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diff --git a/old/65009-0.txt b/old/65009-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index affaa3c..0000000 --- a/old/65009-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21713 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 -Volume III (of 5), by Lynn Montross - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and -most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms -of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you -will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before -using this eBook. - -Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5) - The Chosin Reservoir Campaign - -Author: Lynn Montross - Nicholas Canzona - -Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65009] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed - Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was - produced from images generously made available by The Internet - Archive) - -*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA -1950-1953 VOLUME III (OF 5) *** - - - - -[Illustration] - -[Illustration] - - - - - U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA - - 1950–1953 - - VOLUME III - - _The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_ - - by - - LYNN MONTROSS - - and - - CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC - - Based on Research by - K. JACK BAUER, PHD. - - - [Illustration] - - - Historical Branch, G-3 - Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps - Washington, D. C., 1957 - - - - - Preceding Volumes of - _U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_ - Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter” - Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation” - - - Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 57-60727 - - For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government - Printing Office - Washington 25, D. C. Price $2.75 - Official Price of this Publication $2.75 - - - - -Foreword - - -The breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area -will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics of our history. -It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in the best tradition -of American military annals. - -The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese -divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot be -explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the high -degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the “uncommon -valor” expected of all Marines. - -A great deal of initiative was required of unit commanders, and tactics -had to be improvised at times on the spur of the moment to meet -unusual circumstances. But in the main, the victory was gained by firm -discipline and adherence to time-tested military principles. Allowing -for differences in arms, indeed, the Marines of 1950 used much the same -fundamental tactics as those employed on mountain roads by Xenophon -and his immortal Ten Thousand when they cut their way through Asiatic -hordes to the Black Sea in the year 401 B.C. - -When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might have -accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the -destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into the -enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The decision -of the commander and the determination of all hands to come out -fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with the highest -traditions of the United States Marine Corps. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - R. MCC. PATE - _General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ - _Commandant of the Marine Corps._ - - - - -Preface - - -This is the third in a series of five volumes dealing with the -operations of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the period -2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail the -operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a -part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign. - -The time covered in this book extends from the administrative landing -at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation which ended -on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete, however, without -reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions in Washington and -Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast Korea and governed their -employment. - -Credit is due the U. S. Army and Navy for support on land and sea, and -the U. S. Navy and Air Force for support in the air. But since this is -primarily a Marine Corps history, the activities of other services are -described here only in sufficient detail to show Marine operations in -their proper perspective. - -The ideal of the authors has been to relate the epic of the Chosin -Reservoir breakout from the viewpoint of the man in the foxhole as well -as the senior officer at the command post. Grateful acknowledgment is -made to the 142 Marine officers and men who gave so generously of their -time by contributing 338 narratives, letters, and interviews. In many -instances this material was so detailed that some could not be used, -because of space limitations. But all will go into the permanent Marine -archives for the benefit of future historians. - -Thanks are also extended to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as -Marine officers, who offered valuable comments and criticisms after -reading the preliminary drafts of chapters. Without this assistance no -accurate and detailed account could have been written. - -The maps contained in this volume, as in the previous ones, have been -prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, -Virginia. The advice of officers of the Current History Branch of the -Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has -also been of aid in the preparation of these pages. - -[Illustration: (signature)] - - E. W. SNEDEKER - _Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,_ - _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._ - - - - -Contents - - - _Page_ - - I Problems of Victory 1 - - Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender - Message to NKPA Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of - Celerity--Logistical Problems of Advance--Naval - Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint - Planning for Wonsan Landing - - - II The Wonsan Landing 21 - - ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and - Embarkation--Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation - Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at Objective--MacArthur Orders - Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine Division - - - III First Blood at Kojo 43 - - 1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The - All-Night Fight of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to - Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan Area--Marines - Relieved at Kojo - - - IV Majon-ni and Ambush Alley 61 - - Marines Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of - Mission--Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop - of Supplies Requested--First Attack on Perimeter--KMC - Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st Marines to - Chigyong - - - V Red China to the Rescue 79 - - Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New - Enemy--Communist Victory in Civil War--Organization of - the CCF--The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier--CCF Arms and - Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--CCF - Strategy and Tactics - - - VI The Battle of Sudong 95 - - The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved - by 7th Marines--CCF Counterattack at Sudong--Two - Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of NKPA Tank - Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF - Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines - - - VII Advance to the Chosin Reservoir 125 - - Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New - Enemy--The Turning Point of 15 November--Changes - in X Corps Mission--Marine Preparations for - Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN - Command--Marine Concentration on MSR - - - VIII Crisis at Yudam-ni 151 - - Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before - CCF Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese - Seize Hill 1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of - North Ridge - - - IX Fox Hill 177 - - Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company - at Toktong Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North - Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not Enough - Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November - - - X Hagaru’s Night of Fire 197 - - Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear - MSR--Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of - Marine Units--CCF Attacks from the Southwest--East Hill - Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting Fires--Marine - Attacks on East Hill - - - XI Task Force Drysdale 221 - - CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by - Marine Tanks--The Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack - of George Company on East Hill--High Level Command - Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue - of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip - - - XII Breakout From Yudam-ni 249 - - Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419 - and 1542--March of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack - of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The Ridgerunners of Toktong - Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542--Advance of - Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter - - - XIII Regroupment at Hagaru 277 - - 4,312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements - Flown to Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning - for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at - Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of RCT-7 - to the South--Advance of the Division Trains - - - XIV Onward From Koto-ri 305 - - Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task - Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division - Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the - Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine - Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division - Breakout - - - XV The Hungnam Redeployment 333 - - Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st - Marine Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines - Arrive at New Assembly Area--Contributions of Marine - Aviation--Losses Sustained by the Enemy--Results of the - Reservoir Campaign - - - _Appendixes_ - - A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 361 - - B Task Organization, 1st Marine Division 365 - - C Naval Task Organization 373 - - D Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 379 - - E 1st Marine Division Casualties 381 - - F Command and Staff List, 8 October-15 December 1950, - 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 383 - - G Enemy Order of Battle 397 - - H Air Evacuation Statistics 399 - - I Unit Citations 401 - - Bibliography 405 - - Index 413 - - - - -Illustrations - - -_Photographs_ - -Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 148 and 276. - - -_Maps and Sketches_ - - _Page_ - 1 Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines 4 - - 2 Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division, - October-December 1950 12, 122 - - 3 Wonsan and Harbor 16 - - 4 Kojo Area 47 - - 5 Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan 62 - - 6 Majon-ni Perimeter 64 - - 7 The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division 97 - - 8 Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase 101 - - 9 Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November 111 - - 10 Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass 115 - - 11 1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives 130 - - 12 Yudam-ni 153 - - 13 Marine Attacks, 27 November 155 - - 14 Battle of Northwest Ridge 162 - - 15 Action at 3/5’s CP 169 - - 16 The Battle of North Ridge 173 - - 17 Hagaru Defensive Perimeter 199 - - 18 East Hill Attacks, 29 November 212 - - 19 Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December 223 - - 20 Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December 227 - - 21 Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November 230 - - 22 East Hill Attacks, 30 November 237 - - 23 Breaking off Action, 30 November 252 - - 24 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December 256 - - 25 Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December 269 - - 26 Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December 289 - - 27 Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December 292 - - 28 Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December 295 - - 29 Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December 310 - - 30 Hungnam Docks and Beaches 344 - - - - -CHAPTER I - -Problems Of Victory - -_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender Message to_ NKPA -_Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity--Logistical Problems of -Advance--Naval Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint -Planning for Wonsan Landing_ - - -It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can -be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was brought -home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN) heads, -both political and military, during the last week of September 1950. -Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident -that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in Korea, as -represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). - -Only a month before, such a result would have seemed a faint and -unrealistic hope. Late in August the hard-pressed Eighth U. S. Army -in Korea (EUSAK) was defending that southeast corner of the peninsula -known as the Pusan Perimeter. - -“Nothing fails like success,” runs a cynical French proverb, and the -truth of this adage was demonstrated militarily when the dangerously -over-extended NKPA forces paid the penalty of their tenuous supply -line on 15 September 1950. That was the date of the X Corps amphibious -assault at Inchon, with the 1st Marine Division as landing force -spearheading the advance on Seoul. - -X Corps was the strategic anvil of a combined operation as the Eighth -Army jumped off next day to hammer its way out of the Pusan Perimeter -and pound northward toward Seoul. When elements of the two UN forces -met just south of the Republic of Korea (ROK) capital on 26 September, -the routed NKPA remnants were left only the hope of escaping northward -across the 38th parallel.[1] - - [1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and - Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been - told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with - the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in - the Inchon-Seoul operation. - -The bold strategic plan leading up to this victory--one of the most -decisive ever won by U. S. land, sea and air forces--was largely -the concept of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, who was -Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CinCUNC) as well as -U. S. Commander in Chief in the Far East (CinCFE). It was singularly -appropriate, therefore, that he should have returned the political -control of the battle-scarred ROK capital to President Syngman Rhee on -29 September. Marine officers who witnessed the ceremony have never -forgotten the moving spectacle of the American general and the fiery -Korean patriot, both past their 70th birthdays, as they stood together -under the shell-shattered skylight of the Government Palace.[2] - - [2] Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless - otherwise noted, all interviews have been by the authors. - - -_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel_ - -“Where do we go from here?” would hardly have been an oversimplified -summary of the questions confronting UN leaders when it became apparent -that the NKPA forces were defeated. In order to appraise the situation, -it is necessary to take a glance at preceding events. - -As early as 19 July, the dynamic ROK leader had made it plain that he -did not propose to accept the pre-invasion _status quo_. He served -notice that his forces would unify Korea by driving to the Manchurian -border. Since the Communists had violated the 38th Parallel, the aged -Rhee declared, this imaginary demarcation between North and South no -longer existed. He pointed out that the sole purpose of the line in the -first place had been to divide Soviet and American occupation zones -after World War II, in order to facilitate the Japanese surrender and -pave the way for a democratic Korean government. - -In May 1948, such a government had come about in South Korea by popular -elections, sponsored and supervised by the UN. These elections had been -scheduled for all Korea but were prohibited by the Russians in their -zone. The Communists not only ignored the National Assembly in Seoul, -but also arranged their own version of a governing body in Pyongyang -two months later. The so-called North Korean People’s Republic thus -became another of the Communist puppet states set up by the USSR. - -That the United Nations did not recognize the North Korean state in -no way altered its very real status as a politico-military fact. For -obvious reasons, then, all UN decisions relating to the Communist state -had to take into account the possibility of reactions by Soviet Russia -and Red China, which shared Korea’s northern boundary. - -At the outbreak of the conflict on 25 June 1950, the UN Security -Council had, by a vote of 9-0, called for an immediate end to the -fighting and the withdrawal of all NKPA forces to the 38th Parallel.[3] -This appeal having gone unheeded, the Council on 27 June recommended -“... that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to -the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack -and to restore international peace and security in the area.”[4] It -was the latter authorization, supplemented by another resolution on 7 -July, that led to military commitments by the United States and to the -appointment of General MacArthur as over-all UN Commander. - - [3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the UN in Korea_ (Washington, - 1951). Yugoslavia abstained from the vote, and the USSR, - then boycotting the Council, was absent. - - [4] _Ibid._ - -These early UN actions constituted adequate guidance in Korea until -the Inchon landing and EUSAK’s counteroffensive turned the tide. With -the NKPA in full retreat, however, and UN Forces rapidly approaching -the 38th Parallel, the situation demanded re-evaluation, including -supplemental instructions to the military commander. The question arose -as to whether the North Koreans should be allowed sanctuary beyond the -parallel, possibly enabling them to reorganize for new aggression. It -will be recalled that Syngman Rhee had already expressed his thoughts -forcibly in this connection on 19 July; and the ROK Army translated -thoughts into action on 1 October by crossing the border. - -The UN, in its 7 July resolution, having authorized the United States -to form a unified military force and appoint a supreme commander in -Korea, it fell upon the Administration of President Harry S. Truman -to translate this dictum into workaday reality. Aiding the Chief -Executive and his Cabinet in this delicate task with its far-reaching -implications were the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Army -member, General J. Lawton Collins, also functioned as Executive Agent -of JCS for the United Nations Command in Korea, thus keeping intact -the usual chain of command from the Army Chief of Staff to General -MacArthur, who now served both the U. S. and UN.[5] - - [5] Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary - manuscript (Comments). - -[Illustration: - - EIGHTH ARMY ADVANCES - AND - RESTRAINING LINES - - MAP-1 -] - -Late in August, two of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins and Admiral -Forrest P. Sherman, USN, had flown to Japan to discuss the forthcoming -Inchon landing with General MacArthur. In the course of the talks, it -was agreed that CinCUNC’s objective should be the _destruction_ of the -North Korean forces, and that ground operations should be extended -beyond the 38th Parallel to achieve this goal. The agreement took the -form of a recommendation, placed before Secretary of Defense Louis -Johnson on 7 September.[6] - - [6] JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50. - Unless otherwise stated, copies of all messages cited are - on file in Historical Branch, HQMC. - -A week later, JCS informed MacArthur that President Truman had approved -certain “conclusions” relating to the Korean conflict, but that these -were not yet to be construed as final decisions. Among other things, -the Chief Executive accepted the reasoning that UN Forces had a legal -basis for engaging the NKPA north of the Parallel. MacArthur would plan -operations accordingly, JCS directed, but would carry them out only -after being granted explicit permission.[7] - - [7] JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman, - _Memoirs_, 2 vols (Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359. - -The historic authorization, based on recommendations of the National -Security Council to President Truman, reached General Headquarters -(GHQ), Tokyo, in a message dispatched by JCS on 27 September: - - Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean - Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to - conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne - landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, - provided that at the time of such operations there has been no - entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, - no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our - operations militarily in North Korea.... - -The lengthy message abounded in paragraphs of caution, reflecting the -desire of both the UN and the United States to avoid a general war. Not -discounting the possibility of intervention by Russia or Red China, -JCS carefully outlined MacArthur’s courses of action for several -theoretical situations. Moreover, he was informed that certain broad -restrictions applied regardless of developments: - - ... under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the - Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no - non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces - bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian - border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of - the 38th parallel will not include Air or Naval action against - Manchuria or against USSR territory....[8] - - [8] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360; - MajGen Courtney Whitney, _MacArthur, His Rendezvous - with History_ (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the - JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive - from the JCS on 27 September establishing my military - objective as ‘... the destruction of the North Korean - Armed Forces’ and in the accomplishment thereof - authorizing me to ‘... conduct military operations, - including amphibious and airborne landings or ground - operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea ...’ - made it mandatory rather than discretionary ... that - the UN Forces operate north of that line against enemy - remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans - governing operations north of that Parallel were designed - to implement the resolution passed by the UN General - assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically - approved by the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives - assigned by the JCS, and the military-political - objectives established by said resolution of the UN could - have been accomplished in no other way.” Gen D. MacArthur - letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56. - -Thus MacArthur had the green light, although the signal was shaded by -various qualifications. On 29 September, the new Secretary of Defense, -George C. Marshall, told him in a message, “... We want you to feel -unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th -parallel....”[9] - - [9] JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation - see Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398. - - -_Surrender Message to NKPA Forces_ - -Meanwhile, a step was taken by the U. S. Government on 27 September in -the hope that hostilities might end without much further loss or risk -for either side. By dispatch, JCS authorized MacArthur to announce, at -his discretion, a suggested surrender message to the NKPA.[10] Framed -by the U. S. State Department, the message was broadcast on 1 October -and went as follows: - - [10] JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50. - - To: The Commander-in-chief, North Korean Forces. The early and - total defeat and complete destruction of your Armed Forces and war - making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decision of - the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further - loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations - Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and the forces under your - command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down - your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision - as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all - United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your - control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care, - maintenance, and immediate transportation to such places as I - indicate. - - North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of - the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care - indicated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return - to their homes as soon as practicable. - - I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to - avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of - property.[11] - - [11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in - EUSAK _War Diary_ (_WD_), 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg - 92762, 27 Sep 50. - -The surrender broadcast evoked no direct reply from Kim Il Sung, -Premier of North Korea and Commander in Chief of the NKPA. Instead, the -reaction of the Communist bloc came ominously from another quarter. Two -days after MacArthur’s proclamation, Red China’s Foreign Minister Chou -En-Lai informed K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, that -China would intervene in the event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. -He added, however, that such action would not be forthcoming if only -ROK troops entered North Korea.[12] - - [12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct - 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361–362. The information was - forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that he - had never been informed of it. _Military Situation in - the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed - Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United - States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To - Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far - East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of - the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that - area_ (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter _MacArthur - Hearings_), 109. - -It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September -permitted operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the -time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by -major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, _no announcement of intended -entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North -Korea_....”[13] In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s plans -for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after -Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high -among the United Nations at this time, and CinCUNC shortly received -supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS--the one establishing -legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the other reaffirming -military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7 -October, the United Nations directed that - - [13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360; - Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397. Italics supplied. - - All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability - throughout Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the - establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government - in the Sovereign State of Korea....[14] - - [14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in _Guide to the UN in Korea_, 20. - -Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur could -attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea militarily -and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early -instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows: - - Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in - Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, - you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action - by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of - success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington - prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese - territory.[15] - - [15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 362; - Whitney, _MacArthur_, 404. - - -_MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity_ - -Anticipating his authority for crossing the 38th Parallel, CinCUNC -on 26 September had directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations -Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the border. -He stipulated that Eighth Army should make the main effort in either -the west or the east, and that however this was resolved, there should -be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast--at Chinnampo, -Wonsan, or elsewhere.[16] Despite recommendations of key staff members, -MacArthur did not place X Corps under EUSAK command for the forthcoming -campaign but retained General Almond’s unit as a separate tactical -entity under GHQ.[17] - - [16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The - Chief of Military History (OCMH). - - [17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict: Policy, - Planning, Direction_. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M. - Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” _Army_, vii, - no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65. - -JSPOG, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, -rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework of CinCUNC’s -directive. And the following day, 27 September, a proposed Operation -Plan (OpnPlan) 9-50 was laid before the commander in chief.[18] This -detailed scheme of action evolved from two basic assumptions: (1) that -the bulk of the NKPA had already been destroyed; and (2) that neither -the USSR nor Red China would intervene, covertly or openly. - - [18] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_. - -Eighth Army, according to plan, would attack across the 38th -Parallel, directing its main effort in the west, along the axis -Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang (see Map 1). JSPOG designated the latter -city--capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea--as final -objective of the first phase. Further, it recommended that EUSAK’s -drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a X Corps -amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After establishing a -beachhead, Almond’s force would attack 125 road miles westward through -the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with General Walker’s army, -thereby trapping North Korean elements falling back from the south.[19] - - [19] _Ibid._, and CinCFE _OpnPlan_ 9-50. Copy at OCMH. - -JSPOG suggested that both commands should then advance north to the -line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging roughly from 50 to -100 miles below the Manchurian border. Only ROK elements would proceed -beyond the restraining line, in keeping with the spirit and letter of -the 27 September dispatch from JCS.[20] - - [20] _Ibid._ - -Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as CinCUNC’s chief of staff -during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the JSPOG draft -of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur -forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message with this -reassurance: - - There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by - major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces.[21] - - [21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, - 361; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397–398. - -Within three days, he received word from the Joint Chiefs that they -approved his plan.[22] On 2 October it became the official operation -order for the attack.[23] - - [22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361; - Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398. All dates in the narrative and - in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the - action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the - 30th in Tokyo. - - [23] UNC _Operation Order_ (_OpnO_) 2, 2 Oct 50. - - -_Logistical Problems of Advance_ - -On 29 September, the day before he received the JCS endorsement of his -plan, General MacArthur arrived in Seoul to officiate at the ceremony -restoring control of South Korea to the legal ROK government. During -the visit, he met with the principals named in the Task Organization of -OpnPlan 9-50: - - Eighth U. S. Army LtGen Walton H. Walker, USA - Naval Forces Far East VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN - Far East Air Forces (FEAF) LtGen George E. Stratemeyer, USAF - X Corps MajGen Edward M. Almond, USA - -Missing from the top-level conference, Major General Walter L. Weible, -USA, of the Japan Logistical Command, probably was already aware of -things to come.[24] - - [24] LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA, - 14 Jun 55. - -MacArthur outlined his concept of operations in North Korea to those -present. He set 20 October as D-Day for the Wonsan amphibious assault -by the 1st Marine Division, which, with all X Corps Troops, would -embark for the operation from Inchon. The 7th Infantry Division, also a -part of X Corps, would motor 200 miles to Pusan and there load out for -an administrative landing behind the Marines.[25] - - [25] _Ibid._ - -Initial overland routing of the 7th Division was made necessary by -problems arising out of Inchon’s limited port facilities. General -MacArthur gave EUSAK the logistic responsibility for all UN Forces in -Korea, including X Corps. To carry out this charge, General Walker -could rely on only two harbors, Pusan and Inchon. There were no other -ports in South Korea capable of supporting large-scale military -operations. Meeting the tight Wonsan schedule would require that X -Corps have immediate priority over the whole of Inchon’s capacity, even -with the 7th Division being shunted off on Pusan. And it still remained -for Walker to mount and sustain Eighth Army’s general offensive -_before_ the Wonsan landing! - -In the light of logistical considerations, then, Wonsan had more than -mere tactical significance as the objective of X Corps. Its seizure -would open up the principal east-coast port of Korea, together with -vital new road and rail junctions. But while MacArthur had decided on -an amphibious assault by a separate tactical unit as the proper stroke, -there existed a school of dissenters among his closest advisers. -Generals Hickey and Wright had recommended that X Corps be incorporated -into EUSAK at the close of the Inchon-Seoul Operation. Major General -George L. Eberle, MacArthur’s G-4, held that supplying X Corps in -North Korea would be simpler if that unit were a part of Eighth Army. -And General Almond himself, while hardly a dissenter, had expected -his corps to be placed under General Walker’s command after the Seoul -fighting.[26] - - [26] _Ibid._; Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_; Blumenson, - “MacArthur’s Divided Command.” Gen MacArthur stated: “If - such a dissension existed it was never brought to my - attention. To the contrary, the decision to retain as a - function of GHQ command and coordination between Eighth - Array and X Corps until such time as a juncture between - the two forces had been effected was, so far as I know, - based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members - of my staff....” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has - stated: “Neither General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I - objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps should - have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after - the close of the Inchon-Seoul operation.” MajGen E. K. - Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56. - - -_Naval Missions Prescribed_ - -Logistical problems were magnified by the tight embarkation schedule -laid out for the amphibious force. In submitting its proposed plan for -North Korean operations to General MacArthur on 27 September, JSPOG had -listed the following “bare minimum time requirements:” - - For assembling assault shipping 6 days - For planning 4 days - For loading 6 days - For sailing to Wonsan 4 days - -Thus it was estimated that the 1st Marine Division could assault Wonsan -10 days after receiving the order to load out of Inchon, provided -that shipping had already been assembled and planning accomplished -concurrently.[27] - - [27] JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,” - 27 Sep 50. Copy at OCMH. - -Following CinCUNC’s meeting in the capitol building on the 29th, -General Almond called a conference of division commanders and staff -members at his X Corps Headquarters in Ascom City, near Inchon. -MacArthur’s strategy was outlined to the assembled officers, so that -planning could commence on the division level. Almond set 15 October -as D-Day for the Wonsan landing. He based this target date on the -assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve X Corps on 3 -October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin arriving -at Inchon.[28] - - [28] 1stMarDiv _Special Action Report for the - Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct-15 Dec - 50_ (hereafter 1stMarDiv _SAR_), 10. - -On 29 September, the 1st Marine Division was still committed tactically -above Seoul, two regiments blocking and one attacking. If the first -vessels began arriving at Inchon on 3 October, the assault shipping -would not be completely assembled until the 8th, according to the JSPOG -estimate. Four days would be required to get to the objective, leaving -two days, instead of the planned six, for outloading the landing -force. Neither Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General (CG) -1stMarDiv, nor his staff regarded this as a realistic schedule.[29] - - [29] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes - on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the - First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51_ (MS), - (hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 370–371. - -[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS - -1st Marine Division - -October-December 1950 - - MAP-2 -] - -The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge -of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available to the -division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and no -intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay firm -plans along either administrative or tactical lines.[30] - - [30] _Ibid._ - -Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), issued -his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming -operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force -7 (JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these -missions: - - 1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of - Chongjin. - - 2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as - directed. - - 3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as - required. - - 4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and - support en route. - - 5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead - in the Wonsan area on D-Day. - - 6. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistical support - to X Corps at Wonsan until relieved.[31] - - [31] ComNavFE _OpnPlan 113-50_. Copy at OCMH. - -Admiral Joy’s directive also warned: “The strong probability exists -that the ports and possible landing beaches under control of the North -Koreans have been recently mined. The sighting of new mines floating in -the area indicates that mines are being seeded along the coast.”[32] - - [32] _Ibid._, B, 11. - - -_X Corps Relieved at Seoul_ - -The related events, decisions, and plans of September 1950 had unfolded -with startling rapidity. Before the scattered UN forces could -shift from one phase of operations to another, a transitional gap -developed during the early days of October. Orders might flow forth in -abundance, but not until MacArthur’s land, sea and air forces wound up -one campaign could they begin another. Thus, from the standpoint of -Marine operations, the first week of October is more a story of the -Inchon-Seoul action than of preparations for the Wonsan landing. - -On 2 October, when Eighth Army commenced the relief of X Corps, General -Almond ordered the 7th Infantry Division to begin displacing to Pusan -by motor and rail.[33] There was as yet no such respite for the 1st -Marine Division, which on the same day lost 16 killed in action (KIA) -and 81 wounded (WIA). Practically all of the casualties were taken -by the 7th Regiment, then approaching Uijongbu on the heels of the -enemy.[34] - - [33] X Corps _OpnO 3_, 2 Oct 50. - - [34] MajGen Oliver P. Smith: _Chronicle of the Operations of - the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months - of the Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, Smith, - _Chronicle_), 54. - -Despite the limited planning data in the hands of the 1st Marine -Division, General Smith’s staff put a cautious foot forward on 3 -October.[35] Word of the pending Wonsan operation went out by message -to all subordinate units, with a tentative task organization indicating -the formation of three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs). - - [35] Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely _not_ a complete - lack of planning data. I doubt if any operation ever - had more planning data available. It may not have been - in General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was - available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56. - -The 1st and 7th Marines were earmarked to launch the amphibious -attack. Each would plan on the basis of employing two battalions in -the assault. These battalions were to embark on LSTs and hit the beach -in LVTs. All tactical units were to combat-load out of Inchon. And -although still uninformed as to available shipping, the Marine planners -named likely embarkation groups and listed tentative arrangements for -loading tanks and amphibious vehicles.[36] - - [36] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning - Information,” 3 Oct 50. - -The following day saw the publication of X Corps OpnO 4, specifying -subordinate unit missions. The 7th Infantry Division, together with the -92d and 96th Field Artillery (FA) Battalions, was instructed to mount -out of Pusan and to land at Wonsan on order (see Map 2). These tasks -were assigned to the 1st Marine Division: - - 1. Report immediately to the Attack Force Commander (Commander, - Amphibious Group One) of the Seventh Fleet as the landing force - for the Wonsan attack. - - 2. Seize and secure X Corps base of operations at Wonsan, - protect the Wonsan Airfield, and continue such operations - ashore as assigned. - - 3. Furnish logistic support for all forces ashore until relieved - by Corps Shore Party.[37] - - [37] Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt _Interim - Evaluation Rpt #1_, annex DD, 11; 1stMarDiv _Historical - Diary_ (_HD_), Oct 50; X Corps _OpnO 4_, 4 Oct 50. - -As Almond’s order went out for distribution on 4 October, EUSAK’s 1st -Cavalry Division, bound for Kaesong, passed through the 5th Marines -northwest of Seoul. Simultaneously, the II ROK Corps began assembling -along the road to Uijongbu, captured by the 7th Marines the previous -day.[38] - - [38] Smith, _Chronicle_, 54. - -After 20 days in the line, the weary battalions of the 5th Marines -retired on 5 October across the Han River to an assembly area at -Inchon. They were followed on the 6th by the 1st Regiment, and -on the next day by the 7th Marines. The withdrawal of the latter -unit completed the relief of X Corps, and General Almond’s command -officially reverted to GHQ Reserve.[39] - - [39] _Ibid._, 55. - -October 7th also marked the displacement of the 1st Marine Division -command post (CP) to Inchon, where planning and reality had finally -merged to the extent that preparations for Wonsan could begin in -earnest. Two days earlier, Vice Admiral Struble had re-created JTF-7 -out of his Seventh Fleet; and by publication of his OpnO 16-50 on -the same date, 5 October, he set in motion the operational elements -involved in the projected amphibious envelopment. His new task -organization, almost identical to that which had carried out the Inchon -Operation with historic dispatch, was as follows: - - TF 95 (Advance Force) RAdm Allen E. Smith - TG 95.2 (Covering & Support) RAdm Charles C. Hartman - TG 95.6 (Minesweeping) Capt Richard T. Spofford - TF 90 (Attack Force) RAdm James H. Doyle - TF 79 (Logistical Support Force) Capt Bernard L. Austin - TF 77 (Fast Carrier Force) RAdm Edward C. Ewen - TG 96.8 (Escort Carrier Group) RAdm Richard W. Ruble - TG 96.2 (Patrol & Reconnaissance) RAdm George R. Henderson - TG 70.1 (Flagship Group) Capt Irving T. Duke - -Struble, who had directed the Inchon assault from the bridge of the -USS _Rochester_, would now fly his flag in the recently arrived USS -_Missouri_, the sole American battleship in commission at this early -stage of the Korean war.[40] - - [40] ComSeventhFlt _OpnO 16-50_, 5 Oct 50. - -[Illustration: WONSAN AND HARBOR - - MAP-3 -] - - -_Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing_ - -The Seventh Fleet directive of 5 October dispatched both the Fast -Carrier and the Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces of JTF-7 on the usual -search and attack missions preliminary to an amphibious assault. Task -Force 77, consisting of the carriers _Boxer_, _Leyte_, _Philippine Sea_ -and _Valley Forge_, escorted by a light cruiser and 24 destroyers, -was under orders to direct 50 per cent of the preparatory air effort -against the local defenses of Wonsan. Simultaneously, the Advance -Force, with its cruisers, destroyers and mine sweeping units, would -close in to shell the target and wrest control of the offshore waters -from the enemy.[41] - - [41] _Ibid._ - -Topographic and hydrographic studies made available to the Attack and -Landing Forces showed Wonsan to be a far more accessible target than -Inchon (see Map 3). Nestling in the southwestern corner of Yonghung -Bay, 80 miles above the 38th Parallel, the seaport offers one of the -best natural harbors in Korea. A vast anchorage lies sheltered in the -lee of Kalma Peninsula which, finger-like, juts northward from a bend -in the coastline. Tides range from seven to 14 inches, fog is rare, and -currents are weak. Docks can accommodate vessels drawing from 12 to 25 -feet, and depths in the bay run from 10 fathoms in the outer anchorage -to 15 feet just offshore.[42] - - [42] The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM, - Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater - Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, _Terrain Study - No. 6, Northern Korea_, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv _OpnO - 15-50_, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3, 10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv - _SAR_, annex B (hereafter G-2 _SAR_), sec 2, 1. - -Beaches around Wonsan are of moderate gradient, and the floor at -water’s edge consists of hard-packed sand. Though slightly wet landings -might be expected, amphibious craft could easily negotiate any of the -several desirable approaches. The coastal plain, ranging from 100 -yards to two miles in depth, provides an acceptable lodgment area, but -the seaward wall of the Taebaek mountain range renders inland egress -difficult from the military standpoint. - -In 1940, the population of Wonsan included 69,115 Koreans and 10,205 -Japanese, the latter subsequently being repatriated to their homeland -after World War II. Under the Japanese program of industrialization, -the city had become Korea’s petroleum refining center. The construction -of port facilities, railways, and roads kept pace with the appearance -of cracking plants, supporting industries, and huge storage areas. - -Two airfields served the locale in 1950. One of these, situated on the -coast about five miles north of the seaport, was of minor importance. -The other, known as Wonsan Airfield, on Kalma Peninsula across the -harbor, ranked high as a military prize. Spacious and accessible, it -was an excellent base from which to project air coverage over all of -Korea and the Sea of Japan. The Japanese first developed the field as -an air adjunct to the naval base at Wonsan; but after World War II, -a North Korean aviation unit moved in and used it until July 1950. -Thereafter, with the skies dominated by the UN air arm, Wonsan Airfield -temporarily lost all military significance. Its vacant runways, -barracks, and dispersal areas were given only passing attention in the -UN strategic bombing pattern, although the nearby industrial complex -was demolished. - -In addition to being situated on an excellent harbor, Wonsan is the -eastern terminus of the Seoul-Wonsan corridor, the best of the few -natural routes across the mountainous nation. This 115-mile road and -rail passageway, once considered as a possible overland approach for -X Corps, separates the northern and southern divisions of the Taebaek -range, which rises precipitously from Korea’s east coast to heights of -5000 feet. Railroads and highways, primitive by western standards, also -trace the seaward base of the Taebaek Mountains to connect Wonsan with -Hamhung in the north and Pusan far to the south. Still another road and -railway leads to Pyongyang, 100 miles across the narrow neck of the -peninsula in the western piedmont. - -The climate along Korea’s northeast coast is comparable to that of the -lower Great Lakes region in the United States. Mean summer temperatures -range between 80 and 88 degrees, although highs of 103 degrees have -been recorded. Winter readings drop as low as -7 degrees, but the -season is usually temperate with winds of low velocity. Despite light -snowfalls and moderate icing, the period from October through March is -best suited to military operations, for the heavy rains of spring and -summer create difficulties on the gravel-topped roads. - -Although members of Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group One (PhibGruOne) -staff met with planners of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon early -in October, it soon became apparent that the projected D-Day of 15 -October could not be realized. Maps and intelligence data necessary -for planning did not reach the Attack Force-Landing Force team until 6 -October. The relief of X Corps by EUSAK was completed, not on 3 October -as General Almond had anticipated, but on the 7th. Moreover, the first -transport vessels to reach Inchon ran behind schedule, and they had not -been pre-loaded with a ten-day level of Class I, II, and V supplies, -as was promised. Planning and outloading consequently started late and -from scratch, with the result that D-Day “... was moved progressively -back to a tentative date of 20 October.”[43] - - [43] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10. The classes of supply are as - follows: I, rations; II, supplies and equipment, such - as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios etc, for - which specific allowances have been established; III, - petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL); - IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification - and construction materials, cold weather clothing, etc, - for which specific allowances have not been established; - V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, etc. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -The Wonsan Landing - -_ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and Embarkation--Two -Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at -Objective--MacArthur Orders Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine -Division_ - - -On 6 OCTOBER 1950, after the arrival of the initial assault shipping -at Inchon, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to commence -embarkation on the 8th. Similar instructions were issued by X Corps -the following day.[44] Thus, the first troops and equipment were to be -loaded even before the G-2 Section of the Landing Force could begin -evaluating the enemy situation at the objective, since it was not until -8 October that the intelligence planners received X Corps’ OpnO 4, -published four days earlier. Summing up the outlook at the time, G-2 -later reported: - - [44] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (_EmbO_) 2-50, 6 Oct 50; - Smith, _Notes_, 394. - - Inasmuch as subordinate units of the Division were scheduled to - embark aboard ship some time prior to 15 October 1950, it was - immediately obvious that preliminary intelligence planning, with - its attendant problems of collection, processing, and distribution - of information, and the procurement and distribution of graphic - aids, would be both limited and sketchy.... Fortunately ... - the section [G-2] had been previously alerted on the projected - operation, and while elements of the Division were yet engaged with - the enemy at Uijongbu, had requested reproductions of some 100 - copies of pertinent extracts of the JANIS (75) of Korea. Thus it - was ... that subordinate units would not be wholly unprepared for - the coming operation.[45] - - [45] G-2 _SAR_, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint - Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. - -General Smith’s OpnO 16-50, published on 10 October, climaxed the -accelerated planning at Inchon. Worked out jointly by the staffs -of PhibGruOne and the 1st Marine Division, this directive covered -the Wonsan attack in detail and pinpointed subordinate unit -responsibilities. - -Kalma Peninsula was chosen as the point of assault, with two beaches, -YELLOW and BLUE, marked off on the eastern shore. Ten high-ground -objectives described the semicircular arc of the beachhead, which -focused on Wonsan and fanned out as far as five miles inland. The 1st -and 7th Marines were to hit YELLOW and BLUE Beaches, respectively and -drive inland to their assigned objectives. The 5th, upon being ordered -ashore, would assemble west of Wonsan, prepared for further operations. -Two battalions of the 11th Marines were to land on call in direct -support of the assault units, and the remainder of the artillery would -initially function in general support. - -Other subordinate units drew the usual assignments. The Reconnaissance -Company, after landing on order, was to screen the Division’s left -flank by occupying specified objectives. Attached to the 1st and 7th -Regiments respectively, the 5th and 3d Korean Marine Corps (KMC) -Battalions would also go ashore on call.[46] - - [46] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 16-50_, 10 Oct 50. - - -_ROK Army Captures Wonsan_ - -At 0815, 10 October, coincidentally with the publication of 1stMarDiv -OpnO 16-50, troops of I ROK Corps, advancing rapidly up the east coast -of Korea, entered Wonsan. By evening of the next day, the ROK 3d and -Capital Divisions were mopping up minor resistance in the city and -guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula.[47] - - [47] EUSAK _War Diary Summary_ (_WD Sum_), _Oct 50_, 14–16. - -Overland seizure of the 1st Marine Division’s amphibious objective did -not come as a surprise either at GHQ in Tokyo or at General Smith’s CP -aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in Inchon Harbor. General MacArthur had, in -fact, prepared for this eventuality by considering an alternate assault -landing at Hungnam, another major seaport, about 50 air miles north -of Wonsan. On 8 October, therefore, the JSPOG completed a modified -version of CinCFE OpnPlan 9-50. Eighth Army’s mission--the capture of -Pyongyang--remained unchanged in this draft, but X Corps would now -land “... in the vicinity of Hungnam in order to cut the lines of -communications north of Wonsan and envelop the North Korean forces in -that area.” - -Although the choice of a new objective seemed logical on the basis of -the ROK Army’s accomplishment, certain logistical obstacles at once -loomed in the path of the alternate plan. Not unaware of the most -imposing of these, JSPOG commented: - - The harbor at Wonsan cannot accommodate at docks the large vessels - lifting the 7th Division. Since most of the amphibious type boats - are carried on ships lifting the 1st Marine Division, the plans for - off-loading the 7th Division will have to be revised.[48] - - [48] CinCFE _OpnPlan 9-50_ (_Alternate_), 8 Oct 50. - -But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised. If -the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it would -have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the same -landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam, -the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland -drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land -almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division -landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy would -be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also by the -problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously. - -From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in Korea, -there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment -of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would be -compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence -information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt to -dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word of -the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his staff -wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE persisted -in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with the final -result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the whole X -Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.[49] Coming events were to -uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing itself was -delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November before the -first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.[50] - - [49] C/S Notes in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, - “Report of ... Operations ... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,” - 11; Smith, _Chronicle_, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig, - _et al_, _Battle Report_: _The War In Korea_ (New York, - 1952), 301–302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, - “Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the - Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.” - Wright ltr 16 Feb 56. - - [50] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50. - - -_Marine Loading and Embarkation_ - -On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the _Mount McKinley_, -General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The 1st -Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps OpnO -4, even though its objective had already been captured.[51] - - [51] Smith, _Chronicle_, 59. - -During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at Inchon -an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military Sea -Transport Service (MSTS), and Japanese-manned LSTs (SCAJAP).[52] With -the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the total shipping -assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight APAs, -two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM, and six -commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).[53] - - [52] ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the - abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under - this designation were American ships lent to Japan after - World War II, of which many were recalled during the - Korean War to serve as cargo vessels. - - [53] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex D (hereafter G-4 _SAR_), 2. - -Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and -thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating -job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing forces -for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon as a port. -Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to -a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part of the -amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were delivering -vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate, according -to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles had to be -left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily -diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan; and -although unavailable for port operations when needed, it returned at -the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s heavy beach -equipment.[54] Out of conditions and developments such as these grew -the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October, the date initially -set by General Almond, to the 20th. - - [54] _Ibid._, 3. - -For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping -space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with less -than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.[55] -Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks -of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they -would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was anybody’s -guess at this stage of the war.[56] - - [55] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; - individual assault rations for one day; POL for five - days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five - units of fire (U/F). _Ibid._; 1stMarDiv _Administrative - Order_ (_AdmO_) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a - convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of - ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds - per weapon. - - [56] G-4 _SAR_, 1. - -In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not -materialize), Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks -and trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies -and 16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply -trains would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to -maintain ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving -situation.[57] - - [57] _Ibid._, 3. - -On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General Smith to -effect his OpnPlan 113-50.[58] Coincidentally, the first contingents of -the 5th Marines boarded the _Bayfield_ (1/5), _George Clymer_ (2/5), -and _Bexar_ (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel -Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment, opened his CP in -the _Bayfield_, and his unit completed embarkation.[59] - - [58] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, - 0200 8 Oct 50. - - [59] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv - _SAR_, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 _SAR_), 4, - appendix B (hereafter 2/5 _SAR_), 6, and appendix C - (hereafter 3/5 _SAR_), 4. - -Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th Marines -loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments could -not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that the LSTs -had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor. General Smith -opened his CP in the _Mount McKinley_ at 1200 on the 11th.[60] The -last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the morning of -the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the objective. By -evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the way, but the -_Mount McKinley_ and _Bayfield_ did not depart until the next day.[61] - - [60] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, - _Notes_, 373. - - [61] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar _SAR_), 9; - Smith, _Notes_, 399, 409; 1stMar _HD Oct 50_, 3. - -Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and X -Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers -and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were on -the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows: - - Marine officers 1119 - Marine enlisted 20,597 - Navy officers 153 - Navy enlisted 1002 - U. S. Army & KMC officers attached 189 - U. S. Army & KMC enlisted attached 2339[62] - - [62] 1stMarDiv _Embarkation Summary_, 16 Oct 50; and “Special - Report 1stMarDiv,” 12. - -Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure, -new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It -will be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the -Wonsan assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on -signal, went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an -administrative landing by the Division on RED Beach, north of Wonsan, -instead of Kalma Peninsula.[63] - - [63] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 17-50_, 10 Oct 50. - -As a result of discussions during a X Corps staff conference on 13 -October, a party headed by General Almond flew to Wonsan the next -day.[64] The purpose of his visit was to reconnoiter the objective -and to explain his latest operational directive to the I ROK Corps -commander, who would come under his control.[65] This new order, -published on the 14th, called for an administrative landing by X -Corps and a rapid advance westward along the Wonsan--Pyongyang axis -to a juncture with EUSAK. Assigned to the 1st Marine Division was an -objective northeast of Pyongyang, the Red capital.[66] - - [64] “... Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown - to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which - materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a - matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even - some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be - removed from the shipping prior to our sailing.” Col A. - L. Bowser, Comments, n. d. - - [65] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, - _Chronicle_, 59. - - [66] X Corps _Operation Instruction_ (_OI_) _11_, 14 Oct 50; - Smith, _Notes_, 385. - -It was this tactical scheme, then, that prevailed as the Marines -departed Inchon from 15 to 17 October and the 7th Infantry Division -prepared to embark from Pusan. General Smith, of course, placed into -effect his alternate order for a landing on RED Beach.[67] While there -may be a note of humor in the fact that on 15 October ComPhibGruOne -issued his OpnO 16-50 for the “assault landing” at Wonsan, it must be -remembered that the ship-to-shore movement would remain essentially -the same from the Navy’s standpoint, regardless of the swift march of -events ashore. - - [67] According to General Smith, “The reason for issuing - 1stMarDiv OpnO 17-50 was to provide for an administrative - landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where - there would be easy access to the existing road net. The - ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv OpnO - 16-50 was retained intact. This plan [OpnO 17-50] had - to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was - completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much - quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula - where we eventually landed ... 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450 - 24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv OpnOs 16 and 17 and - provided for an administrative landing on the Kalma - Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to - authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, - letters may be assumed to be to the authors. - - -_Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping_ - -Mine sweeping for the Wonsan landing commenced on 8 October, when Task -Group 95.6, commanded by Captain Spofford, began assembling for the -mission of clearing a path ahead of the 250-ship armada bringing the -1st Marine Division and other units of X Corps. It had been known for a -month that the waters of the east coast were dangerous for navigation. -The first mine was discovered off Chinnampo on the west coast on 7 -September, and four days later Admiral Joy ordered the United Nations -Blocking and Escort Force to stay on the safe side of the 100-fathom -line along the east coast. But it was not until 26 and 28 September -that more definite information was acquired the hard way when the U. S. -destroyer _Brush_ and the ROK mine sweeper _YMS 905_ were damaged by -east coast mines.[68] - - [68] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1090. - -On the 28th ComNavFE issued his OpnO 17-50 covering operations of mine -sweepers in Korean waters. The herculean task awaiting the 12 available -American vessels of this type may be judged by the fact that more than -a hundred had been employed off Okinawa in World War II. - -Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption -that North Korean mining activities, beginning in late July or early -August, were speeded by the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy -to the peril of further amphibious operations. Russian instructors -had trained Korean Reds at Wonsan and Chinnampo in the employment of -Soviet-manufactured mines. Sampans, junks, and wooden coastal barges -were used to sow a field of about 2000 in the harbor and approaches to -Wonsan.[69] - - [69] _Ibid._, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, _Notes_, 404; Karig, - _Korea_, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK _WD_, 24 - Oct 50. - -Captain Spofford’s TG 95.6 commenced its sweep off Wonsan on 10 October -after a sortie from Sasebo. Unfortunately, the three large fleet -sweepers, _Pledge_, _Pirate_, and _Incredible_, were not well adapted -to the shallow sweeping necessary at Wonsan. More dependence could -be placed in the seven small wooden-hulled U. S. motor mine sweepers -_Redhead_, _Mocking Bird_, _Osprey_, _Chatterer_, _Merganser_, _Kite_, -and _Partridge_, which were rugged even though low-powered. Spofford’s -two big high-speed sweepers, _Doyle_ and _Endicott_, had their -limitations for this type of operation; and the nine Japanese and -three ROK sweepers lacked some of the essential gear.[70] - - [70] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1004; - Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily - SitRpt) 105; Karig, _Korea_, 311–314. - -The U. S. destroyers _Collett_, _Swenson_, _Maddox_, and _Thomas_ were -in the Wonsan area as well as the cruiser _Rochester_. On the 9th the -_Rochester’s_ helicopter sighted 61 mines in a reconnaissance, and the -next day the observer found them too numerous to count. In spite of -these grim indications, rapid progress the first day led to predictions -of a brief operation. By late afternoon a 3000-yard channel had been -cleared from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom line. But hopes -were dashed at this point by the discovery of five additional lines of -mines.[71] - - [71] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE - Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations - Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig, - _Korea_, 315. - -On 12 and 13 October the naval guns of TG 95.2 bombarded Tanchon and -Songjin on the northeast coast. While the USS _Missouri_ treated the -marshaling yards of Tanchon to 163 16″ rounds, the cruisers _Helena_, -_Worcester_, and _Ceylon_ fired at bridges, shore batteries, and -tunnels in the Chongjin area.[72] - - [72] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in - CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, 13–15; - ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in _Ibid._, 7. - -Spofford tried to save time on the morning of the 12th by -counter-mining as 39 planes from the carriers _Leyte Gulf_ and -_Philippine Sea_ dropped 50 tons of bombs. It was found, however, -that even the explosion of a 1000-pound bomb would not set off nearby -mines by concussion.[73] According to Admiral Struble, “The results -of this operation simply bore out our experience in World War II, but -were tried out on the long chance that they might be effective in the -current situation.”[74] - - [73] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, - X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE - IntSum 82; Karig, _Korea_, 315. - - [74] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56. - -The 12th was a black day for the sweeping squadron. For the steel -sweepers _Pledge_ and _Pirate_ both were blown up by mines that -afternoon and sank with a total of 13 killed and 87 wounded. Rescue of -the survivors was handicapped by fire from enemy shore batteries.[75] - - [75] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in - CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, H4; - ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15; - Karig, _Korea_, 318–322. - -While the blast of a half-ton bomb had not been powerful enough, -Spofford reasoned that depth charges might start a chain reaction in -which mines would detonate mines. But a precision drop by naval planes -met with no success, and there was nothing left but a return to the -slow, weary, and dangerous work of methodical sweeping.[76] - - [76] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82. - -The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to assist -by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting -mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an -effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays -of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all -mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were of -considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.[77] - - [77] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt - _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, D8. - -On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the _JMS-14_, hit a mine -and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No -attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept -into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the -landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more -disillusioning when the ROK _YMS 516_ disintegrated on 19 October -after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG -95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with -magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could -be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it -exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least -13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.[78] - - [78] Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326. - -The _Mount McKinley_ having arrived off Wonsan that same day, Admiral -Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps staff, went -by boat to the battleship _Missouri_ for a conference with Admiral -Struble. CJTF-7 asserted that he would not authorize the administrative -landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from the shipping lane--a -task which he estimated would take three more days. This announcement -led to General Almond’s decision to fly ashore in the _Missouri’s_ -helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP in Wonsan.[79] So rapidly -had the situation changed, it was hard to remember that this date had -once been set as D-Day when the Marine landing force would fight for a -beachhead. - - [79] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, - _Notes_, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” - 11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean - Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, lxxx, - no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326; - 1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50. - - -_Operation Yo-Yo_ - -Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept -through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s -over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan -for embarkation to the States.” - -Rumor seemed to have the support of fact on this occasion, for compass -readings left no doubt that the armada had indeed executed a maritime -“about face” to head southward. What the men on the transports did -not know was that the reversal of direction had been ordered for -purely military reasons as a result of the conference that day on the -_Missouri_. - -It was puzzling enough to the troops the following morning when the -ships resumed their original course. But this was nothing as compared -to their bewilderment late that afternoon as the Tractor and Transport -Groups turned southward again. - -Every twelve hours, in accordance with the directive of CJTF-7, -the fleet was to reverse course, steaming back and forth off the -eastern coast of Korea until the last of the magnetic mines could be -cleared from the lane in preparation for an administrative landing at -Wonsan.[80] - - [80] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, _Notes_, - 404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56. - -Marines have always been ready with a derisive phrase, and “Operation -Yo-Yo” was coined to express their disgust with this interlude of -concentrated monotony. Never did time die a harder death, and never -did the grumblers have so much to grouse about. Letters to wives and -sweethearts took on more bulk daily, and paper-backed murder mysteries -were worn to tatters by bored readers. - -On the 22d, at CJTF-7’s regular daily meeting, Admirals Struble and -Doyle conferred in the destroyer _Rowan_ with Admiral Smith and Captain -Spofford. It was agreed that the sweeping could not be completed -until the 24th or 25th, which meant that Operation Yo-Yo might last a -week.[81] - - [81] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments, - 16 Mar 56. - -The situation had its serious aspects on LSTs and transports which -were not prepared for a voyage around Korea taking nearly as long as -a crossing of the Pacific. Food supplies ran low as gastro-enteritis -and dysentery swept through the crowded transports in spite of strict -medical precautions. The MSTS transport _Marine Phoenix_ alone had -a sick list of 750 during the epidemic. A case of smallpox was -discovered on the _Bayfield_, and all crewmen as well as passengers -were vaccinated that same day.[82] - - [82] _Ibid._, 11; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex VV, (hereafter - 7thMTBn _SAR_), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27 - Oct 50. - -On the 23d, as the _Mount McKinley_ proceeded into the inner harbor -at Wonsan, there could be no doubt that the final mine sweeping would -be completed by the 25th. Operation Yo-Yo came to an end, therefore, -when Admiral Doyle directed the amphibious fleet to arrive on the 25th, -prepared for an administrative landing. The order of entry called for -the Transport Group to take the lead, followed by the vessels of the -Tractor Group.[83] - - [83] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X - Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50. - -On the morning of the 25th, Admirals Struble and Doyle held a final -conference with General Almond and Captain Spofford. By this time they -had decided to land the Marines over YELLOW and BLUE Beaches on Kalma -Peninsula, as originally conceived in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50. The inner -harbor of Wonsan would remain closed until completely clear of mines, -and then it would be developed as a supply base.[84] - - [84] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith, - _Notes_, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 - 24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56. - - -_Marine Air First at Objective_ - -The sense of frustration which oppressed the Marine ground forces -during Operation Yo-Yo would have been increased if they had realized -that the air maintenance crews had beaten them to Wonsan by a margin -of twelve days. Even more humiliating to the landing force troops, -Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell were flown to the objective area. On the -evening of the 24th they put on a USO show spiced with quips at the -expense of the disgruntled Leathernecks in the transports. - -Planning for Marine air operations in northeast Korea had been modified -from day to day to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic -situation. On 11 October, when ROK forces secured Wonsan, preparations -for air support of an assault landing were abandoned. Two days later -Major General Field Harris, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Tactical -Air Command X Corps (TAC X Corps), flew to Wonsan. After inspecting -the airfield he decided to begin operations without delay.[85] - - [85] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW - _HD_, _Oct 50_; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K (hereafter MAG-12 - _SAR_), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF-312 _SAR_), 3, 5–6; - and Smith, _Notes_, 433–441. - -These developments, of course, were accompanied by amendments to the -original plan which had assigned Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMFs)-214 -and -323 the air support role in the naval task force, with Marine -Aircraft Group (MAG)-12 to be landed as soon as the field at Wonsan was -secured. - -In response to changing conditions, VMF-312 aircraft flew from Kimpo -to Wonsan on the 14th, and R5Ds lifted 210 personnel of the advance -echelons of Headquarters Squadron (Hedron)-12, Service Squadron -(SMS)-12, and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron (VMF(N))-513. Two -LSTs sailed from Kobe with equipment of MAG-12, and Combat Cargo -Command aircraft of Far East Air Force began flying in aviation -gasoline. Bombs and rockets were flown to Wonsan by the planes of -VMF(N)-513.[86] - - [86] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin - Reservoir,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul - 52), 19–20; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix H (hereafter - VMF(N)-513 _SAR_), sec 6, 2. - -On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off Wonsan -in the CVE’s _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. From the following day -until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air cover -for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing 1st Marine -Division administrative landing.[87] - - [87] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214 - _SAR_), 2. - -TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated the -opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon within -three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield were to be -dependent on airlift for all supplies. - -The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine field -made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped by -hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground about -a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to substitute -for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep and eight -bomb trailers for moving ammunition.[88] - - [88] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” - 20; 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; TAC X Corps _OpnO 2-50_, 15 - Oct 50, in _Ibid._ - -Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were -speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP -at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed -reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on -retreating bodies of NKPA troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight -surprised a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles -southeast of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses. - -There were administrative as well as operational problems to be solved. -If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the provision -for air support would have been planned in a manner similar to that of -Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused the 1st MAW -to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces. This was in -accordance with a CinCFE directive to the effect that when both FEAF -and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination control -would be exercised by CG FEAF. He had in turn delegated that control -north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations of -carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force. - -An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth AF -procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes to -be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously, -the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air Force -Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance in -time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which Major -General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave General -Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions for X -Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the Fifth AF. - -His decision was made on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the -authority of CG 1st MAW to take action “in emergencies.” In practice, -the arrangement worked out smoothly during this preliminary period, and -on 12 November CG Fifth Air Force confirmed his oral agreement with a -written directive. - -Direction of air operations in support of X Corps was exercised by -MAG-12 for the 1st MAW from 15 October to 9 November. Night operations -did not begin until late in October for lack of runway lights at -Wonsan, so that VMF(N)-513 flew daytime missions along with VMF-312. -The two carrier-based squadrons conducted flights in a similar manner. -Aircraft reported at designated times to specified Tactical Air Control -Parties (TACPs) for operations directed by a daily Fifth AF order, some -of them in response to previously submitted requests of ground units -for air support. - -Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6 -was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, though -it was under the administrative direction of MAG-12. Two helicopter -pilots, Captain Wallace D. Blatt and First Lieutenant Chester C. Ward, -flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 23 October. The rest of the squadron had -proceeded by LST. A flight echelon of helicopters, commanded by Captain -Victor A. Armstrong, VMO-6 executive officer, remained temporarily at -Kimpo at the request of the Fifth Air Force to evacuate casualties of -the 187th Airborne RCT in the Sukchon area.[89] - - [89] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex WW (hereafter VMO-6 _SAR_), 2. - - -_MacArthur Orders Advance to Border_ - -From all that has gone before, it might be expected that UN strategy -and tactics, after frequent modification, had finally been decided upon -by mid-October 1950. This was not the case, and a brief recapitulation -of events in western and central Korea is now necessary in order to set -the scene for the sweeping changes that followed. - -General Walker’s Eighth Army, as mentioned earlier, had deployed along -the 38th Parallel after relieving X Corps above Seoul on 7 October. Two -days later, armored elements of the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the -boundary to spearhead the U. S. I Corps drive on Sariwon and Pyongyang. -The former city was secured on 17 October with the help of the 27th -Commonwealth Brigade, while the 24th Infantry Division moved up the -west coast on the left of the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis.[90] The -1st Cavalry Division continued the attack toward Pyongyang on the -18th, entering the Red capital with the 1st ROK Division the next day. -Pyongyang was secured on 21 October, and elements of the 1st Cavalry -Division also occupied the undefended port city of Chinnampo, 35 miles -to the southwest.[91] - - [90] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 13–23. - - [91] _Ibid._, 25–30. - -A vertical envelopment on 20 October had come as a dramatic supplement -to the attack on Pyongyang. The 187th Airborne RCT parachuted -successfully into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, about 30 miles north of -the city, thereby cutting the two principal NKPA escape routes to -Manchuria. After watching the drop from his plane, General MacArthur -stopped off at Pyongyang and declared that the surprise stroke had -closed the trap on the enemy. At his Tokyo headquarters the next day, -he predicted that the war would end shortly.[92] - - [92] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_. - -In mountainous central Korea on the right flank of I US Corps, the 6th -ROK Division had been leading the rapid advance of South Korean forces -under EUSAK. With Hwachon captured on 8 October, the division went on -to take the vital hubs of Chorwon on the 10th and Kumwha on the 11th. -It made contact with ROK Capitol Division elements from Wonsan the -following day. During the next 24 hours, the 6th Division advanced 20 -miles, and the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions fanned out to exploit the -deepening penetration. On 14 October the 6th closed on Yangdok, about -midway between Wonsan and Pyongyang.[93] - - [93] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 11–20. - -Thereafter the ROK forces in the center of the peninsula began veering -northwest, so that by 22 October, the day after Pyongyang fell to I -Corps, the vanguard 6th Division was bearing down on Kunu-ri,[94] about -45 air miles to the north of the capital. - - [94] _Ibid._, 20–32. - -From the foregoing, it is obvious that a trans-peninsular drive by -X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. In fact, both in -Washington and in Tokyo the attitude prevailed that the Korean war -was nearing an end. President Truman had deemed a meeting of minds -appropriate at this time, and he flew to Wake Island for a conference -with General MacArthur on 15 October.[95] - - [95] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is - primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., _Substance - of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October - 15, 1950_ (Washington, 1951); and Truman, _Memoirs_, - II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in - MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 36. For a differing account of - the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, - _MacArthur 1941–1951_ (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney, - _MacArthur_, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen. - MacArthur Makes His Reply,” _Life_, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb - 56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides - Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank - Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea - John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of - State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt; - Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM - Headquarters. - -Various aspects of American policy in the Far East were discussed at -the meeting, but the Korean situation ranked high on the agenda. When -asked by President Truman about the chances of Russian or Chinese -interference in the war, General MacArthur replied, “Very little.” His -conclusion agreed with that held by many in high government circles, -although officials in both Washington and Tokyo realized that the -possibility of Communist intervention could not be dismissed entirely. - -MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Chinese troops were stationed in -Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed along -the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only 50,000 to -60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted to -move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be “slaughtered,” owing to the -proximity of UN air bases. - -The commander in chief added that Russia had no troops immediately -available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks for -a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter -would have set in. And while Russia had a fairly good air force in -Siberia and Manchuria, tactical support of Chinese ground troops would -be difficult to control. “I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese -as often as they would bomb us,” MacArthur remarked.[96] - - [96] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the - Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air - employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to - do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained - for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as - the marines but they are effective.” - -Part of the conference dealt with the rehabilitation of Korea and -the eventual departure of UN troops after the fighting had ceased. -MacArthur expressed his belief that organized resistance would end by -Thanksgiving (23 November). He hoped to withdraw EUSAK to Japan by -Christmas, leaving X Corps, reconstituted with the 2d and 3d U. S. -Infantry Divisions and other UN detachments, as a security force until -peace and order were fully restored. All present seemed to agree that -elections should be held early to achieve stability in the re-united -country, and that the ROK Army must be made tough enough to deter the -Chinese Communists from any aggressive moves. - -The conference ended on a note of general optimism. President Truman -pinned a Distinguished Service Medal on the commander in chief (his -fifth), and the latter boarded his plane and departed shortly after the -meeting. - -Once back in Tokyo, MacArthur issued on 17 October a new order that -would become effective if Pyongyang fell before X Corps landed at -Wonsan (as was the case four days later). This draft established -parallel zones of action for EUSAK and X Corps in North Korea, with -the Taebaek Range as the dividing line. The restraining line for UN -Forces was advanced as much as 60 miles to a lateral drawn through -Chongsanjangsi-Koingdong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin (see Map -1). ROK Forces, of course, would still drive all the way to the borders -of Manchuria and the USSR.[97] - - [97] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; - Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. - -On 24 October, just as the 1st Marine Division was preparing to land -at Wonsan, General MacArthur did away with the restraining line -altogether. The original restriction on the advance of UN elements, -he told his subordinate commanders, was based on the possibility of -enemy capitulation. Since there appeared to be no prospect of a formal -surrender, he now authorized Generals Walker and Almond to use whatever -of their ground forces were necessary to secure all of North Korea. And -he enjoined them “... to drive forward with all speed and with full -utilization of all their force.”[98] - - [98] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov - 50_, 5. - -The commander in chief received a message from JCS the next day, -telling him that they considered his new order “not in consonance” -with their 27 September authorization, which had stipulated a policy -of using only ROK ground forces in the provinces bordering Russia and -Manchuria. The matter had caused some concern in Washington, the Joint -Chiefs said, and they wanted to know MacArthur’s reasons for making the -decision.[99] - - [99] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372. - -In reply they were informed that the commander in chief’s decision was -a “matter of military necessity,” since the ROK Army lacked both the -strength and the seasoned commanders required for securing North Korea. -MacArthur added that the 27 September authorization had “... merely -enunciated the [restraining line] provision as a matter of policy,” -and had admitted the possibility of JCS instructions being modified in -accordance with developments. He stated further that he possessed the -authority to so modify from Secretary of Defense Marshall himself, who -had told him “... to feel unhampered tactically and strategically....” -Assuring the Joint Chiefs that he understood the reasons for their -apprehension, he warned that “... tactical hazards might even result -from other action than that which I have directed.”[100] - - [100] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372. - -And there the matter rested. - - -_Landing of 1st Marine Division_ - -It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond -disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the -new Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon -establishing his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed -command of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and -east of the Taebaek Range.[101] - - [101] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50. - -By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung, Hungnam, -and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured on 17 -October during the swift drive northward.[102] The ROK 3d Division had -one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en route to -Hamhung.[103] - - [102] EUSAK _WD_, 23 Oct 50. - - [103] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50. - -On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion -of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK -regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could beach -there safely, since SCAJAP ships had already done so. Learning of the -proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral Struble -forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not justify -the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing was -called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of Kojo.[104] - - [104] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in _Ibid._; - ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, _Notes_, - 404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56. - -On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed X -Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin line. The -1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of the extended -corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security of its -assigned sector.[105] But again planning went for naught when, two -days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard the -restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly -to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X -Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the -Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the Chosin -and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun their -advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles north of -Hamhung.[106] - - [105] 1stMarDiv _OpnPlan_ 4-50, 22 Oct 50. “G-3 (Col Bowser) - and G-4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through - a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of - October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted - at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan - area was made to select and mark administrative assembly - areas for units of the Division. Included in this - reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was - selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view - of its projected employment to the north shortly after - landing.” Bowser Comments. - - [106] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in - _ibid._; Smith, _Notes_, 285. - -It was also on the 25th that the 1st Marine Division finally began its -administrative landing at Wonsan--as anticlimactic a landing as Marines -have ever made. Five LSTs loaded with Engineer, Shore Party, and Combat -Service Group elements beached on Kalma Peninsula in the evening. Since -the approaches had not been declared clear until late afternoon, the -main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the next day. Thus, 26 -October actually became D-Day--or “Doyle Day,” as it was referred to by -an impatient General Almond.[107] - - [107] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar _SAR_), 4; - and Smith, _Notes_, 407–409. The orders covering the - actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90 - msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg - to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to - subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was - given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50. - -At first light on the 26th, landing craft clustered around the -transport vessels in the swept channel as troops spilled down -debarkation nets. The first of 39 scheduled waves were shortly on -the way, with amphibious craft of every description churning the -water.[108] LSUs began disgorging armor of the 1st Tank Battalion at -0730, and the big machines, fitted with deep-water fording adapters, -thrashed through the surf and onto the loose sand.[109] Simultaneously, -swarms of vehicles of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion crawled -ashore shuttling troops and cargo.[110] - - [108] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought - that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore - movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making - a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to - execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16-50] - for the assault landing without issuing an entire new - order.” Bowser Comments. - - [109] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn _SAR_), 2–8. - - [110] 1stAmphTracBn _HD Oct 50_, 2–3. - -At 0900, LSTs landed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines on -YELLOW Beach, while Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s regimental headquarters -splashed ashore out of landing craft dispatched from the _Noble_. The -reserve battalion, 2/1, remained on board ship until the 28th. By 1700, -the 3d Battalion was in position for the night and the 1st was well on -the way to Kojo for a special mission. In the midst of the landing, -Colonel Puller received a message from General Smith congratulating him -on his being selected for promotion to brigadier general.[111] - - [111] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26 - Oct 50. - -Troops of the 7th Marines marched ashore on BLUE Beach without -incident, and the assembled battalions moved to assigned areas north -of Wonsan. At 1300, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg opened his regimental -CP at St. Benedict’s Abbey, which had been gutted by the retreating -Communists.[112] - - [112] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628 - 26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St. - Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, _The - History of the Chaplains Corps_, _U. S. Navy_, (MS) V. - -Advance parties of the 5th Marines began landing over both beaches at -0800. Priority was given to unloading the reserve unit’s cargo, and the -majority of troops remained on board transports for the night. Most -of the regiment debarked the next day and assembled about three miles -northwest of Wonsan, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray established his CP -at 1800.[113] - - [113] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar _SAR_), 8. - -Only the 2d Battalion and several reconnaissance parties of the 11th -Marines landed on the 26th. The remainder of the artillery regiment -went ashore the next day and bivouacked at the coastal town of -Munpyong-ni, five miles above Wonsan. Colonel James H. Brower, the -regimental commander, detached 2/11 to the 1st Marines at 1715 on 27 -October, but the other battalions “... remained in a mobile state -awaiting further orders.”[114] - - [114] 11thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), 21–28 Oct 50. - -The Wonsan landing, though tactically insignificant at the moment, -was a major logistical undertaking to such units as the 1st Engineer -Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge), the 1st Shore Party -Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe), and the 1st Combat -Service Group (Colonel John H. Cook, Jr.). - -Representatives from these and other support and service units had -flown to the objective area several days before the Division’s arrival. -After completing an inspection of Wonsan, the Shore Party detachment -employed 500 North Korean POWs and 210 civilians to improve landing -sites and beach exits. This work continued 24 hours a day for nine -days, until the vanguard LSTs grated ashore on Kalma Peninsula in the -evening of 25 October.[115] At this point, Shore Party Group C (Major -George A. Smith) assumed responsibility for YELLOW Beach in the north, -and Group B (Major Henry Brzezinski) took over BLUE Beach. - - [115] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from - 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn SAR), 5–8, - and UU (hereafter 1st CSG _SAR_) 6 and 1stSPBn, _HD for - Advance Party_, 1–2. - -With the arrival of the first waves of LSTs, LSUs, LVTs, and landing -craft in the morning, there began a routine of unremitting toil that -would abate only after all of X Corps had landed weeks later. Because -of the shallow offshore gradient, many amphibious craft could not -reach the beach with their heavy cargoes, and the Shore Party troops -had to construct ramps which projected 30 feet into the water. These -improvised piers were made of rice bags filled with sand, with the -result that their maintenance required considerable effort in men and -heavy equipment. A pontoon causeway constructed on 27 October lessened -the difficulties connected with getting troops ashore, but other -problems persisted. - -One of these had to do with a sandbar that stretched across the boat -lanes about 50 yards from the coast. Heavier craft frequently grounded -here, and while some could be towed ashore by tractor dozers (TD-18s) -and LVTs, others had to be unloaded in the water by cranes operating -off the ramps and from barges. - -Once men and supplies finally reached dry land, there was the -difficulty of transporting them inland over the loose sand and around -the sprawling dunes of the peninsular beaches. Trucks and trailers -often bogged down to such depths that they had to be uprooted and towed -by LVTs or dozers. This tied up the overworked tracked vehicles when -they were badly needed elsewhere. - -The Combat Service Group established its Class I, III, and V dumps -according to plan on 26 October, but Class II and IV supplies arrived -on the beach “... in a completely mixed condition,” owing to the haste -of the outloading at Inchon. From D-Day onward, from 1500 to 2000 -Korean civilians were hired daily to help segregate and issue supplies. - -Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the intact -port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November. During -the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by rail to -Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November, the group was -attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter assuming -specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of all port -facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all equipment -and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty evacuation; -maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing local security; -traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing field -maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area. - -The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a survey -of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October, when -the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24 cargo -vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo in the -order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with 30,189 -personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534 troops were -outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in November, as the -MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured ashore, the total of -ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs, adding 30,928 personnel, -51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles to the short-lived build-up -in Northeast Korea. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -First Blood At Kojo - -_1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The All-Night Fight -of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan -Area--Marines Relieved at Kojo_ - - -It was perhaps inevitable after the NKPA collapse that an -end-of-the-war atmosphere should prevail. This attitude was found in -the CP as well as the foxhole. General MacArthur, while witnessing the -Eighth Army paratroop landings north of the captured enemy capital, was -quoted by the newspapers as saying: - - The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. With - the closing of that trap there should be an end to organized - resistance.[116] - - [116] _Newsweek_, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30. - -As another straw in the wind, General Smith had received a dispatch -from ComNavFE on 21 October which stated that on the conclusion of -hostilities it was his intention to recommend to CinCFE that the 1st -Marine Division be returned to the United States, less an RCT to be -stationed in Japan.[117] - - [117] Smith, _Notes_, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. - d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: “The Establishment of - a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the - Western Pacific,” 19 Oct 50. - -On the 24th the Marine commander learned that X Corps had received -a document, for planning purposes only, providing that the Corps -commander would become commander of the occupation forces. These were -to consist of a single American division, probably the 3d Infantry -Division, while the remainder of the Eighth Army returned to Japan.[118] - - [118] Smith, _Notes_, 403. - -Such indications seemed less reassuring after an incident which -occurred at Wonsan on the evening of D-day. Two Marines, gathering -firewood on the beach, had been blown to pieces by a booby trap. They -were the only casualties from enemy action in the Wonsan landing.[119] - - [119] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50. - Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby - trapped. - -As early as 24 October the Marine division CP aboard the _Mount -McKinley_ had been advised of an ancillary mission. Immediately -following the landing one battalion was to be sent 39 miles south of -Wonsan to the small seaport of Kojo. There it was to protect a supply -dump of the ROK I Corps.[120] - - [120] Smith, _Notes_, 385; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex C (hereafter - G-3 _SAR_), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J. - Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to - CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning - and intelligence resulting from this order being received - while underway. - -X Corps issued OI 13 on the 25th but General Smith did not receive -his copy until two days later. Corps orders now assigned the Marine -division a zone of action more than 300 road miles from north to south -and 50 road miles in width. The missions prescribed for the Marines -were those of an occupation rather than a fighting force: - - (1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of Wonsan. - - (2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in Kojo and zone. - - (3) To protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, employing not less - than one RCT, and patrolling all roads to the west in zone. - - (4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border. - - (5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in - the Chongjin area rapidly on order. - - (6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) (ROK) in the repair of - the Yonghung-Hamhung railroad, employing not less than one - engineer company.[121] - - [121] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6. - -The 1st Marine Division in turn assigned these tasks to the following -units in OpnO 18-50, issued at 0800 on the 28th but communicated orally -to most of the designated commanding officers during the preceding 48 -hours: - - (1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in - Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni zone, establish necessary road blocks - to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy - enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at - Kojo until further orders. - - (2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps along the - Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the - northern tip of the reservoir and Changjin, prepared for - further advance to the northern border of Korea, and to - destroy enemy in zone. - - (3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-7, relieve - elements of I ROK Corps in the vicinity of Fusen Reservoir, - establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the - area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy. - - (4) BLT1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to - the designated commander for operational control and landing - in the vicinity of Chongjin. - - (5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an - assembly area in the vicinity of Hamhung, to be prepared for - operating in the zone of any RCT.[122] - - [122] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to - COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50. - -Two of the objectives mentioned in these orders, Chongjin and the -northern border of Korea, were more than 300 road miles north of -Wonsan. With the exception of the main coastal route, most of the roads -in the 1st Marine Division zone were mere mountain trails, unfit for -tanks or heavy vehicles. - -OpnO 18-50 was modified the next day to provide for attaching the 1st -Battalion, KMC Regiment, to the 5th Marines, and the 5th KMC Battalion -to the 1st Marines. The security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas -(13 and 32 miles north of Wonsan respectively) was assigned for the -time being to the 5th Marines, reinforced by Company A of the 1st Tank -Battalion. - -On the 27th General Smith moved from the _Mount McKinley_ at 1000 to -the new Division CP, a mile north of Wonsan. An old Russian barracks, -it was too small and badly in need of repairs. The building occupied by -the 1st Marine Air Wing was in even worse shape, but carpenters were -soon busy at boarding up windows and doors blown out by bombs.