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diff --git a/old/65010-0.txt b/old/65010-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 5b13047..0000000 --- a/old/65010-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18229 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 -Volume IV (of 5), by Lynn Montross - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume IV (of 5) - The East-Central Front - -Author: Lynn Montross - Hubbard D. Kuokka - Norman W. Hicks - -Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65010] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME IV (OF 5) *** - - - - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration: CCF 5th PHASE OFFENSIVE - - 1st STEP 22 APRIL - 2d STEP 16 MAY -] - - - - - U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA - - 1950–1953 - - - VOLUME IV - - _The East-Central Front_ - - - by - - LYNN MONTROSS - - MAJOR HUBARD D. KUOKKA, USMC - - and - - MAJOR NORMAN W. HICKS, USMC - - - [Illustration] - - - Historical Branch, G-3 - Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps - Washington, D. C., 1962 - - - - -Preceding Volumes of -_U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_ - - - Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter” - Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation” - Volume III, “The Chosin Reservoir Campaign” - - - Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727 - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government - Printing Office - Washington 25, D.C.--Price $2.25 (cloth) - - - - -Foreword - - -Americans everywhere will remember the inspiring conduct of Marines -during Korean operations in 1950. As the fire brigade of the Pusan -Perimeter, the assault troops at Inchon, and the heroic fighters of the -Chosin Reservoir campaign, they established a record in keeping with -the highest traditions of their Corps. No less praiseworthy were the -Marine actions during the protracted land battles of 1951, the second -year of the Korean “police action.” - -The 1st Marine Division, supported wherever possible by the 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing, helped stem the flood of the Chinese offensive in -April. Then lashing back in vigorous and successful counterattack, the -Marines fought around the Hwachon Reservoir to the mighty fastness of -the Punchbowl. The Punchbowl became familiar terrain to Marines during -the summer of 1951, and the Division suffered its heaviest casualties -of the year fighting in the vicinity of that aptly named circular -depression. - -The fighting waxed hot, then cold, as the truce teams negotiated. They -reached no satisfactory agreement, and the fighting again intensified. -Finally, after a year of active campaigning on Korea’s east-central -front, the Marines moved west to occupy positions defending the -approaches to the Korean capital, Seoul. - -The year of desperate fighting, uneasy truce, and renewed combat -covered by this volume saw the operational employment of a -Marine-developed technique--assault by helicopter-borne troops. Tactics -were continually being refined to meet the ever changing battle -situation. However, throughout the period, the one constant factor -on which United Nations commanders could rely was the spirit and -professional attitude of Marines, both regular and reserve. This is -their hallmark as fighting men. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - DAVID M. SHOUP - _General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ - _Commandant of the Marine Corps._ - -Reviewed and Approved 20 Nov 1961. - - - - -Preface - - -This is the fourth in a series of five volumes dealing with the -operations of United States Marines in Korea during the period 2 August -1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume IV presents in detail the operations of -the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the former while -operating under Eighth Army control and also as part of IX Corps and X -Corps, USA, and the latter while controlled by the Fifth Air Force. - -The period covered in this volume begins in the latter part of December -1950, when the Division rested in the Masan “bean patch,” and continues -through the guerrilla hunt, the Punchbowl fighting, and all other -operations during 1951. The account ends when the Marines move to -positions in the west during March 1952. - -Marines did not fight this war alone; they were a part of the huge -Eighth United States Army in Korea. But since this is primarily a -Marine history, the actions of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force are -presented only sufficiently to place Marine operations in their proper -perspective. - -Many participants in the fighting during this period have generously -contributed to the book by granting interviews, answering inquiries, -and commenting on first draft manuscripts. Their assistance was -invaluable. Although it was not possible to use all the plethora of -detailed comments and information received, the material will go into -Marine Corps archives for possible use and benefit of future historians. - -The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of -Colonel Charles W. Harrison, Major Gerald Fink, and Colonel William -M. Miller as successive Heads of the Historical Branch. Production -was accomplished under the direction of Colonel Thomas G. Roe. Major -William T. Hickman wrote some of the preliminary drafts and did much -valuable research and map sketching. Dr. K. Jack Bauer and Mrs. -Elizabeth Tierney assisted the authors in research, and Mr. Truman R. -Strobridge assisted in proofreading and preparing the index. - -To the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, as well as Marine officers -and NCOs, who submitted valuable comments and criticisms of preliminary -drafts, thanks are also extended. These suggestions added to the -accuracy and details of the text. Additional assistance was rendered by -personnel of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department -of the Army; the Division of Naval History, Department of the Navy; and -the Historical Division, Department of the Air Force. - -The exacting administrative duties involved in processing the volume -from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form were ably -managed by Miss Kay P. Sue. All manuscript typing was done expertly by -Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood. - -The maps contained in this volume were prepared by the Reproduction -Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, and the Historical -Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Official Department of Defense -photographs were used. - -The Marine Corps mourns the passing of the prime author of this series -and other admirable works of Marine Corps and military history. Lynn -Montross, after a lengthy illness, died on 28 January 1961. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - H. W. BUSE, JR. - _Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ - _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._ - - - - -Contents - - - _Page_ - - I Interlude at Masan 1 - - Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in EUSAK - Reserve--General Ridgway New EUSAK Commander--Ridgway’s - Declaration of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment - Shortages--Marine Air Squadrons in Action--The Air Force - System of Control--X Corps Conference at Kyongju - - II The CCF January Offensive 21 - - UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army - Withdrawals--Marine Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine - Division Assigned Mission--Replacements by Air and - Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields--Red China’s “Hate - America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for Victory - - III The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 41 - - The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to - Bofu--Marine Rice Paddy Patrols--Operations THUNDERBOLT - and ROUNDUP--Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC - Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division--10th NKPA Division - Scattered--New Mission for the Marines - - IV Operation KILLER 59 - - The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in - Action--Planning for the New Operation--The Jump-Off on - 21 February--Stiffening of Chinese Resistance--General - Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase Line - ARIZONA--JOC Air Control System Criticised - - V Operation RIPPER 79 - - Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by - Enemy--Second Phase of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW - Units--General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion--1st - KMC Returns to Division--38th Parallel Recrossed by - Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems - - VI The CCF Spring Offensive 99 - - Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied - by KMC Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine - Flank--Marine Air in Support Everywhere--Plugging - the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist - Attacks--Withdrawal to the KANSAS Line--Enemy Stopped in - IX Corps Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps - - VII Advance to the Punchbowl 127 - - Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives - Secured--MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of - the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st MAW in Operation - STRANGLE--KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st Marines - Move up to BROWN Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack - - VIII The Truce Talks at Kaesong 153 - - Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on BADGER - Line--Red Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in - Reserve--Marine Helicopters Take the Lead--Marine Body - Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to K-18--The Division - Back in Action Again - - IX Renewal of the Attack 173 - - Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at - First--Supply Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of - Division Attack--The Mounting Problem of CAS--First - Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight for - Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for - the “Rock” - - X The New Warfare of Position 199 - - Sectors of Major EUSAK Units--Statement by General Van - Fleet--Hill 854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to - Hill 884--Helicopter Operation BLACKBIRD--“To Organize, - Construct, and Defend”--Marine Operations of November - 1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea - - XI Winter Operations in East Korea 227 - - Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in - Company Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes - Command--Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored - Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter Operations MULE TRAIN - and CHANGIE-CHANGIE--The Five Days of Operation CLAM-UP - - XII The Move to West Korea 247 - - Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in - Operation MIXMASTER--Operations of Fifteen Months in - Retrospect - - - Appendixes - - A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 263 - - B Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 267 - - C Command and Staff List 269 - - D Unit Citations 315 - - Bibliography 319 - - Index 325 - - - - -Illustrations - - -_Photographs_ - -Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 86 and 214. - - -_Maps and Sketches_ - - _Page_ - 1 Korea as a Battlefield 4 - - 2 EUSAK Dispositions, December 1950 9 - - 3 Combat Air Bases 16 - - 4 EUSAK Front Lines, January 1951 23 - - 5 Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 43 - - 6 Operation KILLER 61 - - 7 Area Gained, February-March 1951 77 - - 8 Operation RIPPER Plan 82 - - 9 Operation RIPPER Zone 87 - - 10 CCF Offensive, April 1951 110 - - 11 Actions of 1/1 and 3/1, April 1951 112 - - 12 Night of 16–17 May 1951 124 - - 13 Drive to Yangu, May 1951 129 - - 14 X Corps Routes of Advance, May-June 1951 139 - - 15 1st Marine Division Zone of Action, June-July 1951 140 - - 16 1st MAW Operating Area, May-July 1951 145 - - 17 1st Marine Division Area, September 1951 174 - - 18 X Corps Zone of Action, September 1951 177 - - 19 EUSAK Dispositions, September 1951 200 - - 20 1st Marine Division Situation, September 1951 205 - - 21 HMR-161 Operations 1951 209 - - 22 EUSAK Dispositions, March 1952 252 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -Interlude at Masan - -_Return to the Bean Patch--1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK -_Reserve--General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander--Ridgway’s Declaration -of Faith--Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages--Marine Air -Squadrons in Action--The Air Force System of Control--X Corps -Conference at Kyongju_ - - -A new chapter in Korean operations began for the 1st Marine Division at -1800 on 16 December 1950 with the opening of the CP at Masan. By the -following afternoon all units of the Division had arrived from Hungnam -with the exception of VMO-6 and small groups of such specialists as the -amphibian tractor troops left behind to assist with the redeployment of -remaining X Corps elements to south Korea. - -The 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were separated for -the first time since the Inchon landing. VMF-311, the new Panther jet -squadron, was flying from K-9, an Air Force field near Pusan. Operating -together as an all-Marine carrier group taking part in the Hungnam -redeployment were the three Corsair squadrons: VMF-212 on the CVL -(light carrier) _Bataan_; VMF-214 on the CVE _Sicily_; and VMF-323 on -the CVE _Badoeng Strait_. The two Japan-based night fighter squadrons, -VMF(N)-542 and VMF(N)-513, flying from Itazuke, patrolled the skies -between Japan and Korea. - -VMO-6, the observation squadron, consisting of helicopters and OY -fixed-wing planes, was attached to various ships of the Seventh Fleet -for rescue missions when pilots were forced into the sea. A detachment -of Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the -entire Air Defense Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 -(MTACS-2) were also attached to the warships. They assisted in the -control of hundreds of planes that flew over the Hungnam beachhead -daily in support of the final stages of the X Corps evacuation. - -The three Marine Corsair squadrons on the _Sicily_, _Badoeng Strait_, -and _Bataan_ represented the entire air strength of Escort Carrier -Task Group (TG) 96.8, commanded by Rear Admiral Richard N. Ruble. -Each squadron came directly under the operational command of the ship -on which it had embarked. Supply, engineering, ordnance, billeting, -and messing were of course provided through naval channels. The only -relationship of the squadrons to their parent organization, MAG-33, -derived from the administration of personnel and the storage of -equipment at Itami. - - -_Return to the Bean Patch_ - -Masan, the new Division assembly area, was located about 27 air miles -and 40 road miles west of Pusan on the Bay of Masan, which indents -the southern coast of the peninsula (Map 1). In order to prepare for -the arrival of the Division, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, the -assistant division commander (ADC), had flown from Hungnam with the -advance party on 12 December to make necessary arrangements. - -The small seaport, which skirts the bay for about two and a half miles, -was untouched by the war as compared to the ravaged towns of northeast -Korea. It had a protected anchorage, dock facilities, and good rail and -road communications. There was an air strip at Chinhae, a few miles to -the southeast. - -Some sort of cycle seemed to have been completed by veterans of the -5th Marines when they found themselves back again in the familiar -surroundings of the Bean Patch on the northern outskirts of Masan. -This large, cultivated field is entitled to capital letters because -of its historical distinction as bivouac area of the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade after the battle of the Naktong in August 1950. Barely -four months had passed since that hard fight, but a great deal more -history had been made during the combats of the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin -Reservoir operations. - -There was room enough in the Bean Patch for all three infantry -regiments. Headquarters, the 11th Marines, the 1st Signal, 1st Tank, -1st Amtrac, 1st Ordnance, and 1st Motor Transport Battalions were -located on the southern outskirts of town along with the 41 Independent -Commando, Royal Marines. The 1st Combat Service Group, the MP Company, -and the 1st Service, 1st Shore Party, and 1st Engineer Battalions -occupied the dock area of Masan proper. A large building in the center -of town housed the Division hospital, and the 7th Motor Transport -Battalion was assigned to the Changwon area, four miles to the -northeast.[1] - - [1] This section is based on 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) - Historical Diary (_HD_), Dec 50, 1–12; MajGen O. P. - Smith, _Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine - Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War_ - (hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 1239–1242; and BrigGen E. A. - Craig, Comments, 4 Jun 57. - -Peaceful as the surroundings may have seemed to troops who had just -completed the 13-day running fight of the Chosin Reservoir Breakout, -the Chidi San mountain mass some 50 miles northwest of Masan had been -for many years the hideout of Korean bandits and outlaws. The Japanese -had never been able to clear them out, and the Republic of Korea had -met with no better success. After the outbreak of civil war, they made -some pretense of aiding the Communist cause but were actually preying -upon the ROK army and police for arms, food, clothing, and other loot. -Operating in prowling bands as large as 50 or 60 men, the guerrillas -were well armed with rifles, machine guns, and at times even mortars. - -In order to assure the safety both of its own bivouac areas and the -vital port of Masan, Division promptly initiated measures to maintain -surveillance over a broad belt of countryside which described an arc -from Chinju, some 40 miles west of Masan, around to Changwon (Map 1). -The infantry and artillery regiments and the Division Reconnaissance -Company were all assigned subsectors of this security belt. Daily motor -patrols of not less than platoon strength were to be conducted in -each subsector for the purpose of gaining information about the roads -and the guerrillas as well as discouraging their activities.[2] As it -proved, however, no hostile contacts were made by the Marines during -the entire Masan interlude. The guerrillas preferred to restrict their -attention to the local police and civilian population. - - [2] CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 1515, 18 Dec 50. - -[Illustration: KOREA - -AS A BATTLEFIELD] - - -_1st Marine Division in_ EUSAK _Reserve_ - -At 2240 on the 18th a dispatch from Major General Edward M. Almond, -USA, commanding general of X Corps, informed the 1st Marine Division -that it had passed to the operational control of the Eighth Army.[3] - - [3] CG X Corps msg X 15292, 18 Dec 50; EUSAK msg - GX-35290-KG00, 19 Dec 50. - -Major General Oliver P. Smith reported in one of his first dispatches -to EUSAK that the Marines had received fresh rations on only three -days since landing in Korea. The Division commander invited attention -to the importance of building up the physical condition of men who -had lost weight during the Chosin Reservoir operation. An information -copy went to Commander Naval Forces, Far East, (ComNavFE), who reacted -promptly by ordering a refrigeration ship to Masan with 50,000 rations -of turkey. The G-4 of EUSAK also responded with fresh rations from time -to time until the Marines, in the words of General Smith, “had turkey -coming out of their ears.”[4] - - [4] Smith, _Notes_, 1244–1245. - -Games of softball and touch football became popular in the crisp, -invigorating weather as the men rapidly recuperated from fatigue and -nervous tension. A series of shows was put on by troupes of U.S. Army -and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas trees and -decorations. - -The first Christmas in Korea was observed with a memorable display of -holiday spirit by men who had cause to be thankful. A choir from the -5th Marines serenaded Division Headquarters with carols on Christmas -Eve, and all the next day the commanding general and ADC held open -house for staff officers and unit commanders.[5] - - [5] The remainder of this section is based upon Smith, - _Notes_, 1264–1274. - -The United States as a whole rejoiced over the news that the last of -105,000 X Corps troops had embarked from Hungnam on 24 December without -a single life being lost as a result of enemy action. President Truman -spoke for the Nation when he sent this message to General MacArthur: - - Wish to express my personal thanks to you, Admiral Joy, General - Almond, and all your brave men for the effective operations at - Hungnam. This saving of our men in this isolated beachhead is the - best Christmas present I have ever had. - -Photographers and press correspondents flocked to Masan during the -holiday season for pictures and interviews about various aspects of -the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Among them was Captain John Ford, USNR, -a successful motion picture director who had been recalled to active -duty to make a documentary film depicting the role of the Navy and -Marine Corps in Korea. He used scenes in the Masan area for background -material. - -General Smith was informed that a motion picture company intended to -produce a feature film entitled “Retreat, Hell,” based on a remark -attributed to him, “Retreat, Hell, we are just attacking in a different -direction!” When asked if these actually were his words, the Division -commander had a diplomatic answer. He said that he had pointed out to -correspondents at Hagaru that the drive to Hamhung was not a typical -withdrawal or retreat, and thus “the statement attributed to me -described my thinking, that of my staff and unit commanders, and my -situation.” - -During the Masan interlude Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, USAR, arrived as -a representative of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins -University, which had been employed on military research projects by -the Far East Command. Marshall, a well-known military analyst who had -written several books about World War II operations, based his studies -on personal interviews with scores of participants. - -The researcher was given a free hand at Masan. Aided by a stenographer, -he interviewed officers and men from privates to commanding general. -The resulting thousands of words went into a classified report -entitled, “CCF in the Attack (Part II), A Study Based on the Operations -of the 1stMarDiv in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area, 20 -November-10 December 1950.” - - -_General Ridgway New_ EUSAK _Commander_ - -Shortly after arrival at Masan, General Smith called a conference -of unit commanders and emphasized that their task was to re-equip, -resupply, repair and rehabilitate. Officers and men of replacement -drafts were to be integrated and given unit training as soon as -possible. Both veterans and newcomers were soon training in regimental -areas assigned by Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, the Division G-3, who -arranged for a 200-yard rifle range and a mortar range. - -On 23 December came the news that Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, -the Eighth Army commander, had been killed in a jeep accident. His -successor, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, had commanded -the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in Europe during the final operations of -World War II. Commencing his flight from Washington on the 24th, he -landed at Tokyo just before midnight on Christmas day.[6] - - [6] Gen M. B. Ridgway as told to H. M. Martin, _Soldier, The - Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway_ (New York, 1956), 196–211, - hereafter Ridgway, _Memoirs_. - -The new commander’s task was made more difficult by the fact that -the Korean conflict, at the end of its first six months, had become -probably the most unpopular military venture of American history, both -at the front and in the United States. From a mere “police action” -at first, the struggle soon developed into a major effort in which -the national pride suffered humiliations as a consequence of military -unpreparedness. Far from building up the morale of the troops, letters -and newspapers from home too often contributed to the doubts of men who -asked themselves these questions: - -“Why are we here? And what are we fighting for?” - -Some of the answers were scarcely reassuring. It was insinuated, for -instance, that Americans were fighting “to make South Korean real -estate safe for South Koreans.” - -“I must say in all frankness,” commented General Ridgway in his -memoirs, “that the spirit of the Eighth Army as I found it on my -arrival gave me deep concern. There was a definite air of nervousness, -of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to -what the future held. There was much ‘looking over the shoulder’ as the -soldiers say.”[7] - - [7] _Ibid._, 204–205. - -These criticisms were not applicable to the 1st Marine Division. -“Our men were in high spirits and busily engaged in getting ready to -fight again,” commented Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC. “In -my travels around the various units of the Division, and in talking -to the men, I never even once noticed any air of nervousness or -apprehension.... When General Ridgway visited the Division at Masan he -made a tour of the entire camp area and observed training and general -arrangements. He stated that he was quite satisfied with the 1st -Marine Division and its quick comeback after the Chosin fighting.”[8] - - [8] LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Retd), ltr of 4 Jun 57. All - letters, typed interviews, and other documentary sources - cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the - Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps. - -General Ridgway learned soon after his arrival that the Eighth Army -staff had prepared a plan for a phased withdrawal to Pusan in case of -necessity. He called immediately for a plan of attack. Prospects of -putting it into effect were not bright at the moment, but at least it -served to announce his intentions. - -Rumors were rife at this time that a general withdrawal from Korea, -in virtual acknowledgment of defeat, was contemplated. In a letter of -1957, General Douglas MacArthur wrote an emphatic denial: “I have no -means of knowing whether such action may have been seriously considered -in Washington; but, for my own part, I never contemplated such a -withdrawal and made no plans to that effect.”[9] - - [9] Gen Douglas MacArthur, ltr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W. - Snedeker. - -The front hugged the 38th Parallel during the last week of -December as the Eighth Army held a defensive line along the -Munsan-Chunchon-Yangyang axis (Map 2). Three U.S. divisions were -in a combat zone occupied largely by ROK units. The 24th and 25th -Divisions both reduced a third in strength by casualties, remained in -contact with the enemy in west Korea while the 1st Cavalry Division, -also depleted in numbers, occupied blocking positions to the rear. -Personnel and equipment losses suffered by the 2d Division during the -CCF counteroffensive of late November had rendered it noneffective as -a tactical unit until it could be reinforced and re-equipped, and the -3d and 7th Infantry Divisions had just landed in the Pusan-Ulsan area -after the Hungnam redeployment.[10] - - [10] EUSAK Command Report (_Cmd Rpt_), Dec 50. - -On 27 December 1950 the commanding general began a three-day tour of -Eighth Army units at the front. He talked to hundreds of soldiers -ranging from privates to unit commanders. There was nothing the matter -with the Eighth Army, he assured them, that confidence wouldn’t cure. -“I told them their soldier forbears would turn over in their graves -if they heard some of the stories I had heard about the behavior of -some of our troop leaders in combat. The job of a commander was to be -up where the crisis of action was taking place. In time of battle, I -wanted division commanders to be up with their forward battalions, -and I wanted corps commanders up with the regiment that was in the -hottest action. If they had paper work to do, they could do it at -night. By day their place was up there where the shooting was going on.” - -[Illustration: MAP 2 - -EUSAK DISPOSITIONS 31 DEC 1950] - -It could never have been said that this professional soldier, the son -of a Regular Army colonel, had failed to set an example in his own -career. As the commander of an airborne division, he had jumped along -with his men in Normandy. - -Seldom seen in Korea without a grenade attached to his harness, Ridgway -insisted that it was not a gesture of showmanship. In mobile warfare a -man might be surprised by the enemy when he least expected it, he said, -and a grenade was useful for blasting one’s way out of a tight spot. - - -_Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith_ - -After completing his tour of the combat area, the commanding general -concluded that one thing was still lacking. Soldiers of the Eighth Army -hadn’t as yet been given an adequate answer to the questions, “Why are -we here?” and “What are we fighting for?” In the belief that the men -were entitled to an answer from their commanding general, he sat down -in his room and wrote this declaration of faith: - - To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that - Korean town or village. Real estate is here, incidental.... - - The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as - God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall - defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot - their prisoners, enslave their citizens and deride the dignity - of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual - and individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive - with God’s hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead - existence of a Godless world. - - If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility - of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight - for freedom for our Korean allies alone and for their national - survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our - own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent - national existence....[11] - - [11] Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of - Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51. - -The deep conviction of this declaration could not be doubted. But -Ridgway did not confine himself to moral leadership; he also insisted -on a return to sound tactical principles. Upon learning that some of -the infantry commanders in combat sectors had no knowledge of the -enemy’s strength or whereabouts, he ordered that aggressive patrolling -be resumed at once. He directed further that every unit make a resolute -effort to provide a hot reception for the Red Chinese patrols which had -met too little opposition while prodding every night for soft spots -along the thinly held 135-mile United Nations line.[12] - - [12] The source for the remainder of this section is Ridgway, - _Memoirs_, 205–207. - -In his talks with officers and men, the new commander told them -that too many weapons and vehicles had fallen into the hands of the -enemy during the withdrawals in west Korea. He made it plain that in -the future any man abandoning equipment without good cause would be -court-martialed. - -Not only did Ridgway stress the increased use of firepower; he -requested in one of his first messages to the Pentagon that 10 -additional battalions of artillery be sent to Korea. These guns were -to provide the tactical punch when he found an opportunity to take the -offensive. - -Meanwhile, he had the problem of putting up a defense against a -Chinese Communist offensive expected within a week. On his first day -as Eighth Army commander he sent a request to President Syngman Rhee, -of the Republic of Korea, for 30,000 native laborers to dig field -fortifications. The energetic, 71-year-old Korean patriot provided -the first 10,000 at dawn the following morning and the others during -the next two days. Armed with picks and shovels, this army of toilers -created two broad belts of defense, one to the north and one south -of the river Han. The purpose of the first was to stop the enemy if -American firepower could compensate for lack of numbers, and the second -was a final line to be held resolutely. - - -_Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages_ - -Although the Marine ground forces found themselves in the unusual -situation of being 200 miles behind the front, they could be sure that -this respite wouldn’t last. Every effort was being pushed to restore -the Division to combat efficiency by a command and staff acutely -aware of shortages of men and equipment. The effective strength on 29 -December 1950 was 1,304 officers and 20,696 men, including 182 attached -U.S. Army troops and 143 Royal Marine Commandos. This total also -included 28 officers and 1,615 men who had arrived in a replacement -draft of 17 December, and 4 officers and 365 men in a draft of three -days later.[13] - - [13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are - Smith, _Notes_, 1280–1292, 1294, 1295, 1303; 1stMarDiv - Periodic Logistics Reports (_PLR_) 2, 11. - -Authorized Division strength was 1,438 officers and 24,504 men, -indicating a shortage of 134 officers and 3,808 men. Most of the -deficiencies were in the infantry and artillery units--29 officers and -2,951 men in the three infantry regiments, and 38 officers and 538 men -in the artillery. - -Division G-1 had been informed by the FMFPac representative in Japan -that about 5,000 casualties were hospitalized there, and an unknown -number had been evacuated to the United States because of overcrowding -of hospitals in Japan. Such factors made it difficult to predict how -many would return to the Division, but G-1 estimated from 500 to 1,000 -in January. - -The situation in regard to Division equipment might be summed up by -saying that on 23 December there was a serious shortage of practically -all essential items with the single exception of M-1 rifles. Upon -arrival at Masan, units had been required to submit stock status -reports. These lists were forwarded on 23 December to the Commanding -General, Eighth Army, with a notification that requisitions had been -submitted to the 2d Logistical Command, USA, in Pusan. It was requested -that deliveries of supplies and equipment be speeded up, so that the -Division could soon be restored to its former combat efficiency. A -comparison of the totals of selected items on 23 and 31 December as -listed on the following page shows that considerable progress was made -during those eight days. - -The 2d Logistical Command in Pusan, commanded by Brigadier General -Crump Garvin, USA, deserved much of the credit for the week’s -restoration of Marine equipment. Progress passed all expectations, -considering that General Garvin was supplying other Eighth Army units -which had lost equipment during their withdrawal.[14] - - [14] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr of 4 Jun 57. - -There still existed on 29 December a requirement for clothing and -individual equipment, and the spare parts problem remained acute. -Ironically, the fact that the 1st Marine Division had brought most -of its motor transport out from the Chosin Reservoir was a handicap -at Masan. Eighth Army units which had lost their vehicles were given -priority for receiving new ones. This meant that the Marines must make -the best of war-worn trucks. - - _Items of _T/E _Shortages _Shortages - equipment_ allowance_ 23 Dec 50_ 31 Dec 50_ - - Bags, sleeping 23,000 3,585 0 - Machine gun, Browning, - Cal. 30, M1919A4 1,398 338 0 - BAR, 30 cal. 904 441 0 - Carbine, 30 cal., M2 11,084 2,075 0 - Launcher, rocket, 3.5″, M20 396 105 0 - Howitzer, 105mm 54 8 0 - Howitzer, 155mm 18 9 0 - Glasses, field, 7×50 1,740 1,305 1,006 - Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm 12 7 7 - Tank, med., M-26, 90mm 85 16 12 - Truck, 1/4 T., 4×4 641 105 58 - Truck, 1½ T., 6×6, cargo 54 3 0 - Truck, 2½ T., 6×6, cargo 737 124 33 - Radio set, SCR 536 474 211 211 - Radio set, SCR 619 137 74 49 - Telephone, EE8 1,162 58 58 - - -_Marine Air Squadrons in Action_ - -While the ground forces trained in the Masan area, the Corsair -squadrons and the jet squadron flew combat missions. Support of the -Hungnam redeployment had top priority until 24 December, when the last -of the 105,000 troops were evacuated by Rear Admiral James H. Doyle’s -Task Force 90. Such totals as 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles, -and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo were also recorded by the U.S. -Navy’s largest operation of the Korean conflict.[15] - - [15] ComPhibGruOne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5–10, 25. - -No serious trouble was experienced from enemy action during the two -weeks of the redeployment, although G-2 reports warned that several -Chinese divisions were believed to be in the general area. Air strikes -and naval gunfire shared the credit for this result. Nearly 34,000 -shells and 12,800 rockets were fired by the support ships, and UN -planes were on station or carrying out missions every moment that -weather permitted. Marine fighters of VMF-212, VMF-214, and VMF-323, -flying from carriers after the closing of Yonpo Airfield, made a -noteworthy contribution to the success of the Hungnam redeployment.[16] - - [16] For a derailed account of the “amphibious operation in - reverse,” see the last chapter of Volume III of this - series. - -VMF-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski, was -assigned the task of gathering the helicopters of VMO-6 from various -ships of the Seventh Fleet and returning them to the operational -control of the 1st Marine Division at Masan. There the OYs of the -observation squadron were waiting after an overland flight, and Major -Vincent J. Gottschalk’s unit was complete. - -With the Hungnam redeployment ended, the Navy offered to make its -primary carrier-borne air effort in support of the Eighth Army. There -was no single over-all commander of Navy and Air Force aviation in -Korea (other than General MacArthur himself) and the two services were -working under a system of mutual agreement and coordination.[17] - - [17] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report_ (_PacFlt Interim - Rpt_) No. 2, II, 621–758. - -The Far East Air Forces (FEAF), under Lieutenant General George E. -Stratemeyer, was the senior Air Force command in the Far East, on the -same level as ComNavFE, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. The largest FEAF -subordinate command was the Fifth Air Force, commanded by Major General -Earle E. Partridge, with headquarters at Taegu, alongside that of the -Eighth Army. - -Strictly speaking, land-based Marine air had been under Fifth Air -Force operational control throughout the Chosin Reservoir operation. -Actually a verbal agreement between General Partridge and Major General -Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), had given -the Marines a good deal of latitude in making decisions relative to -close air support. This was often the salvation of Marine units during -the breakout, when every minute counted. Later, during the Hungnam -redeployment, control of Marine aircraft became the responsibility of -Admiral Doyle. His control agency was Tactical Air Control Squadron-1 -(TacRon-1) in his flagship, the _Mount McKinley_. TacRon-1 kept in -close touch not only with the 3d infantry Division, USA, defending -the shrinking perimeter, but also with the Eighth Army and Fifth Air -Force.[18] - - [18] TacRon-1 War Diary (_WD_), Dec 50. - -During the last days of 1950 the four Marine air squadrons were kept -busy. VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ was attached to TF-77. The coastline -of east Korea was its hunting grounds for such missions as knocking -out warehouses, bridges, and railway tunnels between the 38th and 39th -parallels. - -Along the west coast, VMF-214 on the _Sicily_ and VMF-323 on the -_Badoeng Strait_ were commanded respectively by Major William M. Lundin -and Major Arnold A. Lund. These squadrons were part of Task Group-95.1 -under Vice Admiral Sir William G. Andrews, RN. The Marine aviators -found themselves in an organization made up of Royal Commonwealth -naval forces and of French, Thai, and ROK units. TG-95.1 had the -responsibility for patrolling the western coastline to prohibit -enemy movement by water in military junks and by vehicle along the -littoral.[19] - - [19] _HD_s and _WDs_ of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMF-212; _PacFlt - Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1939–1960. - -VMF-311, the jet squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Neil R. -MacIntyre, remained the only land-based Marine air unit in Korea. The -Fifth Air Force had made space for it on crowded K-9, seven air miles -northeast of Pusan, when General Harris expressed a desire to keep his -jets in Korea for possible defense against Red air attacks (Map 3). - -MacIntyre exercised his prerogative as squadron commander to fly the -unit’s first combat mission on 17 December. He was not, however, the -first Marine aviator to pilot a jet in combat. That distinction went to -Captain Leslie E. Brown on 9 September 1950. Assigned to the Fifth Air -Force’s 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron as an exchange pilot, he made the -first of several routine flights with an F-80 Shooting Star. - -On 20 December, 17 officers and 51 enlisted men arrived at K-9 to boost -VMF-311’s total to 27 officer pilots and 95 enlisted men. Under Fifth -Air Force control, they were employed to attack suspected CCF troop -shelters, entrenchments, and gun positions on the eve of the expected -enemy offensive. Missions of the jet planes averaged 12 a day at the -end of the month. - - -_The Air Force System of Control_ - -It was seldom realized in the middle of the twentieth century that for -the first time since the Middle Ages, a single human being represented -in his person a decisive tactical unit. Just as the mailed knight on -his barded charger had ruled the battlefields of the medieval world, -so did the pilot of a modern aircraft have the power to put an enemy -battalion to flight with napalm, or to knock out an enemy stronghold -with a 500-pound bomb. - -[Illustration: MAP 3 - -COMBAT AIR BASES - -KOREA-JAPAN] - -A great deal depended, of course, on how the lightning of this human -thunderbolt was controlled. The Marine Corps and the Air Force had -different ideas on the subject. At the foundation of the Marine system -was the concept that the needs of the ground forces came first, -and control of air support should be exercised by the troops being -supported. In each Marine infantry battalion a tactical air control -party (TACP) included two aviators--one to be employed as a forward air -controller (FAC) at the front, and the other as an air liaison officer -in the battalion supporting arms center (SAC).[20] - - [20] The material in this section is derived from the - following sources: _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, - 463–620; Chief. Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical - Air Command, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground - Operations; and CMC, ltr to Dist List re “Analysis of CAS - Systems,” 19 Aug 52. - -In an emergency both could quickly be assigned to companies or even -platoons to “talk” air strikes down on the enemy. The normal chain of -command was bypassed in favor of direct radio from the TACP to the -cognizant air control agency that had the authority to cross-check the -request for possible conflict with other operations and to channel -fighter-bombers to the attack. - -Intermediate commands kept themselves informed of the over-all air -picture and controlled the employment of aviation by their own -subordinates as they listened in on these requests. They indicated -approval by remaining silent, and disapproval by transmitting a -countermand. - -The hub of the Air Force system was the Tactical Air Control Center -(TACC) of the Fifth Air Force-EUSAK Joint Operations Center (JOC), -known by the code name MELLOW. An aviator coming on duty called up -MELLOW and received his instructions from JOC. - -FACs were assigned to U.S. Army and British units down to corps, -division, and regimental levels, and to ROK corps and divisions. -Further assignment to smaller front line units was possible but -entailed a good deal of time and advance planning. And even the most -urgent requests had to be channeled through division and regimental -levels to JOC for approval. - -If a Marine FAC wasn’t able to control an air strike visually because -of terrain conditions, he called for a “tactical air coordinator, -airborne” (TACA) to locate the target from the air and direct -planes to the attack. The Fifth Air Force also used special airborne -coordinators. Known as “Mosquitoes,” they flew low-winged, two-seater -North American training planes, designated T-6s by the Air Force and -SNJs by the Navy. - -This plan was capable under favorable circumstances of providing the -Fifth Air Force-EUSAK tactical air control system with a mobile and -flexible means of directing air power at the front. Its chief weakness, -according to Marine doctrine, lay in the separation of air power from -ground force control. The Air Force claimed the advantage of projecting -tactical air power deep into enemy territory; but as the Marines saw -it, this was deep or interdictory support, and not to be compared to -genuine close air support. - - -_X Corps Conference at Kyongju_ - -The command and staff of the 1st Marine Division could only speculate -during this interim period as to what the near future might hold for -them. Rumors had been circulated, during the first week at Masan, that -the Division would be employed as rearguard to cover an Eighth Army -withdrawal from Korea, with Pusan serving as the port of debarkation. -And while plans cannot be made on a basis of rumor, General Smith and -Colonel Bowser went so far as to discuss the possibility seriously. At -last, on 24 December, a more definite prospect loomed when the EUSAK -staff requested the Division to furnish logistical data for a move by -rail and truck to Wonju, some 130 miles north of Masan. - -It was not known whether an actual move was contemplated or the -intention was merely to have available a plan for future use if the -occasion warranted. General Smith sent the data but added a strong -recommendation to the effect that any commitment of the Division be -postponed until it was re-equipped and strengthened by replacements.[21] - - [21] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Dec 50, 12–13; Smith, _Notes_, 1258–1259. - -At this time the Marine general received a copy of a map prepared -by the Eighth Army staff which showed the phase lines of a 200-mile -withdrawal from the combat zone to the Pusan port of debarkation. No -enlightenment as to the employment of the Division was forthcoming -until 27 December 1950, however, when a EUSAK dispatch directed that -the Marines be detached from Eighth Army reserve and reassigned to the -operational control of X Corps.[22] - - [22] EUSAK msg GX-20179-K600, 27 Dec 50. - -A message of the 28th requested General Smith to attend a conference at -the X Corps CP at Kyongju (about 60 air miles northeast of Masan) on -the 30th. He was directed to bring several members of his staff with -him and to assign a liaison officer to X Corps.[23] - - [23] CG X Corps msg X 16070, 28 Dec 50. - -Two VMO-6 helicopters flew him to Kyongju along with his G-3, Colonel -Bowser, and his aide, Captain Martin J. Sexton. Tossed by high winds, -they landed just in time to meet General Ridgway, who gave a talk -emphasizing the necessity for reconnaissance and maintaining contact -with the enemy. - -The new plan for X Corps employment, as modified after discussion with -the Eighth Army commander, called for the recently reorganized 2d -Infantry Division to be placed under operational control of General -Almond. It was to move out at once to the Wonju front, followed by the -3d and 7th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Marine Division was to stage to -Pohangdong (Map 3) on the east coast, some 65 miles north of Pusan, -with a view to being eventually employed on this same front.[24] - - [24] This account of the Kyongju conference is derived from - Smith, _Notes_, 1269–1271. - -“Certainly no one could accuse General Almond, the X Corps commander, -of defeatism,” was a tribute paid by General Smith. On the contrary, -the Marine general had sometimes differed with him on the grounds -that he was aggressive to the point of giving too little weight to -logistical considerations and time and space factors. - -It was realized at the conference that administrative decisions -must depend to a large extent on the outcome of the impending enemy -offensive. G-2 officers of the Eighth Army, forewarned by prisoner -interrogations, were not surprised when the blow fell shortly before -midnight on the last night of the year. - -In spite of Air Force bombings of roads and suspected supply dumps, -the Chinese Reds had been able to mount a great new offensive only -three weeks after the old one ended. Attacking in the bitter cold of -New Year’s Eve, they made penetrations during the first few hours in -ROK-held sectors of the central and eastern fronts. By daybreak it -became evident that Seoul was a major objective, with the UN situation -deteriorating rapidly. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -The CCF January Offensive - -_UN Forces Give Ground--Further Eighth Army Withdrawals--Marine -Aircraft in the Battle--1st Marine Division Assigned Mission-- -Replacements by Air and Sea--The Move to Japanese Airfields-- -Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--A Tactical Formula for -Victory_ - - -On the last day of 1950 the 1st Marine Division was alerted for two -missions within an hour. At 1425 it was detached from X Corps, after -only four days, and once more assigned to the operational control of -the Eighth Army. The Marines were directed to resume their former -mission of training, reorganizing, and replacing equipment so that -they could be employed either to block enemy penetrations along the -Ulchin-Yongju-Yechon axis (Map 4), or to take over a sector along the -main line of resistance (MLR). - -Forty minutes later another EUSAK dispatch alerted the Division to move -to the Pohang-Andong area, where it would be in position to block any -CCF penetration. This warning order came as no surprise, since X Corps -had already contemplated such employment for General Smith’s troops. -In fact, General Craig and Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Edward W. -Snedeker had left Masan that very morning to select assembly areas and -command posts.[25] - - [25] EUSAK msgs GX 20332-KG00 and GX 20335-KG00 31 Dec 50; - 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4. - -At a conference of G-3 and G-4 officers held at Masan on New Year’s -Day, it was recommended that the administrative headquarters remain in -its present location when the rest of the Division moved up to Pohang. -Although this headquarters had accompanied the Division CP in the past, -it was believed that gains in mobility would result if the large -number of clerical personnel and their increasing bulk of documents -were left behind.[26] In view of the changing situation at the front, -there was less danger of losing valuable records if the headquarters -continued to function at Masan, maintaining contact with the forward CP -by means of daily courier planes. The plan was approved by the Division -commander and worked out to general satisfaction. - - [26] Smith, _Notes_, 1315. - - -_UN Forces Give Ground_ - -Decisions were made during the first few days of 1951 in an atmosphere -of suspense and strain as adverse reports came from the firing line. -General Ridgway had assumed correctly, on the basis of prisoner -interrogations, that the main Chinese effort would be channeled -down the historical invasion corridor north of Seoul. He made his -dispositions accordingly, and the Eighth Army order of battle on 31 -December 1950 (Map 2) was as follows: - -U.S. I Corps--Turkish Brigade, U.S. 25th Division, ROK 1st Division, -from left to right northwest of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British 29th -Brigade. - -U.S. IX Corps--ROK 6th Division, U.S. 24th Division, from left to right -north of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British Commonwealth 27th Brigade, -U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. - -ROK III Corps--ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, from left to right on -central front. In Corps reserve, ROK 7th Division. - -ROK II Corps--ROK 3d Division, on east-central front. - -ROK I Corps--ROK 9th and Capital Divisions, from left to right on -eastern front. - -The U.S. X Corps, comprising the newly reorganized U.S. 2d Infantry -Division at Wonju and the 7th Infantry Division in the Chungju area, -had been given a mission of bolstering the ROK-held line in central and -east Korea and blocking enemy penetrations to the rear. - -In Eighth Army reserve was the 187th Airborne RCT, with Thailand -Battalion attached, in the Suwon area. Also under EUSAK operational -control in rear areas were the 1st Marine Division (Masan), the 3d -Infantry Division (Kyongju), the Canadian Battalion (Miryang), and the -New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion (Pusan). - -[Illustration: EUSAK FRONT LINES 3 Jan. 51 - -MAP 4] - -Altogether, the United Nations forces in Korea numbered 444,336 men -as of January 1951. The cosmopolitan character of the fight against -Communism is indicated by the aid given to the U.S. and ROK forces -by contingents of combat troops from 13 other nations--Australia, -Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, -Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.[27] - - [27] Sources for this section are EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, - 4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65. - -Enemy numbers at this time were estimated at a total of 740,000 men in -Korea and nearby Manchuria. Seven CCF armies, the 37th, 38th, 39th, -40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th were identified among the troops attacking -on New Year’s Eve. The NKPA I and V Corps also participated. Estimated -strength of the assaulting forces was 174,000 Chinese and 60,000 North -Koreans. - -Previously identified but not reported in contact with U.S. forces on -31 December were the 24th, 48th, 49th, and 65th CCF armies and the NKPA -1st, 3d, and 15th Divisions. - -As another possibility which could not be overlooked, the five CCF -armies which had opposed X Corps in northeast Korea might also take -part in the new offensive. Elements of the 20th, 26th, 27th, 30th, and -32d Armies identified in that area early in December, had more than -two weeks in which to reorganize and make their way to the Eighth Army -front. If they got into the fight, it would mean a formidable addition -to the enemy’s forces. - -With only five days at his disposal, after arrival in Korea, General -Ridgway’s preparations were limited. His dispositions could not be -blamed, but it was the old story of the chain and its weakest link -as the enemy scored a major breakthrough at the expense of the 1st -ROK Division on the west-central front. Unfortunately, this unit -represented the tactical joint between I Corps and IX Corps. The enemy -widened the gap before dawn and drove on toward Seoul. - -Early in the morning the EUSAK commanding general was on the road, -waving his arms in an attempt to stop ROK soldiers streaming rearward -in their vehicles after abandoning crew-served weapons. The short -training period for these troops, their tactical inexperience, and the -language barrier were the dissonant notes tolling the ominous chords of -defeat. The whole front was endangered as the enemy poured through an -ever widening gap, and Ridgway ordered that roadblocks be set up where -MPs could halt the fugitives, rearm them, and send them back to the -front. At his request, President Syngman Rhee appealed to ROK soldiers -over the radio and exhorted them to make a stand. By that time it was -too late to save Seoul, and the commanding general gave orders for its -evacuation. - -“The withdrawal was initiated in mid-afternoon on the 3d,” he commented -in retrospect, “I stayed on the bridge site on the north bank until -dark to watch the passage of the most critical loads. These were -the 8-inch howitzers and the British Centurion tanks, both of which -exceeded the safety limits of the bridge under the conditions existing -at the time.”[28] - - [28] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 5 Jun 57. - -It was a scene of terror and despair that Ridgway never forgot. -Thousands of Korean civilian refugees were making their way over the -thin ice of the river Han, many of them carrying children or old people -on their backs. What impressed the observer most was the uncanny -silence of this mass flight in the freezing winter dusk, broken only -by the sound of a multitude of feet shuffling over the ice--a sound -strangely like a vast whispering. It was as if these derelicts of war -were trying incoherently to confide their misery to someone. - -From a strategic viewpoint, the only course left to the Eighth Army was -a continued retirement south of Seoul. “We came back fast,” Ridgway -admitted, “but as a fighting army, not as a running mob. We brought our -dead and wounded with us, and our guns, and our will to fight.”[29] - - [29] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 215. - - -_Further Eighth Army Withdrawals_ - -EUSAK Fragmentary Operations Plan 20, issued as an order on 4 January, -called for a further withdrawal to Line D (Map 4). In preparation, X -Corps had moved up to the front on the 2d, after assuming operational -control of the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and the ROK 2d, 5th, -and 8th Divisions and occupied a sector between U.S. IX Corps and ROK -III Corps.[30] - - [30] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92. - -The U.S. 3d Division was attached to I Corps and the 187th Airborne RCT -passed temporarily under operational control of IX Corps. - -By 7 January the UN forces had pulled back to a modified Line D -extending from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east and -taking in Yoju and Chechon. General Ridgway sent telegrams to all corps -commanders expressing dissatisfaction with the personnel and material -losses inflicted on the enemy during the withdrawal. “I shall expect,” -each message concluded, “utmost exploitation of every opportunity in -accordance with my basic directive.” - -That evening, foreshadowing the offensive operations he was -contemplating, the commanding general ordered a reconnaissance-in-force -by a reinforced infantry regiment north to Osan to search out the -enemy and inflict maximum punishment. No contacts were made, nor did -strong patrols sent out by U.S. IX Corps flush out any sizeable groups -of Chinese. But the Eighth Army had served notice that it intended to -regain the initiative at the first opportunity. - -One more blow remained to be absorbed. On the 8th the Communists struck -in the Wonju area with an attack of four divisions. Elements of the -newly reorganized 2d Infantry Division were forced to give up that -important highway and rail center after counterattacks failed. The -enemy now directed his main effort along the Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon -corridor, and North Korean guerrilla forces infiltrated through the gap -between the U.S. X Corps and ROK III Corps. - -The salient created by this CCF attack caused Line D to be modified -again so that in the center it dipped sharply downward to Chungju -before curving northeast to Samchok (Map 4). - - -_Marine Aircraft in the Battle_ - -The pilots and aircrewmen of the three carrier squadrons and the -land-based jet squadron were the only Marines in a position to take an -active part in the battle. With but one TACP per division, close air -support was out of the question for the ROKs on New Year’s Day. - -Control facilities were severely strained when scores of UN fliers -made use of the frequencies which the Mosquitoes employed for tactical -air direction. The voices were all in the English language, but with -more than one person doing the sending, shrill side noises sliced in -to garble the whole into a cacophony of jungle sounds. A Mosquito -trying to coach a fighter-bomber attack at the crossings of the Imjin -might be drowned out by a distant pilot calling up a controller in the -Hwachon Reservoir Area.[31] - - [31] USAF Hist Study No. 72, _U. S. Air Force Operations in - the Korean Conflict_, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, (hereafter - cited as AHS-72) pp. 188–196. The term “net” denotes a - network of radio stations, all on a single frequency for - a specific purpose. - -As a consequence, there was no coordinated air-ground attack in -direct support of the man in the foxhole. Most of the JOC effort was -directed to the enemy’s rear in an effort to block supporting arms, -reinforcements, and supplies. - -The two Marine squadrons attached to Admiral Ruble’s carriers were at -sea, some 80 miles south of Inchon when news of the Chinese offensive -filtered through the tedious communication channels from JOC and EUSAK. -Major Lund, CO of VMF-323, led an eight-plane attack which destroyed -enemy trucks and some 40 huts believed to be occupied by CCF troops in -a village south of the Imjin. - -Another Marine air mission of New Year’s Day was the flight commanded -by Major Kenneth L. Reusser for the purpose of wiping out a reported -CCF concentration on the central front. Unfortunately, he could not -get verification that the target consisted of enemy troops. Before -a decision could be made, Reusser heard a Mosquito of the 2d ROK -Division calling urgently for any flier in the area to hit another CCF -concentration (this time verified) in a village to the enemy’s rear of -the Chorwon-Hwachon area. Under the Mosquito’s direction the Corsairs -bombed and napalmed the village, then strafed survivors trying to -escape. - -VMF-212, flying with Navy (Task Force) TF-77 on the eastern side of -the peninsula, had a busy New Year’s Day. Two eight-plane interdiction -strikes were flown in the morning against rear area targets along the -coastal highways. The afternoon brought an emergency call from JOC, -and the squadron “scrambled” 14 planes which hit the east flank of an -extensive enemy push south of the Hwachon Reservoir.[32] - - [32] The term “scramble” in military aviation parlance refers - to an expeditious takeoff in response to an emergency - call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a - pattern rather than a panic. - -More than 300 UN fighter-bombers were sent out under JOC, or MELLOW, -control on the embattled first day of 1951. On the west coast TacRon-3 -received more calls for air support than TG-96.8 could fill. Rear -Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey sent a request to Admiral Struble in the -_Missouri_ for additional carrier planes, and within a few hours the -Marines of VMF-212 were detached and on their way to the west coast to -join the other two Corsair squadrons of TG-96.8. - -All four Marine fighter-bomber squadrons took part daily in air -operations as the Chinese Reds continued their advance south of Seoul. -VMF-311 was badly handicapped, however, by mechanical difficulties. -Engine or radio trouble accounted for five “aborts” of the 15 sorties -launched on 4 January. The remaining pilots could not make radio -contacts with their assigned Mosquito controller, and had little choice -other than to attack targets of opportunity. - -The jets continued in action, but it was realized that they were -not giving the maximum of their capabilities. By mid-January the -squadron had become almost ineffective through no fault of its own. -Technical representatives from the companies that had manufactured -both the engine and plane were flown to K-9 (Map 3), and on the 16th -all jets were grounded. These inspectors did not work on the planes; -they were empowered only to report the nature of the trouble to the -airplane companies concerned. The companies in turn reported to BuAir -in Washington, which sent instructions and if necessary mechanics to -Itami, where major aircraft maintenance was done. - -Meanwhile, the fall of Seoul meant that the Air Force was evicted by -enemy action from such major fields as Kimpo and K-16 on an island in -the river Han. The Sabre jets and Mosquitoes had to be pulled back, and -soon the F-51s were no longer secure at Suwon from an advancing enemy. - -Admiral Thackrey’s Western Deployment Group completed the evacuation -from Inchon of 70,000 tons of supplies, 2,000 vehicles, and about -5,000 troops.[33] As the Navy closed out activities on the west -coast, TG-96.8 sent out its last combat air missions on 7 January. -VMF-214 made its final reconnaissance patrols; VMF-212 flew 25 sorties -in support of UN troops in central Korea; and VMF-323 took part in -a series of Air Force raids on enemy troop assembly areas in the -Hoengsong area.[33] - - [33] AHS-72, 47, 48; PhibGru-3 _WD_, Jan 51. - -Until the last, the carrier Marines alternated their Eighth Army -support missions with routine CAPs, coastal searches, and airfield -bombings. Admiral Thackrey’s Redeployment Group, including TacRon-3, -completed its task in the Inchon area and departed on the 7th. On -that same day HMS _Theseus_, flying the flag of Admiral Andrewes, was -back in west coast waters as the British pilots resumed their coastal -patrols and naval air support on that side of the peninsula. Within a -week VMF-212 and the _Bataan_ returned to fly alternate tours of duty -with the pilots of the _Theseus_. The other two carrier squadrons found -themselves unemployed for the time being. Not only were they out of a -job, they were also homeless, since the United Nations had been forced -to give up airfields at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul, Kimpo, and Suwon. Only -K-1, K-2, K-4, K-9, K-10, and two small fields near Taegu remained -(Map 2), and they would scarcely serve the needs of FEAF. Thus it was -that VMF-214 and VMF-323 found a temporary haven at Itami, along with -VMF-311 and most of the administrative and service units of the 1st -MAW. There was nothing to do but wait until a new home could be found -for the fighter-bomber squadrons. - - -_1st Marine Division Assigned Mission_ - -The Marine aviators might have found some consolation in the fact that -their comrades of the ground forces were also groping in a fog of -uncertainty. At the most critical period of the CCF thrust in the Wonju -area, General Smith was summoned to Taegu on 8 January for a conference -with General Ridgway. The Eighth Army commander proposed to attach one -of the Marine RCTs to X Corps in the Andong area, about 95 air miles -north of Masan. The remainder of the Division would then move to the -Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area, some 60 air miles northeast of Masan (Map -4). - -Ridgway asked the Marine general to discuss the prospect with his -staff. He realized, he said, that no commander liked to have his -division split up, and he assured Smith that as soon as the X Corps -zone became stabilized, the RCT would be sent back to him. - -They parted with this understanding, but a few hours after his return -by air to Masan the following message was received from Ridgway: - - Subsequent your departure, alternate plan occurred to me on which - I would like your views soonest. It follows: 1st Mar Div, under - Army control, move without delay to general area outlined to you - personally today, to take over responsibility at date and hour - to be announced later for protection of MSR between Andong and - Kyongju, both inclusive, and prevent hostile penetration in force - south of Andong-Yongdok road.[34] - - [34] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G-1-628-KGG, 8 Jan - 51. - -At 1115 on the 9th the plan was made official. An Eighth Army dispatch -ordered the 1st Marine Division to move without delay to the Pohang -area (Map 4), remaining under EUSAK control, with the following -missions: - -(a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of the Andong-Yongdok -road; - -(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, Uihung, and -Uisong.[35] - - [35] EUSAK msg GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51. - -Based on these directives. Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 on the -9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and to protect -the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in the vicinity -of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, -plus other Division elements, were ordered to provide the required -trucks.[36] - - [36] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 1-51, 9 Jan 51. - -General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 9 January. -He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, where the -Division staff officers and regimental commanders were presented to -him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnaissance -and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Marine -officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth Army units -would be put into effect soon.[37] - - [37] Smith, _Notes_, 1279. - -Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the -completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan to the -objective area.[38] - - [38] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 2-51, 10 Jan 51. - -Shortages both of personnel and equipment were much reduced during -the first two weeks of January. Returns to duty of battle and -nonbattle casualties added 945 to the Division strength. Corresponding -improvements had been made in the material readiness of the Division. -Early in January a large resupply shipment arrived from Kobe, and -a Navy cargo ship brought supplies and equipment which had been -left behind at Inchon in October. Thus the situation was generally -satisfactory except for nearly 1,900 gaps in the ranks that remained to -be filled.[39] - - [39] Smith, _Notes_, 1285–1286, 1307–1308. - - -_Replacements by Air and Sea_ - -Facilities for air transport across the Pacific were limited, since -the Army was also moving replacements to the Far East. A piecemeal -process of shuttling Marines in plane-load increments could not be -completed before 30 January. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, -Jr., commanding FMFPac, took a dim view of this delay. It would be -better for the Division, he maintained, to receive even a part of its -replacements before it went back into action. As a compromise, he -proposed a combined air-sea lift which met the approval of Rear Admiral -Arthur H. Radford, commanding Pacific Fleet. - -Three replacement drafts were already on the way, with the 3d in Japan -and the 4th and 5th at Camp Pendleton. General Shepherd scraped the -bottom of the manpower barrel so closely that he dug up an additional -700 men from Marine security detachments in Japan, the Philippines, and -other Pacific Ocean bases. - -Seven trainloads of Marines from Camp Lejeune arrived at San Francisco -on 10 January to join those from Camp Pendleton. On the same day -230 of these replacements were flown to Hawaii by the Military Air -Transportation Service (MATS), by the R5D’s of Marine VMR-352 and of -Navy VR-5, and by the “Mars” flying boats of Navy VR-9. The next day -799 Marines sailed on the fast transport USNS _General W. O. Darby_. -The remainder were transported at the rate of one plane load a day -by MATS and at the rate of three or four plane loads a day by the -Navy and Marine transport planes of Fleet Logistics Air Wing, Pacific -(FLogAirWingPac).[40] - - [40] Material relative to Marine replacements has been derived - from FMFPac _HD_, Dec 50 and Jan 51. - -Five days later, on the 16th, the airlift had cleared the last Marine -out of Treasure Island. On 21 January, 1,000 men of the special draft -were already with the 1st Division at Pohang and the 799 on board -_General Darby_ were due to dock at Pusan. - -It had been a fast job of coordination by the Navy, Army, Air Force, -and virtually all major units of the Marine Corps. Much of the special -airlift was flown by the R5Ds of VMR-352 and of VMR-152. The former, -commanded by Colonel William B. Steiner, had been flying the El -Toro-Tokyo flights since October, but most of its effort had been in -shuttling between the mainland and Hawaii. VMR-152 had concentrated on -the Hawaii-Japan leg of the long trip. During the Chosin campaign, -the squadron commander, Colonel Deane C. Roberts, had maintained his -headquarters and 10 planes at Itami to support the shuttle to Korea. -He had barely returned to Hawaii from that job when his squadron was -alerted not only for the special lift of Marine replacements but also -for a return to the Far East.[41] - - [41] The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50 - and Jan 51 historical diaries of VMF-352, VMR-152, 1st - MAW, and FMFPac. - -Hawaii had been the bottleneck in this special troop lift. Land and -seaplanes were discharging their human cargo at Barbers Point, Hickam -Air Force Base, and Keehi Lagoon. From there FLogAirWingPac had to -space the planes over the long stretches of sea at approximately -four-hour intervals. The guiding factor was other air traffic over -the same route and the servicing, messing, and rescue capabilities of -Guam and other points along the way, such as tiny Johnston Island. The -latter was barely big enough for its single 6,100-foot runway. - -VMR-152 and the Navy’s VR-21 were assigned the mission of flying -the long Hawaii-Japan portion of the big lift. Itami became another -collection center for the airborne replacements and five of the VMR-152 -planes were retained there to shuttle the troops the last 300 miles to -K-3, near Pohang (Map 2). On 21 January the troop lift reached virtual -completion, but Admiral Radford authorized the 1st MAW to retain a -couple of R5D’s at Itami a little longer. Thus the Marines were able -to avoid highway and rail traffic jams in Korea by flying men and -materials from troop and supply centers in Japan to K-1, K-3, or K-9. - -Looking back at the troop lift from a historical distance, the observer -is most impressed by its demonstration of teamwork on a gigantic scale. -The Marine Corps had functioned as a single great unit, even though a -continent and an ocean separated the vanguard in Korea from the rear -echelons in North Carolina. - - -_The Move to Japanese Airfields_ - -The seven remaining UN airfields in Korea were of course not enough -to accommodate the 25 FEAF and Marine tactical squadrons. Logistics -and lack of space proved to be knotty problems. Thirty tank cars of -gasoline a day were needed for normal flight operations of K-2 alone. -Yet it took these cars eight days to make the 120-mile Pusan-Taegu -round trip, such was the strain put on the railway system by the CCF -offensive. - -FEAF had standby plans to evacuate Korea entirely in an emergency. Some -of the secondary airfields of the Itazuke complex in Japan had been -reevaluated for this purpose. Originally built by the Japanese for -World War II, they were obsolescent by 1951 and because of weather, -neglect, and misuse badly deteriorated.[42] - - [42] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG-33 _HD_s - of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be - designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS-72, 35–37; EUSAK - _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; _PacFlt Interim - Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion - Two (hereafter MCB-2) Report of Activities for Jan 51; - Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58. - -The most promising of these secondary airfields were Tsuika, Ozuki, and -Bofu (Map 3), ranging from 30 to 65 miles east of Itazuke and facing -one another around Japan’s Inland Sea. Nearest to Itazuke and on the -same island of Kyushu was Tsuika. Across the narrow Shimonoseki Strait, -on the shore line of Honshu, were Ozuki and Bofu. - -General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, informed General MacArthur -that it was necessary to start air operations from Ozuki and Bofu as -soon as possible. A good deal of work had already been done on Tsuika, -even to moving a major Japanese highway in order to lengthen the runway -to 7,000 feet. The Air Force general wanted to repair Ozuki for his -F-51 squadrons, and Bofu was to be reserved for the 1st MAW. - -This decision meant a revision of plans for the Marines. MAG-12 had -recently been lifting a hundred men a day to K-1 (Pusan west) with a -view to making it into a major base. These preparations came to an -abrupt halt, pending the final decision on Bofu. - -A Marine survey of that World War II airfield showed it to be in -serious disrepair. The Air Force had already rejected it as a base for -night-harassing B-26s. Although the runway was only 7 feet above sea -level, a 720-foot hill complicated the traffic pattern. Nevertheless, -Bofu was considered suitable for the time being, and the Air Force -assured the 1st MAW that its use would be but temporary. - -FEAF proposed that the Marines start flying out of Bofu immediately, -operating under field conditions. There were, however, essential -repairs to be made. The 5,300-foot runway remained in fair condition, -but much of the taxiway was not surfaced and couldn’t stand heavy use -by the Corsairs, Three of the four hangars needed extensive repairs, -as did the barracks and mess hall. Fuel would have to be stored in -drums. - -The Wing had the capability for minor construction but lacked the -equipment, men, and fiscal authority to handle major work on the -runways and taxiways. The Air Force offered to furnish the labor -and materials, provided that the Navy pay for them. The Navy in its -turn was too limited in funds to restore an Air Force field for only -temporary use by Marines. - -Finally, a compromise solved the problem. The Navy agreed to have -the engineering work done by a detachment of its Mobile Construction -Battalion 2 (Seabees) and furnish the concrete for patching the runways -and rebuilding the warm-up aprons. The Air Force was to provide the -pierced steel planking for the runways. - -On 15 January MAG-33 sent an advance detachment of 125 officers and men -to Bofu to do some of the preliminary work, and on the following day -the Seabees initiated the heavy construction. The restoration of K-1 -was meanwhile resumed by MAG-12. - -Until these two fields were made ready, VMF-212 on the _Bataan_ would -be the only Marine squadron in combat. - - -_Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign_ - -The middle of January was also a transition period for the 1st Marine -Division. In accordance with Division Orders 1-51 and 2-51, the -movement from Masan commenced at 0545 on 10 January when the first -serial of RCT-1 departed by motor for the Pohang-Andong area. LSTs -898 and 914 sailed the next day with elements of the Tank, Ordnance, -Engineer, and Service Battalions. The new Division CP opened at -Sinhung, about five miles southeast of Pohang, at 1600 on 16 January; -and by the 17th all designated motor and water lifts were completed. -Thus the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were poised -to begin new operations which will be described in the following -chapter.[43] - - [43] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51. - -By 15 January relative quiet prevailed along the entire front; the -Chinese Reds had shot their bolt. In terms of territorial gains (Map -4) the Communists could claim a victory, for they had inflicted heavy -losses both in troop casualties and equipment on the UN forces. Yet -the CCF January offensive could not compare with the November-December -attacks either in moral or material damage done to the Eighth Army. -This time the UN divisions had withdrawn for the most part in good -order after the rout of ROK units at the outset. Nor were Ridgway’s -troops always driven from their positions by enemy action. Whenever he -had an option between sacrificing men or Korean real estate, it was the -latter he chose. And by his insistence on good combat discipline, he -made the enemy pay an exorbitant price. - -Nevertheless, the blunt fact remains that the United Nations forces -had been beaten in spite of an overwhelming superiority in aircraft, -artillery, armor, and transport as well as command of the sea. -Stateside Americans can scarcely be blamed for asking themselves why -their well-equipped divisions had been defeated twice within six weeks -by an Asiatic peasant army using semiguerrilla tactics and depending -largely on small arms, mortars, and light artillery. - -The answer cannot be given in simplified terms. Although the Chinese -Reds were represented by a peasant army, it was also a first-rate army -when judged by its own tactical and strategic standards. Military -poverty might be blamed for some of its deficiencies in arms and -equipment, but its semiguerrilla tactics were based on a mobility which -could not be burdened with heavy weapons and transport. The Chinese -coolie in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing better than any -other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an enemy position -in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only Americans who have -had such an experience can realize what a shock it is to be surprised -at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun slugs of gnomelike -attackers who seemed to rise out of the very earth. - -Press correspondents were fond of referring to “the human sea tactics -of the Asiatic hordes.” Nothing could be further from the truth. In -reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a regiment. -Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly endless -succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass but deception and -surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable. - -They also had an advantage over Western soldiers in their ability to -withstand hunger and cold while making long night marches. After all, -the rigors of a winter campaign in Korea were not much worse than the -hardships the Chinese peasant had endured all his life. Usually he was -a veteran of at least five years’ combat experience, for China had -known little but war since the Japanese invasion of 1935. Many of Mao -Tse-tung’s troops, in fact, were former Nationalists who had fought for -Chiang Kai-shek. - -The Chinese Reds held another advantage in Korean terrain well suited -to their tactical system. This factor has been ably summarized by U.S. -Military Academy historians: - - The mountains are high, and the deep gorges between them are a - bar to traffic even when the streams are dry or frozen. Roads are - few, and those that do exist are not suited for heavy traffic. - Transportation then becomes a problem for the pack mule and the - human back rather than the self-propelled vehicle. Telephone - wires are difficult to lay and, with guerrillas on every hand, - are doubly hard to maintain. Even radio is limited by such - terrain, with a considerable reduction in range. In all, most - observers have agreed that American forces have seldom fought in - terrain to which modern means of war are less adaptable.[44] - - [44] U.S. Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_, 28–29. - -The fanaticism and political indoctrination of the CCF soldier must -also be taken into account. His introduction to Communism began when -he was persuaded that China’s small farms would be taken away from the -hated landlords and divided among the people. This is the first stage -of every Communist upheaval. Next comes a reign of terror calculated -to liquidate the entire class of landlords and small shopkeepers. -Communist China, almost literally wading in blood, had reached this -second phase in 1951, the “year of violence.” Mass trials were held in -which the People’s Tribunals, keyed up to a frenzy of fury, sentenced -group after group of “Capitalist oppressors” to death without bothering -about the evidence. The executions were public spectacles. An estimated -million and a half of them took place in 1951 alone as loudspeakers on -street corners blared out first-hand descriptions. - -Drives were organized for everything in Red China. So rapidly did -they multiply that humorless Communist leaders saw no absurdity in -announcing a new drive to reduce the number of drives. And when the -Youth League tried too zealously to please, a drive was launched “to -Correct the Undesirable Habit of Filing False Reports.”[45] Under these -circumstances it is understandable that great emphasis was placed -on Red China’s “Hate America” drive early in 1951. The illiterate -masses were made to believe that Americans practiced all manner of -bestialities, including even cannibalism. This was the indoctrination -of the CCF soldier in Korea, and political commissars with a captain’s -authority were attached to each company to see that no backsliding -occurred. In case of doubt, it was a simple matter to compel the -suspected political deviate to kneel at the roadside and await a bullet -from behind. - - [45] Richard L. Walker, _China Under Communism_ (New Haven, - 1955), 119, 307. - - -_A Tactical Formula for Victory_ - -It might well be inquired where Red China raised the funds, for even -wars waged with human cannon fodder do not come cheaply. Much of the -money was donated by new farm owners as “voluntary” contributions -exceeding by far the rent and taxes of pre-Communist years. The slave -labor of millions of Chinese sent to concentration camps also helped -to foot the bill. In the long run, however, the Communist lords found -perhaps their most effective means in the extortion of ransom from -Chinese living outside the country on pain of torturing or killing -relatives dwelling within its borders. Enormous sums were collected in -spite of the efforts of foreign governments to put an end to this form -of secret terrorism.[46] - - [46] _Ibid._, 13. - -Altogether, the army of Red China may be appraised as a formidable -instrument on terrain suited to its tactics. Several of America’s -foremost military thinkers were convinced, nevertheless, that Eighth -Army reverses of the first few months in Korea were the penalty paid -for a national preoccupation with airborne atomic weapons at the -expense of preparations for limited wars. - -It was only natural that the American public and its political and -military leaders in Washington should have been much concerned about -a weapon with the capability of wiping out a medium-size city in -a minute.[47] Their anxiety was heightened by President Truman’s -announcement on 23 September 1949 that Soviet Russia had exploded an -atomic bomb. A great many Americans, probably a majority, sincerely -believed that it was hardly worthwhile to prepare for an old-fashioned -limited war when the Armageddon of the future would be fought to an -awesome finish with thermonuclear weapons. National policy was shaped -by this line of reasoning; and though we had every opportunity to -study Chinese tactics prior to 1950, few if any preparations were made -to cope with them. The outbreak of Korean hostilities found the four -U.S. skeleton divisions in Japan woefully unready, both morally and -materially. - - [47] The day had not yet dawned when the hydrogen bomb would - have a much greater potentiality for frightfulness. - -At a later date three high-placed U.S. Army generals, Matthew B. -Ridgway, James M. Gavin, and Maxwell D. Taylor, would retire because -they could not reconcile their views with a national policy which -they interpreted as placing all our strategic eggs in the basket of -intercontinental bombers and guided missiles. Afterwards, as advocates -of preparedness for limited as well as atomic warfare, they published -books presenting their side of the case.[48] - - [48] Gen M. B. Ridgway, _Memoirs_ (New York, 1956); Gen J. M. - Gavin, _War and Peace in the Space Age_ (New York, 1958); - Gen M. D. Taylor, _The Uncertain Trumpet_ (New York, - 1959). - -On 15 January 1951 these developments were still in the future, of -course. But even at the time it had already been made evident that -the armed forces of Red China were not an exception to the age-old -rule that there is no such thing as an invincible army. When they came -up against well trained and led U.S. Army outfits in both of their -offensives, they always had a fight on their hands and frequently a -repulse. - -The Marines had proved beyond doubt in their Chosin Reservoir campaign -that the Chinese Reds could be beaten by ground and air firepower -engendered by sound training, discipline, and combat leadership. Five -Chinese armies, of three or four divisions each, were identified in -northeast Korea during the November-December operations. Three of -them were directly or indirectly opposed to the 1st Marine Division, -with a U.S. Army battalion and smaller Army units attached. Yet the -beleaguered American forces seized the initiative and fought their way -for 13 days and 35 miles through enveloping CCF units which had cut the -mountain MSR in five places. - -Throughout the CCF January offensive, EUSAK G-2 officers anxiously -sought every scrap of evidence as to the whereabouts of the five CCF -armies identified in northeast Korea as late as 10 December. Even if -reduced by casualties, they would have been a formidable and perhaps -even decisive reinforcement to the seven CCF armies engaged. But they -did not appear. Nor were they encountered again until the middle of -March 1951, when similarly numbered units filled with replacements -reached the front. - -The full story may never be known, since the Chinese Reds are not fond -of acknowledging their disasters. But it is a likely conjecture that -the fatal combination of Marine firepower and General Winter created -terrible havoc among Communists who had been so certain of an immediate -victory that they were neither armed, clothed, nor supplied for a -13-day campaign in subzero weather. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt - -_The New Marine Zone of Operations--1st MAW Moves to Bofu--Marine Rice -Paddy Patrols--Operations_ THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP_--Action in the -Pohang-Andong Zone--KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_--_10th_ -NPKA _Division Scattered--New Mission for the Marines_ - - -On 15 January 1951 a reinforced regiment of the U.S. 25th Infantry -Division drove northward from Line D (Map 4) to a point about half -a mile from Suwon in the I Corps sector. VMF-212, flying from the -CVE _Bataan_, supported the movement along with land-based Air Force -planes. No CCF troops were encountered during a two-day thrust -dignified with the name Operation WOLFHOUND. Its only importance lay in -its distinction as the first Eighth Army counterstroke in reply to the -enemy’s January offensive. Other EUSAK advances were soon to follow, -each more ambitious than the last and bearing a more bristling code -name. - -General Ridgway proposed by this means to exert continual and -increasing pressure on an enemy paying for victory with extended supply -lines. Meanwhile, he hoped to build up the morale of his own troops -without asking too much of them at first. - -In less than seven weeks, from 1 December 1950 to 15 January 1951, the -Eighth Army had been pushed back an average distance of 200 miles. -Never before in the Nation’s history had an American army given up so -much ground and equipment in so short a time, and damage to morale was -inevitable. Yet the commanding general was confident that a cure would -be effected by better combat leadership and discipline. He planned to -emphasize the need for these remedies until he restored the Eighth Army -to tactical health. - - -_The New Marine Zone of Operations_ - -Ridgway agreed with Marine generals that the 1st Marine Division had -come out of its 13-day battle in the Chosin Reservoir area with its -fighting spirit undulled. Minor respiratory ills seemed to be the -only consequences felt by the survivors. “A hacking cough,” recalled -a Marine staff officer long afterwards, “was the symbol of the Bean -Patch.”[49] - - [49] MajGen F. M. McAlister ltr, 17 Jun 57. - -Such ills soon responded to rest and medical care, and it was a -physically fit division that made the move to the new zone of -operations. About one man out of three in the infantry and artillery -battalions was a newcomer to Korea. These replacements were shaping up -nicely, and the new operation promised to be ideal combat training. - -The move took nearly a week. While the other troops proceeded by motor, -LSTs 898 and 914 sailed with elements of the Tank, Ordnance, Engineer, -and Service Battalions. The Division CP opened at Sinhung (Map 5), -about 5 miles southeast of Pohang, on 16 January. By the following day -all designated motor and water lifts were completed. - -On the 18th the Marines were assigned a three-fold mission by Division -OpnO 3-51: (1) the protection of the Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR (main -supply route); (2) the securing of Andong and the two airstrips in the -vicinity; and (3) the prevention of hostile penetrations in force to -the south of the Andong-Yongdok road. The following zones of patrol -responsibility were assigned to Marine units: - -_Zone A_--RCT-1: an area about 10 miles east and west of the -Uisong-Andong road, including both Uisong and Andong. - -_Zone B_--RCT-5: an area some 15 to 20 miles wide astride the -Kyongju-Yongchon-Uisong road, including Kyongju but excluding Uisong. - -_Zone C_--RCT-7: an area 20 to 25 miles wide from east to west and -extending north from the latitude of Pohang to the Andong-Yongdok road. - -_Zone D_--11th Marines: a strip seven miles wide along the coast -astride the road from Pohang to a point about 10 miles north of Yongdok. - -_Zone E_--1st Tank Battalion: the area bounded by the road from -Pohang to Kyongju and thence to the east coast at a point about 19 -miles southeast of Pohang. - -[Illustration: MAP 5 - -1st Mar Div Zone of Action - -and - -Regimental Boundries - -During Pohang Guerrilla Hunt] - -Keeping open the 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong was -considered the principal mission of the Division. Strong points were -set up at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong. - -Captured documents indicated that enemy forces in unknown numbers had -already infiltrated through gaps in the eastern sectors of the Eighth -Army’s Line D. Guerrilla activity was reported as far west as Tanyang, -on the MSR of IX Corps, and as far south as Taejon, threatening the -supply line of I Corps. Train ambushes occurred on 13 January in the -Namchang area and to the south of Wonju. Other attacks took place on -the rail line about 60 miles north of Taegu. In expectation of further -attempts, trains were provided with a sandbagged car, pushed ahead of -the engine, to absorb the shock of landmine explosions. Another car was -occupied by guards who had the duty of dealing with direct guerrilla -attacks.