aug) - Maj Warren L. MacQuarrie (from 1 Sep) - Maj John R. Hyneman (from 15 Dec) - Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 20 Feb 1953) - Maj Alexander Gagyi (from 15 Apr) - Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 12 Jul) - - _Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol William Q. Houston, Jr. (to 19 - Jun 1952) - LtCol Philip “L” Crawford (from 20 Jun) - LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (from 11 Sep) - LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 7 Dec) - LtCol John E. Hughes (from 1 Mar 1953) - Maj Richard L. Braun (from 21 Apr) - LtCol Harold B. Penne (from 16 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Henry W. Horst (to 31 May 1952) - Maj Robert H. Brumley (from 1 Jun) - Maj Julius B. Griffin (from 30 Jul) - LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 2 Nov) - LtCol Roy R. Hewitt (from 11 Dec) - LtCol John E. Hughes (from 17 Jan 1953) - Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 1 Mar) - Maj Robert C. Woten (from 16 Jul) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212)_ - redesignated - _Marine Attack Squadron 212 (VMA-212)_ - on 10 Jun 1952 - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bryson (to 9 Jun 1952) - LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 10 Jun) - LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher (from 5 Sep) - LtCol Charles E. Dobson, Jr. (from 25 - Oct) - LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 1 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Louis R. Smunk (from 20 Feb) - Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 1 Jun) - LtCol James R. Wallace (from 19 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Richard B. Elliott (to 29 Feb 1952) - Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 8 Mar) - Maj Leslie C. Reed (from 10 Jun) - LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 25 Oct) - Maj Norman O’Bryan (from 20 Feb 1953) - Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 7 Mar) - Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 1 Jun) - Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 19 Jun) - Maj Boris J. Frankovic (from 20 Jul) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323)_ - redesignated - _Marine Attack Squadron 323 (VMA-323)_ - on 30 Jun 1952 - (Transferred from operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft - Wing on 7 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Richard L. Blume (to 25 Apr 1952) - Maj William A. Weir (from 26 Apr) - LtCol Henry S. Miller (from 1 Jun) - LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain (from 1 - Sep) - LtCol Williard C. Lemke (from 20 Nov) - LtCol William M. Frash (from 13 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 11 Apr - to 26 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj William A. Weir (to 8 Jun 1952) - Maj Richard E. Pryor (from 9 Jun) - Maj Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Sep) - Maj Thomas M. Forsyth, Jr. (from 20 Nov) - LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 2 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from - 29 Jan) - Maj Robert C. Woten (from 3 May to 26 - Jun) - - _Marine Attack Squadron 332 (VMA-332)_ - (Came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing - on 29 May 1953) - - Commanding Officer LtCol John B. Berteling (from 29 May - 1953). - Executive Officer Maj Gordon L. Allen (from 29 May 1953) - - _Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-251)_ - attached to - _1st Marine Aircraft Wing_ - on 9 Jun 1953 - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harold A. Harwood (from 9 Jun - 1953) - Executive Officer Maj James W. Merritt (from 9 Jun 1953) - - _Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John R. Burnett (to 11 Jun 1952) - Col Peter D. Lambrecht (from 12 Jun) - LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 19 Jun) - LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr. (from - 9 Sep) - LtCol Robert F. Conley (from 20 Jan - 1953) - LtCol Ross S. Mickey (from 6 May) - LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 10 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Simonds (to 19 Apr 1952) - Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from - 23 Apr) - LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 15 Aug) - Maj Gorden E. Gray (from 20 Aug) - LtCol Jack C. Scott (from 8 Sep) - LtCol Jack B. Winters (from 14 Sep) - Maj Dave E. Severance (from 20 Jan 1953) - Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 9 Jun) - LtCol Robert L. Conrad (from 24 Jun) - Maj Richard M. Hunt (from 10 Jul) - - _Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Martin A. Severson (to 23 May 1952) - Col John P. Condon (from 24 May) - Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 11 Aug) - Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 22 Oct) - Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 10 May 1953) - Col John L. Smith (from 24 Jul) - Executive Officer LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (to 13 May 1952) - LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 14 May) - Col Herbert H. Williamson (from 26 Jul) - LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 11 Aug) - Col John P. Coursey (from 17 Aug) - Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Mar 1953) - LtCol James K. Dill (from 11 May) - LtCol Thomas V. Murto, Jr. (from 26 Jul) - - _Headquarters Squadron, MAG-33_ - - Commanding Officer Capt Allen R. Schutter (to 30 May 1952) - Maj Guy M. Cloud (from 1 Jun) - Maj Richard J. Collins (from 21 Jul) - Maj Reuel H. Pietz (from 1 Nov) - Maj Thomas J. Cushman, Jr. (from 14 - Apr 1953) - Capt Jerry N. Hendershot (from 26 May) - - _Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 9 Jun 1952) - Maj John W. Zuber (from 10 Jun) - Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 6 - Aug) - Maj Kenneth B. Nelson (from 9 Dec) - LtCol Bernard McShane (from 21 Apr 1953) - LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 1 Jun) - LtCol Jack Cosley (from 26 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshberger (to 1 May - 1952) - Maj Summerfield M. Taylor, Jr. (from - 2 May) - Capt Frederic T. Watts, Jr. (from 11 - Aug) - Maj Harold N. McLaffey (from 2 Oct) - Maj Darwin P. Glaese (from 23 Dec) - Capt George J. Collins (from 22 May - 1953) - - _Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Zadik Collier (to 1 Sep 1952) - Maj William N. Case (from 2 Sep) - Maj Patrick Harrison (from 5 Feb 1953) - Maj Julian P. Craigmiles (from 29 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 1 Aug 1952) - Maj John L. Herndon (from 12 Aug) - Maj James Aldworth (from 2 Dec) - Capt Marshall S. Austin (from 22 - April 1953) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas M. Coles (to 20 May 1952) - Maj John W. Zuber (from 21 May) - LtCol Robert C. Armstead (from 5 Jun) - Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 17 Jul) - LtCol Royce W. Coln (from 18 Aug) - LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 29 Sep) - LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou (from 1 - Feb 1953) - LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 31 Mar) - LtCol Lynn H. Stewart (from 5 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (to 26 Apr 1952) - Maj John W. Zuber (from 27 Apr) - Maj Griffith B. Doyle (from 21 May) - Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 10 Jun) - Maj Arthur N. Nehf, Jr. (from 5 Aug) - LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 19 - Nov) - LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 2 Feb 1953) - Maj Carol Bernard (from 31 Mar) - Maj James H. Phillips (from 25 Jun) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-311)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (to 2 Jun 1952) - Maj Henry W. Hise (from 3 Jun) - Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 10 Jun) - Maj William J. Sims (from 26 Jun) - LtCol Arthur H. Adams (from 1 Oct) - LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 1 Feb 1953) - LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 21 Apr) - LtCol Bernard McShane (from 1 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Jay E. McDonald (to 27 Mar 1952) - Maj Henry W. Hise (from 28 Mar) - Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 26 Jun) - Maj Harold A. Langstaff, Jr. (from 22 - Aug) - Maj Williams J. Sims (from 1 Oct) - LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (from 12 Oct) - LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 20 Jan - 1953) - Maj John Skinner, Jr. (from 21 Apr) - Maj William D. Heier (from 3 Jul) - - _Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-312)_ - (On 16 Jun 1953, this squadron was reassigned to the - 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 8 - Apr 1952) - LtCol Robert E. Smith, Jr. (from 9 Apr) - LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (from 11 - Jul) - LtCol Robert E. Cameron (from 4 Oct) - LtCol Winston E. Jewson (from 25 Jan - to 15 Jun 1953) - Executive Officer Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (to 7 - Apr 1952) - Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 9 Apr) - Maj Walter D. Persons (from 11 Jul) - Maj Marshall C. Gregory (from 1 Sep) - Maj James W. Baker (from 13 Jan 1953) - Maj Grover R. Betzer (from 2 Feb) - Maj James L. Cooper (from 4 May to 10 - Jun) - - _Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 13 May 1952) - LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 14 May) - LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 11 Sep) - LtCol Howard L. Walter (from 1 Nov) - LtCol William M. Ritchey (from 16 Feb - 1953) - LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. (from 15 May) - Executive Officer Maj Albert E. James (to 3 Jun 1952) - Maj Marion B. Bowers (from 4 Jun) - Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 18 Jul) - LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 28 Aug) - Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 11 Sep) - Maj Howard L. Walter (from 2 Oct) - Maj Louis Conti (from 6 Nov) - LtCol Grant W. McCombs (from 14 Dec) - Maj Louis Conti (from 5 Feb 1953) - Maj John E. Worlund (from 1 Apr) - - - _Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Keith B. McCutcheon (to 7 Aug 1952) - LtCol John F. Carey (from 8 Aug) - Col Owen A. Chambers (from 15 Mar 1953) - Executive Officer Maj James R. Dyer (to 10 May 1952) - Maj Zigmund J. Radolinski (from 11 May) - LtCol David M. Danser (from 28 May) - LtCol Russel R. Riley (from 1 Sep) - Maj Gilbert Percy (from 3 Jun 1953) - LtCol John H. King, Jr. (from 1 Jul) - - _Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol William H. Herring (to 10 May - 1952) - Maj Wallace J. Slappey, Jr. (from 11 - May) - LtCol Elkin S. Dew (from 11 Sep) - LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (from 2 - Feb 1953) - LtCol Earl E. Anderson (from 1 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from 1 Jul) - Maj Lynn E. Midkiff (from 26 Jun) - Maj Alton W. McCully (from 5 Feb 1953) - Maj John A. Hood (from 15 May) - - _1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion_ - - Battalion Commander Col Max C. Chapman (to 22 Nov 1952) - Col Edgar O. Price (from 23 Nov) - LtCol Henry S. Massie (from 7 Apr 1953) - Executive Officer LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 30 Apr 1952) - Maj Thomas J. Matthews (from 1 May) - Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 15 Mar - 1953) - Maj Henry V. Leasure (from 9 Jun) - - - - -APPENDIX D - -Effective Strength - - -1ST MARINE DIVISION AND 1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING[799] - -Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the -effective strength of 1stMarDiv and 1st MAW throughout the 1952–1953 -period. - - -------------------------------------------------------- - Date Officers Enlisted Total - -------------------------------------------------------- - 31 Mar 52 2,238 30,790 33,028 - ground (1,412) (24,811) (26,223) - aviation ( 826) ( 5,979) ( 6,805) - 30 June 52 2,560 34,509 37,069 - ground (1,684) (28,549) (30,233) - aviation ( 876) ( 5,960) ( 6,836) - 31 Oct 52 2,403 33,726 36,129 - ground (1,423) (26,795) (28,218) - aviation ( 980) ( 6,931) ( 7,911) - 31 Jan 53 2,329 32,976 35,305 - ground (1,352) (26,766) (28,118) - aviation ( 977) ( 6,210) ( 7,187) - 30 Apr 53 2,307 33,995 36,302 - ground (1,370) (28,172) (29,542) - aviation ( 937) ( 5,823) ( 6,760) - 31 Jul 53 2,335 31,881 34,216[800] - ground (1,412) (25,299) (26,711) - aviation ( 923) ( 6,582) ( 7,505) - -------------------------------------------------------- - - [799] Personnel figures file, Statistics Br., HQMC, 31 May - 1950–31 Jan 1955. - - [800] In addition, the 1stMarDiv was reinforced throughout - this period by other indigenous military and civilian - personnel. - - - - -APPENDIX E - -Marine Corps Casualties - -(Ground and Air) - - -KOREAN WAR 1950–1953[801] - - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Date KIA[802] Killed WIA Cumulative - non-Battle Total - --------------------------------------------------------------- - Aug-Dec 1950 1,526 30 6,229 7,785 - - Jan-Dec 1951 960 82 7,924 8,966 - - Jan-Mar 1952 87 19 600 706 - ------------------------------------------- - Aug 1950-Mar 1952 2,573 131 14,753 17,457 - - Apr-Dec 1952 960 66 6,815 7,841 - - Jan-Jul 1953 729 47 4,470 5,246 - ------------------------------------------- - Apr 1952-Jul 1953 1,689 113 11,285 13,087 - - TOTAL: - - Aug 1950 to - Jul 1953 4,262 244 26,038 30,544 - --------------------------------------------------------------- - - [801] Abstracted from U. S. Marine Corps Strength in Korea vs - Korean Casualties by Month, 25 Jun 1950–27 Jul 1953, - based on Korean Operation Report, Statistics Br., HQMC - and Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 1967. - - [802] KIA includes DOW, Captured and Died, and Missing In - Action, Presumed Dead. - - - - -APPENDIX F - -Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War - - - 21Apr51 1stLt Harold D. Daigh - (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 1 YAK - - 21Apr51 Capt Phillip C. DeLong - (VMF-312, F4U-4, USS _Bataan_) 2 YAKs - - 30Jun51 [A]Capt Edwin B. Long - (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2 - - 12Jul51 Capt Donald L. Fenton - (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 PO-2 - - 23Sep51 Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy - (VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) 1 PO-2 - - 4Nov51 [B]Maj William F. Guss - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - 5Mar52 [B]Capt Vincent J. Marzello - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - 16Mar52 [B]LtCol John S. Payne - (1st MAW) 1 MIG - - 7June52 1stLt John W. Andre - (VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) 1 YAK-9 - - 10Sep52 Capt Jesse G. Folmar - (VMA-312, F4U, USS _Sicily_) 1 MIG - - 15Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - 28Sep52 [B]Maj Alexander J. Gillis - (VMF-311) 2 MIGs - - 3Nov52 [C]Maj William T. Stratton, Jr. - (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 YAK-15 - - 8Nov52 Capt Oliver R. Davis - (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG - - 10Dec52 [D]1stLt Joseph A. Corvi - (VMF(K)-513, F3D-2) 1 PO-2 - - 12Jan53 Maj Elswin P. Dunn - (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG - - 20Jan53 [B]Capt Robert Wade - (MAG-33) 1 MIG - - 28Jan53 Capt James R. Weaver - (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG - - 31Jan53 LtCol Robert F. Conley - (VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) 1 MIG - - 7Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 12Apr53 [B]Maj Roy L. Reed - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 16May53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt - (VMF-115) 1 MIG - - 18May53 [B]Capt Harvey L. Jensen - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 22Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 24Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 30Jun53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt - (VMF 115) 1 MIG - - 11Jul53 [B]Maj John F. Bolt - (VMF-115) 2 MIGs - - 12Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - 19Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - 20Jul53 [B]Maj Thomas M. Sellers - (VMF-115) 2 MIGs - - 22Jul53 [B]Maj John H. Glenn - (VMF-311) 1 MIG - - [A] Marines on temporary exchange duty with Fifth Air Force. - - [B] First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by UNC. - - [C] First enemy jet aircraft destroyed through use of - airborne intercept radar equipped fighter. - - [D] First enemy aircraft destroyed by means of lock-on radar - gear. - - - - -APPENDIX G - -Unit Citations[803] - - [803] For text of previous awards to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and - 1st ProvMarBrig, see earlier volumes of this series. - - - PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION - _The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure - in citing - for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the - period 26 October 1950 to 27 July 1953_[804] - THE FIRST UNITED STATES MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED) - _for the award of_ - PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION - -Landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 the First United States Marine -Division (Reinforced) advanced to Yudam-ni where they engaged the -Chinese Communist Forces. The heroic and courageous fighting of the -First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), which was outnumbered -but never outfought by the Chinese Communist Forces; coupled with its -fight against the terrible winter weather in this return to Hungnam, -has added another glorious page to the brilliant history of the United -States Marines. After regrouping and retraining, the First United -States Marine Division (Reinforced) rejoined the United Nations -Forces and began the attack to the north which drove the aggressors -relentlessly before them. The enemy spring offensive during April -1951 which threatened to nullify the recent United Nations gains was -successfully repulsed by the First Marine Division (Reinforced) and -when other Republic of Korea Forces were heavily pressed and fighting -for survival the timely offensive by this Division gave heart to the -peoples of Korea. In March 1952 the First Marine Division (Reinforced) -assumed responsibility of defending the western flank of the Eighth -Army. In carrying out the responsibilities of this assignment the -Marines won everlasting glory at Bunker Hill. Continuing active -operations against the Communist enemy until the Armistice, the First -Marine Division (Reinforced) inflicted heavy losses upon the aggressors -and successfully repulsed their assaults upon strong point Vegas and -Reno during March 1953, and during July 1953, just prior to the signing -of the Armistice, again threw back the enemy in several days of severe -fighting at strong points Berlin and East Berlin. Although suffering -heavy losses during these engagements the First Marine Division -(Reinforced) was at all times successful in maintaining the integrity -of the United Nations’ positions within their assigned sector. The -First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), by its unparalleled -fighting courage and steadfast devotion to duty, has won the undying -affection and gratitude of the Korean people. During its entire -campaign the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) remained -true to its motto of “Semper Fidelis”. In keeping faith with the -highest traditions of its own country the First United States Marine -Division (Reinforced) kindled new hope in the breasts of all free men -and women in the Republic of Korea. This Citation carries with it the -right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual -member of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) who -served in Korea during the stated period. - - /S/ SYNGMAN RHEE - _President_ - - [804] The Korean PUC, for the period 26 Oct 50 to 15 Feb 53, - was presented to the 1stMarDiv in March 1953. Later, - President Syngman Rhee furnished a second citation - extending the period to include 16 Feb-27 Jul 53. The - division was thus cited for the overall period 26 Oct 50 - to 27 Jul 53, and the entire period is considered one - award. Decorations & Medals Br., HQMC. - - - PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION - _The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure - in citing - for outstanding and superior performance of duty_ - THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING - UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS - -The First Marine Aircraft Wing has distinguished itself in support of -United Nations Forces in Korea from 27 February 1951 to 11 June 1953. -During this period, Marine Aircraft flew over 80,000 combat sorties -braving intense opposition to strike enemy fortifications, weapons -and logistical installations throughout North Korea. These extensive -combat operations, often conducted in hazardous weather, have provided -United Nations’ ground forces with unparalleled close air support and -have inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage on enemy forces. -Flying from forward Korean bases and from naval aircraft carriers, -Marine aircraft have continually harassed enemy communication and -transportation systems, successfully curtailing the resupply of hostile -front line troops. The exceptional achievements of the officers and men -of the First Marine Aircraft Wing have materially assisted the Republic -of Korea in its fight for freedom. Their outstanding performance of -duty reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the -highest traditions of military service. - -The citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit -Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First Marine Aircraft -Wing who served in Korea during the stated period. - - /S/ SYNGMAN RHEE - _President_ - - - PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION - _The President of the Republic of Korea - takes pleasure in citing_ - THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ADVISORY COMPONENT - United States Naval Advisory Group - -for outstanding service to the people of Korea and for aid in the -development of the Korean Marine Corps during the period February 1953 -to 27 July 1954. - -While attached to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps the United States -Marine Advisory Component performed commendable service by giving -valuable advice and guidance thus enabling the Korean Marine Corps to -attain a ready status for any emergency. - -By their initiative and constant attention the officers and men have -contributed materially to the effective operation of all offices and -departments of the Korean Marine Corps. Their thorough knowledge of -techniques and military matters has helped in the practical routine -training and in the fitting of the Korean Marine Corps for effective -combat duty. - -By exemplary conduct and indomitable spirit the United States Marine -Corps Advisory Component has left a permanent imprint on the Korean -Marine Corps which will assist in the accomplishment of the missions -assigned to it in the future. - -The outstanding service of the officers and men of the United States -Marine Corps Advisory Component is in the best tradition of the United -States Naval Service and this Presidential Unit Citation is given in -recognition of their significant contribution to the welfare of the -Republic of Korea. - - /S/ SYNGMAN RHEE - _President_ - - - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - - WASHINGTON - - The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the - - FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - -“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against -enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 -and from 7 to 27 July 1953. During these periods the First Marine -Division, Reinforced, maintained the integrity of over thirty-five -miles of defense line in Panmunjom Truce Area against the constant -aggressions of the enemy. During the time the Division was in the -lines, it was under fire and attack by a resolute, well-equipped and -fanatical hostile force. The Division maintained an raiding defense -and constantly kept the enemy off balance by continuously