[123] - - [123] Smith, _Chronicle_, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, - 22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A. Craig, “Notes concerning Wonsan - Administrative Landing and events immediately following, - October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950,” 4 Sep 56. - - -_1/1 Sent to Kojo_ - -A holiday spirit prevailed among the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st -Marines, as they entrained on the morning of 26 October 1950 at a -railhead near the Wonsan airfield. Physical activity was a treat after -the monotony and confinement of Operation Yo-Yo, and 1/1 had been -selected for the Kojo mission. Immediately after the landing on YELLOW -Beach at 0900 that morning, preparations were made for departure by -rail of the rifle companies at noon. Supplies and reinforcing units -were scheduled to follow on the 27th on a second train and a convoy -consisting of 1/1 and Motor Transport Battalion vehicles; Battery F, -2d Battalion, 11th Marines; 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Engineer -Battalion; and a detachment of Company D, 1st Medical Battalion.[124] - - [124] This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv, - 1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar _SAR_, 4; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) - 7; 1stMar _HD_, Oct 50, 4; X Corps _Periodic Operations - Report_ (_POR_) 30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; - Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d. - -At 1330 a wheezing Korean engine manned by a Korean crew pulled out of -Wonsan with the rifle companies riding in gondola cars. It was a bright -blue day, with a hint of frost in the air; and not a sign of enemy -resistance appeared along the 39-mile route, though several tunnels -might have been utilized for a guerrilla attack. - -Upon their arrival late that afternoon, Kojo proved to be the most -attractive town the men had seen in Korea--an almost undamaged small -seaport flanked by the white beaches and sparkling blue waters of the -bay. - -There remained for the Marines the task of relieving ROK units and -protecting an area consisting of a coastal plain about 5000 yards in -diameter which stretched from the bay to a semicircle of hills ranging -from 150 to 600 feet in height (see Map 4). The ROK officers assured -the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins, that his men -would find their duty at Kojo a tame assignment. They admitted that -small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had sometimes raided the villages -for rice, but added that ROK patrols had scoured the hills without -meeting any organized resistance. - -The night passed uneventfully for the battalion in a perimeter -northwest of Kojo while the ROKs occupied outposts along the southern -fringe of the coast plain. In the morning the Marines found the rice -paddies glazed with the first ice of the autumn. After completing -the relief of the 2d Battalion of the 22d ROK Regiment at 1200, they -watched with amusement that afternoon as the Koreans crowded into the -gondola cars with their women, children, dogs, and chickens for the -ride back to Wonsan. When it seemed that the train could not hold -another human being, a ROK officer barked out an order and everyone -squeezed farther back with audible sighs and grunts. At last, as a -grand climax, the officer shouted a final command and the entire -trainload of Koreans sat down simultaneously, like collapsing dominoes. - -It was an ironical circumstance that the ROKs on the overcrowded train -took with them the remnants of the supply dump that 1/1 was assigned to -guard. However important this dump may have been in its heyday, it had -apparently been consumed by the ROKs to the point where only a few -drums of fuel oil remained along with other odds and ends. - -[Illustration: KOJO AREA - -Unit locations are those of 1700 - -27 Oct 50 - - MAP-4 -] - -That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident, -bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And -though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they -had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized -enemy was about to launch a surprise attack. - - -_Marine Positions in Kojo Area_ - -Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for -his battalion. - - Mindful of my mission--to protect the supply dump until removed--I - had to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this - end [he commented]. The supply dump was located at the railroad - station in the flat ground south of Kojo--a point difficult to - defend, since it was on low ground and could be approached by the - enemy from any direction. I considered the most likely direction - of enemy approach to be from the south along the coastal road - or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest. - Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to - cover these approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be - deployed on the hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the - area or counterattack if necessary to prevent loss of the supplies - at the railroad station. I did not consider this disposition - ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive strength, but - it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex - terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason - to expect an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event - such a contingency should occur, it was planned that Company B, the - outpost, would withdraw to the main battle position.[125] - - [125] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins - made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had - taken the supply dump with them. - -Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about two miles -south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies. From -east to west the company held three isolated points of high ground: - -1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one -section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on -the east slope of Hill 109; - -3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company Headquarters, -reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one section of light -machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of 3.5″ rocket -launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west and south of -the 1st Platoon; - -2d Platoon (First Lieutenant George G. Chambers), reinforced by one -section of 81mm mortars, one section of light machine guns, a 75mm -recoilless rifle and one squad of 3.2″ rocket launchers, on Hill 185. - -The remainder of 1/1 occupied positions west of Kojo. Captain Robert -P. Wray’s Charlie Company held a continuous line of foxholes in the -hills that rose from the rice paddies a mile and a half north of Baker -Company’s positions. From west to east were First Lieutenant Francis -B. Conlon’s 2d Platoon, First Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st and -Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey’s 3d. About 250 yards to the east -were two platoons of Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Able Company. On the -slopes north of Barrow stood Colonel Hawkins’ CP and the tubes of First -Lieutenant Edward E. Kaufer’s 4.2″ Mortar Platoon. Captain Barrow’s -third platoon occupied the topographical crest of Hill 117.[126] - - [126] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27–28 Oct 50, revised and - annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren - rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55; - Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56. - -While the Marines organized their positions during the afternoon of -27 October, a column of refugees “almost as long as the eye could -see” appeared in the valley southwest of Kojo headed for the seaport. -Colonel Hawkins estimated that there were 2000 to 3000 people in the -column. Since he did not have the time to examine all the refugees -before darkness, Hawkins had them herded into the peninsula northeast -of Kojo for the night.[127] - - [127] Hawkins ltr, n. d. - -After a quiet afternoon on the 27th, the first hint of enemy opposition -came at 1600 when a wire team was fired upon in the vicinity of Hill -185. Two hours later a truck and a jeep borrowed from the S-3, Major -David W. Bridges, received fire from the high ground west of Hill -109. Both were abandoned after the truck broke down, and a Baker -Company patrol had a brief fire fight at 1900 when it recovered the -vehicles.[128] - - [128] 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv - 4 Nov 55. - -These first indications of Red Korean activity in the Kojo area were -attributed to the forays of guerrilla bands. Not until after the -battle did the Marines learn from POW interrogations that the enemy -consisted of an estimated 1000 to 1200 men of the 10th Regiment, 5th -NKPA Division. This regiment, commanded by Colonel Cho Il Kwon, former -director of the Communist Party at Wonsan, was believed to have its CP -in the large village of Tongchon, about two miles south of the Baker -Company outposts. Other units of the NKPA division, which was credited -with a total strength of 7000 to 8000 men, occupied areas farther to -the south.[129] - - [129] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct - 50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 29 Oct - 50; X Corps _Periodic Intelligence Report_ (_PIR_) 33. - -After the Red Korean collapse, the 2d, 5th, and 10th NKPA Divisions -had maintained their organization, though much depleted in strength by -casualties. Withdrawing to the Wonsan area, they kept to the secondary -roads and raided the villages for food. It is a tribute to Communist -discipline that the outfits had not lost their cohesion at a time when -their cause seemed to be collapsing. But the 5th NKPA Division was -one of the units made up almost entirely of Koreans who had served in -the Chinese Civil War, and its officers were fanatically dedicated to -Communist principles.[130] - - [130] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 26; X Corps _PIR_ 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv - _PIR_ 20, encl 2. - -Only well trained and led troops could have launched the attacks which -hit both ends of the Baker Company’s chain of outposts simultaneously -about 2200, after the first few hours of darkness had passed in -comparative quiet punctuated by occasional shots. Normal security -measures were taken on a cold night with a 50 per cent watch--one -rifleman remaining on the alert in the two-man foxholes while the other -burrowed for warmth into a partially closed sleeping bag. The 81mm and -60mm mortars were registered on the hills just beyond the 2d and 3d -platoons.[131] - - [131] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55. - -These two units came under attack shortly before First Lieutenant -Carlon’s position at the extreme west of Charlie Company’s line was -assailed. In each instance the enemy infiltrated within grenade -throwing distance before his presence was detected. Past contacts with -American soldiers had given the Red Koreans some knowledge of the -language, and for purposes of deception the NKPA assault troops shouted -phrases in broken English: - -“Come this way!... Don’t shoot! We’re friends.”[132] - - [132] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24 - Jan 56. - - -_The All-Night Fight of Baker Company_ - -The surprise was devastating, particularly in the Baker Company zone. -On the eastern slope of Hill 109 the 1st Platoon had no inkling until -men yelled warnings from the foxholes just as the enemy grenades -exploded and Red Koreans in estimated strength of two platoons overran -the position. Seven Marines were killed before they could get out of -their sleeping bags, and others lost contact in the darkness. - -The 3d Platoon and Company CP were attacked from three points to the -south and southeast. Marine 60mm mortars fired within 50 yards of the -front line while the 81s laid down a barrage directly forward of the -position. After a brief and bitter struggle, Communists believed to -number three platoons were repulsed. - -In the Charlie Company zone, Lieutenant Carlon’s position was hardest -hit. The North Koreans closed within ten feet before they were noticed. -During the confused fighting which followed, the enemy won a brief -foothold. An estimated 20 Marines were cut off but got back safely the -next morning. - -After recovering from the initial surprise the Charlie Company outposts -repulsed all further attacks. Wray’s men lost 6 killed and 16 wounded -during the night’s encounters but could count 92 Korean bodies the next -morning. - -At 2215 the 3d Platoon of Baker Company had a second attack at the same -points as the first one. The Red Koreans appeared to Captain Noren to -be exceptionally well disciplined and controlled in spite of heavy -casualties inflicted on them by combination of mortar, machine-gun and -small-arms fire, and grenades.[133] - - [133] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon - the 1stMar _SAR_ 4–5, appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges - interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar, _HD Oct - 50_, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; - Statement of Lt James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51. - -The plight of Belli’s platoon was first made known when 2/B on Hill -185 received a message to the effect that 1/B had withdrawn from Hill -109 with 30 men missing. The retirement was made possible by the brave -stand of Sergeant Clayton Roberts, who covered the movement with a -light machine gun until he was surrounded and killed. - -The 3d Platoon beat off another attack meanwhile as the enemy closed in -from the left rear as well as the front. With machine-gun fire coming -from both directions, Noren informed the battalion CP at 2350 that his -position was untenable and asked permission to withdraw. His request -being granted, he directed Lieutenant Chambers to pull back from Hill -185, covering the withdrawal of 3/B with 81mm fire. - -The intersection of the dike and railway track was designated as the -meeting place for the three Baker Company platoons. Noren covered -the rear of the 3/B withdrawal while his executive officer, First -Lieutenant Chester B. Farmer, took charge of the point. Opposite Hill -109 they encountered Staff Sergeant Robert Fisher and five men whom -Belli had directed to remain at the dike and pick up stragglers while -the rest of 1/B continued to pull back. - -Fisher reported that the attack on Hill 109 had been conducted with -skill and discipline. Whistles and red and green flares were used for -signaling by Communists who cut off a listening post and overran a -squad on the right flank. The assault force numbered 160, according to -POW testimony. - -The methodical, position-by-position withdrawal of the three Baker -Company platoons was conducted so skilfully that remarkably few -casualties resulted. Noren lost all contact for a short time when -enemy fire severed the antenna on his last operative SCR-300. At about -0215 Chambers’ platoon was last to reach the meeting place, having -beaten off several attacks during its withdrawal from Hill 185. With -another large-scale enemy assault threatening, Noren organized a 360° -defense on both sides of the railway track just south of the village -of Chonchon-ni. One Marine was killed and six wounded by enemy fire -received from the west as well as east. - -Fox Battery of the 11th Marines had arrived in the Kojo area about -midnight and set up its guns on the beach northeast of the town at -about 0200.[134] Baker Company had no radio in operation, however, -until parts of two damaged SCR-300’s were combined into one to restore -communication. Contact was made with the 4.2″ mortars, which registered -about 0300, directed by Captain Noren, and broke up the NKPA attack. -The 81mm mortars made it hot for the enemy in Chonchon-ni, and at 0330 -the Communists apparently disengaged to withdraw east of the railway -track and northward toward Kojo. Marine artillery had registered by -0400, but all was quiet in the area the rest of the night. - - [134] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11 - _SAR_), 14. - -Although a few NKPA mortar shells were received, enemy equipment -appeared to be limited for the most part to automatic weapons, small -arms, and grenades. There were indications that Korean civilians had -been used in several instances as human shields for an attacking -force.[135] - - [135] Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50. - -The NKPA withdrawal to Kojo led to the Marine speculation that the -Communists meant to make enforced recruits of some of the hapless -residents allotted a refuge in the peninsula north of the town. As -it proved, they were not harmed by the NKPA troops. The last enemy -effort, just before dawn, was an attack in platoon strength on Second -Lieutenant John J. Swords’ Able Company platoon by Reds who had -infiltrated through Kojo. A brief fight ensued on Hill 117 as the -Marines beat off the assault at the cost of one man killed and two -wounded. - -Baker Company elements had meanwhile resumed their withdrawal along -the railway track north of Chonchon. All was quiet at first light when -Noren began the task of evacuating his wounded in ponchos through rice -paddies which were knee-deep in mud and water under a thin skin of ice. -Marines came out from the Able Company positions to lend a hand. - -The evacuation had nearly been completed when about 200 enemy troops -suddenly moved out from Kojo in a westerly direction across the rice -paddies. Whether they meant to interfere with the evacuation or merely -to escape was never made clear. For the Marines of Able and Baker -Companies as well as the gunners of Fox Battery opened up in broad -daylight and found lucrative targets. An estimated 75 Communists were -killed and wounded before the rest scurried out of range into the hills -west of the coastal plain. - -Some contact was maintained with the enemy until 1000 by elements of -Charlie Company, then the action was gradually broken off as the planes -of VMF(N)-513 came in low with close support.[136] Although the strikes -by air were largely uncontrolled because of poor radio communications -between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) and the planes, they were very -helpful to the Marines on the ground.[137] - - [136] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 _WD Oct 50_; 1/1 - msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren - Comments n. d. - - [137] Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6 - Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d. - - -_2/1 Ordered to Kojo_ - -The radio message bringing the first news of the Kojo fight was sent -by 1/1 at 0418 on the 28th. Owing to transmission difficulty, it was -picked up by the 7th Marines, relayed to the 1st Marines at 0700, and -telephoned to the 1st Marine Division.[138] It stated briefly that -the battalion had been under attack since 1700 by an estimated 1000 -enemy and had suffered a large number of casualties. Helicopters were -requested for air evacuation and an LSTH for water evacuation of the -wounded. Air support was required, the message continued, adding that -the destroyer in direct support of the battalion had not yet arrived on -station. - - [138] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO - 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1825 29 Oct 50. - -At 0830 an officer from 1/1 reported in to 1st Marines CP with a -further account. He reported a platoon of B Company cut off and -estimated 150 casualties.[139] - - [139] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50. - -A third report from 1/1 reached the CP of the 1st Marine Division as an -intercepted radio message at 1238 on the 28th while General Almond was -conferring with General Smith. Sent from Kojo at 1000, the message said: - - Received determined attack from South North and West from sunset - to sunrise by large enemy force. Estimated from 1000 to 1200. - One company still heavily engaged. Civilian reports indicate - possibility 3000 enemy this immediate area. Have suffered 9 KIA, - 39 WIA, 34 MIA [Missing in Action] probably dead. Two positions - overrun during night. If this position is to be held a regiment - is required. Enemy now to South North and West of us but believe - road to North is still open. Harbor is in our hands and ROK LST has - been here. Shall we hold here or withdraw to North? ROK supply dump - ... removed. Request immediate instructions. Send all available - helicopters for wounded. Suggest send instructions by both radio - and helicopters.[140] - - [140] 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points - out, the request for instructions refers to his only - orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no - longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d. - -The Corps and Division commanders agreed immediately that Kojo should -be held, since a large-scale NKPA attack appeared to be in the making. -Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump. Nobody at the -Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been removed, but General -Smith directed his G-3 to issue the necessary orders to send Colonel -Puller, CO of the 1st Marines, and a battalion of reinforcements to -Kojo. Within five minutes Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, 1stMarDiv G-3, -telephoned Corps to request that a train be assembled on the Wonsan -siding immediately for a battalion lift.[141] - - [141] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 28 Oct 50; Craig - “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 - X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, 4; LtCol R. - E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55. - -Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC of the 1st Marine Division, -was on his way to a conference at the 1st Marines CP when he met -General Almond and Colonel Puller, and the three compared notes from -their jeeps. Craig informed them that action toward the providing of -transportation had already been initiated by Division. A request had -later been made for a second destroyer to provide gunfire support (the -first having already arrived) and an LSTH for casualty evacuation. -Another LST had been requested for the purpose of sending tanks to -Kojo, since the road and bridges would not bear the weight of armor. - -The possibility of a major engagement taking place at Kojo seemed to -be confirmed by two later reports 1/1 sent at 1415 and 1840. The first -relayed prisoner of war statements to the effect that an estimated 7000 -men of the NKPA 5th Division were located at Tongchon.[142] The second, -a radio message, read: - - [142] 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n. - d. - - Reinforcement train has not arrived as of 1800. NK prisoners - revealed large enemy force plans attack over position tonight. - Recommend LVTs with LSTs stand by at daylight in case of emergency - evacuation necessary. In view of large numbers of troops facing us - as previously reported and face enemy on all sides except seaward, - consider situation critical. Request higher authority visit.[143] - - [143] 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50. - -By that time Colonel Puller and the troops were on the way. Making up -a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies -in three and a half hours had been something of an administrative feat, -particularly when the battalion was just coming off landing craft. -Yet Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter’s 2/1 and the Regimental Command -Group pulled out for Kojo at 1630 and a second train followed two hours -later.[144] - - [144] Craig, “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; Col A. Sutter - Comments n. d. - -Upon arrival at 2230, CO 1stMar learned that there had been no major -enemy contact since 1000. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins had contracted his -unit that afternoon to his main position along the high ground forming -a semicircle around Hill 117. The 2d Battalion and supporting arms -having tied in with the 1st for the night, Colonel Puller concluded -that no further cause for alarm existed. And since the battery -positions at Kojo were limited, he radioed General Smith that more -artillery would not be needed.[145] - - [145] Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55. - -Seventeen Marines previously listed as MIA by 1/1 had returned unhurt -to their units on the 28th after being cut off during the confusion -of the night’s fighting. Marine air had all but obliterated Tongchon -that afternoon while the U. S. destroyers _Hank_ and _English_ were -bombarding Kojo. - -The request for water as well as air evacuation of serious casualties -had resulted in immediate action. Within an hour after receiving the -message, CTF-90 had the transport _Wantuck_ on the way with a surgical -team, and VMO-6 sent five helicopters which flew 17 wounded men to a -hospital ship at Wonsan on the 29th.[146] - - [146] CTF-90 msg to USS _Wantuck_, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 _SAR_, - 23. - -Ten tanks of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded in LST 883 at -Wonsan on the 28th, but the ship was delayed by running aground. Upon -arrival at Kojo the next day, it again became necessary for the LST to -be pulled off the bar by a tug. By this time the military situation was -so well in hand that the tanks were taken back to Wonsan without being -unloaded.[147] - - [147] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650 - 29 Oct 50. - - -_Security Provided for Wonsan Area_ - -Responsibility for the security of the Wonsan area having been assigned -to the 1st Marines, something of an administrative problem was created -on the 28th by the order sending 2/1 to reinforce 1/1 at Kojo. For the -3d Battalion of the regiment had departed that same day to relieve -a ROK unit at Majon-ni, 28 miles west of Wonsan. Since this left -no troops to patrol roads in the Wonsan area and maintain blocking -positions at Anbyon, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 5th KMC -Battalion were attached to the 1st Marines for those missions. - -Also available to the 1st Marines for such security duties as guarding -the Wonsan airfield and harbor area were the 1st Shore Party Battalion, -1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and Company B of the 1st Armored -Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[148] - - [148] 1stSPBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stMar _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, - annex TT (hereafter 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_) 4–5, appendix 2, - 3–4. - -By the morning of the 29th, moreover, it had already become apparent -that one or both of the battalions in the Kojo area could soon be -spared. When General Craig arrived by helicopter, he found the -situation well in hand.[149] - - [149] Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, _Notes_, 450. - -About 60 percent of the seaport had been destroyed by air strikes -and the guns of the destroyers when a patrol consisting of Dog and -Fox Companies combed the ruins on the morning of the 29th without -finding any evidences of enemy occupation. Meanwhile an Easy Company -patrol ranged to the west of the coastal plain with equally negative -results.[150] - - [150] 2/1 _SAR_, 3; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to - CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct 50; 1stMar Fwd _ISUM_, 1900 29 - Oct 50. - -Captain George B. Farish of VMO-6 was making a reconnaissance flight -when he discerned the word HELP spelled out in rice straw near a -straw-stack a mile northeast of Tongchon. A Marine crawled out from -concealment, and the pilot landed his helicopter to pick up PFC William -H. Meister, who had been hiding since losing touch with his unit during -the enemy night attack on Hill 109. This was the first of four such -rescues completed by Farish that day.[151] - - [151] VMO-6 _HD Oct 50_; VMO-6 _SAR_, 3. - -On the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Noren led a patrol along the -railway track south of Kojo and retraced the route of his fighting -withdrawal in the darkness. In the vicinity of Hill 109, where -Lieutenant Belli’s platoon had been surprised, he found 12 Marine -bodies. None had been despoiled by the enemy of arms or equipment. - -Pushing farther south, Noren encountered sniper fire from the ruins of -Tongchon, destroyed by Marine air, and called for more strikes. The -Corsairs flushed out a group of 20 enemy troops, 16 of whom were cut -down by the machine guns of the Baker Company patrol.[152] - - [152] Smith, _Notes_, 451; Noren Comments. - -By the 29th, when General Almond made a trip of inspection to Kojo, it -was possible to revise the original Marine casualty list as the MIA -casualties were reduced. The final count was 23 KIA, 47 WIA and four -MIA.[153] - - [153] Smith, _Notes_, 451; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, - 29 Oct 40. - -Twenty-four wounded Marines were evacuated to Wonsan that day by APD. -LST 883, when it returned to Wonsan with the tanks, took the bodies of -19 Marines and 17 prisoners. - -Enemy losses, in addition to 83 POW, were estimated at 250 KIA and -an unknown number of WIA on the basis of more than 165 bodies found -by Marine patrols. Curiously enough, the Communists had shown little -interest in the equipment which fell into their hands, and two Marine -75mm recoilless rifles, rendered inoperative, were recovered with -their carts and ammunition in the vicinity of Chonchon-ni. Almost all -abandoned equipment was found in usable condition.[154] - - [154] Smith, _Notes_, 451–452; 1stMar _SAR_, appendix 5, 2; - Noren Comments. - - -_Marines Relieved at Kojo_ - -Each of the Marine rifle companies set up outposts in front of its -zone. Morning and afternoon patrolling, with air on station, went on -during the last two days of October with negative results. Harassing -and interdiction fires were also continued until 1/1 departed. - -LST 973 arrived off Kojo at 1430, 31 October, and disembarked the 5th -Battalion of the KMC Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ battalion, -accompanied by Colonel Puller, left Kojo at 0700 the next morning -on the return trip of the LST. The ship docked at Wonsan at 1230 on -2 November. That afternoon 1/1 relieved elements of the 1st Tank -Battalion at the road block near Katsuma, four miles southeast of -Wonsan. - -Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CG FMFPac, who was acting -in an informal capacity as amphibious adviser to General MacArthur, -inspected 2/1 at Kojo by helicopter on 31 October. Having arrived at -Wonsan that day with Colonel Victor H. Krulak, his G-3, he conferred -at X Corps Headquarters with Admiral Struble and Generals Almond and -Smith.[155] - - [155] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO - 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv - msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 453–454; 1stMar - _SAR_, 6–7; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments. - -Among the other subjects of discussion was the news that Chinese -Communist Forces (CCF) prisoners had been taken in the area north of -Hamhung by ROK units which were soon to be relieved by the 7th Marines. -Several clashes with organized Chinese forces during the last days of -October had also been reported by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division -of the Eighth Army in western Korea. - -The 7th Marines had been given the mission of spearheading the Marine -advance to the northern border of Korea as directed in Corps orders. -After parkas and other cold weather clothing had been issued from the -beach dumps at Wonsan, the regiment completed the movement to Hamhung -by motor convoy from 29 to 31 October. By this time the Corps drive to -the Yalu was shifting into second gear, with the I ROK Corps far in -advance along the coastal highway. Two U. S. Army units were soon to -be involved. The 7th Infantry Division, which landed at Iwon from 29 -October to 8 November, had Corps orders to push on toward the border; -and it was planned that the 3d Infantry Division, due to land its -first units on the 8th at Wonsan, would relieve 1st Marines units south -of Hamhung.[156] - - [156] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 18-50, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, - “Operations Report”, 13–14; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 12; X Corps - _WDs_, 29 Oct-8 Nov 50. - -Corps orders of 2 November called for 2/1 to return to Wonsan -immediately. The southern boundary of X Corps was to be moved 70 miles -farther south, effective on the departure of the battalion from Kojo. -In order to cover the new zone, the KMC regiment had already been -detached from the 1st Marine Division and given responsibility for the -Corps zone south of the 39th Parallel. The relief of the 2d Battalion -of the 5th Marines was completed by KMC elements that same day at -Anbyon, eight miles southeast of Wonsan, thus freeing that unit for a -motor lift northward to rejoin its regiment.[157] - - [157] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps 01 14, - 29 Oct 50; X Corps _OI_ 16, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr - to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to 1stMar, 1803 - 2 Nov 50. - -Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2/1 and the artillery battery departed Kojo -the following day. A small train and a truck convoy sent from Wonsan -were used chiefly for the transport of supplies, and most of the troops -traveled by shanks’ mare. The column was on the way when the report -came that the rail line had been blown up at Anbyon by guerrillas. -The battalion halted there and set up a perimeter for the night which -included both the train and truck convoys. At 0730 in the morning the -convoys moved out again for Wonsan. Delayed slightly by another rail -break, Sutter completed the movement at noon.[158] - - [158] 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov - 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1 - msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 _SAR_, 14–15; Sutter - Comments. - -The track-blowing incident gave evidence that the Marines must deal -with a third type of enemy. In addition to the NKPA remnants, and the -forces of Red China, it now appeared that account must be taken of -thousands of uprooted Koreans prowling in small bands for food and -loot--the flotsam of a cruel civil war. Called guerrillas by courtesy, -they were actually outlaws and banditti, loyal to no cause. And by -virtue of their very furtiveness, they were capable of doing a great -deal of mischief to organized forces. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -Majon-ni and Ambush Alley - -_Marine Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of Mission--Roads -Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop of Supplies Requested--First -Attack on Perimeter--KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st -Marines to Chigyong_ - - -From a distance the Y-shaped mountain valley, encircled by peaks and -crossed by two swift, clear streams, might have been taken for a scene -in the Alps. This impression was borne out by the village of Majon-ni, -which nestled close to the earth, as seen from afar, with the tranquil -and untroubled air of a Swiss hamlet. - -On closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only prove -to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village was -a new schoolhouse with the onion-shaped dome of Russian architecture. -An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small peasant -community, it had been erected not so much for the instruction of -children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles. - -Majon-ni, in short, had been for five years a hotbed of forced culture -in the doctrines of the Communist puppet state set up in northern Korea -after World War II by the occupation forces of Soviet Russia. And it -was here that the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines arrived on 28 October -1950. Relief of elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 enabled those -troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which had brought 3/1.[159] - - [159] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _URpt_ - (_S-3_) 7, 2. - -The Marines had been assigned the mission of “setting up a defensive -position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the use -of this road net.” In addition, the unit was “to patrol roads to the -north, south, and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and -Wonsan.”[160] - - [160] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also - CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar - _OpnO 9-50_, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _AdmO 14-50_, 27 Oct 50. - -This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions -relieving the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the -Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the -troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons -on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial -plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot -pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which -are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be -known to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it -offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the -dispatch of the iron elephants.[161] - - [161] Col T. L. Ridge, _Notes on Operations in North Korea_, - 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, _Notes_) and comments on - preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, _The New - Breed_ (New York, 1952), 203. - -[Illustration: MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSAN - - A Ambush of 2 Nov 50 - B Ambush of 3 Nov 50 - C Ambush of 7 Nov 50 - D Ambush of 12 Nov 50 - E Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50 - - MAP-5 -] - -The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position -at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading -east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They were being -traveled extensively at this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in -civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military effort. - -It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more than -15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such an -important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni.[162] -Thus the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s reinforced -battalion were sent as a blocking and screening force. - - [162] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6. - - -_Marine Units Tied In for Defense_ - -In addition to H&S, Weapons, and the three rifle companies, the task -organization consisted on 28 October of Battery D of the 2d Battalion, -11th Marines, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, and -detachments from ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical -Battalion; and H&S Company, 1st Marines.[163] - - [163] Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based - on: Ridge, _Notes_; and Comments, 28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H. - Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, “The - Dead End of Ambush Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvi, - no. 11 (Nov 51), 38–45. - -The battalion commander and his S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, decided -after a survey of the terrain that the commanding ground was too far -from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The logical -solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with daytime -company OPs and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads. In order -to tie in all units of a perimeter 3770 yards in circumference, it was -necessary to create provisional platoons of such H&S, artillery and -engineer troops as could be spared from their regular duties. Even so, -the defense was spread thin in places. - -The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the battalion CP. -Communication within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid -from the CP to artillery and mortar positions as well as company and -platoon CPs. Radio communication was established with the regiment and -the division but due to the terrain remained irregular at best. - -First Lieutenant Leroy M. Duffy and his engineers were assigned the -task of constructing on OY strip on the east side of the perimeter -which was completed on 2 November. A parallel cliff made it necessary -to land planes at a dangerous angle, but no better site could be had -in this steep-sided valley. - -[Illustration: MAJON-NI PERIMETER - -All roadblocks manned by Weapons Co. Perimeter between A and B manned -by H&S Co, 3/1 and Btry D, 2/11, 28 Oct-4 Nov 50, by Able Co., 1/1, 5–7 -Nov; and by H&S Co., 3/1, and Btry D, 2/11, 8–9 Nov. Perimeter between -C and D manned by 3d Bn, KMC Regt, 10–14 Nov 50. - - MAP-6 -] - -Topography also limited Captain Andrew J. Strohmenger’s cannoneers, -who were almost literally “firing out of a barrel.” Close-in support -was out of the question in the bowl-like valley ringed with peaks, but -the six howitzers were emplaced so that they could be swung to fire on -any avenue of approach, especially toward the three roads leading into -Majon-ni.[164] - - [164] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger, - ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep 55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n. - t. 2 Nov 50. - -No difficulty was found in deciding on a water point, for tests -established the purity of the water from both branches of the Imjin -flowing through the perimeter. Lieutenant Duffy explained that he added -chlorine only because the Marines were accustomed to the flavor. - - -_Political Aspects of Mission_ - -The Marine mission had its political as well as military side. Major -Edwin H. Simmons, CO of Weapons Company, was given the responsibility -for defending the three road blocks of the perimeter with Weapons -Company personnel. At each of them he stationed a heavy machine gun -section and a 3.5″ rocket launcher section. These barriers were also -ports of entry where all Korean transients were searched for weapons. -When a group of 20 to 30 accumulated, they were escorted under guard to -the prison stockade, just across the road from the battalion CP.[165] - - [165] This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4 - Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56. - -There they were “processed” by the Civil Affairs Section, consisting of -12 Marine enlisted men under the command of First Lieutenant Donald M. -Holmes and Master Sergeant Marian M. Stocks, known facetiously as the -mayor and sheriff respectively of Majon-ni. Their decisions were based -largely on the findings of the 181st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) -team and the battalion S-2, Second Lieutenant Frederick W. Hopkins. -The CIC specialists proved to be indispensable by contributing daily -intelligence based on civilian as well as POW interrogations. - -As might be supposed, the question of whether a transient was an -escaping NKPA soldier or a harmless peasant might have perplexed -Solomon himself. But the Marines came up with a simple off-the-cuff -solution. Time did not permit a lengthy screening, and each Korean -was given a brief examination with the aid of interpreters. If his -head was still close-cropped in the NKPA manner, if his neck showed -a tanned V-line recently left by a uniform, if his feet bore the -tell-tale callouses left by military footgear--if he could not pass -these three tests, the transient was sent to the prison stockade as a -fugitive Red Korean soldier. Now that Chinese Communist troops had been -encountered both on the X Corps and Eighth Army fronts, it was all the -more important that battlewise NKPA elements should be prevented from -joining their new allies if Red China intervened. - -Some of the prisoners were admittedly NKPA veterans, weary of the war -and ready to give up voluntarily. Manifestations of this spirit caused -Lieutenant Colonel Ridge to send a radio request for an air drop of -surrender leaflets. - -The first full day’s operations, on 29 October, resulted in 24 -prisoners being taken. But this was a trickle as compared to the -torrent which would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was -maintained during the 17 days of the operations. - - -_Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies_ - -Each of the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out daily -motorized or foot patrols while manning, as required, company OPs. The -three roads were assigned as follows: - - George Company (Captain Carl L. Sitter), the road to Wonsan; - How Company (Captain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.) the road to Seoul; - Item Company (First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher), the road to - Pyongyang.[166] - - [166] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 4. - -All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days. -Nevertheless, a system of artillery and 81mm mortar harassing and -interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was put into -effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms Coordinator -(SAC), and OYs were used for artillery spotting and to call air strikes -when planes were on station.[167] - - [167] _Ibid._, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56. - -The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity for -maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would -permit. Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times, -and the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council along with -such laws or customs as did not conflict with the Marine mission.[168] -A policy of justice and fairness had its reward when the inhabitants -warned the CIC team of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops. - - [168] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51. - -POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy -unit as the 15th NKPA Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th -regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Chol. Following the NKPA -collapse, the division had been able to maintain its organization -while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and raiding the -villages for food. The mission was reported to be the occupation and -control of the upper Imjin valley as a base for guerrilla operations, -with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of the main -objectives.[169] - - [169] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 8; 1st MarDiv _PIRs 21_ and - _22_. - -Enemy numbers were said to reach a total of 11,000. But that figure, -like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the -traditional grain of salt. - -At any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on the morning of -2 November that they were opposed by a resolute enemy skilled at -guerrilla tactics. Second Lieutenant Harvey A. Goss’ platoon of How -Company, reinforced with 81mm mortars, light machine guns, an artillery -forward observer (FO) team and a FAC, was ambushed in a deep gorge -five miles south of Majon-ni while conducting a motorized patrol. The -Marines, raked by rifle and automatic small-arms fire from an unseen -enemy hidden along the heights on both sides, got off only the message, -“We’ve been hit, send help, send help” before the radio was hit.[170] - - [170] The account of the How Company ambush is derived from: - 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 3/1 - memo: “Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600,” 2 Nov - 50; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 8_, 3; 2/11 _SAR_, 16; Simmons - interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan 56; Capt R. A. Doyle - Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d. - -Effective deployment in the narrow road was prevented by stalled -vehicles. Casualties were mounting when Second Lieutenant Kenneth A. -Bott and PFC Donald O. Hoffstetter ran the gauntlet of fire in a jeep. -They reached Majon-ni unhurt although one tire of the jeep had been -shot. - -The 3/1 CP was delayed in summoning air because of the difficulties -in radio transmission.[171] This break in communications alarmed -Major Simmons, acting as SAC. He persuaded the pilot of an OY to fly -him over the scene of the ambush. From his point of vantage Simmons -had a good view of the deployment of Captain Corley’s remaining two -rifle platoons, riding artillery trucks and reinforced with heavy -machine guns and 81mm mortars, which had been sent out from Majon-ni -to extricate the patrol. The 81mm mortars were set up just off the -road and began pounding the North Korean cliffside positions. PFC Jack -Golden, a one-man task force, climbed with a 94-pound heavy machine -gun to a height where he could fire down on the Communists. Marine -Corsairs came on station, somewhat tardily because of the poor radio -communication, and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the hills. - - [171] As a result of this experience a radio which could - contact planes was later requested. 3/1 msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50. - -Lieutenant Robert J. Fleischaker, (MC) USN, the battalion medical -officer, and his assistants cared for the less critical Marine -casualties. One man died during the night but most of the others were -evacuated during the next day in three helicopter flights--much to -the astonishment of the natives. Fleischaker and his assistants also -treated Korean civilians on occasion, and the saving of a village boy’s -life by an emergency appendectomy did much to gain the good will of the -community.[172] - - [172] LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle - Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker Comments, n. d. - - -_Air Drop of Supplies Requested_ - -Radio communication between Majon-ni and Wonsan was so uncertain, -because of the intervening hill mass, that it was possible to -get through for only a few hours at night. The surest means of -communication was a written message carried by helicopter or OY pilots, -who had to insure delivery to regiment after landing at the Wonsan -airfield.[173] - - [173] Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments. - -The supply problem had already begun to pinch before the first week -ended. A convoy came through from Wonsan without molestation on 29 -October, but it was the last for a week. On 1 November, just to play -safe, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge requested a practice air drop which went -off satisfactorily. His judgment was upheld on the morning of the How -Company ambush when a 3/1 supply convoy was attacked seven miles west -of Wonsan (see Map 5) and forced to turn back. - -First Lieutenant James D. Beeler commanded the George Company rifle -platoon escorting the column of supply vehicles which was under the -charge of Second Lieutenant James L. Crutchfield of H&S Company. The -third truck in line, loaded with diesel fuel and C-3 composition,[174] -burst into flames after running into a hail of enemy rifle and -automatic weapons bullets. Meanwhile the first two trucks continued -until they came to a roadblock created by blowing a crater. Turning -around under intense fire, they got back to the point of original -ambush just as the other vehicles were trying to reverse direction; and -in the confusion two trucks went off the narrow road, making a total of -three lost. - - [174] C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used - chiefly by military engineers for demolitions work. - -A flight of three VMF-312 Corsairs led by Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank -Cole dispersed an enemy force estimated at 200 to 300 men. The convoy -was extricated and brought back to Wonsan after the 1st Marines sent -out a task force consisting of four tanks, a tank dozer and six trucks -filled with infantry. Personnel losses in the ambush were nine men -killed and 15 wounded.[175] - - [175] S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to - G-3 1stMarDiv, 1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 1stTkBn - _SAR_, 11; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 2–3; 1stLt J. L. - Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56. - -Ridge now had to call for an air drop in earnest. Gasoline, rations, -grenades and artillery, mortar and machine gun ammunition to a total of -more than 21 tons were packaged at the Wonsan airfield on 2 November -by Captain Hersel D. C. Blasingame’s 1st Air Delivery Platoon. Four -hours after the receipt of the message, the Air Force C-47s released -152 parachutes over the Majon-ni perimeter. This was one of the 141 -replenishment missions of the Air Delivery Platoon in November, -amounting to 864 man-hours of flying time and 377 tons of supplies -dropped.[176] - - [176] 1stAirDelPlat, _HD_, _Nov 50_; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, - 3. - -Less than the usual amount of breakage resulted, but Colonel Puller -considered it so necessary to push a truck convoy through to -Majon-ni that he assigned a rifle company as guards. This mission -fell to Captain Barrow’s Able Company, reinforced by one platoon of -Captain Lester G. Harmon’s Company C engineers, Technical Sergeant -Shelly Wiggins’ section of 81mm mortars, and Second Lieutenant -Harold L. Coffman’s section of 75mm recoilless rifles. Thirty-four -supply vehicles were in the column which left Wonsan at 1430 on 4 -November.[177] - - [177] The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj - R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct 55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3, - 1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2010 5 - Nov 50; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 3–4. - -The late hour of departure was a handicap; and though an OY flew -reconnaissance, the convoy had no FAC. A TACP jeep well back in the -column could communicate with the OY, which relayed the message to the -two VMF-312 Corsairs on station. - -Barrow reasoned that because so many of the enemy roadblocks required -engineer equipment, it would be advisable for Harmon’s vehicles to -lead, followed by First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s infantry -platoon. This scheme promised well when four undefended crater -roadblocks were encountered and speedily filled in by the engineers. -The fifth, however, was the scene of an ambush by Red Koreans occupying -the steep heights on both sides of the narrow, winding road. - -The engineers soon had a hot fire fight on their hands. Taking cover -behind the vehicles, they gave a good account of themselves. But the -stalled trucks delayed the infantry platoon coming to their aid; -and lack of a FAC resulted in less effective close air support than -the Corsairs usually rendered. Thus, with the early November dusk -approaching, Captain Barrow decided on a return to Wonsan. - -By a near-miracle the trucks turned about safely on the narrow shelf -that passed for a road. As the enemy long-range fire increased, Barrow -ordered lights out when the column commenced its eight-mile return -trip. In the darkness a truck loaded with 20 Marines missed a hairpin -turn and plunged over the edge. Fortunately, the accident happened at -one of the few spots where the vehicle could land on a wooded shoulder -instead of hurtling through space to the rocky valley floor several -hundred feet below. It was found that nothing worse than broken bones -and concussion had resulted after a human chain brought the injured men -back up to the road. - -Lights were turned on and the convoy got back without further trouble. -Barrow reported to his regimental commander at Togwon that his losses -amounted to eight men wounded and 16 injured in addition to five -vehicles destroyed. - -Colonel Puller assured him that his failure had been due to an -unavoidably late start and lack of a FAC rather than faulty judgment. - -The following morning, after departing Wonsan at 0830, the air -controller was not needed. Barrow had put into effect a new tactical -plan based on the premise that the guerrillas of Ambush Alley would be -waiting as usual for the sound of approaching trucks. He prepared a -surprise, therefore, by directing his infantry platoons to take turns -at leading the column on foot, keeping a thousand yards or more in -advance of the vehicles. - -The scheme worked to perfection as Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones’ -platoon rounded a bend near the scene of yesterday’s ambush and -surprised about 70 guerrillas as they were eating. The ambushers had -in effect been ambushed. The Marines opened up with everything they -had, and only a few of the Reds escaped with their lives. There was -no further trouble after the convoy got under way again, arriving -at Majon-ni early in the afternoon of 5 November without a single -casualty. Losses of 51 killed and three prisoners were inflicted on the -enemy. - - -_First Attack on Perimeter_ - -The supplies were no less welcome than the Marines who brought -them, for the CIC team had warned of an attack on Majon-ni at 0100 -the following night. Colonel Puller placed Able Company under the -operational control of 3/1 for the defense, and the commanding officer -assigned the three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements a -sector between How and George Companies on the perimeter. - -This addition to his strength made it possible for Lieutenant -Colonel Ridge to send out his executive officer, Major Reginald R. -Myers, in command of a motorized patrol large enough to cope with a -reported enemy build-up of 2000 to 3000 men about six miles northwest -of Majon-ni on the Pyongyang road. Intelligence received by Corps -indicated that this force was assembling in an old mining area, and a -3/1 reconnaissance in force was ordered. - -The Marine task force, consisting of George and Item Companies, plus -elements of Weapons Company, was supported by artillery from Majon-ni. -Nothing more formidable was encountered than a few guerrillas firing at -long-range, but Myers brought back 81 willing prisoners.[178] - - [178] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _9_; - Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative of Capt H. L. Coffman, n. - d. - -That night at 0130, trip flares and exploding booby traps were the -prelude to the first NKPA probing attacks on the perimeter. The enemy -was half an hour late, but otherwise the assault developed pretty much -as the CIC team had predicted, even to the identification of elements -of the 45th Regiment of the 15th NKPA Division. The assailants showed -no disposition to close, and the assault turned into a desultory fire -fight. At 0500, with a fog reducing visibility almost to zero, the -enemy could be heard but not seen in his assault on the battalion -OP. This position was located on the How Company front and manned by -wiremen and artillery and mortar FO teams. When their ammunition ran -out, these Marines were forced to withdraw; but Captain Thomas E. -McCarthy, Second Lieutenants Charles Mattox and Charles R. Stiles with -an assortment of H&S Company personnel recaptured the position the -moment that the fog lifted. The enemy withdrew into the hills after the -Corsairs came on station, and the action ended at 0730 with two wounded -Marines representing the casualty list of 3/1 in the engagement.[179] - - [179] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar - _SAR_, 10, 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5–6; 2/11 _SAR_, - 17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 25 Jan - 56; Corley Comments. - -Able Company returned to Wonsan that morning with 619 of the prisoners -who had been accumulating at Majon-ni until the stockade was almost -overflowing with Korean humanity. Captain Barrow packed the captives -into open trucks covered with tarpaulins. This precaution was taken -in order not to advertise the nature of the cargo while passing -through Ambush Alley, since it might be embarrassing if the guerrillas -attempted to liberate prisoners who outnumbered their keepers three to -one. - -Simultaneously with the return of Able Company, Colonel Puller ordered -his 2d Battalion (-) to proceed via the Majon-ni road to Munchon-ni. -Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s mission was similar to that of Lieutenant -Colonel Ridge at Majon-ni: to block enemy movement along the trails -leading north and to screen civilians. The hamlet of Munchon-ni -squatted near the top of the highest pass along Ambush Alley. Trucks -could be supplied for only one reinforced rifle company--Easy--which -departed Wonsan at 0830. - -Four miles short of the objective, the motorized column entered a -horseshoe bend large enough to contain all the vehicles. On the left -of the road was a sheer drop, and on the right rose cliffs 200 feet in -height. The last truck had just entered the bend when the first was -stopped by a landslide roadblock. As the column ground to a halt the -enemy opened up with rifles and automatic weapons from well camouflaged -positions in the high ground at the far end of the horseshoe.[180] - - [180] The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from: - 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 2/1 _SAR_, 6–7; Col A. Sutter - Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d. - -The Marines scrambled out of the trucks and returned the fire. But it -was necessary to attack in order to dislodge the enemy, and during -the advance Easy Company took a total of 46 casualties--8 KIA and -38 WIA--in addition to six wounded truck drivers. Five of the seven -officers were wounded, including the company commander, Captain Charles -D. Frederick. - -It was estimated that the roadblock had been defended by about 200 Red -Koreans, who left 61 counted dead behind them and probably removed at -least as many wounded. Fifty cases of 120mm mortar ammunition were -destroyed by the Marines and 300 cases of small arms cartridges. - -At 1615 Sutter and the remainder of the 2/1 force arrived on the scene -from Wonsan just as Able Company and its prisoners appeared from the -opposite direction. Helicopters having already evacuated the Easy -Company’s critical casualties, Able Company brought the lightly wounded -and prisoners to Wonsan without further enemy interference. Sutters’ -force proceeded to Munchon-ni as originally planned. - - -_KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni_ - -At Majon-ni an OP manned by two squads of Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s -2d Platoon of How Company was threatened with encirclement on the 8th -when a Red Korean force gradually built up to an estimated 250 men -worked around to the rear. The other two platoons of the company, -reinforced with heavy machine guns and an Item Company platoon, were -sent out from the perimeter. Artillery and mortars helped to scatter -the enemy in confusion with estimated 40 per cent losses. Marine -casualties were one man killed and ten wounded.[181] - - [181] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50; - 2/11 _SAR_, 17; Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See - also Corley Comments. - -On 10 November, reflecting the concern of CO 1st Marines over enemy -activity in the Majon-ni area, the 3d KMC Battalion arrived as -reinforcements together with a convoy of supplies. CO 3/1 assigned the -unit to the sector in the perimeter recently vacated by Able Company of -1/1.[182] - - [182] 2/1 _SAR_, 7. Ridge, _Notes_. - -The celebration of the 175th birthday of the U. S. Marine Corps was not -neglected at Majon-ni. Somehow the cooks managed to bake a prodigious -cake, with thinly spread jam serving as frosting, and all hands were -rotated a few at a time to their company CPs to receive a slice.[183] - - [183] Geer, _The New Breed_, 215. - -That afternoon an OY of VMO-6 spotted an estimated 300 enemy -troops about four miles west of Majon-ni. Under direction of the -aerial observers, Captain Strohmenger’s howitzers broke up this -concentration.[184] - - [184] VMO-6 _SAR_, 8; X Corps, _Guerrilla Activities X Corps - Zone, Nov 50_, 1; 1stMarDiv _PIR 18_; 2/11 _SAR_, 17. - -The CIC team warned that another attack on the perimeter by the 45th -NKPA Regiment would take place on the night of 11–12 November. As -a prelude, General Pak made an effort to terrorize inhabitants who -had kept the team informed of his plans and movements. Some of the -villagers took his threats seriously enough to prepare for a hurried -leavetaking, but the Civil Affairs section reassured them and put a -curfew into effect.[185] - - [185] Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55. - -After such a menacing build-up, the second attack on the perimeter -fizzled out like a damp firecracker. A few probing jabs, beginning at -0130, were followed by a weak main assault on the KMC front which was -easily repulsed. The enemy tried again to overrun the OP but gave up -the attempt after stumbling into a field of “Bouncing Betty” mines. -At 0600 the last action of the Majon-ni operation came to an end as -the Communists withdrew. Friendly losses were two men killed and six -wounded.[186] - - [186] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMarDiv _URpt_ (_S-3_) - 9. 1stMar _SAR_, 11; 2/11 _SAR_, 17. The “Bouncing Betty” - type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring - which sent it several feet into the air to explode with - maximum destructive effect. - -This was the final appearance of the 15th NKPA Division, which -apparently abandoned Majon-ni as an objective and transferred its -guerrilla operations southward along the Imjin valley. The relief of -the Marines and KMCs on position began the next afternoon as elements -of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U. S. 3d Infantry Division, -arrived to take over the perimeter. - -The Army column, including 34 Marine supply vehicles, had moved out -from Wonsan at 1030 the day before. Although 2/1 (less Dog Company) -had maintained its blocking positions at Munchon-ni, the convoy was -stopped a few miles beyond the Marine outposts by a wrecked bridge and -three large craters. Guerrillas poured in small-arms fire from the high -ground which resulted in two soldiers being killed and four wounded. -Two Marine trucks and a jeep were destroyed. - -Extensive repairs to the road being needed, Lieutenant Colonel Robert -M. Blanchard, the commanding officer of 1/15, formed a defensive -perimeter for the night. The column reached Majon-ni without further -incident at 1530 on the 13th.[187] - - [187] Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50; - S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO - 1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMarDiv - tel to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv _POR 146_; - 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 3–4, 6–7; 2/1 _SAR_, 9; 1stMar - _SAR_, 11–12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, _3d Infantry - Division in Korea_ (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28 - Feb 56. - -Following relief by the Army unit, the Marine battalion departed -at 1015 on the 14th by truck for the Wonsan area. A total of 1395 -prisoners had been taken during the 17 days of Majon-ni--a large -proportion of them voluntary--and more than 4000 Korean transients -screened. Enemy battle casualties were estimated at 525 killed and an -unknown number wounded.[188] - - [188] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_. General Ruffner, Chief of - Staff of X Corps, later commented: “Personally, I always - had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at - Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment - and in the second place I always felt that it broke up - what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army - that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of - trouble in our backyard at Wonsan. A lot of determined - enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have been - most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably - slowed down our subsequent movement to the north.” MajGen - C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56. - -Losses of the Marine battalion numbered 65--16 KIA, 4 DOW and 45 WIA. -Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, owing to strict enforcement -of sanitary and health regulations.[189] - - [189] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 7. - -The vulnerability of a tenuous MSR must also be taken into account, and -casualties of nine killed and 81 wounded or injured were incurred by -Marines escorting supply convoys through Ambush Alley. - - -_Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong_ - -From the 1st Marines in the Wonsan area to the 7th Marines leading the -northward advance, a distance of more than 130 road miles separated the -elements of the 1st Marine Division. But the arrival of more U. S. Army -units made possible a first step toward concentration. - -On 29 October the 17th RCT of the 7th Infantry Division had begun -landing at Iwon (see Map 2), about 60 air miles northeast of Hungnam. -Other units and reinforcing elements followed until all had completed -unloading by 8 November--a total of 28,995 troops, 5924 vehicles, and -30,016 short tons of cargo.[190] - - [190] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13–14; X Corps _WD_, - 29 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 35_. - -Transports had been sent by CTF-90 on 31 October to Moji, Japan, for -the first units of the 3d Infantry Division. The 65th RCT landed at -Wonsan on 5 November, but it was not until the 18th that the last -elements arrived.[191] All four of the major units of X Corps--the two -Army divisions as well as the 1st Marine Division and I ROK Corps--were -then in the zone of operations, even though dispersed over a wide area. - - [191] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; X Corps _WD_, - 5 Nov 50; X Corps _POR 40_. - -The commanding generals of both Army units were “old China hands.” -Major General Robert H. Soule, CG 3d Infantry Division, had been U. S. -military attaché in Nationalist China during the last months of the -civil war. During this same period Major General David G. Barr, CG 7th -Infantry Division, was senior officer of the United States Military -Advisory Group in China.[192] - - [192] Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs, - Department of State, _United States Relations with - China: With Spacial Reference to the Period 1944–1949_ - (hereafter _U. S. Relations with China_), (Washington, - 1949), 318, 331. - -On 31 October, by order of ComNavFE, JTF-7 had been dissolved and the -TG 95.2 Support and Covering Group passed to the operational control -of CTF-90, Admiral Doyle. As the center of gravity of X Corps gradually -shifted to the north, General Almond moved his advanced CP from Wonsan -to Hamhung on 2 November and the remainder of his headquarters on the -10th. He was joined four days later by Admiral Doyle and his staff as -the _Mount McKinley_ anchored off Hungnam.[193] - - [193] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; ComNavFE msg - to NavFE, 0204 30 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 150_; LtGen E. A. - Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56. - -The 1st Marine Division CP had displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam on 4 -November as the 5th and 7th Marines carried out assignments in the -north. This movement included 2/5, which had been under the operational -control of the 1st Marines for patrolling missions in the Wonsan area. -Not until a week later was General Smith able to plan the northward -advance of Colonel Puller’s regiment. On the 12th, X Corps OpnO 6 -directed the 3d Infantry Division to relieve elements of the 1st -Marines. The mission of the Army division was to protect the left flank -of X Corps and prepare for an advance to the west.[194] - - [194] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50. - -For a time it had appeared that 1/1, which had the responsibility for -security in the Wonsan area after its return from Kojo, might be sent -to Chongjin, 220 air miles northeast of Wonsan, in accordance with -X Corps OI-13 of 25 October. This battalion was designated for the -mission in 1stMarDiv OpnO 10-50, issued on 5 November, but four days -later X Corps cancelled this requirement.[195] - - [195] 1stMar _OpnO 19-50_, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9 - Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 459–460. 1/5 had been initially - assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1 on - its return from Kojo. - -Before departing the Wonsan area, Puller’s headquarters had another -false alarm. Small craft sighted by air on 8 November, and two -mysterious explosions, led to the report that 500 to 1000 enemy boats -were attempting an amphibious landing ten miles north of Wonsan. -An armored patrol of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, was sent to -investigate but reported no contact.[196] - - [196] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50; - 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 14. Ruffner ltr - 13 Jan 56. - -X Corps directed that upon the relief of the Marines by the 3d Infantry -Division, the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions, which had been under the -operational control of RCT-1, would then be attached to the Army -unit.[197] - - [197] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 492–493; - Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73; CG - 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50. - -After lack of transport imposed a delay of two days, 1/1 initiated -the northward movement of RCT-1 by rail and closed Chigyong, eight -miles southwest of Hamhung, by 1820, 14 November. A motor convoy -followed.[198] - - [198] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 145; Smith, _Notes_, 494; 1/1 msg to - CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry - Division in Korea_, 73. - -Relief of 2/1(-), which had been holding screening and blocking -positions on Ambush Alley, was completed on the 15th by the 3d -Battalion of the 15th Infantry. Other Army elements relieved Dog -Company in the rear area near Wonsan. On the 16th 2/1 moved by rail -to Chigyong, followed by 3/1 and the last elements of RCT-1 the next -day.[199] - - [199] 2/1 _SAR_, 9–10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15 - Nov 50; 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_; 1stMar _SAR_, 12; - 1stMarDiv _POR 154_; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in - Korea_, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56. - -Thus the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative and temporary degree -of concentration. The farthest distance between components had been -reduced from 130 to less than 60 miles by the middle of November, but a -new dispersion of units was already in progress. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -Red China to the Rescue - -_Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New Enemy--Communist -Victory in Civil War--Organization of the CCF--The Chinese Peasant -as a Soldier--CCF Arms and Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” -Campaign--CCF Strategy and Tactics_ - - -Up to this time the 1st Marine Division had virtually been waging two -separate wars. In the southern zone, as was related in the last two -chapters, blocking and screening operations were conducted by RCT-1 -against NKPA remnants. RCT-7, with RCT-5 in reserve, had meanwhile been -confronted in the north by some of the first Chinese Communist troops -to enter the Korean conflict. - -In order to trace the movements of these two Marine regiments, it will -be necessary to go back over chronological ground previously covered. -Division OpnO 18-50, issued on 28 October to implement X Corps OI-13 -and supplementary telephone orders received from Corps, assigned RCT-7 -the mission of proceeding from Wonsan to Hamhung, prepared for an -advance to the Manchurian border 135 miles to the north. RCT-5 was -assigned a zone behind RCT-7 (see end-paper maps). - -Plans for the northward advance brought up the vital problem of -providing security for the 78-mile main supply route (MSR) and the -parallel railway stretching along the coast from Wonsan to Hamhung. -Division orders of the 28th assigned RCT-5 (less 2/5), temporarily -under the operational control of RCT-1, the responsibility for the -security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas, 16 and 57 miles north of -Wonsan respectively. Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, attached to RCT-5, -had orders to establish blocking positions on three main roads joining -the MSR from the west.[200] - - [200] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_, - 463–464. - -RCT-7, after being partially issued cold weather clothing at Wonsan, -moved by road and rail to the Hamhung area during the last three -days of October. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion and Division -Reconnaissance Company were attached along with other reinforcing -units, since this regiment had been designated to lead the advance of -the 1st Marine Division to the Manchurian border.[201] - - [201] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., - 28 Oct 50; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0850 1 Nov 50; - 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50. See the detailed - account of the move in Col R. G. Davis Comments, 7 - May 56. RCT-7 did not receive all of its cold weather - clothing until after it reached Koto-ri. MajGen H. - L. Litzenberg Comments, 18 Jul 56; LtCol M. E. Roach - Comments, 17 May 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep - 56. - -RCT-5 completed a motor march meanwhile from its assembly area near -Wonsan to assigned positions along the Wonsan-Hamhung MSR. General -Almond’s OI-15 (30 October) had directed the dispatch of two Marine -RCTs to the Hamhung area, which meant that Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s -regiment was to follow RCT-7. On the 31st General Smith ordered him -to advance a battalion to Chigyong, eight miles southwest of Hamhung. -Murray selected his 1st Battalion and directed that one of its -companies be detached to relieve an RCT-7 company guarding the Advance -Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, five miles southwest of Hungnam.[202] - - [202] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2118 31 Oct 50; CO 5thMar - msg to CO 1/5, 1013 1 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 463–464; - 5thMar _SAR_, 8–9; 5thMar _URpt 2_; 1/5 _SAR_, 5; 3/5 - _SAR_, 5; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56. - -Two additional Marine units were assigned to assembly areas along -the MSR. The 1st Tank Battalion (less Company C, attached to the 1st -Marines) moved up to Munchon and regained its Company A. Since the -landing of the 11th Marines (less the battalions attached to RCTs) the -artillery regiment (-) had occupied positions at Munpyong-ni, five -miles northwest of Wonsan.[203] - - [203] 1stMarDiv msg to 1stTkBn, 1750 31 Oct 50; 1stTkBn _SAR_, - 11. The move was made 1 Nov. 11thMar _URpt 2–28 Oct 50_. - -When four days passed without enemy contacts along the MSR, General -Almond decided to expedite the movement of RCT-5 to the Hamhung -area. In a conference with General Smith on 2 November, he outlined -a plan for using patrols instead of blocking positions. Under this -system RCT-1, with elements of the 1st Tank Battalion, would be made -responsible for MSR security as far north as Munchon. The 54-mile -stretch between Munchon and Chigyong would be assigned to the Special -Operations Company, USA, and Korean agents, both under Corps control. -As soon as these arrangements could be put into effect, RCT-5 would -be free to advance to Hamhung. That same day, 2 November, the 2d -Battalion was released from operational control of RCT-1 and moved to -Hamhung.[204] - - [204] CG’s Diary in X Corps _WD_, 2 Nov 50. Smith, _Notes_, - 463–464. The Special Operations Company was a - commando-type U. S. Army organization, generally employed - in such operations as raids and reconnaissance. The - strength, weapons, and organization depended on the - mission. - -Ironically, the 2d was also the date of the first guerrilla raid on the -MSR. A patrol from the 1st Tank Battalion was sent by Division to the -aid of the Special Operations Company, which had reported an attack -west of Munchon resulting in a wound casualty and loss of equipment. -The Marines drove the guerrillas back into the hills.[205] - - [205] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1300 2 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv - _PIR_ 9. - - -_Chinese in X Corps Zone_ - -Red Korean guerrilla activities were overshadowed by confirmation of -reports that organized CCF units had appeared in the X Corps zone -as well as on the Eighth Army front. After crossing the Yalu, they -had secretly infiltrated through the mountains, marching by night -and hiding by day from air observation. Their numbers and intentions -remained a mystery at this date, but late in October the 8th U. S. -Cavalry Regiment and the 6th ROK Division were surprised by Chinese in -northwest Korea and badly mauled.[206] - - [206] EUSAK _WDs_ 29 Oct-1 Nov 50. - -First-hand evidence of CCF penetrations in northeast Korea was obtained -by three Marine officers of RCT-7. Shortly after arrival in the Hamhung -area, the regimental commander sent out reconnoitering parties in -preparation for the northward advance of 1 November. The 1/7 patrol on -31 October consisted of a fire team in three jeeps led by Captain Myron -E. Wilcox and First Lieutenants William G. Graeber and John B. Wilson. -As a result of their visit to the CP of the 26th ROK Regiment of the -3d ROK Division, which RCT-7 was scheduled to relieve near Sudong (see -Map 7) on 2 November, the Marine officers reported to their regimental -headquarters that they had seen one Chinese prisoner.[207] - - [207] Maj J. B. Wilson and Capt W. G. Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55. - -As a matter of fact, the ROK regiment took 16 Chinese prisoners in all. -They were identified as belonging to two regiments of the 124th CCF -Division, one of the three divisions of the 42d CCF Army. This force -had crossed the Yalu about 16 October, according to POW testimony, and -moved southward without being observed into the Chosin Reservoir area -during the following ten days.[208] - - [208] Smith, _Notes_, 534; 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 4; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, - 30. These prisoners were later interrogated by Gen Almond - himself and formed the basis of the first official report - of Chinese intervention. Almond Comments, 21 Jun 56; - FECOM msg C67881, 31 Oct 50. - -Not only was Colonel Litzenberg aware that he would be facing Chinese -adversaries in this area; he also suspected that they had infiltrated -toward his left rear. He sent a patrol consisting of 20 men and five -jeeps of Recon Company as far as Chigyong on the 31st without making -any enemy contacts. The following morning CO RCT-7 ordered Recon -Company in 21 jeeps to conduct a reconnaissance to the Huksu-ri area, -approximately 45 miles northwest of Hamhung. After bypassing a blown -bridge, First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman’s force dug in for the night -4500 yards short of its objective. Shots were exchanged several times -that night and early the following morning with North Korean guerrillas -in company strength, but the patrol returned with a negative report as -far as Chinese forces were concerned.[209] - - [209] Maj R. B. Crossman, Capt C. R. Puckett, and Capt D. W. - Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; HqBn, 1stMarDiv (hereafter - HqBn) _URpt 8_ (_Supplementary_), 2. Maj Webb D. Sawyer, - CO 2/7 and Maj James F. Lawrence also made helicopter - reconnaissances of the same ground looking for possible - flanking routes to Koto-ri. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56. - -News was received on 1 November of the heavy losses taken by the 1st -Cavalry Division at the hands of the Chinese in northwest Korea. There -was no change, however, in Corps orders calling for the advance of -Litzenberg’s regiment to the border. Koto-ri, 23 road miles north of -Majon-dong, was the first objective. The right flank of the Eighth Army -was about 60 air miles southwest of Majon-dong, so that RCT-7 must -advance without protection for its left flank except for Division Recon -Company, which was to be relieved as soon as possible by RCT-1. - -“Under these circumstances,” commented General Smith at a later date, -“there was no alternative except to continue forward in the hope that -the Eighth Army situation would right itself and that we would succeed -in our efforts to close up the entire 1st Marine Division behind -RCT-7.”[210] - - [210] Smith, _Notes_, 523–524. See also: Smith, _Chronicle_, 70. - - -_Introducing the New Enemy_ - -Here it is hardly a digression to pause for a brief survey of the -organization, tactics and aims of the new enemy who was about to -prolong the Korean conflict by intervening on behalf of the beaten -NKPA. The powerful, ever-ready military instrument which the Chinese -Reds knew as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been forged and -tempered in the fires of civil strife. It came into being in the late -summer of 1927 during the abortive Nanchang rebellion. Following their -defeat, the Communists found a refuge in Kiangsi Province of south -China and gained strength as disaffected Kuomintang units came over to -their side.[211] - - [211] Richard L. Walker, _China under Communism_ (New Haven, - 1954), 111–112; Order of Battle Branch, Office of the - AC/S G-2, HQ Eighth United States Army (Fwd), _CCF Army - Histories_ (hereafter _CCF Army Histories_), 1. - -The infant PLA managed with difficulty to survive the first four -“bandit suppression campaigns” waged by Chiang Kai-shek. When he -launched his fifth in 1933, the Chinese Reds planned the celebrated -“Long March” which has become one of their most cherished traditions. -Breaking out of Chiang’s encirclement in October, 1934, they took a -circuitous, 6000-mile route to avoid Nationalist armies. Of the 90,000 -who started, only 20,000 were left a year later when the PLA reached -Yenan in Shensi Province.[212] - - [212] _U. S. Relations with China_, 43–44, 207, 323. - -This destination in northwest China gave the Communists a refuge with -Mongolia and Soviet Russia at their backs. There Mao Tse-tung and his -colleagues alternately fought and negotiated with the Government. -Finally, in 1941, the Communists and Nationalists agreed to cease -fighting one another in order to make common cause against the Japanese -invaders. - -The Communists took advantage of their membership in the People’s -Political Council--a Nationalist-sponsored organization which -theoretically united all factions in China against the Japanese--to -continue their “boring-from-within” tactics. Chiang’s estimate of his -troublesome allies was summed up in a quotation attributed to him in -1941: - - You think it is important that I have kept the Japanese from - expanding.... I tell you it is more important that I have kept the - Communists from spreading. The Japanese are a disease of the skin; - the Communists are a disease of the heart.[213] - - [213] Quoted in George Moorad, _Lost Peace in China_ (New York, - 1949), 33. - - -_Communist Victory in Civil War_ - -In late 1945, with the Japanese no longer a menace, the grapple for -mastery began anew. Chiang Kai-shek held the material and moral -advantage as a result of the arms and other assistance supplied by the -United States. - -The Nationalists controlled all the important centers of population -and industry and the major lines of communication. The Communists, -with their backs to the wall, eagerly accepted the United States -proposal for a cease fire in January 1946. General George C. Marshall, -as personal representative of President Truman, flew out to Nanking -in December, 1945, and tried for 12 months to arrange a workable -compromise between two irreconcilable ideologies. Meanwhile, the Reds -retrained and reequipped their forces with the vast supply of weapons -which had fallen into their hands as a result of the collapse of the -Japanese Army in Manchuria in August, 1945. By the spring of 1947, they -were ready again for war. They denounced the truce and recommenced -military operations. From that time the balance of power swung steadily -in their favor.[214] - - [214] _U. S. Relations with China_, 352–363. - -Although the PLA had seized the initiative, the Government still -had an army of about 2,700,000 men facing 1,150,000 Reds, according -to estimates of American military advisers in China. But Chiang -was committed to a positional warfare; his forces were dangerously -over-extended, and for reasons of prestige and political considerations -he hesitated to withdraw from areas of dubious military value. Mao’s -hard and realistic strategy took full advantage of these lapses. As a -result the Communists won the upper hand in Manchuria and Shantung and -by the end of the year had massed large forces in central China. - -Early in 1948, the year of decision, the PLA recaptured Yenan along -with thousands of Government troops. But the most crushing Communist -victory of all came with the surrender of Tsinan, the capital of -Shantung, and its garrison of 85,000 to 100,000 Nationalists. - -In his summary of Nationalist reverses, Major General David G. Barr, -senior officer of the United States Military Advisory Group in China, -reported to the Department of the Army on 16 November 1948: - - No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition - and equipment. Their [the Chinese Nationalists’] military debacles - in my opinion can all be attributed to the world’s worst - leadership and many other morale destroying factors that lead to a - complete loss of will to fight.[215] - - [215] _U. S. Relations with China_, 358. - -By the early spring of 1949 the military collapse of the Nationalists -had gone so far that the enemy controlled the major centers of -population and the railroads from Manchuria south to the Yangtze -Valley. Nanking, Hangkow, and Shanghai were soon to fall into the hands -of Communists whose military strength increased every day as they -captured Nationalist arms and were joined by Nationalist deserters. -Perhaps the best summary of the Chinese Civil War was put in a few -words by Dean Acheson, the U. S. Secretary of State: - - The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they - disintegrated.[216] - - [216] _Ibid._, xiv-xv. - -In addition to the aid extended during World War II, Washington had -authorized grants and credits to Nationalist China amounting to two -billion dollars since V-J Day. Nor was American assistance confined -to arms and monetary grants. From 1945–1947 the occupation of certain -key cities in North China, e. g., Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao[217] -etc., by sizeable U. S. Marine forces held those bases secure for the -Nationalist government and permitted the release of appreciable numbers -of Chiang’s soldiers for offensive operations, who would otherwise have -been tied up in garrison type duty.[218] - - [217] Marines remained in Tsingtao until early 1949. - - [218] The first blows between the Marine and the Chinese - Communists took place not in Korea, but along the - Peiping-Tientsin highway as early as October, 1945. - -The Marines, upon their withdrawal, were directed to turn over vast -stores of weapons and munitions to the Chinese Nationalists. In -addition, the Nationalists were “sold” large quantities of military and -civilian war surplus property, with a total procurement cost of more -than a billion dollars, for a bargain price of 232 million.[219] - - [219] _U. S. Relations with China_, xiv-xv. - - -_Organization of the CCF_ - -Although the victorious army continued to be called the People’s -Liberation Army by the Chinese Reds themselves, it was known as the -Chinese Communist Forces by commentators of Western nations. At the -head of the new police state were the 72 regular and alternate members -of the Central Committee, or Politburo. Formed at the Seventh Party -Congress in 1945, this body consisted for the most part of Mao’s close -associates--leaders identified with the revolutionary movement from the -beginning. - -From top to bottom of the Chinese state, the usual Communist dualism -of high political and military rank prevailed. The highest governing -body, the People’s Revolutionary Military Council, consisted of leaders -holding both positions. After they determined policies, the execution -was left to the General Headquarters of the army.[220] - - [220] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on - the following sources: GHQ, FECOM, _Order of Battle - Information, Chinese Third Field Army_ (1 Mar 51) and - _Chinese Fourth Field Army_ (7 Nov 50); 164-MISDI, - ADVATIS, and ADVATIS FWD rpts in EUSAK _WDs_, _passim_; - X Corps _PIRs_; 1stMarDiv _PIRs_; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 30; - G-2 _SAR_, 16–18; Far East Command, Allied Translator - and Interpreter Service (ATIS), _Enemy Documents, Korean - Operations_, _passim_; Fleet Marine Force Pacific - (FMFPac), _Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea_, - 5–11; Maj R. C. W. Thomas, “The Chinese Communist Forces - in Korea,” _The Army Quarterly_, Oct 52 (digested - in _Military Review_, xxxii, no. 11 (Feb 53), 87); - LtCol Robert F. Rigg, _Red China’s Fighting Hordes_ - (Harrisburg, 1951); Walker: _China Under Communism_. - -This organization comprised a general staff section, a rear Services -section and a general political bureau. Largest CCF administrative unit -was the field army, which reported directly to Headquarters. Composed -of two or more army groups, the field army had a small headquarters of -its own. - -The army group, as the largest unit encountered by UN forces, was -comparable to an army in the American military system. CCF army groups -in Korea consisted of two to four armies with an average total strength -of 60,000–120,000 troops. Equivalent to an American corps was the -CCF army, an organization including three infantry divisions and an -artillery regiment. Thus the average strength of a CCF army was about -30,000 men. - -The CCF infantry division, with a paper strength of 10,000 men, -averaged from 7,000 to 8,500 men in Korea, according to various -estimates. Triangular in organization, it included three infantry -regiments and an artillery battalion. - -Divisional units consisted of reconnaissance and engineer companies of -about 100 men, a 150-man transport company, a 100-man guard company, -and a 60-man communications company. Transport companies had only draft -animals and carts, since little motor transport was organic to a CCF -division at that time. - -The CCF infantry regiment, averaging about 2,200 men in the field, -broke down into the following units: three infantry battalions; an -artillery battery of four to six guns; a mortar and bazooka company; a -guard company; a transportation company; a medical unit with attached -stretcher personnel (often composed of impressed civilians) and a -combined reconnaissance and signal company. - -The CCF infantry battalion, with an authorized strength of 852 men -and an actual strength of perhaps 700, consisted of a mortar and -machine gun or heavy weapons company, a signal squad, a medical squad -and a small battalion headquarters in addition to the three rifle -companies of about 170 men each. Each of the latter was composed of a -headquarters platoon, a 60mm mortar platoon and three rifle platoons. - -The CCF artillery battalion, organic to every division, must be -considered theoretical rather than actual as far as Korean operations -of 1950 are concerned. As a rule, only a few horse-drawn or pack -howitzers were brought into action by an infantry division depending -chiefly on mortars. - - -_The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier_ - -Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the CCF, from the viewpoint -of a Western observer, was the lack of any official provision for the -honorable discharge of a soldier. Once he became a cog in the CCF -military machine, a man remained in the ranks until he was killed, -captured, became a deserter, or was incapacitated for active service by -reason of wounds, disease or old age. - -Theoretically depending on a “volunteer” system, the recruiting -officers of the CCF knew how to apply political or economic pressure -so that a man found it prudent to become a soldier. After putting on -a uniform, he was vigorously indoctrinated in political as well as -military subjects. - -Both self-criticism and criticism of comrades were encouraged at -platoon meetings held for that purpose. Every recruit was subjected -to a course of psychological mass coercion known to the Chinese as -_hsi-nao_ and to the non-Communist world as “brain-washing.” Spying on -comrades and reporting political or military deviations was a soldier’s -duty.[221] - - [221] Walker, _China under Communism_, 51–76. - -Inured to hardships from birth, the peasant in the ranks did not find -that the military service demanded many unwonted privations. He was -used to cold and hunger, and he could make long daily marches on a diet -which the American soldier would have regarded as both insufficient -and monotonous. It would appear, however, that some of the Western -legends about Oriental stoicism and contempt for death were a little -far-fetched. At any rate, the CCF had to deal with the problem of -straggling from the battlefield; and U. S. Marines in Korea could -attest that on occasion the Chinese soldier showed evidences of fear -and low morale. Nor was he as much of a fanatic as might have been -expected, considering the extent of his political indoctrination. - -Although the CCF departed in most respects from the Chinese military -past, the policy of organizing units along ethnic lines was retained. -Men from the same village were formed into a company; companies -from the same area into battalions; and battalions from the same -province into regiments or divisions. Replacements were drawn from the -localities where the unit was originally recruited.[222] - - [222] FMFPac, _CCF Tactics_, 9. - -On the other hand, the Chinese Reds broke with both Nationalist and -Communist tradition in their policy of avoiding a permanent rank -system. Officers (in Korea denoted by red piping on their sleeves) were -divided into company, field, and general groups. The company commander -and political officer held about equal authority in an infantry unit, -and the only NCOs mentioned in CCF field reports are sergeants and -squad leaders.[223] - - [223] ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK _WD_, 14 Nov 50; G-3 _SAR_, - 21–22. - - -_CCF Arms and Equipment_ - -The CCF depended on a wide assortment of weapons, so that it was -not uncommon to find several different kinds of rifles of varying -calibers in the same regiment. Japanese arms acquired after the -surrender of 1945; Russian arms furnished by the Soviets; and American, -German, Czech, British, and Canadian arms taken from the Chinese -Nationalists--these were some of the diverse sources. And it is a -tribute to the adaptability of the Chinese Reds that they managed to -utilize such military hand-me-downs without disastrous confusion. - -Paper work was at a minimum in a force which kept few records and -numbered a great many illiterates. As for logistics, each soldier -was given a four-day food supply in the winter of 1950–1951 when he -crossed the Yalu--usually rice, millet or soy beans carried in his -pack. Afterwards, food was to be procured locally by extortion or -confiscation, though the Communists were fond of using such euphemisms -as “purchase” or “donation” to denote those processes.[224] - - [224] There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops - from division stocks. See ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK _WD_, 4 - Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in _Ibid._, 1 Nov 50. Normal - CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be - committed to combat for about six days and then withdrawn - to replenish its supplies and replace casualties. This - procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an - attack by the CCF and prevented the maintenance of the - momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G. Barr - testimony in _MacArthur Hearing_, 2650; Bowser Comments, - 23 Apr 56. - -The CCF soldiers who fought in Korea during the winter of 1950–1951 -wore a two-piece, reversible mustard-yellow and white uniform of -quilted cotton and a heavy cotton cap with fur-lined ear flaps. Issued -to the troops just before crossing the Yalu, the quilted cotton blouse -and trousers were worn over the standard summer uniform and any other -layers of clothing the soldier may have acquired. - -The first CCF units in action had canvas shoes with crepe rubber soles. -Later arrivals were issued a half-leather shoe or even a full leather -boot. Chinese footwear was of poor quality and few of the troops wore -gloves in cold weather. The consequence was a high rate of frostbitten -hands and feet.[225] - - [225] X Corps msg X 11792; G-2 _SAR_, 21–22; SSgt Robert W. - Tallent, “New Enemy,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxxiv, No. - 2 (Feb 51), 12–15; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 11. - -The CCF soldier usually carried a shawl-like blanket in addition to the -small pack containing his food as well as personal belongings. These -were few and simple, for it could never be said that the Chinese Reds -pampered their soldiers. - - -_China’s “Hate America” Campaign_ - -It was essentially an Asiatic guerrilla army which came to the rescue -of beaten Red Korea in the autumn of 1950. CCF strategic aims had been -summed up years before by Mao Tse-tung himself: - - We are against guerilla-ism of the Red Army, yet we must admit its - guerrilla character. We are opposed to protracted campaigns and - a strategy of quick decision while we believe in a strategy of - protracted war and campaigns of quick decision. As we are opposed - to fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, we believe in - unfixed operational fronts and a war of maneuvers. We are against - simply routing the enemy, and believe in a war of annihilation. - We are against two-fistism in strategic directions and believe - in one-fistism. We are against the institution of a big rear and - believe in a small rear. We are against absolute centralized - command and believe in a relatively centralized command.[226] - - [226] Mao Tse-tung: _Strategic Problems of Chinese - Revolutionary Wars_, Ed by LtCol F. B. Nihart (Quantico, - 1951), 17–18. Adapted from an English translation - published in the _China Digest_, of Hong Kong. - -Mao was held in such reverence as a veteran Chinese Communist leader -that long passages of his writings were committed to memory. His -strategic ideas, therefore, deserve more than passing consideration. -In the first place, his concept of war itself differed from that of -Western nations. - -“There are only two kinds of war in history, revolutionary and -counter-revolutionary,” he wrote. “We support the former and oppose the -latter. Only a revolutionary war is holy.”[227] - - [227] _Ibid._, 4. - -From the Western viewpoint, Mao’s followers had fought four different -wars in close succession--against the Chinese Nationalists from -1927 to 1936; against the Japanese from 1937 to 1945; against the -Nationalists in a second war from 1946 to 1949; and against the -United Nations, beginning in 1950. But Mao and his colleagues saw -this period as one prolonged war in which revolutionists were pitted -against counter-revolutionary adversaries. The fact that the conflict -had lasted for a generation did not disturb Communist leaders who -envisioned a continual state of war “to save mankind and China from -destruction.” - -“The greatest and most ruthless counter-revolutionary war is pressing -on us,” continued Mao. “If we do not hoist the banner of revolutionary -war, a greater part of the human race will face extinction.”[228] - - [228] _Ibid._ - -Early in December, 1949, following Red China’s victory over the -Nationalists, Mao arrived in Moscow for a series of talks with Stalin -which lasted until 4 March 1950. The decisions reached in these -conferences are not known, but it was probably no coincidence that -the Communist puppet state in North Korea violated the world’s peace -a few months later. It is perhaps also significant that the head -of the Soviet Military Mission in Tokyo, Lieutenant General Kuzma -Derevyanko, was absent from Tokyo during the same period and reported -in Moscow.[229] - - [229] LtGen E. M. Almond Comments, 22 Jun 56. - -It was the Year of the Tiger in the Chinese calendar, and a “Resist -America, Aid Korea” movement was launched in Red China when the United -States came to the aid of the Republic of Korea. Every dictatorship -must have some object of mass hatred, and Mao found the United States -ideal for the purpose. A “Hate America” campaign was inaugurated after -the CCF intervention, with the following serving as an example of -anti-American propaganda: - - This [the United States] is the paradise of gangsters, swindlers, - rascals, special agents, fascist germs, speculators, debauchers, - and all the dregs of mankind. This is the world’s manufactory - and source of such crimes as reaction, darkness, cruelty, - decadence, corruption, debauchery, oppression of man by man, and - cannibalism. This is the exhibition ground of all the crimes which - can possibly be committed by mankind. This is a living hell, - ten times, one hundred times, one thousand times worse than can - possibly be depicted by the most sanguinary of writers. Here the - criminal phenomena that issue forth defy the imagination of human - brains. Conscientious persons can only wonder how the spiritual - civilization of mankind can be depraved to such an extent.[230] - - [230] Excerpt from a series of three articles, “Look, This - is the American Way of Life,” used as a primer in the - “Hate America” campaign. Quoted in Walker, _China Under - Communism_, 13. - -Communist doctrine held that the people must be incited by such -propaganda to a constant high pitch of emotional intensity for the -sacrifices demanded by total war. The prevalence of illiteracy made -it necessary to depend largely on street-corner loud speakers blaring -forth radio harangues. Realistic broadcasts of the torture and -execution of political deviates were also heard at times, and such -spectacles were exhibited for the edification of the public.[231] - - [231] _Ibid._ - - -_CCF Strategy and Tactics_ - -CCF strategy was so rudimentary at first that its basic tenets could be -summed up in a 16-word principle adopted by the Central Committee: - - Enemy advancing, we retreat; enemy entrenched, we harass; enemy - exhausted, we attack; enemy retreating, we pursue.[232] - - [232] Mao, _Strategic Problems_, 31. - -But as time went on, other principles were added. Mao favored a planned -defensive-offensive as the only valid strategy against superior enemy -numbers. He made it plain, however, that any withdrawal was to be -merely temporary as the preliminary to advancing and striking at the -first advantageous opportunity. And he reiterated that annihilation of -the enemy must always be the final goal of strategy.[233] - - [233] _Ibid._ - -It was in the field of tactics that the essentially guerrilla character -of the CCF was most fully revealed. Since Communist dialectics -insisted that there was a correct (Marxist) and an incorrect (“petty -bourgeois” or “opportunist” or “reactionary”) way of doing everything, -CCF tactics were reduced to principles whenever possible. - -A generation of warfare against material odds had established a pattern -of attack which proved effective against armies possessing an advantage -in arms and equipment. One Marine officer has aptly defined a Chinese -attack as “assembly on the objective.”[234] The coolie in the CCF ranks -had no superior in the world at making long approach marches by night -and hiding by day, with as many as fifty men sharing a hut or cave and -subsisting on a few handfuls of rice apiece. Night attacks were so much -the rule that any exception came as a surprise. The advancing columns -took such natural routes as draws or stream beds, deploying as soon as -they met resistance. Combat groups then peeled off from the tactical -columns, one at a time, and closed with rifles, submachine guns, and -grenades. - - [234] Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56. - -Once engaged and under fire, the attackers hit the ground. Rising at -any lull, they came on until engaged again; but when fully committed, -they did not relinquish the attack even when riddled with casualties. -Other Chinese came forward to take their places, and the build-up -continued until a penetration was made, usually on the front of one -or two platoons. After consolidating the ground, the combat troops -then crept or wriggled forward against the open flank of the next -platoon position. Each step of the assault was executed with practiced -stealth and boldness, and the results of several such penetrations on a -battalion front could be devastating.[235] - - [235] The above description was derived from S. L. A. Marshall, - “CCF in the Attack” (EUSAK Staff Memorandum ORO-S-26), 5 - Jan 51. - -The pattern of attack was varied somewhat to suit different occasions. -As an example of an action in which the CCF used mortars, the following -is quoted from a Marine field report: - - Five to nine men [CCF] patrols were sent out forward of the main - body in an attempt to locate or establish [our] front lines and - flanks. After these patrols had withdrawn or been beaten off, white - phosphorus mortar shells were dropped about the area in an attempt - to inflict casualties. By closely watching the area for movement - in removing these casualties, they attempted to establish the - location of our front lines. After establishing what they believed - were the front lines, white phosphorous shells were dropped in the - lines and used as markers. While this was taking place, the assault - troops crawled forward to distances as close as possible to the - front lines ... [and] attacked at a given signal. The signal in - this particular instance was three blasts of a police whistle. - The attacking troops then rose and in a perfect skirmish formation - rushed the front line.[236] - - [236] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9_. The remainder of the - section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: _Ibid._; - G-2 _SAR_, 13–45; 1stMar _SAR_, 28–29; 5thMar _SAR_, - 38–44; EUSAK _Combat Information Bulletin No. 4_; FMFPac, - _CCF Tactics_, 1–5. - -It might be added that this attack resulted in a CCF penetration on a -platoon front. Friendly lines were restored only by dawn counterattacks. - -The ambush was a favorite resort of Chinese commanders. Whatever the -form of attack, the object was usually fractionalization of an opposing -force, so that the segments could be beaten in detail by a local -superiority in numbers. - -CCF attacking forces ranged as a rule from a platoon to a company in -size, being continually built up as casualties thinned the ranks. -Reports by newspaper correspondents of “hordes” and “human sea” -assaults were so unrealistic as to inspire a derisive Marine comment: - -“How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?” - -After giving CCF tactics due credit for their merits, some serious -weaknesses were also apparent. The primitive logistical system put such -restrictions on ammunition supplies, particularly artillery and mortar -shells, that a Chinese battalion sometimes had to be pulled back to -wait for replenishments if the first night’s attack failed. At best the -infantry received little help from supporting arms.[237] - - [237] These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early - months of CCF participation in the Korean conflict. - Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951--an - interlude with the enemy exploited for military - purposes--the Chinese gradually built up to an equality - with UN forces in mortars and artillery. - -POW interrogations revealed that in many instances each soldier was -issued 80 rounds of small arms ammunition upon crossing the Yalu. -This was his total supply. The artillery and mortars were so limited -that they must reserve their fire for the front line while passing -up lucrative targets in the rear areas. Some attempts were made to -bring reserve stocks up to forward supply dumps about 30 miles behind -the front, but not much could be accomplished with animal and human -transport. - -A primitive communications system also accounted for CCF shortcomings. -The radio net extended only down to the regimental level, and -telephones only to battalions or occasionally companies. Below the -battalion, communication depended on runners or such signaling devices -as bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights.[238] - - [238] 164-MISDI-1232, 1260, 1266, 1274, and 1275 in EUSAK _WD_, - 19, 26, and 28 Nov and 1 Dec 50; ADVATIS FWD #1. Rpt 0271 - in EUSAK _WD_ 4 Dec 50; X Corps _PIR 81_, Annex 2; G-2 - _SAR_, 17–18. - -The consequence was a tactical rigidity which at times was fatal. -Apparently CCF commanding officers had little or no option below the -battalion level. A battalion once committed to the attack often kept on -as long as its ammunition lasted, even if events indicated that it was -beating out its brains against the strongest part of the opposing line. -The result in many such instances was tactical suicide. - -After these defects are taken into full account, however, the Chinese -soldier and the Korean terrain made a formidable combination. -Ironically, Americans fighting the first war of the new Atomic Age -were encountering conditions reminiscent of the border warfare waged -by their pioneer forefathers against the Indians. These aborigines, -too, were outweighed in terms of weapons and equipment. But from time -immemorial the night has always been the ally of the primitive fighter, -and surprise his best weapon. Thus the Americans in Korea, like their -ancestors on the Western plains, could never be sure when the darkness -would erupt into flame as stealthy foes seemed to spring from the very -earth. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -The Battle of Sudong - -_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines--CCF -Counterattack at Sudong--Two Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of -NKPA Tank Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF -Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_ - - -The coastal plain of the Songchon estuary is one of the most spacious -flatlands in all North Korea. Its 100 square miles divide into two -irrigation districts, which regulate cultivation in a virtual sea of -rice paddies. The Songchon River, swollen by tributaries in its descent -from the northern hinterland, nourishes this agricultural complex -before flowing into the Sea of Japan. - -Flanking the mouth of the waterway are the port city of Hungnam to the -north and the town of Yonpo, with its modern airfield, to the south. -Eight miles upstream lies Hamhung, an important transportation center -with a population of approximately 85,000 Koreans and Japanese in 1940. - -Hamhung straddles the main railroad connecting Wonsan and Sonjin -as it follows the coastal route to the border of Soviet Russia. A -narrow-gauge line (2′ 6″) stems from Hungnam and passes through Hamhung -before penetrating into the mountainous heart of North Korea. Parallel -to this railroad is the only highway that could be utilized by the -transport of the 1st Marine Division for its advance to the north. - - -_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni_ - -Soon the eyes of the world would be fixed on maps of the narrow, -winding 78-mile stretch of dirt and gravel road leading from the -supply port of Hungnam to the forlorn village of Yudam-ni at the -western tip of the Chosin Reservoir. Distances in road miles between -points along the route are as follows: - - Hungnam to Hamhung 8 - Hamhung to Oro-ri 8 - Oro-ri to Majon-dong 14 - Majon-dong to Sudong 7 - Sudong to Chinhung-ni 6 - Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri 10 - Koto-ri to Hagaru 11 - Hagaru to Yudam-ni 14 - ---- - 78 - -The first half of the distance--the 43 miles from Hungnam to -Chinhung-ni--is traversed by a two-lane road passing through -comparatively level terrain. Rolling country is encountered north of -Majon-dong, but it is at Chinhung-ni that the road makes its abrupt -climb into a tumbled region of mile-high peaks. There are few straight -or level stretches all the rest of the 35 miles to Yudam-ni, but the -route from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri is the most difficult. - -Funchilin Pass, comprising eight of these ten miles, represents an -ascent of 2500 feet for a straining jeep or truck. The road is merely -a twisting, one-way shelf, with a cliff on one side and a chasm on the -other. - -About two miles south of Koto-ri the trail reaches a rugged plateau -region. There it rejoins the railway along the Changjin River, though -the narrow-gauge line was operative only from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni. - -Hagaru, at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, with highways -branching off on both sides of that body of water, was an important -communications center before the war. And even though many buildings -had been flattened by bombing, the town was still impressive as -compared to such wretched mountain hamlets as Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri. - -The road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni climbs from the tableland at the foot -of the Chosin Reservoir and winds its way up to 4000-foot Toktong Pass. -Descending through gloomy gorges, it finally reaches a broad valley -leading to Yudam-ni, where roads branch off to the north, west, and -south from a western arm of the Reservoir. - -This was the 78-mile main supply route that would soon be claiming -its page in history. In only a few weeks it would be known to thousands -of Marines as _the_ MSR, as if there never had been another. - -[Illustration: THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION - -November-December 1950 - - MAP-7 -] - -Officers and NCOs of the 7th Marines, which was fated to be the first -United States unit to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle, were -given a verbal preview of the MSR and the part it might play in their -future. This was as the result of a flight of inspection made by -Major Henry J. Woessner on 30 October, following a briefing at the X -Corps CP in Wonsan. The S-3 of the 7th Marines was fortunate enough -to arrive just in time to hear the briefing given General Barr by -General Almond. Pointing to the map, the X Corps commander indicated -that the 7th Infantry Division would push northward to Hyesanjin on -the Yalu. Meanwhile the Marines were to head for the border by way of -Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru while the 3d Infantry Division took -over responsibility for the rear area. - -“When we have cleared all this out,” concluded General Almond, pointing -again to the map, “the ROKs will take over, and we will pull our -divisions out of Korea.”[239] - - [239] Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance - flight are based on LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov - 56. - -At the X Corps CP, Woessner met a U. S. Army liaison officer just -returned from the 26th ROK Regiment with a report of that unit’s -encounter with Chinese Communists. The ROKs had been north of Sudong -when they collided with the new enemy and were pushed back, after -taking 16 prisoners. - -Colonel Edward H. Forney, ranking Marine officer on the X Corps staff, -arranged for Major Woessner to make a reconnaissance flight over the -Hamhung-Hagaru route in an Air Force T-6. The S-3 saw no sign of -enemy troop movements all the way to the northern end of the Chosin -Reservoir, but he did not fail to note the formidable character of the -terrain through which the new MSR passed. - -When he returned that evening with his report, Colonel Litzenberg -called a meeting of officers and NCOs at the regimental CP. In an -informal talk, he told them that they might soon be taking part in the -opening engagement of World War III. - -“We can expect to meet Chinese Communist troops,” he concluded, “and it -is important that we win the first battle. The results of that action -will reverberate around the world, and we want to make sure that the -outcome has an adverse effect in Moscow as well as Peiping.”[240] - - [240] Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov - 56; Maj M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is - from Litzenberg. - - -_ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines_ - -On 1 November the 7th Marines trucked out of Hamhung to an assembly -area midway between Oro-ri and Majon-dong. Moving into position behind -the 26th ROK Regiment without incident, Colonel Litzenberg ordered a -reconnaissance which took Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st -Battalion about four miles northward to the South Korean positions -above Majon-dong. Late that afternoon the regiment secured for the -night in a tight perimeter.[241] - - [241] 7thMar _SAR_, 5, 7. - -Attached to the regiment were the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Major -Francis F. Parry); Division Reconnaissance Company (First Lieutenant -Ralph B. Crossman); Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion (Captain Byron -C. Turner); 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin L. -Beall); Company E, 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Charles -K. Holloway); and detachments from the 1st Signal Battalion, 1st -Service Battalion, and Division Military Police Company.[242] - - [242] _Ibid._, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d. - -Intelligence based on the questioning of the 16 prisoners taken by the -ROKs had revealed that they had been attacked by elements of the 370th -Regiment of the 124th CCF Division. Along with the 125th and 126th, the -other two divisions of the 42d CCF Army, the 124th had crossed the Yalu -during the period 14–20 October. After marching southeast via Kanggye -and Changjin, the unit deployed for the defense of the Chosin Reservoir -power complex while the 126th pushed eastward to the Fusen Reservoir -and the 125th protected the right flank of the 42d CCF Army.[243] - - [243] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55. - -X Corps G-2 officers concluded that these CCF forces were “probably -flank security” for the enemy’s 4th Army Group across the peninsula in -the EUSAK zone.[244] The G-2 section of the 1st Marine Division arrived -at this interpretation: - - [244] X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov 50_, 24. - - The capture by the 26th ROK Regt. of 16 POWs identified as being - members of the 124th CCF Division ... would seem to indicate - that the CCF has decided to intervene in the Korean War. It - would indicate, also, that this reinforcement is being effected - by unit rather than by piecemeal replacement from volunteer - cadres. However, until more definite information is obtained it - must be presumed that the CCF has not yet decided on full scale - intervention.[245] - - [245] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. - -Division intelligence officers concluded their analysis with the -comment, “The advantage to be gained by all-out intervention, at a -time when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not -readily apparent.”[246] - - [246] _Ibid._ - -There was little activity in the valley on 31 October and 1 November. -The ROKs, upon learning that they would be relieved shortly by the -7th Marines, withdrew from advance positions near Sudong to a valley -junction about four miles south of that town. Here, at 0600 on 2 -November, they were hit by an enemy “counterattack” which, since it was -of about two-platoon strength and of only 30 minutes duration, amounted -really to a CCF combat patrol action.[247] - - [247] 1stMarDiv _PIRS 7 & 8_; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55. - -Shortly after this clash, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st -Battalion, 7th Marines, moved out of the regimental assembly area and -marched toward the ROK lines at Majon-dong in route column. Major Webb -D. Sawyer’s 2d Battalion followed at an interval of 500 yards, while -overhead the Corsairs of VMF-312 orbited on station for reconnaissance -and close air support missions.[248] - - [248] The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived - from: 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter - 3/11 _SAR_), 3; G-3 _SAR_, 16; 7thMar _SAR_, 12; VMF-312 - _SAR_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 10; Col H. L. - Litzenberg interv by HistDiv HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul - 51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51; - Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell - interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.; W. J. Davis interv, 18 - Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n. - d.; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen - H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser - Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.; - Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments, - 15 Apr 56; Bey Comments, 24 Apr 51. - -The passage of lines proceeded smoothly and quietly, save for the drone -of aircraft as they probed the reaches of the valley. It was over by -1030. Thereafter, progress to the front was slow and watchful. Led -by Company A, under Captain David W. Banks, the 1st Battalion took -ineffectual long-range CCF fire with only a few casualties. Batteries G -and H of 3/11 displaced forward during the morning, and at noon Battery -I opened up with the first of 26 missions fired by the artillery -battalion that day. - -Though second in the tactical column, 2/7 was responsible for high -ground on both sides of the MSR, dominated on the left by Hill 698. -Company D ascended the eastern slopes early in the afternoon to relieve -a ROK unit that apparently had been unable to hold the crest. When the -South Koreans saw the Marines approaching, they promptly abandoned -their position about midway up the slope and headed for the rear. - -[Illustration: BATTLE OF SUDONG 1ST PHASE - -MAP-8] - -Dog Company continued up the exposed hillside. Scattered enemy shots -from the top of the ridge gradually merged into a pattern of light -resistance as the Marines climbed higher. Captain Milton A. Hull -ordered his troops to halt, deployed his machine guns for return -fire, and radioed for an air strike. Within a few minutes a flight of -Corsairs swept down and worked over the ridgeline. - -Hull’s only assault route traversed a barren area about 50 yards from -the crest. His two assault platoons, fully exposed to the enemy’s -observation, inched upward by fire and movement, taking casualties, -and finally reached the top. Their foothold on the ridgeline did not -discourage the Red Chinese, who continued to pour fire from skillfully -camouflaged positions. To prevent continued attrition among his now -exhausted troops (by this time they had climbed some 1600 vertical -feet from ground level over an average gradient of 25 per cent), -Hull recalled the two platoons to the eastern slopes and radioed for -supporting fire. - -This fire was not forthcoming. Company D held a line near the summit -until about 2200 when Easy Company passed through to occupy a small -plateau about 150 yards below the crest for the night. - -Meanwhile, down in the valley, Litzenberg’s “walking perimeter” -completed a 1300-yard advance by 1630. Owing to the nature of the -terrain, with the attendant 360-degree vulnerability, the regimental -commander stipulated that the 7th Marines’ column extend not less than -4000 (the minimum distance which would allow for close-in artillery -support) nor more than 6000 yards in length. This allowed sufficient -depth for over-all protection, with no loss of mutual support among the -three infantry battalions. - -Enemy resistance had flared up now and then in the course of the -day, but Marine supporting arms so ruled the valley that no serious -challenge by the Chinese developed. VMF-312 flew 12 close support -missions in the Sudong area, and VMF(N)-513 assisted with several -more. The whole precipitous skyline on either side of the regiment was -blasted with 500-pound bombs, 20mm shells, and high-velocity rockets. - -By way of reply to the heavy shelling and bombing, Chinese mortars and -at least one small artillery piece began to fire sporadically as the -day wore on. A 120mm mortar round struck 1/7’s CP at 1700 and wounded -three men. - - -_CCF Counterattack at Sudong_ - -Although the unit commanders of the 7th Marines anticipated more -fighting with the new enemy, they probably did not suspect what the -night held in store when the regiment dug in at dusk on 2 November. -They did not know that the 371st Regiment, 124th CCF Division, was -massed to the north and west, nor that the 370th Regiment occupied high -ground east of the MSR in strength--both units within easy striking -distance of Litzenberg’s perimeter. The 372d Regiment, in reserve, -stood poised in its hidden encampment several miles to the rear.[249] - - [249] This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: - G-3 _SAR_, 18–19; 7thMar _SAR_, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n. - p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 9_ & _10_; Litzenberg - interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51; - Holland-Theros-Connell interv, n. d.; Wilson-Graeber - interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct - 55; Geer, _The New Breed_, 228–235; Capt William J. - Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, MS.; - Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G. - Davis Comments, n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; - Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer - Comments, n. d. - -Leading elements of the 7th Marines deployed defensively less than -a mile south of Sudong (see Map 8). To the right of the MSR, Able -Company’s 3d, 2d, and 1st Platoons, in that order, formed a line which -extended across Hill 532 and part way up a spur of massive Hill 727, -then bent rearward sharply to refuse the east flank. Emplaced along -the road in anti-mechanized defense was the company’s 3.5-inch rocket -squad. The 60mm mortar section and company CP set up in the low ground -behind the spur, but Captain Banks himself decided to spend the night -in an OP with his rifle platoons. - -Lieutenant Colonel Davis of 1/7 deployed Charlie Company (-) across the -MSR from Able, on the northeast slopes of Hill 698.[250] To the rear, -headquarters and one platoon of Company B dug in on an arm of the same -hill, while the other two platoons went into position on the lower -reaches of Hill 727 behind Company A. One platoon of Charlie Company, -Davis’ CP and the battalion 81mm mortars were located in low ground -behind Able Company and the elements of Baker on the right of the road. - - [250] Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company - was unable to move position until dusk. As Col Davis - has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed - Charlie to move into position unseen by the Chinese and - was a major factor in trapping the Chinese in the valley - the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3. - -South of 1/7 lay Major Sawyer’s 2d Battalion with Company D at the foot -of Hill 698, E on its crest and slopes, and F spread along the steep -incline of 727. Sawyer’s CP and elements of the 7th Marines’ Antitank -and 4.2-inch Mortar Companies were situated in a shallow meadow along -the road beneath the Fox Company positions. Several hundred yards -to the rear, south of a sharp bend in the road, Major Maurice E. -Roach’s 3d Battalion deployed in what was in effect a second perimeter -protecting the regimental train, 3/11, and Litzenberg’s CP on the -valley floor. Tieing in at the MSR, Companies H and I occupied ridges -on the left and right of the road respectively, while G (-) arched -through the low ground as the southernmost element of the regiment. -Colonel Litzenberg was concerned about the valley which joined the -Sudong Valley below Oro-ri lest it contain Chinese. He had Major Roach -make a helicopter reconnaissance during the afternoon. Roach sighted -nothing.[251] - - [251] LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56. - -Except for the occasional thump of an incoming mortar round, night -settled on the valley and the Marine perimeter with deceptive quiet. -Deceptive, since at Sudong two CCF battalions were poised to smash at -the 7th Marines with a well-coordinated double envelopment. - -At 2300, Davis’ 1st Battalion reported itself under attack from the -right flank, the enemy apparently descending the higher slopes of -Hill 727. This announcement was somewhat premature, as the Marines of -Company A were merely experiencing the infiltration and probing that -precede almost every Communist assault. At 2400, 2/7 reported two enemy -battalions on the left flank.[252] During the first hour of 3 November, -sobering messages were received from Litzenberg’s northernmost units. -What had begun at 2300 as a staccato of small-arms fire swelled in -volume by imperceptible degrees until Hills 698 and 727 were engulfed -in a ceaseless din. And by 0100 the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th -Marines bent under the weight of a full-scale attack on both flanks. - - [252] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither - D nor F Companies was involved at this time, the - information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however, - doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E - Company was made by more than 20 men. Capt R. T. Bey - Comments, 24 Apr 56. - -Avoiding the obvious approach through the corridor leading south from -Sudong, the commander of the 371st CCF Regiment had dispatched a -battalion along each of the ridgelines bordering the valley. Bursting -flares and bugle calls signaled when the two assault units came -abreast of the Marine positions on the lower reaches of Hills 727 and -698. Then, treading swiftly and silently in their rubber sneakers, -the Chinese infantrymen swept down obliquely and struck Able and Fox -Companies on the east and Baker on the west. Charlie on the slopes -of Hill 698 was undisturbed. Where the Chinese met resistance, they -slugged it out at close range with grenades and submachine guns. -Where they found gaps, they poured through and raced to the low -ground. To the Marines, the specific CCF objectives were not readily -apparent in those hectic hours before dawn, for the enemy seemed to be -everywhere.[253] - - [253] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_; 7thMar msg - to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530 3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51. - -Shortly after the battle was joined high on the hillsides, Marines at -Able Company’s CP heard the clanking sounds of a tracked vehicle on -the MSR to the north. When the machine passed the rocket section at -the roadblock without incident, they dropped their guards momentarily, -believing it to be a friendly bulldozer. The big vehicle rumbled into -the CP and stopped, one headlight glaring at exposed mortar crews and -headquarters personnel. - -“Tank!” shouted Staff Sergeant Donald T. Jones, section chief of Able -Company’s 60mm mortars. - -It was a Russian T-34, one of the five remaining to the 344th North -Korean Tank Regiment, supporting the 124th CCF Division. The troops at -the roadblock had been caught napping. - -A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank sent the lightly armed -Marines scurrying for cover. The armored vehicle quickly withdrew -to the road and drove farther south, into 1/7s’ CP. After a short, -inquisitive pause, it rumbled toward the 1st Battalion’s 81mm mortar -positions. The Russian 85mm rifle flashed four times in the darkness, -but the shells screamed harmlessly over the mortars and detonated in -the high ground beyond. - -Rocket launchers of Charlie Company and the recoilless rifles of -7th Marines Antitank Company opened up from positions around 1/7’s -headquarters. At least one 75mm round struck home, and the belt of -sandbags around the T-34’s turret began to burn. The tank swung back -onto the MSR and headed north. Approaching Able Company’s roadblock, -through which it had entered the Marine position, it took a hit from -the 3.5-inch rocket section. In reply, one 85mm shell at pistol range -all but wiped out the Marine antitank crew. The enemy vehicle, trailing -flame and sparks, clanked around a bend in the road and disappeared. - -Not long after this astounding foray, the fighting on Hills 698 and 727 -spread down to the MSR. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, pressed -now from three directions and suffering heavy casualties, retracted to -the 3d Platoon positions at the tip of the spur. Some of the men were -cut off and forced back on the Baker Company elements east of the MSR. -Ultimately, one of the two Company B platoons in this area was driven -down to the low ground, and the other forced to fall back. Later they -counterattacked and recovered their foxholes. - -West of the MSR, the remainder of Company B fought off assaults on its -left flank and rear by Chinese who had skirted around Charlie Company’s -advance positions.[254] Lieutenant Colonel Davis sent the battalion -reserve, Lieutenant Graeber’s 2d Platoon of Baker, to reinforce the -hard pressed left platoon. Attempting to lead his men across the MSR, -Graeber found the route effectively blocked by the enemy in the river -bed. - - [254] _Ibid._ - -Descending now from both sides of the road, enemy infantrymen swarmed -over the valley floor. They overran most of the 7th Marines 4.2-inch -Mortar Company and captured one of its tubes. They seriously threatened -the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs and the AT Company in the same general -idea. High on the slopes in 2/7’s zone, Companies E and F were beset -by small bands of infiltrators. And though these two companies held -their ground, the Reds found their flanks, slipped behind them, and -entrenched at the key road bend separating 2/7 from 3/7 to the south. -The principal Marine unit at the sharp curve in the MSR was Battery I, -whose position in the low ground became increasingly precarious as the -night wore on. - - -_Two Marine Battalions Cut Off_ - -Dawn of 3 November revealed a confused and alarming situation in -the valley south of Sudong. Enemy troops shared the low ground with -Marine elements between the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs, and they had -blown out a section of the MSR in this locale.[255] The 2d Battalion’s -commander later remarked, “When daylight came, we found that we were -in a dickens of a mess. The rifle companies were well up in the hills, -and the Chinese were occupying the terrain between the CP and the -companies.”[256] - - [255] The demolition had little more than dramatic effect, - however, since the Songchon river bed was negotiable to - vehicles of all types. - - [256] Sawyer Comments. - -Between 2/7 and 3/7, a company of Reds had dug in on a finger of -high ground overlooking the road bend and Battery I from the east. -Scattered Chinese forces roamed Hills 698 and 727 almost at will. -On the latter height, elements of the 371st CCF Regiment had been -reinforced by a battalion of the 370th, so that pressure against the -right flank of 1/7 and 2/7 continued long after daybreak.[257] - - [257] _Ibid._; X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50; 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, - 1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 235–236. - -With his lead battalions thrown back on the defensive, Colonel -Litzenberg relied on overwhelming superiority in supporting arms to -tip the scales on 3 November and regain the initiative. While the -regimental 4.2-inch mortars fired, howitzers of Batteries G and H -thundered almost ceaselessly the whole night long from positions within -3/7’s perimeter. Battery I, after being extricated from the enemy -dominated road bend at 1100 with the help of a platoon of G Company, -added its metal to the bombardment. In the course of the day, the -18 field pieces of the battalion fired a total of 1431 rounds in 49 -missions.[258] - - [258] 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d. - -VMF-312 provided constant air cover after first light. Its planes not -only scourged enemy assault troops left exposed on the ridges, but -also searched out and attacked CCF artillery positions and vehicles. -This squadron alone flew 18 close support missions on 3 November, the -alternating flights being led by Major Daniel H. Davis, Captain Harry -G. C. Henneberger, Captain George E. McClane, and First Lieutenant -Shelby M. Forrest.[259] VMF(N)-513 dispatched a flight of night -fighters to Sudong at 0910 under Major Robert L. Cochran. After raking -enemy troops with 1500 rounds from their 20mm cannon, Cochran and his -three pilots unloaded three general purpose and fragmentation bombs -along with 15 high-velocity rockets.[260] - - [259] VMF-312 _SAR_, 12. - - [260] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 11. The others on this flight were Capt - Edwin Pendry, 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E. - Jennings. - -As much supporting fire fell within the 7th Regiment’s perimeter as -outside. Since the crack of dawn it had been the principal mission -of the advance Marine elements to eject scores of Chinese troops, -individuals and small bands, who were scattered along the hillsides -and valley floor within the zones of the 1st and 2d Battalions. While -accomplishing this task, the Marines established a tactical principle -for coming weeks: that to nullify Chinese night tactics, regardless of -large-scale penetrations and infiltration, defending units had only to -maintain position until daybreak. With observation restored, Marine -firepower invariably would melt down the Chinese mass to impotency. - -This was the case on 3 November, although the melting down process was -a savage, all-day affair. With the help of air, artillery, and mortars, -the 1st Battalion cleared the low ground by midmorning and restored its -right flank later in the day. The Chinese in the valley were crushed, -the main group being annihilated by the heavy machine guns of Weapons -Company as they attempted to march northward along the railroad in -column at daylight. Counted enemy dead in 1/7’s zone alone amounted to -662.[261] - - [261] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar - _SAR_, 13; R. G. Davis Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments. - -The main effort in the 2d Battalion’s zone was aimed at the CCF -concentration on the spur of Hill 727 overlooking the bend in the -MSR. Owing to this barrier, Litzenberg had to call for an airdrop of -supplies to sustain his leading elements on 3 November.[262] Major -Sawyer ordered Company D, on the base of Hill 698 to the south of the -roadblock, to move up the valley, cross the river, and clean out the -spur at Hill 727. Finding the low ground blocked by heavy fire, Captain -Hull circled to the left along the incline of Hill 698, intending to -come abreast of the Chinese strong point before striking at it across -the MSR.[263] - - [262] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul - 51. - - [263] Goggin interv; Hull Comments. - -Meanwhile, Captain Walter D. Phillips’ Easy Company, perched on the -side of Hill 698, struggled to secure the peak of that hill mass. A -rush by First Lieutenant John Yancey’s 2d Platoon at about 0800 secured -a small plateau about 50 yards below the crest against the opposition -of one Chinese soldier. First Lieutenant Robert T. Bey’s 3d Platoon -then passed through and frontally assaulted the peak only to be thrown -back by what Bey calls “the most concentrated grenade barrage this -writer has had the dubious distinction to witness.” Following an air -strike at about 1400 Easy Company secured the crest with its 40 Chinese -dead.[264] - - [264] Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56. - -With all of the rifle companies involved in fire fights or security -missions, Litzenberg resorted to supporting arms and headquarters -troops to knock out the roadblock. From his regimental CP he dispatched -First Lieutenant Earl R. Delong, Executive Officer of the AT Company, -with a reserve 75mm recoilless rifle and a makeshift crew. Delong moved -into position opposite the strong point at a range of 500 yards, while -air and artillery hammered the enemy positions.[265] - - [265] 7thMar msg to CG 1st MarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E. - R. Delong interv, 18 Oct 50. - -Simultaneously, the Division Reconnaissance Company ascended the high -ground east of the MSR in the vicinity of Litzenberg’s headquarters, -then advanced northward along the ridge to envelop the roadblock. This -unit, just returned from an active, overnight patrol to Huksu-ri, moved -into a hillside position and took the rear of the Chinese under fire -across an intervening gulley.[266] - - [266] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, EE (hereafter HqBn _SAR_), 10; HqBn - _URpt 8_, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55. - -Delong’s 75 had begun firing high explosive and white phosphorus into -the enemy’s front; and Company D, after cleaning up the scattered -resistance on the slopes of Hill 698, closed on the roadblock under -cover of two air strikes and prepared to assault. The Chinese, -obviously shaken by the pounding of supporting arms, had commenced a -withdrawal into the hills east of the roadbend when Hull’s men began -their assault. From Recon Company’s positions, Lieutenant Crossman -called for air and artillery to catch the retreating Reds in the -open. But the request was turned down because Dog Company troops were -already filtering through the objective area. By 1810 the roadblock was -eliminated, although Dog Company had to withstand two counterattacks -before its hold on the spur was secure. The Chinese had left behind 28 -dead, strewn among the boulders and recesses of a natural redoubt.[267] - - [267] _Ibid._, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and - 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments. - -The main enemy encroachments having been smashed, the 7th Marines’ -MSR was again clear for traffic, save for long-range harassment by an -occasional CCF rifleman hidden in the hills. At dusk, trucks streamed -northward from the regimental CP to deliver supplies to the 1st and -2d Battalions and to evacuate about 100 battle casualties from those -units. The wounded were rushed to the Division Hospital and the 121st -Army Evacuation Hospital in Hungnam.[268] - - [268] 7thMar _SAR_, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 - 1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50; and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50. - Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action - reports, since all 7th Marines’ records were destroyed - before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni in early December - 1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those - casualty figures for the Division as a whole can be - reported with consistent accuracy. - - -_End of NKPA Tank Regiment_ - -The coming of darkness on 3 November marked the finish of the first -phase. Litzenberg’s perimeter remained essentially the same as on the -previous day, the only changes being Company D’s occupation of the -high ground east of the road bend, Recon Company’s assumption of local -security at the regimental CP, and 3/11’s tighter concentration within -the zone of 3/7. What few light contacts occurred during the night were -decided quickly by Marine artillery and mortars.[269] - - [269] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn - _URpt 8_, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and - 1508 4 Nov 50. - -Later intelligence evaluations proved that these contacts could have -involved only CCF patrols or stragglers, for it was in this same period -that the 370th and 371st CCF Regiments withdrew some three miles from -Sudong to a defense line established by elements of the 372d Regiment -north of Chinhung-ni. The two assault units had paid a high price for -failure during the 2–4 November fighting. The 371st Regiment lost the -equivalent of five companies out of its 1st and 3d Battalions, with the -total dead estimated at 793. And the 3d Battalion, 370th Regiment, was -reduced by the destruction of two companies.[270] - - [270] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 11_ and _12_, - encl 1; 7thMar _SAR_, n. p. - -It was a wobbly 124th CCF Division, then, that dug in with heavy -machine guns and mortars on two massive hills, 987 and 891, flanking -the MSR about two miles north of Chinhung-ni. The depleted 344th NKPA -Tank Regiment could not avail itself of such defensible terrain, -for until Marine engineers widened the tortuous cliff road through -Funchilin Pass it would not accommodate armor.[271] - - [271] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn _SAR_), 8; - and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p. - -Apparently the Chinese Communists had left their North Korean comrades -of the 344th to fend for themselves. The NKPA unit had already dwindled -considerably from its original organization of three armored and -three infantry companies. On 2 November it comprised only five T-34s -and their crews. One of these machines, after being damaged during -the single-handed raid on the 7th Marines’ perimeter that night, was -abandoned the next day. The NKPA crews put the remaining four vehicles -into camouflaged positions next to the MSR at Chinhung-ni, where they -waited resignedly at a tactical dead-end.[272] - - [272] G-2 _SAR_, 34; and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p. - -Colonel Litzenberg was aware of the probability of further resistance -along the road, since on 3 November Marine air had reported -approximately 300 enemy trucks--in groups of 15 or 20--on the move -south of the Chosin Reservoir.[273] At dawn of 4 November, after -a night of relative calm around the old perimeter, he ordered his -subordinates to conduct vigorous patrolling preparatory to continuing -the advance.[274] - - [273] 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_. - - [274] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50. - -[Illustration: CHINHUNG-NI TANK FIGHT - -4 November - - MAP-9 -] - -Troops of 1/7 moved forward in the early light and scouted the valley -as far north as the edge of Sudong. They met no opposition and returned -to the perimeter. Litzenberg then formed the 7th Marines in column, -with the Reconnaissance Company in the lead, followed by 1/7 and 3/7 in -that order. He left the 2d Battalion in position on Hills 698 and 727 -to protect the regimental flanks.[275] - - [275] The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with - enemy tanks is derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 13; - Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, _The New - Breed_, 236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC, - 21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50; - R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman Comments, - n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56. - -Recon Company moved out in jeeps at 0800, First Lieutenant Ernest C. -Hargett’s 1st Platoon in the point. Entering Sudong a short time later, -the vanguard rounded a bend in the middle of town and surprised a group -of CCF soldiers. In a 30-minute fight, Hargett’s men killed three and -captured about 20. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the Reconnaissance Company -meanwhile inspected the high ground above Sudong without opposition. - -Lieutenant Crossman reorganized his company in column on the road and -set out for Chinhung-ni with Second Lieutenant Donald W. Sharon’s 2d -Platoon in the lead. About the same time, 1000, the 1st Battalion moved -out of the 7th Marines’ perimeter south of Sudong and traced Crossman’s -route through the low ground. - -At Chinhung-ni the highway runs along the east side of the river while -the railroad traces the west side. The narrow-gauge track enters -the village over a bridge spanning a branch stream. Just beyond is -Samgo station, which served as a railhead for the cable-car system of -Funchilin Pass. As the Reconnaissance Company approached Chinhung-ni on -4 November, a small group of Chinese soldiers milled around the train -cars and buildings of Samgo Station. They probably had some tactical -connection with the four T-34 tanks camouflaged opposite them across -the river and road; but the two forces seemed oblivious not only of -each other but also of the Marines bearing down on them. - -Lieutenant Sharon’s platoon advanced rapidly from Sudong at 1400, -followed closely by the rest of the Reconnaissance Company and -a section of 75mm recoilless rifles. About 2000 yards south of -Chinhung-ni they halted on sighting fresh tank tracks but quickly -moved out again on orders of Lieutenant Colonel Davis. At the highway -entrance to Chinhung-ni, Sharon’s troops unknowingly passed the first -T-34, hidden on the right of the road. Coming abreast of the second -Communist tank, which also remained undetected for the moment, the -Marines spotted the Chinese soldiers across the river at Samgo Station -and opened fire. - -The CCF infantrymen scattered under the hail of small-arms fire and -many of them were cut down. This was fortunate for Company C of 1/7, -which was marching along the railroad tracks and just then nearing -the bridge south of the station, where it could have been taken under -enfilade fire by the enemy soldiers and tanks. - -It was during the exchange with the Chinese that Sharon and his men -spotted the second North Korean tank under a pile of brush on the right -of the road. The platoon leader, accompanied by Staff Sergeant Richard -B. Twohey and Corporal Joseph E. McDermott, climbed upon the dormant -vehicle. Suddenly the periscope began to revolve. McDermott smashed the -glass and Twohey dropped in a grenade. With Sharon they jumped to the -ground just as the grenade exploded inside the machine. - -The tank engine roared and the vehicle lurched toward the three -Marines. Twohey jumped on it again and dropped another grenade down -the periscope. After the dull thump of the second explosion, the T-34 -stopped dead and began smoking. - -By this time Staff Sergeant William L. Vick’s 75mm recoilless gun -section and 3.5-inch rocket crews of Company C had moved up. Together -they gave the _coup de grace_ to the damaged T-34. Simultaneously, -Sharon’s men saw a thatched hut farther down the road disintegrate -as tank number three emerged, its 85mm rifle swinging menacingly -toward the valley crowded with Marines and vehicles. First Lieutenant -Raymond J. Elledge fired his 75s from their carts, and Company C’s -rocket launchers opened up. The T-34 took hits but rumbled on. Seconds -earlier, First Lieutenant Dan C. Holland, Forward Air Controller -for 1/7, had radioed overhead Corsairs for assistance. One of the -gull-winged planes plummetted out of formation and unleashed a pair of -five-inch rockets. They were direct hits. The T-34 blew up and died on -the road.[276] - - [276] Available records do not indicate whether tank number - three should be credited to VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513, - both of which had close-support flights in the area. - -Sharon and his men moved forward cautiously. While passing the blazing -hulk, they spotted enemy tank Number Four, camouflaged against a -hillside just ahead. At almost the same moment, Marines passing -Chinhung-ni stumbled upon docile tank Number One in the midst of their -formation. Recoilless rifles and rocket launchers blasted the machine, -and its crew climbed out and surrendered. Sharon then led the antitank -crews through the river bed toward the fourth T-34. The Communist -tankmen, entrenched on the slope behind their empty vehicle, gave up -without a fight. The tank itself was knocked out by 3.5-inch rockets -and 75mm shells; and the 344th NKPA Tank Regiment ceased to exist. - - -_The Fight for How Hill_ - -After the destruction of enemy armor, Colonel Litzenberg began -deploying the 7th Marines in perimeter around the valley junction at -Chinhung-ni. The advance had netted about 6000 yards by midafternoon, -and the remaining daylight was needed to bring all elements forward and -consolidate the newly won ground.[277] - - [277] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; and 1stMarDiv _POR 116_. - -Aware that the Chinese were at the top of Funchilin Pass but not that -he was directly under their guns, the regimental commander at 1600 -ordered Reconnaissance Company to patrol some 2000 yards into Funchilin -Pass and outpost the southern tip of Hill 891. The high ground selected -for the outpost coincided with the eastern half of the Chinese forward -line, and it would later be remembered as “How Hill” in honor of -Company H of 3/7.[278] - - [278] 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, - 20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56. - -As 1/7 dug in on the heights flanking Chinhung-ni, Recon Company, with -Second Lieutenant Charles R. Puckett’s 3d Platoon leading, advanced -in motorized column about a mile into the pass. At this point, Hill -987 looms up on the west and the highway veers sharply to the east for -approximately 1000 yards. After a hairpin turn, the road climbs on a -parallel line almost to its starting point, then resumes its northerly -course, clinging to the rocky wall of Hill 891 which rises abruptly -from the chasm that separates it from Hill 987. - -Puckett’s platoon had approached the road bend warily, for a sizeable -enemy group had been spotted earlier near the base of Hill 987 across -the gorge. At 1630 the first two jeeps of the column eased around the -curve and immediately came under fire from Hill 987 to the left, 891 to -the front, and from a CCF patrol to the right, on the road itself.[279] - - [279] HqBn _URpt 8_, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 - Oct 55. - -For 45 minutes Puckett and his men were pinned to the road and -hillside, and only darkness and a strike by Marine air finally -enabled the whole column to withdraw to the 7th Marines’ lines. The -clash cost Recon two killed and five wounded, and heavy machine-gun -fire had destroyed the two lead jeeps.[280] - - [280] _Ibid._ - -[Illustration: ACTION OF 4–5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS - - MAP-10 -] - -During the relatively quiet night of 4–5 November, Colonel Litzenberg -issued his order for the next day’s advance. The 1st Battalion was -to hold the flanks at Chinhung-ni while 3/7, followed at a distance -of 500–1000 yards by 2/7, passed through and attacked into Funchilin -Pass. Major Parry’s 3/11 and the 4.2 Mortar Company were to support -the infantry by high-angle fire from positions south of Sudong.[281] -Resistance could be expected, for even as the 7th Marines peacefully -sat out the hours of darkness, the night fighters of VMF(N)-513 were -bombing and strafing enemy convoys around the southern tip of the -Chosin Reservoir.[282] - - [281] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; 3/11 _SAR_, 3. - - [282] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 12. - -At 0700 Lieutenant Hargett’s 1st Platoon of Recon Company departed -Chinhung-ni along the MSR to patrol on the right flank. Reaching the -hairpin curve, the platoon was pinned down by enemy fire at exactly the -same place where Puckett’s unit had come to grief. VMF-312 and 3/11 -promptly went into action, and Hargett ultimately withdrew his patrol -under the shield of their supporting fire. Marine casualties were four -wounded.[283] - - [283] HqBn _SAR_, 12; HqBn _URpt 9_, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon - interv, 20 Oct 55; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237–238; - Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last - employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it - was detached and ordered back to Majon-dong to patrol the - road to Huksu-ri and the division’s left flank. - -Major Roach’s 3d Battalion moved out for the attack at 0800, passing -through the high-ground positions of 1/7 on either side of Chinhung-ni. -Company I advanced toward Hill 987 and G toward 891 (see Map 10). -Both units were hit hard by small-arms and machine-gun fire as they -came abreast of the road bend; and for the remainder of the day, the -“advance was negligible.”[284] - - [284] The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar - _SAR_, 13–14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; VMF-312 - _SAR_, 9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 13; 1stMarDiv _OpnO 19-50_, - 5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W. - J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 12 & 13_; - Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130 - 5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200, - 1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215 5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245, - 1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar _ISUM 14_; - 1stMarDiv _POR 122_; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237-240; - Capt H. H. Harris Comments, n. d.; Earney Comments, 2–8; - Capt M. P. Newton, “The Attack on ‘How’ Hill,” (MS); - Roach Comments, 7 May 56. - -From 1000 onward, the second phase of the battle roared to a climax -as a duel between supporting arms. In 26 missions during 5 November, -the batteries of 3/11 threw 943 shells into the enemy positions. The -Chinese answered with counterbattery fire from their 122mm mortars, -but toward the end of the day these weapons were silenced by Marine -howitzer barrages. A forward observer with Company G reported an enemy -ammunition dump destroyed. This information was later verified by a -POW who mentioned the following additional losses in CCF mortars: 10 -crewmen killed and 17 wounded, one mortar destroyed, two mortars put -out of action, and the dispersal of “most of the remaining personnel.” - -VMF-312 flew 37 sorties in 90 hours of close support combat on the -5th. Between Chinhung-ni and the Chosin Reservoir, 21 enemy trucks -were destroyed. Pilots reported that “the surrounding ridges were -filled with enemy troops” and that their strikes against these Chinese -were “extremely effective.” Led by Major Cochran and Captain Otis W. -S. Corman, flights from VMF(N)-513 blasted troops, buildings, supply -vehicles, and gun emplacements scattered from Koto-ri at the top of -Funchilin Pass to Hagaru at the reservoir. General Smith, during a -helicopter visit to Litzenberg’s CP, remarked that a “considerable -number of planes ... really worked the place over.”[285] - - [285] Smith, _Chronicle_, 73. - -On the ground, the fight ended at dusk with the Chinese retaining their -firm grip on these well camouflaged positions studding Hills 891 and -987 despite heavy losses.[286] Marine casualties were light, for it -was the tortuous terrain in conjunction with enemy bullets, not enemy -fire alone, that obstructed the attackers. Since General Smith earlier -in the day had named Koto-ri as the 7th Marines’ immediate objective, -Colonel Litzenberg ordered the 3d Battalion to resume the advance at -0800 the next morning. - - [286] One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms - that he could, then climbed out of his bunker and walked - into G Company’s lines to surrender. On interrogation - he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987, - one on Hill 891, and the reserve battalion in the saddle - between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56. - -The night of 5–6 November witnessed only minor contacts around the -regimental perimeter. Some 200 Korean laborers accounted for most of -the activity during darkness as they carried supplies to forward Marine -positions and evacuated casualties to the rear. - -Major Roach’s plan for 6 November called for How Company, supported by -the fire of George, to envelop the southeast slope of Hill 891 while -Item continued its attack on Hill 987. At about 0800 First Lieutenant -Howard H. Harris led How Company out of its reserve position. It took -him until nearly 1500 to traverse the rugged landscape and get into -position. Meanwhile, Item Company under First Lieutenant William E. -Johnson had beaten off one counterattack and edged about 300 yards -closer to Hill 987, with its most effective opposition coming from -bunkers on a spur overlooking the MSR. - -Captain Thomas E. Cooney had been wounded twice the previous day while -leading Company G against the trenches and foxholes on the southern tip -of Hill 891. Except for a feint by one platoon along the MSR into the -hairpin turn, his company spent the day in a long-range fight with the -Chinese defenders. - -Lieutenant Harris led his men over the high ground behind G into -positions to the east. Cooney’s experience showed that the only -possible approach to Hill 891 was to flank it from the southeast. -Although the fresh company arrived sometime after 1400, its attack -was held up until about 1600 to await air. Following a strike by two -Corsairs, the howitzers of 3/11 and the regimental 4.2 mortars began -pounding the Chinese positions. - -How Company jumped off at about 1615. Two assault platoons, led by -Second Lieutenants Robert D. Reem and Minard P. Newton, descended into -the intervening gulley at the tip of the hairpin curve. During a quick -reorganization in the low ground, machine guns were posted to cover -the ascent. Then the platoons started up towards the enemy-held summit -through companion draws, Harris accompanying Newton’s outfit on the -left. - -The powdery soil of the steep slope made climbing difficult and -exhausting. About a hundred yards up, Newton’s platoon began receiving -light fire, followed a few yards farther by a hail of grenades and -machine gun slugs. The Marines inched forward and were stopped by -the Chinese fire. On the right, meanwhile, Reed climbed against -no opposition, so it appeared that the envelopment was working. -Unexpectedly, the two draws converged near the top of the hill, with -the result that the platoons met. - -Lieutenant Harris revised his plans by directing Newton, with his left -squad supporting by BAR fire, to lead Reem to the top of the hill. Once -there, Newton was to swing right and Reem left to envelop the Chinese -positions. Newton worked a squad up onto a nose extending out from -the summit. The Chinese replied with a renewed barrage of grenades -and counterattacked Newton’s left. Sergeant Charlie Foster, seeing -apparent victory turning into defeat, lunged forward to break up the -attack. He reached the top and died but the men behind him repulsed the -Reds. - -During the close fighting on the left, Lieutenant Reem had gathered -his squad leaders for instructions preparatory to the final assault on -the right. An enemy grenade fell into the midst of the group, and Reem -was killed as he smothered the explosion with his body. Staff Sergeant -Anthony J. Ricardi took over the platoon. - -At about 1800 Harris radioed Roach that his troops were exhausted. -Although it was already dusk, he was bringing up his reserve platoon, -he said, for the Chinese still held the crest in strength. Company -H had taken only eight casualties, but ammunition was low and the -approaching darkness prevented the dispatching of more fresh troops. -The battalion commander relayed the report to Colonel Litzenberg, who -immediately ordered the company to disengage and withdraw. The fighting -descent under cover of a 4.2 mortar and artillery bombardment brought -Company H back within the lines of 3/7 by 2000 with its six wounded and -the body of Lieutenant Reem. - - -_Disappearance of CCF Remnants_ - -Darkness on the night of 6 November descended like a cloak over the -124th CCF Division. In the morning the Chinese had vanished. The 3d -Battalion, 7th Marines, encountered no opposition whatever as it -occupied the southern tips of Hills 891 and 987.[287] - - [287] 7thMar _SAR_ 14. - -The mysterious disappearance of this unit, following the equally -strange withdrawal of the Chinese Reds who made the first CCF contacts -in the EUSAK zone, aroused no end of speculation. Officers of the -7th Marines believed that enemy losses had been heavy enough for a -disabling effect. This opinion was confirmed the following year when -a Marine Corps Board visited Korea for a special analytical study -of Marine operations of 1950, based on all Army and Marine records -available at that time as well as interviews and interrogations. The -Board concluded that “the 124th CCF Division was estimated to have been -rendered militarily noneffective.”[288] - - [288] _Marine Corps Board Study_ (hereafter _MCB Study_), - II-C-16. _CCF Army Histories_, 31, states that the 124th - was in action in west central Korea by the middle of - November. - -Following the enemy’s disappearance on the night of 6–7 November, the -7th Marines occupied the southern reaches of Hills 891 and 987 while -reconnoitering to the top of 891. The rest of the day and all the next -was devoted to consolidating positions along the MSR and sending out -patrols in a vain search for the vanished 124th CCF Division.[289] - - [289] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May - 56. - -On 8 November, General Almond visited the 7th Marines. Upon hearing -of the valor of Captain Cooney at “How Hill,” he awarded that officer -the Silver Star medal on the spot. There being neither pendant nor -citation available, the Corps Commander pinned a slip of paper to -Cooney’s jacket in the brief ceremony. Scrawled on the fragment was the -inscription, “Silver Star Medal for Gallantry in Action--Almond.”[290] - - [290] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG’s Diary in X - Corps _WD_, 8 Nov 50; Roach Comments, 7 May 56. - -While the 7th Marines advanced astride the MSR, a volunteer patrol of -fifteen men, led by First Lieutenant William F. Goggin of 2/7, traced -a lonely, circuitous route in the mountains to the west. Having left -Chinhung-ni at 1200 on 8 November, the scouting party covered some 25 -miles through perpendicular wilds during the following 26 hours. This -journey brought it to the Chosin Reservoir plateau at a point just -southwest of Koto-ri. - -Lieutenant Goggin, his slight wound the only scar of the patrol’s -single clash with Chinese, radioed Colonel Litzenberg that Koto-ri was -clear of enemy. He then led his party southward, and in the evening of -the 9th, returned through the lines of 3/7.[291] - - [291] 7thMar _SAR_, 13–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 243–247; - Goggin interv. - -The Marines had been told that big game animals were hunted before -the war in the mountains of northeast Korea. But not until the -otherwise calm night of 9–10 November did a four-legged enemy invade -the positions of RCT-7. Near the cable-car trestle, midway through -Funchilin Pass, an unfriendly bear, no doubt a Russian bear, paid a -nocturnal visit to the 1st Platoon of George Company. An unnamed Marine -PFC, awakened in his sleeping bag, swore afterwards that the animal was -wearing a hammer and sickle emblem. However this may be, the intruder -was routed by his startled yell and disappeared into the night.[292] - - [292] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55. - - -_Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_ - -At 0830 on 10 November--the Marine Corps Birthday--the 1st Battalion -passed through the 3d and emerged from Funchilin Pass onto the open -plateau. Koto-ri (designated as Objective One) was occupied without -opposition an hour and a half later. Litzenberg halted his column and -drew up a perimeter around the mountain village. - -Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the 7th Marines was first to meet a -new enemy who would take a heavier toll in casualties than the Chinese. -This was General Winter, who has won many a historic campaign. When -the first cold blasts struck, “our men were not conditioned for it,” -commented Litzenberg. “The doctors reported numerous cases where the -men came down to the sickbay suffering from what appeared to be shock. -Some of them would come in crying; some of them were extremely nervous; -and the doctors said it was simply the sudden shock of the terrific -cold when they were not ready for it.”[293] - - [293] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45. - -The Marines recovered quickly after “thawing out,” and platoon warming -tents, heated by camp stoves burning fuel oil, were set up at Koto-ri. -Buckets of steaming water were provided for the warming of “C” rations. - -Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting weather -as compared to sub-zero cold which seems to numb the spirit as well -as flesh. Cold weather clothing is a handicap to movement and the -use of firearms; and some weapons, particularly the carbine, are not -dependable at low temperatures. It was probably as well for morale -that the Marines at Koto-ri could not foresee that this was only the -beginning of a prolonged operation in sub-zero weather without a -parallel in the nation’s history.[294] - - [294] Marshall, _CCF in the Attack_. See also FECOM, _Terrain - Study No. 6_, XIX-8; R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett - Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments, n. - d. - -Until 13 November, when the 7th Marines advanced toward Hagaru, patrols -from Koto-ri repeatedly sighted bands of Chinese in the distance. -Except for a fight on 11 November in which C Company claimed to have -inflicted 40 casualties on the enemy and lost four killed and four -wounded, there was little action. With a little pressure on the -ground or from the air, the enemy vanished, and thus the uneasy calm -continued.[295] - - [295] 7th Mar _SAR_, 15–16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400 - 10 Nov 50; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. - -[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS - -1st Marine Division - -October-December 1950 - - MAP-2 -] - -While the 7th Regiment had been fighting, marching, and climbing toward -the Chosin Reservoir in early November, the 5th Marines peacefully -combed the approaches to the Fusen Reservoir to the east. After -detaching 1/5 to Division control on 4 November and stationing 3/5 -near Oro-ri, Lieutenant Colonel Murray sent the 2d Battalion into the -Sinhung Valley to relieve the 18th ROK Regiment. The relief took place -at 1145 on the 4th, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed 2/5 -around a valley junction five miles north and 15 miles east of the then -embattled 7th Marines.[296] - - [296] 2/5 _SAR_, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and - 2202 3 Nov 50; CG X Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO - 5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2″ MCo, 2100 3 - Nov 50; 2/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 2. - -Roise’s mission was twofold: to block the Sinhung corridor while -determining the strength and disposition of the enemy, if any; and to -check certain northerly routes shown on maps as possibly leading to -either the Fusen or Chosin Reservoirs, or both. Reconnaissance patrols -in squad strength and combat patrols of reinforced platoons and company -size fanned out in a broad arc during 5–9 November. They determined -that no usable route led to either reservoir from the south, but that -the highway continuing northeast from the town of Sinhung, leading -to the 7th Infantry Division’s zone and the Manchurian border, would -carry military traffic. From 7 November, Roise’s troops made daily -contact with Army patrols coming down the highway, but no units tried -to penetrate the apparent screen of enemy defenses close to the Fusen -Reservoir.[297] - - [297] 2/5 _SAR_, 10. - -Major Merlin R. Olson, 1/5’s Executive Officer, led Companies A and B -on 7 November in a reconnaissance in force to Huksu-ri, that annoying -road junction west of Oro-ri. On the 8th Olson’s force had a running -fight with North Koreans before being recalled while still short of his -objective. Olson’s recall resulted from reports of 2000 North Koreans -moving towards the MSR.[298] - - [298] CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; “Special - Reconnaissance of the 1st Bn 5thMar, 7–9 Nov 50,” 10 Nov - 50. - -On 8 November, Company D (Reinf) made an overnight trek deep into a -branch valley northwest of Sinhung, reaching a point about 10 miles due -east of Koto-ri. One CCF soldier was captured while asleep in a house. -He said he belonged to the 126th Division and that Red China would -commit a total of 24 divisions against the UN forces in Korea.[299] - - [299] 2/5 _SAR_, 10, 32. - -On 9 November, Colonel Murray received orders to concentrate his -regiment along the MSR leading to the Chosin Reservoir. During the -next two days he deployed the 1st and 3d Battalions at Majon-dong and -Chinhung-ni respectively. The ambush of a Charlie Company patrol on the -10th delayed the departure of 1/5 from the Chigyong area. The patrol -had to be rescued by a battalion attack the next day before the force -could move to Majon-dong.[300] On the 13th while operating out of -Majon-dong a 1/5 patrol ran into 50–150 enemy who inflicted 7 KIA and 3 -WIA before withdrawing.[301] - - [300] 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 5; - 5thMar _URpt 4_. - - [301] 5thMar _URpt 4_; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 6. - -The 2d Battalion moved out of the Sinhung Valley on 13 and 14 November -to relieve the 7th Marines of the responsibility for defending Koto-ri -and thus free Colonel Litzenberg’s regiment for the advance to Hagaru -and the north. Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion had completed its -mission without firing more than a few shots and with a total prisoner -bag of 12 North Koreans and one Chinese.[302] - - [302] 5thMar _SAR_, 12; 5thMar _URpt 4_. - -Although the new enemy had seemingly evaporated from the path of the -1st Marine Division, there was good reason to believe that he was not -forsaking his aggressive designs in North Korea. For in addition to -the ominous but questionable predictions of Chinese POWs, eyewitness -accounts of pilots of VMF(N)-542 provided G-2 officers with information -of the gravest portent in early November. The Marine airmen made -nightly strikes from the 1st to the 9th against Sinuiju at the mouth -of the Yalu, and they repeatedly reported a steady stream of trucks -moving into northwest Korea from Antung, Manchuria. Time after time -they blasted Sinuiju with bombs, rockets, and 20mm shells, and though -parts of the city were continuously aflame, it still seethed with -activity. They described southward bound traffic as “heavy,” “very -heavy,” and even “tremendous,” and at least one convoy was reported to -be “gigantic.”[303] - - [303] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542 - _SAR_), 1–8. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -Advance To The Chosin Reservoir - -_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New Enemy--The -Turning Point of 15 November--Changes in X Corps Mission--Marine -Preparations for Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN -Command--Marine Concentration on MSR_ - - -On 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with the -Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam. General -Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d, recommended the -abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts as the best -location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside the city where -the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row. -All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces.[304] - - [304] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56. - -A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites -were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by -helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th. -That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters -Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En route -it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.[305] - - [305] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv - msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W. - Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56. - -A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun -positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP. -Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions -and outposts being connected by telephone. - -During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the -existence of 250 tons of NKPA high explosive, stored only 600 yards -from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this -enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A -16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive -could be removed and detonated.[306] - - [306] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514. Some - explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the - caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. - - -_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR_ - -Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance as -the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This -responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps -on 3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The 1st -Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security -from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion of -the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong. -This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon without any -protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents and the Special -Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control. - -On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North Koreans -were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon Corps -notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired on -railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.[307] - - [307] Smith, _Notes_, 472–473; G-3 _SAR_, 21. The previous day - an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a - short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, _SAR_, 12. - -On 6 November, immediately after landing at Wonsan, the 65th RCT of -the 3d Infantry Division (less one battalion, placed temporarily under -1st Marine Division control for the Majon-ni operation) was ordered by -Corps to relieve elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, USA, -which had been recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT was assigned a -mission of protecting the Yonghung-Kowon area and patrolling to the -west (see map on Page 122).[308] - - [308] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry - Division in Korea_, 69; Smith, _Notes_, 473. - -The Wonsan-Hamhung rail line took on special importance after the -announcement that water transportation would be delayed until -enemy mines were cleared from the harbor at Hungnam. This made it -necessary for the 1st Marine Division to send daily supply trains from -Wonsan.[309] The first two completed the run without incident, but -after departing Wonsan at dusk on the 6th the third train was halted -at Kowon by the destruction of rails ahead. North Korean guerrillas -attacked the train, guarded by a lieutenant and 38 men from Company C -of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[310] - - [309] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50. - - [310] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived - from: 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn _HD_, _Nov - 50_, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d. - -The detachment was taken by surprise in the darkness by foes firing -from both sides of the track. When the Marines attempted to reverse the -train, the enemy wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler with -grenades. In the darkness the guard became separated into two groups, -the smaller of which was surrounded in a car. The guerrillas fired -through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines to the floor, and threw -grenades through the windows until all ten men were killed or wounded, -only two of them surviving. - -The remaining 29 men of the guard made a stand on an embankment about -200 yards from the track. Six Marines were wounded in the ensuing fire -fight. The train guard broke off the action and withdrew to the area of -the Army artillery battalion. - -An empty train from Hamhung, guarded by a platoon from Company A of -the Amtracs, was halted at 1700 on the afternoon of 6 November by -railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of guerrilla activity in the -area had proved to be only too well founded when elements of the 96th -Field Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their -perimeter south of the town was breached with losses to the Army unit -of equipment and ammunition. - -The 2d Battalion of the 65th RCT, which arrived at Yonghung late that -afternoon, had its baptism of fire within a few hours. Guerrillas -in estimated strength of 500 to 800 attacked at 0300 on the 7th, -inflicting casualties of six killed and 14 wounded. Troops of the 96th -Field Artillery Battalion also came under attack, as did elements of -the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion -sent a Marine tank and “Weasel” (M-29) to evacuate the wounded with -the assistance of the Amtrac platoon guarding the empty train at -Yonghung.[311] - - [311] G-3 _SAR_, 24; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 13. - -At 1400 that afternoon the empty train resumed its run to Wonsan. -Only two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six cars were -derailed by a split rail and wrecked just south of Yonghung. Personnel -losses amounted to one man killed and 14 injured.[312] - - [312] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon: - 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn HD, _Nov 50_, 3; - Dolcater _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 69; G-3 _SAR_, - 24; X Corps _POR 42_; and _1stMarURpt (S-3) 9_; D/Tks tel - to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50. - -At almost exactly this same hour the fourth supply train was stopped -south of Kowon by a blown section of track. The guard proceeded on -foot to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the -third supply train, abandoned by the enemy after being plundered. -One ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car the -bodies of the trapped Marines were found. So extensive was the damage -to tracks and switches that rail service could not be resumed until 9 -November.[313] - - [313] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7 - Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 475–478. - -The Corps commander summoned General Smith to Wonsan that morning for -a conference on measures for the security of the rail line. It was -decided that only daytime runs would be made thereafter, with the train -guard increased from 38 to 50 men. The 65th RCT, the 26th ROK Regiment -and a battery of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were placed under -the temporary control of the 1st Marine Division with a mission of -guarding bridges and other key points.[314] - - [314] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps - _WD_ 7 Nov 50. - -General Smith worked out a plan for the ROK regiment to drive the -guerrillas southward from the Chigyong area toward the 65th RCT at -Yonghung. As it proved, elements of both units were given Corps -commitments which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect. -They remained only a few days under nominal Division control, being -used for a variety of security missions along the Wonsan-Hamhung -MSR.[315] - - [315] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50. - -By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their runs, -95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat Service -Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the -Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open gondola -cars.[316] - - [316] 1st CSG _SAR_, 8. - - -_Appraisals of the New Enemy_ - -It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have -enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs -of Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war, -division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far -ahead. - -Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first -place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and -vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff -had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November -the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had -crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three -days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence summary -warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale -counteroffensive.[317] - - [317] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in - Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. - -General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half -of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in Korea, -indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these units had -appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps zone north -of Hamhung. - -“At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial -reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in -Manchuria, and into Korea.”[318] - - [318] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations - in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept - State, _United Nations Action in Korea_ (Washington, - 1951), 9. - -Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of -his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called -volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten _NKPA_ -remnants? Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military -intervention? - -President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General -MacArthur an estimate of the situation.[319] The general’s reply stated -that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of -Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended “... -that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of -military facts.”[320] - - [319] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman _Memoirs_ II, 373. - - [320] Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50. - -During the next three days the issue of bombing bridges across the Yalu -posed a question that has remained a controversial subject ever since. -General MacArthur was granted permission, after being at first refused, -but cautioned “that extreme care be taken to avoid violation [of] -Manchurian territory and airspace.”[321] - - [321] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; - JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 375–376; - Whitney, _MacArthur_, 405–411. - -[Illustration: 1ST MARINE DIVISION ZONE AND OBJECTIVES - -November 1950 - - MAP-11 -] - -In two messages of 7 November, the UN commander confirmed his original -appraisal to the effect that the Chinese were not making a full-scale -intervention. But he conceded that reinforcements might enable the new -enemy to stop the UN advance or even throw it into reverse. He planned -a resumption of the initiative, he said, in order to take “accurate -measure ... of enemy strength.” And he repeated that the restriction of -his bombing operations provided “a complete sanctuary for hostile air -immediately upon their crossing of the Manchuria-North Korean border.” -This factor, he warned, could “assume decisive proportions....”[322] - - [322] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman, - _Memoirs_, II, 377. - -On this same date, with the wary phase of UN strategy at its height, -General Almond flew to Hungnam to confer with General Smith. The X -Corps commander still wore another hat as General MacArthur’s chief of -staff; and though he could not function actively in this position, he -kept in close touch with strategic aims at Tokyo. Thus the cautious -spirit of the UN commander’s messages of 7 November was reflected in -Almond’s changed viewpoint. Where he had previously urged haste in the -X Corps drive to the border, he was now disposed to put on the brakes -and carry out that mission with less scattering of forces. - -The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed, and the Marine general -recommended that only enough territory be held for the security of -Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan. Almond believed that Hagaru should also -be included, but he agreed that a greater degree of concentration was -advisable.[323] - - [323] Smith, _Notes_, 552–553. - -As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance, -however, operations again took on the character of an occupation rather -than a drive which might end in a collision with a powerful new enemy. - -X Corps OpnO 6, issued at 2400 on 11 November, called for an advance -to the border by I ROK Corps on the right, the 7th Infantry Division -in the center and the 1st Marine Division on the left. The 3d Infantry -Division, with the 26th ROK Regiment attached, was to have the -responsibility for the Wonsan-Yonghung area after relieving elements -of the 1st Marine Division; the Marines were directed to take blocking -positions at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni. In the Corps rear, the 1st KMC -Regiment (-) had a zone to the south and west of Kojo. - -The Marine zone on the Yalu, about 40 miles in width, was approached -and bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin area. One of -them ended at Huchanggangu and the other at Singalpajin. From that -point the zone of the 7th Infantry Division extended east to Hyesanjin -(where the border turns north at a right angle) and thence again -eastward to the Hapsu area. I ROK Corps was to operate from the line -Hapsu-Chuchonhujang and drive northward along the coast with Chongjin -as an objective.[324] - - [324] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 11 Nov 50. - -Such a dispersion of forces, depending for supplies on poor secondary -roads through wild mountain regions, could hardly have been -contemplated if large-scale CCF opposition were expected. As a further -indication of renewed confidence, General MacArthur asked informally -and indirectly that X Corps do everything possible to assist the Eighth -Army in its drive to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal -letter of 11 November from General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, to the Corps -commander.[325] - - [325] _X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10 - Dec 50, 9_; X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5. - - -_The Turning Point of 15 November_ - -The date of General Almond’s reply, the 15th, is worthy of recognition -as a turning point. For it was also the occasion of messages from the -UN commander-in-chief and the commanding general of the 1st Marine -Division which had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course -of the Chosin Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions as -a result of the concepts advanced in these three communications of 15 -November 1950. - -Obviously the gap of 80 miles separating the Eighth Army from X Corps -would have to be reduced before much help could be given by the latter. -General Almond replied to General Wright in a letter proposing that X -Corps attack to the west of the Chosin Reservoir while also continuing -to advance northward in zone to complete its original mission. - -That same day, while the letter was en route to Tokyo, General -MacArthur came to a far-reaching decision. In a radio message he -directed the X Corps commander to develop, as an alternative to -OpnO 6, a plan for reorienting his attack to the west on reaching -Changjin in order to cut the Chinese MSR, as represented by the -Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon road and rail line. - -This was the first indicated change in mission, according to the X -Corps command report, since CinCFE’s directive late in October calling -for a drive to the border. The amendment “was made necessary,” the -report continued, “by the enemy build-up in front of the Eighth Army -and the fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt ... -to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of the Eighth -Army situation ... fixed the relative combat power as 100,000 UN to -100,000 enemy with UN forces having air superiority and superior -artillery support.... The enemy was given an offensive capacity which -he could implement with an estimated reserve of 140,000 CCF troops -north of the Yalu River. In view of the enemy’s offensive capacity, -Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to make a general advance -with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the enemy -MSR (Huichon-Kanggye). This course of action was designed to meet any -course of action which might be adopted by the enemy. To assist the -Eighth Army advance, X Corps was to initiate a main attack to the West -from the Chosin Reservoir area, cutting the enemy MSR at Mupyong-ni, -and advance in a northwesterly direction to the Yalu River line at -Manpojin.”[326] - - [326] X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 4–5. - -By a coincidence it was also on Wednesday, 15 November, that General -Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military events. -Addressed to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps, -this communication made it plain that the 1st Marine Division commander -and his staff did not share in the renewed optimism as to the course -of the UN war effort. Not only did the Marines accept the possibility -of imminent and formidable CCF intervention, but they were making -preparations to meet it. - - So far our MSR north of Hamhung has not been molested, but there is - evidence that this situation will not continue.... - - Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to - what is our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border. - The Eighth Army, 80 miles to the southwest, will not attack until - the 20th. Manifestly, we should not push on without regard to the - Eighth Army. We would simply get further out on a limb. If the - Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be - made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign in the - mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier - or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this - area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and - wounded. - -The letter mentioned such preparations as the work done by Marine -engineers to strengthen the Hamhung-Hagaru road for tanks and heavy -vehicles. Plans had been approved, added General Smith, for an airstrip -at Hagaru capable of landing cargo planes for resupply and casualty -evacuation. - -He emphasized that he did not mean to be pessimistic. “Our people are -doing a creditable job,” he said; “their spirit is fine, and they will -continue to do a fine job.” But in conclusion he reiterated his doubts -about his “wide open left flank” and his concern over “the prospect of -stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120 -air miles from Hamhung to the border.”[327] - - [327] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen - Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of - General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps - conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very - thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the - assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or - landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation - to be expected by plane from the air field that we were - to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56. - -General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter when two -Navy officers called at the CP--Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse, -chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of -staff to Admiral Doyle. Both were old acquaintances of the Marine -general, who had led the assault landing force on Peleliu in 1944 while -Sears commanded an LST group. Smith felt that he could speak frankly, -therefore, and expressed his concern over the aspects of the strategic -situation he had discussed in the letter.[328] - - [328] Smith, _Chronicle_, 31. - -CinCFE had requested in his message of the 1st that the plan for -reorienting the X Corps attack be submitted to him as an alternative to -OpnO 6. General Almond put his staff to work on the 16th, and that same -day Draft No. 1, of OpnO Plan 8 was completed. This was a concept of an -attack on Kanggye by means of a drive westward from Changjin.[329] - - [329] This section is based on: X Corps _Special Report, Chosin - Reservoir_, 9; and X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5–6, 51–52. - - -_Changes in X Corps Mission_ - -Almond disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the MSR of the -Corps element making the effort would be too far extended. He requested -the preparation of a new plan based on the concept of an advance -farther south on the Hagaru-Mupyong-ni axis and west of the zone of the -1st Marine Division. The X Corps commander also directed: - - (1) That the Hamhung-Hagaru road be developed as a Corps MSR with - intensive effort on the part of Corps troops, including Corps - engineers; - - (2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of - seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st - Marine Division. - -The Corps commander considered that Changjin and Mupyong-ni were too -widely separated as objectives to be assigned to a single division, -not to mention the difficult terrain. His staff worked for four days -on Draft No. 2 of OpnO Plan 8 before submitting it to him. He accepted -it with several modifications and directed that the third draft be -taken to Tokyo by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, the Corps G-3, for -presentation to GHQ. - - -_Marine Preparations for Trouble_ - -General Smith, for his part, lost no time in putting into effect his -preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack. The -completion of mine clearance at Hungnam had opened that port on 15 -November, thus easing the transportation situation. That same day the -7th Marines occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of four -degrees below zero which threatened an early and bleak winter. - -Only four days previously, X Corps OpnO No. 6 had directed the 1st -Marine Division to take up blocking positions to the west, at Huksu-ri -and Yudam-ni, while continuing the northward advance to the Yalu. This -meant a further dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce the 163 -road miles separating his infantry battalions. - -In order to carry out the Corps directives, Division OpnO 21-50 of 13 -November assigned the following tasks: - - RCT-1--to seize Huksu-ri; - - RCT-7--to seize Hagaru, and, on order, to seize Yudam-ni; - - RCT-5--to protect the MSR from positions at Majon-dong, - Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri, while preparing to pass through - RCT-7 in the Hagaru area and advance to Changjin - (approximately 40 miles northward); - - Division Reconnaissance Company--to screen the Division right - flank by operating in the Soyang-ni-Sinhung valley to the - east Division boundary.[330] - - [330] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 21-50_, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the - seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a - battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv - FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a - fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, - 1437 14 Nov 50. - -In connection with the mission of RCT-7, the words “on order” deserve -special notice. For the commanding officer was directed by Smith’s -oral instructions to take up blocking positions at Toktong Pass, about -halfway between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, until additional units of the -Division could be moved up to the Hagaru area. In other words, the -Division commander believed that the possibilities of large-scale -CCF intervention were such as to justify caution in the drive to -Yudam-ni.[331] - - [331] Smith, _Notes_, 592–594. - -Not only would the concentration of the Marine units ease General -Smith’s concern over the tactical situation; it would also greatly -simplify the administrative load. Colonel Bowser has commented, -“Division was faced with the problem of handling a division scattered -from Wonsan and Majon-ni in the south to the heavy engagement of the -7th Mar in the north. Add to this the problem of guerrilla bandits -between Wonsan and Hungnam/Hamhung as well as a completely unknown -situation to the West, and you have a task of considerable magnitude -for any division staff.”[332] - - [332] Bowser Comments. - -RCT-1 was delayed several days by lack of railway facilities in its -move 70 miles northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wonsan -area by the 3d Infantry Division.[333] But most of the other Marine -units had been pulled up--a battalion or even a company at a time--as -far as the Hungnam area. Along the new MSR north of Hamhung, the column -of advance on 15 November consisted of these units: - - [333] 1stMar _SAR_, 13. - - Hagaru--RCT-7; - - Koto-ri--2d Battalion, RCT-5; - - Chinhung-ni--3d Battalion, RCT-5; Battery K, 4th Battalion, - 11th Marines; Detachment 1st Ordnance Battalion; Detachment - 1st Service Battalion; 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, 1st - Engineer Battalion; Company B (less 3d Platoon), 1st Engineer - Battalion; - - Majon-dong--1st Battalion RCT-5; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion. - -The Division command and staff took a dim view of the possibility of -completing “the race to the Yalu” before winter. It was already too -late, if sub-zero temperatures were any indication; and preparations -must now be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter -campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were the -selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips along the -MSR, and the strengthening of the road to make it fit for tanks and -heavy vehicles. - -Hagaru, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, had been recommended by -General Craig as the best location for a forward base when he visited -here on the 15th. The commanding generals of the Division and Wing -arrived for a tour of inspection the next day. General Harris made -the trip at the express request of General Almond, who believed that -a strip long enough to land R4Ds was necessary to insure resupply -and casualty evacuation in a midwinter emergency. One of the few -comparatively flat pieces of real estate in northeast Korea was found -just south of the town. The black loam promised to make a hard surface -in freezing weather, so that the prevailing arctic temperatures offered -at least one consolation.[334] - - [334] Smith, _Notes_, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56. - -An OY strip had been completed on 13 November at Koto-ri, but heavier -engineer equipment was needed at Hagaru. Before it could be brought -forward, the road from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri required strengthening -and widening. This task had already been assigned to Lieutenant Colonel -Partridge, commanding the 1st Engineer Battalion. After a survey by -jeep, he decided to begin operations at the highest point of the -one-way dirt road. - -“By working down,” he explained, “we could first of all provide for -what we considered to be a dangerous accumulation of snow, and the -problem of land slides.... The work on the road involved a good bit -of drainage in order to insure that the melting snows from day to day -during the sunlight hours would not filter across and destroy the road -bed. It involved demolitions and drilling and a good deal of dozer and -grader work.”[335] - - [335] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51, - 31–32. - -Enough progress had been made by 18 November so that armor could be -sent forward to support RCT-7. Only the day before, the 1st Tank -Battalion had begun functioning with its Headquarters and Service -Companies at Soyang-ni, eight miles northwest of Hamhung. The road -between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri was still impassable for M-26 -(Pershing) tanks until the engineers could widen some of the turns. But -Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized -a provisional tank platoon consisting of two M4A3 (Sherman) tanks from -Headquarters Company and four dozer tanks from Company D at Majon-dong. -They proceeded without incident on the 18th to Hagaru, operating as a -gun platoon.[336] - - [336] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare - the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO - 1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50. - -Opening the mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the -18th to begin work on the Hagaru airstrip. Five large dozers with pans -of eight cubic yards capacity arrived at the site the next day, and -Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking out -a runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called for a cut -of 90,000 cubic yards and a fill of 60,000 for a 3200-foot runway. The -rub was that engineering field manuals prescribed a runway of 3600 feet -for R4Ds or C-47s at sea level, plus an additional 1000 feet for each -1000 feet of altitude. And since Hagaru was about 4000 feet above sea -level, it could only be hoped that pilots were right in estimating that -a strip of 3000 to 4500 feet might do in a pinch.[337] - - [337] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge - interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40. - -The 19th also dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station -at Hagaru for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this -time, the 1st Service and 1st Ordnance Battalions had been in charge -of division dumps at Hamhung. Supplies arrived by rail after being -unloaded from the ships at Wonsan by the 1st Shore Party Battalion and -the 1st Combat Service Group. - -The completion of mine clearance made it possible to order the latter -organization to Hungnam by sea to operate in-transit depots for X -Corps. Practically all Division supplies were soon being received by -sea at this port, where the 1st Combat Service Group separated the -incoming cargo into proper classifications and forwarded it to the -dumps at Hamhung. Port operation was the responsibility of the 2d -Engineer Special Brigade, USA. After the project got into full swing, -from 2000 to 2500 Korean laborers were employed at Hungnam and as many -as 6000 tons of cargo unloaded in 24 hours.[338] - - [338] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54. - -A limited amount of rolling stock was available for the narrow-gauge -railway from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. But it was up to the Marines -to put the line back into operation, for the X Corps Railway -Transportation Section already had its hands full with the -Wonsan-Hamhung route. The 1st Service Battalion was authorized to make -the attempt, and enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the -trains. Chinhung-ni thus became the railhead for supplies tracked the -rest of the way to Hagaru.[339] - - [339] _Ibid._ - -Preparations were also made for large-scale casualty evacuation to the -Division hospital at Hungnam. H&S, A and B Companies of the 1st Medical -Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital while D, C -and E Companies were attached to RCTs 1, 5 and 7 respectively. As the -Division center of gravity shifted northward, medical officers foresaw -the need of a hospital-type facility at Hagaru in addition to the -clearing stations contemplated at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. Plans were -approved, therefore, for Companies C and E to pool their resources at -Hagaru and establish a medical supply dump. Additional surgical teams -were to be flown to Hagaru in an emergency by Companies A and B from -the hospital at Hungnam. - -Meanwhile the hospital ship _Consolation_, commanded by Captain John -W. McElroy, USNR, prepared to move from Wonsan to Hungnam. There the -Division hospital had been enlarged to 400 beds, and an additional 100 -to 150 were planned for the new annex at Hamhung. In order to speed up -casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars were equipped for that -purpose on the 35-mile narrow-gauge line from Chinhung-ni.[340] - - [340] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50; - 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn _SAR_), 4–7. - - -_Supplies Trucked to Hagaru_ - -Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were -included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November. As a -preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect the -Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum of a -battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the MSR in -zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. - -RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a battalion -through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of the Chosin -Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of Hagaru; and -(3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni, some 20 miles -north of Hagaru. - -Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the MSR -in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its 4th -Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on order. - -OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to establish -a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the dumps of -RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; and (3) -to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The following supply -levels were fixed: - - Classes I and III, five days; - - Class V, 1 Unit of fire; - - Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the - north and west of Koto-ri.[341] - - [341] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 22-50_, 17 Nov 50. - -Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of -RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement -from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on the -18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the -employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with -the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at -a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong to -execute its mission.[342] - - [342] 1stMar _SAR_, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220 - 18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50. - -Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps -verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the -modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed -the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to -establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.[343] - - [343] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; X Corps _OI 17_, 22 Nov 50. See - also G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in - G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 20 Nov 50. - -Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress -toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which he -regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy -positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he could -now push ahead. - -As an added factor, the 1st Marine Division had just acquired a new -unit. Early in November Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith could -use the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. This British unit -of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel -Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached to ComNavFE in Japan, had requested -service with the U. S. Marines. Smith replied that he would be glad to -have these fine troops. Highly trained in reconnaissance, they could -operate with the Division Reconnaissance Company in protecting the -flank of the Marine advance. The British Marines arrived at Hungnam on -the 20th and reported to the 1st Marine Division.[344] - - [344] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; 1stMarDiv _POR 164_. - -Division OpnO 23-50, issued at 0800 on the 23d, directed the Commandos -to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging as far as -13 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit and the -Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out CCF troops beyond the -reach of routine infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to elements of -the Division were as follows: - - RCT-7--to seize Yudam-ni and maintain one battalion in that - position; - - RCT-5--to seize Kyolmul-li (20 miles north of Hagaru) and be - prepared to seize Toksil-li (10 miles northwest of - Kyolmul-li) and Tuan-di (15 miles northeast of Kyolmul-li) - on order; - - RCT-1--to relieve elements of RCT-7 in the vicinity of Hagaru and - Koto-ri and protect the Division MSR from positions in the - vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; - - 1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)--to protect the MSR from - positions in the vicinity of Majon-dong and Soyang-ni; - - 1st Engineer Battalion--to support Division operations with - priority to the maintenance of the MSR and construction of - the airfield at Hagaru. - -OpnO 23-50 also provided that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment -continue operation of the truckhead at Hagaru and stock supplies at -the following levels: Classes I and III, 8 days; Classes II and IV, as -required; and Class V, one and one-third U/F for all troops operating -to the north and west of Chinhung-ni.[345] - - [345] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 23-50_, 23 Nov 50. - -The trucking facilities of the Division had been strained to the -limit ever since the Wonsan landing. Shortly afterwards the bulk of -the 7th Motor transport Battalion was taken under the operational -control of X Corps, and it became necessary to attach the 1st Motor -Transport Battalion to RCT-7. On 19 November, however, the 1st MT (less -detachments) had passed to the control of the 1st Supply Regulating -Detachment at Hagaru. There the truckers not only built up the -stockpile of supplies but rendered the best support that units of the -division had known so far along the MSR.[346] - - [346] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn _SAR_), 4, - 7; 7th MTBn _SAR_, 2–3. - - -_Confidence of UN Command_ - -General MacArthur did not appear to be shaken by EUSAK G-2 reports -during the third week of November which called attention to a -formidable CCF build-up on both sides of the Yalu. On the contrary, -a UN order of the 20th, giving directions for the conduct of troops -at the border, indicated that an occupation rather than a fight was -expected: - - Elements of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate - vicinity of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or - vehicles will go beyond the boundary between Korea and Manchuria, - or between Korea and the USSR, nor will fire be exchanged with, or - air strikes be requested on forces north of the northern boundary - of Korea. Rigid control of troop movements in vicinity of northern - boundary will be exercised. _Damage, destruction or disruption of - service of power plants will be avoided._ No personnel, military - or civilian, will be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the - Manchurian or USSR border. Commanders will insure that the sanctity - of the international border is meticulously preserved.[347] - - [347] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added. - -The italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made -converts in high State Department as well as Defense circles in -Washington. The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned -chiefly with defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the power -complexes along the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that early in -November the Sinuiju radio described the CCF troops crossing the river -as a “volunteer corps” for the protection of the hydro-electric plants -along the Yalu serving Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Proceeding from -this premise, it was a logical conclusion that if no provocation were -given these forces, a large-scale fight might be avoided.[348] - - [348] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists - Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, _Memoirs_, - II, 372. - -General MacArthur, after receiving a qualified permission to bomb the -Yalu bridges, had enjoined UN airmen not to violate territory or air -space on the other side of the river. This meant that the bomber crews -must take much greater risks, since their restricted axes of approach -and flight paths were known to enemy antiaircraft gunners in advance. -Moreover, CCF jet fighters could attack and retire to the sanctuary of -Manchuria when hard-pressed.[349] - - [349] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50; - Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. See also Karig, _Korea_, - 376–378. - -Despite these handicaps, Air Force and Navy bombers knocked out four of -the twelve international bridges and damaged most of the others. These -efforts doubtless imposed delays, but troops and supplies continued -to cross throughout November.[350] After arrival in North Korea, they -seemed to vanish into that void of mystery which had swallowed up -Chinese Communist troops ever since they broke off contact. - - [350] Schnabel _Korean Conflict_. Bombing of the bridges ceased - 6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, _Report - from the Secretory of Defense ... on Operations in - Korea_, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4. - -Students of history may have recalled at this time that one of the most -significant engagements of modern history was known as the Battle of -the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the clash of 30 April -1904 was not a great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking at -Chemulpo (Inchon) and marching up the Korean peninsula, numbered five -times the Russian force which opposed the crossing of the Yalu at Uiji, -just east of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless to be expected, -yet a new page of history had opened. For the first time in modern -chronicles, an Asiatic army had successfully challenged a European army -with the weapons and tactics of the Machine Age. - -Now, nearly half a century later, history was repeating itself as -another Asiatic army crossed the Yalu with unknown capabilities and -intentions. If the Chinese Communists were merely sending a force to -guard the hydro-electric complexes and frontier, hopes of peace by -Christmas might be realized. But if the invaders were secretly massing -for an all-out counter-offensive, a great new war might soon be flaming -up from the ashes of the old. - -Little fault can be found with current G-2 estimates of CCF numbers, -which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the wisdom of -hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of CCF intentions -by the UN command, and there can be no doubt that an end-of-the-war -atmosphere prevailed on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive of 24 -November. - -Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in Korea -and the United States in a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious -peace which seemed almost within grasp. It was a tribute to American -bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were -served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside -restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units, -included shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, roast young tom turkey with -cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes, fruit salad, fruit cake, mince -pie and coffee.[351] - - [351] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50. - -As an item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned the -day before that the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division had -reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin. Not a single Chinese soldier had -been encountered by troops who had troubles enough with sub-zero -temperatures and mountain roads.[352] - - [352] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north - as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the - 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to - be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first - CCF attacks. EUSAK, _WDSum, Oct 50_, 38, 44. - -Since the first week of November, in fact, there had been no clashes of -any importance with the invaders from Red China. On the 24th, as usual, -the front was quiet everywhere except for minor patrol contacts. Yet -this was the D-day of the great Eighth Army offensive, and the stirring -communique of the commander-in-chief was read to all troops in Korea. -It was a message in the bold spirit of Inchon, and no one could doubt -the confidence of the UN command after hearing these words: - - The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea - against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its - decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air - forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained - attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully - interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further - reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential - supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with - noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding - enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the - enemy’s geographical potential. This morning the western sector - of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to - complete the compression and close the vise. If successful, this - should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and - unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations - military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean - people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality. - It is that for which we fight.[353] - - /s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, - _General of the Army_, - _United States Army_, - _Commander-in-Chief_. - - [353] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50. - -Eighth Army troops found it something of an anticlimax, after this -message, to jump off without meeting any large-scale opposition. -General MacArthur, who flew to the front for the occasion, watched from -his plane as the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a -motor march. - -“The Army offensive began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours on 24 November,” -said the EUSAK report. “Since for some time there had been little -contact with enemy forces the advance of EUSAK elements was in the -nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance in the -initial stage. Across the Eighth Army front as a whole, advances were -made from 4000 to 16,000 yards.”[354] - - [354] EUSAK _WD_, 24 Nov 50. - - -_Marine Concentration on MSR_ - -On this same day Lieutenant Colonel Chiles presented X Corps OpnPlan 8, -Draft 3, at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC Headquarters with only one -modification--the shifting of the proposed boundary between X Corps and -Eighth Army farther to the south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division. - -This plan was the basis of X Corps OpnO 7. Issued on the 25th, it -provided for a reorientation of the X Corps attack to provide more -assistance for Eighth Army. H-hour was to be 0800 on the 27th, and the -principal units of X Corps were assigned these tasks: - - 1st Marine Division--to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu; - - 7th Infantry Division--(1) to attack from east side of Chosin - Reservoir and advance to Yalu in zone; (2) to secure Pungsan area, - coordinating with 1 ROK Corps; - - 1 ROK Corps--to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas, destroying - enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea; - - 3rd Infantry Division--(1) to gain and maintain contact with the - right flank of Eighth Army in zone; (2) to protect the left flank - of X Corps; (3) to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps - order; (4) to protect harbor and airfield at Wonsan; (5) to destroy - enemy guerrillas in zone.[355] - - [355] X Corps _OpnO 7_, 25 Nov. 50. - -A Corps warning order, issued on the evening of the 24th, was -supplemented by a briefing session at Corps Headquarters at 1000 the -next morning. General Smith learned that his division was to be the -northern arm of the pincers in the “massive compression envelopment” -while the 7th Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission -of advancing east of the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu.[356] - - [356] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps - _WD_, 25 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 727. - -The new Marine boundary cut across Korea to the north of Eighth Army. -From Yudam-ni the Marine route of advance led to Mupyong-ni 55 miles to -the west. This objective was about halfway between Huichon in the south -and Kanggye in the north (see map, Page 130). From the latter, which -was believed to be the assembly area of the NKPA remnants, a good road -led about 40 miles north to Manpojin on the Yalu. - -In accordance with Corps OpnO 7, the rear boundary of the 1st Marine -Division had been moved north to a line just south of Hagaru. The 3d -Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru, -but this unit had so many other commitments that it could assign few -troops to the task. General Smith was granted permission, therefore, -to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. This left the 3d -Infantry Division responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong -southward to Hamhung.[357] - - [357] Smith, _Notes_, 727–729. - -Corps OpnO 7, in short, provided for a wide envelopment to be -spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division on 27 November. The other arm -of the pincers, of course, was to be the Eighth Army; but on the -evening of the 25th came the disturbing news that its right wing, the -II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke. -This reverse took place in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles -southwest of Yudam-ni.[358] - - [358] _Ibid._, 728; EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov 50. - -EUSAK intelligence reports, as it proved, were not far off the mark in -estimating enemy strength on the Eighth Army front at 149,741 troops -at this time.[359] During the past few days, however, estimates of -probable enemy courses of action had been so reassuring as to justify -the confidence of CinCFE’s communique on D-day. Even the setback of the -25th was not regarded as alarming. - - [359] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of - 95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of the day before. EUSAK - _PIR 136_, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 25 Nov 50. - -“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the -east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the -EUSAK attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks -in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to be -“an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong local -counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with -bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by CCF -or USSR forces.”[360] - - [360] EUSAK _PIR 137_, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov - 50. - -On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave -General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units -and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1 -from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry -regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5 to -advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to Yudam-ni. - -Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate -transportation had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only -by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to -Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines -on 23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1 -Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles, -3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to -Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.[361] - - [361] 1stMar _SAR_, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_, - 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50. - -All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin -Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at -Hagaru, however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance -in this quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th -when a platoon-size patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove -nearly to the northern end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups -were flushed out and an abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit -resulting in five Chinese killed and one captured. This was one -of the few encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three -battalions, and no signs of large-scale enemy activity were reported -by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter -reconnaissance.[362] - - [362] 5thMar _SAR_ 15–18. Smith, _Notes_, 626. - -Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had first -been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But until -RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander limited -the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated 150 to -200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered with the -aid of air strikes and artillery support. - -On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion -led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant Colonel -Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped but -undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along -the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the -24th with a full, hot turkey dinner--their last full meal for 17 -days--and seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible -resistance.[363] The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11 -(-) followed. - - [363] 7thMar _SAR_, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 - Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d. - -Marine operations east of the Chosin Reservoir came to an end at -1200 on the 25th with the relief of RCT-5 by the 1st Battalion, 32d -Infantry, 7th Infantry Division. Corps orders called for this unit -to remain under operational control of the 1st Marine Division until -the assumption of command in the area by the CO, 31st Infantry. All -elements of RCT-5 were to be relieved by the following noon for the -mission of advancing to Yudam-ni and then passing through RCT-7 to lead -the attack toward Mupyong-ni.[364] - - [364] 5thMar _SAR_, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25 - Nov 50. - -This was in accordance with Division OpnO 24-50, issued at 0800 on the -26th to implement the provisions of Corps OpnO 7. The jump-off was to -be at 0800 on 27 November, with the first objective the road junction -at Yongnim-dong (27 road miles west of Yudam-ni), in preparation for -further advance on order to the high ground about one mile south of -Kogae-gol and 35 miles west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions of OpnO 24-50 -were as follows: - - RCT-7--to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when - passed through by RCT-5, to protect the Division MSR from - Sinhung-ni (7 miles west of Hagaru) to Yudam-ni; - - RCT-5--to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27 - November, advance to the west and seize first objective, - prepared for further advance; - - RCT-1--in Division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of - Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru for the protection of the - MSR; - - 11th Marines--less detachments, to provide general support from - positions in the vicinity of Yudam-ni; - - 41st Commando--reinforced, to move to Yudam-ni prepared for - operations to the southwest to protect Division left flank; - - Reconnaissance Company--to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the - north in co-ordination with operations of RCT-7.[365] - - [365] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 24-50_, 26 Nov 50. - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 421351 - - _Operation Yo-Yo--Back and forth, changing course at - twelve-hour intervals, the ships bearing the Marines and their - gear mark time during mine clearance operations at Wonsan._ -] - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 351586 -] - - _Wonsan Arrivals--Above, Bob Hope entertaining Marine airmen - who were first to reach the seaport; and, below, Marine - infantry disembarking from cargo nets of_ Marine Phoenix _into - the LCVPs_. - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 421451 -] - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 421319 USN Photo 421362 -] - - _Administrative Landing--Above, an LCM and a troop-laden - amtrac in Wonsan harbor; and, below, LSTs drawn up abreast to - land the thousands of tons of supplies required by a division._ - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 421388 -] - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 351722 -] - - _Wonsan Scenes--Above, a camouflaged hangar on Wonsan - airfield; below, Marine infantry in railway station awaiting - transportation shortly after their debarkation._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4552 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4323 -] - - _First Action in Northeast Korea--Two views of Marine infantry - mopping up guerrillas after surprise counterattack in Kojo - area by NKPA troops escaping to join Chinese Reds._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4327 -] - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 423189 Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig -] - - _On the Planning Level--Above, RAdm J. H. Doyle, CTF-90, and - BrigGen E. A. Craig, ADC of 1st Marine Division; below, V/Adm - A. D. Struble, Cdr JTF-7, and MajGen E. M. Almond, CG X Corps, - in the USS_ Missouri. - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 422376 -] - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 391740 -] - - _Command Conference--Above, left to right, MajGen W. J. - Wallace, USMC; LtGen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC; MajGen O. - P. Smith, USMC; MajGen E. A. Almond, USA; and MajGen Field - Harris, USMC; below, 1st Marine Division CP at Hungnam._ - -[Illustration: - - Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4534 -] - - _First Chinese Resistance--Above, infantry of 7th Marines - setting up mortar during initial encounter with Chinese in - northeast Korea; and, below, enemy tank killed by Marine fire._ - -[Illustration: - - Photo courtesy Maj R. B. Crossman -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4550 -] - - _Advance of RCT-7--Above, artillery emplacement of Battery - G, 11th Marines, on 3 November 1950; and, below, supplies - transported over railroad from Wonsan to Hamhung._ - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 352741 -] - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 365268 -] - - _As Seen from the Air--Above, “Frozen Chosin” and the rugged - terrain of the Reservoir area; and, below, an aerial view of - the MSR winding its precarious way through Funchilin Pass--“a - cliff on one side and a chasm on the other.”_ - -[Illustration: - - Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5389 -] - - _As Seen by the Infantry--Here are two views of the sort - of terrain encountered by the infantry of the 1st Marine - Division; sometimes it was as difficult to complete an - approach march as to dislodge the enemy after arrival._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5432 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4841 USMC Photo A 4912 -] - - _Air Supply and Evacuation--Above, an air drop of supplies - and helicopter evacuation of casualties at Yudam-ni; below, - parachute-rigged cases of ammunition in an Air Force C-47._ - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 353608 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4860 -] - - _Preparations for Yudam-ni Breakout--Above, Marines selecting - gear for breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; and, below, the - first stages of the three-day fighting advance._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4843 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4500 -] - - _Chinese Communist POWs--Above, these CCF prisoners don’t seem - unhappy about their captivity; below, a Chinese officer being - interrogated with the aid of an interpreter._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5206 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5675 -] - - _Marines on the March--These two pictures give some idea of - the exhaustion of Marines, many of them walking wounded, as - they huddle by the roadside during halts of the Yudam-ni - breakout._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5676 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5356 -] - - _Covered by Artillery--Above, a 105mm howitzer fires to the - rear as the infantry fights its way forward from Yudam-ni; - below, a quarter of a mile per hour was considered good - progress._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4863 -] - -General Smith, flying by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on the -morning of the 26th, could survey the MSR below him and reflect with -satisfaction that it was now easier to count the Marine outfits south -of Chinhung-ni than those to the north. These included the 1st Tank -Battalion with the exception of the provisional platoon at Hagaru and -the 2d Platoon of Company D at Chinhung-ni. Transportation had not yet -been provided for the 41st Commando, but the new unit was scheduled -to move up in convoy on the 28th with Headquarters Battalion when the -Division CP displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru. By that time only service -units and a few platoons of tanks and engineers would be left in the -rear area. - -At Hagaru the C-47 airstrip was taking shape as the dozers hacked away -at the frozen earth night and day, working under flood lights in the -darkness. Companies C and E of the 1st Medical Battalion had set up -clearing stations and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop units -at Hagaru and Yudam-ni had two days’ supplies of rations and fuel, but -only a unit of fire was stockpiled at Hagaru in addition to the half -unit carried by the troops. - -Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting mountain -road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack in the -morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP, General -Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a -rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter -dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury -resulted to passenger, pilot or machine.[366] - - [366] Smith, _Chronicle_, 89. - -On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines, -reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They -asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army -had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted -men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from -Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.[367] - - [367] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50. - -X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast from -Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast -of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified -in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates -of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese -attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung -axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a continued -westward withdrawal more likely.[368] - - [368] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 32; - 1stMarDiv _PIR 33_. - -Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and staff -that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country west -of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the relatively -fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.[369] - - [369] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, _Chronicle_, 79, - 82, 87. - -It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to -Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on either -side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad -hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine -general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse -in west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated -on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d -Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the -Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the -Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United -Nations envelopment. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -Crisis at Yudam-ni - -_Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before CCF -Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese Seize Hill -1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of North Ridge_ - - -The 2d battalion, vanguard of the 5th Marines, completed its move -from the east coast of the Chosin Reservoir to Yudam-ni during the -afternoon and evening of 26 November. After deploying his command south -of the village, Lieutenant Colonel Roise and his S-3, Major Theodore -F. Spiker, made a reconnaissance in preparation for the next day’s -attack.[370] - - [370] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9. - -Yudam-ni lies in the center of a broad valley surrounded by five great -ridges, named in relation to their direction from the village: North, -Northwest, Southwest, South, and Southeast. Beginning at the rim of -the valley, each of these ridges extends several thousand yards and -includes many peaks, spurs, and draws, certain of which took on special -significance as the crisis at Yudam-ni unfolded. - -A finger of the Chosin Reservoir reaches toward Yudam-ni in the -valley between North and Southeast Ridges. The other four corridors -radiating from the valley are highway routes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise -surveyed the westerly road, which leaves Yudam-ni between Northwest and -Southwest Ridges. His assigned objective encompassed distant spurs of -these heights, bordering the road about a mile and a half west of the -village.[371] - - [371] 5thMar _OpnO 39-50_, 26 Nov 50. - -The 7th Marines (-) was disposed in perimeter around Yudam-ni on -terminal hills of four of the five ridges: D and E Companies (attached -to 1/7) on North Ridge, 3/7 on Southwest, and 1/7 on South and -Southeast.[372] Since the high ground occupied by 3/7 overlooked the -route of attack and Roise’s objective, Colonel Litzenberg[373] later -in the day specified a new destination for 2/5, a pass ten miles west -of Yudam-ni. It was a big order, but Litzenberg’s troops would support -the 5th Marines’ outfit by making limited advances along the skylines -of Northwest and Southwest Ridges. With this protection on his flanks -initially, Roise could concentrate more strength for the drive through -the low ground.[374] - - [372] The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines - prevented H&S and Weapons (-) Companies from moving to - Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on the 27th - while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support - Fox Company. The two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni - were assigned to 1/7 for operational control. MajGen H. - L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D. - Sawyer Comments, 7 Sept 56. - - [373] Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines - in the absence of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. - The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col - Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as - senior officer present. See Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. - d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner - Comments, 13 Nov 56. - - [374] 7thMar _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 14; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9; - Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 - Sep 56. Roise Comments. - -Nightfall of 26 November was accompanied by an abrupt temperature drop -to zero degrees Fahrenheit. The north wind screamed across the frozen -reservoir and lashed the Marines on the valley floor and hillsides -around Yudam-ni. At 2200, a group of half-frozen company commanders -gathered within the flapping walls of Roise’s blackout tent to receive -their orders. The attack was to start at 0800 the next morning, -with 2/5 passing through the 7th Marines in a column of companies. -Recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch mortars of the 5th Marines would support -the advance, along with First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards’ 2d Platoon -of Able Company Engineers. Two Corsairs of VMF-312 and a spotter -plane from VMO-6 were to provide aerial reconnaissance and close air -support.[375] - - [375] 2/5 _SAR_, 14. - -In other wind-blown tents, 7th Regiment officers learned of their -missions as assigned by Colonel Litzenberg. The 3d Battalion would -move farther along the crest of Southwest Ridge on 27 November and -also seize the terminal peak, Hill 1403, of Northwest Ridge across -the MSR, in order to support 2/5’s attack more effectively. Dog and -Easy Companies were to patrol North Ridge and the west coast of the -Reservoir, while 1/7 scouted both South and Southeast Ridges and -their adjoining corridors. Particular attention would be paid to the -valley running southward between these hill masses, for therein lay the -vital road to Hagaru.[376] - - [376] 7thMar FragO, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 20–21. - -[Illustration: YUDAM-NI - - MAP-12 -] - - -_Marine Attack on 27 November_ - -The Yudam-ni perimeter was quiet throughout the long, frigid night -of 26–27 November. At dawn the basin and hillsides came alive with -parka-clad figures stamping and clapping life back into leaden limbs. -Gradually they began to cluster around small fires to thaw out the -morning rations and their weapons. - -Companies G and H of 3/7 jumped off in the attack at 0815, the former -to extend the foothold on Southwest Ridge, the latter to seize Hill -1403, terminal height of Northwest Ridge. Led by Captain Leroy M. -Cooke, How Company advanced unopposed and secured its objective by -midmorning.[377] Captain Cooney’s Company G moved rapidly 1200 yards -along the crest of Southwest Ridge and occupied a commanding peak, -Hill 1426, at 0845 without meeting opposition. But when Cooney resumed -the advance, his troops almost immediately came under fire from enemy -positions on another peak 500 yards away.[378] - - [377] Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and - Lieutenant H. H. Harris reverted to ExecO. - - [378] Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from: - 7thMar _SAR_, 20–21; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; - 2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, - annex SS, appendix A (hereafter 1/11 _SAR_), 8–9; VMF-312 - _SAR_, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50; - LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d. - -During 3/7’s operations on the high ground the 2d Battalion, 5th -Marines, had marched out of Yudam-ni and launched the main attack along -the road. Company F, under Captain Uel D. Peters, led 2/5 as it passed -beneath the steep walls of Southwest and Northwest Ridges. The first -objective was a long spur of the latter height, 500 yards across a draw -from the 7th Marines on Hill 1403. Approaching the mouth of the draw -on the right of the road, Fox Company was hit by long-range small-arms -fire from enemy emplacements on the objective. About the same time, -0935, a message from the VMO-6 spotter plane told of CCF positions all -across the front. Captain Peters held up momentarily to appraise the -situation, and engineers moving behind his outfit began to clear the -first of nine unmanned enemy roadblocks that obstructed the MSR. - -[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS - 27 NOV - - MAP-13 -] - -According to plan, Company F ascended part way up the slopes of Hill -1403 and then advanced across the front of the 7th Marines to the head -of the long draw that set off the Communist-held spur. Simultaneously, -4.2-inch and 81mm mortar crews positioned their weapons along the road -to support this envelopment. The flatlands south of Yudam-ni trembled -as the 105mm howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey A. Feehan’s -1st Battalion, 11th Marines, opened up at 1015 with a 15-minute -preparation.[379] - - [379] Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood - who had commanded 1/11 since its arrival in Korea with - the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50. - -While Company F moved overland to strike at the left (north) flank of -the CCF position, Captain Samuel S. Smith’s Dog Company edged forward -along the MSR to the mouth of the draw. Like the earlier unit, it was -met by a hail of bullets. The regimental 4.2-inch mortars opened fire -on the crest of the spur, and recoilless rifles slammed 75mm shells -into bunkers just now sighted on the forward slopes. At 1115, after -ground supporting arms had partially neutralized the CCF positions, -Corsairs of VMF-312 blasted the objective with rockets and bombs. - -In the wake of the air strike, First Lieutenant Gerald J. McLaughlin -led Fox Company’s 1st Platoon against the enemy’s north flank, the rest -of the company supporting the assault by fire from Hill 1403. Most of -the Chinese defenders fled to the west, and McLaughlin’s troops cleared -the northern half of the spur by 1300, capturing three Red soldiers. -The 2d Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Donald J. Krabbe, then -passed through to secure the southern half, overlooking the road. -Although the attackers encountered only negligible local resistance, -they were slowed by heavy machine-gun fire sweeping in from a peak 1000 -yards farther west. - -During Company F’s action on the high ground, Dog Company filed around -the road bend at the south end of the spur and moved toward a valley -junction a few hundred yards away. This fork is dominated by Sakkat -Mountain to the west; and the Chinese, in order to block the Marine -advance, had dug tiers of entrenchments on the eastern slopes of the -massive height. Frontal fire from these positions converged on Company -D’s column. Faced by such formidable resistance and terrain Lieutenant -Colonel Roise discontinued the attack. At 1430 he ordered Fox Company -to set up on Northwest Ridge for the night, and Dog to deploy -defensively across the MSR on a spur of Southwest Ridge. - -On the crest of the latter, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had found -progress increasingly costly during the afternoon of 27 November. The -peak beyond Hill 1426 was occupied by Company G at 1500,[380] bringing -that unit on line with Dog Company of 2/5 in the low ground to the -north. Like the 5th Marines’ outfit, Company G was now confronted with -the broad crescent of CCF fortifications buttressed by the defensive -complex on Sakkat Mountain. Machine-gun barrages drove the 7th Marines’ -unit off the hilltop, and Company I of 3/7 rushed forward from the high -ground overlooking Yudam-ni to add its firepower in support. Baker -Company of 1/7, on patrol in the valley between Southwest and South -Ridges, ascended into the bullet-swept zone at 1230 to help out. When -it became heavily engaged, elements of Company C were ordered forward -from the Yudam-ni vicinity as reinforcement. Thus parts of three -battalions, 2/5, 3/7, and 1/7, felt the storm of steel and lead on -Southwest Ridge throughout the afternoon. - - [380] While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements, - George Company’s commander, Capt Cooney, was mortally - wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56. - -While fighting raged in an arc from south to west on the 27th, another -danger area was discovered to the north and northeast, completing a -vast semicircle of known CCF concentrations in proximity to Yudam-ni. -A patrol from Company D of 2/7, moving over North Ridge along the -west coast of the reservoir, ran into heavy machine-gun and mortar -fire about 4000 yards from the village. Marine air struck at the -entrenchments of an estimated enemy company, and at 1645 the patrol -withdrew with several casualties to Company D’s lines on the southern -tip of North Ridge. - -At dusk on the 27th a general calm settled over Yudam-ni, broken only -occasionally by scattered exchanges of small-arms fire. The main Marine -attack had netted about 1500 yards, placing 2/5 on the objective -originally assigned by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel -Murray. That the Chinese did not allow this battalion to advance three -more miles, to its new objective and into hopeless entrapment, seems -inconsistent in view of the CCF plans for the night of 27–28 November. -The auxiliary attack by 3/7 won 1200 more yards of the crest of -Southwest Ridge, and the occupation of Hill 1403 by How Company of that -battalion represented a gain of about 2000. - -In a few hours, the Marines would give thanks that their successes on -27 November had been modest ones. - - -_Marine Dispositions Before CCF Attack_ - -The units of Yudam-ni will be listed counter-clockwise, beginning with -those on North Ridge, according to the positions they occupied around -the perimeter on the night of 27–28 November. North Ridge, bounded on -the east by the reservoir and on the west by the valley separating -Northwest Ridge, lay closest to the village and was therefore of -immediate tactical importance. Facing this hill mass from Yudam-ni, -one sees four distinct terminal heights: Hill 1167 on the right, Hills -1240 and 1282 in the center, and the giant spur of Hill 1384 on the -left. Companies D and E of the 7th Marines, occupied Hills 1240 and -1282 respectively. Since the combined front of these two units was a -mile wide, they concentrated on their assigned hilltops and relied on -periodic patrols to span the gaping, 500-yard saddle between. Although -both flanks of each company dangled “in the air,” they were backed by -two-thirds of the 5th Marine Regiment in the valley of Yudam-ni.[381] - - [381] This section is derived from: 5thMar _SAR_, 19–20; 7thMar - _SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 11–12; 2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 3/5 _SAR_, - 13. - -The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had arrived from the east coast of the -Chosin Reservoir at noon on the 27th, while the attacks to the west -were in full progress. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett placed his unit in an -assembly area at the base of North Ridge, beneath the large, unoccupied -spur leading to Hill 1384. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, did not -complete its move to Yudam-ni from the east side of the reservoir -until after dark. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Stevens, II, secured for -the night in the valley below Hills 1282 and 1240; and with Taplett’s -nearby command, 1/5 thus comprised a formidable reserve behind the thin -high-ground defenses of Companies D and E of 2/7. - -To the left of North Ridge, going round the clock, Company H of -3/7 dug in on the crest of Hill 1403, terminal height of Northwest -Ridge. Farther to the left, in the broad draw through which Company -F had earlier enveloped the CCF-held spur, Company E of 2/5 took up -strong blocking positions. The latter unit was not tied in with the -7th Marines’ troops on Hill 1403, there being a steep and rugged gap -of about 200 yards on the intervening hillside. Easy Company’s line -extended up the left side of the draw and connected with Fox’s on the -northern tip of the newly won spur. Company F manned the remainder -of that finger of high ground, its left flank overlooking the road -separating Southwest Ridge. - -As mentioned before, Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied -a finger of Southwest Ridge jutting out toward the road and directly -opposite Fox Company’s spur. To the left, but beyond physical contact, -Companies G and I of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, defended the -topographical crest of Southwest Ridge. As an example of altitudes -and distances involved around the perimeter, the latter company, -perched atop Hill 1426 (meters), sat 1200 feet above the valley floor -at Yudam-ni[382] and at a lineal distance of a mile and a half from -the village. To its left rear, 2000 yards away on the same hill mass, -Company A of 1/7 defended a terminal peak, Hill 1294, overlooking the -broad valley separating South Ridge. A platoon of Company C, 1/7, was -deployed on the valley floor to block that avenue into Marine artillery -positions. - - [382] Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level. - -South Ridge, capped by a conical peak jutting 1600 feet skyward, points -at Yudam-ni and the reservoir like a great arrowhead. Company B of 1/7, -after returning from the active patrol mentioned earlier, entrenched on -the tip, Hill 1276, to cover the deep gorge between South and Southeast -Ridges. In this narrow ribbon of low ground, the MSR from Yudam-ni -travels southward four miles before turning abruptly east into Toktong -Pass. Company C of 1/7, less one platoon, occupied a spur of Southeast -Ridge near the sharp turn--three miles from the Valley of Yudam-ni and -five from the village itself. - -Even farther out on a tactical limb was Fox Company of 2/7, which -had departed Hagaru at noon on 27 November[383] to take up hilltop -positions in the center of Toktong Pass. Its mission, like that of -Company C, was to guard the vulnerable MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni. -But it was seven miles from the friendly perimeter at Hagaru on the -one side and over two mountainous miles from Company C on the other. -Fox Company, numerically and geographically, appeared to be fair game -for some CCF regiment on the prowl--although appearances are sometimes -deceiving. - - [383] Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51. - -This, then, was the disposition of the 5th and 7th Marines in the -evening of 27 November: a total of ten understrength rifle companies -of both regiments on the high ground around Yudam-ni; two battalions -of the 5th in the valley near the village; and two rifle companies, -Charlie and Fox, of the 7th in isolated positions along the 14-mile -route to Hagaru. - -The regimental command posts of Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant -Colonel Murray were located at Yudam-ni along with the usual -headquarters elements, except for the Antitank Company of the 7th -Marines, at Hagaru. Also at Hagaru were Lieutenant Colonel Randolph S. -D. Lockwood’s headquarters of 2/7,[384] and Weapons Company (-) of that -battalion. For this reason, Companies D and E, on Hills 1240 and 1282 -at Yudam-ni, came under temporary control of 1/7. - - [384] LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov. - -Despite the lack of tanks,[385] the Yudam-ni perimeter encompassed -an impressive array of Marine supporting arms. The 1st and 4th -Battalions, together with Batteries G and I of the 3d, represented -almost three-fourths of the fire power of the 11th Regiment. The 48 -howitzers--thirty 105mm and eighteen 155mm--were emplaced in the -expansive flats generally south of the village, in the direction of -South and Southeast Ridges. In position to the north were the 75mm -recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines and the 4.2-inch mortar companies -of both infantry regiments. - - [385] Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had - attempted to come through from Hagaru but gave up the - attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one - M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese - cut the road before the others could follow. 1stTkBn, - _SAR_, 21. - -The Yudam-ni lines bristled with enough firepower to give any commander -confidence, but the supply situation was not reassuring. Although -Captain Robert A. Morehead and a detachment from the 1st Service -Battalion arrived during the 27th to begin establishment of a division -dump, the supply level was low. The dumps of the 5th and 7th Marines -contained about 3 days’ rations, 3 days’ POL, and 2 U/F of small arms -ammunition in addition to amounts in the hands of the troops. Very -little artillery ammunition was available beyond that held by the -firing batteries. During the 27th Colonel Litzenberg sent his S-4, -Major Maurice E. Roach, to Hagaru to arrange for the dispatching of -about five truckloads each of rations, POL, and ammunition. They -arrived late on the evening of the same day--the last supplies to -get through from Hagaru. That same evening Lieutenant Colonel Beall, -commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, led all the -organic vehicles (except 40-50) of the 5th and 7th Marines back to -Hagaru with the intent of returning them the following day loaded. The -Chinese, who had already invested the road, for some reason permitted -the trucks to pass. Beall reached Hagaru without incident. The trucks -were never able to return.[386] - - [386] 7thMar _SAR_, 42–43; 5thMar _SAR_, 45-50; 1stMarDiv - _SAR_, annex FF (1stServBn); 1stMTBn _SAR_, 9; Roach - Comments, 24 Jul 56. - - -_The Battle of Northwest Ridge_ - -At 1830, two hours after the looming mass of Sakkat Mountain had -blotted out the sun on 27 November, Yudam-ni was pitch black. The -temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero.[387] - - [387] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from - 7thMar _SAR_, 21, n. p.; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 2/5 _SAR_, - 17–18; 2/5 _HD Nov 50_, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG - 1stMarDiv, 2253 27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt - Samuel Jaskilka, “Easy Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, - xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n. - d. - -On Northwest Ridge the infantrymen of 3/7 and 2/5 slowly grew numb from -the penetrating cold. Trigger fingers, though heavily gloved, ached -against the brittle steel of weapons, and parka hoods became encrusted -with frozen moisture. In the cumbersome shoe-pacs, perspiration-soaked -feet gradually became transformed into lumps of biting pain. - -When men are immobilized for hours in such temperatures, no amount of -clothing will keep them warm. Yet, even more disturbing to the Marines -on the Yudam-ni perimeter was the effect of the weather on carbines and -BARs. These weapons froze to such a degree that they became unreliable -or, in some cases, completely unserviceable. The M-1 rifle and Browning -machine guns showed stubborn streaks but retained their effectiveness, -provided they had been cared for properly. - -While the Marines sat in their holes and cursed the frigid night, the -quiet hills around them came alive with thousands of Red Chinese on the -march. Unseen and unheard, the endless columns of quilted green wound -through valleys and over mountain trails leading toward the southern -tips of North and Northwest Ridges. These were the assault battalions -of the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions. With seven other divisions they -comprised Red China’s 9th Army Group led by Sung Shin-lun, one of the -best field commanders in the CCF. Lin Pao, commanding the 3d Field -Army, had dispatched Sung’s army group to northeast Korea specifically -to destroy the 1st Marine Division. The knockout blow, aimed at -the northwest arc of the Yudam-ni perimeter, amounted to a massive -frontal assault. Another CCF division, the 59th, had completed a wide -envelopment to the south, driving in toward South Ridge and Toktong -Pass to cut the MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.[388] - - [388] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 31–32; G-2 _SAR_, 15, 30–31; _CCF Army - Histories_, 13, 21. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE - - MAP-14 -] - -This was the main effort of the CCF in northeast Korea: three divisions -against two regiments of Marines. And in addition to the advantage -of mass, the Reds held the trump cards of mobility and surprise. -They enjoyed superior mobility because they were unencumbered by -heavy weapons and hence could use primitive routes of approach in the -darkness. They had the advantage of surprise because their practice -of marching by night and hiding by day had concealed their approach -to a large degree from UN air observation. To offset these odds, the -outnumbered Marines would have to rely on superior firepower, command -of the air, and another weapon called _esprit_. - -By 2100, Northwest Ridge was crawling with Chinese only a few hundred -yards from the positions of Companies E and F, 5th Marines, and -Company H, 7th Marines. The enemy troops, padding silently in their -rubber sneakers, had as yet given no hint of their presence. To divert -attention, the Red commander sent a patrol against 2/5’s roadblock on -the MSR between Northwest and Southwest Ridges. Troops of Company D, -5th Marines, exchanged grenades with the Chinese and killed two of -them. The remainder they quickly dispersed with mortar fire. - -Simultaneously with the thrust at the roadblock, small enemy teams -probed Fox Company’s line on the spur of Northwest Ridge, vanishing -into the night after each light contact. These disturbances in the -center of 2/5’s zone enabled CCF infiltrators and grenadiers on the -northern tip of the spur to crawl undetected within a few yards of the -limiting point between Company F and Company E on the right. Bugle -calls cut through the darkness, and the grenadiers began heaving their -missiles while the submachine gunners opened up. The din of this first -attempt to unnerve the defenders lasted several minutes. Then came a -sustained mortar bombardment of Marine front lines. While the shells -rained down, the Chinese opened fire with crew-served automatic weapons -emplaced all across Northwest Ridge. - -At 2125 the mortar eruptions began to walk toward the Marine rear. -Whistles screeched, enemy machine guns fell silent, and the first -Chinese assault waves hurled themselves against the juncture of -Companies E and F. The enemy attacked on an extremely narrow front in -order to maintain control. His troops advanced in column within grenade -range, then deployed abruptly into skirmish lines that flailed the -Marine positions ceaselessly and without regard to losses. - -The machine guns and rifles of Companies E and F piled the attackers -in grotesque heaps up and down the front, but the pressure of human -tonnage was unremitting. Ultimately, the Reds broke through on the -northern tip of the spur, where the two units were joined. They -poured troops into the gap, and as they attempted to roll back the -newly exposed flanks, they overran part of Fox Company’s right wing -platoon. Captain Samuel Jaskilka, commanding Easy Company in the draw, -dispatched a light machine-gun section and a squad from his 3d Platoon -(deployed in the rear) to reinforce his 1st Platoon at the edge of the -breakthrough. The latter unit, under Second Lieutenant Jade L. Nolan, -held firm and bent back its left to prevent encroachment on the rear. -Staff Sergeant Russell J. Borgomainero, of the 1st Platoon, deployed -the reinforcements to contain the penetration, while 2/5’s 81mm mortars -laid barrages on the salient. - -At 2215, as the attack against Companies E and F was reaching its -height, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered H&S Company of 2/5 to deploy -for the immediate defense of his command post. The Chinese, blocked in -their attempts to get behind Easy Company, continued to stab at the -rear of Fox. If their envelopment succeeded, they could swarm over the -headquarters and supporting arms positions of the 2d Battalion. - -Roise’s precaution proved unnecessary. As fast as the Red commander -sent troops into the salient, they were cut down by mortar, -machine-gun, and rifle fire. The few who did worm their way into -Marine supporting positions died in individual combat. At 2230, on the -right of Company E’s front, the 2d Platoon turned its machine guns on -a native hut 200 yards up the draw and set it ablaze. The brilliant -illumination exposed all CCF troops in the narrow corridor and on the -adjoining slopes; and the Marines commenced a turkey shoot that ended -at 2400 with the virtual annihilation of the main enemy force. - -The Chinese maintained their grip on the northern tip of the -spur, however, and fought off patrols from Easy Company trying to -re-establish contact with Fox. Since the gap remained, leaving the -enemy in position to fire on the Marine rear, Roise shifted the -reserve platoon of Company D to Fox Company’s side of the salient. -This redeployment, in conjunction with Company E’s earlier action on -the other side, converted the penetration area into a gantlet for the -Chinese. Already weakened by casualties numbering in the hundreds, the -Red commander apparently wrote off the salient as a net loss, for he -never used it again. - - -_Chinese Seize Hill 1403_ - -At 2135, just as the first assault waves were pounding 2/5’s front, the -vanguard of another enemy force began to feel out the lines of Company -H, 3/7, on Hill 1403 to the north. Captain Cooke’s three platoons were -deployed in an arc from the road to the peak of the hill to protect -the line of communication to the valley of Yudam-ni. Out of physical -contact with all friendly elements, How Company was assailable from -every direction, as the Chinese quickly discovered.[389] - - [389] Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section - are: 7thMar _SAR_; RCT 7 _URpt_ 6; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 2/5 - _HD_, _Nov 50_, 9–10; 2/5 _SAR_, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to - CG 1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, “Easy - Alley,” 18–19; Capt M. P. Newton Comments, n. d. - -Following a half hour of lightning probes, the enemy launched a strong -attack against First Lieutenant Elmer A. Krieg’s platoon on the right -front. Communications with Cooke’s CP went out almost immediately, and -in the space of a few minutes the Marine right flank collapsed under -the weight of CCF numbers. Krieg shifted his remaining men to the left -and joined Second Lieutenant Paul E. Denny’s platoon. - -At the company CP on the reverse slope, Captain Cooke and his forward -observers radioed for all available supporting arms. The prompt -barrages by artillery and mortars in the valley stopped the Communists -on the right half of the summit and enabled Cooke to reorganize his -forward platoons. As the supporting fires lifted, he personally led -an assault to restore the right flank. But the CCF machine guns and -grenades smashed the counterattack, and Cooke was cut down at the head -of his men. - -Second Lieutenant James M. Mitchell, executive officer, temporarily -took command of Company H. When word of Cooke’s death reached 3/7’s CP, -Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris[390] dispatched Lieutenant Harris -(no relation), recently returned to duty after illness, to take over -the beleaguered unit. - - [390] LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved - Maj Roach on 11 Nov. - -The younger Harris, who had been out of action since shortly after the -“How Hill” battle in early November, safely ascended the enemy-infested -slopes of Hill 1403 in the darkness. About midnight he reached How -Company’s positions and found all of Cooke’s officers wounded but one, -Lieutenant Newton. The platoons of Krieg and Denny were badly depleted, -but Harris moved Newton’s platoon from the left flank to the right. -Newton’s men regained enough ground in a counterattack to cement the -company’s position. - -After these first attacks against 2/5 and H/7 over the two-mile breadth -of Northwest Ridge, the Chinese remained generally inactive for a -period of about two hours. They had paid heavily for minor gains--so -heavily that fresh battalions were called from reserve to stamp out the -Marine resistance on the tip of the ridge. And at 0300, several hundred -CCF riflemen, grenadiers, and submachine gunners commenced the second -general assault, striking at 2/5 and Company H simultaneously. - -In the low ground at the center of the two-mile front, Jaskilka’s Easy -Company threw a curtain of machine-gun fire across the draw in the path -of 300 Chinese advancing frontally. The first enemy ranks marched into -the fire lanes and were mowed down like rows of grain. The CCF soldiers -in subsequent formations apparently viewed the grisly, corpse-strewn -corridor with misgivings, for they stopped several hundred yards up the -narrow valley and took cover. Thereafter, the main fighting in Company -E’s zone involved long-range exchanges of machine-gun and mortar fire, -although clashes at close quarters occasionally flared up on the flanks. - -Approximately 200 Communist troops had concentrated meanwhile against -Fox Company on the spur to the left, where the ground afforded more -cover and space for maneuver. Stumbling over a carpet of their own -dead, the Reds thrust repeatedly at the center of the Marine line. They -inflicted many casualties on the defenders and ultimately overran two -machine-gun positions. But this was the sum total of their success; and -fighting on the north half of the spur, at the edge of the gap between -Companies E and F, continued sporadically for the rest of the night -with neither side gaining any appreciable advantage. - -On the right of the 2d Battalion, the second CCF onslaught had struck -the front and both flanks of Company H on Hill 1403. Human cannon -fodder of Red China was hurled against the Marine positions for a full -hour, but Lieutenant Harris’ command held. H Company’s roadblock, -commanded by Sergeant Vick, decisively beat off a Chinese attack in the -valley; and at 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Harris ordered the hard pressed -company to pull back toward the rear of Easy Company, 2/5. Two hours -later How Company completed its fighting withdrawal. - -The loss of Hill 1403 posed a grave threat to the whole defensive -network around the village. Not only were the Chinese now ideally -situated to strike at the rear of 2/5 and sever it from the two -regiments, but in sufficient strength they could attack the rear and -flanks of the Marine units on North and Southwest Ridges. Moreover, at -dawn, they would be looking down the throats of some 2000 Marines on -the valley floor. - - -_Fighting at 3/5’s CP_ - -The partially successful assault on Northwest Ridge involved two -regiments, the 266th and 267th, of the 89th CCF Division. Operating -abreast of this force, the 79th Division had meanwhile advanced over -the rugged spine of North Ridge toward the two isolated companies of -the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, occupying terminal Hills 1282 and 1240 -of that huge land mass. Elements of the 79th Division’s three regiments -were in the fore, and each regiment was apparently disposed in a column -of battalions. Facing south toward the Marine positions on North Ridge, -the CCF order of battle, with probable objectives assigned, was as -follows: - - 237th Regt 235th Regt 236th Regt - - Hill 1384 Hill 1240 Hill 1167 - - (Unoccupied) (D/7) (Unoccupied) - -For reasons unknown, the commander of the 235th Regiment did not -include Hill 1282 in his plan for seizing the high ground above -Yudam-ni. He ordered his 1st Battalion to take only Hill 1240, and the -commanding officer of that unit in turn assigned the mission to his -1st and Special Duty Companies. After these two outfits had seized -the objective, the 2d and 3d Companies would pass through and, in -conjunction with other CCF forces in the locale, “... annihilate the -enemy at Yudam-ni.”[391] - - [391] ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 84, - 38. Except where otherwise noted, this section is based - on: _Ibid._, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May - 56; 1stLt R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52; - RCT 7 _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 - Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, - 0730 28 Nov 50; 3/5 _SAR_, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J. - H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation contains a - number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of - small unit actions. An earlier translation is to be found - in ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 66, - 87–134. - -Approaching the terminal high ground in darkness, the 1st Battalion, -235th Regiment, veered off its course and mistakenly ascended a spur -toward Hill 1282. The 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment, keeping contact -as it advanced on the left, participated in the error and wound up -at the foot of Hill 1240. Thus confronted with this precipitous mass -instead of low, gently sloping Hill 1167, the 3d Battalion floundered -for several hours and did not take part in the first attack against -the Marine perimeter. It did, however, send out the usual screen of -infiltrators. - -At 2200, submachine gunners and grenadiers of the 1st and Special Duty -Companies, 1/235, commenced the preliminaries against Company E, 7th -Marines on Hill 1282, believing they were engaging a Marine platoon on -Hill 1240. The harassing force was driven off after failing to disrupt -the Marine defenses. Almost two hours later, at 2345, Company D of 2/7 -reported enemy infiltration on Hill 1240 a thousand yards to the east. -Both Marine companies cancelled the patrols scheduled for the long -saddle connecting their positions and went on a 100% alert. - -Captain Phillips, commanding Easy Company, had arranged two platoons in -perimeter around the summit of Hill 1282, and the third he had deployed -to the right rear, on a spur that dipped toward Yudam-ni. At midnight, -after a period of silence across the company front, the initial CCF -assault wave slammed into the northeastern arc of the perimeter, -manned by First Lieutenant Yancey’s platoon. Marine firepower blunted -this frontal attack, and the Reds tried to slip around the east side -of the hilltop. They ran head-on into First Lieutenant Bey’s platoon -entrenched on the spur and were thrown back. - -Resorting to grinding tactics, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted Company -E’s position from midnight to 0200. Whistles and bugles blared over the -reaches of North Ridge, and the charging squads of infantry met death -stoically, to the tune of weird Oriental chants. When one formation -was cut to pieces by machine-gun fire and grenades, another rose out -of the night to take its place. By 0200, as the first attack began to -taper off, the northeastern slopes of Hill 1282 lay buried under a mat -of human wreckage. An hour later, the 1st and Special Duty Companies -of the 1st Battalion, 235th CCF Regiment, had ceased to exist, having -lost nearly every man of their combined total of over 200. Company E’s -casualties had been heavy, but the Marines still held Hill 1282. - -[Illustration: ACTION AT 3/5’S CP - - MAP-15 -] - -On Hill 1240, a thousand yards to the east, infiltrators of the 3d -Battalion, 236th CCF Regiment, probed Dog Company’s perimeter while -Easy was under attack. By 0030, some of the harassing parties had -side-slipped through the saddle separating Hill 1282 and opened fire on -the 5th and 7th Regimental headquarters in Yudam-ni. - -The sniping from the slopes of North Ridge did not surprise the Marines -in the valley, for they had long been preparing for a possible threat -from that direction. Early in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett -had re-deployed 3/5 from an assembly area just north of the village to -a broad tactical perimeter in the same locale. Companies H and I, the -latter on the right, he positioned facing Northwest Ridge--specifically -Hill 1403. Two platoons of Company G held blocking positions near the -base of Southwest Ridge, and the third manned an outpost on the slopes -of that high ground. At the bottom of North Ridge, in the draw between -Hill 1282 and the spur of 1384, Taplett established his CP with H&S and -Weapons Companies providing local security. - -When 3/5’s commander learned that the spur of Hill 1384 was unoccupied, -he dispatched a platoon of Company I to an outpost position 500 yards -up the slope. About 300 yards behind the Item Company unit, on a -portion of the spur directly above the battalion CP, a platoon of South -Korean police deployed with two heavy machine guns. - -At 2045, fifteen minutes before any other unit on the Yudam-ni reported -a contact, the outpost platoon of Item Company began receiving fire -from above. This harassment, probably involving advance elements of -the 237th CCF Regiment, continued sporadically for several hours, -throughout the period of the first Communist attacks against other -fronts. - -In the valley at 2120, a few men of How Company, 7th Marines, entered -3/5’s positions barefooted and partially clothed. Taplett, personally -noting the time of their arrival, questioned them in the battalion aid -station, and they told how their 60mm mortar position on Hill 1403 had -been seized by the Chinese.[392] - - [392] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56. - -The battalion commander returned to his CP, and after listening to the -far-off din of the initial Communist attacks, placed his perimeter on -a 100% alert at 0115. Half an hour later, the Item Company platoon -on the spur of Hill 1384 reported an increase in enemy fire coming -from above. A message from H/7 next warned that CCF troops were moving -around Hill 1403 to cut the MSR. Company I observed activity in that -quarter shortly afterwards, and at 0218 opened fire on an enemy -platoon, which promptly retracted. - -A few minutes later, a company--possibly two companies--of Chinese -swept down the spur of Hill 1384, overran the Item Company platoon -outpost, and continued on towards the police platoon. The South -Koreans, after inflicting heavy casualties on the Reds with their two -machine guns, vacated the high ground. Enemy troops then spread out -along the crest and poured plunging fire into H&S and Weapons Companies -defending the draw. - -Weapons Company, on the far side of the depression, held its ground, -but H&S, directly under the gun, shortly fell back across the MSR. -Taplett’s CP was left in a no man’s land, with enemy bullets raining -down out of the night and Marine fire whistling back from across the -draw and road. Upon learning of the withdrawal, the battalion commander -elected to remain in the tent in order to keep telephone contact with -his rifle companies, which were as yet uninvolved. He did not consider -the situation too serious, and it seemed as though the police platoon’s -machine guns had taken the sting out of the enemy assault. - -Except for a few individuals, the Chinese did not descend from the -spur. Nor did they direct much fire at Taplett’s blackout tent, which -they probably took to be unoccupied. Inside, the battalion commander -studied his maps, received reports and issued instructions over the -field phone while his S-3, Major Thomas A. Durham, sat nearby with -pistol drawn. Major John J. Canney, the executive officer, left the -CP to retrieve H&S Company and was killed as he approached the MSR. -Private First Class Louis W. Swinson, radio operator, whose instrument -had proved unreliable in the severe cold, took position outside -the tent and covered the approaches with his rifle. This unique -situation--a battalion commander under fire in an exposed position -while his rifle companies lay peacefully entrenched several hundred -yards away--lasted for over an hour. - - -_The Battle of North Ridge_ - -At approximately 0300, when Taplett, Durham, and Swinson began their -lonely vigil, the 79th CCF Division launched another assault on North -Ridge (see Map 16).[393] As a result of the enemy’s first attack, -and in anticipation of the second, Colonel Murray earlier had moved -elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into position behind 3/5. - - [393] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from: - 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 1/5 _HD, Nov 50_; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; - 7thMar _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 - Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven - Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56; - Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun - 56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56. - -Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell’s 1st Platoon of Company A -left the battalion assembly area in the valley at 0100 and started up -the steep incline of Hill 1282. Climbing the icy slopes by day was -difficult enough, but darkness and a minus-20-degree temperature made -it a gruelling and perilous ordeal. Trapnell’s outfit did not reach the -crest until after 0300, when the CCF assault was at the height of its -fury and Company E was facing imminent annihilation. The Able Company -unit moved into position with Lieutenant Bey’s platoon on the spur -jutting back from the peak. As yet, the full force of the Chinese drive -had not spread to this area. - -The Red commander of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, used his 3d -Company for the second attack against the cap of Hill 1282. With the -few survivors of the 1st and Special Duty Companies attached, the fresh -unit probably numbered about 125 troops. In squads of eight to ten, -the Chinese struck again and again at the perimeter on the summit, and -the two depleted platoons of Easy Company dwindled to a mere handful -of tired, desperate Marines. First Lieutenant Robert E. Snyder’s 3d -Platoon of A/5, having been sent up from the valley shortly after -Trapnell’s outfit, arrived as reinforcements. Snyder did not have -contact with Bey and Trapnell, whose platoons were still intact, so he -integrated his men with the remnants of the two platoons on the peak. - -Both sides suffered crippling losses during the close fighting on Hill -1282. The Reds finally drove a wedge between the Marine defenders on -the summit and the platoons of Bey and Trapnell on the spur. According -to Bey: - - It soon became obvious that a penetration had been made to our - left. The positions atop the hill and the Command Post area were - brightly illuminated by flares and other explosions. By this - time [approximately 0400] nothing but Chinese could be heard on - the telephone in the command post and my Platoon Sergeant, Staff - Sergeant Daniel M. Murphy, requested permission to take what men we - could spare in an attempt to close the gap between the left flank - of the platoon and the rest of the company. I told him to go ahead - and do what he could.[394] - - [394] Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52. - -[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTH RIDGE - - MAP-16 -] - -Meanwhile, the center and rear of Easy Company’s perimeter was reduced -to the chaos of a last stand. Yancey, already wounded, was hit again -as he tried to reorganize the few Marine survivors on the peak. First -Lieutenant Leonard M. Clements, the other platoon leader, fell wounded -as did First Lieutenant William J. Schreier of the mortar section and -Lieutenant Snyder. Captain Phillips, hurling grenades in the midst of -the melee, was killed. His executive officer, First Lieutenant Raymond -O. Ball, took command of Company E, shouting out encouragement as he -lay immobilized by two wounds. He was hit several more times before he -lapsed into unconsciousness and died after reaching the aid station. -Lieutenant Snyder took command. - -By 0500, CCF infantrymen of the 3d Company, 1/235, occupied the summit -of Hill 1282, still believing it to be Hill 1240. The remnants of -the platoons of Yancey, Clements, and Snyder had been driven to the -reverse slope in the west, while the units of Trapnell and Bey clung to -the crest of the southeastern spur, overlooking Yudam-ni. Up to this -point, Chinese casualties on Hill 1282 probably numbered about 250, -with Marine losses approximating 150. Easy Company had been reduced to -the effective strength of a rifle platoon (split in two), and the pair -of A/5 platoons paid with upwards of 40 killed and wounded during the -brief time on the battle line; only six effectives remained of Snyder’s -platoon. - -The danger from enemy-held Hill 1282 was compounded by the success of -the 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment on Hill 1240 to the east. At about -0105 the Chinese who had previously been content only to make probing -attacks on Captain Hull’s Dog Company shifted to a full-scale assault. -Sergeant Othmar J. Reller’s platoon, holding the northwest portion of -the company perimeter, beat off three attacks before being overrun at -about 0230. First Lieutenant Richard C. Webber, the machine gun platoon -leader, attempted to plug the gap with the available reinforcements but -was prevented by a fire fight outside the Company CP. First Lieutenant -Edward M. Seeburger’s platoon holding the perimeter on the right (east) -was under too heavy an attack to extend to the left and tie in with -Webber. The Chinese overran Hull’s CP at about 0300, and he ordered -Seeburger and First Lieutenant Anthony J. Sota, commanding the rear -platoon, to reorganize at the foot of Hill 1240. - -Captain Hull, wounded, his command cut to the size of a few squads, -rallied his troops on the hillside and led a counterattack against -the crest. The surprised Chinese recoiled and the Marines won a small -foothold. Then the enemy smashed back from the front, right flank, and -right rear. Hull was wounded again but continued in action as his hasty -perimeter diminished to the proportions of a squad position. With the -approach of dawn, he had only 16 men left who could fight. The enemy -was on the higher ground to his front, on both flanks, and on the -slopes in his rear. - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -Fox Hill - -_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company at Toktong -Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge--Deadlock on Hill 1240--The -Fight for Northwest Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not -Enough Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November_ - - -Of the Marine artillery units at Yudam-ni, those most directly -imperiled by CCF gains on North Ridge were Major Parry’s 3d Battalion -and Battery K of the 4th. The latter, under First Lieutenant Robert C. -Messman, lay beneath the southeastern spur of Hill 1282, having gone -into position at 2100 on 27 November. Rearward of King Battery, 3/11 -was positioned below the steep slopes of Hill 1240 where its 105s had -fired in direct support of the 7th Marines on 26 and 27 November (see -Map 12).[395] - - [395] 3/11 _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 4, - (hereafter 4/11 _SAR_), 5. - -The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which had arrived at Yudam-ni -early on the 27th to support the 5th Regiment, was emplaced in the -valley between the tips of South and Southwest Ridges. Major William -McReynolds, commanding the 4th Battalion, reached the perimeter with -his outfit later. He had two batteries in action by 1900 and all three -by 2300 on the low ground separating South and Southeast Ridges. -Battery K, firing under the direction of 1/11 pending the arrival of -the parent unit, then reverted to McReynolds’ control, although it did -not displace rearward to 4/11’s positions until the next day. - -The TD-14 bulldozers of the 11th Marines had proved to be no match -for the eight-inch frostline around the Reservoir, with the result -that all batteries and security positions sat fully exposed on -the concrete-like flatlands. Incoming mortar fire harassed the -artillerymen throughout the day of 27 November, and after dark CCF -flat trajectory weapons stepped up the tempo of bombardment. Marine -casualties in the valley were light, however, for the enemy gunners -seemed unable to group their erratic pot shots into effective -barrages.[396] - - [396] 1/11 _SAR_, 8; 4/11 _SAR_, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv, - 26 Nov 56. - -It was the imminent threat of Communist infantry attack from North -Ridge that weighed down on the artillerymen of the 11th Regiment -during the predawn hours of 28 November. Since the beginning of the -CCF onslaught, they had been firing their howitzers almost ceaselessly -in a 180-degree arc, and ammunition stocks were fast dwindling to a -critical level. Their gun flashes providing brilliant targets for enemy -infiltrators, they could reasonably expect a full-scale assault in the -event of the dislodgment of Easy and Dog Companies from Hills 1282 and -1240. The effect of countermoves by Colonels Litzenberg and Murray -would not be known until after dawn, and meanwhile the Marine gunners -kept on firing their howitzers while the black outline of North Ridge -loomed ever more menacing. - - -_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7_ - -While the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions pounded the northwest arc of -the Yudam-ni perimeter during the night of 27–28 November, the 59th -completed its wide end-sweep to the southeast and moved against the -14-mile stretch of road to Hagaru. At the moment the Communist effort -in that quarter could be considered a secondary attack, but if ever a -target fulfilled all the qualifications of a prime objective, it was -this critical link in the MSR--the very lifeline to most of the 1st -Marine Division’s infantry and artillery strength. - -During the 27th Captain Wilcox’s Baker Company of the 7th Marines -patrolled along South Ridge. As darkness fell, it was heavily engaged -and incumbered with a number of litter casualties. With the permission -of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Davis led Captain John -F. Morris’s Charlie Company (-) down the MSR to positions across the -road from Hill 1419. Aided by Charlie Company, Baker was then able to -withdraw and return to Yudam-ni with Davis while Morris and his reduced -company took up positions on Hill 1419.[397] - - [397] Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56. - -He deployed his two rifle platoons and 60mm mortar section in a -crescent on the lower slopes of the eastern spur, facing the distant -crest. At 0230, five hours after Yudam-ni came under attack, a CCF -force descended from the high ground and struck the right flank.[398] - - [398] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived - from: Geer, _The New Breed_, 288–290; Lynn Montross, - “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, - xxxvii, no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7thMar ISUM 67; and 7thMar - msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50. - -After overrunning part of First Lieutenant Jack A. Chabek’s platoon -and inflicting heavy casualties, the Reds lashed out at the left flank -of the crescent-shaped defense. Here Staff Sergeant Earle J. Payne’s -platoon, less one squad in an outpost on higher ground, bent under the -weight of the attack and was soon in danger of being driven out of -position. Captain Morris reinforced the platoons on each flank with -men from his headquarters and the mortar section. The reshuffling was -accomplished in the nick of time and just barely tipped the scales in -favor of the defenders. A seesaw battle raged until after dawn on the -28th when, with the help of artillery fire from Yudam-ni, the Marines -drove the Chinese back into the hills. - -Although the critical pressure eased at daybreak, Company C remained -pinned down by enemy fire coming from every direction, including the -crest of Hill 1419 directly above. The Chinese were in absolute control -of the MSR to the south, toward Toktong Pass, and to the north, in -the direction of Yudam-ni. Morris had taken about 40 casualties--a -dangerously high proportion, since he had only two of his three rifle -platoons. His radio had been knocked out by enemy bullets, and the 60mm -mortar section was left with but a few rounds of ammunition. For want -of communication, he could get no help from the Marine Corsairs on -station overhead. - -The outpost squad from Payne’s platoon could not be contacted in -its position on the higher slopes of Hill 1419. Corporal Curtis J. -Kiesling, who volunteered to search for the lost unit, was killed by -CCF machine-gun fire as he attempted to scale the rugged incline. Other -men of Company C repeatedly exposed themselves in order to drag wounded -comrades to the relative safety of a draw leading down to the MSR. - -Surrounded and outnumbered, Morris had no alternative but to await -help from Yudam-ni. He contracted his perimeter on the hillside east -of the road, and from this tiny tactical island, for the rest of the -morning, his men watched Communist troops jockey for position around a -360-degree circle. - - -_Fox Company at Toktong Pass_ - -Where Morris had taken a reduced infantry company into its lonely -assignment on the MSR, Captain William E. Barber went into position at -Toktong Pass on the 27th with a heavily reinforced outfit.[399] His -Fox Company of 2/7, augmented by heavy machine gun and 81mm mortar -sections of Weapons Company, numbered 240 officers and men. At the -midway point of the pass, Barber chose an isolated hill just north of -the MSR for his company perimeter. He placed the 3d Platoon (First -Lieutenant Robert C. McCarthy) on the summit, facing generally north, -with the 1st (First Lieutenant John M. Dunne) on the right and the 2d -(First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson) on the left. The 3d Platoon formed -a hilltop perimeter with two squads forward and the third in reserve -to the rear. Tied in on each flank, the 1st and 2d Platoons stretched -down the respective hillsides and bent back toward the MSR. These two -were connected on the reverse slope by company headquarters and the -rocket squad. Just below, at the base of the hill next to the road, -were Barber’s CP together with the 81mm and 60mm mortar sections. All -machine guns, including the heavies from Weapons Company, were emplaced -with the rifle platoons. - - [399] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is - derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross, - “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar _SAR_, - 20–21; 7thMar _URpt_ 5; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, - 1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. - Z. Freeman, 3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and SSgt R. R. - Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 Jul 51. - -During the first half of the night of 27–28 November, Toktong Pass -rumbled with the reverberations of truck convoys--the final serials -of 1/5 and 4/11 outbound for Yudam-ni and Lieutenant Colonel Beall’s -empty trucks inbound for Hagaru. It was after 2000 before the last -trucks climbed to the summit, then nosed downhill, whining and roaring -through the night as they made the twisting descent. Chinese Communists -had already launched their first attacks against Southwest Ridge at -Yudam-ni, but Fox Company’s perimeter remained quiet, even during the -first hour of 28 November. - -It was actually too quiet at 0115 when Lieutenant McCarthy inspected -the 3d Platoon positions atop Fox Hill, now glittering in the light -of a full moon. Finding his men numbed by the severe cold, he called -together his squad leaders and admonished them to be more alert. A -short time later, during his next inspection, McCarthy heard the proper -challenges ring out at every point. - -There was no lack of watchfulness at 0230. For it was then that Chinese -in estimated company strength lunged out of the night and assaulted the -north, west, and south arcs of Company F’s perimeter. On the summit, -the two forward squads of McCarthy’s platoon were overwhelmed almost -immediately, losing 15 killed and nine wounded out of a total of 35 -men. Three others would later be listed as missing. The eight uninjured -fell back to the reserve squad’s position on the military crest to the -rear, and the enemy took over the topographical peak. - -Fighting with small arms and grenades also raged on the hillside to the -left, where the Chinese attempted to drive a wedge between the 2d and -3d Platoons. Repeated assaults were hurled back with grievous losses to -the Reds, and they apparently threw in fresh units in their bid for a -critical penetration. That they failed was due largely to the valor of -three Marines who made a determined stand at the vital junction: PFC -Robert F. Benson and Private Hector A. Cafferatta of the 2d Platoon, -and PFC Gerald J. Smith, a fire team leader of the 3d. These men, -assisted by the members of Smith’s team, are credited with annihilating -two enemy platoons. - -While the enemy had undoubtedly planned the attack on the two rifle -platoons with typical precision, it seems that he literally stumbled -into the rear of Fox Company’s position. Corporal Donald R. Thornton, -member of a rocket launcher crew, reported that a group of Chinese -walking along the MSR suddenly found themselves at the edge of Barber’s -CP and the mortar positions. The Communist soldiers recovered from the -surprise and closed in aggressively, forcing the company commander and -the mortar crews to ascend the hill to a protective line of trees. An -embankment where the MSR cut through the base of the hill prevented -pursuit by the Chinese. When they tried to climb over it they were cut -down by small-arms fire; when they hid behind it they were riddled by -grenades that the Marines rolled downhill; when they finally gave up -and tried to flee, they were shot as they ran into the open. - -On the right (east) side of the perimeter, the 1st Platoon was engaged -only on the flanks, near the summit where it tied in with the 3d and -down the slope where it joined the headquarters troops and mortar crews -defending the rear. - -Fighting around the 270° arc of the perimeter continued until after -daybreak. Despite losses of 20 dead and 54 wounded, Fox Company was in -complete control of the situation. Lieutenant McCarthy described the -breaking-off action as follows: - - By 0630, 28 November, the Chinese had received so many casualties - that the attack could no longer be considered organized. Few - Chinese remained alive near the company perimeter. Individual - Chinese continued to crawl up and throw grenades. A Marine would - make a one-man assault on these individuals, shooting or bayoneting - them. The attack could be considered over, although three Marines - ... were hit by rifle fire at 0730. We received small arms fire - intermittently during the day, but no attack. - -McCarthy estimated that enemy dead in front of the 2d and 3d Platoons -numbered 350, while yet another 100 littered the 1st Platoon’s zone and -the area at the base of the hill along the MSR.[400] - - [400] These figures would indicate the complete destruction of - a CCF Battalion. - - -_Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge_ - -As Companies C and F of the 7th Marines were fighting on the MSR in the -hours just before dawn of 28 November, the first of a series of Marine -counterattacks commenced at Yudam-ni. It was essential to the very -survival of the 5th and 7th Regiments that the Chinese be driven back, -or at least checked, on the high ground surrounding the village. - -Lieutenant Colonel Taplett, operating his CP in the no man’s land at -the base of North Ridge, ordered Company G of 3/5 to counterattack the -spur of Hill 1384 at about 0300.[401] The platoon of George Company -outposting Southwest Ridge was left in position, but the other two -platoons, under Second Lieutenants John J. Cahill and Dana B. Cashion, -moved out abreast shortly after 0300. Driving northward aggressively, -they crossed the MSR, “liberated” Taplett’s CP, and cleared the draw -in which Weapons Company of 3/5 was still entrenched. Troops of H&S -Company followed the attackers and reoccupied their old positions in -the gulley. - - [401] The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from: - 5thMar _SAR_, 21–22; 3/5 _SAR_, 14; Taplett interv, 3 May - 56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d. - -Cahill and Cashion, displaying remarkable cohesion on unfamiliar ground -in the darkness, led the way up Hill 1384. Their men advanced swiftly -behind a shield of marching fire and routed the few[402] Chinese on -the spur. The position earlier vacated by the police platoon was -recaptured, and the Marines saw numerous enemy dead in front of the -South Korean machine gun emplacements. About 500 yards beyond the -battalion CP the two platoons halted until daylight. The seven men -who had formed the Item Company outpost on Hill 1384 arrived shortly -afterwards and were integrated into Cashion’s platoon. - - [402] Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came - from 25–30 Chinese. - -He continued the attack soon after daybreak, with Cahill’s platoon -giving fire support. Cashion and his men plunged into enemy territory -along the ridge line leading northward to the topographical crest of -Hill 1384, about 1000 yards distant. They had reached the final slopes -when Taplett received the radio message, almost incredible to him, -that the two platoons were nearing the peak of Hill 1384. He directed -them to discontinue the attack and withdraw to the top of the spur. -There they were to establish a defense line overlooking Yudam-ni until -receiving further orders. The spirited drive led by the two young -officers had taken considerable pressure off the Marine units in the -valley west of the village. One immediate effect was that approximately -80 officers and men of How Company, 7th Marines, were able to retire -into 3/5’s perimeter from the slopes of Hill 1403 on Northwest Ridge. - -To the east of 3/5, a second successful counterattack by the 5th -Marines brought stability to yet another critical point. Company C of -1/5 had deployed shortly after midnight to back up 3/5, in the event -of a breakthrough in the valley. Owing to the adverse developments on -Hills 1282 and 1240, however, it was later placed under operational -control of the 7th Marines. One platoon left for Hill 1240 in the -middle of the night to reinforce D/7, and the remainder of the company, -led by Captain Jack R. Jones, ascended 1282 to assist E/7 and the two -platoons of A/5 earlier committed.[403] - - [403] The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from - 5thMar _SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; 7th - Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD, Nov - 50_, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26 - Jun 52; ATIS _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_ Issue - 66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens, - II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 - Jun 56; SSgt R. C. Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. - -Charlie Company moved up a draw with Jones and his executive officer, -First Lieutenant Loren R. Smith, in the van of the column, followed by -the 1st and 2d Platoons and the 60mm mortar section. Light machine-gun -sections were attached to the rifle platoons. The climb took almost two -hours in the predawn darkness, the company frequently halting while -Jones questioned wounded men descending from the top. Numb from cold, -shock, and loss of blood, they could give no intelligible picture of a -situation described as grim and confused. - -At approximately 0430, the head of the column came under heavy fire -from above as it reached a point just below the military crest, about -100 yards from the summit of 1282. Here, Jones found Staff Sergeant -Murphy from E/7’s 3d Platoon which, along with Trapnell’s, was out of -sight on the spur to the right. Also out of sight but far to the left -were Snyder’s platoon of A/5 and a handful of men of Easy Company. -While CCF grenades and small-arms fire rained down, Murphy explained -that E/7’s main position had been overrun and that he was attempting to -form a holding line in the center with some 20 survivors of the summit -battle. - -Jones quickly deployed his two platoons for the attack, the 2d under -Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness on the right, the 1st under Second -Lieutenant Max A. Merrit on the left. Murphy’s small contingent joined -the formation. Second Lieutenant Robert H. Corbet set up his 60mm -mortar section to support the advance, then took a place in the assault -line. Down in the valley the 81mm mortars of 1/5 opened up with a -preparatory barrage. Artillery could not fire because of the short -distance between friendly and enemy lines, and the first flight of -Corsairs was not yet on station. - -The frontal attack against the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 235th CCF -Regiment began shortly after daybreak. Jones personally led the Marine -skirmishers against more than 50 enemy soldiers armed with machine -guns and grenades. His troops moved upward through a hail of fire and -overran the Communists after a savage clash that included hand-to-hand -fighting. The Marines then deployed with the just-arrived 2d Platoon -of Able Company bridging the gap between Jones and Trapnell in time to -thwart the advance of enemy reinforcements. - -According to enemy reports, only six or seven men survived the 3d -Company’s defeat. One of them happened to be the company political -officer, who conveniently had retired from the battle line during the -crucial stage of the struggle. At 1/235’s CP, a few hundred yards -to the rear, he was given a platoon of the 2d Company “in order to -evacuate the wounded and to safeguard the occupied position on Hill -1282....” The fresh unit ascended the northern slopes of the height -while Jones’ company was battling its way up from the south. By the -time the Red soldiers of the 2d Company neared the summit, they were -confronted from above by the muzzles of Marine rifles and machine guns. -The whole story unfolds in CCF records as follows: - - As soon as the 1st Platoon [2d Company] advanced to the 3d - Company’s position its assistant company commander came up with - the platoon. At that time, the enemy [C/5] counterattacked very - violently. Accordingly, the assistant company commander ordered - the 1st Platoon to strike the enemy immediately and determinedly. - Before the 1st Platoon’s troops had been deployed, Lee Feng Hsi, - the Platoon Leader, shouted: “Charge!” So both the 1st and 2d - Squads pressed forward in swarms side by side. When they were - within a little more than ten meters of the top of the hill they - suffered casualties from enemy hand grenades and short-range fire. - Consequently, they were absolutely unable to advance any farther. - At that time, the assistant company commander and the majority of - the platoon and squad leaders were either killed or wounded. - - While the 1st and 2d Squads were encountering the enemy’s - counterattack, the 3d Squad also deployed and joined them in an - effort to drive the enemy to the back of the hill. As a result, - more than half of the 3d Squad were either killed or wounded. When - the second assistant platoon leader attempted to reorganize, his - troops suffered again from enemy flanking fire and hand grenades. - Thus, after having fought for no more than ten minutes, the entire - platoon lost its attacking strength and was forced to retreat - somewhat to be able to defend firmly the place it held. - -Meanwhile, according to Chinese accounts, Tsung Hui Tzu, commander of -the 2d Company, had arrived at the CP of 1/235 with his 2d Platoon at -0620. Noting that his 1st Platoon was in trouble, he said to the leader -of the 2d, “There are some enemy soldiers on the hill [1282] in front -of us; attack forward determinedly.” - -The 2d Platoon jumped off immediately with two squads abreast and one -trailing. Within 30 meters of the crest, the Reds attempted to rush -Charlie Company’s position behind a barrage of hand grenades. The -assault failed. On the right the assistant platoon leader fell at the -head of the 4th squad, which was reduced to three survivors. Tsung, the -company commander, rushed forward and led the 6th squad on the left. -He was wounded and the squad cut to pieces. Incredibly, the platoon -leader ordered the three remaining men of the 4th squad to assault the -summit again. They tried and only one of them came back. The 5th squad, -advancing out of reserve, had no sooner begun to deploy than it lost -all of its NCOs. “As it mixed with the 4th and 6th squads to attack, -they suffered casualties again from enemy flanking fire and hand -grenades from the top of the hill. Therefore, the entire platoon lost -its combat strength, with only seven men being left alive.” - -Not only was the commanding officer of 1/235 down to his last company, -but that company was down to its last platoon. Forever hovering in the -rear, the 2d Company’s political officer, Liu Sheng Hsi, ordered the -platoon to “continue the attack.” The assault began with two squads -forward, led by the platoon leader and his assistant. They charged -uphill into the teeth of Charlie Company’s position. Like all the -others, they were ground into the mat of corpses on the blood-soaked -snow. To complete the suicide of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, the -reserve squad of this last platoon was committed. A few minutes later, -“... there were only six men left.” - -The 2d Company paid for its failure with 94 of the original 116 -officers and men. This loss, added to those of the 1st, 3d, and -Special Duty Companies, would place 1/235’s casualties on Hill 1282 at -approximately 400, including practically all the company commanders, -platoon leaders, and NCOs. It can be assumed that nearly all of the -wounded succumbed, since evacuation was well nigh impossible with -Marines in control of the summit for the next 24 hours. - -Marine losses were not light. Able and Charlie Companies of 1/5 -together suffered 15 KIA and 67 WIA. Easy Company of 2/7, according -to best estimates, made its stand at a cost of about 120 killed and -wounded. - - -_Deadlock on Hill 1240_ - -At daybreak of 20 November, several of Easy Company’s casualties still -lay in their foxholes on the forward slopes of Hill 1282. To recover -them was an undertaking of great risk, even after the defeat of 1/235; -for CCF survivors continued to fire at the summit from positions on the -lower slopes. Captain Jones directed the evacuation and repeatedly ran -forward of his lines to rescue half-frozen Marines who were immobilized -by wounds.[404] - - [404] L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, _The New Breed_, 285. - -Headquarters personnel of 1/5 spent the whole morning removing -casualties from 1282 and carrying them to the battalion and regimental -aid stations, which soon were filled to overflowing. In the meantime, -Able Company joined Charlie on the crest and assimilated the depleted -platoons of Trapnell and Snyder. A new defensive line was drawn across -the vital peak with C/5 in the center, A/5 on the right, and E/7, -now under the command of Lieutenant Bey, on the left. By midmorning, -despite the continued exchange of fire with CCF troops on the slopes, -there was no doubt that the Marines would hold the hill.[405] - - [405] 5thMar _SAR_, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56. - -This was not the case 1000 yards to the right, where daybreak had -found the shattered remnants of D/7 clinging to a toehold on Hill 1240 -and beset from every direction by troops of the 3d Battalion, 236th CCF -Regiment.[406] The 3d Platoon of C/5, which had been dispatched from -the valley at 0400 to help, was delayed by darkness and terrain. Second -Lieutenant Harold L. Dawe’s small relief force became hotly engaged -on the lower slopes, far short of Dog Company’s position, but made a -fighting ascent after dawn. - - [406] The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from: - 5thMar _SAR_, 12; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 288; - Capt H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d. - -Initially Dawe missed contact with the beleagured outfit, but -afterwards the two forces cleared the Chinese from 1240. From his -position on the northeastern spur of the hill he could see the enemy -massing on the reverse slopes of 1240 and 1282. Communications were out -and he could not call for fire. At about 1100 the Reds counterattacked -with an estimated two or more battalions and forced Dawe to withdraw -about 150 yards. There his depleted platoon and the 16 remaining men of -Dog Company held under heavy mortar fire until relieved by B/5 at 1700. -The price of a stalemate on Hill 1240 was to Dawe about half of his -platoon, and to Hull practically his whole company. - - -_The Fight for Northwest Ridge_ - -To the left of North Ridge, dawn of 28 November revealed a tactical -paradox on the looming massif of Northwest Ridge. Both Marines and -Red Chinese occupied the terminal high ground, and it was difficult -to determine which had emerged victorious from the all-night battle. -How Company, 7th Marines, had withdrawn from Hill 1403, and from this -commanding peak soldiers of the 89th CCF Division could observe and -enfilade the whole of Yudam-ni valley. In addition to the 80 officers -and men of How Company who had pulled back to the lines of 3/5 during -the early morning, another group found its way to the rear of Easy -Company, 2/5, as mentioned earlier.[407] - - [407] 3/5 _SAR_, 14, and 2/5 _SAR_, 18; 7thMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50. - -The appearance of the latter contingent at 0430 was a cause of -consternation to Lieutenant Colonel Roise. His rifle companies had -thrown back repeated CCF attacks along the draw and spur on the left -of the 7th Marines’ outfit, but the loss of 1403 now offset his -victory and gravely imperiled his line of communications to the rest -of the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni, a mile to the rear. Nevertheless, 2/5 -continued to hold. At 0600 Company E counterattacked and drove the -Chinese from the northern tip of the spur which they had occupied -during the night. Fox Company, its right flank now restored and in -contact with Easy, lashed out at 0800 and recaptured the two machine -guns overrun by the enemy four hours earlier. Fifteen CCF soldiers who -had found their way into the rear of Company F some time in the night -were destroyed. Easy Company, after its successful counterattack on the -spur, drove off a large Communist force attempting to move against its -right flank.[408] - - [408] _Ibid._; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.” - -Incredibly, 2/5’s losses for the night-long fight were 7 KIA, 25 WIA, -and 60 weather casualties. Chinese dead piled across the front of Easy -and Fox Companies numbered 500, according to a rough count.[409] There -was no estimate made by How Company, 7th Marines, of enemy losses on -Hill 1403. - - [409] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9–10. - -At 0145 on the 28th, Roise had received Murray’s order to continue the -attack to the west after daybreak, so that 3/5 could move forward, -deploy, and add its weight to the X Corps offensive. Events during the -night altered Murray’s plans, of course, and at 0545 the regimental -commander alerted Roise to the probability of withdrawing 2/5 to -Southwest Ridge later in the morning. The battalion commander, not -realizing the extent of the crisis at Yudam-ni, thought a mistake had -been made when he checked the map coordinates mentioned in the message. -Despite the fact that his whole front was engaged at the time, he was -prepared to continue the westward drive, and he questioned regimental -headquarters about the “error” which would take his battalion rearward. -Needless to say, the correctness of the map coordinates was quickly -confirmed.[410] - - [410] 5thMar _SAR_, 21; 2/5 _SAR_, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv - 13 Jun 56. - -Lieutenant Colonel Murray visited Colonel Litzenberg at dawn on the -28th, while elements of the 5th Marines were counterattacking the -Chinese forces on North and Northwest Ridges. They agreed that the -enemy had appeared in sufficient strength to warrant a switch to -the defensive by both regiments, and Murray cancelled the scheduled -westward attack by his 2d and 3d Battalions. At 1100 he ordered 2/5 -to pull back to Southwest Ridge, tying in on the left with 3/7 on the -same hill mass, and on the right with 3/5, whose line extended from -the valley northwest of Yudam-ni to the crest of North Ridge.[411] - - [411] _Ibid._; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d. - -Orders officially halting the northwestward advance and directing the -5th Marines to coordinate positions with the 7th Marines were sent -by General Smith at 1650.[412] Twenty-three minutes earlier he had -ordered the 7th Marines to attack to the south and reopen the MSR to -Hagaru.[413] - - [412] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50. - - [413] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50. - -To coordinate better the defense of the new perimeter, Murray moved his -CP from the northwestern edge of Yudam-ni to the center of the village, -where the 7th Marines’ headquarters was located. He spent most of his -time thereafter with Litzenberg, while Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. -Stewart, his executive officer, ran the 5th Regiment command post.[414] -Through constant contact and a policy of close cooperation in all -matters, the two regimental commanders and their staffs came up with -joint plans for the defense of Yudam-ni and the ultimate breakout to -Hagaru. - - [414] _Ibid._; 5th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50. - -The first of these plans had to do with the realignment of forces at -Yudam-ni and the rescue of Charlie and Fox Companies, 7th Marines. -Early in the afternoon of 28 November, 2/5 began withdrawing from -Northwest Ridge a company at a time, with Company E providing covering -fire as rear guard. The battalion’s displacement to Southwest Ridge was -completed by 2000 against CCF resistance consisting only of harassing -fires.[415] - - [415] 2/5 _SAR_, 19. - -Directly across the valley of Yudam-ni, Company I of 3/5 relieved the -elements of 1/5 on Hill 1282 of North Ridge in late afternoon. George -and How Companies of 3/5 deployed in the low ground to protect the -corridor approaches to Yudam-ni from the northwest. Lieutenant Colonel -Stevens, keeping the bulk of 1/5 in reserve, dispatched Company B at -1400 to relieve the battered handful of Marines on Hill 1240. - -While this reshuffling took place on the 28th, Colonel Litzenberg -listened anxiously to the grim reports from his 1st Battalion, which -had set out in the morning to retrieve both Charlie and Fox Companies -from their encircled positions on the MSR leading to Hagaru.[416] -Able Company led off for the relief force at 1015, entering the gorge -between South and Southeast Ridges. Five hours of fighting, marching, -and climbing took it to a point about three miles from the Yudam-ni -perimeter and one mile short of Company C’s position. Here, while -moving through the high ground east of the MSR, the vanguard met heavy -resistance and was stopped cold. - - [416] The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar - _SAR_, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450, - 1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar - msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 290–291. - -Lieutenant Colonel Davis, who was following with the remainder of -the 1st Battalion, committed Company B to a flanking movement west -of the road. Air and 81mm mortars supported the auxiliary attack and -routed the Chinese. Both companies advanced to high-ground positions -abreast of Charlie Company’s perimeter, then bent toward the MSR to -provide a protective crescent between the beleaguered outfit and the -enemy-infested ground to the south. - -By now it was dark. Fox Company, according to plan, was supposed -to have fought its way from Toktong Pass. Owing to the burden of -casualties and the ring of Chinese around its distant hilltop, it was -not able to do so. Litzenberg, concerned lest 1/7 be similarly trapped -in the gorge, recalled Davis to Yudam-ni. The relief force returned at -2110 with Charlie Company and its 46 wounded. - - -_Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill_ - -Fox Company, with 54 wounded on its hands, spent an active day at -the top of Toktong Pass.[417] After the Chinese attacks subsided -in the morning, Barber’s men collected ammunition and weapons from -Marine casualties and Communist dead. Included among enemy arms were -several of the familiar U. S. Thompson submachine guns and Model 1903 -Springfield rifles. - - [417] This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is - derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” - 16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv 4 - Jul 51; Geer, _The New Breed_, 300–302; Statement of Cpl - C. R. North, n. d. - -At 1030 a flight of Australian F-51s (Mustangs) blasted CCF positions -around Toktong Pass, particularly a rocky promontory several hundred -yards to the north on Hill 1653, which the enemy already had -transformed into a redoubt. Within the Marine perimeter, the wounded -were placed in two tents on a sheltered hillside where Navy corpsmen -attended them constantly. According to Lieutenant McCarthy’s account, -the medics, “by candlelight ... changed the bandages, slipped men in -and out of sleeping bags, warmed C-rations for the men, and melted the -morphine syrettes in their mouths before the injections. Because the -plasma was frozen the corpsmen had to watch men die for the lack of it.” - -During late morning and the afternoon, Barber sent out patrols to -screen the areas immediately beyond his lines. The scouting parties -met only sniper fire, but other evidence of enemy activity indicated -that Fox Hill was completely surrounded. An appeal for resupply by air -was answered later in the day when Marine R5Ds dropped medical kits -and ammunition at the base of the hill. At a cost of two wounded, the -precious supplies were recovered before sundown. - -Fox Company’s perimeter for the night of 28–29 November was the same as -before, except that the ranks were noticeably thinner. Nevertheless, a -feeling of confidence pervaded the men on the hilltop; they believed -implicitly that they could hold. They believed it despite the fact that -strong relief columns from both Yudam-ni and Hagaru had been unable to -break through to them. - -All was quiet on Fox Hill until 0215, when CCF mortar rounds killed one -Marine and wounded two others in the 3d Platoon, now reduced to some 20 -able-bodied men. About 40 Chinese made a penetration in this area after -a series of probing attacks all along the line. One Marine crew turned -its light machine gun about and brought it to bear on the bunched-up -attackers with deadly effect. A gap in the lines on both flanks caused -the platoon to pull back about 20 yards. At sunrise, however, Staff -Sergeant John D. Audas led a counterattack which regained the lost -ground at a cost of only two wounded. - -The second night’s fighting cost Fox Company a total of five killed and -29 wounded. Both Captain Barber and Lieutenant McCarthy suffered leg -wounds, but continued in action after receiving first aid. The company -commander directed that the open ground on Fox Hill be marked with -colored parachutes from the previous day’s air drops. This provision -resulted in accurate drops and easy recoveries when Marine transport -planes arrived at 1030 on the 29th with ammunition and supplies. -Shortly afterwards First Lieutenant Floyd J. Englehardt of VMO-6 landed -with batteries for the SCR-300 and 619 radios. Although his helicopter -was damaged by hits from long-distance Chinese fire, he managed to take -off safely. - -Air drops that afternoon by C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command missed -the marked zone at times, and much of the mortar ammunition landed -about 500 yards to the west of the perimeter. Lieutenant Peterson, -already twice wounded, led Marines who recovered some of the rounds -but were pinned down by CCF fire and got back, one at a time, with -difficulty. At dusk, under cover of fire from How Battery, another -detail recovered the ammunition without enemy interference. - - -_Not Enough Tents for Casualties_ - -The night of 28–29 November passed with only minor activity in the -Yudam-ni area for the infantry of RCT-5; but the regimental surgeon, -Lieutenant Commander Chester M. Lessenden (MC) USN, had his hands full. -During the fighting of the previous night the joint aid station had -been west of Yudam-ni. Tents sheltering the wounded were riddled by -enemy small-arms fire from the North Ridge battle, and on the morning -of the 28th the aid station displaced to a safer location southwest -of Yudam-ni. The seriously wounded filled the few tents initially -available, and the others were protected from freezing by being placed -outdoors, side by side, and covered by tarpaulins while lying on straw. -Primitive as this hospitalization was, DOW cases were no more than -might have been expected under better conditions.[418] - - [418] 5thMar _SAR_, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 _SAR_, - 5; McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56. - -The crowding in the aid stations was much relieved on 30 November by -the erection of sufficient tentage by 4/11 to provide shelter for -approximately 500 casualties. - -“Everything was frozen,” said Lessenden later in an interview with -Keyes Beech, a press correspondent. “Plasma froze and the bottles -broke. We couldn’t use plasma because it wouldn’t go into solution and -the tubes would clog up with particles. We couldn’t change dressings -because we had to work with gloves on to keep our hands from freezing. - -“We couldn’t cut a man’s clothes off to get at a wound because he -would freeze to death. Actually a man was often better off if we left -him alone. Did you ever try to stuff a wounded man into a sleeping -bag?”[419] - - [419] Keyes Beech: _Tokyo and Points East_ (New York, 1954), - 196. - -The joint defense plan for the night of 28–29 November provided for -RCT-5 to take the responsibility for the west and north sectors, while -RCT-7 was to defend to the east, south and southwest. Enemy mortar -fire was received during the night in both regimental zones, but -there were few infantry contacts. This lack of activity could only be -interpreted as a temporary lull while the enemy regrouped for further -efforts. - -As for the next attempt to relieve Fox Company and open the MSR to -Hagaru, the joint planners at Yudam-ni decided on the night of the -28th that all troops of the two regiments now in line were needed for -defense. There were actually no men to spare for a relief column, and -yet Division had ordered the effort to be made. The solution seemed -to be a composite battalion consisting of perimeter reserve units. -In order to replace these troops, personnel were to be assigned from -headquarters units and artillery batteries. This was the genesis of the -Composite Battalion, consisting of elements from Able Company of 1/5, -Baker Company of 1/7 and George Company of 3/7, reinforced by a 75mm -recoilless section and two 81mm mortar sections from RCT-7 battalions. -These troops were directed to assemble at the 1/7 CP on the morning -of the 29th, with Major Warren Morris, executive officer of 3/7, in -command.[420] - - [420] This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from - the following sources: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n. - d., 5–8; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p. - -At 0800 the striking force moved out southward with the dual mission of -relieving Captain Barber and opening up the MSR all the way to Hagaru. -After an advance of 300 yards, heavy machine-gun fire hit the column -from both sides of the road. Groups of Chinese could be plainly seen on -the ridges, affording remunerative targets for the 81mm mortars and 75 -recoilless guns. Forward air controllers soon had the Corsairs overhead -to lead the way. At a point about 4500 yards south of Yudam-ni, -however, Marine planes dropped two messages warning that the enemy was -entrenched in formidable force along the high ground on both sides of -the MSR. - -Similar messages were delivered by the aircraft to the regimental CP at -Yudam-ni. They caused Colonel Litzenberg to modify the orders of the -Composite Battalion and direct that it relieve Fox Company and return -to Yudam-ni before dark. - -By this time Morris’ troops had become engaged with large numbers of -Chinese who were being constantly reinforced by groups moving into the -area along draws masked from friendly ground observation. Litzenberg -was informed on a basis of air observation that Morris was in danger of -being surrounded, and at 1315 he sent an urgent message directing the -force to return to Yudam-ni. Contact was broken off immediately with -the aid of air and artillery cover and the Composite Battalion withdrew -without further incident. - - -_The Turning Point of 30 November_ - -The Yudam-ni area had a relatively quiet night on 29–30 November. But -even though there was little fighting, the continued sub-zero cold -imposed a strain on the men when at least a fifty per cent alert must -be maintained at all times. This was the third virtually sleepless -night for troops who had not had a warm meal since the Thanksgiving -feast. - -“Seldom has the human frame been so savagely punished and continued to -function,” wrote Keyes Beech. “Many men discovered reserves of strength -they never knew they possessed. Some survived and fought on will power -alone.”[421] - - [421] Beech, _Tokyo and Points East_, 197. - -Certainly there was no lack of will power on Fox Hill as Captain Barber -called his platoon leaders together at about 1700 on 29 November and -told them not to expect any immediate relief. Chinese attacks, he -warned, might be heavier than ever this third night, but they would be -beaten off as usual. - -The area was quiet until about 0200 on the 30th, when an Oriental -voice called out of the darkness in English, “Fox Company, you are -surrounded. I am a lieutenant from the 11th Marines. The Chinese will -give you warm clothes and good treatment. Surrender now!”[422] The -Marines replied with 81mm illumination shells which revealed targets -for the machine guns as the Chinese advanced across the valley from the -south. - - [422] This description of the third night on Fox Hill is - derived from McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 21. - -Thanks to the afternoon’s air drops, Fox Hill had enough mortar -ammunition and hand grenades for the first time, and good use was made -of both. An estimated three CCF companies were cut to pieces at a cost -of a single Marine wounded. - -At sunrise, as the Corsairs roared over, all tension vanished on Fox -Hill. For it was generally agreed that if the Chinese couldn’t take the -position in three nights, they would never make the grade. - -The troops in the Yudam-ni area also felt that the enemy had shot -his bolt without achieving anything more than a few local gains at a -terrible cost in killed and wounded. It was recognized that some hard -fighting lay ahead, but the morning of the 30th was a moral turning -point both in the foxhole and the CP. - -It was evident even on the platoon level at Yudam-ni that big events -were in the wind. Marine enlisted men are traditionally shrewd at -sizing up a tactical situation, and they sensed that a change was -at hand. For three days and nights they had been on the defensive, -fighting for their lives, and now the word was passed from one man to -another that the Marines were about to snatch the initiative. - -The regimental commanders and staff officers had a worry lifted from -their minds when a helicopter brought the news that Hagaru had passed -a quiet night after repulsing large enemy forces in a dusk-to-dawn -battle the night before. It would have added enormously to the task -of the Yudam-ni troops, of course, if the Chinese had seized that -forward base with its air strip and stockpiles of supplies. Thus it was -heartening to learn that a single reinforced Marine infantry battalion -and an assortment of service troops had beaten off the attacks of large -elements of a Chinese division at Hagaru. The following two chapters -will be devoted to an account of that critical battle and its aftermath -before returning to Yudam-ni. - - - - -CHAPTER X - -Hagaru’s Night of Fire - -_Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear MSR--Intelligence -as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of Marine Units--CCF Attacks from -the Southwest--East Hill Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting -Fires--Marine Attacks on East Hill_ - - -The importance of Hagaru in the Marine scheme of things was starkly -obvious after the Chinese cut the MSR. Hagaru, with its supply dumps, -hospital facilities and partly finished C-47 airstrip, was the one -base offering the 1st Marine Division a reasonable hope of uniting its -separated elements. Hagaru had to be held at all costs, yet only a -reinforced infantry battalion (less one rifle company and a third of -its Weapons Company) and two batteries of artillery were available for -the main burden of the defense. - -Owing to transportation shortages, the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines -did not arrive at Hagaru until after dusk on 26 November. Even so, it -had been necessary to leave George Company and a platoon of Weapons -Company behind at Chigyong for lack of vehicles.[423] - - [423] This section is derived from: 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_, 2; 3/1 - _SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep - 55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons Comments, - n. d. - -The parka-clad Marines, climbing down stiffly from the trucks, had -their first sight of a panorama which reminded one officer of old -photographs of a gold-rush mining camp in the Klondike. Tents, huts, -and supply dumps were scattered in a seemingly haphazard fashion about -a frozen plain crossed by a frozen river and bordered on three sides by -low hills rising to steep heights on the eastern outskirts. Although -many of the buildings had survived the bombings, the battered town -at the foot of the ice-locked Chosin Reservoir was not a spectacle -calculated to raise the spirits of newcomers. - -It was too late to relieve 2/7(-) that evening. Lieutenant Colonels -Ridge and Lockwood agreed that Fox Company, 7th Marines, and Weapons -Company (-) of 2/7 would occupy positions jointly with 3/1. The hours -of darkness passed quietly and relief was completed the next day. Fox -Company then moved to its new positions near Toktong Pass. - - -_Four-Mile Perimeter Required_ - -On the morning of 27 November, of course, an all-out enemy attack was -still in the realm of speculation. But it was evident to Lieutenant -Colonel Ridge, CO of 3/1, that one to two infantry regiments and -supporting arms would be required for an adequate defense of Hagaru. -With only a battalion (-) at his disposal, he realized that he must -make the best possible use of the ground. For the purposes of a -survey, he sent his S-3, Major Trompeter, on a walking reconnaissance -with Major Simmons, CO of Weapons Company and 3/1 Supporting Arms -Coordinator. - -After a circuit of the natural amphitheater, the two officers agreed -that even to hold the reverse slopes would require a perimeter of more -than four miles in circumference (see Map 17). The personnel resources -of 3/1 would thus be stretched to an average of one man for nearly -seven yards of front. This meant that the commanding officer must take -his choice between being weak everywhere or strong in a few sectors to -the neglect of others. In either event, some areas along the perimeter -would probably have to be defended by supporting fires alone.