[50] - - [50] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jan 51. - -The tactical problem of the Marines was quite simple--on paper. About -1,600 square miles, most of them standing on end in mountainous -terrain, were included in the new zone of operations. The experience -of World War II had demonstrated how effective guerrilla warfare could -be as an adjunct to large-scale military operations. Officers of the -1st Marine Division had no illusions about their mission, therefore, -when they received unconfirmed reports of NKPA guerrilla infiltrations -behind the EUSAK lines toward Andong. - -All uncertainty vanished on 18 January, shortly after the issuing of -OpnO 3-51, when a patrol of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, flushed out -an undetermined number of North Korean troops east of Andong. They took -to their heels so earnestly that the Marines barely managed to catch -three of them after a long chase. - -The prisoners identified their unit as the 27th Infantry of the NKPA -10th Infantry Division. The other two regiments, the 25th and 29th, -were also in the general area. All three were supported more in theory -than fact by artillery, mortar, medical, and engineer units organic -to the division. In reality, however, the estimated total of 6,000 -troops consisted largely of infantry, A few mortars, according to the -prisoners, were the largest weapons. - -Following the Inchon-Seoul operation, the remnants of the badly -mauled NKPA 10th Infantry Division had straggled back across the -38th Parallel to the Hwachon area. There they were reorganized by the -Chinese for guerrilla operations and placed under the command of NKPA -Major General Lee Ban Nam.[51] - - [51] 1stMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (_PIR_) 87–94, - 17–22 Jan 51. - -Late in December the rebuilt division, still short of arms and -equipment, departed Hwachon with a mission of infiltrating through the -UN lines to cut communications and harass rear installations of the -Andong-Taegu area. Shots were exchanged with United Nations troops near -Wonju, but General Lee Ban Nam and his troops contrived to slip to the -east through the mountains. Stealthily moving southward, marching by -night and hiding by day, they were soon in a position to heckle the -rear of the X Corps sector. This advantage did not last long. Before -they could strike a blow, the element of surprise was lost along with -the three prisoners taken by the Marines. - -As the Marine units moved into their assigned zones, General Ridgway -flew to Pohang to confer with General Smith. Not only did he express -confidence that the Marines would soon have the situation well under -control; he also suggested the possibility of small amphibious landings -along the east coast. The purpose was to block a possible southward -advance of the three CCF armies that had operated in Northeast Korea -during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.[52] - - [52] Units of these armies, it may be recalled, were not - identified again in the CCF order of battle before the - middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of - these enemy troops being used for a surprise stroke had - to be taken into consideration. - -The east coast littoral was considered the most likely route of -approach. Smith was of the opinion, however, that an amphibious landing -should be made in strength, if at all. And there the matter rested.[53] - - [53] Smith, _Notes_, 1339. - - -_1st MAW Moves to Bofu_ - -During the operations of the first few days the Marine ground forces -had to depend for air support on FEAF planes sent by JOC. The 1st -Marine Aircraft Wing had its hands full at this time with housekeeping -activities. Work began at Bofu (Map 3) on 20 January as a Seabee -detachment arrived with its graders and bulldozers. They were assisted -by details of Marines from MAG-33.[54] - - [54] This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on - the January historical diaries of the following - organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214; - VMF-323; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)-542; MWSS-1; FMFPac. Another - source is _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 969. - -The job went ahead with typical Seabee efficiency. While specialists -installed plumbing for the galleys and barracks, other crews graded -taxiways, laid pierced steel planking, and poured concrete to patch up -runways, parking ramps, and warmup aprons. - -MAG-12 kept busy at the task of moving men and equipment from Itami -and other Japanese fields to Korea. Aircraft of VMR-152, commanded -by Colonel Deane C. Roberts, provided transportation. Since safety -measures precluded the use of the K-1 runway during construction -activity, K-9 substituted temporarily. As fast as the planes unloaded, -passengers and gear were trucked 15 miles through Pusan to K-1. - -It was a transition period in more ways than one for the 1st MAW. -Following are the changes of commanders that took place during the last -2 weeks of January: - - Colonel Radford C. West, relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. - Fontana as commanding officer of MAG-33; - - Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole, joined MAG-33 staff as - personnel officer after being relieved of VMF-312 command by - Major Donald P. Frame; - - Major Arnold A. Lund of VMF-323, relieved by Major Stanley S. - Nicolay and assigned to General Harris’ staff as assistant - operations officer; - - Major William M. Lundin, relieved of VMF-214 command by Major - James A. Feeney, Jr., and transferred to the command of Service - and Maintenance Squadron-33 (SMS-33). - -This left only Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski of VMF-212 -and Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr., of VMF(N)-542 still in -command of the tactical squadrons they brought to Korea; and the latter -was to be relieved by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson in February. - -The only combat operations of the 1st MAW during the week of -housekeeping from 16 to 23 January were carried out by VMF-212 from the -deck of the _Bataan_.[55] This CVL carrier alternated with the British -light fleet carrier HMS _Theseus_ on the Korean west coast blockade. -Their activities were coordinated by Vice Admiral Andrewes, RN, -commanding the group blockading the Korean west coast. - - [55] VMF-212 _HD_, Jan 51; USS _Bataan_ (CVL-29) Action Rpt, - “Operations off the West Coast of Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr - 51;” USS _Bataan WD_, Jan 51; Col R. W. Wyczawski, interv - of 2 Jun 58. - -VMF-212 sent out a morning and afternoon reconnaissance flight each -day up the coastline as far as the 39th parallel. On the trip north -the pilots scanned the coastal waters for small enemy shipping which -might indicate reinforcement from Chinese ports on the Yellow Sea. The -return trip along the highways and railroads of the littoral was made -to detect signs of any new enemy activity on land. Four aircraft flew -each of the two coastal sweeps; eight maintained a defensive patrol -over the carrier itself; and any remaining flights were under control -of JOC, with FEAF Mosquitoes providing liaison between fighter-bombers -and ground forces. - -To insure sea room beyond the islands and mudbanks of the west coast, -the _Bataan_ had to stay outside the 100-fathom curve. This meant that -the pilots must fly across 65 to 80 miles of open sea in order to reach -the coast. The winter weather varied from unbelievable to unbearable, -and bulky, uncomfortable survival suits were a necessity. They could be -a death trap, however, if a leak developed or if they were not adjusted -tightly at the throat and wrists. Captain Alfred H. Agan, for instance, -was shot down southeast of Inchon and had to choose between landing in -enemy territory and ditching in the sea. He tried for a small island -offshore but crash-landed into the surf. Before a helicopter from the -_Bataan_ could fly 65 miles to the rescue, he died from the shock of -icy water which partially filled his survival suit. - -The pilots of VMF-212 reported an increase in enemy antiaircraft fire, -particularly in CCF rear areas. They were amazed to find troops dug in -along the coast as far back as 50 or 60 miles from the battle lines. -These precautions were the enemy’s tribute to Marine capabilities for -amphibious warfare. The fear of another Inchon caused the Chinese to -immobilize thousands of men on both coasts to guard against another -such decisive landing far behind the front. - -On the squadron’s third day of sea operations, three planes were hit -by rifle and machine gun fire on reconnaissance missions. One of them, -flown by Captain Russell G. Patterson, Jr., was shot down behind the -enemy lines but a FEAF helicopter rescued the pilot. First Lieutenant -Alfred J. Ward was not so fortunate. His plane was riddled the -following day by enemy fire and he crashed to his death in the midst of -CCF soldiers. - -Not until 22 January did the reconditioning of Bofu reach such an -advanced stage that Lieutenant Colonel Fontana could set up his MAG-33 -command post. VMF-312 moved in the next day and the first combat -missions were launched to the vicinity of Seoul, 300 miles away. On -the 24th General Harris established his headquarters. A few hours later -VMF-214 and VMF-323 arrived from Itami, where they had put in an idle -week, with no place to go, after their carrier duty. On the 26th, when -they flew their first missions as land-based squadrons, MAG-33 was back -in business and Bofu was a going concern. - -No such claim could have been made for MAG-12 and K-1. Although Colonel -Boeker C. Batterton set up his command post on 27 January 1951, two -more weeks were to pass before the K-1 runway was fit for the flights -to tactical aircraft. Meanwhile, the MAG-12 squadrons had to make out -as best they could at K-9. - - -_Marine Rice Paddy Patrols_ - -Operations of the first few days demonstrated to 1st Marine Division -ground forces that locating the enemy was more of a problem than -defeating him. Obviously, the NKPA 10th Division had few if any of -the advantages which make for effective guerrilla warfare. Far from -receiving any voluntary support from the inhabitants, the Korean Reds -had their own movements promptly reported to the Marines. Retaliations -on civilians, such as burning mountain villages, were not calculated -to improve relations. Nor did the enemy possess any of the other -requisites for successful operations in an opponent’s rear--a base, -a source of supply, good communications, and a reliable intelligence -system. - -If it came to a fight, there could be little doubt about the outcome. -But Marine staff officers must have been reminded of the old recipe for -rabbit pie which begins, “First, catch your rabbit.” - -Such a situation called for systematic patrolling in all Marine zones -of action. Secondary roads and mountain trails were covered by “rice -paddy patrols.” Numbering from four men to a squad, these groups ranged -far and wide on foot in an area that was more often vertical than -horizontal. On a single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 of these rice -paddy patrols in action.[56] No better training for replacements could -have been devised. Sometimes the men were on their own for several -days, depending for supplies on helicopter drops. And while casualties -were light, there was just enough danger from sniping and potential -ambushes to keep the replacements on the alert. - - [56] 5thMar _WD_, Jan-Feb 51. - -Roads fit for vehicles--especially the 75-mile stretch of MSR from -Pohang to Andong--were under the constant surveillance of motorized -patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105mm howitzer. The -farthest distance was 15 miles between the main Marine strong points at -Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong.[57] - - [57] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51. - -Close air support was seldom needed against such an elusive enemy as -the Marines faced. General Craig put in a request, however, for an -air squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two Marine -all-weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, were General Harris’ -first and second choices. They had been flying under Air Force (314th -Air Division) control in the defense of Japan, a mission of dull -routine and waiting for something to break the monotony of patrolling. - -The twin-engined F7F-3N Tigercats of VMF(N)-542 were well equipped -with electronics equipment for night interceptor work. VMF(N)-513 flew -F4U-5Ns, the night-fighter modification of the latest Corsair.[58] - - [58] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise - noted, is based on 1stMAW _HD_, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513 - _HD_, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations - of aircraft designations. - -General Harris’ plan for VMF(N)-542 to take over the duties of -VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke had the approval of General Partridge. This made -it possible to send the latter squadron to K-9 at Pusan to replace the -VMF-311 jets, which in turn left for Itami to await corrections of -engineering defects. - -VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat missions from K-9 on 22 January. These -consisted of routine armed reconnaissance flights and an occasional -deep support mission for the Eighth Army. Not until the 25th did the -squadron respond to a request from Marine ground forces. And out of 49 -combat missions (110 sorties) during the remaining 6 days of the month, -only three (10 sorties) were in support of the 1st Marine Division. - -For routine operations the Marine ground forces found the support -of VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY observation planes were -ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be caught before he could -be fought. And the helicopters did their part by dropping supplies, -evacuating casualties, and laying wire. - -Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strengthened its administrative -ties with the 1st Marine Division. Although the two organizations had -no common operational commander other than General MacArthur, they -maintained a close liaison. Harris attached two TBM Avengers to VMO-6 -for use as radio relays when ground-to-ground communications failed -in the mountainous Pohang-Andong area. He also set up daily courier -flights, at General Smith’s request, to provide fast administrative -liaison between widely dispersed Marine air and ground units in Korea -and Japan. - - -_Operations_ THUNDERBOLT _and_ ROUNDUP - -On 25 January two corps of the Eighth Army jumped off in Operation -THUNDERBOLT. Advancing side by side, I Corps and IX Corps had orders -to launch limited objective attacks and regain solid contact with the -enemy, who was obviously preparing for a new offensive. - -The EUSAK commander moved his CP from Taegu to Chonan (Map 1), the -I Corps headquarters, in order to maintain personal control of the -operation. He requested the Navy to step up offshore patrolling on the -west coast as left-flank protection. Emphasis was also placed on aerial -reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, as well as deep support -directed by the Mosquitoes. - -Even VMF(N)-542 at Itazuke had orders to conduct long flights to Seoul -and maintain continuous patrols to report any attempt of the enemy to -retire across the frozen Han River. The F7F-3N pilots shot up camp -areas, convoys, and other lucrative targets but found no indications -of large-scale crossings over the ice.[59] So varied were the missions -of the squadron that it came as no surprise to be assigned to naval -gunfire spotting for the USS _St. Paul_ and the other British and -American cruisers shelling Inchon. - - [59] VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Jan 51. - -All Marine tactical squadrons were in action on 28 January for the -first time since December. Nearly two-thirds of the flights from Bofu -and K-9 were diverted from armed reconnaissance to troop support. A -typical operation was carried out by four VMF-312 planes on their -second day of duty at Bofu. After reporting to MELLOW they were -directed to Mosquito Cobalt, which had received a message that enemy -troops were hiding in a village just north of Suwon, occupied that day -by the U.S. 35th infantry. Under the Mosquito’s direction they bombed, -strafed, and napalmed some 40 buildings containing CCF soldiers.[60] - - [60] VMF-312 _HD_, Jan 51. - -The fall of Suwon opened the way to Inchon and Seoul as Chinese -resistance stiffened. Eighth Army progress was anything but reckless, -but Ridgway had served notice on the enemy that he held the initiative -and intended to keep it. Operation ROUNDUP followed on the heels of -THUNDERBOLT. Merely a change in name was involved, for the advance -continued at the same prudent pace without any important amendments to -the original mission. - - -_Action in the Pohang-Andong Zone_ - -The Marines in the Pohang-Andong zone had their first brush with -the elusive enemy on 22 January. A patrol of the 1st Battalion, 1st -Marines, flushed out a guerrilla force near Mukkye-dong, several miles -southeast of Andong (Map 5). Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company -deployed for action at sunset and shots were exchanged. The Marines had -no casualties and the enemy could not have suffered many losses before -he disappeared into the winter dusk. - -Even at this early date the Korean Reds seemed to have lost confidence -in their guerrilla operations. In a message dated 23 January taken -from a prisoner, the commanding general of the II NKPA Corps directed -General Lee Ban Nam to withdraw if possible. It read as follows: - - Get all of your troops out of the enemy encirclement and withdraw - to north of Pyongchang without delay. Liaison team sent with - radio. If you will inform us of your escape route we will assist - by clearing your advance. If you cannot escape, stay in the rear - of enemy as guerrillas.[61] - - [61] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 116, Encl 1. - -By the 24th an enemy drift southeast from the zones of the 1st and 5th -Marines to 7th Marines territory was apparent. The 1/7 command post and -Company A received scattered mortar fire late that afternoon. Action -picked up the next morning when dawn brought an attack by an estimated -100 guerrillas on the regimental command post. After a brisk 90-minute -fire fight the Korean Reds withdrew to the east, leaving seven dead -behind and taking with them an unknown number of wounded. - -Later that morning the 7th Marines teamed up with the National Police -against the Chiso-dong area. Nine bodies were counted as the 3d -battalion seized its objective, but 1/7 was slowed by an entrenched -enemy who offered an unyielding defense. The Marine battalion ground -to a halt just one mile short of Chiso-dong and dug in for the night -as artillery continued to pound the enemy. The air strikes on the 25th -were flown by VMF(N)-513 and VMF-323, both based at K-9, but the pilots -could not contact the FAC and had to make dummy runs over the enemy. - -Marine planes and artillery cleared the way on 26 January as 1/7 -advanced against scattered opposition. Nearly 400 guerrillas put up a -ragged and futile resistance, but by 1530 Marine firepower prevailed -and Chiso-dong was taken. The 2d Battalion had meanwhile occupied -Hapton-ni, eight miles southeast of Topyong-dong (Map 5). A light enemy -counterattack was repulsed with ease.[62] Altogether, enemy casualties -for the day amounted to 161 KIA or POW. - - [62] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for - Jan 51. - -The VMF-323 flight led by Captain Don H. Fisher and Captain Floyd K. -Fulton’s VMF(N)-513 flight merit recognition as the first successful -instance of Marine air-ground cooperation since the Chosin Reservoir -campaign. - -While the 7th Marines served eviction notices on the enemy in its area, -action elsewhere was light. Task Force Puller[63] hastened on the -26th to Chongja-dong, seven miles northeast of Uisong, to investigate -a police report that 300 enemy had seized the town. A Marine attack, -following an artillery preparation, was planned for 1500. Captain -Thomas J. Bohannon led Able Company in but discovered that the shells -had fallen on empty huts.[64] - - [63] Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel - Puller was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. On - that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of RCT-1. - - [64] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 50, 11. - -During the next few days the rice paddy patrols continued to range -over the countryside, searching out the enemy. Combat units were -sent to areas where the G-2 red arrows indicated an NKPA buildup. On -the morning of the 29th, the 5th Marines tried to organize an attack -on a large enemy force reported near Chachon-dong, 12 miles west of -Topyong-dong. Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie Company, moving out at -night in small foot patrols to maintain secrecy, scoured the area in an -attempt to pin down the enemy. - -Marine intelligence reports had warned of a dawn raid on the town for -the purpose of plundering food from the inhabitants and arms from the -Korean police station. First Lieutenant Richard J. Schening, executive -officer, led a scouting force ahead of the main body to reconnoiter -the area. He urged that a trap be set for the enemy, and the company -commander has left a description of one of the most elaborate ambushes -ever attempted by the Marines during the war: - - Well before daylight, a cordon was stealthily braided around - Chachon-dong and we settled down to await the raiders. A later - daylight inspection of the deployment showed that the men had - done a splendid job of locating themselves so as to avoid - detection. They were concealed under porches, beneath the - brambles, and in the heaviest foliage and trees. But no guerrilla - attack materialized, probably due to a “grapevine” warning of our - movement and intent.... During the remaining days in the village - we conducted extensive patrolling in an attempt to catch at least - one guerrilla for our effort. Patrols were kept small to maintain - secrecy. We even dressed Marines in clothing worn by the “locals” - and sent them out in the hills with wood-gathering details. - Larger patrols up to a platoon in size were sent on combat - missions at night, One thing was certain: it was easier to talk - about capturing guerrillas than it was to lay a hand on them.[65] - - [65] Maj J. R. Jones ltr, 24 Jun 57. - -The elusiveness of the enemy could not always be credited to effective -guerrilla tactics. Often it was due to distaste for combat. As -evidence of low NKPA morale, Major Yu Dung Nam, a battalion commander, -was condemned to death and shot late in January because he planned -to surrender, according to POW testimony. Rations were at a bare -subsistence level and typhus had claimed many victims.[66] - - [66] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 105, 5 Feb 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 51, 13. - -Unrelenting Marine pressure throughout the first week of February -wore the guerrillas down until groups larger than 50 men were -seldom encountered. On the 3d an NKPA second lieutenant surrendered -voluntarily to a RCT-7 patrol and brought three of his men with him. -NKPA morale had sunk so low, he divulged, that all ranks were striving -only for survival. The division commander, Major General Lee Ban Nam, -had apparently become a victim of acute melancholia. He spent nearly -all his time, according to the prisoner, in the solitude of foxholes -dug into the slopes of hills for added protection. There he brooded -constantly over his predicament, but without arriving at any better -solution than alternate hiding and flight.[67] - - [67] _Ibid._ - -Certainly the military situation didn’t offer much to gladden this -Hamlet of the rice paddies, and the Marines continued to give him -fresh causes for pessimism. His footsore remnants eluded RCT-5 only to -stumble into the zone of RCT-1, northeast of Uisong. Neither rest nor -sanctuary awaited them, for the 1st and 2d battalions penetrated into -the mountains near Sangyong to surprise and rout a force estimated at -400 men.[68] - - [68] 1stMar _WD_, Feb 51. - - -_KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division_ - -Late in January the 1st KMC Regiment got into the fight after being -attached once more to the 1st Marine Division by a EUSAK dispatch of -the 21st. Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison headed a new group -of Division liaison and advisory officers as the four KMC battalions -moved out from Chinhae by LST and truck convoy to the Pohang area. -Division OpnO 4-51 (26 January) assigned the regiment Sector F, astride -the Yongdok-Andong road, which had been carved out of Sectors C and D, -held by the 7th and 11th Marines respectively. The KMCs were ordered to -conduct daily patrolling from positions near Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and -Chinandong and prevent enemy concentrations in their sector.[69] - - [69] References to the 1st KMC Regt in this chapter are based - on Smith, _Notes_, 1450–1458, and Col C. W. Harrison, - _Narrative_, n.d., 1–15. Previous periods of KMC - attachment to the 1stMarDiv are described in Vols I, II, - and III of this series. - -Although the ROK Army and Eighth Army had the responsibility for -supplying the KMCs, it proved necessary for the 1st Marine Division -to cope with some of the gaps in equipment and rations. Contrary to a -prevalent Western belief, Koreans did not subsist on a diet of rice -alone. They were accustomed to having “side dishes” with their rice, -such as eggs, meat, fish, or vegetables. Colonel Kim Sung Eun, the -regimental commander, had an allotment of money for these purchases, -but the sum was insufficient to meet inflation prices even if there -had been enough food left in a district eaten bare. As a consequence, -the KMCs had to get along on a monotonous and vitamin-poor diet until -the ROK Army belatedly came to the rescue with issues of food for side -dishes. - -On 29 January the KMC Regiment opened its CP at Yongdok. Regimental -OpnO 1 of that date divided Sector F into three parts, assigning the -western, central, and eastern subsectors to the 3d, 1st, and 2d -Battalions respectively. The 5th Battalion was attached to the 1st -Marines and assigned to patrolling operations in the Andong area.[70] - - [70] What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was - designated the 5th because the Korean word for 4th is the - same as the word for death and is considered unlucky. - -The first few days of February saw a brief flurry of activity before -NKPA guerrilla resistance breathed its last gasps. Reports that the -remnants of the NKPA 25th and 27th Regiments were in flight toward the -zone of the 5th Marines led to a concentration for a knockout blow, -but the enemy stole away to the north in the vicinity of Topyong-dong. -There he discovered that he had jumped from the frying pan into the -fire. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines closed in from one -side while the 1st and 3d Battalions of the KMC Regiment blocked roads -in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha-dong. Only a wild flight in -small groups saved the guerrillas from annihilation. - -The nearest approach to effective NKPA resistance was encountered on 5 -February after the 1st and 2d KMC Battalions had established blocking -positions in zone at the request of the 7th Marines, which was driving -the enemy northward. A platoon-size patrol of the 2d KMC Battalion came -up against Korean Reds dug in with 81mm mortars and heavy and light -machine guns a few miles southwest of Yongdok. The KMCs were scattered -with losses of 1 KIA, 8 WIA, and 24 MIA in addition to all arms and -equipment, though the missing men returned later. - -It was the single NKPA success of the entire campaign. - -An assault was launched the following morning on this enemy stronghold -by a composite KMC battalion, supported by four VMF(N)-513 aircraft -which attacked with rockets and bombs. The largest combat of the -guerrilla hunt appeared to be in the making, but again the enemy -vanished after putting up an ineffectual resistance with small arms and -mortars.[71] - - [71] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _HD_, - Feb 51. - -An unusual air tactic was tested on 4 February in the 7th Marines zone -when an interpreter in an R4D plane hailed the guerrillas by loud -speaker in their own language with a demand that they surrender or -suffer the consequences. Marine fighter-bombers were on station to back -the threat, and about 150 supposed NKPA soldiers came in with uplifted -hands while VMF-323 planes delivered the consequences to the holdouts -in the form of bombs, rockets, and napalm. Unfortunately, it developed -that practically all of the prisoners were terrified civilians seeking -an escape from the slave labor imposed upon them by the guerrillas.[72] - - [72] VMF-323 _HD_, Feb 51. - - -_10th NKPA Division Scattered_ - -Reports of enemy activity were received daily from Korean civilians -and police, and seldom was a smaller number than “about two thousand” -mentioned. In reality, Marine patrols had difficulty in tracking down -as many as ten of the skulking, half-starved fugitives split up into -small bands hiding in the hills. On 5 February the situation was summed -up by General Smith in reply to a EUSAK request for an estimate of the -time required to complete the Marine mission: - - The original 10th NKPA Div forces in the 1st Marine Division area - have been dispersed into many groups, reduced to an effective - strength of 40 per cent, and are no longer capable of a major - effort while dispersed.... It is considered that the situation - in the Division area is sufficiently in hand to permit the - withdrawal of the Division and the assignment of another mission - at any time a new force to be assigned the responsibility for the - area assumes such responsibility and the 1st Marine Division can - be reassembled.[73] - - [73] Smith, _Notes_, 1378. - -Patrolling continued as usual in all Marine regimental zones during the -second week in February. Some units, such as the 11th Marines and the -Division Reconnaissance Company, had made few enemy contacts throughout -the operation. But at least the cannoneers had found good pheasant -hunting and enjoyed a change in the bill of fare. - -It was just as well that the tactical situation seldom made it -necessary to call for air support at this stage, since the 1st MAW -was once again in the throes of moves which will be described in the -following chapter. Bofu had been only a temporary base for MAG-33 -squadrons which were making another transfer to K-9 while MAG-12 -completed its shift to K-1. - -VMO-6 took care of the reduced air requirements of the Division -adequately. Another helicopter “first” was scored when First Lieutenant -John L. Scott received credit for the first night casualty evacuation -by a HTL (Bell), which then had no instruments for night flying. For -a harrowing moment, however, it would be hard to beat the experience -of Captain Clarence W. Parkins and Corpsman R. E. Krisky. While they -were flying a casualty to the hospital ship _Consolation_, the patient -became wildly delirious. It took the combined efforts of pilot and -corpsman to subdue him and make a safe landing.[74] - - [74] VMO-6 _HD_, Feb 51. - -Any excitement would have been welcomed by the troops in general. For -the area was as tranquil as if the guerrillas had never troubled its -snowbound heights. Recently arrived Marines might have been pardoned -for concluding that the NKPA 10th Division and its gloomy commander -were but creatures of the imagination--phantoms to be compared to the -crew of the _Flying Dutchman_, that legendary ship condemned to sail on -endlessly until the Day of Judgment. The NKPA 10th Division also seemed -doomed to perpetual flight as its ghostly survivors made their way from -crag to crag of the remote ridgelines. - -Thanks to the rice paddy patrols, the replacements were ready for -combat and the Division was organizing a rotation draft for return to -the States. Five officers and 600 men had already been selected on a -basis of combat time, wounds received, and length of service. Major -General Edward A. Craig, who commanded the first Marines to land in -Korea, was given a farewell dinner and congratulated on his second -star. Two new brigadier generals were named, with Lewis B. “Chesty” -Puller relieving Craig as ADC and Gregon A. Williams accompanying him -on the voyage back to the States. Captain Eugene R. “Bud” Hering, (MC) -USN, was also returning with the gratitude of all Marines for his care -of casualties in the “frozen Chosin” campaign.[75] - - [75] Smith, _Notes_, 1369. - -All Marine missions in the guerrilla hunt had been successfully -accomplished, so that the Division could be relieved at any time by the -2d ROK Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 prisoners. -Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is no doubt -that the total NKPA casualties were crippling. At any rate, the NKPA -10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without accomplishing -any of its objectives. Marine casualties from 18 January to 15 -February were 19 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, 148 WIA, and 1,751 of a nonbattle -classification, largely frostbite cases soon restored to duty.[76] - - [76] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (_POR_) 18 Jan-15 - Feb 51, 71–159. - - -_New Mission for the Marines_ - -On 11 February, General Smith flew to Taegu to discuss the next Marine -mission with General Ridgway. The EUSAK commander spoke favorably of -employing the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 24th Infantry Division -in the critical Han River corridor, where recent UN advances had been -made. He also recognized the advantages of committing the Marines -to the east coast, so that they could be held in readiness for an -amphibious operation. A third possibility was the Yoju corridor of the -IX Corps zone (Map 1). As “the most powerful division in Korea,” said -Ridgway, “the Marines would be astride what he considered the logical -route for an expected enemy counterthrust.”[77] - - [77] Smith, _Notes_, 1441–1445. - -No decision was reached that day. At midnight the CCF attack -materialized; and the central front was the area of decision, as -Ridgway had predicted. - -Naturally, the next mission for the Marines had to be reconsidered in -the light of this development. On 12 February EUSAK warning orders -alerted the 1st Marine Division to be prepared to move to Chungju, in -the rear area of the IX Corps front where the heaviest CCF attacks were -taking place. The Division was further directed to make an immediate -reconnaissance of the Chungju area while the 1st KMC Regiment prepared -for a move to Samchok on the east coast and attachment to the ROK -Capitol Division. The following day brought orders from the Eighth -Army to initiate these movements on 15 February 1951.[78] Thus the -Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt came to an end with the Marines on their -way to new employment in the battle line of the Eighth Army. - - [78] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -Operation Killer - -_The Move to the Chungju Area--Marine Planes in Action--Planning for -the New Operation--The Jump-Off on 21 February--Stiffening of Chinese -Resistance--General Smith in Command of IX Corps--The Advance to Phase -Line_ ARIZONA_--JOC Air Control System Criticized_ - - -The CCF counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 11 February -1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure exerted during -the previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice beaten during a recent -six-week period and pushed back some 200 miles, EUSAK had shown amazing -powers of recuperation. - -“It is hard for me to put into words the magnificent competence, the -fierce, combative, aggressive spirit of that force once it picked -itself off the ground and waded back into the fight,” commented General -Ridgway in retrospect.[79] - - [79] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 216. - -During Operations THUNDERBOLT and ROUNDUP he had kept a tight rein on -the Eighth Army by insisting on vigorous artillery preparations and -close lateral contacts between units. On 10 February, however, caution -was relaxed as CCF resistance suddenly collapsed west and south of -Seoul, That day the U.S. 24th Infantry Division forged ahead 11,000 -yards to occupy the port of Inchon and Kimpo Airfield, both so wrecked -that weeks of repair would be necessary to make them operational. Seoul -was within sight of the U.S. forces on the left bank of the Han when an -aroused enemy struck back on the subzero night of the 11th. - -Apparently the CCF drive on the central front had as its objective the -relieving of UN pressure on the Seoul area to the west. The CCF 40th -and 66th Armies and NKPA V Corps struck in the IX Corps sector north -of Hoengsong (Map 6). Two ROK divisions being dislodged by the initial -blows, their retreat made necessary the withdrawal of other IX Corps -units. As a consequence, Hoengsong had to be abandoned on 12 February -to the Communists hammering out a salient northeast of Wonju.[80] - - [80] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51; Smith, - _Notes_, 1462–1465. - -The UN forces were not bound by any unrealistic concept of holding -ground to the last ditch. General Ridgway deemed it more important -to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy at a minimum cost in -casualties. While fighting on the defensive, he had already made up -his mind to launch an offensive of his own to catch the Chinese off -balance the moment their counterattack ground to a halt. His new -limited objective operation emphasized the destruction of the enemy’s -fighting strength as the major objective rather than the acquisition -of territory. A high attrition rate would preclude the Communists’ -capacity to hold and enable EUSAK commander to recover the critical -hill mass north of Wonju. It was for this purpose, he informed Major -General Bryant E. Moore, IX Corps commanding general, that the 1st -Marine Division would be employed. - -“The force which holds Wonju,” he said, “has the situation in hand.”[81] - - [81] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec I, 52. Comments by Gen O. P. - Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, - 14 Feb 58. - - -_The Move to the Chungju Area_ - -The 1st Marine Division had instructions to report its order of march -to the Eighth Army, and to keep the Taegu headquarters informed of -progress. Meanwhile, the Marines were to remain under EUSAK operational -control but would pass to IX Corps control at a date and hour to be -announced. - -General Puller flew to Chungju with a reconnaissance party on 13 -February to look over the road and select CP sites. On the following -morning Major Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company arrived at -Chungju for patrol duty, and movement by rail and road commenced on the -15th in accordance with Division OpnO 5-51, issued the day before. - -[Illustration: MAP 6 - -1st Mar Div Zone of Action - -Operation Killer - -Showing Phase I & II Objectives] - -The 1st Marines, with the 7th Motor Transport Battalion attached, led -the motor march, and the 5th and 7th Marines followed in that order. -Tracked vehicles were outloaded by rail from Andong and Pohang in a -total of 67 flat cars. Owing to a shortage of cars, Company B and H&S -Company of the 1st Tank Battalion made the move of 120 miles by road. -These tankers claimed the all-time Marine Corps distance record for -armor.[82] - - [82] LtCol H. T. Milne, ltr of 3 Dec 57; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb - 51. - -While the Marine move was in progress, the CCF counterattack went on -full blast along the central front. Driving southeast from the IX Corps -area to the X Corps front, the Chinese cut off and surrounded the 23d -Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division, USA. Colonel Paul Freemen and his -men put up a fight that is one of the classics of the war. Supported by -Marine and Air Force planes, they gave more fire than they received and -held out until rescued by a tank column.[83] - - [83] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B. Ridgway, - USA (Ret), 4 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58. - -February was also a transition period for Marine fighter squadrons -which had been more or less on the move since the middle of January. -Even before the transfer to Bofu, it had been decided that K-3, four -miles south of Pohang, was to be the ultimate home of MAG-33. While -awaiting completion of this field, VMFs-214, -312, and -323 would find -temporary lodging at K-1, near Pusan, recently assigned to MAG-12.[84] - - [84] The balance of this section, unless otherwise specified, - is derived from the _HD_s for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW, - MAG-33, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF-323, VMF(N)-513, and - VMF-311. - -On 6 February, Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, assistant -commanding general of the 1st MAW, radioed General Harris that K-1 -would be ready to receive a squadron a day, starting on the 8th. Harris -ordered Squadrons 323, 214, and 312 to make their moves on 8, 9, and 10 -February respectively. Transport aircraft were to lift ground crews, -extra pilots, and light equipment directly to K-1. Pilots had orders to -fly combat missions en route. - -By the 13th most of the vehicles, heavy equipment, and general supplies -had been loaded on a train for Kobe, there to be transshipped on LSTs -to Pohang. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Fontana set up his MAG-33 -command post at K-3 and directed the three fighter squadrons to report -from K-1. - -The new field occupied a bench overlooking a wide, sandy beach. Built -originally by the Japanese, the strip had 5,200 feet of concrete -runway. The Air Force had extended it to 5,700 feet with pierced steel -planking. This addition brought the end of the runway to the brink of -a 60-foot drop-off--a hazard in the event of a “hot” landing to the -northwest or too low an approach from the southeast. - -Next to arrive at K-3 were the F9F-2Bs of VMF-311. Four weeks of -adjustments at Itami had restored the jets to operative condition. An -advance echelon went ahead to establish squadron living and operating -areas, and the pilots ferried the 19 aircraft. Ground crews and -equipment followed on transport planes. - -Plans were made for VMF(N)-513 to move from Itami to K-3 before the end -of the month. The other all-weather squadron, VMF(N)-542, now commanded -by Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, completed the transfer from -Itami and Itazuke to K-1. - -This field was also the destination of the photo pilots of Headquarters -Squadron, 1st MAW, who flew their F7F-3P and F4U-5P fighters from -Itami. Major Donald S. Bush commanded a unit, formerly a squadron, -which had been one of the first aviation organizations to see action in -Korea. Among its accomplishments were the preliminary beach studies for -the Inchon and Wonsan landings. - -With the completion of the moves of February 1951, the 1st MAW was -again based on Korean soil. Fifteen types of Marine aircraft were -being flown. For the heavy hauling, the R4D and R5D transports shifted -troops and supplies. Included among the fighters were F9F Panthers, F4U -Corsairs, and two models of F7F Tigercats--a stripped-down photo plane, -and a radar-armed night fighter. Stinson OY Grasshoppers, TBM Avengers, -and Beechcraft SNBs rounded out the list of conventional planes. Three -types of rotary-wing aircraft were represented: the Sikorsky HO3S-1, -and two models of the Bell HTL.[85] - - [85] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8. - - -_Marine Planes in Action_ - -By 15 February the brief CCF counterstroke had spent its force. -Hoengsong had fallen to Communists who hammered out a salient on a -20-mile front extending as far southward as the outskirts of Wonju (Map -6). But the enemy’s main purpose had failed of accomplishment, for the -grip of the Eighth Army on Inchon and Kimpo Airfield was not shaken. -Nor did the Chinese gain a breathing spell in their preparations for a -third great offensive as a followup to the December and January drives. - -More by coincidence than design, the Fifth Air Force launched a new -system of air tactics a few days after the beginning of the CCF -counterstroke. Called “Reconnaissance Plan Fighter,” it was based on -a division of enemy-held Korea into 22 sections. Squadrons were given -the mission of making hourly surveys of the same areas, day after day, -until pilots became so familiar with them that any change hinting at -CCF activity would be noticed at once.[86] - - [86] VMF-323 HD, 15 Feb 51. - -If these surveys revealed any sign of any enemy concentration, either -of men or supplies, JOC scrambled special bombing strikes against them. - -Although Marine fliers could readily see the advantages of covering -the same ground daily, it made for monotony on reconnaissance -missions. Only a highly unusual spectacle would startle a pilot, but -First Lieutenant Weldon R. Mitchell blinked when he saw a camel in -his gunsights.[87] Shaggy little Mongolian horses were no novelty as -ammunition bearers, and after recovering from his first astonishment -the VMF-311 pilot cut loose with .50 caliber machine gun slugs. As he -suspected, the camel’s pack contained ammunition and the animal was all -but vaporized in the explosion. - - [87] _Naval Aviation News_, Apr 51, 8. - -Major Bush’s photographic unit had an important part in keeping the -enemy under constant surveillance. The Fifth Air Force directed on -16 February that all photo requests were to be screened by the Fifth -Air Force’s 543d Tactical Support Group at Taegu. Under the tactical -coordination of this Group, the Marine unit was to fill all Navy and -Marine requests. When not on such missions, it would be fitted into the -Fifth Air Force photographic reconnaissance program.[88] - - [88] 1st MAW and MAG-12 _HD_s, Feb 51. - -Pinpoint photos of suspected troop areas and such terrain features as -defiles, junctions, detours, and bridges were in demand. The fact had -to be faced that the enemy was almost unbelievably clever at camouflage -and concealment. In one instance it was found that the Chinese had -constructed bridge sections which they hid by day and put to use at -night.[89] On another occasion they sank a bridge by means of weights -so that it remained far enough beneath the surface of the water in the -daytime to avoid detection by reconnaissance aircraft. - - [89] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, ltr of 14 Jun 57. - -When the photo planes carried out missions as far north as MIG -Alley[90] they flew in pairs. A fighter circled overhead to protect the -photo pilot from an enemy air attack while he paid full attention to -the task of “shooting” the terrain with his camera. - - [90] MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area - along the Yalu River where Communist jets were active. - - -_Planning for the New Operation_ - -Adaptability to changing circumstances had already become perhaps the -outstanding quality of the revitalized Eighth Army. No better example -could be found than the evolution of Operation KILLER, which completed -the cycle from concept to plan and execution in just three days. - -On 18 February 1951, General Ridgway learned that the enemy was -apparently withdrawing. IX Corps and X Corps units had probed forward -that morning without meeting any opposition. Before nightfall the -commanding general decided to launch a limited objectives offensive by -the entire Eighth Army. He called a planning conference for the 19th -and set the 21st as D-Day for the new operation. - -The 1st Marine Division found itself detached from X Corps on the -19th and placed under the operational control of General Moore of IX -Corps. This was not the first time in Marine Corps history, of course, -when “soldiers of the sea” have fought alongside U.S. Army units in -conventional land warfare. One of the best-known occasions was in World -War I, when two Marine regiments distinguished themselves in France as -a brigade of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. - -The Marines had been a part of X Corps in 1950, but always under -tactical circumstances which permitted more or less independent -operations with the support of organic aircraft. Now the Division was -to be closely integrated with the other major IX Corps units, the 24th -Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th ROK Division, and -the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Marine calls for air strikes -would continue to be made through JOC, as they had been since the -Hungnam redeployment. - -General Ridgway was on hand for the planning conference held on 19 -February in General Moore’s CP at Yoju and attended by officers from -IX and X Corps. General Smith, Colonel McAlister, and Colonel Bowser -represented the 1st Marine Division. - -The scheme of maneuver called for the Marines to relieve elements of X -Corps and attack in a northeasterly direction from a line of departure -north of Wonju (Map 6) through the Wonju basin. The object was to cut -off enemy forces which had penetrated south and east of Hoengsong, and -to recover control of the roads running eastward by seizing the high -ground just south of the town.[91] - - [91] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 1–2, 20. - -In the X Corps zone to the east, on the right flank of the Marines, -the 7th Infantry Division was to attack to the north along the -Yongwol-Pyongchang road. On the other Marine flank would be elements of -the 6th ROK Division. - -Simultaneous advances were planned for I Corps to the west, where -patrols had found evidence that Seoul was lightly held. - -Two U.S. Army units were designated at the 19 February conference to -support the 1st Marine Division--the 74th Truck Company and the 92d -Armored Field Artillery, then en route to the Chungju area.[92] These -cannoneers and their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. -Lavoie, USA, were well and favorably known to the Marines, having given -effective support during the Chosin Reservoir operations. - - [92] _Ibid._ - -First Marine Division OpnO 6-51, issued on 20 February, directed the -two assault regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines, to jump off at 0800 -on the 21st and seize the first objective, the ridgeline about three -and a half miles south of the high ground dominating Hoengsong (Map -6). RCT-1, with Division Recon Company and C/Engineers attached, was -to pass through elements of the 2d Infantry Division in zone while -RCT-5, with A/Engineers attached, passed through elements of the 187th -Airborne Infantry, USA. RCT-7 had been designated the reserve regiment; -but since it could not arrive from the Pohang-Andong area in time, a -battalion of the 5th Marines was assigned this mission.[93] - - [93] _Ibid._, 2, 22, and 1stMarDiv OpnO 6-51. - -The objective area was believed to be defended by the 196th Infantry -Division of the 66th CCF Army and unknown elements of the 39th and 40th -CCF Armies. Ahead of the Marines and other IX Corps units lay some -uninviting terrain. Rocky heights and narrow valleys were laced by -swift streams, the largest being the river Som, running from northeast -to southwest through a defile cutting across the western part of the -Division sector. Bordering this twisting stream was the Wonju-Hoengsong -“highway”--a poor dirt road even by Korean standards. Through the right -half of the Division zone an even more primitive road, scarcely fit for -vehicular traffic, wound northeast from Wonju.[94] - - [94] _Ibid._, 22–24. - -All Eighth Army forces were to be tightly buttoned up and to keep in -close physical contact while maintaining integrity of units. Patrol -observation and reconnaissance were stressed by the EUSAK commanding -general, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in -advancing ahead of schedule. Again, as in previous operations, real -estate was to be secondary to the inflicting of maximum personnel and -materiel damage. - -On the eve of Operation KILLER, a message from IX Corps emphasized -to all units the necessity for making sure “that no hostile force of -sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of your forces has been -bypassed. Maintenance of lateral contact between all units is of prime -importance.”[95] - - [95] IX Corps msg in 1stMarDiv _In&Out#9_. - -Marine ground force and aviation officers alike realized that the -forthcoming offensive would be the first real test of the operational -control of the 1st MAW by the Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army. -General Smith was uneasy about the outlook. On 13 February 1951, the -day he was alerted for the move to Chungju, he had requested in a -message to EUSAK that the 1st MAW be assigned to the support of his -division. Both Marine ground and air officers, he said, believed that -this change would fit into the JOC overall air control system without -any disruption.[96] But no approval of General Smith’s proposal had -been received before D-Day. - - [96] CG 1stMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG EUSAK. - - -_The Jumpoff on 21 February_ - -From the outset the transport and supply situation was a G-4 officer’s -nightmare. Heavy traffic broke the back of the MSR before the jumpoff, -so that mud delayed the 5th Marines in reaching the line of departure -(LD). - -General Puller, the ADC, telephoned the Division commander for a -decision in the event that all elements of the regiment were unable -to arrive in time. This question was already under discussion between -General Moore and General Smith in the new 1st Marine Division CP, just -opened at Wonju. After later reports of troop arrivals reached him, -Smith decided with few minutes to spare that he would attack with only -the troops able to reach the LD in time--three battalions of the 1st -Marines, a battalion of the 5th Marines, two battalions of the 11th -Marines, and a company of tanks. Moore then confirmed 1000 as H-hour -and notified Puller of the decision. - -The last-minute arrival of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reminded -Smith of the occasion in France, 32 years before, when the 5th Marines -of World War I had to double-time across the wheat fields in order to -attack on schedule at Soissons on 18 July 1918. For at Wonju the lone -battalion scrambled out of trucks on the double and advanced without -taking time for reorganization.[97] - - [97] LtGen O. P. Smith, ltr of 28 Jul 53. - -Snarled traffic conditions were complicated by the arrival of -high-ranking officers for the jumpoff. General MacArthur visited the -zone of the 187th Airborne RCT, recently attached to X Corps. General -Ridgway and General Moore were on hand when the Marines attacked. The -EUSAK commander, surveying the scene from a snow-covered embankment, -was disturbed to see a Marine corporal stumbling over an untied shoe -lace while carrying a heavy radio. - -“I hesitated just a moment,” commented Ridgway, “knowing that what I -wanted to do might be misconstrued as showmanship. Then I slid down -the bank on my tail, landed right at his feet, knelt down and tied his -shoe. Later, when this incident was reported in the States, there were -some who did report it as a theatrical gesture. This was not true. It -was purely an impulse to help a fighting soldier, a man in trouble.”[98] - - [98] Ridgway, _Memoirs_, 218–219. - -The Eighth Army commander was not the only one to see the advantages -of tobogganing in terrain consisting of mud on the sunny slope of -hills and snow on the shady side. When Captain Jack R. Jones’ Charlie -Company of 1/5 reached its first steep decline, the Marine leading the -2d Platoon slipped and fell in the snow, sliding about a hundred feet -down the embankment. The man behind him profited from his example to -make a purposeful slide, as did the rest of First Lieutenant William E. -Kerrigan’s men.[99] - - [99] Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ltr of 25 May 57. - -This was but one of the unwarlike incidents which enlivened the -jumpoff of Operation KILLER. Seldom if ever have Marines taken part -in an offensive which began so inoffensively, for 21 February was -distinguished for lack of enemy resistance in the Marine zone. Only -a few rounds of scattered rifle fire were encountered until late -afternoon. Then the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, leading the column of -attack, had two long-distance fire fights before digging in for the -night. Three Marines were slightly wounded and the enemy withdrew with -such casualties as he may have suffered.[100] - - [100] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 4. - -The word “light” could never have been applied to the resistance put -up by the weather and terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, -commanding 3/5, described it as “a mixture of thawing snow, rain, mud, -and slush.” His men spent the night in foxholes half filled with water. -Every one of them was “wet to the bones, including his clothes, parka, -weapons, and ammo.”[101] - - [101] Comment by Col J. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57. - -The 1st Marines led the attacking column of battalions on 22 -February, with 1/1 in the lead. More long-distance small-arms fire -was encountered than on the first day, but again there were no close -contacts with a retreating enemy.[102] - - [102] 1stMarDiv HD, Feb 51, 4–5. - - -_Stiffening of Chinese Resistance_ - -Not until the 23d did either Marine regiment run into determined -opposition. Then the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines, -advancing abreast, had a fight while going up against two hills of a -ridge just south of the first phase objectives. - -So far the Marines had found JOC air support satisfactory in quantity. -The statistics show that the Fifth Air Force supported the Eighth Army -during the first phase of Operation KILLER (21–24 February, inclusive) -with an average of 600 sorties a day.[103] There was no room for -complaint until the morning of the 23d, when an air strike the 5th -Marines requested the preceding evening for 0800 failed to materialize -on time. On this occasion the combination of an intense Marine -artillery preparation and light enemy resistance compensated for lack -of air support and the hill was taken with ease. - - [103] Statistics are from EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, G-3 Air Rpt. - -That afternoon it took a brisk fight to evict an enemy in estimated -battalion strength from log-covered bunkers on the second hill. This -time JOC responded to Marine requests with two effective air strikes. -Sixty Chinese dead were counted, and the Marines reported 1 KIA and 21 -WIA.[104] - - [104] 2/1 _HD_, 16 Dec 51, 15–16. - -On the whole, however, the 5th Marines encountered only slight -resistance. “About all we did was walk--walk--walk!” recalled Captain -Franklin B. Mayer, commanding Easy Company of 2/5. “I don’t think I’ve -ever been so tired or footsore in my life--exception the retreat from -Chosin, but not by much.”[105] - - [105] LtCol F. B. Mayer, ltr of 8 May 57. - -On the 24th the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines had little -trouble in taking two hills designated as the main Phase 1 objectives. -The 1st Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol into -Hoengsong after artillery preparation and an air strike. Captain Robert -P. Wray, commanding Charlie Company of 1/1 and a platoon of tanks, -entered the ruins of the town only to encounter machine gun and mortar -fire from the hills to the west.[106] - - [106] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj - R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57. - -When the antennae were shot off two tanks, Wray directed their 90mm -fire by runner and knocked out the enemy positions. After proceeding -further into the town, he was recalled by his battalion commander, -Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, because an aerial observer had -reported that Chinese were waiting to ambush the patrol. - -An air strike was directed on them while Wray rescued several survivors -of “Massacre Valley,” northwest of Hoengsong, where a U.S. Army truck -convoy had been ambushed during the recent CCF counterattack. The -patrol returned before the ground had completely thawed. Only a few -hours later a jeep passing over the same road was blown up by a land -mine which killed the driver. This was one of the first object lessons -illustrating the danger from enemy mines which were harmless until the -midday sun thawed out the ground. - -Chinese artillery fire from the hills north of Hoengsong accounted for -one Marine KIA and four WIA late that afternoon before counter-battery -fire by 2/11 silenced the enemy. This exchange ended the first phase -of Operation KILLER at dusk on 24 February with all preliminary -objectives seized.[107] - - [107] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, 2, 5–6. - -Air support had been rendered, for the most part, by Fifth Air Force -planes. This gave rise to grumbling by Marine ground forces, who felt -that they had been unnecessarily deprived of their own close air -support. The fact was, however, that U.S. Army and British Commonwealth -troops also preferred Marine air and were outspoken about it. As a -disgruntled Marine ground force officer put it, Marine air was “too -good for our own good.” - -During the first phase of Operation KILLER most of the sorties by 1st -MAW planes were in support of U.S. Army units. On 23 February the -Marines flew 101 of the Fifth Air Force total of some 800 sorties for -the day.[108] The experience of VMF-312 was fairly typical of the other -Marine fighter-bomber squadrons. In the morning VMF-312 took part in -a 16-plane strike behind the CCF lines. That afternoon two special -flights of four planes each were scrambled in support of 2d and 7th -Infantry Division units of X Corps. The following morning Major Daniel -H. Davis, executive officer of the squadron, scrambled with four -planes and reported to a FAC attached to the Canadian and Australian -battalions of the British Commonwealth Division. These troops were -engaged near Chipyong-ni in the hottest fight of the first phase of -Operation KILLER. After the FAC marked the CCF strongholds with white -phosphorus, the Corsairs came snarling in with napalm, rocket, and -strafing runs just ahead of the infantry. The enemy was driven out of -positions defended by 20mm antipersonnel fire, but Major Davis paid -with his life on his eighth run when he lost a wing and crashed to his -death. - - [108] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st - MAW _HD_, 22–24 Feb 51. - - -_General Smith in Command of IX Corps_ - -On 24 February 1951 came the news that General Moore had suddenly died -as the indirect result of a helicopter accident. The aircraft had -plunged into the Han River, after hitting a telephone wire, and the IX -Corps commander was rescued unhurt only to die of a heart attack half -an hour afterwards. - -Commander of the 8th Infantry Division in European operations of -World War II, General Moore later became Superintendent of the U.S. -Military Academy at West Point. As his successor, pending a permanent -appointment, General Ridgway named General Smith to the command of IX -Corps. When announcing this decision, the Eighth Army commander said, -“General Smith is to be taken into their hearts in IX Corps, and, by -definite action, made to feel that he belongs there.”[109] - - [109] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23. - -Marines with an interest in Corps history could recall only two similar -occasions when Marines commanded major U.S. Army units. Major General -John A. Lejeune had headed the 2d Infantry Division in World War I, and -Major General Roy S. Geiger led the U.S. Tenth Army to victory during -the closing days of the Okinawa operation after a Japanese shell killed -Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., USA. - -On 24 February, with General Puller taking command of the 1st Marine -Division, General Smith flew to Yoju by helicopter to begin his new -duties. His military competence and complete lack of ostentation made -him cordially accepted at the IX Corps CP. The following day General -Ridgway arrived for a conference. Wishing to change the boundary -between IX and X Corps, so as to orient the former more to the north, -he directed the Marine general to reach an agreement with X Corps. He -also asked for a recommendation as to future operations of the Marines, -and General Smith replied that he knew of no better employment for -his division than to continue attacking along the Hoengsong-Hongchon -axis.[110] - - [110] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Chronicle of the Operations of - the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months - of the Korean War_, 1950–1951 (MS), (hereafter, Smith, - _Chronicle_), 24–25 Feb 51. - -The change in boundaries, as decided at a conference of corps -commanders, meant that in the zone of the 1st Marine Division the 5th -Marines on the right would be pinched out by the 3d ROK Division of X -Corps. On the left, the zone was to be extended by bringing the 7th -Marines into line to the left of the 1st Marines while the 5th Marines -dropped back into reserve.[111] - - [111] 5th and 7th Marines _HD_s, Feb 51. - -Logistics became the better part of valor on 25 February as Ridgway -called a halt in the fighting until enough ammunition, fuel, and other -supplies could be brought up for a resumption of the attack toward the -final objective, Phase Line ARIZONA (Map 6). Napoleon’s famous remark -that mud should be recognized as a separate element was apt as violent -rains turned all roads into swamps. Operations might have come to a -standstill except for air drops. On the 25th the Combat Air Command -flew 480.7 tons of freight and 1,004 passengers, followed by 604.9 -tons and 1,193 passengers the following day.[112] Corps and Division -engineers strove meanwhile with indigenous labor to repair the roads. - - [112] FEAF _Operations History_, Vol II, 300–306; Comment by - Col J. H. Partridge, 10 Dec 57. - -By a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so that -the EUSAK commanding general could issue orders on 25 February for -the second phase of Operation KILLER to commence on 1 March. He made -it known that he was not satisfied with results so far. The assigned -physical objectives had been taken, but the enemy’s withdrawals had -saved him from the full extent of the personnel and material losses -Ridgway had hoped to inflict. He called on his staff officers, -therefore, for plans aiming at a new operation “having the primary -intent of destroying as many enemy and as much equipment as possible -and, by continued pressure, allowing the enemy no time to mount a -counteroffensive.”[113] A secondary mission was that of outflanking -Seoul and the area between Seoul and the Imjin River, “so that this -territory may be taken either by attack from the east or by enemy -default.” - - [113] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53. - -The name of the new drive was to be Operation RIPPER, and it was to -jump off as soon as possible after the finish of KILLER. - - -_The Advance to Phase Line_ ARIZONA - -From newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, the -Marines could look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objectives, -the hills to the north of the battered town. Hoengsong occupied a -valley at the confluence of two rain-swollen streams. Thus a triangular -area of low, flat ground lay between the ruins and the hills which -must be taken in the final phase of Operation KILLER. The 1st and 7th -Marines were the combat units, with the 5th Marines in reserve. (The -KMC Regiment, it may be recalled, had been temporarily detached for -service with the ROK army.) - -Before the 1st and 7th Marines could launch their combined attack, the -latter had to fight its way up to the point of junction after relieving -elements of the 6th ROK Division.[114] The scheme of maneuver then -called for Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3/1 to sideslip into -the zone of Major Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7, in order to be in position -for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This meant a crossing of -the river Som for 3/1 and a combined assault with 3/7 on the high -ground along the west bank. - - [114] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived - from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar _HD_, Mar - 51, 2–6; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK - _Cmd Rpt_, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons - narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff. - -The problem of crossing the river, 200 feet wide and chest-deep at the -most likely site, was turned over to Banning with the explanation that -the engineer company supporting the regiment could not be diverted from -road repairs. To meet this emergency Major Edwin H. Simmons, commanding -Weapons Company of 3/1, produced a field manual with instructions for -building a “Swiss bent bridge.”[115] His Antitank Assault Platoon -was given the task under the command of energetic Technical Sergeant -Carmelo J. Randazzo, a veteran on his third enlistment. - - [115] FM 70-10, _Mountain Operations_, 41–46. - -There was no lack of trees for timbers, and rolls of telephone wire -were sworn to be beyond salvaging by the battalion communications -officer. The A-shaped bents, or trusses, were lashed together with wire -and enthusiasm, then carried out into the ice-cold water to be attached -to spars and stringers. - -It was a great triumph for “war by the book.” Before dark on 28 -February two spans, one 120 feet long and another half that length, -were linked by a sandbar in midstream. The improvised bridge stood up -well next morning when the battalion crossed to the west bank. There -3/1 echeloned itself behind 3/7, which gained the first 1,000 yards -under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated air strikes. - -On the left, Major James I. Glendinning’s 2d Battalion of the 7th -Marines ran into increasingly stubborn opposition from CCF mortar and -small-arms fire. Before noon the attacks of both battalions of the 7th -Marines were brought almost to a halt in difficult terrain which the -Communists had booby-trapped. Neither artillery nor air strikes had a -decisive effect against an enemy sheltered by log-covered bunkers. So -many delays were encountered that it was decided in mid-afternoon to -postpone the advance until the following morning, 2 March. - -Artillery and air strikes supported 2/7, 3/7, and 3/1 as they attacked -at 0800 west of the river. Meanwhile, 1/7 patrolled on the division -left flank while maintaining contact with the 6th ROK Division. - -Apparently the enemy put up a hard fight only when he could not -withdraw in time to avoid one. Resistance was light on the west bank, -and east of the river Lieutenant Colonel Allen Sutter’s 2/1, supported -by tanks, had little trouble. His battalion linked up with 3/1 in the -afternoon and dug in after taking its assigned objective, Hill 208, -with casualties of three men wounded. - -The only determined opposition of 2 March took place during the -afternoon in the zone of 2/7, There the attackers could only inch -forward over rocky terrain which the enemy defended, ridge by ridge, -in spite of air strikes and 1,600 artillery rounds fired by the 11th -Marines. - -At daybreak on the 3d the men of the 1st and 7th Marines could look to -the north and see their final objectives. Five hills lay along Phase -Line ARIZONA from west to east--Hills 536 and 333 in the zone of the -7th Marines, and Hills 321, 335, and 201 in the zone of the 1st Marines. - -The last two positions were in the path of 2/1, which seized them after -several brisk fire fights. Casualties of three KIA and 28 WIA were -incurred while inflicting losses of 70 counted CCF dead. The terrain -gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy in taking Hill 321, where the CCF -troops had already begun their withdrawal. - -It was in the zone of the 7th Marines that Communist resistance was -hottest. The 1st battalion was summoned to cover the regimental left -flank and aid in the attack of 2/7 on Hill 536 while 3/7 continued its -struggle for Hill 333. Both battalions had their hardest fight of the -entire operation that afternoon. They lost most of the 14 KIA and 104 -WIA which the Division reported for 3 March, and the enemy still held -the topographical crests. - -The 1st Marines had reached the mopping-up stage on 4 March, while the -7th Marines prepared to go up against an expected last-ditch stand -of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333. The parkas of the assault troops -were powdered with snow as the men moved out to the attack at 0800, -following an intensive artillery preparation. There was something -ominous about the silence in the objective area, but no trap had been -set for the attackers. The Communists actually had pulled out under -cover of darkness, leaving behind only enough outpost troops for -delaying operations. - -Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on the 4th for the Marines, though -mopping up continued throughout the following day. Total Marine -casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395--48 KIA, 2 MIA, and 345 -WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 prisoners. It is -certain, however, that the actual KIA and WIA figures were much higher, -since the withdrawing Communists buried their dead and took their -wounded with them. - -Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit it -with achieving its main purpose--keeping the Communists off balance -while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great -offensive (Map 7). This explains why the enemy as a whole put up a -half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible and -fight another day. - - -JOC _Air Control System Criticized_ - -Operation KILLER was the first real test of the JOC system as far -as the Marines were concerned, and both the flying and ground-force -Marines felt that it had shown grave shortcomings. Air support on -1 March proved so disappointing that General Puller, as temporary -commander of the 1st Marine Division, reported the situation to General -Shepherd, commanding FMFPac. His letter is quoted in part as follows: - - We are having very little success in obtaining Marine air for - CAS [close air support] missions and practically no success in - having Marine air on station for CAS missions.... Most of our - CAS missions in the current operation have been Air Force or - Navy Carrier planes. They do a good job and we are glad to have - them, but our Marine air, with whom we have trained and operated, - can do a better job. We have attempted to insure that Marine - air would support us, and to cut down the delays in receiving - such support, as evidenced by the attached dispatches. We have - received no decision relative to our requests. Apparently, the - answer is no by default.[116] - - [116] Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, Encl. 4. This is a file of - documents in the Marine archives relating to problems of - JOC control in the spring of 1951. - -[Illustration: MAP 7] - -General Puller’s report was obviously written for the record, since -General Shepherd was present at the 1st Marine Division CP at the time. -He witnessed personally the Marine attacks of 2 and 3 March and the air -support they received. On the 3d, the day of heaviest fighting in the -entire operation, there could be no complaint that few Marine aircraft -supported Marine ground forces. The Corsairs flew 26 CAS sorties that -day and cleared the way more than once for the 2d and 3d Battalions -of the 7th Marines. The trouble was that air support as administered -by JOC was so often late in arriving, even when requested the evening -before. More than once the infantry had to go ahead with only artillery -support. Such delays threw the whole plan of attack out of gear, for -air and artillery had to be closely coordinated to be at their best. - -General Shepherd had a series of talks with General Harris. Both then -conferred with General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force. -They requested that he authorize the 1st MAW to keep two planes on -station over the 1st Marine Division whenever it was engaged. General -Partridge did not concur. He maintained that Marine aircraft should be -available to him if needed elsewhere in an emergency. He did consent, -however, to permit 1st MAW armed reconnaissance sorties to check in -with DEVASTATE BAKER for any CAS requests.[117] - - [117] Shepherd Papers, Encl 2, a ltr from Gen Shepherd to - CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. DEVASTATE BAKER was the call sign of - Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), which - coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air - control parties (TACPS). - -This conference did much to clear up the situation. On 5 March no less -than 48 Marine sorties reported to DEVASTATE BAKER, though there was -little need for them in mopping-up operations. And during the next two -weeks an average of 40 sorties a day was maintained. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -Operation Ripper - -_Light Resistance the First Day--Seoul Abandoned by Enemy--Second Phase -of the Operation--Changes in 1st MAW Units--General MacArthur Visits -Marine Battalion--1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division--38th Parallel -Recrossed by Marines--Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_ - - -The new IX corps commander, Major General William H. Hoge, USA, arrived -at Yoju on 4 March 1951. He relieved General Smith the next day and a -color guard turned out to render honors to the Marine commander when he -returned by helicopter to his own Division CP. Upon Smith’s arrival, -General Puller resumed his former duties as ADC. - -The jumpoff of the new operation was scheduled for 0800 on 7 March, -so little time remained for last-minute preparations. The basic plan -called for the drive of IX and X Corps toward the 38th Parallel on the -central front. Protection was to be given on the left flank by I Corps -in the area south and east of Seoul. On the right the ROK divisions had -the mission of maintaining lateral security with a limited northward -advance. - -It was no secret that General Ridgway had been disappointed in the -numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation KILLER. -The primary purpose of RIPPER was to inflict as many Communist -casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure to keep the -enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A secondary -purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that city and the -river Imjin, thus compelling the enemy to choose between default and a -defense on unfavorable terms.[118] - - [118] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51. - -CCF strategy in the early spring of 1951 was obviously conditioned -by preparations for a third great offensive. The enemy’s emphasis on -caution is shown in a translation of a CCF training directive of this -period: - - There must absolutely be no hasty or impatient attitude - toward warfare. Consequently, even though we have a thorough - knowledge of the enemy situation and the terrain, if one day is - disadvantageous for us to engage in combat, it should be done the - next day; if day fighting is disadvantageous, fighting should - be conducted at night, and if engagements in a certain terrain - are not to our advantage, another location should be selected - for combat engagement. When the enemy is concentrated and a weak - point is difficult to find, one must be created (by agitating - or confusing them in some way), or wait until the enemy is - deploying. Engagements must be conducted only when the situation - is entirely to our advantage.[119] - - [119] IX Corps _PIR_ #169; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 21. - - -_Light Resistance the First Day_ - -United Nations forces held a line extending across the peninsula from -Inchon (Map 8) in the west by way of Hoengsong to the east coast in the -vicinity of Chumunjin. The IX Corps order called for the 1st Marine -Division to maintain lateral contact with the 1st Cavalry Division -on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right. Hongchon and -Chunchon, two of the main objectives of Operation RIPPER, lay directly -in the path of the IX Corps advance. Both were important communications -centers which could be utilized to advantage by the enemy for his -forthcoming offensive. - -The first phase line in the IX Corps zone was ALBANY. The Marines -did not need a map to locate an objective just beyond Oum Mountain, -a stark 2,900-foot peak about five and a half miles from the line -of departure. Distance in this area was conditioned by terrain, and -it was a natural fortress of wooded hills and swift streams that -confronted the 1st Marine Division. Highways were conspicuous by their -absence, and extensive maintenance would be required to utilize the -Hoengsong-Hongchon road as a MSR. So few and poor were the secondary -roads that it would sometimes prove necessary for vehicles to detour -along the rocky stream beds.[120] - - [120] This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived - from the IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_ and the 1stMarDiv _WD_ for - Mar 51. - -The last offensive had not developed major or prolonged resistance -at any point. Yet that possibility had to be anticipated by Marine -planners. At least the enemy was an old acquaintance--the 66th CCF -Army,[121] commanded by General Show Shiu Kwai. The 196th Division was -on the left and the 197th on the right, with the 198th in reserve. -These units were believed to comprise about 24,000 men. - - [121] A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions - supported by artillery, is comparable to a U.S. corps. - -Wednesday, 7 March, dawned cold and clear, with snow falling in the -afternoon. The Hoengsong-Hongchon road, winding through Kunsamma Pass, -paralleled the boundary between the two Marine assault regiments, the -7th Marines on the left and the 1st Marines on the right. They jumped -off to attack in line abreast, employing all three battalions when -the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th Marines continued its -patrolling activities in the Hoengsong area as Division reserve. - -The 11th Marines had to ration its artillery ammunition, owing to -supply shortages. JOC came to the rescue nobly by ordering MAG-33 to -place 11 flights of four planes each at the disposal of DEVASTATE BAKER -on D-minus-one. These aircraft reported at hourly intervals to work -over targets in the area of the next day’s Marine operations. For the -ground forces, it was an embarrassment of riches. They had more air -support than they could use at times, and DEVASTATE BAKER sent the -surplus to hit reserve concentrations and other targets of opportunity -in the enemy’s rear.[122] - - [122] Compilation from 1st MAW Sqdns’ _HD_s, 7 and 8 Mar 51. - -The two Marine assault regiments met with light resistance on D-Day. -Both took their objectives with little trouble except for scattered -bursts of machine gun fire. Total casualties for the day were seven men -wounded. - -It was like old times to have Marine planes supporting Marine ground -forces. MAG-12 aircraft were on the job the next day, when CCF -resistance stiffened without ever becoming serious. Heavy CCF mortar -and small-arms fire was received by 3/1, supported by Company A of the -1st Tank Battalion. Well placed rounds by the 11th Marines silenced the -enemy in this quarter, and both battalions of the 1st Marines reached -their assigned positions by nightfall. - -[Illustration: MAP 8 - -EUSAK plan for Operation Ripper] - -The second day’s advances gave added proof that the enemy was up to his -old trick of putting up a limited defense while pulling back before -the Marines could come to grips. Log bunkers were ideal for these CCF -delaying tactics; each was a little fortress that might enable a squad -to stand off a company while larger CCF units withdrew. - -The Marine assault troops found that a preliminary treatment of napalm -from MAG-12 aircraft, followed by well-aimed 90mm fire from the tanks, -did much to soften up the bunkers for an infantry attack with hand -grenades. - -Company A of the 7th Marines had the hardest fight of all Marine units -on 8 March. Second Lieutenant Clayton O. Bush and the 2d Platoon led -the attack on the company objective, a hill mass to the left of Oum -San. With 300 yards still to be covered, the Marines were pinned -down by well aimed CCF small-arms and mortar fire, including white -phosphorus. A high explosive shell scored a direct hit on the platoon, -killing two men and wounding three. Bush was evacuated, with his right -arm mangled. First Lieutenant Eugenous Hovatter, the company commander, -ordered the 1st Platoon to pass through the 2d and continue the attack -with air and tank support. The flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles -did much to help the company clear the enemy from the hill and the 7th -Marines reached all assigned regimental objectives for the day.[123] - - [123] 7thMar _HD_, Mar 51; VMF-323 _HD_, Mar 51; Capt Clayton - O. Bush, ltr of 11 Aug 57. - -The Marine advance came to a halt on 9 March to wait for Army units to -catch up on the right. While the 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines took -blocking positions, the 1st and 7th Marines sent out patrols on both -flanks in an effort to regain lateral contact. For the next two days, -1st Marine Division operations were limited to patrolling. A good deal -of activity took place in the rear, however, as Marine service units -moved up to Hoengsong. - - -_Seoul Abandoned by Enemy_ - -The advance was resumed on 11 March after the relief of 2/1 by Major -Walter Gall’s Division Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by a platoon -of tanks. Although the enemy withdrew from most of his positions -without putting up much resistance, a patrol of George Company, 3/1, -had a hot fire fight on Hill 549. Opening fire at 50 yards from -camouflaged, log-faced bunkers, the Chinese killed one man and wounded -nine. Marine infantrymen, supported by flat-trajectory 90mm fire, -approached within grenade-throwing range to destroy five bunkers and -kill 16 of the defenders. As the patrol withdrew, it called on the 11th -Marines to finish the job. The cannoneers were credited with several -direct hits.[124] - - [124] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 8. - -Chinese resistance continued to be light as the two Marine regiments -occupied rather than seized ground on 12 and 13 March. By the 14th all -units were dug in along Phase Line ALBANY. - -CCF withdrawals were also reported by other Eighth Army units. On -15 March a patrol from the 1st ROK Division of I Corps found Seoul -abandoned by the enemy. The Chinese Reds had made their choice and UN -forces took over a devastated city with some 200,000 civilians dragging -out a miserable existence in the ruins. Dead power lines dangled over -buildings pounded into rubble, and even such a famous landmark as the -enormous red, brass-studded gates of the American Embassy Compound had -been destroyed. - -It was the fourth time that Seoul had changed hands in 9 months of war. -Air reconnaissance having established that the enemy had withdrawn -about 15 miles to entrenched positions in the Uijongbu area, General -Ridgway enlarged the mission of I Corps by directing it to advance on -the left of IX Corps.[125] - - [125] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 68–70. - -During the first phase of Operation RIPPER, from 7 to 13 March, counted -casualties inflicted on the enemy by X Corps amounted to 6,543 KIA and -216 POW. IX Corps casualties during the same period were reported as -158 KIA, 965 WIA, and 35 MIA--a total of 1,158.[126] - - [126] IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 35–37. - -The total strength of the Eighth Army (less the Marines) was 185,229 -officers and men in March 1951. Adding the 25,642 of the 1st Marine -Division, the 4,645 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, plus 11,353 of -the American Air Force and 355 attached from the U.S. Navy, 227,119 -Americans were serving in Korea. This does not count 13,475 South -Koreans serving in various U.S. Army divisions.[127] - - [127] _Ibid._ - -The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with an authorized total of 728 officers -and 4,216 enlisted men, had an actual strength of 626 and 4,019 -respectively on 31 March 1951. Of an authorized 29 officers and 93 -enlisted men from the Navy, 22 and 83 in these categories were on -duty.[128] - - [128] FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51. - -Troops to the number of 21,184 from the ground forces of other United -Nations were represented as follows: - - United Kingdom and Australia 10,136 - Turkey 4,383 - Philippines 1,277 - Thailand 1,050 - Canada 858 - New Zealand 816 - Greece 777 - France 749 - Belgium-Luxembourg 638 - Netherlands 500 - ---------- - [129]21,184 - - [129] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include - personnel in hospitals or clearing stations. UK and - Australian statistics are not separated in available - records. - -The 249,815 officers and men of the ROK Army make a total UN combat -strength of 493,503. There were an additional 671 in three noncombat -units: the Danish hospital ship _Jutlandia_, 186; the 60th Indian -Ambulance Group, 329; and the Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit, -156.[130] - - [130] _Ibid._ - -Chinese forces in Korea, including confirmed and probable, totaled 16 -armies, each comparable to a U.S. corps. Eight others were reported. -Assuming that these CCF units averaged a field strength of 24,000 -officers and men, the total would have been 384,000 for the 16 armies. -The reorganized forces of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) were -credited with five armies. Adding these 120,000 men to the 16 Chinese -armies, the enemy had 504,000 troops in Korea plus whatever might -have been the strength of the eight reported armies and the rear area -service elements. In addition, large reserves stood just over the -border in Manchuria.[131] - - [131] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 95. - - -_Second Phase of the Operation_ - -With scarcely a pause on Phase Line ALBANY, the second phase of -Operation RIPPER began on 14 March with a drive toward Phase Line -BUFFALO (Map 8). Despite the difficulty of maneuver over muddy roads in -mountainous terrain, an Eighth Army directive of that date called for -a pincers movement to be initiated by means of a rapid advance of the -1st Marine Division on the right and the 1st Cavalry Division on the -left. It was hoped that the Chinese forces south of Hongchon might be -trapped and destroyed after the 187th Airborne Regiment cut off escape -by landing north of the town. General Ridgway having urged his corps -commanders to stress maneuver, IX Corps sent this message to division -commanders: - - It is desired that more use be made of maneuver within and - between division zones with a view toward trapping and - annihilating the enemy through such maneuver. Movements should be - less stereotyped; it is not desirable that units always advance - toward the enemy abreast. Well planned and successfully executed - maneuver using companies and battalions has previously been - conducted; this should be extended to include regiments. This - Headquarters is studying and will continue to study and order - into execution the maneuver of divisions with the same intent and - purpose.