patrolling, -probing and raiding enemy positions, accompanied by the full weight of -artillery and air support. Commencing in August 1952, and frequently -thereafter, during the months of October 1952, March 1953, and July -1953, the enemy launched a series of large scale attacks to capture -certain terrain features critical to the defense of friendly lines. -The outposts and main defensive positions called Bunker Hill, The -Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, along with certain -smaller outposts, gave title to battles of unsurpassed ferocity in -which the full effort of the Marine Division was required to hurl -back the attackers at heavy cost to both the Division and the enemy. -That the lines in the Division sector remained firm and unbreached at -the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953 gave eloquent tribute to -the resourcefulness, courage, professional acumen and stamina of the -members of the First Marine Division, Reinforced. Their inspiring and -unyielding devotion to the fulfillment of their vital mission reflects -the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service.” - -All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Division, -Reinforced, during the periods 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and 7 to -27 July 1953, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the -NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units of the -Division and the following reinforcing units: - -FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: 1st 4.5 Rocket Battery; -1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor -Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; 1st Amphibian -Truck Company; Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st -Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay -Team, 1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance -Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st -Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison -Company. - -UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army -Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32nd Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck -Co.; 513th Truck Co; 3rd Plt, 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to -operational control of 11th Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, -was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92nd Army -Engr Searchlight Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163rd MIS Det USA (Unit -redesignated 1 Sep 1952 to MIS Plt); TLO Det USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs -Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 Howitzer); 623rd Field -Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn “C” Btry; 204th Field Arty Bn “B” Btry; -84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US -Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2nd US Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th -US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty -Bn “A” Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; -90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; -Prov Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 32nd RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA; -Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; 2nd Bn, 31st Inf, USA -(less Co E); 185th Engr (C) Bn, USA (less Co A); Co B, 1st Bn, 31st -Inf, USA. - - CHARLES S. THOMAS - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - - WASHINGTON - - The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the - - FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - -“For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against -enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 1 August 1952 to 27 July 1953. -Flying more than 45,000 combat sorties against determined opposition -during this period, the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, struck -repeatedly and effectively at enemy troops, fortifications, logistical -installations and lines of communication throughout North Korea. -These extensive combat operations provided friendly ground forces -with decisive close air support during such battles as Bunker Hill, -The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, and inflicted -heavy casualties and tremendous damage upon the enemy. Operating from -naval aircraft carriers and from forward Korean bases, Marine aircraft -continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, -curtailing the movement of hostile troops to the front lines, and -provided the air defense of South Korea. The notable record achieved -by the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, is an eloquent tribute -to the resourcefulness, courage and stamina of all her gallant -officers and men. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to duty in -the fulfillment of these vital tasks reflect the highest credit upon -themselves and the United States Naval Service.” - -All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Aircraft -Wing, Reinforced, during the above period, or any part thereof, are -hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This -includes all organic units and the following reinforcing units: -Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1; 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft -Artillery Gun Battalion; and Ground Control Approach Unit 41M. - - CHARLES S. THOMAS - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - EXTRACT - - GENERAL ORDERS NO. 16 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY - - _Washington 25, D.C., 3 March 1954_ - - DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION--Citation of Unit--Section 1 - -1--DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION.--As authorized by Executive Order 9396 -(sec. I, WD Bul, 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. -III, WD Bul 11, 1942), the following unit is cited under AR 220-315 in -the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of -deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows: - -1. The Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and the -following attached units: The Turkish Liaison Detachment, 8215th Army -Unit; Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division; and -Company C, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, are cited -for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action -against the enemy near Munsan-ni, Korea, during the period 28 to 29 -May 1953. On the night of 28 May, an assault, supported by a heavy -barrage, was launched by a powerful enemy force, determined to wrest -outposts “Elko,” “Carson,” and “Vegas” from friendly hands. The valiant -troops occupying these positions were soon surrounded and hand-to-hand -combat ensued. With great tenacity and courage, the friendly troops -fought on until, with only three of them still standing on outpost -“Carson,” the first position fell. Despite the tremendous number of -casualties they had suffered, the foe intensified the attack on the two -remaining terrain features, rushing repeatedly up the slopes only to be -hurled back by the gallant defenders. Friendly reinforcements arrived -together with concentrated artillery support. All fire power was -brought to bear on the charging enemy, as the defending troops fought -desperately to hold. The foe came on in seemingly endless numbers and -friendly tanks moved into highly vulnerable positions to fire at close -range. Friendly casualties were heavy, but the toll of enemy dead was -enormous. The determined foe paid apparently no attention to their -thousands of casualties and appeared prepared to sacrifice thousands -more to gain their objectives. Realizing that these friendly outposts -could not hope to stand in the face of the endless waves of hostile -troops, the friendly command ordered the outpost defenders to withdraw -to the main line of resistance. The extraordinary heroism, singleness -of purpose, and magnificent fighting spirit exhibited by the members of -the Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and attached -units throughout this crucial battle, resulted in the frustration of -enemy plans to breach the main line of resistance, thus reflecting the -greatest credit on themselves and the military profession. - -By order of the Secretary of the Army: - - OFFICIAL: - WM. E. BERGIN - Major General, USA - The Adjutant General - - M. B. RIDGWAY - General, United States Army - Chief of Staff - - - THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - - WASHINGTON - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to - - MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON SIX - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - -“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in -Korea from August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Pioneering in the development -of frontline helicopter evacuation of casualties, Marine Observation -Squadron Six skillfully carried out unprecedented low-altitude -evacuation flights during all hours of the day and night over rugged -mountainous terrain in the face of enemy fire and extremely adverse -weather, thereby saving untold lives and lessening the suffering of -wounded marines. In addition, this valiant squadron completed thousands -of day and night artillery spotting, reconnaissance and tactical air -control missions, contributing materially to the extensive damage -inflicted upon enemy positions, supply lines and troop concentrations. -The splendid record achieved by Marine Observation Squadron Six attests -to the courage, determination and esprit de corps of the officers and -men of this unit and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the -United States Naval Service.” - - For the President, - CHARLES S. THOMAS - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - - -APPENDIX H - -Armistice Agreement - -_Volume I_ - - -TEXT OF AGREEMENT - -_Agreement between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on -the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and -the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, -concerning a military armistice in Korea._ - - -PREAMBLE - -The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on -the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army -and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other -hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great -toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective -of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation -of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final -peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and -mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions -and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and -Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely -military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in -Korea. - - -_Article I_ - -MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE - -1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall -withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a -Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone -shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of -incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities. - -2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the -attached map. - -3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern -boundary as indicated on the attached map. - -4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed -by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The -Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected -along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective -areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection -of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the -boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone. - -5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping -of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other -bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission -shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River -Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side -shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control -of that side. - -6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against -the Demilitarized Zone. - -7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the -Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by -the Military Armistice Commission. - -8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be -permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either -side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into -whose territory entry is sought. - -9. No person, military or civilian shall be permitted to enter the -Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil -administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter -by the Military Armistice Commission. - -10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized -Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the -responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and -civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone -which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint -responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army -and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The number of -persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to -enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration -and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but -in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed -one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil -police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by -the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry -arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice -Commission. - -11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the -complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized -Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint -Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory -Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral -Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other -persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the -Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of -movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military -control of either side over any route necessary to move between points -within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by -roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone. - - -_Article II_ - -CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND ARMISTICE - -A. _General_ - -12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a -complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces -under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, -naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice -Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and -hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.) - -13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as -to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the -holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the -Commanders of the opposing sides shall: - - a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice becomes -effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and -equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided -herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other -hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice -Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the -Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, -together with lanes known to be free of all hazards, shall be reported -to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose -forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall -be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the -termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall -be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the -supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of -the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized -a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under -Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police -nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice -Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and -personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of -either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone. - - b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes -effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and -equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of -the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the -stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason -for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action -which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The -term “coastal islands,” as used above, refers to those islands which, -though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement -becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; -provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of -the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall -be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean -People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers -except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58´N, 124°40´E), -TAECHONG-DO (37°50´N, 124°42´E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46´N, 124°46´E), -YONPYONG-DO (37°38´N, 125°40´E), and U-DO (37°36´N, 125°58´E), which -shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, -United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea -lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the -military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. - - c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military -personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, -the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the -return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary -duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed -below. “Rotation” is defined as the replacement of units or personnel -by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in -Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from -Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 -hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, -however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in -the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in -any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel -of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of -such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel -of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this -Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military -personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. -Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military -personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and -the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, such reports shall include -places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at -or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory -Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct -supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel -authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 -hereof. - - d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, -armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that -combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are -destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the -armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the -same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored -vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only -through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order -to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, -weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement -purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items -shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral -Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements -regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be -replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the -ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations -Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams -shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat -aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, -at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. - - e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any -of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished. - - f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record -and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration -personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit -after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of -Korea under their Military control, for the purpose of proceeding -to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased -military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. -The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the -above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. -The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side -all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the -deceased military personnel of the other side. - - g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation -to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the -Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations -Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and -responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral -Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection -Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of -the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry -enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication -agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral -Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of -this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In -order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and -means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of -communication are closed or impassable. - - h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and -transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice -Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their -Teams. - - i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their -respective ports of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the -headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the -Commission may determine. - - j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations -Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and -facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their function, -including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to -those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under -international usage. - -14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces -under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall -respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military -control of the opposing side. - -15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval -forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the -Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military -control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any -kind of Korea. - -16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, -which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized -Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the -opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both. - -17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms -and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories -hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing -sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures -and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of -the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall -actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice -Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring -observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions -of this Armistice Agreement. - -18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission -and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams -shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides. - - -B. _Military Armistice Commission_ - - -1. Composition - -19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established. - -20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten -(10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the -Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall -be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s -Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten -members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The -two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier -generals, colonels, or their equivalents. - -21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to -use staff assistants as required. - -22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the -necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat -charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, -secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission -may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a -Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized -personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in -English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic. - -23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided -with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may -be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the -Military Armistice Commission. - - b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than -four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of -whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations -Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme -Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese -People’s Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, -and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the -functioning of the Joint Observer Teams. - - -2. Functions and Authority - -24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be -to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to -settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement. - -25. The Military Armistice Commission shall: - - a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57´29´´ -N, 126°40´00´´ E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate -its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by -agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission. - - b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman. - - c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem -necessary. - - d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice -Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River -Estuary. - - e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams. - - f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice -Agreement. - - g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all -reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and -all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral -Nations Supervisory Commission. - - h. Give general supervision and direction to the Committee for -Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the -Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established. - - i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the -Commanders of the opposing sides; provided however, that the foregoing -shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from -communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire -to employ. - - j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its -Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, -aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission. - -26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the -Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the -provisions of this Armistice Agreement to the Demilitarized Zone and to -the Han River Estuary. - -27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of -either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams -to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to -have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; -provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer -Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice -Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of -either side on the Commission. - -28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either -side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory -Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places -outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice -Agreement have been reported to have occurred. - -29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation -of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report -such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides. - -30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation -of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it -shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides. - - -3. General - -31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of -not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members -of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on -twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side. - -32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the -Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of -the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting. - -33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the -Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in -addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by -them, or as may be required by the Commission. - -34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files -of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice -Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of -such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct -of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set -of the above files shall be turned over to each side. - -35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to -the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or -additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should -generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. - - -C. _Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission_ - - -1. Composition - -36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established. - -37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed -of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by -neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations -Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall -be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme -Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese -People’s Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term -“neutral nations” as herein used is defined as those nations whose -combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. -Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of -the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate -member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal -member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the -same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory -Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from -the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of -members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side. - -38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be -permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as -required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members -of the Commission. - -39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral -Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative -personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the -Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, -interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to -it. - -40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially -provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection -Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members -of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations -Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be -subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission -only. - - b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less -than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall -be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United -Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations -nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army -and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Members appointed -to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of -the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the -Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom -shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, -United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation -nominated by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and -the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, may be formed as -circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, -interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may -be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished -by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone -and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations -Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations -Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its -own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be -personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations -Supervisory Commission is composed. - - -2. Functions and Authority - -41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be -to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and -investigation, as stipulated in Subparagraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph -28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, -inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission. - -42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall: - - a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the -Military Armistice Commission. - - b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem -necessary. - - c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection -Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs -13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry -enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and -inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where -violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have -occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, -and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such -as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, -armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into -Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or -examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat -aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition. - - d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations -Inspection Teams. - - e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports -of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory -under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations -Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports -of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory -under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean -People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and -establish initially ten (10) mobile neutral Nations Inspection Teams -in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of -the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced -by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military -Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations -Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with -requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice -Commission. - - f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct -without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice -Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of -this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice -Commission or by the senior member of either-side on the Commission. - - g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and -its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for -all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its -mission. - -43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the -following ports of entry: - - -Territory under the military control of the United Nations command - - INCHON (37°28´N, 126°38´E) - TAEGU (35°52´N, 128°36´E) - PUSAN (35°06´N, 129°02´E) - KANGNUNG (37°45´N, 128°54´E) - KUNSAN (35°59´N, 126°43´E) - - -Territory under the military control of the Korean People’s Army and -the Chinese People’s Volunteers - - SINUIJU (40°´N, 124°24´E) - CHONGJIN (41°46´N, 129°49´E) - HUNGNAM (39°50´N, 127°37´E) - MANPO (41°09´N, 126°18´E) - SINANJU (39°36´N, 125°36´E) - -These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full -convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of -communication set forth on the attached map. - - -3. General - -44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. -Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the -members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that -such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any -member. - -45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the -Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the -Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. -Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese. - -46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports -concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, -and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as -required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special -reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or may be required by the -Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may -also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, -that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof -shall be considered as informational only. - -47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection -Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by -the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the -language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of -translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission -shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall -forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter -of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final -action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has -been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members -of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be -subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the -request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice -Commission, for clarification of any report submitted. - -48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain -duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by -this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain -duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be -necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of -the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each -side. - -49. The Neutral Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the -Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions -to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally -be those designed to insure a more effective armistice. - -50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, -shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military -Armistice Commission. - - -_Article III_ - -ARRANGEMENTS RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR - -51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the -custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes -effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions -agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice -Agreement. - - a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes -effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly -repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in -its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they -belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in -accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to -expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, -prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total -numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. -Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be -accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank -(if any) and internment or military serial number. - - b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who -are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from -its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the -Annex hereto: “Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission.” - - c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of -three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side -to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, -be called “repatriation” in English, “song hwan” in Korean, and “ch’ien -fan” in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence -of such prisoner of war. - -52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the -Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident -to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement. - -53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon -repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, -there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with -the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care -and attendance en route. - -54. The repatriation of all the prisoners of war required by -Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of -sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. -Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the -repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at -the earliest practicable time. - -55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will -be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of -delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone -may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of -Prisoners of War. - -56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby -established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, -three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United -Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by -the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander -of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the -general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, -be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for -the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution -by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement -relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the -duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of -prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners -of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when -necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard -to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of -war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established -in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners -of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the -actual repatriation or prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and -54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery -and reception of prisoners of war, and to carry out such other related -functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war. - - b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its -responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of -War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice -Commission for decision. The Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners -of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters -of the Military Armistice Commission. - - c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be -dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the -program of repatriation of prisoners of war. - -57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, -joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national -Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the -United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the -Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and -representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of -China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross -teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions -of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the -prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist -upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services -as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of -war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide -assistance in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both -sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, -and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the -prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the -comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams -may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from prisoner -of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of -war. - - b. The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below: - - (1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten -(10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each -side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war -by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners -of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between -representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work -and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for -Repatriation of Prisoners of War. - - (2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty -(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each -side, to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of -the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This -team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the -prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of -prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the -Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of -the People’s Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team. - - (3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty -(30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each -side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of -the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners -of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) -of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a -Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations -Command shall serve as chairman of this team. - - (4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross -team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the -team, with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be -formed as circumstances require. - - (5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, -and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to -perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each -side to the team operating in the territory under his military control. - - (6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both -sides or any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be -increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for -Repatriation of Prisoners of War. - - c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red -Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to -insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in -the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall -provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities -as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his -military control. - - d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of -the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in -Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation. - -58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of -the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) -days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following -information concerning prisoners of war: - - (1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped -since the effective date of the data last exchanged. - - (2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, -rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place -of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody. - - b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of -the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall -furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of -Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the -provisions of Sub-paragraph 58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at -ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and -reception of prisoners of war. - - c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the -detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and -reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military -Armistice Commission for disposition. - -59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement -becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the -Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, -resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this -Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted -and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to -return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all -civilians, who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, -are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander -of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s -Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military -Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if -they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme -Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese -People’s Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military -Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for -publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control -the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling -upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and -assistance to all such civilians who desire to return home. - - b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this -Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the -military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army -and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers shall, if they -desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the -Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted -to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this -Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the -military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, -shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military -control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and -the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, be permitted and -assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for -publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control -the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling -upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and -assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to -proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the -other side. - - c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in -Sub-paragraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in -Sub-paragraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as -possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. - - d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is -hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field -grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, -United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly -by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander -of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the -general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, -be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for -assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for -supervising the execution of both sides of all of the provisions of -this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned -civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary -arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and -coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select -the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will -cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the -crossing points; and to carry out such other functions as are required -to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians. - - (2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its -responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced -Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice -Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of -Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the -headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission. - - (3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians -shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon -fulfillment of its mission. - - -_Article IV_ - -RECOMMENDATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES - -60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, -the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the -governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within -three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes -effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides -be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through -negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from -Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc. - - -_Article V_ - -MISCELLANEOUS - -61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be -mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides. - -62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall -remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually -acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate -agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both -sides. - -63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than -Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953. - -Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, -in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic. - - KIM IL SUNG - Marshall, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea - Supreme Commander, Korean People’s Army - - PENG TEH-HUAI - Commander, Chinese People’s Volunteers - - MARK W. CLARK - General, United States Army - Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command - - PRESENT - - NAM IL - General, Korean People’s Army - Senior Delegate, - Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s - Volunteers - - WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR. - Lieutenant General, - United States Army - Senior Delegate, - United Nations Command Delegation - - -ANNEX - -TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION - -(_See Sub-paragraph 51b_) - -1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to -exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, -Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested -by both sides to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission which shall be established to take custody in Korea of those -prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, -have not exercised their right to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission shall establish its headquarters within the -Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom, and shall station -subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation -Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both -sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation -Commission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and -interviews. - -2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required -to assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out -its functions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by -India, whose representative shall be the umpire in accordance with -the provisions of Article 132 of the Geneva Convention and shall also -be chairman and executive agent of the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission. Representatives from each of the other four powers shall -be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to exceed fifty (50) -each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations is absent -for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate -representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and -authority. The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph -shall be limited to military police type small arms. - -3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners -of war specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their -repatriation, and no violence to their persons or affront to their -dignity or self-respect shall be permitted in any manner for any -purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 below). This duty is enjoined -on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This -Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war shall at all times be -treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the -Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that Convention. - - -_II_ - -CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR - -4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of -repatriation following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement -shall be released from the military control and from the custody of the -detaining side as soon as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty -(60) days subsequent to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement -to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at locations in Korea to -be designated by the detaining side. - -5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes -control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of -the detaining side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations -specified in the preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by -the armed forces of India. - -6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining -side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring -security and order in the areas around the locations where the -prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining -any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under -its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the -locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. - -7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in -this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of -the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate -functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war -under its temporary jurisdiction. - - -_III_ - -EXPLANATION - -8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received -and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not -exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make -arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which -the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send -representatives to locations where such prisoners of war are in custody -to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations -their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return -to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home -to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions: - - a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed -seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not -be less than a total of five (5); - - b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall -have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral -Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the -Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; - - c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence -of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side; - - d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be -prescribed by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and will be designed -to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this -Paragraph; - - e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall -be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel -for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel -shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining -representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners -of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams -shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) -communications personnel. - -9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities -to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies -of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of -their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, -in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission. - - -_IV_ - -DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR - -10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of -repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to -a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the -Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is -made, it shall be considered immediately by majority vote the validity -of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated -by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war -concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the -tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he -shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange -point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in -the Armistice Agreement. - -11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody -of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, -access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in -Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition -of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be -repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended -to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall -endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which -period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue -to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations -Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoners -of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have -not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other -disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one -hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to -the application of each individual, and those who choose to go to -neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be -completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions -and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those -above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of -war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of -the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them -in returning to their fatherlands. - - -_V_ - -RED CROSS VISITATION - -12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the -Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in -accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission. - - -_VI_ - -PRESS COVERAGE - -13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall insure freedom -of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as -enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by -the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. - - -_VII_ - -LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PRISONERS OF WAR - -14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war -in the area under its military control, delivering required support to -the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point -in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation. - -15. The cost of repatriating prisoners to the exchange point at -Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the -exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance -with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention. - -16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing -such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as -required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. - -17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical -support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining -side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of -the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those -cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of -war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate -such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be -returned to a prisoners of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 -above. - -18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain -from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in -carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any -name and in any form interfere or exert influence. - - -_VIII_ - -LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEUTRAL NATIONS REPATRIATION COMMISSION - -19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for -the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed -in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute -on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The -precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the -Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each -case. - -20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting -the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit -over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph -23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of -residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each -of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security -of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where -the prisoners of war are in custody. - -21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, -communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining -representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its -military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable -basis. - - -_IX_ - -PUBLICATION - -22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this -agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the -custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be -repatriated. - - -_X_ - -MOVEMENT - -23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation -Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of -communication, as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side -and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these -lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing -side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such -personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, -shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side -in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement -shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion. - - -_XI_ - -PROCEDURAL MATTERS - -24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral -Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Repatriation Commission, -and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are designed or -assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate -on the basis of majority vote. - -25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly -report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in -its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the -end of each week. - -26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the -five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the -Armistice becomes effective. - -Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in -English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic. - - NAM IL - General, Korean People’s Army - Senior Delegate, - Delegation of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s - Volunteers - - WILLIAM K. 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Command Diaries, Intelligence Summaries, Special Action -Reports, etc., March 1952-December 1953. - -1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment. Command Diaries, Unit Reports, -Intelligence Summaries, Special Action Reports, etc. March -1952-December 1953. - -Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Command Diaries, March-December 1952. - -Marine Air Group 12. Command Diaries, March 1952-September 1953. - -Marine Air Group 33. Command Diaries, March 1952-September 1953. - -Marine Air Control Group 2. Command Diaries, September 1952-February -1953. - -Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Command Diaries, selected -dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-October 1953. - -2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-October 1953. - -3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-October 1953. - -1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-February 1954. - -2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-February 1954. - -3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-February 1954. - -1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -2d Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -3d Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -4th Battalion, 11th Marines. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-December 1953. - -1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Command Diaries, selected dates, March -1952-July 1953. - -1st Engineer Battalion. Command Diaries, March 1952-December 1953. - -1st Tank Battalion. Command Diaries, March 1952-December 1953. - -East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit). Command Diaries, January -1952-July 1953. - -West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit). Command Diaries, January -1952-July 1953. - -VMO-6. Command Diaries, March 1952-July 1953. - -HMR-161. Command Diaries, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMA-121. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMA-212. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMA-251. Command Diaries, June-July 1953. - -VMA-312. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMA-323. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMF-115. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMF-311. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMF(N)-513. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - -VMJ-1. Command Diaries, selected dates, March 1952-July 1953. - - -BOOKS AND PERIODICALS - - Asprey, Robert, B., _et al._ “The Soldier and the Prisoner,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 49, no. 5:37-44 (May 1965). - - Barclay, C. N. Brigadier, British Army. _The First Commonwealth - Division--The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in - Korea, 1950–1953._ Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1954. - - Batterton, Roy J., Jr., LtCol, USMC. “Random Notes on Korea,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39 no. 11:28-34 (November 1955). - - Berger, Carl. _The Korea Knot--A Military-Political History._ - Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957. - - Blakeney, Jane. _Heroes--U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955._ - Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957. - - Braestrup, Peter, 1stLt, USMC. “Outpost Warfare,” _Marine Corps - Gazette_, v. 38, no. 11:32-36 (November 1953). - - ----. “Back to the Trenches,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 39, no. - 3:32-35 (March 1955). - - Cagle, Malcolm W., Cdr, USN, and Manson, Frank A., Cdr, USN. _The - Sea War in Korea._ Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957. - - Clark, Mark W., Gen, USA (Ret). _From the Danube to the Yalu._ - New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. - - Collins, J. Lawton. _War in Peacetime--The History and Lessons of - Korea._ Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969. - - Damopoulos, C. N., Cpl, USMC. “From Camp Pendleton to Inchon--18 - Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, - Recalls Experiences in Korea,” San Diego MCRD _CheVron_, v. 27, - no. 31 (21 August 1968). - - Fehrenbach, T. R. _The Fight for Korea, From the War of 1950 to - the Pueblo Incident._ New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969. - - ----. _This Kind of War--A Study in Unpreparedness._ New York: - The Macmillan Company, 1963. - - Field, James A., Jr. _History of United States Naval Operations, - Korea._ Washington: Division of Naval History, 1962. - - Fugate, Robert T., MSgt, USMC. “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” - _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 6:16-21, 74 (June 1953). - - ----. “Freedom Village,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 7:20-23, 70 - (July 1953). - - Futrell, Robert F. _The United Stales Air Force in Korea, - 1950–1953._ New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961. - - Heinecke, Roy E., MSgt, USMC. “A Year in Korea,” _Leatherneck_, - v. 36, no. 11:49-53, 85 (November 1953). - - ----. “Big Switch,” _Leatherneck_, v. 36, no. 11:44-48 (November - 1953). - - ----. “Four Star Visit,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, no. 1:14-17, 74 - (January 1954). - - Heinl, Robert D., Jr. _Soldiers of the Sea: The United States - Marine Corps, 1775–1962._ Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962. - - Hermes, Walter G. _U.S. Army in the Korean War--Truce Tent and - Fighting Front._ Washington: Office of the Chief of Military - History, USA, 1966. - - Hicks, Norman W., Maj. USMC. “U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, - 1952–1953, with Special Emphasis on Outpost Warfare.” MS, 1962. - - Joy, C. Turner, VAdm, USN. _How Communists Negotiate._ New York: - The Macmillan Company, 1955. - - _Leatherneck._ 1953–1955, _passim_. - - Leckie, Robert. _Conflict--The History of the Korean War, - 1950–1953._ New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962. - - MacDonald, James Angus, Jr., Maj, USMC. _The Problems of U.S. - Marine Corps Prisoner of War in Korea._ MS, 1961. - - _Marine Corps Gazette._ 1953–1955, _passim_. - - Marshall, S. L. A. _The Military History of the Korean War._ New - York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963. - - ----. _Pork Chop Hill--The American Fighting Man in Action, - Korea, Spring 1953._ New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956. - - Miller, John, Jr., Carroll, Owen J., Maj, USA, and Tackley, - Margaret E. _Korea 1951–1953._ Washington: Department of the - Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1958. - - Montross, Lynn and Canzona, Nicholas A., Capt, USMC. _U.S. Marine - Operations in Korea, 1950–1953._ v. I: _The Pusan Perimeter_. - Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. - - ----. _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953._ v. II: _The - Inchon-Seoul Operations_. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 - Division, HQMC, 1955. - - ----. _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953._ v. III: _The - Chosin Reservoir Campaign_. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 - Division, HQMC, 1957 - - Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky--The Story of U.S. Marine - Combat Helicopters._ New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. - - Montross, Lynn, Kuokka, Hubard D., Maj, USMC, and Hicks, Norman - W., Maj, USMC. _U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950–1953._ v. - IV: _The East-Central Front_. Washington: Historical Branch, - G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962. - - _New York Times_, issues 27–31 March, 19–21 April, 5 August-6 - September 1953. - - Phillips, C. A., LtCol, USMC and Kuokka, H. D., Maj, USMC. “1st - MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 5:42-47 (May 1957). - - ----. “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, v. 41, no. 6:20-26 (June 1957). - - Rees, David. _Korea: The Limited War._ New York: St. Martin’s - Press, 1964. - - Ridgway, Matthew B., Gen, USA (Ret). _The Korean War._ Garden - City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967. - - Robinson, C. A., Capt, USMC, and Cellers, D, L., Sgt, USMC. “Land - of the Morning Calm,” _Midwest Reporter_, pp. 2–5 (July 1968). - - Russ, Martin. _The Last Parallel: A Marine’s War Journal._ New - York: Rinehart and Company, 1957. - - Sarokin, Paul, MSgt, USMC. “DMZ Marines,” _Leatherneck_, v. 37, - no. 10:22-30 (October 1954). - - Sherrod, Robert. _History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War - II._ Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. - - U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, - _Marine Corps Aircraft, 1913–1960_. Washington: Historical - Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1964. - - U.S. Military Academy. _Operations in Korea._ West Point: - Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military - Academy, 1956. - - _A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the Chinese - People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and - Aid Korea._ Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961. - - _Washington Post_, issues 27–31 March, 19–21 April, 5 August-6 - September 1953. - - Wood, Herbert F., LtCol. _Strange Battleground: The Operations - in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense Policy of Canada._ - Ottawa: The Army Historical Section, Canadian Forces - Headquarters, 1966. - - - - -Index - - - Acar, BGen Sirri, 329 - - Adams, LtCol Arthur H., 194 - - Adams, Col Hewitt D., 233, 268, 300, 323, 328_n_ - - Air activities - Communist, 18, 34, 52, 59, 99, 170, 178, 354–355, 516 - United Nations, 52, 62, 70, 77, 132–133, 170–172, 224–225, 242, 244, - 257, 291, 295–296, 307, 341, 345, 347, 349, 350_n_, 351, - 374–375, 379_n_, 389, 413–414, 416, 418, 483, 488–489, - 491–492, 514, 516_n_, 520, 526, 531. _See also_ Helicopters. - Air lift, 138–139, 139_n_, 408, 479, 496–497 - Air control, 132, 257_n_, 488_n_, 490–491 - Air drops, 487, 511_n_ - Bombing, 62, 133, 170, 172, 294–295, 299, 309, 489–490 - Escort, 490 - Evacuation, 495_n_ - Flaredrop, 140, 140_n_ - Interdiction, 53, 63–64, 70, 170, 350, 350_n_, 352, 357, 375–376, - 413, 485, 488–489, 492_n_, 493, 514–515 - Liaison, 72, 517_n_ - Mapping, 174, 178 - Observation, 76–77, 85, 126, 136, 190, 291, 302–304, 338, 370–371, - 379, 414, 512, 519 - Patrolling, 66, 241, 376, 414 - Photography, 43, 69, 136_n_, 172, 174, 348–349, 397, 485, 491, 512 - Reconnaissance, 42, 141, 397, 412–413, 430, 465, 485–486, - 491, 512, 522 - Search and Rescue, 53, 485 - Strikes, 61–62, 65, 70–72, 77, 81, 132–134, 158, 170, 176, 196, - 208, 224–226, 231, 238, 240, 258, 260, 271, 291, 295, 297, - 306, 310, 325, 337, 339, 347–348, 379, 485–486, 512, 513_n_, - 516 - Support, 28, 38, 61–62, 64–65, 103–104, 131, 133, 158, 196, 207, - 225, 234, 240, 243–244, 291, 297, 325, 341, 345, 346_n_, - 349–352, 368, 374, 374_n_, 375, 375_n_, 383, 389, 397, 485, - 486_n_, 488, 488_n_, 489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493, 514, 514_n_, - 516–517. _See also_ Close air support. - - Aircraft - Communist, 30, 68–69, 96, 170, 173–174, 241, 347, 376, 464 - United Nations, 7, 42, 61, 61_n_, 132–133, 171, 224, 241, 347, - 347_n_, 375, 418, 428, 431, 488, 490, 492, 511, 511_n_, 516, - 519. _See also_ Helicopters. - Types - AD (Skyraider), 65, 70, 132–133, 207–208, 270, 292, 295, 299, 306, - 325, 341, 379, 385, 469 - AU (Corsair), 66, 181, 196, 295, 299, 304, 306, 325, 381 - C-47, 487 - C-119, 487 - F2H-2P (Banshee), 43, 397, 490–491 - F3D (Skyknight), 134_n_, 139, 181, 240–242, 291, 346–348, 469, 490 - F4U (Corsair), 27, 65–66, 66_n_, 77, 133, 173, 176, 196, 208, 270, - 294–295, 299, 341, 347, 350_n_, 357, 374, 397, 420, - 485, 489, 491_n_ - F7F (Tigercat), 133, 202, 345–348, 490 - F9F (Panther), 65, 112, 132–133, 177, 194, 242–244, 270, 291, 299, - 325, 350, 368, 375, 397, 434, 471, 488–489 - F-80 (Shooting Star), 112, 132 - F-84 (Thunderjet), 132, 177, 291, 306 - F-86 (Sabrejet), 174, 376, 491 - Observation planes, 345, 369–370, 488–490 - OE-1, 42, 235, 271, 414 - OY, 235 - R4D, 487 - R4Q (Fairchild Packet), 472 - R5D, 28, 49, 139, 181, 485, 488 - - Aircraft losses - Communist, 490 - United Nations, 64, 66, 69–72, 134, 134_n_, 243, 352, 376, 376_n_, - 413_n_, 490, 492 - - Air doctrine, 492, 513 - - Airfields - Communist, 397, 489 - United Nations, 24, 24_n_, 26, 28, 53, 59, 68, 202, 241, 348, 355, - 469, 487, 489 - K-2 (Taegu), 177, 178_n_, 469 - K-3 (Pohang), 27–28, 43, 47–48, 68–69, 100, 177, 231, 299, - 345, 352_n_, 469 - K-6 (Pyontaek), 28_n_, 69, 175, 178, 257_n_, 270, 299, - 376, 469, 473 - K-8 (Kunsan), 28, 69, 202, 270, 348, 469 - K-14 (Kimpo), 4, 18–19, 249, 469, 478, 486 - K-16, 12, 319, 332, 469 - - Air Force-Army close air support system, 178, 517. _See also_ Close - air support. - - Air Force, U.S., 26, 42, 62, 62_n_, 64, 68, 132–133, 152, 170, 174, - 237, 243, 245, 291, 306, 347, 376, 428, 473, 487–488, 490, - 490_n_, 491, 496–497, 512, 515 - Units - Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 26, 43, 63–64, 224–225, 237, 239, 241, - 350_n_, 352, 470, 473, 514 - Fifth Air Force (FAF), 7, 21, 26–28, 42–43, 52, 61, 61_n_, 62–64, - 67–70, 88, 97, 132, 170_n_, 179, 224–226, 236–240, 271, 306, - 309, 345, 348, 351–352, 376, 385, 468–469, 470–474, 493, - 507, 510–511, 511_n_, 512–514, 515–517 - Tactical Air Command, 174_n_ - Fifth Air Force Reconnaissance Wing, 512 - 19th Bomber Group, 347_n_ - 4th Fighter Group, 174 - 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, 376 - 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 174 - 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 69 - - Air observers. _See_ Air activities, United Nations. - - Air support. _See_ Air activities, United Nations. - - Alexandria, Va., 287, 287_n_ - - Altman, LtCol Sidney J., 149, 200 - - American Civil War, 143_n_ - - American Revolutionary War, 143_n_ - - Ammunition - Communist, 93, 140, 190, 212–213, 246, 286, 293, 409 - Artillery, 30, 34, 37, 52, 103, 112, 121, 128–129, 140, 146, 246, - 248, 286, 293, 306, 356–357, 368, 382, 389, 396, 396_n_ - Duds, 396_n_ - Dumps, 244, 306–307 - Expenditure, 337_n_ - Mortar, 30, 34, 37, 112, 129, 140, 292–293, 297, 326, 357, 389, - 392 - Rockets, 104 - Small arms, 92, 140, 246, 286, 293, 409 - Supply, 140, 190 - United Nations, 134, 137, 192, 192_n_, 247, 275, 285, 308, 376, 386, - 451–452, 466, 470 - Artillery, 74, 93, 127, 134–137, 140, 192, 195, 203–207, 221, 231, - 253, 280, 284, 303, 324_n_, 346, 369, 379, 379_n_, 388–389, - 392, 397, 530 - Bombs, 62, 132–133, 202, 208, 244, 297, 299, 304, 307, 325, 350, - 352, 381, 385, 397, 486, 489, 491, 520 - Expenditure, 337_n_, 339 - Fuzes, 74–75, 168, 199, 281, 283, 283_n_, 286, 300, 346 - Mortar, 124, 280, 300 - Restrictions, 389_n_ - Resupply, 44, 247_n_, 273, 331, 497 - Rockets, 124, 124_n_, 135 - Shortages, 117, 192–193, 246 - Small arms, 137, 257, 280, 300, 367, 369–370, 379, 388–389, 392 - White phosphorus, 105, 283, 379, 389 - - Amphibious - Assault, 86, 483, 493, 499 - Combat operation, 244 - Large-scale landing, 483 - Maneuver, 484 - Operation, 46, 488_n_, 531, 535 - Readiness, 508_n_ - Retraining program, 333 - Strike, 13_n_ - Training, 12, 333_n_, 334 - Warfare, 482 - - Anderson, LtGen Samuel E., 351 - - Andre, Lt John W., 173 - - Anglican chaplain, 426 - - Armagost, Capt William I., 397 - - Armed Forces of the United States, 64, 441 - - Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 505–506 - - Armistice, 95, 321, 356, 359, 381, 389, 394, 396_n_, 397, 400, 405, - 449, 456, 458_n_, 468, 470, 528–529, 532 - Agreement, 64, 228_n_, 360, 377_n_, 391, 393–394, 408, 445–446, 448, - 448_n_, 457, 460, 465, 469–470 - Conferences, 528 - Negotiations, 228, 314, 322, 433_n_, 448, 480, 528 - Post-armistice period, 475 - Projected plan, 322 - - Armitage, LtCol Gerald T., 71, 108, 108_n_, 119, 121, 126, 131, - 134–135, 149_n_ - - Armor, 114, 325, 327, 367, 379 - - Army, U.S., Chaplain School, 440_n_ - - Army, U.S., Doctrine, 508 - - Army, U.S., Quartermaster General, 484 - - Army, U.S., Supply Agency, 60 - - Army, U.S., Training Test, 336 - - Army, U.S., Units - Far East Command, 321, 470–472, 473_n_, 504_n_ - Army Forces, Far East, 245 - Army Service Command, 4_n_ - 2d Logistical Command, 44, 47 - Munsan-ni Provisional Command, 314 - Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, 1, 3, 5–8, 10–11, 28, 44, 47, 51–52, 64, - 69, 72, 85–86, 93, 101, 105, 132, 141, 148, 170_n_, 192, - 222–226, 232, 234, 236, 238–239, 267, 315, 327, 327_n_, - 333_n_, 335–336, 341–342, 344_n_, 351, 359_n_, 360, 372, - 377, 393–394, 396, 445, 454, 460, 472–474, 477–479, 481, - 483, 491–493, 496, 507, 509–511, 514_n_, 515–516, - 518, 533, 535 - I Corps, 1, 11, 16–17, 21–22, 24, 38–40, 46, 51–52, 61, 73, 84–88, - 92–93, 93_n_, 101, 135, 170_n_, 182_n_, 186, 191_n_, 214, - 222–223, 243, 251, 264–265, 267, 270, 311, 323–324, 326–328, - 331–333, 336, 338–342, 344, 350_n_, 351, 360, 363, 368–369, - 371, 378, 378_n_, 379_n_, 388, 393–394, 446, 455–458, - 460–461, 468, 481, 483, 508–512 - IX Corps, 6, 51–52, 222–223, 326, 342, 350, 385, 393, 412–413, 437, - 480, 483, 507 - X Corps, 2, 5–6, 10, 45, 52, 222, 326, 342, 351, 409, 412–413, 416, - 477–479, 481, 483–484, 487–488 - 2d Infantry Division, 222–223, 267, 267_n_, 299, 412 - 3d Infantry Division, 96–97, 350, 350_n_ - 7th Infantry Division, 5, 51, 222–224, 267_n_, 307, 309, 333, 350, - 350_n_, 393, 412, 460, 479 - 25th Infantry Division, 52, 176, 326–327, 329, 331, 333, 337_n_, - 338–341, 344, 351, 361, 363–364, 367–368, 370, 385, - 388, 463, 522 - 40th Infantry Division, 51, 222 - 45th Infantry Division, 51–52, 100 - 5th Infantry Regiment, 327 - 14th Infantry Regiment, 328, 334, 339–340, 364, 367 - 23d Infantry Regiment, 486 - 24th Infantry Regiment, 404, 473 - 27th Infantry Regiment, 329, 332 - 35th Infantry Regiment, 328–329, 331–332, 338, 364 - 38th Infantry Regiment, 267 - 461st Infantry Regiment, 304, 306 - 21st Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, 328 - 8th Field Artillery Battalion, 328 - 17th Field Artillery Battalion, 136, 191, 270, 281, 304, 379 - 64th Field Artillery Battalion, 328 - 69th Field Artillery Battalion, 328 - 90th Field Artillery Battalion, 328 - 158th Field Artillery Battalion, 270 - 159th Field Artillery Battalion, 191, 270, 379 - 204th Field Artillery Battalion, 192, 270, 281 - 424th Field Artillery Battalion, 304 - 623d Field Artillery Battalion, 191, 191_n_, 270, 281, 301–302 - 89th Tank Battalion, 329 - 181st Counterintelligence Corps, 18 - 61st Engineer Searchlight Company, 18 - 11th Evacuation Hospital, 401–402 - 61st Field Artillery Battery, 305 - 163d Military Intelligence Service Detachment, 18 - 45th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, 316 - - Arnold, TSgt Richard E., 404 - - Artillery - Communist, 3, 29, 32, 34, 36, 41, 45, 52, 56, 59, 67, 69, 73–74, - 79–82, 87, 89, 91, 93–94, 104, 111–112, 116–119, 121, - 123–130, 132–134, 136, 139–140, 142–143, 145–147, 149–150, - 152–153, 155–156, 158, 160, 162–168, 188, 188_n_, 190, - 193–194, 196–197, 199–200, 202, 205–206, 209–210, 212–214, - 218, 220–221, 225, 230, 248–249, 253, 255, 255_n_, 259–261, - 284, 290–291, 293–294, 297, 301–303, 306, 308–309, 324, 326, - 337–338, 340, 355, 358, 365–367, 369, 371, 377, 385, 385_n_, - 386–387, 389, 392, 396, 464, 482, 482_n_, 491–492, - 510–511, 525 - United Nations, 21, 33, 37–38, 45, 52, 69, 69_n_, 70–71, 71_n_, - 72–75, 79–80, 82, 87, 90, 98, 112, 114, 121, 126–127, 129, - 131, 134–137, 142, 142_n_, 143, 146, 153, 158, 160, 162, - 165–168, 178, 191–192, 195, 199, 202, 205, 207_n_, 209–210, - 220–222, 225, 230–232, 239, 248, 255–257, 259, 281, 283, - 285, 287, 290–292, 296–297, 300–302, 304–306, 308–309, - 324–325, 327–328, 331, 340, 346, 354, 356, 361, 363, - 367–369, 372, 377–379, 379_n_, 386, 389, 389_n_, 391–392, - 396, 464, 482, 491–492, 509, 511, 511_n_, 520–524, 530 - - Ascom City, 4, 4_n_, 18, 24, 44, 44_n_, 251, 329, 332, 360, 463 - - Atkin, LtCol Ernest G., 268 - - Atomic age warfare, 483, 513_n_ - - Atsugi, Japan, 471 - - Attorney General, U.S., 227 - - Augustine, LtCol Francis W., 316_n_ - - Austin-Roberts-West, MajGen M. M., 187, 231 - - Australians, 318_n_ - - Ava Gate, 373 - - Aviators, 317, 351, 375, 397, 405, 413, 420, 487. _See also_ - Air activities. - - Aviles, PFC Pedron E., 403 - - Axis powers, 411 - - Azores, 26 - - - Babson, 2dLt John, Jr., 199 - - Bach, Capt Lawrence E., 139 - - _Badoeng Strait_, USS, 355, 374_n_, 486 - - Baez, Pvt Alberto P., 317 - - Baird, Capt Robert, 173_n_ - - _Bairoko_, USS, 27, 58, 58_n_, 347 - - Barber, Maj Stewart C., 409 - - Barcus, MajGen Glenn O., 88, 233, 236–240, 242–243, 352, 496 - - Bare, BGen Robert O., 88 - - Barlow, Capt Carl F., 376 - - Barnett, PFC Richard E., 412, 412_n_ - - Barninger, Col Clarence A., 194 - - Barrett, LtCol Charles D., 187, 187_n_, 259 - - Bartos, Lt Joseph S., Jr., 58 - - Bartosh, LtCol Walter R., 243 - - _Bataan_, USS, 27, 99, 175, 347_n_, 355 - - Bates, 2dLt William H., 387, 392 - - Batterton, LtCol Roy J., Jr., 107_n_, 108, 112, 114, 123, 159 - - Becker, MSgt Robert P., 242 - - Beggs, Col Raymond W., 315 - - Belants, Capt Bernard B., 205, 205_n_, 206 - - Bell, 1stLt Richard, 405 - - Benfold, HM3 Edward C., 152_n_ - - Benson, Capt Carl H., 136 - - Benson, LtCol Graham H., 175 - - Berteling, LtCol John B., 347 - - Berueffy, Maj Max, Jr., 340 - - Beswick, Capt Byron H., 437–438 - - Binney, MajGen Arthur F., 413_n_ - - Blair, Cpl William S., 437 - - Blanchard, Capt Don H., 256 - - Bley, Maj Roy H., 430 - - Blume, LtCol Richard L., 28_n_ - - Bolt, Maj John F., 350, 376 - - Booker, Capt Jesse V., 405, 412 - - Bookhart, LtCol Hoyt U., Jr., 359 - - Bordelon, Lt Guy P., 376 - - Bourgeois, 1stLt Alvin R., 177 - - Bowman, Col George S., Jr., 234, 297, 348_n_ - - Bradley, Gen Omar, 227, 483_n_ - - Braun, Maj Richard L., 349, 379_n_ - - Bridges, 16, 31, 101–102, 157, 335–336 - Freedom Gate, 31, 102, 155, 218, 259, 370, 371_n_, 463 - Honker, 101–103, 148, 464 - Libby, 364, 371_n_, 464 - Sinanju Complex, 347_n_ - Spoonbill, 270, 364, 371, 464 - Widgeon, 31, 102–103, 148 - X-Ray, 31, 102, 364 - - Brier, Capt George R., 176 - - Briscoe, VAdm Robert P., 88, 336 - - British, 318_n_, 356, 389_n_, 410, 420 - - Broomhead, Ens Marvin, 414 - - Brown, LtCol Gerald, 421, 441 - - Brown, 2dLt James M., 134_n_ - - Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 227 - - Brunelli, Col Austin R., 86_n_; BGen, 86_n_ - - Bryan, LtCol Leslie T., Jr., 349 - - Bryson, LtCol Robert L., 28_n_ - - Buntin, Maj Joseph S., 303, 305 - - Burger, BGen Joseph C., 319, 405 - - Burnett, LtCol John R., 28 - - Byrum, Capt Paul B., 165_n_, 195, 205, 211_n_ - - - Cain, MSgt John T., 429, 432–435, 442 - - Cairo Declaration, 2, 534 - - Campbell, Capt George W., 116 - - Camp Casey, 326–329, 332, 334, 336 - - Camp Indianhead, 327–329, 335, 344, 364 - - Camp Lejeune, 148, 336, 476, 494, 498, 500 - - Camp Pendleton, 3, 88, 98, 139, 471, 473, 476, 500 - Training and Replacement Command, 98 - - Camp Rose, 202, 267, 310, 328 - - Caputo, LtCol Anthony, 108_n_, 167, 186, 202, 205 - - Carey, LtCol John F., 179, 247, 247_n_ - - Cargill, LtCol Wayne M., 177, 207–208; Col, 259_n_ - - Carney, Col Edward B., 348_n_, 375, 472 - - Carriers. _See_ Ships. - - Cassels, MajGen A. J. H., 93_n_ - - Cates, Gen Clifton B., 499 - - Casualties - Communist, 6, 10, 32–34, 36–37, 61, 73, 75–77, 80–81, 83, 89, 92–93, - 95, 103, 106, 106_n_, 125–130, 138, 141, 143, 146, 149–150, - 152–153, 155, 158–159, 163–166, 169, 171, 176, 208, 210–212, - 212_n_, 221–224, 257, 258_n_, 259, 264, 288–289, 296, 300, - 304–305, 307, 324–325, 337, 340–342, 346_n_, 370, 372–373, - 379, 381, 381_n_, 387, 389, 392–393, 451, 482_n_, 507, 522, - 532–533, 533_n_ - United Nations, 22, 32–34, 36, 49, 59, 75–77, 79–81, 83, 87–89, - 91–92, 95–97, 103, 111–113, 118–119, 121, 123, 126–127, - 129–131, 133, 136, 138–140, 142, 142_n_, 146, 150, 152–153, - 155–156, 158–160, 163–167, 169, 197, 209, 209_n_, 210, 212, - 214, 214_n_, 218, 227, 239, 246, 256–257, 260, 264, 285, - 288, 288_n_, 289, 306–307, 324, 340–342, 357, 359, 366, - 370–374, 374_n_, 379_n_, 381, 381_n_, 386–387, 391, 391_n_, - 392, 396, 398, 410–411, 411_n_, 450, 480, 482, 482_n_, 484, - 495, 495_n_, 510, 514_n_, 521, 527, 531–532, 533, 533_n_ - - Casualty evacuation, 127, 140, 234, 271, 287–288, 293, 486–488, 494, - 521 - - CAT Line, 327 - - Cease-fire, 321–322, 341, 361, 393–394, 396–397, 399, 445–447, 451, - 484 - Agreement, 2, 454 - Line, 391, 532 - - Cereghino, LtCol Alexander D., 291, 365; Col, 366_n_ - - Chamberlin, LtCol Kenneth R., 176, 207 - - Chambers, Col Owen A., 247_n_ - - Champagne, Cpl David B., 83_n_ - - Chapman, Col Max C., 28 - - Charette, HM3C William R., 294, 294_n_, 299 - - Checklou, Capt Henry A., 275_n_, 278_n_ - - Cheek, Capt Leon C., Jr., 202 - - Cherry Point, 486, 498 - - Chiang Kai-shek, 2_n_ - - China, 2, 2_n_, 5, 58, 64, 88, 377, 350_n_, 357, 427, 513, 525, 529 - - Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 3, 5, 7, 7_n_, 17, 24, 26, 28–34, - 36–39, 45–46, 52–53, 53_n_, 55, 59, 61, 69, 73–74, 79–80, - 82–83, 85, 87–89, 92–95, 97, 101–102, 104–106, 108, 111–113, - 116–119, 122–127, 129–130, 136, 140–141, 147–148, 157–158, - 187–188, 203, 207–208, 217–218, 220, 223, 227–230, 242, - 257_n_, 259–261, 263–264, 264_n_, 279, 283–292, 294–305, - 307, 309, 311, 315–316, 321, 321_n_, 322, 324–326, 337–342, - 346, 351–352, 357–358, 364–365, 367–374, 377–379, 381, 383, - 385–389, 391–393, 393_n_, 394, 397–399, 403–404, 406–408, - 410–411, 413–414, 416, 418–431, 433–442, 445, 451, 454, - 457–460, 463–466, 469–470, 478, 478_n_, 479–481, 482_n_, - 509, 511–514, 517–520, 525–527, 529. _See also_ Air - activities; Artillery; Defenses; Supplies; Weapons. - Amphibious operations, 59, 249 - Antiaircraft defenses, 64, 69, 71, 71_n_, 170, 174, 240, 243, 283, - 346, 411, 414, 433, 492, 514 - Assembly areas, 24, 292, 295, 297, 305, 519 - Attacks, 6, 18, 31, 34, 73, 106_n_, 121, 130, 163, 186, 220–221, - 223, 231, 241, 249, 253, 261, 264, 264_n_, 265, 294, 298, - 301, 303–304, 308–309, 326, 335, 340–342, 351, 353, 367, - 377, 386, 388–389, 391–392, 396, 413, 415, 424, 481, 482_n_, - 518, 522, 529 - Bases, 507 - Capabilities, 85, 464, 524, 532 - Cargo carriers, 200 - Choke points, 136 - Combat efficiency, 108, 525–526 - Combat techniques, 519 - Command posts, 133, 385 - Counterattacks, 82, 105, 112, 119, 256, 297, 300–301, 307, 379_n_ - Counterbattery fire, 136, 166, 179, 291, 339, 375, 392, 394 - Counterintelligence efforts, 522 - Defensive efforts, 117, 341, 514 - Employment of weapons, 85 - Encroachment efforts, 351 - Equipment, 170 - Espionage agents, 249, 251 - Explainers, 459 - Flags, 408 - Ground defenses, 7, 87, 94, 104, 117, 170, 218, 230, 243, 256, 265, - 273, 287, 293–294, 296, 298, 324_n_, 338, 341, 365, 369–370, - 372, 392, 394, 483, 519, 523 - Guerrillas, 6, 527 - Harassment, 59, 325, 355, 357, 359, 422, 425 - Hierarchy, 314 - Infiltration, 249, 251, 387 - Junks, 354 - Leaders, 7, 313–314 - Observation posts, 73, 95, 133, 258, 519 - Offensives, 5–6, 32, 263, 342, 514–515, 518, 525 - Officials, 421_n_, 422, 425 - Order of battle, 85–86, 248_n_ - Outposts, 133–134, 137–138 - Plans, 306, 322 - Propaganda, 7_n_, 469 - Psychological efforts, 188, 190, 325, 373, 425, 522 - Reinforcements, 33, 300–301, 340, 368, 378 - Reserves, 225, 511 - Shore defenses, 56, 357–358 - Slogans, 408 - Strategy, 534 - Strength, 188, 248, 309, 350 - Units - 9th Army Group, 479–480 - 40th Army, 96, 108, 141, 188, 199, 297 - 46th Army, 280, 298, 366 - 60th Army, 342 - 63d Army, 29, 96 - 65th Army, 29, 96, 108, 248_n_ - 68th Army, 342 - 1st Armored Division, 29 - 118th Division, 96, 108, 141 - 119th Division, 188, 199 - 120th Division, 280, 338, 338_n_ - 124th Division, 479 - 136th Division, 366 - 188th Division, 29 - 189th Division, 96 - 193d Division, 29, 96, 248_n_ - 194th Division, 29, 96, 108 - 195th Division, 29, 96, 248_n_ - 352d Regiment, 108 - 356th Regiment, 188 - 357th Regiment, 188, 196, 199 - 358th Regiment, 297–298, 307 - 388th Regiment, 280 - 407th Regiment, 366 - 408th Regiment, 387 - 580th Regiment, 108 - 581st Regiment, 220 - 582d Regiment, 220 - 584th Regiment, 220 - 585th Regiment, 220 - - Chinhae, 531 - - Chinhung-ni, 488 - - Chinju, 327, 476, 486 - - Chinnampo, 173, 242, 354 - - Cho-do Island, 55–56, 59, 173, 353–356 - - Chogum-ni, 285 - - Chongsong River, 243, 418, 421–422 - - Chormyon, 463 - - Chorwon Kumwha, 223, 420, 436 - - Chosin Reservoir, 5, 410, 412, 475, 479–480, 487–488, 494, 502, 535 - - Chunchon, 436, 497 - - Church, Capt John Jr., 175 - - Churchill, Winston S., 427 - - Clark, Gen Mark W., 64, 88, 170–171, 171_n_, 172, 226–227, 229, 231, - 314, 319, 321–322, 336, 340, 378_n_, 401, 405, 405_n_, 446 - - Clarke, LtGen Bruce C., 332, 332_n_, 379_n_ - - Clarke, LtCol Harry D., 101; Col, 101_n_ - - Clarke, VAdm Joseph J., 225, 231, 352, 376, 515 - - Close air support, 4, 7, 21, 27–28, 42, 61–62, 71–72, 79, 84, 132–134, - 136, 170, 170_n_, 172, 177, 207_n_, 208, 224–225, 234_n_, - 238–240, 243, 256, 257_n_, 299, 307, 310, 325, 326_n_, - 339–340, 345, 347–352, 375–376, 379, 386, 413, 473, 477_n_, - 485–486, 488–489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493, 511, 513–517. _See - also_ Air activities, United Nations. - - Clothing - Communist, 318, 526 - United Nations, 245, 319–320, 401, 405 - Body armor, 8, 140, 140_n_, 246, 294, 451 - Boots, 8, 245–246, 484, 526 - Cold weather gear, 526 - - Coffee, Sgt Robert J., 403 - - Cold, 1stLt Frank E., 436, 436_n_ - - Coln, LtCol Royce W., 177, 242 - - Combat outposts, 106, 106_n_, 509, 518–519, 523–524. _See also_ - Hills; Outposts. - 1, 268 - 2, 118, 126, 232, 268, 268_n_, 316_n_, 323, 338, 371 - 2A, 519 - 19, 365 - 19A, 365 - 21, 299, 304 - 31, 217, 220, 220_n_, 221 - 33, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221, 259 - 36, 169, 218 - 37, 169, 218 - 39, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221 - 51, 217–218, 220, 220_n_, 221 - 86, 169, 218 - Ava, 267, 451 - Berlin, 367_n_ - Bruce (Hill 148), 157, 157_n_ - Bunker Hill (Hill 122), 300, 306, 451, 481, 515, 519 - Camel, 397 - Carson (Hill 27), 260, 278, 280, 286 - Corine, 306 - Dagmar, 261, 306 - Detroit (Hill 15), 163, 414 - Esther, 260–261, 372, 451 - Frisco (Hill 13), 163, 414 - Green, 94 - Hedy (Hill 124), 259–261, 264, 306 - Hook, 186–187, 187_n_, 188, 188_n_, 191–193, 193_n_, 194–196, - 196_n_, 197, 197_n_, 199–200, 202–203, 205–207, 207_n_, - 208–211, 211_n_, 212–214, 215_n_, 222, 230–231, 246, 255_n_, - 263, 338–339, 351, 414, 508 - Ingrid, 268 - Kate, 268 - Marilyn, 268 - Nevada, 267, 290 - Reno (Hill 25), 211–212, 230, 265, 273, 275–276, 278–283 - Reno Block, 273 - Ronson, 187, 211, 414 - Seattle, 163, 187–188, 207 - Vegas (Hill 21), 230, 260, 276, 278, 280, 283, 294–295, 302, - 305–307, 311, 326, 338 - Verdun, 163, 163_n_, 187 - Warsaw, 163, 163_n_, 187–188, 202, 211, 414 - White, 91 - Yoke, 259–260 - - Commandant of the Marine Corps, 88, 98, 138–139, 139_n_, 158–159, 231, - 310, 332, 345, 396, 409–410, 423, 471–472, 499, 501, - 504–505, 534 - - Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 478_n_ - - Commander in Chief, Far East, 3, 359, 476, 478, 499, 514 - - Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 332, 352_n_, 353, 474 - - Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, 4, 52, 64, 84, 170, 226, - 231, 314, 322, 401, 405, 408, 446, 448, 457, 477, 481, 483, - 496, 500, 522 - - Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, 47, 98, 320, 336, 408, 469, 488_n_ - - Commander, Seventh Fleet, 351–352, 376, 515 - - Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army in Korea, 13_n_, 44, 51_n_, 62, - 86, 314, 319, 336, 378, 405, 413, 480–481, 491, 497, 530 - - Commanding General, I Corps, 156, 332, 336, 340, 361, 378, 405, 456 - - Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, 2, 11, 13_n_, 18, 148, 310, - 319, 334, 336, 345, 365, 378_n_, 501, 514_n_, 522, 530 - - Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 24, 43, 68, 233, 236, - 348, 376, 469, 472, 474, 488, 493, 513, 515–516 - - Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, 237, 242, 348, 515 - - Communications - Communist, 63, 69, 514, 522 - United Nations, 134_n_, 167–168, 280, 289, 339_n_, 354, 373, 438, - 449, 464, 517, 517_n_, 521 - Armored vehicle, 81 - Difficulties, 21, 284, 291 - Failures, 75_n_, 285, 367, 488 - Installations, 18 - Interservice, 487 - Lines, 193, 339_n_, 494 - Makeshift rigs, 494 - Nets, 182, 366 - Radio, 6, 67, 75_n_, 81, 85, 119, 123, 168, 182_n_, 235, 273, 284, - 316_n_, 339_n_, 358, 388, 464, 488, 493 - Trench, 287 - Wire, 46, 193, 273, 275, 278, 391, 494 - - Communism, 404, 426–427, 435, 442, 527–529, 531–535 - - Condon, Col John J., 65, 176, 239; MajGen, 65_n_ - - Congress, United States, 440, 502, 504, 506, 515, 517_n_ - - Conley, LtCol Robert F., 242, 291, 347_n_, 349 - - Connolly, Capt Howard J., 119, 124–125, 135 - - Connolly, Capt Thomas P., 302 - - Conrad, LtCol Robert L., 349 - - _Consolation_, USS, 288, 319, 495 - - Cooley, MajGen Albert D., 474_n_ - - Cortelyou, LtCol Stoddard G., 291 - - Corvi, 1stLt Joseph A., 242 - - Coss, LtCol Francis K., 291, 349 - - Craig, BGen Edward A., 3, 8; LtGen, 475_n_, 477 - - Cram, Col Jack R., 233, 345 - - Crawford, LtCol Philip “L”, 132, 177 - - Crockett, Col Richard H., 249_n_ - - Cross, LtCol Thomas J., 89, 146_n_ - - Culhane, Col Thomas A., Jr., 12_n_, 20, 37, 77, 84, 114, 150_n_ - - Curry, Col Manly L., 368; BGen, 397_n_ - - Cushing, LtCol William H., 20 - - Cushman, BGen Thomas J., 7_n_, 485 - - Czechoslovakia, 458_n_, 459, 525 - - - D-Day, 258, 334–335 - - Daly, Maj Jack M., 320 - - Damopoulos, Cpl C. N., 475_n_ - - Daniel, RAdm John C., 315, 318 - - Daniels, Lt Willie L., 173 - - Daughtry, LtCol George W. E., 20, 82–83, 93 - - Davenport, Col William K., 56, 58, 59_n_ - - Davies, Capt Samuel J., 426, 427_n_ - - Davis, LtCol Bert, Jr., 165, 191, 195, 202 - - Davis, Capt Oliver R., 241 - - Dawson, BGen Marion L., 474_n_ - - Day, QMSgt James, 423 - - Dean, MajGen William F., 406, 411_n_, 426, 431 - - Declaration of war, 506 - - Defense, Department of, 64, 174_n_, 430 - Secretary, 227, 500 - - Defenses - Communist, 16, 166, 230, 256, 296–297, 299, 368, 379, 389, - 509, 520, 526 - Active weapons positions, 519 - Air-raid shelters, 106–107 - Antiaircraft, 413 - Antitank, 257 - Artillery emplacements, 24, 338 - Artillery preparation, 289 - Automatic weapons site, 381 - Bivouac, 73 - Bunkers, 33, 62, 75, 77, 81, 83, 90, 93, 104, 136, 141, 160, 190, - 195–196, 200, 207–208, 257, 291–292, 299, 304, 307, 368, - 379, 385, 519–520 - Camouflage, 519 - Caves, 195, 208, 257, 299, 356, 379, 519, 520 - Counterbattery efforts, 309 - Dugouts, 32 - Emplacements, 232, 325, 375 - Field fortifications, 92, 106–107, 519 - Firing positions, 138 - Flank security, 138 - Flares, 159 - Fortifications, 302, 375, 378, 520 - Ground, 519–520 - Guns, 357 - Emplacements, 46, 207 - Positions, 71, 74, 385 - Installations, 389 - Living quarters, 100 - Machine gun positions, 95, 289 - Mess halls, 106 - Mortar positions, 73, 381, 385 - Mortar preparation, 289 - Observation posts, 136, 356 - Positions, 33, 72, 90, 93, 136, 379, 520 - Revetments, 33 - Secondary line, 520 - Shelter, 106 - Storage spaces, 106 - Strong points, 207, 381 - Tactical wire, 33 - Trenches, 10, 32, 89, 93, 104, 136, 160, 168, 195, 196_n_, 200, - 206–207, 259, 292–293, 295, 299, 302, 304, 307, 368, 379, - 385, 388, 520 - Trenchlines, 95, 188, 206, 210, 267, 296, 374, 379, 388 - Trenchworks, 75, 379, 389, 519 - Tunnels, 106, 257, 519–520 - Underground earthworks, 106 - Weapons emplacements, 136, 283, 295, 379 - Weapons positions, 133, 136, 307, 337 - Works, 520 - Korea, Republic of, 160, 162, 220 - United Nations - All-round, 519 - Ambushes, 8, 203, 524 - Ammunition holes, 467 - Antiaircraft defense, 67 - Antiguerrilla activities, 412 - Artillery box traffic, 190 - Artillery fire, 258, 289 - Artillery firepower, 309 - Attacks, 53_n_, 109 - Automatic weapons sites, 303, 467 - Barbed wire obstacle, 258 - Box-me-ins, 75, 75_n_, 89, 121, 124, 127, 129, 134, 150, 281, 289, - 301, 304, 325, 369, 518_n_, 519 - Bunkers, 22, 34, 75, 89, 100–101, 107–108, 108_n_, 118, 148, - 152–153, 193–194, 197, 199, 205–206, 207_n_, 210–211, 213, - 213_n_, 214–215, 273, 283, 303, 323, 388, 467–468, 520–521 - Camp facilities, 32 - Caves, 273, 283, 285, 521 - Combat outposts slope defenses, 255 - Command posts, bunkered, 467–468 - Counterattacks, 134, 206, 308 - Counterbattery, 117, 117_n_, 207, 256, 291–292 - Countermortar, 256, 281, 286, 291 - Defense-in-depth concept, 509 - Defensive boxes, 378 - Emplacements, 253 - Field fortifications, 215 - Fighting holes, 299, 303, 521 - Fighting light, 18-inch, 114 - Fighting positions, 253 - Fires, 127, 324, 354, 369, 373, 379, 387, 389, 519 - Fire support, 21, 309, 357 - Flames, 392 - Flares, 160 - Fortifications, 32, 121, 397, 448, 452, 509, 518 - Foxholes, 302–303 - Ground, 1, 8, 391 - Gun emplacements, 32, 253, 304, 339 - Hill defenses, 391 - Individual shelter, 214 - Installations, 107 - Linear defense, 465 - Listening posts, 273 - Marine, U.S., 82, 84, 127 - 4.2-inch mortar positions, 466 - 81mm mortar positions, 466 - Outpost, 75 - Positions, 34, 106, 203, 253, 467–468 - Preparations, 121 - Protective boxes, 281 - Protective wire, 324 - Reconnaissance, motorized, 465 - Sandbags, 520 - Searchlight, 114 - Stabilized lines, 523 - Stabilized situation, 466 - Strongpoint, 465 - Tactics, 518 - Tank slots, 467–468 - Timbers, 107, 448 - Trenches, 148, 153, 193–194, 197_n_, 209, 214, 253, 273, 283–285, - 299, 303–304, 323–324, 387, 398, 467, 520, 522 - Trenchline, 211, 214, 257, 273, 275–276, 366, 386–387, - 389, 468, 509 - Trenchworks, 32, 121, 387 - Weapon - Dugouts, 303 - Emplacements, 22 - Positions, 299 - Wire, 300, 309, 368, 379, 494 - - _DeHaven_, USS, 347 - - Demarcation line, 458, 529, 532 - - Demars, Cpl George C., 305 - - Demas, Capt John G., 126–127, 129 - - Demers, Maj Raymond E., 177 - - Demilitarized Zone, 322, 377_n_, 394, 399, 408, 445–450, 453–456, - 456_n_, 457–461, 463–467, 469 - Police companies, 456, 456_n_, 457, 459 - - Deputy Director of Logistic Plans, 337 - - Detroit, 147_n_ - - Dewey, Cpl Duane E., 37_n_ - - Dickerson, Sgt Charles W., 436_n_ - - Dion, 2dLt James W., 118 - - Diplomatic maneuverings, 313 - - Director of the Marine Corps Educational Center, 337 - - Distinguished Service Medal, 233, 336 - - Division of Reserve, 337 - - Dobervich, LtCol Michiel, 39, 250 - - Dobson, LtCol Charles E., 207, 243 - - Donahue, 2dLt John J., 82–83 - - Donk, 2dLt Terry K., 95 - - Dorney, Col Harvey C., 347_n_ - - Dorsey, Col Elmer T., 28, 28_n_ - - Doyle, RAdm James H., 478, 478_n_ - - Dragon Lady, 371 - - Dufford, Maj John M., 175 - - Dulacki, LtCol Leo J., 165, 167, 187, 193, 195, 197, 197_n_, 199, - 208–211, 214; Col, 163_n_ - - Dulles, John Foster, 427 - - DULUTH Line, 327 - - Dunis, MSgt Gust H., 436_n_, 437 - - Dunlap, Col John F., 320 - - Dunn, Maj Elswin P. 242 - - Dyer, RAdm George C., 58 - - - East Coast Island Defense Command. _See_ Marine Units. - - Edenton, 471 - - Edwards, LtCol Harry W., 20_n_ - - Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 64_n_, 227, 227_n_; - President, 37_n_, 147_n_, 314, 321 - - Electronic countermeasures, 177, 492. _See also_ Air Activities, - United Nations. - - El Toro, 233, 374, 472, 485, 498, 500 - - English language, 317, 445 - - Equipment - Communist, 90, 93, 225, 511, 525–526 - United Nations, 5, 8, 10, 10_n_, 11, 44, 60, 63, 101, 241, 250, 309, - 316, 359, 401, 448, 451–452, 480, 509, 512_n_ - - Estess, Sgt Morris L., 436_n_ - - Estey, Capt Ralph F., 293, 295–296 - - European - Campaigns, 88 - Command, 504_n_ - Theater of Operations, 493 - - Evans, Capt Dexter E., 195 - - Evans, Capt G. L. G., RN, 60_n_ - - Everest, LtGen Frank F., 43, 88, 515 - - Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, 504_n_ - - Exercises, 86, 232, 249, 323–324, 334–336, 360, 400, 497, 508. _See - also_ MARLEX exercises. - - - Far East, 471, 474, 476–477, 499–500, 500_n_, 501, 533 - - Farthest Point of Advance, 374 - - Fascist, 427 - - Ferranto, 1stLt Felix L., 433 - - Filipinos, 318_n_ - - Finch, LtCol James H., 268, 323 - - Findtner, Col Frederick R., 268 - - Fink, Capt Gerald, 420, 431–433 - - Fire direction center, 72. _See also_ Artillery. - - Fisher, LtCol Thell H., 19, 320, 408 - - Fitzmaurice, Maj Charles W., 250 - - Flares, 67, 75, 140, 398 - - Fleps, LtCol Carl J., 471–472 - - Fletcher, LtCol Maurice W., 177, 207_n_ - - Fliers, 132, 375, 385, 405, 511. _See also_ Air activities. - - Flores, Capt James R., 203 - - Flournoy, Col Walter N., 38, 38_n_, 70, 108 - - Flynn, Capt John P., 406, 430, 433, 433_n_, 442 - - Foley, Lt Kenneth S., 69 - - Folmar, Capt Jesse G., 173 - - Formosa, 427 - - Forrestal, James V., 495_n_ - - Fortin, MSgt Lawrence J., 242 - - Forty-first Parallel, 55 - - Forward air controllers, 56, 70–72, 99, 172, 257_n_, 488, 516, 517_n_. - _See also_ Air Activities, United Nations. - - Forward observers, 72, 105, 202, 232, 250, 273, 275, 299, 302, 369, - 464. _See also_ Artillery. - - Foster, Capt William J., Jr., 397 - - Fourth of July, 90, 92–93 - - Fox, LtCol Lawrence F., 177 - - Franz, 2dLt Edgar R., 297 - - Frease, 1stLt William A., 377 - - Freedom Gate, 400 - - Freedom Village, 316–319, 327, 400–406, 408, 459 - - Free World, 314, 535 - - Fressler, WO Dramus F., 241 - - Frier, Capt Donald G., 191 - - Fuel, 67, 235, 246, 260_n_, 341, 472_n_ - - Fuller, LtCol Regan, 320 - - Funk, Col Glenn C., 268_n_, 323, 335, 363, 369 - - Fuson, Capt Harold C., 89 - - Futrell, Dr. Robert C., 62_n_ - - - Galer, Col Robert E., 65–67 - - Galliher, 2dLt Robert E., 100 - - Garcia, PFC Fernando L., 152 - - Gayle, LtCol Gordon D., 13_n_ - - General Classification Test, 457–458 - - Geneva, 229, 424 - Convention, 442, 539 - - Gentleman, LtCol Alexander W., 150_n_ - - George, MSgt D. R., 242 - - Gerding, Jules E., 83 - - German manufacture, 525 - - Gifu, 471 - - Gililland, LtCol George A., 268 - - Gillette, 1stLt Robert J., 433, 438 - - Gillis, Maj Alexander J., 174 - - Gingrich, RAdm John E., 355 - - Givens, Maj Donald F., 177 - - Glenview, 499 - - Glick, LtCol Jacob E., 182_n_ - - _Glory_, HMS, 355 - - Gocke, Maj Charles E., 316 - - Goich, Capt Samuel G., 457 - - Gold Star, 88, 337, 376, 442 - - GOP mission, 467 - - Graham, PFC Alfred P., Jr., 403, 438 - - Graham, Capt Leland, 77 - - Gray, Capt Carl R., 261 - - Gray, 1stLt John S., 302 - - Great Britain, 2 - - Greek, 318_n_ - - Gregory, LtCol Noel C., 20 - - Griffith, Sgt Donald M., 437, 441 - - Grindle, PFC Richard R., 437 - - Ground Control Intercept, 490. _See also_ Air Activities, United - Nations. - - Guadalcanal, 26, 148, 267_n_, 298, 327_n_, 337 - - - Hadd, LtCol Harry A., 383 - - Haeju-Chinnampo, 27, 27_n_ - - Haffner, Col Loren, 233, 268, 268_n_ - - Hagaru, 412, 480, 487–488 - - Haiti, 2, 477 - - Hamhung, 65, 488 - - Hamhung-Hungnam area, 480, 488, 530 - - Hammon, HM Francis C., 287, 287_n_ - - Haneda Air Force Base, 319 - - Han River, 4, 15, 18, 32, 39–41, 96, 105, 234, 248–250, 398, 463, 508 - - Hanshin Air Force Base, 472 - - Haring, PFC John A., 436_n_ - - Harlan, Capt Murry V., Jr., 209–210 - - Harper, Capt Esmond E., 391 - - Harris, MajGen Field, 7, 7_n_, 485 - - Harris Maj Walter R., 406, 423, 439, 442 - - Harrison, SSgt Charles L., 434, 436_n_, 437, 441 - - Harrison, Maj Thomas D., 433, 435 - - Harrison, BGen William K., 228, 322, 433 - - Harshberger, Col John D., 471 - - Hart, LtGen Franklin A., 98, 139_n_, 214, 215_n_ - - Hausman, Col William F., 472 - - _Haven_, USS, 288, 319 - - Harwood, LtCol Harold A., 374_n_ - - Hawaii, 320, 337 - - Hawkins, Cpl Clifford R., 436_n_ - - Hayton, Cpl Ernest E., 436_n_ - - Heinl, LtCol Robert D., Jr., 187, 359; - Col 327_n_, 358 - - Helicopters, 8, 12, 22, 40–41, 66, 66_n_, 67, 67_n_, 77, 86, 118, 127, - 140, 180, 215_n_, 235–236, 246–247_n_, 271, 288, 307, - 316_n_, 319, 333–334, 336, 370, 402, 408, 414, 455, 459, - 481, 484, 493–494, 494_n_, 495–498. _See also_ Air - Activities, United Nations and Aircraft, United Nations. - Casualty evacuation, 8, 42, 49, 139–140, 234–236, 236_n_, 271, 307, - 370, 402, 459, 494–495, 497 - Liaison, 494 - Lifts, 8, 31, 335, 495–496 - Reconnaissance, 494 - Rescue, 67, 174 - Resupply, 8, 101, 246, 481, 495–497 - Types - HO3S, 414 - HO3S-1, 42_n_, 488, 493 - HO5S, 181, 235 - HO5S-1, 180, 271 - HRS-2, 235, 472 - HTL, 235 - HTL-4, 42_n_, 180, 271 - - Hemphill, Col Bruce T., 21 - - Henderson, Col Frederick P., 21, 21_n_, 46, 71–72, 136; - BGen, 46, 46_n_, 135_n_, 179_n_ - - Henry, 1stLt Kenneth W., 414, 429 - - Herring, LtCol William T., 24, 42 - - Hicks, LtCol Alton L., 182_n_ - - Hilburn, PFC Theron L., 436_n_ - - Hill, 2dLt John W., Jr., 177 - - Hill 13 (Frisco), 280 - - Hill 15 (Detroit), 258, 280 - - Hill 21B, 286, 292, 304 - - Hill 25A (Hill 150), 273, 280–281, 298–299, 304 - - Hill 27 (Carson), 273 - - Hill 29, 280, 286 - - Hill 31, 255, 273, 275, 285, 301 - - Hill 31A, 255, 260, 273, 279 - - Hill 31D, 285 - - Hill 33, 279 - - Hill 34, 75 - - Hill 35, 279 - - Hill 35A, 259 - - Hill 36, 157 - - Hill 37, 157 - - Hill 40, 279 - - Hill 44, 279, 289, 300 - - Hill 45, 286 - - Hill 47, 273, 285, 309 - - Hill 48A (Stromboli), 122–126, 132–134, 136–137, 139, 141, 150, 157 - - Hill 52, 109 - - Hill 56, 157 - - Hill 56A (Samoa), 109, 113, 116 - - Hill 57, 276 - - Hill 57A, 281, 291, 294, 297 - - Hill 58A (Siberia), 109, 111–114, 116, 118, 118_n_, 128, 131–132, 134, - 136, 138–139, 141 - - Hill 67 (Arrowhead), 36, 79, 273, 275, 286, 301 - - Hill 86, 157, 160, 162 - - Hill 90, 259, 372 - - Hill 98, 280, 291 - - Hill 101, 265 - - Hill 104, 82–83, 122, 133, 150, 256 - - Hill 108, 289 - - Hill 110, 111, 113, 116 - - Hill 111, 383, 385–386, 388–389, 391, 450 - - Hill 114, 289, 300 - - Hill 116, 289 - - Hill 119, 381, 383, 385–386, 388, 388_n_, 389, 391, 450 - - Hill 120, 109, 111, 129, 132, 134 - - Hill 122, (Bunker Hill), 109, 113–114, 118–119, 121–122, 124–133, - 135–139, 141, 143, 145, 149, 159 - - Hill 123, 119, 134 - - Hill 124, 109, 119, 121–122, 129, 145, 159–160, 162, 259 - - Hill 126, 276, 369, 383, 391, 464 - - Hill 134, 232 - - Hill 139, 293, 377, 385 - - Hill 140, 279 - - Hill 146, 186, 205–206 - - Hill 150 (Hill 25A), 275–276, 297 - - Hill 153, 273, 276, 278, 292, 297, 301, 303–304 - - Hill 155 (Hill 167), 155, 217–218, 221, 281, 298, 464–465 - - Hill 159 (Yoke), 89, 91 - - Hill 163, 464 - - Hill 167. _See_ Hill 155. - - Hill 181, 276, 464 - - Hill 190, 265, 273, 276, 280–281, 291, 293, 297, 365 - - Hill 190.5, 298 - - Hill 191, 223 - - Hill 201, 109 - - Hill 229, 104, 109, 276, 464 - - Hill 240, 259 - - Hill 255, 223 - - Hill 266, 224 - - Hill 355, 223 - - Hill Bunker (Hill 122), 102, 108–109, 111, 113–114, 117–118, 118_n_, - 119, 121–122, 124–143, 145–147, 149–150, 156, 159–160, 162, - 172, 179, 185, 250, 265, 308, 452 - - Hill Detroit (Hill 15), 258, 294 - - Hill Fox, 412 - - Hill Frisco, 294 - - Hill Kumgok, 256–257 - - Hill Nevada, 286 - - Hill Old Baldy, 223–224, 299, 309 - - Hill Paekhak, 104 - - Hill Pork Chop, 223 - - Hill Red, 256–257 - - Hill Sahon, 122 - - Hill T, 80 - - Hill, Tumae-ri, 297 - - Hill Ungok, 255–257, 259–260, 271, 275, 291 - - Hill Z, 77 - - Hillam, LtCol Bruce F., 74_n_ - - Hines, LtCol Owen M., 69 - - Hippocratic tradition, 294 - - Hogaboom, MajGen Robert E., 473_n_ - - Hoglind, MSgt H. C., 241 - - Holben, Maj Raymond C., 175 - - Holcomb, Cpl Frederick G., 436_n_ - - Hollinger, PFC Bernard R., 403 - - Holt, Capt Edward Y., Jr., 152 - - Holy Communion, 232 - - Hongchon area, 412 - - Honshu, 28 - - Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 20, 62_n_, 81, 91_n_, 117_n_, 197_n_ - - Hudson, Capt Floyd G., 292 - - Hughes, LtCol John E., 349 - - Hungnam, 5–6, 357 - - Hunter, Capt Clyde W., 195, 257, 281, 293; Col, 257_n_ - - Hutchinson, LtCol Homer G., Jr., 241 - - Hwachon Reservoir, 530, 535 - - Hwangto-do Island, 55, 356, 358 - - Hyan, MajGen Zoon Shin, 310 - - - Il, BGen Lee, 58 - - Il, Gen Nam, 228 - - Imjin River, 15–16, 31–32, 41, 44, 50, 101–103, 105, 148, 187, 202, - 234, 249, 251, 263, 268, 270, 339, 364, 371, 381, 391, 394, - 447, 450, 453, 461, 463–464, 508 - - Inchon, 4, 4_n_, 5, 10_n_, 13, 15, 18, 56, 86, 270, 288, 319, 323, 334, - 354, 402, 408, 474, 477–479, 483, 486–487, 494, 499, 502, - 530–531, 535 - - Inchon-Seoul, 4, 12, 475, 478–479, 486, 502, 512_n_ - - India, 228, 314, 321_n_, 408 - - Indian Resolution, 228–229 - - Indians, 408 - - Inje, 484, 535 - - Insco, PFC Bernard W., 437 - - Intelligence - Communist, 58, 74, 85, 123, 228, 425, 522 - United Nations, 29–30, 36, 45, 53, 58–59, 69, 81, 85, 93, 96, 128, - 141, 193, 237, 264_n_, 319, 320, 335, 346, 348, 353–354, - 357, 371, 388, 392, 512, 514, 520–521, 532 - - International Red Cross inspection teams, 319 - - Irvin, Maj William H., Jr., 175 - - Itami Air Force Base, 28, 47, 49, 210, 470, 472, 486 - - ITEM raid, 260, 279, 291 - - Iwakuni, 474 - - Iwo Jima, 148, 233, 337, 474 - - - Jack, Col Samuel S., 170_n_; - BGen, 474, 474_n_; - MajGen, 139_n_, 178_n_, 181_n_ - - JAMESTOWN Line, 11–12, 15–17, 19–20, 22, 31, 37–39, 45, 49, 74, 76, - 81–82, 84, 87–88, 92, 96, 100, 104, 106–107, 109, 111, - 121–123, 125, 130, 132, 148–149, 152–153, 157, 165–170, 172, - 186, 200, 207, 218, 231–232, 261, 265, 267–268, 301, 323, - 327, 451, 466, 497 - - Japan, 2–3, 6_n_, 44, 47–48, 56, 97, 183, 235, 320, 374, 402, 433_n_, - 469, 471, 473–474, 476, 485, 491 - - Japanese, 4_n_, 88, 106, 434, 485, 525 - - Jensen, LtCol Oscar T., Jr., 152 - - Jerome, Col Clayton C., 43; - BGen, 43, 61, 61_n_, 62; - MajGen, 159, 177, 179, 181, 231, 233; - LtGen, 43_n_ - - Jersey Ridge, 364 - - Jewson, LtCol Winston E., 347 - - Jobusch, Lt Wallace E., 59 - - Johnson, PFC Richard D., 404 - - Joint Chiefs of Staff, 229, 337, 476–477, 500–501, 505, 505_n_ - Chairman, 352_n_, 483 - - Joint Observer Teams, 458 - - Joint Operations Center, Korea, 26–27, 68, 170_n_, 238, 350, 376, 469, - 472, 474, 488_n_, 515–516 - - Jones, LtCol Olin W., Jr., 281 - - Jones, LtCol Paul M., 366, 378 - - Jordahl, Col Russell N., 44 - - Joy, VAdm C. Turner, 7_n_, 88, 228, 528 - - Judson, Capt Robert W., 112 - - - Kaesong, 7, 13, 15–16, 22, 75, 104, 175, 318, 350_n_, 401, 405, 413, - 480, 489, 511, 511_n_ - - Kaesong-Munsan road, 24 - - Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, 511 - - Kaneohe, 471 - - Kang, Maj Shin Ho, 220_n_ - - Kanggye, 415–416, 437 - - Kanghwa-do Island, 15, 248_n_, 354 - - KANSAS Line, 20, 22, 39, 100, 103, 232, 248, 250–251, 253, 268, 323, - 339, 396, 450, 461, 468, 532 - - KANSAS SWITCH Line, 461 - - Kapaun, Capt Emil J., 427_n_ - - Kapaun High School, Father, 433_n_ - - Kaylor, PFC Charles M., 436_n_ - - Keck, 1stLt Frank L., Jr., 376 - - Keller, Maj Robert P., 485 - - Kelly, Maj George E., 305 - - Kelly, PFC John D., 83_n_ - - Kelso, Pvt Jack W., 164_n_ - - Kendall, MajGen Paul W., 88, 156, 182_n_, 227, 332_n_ - - Kennedy, Cpl Gethern, Jr., 403 - - Keun, 1stLt No Won, 33 - - Kicklighter, Maj Edward C., 349 - - Kidd, Cpl Harold J., 437 - - Kilmer, HM John E., 127 - - Kilmer, Joyce, 127 - - Kim, Col Dong Ha, 19 - - Kim, 2dLt Young Ha, 75 - - Kim-Peng offer, 314 - - Kimpo, 12–13, 13_n_, 15, 17–18, 34, 481, 484, 486–487 - - Kimpo Peninsula, 4, 11–12, 15, 17–18, 32, 38, 40, 96, 248, 248_n_, 249 - - King, Col Kenneth A., 60, 60_n_ - - King, LtCol Louis N., 112, 145 - - Kirby, Col Kenneth D., 233 - - Kirby-Smith, Maj Ephraim, 39 - - Knudson, Maj Curtis E., 175 - - Kobe, 44, 471 - - Kohus, PFC Francis E., Jr., 403 - - Kojo, 55, 178, 226–227 - - Kongnung River, 15 - - Korea, 2–4, 4_n_, 5, 6_n_, 7_n_, 24, 24_n_, 26–27, 29, 38, 43–45, - 48–49, 51_n_, 52, 56, 