[424] - - [424] Ridge, _Notes_; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55. - -“Under the circumstances,” commented General Smith, “and considering -the mission assigned to the 1st Marine Division, an infantry component -of one battalion was all that could be spared for the defense of -Hagaru. This battalion was very adequately supported by air, and had -sufficient artillery and tanks for its purposes.”[425] - - [425] Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56. - -The terrain gave the enemy two major covered avenues of approach for -troop movements. One was the hill mass east of Hagaru, the other a draw -leading into the southwest side of the town, where the new airstrip -was being constructed. Nor could the possibility of a surprise attack -from some other quarter be dismissed entirely, since CCF observers -would be able to watch Marine preparations from the surrounding hills -in daylight hours. - -[Illustration: HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER - -28–29 November 1950 - - MAP-17 -] - -Lieutenant Colonel Ridge decided that final troop dispositions must -depend not only on terrain but equally on intelligence as to enemy -capabilities. Until he had more information, the units of 3/1 were to -remain in the areas formerly occupied by 2/7. - - -_Attempts to Clear MSR_ - -The Battalion CP had been set up in a pyramidal tent at the angle of -the road to Yudam-ni. Most of the day on the 27th was given over to -improving positions. At the southwest end of the perimeter, First -Lieutenant Fisher’s Item Company took over from Captain Barber’s Fox -Company, the only rifle company of 2/7 remaining at Hagaru. - -On the strength of preliminary S-2 reports, Ridge instructed the -commanders of his two rifle companies to improve their sectors, which -included the entire south and southwest curve of the perimeter. All the -Division Headquarters troops except one motor convoy had reached Hagaru -by the 27th, and it was due to leave Hungnam the next morning. The new -Division CP was located in the northeast quarter of town, near the long -concrete bridge over the frozen Changjin River. Rows of heated tents -surrounded a Japanese type frame house repaired for the occupancy of -General Smith, who was expected by helicopter in the morning. Already -functioning at the CP were elements of the General Staff Sections and -Headquarters Company.[426] - - [426] Smith, _Notes_, 689–690. - -The busiest Marines at Hagaru on the 27th were the men of the 1st -Engineer Battalion. While a Company B platoon built tent decks for the -Division CP, detachments of Company A were at work on the maintenance -of the MSR in the area, and Company D had the job of hacking out -the new airstrip. Apparently the latter project had its “sidewalk -contractors” even in sub-zero weather, for this comment found its way -into the company report: - - Dozer work [was] pleasing to the eye of those who wanted activity - but contributed little to the overall earth-moving problem of - 90,000 cubic yards of cut and 60,000 cubic yards of fill.[427] - - [427] D/Engr _SAR_. - -Motor graders and scrapers with a 5.8 cubic yard capacity had been -moved up from Hamhung. So difficult did it prove to get a bite of the -frozen earth that steel teeth were welded to the blades. When the pan -was filled, however, the earth froze to the cutting edges until it -could be removed only by means of a jack hammer. - -The strip was about one-fourth completed on the 27th, according to -minimum estimates of the length required. Work went on that night -as usual under the flood lights.[428] Not until the small hours of -the morning did the first reports reach Hagaru of the CCF attacks on -Yudam-ni and Fox Hill. - - [428] 1stEngrBn _SAR_, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51. - -Some remnants of 2/7 were still at Hagaru, for lack of transportation, -when Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood, commanding officer of the battalion, -received a dispatch from Colonel Litzenberg directing him to proceed to -Toktong Pass and assist Fox Company. At 0530 he requested the “loan” -of a rifle company of 3/1 to reinforce elements of Weapons Company -(-), 2/7. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge could spare only a platoon from How -Company, and at 0830 the attempt was cancelled. An hour later Weapons -Company and three tanks from the 2d Platoon of Company D, 1st Tank -Battalion, made another effort. They pushed half-way to the objective, -only to be turned back by heavy Chinese small-arms and mortar fire -from the high ground on both sides of the road. Supporting fires from -3/1 helped the column to break off contact and return to Hagaru at -1500.[429] - - [429] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 21; 3/1 msg - to CO 1stMar, 1845 28 Nov 50. - -No better success attended a reinforced platoon of How Company, 3/1, -accompanied by three Company D tanks, when it set out on the road to -Koto-ri. On the outskirts of Hagaru, within sight of Captain Corley’s -CP, the men were forced to climb down from their vehicles and engage in -a hot fire fight. They estimated the enemy force at about 50, but an OY -pilot dropped a message warning that some 300 Chinese were moving up -on the flanks of the patrol. The Marines managed to disengage at 1530, -with the aid of mortar and artillery fires from Hagaru, and returned to -the perimeter with losses of one killed and five wounded.[430] - - [430] _Ibid._; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d. - -A similar patrol from Item Company, 3/1, struck off to the southwest of -the perimeter in the direction of Hungmun-ni. Late in the morning of -the 28th, this reinforced platoon encountered an estimated 150 enemy -and called for artillery and mortar fires. After dispersing this CCF -group, the patrol routed a second enemy detachment an hour later after -a brief fire fight.[431] - - [431] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon - [sic] interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 28 May 51. - -Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the Chinese attack on the MSR -were dispelled by reports from the OY and HO3S-1 pilots of VMO-6. They -disclosed that defended enemy road blocks had cut off Yudam-ni, Fox -Hill, Hagaru, and Koto-ri from any physical contact with one another. -The advance units of the 1st Marine Division had been sliced into -four isolated segments as CCF columns penetrated as far south as the -Chinhung-ni area.[432] - - [432] VMO-6 tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg - to CG 1stMarDiv, 1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO - 1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50. - - -_Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities_ - -There was no question at all in the minds of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge -and his officers as to whether the Chinese would attack at Hagaru. As -early as the morning of the 27th, the problem had simply been one of -when, where, and in what strength. It was up to the S-2 Section to -provide the answers, and upon their correctness would depend the fate -of Hagaru, perhaps even of the 1st Marine Division. - -Second Lieutenant Richard E. Carey, the S-2, was a newcomer to the -battalion staff, recently transferred from a George Company infantry -platoon. His group consisted of an assistant intelligence chief, -Staff Sergeant Saverio P. Gallo, an interpreter, and four scout -observers.[433] There were also two CIC agents assigned to 3/1 by -Division G-2. - - [433] This section is based on Ridge, _Notes_, and Comments, - 7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The - need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the - former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had - been transferred from the S-2 Section just before the - move to Hagaru. - -At Hagaru, as at Majon-ni, the Marines had won respect at the outset by -allowing the Korean residents all privileges of self-government which -could be reconciled with military security. The police department and -town officials had been permitted to continue functioning. They in turn -briefed the population as to restricted areas and security regulations, -particularly curfew. Korean civilians entering Hagaru through Marine -road blocks were searched before being taken to the police station -where they were questioned by an interrogation team from the S-2 -Section. - -Hagaru’s resemblance to a gold-rush mining camp was heightened on the -27th by a tremendous influx both of troops and Koreans from outlying -districts. A large truck convoy from Headquarters Battalion arrived -to set up the new Division CP, and detachments from various Marine or -Army service units entered in a seemingly endless stream. The Korean -refugees had much the same story to tell; most of them came from areas -to the north and west of Hagaru, and they had been evicted from their -homes by large numbers of CCF troops. - -Carey instructed his CIC agents to converse with incoming Koreans and -learn everything possible about the enemy situation. Again, as at -Majon-ni, people who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with Communism -were found “highly co-operative.” As untrained observers, however, -their estimates of CCF numbers and equipment could not be taken too -literally. Since their statements agreed that the enemy was in close -proximity, Carey decided to take the risk of sending his two CIC agents -on the dangerous mission of establishing direct contact. They were -enjoined to make a circuit of the perimeter, mingling whenever possible -with the Chinese and determining the areas of heaviest concentration. - -The results went beyond Carey’s fondest expectations. Not only did -his agents return safely from their long hike over the hills, but -they brought back vital information. Well led and equipped Chinese -Communist units had been encountered to the south and west of Hagaru. -And since Marine air also reported unusual activity in this area, it -was a reasonable assumption that the enemy was concentrated there -approximately in division strength. - -This answered the questions as to “how many” and “where.” There -remained the problem as to “when” the attack might be expected, and -again on the 28th Carey sent out his CIC agents to make direct contact. -“I expected little or no information,” he recollected, “but apparently -these men had a way with them. Upon reporting back, they told me that -they had talked freely with enemy troops, including several officers -who boasted that they would occupy Hagaru on the night of 28 November.” - -Major enemy units were reported to be five miles from the perimeter. -Dusk was at approximately 1800, with complete darkness setting in -shortly afterwards. Adding the estimate of three and a half hours for -Chinese movements to the line of departure, the S-2 Section calculated -that the enemy could attack as early as 2130 on the night of the 28th -from the south and west in division strength.[434] - - [434] The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was - considered, since Chinese forces were known to be east of - the hill. Col Ridge states, “I assume[d] that the build - up of such forces would not allow their capability of a - strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56. - - -_Positions of Marine Units_ - -These intelligence estimates were accepted by Lieutenant Colonel -Ridge as the basis for his planning and troop dispositions. As -the main bastion of defense, the tied-in sectors of How and Item -Companies were extended to include the south and southwest sides -of the perimeter--nearly one-third of the entire circumference--in -a continuous line 2300 yards in length, or more than a mile and a -quarter. Each platoon front thus averaged about 380 yards, which meant -that supporting arms must make up for lack of numbers.[435] - - [435] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the - following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_; Ridge, - _Notes_; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17 - Aug 55; Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher, - n. d.; Simmons Comments. - -East Hill, considered the second most likely point of enemy attack, was -to be assigned to George Company on arrival. Captain Sitter’s outfit -had orders to depart the Chigyong area on the morning of the 28th, so -that it could be expected at Hagaru before dark. - -The southeast quarter of the perimeter, between East Hill and the -left flank of How Company, was to be held by the following units: (1) -Weapons Company (less detachments reinforcing the rifle companies and -its 81mm mortars emplaced near the battalion CP) manning a road block -on the route to Koto-ri and defending the south nose of East Hill; (2) -Dog Company, 1st Engineer Battalion (less men at work on the airstrip), -occupying the ground south of the concrete bridge; and (3) Dog Battery, -2d Battalion, 11th Marines, which had the mission of covering 75 per -cent of the perimeter with observed indirect fire and 25 per cent with -direct fire. - -These dispositions left a gap between Weapons Company and the engineer -and artillery units on the west bank of the Changjin River. But this -stretch of frozen marshland was so well covered by fire that an enemy -attack here would have been welcomed. - -The first reports of the CCF onslaughts at Yudam-ni and Fox Hill, as -interpreted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, “clearly indicated that no -time was to be lost at buttoning up the Hagaru perimeter.” He called -on Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3, on the morning of the 28th and -recommended that an overall defense commander be designated with -operational control over all local units. Ridge also requested that -George Company and the 41st Commando be expedited in their movement to -Hagaru. - -Before a decision could be reached, General Smith arrived by -helicopter and opened the Division CP at 1100. A Marine rear echelon -had remained at Hungnam to cope with supply requirements. Colonel -Francis A. McAlister, the G-4, left in command, accomplished during the -forthcoming campaign what General Smith termed “a magnificent job” in -rendering logistical support.[436] - - [436] Smith, _Notes_, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, - 1015 28 Nov 50. - -The CP at Hagaru had been open only half an hour when General Almond -arrived in a VMO-6 helicopter to confer with the Division commander. -Departing at 1255, he visited the 31st Infantry troops who had been -hard hit the night before by CCF attacks east of the Chosin Reservoir. -On his return to Hamhung, the Corps commander was informed that CinCFE -had directed him to fly immediately to Tokyo for a conference. There -he learned that the Eighth Army was in full retreat, with some units -taking heavy losses both in personnel and equipment. Generals Almond, -Walker, Hickey, Willoughby, Whitney, and Wright took turns at briefing -the commander in chief during a meeting which lasted from midnight to -0130.[437] - - [437] CG Diary, in X Corps _WD_, 28 Nov 50; X Corps _WDSum_, - Nov 50, 16. - -At Hagaru it was becoming more apparent hourly to Ridge that his -prospects of employing Captain Sitter’s company on East Hill were -growing dim. As he learned later, the unit had left Chigyong that -morning in the trucks of Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion, -commanded by Captain Clovis M. Jones. Sitter was met at Koto-ri by -Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of RCT-1, and -directed to report to the regimental S-3, Major Robert E. Lorigan. -Efforts to open up the road to Hagaru had failed, he was told, and -it would be necessary for George Company to remain overnight at -Koto-ri.[438] - - [438] Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d. - -The probability of such an outcome had already been accepted by Ridge -on the basis of the resistance met on the road to Koto-ri by his How -Company patrol. With this development added to his worries, he received -a telephone call at 1500 from Colonel Bowser, informing him that he had -been named defense commander at Hagaru by General Smith.[439] - - [439] This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate - Units, 1625 28 Nov 50. - -Just ten minutes later a single CCF shell, assumed to be of 76mm -caliber, exploded in the Battalion CP area and fatally wounded Captain -Paul E. Storaasli, the S-4. The perimeter was so cluttered with tents -and dumps that artillery fire at random could hardly have been wasted; -but the enemy gun remained silent the rest of the day, doubtless to -avert Marine counter-battery reprisals. - -Only three hours of daylight remained when the newly designated defense -commander summoned unit commanders to an initial conference. It was -not made clear just what troops had been placed under his operational -control. “A primary reason,” commented Ridge, “was that no one knew -what units were there, this being compounded by the numerous small -elements such as detachments, advance parties, etc., of which many were -Corps and ROK units. Hence, the Battalion S-1 and his assistants were -a combination of town criers and census takers. We did, however, get -most of the commanders of major units (if such they could be called) -to the initial conference, but the process of locating and identifying -smaller units was thereafter a continuous process which we really never -accurately completed.”[440] - - [440] Ridge, _Notes_, 27–28. - -The larger outfits could be summoned to the conference by telephone but -it was necessary to send out runners in other instances. With George -Company not available, the question of defending East Hill loomed -large. Ridge decided against all proposals that one of the two rifle -companies be used for that purpose. On the strength of the S-2 report, -he preferred to concentrate as much strength as possible against an -attack from the southwest. This meant taking his chances on East Hill -with such service troops as he could scrape up, and it was plain that a -strong CCF effort in this quarter would have to be met in large part by -fire power from supporting arms. - -The two main detachments selected for East Hill (excluding the south -nose) were from Dog Company of the 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA, -and elements of X corps Headquarters. Since the mission called for -control of mortar and artillery fires as well as tactical leadership, -two officers of Weapons Company, 3/1, were assigned--Captain John C. -Shelnutt to the Army engineer company, and First Lieutenant John L. -Burke, Jr., to the Headquarters troops. Each was to be accompanied by a -Marine radio (SCR 300) operator. - -Smaller detachments were later sent to East Hill from two other service -units--the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and the 4th -Signal Battalion of X Corps. - -The Antitank Company of the 7th Marines defended the area to the north -of East Hill. Next came How Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, which -had the primary mission of supporting Fox Company, 2/7, on the hill -near Toktong Pass. But by moving gun trails the cannoneers could with -some difficulty fire on the 270° arc of the perimeter stretching from -the right flank of Item Company around to the north nose of East Hill. - -Between the sectors held by How Battery, 3/11, and Item Company, 3/1, -were troops of five Marine units: Regulating Detachment, 1st Service -Battalion; 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Marine Tactical Air Control -Squadron 2 (MTACS-2); Division Headquarters Battalion; and H&S Company -3/1. The only other unit in this quarter was Weapons Company (-), 2/7, -which held the road block on the route to Yudam-ni. - -At the conference it was decided that since Lieutenant Colonel Charles -L. Banks’ Regulating Detachment had taken the lead in organizing the -Supply Area on the north side of Hagaru, the arc of the perimeter east -of the river and west of East Hill was to be made into a secondary -defense zone. Banks thus became in effect a sub-sector commander. -The only infantry troops in the Supply Area being detachments of 2/7 -units, it was also agreed that tactical decisions concerning the zone -should be discussed with the two ranking battalion officers--Lieutenant -Colonel Lockwood, the commander, and Major Sawyer, the executive.[441] - - [441] “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific - mission because it was assumed that his uncanceled order - from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts in - the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56. - -These matters having been settled, the conference broke up shortly -after 1700 and the various commanders hastened back to their outfits to -make last-minute preparations for the night’s attack. A strange hush -had fallen over the perimeter, broken only by the occasional crackle of -small-arms fire, and the damp air felt like snow. - - -_CCF Attack from the Southwest_ - -How and Item Companies were ready. All platoon positions were well dug -in, though the earth was frozen to a depth of six to ten inches. - -The men of Item Company used their heads as well as hands after -Lieutenant Fisher managed to obtain a thousand sandbags and several -bags of C3. This explosive was utilized in ration cans to make -improvised shape charges which blasted a hole through the frozen crust -of snow and earth. Then it became a simple matter to enlarge the hole -and place the loose dirt in sandbags to form a parapet.[442] This -ingenious system resulted in de luxe foxholes and mortar emplacements -attaining to the dignity of field fortifications. - - [442] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1 - tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov 50; Ridge, _Notes_; Simmons - interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley - narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug - 55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors, 10 Oct 55; and Sgt - K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55. - -Both company fronts bristled with concertinas, trip flares, booby -traps, and five-gallon cans of gasoline rigged with thermite bombs for -illumination. Three probable routes of enemy attack channeled the low -hills to the southwest--a main draw leading to the junction between the -two company sectors, and a lesser draw providing an approach to each. -The ground in front of the junction had been mined, and two tanks from -the Provisional Platoon were stationed in this quarter. Detachments -from Weapons Company also reinforced both rifle companies. Thus the six -platoons faced the enemy in the following order: - - ITEM COMPANY HOW COMPANY - Lt Fisher Capt Corley - Lt Degerne Lt Hall Lt Needham Lt Barrett Lt Endsley Lt Mason - 1st 3d 2d 1st 3d 2d - -Beginning at 1700, hot food was served to all hands in rotation. A -fifty per cent alert went into effect after dark as the men were sent -back on regular schedule for coffee and a smoke in warming tents -located as close to the front as possible. The first snowflakes -fluttered down about 1950, muffling the clank of the dozers at work as -usual under the floodlights on the airstrip behind the How Company’s -sector. Just before 2130, the expected time of CCF attack, both company -commanders ordered a hundred per cent alert, but the enemy did not -show up on schedule. It was just over an hour later when three red -flares and three blasts on a police whistle signaled the beginning of -the attack. Soon trip flares and exploding booby traps revealed the -approach of probing patrols composed of five to ten men. - -A few minutes later, white phosphorus mortar shells scorched the Marine -front line with accurate aim. The main CCF attack followed shortly -afterwards, with both company sectors being hit by assault waves -closing in to grenade-throwing distance. - -The enemy in turn was staggered by the full power of Marine supporting -arms. Snowflakes reduced an already low visibility, but fields of fire -had been carefully charted and artillery and mortar concentrations -skillfully registered in. Still, the Communists kept on coming in spite -of frightful losses. Second Lieutenant Wayne L. Hall, commanding the 3d -Platoon in the center of Item Company, was jumped by three Chinese whom -he killed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol after his carbine jammed. -The third foe pitched forward into Hall’s foxhole. - -On the left flank, tied in with How Company, First Lieutenant Robert -C. Needham’s 2d Platoon sustained most of the attack on Item Company. -The fire of Second Lieutenant James J. Boley’s 60mm mortars and Second -Lieutenant John H. Miller’s light machine guns was concentrated in -this area. It seemed impossible that enemy burp guns could miss such a -target as Lieutenant Fisher, six feet two inches in height and weighing -235 pounds. But he continued to pass up and down the line, pausing at -each foxhole for a few words of encouragement. By midnight the enemy -pressure on Needham’s and Hall’s lines had slackened, and on the right -flank Second Lieutenant Mayhlon L. Degernes’ 1st Platoon received only -light attacks. - -This was also the case on the left flank of How Company, where Second -Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s 2d Platoon saw little action as compared -to the other two. A front of some 800 yards in the center of the -2300-yard Marine line, including two platoon positions and parts of two -others, bore the brunt of the CCF assault on How and Item Companies. - -Captain Corley had just visited his center platoon when the first -attacks hit How Company. Second Lieutenant Wendell C. Endsley was -killed while the company commander was on his way to Second Lieutenant -Roscoe L. Barrett’s 1st Platoon, on the right, which soon had its left -flank heavily engaged. - -Never was CCF skill at night attacks displayed more effectively. -Barrett concluded that the Chinese actually rolled down the slope into -the How Company lines, so that they seemed to emerge from the very -earth. The 3d Platoon, already thinned by accurate CCF white phosphorus -mortar fire, was now further reduced in strength by grenades and burp -gun bursts. About this time the company wire net went out and Corley -could keep in touch with his platoons only by runners. The battalion -telephone line also being cut, he reported his situation by radio to -the Battalion CP. - -Two wiremen were killed while trying to repair the line. The Chinese -continued to come on in waves, each preceded by concentrations of -light and heavy mortar fire on the right and center of the How Company -position. About 0030 the enemy broke through in the 3d Platoon area -and penetrated as far back as the Company CP. A scene of pandemonium -ensued, the sound of Chinese trumpets and whistles adding to the -confusion as it became difficult to tell friend from foe. “Tracers were -so thick,” recalled Sergeant Keith E. Davis, “that they lighted up the -darkness like a Christmas tree.”[443] - - [443] K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55. - -Corley and five enlisted men operated as a supporting fire team while -First Lieutenant Harrison F. Betts rounded up as many men as he could -find and tried to plug the gap in the 3d Platoon line. This outnumbered -group was swept aside as the next wave of CCF attack carried to the -rear of How Company and threatened the engineers at work under the -floodlights. - -A few Chinese actually broke through and fired at the Marines operating -the dozers. Second Lieutenant Robert L. McFarland, the equipment -officer, led a group of Dog Company engineers who counterattacked and -cleared the airstrip at the cost of a few casualties. Then the men -resumed work under the floodlights.[444] - - [444] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun - 56, questions whether the floodlights were on during the - whole attack. - -The Battalion reserve, if such it could be called, consisted of any -service troops who could be hastily gathered to meet the emergency. -Shortly before midnight Ridge sent a platoon-strength group of X Corps -signalmen and engineers under First Lieutenant Grady P. Mitchell to -the aid of How Company. Mitchell was killed upon arrival and First -Lieutenant Horace L. Johnson, Jr., deployed the reinforcements in a -shallow ditch as a company reserve. - -About midnight the fight had reached such a pitch of intensity that -no spot in the perimeter was safe. The Company C medical clearing -station, only a few hundred yards to the rear of Item Company, was -repeatedly hit by machine gun bullets whipping through the wooden walls -as surgeons operated on the wounded. The Division CP also took hits, -and a bullet which penetrated General Smith’s quarters produced unusual -sound effects when it ricocheted off pots and pans in the galley.[445] - - [445] Smith, _Chronicle_, 93. - -The Chinese seemed to be everywhere in the How Company zone. Shortly -after midnight they surrounded the CP, portable galley and provision -tent. “It is my personal opinion,” commented Captain Corley, “that if -the enemy had decided to effect a major breakthrough at this time, -he would have experienced practically no difficulty. However, he -seemed content to wander in and around the 3d Platoon, galley and hut -areas.”[446] - - [446] Corley narrative. - -The Chinese, in short, demonstrated that they knew better how to -create a penetration than to exploit one. Once inside the How Company -lines, they disintegrated into looting groups or purposeless tactical -fragments. Clothing appealed most to the plunderers, and a wounded -Marine in the 3d Platoon area saved his life by pretending to be dead -while Communists stripped him of his parka. - -About 0030 the Battalion CP advised Corley by radio that more -reinforcements were on the way. Lieutenant Johnson met the contingent, -comprising about 50 service troops, and guided them into the company -area, where they were deployed as an added reserve to defend the -airstrip. - -Item Company was still having it hot and heavy but continued to beat -off all CCF assaults. Elements of Weapons Company, manning the south -road block, came under attack at 0115. Apparently a small enemy column -had lost direction and blundered into a field of fire covered by heavy -machine guns. The hurricane of Marine fire caught the Communists before -they deployed and the result was virtual annihilation. - - -_East Hill Lost to Enemy_ - -Half an hour later, with the situation improving in the How Company -zone, the Battalion CP had its first alarming reports of reverses -on East Hill. The terrain itself had offered difficulties to men -scrambling up the steep, icy slopes with heavy burdens of ammunition. -These detachments of service troops, moreover, included a large -proportion of newly recruited ROKs who had little training and -understood no English. - -[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS - -29 November - - MAP-18 -] - -The largest of the East Hill units, Company D of the 10th Engineer -Combat Battalion, commanded by Captain Philip A. Kulbes, USA, was -composed of 77 American enlisted men and 90 ROKs. Combat equipment -(in addition to individual weapons) consisted of four .50 caliber -machine guns, five light .30 caliber machine guns, and six 3.5 rocket -launchers.[447] - - [447] References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt - Norman R. Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John - G. Westover, Ed., _Combat Support in Korea_ (Washington, - 1955), 206–208. - -The Army engineers had arrived at Hagaru at 1200 on the 28th, shortly -before the enemy cut the MSR. After being assigned to the East Hill -sector during the afternoon, the company used the few remaining hours -of daylight to move vehicles and gear back to an equipment park in the -perimeter. It was 2030 before the four platoons got into position on -East Hill after an exhausting climb in the darkness with heavy loads of -ammunition. Some use was made of existing holes, but most of the men -were not dug in when the Chinese attacked. - -On the left the collapse of a ROK platoon attached to X Corps -Headquarters led rapidly to confusion everywhere on East Hill. Captain -Shelnutt, the Marine officer assigned to the Army engineers, found -that he could not close the gap by extending the line to the left. Nor -did the men, particularly the ROKs, have the training to side-slip -to the left under fire and beat off flank attacks. The consequence -was a general withdrawal on East Hill, attended in some instances by -demoralization. Shelnutt was killed as the four engineer platoons fell -back some 250 yards in “a tight knot,” according to Lieutenant Norman -R. Rosen, USA, commander of the 3d Platoon. - -This was the situation as reported by the Marine radio operator, PFC -Bruno Podolak, who voluntarily remained as an observer at his post, now -behind enemy lines. At 0230 a telephone call to Colonel Bowser from the -3/1 CP was recorded in the message blank as follows: - -“How Company still catching hell and are about ready to launch -counterattack to restore line. About an hour ago, enemy appeared on -East Hill. A group of enemy sneaked up to a bunch of Banks’ men and -hand-grenaded hell out of them and took position. Sending executive -officer over to see if we can get some fire on that area. Should be -able to restore the line but liable to be costly. Reserve practically -nil. Do have a backstop behind the break in How lines on this side of -airstrip, composed of engineers and other odds and ends.”[448] - - [448] 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50. - -At 0400 there was little to prevent the enemy from making a complete -breakthrough on East Hill and attacking the Division CP and the supply -dumps. A friendly foothold had been retained on reverse slopes of the -southern nose, but the northern part was held only by artillery fires. -Along the road at the bottom of East Hill a thin line of service troops -with several tanks and machine guns formed a weak barrier. - -All indications point to the fact that the Chinese themselves were not -in sufficient strength to follow up their success. Their attack on East -Hill was apparently a secondary and diversionary effort in support of -the main assault on the sectors held by How and Item Companies. At any -rate, the enemy contented himself with holding the high ground he had -won. - -Some of the defenders of East Hill had fought with bravery which is the -more admirable because of their lack of combat training. Battle is a -business for specialists, and Lieutenant Rosen relates that the Army -engineers “had a great deal of difficulty with our weapons because they -were cold and fired sluggishly. We had gone into action so unexpectedly -that it had not occurred to us to clean the oil off our weapons.” As -an example of the difficulties imposed by the language barrier, the -officers were given to understand by the ROKs that they had no more -ammunition. “Weeks later,” commented Rosen, “we found that most of -them had not fired their ammunition this night, but continued to carry -it.”[449] - - [449] Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209. - -In view of such circumstances, the service troops put up a creditable -if losing fight in the darkness on East Hill. The 77 Americans of the -Army engineer company suffered losses of 10 KIA, 25 WIA, and nine MIA; -and of the 90 ROKs, about 50 were killed, wounded, or missing, chiefly -the latter.[450] - - [450] _Ibid._, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29 - Nov 50. - - -_The Volcano of Supporting Fires_ - -As usual, the men in the thick of the fight saw only what happened in -their immediate area. The scene as a whole was witnessed by a young -Marine officer of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, on duty at a -sawmill two miles north of Hagaru. From the high ground he could look -south down into the perimeter, and the awesome spectacle of a night -battle made him think of a volcano in eruption. Gun flashes stabbing -the darkness were fused into a great ring of living flame, and the -thousands of explosions blended into one steady, low-pitched roar.[451] - - [451] Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56. - -Seldom in Marine history have supporting arms played as vital a part as -during this night at Hagaru. It is possible that a disaster was averted -on East Hill when the Marines of Captain Benjamin S. Read’s How Battery -shifted trails and plugged the hole in the line with howitzer fires -alone. Lieutenant Colonel Banks and Major Walter T. Warren, commanding -the antitank company of the 7th Marines, acted as observers. Reporting -by telephone to the gun pits, they directed the sweating gunners so -accurately that an enemy attack would have come up against a curtain of -fire.[452] - - [452] Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns - Never Got Cold,” _Saturday Evening Post_, ccxxiii (7 Apr - 51), 145. - -Captain Strohmenger’s Dog Battery had been attached to 3/1 so long -that a high degree of co-ordination existed. His 105s fired about -1200 rounds that night, and POW interrogations disclosed that enemy -concentrations in rear areas were repeatedly broken up. - -When CCF guns replied, shortly before midnight, there was danger of -a fuel or ammunition dump being hit and starting a chain reaction of -detonations in the crowded perimeter. Strohmenger ordered five of his -howitzers to cease fire while he moved the sixth out about 150 yards to -act as a decoy. Its flashes drew fire from the enemy, as he had hoped, -revealing the positions of the Chinese artillery. Dog Battery officers -set up two aiming circles and calculated the range and deflection. Then -the command was given for all six Marine howitzers to open up. The -enemy guns were silenced for the night. A later survey established that -two CCF 76mm guns had been destroyed and two others removed.[453] - - [453] Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55. - -The 60mm mortars of the two rifle companies fired a total of more than -3200 rounds; and on both fronts the heavy machine guns of Weapons -Company added tremendously to the fire power. Illuminating shells -being scarce, two Korean houses on the Item Company’s front were set -ablaze by orders of Lieutenant Fisher. The flames seemed to attract CCF -soldiers like moths, and the machine guns of the two tanks stationed -here reaped a deadly harvest. Curiously enough, the Chinese apparently -did not realize what excellent targets they made when silhouetted -against the burning buildings. - -By 0400 it was evident that the enemy’s main effort had failed. No -further attacks of any consequence were sustained by the two rifle -companies. It remained only to dispose of the unwelcome CCF visitors -sealed off in the How Company zone, and at 0420 Captain Corley rounded -up men for a counterattack. - -“It will be just as dark for them as for us,” he told his NCOs. - -Second Lieutenant Edward W. Snelling was directed to fire all his -remaining 60mm mortar ammunition in support. Corley and Betts led the -service troops sent as reinforcements while Johnson advanced on the -left. A bitter fight of extermination ensued, and by 0630 the MLR had -been restored. How Company, which sustained the heaviest losses of any -Marine unit that night, had a total of 16 men killed and 39 wounded, -not including attached units.[454] - - [454] Corley and Barrett narratives. - -After it was all over, the stillness had a strange impact on ears -attuned the whole night long to the thump of mortars and clatter of -machine guns. The harsh gray light of dawn revealed the unforgettable -spectacle of hundreds of Chinese dead heaped up in front of the two -Marine rifle companies.[455] Shrouds of new white snow covered many of -them, and crimson trails showed where the wounded had made their way to -the rear. - - [455] POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this - sector had been one regiment. CIC tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, - 1715 29 Nov 50. - - -_Marine Attacks on East Hill_ - -But even though the enemy’s main attack had failed, his secondary -effort on East Hill represented a grave threat to perimeter security. -At 0530 Ridge decided to counterattack, and Major Reginald R. Myers -volunteered to lead an assault column composed of all reserves who -could be scraped together for the attempt. - -It was broad daylight before the Battalion executive officer moved out -with an assortment of Marine, Army, and ROK service troops, some of -them stragglers from the night’s withdrawals from East Hill (see Map -18). Their total strength compared to that of an infantry company. -About 55 separate units were represented at Hagaru, many by splinter -groups, so that most of Myers’ men were strangers to one another as -well as to their officers and NCOs. - -The largest Marine group was the platoon led by First Lieutenant Robert -E. Jochums, assistant operations officer of the 1st Engineer Battalion. -Clerks, typists, and truck drivers were included along with Company D -engineers. Armed with carbines or M-1s and two grenades apiece, the men -carried all the small arms ammunition they could manage. Few had had -recent combat experience and the platoon commander knew only one of -them personally--a company clerk whom he made his runner. - -It was typical of the informality attending this operation that a -Marine NCO with a small group attached themselves to Jochums, giving -him a total of about 45. They had an exhausting, 45-minute climb up the -hill to the line of departure, where Myers directed them to attack on -the left of his main force. - -The early morning fog enshrouded East Hill and Myers’ attack had to -wait until it cleared. The jump-off line lay along a steep slope with -little or no cover. From the outset the advancing troops were exposed -to scattered small-arms fire as well as grenades which needed only -to be rolled downhill. New snow covering the old icy crust made for -treacherous footing, so that the heavily laden men took painful falls. - -Myers’ little task force can scarcely be considered a tactical -organization. His close air support was excellent; but both artillery -and mortar support were lacking. Jochums did not notice any weapons -save small arms and grenades. - -“Our plane assaults were very effective, especially the napalm -attacks,” he commented on the basis of a personal log kept at the time. -“During these strikes, either live or dry runs, the enemy troops in the -line of fire would often rise and run from their positions to those in -the rear.”[456] - - [456] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments. - -Marine air came on station at 0930 as VMF-312 planes peeled off to hit -the enemy with napalm and bombs. The squadron flew 31 sorties that -day at Hagaru, nearly all in the East Hill area. Enemy small-arms -fire crippled one aircraft; but the pilot, First Lieutenant Harry W. -Colmery, escaped serious injuries by making a successful crash landing -within the perimeter.[457] - - [457] VMF-312 _SAR_, 15–16. - -All accounts agree that the ground forces met more serious opposition -from the terrain at times than from the enemy. So cut up into ridges -and ravines was this great hill mass that the troops seldom knew -whether they were advancing in defilade or exposing themselves to -the fire of hidden adversaries. Thus the attack became a lethal game -of hide-and-seek in which a step to the right or left might make the -difference between life and death. On the other hand, when the Corsairs -provided shooting gallery targets by flushing out opponents, only a -few men could get into effective firing position along the narrow, -restricted ridges before the Communists scuttled safely to new cover. - -It took most of the energies of the attackers to keep on toiling -upward, gasping for breath, clutching at bushes for support, and -sweating at every pore in spite of the cold. At noon, after snail-like -progress, the force was still far short of the main ridge recognized as -the dividing line between friendly forces and the enemy. By this time -more than half of Myers’ composite company had melted away as a result -of casualties and exhaustion. Jochums saw no more than 15 wounded men -in the attacking force during the day. He noted about the same number -of dead Chinese. As for enemy strength, he estimated that the total may -have amounted to a company or slightly more. - -It was his conviction that “three well organized platoons could have -pressed the assault without serious consequences and seized the -immediate highest objective. What was behind that I am unable to -say, but I feel that taking this high ground would have solved the -problem.”[458] - - [458] Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we] - could not control movement of the enemy on the reverse - side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.” - -Most of the friendly casualties were caused by the grenades and grazing -machine-gun fire of concealed opponents who had the law of gravity -fighting on their side. Jochums was painfully wounded in the foot but -continued with his platoon. “The age-old problem of leadership in such -an operation,” he concluded, “may be compared to moving a piece of -string--pulling it forward will get you farther than pushing.” - -Enemy small-arms fire increased in volume when Myers’ remnants, -estimated at 75 men, reached the military crest of the decisive ridge. -There the groups in the center and on the right were halted by the -Chinese holding the topographical crest and reverse slope. On the left -Jochums’ men managed to push on to an outlying spur before being -stopped by CCF fire from a ridge to the northeast. Jochums’ position -was still short of the commanding high ground, yet it was destined to -be the point of farthest penetration on East Hill. - -Myers ordered his men to take what cover they could find and draw up -a defensive line “short of the topographical crest” while awaiting -a supporting attack.[459] This was to be carried out by elements of -Captain George W. King’s Able Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion, -which had been stationed at a sawmill two miles north of Hagaru to -repair a blown bridge. These troops reached the perimeter without -incident at noon and proceeded immediately to the assault. - - [459] Myers Comments. - -First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st Platoon led the column. -Orders were to ascend the southwestern slope of East Hill, pass -through Myers’ force and clear the ridge line. But after completing -an exhausting climb to the military crest, the engineer officer was -directed to retrace his steps to the foot. There Captain King informed -him that a new attack had been ordered on the opposite flank, from a -starting point about 1000 yards to the northeast. - -Moving to the indicated route of approach, Canzona began his second -ascent with two squads in line, pushing up a spur and a draw which -became almost perpendicular as it neared the topographical crest. Only -his skeleton platoon of about 20 men was involved. There were neither -radios nor supporting arms, and a light machine gun was the sole weapon -in addition to small arms and grenades. - -Upon reaching the military crest, the engineers were pinned down by CCF -machine-gun fire along a trail a few feet wide, with nearly vertical -sides. Only Canzona, Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPhersen and PFC Eugene -B. Schlegel had room for “deployment,” and they found the platoon’s one -machine gun inoperative after it was laboriously passed up from the -rear. Schlegel was wounded and rolled downhill like a log, unconscious -from loss of blood. - -Another machine gun, sent up from the foot, enabled the platoon to hold -its own even though it could not advance. Canzona put in a request by -runner for mortar support, but only two 81mm rounds were delivered -after a long delay. It was late afternoon when he walked downhill -to consult King, who had just been ordered to withdraw Company A to -a reverse slope position. Canzona returned to his men and pulled -them back about half-way down the slope while McPherson covered the -retirement with machine-gun fire. The winter sun was sinking when -the weary engineers set up a night defense, and at that moment the -howitzers of How Battery cut loose with point-detonation and proximity -bursts which hit the Chinese positions with deadly accuracy. - -Canzona estimated the enemy strength in his zone at no more than a -platoon, which might have been dislodged with the aid of artillery or -even mortar fire.[460] - - [460] Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that - the Chinese positions were defiladed from artillery fire. - Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d. - -About 500 yards south of the engineers, Major Myers held a defensive -position with his remaining force of about two platoons. The Battalion -CP had reason to believe that the outposts on East Hill would be -relieved shortly by George Company, with the 41st Commando in perimeter -reserve. Both had departed Koto-ri that morning in a strong convoy -which also included an Army infantry company, four platoons of Marine -tanks, and the last serial of Division Headquarters Battalion. - -It was still touch and go at Hagaru at dusk on the 29th, but the -defenders could take satisfaction in having weathered the enemy’s -first onslaught. General Smith, courteous and imperturbable as always, -visited the Battalion CP to commend Ridge and his officers for the -night’s work. Two rifle companies had inflicted a bloody repulse on -several times their own numbers, and the counterattacking forces on -East Hill had at least hung on by their eyelashes. - -In the final issue, a bob-tailed rifle battalion, two artillery -batteries and an assortment of service troops had stood off a CCF -division identified as the 58th and composed of the 172d, 173d, and -174th Infantry Regiments reinforced with organic mortars and some -horse-drawn artillery. Chinese prisoners reported that the 172d, taking -the principal part in the attacks on How and Item Companies, had -suffered 90 per cent casualties. Elements of the 173d were believed -to have figured to a lesser extent, with the 174th being kept in -reserve.[461] - - [461] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 9–10; Ridge, _Notes_; Carey - narrative. - -This was the situation in the early darkness of 29 November, when the -disturbing news reached Hagaru that George Company and the Commandos -were being heavily attacked on the road from Koto-ri and had requested -permission to turn back. - - - - -CHAPTER XI - -Task Force Drysdale - -_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks--The -Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack of George Company on East Hill--High -Level Command Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue -of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_ - - -Before the Chinese struck at Yudam-ni, they had penetrated 35 miles -farther south along the MSR. At Chinhung-ni, on the night of 26 -November, the Marines of the 1st Battalion, RCT-1, exchanged shots in -the darkness with several elusive enemy groups making “light probing -attacks.” - -Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, the new battalion commander, -had set up a defensive perimeter upon arrival with his three rifle -companies reinforced by 4.2-inch mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle -platoons.[462] The identity of the enemy on the night of the 26th was -not suspected, and patrols the next day made no contacts. At 1900 on -the 27th, however, another light attack on the perimeter was repulsed. -During the next two days, patrol actions definitely established that -Chinese in estimated battalion strength were in a mountain valley to -the west, hiding in houses by day and probing by night apparently in -preparation for a determined attack. - - [462] This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar - _SAR_, 13–14; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _13_, 1–2; VMF-312 - _SAR_, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W. - L. Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D. - M. Schmuck Comments, n. d. - -Schmuck decided to strike first. On the 29th, a Baker Company -reconnaissance patrol searched out the enemy positions, and the next -day the battalion commander led an attacking force composed of Captain -Barrow’s Able Company and part of Captain Noren’s Baker Company, -reinforced by 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars under the direction of Major -William L. Bates, Jr., commanding the Weapons Company. - -While First Lieutenant Howard A. Blancheri’s Fox Battery of 2/11 laid -down supporting fires, the infantry “ran the Chinese right out of the -country,” according to Major Bates’ account. “We burned all the houses -they had been living in and brought the civilians back with us. We had -no more difficulty with the Chinese from that valley.” - -The Communists were found to be warmly clothed in new padded cotton -uniforms and armed with American weapons presumably captured from the -Nationalists. An estimated 56 were killed by the ground forces before -the Corsairs of VMF-312 took up a relentless pursuit which lasted until -the enemy remnants scattered into hiding. Some of the Chinese were -mounted on shaggy Mongolian ponies.[463] - - [463] Schmuck Comments. - - -_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri_ - -During this same period, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2d Battalion of -RCT-1 had several hard-fought encounters with the new enemy. After -arriving at Koto-ri on the 24th, he set up a perimeter defense facing -west, north, and east which included a 4.2-inch Mortar Platoon as well -as Easy Battery of 2/11, commanded by Captain John C. McClelland, Jr. -Some commanding ground was left unoccupied, but Sutter believed that -a tight perimeter offered advantages over widely separated blocking -positions. In addition to 2/1, the regimental CP and H&S Company, -the AT Company (-), the 4.2 Mortar Company (-), Company D of the 1st -Medical Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 11th Marines (less -Batteries D and F) were at Koto-ri. - -The perimeter, second in importance only to Hagaru as a base, was to be -jammed during the next few days with hundreds of Marine and Army troops -held up by CCF roadblocks to the north. On 27 November, the enemy made -his presence known. A motorized patrol of platoon strength from Captain -Jack A. Smith’s Easy Company, supported by a section of tanks, engaged -in a fire fight with about 25 Chinese in the hills west of Koto-ri. Two -wounded CCF soldiers were left behind by the dispersed enemy. At this -point the patrol proceeded on foot until it was stopped by the fire of -an estimated 200 Communists dug in along ridge lines. At 1600 the -Marines returned to the perimeter with two men wounded. - -[Illustration: KOTO-RI PERIMETER - -28 November – 7 December - - MAP-19 -] - -Enemy losses were reported as eight killed and 15 wounded in addition -to the two prisoners. Upon being questioned, these Chinese asserted -that they belonged to a Chinese division assembling to the west of -Koto-ri with a headquarters in a mine shaft.[464] - - [464] 1stMar _SAR_, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 1815 and 1930 27 Nov 50. - -There could be no doubt the next day that the enemy had swarmed into -the area in fairly large numbers. A Marine outpost on a hill northeast -of the perimeter received heavy small-arms fire at 0845 and was -reinforced by a platoon from Easy Company. Finally these troops had to -be withdrawn and an air strike called on the hill to evict the enemy. - -At 1058 General Smith ordered Colonel Puller to push a force up the MSR -to make contact with the tank patrol being sent south from Hagaru and -to clear the MSR.[465] Groups of Chinese, sighted during the day to -the north, west and east, were taken under artillery fire by Captain -McClelland’s battery. Reconnaissance planes landing at the Koto-ri OY -strip reported CCF roadblocks on the way to Hagaru; and at 1330 Captain -Gildo S. Codispoti, the S-3, dispatched Captain Welby W. Cronk’s Dog -Company in vehicles with orders to open up the route. Following in Dog -Company’s wake came the last serial of Division Headquarters troops, on -its way to Hagaru.[466] - - [465] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50. - - [466] The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 _SAR_, - 12–13; HqBn _URpt 12_. LtCol J. C McClelland, Jr., ltr, - 21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d. - -Less than a mile north of the perimeter, the convoy ran into a storm -of rifle and automatic weapons fire from Chinese entrenched along the -high ground on both sides of the road. The Marines of Dog Company piled -out of their vehicles and deployed for a hot fire fight, supported from -Koto-ri by 81mm mortars of Captain William A. Kerr’s Weapons Company. -Two platoons swung around to clear the enemy from the ridge. The other -platoon and the Headquarters troops advanced along the road. - -At 1615 a platoon from Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company was -ordered out to assist in evacuating casualties. But as the afternoon -wore on, it grew apparent that the Chinese were in greater strength -than had been anticipated, and all troops were directed to return to -Koto-ri at 1735. They did so under cover of strikes by the Corsairs of -VMF-312. - -Marine losses numbered four KIA or DOW and 34 WIA. Enemy casualties -were estimated at 154 killed and 83 wounded in addition to three -prisoners taken from a unit identified as the 179th Regiment of the -60th CCF Division. Captured Chinese weapons included 130 rifles, 25 -machine guns, and two cases of grenades. - -That evening George Company of 3/1, 41st Commando, Royal Marines, and -Baker Company of the 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, arrived at -Koto-ri on their way to Hagaru (see Map 20). Colonel Puller and his -S-3, Major Lorigan, organized the newcomers into a task force under the -command of Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, CO of the British unit, with -orders to fight its way to Hagaru the following day. - -Luckily the enemy did not elect to attack the overcrowded perimeter on -the night of the 28th. Every warming tent was packed to capacity, and a -CCF mortar round could hardly have landed anywhere without doing a good -deal of damage. - -After a quiet night the Chinese began the new day by digging -emplacements in the hills to the west under harassing fire from F -Company. The howitzers of Easy Battery and the mortars of 2/1 provided -supporting fires for Task Force Drysdale when it moved out at 0945 -followed by a convoy of Division Headquarters troops. A platoon of Easy -Company, 2/1, went along with corpsmen and ambulances to assist in -evacuating any early wounded back to Koto-ri. Stubborn CCF resistance -resulted in casualties from the outset, and it was 1600 before the Easy -Company escort platoon got back to the perimeter. - -The Chinese, keeping the perimeter under observation all day, evidently -concluded that the northern rim, defended by Easy Company, offered the -best opportunity for a penetration. Marine air strikes were called -on the Chinese swarming over the near-by high ground during the last -minutes of daylight, but enemy mortar rounds hit Easy Company at 1745. -They were followed by bugle calls and whistle signals as the CCF -infantry attacked from the high ground to the northeast. - -The assault force was estimated at company strength, with the remainder -of a battalion in reserve. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they had -made their intentions clear all day with unusual activity in the -surrounding hills, and Easy Company was not surprised. Major Clarence -J. Mabry, the 2/1 executive officer, could be heard above the machine -guns as he shouted encouragement to Marines who poured it into the -advancing Communists. They came on with such persistence that 17 -managed to penetrate within the lines, apparently to attack the warming -tents.[467] All were killed. In addition, about 150 CCF bodies lay in -front of the sector when the enemy withdrew at 1855, after suffering a -complete repulse. - - [467] LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56. - -It was conjectured that the Chinese had interpreted the return of the -Easy Company platoon late that afternoon as an indication that a gap -in the line needed to be hastily plugged. But the supposed weak spot -did not materialize, and at 1935 the enemy signed off for the night -after pumping four final mortar rounds in the vicinity of the Battalion -CP without doing any harm. Losses of 2/1 for the day were six KIA and -18 WIA, total CCF casualties being estimated at 175 killed and 200 -wounded. Ten heavy machine guns, seven LMGs, 12 Thompson submachine -guns, 76 rifles, four pistols, and 500 grenades were captured. - -That was all at Koto-ri, where Recon Company arrived during the day -to add its weight to the defense. But during intervals of silence the -sound of heavy and continuous firing to the north gave proof that Task -Force Drysdale was in trouble. - - -_Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks_ - -Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale’s plan of attack had called for his British -Marines to lead out at 0930 and seize the first hill mass to the east -of the road. Captain Sitter’s George Company of 3/1 was to follow -and pass through to attack Hill 1236, with Baker Company of the 31st -Infantry in reserve. LtCol Sutter, assisted by his staff, had the -responsibility for planning and coordinating preparatory artillery and -mortar fires from Koto-ri and attaching an air liaison officer to the -task force.[468] - - [468] Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO - 41st Commando ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn - _SAR_, 23–27; Smith, _Notes_, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter - ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas - ltr to HistBr G-3, 18 Dec 55; Narrative of Capt M. J. - Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan - 56; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” _Marine - Corps Gazette_, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51), 28–32; 1stMar - tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J. - Catania, “Truck Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, _Combat - Support in Korea_, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, - Comments, n. d. - -The first hill was taken without meeting serious resistance, but Sitter -came up against well entrenched CCF troops when he attacked Hill 1236, -about a mile and a half north of Koto-ri. It was nip and tuck until -Master Sergeant Rocco A. Zullo fired his 3.5 rocket launcher at a -range of 200 yards. Several rounds brought the Chinese out of their -holes and the Marines took possession of the hill. - -[Illustration: ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE HAGARU - -28 November-1 December - - MAP-20 -] - -The Commandos and George Company moved up about a mile astride of the -road toward the third objective, Hill 1182. There the enemy resisted -strenuously with well-placed mortar as well as machine-gun fire from -strong positions on the high ground. The impetus of the attack had been -stopped when Sitter received orders from the task force commander to -break off action, withdraw to the road, and await new instructions. - -Drysdale had received a message from RCT-1 at 1130 advising him that -the armor of Company D (less 2d platoon), 1st Tank Battalion, would be -available to him at 1300. He decided to wait, therefore, and re-form -the column before continuing the advance. - -The two platoons of Company D tanks, reinforced by the tank platoon -of the AT Company, RCT-5, reached Koto-ri at noon after moving out -that morning from Majon-dong. Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, departed -Tongjong-ni, just south of Majon-dong, but did not arrive at Koto-ri -until 1500. The 2d Platoon being attached to Sutter’s battalion, the -remainder of the company was directed to bring up the rear of the Task -Force Drysdale, which by that time had renewed its attack. Thus the -convoy was made up of the following components, including the elements -which joined in the late afternoon of 29 November: - - -----------------------------+---------+---------+--------- - Unit |Estimated|Estimated|Estimated - |Strength |Vehicles | Tanks - -----------------------------+---------+---------+--------- - 41 Ind. Commando, RM | 235 | | - Co. G, 3/1 | 205 | | - Co. B, 31st Infantry, USA | 190 | 22 | - Det. Div. Hq. Bn. | 62 | 17 | - Det. 1st Sig. Bn. | 8 | 4 | - Det. 7th MT Bn.[469] | 12 | 22 | - Det. Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn. | 18 | 31 | - Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn. | 86 | 23 | 12 - Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn. | 77 | 22 | 12 - Tank Plat., AT Co., RCT-5 | 29 | | 5 - -----------------------------+---------+---------+--------- - Total | 922 | 141 | 29 - -----------------------------+---------+---------+--------- - - [469] Trailers are included among the vehicles. George Company, - 3/1 lacked organic transport and was mounted in the - vehicles of 7thMTBn. For similar reasons ServCo, 1stTkBn, - supplied the transportation for the 41st Commando and - 377th Transportation Truck Company, USA, for B/31stInf. - -At 1350 the head of the column had resumed the advance, with the order -of march as shown below: - - D/TKs & AT/5 -- G/1 -- 41 Cmdo -- B/31 -- HqBn -- B/TKs - 17 tks 22 veh 31 veh 22 veh 66 veh 12 tks - -Shortly after moving out, Sitter’s men were hit by heavy small-arms -fire from houses on the right of the road. The company commander went -forward and requested the tanks to open up with their 90mm guns, and -the Chinese flushed out of the houses were destroyed by machine-gun -fire. - -Progress was slow because of the necessity of further halts while the -tanks blasted out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as -small-arms fire was encountered, and a round scored a direct hit on -one of the trucks carrying personnel of 3d Platoon of George Company, -wounding every man in the vehicle. - -Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over roadblocks -or around craters. For the three infantry companies, the advance -consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes in -which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage in fire fights. -Finally, about 1615, the column ground to a complete halt about four -miles north of Koto-ri. At that time the tanks of Company B were just -leaving the 2/1 perimeter to join the convoy. - - -_The Fight in Hell Fire Valley_ - -Drysdale and Sitter were informed by the tank officers that they -thought the armor could get through, but that further movement for the -trucks was inadvisable in view of road conditions and increasing enemy -resistance. The task force commander requested a decision from Division -Headquarters as to whether he should resume an advance which threatened -to prove costly. It was a difficult choice for General Smith to make, -but in view of the urgent necessity for reinforcements at Hagaru he -directed Drysdale to continue.[470] - - [470] Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are - the same as the preceding, plus: Statement of Capt M. C. - Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton, - and Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb - 51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; - CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C. - W. Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt - J. B. Nash, and TSgt C L. Harrison intervs by HistDiv - HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt - Shutts, 26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov - 56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson, Estess, and Williams were - among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped from - Chinese imprisonment several months later. - -The tanks had to refuel, so that more time was lost. CCF fire was -only moderate during this delay, thanks to the air strikes of VMF-321 -planes directed by Captain Norman Vining. When the column stopped, -the vehicles had pulled off into a dry stream bed. Upon resuming the -advance, unit integrity was lost and infantry elements mingled with -headquarters troops. - -[Illustration: TASK FORCE DRYSDALE AMBUSH - -29 November - - MAP-21 -] - -Not far south of the halfway point to Hagaru, increased enemy fire -caused an abrupt halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply -on the right of the road, while on the left a frozen creek wound -through a plain several hundred yards wide, bordered by the Changjin -River and wooded hills. This was Hell Fire Valley--a name applied by -Drysdale--and it was to be the scene of an all-night fight by half the -men of the convoy (see Map 21). - -Such a possibility was far from their thoughts when they piled out of -the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all day, to return -the enemy’s fire. It did not even seem significant when an enemy -mortar shell set one of the trucks in flames at the far end of the -valley, thus creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy -took advantage of the opportunity to pour in small-arms and mortar -fire which pinned down the troops taking cover behind vehicles or in -the roadside ditches and prevented removal of the damaged truck. -During this interlude the head of the column, consisting of Dog/Tanks, -George Company, nearly three-fourths of the 41st Commando and a few -Army infantrymen, continued the advance, with Drysdale in command, in -obedience to orders to proceed to Hagaru at all costs. Left behind in -Hell Fire Valley were 61 Commandos, most of Company B, 31st Infantry, -and practically all the Division Headquarters and Service troops. - -Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, assistant Division G-4 and -senior officer caught south of the roadblock, ordered the barred -vehicles to turn around and attempt a return to Koto-ri. Before his -orders could be carried out, a Chinese attack severed the convoy about -200 yards to the north of him. Other enemy attacks cut the road south -of the stalled convoy, both Chidester and Major James K. Eagan being -wounded and captured. - -Shallow ditches on either side of the road and the unused narrow-gauge -railway were utilized by the isolated troops as protection from the -fire of the Chinese occupying the high ground rising abruptly at the -right. The valley was about a mile long, covered with a frozen crust -of snow; and far from affording much cover, it offered the enemy a -convenient approach to the rear by way of the wide plain and frozen -river. - -The Chinese fire was not heavy at first. But when darkness put an end -to Marine air strikes, the enemy became increasingly bolder. Even so, -there was no attempt for several hours to close within grenade-throwing -distance. During this interlude the defenders had time to recover from -their confusion and take defensive positions. - -As nearly as the scene can be reconstructed from confused and -contradictory accounts, one large and three small perimeters were -strung out over a distance of perhaps 1200 yards from north to south. -Toward the north, near the outskirts of the village of Pusong-ni, -was the largest perimeter. It contained the troops caught north -of the second fracture of the column and was led by Major John N. -McLaughlin.[471] His hodge-podge of 130 to 140 men included Captain -Charles Peckham and part of his B Company, 31st Infantry; Warrant -Officer Lloyd V. Dirst and a group of Marine MPs; some Commandos, -Associated Press photographer Frank Noel, and assorted Marine service -and headquarters troops. - - [471] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had - transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G-3 - and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv. - -The three smaller perimeters appear to have resulted from the -splintering of a larger group originally containing nearly all the men -caught south of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seeley, -Division motor transport officer, attempted to form a perimeter with -these men but was frustrated by Chinese attacks which forced the men -to fall back in small groups. About 300 yards south of McLaughlin’s -perimeter the remnants of two Army platoons crouched in a drainage -ditch. Apparently several Marines, including CWO Dee R. Yancey, were -with them. Some 30 yards farther down the ditch were Captain Michael -J. Capraro, the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck, General -Craig’s aide, and about 15 headquarters troops. A few other Marines -clustered around Major Seeley, perhaps a hundred yards south of -Capraro’s group.[472] - - [472] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable - that estimates made by participants in the darkness - varied a great deal. - -There was some hope at first that the tanks of Baker Company, 1st Tank -Battalion, would come to the rescue. But the Marine armor ran into -heavy opposition near Hills 1236 and 1182 along the road cleared only a -few hours before by Task Force Drysdale. - -When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split the -motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That -is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks nearest to -Koto-ri got back without much trouble at 2110 after the enemy cut the -column into three groups. The middle group, comprising most of the -service trucks, was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walseth, -the Division G-1, was wounded as this group finally fought back to -Koto-ri at 0230 after heavy losses in trucks. This left the tank -platoon which had proceeded farthest; and it formed a tight perimeter -for the night about half a mile south of Seeley’s position, boxed in by -friendly artillery fires from Koto-ri. At dawn the tanks returned to -Koto-ri without further enemy interference. - -No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in Hell -Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks might arrive to the -aid of men who had no weapons larger than a single 75mm recoilless in -addition to rifles, carbines, and grenades. There were also a few 60mm -mortars but no ammunition for them. - -Fortunately, no determined Chinese attacks were received up to -midnight. Looting the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the -Asiatics, and their officers contented themselves with keeping the -perimeters pinned down and enveloped on three sides. - -Not until the early hours of 30 November did the Communists resort to -probing attacks by small groups armed with grenades. The headquarters -and service troops gave a good account of themselves in the fire fight. -Signalmen, clerks, cooks, truck drivers, military policemen--the -Marines of Hell Fire Valley included a good many veterans of World War -II, and they proved as steady as the tough combat-trained Commandos. -Once again the value of the Marine Corps insistence on good basic -training showed itself. - -Major McLaughlin sent reconnaissance parties south in an unsuccessful -attempt to link up with the other perimeters. He decided, therefore, to -remain in his positions and fight off the Chinese until air could come -on station at dawn. The wounded were placed in the deepest of the three -ditches and Army medics gave first aid. - -As the night wore on, McLaughlin’s situation became increasingly grave. -By 0200 his men were out of grenades. An Army crew performed valiantly -with the 75mm recoilless, firing at enemy mortar flashes until all the -soldiers were killed or wounded and the gun put out of action. Twice -McLaughlin’s men drove the Chinese from their mortars only to have them -return. - -Some of the Commandos managed to slip out of the perimeter in an effort -to reach Koto-ri and summon assistance. But an attempt by Noel and two -men to run the gantlet in a jeep between 0200 and 0300 ended in their -capture before they proceeded a hundred yards. - -At about 0430 the Chinese sent their prisoners to the perimeter with -a surrender demand. McLaughlin, accompanied by a Commando, went out -to parley through an interpreter in the hope of stalling until help -arrived, or at least until some of the men escaped. - -“Initially I demanded a CCF surrender!” he recalls. “But it made little -impression.” - -The Marine officer stalled until the Chinese threatened to overrun the -perimeter with an all-out attack. They gave him ten minutes to discuss -the capitulation with his officers. McLaughlin went from one to another -of the approximately 40 able bodied men he had left. Some had no rifle -ammunition at all and none had more than eight rounds. For the sake of -his wounded, he consented to surrender on condition that the serious -cases be evacuated. The Chinese agreed and the fight in Hell Fire -Valley ended. - -McLaughlin succeeded in killing enough time so that more men were given -the opportunity to slip away while the enemy relaxed his vigilance -during the prolonged negotiations. Largest of these groups was composed -of the survivors of the three small perimeters. Capraro and Buck, -both of whom were slightly wounded, managed to unite with the Army -infantrymen just north of them and nine Commandos, who joined them at -about 0200. An hour and a half later they linked up with the Marines -under Seeley, who led the combined group in a withdrawal to the high -ground across the river. Outdistancing their CCF pursuers, after -shooting down several, they made it safely to Koto-ri. - -Other groups, including three more Commandos and 71 Army infantrymen, -also contrived to straggle back to the 2/1 perimeter. - -Although the Chinese did not keep their word as to evacuation of the -wounded, they did not interfere with the removal of the more critical -cases to a Korean house. When the enemy retired to the hills for -the day, an opportunity was found to evacuate these casualties to -Koto-ri.[473] - - [473] LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the - end of the conflict, when the exchanges of prisoners took - place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has - been able to secure, it appears that both officers died - of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp. McLaughlin - Comments, 5 Nov 56. - -An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will -probably never be made, but the following estimate is not far from the -mark: - - -----------------------+-----------+------------+------------- - | KIA | Total | - | and | Battle | Vehicles - Unit | MIA WIA | Casualties | Lost[A] - -----------------------+-----------+------------+------------- - 41st Commando | 18 43 | 61 | - Co. G, 3/1 | 8 40 | 48 | - Co. B, 1/31 | 100 19 | 119 | 22 - Div. Hq. Bn. | 25 25 | 50 | 18 - 1st Sig. Bn. | 4 2 | 6 | - 7th MT Bn. | 2 3 | 5 | 4 - Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn | 5 6 | 11 | 30 - Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 12 | 12 | - Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn | 0 8 | 8 | 1 - Plat, AT Co., RCT-5 | 0 1 | 1 | - -----------------------+-----------+------------+------------- - Total | 162 159 | 321 | 75 - -----------------------+-----------+------------+------------- - - [A] Smith, _Notes_, 867–868. - -“The casualties of Task Force Drysdale were heavy,” commented General -Smith, “but by its partial success the Task Force made a significant -contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the Division. -To the slender infantry garrison of Hagaru were added a tank company of -about 100 men and some 300 seasoned infantrymen. The approximately 300 -troops which returned to Koto-ri participated thereafter in the defense -of that perimeter.”[474] - - [474] _Ibid._ A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was - written the following spring in front-page headlines - announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17 - enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five - NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages. - Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either - escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and - were liberated in Operation Big Switch. - -The head of the Task Force Drysdale column, with the Company D tanks -leading George Company and the Commandos, was not aware at dusk on the -29th that the convoy had been cut behind them. There had been previous -gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it was -supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would catch up with -the vanguard. - -Progress was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high -ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about -2200 yards from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated -CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged by a -satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were -set afire. After Drysdale was wounded the command passed to Sitter, -who formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse of the Chinese -permitted the march to be resumed.[475] - - [475] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been - derived from the following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 - Dec 50_, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 24–25; Ridge, _Notes_; - Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums - ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey - narrative, 3 Feb 56. - -Several pyramidal tents just outside the Hagaru perimeter were assumed -to be occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity destroyed -two George Company trucks and caused several casualties. Later it was -learned that the tents had been originally occupied by troops of the -10th Engineer Battalion and abandoned when the Chinese attacked on the -28th. - -At 1915, Captain Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who -directed that George Company and the 41st Commando spend the night in -perimeter reserve. After their all-day fight, the men of the column -could scarcely believe their eyes when they saw the Marine engineers at -work on the airstrip under the floodlights. - -Contrary to expectations, the hours of darkness on 29–30 November -passed in comparative quiet at Hagaru except for CCF harassing fires. -It was not a coincidence that the enemy kept his distance. Attacks on -the East Hill and Item and How Company positions of 3/1 actually had -been planned and partly executed by troops of the 58th CCF Division, -according to POW testimony. They were broken up by Marine air attacks -and supporting fires which hit the assembly areas. - -The effectiveness of these fires owed a good deal to the intelligence -brought back to Lieutenant Carey, the Battalion S-2, by CIC agents who -circulated among Chinese troops on 27 and 28 November. The Battalion -S-2 had a work table at the CP beside Major Simmons, the SAC, who -directed six sorties of the night hecklers of VMF(N)-542. He guided -the planes through the darkness to their targets with a fiery arrow -as converging machine-gun tracer bullets crossed over suspected CCF -assembly areas. - -The 81mm mortars of Weapons Company, 3/1, fired about 1100 rounds -during the night, and the corresponding unit of 2/7 made a noteworthy -contribution. The following day, according to Carey, Chinese prisoners -reported that “most of the units employed around Hagaru were very badly -hit.”[476] - - [476] This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of - 29–30 November is based on: Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56; - LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 - Dec 50_, 4–5. - -A few white phosphorus mortar rounds fell in the lines of How and Item -Companies, and a CCF green flare caused an alert for an attack which -never materialized. In the early morning hours of the 30th an enemy -concentration appeared to be taking place on the Item Company front, -but intensive 60mm mortar fire put an end to the threat. - - -_Attack of George Company on East Hill_ - -At 0800, the battalion commander ordered George Company to retake East -Hill while the Commandos remained in reserve. Sitter’s plan called for -his 1st and 2d platoons, commanded by Second Lieutenants Frederick W. -Hopkins and John W. Jaeger respectively, to pass through Myers’ group, -then make a sharp left turn and attack on either side of the ridge. -First Lieutenant Carl E. Dennis’ 3d Platoon and two platoons of Able -Company engineers were to follow in reserve. - -Slow progress caused the George Company commander to modify the plan -by giving his 3d platoon and the two engineer platoons the mission of -enveloping the CCF right flank (see Map 22). Lieutenant Dennis led -the attack, with First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt’s and Lieutenant -Canzona’s engineer platoons following. - -[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS - -30 November - - MAP-22 -] - -Neither of the George Company attacks was successful. The trampling of -hundreds of feet over the snow had made the footing more treacherous -than ever; and once again the combination of difficult terrain and -long-range Chinese fire accounted for failure to retake East Hill. -Sitter’s request to set up defense positions on the ground previously -occupied by Myers was granted. Meanwhile Dennis’ platoon and the -engineers were directed to withdraw to the foot of the hill, so that -the Corsairs could work the CCF positions over with rockets and bombs. - - -_High Level Command Conference_ - -Although the Marines at Hagaru had little to do with the higher levels -of strategy, it was evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth -Army in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of X Corps. -Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the -three battalions (two infantry and one artillery) of the 7th Infantry -Division east of the Chosin Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I. -Hodes, assistant division commander, informed General Smith at noon on -the 29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties -while falling back toward Hagaru and were unable to fight their way out -to safety. At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area, -including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational -control of the Marine commander by X Corps. The 1st Marine Division -was directed to “redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni area to -Hagaru area, gain contact with elements of the 7th Inf Div E of Chosin -Reservoir; co-ordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru in a perimeter -defense based on Hagaru; open and secure Hagaru-Koto-ri MSR.”[477] - - [477] X Corps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50. - -On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at Hagaru in -the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr, and Hodes were informed -at the briefing session that a disaster threatened the three Army -battalions.[478] - - [478] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 16–17; - CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 30 Nov 50. - -Almond was also much concerned about the attacks on the Marine MSR. He -had been given a firsthand account that morning by the senior Marine -officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney, who had just -returned from Koto-ri.[479] - - [479] Col E. H. Forney, _Transcript of Special Report, Deputy - Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August, 21 December 1950_, 3. - -At the Hagaru conference the X Corps commander announced that he had -abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the Chosin Reservoir -area. Stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward Hamhung, -he promised Smith resupply by air after authorizing him to burn or -destroy all equipment which would delay his withdrawal to the seacoast. - -The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by his -ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out, he -added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was his intention, -therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.[480] - - [480] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95. These decisions were confirmed by - CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50. - -Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule -for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those -two generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the -Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an -inconclusive note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received. -It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy to -the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the -Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”[481] - - [481] X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps _WD Sum, - Nov 50_, 16–17; and CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_ - 30 Nov 50. - -The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the -evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12 -to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the three combat -squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at once. Transfer of -the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many instances the planes -took off on combat missions from Wonsan and landed at Yonpo, so that -the ground forces were not deprived of air support.[482] - - [482] MAG-12 _HD Nov 50_, 8; 1stMAW _HD Dec 50_; CO MAG-12 msg - to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in - _ibid._ VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_. - -High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation -of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy foresaw -as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth Army -continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back and -being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous -quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date -that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in -turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either by -an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.[483] - - [483] ComPhibGruOne, _Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment, - December 1950_, 1. - - -_CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru_ - -During the early hours of darkness on 30 November, it appeared that -Hagaru might have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were heard -by Item Company at 2015, and the enemy sent up a green flare an hour -later. But no unusual CCF activity was reported until 2330, when small -patrols began probing for weak spots in the Item Company lines. - -The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area for such -research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up an elaborate system -of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps; and his sandbagged -foxholes and weapon emplacements afforded his men maximum protection. -At midnight, when the enemy came on in strength, each successive -assault wave shattered against the terrific fire power which a Marine -rifle company, aided by artillery, tanks, 81mm mortars, and heavy -machine guns, could concentrate. - -Several times the enemy’s momentum carried him to the Item Company -foxholes but no Communists lived to exploit their advantage. On one -of these occasions Sergeant Charles V. Davidson, having expended his -ammunition, proved that cold steel still has its uses by bayoneting the -last of his attackers.[484] - - [484] Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55. - -Again, as on the night of the 28th, the enemy had chosen to launch his -major attack against Marine strength, though his daytime observation -must have disclosed the preparations for a hot reception in the Item -Company sector. An estimated 500 to 750 Chinese were killed on this -front at a cost to Fisher’s men of two KIA and 10 WIA.[485] - - [485] 3/1 _SAR_ 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, _Notes_. - -The Chinese also repeated themselves by carrying out another attack on -East Hill which ended in a second costly stalemate. The western slope -up to the military crest was held by the following units from right -to left: First Lieutenant Ermine L. Meeker’s 1st Platoon of Baker -Company engineers; the 2d, 1st, and 3d Platoons of George Company; and -Lieutenant Skelt’s 3d Platoon of Able Company Engineers. To the left of -Skelt, near the foot of the hill, were Lieutenant Canzona’s 1st Platoon -of Able engineers; two tanks of the AT Company, 2/7; and elements of -Lieutenant Colonel Banks’ 1st Service Battalion.[486] - - [486] Sources for the balance of this section are as follows: - Smith, _Chronicle_, 97–100; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, - 5–6; Ridge, _Notes_; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona - narrative, 8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14 - Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10 Apr 56. - -The action began shortly before midnight with one of those comedy -situations which develop on the grimmest occasions. The sign or -password was “Abraham” and the countersign “Lincoln,” but two Company A -engineers on a listening post did not pause for the customary exchange. -Having been jumped by what their startled eyes took to be a Chinese -regiment, they sprinted downhill yelling, “Abraham Lincoln! Abraham -Lincoln!” as they slid into Skelt’s lines with the enemy close behind. - -His engineers had no leisure for a laugh. Within a few seconds they -were mixing it in a wild melee with Communists who seemed literally to -drop on them from above. Meanwhile, George Company was hard hit by well -aimed mortar fire which threatened to wipe out Lieutenant Hopkins’ 1st -Platoon. The ensuing double-headed CCF attack bent back the left flank -of George Company, with both the 1st and 3d Platoons giving ground. - -On the left Skelt’s platoon was pushed down to the foot of the hill by -superior enemy numbers after exactly half of his 28 men were killed or -wounded. Here the fight continued with Banks’ service troops lending a -hand until the Chinese were exterminated. - -This penetration was a hollow triumph for the enemy. No friendly forces -being left in the center, the How Battery howitzers walked shells up -and down the western slope. Mortars and machine guns chimed in, and -Lieutenant Canzona’s platoon was in position to direct the fire of the -two tanks of AT Company 2/7. - -The scene became bright as day after an enemy artillery shell set 50 -drums of gasoline ablaze in a Supply Area dump. Like an enormous torch, -the flames illuminated the battle so vividly that General Smith looked -on from the doorway of his CP, some 1200 yards away. Several bullets -pierced the roof and walls during the night. - -Again, as in the fight of 28–29 November, Marine fire power blocked the -gap on the central and northwest slopes of East Hill. Marine and Army -service troops took a part in the fighting which is the more creditable -considering that they were ordered out in the middle of the night, -placed in a provisional unit with strange troops, and marched off into -the darkness to attack or defend at some critical point. - -Lieutenant Meeker’s engineer platoon, on the right of George Company, -had a long-drawn fire fight but got off with losses of one man killed -and three wounded. At 0100 the CCF pressure on Sitter’s troops was -so heavy that Lieutenant Carey, former commander of the 1st Platoon, -was taken from his S-2 duties to lead a group of reinforcements which -he described as “all available hands from the CP or any other units -in Hagaru who could spare personnel.” Carrying as much ammunition as -possible, he arrived at the George Company CP to find Sitter still -commanding in spite of his wound. Scarcely a full squad was left of -Carey’s old outfit when he helped to restore the lines. - -It was necessary for Ridge to send a further reinforcement consisting -of British Marines of the 41st Commando before George Company’s left -flank was secured. A counterattack at daybreak regained lost ground, -and the situation was well under control when air came on station at -0900. - -Thus ended another night of confusion and frustration for both sides -on East Hill. While the Chinese attack had been better organized and -in larger force than the effort of the 29th, it was too little and too -late for decisive results in spite of heavy losses. On the other hand, -George Company and its reinforcing elements had suffered an estimated -60 men killed and wounded. - -Although the Marines of Hagaru could not have suspected it on the -morning of 1 December, the enemy had, for the time being, shot his -bolt. His first two large-scale attacks, as POW interrogations were -to confirm, had used up not only the personnel of a division but most -of the limited supplies of ammunition available. Thus it is probable -that the following estimates of CCF casualties, as published in the 3/1 -report, for the period of 28 November to 5 December, were nearer to -accuracy than most such summaries: - - (1) 58th CCF Division: Estimated casualties of 3300 for the 172d - Regiment; 1750 each for the 173d and 174th Regiments. - - (2) 59th CCF Division: Estimated 1750 casualties for the 176th - Regiment. No other units identified. - -The known Chinese dead in the two night battles amounted to at least -1500; and if it may be assumed that three or four times that number -were wounded, the total casualties would have crippled an enemy -infantry division of 7500 to 10,000 men, plus an additional regiment. -Considering the primitive state of CCF supply and medical service, -moreover, it is likely that hundreds died of wounds and privations -behind their own lines. - -The losses of 3/1 at Hagaru were given as 33 KIA, 10 DOW, 2 MIA, and -270 WIA--a total of 315 battle casualties, nearly all of which were -incurred from 28 November to 1 December.[487] There are no over-all -casualty figures for Marine or Army service troops, but it is probable -that their total losses exceeded those of 3/1. - - [487] Ridge, _Notes_; Smith, _Notes_, 854. - - -_Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded_ - -Casualties estimated as high as 75 per cent were suffered by the three -U. S. Army battalions east of the Reservoir. At 2200 on the night -of 1 December, the first survivors, most of them walking wounded, -reached the Marine lines north of Hagaru with tales of frightful losses -suffered in the five days of continual fighting since the first CCF -attack on the night of 27–28 November. - -Following this action Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commanding the 31st -Infantry, had set up a perimeter near Sinhung-ni with the 3d Battalion -of his regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 57th Field Artillery. -Along the shore farther to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, -USA, held a separate perimeter with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry -(see Map 20).[488] - - [488] The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, - unless otherwise noted, are: Statement of Capt Edward P. - Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, - n. d.; Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,” - in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, _Combat Actions in Korea_, - 63–86; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 33–34. Chinese accounts - of these actions may be found in ATIS _Enemy Documents: - Korean Campaign_, Issue 84, 7–15 and 20–25. LtCol Faith - had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to - MajGen Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d - Airborne Div. - -Both positions were hard hit by the Chinese on the night of 27–28 -November and isolated from each other. During the next 24 hours they -beat off CCF attacks with the support of Marine and FEAF planes, and -Faith fought his way through to a junction with the Sinhung-ni force. - -When the senior officer was killed, Faith took command of all three -battalions. Immobilized by nearly 500 casualties, he remained in the -Sinhung-ni perimeter, where he was supplied by air. On the 29th General -Hodes sent a relief force in company strength from 31st Infantry units -in the area just north of Hagaru. These troops, supported by several -Army tanks, were hurled back by superior CCF numbers with the loss of -two tanks and heavy personnel casualties. - -On 1 December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in his Sinhung-ni -perimeter, Faith attempted to break through to Hagaru. After destroying -the howitzers and all but the most essential equipment, the convoy with -its hundreds of wounded moved out under the constant cover of Marine -close air support, controlled by Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC.[489] - - [489] VMF(N)-542 _SAR_, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Dec 50, - 1–2; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, (hereafter MAG-33 _SAR_), sec - B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in 1stLt - H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan - 51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan - 51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan - 51; and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18 - Feb 51. - -Progress was slow and exhausting, with frequent stops for fire fights. -There were many instances of individual bravery in the face of -adversity, but losses of officers and NCOs gradually deprived the units -of leadership. As an added handicap, a large proportion of the troops -were ROKs who understood no English. - -The task force came near to a breakout. At dusk it was only four and a -half miles from Hagaru when Faith fell mortally wounded and the units -shattered into leaderless groups.[490] Soon the column had ceased to -exist as a military force. A tragic disintegration set in as wounded -and frostbitten men made their way over the ice of the Reservoir in -wretched little bands drawn together by a common misery rather than -discipline. - - [490] The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a - Congressional Medal of Honor. - -By a miracle the first stragglers to reach Hagaru got through the mine -fields and trip flares without harm. Before dawn a total of about 670 -survivors of Task Force Faith had been taken into the warming tents of -Hagaru. - -Lieutenant Colonel Beall, commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport -Battalion, made a personal search in the morning for other survivors. -Finding more than his jeep could carry, he organized a task force of -trucks, jeeps, and sleds. The only CCF opposition to the Marines came -in the form of long-distance sniping which grew so troublesome late in -the afternoon that the truckers set up a machine gun section on the -ice for protection. Far from hindering the escape of the Army wounded, -the Chinese actually assisted in some instances, thus adding to the -difficulty of understanding the Oriental mentality.[491] - - [491] The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force - Faith is based upon: 1stMar Div _SAR_, annex Q (hereafter - DivSurgeon _SAR_), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement - of LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv _POR 197_; Smith, - _Notes_, 902–906; and Smith, _Chronicle_, 98, 100. - -Of the 319 soldiers rescued by Beall on 2 December, nearly all were -wounded or frostbitten. Some were found wandering about in aimless -circles on the ice, in a state of shock. - -A company-size task force of Army troops from Hagaru, supported by -tanks, moved out that day to bring in any organized units of the three -shattered battalions which might have been left behind. Known as Task -Force Anderson after Lieutenant Colonel Berry K. Anderson, senior Army -officer at Hagaru, the column met heavy CCF opposition and was recalled -when it became evident that only stragglers remained.[492] - - [492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G-3 1stMarDiv - tel to S-3 11–12 Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50. - -Beall and his men kept up their rescue work until the last of an -estimated 1050 survivors of the original 2500 troops had been saved. -A Marine reconnaissance patrol counted more than 300 dead in the -abandoned trucks of the Task Force Faith convoy, and there were -apparently hundreds of MIA. The 385 able-bodied soldiers who reached -Hagaru were organized into a provisional battalion and provided with -Marine equipment.[493] - - [493] _Ibid._ Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by - air from Hagaru as casualties run as high as 1500, but - no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover, - would have to include men from the Army units stationed - at Hagaru as well as survivors of the Task Force Faith - disaster. - - -_First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_ - -Casualty evacuation had become such a problem by 1 December that -Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, the Division surgeon, called at -General Smith’s CP that morning. He reported that some 600 casualties -at Hagaru were putting a severe strain on the limited facilities of C -and E Companies of the 1st Medical Battalion. It was further estimated -that 500 casualties would be brought in by the Yudam-ni units and 400 -from the three Army battalions east of the Reservoir.[494] - - [494] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–994, and - _Chronicle_, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R. Hering, “Address Before - U. S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and - “Address Before American Medical Association Convention,” - 14 Jun 51. - -Although both figures were to prove far too low, they seemed alarmingly -high at a time when only the most critical casualties could be -evacuated by helicopter or OY. Flying in extreme cold and landing -at high altitudes where the aircraft has less than normal lift, the -pilots of Major Gottschalk’s VMO-6 saved scores of lives. From 27 -November to 1 December, when the transports took over, 152 casualties -were evacuated by the OYs and helicopters--109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from -Hagaru, and seven from Koto-ri.[495] - - [495] VMO-6 _SAR_, 14–15; Smith, _Notes_, 844. - -Altogether, 220 evacuation flights and 11 rescue missions were -completed during the entire Reservoir campaign by a squadron which on -1 November included 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, eight OY-2 and two -L5G observation planes and nine HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. First -Lieutenant Robert A. Longstaff was killed by enemy small-arms fire near -Toktong Pass while on an evacuation flight, and both Captain Farish and -Lieutenant Englehardt had their helicopters so badly riddled by CCF -bullets that the machines were laid up for repairs.[496] - - [496] _Ibid._ See also Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New - York, 1954), 134–136. - -Two surgical teams from Hungnam had been flown to Hagaru by helicopter, -but the evacuation problem remained so urgent on 1 December that the -command of the 1st Marine Division authorized a trial landing on the -new airstrip. Only 40 per cent completed at this time, the runway was -2900 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 2 per cent grade to the north. - -It was a tense moment, at 1430 that afternoon, when the knots of -parka-clad Marine spectators watched the wheels of the first FEAF -C-47 hit the frozen, snow-covered strip. The big two-motored aircraft -bounced and lurched its way over the rough surface, but the landing -was a success. An even more nerve-racking test ensued half an hour -later when the pilot took off with 24 casualties. It seemed for a -breath-snatching instant that the run wouldn’t be long enough for the -machine to become airborne, but at last the tail lifted and the wings -got enough “bite” to clear the hills to the south. - -Three more planes landed that afternoon, taking off with about 60 more -casualties. The last arrival, heavily loaded with ammunition, collapsed -its landing gear on the bumpy strip and had to be destroyed and -abandoned.[497] - - [497] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–991, and - _Chronicle_, 98–99. - -At the other end of the evacuation chain, clearing stations had been -established by X Corps at Yonpo Airfield to receive and distribute -casualties. A 30-day evacuation policy was maintained, and the -casualties to remain in the area went to the 1st Marine Division -Hospital in Hungnam, the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital in Hamhung, and -the USS _Consolation_ in Hungnam harbor. Casualties requiring more than -30 days of hospitalization were flown from Yonpo to Japan, though a -few critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaru to Japan.[498] - - [498] _Ibid._ - -It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru to fly both supplies -and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on 1 December, the 1st Marine -Division had its first C-119 air drop from Japan. Known as “Baldwins,” -these drops consisted of a prearranged quantity of small arms -ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies, though the -amounts could be modified as desired.[499] - - [499] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. - d. - -Air drops, however, did not have the capability of supplying an RCT in -combat, let alone a division. At this time the Combat Cargo Command, -FEAF, estimated its delivery capabilities at only 70 tons per day; -and even though in practice this total was stepped up to 100, it fell -five short of the requirements of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight -of the Division commander and staff had enabled the Supply Regulating -Detachment to build up a level of six days’ rations and two units of -fire at Hagaru.[500] This backlog, plus such quantities as could be -delivered by Baldwin drops, promised to see the Division through the -emergency. - - [500] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004. - -Infantrymen are seldom given to self-effacement, but at nightfall on 1 -December only an ungrateful gravel-cruncher could have failed to pay a -silent tribute to the other services as well as to the supporting arms -of the Marine Corps. Navy medics, FEAF airmen, Army service units--they -had all helped to make it possible for the Marines to plan a breakout. -Yet it is likely that the 1st Engineer Battalion came first in the -affections of wounded men being loaded in the C-47s for evacuation. - -In just twelve days and nights the engineers of Company D had hacked -this airstrip out of the frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could never -forget the two critical nights of battle when they looked back over -their shoulders from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of the -dozers puffing and huffing under the floodlights. In a pinch Lieutenant -Colonel Partridge’s specialists had doubled as riflemen, too, and -several platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to -the engineers, the Hagaru base was no longer isolated on 1 December. -And though the enemy did not yet realize it, he had lost the initiative -on this eventful Friday. The Marines at Yudam-ni were coming out, and -they were coming out fighting with their casualties and equipment. - - - - -CHAPTER XII - -Breakout From Yudam-ni - -_Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542--March -of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The -Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and -1542--Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter_ - - -The first steps toward regaining the initiative were taken by the -Marine command as early as 29 November. Upon being informed that the -composite battalion had failed to open up the MSR south of Yudam-ni, -General Smith concluded that it was a task for a regiment. At 1545 that -afternoon he issued the following orders to RCTs 5 and 7: - - RCT-5 assume responsibility protection Yudam-ni area adjusting - present dispositions accordingly. RCT-7 conduct operations clear - MSR to Hagaru without delay employing entire regiment.[501] - - [501] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50. - -That same evening the Division CP received X Corps OI 19, providing -that an RCT be redeployed from the Yudam-ni area to Hagaru.[502] No -further directives from Division were necessary to implement this -instruction, since it had been anticipated in General Smith’s orders. - - [502] XCorps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50. - -Upon receipt, the two Yudam-ni regimental commanders began joint -planning for measures to be taken. The unusual command situation at -Yudam-ni, in the absence of the assistant division commander, was -explained by Colonel Litzenberg: - - The 5th and 7th Marines were each acting under separate orders - from the Division. The Division would issue orders to one regiment - with information to the other, so that Division retained the - control; and, of course, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, in - general support of both regiments, was not actually under the - control of either of us. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ... operated - in very close coordination with me, sometimes at his own command - post and sometimes at mine. We called in [Major] McReynolds, - the commander of 4/11, discussed the situation with him, and - thereafter Lieutenant Colonel Murray and I issued orders jointly as - necessary.... This command arrangement functioned very well. There - was never any particular disagreement.[503] - - [503] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj - McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col - Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds - Comments, 15 Aug 56. - -For purposes of planning the supporting fires for the breakout, an -artillery groupment was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Feehan given the -responsibility of coordination. It was further agreed that no air drops -of 155mm ammunition would be requested because of the greater number of -105mm rounds which could be received with fewer difficulties.[504] - - [504] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds - Comments, 15 Aug 56. - -The problems of the two RCTs, commented General Smith, could not be -separated. “The only feasible thing for them to do was pool their -resources.... The assignment of command to the senior regimental -commander was considered but rejected in favor of cooperation.”