[132] - - [132] IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51. - -Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division made rapid -progress toward Phase Line BAKER (Map 9), established by IX Corps as an -intermediate control. Unfortunately for the purposes of the envelopment -maneuver, the Chinese withdrew from the Hongchon area before the -pincers could close or the 187th Airborne make an air drop. CCF -resistance was confined to machine gun fire covering hasty retirements. -The 7th Marines on the left occupied its objective without once calling -for air or artillery support, and the 1st Marines was virtually -unopposed. Division casualties for the 14th were six men wounded. - -Flash floods and roads churned into hub-deep mud were the greatest -enemies of progress. Serious as the resulting supply problems were, -they might have been worse but for the efforts of the recently -organized Civil Transport Corps formed from members of the ROK National -Guard who lacked the necessary training for military duties. There was -no shortage of willing indigenous labor, for these auxiliaries received -pay as well as rations and clothing. Formed into companies, they worked -with the wooden “A-frames”--so-called because of their shape--used from -time immemorial in Korea as a rack for carrying heavy burdens. - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 356353 - - _Flight From The Foe--A Korean carries his aged father across the - icy Han River in the flight southward to escape the advancing - Communist troops in their drive of January, 1951._ -] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158073] - - _At the Critical Moment--Above, a Marine tank blasts an enemy - emplacement while a rifleman stands by for the final assault; - below, Marine riflemen hug the ground as they advance under fire - during Operation RIPPER in March, 1951._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 6862] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8064 USMC Photo A 161016] - - _Attack--Above, Marine machine gunner climbs a ridge while a - flamethrower operator burns straw to deny cover to the enemy; - below, a young rifleman hurriedly reloads after emptying a clip - at Chinese Communist soldiers._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159023] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155354] - - _Supporting The Fighting Man--Above, a group of surgeons are at - work in a minor surgery ward; below, a cargador train carries - ammunition and rations to the front-line companies._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9857] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 8756] - - _Moving Out--Above, a Marine rifle company, C/1/1, moves to a - rest area after almost two months of fighting; below, camouflaged - Korean Marines on patrol pause to check the route._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 161982] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 9458 USMC Photo A 9457] - - “_Calling_ DEVASTATE BAKER!”--_Above, forward air controllers - with attacking companies use the call sign of supporting air; - below, a dependable Corsair responds to the infantry’s call._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 133540] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 346714] - - “_Launch and Attack”--Above, a Panther jet takes off on a close - air support mission; below, the attack is pressed at close range - on a stubborn enemy by a Tigercat (left) and a Corsair (right)._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 130948 USMC Photo A 7283] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158968] - - _Supporting The Troops--Above, a tank commander emerges from his - steel shell in order to scan the hills for targets; below, a - rocket battery harasses the enemy near Chunchon in May, 1951._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 155643] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159109] - - _Power-Packed Punch--Above, a Marine tank topples Korean trees - while moving into position to support an attack by fire; below, a - rocket battery firing a ripple at night._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 169791] - -[Illustration: USMC A 3597] - - _Prisoners of War--Above, Marines guarding captured prisoners - awaiting interrogation; and below, after hearing the familiar - order to “saddle up” a Marine awaits the word to move out._ - -[Illustration: USMC A 159197] - -[Illustration: USMC A 9769] - - _Random Scenes--Above, the result of what happens when a jeep - runs over an anti-tank mine; and below, a Marine fire direction - control center in operation._ - -[Illustration: USMC A 155903] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962] - - _Aerial Workhorse--Above, after refueling at a mountainside - fuel dump, a Marine helicopter loads men for evacuation; below, - pre-fab bunkers are unloaded on a Korean hillside._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 159962] - - _Have Chopper, Will Travel--Above, Marine helicopter - demonstrating rescue technique; and below, staff officers board - helicopters in preparation for front line inspection trip._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 168493] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo 160193 USMC Photo A 158811] - - _Fighting Faces--Above, left, PFC H. W. Hodges pauses to drink - from a “refrigerated” spring; above, right, PFC J. W. Harnsberger - relaxes on the MLR; below, Sgt E. L. Whitlow and Capt W. F. - Whitbeck scan the front for signs of enemy action._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 167904] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 131819] - - _Family Reunion--Above, Col W. S. Brown, CO 1st Marines, visits - his son, a Marine corporal; below, left, Capt G. H. Parker - directs an air strike from a tree top observation post; below, - right, PFC K. L. Spriggs receives his Purple Heart._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 132390 USMC Photo A 158743] - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 158079] - - _Necklace of Boots--Above, a South Korean cargador carries a - necklace of boots to a front line company; below, new thermal - boots are issued to combat troops._ - -[Illustration: USMC Photo A 157927] - -[Illustration: MAP 9 - -1st Mar Div Zone of Action - -Operation Ripper] - -The Civil Transport Corps proved to be a boon for the Eighth Army. -Veteran porters could manage a load of 100 to 125 pounds over ground -too rugged for motor vehicles. Several hundred were attached to each -regiment during Operation RIPPER. - -Any lingering hope of rounding up Chinese prisoners in the Hongchon -area was blasted on the 15th when evidence of Chinese withdrawal came -in the form of an enemy radio message intercepted at 1230. “We cannot -fight any longer,” the translation read. “We must move back today. We -will move back at 1400. Enemy troops will enter our positions at 1300 -or 1400. Enemy troops approaching fast.”[133] - - [133] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv; CO 1stMar, 1300 15 Mar 51. - -Hongchon fell without a fight to the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines -on the afternoon of 15 March. Major Webb D. Sawyer, the commanding -officer, sent a motor patrol through the ruins without flushing out any -Chinese, but on the return trip a truck was damaged by a “butterfly -bomb.” This led to the discovery that the Hongchon area was covered -with similar explosives that had been dropped by U.S. planes to slow up -the CCF counterattacks in the middle of February. - -Butterfly bombs, so-called because of the whirling vanes that -controlled the drop and armed the 4-pound projectiles, could be set for -air or ground bursts. Usually, however, they were dropped in clusters -to remain on the ground until disturbed. Apparently the enemy had not -troubled to clear them from the Hongchon area, and that three-day task -was begun by Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion while 1/7 seized -the high ground northwest of the town.[134] - - [134] LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual - 9-1980, AF 136–137. This was not the first nor the last - time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs became a - deadly nuisance to friendly forces. - - -_Changes in 1st MAW Units_ - -Air support for the ground forces continued to be more than adequate in -quantity. Since the agreement between Generals Partridge and Harris, 40 -1st MAW sorties a day had been allotted to the 1st Marine Division. The -timing was not all that could have been asked on occasion, but on the -whole the Marine infantry had no complaint. - -The 1st MAW had undergone an extensive reshuffling of units on the eve -of Operation RIPPER. VMF(N)-542 was sent back to El Toro, California, -for conversion to F3D jet all weather fighters. The squadron’s F7F-3N’s -and two F-82’s were left with VMF(N)-513. The former commanding officer -of 542, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Anderson, assumed command of 513. -He relieved Lieutenant Colonel David C. Wolfe, who returned to the -States. - -The California-bound cadre of 542 included 45 officers and 145 enlisted -men under Major Albert L. Clark. VMF(N)-513 was now a composite -squadron, attacking from K-1 during the day with its F4U-5N’s and at -night with its F7F-3N’s. - -Another change took place when VMF-312 replaced VMF-212 on the CVE -_Bataan_. The former squadron had been preparing for weeks to perform -carrier duty, so that the change was made without a hitch. VMF-212, -after nearly 3 months on the _Bataan_, established itself at K-3 under -a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Claude H. Welch, who -relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski. - -The transportation jam in Korea made necessary the permanent assignment -of a VMR-152 detachment to 1st MAW Headquarters. Transports had -heretofore been sent to the Wing on a temporary basis and returned to -Hawaii when missions were completed. - -Mud and inadequate rail facilities doubled the demands on FEAF’S -aerial supply of combat forces. The Wing’s courier service to Marine -air and ground forces scattered over Korea reached the limit of its -capabilities. As a solution General Harris requested a five-plane -VMR-152 detachment on a long-term assignment, and Colonel Deane C. -Roberts took command of this forward echelon at Itami. - -It was now possible to handle cargo and troop transport at the cargo -and passenger terminals of all Marine air bases. In one 4-day period, -early in April, approximately 2,000 replacement troops were lifted from -Masan to Hoengsong by the five R5Ds. About a thousand rotated veterans -were flown back on the return trips.[135] - - [135] Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st - MAW units are derived from the historical diaries of the - units concerned for February, March, and April 1951. - -A further change involved the coordination of the Wing’s air control -organizations. As the enemy’s air power increased, obviously the -problems of UN air defense multiplied. At K-1 the Marine Ground -Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1) and the Air Defense Section of Marine -Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2) were hard pressed to identify -and control the hundreds of aircraft flying daily over Korea. - -There was no adequate system of alerting these air defense stations to -the effect that planes were departing or incoming. Many of them failed -to send out their standard identification friend or foe (IFF) signals; -and those that did so were still suspect, since U.S. electronics -equipment on UN planes had fallen into enemy hands. As a consequence -MGCIS-1 was kept busy vectoring air defense fighters to verify that -certain bogeys were friendly transports, B-29s, or enemy bombers.[136] - - [136] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1038, 1039. A “bogey” is - an unidentified plane. - -In an effort to cope with the situation, General Harris requested that -another Marine ground control intercept squadron, MGCIS-3 be sent to -Korea. He desired that Marine Air Control Group-2 (MACG-2) also be made -available to coordinate the Wing’s air control functions. These units -sailed on 5 March from San Francisco. - -Until March 1951 the Air Force’s 606th Aircraft Control and Warning -Squadron had participated in the air surveillance of the Pusan area -from the top of 3,000-foot Chon-San--the encroaching mountain that made -K-9’s traffic pattern so hazardous. This Air Force unit displaced to -Taejon early in March, and the MGCIS-1 commanding officer, Major H. E. -Allen, moved his radio and radar vans to the mountain top to take over -the job.[137] - - [137] LtCol H. E. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59. - - -_General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion_ - -Following the occupation of Hongchon on the 15th, the Marine ground -forces ran into stiffening enemy opposition during the next two days. -The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines were pinned down by intense -CCF mortar and artillery fire when attacking Hill 356 (Map 9). Three -out of six friendly 81mm mortars were knocked out on 15 March in the 3d -Battalion area, and at dusk 2/7 and 3/7 had barely won a foothold on -the hill.[138] - - [138] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51. - -The 1st Marines also met opposition which indicated that the enemy -planned to make a stand on the high ground east and north of Hongchon. -An intricate maneuver was executed when Lieutenant Colonel Robert -K. McClelland’s 2/1 swung from the right flank, where no enemy was -encountered, to the extreme left. As a preliminary, the battalion -had to circle to the rear, then move by truck up the MSR and through -the zone of the 7th Marines as far as the village of Yangjimal (Map -9). Dismounting, the men made a difficult march across broken country -toward Hill 246. At 1230 on the 15th the column deployed to attack -Hill 428 in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning’s 3d -Battalion. - -Easy Company (Captain Jack A. Smith) and Item Company (First Lieutenant -Joseph R. Fisher) engaged in a hot fire fight with the enemy. Both -sides relied chiefly on mortars, but the Chinese had the advantage of -firing from camouflaged bunkers. Smith called for an air strike and -four planes from VMF-214 responded immediately. Fox Company (Captain -Goodwin C. Groff) and Dog Company (Captain Welby D. Cronk) were -committed in the attempt to carry Hill 428, but the enemy continued to -resist stubbornly until dusk. McClelland then ordered a withdrawal to -night defensive positions around Hill 246. The two assault battalions -had suffered 7 KIA and 86 WIA casualties. Counted enemy dead were -reported as 93.[139] - - [139] 2/1 _HD_ 16 Dec 50 to 30 Apr 51, 21–22; VMF-214 _HD_ Mar - 51, 25–26. - -Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Kennedy’s 3/5 was attached to the 1st -Marines to protect the right flank as the Marines prepared to resume -the attack on the morning of the 16th. But the enemy had pulled out -from Hill 428 during the night and patrols advanced more than 300 yards -without making contact. - -Another hard action awaited the 7th Marines on the 16th, when Major -Sawyer’s 1st Battalion moved up to Line BAKER (Map 9). The Chinese -resisted so hard on Hill 399 that the Marines had to attack bunker -after bunker with grenades. - -The following morning was the occasion of a visit to the front by -General MacArthur. Accompanied by Generals Ridgway and O. P. Smith, he -drove in a jeep from Wonju over the mountain pass to Hongchon, where -Marine engineers were still clearing mines. The jeep stalled after -crossing the Hongchon-gang at a ford and a tow was necessary. This -did not deter the commander in chief, who had asked to visit a Marine -battalion in a combat area. He was taken to the CP of Major Sawyer, -whose 1/7 was mopping up on Hill 399 after the hard fight of the day -before. - -Five hours of riding over miserable roads had not daunted the -71-year-old veteran of two World Wars. He seemed fresh and rested as he -shook hands with 1/7 officers. “Although we had not passed the word -regarding General MacArthur’s visit,” commented General Smith, “there -were dozens of cameras in evidence.”[140] - - [140] Smith, _Chronicle_, 17 Mar 51. - -IX Corps orders were received on the 17th for the 1st Marine Division -to attack from Line BAKER to Line BUFFALO (Map 9). The Division plan of -maneuver called for the 5th Marines to pass through and relieve the 7th -Marines while the 1st Marines continued to advance on the right. - -Again the enemy chose withdrawal to resistance, and five of the six -Marine battalions reached Line BUFFALO on 20 March after encountering -only sniper fire and a few scattered mortar rounds. Enemy opposition -was reserved for 2/1 on the 19th, when Fox Company was pinned down by -enemy small-arms and mortar fire from a long, narrow ridge running -north and south to the west of Hill 330. - -Fortunately for the attackers, a parallel valley enabled a platoon of -tanks from Baker Company, 1st Tank Battalion, to knock out unusually -strong CCF bunkers with direct 90mm fire while Fox Company riflemen -followed along the ridgeline with a grenade attack before the enemy had -time to recover. Thanks to intelligent planning, not a single Marine -was killed or wounded as the battalion dug in for the night on Hill 330. - -Adopting the same tactics on the 20th, after artillery preparation -and an air strike by VMF-214 and VMF-323 planes, Easy Company of -2/1 advanced along the ridgeline connecting Hills 330 and 381 while -tanks moved forward on either side providing direct flat-trajectory -90mm fire. By 1315 the Marines had overrun the enemy’s main line of -resistance without a casualty.[141] - - [141] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 _HD_, Mar - 51. - - -_1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division_ - -As the Eighth Army jumped off on 20 March from Line BUFFALO toward -Line CAIRO (Map 9), the 1st KMC Regiment was attached again to the -1st Marine Division. This was the third time that Lieutenant Colonel -Charles W. Harrison had been directed to reorganize and reassemble -a KMC liaison advisory group. The 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds, was placed in -direct artillery support. When the advance was resumed, the KMCs -attacked between the 1st Marines on the right and the 5th Marines on -the left.[142] - - [142] Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51, 2–3. - -The high _esprit de corps_ of the KMCs shines forth from a comment -written in his own English by First Lieutenant Kim Sik Tong: “The KMC -ideal is to complete the mission, regardless of receiving strong enemy -resistance, with endurance and strong united power, and always bearing -in one’s mind the distinction between honor and dishonor.”[143] - - [143] 1stKMCRegt _POR_, 24 Mar 51. - -The zone of the KMC Regiment was a roadless wilderness, making it -necessary to air-drop ammunition and supplies for the attack on Hill -975. This was the hardest fight of the Division advance to Line CAIRO. -Excellent artillery support was provided for the 2d and 3d Battalions -as they inched their way forward in three days of bitter combat. Not -until the morning of 24 March was the issue decided by maneuver when -the 1st Battalion moved around the left KMC flank into a position -threatening the enemy’s right. Resistance slackened immediately on Hill -975 and the KMCs took their objective without further trouble. - -The 1st and 5th Marines were already on Line CAIRO, having met -comparatively light opposition from NKPA troops who had relieved the -66th and 39th CCF Armies. Apparently the enemy was using North Koreans -as expendable delaying elements while massing in the rear for an -offensive that could be expected at any time. A smoke screen, produced -by burning green wood, shrouded the front in an almost constant haze. - -Although the objectives of Operation RIPPER had been reached, General -Ridgway planned to continue the UN offensive for the purpose of keeping -the enemy off balance during his offensive preparations. The Eighth -Army had been attacking with few and brief pauses for regrouping even -since 21 February, and the commanding general wished to maintain its -momentum. - -An advance of the 1st Marine Division to a new Line CAIRO was ordered -by IX Corps on 26 March. This was simply a northeast extension of the -old line to the boundary between IX and X Corps (Map 9). There was -no need for the 5th Marines to advance, and the 1st Marines and KMC -Regiment moved up to the new line on schedule without opposition. - -Eighth Army units had made average gains of about 35 miles during the -last three weeks while driving nearly to the 38th Parallel. On 29 -March, General Ridgway published a plan for Operation RUGGED. It was -to be a continuation of the offensive, with Line KANSAS (Map 8) as the -new objective. While other 1st Marine units were being relieved by X -Corps elements, the 7th Marines was to be moved up from reserve near -Hongchon and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for the attack beyond -Chunchon, evacuated by the retreating enemy.[144] - - [144] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 51, 18–19. - -On 1 April the Marines were informed of sweeping changes in IX Corps -plans. Instead of being relieved, the 1st Marine Division was to -continue forward with two infantry regiments plus the KMCs. Its new -mission called for a relief of the 1st Cavalry Division (with the 7th -Marines attached) north of Chunchon. This modification gave General -Smith the responsibility for nearly 20 miles of front.[145] - - [145] Smith, _Chronicle_, 1 Apr 51. - -“I visited this front frequently,” commented Major General A. L. -Bowser, the G-3 of that period, “and it was difficult at times to even -locate an infantry battalion.... Visitors from the States or FMFPac -were shocked at the wide frontages.”[146] - - [146] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58. - - -_38th Parallel Recrossed by Marines_ - -Further IX Corps instructions on 2 April directed that the 1st Marines -go into Division reserve near Hongchon while the 5th Marines and 1st -KMC Regiment attacked. The deep, swift Soyang-gang, fordable in only a -few places, lay squarely in the path of the 5th Marines. Speculations -as to the method of crossing became rife just as air mattresses were -issued. And though the officers denied any such intent, the troops were -convinced that inflated mattresses would be used. - -As it happened, the regimental executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel -Stewart, worked out a plan that did not include any such novelty. A -narrow ford was discovered that would get the 1st and 2d Battalions -across while the 3d rode in DUKWs. Light enemy opposition of a rear -guard nature was encountered but the regiment completed the operation -without casualties. Stewart reported to the regimental CP and learned -that a jeep waited to take him on the initial lap of his homeward -journey. He was the last man to leave Korea of the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade, which had landed at Pusan on 2 August 1950.[147] - - [147] Col J. L. Stewart, ltr of 25 Oct 57. - -After reaching their prescribed objectives, the 5th Marines and KMC -Regiment were relieved on 5 April by elements of the 7th Infantry -Division of X Corps. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines, attached to the 1st -Cavalry Division, advanced northward with the 7th and 8th Cavalry -Regiments. Little opposition developed and on 4 April the Marines were -among the first Eighth Army troops to recross the 38th Parallel. - -General Ridgway published another operation plan on 6 April 1951 and -designated new Eighth Army objectives to the northward. The purpose -was to threaten the buildup for the forthcoming CCF offensive that was -taking place behind the enemy lines in the so-called “Iron Triangle.” - -This strategic area, one of the few pieces of comparatively level real -estate in central Korea, was bounded by Kumhwa, Chorwon, and Pyongyang -(Map 14). A broad valley containing a network of good roads, it had -been utilized by the Chinese for the massing of supplies and troops. - -Experience had proved that interdictory bombing could not prevent -the enemy from nourishing an offensive, even though the FEAF had -complete control of the air over roads and rail lines of a mountainous -peninsula. The Chinese, though hampered in their efforts, had been -able to bring up large quantities of supplies under cover of darkness. -General Ridgway determined, therefore, to launch his ground forces at -objectives threatening the Iron Triangle, thus forcing the enemy to -fight. - -On 8 April, in preparation for the new effort, the 1st Marine Division -was directed by IX Corps to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division on Line -KANSAS and prepare to attack toward Line QUANTICO (Map 8). - - -_Renewal of Division’s CAS Problems_ - -By this time, after three months of various sorts of operational -difficulties, VMF-311 was riding a wave of efficiency. The distance -from the operating base to the combat area emphasized the superior -speed of the F9Fs. The Panther jets could get into action in half the -time required by the Corsairs. The jets were more stable in rocket, -bombing, and strafing runs. They were faster on armed reconnaissance -and often were pouring it into the enemy before he could disperse. -These advantages offset the high fuel consumption of the F9Fs and made -them ideal planes for close air support. - -On the morning of 8 April an opportunity arose for the Marine jets to -help the 7th Marines. It started when 3/7 patrols encountered 120mm -mortars, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades employed by an -enemy force dug in on a ridge looming over the road near the west end -of the Hwachon reservoir. The battalion forward air controller radioed -DEVASTATE BAKER at Hongchon for air support.[148] - - [148] The following description is from: 7th Mar HD, 8 Apr 51, - 5; IX Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574 - and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7) - “Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW _HD_, Apr 51, App - VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr. - -At the time Major Roy R. Hewitt, an air officer on General Shepherd’s -FMFPac staff, was visiting the Air Support Section of Marine Tactical -Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2). His blow-by-blow report of events is -as follows: - - a. At 0900 a request for an air support strike on an enemy mortar - position was received from the 7th Marines. It took the Air - Support Section until 0945 to get through to JOC and then it had - to be shunted through K-1 in order to get the request in. - - b. The G-3 1st Marine Air Wing had arranged with JOC to have four - (4) F9F ‘scramble alert’ for use by the 1st Marine Division. - The F9Fs were requested, and JOC authorized their use, but when - Marine Aircraft Group-33 was contacted they informed the Air - Support Section that JOC had already scrambled the aircraft and - sent them to another target. - - c. Air Support Section again contacted JOC, and JOC said aircraft - would be on station in one (1) hour. At the end of one (1) hour - JOC was again contacted concerning aircraft. This time JOC said - they would have two (2) flights on station within one (1) hour. - At the end of the second one (1) hour period no aircraft were - received. - - d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed - that any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be - requested through the 1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th - Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC notified DEVASTATE BAKER - that any such requests from the 1st Marine Division would not be - honored until the Division went back into action.][149] - - [149] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, _op. cit._ - -During all this time ten Marine planes--six from VMF-311 and four from -VMF-214--had reported in and out of the area. They had been sent by -MELLOW to work under the control of Mosquito STRATEGY, the tactical air -controller (airborne) (TACA) of the 1st Cavalry Division. The flights -also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the Marines’ left, hit -troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines’ front, and aided -the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were encountering resistance on -the commanding ground to the right. None of the flights supported the -Marines. - -Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the enemy -positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of four -Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt’s report continued: - - e. At the end of six (6) hours air support was finally received - by the 7th Marines. It was brought in by a Mosquito who would not - relinquish control of the aircraft to the Forward Air Controller - who could see the target much better than the Mosquito. - - f. After having the fighters make a couple of passes the Mosquito - took the fighters and went to another target without having - completely destroyed the position. - -This was the beginning of a deterioration in air support for Marine -ground forces that can be charged in large measure to the JOC system -of control. Major Hewitt’s report was read with great interest by -high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers. By now they were devoting -a lot of thought to the breakup of the Marine air-ground team. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -The CCF Spring Offensive - -_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive--Hwachon Occupied by KMC -Regiment--CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank--Marine Air in Support -Everywhere--Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left--Repulse of Communist -Attacks--Withdrawal to the_ KANSAS _Line--Enemy Stopped in IX Corps -Sector--1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_ - - -On 10 April 1951 the 1st Marine Division was poised on Line KANSAS for -a drive to Line QUANTICO. Then a new IX Corps directive put on the -brakes, and for 10 days Marine activities were limited to patrolling -and preparation of defensive works. Boundary adjustments between the -Division and the 6th ROK Division on the left extended the Marine -zone about 2,000 yards to the west; and General O. P. Smith’s CP was -advanced to Sapyong-ni, just south of the 38th Parallel (Map 8). - -Out of a blue sky came the announcement on the 11th that General -MacArthur had been recalled by President Truman for failure to give -wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government -and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. -General Ridgway was appointed to the UN command, and he in turn was -relieved on 14 April by Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA. - -The new Eighth Army commander, youthful in appearance for his 59 years, -was no novice at fighting Communists. In 1949 and 1950 he had been -Director of the Joint Military Aid Group that saved Greece from falling -into the clutches of Communism after Moscow fomented a civil war. Van -Fleet also brought to his new command a World War II reputation as a -vigorous leader with a preference for offensive doctrines. - - -_Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive_ - -Chinese prisoners taken during the first three weeks of April 1951 told -all they knew with no apparent reluctance, just as Japanese captives -had given information in World War II. Inconsistent as it may seem that -fanatical Asian soldiers should prove so cooperative, such was the -penalty the enemy paid for insisting on resistance to the last ditch. -Since the possibility of surrender was not considered, CCF prisoners -were taught no code of behavior and answered questions freely and -frankly. - -POW interrogations were supplemented by captured documents revealing -that the Chinese prided themselves on a new tactical doctrine known -as “the roving defensive,” put into effect in the spring of 1951. It -meant “not to hold your position to the death, but to defend against -the enemy through movement,” explained a secret CCF directive dated 17 -March 1951. “Therefore, the wisdom of the roving defensive is based -on exhausting the enemy without regard for the loss or gain of some -fighting area or the immediate fulfillment of our aims.”[150] - - [150] This section is based upon the following documents: IX - Corps _CmdRpt_ 5, Apr 51, Sec 3, Intelligence; 1stMarDiv - _HD_, Apr 51; _PIR_ 171, 179, 180. - -It was admitted that the CCF soldier must work harder, “because the -troops will have to construct entrenchments and field works in every -place they move.” But the advantages were that “roving warfare can -conserve our power, deplete the enemy’s strength, and secure for us -more favorable conditions for future victory. Meanwhile, the enemy will -make the mistake once again, and collapse on the Korean battlefield.” - -The last sentence evidently refers to the UN advance of late November -1950 that was rolled back by a surprise CCF counteroffensive. Chinese -strategists seem to have concluded that their “roving defensive” had -made possible another such offensive victory in the spring of 1951. At -any rate, prisoners questioned by the 1st Marine Division and other IX -Corps units agreed that the CCF 5th Phase Offensive was scheduled to -begin on 22 April 1951. The IX Corps zone was said to be the target -area for an attempted breakthrough.[151] - - [151] EUSAK, IX Corps and 1stMarDiv G-2 _PIR_s, 1–20 Apr 51. - -Marine G-2 officers recalled that prisoners gave information on the eve -of the CCF offensive in November 1950 that proved to be astonishingly -accurate in the light of later events. For it was a paradox that -the Chinese Reds, so secretive in other respects, let the man in the -ranks know about high-level strategic plans. In the spring of 1951 it -mattered little, since air reconnaissance had kept the Eighth Army well -informed as to the enemy buildup. - -Prisoners were taken in the IX Corps zone from the following major CCF -units during the first three weeks of April: - - 20th Army (58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions), estimated strength, - 24,261; - - 26th Army (76th, 77th, and 78th Divisions), estimated total - strength, 22,222; - - 39th Army (115th, 116th, and 117th Divisions), estimated total - strength, 19,538; - - 40th Army (118th, 119th, and 120th Divisions), estimated total - strength, 25,319. - -The 20th and 26th, it may be recalled, were two of the CCF armies -opposing the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Reservoir breakout. -It was a satisfaction to the Marines that their opponents of December -1950 had evidently needed from three to four months to reorganize and -get back into action. - -In CCF reserve on 21 April 1951 were the 42d and 66th Armies, both -located in the Iron Triangle to the enemy’s rear. The former included -the 124th, 125th, and 126th Divisions--the 124th being the unit cut to -pieces from 3 to 7 November 1950 by the 7th Marines in the war’s first -American offensive action against Chinese Red adversaries. - - -_Hwachon Occupied by KMC Regiment_ - -At 0700 on the 21st the 1st Marine Division resumed the attack toward -Line QUANTICO with the 7th Marines on the left, the 5th Marines in the -center, the KMC Regiment on the right, and the 1st Marines in reserve. -Negligible resistance awaited the Marines and other IX Corps troops -during advances of 5,000 to 9,000 yards. An ominous quiet hung over the -front as green wood smoke limited visibility to a few hundred yards. - -On the Marine left the 6th ROK Division lost touch, opening a gap -of 2,500 yards, according to a message from Corps to the 1st Marine -Division. The ROK commander was ordered by Corps to restore lateral -contact. This incident would be recalled significantly by the Marines -when the CCF blow fell.[152] - - [152] 1stMarDiv _HD_ Apr 51, 47–48; CO 7thMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr 51. - -The KMC Regiment had the mission of finishing the fight for control of -the Hwachon Reservoir area. Early in April the 1st Cavalry Division -and the 4th Ranger Company, USA, had been repulsed in attempts to -fight their way across the artificial lake in rubber boats. The enemy -retaliated by opening the penstocks and spillway gates. Considering -that the dam was 275 feet high and the spillway 826 feet long, it is -not surprising that a wall of water 10 feet high roared down the Pukhan -Valley into areas recently occupied by IX Corps units.[153] - - [153] Capt D. E. Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam, - Korea,” _The Military Engineer_, Jan-Feb 1952, 7–8. - -Both Army and Marine engineers were on the alert, having been warned by -aerial observers. They cut three floating bridges loose from one bank -or another, so that they could ride out the crest of the flood. Thanks -to this precaution, only temporary damage and interruption of traffic -resulted.[154] - - [154] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51. - -The 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. -Partridge, was given the mission by Corps of jamming the gates of the -dam at the open position. Compliance would have to wait, of course, -until the KMCs took the dam. Partridge conferred meanwhile with Colonel -Bowser, and it was decided to take no action after the anticipated -capture until a demolitions reconnaissance could be made.[155] - - [155] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col J. H. - Partridge, ltr of 17 Mar 58. - -As early as 18 April a KMC patrol had crossed the Pukhan into the town -of Hwachon, which was found abandoned except for 11 Chinese soldiers, -who were taken prisoner. Marine engineers installed a floating bridge -on the 21st for the advance of one KMC battalion the next morning. The -other two battalions were to cross the river several miles downstream -by DUKWs.[156] - - [156] CO KMC Regt msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in KMC - In&Out #1; Col C. W. Harrison, _Narrative_, Mar-Apr 51. - -Corps plans for the attack were made in full realization of air -reconnaissance reports for 20 and 21 April indicating that the enemy -offensive buildup was in its final stages. This intelligence was -gleaned in spite of all enemy efforts to frustrate the airmen. CCF -spotters were placed on mountain tops to give the alarm, and relays -of men fired shots to pass on warnings of approaching planes. -Antiaircraft defenses were increased at such vital spots as bridges -and supply areas. The Communists even went so far as to put out -decoys--fake trucks, tanks, and tank cars--to lure UN fighter-bombers -within range of antiaircraft guns. - -These efforts resulted in 16 Marine planes being shot down from 1 -to 21 April 1951. Nine of the pilots were killed, one was captured, -three were rescued from enemy territory, one walked back to friendly -outposts, and two managed to bail out or crash-land behind the UN -lines.[157] - - [157] Compilation of data from 1stMAW sqdn _HD_s, Apr 51; - _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 1051, 1071. - -This total was equivalent to two-thirds of the average tactical -squadron. Because of the disruption to the 1st MAW pilot replacement -program, the Commandant arranged for 20 pilots to be flown to Korea to -augment the normal rotation quotas.[158] - - [158] _Ibid._ - -Direct opposition from enemy aircraft was also on the increase. CCF -flights even reached the EUSAK battle line as unidentified light planes -flew over positions or dropped small bombs. Evidently the enemy was -using well camouflaged airfields in North Korea. - -An air battle took place on 20 April when two VMF-312 pilots from -the _Bataan_, Captain Philip C. DeLong and First Lieutenant Harold -D. Daigh, encountered four YAK fighters in the heavily defended -Pyongyang-Chinnanpo area. They gave chase and shot down three of the -enemy planes.[159] - - [159] 1st MAW _HD_, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 _HD_, 20 Apr 51. - -Marine aircraft were on station when Marine ground forces resumed their -forward movement at 0830 on the morning of 22 April. A CCF prisoner -taken that very afternoon confirmed previous POW statements that the -22d was the opening day of the Fifth Phase Offensive. The front was -quiet, however, as the three Marine infantry regiments advanced almost -at will. - -A motorized patrol of Division Reconnaissance Company, led by the -commanding officer, Major Robert L. Autrey, had the initial contact -with the enemy while advancing on the Division left flank. The two -platoons, supported by Marine tanks, found their first indications when -searching a Korean roadside hut. Although the natives denied having -seen any Chinese soldiers. Corporal Paul G. Martin discovered about 50 -hidden rice bowls waiting to be washed. Upon being confronted with -this evidence, the terrified Koreans admitted that Chinese soldiers had -reconnoitred the area just before dawn. - -Farther up the road, an ammunition dump of hidden mortar shells was -discovered. The enemy had also put up several crude propaganda signs -with such sentiments as YOUR FOLKS LIKE SEE YOU HOME and HALT! FORWARD -MEANS DEATH. - -The patrol dismounted and proceeded with caution, guided by an OY -overhead. Although the “choppers” were the favored aircraft of VMO-6, -the OYs also earned the gratitude of the troops on many an occasion -such as this. The pilot gave the alarm just before hidden Communists -opened fire. Thus the Marines of the patrol were enabled to take cover, -and the tanks routed the enemy force with well placed 90mm shells.[160] - - [160] Sgt Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 2 Jul 56. - -The KMCs met no resistance worth mentioning when they secured the town -of Hwachan and the north bank of the Pukhan just west of the reservoir. -Only light and scattered opposition awaited the 5th Marines (Colonel -Richard M. Hayward) and the 7th Marines (Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.) -on their way to the occupation of assigned objectives on Line QUANTICO. - - -_CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank_ - -For weeks the Communist forces in Korea might have been compared to an -antagonist backtracking to get set for taking aim with a shotgun. There -could be no doubt, on the strength of daily G-2 reports, about both -barrels being loaded. And on the night of 22 April the enemy pulled the -trigger. - -The KMCs, after taking their objectives, reported a concentration -of enemy small-arms fire. At 1800 the command of the 1st Marine -Division directed a renewal of the advance at 0700, on the morning of -the 23d. This order was cancelled at 2224 by a message calling for -all Marine units to consolidate and patrol in zone, pending further -instructions.[161] - - [161] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, 11th Mar, 1st KMC, Tk, - and EngBns, 2224 22 Apr 51 in Div In&Out #21. - -One of the reasons for the sudden change was the receipt of a message -by the 1st Marine Division at 2120, informing that the 6th ROK -Division was under heavy attack to the west of the Marines. Meanwhile, -an on-the-spot questioning of a CCF prisoner just taken by the KMCs -convinced the command and staff of the 1st Marine Division that the CCF -5th Phase Offensive was only hours away and gathering momentum. Thanks -to this timely interpretation, all forward Marine units were alerted -two hours before the main blow fell. - -It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first -became critical. The 6th ROK Division had never quite succeeded in -closing up the gap on its right and restoring contact with the Marines. -But this failure was trivial as compared to the collapse of the entire -ROK division an hour before midnight, leaving a gap wide enough for a -major breakthrough. - -The 1st Marine Division took prompt measures to cope with the -emergency. As early as 2130, the 1st Marines, in reserve just north -of Chunchon, were alerted to move one battalion to contain a possible -enemy threat to the Division left flank. A second message an hour later -called for immediate execution. And at midnight the Division Provost -Marshal was directed to stop ROK stragglers and place them under guard. -The Division Reconnaissance Company received orders to aid the military -police.[162] - - [162] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in - Div In&Out #12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51, 6 and 50. - -Colonel Francis M. McAlister, commanding the 1st Marines, selected -Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1st Battalion to carry out Division -orders. “By midnight we were all on trucks and rolling on the roads -north,” wrote Second Lieutenant Joseph M. Reisler in a letter home. -“Mile after mile, all the roads were covered with remnants of the ROKs -who had fled. Thousands of them [were] straggling along the roads in -confusion.”[163] - - [163] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51. - -Despite these preparations for trouble on the left flank, the KMCs -on the right and the 5th Marines in the center were first in the -Division to come under attack. During the last minutes of 22 April the -2d KMC Battalion had it hot and heavy on Hill 509. To the left the -1st KMC Battalion, partially encircled, notified the 5th Marines of a -penetration. - -The effects were felt immediately by 1/5, with its CP in Hwachon. Hill -313 was the key to the town, being located at the Hwachon end of a long -ridge forming a natural avenue of approach from the northeast. Captain -James T. Cronin’s Baker Company of 1/5 had the responsibility for -protecting the CP and shifting troops to the right flank if necessary. -He sent Second Lieutenant Harvey W. Nolan’s platoon to run a race with -the enemy for the occupation of Hill 313. Attached in excess of T/O for -familiarization was Second Lieutenant Patrick T. McGahn.[164] - - [164] Sources for this 1/5 action are 5thMar _HD_, Apr 51; - LtCol John L. Hopkins, interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T. - Cronin, ltr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv of 27 - Jul 56. - -About 220 yards from the summit the slope was so steep that the Marines -clawed their way upward on hands and knees. The company commander -posted the attached light machine gun section while Nolan, McGahn, -and Sergeant William Piner organized the assault. The three squads of -riflemen advanced a few yards, only to be pinned down by well directed -CCF machine gun fire. Another rush brought the Marines closer to the -enemy but a stalemate ensued in the darkness. Seven of the platoon were -killed and 17 wounded. - -The situation in the 1/5 area was so serious that Fox Company of 2/5 -(Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin) sent reinforcements. At dawn, -however, Hill 313 proved to be abandoned by the enemy. A vigorous KMC -counterstroke had swept the Communists from Hill 509, so that the front -was relatively quiet in this area. The courage and determination of the -KMC Regiment were praised by General Smith, who sent this message on -the morning of the 23d to Colonel Kim, the commanding officer: - - Congratulate you and your fine officers and men on dash and - spirit in maintaining your positions against strong enemy - attacks. We are proud of the Korean Marines.[165] - - [165] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO KMC Regt, 0910 23 Apr 51. - -It is taking no credit away from the KMCs and 5th Marines to point out -that they appear to have been hit by enemy holding attacks. The main -CCF effort was directed at the left of the Division line, held by the -7th Marines. - -The heaviest fighting took place in the sector of 1/7 on the extreme -left, commanded by Major Webb D. Sawyer. It was obvious that the -enemy planned to widen the penetration made at the expense of the -6th ROK Division. The 358th Regiment of the 120th Division, CCF 40th -Army, hurled nearly 2,000 men at the Marine battalion. Charlie -Company, commanded by Captain Eugene H. Haffey, took the brunt of the -assault.[166] - - [166] This account of the 7th Marines’ fight is based on the - following sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; BrigGen A. - L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col R. G. Davis, Comments, - n.d.; Col H. Nickerson, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F. - Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 - Feb 58. - -The thin battalion line bent under sheer weight of numbers. But it did -not break. It held through three hours of furious fighting, with the -support of Marine and Army artillery, until the 1st Battalion of the -1st Marines came up as reinforcements under the operational control of -the 7th Marines. The newcomers took a position to the left of 1/7, so -that the division flank was no longer completely “in the air.” - -This was one of the first examples of the Corps and Division -maneuvering that played such a large part throughout in the blunting of -the CCF offensive. Troops were not left to continue a desperate fight -when a shift of units would ease the pressure. - - -_Marine Air in Support Everywhere_ - -At first light on the 23d the FEAF Mosquitoes and fighter-bombers -went into action. The Marines had four two-plane flights of Corsairs -airborne before sun-up. VMF-323 responded to a call from Baker Company, -1/5, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Hill 313. A low-flying -OY of VMO-6, commanded by Major D. W. McFarland, guided the Corsairs -to the withdrawing Chinese, who were worked over thoroughly. VMF-214 -planes meanwhile supported 1/7 in that battalion’s desperate fight at -the left of the line.[167] - - [167] _HD_s of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMO-6 for Apr 51. - -A pilot’s-eye view showed fighting in progress from one coast to -another, although the enemy was making his main effort in the IX -Corps sector. The U.S. 24th Infantry Division, to the left of the 6th -ROK Division, was having to bend its right flank southward to defend -against the CCF penetration. Toward the rear the 27th Brigade of the -British Commonwealth Division, in IX Corps reserve, was being alerted -to meet the Communists head on and bring the breakthrough to a halt. - -Elements of the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions on the edge of the Iron -Triangle were giving ground slowly. Seoul was obviously an objective -of CCF units that had crossed the Imjin in the moonlight. But -General Ridgway had decided that the city was not to be abandoned. -“Considerable importance was attached to the retention of Seoul,” he -explained at a later date, “as it then had more value psychologically -than its acquisition had conferred when we were still south of the -Han.”[168] - - [168] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 29 Jan 58. - -Near the junction of X Corps and I ROK Corps the 7th ROK Division had -been hard hit, although the enemy attack in this area was a secondary -effort. Air support helped this unit to hold its own until it could be -reinforced. - -Of the 205 Marine aircraft sorties on 23 April, 153 went to support -the fighting front. The 1st Marine Division received 42 of these CAS -strikes; 24 went to the ROK 7th Division; 59 to I Corps to check -the advance on Seoul; and 28 to pound the Communists crossings the -Imjin.[169] - - [169] Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51. - -Only about 66 percent of the landing strip at K-3 (Pohang) could be -used; the remainder was being repaired by the Seabees. In order to give -the Panther jets more room, VMF-212 shifted its squadrons for two days -to K-16 near Seoul. A detachment of VMF-323 planes from K-1 (Pusan) -also made the move. Since K-16 was only 30 miles from the combat area -along the Imjin, the Corsairs were able to launch their attacks and -return for rearming and refueling in an hour or less.[170] - - [170] VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 _HD_s for Apr 51. - - -_Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left_ - -At first light on 23 April the entire left flank of the 1st Marine -Division lay exposed to the Chinese who had poured into the gap left by -the disintegration of the 6th ROK Division. IX Corps orders called for -the ROKs to reassemble on the KANSAS line, but most of them straggled -from 10 to 14 miles behind the positions they held prior to the CCF -attack. The 1st Marine Division ordered Reconnaissance Company to stop -ROK stragglers at the river crossing, and several groups were turned -back. - -The reasons for the ROK collapse are variously given. Weak command -and low morale have been blamed for the debacle, yet the shattered -division did not lack for defenders. No less an authority than General -Van Fleet declared himself “... reluctant to criticize the 6th ROK -Division too severely. I do not believe they deliberately threw away -their equipment--I am inclined to believe such equipment was abandoned -due to the terrain, lack of roads and weight. Our check at the time -indicated that the Korean soldiers held on to their hand weapons. It is -interesting to know that General Chang who commanded 6th ROK Division -at the time ... is today [March 1958] Vice Chief of Staff of the Korean -Army.”[171] - - [171] Gen J. S. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58. - -As a first step toward setting up a defense in two directions, the 1st -Marine Division received orders from IX Corps to fall back to Line -PENDLETON (Map 10). This was one of the Eighth Army lines assigned to -such profusion that they resembled cracks in a pane of glass. PENDLETON -ran generally southwest to northeast through the 7th Marines sector, -then turned eastward just north of the town of Hwachon. - -By occupying this line, the 7th Marines could bend its left to the -south in order to refuse that flank. Still farther to the south, the -1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines were to take positions facing -west. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division would face west as much -as north. On the center and right the KMCs and 5th Marines would find -it necessary to withdraw only about 1,000 yards to take up their new -positions.[172] - - [172] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51; MajGen - O. P. Smith, _Chronicle_, 23–24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W. - Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 - Feb 58; Col H. Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W. F. - Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27 - Apr 58; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B. Mills, interv of - 4 Apr 58. - -It was up to 1/1 to make the first move toward plugging the gap. At -0130 on the 23d Captain John Coffey’s Baker Company led the way. Moving -north in the darkness along the Pukhan and then west along a tributary, -the long column of vehicles made its first stop about 1,000 yards from -the assigned position. Here the 92d Armored Field Battalion, USA, was -stationed in support of the 6th ROK Division and elements of the 1st -Marine Division. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. -Lavoie, was an old acquaintance of 1/1, having supported that battalion -during the final days of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. Lavoie was -held in high esteem by the Marines, who found it characteristic of him -that in this fluid situation his cannoneers were formed into a tight -defensive perimeter, ready to fight as infantry if need be. - -[Illustration: MAP 10 - -CCF Offensive Starting 22 April - -And Subsequent Marine Withdrawals] - -Another Army artillery unit, the 987th Armored Field Artillery -Battalion, had been roughly used by the Chinese who routed the ROK -division. Losses in guns and equipment had resulted, and Coffey moved -with his company about 1,500 yards to the west to assist in extricating -from the mud all the 105s that could be saved. Resistance was -encountered in the form of machine gun fire from Chinese who had set up -a road block.[173] - - [173] Sources for operations of the two Army artillery - battalions are: Gen W. M. Hoge, USA (Ret.), ltr of 3 Feb - 58; LtCol Leon F. Lavoie, USA, ltr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy - A. Tucker, USA, ltr of 30 Nov 57; LtCol John F. Coffey, - USMC, ltr of 9 Feb 58; Capt Russell A. Gugeler, USA, - _Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington, 1954), 162–173. - -Upon returning to 1/1, Coffey found it occupying what was in effect an -outpost to the southwest of the 7th Marines. Baker Company was assigned -to the left of Captain Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company, holding the -curve of a horseshoe-shaped ridge, with Captain Thomas J. Bohannon’s -Able Company on the right. In support, along the comparatively level -ground to the immediate rear, was Weapons Company (Major William L. -Bates). - -With 1/1 facing in three directions to block a CCF attack, 1/7 managed -to disengage and withdraw through 3/7, which occupied a position on -Line PENDLETON. VMO-6 helicopters and troops of 2/7 helped to evacuate -the 1/7 casualties incurred during the night’s hard fighting. - -During the early morning hours of the 23d the Marines of 3/1 had -boarded trucks to the village of Todun-ni (Map 11) on the west bank of -the Pukhan. Their assigned position was Hill 902, a 3,000-foot height -dominating the surrounding terrain. The Chinese also were interested in -this piece of real estate, since it overlooked the river crossing of -the 1st Marine Division. Pressure to beat the Communists to the crest -mounted as NCOs urged the men to their utmost efforts over steep uphill -trails. - -[Illustration: MAP 11 - -Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902, and Subsequent -Withdrawals, 23–25 April] - -The Marines won the race. Once in position, however, it was evident -to Lieutenant Colonel Banning that three ridge lines leading up to -the hill mass would have to be defended. This necessity imposed a -triangular formation, and he placed Captain Horace L. Johnson’s George -Company at the apex, with First Lieutenant William J. Allert’s How -Company on the left, and First Lieutenant William Swanson’s Item -Company on the right. The heavy machine guns of Major Edwin A. Simmons’ -Weapons Company were distributed among the rifle companies and the -81mm mortars placed only 10 to 20 yards behind the front lines.[174] - - [174] 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar _HD_s, Apr 51; LtCol E. A. - Simmons, interv of 12 Jun 57. - -The KMCs and 5th Marines completed their withdrawal without -interference. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division on the afternoon -of 23 April might have been compared to a fishhook with the shank in -the north and the barb curling around to the west and south. The three -Marine battalions plugging the gap were not tied in physically. Major -Maurice E. Roach’s 3/7 was separated by an interval of 1,000 yards from -1/1, and the other two Marine battalions were 5,500 yards apart (Map -11). But at least the 1st Marine Division had formed a new front under -fire and awaited the night’s attacks with confidence. - - -_Repulse of Communist Attacks_ - -Bugle calls and green flares at about 2000 announced the presence of -the Chinese to the west of 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge. - -“They came on in wave after wave, hundreds of them,” wrote Lieutenant -Reisler, whose platoon held an outpost in advance of Charlie Company. -“They were singing, humming and chanting, ‘Awake, Marine....’ In the -first rush they knocked out both our machine guns and wounded about 10 -men, putting a big hole in our lines. We held for about 15 minutes, -under mortar fire, machine gun fire, and those grenades--hundreds of -grenades. There was nothing to do but withdraw to a better position, -which I did. We pulled back about 50 yds. and set up a new line. All -this was in the pitch-black night with Chinese cymbals crashing, horns -blowing, and their god-awful yells.”[175] - - [175] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51. - -For four hours the attacks on Horseshoe Ridge were continuous, -particularly along the curve held by Wray’s company. He was reinforced -during the night by squads sent from Coffey’s and Bohannon’s companies. -Wray realized that the integrity of the battalion position depended on -holding the curve of the ridge, but his main problem was bringing up -enough ammunition. Men evacuating casualties to the rear returned with -supplies, but the amount was all too limited until Corporal Leo Marquez -appointed himself a one-man committee. His energy equalled his courage -as he carried grenades and small-arms ammunition all night to the men -on the firing line. Marquez emerged unhurt in spite of bullet holes -through his cartridge belt, helmet, and a heel of his shoe. - -About midnight it was the turn of 3/1. These Marines had dug in as best -they could, but the position was too rocky to permit much excavation. -Ammunition for the mortars had to be hand-carried from a point halfway -up the hill. - -Several hours of harrassing mortar fire preceded the CCF effort. George -Company, at the apex of the ridge, was almost overwhelmed by the -first Communist waves of assault. The courage of individual Marines -shone forth in the ensuing struggle. Technical Sergeant Harold E. -Wilson, second in command of the center platoon, suffered four painful -wounds but remained in the fight, encouraging his men and guiding -reinforcements from How Company as they arrived.[176] - - [176] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51. - -Steady artillery support was provided by Colonel McAlister, who -rounded up a jury-rigged liaison party and three forward observer -teams composed mainly of officers from the 987th AFA Battalion. They -registered 11th Marines and 987th Battalion defensive fires which had -a large part in stopping the CCF attack as it lapped around George -Company and hit How and Item on the other two ridges. - -Colonel McAlister and Colonel Nickerson paid a visit to the CP of -1/1, which remained under the operational control of the 7th Marines -until morning. The two regimental commanders arranged for artillery -and tank support to cover the gap between 1/1 and 3/7.[177] The enemy, -however, seemed to be wary about infiltrating between the three -battalion outposts. This reluctance owed in large part to the deadly -flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles of Companies A and B of the 1st -Tank Battalion, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Holly F. -Evans, had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne that day. - - [177] Col H. Nickerson Jr., ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. West, - comments, n.d. - -Attacks on 3/1 and 3/7 also continued throughout the night. At daybreak -the close air support of Marine aircraft prevented further Communist -efforts, though dug-in enemy groups remained within machine gun range. -Identification of Chinese bodies at daybreak indicated that the 359th -and 360th Regiments, 120th Division, 40th CCF Army, had been employed. - - -_Withdrawal to the Kansas Line_ - -Now came the problem for the three Marine battalions of letting loose -of the tiger’s tail. Corps orders were received on the morning of -24 April for all units of the Division to pull back to Line KANSAS. -This was in accordance with General Ridgway’s policy, continued by -General Van Fleet, of attaching more importance to destruction of enemy -personnel than the holding of military real estate. - -Some of the most seriously wounded men of 1/1 required immediate -evacuation, in spite of the obvious risks. A VMO-6 helicopter piloted -by First Lieutenant Robert E. Matthewson attempted a landing at the -base of Horseshoe Ridge. As he hovered over the panel markings, CCF -small-arms fire mangled the tail rotor. The machine plunged to earth so -badly damaged that it had to be destroyed. Matthewson emerged unhurt -and waved off a helicopter flown by Captain H. G. McRay. Then the -stranded pilot asked for a rifle and gave a good account of himself as -an infantryman.[178] - - [178] VMO-6 _HD_ for Apr 51. - -While First Lieutenant Norman W. Hicks’ second platoon fought as the -rear guard, First Lieutenant Niel B. Mills’ first platoon of Charlie -Company led the attack down the hill, carrying the wounded behind. In -an attempt to rout the Chinese from a flanking hill, Mills was wounded -in the neck by a bullet that severed an artery. Corpsman E. N. Smith -gripped the end of the artery between his fingers until a hemostat -could be applied, thus saving the lieutenant’s life. Just before losing -consciousness. Mills looked at his watch. It was 1000 and 1/1 had -weathered the storm.[179] - - [179] LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59. - -The 3d Battalion of the 7th Marines, which had beaten off probing -attacks all night, coordinated its movements with those of the two -Marine battalions as they slowly withdrew toward the Pukhan. Despite -Marine air attacks, the Communists not only followed but infiltrated in -sufficient numbers to threaten the perimeter of Lavoie’s cannoneers. -The training this Army officer had given his men in infantry tactics -now paid off as the perimeter held firm while mowing down the -attackers with point blank 105mm shells at a range of 1,000 yards. The -Marines of Captain Bohannon’s company soon got into the fight, and -the 92d repaid the courtesy by supporting 1/1 and 3/7 during their -withdrawal. Counted CCF dead numbered 179 at a cost to the 92d of 4 KIA -and 11 WIA casualties.[180] - - [180] Capt R. A. Gugeler, USA, _Combat Actions in Korea_, - 170–172. - -As the morning haze lifted, the OYs of VMO-6 spotted for both Army and -Marine artillery, DEVASTATE BAKER fed close support to the forward -air controllers as fast as it could get planes from K-16 at Seoul, -only a 15-minute flight away. Not only 49 Corsairs but also 40 of the -Navy ADs and Air Force F-51s and jets aided the Marine ground forces -in their withdrawal to Line KANSAS. To speed the fighter-bombers to -their targets, some of the Marine pilots were designated tactical air -coordinators, airborne (TACA). Their familiarity with the terrain was -an asset as they led incoming pilots to ground force units most in need -of support.[181] - - [181] Summary of data from 1st MAW _HD_s for 24 Apr 51. - -It was a confusing day in the air. The mutual radio frequencies -to which planes and ground controllers were pretuned proved to be -inadequate. The consequence was all too often the blocking out of key -information at a frustrating moment. Haze and smoke made for limited -vision. The planes needed a two-mile circle for their attacks, yet the -battalions were at times less than 1,000 yards apart. DEVASTATE BAKER -had to deal with this congested and dangerous situation as best it -could. - -In addition to its strong support of Marine ground forces, the 1st MAW -sent 10 sorties to the ROKs in east Korea and 57 to I Corps in its -battle along the Imjin. By this time the Gloucestershire Battalion of -the 29th British Brigade was isolated seven miles behind enemy lines -and receiving all supplies by air-drop. The outlook grew so desperate -that officers ordered their men to break up and make their way back to -the UN lines if they could. Only 40 ever succeeded. - -In the former 6th ROK Division sector units of the 27th Brigade of the -British Commonwealth Division had done a magnificent job of stopping -the breakthrough. The 2d Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian -Light Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment -distinguished themselves in this fight, which won a Distinguished Unit -Citation for the division.[182] - - [182] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr51, Sec 1, 98, 100, 101; Brig C. N. - Barclay, _The First Commonwealth Division_ (Aldershot, - 1954), 69–70. - - -_Enemy Stopped in IX Corps Sector_ - -Spring had come at last to war-ravaged Korea and the hills were a -misty green in the sunshine. Looking down from an aircraft on the warm -afternoon of 24 April 1951 the Marine sector resembled a human anthill. -Columns of weary men toiled and strained in every direction. Chaotic -as the scene may have seemed, however, everything had a purpose. The -1st Marine Division was in full control of all troop movements, despite -enemy pressure of the last two nights. - -The 5th Marines and KMCs had no opposition as they continued their -withdrawal. Marine air reduced to a minimum the harassing efforts of -the Chinese following the 1st Marines. As front-line units disengaged -and fell back, the length of the main line of resistance was contracted -enough for the 7th Marines to be assigned a reserve role. The 1st and -2d Battalions were given the responsibility for the defense of Chunchon -as well as the crossing sites over the Pukhan and Soyang Rivers. Major -Roach had reached the outskirts of Chunchon when 3/7 was ordered back -across the Chunchon, to be attached to the 1st Marines on the left -flank.[183] - - [183] 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51. - -Throughout the night of 24–25 April the enemy probed the Marine lines, -seeking in vain a weak spot where a penetration could be made. It -was already evident that the breakthrough in this area had given the -Communists only a short-lived advantage. By the third night they were -definitely stopped. Only minor patrol actions resulted except for two -attacks in company strength on 2/1 at 0050 and 0150. Both were repulsed -with total CCF losses of 25 counted dead. - -Contrary to the usual rule, the Marines saw more action during the -daylight hours. A company-size patrol from 1/1 became heavily engaged -at 1350 and three Company A tanks moved up in support. The fight lasted -until 1645, when the enemy broke off action and the tanks evacuated 18 -wounded Marines. - -Early in the afternoon a 3/1 patrol had advanced only 200 yards along -a ridgeline when it was compelled to withdraw after running into -concentrated mortar and machine gun fire. Sporadic mortar rounds -continued until a direct hit was scored on the battalion CP, wounding -Colonel McAlister, Lieutenant Colonel Banning, Major Reginald R. Myers, -the executive officer, and Major Joseph D. Trompeter, the S-3. Banning -and Myers were evacuated and Trompeter assumed command of 3/1. - -Losses of 18 KIA and 82 WIA for 24–25 April brought the casualties of -the 1st Marines to nearly 300 during the past 48 hours.[184] - - [184] 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51. - -A simple ceremony was held at the 1st Marine Division CP on the -afternoon of the 24th for the relief of General Smith by Major General -Gerald C. Thomas. The new commanding general, a native of Missouri, was -educated at Illinois Wesleyan University and enlisted in the Marine -Corps in May 1917 at the age of 23. Awarded the Silver Star for bravery -at Belleau Wood and Soissons, he was commissioned just before the -Meuse-Argonne offensive, in which he was wounded. - -During the next two decades, Thomas chased bandits in Haiti, guarded -the U.S. mails, protected American interests in China, and served as -naval observer in Egypt when Rommel knocked at the gates of Alexandria -in 1941. As operations officer and later chief of staff of the 1st -Marine Division, he participated in the Guadalcanal campaign in 1942. -The next year he became chief of staff of I Marine Amphibious Corps in -the Bougainville operation. Returning to Marine Headquarters in 1944 as -Director of Plans and Policies, he was named commanding general of the -Marines in China three years later. - -General Smith had won an enduring place in the hearts of all Marines -for his magnificent leadership as well as resourceful generalship -during the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin Reservoir campaigns. Speaking of the -Marines of April 1951, he paid them this tribute in retrospect: - - The unit commanders and staff of the Division deserve great - credit for the manner in which they planned and conducted - the operations which resulted in blunting the Chinese - counteroffensive in our area. In my opinion, it was the most - professional job performed by the Division while it was under my - command.[185] - - [185] Gen O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), ltr of 11 Feb 58. - -The night of 25–26 April passed in comparative quiet for the Marines. -A few CCF probing attacks and occasional mortar rounds were the extent -of the enemy’s activity. All Marine units had now reached the modified -Line KANSAS, but General Van Fleet desired further withdrawals because -the enemy had cut a lateral road. - -IX Corps also directed that the 1st Marine Division be prepared on -the 26th to move back to Chunchon, where it would defend along the -south bank of the Soyang until service units could move out their -large supply dumps. The Division was to tie in on the right with the -lower extension of the Hwachon Reservoir, and contact was made in that -quarter with the French battalion of the 2d Infantry Division, X Corps. -On the Marine left flank the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division -had relieved elements of the British Commonwealth Division. - -Marine regimental officers met with Colonel Bowser, G-3, to plan -the continued withdrawal. It was decided that four infantry -battalions--1/1, 2/1, 3/5, and 3/7--were to take positions on the west -bank of the Pukhan to protect the Mojin bridge and ferry sites while -the other units crossed. The execution of the plan went smoothly, -without enemy interference. After all other Marine troops were on the -east side, 3/7 disengaged last of all and forded the chest-deep stream -as a prelude to hiking to Chunchon.[186] - - [186] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, - 2040 27 Apr 51. - -The enemy was kept at a discreet distance throughout the night by -continuous artillery fires supplemented by ripples from Captain Eugene -A. Bushe’s Battery C, 1st 4.5´´ Rocket Battalion. An acute shortage -of trucks made it necessary for most of the troops to hike. Then came -the task of organizing the new Division defenses on a line running -northeast and southwest through the northern outskirts of Chunchon (Map -10). Planning continued meanwhile for further withdrawals to positions -astride the Hongchon-Chunchon MSR.[187] - - [187] CO IX Corps _IXACT 1370_; 1stMar _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar - _HD_, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_, Apr 51. A “ripple” normally - consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six - launchers. - -It was apparent by this time that the enemy had been badly mauled on -the IX Corps front. The Communists were now making a supreme effort to -smash through in the I Corps area and capture Seoul. It was believed -that they had set themselves the goal of taking the city by May Day, -the world-wide Communist holiday. - -In this aspiration they were destined to be disappointed. They tried to -work around the Eighth Army’s left flank by crossing the river Han to -the Kimpo Peninsula, but air strikes and the threat of naval gunfire -frustrated them. Another flanking attempt 35 miles to the southeast -met repulse, and before the end of the month it was evident that the -Chinese Reds would not celebrate May Day in Seoul. - -Generally speaking, the Eighth Army had kept its major units intact -and inflicted frightful losses on the enemy while trading shell-pocked -ground for Chinese lives. The night of 27–28 April saw little activity -on the IX Corps front, adding to the evidence that the enemy had shot -his bolt. The next day the 1st Marine Division, along with other -Eighth Army forces, continued the withdrawal to the general defensive -line designated NO NAME Line (Map 10). Further withdrawals were not -contemplated, asserted the IX Corps commander, who sent this message to -General Thomas: - - It is the intention of CG Eighth Army to hold firmly on general - defense line as outlined in my Operation Plan 17 and my message - 9639, and from this line to inflict maximum personnel casualties - by an active defense utilizing artillery and sharp armored - counterattacks. Withdrawal south of this line will be initiated - only on personal direction of Corps commander.[188] - - [188] CG IX Corps msg to CG 1stMarDiv with plans for - withdrawal, 28 Apr 51. - -FEAF placed the emphasis on armed reconnaissance or interdiction -flights for Marine aircraft during the last few days of April. 1st MAW -pilots reported the killing or wounding of 312 enemy troops on the -29th and 30th, and the destruction of 212 trucks, 6 locomotives, and -80 box cars. On the other side of the ledger, the Wing lost a plane a -day during the first eight days of the CCF offensive. Of the fliers -shot down, five were killed, one was wounded seriously but rescued by -helicopter, and two returned safely from enemy-held territory.[189] - - [189] 1st MAW _HD_, Apr51, Pt #1, Chronology 22–30 Apr and App - VI, PORs #46 (23 Apr) and 54 (1 May). - -The shortage of vehicles slowed the withdrawal of Marine ground forces, -but by the 30th the 5th Marines, KMC Regiment, and 7th Marines were -deployed from left to right on NO NAME Line. The 1st Marines went into -reserve near Hongchon. On the Division left was the reorganized 6th ROK -Division, and on the right the 2d Infantry Division of X Corps.[190] - - [190] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Apr 51; 5thMar HD, Apr 51; 7thMar _HD_, - Apr 51. - -Nobody was in a better position to evaluate Marine maneuvers of the -past week than Colonel Bowser, the G-3, and he had the highest praise. -“Whereas the Chosin withdrawal was more spectacular than the April -‘retrograde,’” he commented seven years later, “the latter was executed -so smoothly and efficiently that a complex and difficult operation was -made to look easy. The entire Division executed everything asked of it -with the calm assurance of veterans.”[191] - - [191] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58. - - -_1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps_ - -UN estimates of enemy casualties ranged from 70,000 to 100,000. The -Fifth Phase Offensive was an unmitigated defeat for the Communists so -far, but EUSAK G-2 officers warned that this was only the first round. -Seventeen fresh CCF divisions were available for the second. - -General Van Fleet called a conference of corps commanders on 30 April -to discuss defensive plans. In the reshuffling of units the 1st Marine -Division was placed for the third time in eight months under the -operational control of X Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Edward -M. Almond. The Marines were to occupy the western sector of X Corps -after its boundary with IX Corps had been shifted about 12 miles to the -west.[192] - - [192] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 115–118. - -Van Fleet put into effect a reshuffling of units all the way across the -peninsula in preparation for the expected renewal of the CCF offensive. -Thus on 1 May the UN line was as follows from left to right: - - _US I Corps_--1 ROK Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th - Infantry Division in line; the 3d Infantry Division and British - 29th Brigade in reserve; - - _US IX Corps_--British 27th Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, 5th - and 6th ROK Divisions and 7th Infantry Division in line; the - 187th Airborne RCT in reserve; - - _US X Corps_--1st Marine Division, 2d Infantry Division, 5th and - 7th ROK Divisions; - - _ROK III Corps_--9th and 3d Divisions; - - _ROK I Corps_--Capitol Division and ROK 11th Division. - -“I don’t want to lose a company--certainly not a battalion,” Van Fleet -told the corps commanders. “Keep units intact. Small units must be kept -within supporting distance.... Give every consideration to the use of -armor and infantry teams for a limited objective counterthrust. For -greater distances, have ready and use when appropriate, regiments of -infantry protected by artillery and tanks.”[193] - - [193] _Ibid._ - -From the foxhole to the command post a confident new offensive spirit -animated an Eight Army which only four months previously had been -recuperating from two major reverses within two months. The Eighth -Army, in short, had been welded by fire into one of the finest military -instruments of American military history; and the foreign units -attached to it proved on the battlefield that they were picked troops. - -With the Hwachon dam now in enemy hands, the Communists had the -capability of closing the gates, thus lowering the water level in the -Pukhan and Han rivers to fording depth. As a countermeasure, EUSAK -asked the Navy to blast the dam. It was a difficult assignment, but -Douglas AD Skyraiders from the _Princeton_ successfully torpedoed the -flood gates on 1 May.[194] - - [194] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 766. - -An atmosphere of watchful waiting prevailed during the next two weeks -as the Marines on NO NAME Line improved their defensive positions and -patrolled to maintain contact with the enemy. Eighth Army evolved at -this time the “patrol base” concept to deal with an enemy retiring -beyond artillery range. These bases were part of a screen, called -the outpost line of resistance (OPLR), established in front of the -MLR. Their mission was to maintain contact with the enemy by means of -patrols, give warning of an impending attack, and delay its progress as -much as possible. - -When it came to artillery ammunition, the 11th Marines found that it -had progressed from a famine to a feast. Where shells had recently -been rationed because of transport difficulties, the Eighth Army -now directed the cannoneers along NO NAME Line to expend a unit -of fire a day. The 11th Marines protested, since the infantry was -seldom in contact with the enemy. One artillery battalion submitted -a tongue-in-cheek report to the effect that the required amount -of ammunition had been fired “in target areas cleared of friendly -patrols.”[195] The requirement was kept in force, however, until the -demands of the renewed CCF offensive resulted in another ammunition -shortage for the 11th Marines. - - [195] Col Merritt Adelman, ltr of 10 Feb 58. - -Marine tanks were directed by Division to use their 90mm rifles to -supplement 11th Marine howitzers in carrying out Corps fire plans. The -tankers protested that their tubes had nearly reached the end of a -normal life expectancy, with no replacements in sight. This plaint did -not fall upon deaf ears at Corps Headquarters and two Army units, the -96th AFA Battalion and 17th FA Battalion, were assigned to fire the -deep missions.[196] - - [196] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG 1stMarDiv msg - to CG X Corps, 9 May 51; X Corps msg X9613, 10 May 51. - -Eighth Army staff officers concluded that the enemy would launch -his next effort in the center. Intelligence, according to General -Van Fleet, “had noted for some 2 weeks prior to the May attack -that the Chinese Communists were shifting their units to the -east.” Nevertheless, the blow fell “much farther east than [was] -expected.”[197] - - [197] Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58. - -Although the east offered the best prospects of surprise, a rugged -terrain of few roads imposed grave logistical handicaps on the -enemy. Moreover, UN warships dominated the entire eastern littoral. -Despite these disadvantages, an estimated 125,000 Chinese attacked -on the morning of 16 May 1951 in the area of the III and I ROK Corps -between the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the coast. Six CCF divisions -spearheaded an advance on a 20-mile front that broke through the lines -of the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions. Pouring into this gap, the Communists -made a maximum penetration of 30 miles that endangered the right flank -of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. - -General Van Fleet took immediate steps to stabilize the front. In one -of the war’s most remarkable maneuvers he sent units of the 3d Infantry -Division, then in reserve southeast of Seoul, on a 70-mile all-night -ride in trucks to the threatened area.[198] - - [198] Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive - of 16 May 51 are based on the following sources: EUSAK - _Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 12–18; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51; CO - 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51. - -The 1st Marine Division was not directly in the path of the enemy -advance. During the early morning hours of 17 May, however, an enemy -column made a thrust that apparently was intended as an end-run attack -on the left flank of the 2d Infantry Division. Avoiding initially the -Chunchon-Hongchon highway, Chinese in estimated regimental strength -slipped behind the patrol base set up by a KMC company just west of the -MSR (Map 12). - -For several days Colonel Nickerson and his executive officer, -Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis, had been apprehensive over the -security of this road on which the 7th Marines depended for logistical -support. On the afternoon of the 17th they pulled back Lieutenant -Colonel Bernard T. Kelly’s 3/7 (less Company G) to establish a blocking -position, generally rectangular in shape, at the vital Morae-Kogae pass -on the Chunchon road. This move was not completed until sunset and -George Company did not rejoin the battalion until midnight, so that the -enemy probably had no intelligence of the new position. The main road -ran along a shelf on one shoulder of the pass, but the Chinese avoided -it and came by a trail from the northwest (Map 12). - -The surprise was mutual. A platoon of D/Tanks, a Weapons Company -platoon, and an Item Company platoon, defending the northern end of -the perimeter, opened up with everything they had. A desperate fire -fight ensued as the enemy replied with a variety of weapons--mortars, -recoilless rifles, satchel charges, grenades, and machine guns. - -[Illustration: MAP 12 - -SITUATION ON THE NIGHT OF 16–17 MAY 1951] - -Two CCF soldiers were killed after disabling a Marine tank by a grenade -explosion in the engine compartment. A satchel charge knocked out -another tank, and the enemy made an unsuccessful attempt to kill a -third by rolling up a drum of gasoline and igniting it. - -Captain Victor Stoyanow’s Item Company, at the critical point of the -thinly stretched 3/7 perimeter, was hard-pressed. The enemy made a -slight penetration into one platoon position but was repulsed by a -counterattack that Stoyanow led. Marine infantry and tanks were well -supported by artillery that sealed off the Chinese column from the -rear. The action ended at daybreak with the routed enemy seeking only -escape as Marine artillery and mortars continued to find lucrative -targets. Air did not come on station until about 1030, when it added -to the slaughter. Scattered enemy groups finally found a refuge in the -hills, leaving behind 82 prisoners and 112 counted dead. Captures of -enemy equipment included mortars, recoilless rifles, and Russian 76mm -guns and machine guns. Friendly losses were 7 KIA and 19 WIA.[199] - - [199] This account of 3/7’s action is derived from 1stMarDiv, - 7thMar, 1stTkBn, and 3/7 _HD_s, May 51; Col B. T. Kelly, - interv of 28 Dec 57. - -1st MAW squadrons were kept busy furnishing close air support to the -2d Infantry Division and the two ROK divisions hit by the enemy’s May -offensive. Because of the patrolling in the Marine sector, the OYs -of VMO-6 took over much of the task of controlling air strikes. They -flew cover for the infantry-tank patrols, and in the distant areas -controlled almost as many air strikes as they did artillery missions. -From the 1st to the 23d of May, VMO-6 observers controlled 54 air -strikes involving 189 UN planes--159 Navy and Marine F4Us, F9Fs, and -ADs, and 30 Air Force F-80s, F-84s, and F-51s. About 40 percent of the -aircraft controlled by the OYs were non-Marine planes.[200] - - [200] VMO-6 _HD_, May 51. - -On the 18th the 1st Marine Division, carrying out X Corps orders, began -a maneuver designed to aid the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on the east -by narrowing its front. The 7th Marines pulled back to NO NAME Line to -relieve the 1st Marines, which side-slipped to the east to take over -an area held by the 9th Infantry. The 5th Marines then swung around -from the Division left flank to the extreme right and relieved another -Army regiment, the 38th Infantry. This permitted the 2d Infantry -Division to face east and repulse attacks from that direction. - -By noon on 19 May the enemy’s renewed Fifth Phase Offensive had lost -most of its momentum as CCF supplies dwindled to a trickle along a -tenuous line of communications. That same day, when Colonel Wilburt S. -Brown took over the command of the 1st Marines from Colonel McAlister, -all four Marine regiments were in line--from left to right, the KMCs, -the 7th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 5th Marines. A new NO NAME -Line ran more in a east-west direction than the old one with its -northeast to southwest slant. Thus in the east of the Marine sector -the line was moved back some 4,000 yards while remaining virtually -unchanged in the west. - -Enough enemy pressure was still being felt by the 2d Infantry Division -so that General Van Fleet ordered a limited offensive by IX Corps to -divert some of the CCF strength. While the rest of the 1st Marine -Division stood fast, the KMC Regiment advanced with IX Corps elements. - -At the other end of the line the Marines had the second of their two -fights during the CCF offensive. Major Morse L. Holliday’s 3/5 became -engaged at 0445 on the 20th with elements of the 44th CCF Division. -Chinese in regimental strength were apparently on the way to occupy the -positions of the Marine battalion, unaware of its presence. - -This mistake cost them dearly when 3/5 opened up with every weapon at -its disposal while requesting the support of Marine air, rockets, and -artillery. The slaughter lasted until 0930, when the last of the routed -Chinese escaped into the hills. Fifteen were taken prisoner and 152 -dead were counted in front of the Marine positions.[201] - - [201] 5thMar _HD_, May 51. - -From 20 May onward, it grew more apparent every hour that the second -installment of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive had failed even more -conclusively than the first. The enemy had only a narrow penetration -on a secondary front to show for ruinous casualties. Worse yet, from -the Chinese viewpoint, the UN forces were in a position to retaliate -before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The Eighth Army -had come through with relatively light losses, and it was now about to -seize the initiative. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Advance to the Punchbowl - -_Plan to Cut Off Communists--Initial Marine Objectives Secured--MAG-12 -Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong--Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610--1st -MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE--_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack--1st -Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line--7th Marines Committed to Attack_ - - -Only from the air could the effects of the UN counterstroke of May and -June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than a CCF withdrawal; -it was a flight of beaten troops under very little control in some -instances. They were scourged with bullets, rockets, and napalm as -planes swooped down upon them like hawks scattering chickens. And where -it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to surrender voluntarily, -remnants of platoons, companies, and even battalions were now giving up -after throwing down their arms. - - There had been nothing like it before, and its like would never - be seen in Korea again. The enemy was on the run! General Van - Fleet, after his retirement, summed up the double-barreled - Chinese spring offensive and the UN counterstroke in these words: - -We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten and could -have destroyed his armies. Those days are the ones most vivid in my -memory--great days when all the Eighth Army, and we thought America -too, were inspired to win. In those days in Korea we reached the -heights.[202] - - [202] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), “The Truth About Korea,” - _Life_, 11 May 53. - -Communist casualties from 15 to 31 May were estimated by the Eighth -Army at 105,000. This figure included 17,000 counted dead and the -unprecedented total of some 10,000 prisoners, most of them Chinese Reds -taken during the last week of the month in frantic efforts to escape. -Such results were a vast departure from past occasions when Mao -Tse-tung’s troops had preferred death to surrender. - -In all probability, only the mountainous terrain saved them from a -complete debacle. If the Eighth Army had been able to use its armor for -a mechanized pursuit, it might have struck blows from which the enemy -could not recover. As it was, the Communists escaped disaster by virtue -of the fact that a platoon could often stand off a company or even a -battalion by digging in and defending high ground commanding the only -approach. Every hill was a potential Thermopylae in this craggy land of -few roads. - -It was the misfortune of the 1st Marine Division to have perhaps the -least lucrative zone of action in all Korea for the peninsula-wide -turkey shoot. A chaos of jagged peaks and dark, narrow valleys, the -terrain alone was enough to limit an advance. Even so, the Marines -inflicted 1,870 counted KIA casualties on the Communists in May and -captured 593, most of them during the last eight days of the month. - -General Almond congratulated the Division for its accomplishment of “a -most arduous battle task. You have denied [the enemy] the opportunity -of regrouping his forces and forced him into a hasty retreat; the -destruction of enemy forces and materiel has been tremendous and many -times greater than our own losses.”[203] - - [203] CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51. - - -_Plan to Cut Off Communists_ - -The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, released from IX Corps -reserve, arrived in the Hongchon area on 21 May and took a position -between the 1st Marine Division on the left and the 2d Infantry -Division on the right. Two days later X Corps gave the Marines the -mission of securing the important road center of Yanggu at the eastern -end of the Hwachon Reservoir (Map 13). Elements of the 2d Infantry -Division, with the 187th Airborne RCT attached, were meanwhile to drive -northeast to Inje after establishing a bridgehead across the river -Soyang. From Inje the 187th (reinforced) would continue to advance -northeast toward its final objective, Kansong on the coast. After -linking up with I ROK Corps, the Army regiment might be able to pull -the drawstring on a tremendous bag of prisoners--all the CCF forces -south of the Inje-Kansong road. There was, however, a big “if” in the -equation. The Communists were falling back with all haste, and it was -a question whether the bag could be closed in time. - -[Illustration: 1st Marine Division Drive To Yanggu - -23–31 May - -Showing Regimental Routes - -MAP 13] - -The 1st Marine Division jumped off at 0800 on 23 May with the 1st and -5th Marines abreast, the 1st on the left. Both regiments advanced more -than 5,000 yards against negligible opposition. During the course of -this attack the 1st Marines experimented by calling an air strike -in the hope of detonating an entire mine field. The results were -disappointing. Live mines were blown to new locations, thus changing -the pattern, but few exploded.