62, 62_n_, 83, 86, 88, 96–100, 105, - 108, 127, 135, 139, 143, 188, 225–227, 233, 235–236, - 244–246, 263, 270, 309, 314, 319, 321, 327, 345, 347_n_, - 349, 356, 374_n_, 375, 379, 391, 393–394, 398, 408–411, 414, - 420_n_, 426–427, 429–430, 438, 441–442, 448, 469–473, - 476–482, 484–487, 491, 493–497, 499–504, 506–508, 512–513, - 513_n_, 514_n_, 517, 520, 523–524, 527–535 - East, 1, 5–6, 17, 53, 56, 59, 70, 205, 342, 351, 353, 356, 409, 475, - 487, 507, 512 - North (People’s Republic), 3–7, 27_n_, 28_n_, 53, 55, 65–66, - 170–171, 224, 241, 321, 353, 403, 412_n_, 413_n_, 415–416, - 419–420, 425, 428, 432–434, 438–439, 470, 479, 481, 513, - 516, 531–532, 532_n_ - Hydroelectric plants, 63–65, 513 - North Korean People’s Army, 3–5, 17, 20, 26, 58, 67, 229, 314, - 355_n_, 350–359, 402, 410, 411_n_, 412, 425, 430, 459, 475, - 474–479, 525, 530 - Units - I Corps, 358 - 23d Brigade, 355 - Tank and Infantry School, 244 - - South (Republic of Korea), 3–6, 15, 28, 31, 43, 51, 67–68, 100, 106, - 224, 318, 321–322, 355, 360, 478, 480, 529–532, 532_n_, 534 - Army, 20, 51–52, 100, 155, 223, 314, 321, 323, 342, 344, 351–352, - 359_n_, 360, 372, 375, 393–394, 400, 476, 483, 497, - 517, 529–530 - I Corps, 52, 175, 222, 393, 460 - II Corps, 52, 342, 351, 385, 393, 517 - Capital Division, 52 - 1st Division, 11, 51–52, 222, 257_n_, 333, 342, 479 - 3d Division, 52 - 5th Division, 52, 222 - 6th Division, 52 - 7th Division, 52 - 8th Division, 10, 52 - 9th Division, 51, 342 - 11th Division, 52 - 20th Division, 342 - 15th Regiment, 11 - 13th Security Battalion, 17–18 - Marine Corps, 6, 11, 32–34, 39, 41, 45, 55–56, 59, 87, 90, 122, 136, - 185, 188, 190, 196, 217–218, 220–221, 248, 259–260, 268, - 280, 303, 310, 328, 335–336, 353–354, 356, 359_n_, 448, 455, - 461, 463, 483, 529–531 - 1st Regiment, 4, 6, 6_n_, 10–12, 17, 19, 19_n_, 29, 31–32, 37–39, - 75–76, 96, 148, 155–162, 169, 176, 187, 190, 217, 222, 261, - 265, 267_n_, 270, 300, 325, 327–329, 331, 344, 370, 373, - 447, 461, 463, 481, 508, 512_n_, 530 - 1st Battalion, 19, 31–33, 75, 90 - 2d Battalion, 19, 32, 75 - 3d Battalion, 19, 31, 37, 220_n_, 344 - 5th Battalion, 17–18, 217, 22_n_, 335, 530 - 2d Regiment, 353, 530 - 1st Artillery Battalion, 11, 270, 328, 331 - 1st Engineer Company, 328 - Tank Company, 331 - Navy, 359_n_ - Service Corps, 100, 100_n_, 117, 182, 188, 193, 278, 288, 329, - 454, 454_n_, 509 - 103d Regiment, 100, 454_n_ - West, 10–11, 13, 13_n_, 16–17, 22, 32, 53, 92, 143, 203, 261, - 264–265, 335, 353, 391, 409, 463, 474–475, 507–509, 523, 535 - - Korean Armistice Commission, 7_n_, 528 - - Korean Communication Zone, 100 - - Korean Defense Minister, 310 - - Korean Military Advisory Group, 529–530 - - Korean National Police, 249, 251 - - Korean Presidential Unit Citation Streamer, 310, 352, 352_n_, 492 - - Koto-ri, 412, 487 - - Kreiser, BGen Alexander W., Jr., 472 - - Ksycewski, Capt Casimir C., 113, 145 - - Kumgok, 279 - - Kumsong, 342, 393, 517 - - Kung Dong, 420–421 - - Kunsan, 202, 270, 335 - - Kurth, Capt Harold D., Jr., 258 - - Kwak, 2dLt Sang In, 90 - - Kyu, LtCol Kim Yong, 155_n_ - - - Lafleur, 2dLt Carl R., 177 - - _Lake Champlain_, USS, 346 - - Lambrecht, Col Peter D., 133–134 - - Lamson-Scribner, BGen Frank H., 71; MajGen 71_n_ - - Lawrence, LtCol Henry C., Jr., 324 - - Layer, Col Walter F., 108, 113, 121–122, 126, 137–138, 146, - 159, 162, 233 - - League of Red Cross Societies, 229 - - Lee, Maj Benjamin G., 297–298, 301–302 - - Lee, Lt Ernest S., 76–77 - - Lee, MajGen Sang Cho, 315 - - Legion of Merit, 88, 233, 337, 442 - - Lehner, Dr. Otto, 319 - - Leopard (Korean guerrillas), 354 - - Letter of Commendation, 442 - - _Lexington_, USS, 2 - - Li, Yo-Yang, 106 - - Liberty Village, 402, 404 - - Little Swap, 317 - - Logistics, - Communist, 224, 478, 513, 525 - United Nations, 11–12, 16, 18, 24, 44, 46–49, 60_n_, 62, 100, 140, - 244–245, 263, 355, 469, 485, 487, 493, 497, 534 - - Long, LtCol Frank A., 383 - - Long, Col Glenn R., 236_n_ - - Lorence, Capt Herbert M., 293, 296–297, 299 - - Los Angeles, 500 - - Lund, Maj Arnold A., 374_n_ - - Lundquist, 2dLt Carl R., 420 - - Lutz, 2dLt Theodore J., Jr., 392 - - - MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 3–5, 6_n_, 427, 476–478, - 496, 499–500 - - MacDonald, Maj James A., Jr., 212_n_, 440 - - MacLean, Maj William G., 472 - - Madam-ni, 15 - - Maddell, Cpl James E., 405 - - Maffioli, Cpl Leonard J., 436_n_ - - Main Battle Position, 445–447, 453–454, 460–461, 468 - - Main Line of Resistance, 11–12, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 30–33, 36, 38, 40, - 45, 51, 61, 73–74, 76, 81–84, 86–87, 89–90, 92, 95–96, 101, - 104–105, 109, 111, 113–114, 116–117, 119, 121–123, 125–127, - 130, 135, 137, 143, 145, 147, 149, 152, 163, 165–167, 169, - 185–187, 193–195, 197_n_, 199–200, 202–203, 205–206, 207_n_, - 209–210, 217, 221, 225, 230, 231_n_, 232, 239, 247–248, 251, - 253, 253_n_, 256–257, 259, 261, 264–265, 267, 270, 273, 276, - 278–281, 283–289, 292–294, 297–300, 304–307, 309, 323–324, - 327–329, 331–332, 339–341, 345, 361, 363–366, 367_n_, 369, - 369_n_, 371, 373–374, 377–379, 379_n_, 381, 383, 385–388, - 393, 396, 414, 445, 447–448, 450–452, 454–455, 465–466, 480, - 496–497, 508–509, 511, 516, 518–520, 524 - - Main Supply Route - Communist, 5, 202, 514 - United Nations, 114, 207, 467, 479 - - Maizlish, 2dLt Irvin B., 305 - - Majon-ni, 436 - - Malik, Jacob, 7 - - _Manchester_, USS, 414 - - Manchurian border, 415, 513 - - Mangrum, LtGen Richard C., 515 - - Manor, Sgt Paul M., 436_n_ - - Mantel, Maj Samuel J., Jr. 350 - - Marine Corps, U. S., 8, 13, 26, 37_n_, 39, 44, 55, 61, 86, 239, 323, - 333–334, 359_n_, 409–411, 423, 430, 440–441, 471, 474–479, - 482–484, 493–495, 497–502, 504–505, 505_n_, 506–508, 512, - 523, 528, 530–531, 534–535 - Air Reserve Training Command, 499 - Basic School, 143_n_ - Equipment Board, 49_n_ - Fleet Marine Force, 10, 55, 139_n_, 244–245, 320, 482, 488_n_, 501 - Headquarters, 148, 503 - Study, 503 - Reserve, 336, 499–502, 503_n_, 504–506 - Units - Air. _See also_ Air activities, United Nations. - AirFMFPac, 233 - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 4, 7, 24, 26–28, 42–43, 47, 60, 60_n_, - 65, 68–70, 72, 98–100, 104, 132, 159, 170_n_, 172, 175, 181, - 207, 231, 233–240, 243–245, 257_n_, 270–271, 294–295, 299, - 307, 310, 310_n_, 320, 326_n_, 344, 348–349, 351–352, - 352_n_, 370, 374–375, 375_n_, 376, 397–398, 405–406, 411, - 413, 467–472, 474, 485, 487, 488_n_, 489, 490–493, 495, - 500–501, 503–504, 507, 512, 515, 515_n_, 516, 535 - 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 486, 498 - Marine Air Control Group 2, 28, 49, 99, 233, 270, 345, - 489, 492, 505 - Marine Aircraft Group 11, 26, 471, 473 - Marine Aircraft Group 12, 26–28, 42, 49, 61, 65–67, 72, 132–133, - 158, 175–176, 187, 208, 234, 242–243, 256, 257_n_, 270, 294, - 297, 299, 306–307, 325, 347, 347_n_, 348, 348_n_, 350–352, - 374, 374_n_, 375, 375_n_, 376, 379, 469, 472–473, 486, - 489, 491, 515 - Marine Aircraft Group 13, 375 - Marine Aircraft Group 16, 471–472 - Marine Aircraft Group 32, 43 - Marine Aircraft Group 33, 26–27, 39_n_, 42, 47–48, 65, 68–69, - 71_n_, 132–133, 175–178, 234, 239, 242–244, 250_n_, 270, - 292, 299, 307, 325, 347–348, 350–352, 352_n_, 374–375, - 375_n_, 376, 385, 469, 472–473, 476, 485–486, 489, - 491, 500, 516 - Air Base Squadron 16, 472 - Air Maintenance Squadron 16, 472 - Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1, 69, 485, 487, 502 - Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3, 69, 472 - Headquarters Squadron 1, 405 - Headquarters Squadron 12, 487 - Headquarters Squadron 33, 413, 485 - Tactical Air Control Squadron 2, 332, 485, 487 - Wing Service Squadron 1, 270, 348 - HMR-161, 24, 40–41, 49, 179–181, 234–236, 236_n_, 246–247, - 247_n_, 271, 288, 334–336, 351, 370, 402, 408, 486, 495–497 - HMR-163, 472 - HMX-1, 493 - VMA-121, 27, 132, 158, 177, 207–208, 242–243, 292, 295–296, 299, - 306, 310, 325, 339, 349, 353, 379, 381, 385, 406, - 413, 413_n_, 491 - VMA-212, 158, 181, 207, 295, 325, 349, 486 - VMA-233, 491 - VMA-251, 374, 374_n_, 385_n_, 397, 469, 491 - VMA-312, 27, 27_n_, 42, 58, 173, 175, 178, 240, 347, 347_n_, - 348–349, 350_n_, 351_n_, 413, 415, 420, 486, 488, 491, 503 - VMA-323, 158, 176, 196, 207–208, 243, 293–296, 299, 304, 306, - 310, 325, 339, 349, 374, 374_n_ - VMA-332, 347, 375_n_, 491, 503 - VMC-1, 177, 238, 469, 492 - VMF-115, 27, 65, 177, 242–243, 291–292, 299, 310, 325, 334, 341, - 349–350, 350_n_, 375–376, 385, 491 - VMF-121, 435 - VMF-212, 26, 28_n_, 42, 175, 177, 208, 242–243, 294, 299, 304, - 306, 310, 339, 376, 379, 381, 414, 487, 491 - VMF-214, 374_n_, 485, 491 - VMF-222, 471 - VMF-224, 471 - VMF-253, 471 - VMF-311, 27, 65, 174, 176, 194, 243, 291–292, 299, 325, 334, - 339, 341, 349–350, 350_n_, 368, 375–376, 385, 389, 397, 405, - 413, 415, 434, 488, 491 - VMF-312, 487 - VMF-314, 471 - VMF-323, 26, 28_n_, 42, 175, 374_n_, 403, 413, 415, 420, 437, - 486–488, 491 - VMF(N)-513, 26–28, 42, 69, 133, 139, 173, 181, 202, 240–243, - 291, 294, 310, 325, 345–347, 347_n_, 349, 376, 406, 413, - 429, 433, 438, 469, 485–487, 490–491, 503_n_ - VMF(N)-542, 486–487 - VMJ-1, 27, 42–43, 174, 238, 270, 348, 348_n_, 349, 397, - 490–491, 512 - VMO-2, 471–472 - VMO-6, 24, 42, 49, 179–181, 234–236, 271, 288, 290, 332, 334, - 345, 351_n_, 370, 377, 413, 415, 430, 485–488, 490, 493–495, - 497, 503_n_, 512 - VMR-152, 28, 49, 181, 472, 485, 488 - VMR-253, 471 - VMR-352, 485 - Air Support Radar Team 1, 332, 346, 364, 489 - 1st Marine Aeronautical Company, 26 - Ground - 1st Marine Division, 1–2, 4, 4_n_, 5–6, 6_n_, 7, 10, 10_n_, - 11–13, 15, 17, 19, 19_n_, 21–22, 24, 27, 28_n_, 29–33, - 37–39, 42, 46, 49, 51–52, 55, 61, 72, 74, 81, 84–85, 88, - 91–92, 96–97, 100, 100_n_, 102–108, 111, 117, 119, 125–127, - 131–132, 136–141, 169–170, 170_n_, 185, 188, 192–193, 203, - 212, 215, 217–218, 221–222, 231, 234, 234_n_, 240, 243–245, - 247_n_, 251, 255, 257_n_, 258–259, 261, 263, 264_n_, 265, - 267, 267_n_, 270–271, 281, 290, 304, 306, 310, 310_n_, 314, - 317, 319–320, 326, 326_n_, 328–329, 333, 333_n_, 334, 336, - 339, 345, 351, 351_n_, 360–361, 363–364, 368, 370–371, 375, - 378_n_, 383, 385, 385_n_, 388, 391–394, 396–403, 405–406, - 409–413, 436, 436_n_, 437, 445–446, 453, 455, 457, 459–461, - 468, 470, 472–473, 473_n_, 475–477, 477_n_, 478–481, 481_n_, - 482, 482_n_, 483–484, 487–488, 490–491, 495, 498–499, - 499_n_, 500, 500_n_, 501–504, 507–508, 508_n_, 509, 511–512, - 512_n_, 514_n_, 515, 515_n_, 516, 518, 521, 523, 530, - 533_n_, 535 - 2d Marine Division, 148, 336, 476–477, 498, 499_n_, 500–501 - 3d Marine Division, 139, 471–472, 474 - 1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force, 471, 471_n_ - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 310_n_, 327, 411–412, 471_n_, - 476–477, 488_n_, 491, 494, 499, 501 - 1st Marines, 4–5, 10–12, 19–20, 22, 30, 34, 38, 71, 82, 87, 96, - 108–109, 112–114, 119, 121–122, 125–129, 131–138, 140–142, - 145–146, 150, 159, 162, 185, 230–233, 236, 250, 257, - 260–261, 264, 267–268, 276, 289, 300, 306, 308, 316_n_, 323, - 325, 328, 328_n_, 329, 332, 339, 341, 363–364, 381, 381_n_, - 383, 385–386, 388–389, 391–392, 396, 400, 415, 447, 450, - 453, 455, 461, 463, 467, 479, 489 - 1st Battalion, 19, 96, 112, 121–122, 128, 131, 143, 145, 230, - 268, 268_n_, 332, 450, 455 - 2d Battalion, 19, 34, 38, 89, 108–109, 112, 114, 117–118, - 118_n_, 123, 128, 133, 145–146, 149, 159, 188, 230, 268, - 268_n_, 383, 388, 390–391, 496 - 3d Battalion, 19, 32, 71, 86, 108–109, 118, 118_n_, 121–122, - 124–128, 130–131, 135, 140, 142, 149_n_, 156, 162, 200, - 208–209, 209_n_, 210, 211_n_, 230, 260, 268, 289, 300, 332, - 385–386, 388–389, 392, 403–404 - 4th Marines, 471 - 5th Marines, 2, 4–5, 10–12, 19–20, 30, 33–34, 38–39, 74, 76, 79, - 81, 84, 87, 92, 96, 103, 105, 114, 116, 122, 125, 140_n_, - 141, 146, 150, 152–153, 157_n_, 164, 185, 233, 247, 250_n_, - 255–256, 258–261, 264, 267, 267_n_, 268, 270, 279–281, 286, - 290–291, 297, 304–306, 308, 310, 323, 323_n_, 324_n_, - 327–328, 334, 363–364, 367, 371–373, 374_n_, 377, 383, - 387–388, 392, 394, 415, 436_n_, 446–447, 449–450, 453–457, - 459, 461, 463–465, 467, 476, 479, 530 - 1st Battalion, 20, 34, 76–77, 79, 84, 92, 105, 105_n_, 150, - 247, 256, 258, 260, 264, 267, 275, 278–280, 283–288, 288_n_, - 291, 447, 464, 466–467 - 2d Battalion, 11, 20, 34, 36, 77, 87–89, 92, 146–147, 147_n_, - 150_n_, 254, 258, 267_n_, 268, 280, 284–288, 291–293, - 295–299, 302–306, 323, 323_n_, 336, 372, 451, 447, 450, 455, - 459, 464, 466–467 - 3d Battalion, 20, 86–87, 150, 152–153, 259, 267, 267_n_, 268, - 276, 278–281, 285, 287–288, 288_n_, 289, 292, 297, 303, 305, - 323, 392, 403, 438, 447, 451, 453, 464 - 6th Marines, 501 - 3d Battalion, 501 - 7th Marines, 4_n_, 5, 10, 12, 20, 41, 45, 79, 81–82, 84, 87, - 91–92, 96, 103, 121, 157_n_, 160, 164–166, 168–169, 180, - 183, 185–188, 188_n_, 190–191, 193, 195, 199–200, 202, - 211–212, 212_n_, 231–233, 236, 246–247, 255_n_, 259–260, - 267–268, 268_n_, 270, 308, 310, 323–325, 327–329, 329_n_, - 334–335, 344, 344_n_, 345, 363–364, 366_n_, 367–368, 369_n_, - 370–371, 373, 375, 378, 381_n_, 383, 385, 385_n_, 387–389, - 389_n_, 392, 396, 414–415, 436_n_, 446, 453, 461, 479, - 489, 501, 508 - 1st Battalion, 20, 81–82, 82_n_, 83, 83_n_, 94–95, 165, - 165_n_, 166, 166_n_, 186–187, 194–196, 197_n_, 199–200, - 202–203, 205, 208–211, 211_n_, 214, 231, 259, 268, 268_n_, - 324, 329_n_, 364, 367, 383, 403, 437, 449, 473 - 2d Battalion, 12, 18, 20, 40, 74, 81, 91, 108, 108_n_, 121, - 126, 165_n_, 166, 186, 202–203, 205, 287–288, 291, 293–298, - 302–303, 305–306, 324, 329, 329_n_, 332, 364–366, 366_n_, - 367, 377, 377_n_, 378, 383, 388, 390, 390_n_, 392, 436_n_, - 457 - 3d Battalion, 20, 91, 108, 108_n_, 119, 121, 125–127, 130, - 163_n_, 165, 165_n_, 166, 166_n_, 167–168, 168_n_, 186, - 187_n_, 200, 205, 205_n_, 206–207, 211_n_, 259, 317, 329_n_, - 332, 364, 366, 368, 370, 377, 377_n_, 378–379, 381, 383, - 385, 389–390 - 9th Marines, 471 - 11th Marines, 10, 18, 21, 30, 46, 71–74, 93, 98, 111, 124, 131, - 134–136, 182_n_, 188, 190, 192, 194, 207, 209, 231–233, - 268_n_, 268, 270, 281, 290, 302, 308, 331, 334, 337_n_, - 338–339, 341, 367–370, 372, 378–379, 386, 388–389, 389_n_, - 392, 396, 415, 436_n_, 455, 461, 491, 509, 512_n_ - 1st Battalion, 11, 39, 79, 191, 256, 268, 281, 286, 290, 295, - 301–302, 304, 306, 308, 323–324, 334, 337, 372, 378 - 2d Battalion, 82, 165, 191, 194–195, 202, 207, 207_n_, 208, - 281, 295, 301, 324, 337, 340, 366, 366_n_, 367, 369, 373, - 378, 387, 392, 396_n_, 437 - 3d Battalion, 134–135, 268, 281, 300, 308, 336–337, 367, 369, - 372, 377, 387 - 4th Battalion, 79, 191, 195, 195_n_, 207, 268, 270, 281, 295, - 301–302, 324, 331, 337, 366, 378 - Kimpo Provisional Regiment, 17–19, 19_n_, 20, 29, 32, 39_n_, 44, - 96, 248–249, 249_n_, 250, 265, 332, 360, 369–370, - 398_n_, 463, 508 - 1st Combat Service Group, 10, 44, 47, 60, 245 - Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 250, 512_n_ - 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 18–19, 19_n_, 39, 39_n_, 47, - 96, 105, 239, 248, 250, 250_n_, 251, 265, 324, 360, - 370, 463, 508 - 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, 17–18, 335 - 1st Engineer Battalion, 101, 107, 316, 328, 334–335, 448, 451 - 1st Medical Battalion, 18, 182, 288, 335 - 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 44, 482 - 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 182, 436_n_, 512_n_ - 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 28, 68–69, - 413_n_, 438, 489 - 1st Ordnance Battalion, 308 - 1st Service Battalion, 434, 436_n_ - 1st Shore Party Battalion, 18, 44, 268_n_, 316, 328, 335 - 1st Signal Battalion, 18, 182, 403, 433, 436_n_ - 1st Tank Battalion, 40, 45, 73, 94, 136–137, 195, 195_n_, 207, - 256–257, 270, 316_n_, 331, 331_n_, 334, 337–339, 360, - 364_n_, 369, 370, 436_n_, 453, 512_n_ - East Coast Island Defense Command, 53_n_, 55–56, 59, 353, - 356–359, 397, 530 - West Coast Island Defense Command, 53, 55–56, 58–60, 323, - 353–356, 359, 397, 530 - 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, 18, 56, 345, 359 - 1st Amphibian Truck Company, 47 - 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery-Automatic Weapons - Battery, 270, 305 - 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery, 79, 93, 135, 179, 208, 301–302, - 308, 331, 338, 344, 367, 379, 497 - Military Police Company, 1st Marine Division, 401, 434, 436_n_ - 1st Provisional Casual Company, 55 - 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company, 457–458, 460 - Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, 18, 39, 250, 327, - 339, 360, 369–370, 403 - - Marino, 1stLt Charles, 377 - - MARLEX operations, 332–333, 333_n_, 334, 334_n_, 335, 467, 508 - MARLEX I, 334 - MARLEX II, 335, 335_n_ - MARLEX III, 335–336 - MARLEX IV, 473 - MARLEX XX, 323, 323_n_ - - Martelli, Capt Paul L., 403_n_, 420, 439 - - Martin, LtCol Kenneth E., 182 - - Marxism-Leninism, 418, 426–427 - - Masan, 6, 44 - - Mass, LtCol John B., Jr., 242 - - Matthews, Capt Charles C., 34 - - Matthews, Sgt Daniel P., 296 - - May, LtCol Charles W., 413_n_ - - Mayer, Maj William F., 440 - - McCain, Capt Gene M., 136 - - McCaul, BGen Verne J., 405, 472, 474_n_ - - McCool, WO Felix J., 434 - - McCoy, LtCol Charles W., 331_n_ - - McCutcheon, Col Keith B., 24, 41, 49; - MajGen, 24_n_ - - McDaniel, 2dLt Roland L., 419 - - McGill, Col Robert A., 61_n_ - - McGlothlin, LtCol Joe H., 27_n_ - - McLaughlin, PFC Alford L., 152 - - McLaughlin, Capt Frederick G, 165_n_, 199, 205 - - McLaughlin, Maj John H., 406, 419, 421–422, 424, 438–439, 442; - MajGen, 425_n_ - - McLaughlin, LtCol Williams S., 20, 146_n_, 258_n_ - - McShane, LtCol Bernard, 349, 368 - - Medal of Honor, 26, 37_n_, 65, 83, 92, 92_n_, 127, 147_n_, 152, - 164_n_, 168_n_, 206, 207_n_, 287, 294_n_, 296_n_, 308, 398 - - Medical, United Nations - Aid Stations, 77, 118, 127–128, 139, 288, 495 - Blood, 140, 451 - Care, 139 - Corpsmen, 127, 140 - Doctors, 127 - Evacuation, 139, 182, 495 - Facilities, 138–139, 236, 273, 531 - Frostbite, 484 - Heat casualties, 128, 139–140 - Hospitals, 140, 495 - Problems, 49 - Stretcher bearers, 127 - Stretchers, 139 - Supplies, 139, 355 - Support, 118, 139–140 - Tents, 402 - Treatment, 108 - - Mediterranean duty, 501 - - Megee, Maj Vernon E., 233; - Col, 233; - BGen, 233, 236–238, 310, 336, 348–349, 352, 376, 397, 405; - MajGen, 233, 474_n_, 493_n_, 516_n_ - - Meikle, 2dLt John W., 200 - - Melancon, Capt Byron J., 119_n_ - - Melvin, Capt John B., 292 - - Metze, Col Albert F., 400–401, 405 - - Metzger, MajGen Louis, 398_n_ - - Michelson, Maj Laural M., 202 - - Michener, James A., 441 - - Mickey, LtCol Ross S., 349 - - Mildner, Capt Theodore J., 260 - - Military Armistice Commission, 449, 456–458 - - Military Demarcation Line, 445, 451, 459, 464 - - Miller, LtCol Henry S., 175 - - Miller, LtCol Roy D., 383 - - Mills, Col James E., 233, 268, 338 - - Mines, 22, 32, 77, 84, 92, 256, 359, 371, 379_n_, 394, 396, 451, 487, - 522. _See also_ Weapons. - - MINNESOTA Line, 8, 49, 327 - - MISSOURI Line, 327 - - Mitchener, Col Harold J., 472 - - Moak, Capt Stanley T., 128, 149 - - Mo-do Island, 55, 356 - - Moody, Capt Clarence G., Jr., 122–123, 146 - - _Moore_, USS, 357 - - Moore, LtCol Clarence H., 349 - - Moore, Lt Edwin C., 414 - - Moore, Col Luther S., 26 - - Moore, Col Thomas C., 90–91, 160, 180, 186, 188, 190–191, 193–194, - 195_n_, 199–200, 203, 205, 273 - - Moran, LtCol Arthur M., 349 - - Morris, LtCol John E., 182 - - Muccio, Honorable John J., 43 - - Munsan-ni, 12, 16, 22, 24, 40, 44–45, 264, 314–316, 316_n_, 319, 329, - 331–332, 400–402, 463, 511 - - Munsan-ni-Kaesong rail line, 122, 155 - - Munsan-ni Provisional Command, 360, 400, 402, 461 - - Murphy, 2dLt Rowland M., 439 - - Murray, 2dLt Benjamin H., 289 - - Murray, Col James C., 528–529, 529_n_ - - Murto, Lt Robert E., 139 - - - Nagoya, 474 - - Naktong, 472, 476–477, 486, 494 - - Nan-do Island, 55 - - Napalm, 112, 116, 132–133, 207–208, 232, 307, 352, 486, 520 - - Nara, 471 - - Nash, SSgt James B., 436_n_ - - National Anthem, 423 - - Naval Academy, 88, 442 - - Naval gunfire, 21, 56, 178, 353–357, 418 - - Navy and Marine Corps Medal, 442 - - Navy Cross, 148, 267_n_, 308, 374, 376, 392 - - Navy, Secretary of the, 481, 495_n_, 505_n_ - - Navy, Surgeon General of the, 140 - - Navy, U.S., 47, 56, 65, 140, 226, 432. - _See also_ Task Organizations. - Units - Amphibious Force Far East, 334_n_ - Amphibious Group Western Pacific, 334_n_ - Pacific Fleet, 478_n_ - Seventh Fleet, 225–226, 357, 358_n_, 493 - Fleet Logistic Wing, 432 - Composite Squadron 3, 376 - Fleet Air Service Squadron 11, 47 - Naval Construction Battalion Unit 1804, 47 - - Negro Marines, 504, 504_n_ - - Nelson, Col Wallace M., 315, 328_n_, 364, 381, 389 - - Neutral corridor, 318 - - Neutral custody, 321 - - Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, 321_n_, 322 - - Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 458, 458_n_ - - Neutral observers, 425 - - Neutrality zone, 7 - - New Britain, 2 - - _New Jersey_, USS, 356 - - Nihart, LtCol Franklin B., 20, 70, 77, 81, 105; Col, 8_n_ - - No-Fire-Line, 511 - - No-Fly Line, 459, 468–469, 511 - - No-Man’s-Land, 87, 108, 157, 190, 223, 264, 300, 371, 509 - - No-Pass Fence, 445, 456 - - No-Pass Line, 399, 445–446, 461, 463, 465 - - Nordell, Capt Robert I., 376 - - Normandy, 88 - - North Korea. _See_ Korea. - - - Oakland, 500 - - Objective 1, 82–83 - - Objective 2, 82 - - Objective S, 77, 80 - - Objective V, 77, 79–80 - - Objective X, 77, 79–80 - - Objective Y, 79–80 - - Obong-ni, 486 - - O’Brien, 2dLt George H., 206 - - _Ocean_, HMS, 60, 355 - - O’Daniel, LtGen John W., 24, 39, 88 - - Oddy, LtCol Robert J., 268 - - Okinawa, 26, 88, 233, 337, 474 - - Operation AMAZON, 101 - - Operation BACK DOOR, 473 - - Operation BIG SWITCH. _See_ Prisoners of War, Exchanges. - - Operation BIMBO, 232 - - Operation CAT WHISKER, 250 - - Operation CHARLIE, 258, 258_n_, 259 - - Operation CIRCUS, 41 - - Operation CLAMBAKE, 255–257, 257_n_, 258–260 - - Operation CLAM-UP, 8, 10 - - Operation CLOBBER, 73 - - Operation FIRECRACKER, 93 - - Operation HAYLIFT, 180, 246 - - Operation HAYLIFT I, 247 - - Operation HAYLIFT II, 246–247, 497 - - Operation KILLER, 480, 489 - - Operation LEAPFROG, 41 - - Operation LITTLE SWITCH. _See_ Prisoners of War, Exchanges. - - Operation MIXMASTER, 10–11, 45 - - Operation PANDORA, 356 - - Operation PARALYSIS, 243 - - Operation PRESSURE, 64, 224 - - Operation PRESSURE PUMP, 170–172 - - Operation PRONTO, 40 - - Operation RAINBOW, 316 - - Operation RIDDLE, 179 - - Operation RIPPER, 412, 480 - - Operation SPYGLASS, 473 - - Operation STRANGLE, 63, 224, 489, 514–515 - - Operation SWITCH, 496 - - Operation TIMBER, 100 - - Operation WINDMILL I, 496 - - Order of Military Merit, Taiguk, Korean, 43, 148, 159, 336 - - Ordnance, 70, 136, 196_n_, 225, 247, 350, 352–353, 368, 375, 448, 451, - 516, 520, 525 - - Osan-ni, 474 - - Osborne, BGen Ralph M., 400 - - O’Shea, BGen George J., 403_n_ - - O’Shea, 1stLt Robert J., 403_n_ - - Otsu, 55, 471 - - Outposts - Communist, 111, 519 - United Nations, 34, 36, 75, 122, 348, 447, 519. _See also_ Combat - Outposts; Hills. - 2, 36, 40 - 3, 34, 36, 76–77, 79 - 31, 157 - 33, 157 - 36, 155–156, 158, 161, 176, 300 - 37, 155–156, 161, 300 - 67, 155 - 86, 161 - Allen, 150, 152, 157, 264 - Arrowhead, 275, 280, 295, 324 - Ava, 267, 267_n_, 365, 397 - Berlin, 186, 264, 268, 276, 280–281, 289–290, 305, 329, 337–338, - 341, 365–370, 372, 375, 377–378, 378_n_, 379, 381, 383, 385, - 388–389, 391–392, 463 - Berlin Gate, 386 - Boulder City, 381, 385, 387–388, 388_n_, 389, 391, 394, 396, - 396_n_, 404, 446, 464, 481, 509 - Bruce, 150, 152–153, 264 - Bunker, 268, 280, 289, 300 - Bunker Hill, 463 - Carson, 157_n_, 167, 186, 196_n_, 202, 261, 264–265, 267, 273, - 275, 279–280, 283, 283_n_, 284, 290, 301, 309, 310_n_, - 324–325, 336–341, 364–365, 463 - Clarence, 150, 152, 157, 264 - Corinne, 268 - Dagmar, 268, 280, 289, 300, 308, 377, 383, 387 - Detroit, 157_n_, 163, 167–169, 377 - Donald, 150 - East Berlin, 186, 268, 280–281, 289, 329, 337–338, 341, 365–369, - 375, 377–378, 378_n_, 379, 381, 386, 391–392, 463 - Elko, 309, 324–325, 336–338, 340–341, 364–365, 372 - Elmer, 146–147 - Esther, 268, 280, 289, 300, 387–388, 392 - Felix, 150, 157 - Frisco, 163, 165, 167–168, 168_n_, 169, 208, 317, 369 - Gary, 150 - Ginger, 268 - Hedy, 268, 280, 289, 290, 300, 383, 451–452 - Hilda, 146–147 - Hill, 119, 388 - Hook, 195, 195_n_, 464, 481 - Ingrid, 377 - Irene, 146–147, 207 - Jamestown, 210 - Jersey, 