[505] - - [505] Smith, _Notes_, 918–919. - -At 0600 on the 30th, the two RCTs issued their Joint OpnO 1-50, which -called for the regroupment of the Yudam-ni forces in a new position -south of the village and astride the MSR as a first step toward a -breakout.[506] Thus in effect the two RCTs and supporting troops would -be exchanging an east-and-west perimeter for one pointing from north -to south along the road to Hagaru. Not only was the terrain south of -the village more defensible, but a smaller perimeter would serve the -purpose. - - [506] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, - is derived from: RCT 5 and RCT 7 _Joint OpnO 1-50_, 30 - Nov 50; X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 22–23; - 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 2/5 _SAR_, 20–21; Litzenberg interv, - 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen O. P. Smith Comments, 13 - Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D. - Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56. - -Lieutenant Colonel Winecoff, Assistant G-3 of the Division, flew to -Yudam-ni on the 30th to observe and report on the situation. He was -given a copy of Joint OpnO 1-50 for delivery to General Smith on his -return to Hagaru.[507] - - [507] A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an - evacuation helicopter but it did not reach the Division - CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments. - -That same afternoon, during a conference with General Almond at -Hagaru, the Marine commander received X Corps OpnO 8, directing him -to operate against the enemy in zone, withdrawing elements north and -northwest of Hagaru to that area while securing the Sudong-Hagaru MSR. -And at 1920 that evening, Division issued the following dispatch orders -to RCTs 5 and 7: - - Expedite execution of Joint OpnO 1-50 and combined movement RCT-5 - and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy - any supplies and equipment which must be abandoned during this - withdrawal.[508] - - [508] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1920 30 Nov 50. - See also Smith, _Notes_, 923–924. - -As a prerequisite, a good deal of reorganization had to be effected -at Yudam-ni. In order to provide a force to hold the shoulders of the -high ground through which RCT-7 would advance, it was decided to put -together another composite battalion. - -The new unit consisted of George Company, 3/7, Able Company, 1/5, -and the remnants of Dog and Easy Companies, 2/7, combined into a -provisional company under Captain Robert J. Polson; a section of -81s each from 2/7 and 3/7’s Weapons Companies; and a communications -detachment from 3/7. Major Maurice E. Roach, regimental S-4 placed in -command, realized that such a jury-rigged outfit might be subject to -morale problems. Noting that one of the men had made a neckerchief -out of a torn green parachute, he seized upon the idea as a means -of appealing to unit pride. Soon all the men were sporting green -neckerchiefs, and Roach gave the new unit added distinction by -christening it the Damnation Battalion after adopting “Damnation” as -the code word.[509] - - [509] This account of the organization of the “Damnation” - Battalion is based upon: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, - n. d., 9–10; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; LtCol - M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. “I trust,” commented Gen - Litzenberg dryly, “that the green neckerchiefs were all - made of _torn_ parachutes!” - -Beginning in the early morning hours of the 30th, regroupment was the -chief activity at Yudam-ni. Enemy opposition during the night took the -form of scattered small-arms fire varied with minor probing attacks. -This comparative lull lasted until 0710, when Item Company of 3/5 -beat off an enemy assault on Hill 1282 (North Ridge) with the support -of Marine air strikes and 81mm mortar fire. In the same area George -Company had a brisk fire fight from 1315 to dusk. - -The plan of the regroupment envisioned a gradual withdrawal from the -north and west of Yudam-ni by RCT-5 for the purpose of relieving units -of RCT-7 and enabling them to extend the perimeter southward from the -village (see Map 23). It fell to 2/5 to execute the most difficult -maneuver of the day. Roise’s battalion held a line stretching from Hill -1426 on Southwest Ridge along the high ground to 3/5’s positions on -Hill 1282. After disengaging with the help of Marine air and artillery, -2/5 gave up Hill 1426 and pulled back nearly a mile, relieving elements -of 3/7 on the left. Roise’s new line included Hill 1294 on Southwest -Ridge, overlooking the MSR, and extended northeast to Hill 1282 as -before. Meanwhile 1/5 continued to hold a defensive line from Hill 1240 -eastward to Hill 1167. - -[Illustration: BREAKING OFF ACTION - -30 Nov 50 - - MAP-23 -] - -These movements freed 3/7 to re-deploy to new positions astride the -MSR about 4000 yards south of Yudam-ni. In this same general area, 1/7 -continued to block the valley to the southwest while holding Hill 1276, -of South Ridge, about 2500 yards south of the village. - -“The question of whether we should make these movements during daylight -or at night was a difficult one,” said Colonel Litzenberg. “We finally -decided to make the movements in daylight when we could have advantage -of observation for air cover and artillery. The movement, piecemeal by -battalion, was successfully executed.”[510] - - [510] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55. - -The enemy took surprisingly little advantage of the readjustment. -Movements were completed in an orderly and methodical manner as the -units drew rations and ammunition for the breakout. Preparations were -made for the destruction of all equipment which could not be carried -out, and air drops of ammunition and other supplies were received. - -As a solution for the problem of casualty evacuation, General Smith had -suggested the construction of an OY strip. A start was made at 0900 on -the 30th by the TD-18 dozers of Major McReynolds’ artillery battalion, -but the area came under enemy fire the next day and the nearly -completed strip could be used only twice.[511] - - [511] _Ibid._, McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56. - - -_Joint Planning for Breakout_ - -The plan, as finally agreed upon, called for a combination of the two -solutions. Since it was essential to relieve hard-pressed Fox Company -and secure vital Toktong Pass prior to the arrival of the main column, -one force would advance across country. And since it would have been -physically impossible to carry the wounded over the mountains, the main -body would fight its way along the road to Toktong Pass.[512] - - [512] This section is derived from: RCT-5 and RCT-7 _Joint OpnO - 2-50_, 1 Dec 50; 5thMar _SAR_, 26–27; 3/5 _SAR_, 15; - 7thMar _SAR_, 23; Smith, _Notes_, 923–927; Litzenberg - interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 58–59; Col J. L. Stewart - Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. V. Fridrich interv, 21 Apr - 56; Narrative of LtCol R. G. Davis, 11 Jan 53; Taplett - Comments, 9 Aug 56; Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56; McReynolds - Comments, 15 Aug 56. - -The over-all plan for the Yudam-ni breakout, after being flown to -Hagaru by helicopter for General Smith’s approval, was incorporated -into Joint OpnO 2-50. This directive, later modified by fragmentary -orders, was issued in the morning of 1 December 1950. - -It meant dispensing with the vehicles and heavy equipment of the -cross-country force. Only the barest military necessities could be -taken by men loaded down with ammunition while struggling through -snow-drifts. - -The unit selected for the attempt was the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davis. The plan of maneuver called for -him to strike off across the mountain tops under cover of darkness on -the night of 1 December. As the other units moved out astride the MSR -from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 3/5 was to be the advance guard. - -Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s battalion had the mission of passing -through 3/7 to seize the commanding ground on both sides of the road -and lead the way for the rest of the Yudam-ni troops. Thus the attacks -of 1/7 and 3/5 would converge in the general area of Fox Hill and -Toktong Pass. - -The point of the advance was to be the only Marine tank to reach -Yudam-ni while the MSR was still open. It was left stranded after the -recall of the crew to Hagaru; but Staff Sergeant Russell A. Munsell -and another crewman were flown up from Hagaru by helicopter at Colonel -Litzenberg’s request. They were to man Tank D-23 when it moved out with -the point. Plans also called for a battery of 3/11 to advance near the -head of the column, so that it could go into position near Sinhung-ni -and provide covering fires for the rearguard while other artillery -units displaced. - -The 4th Battalion of the 11th Marines had orders to fire most of its -155mm ammunition before departure. All the men who could be spared from -this unit were formed into nine provisional infantry platoons. Two were -assigned to reinforce the 7th Marines and three to the 5th Marines; -four were retained under Major McReynold’s command to protect the -flanks of the vehicle train. It was further prescribed that the guns of -4/11 were to bring up the rear of the convoy, so that the road would -not be blocked in the event of any of its vehicles becoming immobilized. - -Only drivers and seriously wounded men were permitted to ride the -trucks in the middle of the column along with critical equipment and -supplies. Since all additional space in the vehicles would doubtless be -needed for casualties incurred in the breakout as well as Fox Company -casualties, it was decided not to bring out the dead from Yudam-ni. A -field burial was conducted by chaplains for 85 officers and men.[513] - - [513] After the cease-fire of July 1953, the remains were - returned to the United States, in accordance with the - terms of the Korean Armistice. - -All available Marine aircraft were to be on station. Moreover, carrier -planes of TF 77 had been released from other missions by the Fifth -AF to reinforce the aircraft of the 1st MAW in direct support of the -Yudam-ni troops. - - -_The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542_ - -The transition from planning to execution began on the morning of 1 -December. Only the 1st and 3d Battalions of RCT-5 were left to the -north of Yudam-ni, and pulling them out was to prove equivalent to -letting loose of the tiger’s tail. - -The 3d Battalion began its withdrawal at 0800, followed 90 minutes -later by the 1st. The initial phases of the maneuver were carried out -without great difficulty. The first major problem came when 3/5’s last -unit, George Company, pulled down from Hill 1282 (see Map 24). There -the Marines had been in such close contact with the enemy that grenades -were the main weapon of both sides. The problem of preventing the -Chinese from swarming over the top of the ridge at the critical moment -and pursuing the Marines down the slope was solved by First Lieutenant -Daniel Greene, the FAC, with a dummy run by close supporting aircraft. -While the first pass of the Corsairs kept the Communists down, Captain -Chester R. Hermanson commenced his withdrawal. As soon as his men -moved out at a safe distance he signalled to the FAC, who called for -live runs of Marine air in coordination with the fires directed by the -artillery liaison officer, First Lieutenant Henry G. Ammer. First -Lieutenant Arthur E. House’s 81mm mortar platoon also rendered skillful -support during the withdrawal.[514] - - [514] The description of the withdrawal of 1/5 and 3/5 is based - on: 5thMar _SAR_, 26; 1/5 _SAR_, 15–16; 3/5 _SAR_, 15; - LtCol R. D. Taplett and Maj R. E. Whipple, “Darkhorse - Sets the Pace,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. - 6 (Jun 53), 22–23; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55; Taplett - Comments, 9 Aug 56; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 25 - Jul 56. - -[Illustration: BREAKOUT FROM YUDAM-NI - -1500 to 2400 1 Dec 1950 - - MAP-24 -] - -The ancient ruse was so successful that George Company disengaged -without a single casualty. Ammunition left behind by the rifle platoons -was detonated just as the rockets, bombs, and napalm of the Corsairs -hit the Chinese, followed by artillery and mortar shells. Hill 1282 -seemed to erupt in one tremendous explosion. While Captain Hermanson’s -men crossed the bridge south of the burning town, an engineer -demolitions crew waited to destroy the span. - -The rear guard unit for the withdrawal of the two battalions was First -Lieutenant John R. Hancock’s Baker Company of 1/5. He felt that his -best chance would be to “sneak off” Hill 1240. Accordingly he requested -that no supporting fires be furnished Baker Company, except at his -request. Making very effective use of his light machine guns to cover -his withdrawal with a spray of fire, Hancock disengaged without a -casualty. - -The next stage of the regroupment was carried out in preparation for -the attacks of 3/5 and 1/7. In order to clear the way on both sides of -the MSR, 3/7 (minus How Company) moved out at 0900 on 1 December to -attack Hill 1542 while How Company went up against Hill 1419. - -Joint OpnO 1-50 was modified meanwhile by verbal instructions directing -2/5, instead of 3/5, to relieve 1/7 on Hill 1276, thus freeing Colonel -Davis’ battalion for its assigned mission. The 1st Battalion of RCT-5 -took positions stretching from Hill 1100 on the west side of the MSR -to the low ground southeast of the arm of the Reservoir. This meant -that after 3/7 (-) seized Hill 1542, three Marine infantry battalions -would occupy a defensive line about three and a half miles in length, -stretching diagonally northeast from that position to the arm of the -Reservoir, with Hill 1276 as its central bastion.[515] - - [515] 5thMar _SAR_, 26–27; 7thMar _SAR_, 23; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; - 1/5 _SAR_, 15–16; 2/5 _SAR_, 21–22; 3/5 _SAR_, 15. CO - 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50. - -Shortly before dusk Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 arrived in -position to pass through Lieutenant Colonel Harris’ 3/7. The two -battalion commanders agreed that 3/5 would execute the movement even -though 3/7 had not yet secured its objectives, and 3/5 attacked -astride the MSR at 1500.[516] - - [516] Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56. - -Harris’ battalion had been having it hot and heavy all day on Hills -1419 and 1542 after jumping off at 0900. These objectives were too far -apart for a mutually supported attack and the Chinese defended the -difficult terrain with tenacity. - -Item Company, reinforced by artillerymen and headquarters troops, made -slow progress west of the road against the Chinese dug in on Hill 1542. -At 1700 George Company moved into position on the left. Both companies -attempted an assault but the 3/7 report states, “Each attack by ‘I’ -Co and ‘G’ Co never reached full momentum before it was broken up.” -One platoon of Item Company reached the military crest before being -repulsed. When night fell, the Marines were still on the eastern slopes -of 1542.[517] - - [517] 3/7 _SAR_, n. p. - -On Hill 1419, about 1000 yards east of the road, How Company of 3/7 met -stiff opposition from Chinese dug in along four finger ridges as well -as the main spur leading to the topographical crest. It became evident -that How Company alone could not seize the hill and about noon Able -Company of Davis’ battalion joined the attack, on How’s left. - -The heavy undergrowth gave concealment to the enemy, though it also -offered footholds to the Marines scrambling up the steep and icy -slopes. Air strikes were laid down just ahead of them, blasting the -Chinese with bombs, rockets, and 20mm fire. Artillery support, however, -was limited by the relative blindness of the forward observer in the -brush, but mortars succeeded in knocking out several enemy positions. -How Company’s attack had come to a standstill because of casualties -which included Lieutenant Harris. First Lieutenant Eugenous M. -Hovatter’s Able Company regained the momentum, thanks to the efforts of -First Lieutenant Leslie C. Williams’ 1st Platoon. Aided by How and by -Baker, which was committed late in the afternoon, Able Company secured -Hill 1419 about 1930. Thus the jump-off point for the 1/7 advance -across the mountain tops had been seized. - -After setting up hasty defenses, Davis directed that all dead and -wounded be evacuated to 3/5’s aid station on the road. How Company -was attached to his battalion by order of Colonel Litzenberg, since -all units had been thinned by casualties. Then the battalion tail was -pulled up the mountain and the last physical tie broken with other -Marine units in the Yudam-ni area.[518] - - [518] 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; - Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; CO 7thMar msg to CG - 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50; LtCol R. G. Davis interv by - Capts K. W. Shutts and A. Z. Freeman, 6 Apr 51; Maj E. M. - Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 56. - -The Marines had seized the initiative, never again to relinquish it -during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. - - -_March of 1/7 Over the Mountains_ - -Planning at the battalion level was done by Davis, his executive -officer, Major Raymond V. Fridrich, and his S-3, Major Thomas B. Tighe. -It was decided to take only two of the 81mm mortars and six heavy -machine guns. They were to be manned with double crews, so that enough -ammunition could be carried to keep them in action. - -Pack-set radios (AN/GRC-9) were to provide positive communications -in case the portable sets (SCR-300) would not reach to the Yudam-ni -perimeter. The artillery liaison officer was to carry a pack set -(SCR-610) to insure artillery communication.[519] - - [519] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based on - Davis narrative; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul - 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr - 51; and Capt W. J. Davis interv, 4 Jun 56. - -All personnel not sick or wounded were to participate, leaving behind -enough walking wounded or frostbite cases to drive the vehicles and -move the gear left behind with the regimental train. Extra litters were -to be taken, each serving initially to carry additional mortar and -machine gun ammunition; and all men were to carry sleeping bags not -only for the protection of the wounded but also to save their own lives -if the column should be cut off in the mountains for several days. -Every man was to start the march with an extra bandolier of small arms -ammunition, and personnel of the reserve company and headquarters group -were to carry an extra round of 81mm mortar ammunition up the first -mountain for replenishment of supplies depleted at that point. - -After driving the enemy from the topographical crest of Hill 1419, the -four companies were not permitted a breathing spell. Davis feared the -effects of the extreme (16 degrees below zero) cold on troops drenched -with sweat from clawing their way up the mountain. He pressed the -reorganization with all possible speed, therefore, after no enemy -contacts were reported by patrols ranging to the southeast. And at 2100 -on the night of 1 December the column set out in this order: - - Baker Company First Lieutenant Kurcaba - 1/7 Command Group Lieutenant Colonel Davis - Able Company First Lieutenant Hovatter - Charlie Company Captain Morris - Headquarters Group Major Fridrich - How Company Second Lieutenant Newton - -The night was dark but a few stars showed over the horizon in the -general direction to be taken. They served as a guide, with a prominent -rock mass being designated the first objective. - -The snow-covered peaks all looked alike in the darkness, and the guide -stars were lost to sight when the column descended into valleys. -Repeated compass orientations of the map examined by flashlight under a -poncho never checked out. The artillery was called upon to place white -phosphorus on designated hills, but the splash of these rounds could -seldom be located. - -The point was slowed by the necessity of breaking trail in snow that -had drifted knee-deep in places. After a path had been beaten, the -icy footing became treacherous for the heavily burdened Marines. Some -painful falls were taken on the downhill slopes by men who had to climb -the finger ridges on hands and knees. - -Apparently the enemy had been caught by complete surprise, for the -Marines had the desolate area to themselves. A more immediate danger -was loss of direction, and the head of the column veered off to the -southwest while crossing the second valley. A drift in this direction -would eventually take the battalion toward the enemy-held road to -Hagaru (see Map 25), which had been scheduled by the Marine artillery -for harassing and interdiction fires. - -Radio failures kept Kurcaba, at the point, from receiving messages -sent in warning. An attempt was made to communicate by word of mouth, -but the shouts from behind often did not penetrate to ears protected -from the cold by parka hoods. At last the loss of direction became so -alarming that Davis himself hurried forward with his radio operator -and runner. In the darkness he lost touch with them and floundered on -alone, panting and stumbling. - -It took such effort to overtake the point that he did not make it until -the men were scrambling up the next steep ridge. There the westward -drift was corrected just in time, for the battalion was running into -its first CCF opposition. - -The column had been heading up Hill 1520, the eastern and western -slopes of which were held by the enemy. An increasing volume of -small-arms fire was received as Davis gave his company commanders -orders to reorganize units in preparation for attack. Exhausted though -the men were, they summoned a burst of energy and advanced in two -assault columns supported by 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns. Now -the exertion of carrying extra ammunition paid dividends as Baker and -Charlie Companies closed in on a CCF position held in estimated platoon -strength. Some of the Chinese were surprised while asleep or numbed -with the cold, and the Marines destroyed the enemy force at a cost of -only a few men wounded. - -The attack cleared the enemy from the eastern slope of Hill 1520, but -distant small-arms fire was received from ridges across the valley to -the east. Davis called a halt for reorganization, since the troops -had obviously reached the limit of their endurance. Suddenly they -began collapsing in the snow--“like dominoes,” as the commanding -officer later described the alarming spectacle. And there the men lay, -oblivious to the cold, heedless of the Chinese bullets ricocheting off -the rocks. - -A strange scene ensued in the dim starlight as company officers and -NCOs shook and cuffed the prostrate Marines into wakefulness. The -officers could sympathize even while demanding renewed efforts, for the -sub-zero cold seemed to numb the mind as well as body. - -Davis had even requested his company commanders to check every order -he gave, just to make sure his own weary brain was functioning -accurately. At 0300 he decided to allow the men a rest--the first in -20 hours of continuous fighting or marching under a double burden. As -a preliminary, the battalion commander insisted that the perimeter be -buttoned up and small patrols organized within companies to insure a -25 per cent alert. Then the pack radio was set up to establish the -night’s first contact with the regimental CP, and the men took turns at -sleeping as an eerie silence fell over the wasteland of ice and stone. - - -_Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December_ - -Returning to the Yudam-ni area, it may be recalled that Lieutenant -Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 had passed through 3/7 at 1500 on 1 December -with a mission of attacking astride the MSR to lead the way for the -main column. Tank D-23, a How Company platoon and a platoon of Able -Company engineers set the pace, followed by the rest of How Company -and the other two rifle companies. After an advance of 1400 yards the -battalion column was stopped by heavy CCF fire from both sides. How and -Item Companies fanned out west and east of the road and a longdrawn -firefight ensued before the Marines cleared the enemy from their flanks -at 1930.[520] - - [520] Descriptions of 3/5 operations in this section are based - on the 3/5 _SAR_, 15; Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse - Sets the Pace,” II, 46-50; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56. - -Artillery support for the breakout was provided by 1/11 and 3/11 (minus -Battery H). The plan called for 1/11 to take the main responsibility -for furnishing supporting fires at the outset while 3/11 displaced as -soon as possible to the vicinity of Sinhung-ni, whence the last lap of -the march to Hagaru could be effectively covered. The 1st Battalion -would then join the vehicle column and move with it to Hagaru.[521] - - [521] 11thMar _SAR_, 7; _MCB Study_, II-C-72. - -Taplett gave 3/5 a brief rest after securing his first objectives--the -high ground on both sides of the road just opposite the northern spurs -of Hill 1520. Then he ordered a renewal of the attack shortly before -midnight. How Company on the right met only moderate opposition, but -was held up by the inability of Item Company to make headway against -Chinese dug in along the western slope of Hill 1520. Neither 1/7 nor -3/5 had any idea at the moment that they were simultaneously engaged on -opposite sides of the same great land mass, though separated by enemy -groups as well as terrain of fantastic difficulties. So rugged was this -mile-high mountain that the two Marine outfits might as well have been -in different worlds as far as mutual support was concerned. - -Item Company stirred up such a hornet’s nest on the western slope that -Captain Harold O. Schrier was granted permission by the battalion -commander to return to his jump-off position, so that he could better -defend the MSR. There he was attacked by Chinese who alternated -infantry attacks with mortar bombardments. Radio communication failed -and runners sent from the battalion CP to Item Company lost their way. -Thus the company was isolated during an all-night defensive fight. -Second Lieutenant Willard S. Peterson took over the command after -Schrier received a second wound. - -Taplett had ordered his reserve company, George, and his attached -engineers into defensive positions to the rear of Item Company. The -engineers on the right flank were also hit by the Chinese and had -several wounded, including the platoon commander, First Lieutenant -Wayne E. Richards, before repulsing the attack. - -Counted CCF dead in the Item Company area totaled 342 at daybreak on -the 2d, but the Marines had paid a heavy price in casualties. Less -than 20 able-bodied men were left when George Company passed through -to renew the attack on Hill 1520. For that matter, both George and -How Companies were reduced to two-platoon strength. Taplett requested -reinforcement by an additional company, and was assigned the so-called -Dog-Easy composite company made up of the remnants of 2/7. This outfit -moved directly down the road between George and How Companies.[522] - - [522] “Item Company upon relief was temporarily non-effective. - In fact it ceased to exist except on paper. Some of the - survivors were assigned to G/5 and the wounded who were - able to walk were assigned to a provisional rifle unit - organized from H&S Co and under the command of Lt George - Bowman.” Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56. - -It took George Company until 1200 to secure the western slope of Hill -1520. The composite company ran into difficulties meanwhile at a point -on the MSR where the Chinese had blown a bridge over a deep stream bed -and set up a roadblock defended by machine guns. While George Company -attacked down a long spur above the enemy, Dog-Easy Company maneuvered -in defilade to outflank him. Lieutenant Greene, the FAC, directed -the F4Us on target and the ground forces were treated to a daring -exhibition of close support by Corsairs which barely cleared the ridge -after pulling out of their runs. The roadblock was speedily wiped out, -but the vehicle column had to wait until the engineers could construct -a bypass. Then the advance of 3/5 was resumed, with George and How -Companies attacking on opposite sides of the MSR, and the composite -company astride the road, following the tank and engineer platoons. - - -_The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass_ - -All the rest of their lives the survivors of the two spearhead Marine -battalions would take pride in nicknames earned during the breakout -from Yudam-ni. For Taplett’s outfit it was “Darkhorse,” after the radio -call sign of the battalion, while Davis’ men felt that they had a right -to be known as the “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass.” - -At daybreak on 2 December, 1/7 corrected its westward drift of the -previous night and attacked toward Hill 1653, a mountain only about a -mile and a half north of Fox Hill. Davis’ men got the better of several -firefights at long range with CF groups on ridges to the east, but the -terrain gave them more effective opposition than the enemy.[523] - - [523] This section is based on R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan - 53; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich - interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and W. - G. Davis interv, 4 June 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 20 - Aug 56; Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 5. - -The radios of 1/7 could not contact Marine planes when they came on -station, and relays through tactical channels proved ineffective. -Moreover, all efforts to reach Fox Company by radio had failed. This -situation worried the battalion commander, who realized that he was -approaching within range of friendly 81mm mortar fire from Fox Hill. - -The ancient moral weapon of surprise stood Davis and his men in good -stead, however, as the column encountered little opposition on the -western slope of Hill 1653. How Company, bringing up the rear with the -wounded men, came under an attack which threatened for a moment to -endanger the casualties. But after the litters were carried forward, -Newton managed to keep the Chinese at a respectful distance without aid -from the other companies. - -Charlie Company was given the mission of seizing a spur covering the -advance of Able and Baker companies east from Hill 1520 to Hill 1653. -The command group had just passed Morris on this position when the -radio operator shouted to Davis: - -“Fox Six on the radio, sir.” - -Captain Barber’s offer to send out a patrol to guide 1/7 to his -position was declined, but Fox Company did control the strike by planes -of VMF-312 which covered the attack of Kurcaba’s company on the final -objective--a ridge about 400 yards north of Fox Hill. Aided by the -air attack and supporting 81mm mortar fires, Baker Company seized the -position and Able Company the northern portion of Hill 1653. It was -1125 on the morning of 2 December 1950 when the first men of Baker -Company reached Fox Company’s lines. - -Able Company held its position on Hill 1653 until the rest of the -battalion was on Fox Hill. After grounding their packs, men from the -forward companies went back to help carry the 22 wounded men into -the perimeter. While supervising this task, the regimental surgeon, -Lieutenant Peter A. Arioli, (MC) USN, was instantly killed by a Chinese -sniper’s bullet. There were no other death casualties, though two men -had to be placed in improvised strait jackets after cracking mentally -and physically under the strain. Both died before evacuation was -possible. - -The first objective had been reached, but there was to be no rest until -Toktong Pass was secured. Baker Company paused on Fox Hill only long -enough for Kurcaba’s men to eat a hasty meal of air-dropped rations. -Then they moved out to seize the high ground commanding the vital -terrain feature at a point where the road describes a loop from north -to south. Able Company followed shortly afterwards and the two outfits -set up a single perimeter for the night while the rest of the battalion -manned perimeters on the high ground east of Fox Hill. Barber’s men -remained in their positions. - -Five days and nights of battle had left Fox Company with 118 -casualties--26 KIA, 3 MIA, and 89 WIA. Six of the seven officers were -wounded, and practically all the unwounded men suffered from frostbite -and digestive ills. - - -_CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542_ - -While the two spearhead battalions advanced, the Marine elements in -the rear could not complain of being neglected by the enemy. All three -infantry battalions were kept busy with CCF attacks which persisted -from midnight until long after daybreak (see Map 24). - -Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2/5, which had been designated as rearguard, -was hit on Hill 1276 in the early morning hours of 2 December. Under -cover of rifle and machine-gun fire, the Chinese advanced on the Fox -Company positions with their “inverted wedge” assault formation. -Testimony as to its effectiveness is found in the 2/5 report: - - The [Chinese] ... used fire and movement to excellent advantage. - They would direct a frontal attack against our positions while - other elements of their attacking force moved in closer to “F” - Company flanks in an attempt at a double envelopment. Then in turn - the forces on both flanks would attack while the forces directly to - our front would move closer to our position. In this, the enemy, by - diverting our attention in the above manner, were able to maneuver - their forces to within hand grenade range of our positions. - -One Fox platoon, assailed from three sides, was forced to withdraw -at 0110 and consolidate with the rest of the company. At 0200 the -FAC requested an air strike from two night fighters on station. The -aircraft were directed on the target by 60mm mortar white phosphorus -bursts and conducted effective strafing and rocket runs within 200 -yards of the Marine front line. In all, five aircraft of VMF(N)-542 -were employed with excellent results during the night. - -At 0230 Roise directed Fox Company to retake the left-flank hill from -which the platoon had been driven. Two attempts were made before -daybreak with the support of 4.2-inch mortar fire, but enemy machine -guns stopped the assault. At 0730 an air strike was requested. After -strafing and rocket runs, Fox Company fought its way to the crest, only -to find the position untenable because of machine-gun fire from the -reverse slope. At 1000 the Corsairs blasted the enemy for 25 minutes -with napalm and 500-pound bombs, and CCF troops were observed vacating -the objective area. It was nearly time for the battalion to displace -as the rearguard, however, and the enemy was left in possession of a -scarred and scorched piece of real estate. - -Both Dog and Easy Companies received probing attacks which the Chinese -did not attempt to push home. At daybreak some of them broke and ran -along the Dog Company front, throwing away their weapons as they -scattered in disorder. Marine fire pursued the retreating Communists -and cut down many of them. Captain Arthur D. Challacombe’s provisional -company of artillerymen on Dog Company’s right counted over 50 dead in -front of its positions.[524] - - [524] 2/5 _SAR_, 22; Stewart Comments; McReynolds Comments, 15 - Aug 56. - -On the eastern flank 1/5 came under attack about 2100 by 75–100 Chinese -who crossed the arm of the reservoir on ice. Mortar and artillery fire -drove them back at 0100 with heavy losses, but attempts at infiltration -continued throughout the night. In the morning 51 CCF dead were counted -in front of one Charlie Company machine gun, and total enemy KIA were -estimated at 200.[525] - - [525] 1/5 _SAR_, 16; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. - -At the other end of the Marine line, a CCF attack hit 3/7 (-) on Hill -1542. The assault force, according to the enemy report, consisted of -Sung-Wei-shan’s 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 235th Regiment, the 5th -Company of 2/235, and apparently two other companies of 3/235. All were -units of the 79th CCF Division, and their mission was “to annihilate -the defending enemy before daylight.”[526] - - [526] The description of the fight on Hill 1542 is derived - from: ATIS _Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign_, Issue 66, - 88–93; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; Maj W. - R. Earney ltr to Gen Litzenberg, 16 Jul 56. - -George and Item Companies of 3/7, following their repulse from the -upper reaches of Hill 1542, had formed a defensive perimeter on the -eastern slope. As reinforcements the depleted units were assigned a -composite outfit known as Jig Company and consisting of about 100 -cannoneers, headquarters troops, and any other elements which could -be hastily put together. First Lieutenant Alfred I. Thomas, of Item -Company, was placed in command of men who were for the most part -strangers to him as well as to one another. - -Sung led the 9th Company’s attacking column. Although the Chinese -account states that his men were advancing from the northwest toward -the topographical crest of Hill 1542, they actually held the summit. -Their attack was downhill, though some climbing of spurs and finger -ridges may have been necessary. After reconnoitering to a point -within 25 yards of the Marines, the Chinese jumped off at 0430 with -the support of fires from battalion weapons. Relying on the “inverted -wedge,” the attackers bored in alternately right and left while seeking -an opportunity for a knockout blow. The 2d Platoon on the Chinese -left took a severe mauling, losing its commander and almost half of -its men. The other two platoons had heavy casualties but succeeded in -routing the jury-rigged Jig Company. Since it was a composite outfit -not yet 24 hours old, there is no record of either its operations or -losses. Apparently, however, a majority of the men straggled back to -their original units. Lieutenant Thomas, who had commanded ably under -difficult circumstances, rejoined First Lieutenant William E. Johnson’s -Item Company with such men as he had left. The Marines gave ground -slowly under Chinese pressure until daybreak, when they held positions -abreast of George Company, which had not been heavily engaged. - -The two companies were reduced to a total of fewer than 200 men. After -being reinforced by H&S Company personnel, they formed a defensive line -in an arc stretching from the MSR about 1100 yards and taking in the -eastern slopes of Hill 1542.[527] - - [527] General Litzenberg points out that “it was necessary for - 3/7 to maintain protection for the main column until it - passed by Hill 1542. They [3/7] held high enough to keep - Chinese small arms fire at a sufficient distance from the - Road.” Litzenberg Comments, 7 Aug 56. - -Apparently the Communists, like military forces everywhere, did not -err on the light side when estimating the casualties of opponents. The -Marine losses for the night were listed in the CCF report as “killed, -altogether 100 enemy troops.” This figure, indicating total casualties -of several hundred, is manifestly too high. Owing to the loss of 7th -Marines records, the statistics for Item Company are not available, but -it does not appear that more than 30 to 40 men were killed or wounded. - - -_Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December_ - -Several CCF daylight attacks in platoon strength were received between -Hills 1542 and 1276 during the morning hours of 2 December. All Marine -units in this area were in process of disengaging, so that the emphasis -was placed on breaking off action rather than attempting to defend -ground soon to be evacuated. - -The vehicle train in the rear made slow progress during the afternoon -of 2 December. Infantry strength was not sufficient to occupy all -the commanding terrain during the passage of the motor column, and -CCF groups infiltrated back into areas vacated by Marine riflemen. -Effective air support reduced most of these efforts to harassing -attacks, but Marine vehicle drivers were singled out for special -attention, making it necessary to find replacements among near-by -troops. - -To 1/5 fell the mission of furnishing close-in flank protection on the -left. Marine air and artillery supported infantry attacks clearing -the flanks and the column jolted on with frequent halts. The night -passed without incident except for a CCF attack on 3/11. George Battery -gunners had to employ direct fire to repulse the Communists, and a -105mm howitzer was lost as well as several vehicles. - -Darkhorse, leading the way, was meanwhile fighting for nearly every -foot of the road during the advance of 2 December. George Company -on the left went up against Hill 1520 while Dog-Easy moved astride -the MSR. By noon George had secured its objective. Dog-Easy advanced -against moderate resistance to a point about 300 yards beyond Hill -1520 where a demolished bridge had spanned a rock ravine as the road -turns from south to east. Here Chinese automatic weapons fire halted -the column until a strike by 12 Corsairs cleared the enemy from the -ravine. On the right Captain Harold B. Williamson’s How Company was to -have joined in the attack, moving through the high ground south of the -bend in the road. A Chinese strongpoint delayed its advance and How was -pinned down by heavy enemy fire while attempting to cross a stream bed -halfway to its objective. The last air strike of the day freed Captain -Williamson’s unit, which secured its objective after dark. During -the last minutes of daylight, the engineer platoon, now commanded by -Technical Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, constructed a bypass around the -blasted bridge. About 1900 the first vehicles followed the tank across. - -[Illustration: BREAKOUT FROM YUDAM-NI - -2–4 Dec 50 - - MAP-25 -] - -Taplett’s battalion continued its slow progress with George and How -Companies clearing the high ground on opposite sides of the road while -Dog-Easy moved astride the MSR. At about 0200 on the 3d the advance -came to a halt 1000 yards short of Fox Hill. Dog-Easy, which had -suffered heavy casualties, particularly among its key NCOs, had reached -the limit of exhaustion, and 3/5 secured for the rest of the night. Not -until daylight did How Company discover that it had halted 300 yards -short of its final objective, the hill mass southwest of Fox Hill. - -At dawn on 3 December the ground was covered with six inches of new -snow, hiding the scars of war and giving a deceptively peaceful -appearance to the Korean hills as the Marine column got under way again -with Sergeant Knox’s engineers at the point, just behind Sergeant -Munsell’s lone tank. Alternately serving as engineers and riflemen, -this platoon came through with 17 able-bodied men left out of the 48 -who started. - -Dog-Easy Company having been rendered ineffective by its casualties, -Taplett moved George Company down from the left flank to advance -astride the road. First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize took over the -reorganized outfit, assisted by Second Lieutenant August L. Camaratta. -The two riddled Dog-Easy platoons were combined with George Company -under the command of Second Lieutenant John J. Cahill and Technical -Sergeant Don Faber. - -Cahill had the distinction of leading the platoon which fought the -first action of Marine ground forces in the Korean conflict. But it -hardly seemed possible on this sub-zero December morning that the -encounter had taken place barely four months before, or that the -temperature that August day had been 102° in the non-existent shade. -Korea was a land of extremes. - -Darkhorse was not far from a junction with the Ridgerunners. The -night of 2–3 December had passed quietly in Toktong Pass, where the -five companies occupied separate perimeters. The Marines on Fox Hill -lighted warming fires in the hope of tempting the enemy to reveal his -positions. The Chinese obliged by firing from two near-by ridges. One -CCF group was dug in along a southern spur of the hill held by Able -and Baker Companies, and the other occupied a ridge extending eastward -beyond Toktong Pass in the direction of Hagaru. - -Simultaneous attacks in opposite directions were launched by 1/7. Davis -led Morris’ and Newton’s companies against the CCF force barring the -way to Hagaru. Tighe moved out with Kurcaba’s and Hovatter’s companies -meanwhile against a larger CCF force on high ground south of the big -bend in the road. This stroke took the Chinese by surprise. As they -fell back in disorder, the Communists did not realize that they were -blundering into the path of the oncoming Marines of Williamson’s How/5, -attacking south of the MSR. Colonel Litzenberg, who had been informed -by radio, turned to Lieutenant Colonel Murray and said, “Ray, notify -your Third Battalion commander that the Chinese are running southwest -into his arms!”[528] - - [528] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 61. Other - sources for this section are as follows: LtCol Taplett - interv, 8 Jun 56 and Comments, 9 and 14 Aug 56; TSgt - E. L. Knox interv, 30 May 56; _MCB Study_, II-C-78–80; - Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse Leads the Way,” II, - 49-50; Smith, _Notes_, 932–946; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 - Jan 53; 5thMar _SAR_, 29; Geer, _The New Breed_, 338–341. - -Taplett was unaware that Tighe’s attack was forcing about a battalion -of Chinese into his lap. He had spotted the Chinese in strength on the -high ground south of the road when day broke. Attempts to lay artillery -on the Chinese having failed because of the range from Hagaru, the 3/5 -commander called for an air strike. The overcast lifted just as the -Corsairs came on station. They hit the demoralized Communists with -napalm and rockets while the 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns of -the two converging Marine forces opened up with everything they had. -Probably the greatest slaughter of the Yudam-ni breakout ended at 1030 -with the CCF battalion “completely eliminated,” as the 3/5 report -phrased it, and How Company in possession of the CCF positions. - -At 1300 on 3 December, after Davis had cleared the enemy from the ridge -northeast of Toktong Pass, the basic maneuver of the breakout was -completed by the junction of 3/5 and 1/7. Several more fights awaited -Taplett’s men on the way to Hagaru, but at Toktong Pass they had -fulfilled their mission. That the victory had not been gained without -paying a price in casualties is indicated by the following daily -returns of effective strength in the three rifle companies: - - ---------------+--------+--------+--------+-------- - Unit | 1 Dec. | 2 Dec. | 3 Dec. | 4 Dec. - ---------------+--------+--------+--------+-------- - George Company | 114 | 96 | 84 | 80 - How Company | 180 | 167 | 131 | 73 - Item Company | 143 | 41 | 41 | 41 - ---------------+--------+--------+--------+-------- - Total | 437 | 304 | 256 | 194 - ---------------+--------+--------+--------+-------- - -This is a total of 243 battle and non-battle casualties as compared to -the 144 suffered by the same units during the CCF attacks of 27 to 30 -November. - - -_Entry into Hagaru Perimeter_ - -When the truck column with its wounded men reached Toktong Pass, it -halted to receive the casualties of 1/7, 3/5, and Fox Company of 2/7. -Lieutenant Commander John H. Craven, chaplain of the 7th Marines, -helped to assist the litter cases into vehicles. Since there was not -room for all, the walking wounded had to make room for helpless men. -They complied with a courage which will never be forgotten by those -who saw them struggling painfully toward Hagaru alongside the truck -column.[529] - - [529] Stewart Comments. - -When the tank leading the 3/5 column reached Toktong Pass it halted -only long enough for Colonels Taplett and Davis to confer. D-23 then -moved out and the four companies of 1/7 came down from their hillside -positions and fell in behind. - -Stevens’ 1/5, having leap-frogged 3/5, followed next on the way to -blocking positions farther east on the MSR. Taplett remained in Toktong -Pass until after midnight, acting as radio relay between Colonels -Litzenberg and Murray, by now in Hagaru, and 2/5 in the rear. At about -midnight the 3/5 commander sent G and H Companies into the vehicle -column to furnish security for the artillery, and an hour later the -remainder of the battalion joined the column. Roise’s 2/5, which had -passed through 3/7 came next, followed by Harris’ rear guard. - -Interspersed among the infantry were elements of artillery and service -troops with their vehicles, and the column became more scrambled after -each halt.[530] Two observation planes of VMO-6 circled overhead to -give warning of enemy concentrations. Marine planes were on station -continuously during daylight hours, strafing and rocketing to the front -and along both flanks. A total of 145 sorties, most of them in close -air support of troops advancing along the Hagaru-Yudam-ni MSR, were -flown on 3 December by the following units:[531] - - [530] Sources for this section, unless otherwise noted, are - the same as those for the last and: 3/1 tels to G-3 - 1stMarDiv, 0430 and 1715 4 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to - 11thMar, 0730 4 Dec 50; 7thMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, - 0830 and 0925 4 Dec 50: G-3 1stMarDiv tels to 3/1, 0950 - and 1330 4 Dec 50; Stevens Comments, 25 Jul 56. - - [531] MAG-33 _SAR_ sec B 6–7; VMF-214 _SAR_, 5; 1stMAW _HD_, - Dec 50. - - Squadron Sorties - VMF-214 36 - VMF-323 28 - VMF-212 27 - VMF-312 34 - VMF(N)-513 7 - VMF(N)-542 13 - ---- - 145 - -At the other end of the route the Royal Marine Commandos, reinforced by -a platoon of tanks, were sent out from Hagaru at 1630 on 3 December, to -drive the Chinese from the road leading into that perimeter. - -Thanks to excellent air support, 1/7 met no opposition save harassing -attacks. One of Davis’s flanking patrols reported the flushing out of a -few Chinese so exhausted by cold and hardships that they had abandoned -their weapons and holed up together for warmth. If these Marines had -been in a mood for such reflections, they might have recalled that -the American press of late had been bemoaning the supposed decline of -the nation’s young manhood. UN reverses in the summer of 1950 had led -editorial writers to conclude that our troops had neither the legs -for long marches nor the backs for the bearing of military burdens. -Mechanization had gone so far, they lamented, that we had become -the servants rather than the masters of our own wheeled and tracked -vehicles. - -The Marines of Davis’ battalion might have taken a grim satisfaction, -therefore, in encountering Chinese peasants, inured all their lives to -privations, whose will to fight had been broken by the hardships of -the past week. These Marines had not known a full night’s sleep during -that week. They had subsisted on a diet of crackers varied with canned -rations thawed by body heat. They had been under continuous nervous -pressure as well as physical strain, and yet they were able to summon -one last burst of pride when the point neared the Hagaru perimeter at -1900 on 3 December 1950. Several hundred yards from the entrance a halt -was called while the men closed up into a compact column.[532] Then -they came in marching, their shoulders thrown back and their shoepacs -beating a firm tread on the frozen road. - - [532] Since the four rifle companies had been left on key - points, controlling the last two and a half miles into - Hagaru, the column consisted mostly of H&S and Weapons - Company personnel. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56. - -The Marines at the head of the column were followed by the walking -wounded and the vehicles loaded with more serious cases, some of whom -had been strapped to the hoods. All casualties were given medical care -and the remaining troops taken into warming tents for hot coffee. Many -of them appeared dazed and uncomprehending at first. Others wandered -about aimlessly with blank faces. But there were few who had suffered -any psychological disturbances that could not be cleared up with a good -night’s sleep and some hot food. - -Troops of 4/11 and 3/5 were due to arrive next at Hagaru while 1/5 -and 2/5 echeloned companies forward along the MSR to provide flank -protection. Not all the Chinese had lost aggressiveness, but the -column had little difficulty until 0200 on 4 December. Then it came to -an abrupt halt when prime movers of eight 155mm howitzers ran out of -diesel fuel. As far back as Sinhung-ni 150 gallons had been requested -but none had been delivered.[533] While the troops ahead, including G -and H of 3/5, continued on towards Hagaru, unaware of the break, a bad -situation developed around the stalled guns. - - [533] Lieutenant Meeker, dispatched from Hagaru with fuel, was - unable to get through to the stalled artillery because - of Chinese fire. Some of his men, however, did pass - the Chinese block and served as part of CWO Carlson’s - improvised gun crew. Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 19 Jul 56. - -Following the halting of the convoy Major Angus J. Cronin, in charge of -4/11’s vehicle column, and his handful of truck drivers and cannoneers -drove off a platoon of Chinese. These Marines were soon joined by -Lieutenant Colonel Feehan’s 1/11 and Able Company of 1/5. By the time -Lieutenant Colonel Taplett arrived, the 155s had been moved off the -road by Captain O. R. Lodge of 4/11, who continued in spite of a wound -until more severely wounded in the head. - -Roise and Stevens arrived shortly afterwards and the three battalion -commanders drew up a hasty plan. While 3/5 built up a base of fire a -platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, would move through the ridge north of -the road to knock out the Chinese strong point. Up to this time there -had been few and minor instances of panic during the breakout from -Yudam-ni. But some confusion resulted when the enemy took advantage of -the delay to blow a small bridge ahead and increase his rate of fire. -Thus a new roadblock awaited after the howitzers were removed, and two -truck drivers were killed while the engineers repaired the break. Other -drivers bypassed the bridge and made a dash for safety by crossing the -little stream on the ice. - -A comparatively few men, giving way to panic, were endangering the -entire column. Behind one of the fleeing trucks an angry warrant -officer pounded in pursuit, shouting some of the most sulphurous -profanity that Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had ever heard.[534] This -was CWO Allen Carlson of Baker Battery, 1/11. He disappeared around a -bend in the road, only to return a moment later with a chastened driver -towing a 105mm howitzer. Carlson hastily recruited a crew and set up -the piece beside the road for point-blank fire at the enemy position -while Taplett directed the fire of a 75mm recoilless rifle. - - [534] Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56. - -A Charlie Battery howitzer and a 1/5 heavy machine gun added their -contribution as a platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, attacked under cover of -air strikes. The Chinese position was overrun at 0830 at an estimated -cost to the enemy of 150 dead. Two other attacks were launched by -infantry units of Roise’s battalion on the high ground to the left -before the MSR was cleared. - -When the 155mm howitzers were pushed off the road, it had been assumed -that they would be retrieved. Only 1000 yards farther down the MSR -was a cache of air-dropped diesel fuel, but efforts to bring back -replenishments were frustrated by enemy fire. Attempts at recovery by -the British Marines failed later that day, and orders were given for -the destruction by air of the eight stalled howitzers plus a ninth -which had previously been abandoned after skidding off the road. This -was the largest loss of weapons in the Yudam-ni breakout. - -At 1400 on 4 December the last elements of the rearguard, 3/7, entered -the perimeter and the four-day operation passed into history. Some -1500 casualties were brought to Hagaru, a third of them being in the -non-battle category, chiefly frostbite cases. It had taken the head of -the column about 59 hours to cover the 14 miles, and the rear units 79 -hours. - -“Under the circumstances of its execution,” commented General Smith, -“the breakout was remarkably well conducted. Since centralized control -of the widespread elements was a difficult task, particularly with a -joint command, unit commanders were required to exercise a high degree -of initiative.... The spirit and discipline of the men under the most -adverse conditions of weather and terrain was another highly important -factor contributing to the success of the operation and also reflecting -the quality of the leadership being exercised.”[535] - - [535] Smith, _Notes_, 948. - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5679 -] - - _This Was Hagaru--Two views of the Marine forward base - at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, with East Hill in - the background; here the troops reorganized for the final - breakout._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 4971 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5434 -] - - _Patrol Actions--Task forces, ranging in size from a squad - to a battalion, sometimes supported by tanks as well as air - and artillery, were employed for specific missions during the - breakout._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5445 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5438 -] - - _Before and After Taking--Two views, only a few seconds apart, - of the effective close air support given Marine infantry; the - plane is hidden by the dense cloud of black smoke._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5440 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5685 -] - - _The Hagaru Airstrip--Above, walking wounded awaiting - evacuation in an Air Force C-47 which flew in artillery - ammunition; below, casualties leave their rifles behind but - will take out much-needed parachutes shown in the foreground._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5683 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5398 -] - - _Helicopter and Ambulance Evacuation--Above, the helicopters - of VMO-6 flew out casualties from areas which otherwise could - not have been reached; below, ambulances had their moments, - too, as this bullet-riddled specimen shows._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5461 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5409 -] - - _Breakout from Hagaru--Above, crippled vehicles are simply - pushed off the road; below, at every halt the weary - gravel-crunchers sink exhausted into the snow._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5428 -] - -[Illustration: - - Photos courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig and Capt R. W. Crook -] - - _Victims of Communist Aggression--Three views of the Korean - refugees, ranging from infants to patriarchs, who followed the - Marine column all the way to Hungnam._ - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 355017 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 130426 -] - - _Magnificent Air Support--Above, crewmen check rockets of a - Corsair fighter-bomber; and, below, one of the old Grumman - TBMs resurrected for casualty evacuation from Koto-ri._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 130442 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5361 -] - - _Fighting in the Heavyweight Division--Above, Marine tanks - awaiting withdrawal from Koto-ri; below, Army self-propelled - 155mm howitzers firing from the Chinhung-ni area._ - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 354246 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5372 -] - - _Through the Swirling Flakes--The march southward from Koto-ri - begins in a snowstorm as a Marine infantry battalion attacks - northward from Chinhung-ni to open up the MSR._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5370 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5382 -] - - _The Endless Column of March--Two more views of the column, - the first elements of which reached Chinhung-ni before the - last troops departed Koto-ri, ten miles to the rear._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5356 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5466 USMC Photo A 5444 -] - - _Clearing the Flanks--Tanks and infantry work together to - clear the flanks of enemy combat groups which watched for - every opportunity to attack from the high ground._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5369 -] - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5376 -] - - _A job for the Engineers--Above, this gap had to be spanned - if the vehicles were to be brought out from Koto-ri; below, - infantry crossing over air-dropped Treadway bridge._ - -[Illustration: - - USMC Photo A 5408 -] - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 424506 USN Photo 424527 -] - - _The Hungnam Redeployment--Above, two views of Marines who - were first X Corps troops to embark; below, a glimpse of the - thousands of tons of equipment to be loaded._ - -[Illustration: - - USA Photo SC 355022 -] - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 423914 -] - - _Waterfront Panoramas--Above, these two LSTs were among the - last to be loaded; below, the final demolitions scene, with - the USS_ Begor _(APD 127) shown in the foreground_. - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 424297 -] - -[Illustration: - - USN Photo 424567 - - _The Honored Dead--On the day of his departure from Hungnam - the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division visits the - cemetery for a last silent tribute to the dead._ -] - - - - -CHAPTER XIII - -Regroupment at Hagaru - -_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements Flown to -Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1 -Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of -RCT-7 to the South--Advance of the Division Trains_ - - -The marines at Hagaru would have been astonished to learn how much -anxiety over their “encirclement” was being currently felt in the -United States. It had been a rude shock for Americans who believed -that the troops in Korea would be “home by Christmas” to realize that -the unexpected Chinese intervention had created virtually a new war. -This war, moreover, was apparently going against the UN forces. On -Thanksgiving Day the victory over Communist aggression had seemed -almost complete, yet only a week later the headlines announced major -reverses. The Eighth Army was in full retreat, and an entire Marine -division was said to be “trapped.” - -So disturbing were the reports from Korea, newspaper readers and -radio listeners could scarcely have imagined the mood of confidence -prevailing at Hagaru after the arrival of the troops from Yudam-ni. -Even prior to that event, few Marines had any doubts as to the ability -of the Division to fight its way out to the seacoast. - -The Hagaru perimeter presented a scene of bustling activity during the -first days of December. Trucks and jeeps bounced along the bumpy roads -in such numbers as to create a traffic problem. Twin-engined planes -roared in and out of the snow-covered airstrip at frequent intervals -throughout the daylight hours. Overhead the “Flying Boxcars” spilled a -rainbow profusion of red, blue, yellow, green and orange parachutes to -drift earthward with heavy loads of rations, gasoline and ammunition. - -The busy panorama even had its humorous aspects. Parka-clad Marines -displaying a five-day growth of beard went about with their cheeks -bulging from an accumulation of Tootsie Rolls--a caramel confection -much esteemed by Stateside youngsters for its long-lasting qualities. -The Post Exchange Section had originally brought merchandise into -Hagaru on the assumption that it would be established as a base. No -space in vehicles was available for its removal and the commanding -general directed that the entire remaining stock, $13,547.80 worth, -chiefly candies and cookies, should be issued gratuitously to the -troops.[536] Tootsie Rolls proved to be a prime favorite with men who -would have scorned them in civilian life. Not only were they more -tasty than half-frozen “C” rations, but they resulted in no intestinal -disorders. Moreover, they were useful as temporary repairs for leaking -radiators. - - [536] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith, - _Notes_, 1017–1018. - -There was nothing during the daytime to indicate the presence of -CCF troops near Hagaru. Even in hours of darkness the enemy was -quiet throughout the first five nights of December. Apparently the -Chinese were powerless to renew the attack until reinforcements and -replenishments of supplies and ammunition reached the area. - - -_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air_ - -Evacuation of the wounded was the chief problem on 2 December, when -it became evident that previous estimates of losses at Yudam-ni and -among the Army troops east of the Reservoir were far too low. A total -of 914 casualties were flown out by the C-47s and R4Ds that day and -more than 700 on the 3d. Captain Hering and his assistants had assumed -that the Air Force evacuation officer was screening the casualties -until he informed them that this was not his responsibility. The -Division surgeon then set a Spartan standard. He passed personally on -all controversial cases and approved for evacuation only those in as -bad shape as Lieutenant Commander Lessenden, the 5th Marines surgeon -who had refused to be flown out and continued on duty after both feet -were painfully frozen. Apparently it was not too severe a test for -men who could stand the pain, since Lessenden suffered no permanent -injuries.[537] - - [537] Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U. S. Navy, Public - Information Release, 21 Apr 51; LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC) - USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address - Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.” - -Captain Hering had to use his medical authority in several instances to -overcome the objections of Yudam-ni casualties who declined evacuation, -though in obvious need of hospitalization.[538] - - [538] _Ibid._ Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin - Reservoir campaign led to the adoption of the thermal - boot as an effective preventive measure during the - operations of the following two winters of the Korean - conflict. - -The liaison airstrip at Koto-ri had been of little use, since it was -outside the perimeter and exposed to enemy fire. But the completion of -a new strip on the 2d made it possible to evacuate about 47 casualties -that day from the 2/1 perimeter.[539] - - [539] 2/1 _SAR_, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X - Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith, - _Notes_, 844; VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18. - -More than 1400 casualties remained at Hagaru on the morning of 5 -December. They were all flown out before nightfall, making a total -of 4312 men (3150 Marines, 1137 Army personnel and 25 Royal Marines) -evacuated from Hagaru by air in the first five days of December, -according to Marine figures.[540] X Corps estimated a total of 4207 for -the same period.[541] - - [540] Smith, _Notes_, 998–999. - - [541] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93. - -R4Ds of the 1st MAW, flying under Wing operational control, were -represented in the flights to and from Hagaru as well as the C-47s -of the Combat Cargo Command, FEAF.[542] The large-scale casualty -evacuation was completed without losing a man, even though the aircraft -landing on the rough strip careened precariously as they bounced along -the frozen runway. Only two planes could be accommodated simultaneously -at first, but Marine engineers widened the 2900-foot strip until six -planes could be parked at a time. - - [542] Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56. - -A four-engine Navy R5D made a successful landing with stretchers flown -in from Japan. After taking off with a load of wounded, the pilot -barely cleared the surrounding hills, and it was decided to risk no -further evacuations with such large aircraft. Two crash landings marred -operations on the field. An incoming Marine R4D, heavily loaded with -artillery ammunition, wiped out its landing gear on the rough surface -and was abandoned after its load had been put to good use by the -gunners. A second accident involved an Air Force C-47 which lost power -on the take off and came down just outside the Marine lines without -injury to its load of casualties. Troops from the perimeter were -rushed out immediately to rescue its occupants but the plane had to be -destroyed.[543] - - [543] _Ibid._, Smith, _Notes_, 998–999. - -Not until long later were final official casualty reports rendered for -the period of the Yudam-ni regroupment and breakout. Regimental figures -are not available, and the totals included the losses suffered by the -troops at Hagaru during the night of 30 November-1 December. Following -are the figures for the 1st Marine Division as a whole throughout this -five-day period: - - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+-------------- - | | | | | Total | - | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Battle | Non-Battle[B] - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+-------------- - 30 Nov | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 222 | 102 - 1 Dec | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 158 | 134 - 2 Dec | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 321 | 180 - 3 Dec | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 217 | 196 - 4 Dec | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 222 | 582 - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+-------------- - Totals | 135 | 29 | 55 | 921 | 1140 | 1194 - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+-------------- - - [B] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix - II, 3. - - -_537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru_ - -At 1359, on 3 December, X Corps issued OI 22, directing the 1st -Marine Division to withdraw all elements to Hamhung area via the -Hagaru-Hamhung axis as rapidly as evacuation of wounded and other -preparations would permit.[544] General Almond flew to Hagaru that same -day for a conference with General Smith. Nothing further was said about -destruction of equipment. At that very time, in fact, various critical -items were being salvaged and flown out from Hagaru when space on -planes was available. - - [544] X Corps _OI 22_, 2 Dec 50. - -Surplus weapons had accumulated as a result of casualties and the -Marine general wished to avoid the destruction of any material that -could be removed by air without interfering with casualty evacuation. -It was particularly necessary to salvage and fly out the parachutes and -packages used for air drops, since a critical shortage of these had -been reported from Japan. Before leaving Hagaru, the Division also -planned to evacuate large quantities of stoves, tents, typewriters, -rifles, machine guns and damaged 4.2″ mortars.[545] - - [545] This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived - from the following sources: G-1 _SAR_, 6–7 and G-4 _SAR_ - 6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps _Special Report, Chosin - Reservoir_; Smith, _Notes_, 1011–1015, and _Chronicle_, - 103–105; Forney, _Special Report_, 3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton - interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51. - -Space in empty planes landing at Hagaru was utilized not only for -bringing in equipment and medical supplies, but also replacements. -Since the Wonsan landing some hundreds of Marines, most of them wounded -in the Inchon-Seoul operation, had returned from hospitals in Japan. -These men, upon reporting at Hungnam, were temporarily assigned to -the Headquarters Battalion, since the Division had no provision in -its T/O for a replacement organization. Ordinarily they would have -been returned to their units, but enemy action made this procedure -impossible until the completion of the airstrip. - -During the first five days of December, therefore, 537 replacements -were flown to Hagaru, fit for duty and equipped with cold-weather -clothing. Those destined for the 1st Marines were assigned to the 3d -Battalion for perimeter defense, and personnel for the 5th and 7th -Marines joined those units after their arrival at Hagaru. - -Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, the chief of the Combat Cargo -Command, expressed astonishment during his visit of 5 December on -learning about these replacements. He had come to offer his C-47s for -troop evacuation after the casualties were flown out, but General Smith -explained that all able-bodied men would be needed for the breakout. - - -_Air Drops of Ammunition_ - -Visitors and press correspondents arrived daily at Hagaru in the empty -C-47s and R4Ds. Among them was Miss Marguerite Higgins, reporter for -the New York _Herald-Tribune_. General Smith ruled that for her own -protection, considering the possibility of enemy attack, she must leave -the perimeter before nightfall. - -French and British publications were represented as well as most of -the larger American dailies and wire services. At one of the press -conferences the question arose as to the proper name of the Marine -operation. A British correspondent had intended to refer to it as a -“retreat” or “retirement,” but General Smith held that there could be -no retreat when there was no rear. Since the Division was surrounded, -he maintained, the word “retreat” was not a correct term for the coming -breakout to the coast.[546] - - [546] Smith, _Notes_, 977–978; _Chronicle_, 103–106. - -General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Murray were interviewed for -television by Charles de Soria, who also “shot” Marines on infantry -duty and casualties awaiting evacuation. These pictures and recordings -were later shown in the United States under the title _Gethsemane_. - -The correspondents were astonished to find the Hagaru perimeter so -lacking in enemy activity. This quiet was shattered at 2010 on 5 -December when two B-26s bombed and strafed the area. Marine night -fighters were absent on a search mission, but one was recalled to offer -protection against further efforts of the sort. A possible explanation -was advanced by First Lieutenant Harry S. Wilson, of VMF(N)-542, who -reported that he had received orders by radio to attack Hagaru. It was -his conviction that Chinese use of captured radio equipment accounted -for the B-26 attack.[547] - - [547] 1stMarDiv _G-3 Journal_, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E. - Hood, memo: Close Air Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv, - 29 Jan 51. - -The interlude of CCF inactivity gave the 1st Marine Division an -opportunity to build up a stock of air-dropped ammunition and supplies. -Poor communications had prevented the obtaining of advance information -as to the requirements of the Yudam-ni troops, and their needs had to -be estimated by the assistant G-4. - -It was planned that units moving out from Hagaru would take only enough -supplies for the advance to Koto-ri. Materiel would be air-dropped -there to support the next stage of the breakout. - -The C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command were called upon to fly in the -largest part of the total of the 372.7 tons requested for air delivery -at Hagaru. C-47s and R4Ds were available for some items, particularly -of a fragile nature; and specially packaged small drops to meet -specific needs could be made by planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. - -Officers and men of the Headquarters Battalion at Hagaru were ordered -to assist the 1st Regulating Detachment in the operation of the Hagaru -airhead. Army service troops were also assigned to the task, and -dumps were set up adjacent to the drop zone for the direct issuing of -supplies. The major items requested were artillery, mortar and small -arms ammunition, hand grenades, gasoline and diesel oil, rations, and -communication wire.[548] - - [548] HqBn _URpt 13_; G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F. - Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56. - -There is no record of the amounts actually received. Pilots sometimes -missed the drop zone so far that the containers were “captured” by the -enemy or landed in areas where recovery was not feasible because of -enemy fire. In other instances, the supplies fell near the positions of -front-line units which issued them on the spot without any formalities -of bookkeeping. - -Breakage rates were high, due to the frozen ground. About 70 per cent -of the POL products and 70 to 80 per cent of the rations were recovered -in usable condition. Of the artillery ammunition delivered to the drop -zone, 40 per cent was badly damaged and only 25 per cent ever reached -the gun positions. About 45 per cent of the small arms ammunition -was recovered and usable. A hundred per cent of the requested mortar -ammunition and 90 per cent of the 81mm rounds were put into the air -over the drop zone, though the damage rate was nearly as high as that -of the artillery shells.[549] - - [549] G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 3–5. - -In spite of the seemingly low percentages of receipts as compared -to requests, it was considered that the Hagaru air drops had been -successful on the whole. “Without the extra ammunition,” commented -General Smith, “many more of the friendly troops would have been -killed.... There can be no doubt that the supplies received by this -method proved to be the margin necessary to sustain adequately the -operations of the division during this period.”[550] - - [550] Smith, _Notes_, 1010. - - -_Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri_ - -The need of the Yudam-ni troops for recuperation was so urgent that 6 -December was set as the D-day of the attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri. On -the recommendation of his staff, General Smith decided that the need -of the troops for rest and regroupment outweighed the advantages of a -speedy advance, even though the enemy would be allowed more time to get -his forces into position along the MSR. - -Another factor influencing this decision was the thinning of the -command group and staff sections of the Division. It will be recalled -that General Craig, the Assistant Division Commander, had recently been -returned on emergency leave to the United States. Colonel Walseth (G-1) -was wounded on 30 November, while Lieutenant Colonel Chidester, had -been MIA since that date. Colonel McAlister (G-4) had been directed to -remain at Hungnam to co-ordinate logistic functions. - -A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel. -This was due in part to the casualties suffered by the last convoy of -Headquarters troops to move up from Hungnam. Moreover, the office force -had been depleted by calls for reinforcements to defend the perimeter. - -By dint of working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout -to Koto-ri was completed on schedule. OpnO 25-50, issued at 0800 on 5 -December, provided for an advance of the 1st Marine Division at first -light the following morning on the Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni-Majon-dong -axis to close the Hamhung area. The principal subordinate units were -assigned these tasks: - - (a) RCT-5 (3/1 attached) to relieve all elements on perimeter - defense in the Hagaru area by 1200, 5 December; to cover - the movement of RCT-7 out of Hagaru to the south; to follow - RCT-7 to the south on the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis; - to protect the Division rear from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and to - follow RCT-7 from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area as Division - reserve. - - (b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the - Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis to close the Hamhung area. - - (c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni, - protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the - Division through Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear - from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area.[551] - - [551] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 25-50_, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the - remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv _AdmO 20-50_, 4 - Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec - 50; Smith, _Chronicle_, 104–106. - -All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators, -casualties and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to -march on foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security. -It was directed that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the -side of the road and destroyed if not operative by the time the column -passed. During halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be -established. - -Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for -reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions -to clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were -planned by the Division Engineer Officer. - -Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed that -the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days, equally -distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected -items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and the -following provision was made for ammunition: - - On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle, - minimum 1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps - depleted or transportation capacity exceeded. - -Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other -casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated in vehicles -of the column. - -Two Division trains were set up by AdminO 20-50. Lieutenant Colonel -Banks commanded Train No. 1, under RCT-7; and No. 2, under RCT-5, was -in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne. Each motor serial in the trains -was to have a commander who maintained radio communication with the -train commander. - -Truck transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment -at Hagaru, a Division destruction plan was issued on 4 December, making -unit commanders responsible for disposing of all excess supplies and -equipment within their own areas. “Commanding officer 1st Regulating -Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies and -equipment remaining in dumps,” the order continued. “Unit commanders -and CO 1st Regulating Detachment report types and amounts of supplies -and equipment to this headquarters (G-4) prior to destruction. -Permission to use fuel and ammunition for destruction purposes must be -obtained from this headquarters (G-4).” - - -_3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru_ - -General Smith held conferences on 4 and 5 December of senior unit -commanders. During the afternoon of the 4th General Almond arrived by -plane and was briefed on the plan for the breakout. In a brief ceremony -at the Division CP he presented the Distinguished Service Cross to -General Smith, Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonels Murray and -Beall. - -The night of 5–6 December was the fifth in a row to pass without enemy -activity at Hagaru. But if Division G-2 summaries were to be credited, -it was the calm before the storm. For the Chinese were believed to -be assembling troops and supplies both at Hagaru and along the MSR -to Koto-ri. Up to this time seven CCF divisions, the 58th, 59th, -60th, 76th, 79th, 80th and 89th, had been identified through POW -interrogations. But there were evidences that the 77th and 78th were -also within striking distance.[552] - - [552] Smith, _Notes_, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps - _Command Report Annex (CR)_, 4 Dec 50. - -At 1200 on 5 December the 5th Marines relieved 3/1 of the -responsibility for the defense of the Hagaru area. Division elements -other than infantry were withdrawn from the front line, leaving -Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s three battalions, with 3/1 attached, -disposed around the perimeter as follows: - - 1/5--From the Yudam-ni road around the north of Hagaru and astride - the Changjin Valley to a point at the base of the ridge about - 1,000 yards east of the bridge over the Changjin River. - - 2/5--In position on western slopes of East Hill. - - 3/5--From the south nose of East Hill west across the river to - link up with 3/1 south of the airstrip. - - 3/1--South and southwest of airstrip in sector formerly held by - How and Item Companies of 3/1.[553] - - [553] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec - 50; 5th Mar _SAR_, 30–31. - -Not only were the CCF positions on East Hill a threat to Hagaru; they -also dominated the road leading south to Koto-ri. Thus the plan for the -breakout called for simultaneous attacks to be launched at first light -on the 6th--RCT-5 to regain the enemy-held portion of East Hill, and -RCT-7 to lead the advance of the Division motor column toward Koto-ri. - -A plan for air support, prepared by the command and staff of the 1st -MAW, was brought to Hagaru by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, -Assistant Wing Commander, on 5 December. Aircraft were to be on station -at 0700 to furnish close support for the attack on East Hill. Along -the MSR to Koto-ri an umbrella of 24 close support aircraft was to -cover the head, rear and flanks of the breakout column while search -and attack planes scoured the ridges flanking the road and approaches -leading into it. Support was also to be furnished after dark by the -night hecklers. All strikes within three miles of either side of the -MSR were to be controlled by the ground forces while the planes were -free to hit any targets beyond. - -The concentration of aircraft covering the advance south from Hagaru -was one of the greatest of the whole war. Marine planes at Yonpo would, -of course, continue approximately 100 daily sorties to which VMF-323 -would add 30 more from the _Badoeng Strait_. The Navy’s fast carriers, -_Leyte_, _Valley Forge_, _Philippine Sea_, and _Princeton_ were to -abandon temporarily their deep support or interdiction operations -and contribute about 100 or more attack sorties daily. The Fifth Air -Force was to add more power with additional U. S. and Australian -fighter-bombers as well as medium and heavy bomber interdiction -beyond the bomb line. To augment the carrier support for the X Corps -consolidation and possible redeployment by sea, VMF-212 had departed -Yonpo on 4 December and was re-equipping in Itami for return to -battle aboard the newly arrived USS _Bataan_. The _Sicily_ was also -heading for the area to take back aboard the Corsairs of VMF-214 on 7 -December.[554] - - [554] 1stMAW _OpnO 2-50_, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air - Support for 6 Dec,” 5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex - CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation - Report No. 1_, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg - Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D. Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56. - 1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_. The VMF-214 pilots casually made - their transition from shore to carrier base between - sorties. - -Continuous artillery support, both for RCT-5 and RCT-7, was planned -by the 11th Marines. Two batteries of the 3d Battalion and one of the -4th were to move out at the head of the RCT-7 train, the two from 3/11 -to occupy initial positions halfway to Koto-ri to support the attack -southward to that objective, and the 4/11 battery to take position in -Koto-ri and provide general support northward in combination with the -battery of 2/11 attached to that perimeter. The remaining batteries of -the 3d and 4th Battalions would provide initial support from Hagaru -southward until ordered to move out. - -The three batteries of 1/11, with D/11 attached, were to support the -operations of RCT-5 in a similar manner. Two batteries would move out -at the head of the regimental train to positions halfway to Koto-ri, -the remaining two would fire to the south in support of withdrawing -units and then displace when the first two were in position.[555] - - [555] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar _SAR_), 8. As - a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during - the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was - reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers - each. - -Throughout the night of 5–6 December, the darkness was stabbed by -flashes as the artillery at Hagaru fired concentrations to saturate -the area along the Hagaru-Koto-ri axis. In order to prevent cratering -of the road the 155’s fired VT rounds. A secondary purpose of this -bombardment was to expend profitably the surplus of ammunition which -could not be brought out.[556] - - [556] _Ibid._, 1stMarDiv _POR_ 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W. - McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56. - -At daybreak on the 6th the Division Headquarters broke camp. General -Smith had decided to fly the command group to Koto-ri in advance of -the troops, so that planning could begin immediately for the breakout -from Koto-ri southward. General Barr visited during the morning and -was informed that the 7th Infantry Division casualties who had reached -Hagaru had been flown out. The remaining 490 able-bodied men (including -385 survivors of Task Force Faith) had been provided with Marine -equipment and organized into a provisional battalion under the command -of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, USA. This battalion was attached to the -7th Marines and sometimes referred to as 31/7. - -Throughout the morning General Smith kept in close touch with the -progress of RCT-7 toward Koto-ri. At 1400 a reassuring message was -received from Colonel Litzenberg, and the commanding general took off -from Hagaru by helicopter. Ten minutes later he and his aide, Captain -Martin J. Sexton, landed at Koto-ri. The other members of the command -group, following by OY and helicopter, set up in a large tent at -Koto-ri and started planning for the next stage.[557] - - [557] Smith, _Notes_, 1058–1060; HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_, 5. - - -_East Hill Retaken from Chinese_ - -Meanwhile, at Hagaru, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had designated his -2d Battalion for the assault on East Hill. At 0700 on 6 December, as -the 4.2″ mortars began their planned preparation, the 7th Marines had -already initiated the breakout to Koto-ri. When Marine planes arrived -on station at 0725, a shortage of napalm tanks limited the air attack -to bombing, rocket and strafing runs. These had little apparent effect -on the objective. Further air strikes were directed by the FAC, First -Lieutenant Manning T. Jeter, Jr., who was severely wounded while -standing on the crest to direct the Corsairs to the target. Captain -David G. Johnson, the air liaison officer, took his place. A total of -76 planes participated in the day’s air attacks. - -At 0900 Captain Smith’s Dog Company moved out to the assault (see Map -26) with First Lieutenant George A. Sorenson’s 3d Platoon in the lead, -followed by the 2d and 1st Platoons in that order.[558] Attacking to -the northward, Sorensen was pinned down by fire from Objective A before -he had covered 50 yards. This was the enemy’s main forward position -on East Hill, which he had held against Marine attacks ever since -seizing it in the early morning hours of 29 November. First Lieutenant -John R. Hinds replaced Sorensen, after that officer was wounded. While -he engaged the enemy frontally, First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s -2d Platoon poured in flanking fires and First Lieutenant Richard M. -Johnson’s 1st Platoon executed a flanking movement. - - [558] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon - the following sources: 5thMar _SAR_, 31–32; 1/5 _SAR_, - 17–18; 2/5 _SAR_, 27–29; Smith, _Notes_, 1031–1033; Geer, - _The New Breed_, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R. - Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H. Honeycutt interv by Capt K. - A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L. - Murray, Comments, n. d. - -[Illustration: SEIZURE OF EAST HILL AND CHINESE COUNTER ATTACK - -6–7 December - - MAP-26 -] - -Chinese resistance suddenly collapsed about 1100. Thus it seemed almost -an anticlimax that East Hill, after holding out against the Marines -more than a week, should have been retaken at a cost of one man killed -and three wounded. About 30 CCF dead were found. - -As events were to prove, however, this was but the first round in a -hard-fought 22-hour battle for the hill mass. The next phase began -at 1130, when Roise ordered Captain Peters’ Fox Company to relieve -Smith so that Dog Company could resume the attack against Objective -B, a ridge about 500 yards to the southeast. The lower slopes of this -position were now being cleared by 2/7. - -After a 10-minute artillery preparation, the three platoons of Dog -Company jumped off at 1250. The Chinese put up a stubborn resistance -and it took until 1430 to seize the new objective. Marine casualties -were moderate, however, and Captain Smith set up three platoon -positions along the ridge running to the south whence he could control -the road leading out of Hagaru. - -Late in the day the enemy appeared to be massing for a counterattack in -the saddle between the two objectives. Johnson called an air strike and -all Dog and Fox Company troops within range opened up with everything -they had as McNaughton led a patrol against the Chinese in the saddle. -Caught between the infantry fires and the rocket and strafing runs of -the Corsairs, the CCF survivors surrendered en masse to McNaughton and -his platoon. About 220 prisoners were taken to set a record for the 1st -Marine Division in the Reservoir campaign.[559] - - [559] 2/5 _SAR_, 28–29. - -At the request of Captain Smith, the saddle between the two Marine -companies was occupied by reinforcements consisting of an officer and -11 men from the regimental AT Company and an officer and 32 men from -the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Shortly after dark the enemy launched -a vigorous counterattack. Tanks and 81mm mortars fired in support of -Marines who made good use of 2.36″ white phosphorus rockets at close -range. - -Although the Chinese endured frightful casualties, they returned again -and again to the attack until midnight. It was evident that they -considered this a fight to a finish for East Hill, and at 0205 they -renewed the assault against all three companies of the 2d Battalion as -well as Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion. - -The struggle during the next three hours was considered the most -spectacular if not the most fiercely contested battle of the entire -Reservoir campaign even by veterans of the Yudam-ni actions. Never -before had they seen the Chinese come on in such numbers or return -to the attack with such persistence. The darkness was crisscrossed -with a fiery pattern of tracer bullets at one moment, and next the -uncanny radiance of an illumination shell would reveal Chinese columns -shuffling in at a trot, only to go down in heaps as they deployed. -Marine tanks, artillery, mortars, rockets and machine guns reaped -a deadly harvest, and still the enemy kept on coming with a dogged -fatalism which commanded the respect of the Marines. Looking like -round little gnomes in their padded cotton uniforms, groups of Chinese -contrived at times to approach within grenade-throwing distance before -being cut down. - -The fight was not entirely one-sided. The Marines took a pounding from -CCF mortars and machine guns, and by 0300 Dog Company was hard-pressed -in its three extended positions pointed like a pistol at the heart of -the enemy’s assembly areas. Both McNaughton and the executive officer, -First Lieutenant James H. Honeycutt, were wounded but remained in -action. - -This was the second time in three months that Dog Company had -spearheaded a Marine attack on a desperately defended hill complex. -Northwest of Seoul in September, only 26 able-bodied men had survived -to break the back of North Korean resistance. The company commander, -First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, had died a hero’s death at the moment -of victory, and First Lieutenant Karle F. Seydel was the unit’s only -unwounded officer. - -Now another Smith commanded Dog Company, and Seydel was killed as enemy -pressure from front and flank threatened to overwhelm the three riddled -platoons. Casualties of 13 KIA and 50 WIA were taken in the battle -for East Hill as Dog Company and the provisional platoons fell back -fighting to the former Objective A and tied in with Fox Company. - -[Illustration: THE LAST NIGHT AT HAGARU - -6–7 DECEMBER 1950 - - MAP-27 -] - -Along the low ground at the northern end of East Hill the Chinese -were beaten off with ruinous losses by Jaskilka’s Easy Company of 2/5, -Jones’ Charlie Company of 1/5 and three Army tanks (see Map 27). Enemy -troops had to cross a comparatively level expanse which provided a -lucrative field of fire for Marine supporting arms. Heaps of CCF dead, -many of them charred by white phosphorus bursts, were piled up in front -of the Marine positions. - -Next, the Chinese hit Captain James B. Heater’s Able Company of 1/5, -still farther to the left, and overran several squad positions. One -platoon was forced to withdraw to the rise on which the Division CP had -previously been located. The lines were restored at 0546 with the help -of Lieutenant Hancock and his Baker Company, which had been in reserve. -Altogether the 1st Battalion had suffered casualties of ten killed -and 43 wounded, while the counted CCF slain numbered 260 in front of -Charlie Company and 200 in the area of Able Company. George Company -of 3/1 also beat off a Chinese attack on the south of the perimeter. -With the coming of daylight these Marines found that they had one of -the Chinese withdrawal routes under their guns. Mortar and rifle fire -annihilated one group of about 60 enemy and another group of 15 Reds -surrendered.[560] - - [560] Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13. - -The new day revealed a scene of slaughter which surpassed anything -the Marines had seen since the fight for the approaches of Seoul in -September. Estimates of CCF dead in front of the 2d Battalion positions -on and around East Hill ran as high as 800, and certain it is that the -enemy had suffered a major defeat. - -When Marine air came on station, the Chinese as usual scattered for -cover. About 0200 Murray ordered 3/5, which had not been in contact -with the enemy during the night, to displace to the south at the head -of Division Train No. 2, followed by 1/5 and Ridge’s battalion of the -1st Marines. This meant that Roise’s men with a platoon of tanks and -the engineers in charge of demolitions would be the last troops out of -Hagaru. - - -_Attack of RCT-7 to the South_ - -During the 22-hour battle on East Hill the 7th Marines had been -attacking toward Koto-ri (see Map 28). On the eve of the breakout the -gaps in the infantry ranks were partially filled with 300 artillerymen -from the 11th Marines, bringing Litzenberg’s strength up to about 2200 -men. 7th Mar OpnO 14-50 called for the advance to be initiated at first -light on 6 December as follows: - - 1st Battalion--to move out at 0430 to clear the ground to the right - of the river; - - 2d Battalion--supported by tanks, to attack as advanced guard along - the MSR; - - Provisional Battalion (31/7)--to clear the ground to the left of - the MSR;[561] - - [561] Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to - permit advance through the high ground, the Provisional - Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear enemy - from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5 - Oct 56. - -3d Battalion--to bring up the rear of the regimental train, with George -Company disposed along both flanks as security for the vehicles.[562] - - [562] Sources for this section, except where otherwise - noted, are: 7thMar _SAR_, 24; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, - _Notes_, 1029–1031, 1033–1047; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 1stLt - J. B. Chandler, “Thank God I’m a Marine,” _Leatherneck - Magazine_, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25–26; MajGen H. L. - Litzenberg, Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to - Koto-ri, 6–7 December 1950, 2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct - 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments, - 7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M. - E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. - -Daybreak revealed a peculiar silvery fog covering the Hagaru area.[563] -The 1st Battalion, with Charlie Company in assault, had as its first -objective the high ground southeast of Tonae-ri. No resistance was -encountered, though 24 Chinese were surprised asleep in their positions -near the objective and 17 of them killed. - - [563] Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56. - -The 2d Platoon of Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion, was attached to -2/7 when the advance guard jumped off at 0630 from the road block -south of Hagaru. Almost immediately the column ran into trouble. Upon -clearing the road block the lead dozer-tank took three hits from a -3.5 bazooka. Within twenty minutes the column came under heavy fire -from CCF positions on the high ground on the left. Fox Company, in the -lead, was allowed to pass before the enemy opened up on the Battalion -Command Group, Dog-Easy Company and Weapons Company. The fog prevented -air support initially. When it lifted, First Lieutenant John G. -Theros, FAC of 2/7, brought in Marine aircraft and 81mm fire on the -CCF position.[564] It took a coordinated attack by the two infantry -companies and the tanks, however, before the resistance could be put -down and the advance resumed at 1200. Two and a half hours later the -upper reaches of this hill were cleared by D/5. - - [564] 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16 - Feb 51; Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56. - -After 2/7 and air smothered the initial Chinese resistance, Fox Company -and the platoon of Dog/Tanks advanced down the road. About 4000 yards -south of Hagaru they met the next resistance. Although the Chinese -positions were in plain sight of 1/7, neither 2/7 nor air could spot -them. Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood attempted to -co-ordinate mortar fires from 2/7 with observation from 1/7, but were -unsuccessful because of poor radio communications. Following an erratic -artillery barrage and some good shooting by the tanks, Fox Company -cleared the enemy position about 1500, aided by a Dog-Easy flanking -attack and the Provisional Battalion. In order to assist 2/7, Baker -Company of 1/7 came down from the ridge west of the river to act as -right flank guard. - -[Illustration: THE BREAKOUT FROM HAGARU TO KOTO-RI - -6–7 December 1950 - - A--1/7’s Initial Objective - B--CCF Position Overlooking the MSR - C--2/7 Held Up by CCF Machine Guns - D--Blown Bridge - E--3/7 B Regtl Train Held Up - F--Commandos Rescued - G--3/11’s Fire Fight - H--Division Train 1 Held Up - I--Pusong-ni - J--Hell Fire Valley - - MAP-28 -] - -Meanwhile 1/7 continued to push ahead methodically to the right of the -MSR as the three rifle companies leapfrogged one another. Enemy contact -was continual but no serious opposition developed during the daytime -hours. On the left flank the Provisional Battalion had several fire -fights, while the advance was uneventful for the 3d Battalion following -in the rear of the regimental train. - -About 5000 yards had been covered by dusk. Enemy resistance stiffened -after dark, as had been anticipated. The planners had realized that -the movement could have been made in daylight hours with fewer losses -in personnel and equipment. But intelligence of the expected arrival -of CCF reinforcements influenced the decision to continue the march -throughout the night even at the cost of increased opposition. By noon -long lines of Chinese could be seen along the sky Line to the east of -the road moving towards the MSR. Air attacked these reinforcements but -could not stop their movement, as later events proved. - -About 8000 yards south of Hagaru, in Hell Fire Valley, a Chinese -machine gun on the left stopped the 2d Battalion at 2200. The column -was held up until midnight before Army tank fire knocked out the enemy -gun. After covering 1200 more yards a blown bridge caused another halt -while Dog Company engineers made repairs. Movement was resumed at 0200 -when a second blown bridge resulted in a delay of an hour and a half -before it could be bypassed. - -Dawn brought a significant innovation in air support. Circling above -the 11-mile column inching toward Koto-ri was an airborne Tactical Air -Direction Center (TADC) installed in an R5D of VMR-152 and operated -by Major Harlen E. Hood and his communicators from MTACS-2. Major -Christian C. Lee, Commanding Officer of MTACS-2, had made arrangements -when he realized that with his radios packed in trucks and jeeps he -could not control close air support effectively. Only the addition of -one radio to those standard in the aircraft was necessary to provide -basic communications, but when being readied for the predawn takeoff -the mission faced failure because an engine wouldn’t start. Minus a -refueler truck, the crew chief, Technical Sergeant H. C. Stuart, had -worked all night to pour 2400 gallons of gas into the craft by hand. -Now, in the bitter cold of dawn, he set about to overhaul the starting -motor. Two hours later Major John N. Swartley was piloting the plane -over the MSR.[565] - - [565] 1stMAW _SAR_, Annex I (VMR-152), 11–12, and annex K, - appendix J, (hereafter MTACS-2_SAR_), 25; Air Officer’s - Rpt, in X Corps _CR_, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley ltr - to authors, 15 Oct 56. - -No trouble was encountered by 2/7 along the last few miles of the -route and the battalion was first to arrive at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, the -3d Battalion had been assigned the additional mission of replacing -the Provisional Battalion as protection for the left flank as well as -rear of the 7th Marines train. A brief fire fight developed at about -2100 as the Chinese closed to hand-grenade range. Lieutenant Colonel -Harris deployed George and Item Companies around the vehicles and drove -the enemy back to a respectful distance. Between 0200 and 0430, Item -Company of 3/7 and a platoon of tanks were sent back up the road to -clear out a troublesome Chinese position near Hell Fire Valley. - -About 0200, during a halt for bridge repairs, the 7th Marines train -was hit by enemy fire. The regimental command group suffered most. -Captain Donald R. France and First Lieutenant Clarence E. McGuinness -were killed and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Dowsett was wounded. -While Lieutenant (jg) Robert G. Medemeyer, (MC), USN, gave first aid, -Chaplain (Lieutenant (jg)) Cornelius J. Griffin entered an ambulance to -console a dying Marine. CCF machine gun bullets shattered his jaw and -killed Sergeant Matthew Caruso at his side. Lieutenant Colonel Harris -and Major Roach supervised the deployment of How Company troops to beat -off the attack. - -About 0530 Lieutenant Colonel Harris disappeared. A search was made for -him to no avail and he was listed as a MIA. It was later determined -that he had been killed. - -The 1st Battalion of RCT-7, after a relatively uneventful march over -the high ground west of the river, moved down the slope to join the -regimental column. Major Warren Morris assumed command of the 3d -Battalion, which reached Koto-ri about 0700. At about 1100, after a -brief rest, the men were ordered together with Lockwood’s troops to -move back up along the MSR to the north and set up blocking between -Koto-ri and Hill 1182 to keep the road open for other units of the -Division.[566] While carrying out this mission, the 2d Battalion helped -to bring in 22 British Marines who had been stranded ever since the -Task Force Drysdale fight on the night of 29–30 November. Their plight -was not known until 4 December, when an OY pilot saw the letters -H-E-L-P stamped out in the snow and air-dropped food and medical -supplies. - - [566] 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO, - 0930 7 Dec 50. - - -_Advance of the Division Trains_ - -By 1700 on 7 December all elements of RCT-7 were in the perimeter at -Koto-ri. Division Train No. 1 was due next, and the planners had hoped -that the rifle battalions would clear the way for the vehicles. As it -proved, however, the Chinese closed in behind RCT-7 and attacked the -flanks of the convoy, with the result that the service troops actually -saw more action than the infantrymen. - -One of the causes may be traced to the fact that Division Train No. 1 -had to wait at Hagaru until 1600 on the 6th before RCT-7 made enough -progress toward Koto-ri to warrant putting the convoy on the road. -About 2000 yards south of Hagaru elements of the 3d Battalion, 11th -Marines, were hit in the early darkness by CCF mortar and small-arms -fire. The gunners of George and How Batteries deployed as infantrymen -and repulsed the enemy at the cost of a few casualties. - -Upon resuming the march, a second fire fight took place after 1500 more -yards had been covered. Several vehicles, set afire by Chinese mortar -shells, blocked the road and brought the convoy to a halt. At daybreak -the enemy swarmed to the attack in formidable numbers. It was nip and -tuck as all pieces of How Battery and three howitzers of George Battery -were emplaced between the trucks of the 1st MT Battalion. - -There was no opportunity to dig in the trails of guns employing time -fire with fuses cut for ranges of 40 to 500 yards. But the Chinese were -stopped cold by two hours of continuous fire after approaching within -40 yards. All but about 50 of an estimated 500 to 800 enemy were killed -or wounded before the remainder fled, according to the estimate of the -gunners.[567] - - [567] Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement - of the division trains is based on: HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_, - 6–9; HqBn, _URpt 13_; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A. - Shutts, 11 Apr 51. - -The convoy of the Division Headquarters Company also had to fight -its way. Small arms ammunition had been distributed throughout the -column, and light machine guns were mounted on top of truck loads. -All able-bodied men with the exception of drivers and radio operators -walked in single file on either side of the vehicles carrying the -wounded. - -Progress was slow, with many halts caused by CCF fire. At 0130 several -trucks were set aflame by enemy mortar shells and 2.36 rockets. -Headquarters troops deployed in roadside ditches while two machine guns -manned by bandsmen kept the Chinese at a distance. At 0200 the clouds -cleared enough to permit strikes by night hecklers of VMF (N)-513. They -stopped the Chinese until just before daylight, when a company-size -group penetrated within 30 yards of the convoy. During this fight First -Lieutenant Charles H. Sullivan, who measured six feet four and weighed -240 pounds, emptied his carbine at advancing Chinese. Then he hurled it -like a javelin to drive the bayonet into the chest of an opponent at 15 -feet. - -Under the coaching of the MTACS commander, Major Lee, two more -night fighters--Major Albert L. Clark and First Lieutenant Truman -Clark--pinned the Chinese down with strafing runs as close as 30 yards -from the Marine ground troops. At dawn Major Percy F. Avant, Jr., -and his four-plane division from VMF-312 dumped about four tons of -explosives and napalm on Chinese who broke and ran for cover. The fire -fight had cost Headquarters Battalion 6 KIA and 14 WIA.[568] - - [568] This description of the headquarters convoy fight is - based on: _Ibid._; Cpl G. L. Coon, “Versatility,” - _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18–19; - Simpson Comments, 24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 _SAR_, 19; Maj - C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 7 Feb 51, - Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56. - -The MP Company, just forward of Headquarters Company, had the problem -of guarding about 160 Chinese prisoners. Captives unable to walk had -been left behind at Hagaru, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed -that the wounded be given shelter and provided with food and fuel by -the departing Marines. The prisoners escorted by the MPs were lying -in the middle of the road during the attack when the enemy seemed to -concentrate his fire on them while shouting in Chinese. A scene of -pandemonium ensued as some of the able-bodied prisoners attempted to -make a break. Now the Marines as well as the enemy fired into them and -137 were killed in the wild melee. - -When the convoy got under way again, two Communists were captured -and 15 killed after being flushed out of houses in the village of -Pusong-ni. At daybreak a halt was called in Hell Fire Valley for the -purpose of identifying bodies of MPs and Headquarters troops, killed -in the Task Force Drysdale battle, which were to be picked up later. -Attempts to start the looted and abandoned vehicles met with no success -and the convoy continued the movement to Koto-ri without incident, -arriving about 1000 on the 7th. - -At this hour the last Marine troops had not yet left Hagaru, so that -the column as a whole extended the entire 11 miles of the route. -Division Train No. 2 had formed up during the afternoon of the 6th, -but was unable to start until after dark. At midnight the train had -moved only a short distance out of Hagaru. Lieutenant Colonel Milne -requested infantry support and 3/5 was given the mission of advancing -at the head of the column, along with the 5th Marines regimental train, -to eliminate enemy resistance.[569] Taplett had only two companies, one -of which proceeded astride the road while the other echeloned to the -left rear. The late start proved to be a blessing, since Division Train -No. 2 completed most of its movement by daylight under an umbrella of -Marine air and met only light and scattered resistance. The head of the -column reached Koto-ri at 1700, and at 2300 all of the major Division -units were in the perimeter except 2/5, the rear guard.