[204] - - [204] 2/1 _HD_, May 51. - -The 7th Marines was relieved on the 23d by elements of the 7th Infantry -Division (IX Corps) and moved to the east for employment on the Marine -right flank. The KMC Regiment, relieved by other IX Corps units, went -into Division reserve.[205] - - [205] 1stMarDiv _HD_, May 51. - -The 1st Marines, advancing on the left, reached its objectives, about -two-thirds of the way to the Soyang, by noon on the 26th. The regiment -reverted to Division reserve upon relief by the KMCs. In the right -half of the Division zone, resistance gradually stiffened. On the -24th, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines ran into trouble as -they started their advance toward their initial objective, three hills -about 7,000 yards north of Hangye (Map 12). Both battalions were slowed -by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. They requested immediate -artillery and air support. - -Captain John A. Pearson, commanding Item Company, could observe the -enemy on Hill 1051, holding up the attack with flanking fire. He -directed air and artillery on the crest and on the Communists dug in -along the southeastern slopes. Soon the enemy troops were seen retiring -northward. This eased the pressure on the center, and Captain Samuel S. -Smith’s Dog Company managed to work forward and gain the summit of Hill -883 by 1300. Tanks moved up in support and at midnight Colonel Hayward -reported his portion of the Division objective secured.[206] - - [206] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51. - -The 7th Marines, moving forward in the right rear of the 5th, veered -to the left and drove into the center of the Division zone, reaching -the southern bank of the Soyang by nightfall on the 26th. That same day -2/7 overran an enemy ammunition dump and took 27 CCF prisoners, some -of them wounded men who had been left behind. The captured material -included the following items: - - 100,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition; - 12,000 rounds of mortar ammunition; - 1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition; - 6,000 pounds of explosive charges; - 9,000 hand grenades. - -Five U.S. trucks and jeeps were “released to higher headquarters.” Two -CCF trucks, two mules, and a horse were “integrated into the battalion -transportation system and profitably employed thereafter.”[207] - - [207] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F. - Meyerhoff, ltr of 8 Aug 58. - -The 187th Airborne RCT reported on the 24th that its advance was being -held up by increasing enemy resistance.[208] It was already evident -that the CCF flight had frustrated the plan of cutting off decisively -large numbers in the X Corps zone. Air observation established, -however, that hundreds of Chinese Reds had merely escaped from the -frying pan into the fire. By fleeing westward along the south shore of -the Hwachon Reservoir, they stumbled into the IX Corps zone. There the -remnants of whole units surrendered, in some instances without striking -a blow. Along the route they were pitilessly attacked by UN aircraft. -1st MAW units had never before known such good hunting as during the -last week in May 1951.[209] - - [208] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar - In&Out #13. - - [209] James T. Stewart, _Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea_ - (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957) - 13–15, 84–86; 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth - Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs), - 20–31 May; 1st MAW _HD_ May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORS for 20–31 - May; _Ibid._, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27 - May, 31 May; EUSAK _Cmd Rept_, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts - 5 and 6, Encls 20–31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air. - -Despite the “murky instrument weather” of 27 May the all-weather -fighters of VMF(N)-513 reporting the killing of an estimated 425 CCF -soldiers. Two F7F pilots killed or wounded some 200 Chinese Reds in the -I Corps zone. On the following day the 1st MAW claimed a total of 454 -KIA casualties inflicted on the enemy.[210] - - [210] _Ibid._, VMF(N)-513 HD, 27 May 51. - -Estimates of enemy dead by pilots are likely to be over-optimistic, -but there can be no doubt that UN aircraft slaughtered the fleeing -Communists in large numbers. Only poor flying weather saved the enemy -from far worse casualties. So intent were the Chinese on escape that -they violated their usual rule of making troop movements only by night. -When the fog and mist cleared briefly, Marine pilots had glimpses -of CCF units crowding the roads without any attempt at concealment. -Napalm, bombs, and machine guns left heaps of dead and wounded as the -survivors continued their flight, hoping for a return of fog and mist -to protect them. - - -_Initial Marine Objectives Secured_ - -As the Marine ground forces advanced, they found fewer and fewer -Chinese Reds opposing them. The explanation was given by a prisoner -from the 12th Division, V Corps, of the North Korean People’s Army -(NKPA). His unit had the mission, he said, of relieving troops in the -Yanggu-Inje area and conducting delaying actions. The purpose was -to allow CCF units to escape a complete disaster and dig in farther -north. The North Koreans, in short, were being sacrificed in rear guard -delaying actions in order that the Chinese Reds might save their own -skins. - -U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such -treatment. The answer was that they couldn’t help themselves. The -Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained them -after the NKPA collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under the thumb -of political commissars holding life and death authority over them. -Any NKPA soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty or escape was -certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the firing line had -a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the system had none. - -This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when -NKPA troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions. -Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese -Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red -with more tenacity on the defensive. - -Because of the stubborn NKPA opposition in East Korea, the Eighth Army -staff and command gave some thought to the possibility of an amphibious -operation in the enemy’s rear by the 1st Marine Division. Plans were -discussed on 28 May for a landing at Tongchon (Map 8). The Marines -were to drive southward along the Tongchon-Kumhwa road to link up -with the IX Corps units attacking toward the northeast along the same -route. After meeting, the two forces would systematically destroy the -pocketed enemy units. It was decided that 6 June would be D-day. And -then, to the great disappointment of Generals Thomas and Almond, the -plan was suddenly cancelled by EUSAK on 29 May after a single day’s -consideration.[211] - - [211] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC - (Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA - (Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58. - -Another scheme for cutting off large enemy forces was abandoned on 28 -May when the 187th Airborne got as far as Inje. Most of the CCF units -having escaped, this regiment was given a new mission of securing the -high ground to the north of Inje. - -During the last five days of May the 5th and 7th Marines continued to -advance steadily. On the morning of the 31st the 7th faced the task -of breaking through a stubbornly contested pass leading into Yanggu. -With a battalion on each ridge leading into the pass, Colonel Nickerson -found it a slow yet precarious prelude to get the men down. Adding to -their trials were some 500 enemy 76mm and mortar shells received by the -regiment. - -General Van Fleet, an onlooker while visiting the 7th Marines OP, shook -his head wonderingly. “How did you ever get the men up those cliffs?” -he asked Colonel Nickerson. - -The answer was short and simple. “General,” said the regimental -commander, “they climbed.” - -As the day wore on, Nickerson called for what his executive officer, -Lieutenant Colonel Davis, described as “a through-the-middle play. A -company of tanks [Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Captain -Richard M. Taylor] was launched up the road with infantry on foot -hugging the protective cover of the steep road embankments. As the -tanks drew fire, the infantry could spot the source and ... quickly -cleaned the enemy out. This rapid thrust caused the enemy defenders to -flee as fire was poured into them from our center force as well as the -flank attackers.”[212] - - [212] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; _HD_s for 1stMarDiv, - 5thMar and 7thMar for May 51. - -By nightfall on the 31st the 7th Marines had control of Yanggu, its -airfield, and the hills surrounding that burnt-out town. The 5th -Marines had reached a point 6,000 yards northeast of Yanggu, astride -the north-south ridgeline between that road center and Inje. - -Losses for the 1st Marine Division in May added up to 75 KIA, 8 DOW, -and 731 WIA. The ratio of wounded to killed, it may be noted, is more -than nine-to-one. This proportion, so much more favorable than the -usual ratio, rose to an even more astonishing 15-to-1 in June. Various -explanations have been offered, one of them being the spirit of cool -professionalism of Marines who had learned how to take cover and not -expose themselves to needless risks. But this doesn’t account for the -unusual ratio, and it may perhaps be concluded that the Marines were -simply lucky in this operation. - -The comparatively low death rate has also been credited in part to the -alertness with which Marine officers adapted to changing situations. -War is a grim business on the whole, but Colonel Wilburt S. Brown -took an amusing advantage of enemy propaganda accusing Americans -of all manner of crimes against humanity. At the outset he had -requested colored smoke shells for signaling. But upon learning from -POW interrogations that NKPA soldiers were terrified by what they -believed to be frightful new gases, the commanding officer of the 1st -Marines had an added reason for using green, red, and yellow smoke. -Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman, commanding officer -of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, soon had to inform him that the -inadequate supply was exhausted.[213] It was never renewed during -Brown’s command. - - [213] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58. - -Major David W. McFarland, commanding officer of VMO-6, also exploited -enemy ignorance. His original purpose in initiating night aerial -observation by OY planes was to improve artillery accuracy. Soon he -noticed that the mere presence of an OY overhead would silence enemy -artillery. - -“The aerial observer,” McFarland explained, “was often unable to -determine the location of enemy artillery even though he could see it -firing, because he would be unable to locate map coordinates in the -dark--that is, relating them to the ground. Fortunately, this fact was -unknown to the enemy. From their observation of the OYs in the daytime, -they had found that the safest thing to do whenever an OY was overhead -was to take cover. This they continued to do at night.”[214] - - [214] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58. - -VMO-6 also put into effect an improvement of 1st Marine Division aerial -photographic service at a time when the 1st MAW photo section had -missions all over the Korean front. Lieutenant Colonel Donald S. Bush, -commanding officer of the section, is credited with the innovation of -mounting a K-17 camera on a OY. Only a 6-inch focal length lens could -be installed on one of these small planes. This meant that in order to -get the same picture as a jet the OY must fly at half the altitude. The -pilot would be in more danger but haze problems were reduced. - -The experiment was an immediate success. The Division set up a photo -laboratory near the VMO-6 CP for rapid processing and printing. A -helicopter stood by for rapid delivery to the units concerned.[215] - - [215] _Ibid._ - -Not all the variations in tactics were innovations. Lieutenant Colonel -Bernard T. Kelly, commanding officer of 3/7, revived an old device -on 31 May by using indirect automatic weapons fire with good effect. -Four water-cooled heavy machine guns provided long range (2,600 yards) -plunging fires on the reverse slopes of hills in support of his leading -elements during the final attack on Yanggu.[216] - - [216] Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jun 58. - - -_MAG-12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong_ - -Delay and uncertainty were still the two great stumbling blocks to -adequate air support for the ground forces under the JOC control -system. Marine officers contended that infantry units sometimes -took unnecessary casualties as a consequence. Worse yet, there were -occasions when the expected planes did not arrive at all. - -Statistics kept by the 1st MAW and Navy during the spring of 1951 -upheld these conclusions. During the Inchon-Seoul operation, the -average delay in receiving air support had been 15 minutes as compared -to 80 minutes in May and June of 1951. Approximately 35 minutes of this -time was required to process the request through JOC. And only 65 to 70 -percent of the sorties requested were ever received by Marine ground -forces.[217] - - [217] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 2, II, 523–537. - -Generals Shepherd and Harris had discussed the problem during the early -spring of 1951 with General Partridge of the Fifth Air Force. Several -compromises were reached, and for brief periods the 1st Marine Division -received more air support than it could use. Unfortunately, these -periods were at times of the least need. When the chips were down, the -old delays and uncertainties reappeared. General Partridge commented: - - The 1st Marine Air Wing was assigned for operational control by - the Fifth Air Force and it was used just as any of the other - units of the Fifth were employed, that is, in support anywhere - along the battle front were it appeared to be most urgently - needed. - - In every action such as took place in Korea when the resources - and especially the air resources are far too few, ground - commanders inevitably feel that they are being shortchanged. - They are trying to accomplish their objectives under the most - difficult circumstances and with the minimum number of casualties - and they want all the assistance from the air that they can - get. I am sure I would feel the same in similar circumstances. - However, there was never enough air support to satisfy everyone - and I was most unhappy that this was the case. - - From time to time I was called upon to denude one section of the - front of its close air support in order to bolster some other - area where the situation was critical. Sometimes this worked to - the advantage of the Marines as in the case of operations near - the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950, and at other times it - worked to their disadvantage. In retrospect, however, I would - estimate that, day in and day out, the Marine ground units had - more air support than any other division which was engaged.[218] - - [218] Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, ltr of 28 Jun 59. - -With all due respect to General Partridge, Marine officers felt that -the discussion should not be limited merely to the amount of air -support. It was not so much the amount as the delay and unreliability -under JOC control that constituted the problem as the Marines saw it. -On 24 May, while on one of his periodic tours of the Far East, General -Shepherd brought up the matter of CAS with General Ridgway. He agreed -with the UN commander in chief that it would be improper for a Marine -division to expect the exclusive support of a Marine air wing in Korea. -The main difficulty, he reiterated, lay in the slowness and uncertainty -of getting air support when needed.[219] - - [219] _FMFPac Visit_ 21–31 May 51, 5, 6. - -At this time an extensive reshuffling of Air Force commanders was in -progress. On 21 May General Partridge relieved Lieutenant General -George E. Stratemeyer, CG FEAF, who had suffered a heart attack. -Partridge in turn was relieved by Major General Edward J. Timberlake, -who assumed temporary command of Fifth Air Force until Major General -Frank E. Everest arrived to take over a few days later. - -The 1st MAW was also undergoing changes in command. General Harris -was relieved on 29 May by his deputy commander, Major General Thomas -J. Cushman. Brigadier General William O. Brice, just arrived from the -States, became the Wing’s new deputy commander. - -After several “get acquainted” discussions, the new Air Force and 1st -MAW generals agreed on a plan to cut down delays in air support. It was -a simple solution: the aircraft were merely to be brought nearer to -the Marine ground forces. This was to be managed by moving the MAG-12 -forward echelon from K-16 at Seoul to K-46 at Hoengsong (Map 16). The -new field, if such it could be called, was nothing more than a stony -dirt strip. But it was only 40 miles, or a 10- to 15-minute flight, -from the firing line. The first missions from the new field were flown -on 27 May. VMFs-214 and -323 kept an average of 12 Corsairs at K-46 -thereafter, rotating them from K-1.[220] - - [220] MAG-12 _HD_, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; 1st MAW _HD_, May - 51, Summary and Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51. - -On the surface this seemed to be a practical solution, especially -after a four-plane alert was established at K-46 for use by the 1st -Marine Division when needed. DEVASTATE BAKER was permitted to put in -an alerting call directly to the field. The rub was that JOC must be -called in order to make the original request. Before the planes could -take off, the MAG-12 operations officer at the field was likewise -required to call JOC and confirm the fact that the mission had been -approved. - -Communications were poor at first for the 40 miles between the field -and the front. DEVASTATE BAKER got better results by calling 1st MAW -Headquarters at K-1, 140 miles south, and having the Wing call K-46 and -JOC. This meant delays such as General Thomas described in a letter to -General Almond. On 29 May, he said, the 5th and 7th Marines were up -against severe enemy fire in their attack. The TACPS had enemy targets -under observation and were ready to control any aircraft they could -get. The Marines requested 92 sorties and received 55. Of these, 20 -were flown by Corsairs or Panther Jets, and 35 by Air Force jets and -Mustangs. And though 55 sorties were considerably less than optimum -air support, practically all arrived from two to four hours late. On -the firing line the enemy’s resistance, concluded General Thomas, was -broken not by air power but by Marine riflemen.[221] - - [221] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51. - -On other days the new plan made a more encouraging showing. There was, -for instance, the occasion when the OYs discovered an enemy regiment -near the 1st Marine Division right flank. DEVASTATE BAKER called the -1st MAW direct on 31 May for 16 fighters as soon as possible. Wing -called JOC for approval to launch the flight and put in a call to K-46 -to alert the planes. In just 48 minutes after the initial call from -DEVASTATE BAKER, 16 pilots had jumped into their flight gear at K-46, -had been briefed, and were airborne on what proved to be a timely -strike with excellent results.[222] - - [222] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for 31 May 51. - -A new tactic of night air support was introduced late in May when -Marine R4D transports were outfitted to operate as flare planes. Not -only did these unarmed aircraft light up targets along the front lines -for the VMF(N)-513 night fighters; they were also on call for use by -the 1st Marine Division. Later, on 12 June, the Navy provided the 1st -MAW with PB4Y-2 Privateers for the nightly illumination missions.[223] - - [223] 1st MAW _HD_, May 51, Pt 1, App II, 2; Chronology, 31 - May; MAG-12 _HD_ Jun 51, Chronology and 12 Jun. - - -_Fight of the 5th Marines for Hill 610_ - -During the heyday of the battleship, every midshipman dreamed of some -glorious future day when he would be on the bridge, directing the naval -maneuver known as crossing the T. In other words, his ships would be in -line of battle, firing converging broadsides on an enemy approaching -in column. Obviously, the enemy would be at a disadvantage until he -executed a 90° turn under fire to bring his battered ships into line to -deliver broadsides of their own. - -It was a mountain warfare variation of crossing the T that the Korean -Reds were using against the Marines. Whenever possible, the enemy -made a stand on a hill flanked by transverse ridgelines. He emplaced -hidden machine guns or mortars on these ridgelines to pour a converging -fire into attackers limited by the terrain to a single approach. It -meant that the Marines had to advance through this crossfire before -they could get in position for the final assault on the enemy’s main -position. - -There were two tactical antidotes. One was well directed close air -support. The other was the support of tanks advancing parallel to -enemy-held ridgelines and scorching them with the direct fire of 90mm -rifles and 50 caliber machine guns. - -[Illustration: X CORPS ROUTES OF ADVANCE DURING EUSAK OPERATIONS - -23 MAY-17 JUNE 51 - -MAP 14] - -[Illustration: 1st MAR DIV ZONE OF ACTION 4 JUNE-17 JULY 51 AND 19 JUN -51 SITUATION ON BROWN LINE - -MAP 15] - -On 1 June the two regiments in assault, the 5th and 7th Marines, found -the resistance growing stiffer as they slugged their way forward toward -Line KANSAS (Map 15). Within an hour after jumping off, 2/5 was heavily -engaged with an estimated 200 enemy defending Hill 651 tenaciously. At -noon, after ground assaults had failed, a request was put in for air -support. Four VMF-214 planes led by Captain William T. Kopas bombed and -strafed the target. This attack broke the back of NKPA opposition, and -2/5 moved in to seize the objective.[224] - - [224] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the - following sources: X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51; _HD_s of - 1st MarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, and VMF-214 for Jun - 51. - -Early on the morning of the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins’ 1/5 -moved out to secure the southwest end of the long ridge line that -stretched northeast from Yanggu (Map 15) and afforded a natural avenue -of approach to Taeam-san and the KANSAS line on the southern rim of -the Punchbowl. The Marine advance got under way at 0915. After two -four-plane strikes by VMF-214 and a “preparation” by 1/11 and the 1st -Rocket Battery, the battalion attacked across a valley with Baker -Company (First Lieutenant William E. Kerrigan) on the right and Charlie -Company (First Lieutenant Robert E. Warner) on the left to seize the -terminal point on the ridge leading to Hill 610 (Map 15). Able Company -(Captain John L. Kelly) followed Charlie as Company C (Captain Richard -M. Taylor) of the 1st Tank Battalion moved into supporting position. - -Converging fire from transverse ridges had the Marine riflemen pinned -down until the tankers moved along the valley road running parallel. -Direct 90mm fire into NKPA log bunkers enabled C/1/5 to advance to the -forward slope of Hill 610. The enemy fought back with machine guns and -grenades while directing long-range rifle fire against 2/5, attacking -along a parallel ridge across the valley. - -By 1945 the last bunker on Hill 610 had been overrun. Meanwhile, 2/5 -had pushed ahead some 5,000 yards to the northeast. - -The capture of Hill 610 will never have its glorious page in history. -It was all in the day’s work for Marines who could expect a succession -of such nameless battles as they clawed their way forward. That night -the weary men of 1/5 were not astonished to receive a counterattack -in the darkness. It was all part of the job, too. After driving off -the unseen enemy, the new tenants of Hill 610 snatched a few hours of -sleep. They were on their feet again at dawn, ready to go up against -the next key terrain feature in a rocky area that seemed to be composed -entirely of Hill 610s. - -The next knob along the ridge happened to be Hill 680, about 1,000 -yards to the northeast. VMF-214 planes from K-46 napalmed and strafed -the enemy, and Able Company led the 1/5 attack. During the air strike -the Koreans had taken to cover in their holes on the reverse. - -They were back in previously selected forward slope firing positions by -the time the Marines came in sight. Close-in artillery support enabled -the attackers to get within grenade range and seize the last NKPA -bunker by 1400. Able Company pushed on. - -Midway from Hill 680 to the next knob, Hill 692, the advance was -stopped by enemy small-arms and mortar fire. An air strike was -requested on the bunkers holding up the assault, but fog closed in and -the planes were delayed more than two hours. - -At 1600, after Able Company had renewed the assault without air -support, four VMF-214 Corsairs started a target run controlled by a -liaison plane from VMO-6. The foremost Marines, almost at the summit -by this time, had to beat a hasty retreat to escape the napalm and -500-pound bombs being dumped on Hill 692. Fortunately, there were no -friendly casualties. Some were caused indirectly, however, when hostile -mortar fire caught Marines withdrawing along a connecting saddle to the -comparatively safe reverse slope of Hill 680. When the danger passed, -Able Company returned to the attack on 692 and routed the remaining -defenders.[225] - - [225] 5thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), Jun 51, 35. - -The 1st Marine Division made it a policy thereafter that only the -forward air controllers on the ground were to direct close air support -along the front. Control of air strikes farther behind the enemy lines -was reserved for the OYs. - - -_1st MAW in Operation_ STRANGLE - -Sightings of enemy vehicles during the month of May totaled -54,561--seven times those of January. This increase prompted General -Van Fleet to ask the Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet to initiate a -program of cutting off all possible enemy road traffic between the -latitudes 38° 15´ N and 39° 15´ N. - -Earlier in 1951 the interdiction program had been aimed chiefly at the -enemy’s rail lines and bridges. The Communists had countered by using -more trucks. The new program, known as Operation STRANGLE, was to be -concentrated against vital road networks. Flight leaders were briefed -to search out critical spots where truck and ox cart traffic could be -stopped. Roads skirting hills were to be blocked by landslides caused -by well placed bombs. Where cliffside roads followed the coast, as they -so often did in East Korea, naval gunfire started avalanches of dirt -and rocks which sometimes reached a depth of 20 feet. Roads running -through a narrow ravine or rice paddy could often be cut by a deep bomb -crater.[226] - - [226] Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on _Pac - Flt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chapter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and - on 1st MAW _HD_s, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, G-3 Journal - entries, Assessment Rpts. - -The 1st MAW was given the assignment of stopping traffic on three roads -in East Korea--from Wonsan to Pyonggang, from Kojo to Kumhwa, and along -a lateral route linking the two (Map 16). Since Kumhwa and Pyonggang -were two of the three Iron Triangle towns, these roads were of more -than ordinary importance. - -The Communists reacted to the new UN pressure by increasing their -flak traps. UN pilots were lured with such bait as mysterious lights, -tempting displays of supposed fuel drums, or damaged UN aircraft that -called for investigation. The cost of the UN in planes and pilots -showed an increase during the first two months of Operation STRANGLE. -From 20 May to the middle of July, 20 Marine planes were shot down. -Six of the pilots returned safely; two were killed and 12 listed as -missing.[227] - - [227] 1st MAW _HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33 - _HD_s May-Jul 51, Summaries. - -The demands of Operation STRANGLE added to the emphasis on interdiction -and armed reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force. Statistics compiled -by the 1st Marine Division for 1-17 June 1951 show that 984 close air -support sorties had been requested and 642 received--about 65 percent. -The ratio of Marine planes to other UN aircraft reporting to the -Division was about four to one.[228] - - [228] Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG - 1stMarDiv. - -The statistics of the 1st MAW indicate that out of a total of 1,875 -combat sorties flown from 1 to 15 June 1951, about a third were close -air support--651 day CAS and 19 night CAS. Of this number, 377 sorties -went to the 1st Marine Division, which received more than half. Next -in line were the 7th Infantry Division (41 sorties), the 3d Infantry -Division (31 sorties), and the 25th Infantry Division (28 sorties).[229] - - [229] 1st MAW _HD_, Jun 51. Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun. - -The effect of Operation STRANGLE on the enemy must be left largely -to conjecture. There can be no doubt that it added enormously to the -Communists’ logistical problem. It is equally certain that they solved -these problems to such an extent that their combat units were never -at a decisive handicap for lack of ammunition and other supplies. -Operation STRANGLE, in short, merely added to the evidence that -interdictory air alone was not enough to knock a determined adversary -out of the war, as enthusiasts had predicted at the outbreak of -hostilities in Korea. - - -_KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack_ - -On the night of 1–2 June, Colonel Nickerson was notified that the 7th -Marines would be relieved next day by the 1st Marines, which would -pass through and continue the attack. The 1st Marines moved into -assembly areas at 0630. Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Hire, commanding -officer of 3/1, went forward at 0800 with his command group to make -a reconnaissance of the area. As his staff paused for a conference -in a supposedly enfiladed location, a Communist mortar barrage hit -the group by complete surprise. The artillery Liaison officer was -killed instantly. His assistant, two forward observers, four company -commanders, the S-3 and 32 enlisted men were wounded. So hard hit was -the battalion that its attack had to be postponed until the following -day.[230] - - [230] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51. - -The first Division objective was designated X-RAY. 2/1 had the mission -of taking the high point, Hill 516 (Map 15). Across the valley 3/1 -advanced up a parallel ridge. Planes from VMF-214 and VMF-323 cleared -the way for the securing of this battalion’s objective at 1900. -Aircraft from these same squadrons also aided 2/1 in over-running the -last opposition on Hill 516, where 80 NKPA dead were counted.[231] - - [231] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; _HD_s of - VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51. - -[Illustration: MAP 16 - -1st MARINE AIR WING - -OPERATING AREA - -23 MAY-15 JULY 1951 - -UNIT LOCATIONS ON 1 JULY] - -The KMC regiment, in reserve only two days, was ordered to relieve -the 5th Marines on 4 June. This would permit Colonel Hayward to shift -over to the right flank, thus extending the 1st Marine Division zone -5,000 yards to the east with a north-south boundary of the Soyang river -valley (Map 15). The purpose of this maneuver was to free 2d Infantry -Division troops for a mission of mopping up in the X Corps rear area. - -Three Marine regiments were now in line, the 1st on the left, the -KMCs in the center, the 5th on the right, and the 7th in reserve. A -reshuffling of units also took place in the 1st MAW when VMF-312 ended -its tour of duty on the CVL _Bataan_. The replacement involved a change -of carriers when VMF-323 was alerted for west coast duty on the CVE -_Sicily_ a week later.[232] - - [232] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv - _Special Action Report_ (_SAR_), Jun 51. - -Ahead of the KMCs stretched the most difficult of the regimental zones -of action--the main mountain range extending northeast from Yanggu -to Hill 1316, known to the Koreans as Taeam-san. Along these ridges -the Chinese had placed North Korean troops with orders to “hold until -death.”[233] - - [233] The account of the KMC attack is based upon these - sources: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51; “KMC Operations in - Korea, Jun 51,” n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, then KMC - senior adviser. - -From the air, the ground in front of the KMCs resembled a monstrous -prehistoric lizard, rearing up on its hind legs. The 1st Battalion was -to ascend the tail and the 2d the hind legs. The two would meet at the -rump, Hill 1122 (Map 15). From this position the backbone ran northeast -to the shoulders, Hill 1218. Still farther northeast, along the neck, -was the key terrain feature--Taeam-san, the head of the imagined -reptile. - -The 1st and 2d Battalions ran immediately into the opposition of an -estimated NKPA regiment. In an effort to outflank the enemy, the 3d -Battalion swung over to the east and attacked up the ridge forming -the forelegs. Seizure of the shoulders (Hill 1218) would render enemy -positions along the back, rump, hind legs, and tail untenable. Major -General Choe Am Lin, commanding the 12th NKPA Division, was quick to -recognize the tactical worth of this height and exact a stiff price for -it. - -That the KMCs could expect little mercy from their fellow countrymen -was demonstrated when the bodies of ten men reported missing were -found. All had been shot in the back of the head. - -For five days the fight raged with unabated fury. The terrain limited -the advance to a narrow front, so that the attack resembled the thrust -of a spear rather than a blow from a battering ram. When the KMCs did -gain a brief foothold, the enemy launched a counterattack. - -At 2000 on 10 June, after six days of relatively unsuccessful fighting, -the KMCs decided to gamble on a night attack. This had heretofore -been the enemy’s prerogative, and the Korean Reds were caught unaware -in a devastating surprise. Most of the NKPA troops were attending to -housekeeping duties at 0200 when all three KMC battalions fell upon -them like an avalanche. Hill 1122, the rump of the lizard, was seized; -and under pressure the enemy withdrew from the shoulders. This made the -fall of Taeam-san inevitable, and only mopping-up operations remained -for KMCs who had suffered more than 500 casualties. General Thomas sent -the regiment this message on 12 June: - - Congratulations to the KMC on a difficult job well done. Your - seizure of objectives on the KANSAS Line from a determined enemy - was a magnificent dash of courage and endurance. Your courageous - and aggressive actions justify our pride in the Korean Marines. - -Logistical support of the three regiments in the attack presented a -problem to the Division supply echelons. The KMCs in the center and -the 1st Marines on the left could be supplied over a narrow, winding -mountain road that scaled a high pass before dropping down into an -east-west valley giving relatively easy access to the center and left. -The 5th Marines had to receive its supplies over another mountain road -leading north of Inje, then west into the regimental zone.[234] - - [234] The KMC’s drew fuel and ammunition from the 1st Marine - Division and rations from the ROK Army. Other classes of - supplies were obtained generally on a catch-as-catch-can - basis with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan. - -Both of the Division supply routes needed a good deal of engineering -work before trucks could move over them freely. Landslides were -frequent and many trucks skidded off the slippery trail while rounding -the hairpin turns. - -The 1st Marines moved northward on north-south ridges, and the KMCs in -the center had spurs leading to their objectives. It was the misfortune -of the 5th Marines to have a topographical washboard effect ahead. The -axis of advance was south to north, but the ground on the way to the -final objectives on the KANSAS Line consisted of five sharply defined -ridgelines running northwest to southeast. Instead of attacking along -the ridgelines Colonel Hayward’s men had to climb some 1,200 feet, then -descend 1,200 feet, five separate times while covering an advance of -8,000 yards (Map 15). - -Artillery fired for more than two hours on the morning of 6 June to -soften defenses on the next regimental objective, Hill 729. An air -strike was attempted but fog with low-hanging clouds forced the flight -leader to abort the mission. At 1300 the assault battalions moved -across the LD against small-arms and machine gun fire. The fog lifted -sufficiently at 1400 to allow four F9Fs from VMF-311 to deliver an -effective attack. And by 2100 both 2/5 and 3/5 were consolidating their -positions on the first of the five ridges. - -This assault is typical of the fighting as the 5th Marines took the -remaining four ridges, one by one, in a slugging assault on an enemy -defending every commanding height. The advance resolved itself into -a pattern as the Korean Reds probed the Marine lines at night and -continued their tough resistance by day. For 10 days the regiment -plugged ahead, step by step, with the support of artillery, air, -mortars, and 75 mm recoilless rifles.[235] - - [235] _HD_s of 1stMarDiv and 1stMar, Jun 51. - - -_1st Marines Moves Up to_ BROWN _Line_ - -On the left flank, the 1st Marines devoted several days to -consolidating its position and sending out reconnaissance patrols -in preparation for an attack on the ridge just north of the Hwachon -Reservoir. From this height the Communists could look down the throats -of Colonel Brown’s troops. - -From 6 to 8 June, Lieutenant Colonel Hire’s 3d Battalion led the attack -against moderate but gathering resistance. A gain of 1,500 yards was -made on the right flank by 2/1, commanded by Major Clarence J. Mabry -after the evacuation of Lieutenant Colonel McClellan, wounded on the -5th. On the left, Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West’s 1/1 held fast as -the 5th ROK Regiment, 7th ROK Division, X Corps, passed through on its -way to a new zone of action to the west. - -Early on the 9th, as 2/1 was preparing to launch its attack, an intense -artillery and mortar barrage fell upon the lines, followed by the -assault of an estimated NKPA company, The Korean Reds were beaten off -with heavy losses. And though the enemy fire continued, 2/1 jumped off -on schedule, fighting for every inch of ground. Colonel Brown committed -1/1 on the left. It was an all-day fight for both battalions. After -taking one ridge in the morning, it was used as the springboard for -an assault on the second objective. The weapons of the regimental -Anti-Tank Company built up a base of fire that enabled this ridge to be -secured by 1600. - -The 5th ROK Regiment took its objectives by the morning of the 10th. -The 1st Marines provided additional fire support by diverting all its -antitank guns and tank rifles to the aid of the ROKs. - -The pressure, which had been building up for several days, reached -a new high on 10 June. Late that morning Colonel Brown met General -Almond and the Division G-3, Colonel Richard G. Weede, at a conference. -By 1100 the entire 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines was committed. On -the left, Lieutenant Colonel West had to hold up the 1st Battalion -until 1330, when the ROKs completed the occupation of the high ground -dominating the route of advance. - -For several hours it appeared that the Marines had met their match -this time. A tenacious enemy defended log bunkers expertly, refusing -to give ground until evicted by grenade and bayonet attacks. At every -opportunity the Communists counterattacked. So effective was their -resistance that at dusk the two Marine battalions were still short of -their objectives in spite of casualties draining the strength of both -units. - -Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff, commanding officer of the 11th Marines, -remained on the telephone for hours with Colonel Brown. He gave all -possible artillery support, not only of his own regiment but also -nearby Corps units. By nightfall, with the attacking battalions -still held up, the atmosphere was tense in the regimental forward -CP. Lieutenant Colonel Adelman, commanding the supporting artillery -battalion, 2/11, helped to coordinate air strikes and artillery with -Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, executive officer of the 1st -Marines, and the air liaison officers. - -“Everything I had ever hoped to see in years of teaching such -coordination of fires seemed to come true that night,” commented -Colonel Brown at a later date. “I stayed in my regular CP until I was -sure all I could do through Winecoff was done, and then went forward to -see the finale. It was a glorious spectacle, that last bayonet assault. -In the last analysis 2/1 had to take its objective with the bayonet and -hand grenades, crawling up the side of a mountain to get at the enemy. -It was bloody work, the hardest fighting I have ever seen.”[236] - - [236] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 8 Jun 58. Other - sources for this section are the _HD_s of 1stMarDiv, - 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and VMF-214. - -This was no small tribute, coming from a veteran officer whose combat -service included three major wars, not to mention Nicaragua and -China. It was nearly midnight before Mabry’s battalion took its final -objective. Casualties for the day’s attack were 14 KIA and 114 WIA -exclusive of slightly wounded, who were neither counted nor evacuated. -West’s battalion, which seized Hill 802, overlooking the Soyang River, -had won its all-day fight at a cost of 9 KIA and 97 WIA. - -Unfailing support had been given throughout the daylight hours by -aircraft of VMF-214. VMF(N)-513 took over on the night shift, and -planes came screeching in as late as 2200 to attack moonlit targets a -hundred yards ahead of the leading infantry elements. - -The 1st Marines had outfought and outgamed a tough enemy. Never again, -after the 10th, was the NKPA resistance quite as determined. The 3d -Battalion led the other two during the next few days. There was plenty -of fighting for all three, but the result was never again in doubt. - -By the late afternoon of 14 June the regiment was in position on the -BROWN Line. This was the unofficial name for an extension of the KANSAS -Line some 3,000 yards north. It had been requested by Colonel Brown -when he realized that positions along the KANSAS Line were completely -dominated by the next ridge to the north. - -The change made necessary a continued advance by the KMCs on the right -to tie in with the 1st Marines. The so-called BROWN Line was then -officially designated the modified KANSAS Line. - - -_7th Marines Committed to the Attack_ - -For several days General Thomas had been concerned over the heavy -casualties suffered by his command. In order to give greater impetus -to the Division effort, he decided to commit the reserve infantry -regiment, the 7th Marines (minus one battalion held back as Division -reserve) to complete the occupation of the modified KANSAS Line. - -On 8 June, Colonel Nickerson’s regiment (minus 3/7) moved into an -assembly area between the 1st Marines and the KMCs, ready to attack in -the morning. Ahead stretched a narrow but difficult zone of advance up -the valley of the So-chon River (Map 15). Tank-infantry patrols went -forward to select favorable positions for the jumpoff, and engineers -worked throughout the daylight hours to clear the valley roads of -mines. Despite their best efforts, 10 Marine tanks were lost to mines -during the first week.[237] - - [237] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the - _HD_s of the 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 for Jun - 51. - -As the two battalions advanced on the morning of the 9th they came -under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Nevertheless, they secured -Hill 420 and dug in before nightfall. - -On the 10th Rooney’s 1/7 advanced along the ridgeline to support -the attack of Meyerhoff’s 2/7 up the valley floor. The maneuver was -carried out successfully in spite of NKPA automatic weapons and mortar -opposition. Contact was established with KMC forward units at dusk. -Sixteen POWs were taken by the 7th Marines and 85 North Korean dead -were counted on the objectives. - -The two battalions continued the attack throughout the next week. The -3d Battalion of the 7th Marines remained General Thomas’ sole Division -reserve until he committed it on the afternoon of 18 June. - -The newcomers got into the fight just in time for the enemy’s all-out -effort to defend the steep east-west ridge marking the BROWN Line. -The nature of the terrain made maneuver impossible--a frontal assault -was the only answer. Defending the ridge was the 1st Battalion, 41st -Regiment, 12th NKPA Division. Waiting on the reverse slope, the enemy -launched a counterattack when the Marines neared the crest. George -Company, commanded by First Lieutenant William C. Airheart, met five -successive repulses at the hands of superior numbers. Item Company -(First Lieutenant Frank A. Winfrey) also took part in the fifth -assault, and both companies held their ground near the summit when the -fighting ended at dusk. They expected to resume the attack at dawn, -but the enemy had silently withdrawn during the night. All three 7th -Marines battalions occupied their designated positions on the BROWN -Line without further interference. - -By early afternoon on the 20th, the Division was in complete control of -the modified KANSAS Line and construction of defenses began in earnest. -The next day the 1st Marines and KMCs extended their right and left -flanks respectively and pinched out the 7th Marines, which dropped back -into reserve. - -Thus ended two months of continual hard fighting for the 1st Marine -Division, beginning on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. Few and -far between were the interludes of rest for troops which saw both -defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy’s two drives, -they launched a month-long counterstroke that had the enemy hardpressed -at times for survival. Only the ruthless sacrifice of NKPA troops in -defensive operations enabled the Chinese Reds to recover from the blows -dealt them in late May and early June. - -The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire -month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1,044 WIA, most of them -being reported during the first 2 weeks. This was a higher total than -the regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir operation. Reflecting -on the caliber of these men, their regimental commander had this to say: - - They were war-wise when I got command; I contributed nothing to - their training because they were in battle when I joined them and - I left them when they came out of the lines for a rest. They used - cover, maneuvered beautifully, used their own and supporting arms - intelligently, were patient and not foolhardy; but when it came - to the point where they had to rely on themselves with bayonet, - hand grenade and sheer guts, they could and did do that too. I - have long ago given up telling people what I saw them do on many - occasions. Nobody believes me, nor would I believe anyone else - telling the same story of other troops.[238] - - [238] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr to Maj W. T. - Hickman, 22 Apr 57. - -Colonel Brown, of course, paid this tribute to the troops of his -regiment. But it is safe to say that any commanding officer of the 1st -Marine Division would have felt that these sentiments applied equally -to his own men. All the combat Marines of the 60-day battle had shown -themselves to be worthy heirs of the traditions of Belleau Wood, -Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -The Truce Talks at Kaesong - -_Communists Ask for Truce Talks--Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line--Red -Herrings at Kaesong--1st Marine Division in Reserve--Marine Helicopters -Take the Lead--Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea--MAG-12 Moves to -K-18--The Division Back in Action Again_ - - -It is not likely that the date 25 June 1951 meant much to the Marines -on the KANSAS Line. In all probability few of them recalled that it was -the first anniversary of the Communist aggression which started the war -in Korea. - -Since that surprise attack on a June Sunday morning in 1950, some -1,250,000 men had been killed, wounded or captured in battle--a million -of them from the Communist forces of Red China and the North Korean -People’s Republic. This was the estimate of J. Donald Kingsley, Korean -reconstruction agent general for the United States. He reckoned the -civilian victims of privation, violence, and disease at two million -dead. Another three million had been made homeless refugees.[239] - - [239] This section is based on by Peter Kihss, “One Year in - Korea,” _United Nations World_, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951, - 21–23. - -On 25 June 1951 the Communists held less territory by 2,100 square -miles than they occupied when they began their onslaught with an -overwhelming local superiority in arms and trained troops. Losses of -Communist equipment during the first year included 391 aircraft, 1,000 -pieces of artillery, and many thousands of machine guns, automatic -rifles, and mortars. North Korea, formerly the industrial region of the -peninsula, lay in ruins. Cities, factories, and power plants had been -pounded into rubble. - -In short, the thrifty conquest planned by the Koreans and their Soviet -masters had backfired. Not only had the Communist offensives of April -and May been stopped; the United Nations forces had rebounded to win -their greatest victory of the war’s first year. While X Corps was -advancing to the Punchbowl, other major Eighth Army units had also -gained ground. Perhaps the most crushing blow was dealt by I Corps in -its attack on the Iron Triangle. Units of two U.S. infantry divisions -fought their way through extensive mine fields into Chorwon and Kumhwa -on 8 June. By the end of the month, I Corps held defensive positions -about midway between the base and apex of the strategic triangle that -had been the enemy’s main assembly area for the troops and supplies of -his spring offensives.[240] - - [240] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Jun 51. - -On the east-central front, units of IX Corps pushed within 10 miles of -Kumsong while I ROK Corps advanced along the east coast to Chodo-ri. -Thus the UN forces occupied the most favorable line they had held since -the great CCF offensive early in January. From the mouth of the Imjin -this line ran northeast to the middle of the Iron Triangle, eastward -across the mountains to the southern rim of the Punchbowl, then -northeast to the coast of Chodo-ri (Map 14). - - -_Communists Ask for Truce Talks_ - -The first anniversary of the Korean conflict was overshadowed two days -earlier by the news that the Communists had taken the initiative in -proposing truce talks. The suggestion was made in a New York radio -address of 23 June by a Soviet delegate to the United Nations--Jacob -Malik, Foreign Minister of the USSR. On the 25th the idea was -unofficially endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist -government. UN officials immediately indicated their willingness -to discuss preliminary terms. The outcome was an agreement that -representatives of both sides would meet on 7 July at Kaesong, then -located between the opposing lines in west Korea. - -Why had the Communists been first to ask for a truce conference? Both -Generals Van Fleet and Almond believed that the answer might have -been traced to military necessity rather than any genuine desire for -peace. “I felt at that time that the Chinese Communists and the North -Korean armies were on the most wobbly legs that they had been on to -that date,” said General Almond when interviewed shortly after his -retirement in 1953. “They were punch drunk and ineffective, and I, -personally, thought at that time that it was the time to finish off the -effort.”[241] - - [241] _U.S. News and World Report_, 13 Feb 53, 40–41. - -Raymond Cartier, representing a Paris newspaper, probably spoke for -most of the correspondents at the front when he suspected that the -proposal for truce talks “was possibly just a crafty trick devised by -the Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled Chinese -armies.”[242] - - [242] _UN World_, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10. - -It might have been recalled at this time that the Communists had used -truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese Civil War. -In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Nationalist victory were bright, -the enemy took advantage of American peace efforts by agreeing on -several occasions to meet for truce conferences. And while prolonging -the talks by all manner of subterfuges, the Communists profited from -the breathing spells by regrouping their forces and planning new -offensives. Their final triumph, in fact, owed in no small measure to -interludes when the conference table served a military purpose.[243] - - [243] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series - 30, pp. 352–363. - -History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the next -two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer weeks. -Indeed, Admiral C. Turner Joy believed that the war was actually -prolonged rather than shortened as a result of the negotiations. - -“Military victory was not impossible nor even unusually difficult -of achievement,” wrote the Senior Delegate and Chief of the UN -Command delegation at the truce talks. “Elimination of the artificial -restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective -blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military victory -in less time than was expended on truce talks.”[244] - - [244] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), _How Communists - Negotiate_ (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter - Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_. One of Admiral Joy’s - last services to his country before his death in 1956 - was the writing of this book. Other sources for this - section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., “Inside Story of - Our Mistakes in Korea,” _U.S. News and World Report_, 23 - Jan 1953, 35–36; E. Weintal, “What Happened at Kaesong - and What is in Prospect,” _Newsweek_, 23 Jul 1951, 38; - Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray. - -Mao Tse-tung’s forces had lost face by the failure of their long -heralded 5th Phase Offensive. They had been badly beaten during the UN -counteroffensive. Pretensions of high CCF morale could no longer be -maintained when troops were laying down their arms without a fight. -Nor could charges of low UN morale be supported when the fighting -spirit of the Eighth Army was being shown every day at the front. - -In view of these circumstances, it would appear that the Communists had -poor cards to play against United Nations trumps at a truce conference. -But they played them so craftily, with such a sly sense of propaganda -values, that the victors of the May and June battles were soon made to -appear losers begging for a breathing spell. - -To begin with, the Chinese knew that the mere public announcement of -the possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in the -United States, where the war was unpopular. Pressure would be brought -upon Washington to meet the enemy immediately for negotiations. And -while a cease fire remained even a remote prospect, American public -opinion would demand a slackening of offensive military operations with -their attendant casualties. - -From the outset it was apparent that the United Nations Command was -no match for the Communists in low cunning. The UN suggested, for -instance, that the truce teams meet on the Danish hospital ship -_Jutlandia_. Here, surely, was neutral ground, since the Danes had no -combat forces in Korea. Moreover, the ship was to be anchored in Wonsan -harbor within range of CCF shore batteries. - -The Reds won the first of many such concessions with their refusal. -They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command let -them have it their way. The reason for the Communist decision was soon -made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing Eighth Army, -which meant that an important road center would be immune from attack. -And though the ancient Korean town was originally in no man’s land, the -Communists soon managed to include it within their lines. - -All delegates were requested to display white flags on their -vehicles for identification. Communist photographers were on hand -to snap countless pictures of UN delegates which convinced Asia’s -illiterate millions at a glance that the beaten United Nations had -sent representatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other -photographs showed the unarmed UN delegates being herded about Kaesong -by scowling Communist guards with burp guns. - -No detail of the stage setting was too trivial to be overlooked. -Oriental custom prescribes that at the peace table the victors face -south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the UN delegates -were seated at Kaesong with a view to enhancing Communist prestige.[245] - - [245] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 4–5. - -Some of the propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous, “At the -first meeting of the delegates,” Admiral Joy related, “I seated myself -at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The Communists -had provided a chair for me which was considerably shorter than a -standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist delegate, -General Nam Il, protruded a good foot above my cagily diminished -stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam Il with a -chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain-smoking Nam Il puffed -his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glowered down on me, an -obviously torpedoed admiral. This condition of affairs was promptly -rectified when I changed my foreshortened chair for a normal one, but -not before Communist photographers had exposed reels of film.”[246] - - [246] _Ibid._ - - -_Patrol Bases on_ BADGER _Line_ - -The war went on, of course, during the negotiations. But the tempo was -much reduced as the UN forces consolidated their gains, and the enemy -appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. Generally -speaking, the Eighth Army had shifted from the offensive to the -defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Marine Division occupied -the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its way to the -BROWN Line. - -On 22 June all three infantry regiments were directed to establish -battalion-size patrol bases on the BADGER Line--1½ to 2½ miles forward -of their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached -to Colonel Brown and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the -regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish a -patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. - -While these arrangements were being carried out, General Almond called -at the 1st Marines CP. He expressed surprise that the establishment -of patrol bases was being contemplated by EUSAK when some of the -front-line units were still in contact with the enemy.[247] - - [247] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jun 51, 55. - -Execution of these orders was accordingly suspended. The following -day, however, Division again alerted the infantry regiments to be -prepared to occupy patrol bases on order. This was by direction of -Corps, which in turn had been directed by EUSAK. - -The Marine regimental and battalion commanders were not happy about -this turn of affairs. The patrol base concept had been tried out early -in May, during the lull between the enemy’s two offensives, and found -wanting. In theory it was a good means of keeping contact with an -enemy who had pulled back out of mortar and light artillery range. In -practice the enemy had shown that he could bypass patrol bases at night -for probing attacks on the MLR. The bases themselves ran the constant -risk of being surrounded and overwhelmed. As a final objection, a -regiment was often deprived of its reserve battalion, which was the -logical choice for such duty. - -In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out on 26 June and established a -patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such a bombardment of -large caliber mortar fire that Colonel Brown pulled the battalion back -to the MLR the following day.[248] - - [248] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51. - -General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after his -retirement when he summed it up as “an invitation to disaster.”[249] He -could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early in July -that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san. - - [249] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting - to note that there was no mention of the patrol base - concept in the then current _Field Service Regulations, - Operations, FM 100-5_, published by the Department of the - Army in August 1949. - -This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, afforded -excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and westward into -the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware of these -advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his MLR. This -was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by KMC -reconnaissance patrols.[250] - - [250] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section - is based on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 7–11; Col C. W. - Harrison’s account, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July - 1951;” Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58. - -Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning of 7 -July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an order -directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the following -day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time for -planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be -relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to -form a composite battalion of the three companies that could most -conveniently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large -proportion of recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival. - -There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, fairly -level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The other called -for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the MLR and a -steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san. - -Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the right -by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridgeline on -the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes and an -artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft grounded. - -The attack jumped off at 1030 on 8 July. All three companies were -greeted by enemy mortar and machine gun fire that pinned down the -company on the right. The two companies on the left won a foothold on -Hill 1100, about a mile in front of Taeu-san. Here the advance ground -to a halt. - -These KMCs dug in for the night and repulsed a series of -counterattacks. On the morning of the 9th the KMC regimental commander, -Colonel Kim Tai Shik, committed the entire 1st Battalion to the attack -on the right. It had no better success than the company of the day -before. Meanwhile, the two companies were driven off Hill 1100. - -Colonel Gould P. Groves, senior liaison officer with the KMCs, -recommended that the remnants of the two companies be withdrawn. The -1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but it was plain that -the KMC regiment could not come close to Taeu-san. On 12 July the 1st -Marine Division informed X Corps that the position held by the KMCs -just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an advance -patrol base. As far as the Marines were concerned, the sad affair was -permitted to rest there. - -As evidence of the valiant effort made by the KMCs, they suffered 222 -casualties. A sequel to this story was written late in July after the -2d infantry Division relieved the Marines. X Corps again ordered the -capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base, and it required the commitment of -the major part of the division to accomplish the task.[251] - - [251] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv _HD_, Jul 51, - 13–19. - -Although the fighting had not been severe for other units of the 1st -Marine Division during the first two weeks of July, the casualties -(including KMC losses) were 55 KIA, 360 WIA, and 22 MIA--a total of -437. Relief of the Marines was completed by the 2d Infantry Division -on 15 July, and by the 17th all units were on their way back to -assembly areas in X Corps rear. - -It was the second time since the landing of the 1st Provisional Marine -Brigade on 2 August 1950 that the Marines had been away from the firing -line for more than a few days. - - -_Red Herrings at Kaesong_ - -It is not changing the subject to switch to the truce talks. Kaesong -was actually a second UN front. - -After the preliminaries had been settled--most of them to Communist -satisfaction--the UN delegation, headed by Admiral Joy, held a first -meeting on 10 July 1951 with his opposite number, NKPA Major General -Nam Il, and the Communist truce team. This was the first of the talks -that were to drag on for two dreary years. - -Nam Il, a Korean native of Manchuria, born in 1911, had been educated -in Russia and had served with the Soviet army in World War II. His -career in Korea began when he arrived as a captain with Soviet -occupation troops in 1945. Rising to power rapidly, he took a prominent -part in the creation of a Soviet puppet state in North Korea. - -An atmosphere of sullen hatred surrounded the UN delegates at Kaesong. -The CCF sentinel posted at the entrance to the conference room wore a -gaudy medal which he boasted had been awarded to him “for killing forty -Americans.” When Admiral Joy tried to send a report to General Ridgway, -the messenger was turned back by armed Communist guards. These are -samples of the indignities heaped upon the UN truce team. After several -UN delegates were threatened by guards with burp guns, Joy protested to -Nam Il, “demanding prompt elimination of such crudities.” - -In order to give their battered armies more time for recuperation, the -Communist delegates met every issue with delaying tactics. They proved -themselves to be masters of the ancient art of dragging a red herring -across the trail. Going back on their word did not embarrass them in -the least if they found it to their advantage to renege.[252] - - [252] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived - from the following sources: Joy, _How Communists - Negotiate_, 6–10, 129, 140; Carl Berger, _The Korean - Knot_ (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 141–151; - Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray. - -The truce negotiations were bound to have an immediate effect on -military operations. In the United States it seemed a pity to -newspaper readers that American young men should have to die in -battle at a time when headlines were hinting at the possibility of -peace. Mothers wrote to their congressmen, requesting a halt in Korean -operations. - -General Van Fleet minced no words after his retirement when he -commented on the effect of the truce talks on strategy: - - Instead of getting directives for offensive action, we found our - activities more and more proscribed as time went on. Even in the - matter of straightening out our lines for greater protection, - or capturing hills when the Reds were looking down our throats, - we were limited by orders from the Far East Command in Japan, - presumably acting on directives from Washington.[253] - - [253] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), “The Truth About Korea,” - _Life_, 11 May 53, 133. - -It was the opinion of Admiral Joy that more UN casualties were suffered -as a consequence of the truce talks than would have resulted from an -offensive taking full advantage of Red China’s military weaknesses in -June 1951. - -“As soon as armistice discussions began,” he wrote, “United Nations -Command ground forces slackened their offensive preparations. -Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to -the maximum during the armistice talks.... I feel certain that the -casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long years -of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from an -offensive in the summer of 1951.”[254] - - [254] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 166. - - -_1st Marine Division in Reserve_ - -Most of the 1st Marine Division units were in X Corps reserve during -the last two weeks of July 1951. The 5th Marines, however, remained -in “ready reserve” near Inje under the operational control of X -Corps. Toward the end of the month, the 3d Battalion of the 11th -Marines passed to the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division. -Meanwhile, the 7th Marines and Division Reconnaissance Company -displaced to the Yanggu area to aid in the construction of defensive -positions and undergo special training. - -1st Marine Division Training Order 2-51, covering the period from 23 -July to 20 August 1951, provided for a stiff daily schedule of general -and specialist military subjects. The objectives were “to maintain -each individual and unit of the command at a very high state of -proficiency, while emphasizing rest and rehabilitation of personnel -and repair and maintenance of equipment.... A minimum of 33% of all -technical training was to be conducted at night, stressing individual -and unit night discipline. Formal unit schools and on-the-job training -were utilized extensively.”[255] - - [255] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jul 51, 18. - -Most thoroughly covered among general military subjects were mechanical -training, capabilities, tactical employment, and firing of individual -and infantry crew-served weapons. Lectures and demonstrations were -combined to good effect with instruction in basic infantry tactics. - -“The prescribed periods of physical conditioning,” the Division -report continued, “were supplemented by extensive organized athletic -programs outside of training hours, resulting in the maintenance of -a high degree of battle conditioning of all hands. Special military -subjects encompassed the whole range of activities necessary to the -accomplishment of any mission assigned the Division. Building from the -duties of the individual Marine, infantry, artillery, engineer, and -tank personnel progressed through small unit employment and tactics as -it applied to their respective specialities. Meanwhile such diverse -training as tank repair and watch repair was conducted in various -units.”[256] - - [256] _Ibid._ - -Fortification came in for study after a tour of the KANSAS Line by -Major General Clovis E. Byers, who had relieved General Almond as X -Corps commander. He listed the weaknesses he found and directed that -“special attention [be] given to the thickness, strength and support -of bunker overheads, and to the proper revetting and draining of -excavations.”[257] - - [257] CG X Corps, CITE X 21568. - -The KMC Regiment received the most thorough training it had ever -known, considering that it had been in combat continually since its -organization. Each of the Division’s three other regiments sent four -training teams consisting of a lieutenant, an NCO, and an interpreter -to the KMCs on 22 July. The 12 teams had orders to remain until 20 -August. Attached to various KMC companies, they acted as advisers for -the entire training period. - -Another organization of Koreans that had won its way to favorable -recognition was the newly formed Civil Transport Corps (CTC). The use -of indigenous labor for logistical purposes dated back to March 1951, -when the Eighth Army’s advance was slowed up by supply problems caused -by muddy roads. Plans were made to equip and train a special corps to -assist in the logistical support of combat troops in areas inaccessible -to normal motor transportation.[258] - - [258] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Apr 51, 1080110. - -The project began on 29 March with 720 South Koreans--all from the -Korean National Guard--being assigned to I Corps. Plans were developed -for a Civil Transport Corps of 82 companies, each containing 240 men. -The CTC was to be supervised by a staff of eight U.S. Army officers and -four enlisted men under the operational control of the Transportation -Section, EUSAK. - -The ROK Army had the added responsibility for logistical support, of -hospitalization and medical services other than emergency treatment in -forward areas. Support for the CTC from UN units was to be provided -in a manner similar to that in effect for the ROK forces.[259] No -difficulty was found in filling the CTC ranks, for the pay meant food -and clothing to a Korean and his family. - - [259] _Ibid._ - -The Marines were always astonished at the heavy loads the Korean -cargadores could carry uphill on their “A-frames,” which looked like -sturdy easels with a pair of arm-and-shoulder carrying straps. Humble -and patient, these burden bearers were the only means of supply in -remote combat areas. - - -_Marine Helicopters Take the Lead_ - -The truce talks continued to be front-page news in August. Some of -the more impulsive newspaper and radio commentators hinted at the -possibility of a cease fire before the end of summer. As for the Marine -command and staff, they were not so optimistic, judging from this -sentence in a report: - -“All Division units were notified on 14 August that requisitions had -been sent to EUSAK for cold weather clothing and equipment.” - -The training period afforded an opportunity to glance back over the -first year of fighting in Korea and evaluate the results. There could -be no doubt that the war’s foremost tactical innovation so far was -the combat helicopter. The Marine Corps had taken the lead in its -development when VMO-6, made up of OYs and Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopters -in roughly equal numbers, got into action with the 1st Provisional -Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter. Brigadier General Edward A. -Craig had the historical distinction, insofar as is known, of being -the first commanding general to see the advantages of a “chopper” as a -command vehicle. - -Evacuation of casualties was the principal job of the rotary-wing -aircraft, and 1,926 wounded Marines were flown out during the first -year. No less than 701 of these mercy flights took place during the -three months from 1 April to 30 June 1951, covering the period of the -two CCF 5th Phase offensives and the UN counterstroke. By that time -the Bell HTL-4, with its built-in litters on both sides sheltered by -plexiglas hoods, had taken over most of the evacuation missions from -the HO3S-1. - -The zeal of the pilots contributed substantially to the successful -results. Captain Dwain L. Redalen gave a demonstration of the VMO-6 -spirit at the height of the first CCF offensive in the spring of 1951. -During the 13½ hours from 0600 to 1930 on 23 April, he was in the air -constantly except for intervals of loading or unloading casualties. -Logging a total of 9.6 flight hours, he evacuated 18 wounded men under -enemy fire that left bullet holes in the plexiglas of his HTL-4.[260] - - [260] VMO-6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51. - -Practically all the helicopter techniques put into effect by VMO-6 -had originally been developed by the Marine experimental squadron, -HMX-1, organized late in 1947 at Quantico. Despite the enthusiasm for -rotary-wing aircraft then prevailing, HMX-1 decided that an observation -squadron should combine OYs with helicopters. The wisdom of this -conclusion was proved in Korea, where the test of combat showed that -both types were needed. The OYs were the superiors at reconnaissance -and artillery spot missions, while the helicopters excelled at -transportation and liaison and evacuation flights. - -VMO-6 as a whole was the only Marine organization linking the ground -and air commands. An administrative unit of the 1st MAW, the squadron -was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division.[261] - - [261] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived - from the following sources: Elizabeth L. Tierney, - Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, statistics compiled from - VMO-6 reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51; - 1stMarDiv type “C” rpt on assault helicopters, 4 Oct 51; - Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (Harper, 1954), based - on Marine records, 151–158. - -Thanks to the ability of the helicopter to land “on a dime,” staff -liaison missions and command visits were greatly facilitated. The -helicopter had become the modern general’s steed, and the gap between -staff and line was narrowed by rotary wings. - -The importance of wound evacuation missions can hardly be -overestimated. Surgeons stressed the value of time in treating the -shock resulting from severe wounds. The sooner a patient could be made -ready for surgery, the better were his chances of survival. Definitive -care had waited in the past until a casualty was borne on a jolting -stretcher from the firing line to the nearest road to begin a long -ambulance ride. Such a journey might take most of a day, but there were -instances of a helicopter evacuee reaching the operation table only an -hour after being wounded at the front, 15 or 20 miles away. - -Captain J. W. McElroy, USNR, commanding the famous hospital ship -_Consolation_, asserted that his experience had “proved conclusively -the superiority of the helicopter method of embarking and evacuating -casualties to and from the ship.”[262] A helicopter loading platform -was installed on the _Consolation_ in July 1951, during an overhaul at -the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in California. Marine helicopter pilots -advised as to landing requirements, and eventually all the hospital -ships had similar platforms. - - [262] CO USS _Consolation_ rpt to ComNavFE, 26 Jan 52. - -At a conservative estimate, the 1,926 wounded men flown out by VMO-6 -helicopters during the squadron’s first year in Korea included several -hundred who might not have survived former methods of evacuation. - - -_Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea_ - -Another far-reaching tactical innovation was being launched at this -time as Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN, supervised a -joint Army-Navy three-month field test of Marine armored vests made of -lightweight plastics. - -A glance at the past reveals that body armor had never quite vanished -from modern warfare. European cavalry lancers wore steel cuirasses -throughout the 19th century. During the American Civil War two -commercial firms in Connecticut manufactured steel breastplates -purchased by thousands of Union soldiers. So irksome were the weight -and rigidity of this protection, however, that infantrymen soon -discarded it. - -World War I dated the first widespread adoption of armor in the 20th -century. The idea was suggested when a French general noted that one of -his men had survived a lethal shell fragment by virtue of wearing an -iron mess bowl under his beret. France led the way, and before the end -of 1915 steel helmets were being issued to all armies on the Western -Front. - -When the United States entered the war, General John J. Pershing put in -a request for body armor. Some 30 prototypes using steel or aluminum -plates were submitted but rejected. In every instance the weight and -rigidity were such that too high a price in mobility would be paid for -protection.[263] - - [263] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived - from the following sources: Rpt of Joint Army-Navy - Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G-4 Files; _Instructional - Information, Vest, Armored_, M-1951, G-4 Files, HQMC; - LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis - Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, ltr of 22 Jun 54; Capt D. G. - McGrew, ltr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, USMC, ltr - of 30 Jun 54. - -During the 1930’s new possibilities were opened up by developments in -lightweight plastics. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor interrupted -experiments that were not resumed until 1943. Then a new start was -made with the formation of a joint Army-Navy committee headed by Rear -Admiral Alexander H. Van Kueren and Colonel George F. Doriot. - -Wound statistics indicated that the great majority of fatal wounds were -received in a comparatively small area of the body. The following table -shows the regional frequency: - - NON-FATAL FATAL - - _Percent_ _Percent_ - Head 10 Head 20 - Chest 10 Chest 50 - Abdomen 10 Abdomen 20 - Upper Extremity 30 Upper Extremity 5 - Lower Extremity 40 Lower Extremity 5 - -Shell, mortar, or grenade fragments caused 60 percent of the fatal -wounds, the statistics revealed, with the remainder being charged -to rifle or machine gun fire. It was futile to hope for lightweight -protection against high-velocity bullets. But researchers hoped that -plastic body armor could stop enough shell or mortar fragments to -reduce serious wounds to light wounds while preventing light wounds -altogether. - -Doron and nylon were the materials approved by the joint Army-Navy -committee. The first, named in honor of Colonel Doriot, consisted of -laminated layers of glass cloth filaments, bonded under heavy pressure -to form a thin, rigid slab. That a 1/8-inch thickness could stop and -partially flatten a submachine gun bullet with a muzzle velocity of -1,150 feet per second was demonstrated by ballistic tests at a range of -eight yards. - -The committee recommended 12-ply, laminated, basket-weave nylon for -use where flexibility was required. Both the doron and nylon protected -the wearer by offering enough resistance to absorb the energy of the -missile, which spent itself at the impact. Thus the shock was spread -out over too large a surface for a penetration, although the wearer -could receive a bad bruise. If a penetration did result from a missile -of higher velocity, its effects would be much reduced in severity. - -Aircraft pilots and crewmen, who could tolerate more weight than -foot-sloggers, were first to benefit. Flak suits and curtains were -being manufactured in quantity for airmen by 1944, and the Eighth Air -Force claimed a 50 percent reduction in casualties as a result. - -The infantry stood most in need of protection. Statistics from 57 U.S. -divisions in the European theater of operations during World War II -indicated that foot soldiers, comprising 68.5 percent of the total -strength, suffered 94.5 percent of the casualties. It was further -established that shell or mortar fragments caused from 61.3 to 80.4 -percent of the wounds. - -Unfortunately, progress lagged for the ground forces, owing to -conflicting requirements. Several prototype armored vests were -submitted and rejected. The Marine Corps planned to conduct combat -tests in the spring of 1945 by providing the ordinary utility jacket -with sheaths to hold slabs of doron. A battalion of the 2d Marine -Division had been selected to wear the garment on Okinawa, but the -experiment was interrupted by the end of the campaign. - -The Navy and Marine Corps renewed their research in 1947 at Camp -Lejeune. There a new ballistics center, established for the development -and evaluation of body armor, was set up by the Naval Medical Field -Research Laboratory (NMFRL). Lieutenant Commander Lewis was placed in -charge of experiments. - -Scientific precision seemed more important than haste in time of peace, -and the NMFRL was not ready with an armored vest when Communism -challenged the free world to a showdown in Korea. Five hundred of the -armored utility jackets of the proposed Okinawa test were available, -however, and were air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division during the -Inchon-Seoul operation. - -Many of them went astray during the sea lift to Wonsan and subsequent -Chosin Reservoir operation. Only the 50 garments issued to the Division -Reconnaissance Company were worn in combat. And though this unit kept -no records, the doron slabs were credited by Major Walter Gall, the -commanding officer, with saving several lives. - -By the summer of 1951, Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his researchers -had designed a new Marine armored vest, weighing about 8½ pounds, -combining curved, overlapping doron plates with flexible pads -of basket-weave nylon. This garment, according to the official -description, was capable of “stopping a .45 caliber USA pistol or -Thompson submachine gun bullet; all the fragments of the U.S. hand -grenade at three feet; 75 percent of the U.S. 81mm mortar at 10 feet; -and full thrust of the American bayonet.” - -Only 40 vests were available for field tests in the summer of 1951. -Lewis rotated them among as many wearers as possible in the three -regiments selected for the test, the 5th Marines and the 23d and 38th -regiments of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. There was, as he saw it, -a psychological question to be answered--would body armor win the -acceptance of troops in combat? The hackneyed phrase “bullet-proof -vest,” for instance, put the wearer in a class with the buyer of a -gold brick. Nylon was associated in the minds of the men with alluring -feminine attire rather than protection from shell fragments. Finally, -there could be no denying that undesired weight had been added, that -doron plates hampered movement to some extent, and that nylon pads were -uncomfortably warm for summer wear. - -Despite these drawbacks, Lewis found that troop acceptance was all -that could be asked. The locale of the tests was the Inje area and the -approaches to the KANSAS Line in June and early July. “By keeping these -few vests almost constantly in use,” the Medical Service Corps officer -commented, “the maximum amount of troop wear was obtained. Included -in the wide sampling were company aid men, riflemen, BAR men, mortar -(60mm) men, radio (backpack type) men--each carrying his basic weapon, -ammunition load and a one-meal ration.” - -When Lewis returned to Camp Lejeune, he reported “that body armor, -protection of some type for the vital anatomic areas, is almost -unanimously _desired by all combat troops_, particularly the combat -veteran of several actual fire fights with the enemy.”[264] - - [264] Quotations are from _Instructional Information, Vest - Armored_, M-1951. The italicized words were in the - original. - -Infantry body armor had at last made the transition from a dream -to a reality. The M-1951 was put into production by a Philadelphia -sportswear firm. And it was estimated that by the spring of 1952 nearly -all Marines would be protected by the vest in combat. - -Saving of American lives, of course, was a primary consideration. But -there was a tactical as well as humanitarian advantage to be gained. -For if body armor could reduce fatal and serious wounds by as much as -50 percent, as NMFRL researchers hoped, it would mean that a large -percentage of the enemy’s best antipersonnel weapons had in effect been -silenced. - - -_MAG-12 Moves to K-18_ - -There was no respite for 1st MAW while the 1st Marine Division remained -in reserve. Operation STRANGLE was at its height, and interdiction -flights called for nearly all the resources of Marine aviation during -the summer of 1951. - -Close air support missions were made secondary. This principle was -upheld by Air Force Major General Otto P. Weyland: - - I might suggest that all of us should keep in mind the - limitations of air forces as well as their capabilities. - Continuous CAS along a static front requires dispersed and - sustained fire power against pinpoint targets. With conventional - weapons there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic - mobility and fire power of air forces against worthwhile - concentrations. In a static situation close support is an - expensive substitute for artillery fire. It pays its greatest - dividends when the enemy’s sustaining capability has been - crippled and his logistics cut to a minimum while his forces - are immobilized by interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Then - decisive results can be obtained as the close-support effort is - massed in coordination with determined ground action.[265] - - [265] Quoted in James T. Stewart, _Air Power, The Decisive - Force in Korea_ (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand Company, - 1957), 22–23. - -Marine aviation officers, of course, would have challenged some of -these opinions. But General Weyland insisted that in the summer and -fall of 1951 “it would have been sheer folly not to have concentrated -the bulk of our air effort against interdiction targets in the enemy -rear areas. Otherwise, the available firepower would have been expended -inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along the front, -while the enemy was left to build up his resources to launch and -sustain a general offensive.”[266] - - [266] _Ibid._ - -The UN interdiction program was costly to the Communists. Yet it -remained a stubborn fact that the enemy had not only maintained but -actually increased his flow of supplies in spite of bombings that might -have knocked a Western army out of the war. That was because CCF and -NKPA troops could operate with a minimum of 50 short tons per day per -division--an average of about 10 pounds per man. It was about one-fifth -of the supply requirements for an equal number of U.S. troops. - -Try as they might, the UN air forces could not prevent the arrival of -the 2,900 tons of rations, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies needed -every day by the 58 Communist divisions at the front. - -The enemy during this period was increasing his own air potential. On -17 June the Fifth Air Force warned that the Communists had stepped up -their number of planes from an estimated 900 in mid-May to 1,050 in -mid-June. Their Korean airfields were being kept under repair in spite -of persistent UN air attacks. - -In June enemy light planes made night raids along the UN front lines -and even into the Seoul area. VMF(N)-513 pilots, flying the nightly -combat patrol over Seoul, had several fleeting contacts with these -black-painted raiders. The Marines were unable to close in for the -kill, since the opposing planes were nonmetal and difficult to track -by radar. Soon, however, the VMF(N)-513 pilots had better hunting. On -30 June Captain Edwin B. Long and his radar operator, CWO Robert C. -Buckingham, shot down a black, two-place PO-2 biplane. And on 13 July -Captain Donald L. Fenton destroyed another.[267] - - [267] MAG-12 HD, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology, 30 Jun; MAG-12 - _HD_, Jul 51, Chronology, 13 Jul. - -Despite the Air Force emphasis on interdiction, better close air -support remained a major objective of the 1st MAW. One of the -requirements was a shorter flying distance from air base to combat -area. K-46, the MAG-12 field near Hoengsong, had qualified with respect -to reduced flying time. Maintenance problems caused by the dusty, rocky -runway of this primitive strip led to its abandonment. On 14 July -the squadrons pulled back temporarily to K-1, and on the 26th MAG-12 -withdrew its maintenance crews. - -The Group’s new field was K-18, a 4,400-foot strip on the east coast -near Kangnung and just south of the 38th Parallel. Situated only 40 -miles behind the 1st Marine Division and on the seacoast, the new field -seemed to be ideally located. The runway, reinforced with pierced steel -planking, extended inland from a beach where water-borne supplies could -be delivered, as at K-3.[268] - - [268] “Rpt of Visit to Far East by CG, FMFPac, and his staff - during the period 27 August to 12 September 1951,” 17 - _ff._ - - -_The Division Back in Action Again_ - -Political causes had a good deal to do with the renewal of activity for -the 1st Marine Division late in August 1951. Apparently the Communist -armed forces had been given enough time to recuperate from their hard -knocks in May and June. At any rate, the Red delegates walked out on -the truce talks after falsely charging on 22 August that UN planes -had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area by dropping napalm -bombs. Although the Reds were unable to show any credible evidence, the -negotiations came to an abrupt end for the time being.