377 - Jersey Ridge, 386 - Jill, 157 - Kate, 300, 464 - Marilyn, 464 - Nevada, 264–265, 338, 340, 342 - Nevada Cities, 261, 264–265, 273, 307, 309, 329, 338 - Old Baldy, 309 - Reno, 158_n_, 167, 186, 196_n_, 202–203, 261, 264–265, 267, 273, - 275–276, 279–281, 283, 283_n_, 284–288, 288_n_, 289–292, - 294, 297–299, 301–304, 306, 309, 310_n_, 324, 364, 367, 463 - Reno Block, 265, 284–287 - Rome, 207 - Ronson, 193, 193_n_, 195, 197, 199, 210, 338 - Seattle, 157_n_, 163, 165–166, 169, 207 - Stromboli, 124 - Three Cities, 267 - Ungok, 275, 279–280, 374 - Vegas, 157_n_, 186, 196_n_, 202, 261, 264–265, 267, 273, 275, - 278–281, 283, 283_n_, 284–288, 288_n_, 289–299, 301–310, - 310_n_, 311, 320, 323, 325, 336–338, 338_n_, 339–341, - 364–367, 369, 379, 463, 481, 521 - Verdun, 163, 163_n_, 166 - Warsaw, 163, 165–167, 193, 193_n_, 195, 195_n_, 197, 199–200, - 202, 209–210 - Yoke, 89, 91, 94–95, 463 - - Outpost Line of Observation, 37–38 - - Outpost Line of Resistance - Communist, 104, 109, 111, 116, 172 - United Nations, 22, 24, 31–34, 36–39, 46, 74, 76, 76_n_, 81–82, 218, - 461, 463–466, 509 - - Owens, LtCol Alfred L., 300 - - Owens, Capt Robert A., 94–95 - - - Pacific, 3, 88, 471, 473, 476, 485, 493 - - Pacific Fleet Medical Officer, 49 - - Paengyong-do Island, 55–56, 58, 353–355 - - Pak, Maj, 420 - - Pala, Col. William P., 10_n_ - - Pangburn, 2dLt Charles I., 176 - - Panmunjom, 13, 22, 40, 81, 90, 104, 228, 230, 232, 264, 268_n_, 313, - 315–316, 316_n_, 317–319, 321–322, 324–325, 328, 350_n_, - 360, 372, 377_n_, 391, 393, 400–402, 405, 407–408, 467, 481, - 511, 511_n_, 535 - Bargaining table, 264 - Corridor, 243 - Exchange site, 317 - Liaison officer, 229 - Negotiations, 314 - Neutral zone, 316_n_ - Peace corridor, 21, 126, 218, 268, 316, 323, 464, 511, 519 - Receiving center, 318 - Receiving tents, 318 - Rescue force, 118 - Truce meetings, 322 - Truce tents, 313 - - Papurca, LtCol John H., 19 - - Pardue, Bishop Austin, 232 - - Paris talks, 425_n_ - - Pate, MajGen Randolph McC., 336–337, 365, 378_n_, 394, 405, 473_n_ - - Patrols - Communist, 169, 190, 259, 309, 414 - United Nations, 30, 32–33, 39, 84–87, 90, 109, 185, 203, 232, - 249–250, 259–260, 326, 371–373, 374_n_, 413, 414, 437, - 464–465, 469, 481, 482_n_, 509, 519, 524 - - Payne, Col Frederick R., Jr., 28 - - Peace Corridor, 259, 402 - - Peace negotiations, 7–8, 510 - - Peace pagoda, 401 - - Peace talks, 313, 325, 372 - - Peatross, LtCol Oscar F., 258, 258_n_ - - Peeler, 2dLt John J., 289 - - Peiping, 429 - - Peleliu, 2, 26, 88, 267_n_, 337 - - Peng, Gen Teh Huai, 229, 421 - - Penne, LtCol Harold B., 379 - - Pepper, MajGen Robert H., 471, 473_n_ - - Perry, Capt Jack E., 434 - - Peruvian Minister of Aviation, 233 - - Philadelphia, 321 - - Phillips, PFC Paul J., 436_n_ - - Phoenix, 500 - - Pilots, 29, 61, 99, 132, 140, 174, 234, 291, 304, 347_n_, 349, 351, - 371, 375–377, 379, 397, 405–406, 411–415, 420, 424, 429, - 433, 436, 438, 485, 487, 489, 491–492, 492_n_, 493–495, 515. - _See also_ Air Activities, United Nations. - - Pittsburgh Diocese, 232 - - Plans, United Nations, 11, 20, 40, 82, 93, 125, 258, 323, 333–334, - 335_n_, 363, 468, 479 - - Platt, LtCol Jonas M., 256–257, 267 - - Poage, Capt Jay V., 230 - - Poe, 1stLt William A., 175 - - Pohang, 6, 39_n_, 43, 47, 69, 177, 250, 250_n_, 375, 473, 530 - - Pohang University, 99 - - Poland, 458_n_ - - Polish members of the Neutral Nations Commission, 459 - - Pollock, MajGen Edwin A., 148, 157–158, 169, 172, 176, 181, 190, 194, - 200, 208, 214, 227, 231, 240, 243, 245, 290, 310, - 319, 334, 336 - - Post, Capt Robert J., 339; LtCol, 331_n_, 339_n_ - - Post-truce orders, 499 - - Postwar airlift program, 472 - - Postwar situation, 470 - - Potsdam Conference, 2 - - Potsdam Declaration, 2_n_ - - Pratt, LtCol Spencer H., 19, 32 - - Pregnall, LtCol Daniel S., 300 - - President (U.S.), 423, 505–506 - - President elect, 227 - - Presidential election, 276 - - Prisoners of War - American, 81, 212–213, 297–298, 305, 307, 317, 319–320, 354, 381_n_, - 399, 399_n_, 405–408, 411–415, 415_n_, 416, 420_n_, 421–424, - 425_n_, 426, 431, 437, 440–443, 480, 512 - Communist, 34, 79, 104, 106, 206, 227, 287, 298, 307, 315, 317–319, - 407–408, 426, 467, 512, 512_n_, 524 - Nonrepatriates, 314, 321, 321_n_, 322, 408, 457, 459, 463, 466–467 - Repatriates, 316, 319, 321–322, 336, 396, 400–402, 407, 442 - Exchanges, 229, 311, 313–319, 321, 360, 400, 406–407, 411, - 414, 461, 527 - Operation BIG SWITCH, 321, 336, 399–401, 404, 406–407, 409, 415, - 435, 439, 459 - Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 314, 316–317, 318_n_, 321, 360, 400, - 405_n_, 407–409, 421_n_ - Interrogation - Communist, 418, 420, 425, 428–430, 432–433 - United Nations, 85, 87, 136, 297–298, 408, 530 - United Nations, 106, 314, 316–318, 318_n_, 319–321, 350_n_, 401–403, - 407, 409, 416, 418–419, 421–422, 424–426, 431, 435, 439, 443 - - Propaganda, Communist, 105, 249, 326, 355, 372, 406, 408, 419, - 422–424, 426, 428–430, 441, 511, 511_n_ - - Public Law 416, 504–505 - - Pugh, RAdm Lamont, 140 - - Pukhan River, 342 - - Pumphrey, Pvt Louis A., 319 - - Punchbowl, 7, 17, 52, 413, 480 - - Punchbowl area, 342, 413, 484, 495, 514_n_, 535 - - Purple Heart, 298 - - Pusan, 4–6, 8, 53, 227, 318, 477, 486, 488, 488_n_, 494, 535 - - Pusan Perimeter, 4, 411_n_, 412, 475–476 - - Pyongtaek, 270, 376 - - Pyongyang, 139, 170–172, 174, 177, 241, 244, 420, 423, 479 - - - Quantico, 143, 337, 493–494 - - Quilali, 26 - - Quiring, PFC Charles E., 436_n_ - - - R-Day, 335 - - Radar, United Nations, 53, 63, 68, 134, 241, 291, 325, 385, 487, - 489–490, 492 - AN/MPQ-2, 62_n_ - MPQ-14, 81, 132, 134, 202, 244, 294, 299, 306, 325, 339, 345–346, - 368, 375, 385, 385_n_, 389, 489 - - Radford, Adm Arthur W., 332, 352_n_ - - Randall, LtCol David S., 191 - - Raymond, Sgt Theodore J., 392 - - Read, Maj Robert R., 27 - - Reconnaissance, 27, 42, 45, 56, 59, 86, 95, 105, 256 - - Red Cross, 229, 314, 320 - - Reinecke, Col Frank M., 56; BGen, 58 - - Report of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the - Committee on Armed Services, 517_n_ - - _Repose_, USS, 495 - - Rhee, President Syngman, 3, 43, 148, 159, 321–322, 342, 352_n_, 360, - 408 - - Rich, Capt Richard V., 320 - - Richardson, Maj Judcon C., 429, 432 - - Ricketts, Brigadier A. H. G., 197_n_ - - Ridgway, Gen Matthew B., 63–64, 88, 480–481, 486, 496, 496_n_, 515 - - Riseley, BGen James P., 471 - - Ritchey, LtCol William M., 349 - - Roads, 10, 21, 45, 480, 519 - - Robertshaw, Col Louis B., 243–244, 299 - - Robinson, LtCol Barnette, 243 - - Roe, Maj Murray O., 290 - - Rogers, LtCol Charles O., 134–135 - - Roth, 2dLt Richard L., 177 - - Royal Marine-USMC-Army convoy, 410 - - Russell, LtCol Gerald F., 108_n_, 167, 187 - - Russo-American Commission, 3 - - - Sachon, 327 - - Sachon-Chinju area, 486 - - Sachon River, 15, 33, 75, 90, 105, 157–158, 161–162, 169, 259 - - Sachon Valley, 218 - - St. Denis, 2dLt Thomas R., 345 - - _Samaritan_, USS, 495_n_ - - Samichon River, 15, 92, 186, 188, 208, 463 - - Samichon Valley, 186–187, 194 - - Samichon Village, 92 - - San Diego, 476 - - San Francisco, 408, 500 - - Santo Domingo, 337 - - Sariwon, 177 - - Sartor, Capt Louis J., 388 - - Saussy, Maj George S., Jr., 250, 250_n_ - - Schilt, 1stLt Christian F., 26; MajGen, 43, 336 - - Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, - 420_n_, 440–441 - - Schlichter, Sgt Charles B., 407 - - Schwable, Col Frank H., 407, 430–431, 442 - - Scott, MSgt James M., 242 - - Scranton, Capt Sereno S., Jr., 117, 119, 130–131 - - Schroeder, Maj Charles L., 345 - - Seal, 2dLt Kenneth A., 83; Maj, 82_n_ - - Sea of Japan, 52, 376, 398 - - Selden, LtCol John T., 2; BGen, 2; MajGen, 2, 12, 13_n_, 17, 20–22, - 38–39, 43, 46, 50, 61–62, 71, 84, 86, 93, 93_n_, 96–98, 101, - 103, 121, 126, 138–139, 141, 142_n_, 148 - - Sellers, Maj Thomas M., 376 - - Seoul, 1, 4, 6, 12–13, 15–16, 18, 26, 28, 31, 69, 187, 265, 270, 273, - 275, 280, 319, 324, 326_n_, 474, 478–479, 481, 482_n_, 494, - 535 - - Severson, Col Martin A., 26–27 - - Seymour, 2dLt Rufus A., 287 - - Sharpe, 2dLt Whitlock N., 176 - - Shea, Col Harry N., 192, 233, 355 - - Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C., Jr., 98, 138–139, 141, 142_n_, 310, 332, - 409, 505, 534 - - Sherwood, Capt James H., 339 - - Shimamura, Cpl Saburo, 436 - - Ships, United Nations, 5, 56, 67, 358, 397 - Carriers, 10, 485, 487, 491 - Cruisers, 414 - CVEs, 491 - Hospital, 140, 402, 495, 495_n_ - LSDs, 10_n_ - Minesweepers, 226 - - Shoden, Capt John C., 71 - - Shuck, SSgt William E., Jr., 91–92, 92_n_ - - _Sicily_, USS, 173, 179, 485 - - Siers, 2dLt Howard L., 82 - - Sikorsky, Igor, 499 - - Silver Star, 298, 376 - - Simanek, PFC Robert E., 147_n_ - - Sims, Maj William J., 176 - - Sinanju, 174, 243 - - Sin-do Island, 55 - - Sinuiju, 376, 416 - - Skinner, 2dLt Sherwood E., 207_n_ - - Skotnicki, Capt Anthony J., 119_n_ - - Smith, Col John L., 375_n_, 472 - - Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 477, 498, 501 - - Smith, LtCol Robert E., Jr., 27_n_ - - Smoak, Col Eustace R., 150, 233 - - Smunk, LtCol Louis R., 299, 349 - - So-Do Island, 55 - - Sokcho-ri, 10_n_ - - Sok-to Island, 55–56, 58–59, 353–356 - - Solomon Islands, 26, 43 - - Songjin, 55–56, 357 - - South African, 318_n_ - - South Korea. _See_ Korea. - - Soyang River, 1, 413, 480, 496 - - Spangler, 2dLt Donald E., 308 - - Spellman, Francis Cardinal, 231 - - Spurlock, 2dLt Stuart L., Jr., 175 - - Staab, Col Edward M., Jr., 18–19, 249_n_ - - Stacy, Col Arthur R., 375, 375_n_, 472 - - Stalin, Premier Joseph, 230, 314 - - Standing Operating Procedure, 71–72, 257_n_, 279 - - STAYBACK Line, 50 - - Steege, PFC Leonard E., 405 - - Steel, Maj Fred A., 69 - - Steigerwald, SSgt Robert S., 294 - - Stell, PFC Robert C., 319 - - Stevens, Robert T., 405 - - Stewart, LtCol Lynn H., 349 - - Stewart, PFC Roy L., 374_n_ - - Stiff, LtCol Houston, 20 - - Still, 2dLt Richard L., 438–439 - - Stockholm Peace Appeal, 427 - - Stratton, Maj William T., Jr., 241 - - Stumpges, MSgt Frederick J., 434 - - Sudong, 479 - - Suez Canal, 501 - - Suiho, 64 - - Suiho Reservoir, 491 - - Sung, Kim Il, 3, 229 - - Supplies - Communist, 4, 7, 93, 169, 212, 225, 357, 396, 489, 519, 525 - Areas, 66, 171, 339, 385, 513 - Buildup, 342, 511 - Dumps, 136, 225, 351, 486 - Installations, 63, 513 - Lines, 489 - Points, 294, 306, 378, 397 - Resupply, 290, 297, 299, 303, 525 - Routes, 30, 265, 295, 298, 305 - Shelter, 242 - Stockpiles, 224, 451, 525 - United Nations, 10, 16, 19, 40, 44, 47, 60, 60_n_, 62, 67, 72, 80, - 100, 121, 127, 140, 142, 181_n_, 199, 211, 245, 247, 331, - 355, 358–359, 370, 396–397, 455, 497 - Areas, 45, 253, 288, 308 - Class I, 180, 246, 400 - Class II, 180 - Class III, 180, 246, 400 - Class IV, 180 - Class V, 180, 246 - Dumps, 68, 448, 451, 455 - Island defense, 60 - Resupply, 16, 21, 59, 245–247, 371_n_, 379_n_ - Routes, 6, 391 - - Sweden, 458_n_ - - Swenceski, Col Alexander B., 356 - - Swigert, 1stLt Oral R., Jr., 385, 392 - - Swinson, Maj James D., 320 - - Switzerland, 458_n_ - - - Tables of Equipment, 245, 461 - - Tables of Organization, 244–245 - - Tactical Air Control Parties, 493, 517. _See also_ Air activities, - United Nations. - - Tactical Air Coordination Center, 68–69. _See also_ Air activities, - United Nations. - - Tactical Air Direction Center, 68, 487–488. _See also_ Air activities, - United Nations. - - Tactical Liaison Officers, 85 - - Tactics - Communist, 104–106, 192–193, 213, 224, 264, 309, 511, 519, 523 - United Nations, 11, 24, 62, 70, 81, 86, 333, 381, 418, 484, 490_n_, - 507, 512, 517, 524, 530, 532–533 - - Taechong-do Island, 55–56, 353 - - Tae-do Island, 55, 346, 359 - - Taedok-san, 109 - - Taedong-san, 109 - - Taedong River, 243 - - Taegu, 177 - - Taejon, 406 - - Taft, 1stLt Kenneth E., Jr., 288 - - Tai, Yung Shin, 310 - - Tanks - Communist, 3, 70, 96, 155, 158, 218, 511 - United Nations, 33, 38–39, 45, 73, 80–82, 94–95, 98, 101, 114, 116, - 121, 124, 128–129, 131, 136–137, 146, 160–161, 194–195, 202, - 207–208, 231, 243, 256–259, 270, 281, 283, 286, 290–293, - 295–296, 300, 302, 307–308, 323–325, 331, 331_n_, 339, - 339_n_, 341, 363, 367, 369, 378, 386–388, 388_n_, 392, 436, - 468, 523–524, 530 - - Task organizations - Forces - Drysdale, 212, 410, 412 - Track, 329, 332 - 77, 357 - 90, 334 - 95, 53, 55, 99, 226, 354–355, 357, 359 - Groups - 95, 358 - 95.1, 55 - 95.2, 55 - Elements - 90, 85, 334, 334_n_ - 95.15, 56, 58, 353 - 95.23, 56, 353 - Units - 95.1.3, 353 - 95.2.3, 353, 356 - - Taylor, LtGen Maxwell D., 319, 327_n_, 378_n_, 393, 405, 497 - - Terrain, 5–6, 13, 15–17, 24, 33, 61, 66–67, 77, 79, 82, 84, 103, 109, - 122, 129, 133, 138, 143, 143_n_, 186–187, 206, 239, 248, - 253, 253_n_, 263–264, 275–276, 279, 292, 306, 345, 367, 369, - 387, 391, 398, 452, 461, 463–465, 467–468, 481, 494–495, - 509, 517–520, 523–524, 526, 533 - - Texas, 206 - - Thirty-sixth Parallel, 68 - - Thirty-seventh Parallel, 55, 68 - - Thirty-eighth Parallel, 2–7, 15, 19, 27_n_, 30, 53, 55–56, 65, 264, - 356, 397, 412, 436, 448_n_, 479–480, 489, 507, 532, 532_n_ - - Thirty-ninth Parallel, 27_n_, 55, 66, 173, 178, 226, 353, 357, 489, - 514 - - Thistlethwaite, Capt Lote, 376 - - Thomas, MajGen Gerald C., 2, 514_n_ - - Thomas, Capt John H., 165, 205_n_ - - Thompson, Capt Earl W., 82, 94–95 - - Thompson, 2dLt James S., 175 - - Thorin, Chief Duane, 441 - - Thorpe, Capt Jesse F., 111 - - Thrash, LtCol William G., 406, 413_n_, 422, 438, 442 - - Thurston, Maj Robert D., 389, 391 - - Time on target, 92–93, 305, 346, 367 - - Tinsley, Col James H., 13_n_ - - Tipps, Lt Ross L., 79 - - Tokchok-to Island, 55–56, 86, 323, 333, 353, 473 - - Toktong Pass, 412 - - Tokyo, 26, 314, 320, 360, 403, 408, 471 - - Tokyo Army Hospital Annex, 320 - - Tompkins, Col Rathvon McC., 464 - - T’ongch’on, 351 - - Tongduchon-ni, 332 - - Tonggang-ni, 33 - - Toryom, 186 - - Transportation - Communist, 42, 53, 224, 243, 357, 397, 486, 514 - United Nations, 10, 16, 45, 75, 100–101, 248–249, 264, 314, 332, 514 - - Travis Air Force Base, 320 - - Truce, 227, 264, 314, 341, 529 - Agreement, 322, 361, 372, 377_n_, 404, 458, 469, 513 - Corridor, 371 - Line, 322, 464, 528 - Negotiations, 7–8, 13, 22, 53, 95, 156, 228, 264, 311, 313–316, 321, - 323, 328, 338, 360, 377_n_, 393, 410_n_, 413, 446, 480–481, - 489, 510–511, 525, 527–529 - Restrictions, 469 - Talks, 264, 315, 321, 323, 328, 338, 360, 410_n_, 480–481, 489, - 510–511, 527–528 - - Truman, President Harry S., 3–4, 427, 499, 504_n_ - - Tschirgi, Col Harvey C., 249, 249_n_, 324_n_, 328, 334, 364 - - Tuckman, Robert D., 326_n_ - - Tumae-ri Ridge, 82 - - Turner, 1stLt Kenneth E., 377 - - Twining, BGen Merrill B., 37, 88, 105; MajGen, 473, 473_n_; - LtGen, 37_n_ - - - Ullman, LtCol Vernon O., 174–175 - - Ung-do Island, 55 - - Ungok, 114, 265, 325 - - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2–3, 427, 525 - Soviet manufacture, 525 - Soviet soldiers, 3 - - United Kingdom, 2 - - United Nations, 3–4, 7–8, 27, 39, 51, 170–172, 228–229, 311, 322, 424, - 426–427, 429, 458–459, 469 - Charter, 534 - Civil Assistance Command, 355 - Command, 3–5, 7–8, 17–18, 52, 55, 88, 100, 100_n_, 222–224, 226–229, - 315, 317, 321–322, 337–338, 340, 342, 351–352, 357, 372, - 375, 391, 399, 401, 405, 413, 429, 459, 469–470, 476, 478, - 480, 507, 513, 521, 527, 531, 533 - General Assembly, 229 - Military Armistice Commission, 469. _See also_ Truce. - Personnel and Medical Processing Unit, 315, 328_n_, 360, 400–401 - Provisional Command Receipt and Control Section, 401 - Secretariat, 458_n_ - Security Council, 3–4 - Units. _See also_ Army; Air Force; Marine Corps; Navy; Korea. - British - 1st Commonwealth Division, 11, 13, 15, 19, 38, 51, 93, 97, 102, - 164, 186–187, 192, 197, 222–223, 231, 253_n_, 323–324, 333, - 336, 338–339, 341–342, 344, 351, 363, 381, 383, 388, 389_n_, - 393, 460, 483 - 29th Infantry Brigade, 197_n_ - Black Watch Regiment, 222, 231 - Gloucestershire Regiment, 426 - Royal Marines, 415, 421, 423, 480 - Canadian - 25th Infantry Brigade, 19, 38 - 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, 258_n_ - Columbian Battalion, 233, 318_n_, 440 - Ethiopian Battalion, 222 - Turkish Armed Forces Command, 327–329, 329_n_, 331, 332_n_, - 337–340, 351, 364, 366–368, 369_n_ - 1st Battalion, 329, 332, 378_n_ - 2d Battalion, 332_n_ - 3d Battalion, 332 - Field Artillery Battalion, 328, 337, 367, 378 - 4.2-inch Mortar Company, 332, 364 - - United States, 2–4, 43, 64_n_, 93, 97–98, 226, 227_n_, 229, 231, 235, - 239, 320, 344_n_, 348_n_, 349, 375, 402, 405_n_, 419, 424, - 433_n_, 442, 474, 477, 497, 501, 513_n_, 527, 531, 534 - - United States Senate, 64, 440 - - United States State Department, 229 - - Universal Military Training and Service Act, 505–506 - - - Valentine’s Day bombardment, 357 - - _Valley Forge_, USS, 412 - - Valley Forge Hospital, 320 - - Vance, Maj Johnnie C., 176 - - Van Fleet, Gen James A., 11, 13_n_, 51, 51_n_, 192, 222, 227, - 413, 481, 530 - - Vanzuyen, Capt William M., 125 - - Vegetation. _See_ Terrain. - - Vehicles. _See also_ Tanks. - Communist - Ambulance, 318, 402 - Jeeps, 402 - Trucks, 402, 433, 489, 519 - United Nations - Ambulance Jeeps, 118, 127, 402 - Amphibian tractors, 47, 81, 86, 323 - Amphibian trucks. _See_ DUKWs. - Amphibian vehicles, 4, 48 - Armored amphibians, 323 - Armored personnel carriers, 81, 118, 139, 331 - Armored utility vehicles, 341 - Armored vehicles, 232, 257, 259, 331, 369, 379, 388–389, 470 - Artillery dozers, 46 - Bulldozers, 316 - DUKWs, 10, 47 - Flame vehicles, 114, 116 - Jeeps, 10, 77 - Jeep trailer, 10 - Radio jeeps, 488 - Tracked vehicles, 10_n_, 81, 137, 251 - Tractors, 250–251 - Trailers, one-ton, 63 - Trucks, 10, 40, 46, 139, 370, 455 - - Very Important Persons, 108 - - Vicar for Catholic Chaplains of the Armed Forces, 231 - - - Wade, Col Sidney S., 19–20, 22_n_, 38_n_ - - Wagner, Capt Arthur, 433 - - Wake Island, 434 - - WAKEUP Raid, 230, 257 - - Wallace, LtCol James R., 349, 381 - - Walt, Col Lewis W., 233, 256, 258, 261, 267, 267_n_, 268, 285, 324; - LtGen, 287_n_ - - Walter, Sgt Stephen C., 374_n_ - - Walz, Capt Ralph L., 286, 302 - - War Crimes Exhibit, 429 - - Warren, LtCol Charles, 230, 349 - - Warren, LtCol Joe L., 350 - - Washington, D. C., 322, 486, 513 - - Watkins, SSgt Lewis G., 168_n_ - - Watson, 2dLt Theodore H., 74–75 - - Watson, Col William R., Jr., 106_n_ - - Weapons. _See also_ Artillery; Tanks. - Communist, 90, 132, 136, 207, 218, 257, 292, 324–325, 368, 373, 378, - 389, 525–526 - Antiaircraft, 30, 64, 69, 170, 525 - Artillery, 62, 81, 117, 149, 190, 279, 281 - Self-propelled, 73, 96, 104, 260 - 57mm, 29_n_ - 75mm, 29, 188_n_ - 76mm, 188_n_, 207, 220, 280, 283, 285, 385 - 105mm, 520 - 122mm, 29_n_, 188_n_, 220, 292_n_ - 152mm, 188_n_, 190 - 155mm, 29 - Automatic weapons, 30, 36–37, 90, 130–131, 133, 136, 149, 155, - 230, 289, 292, 301, 305, 373, 376 - Bangalore torpedoes, 36, 213 - Bazookas, 302 - Carbines, 33 - Grenades, 36, 37_n_, 83_n_, 89, 91, 105, 112, 117, 122, 130, 146, - 147_n_, 149–150, 152, 155–156, 165, 168_n_, 203, 210, 259, - 260_n_, 293–294, 296, 298, 305, 325, 373 - Machine guns, 30, 33, 83, 89, 91, 112, 123–124, 128, 150, 153, - 164, 205, 260, 279, 293–294, 296, 298, 364, 372, - 374, 414, 527 - Mortars, 32, 36, 45, 52, 62, 76–77, 80–81, 81_n_, 82, 87, 89–91, - 93–94, 111, 116–119, 121, 123–127, 129–134, 136, 140–143, - 145–147, 149–150, 153, 155, 158, 162, 164, 166, 193–194, - 196–197, 199–200, 205–206, 209–210, 212, 214, 218, 221, 230, - 232, 248, 255_n_, 259, 261, 279, 281, 284, 286–287, 290, - 292–293, 293_n_, 294–295, 297, 299, 301–304, 306, 308–309, - 324, 337, 340, 364–367, 371–373, 377, 379, 385–387, 388_n_, - 389, 392, 451, 519 - 4.2-inch, 324 - 60mm, 111, 280, 283, 292_n_, 324, 385, 519 - 81mm, 324 - 82mm, 131, 141, 280, 283, 285, 385, 397, 519 - 120mm, 36, 292_n_, 302, 385 - 122mm, 285 - United Nations, 108, 143, 214, 276, 418, 466, 470 - Antiaircraft, 64, 71 - Atomic, 210 - Automatic, 68, 76, 105, 122, 143, 256, 300, 465–466 - Bangalore torpedoes, 256 - Bayonets, 82, 199, 283 - Bazookas, 278 - Cannons, 20mm, 241, 486 - Carbines, 90, 152, 206, 273, 275, 292, 529 - Flamethrowers, 90, 160, 256, 259, 260_n_, 273, 275, 278, 387–388 - Grenade launchers, 273, 374 - Grenades, 79, 127, 130, 152, 193, 193_n_, 206, 207_n_, 210, 246, - 256, 285, 292, 295, 374 - Guns, 95, 268, 275, 295, 300, 530 - Tank, 358, 384, 524 - 75mm, 270 - 90mm, 45, 94, 114, 116, 125, 128, 354, 356, 369, 378, 524 - 155mm, 192 - Howitzers, 80, 192, 246, 258, 268, 281, 301, 339 - 8-inch, 191, 270, 281, 304, 379 - 105mm, 46, 114, 192, 268, 295, 509 - 155mm, 46, 191–192, 270, 295, 301–302, 509 - 240mm, 379 - Knives, 283 - Machine guns, 37, 76, 80, 90–91, 107, 116, 121, 129, 137, 152, - 193, 232, 253, 256, 273, 275, 278, 283, 300, 303, 305, 325, - 327, 366, 378, 387, 465–466, 523 - Mortars, 73, 79–90, 90, 106_n_, 112, 124, 127, 129, 150, 166, 194, - 199, 202, 210, 239, 259, 289–291, 295–297, 300–304, 367, - 372, 386, 389, 521 - 4.2-inch, 39, 79, 121, 135–136, 306, 325, 366, 369, 378, 387 - 60mm, 121, 135, 273, 281, 366, 378 - 81mm, 89, 121, 135, 140, 162, 193, 193_n_, 273, 276, 281, 325, - 366, 369, 378, 387 - Pistols, 199, 273, 275, 278, 485 - Rifles, 37, 79, 90–91, 118, 129, 145, 199, 210, 214, 283, - 296, 372, 529 - Automatic, 168_n_, 245 - BARs, 273, 275, 292, 300, 303, 372, 526 - M-1, 32, 273, 275, 292, 451, 458, 526 - Rockets, 79–80, 124, 132–133, 179, 283, 290, 301, 303–304, 328, - 340, 344, 367, 379, 385–386 - Launchers, 124, 124_n_, 179 - 3.5-inch, 48, 256, 273, 388 - 4.5-inch, 46, 121, 124, 124_n_, 196, 215, 215_n_ - 5-inch HVAR, 486 - Satchel charges, 256 - Searchlights, 101_n_, 128, 305, 345, 490, 524 - Small arms, 75–76, 80, 106, 117, 122, 127, 149, 259, 273, 278, - 300, 378, 391, 521 - - Weather, 8, 10, 16, 30, 48–49, 52, 102–104, 128, 130, 137, 139, 148, - 211, 235, 263, 303, 323, 335, 349, 351, 355, 358, 364, 368, - 370–371, 371_n_, 374–375, 385–386, 415, 418–419, 422, 450, - 454, 467, 478, 480–481, 484, 487, 489, 494, 496–497, 520 - - Weaver, Capt James R., 242 - - Webb, PFC Billy J., 251 - - Weir, Maj William A., 175 - - Welcome Gate to Freedom, 318. _See also_ Freedom Gate. - - West, Col Gordon H., 392_n_ - - Westbrook, SSgt W. H., 376 - - Weyland, LtGen Otto P., 43, 233 - - Whalen, 1stLt Robert A., 409 - - Wheeler, LtCol Edwin B., 250, 250_n_ - - Wheeler, Cpl Theodore R., 436_n_ - - Whitbeck, Capt William R., Jr., 156 - - White House, 37_n_ - - Whitemore, Capt Lyle S., Jr., 94 - - Wichita, 433_n_ - - Wilkinson, LtCol Frank R., Jr., 250_n_ - - Williams, Cpl Calvin W., 436_n_ - - Williams, 1stLt Duke, Jr., 414 - - Williams, SSgt John J., 297 - - Williams, BGen Samuel T., 176; MajGen, 326, 340 - - Williamson, Capt Edward C., 192_n_ - - Williamson, Col Herbert H., 176, 234 - - Williamson, LtCol John I., 137, 270, 331_n_ - - Wilson, Charles E., 227 - - Wilson, Col Nelson, 339 - - Witt, LtCol Francis “X,” Jr., 316_n_ - - Wiwon, 423 - - Wolff, Dr. Harold G., 441 - - Wonju, 6, 412 - - Wonsan, 5, 53, 55–56, 66–67, 226, 353, 356–358, 397, 479, 487, 492, - 502, 530, 538_n_ - - Wood, LtCol William A., 409 - - Woon, VAdm Il Sohn, 310 - - World Peace Camp, 427 - - World War, I, 2, 7, 26, 143, 193, 413, 431, 520 - - World War II, 2, 4_n_, 26, 28, 48, 65, 88, 98, 106, 114, 148, 172, - 173_n_, 176, 213_n_, 233, 267_n_, 298, 327_n_, 336, 401, - 411, 427_n_, 431, 433_n_, 434, 442, 477_n_, 483–485, 493, - 495_n_, 504, 506, 510, 513_n_, 533–534 - Post-World War II, 476, 533 - - World War III, 513 - - Woten, Maj Robert C., 349, 374_n_ - - Wright, LtCol Raymond D., 191 - - WYOMING Line, 20, 22, 100, 232, 268, 461, 468 - - WYOMING FORWARD Line, 39, 41 - - - Yalu Reservoir, 418 - - Yalu River, 53, 55, 64, 174, 321, 416, 418, 423, 479, 489, 491 - - Yang-do Island, 55, 359 - - Yanggu, 480 - - Yellow Sea, 15, 134, 174, 241, 355, 398, 508 - - Yesong River, 480 - - Yo-do Island, 55, 59, 356–359, 359_n_ - - Yokosuka, 320 - - Yom River, 15, 19, 248_n_, 250 - - Yongji-ri, 332, 463 - - Yongjong-ni, 334–335 - - Yongmi-dong, 243 - - Yongpyong-do Island, 55–56, 353 - - Yonpo, 488 - - Yudam-ni, 412, 479, 480 - - - ✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1972 O-427-555 - - -[Illustration: THE FAR EAST] - -[Illustration: U. S. MARINE GROUND OPERATIONS KOREAN WAR 1950–1953] - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Frequent, simple typographical errors were silently corrected; -unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, -and otherwise left unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. 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