[570] - - [569] Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d. - - [570] The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and - 3/1 are based on: 3/5 _SAR_, 17; 3/1, _SAR_, 26 Nov-15 - Dec 50, 7; 5th Mar _SAR_, 32–34; 1/5 _SAR_, 18–19; 2/5 - _SAR_, 29–30, 37. - -Both 1/5 and 3/1 had formed up in Hagaru on the morning of the 7th and -moved out as rapidly as traffic would permit, which was slow indeed. -They were accompanied by the 41st Commando, which had earned the esteem -of all U. S. Marines by valor in combat. British imperturbability was -at its best when Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale held an inspection shortly -before departing Hagaru. Disdainful of the scattered shots which were -still being heard, the officers moved up and down the rigid lines, and -men whose gear was not in the best possible shape were reprimanded. - -By 1000 nobody was left in the battered town except Roise’s battalion, -First Lieutenant Vaughan R. Stuart’s tank platoon and elements of Able -Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Captain William R. Gould. -This unit and CWO Willie S. Harrison’s Explosive Ordnance Section of -Headquarters Company engineers were attached to the 5th Marines for the -mission of the demolitions at Hagaru.[571] - - [571] Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru - are based on these sources: 1st Engr Bn _SAR_, 13; - Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A. - Canzona, 13 Jul 56. - -Gould had formed five demolitions teams, each composed of an officer -and four to six men. On the evening of 6 December they began -preparations for burning stockpiles of surplus clothing and equipment -along with the buildings of the Hagaru train yard. There was also the -duty of placing charges in the dumps of mortar and artillery ammunition -which could not be transported to Hagaru. - -One of the main problems was the disposal of a small mountain of frozen -surplus rations. A team of engineers spent hours on the 6th at the task -of smashing cans and crates of food with a bulldozer and saturating the -dump with fuel oil. - -The Able Company engineers came under the operational control of -the 2d Battalion after the other units of the 5th Marines departed. -Demolitions were to await the order of Lieutenant Colonel Roise on the -morning of the 7th. Hagaru was full of combustibles, however, and fires -of mysterious origin sent up dense clouds of smoke before the engineers -touched off the oil-soaked food supplies and the buildings of the train -yard. - -As the Marines of 2/5 pulled back toward the southern tip of East Hill, -smoke blotted out the surrounding area so that enemy movements could -not be detected. Worse yet, premature explosions sent up fountains -of debris just as the engineers were setting up their fuses for a -20-minute delay. Detonations shook the earth on all sides. Rockets -sliced through the air, shells shattered into vicious fragments, -and large chunks of real estate rained down everywhere. Roise was -understandably furious, since his troops were endangered during -their withdrawal. By a miracle they came off East Hill without any -casualties, and the engineers were the last Marines left in Hagaru. -Soon the entire base seemed to be erupting like a volcano. Visibility -was reduced to zero when the engineers pulled out, after setting a last -tremendous charge to blow the bridge. - -So compelling was the lure of loot that small groups of Chinese came -down from the high ground toward the man-made hell of flame and -explosions. Between clouds of smoke they could be seen picking over the -debris, and the Marine tanks cranked off a few rounds at targets of -opportunity. - -It is not likely that any of Roise’s weary troops paused for a last -sentimental look over their shoulders at the dying Korean town. -Hagaru was not exactly a pleasure resort, and yet hundreds of Marines -and soldiers owed their lives to the fact that this forward base -had enabled the Division to evacuate all casualties and fly in -replacements while regrouping for the breakout to the seacoast. - -If it had not been for the forethought of the Division and Wing -commanders, with the concurrence of General Almond, there would have -been no R4D airstrip, no stockpiles of ammunition, rations and medical -supplies. And though the Marines might conceivably have fought their -way out of the CCF encirclement without a Hagaru, it would have been -at the cost of abandoning much equipment and suffering much higher -casualties. - -Only a few weeks before, this Korean town had been merely an unknown -dot on the map. But on 7 December 1950 the name was familiar to -newspaper readers and radio listeners all over the United States as -they anxiously awaited tidings of the breakout. Already it had become a -name to be remembered in U. S. Marine annals along with such historical -landmarks as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Iwo Jima. - -Prospects of a warm meal and a night’s sleep meant more than history -to Roise’s troops when the column moved out at last shortly after -noon, with the engineers bringing up the rear to blow bridges -along the route. A pitiful horde of Korean refugees followed the -troops--thousands of men, women and children with such personal -belongings as they could carry. Efforts on the part of the engineers to -warn the refugees of impending demolitions were futile. Although these -North Koreans had enjoyed for five years the “blessings” of Communist -government, the prospect of being left behind to the tender mercies -of the Chinese Communists was so terrifying that they took appalling -risks. Knowing that a bridge was about to blow up at any instant, they -swarmed across in a blind panic of flight. Never did war seem more -harsh or its victims more pathetic.[572] - - [572] Sexton interv, 16 May 51. - -The rear guard had less air and artillery support than any of the -preceding troops, yet CCF opposition was confined to scattered -small-arms fire all the way to Hell Fire Valley. There the enemy lobbed -over a few mortar shells during a long halt at dusk, but the rest of -the advance was uneventful. Gould’s engineers took chances repeatedly -of being cut off when they fell behind to burn abandoned vehicles or -blow bridges. On several occasions a small group found itself entirely -isolated as the infantry and even the refugees pushed on ahead. Luckily -the engineers made it without any casualties, and by midnight the last -troops of the 1st Marine Division had entered the perimeter at Koto-ri. - -Thus the first stage of the Division breakout came to a close. In -proportion to total numbers, the service troops of Division Train -No. 1 had taken the heaviest losses--six killed and 12 wounded for -the Division Headquarters Company; one killed and 16 wounded for the -Military Police Company; four killed and 28 wounded for the 1st Motor -Transport Battalion; one killed and 27 wounded for the 1st Ordnance -Battalion; and three killed and 34 wounded for the 3d Battalion of the -11th Marines. Battle casualties for the entire 1st Marine Division, -including those of the East Hill battle, were as follows: - - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- - Dates | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- - 6 Dec | 32 | 4 | 7 | 218 | 261 - 7 Dec | 51 | 16 | 0 | 288 | 355 - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- - Totals | 83 | 20 | 7 | 506 | 616[573] - ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------- - - [573] Div Adjutant _SAR_, Appendix II, 3. - -About 38 hours were required for the movement of some 10,000 troops -and more than 1,000 vehicles. The new arrivals filled the perimeter at -Koto-ri to the bursting point, but there was to be no pause at this -point. Division OpnO 26-50, issued at 1815 on the 7th, before the last -troops had arrived, provided for the advance to be resumed from Koto-ri -at first light the following morning. - - - - -CHAPTER XIV - -Onward from Koto-ri - -_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task Force Dog--Air -Drop of Bridge Sections--Division Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in -the Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine Operations of 9 and -10 December--Completion of Division Breakout_ - - -The progress of the 1st Marine Division breakout depended in no small -degree on the reliable communications provided by the division radio -relay linking up Hagaru, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Hungnam. At 1440 on -6 December the vehicles of the Hagaru relay terminal joined Division -Train No. 1, whereupon the station at Koto-ri became in turn the -terminal.[574] - - [574] Smith, _Notes_, 1056. - -This station was located on the highest point of ground just south of -the Koto-ri perimeter. And though it was outside the defense area, the -Chinese did not bother it until the Marines were breaking camp. Then -the opposition consisted only of harassing small-arms fires instead of -the attack which might have been expected.[575] - - [575] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. - -In fact, the enemy did not launch another large-scale assault on -Koto-ri after his costly repulse on the night of 28–29 November. -Although the perimeter was surrounded throughout the first six days of -December, incipient CCF attacks were broken up in the enemy’s assembly -areas. Excellent observation as well as casualty evacuation was -provided by the OYs taking off from the Koto-ri airstrip. They were the -eyes of an impressive array of Marine fire power--tanks, 4.2-inch, and -81mm mortars as well as aircraft and Captain McClelland’s Easy Battery -of 2/11. - -“The artillery 105’s and the mortars did a grand job,” commented Major -Bartley. “They were always available, shifted their fires quickly -and accurately, and serviced their pieces amazingly well in the cold -weather.”[576] - - [576] Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on - 1stMar _SAR_, 18–24, and the 2/1 _SAR_, 15–18. - -As a further asset, the Koto-ri perimeter was defended by adequate -numbers in comparison to Hagaru during the first critical week of -CCF attacks. On 30 November, when Baker Company of the 1st Tank -Battalion returned to Koto-ri after the Task Force Drysdale battle, -three platoons of tanks were added to the Dog Company platoon already -attached to 2/1. The next day Colonel Puller’s RCT-1 (-) was further -strengthened by the arrival of the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, -7th Infantry Division, the last unit to reach Koto-ri from the south. -These Army troops had been ordered to Hagaru, but owing to the changing -situation they were directed by X Corps on 1 December to remain at -Koto-ri. Under the operational control of Colonel Puller, 2/31 took -over a sector at the southern end of the perimeter. - -Sporadic CCF small-arms fire was received on each of the first six days -of December, and enemy troop movements were observed at all points of -the compass. On several occasions a few mortar shells were lobbed into -the perimeter. Not a single Marine casualty was suffered during the -period,[577] though CCF losses were estimated at 646 killed and 322 -wounded. - - [577] Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA - expanding the perimeter to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar - msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50. - -Daily air drops were required to keep the perimeter supplied with -ammunition, rations, and other essentials. Captain Norman Vining, the -Battalion FAC, who had once been a carrier landing signal officer, -guided planes to satisfactory drop zones with makeshift paddles. One -day a case of .30 caliber cartridges broke free from its chute and -hurtled through the top of Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s tent during a -conference. Narrowly missing several officers, it hit the straw at -their feet and bounced high into the air before landing on a crate used -as a table. - - -_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri_ - -Koto-ri being second only to Hagaru as an advance base, Colonel Puller -at times had responsibilities which are usually shouldered by an ADC. -On 29 November he had been the organizer of Task Force Drysdale, and on -6 December it became his task to make ready for the reception of the -10,000 troops from Hagaru. - -Although the Koto-ri perimeter was already overcrowded, Puller directed -that hot food and warming tents be provided for all Hagaru troops upon -arrival. More than 14,000 men would then be organized for the next -stage of the breakout. Strength estimates were as follows:[578] - - [578] Smith, _Notes_, 1069–1071. - - Marine garrison at Koto-ri 2,640 - U. S. Army units at Koto-ri 1,535 - Royal Marine Commandos at Koto-ri 25 - Marines arriving from Hagaru 9,046 - U. S. Army troops arriving from Hagaru 818 - Royal Marine Commandos arriving from Hagaru 125 - ROK police attached to RCT-5 40 - ------- - 14,229 - -Puller dealt with the problem of casualty evacuation at Koto-ri by -ordering that the OY strip be lengthened so that larger aircraft could -land. The engineers of Charlie Company started the job on 6 December, -and progress speeded up as the Dog Company engineers arrived next day -from Hagaru with their heavy equipment. - -The strip had been widened by 40 feet and extended by 300 on 7 December -when the first TBM landed. These planes had been borrowed from the Navy -and 1stMAW administrative flight lines and assigned to VMO-6. They -could fly out several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory -cases. Captain Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., of VMO-6 and First Lieutenant -Truman Clark of VMF(N)-513, evacuated a total of 103 casualties. The -carrier landing training of the Marines stood them in good stead as -Captain Malcolm G. Moncrief, Jr., a qualified landing signal officer -of VMF-312, directed the TBMs to their landings at Koto-ri with -paddles.[579] - - [579] “Carrier Deck,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar - 51), 19–20; 1stMar _SAR_, 23; 2/1 _SAR_, 17–18; 1stEngrBn - _SAR_, 13; 1stMedBn _SAR_, 12; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 17–18; - 1stMAW _SAR_, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d. - -The clearing station established at Koto-ri by Company D of the 1st -Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Gustave T. Anderson (MC), USN -had a normal bed capacity of only 60 but somehow continued to handle -a total of 832 cases, including non-battle casualties. The Company D -medics were assisted during their last few days at Koto-ri by Captain -Hering, the Division surgeon, and Commander Howard A. Johnson (MC), -USN, the CO of the 1st Medical Battalion. Captain Richard S. Silvis -(MC), USN, surgeon of the 2d Marine Division, on temporary duty in -Korea as an observer, also took an active part.[580] - - [580] 1stMedBn _SAR_, 3–7. - -Surgical assistance was welcomed by the Company D medics, since -operations at Koto-ri were performed under the most difficult -conditions. Only tents being available for patients, the hundreds -of casualties brought from Hagaru added to the necessity for speedy -evacuation. About 200 cases were flown out on the 7th by TBMs and -liaison aircraft. By the following morning the engineers had lengthened -the OY strip to 1750 feet, but a heavy snowfall put an end to nearly -all air activity. In spite of the risks involved, one Air Force C-47 -did get through to Koto-ri, where it could be heard but not seen while -circling blindly about the perimeter. By a miracle the plane landed -safely and took off with 19 casualties. The following day saw air -evacuation of casualties in full swing, with about 225 being flown out -to clear the hospital tents of all serious cases.[581] - - [581] _Ibid._ See also Smith, _Notes_, 995–998, 1110–1112. - - -_Activation of Task Force Dog_ - -A large tent in the middle of the perimeter served both as office -and sleeping quarters for General Smith and his staff. Planning was -immediately resumed after they arrived at Koto-ri on the afternoon of 6 -December. Before leaving Hagaru it had been recognized that the enemy -might be saving his main effort for the mountainous ten-mile stretch -from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. In such terrain a mere CCF platoon could -do a great deal of mischief, and the planners agreed that it would be -necessary for 1/1 to attack northward from Chinhung-ni and clear the -road. This meant that the battalion must be relieved by an Army unit, -and a request was made verbally to General Almond.[582] - - [582] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064. - -X Corps had received orders on 1 December for the 3d Infantry Division -to assemble in the Wonsan area prepared for further operations, -possibly to join the Eighth Army in west Korea. Although General Almond -initiated execution of the order immediately, he sent the highest -ranking Marine officer on his staff, Colonel Forney, and the Corps -G-2, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn, to Tokyo to explain the -implications of the withdrawal of this Army division from northeast -Korea. Following a conference with General Hickey, GHQ Chief of Staff, -the Division was released back to X Corps on the 3d, and General Almond -ordered it to return to the Hamhung area to protect this vital port -area and to assist the breakout of the 1st Marine Division by relieving -1/1 at Chinhung-ni.[583] - - [583] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 17–18; - Forney, _Special Report_, 3. - -At 2115 on 6 December the 1st Marine Division requested by dispatch -that the relief be completed the next day in order to free 1/1 for -the attack to the north. The relief column, designated Task Force Dog -and commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, ADC of the 3d -Infantry Division, consisted of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, the -92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, plus detachments of engineers, -signalmen, and antiaircraft troops. Brushing aside some Chinese -roadblocks, it arrived at Chinhung-ni on the afternoon of the 7th and -relieved 1/1 immediately.[584] - - [584] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064; X Corps _Special Report, - Chosin Reservoir_, 20–24; X Corps _OI 26_, 5 Dec 50; - and Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 90; CG - 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps - msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d. - - -_Air Drop of Bridge Sections_ - -Another problem which the 1st Marine Division planners had faced at -Hagaru called for an engineering solution. As early as 4 December the -commanding general was notified that a critical bridge three and a -half miles south of Koto-ri (see Map 29) had been blown by the enemy -for the third time. At this point water from the Chosin Reservoir was -discharged from a tunnel into four penstocks, or large steel pipes, -which descended sharply down the mountainside to the turbines of the -power plant in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road, they -were covered on the uphill side by a concrete gatehouse, without a -floor. On the downhill side was the one-way bridge over the penstocks -which the enemy had thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer -drop down the mountainside there was no possibility of a bypass. Thus -the gap of 16 feet (24 feet, counting the abutments) must be spanned if -the Division was to bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns.[585] - - [585] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based - on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, - 48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73; - Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn - _SAR_, 3–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 361–362, 369; LtCol - J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d. - -Following the destruction of the original concrete bridge, the enemy -had blown a temporary wooden structure and an M-2 steel treadway span -installed by Army engineers. No prefabricated bridging was available at -Hagaru, and time did not permit the construction of a timber trestle -bridge. The possibility of Bailey bridge sections was considered but -rejected for technical reasons. Finally, after a detailed study of -the break from the air on 6 December, Lieutenant Colonel Partridge -estimated that four sections of an M-2 steel treadway bridge would be -required. Prospects did not appear bright when a bridge section was -badly damaged on the 6th after being test-dropped at Yonpo by an Air -Force C-119. Nevertheless, it was decided to go ahead the next day with -the drop at Koto-ri.[586] - - [586] Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge - interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53; 1stEngBn _SAR_, 13–14. - -[Illustration: FUNCHILIN PASS AND ADVANCES OF - -8–10 December - -SEIZURE OF HILL 1081 - - MAP-29 -] - -There were four U. S. Army treadway bridge (Brockway) trucks at -Koto-ri, two of which were operative. After conferring with First -Lieutenant George A. Babe of the 1st Engineer Battalion and Colonel -Hugh D. McGaw of the 185th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA, Partridge -decided to request a drop of eight sections in order to have a 100% -margin of safety in case of damage. - -After analyzing the causes of the unsuccessful test drop, Captain -Blasingame of the Air Delivery Platoon had larger parachutes flown to -Yonpo from Japan, accompanied by Captain Cecil W. Hospelhorn, USA, and -a special crew of Army parachute riggers. Blasingame and a hundred-man -work detail from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion worked all night -at Yonpo to make ready for the drop next day by eight C-119s of the Air -Force. - -At 0930 on 7 December three of the 2500-pound bridge sections were -dropped inside the Koto-ri perimeter and recovered by the Brockway -trucks. The remaining five sections were delivered by noon, one of them -falling into the hands of the Chinese and one being damaged. - -Plywood center sections were also dropped so that the bridge could -accommodate any type of Marine wheel or tracked vehicle. Thus the tanks -could cross on the metal spans only, while the trucks could manage with -one wheel on the metal span and the other on the plywood center.[587] - - [587] Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn, - “Aerial Supply in Korea,” _Combat Forces Journal_, I, no. - 10 (May 51), 29–30. - -All the necessary equipment having been assembled at Koto-ri by the -late afternoon of the 7th, the next problem was to transport it three -and a half miles to the bridge site. Colonel Bowser, the Division -G-3, directed the engineers to coordinate their movements with the -progress made by RCT-7 the following morning. Lieutenant Colonel -Partridge attended a briefing conducted by Colonel Litzenberg on the -eve of the assault, and it was agreed that the trucks with the bridge -section would accompany the regimental train. First Lieutenant Ewald -D. Vom Orde’s First Platoon of Company D engineers was designated as -the escort. First Lieutenant Charles C. Ward’s engineers led the 7th -Marines trains. Both platoons were assigned the task of installing the -bridge sections. - - -_Division Planning for Attack_ - -On the assumption that the gap over the penstocks would be successfully -spanned, the 1st Marine Division issued OpnO 26-50 at 1850 on 7 -December. Although the last operation order had specified the Hamhung -area as the objective, it was found necessary at Koto-ri to give more -explicit instructions for the advance to the southward. - -The plan was simple. Recognizing the sharp cleft of Funchilin Pass as -the most difficult defile of the entire breakout, General Smith ordered -the seizure of the heights overlooking the pass from the north end of -Hill 1081, dominating the road through the pass. In its details the -plan shaped up as follows: - - (1) RCT-7 (reinforced with the Provisional Army battalion) - to attack south from Koto-ri at 0800 on 8 December and seize - Objectives A and B--the first being the southern extension of Hill - 1328, about 2500 yards southwest of Koto-ri, and the other the - second nose due south of Koto-ri. - - (2) RCT-5 to attack and seize Objective D (Hill 1457, two and a - half miles south of Koto-ri) while RCT-7 continued its attack and - seized Objective C (a nose dominating the MSR two and three-fourths - miles south of Koto-ri). - - (3) At 0800, as RCT-7 jumped off at Koto-ri, the 1st Battalion of - RCT-1 was to attack from Chinhung-ni and seize Objective E (Hill - 1081, three miles to the north). - - (4) RCT-1 (less the 1st Battalion but reinforced by 2/31) was to - protect Koto-ri until the Division and regimental trains cleared, - whereupon it was to relieve RCTs 5 and 7 on Objectives A, B, C and - D. - - (5) Upon relief by RCT-1, RCTs 5 and 7 were to proceed south along - the MSR to the Hamhung area. - - (6) RCT-1 was to follow RCT-5 and protect the Division rear.[588] - - [588] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 26-50, 7 Dec 50. The task organization - remained as it was during the move from Hagaru to - Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar _OpnO_ - 16-50, 7 Dec 50; 5thMar _OpnO_ 44-50, 7 Dec 50; and - 7thMar _Frag O_, 7 Dec 50. Other sources for this section - are: 11thMar _SAR_, 9; and Smith, _Notes_, 1062. - -Artillery plans provided for one battery of 2/11 and one of 3/11 to -answer the calls of RCT-7 for supporting fires. The other batteries -of 3/11 were to move south with the motor column while two batteries -of 1/11 supported RCT-5. The remaining battery of 3/11 was attached -to 2/11 with a mission of moving south to Chinhung-ni and taking a -position from which to support the withdrawal of RCT-1 as rearguard. -Easy Battery of 2/11, left behind at Koto-ri, was laid to fire to the -north and west, while Fox Battery of 2/11 and the 92d Armored Field -Artillery Battalion at Chinhung-ni supported the attack of 1/1 on Hill -1081. - -The plan of the 1stMAW for air support was essentially the same as the -one which proved so effective during the advance from Hagaru to Koto-ri. - -An object lesson of that movement had been the personnel and equipment -losses suffered by the Division trains as a consequence of a late -start. The planners were determined not to repeat this mistake. As a -further precautionary measure, General Smith directed that the tanks -form the last elements of the motor column.[589] Thus in the event of a -breakdown on the twisting, single-lane road, it would not be necessary -to abandon all the vehicles behind a crippled tank. - - [589] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100 - 8 Dec 50. - -As for the enemy situation, G-2 summaries indicated that early in -December the CCF 26th Corps, consisting of the 76th, 77th and 78th -Divisions, reinforced by the 94th Division of the 32d Corps, had moved -down from the north and taken positions on the east side of the MSR -between Hagaru and Koto-ri. There they relieved the 60th Division, -which moved into the area south of Koto-ri. The 76th and 77th Divisions -occupied positions along the MSR in the Koto-ri area, while the 78th -and 94th Divisions were apparently held in reserve. Elements of the -89th Division, operating from the mountainous area southwest of -Koto-ri, conducted harassing operations against the MSR in the vicinity -of Chinhung-ni as well as Koto-ri. - -The 60th CCF Division held prepared positions on the high ground -south of Koto-ri commanding Funchilin Pass and the MSR leading to -Chinhung-ni. That these positions included Hill 1081, the dominating -terrain feature, was revealed by prisoners taken in the vicinity by -patrols of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, prior to 8 December. - - -_Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm_ - -Division plans had not called for the swirling snowstorm which reduced -visibility to 50 feet and precluded air support at first light on 8 -December. In spite of weather conditions, the assault battalions of -RCT-7 moved out from Koto-ri on schedule after 1/1 attacked northward -from Chinhung-ni. - -The planners had realized that the success of the movement to -Chinhung-ni would depend to a large extent on the seizure of Objective -E--Hill 1081. On 2 December Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a -reconnaissance patrol into Funchilin Pass as far north as this -position. Sighting large numbers of Chinese on both sides of the road, -he called for artillery fires with good effect. This reconnaissance did -much to establish Hill 1081 as the key terrain feature. - -Although 1/1 had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged in -no large-scale actions so far in the Reservoir campaign. The men were -fresh, well-rested and spoiling for a fight when they moved out at 0200 -on 8 December from an assembly area south of Chinhung-ni after being -relieved by Task Force Dog. - -Schmuck’s battle plan provided for the three companies to advance in -column along the MSR in the predawn darkness. Since orders were to -attack at 0800, a start at 0200 was considered necessary in order to -make the six-mile approach march. - -Captain Wray’s Charlie Company, in the lead, was to take Objective 1, -the southwestern nose of Hill 1081, and hold it while the other two -companies passed through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow’s -Able Company was to attack east of the MSR and fight its way to the -summit of Hill 1081; and Captain Noren’s Baker Company to advance to -the left flank, along the slopes between Barrow and the MSR.[590] - - [590] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived - from the following sources: _Ibid._; 1stMar _SAR_, 19–20, - 24–26; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_; Bates interv, 16 Mar - 53, 108–112, Geer, _The New Breed_, 364–368; Col D. M. - Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv, - 8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the - two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in - the _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23, - and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14 - Dec 56. - -The combination of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to zero -as 1/1 set out along the slippery MSR five hours before daybreak. All -heavy equipment had been sent to the rear from Chinhung-ni, and the -only vehicles were two ambulances and a radio jeep. - -In the snow-muffled silence of the night the men took on protective -coloring as feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective 1 was -seized shortly after dawn, following a difficult approach march against -negligible resistance. The battalion commander prepared for the next -phase by bringing up 81mm mortars and an attached platoon of 4.2s and -emplacing those weapons in Wray’s position. He also directed that the -five attached Army self-propelled quad-.50 caliber and twin 40mm guns -of B Company 50th AAA (AW) Bn be moved to a little rise off to the -left of the road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang. From this -position they covered the MSR as far as the bridge over the penstocks. - -At 1000 the main attack was set in motion. Baker Company advanced along -the wooded western slope of Hill 1081 as Barrow attacked up the hogback -ridge leading to the summit. The snowstorm fought on the side of the -Marines by hiding their movements from the Chinese occupying the high -ground east of the MSR around the great horseshoe bend where the road -passed under the cable car line. - -Noren’s men saw hundreds of enemy footprints but met only scattered -opposition until they came to the first CCF roadblock on their left -flank. There they were stopped by two machine guns, but a Marine patrol -worked around on the uphill side and routed the Communists with a -machine gun and 60mm mortar attack. - -In the absence of air and artillery support, the 4.2s and 81mm mortars -emplaced in the Charlie Company position were called upon whenever -visibility permitted. Surprise was Noren’s best resource, however, when -Baker Company came up against the CCF bunker complex on the western -slope of Hill 1081. The enemy had so little warning that the Marines -found a kettle of rice cooking in the largest bunker, an elaborate -log and sandbag structure which had evidently been a CCF command -post. The entire complex was taken after a brief but savage fight in -which all defenders were killed or routed. Schmuck set up his CP in a -captured bunker, where he and his officers soon discovered that several -regiments of Chinese lice had not yet surrendered. - -Only enough daylight was left for the sending out of patrols, whereupon -Noren secured for the night. His losses amounted to three killed and -six wounded. - -Barrow’s men had no physical contact with Baker Company while clawing -their way upward along an icy ridge line too narrow for deployment. -A sudden break in the snow afforded the Able Company commander a -glimpse of a CCF stronghold on a knob between him and his objective, -the topographical crest of Hill 1081. The drifting flakes cut off the -view before he could direct mortar fire, but Barrow decided to attack -without this support and rely upon surprise. Advancing in column along -the steep and narrow approach, he sent Lieutenant Jones with two squads -of the 2d Platoon to execute a wide enveloping movement on the left. -Lieutenant McClelland’s 1st Platoon had a similar mission on the right. -Barrow himself led Staff Sergeant William Roach’s 3d Platoon in a front -attack. - -It took more than an hour for the two flanking forces to get into -position. Not until they had worked well around the Chinese bunker -complex did Barrow give the signal for attack. Perhaps because silence -had been enforced during the stealthy advance, the assault troops -yelled like Indians as they closed in on the foe. Out of the snowstorm -Barrow’s men “erupted with maximum violence,” and the enemy was too -stunned to put up much of a fight. The only effective resistance -came from a single CCF machine gun which caused most of the Marine -casualties before Corporal Joseph Leeds and his fire team knocked it -out, killing nine Communists in the process. - -More than 60 enemy bodies were counted after the Marines cleaned out -the bunkers and shot down fleeing Chinese. Barrow’s losses were 10 men -killed and 11 wounded. - -By this time it was apparent that the Chinese had held an integrated -system of bunkers and strong points extending to the summit of Hill -1081. The battalion had been strictly on its own all day, all contact -with the infantry of Task Force Dog having ended with the relief. When -communications permitted, however, 1/1 could count on the excellent -direct support of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, USA, -commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie. The Army cannoneers had -set up near Fox Battery of 2/11, using the fire control data of this -Marine artillery unit. - -The night was clear, promising air and artillery support in the -morning, as Able Company consolidated in the captured CCF positions. -Although the battalion aid station was only 700 yards away, the terrain -was so difficult that litter bearers took several hours to struggle -down with the Marine wounded. About midnight the Chinese interrupted -with an attack in estimated platoon strength, but Barrow’s men drove -them off with CCF losses of 18 killed. - -The rest of the night passed quietly, and Baker Company had no -disturbance on the high ground overlooking the MSR. - - -_Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5_ - -While these events were taking place, the attack to the south from -Koto-ri also fell short of the day’s objectives. Colonel Litzenberg’s -plan called for two of his four battalions (the fourth being the -Provisional Battalion of Army troops) to clear the high ground on -either side of the road so that a third battalion could advance astride -the MSR, followed by the reserve battalion and regimental train. - -Major Morris, commanding 3/7, had been assigned the task of attacking -on the right at 0800 and seizing Objective A, the southernmost of -the cluster of hills known collectively as Hill 1328. He made such -slow progress against CCF and small-arms fire that at 1100 Colonel -Litzenberg suggested the commitments of 3/7’s reserve company. “All -three companies,” replied Morris, “are up there--fifty men from George, -fifty men from How, thirty men from Item. That’s it!”[591] - - [591] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69. - -Early in the afternoon of 8 December, Litzenberg committed his reserve, -2/7, to assist 3/7. Lockwood’s battalion was on the road south of 3/7 -and attacked west in an attempt to get in the rear of the enemy holding -up 3/7. Easy and Fox Companies attacked abreast and by 1800 the two -battalions had joined on the northeastern slopes of the objective. In -view of the approaching darkness, however, the attack was postponed -until morning, and the troops consolidated for the night short of the -objective, which was seized the following morning. - -Litzenberg’s plan for the seizure of the heights overlooking the -northern entrance to Funchilin Pass provided for the Army Provisional -Battalion to take Objective B. The soldiers jumped off at 0800, on the -left of the MSR, supported by two tanks of the 5th Marines AT Company. -By 0900 the battalion had secured its objective without meeting any -resistance. Litzenberg then ordered a further advance of 800 yards to -the northwestern tip of Hill 1457. At 1330 the Army troops secured -their second objective, still without resistance and tied in with 1/5 -for the night.[592] - - [592] FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X - Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 7thMar _SAR_, 25; - 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 17 - Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56. - -Lieutenant Colonel Davis having become regimental executive officer -after Dowsett was wounded, Major Sawyer took over command of 1/7. His -plan called for the battalion to advance about 2000 yards down the road -and wait for 3/7 to come up on his right flank. Then the two battalions -would move along together. - -The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800 and reached its phase line without -opposition. First Lieutenant Bobbie B. Bradley’s platoon advanced down -the road to gain contact with the Chinese while the remainder of the -battalion halted. When 2/7 began its attack in support of 3/7, Sawyer’s -battalion moved out. Bradley’s patrol having run into opposition -from the northern reaches of Hill 1304, Companies A and C moved west -of the MSR in a double envelopment of the enemy position. Company B -continued the advance towards Objective C, meeting a heavy cross fire -from Chinese to their front and on Hill 1304. Lieutenant Kurcaba was -killed and Lieutenants Chew Een Lee and Joseph R. Owen wounded. First -Lieutenant William W. Taylor took command and managed to clear the -enemy from his front just before dusk. - -Able and Charlie Companies faced less resistance in overrunning the -foxholes and two bunkers on Hill 1304. With dusk falling, Sawyer did -not attempt a further advance. Able and Charlie Companies dug in on -Hill 1304 while Baker set up a perimeter slightly short of Objective C. -The first serials of the truck convoy had moved closely on the heels -of 1/7 and had to be backed up to a level area near Objective A. There -they formed a perimeter reinforced with H&S and Weapons Companies of -1/7.[593] - - [593] 7thMar _SAR_, 25; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; CO 1/7 msg to CO - 7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 362–363. - LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56. - -Division OpnO 26-50 had directed Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s RCT-5 to -await orders before attacking Objective D. It was nearly noon on the -8th before the 1st Battalion, in assault, was directed to move out from -Koto-ri. - -Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for a mile, then sent -two companies out to the left to occupy the objective, Hill 1457. -Baker Company seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover -the attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the ridge leading to -the objective. Charlie Company fell in with a patrol from the Army -Provisional Battalion attached to the RCT-7, and the two combined -forces to drive the enemy off the high ground about 1550. A weak -Chinese counterattack was easily repulsed, and at 1700 as darkness fell -Baker and Charlie Companies tied in with the Army troops while Able -Company formed its own perimeter overlooking the MSR. In reserve, the -41st Commando moved into the high ground behind 1/5 to guard against -infiltration.[594] - - [594] 1/5 _SAR_, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8 - Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50; - 5thMar _SAR_, 34; Smith, _Notes_, 1072. - -The day’s story would not be complete without reference to the -Treadway bridge train, which moved out about 1400 on the 8th in the -trace of 1/7. Instructions were to install the sections at the first -opportunity, but the site had not been secured as darkness approached. -A few Chinese mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the vulnerable -Brockway trucks influenced a decision to return them closer to -Koto-ri.[595] - - [595] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3 - 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in G-3 - Journal, X Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs _SAR_, 10. - -Summing up the attacks of 8 December, weather and terrain had done more -than the enemy to prevent all assault units of the 1st Marine Division -from securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been heavy, -however, and for the most part the troops were in a position for a -renewal of their efforts in the morning. - -As for the Koto-ri perimeter, the 8th had passed with only scattered -small-arms fire being received by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st -Marines, in Division reserve. All day the Dog Company roadblock, on -the route to Hagaru, was like a dam holding back the human torrent of -Korean refugees. From this throng rose a low-pitched wail of misery -as homeless men, women, and children huddled without shelter in the -snowstorm of the 8th. It was a distressing spectacle to the Marines in -the perimeter, yet the refugees could not be admitted because of the -probability that Chinese soldiers had infiltrated among them, watching -for an opportunity to use hidden weapons. There was little the Marines -could offer by way of succor except medical care in some instances. -Two women gave birth during the bitterly cold night of the 8th with -the assistance of Navy medics. In the morning the crowd of refugees, -swollen by new arrivals, waited with the patience of the humble to -follow the Marine rear guard to the seacoast.[596] - - [596] 2/1 _SAR_, 18–19. - -White is the color of mourning in Korea, and snowflakes drifted down -gently over the common grave in which 117 Marines, soldiers, and Royal -Marine Commandos were buried on the 8th at Koto-ri. Lack of time had -prevented the digging of individual graves in the frozen soil.[597] -Although the necessity of conducting a mass burial was regretted, all -available space in planes and vehicles was needed for the evacuation of -casualties. - - [597] Smith, _Notes_, 1112–1113; Smith, _Chronicle_, 110. - According to the terms of the Armistice of 27 July 1953, - the remains were delivered to the Americans after the - cease-fire. - - -_Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December_ - -New snow sparkled in the sunlight as the day of 9 December dawned -bright, clear, and cold. A brief reconnaissance convinced Captain Noren -that in the early darkness of the previous evening he had stopped -one ridge short of his objective--the northwest slopes of Hill 1081, -covering the approach to the cable underpass. Baker Company of 1/1 -moved forward without CCF interference to the position. - -Captain Barrow had his men test-fire their weapons before mounting -the final assault on the dominating knob of the hill. This proved to -be a wise precaution, since many of the mechanisms had frozen. After -thawing them out, Able Company attacked in column with the 1st Platoon -in the lead. Although the assault troops had the benefit of excellent -air, artillery, and mortar support, they came under intense small-arms -fire from Communists occupying camouflaged log and sandbag bunkers. -McClelland’s men were hard hit but his left flank squad worked its way -forward in brief rushes to positions within 200 yards of Objective E, -the topographical crest of Hill 1081. At this point Staff Sergeant -Ernest J. Umbaugh organized a squad grenade attack which wiped out the -first CCF bunker. - -A stretch of about 175 yards, swept bare in places by the icy wind, now -lay between the Marines and the final knob. Barrow perceived that this -deadly CCF field of fire could be skirted by troops working their way -around a shelf jutting from the military crest. Under cover of fire -from his 60mm mortars and a strike by four Corsairs, he brought up his -2d and 3d platoons. While McClelland profited by the cover of scrub -trees to come up behind the objective, Jones built up a base of fire to -cover the direct assault of Roach’s platoon as it stormed up the crest. -McClelland had to contend with the enemy’s last-ditch stand in two log -bunkers which the 1st platoon knocked out by tossing grenades through -the embrasures. The Communists resisted to the last gasp, but at 1500 -the Marines were in undisputed possession of Hill 1081. - -Sergeant Umbaugh paid with his life at the moment of victory, and -Barrow had only 111 able-bodied men left of the 223 he had led out -from Chinghung-ni. But the Marines had won the decisive battle of the -advance from Koto-ri; they held the key height dominating Funchilin -Pass, though 530 counted enemy dead testified to the desperation of the -CCF defense. - -Able Company had the most spectacular part, but the victory owed to -the united efforts of all three rifle companies and supporting arms. -While Barrow held the crest of the hill, Noren pushed farther along -the cable car track, meeting stubborn resistance from scattered enemy -groups.[598] - - [598] 1stMar _SAR_, 24–26; Bates interv, 16Mar53, 108–112; - Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last - Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments. - -The collapse of CCF resistance on Hill 1081 had a beneficial effect -on the Marine advance from Koto-ri. RCT-7 continued its attack on the -morning of the 9th with effective air and artillery support. Lieutenant -Hovatter’s Able Company of 1/7 seized the remainder of Hill 1304 while -Lieutenant Taylor’s Baker Company moved south to Objective C. The Army -Provisional Battalion occupied the high ground between Objectives C and -D. - -These movements were carried out against ineffectual enemy resistance -or none at all. Whenever a few Communists dared to raise their heads -along the MSR, the airborne TADC in the R5D had the communications -equipment to control aircraft on station and to direct their employment -in response to ground force units. - -The 1st Battalion of RCT-5 maintained its positions on Objective D -(Hill 1457) all day. At Koto-ri the other two battalions and regimental -headquarters made preparations to move out the following day. - -As a preliminary to the withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) from Koto-ri, the 3d -Battalion was relieved in its positions along the perimeter by the 41st -Commando. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s men then moved out to relieve -3/7 on Objective A and occupy Objective B. The 2d Battalion of RCT-7 -(less a company with the regimental train) outposted the MSR between -Objectives A and C at about 1630.[599] - - [599] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; - 1stMar _SAR_, 25; 3/1 _SAR_, 8; 5thMar _SAR_, 35; 1/5 - _SAR_, 19; Smith, _Notes_, 1077; Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct - 56. - -Captain Morris’ Charlie Company and a platoon of Baker Company, -1/7, moved down the MSR and secured the bridge site after a short -fight. While Charlie Company outposted the area, the Baker platoon -crossed behind the broken bridge and suddenly found about 50 Chinese -in foxholes. “They were so badly frozen,” reported Sawyer, “that -the men simply lifted them from the holes and sat them on the road -where Marines from Charlie Company took them over.”[600] Late in the -afternoon a patrol from 1/7 attempted to make contact with 1/1 by -moving down the MSR. Chinese fire forced the men off the road and -they scrambled across the defile below the overpass and into 1/1’s -lines.[601] - - [600] Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56. - - [601] _Ibid._, Schmuck Comments. - -Lieutenant Colonel Partridge arrived with Weapons Company, 1/7, and the -bridge sections followed in the Brockway truck. Even the enemy lent a -hand when Communist prisoners were put to work as laborers. After the -abutments were constructed, a Brockway truck laid the treadways and -plywood panels in position so that both trucks and tanks could cross. - -At about 1530, three hours after the start, the bridge was in place. -Partridge drove his jeep to the top of the pass to inform Lieutenant -Colonel Banks, Commanding Division Train No. 1, that he could begin the -descent. - -Sawyer’s troops had not been idle that afternoon and a total of about -60 CCF prisoners were taken during attacks to drive the enemy back -from the bridge site. At about 1700 Partridge returned, and an hour -later the first elements of the Division trains began to cross. Only -a few vehicles had reached the other side when a disastrous accident -threatened to undo everything that had been accomplished. A tractor -towing an earth-moving pan broke through the plywood center panel, -rendering it useless. And with the treadways spaced as they were, the -way was closed to wheeled vehicles. - -A first ray of hope glimmered when an expert tractor driver, Technical -Sergeant Wilfred H. Prosser, managed to back the machine off the -wrecked bridge. Then Partridge did some mental calculations and came up -with the answer that a total width of 136 inches would result if the -treadways were placed as far apart as possible. This would allow a very -slight margin at both extremes--two inches to spare for the M-26s on -the treadways; and barely half an inch for the jeeps using the 45-inch -interval between the metal lips on the inboard edges of the treadways. - -Thanks to skillful handling of the bulldozers the treadways were soon -respaced. And in the early darkness Partridge’s solution paid off -when the first jeep crossed, its tires scraping both edges. Thus the -convoy got under way again as an engineer detachment guided vehicles -across with flashlights while Sawyer’s troops kept the enemy at a -distance.[602] - - [602] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65. - -Advance reports of the bridge drop had brought press representatives -flocking to Koto-ri in casualty evacuation planes. David Duncan, of -_Life_, a former Marine, took realistic photographs of the troops which -attracted nation-wide attention. Keyes Beech sent out daily reports -while making notes for a book about his adventures in Korea. Miss -Marguerite Higgins, who refused to be outdone by male colleagues, was -twice requested to leave Koto-ri before nightfall by Marine officers -who respected her pluck as a reporter but felt that the perimeter was -no place for a woman in the event of an enemy attack. - -Hundreds of words were written about the bridge drop. Some of these -accounts were so dramatized as to give Stateside newspaper readers -the impression that the span had been parachuted to earth in one -piece, settling down neatly over the abutments. Headlines reported the -progress of the 1st Marine Division every day, and front-page maps made -every American household familiar with the names of such obscure Korean -mountain hamlets at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. - -General Shepherd and Colonel Frederick P. Henderson flew up to the -perimeter on the 9th for a conference with General Smith. Before their -departure they were informed that all remaining casualties at Koto-ri -would be evacuated that day.[603] - - [603] Smith, _Notes_, 1114; _Chronicle_, 111–112. - -All night long on 9–10 December an endless stream of troops and -vehicles poured across the span that was doubtless the world’s most -famous bridge for the moment. “The sensation throughout that night,” -recalled Lieutenant Colonel Partridge in retrospect, “was extremely -eerie. There seemed to be a glow over everything. There was no -illumination and yet you seemed to see quite well; there was artillery -fire, and the sound of many artillery pieces being discharged; there -was the crunching of the many feet and many vehicles on the crisp snow. -There were many North Korean refugees on one side of the column and -Marines walking on the other side. Every once in a while, there would -be a baby wailing. There were cattle on the road. Everything added to -the general sensation of relief, or expected relief, and was about as -eerie as anything I’ve ever experienced in my life.”[604] - - [604] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66. - -Advancing jerkily by stops and starts, the column met no serious -opposition from Chinese who appeared to be numbed by cold and defeat. -Prisoners taken that night brought the total up to more than a hundred -during the movement from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. Some of them were -suffering from gangrene, the result of neglected frozen limbs, and -others showed the effects of prolonged malnutrition. These captives -testified that CCF losses from both battle and non-battle casualties -had been crippling. - -At 0245 on the morning of the 10th the leading elements of the 1st -Battalion, RCT-7, began to arrive at Chinhung-ni. A traffic regulating -post had been set up at that point the day before by Colonel Edward -W. Snedeker, Division Deputy Chief of Staff, for the purpose of -controlling the movement of Marine units to the south.[605] - - [605] Smith, Notes, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr - 51]. - -The remaining elements of RCT-7 were strung out from Objective C -to the cableway crossing of the MSR. Traffic moved without a hitch -until 0400, when two trucks bogged down in a U-shaped bypass across a -partially frozen stream about 2000 yards beyond the treadway bridge. -Major Frederick Simpson, commanding the 1st Divisional Train, had the -vehicles pushed off to one side while the engineers built up the road. -After a delay of three hours the column got under way again, with the -first vehicles reaching Chinhung-ni at 0830. Ultimately both Division -trains got through without a fight, thanks to avoiding the delays -which had caused so much trouble during the advance from Hagaru to -Koto-ri.[606] - - [606] HqBn _HD Dec 50_, 9; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 13; Simpson interv, - 11 Apr 51; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56. - -Following the trains, the 7th Marines moved through the Pass. -Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood’s 2/7 (less Company E, guarding the -regimental train) led the way for the regimental command group, the -Provisional Army Battalion, 3/7 and the 3d Battalion of the 11th -Marines.[607] - - [607] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 3/11 _SAR_, 9. - -During the early morning hours of the 10th George Company of 3/1 -beat off an attack on Objective A by an enemy force estimated at 350 -men. This was the only noteworthy instance of CCF activity otherwise -limited to scattered shots, and it was believed that the Communists -were side-slipping southward, parallel with the MSR. Confirmation of -that assumption came at 1200, when Able Company of 1/1 sighted Chinese -marching in platoon and company columns through the valley only about -1000 yards east of Hill 1081. Almost simultaneously other dense CCF -columns crossed the field of fire of the attached Army self-propelled -AAA guns while pouring around an adjacent slope. Lieutenant Colonel -Schmuck called immediately for air strikes and artillery fires. Able -Company hit the enemy with 4.2″ and 81mm mortar rounds, and the Army -teams cut loose with .50 cal. and 40mm bursts. The slaughter continued -for an hour as the Chinese kept on moving southward with that fatalism -which never failed to astonish the Marines. - -Baker Company of 1/1 launched an assault with close air support at -1300 on a CCF strong point adjacent to the railroad and north of -the battalion’s positions overlooking the MSR. Noren’s men found -3.5″ rocket launchers their most effective weapon when clearing the -Communists from heavily timbered and sandbagged bunkers. Excellent -close air support was received, though two Marine KIA casualties -resulted from an error by Navy planes.[608] - - [608] 1stMarDiv _PIR 47_. Bates interv, 16Mar53; - Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments. - -All day the seemingly endless column of vehicles and troops wound -southward along the twisting mountain road. At 1030 General Smith -and key members of his staff displaced from Koto-ri and proceeded by -C-47 and helicopter to the rear CP of the Division at Hungnam. By -1800 both Division trains, all elements of RCT-7 and the 1st, 3d, and -4th Battalions of the 11th Marines had closed Chinhung-ni. There the -infantrymen entrucked for Hungnam.[609] - - [609] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 11thMar _SAR_, 9–10; Smith _Chronicle_, - 112; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56. - -The 5th Marines column followed the 7th, with 3/5 leading the way -and 2/5 close behind. Just south of Objective A a brief fire fight -was necessary to silence a CCF machine gun, whereupon the movement -continued without further incident until the two battalions reached -Chinhung-ni at dusk. The 1st Battalion was not relieved by 2/1 until -1800 and did not close Chinhung-ni until the early morning hours of the -11th.[610] - - [610] 5thMar _SAR_, 34–36; 1/5 _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 31; 3/5 - _SAR_, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct - 56. - -The withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) and attached units from Koto-ri commenced -on the afternoon of the 10th. The 3d Battalion, it will be recalled, -had relieved RCT-7 units the day before on Objectives A, B and C, and -the 1st Battalion occupied Objective E. The regimental plan called for -1/1 to hold the Hill 1081 area and protect the MSR until the other -units of the regiment passed through, whereupon Schmuck’s battalion was -to pull out with the tanks at the end of the column as the rear guard. - -The movement from the Koto-ri perimeter commenced at 1500 when H&S -Company of RCT-1 departed. The 2d Battalion (-) of the 11th Marines -fell in behind, followed in order by a detachment of the 185th (C) -Engineers, USA, the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, USA, the 2d -Battalion of RCT-1, the Division Reconnaissance Company and Lieutenant -Colonel Milne’s tank column, consisting of Companies B and D of the 1st -Tank Battalion, the Tank Company of the 31st Infantry, USA, and the -Tank Platoon of the 5th Marines AT Company.[611] - - [611] 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 2/1 _SAR_, 19; 1stMar _(S-3) URpt - 13_, 16–17. The Marine Provisional Tank Platoon had - reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which - had to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded - and integrated with its remaining M4A3 into B and D - Companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s. - -As the last elements left Koto-ri the 92d FA Battalion at Chinhung-ni -began laying heavy concentrations on the evacuated base. Only scattered -shots were received by the tail of the column from Chinese troops -mingling with the Korean refugees. Several small enemy groups on the -flanks of the column were taken under fire and dispersed.[612] But with -3/1 guarding Objectives A, B and C, no serious opposition developed -during the first stage of the withdrawal. - - [612] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A. - Youngdale Comments, 19 Nov 56. - - -_Completion of Division Breakout_ - -At dusk on 10 December all indications made it appear that the movement -of the 1st Marine Division southward would be completed according to -plan with only minor losses of personnel and equipment. Following the -seizure of Hill 1081, casualties had been comparatively light and enemy -resistance ineffectual. Then, between midnight and 0100 on 11 December, -two reverses occurred in areas the Marines supposed to be safe. - -The MSR south of Chinhung-ni was under the protection of troops of the -3d Infantry Division--Task Force Dog at Chinhung-ni, and two battalions -of the 65th Infantry in the vicinity of Sudong and Majon-dong. It was -manifestly impossible, of course, for the Army troops to guard every -yard of the road, for the rugged terrain offered many potential ambush -sites.[613] Guerrilla activity had been reported near Sudong, but the -division trains and the 5th and 7th Marines had passed through without -incident. - - [613] MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D. - Mead, USA, ltr to Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56. - -On the afternoon of the 10th, Korean civilians warned of an impending -attack by Chinese soldiers who had infiltrated into this village. As -previously indicated, Colonel Snedeker had arrived at Chinhung-ni -the previous afternoon. At his suggestion Task Force Dog sent out an -infantry patrol which returned with a report of no enemy activity. - -At dusk an attack on the traffic turnaround outside Sudong caused -Snedeker to halt all traffic at Chinhung-ni until the MSR was cleared. -After a fire fight in the darkness, elements of the 65th Infantry -reported at dusk that the enemy roadblock had been cleared, and the -Marine column resumed its movement southward.[614] - - [614] This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv - _CR, Dec 50_, as occurring at 0130 11 Dec. The account of - the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 1stMar - _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston, - USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L. Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16 - May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr., 6 - Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12 - Incredible Days of Col John Page,” _Readers Digest_, - lxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston - material is in the possession of Capt Canzona. - -During the next few hours Colonel Snedeker’s worst problem was lack -of transport. The Division had requested that the maximum number of -trucks, ambulances and narrow-gauge freight cars be collected at -Majon-dong, the new railhead. Only about 150 trucks were actually made -available, however, 110 of them being from Division service units in -the Hungnam area. - -In spite of this shortage, the flow of traffic was being maintained -when an explosion of CCF activity brought every thing to a stop at -Sudong shortly after midnight. Mountain defiles had usually been the -scene of enemy ambushes, but this time the Chinese swarmed out from -behind houses in the village with grenades and burp guns. Several truck -drivers of the RCT-1 regimental train were killed by the first shots -and their vehicles set on fire. In the flickering light a confused -fight ensued as trucks to the rear stopped. The Marines of the RCT-1 -train resisted as best they could, but leadership was lacking until -Lieutenant Colonel John U. D. Page, USA, and Marine PFC Marvin L. -Wasson teamed up as a two-man task force which routed a group of -about 20 Chinese at the head of the vehicle column. The valiant Army -artillery officer paid with his life, and Wasson received two wounds -from a grenade explosion. Pausing only for first aid, he got back -into the fight as another Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Waldon -C. Winston, commanding the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, USA, -directed a counterattack by Marine and Army service troops. Harry -Smith, a United Press correspondent, also had a part in the action. - -Wasson called for a machine gun to cover him while he fired three white -phosphorus rounds from a 75mm recoilless at a house serving the enemy -as a stronghold. It burst into flames and the survivors who ran out -were cut down by machine-gun fire. The Marine PFC, a jeep driver who -was dubbed “The Spirit of ’76” by Winston, then volunteered to help -push trucks of exploding ammunition off the road. - -Winston gradually brought order out of chaos, but it was daybreak -before the MSR was cleared so that the column could start moving again. -The RCT-1 regimental train had suffered casualties of eight killed and -21 wounded, while equipment losses consisted of nine trucks and an -armored personnel carrier. - -Lack of infantry protection was a factor in another reverse which -occurred at the tail of the Division column. General Smith’s final -orders for withdrawal provided that the tanks were to come out behind -the 1st Marines’ train with the infantry of that regiment bringing up -the rear.[615] Thus a breakdown in the armored column would not block -the road for wheeled vehicles, yet the tanks would have protection -against close-in attack. - - [615] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec - 50. - -The 1st Marines prepared detailed plans for the leapfrogging of -battalions during the final withdrawal phase. In effect these called -for 2/1 to relieve 1/5 on Objective D and remain there until relieved -in turn by 2/31. The Army battalion would hold until 3/1 passed -through, then follow Ridge’s battalion down the MSR. After 2/1, 3/1 and -2/31 had passed through Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck’s positions around -Hill 1081, 1/1 would follow as rear guard.[616] - - [616] 1stMar _OpnO 16-50_, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before - the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group - makes no mention of protecting the armor. - -The first departure from plan occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Sutter -discovered, after starting up Hill 1457, that Objective D was so far -from the road and so steep that most of the night would be required -merely for the battalion to make the climb. No enemy having been -sighted, he asked permission to return to the road and continue along -the MSR. This request was granted by Colonel Puller and 2/1 resumed -the march, followed by 2/11(-), 2/31 and H&S Company of RCT-1 in that -order. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3/1, which remained on Objectives A, -B and C until 2100, fell in at the end of the regimental column.[617] - - [617] 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56. - -About midnight, after waiting for 3/1 to move down the pass, the -tank column began its descent with only Recon Company as protection. -Lieutenant Hargett’s platoon of 28 men guarded the last ten tanks and -the other two platoons screened the middle and head of the column.[618] -Behind the last machine, approaching as close as they dared, were the -thousands of refugees. CCF soldiers had mingled with them, watching -for an opportunity to strike, and Hargett had the task of keeping the -Koreans at a respectful distance. - - [618] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company, - nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were - screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams - Comments, 26 Dec 56. - -Progress was slow as the 40 tanks inched around the icy curves with -lights on and dismounted crewmen acting as guides. Shortly before -0100 the ninth machine from the rear had a brake freeze which brought -the tail of the column to a halt for 45 minutes. The rest of the -tanks clanked on ahead, leaving the last nine stranded along the MSR -southwest of Hill 1457 and about 2000 yards from the treadway bridge. -The enemy took advantage of the delay when five CCF soldiers emerged -in file from among the refugees as a voice in English called that they -wished to surrender.[619] - - [619] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank - column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by - HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman - [sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt - C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K. - A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; _MCB Study_, II-C-111–113; Smith, - _Notes_, 1087; HqBn _URpt 14_; Williams Comments, 26 Dec - 56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56. - -Hargett went to meet them cautiously, covered by Corporal George A. J. -Amyotte’s BAR. Suddenly the leading Chinese stepped aside to reveal -the other four producing hidden burp guns and grenades. Hargett pulled -the trigger of his carbine but it failed him in the sub-zero cold. The -former all-Marine football star then hurled himself at the enemy group, -swinging his carbine. He crushed a Chinese skull like an eggshell, but -a grenade explosion wounded him as the ambush developed into an attack -from the high ground on the flank as well as the rear. - -Before the remaining four Chinese could do Hargett any further harm, -Amyotte shot them down, one by one. The fight turned into a wild melee -in which friend could hardly be distinguished from foe. - -Hargett’s platoon slowly fell back until the last tank was lost to -the enemy along with its crew. The men in the next to last tank had -buttoned up and could not be aroused to their danger by banging on the -hull with rifle butts. While making the effort Hargett was stunned by -an enemy explosive charge which blew PFC Robert D. DeMott over the -sheer drop at the side of the road, leaving him unconscious on a -ledge. The other men of his platoon believed that he had been killed -and continued their withdrawal, only to find the next seven tanks -abandoned with their hatches open. - -Amyotte, wearing body armor, was covering the retirement, firing from -prone, when a CCF grenade exploded after landing squarely on his back. -The Chinese must have suspected black magic when he went on cooly -picking off opponents as if nothing had happened.[620] - - [620] Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical - Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, the ordinary utility - jackets contained thin plates of fiberglas which would - stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred - jackets had been air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division - for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority - during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50 - garments sent to Recon Company were worn in combat. Lynn - Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine Corps - Gazette_, xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of - the development of body armor, one of the most important - tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told - in the next two volumes of this series. - -It was a precarious situation for Hargett and his remaining 24 men. But -they fought their way out without further casualties, and meanwhile -tank crewmen had succeeded in freeing the brake of the lead tank -and driving two tanks down the road. One of them was brought out by -Corporal C. P. Lett, who had never driven before. “I’m going to get -this tank out of here even if I get killed doing it!” he told Hargett. -By sheer determination, coupled with luck, he maneuvered around the -obstacles ahead and down the icy road to safety. - -Captain Gould and his demolitions crew of engineers had been waiting -for hours to blow the treadway bridge after the last elements of the -Division crossed. With the passage of the two tanks and Hargett’s -platoon, it was believed that all Marines who could be extricated were -safely over the span. On this assumption, which later proved to be -erroneous, CWO Willie Harrison set off the demolition charges. - -The losses of the Recon platoon were three men MIA (two of them later -changed to KIA) and 12 wounded. Crews of the two rear tanks were -missing and presumed dead.[621] Hargett’s losses would have been more -severe except for the fact that some of his men were wearing Marine -body armor made of light-weight plastics. - - [621] CO 1stTkBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives - tank personnel losses as 4 MIA. - -To another man of Hargett’s platoon went the distinction of being the -last Marine out at the finish of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. When -durable PFC DeMott recovered consciousness, after being blown over the -brink by the CCF pack charge explosion, he found himself precariously -perched on a ledge overhanging the chasm. Slightly wounded, he -managed to climb back on the road, where he encountered only Korean -refugees. Upon hearing a tremendous detonation he realized that the -bridge had been blown. He remembered, however, that pedestrians could -cross through the gatehouse above the penstocks, and he came down the -mountain with the refugees to Chinhung-ni. There he was given a welcome -befitting one who has cheated death of a sure thing. - -The remaining tanks made it safely to Chinhung-ni without benefit of -infantry protection other than what was afforded by Recon Company.[622] -Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck did not receive a copy of 1stMar OpnO 16-50, -he explained, his only information being a Frag O designating 1/1 as -rear guard and “a hasty, 30-second conference” with Colonel Puller -when the 1st Marine command group passed through. “I was informed,” he -added, “that the tanks were in the rear of the 1st Marines, that 2d Bn, -31st Infantry was bringing up the rear, and that as soon as that unit -passed, I would employ my battalion as rear guard.... No mention at all -was made of the Reconnaissance Company. In order to check off the units -that passed endlessly through my lines, I established a check point at -the incline railway overpass and kept a close record of movement.” - - [622] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement - of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56. - -A great deal of intermingling of units was observed by the 1/1 -commander. At 0300, after sighting the lights of the tanks, he -gave orders for Able Company to commence the withdrawal, in order -“to consolidate my battalion for the rear guard action prior to -daybreak.... When the first tanks reached my position, I was first -startled to find no 2/31 accompanying them and then flabbergasted to -discover that the Recon Company was somewhere out there ‘screening’ the -movement. This canceled my carefully laid covering plan.”[623] - - [623] Schmuck Comments. - -No further trouble resulted for the tanks and Recon Company. Ahead -of them the infantry units continued the movement southward from -Chinhung-ni chiefly by marching because of the shortage of trucks. -Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s men proved that footslogging is not a -lost art by covering the 22 miles from Koto-ri to Majon-dong in a -20-hour hike with packs, heavy parkas, individual weapons and sleeping -bags.[624] - - [624] LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56. - -Battle casualties of the division for the final stage, the attack from -Koto-ri southward, were as follows: - - ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ - Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals[625] - ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ - 8 Dec | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 168 - 9 Dec | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 60 - 10 Dec | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 65 - 11 Dec | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 54 - ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ - Totals | 51 | 24 | 16 | 256 | 347 - ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------ - - [625] DivAdjutant _SAR_, appendix II, 3. - -At 1300 on 11 December the last elements of the Division cleared -Chinhung-ni. Majon-dong had been left behind at 1730 without audible -regrets; and by 2100 all units, with the exception of the tanks, had -reached assigned assembly areas in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. The -armored column arrived at the LST staging area of Hungnam half an hour -before midnight, thus bringing to an end the breakout of the 1st Marine -Division.[626] - - [626] Smith, _Notes_, 1091. - - - - -CHAPTER XV - -The Hungnam Redeployment - -_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st Marine -Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines Arrive at New Assembly -Area--Contributions of Marine Aviation--Losses Sustained by the -Enemy--Results of the Reservoir Campaign_ - - -“Wave and look happy!” These were the first words to greet some of the -weary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. They -grinned obligingly in response to the press photographers snapping -pictures of the motor column from the roadside. They were happy indeed -to be back in a world of hot meals and hot baths. They were happy to be -alive. - -Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing as well as -flattering to learn that such expressions as “epic” and “saga” and -“miracle of deliverance” were being applied to the breakout in American -newspapers. The press correspondents in turn were astonished to learn -that never for a moment had the men doubted that they would slug their -way out to the seacoast. - -“The running fight of the Marines and two battalions of the Army’s 7th -Infantry Division from Hagaru to Hamhung--40 miles by air but 60 miles -over the icy, twisting mountainous road--was a battle unparalleled in -U. S. military history,” commented _Time_. “It had some aspects of -Bataan, some of Anzio, some of Dunkirk, some of Valley Forge, some of -the ‘Retreat of the 10,000’ (401–400 B. C.) as described in Xenophon’s -_Anabasis_.” - -Not until the Marines had fought their way as far as Chinhung-ni, the -weekly newsmagazine continued, did there appear to be much hope that -they would come out as an organized force. Then “for the first time it -looked as if most of the 20,000 [Marines] would get through.”[627] - - [627] _Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine_, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50), - (Pacific Edition), 18–19. - -By reading contemporary press accounts it is possible to recapture -the mood of the American public upon realization of the disaster -which had overtaken the Eighth Army. “It was defeat--the worst defeat -the United States ever suffered,” reported _Time_ in the issue of 11 -December 1950. “The Nation received the fearful news from Korea with a -strange-seeming calmness--the kind of confused, fearful, half-believing -matter-of-factness with which many a man has reacted upon learning that -he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news of Pearl Harbor, nine years ago -to the month, had pealed out like a fire bell. But the numbing facts -of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness slowly -out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques; days passed -before its enormity finally became plain.”[628] - - [628] _Time_, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9. - -_Newsweek_ called it “America’s worst military licking since Pearl -Harbor. Perhaps it might become the worst military disaster in American -history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately -two-thirds of the U. S. Army that had been thrown into Korea might have -to be evacuated in a new Dunkerque to save them from being lost in a -new Bataan.”[629] - - [629] _Newsweek_, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. “Such - quotations,” comments General MacArthur, referring to - the excerpts from _Time_ and _Newsweek_, “certainly - do not reflect the mood of the American public at the - time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible - writers.... Neither [of the two news magazines] had the - slightest access to the basic information and factors - which involved the decisions and operations of our - government and its higher military commanders.... The - unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the - situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing - them with the actual military reports by the commands - involved.” Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, - 17 Oct 56. - -The situation in west Korea was depressing enough. But at least the -Eighth Army had a line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension -that the American public stared at front-page maps showing the -“entrapment” of the 1st Marine Division and attached U. S. Army units -and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases from Korea did -not encourage much expectation that the encircled troops could save -themselves from destruction by any means other than surrender. In -either event the result would be a military catastrophe without a -parallel in the Nation’s history. - -The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the Marines -had seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through Chinese -blocking the route to Hagaru. Then came the thrilling reports of the -air drops of supplies at Hagaru and the mass evacuation of casualties -by air. Much of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wiped -clean by pride as General Smith’s troops fought through to Koto-ri and -Chinhung-ni in sub-zero cold. The air drop of the bridge sections was -a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was now -a fact--the Chosin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted -a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony of -POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF corps was the -annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but the result had -been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation of the -CCF units themselves. - -It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore, that Americans -read about the column of grimy, parka-clad men which came out of the -mountains of northeast Korea on 11 December 1950. They had come out -fighting and they had brought their wounded and most of their equipment -out with them. - - -_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area_ - -As late as 9 December it had been General Smith’s understanding -that the 1st Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector south -and southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam was -notified by X Corps that plans for the defense of the Hungnam area -had been changed, so that the Marines were to embark immediately for -redeployment by water to South Korea. General Smith was informed on the -10th, and so promptly was the new plan put into effect that the first -Marine units were already loading out before the last elements of the -Division arrived at Hungnam.[630] - - [630] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of - its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the - following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50. - EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50. - -No changes were necessary in the plans for the reception of Marine -units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel Snedeker and Colonel -McAllister on orders of General Smith. On 8 December, Snedeker had -issued detailed instructions which designated defensive sectors for -RCT-1 at Chigyong and for RCT-5 and RCT-7 in the vicinity of Yonpo -Airfield. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged with making -such preparations to receive the returning troops as putting up tents, -installing stoves, erecting heads and equipping galleys.[631] - - [631] Smith, _Notes_, 1065–1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: “Plan - for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area,” - 0800 8 Dec 50. - -The Navy, as usual, was ready. On 15 November, it may be recalled, -General Smith had candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic -outlook to Admiral Morehouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was chief of -staff to Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, and Sears served in a like capacity -under Admiral Doyle, CTF-90. This frank discussion had not fallen -upon deaf ears; and on the 28th, only a few hours after the first CCF -attacks at Yudam-ni, ComNavFE alerted CTF-90 as to the possible need -for a redeployment operation by sea. The following day Joy advised that -events in the Chosin Reservoir area made it desirable for ships of -TF-90 to be on six hours’ notice either in Korean waters or at Sasebo, -Japan.[632] - - [632] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this - section is based on the following sources: ComPhibGruOne, - _Action Report, Hungnam_, 1–2, 4–6; Forney _Special - Report_, 5–7; X Corps, _OpnO_ 9, 5 Dec 50; X Corps, - _Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation_, 2–3; X Corps _OI - 27_, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E. - W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56. - -CTF-90 commenced planning immediately for either an administrative or -emergency outloading. His OpnO 19-50, issued on the 28th for planning -purposes, provided for half of the amphibious force to conduct -redeployment operations on the east coast under Doyle as ComPhibGruOne, -while the other half had a similar mission on the west coast under -Admiral Thackrey, ComPhibGruThree. - -At this time ComPhibGruThree and most of the amphibious units were -in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All were directed by -Admiral Joy on the 29th to proceed to Sasebo. - -ComPhibGruOne had just completed the opening of Hungnam as a major -resupply port and was preparing to withdraw to Japan with the remaining -amphibious force. On 30 November, however, the deteriorating situation -of ground forces in Korea made it necessary for all units of TF-90 to -be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared to be more critical on -the west coast, and two-thirds of the smaller amphibious ships were -allotted to the Inchon area while the transports were divided equally -between Inchon and Hungnam. - -The first week of December was devoted to planning and preparing for a -redeployment of X Corps by sea which appeared more likely every day. -Mine sweeping operations were resumed at Hungnam to enlarge the swept -anchorage area and provide swept channels for gunfire support ships. - -X Corps OpnO 9-50, issued on 5 December, provided for the defense of -the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final defense line -about seven miles in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area, -converging on the harbor, were assigned to the following major units -from east to west--1st ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin), 7th -Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division (with the 1st KMC Regiment(-)), -and the 1st Marine Division. The Marine sector included Yonpo Airfield. - -On 8 December a conference held on board the _Mount McKinley_ by -ComNavFE and CTF-90 was attended by Vice Admiral Struble, Com7thFlt, -Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, ComCruDivFive, and Lieutenant General -Shepherd, CG FMFPac. - -General Shepherd was present as “Representative of Commander Naval -Forces, Far East, on matters relating to the Marine Corps and for -consultation and advice in connection with the contemplated amphibious -operation now being planned.”[633] - - [633] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50. - “Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my - command functions,” commented General Shepherd, “I had - been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford - and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall, - I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of - the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the - Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with - these instructions I exercised close overall supervision - of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to - both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the - embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from - Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56. - -General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea and -to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after assembling -in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the 1st ROK Corps as -soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok area. An assembly area -in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from the other units of X -Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division. - -CTF-90 was assigned the following missions: - - (1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of - UN forces in Korea as directed; - - (2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated - embarkation areas; - - (3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports; - - (4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of - friendly units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan; - - (5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations, - including ROK forces and UN prisoners of war; - - (6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other - commands as appropriate; - - (7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or - other designated Korean embarkation area. - -No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and -Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted since -Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not wait on -detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had to be done. - -An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available -source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked, -and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must be -evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains -of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a -comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the -perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against -an enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of -launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the -Hamhung-Hungnam area. - -It was aptly dubbed “an amphibious landing in reverse,” since the -plan called for the methodical shrinking of the perimeter, under -cover of air strikes and naval gunfire, until the last platoon of the -ground forces had embarked. Then would come the grand finale of the -demolitions. - - -_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_ - -The Wonsan evacuation was instructive as a rehearsal for the Hungnam -redeployment. From 2 to 10 December, Lieutenant Colonel Crowe’s 1st -Shore Party Battalion had charge of the outloading while sharing the -defense of the harbor with a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division -and two KMC battalions. Another Marine outfit, Company A of the 1st -Amphibian Truck Battalion, speeded up the operation by making hundreds -of round trips between docks and ships with DUKWs.[634] - - [634] The sources of this section, unless otherwise stated, are - as follows: Forney, _Special Report, 8–18_; _MCB Study_, - II-C-114–115; ComPhibGruOne _Action Report, Hungnam_, - 5–10, 25; 1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_, 1–2; Smith, _Notes_, - 120–1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, _Report on Amphibious - Withdrawal of the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea_, - 1–9; MGCIS-1 _HD, Dec 50_; X Corps _OpnO 10_, 11 Dec 50; - 1stMarDiv _EmbO 3-50_, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct - 56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8 - Dec 56. - -Air cover and naval gunfire from supporting ships of TE-90.21 was so -effective that Wonsan had no enemy interference worth mentioning. -Covering missions continued to be fired until the last friendly troops -withdrew, and operations were completed without the necessity of -destroying UN supplies and equipment. Altogether, 3834 troops, 7009 -Korean civilians, 1146 vehicles, and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo had -been outloaded when the operation was completed on 10 December. One -detachment of Shore Party troops sailed for Pusan with the DUKWs in -preparation for unloading the 1st Marine Division upon its arrival at -that port. - -The Hungnam evacuation plan, as outlined in X Corps OpnO 10-50, issued -on 11 December, provided for the immediate embarkation of the 1st -Marine Division and the 3d ROK Division. A smaller perimeter than -the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th and 3d -Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility. -Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only -reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points. -Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be stepped up as the -perimeter contracted. - -CTF-90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10 December after -approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers -and representatives of X Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of -Staff, X Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer with -responsibility for the operation of the Hungnam port and was assigned -a small staff. Major Richard W. Shutts, of General Shepherd’s party, -was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two more former TTUPac -Marines on the X Corps staff were assigned sections--Major Charles -P. Weiland, the Loading Section; and Major Jack R. Munday, the Navy -Liaison Section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moisell, USA, headed the -Movement Section, and Captain William C. Cool, USA, the Rations Section. - -Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren served as Colonel Forney’s -executive officer until he was incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved -by Lieutenant Colonel Crowe. - -The 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA, was responsible for operation -of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas, and for -furnishing Japanese stevedores, winch operators, cargo handling -equipment, and dunnage. A reinforced company from the 1st Shore Party -Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches while controlling the -lighterage for ships loading in the stream. - -It was decided on 11 December that 1st Marine Division staging to -assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading had to be expedited -so that ships could be used for a second and even third turn-around. -Embarkation Order 3-50, issued by the Division on the 11th, assigned -vehicle and cargo assembly areas to units, and an embarkation control -office was set up in the dock area. - -As compensation for the cramped confines of the Hungnam harbor, the -tidal range was less than a foot as compared to the maximum of 31 -feet at Inchon. And though the docks had space for only seven ships, -Major Weiland planned to double-berth four additional ships and load -them from the outboard side. In addition, 11 LSTs could be handled -simultaneously--seven at GREEN Beach One, and the others at GREEN Beach -Two. - -Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a standby basis, ready to -begin loading at once upon assignment of space by the embarkation -officer. The Division rear CP at Hungnam had become the only CP with -General Smith’s arrival; and on the 11th General Craig, the ADC, -returned from emergency leave. - -General MacArthur flew to Yonpo Airfield on the 11th for a brief -conference with General Almond and approved the X Corps plan. A date of -27 December was set for Corps units to pass under the control of the -Eighth Army in South Korea. - -The outloading of the 1st Marine Division was making good progress on -the 12th when General Smith visited the docks on a tour of inspection. -That evening he and General Shepherd attended a dinner at the Corps CP -in honor of General Almond’s 58th birthday. The Army was represented -by Major Generals Barr, Soule, and Clark L. Ruffner, X Corps Chief of -Staff. - -By the following day the 5th and 7th Marines were ready to sail. -Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning as they went -along. Not knowing in advance what type of ship might be assigned, -they found that carefully calculated stowage diagrams were out of the -question. Under these circumstances, amphibious training and experience -were invaluable. - -Space in the tent city established by X Corps to the rear of the LST -beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation. -Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas to the -beach. - -While the Marines were outloading, the two Army divisions defending -the perimeter had only minor patrol actions. Their artillery supplied -most of the interdiction fires at the outset, with naval gunfire giving -the deep support. Vigorous air support by Navy, Air Force, and Marine -planes also did much to discourage any hostile intentions the enemy may -have had. - -MGCIS-1, the ground control intercept squadron at Yonpo, stopped -directing the high altitude fighters on 11 December and passed over to -the USS _Mount McKinley_ the task of keeping the perimeter clear of -any enemy planes. Over-all control of air still remained ashore with -MTACS-2. - -At 1500 on the 13th General Smith went aboard the USS _Bayfield_ and -opened the Division CP. As his last duty on shore, he attended memorial -services held by the Division at the Hungnam Cemetery. While the -commanding general paid his tribute to the honored dead, Chinese POWs -were making preparations for the interment of the last bodies brought -down from Chinhung-ni. - -The Marine loading was completed on the 14th. At a conference that -day with CTF-90 on board the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith inquired -as to the possibility of having the ships carrying the Marines unload -at Masan instead of Pusan, thus saving a 40-mile movement by truck. -Admiral Doyle pointed out that this procedure was not feasible -because of the lack of lighterage facilities at Masan. The additional -turn-around time, moreover, would have delayed the evacuation of -remaining Corps units. - -The 14th was also the day when Marine air strikes from Yonpo ended -with the departure of the last of the Wing’s land-based fighters for -Japan. Shortly after midnight the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 -passed control of all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy’s Tactical -Air Control Squadron One of TF-90 aboard the USS _Mount McKinley_. The -Marine squadron then set up a standby TACC aboard an LST until the -final withdrawal on 24 December. - -At 1030 on 15 December, as the _Bayfield_ sailed, the curtain went -down on one of the most memorable campaigns in the 175-year history of -the Marine Corps. A total of 22,215 Marines had embarked in shipping -consisting of an APA, an AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7 commercial -cargo ships. - -The Yonpo airlift continued, however, until 17 December when the -field was closed and a temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was -made available to twin-engine R4D’s for the final phase of the air -evacuation. The only Marine units left in Hungnam were a reinforced -Shore Party company, an ANGLICO group and one and a half companies (88 -LVTs) of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the -operational control of X Corps to assist in the outloading of Army -units. Also, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton, commanding MAG-12, had moved -to Hungnam for the final evacuation of his air group from Yonpo and to -arrange for loading its heavy equipment and remaining personnel aboard -SS _Towanda Victory_. Then on 18 December he flew his command post to -Itami.[635] - - [635] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; MAG-12 _WD, Dec 50_. - - -_The Last Ten Days at Hungnam_ - -With ten days remaining for the embarkation of the two Army divisions, -the problem of Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule. But -CTF-90 contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the homeless Koreans -were willing to put up with any hardships to escape from Communist -domination. It became standard practice to embark at least 5000 on -an LST, not counting children in arms, and no less than 12,000 human -sardines found standing room on one commercial cargo ship.[636] - - [636] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are - the same as for the last. - -The most fragile link in the complex chain of operations was -represented by the two 390-ton diesel electric tugs. No others were -available, nor were spare parts to be had, yet both tugs had clocked -more than 5000 running hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed -almost a miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours in -all, and repairs were made with materials at hand. - -On the 18th, when the last ROKs sailed for Samchok, the 7th Infantry -Division was in the midst of its outloading. By 20 December all troops -of this unit had embarked, according to schedule. Responsibility for -the defense of Hungnam then passed to Admiral Doyle as General Almond -and his staff joined CTF-90 on board the flagship _Mount McKinley_. -General Soule’s 3d Division now manned the shore defenses alone.[637] - - [637] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56. - -When the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam, -following the evacuation of Hamhung and Yonpo Airfield, two cruisers, -seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire -front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of -nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support -ships, with the battleship _Missouri_ contributing 162 16-inch rounds -at the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and -12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during the -naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing. - -Seven embarkation sites were employed (see Map 30). From left to right -they were designated as PINK Beach, BLUE Beach, GREEN One and Two -Beaches, and YELLOW One, Two, and Three Beaches. The 7th RCT, holding -the left sector, was to embark from PINK Beach. BLUE and GREEN One -Beaches were assigned to the 65th RCT in the center, while the 15th RCT -had GREEN Two and the three YELLOW Beaches. - -H-hour had been set at 1100 on the 24th, and seven LSTs were beached at -0800 to receive 3d Infantry Division troops. Soon the three regiments -were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering forces while -the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdrawals were -conducted methodically along specified routes by units using marking -panels. Then the battalions themselves pulled out, leaving only seven -reinforced platoons manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment -came to an end when these platoons boarded an LST after a search for -stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful -finish except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on -PINK Beach, resulting in two men killed and 21 wounded. - -All beaches were clear by 1436 on Sunday afternoon, the 24th, with Able -and Baker Companies of the Amtrac Battalion sticking it out to the end. -Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the last -withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops from PINK Beach. -With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition dump explosion -on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were safely reembarked on LSDs at -the finish of the operation.[638] - - [638] 1stAmphTracBn _HD, Dec 50_, 5. - -Remarkably few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping -space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500 -thousand-pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring -demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown -sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which -left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins. - -The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the _Mount McKinley_ about -to sail for Ulsan with CTF-90 and Generals Almond and Shepherd after -an eminently successful operation. It had been pretty much the Navy’s -show, in the absence of enemy interference, and the final statistics -were staggering--105,000 military personnel, 91,000 Korean refugees, -17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo loaded out in -193 shiploads by 109 ships. - -[Illustration: HUNGNAM DOCKS AND BEACHES - - MAP-30 -] - -“With naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead, -we were able to take our time and get everything out,” commented -Admiral Joy on 26 December. “Admiral Doyle has turned in another -brilliant performance. We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk--not even -faintly.”[639] - - [639] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached - report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in _New - York Times_, 27 Dec 50. - - -_Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area_ - -While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam, the -Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to their -new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the ADC, had -gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and made arrangements -for the reception of the Division.[640] - - [640] Smith, _Notes_, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival - of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be - found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series. - -News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the Eighth -Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated that the -advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive shortly. -Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by UN -forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique of 26 -December that operations “were skilfully conducted without loss of -cohesion and with all units remaining intact.... - - In its broad implications I consider that these operations, - initiated on 24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam] - redeployment, have served a very significant purpose--possibly in - general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted - during the course of the Korean campaign. - - The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without - warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command - but without attaining a decision. - - Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or - even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective. - - But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable - period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed - before too late secret political and military decisions of - enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at - surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces - with one mighty extended blow.”[641] - - [641] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50. - -Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal -turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well -as military implications. Press representatives, military critics -and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a -great victory at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that -the Eighth Army withdrawal of November and December was a costly -reverse.[642] - - [642] General MacArthur’s comments are as follows: “This, - again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the - facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders - present.... It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm - and annihilate, through a ‘sneak’ attack, the Eighth - Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming - forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war, - against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be - no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory - advance which uncovered the enemy’s plot before he had - assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic - withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a - ‘Pearl Harbor’ nature.... This was undoubtedly one of the - most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable - with and markedly similar to Wellington’s great Peninsula - withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken - and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I - have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X - Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both - were preserved with practically undiminished potential - for further action. I have always regarded this action, - considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties - and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and - satisfying I have ever commanded.” MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct - 56. - -Marine officers in Korea had no first-hand knowledge of EUSAK -operations. It was obvious, however, that an Eighth Army retirement -south of the 38th Parallel had made it desirable if not actually -necessary for X Corps to withdraw from northeast Korea, even though -General Almond held that a Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter could be defended -throughout the winter. - - -_Contributions of Marine Aviation_ - -The close coordination of aviation with the ground forces in the Chosin -campaign was due in large measure to the assignment of additional -pilots to the 1st Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had -been plucked from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time to -join their battalions before embarking at Inchon. Increasing the number -of FACs to two per battalion did much to bring air support down to the -company level when needed.[643] - - [643] Air Officer _SAR_, 4. - -Air units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names, grid -coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands of the ground -troops. Here the Marine system of the man on the ground talking the -pilot onto the target by reference to visual land marks paid off. - -Cloudy, stormy weather was common. Three night fighter pilots were -lost because of icing, disorientation, and insufficient radio aids -to navigation. Two VMF-212 land-based pilots saved themselves from -destruction only by landing on the _Badoeng Strait_ with their last -drops of gas. - -With the approach of winter and cold weather, aircraft on the landing -strips had to be run up every two hours at night to keep the oil warm -enough for early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped. Planes -skidded on icy runways. Once, after a six inch snow, 80 men and ten -trucks worked all night to clear and sand a 150-foot strip down the -runway at Yonpo.[644] - - [644] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12 - _SAR_, annex C, 10; VMF-214 _SAR_, annex F, 23; 1stMAW - _SAR_, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW - _SAR_, 5–7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d. - -As early as mid-November it once took hours of scraping and chipping -on the _Badoeng Strait_ to clear three inches of glazed ice and snow -off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, and barriers. Planes which -stood the night on the flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar -deck to thaw out. On another occasion VMF-214 had to cancel all flight -operations because 68-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures -covered the _Sicily’s_ flight deck and aircraft with a persistent coat -of ice. - -One pilot of VMF-323 had to return shortly after takeoff because water -vapor froze in his oil breather tube in flight. With the back pressure -throwing oil all over his windshield and billowing black vapor and -smoke out of his cowl, he landed only to have the front of his Corsair -burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the hot exhaust -stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished the fire. - -A hazard as great as being shot down was a crash landing or bail-out -at sea, where the water was cold enough to kill a man in 20 minutes. -Survival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could barely -get into their cockpits. - -Maintenance and servicing problems ashore, complicated by dirt, dust, -and the scarcity of parts, kept mechanics working to the point of -exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the ground crews to refuel and -arm planes by hand, often from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive -crashes, one fatal, were attributed to accumulated water in gasoline. - -Aboard ship until mid-November, VMF-214 was able to keep 91 per cent -of its planes operative. When suddenly deployed ashore to Wonsan, its -aircraft availability dropped to 82 per cent and at Yonpo to 67 per -cent. Once back at sea again in December, it jumped up to 90 per cent. - -Basic difference in close air support doctrine between the Navy and -Marines and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison -between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force commands; -by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force -Operations Center at Seoul; and by indoctrination of non-Marine -units of the X Corps in the Marine-Navy style of close air support. -Difficulties in inter-service communications slowed Fifth Air Force -operations orders to carrier squadrons, both Navy and Marine. Messages -were routed via FEAF and ComNavFe in Tokyo and arrived hours late. -Ashore, even MAG-12 during the first two weeks at Wonsan received -its Fifth Air Force mission orders six to 36 hours late. A direct -radio teletype between 1st MAW and 5thAF headquarters alleviated the -situation. And when the CG 1st MAW received full control of the air -over the X Corps area on 1 December, these problems were eased. - -Actual control of air support for the scattered ground units -demonstrated close cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. This -was evident from the time the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron One -on the USS _Mount McKinley_ passed control to the Air Defense Section -of MTACS-2 at Hamhung to the time that control returned to the ship in -the Hungnam evacuation. - -When the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an emergency TACC -and acted as a radar reporting station for MTACS-2. When control -was passed back afloat, the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 stood -by as a standby TACC aboard an LST until the last man was pulled -off the beach. Furthermore, three officers from MGCIS-1 went aboard -_Mount McKinley_ to help out as Air Defense controllers. They were -experienced. All through the Wonsan-Chosin campaign, the MGCIS had -directed the defensive fighter patrols, circling Wonsan and Yonpo, to -check all unidentified aircraft before the latter got close enough to -do any damage, MGCIS-1 also steered lost planes to base in bad weather, -occasionally vectored them into the GCA radar-controlled landing -pattern, and even assisted MTACCS-2 in directing air support planes to -FACs.