[269] - - [269] Berger, _The Korean Knot_, _op. cit._ 144–145. - -On the 26th all Marine units received a Division warning that offensive -operations were to be initiated in the immediate future. The effective -strength, of the Division (including the KMCs) had been reported as -1,386 officers and 24,044 enlisted men on 1 August 1951. Attached to -the Division at that time were 165 interpreters and 4,184 Korean CTC -cargadores. - -On the 26th the regiments were disposed as follows: the 1st Marines -near Chogutan; the 5th Marines near Inje; the 7th Marines near Yanggu; -and the 1st KMC Regiment at Hangye. Service units and the Division -CP were located along the Hongchon-Hangye road in the vicinity of -Tundong-ni. - -The 11th Marines (-), with the 196th FA Battalion, USA, attached, -constituted the 11th Marine Regiment Group, an element of X Corps -artillery. Throughout the training period 2/11 remained under the -control of the 1st Marine Division and 3/11 was attached to the 2d -Infantry Division. - -The 5th Marines, 7th Marines, and KMCs were alerted to be prepared -to move up to the combat areas south and west of the Punchbowl on 27 -August. The 1st Marines was to remain in Division reserve, and the 11th -Marines reverted to parent control.[270] - - [270] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5. - -It was only about a five hour motor march from Tundong-ni to the -forward assembly area under normal road and weather conditions. But -recent rains had turned roads into bogs and fordable streams into -torrents. Bridges were weakened by the raging current in the Soyang, -and landslides blocked the road in many places. - -The 1st Marine Division was back in action again. But it would have to -fight its first battles against the rain and the mud. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -Renewal of the Attack - -_Crossing the Soyang in Flood--Light Resistance at First--Supply -Problems Cause Delay--Resumption of Division Attack--The Mounting -Problem of CAS--First Helicopter Supply Operation of History--The Fight -for Hill 749--5th Marines Attack Hill 812--The Struggle for the “Rock”_ - - -It was to a large extent a new 1st Marine Division on 27 August 1951. -Very few veterans of the Reservoir campaign were left, and even -the Marines of the hard fighting in April and May had been thinned -by casualties and rotation. Whatever the new arrivals lacked in -experience, however, they had made up as far as possible by intensive -and realistic training while the Division was in reserve. - -The new Marine zone of action, in the Punchbowl area, was as bleak and -forbidding as any expanse of terrain in Korea. Dominating the Punchbowl -from the north and blocking any movement out of it was YOKE Ridge, -looking somewhat like an alligator on the map (See Map 17). Hill 930 -represented the snout. Hill 1000 was the head, and the body extended -eastward through Hills 1026 and 924. - -Two smaller hills, 702 and 602, spread off southeast and northeast -respectively to the Soyang River and its unnamed tributary from the -west. On either side of YOKE Ridge were numerous sharp and narrow -ridges. Some of the hills were wooded with enough scrub pine to afford -concealment for outposts and bunkers. Altogether, it was an area -eminently suited to defense. - -The defenders were identified by Division G-2 as troops of the 6th -Regiment, 2d Division, II NKPA Corps. Apparently they did not lack -supporting weapons, for 3/7 positions on Hill 680 were hit by an -estimated 200 mortar and artillery rounds during daylight hours of the -30th. - -[Illustration: MAP 17 - -AREA OF 1st MAR DIV - -ACTIVITY SEPT 1951 - -FRONT LINES 30 AUG 51 ON KANSAS - -OBJECTIVE LINE HAYS] - - -_Crossing the Soyang in Flood_ - -The 7th Marines and KMC Regiment, ordered to relieve U.S. and ROK -Army units on the KANSAS Line, started their march in a downpour on -27 August. The 5th Marines (less 1st Battalion) at Inje had orders to -follow the 7th up the narrow Soyang valley. - -Typical of the wet weather difficulties were those experienced by 3/7. -Scheduled to depart early for the forward positions, the companies -struck tents. Trucks failed to arrive and they remained to eat the noon -meal, a gustatorial bonus of all food the galley crew could not carry -with them. Unfortunately, the trucks were delayed further and the men -shivered in the rain as they ate an evening meal of “C” rations. - -When the vehicles finally arrived at 2100 the rain had reached -torrential proportions. Progress was so slow over muddy roads that -it took until 0330 on the 28th to reach the CP of the 7th Marines at -Sohwari (Map 18), just southeast of the junction of the Soyang and a -tributary from the east. - -The bivouac area assigned to 3/7 for the night proved to be a foot deep -in water, and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly directed his men to catch what -sleep they could in the trucks while he and his staff attempted to -straighten out the snarled traffic situation.[271] - - [271] Sources are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug 51, 3–5; Col B. T. - Kelly’s contemporary “Notes on my Service in Korea, 14 - Apr-13 Sep 1951” (hereafter Kelly, _Notes_). - -It took the rest of the night for the 3/7 officers to walk the length -of the convoy, cutting out trucks with less essential cargo. With -only a small space available for a turn-around, the 3/7 vehicles were -ordered to back into it, unload their troops and equipment, and return -along a narrow road, which had been churned into a quagmire. - -The battalion assembly area was on the other side of the rain-swollen -Soyang. How Company and the command group managed to cross over a -waist-deep ford, but the crossing was so perilous that DUKWs were -requested for the other two rifle companies. Lieutenant Colonel Louis -C. Griffin’s 2/7 also found the river crossing an operation requiring -DUKWs. By the afternoon of the 29th all elements of the two 7th Marine -battalions were on the west bank, occupying their assigned assembly -areas. - -The relief proceeded slowly. Two KMC battalions on the left of the -7th Marines took over the zone formerly held by elements of the 2d -Infantry Division and the 8th ROK Division. The cosmopolitan character -of the Eighth Army was revealed when 2/KMC relieved the French -Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Linguistic chaos was averted -only by the best efforts of the exhausted interpreters. - -By the 30th, the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions were behind the line of -departure on Hill 755, ready to attack in the morning. The 2d Battalion -assumed responsibility for the regimental zone on the KANSAS Line. - -The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines had meanwhile completed the -relief of elements of the 8th ROK Division. On the other side of the -river Lieutenant Colonel James G. Kelly’s 1/7 had relieved units of the -ROK division on the hill mass a mile and a half north of Tonpyong (Map -17). These Marines were first to come under fire as the enemy sent over -a few mortar rounds after dark on the 29th. - -Division OpnO 22-51 directed the two assault regiments, the 7th Marines -and KMCs, to attack at 0600 the following morning and seize their -assigned positions on Corps Objective YOKE, the ridgeline running from -Hill 930 on the west through Hills 1026 and 924 on the east (Map 17). -Objective 1, the hill mass 1½ miles northeast of Tonpyong, was already -occupied by 1/7. - -The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was ordered to seize Objective 2, -generally that part of YOKE Ridge east of Hill 924. The KMC Regiment -was assigned Objective 3, consisting of Hills 924 and 1026. - -Other 1st Marine Division units had the following missions on 31 August: - - _5th Marines_--to patrol the Division zone along the KANSAS Line - and protect defensive installations; - - _1st Marines_--to remain in the rear in the Hongchon area in X - Corps reserve; - - _1st Tank Battalion_--to move up in readiness to support the - assault regiments; - - _Division Reconnaissance Company_--to continue to patrol the - Punchbowl and mop up bypassed enemy. - -Land mines were a constant menace to troop movements as the assault -regiments adjusted positions in preparation for the attack. As usual, -neglected “friendly” mines were encountered as well as those planted by -the enemy.[272] - - [272] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based - on 1stMarDiv _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep - 51; 2/7 and 3/7 _HD_, Aug and Sep 51; Kelly, _Notes_; Col - G. P. Groves, ltr of 8 Apr 58. - -[Illustration: X CORPS ZONE OF ACTION - -SEPTEMBER 51 - - FRONT LINES ON 20 SEPT 51 WERE GENERALLY ALONG HAYS LINE - -MAP 18] - - -POW information and air reports indicated a southward movement of two -to three enemy regiments with artillery and supplies. Prisoners stated -that an attack was due on 1 September, leading to the G-2 conjecture -that the enemy’s Sixth Phase Offensive might be about to start. - - -_Light Resistance at First_ - -Priority of air support on 31 August was assigned to the two KMC -battalions. They jumped off in column against light to moderate -resistance, with Hill 924 as their first objective. Mine fields gave -the KMCs more trouble at first than scattered NKPA mortar and machine -gun fire. Forward movement and maneuver were restricted as 1/KMC -passed through 3/KMC at 1445 to continue the attack against stiffening -resistance. - -On the right 3/7 also encountered light resistance in the morning which -increased as the assault troops neared the objective. The slopes of -Hill 702 proved to be heavily mined, and forward elements of 3/7 were -hit by a concentration of mortar and artillery fire. - -East of the river, on the regimental right flank, where Objective 1 had -been occupied without a fight, 1/7 supported the attack of 3/7 with -mortar fire. Both 3/7 and the KMCs were within 1,000 yards of their -objectives late in the afternoon when a halt was called for the day. -Casualties had been light, thanks in large measure to excellent air and -artillery support. - -When the attack was resumed on 1 September, 3/KMC moved through -positions of 3/7 to reach a ridgeline on the flank of the regimental -objective. While 3/KMC advanced from the northeast, 1/KMC closed in -from the southeast. Both battalions took heavy losses from enemy mines -and mortars as well as machine guns and automatic weapons fired from -hidden bunkers. The converging attack made slow but steady progress, -however, until one company of 3/KMC drove within 200 meters of the -top of Hill 924 at 1700. Even so, it took four more hours of hard -fighting to secure the objective. That evening 2/KMC was relieved of -its defensive responsibility along the KANSAS Line by 3d Battalion, 5th -Marines, enabling the KMC battalion to join in the attack. - -Throughout the day 3/7 slugged it out in the vicinity of 702 with an -NKPA battalion. Four counterattacks were launched from Hill 602, the -northeastern fork of YOKE Ridge. More than 500 men were employed in -this effort, some of them penetrating briefly into 3/7 positions. Two -air strikes, called by patrols of 1/7 from across the river, helped to -break up the main NKPA attack, and the 11th Marines (Colonel Custis -Burton, Jr.), poured in a deadly concentration of artillery fire. -Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly’s battalion continued to be engaged -until dusk. - -The tenacity of the NKPA defense was demonstrated at the expense of -the KMCs when they were driven from the top of Hill 924 by a surprise -enemy counterattack at midnight. The Korean Marines came back strongly -at daybreak and a terrific fight ensued before the North Koreans were -in turn evicted shortly before noon. As a measure of the artillery -assistance rendered, Major Gordon R. Worthington’s 1st Battalion, -11th Marines, fired 1,682 rounds of 105 ammunition in support of the -KMC’s during the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 2 September. During the -same period Lieutenant Colonel William McReynold’s 3/11 fired 1,400 -rounds in support of 3/7. The other battalions of the Marine artillery -regiment, reinforced by the 196th, 937th, and 780th Field Artillery -Battalions, USA, brought the number of rounds to a grand total of 8,400 -for this 24-hour period. - -After the securing of Hill 924, the 2d Battalion of the KMC Regiment -passed through the 1st and 3d Battalions to spearpoint the attack -west toward Hill 1026. In the zone of 3/7, an NKPA counterattack was -repulsed at 0700 on 2 September. Two hours later George Company, -supported by How Company with mortar and machine gun fire, moved out to -resume the attack on Hill 602. Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly ordered -his battalion heavy machine guns set up in battery to deliver overhead -supporting fires. - -In slightly less than two hours the Marines of 3/7 swept the crest -of Hill 602, securing Division Objective 2. Three company-size enemy -counterattacks were repulsed before the North Koreans withdrew to the -north at 1500. - -The 2d KMC Battalion fought its way to a point within 800 yards of Hill -1026 before dusk. So aggressive and persistent was the NKPA defense -that several light enemy probing attacks were launched during the night -of 2–3 September, not only against forward Marine elements but also -against the 5th Marines units on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear. -The front was where you found it. - -While 3/7 constructed emplacements and obstacles on Hill 602, the KMCs -continued their attack on the morning of 3 September toward Hill 1026. -With the extending of the 7th Marines zone to the left to decrease the -width of the KMC front, 2/7 was brought up from regimental reserve to -help cover a new sector that included Hill 924. - -The attack led by 2/KMC collided with a large-scale enemy -counterattack. It was nip and tuck for 3½ hours before the North -Koreans broke, but, by midmorning, the KMCs were in possession of -Division Objective 3 and consolidating for defense. They were not a -moment too soon in these preparations, for the enemy counterattacked at -1230 and put up a hot fight for two hours before retiring. - -This action completed the battle for Corps Objective YOKE. At 1800 on -3 September, the 1st Marine Division was in full possession of the -HAYS Line, dominating the entire northern rim of the Punchbowl (Map -18). Reports from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and 5th ROK Division, -attacking in sectors to the west, indicated that the pressure exerted -by the Marines was assisting these units. Large gains had been made on -the west side of the Punchbowl against comparatively light resistance. - -On 4 September, with all objectives consolidated, 1st Marine Division -units patrolled northward from defensive positions. Plans were being -formed for the second phase of the Division attack--the advance to -seize the next series of commanding ridgelines, 4,000 to 7,000 yards -forward of the present MLR. - -The victory in the four-day battle had not been bought cheaply. A total -of 109 Marine KIA and 494 WIA (including KMCs) was reported. NKPA -casualties for the period were 656 counted KIA and 40 prisoners. - -As evidence that the enemy had profited by the breathing spell during -the Kaesong truce talks, it was estimated that NKPA artillery fire in -the Punchbowl sector almost equalled the firepower provided by the -organic Marine artillery and the guns of attached U.S. Army units. NKPA -strength in mortars and machine guns also compared favorably with that -of Marines. - - -_Supply Problems Cause Delay_ - -Logistical shortages made it necessary for the 1st Marine Division to -call a six-day halt and build up a new reserve of artillery and mortar -ammunition. - -During the first phase of the Division attack, the main burden of -transport and supply had fallen upon three Marine units--the 1st -Ordnance Battalion (Major Harold C. Borth), the 1st Motor Transport -Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman), and the 7th -Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Cagle). The -extraordinary expenditure of artillery shells for these four days posed -a resupply problem that was aggravated by an almost impassable supply -route. The three Marine battalions had to strain every resource to meet -minimal requirements. - -Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, a U.S. Army installation manned -by elements of the Marine 1st Ordnance Battalion, was located about -five miles behind the gun positions. From this dump it was 48 miles -to Hongchon, the source of supplies for ASP 60-B. A well maintained, -two-lane dirt road led from that base to Inje, but northward it -deteriorated into a narrow, twisting trail following the Soyang valley. -Recent rains, resulting in earth slides and mudholes, had reduced the -road to such a condition that the round trip between ASP 60-B and -Hongchon took 25 hours.[273] - - [273] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 7. - -As an added complication, it was necessary to build up a 10-day reserve -of ammunition at ASP 60-B so that Division transport would be available -for lifting 2,000 rotated troops to Chunchon some time between 3 and -15 September. This meant that 50 to 60 Marine trucks must be employed -daily to haul ammunition, with the result of a drastic shortage of -motor transport for other purposes. - -Only human transport was available for supplying Marines on the firing -line. X Corps started the month of September with 20,070 Korean Service -Corps, the successor to CTC, and civilian contract laborers--the -equivalent in numbers of a U.S. Army infantry division. Even so, 14 -air drops were necessary during the month, only one of which went to a -Marine unit. This took place on 1 September, when 20 Air Force cargo -planes from Japan dropped ammunition and rations to the KMCs. A 90 -percent recovery was reported.[274] - - [274] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 41–42; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, - 5–6. - -It generally took a full day in the 1st Marine Division zone during -the first week of September for a cargador to complete the trip from -a battalion supply point to the front lines and return. This made it -necessary to assign from 150 to 250 Korean laborers to each infantry -battalion. And as the Marines advanced farther into the rugged Korean -highlands, the logistic problem was increased. - - -_Resumption of Division Attack_ - -Enemy groups moving southward into the zone of the 1st Marine -Division during the six-day lull were sighted by air observation. POW -interrogations and other G-2 sources established that the 2d NKPA -Division, II Corps, had been relieved by the 1st NKPA Division, III -Corps. Accurate 76mm fire from well-hidden guns was received by the -Marines throughout the interlude, and patrols ran into brisk mortar -fire when they approached too near to enemy bunkers on Hill 673. - -For the second time, during the night of 4–5 September, 5th Marines -units were assailed on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rear of the -7th Marines troops similarly deployed along the HAYS Line. Yet a -large 7th Marines patrol ranged forward some 2,000 yards the next -day without enemy contacts. A like result was reported by a patrol -representing almost the entire strength of the Division Reconnaissance -Company (Major Robert L. Autry) after it scoured the area north of the -Punchbowl.[275] - - [275] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based - on the following sources: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 38–53; - X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, - 8–14; 7th Mar _HD_, Sep 51; 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns of 7th - Mar, _HD_s for Sep 51. - -1st Marine Division OpnO 23-51, issued on the morning of 9 September, -called for the 7th Marines to jump off at 0300 on the 11th and attack -Objectives ABLE and BAKER--Hills 673 and 749 respectively--white -maintaining contact with the 8th ROK Division on the right. Other -Division units were given these missions: - - _1st Marines_--to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon - to Division control; to be prepared to pass through the 7th - Marines, when that regiment secured its objectives, and - continue the attack to seize Objective CHARLIE, the ridgeline - leading northwest from Hill 1052. - - _5th Marines_--to maintain one company on KANSAS line while - occupying positions in Division reserve along HAYS Line in rear - of 7th Marines. - - _KMC Regiment_--to patrol aggressively on Division left to exert - pressure on enemy defenses south and southeast of Objective - CHARLIE. - - _11th Marines_--to displace forward to support attack of the 7th - Marines. - - _Division Reconnaissance Company_--to patrol northward in the - Soyang valley as far as Hwanggi to deny the enemy this area. - -The area ahead of the 7th Marines was ideal for defense. From YOKE -Ridge the assault troops had to descend into a narrow valley formed -by a small tributary of the Soyang-gang, cross the stream, and climb -Kanmubong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of terrain -was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 980, and 1052 (Map -17). Thus the attack of the 7th Marines had as its primary purpose -the securing of initial objectives on Kanmubong Ridge that would give -access to the main NKPA defense line, some 4,000 yards to the north. - -The 7th Marines was to seize the eastern tip (Objective ABLE) of this -commanding terrain feature and “run the ridge” to Hill 749, Objective -BAKER. While Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin’s 2/7 maintained its -patrolling activities on the left, tied in with the KMCs, Lieutenant -Colonel B. T. Kelly’s 3/7 in the center and Lieutenant Colonel J. G. -Kelly’s 1/7 on the right were to attack. - -As an intermediate regimental objective on the way to Kanmubong Ridge, -the 680-meter hill directly north of B. T. Kelly’s position on Hill 602 -was assigned to his battalion. He ordered How Company to move forward -under cover of darkness and be prepared to attack at dawn. Rain and -poor visibility delayed the attempt until surprise was lost, and after -a fierce fire fight How Company was stopped halfway up the southeast -spur. - -In order to relieve the pressure, the battalion commander directed Item -Company to attack on the left up the southwest spur. This maneuver -enabled How Company to inch forward under heavy mortar and machine gun -fire to a point with 50 yards of the topographical crest. Item Company -became confused in the “fog of war” and finally wound up on How’s spur -at 1245. - -Twice the two companies made a combined assault after artillery and -mortar preparation and air strikes with napalm, rocket, and strafing -fire. Both times the North Koreans swarmed out of their bunkers to -drive the Marines halfway back to the original jump off line. It was -anybody’s fight when the two battered companies dug in at dusk. - -Across the valley to the east, J. G. Kelly’s 1/7 had no better fortune -in its attack on Hill 673. Heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire kept -the assault troops pinned down until they consolidated for the night. - -With both attacking battalions in trouble, Colonel Nickerson ordered -2/7 to advance up the narrow valley separating them. His plan called -for the reserve battalion to move under cover of darkness around the -left flank of 1/7 and into a position behind the enemy before wheeling -to the northeast to trap the North Koreans defending Hill 673. - -The maneuver succeeded brilliantly. Griffin’s troops were undetected as -they filed northward during the night, making every effort to maintain -silence. By daybreak on 12 September 2/7 had two platoons in position -behind the enemy to lead the attack.[276] - - [276] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58. - -The assault exploded with complete surprise as 2/7 swept to the crest -of Hill 673 against confused and ineffectual opposition. Griffin’s -battalion and 1/7 had the enemy between them, but the jaws of the trap -could not close in time because of NKPA mine fields. Thus 1/7 continued -to be held up on the forward approaches to Hill 673 by NKPA mortar -and small-arms fire. Grenades were the most effective weapons as J. -G. Kelly’s men slugged their way to the summit at 1415 while 2/7 was -attacking Objective BAKER, Hill 749. - -On the other side of the valley, 3/7 had seized its initial objective. -While How and Item Companies attacked up the southeast spur, where they -had been stopped the day before, George Company launched a surprise -assault up the southwest spur. This was the blow that broke the enemy’s -will to resist. George Company knocked out seven active enemy bunkers, -one by one, thus taking the pressure off the troops on the other spur. -At 1028 all three companies met on the summit. - -The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, radioed that Objective BAKER had -been secured at 1710 after a hard fight, but this report proved to -be premature. Enough NKPA troops to give the Marines a good deal of -trouble were still holding the wooded slopes of Hill 749, and it would -take the attack of a fresh battalion to dislodge them. Along the -ridgeline from Hill 673 to Hill 749, an undetermined number of enemy -soldiers had been caught between 2/7 and 1/7, and events were to prove -that they would resist as long as a man remained alive. - -Casualties of the 1st Marine Division on 11 and 12 September were 22 -KIA and 245 WIA, nearly all of them being suffered by the assault -regiment. Enemy losses included 30 counted KIA and 22 prisoners. - - -_The Mounting Problem of CAS_ - -With the Division in reserve from 15 July until the latter part of -August, close air support (CAS) was not a vital problem; however, -upon return to the Punchbowl area the situation became serious. The -difficulties arose from the time lag between the request for air -support to the time the planes arrived over target. The 1st Marine -Aircraft Wing operating under the control of the Fifth Air Force was -busily employed on interdiction missions. On 30 August, a tactical air -observer, spotting what appeared to be a division of NKPA troops moving -toward the Marines, hurriedly flashed back a request for a multi-plane -strike. The enemy troops were beyond artillery range, but they were -bunched up--a good target for a concentrated air strike. It was more -than three hours later that four fighter bombers arrived on the scene; -by that time, the enemy formation had dispersed and the desired number -of casualties could not be inflicted.[277] - - [277] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1) - “Observations on Close Air Support for the 1st Marine - Division during 5–23 September 1951.” - -The reason for this lack of timely air support was apparent. Most -of the UN air power was being funneled into Operation STRANGLE, the -interdiction operation designed to cut off the enemy’s vehicular and -rail traffic in the narrow waist of North Korea. With the emphasis on -air interdiction, close air support sorties were limited to only 96 per -day for the entire Eighth Army.[278] The 1st Marine Division received -only a proportionate share. - - [278] _PacFlt interim Rpt_ No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv - _SAR_, Jun 51. - -Marine close air support was needed because of the enemy’s determined -resistance to the Division’s attack. The Reds hurled frequent night -counterattacks and pounded the Marine positions with artillery and -mortars hidden in the precipitous Punchbowl area. At one time it was -estimated that the enemy was using 92 pieces of artillery. The Marines -had only 72 field pieces, but in one 24-hour period they expended more -than 11,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on a 6,000-yard frontage. -The enemy emplacements, hewn out of solid rock, were hard to knock out. - -To support the hard-working infantrymen, Marine Aircraft Group 12 -(MAG-12) had moved VMF-214 and VMF-312 from the Pusan area to K-18, -an airfield on the east coast at Kangnung. By moving closer to the -Division area, planes were able to extend their time over the target -area and render more effective support to the infantry. Also, Marine -Air Support Radar Team One (MASRT-1) was sent to Korea and established -positions to support the Division. Using its support radar the team -began to evaluate its capability of guiding unseen fighter-bombers at -night or under conditions of poor visibility.[279] - - [279] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–18; Chap. 10, - 10–12, Chap. 15, 15–20, 60–61; Gen G. C. Thomas interv, - 21 Jan 59. - -Even though the Corsairs at K-18 were less than 50 miles from the 1st -Marine Division, very few were available to the Marines. Operation -STRANGLE, in full swing, was not achieving the desired results. Since -sightings of enemy vehicles were increasing, more and more Marine and -Navy air sorties were channeled into interdiction. During 18 days of -rugged fighting from 3 to 21 September, forward air controllers made -182 tactical air requests. Fighter-bombers were provided on 127 of -these requests; however, in only 24 instances did the planes arrive -when needed. The average delay time in getting CAS in response to -requests during September was slightly less than two hours, but in 49 -cases the planes were more than two hours late.[280] As a consequence, -General Thomas reported, many of the 1,621 casualties suffered by the -1st Marine Division during the hard fighting in September were due -to inadequate close air support. Furthermore, he said, the tactical -capabilities of his battalions were strongly restricted. - - [280] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–14. - -During the planning of attacks, infantry commanders almost always -desired and requested close air support. It was also desirable to have -planes on station overhead should an immediate CAS need arise, for the -lack of an air strike when needed could jeopardize success. However, -with restricted availability of CAS planes due to participation in -STRANGLE, many times desired air cover was not to be had. Attacks under -those circumstances were often costly. - - -_First Helicopter Supply Operation of History_ - -The relief of the three battalions of the 7th Marines by their -corresponding numbers of Colonel Thomas A. Wornham’s 1st Marines took -place during the night of 12–13 September. By daybreak 3/1 and 1/1 -had assumed responsibility for the zones of 3/7 and 1/7, which were -on their way to Division reserve at Wontong-ni at the junction of the -Inje and Kansong roads. In the center, however, 2/1 could not complete -the relief of 2/7. Not only was that battalion engaged most of the day -with the enemy, but the units were separated--one company south of Hill -749 being unable to join the other two companies on separate spurs -northwest of that height. All three were under persistent NKPA mortar -and 76mm fire.[281] - - [281] Sources for this section are as follows: EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, - Sep 51, 35–53; X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv - _HD_, Sep 51, 10–16; 1st Marines _HD_, Sep 51; 1/1, 2/1, - and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51; Class “C” Rpt, _Employment of - Assault Helicopters_, 1–6; Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the - Sky_ (New York, 1954), 159–162, (hereafter _Cavalry of - the Sky_). - -The attack of the 1st Marines, originally scheduled for 0500 on 13 -September, had been changed to 0900 by Division orders. One reason -for the postponement was the serious shortage of ammunition and other -supplies after the urgent demands of the last two days. Another reason -was the inability of VMO-6 helicopters, lifting two wounded men at -most, to cope with the mounting casualty lists. Enemy interdiction -of roads added in several instances to the complications of a major -logistical problem, particularly in the zone of Lieutenant Colonel -Franklin B. Nihart’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. - -The hour had struck for HMR-161, and the world’s first large-scale -helicopter supply operation in a combat zone would soon be under way. -It was not the development of a day. On the contrary, its roots went -all the way back to 1945, when the atomic bomb of Hiroshima rendered -obsolescent in 10 seconds a system of amphibious assault tactics that -had been 10 years in the making. Obviously, the concentrations of -transports, warships, and aircraft carriers that had made possible the -Saipan and Iwo Jima landings would be sitting ducks for an enemy armed -with atomic weapons. - -The problem was left on the doorstep of the Marine Corps Schools, which -had reared the Fleet Marine Force from infancy to maturity during the -1930’s. A Special Board and Secretariat were appointed for studies. -They assigned two general missions to Marine Helicopter Experimental -Squadron 1 (HMX-1), organized late in 1947 before the first rotary-wing -aircraft had been delivered. These missions were: - - (1) Develop techniques and tactics in connection with the - movement of assault troops by helicopter in amphibious operations; - - (2) Evaluate a small helicopter as a replacement for the present - OY type aircraft to be used for gunfire spotting, observation, - and liaison missions in connection with amphibious operation.[282] - - [282] CMC ltr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47. - -The second mission resulted in the small Sikorsky and Bell helicopters -of VMO-6 which landed in Korea with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade -in August 1950. Although it was originally believed that rotary wing -aircraft might replace the OYs, combat experience soon demonstrated -that the best results were obtained by retaining both types in fairly -equal numbers. - -Landing exercises under simulated combat conditions were conducted -by HMX-1 in fulfillment of the first mission. At first the squadron -had only three-place helicopters. Later, when the usefulness of the -helicopter was fully realized, even the new 10-place “choppers” were -never available in sufficient numbers. The capacity designations of -these machines, however, were more ideal than real, for the helicopters -could lift only four to six men in addition to the pilot, copilot, -and crewman. Despite such drawbacks, HMX-1 developed tactical and -logistical techniques for helicopter landings to be made from widely -dispersed carriers against an enemy using atomic weapons. - -Belated deliveries of aircraft delayed the commissioning of the world’s -first transport helicopter squadron, HMR-161, until 15 January 1951 -at El Toro. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring was designated the -commanding officer and Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell the -executive officer. - -Nearly three months passed before the first three transport -helicopters arrived. The squadron was gradually built up to a -strength of 43 officers and 244 enlisted men with a full complement -of 15 HRS-1 helicopters. These Sikorsky aircraft, designed to -Marine specifications, were simply an enlarged three-place HO3S in -configuration, with a similar main rotor and vertical tail rotor. About -62 feet long with maximum extension of rotor blades, the HRS-1 was -11½ feet wide with the blades folded. Following are some of the other -statistics: - -Gross weight at sea level, 7,000 pounds; cruising speed, 60 knots; -payload at sea level, 1,420 pounds; troop-lifting capacity, four to -six men with full combat equipment or three to five casualties in -litters.[283] Capabilities varied, of course, according to such factors -as altitude, temperature, and pilot experience. - - [283] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 157. - -Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 arrived in Korea on the last -day of August, and by the 10th of September it had moved up to the -front, sharing Airfield X-83 (see Map 18) with VMO-6.[284] The 11th -was devoted to reconnaissance flights in search of landing sites, and -on the 12th the transport squadron was ready for its first combat -mission. A new means of logistical and tactical support that was to -revolutionize operations and create front page headlines had arrived in -Korea. - - [284] Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an “X” designation and - fields in the “K” category were major installations. - Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated - “A.” - -Prior to the squadron’s arrival, the Division chief of staff, Colonel -Victor H. Krulak, had held numerous planning conferences with Division -staff officers, and preparations for the employment of HMR-161 had -made noteworthy progress. Then General Thomas ordered executed the -first operation of the squadron under combat conditions, and the major -logistical problem of moving supplies and evacuating casualties was -well on the way to being solved. At 1600 on 13 September 1951--a date -that would have historical significance--Operation WINDMILL I was set -in motion. - -Lieutenant Colonel Herring had attended the final planning conference -at Division headquarters at 0830 on the 13th, and he was told that the -operation would involve a lift of one day’s supplies to 2/1 over a -distance of seven miles. The commanding officer of 2/1 was to select -suitable landing points and the commanding officer of 1st Shore Party -Battalion had the responsibility of providing support teams to operate -at the embarkation and landing points.[285] - - [285] LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61. - -Only two days had been available for training and rehearsals, but not -a minute was wasted. All morning on the 13th the embarkation point -section separated the supplies into balanced loads of about 800 pounds -per helicopter. Loading commenced at 1520. Half an hour later, seven -aircraft were ready to depart while four others went ahead to carry the -landing point section to the previously reconnoitered site. - -The route followed the valleys as much as possible, so that the -helicopters were in defilade most of the way. Smoke was laid down by -the 11th Marines for concealment. - -The landing point section managed in 20 minutes to clear an area of -20 × 40 feet (later enlarged to 100 × 100 feet) and mark it with -fluorescent panels. At 1610 the first HRS-1 hovered with cargo nets -suspended from a hook released by manual control. A few minutes later -it took off with five walking wounded and two litter cases. - -Each helicopter carried out as many casualties as possible, depending -on the amount of gasoline in the fuel tanks. Only 30 minutes passed -from the time one Marine was wounded and the time of his arrival at a -hospital clearing station 17 miles behind the firing line. - -Radio provided communications between helicopters in flight, HMR-161 -headquarters, 2/1 CP, and the Shore Party team at the landing site. - -Fifteen aircraft were employed for one hour, three for two hours, and -one for two hours and 45 minutes--a total of 28 flights in over-all -time of 2½ hours. The helicopters landed at intervals of two minutes -and took off as soon as the landing point section could put the -casualties aboard. And though an altitude of 2,100 feet restricted -loads, 18,848 pounds of cargo had been lifted into the area and 74 -casualties evacuated when the last “chopper” returned to X-83 at 1840. - -To even the most pessimistic observer Operation WINDMILL I was a -complete success, so successful that a similar operation, WINDMILL II -was conducted on the 19th. Two days later the first helicopter lift of -combat troops was completed. A new era of military transport had dawned. - - -_The Fight for Hill 749_ - -Although 2/1 alone had 240 Korean cargadores attached, the 7½ tons of -helicopter-borne supplies, largely ammunition, were vitally needed -by the two assault battalions of the 1st Marines. After relieving -Fox Company of 2/7 south of Hill 749 at 1100 on the 13th, Lieutenant -Colonel Nihart’s 2/1 jumped off to the attack an hour later. Stiff -opposition was encountered from the beginning. The relief of the -remaining two companies of 2/7 was complicated by the fact that they -were some 400 yards from the position reported, on the reverse slope of -Hill 749. Throughout the day these Marines were heavily engaged with -the enemy.[286] - - [286] Sources for this section are the same as for the previous - section except when otherwise noted. - -On the left of 2/1, the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La -Hue) could not make much progress toward its regimental objective, Hill -751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749. A second attack of 2/1 -at 1500 drove to the summit of that height after fierce fighting with -small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. There was still much -fighting to be done before the entire objective would be secured since -many enemy bunkers hidden among the trees remained to be neutralized. - -At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7 -companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took -until 2025 for Nihart’s men to complete the relief after fighting for -every foot of ground. - -Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the -fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because -of the danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant -Colonel Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds -and Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly -H. Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six -enemy bunkers. The 4.2″ mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 28 WP -rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel -John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing mine fields. - -Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night, -and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300 -enemy. Colonel Wornham’s regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14 -September. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward -against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and -automatic weapons fire. - -NKPA resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749, -where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took -constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling -3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat -trajectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were -directed against NKPA bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029 -rounds. - -The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 48 -hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action took -a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The principal -fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of -Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a heavy -artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was -stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery -coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. The -assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th -Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective BAKER yet -remained to be secured. - -The Marines could not help paying reluctant tribute to the skill as -well as obstinacy of the NKPA defense. Enemy bunkers were so stoutly -constructed that the North Koreans did not hesitate to direct well -aimed mortar fire on their own positions when the Marines closed in for -the final attack. - -NKPA fields of fire were laid out for the utmost effect. Marines with -recent memories of college football referred to the enemy’s effective -use of terrain as the “North Korean T Formation.” On Hill 749, for -example, the main ridgeline leading to the summit was crossed by -another wooded ridgeline at right angles. Attackers fighting their way -up the leg of the “T” came under deadly crossfire from the head of the -imaginary letter--a transverse ridgeline bristling with mortars and -machine guns positioned in bunkers. - -In accordance with Division OpnO 25-51, the 5th Marines (Colonel -Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on 15 September in -preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the attack. -The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in turn would relieve 1/1 (Major Edgar -F. Carney, Jr.), so that it could pass through 2/1 and carry on the -assault to complete the securing of Hill 749. - -The KMCs and Division Recon Company were to relieve the 5th Marines of -responsibility for the HAYS Line, while the 7th Marines remained in -reserve at Wontong-ni. - -The comparative quiet of the 15th was shattered a minute after midnight -when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 2/1 off Hill -749. The NKPA hurricane barrage that preceded the attempt, according -to the Division report, “reached an intensity that was estimated to -surpass that of any barrage yet encountered by the 1st Marine Division -in Korea.”[287] - - [287] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–20. - -The thinned companies of 2/1 took a frightful pounding from 76mm, -105mm, and 122mm artillery supplemented by 82mm and 120mm mortars. -Bugles and whistles were the signal for the onslaught. It was stopped -by weary Marines who demonstrated at NKPA expense that they, too, could -put up a resolute defensive fight. - -Wave after wave of attackers dashed itself at the thinned Marine -platoons, only to shatter against a resistance that could be bent -but not broken. The fight was noteworthy for examples of individual -valor. When one of the forward Marine platoons was compelled to give -ground slowly, Corporal Joseph Vittori of Fox Company rushed through -the withdrawing troops to lead a successful local counterattack. As -the all-night fight continued, “he leaped from one foxhole to another, -covering each foxhole in turn as casualties continued to mount, manning -a machine gun when the gunner was struck down and making repeated trips -through the heaviest shell fire to replenish ammunition.”[288] - - [288] Jane Blakeney, ed., _Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps, - 1861–1955_ (Washington, 1957), Joseph Vittori Medal of - Honor Citation, 45. - -Vittori was mortally wounded during the last few minutes of the -fight, thus becoming the second Marine of 2/1 within a 48-hour period -to win the Medal of Honor. His predecessor was Pfc Edward Gomez of -Easy Company. When an enemy grenade landed in the midst of his squad -on 14 September, he “unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and, -diving into the ditch with the deadly missile, absorbed the shattering -violence of the explosion in his own body.”[289] - - [289] _Ibid._, Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38. - -Not until 0400 on the 16th did the enemy waves of attack subside on -Hill 749. NKPA strength was estimated at a regiment. A combined assault -by an estimated 150 enemy on 3/1 positions to the west in the vicinity -of Hill 751 was repulsed shortly after midnight, as were three lesser -efforts during the early morning hours of the 16th. - -When the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved out at 0830 to pass through -2/1 and continue the fight, it was the first day of command for -Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.[290] The passage of lines was slowed -by enemy mortar fire, and NKPA resistance stiffened as 1/1 attacked -along the ridgeline leading toward Hill 749. At 1800, after a hard -day’s fighting, Objective BAKER was occupied and defensive positions -were organized for the night. - - [290] On 14 September, LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr., the previous - commanding officer of 1/1, was severely wounded while - reconnoitering forward positions. He was evacuated, - and the executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr., - commanded until LtCol John E. Gorman assumed command at - noon on the 16th. - -Thus was the attack of the 1st Marines terminated. Around Hill 751, 3/1 -remained in control. The regiment’s other two battalions, 1/1 and 2/1, -held a defensive line about 1,500 yards long on both sides of Hill 749. - -Hill 749 had finally been secured. A number of mutually supporting -hidden enemy bunkers had been knocked out in a ruthless battle of -extermination, and veterans of the World War II Pacific conflict were -reminded of occasions when Japanese resistance flared up in similar -fashion after ground was thought to be secure. - -Casualties of the 1st Marine Division during the four-day fight for -Hill 749, most of them suffered by the attacking regiment, were 90 KIA, -714 WIA, and 1 MIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 771 counted -KIA (although more than twice that number were estimated KIA) and 81 -prisoners. - - -_5th Marines Attack Hill 812_ - -Division OpnO 25-51 assigned the 5th Marines the mission of passing -through 3/1 in the vicinity of Hill 751 and attacking to secure -Objective DOG, the bare, brown hill mass which loomed approximately -1,000 yards ahead. The last few hundred yards were certain to be long -ones, for the main east-west ridgeline leading to Hill 812 was crossed -by a north-south ridgeline--the leg and head of another “T” formation. -Again, as on Hill 749, the attackers had to fight their way through a -vicious crossfire. - -Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff’s 2/5 on the right had the main -effort. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. -Kennedy) was to advance on Stiff’s left with the mission of supporting -his attack on Objective DOG, prepared to seize Hill 980 on order. -Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston’s 1/5 remained in regimental -reserve.[291] - - [291] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified are - as follows: 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 19–23; 5thMar _HD_, - Sep 51, 14–19; 1st, 2d, and 3dBn, 5th Mar, _HD_, Sep - 51; LtCol Houston Stiff, interv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P. - Averill, “Final Objective,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, vol. - 40, no. 8 (Aug 56), 10–16. - -Fox Company spearheaded the 2/5 attack by moving initially up the low -ground between Hill 673 on the right hand and 680 on the left. Owing to -delays in completing the relief of 1st Marines elements, it was early -afternoon on 16 September before the assault got underway. Progress was -slow against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, and a halt came at 1700 -for regrouping and evacuation of casualties. - -Dog Company, in support on the ridge to the left, sighted troops -approaching the objective and requested that the positions of the -assault company be identified. In order to pinpoint the locations, -a white phosphorous grenade was used as a mark. It attracted the -attention of aircraft summoned by 3/5 against Hill 980 (Map 17), from -which fire had been received. The planes, assuming that another target -had been designated, attacked the forward platoons of Fox Company with -napalm and machine guns. By a miracle, recognition panels were put out -before a single casualty resulted, but the men found it a harrowing -experience. - -Darkness fell before the attack could be resumed, and Fox Company -pulled back along the ridgeline to set up a perimeter defense and -evacuate the wounded. The night passed without enemy action. Bright -moonlight made for unusual visibility which discouraged enemy attacks -and permitted the Marine assault platoons more sleep than might -otherwise have been expected. - -Regimental orders called for 2/5 to resume the attack at 0400 on the -17th, supported by the fires of 3/5, while 1/5 continued in reserve. -Fox Company of 2/5 had some difficulty in orienting itself after the -confusion of the night before and was delayed until 0700 in jumping -off. This proved to be a stroke of luck, for dawn gave the Marines a -good view of unsuspecting enemy troops eating breakfast and making -ready for the day’s fighting. Fox Company called artillery on them with -good effect. - -Surprise gave the attack an opening advantage and rapid progress was -made at first along the main ridgeline leading west to Hill 812. Then -Fox Company was stopped by the crossfire from the head of the “T.” Easy -Company passed through at 0830 to continue the assault, reinforced by a -platoon of Fox Company that had become Separated from its parent unit, -although it kept in touch by radio. - -An air strike was called but did not materialize. After waiting for -it in vain, Easy Company drove toward the summit with the support of -artillery and mortars. - -Two hours after passing through Fox Company, the attackers had advanced -only about a hundred yards against the NKPA crossfire. At 1100, -Lieutenant Colonel Stiff ordered an all-out drive for the objective, -following a preliminary barrage of everything that could be thrown -at the enemy--artillery, 75mm recoilless, rockets, and 81mm and 4.2″ -mortars. As soon as the bombardment lifted, Easy Company was to drive -straight ahead along the ridgeline while the 2d Platoon of Fox Company -made a flank attack. - -This maneuver turned the trick. The blow on the flank took the enemy -by surprise, and in just 36 minutes the assault troops were on the -summit after a hard fight at close quarters with automatic weapons and -grenades. Since regimental orders had specified “before nightfall,” -Objective DOG had been seized ahead of schedule. - -With scarcely a pause, Easy Company continued along the ridgeline -leading west from Hill 812 toward Hill 980. Remarkably fast progress -was made against an enemy who appeared to be thrown off balance. -Permission was asked to seize Hill 980. The regimental commander -refused because of instructions from Division to the effect that this -position could not be defended while the enemy remained in possession -of Hill 1052, the key terrain feature. Easy Company was directed to -withdraw 600 yards toward Hill 812. - -Late in the evening of 17 September, Colonel Weede directed his two -assault battalions to consolidate on the best ground in their present -locations and prepare to hold a defensive line. - -When the brakes were put on the attack, 3/5 was strung out over a wide -area to the north of Hill 751. This battalion was not tied in with 2/5, -which occupied positions coordinated for the defense of Hill 812--Easy -Company to the west, on the ridgeline leading to 980; Dog and Weapons -Company to the south, protecting the left flank; and Fox Company to the -east. - -Both Easy and Fox Companies were under fire from Hills 980 and 1052, -and daytime movement on 812 was restricted to the northern slope. Even -so, sniping shots from well aimed North Korean 76mm mountain guns -inflicted a number of casualties. - - -_The Struggle for the “Rock”_ - -An abrupt change in the enemy’s strategy became evident throughout -these September operations. Where he had previously contented himself -with an elastic defense, every position was now bitterly fought for and -held to the last man. When it was lost, counterattacks were launched in -efforts to regain it. - -One of these attempts hit the western outpost of 2/5’s Easy Company at -0430 on 18 September, compelling the Marines to give ground. A second -counterattack at 0840 was repulsed. Enemy fire from Hills 980 and 1042 -continued all day long, and Colonel Stiff’s battalion suffered most -of the 16 KIA and 98 WIA casualties reported by the Division for 18 -September. - -The night of 18–19 September passed in comparative quiet, but at -daylight the enemy on Hills 980 and 1052 was still looking down the -throats of the 2/5 Marines. None of the participants will ever forget -a landmark known simply as “the Rock”--a huge granite knob athwart the -ridgeline approximately 700 yards west of Hill 812. Only 12 feet high, -its location made it visible from afar. The Marines outposted the top -and eastern side, while the enemy held tenaciously to the western side. -Along the northern slope of the ridge leading west to the Rock were the -only positions affording protection to the dug-in forward elements of -the battalion. - -The need for fortification materials such as sand bags, barbed wire, -and mines aggravated the already serious supply problems of 2/5. -A request for helicopter support was sent at 1100 on the 19th and -approved immediately by General Thomas. Loading commenced early the -same afternoon, and Operation WINDMILL II was launched. A total of -12,180 pounds were lifted by 10 HRS-1 aircraft in 16 flights during the -overall time of one hour.[292] - - [292] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162. - -Again, on 19 September, 2/5 incurred most of the casualties reported -by the Division. During the day 1/5, after relieving the 1st and 2d -Battalions of the 1st Marines, moved up on the right of 2/5 to occupy a -defensive line stretching two miles east along the ridge almost to the -Soyang-gang. - -NKPA action was confined to incessant long-range fire during the -daylight hours of the 19th, but at 0315 the following morning the -enemy made a desperate effort to retake Hill 812. After a brief but -intense mortar and artillery barrage, North Koreans in at least company -strength came pouring around the northern side of the Rock to attack -with grenades and burp guns at close range. The left platoon of Easy -Company counterattacked but was pushed back by superior numbers to -positions on the left flank of the hill. - -The enemy immediately took possession of evacuated ground which enabled -him to fire into the front lines of Easy Company. At 0500 another -Marine counterattack began, with Easy Company making a frontal assault -and the 2d Platoon of Fox Company striking the enemy flank. It was -the same platoon that had delivered the flank attack resulting in the -capture of Hill 812. Again 2/Fox struck the decisive blow with grenades -and automatic weapons. The surprise was too much for enemy troops who -hastened back to their own side of the Rock, leaving 60 counted dead -behind.[293] - - [293] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded - during the three-day attack were incurred for the must - part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular. - Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA - (265 counted) and 113 prisoners. - -This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three Marine -regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the KMC Regiment -patrolled aggressively on the Division left flank. Three of the four -Division objectives had been secured after savage fights, but Objective -CHARLIE (the ridgeline northwest of Hill 1052 in the KMC zone) had yet -to be attacked when Division OpnO 26-51 put an abrupt stop to offensive -movement. - -Not only was the fight west of Hill 812 the last action of the 1st -Marine Division’s nine-day battle; it was the last action of mobility -for Marines in Korea. As time went on, it would become more and more -apparent that 20 September 1951 dated a turning point in the Korean -conflict. On that day the warfare of movement came to an end, and the -warfare of position began. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -The New Warfare of Position - -_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units--Statement by General Van Fleet--Hill -854 Secured by 3/1--Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884--Helicopter -Operation_ BLACKBIRD--_“To Organize, Construct, and Defend”--Marine -Operations of November 1951--The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_ - - -Two and a half weeks of hard fighting had taken place along the X Corps -front when General James A. Van Fleet paid a visit on 16 September -1951. The commanding general of EUSAK wished to inspect the operations -and determine the morale of the 1st Marine Division and 2d Infantry -Division, both of which had suffered heavy casualties. He found the -morale of these X Corps units good and had no adverse criticisms of -their operations. While on this tour of inspection, however, he issued -the following three directives to X Corps: - - (1) That replacements would be integrated into units only when - the battalion or larger-sized unit to which they were assigned - was in reserve; - - (2) that certain ‘choke points’ [General Van Fleet pointed - out the locations on the map] be interdicted to prevent enemy - reinforcements or withdrawals through these points; - - (3) _that the Corps Commander firm up his line by 20 September - and to plan no further offensives after that date_, as it was - unprofitable to continue the bitter operation.[294] - - [294] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47. Other sources for this - chapter are comments and criticisms by the following - officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Marines. Ranks in - each instance are those held at the time of interview or - correspondence. - - General J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas, - Lieutenant General J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H. - Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels G. P. Groves, - B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H. Tinsley, F. B. - Nihart, G. D. Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, J. F. Stamm, F. P. - Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. Edwards, J. G. - Kelly; Major R. L. Autry. - -[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS - -20 SEPTEMBER 1951 - -MAP 19] - -Italics have been added to emphasize the importance of 20 September -1951 as the turning point when a warfare of position replaced a warfare -of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the conflict in -Korea. There are few dates as important in the entire history of the -war. - -General Van Fleet reiterated his instructions on the 18th in a -confirming directive to the effect that X Corps continue making limited -attacks “until 20 September, after which ... units were to firm up the -existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it.”[295] - - [295] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 53. - - -_Sectors of Major_ EUSAK _Units_ - -At this turning point the Eighth Army had 14 divisions from four corps -committed along a 125-mile front across the peninsula. These units were -distributed (Map 19) as follows: - - -U.S. I CORPS - - _ROK 1st Division_ holding the left anchor in the Munsan-ni area - and controlling the 5th KMC Battalion on the Kimpo Peninsula; - - _British 1st Commonwealth Division_ across the river Imjin to the - northeast; - - _U.S. 1st Cavalry Division_ (Greek and Thai Battalions attached) - still farther to the northeast in the Yonchon area; - - _U.S. 3rd Infantry Division_ (Belgian Battalion and Philippine - 20th BCT attached) having the responsibility for the vital - Chorwon area; - - -U.S. IX CORPS - - _U.S. 25th Infantry Division_ (Turkish Brigade attached) - defending the area west of Kumhwa; - - _ROK 2d Division_ holding a sector east of Kumhwa; - - _U.S. 7th Infantry Division_ (Ethiopian Battalion attached) on - the right; - - _ROK 6th Division_ with a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan - River, the Corps boundary; - - _U.S. 24th Infantry Division_ (Colombian Battalion attached) in - Corps reserve south of Hwachon; - - -U.S. X CORPS - - _ROK 8th Division_ on the left flank; - - _U.S. 2d Infantry Division_ (French and Netherlands Battalions - attached) in left-central portion of Corps front; - - _ROK 5th Division_ occupying a narrow sector to the east; - - _U.S. 1st Marine Division_ holding eastern portion of the Corps - sector; - - -ROK I CORPS - - _ROK 11th Division_ responsible for left of the Corps front; - - _ROK Capitol Division_ holding the line eastward to the Sea of - Japan; - - _ROK 3d Division_ in reserve at Yangyang for a period of - training.[296] - - [296] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Oct 31, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv _HD_, - Sep 51, 3. - - -Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps -front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical -sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended its -line eastward to relieve the 8th ROK Division on the extreme right of -the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Division -on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 2d Infantry -Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines. - - -_Statement by General Van Fleet_ - -“Theirs not to reason why” could never have been written about American -fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have always taken -a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical decisions -governing their operations. This applies with particular force to the -Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of operations above -the division level. - -As if in direct reply to unspoken questions, the commanding general of -the Eighth Army made a statement on 30 September explaining the purpose -of his strategy. “My basic mission during the past four months,” he -said, “has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of Eighth Army -will not be destroyed.... Each loaded enemy weapon was a definite -threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we knock out as many -of those weapons as we could find....” - -“In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula,” continued -General Van Fleet, “we have taken many casualties.... It was mandatory -that we control the high ground features, so that we could look down -the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform our task of -destruction.... In seizing these hills we lost men, but in losing a -comparative few we saved other thousands.” - -Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by UN ground forces -alone from 25 May to 25 September, were announced as 188,237 by the -EUSAK commander. “As we open our autumn campaign,” he added, “the -enemy potential along the front line has been sharply reduced by our -hill-hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea are not liquidated -but they are badly crippled.”[297] - - [297] _Ibid._, 29–30. - -Even so, EUSAK G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 1951 with -more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and available -as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one NKPA corps were -capable of reinforcing the units on the MLR or participating in an -offensive. The enemy also had an estimated 7,000 men in guerrilla -forces behind the UN lines.[298] - - [298] _Ibid._, 7–9 and Plate No. 4. - -The maximum strength of UN forces in Korea during October was 607,300. -This total included 236,871 U.S. Army troops, 21,020 Fifth Air Force -personnel, 30,913 U.S. Marines (including 5,386 officers and men of the -1st Marine Aircraft Wing), 286,000 men in ROK units, and 32,172 Allied -troops.[299] - - [299] _Ibid._, 5–6, and Plate No. 1. - -Although it might appear that the opposing forces were about equal, -it must be remembered that well over one-fourth of the UN troops were -engaged in administrative or maintenance duties behind the front. Thus -the Communists had a numerical advantage of at least four to three on -the firing line. This was not at all unusual, since they had enjoyed a -preponderance in manpower from the beginning. - - -_Hill 854 Secured by 3/1_ - -In accordance with EUSAK instructions, X Corps OI-235 directed the 1st -Marine Division to organize and construct defensive positions after -relieving the 8th ROK Division on the right and taking over its sector. -On the Corps boundary, elements of the 11th ROK Division, I ROK Corps, -were to be relieved on Hill 884 (Map 20). This meant the addition of -some 9,000 yards to the Marine front, making a total of about 22,800 -yards or more than 13 miles. - -First Marine Division OpnO 27-51, issued on 18 September, relayed the -X Corps directions. It also called for such offensive action as might -be necessary to complete the securing of Hill 854, in the sector of -the 8th ROK Division, if not in friendly hands at the time of the -relief.[300] - - [300] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3. - -That the enemy had put up a desperate fight to hold this position -is indicated by the EUSAK report for 15–16 September: “The ROK 8th -Division, employing all three regiments, attacked against heavy and -stubborn resistance to wrest Hill 854 from the three battalions of -North Koreans who held the position. The ROK 21st Regiment forced one -of these battalions to withdraw and occupied a part of the hill, but -at the close of the day were engaged in heavy hand-to-hand fighting to -retain the position.”[301] - - [301] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Sep 51, 47. - -On 20 September, after three weeks of continual combat, the major units -of the 1st Marine Division were disposed from left to right (Map 20) as -follows: - -1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dae Shik, commanding; Colonel Walter N. -Flournoy, senior adviser) occupying the HAYS line on the left flank and -patrolling vigorously to the north; - -5th Marines (Colonel Richard G. Weede) holding a wide sector in the -center, with Hill 812 as the principal terrain feature; - -1st Marines (Colonel Thomas A. Wornham) in process of extending -eastward to the Corps boundary just beyond Hill 884; - -7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Wermuth) in Division reserve at -Wontong-ni.[302] - - [302] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 3–4, 18–22. - -Division OpnO 27-51 designated the 1st Marines to relieve the ROKs -on Hill 854 and complete the seizure of that terrain feature, if -necessary. As a preliminary, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines -(Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston) took over the front of the 1st -Marines on the HAYS line. This enabled 1/1 and 3/1 to enlarge the -Division sector by side-slipping to the east while Lieutenant Colonel -Franklin B. Nihart’s 2/1 went into immediate reserve just behind the -main line of resistance.[303] - - [303] The balance of this section is based on the 1stMarDiv - _HD_, Sep 51, 18–24, and on 1/1 and 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51. - -The 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E. -Gorman) relieved two battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment in the Hill -854 area. No opposition from the enemy was encountered, but the -Marines suffered 11 casualties from mines as a consequence of incorrect -charts supplied by the ROKs. - -[Illustration: 1st MARINE DIVISION ZONE OF ACTION SITUATION ON 20 -SEPT 51 - -MAP 20] - -By this time it had become an open question whether “friendly” mines -did more harm to friend or foe. Certain it was, at any rate, that the -prevailing system--or lack of system--resulted in Marine casualties -during nearly every offensive operation in zones where the action -shifted back and forth. - -Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La Hue’s 3/1 relieved two battalions of -the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the ROKs had fought their way to the -summit of Hill 854, the ridgeline to the southwest remained in the -enemy’s hands. An attack by 3/1 was planned for 1530 on 20 September, -supported by artillery and an air strike. Delays in the arrival of the -planes caused a postponement until 1720. How Company jumped off and had -advanced 50 yards when a man was killed and another wounded by mines. -The attack was called off at dusk so that the ROKs could remove the -explosives they had planted. - -Air support was requested for 0700 on the morning of the 21st, but it -was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived for a strike directed by -an observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air controller. At 1220, -following a 10-minute artillery preparation, How Company spearpointed -a battalion attack which met stiff resistance. Another air strike was -requested but did not materialize. The assault continued with mortar -and artillery support until 1745, when How Company reported the ridge -line secured. - -Casualties of 3/1 for the two days were nine KIA and 55 WIA. Enemy -losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated KIA, 225 estimated WIA, -and 29 prisoners.[304] - - [304] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1 - historical diaries for September 1951. - -“A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within the -battalion sector,” the 3/1 report for the 23d concluded, “most of these -being U.S. types which were placed by ROK troops, with only a few enemy -mines scattered in the central portion of the sector.”[305] - - [305] 3/1 _HD_, Sep 51, 8. - - -_Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884_ - -Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines to -extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of the -11th Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances this -would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving troops -merely to climb Hill 884 (Map 20), The position was accessible only on -foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of cargadores. - -Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a -reconnaissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas, -commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission to -the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop lift by -helicopter. - -He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been -undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft. -Large-scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage. - -Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, commanding officer of HMR-101, -had but 48 hours for preparation. He and his executive officer, -Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell, worked out a tactical and -loading plan with the commanding officer of Recon Company, Major -Ephraim Kirby-Smith, and the acting Division Embarkation Officer, First -Lieutenant Richard C. Higgs.[306] - - [306] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are - the following: DivReconCo _HD_, 1stShorePartyBn _HD_, - HMR-161 _HD_, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of - Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 162–165. - -An air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two acceptable -locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a -sheer drop on two sides. About 100 yards apart and some 300 feet below -the topographical crest, each could be cleared sufficiently for the -landing of a single aircraft. - -Major Kirby-Smith decided on the order in which troops of his company -and attached units would be landed. The assignment and loading -tables were completed on 20 September in time for a rehearsal. All -participants were instructed as to their team numbers and embarkation -points. - -H-Hour of Operation SUMMIT (Map 21) was set for 1000 on 21 September. -The plan called for a preliminary landing of a Recon Company rifle -squad to provide security. Next, a landing point team from the 1st -Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards) had the -mission of clearing the two sites. These two groups were to disembark -from hovering helicopters by means of knotted 30-foot ropes. Strong -winds at the 2,900-foot altitude made landing quite hazardous. - -The execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog so prevalent -at this time of year. As soon as the two landing sites were cleared -(about 40 minutes), word was transmitted by radio for the loading to -begin at Field X-83 (Map 21), about 14 miles southwest of Hill 884 by -the defiladed route of flight. - -Control over the landings and takeoffs on the two Hill 884 sites was -exercised by a hovering helicopter. Aircraft landed at 30-second -intervals, each carrying five fully equipped men who disembarked in -average time of 20 seconds. Two radio nets maintained communications -between the landing sites and orbiting aircraft. Voice contact could -not be established between the landing point team and X-83, however, -and it became necessary for a helicopter to return within sight of the -field to restore communications for incoming aircraft. - -A total of 224 men, including a heavy machine gun platoon from 2/7, was -lifted in flight time of 31.2 hours and over-all time of four hours. In -addition, 17,772 pounds of cargo were landed. - -Operation SUMMIT ended with the laying of two telephone lines between -Recon Company on Hill 884 and the CP of the 1st Marines, about eight -miles to the rear. Fifteen minutes were required for dropping each -line. The ROKs, following their relief, proceeded on foot to their own -Corps area. - -From a tactical viewpoint, the importance of Hill 884 lay in its -domination of enemy-held terrain. The difficulty of reaching the remote -position had been overcome by the helicopter, and Operation SUMMIT was -recorded in front page headlines by Stateside newspapers. - -Congratulations poured in from all sides. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. -Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, complimented HMR-161 on -“a bright new chapter in the employment of helicopters by Marines.” -Major General Clovis E. Byers, commanding X Corps, praised the “organic -and attached units of the 1st Marine Division that participated in -the first relief of units on the battle position. Your imaginative -experiment with this kind of transport is certain to be of lasting -value to all the services.”[307] - - [307] Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR-161 _HD_, - Sep 51. - -Nobody was more enthusiastic than General Thomas. “Operation SUMMIT, -the first helicopter-borne landing of a combat unit in history, was an -outstanding success,” said his message. “To all who took part, well -done!” - -[Illustration: HMR-161 - -OPERATIONS - -1951 - -MAP 21] - - -_Helicopter Operation_ BLACKBIRD - -It is not surprising, considering their training, that the Marines -found it a difficult transition from offensive to defensive operations -after 20 September. As evidence that patrols were conducted with -customary aggressiveness, Marine casualties (including the 1st KMC -Regiment) for the last 10 days of the month were 59 KIA, 1 MIA, and 331 -WIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 505 counted KIA, and 237 -prisoners. - -1st Marine Division casualties of 2,416 (including 594 reported by the -KMCs) for September as a whole were the most severe suffered during -any month of the war so far with the exception of December 1950 and -June 1951. NKPA losses of the month were 2,799 counted KIA and 557 -prisoners.[308] - - [308] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Sep 51, 4, 31–32. - -On the 23d the 1st Marines extended to the eastern boundary of X Corps -and relieved the Division Reconnaissance Company on Hill 884. That same -day the enemy was treated to a novelty when 100 well aimed 16-inch -projectiles, fired from a range of 40,000 yards, roared in like meteors -on his positions in the area of Hill 951 (Map 20). Naval gunfire from -the USS _New Jersey_ was being conducted by Marine spotters in forward -OPs, who reported good coverage for the 2,000-pound rounds. Ammunition -dumps and artillery pieces were destroyed while NKPA troops in the open -suffered heavy personnel casualties, according to observers. - -Several more bombardments were contributed by the _New Jersey_ at -the request of 1/1 and 3/1 during the balance of the month. Marine -and attached Army artillery also gave excellent support with fire -so accurate as to break up enemy counterattacks before they could -be launched. Ammunition restrictions hampered the efforts of the -11th Marines (Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.) but the cannoneers never -failed to respond to an emergency. The 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank -Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans) continued to show good -results with direct observed fire on enemy bunkers. Air support in -September, concluded the Division report, was “generally inadequate and -unsatisfactory.”[309] - - [309] _Ibid._ - -By the last week of September the Division right (east) flank was well -protected, considering the rugged terrain. Not as much could be said -for the other flank, northwest of the Punchbowl, where the sector of -the Marines joined that of the 5th ROK Division. Since the Division -sector was divided by high, roadless mountains, there was no rapid -way of moving reserves other than by helicopter. In short, the 1st -Marine Division was hard pressed to man a 22,800-yard MLR while keeping -in reserve enough troops to help defend this sensitive area in an -emergency. - -Plans were completed by General Thomas and the Division staff for the -rapid displacement of a company from 2/1, the reserve battalion of the -1st Marines, to meet any such threat. Since a surprise attack was most -likely to occur at night, it was decided that a helicopter lift of an -element of the Division reserve should be made in the darkness of 27 -September after a detailed daytime rehearsal.[310] - - [310] The remainder of this section is based upon the Type “C” - Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, - 1–9; HMR-161 and 1stShorePartyBn _HD_, Sep and Oct 51; - _Cavalry of the Sky_, 165–167. - -In contrast to former Marine helicopters, which had no night-flying -aids, the HRS-1 was equipped with few attitude of flight instruments. -They were primitive compared to the sophisticated instrumentation of -fixed-wing planes, and Lieutenant Colonel Herring sent his pilots on -preliminary night indoctrination flights to memorize terrain features. - -The route, five air miles in length, amounted to a round trip of 13 -miles because of the detours necessary for purposes of concealment. The -aircraft were to take off from a dry river bed southeast of Hill 702 -(Map 21) and land near the northwestern rim of the Punchbowl, where the -troops would march a mile to their final assembly area. - -The infantry unit selected for Operation BLACKBIRD was Easy Company -of 2/1, commanded by Second Lieutenant William K. Rockey. Lieutenant -Colonel Nihart and Major Carl E. Walker, the battalion commander and -his executive officer, supervised the daylight rehearsal on the morning -of the 27th. Six helicopters lifted 200 men in the overall time of two -hours and 10 minutes to a landing site of 50 by 100 feet cleared by a -team of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. The troops were proceeding on -foot to their assembly area when an antipersonnel mine wounded a man. -Nihart called a halt immediately and investigation revealed that the -area was filled with mines. Plans were changed to abandon the march, -although the landing site remained the same. - -Operation BLACKBIRD got under way at 1930 on 27 September. The night -was dark when the first HRS-1 took off with five combat-equipped men. -Three-minute intervals were required between aircraft operating on a -shuttle system, so as to avoid the danger of collisions. Different -altitudes were assigned to outgoing and incoming helicopters which -used running lights only two minutes before entering or leaving the -debarkation zone. - -A total of 223 troops were landed in over-all time of two hours and -20 minutes instead of the nine hours a movement by foot would have -required. Nevertheless, some of the results were not reassuring. -Rotor wash blew out many of the flare pots lighting the embarkation -area, and the battery-powered beach lanterns on the landing site -proved inadequate. Pilots were temporarily blinded by the glare on -windshields; and artillery flashes bothered them while making their way -through three mountain passes. Fortunately, good radio communications -aided pilots who had trouble in locating the landing site in spite of -night rehearsals. - -Operation BLACKBIRD remained the only night helicopter troop lift -during the war in Korea. “Present equipment,” said the Marine report, -“indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night lifts -should be limited to movements within friendly territory.”[311] - - [311] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “The Employment of Assault - Helicopters,” Part II, 4. - - -“_To Organize, Construct and Defend_” - -“The Division continued to organize, construct and defend positions -along a 13½-mile front; patrol forward of the MLR and screen rear -areas; and maintain one U.S. Marine regiment which could not be -committed without authority from X Corps in a reserve area 17 miles -behind the lines.” - -The above quotation, from the opening paragraph of the report of the -1st Marine Division for October 1951, sums up in a nutshell the new -trend of operations since 20 September. It is significant that for -the first time in 1951 the Division Historical Diary departs from a -daily account of events and divides the month into two equal parts -for a chronicle of operations. Not enough had happened to justify a -day-by-day summary. - -This does not mean that the Marines neglected any opportunity to do -the enemy hurt. It means only that the opportunities of defensive -warfare were limited as compared to the preceding six months of -offensive operations. That the Marines made the best of such -opportunities is shown by the fact that the ratio of enemy to friendly -casualties increased from the 4-to-1 of September to the 20-to-1 of -October, even though the totals of the former month were larger.[312] - - [312] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 1–3. - -As a result of his new defensive policies, the enemy often avoided -a fight. Day after day passed during the first two weeks of October -without far-ranging Marine patrols being able to make contact. - -Line MINNESOTA, the new MLR (Map 20), ran roughly parallel to the -hays line but included advanced positions taken in the September -offensive. During the first 10 days of October the 2d Battalion of the -1st Marines continued to be the Division forward reserve in readiness -for a quick shift to any threatened point in the MLR, and the Division -Reconnaissance Company had the mission of maintaining daily contact -with the 11th ROK Division on the Marines’ right flank. - -It might seem that the 7th Marines, 17 miles to the rear at Wontong-ni, -would be entirely becalmed. Yet this regiment saw as much action on -some days as any of the three regiments ranging forward of the MLR. -The explanation was that the rear area was infested with elusive North -Korean guerrillas who kept the 7th Marines patrols busy. - -Early in October the question arose as to how quickly a reserve -battalion could be shifted from one point to another. By this time -a company-size helicopter lift had become commonplace, having been -successfully completed twice by HMR-161 since Operation SUMMIT. It -remained to be seen whether a battalion could be transported with -comparable celerity, and, on 9 October, Division issued an order -warning of 3/7’s move. - -The 7th Marines was due to exchange places with the 5th Marines on -the 11th after relieving that regiment in the center of the Division -front. While 1/7 and 2/7 completed a conventional relief of their -opposite numbers, 3/7 was selected for a helicopter lift. Lieutenant -Colonel Edwards, the new commanding officer, had recently commanded the -Shore Party Battalion and helped to train its landing site and loading -point teams. He took part in the planning along with Colonel Krulak, -Lieutenant Colonels Herring and Mitchell, and the new commanding -officer of the Shore Party Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel George G. -Pafford. - -Planning went on as if for an amphibious operation. Assignment and -loading tables were worked out, and each Marine of the six-man -embarkation teams had his designated place in the helicopter. On 10 -October all officers and men of 3/7 attended a familiarization class at -which trial teams were loaded. - -Operation BUMBLEBEE began at 1000 on the 11th. Field X-77 (Map 21) -had been selected as the loading zone because of its proximity to the -assembly area of the 7th Marines. The landing site was just behind the -5th Marines MLR, northeast of Hill 702. A flight path of 15 miles took -advantage of the concealment afforded by valleys and defiladed areas. - -The two dispatchers in the loading zone were provided with a checkoff -flight list containing the names of every team of 3/7. In order to -avoid delays, replacements could be summoned from a casual pool to fill -understrength teams to plane capacity. Average time for loading was 20 -seconds. - -Ten to 12 minutes were required for the flight. As the helicopters -landed at intervals of a minute, a team could exit and allow the craft -to be airborne in an average time of 17 seconds. “Time was saved,” -according to one Marine report, “when the Shore Party personnel, after -opening the door, vigorously assisted the passengers by grasping their -arms and starting them away from the craft. The last man out checked to -see if any gear had been forgotten. Guides furnished by the battalion -directed the passengers toward their respective company assembly areas, -thus keeping the landing areas clear at all times.”[313] - - [313] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” - Part II, 5–9. Other sources for Operation BUMBLEBEE are - HMR-161 and 1st ShorePartyBn _HD_, Oct 51, and _Cavalry - of the Sky_, 167–170. - -Twelve helicopters were employed in 156 flights. The flight time was -65.9 hours and over-all time five hours and 50 minutes. A total weight -of 229,920 pounds included 958 combat-equipped troops averaging 240 -pounds. - -[Illustration: - - DD MC A 132540 - -_Helicopter In The Hills--A large Sikorsky helicopter hovers over -the mountainous terrain of Korea. This type of aircraft has been -extensively used for many types of transport missions._] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 131324] - - _Generals Confer--Above, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (left) and - MajGen Field Harris discuss the situation in April, 1952. Below, - MajGen John T. Selden (right) briefs Army MajGen R. D. Palmer._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 159084] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 8410] - - _On The Planning Level--Above, BrigGen Whaling, MajGen Thomas, - and BrigGen Puller enjoy a bit of humor, while, below, MajGen - Thomas, LtGen Shephard, and Col Wade pose for the photographer._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 157916] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 161585] - - _Ready For Action--Above, a Marine 105mm howitzer battery - preparing to fire a mission. Below, exterior and interior views - of a heavy and light machine gun emplacement._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 155525 DD MC A 169584] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 6953 DD MC A 6754] - - _Going Up--Above, left and right, Marines move into position on - one of the many Korean hills. Below, a section of the MLR in - March, 1952._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 160250] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 159304] - - _The Lifeline--Above, a view of the MSR of the 1st Marine - Division during January, 1952. Below, during the rainy season it - is difficult to move supplies over the poor roads._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 164552] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 162316] - - _Terrain Features--Above, a Marine helicopter flies behind - ice-covered slopes to avoid enemy fire. Below, an enemy - stronghold nicknamed “Luke The Gook’s Castle.”_ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 160572] - -[Illustration: USN 439970 USN 441346] - - _Panmunjom “Talkathon”--Above (left) Gen Nam Il starts for the - truce talks. Above (right) United Nations’ sentries. Below, the - Chinese and North Korean Communist negotiators._ - -[Illustration: USN 431929] - -[Illustration: USN 432414] - - _Watchful Waiting--Above, MajGen L. C. Cragie and VAdm C. T. Joy - talk to correspondents at Panmunjom. Below, Communist and UN - sentries walk posts around the peace talk site._ - -[Illustration: USN 935646 USN 435646] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 163575 DD MC A 164145] - - _Lifesaver--Above, bruised Marines show the armored vests that - saved their lives. Below, a .45 caliber bullet test-fired into - cotton contrasted with three removed from an armored vest._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 46216] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 168081] - - _Torso Protection--Above, a Marine rifleman lies prone to exhibit - the protective torso armor. Below, a helicopter evacuates a - corpsman who was wounded while treating a buddy._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 167282] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 156301] - - _Papa-sans and Pills--Above, a group of Korean patriarchs gaze - curiously at a Marine tank. Below, an Army nurse administers - medication to a grimacing Marine._ - -[Illustration: SC 358063] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 159786] - - _A Dog’s Life--Above, Marines line up with their pets all packed - and ready to go. Below, troops gather for the ever-welcome mail - call._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 7468] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 6843] - - _At The Front--Above, Marines advance across a fog-filled valley - while supported by machine gun fire. Below, a group of Communist - prisoners wait for interrogation by trained experts._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 157686] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 408351] - - _CCF Propaganda--Above, one of the thousands of - attractively-colored CCF Christmas cards dropped on the_ MLR _in - December, 1951. Below, a mortar observer crew in action._ - -[Illustration: DD MC A 6627] - -[Illustration: DD MC A 162989] - - _Life’s Little Problems--PFC Henry A. Friday pauses to rest in - a trench and reflect upon the progress of his own particular - efforts towards fighting the Communists._ - -These statistics of Operation BUMBLEBEE made it certain that Stateside -headlines would proclaim another Marine “first.” Only four days later -HMR-161 demonstrated its ability to carry out on short notice an -emergency resupply and evacuation operation in a combat zone. Help -was requested in the IX Corps sector to the west for a completely -surrounded ROK unit in need of ammunition and of casualty evacuation. -Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell led six HRS-1 aircraft which flew in 19,000 -pounds of ammunition. Lieutenant Donald L. Hilian (MC), USN, surgeon of -HMR-161, landed to supervise the evacuation of 24 wounded ROKs, several -of whom would otherwise have died. Captains James T. Cotton and Albert -A. Black made four flights each into the beleaguered area, and all -Marine pilots of Operation WEDGE were congratulated in person by Major -General Claude F. Ferenbaugh, commanding general of IX Corps.[314] - - [314] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 171. - -Seven infantry battalions, with 2/1 in immediate reserve, manned the -MLR from 1 to 13 October--three KMC battalions on the left of the -Division sector; two 5th Marines battalions (relieved by the 7th -Marines on the 11th) in the center; and two 1st Marines battalions on -the right. Scout and sniper teams were employed throughout the period, -with contacts few and far between. More destruction was inflicted on -the enemy by observed artillery, tank, and mortar fire.[315] - - [315] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise - specified, is based on the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 3–12. - -A new emphasis was placed on psychological warfare during these -defensive operations. Eighty-seven NKPA soldiers surrendered from 1 to -13 October, but whether they responded to leaflets fired by the 11th -Marines could not be determined. - -Early in October the 1st Marine Division was granted permission -by EUSAK to use Sokcho-ri (Map 19) as a port of embarkation and -debarkation instead of Pusan. The change proved satisfactory even -though troops had to be lightered from ship to shore. A 68-mile truck -movement through the I ROK Corps zone replaced the airlift of 200 miles -from Pusan to Chunchon, followed by a motor march of 70 miles. It was -estimated that the new routing would add from 8,000 to 10,000 man-days -a month to the combat potential of the Division. - -An improvement in logistics resulted when the Division asked and -received permission from EUSAK to use field K-50 near Sokcho-ri for an -airhead instead of K-51 at Inje. Although the Marines were limited to -five or six sorties a day while sharing K-50 with I ROK Corps, they -were able to transfer many airhead activities to the new field. - -The mission of the Division remained essentially unchanged from 14 -to 31 October. Foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory, -and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and -artillery, were launched at every opportunity. - -Typical of these operations was the raid staged on 16 October by -elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, (Lieutenant Colonel James -G. Kelly) supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers. Captain -John R. McMahon’s Charlie Company was the principal unit involved. The -Marine column had as its objective an NKPA strong point overlooking the -village of Changhang (Map 2) on the east and the flats on both sides of -the Soyang-gang to the south and southwest. Captain McMahon’s mission -was “to reduce all fortifications and installations ...” [and] “... -to seize, occupy and hold ground until the area was thoroughly mined, -booby-trapped and infested with trip flares.”[316] - - [316] This account of the raid is derived from the 1/7 _HD_, - Oct 51, and the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7. - -A small-scale battle flared up for a few minutes as the enemy put up a -stiff resistance with artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. -Superior Marine firepower soon prevailed, and at 1540 the attackers -reached their objective. During the next hour and 20 minutes enemy -installations were destroyed and the strong point rendered untenable by -mines and booby traps. The Marines withdrew at 1700 after sustaining -casualties of 3 KIA and 18 WIA. Enemy losses were 35 counted KIA. - -The next day a reinforced KMC company, supported by tanks, air, -artillery, and engineers made a similar raid on enemy positions about -875 yards northwest of Hill 751 and 1,500 yards south of Hill 1052 (Map -20). Twenty-five NKPA bunkers were destroyed with losses to the enemy -of 15 counted KIA, 3 prisoners, and 5 captured machine guns.[317] - - [317] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7–8. - -On 21 October the front of the 1st Marine Division was reduced a mile -when elements of the 3d ROK Division relieved the 2d KMC Battalion on -the Marine left flank in accordance with instructions of X Corps. Six -infantry battalions now manned an MLR of 12¼ miles. - -A strong enemy position, menacing the forward elements, had developed -to the north of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines’ sector. Three days -of reconnaissance and detailed preparation preceded the destructive -raid carried out on 30 October. Captain George E. Lawrence’s Charlie -Company, reinforced with heavy machine guns, was held up by NKPA -resistance in estimated company strength. The Marines fought their -way up a ridgeline, throwing white phosphorus grenades into enemy -bunkers. Pinned down momentarily by NKPA mortar and small-arms fire, -they reached a defiladed position and withdrew under cover of Marine -artillery, air, mortars, and heavy machine guns. At a cost of only one -WIA, the raiders inflicted 65 counted KIA casualties on the enemy and -destroyed an estimated 40 NKPA bunkers.[318] - - [318] 1/1 _HD_, Oct 51, 16; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 7. - -All three Marine regiments on Line MINNESOTA were directed by General -Thomas to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own weapons in the -form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October the 3d Battalion of the -1st Marines feigned preparations for an attack even to the extent of a -brief artillery barrage. When the firing let up, the Marines sounded -an NKPA bugle call as a signal for enemy troops to rush out of bunkers -and man open trenches. Thus exposed, they became the victims of intense -Marine mortar and artillery fire which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA -and 48 WIA casualties. - -During the last 2 weeks of October, 11 missions were fired by the -battleship USS _New Jersey_ and 41 missions by the heavy cruiser USS -_Toledo_. Appreciation was expressed in a message to the _Toledo_ by -General Thomas: “Your accurate and effective fire during period 24–29 -October made an important contribution to operations of this division. -Many thanks and come again.”[319] - - [319] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS _Toledo_, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3 - msgs, Oct 51. - -Antiguerrilla raids behind the MLR were carried out by Marine ground -forces relying upon HMR-161 helicopters for transportation. In -Operation BUSHBEATER teams from 1/1 were landed on the Division’s east -flank to sweep westward toward the Soyang-gang on 22 October while -teams from Recon Company patrolled from the opposite direction. - -Operations HOUSEBURNER I and II were planned to deprive guerrillas of -shelter during the coming winter. As the name implies, helicopter-borne -teams set Korean huts afire with flame throwers and incendiary -grenades.[320] - - [320] _Cavalry of the Sky_, 172–173. - -Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were -believed to comprise the 2d Division, II NKPA Corps, the 1st and -15th Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. NKPA -casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Marine Division -as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, and 571 -prisoners. The Marines (including the 1st KMC Regiment) suffered losses -of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA.[321] - - [321] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Oct 51, 2. - - -_Marine Operations of November 1951_ - -On 1 November 1951 the front line strength of the opposing forces -was nearly equal--195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy. In -reserves the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with nine -CCF armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four NKPA corps. All -were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault troops -for a great offensive.[322] - - [322] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 9. - -Even though the Eighth Army was committed to a warfare of position, -General Van Fleet meant to keep the initiative. “If we had stagnated -on any one of our many positions since the tide turned in April,” -he said in a recorded statement of 3 November, “the hydra-headed -Communists--who seem to grow two soldiers for each one cut down--would -soon have been at our throats. With the enemy’s prolific capacity -posing an ever-present threat, we had no choice but to destroy the -menace before it matured.”[323] - - [323] _Ibid._, 32. - -Throughout November the 1st Marine Division continued to occupy the -eastern portion of the X Corps defense sector in east-central Korea. -From left to right the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 1st Marines -held the 12¼-mile MLR with two battalions each. The 5th Marines -remained in reserve until the 11th, when it relieved the 1st Marines. -That regiment went into the new reserve area at Mago-ri (Map 19).[324] - - [324] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise - specified, is derived from the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Nov 51, - 1–20. - -Elements of the 1st, 15th, and 19th Divisions, III NKPA Corps, manned -the opposing lines. The Marines continued to organize artillery- and -air-supported tank-infantry-engineer task forces in company strength -for raids. Squad-size patrols were sent out nightly to ambush the -enemy, employing ruses whenever possible. - -The howitzers of the 11th Marines and the 90mm rifles of the 1st -Tank Battalion were kept busy throughout the month. On 7–8 November, -for instance, Marine artillery fired 257 observed missions in 24 -hours--including 34 on enemy artillery positions, 32 on mortar -positions, 25 on bunkers, 22 on machine gun positions, 4 in support -of friendly patrols, 3 on supply dumps, 2 on trucks, and 1 each on a -bridge, a CP, and a 57mm recoilless rifle position. - -In spite of such daily pounding, aerial photographs proved that NKPA -defenses in depth had become more intricate and formidable in November -1951 than during any previous month. - -On the 7th the 14th Replacement Draft added 2,756 officers and men -to the 1st Marine Division. Within a few hours 2,066 officers and -men of the 10th Rotation Draft were detached. And on the 27th the -11th Rotation Draft represented a further loss of 2,468 Marines whose -departure was hastened so that they could be home by Christmas. - -A note of grim humor crept into proceedings on 9 November. Division -OpnO 50-51 directed that all supporting arms and weapons commemorate -the Marine Corps Birthday the next day by firing a TOT on Hill 1052, -the key enemy observation point overlooking the friendly sector.[325] -While the cruiser USS _Los Angeles_ contributed naval gunfire, the -Commanding General of 1st MAW, Major General Christian F. Schilt, led -an air strike of 83 Marine planes to blast this enemy strong point. - - [325] The initials TOT stand for Time on Target--an artillery - order calling for all guns to time their firing so that - projectiles will hit the target simultaneously. - -The performance was embellished on the 10th when Marine tanks, mortars, -and machine guns added their fire to the grand crescendo of exploding -shells and bombs. The Communists were also bombarded with 50,000 -leaflets inviting them to the Marine birthday dinner that evening. -Twenty Korean Reds actually did surrender, though some doubt remained -whether they had responded to the invitation or the TOT. General Van -Fleet sent a message to all Marines in his command, congratulating them -on “a job well done” in Korea.[326] - - [326] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 42. - -On 11 November the 5th Marines carried out its relief of the 1st -Marines on Line MINNESOTA. This was the occasion for the largest -helicopter troop lift so far, involving the transportation of nearly -2,000 combat-equipped men. - -Operation SWITCH began at 0635 on D-Day when three helicopters took off -from Field X-83 with Shore Party specialists to signal aircraft into -landing sites and supervise the unloading and reloading of troops. -Twelve helicopters were employed, each carrying five men and supplies -from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. -Norton), and returning to Field X-83 with a like load from Lieutenant -Colonel Clifford E. Quilici’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines.[327] - - [327] HMR-161 _HD_, Nov 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 174. - -Naval gunfire from the USS _New Jersey_ helped to keep the enemy quiet -during the relief. All told, 950 men were flown to Hill 884--soon to be -known unofficially as “Mount Helicopter”--and 952 lifted to Field X-83 -in return flights. Total flight time was 95.6 hours and over-all time -10 hours. Once again the Marine Corps had made tactical history. - -Ground forces operations throughout November seldom varied from the -familiar pattern of squad-size patrols nightly and an occasional -daytime raid by a company-size task force with the support of artillery -and air. Supporting arms kept enemy strongholds under almost constant -fire, and North Korean activity in the construction or improvement of -bunkers provided frequent targets of opportunity. - -Contacts seemed to be avoided by enemy troops. On the night of 29 -November, for instance, 11 Marine ambush patrols ranged from 1,500 -to 2,500 yards ahead of the MLR with only a single contact before -returning at daybreak. One enemy KIA was inflicted and one prisoner -taken at a cost of four Marine WIA casualties. - -Total Marine casualties (including the KMCs) during November were -34 KIA and 250 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 408 counted and 1,728 -estimated KIA, 2,235 estimated WIA, and 104 prisoners. - - -_The Second Marine Christmas in Korea_ - -Marine operations in December were shaped in advance by the resumption -of armistice negotiations. This time Panmunjom was agreed upon as a -conference site instead of Kaesong. Literally a wide place in the road, -the tiny hamlet was located just north of the 38th Parallel between -Munsan and Kaesong (Map 19). In the lack of houses, tents provided -shelter for the UN and Communist delegates who renewed their meetings -on 25 October 1951 for the first time since the Reds walked out at -Kaesong on 23 August. - -Discussions during November were largely devoted to the question of -a cease fire based upon a line of demarcation. On the 23d it was -agreed to accept a line linking up the farthest points of repeated -contacts up to 2,000 yards forward of the United Nations MLR. Three -days later, representatives of both sides initialed maps to indicate -acceptances.[328] - - [328] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the - following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., _Panmunjom, - The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations_ - (New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; _Joy, How - Communists Negotiate_, 40–52. - -The effect of the so-called cease fire on EUSAK operations was -immediate. General Van Fleet sent his corps commanders a letter of -instructions warning that active defensive operations were to continue -until a full armistice had been concluded. If such an event took place -within 30 days after 27 November 1951, the demarcation line would not -be altered. But if an agreement had not been reached by that time, the -line would be revised in accordance with actual changes.[329] - - [329] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 58. - -EUSAK instructions to corps commanders were relayed in a X Corps -message of 27 November to the 1st Marine Division: - - _Part 1._ The conference at Panmunjom has fixed a military - demarcation line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities - within a 30-day period. - - _Part II._ Every US, UN, and ROK soldier will be informed that - hostilities will continue until armistice agreement is signed. - - _Part III._ While negotiations continue, X Corps will: (1) - Demonstrate its willingness to reach an agreement by reducing - operations to those which are essential to insure maintenance of - present positions. Counterattacks to regain key terrain lost to - enemy assault are authorized, but other clearly offensive actions - will be taken only by direction of this Headquarters; patrolling - only to that line beyond which contact has been repeatedly - established; limiting supporting fires, including air strikes, - to destruction of those targets which appear to constitute a - major threat, or to improve the enemy’s offensive capability. - (2) Prepare for offensive action by: Conserving ammunition; - maintaining combat effectiveness through intensified training; - preparation for and rehearsal of limited-objective attacks, to be - launched near the end of the 30-day period in order to improve - the MLR. - - _Part IV._ Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary - casualties.[330] - - [330] X Corps _Cmd Rpt_, Nov 51, 15–16. - -In view of these instructions, it is understandable that a lull set -in along the X Corps front in December 1951. Most of the cold weather -clothing had been issued during the preceding month, and work was -largely completed for the “winterizing” of bunkers. It remained only -to improve defensive installations as front line elements continued -to send out patrols to maintain pressure against the enemy. And since -the Communists were putting similar military policies into effect, both -sides kept in contact with relatively small units.[331] - - [331] The source for the remainder of this section, unless - otherwise stated, is the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Dec 51, 1–17. - -The enemy also busied himself with extending already formidable -defenses in depth. And though he did not seek a fight, he showed no -hesitation about accepting one. - -From 5 to 20 Marine patrols went out nightly during December, some of -them manning night outposts called “duck blinds;”[332] occasional raids -continued with relatively few contacts. In the rear of the Division -area, helicopter patrols continued against guerrillas. - - [332] LtCol Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-3 dtd 3 Feb 1959. - -The 13 aircraft of HMR-161 had a busy month with 390 missions and 621 -flights. Six thousand pounds of rations, 9,000 pounds of fuel oil in -drums, 15,000 pounds of fortification material, and 15,000 pounds of -cold weather clothing were among the supplies flown to the front. -Personnel to the number of 2,022 were lifted, and cargo to the amount -of 149,477 pounds. - -The first breakthrough in truce negotiations, at Kaesong, occurred on -18 December, when lists of prisoners held by both sides were exchanged. -Prior to this exchange of lists the UN Command could only speculate on -the number carried as missing in action who were in reality held as -prisoners of war. The Communists had previously reported only a few -dozen names, and then only if it suited their propaganda purposes. -Radio Peking, in releasing names piecemeal, had broadcast recordings -made by UN prisoners under duress. Far Eastern monitors reported these -broadcasts were slanted to give the Communist viewpoint. - -The 18 December list of 3,198 American POWs revealed only 61 Marines -including 2 Navy hospital corpsmen. (Information received from 18 -Marines who gained their freedom in May 1951 was sketchy concerning -others held at the time and was never accredited as official or -authoritative.)[333] Interestingly enough when the Communist -negotiators saw the list given them by the UN representative they -became irate and tried to withdraw their list. The names of the Chinese -and Korean prisoners had been Anglicized and caused considerable -difficulty in retranslating the names into oriental characters. - - [333] Maj J. Angus MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” MS - available in Historical Archives, G-3, HQMC. - -Negotiations hit a snag at this point, and no other list was offered by -the Red officials until the first prisoner exchange (Operation LITTLE -SWITCH in April 1953). Notwithstanding the protracted and exasperating -tactics of the Reds at the truce table, the exchange of prisoner of war -lists presaged infinitely better treatment to the UN prisoners than had -been accorded them prior to that time. The so-called lenient treatment -policy by the Chinese, promulgated in July 1951, was initiated after -the exchange of lists.[334] - - [334] Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec 1960; Extract of Interim - Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative - to 30 Jun 1953, 18. - -The lists given by the Communists did not include several Marines -captured during the months of October, November, or December of 1951. -The families of these men were to sit in anguish waiting for these -names until April of 1953. These and other instances of perfidy and -treachery at the truce table by the Communist negotiators were to -become legion.[335] - - [335] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 104–105; Maj J. A. - MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” _op. cit._ - -On 19 December the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major William E. Baugh) -was relieved just behind the MLR by Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1/5 -in helicopter Operation FAREWELL. It was the last flight in Korea for -Lieutenant Colonel Herring, who returned to Quantico as commanding -officer of Marine Helicopter Experimental Squadron (HMX)-1. His relief -as commander of HMR-1 was Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, and Lieutenant -Colonel Mitchell remained as executive officer.[336] - - [336] HMR-161 _HD_, Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 175–176. - Two of the original 15 HRS-1 aircraft had been damaged - in accidents, but one was later restored to action with - parts cannibalized from the other. - -The Marine helicopters of VMO-6 had also been setting records during -the last half of 1951 under four commanding officers, Major David W. -McFarland (5 April-5 October), Major Allan H. Ringblom (6 October-31 -October), Major Edward R. Polgrean (1 November-25 November), and Major -Kenneth C. Smedley (26 November-31 January 1952). A total of 1,096 -Marine wounded had been flown out during this period, many of whom -would otherwise have lost their lives.[337] - - [337] VMO-6 _HD_, Jun-Dec 51; _Cavalry of the Sky_, 146, - 180–181. - -The supposed vulnerability of the helicopter was whittled down to a -myth by VMO-6 experience. Returning from a front line mission with -bullet holes was too commonplace for mention, yet the year 1951 -passed without a single helicopter pilot being lost to enemy action, -even though several aircraft were shot down. The experience of these -12 months also proved anew the wisdom of combining rotary-wing and -fixed-wing aircraft in an observation squadron in fairly equal numbers. -When it came to reconnaissance and artillery spotting, the nimble -little OYs and OEs (both types are light observation planes) were much -better suited than the “choppers.” - -As for close air support, increased Air Force emphasis on an -interdiction campaign beyond artillery ranges added to the limitations -imposed on Marine requests. Of the 22 strikes requested in December -1951, only five were approved. - -From the 1st to the 10th, units of the Division along the MLR consisted -from left to right of the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, and 5th -Marines. The only major change took place on the 11th, when the 1st -Marines relieved the 7th and the latter went into Division reserve. -Enemy units were believed to be the 1st, 15th, and 19th (soon relieved -by the 47th) NKPA Divisions with an estimated strength of 25,750. - -Permission was rarely granted by X Corps for Marine raids to cross -the EUSAK military limiting line known as Line DUCK, which generally -coincided with the line of demarcation. Christmas passed like any -other day except for the holiday feast. Nineteen patrols went out on -Christmas Eve, two of which had brief fire fights with enemy patrols -before returning at dawn. During the day 40 rounds of naval gunfire -from the heavy cruiser USS _St. Paul_ were credited with destroying -seven enemy bunkers. - -More than a third of the Marines partaking of Christmas turkey were -comparative newcomers who had reached Korea since the warfare of -movement ended on 20 September. The 15th Replacement Draft brought 38 -officers and 2,278 men early in December, and 127 officers and 1,805 -men departed with the 12th Rotation Draft. No Marines who had arrived -prior to 1 January 1951 were left among the 1,495 officers and 23,040 -men in Korea at the close of the year. - -Heavy snow on 26 December impeded foot-patrol activity and increased -the danger of mines. Next day, when the 30-day cease-fire agreement -ended, it was announced at Panmunjom that the terms had been renewed -and that operational restrictions would be extended indefinitely. - -Thus December came to an end on a note of troubled uncertainty. Not a -single large-scale combat had been reported, yet 24 Marines were killed -(including KMCs) and 139 wounded in patrol actions. That the enemy had -sometimes succeeded in the grim quest of both sides for prisoners is -shown by the unwonted entry of eight Marines missing in action. NKPA -losses for the month consisted of 246 counted KIA, and 56 prisoners. - -The year 1951 passed into history at 2400 on 31 December as the 11th -Marines saluted 1952 by firing a “toast” at enemy strongholds. The -thud of the snow-muffled howitzers was also a fitting farewell to the -past year of a war that was not officially a war. Indications were -that it would doubtless be concluded by a peace that was not a peace, -judging from the attitude of the Communist delegates at Panmunjom. -And meanwhile the Marines and other Eighth Army troops would keep on -fighting in accordance with the terms of a cease fire was not a cease -fire. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -Winter Operations in East Korea - -_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve--Marine Raid in Company -Strength--Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command--Boot, Combat, -Rubber, Insulated--500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea--Helicopter -Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE_--The Fire Days of -Operation_ CLAM-UP - - -As the New Year began, the 1st Marine Division occupied practically -the same front it had held along Line MINNESOTA for the last three -months (Map 20) and would continue to hold for the next two and a half. -The major units were disposed from left to right on 1 January 1952 as -follows: - -1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dong Ha commanding, LtCol Alfred H. -Marks, senior advisor); - - 1st Marines (Colonel Sidney S. Wade); - - 5th Marines (Colonel Frank P. Hager, Jr.); - - 11th Marines (Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill) in artillery support. - -The 7th Marines (Colonel John J. Wermuth) was in reserve until 10 -January, when it relieved the 5th Marines on line. That regiment then -went into reserve and could not be committed to action without the -approval of X Corps.[338] - - [338] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 1–2. - -Tactical units not organic to the 1st Marine Division but attached at -this time were, in addition to the 1st KMC Regiment, the 1st Korean -Artillery Battalion, the 1st Platoon, 92d U.S. Army Searchlight -Company, and Battery C, 1st 4.5″ Rocket Battalion. - -The new Korean artillery battalion consisted of two medium (155mm) and -two light (105mm) howitzer batteries. Major General Gerald C. Thomas, -commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, approved a plan for -placing this unit in the Punchbowl on 9 January to reinforce Lieutenant -Colonel Sherman W. Parry’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. - -Enemy units opposing the 1st Marine Division up to 23 January 1952 -were the 1st, 15th, and 47th NKPA Divisions with an estimated combined -strength of 25,750 men. On the 23d the 15th Division was relieved by -the 45th. - -The enemy, according to the Division report, showed “greater caution -than he had in previous months, and friendly outposts and ambuscades -noted fewer contacts. His harassing mortar and artillery fires -increased in volume through the month. Meanwhile, extensive efforts to -improve his defenses continued with particular attention being given to -reverse slope installations.”[339] - - [339] _Ibid._, 1, 6, 7. - - -_Ambush Patrol on New Year’s Eve_ - -The new year was but a few minutes old when the first Marine action -took place. Captain Charles W. McDonald’s Baker Company had been -directed by Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. Norton, commanding the 1st -Battalion, 5th Marines, to send out an ambush patrol on New Year’s Eve. - -A rifle squad, a light machine gun squad, an interpreter, and a -corpsman composed the little column wearing white camouflage clothing -which made the men all but invisible against a background of snow. -After getting into position, the patrol settled down for the usual -long wait. Darkness was the enemy’s element, and Marine ambushers ran -the risk of being ambushed themselves. This time, however, a six-man -North Korean patrol came within five yards before the Marines let the -enemy have it with machine gun and rifle fire which inflicted one KIA -and four estimated WIA casualties. Efforts to take a prisoner were -frustrated as the NKPA survivors melted away into the darkness. The -Baker Company patrol returned without casualties at 0400.[340] - - [340] 1/5 _HD_, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, 3. - -Marine operations were still limited by the EUSAK “cease fire” -directive which went into effect for a month on 27 November 1951 in -accordance with a decision reached during the armistice negotiations -at Panmunjom. UN and Communist delegates agreed on a line of -demarcation, known to the Eighth Army as Line DUCK. It linked up points -of repeated EUSAK patrol contacts, not to exceed 2,000 yards beyond -the MLR. Operations past this line, running generally parallel with -Line MINNESOTA, could not be launched without permission from corps -commanders. - -When the agreement expired on 27 December, it was renewed indefinitely. -Actually, it brought about few changes in the warfare of position which -had replaced a warfare of movement on 20 September 1951. Each Marine -infantry regiment on the MLR continued to send out several squad-size -patrols nightly for such purposes as ambush, reconnaissance, and taking -prisoners. Raids were employed for special missions where formidable -enemy resistance might be expected. These forces usually ranged from -a platoon to a company in strength, reinforced by supporting weapons. -Operations of this sort were planned with meticulous thoroughness and -carried out with minimal risks. - - -_Marine Raid in Company Strength_ - -The first company-size raid of the new year was conducted by units -of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Spencer -H. Pratt) in the darkness of 1–2 January 1952. Captain James B. Ord, -Jr.’s How Company was alerted on 30 December to prepare for a night -raid with a mission of reconnaissance and capturing or destroying any -enemy that might be encountered. On the afternoon of the 30th, Ord made -a preliminary reconnaissance with Second Lieutenants Milo J. See and -John E. Watson, commanding the 2d and 3d Platoons respectively. That -evening the company commander held a briefing at his OP (observation -post) which was attended by the sergeants and squad leaders of the two -platoons selected for the raid.[341] - - [341] Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise - specified, are Maj J. B. Ord, Jr., intervs of 3 Sep and - 24 Oct 58; and Appendix VI, 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan 52, a - five-page special action report of the operation. - -This command group carried out a second reconnaissance forward of the -MLR on 31 December, proceeding until they ran into enemy sniper fire. -Captain Ord requested aerial reconnaissance and three missions were -flown by observation planes of Major Kenneth C. Smedley’s VMO-6. - -Line DUCK and the assigned battalion sector limited the objective area. -On a basis of these restrictions as well as reconnaissance reports, -Ord recommended an operational area containing three objectives, each -of which represented a point where the enemy was not likely to be -encountered. These objectives were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Pratt -and formed the basis of the battalion order. - -The task organization for the raid included two attached How Company -units, the machine gun platoon (-), and 60mm mortar section, commanded -by Second Lieutenants John D. Koutsandreas and James J. Hughes -respectively. Another infantry unit, the 1st Platoon of Item Company, -3/1 (Second Lieutenant William E. Harper), was also attached. - -First Lieutenant Francis E. White, How Company executive officer, -remained at the OP with the tactical air-control party, which had an -observation plane on strip alert in case the raiders ran into artillery -or mortar fire. A forward air controller with radioman accompanied -the raiding party as well as artillery, 4.2″, and 81mm mortar forward -observers. An interpreter, the assistant battalion surgeon, and a -corpsman were included, and wiremen had the assignment of laying a line. - -Hill 812 (Map 20) was the jumping-off place for the column of files in -ghostly white snow suits with hoods. Boots were dark in contrast but -the snow was deep enough to hide them. The drifts slowed up the wiremen -and an infantry fire team protected them at their work. - -The first objective consisted of bunkers and suspected mortar positions -which had been reported by tactical air observers as recently occupied -by the enemy. They were empty when the raiding party reached them, -and the Marine column proceeded toward Objective 2, an ambush site -overlooking and commanding a crossing of the Soyang-gang. - -The selected area for the support group was located nearby, and there -the machine gun section and riflemen took positions on a nose with the -wiremen, radiomen, and corpsman in the center. While these elements -peeled off, the raiding party continued toward the ambush site, where -it was planned to lie in wait two hours for the enemy. A suspected mine -field had to be crossed and Captain Ord directed his men to advance in -single file, stepping carefully in the footprints ahead. Twelve Marines -had passed safely when the 13th became the victim of a mine explosion. -The corpsman found broken bones but none of the usual torn flesh and -hemorrhaging, thanks to the new thermal boots issued during the winter -of 1951–1952.[342] - - [342] Later in the chapter this innovation will be described. - -The temperature was zero with a sharp wind blowing. Some of the Marines -had to shed clothing to keep the casualty warm during the forced -immobility, and the raiding party commander broke radio silence by -requesting permission of Captain Ord, in the support group area, to -pull back to that position and set up the ambush. - -Permission was granted by Ord after radio consultation with the -battalion commander on the How Company OP. The raiding party remained -in ambush formation on Objective 2 for two hours without seeing or -hearing an enemy. By that time the condition of the mine casualty had -deteriorated to such an extent that Lieutenant Colonel Pratt gave -permission for a return to the MLR without proceeding to Objective 3. - -He directed that the raiders split and take two routes in the hope of -capturing a prisoner, since a light enemy probing attack on the MLR -had just been reported by Item Company of 3/1. This proved to be a -fortunate decision, for two NKPA soldiers were seized. The main object -of the raid had thus been fulfilled, even though little action was seen -during the five-hour operation. - -Raids of this sort may seem anticlimactic when compared to the fights -in the same area during the first three weeks of September. But the -Marines were showing adaptability in conforming to a warfare of -position that was contrary to all their offensive training. Careful -reconnaissance, detailed planning, and minimal risks--these were the -elements of defensive tactics in which large forces had to content -themselves with small gains. - - -_Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command_ - -On 11 January 1952 the 1st Marine Division had its second change of -command in Korea when Major General John T. Selden relieved General -Thomas. The new commanding general was born at Richmond, Virginia, and -educated there at McGuire’s University School. Before the United States -entered World War I, he tried to join the Canadian Army but was warned -that he would lose his American citizenship. In January 1915, at the -age of 21, he enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps and saw two -years of active duty on jungle patrols in Haiti. Commissioned as a -second lieutenant in 1918, he served in ocean convoys during World War -I. - -Sea duty, China duty, and more Haiti duty occupied him during the -postwar years. The outbreak of World War II found him a Scouting Force -Marine Officer aboard the _Indianapolis_. After that he had three main -assignments: personnel and intelligence officer of I Marine Amphibious -Corps; commanding officer of the 5th Marines in the New Britain -operation; and chief of staff of the 1st Marine Division at Peleliu. - -Brigadier General William J. Whaling remained on duty as Assistant -Division Commander. The new staff officers were Colonel Richard G. -Weede, Chief of Staff; Colonel Walter N. Flournoy, G-1; Lieutenant -Colonel James H. Tinsley, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle, G-3; -and Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., G-4. - -A change of FMFPac command had taken place on 1 January. Lieutenant -General Franklin H. Hart relieved General Shepherd, who became -Commandant of the Marine Corps as General Cates finished his four-year -term. General Hart paid his first visit to the 1st Marine Division late -in January. - -The new FMFPac commander found the Marines occupying essentially the -same positions they had defended since late September. About two-thirds -of the 12¼-mile MLR on Line MINNESOTA (Map 20) was good defensive -ground. It had been strengthened by an elaborate system of trenches and -bunkers behind miles of barbed wire.[343] - - [343] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are - the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Jan, Feb, and Mar 52, and _PacFlt - Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX. - -In the left-central portion of the Marine sector, the enemy held the -dominating terrain. This was particularly true of the rugged area just -west of Hill 812, where the opposing trenches were only 50 to 150 yards -apart. There a fire-raked landmark, known to the Marines as Luke the -Gook’s Castle, had been made into a strong point by the enemy. Its base -was a maze of trenches and bunkers, and the 20-foot granite knob could -have been taken only at an excessive cost in casualties. Although this -bastion was hit repeatedly by almost every type of supporting ordnance, -it was never completely destroyed nor denied to the enemy. - -Operations of trench warfare had inevitably shaken down into a daily -routine of sniping by day and patrols or raids by night. Marine -artillery, mortars, and stationary tank fire, occasionally reinforced -by naval guns, played an increasingly important part in the coordinated -destruction of NKPA defenses. As a result the enemy was limited for the -most part to well camouflaged reverse slope positions. - -Because of the 1st Marine Division’s defensive mission and the -constant rotation of the more experienced personnel back to the United -States, it was considered that men assigned to infantry elements, in -particular, needed additional training in small unit leadership and -offensive tactics. Consequently the regiments were rotated at monthly -intervals to the reserve area near Wontong-ni, where Camp Tripoli -had been established for training. An average of 84 NCOs a week -completed a 168-hour special course of instruction over a four-week -period. The program for the rank and file was so intensive, according -to one report, that “it was considered a relief by some Marines to -cease training and return to the relatively quiet life on the front -lines.”[344] - - [344] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 4, IX, 9–11. - -The truce talks at Panmunjom continued to influence operations at the -front. A demilitarized zone having been proposed in anticipation of -an armistice, preparations were begun by the 1st Marine Division to -develop the defenses along Line ICELAND, generally conforming to the -Line KANSAS of Marine fights early in September. It was to be used as -a new line of defense if the UN and Communist delegates reached an -agreement. - -Perhaps because other offensive tactics were so curtailed, -psychological warfare had its heyday in the winter months of 1952. -Propaganda leaflets were dropped from planes or fired by 105mm -howitzers. At vantage points along the front, loud speakers bombarded -the Communists with surrender appeals in their own language. The -effects could not be evaluated with any degree of certainty, but it was -hoped that the enemy did not respond with the amused indifference shown -by the Marines toward Red propaganda. - - -_Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated_ - -The average low temperature for January 1952, was 11 degrees -Fahrenheit. This was mild weather as compared to the subzero readings -of the previous winter. Only 10 slight frostbite cases were reported -for the month in contrast to the 3,083 nonbattle casualties, nearly -all frostbite cases, incurred during the two weeks (27 November to 10 -December 1950) of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. - -The improvement in January 1952 could not be credited entirely to more -clement weather. It was due in greater measure to one of the most -noteworthy innovations of the Korean war--the insulated rubber combat -boot, which proved much superior to the shoe pac of the past winter. - -U.S. Army experiments dated back to 1944. They were dropped three years -later after efforts to perfect a boot with sealed insulation failed -to meet the test of long marches. The Navy had more promising results -with the boot during the winter of 1948–1949 when Arctic clothing -tests were conducted at Point Barrow, Alaska. Army and Navy tests at -Mt. Washington, New Hampshire, the following winter were inconclusive. -Marine Corps tests were held during the first four months of 1951 at -the following places: MCEB, Quantico; Fort Churchill, Manitoba; Big -Delta, Alaska; Pickel Meadows, California; and the Naval Medical Field -Research Laboratory (NMFRL), Camp Lejeune. - -“In addition to engineering tests,” states the Marine report, “the -insulated rubber boots have been worn by test subjects selected from -a variety of backgrounds; under conditions of activity varying from -strenuous marching for 20 miles to complete immobility; in ambient -temperatures from 58° to -42° F.; over terrain ranging from soft snow -[to] hard snow, ice, sand, rocky ground, mud, gravel, water, and iced -river banks; for periods of time corresponding to a normal working day -and more than 72 hours. As now constructed, the insulated rubber boot, -employing the vapor barrier principle, meets the requirements outlined -previously and is satisfactory for use by Marine Corps ground troops in -cold climate areas, supplanting the shoe-pac combination....”[345] - - [345] LtCol G. W. Hardwick, “Summary of Marine Corps Experience - with IRB [Insulated Rubber Boot], Rpt of 8 May 1951.” - Other sources for the development of the boot, also found - in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps, are as follows: - G. E. Folk, Abstract of Bowdoin College Rpt, Jun 1951, - “The Penetration of Water into the Human Foot;” G-4 Rpt, - “Resume of Activity re Insulated Rubber Boot,” 7 Feb - 1952; G-4 Rpt, “Boot, Rubber, Insulated, Cold Weather,” - 28 Nov 51; G-4 Rpt, “Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insulated, - Rubber,” n.d.; MajGen J. T. Selden memo to CMC, 26 Apr 52. - -The distinguishing feature of the “thermal boot,” as it came to be -popularly known, is an air space between the inner and outer layers -of wool pile insulation, both of which are completely sealed off by -latex from any contact with moisture. This air space, under pressure, -produces a vapor barrier such that heat cannot readily escape when it -is emitted from the foot. Thus the wearer of the boot supplies his -own warmth, which is retained as long as he is active, regardless of -prevailing temperatures. If, however, the walls of the air space are -punctured and the insulation becomes wet, the moisture collected within -the boot freezes at low temperatures if the wearer remains inactive. In -such cases, severe frostbite may result. - -Some of the tests were spectacular. One subject poured water containing -pieces of ice into his boots and donned frozen socks before putting on -the footgear. After 10 minutes of walking, the ice in the boots had -turned to warm water, and there was no harmful effect on the man. - -Another subject waded across a knee-deep creek at a temperature of -zero. Before he had marched a mile in the snow, his feet had warmed the -water in the boots, although his pants were frozen so stiff that he -could scarcely walk. - -Seldom has a military innovation been tested so thoroughly and -scientifically in such a short time. Colonels Ion M. Bethel and John -F. Stamm of Marine Corps Headquarters took a leading part in the -development and procurement phases along with Lieutenant Colonel Gordon -A. Hardwick. Major Vernon D. Boyd and Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. were -active in the troop acceptance tests. - -A good many “bugs” had to be eliminated before the boot met with -complete Marine approval. The manufacturer’s modifications were -effected with minimal delay. - -It is perhaps needless to add that the thermal boot was not foolproof. -Protection continued in subzero weather for at least an hour after -the termination of activity, but it was inviting frostbite to remain -motionless much longer. Socks had to be changed every 12 hours, and -foot cleanliness and hygiene could not be neglected. - -If a few such simple rules were observed, a man had virtually perfect -frostbite protection in the coldest weather. In fact, it was seriously -proposed that a Marine casualty of this sort should be charged with -misconduct if he acquired his frostbite while provided with thermal -boots and a change of socks. - -In view of the tests and negotiations with the manufacturers, it was a -marvel of promptness when the first shipment of boots reached the 1st -Marine Division in August 1951, long before the advent of cold weather. - -Distribution to the Division was completed by 15 November. Throughout -the winter the experience of all units concerned was reported to -Division headquarters. And in a memorandum of 26 August 1952 to the -Commandant, General Selden expressed his approval: “The boot, rubber, -insulated, is considered an excellent item of cold weather equipment. -It is far superior to the shoe pac.” - -The acceptance by the rank and file went so far that the “Mickey Mouse -boot,” as it was sometimes dubbed, acquired a reputation for protecting -the wearer against antipersonnel mines. Some wounds apparently were -reduced in severity by this protection, but it could not be claimed -that the boot qualified as armor. - -Production by the manufacturer kept pace with Division and Air Wing -requirements in Korea. By 14 December 1951 about 90,000 pairs of boots -and 2,000 patching kits had been received at San Francisco--more than -enough to take care of the 6,500 pairs needed monthly for resupply -under combat conditions. - -The thermal boot was here to stay. - - -_500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea_ - -Marine body armor was just then about to meet its first large-scale -test in the field. It had cleared its preliminary hurdle during the -tests from 14 June to 13 October 1951 (see Chapter VIII) when a joint -Army-Navy Medical Commission endorsed 40 vests worn in action by troops -of the 5th Marines and two Army infantry regiments. - -On 9 November, at Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine officers were -briefed on the successful results in Korea by the two Navy officers -who helped supervise the tests, Commander John S. Cowan (MC) USN, and -Lieutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN. - -That same day the commanding general of FMFPac stated an -operational requirement for 500 armored vests to be sent to the 1st -Marine Division. And on 16 November the Commandant approved the -standardization and procurement of vests to be designed by the Naval -Medical Field Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune and air-shipped to -Korea not later than 31 January 1952.[346] - - [346] Sources for this section, except when otherwise - specified, are the following: ACofS, G-4, Rpts of 2 Jan, - 29 Feb, and 15 May 52 (in G-4 files, Headquarters Marine - Corps); Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCEB, Quantico, Va., - 3 Jan 1952; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, ltr of 30 Jun 1954; - LtCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 1954. - -So many problems remained to be solved that it was nip and tuck whether -Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his NMFRL colleagues would make the -deadline. On 11 December 1951 another body armor meeting was held -at Marine Corps Headquarters, attended by Marine representatives. -Lieutenant Commander Lewis and Mr. John F. Quinlan, reporting for the -NMFRL, explained that as a consequence of changes in design to speed up -manufacture, samples submitted to them weighed as much as 10 pounds. - -Under no circumstances, said Lewis, would he approve a vest weighing -more than eight pounds, since its success depended so much on troop -acceptance. Despite the fact that only a few weeks remained before the -deadline, Lewis exhibited a vest that he and Quinlan had redesigned by -working around the clock until the armor came within the weight limit -without any sacrifice in protection. This vest was immediately put into -production as the M-1951. - -A plastic fibre manufacturer agreed to supply 70,000 Doron plates, and -a Philadelphia sportswear company contracted to manufacture the first -500 vests, plus an additional 2,500 to be delivered by 30 March 1952. -The M-1951 was described in Marine reports as “a zippered, vest-type, -sleeveless jacket constructed of water-resistant nylon incorporating -two types of armor. One, a flexible pad of basket-weave nylon, covers -the upper chest and shoulder girdle; the other, overlapping curved -Doron plates, covers the lower chest, back and abdomen. These Doron -plates consist of several layers of fibre glass cloth, bonded or -laminated together with a resin.... Although the ballistic properties -of the flexible pads of basket-weave nylon and the Doron plates are -virtually the same, by using the rigid plates where flexibility is not -mandatory the problem of protrusion and the resultant wounds under the -armor is reduced.”[347] - - [347] ACofS, G-4, “Instructional Information, Vest, Armored, - M-1951,” 5–6. - -Marine wearers of the M-1951 were warned that it would not stop rifle -or machine gun bullets unless they had lost much of their velocity at -long ranges. The vest was protection against most grenade, mortar, and -artillery fragments, as well as .45 caliber pistol and burp gun slugs -of less than 1,000 feet per second initial muzzle velocity. Wearers did -not escape entirely unscathed, for the impact of the fragment or slug -left painful bruises. - -It was a close squeak but the first 500 vests reached Korea with only -a few days to spare. Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. accompanied the -shipment as project officer with a mission of supervising and observing -the use made of the M-1951 in action. His first letter to Headquarters -Marine Corps, dated 4 February 1952, commented that “up to tonight we -have had nine men hit while wearing the vest. One was killed outright -as a 120mm mortar round landed right in his lap. However, the other -eight showed excellent results. All of the eight were wounded in -other places not covered by the vest--but they are all WIA instead of -KIA.”[348] - - [348] Capt D. W. McGrew, Jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, ltr of 4 - Feb 52. - -Captain McGrew cited the instance of a Pfc of the 2d Battalion, 7th -Marines, wounded by the explosion of an 82mm mortar shell only 15 feet -in front of him. He received several fragments in the face and his leg -was fractured. But there were some 45 holes in his vest, without any -penetrations. Fifteen of the fragments had been large enough to inflict -mortal chest or abdomen wounds. - -The 500 vests were issued only to troops in particularly hazardous -situations, such as patrols to the enemy lines. Upon returning from a -patrol or raid, the wearers turned in their armor to be worn by other -Marines under fire. - -“The reaction of the user to the vest,” reported McGrew, “is closely -related to the amount of enemy activity. In sectors of the OPLR and -MLR [outpost and main lines of resistance] where heavy incoming mortar -and artillery fire was received, there were no complaints regarding -the weight or restrictive features of the vest. In other sectors where -there was little or no enemy activity, approximately 15 percent of the -personnel complained that the vest was heavy and restricted movement to -some degree. Approximately 2 percent of the wearers in these sectors -thought the vest was not worth the trouble and would wear it only when -ordered to do so.”[349] - - [349] ACofS, G-4, “Report of Field Test of Armored Vest, - M-1951,” 15 May 51. - -The project officer believed that a “significant reduction” in KIA -casualties could be credited to the M-1951, but that WIA figures were -only slightly lessened. That was because so many wearers were wounded -who would have been killed save for the armor. Captain McGrew listed -the following case histories, confirmed by medical officers: - - Men who would have been killed instead of wounded if they had - lacked armor protection--23: - - Men who had potentially severe wounds reduced to superficial - wounds--29; - - Men who had superficial wounds prevented altogether--31. - -The project officer had no opportunity to compare the casualties of -vest wearers with those of an equal number of unprotected Marines -taking part in the same action. It was his conclusion, based on -observation, that “use of the vest by all personnel who are habitually -forward of battalion command posts may result in as much as a 30 -percent reduction in battle casualties. Because many WIA cases are -the result of wounds of the extremities and/or multiple wounds, there -probably will not be a large reduction of casualties in this category. -It is believed that the largest reduction will occur in the KIA -category and that this reduction will be substantial.”[350] - - [350] _Ibid._ - -The introduction of body armor was not heralded in the press by page -one headlines such as had announced the first transport helicopter -operations in Korea. Occasionally a photograph on page eight showed a -Marine grinning triumphantly while pointing to a hole in his armored -vest and holding aloft the jagged mortar fragment that might otherwise -have killed him. But it is safe to say that a majority of Stateside -newspaper readers and radio listeners in 1951 were unaware of the -Marine revival of armor adapted to 20th-century warfare. - -Press correspondents in Korea did not appear to grasp the tactical -significance of an innovation which they regarded entirely as a -humanitarian achievement. From a strictly military viewpoint, however, -it was apparent that if the M-1951 could reduce casualties by 30 -percent, as Captain McGrew estimated (and his estimate was later -regarded as conservative), it would mean that a like reduction had been -effected in the destructive potential of the enemy’s best antipersonnel -weapons. It was as if the Marines were able to slip behind the enemy’s -lines and silence 3 out of 10 of his howitzers, mortars, burp guns, and -grenades. - -This was of particular importance in overcoming the numerical -superiority of the Communists. Not only did each American wound -casualty reduce the effectiveness of a unit, but four or more comrades -were often neutralized as stretcher bearers in Korean mountain terrain. -If body armor could prevent 3 casualties out of 10, therefore, it -would be a significant addition to a unit’s numerical strength as well -as combat morale. - -Any doubts about Marine troop acceptance of the M-1951 were laid to -rest by the approval of the 500 vests issued early in February 1952. An -additional 2,500 arrived early in March and on the 13th of that month -the Division ordered 25,000 more. The armored vest, like the thermal -boot, had needed only a thorough trial to become standard equipment. - - -_Helicopter Operations_ MULETRAIN _and_ CHANGIE-CHANGIE - -The combat helicopter, oldest of the three Marine tactical innovations -in Korea, had already managed to make routine performances out of -operations that once claimed headlines. Battalion troop lifts were no -longer a novelty, and supplying a front-line company by air was taken -for granted. But nothing quite as ambitious as Operation MULETRAIN had -ever been attempted--the mission of completely supplying a battalion on -the MLR for a week with a daily average of four helicopters. - -Hill 884 was again the objective. Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon’s HMR-161 -was given the task of flying tentage, stoves, rations, and ammunition -from supply dumps to the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines, commanded by -Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman. - -It was the first opportunity for HMR-161 to try out improvements in -helicopter “flying crane” techniques credited to Major Charles E. -Cornwell. He had adapted the underslung nets, controlled manually -from the cabin, which did a better job than the pallet, or portable -platform, for many types of cargo. - -An average altitude of 2,300 feet for the five landing places made it -necessary to reduce the payload to 850 pounds. Yet HMR-161 handled -the assignment during the first week of 1952 with about one-third of -its aircraft while the remainder went about routine chores. So well -did four helicopters keep ahead of schedule that sometimes they flew -in more cargo than could be immediately unloaded at the objectives. -Following are the statistics of the seven days: - - Pounds lifted, 150,730; Hours of flight time, 91.7; Loads lifted, - 219; Average of miles flown, 9.6 - -Three days later, Operation CHANGIE-CHANGIE began on 10 January 1952. -Like Operation BUMBLEBEE three months earlier, this was a battalion -relief lift. Yet it differed from its predecessors in that troops -were to be flown from Field X-83 to sites on the company instead of -battalion level, the former being only 200 yards behind the front -line.[351] - - [351] Sources for the helicopter operations described in this - section are the following: HMR-161, _HD_, Jan and Feb 51; - _Cavalry of the Sky_, 176–175. Veterans of the Korean - conflict will recall that “changie-changie” meant “swap” - in the pidgin English serving as a conversational medium - between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable - to a relief operation. - -In December the loading zone and landing site duties formerly assigned -to a platoon of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, were taken over by the -1st Air Delivery Platoon, Service Command, FMFPac. First Lieutenant -William A. Reavis and 35 enlisted men had a mission “to prepare -and deliver supplies by air, whether by parachute, air freight, -or helicopter.” These specialists were in charge during Operation -CHANGIE-CHANGIE when the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel -Edward G. Kurdziel) relieved Lieutenant Colonel Norton’s 1st Battalion, -5th Marines. The operation was conducted smoothly by helicopters flying -in defilade throughout the approach, landing, and return phases. - -Operation MOUSETRAP, from 14 to 17 January, was planned primarily as -a test of the ability of HMR-161 to launch an antiguerrilla attack on -short notice. Colonel McCutcheon and Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell were -alerted at 0100 in regard to a two-company lift scheduled for 1000 -that same morning. With “only minor difficulties” they transported 500 -Marines to a landing site cleared by the Air Delivery Platoon. Three -similar troop movements were completed by HMR-161 during the next three -days. - -If ever a bronze plaque is awarded in commemoration of the first -history-making helicopter troop and supply lifts, it would be fitting -to install it on Hill 884. That bleak and roadless height had its fifth -large-scale operation on 24 February when Lieutenant Colonel Harold -C. Howard’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved the 2d Battalion, -of that same regiment on “Mount Helicopter.” Operation ROTATE was -completed without incident as further evidence that battalion reliefs -by helicopter were now routine. - -In spite of the demands made upon HMR-161 helicopters in cold weather -and mountainous terrain, it is noteworthy that no serious mechanical -defects had developed. This six-month record came to an end on 24 -February 1952 when Captain John R. Irwin was returning from Seoul to -X-83. Warned by alarming vibrations, he landed to discover that the -broken remnants of the tail assembly had dropped behind him in the snow. - -Four days later, while flying a load of logs for bunkers, Captain -Calvin G. Alston’s aircraft was so shaken by vibrations that he -suspected damage from enemy artillery fragments. He made a forced -landing in the snow only to discover another instance of a tail -assembly breakdown. - -Colonel McCutcheon grounded all HMR-161 aircraft until the trouble -could be corrected. Not until 14 March, after 16 modified tail -assemblies had been flown to Korea did the Marine transport helicopter -squadron take to the air again. - - -_The Five Days of Operation_ CLAM-UP - -Ground operations continued with little change during February and -the first two weeks of March. The only departure from the well-worn -tactical norm came on 10 February, when EUSAK put Operation CLAM-UP -into effect across the entire UN front. - -The purpose was to feign a withdrawal and lure the enemy into sending -out patrols which would yield prisoners to Eighth Army units. A EUSAK -letter of instruction, dated 4 February 1952, asserted that “a policy -of aggressive patrolling has led the enemy to rely upon our patrols -for the maintenance of contact. This situation enables him to maintain -contact without subjecting his troops to the hazard of capture or -casualty.”[352] - - [352] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon - the 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 1–12; and _PacFlt Interim - Rpt_ No. 4, 9–11 to 9–14. - -All corps were directed to “... attempt to decoy the enemy into -dispatching patrols against our lines and ambush and capture such -patrols.” - -First Marine Division orders called for an elaborate series of -deceptions. Immediately prior to CLAM-UP, on 9–10 February, the 11th -Marines fired 471 harrassing and interdiction missions, as if to -cover a large-scale withdrawal. Over 12,000 artillery rounds were -expended.[353] Then CLAM-UP commenced, and the three regiments on the -MLR--from left to right, the KMCs, 1st Marines, and 7th Marines--did -their part to hoodwink the enemy. Reserve battalions executed daylight -marches on foot to the rear and returned after dark by means of motor -lifts. The 5th Marines, in Division reserve at Camp Tripoli, executed -similar feigned withdrawals. - - [353] 11thMar _HD_, Feb 52, 13; Col B. T. Hemphill comments, 20 - Jan 59. - -After the Marine cannoneers completed their supposed covering fires, -the front was plunged into an eerie silence. It did not take long, -of course, for the enemy’s curiosity to be aroused. NKPA patrols -reconnoitred the Marine lines on the night of 10–11 February without -being fired upon. The following night a patrol attempted to draw Marine -fire in the Hill 812 area by advertising its presence with loud talk. -The enemy’s fire was not returned until the patrol attacked a Marine -position with white phosphorous grenades. In sheer self-defense the -Marines retaliated, and the North Koreans made a hurried exit, leaving -behind 10 dead and 2 wounded men who became prisoners. - -At first light on the 12th another enemy patrol tried to penetrate the -wire in front of a 1st Marines position and paid the penalty with nine -men killed and three wounded in a 15-minute fire fight. - -On 13 February the Marines were pounded with the month’s heaviest -concentration of NKPA fire--344 artillery and 1,469 mortar rounds. Thus -did the enemy serve notice of his realization that Marine positions on -the MLR were being held in strength. NKPA patrol actions on the nights -of the 13th and 14th were launched at Marine trenches on Hills 812 and -854 at the estimated cost of heavy casualties. - -When Operation CLAM-UP came to an end on 15 February, it had admittedly -fallen short of EUSAK expectations. Although NKPA patrol losses had -been considerable, they were offset by fewer casualties in rear areas -enjoying a five-day immunity from UN artillery fire. Worse yet, the -enemy was enabled during this period of grace to bring up ammunition -and other supplies without interference. As a final disillusionment, it -was reckoned that across the whole Eighth Army front the Communists had -lost fewer prisoners than during the preceding five-day period. - -In the Marine combat zone a gain was recorded in enemy casualties. -General Selden congratulated the Division on “the fire discipline -practiced by MLR troops and by platoon and company commanders. As a -consequence of the fire discipline, the line companies were able to -kill 56 enemy and wound 54.” These totals, it was pointed out, were -larger than the losses normally inflicted on the enemy in a five-day -period.[354] - - [354] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 52, 3. - -On the other hand, five deserters from the mortar company of the 1st -Battalion, 91st Regiment, 45th NKPA Division revealed that advantage -had been taken of Operation CLAM-UP by detailing mortar personnel and -men from the rifle companies to carry ammunition. During the five-day -lull, according to the prisoners, 2,600 rounds were brought up for the -company’s nine mortars.[355] - - [355] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ No. 486, Feb 52. - -After the brief flurry of Operation CLAM-UP the front quickly settled -down to its old routine of patrols. An average of eight Marine night -ambush patrols and five daylight reconnaissance patrols forward of the -MLR was maintained. The results left much to be desired. Of the last -110 ambuscades and 75 reconnaissance patrols reported in February, only -1 of the former and 6 of the latter claimed contacts. All but one of -the contacts had negligible results. - -The Marine fire attack did the enemy more damage. Artillery fired 679 -observed missions during the month--211 on troops, 175 on bunkers, 121 -on mortars, 96 on artillery, and 75 on such miscellaneous targets as -OPs, vehicles, machine guns, and supply points. This total was recorded -in spite of an ammunition shortage which would ultimately become the -subject of debate in Congress. - -Even with supplies of ammunition limited by X Corps orders, Marine -artillery drove the enemy from untenable forward-slope positions to -underground fortifications on the reverse slope. - -Naval gunfire was limited by the extreme range to the Division zone -of action.[356] Only large targets forward and to the right of center -could be taken under fire. Even so, the _Wisconsin_ and the _St. -Paul_ scored some devastating hits in February on enemy reverse slope -positions. - - [356] The battleship _Wisconsin_ had a main battery of 16-inch - guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy - cruiser _St. Paul_ had a main battery of 8-inch guns with - a maximum range of 16 miles. - -On one occasion, the _Wisconsin_ erroneously calculated its deflection. -Two 16-inch rounds landed between the front line and the 3/7 mortar -positions before the fire could be stopped. Fortunately, no one was -injured. The _Wisconsin_ Marine officer happened to be visiting the -Division CP that day, and on hearing the news he came up to 3/7 and -collected a large shell fragment. He stated that he intended to mount -the jagged piece of steel in the ship’s CIC room as a reminder to -future gunners to make no errors in plot. - -Observed direct fire by the 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion -(Major Walter E. Reynolds, Jr.) continued to be effective against NKPA -bunkers and gun emplacements. Utilizing the high ground along the MLR, -particularly on Hills 812 and 854, tanks sniped at the enemy both by -day and night. - -This was made possible by the powerful lights of a platoon from the -92d U.S. Army Searchlight Company, attached to the 11th Marines. The -mountainous terrain in East Korea was not particularly suited to -“artificial moonlight”--the indirect illumination of a large area which -results from “bouncing” the rays of searchlights off low-lying clouds. -But direct illumination permitted aimed 90mm fire in the darkness and -had the further advantage of blinding the enemy to the tanks themselves -as well as to troop movements behind them. Not a single light was shot -out during the winter in spite of persistent NKPA attempts. - -The lessons taught by battlefield illumination in Korea were to be -incorporated into two instructive bulletins after the war. “The enemy -does _not_ have any better night vision than we do,” asserted USMC -Landing Force Bulletin No. 6. “No racial or national group of people -has any inherent physical advantage over another as to capability for -seeing in darkness....[357] The apparent advantage which the enemy -sometimes displays in night operations is due only to a difference -in training. In the case of the Oriental soldier, or the Eskimo, for -example, training usually begins early in life, where he does not have -the convenience of artificial light to the degree we have, and has been -forced to make maximum use of his natural night vision in many of his -normal activities. - -“U.S. Forces have conducted many successful night operations after -adequate training. Some units have reported that after intensive night -training, personnel have become so proficient that they sometimes -prefer night operations to daylight operations.” - - [357] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night - Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No. - 18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56. - -In support of this conclusion, records for the winter of 1951–1952 -reveal that the Marines held their own very well in the night combats -of no man’s land, where the outcome depended upon immediate decisions -based upon seeing in the dark. - -Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, were -23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. Enemy losses -were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 606 estimated WIA, -and 63 prisoners.[358] - - [358] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for - this chapter are comments and criticism by the following - officers: (Ranks listed are those held at time of - interview or comment.) Gen G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T. - Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J. - H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T. - Hemphill. - -After a winter of positional warfare, the Marines could recall with -better understanding the tales their fathers had told them about -France in World War I. For history was staging one of its repetitions; -and, allowing for improvements in weapons, the trenches of Korea in -1951–1952 differed but slightly from the trenches of the Western Front -in 1917–1918. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -The Move to West Korea - -_Truce Talks--Tactical Innovations--The Marines in Operation_ -MIXMASTER--_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_ - - -No chronicle of activities in Korea would be complete without a -discussion of the truce talks which began in the summer of 1951. -When the Communists proposed these meetings early in June, their -motives were transparent; they were hurt, staggering, and badly in -need of a breathing spell. Pretending a sudden interest in peace, the -hard-pressed enemy requested talks at Kaesong for the purposes of -recuperation. - -The enemy would never admit the real damage he suffered. A typical -excuse for the smashing CCF defeat was given in a book by Wilford G. -Burchett, an Australian Communist who was a press correspondent behind -the Chinese lines. - -“Immediately prior to the beginning of the talks,” he explained, -“the Korean-Chinese troops had withdrawn extensively along the East -Coast, hoping to entice the Americans as deep as possible into a trap -which would be sprung and would cut them off by an encircling move. -The Americans were seriously nibbling at the bait when the proposal -for cease-fire talks was made. The line was immediately frozen and -Korean-Chinese troops started to dig in.”[359] - - [359] Wilford G. Burchett: _This Monstrous War_ (Melbourne, - 1953): J. Waters, 121–122. Burchett was a Communist free - lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers. He wrote - several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in - the Korean War. - -This beginning of static warfare was unquestionably the great turning -point of a war whose course from that time on was to be decided at -the conference table of Kaesong and later Panmunjom. Any doubts as to -the actual motives of the Communists might have been dispelled upon -reading in Burchett’s book this naive boast of the advantage taken of -the truce talks by the Reds: - - Digging in is an understatement of the way the Korean-Chinese - troops literally burrowed into the mountains, constructed two - and three story dwellings underground, linked mountains and - hills by underground tunnels and carved deep communication - trenches linking flank with flank and front with rear. They raked - the insides out of mountains as you would rake ashes out of a - furnace. Each hill, mountain or ridge was connected with its - neighbors by deep, zig-zagged inter-communication trenches, at - least two yards below ground level and with yard-high antiblast - walls. In emergency, troops could be switched from hill-top - to hill-top with the enemy never knowing. Similar trenches - extended well to the rear, so that supplies could be brought - up and withdrawals if necessary made in comparative safety.... - Everything was deep underground with many yards of rock and earth - between them and shells and bombs, atomic or otherwise. Back of - the front line positions, similar scooped-out mountain ridges - stretched all the way back to Pyongyang and further. It was - against these positions that Van Fleet began hurling his troops - in August, 1951.[360] - - [360] _Ibid._ General Van Fleet did not “hurl” his troops - against anything. He began limited offensives for the - purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining - offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, ltr of 28 - Feb 59. - -The breathing spell provided by preliminary truce talk discussions gave -the Communists an opportunity they had not previously enjoyed. Not only -did they have time to prepare sturdy and effective entrenchments, but -they were able to bring up additional mortars and artillery to equal -those of the Allied forces. As a further advantage, while “free from -the compulsion of impending military disaster,”[361] they made use -of the interlude to reorganize and train NKPA divisions to a new and -increased level of effectiveness. - - [361] C. Turner Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 28. - -Communists are never embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement -already reached, and once having accomplished their intermediate goal, -the Red delegates broke off the Kaesong talks for a while. Once the -pressure on them was reduced, the enemy was in a position to try to -obtain the most favorable terms for armistice talks, even if it meant -prolonging the fighting. - -The change in tactics soon became apparent. “Since the opening of the -Kaesong conference,” commented a FECom G-2 report, “the enemy has -deviated from his usual tactics of ‘flexible defense’ which he so -skilfully employed during the buildup period prior to all his past -offensives--to that of a more orthodox ‘fixed defense.’ Where the enemy -in the past has defended key terrain features with relatively small -groups to delay friendly forces, he has now changed over to tactics of -a fixed line of defense to be defended at all costs.”[362] - - [362] FECom G-2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51. - -“The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armistice Conference -by the Communists was in connection with the exchange of prisoners of -war,”[363] which subject will be discussed in Volume V of this series. -The United Nations contended that all prisoners should be “screened” -to determine whether they wished to return to their side of origin. No -prisoner was to be returned against his wishes. The Communists claimed -this treatment consisted of a reign of terror in which CCF prisoners -were held at gunpoint. - - [363] Joy, _How Communists Negotiate_, 53. - -Some prisoners held in UN camps rioted and injuries and deaths -resulted. This provided the Communists with excellent propaganda on -which to denounce our principles of no forced repatriation.[364] In -the end, after a delay of more than 14 months of war, the Communists -finally did accept this principle, and an armistice was achieved. - - [364] _Ibid._ - -The Communist delaying tactics were not entirely without benefits -to the Allied forces, for the major part of the 1st Marine Division -had the opportunity to go into reserve and engage in several weeks’ -intensive training. While the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was busily -participating in the interdiction activities of Operation STRANGLE, -General Van Fleet and his ground commanders felt frustrated over their -orders to “sit tight” rather than attack and prevent further enemy -buildup. - -An agreement to resume cease-fire talks, this time at Panmunjom, led to -a EUSAK order which committed the 1st Marine Division and other major -units to a defensive stand behind a fixed line of demarcation on 20 -September 1951 (Map 19). Further negotiations resulted in a month’s -lull which was brought about by the fact that the delegates could -not agree on where the lines would remain if the fighting stopped. -The United States delegates pressed for a settlement within a 30-day -period. The Communists continued to stall. The United States then -consented to accept the present (then current) demarcation line if the -Communists agreed within the 30-day period.[365] - - [365] Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59. - -The significance of these dates was to become more and more plain as -the conflict dragged on into 1952 with both sides on the defensive, -limiting themselves to the raids and patrols of positional warfare -while the appointed representatives haggled for a truce. Although the -Marines did not realize it, the war had already turned into a contest -of watchful waiting and fierce local fights. - -This line of demarcation left the Eighth Army holding a MLR across -one of the narrowest parts of the peninsula (Map 22). Just behind -the Communist MLR the peninsula bulged to the west. This meant that -the enemy had to devote much of his effort to mining the waters and -defense of many beaches against a surprise amphibious attack, and it -necessitated keeping in operation long and vulnerable supply lines. - -It is probable that a UN breakthrough or successful amphibious -operation could have been mounted at this time,[366] for several high -ranking officers expressed such opinions. All the necessary ingredients -were available, yet the high level decision for such an operation was -not made. - - [366] BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59. - - -_Tactical Innovations_ - -Until World War II, it had been a deserved reproach throughout the -brief history of our country that Americans were never prepared at the -outset of a war. A welcome departure from this tenet came in 1942 when -the Marine Corps and Navy introduced the new amphibious tactics they -had developed during the 1930s. Victory in the Pacific War was due in -large measure to the techniques, landing craft, and vehicles of the -Navy-Marine Corps ship-to-shore attack. - -As a result, North Africa, Europe, and the Japanese-occupied islands of -the Pacific were opened to invasion without a single major reverse. In -contrast, Hitler’s _Wehrmacht_ lacked both the techniques and equipment -to launch a cross-channel attack on England in 1940, and Operation SEA -LION was of necessity abandoned by an army that dominated the rest of -Europe as a result of victories in land warfare. - -Again, in Korea, the Marines demonstrated their foresightedness -by taking a prominent part in the development of such important -innovations as combat helicopters, body armor, and thermal -footwear.[367] By the first month in 1952 the combat helicopter had -proved to be of immeasurable assistance in modern warfare, in the -beginning of the Korean War the “chopper” was initially used for -command and liaison flights and reconnaissance missions. Evacuation of -casualties and rescue missions also became routine duties, and within -a short time the helicopter became the favorite “workhorse” for a -variety of tasks. In September of 1951 tactical troop movements began. -These operations made newspaper headlines everywhere. - - [367] Previous chapters discuss the background and development - of these innovations. - -Of greater tactical importance, at least in the opinion of the -front-line rifleman, was the physical protection provided him. The -armored vest and the new thermal boots were first tested by Marines -late in 1951 and soon came to be highly desired items of equipment. - -The fighting men in Korea would not disagree with Benjamin Franklin’s -statement that “there never was a good war,” but modern inventions -certainly improved conditions by providing for the safety and comfort -of the fighting men. Marine transport helicopters and body armor were -of particular importance because they added to the human resources -of UN forces opposed by an enemy with a contempt for life, based on -seemingly endless reserves of manpower. UN commanders in their fight -against the Communist forces could not recklessly expend lives as did -the enemy; therefore, the Allies had need of tactical innovations and -life-saving devices in order to compensate for a lack of numbers. - - -_The Marines in Operation_ MIXMASTER - -In the spring of 1952, when the UN and Communist forces were facing -each other from static positions and fighting local engagements, -Operation MIXMASTER took place. MIXMASTER was a complicated -rearrangement of UN divisions across the entire Korean front during -March, and involved the shuffling of about 200,000 men and their -equipment over distances from 25 to 180 miles. It was a severe test of -Eighth Army mobility.[368] - - [368] Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59. - -General Van Fleet visited the 1st Marine Division CP on 12 March 1952, -and announced an important command decision. After six months of -defensive warfare in the same sector along Line MINNESOTA (20 September -1951 to 16 March 1952) the Division was to move across the peninsula to -West Korea. - -[Illustration: EUSAK DISPOSITIONS - -15 MARCH 1952 - -MAP 22] - -The Marines had orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take -over a sector at the extreme left of the Eighth Army line under the -operational control of I Corps (Map 22). There they would have the -responsibility for blocking Korea’s historic invasion route to Seoul. -The reasons behind this EUSAK decision were summarized in the 1st -Marine Division report as follows: - - (1) The abandonment of plans to carry out an amphibious - envelopment somewhere on the east coast; - - (2) Concern over weaknesses in the Kimpo area defenses; - - (3) The overall situation would not permit loss of ground on the - EUSAK left (South Korea) as this would endanger the capital at - Seoul; that if retraction of lines was necessary, territory could - better be sacrificed on the right (North Korea) where the country - was mountainous and had little economic or strategic value.[369] - - [369] 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52, 1–2. - -Up to this time the four corps of the Eighth Army had defended a -125-mile front across the peninsula (Map 22) with the following units -in line from left to right on 15 March 1952. - - I CORPS--ROK 1st Division; British Commonwealth Division; U.S. 3d - Infantry Division (-); U.S. 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma - National Guard); ROK 9th Division. In reserve were the ROK 8th - Division and RCT-65 of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division. - - IX CORPS--U.S. 2d Infantry Division; ROK 2d Division; U.S. 40th - Infantry Division (California National Guard); ROK 3d Division. - In reserve were the U.S. 7th Infantry Division (-), RCT-17 of - that Division, and the ROK Capitol Division. - - X CORPS--ROK 7th Division; U.S. 25th Infantry Division; U.S. 1st - Marine Division (including 1st KMC Regiment). In reserve was - the ROK 6th Division (-). - - I ROK CORPS--ROK 5th Division (-). In reserve was the ROK 11th - Division (-).[370] - - [370] EUSAK _Cmd Rpt_, Mar 52, 13–14. - -Allowing for a few changes, these were the positions held by major -EUSAK units through the winter of 1951–1952. - -The Marine move was launched by Division Operation Plan 2-52 and -provided that the 1st Marine Division would be relieved by the 8th ROK -Division as a preliminary to movement overland and by sea to the relief -of the 1st ROK Division and defense of Line JAMESTOWN in the I Corps -sector in the west. According to verbal orders later confirmed by EUSAK -OI 272, transportation by truck and ship was specified, and the move -was to be completed prior to 1 April.[371] - - [371] Sources for this section are 1stMarDiv _HD_, Mar 52, - 9–10; 1st MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52; 7th MT Bn _HD_, Mar 52. - -Obviously such a transplacement--moving entire divisions great -distances from one sector of the MLR to another--necessitated careful -timing and close coordination, but the planners involved were equal to -the task. In referring to detailed plans by the Division G-3 Section -(Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle) and the G-4 Section (Colonel -Robert A. McGill), several unit commanders expressed the opinion that -“the move from east to west was a masterpiece of logistical efficiency -with no unnecessary paper work and no undue harrassment.”[372] - - [372] Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others. - -In addition to transporting the Division, the arrival of replacements -and departure of personnel to be rotated to the United States were -smoothly coordinated into the over-all plan. The transport _General -W. H. Gordon_ anchored at Sokcho-ri on 16 March with 174 officers and -1,135 enlisted men of the 18th Replacement Draft. The newly arrived -Marines scarcely had time to drop their seabags before they joined the -motor march to West Korea. The _Gordon_ departed with 103 officers and -1,135 Marines homeward bound, and the 2d Logistical Command (Army) -received a 1st Marine Division request to route the 19th Replacement -Draft, due in April, to Inchon instead of Sokcho-ri. - -At K-50, near Sokcho-ri on the east coast, air freight and passenger -service was discontinued and diverted to the new Division airhead, -K-16, at Seoul. The Division railhead was changed to Munsan-ni (Map 22). - -The first Marine unit to depart for West Korea was the KMC Regiment -with its organic battalion of artillery. Since the artillery had -to be moved and repositioned all across the front with as little -interruption as possible in overall support available at any one time, -the 11th Marines CO planned to move his battalions directly into -their new firing positions. This was preceded by an initial detailed -reconnaissance. - -Elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry sideslipped to the right and assumed -responsibility for the Marine sector on the 17th (Map 22), and the KMCs -and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines moved into their new positions on -18 March. The other artillery battalions followed at two-day intervals, -all battalions firing from their new positions by 24 March. - -The movement of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion (less Company A), -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. O’Neill, was an unforgettable -experience. Embarking on LSTs manned by a skeleton Japanese crew, the -vessels headed for the Kimpo Peninsula. The weather was squally and -foggy throughout, and the ships were completely blacked out at night -with no facilities for emergency transmission of messages. There were -many navigational hazards, but in spite of this, and the lack of -adequate navigational equipment, the LSTs arrived at their destination -without incident. - -Two days later, on 20 September, the 1st Tank Battalion and the -antitank companies of the three infantry regiments also took the sea -route to the new Division area in the west. - -Division Operation Order 8-52, dated 18 March, directed the 1st Marines -to proceed by motor march from the Division reserve area at Camp -TRIPOLI to the new Division area east of Munsan-ni, and there to move -into front line positions. The 7th Marines, after being relieved on the -20th by elements of the 8th ROK Division, assembled at Camp TRIPOLI -and moved by truck to West Korea. Colonel Austin R. Brunelli, who had -replaced Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., as chief of staff, moved the -forward CP personnel and prepared the new Division command post. - -After being relieved by the ROKs on the 23d, the 5th Marines departed -their east coast area. Two days later the regiment arrived in the -Munsan-ni area behind the 7th Marines and the remaining elements of the -artillery regiment. - -The 5th Marines had originally been scheduled to occupy reserve -positions on the Kimpo Peninsula, but plans were changed en route. The -commanding general and his G-3 were appalled at the Division sector’s -width, and after General Selden had a chance to inspect the areas to -be defended and talk over the situation with the commanders of the 1st -and 7th Marines (Col Sidney S. Wade and Col Russell E. Honsowetz), he -decided that the 5th Marines should go into the line.[373] - - [373] _Ibid._ - -A few hours after the 5th Marines convoy left the east coast on their -140-mile trans-Korea move, helicopters picked up the regimental and -battalion commanders from their respective vehicles in the convoy -and took them to the new Division CP. There they were assigned new -defensive sectors and immediately reconnoitered the ground while -awaiting the arrival of their units. By the time the regiment arrived, -all preparations were made for them to move into positions and relieve -a portion of the thinly stretched line of the 1st Marines. - -It had been a busy week for the 1st and 7th Motor Transport Battalions, -commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman and -Major Herbert E. Pierce. Two hundred Division trucks and a like number -of U.S. Army vehicles made up the long columns that shuttled back and -forth across the peninsula. The plan provided for moving an infantry -regiment every third day. For the drivers this meant a 140-mile trip, -a return trip the following day, and a one-day layover for maintenance -before commencing the new cycle. The artillery battalions, by order of -X Corps, were retained until the latest possible date. - -The statistics of Operation MIXMASTER are impressive. It took 5,716 -truck loads and 80 DUKW loads to move most of the Division personnel, -gear, and supplies. Sixty-three lowboys (flat-bed trailers) and 83 -railroad cars were also utilized in addition to hundreds of jeeps and -jeep trailers. Three LSDs and 11 LSTs sailed from Sokcho-ri to Inchon -with the heaviest equipment. - -During the previous winter a sizable number of prefabricated shelters -had been set up for supporting and headquarters units. Since timber, -logs, and salvage materials were in short supply, the 1st Marine -Division moved large quantities of these materials to the west coast -in order to live as comfortably as possible under static warfare -conditions. - -The operations of the 1st Marine Division in defense of the western -sector of Line JAMESTOWN do not come within the scope of Volume IV. The -account of Marine activities in the new sector, under the operational -control of I Corps, will be discussed in the fifth and final volume of -this series. - - -_Operations of Fifteen Months in Retrospect_ - -During 1951 the Korean War became a most unpopular military venture -among Americans. As a consequence, letters and newspapers from home -caused a certain amount of anxiety among citizen-soldiers in Korea. To -counter any spirit of doubt which may have arisen, military leaders -issued frank and honest replies to inquiring politicians. - -The _esprit de corps_ of Marines was high, and they were well aware -of their purpose in Korea. One noted author, on spending a couple of -days among front-line Marines during January of 1952, told a group of -officers at the Division CP that he “was impressed with the morale of -the Marines on the MLR.” He stated that he “had been prepared to find -that they didn’t know what they were fighting for or why they were -there.” However, he was encouraged to find that they knew exactly their -purpose in the Korean fighting.[374] - - [374] Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James - Michener’s visit to 1stMarDiv, ltr of 23 Mar 59. - -The period of nearly 15 months covered by Volume IV was at that time -the longest stretch of land warfare ever experienced by a major Marine -unit. Even during the numerous island-hopping campaigns of World War -II, the periods of combat were relatively brief for each. - -Glancing back over the year 1951 with the benefit of hindsight, -it is evident that Marine “uncommon valor” during this period was -supplemented by such outstanding innovations as helicopter-borne -assaults and lightweight body armor, concepts brought to fruition by -the pressure of combat. - -It is also apparent that Marine training, both for officers and -enlisted men, paid off handsomely under the demands of practically -every type of land warfare. The Division chalked up a commendable -record of service fighting on the east-central front. Since the UN -commander desired to have EUSAK’s only amphibious trained and equipped -division near a coast offering a suitable selection of landing -beaches, the Division was originally positioned in the east. Not since -the Inchon landing, however, had the Marines been employed in their -specialty, amphibious assault. - -Subsequent to the unprecedented Chosin Reservoir campaign of late 1950 -the Division reorganized and refitted in South Korea near Masan. Then -in January and February of 1951 came the prolonged guerrilla-hunting -campaign (Map 5) some 60 air miles north of Masan. Division operations -in this area covered more than 1,000 square miles.[375] - - [375] Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 28 Jan 59. - -The mountainous terrain offered cover and concealment for the -clandestine operations of far too many enemy groups. A solution to -this problem was found in “rice paddy patrols”--groups ranging from a -fire team to a squad in size which penetrated the mountain areas on -foot to flush out small enemy bands. In retrospect, had one squadron -of helicopters been available at that time, and its quick lift -capabilities utilized, the increased mobility and surveillance would -have made quite a difference in the conduct of the action. - -Although land-based Marine air power had been under operational control -of the Fifth Air Force during the Chosin Reservoir fighting, a verbal -agreement allowed the 1st MAW commander to provide directly necessary -support to the 1st Marine Division. At the same time, carrier-based -Marine planes were flying on the west coast along with other Allied -planes harrassing enemy traffic. - -During the guerrilla hunt VMO-6 planes provided air support to the 1st -Marine Division while Marine attack aircraft were busy elsewhere along -the Eighth Army front. Marine pilots, operating under JOC control, felt -frustrated because they were unable to provide the timely close air -support desired by the infantry. The Marine viewpoint held that too -many links in the Air Force system of control caused an excessive delay -in bringing air power over the target. This system continued for the -remainder of the year. - -As an operation, the guerrilla hunt was merely a series of minor -engagements, but it accomplished its purpose of clearing out most of -the North Korean irregulars who had been a constant threat in the -Eighth Army’s rear. In addition, the numerous small patrols provided -excellent training for the newly arrived replacements. - -The Eighth Army seemed to gain new vitality under General Ridgway. -On the 18th of February, when the general learned that the enemy was -withdrawing, he ordered a limited offensive. Operation KILLER began -three days later, and was followed by Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The -purpose of these operations was twofold: (1) General Ridgway wanted -to restore his army’s fighting spirit after its two defeats during -the 1950–1951 winter; and (2) he wished to keep the Chinese Reds off -balance while they prepared for another Communist offensive. - -For the Marines these two operations were an experience with a strictly -limited offensive. The advance was “buttoned up” as major units paid -close attention to lateral contact. As the advance continued in March -and April, mud proved to be an adversary second only to a formidable -enemy using delaying tactics, and the Division as a whole had a -thorough workout in the logistics of the offensive under adverse -conditions. - -In early April the Division, as part of the Eighth Army, crossed the -38th parallel and continued the attack to the north, the purpose being -to threaten the suspected enemy buildup for an offensive. EUSAK forces -rolled onward while the enemy, using his roving defensive tactics, -fought vigorously and withdrew. - -The long-expected enemy counterblow fell on the night of 22 April and -resulted in the 1st Marine Division bearing the brunt of a 48-hour -attack (Map 10). This opening CCF assault in the IX Corps area of -east-central Korea was intended to throw the Eighth Army off balance as -a preliminary to aiming the main blow at I Corps in west Korea. - -The CCF attack opened a hole in the MLR large enough for a major -breakthrough, and the Communists apparently expected to exploit -this success to the fullest. However, the Allied line pulled back, -consolidated, and held, as the Division’s reserve regiment was thrown -in to stem the tide. As the Marine flank was refused, the units on -the left found themselves facing to the west while stopping the enemy -thrust. Slowly, trading space for time, the Marines contained the enemy -attack while the entire Eighth Army line organized new positions. - -The enemy effort ground to a halt in the east-central sector, and the -Chinese Reds were contravened in their attempt to take Seoul by May -Day. Surprise and impetus were lost on the western front when they -struck several days later, only to be stopped with frightful losses -after a few gains on regimental fronts. The Allied line now held firm. - -The Division’s war of maneuver had worked well in halting this round -of the CCF offensive, but the Communists were far from finished. As 17 -enemy divisions were still available to attack, the Marine division was -shifted to the east on 1 May in preparation for an expected battle. - -On the 16th of May the Chinese offensive again opened, with the enemy -hitting more to the east than had been expected, and making a deep -but narrow penetration near the coast. The Marines moved eastward, -established blocking positions, and engaged fringe units of the drive. -This allowed the right flank Army division to move farther east and -brake the enemy’s rush. - -The enemy was dangerously overextended when the UN counterstroke hit -him late in May. For a month the Eighth Army attacked and advanced, the -Marines slugging ahead day after day in the X Corps zone of action. -CCF casualties mounted high, and Marine veterans of only a few months -of Korean service saw scores of enemy corpses left behind on the -battlefield as the enemy withdrew northward. - -This great UN counteroffensive netted prisoners all along the EUSAK -front as remnants of CCF platoons and even companies threw down -their arms. Marines captured their share. Upwards of 10,000 Chinese -surrendered to the Allies in a 10-day period--more prisoners than had -been taken up to this time. - -As the Chinese withdrew northward they left determined NKPA troops -behind. The 1st Marine Division moved slowly forward, fighting for -every inch of ground. So fierce was the enemy’s resistance that at -times during June the division commander was forced to commit all four -regiments (the KMCs included) in the attack at the same time in order -to seize designated objectives. This was a modification of accepted -tactical doctrine, necessitated by the situation. - -Throughout March, April, and part of May, Marine pilots continued to -provide close air support not only for the 1st Marine Division, but -also for other Allied units as directed by JOC. From the beginning -of Operation STRANGLE on 20 May this interdiction effort had first -priority, and close air support to all infantry units was secondary. -Difficulties in air-ground communication continued as radio frequencies -were heavily burdened with traffic. Although the 1st Marine Division -received a proportionate share of the few air support missions flown, -the frustrating time lag between requests for air support and the -arrival of planes on target continued into the next year. - -Some planes were always available for front line support, although -rarely ever enough according to infantrymen’s opinion. When they had -the chance, 1st MAW pilots viciously attacked the fleeing enemy to -ease the way for advancing ground troops. During June the unrelenting -pressure of combined air-ground attacks sometimes caused large groups -of enemy to surrender. Marines also captured thousands of rounds of -enemy ammunition and other equipment. - -By the last week in June the Marines had entrenched themselves along -the Division’s assigned portion of the MLR and “caught their breath” -after two months of hard fighting. In driving from the Hwachon -Reservoir area to the Punchbowl, they had employed practically every -weapon and tactic that could be used in an all-out offensive. The -Division then settled down to stable positions for a while, and some -units had the opportunity to go into reserve and train. - -It was a recharged 1st Marine Division (the 5th and 11th Marines did -not go into reserve during this period) which moved back into the lines -at the end of August. The offensive which opened northeast of the -Punchbowl on the 30th and lasted with few and brief interludes until 20 -September was the equal of the June fighting in sustained ferocity. -All four infantry regiments (including the KMCs) went up against -seemingly impregnable opposition. - -The enemy’s “stubborn defense of strong positions and many well-placed -log and earth bunkers was similar to the tenacious tactics of the -Japanese in World War II,” according to a Navy report. “His artillery -and mortar fires were effective, his minefields continued to be -hazardous for many weeks, and his ability to dig in and fortify his -positions [was] always impressive.”[376] - - [376] _PacFlt Interim Rpt_ No. 3, 15–25. - -After the 20th of September the EUSAK commander ordered that no further -offensives be launched and that the MLR be stabilized. This was a -period of aggressive patrolling, local attacks for more advantageous -pieces of terrain, and watchful waiting to determine the outcome of -truce negotiations. In spite of Operation STRANGLE, enemy vehicular -movements increased at the end of the year, but 1st MAW pilots -continually attempted to provide more support for all the infantry -divisions. - -The mission of the 1st Marine Division at this time was to organize, -construct, and defend its sector of the MLR, a front of more than 13 -miles. Although there were heavy local skirmishes, during the latter -months of 1951 and the first 3 months of 1952, no great offensive -drives were launched. Essentially, the Marines were engaged in an -aggressive defense of their positions until they moved to West Korea. - -While all Marines were hoping that the conflict would soon end, there -was no slackening of the customary vigilance. All hands remembered -General Ridgway’s words of the previous year, that it was “... a fight -for our own freedom, our own survival ...,”[377] and this was their -creed. - - [377] See Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1. - -These lines would have made a fitting epitaph for Marines who gave -their lives in Korea. They had as worthy a cause as any fighting men of -our history, for it had become increasingly plain since World War II -that a stand must eventually be made against Communist encroachments. -By going halfway around the world to fight the enemy on his own -doorstep, Americans may well have spared themselves a more bloody and -costly future struggle nearer to their own homeland if not actually -on their own soil. The designs of Red China and Soviet Russia were -unmasked in Korea, and the people of the United States awakened to -their peril after neglecting the Nation’s defenses since 1945. To that -extent, therefore, the operations in Korea were a defeat for Communism. - - - - -APPENDIX A - -Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations - - - ADC--Assistant Division Commander - - AdmO--Administrative Order - - AD--Douglas “Skyraider” single engine attack plane - - AF--Air Force - - AH--Hospital Ship - - AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon - - AirO--Air Officer - - AirSptSec--Air Support Section - - AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion - - AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion - - ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company - - ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion - - AT--Antitank - - AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company - - AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company - - BB--Battleship - - BLT--Battalion Landing Team - - Bn--Battalion - - Btry--Battery - - BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery - - C-47--Douglas Transport used by Air Force (same as R4D) - - CA--Heavy Cruiser - - CCF--Chinese Communist Forces - - CG--Commanding General - - CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA - - CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East - - CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet - - CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command - - CL--Light Cruiser - - CO--Commanding Officer - - Co--Company - - ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing - - ComNavFe--Commander Naval Forces Far East - - ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet - - ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One - - ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet - - ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort - Force - - CP--Command Post - - CR--Command Report - - C/S--Chief of Staff - - CSG--Combat Service Group - - CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army - - CTF--Commander Task Force - - CTG--Commander Task Group - - CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier - - CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier - - DD--Destroyer - - DE--Destroyer Escort - - Det--Detachment - - DOW--Died of Wounds - - EmbO--Embarkation Order/Officer - - EngrBn--Engineer Battalion - - EUSAK--Eighth U.S. Army in Korea - - FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA) - - FAC--Forward Air Controller - - FAF--Fifth Air Force - - FEAF--Far East Air Force - - FECOM--Far East Command - - F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Fighter-Bomber - - F4U-5N--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Single-Engine Night Fighter - - F7F-3N--Grumman “Tigercat” Twin-Engine Night Fighter - - FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific - - FO--Forward Observer - - FragOrder--Fragmentary Order - - Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon - - GHQ--General Headquarters - - Gru--Group - - H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company - - HD--Historical Diary - - Hedron--Headquarters Squadron - - HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter - - HqBn--Headquarters Battalion - - HQMC--Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps - - InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA) - - Interv--Interview - - ISUM--Intelligence Summary - - JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies - - JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff - - JMS--Japanese Minesweeper - - JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group - - JTF--Joint Task Force - - KIA--Killed in Action - - KMC--Korean Marine Corps - - Ln--Liaison - - LSD--Landing Ship, Dock - - LSM--Landing Ship, Medium - - LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket - - LST--Landing Ship, Tank - - LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank-Casualty Evacuation - - LSU--Landing Ship, Utility - - Ltr--Letter - - LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked - - MAG--Marine Aircraft Group - - MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing - - MS--Manuscript - - MedBn--Medical Battalion - - MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company (USA) - - MIA--Missing in Action - - MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA) - - MLR--Main Line of Resistance, the main front line - - Mosquito--North American AT-6 “Texan” Trainer; - Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and Target Spotting - - MP--Military Police - - MRO--Movement Report Office - - Msg--Message - - MSR--Main Supply Route - - MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service - - MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron - - MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion - - NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group - - NavFE--Naval Forces Far East - - NCO--Noncommissioned Officer - - NK--North Korea(n) - - NKPA--North Korean People’s Army - - N.d.--Date not given - - N.t.--Time not given - - O--Officer; Order - - OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA) - - OI--Operation Instruction - - OpnO--Operation Order - - OpnPlan--Operation Plan - - OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion - - OY--Consolidated-Vultee Single-Engine Light Observation Plane - - PhibGru--Amphibious Group - - PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report - - PLA--People’s Liberation Army - - Plat--Platoon - - POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants - - POR--Periodic Operation Report - - POW--Prisoner of War - - QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA) - - R4D--Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine designation of - C-47) - - R5D--Douglas Four-Engine Transport - - RCT--Regimental Combat Team - - Recon--Reconnaissance - - Reinf--Reinforced - - RktBn--Rocket Battalion - - RM--Royal Marines - - ROK--Republic of Korea - - R&O File--Records and Orders File - - ROKA--Republic of Korea Army - - ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy - - Rpt--Report - - SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator - - SAR--Special Action Report - - Sec--Section - - SecDef--Secretary of Defense - - ServBn--Service Battalion - - SigBn--Signal Battalion - - SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company - - SitRpt--Situation Report - - SP--Shore Party - - SMC--Marine Supply Squadron - - TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator; - Tactical Air Commander - - TACP--Tactical Air Control Party - - Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron - - TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center - - T-AP--Transport operated by MSTS - - TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Single-Engine Torpedo Bomber. - Also used for Utility Purposes. - - TE--Task Element - - T/E--Table of Equipment - - Tel--Telephone Message - - TF--Task Force - - TG--Task Group - - TkBn--Tank Battalion - - Trk--Truck - - T/O--Table of Organization - - TU--Task Unit - - UDT--Underwater Demolition Team - - U/F--Unit of Fire - - UN--United Nations - - UNC--United Nations Command - - URpt--Unit Report - - USA--United States Army - - USAR--United States Army Reserve - - USAF--United States Air Force - - USMC--United States Marine Corps - - USMCR--United States Marine Corps Reserve - - USN--United States Navy - - USNR--United States Navy Reserve - - VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron - - VMF(N)--Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron - - VMO--Marine Observation Squadron - - VMR--Marine Transport Squadron - - WD--War Diary - - WD Sum--War Diary Summary - - WIA--Wounded in Action - - - - -APPENDIX B - -Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division - - -Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the -effective strength of the 1st Marine Division throughout the period -1951–1952. - - ----------+-------+--------+--------+------- - |Organic|Attached|Attached| - Date | USMC | U.S. | KMC | Total - |and USN| Army | | - ----------+-------+--------+--------+------- - 30 Mar 51 | 25,831| 236 | 3,128 | 29,195 - | | | | - 30 May 51 | 25,820| 302 | 3,266 | 29,388 - | | | | - 30 Sep 51 | 24,160| 54 | 3,035 | 27,249 - | | | | - 30 Mar 52 | 26,140| 59 | 4,378 | 30,577 - ----------+-------+--------+--------+------- - - - - -APPENDIX C - -Command and Staff List December 1950-March 1952 1st Marine Division - - - Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith (to 23 Feb - 1951) - BrigGen Lewis B. Puller (from 24 - Feb) - MajGen Oliver P. Smith (from 5 Mar) - MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (from 25 - Apr) - MajGen John T. Selden (from 11 Jan - 1952) - Asst Division Commander BrigGen Edward A. Craig (to 20 Jan - 1951) - MajGen Edward A. Craig (from 21 - Jan) - BrigGen Lewis B. Puller (from 2 - Feb) - BrigGen William J. Whaling (from - 20 May) - Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams (to 22 Jan - 1951) - BrigGen Gregon A. Williams (from - 23 Jan) - Col Edward W. Snedeker (from 27 - Jan) - Col Francis M. McAlister (from 23 - May) - Col Richard G. Weede (from 10 Jun) - Col Victor H. Krulak (from 29 Jun) - Col Richard G. Weede (from 26 Nov) - Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 15 - Feb 1952) - Col Austin R. Brunelli (from 23 - Mar) - G-1 LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold (to 13 - Feb 1951) - Col Bryghte D. Godbold (from 14 - Feb) - Col Wesley M. Platt (from 31 May) - Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Sep) - Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 20 - Nov) - G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. (to 5 - Feb 1951) - LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman (from - 6 Feb) - LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (from 8 Mar) - LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 13 - Aug) - G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., (to 7 - May 1951) - Col Richard G. Weede (from 8 May) - Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 30 Jul) - LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 14 Nov) - G-4 Col Francis M. McAlister (to 25 - Jan 1951) - LtCol Charles L. Banks (from 26 - Jan) - Col Charles L. Banks (from 14 Feb) - Col Frank P. Hager (from 24 May) - Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 19 - Nov) - Col Robert A. McGill (from 9 Feb - 1952) - - _Special Staff_ - - Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello (to 18 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Foster C. LaHue (from 19 Feb) - LtCol Homer E. Hire (from 19 Jun) - Maj James K. Young (from 15 Oct) - Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp (to 20 Apr 1951) - LtCol Edward V. Finn (from 21 Apr) - Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26 - Sep 1951) - LtCol Michiel Dobervich (from 27 - Sep) - Anti-Tank Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 27 Apr 1951) - Maj William L. Bates (from 28 Apr) - Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep) - Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 9 Nov) - Maj John P. Lanigan (from 31 Dec) - Maj Harold C. Howard (from 2 Mar - 1952) - Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun - 1951) - Maj George M. Warnke (from 16 Jun) - LtCol John T. O’Neill (from 2 Oct) - Artillery Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar - 1951) - Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar) - LtCol Custis Burton, Jr. (from 5 - Aug) - LtCol George B. Thomas (from 8 Nov) - LtCol Dale H. Heely (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 11 Jan) - Col Frederick P. Henderson (from - 27 Mar) - Chaplain Cmdr Robert M. Schwyhart, USN (to - 17 Feb 1951) - Cmdr Francis W. Kelly, USN (from - 18 Feb) - Cmdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN - (from 8 Oct) - Chemical Warfare and Radiological - Defense Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 15 Jul 1951) - Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep) - Maj Luther H. Hake (from 21 Nov) - Maj John P. Lanigan (from 31 Dec) - Maj Harold C. Howard (from 29 Feb - 1952) - Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith, USN (to 20 May - 1951) - Cmdr James L. Bradley, USN (from - 21 May) - Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (from - 15 Jul) - Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse (to 9 Mar 1951) - LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 10 - Mar) - LtCol Clifford E. Quilici (from 11 - Aug) - LtCol Corbin L. West (from 26 Oct) - LtCol John H. Papurca (from 6 Dec) - Engineer Officer LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun - 1951) - LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 11 Jun) - LtCol August L. Vogt (from 19 Sep) - Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C. Conley (to 16 May - 1951) - 1stLt Frank C. Trumble (from 17 - May) - 1stLt George W. Krahn (from 29 Aug) - Capt Robert W. Schmidt (from 26 - Oct) - Capt Robert J. McKay (from 6 Mar - 1952) - Capt Benjamin Reed (from 26 Mar) - Food Director LtCol Norman R. Nickerson (to 6 - May 1951) - LtCol George G. Pafford (from 7 - May) - 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (from 16 - Aug) - Historical Officer 1stLt John M. Patrick (to 26 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt Theodore L. Richardson (from - 27 Jun) - 2dLt Francis X. Goss (from 8 Jan - 1952) - Inspector Col John A. White (to 26 Apr 1951) - Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Apr) - LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 21 - Jun) - Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30 - Jun) - LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 1 Oct) - Col William K. Davenport, Jr. - (from 19 Nov) - Legal Officer LtCol Albert H. Schierman (to 8 - May 1951) - LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood - (from 9 May) - Cmdr Geoffrey E. Carlisle, USN - (from 28 Oct) - LtCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (from 6 - Mar 1952) - Motor Transport Officer LtCol Henry W. Seeley, Jr. (to 26 - Jun 1951) - LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 27 - Jun) - Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 17 Aug) - Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 3 Jan - 1952) - Naval Gunfire Officer LtCol Loren S. Fraser (to 12 Aug - 1951) - Maj Charles A. Lipot (from 13 Aug) - Maj John V. Downes (from 23 Mar - 1952) - Ordnance Officer Capt Donald L. Shenaut (to 9 Jul - 1951) - Maj Frank W. Keith (from 10 Jul) - Maj James M. Rogers (from 1 Nov) - Maj Harold G. Borth (from 11 Jan - 1952) - Postal Officer Maj Frederick Bove (to 13 May 1951) - 1stLt Robert P. Sanders (from 14 - May) - 1stLt Robert W. Blum (from 26 Jul) - 1stLt Edward D. Geizer, Jr. (from - 10 Aug) - CWO George C. Hunter (from 9 Feb - 1952) - Provost Marshall Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr - 1951) - Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21 - Apr) - Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 6 Aug) - LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18 - Oct) - Public Information Officer Capt Michael C. Capraro (to 14 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt Jeremiah A. O’Leary, Jr. - (from 15 Apr) - 1stLt Robert S. Gray (from 27 Dec) - Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May - 1951) - LtCol Horace S. Figuers (from 11 - May) - LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 7 Jul) - LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29 - Sep) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 20 - Dec) - LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (from 9 - Mar 1952) - Signal Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 7 Jun - 1951) - LtCol Jino J. D’Alessandro (from 8 - Jun) - Special Services Officer LtCol John M. Bathum (to 10 Sep - 1951) - Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 11 - Sep) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 28 - Oct) - 1stLt Joseph H. McDannold (from 20 - Dec) - Capt John W. Algeo (from 16 Feb - 1952) - LtCol John E. Gorman (from 9 Mar) - Supply Officer Col Gordon E. Hendricks (to 29 Jun - 1951) - Col Chester R. Allen (from 30 Jun) - Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN (to 24 - Jan 1951) - Cmdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (from - 25 Jan 1951) - Capt Louis R. Kirkpatrick, USN - (from 10 Jul 1951) - Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 22 Apr - 1951) - LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 23 Apr) - Maj Walter E. Reynolds (from 9 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Division Rear - Echelon Headquarters Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 23 Jul - 1951) - Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 24 Jul - to 19 Nov) - - _Headquarters Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr (to 23 Apr - 1951) - LtCol William P. Alston (from 24 - Apr) - Col Gould P. Groves (from 11 May) - LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 29 - Jun) - LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 29 Aug) - Col William K. Davenport, Jr. - (from 19 Nov) - Maj Corbin L. West (from 15 Jan - 1952) - Col Robert T. Stivers (from 18 Feb) - Executive Officer Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug - 1951) - Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 16 - Aug) - Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec) - Capt “J” E. Hancey (from 22 Jan - 1952) - Maj Corbin L. West (from 18 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug - 1951) - Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 16 - Aug) - Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec) - Capt “J” E. Hancey (from 21 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Military Police - Company Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr - 1951) - Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21 - Apr) - Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 19 Sep) - LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18 - October) - Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance - Company Maj Walter Gall (to 26 Mar 1951) - Capt Robert L. Autry (from 27 Mar) - Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (from 10 - Sep) - - _1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Lewis B. Puller (to 24 Jan - 1951) - Col Francis M. McAlister (from 25 - Jan) - Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 19 May) - Col Thomas A. Wornham (from 18 Jul) - Col Sidney S. Wade (from 13 Oct) - Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert (to 7 Jan - 1951) - LtCol Alan Sutter (from 8 Jan) - LtCol Robert W. Rickert (from 16 - Jan) - LtCol Alan Sutter (from 12 Feb) - LtCol Donald M. Schmuck (from 31 - May) - LtCol John A. McAlister (from 3 - Sep) - LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 7 - Jan 1952) - S-1 Capt William G. Reeves (to 8 Jan - 1951) - Capt David M. Cox (from 9 Jan) - Capt John S. Court (from 5 Sep) - Maj Elizia M. Cable (from 21 Oct) - Capt Thomas C. Palmer (from 12 Feb - 1952) - Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 28 Feb) - S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian (to 10 May - 1951) - Capt Glenn F. Miller (from 11 May) - Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from 2 - Oct) - Capt Fred K. Cottrell (from 15 Dec) - Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 4 Mar - 1952) - S-3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan (to 20 Jul - 1951) - Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 21 - Jul) - Maj John P. Lanigan (from 4 Mar - 1952) - S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady (to 27 Apr - 1951) - Capt Augustine B. Reynolds, Jr. - (from 28 Apr) - Maj Thomas A. Burns (from 5 Jul) - Maj John L. Kelly (from 5 Oct) - Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 27 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Maj Robert K. McClelland (to 11 - Mar 1951) - Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 Mar) - Capt George E. Petro (from 11 May) - 1stLt Roscoe L. Barrett, Jr. (from - 15 Aug) - 1stLt James L. Burnett (from 3 Oct) - Capt James P. Egan (from 23 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Anti-Tank - Company Capt George E. Petro (to 10 May - 1951) - 1stLt John A. Dudrey (from 11 May) - 1stLt Magness W. Marshall (from 2 - Oct) - Capt Frederick A. Hale (from 27 - Nov) - Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar - Company Capt Frank J. Faureck (to 8 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Edward E. Kauffer (from 9 - Feb) - Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 5 Mar) - Capt Edward E. Kauffer (from 4 Jun) - 1stLt Robert W. Jorn (from 9 Aug) - 1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 2 Oct) - Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from - 23 Dec) - Capt George E. Lawrence (from 18 - Mar 1952) - - _1st Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Donald M. Schmuck (to 27 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Robley E. West (from 28 Feb) - Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 15 Jun) - LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr. (from 7 - Jul) - Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 14 - Sep) - LtCol John E. Gorman (from 16 Sep) - LtCol John H. Papurca (from 7 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Robley E. West (to 27 Feb 1951) - Maj David W. Bridges (from 28 Feb) - Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 10 Jun) - Maj Wesley C. Noren (from 15 Jun) - Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 20 - Jul) - Maj Leo V. Gross (from 18 Dec) - Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 4 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt William B. Hopkins (to 30 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt Bruce E. Geisert (from 31 - Jan) - 1stLt Norman W. Hicks (from 1 Jul) - 1stLt John B. Franklin (from 18 - Aug) - 1stLt Stuart P. Barr, Jr. (from 22 - Oct) - 1stLt Nicholas J. Sheppard (from - 28 Nov) - 1stLt Harry A. Spaight (from 26 - Dec) - Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Feb - 1952) - 2ndLt Vinton L. Spencer (from 4 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Capt Robert H. Barrow (to 30 Jan - 1951) - Capt Thomas J. Bohannon (from 31 - Jan) - 1stLt Calvin R. Baker (from 1 Jul) - Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Oct) - 1stLt Clifton M. Grubbs (from 20 - Feb 1952) - Capt Anthony Novak (from 17 Mar) - 1stLt Morace M. Dritley (from 26 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Wesley C. Noren (to 12 Mar - 1951) - Capt John F. Coffey (from 13 Mar) - 1stLt James H. Cowan, Jr. (from 8 - Jun) - 1stLt Robert G. Work (from 1 Aug) - 1stLt Richard S. Kitchen (from 18 - Aug) - Capt Roy J. Wride (from 16 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company - C Capt Robert P. Wray (to 9 May - 1951) - 1stLt William A. Craven (from 10 - May) - 1stLt William F. Koehnlein (from - 12 Jun) - Capt Michael D. Harvath (from 21 - Jul) - Capt George E. Lawrence (from 10 - Oct) - Capt Kenneth F. Swiger (from 7 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj William L. Bates (to 28 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt William F. Koehnlein (from 1 - Mar) - Capt Wesley C. Noren (from 13 Mar) - Maj John F. Coffey (from 8 Jun) - Capt Benjamin W. Muntz (from 5 Jul) - Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 14 - Jul) - Maj John F. Morris (from 14 Aug) - Maj Fletcher B. Wycoff (from 9 Sep) - Capt James P. Egan (from 27 Dec) - Capt George E. Lawrence (from 21 - Feb 1952) - 1stLt Joseph E. Lee (from 18 Mar) - Maj Stanley N. McLeod (from 27 Mar) - - _2d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter (to 7 Jan 1951) - Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 8 Jan) - LtCol Allan Sutter (from 15 Jan) - Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 13 Feb) - LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from - 15 Mar) - Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 5 Jun) - LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from - 20 Jun) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 14 - Aug) - LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 28 - Oct) - LtCol Theil H. Fisher (from 3 Jan - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry (to 7 Jan - 1951) - Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 8 Jan) - Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Jan) - Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 13 - Feb) - Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Mar) - Maj Jules M. Rouse (from 10 Jun) - Maj John P. Lanigan (from 6 Aug) - Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 26 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt Raymond DeWees, Jr. (to 9 Sep - 1951) - 2dLt Robert A. Arning (from 10 Sep) - 1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from - 30 Oct) - 1stLt Frank E. Guthrie (from 3 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company D - Capt Welby W. Cronk (to 4 Mar 1951) - 1stLt Theodore Culpepper (from 5 - Mar) - 1stLt Alexander L. Michaux, Jr. - (from 19 Apr) - 1stLt Jay “J” Thomas (from 11 Jun) - 1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from - 9 Aug) - 1stLt Robert E. Lundberg (from 15 - Sep) - 2dLt Arthur H. Woodruff (from 25 - Sep) - 1stLt Richard A. Bonifas (from 5 - Oct) - 1stLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from - 16 Oct) - Capt Richard A. Bonifas (from 30 - Oct) - 1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 3 Nov) - Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 13 - Nov) - Capt John H. Lauck (from 26 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company E - Capt Jack A. Smith (to 9 Mar 1951) - 1stLt Johnny L. Carter (from 10 - Mar) - 1stLt Donald L. Evans, Jr. (from 9 - Aug) - Capt Ralph V. Harper (from 14 Aug) - 1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 14 Sep) - 2dLt William K. Rockey (from 25 - Sep) - 1stLt Kenneth E. Will (from 5 Oct) - Capt James H. Reeder (from 16 Oct) - Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from - 21 Feb 1952) - Capt Jack H. Hagler (from 17 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company F - Capt Goodwin C. Groff (to 9 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt Patrick McGrotty (from 10 - Jun) - Capt Frederick A. Hale, Jr. (from - 4 Sep) - Capt Neville G. Hall, Jr. (from 21 - Nov) - 1stLt John A. Barry (from 29 Dec) - 1stLt Robert J. Lahr (from 11 Mar - 1952) - Capt Victor A. Kleber, Jr. (from - 18 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Capt William A. Kerr (to 28 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Russell A. Davidson (from 1 - Mar) - Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 May) - Capt Russell A. Davidson (from 2 - Jul) - Maj John I. Kelly (from 22 Jul) - Maj William S. Witt (from 5 Oct) - Capt John W. Algeo (from 20 Nov) - Maj William S. Witt (from 20 Jan - 1952) - Capt John W. Algeo (from 3 Feb) - 1stLt Clarence G. Moody, Jr. (from - 17 Feb) - Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from - 18 Mar) - - _3d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge (to 15 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 16 - Feb) - Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 25 - Apr) - Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 8 May) - LtCol Homer E. Hire (from 15 May) - LtCol Foster C. LaHue (from 19 Jul) - LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (from 13 - Nov) - Executive Officer Maj Reginald R. Myers (to 25 Apr) - Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 26 Apr) - Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 15 - May) - Maj Ralph “C” Rosacker (from 7 Jun) - Maj Rodney V. Reighard (from 22 - July) - Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 3 Oct) - Maj Robert V. Perkins (from 4 Jan - 52) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt Roy N. Courington (to 16 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Edgar A. Crum (from 17 Feb) - 1stLt Daniel R. Evans (from 3 Mar) - Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (from - 20 Mar) - 1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 9 Aug) - Capt Earle E. Carr (from 1 Sep) - 2dLt Joseph D. Reed (from 3 Oct) - 2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 4 Jan - 1952) - Capt Harold R. Connolly (from 22 - Feb) - Capt Donald C. Mack (from 15 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company G - Capt Carl L. Sitter (to 13 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Horace L. Johnson (from 14 - Feb) - 1stLt Thomas J. Holt (from 26 May) - 1stLt Fred G. Redmon (from 1 Jun) - Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 5 Jun) - 1stLt Harold R. Connolly (from 20 - Jul) - Capt Fred A. Kraus (from 8 Nov) - 1stLt Richard A. Krajnyak (from 19 - Feb 1952) - Capt Wilford L. Stone (from 17 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company H - Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (to - 19 Mar 1951) - 1stLt William J. Allert (from 20 - Mar) - 1stLt Daniel R. Evans (from 8 May) - 1stLt James L. Burnett (from 8 Jun) - 1stLt Herbert M. Anderson (from 15 - Jun) - 1stLt James L. Burnett (from 21 - Sep) - Capt Earle E. Carr (from 3 Oct) - Capt James B. Ord, Jr. (from 17 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company I - 1stLt Joseph R. Fisher (to 7 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt William Swanson (from 8 Apr) - Capt Stone W. Quillian (from 15 - May) - 1stLt Norbert D. Carlson (from 5 - Aug) - Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 7 Sep) - Capt Donald C. Mack (from 19 Jan - 1952) - Capt Richard B. Smith (from 22 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj Edwin H. Simmons (to 25 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt James F. Williams (from 26 - Apr) - Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 6 Jun) - Maj Henry Brzezinski (from 19 Jun) - Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 6 Aug) - Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 31 Aug) - 1stLt Thomas C. Holleman (from 2 - Oct) - Maj Robert V. Perkins (from 15 Nov) - Capt Earle E. Carr (from 4 Jan - 1952) - 1stLt Hugh P. Murphy (from 25 Jan) - - _5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray (to 23 Jan - 1951) - Col Raymond L. Murray (from 24 Jan) - Col Richard W. Hayward (from 14 - Mar) - Col Richard G. Weede (from 7 Aug) - Col Frank P. Hager, Jr. (from 19 - Nov) - Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (from - 23 Feb 1952) - Executive Officer LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (to 13 Feb - 1951) - LtCol John W. Stevens, II (from 14 - Feb) - LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14 - Mar) - LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 4 - Apr) - LtCol Francis H. Cooper (from 17 - Jun) - LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 22 - Sep) - LtCol John T. Rooney (from 13 Dec) - LtCol John A. Saxten (from 19 Mar - 1952) - S-1 Capt Alton C. Weed (to 1 Mar 1951) - Capt Jack E. Hawthorn (from 2 Mar) - Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (from - 17 Mar) - Capt Harley L. Grant (from 25 Aug) - S-2 1stLt Richard M. Woodard (to 3 Feb - 1951) - Capt Eugene F. Langan (from 4 Feb) - Maj Nicholas G. W. Thorne (from 9 - Aug) - Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 17 - Nov) - Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 31 Jan - 1952) - S-3 Maj Lawrence W. Smith, Jr. (to 8 - Mar 1951) - Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 9 Mar) - LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 24 Jun) - Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. - (from 11 Jul) - Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 10 Oct) - Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from - 15 Dec) - S-4 Maj Harold Wallace (to 9 Mar 1951) - Maj William E. Baugh (from 10 Mar) - Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 11 Aug) - Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 22 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt Jack E. Hanthorn (to 1 Mar - 1951) - 1stLt Richard M. Woodard (from 2 - Mar) - 1stLt Lee J. Cary (from 22 Jun) - Capt Howard H. Dismeier (from 12 - Sep) - 1stLt George “T” Capatanos (from 1 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Antitank Company - 1stLt Almarion S. Bailey (to 8 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 9 Apr) - 1stLt William E. Kerrigan (from 23 - Jul) - Capt Edgar F. Moore, Jr. (from 15 - Aug) - Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar - Company 1stLt Robert M. Lucy (to 25 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Robert H. Uskurait (from 26 - Feb) - 1stLt John A. Buchanan (from 11 - Sep) - Capt Yale B. Davis (from 29 Dec) - - _1st Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 20 - Feb 1951) - LtCol John W. Hopkins (from 21 Feb) - LtCol William P. Alston (from 21 - Jun) - Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Nov) - Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 25 Nov) - LtCol Kirt W. Norton (from 2 Dec) - LtCol Louis N. King (from 13 Jan - 1952) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 12 - Feb) - Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson (to 8 Apr 1951) - Maj Donald J. Kendall, Jr. (from 9 - Apr) - Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Aug) - Maj Robert L. Autry (from 9 Nov) - Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 2 Dec) - Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 31 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (to 11 - Mar 1951) - 2dLt Robert H. Corbet (from 12 Mar) - 1stLt Andrew V. Marusak (from 29 - Mar) - 1stLt Frank J. Meers (from 12 Jul) - 2dLt Vincent B. Murphy, Jr. (from - 3 Oct) - 1stLt Parks H. Simpson (from 25 - Oct) - 1stLt Thomas J. Hermes (from 13 - Nov) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Capt Almond H. Sollom (to 5 Mar - 1951) - 1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (from 6 Mar) - Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 6 - Apr) - Maj Albert Hartman (from 13 Apr) - Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (from 8 - May) - 1stLt Frank J. Meers (from 4 Jun) - Capt Lucian F. May (from 12 Jul) - Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from 1 - Sep) - Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 9 Nov) - Capt Nicholas G. W. Thorne (from - 17 Nov) - Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 31 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company A - 1stLt Loren R. Smith (to 16 Feb - 1951) - Capt Walter E. G. Godenius (from - 17 Feb) - Capt John L. Kelly (from 9 Apr) - Capt Richard M. Woodard (from 1 - Jul) - Capt Eugene F. Langan (from 12 Aug) - Capt Frederick B. Clunie (from 5 - Nov) - 1stLt Merrill Waide, Jr. (from 24 - Jan 1952) - 1stLt Ernest S. Lee (from 18 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company B - 1stLt John R. Hancock (to 7 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Michael V. Palatas (from 8 - Feb) - 1stLt James T. Cronin (from 17 Feb) - 1stLt William E. Kerrigan (from 8 - Jun) - 1stLt Stuart H. Wright (from 30 - Jun) - 1stLt John A. Hayes (from 12 Jul) - Capt Louis R. Daze (from 21 Jul) - Capt Charles M. MacDonald, Jr. - (from 21 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Capt Jack R. Jones (to 8 May 1951) - 1stLt Richard J. Schening (from 9 - May) - 1stLt Robert E. Warner (from 29 - May) - Capt Lucian F. May (from 4 Sep) - Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 22 Jan - 1952) - - _2d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise (to 19 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 20 Feb) - Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. - (from 24 Jun) - LtCol Houston Stiff (from 8 Jul) - Maj William E. Baugh (from 3 Dec) - LtCol George G. Pafford (from 27 - Dec) - LtCol William P. Cushing (from 14 - Mar 1952) - Executive Officer Maj John L. Hopkins (to 20 Feb - 1951) - Maj Theodore F. Spiker (from 21 - Feb) - Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. - (from 9 Apr) - Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 25 Jun) - Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 3 Sep) - Maj Robert W. Rynerson (from 9 Sep) - Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 26 Sep) - Maj William L. Sims (from 9 Dec) - Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 27 Dec) - Maj William P. Cushing (from 21 - Feb 1952) - Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 14 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt Franklin B. Mayer (to 9 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (from 10 - Jan) - Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 21 - Feb) - 1stLt John R. Hinds (from 2 Jul) - 1stLt Richard T. Hauar (from 12 - Jul) - 1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 8 - Aug) - 1stLt Dexter H. Kimball (from 25 - Sep) - 1stLt Otis “Z” McConnell, Jr. - (from 23 Dec) - 1stLt Emmett T. Hill, Jr. (from 15 - Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company D - Capt Samuel S. Smith (to 11 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt John P. Cooney (from 12 Jun) - Capt Ray N. Joens (from 28 Jun) - Capt Victor Sawina (from 26 Sep) - 1stLt Tom G. Fagles (from 7 Oct) - Capt Philip A. Davis (from 23 Dec) - 1stLt Emmitt T. Hill (from 13 Feb - 1952) - Capt William A. Harper (from 25 - Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company E - 1stLt James F. Roberts (to 9 Jan - 1951) - Capt Franklin B. Mayer (from 10 - Jan) - Capt William E. Melby (from 9 Apr) - 1stLt Bernard W. Christofferson - (from 20 Apr) - 1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 12 Jun) - Capt William E. Melby (from 18 Jun) - 1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 9 Jul) - Capt William L. Wallace (from 3 - Aug) - Capt Warren H. Allen (from 3 Oct) - 1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 18 Oct) - Capt Charles C. Matthews (from 4 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company F - 1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (to 8 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt George Janiszewski (from 9 - Jan) - Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 20 - Jan) - 1stLt George Janiszewski (from 20 - Feb) - 1stLt James H. Honeycutt, Jr. - (from 9 Apr) - 1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 23 - Jul) - Capt William E. Melby (from 11 Aug) - Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 4 - Nov) - Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 14 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj Glen E. Martin (to 19 Feb 1951) - Capt John Stepanovich (from 20 Feb) - Capt Elliot B. Lima (from 6 Apr) - 1stLt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from - 17 Aug) - Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 15 Sep) - Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 25 - Sep) - Maj William L. Sims (from 4 Nov) - Capt William A. Harper (from 23 - Dec) - Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 25 Feb - 1952) - Capt Russell L. Silverthorn (from - 16 Mar) - - _3d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett (to 13 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14 - Feb) - LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 14 - Mar) - Maj Morse “L” Holladay (from 4 Apr) - LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 16 - Jun) - Maj William E. Baugh (from 23 Sep) - LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 13 - Oct) - LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from - 25 Feb 1952) - Capt Philip A. Davis (from 23 Dec) - 1stLt Emmitt T. Hill (from 13 Feb - 1952) - Capt William A. Harper (from 25 - Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company E - 1stLt James F. Roberts (to 9 Jan - 1951) - Capt Franklin B. Mayer (from 10 - Jan) - Capt William E. Melby (from 9 Apr) - 1stLt Bernard W. Christofferson - (from 20 Apr) - 1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 12 Jun) - Capt William E. Melby (from 18 Jun) - 1stLt Warren H. Allen (from 9 Jul) - Capt William L. Wallace (from 3 - Aug) - Capt Warren H. Allen (from 3 Oct) - 1stLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 18 Oct) - Capt Charles C. Matthews (from 4 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company F - 1stLt Charles “H” Dalton (to 8 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt George Janiszewski (from 9 - Jan) - Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 20 - Jan) - 1stLt George Janiszewski (from 20 - Feb) - 1stLt James H. Honeycutt, Jr. - (from 9 Apr) - 1stLt Harold L. Michael (from 23 - Jul) - Capt William E. Melby (from 11 Aug) - Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 4 - Nov) - Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 14 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj Glen E. Martin (to 19 Feb 1951) - Capt John Stepanovich (from 20 Feb) - Capt Elliot B. Lima (from 6 Apr) - 1stLt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from - 17 Aug) - Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 15 Sep) - Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 25 - Sep) - Maj William L. Sims (from 4 Nov) - Capt William A. Harper (from 23 - Dec) - Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 25 Feb - 1952) - Capt Russell L. Silverthorn (from - 16 Mar) - - _3d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett (to 13 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14 - Feb) - LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 14 - Mar) - Maj Morse “L” Holladay (from 4 Apr) - LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 16 - Jun) - Maj William E. Baugh (from 23 Sep) - LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 13 - Oct) - LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from - 25 Feb 1952) - - _7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg (to 15 Apr - 1951) - Col Herman Nickerson, Jr. (from 16 - Apr) - LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 20 Sep) - Col John J. Wermuth (from 13 Dec) - Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 11 - Mar 1952) - Executive Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 3 Jun - 1951) - LtCol Woodrow M. Kessler (from 4 - Jun) - LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 30 Jun) - LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 20 Sep) - LtCol James G. Kelly (from 3 Nov) - LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 2 Dec) - LtCol John D. Wiggins (from 23 Feb - 1952) - S-1 Capt John R. Grove (to 15 Apr 1951) - Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 16 Apr) - Maj Robert R. Sedgwick (from 5 Sep) - Capt William K. Dormady (from 5 - Jan 1952) - S-2 Capt John D. Bradbeer (to 4 Jul - 1951) - Capt Walter E. Lange (from 5 Jul) - Capt Clifford E. McCollam (from 29 - Jul) - Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 25 Aug) - 1stLt George W. Barnes (from 8 Nov) - Capt Donald E. Euchert (from 19 - Dec) - Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 17 - Mar 1952) - S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II (to 8 - Jan 1951) - Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 9 Jun) - Maj George Codrea (from 22 Sep) - S-4 Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 8 Jan - 1951) - Maj William E. Voorhies (from 9 - Jan) - Maj John D. Bradbeer (from 5 Jul) - Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 5 Oct) - Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 3 Jan - 1952) - Maj James K. Linnan (from 19 Jan) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company 2dLt Arthur R. Mooney (to 17 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Harrol Kiser (from 18 Feb) - 1stLt John C. Beauparlant (from 6 - Mar) - 1stLt Welton R. Abell (from 14 Mar) - Capt James J. Bott (from 19 Mar) - Capt Thomas A. Robesky (from 9 May) - Capt Walter R. Anderson (from 18 - Jun) - Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 5 Sep) - Capt Donald S. McClellan (from 20 - Sep) - Capt David A. McKay (from 28 Nov) - Capt Robert C. Hendrickson (from - 17 Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Antitank Company - 1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 5 May - 1951) - 1stLt Raymond J. Eldridge (from 6 - Mar) - Capt Thomas Santamaria (from 19 - Apr) - 1stLt Francis W. Tief (from 13 May) - 1stLt William F. Dyroff (from 10 - Aug) - Commanding Officer, 4.2 Inch Mortar - Company Maj Rodney V. Reighard (to 1 Jul - 1951) - 1stLt Samuel E. Piercy (from 2 Jul) - Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 24 Sep) - Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 28 Nov) - Capt John F. McMahon, Jr. (from 28 - Dec) - - _1st Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 25 Apr 1951) - LtCol John T. Rooney (from 26 Apr) - LtCol James G. Kelly (from 23 Aug) - Maj Harold C. Howard (from 8 Nov) - LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (from - 28 Feb 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (to 20 Feb - 1951) - Maj Thomas B. Tighe (from 21 Feb) - Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (from 24 - Mar) - Maj Thomas B. Tighe (from 26 May) - Maj Robert J. Poison (from 5 Jul) - Maj George Codrea (from 4 Aug) - Maj Harold C. Howard (from 15 Sep) - Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 8 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company 1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul (to 19 Jan - 1951) - Capt John C. Johnson (from 20 Jan) - Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 18 Mar) - 1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (from - 28 Mar) - Capt Donald F. J. Field (from 11 - May) - Capt Wilburt R. Gaul (from 7 Jun) - 1stLt Robert C. Taylor (from 9 Aug) - Capt Orville E. Brauss (from 24 - Nov) - 1stLt Guy R. Cassell (from 14 Dec) - 1stLt Edward L. Nadeau (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Capt Seneker Woll (from 18 Jan) - 2dLt Henry D. Bruns (from 10 Feb) - 2dLt Lawrence P. Flynn (from 9 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company A - 1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (to 27 - Mar 1951) - Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 28 Mar) - 1stLt Van D. Bell (from 3 Jun) - Capt Everett Hampton (from 2 Sep) - 2dLt Carl F. Ullrich (from 2 Jan - 1952) - Capt Earl W. Thompson (from 27 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt James J. Bott (to 5 Mar 1951) - Capt John C. Johnston (from 6 Mar) - 1stLt Orville W. Brauss (from 22 - Jul) - 1stLt Dean F. Johnson (from 23 Aug) - 1stLt James W. Sweeney (from 14 - Sep) - Capt Henry A. Glockner (from 29 - Sep) - 1stLt Donald L. Smith (from 14 Dec) - 1stLt “J” Alan Myers (from 1 Jan - 1952) - 1stLt Donald M. Russ (from 14 Feb) - Capt Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr. (from - 28 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Capt John F. Morris (to 17 Jan - 1951) - Capt Eugene H. Haffey (from 18 Jan) - Capt Daniel F. J. Field (from 8 - Jun) - 1stLt Donald E. Euckert (from 23 - Jul) - Capt John F. McMahon (from 10 Aug) - Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from - 21 Nov) - Capt Seneker Woll (from 7 Jan 1952) - Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from - 18 Jan) - Capt Roger L. Johnson (from 3 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj William E. Voorhies (to 5 Jan - 1951) - Capt Robert J. Poison (from 6 Jan) - Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 12 Jan) - Maj Robert J. Poison (from 15 May) - Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 5 Jul) - Capt John C. Johnston (from 5 Aug) - Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 5 Nov) - Capt John R. McMahon (from 22 Nov) - 1stLt Guy R. Cassell (from 31 Dec) - Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from 4 - Jan 1952) - 1stLt Frank P. Shannon (from 18 - Jan) - 1stLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 16 - Feb) - - _2d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bayer (to 15 Feb - 1951) - Maj James I. Glendinning (from 16 - Feb) - LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (from 21 - Mar) - LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 21 - Jul) - LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 11 Nov) - Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 1 Dec) - LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 27 Feb - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. (to 2 - Jan 1951) - Maj James I. Glendinning, Jr. - (from 3 Jan) - Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. (from - 20 May) - Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 4 Jul) - Maj Edwin Madsen (from 2 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company 1stLt Kent D. Thorup (to 19 Jan - 1951) - Capt Jerome D. Gordon (from 20 Jan) - 1stLt Kent D. Thorup (from 6 Feb) - Capt Thomas “A” Robesky (from 15 - Mar) - 1stLt Joseph R. Walsh (from 8 May) - 1stLt George G. Flood (from 8 Jun) - 1stLt John J. Robinson, Jr. (from - 1 Sep) - Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from 5 - Nov) - 1stLt Donald D. MacLachlan (from - 16 Dec) - 1stLt Edward R. Hannon (from 27 - Feb 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company D - 1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr. (to 1 - Jan 1951) - Capt Patsy Algieri (from 2 Jan) - Capt Jerome D. Gordon (from 8 Feb) - Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 7 Apr) - 1stLt Thomas W. Burke (from 21 Jul) - Capt John H. Chafee (from 15 Sep) - Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from - 15 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company E - 1stLt David H. Vanderwart (to 21 - Jan 1951) - 1stLt Robert T. Bey (from 22 Jan) - Capt Walter R. Anderson, Jr. (from - 8 Feb) - Capt Merlin T. Matthews (from 17 - Feb) - 1stLt Robert W. Schmidt (from 14 - Jun) - 1stLt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from - 18 Sep) - Capt Embree W. Maxson (from 5 Oct) - Capt Donald McGuire (from 21 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company F - 1stLt Ronald J. Rice (to 1 Mar - 1951) - 1stLt Ross R. Minor (from 2 Mar) - Capt Raymond N. Bowman (from 6 Mar) - 1stLt Ross R. Minor (from 1 May) - Capt Donald S. McClellan (from 23 - Jun) - 1stLt Don G. Phelan (from 24 Aug) - Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 14 - Oct) - 1stLt Rex C. Wells (from 17 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj Joseph L. Abel (to 7 Jan 1951) - Maj James P. Metzler (from 8 Jan) - Capt John R. Grove (from 19 Apr) - Capt Harry L. Givens (from 20 May) - Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 8 Aug) - Capt David A. McKay (from 24 Sep) - Capt Waiter Oberg (from 26 Nov) - 1stLt Elmer R. Phillips (from 17 - Feb 1952) - Maj Dennis D. Nicholson (from 16 - Mar) - Capt Owen G. Jackson, Jr. (from 30 - Mar) - - _3d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (to 13 - Jan 1951) - LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (from 14 - Jan) - Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 16 - Feb) - LtCol Bernard T, Kelly (from 8 May) - LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 4 Oct) - LtCol Houston Stiff (from 12 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 8 Jan 1951) - Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 9 - Jan) - Maj Warren Morris (from 16 Feb) - Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jul) - Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 4 Aug) - Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 6 Aug) - Maj Franklin G. Bacon (from 3 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company 1stLt Samuel B. Abston (to 7 Jan - 1951) - Capt John DeCloud (from 8 Jan) - 1stLt Samuel D. Miller (from 5 Mar) - 1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 15 - May) - 1stLt Robert H. Starek (from 25 - May) - 1stLt William R. Bennett (from 21 - Jul) - 1stLt Dennis E. Youngblood (from 6 - Oct) - 1stLt Raymond B. McGill (from 28 - Nov) - Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 2 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company G - 1stLt George R. Earnest (to 31 Dec - 1950) - Capt Walter E. Lange (from 1 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt George R. Earnest (from 11 - Mar) - 1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 22 - Mar) - Capt William C. Airheart (from 28 - Mar) - 1stLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 22 - Jul) - Capt Robert C. Hendrickson (from - 12 Aug) - Capt Thomas D. Smith, Jr. (from 14 - Dec) - 1stLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 11 - Feb 1952) - Capt Thomas P. O’Callaghan (from - 23 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company H - 1stLt William C. Airheart (to 19 - Jan 1951) - Capt James A. Hoey, Jr. (from 20 - Jan) - Capt Reed T. King (from 5 Jun) - 1stLt Dwight A. Young (from 4 Aug) - Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 9 Nov) - 1stLt William B. Stengle (from 22 - Feb 1952) - Capt William B. Cosgrove (from 17 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company I - Capt Howard L. Mabie (to 15 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Alfred I. Thomas (from 16 - Feb) - 1stLt Victor Stoyanow (from 29 Mar) - 1stLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 5 Jun) - 1stLt Thomas N. Preston (from 20 - Jun) - 1stLt Richard L. Shell (from 23 - Jul) - Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 5 - Sep) - Capt Clifford G. Moore (from 14 - Sep) - 1stLt Charles H. Hammett (from 27 - Dec) - 1stLt Hubert McEntyre (from 2 Mar - 1952) - Capt Gifford S. Horton (from 9 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Weapons Company - Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr. (to 16 - Feb 1951) - Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 17 Feb) - 1stLt Frederick Van Brunt (from 8 - Apr) - Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 19 Apr) - Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jun) - 1stLt Alfred I. Thomas (from 4 Jul) - Capt Claudie “M” Hollingsworth - (from 8 Jul) - Capt William C. Airheart (from 12 - Aug) - Capt Theodore E. Metzger (from 4 - Nov) - Capt Thomas P. O’Callaghan (from - 27 Dec) - 1stLt Louis A. Mann (from 22 Feb - 1952) - - _11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar - 1951) - Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar) - Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 5 Aug) - Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 17 Nov) - Col Frederick P. Henderson (from - 27 Mar 1952) - Executive Officer LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (to 5 Mar - 1951) - LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (from 6 - Mar) - LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (from 7 May) - LtCol Merritt Adelman (from 13 Jun) - LtCol Albert H. Potter (from 15 - Aug) - LtCol Lewis A. Jones (from 23 Nov) - S-1 Maj Floyd M. McCorkle (to 10 Jun - 1951) - Capt Arthur L. Jackson (from 11 - Jun) - 1stLt Jessie R. Collins (from 2 - Oct) - S-2 Capt William T. Phillips (to 26 - Aug 1951) - Capt Vernon K. Ausherman (from 27 - Aug) - Capt Phillip A. Schloss, Jr. (from - 17 Dec) - Capt Marshall R. Hunter, Jr. (from - 20 Feb 1952) - S-3 LtCol James O. Appleyard (to 19 - Jul 1951) - LtCol William H. Gilliam (from 20 - Jul) - LtCol William F. Pala (from 18 Nov) - S-4 Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 5 Feb - 1951) - Maj Thomas M. Coggins (from 6 Feb) - Maj Benjamin W. Muntz (from 23 Jul) - Capt Robert B. Carney (from 14 Sep) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Battery Capt Clarence E. Hixon (to 7 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt Thomas C. Thompson (from 8 - Apr) - Capt Richard L. McDaniel (from 22 - Aug) - Maj Claudie “M” Hollingsworth - (from 24 Sep) - 2dLt Chester E. Reese (from 17 Nov) - 1stLt Samuel S. Rockwood (from 9 - Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Service Battery - Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 5 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Fred Rea (from 6 Feb) - 1stLt John F. Gresham (from 21 May) - 2dLt Chester E. Reese (from 7 Nov) - Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 17 - Nov) - Capt William B. Tom (from 16 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Battery C, 1st - 4.5 Inch Rocket Battalion 1stLt Eugene A. Busche (to 11 Jul - 1951) - 1stLt Edward A. Bailey (from 12 - Jul) - 1stLt Stephen R. Mihalic (from 2 - Nov) - 1stLt Edward J. Pierson (from 30 - Mar 1952) - - _1st Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harvey A. Feehan (to 30 Mar - 1951) - Maj Thomas F. Cave, Jr. (from 31 - Mar) - Maj Gordon R. Worthington (from 8 - Aug) - LtCol Sherman W. Parry (from 13 - Sep) - LtCol James R. Haynes (from 30 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Thomas F. Cave (to 30 Mar 1951) - Maj Gordon R. Worthington (from 31 - Mar) - Maj George J. Kovich, Jr. (from 8 - Aug) - Maj Harold E. Nelson (from 17 Sep) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Battery Capt Haskell C. Baker (to 2 Jan - 1951) - Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (from 3 - Jan) - Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 3 May) - Capt John McCaffrey (from 2 Jul) - Capt Rodman E. Street (from 17 Oct) - 1stLt Charles D. Branson (from 26 - Dec) - 1stLt Harley “B” Riley (from 1 Feb - 1952) - 1stLt Joseph P. McDermott, Jr. - (from 26 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Service Battery - Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (to 1 - Jan 1951) - 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch (from 2 - Jan) - Capt Philip D. Higby (from 1 Mar) - Capt Mont G. Kenney (from 9 Jul) - Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from 9 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Battery A - Capt James D. Jordan (to 1 Apr - 1951) - Capt Mont G. Kenney (from 2 Apr) - Capt Philip D. Higby (from 10 Jul) - Capt Joseph A. Goeke (from 22 Jul) - 1stLt Richard J. Randolph, Jr. - (from 11 Sep) - 1stLt Robert O. Martin, Jr. (from - 3 Oct) - Capt Duane W. Skow (from 9 Nov) - Capt Rodman E. Street (from 24 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Battery B - Capt Gilbert N. Powell (to 12 Jun - 1951) - Capt Charles D. Corpening (from 13 - Jun) - Capt Leslie C. Procter, Jr. (from - 27 Aug) - 1stLt Donald T. Clark (from 13 Dec) - 1stLt Jefferson S. Smith (from 1 - Feb 1952) - Commanding Officer, Battery C - Capt William J. Nichols, Jr. (to - 14 Feb 1951) - Capt Haskell C. Baker (from 15 Feb) - Capt Glenn L. Tole (from 14 Jul) - Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from - 12 Sep) - 1stLt Harold H. Ramsour (from 5 - Jan 1952) - Capt James C. Gasser (from 26 Mar - 1952) - - _2d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger (to 4 - Mar 1951) - Maj Jack C. Newell (from 5 Mar) - LtCol Merritt Adelman (from 14 Mar) - LtCol Dale H. Heely (from 13 Jun) - LtCol George B. Thomas (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Neal C. Newell (to 15 Mar 1951) - Maj Bruce E. Keith (from 16 Mar) - Maj Horace W. Card, Jr. (from 12 - May) - Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 4 Aug) - Maj Claudie “M” Hollingsworth - (from 14 Aug) - Maj Frank W. Keith (from 11 Sep) - Maj James R. Haynes (from 1 Nov) - Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 29 Nov) - Maj James R. Haynes (from 15 Dec) - Maj Morris R. Snead (from 29 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Battery Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (to 27 - Jun 1951) - 1stLt Howard A. Blancheri (from 28 - Jun) - Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 3 Oct) - 1stLt John J. Scollay (from 29 Oct) - 2dLt Arthur H. Westing (from 15 - Jan 1952) - 2dLt John E. Buynak (from 16 Feb) - 1stLt Ivan B. Clevinger (from 13 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Service Battery - Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (to - 24 Feb 1951) - Capt William D. Gibson (from 25 - Feb) - 1stLt Walter L. Blocker (from 30 - Jun) - Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 20 - Jul) - 1stLt Robert E. Santee (from 6 Oct) - 1stLt Donald F. Schaller (from 3 - Feb 1952) - 1stLt James W. Bell (from 16 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Battery D - Capt Richard E. Roach (to 18 Mar - 1951) - Capt William D. Stubbs, Jr. (from - 19 Mar) - Capt Walter L. Blocker, Jr. (from - 4 Aug) - 1stLt John M. Hoben (from 4 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Battery E - Capt Richard N. Aufmann (to 25 Feb - 1951) - Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from - 26 Feb) - Capt Robt. E. Dawson (from 2 Apr) - Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from - 27 Apr) - Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (from - 28 Jun) - 1stLt Albert “G” Harris, III (from - 7 Aug) - Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 11 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Battery F - 1stLt Howard A. Blancheri (to 20 - Jan 1951) - Capt George J. Kovtch, Jr. (from - 21 Jan) - Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 3 May) - Capt William D. Gibson (from 30 - Jun) - 1stLt James F. Shea (from 13 Aug) - 1stLt James W. Bell (from 8 Nov) - Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 24 Nov) - Capt John S. Adamson (from 24 Dec) - 1stLt Frederick A. Koch, Jr. (from - 31 Dec) - - _3d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Francis F. Parry (to 6 Feb - 1951) - LtCol William McReynolds (from 7 - Feb) - Maj James R. Haynes (from 6 Sep) - LtCol James F. Coady (from 23 Oct) - LtCol Henry E. Barnes (from 2 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. (to 14 - Jul 1951) - Maj Stephen K. Pawloski (from 15 - Jul) - Maj James R. Haynes (from 16 Aug) - Maj Carl A. Neilson (from 6 Sep) - Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from - 1 Dec) - Maj Charles A. Lipot (from 4 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Battery 1stLt John J. Brackett (to 20 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt Eugene H. Brown (from 21 Jan) - 1stLt Robert C. Cameron (from 6 - Apr) - Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 21 - May) - 1stLt Robert H. Maurer (from 2 Aug) - 1stLt Thomas E. Driscoll (from 18 - Aug) - 1stLt Hugh W. Manning (from 6 Sep) - 2dLt John B. Buynak (from 7 Oct) - Capt Thomas L. Sullivan (from 20 - Nov) - 2dLt Thomas P. McGeeney, Jr. (from - 3 Jan 1952) - 2dLt Albert E. Shaw, Jr. (from 19 - Feb) - 1stLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from - 14 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Service Battery - Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 25 Feb - 1951) - 1stLt Lawrence T. Kane (from 26 - Feb) - 1stLt David D. Metcalf (from 4 Apr) - Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 10 - Sep) - Capt Charles J. Small (from 27 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Battery G - Capt Ernest W. Payne (to 14 Jul - 1951) - Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 15 - Jul) - 1stLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 6 - Sep) - 1stLt Mervyn E. Kerstner (from 11 - Sep) - 1stLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 15 - Sep) - 1stLt Edward S. McCabe (from 1 Nov) - 1stLt Joseph M. Vosmik (from 13 - Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Battery H - Capt Mason D. McQuiston (to 24 Aug - 1951) - Capt David D. Metcalf (from 25 Aug) - 1stLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from - 1 Nov) - 1stLt George E. Chambers, Jr. - (from 21 Jan 1952) - 1stLt Russell E. Blagg (from 17 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Battery I - Capt Robert T. Patterson, Jr, (to - 13 Jun 1951) - Capt Floyd R. Jaggears (from 14 - Jun) - Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 2 - Aug) - 1stLt Homer C. Wright (from 12 Aug) - Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 25 - Aug) - 1stLt Homer C. Wright (from 9 Sep) - 1stLt Charles R. Davidson, Jr. - (from 19 Feb 1952) - - _4th Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds (to 6 Feb - 1951) - Maj Maurice J. Coffey (from 7 Feb) - Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. (from 16 - Jul) - LtCol Louis A. Jones (from 6 Sep) - LtCol William M. Gilliam (from 24 - Nov) - Executive Officer Maj Maurice J. Coffey (to 6 Feb - 1951) - Maj Donald V. Anderson (from 7 Feb) - Maj Bernard W. Giebler (from 17 - Aug) - LtCol Bruce F. Hillan (from 24 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Battery 1stLt Michael B. Wier (to 10 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt Frank P. Zarzeka (from 11 - Jun) - 1stLt Arthur Coburn (from 21 Aug) - 1stLt Paul R. Joyce (from 28 Aug) - 1stLt Thomas C. Thompson, Jr. - (from 25 Nov) - 1stLt Earl C. Senter (from 10 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Service Battery - Capt Aldor B. Elmquist (to 9 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt Matthew J. Dennin (from 10 - Jun) - 1stLt William A. Mazzarella (from - 1 Jul) - Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 2 Sep) - Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 8 Sep) - Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 16 - Oct) - 1stLt Leland B. Elton (from 19 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Battery K - Capt Arthur D. Challacombe, Jr. - (to 4 Aug 1951) - 1stLt Albert E. Coffeen (from 5 - Aug) - 1stLt Paul M. Rice (from 23 Dec) - 1stLt William L. Jesse (from 17 - Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Battery L - Capt Armond G. Daddazio (to 15 Apr - 1951) - Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 16 Apr) - Capt William M. Sigler, Jr. (from - 7 Sep) - 1stLt Dennis Manko (from 28 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Battery M - Capt Vernon W. Shapiro (to 3 Feb - 1951) - Capt Charles E. Walker (from 14 - Feb) - Capt Walter E. Magon (from 18 Jun) - 1stLt George C. Briggs, Jr. (from - 28 Nov) - 1stLt Louis M. Dunklin (from 10 - Feb 1952) - 1stLt Billy J. White (from 18 Mar) - - _1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26 - Sep 1951) - LtCol Michiel Dobervich (from 27 - Sep) - Executive Officer Maj Arthur J. Barrett (to 14 Sep - 1951) - Maj William L. Eubank (from 15 Sep) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Frank E. Granucci (to 12 Jun - 1951) - Capt Lawrence H. Woods (from 13 - Jun) - Capt Thomas J. Melcher (from 15 - Sep) - 1stLt Richard R. Myers (from 9 Jan - 1952) - 1stLt William H. Gatlin (from 10 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Maj James P. Treadwell (to 6 Apr - 1951) - Maj Thomas H. Boler (from 7 Apr) - Capt Harry A. Steinmeyer (from 1 - May) - Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 17 - May) - Capt Robert L. Stuford (from 10 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Russell Hamlet (to 11 Apr - 1951) - Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 12 - Apr) - Capt John C. Crawley (from 17 May) - Capt Carl L. Hill (from 10 Jun) - Capt Harold W. Stroschein (from 1 - Jan 1952) - Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 10 Jan) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Maj Arthur J. Noonan (to 8 Aug - 1951) - Maj William L. Eubank (from 9 Aug) - Maj Edward C. Nelson (from 10 Sep) - Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 19 Dec) - Capt Robert T. Johnson (from 9 Jan - 1952) - - _1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun - 1951) - Maj George M. Warnke (from 16 Jun) - LtCol John T. O’Neill (from 2 Oct) - Executive Officer Maj Richard G. Warga (to 7 Apr - 1951) - Maj George M. Warnke (from 8 Apr) - Maj Bernard G. Thobe (from 16 Jun) - Maj Robert J. Murphy (from 1 Oct) - Maj David Young (from 6 Jan 1952) - LtCol James L. Jones (from 29 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Roger B. Thompson (to 10 May - 1951) - 1stLt Jean T. Fox (from 11 May) - Capt Richard P. Greene (from 18 - Jun) - 1stLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 12 - Oct) - 2dLt Newton C. Tullis (from 2 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Capt Bernard G. Thobe (to 25 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt Clyde P. Guy (from 26 Apr) - Maj Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (from 5 - Sep) - Maj David Foos (from 3 Oct) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Lewis E. Bolts (to 26 Jun - 1951) - Maj Ralph H. Platt (from 27 Jun) - Maj John M. Scarborough (from 3 - Oct) - Capt John B. Harney (from 10 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Service Company - Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (to 4 Sep - 1951) - 1stLt Presley K. Saine (from 5 Sep) - 2dLt John A. Boone (from 5 Nov) - Capt William H. Chandler (from 16 - Mar 1952) - - _1st Combat Service Group_ - - Commanding Officer Col John N. Cook, Jr. (to 10 Jun - 1951) - LtCol John M. Brickley (from 10 - Jun) - Col Joseph P. Sayers (from 9 Aug) - Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30 - Sep) - Executive Officer LtCol Edward A. Clark (to 17 Jan - 1951) - LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood - (from 18 Jan) - LtCol John H. Brickley (from 9 May) - Maj Murray F. Rose (from 11 Jun) - LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from - 17 Aug) - Maj John R. Blackett (from 1 Sep) - LtCol Robert T. Stivers (from 22 - Oct) - LtCol James G. Kelly (from 6 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Francis L. Miller (to 11 Apr - 1951) - Capt Raymond E. Wase (from 12 Apr) - Capt Billie G. Hagan (from 19 Apr) - Capt George M. Zellick (from 22 - Jul) - 1stLt William P. Lacy (from 21 Sep) - Capt James H. Shaw (from 15 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Maintenance - Company Maj Edward H. Voorhees (to 19 May - 1951) - 1stLt Donald M. Dackins (from 20 - May) - Maj Berny L. Thurman (from 3 Sep) - Capt Warren H. Allen (from 25 Nov) - Maj John R. Blackett (from 31 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Supply Company - Maj Robert W. Hengesbach (to 17 - Apr 1951) - Capt Bernard L. Keiter (from 18 - Apr) - 1stLt John Spiropoulas (from 24 - Nov) - Maj William D. Porter (from 29 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Support Company - Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr. (to 22 - Jan 1951) - Maj James T. Breen (from 23 Jan) - Maj Mason H. Morse (from 10 Oct) - Maj Howard T. Pittman (from 4 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Truck Company - Capt Jack W. Temple (to 10 Jun - 1951) - 1stLt Cecil C. Spencer (from 11 - Jun) - 1stLt Frank W. Dickel (from 7 Jul) - 1stLt James H. Shaw (from 8 Sep) - Capt Jacob Stocker (from 24 Sep) - Commanding Officer, 1st Fumigation - and Bath Platoon 1stLt James L. Dumas (to 14 Aug - 1951) - 1stLt Raymond S. Eason (from 15 - Aug) - 1stLt Roger B. Meade (from 6 Sep) - Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery - Platoon Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame (to - 10 Jun 1951) - 2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 11 Jun) - CWO John T. Eakes (from 26 Jun) - 1stLt William A. Reavis (from 30 - Dec) - 2dLt William S. Daniels (from 7 - Feb 1952) - - _1st Engineer Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun - 1951) - LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 11 Jun) - Executive Officer Maj Richard M. Elliott (to 1 Feb - 1951) - Maj Emile P. Moses, Jr. (from 2 - Feb) - Maj Grover C. Williams (from 4 Aug) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Edward D. Newton (to 24 Mar - 1951) - 1stLt Gerald W. Wade (from 25 Mar) - 1stLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 16 Jun) - Capt Leonard L. Schultz (from 22 - Aug) - Capt Donald F. Draeger (from 24 - Nov) - Capt Robert W. Hurley (from 20 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Service Company - Capt Phillip A. Terrell, Jr. (to - 25 Mar 1951) - Maj Richard M. Elliott (from 26 - Mar) - Maj Louis L. Ball (from 6 Sep) - Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 10 Jan - 1952) - 1stLt Arthur L. Rourke (from 9 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Capt William B. Gould (to 20 Apr - 1951) - Capt Harold R. Gingher (from 21 - Apr) - 1stLt George L. Bowman (from 15 - Jun) - 1stLt Floyd L. Vuillemot (from 1 - Oct) - Capt Walter L. Hill (from 5 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Orville L. Bibb (to 25 Mar - 1951) - Capt Phillip A. Terrill, Jr. (from - 26 Mar 1951) - 1stLt Gerald W. Wade (from 17 Oct) - 1stLt Clyde R. Kolahan (from 1 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 15 Aug - 1951) - 1stLt Robert L. Brown (from 16 Aug) - 1stLt Robert J. Hickson (from 4 - Nov) - Commanding Officer, Company D - Capt Byron C. Turner (to 30 May - 1951) - Capt Edward D. Newton (from 31 May) - Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 29 Jun) - 1stLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 23 Sep) - 1stLt John J. Killelea (from 23 - Dec) - - _1st Medical Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (to 22 - Jan 1951) - Cdr Clifford A. Stevenson, USN - (from 23 Jan) - Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN - (from 23 Sep) - Executive Officer Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8 - Jan 1951) - LtCdr Gustave T. Anderson, USN - (from 9 Jan) - Cdr George A. Schlesinger, USN - (from 4 Jul) - Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 - Aug) - LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from - 28 Oct) - Cdr James C. Luce, USN (from 28 - Feb 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8 - Jan 1951) - LtCdr Gustav T. Anderson, USN - (from 9 Jan) - Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 7 - Jun) - Cdr George C. Schlesinger, USN - (from 4 Jul) - Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 - Aug) - LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from - 28 Oct) - Lt Edgar F. Bechtel, USN (from 16 - Dec) - Lt(jg) Charles P. Richardson, USN - (from 21 Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN (to 3 - Mar 1951) - Cdr Philip L. Nova, USN (from 4 - Mar) - Cdr James A. Addison, USN (from 18 - Apr) - LtCdr Arvin T. Henderson, USN - (from 22 Sep) - Commanding Officer, Company B - LtCdr James A. Kaufman, USN (to 12 - Jun 1951) - LtCdr Francis M. Morgan, USN (from - 13 Jun) - Lt James F. Mumma, USN (from 11 - Aug) - Lt Robert Fahrner, USN (from 17 - Sep) - Lt John T. St. Mary, USN (from 20 - Sep) - Lt(jg) Leroy F. Von Lackum, USN - (from 15 Oct) - LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from - 8 Nov) - CWO William R. Lipscomb, USN (from - 27 Nov) - WO Clarence B. Mohler, USN (from 7 - Dec) - WO William R. Stanberry, USN (from - 22 Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN (to 8 - Jan 1951) - Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 - Jan) - LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from - 6 Jun) - Lt John P. McDonald, USN (from 28 - Oct) - LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from - 27 Nov) - Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN - (from 26 Dec) - LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN - (from 11 Jan 1952) - Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN - (from 7 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Company D - LtCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN (to - 7 Jan 1951) - LtCdr Daniel M. Pino, USN (from 8 - Jan) - Lt(jg) Hermes C. Grillo, USN (from - 10 Aug) - Lt(jg) Powell H. Perkins, USN - (from 8 Dec) - LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN - (from 6 Feb 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company E - LtCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN (to - 8 Jan 1951) - LtCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (from 9 - Jan) - LtCdr Robert G. Allen, USN (from - 13 Jun) - Lt Robert J. Fahrner, USN (from 9 - Sep) - LtCdr Clifford R. Hall, USN (from - 17 Oct) - - _1st Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Olin L. Beall (to 15 Mar - 1951) - LtCol John R. Barreiro, Jr. (from - 16 Mar) - LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 18 - Aug) - Executive Officer Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr. (to 15 - Mar 1951) - Maj Edward L. Roberts (from 16 Mar) - Maj Eero Nori (from 6 Aug) - Capt Howard Dismeier (from 3 Feb - 1952) - Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 7 Mar) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Capt George B. Loveday (to 4 May - 1951) - 1stLt John C. O’Connell (from 5 - May) - 2dLt Walter R. Gustafson (from 21 - Jul) - 1stLt John C. O’Connell (from 17 - Aug) - Capt Seneker Woll (from 1 Sep) - 1stLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Capt Arthur W. Ecklund (to 3 May - 1951) - 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum (from 4 - May) - Capt Arnold T. Reed (from 4 Sep) - 1stLt Walter A. Knopp (from 30 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt James C. Camp, Jr. (to 9 Aug - 1951) - 1stLt Marshall “A” Webb, Jr. (from - 10 Aug) - 1stLt Gerald W. Gruber (from 13 - Sep) - Commanding Officer, Company C - 1stLt Norman E. Stow (to 15 Aug - 1951) - Capt Joe P. England (from 16 Aug) - Commanding Officer, Company D - 1stLt William D. Pothoff (to 8 Oct - 1951) - 1stLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Oct) - Capt Leroy P. Oetter (from 17 Oct) - Commanding Officer, Automotive - Support Company 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum (to 16 - Feb 1951) - Capt Walter J. Desel, Jr. (from 17 - Feb) - 1stLt Marshall “A” Webb, Jr. (from - 14 May) - Capt Leon Serkin (from 1 Aug) - Capt Charles R. Godwin (from 4 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Automotive - Maintenance Company Maj Edward L. Roberts (to 15 Mar - 1951) - Capt Victor E. Sellers (from 16 - Mar) - Capt Ira N. Hayes (from 10 Apr) - Capt Harold L. Mayfield (from 3 - Aug) - Maj Marion D. Grush (from 5 Nov) - - _7th Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Carl J. Cagle (to 1 Oct 1951) - Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 2 Oct) - Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 3 Jan - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson (to 26 Jul - 1951) - Capt Joseph L. Bunker (from 27 Jul) - Maj Walter R. O’Quinn (from 19 Sep) - Maj Ben Sutts (from 2 Oct) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company 2dLt Henry F. Finney (to 13 Jan - 1951) - 2dLt Palmer B. Fordham (from 14 - Jan) - 1stLt Richard J. Keeling (from 10 - Feb) - 1stLt Earl H. Johnson (from 10 Apr) - 1stLt Louis C. Tauber (from 13 Aug) - 1stLt Kenneth F. Smith (from 1 Sep) - Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Capt Ira N. Hayes (to 8 Apr 1951) - 1stLt Landon E Christian (from 9 - Apr) - Capt Robert B. Stone (from 8 Aug) - Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Sep) - Capt Kenneth F. Smith (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Clovis M. Jones (to 11 Mar - 1951) - 1stLt Lawrence C. Norton (from 12 - Mar) - 1stLt John B. Wilson (from 1 Sep) - 1stLt Clyde H. Loveday, Jr. (from - 15 Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Capt Fred B. Rogers (to 16 Apr - 1951) - 1stLt Oscar A. Bosma (from 17 Apr) - 1stLt Richard C. O’Dowd (from 6 - Jun) - Capt Roscoe C. Hibbard (from 23 - Nov) - Capt Clifton G. Moore (from 28 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company D - Capt Joseph L. Bunker (to 26 Jul - 1951) - 1stLt Hubert J. Thomas (from 27 - Jul) - 1stLt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1 - Sep) - Capt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1 Jan - 1952) - - _1st Ordnance Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams (to 31 Aug - 1951) - Maj Harold C. Borth (from 1 Sep) - Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr. (to 5 - Jul 1951) - Capt Theodore Tunis (from 6 Jul) - Capt Gordon H. Moore (from 1 Aug) - Maj Harold C. Borth (from 13 Aug) - Maj Eugene Anderson (from 1 Sep) - Capt Thomas J. Belt, Jr. (from 1 - Jan 1952) - Capt Frederick V. Osborn (from 6 - Feb) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Gordon H. Moore (to 9 Sep - 1951) - 2dLt Willie B. Hayter, Jr. (from - 10 Sep) - 1stLt Henry “H” Best, Jr. (from 7 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Ordnance Supply - Company 1stLt Victor F. Brown (to 10 Aug - 1951) - Capt Simon W. Vevurka (from 11 Aug) - Capt Thomas J. Belt (from 1 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Ammunition - Company Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 6 Apr - 1951) - Capt Robert C. Holder (from 7 Apr) - Capt David A. Malinsky (from 12 - Sep) - Capt Chester D. Brown, Jr. (from 4 - Jan 1952) - Capt Cecil B. Smith (from 21 Feb) - Commanding Officer, Ordnance - Maintenance Company Capt George L. Williams (to 15 Aug - 1951) - Maj James H. Pierce (from 16 Aug) - 1stLt Charles B. Haslam (from 10 - Dec) - Capt William E. L. Donner (from 20 - Jan 1952) - Capt Dwight H. Sawin, Jr. (from 17 - Mar) - - _1st Service Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Charles L. Banks (to 11 Jan - 1951) - Col Gould P. Groves (from 12 Jan) - LtCol Horace E. Knapp (from 27 Mar) - LtCol Woodrow M. Kessler (from 6 - Jul) - LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 3 - Mar 1952) - Executive Officer Maj John R. Stone (to 18 Jun 1951) - Capt Victor E. Johnson, Jr. (from - 19 Jun) - Maj Louis G. Monville (from 3 Jul) - Maj George E. Allison (from 18 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company Capt Morse “L” Holladay (to 20 Jan - 1951) - 1stLt Robert E. Follendorf (from - 21 Jan) - 1stLt James B. Lichtenberger (from - 3 Sep) - 1stLt Peter N. Pappas (from 10 Oct) - Capt John E. Welch (from 31 Dec) - 1stLt Joseph D. Walker (from 10 - Jan 1952) - 1stLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 10 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Supply Company - Capt Robert A. Morehead (to 13 Apr - 1951) - Capt George K. Reid (from 14 Apr) - Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 27 - May) - Capt Milton W. Magee (from 6 Jun) - Maj James R. Fury (from 13 Aug) - Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 26 - Dec) - Capt John H. Tomlinson (from 11 - Mar 1952) - Commanding Officer, Support Company - Capt Thomas M. Sagar (to 22 Jan - 1951) - Capt Morse “L” Holladay (from 23 - Jan) - 1stLt Victor E. Johnson (from 30 - Mar) - Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 7 - Jun) - 1stLt Glenn P. Gasaway (from 2 Jul) - 1stLt Robert W. Blum (from 3 Sep) - Capt Robert E. Moyer (from 1 Oct) - 1stLt Jack A. Mackenzie (from 13 - Nov) - 1stLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 21 - Dec) - 1stLt Barry D. Diamond (from 8 Jan - 1952) - Capt Seneker Woll (from 10 Mar) - - _1st Shore Party Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May - 1951) - LtCol Horace H. Figuers (from 11 - May) - LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 17 - Jul) - LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29 - Sep) - LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 20 - Dec) - LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (from 9 - Mar 1952) - Executive Officer LtCol Horace H. Figuers (to 10 May - 1951) - Maj John G. Dibble (from 11 May) - Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7 - Aug) - Maj Joseph T. Smith, Jr. (from 6 - Sep) - Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7 - Nov) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters and - Service Company Maj James I. Glendinning, Jr. (to - 2 Jan 1951) - Maj George A. Smith (from 3 Jan) - Maj Burt A. Lewis (from 19 May) - Maj William T. Miller (from 20 Jun) - 1stLt Robert H. During (from 20 - Aug) - Maj Edson W. Card (from 29 Aug) - Maj Paul R. Nugent (from 12 Sep) - Capt Quentin H. Kravig (from 19 - Jan 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company A - Maj Charles E. Ingram (to 1 Jul - 1951) - Maj Orville L. Bibb (from 2 Jul) - Capt Calvin Wall (from 10 Aug) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Maj Henry Brezinski (to 17 Jun - 1951) - Capt William A. Reno (from 18 Jun) - Maj Charles E. Ingram (from 3 Jul) - Maj George W. Ellis, Jr. (from 29 - Jul) - Capt Francis V. Clifford (from 8 - Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Maj Murray F. Rose (to 9 Jun 1951) - Capt Henry J. Jadrich (from 10 Jun) - Maj Burt A. Lewis, Jr. (from 21 - Jun) - Maj Edson W. Card (from 4 Aug) - Capt William A. Reno (from 29 Aug) - Maj Edson W. Card (from 8 Sep) - Capt Robert T. Weis (from 12 Dec) - - _1st Signal Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 6 Apr - 1951) - Maj Richard A. Glaeser (from 7 Apr) - Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 31 Aug) - LtCol John E. Morris (from 20 Oct) - Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson (to 9 Mar - 1951) - Maj Richard A. Glaeser (from 10 - Mar) - Capt Marion J. Griffin (from 7 Apr) - Maj Robert W. Nelson (from 20 Apr) - Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 20 Oct) - Maj Ernest C. Bennett (from 12 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company 2dLt Merle W. Allen (to 1 Mar 1951) - 1stLt Raymond B. Spicer (from 2 - Mar) - 2dLt Richard D. Alexander (from 18 - Jun) - 1stLt Frank J. Cerny (from 16 Aug) - Commanding Officer, Signal Company - Maj Richard A. Glaeser (to 8 Mar - 1951) - Capt John H. McGuire (from 9 Mar) - Maj Harold S. Hill (from 17 Aug) - Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 1 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, ANGLICO - Maj Frederick N. Steinhauser (to - 24 Oct 1951) - Maj Walter R. Miller (from 25 Oct) - LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 13 Feb - 1952) - - _1st Tank Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 21 Apr - 1951) - LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 22 Apr) - Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from - 9 Feb 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Philip C. Morell (to 2 Sep - 1951) - Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from - 3 Sep) - Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (from 9 - Feb 1952) - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - Company 1stLt John B. Lund (to 21 Sep 1951) - Capt Robert S. Grether (from 22 - Sep) - 1stLt Jack D. Sheldon (from 10 Mar - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Service Company - Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 3 Jul - 1951) - Maj George W. Bubb (from 4 Jul) - Maj Edward C. Nelson (from 27 Dec) - Capt Robt. H. Vogel (from 9 Feb - 1952) - Commanding Officer, Company A - 1stLt Robert J. Craig (to 20 Jan - 1951) - Maj Arthur M. Hale (from 21 Jan) - Capt Robert M. Krippner (from 31 - Mar) - Capt John E. Scanlon (from 17 Apr) - Capt Joseph W. Luker (from 14 Jun) - Capt Robert S. Grether (from 3 Sep) - Capt Albert W. Snell (from 21 Sep) - 1stLt William E. Young (from 19 - Feb 1952) - Capt Milton L. Raphael (from 10 - Mar) - Commanding Officer, Company B - Capt Bruce F. Williams (to 1 Jul - 1951) - Capt Paul F. Curtis (from 2 Jul) - Capt John E. Lund (from 2 Oct) - 1stLt Paul A. Wood (from 5 Nov) - Capt Jack J. Jackson (from 29 Dec) - Commanding Officer, Company C - Capt Richard M. Taylor (to 5 Aug - 1951) - Maj Walter Moore (from 6 Aug) - Capt Thomas W. Clark (from 21 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Company D - Capt Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr. (to 2 - Sep 1951) - Capt James L. Carey (from 3 Sep) - Capt Charles A. Sooter (from 28 - Nov) - - _Marine Observation Squadron 6_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk (to 31 - Mar 1951) - Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 1 - Apr) - Maj David W. McFarland (from 5 Apr) - Maj Allan H. Ringblom (from 6 Oct) - Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 1 Nov) - Maj Kenneth G. Smedley (from 1 Feb - 1952) - Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from - 11 Feb) - LtCol William T. Herring (from 27 - Feb) - Executive Officer Capt Andrew L. McVicars (to 13 Jan - 1951) - Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 14 - Jan) - Capt Kenneth C. Smedley (from 21 - Jul) - Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from - 21 Nov) - - _Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol George W. Herring (to 17 Dec - 1951) - Col Keith B. McCutcheon (from 18 - Dec) - Executive Officer Maj William P. Mitchell (to 19 Mar - 1952) - Maj James R. Dyer (from 20 Mar) - - - FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (1st MAW) - 1 January 1951–31 March 1952 - - Commanding General MajGen Field Harris (to 28 May - 1951) - BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman (from 29 - May) - MajGen Christian F. Schilt (from - 27 Jul) - Asst Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman - (to 28 May 1951) - BrigGen William O. Brice (from 29 - May) - BrigGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner - (from 29 Sep) - Chief of Staff Col Caleb T. Bailey (to 18 Aug 1951) - Col Arthur F. Binney (from 19 Aug) - Col Carson A. Roberts (from 2 Jan - 1952) - Col Arthur F. Binney (from 26 Mar) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 Col Raymond E. Hopper (to 10 Feb - 1951) - Col Alexander G. Bunker (from 11 - Feb) - LtCol Owen M. Hines (from 1 Nov) - Col Robert O. Bisson (from 27 Feb - 1952) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col Roger T. Carleson (to 18 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Winson V. Crockett (from 19 - Feb) - Capt John E. Buckle (from 21 Jun) - Capt William G. Redel (from 1 Aug) - LtCol Chester A. Henry, Jr. (from - 1 Sep) - LtCol John W. Stage (from 12 Jan - 1952) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 Col Edward C. Dyer (to 28 Feb 1951) - LtCol Howard A. York (from 1 Mar) - LtCol Neil R. MacIntyre (from 12 - Mar) - Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from - 26 Jun) - Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 19 - Aug) - Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from 7 - Sep) - Col Guy M. Morrows (from 14 Sep) - Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 21 - Jan 1952) - Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Col Thomas J. Noon (to 14 May 1951) - Col Wallace T. Breakey (from 15 - May) - LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 21 Jul) - Col Luther S. Moore (from 5 Sep) - Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 7 Jan - 1952) - Col Robert E. Galer (from 12 Mar) - - _Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Frank G. Dailey (to 29 Dec - 1950) - LtCol Radford C. West (from 30 Dec) - LtCol Paul J. Fontana (from 15 Jan - 1951) - LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr. - (acting) (from 2 Apr) - Col Guy M. Morrow (from 9 Apr) - Col Carson A. Roberts (from 31 Jul) - Col Arthur F. Binney (from 2 Jan - 1952) - Col Martin A. Severson (from 27 - Mar) - Executive Officer LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr. (to 18 - May 1951) - LtCol James B. Moore (from 19 May) - LtCol Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 14 - Jul) - LtCol John W. Stage (from 2 Sep) - LtCol Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 12 - Jan 1952) - LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 6 Feb) - - _Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Nathan T. Post (to 10 Jan - 1952) - LtCol Finley T. Clarke, Jr. (from - 11 Jan) - Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 27 - Mar) - Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshbarger (to 24 - Apr 1952) - - _Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (2 Dec - 1951 to 21 Jan 1952) - Maj Zadik Collier (from 22 Jan) - Executive Officer Maj Alton C. Bennett (to 4 Dec - 1951) - Maj Zadik Collier (from 5 Dec) - Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 22 Jan - 1952) - - _Headquarters Squadron 33 (HQSQ, MAG-33)_ - - Commanding Officer Capt Grover C. McClure, Jr. (to 14 - Apr 1951) - Maj William D. Armstrong (from 15 - Apr) - Maj Raymond F. Scherer (from 28 - Jul) - Maj Morgan C. Webb, III (from 27 - Aug) - Capt Allen R. Schutter (from 27 - Mar 1952) - - _Marine Service Squadron 33 (SMS-33)_[378] - - Commanding Officer LtCol James C. Lindsay (to 23 Jan - 1951) - Maj Edward J. Montagne (from 24 - Jan) - Maj William M. Lundin (from 26 Jan) - Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. (from 1 - Apr) - LtCol Allen T. Barnum (from 2 Jul) - LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (from 12 - Nov) - Executive Officer Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (to 13 - Mar 1951)[379] - Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr.[380] - (from 2 Jul) - Maj George K. Harshbarger (from 7 - Aug) - - _Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Boeker C. Batterton (to 28 May - 1951) - Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 29 - May) - Col Richard C. Mangrum (from 1 Aug) - Col Luther S. Moore (from 2 Jan - 1952) - Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 1 Apr) - Executive Officer LtCol Donald K. Yost (to 24 Feb - 1951) - LtCol Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from - 25 Feb) - LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski (from - 26 Jun) - LtCol William G. Thrash (from 18 - Jul) - LtCol Hugh M. Elwood (from 8 Aug) - LtCol Jens C. Aggerbeck, Jr. (from - 17 Nov) - LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 27 Feb - 1952) - - _Headquarters Squadron, (HQSQ, MAG-12)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj John E. Hays (to 31 Dec 1950) - Capt William E. Lesage (from 1 Jan - 1951) - Maj Bradley K. Schwarz (from 4 Apr) - Maj David P. John (from 2 Sep) - Capt Joseph E. Givens (from 9 Oct) - Capt George Byers, Jr. (from 1 Feb - 1952) - - _Marine Service Squadron 12 (SMS-12)[381]_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Charles E. McLean, Jr. (to - 28 Jul 1951) - Maj Perry L. Shuman (from 29 Jul) - Executive Officer Maj Joseph W. Mackin (to 2 Apr - 1951) - Maj Howard W. Bollmann (from 3 Apr) - Maj Raphael Ahern (from 8 Aug) - Maj Robert E. Wall (from 3 Oct) - - _Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)_ (Commissioned 1 Dec 1951) - - Commanding Officer Maj Perry L. Shuman (to 5 Jan - 1952)[382] - Maj Robert L. Bryson (from 6 Jan) - LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 1 Mar) - Executive Officer Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (to 18 - Dec 1951) - Maj Robert L. Bryson (from 19 Dec) - Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 6 - Jan 1952) - Maj Robert A. Collett (from 1 Mar) - - _Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)_ - (Commissioned 1 Dec 1951) - - Commanding Officer Maj Robert E. Wall (to 10 Feb 1952) - LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 11 Feb) - LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 1 Mar) - Executive Officer Capt Kenneth A. Anderson (to 26 - Dec 1951) - Maj “S” “D” G. Peterson (from 27 - Dec)[383] - Maj Robert E. Wall (from Feb/Mar - 1952)[383] - - _Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)_ (Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953) - and - _Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)_ (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953) - - Commanding Officer CWO Aubrey D. Taylor (to 23 Jan - 1951) - LtCol James C. Lindsay (from 24 - Jan) - Col Roger T. Carleson (from 19 Feb) - Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 9 Sep) - Col John Wehle (from 7 Jan 1952) - Executive Officer None shown prior to 19 Feb 1951. - LtCol James C. Lindsay (to 16 Jul - 1951) - LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 17 Jul) - Maj Edward J. McGee (from 13 Nov) - LtCol Robert M. Haynes (from 2 Dec) - LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 15 - Mar 1952) - - _Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Harold E. Allen (to 10 Jun - 1951) - LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 11 - Jun) - Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 18 - Aug) - LtCol William T. Herring (from 18 - Sep) - Maj Milton M. Cook (from 1 Feb - 1952) - LtCol Herbert D. Raymond, Jr. - (from 16 Feb) - Maj Fred A. Steele (from 28 Mar) - Executive Officer Maj Richard Hey, Jr. (to 3 Apr - 1951) - Maj Casper F. Hegner (from 4 Apr) - Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 31 - Jul) - Maj William T. Porter (from 21 Nov) - Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 11 - Dec) - Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from 2 - Feb 1952) - Maj Fred A. Steele (from 16 Feb) - Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from - 28 Mar) - - _Marine Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152)_ - - Commanding Officer Col Deane C. Roberts (to 15 Jul - 1951) - LtCol John S. Carter (from 16 Jul) - Col William B. Steiner (from 27 - Jul) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212) redesignated Marine Attack - Squadron 212 (VMA-212) on 10 Jun 1952_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski (to 9 - Mar 1951) - LtCol Claude H. Welch (from 10 Mar) - LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 21 - Aug) - LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 11 Dec) - LtCol Robert L. Bryson (from 1 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. (to 18 - Mar 1951) - Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (from - 19 Mar) - Maj Joseph W. Mackin (from 13 Apr) - Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 16 - Jul) - Maj William H. Rankin (from 20 Sep) - Maj Robert A. Collett (from 11 Dec) - Maj Richard B. Elliott (from 23 - Feb 1952) - - _1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion_ Arrived Pusan, Korea--29 Aug 1951 - - Battalion Commander LtCol Charles W. May (KIA) (to 21 - Dec 1951) - LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 22 - Dec) - Col John F. Dunlap (from 30 Jan - 1952) - Col Max C. Chapman (from 23 Mar) - Executive Officer Maj Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 21 Dec - 1951) - None shown 22–25 Dec 1951. - Maj David H. Simmons (from 26 Dec) - LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 30 - Jan 1952) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-311)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Neil R. MacIntyre (to 10 Mar - 1951) - LtCol John F. Kinney (from 11 Mar) - Maj Frank S. Hoffecker (from 28 - Jul) - LtCol James B. Moore (from 1 Aug) - LtCol John S. Payne (from 1 Dec) - LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (from 27 - Feb 1952) - Executive Officer Maj John R. Stack (to 20 Feb 1951) - Maj Samuel Richards, Jr. (from 21 - Feb) - Maj Samuel B. Folsom, Jr. (from - Apr)[384] - Maj Frank S. Hoffecker, Jr. (from - 1 Jun) (KIA) - Maj Frank C. Drury (from 25 Aug) - Maj Carroll E. McCullah (from 1 - Jan 1952) - Maj Jay E. McDonald (from 16 Feb) - - _Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol David C. Wolfe (to 22 Feb - 1951) - LtCol James R. Anderson (from 23 - Feb) - LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 1 Jul) - LtCol Allen T. Barnum (from 22 Nov) - Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 1 Feb - 1952) - LtCol John R. Burnett (from 1 Mar) - Executive Officer Maj Albert L. Clark (to 18 Dec - 1950) - Maj George B. Herlihy (from 19 Dec) - Maj William G. Johnson[385] (from - Feb 1951) - Maj Evans C. Carlson (from 23 Apr) - Maj John E. Reynolds (from 7 May) - Maj Leo F. Tatro, Jr. (from 25 Aug) - Maj Judson C. Richardson, Jr. - (MIA) (from 4 Oct) - Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 14 Dec) - Maj Leroy T. Frey (from 1 Feb 1952) - Maj Frank H. Simonds (from 1 Mar) - - _Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542 (VMF(N)-542)_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr. (to 5 - Feb 1951) - LtCol James R. Anderson (from 6 - Feb) - Maj Albert L. Clark (from 23 - Feb)[386] - LtCol Peter D. Lambrecht (from 24 - Mar) - Executive Officer Maj Robert T. Whitten (to 23 Jan - 1951) - LtCol James R. Anderson (from 24 - Jan) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323) redesignated Marine Attack - Squadron 323 (VMA-323) on 30 Jun 1952_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Arnold A. Lund (to 24 Jan 1951) - Maj Stanley S. Nicolay (from 25 - Jan) - Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Mar) - Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 3 May) - LtCol George F. Vaughan (from 25 - Sep) - Maj John L. Dexter (from 26 Oct) - LtCol Richard L. Blume (from 16 - Jan 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Johnson (to 31 Jan - 1951) - Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Feb) - Maj Wilbur F. Evans, Jr. (from 1 - Mar) - Maj John L. Dexter (from 7 Jul) - Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 25 - Oct) - Maj Andrew J. Voyles (from 22 Nov) - Maj Howard E. Cook (from 18 Dec) - Maj Herbert D. Raymond, Jr. (from - 13 Jan 1952) - Maj Howard E. Cook (from 14 Feb) - Maj William A. Weir (from 16 Mar) - - _Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)_ (Arrived Korea 11 Apr 1951) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 10 - Apr 1951) - Col Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (from - 30 Apr) - Col Martin A. Severson (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Col Frederick R. Payne, Jr. (from - 1 Mar) - Executive Officer None shown during period LtCol - Brilliant was CO. - LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 30 - Apr 1951) - LtCol Joseph W. Kean (from 10 Jun) - LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 4 Dec) - LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 6 Feb - 1952) - - _Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Christian C. Lee (to 30 Apr - 1951) - Maj James A. Etheridge (from 1 May) - Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 6 - May) - Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 28 May) - LtCol Henry W. Bransom (from 25 - Jun) - LtCol Hensley Williams (from 1 Dec - 1951) - Executive Officer Maj Harlen E. Hood (to Mar/Apr - 1951) - Maj James A. Etheridge (from 26 - Apr)[387] - Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 1 May) - Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 28 - May) - Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 23 Sep) - - _Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Raymond H. George (to 15 Feb - 1951) - Maj Jack R. Moore (from 16 Feb) - LtCol Hoyle R. Barr (from 1 Nov) - LtCol Owen W. Hines (from 2 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj David M. Hudson (to 15 Aug - 1951) - Maj Daniel L. Cummings (from 16 - Aug) - Maj James H. Foster (from 17 Feb - 1952) - - _Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121)_ - - (Departed El Toro--2 Oct 1951 for Korea; 21 Oct 1951 reported to CG, - 1stMAW, for duty; 22 Oct 1951 CO arrived Pohang (K-3), Korea.) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Alfred N. Gordon (KIA) (to - 17 Nov 1951) - Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 18 - Nov) - LtCol Phillip B. May (from 1 Dec) - LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. - (from 15 Mar 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 17 - Nov 1951) - Maj Edward B. Harrison (from 18 - Nov) - Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 1 - Dec) - Maj Edward B. Harrison (from 1 Jan - 1952) - Maj Richard J. Flynn, Jr. (from 15 - Feb) - Maj Henry W. Horst (from 26 Mar) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214)_ - - Commanding Officer Maj William M. Lundin (to 25 Jan - 1951) - Maj James A. Feeley, Jr. (from 26 - Jan) - Maj Edward Ochoa (from 5 May) - LtCol James W. Poindexter (from 16 - May) - Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 4 - Nov)[388] - Executive Officer Maj Edward Ochoa (to 31 Jan 1951) - Maj Hugh B. Calahan (from 1 Feb) - Maj Herbert C. Langenfeld[389] - (from 1 Jun) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)_ (Arrived Pohang (K-3), Korea - on 25 Feb 1952) - - Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas M. Coles (25 Feb-20 - May 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (25 Feb-26 - Apr 1952) - - _Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF-312) redesignated Marine Attack Squadron - (VMA-312) on 1 Mar 1952_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol “J” Frank Cole (to 28 Jan - 1951) - Maj Donald P. Frame (KIA) (from 29 - Jan) - Maj Frank H. Presley (from 4 Apr) - Maj Edward J. McGee (from 20 Jun) - LtCol Harry W. Reed (KIA) (from 22 - Jul) - Maj Edward J. McGee (from 31 Jul) - LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 15 Aug) - LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (from - 8 Jan 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Presley (to 3 Apr - 1951) - Capt Phillip C. DeLong (from 4 Apr) - Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from - 22 Jun) - Maj Edward J. McGee (from 22 Jul) - Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from - 31 Jul) - Maj Edward J. McGee (from 14 Aug) - Maj James H. Crutchfield (KIA) - (from 25 Oct) - Maj Jay W. Hubbard (from 4 Nov) - Maj Richard J. Webster (from 19 - Dec)[390] - Maj Fred A. Steele (from Jan - 1952)[390] - Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (from - 28 Jan) - Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 30 - Mar) - - _Photographic Unit--commissioned Marine Photographic Squadron 1 - (VMJ-1) on 25 Feb 1952_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Donald S. Bush (to 14 Jun 1951) - Maj Edgar L. Smith (from 15 Jun) - Maj James W. Dougherty (from 27 - Jul) - Capt Edward A. Fitzgerald (from 29 - Oct) - LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 12 Nov) - Maj Robert R. Read (from 26 Mar - 1952) - Executive Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 25 Mar 1952) - Maj Albert E. James (from 26 Mar) - - _HQSQ, 1st MAW_ - - Commanding Officer Capt Earl B. Sumerlin, Jr. (to 12 - Jan 1951) - Maj John A. Reeder (from 13 Jan) - Capt Edwin H. McCaleb, III (from - 17 Jun) - Maj Herbert C. Langenfeld (from - 11 Oct) - Maj Earl C. Miles (from 2 Dec) - - [378] SMS disestablished 1 Dec 1951--concurrently MABS-33 and - MAMS-33 formed. - - [379] No Exec listed after Montagne was detached sometime in - March 1951 until July 1951. Thompson came aboard 13 Mar - 1951 which may well be date that Montagne was detached as - Exec--however, nothing is recorded to this effect. - - [380] It is quite possible and logical that Thompson was Exec - from 13 Mar-2 Apr 1951--when he became CO. - - [381] SMS-12 disestablished 1 Dec 1951--concurrently MABS-12 - and MAMS-12 formed and commissioned. - - [382] Narrative of Jan 1952 CD MABS-12 states Shuman det 4 Jan - 1952 and Bryson on same date took over as CO. Assumption - of command order states that 6 Jan 1952 was date Bryson - became CO. - - [383] These dates are those from the Station Lists--the diary - records nothing (except in the case of Beatty (20 Feb - 1952)) that would either prove or disprove these dates as - being correct. - - [384] The absence of a specific date indicates that no specific - date of assignment is shown in unit records. - - [385] The absence of specific dates indicates that no specific - assignment dates can be found in existing records. - - [386] VMF(N)-542: At sea bound for United States 12–21 Mar - 1951--arrived El Toro, 24 Mar 1951. - - [387] His date of attachment is vague. - - [388] VMF-214 departed Korea for Itami on 4 Nov 1951--en route - to USA (El Toro) aboard the _Lenawee_, 8–27 Nov 1951. - - [389] Records do not indicate specific date. - - [390] Records do not indicate specific date. - - - - -APPENDIX D - -Unit Citations - -THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - -WASHINGTON - - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the - - FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - - “For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor - forces in Korea during the periods 21 to 26 April, 16 May to - 30 June, and 11 to 25 September 1951. Spearheading the first - counteroffensive in the spring of 1951, the First Marine - Division, Reinforced, engaged the enemy in the mountainous - center of Korea in a brilliant series of actions unparalleled - in the history of the Marine Corps, destroying and routing - hostile forces with an unrelenting drive of seventy miles north - from Wonju. During the period 21 to 26 April, the full force - of the enemy counteroffensive was met by the Division, north - of the Hwachon Reservoir. Although major units flanking the - Marine Division were destroyed or driven back by the force of - this attack, the Division held firm against the attackers, - repelling the onslaught from three directions and preventing the - encirclement of the key center of the lines. Following a rapid - regrouping of friendly forces in close contact with the enemy, - the First Marine Division, Reinforced, was committed into the - flanks of the massive enemy penetration and, from 16 May to 30 - June, was locked in violent and crucial battle which resulted - in the enemy being driven back to the north with disastrous - losses to his forces in the number of killed, wounded and - captured. Carrying out a series of devastating assaults, the - Division succeeded in reducing the enemy’s main fortified complex - dominating the 38th Parallel. In the final significant offensive - of the action in Korea, from 11 to 25 September 1951, the First - Marine Division, Reinforced, completed the destruction of the - enemy forces in Eastern Korea by advancing the front against a - final desperate enemy defense in the ‘Punch Bowl’ area in heavy - action which completed the liberation of South Korea in this - locality. With the enemy’s major defenses reduced, his forces on - the central front decimated, and the advantage of terrain and - the tactical initiative passing to friendly forces, he never - again recovered sufficiently to resume the offensive in Korea. - The outstanding courage, resourcefulness and aggressive fighting - spirit of the officers and men of the First Marine Division, - Reinforced, reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the - United States Naval Service.” - - The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division - participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in - Korea during the cited periods: - - FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS: “C” Battery, 1st - 4.5 Rocket Battalion; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian - Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored - Amphibian Battalion; “A” Company, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion - (Redesignated 1st Amphibian Truck Company 18 July 1951); Team - #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st Fumigation and - Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 1st - Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance - Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; - 1st Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire - Liaison Company. - - UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS: (For such periods not included in Army - Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32d Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th - Truck Co; 513th Truck Co; 1st Ord Medium Maint Co, USA; 3d Plt, - 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to operational control of 11th - Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, was attached to 7th - MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92d Army Engr Searchlight - Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163d MIS Det USA; TLO Det USA; UNMACK - Civil Affairs Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 - Howitzer); 623d Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn “C” Btry; 204th - Field Arty Bn “B” Btry; 84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th - US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2d US - Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; - Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty Bn “A” Btry; 69th - Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field - Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; Prov - Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 32d RCTS); Co D, 10th Engr (C) Bn, USA; - Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; Co B, 1st Bn, 31st - Inf, USA; 2d Bn, 31st Inf, USA (less Co E). - - For the President, - CHARLES S. THOMAS - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - -THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - -WASHINGTON - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the - - FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - - “For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor - forces in Korea from 8 March to 30 April, 18 May to 30 June, and - 3 August to 29 September 1951. Carrying out ‘round-the-clock’ - combat flights during these periods, often under hazardous - conditions of weather and terrain, the First Marine Aircraft - Wing, Reinforced, provided unparalleled close air support for - friendly ground forces, effectively reducing the enemy’s power - to resist and contributing materially to the sweeping victories - achieved by our ground forces. Operating continuously in the - most advanced areas under fire, the Wing consistently maintained - a high degree of combat readiness and struck savage blows to - inflict tremendous damage and heavy casualties upon the enemy. - Individually capable and determined, the gallant officers and men - of this indomitable team achieved a distinctive combat record - during a period of vital operations against a stubborn foe. This - record is a lasting tribute to the courage and fighting spirit of - all members of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, and - reflects the highest credit upon the United States Naval Service.” - - All organic units (excepting Marine Fighting Squadrons 214 and - 323 for the periods 8 March to 30 April 1951 and 18 May to 30 - June 1951, and Marine Observation Squadron 6 for the entire three - periods) and the following reinforcing units of the First Marine - Aircraft Wing participated in operations against enemy aggressor - forces in Korea during one or more of the above cited periods: - 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and Ground Control - Approach Unit 41M. - - For the President, - CHARLES S. THOMAS - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - - -Bibliography - -DOCUMENTS - - - Department of the Army. Joint Daily Situation Reports, December - 1950-March 1952. Reports and Orders (1950–1952) R&O File, HQMC - Historical. - - Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the Operations of the - First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript - File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Notes on the Operation of the 1st Marine Division During the - First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript - File, HQMC Historical. - - U.S. Air Force. U.S. Air Force Historical Study Number 72 - (Continuation of Army Historical Study Number 71), “U.S. Air - Force Operations in Korean Conflict 1 November 1950 to 30 June - 1952.” July 1955. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - U.S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War, - 1950–54. Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Letters and comments from participants in the Korean War. - Comments File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Letters, memoranda, narratives, and statements received by - Historical Branch, G-3, concerning Korean operations. Monograph - and Comments File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Distribution List: - “Analysis of Close Air Support Systems,” 19 August 1952. HQMC - Historical. - - ----. Report of Joint Army-Navy Mission at Headquarters U.S. Marine - Corps, 9 November 1951. G-4 Files, HQMC. - - ----. _Instructional Information, Vest, Armored_, M-1951. G-4 - Files, HQMC. - - Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Interim Evaluation Report - Number 1, 25 June to 15 November 1950. 20 January 1951. 6 vols. - UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 2, 16 - November 1950 to 30 April 1951. 6 vols. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 3, 1 May - 1951 to 31 December 1951. 6 vols. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 4, 1 - January to 30 June 1952. 6 vols. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - Far East Command. Allied Translator and Interpreter Service. Enemy - Documents: Korean Operations. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical - and Document File Section. - - ----. Operations Branch, Theater Intelligence Division, Military - Intelligence Section, Order of Battle Information Chinese - Communist Third Field Army. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical. - - Chief, Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical Air Command. Joint - Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations. UHR File, HQMC - Historical. - - Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in - Korea. 22 March 1951. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Staff Study: The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine - Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific. 19 October 1950. - R&O File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. War Diaries, Command Reports, and - supporting documents, December 1950-March 1952. Departmental - Records Branch, The Adjutant General’s Office. Alexandria, Va. - (DRB, TAGO). - - ----. Order of Battle Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of - Staff, G-2. CCF Army Histories. 1 December 1954. Copy at OCMH. - - Fifth Air Force. Reports, orders, and supporting documents, May - 1951-March 1952. Copies at HQMC Historical. - - X Corps. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents, - December 1950-March 1952. DRB. TAGO. - - ----. G-2 Section. Periodic Intelligence Reports, December - 1950-March 1952. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Marine Air Wing, FMF. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Command Diary (Korea), Type B Report File (Diary File), - HQMC Historical. - - 1st Marine Division, FMF. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Periodic Intelligence Reports, December 1950-March 1952. - Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - ----. Periodic Operations Reports, December 1950-March 1952. - Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - ----. Reports, messages, journals, correspondence, orders, and - miscellaneous matter, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence - File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - ----. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - Commander Amphibious Group One (CTF 90). Action Report Hungnam - Operation; Period 9 December 1950 through 25 December 1950. 21 - January 1951. R&O File, HQMC Historical. - - Commander Amphibious Group Three (CTG 90.1). War Diary, January - 1951. UHR File (Navy), HQMC Historical. - - 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, - 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952, Correspondence File, - 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - 7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, - 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - 11th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - ----. Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, - 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. - - Marine Air Group 12. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. - Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - Marine Air Group 33. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. - Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, Unit Reports, Intelligence - Summaries, Periodic Operation Reports, Periodic Intelligence - Reports, Dispatch Summaries, Patrol Orders, Special Action - Reports, 1951–1952. HQMC Historical. - - Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Unit Reports, December - 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC - Historical. - - 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Engineer Battalion. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - 1st Tank Battalion. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. - Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - VMO-6. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF-212. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF-214. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF-311. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF-312. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF-323. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, - HQMC Historical. - - VMF(N)-513. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - VMF(N)-542. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary - File, HQMC Historical. - - Tactical Air Control Squadron One. War Diary, December 1950-March - 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - Marine Wing Service Squadron One. Historical Diary, December - 1950-March 1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. - - Mobile Construction Battalion Two. Report of Activities, January - 1951. UHR File, HQMC Historical. - - USS _Bataan_ (CVL-29). War Diary, January 1951. Unit Report File, - HQMC Historical. - - USS _Bataan_ (CVL-29). Action Report, “Operations off the West - Coast of Korea,” 15 January-7 April 1951. UHR File, HQMC - Historical. - - USS _Consolation_ (AH). Commanding Officer’s Report to Commander, - Naval Forces Far East dated 26 January 1952. UHR File, HQMC - Historical. - - -OTHER SOURCES - - Almond, Edward M., Gen, USA. Quoted in _U.S. News and World - Report_, 34:40-2 (13 February 1953). - - Barclay, Cyril N., Brigadier, British Army. _The First - Commonwealth Division._ Aldershot: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1954. - - Berger, Carl. _The Korean Knot._ Philadelphia: University of - Pennsylvania Press, 1957. - - Burchette, Wilford G. _This Monstrous War._ Melbourne: J. Waters, - 1953. - - Cartier, Raymond. “Top Reporters Forum,” _UN World_, v. 5, no. 10 - (October 1951). - - Fowler, Delbert E., Capt, USA, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam, - Korea,” _The Military Engineer_, v. 44, no. 297 (Jan-Feb 1952). - - Gavin, James M., Gen, USA, (Ret.). _War and Peace in the Space - Age._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. - - Gugeler, Russell A., Capt, USA, Editor. _Combat Actions in - Korea._ Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954. - - Harrison, Charles W., Col, USMC, “KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8–11 - July 1951.” Manuscript, HQMC Historical. - - Joy, C. Turner, Adm, USN, (Ret). _How Communists Negotiate._ New - York: Macmillan, 1955. - - Kihss, Peter. “One Year in Korea,” _United Nations World_, v. 5, - no. 7 (July 1951). - - Metcalf, Clyde H., LtCol, USMC. _A History of the United States - Marine Corps._ New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939. - - Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky._ New York: Harper and - Brothers, 1954. - - Ridgway, Matthew B., LtGen, USA, (Ret.) as told to H. M. Martin. - _Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway._ New York: Harper - and Brothers, 1956. - - Stewart, James T. _Airpower, The Decisive Force tn Korea._ - Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957. - - Taylor, Maxwell D., Gen, USA, (Ret.) _The Uncertain Trumpet._ New - York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. - - U.S. Army. FM 70-10, _Mountain Operations_. Washington: The - Adjutant General’s Office, 1947. - - ----. TM 9-1980, _Bombs For Aircraft_. Washington: The Adjutant - General’s Office, 1950. - - U.S. Department of State. _U.S. Relations with China with Special - Reference to the Period 1944–1949_ [China White Papers]. State - Department Publications 3573, Far East Series 30. Washington, - 1949. - - U.S. Marine Corps. Landing Force Bulletin Number 6, _Night Vision - and Night Combat_, HQMC, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1953. - - ----. Landing Force Bulletin Number 18, _Battlefield - Illumination_, HQMC, Washington, D.C. 4 June 1956. - - U.S. Military Academy, _Operations in Korea_. West Point: - Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military - Academy, 1956. - - U.S. Navy, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. “Korean Air War,” - _Naval Aviation News_ (April 1951). - - Van Fleet, James A., Gen, USA (Ret). “The Truth About Korea,” - _Life_, 34:126-8 (11 May 1953). - - Vatcher, William H. Jr. “Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea,” - _U.S. News and World Report_, 34:35-6 (23 January 1953). - - Vatcher, William H. Jr. _Panmunjom, The Story of the Korean - Military Negotiations_. New York: F. Praeger, 1958. - - Walker, Richard L. _China Under Communism: The First Five Years_. - New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. - - Weintal, E. “What Happened at Kaesong and What is in Prospect,” - _Newsweek_, 38:38 (23 July 1951). - - - - -Index - - - Adelman, LtCol Merritt, 122_n_, 134, 149 - - A-frames, 86, 163 - - Agan, Capt Alfred H., 47 - - Air attack, enemy, 65 - - Air battle, 103 - - Air control, 97 - 1st MAW, 89 - System, USAF, 18 - System, USMC, 18 - - Aircraft, 46, 47, 63, 71, 83, 89, 96, 117, 125, 131, 137, 159, - 188–190, 208. - _See_ Helicopters and Communist Forces. - AD (Skyraiders), 116, 122, 125 - B-26, 33 - B-29, 90 - F3D (SkyKnight), 89 - F4U (Corsair), 13, 27, 33, 49, 63, 71, 78, 89, 96, 107, 108, 116, - 125, 137, 142, 186 - F7F (Tigercat), 49, 50, 63, 89, 131 - F9F (Panther), 63, 96, 108, 125, 137, 148 - F-51 (Mustang), 28, 33, 116, 125, 137, 206 - F-80 (Shooting Star), 15, 97, 125 - F-82, 89 - F-84, 125 - Jets, 15, 49, 63, 96 - Marine, 63, 78, 103, 108, 120 - Mars, 31 - Mosquito, 18, 26–28, 47, 50, 51, 97, 107 - Observation planes - OEs, 224 - OYs, 1, 14, 49, 63, 104, 107, 116, 125, 134, 137, 142, 164, - 187, 188, 224 - PB4Y-2, 138 - PO-2, 170 - R4D, 55, 63, 138 - R5D, 31, 32, 63, 89 - Sabre jets, 28 - SNB (Beechcraft), 63 - SNJ, 18 - TBM (Avenger), 50, 63 - T-6, 18 - Transports, 31 - - Air drop, 73, 93, 116, 181 - - Air Fields - Bofu, repair of, 33 - Kimpo, 28, 29, 59, 64 - K-1, 29, 32, 33, 35, 46, 48, 56, 62, 63, 89, 96, 108, 137, 171 - K-2, 29, 32 - K-3, 32, 62, 63, 89, 108, 171 - K-4, 29 - K-9, 1, 15, 28, 29, 32, 46, 48–50, 52, 56, 90 - K-10, 29 - K-16, 28, 108, 116, 137, 254 - K-18, 171, 185, 186 - K-46, 137, 138, 142, 170 - K-50, 215, 254 - K-51, 215 - X-77, 214 - X-83, 189, 208, 219, 220, 241, 242 - Seoul, 29 - Suwon, 28, 29 - Tsuika, 33_n_ - Wonsan, 29 - Yonpo, 29 - - Air Force, 28, 31, 33, 34, 63, 76, 170, 224 - Eighth Air Force, 167 - Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 14, 29, 32, 33, 45, 47, 95 - Commander, 33 - Combat Air Command, 73 - Military Air Transport Service, 31 - Fifth Air Force, 14, 15, 18, 49, 64, 67, 69, 78, 135, 142, 143, - 170, 185, 257 - Control, 15 - 543d Tactical Support Group, 64 - 8th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 15 - 606th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 90 - - Airheart, 1stLt William C., 151 - - Air Liaison officer, 17 - - Air lift, 31, 32, 215 - Troop, 32 - - Air mattresses, 94 - - Air observation, 182 - - Air operations - Control, 26 - United Nations, 33 - - Air reconnaissance, 49, 50, 64, 78, 84, 101, 143, 207 - Armed, 96 - Patrols, 28 - United States, 47 - - Air strike, 17, 69, 70, 75, 91, 92, 119, 125, 130, 142, 148, 149, 159, - 179, 183, 185, 186, 195, 206, 219, 221 - Control, 17, 142 - Interdiction, 27, 144 - Tactics, 64 - United States, 13, 52 - U. S. Marine Corps, 65, 70, 74, 115 - - Air support, 27, 28, 45, 69, 76, 78, 81, 86, 96, 97, 108, 130, - 135–138, 141, 142, 148, 150, 178, 185, 191, 206, 210, - 220, 258, 260 - Close, 14, 18, 26, 27, 49, 71, 76, 78, 96, 108, 114, 125, 136, - 142–144, 169, 170, 185, 186, 224, 258, 260 - Control of, 14, 15, 17, 136 - Air Force, 17 - Marine Corps, 17 - Deep, 49, 50 - Interdictory, 18 - Naval (British), 28 - Reconnaissance, 64 - United States, 56, 71, 83 - - ALBANY, Phase Line, 80, 84, 85 - - Allen, BrigGen C. R., 246_n_ - - Allen, Maj H. E., 90, 90_n_ - - Allert, 1stLt William J., 111 - - Almond, MajGen Edward M., 5, 19, 121, 128, 133, 133_n_, 137, 149, - 154, 157, 162 - - Alston, LtCol William P., 194, 204, 242 - - Ambushes, 70, 217, 229, 231, 242 - Chinese Communist Forces, 44 - Marine, U.S., 53 - North Korean People’s Army, 49 - - American Civil War, 165 - - Americans, Fighting for Korea, 7 - - Ammunition, 72, 122, 144, 170, 179, 181, 187, 190, 193, 210, 214, 221, - 243, 244, 260 - Artillery, 185 - Mortar, 180 - 11th Marines, 122 - Dump, 104, 210 - Enemy, 130 - Mortars, 114, 244 - Shells, 104 - Shortage, 244 - Small-arms, 114 - Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, 181 - United States, 64, 93, 122 - U. S. Marine Corps, 113 - - Amphibious - Assault, 257 - Attack, 250 - Landing, 45, 47 - Operation, 250 - Tactics, 250 - - Anderson, LtCol James R., 46, 63, 89 - - Andong, 29, 42, 44, 49, 51, 55, 62, 66 - - Andong-Taegu area, 45 - - Andrewes, VAdm Sir William G., RN, 15, 28, 46 - - Antiaircraft - Defenses, 103 - Fire, enemy, 47 - - ARIZONA, Phase Line, 73, 75 - - Armor, body, 165, 166, 168, 169, 237–239, 251, 257. _See_ Vest, Armored. - - Army, U. S., Strength figures, 11 - - Army, U. S. Units - Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 5, 8, 10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, - 25–27, 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 44, 49, 51, 54, 58–60, 63, 65, - 67, 69, 84, 86, 92, 93, 109, 119, 121, 122, 127, 128, 132, - 133, 156–158, 163, 176, 185, 201, 203, 215, 218, 225, 242, - 243, 250–253, 258, 259 - Commander, 7, 11, 12, 19, 41, 50, 58, 60, 67, 68, 72, 73, 99, 120, - 199, 202, 261 - Fortifications, 11 - Morale, 7, 8, 156 - Tactics, 8 - Transportation Section, 163 - Units, supply of, 12 - Tenth Army, 72 - I Corps, 22, 24, 25, 44, 50, 66, 79, 84, 108, 116, 119, 121, 131, - 154, 163, 201, 251, 253, 256, 259 - Headquarters, 50 - IX Corps, 22, 24–26, 44, 50, 58, 60, 62, 65–67, 72, 79, 80, 84, 86, - 93–95, 99–102, 107–109, 118, 121, 126, 128, 130–132, 154, - 201, 214, 253, 259 - Commander, 60, 71, 79, 215 - Command Post, 72 - X Corps, 1, 5, 19, 21, 22, 24–26, 29, 45, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 79, - 93, 94, 108, 120, 121, 125, 128, 131, 146, 149, 154, 158, - 159, 161, 181, 199, 201, 206, 210, 212, 216, 218, 221, 224, - 227, 253, 256, 259 - Commander, 162 - Command post, 19 - Evacuation, 2, 5 - XVIII Airborne Corps, 7 - 1st Cavalry Division, 8, 22, 65, 80, 86, 94–97, 102, 119, 121, 201 - 2d Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 26, 62, 65, 66, 71, 72, 80, - 119–121, 123, 125, 126, 128, 146, 159, 161, 168, 171, 173, - 176, 180, 202, 253 - Morale, 199 - 3d Infantry Division, 8, 14, 19, 22, 25, 121, 123, 144, 201, 253 - 7th Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 66, 71, 72, 95, 121, 130, 144, - 201, 217, 253 - 24th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 58, 59, 65, 107, 121, 201 - 25th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 41, 107, 121, 144, 201, 253, 254 - 40th Infantry Division, 253 - 45th Infantry Division, 253 - 2d Logistical Command, 12, 254 - 5th Cavalry Regiment, 119 - 7th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97 - 8th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97 - 9th Infantry Regiment, 126 - 17th Regimental Combat Team, 253 - 23d Regiment, 62, 168 - 35th Regiment, 51 - 38th Regiment, 126, 168 - 65th Regimental Combat Team, 253 - 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 22, 25, 66, 68, 86, 121, - 128, 131, 133 - 17th Field Artillery Battalion, 122 - 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 66, 109 - 96th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 122 - 196th Field Artillery Battalion, 171 - 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 111, 114 - 92d U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 227 - 4th Ranger Company, 102 - 74th Truck Company, 66 - U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 245 - - Artillery, 159, 176, 195 - Army, 11, 59, 107, 116, 121, 210 - Chinese Communist Forces, 70, 90, 134 - Marine, 52, 69, 70, 74–76, 86, 92, 107, 114, 116, 125, 180, 183, - 210, 218, 244 - North Korea People’s Army, 180 - - Support, 78, 92, 93, 114, 130, 142, 148, 149, 178, 191, 195, - 206, 220, 227 - - Atomic bomb, 37, 187 - - Australia, 24 - - Autrey, Maj Robert L., 103, 182, 199_n_ - - Averill, Maj Gerald P., 194_n_ - - - BADGER Line, 157 - - _Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 1, 2, 15 - - BAKER, Phase Line, 86, 91, 92 - - Banning, LtCol Virgil W., 74, 91, 111, 117, 118 - - Barclay, Brig C. N., 116_n_ - - Barbed wire, 197, 232 - - _Bataan_ (CVL), USS, 1, 2, 14, 28, 35, 41, 46, 47, 89, 103, 146 - - Bates, Maj William L., 111 - - Batterton, Col Boeker C., 48 - - Baugh, Maj William E., 223 - - Bay of Masan, 2 - - Bayonet assault, 150 - - Bean Patch, 2, 3 - - Belgium, 24 - - Bell. _See_ Helicopters. - - Belleau Wood, 118, 152 - - Berger, Carl, 160_n_, 171_n_ - - Bethel, Col Ion M., 235 - - Black, Capt Albert A., 215 - - Blakeney, Jane, 193_n_ - - Bofu, 33, 35, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 62 - - Bohannon, Capt Thomas J., 52, 111, 113, 116 - - Booby traps, 206 - - Borth, Maj Harold C., 181 - - Bougainville, 118 - - Bowser, Col Alpha L., 7, 18, 19, 60_n_, 62_n_, 94, 94_n_, 102, 102_n_, - 107_n_, 120_n_ - - Boyd, Maj Vernon D., 235 - - Brice, BrigGen William O., 136 - - Bridges, 64, 102, 103 - Enemy, 143 - Floating, 102 - Improvised, 74 - Korean, 15 - Sections, 64 - Swiss bent, 74 - - Brown, Capt Leslie E., 15 - - Brown, Col Wilburt S., 126, 134, 134_n_, 148–150, 150_n_, 152, - 152_n_, 157, 158 - - BROWN Line, 150, 151, 157 - - Brunelli, Col Austin R., 255 - - Buckingham, CWO Robert C., 170 - - Buckner, LtGen Simon Bolivar, 72 - - BUFFALO, Phase Line, 85, 92 - - Bugles, NKPA, 192, 217 - - Bunkers, 184, 191, 192, 194, 210, 217, 219, 221, 224, 230, 232, 242, - 244, 245, 261 - Chinese Communist Forces, 70, 75, 83, 91, 92 - Enemy, 149 - North Korean People’s Army, 141, 142, 182, 183, 191, 216, 220 - - Burchett, Wilford G., 247, 247_n_, 248 - - Burton, Col Custis, Jr., 179, 210, 232, 255 - - Bush, 2dLt Clayton O., 83, 83_n_ - - Bush, Maj Donald S., 63, 64, 134 - - Bushe, Capt Eugene A., 119 - - Butterfly bombs, USMC, 88 - - Byers, MajGen Clovis E., 162, 208 - - - C Rations, 175 - - Cagle, LtCol Carl J., 181 - - CAIRO, Phase Line, 92, 93 - - Camel, 64 - - Cameras, 92 - K-17 camera, 134 - - Camp Lejeune, 31, 167, 168, 234, 236 - - Camp Pendleton, 31 - - Camp Tripoli, 233, 243, 255 - - Canada, 24 - - Cargadores, 163, 173, 181, 190 - - Cargo ship, USN, 30 - - Carney, Maj Edgar F., Jr., 192, 193_n_ - - Cartier, Raymond, 155 - - Casualties, 210, 213, 220, 221, 238, 239, 243 - Chinese Communist Forces, 38, 70, 75, 76, 79, 83, 84, 91, 116, 118, - 121, 125–128, 131, 259 - Eighth Air Force, 167 - Enemy, 153, 202, 206, 210, 216, 220, 246, 259 - Evacuating of, 165, 189, 190, 214 - Korean Marine Corps, 55, 147, 159 - IX Corps, 84 - Non-Battle, 234 - North Korean (NKPA), 51, 52, 57, 146, 180, 184, 194, 198, 210, 217, - 220, 225, 228 - X Corps, 84 - United Nations, 34, 161, 202 - United States, 60, 156 - U. S. Marine Corps, 30, 49, 51, 57, 69, 70, 75, 76, 81, 83, 86, 91, - 111, 116, 118, 125, 131, 133, 143, 150–152, 159, 173, 178, - 180, 184, 186, 193, 194, 196, 199, 206, 210, 216, - 218, 220, 246 - Evacuation of, 164 - - Cates, Gen Clifton B., 232 - - Chachon-dong, 52 - - Chaegok-tong, 54 - - Chang, Gen, 109 - - Changhang, 216 - - Changwon, 3 - - Chechon, 26 - - Chiang Kai-shek, 36 - - Chidi San mountain mass, 3 - - China, Red, 261 - Funds for war, 37 - “Hate America” Campaign, 35, 36 - - Chinandong, 54 - - Chinese Civil War, 155 - - Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 6, 58, 59, 85, 123, 128, 154 - Air strike, 15 - Armies, 45 - Attack, 26 - Bugle calls, 113 - Concentration, 27 - Counterstroke, 63 - Entrenchments, 15, 248 - Equipment, 39, 153 - Gun positions, 15 - Infiltration, 35 - Logistical, 144 - Morale, 155 - Offensive, 11, 15, 19, 33, 107, 120–122, 126, 152, 164, 259 - Fifth Phase, 103, 105, 121, 126, 155, 164 - January, 19, 34, 41, 154 - Sixth Phase, 178 - Penetration, 21 - Road block, 111 - Shore batteries, 156 - Soldier, 35 - Strategy, 35, 80, 101 - Strength figures, 218 - Supply - Dumps, 19 - Lines, 41 - Tactics, 35–38, 100, 248 - Human Sea, 35 - Troops, 27, 41, 50, 51, 170 - Shelters, 15 - Uniform, 35 - YAK fighter, 103 - Units - 20th Army, 24, 101 - 24th Army, 24 - 26th Army, 24, 101 - 27th Army, 24 - 30th Army, 24 - 32d Army, 24 - 37th Army, 24 - 38th Army, 24 - 39th Army, 24, 66, 93, 101 - 40th Army, 24, 60, 66, 101, 106, 115 - 42d Army, 24, 101 - 48th Army, 24 - 49th Army, 24 - 50th Army, 24 - 65th Army, 24 - 66th Army, 24, 60, 66, 81, 93, 101 - 44th Division, 126 - 58th Division, 101 - 59th Division, 101 - 60th Division, 101 - 76th Division, 101 - 77th Division, 101 - 78th Division, 101 - 115th Division, 101 - 116th Division, 101 - 117th Division, 101 - 118th Division, 101 - 119th Division, 101 - 120th Division, 101, 106, 115 - 124th Division, 101 - 125th Division, 101 - 126th Division, 101 - 196th Division, 66, 81 - 197th Division, 81 - 198th Division, 81 - 358th Regiment, 106 - 359th Regiment, 115 - 360th Regiment, 115 - - Chinese Nationalists, 36 - - Chinhae, 2, 54 - - Chinju, 3 - - Chiso-dong, 52 - - Chodo-ri, 154 - - Choe, MajGen Am Lin, 146 - - Chogutan, 171 - - Chongja-dong, 52 - - Chon-San, 90 - - Chorwon, 95, 154, 201 - Hwachon area, 27 - - Chosin, 70 - Breakout, 3, 14, 101, 109, 234 - Campaign, 6, 32, 38, 42, 45, 52, 57, 118, 257 - Fighting, 8 - Operation, 2, 5, 152, 168 - Reservoir, 12, 66, 136, 152, 257 - Withdrawal, 120 - - Christmas in Korea, 5 - - Chumunjin, 80 - - Chunchon, 8, 80, 94, 117, 119, 181, 215 - - Chunchon-Hongchon highway, 123 - - Chunchon-Wonju-Chechon corridor, 26 - - Chungju, 22, 26, 58, 60, 66, 67 - - Chipyong-ni, 71 - - Clark, Maj Albert L., 89 - - Clothing - Camouflage, 228 - Cold weather, 163, 221, 222 - - Coffey, Capt John, 109, 109_n_, 111, 111_n_, - 113 - - Cole, LtCol Frank J., 46 - - Commander Naval Forces, Far East (Com NavFE), 5 - _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN. - - Communications, 137, 208 - Air-ground, 260 - - Communist - Cause, 3 - Delaying tactics, 249 - Photographers, 156, 157 - Truce Team, 160 - - _Consolation_ (AH), USS, 57, 165 - - Cornwell, Maj Charles E., 240 - - Correspondents, at Hagaru, 6 - - Cotton, Capt James T., 215 - - Cowan, Cdr John S., 236 - - Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 2, 3_n_, 7, 8_n_, 12_n_, 21, 49, 57, 164 - - Cronin, Capt James T., 106, 106_n_ - - Cronk, Capt Welby D., 91 - - Culhane, Col Thomas A., Jr., 254_n_ - - Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 136 - - - Daigh, 1stLt Harold D., 103 - - Davis, Maj Daniel H., 71 - - Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 107_n_, 123, 133 - - Delegates - Communist, 171, 220, 225, 229, 233 - Delaying tactics, 160 - United States, 248, 249 - - DeLong, Capt Philip C., 103 - - Demolitions, 102 - - DEVASTATE BAKER, 96 - - Doriot, Col George F., 166, 167 - - Doyle, RAdm James H., 13, 14 - - DUCK, Line, 224, 229, 230 - - - Edwards, LtCol Harry W., 189_n_, 199_n_, 207, 213, 222_n_ - - El Toro, California, 88, 188 - - England, 250 - - Equipment - Eighth Army, 12 - Shortages, 30 - USMC, 12 - Shortages, 11, 12 - Worn, 13 - - Ethiopia, 24 - - Evacuation, 115 - Casualties, 164, 165, 250 - Hungnam, 5 - - Evans, LtCol Holly F., 114, 191, 210 - - Everest, MajGen Frank E., 136 - - Feeney, Maj James A., Jr., 46 - - Fenton, Capt Donald L., 170 - - Ferenbaugh, MajGen Claude F., 215 - - Fink, Maj Gerald, 223_n_ - - Fisher, Capt Don H., 52 - - Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 91 - - Flak traps, 143 - - Flares - CCF, 113 - Trip, 216 - - Flournoy, Col Walter N., 204, 232 - - _Flying Dutchman_ (legendary ship), 57 - - Fontana, LtCol Paul J., 46, 47, 62 - - Ford, Capt John, USNR, 6 - - Forward Air Controller (FAC), 17, 52, 71, 96, 97, 116, 142, - 186, 206, 230 - - Forward Observers, 144 - - Forward OPs, 210 - - Fowler, Capt Delbert M., 102_n_ - - Frame, Maj Donald P., 46 - - France, 24, 65, 68, 246 - - Franklin, Benjamin, 251 - - Freeman, Col Paul, 62 - - French, 202 - - Fresh Rations, Marines, 5 - - Frostbite, 234, 235 - Casualty, Medical, 57 - - Fulton, Capt Floyd K., 52 - - - Gall, Maj Walter, 60, 83, 168 - - Garvin, BrigGen Crump, 12 - - Gases, 134 - - Gasoline, 32, 34, 72, 170, 190, 222 - - Gavin, Gen James M., 38, 38_n_ - - Gayle, LtCol Gordon D., 199_n_, 232, 254 - - Geiger, MajGen Roy S., 72 - - _General Darby_, USNS, 31 - - _General W. H. Gordon_, USS, 254 - - Glendinning, Maj James I., 74 - - Gomez, Pfc Edward, 193, 193_n_ - - Gorman, LtCol John E., 193, 193_n_, 204, 240 - - Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 14 - - Greece, 24, 99 - - Griffin, LtCol Louis C., 175, 183, 184 - - Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 91 - - Groves, Col Gould P., 158_n_, 159, 176_n_, 199_n_ - - Guadalcanal campaign, 118, 152 - - Guam, 32 - - Guerrillas, 36, 44, 203, 213, 222, 257, 258 - Anti-, 241 - Communist, 3 - Communist Chinese Forces, 35, 44, 51 - Enemy, 53, 57, 58 - North Korean People’s Army, 26, 44, 45, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56 - - Gugeler, Capt Russell A., 111_n_, 116_n_ - - Haffey, Capt Eugene H., 107 - - Hagaru-ri, 6 - - Hager, Col Frank P., Jr., 199_n_, 227 - - Haiti, 118, 232 - - Hamhung, 6 - - Han River, 11, 25, 28, 50, 58, 59, 71, 108, 119, 122 - - Hangye, 130, 171 - - Hardwick, LtCol Gordon A., 166_n_, 234_n_, 235, 237_n_, 238_n_ - - Harper, 2dLt William E., 230 - - Harris, MajGen Field, 14, 15, 46, 48, 49, 50, 62, 78, 88, 89, - 90, 135, 136 - - Harrison, LtCol Charles W., 54, 54_n_, 92, 93_n_, 102_n_, 146_n_, 158_n_ - - Hart, LtGen Franklin H., 232 - - Hawaii, 89 - - HAYS Line, 180, 182, 192, 204, 213 - - Hayward, Col Richard W., 130, 146, 148 - - Heely, LtCol Dale H., 191 - - Helicopter, 1, 14, 47, 72, 79, 111, 115, 135, 164, 165, 187–190, 207, - 208, 211, 212, 214, 219, 220, 223, 240, 241, 250, 251, 257 - Evacuating of casualties, 49, 56 - Laying wire, 49 - Lift, 211, 213 - Troop, 207, 212 - HO3S-1, 63, 164, 188 - HTL, 59, 63, 164, 188 - - Helmets, steel, 166 - - Hemostat, 115 - - Hemphill, Col Bruce T., 199_n_, 227, 242_n_, 246_n_, 251_n_ - - Hering, Capt Eugene R. (MC), USNR, 57 - - Herring, LtCol George W., 188, 189, 207, 211, 213, 223 - - Hewitt, Maj Roy R., 96, 96_n_, 97 - - Hickman, Maj William T., 152_n_ - - Hicks, 1stLt Norman W., 115, 115_n_, 223_n_ - - Higgs, 1stLt Richard C., 207 - - Highways, 80 - Coastal, 27 - Japanese, 33 - Traffic jams, 32 - - Hilian, Lt Donald L., (MC), USN, 215 - - Hill 201, 75 - - Hill 208, 75 - - Hill 246, 91 - - Hill 313, 105–107 - - Hill 321, 75 - - Hill 330, 92 - - Hill 333, 75 - - Hill 335, 75 - - Hill 356, 90 - - Hill 381, 92 - - Hill 399, 91 - - Hill 420, 151 - - Hill 428, 91 - - Hill 509, 105, 106 - - Hill 516, 144, 146 - - Hill 536, 75 - - Hill 549, 83 - - Hill 602, 173, 178, 179, 183 - - Hill 610, 141, 142 - - Hill 651, 141 - - Hill 673, 182–184, 194 - - Hill 680, 142, 173 - - Hill 692, 142 - - Hill 702, 173, 178, 211, 214 - - Hill 749, 182–184, 187, 190–194 - - Hill 751, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 216 - - Hill 755, 176 - - Hill 761, 157, 158 - - Hill 802, 150 - - Hill 812, 183, 194–198, 204, 230, 232, 243, 245. _See_ Kanmubong Ridge - - Hill 854, 204, 206, 243, 245 - - Hill 883, 130 - - Hill 884, 203, 204, 206, 208, 210, 220, 240, 241. - _See_ “Mount Helicopter” - - Hill 902, 111 - - Hill 924, 173, 176, 178–180 - - Hill 930, 173, 176 - - Hill 951, 210 - - Hill 975, 93 - - Hill 980, 183, 194–197 - - Hill 1000, 173 - - Hill 1001, 159 - - Hill 1026, 173, 176, 179, 180 - - Hill 1042, 196 - - Hill 1051, 130 - - Hill 1052, 182, 183, 196–198, 216, 219 - - Hill 1100, 159 - - Hill 1122, 146, 147 - - Hill 1218, 146 - - Hill 1316, 146 - - Hire, LtCol Homer E., 144, 148 - - Hiroshima, 187 - - Hoengsong, 28, 60, 63, 66, 70, 72–74, 80–83, 89, 137, 170 - - Hoengsong-Hongchon road, 80, 81 - - Hoge, MajGen William H., 79, 111_n_ - - Holliday, Maj Morse L., 126 - - Hongchon, 72, 80, 86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 120, 128, 176, 181 - - Hongchon-Hangye road, 171 - - Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 255 - - Hopkins, LtCol John L., 106_n_, 141 - - Hospital - Clearing Station, 190 - Japan, 12 - Ships, 165 - - Horseshoe Ridge, 113, 115 - - Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., 83 - - Howard, LtCol Harold C., 241 - - Hughes, James J., 230 - - Hungnam, 2 - Beachhead, 2 - Evacuation of, 2, 5 - Redeployment, 1, 8, 13, 14, 65 - - Hwachon, 45, 102, 105, 109, 122, 201 - Reservoir, 27, 96, 102, 119, 128, 131, 148, 260 - - Hwanggi, 182 - - - Illinois Wesleyan University, 118 - - Imjin, 26, 27, 107, 108, 116, 154, 201 - River, 73, 79 - - Inchon, 27, 28, 30, 47, 50, 51, 59, 63, 80, 254, 256 - Evacuation of, 28 - Landing, 1, 63, 257 - - Inchon-Seoul, 118 - Operation, 2, 44, 135, 168 - - _Indianapolis_ (CA), USS, 232 - - Inje, 128, 133, 147, 161, 168, 171, 175, 181, 187, 215 - - Inje-Kansong road, 128 - - Innovations, 257 - Body armor, 239 - Helicopter, 164, 240 - Tactical, 165, 251 - - Iron Triangle, 95, 101, 107, 143, 154 - - Irwin, Capt John R., 242 - - Itami, 2, 28, 29, 32, 48, 49, 63, 89 - - Itazuke, 1, 33, 49, 50, 63 - - Iwo Jima, 152, 187 - - - Japan, 1, 12, 33, 50 - - JAMESTOWN, Line, 253, 256 - - Johnson, Capt Horace L., 111 - - Johnston Island, 32 - - Jones, Capt Jack R., 52, 68 - - Jones, Maj Jack R., 53_n_ - - JOC (FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations Center), 17, 27, 45, 47, 64, 65, 67, - 69, 70, 78, 81, 96, 135–138, 258, 260 - Air Control, 67, 76, 97, 135 - - Joy, VAdm C. Turner (ComNavFE), 5, 14, 155, 157, 157_n_, 160, 160_n_, - 161, 161_n_, 221_n_, 223_n_, 248_n_, 249_n_ - - Junks, enemy, 15 - - _Jutlandia_, Danish Hospital Ship, 85, 156 - - - Kaesong, 154, 156, 157, 160, 171, 180, 220, 222, 247, 248 - - Kangnung, 171, 185 - - Kanmubong Ridge, 183, _See_ Hill 812. - - KANSAS Line, 94, 95, 99, 108, 115, 116, 118, 141, 147, 148, 150–153, - 162, 168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 233 - - Kansong, 128, 187 - - Kelly, LtCol Bernard T., 123, 125_n_, 135, 135_n_, 175, 175_n_, - 176_n_, 179, 183 - - Kelly, LtCol James G., 176, 183, 184, 199_n_, 216 - - Kelly, Capt John L., 141 - - Kelsey, LtCol John V., 191 - - Kennedy, LtCol Donald R., 91, 194 - - Kerrigan, 1stLt William E., 68, 68_n_, 141 - - Kihss, Peter, 153_n_ - - Kim, Col Dae Shik, 204 - - Kim, Col Dong Ha, 106, 227 - - Kim, 1stLt SikTong, 93 - - Kim, Col Sung Eun, 54 - - Kimpo, 253 - Peninsula, 119, 201, 254, 255 - - Kingsley, J. Donald, 153 - - Kirby-Smith, Maj Ephraim, 207 - - Kirkpatrick, Capt Louis P., (MC), USN, 166_n_ - - Knapp, LtCol Horace E., Jr., 193_n_ - - Kobe, 30, 62, 143 - - Kopas, Capt William T., 141 - - Korea, 1 - North - North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 52, 53. 55, 85, 154 - Irregulars, 258 - Morale, 53 - Soldiers, 55 - Strategy, 196 - Strength figures, 218 - Troops, 132, 147, 152, 170, 184, 185, 260 - Units - I Corps, 24 - II Corps, 51, 173, 182 - III Corps, 182, 217 - V Corps, 24, 60, 132 - 1st Division, 24, 182, 217, 218, 228 - 2d Division, 182, 217 - 3d Division, 24 - 10th Division, 44, 45, 48, 56, 57 - 12th Division, 132, 146 - 15th Division, 24, 217, 218, 224, 228 - 19th Division, 218, 224 - 45th Division, 228 - 47th Division, 224, 228 - 6th Regiment, 173 - 25th Regiment, 44, 55 - 27th Regiment, 44, 55 - 29th Regiment, 44 - 41st Regiment, 151 - 91st Regiment, 244 - - Korea, - South - Republic of Korea, 3, 11 - Army (ROKA), 3, 19, 26, 54, 73, 108, 116, 163, 206 - Units - I Corps, 22, 108, 121, 123, 128, 154, 202, 215, 253 - II Corps, 22 - III Corps, 22, 25, 26, 121, 123 - Civil Transport Corps, 86, 162, 163, 181 - Korean Service Corps, 181 - Capital Division, 22, 58, 121, 202, 253 - 1st Division, 22, 24, 84, 121, 201, 251, 253 - 2d Division, 22, 25, 27, 57, 201, 253 - 3d Division, 22, 72, 121, 202, 216, 253 - 5th Division, 22, 25, 121, 123, 180, 202, 211, 253 - 6th Division, 22, 65, 66, 74, 97, 99, 101, 105–109, 116, 120, - 121, 201, 253 - 7th Division, 22, 108, 121, 123, 148, 202, 253 - 8th Division, 22, 25, 176, 182, 201–204, 253, 255 - 9th Division, 22, 121, 253 - 11th Division, 121, 202, 203, 213, 253 - 5th Regiment, 148, 149 - 10th Regiment, 204 - 11th Regiment, 207 - 21st Regiment, 204, 206 - National Guard, 86, 163 - Soldiers, Lack of training, 24 - Marine Corps (KMC), 54, 93, 94, 102, 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 126, - 146–148, 150–152, 158, 159, 162, 171, 176, 178–181, 183, - 243, 254, 260 - 1st Regiment, 54, 58, 73, 92–95, 101, 102, 106, 120, 126, 130, - 146, 147, 158, 159, 162, 171, 175, 176, 178, 182, 198, 204, - 210, 218, 224, 227, 246, 253, 254 - 1st Battalion, 54, 55, 105, 146, 159, 176, 178 - 2d Battalion, 55, 93, 146, 176, 178–180, 216 - 3d Battalion, 54, 93, 146, 176, 178 - 5th Battalion, 55, 201 - 1st Korean Artillery Battalion, 227 - Diet, 54 - Police, 3, 52, 53 - - Korean entertainers, 5 - - Korean War, police action, 7 - - Koto-ri, 6 - - Koutsandreas, 2dLt John D., 230 - - Krisky, Corpsman R. E., 57 - - Krulak, Col Victor H., 189, 199_n_, 213, 250_n_ - - Kumhwa, 95, 143, 154, 201 - - Kumsong, 154 - - Kunsamma Pass, 81 - - Kurdziel, LtCol Edward G., 184_n_, 241 - - Kyongju, 19, 22, 29, 30, 42 - - Kyongju-Yungchon-Uisong road, 42 - - - La Hue, LtCol Foster C., 190, 206 - - Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., Jr., 66, 109, 115 - - Lawrence, Capt George E., 216 - - Lee, Maj Gen Ban Nam, 45, 51, 53 - - Lejeune, MajGen John A., 72 - - Lewis, LCdr Frederick J. (MSC), USN, 165, 167, 168, 236, 237, 237_n_ - - ICELAND, Line, 233 - - Litters, 188 - - Litzenberg, MajGen Homer L., 64_n_ - - Logistics, 72, 73, 180, 182, 215, 258. _See_ Supplies. - - Long, Capt Edwin B., 170 - - _Los Angeles_ (CA), USS, 219 - - Lund, Maj Arnold A., 15, 27, 46 - - Lundin, Maj William M., 15, 46 - - - Mabry, Maj Clarence J., 148 - - MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 5, 8, 8_n_, 14, 33, - 50, 68, 91, 92 - Recall of, 99 - - MacDonald, Maj J. Angus, 222_n_, 223_n_ - - MacIntyre, LtCol Neil R., 15 - - Mago-ri, 218 - - Main line of resistance (MLR), 21, 122, 157–159, 180, 203, 204, - 211–218, 220, 221, 223, 224, 229, 231, 232, 238, 240, 243, - 245, 250, 253, 259–261 - - Main Supply Route (MSR), 29, 30, 38, 42, 44, 67, 80, 91, 123 - Hongchon-Chunchon, 119 - - Malik, Jacob, Foreign Minister of the USSR, 154 - - Manchuria, 85, 160 - - Mao Tse-tung, 36, 128, 155 - - Marine Corps, U. S. - Role in Korea, 6, 32 - Units - Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 12, 31, 241 - 1st Air Delivery Platoon, 241 - 1st Combat Service Group, 3, 241 - 1st 4.5 Rocket Battalion, 119, 227 - Battery C, 119 - 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 30, 60, 181, 255 - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1, 14, 29, 32, 33, 33_n_, 34, 45, 46, - 50, 56, 62, 63, 67, 71, 78, 84, 88, 89, 96, 103, 116, 120, - 125, 131, 134–138, 143, 146, 164, 169, 170, 185, 203, 219, - 249, 260, 261 - Commanding Officer, 257 - Headquarters Squadron, 63 - Marine Air Control Group-2, 90 - Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1, 1, 89, 90 - Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-3, 90 - Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2, 1, 2, 89, 96 - Air Defense Section, 89 - Marine Aircraft Group 12, 33, 35, 46, 48, 56, 60, 81, 83, 137, - 170, 171, 185 - Marine Aircraft Group 33, 2, 33_n_, 34, 45–48, 56, 62, 81, 96 - Service Squadron 33, 46 - HMR-161, 187–190, 207, 208, 213–215, 217, 222, 240–242 - HMX-1, 164, 187, 188, 223 - HRS-1, 188, 189, 107, 211, 212, 214 - MASRT-1, 186 - VMF-152, 31, 32 - VMF-212, 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 35, 41, 46, 47, 89, 108 - VMF-214, 1, 13, 15, 28, 29, 46, 48, 62, 91, 92, 96, 107, 137, 141, - 142, 144, 150, 185 - VMF-311, 1, 15, 28, 29, 49, 63, 64, 95, 96, 148 - VMF-312, 46, 47, 50, 62, 71, 89, 103, 146, 185 - VMF-323, 1, 14, 15, 27–29, 46, 48, 52, 55, 62, 92, 107, 108, - 137, 144, 146 - VMF-352, 31 - VMF(N)-513, 1, 49, 52, 55, 63, 89, 131, 138, 150, 170 - VMF(N)-542, 1, 46, 49, 50, 63, 88 - VMO-6, 1, 14, 49, 50, 56, 104, 107, 111, 115, 116, 125, 134, 135, - 142, 164, 165, 187–189, 206, 223, 229, 258 - VMR-152, 31, 32, 46, 89 - VMR-352, 31 - I Marine Amphibious Corps, 118, 232 - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade 2, 95, 160, 164, 188 - 1st Marine Division, 1, 6, 8, 12, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29–31, 34, - 35, 38, 42, 44, 48–50, 54, 56–60, 65–67, 72, 76, 78, 80, 83, - 84, 86, 88, 92–96, 99, 101, 105, 108, 109, 111, 113, 117, - 118, 120–123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 132–135, 137, 138, - 142–144, 146, 147, 152, 157, 159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 171, - 173, 176, 180–182, 184–186, 192, 194, 198, 202–204, 208, - 211, 212, 215–219, 221, 227, 228, 231–233, 236, 242, 249, - 253, 254, 256–261 - Assembly area at Masan, 2, 17 - Administrative headquarters at Masan, 1, 22 - Commander, 22, 260 - Command Posts, 21, 22, 34, 42, 68, 78, 79, 244, 251, 255, 256 - EUSAK Control, 5 - Equipment, Shortage of, 12 - Fresh rations, 5 - Headquarters, 3, 5 - Hospital, 3 - Military Police Company, 3 - Morale, 7, 199 - Personnel, Shortage of, 11 - Reconnaissance Company, 3, 56, 60, 66, 83, 103, 105, 108, 161, - 168, 176, 182, 192, 207, 208, 210, 213, 217 - Security Measures, 3 - Strength figures, 11, 12 - 1st Marines, 30, 34, 42, 51, 54, 60, 66, 68–75, 81, 83, 86, 90–94, - 101, 105, 117, 120, 125, 126, 130, 134, 144, 146–152, 157, - 171, 176, 182, 186, 187, 190, 191, 193, 194, 204, 210, 211, - 215, 218, 219, 224, 227, 229, 243, 255 - Commanding Officer, 255 - Command Post, 157, 208 - Antitank Company, 149 - 1st Battalion, 51, 69, 70, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113–117, 119, - 148–150, 187, 192, 193, 197, 204, 210, 216, 217, 240 - Command Post, 114 - Company A, 111 - Company B, 111 - Company C, 51, 70, 111, 113, 115, 216 - Weapons Company, 111 - 2d Battalion, 55, 69, 75, 83, 90, 117, 119, 144, 148–150, 187, - 189–193, 197, 204, 211, 213, 215, 220 - Commanding Officer, 150, 189 - Command Post, 190 - Company D, 91 - Company E, 91, 92, 211 - Company F, 91, 92, 193 - 3d Battalion, 44, 55, 74, 75, 81, 91, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118, - 144, 148, 150, 157, 158, 186, 191–194, 204, 206, - 210, 217, 229 - Company G, 83, 111, 114 - Company H, 111, 114, 206, 229–231 - Company I, 91, 111, 114, 230, 231 - Weapons Company, 74, 111 - 5th Marines, 2, 5, 42, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 62, 66–70, 72, 73, 81, - 92–95, 101, 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 120, 126, 130, 133, - 137, 141, 146–148, 161, 168, 171, 175, 176, 179, 182, 192, - 194, 204, 213–215, 218, 219, 224, 227, 232, 236, - 243, 255, 260 - 1st Battalion, 54, 68–70, 94, 106, 141, 175, 194, 195, 197, 204, - 220, 228, 241 - Command Post, 105 - Company A, 141, 142 - Company B, 107, 141, 228 - Company C, 52, 68, 141 - 2d Battalion, 54, 70, 94, 130, 141, 148, 194–197, 223 - Company D, 130, 194, 196 - Company F, 106, 194–197 - Weapons Company, 196 - 3d Battalion, 69, 70, 91, 94, 119, 126, 130, 148, 178, 194–196 - 7th Marines, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 62, 66, 72–75, 81, 83, 86, 91, - 92, 94–97, 101, 106, 107, 109, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 125, - 126, 130, 133, 137, 141, 144, 146, 151, 152, 161, 171, 175, - 176, 180, 182, 183, 186, 192, 204, 213–215, 218, 224, - 227, 243, 255 - Commanding Officer, 255 - Command Post, 175 - Outpost, 133 - 1st Battalion, 52, 75, 88, 91, 106, 107, 111, 117, 151, 176, - 178, 179, 183, 184, 187, 213, 216, 241 - Command Post, 51, 91 - Company A, 51, 52, 83 - Company C, 107, 216 - 2d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 111, 117, 130, 151, 175, 176, - 180, 183, 184, 187, 190, 191, 208, 213, 238, 241 - Company F, 190 - 3d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 96, 97, 111, 113–115, 117, - 119, 123, 125, 135, 151, 157, 173, 175, 176, 178, 179, 183, - 184, 187, 213, 214, 244 - Company G, 123, 151, 179, 184 - Company H, 175, 179, 183, 184 - Company I, 125, 151, 183, 184 - 11th Marines, 3, 42, 54, 56, 68, 75, 81, 84, 114, 122, 149, 171, - 179, 182, 189, 191, 192, 210, 215, 218, 225, 227, 242, - 245, 254, 260 - 1st Battalion, 141, 179, 228, 254 - 2d Battalion, 70, 134, 149, 171, 191 - 3d Battalion, 92, 161, 171, 179 - 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1, 3 - 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, 254 - 1st Engineer Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 102 - Company C, 191 - Company D, 88 - 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 30, 181, 255 - 1st Ordnance Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 181, 230 - 1st Signal Battalion, 3 - 1st Service Battalion, 3, 34, 42 - 1st Shore Party Battalion, 3, 189, 207, 211, 213, 241 - 1st Tank Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 62, 176, 210, 218, 245, 255 - Company A, 81, 114 - Company B, 62, 92, 114 - Company C, 133, 141 - H & S Company, 62 - _See also_ Replacement Drafts and Rotation Drafts. - 2d Marine Division, 167 - - Marks, LtCol Alfred H., 227 - - Marquez, Cpl Leo, 113, 114 - - Marshall, Col S. L. A., 6 - - Martin, LtCol Glen E., 106 - - Martin, Cpl Paul G., 103, 104_n_ - - Masan, 1–3, 5–7, 12–14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 30, 34, 89, 257 - - Massacre Valley, 70 - - Matthewson, 1stLt Robert E., 115 - - Mayer, Capt Franklin B., 70, 70_n_ - - McAlister, Col Francis M, 42_n_, 52_n_, 66, 105, 114, 117, 126 - - McClelland, LtCol Robert K., 90, 91, 148 - - McCutcheon, Col Keith B., 199_n_, 223, 240, 241, 242 - - McDonald, Capt Charles W., 228 - - McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, 165 - - McFarland, Maj David W., 107, 134, 134_n_, 223 - - McGahn, 2dLt Patrick T., 106, 106_n_ - - McGill, Col Robert A., 254 - - McGrew, Capt David G., Jr., 166_n_, 235, 238, 238_n_, 239 - - McGuire’s University School, 231 - - McMahon, Capt John R., 216 - - McRay, Capt H. G., 115 - - McReynolds, LtCol William, 92, 179 - - MELLOW, Code Name, 17. _See_ JOC. - - Meuse-Argonne offensive, 118 - - Meyerhoff, Col Wilbur F., 74_n_, 107_n_, 109_n_, 131_n_, 151 - - Michener, James, 257_n_ - - MIG Alley, 65 - - Mills, 1stLt Niel B., 109_n_, 115 - - Milne, LtCol Harry T., 62_n_, 114 - - Mine fields, 130, 191, 230, 261 - NKPA, 184 - - Mines, 130, 151, 178, 197, 206, 211, 224 - Antipersonnel, 211, 236 - Enemy, 206 - Friendly, 206 - - MINNESOTA Line, 213, 217, 219, 227,229, 232, 251 - - Miryang, 22 - - _Missouri_ (BB), USS, 27 - - Mitchell, 1stLt Weldon R., 64 - - Mitchell, LtCol William P., 188, 199_n_, 207, 213, 214, 223, 241 - - Mojin, 119 - - Mongolian horses, 64 - - Montross, Lynn, 164_n_, 187_n_, 207_n_ - - Moore, MajGen Bryant E., 60, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72 - - Morae-Kogae, 123 - - Moscow, 99 - - Mount Helicopter, 220. _See_ Hill 884. - - _Mount McKinley_ (AGC), USS, 14 - - Mountain warfare, 138 - - Mukkye-dong, 51 - - Munsan, 8, 220 - - Munsan-ni, 201, 255 - - Murray, Col James C., 155_n_, 160_n_ - - Myers, Maj Reginald R., 117, 118 - - - Naktong, Battle of, 2 - - Nam Il, Gen, 157, 160 - - Napoleon, 73 - - Native laborers, 11 - - Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, 167, 169, 234, 236, 237 - - Naval gunfire, 13, 50, 119, 143, 210, 219, 220, 244 - - Navy, U. S., 5, 28, 34, 135, 138, 167, 234 - Role in Korea, 6 - Units - Naval Forces Far East, 5 - Commander, (ComNavFE), _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy. - Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 31, 32 - Seventh Fleet, 142 - Tactical Air Control Squadron-1, 14 - Tactical Air Control Squadron-3, 27, 28 - Task Force 77, 14, 27 - Task Force 90, 13 - Commander, 13. _See also_ RAdm J. H. Doyle. - Task Group 95.1, 15 - Escort Carrier Task Group 96.8, 2, 27, 28 - Western Deployment Group, 28 _See_ RAdm Lyman A. Thackrey. - Mobile Construction Battalion 2 (Seabees), 34, 35, 45, 46 - VR-5, 31 - VR-9, 31 - VR-21, 32 - - Netherlands, 24, 202 - - New Britain operation, 232 - - _New Jersey_ (BB), USS, 210, 217, 220 - - New Zealand, 24 - - Nicaragua, 150 - - Nickerson, Col Herman, Jr., 107_n_, 109_n_, 114, 114_n_, 123, 133, - 144, 151, 183 - - Nicolay, Maj Stanley S., 46 - - Nihart, LtCol Franklin B., 187, 190, 191, 199_n_, 204, 211, - 246_n_, 257_n_ - - Nolan, 2dLt Harvey W., 106 - - NO NAME Line, 120, 122, 125, 126 - - Noon, Col Thomas J., 33_n_ - - Norton, LtCol Kirt W., 220, 223, 228, 241 - - - Objective 1, 176, 178 - - Objective 2, 176, 179, 230, 231 - - Objective 3, 176, 180, 231 - - Objective ABLE, 182, 183. _See also_ Hill 673. - - Objective BAKER, 182–184, 192, 193. _See also_ Hill 749. - - Objective CHARLIE, 182, 198 - - Objective DOG, 194, 196 - - Objective YOKE, 176, 180 - - Okinawa, 72, 167 - - O’Neill, LtCol John T., 254 - - Operation BLACKBIRD, 211, 212 - - Operation BUMBLEBEE, 214, 241 - - Operation BUSHBEATER, 217 - - Operation CHANGIE-CHANGIE, 241 - - Operation CLAM-UP, 242–244 - - Operation FAREWELL, 223 - - Operation HOUSEBURNER I, 217 - - Operation HOUSEBURNER II, 217 - - Operation KILLER, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 258 - - Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 223 - - Operation MIXMASTER, 251, 256 - - Operation MOUSETRAP, 241 - - Operation MULETRAIN, 240 - - Operation ROTATE, 241 - - Operation ROUNDUP, 51, 59 - - Operation RIPPER, 73, 79, 80, 84, 85, 88, 93, 258 - - Operation RUGGED, 94 - - Operation SEA LION, 250 - - Operation STRANGLE, 143, 144, 169, 185, 186, 249, 260, 261 - - Operation SUMMIT, 207, 208, 213 - - Operation SWITCH, 219 - - Operation THUNDERBOLT, 50, 51, 59 - - Operation WEDGE, 215 - - Operation WINDMILL I, 189, 190 - - Operation WINDMILL II, 190, 197 - - Operation WOLFHOUND, 41 - - Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University, 6 - - Outpost, 244 - Line of Resistance, 122, 238 - - Ord, Capt James B., 229, 229_n_, 230, 231 - - Osan, 26 - - Oum Mountain, 80 - - Oum San, 83 - - Ozuki, 33 - - - Paekcha-dong, 55 - - Pafford, LtCol George G., 213 - - Parka, 69, 75 - - Parkins, Capt Clarence W., 57 - - Parry, LtCol Sherman W., 228 - - Partridge, MajGen Earle E., 14, 49, 78, 88_n_, 135, 136, 136_n_ - - Partridge, Col John H., 73_n_, 102, 102_n_ - - Patrols, 91, 102, 104, 117, 122, 179, 182, 210, 213, 218–220, 222, - 224, 225, 228, 229, 232, 238, 242–244, 249, 258 - Aggressive tactics, 11 - Air, 49, 50 - Ambush, 220, 228, 244 - Bases, 157–159 - Concept, 158 - Chinese Communist Forces, 11 - Coastal, British, 28 - Enemy, 224 - 1st Marines, 70 - 1st ROK Division, 84 - Foot, 215, 224 - C/1/5, 52 - Helicopter, 222 - Jungle, 232 - Marine, 53, 56, 70 - Motor, 49, 88, 103 - Reconnaissance, 67, 148, 158, 244 - Rice paddy, 257 - RCT-7, 53 - Sea, 50 - 3/1, 44 - United States, 66, 70, 83 - United States Army, 3, 26 - - Panel markings, 115 - - Panmunjom, 220, 221, 224, 225, 229, 233, 247, 249 - - Patterson, Capt Russell G., Jr., 47 - - Pearson, Capt John A., 130 - - Pearl Harbor, 166 - - Peleliu, 232 - - PENDLETON, Phase Line, 109, 111 - - Pentagon, 11 - - People’s Tribunal, China, 36 - - Pershing, Gen John J., 166 - - Philippines, 24 - - Photo laboratory, 135 - - Pierce, Maj Herbert E., 256 - - Piner, Sgt William, 106 - - Plans and Orders - EUSAK - Operation Plan 20, 25 - Operation Instruction (OI)-272, 253 - IX Corps - Operation Plan 17, 120 - X Corps - Operation Instruction 235, 203 - 1st Marine Division - Operation Order 1-51, 30, 34 - Operation Order 2-51, 30, 34 - Operation Order 3-51, 42, 44 - Operation Order 4-51, 54 - Operation Order 5-51, 60 - Operation Order 6-51, 66 - Operation Order 22-51, 176 - Operation Order 23-51, 182 - Operation Order 25-51, 192, 194 - Operation Order 26-51, 198 - Operation Order 27-51, 204, 206 - Operation Order 50-51, 219 - Operation Order 2-52, 253 - Operation Order 8-52, 255 - Training Order 2-51, 161 - - Planes, Marine, 219. _See also_ Aircraft. - - Pohang, 21, 30–34, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 54, 62, 66 - - Pohang-Andong, 50 - - Pohangdong, 19 - - Pohang-Kyongju road, 42 - - Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR, 42, 44, 49 - - Police action, Korean War, 7 - - Political commissars, NKPA, 132 - - Political indoctrination of the CCF soldier, 36 - - Polgrean, Maj Edward R., 223 - - Port of debarkation, Pusan, 18 - - Pratt, LtCol Spencer H., 229–231 - - _Princeton_ (CV), USS, 122 - - Prisoners, 56, 222, 229, 243 - Chinese Communist Forces, 100, 101, 103, 131, 249, 260 - Interrogations, 19, 22 - NKPA, 44, 45, 57, 132 - UN, 222, 223 - of War (POWs), 151, 176 - American, 222 - Exchange, 249 - Interrogations, 53, 100, 134, 182 - - Press correspondents, 6, 35, 239, 247 - - Privateers, 138 - - Propaganda, 156, 157, 222, 233 - Chinese, 104, 249 - Chinese Communist Forces, 134 - - Psychological warfare, 215, 233 - - Pukhan, 102, 109, 111, 115, 119 - River, 117, 122, 201 - Valley, 102 - - Puller, Col Lewis B., 52_n_, 57, 60, 67, 68, 72, 76, 78, 79 - - Punchbowl, 141, 154, 158, 173, 176, 180, 182, 185, 211, 228, 260 - - Pusan, 2, 8, 12, 15, 19, 22, 46, 49, 62, 90, 95, 108, 185, 215 - Air Force Field at, 1 - Perimeter, 164 - Port of debarkation, 18 - Withdrawal to, 8 - - Pyongchang, 51 - - Pyonggang, 143 - - Pyongtaek, 26 - - Pyongyang, 95, 248 - - Pyongyang-Chinnanpo, 103 - - - Quantico, Virginia, 164, 223, 234 - - QUANTICO, Phase Line, 95, 99 - - Quilici, LtCol Clifford E., 220 - - Quinlan, John F., 237 - - - Radford, Adm Arthur H., 31, 32 - - Radio, 36, 68, 116, 168, 190, 195, 231 - CCF/NKPA, 51 - Trouble in Jets, 28 - - Rail, 89 - Traffic jams, 32 - Transportation, 60 - - Railhead at Munsan-ni, 254 - - Railroads, enemy, 143 - - Railway system, South Korea, 33 - Tunnels, North Korea, 15 - - Randazzo, TSgt Carmelo J., 74 - - Rations, 170, 181, 222 - USMC, 54 - - Reavis, 1stLt William A., 241 - - Reconnaissance, 229 - - Redalen, Capt Dwail L., 164 - - Refrigeration ship, UN, 5 - - Refugees, 13, 25, 153 - - Reisler, 2dLt Joseph M., 105, 105_n_, 113 - - Replacement Drafts, USMC, 6, 31 - 14th Replacement Draft, 219 - 15th Replacement Draft, 224 - 18th Replacement Draft, 254 - 19th Replacement Draft, 254 - - Replacements, 258 - Airborne, 32 - Chinese Communist Forces, 38 - U. S., 42 - U. S. M. C., 18, 31, 32, 48, 49, 57, 89, 214 - - Reusser, Maj Kenneth L., 27 - - Reynolds, Maj Walter E., Jr., 245 - - Rhee, President Syngman, 11, 25 - - Rice paddy patrols, 48, 52, 57. _See also_ Patrols. - - Ridgway, LtGen Matthew B., 6, 7, 7_n_, 8, 10, 11, 11_n_, 19, 22, 24, - 25, 25_n_, 26, 29, 30, 38, 38_n_, 41, 42, 45, 51, 58, 59, - 59_n_, 60, 62_n_, 65, 68, 72, 73, 79, 84, 86, 91, 93–95, 99, - 108, 115, 136, 160, 258, 261, 261_n_ - Declaration of Faith, 10 - Moral Leadership, 10 - Strategy, 35 - Tactics, 11 - - Ringblom, Maj Allan H., 223 - - Roach, Maj Maurice E., 74, 113, 117 - - Road - Andong-Yongdok, 30 - Center at Yanggu, 133 - Networks, 143 - Traffic, 143 - Transportation, 60 - - Roadblocks, U. S., 24 - - Roads, 48, 66, 73, 86, 95, 123, 143, 163, 181 - - Roberts, Col Deane C., 32, 46, 89 - - Rockey, 2dLt William K., 211 - - Rooney, Col John T., 107_n_, 109_n_, 151 - - Rotation draft, USMC, 57 - 10th Rotation Draft, 219 - 11th Rotation Draft, 219 - 12th Rotation Draft, 224 - 27th Rotation Draft, 219 - - Rubber boats, 102 - - Ruble, RAdm Richard W., 27 - - Russia, 160 - Soviet, 37, 261 - - - Saipan, 187 - - Samchok, 26, 58 - - Samgo-ri, 55 - - Sangyong, 54 - - Sapyong-ni, 99 - - Sawyer, Maj Webb D., 88, 88_n_, 91, 106 - - Schening, 1stLt Richard J., 53 - - Schilt, MajGen Christian F., 219 - - Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., 70, 149 - - Scott, 1stLt John L., 56 - - See, 2dLt Milo J., 229 - - Selden, MajGen John T., 199_n_, 231, 234_n_, 236, 243, 255 - - Seoul, 19, 22, 24, 28, 47, 50, 51, 59, 66, 73, 79, 84, 107, 108, 119, - 123, 137, 170, 242, 253, 254, 259 - Evacuation of, 25 - Historic invasion route, 253 - UN Airfield at, 29 - - Sexton, Capt Martin J., 19 - - Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C., Jr., 31, 76, 76_n_, 78, 78_n_, 96, 96_n_, - 135, 136, 208, 232 - - Ships - LSD, 256 - LST, 254–256 - LST 898, 34, 42 - LST 914, 34, 42 - _See also_ Ship by name. - - Shoes, 114 - Lace, 68 - - Show, Gen Shin Kwai, 81 - - _Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 2, 15, 146 - - Sikorsky. See Helicopters. - - Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 74, 74_n_, 111, 113_n_ - - Sinhung, 34, 42 - - Smedley, Maj Kenneth C., 223, 229 - - Smith, Corpsman E. N., 115 - - Smith, Capt Jack A., 91 - - Smith, Capt Samuel S., 130 - - Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 3_n_, 5, 5_n_, 6, 12_n_, 18, 18_n_, 19, - 19_n_, 21, 22_n_, 29, 30, 30_n_, 45, 45_n_, 50, 54_n_, 56, - 56_n_, 57_n_, 58, 58_n_, 60_n_, 66, 67, 68, 68_n_, 72, 79, - 91, 92, 92_n_, 94, 94_n_, 99, 106, 106_n_, 118, 118_n_, 257 - - Smoke, 116 - Screen, 93 - Shells, 134 - - Snedeker, Col Edward W., 8_n_, 21, 109_n_ - - Sniper, 215 - Fire, 92, 229 - - Sniping, 196, 232 - NKPA, 49 - - Snows, 69, 228, 230, 234 - - So-chon River, 151, 158 - - Sohwari, 175 - - Soissons, 118 - - Sokcho-ri, 215, 254, 256 - - Som River, 66, 74 - - South Africa, 24 - - Soyang, 119, 128, 130, 175 - Bridgehead, 128 - River, 94, 117, 146, 150, 173, 197, 216, 217, 230 - Valley, 175, 181, 182 - - Stamm, Col John F., 199_n_, 235, 246_n_ - - Steiner, Col William B., 31 - - Stewart, James T., 131_n_, 169_n_ - - Stewart, LtCol Joseph L., 69, 69_n_, 94, 95_n_ - - Stiff, LtCol Houston, 194, 195 - - Stoyanow, Capt Victor, 125 - - _St. Paul_ (CA), USS, 50, 224, 244 - - Strategy - Effect of tire truce talks, 161 - Limited war, 36, 37, 38 - Nuclear war, 36, 37, 38 - - Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., 14, 33, 136 - - Strongholds, CCF, 71 - - Struble, VAdm Arthur D., 27 - - Supplies, 72, 95, 144, 147, 154, 170, 171, 176, 181, 187, 189, 190, - 220, 222, 241, 243 - _See_ Logistics. - Dumps, 119, 219 - U. S., 30, 62, 95 - USMC, 48, 113 - - Surrender message, 55 - - Survival suits, 47 - - Sutter, LtCol Allan, 75 - - Suwon, 22, 41, 50, 51 - UN Airfield at, 29 - - Swanson, 1stLt William, 111 - - - Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 17 - - Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), 17, 26, 137 - - Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) (TACA), 97 - - Tactical Air Coordinator, Airborne (TACA), 17, 116 - - Tactics, 10, 258 - Advantage, 169 - Aggressive patrolling, 11 - CCF, 83, 138 - Delaying, 258 - Eighth Army, 8 - Firepower, 11 - Marine Corps, 138, 260 - NKPA, 192 - Plan of Attack, 8 - Ridgway, 11 - - Taeam-san, 141, 146, 147 - - Taegu, 14, 29, 44, 58, 60, 64 - - Taejon, 44, 90 - - Taeu-san, 158, 159 - - Tanks, 83, 131, 191, 245 - British Centurion, 25 - Column, USA, 62 - Fake, CCF, 103 - Infantry patrols, 151 - Support, 138 - US, 121 - USMC, 68, 70, 75, 83, 92, 104, 114, 117, 122, 125, 130, 133, 219 - - Tanyang, 44 - - Task Force Puller, 52 - - Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 38, 38_n_ - - Taylor, Capt Richard M., 133, 141 - - Telephone, 158, 208 - Wire, 36, 71, 74 - - Thailand, 24 - - Thackrey, RAdm Lyman A., 27, 28 - - Thermal boots, 231, 234–236, 240, 250, 251 - Innovations, 234 - - Thermopylae, 128 - - _Theseus_, HMS, 28, 29, 46 - - Thirty-eighth Parallel, 8, 15, 45, 79, 220, 258 - - Thirty-ninth Parallel, 15 - - Thomas, MajGen Gerald C., 118, 120, 133, 133_n_, 137, 147, 150, 151, - 158, 158_n_, 186, 186_n_, 189, 197, 199_n_, 207, 208, 211, - 217, 228, 231, 246_n_ - - Tierney, Elizabeth L., 164_n_ - - Timberlake, MajGen Edward J., 136 - - Tim, Col Tai Shik, 159 - - Tinsley, LtCol James H., 119_n_, 232, 246_n_ - - Todun-ni, 111 - - _Toledo_ (CA), USS, 217 - - Tongchon, proposed landing at, 132 - - Tongchon-Kumhwa road, 132 - - Tonpyong, 176 - - Topyong-dong, 52, 55 - - Transportation, 36, 46, 89 - Highways, 47 - Human, 181 - Motor, 42, 163, 181 - Motor lift, 42 - Railroads, 47 - Roads, 36 - Trains, 44 - Water lift, 42 - _See_ Logistics. - - Treasure Island, 31 - - Trenches, 217, 232, 246, 248 - Marine, 243 - Warfare, 232 - - Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 117, 118 - - Truce, 160 - Talks, 154–156, 161, 163, 171, 180, 222, 233, 247–249, 261 - - Truman, President Harry S., 5, 37, 99 - - Tsuika, 33 - - Tucker, LtCol Roy A., 111_n_ - - Tundong-ni, 171 - - Turkey, 24 - - Typhus, 53 - - - Uihung, 30 - - Uijongbu, 84 - - Uisong, 30, 42, 44, 49, 52, 54 - - Uisong-Andong road, 42 - - Ulsan, 8 - - United Kingdom, 24 - - United Nations (UN), 29, 156 - Delegates, 156, 160, 220, 229, 233 - Forces, 24, 35, 60, 80, 126, 154, 161, 163 - Commander, 257 - Strength figures, 85, 218 - Truce Team, 160 - - Units - British Commonwealth - 1st Commonwealth Division, 71, 116, 119, 201, 253 - 27th Brigade, 22, 65, 107, 116, 121 - 29th Brigade, 22, 116, 121 - Royal Australian Regiment, 116 - Canadian Battalion, 22 - Canadian Light Infantry, Princess Patricia, 116 - Gloucestershire Battalion, 116 - Independent Commandos, Royal Marines, 11, 12 - 41 Independent Commando, 3 - New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion, 22 - Royal commonwealth naval forces, 15 - Belgian Battalion, 201 - Colombian Battalion, 201 - EUSAK. _See_ Army Units. - Ethiopian Battalion, 201 - French Battalion, 176 - French Units, 15 - Greek Battalion, 201 - 60th Indian Ambulance Group, 85 - Philippine 20th BCT, 201 - Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit, 85 - Thai units, 15 - Thailand Battalion, 22, 201 - Turkish Brigade, 22, 201 - - - Van Fleet, LtGen James A., 99, 109, 109_n_, 115, 118, 121–123, 123_n_, - 126, 127, 127_n_, 133 142, 154, 161, 161_n_, 199_n_, 201, - 202, 218, 219, 221, 248, 248_n_, 249, 251 - - Van Kueren, RAdm Alexander H., 166 - - Van Ryzin, BrigGen William J., 136_n_ - - Vatcher, William H., Jr., 155_n_, 221_n_ - - Vehicles, 142, 175, 186, 244 - DUKWs, 94, 102, 175 - EUSAK, 12 - Enemy, 15 - Jeep, 70, 91, 94, 131, 256 - Trailers, 256 - Ox cart, CCF, 143 - Tank cars, 32 - Tracked, USMC, 62 - Trucks, 105, 119, 131, 175, 181, 215, 256 - Convoy, 54, 70 - Enemy, 131, 143 - Fake, CCF, 103 - USMC, 30, 147 - - U. S., 13, 62 - - Vests, armored, 165, 167, 168, 236–238, 240, 251. _See_ Armor, body. - - Vittori, Cpl Joseph, 193, 193_n_ - - Volcansek, LtCol Max J., Jr., 46 - - - Wade, Col Sidney S., 119_n_, 227, 246_n_, 255 - - Walker, Maj Carl E., 211 - - Walker, Richard L., 36_n_ - - Walker, LtGen Walton H., 7 - - Ward, 1stLt Alfred J., 47 - - Warehouses, Korean, 15 - - Warfare - Land, 250, 257 - Movement, of, 198, 201, 224, 229 - Position, of, 198, 201, 218, 229, 231 - Static, 247 - Trench, 232 - - Warner, 1stLt Robert E., 141 - - Warships, UN, 123. _See_ Ships. - - Washington, D. C., 7, 8, 28, 156, 161 - - Watson, 2dLt John E., 229 - - Weapons - CCF, 35 - Antiaircraft guns, 103 - Artillery, 35, 248 - Automatic weapons, 96 - Booby traps, 74 - Burp guns, 156, 160 - Enemy mines, 70 - Grenades, 35, 96, 125 - Land mines, 70 - Explosions, 44 - Machine gun, 47, 70, 106, 125, 130, 138 - Mines, 74 - Mortars, 35, 74, 81, 83, 125, 130, 138, 144, 248 - Fire, 92 - 120mm, 96 - Rifle, 47 - Recoilless, 125 - Russian 76mm guns, 125 - Satchel charges, 125 - Small arms, 35, 81, 83, 92, 96 - Fire, 74 - NKPA - Artillery, 44, 149, 151, 191 - Automatic, 151 - Burp, 197 - Grenades, l4l, 197 - Machine guns, 55, 141, 178, 180, 192 - Mortars, 44, 51, 55, 142, 149, 151, 179, 180, 184, 187, - 191, 192, 217 - 76mm, 187, 192, 196 - 81mm, 55 - 82mm, 192 - 105mm, 192 - 120mm, 192 - 122mm, 192 - Rifle, 141 - Small arms, 55, 142, 184, 217 - ROKA - 105 mm Howitzer, 227 - 155 mm Howitzer, 227 - United States, 69 - Army Artillery, 11 - Grenade, 10 - Howitzer, 277 - Napalm, 17, 27, 51, 55, 71, 83, 132, 142, 171, 183, 195 - Pistol, 168 - Thompson submachine gun, 168 - USMC - Air, 217, _See_ Aircraft. - Antitank guns, 149 - Artillery, 148, 217 - Bayonet, 149, 150, 168 - Bombs, 142, 143 - Napalm, 27 - Booby traps, 216 - Flame throwers, 217 - Grenades, 83, 91, 92, 149, 150, 168, 184, 195, 217 - 105mm Howitzer. 49, 233 - Machine guns, 135, 179, 216, 217 - Mines, 176, 216. _See also_ Mines. - Mortars, 148, 206, 217 - 4.2″ Mortars, 191, 195 - 81mm Mortars, 90, 113, 168, 195 - Rifles, 115 - M-1, 12 - 75mm Recoilless, 148, 195 - 90mm, 210 - Tank, 149 - Rockets, 195 - - Weather, 25, 33, 39, 69, 131, 233–235, 255 - - Weede, Col Richard G., 149, 192, 196, 199_n_, 204, 232 - - _Wehrmacht_, 250 - - Weintal, E., 155_n_ - - Wermuth, LtCol John J., 204, 227 - - Welch, LtCol Claude H., 89 - - Wertman, LtCol Howard E., 181, 255 - - West Point, 72 - - West, Col Radford C., 46 - - West, LtCol Robley E., 105, 148, 149 - - Weyland, MajGen Otto P., 169 - - Whaling, BrigGen William J., 232 - - White, 1stLt Francis E., 230 - - Williams, BrigGen Gregon A., 57 - - Wilson, TSgt Harold E., 114 - - Winecoff, Col Joseph L., 149, 150 - - Winfrey, 1stLt Frank A., 151 - - Wire laying, 230 - - _Wisconsin_, (BB), USS, 244 - - Whistles, NPKA, 192 - - Wolfe, LtCol David C., 89 - - Wonju, 18, 19, 22, 29, 44, 45, 59, 60, 63, 66–68, 91 - Highway and rail center at, 26 - - Wonju-Hoengsong highway, 67 - - Wonsan, 143, 156, 168 - Landing, 63 - UN airfield at, 29 - - Wontong-ni, 187, 192, 204, 213, 233 - - Wornham, Col Thomas A., 186, 191, 204 - - Worthington, Maj Gordon R., 179 - - World War I, 65, 68, 72, 166, 231, 232, 246 - - World War II, 6, 7, 33, 44, 72, 99, 100, 160, 167, 194, 232, - 250, 257, 261 - - Wound statistics, 166 - - Wray, Capt Robert P., 51, 70, 70_n_, 109_n_, 111, 113, 115_n_ - - Wyczawski, LtCol Richard W., 14, 46, 46_n_, 89 - - - Yanggu, 128, 133, 135, 141, 146, 161, 171, 202 - Road center at, 132 - - Yanggu-Inje, 132 - - Yangjimal, 91 - - Yangyang, 8, 202 - - Yoju, 26, 66, 72, 79 - Corridor, 58 - - YOKE Ridge, 173, 176, 178, 183. _See also_ Objective YOKE. - - Yonchon, 201 - - Yongchon, 30, 44, 49 - - Yongdok, 42, 54, 55 - - Yongdok-Andong road, 54 - - Yongwol-Pyongchang road, 66 - - Yonpo Airfield, 14, 29 - - Yu, Maj Dung Nam, 53 - - Yudam-ni area, 6 - - - U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962-0 634040 - - -[Illustration: UN COUNTERSTROKE OF 23 MAY 51] - -[Illustration] - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they -were not changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation -marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left -unbalanced. - -Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs -and outside quotations. 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