[645] - - [645] MGCIS-1 _HD Dec 50_, 2; MTACS-2 _HD Dec 50_, 7. - -Tactical air support in the X Corps zone was directed to the ground -units by the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. From 26 October to 11 -December, 3703 sorties in 1053 missions were controlled by the TACPs -of Marine, Army, and ROK units. Close air support missions accounted -for 599 of the total (468 for 1st Marine Division, 8 for 3d Infantry -Division, 56 for 7th Infantry Division, and 67 for ROKs). The remaining -454 missions were search and attack.[646] - - [646] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is - based upon Smith, _Notes_, 1149–1161, 1222. - -When FAC communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft became -radio relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the airborne -TADC, orbiting over the road from Hagaru. - -Approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of -non-Marine ground units. The ROK and the U. S. Army units were not as -well supplied with experienced FACs as the 1st Marine Division. In -these areas four Air Force “Mosquitos” (AT-6 “Texan” training planes) -were assigned to X Corps to assist in the control of air support.[647] - - [647] 1stMAW _HDs, Oct-Dec 50_. - -When shore-based Marine air support was about to cease with the closing -of Yonpo air field, VMF-214 and VMF-212 quickly moved their operations -aboard carrier; and during the final phases of the Hungnam evacuation, -almost half of the Marine tactical air strength was operating from -carrier bases. VMF-214 flew back aboard _Sicily_ on 7 December without -missing a mission and VMF-212, which had moved to Itami on 4 December -to draw and test a new complement of carrier Corsairs, was aboard the -USS _Bataan_ eight days later. When the month ended, still another -squadron, VMF-312, was polishing up its carrier landing technique for -seaborne duty.[648] - - [648] VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_, 2. - -The outcome of the Hagaru withdrawal owed much to air-dropped supplies -and to casualty evacuations by General Tunner’s Combat Cargo Command -(CCC). Assisting Combat Cargo in Marine support were the Wing’s R4D -twin engine transports and TBM World War II type torpedo bombers, -both of which were flown largely by the field-desk pilots on the Wing -and Group staffs. Most of the Marines’ share of the heavy airlifting, -however, was done by the four engine R5D transports of Colonel Dean C. -Roberts’ VMR-152. Early in October this squadron had been temporarily -shifted from the trans-Pacific airlift of the Navy’s Fleet Logistics -Air Wing to support the Marines in the Wonsan campaign. In Korea its -operations were controlled by the Combat Cargo Command, which committed -an average of five Marine R5D’s a day into the CCC airlift. In such -missions these transports supported all UN units from Pyongyang to -Yonpo and points north. Marine transports not committed by the CCC -for general UN support in Korea were available for Wing use. From 1 -November until Christmas, VMR-152 safely carried five million pounds of -supplies to the front and evacuated more than 4000 casualties.[649] - - [649] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg - to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152, - 0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 _SAR_, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman - Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when - VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790 - miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of - cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers, - including 4276 casualties. - -The Chosin Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in Marine -aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne TADC to control -the air support of the division column between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni. -The second was the appearance of VMF-311, the first Marine jet squadron -to fly in combat. Beginning on 10 December the newly arrived squadron -flew interdiction missions for four days from Yonpo. Then it moved to -Pusan to operate for the remainder of the month with 5th Air Force jets -streaking up the long peninsula to cover the withdrawal of the Eighth -Army.[650] - - [650] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311 - _HD, Dec 50_. - -Appreciation for the assistance given by Marine aviation to Marine -ground forces was expressed in a letter of 20 December from General -Smith to General Harris, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air -Wing. The Division Commander said: - - Without your support our task would have been infinitely more - difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and - in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or - clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar - of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the - presence of a night heckler was reassuring. - - Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing - proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of - understanding has been established that will never be broken.[651] - - [651] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50. - -The story of air support in the Chosin Reservoir campaign would not -be complete without a summary of the results of VMO-6. Marines took a -proprietary interest in Major Gottschalk’s squadron, which had put -into effect the helicopter techniques worked out at Quantico by the -experimental squadron, HMX-1. Some of these techniques were having -their first test in combat, for the development of rotary-wing aircraft -in 1950 was at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed-wing -aircraft in the first year of World War I. On 28 October, VMO-6 had a -strength of 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, ten light fixed-wing aircraft -(eight OY-2s, two L5Gs) and nine HO3S-1 helicopters. From that date -until 15 December the squadron made 1544 flights for a total of 1624.8 -hours. The principal missions were as follows: - - Reconnaissance--OYs, 393; helicopters, 64; Transportation--OYs, - 130; helicopters, 421; Evacuation--OYs, 29; helicopters, 191; - Liaison--OYs, 35; helicopters, 90; Artillery spot--OYs, 39; - helicopters, 0; Utility--OYs, 26; helicopters, 60; Rescue--OYs, 0; - helicopters, 11.[652] - - [652] VMO-6 _SAR_, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, _Transcript of - Informal Remarks at HQMC_, 17 May 51. - -But statistics can give no idea of the most significant achievement -of VMO-6 in the Reservoir campaign. For during the most critical -period the only physical contact between units separated by enemy -action was provided by the OYs and helicopters. The importance of this -contribution can hardly be overestimated. - - -_Losses Sustained by the Enemy_ - -Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of -the Navy, included a total of 4418 battle casualties from 26 October -to 15 December 1950--604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3508 WIA. The -7313 non-battle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and -indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty.[653] Eight -Marine pilots were KIA or died of wounds, four were MIA, and three -were wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the non-battle -casualties were returned to duty during the operation.[654] - - [653] Smith, _Notes_, 1146–1149. See Appendix E for a - day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties. - - [654] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56. - -Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of -37,500--15,000 killed and 7500 wounded by Marine ground forces, plus -10,000 killed and 5000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance can -be placed in such figures as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy -testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists. This -evidence goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere with the -Hungnam redeployment. - -Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have been candid -in admitting failures and unsparing in self-criticism. Among captured -documents are summaries of the operations of the three CCF armies -encountered by the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. These major -units, representing at least 11 and probably 12 divisions, were as -follows: - - 20th CCF Army--58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions, with the 89th - Division of the 30th Army attached; - - 26th CCF Army--76th, 77th, and 78th Division, with probably the - 94th Division of 32d Army attached; - - 27th CCF Army--79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, with the 70th - Division of 24th Army attached.[655] - - [655] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and - therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of - a U. S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is - derived from the _MCB Study_, II-C-116–125, which in turn - is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations - and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting - of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of - preparing “an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps - forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50–15 Dec - 50.” - -All three armies were major units of the 9th Army Group of the 3d -CCF Field Army. In mid-October the leading elements of the 4th CCF -Field Army had crossed the Yalu to oppose the U. S. Eighth Army. The -operations of X Corps in northeast Korea being considered a threat to -the left flank, the 42d Army was detached with a mission of providing -flank protection, pending relief by units of the 3d CCF Field Army. -Three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th were represented. While -the last hovered on the left flank of the 4th Field Army, the 124th was -hard hit near Sudong during the first week of November by RCT-7 of the -1st Marine Division. - -In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the 125th Division -moved south of Hagaru from the Fusen Reservoir area. Both CCF divisions -then fell back to Yudam-ni, where they were relieved by units of the -20th Army, 3d Field Army. This ended the operations of the 4th Field -Army in northeast Korea. - -Shortly after the appearance of the 20th Army in the Yudam-ni area, the -27th Army moved into positions north of the Chosin Reservoir. Thus the -enemy had available eight divisions for the attacks of 27–28 November -on the Marines in the Yudam-ni area and the three 7th Infantry Division -battalions east of the Chosin Reservoir. If it may be assumed that -these CCF divisions averaged 7500 men each, or three-fourths of full -strength, the enemy had a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve. - -The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish their basic mission, -which prisoners agreed was the destruction of the 1st Marine Division. -In every instance the efforts of the first night were the most -formidable, with enemy effectiveness declining sharply after a second -or third attack. The explanation seems to be that the 12 divisions -were sent into northeast Korea with supplies which would have been -sufficient only if the first attempts had succeeded. The following -comment by the 26th Army supports this conclusion: - - A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it - impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops. - As a result, our soldiers frequently starve. From now on, the - organization of our rear service units should be improved.[656] - - [656] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section - are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group, - Document 204141, “Compilation of Battle Experiences - Reported by Various Armies in their Operation Against - U. S. Forces in Korea.” Among the units covered are the - 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies. - -The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few -potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical -strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated.... -The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we -used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds. - -The enemy’s tactical rigidity and tendency to repeat costly errors are -charged by the 20th Army to inferior communications: - - Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it - took more than two days to receive instructions from higher level - units. Rapid changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion - of our signal communication caused us to lose our opportunities - in combat and made the instructions of the high level units - ineffective.... - - We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but - we failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed - to carry out the orders of the higher echelon. For example, the - failure to annihilate the enemy at Yut’an-ni [Yudam-ni] made it - impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hakalwu-ri [Hagaru]. The - higher level units’ refusal of the lower level units’ suggestion of - rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy one by one - gave the enemy a chance to break out from the encirclement. - -One of the most striking instances of the tactical inflexibility -which stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru. With only a -depleted Marine Infantry battalion and service troops available to -defend a perimeter four miles in circumference, the enemy needed mere -daylight observation to ascertain and avoid the most strongly defended -positions. Yet these were just the positions chosen for the attack, -not only on the first night but also the second occasion 48 hours later. - -“The [CCF] tactics were mechanical,” commented the 27th Army. -“We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and -consequently the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower -echelon units were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance -between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations -of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close, -and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was -not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net and suffered -heavy casualties.” - -Summing up the reasons why the Marines at Yudam-ni were not -“exterminated promptly,” the 27th Army concludes that it was “because -our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions -and the troops suffered too many casualties.” This would seem to be -another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine -Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt. -At any rate, evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly to -crippling losses both from Marine fire power and non-battle casualties -chargeable to lack of equipment and supplies. - -The 20th Army had a hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper care -of wounds. Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated by typhus or -ailments of malnutrition and indigestion. - -More than 90 per cent of the 26th Army suffered from frostbite. The -27th Army complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties alone out of a -strength of four divisions: - - The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough - houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was - the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel - (more than 10 thousand persons), the weapons were not used - effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow-covered ground - during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in - one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades; - the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar - tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells - failed to detonate; skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and - the mortar tubes. - -Testimony as to the effects of Marine fire power is also given by the -26th Army: - - The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and - airplanes is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for - the depth, the enemy carries with him automatic light firearms - which, coordinated with rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are - disposed at the front line. The characteristic of their employment - is to stay quietly under cover and open fire suddenly when we come - to between 70 and 100 meters from them, making it difficult for our - troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us. - -The 20th and 27th Armies appear to have been bled white by the losses -of the first week. Early in December, units of the 26th Army appeared -on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and this unit -furnished most of the opposition from 6 to 11 December. - -Seven divisions in all were identified by the 1st Marine Division; and -since the taking of prisoners was not a matter of top priority with -men fighting for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were -encountered. The CCF 9th Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned -on 7 December, included a total of 12 divisions. This POW gave the -following statement: - - Missions of the four (4) armies in 9th Group are to annihilate the - 1st Division which is considered to be the best division in the - U. S. After annihilating the 1st Marine Division they are to move - south and take Hamhung.[657] - - [657] 1stMarDiv PIR 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by - the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the - 30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been - attached to each of the other three armies. - -As to the reason why the Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam -redeployment, there seems little doubt that the 9th Army Group was too -riddled by battle and non-battle casualties to make the effort. This is -not a matter of opinion. Following the Hungnam redeployment, as the U. -S. Eighth Army braced itself to meet a new CCF offensive, UN and FECOM -G-2 officers were naturally concerned as to whether the remaining 9th -Army Group troops in northeast Korea would be available to strengthen -the CCF 4th Field Army. It was estimated that only two weeks would -be required to move these troops to West Korea, where they had the -capability of reinforcing the CCF attack against the Eighth Army. - -Efforts to locate the 9th Army Group were unavailing for nearly three -months. Then a prisoner from the 77th Division of the 26th Army was -captured by U. S. Eighth Army troops on 18 March 1951. During the -following week POW interrogations established that three divisions of -the 26th Army were in contact with Eighth Army units northeast of Seoul. - -“The only conclusion to be drawn,” comments the _Marine Corps Board -Study_, “based on information collected by 1stMarDiv and X Corps, -and that by UN and FEC, is that all corps of 9th Army Group had been -rendered militarily ineffective in the Chosin Reservoir operation and -required a considerable period of time for replacement, re-equipment, -and reorganization.”[658] - - [658] _MCB Study_, II-C-125. - -Thus it appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the -Chosin Reservoir fights; they also saved U. S. Eighth Army from being -assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the CCF offensive -which exploded on the last night of 1950. - - -_Results of the Reservoir Campaign_ - -There could be no doubt, after taking into account the CCF mission, -that the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, had sustained a reverse in -northeast Korea which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand, it -might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such as the Marine -breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed, could be -termed a victory. - -This question involves issues too complex for a clearcut positive -answer, but it would be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in -the _Marine Corps Board Study_: - - Although the operations of this phase constitute a withdrawal, - despite the fact that CG 1stMarDiv characterized them as “an attack - in a new direction,” the withdrawal was executed in the face of - overwhelming odds and conducted in such a manner that, contrary to - the usual withdrawal, some very important tactical results were - achieved. These may be summarized as follows: - - 1. Extricated 1stMarDiv from a trap sprung by overwhelming enemy - ground forces by skilful employment of integrated ground and air - action which enabled the Division to come through with all operable - equipment, with wounded properly evacuated and with tactical - integrity. - - 2. Outfought and outlasted at least seven CCF divisions under - conditions of terrain and weather chosen by the enemy and reputedly - to his liking. Although frostbite took a heavy toll of the Division - it hit CCF units far harder, perhaps decisively. - - 3. In the process of accomplishing “2” above, rendered militarily - non-effective a large part of 9th CCF Army Group. Those units not - contacted by 1stMarDiv were fixed in the Chosin Reservoir area for - possible employment against the Division and consequently suffered - from the ravages of sub-zero cold and heavy air attacks. - - 4. As a direct result of “3” above, enabled X Corps to evacuate - Hungnam without enemy interference and, consequently, as a combat - effective unit with all personnel and serviceable equipment. - Pressure on X Corps by 9th CCF Army Group during the seaward - evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult operation, would - undoubtedly have altered the result.[659] - - [659] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted, - are from the _MCB Study_, II-C-125–127. - -Improvisations in tactics were now and then made necessary by unusual -conditions of terrain, weather or enemy action. But on the whole the -Marines saved themselves in the Reservoir campaign by the application -of sound military tactics. In the doing they demonstrated repeatedly -that the rear makes as good a front as any other for the militarily -skilled and stout-hearted, and that a unit is not beaten merely because -it is surrounded by a more numerous enemy. - -Inevitably the Marine campaign has been compared to that classic of all -military breakouts--the march of the immortal Ten Thousand which is -the subject of Xenophon’s _Anabasis_. Stranded in the hostile Persian -Empire in the year 401 B. C., these Greek mercenaries cut their way to -safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the tactics -used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisophus to overcome road blocks -in mountain country will have a familiar ring to Marine veterans of the -Reservoir: - - The enemy, by keeping up a continuous battle and occupying in - advance every narrow place, obstructed passage after passage. - Accordingly, whenever the van was obstructed, Xenophon, from - behind, made a dash up the hills and broke the barricade, and freed - the vanguard by endeavoring to get above the obstructing enemy. - Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisophus, in the same - way, made a detour, and by endeavoring to mount higher than the - barricaders, freed the passage for the rear rank; and in this way, - turn and turn about, they rescued each other, and paid unflinching - attention to their mutual needs.[660] - - [660] Xenophon, _The Anabasis of Cyrus_, Henry C. Dakyns, - trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, _The Greek Historians_, (2 - vols., New York, 1942), II, 297–298. - -Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazookas and machine -guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the Reservoir breakout were -essentially those which served Xenophon and the Ten Thousand more -than 33 centuries ago. Organization, combat, training, spirit, and -discipline enabled the Marines, like the Hellenes before them, to -overcome numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic mountain roads -to the sea. - -The over-all strategic effects of the Reservoir campaign, as summarized -by the Marine Corps Board Study, were as follows: - - 1. Played a prominent part ... in enabling X Corps, a considerable - segment of the total UN forces in Korea, to be withdrawn from - Hungnam as a combat effective force available for employment - with the Eighth Army in South Korea at a time when that Army was - retreating and was in critical need of a reinforcement. - - 2. Were largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF - forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when - such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference - between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation - therefrom, by being instrumental in rendering 9th CCF Army - Group, a force of three corps of four divisions each, militarily - noneffective for a minimum period of three months. - -That the breakout of the 1st Marine Division had affected American -political and military policy at the highest levels was the assertion -of an editorial in _Time_. Referring to what it termed the “Great -Debate,” in December 1950, as to whether American forces should be -withdrawn from Korea, the news-magazine commented: - - When the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the - “unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their - equipment, their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia - took on a different look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels - of the Hungnam action contributed more to forming U. S. policy - than all the words in the “Great Debate.” The nation--and the - revitalized Eighth Army--now knows that U. S. fighting men will - stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity is - found to punish Communist aggression.[661] - - [661] _Time_, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51). - -General Douglas MacArthur as CINCUNC, in his 11th report of operations -of UN forces in Korea, submitted the following to the United Nations -Organization regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation: - - In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements - of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in - bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against - opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist Force divisions - which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part - to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The - basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage - displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their - integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior - forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded - had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and - equipment to the enemy. - - United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close - support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming - numbers of Chinese Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by - the United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the - successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the - Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support - provided by the United States Marine Air Force and Naval Aircraft - in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground - force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of - tactical air operations in history.[662] - - [662] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC _11th Report of the - Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces_, 31 Jan - 51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit - Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished - Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW. - -Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful evacuation at -Hungnam in large measure to the Marine breakout. Writing to General -Smith several months later, he asserted that he had “filled in what has -been a neglected page in the story of the Hungnam redeployment. It is -simply this: that the destruction of enemy forces wrought by the First -Marine Division on the march down the hill was a major factor in the -successful withdrawal; and that the destruction was so complete the -enemy was unable to exert serious pressure at any time on the shrinking -perimeter. To my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the performance of -the First Marine Division on that march constitutes one of the most -glorious chapters in Marine Corps history.”[663] - - [663] RAdm T. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51. - -Letters of commendation were received by the 1st Marine Division from -General Cates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General Collins, -Chief of Staff, USA, General Almond, and many other high-ranking -military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for sincerity and emotion, -there was no message which appealed more to the officers and men of -the Division than the concluding paragraph of this tribute from the -commanding general who had guided their destinies with unswerving -courage and who had come out with them, Major General Oliver P. Smith: - - The performance of officers and men in this operation was - magnificent. Rarely have all hands in a division participated so - intimately in the combat phases of an operation. Every Marine - can be justly proud of his participation. In Korea, Tokyo and - Washington there is full appreciation of the remarkable feat of the - division. With the knowledge of the determination, professional - competence, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed - by officers and men of this division, my feeling is one of humble - pride. No division commander has ever been privileged to command a - finer body of men.[664] - - [664] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50. - - - - -APPENDIX A - -Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations - - - ADC--Assistant Division Commander. - AdmO--Administrative Order. - AF--Air Force. - AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship. - AH--Hospital Ship. - AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon. - AirO--Air Officer. - AirSptSec--Air Support Section. - AKA--Assault Cargo Ship. - AKL--Cargo, Ship, Light. - AM--Minesweeper. - AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion. - AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion. - AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper. - ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. - AP--Transport. - APA--Assault Transport. - APD--High Speed Transport. - ARG--Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship. - ARL--Landing Craft Repair Ship. - ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion. - ARS--Salvage Vessel. - AT--Antitank. - ATF--Ocean Tug, Fleet. - AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company. - AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company. - BB--Battleship. - BLT--Battalion Landing Team. - Bn--Battalion. - Btry--Battery. - BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. - C-47--Douglas Transport (same as R4D). - CA--Heavy Cruiser. - CCF--Chinese Communist Forces. - CG--Commanding General. - CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA. - CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East. - CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. - CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. - CL--Light Cruiser. - CO--Commanding Officer. - Co--Company. - ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing. - ComNavFE--Commander Naval Forces Far East. - ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet. - ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One. - ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet. - ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort Force. - CP--Command Post. - CR--Command Report. - C/S--Chief of Staff. - CSG--Combat Service Group. - CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. - CTF--Commander Task Force. - CTG--Commander Task Group. - CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier. - CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier. - DD--Destroyer. - DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer. - DE--Destroyer Escort. - Det--Detachment. - DMS--High Speed Minesweeper. - DOW--Died of Wounds. - EmbO--Embarkation Order. - EmbO--Embarkation Officer. - EngrBn--Engineer Battalion. - EUSAK--Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. - FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA). - FAC--Forward Air Controller. - FEAF--Far East Air Force. - FECOM--Far East Command. - F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Fighter-Bomber. - FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. - FO--Forward Observer. - FragOrder--Fragmentary Order. - Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon. - GHQ--General Headquarters. - Gru--Group. - H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company. - HD--Historical Diary. - Hedron--Headquarters Squadron. - HMS--Her Majesty’s Ship. - HMAS--Her Majesty’s Australian Ship. - HMCS--Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship. - HMNZS--Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship. - HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter. - HQBn--Headquarters Battalion. - HQMC--Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps. - InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA). - Interv--Interview. - ISUM--Intelligence Summary. - JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. - JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff. - JMS--Japanese Minesweeper. - JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group. - JTF--Joint Task Force. - KIA--Killed in Action. - KMC--Korean Marine Corps. - Ln--Liaison. - LSD--Landing Ship, Dock. - LSM--Landing Ship, Medium. - LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket. - LST--Landing Ship, Tank. - LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank--Casualty Evacuation. - LSU--Landing Ship, Utility. - Ltr--Letter. - LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked. - MAG--Marine Aircraft Group. - MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing. - MS--Manuscript. - MedBn--Medical Battalion. - MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company, USA. - MIA--Missing in Action. - MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA). - MP--Military Police. - MRO--Movement Report Office. - msg--Message. - MSR--Main Supply Route. - MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service. - MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron. - MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion. - NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group. - NavFE--Naval Forces Far East. - NCO--Noncommissioned Officer. - NK--North Korea(n). - NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army. - N.d.--Date not given. - N.t.--Time not given. - O--Officer; Order. - OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA). - OI--Operation Instruction. - OpnO--Operation Order. - OpnPlan--Operation Plan. - OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion. - OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane. - PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel. - PF--Frigate. - PhibGru--Amphibious Group. - PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report. - PLA--People’s Liberation Army. - Plat--Platoon. - POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants. - POR--Periodic Operation Report. - POW--Prisoner of War. - QMPetDistCo--Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Company (USA). - QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA). - R4D--Douglas Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47). - RCT--Regimental Combat Team. - Recon--Reconnaissance. - Reinf--Reinforced. - RktBn--Rocket Battalion. - RM--Royal Marines. - ROK--Republic of Korea. - R & O File--Records and Orders File. - ROKA--Republic of Korea Army. - ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy. - SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator. - SAR--Special Action Report. - SCAJAP--Shipping Control Authority, Japan. - SecDef--Secretary of Defense. - ServBn--Service Battalion. - SigBn--Signal Battalion. - SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company. - SitRpt--Situation Report. - SP--Shore Party. - SMS--Marine Supply Squadron. - TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator; Tactical Air Commander. - TACP--Tactical Air Control Party. - Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron. - TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center. - T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS. - TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber. - TE--Task Element. - T/E--Table of Equipment. - Tel--Telephone Message. - TF--Task Force. - TG--Task Group. - TkBn--Tank Battalion. - Trk--Truck. - T/O--Table of Organization. - TU--Task Unit. - UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team. - U/F--Unit of Fire. - UN--United Nations. - UNC--United Nations Command. - URpt--Unit Report. - USA--United States Army. - USAF--United States Air Force. - USMC--United States Marine Corps. - USN--United States Navy. - VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron. - VMF(N)--All-Weather, Fighter Squadron. - VMO--Marine Observation Squadron. - VMR--Marine Transport Squadron. - WD--War Diary. - WD Sum--War Diary Summary. - WIA--Wounded in Action. - YMS--Motor Minesweeper. - - - - -APPENDIX B - -Task Organization 1st Marine Division - - -In order to present a true picture of the Task Organization of the -1st Marine Division during its operations in northeast Korea the -organization will be presented for the following periods: - - 1. Wonsan Landing (OpnO 16-50) - 2. Advance to the Reservoir (OpnO 19-50) - 3. Movement south from Hagaru (OpnO 25-50) - 4. Hungnam Evacuation (OpnO 27-50) - - 1. TASK ORGANIZATION OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION FOR WONSAN LANDING - - _1st Marine Division, (Reinf), FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR - 163rd MISD, USA - 441st CIC Det, USA - 1st SigBn, less dets Maj R. L. SCHREIER - Carrier Plat, FMF - Det, 4th SigBn, USA - 2d SigRepUnit, USA - Det, 205th SigRepCo, USA - 1st ServBn, less dets LtCol C. L. BANKS - 1stMTBn LtCol O. L. BEALL - 1st OrdBn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS - 1st SPBn, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE - SPCommSec, 1stSigBn - Det, 1st CSG - Det, NavBchGru 1 - 1st MedBn, less dets Cdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN - 2d Plat, 560thMedAmbCo, USA - 7thMTBn Maj J. F. STEPKA - 1st CSG, less dets Col. J. S. COOK - 1st Fum&BathPlat, FMF - 1st AirDelPlat, FMF - Plat, 20th QMSubsistSupCo, USA - Plat, 506th QMPetDisCo, USA - NavBchGru 1, less dets - - _Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER - - 1st Marines - Det, 5th KMC Bn - Co C, 1st EngrBn - Co C, 1st MTBn - Co D, 1st MedBn - Plat, 1stArmd AmphBn - Det, 1stSigBn - FO & LnO Secs, 2/11 - LnDet, 1stTkBn - SP Gru B - Det, MP Co - Det, 1st CSG - Det, NavBchGru 1 - - _Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 5th Marines - Co A, 1st EngrBn - Co D, 1st MTBn - Co C, 1st MedBn - Det, 1stSigBn - FO & LnO Secs, 1/11 - SP Gru A - Det, MP Co - Det, 1st CSG - Det, NavBchGru 1 - - _Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 7th Marines - Det, 3d KMC Bn - Co D, 1st EngrBn - Co B, 1st MTBn - Co D, 1st MedBn - Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn - Det, 1st SigBn - FO & LnO Secs, 3/11 - LnDet, 1st TkBn - SP Gru C - Det, MP Co - Det, 1st CSG - Det, NavBchGru 1 - - _11th Marines, Reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER - - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn - 1st AmphTrkCo, FMF - - _1st Tank Battalion_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE - _1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE - _3d KMC Battalion_, less dets Maj KIM YUN GUN - _5th KMC Battalion_, less dets Col KIM TAI SHIK - _1st AmphTracBn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN - _Reconnaissance Company, 1stMarDiv_ 1stLt R. B. CROSSMAN - _VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK - - 2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ADVANCE TO THE RESERVOIR - - _1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, less dets - 163d MISD - 441st CIC Det - 1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets - 1stServBn, Reinf, less dets - Co A. 7th MTBn (less 1 plat) - Det, 1st MTBn - 1st OrdBn - 1stMedBn, less dets - 1st AmphTracBn - Co B, 1st ArmdAmphBn (less 1st Plat) - 7th MT Bn, less dets - 1st CSG, Reinf - 1st AmphTrkCo - 1st AirDelPlat - 1st Fum&Bath Plat - - _Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER - - 1st Marines - 2/11 - Co D, 1st MedBn - Co C, 1st TkBn - Co C, Reinf, 1st EngrBn - Det, 1stSigBn - Det, 1stServBn - Det, MP Co - - _Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 7th Marines - 3/11 - Recon Co, 1stMarDiv - 1st MTBn, less dets - Co D, Reinf, 1st EngrBn - Co E, 1st MedBn - Det, 1stSigBn - Det, MP Co - Det, 1stServBn - - _Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 5th Marines - 1/11 - Co A, Reinf, 1stEngrBn - Co C, 1stMedBn - Co, 1stMTBn - Det, 1stSigBn - Det, MP Co - Det, 1stServBn - - _11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets Col J. H. BROWER - - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn - - _1st Tank Battalion, Reinf_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE - Tk Plat, 5thMar - Tk Plat, 7thMar - - _1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE - _VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK - - 3. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MOVEMENT SOUTH FROM HAGARU - - (Except where noted the organization remained the same for the - movement south from Koto-ri.). - - _1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH - - HqBn, Reinf, less dets - 163d MISD - 181st CIC - 1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets - 1st ServBn, Reinf, less dets - Co A, 7thMTBn, less dets - AutoSup Co, 1stMTBn - AutoMaint Co, 1stMTBn - 1stOrdBn, less dets - 1stMedBn, Reinf, less dets - 1st Fum&Bath Plat - 2d Plat, 506thMedAmbCo, USA - (under opn control X Corps) - 1stAmphTracBn, Reinf, less dets - 1st CSG, Reinf - 7thMTBn, less dets - Co A, 1stAmphTracBn - 1st AirDel Plat - 1stSPBn (under opn control 3dInfDiv) - 1stTkBn, less dets - VMO-6 - - _Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 5th Marines, less Tk Plat - 1/11 - Btry D, 2/11 (released to RCT 1 on - passage through Koto-ri) - 11th Marines, Reinf, less dets - 4/11, less Btry L - Det, 96th FABn, USA 3/1 (released to RCT 1 on - passage through Koto-ri) - Det, 1stSigBn - Tk Co, 31st Inf, USA - Prov Plat, 1stTkBn - Co A, 1stEngrBn (released to RCT 1 on - passage through Koto-ri) - Det, 1stEngrBn - 41 Commando, RM - Division Train 2 LtCol H. T. MILNE - Traffic Plat, MP Co - Det, 513th TrkCo, USA - Det, 1stMTBn - Co D, 10thEngr(C)Bn, USA - Det, 1stMedBn - Det, 1stServBn - Det, 1stSigBn - Det, 515th Trk Co, USA - - _Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11 - Btry L, 4/11 (released to RCT 1 on - arrival Koto-ri) - ProvBn, 31st Inf, USA - Det, 1stSigBn - Co D, 1stTkBn - Co D, Reinf, 1stEngrBn - Division Train 1 LtCol C. L. BANKS - Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv - Det, Hq X Corps - Det, 1stServBn - Det, 1stOrdBn - Det, 7thMTBn - Det, X Corps Ord Co, USA - MP Co, 1stMarDiv, less dets - 1stMTBn, less dets - Det, 1stSigBn - AirSptSec, MTACS-2 - Det, 1stMedBn - - _Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER - - 1st Marines, less 3/1 and Tk Plat - 2/31, Reinf, USA - 2/11, less Btry D (Btry D attached on passage - Koto-ri) - Btry L, 4/11 (Btry L attached on arrival - Koto-ri) - Cos A & B, 7thMTBn - Co C, Reinf, 1stMTBn - Det, 1stSigBn - Det, 1stServBn - Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv - Det, 1stOrdBn - Cos B & D, 1stMedBn - Recon Co, 1stMarDiv - Det, 1stEngr Bn - Det, 7th Mar - Det, 41 Commando, RM (released to 41 Commando on - passage Koto-ri by RCT 5) - Co B, Reinf, 1stTkBn - Misc elms, USA - - 4. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM EVACUATION. - - _Forward Echelon_ BrigGen E. A. CRAIG - - _Main Body, 1st Marine Division_, MajGen O. P. SMITH - - _Reinf, FMF_, less dets - - _Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG - - 7th Marines, less Tk Plat - 3/11 - Co D, 1stEngrBn - 1st CSG, less dets - Det, HqBn - 1stServBn - Co A, 7th MTBn - Det, 1stSigBn - 1stMedBn, Reinf - 1st Fum&Bath Plat - - _Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY - - 5th Marines - 1/11 - 41 Commando, RM - Co A, 1stEngrBn - 1stOrdBn - 1stMTBn - Det, 1stSigBn - - _Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER - - 1st Marines - 2/11 - Co C, 1stEngrBn - 1stTkBn - Tk Plat, 5th Mar - Tk Plat, 7th Mar - Det, 1stSigBn - - _HqBn, Reinf_, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR - - 1stSigBn, less dets - 163d MISD, USA - 181st CIC Det, USA - - _11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets LtCol C. A. YOUNGDALE - - Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn - 1st EngrBn, less dets - 7thMTBn, less dets - ANGLICO, 1stSigBn - - _1stSPBn_, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE - - _1st AmphTracBn, Reinf, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN - - Co A, Reinf, 1stAmphTrkBn, FMF - Co B, 1stArmdAmphBn, FMF - - - - -APPENDIX C - -Naval Task Organization - - -1. _Wonsan Landing_ - - JTF 7 VAdm A. D. Struble - TF 90 Attack Force RAdm J. H. Doyle - TG 91.2 Landing Force (1st MajGen O. P. Smith - MarDiv) - TE 90.00 Flagship Element - _Mount McKinley_ 1 AGC - TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Cdr T. H. Moore - Element - TU 90.01.1 TacRon 1 - TU 90.01.2 TacRon 3 - TE 90.02 Naval Beach Group Capt W. T. Singer - Element - TU 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit - TU 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr M. C. Sibisky - TU 90.02.3 Boat Unit One LCdr H. E. Hock - TU 90.02.4 Amphibious LCdr M. T. Jacobs, Jr. - Construction Bn. - TU 90.02.5 Underwater LCdr W. R. McKinney - Demolitions Team Unit - TG 90.1 Administrative Group RAdm L. A. Thackery - TE 90.10 Flagship Element Capt J. B. Stefonek - _Eldorado_ 1 AGC - TU 90.1.1 Medical Unit - _Consolation_ 1 AH - _LST 898_[665] - _LST 975_[665] 2 LST - TU 90.1.2 Repair and Salvage Capt P. W. Mothersill - Unit - _Lipan_ - _Cree_ - _Arikara_ 3 ATF - _Conserver_ 1 ARS - _Askari_ 1 ARL - _Gunston Hall_ - _Fort Marion_ - _Comstock_ - _Catamount_ - _Colonial_ 5 LSD - Plus other units as assigned - TU 90.1.3 Service Unit LCdr J. D. Johnston - 15 LSU - TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt V. R. Roane - TE 90.21 Transport Division Capt S. G. Kelly - ABLE - _Bayfield_ - _Noble_ - _Cavalier_ - _Okanogan_ 4 APA - _Washburn_ - _Seminole_ - _Titania_ - _Oglethorpe_ - _Archenar_ 5 AKA - _Marine Phoenix_ 1 T-AP - TE 90.22 Transport Division Capt A. E. Jarrell - BAKER - _Henrico_ - _George Clymer_ - _Pickaway_ - _Bexar_ 4 APA - _Union_ - _Algol_ - _Alshain_ - _Winston_ - _Montague_ 5 AKA - _Aiken Victory_ 1 T-AP - _Robin Goodfellow_ - 1 Commercial freighter - TG 90.3 Tractor Group Capt R. C. Peden - _Gunston Hall_[666] - _Fort Marion_[666] - _Comstock_[666] - _Catamount_[666] - _Colonial_[666] 5 LSD - _LST 1123_ - _LST 715_ - _LST 742_ - _LST 799_ - _LST 802_ - _LST 845_ - _LST 883_ - _LST 898_ - _LST 914_ - _LST 973_ - _LST 975_ - _LST 1048_ 12 LST - 23 SCAJAP LSTs 23 LST - TG 90.4 Control Group LCdr C. Allmon - _PCEC 896_ 1 PCEC - TU 90.4.1 Control Unit Lt S. C. Pinksen - BLUE - _Wantuck_ 1 APD - TU 90.4.2 Control Unit Lt A. C. Ansorge - YELLOW - _Horace A. Bass_ 1 APD - TG 95.6 Minesweeping and Capt R. T. Spofford - Protection Group - _Collett_ 1 DD - _Diachenko_ 1 APD - _Doyle_ - _Endicott_ 2 DMS - _Pledge_ - _Incredible_ 2 AM - _Kite_ - _Merganser_ - _Mockingbird_ - _Osprey_ - _Redhead_ - _Chatterer_ 7 AMS - HMS _Mounts Bay_ - HMNZS _Pukaki_ - HMNZS _Putira_ - _LaGrandiere_ (French) - 4 PF - 8 Japanese mine sweepers - 4 Japanese mine destruction - and buoying vessels - 1 ROKN 1 AKL - Plus other units assigned - TG 90.6 Reconnaissance Group Cdr S. C. Small - _Horace A. Bass_ - _Wantuck_ 2 APD - UDT 1 - UDT 3 2 UDT - TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble - _Badoeng Strait_ - _Sicily_ 2 CVE - _Taussig_ - _Hanson_ - _George K. Mackenzie_ - _Ernest G. Small_ - _Southerland_ - _Rowan_ 6 DD - TG 95.2 Gunfire Support Group RAdm G. R. Hartman - _Helena_ - _Rochester_ - _Toledo_ 3 CA - HMS _Ceylon_ 1 CL - HMS _Cockade_ - HMCS _Alhabaskan_ - HMAS _Warramunga_ - 3 DD of DesRon 9 6 DD - LSMR 401[667] - LSMR 403[667] - LSMR 404[667] - -2. _Hungnam Evacuation_ - - TF 90 Amphibious Force, Naval Forces Far East RAdm J. H. Doyle - TE 90.00 Flagship Element - _Mount McKinley_ - TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element Cdr R. W. Arndt - TacRon ONE - TE 90.02 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr L. C. Conwell - _Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG - _Askari_ ARL - _Bolster_ - _Conserver_ 2 ARS - _Tawakoni_ ATF - TE 90.03 Control Element LCdr C. Allmon - _Diachenko_ - _Begor_ 2 APD - PCEC 882 PCEC - TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt S. G. Kelly - TE 90.21 Transport Element Capt A. E. Jarrell - _Bayfield_ - _Henrico_ - _Noble_ 3 APA - _Winston_ - _Seminole_ - _Montague_ 3 AKA - _Begor_ - _Diachenko_ 2 APD - PCEC 882 PCEC - _Fort Marion_[668] - _Colonial_[668] - _Catamount_[668] 3 LSD - LST 742 - LST 715 - LST 845 - LST 802 - LST 883 - LST 799 - LST 898 - LST 914 - LST 975 - LST 973 - LST 1048 11 LST - - TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group RAdm R. H. Hillenkoetter - _St. Paul_ - _Rochester_ 2 CA - _Zellars_ - _Charles S. Sperry_ - _Massey_ - _Forrest Royal_ 4 DD - LSMR 401 - LSMR 403 - LSMR 404 3 LSMR - - Plus DD as assigned from TG 95.2 - TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and RAdm J. M. Higgins - Minesweeping Group - _Rochester_ CA - _English_ - _Hank_ - _Wallace L. Lind_ - _Borie_ 4 DD - _Sausalito_ - _Hoquiam_ - _Gallup_ - _Gloucester_ - _Bisbee_ - _Glendale_ 6 PF - - TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group Capt R. T. Spofford - _Endicott_ - _Doyle_ 2 DMS - _Incredible_ AM - _Curlew_ - _Heron_ 2 AMS - - TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble - _Badoeng Strait_ - _Sicily_ 2 CVE - _Bataan_ CVL - _Lofberg_ - _John A. Bole_ - _Mackenzie_ - _Taussig_ - _Ernest G. Small_ - _Brinkley Bass_ - _Arnold J. Isbell_ 7 DD - _Hanson_ DDR - - Vessels attached TF 90 for - operational control. - - _Missouri_ BB - _Duncan_ DDR (from 10 Dec) - _Foss_ DE (from 9 Dec) - _Consolation_ - AH (from 2 Dec) - - - [665] Reported to CTG 95.2 upon arrival at objective area. - - [666] Carrying 3 LSU. - - [667] Reported to CTF 90 when released by CTG 95.2. - - [668] 3 LSU embarked - - - - -APPENDIX D - -Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division[669] - - - ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+------- - |Organic |Attached|Attached| | - Date | USMC | U. S. | Royal |Attached| - |and USN | Army |Marines | KMC | Total - ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+------- - 8 Oct 50 | 23,533 | 78 | 0 | 2,159 | 25,770 - 26 Oct 50 | 23,608 | 83 | 0 | 1,588 | 25,279 - 27 Nov 50 | 25,166 | 73 | 234 | 0 | 25,473 - 5 Dec 50 | 21,551 | 2,535 | 157 | 0 | 24,243 - 8 Dec 50 | 21,039 | 2,448 | 157 | 0 | 23,644 - 15 Dec 50 | 19,362 | 14 | 144 | 0 | 19,520 - ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+------- - - [669] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex A (G-1), 4. - - - - -APPENDIX E - -1st Marine Division Casualties[670] - - - --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- - | | | | | Non-battle - Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | casualties - --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- - 8Oct50 | | | | | 21 - 9Oct50 | | | | | 12 - 10Oct50 | | | | | 11 - 11Oct50 | | | | | 35 - 12Oct50 | | | | | 23 - 13Oct50 | | | | | 5 - 14Oct50 | | | | | 5 - 15Oct50 | | | | | 4 - 16Oct50 | | | | | 3 - 17Oct50 | | | | | 5 - 18Oct50 | | | | | 2 - 19Oct50 | | | | | 1 - 20Oct50 | | | | | 4 - 21Oct50 | | | | | 1 - 22Oct50 | | | | | 2 - 23Oct50 | | | | | 1 - 24Oct50 | | | | | 5 - 25Oct50 | | | | | 12 - 26Oct50 | | | | | 43 - 27Oct50 | 22 | | 4 | 44 | 54 - 28Oct50 | 1 | | | 3 | 68 - 29Oct50 | | | | | 115 - 30Oct50 | 1 | | | 5 | 52 - 31Oct50 | | | | | 36 - 1Nov50 | | | | | 29 - 2Nov50 | 22 | 2 | | 67 | 64 - 3Nov50 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 162 | 93 - 4Nov50 | 17 | 4 | | 84 | 126 - 5Nov50 | 1 | 1 | | 23 | 94 - 6Nov50 | 5 | 1 | | 38 | 87 - 7Nov50 | 15 | | | 60 | 51 - 8Nov50 | 1 | 2 | | 17 | 50 - 9Nov50 | 2 | 7 | | | 50 - 10Nov50 | 3 | | | 20 | 57 - 11Nov50 | 8 | | | 16 | 48 - 12Nov50 | 2 | | | 4 | 40 - 13Nov50 | 7 | | | 9 | 63 - 14Nov50 | | | | | 66 - 15Nov50 | | | | 1 | 172 - 16Nov50 | 1 | | | 2 | 136 - 17Nov50 | | | | 2 | 77 - 18Nov50 | | | | | 79 - 19Nov50 | | | | 1 | 58 - 20Nov50 | | | | | 46 - 21Nov50 | 4 | | | 5 | 63 - 22Nov50 | | | | | 65 - 23Nov50 | 1 | | | 3 | 58 - 24Nov50 | 3 | | | 8 | 51 - 25Nov50 | | | | 8 | 55 - 26Nov50 | 2 | | 1 | 5 | 68 - 27Nov50 | 37 | 1 | 17 | 186 | 96 - 28Nov50 | 95 | 3 | 43 | 539 | 259 - 29Nov50 | 60 | 14 | 42 | 396 | 105 - 30Nov50 | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 102 - 1Dec50 | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 134 - 2Dec50 | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 180 - 3Dec50 | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 196 - 4Dec50 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 582 - 5Dec50 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 81 | 469 - 6Dec50 | 32 | 4 | 7 | 212 | 262 - 7Dec50 | 51 | 16 | | 281 | 304 - 8Dec50 | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 170 - 9Dec50 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 224 - 10Dec50 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 266 - 11Dec50 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 308 - 12Dec50 | | 2 | 4 | 3 | 123 - 13Dec50 | | | | 1 | 52 - 14Dec50 | | | | | 103 - 15Dec50 | | 1 | | | 34 - 16Dec50 | | | | | 90 - 17Dec50 | | | | 1 | 105 - 18Dec50 | | | | | 282 - 19Dec50 | | | | | 202 - 20Dec50 | | | | | 151 - 21Dec50 | | | | 1 | 111 - 22Dec50 | | | | | 68 - 23Dec50 | | | | 3 | 79 - 24Dec50 | 1 | | | 10 | 42 - --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- - Total | 604 | 114 | 192 | 3,485 | 7,338 - --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+----------- - - [670] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E, appendix 2 (Casualty - Reporting Section, 12Jan51); Smith, _Notes_, 1147–1149. - - - - -APPENDIX F - -Command and Staff List - -8 October-15 December 1950 - - -1ST MARINE DIVISION - - Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith - Assistant Division Commander BrigGen Edward A. Craig - Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams - Deputy Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker - G-1 Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 28 Nov) - LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold - G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. - G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr. - G-4 Col Francis A. McAlister - - -_Special Staff_ - - Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello - Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp - Artillery Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov) - Col Carl A. Youngdale - Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. - Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper - Chaplain Cdr Robert H. Schwyhart (ChC), USN - Chemical Warfare and - Radiological Defense Officer Maj John H. Blue - Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith (DC), USN - Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse - Engineer Officer LtCol John H. Partridge - Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C. Conley - Food Director Maj Norman R. Nickerson - Inspector Col John A. White - Historical Officer 2dLt John M. Patrick - Legal Officer LtCol Albert H. Schierman - Motor Transport Officer Maj Henry W. Seeley - Naval Gunfire Officer LtCol Loren S. Fraser - Ordnance Officer Capt Donald L. Shenaut - Provost Marshal Capt John H. Griffin - Public Information Officer Capt Michael Capraro (to 6 Nov) - Maj Carl E. Stahley - Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe - Signal Officer LtCol Albert Creal - Special Services Officer Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 29 Nov) - LtCol John M. Bathum - Supply Officer Col Gordon S. Hendricks - Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering (MC), USN - Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne - - -_Attached Units_ - - Commanding Officer, 163d Military - Intelligence Specialist - Detachment, USA Capt Fujio F. Asano, USA - Commanding Officer, 181st Counter - Intelligence Corps Detachment, - USA Maj Millard E. Dougherty, USA - Commanding Officer, 41st - Independent Commando, - Royal Marines LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM - - -_Headquarters Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Maj Frederick Simpson - Commanding Officer, - Military Police Company Capt John H. Griffin - Commanding Officer, - Reconnaissance Company 1stLt Ralph B. Crossman (to 23 Nov) - Maj Walter Gall - - -_1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Lewis B. Puller - Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert - S-1 Capt William G. Reeves - S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian - S-3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan - S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Frank P. Tatum - Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch - Mortar Company Capt Frank J. Faureck - Commanding Officer, Antitank - Company Capt George E. Petro - - -_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Jack Hawkins (to 7 Nov) - LtCol Donald M. Schmuck - Executive Officer Maj Maurice H. Clarke - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt William B. Hopkins - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Robert H. Barrow - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Wesley Noren - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Robert P. Wray - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj William T. Bates, Jr. - - -_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter - Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Raymond Dewees, Jr. - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Welby W. Cronk - Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Charles D. Frederick (to 6 Nov) - 1stLt Harold B. Wilson (6–17 Nov) - Capt Jack A. Smith - Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Goodwin C. Groff - Commanding Officer, Weapons Maj Whitman S. Bartley (to 16 Nov) - Company Capt William A. Kerr - - -_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge - Executive Officer Maj Reginald R. Myers - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Thomas E. McCarthy - Commanding Officer, G Company Capt George C. Westover (to 30 Oct) - Capt Carl L. Sitter - Commanding Officer, H Company Capt Clarence E. Corley - Commanding Officer, I Company 1stLt Joseph R. Fisher - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj Edwin H. Simmons - - -_5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray - Executive Officer LtCol Joseph L. Stewart - S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed - S-2 Maj William C. Easterline - S-3 Maj Theodore J. Spiker - S-4 Maj Harold Wallace - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Harold G. Schrier (to 9 Oct) - Capt Jack E. Hawthorn - Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch - Mortar Company 1stLt Robert M. Lucy - Commanding Officer, Antitank - Company 1stLt Almarion S. Bailey - - -_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton (to 17 Nov) - LtCol John W. Stevens, II - Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Walter E. G. Godenius - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt John R. Stevens (to 17 Nov) - Capt James B. Heater - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Francis I. Fenton (to 13 Oct) - 1stLt John R. Hancock - Commanding Officer, C Company 1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (to 6 Nov) - Capt Jack R. Jones - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj John W. Russell - - -_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise - Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 12Nov) - Maj Glen E. Martin (13–21Nov) - Maj John L. Hopkins - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company 1stLt David W. Walsh (to 8 Oct) - Capt Franklin B. Mayer - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Samuel S. Smith - Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 12 Dec) - Capt Lawrence W. Henke, Jr. - Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Uel D. Peters (to 6 Dec) - 1stLt Charles “H” Dalton - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj James W. Bateman (to 10 Oct) - Maj Glen E. Martin (11 Oct-12 Nov) - Maj James W. Bateman (13–21 Nov) - Maj Glen E. Martin - - -_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett - Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney (to 28 Nov) - Maj Harold W. Swain - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Roland A. Marbaugh (to 4 Dec) - Capt Raymond H. Spuhler - Commanding Officer, G Company 1stLt Charles D. Mize (to 17 Nov) - Capt Chester R. Hermanson (18 Nov-2 - Dec) - 1stLt Charles D. Mize - Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Donald E. Watterson (to 8 Nov) - Capt Harold B. Williamson - Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Harold G. Schrier - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj Murray Ehrlich (to 18 Nov) - Maj Harold W. Swain (19–28 Nov) - 1stLt Hubert J. Shovlin - - -_7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr. - Executive Officer LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to 7 Dec) - LtCol Raymond G. Davis - S-1 Capt John R. Grove - S-2 Capt Donald R. France (to 6 Dec) - S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II - S-4 Maj David L. Mell (to 22 Nov) - Maj Maurice E. Roach - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Nicholas L. Shields (to 3 Dec) - Maj Walter T. Warren (4–7 Dec)[671] - Maj Rodney V. Reigard[672] - Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch - Mortar Company Maj Stanley D. Low (to 2 Nov) - 1stLt Gordon Vincent (3–18 Nov) - Maj Rodney V. Reigard - Commanding Officer, Antitank - Company 1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 20 Oct) - Maj Walter T. Warren (21 Oct-8 Dec) - 1stLt Earl R. DeLong - - -_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 7 Dec) - Maj Webb D. Sawyer - Executive Officer Maj Raymond V. Fridrich - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Elmer L. Starr (to 22 Nov) - 1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt David W. Banks (to 20 Nov) - 1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Myron E. Wilcox, Jr. (to 27 Nov) - 1stLt Joseph R. Kurcaba (27 Nov-8-Dec) - 1stLt William W. Taylor - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt William E. Shea (to 16 Nov) - Capt John F. Morris - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj William E. Vorhies - - -_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 9 Nov) - LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood - Executive Officer Maj Roland E. Carey (to 9 Nov) - Maj Webb D. Sawyer (10 Nov-8 Dec) - Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Walter R. Anderson - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Milton A. Hull (to 28 Nov) - 1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr. - Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Walter D. Phillips, Jr. - (to 28 Nov) - 1stLt Raymond O. Ball (28 Nov) - 1stLt Robert T. Bey - Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Elmer J. Zorn (to 6 Nov) - Capt William E. Barber (7 Nov-3 Dec) - 1stLt John M. Dunne (3–6 Dec) - 1stLt Welton R. Abell - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. (to 12 Nov) - Maj Joseph L. Abel (13–19 Nov) - Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. - - -_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 10 Nov) - LtCol William F. Harris (11 Nov-6 Dec) - Maj Warren Morris - Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 6 Dec) - Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr. - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt Eric R. Haars (to 29 Nov) - Commanding Officer, G Company Capt Thomas E. Cooney (to 27 Nov) - Capt Eric R. Haars (29 Nov-3 Dec) - 1stLt George R. Earnest - Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Howard H. Harris (to 11 Nov) - Capt Leroy M. Cooke (12–27 Nov) - 1stLt Howard H. Harris (27 Nov-1 Dec) - 1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge (1–5 Dec) - 2dLt Minard P. Newton - Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Richard H. Sengewald (to 14 Oct) - 1stLt William E. Johnson - (15 Oct-3 Dec) - 1stLt Alfred I. Thomas - Commanding Officer, Weapons - Company Maj Jefferson D. Smith (to 5 Dec) - 1stLt Austin S. Parker (6–10 Dec) - 1stLt Robert E. Hill - - -_11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov) - LtCol Carl A. Youngdale - Executive Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 30 Nov) - S-1 Maj Floyd M. McCorkle - S-2 Capt William T. Phillips - S-3 LtCol James O. Appleyard - S-4 Maj Donald V. Anderson - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Battery Capt Albert H. Wunderly (to 7 Nov) - Capt Clarence E. Hixson (15–25 Nov) - 1stLt William C. Patton - Commanding Officer, - Service Battery Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 16 Nov) - 1stLt Joseph M. Brent - Commanding Officer, - Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch - Rocket Battalion 1stLt Eugene A. Bushe - - -_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood (to 15 Nov) - LtCol Harvey A. Feehan - Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Battery Capt James W. Brayshay (to 25 Nov) - Commanding Officer, Service - Battery 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch - Commanding Officer, A Battery Capt James D. Jordan - Commanding Officer, B Battery Capt Arnold C. Hoffstetter (to 8 Oct) - Capt Gilbert N. Powell - Commanding Officer, C Battery Capt William J. Nichols, Jr. - - -_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Merritt Adelman - Executive Officer Maj Donald E. Noll (to 25 Oct) - Maj Neal G. Newell - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Battery Capt George J. Batson - Commanding Officer, Service - Battery Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. - Commanding Officer, D Battery Capt Andrew J. Strohmenger (to 8 Dec) - Capt Richard E. Roach - Commanding Officer, E Battery Capt John C. McClelland, Jr. - Commanding Officer, F Battery Capt George J. Kovich, Jr. (to 19 Nov) - 1stLt Howard A. Blancheri - - -_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Francis F. Parry - Executive Officer Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Battery 1stLt Michael B. Weir (to 11 Nov) - 1stLt Eugene H. Brown (12–18 Nov) - 1stLt John J. Brackett - Commanding Officer, Service - Battery Capt Robert A. Thompson (to 17 Oct) - Capt Ernest W. Payne (18 Oct-30 Nov) - Capt Samuel A. Hannah - Commanding Officer, G Battery Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 30 Nov) - Capt Ernest W. Payne - Commanding Officer, H Battery Capt Benjamin S. Read (to 8 Dec) - 1stLt Wilber N. Herndon - Commanding Officer, I Battery Capt John M. McLaurin, Jr. (to 30 Nov) - Capt Robert T. Patterson - - -_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_ - - Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds - Executive Officer Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 8 Nov) - Maj Maurice J. Coffey - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Battery Capt Charles S. Cummings (to 25 Oct) - Capt Paul L. Hirt - Commanding Officer, Service - Battery Capt Armand G. Daddazio - Commanding Officer, K Battery 1stLt Robert C. Messman (to 27 Nov) - 1stLt Robert C. Parrott - (28 Nov-11 Dec) - Capt Arthur D. Challacombe - Commanding Officer, L Battery Capt Lawrence R. Cloern - Commanding Officer, M Battery Capt Vernon W. Shapiro - - -_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. - Executive Officer Maj Arthur J. Barrett - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Frank E. Granucci - Commanding Officer, A Company Maj James P. Treadwell - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Russell Hamlet - Commanding Officer, C Company Maj Arthur J. Noonan - - -_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper - Executive Officer Maj Richard G. Warga - Commanding Officer, - Headquarter Company Capt Roger B. Thompson - Commanding Officer, - Service Company Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr. - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Bernard G. Thobe - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Lewis E. Bolts - - -_1st Combat Service Group_ - - Commanding Officer Col John H. Cook, Jr. - Executive Officer LtCol Edward A. Clark - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Francis L. Miller - Commanding Officer, - Maintenance Company Maj Edward H. Voorhees - Commanding Officer, - Supply Company Maj Robert W. Hengesback - Commanding Officer, Support - Company Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr. - Commanding Officer, Truck Company Capt John A. Pearson (to 11 Nov) - 2dLt Alan G. Copp (11–30 Nov) - Capt Jack W. Temple - Commanding Officer, 1st - Fumigation and Bath Company 1stLt James L. Dumas - Commanding Officer, 1st Air - Delivery Platoon Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame - - -_1st Engineer Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge - Executive Officer Maj Richard M. Elliott - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt James H. McRoberts (to 20 Nov) - Maj Hewitt A. Snow - Capt Edward B. Newton - Commanding Officer, - Service Company Maj James W. McIllwain (to 22 Nov) - Capt Philip A. Terrell, Jr. - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt George W. King (to 2 Dec) - Capt William R. Gould - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Orville L. Bibb - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 12 Nov) - 1stLt Ronald L. Glendinning - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Byron C. Turner - - -_1st Medical Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN - Executive Officer Cdr William S. Francis, USN - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Cdr William S. Francis, USN - Commanding Officer, A Company Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN - Commanding Officer, B Company LCdr James A. Kaufman, USN - Commanding Officer, C Company Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN - Commanding Officer, D Company LCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN - Commanding Officer, E Company LCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (to 15 Oct) - Lt (jg) Ernest N. Grover, USN - (15–30 Oct) - LCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN - - -_1st Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Olin L. Beall - Executive Officer Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr. - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt George B. Loveday - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Arthur W. Ecklund - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt James C. Camp, Jr. - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Garfield M. Randall (to 30 Nov) - 1stLt Norman E. Stow - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Bernard J. Whitelock (9 Dec) - 1stLt Philip R. Hade - Commanding Officer, Automotive - Maintenance Company Maj Edward L. Roberts - Commanding Officer, Automotive - Supply Company 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum - Commanding Officer, Amphibian - Truck Company, FMF[673] Capt John Bookhout - - -_1st Ordnance Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams - Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr. - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Theodore Tunis (to 13 Nov) - Capt Gordon H. Moore - Commanding Officer, - Ordnance Supply Company Capt Russel S. LaPointe (to 5 Dec) - 1stLt Victor F. Brown - Commanding Officer, - Ammunition Company Capt Harvey W. Gagner (to 30 Nov) - 1stLt Charles H. Miller - Commanding Officer, Ordnance - Maintenance Company Capt George L. Williams - - -_1st Service Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Charles L. Banks - Executive Officer Maj John R. Stone - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Morse “L” Holladay - Commanding Officer, - Service Company Capt Robert A. Morehead - Commanding Officer, - Support Company Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 27 Oct) - Capt Thomas M. Sagar - - -_1st Shore Party Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe - Executive Officer LtCol Horace H. Figuers - Commanding Officer, Headquarters - and Service Company Capt William T. Miller - Commanding Officer, A Company Maj William L. Batchelor (to 22 Nov) - Capt Nathaniel H. Carver - Commanding Officer, B Company Maj Henry Brzezinski - Commanding Officer C Company Maj George A. Smith (to 24 Nov) - Maj Murray F. Rose - - -_1st Signal Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Robert L. Schreier - Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Howard K. Alberts (to 14 Nov) - Capt Earl F. Stanley - Commanding Officer, - Signal Company Maj Richard A. Glaeser - Commanding Officer, ANGLICO Maj Fulton L. Oglesby (to 16 Nov) - Maj Frederick M. Steinhauser - - -_1st Tank Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne - Executive Officer Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 1 Dec) - Maj Philip C. Morrell - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company Capt Bruce W. Clarke (to 18 Nov) - 1stLt Frederick L. Adams - Commanding Officer, - Service Company Capt Philip C. Morell (to 1 Dec) - Maj Douglas E. Haberlie - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Gearl M. English (to 1 Dec) - 1stLt Robert J. Craig - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Bruce F. Williams - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Richard M. Taylor - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Lester T. Chase (to 18 Nov) - Capt Bruce W. Clarke (19 Nov-10 Dec) - 1stLt Paul E. Sanders - - -_7th Motor Transport Battalion_ - - Commanding Officer Maj Joseph F. Stepka (to 7 Nov) - LtCol Carl J. Cagle - Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Company 1stLt Reed T. King - Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Ira N. Hayes - Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Clovis M. Jones - Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Fred B. Rogers - Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Joseph L. Bunker - - -_Marine Observation Squadron 6_ - - (Under operational control of - 1stMarDiv and administrative - control of 1stMAW) - Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk - Executive Officer Capt Victor A. Armstrong (to 13 Nov) - Capt Andrew L. McVickers - - -1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING - - Commanding General MajGen Field Harris - Assistant Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman - Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir (8 Oct-1 Nov) - Col Caleb T. Bailey (2 Nov-15 Dec) - Deputy Chief of Staff for - Operations[674] Col Edward C. Dyer - G-1 Col Raymond E. Hopper - G-2 LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr. - G-3 LtCol Howard A. York (to 9 Nov) - LtCol Paul J. Fontana - (10 Nov-28 Nov)[675] - LtCol Howard A. York - (29 Nov-15 Dec) - G-4 Col Thomas J. Noon - Commanding Officer, - Rear Echelon, Itami Col Roger T. Carleson - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Squadron, One Capt Earl “B” Sumerlin, Jr. - - -_Marine Aircraft Group 12_ - - Commanding Officer Col Boeker C. Batterton - Deputy Group Commander LtCol Paul J. Fontana - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Squadron 12 Maj John E. Hays - Commanding Officer, - Service Squadron 12 Maj Claude H. Welch (to 4 Nov) - Maj Charles E. J. McLean - - -_Marine Aircraft Group 33_ - - Commanding Officer Col Frank C. Dailey - Deputy Group Commander LtCol Radford C. West - Commanding Officer, - Headquarters Squadron 33 Capt Walter “L” Hilton - Commanding Officer, - Marine Service Squadron 33 LtCol James C. Lindsay - - -_Squadrons_ - - Commanding Officer, - Marine Fighter Squadron 212 LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski - Commanding Officer, - Marine Fighter Squadron 214 Maj Robert P. Keller (to 2 0Nov) - Maj William M. Lundin - Commanding Officer, - Marine Fighter Squadron 312 LtCol “J” Frank Cole - Commanding Officer, - Marine Fighter Squadron 311 LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (from 8 Nov) - Commanding Officer, - Marine Fighter Squadron 323 Maj Arnold A. Lund - Commanding Officer, - Marine All-Weather Squadron 513 Maj J. Hunter Reinburg (to 4 Nov) - LtCol David C. Wolfe - Commanding Officer, - Marine All-Weather Fighter - Squadron 542 LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr. - Commanding Officer, - Marine Transport Squadron 152 Col Deane C. Roberts - Commanding Officer, - Marine Ground Control - Intercept Squadron 1 Maj Harold E. Allen - Commanding Officer, - Marine Tactical Air Control - Squadron 2 Maj Christian C. Lee - - - [671] Additional duty. - - [672] Additional duty. - - [673] Redesignated Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, - 15 Nov. - - [674] Also Deputy C/S, Air Support, X Corps. - - [675] Additional duty. - - - - -APPENDIX G - -Enemy Order of Battle - - -1. North Korean - -During operations around Wonsan the 1st Marine Division encountered -fragments and stragglers from many NKPA divisions. The organized -elements were chiefly from the 2d, 5th, and 15th Divisions. - -2. Chinese - - 42d Army - 124th Division In action against 7th Marines south of - 370th Regiment Sudong 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions - 371st Regiment of 3–6 Nov. - 372nd Regiment - 125th Division Not in contact. Probably to west of - 373rd Regiment 124th Division. - 374th Regiment - 375th Regiment - 126th Division Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru. - 376th Regiment Never heavily engaged. - 377th Regiment - 378th Regiment - 20th Army - 58th Division First in action at Hagaru 28 Nov. - 172nd Regiment Badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru. - 173rd Regiment - 174th Regiment - 59th Division In contact with 7th Marines southwest - 175th Regiment of Yudam-ni 23 Nov. Later defended - 176th Regiment Toktong Pass. - 177th Regiment - 60th Division In contact with 7th Marines southeast - 178th Regiment of Yudam-ni 25 Nov. Later moved to - 179th Regiment Funchilin Pass area. - 180th Regiment - 89th Division First contacted by 7th Marines west - 266th Regiment of Hagaru 22 Nov. About 2 Dec - 267th Regiment moved south to Majon-dong area. - 268th Regiment - 27th Army - 79th Division Attacked Yudam-ni 27 Nov. - 235th Regiment - 236th Regiment - 237th Regiment - 80th Division Attacked 7th Infantry Division units - 238th Regiment east of Reservoir 27 Nov. - 239th Regiment - 240th Regiment - 81st Division No report of contact until 13 Dec. - 241st Regiment May have been in Yudam-ni area. - 242nd Regiment - 243rd Regiment - 90th Division No contact reported. May have been - 268th Regiment in reserve near Hagaru. - 269th Regiment - 270th Regiment - 26th Army - 76th Division First contacts east of Hagaru 5 Dec. - 226th Regiment Suffered heavy losses around Koto-ri. - 227th Regiment - 228th Regiment - 77th Division First contacts at Hagaru 5 Dec. - 229th Regiment - 230th Regiment - 231st Regiment - 78th Division Not reported in contact. May not - 232nd Regiment have reached area in time for combat. - 233rd Regiment - 234th Regiment - 88th Division Not reported in contact. May not - 263rd Regiment have reached area in time for combat. - 264th Regiment - 265th Regiment - - - - -APPENDIX H - -Air Evacuation Statistics[676] - - - --------+------------------+------------------+-----------+----- - | HAGARU | KOTO-RI | YUDAM-NI | - +----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- - Date | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | HO4S |Total - --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- - 27Nov50 | 19 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21 - 28Nov50 | 24 | 0| 18 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 74 - 29Nov50 | 31 | 0| 16 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 69 - 30Nov50 | 62 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 111 - 1Dec50 | 52 | 157| 2 | 0| 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 222 - 2Dec50 | 0 | 960| 0 | 47| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,007 - 3Dec50 | 0 | 464| 0 | 53| 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 523 - 4Dec50 | 0 | 1,046| 0 | 89| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,135 - 5Dec50 | 0 | 1,580| 0 | 48| 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |1,630 - 6Dec50 | 0 | 137| 0 | 0| 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 140 - 7Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 226| 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 232 - 8Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 - 9Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 21| 277 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 300 - 10Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 12 - --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- - Totals |188 | 4,344| 36 | 484| 304 | 24 | 3 | 112 |5,493 - --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+----- - - [676] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith, - _Notes_, 844; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18. TBM evacuation - included under OY for Koto-ri, 2 to 7 December 1950. - - - - -APPENDIX I - -Unit Citations - - -THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY - -WASHINGTON - -The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the -PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the - -FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED - -for service as set forth in the following CITATION: - - “For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty - in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin Reservoir - and Koto-ri area of Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950. - When the full fury of the enemy counterattack struck both the - Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27 and 28 November 1950, the - First Marine Division, Reinforced, operating as the left flank - division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward - from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications - of hostile forces attacking the Eighth Army and, at the same - time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply - route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to - Chinhung-ni, approximately 35 miles distant. Ordered to withdraw to - Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly units in - the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area, the - Division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy Third - Route Army and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri - and Koto-ri held firmly against repeated and determined attacks by - hostile forces, gallantly fought its way successively to Hagaru-ri, - Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni and Hamburg over twisting, mountainous and - icy roads in sub-zero temperatures. Battling desperately night - and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a - period of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First - Marine Division, Reinforced, emerged from its ordeal as a fighting - unit with its wounded, with its guns and equipment and with its - prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy divisions, together - with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses which - seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces - for a considerable period of time. The valiant fighting spirit, - relentless perseverance and heroic fortitude of the officers and - men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, in battle against - a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with the highest - traditions of the United States Naval Service.” - - The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division - participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea - from 27 November to 11 December 1950: - - ORGANIC UNITS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION: First Marine Division - (less Detachment Headquarters Battalion; Detachment First Signal - Battalion; Detachment First Service Battalion; Detachment - Headquarters and Companies A and C, First Tank Battalion; - Automotive Supply Company, First Motor Transport Battalion; - Automotive Maintenance Company, First Motor Transport Battalion; - Detachment First Ordnance Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and - Company A, First Medical Battalion; First Shore Party Battalion; - 4.5″ Rocket Battery and Service Battery, Fourth Battalion, Eleventh - Marines). - - ATTACHED MARINE CORPS UNITS: Companies A and B, Seventh Motor - Transport Battalion; Detachment Radio Relay Platoon. - - ATTACHED ARMY UNITS: Provisional Battalion (Detachments, 31st and - 32nd Regimental Combat Teams); Company D, 10th Engineer Combat - Battalion; Tank Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Headquarters - Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Company B, 1st Battalion, 31st - Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (less - Company E); 185th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A). - - For the President, - - R. B. ANDERSON - _Secretary of the Navy_ - - - GENERAL ORDERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY - - No. 72 Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1951 - - DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION - -1. The 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, is cited for -outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action -against an armed enemy in the areas of Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru-ri, and -Koto-ri, Korea, during the period 22 November to 14 December 1950. The -historic role of close-support air missions flown by personnel on land -and carrier based aircraft during the operations of the X Corps, United -States Army, contributed immeasurably to the successful withdrawal of -the X Corps when hordes of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops -had encircled their positions endangering the entire operation. In -their magnificent employment of close-support doctrine and in their -exceedingly effective interdiction missions and night combat air -patrols, the 1st Marine Air Wing flew 2,572 day and night sorties -during this period, inflicting 10,313 enemy casualties and destroying -723 buildings, 144 vehicles, 17 tanks, 9 bridges, 4 locomotives, 3 -command posts, 30 boxcars, 47 gun positions, and 19 supply, ammunition, -and fuel dumps. These missions were flown over hazardous mountain -terrain under extremely adverse weather conditions and in the face -of intense enemy antiaircraft and small-arms fire. The normally -ground-based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously improvised -into an airborne center in a C-54 aircraft without appreciable loss -of efficiency in operations and the responsibility for controlling -aircraft was assumed and accomplished in a remarkable manner through -day and night operations by controlling personnel. Airborne tactical -air coordinators also were established to supplement the airborne -center to direct specific strikes in areas not under surveillance of -ground control parties to the end that every available sortie was -utilized to maximum effectiveness. In the evacuation of friendly -casualties by cargo airplanes, the use of helicopters for rescue of air -personnel shot down by the enemy and the evacuation of wounded, and -the high state of aircraft availability maintained by ground personnel -working under hazardous and extremely adverse conditions because of -intense cold, personnel of the entire 1st Marine Air Wing displayed -fortitude, courage, and marked esprit de corps. Although suffering a -considerable loss of personnel and equipment during this trying period, -the morale and effectiveness of the 1st Marine Air Wing were sustained -at a constantly high level. The repeated acts of valor and gallantry by -the officers and men of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, -and their enviable combat record reflect great credit on the members -thereof and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military -service. - -By order of the Secretary of the Army: - - J. LAWTON COLLINS - Chief of Staff, United States Army - - - - -Bibliography - - -Documents - - Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of Special Report, Deputy - Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August-31 December 1950. Interviews - (Korea) File, Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, - G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC Historical). - - Shutts, Richard W. Maj, USMC. Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of - the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea. Copy in Interviews (Korea) - File, HQMC Historical. - - Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the Operations of the - 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean - War, 1950–1951. MS. 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Copy in R&O File, HQMC Historical. - - Read, Benjamin S., Capt, USMC, as told to Hugh Morrow. “Our Guns - Never Got Cold,” _Saturday Evening Post_, 223, no. 40: 32–3 - (April 1951). - - Rigg, Robert B., LtCol, USA. _Red China’s Fighting Hordes._ - Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1951. - - Schnabel, James F., Maj, USA. The Korean Conflict: Policy, - Planning, Direction. MS at OCMH. - - Stiles, Charles R., 1stLt, USMC. “Dead End of Ambush Alley,” - _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 11: 38–45 (November 1951). - - Tallent, Robert W., SSgt, USMC. “New Enemy,” _Leatherneck - Magazine_, 34, no. 2: 12–15 (February 1951). - - Taplett, Robert D., LtCol, USMC, and Maj Russell E. Whipple, USMC. - “Darkhorse Sets the Pace,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 37, no. 6; - 14–23, no. 7: 44–51 (June-July 1953). - - Thomas, R. C. W., Maj, British Army. “The Chinese Communist Forces - in Korea.” _The Army Quarterly_, October 1952, digested in - _Military Review_, 32, no. 11: 87–91 (February 1953). - - Truman, Harry S. _Memoirs_, 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday, - 1955–1956. - - U. S. Department of State. _Guide to the U. N. in Korea._ - Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. State - Department Publications 4229, Far East Series 47. - - ----. _United Nations Actions in Korea._ Washington: U. S. Government - Printing Office, 1951. State Department Publications 4051. - - ----. Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs. _United - States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period - 1944–1949._ Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949. - State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series 30. - - Walker, Richard L. _China Under Communism: The First Five Years._ - New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. - - Westover, John G., Capt, USA, Editor. _Combat Support in Korea._ - Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1955. - - Whitney, Courtney, MajGen, USA. _MacArthur, His Rendezvous with - History._ New York: Knopf, 1956. - - Willoughby, Charles A., and John Chamberlain. _MacArthur - 1941–1951._ New York: McGraw Hill, [1954]. - - Xenophon. _The Anabasis of Cyrus._ Translated by Henry C. Dakyns. - In Francis R. B. Godolphin, Editor. _The Greek Historians._ 2 - vols. New York: Random House, [1942]. - - - - -Index - - - Aid station, 192, 258, 316 - - Aircraft - Air Force and Navy Bombers, 143 - AT-6 (Mosquito), 98, 349 - B-26, 282 - C-47, 69, 138, 246, 247, 278, 279, 281, 282, 308, 323 - C-119, 191, 247, 282, 311 - Carrier planes, 254 - F4U (Corsair), 57, 67, 68, 70, 100, 102, 113, 118, 152, 156, 179, - 193, 194, 218, 222, 224, 238, 255, 257, 263, 266, 268, 271, - 287, 288, 290, 320, 347, 349 - F-51 (Mustang), 190 - HO3S-1 _See_ Helicopters. - L5G, 246, 351 - Marine aircraft, 254, 264, 272 - Mariners, 29 - Navy planes, 325 - Night fighters, 282 - Observation planes (OY-2s), 66–69, 73, 152, 201, 202, 245, 246, 272, - 288, 298, 305, 308, 351 - R4D, 137, 138, 278, 279, 281, 282, 341, 349 - R5D, 32, 191, 279, 296, 321, 349 - Spotter plane, 154 - Sunderlands, 29 - TBM, 307, 349, 368 - Transport planes, Marine, 191 - - Air drop, 68, 69, 191, 194, 243, 247, 250, 275, 277, 280, 282, 283, - 306, 311, 322, 334, 349 - - Air Force, 311 - Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 10, 35, 247 - Combat Cargo Command, 32, 191, 247, 279, 281, 282, 349 - Fifth Air Force, 34, 254, 287, 348, 350 - Commanding general, 33 - Headquarters, 33 - RAAF Australian F-51s (Mustangs), 190 - - Air strikes, 56, 57, 109, 118, 147, 156, 224, 225, 230, 231, 238, 251, - 258, 264, 265, 268, 271, 273, 288, 290, 320, 324, 326. _See - also_ Air Support. - - Air strip - C-47, 149 - OY strip (Yudam-ni), 253 - OY strip (Hagaru), 137 - OY strip (Majon-ni), 63 - - Air support, 54–56, 108, 109, 190, 194, 243, 253, 268, 286, 296, 302, - 313, 320, 321, 339, 340, 343, 349, 350. _See also_ - Air Strikes. - Breakout, 286, 287 - Close, 70, 100, 102, 117, 152, 217, 254, 255, 263, 272, 286, 296, - 299, 325, 348, 358 - Evacuation, 278, 279, 281, 285, 308, 341 - Observation, 163 - Procedures, 33 - Reconnaissance, 152, 163 - - Air operations, 349 - Cargo, 349 - Control, 348, 349 - Air Defense Controllers, 348 - Cover, 338 - Innovations, 350 - Problems, 347 - - Almond, Lt Gen Edward M., USA, 8–10, 10_n_, 11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 26, - 29, 31, 32, 37–39, 54, 55, 57, 58, 76, 80, 82_n_, 90_n_, 98, - 120, 126, 131, 132, 134, 134_n_, 137, 205, 238, 239, 250, 280, - 285, 302, 308, 337, 340, 342, 343, 346, 339 - - Alvarez, SSgt. R. C, 183_n_, 257_n_, 266_n_, 288_n_ - - Ambushes, 70, 72 - - Ambush Alley, 62, 70, 72, 75, 77 - - Ammer, 1st Lt Henry G., 255 - - Ammunition, 194, 257, 259, 277, 282, 283, 285, 287, 302 - Artillery, 160, 250, 254, 279 - Bomb, 266 - Mortar, 179, 201, 291, 324 - Small arms, 144, 160 - - Amyotte, Cpl George A. J., 329, 330 - - Anbyon, 56, 59 - - Anderson, LtCol Berry K., USA, 245, 288 - - Anderson, LCdr Gustave T., (MC) USN, 307 - - Antung, Manchuria, 124 - - Anzio, 333 - - Arioli, Lt Peter E., (MC) USN, 264 - - Armor, body, 330 - - Armstrong, Capt Victor A., 34 - - Army, 247, 307 - - Army Units, U. S. - Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 26, - 34–36, 43, 58, 63, 81, 82, 99, 118, 129, 132, 133, 142, 145, - 146, 205, 238, 239, 277, 334, 337, 340, 345, 346, 350, - 352, 355, 358 - 121st Army Evacuation Hospital, 189, 246 - 181st Counter Intelligence Corps team (CIC), 65 - Fourth Signal Battalion, 127, 207, 290 - Provisional Battalion, 245, 294, 296, 297, 312, 317, 318, 321, 324 - Special Operations Company, 81, 126 - IX Corps, 34, 35 - X Corps, 1, 8–11, 14, 14_n_, 15, 18, 21–27, 33, 34, 36–38, 40–44, - 59, 65, 75, 76, 81, 98, 125, 129, 131–134, 141, 143, 145, 147, - 149, 188, 238, 240, 246, 280, 306, 308, 335–338, 340, 342, - 352, 355, 357, 358 - Command Post. _See_ Headquarters, X Corps, below. - Headquarters, 11, 29, 76, 98, 206, 340 - Railway Transportation Section, 138 - Tactical Air Command, (TAC X Corps), 31 - 1st Cavalry Division, 15, 34, 58, 82 - 2d Infantry Division, 36, 150 - 3d Infantry Division, 36, 43, 58, 59, 75, 76, 98, 126, 131, 136, - 140, 145, 146, 308, 309, 326, 337–339, 342, 343 - 7th Infantry Division, 10, 14, 23, 24, 26, 58, 98, 123, 131, 135, - 145, 146, 238, 288, 309, 333, 337, 339, 342, 352, 358 - 24th Infantry Division, 34 - 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 138, 139 - 187th Airborne RCT 34 - 7th Regimental Combat Team, 343 - 15th Regimental Combat Team, 343 - 1st Battalion, 74, 77 - 17th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 144 - 31st Infantry Regiment, 148, 205, 243, 288 - Company B, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234 - 2d Battalion, 306, 312, 326, 328, 331 - Tank Company, 326 - 32d Infantry Regiment, 243 - 1st Battalion, 140 - 65th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 126–128, 326, 327 - 2d Battalion, 127 - 10th Engineer Battalion, 235 - Company D, 206, 213 - 185th Engineer Battalion, 311, 325 - 50th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic-weapons) Battalion, 315 - 57th Field Artillery Battalion, 243 - 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 309, 313, 316, 326 - 96th Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 126–128 - - Artillery, 73 - Army, 340 - Chinese Communist Forces, 206, 220 - Marine, 108–110, 117, 118, 165, 178, 201, 202, 240, 266, - 272, 287, 291 - Support, 100, 147, 156, 179, 194, 208, 217, 220, 253, 255, 257, 258, - 260, 287, 290, 296, 302, 320, 321, 325 - - Ascom City, 11 - - Audas, SSgt John D., 191 - - Austin, Capt Bernard L., 15 - - Avant, Maj Percy F., Jr., 299 - - - Babe, 1stLt George A., 311 - - _Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 32, 286, 347 - - Ball, 1stLt Raymond O., 174 - - Banks, LtCol Charles L., 207, 214, 215, 241, 285, 322 - - Banks, Capt David W., 100, 103 - - Barber, Capt William E., 180, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 264, 265 - - Barr, MajGen David G., USA, 75, 84, 84_n_, 98, 238, 239, 288, 340 - - Barrett, Capt R. L., Jr., 208_n_, 209, 216_n_ - - Barrow, Capt Robert H., 49, 51_n_, 55_n_, 69, 70, 72, 221, - 314–316, 320 - - Bartley, LtCol Whitman S., 279_n_, 305_n_, 306 - - _Bataan_ (CVL), USS, 287, 333, 334, 349 - - Bates, Maj W. L., Jr., 221_n_, 222, 314_n_, 321, 355 - - Batterton, Col Boeker C., 342 - - _Bayfield_ (APA), USS, 25, 31, 341 - - Beaches - Hungnam - BLUE, 343 - GREEN, 340, 343 - PINK, 343 - YELLOW, 342 - Wonson - BLUE, 22, 31, 39, 40 - RED, 26 - YELLOW, 22, 31, 39, 40, 45 - - Beall, LtCol Olin L., 99, 160, 180, 244, 245, 285 - - Bear, 120 - - Beech, Keyes, 192, 194, 323 - - Beeler, 1stLt James D., 68 - - Belleau Wood, 302 - - Belli, 1stLt George S., 46_n_, 48, 51, 52, 57 - - Benson, Pfc Robert F., 181 - - Betts, 1stLt Harrison F., 210, 216 - - Bey, 1stLt R. T., 100_n_, 104_n_, 108, 108_n_, 167, 168, 172, 183_n_, 186 - - Beyes, 1stLt Warren J., 107_n_ - - Blanchard, LtCol Robert M., USA, 74 - - Blancheri, 1stLt Howard A., 222 - - Blankenship, Capt C. P., 244_n_ - - Blasingame, Capt Hersel D. C., 69, 311 - - Blatt, Capt Wallace D., 34 - - Blocking and Escort Force, United Nations, 27 - - Blumenson, Capt Martin, USA, 8_n_, 11_n_, 243_n_ - - Booby trap, 43, 71 - - Boley, 2dLt James J., 209 - - Borgomainero, SSgt Russell J., 164 - - Bott, 2dLt Kenneth A., 67 - - Bowman, Lt George, 263_n_ - - Bowser, Col Alpha L., 26_n_, 38_n_, 39_n_, 43_n_, 54, 60, 89_n_, - 92_n_, 100_n_, 136, 205, 206, 213, 311 - - _Boxer_ (CV), USS, 17, 25 - - Bradley, 1stLt Bobbie B., 318 - - Bradley, Gen O. N., USA, 35_n_ - - Breakout - Logistics, 247 - Plans, 238, 239, 250, 251 - - Bridge, 274, 286, 296, 297, 302 - M-2 Steel Treadway, 311, 319, 329–331 - - Bridges, Maj David W., 46_n_, 49, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51_n_, 314_n_, - 321_n_, 325_n_ - - Brower, Col. James H., 40, 220, 247_n_ - - _Brush_ (DD), USS, 27 - - Brzezinski, Maj Henry, 40 - - Buck, 1stLt John A., 226_n_, 232, 234 - - Bunkers, Chinese Communist Forces, 315, 316, 320, 325 - - Burke, 1stLt John L., Jr., 207 - - - Cafferatta, Pvt Hector A., 181 - - Cahill, 2dLt John H., 167, 182, 270 - - Camaratta, 2dLt August L., 270 - - Camp Lejeune, 330_n_ - - Canney, Maj John J., 171 - - Canzona, 1stLt N. A., 215_n_, 219, 235, 238, 241, 300_n_, 327, 331_n_ - - Capraro, Capt M. J., 226_n_, 229_n_, 232, 234 - - Carey, 2dLt Richard E., 202, 203, 220_n_, 235_n_, 241_n_, 326 - - Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., 49–51 - - Carlson, CWO Allen, 275 - - Caruso, Sgt Matthew, 297 - - Cashion, 2dLt Dana B., 182, 182_n_ - - Casualties - Army, U. S., 74, 81, 127, 214, 243–245, 306_n_, 343 - Chinese Communist Forces, 108–110, 112, 117, 121, 147, 164, 166, - 168, 174, 181–183, 186, 188, 190, 194, 222, 224, 226, 241, - 242, 263, 266, 290, 293, 294, 299, 306, 315, 316, 320, 324, - 351, 354, 355 - Enemy losses, 118 - Evacuation, 55, 57, 138, 139, 245, 246, 253, 305, 307, 319, 334, 349 - Control Officer, 339 - Marine, 51, 52, 54, 57, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 100, 102, 109, 116–118, - 121, 124, 127, 157, 166, 168, 174, 178, 179, 181, 182, 186, - 188, 190–192, 194, 201, 210, 216, 219, 224, 225, 234, 240–243, - 245, 247, 258, 264, 265, 272, 275, 278–281, 284, 290, 291, - 293, 298, 299, 302, 303, 306–308, 315, 316, 319, 323, 325, - 328, 330–332, 351, 385 - Casualty list, 57 - North Korean (NKPA), 51, 53, 70, 72, 73 - Personnel losses, 69 - Republic of Korea Army, 214 - - Catania, Lt Alfred J., 226_n_ - - Cates, Gen Clifton B., 133, 134_n_, 359 - - _Ceylon_ (CL), HMS, 28 - - Chabek, 1stLt Jack A., 179 - - Challacombe, Capt Arthur D., 266 - - Chamberlain, J., 35_n_ - - Chambers 1stLt George C, 49, 52 - - Chandler, 1stLt J. B., 294_n_ - - Changjin, 44, 96, 99, 132, 134, 135, 200, 204, 230, 286 - - _Chatterer_ (AMS), USS, 27 - - Cherisophus, 357 - - Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 84 - - Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 231, 234, 283 - - Chigyong, 77, 80–82, 124, 126, 128, 136, 140, 147, 197, 204, 205, 335 - - Chiles, LtCol John H., USA, 135, 145 - - China, 3, 5, 7 - Central Committee, 85 - Civil War, 83–85 - “Hate America” campaign, 91 - Intervention, 35, 131 - Kiangsi Province (South China), 83 - North China, Occupation by Marines, 85 - People’s Revolutionary Military Council, 86 - “Resist America, Aid Korea” movement, 90 - Seventh Party Congress, 85 - - Chinese Communist Forces, 5, 81, 85, 98, 99, 129, 203 - Assault, 168 - Bugle calls, 104 - Bunkers. _See_ Bunkers. - Command Post, 315 - Counterstroke, 146 - Entrenchment, 156, 157 - Equipment, 88 - Fortifications, 157 - Intervention, 128, 129, 142, 143 - Jet fighters, 142 - Logistics, 88, 93, 353 - “Long March”, 83 - Organization, 85, 86, 88 - People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 83–85 - Plans, 353 - Rank, 88 - Recruiting, 87 - Reinforcements, 296 - Roadblock, 109 - Strategic concepts, 90 - Strategy, 91 - Strong point, 325 - Tactics, 89, 91–94, 354 - Training, 87 - Troops, 79, 98 - Uniforms, 89 - Units - 3d Field Army, 161, 352, 356 - 4th Field Army, 99, 352, 355 - 9th Army Group, 161, 352, 354–356, 358 - 20th Army, 149, 352–355 - 24th Army, 352 - 26th Army, 313, 352–355 - 27th Army, 352, 354, 355 - 30th Army, 352 - 32d Army, 313, 352 - 42d Army, 82, 99, 352 - 58th Division, 149, 220, 242, 285, 326, 352 - 59th Division, 149, 161, 242, 285, 352 - 60th Division, 149, 225, 285, 313, 352 - 70th Division, 352 - 76th Division, 352 - 77th Division, 286, 313, 352, 355 - 78th Division, 286, 313, 352 - 79th Division, 161, 167, 171, 178, 266, 285, 352 - 80th Division, 285, 352 - 81st Division, 352 - 89th Division, 161, 167, 178, 187, 285, 313, 352 - 94th Division, 313, 352 - 124th Division, 82, 99, 105, 110, 118, 120, 352 - 125th Division, 99, 332 - 126th Division, 99, 123, 167, 332 - 172d Regiment, 220, 242 - 173d Regiment, 220, 242 - 174th Regiment, 220, 242 - 176th Regiment, 242 - 179th Regiment, 225 - 235th Regiment, 167, 168, 172, 174, 184, 185, 186, 266 - 236th Regiment, 167, 168, 170, 174, 187 - 237th Regiment, 167, 170 - 267th Regiment, 167 - 370th Regiment, 99, 103, 107, 110 - 371st Regiment, 103, 104, 107, 110 - 372d Regiment, 103, 110 - Chinese Nationalists, 84, 85 - - Chinhung-ni, 96, 98, 110, 112–114, 116, 117, 120, 124, 133–141, - 146–149, 202, 221, 284, 303, 307–309, 312–314, 323–327, 331, - 333, 333, 341, 330 - Tank Battle, 113 - - Chinnampo, 8, 27, 34 - - Chonchon-ni, 52, 33, 37 - - Chongjin, 28, 44, 45, 76, 132, 145 - - Chongju, 9 - - Chongsanjangsi, 36–38 - - Chou En-Lai, 7 - - Chorwon, 35 - - Chosin, 38 - Campaign, 346, 348, 336 - Plans, 38 - Results, 356–339 - Reservoir, 82, 96, 98, 99, 110, 116, 117, 120, 123, 124, 132, 133, - 137, 139, 145–149, 151, 198, 205, 238, 239, 266, 309, 350, 352 - Withdrawal from. _See_ Breakout. - - Cho Il Kwon, Col (NKPA), 50 - - Chuchonhujang, 132 - - CIC, 66, 70, 71, 73, 202, 203 - - Civil affairs, 65, 66, 73 - - Clark, Maj Albert L, 299 - - Clark, 1stLt Truman, 299, 307 - - Clearing stations, 139, 210, 211, 246, 307 - - Clements, 1stLt Leonard M., 174 - - Clothing, cold weather, 58, 80, 281 - - Cochran, Maj Robert L., 107, 117 - - Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., 224 - - Coffman, 2dLt Harold L., 69, 71_n_ - - Cole, LtCol J. Frank, 68 - - _Collett_ (DD), USS, 28 - - Collins, Capt E. E., 172_n_, 183_n_, 186_n_ - - Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 5, 359 - - Colmery, 1stLt Harry W., 217 - - Command Post. _See_ Unit concerned. - - Commander in Chief Far East (CinCFE). _See_ General of the Army - Douglas MacArthur, USA. - - Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt). _See_ Adm Arthur W. - Radford, USN. - - Commander Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). _See_ VAdm A. D. Struble, USN. - - Commiskey, 2dLt Henry A., 49 - - Communications, 210, 349 - Wire, 282 - - Composite battalion, 251 - - Condit, Kenneth W., 32_n_, 138_n_ - - Conference, 33 - - Connell, Capt H. G., 100_n_, 103 - - _Consolation_ (AH), USS, 139, 246 - - Convoy, 43, 48, 70, 74, 73, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286 - Enemy, 116 - Motor, 38, 59, 62, 77, 149, 180, 200, 318 - Supply, 68 - - Cook, Col John H., Jr., 40 - - Cooke, Capt Leroy M., 154, 165 - - Cool, Capt William C, 339 - - Coon, Cpl G. L., 294_n_ - - Cooney, Capt Thomas E., 118, 120, 154, 157_n_ - - Corbet, 2dLt R. H., 184 - - Corley, Capt Clarence E., Jr., 66, 67, 71_n_, 73_n_, 201, 204_n_, - 208_n_, 208–211, 216 - - Corman, Capt Otis W. S., 117 - - Correspondents, press, 281, 282, 322 - - Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 45_n_, 54_n_, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 76_n_, - 125, 125_n_, 137, 285, 340, 345 - - Craven, LCdr John H., USN, 121_n_, 172_n_, 272, 278 - - Craven, 1stLt William A., 49 - - Cronin, Maj Angus J., 274 - - Cronk, Capt Welby W., 224 - - Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., 82, 99, 109, 112_n_, 114_n_, 116_n_, 329 - - Crowe, LtCol Henry P., 40, 338, 339 - - Crutchfield, 2dLt James L., 68 - - Counter Intelligence Corps. _See_ CIC. - - Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 286, 342 - - - D-Day (Wonsan Landing), 11 - - Dairen, 142 - - Dakyns, Henry C., 357_n_ - - Damnation Battalion, 251 - - Dana, 1stLt C. C., 180_n_, 190_n_ - - Danford, SSgt R. R., 180_n_, 190_n_ - - Davidson, Sgt Charles V., 240 - - Davis, Maj Daniel H., 107 - - Davis, Sgt K. E., 208_n_, 210 - - Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 80_n_, 99, 99_n_, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106, - 108_n_, 112, 112_n_, 121_n_, 148, 149, 178, 190, 254_n_, 257, - 258, 259_n_, 260, 261, 263, 264, 270–273, 294, 317 - - Davis, Capt W. J., 100, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116_n_, 259_n_, 264 - - Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., 187 - - Degernes, 2dLt Mayhlon, L., 208, 209 - - Delong, 1stLt Earl R., 108, 109 - - Demolitions, 302 - Teams, 301 - C3 explosive, 208 - - DeMott, Pfc Robert D., 329, 330 - - Dennis, 1stLt Carl E., 236 - - Denny, 2dLt Paul E., 165 - - Derevyanko, LtGen Kuzma, (USSR), 90 - - Dickerson, Sgt C W., 229_n_ - - Dirst, WO Lloyd V., 231 - - Dolcater, Capt Max W., USA, 74_n_, 76_n_, 77_n_, 126_n_, 127_n_, 309_n_ - - Dowsett, LtCol Frederick W., 114_n_, 121_n_, 297, 317 - - Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 15, 23–25, 29–31, 38, 76, 134, 240, 336, - 337, 341, 342_n_, 345, 359 - Amphibious Group, 18 - - Doyle, Capt R. A., 67_n_, 68_n_ - - _Doyle_ (DMS), USS, 27 - - Drury, Clifford M., 40_n_ - - Drysdale, LtCol Douglas B., RM., 140, 225, 226, 228–231, 235, 300 - - Duffy, 1stLt Leroy M., 63, 64 - - Duke, Capt Irving T., 15 - - Dumps, 138 - Ammunition, 215, 343 - Enemy, 117 - RCT-7, 140 - Supply, 41, 46, 48, 160, 195, 197, 214, 282, 285 - Area, 241 - Medical, 139, 149 - ROK, 44, 54 - - Duncan, David, 322 - - Dunkerque, 334 - - Dunkirk, 333, 345 - - Dunne, 1stLt John M., 180 - - Durham, Maj Thomas A., 171 - - Dyer, BrigGen E. C., 387_n_ - - Dysentery, 30 - - - Eagan, Maj James K., 231, 234_n_ - - Earney, Maj W. R., 103_n_, 107_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_, 193_n_, 251, 266_n_ - - Eberle, MajGen George L., USA, 10, 11_n_ - - Edwards, LtCol H. W., 29_n_ - - Elledge, 1stLt Raymond J., 113 - - _Endicott_ (DMS), USS, 27 - - Endsley, 2dLt Wendell C., 208, 209 - - Enemy, 74 - - Engineers, 263, 279, 293, 302, 324 - Army, 311 - Demolitions crew, 257 - - _English_ (DD), USS, 56 - - Englehardt, 1stLt Floyd J., 191, 246 - - Estess, Sgt M. L., 229_n_ - - Ewen, RAdm Edward C., USN, 15 - - - Faber, TSgt Don, 270 - - Faith, LtCol Don C., USA, 243, 244 - - Far East Command. _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. - General Headquarters, 5, 8, 22 - Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 8, 9, 11, 13, 22, 23 - - Farish, Capt George B., 57, 246 - - Farmer, 1stLt Chester B., 52 - - Feehan, LtCol Harvey A., 156, 250, 274 - - Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 66, 200, 204_n_, 208, 209, 216, 240 - - Fisher, Sgt Robert, 52 - - Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., (MC) USN, 67 - - Floodlights, 210, 247 - - Forney, Col Edward H., 98, 239, 281, 308, 336, 338, 339 - - Forrest, 1stLt Shelby M., 107 - - Forward Air Controller (FAC), 53, 67, 70, 113, 193, 255, 263, 265, - 288, 294, 306, 346, 349 - - Forward Observer (FO) team, 67 - - Foster, Sgt Charles, 118 - - Foster, Pvt Richard J., 127_n_ - - France, Capt Donald R., 297 - - Frederick, Capt Charles D., 72 - - Freeman, Capt A. Z., 159_n_, 180_n_ - - Fridrich, LtCol R. V., 254_n_, 259_n_, 260, 264_n_ - - Frostbite, 351, 354 - - Fuel, 275, 285 - Diesel oil, 282 - Gasoline, 277, 282 - - Funchilin Pass, 96, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 312–314, 317, 320 - - Fusen Reservoir, 38, 99, 123 - - - Gall, Maj W., 329 - - Gallo, SSgt Saverio P., 202 - - Gastro-enteritis, 30 - - GCA, 348 - - Geer, LtCol Andrew, 62_n_, 73_n_, 103_n_, 107_n_, 112_n_, 116_n_, - 120_n_, 179_n_, 186_n_, 187_n_, 189_n_, 190_n_, 271_n_, - 288_n_, 314_n_, 318_n_ - - _George Clymer_ (APA), USS, 25 - - Giusti, Ernest H., 32_n_ - - Godolphin, F. R. B., 357_n_ - - Goggin, 1stLt W. F., 100_n_, 108_n_, 109_n_, 110_n_, 120, 120_n_ - - Golden, Pfc Jack, 67 - - Goss, 2dLt Harvey A., 67 - - Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 34, 68_n_, 245, 350 - - Gould, Capt William R., 300–302, 330 - - Graeber, 1stLt William C., 81, 99_n_, 100_n_, 103_n_, 106 - - Grayson, MSgt E. F., 229_n_ - - Greene, 1stLt Daniel, 255, 263 - - Griffen, Lt (jg) Cornelius J., (ChC) USN, 297 - - Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 224 - - Ground Control Approach. _See_ GCA. - - Guadalcanal, 302 - - Guerrillas, 59, 67, 70–72, 74, 81, 82, 125–128, 145, 326 - First Raid on MSR, 81 - - Gugeler, Capt Russel A., USA, 243_n_ - - - Hagaru, 96, 98, 117, 121, 124, 131, 134–141, 146–149, 151, 159–161, - 178, 180, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200–205, 206_n_, - 207–211, 213–220, 222, 225, 229–231, 235, 238–247, 249, 250, - 254, 260, 262, 270, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 280–283, 285–291, - 293, 294, 298, 305–309, 311, 313, 319, 324, 326, 333, 334, - 349, 350, 353, 355 - Airstrip, 134, 137, 138, 195, 197, 200, 210, 219, 235, 246, - 247, 281, 302 - Breakout, 287, 288, 294, 296–302 - Air cover, 286, 287 - Demolitions, 301 - Plans, 283–286, 294 - Destruction of excess material, 285 - Intelligence, 202–204, 206, 285 - Medical, 278, 279 - Military government, 202, 203 - - Hall, 2dLt Wayne L., 208, 209 - - Hamhung, 7, 18, 38, 41, 45, 58, 59, 76, 77, 79–82, 95, 96, 98, 99, - 125–128, 131, 133–138, 146, 150, 201, 205, 239, 246, 280, 304, - 312, 332, 333, 338, 342, 346, 348, 355 - - Han River, 15 - - Hancock, 1stLt John R., 257, 293 - - Hangkow, 85 - - _Hank_ (DD), USS, 56 - - Hapsu, 132, 145 - - Hargett, 1stLt Ernest C., 112, 116, 328, 329_n_, 330 - - Harmon, Capt Lester G., 69 - - Harriman, Averell, 35_n_ - - Harris, MajGen Field, 31, 33, 137, 165_n_, 239, 350 - - Harris, 1stLt H. H., 103_n_, 116, 116_n_, 117, 118, 120_n_, - 165, 166, 258 - - Harris, LtCol William F., 165, 257, 272, 297 - - Harrison, TSgt C. L., 229_n_ - - Harrison, Col C. W., 2_n_, 81_n_ - - Harrison, CWO Willie S., 300, 330 - - Hartman, RAdm Charles C., USN, 15 - - Hawkins, LtCol Jack, 44_n_, 46, 48, 48_n_, 49, 51_n_, 53_n_, 54_n_, - 55, 55_n_, 58, 58_n_ - - Heater, Capt James B., 293 - - _Helena_ (CA), USS, 28 - - Helicopters, 54, 56–58, 68, 72, 104, 117, 125, 147–150, 191, 195, 205, - 245, 254, 285, 288, 325, 351 - HO3S-1, 202, 246, 351 - HMX-1, 351 - - Hell Fire Valley, 230, 296, 297, 299, 302. _See also_ Task - Force, Drysdale. - - Henderson, Col Frederick P., 323 - - Henderson, RAdm George R., USN, 15 - - Henneberger, Capt Harry G. C., 107 - - Hering, Capt Eugene R., (MC) USN, 245, 278, 279, 307 - - Hermanson, Capt Chester R., 255, 257 - - Hickey, MajGen Doyle O., USA, 9, 10, 11_n_, 205, 309 - - Highway, 95 - - Higginbotham, Capt S. W., 294_n_, 299_n_ - - Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, 337 - - Higgins, Marguerite, 281, 323 - - Hill D, 312. _See also_ Hill 1457. - - Hill, East, 204–207, 213–220, 240–242, 286, 288, 290, 291, 293, - 301, 303, 326 - - Hill, Fox, 180–182, 190, 191, 194, 201, 202, 204, 254, 264, 270 - - Hill, How, 114, 120. _See also_ Hill 891. - - Hill 109----49, 51, 52, 57 - - Hill 117----49, 53, 55 - - Hill 185----49, 51, 52 - - Hill 532----103 - - Hill 698----100, 102, 103, 103_n_, 104, 105, 107–109, 112 - - Hill 727----103–105, 107, 108, 112 - - Hill 891----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118–120 - - Hill 987----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118, 120 - - Hill 1081----312–316, 320, 321, 324–326, 328 - - Hill 1100----257 - - Hill 1167----158, 168, 253 - - Hill 1182----228, 232 - - Hill 1236----226, 232 - - Hill 1240----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 174, 177, 178, 183, 187, - 189, 253, 257 - - Hill 1276----159, 253, 257, 265, 268 - - Hill 1282----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 183–187, - 251, 253, 255, 257. _See also_ Ridge, North. - - Hill 1294----159, 253 - - Hill 1304----117_n_, 318, 321 - - Hill 1328----312, 317, 318, 327 - - Hill 1384----158, 167, 170, 171, 182 - - Hill 1403----152, 154, 156–158, 165, 166, 170, 183, 187, 188 - - Hill 1419----178, 179, 257–259 - - Hill 1426----154, 157, 159, 253 - - Hill 1457----312, 317, 318, 321, 328, 329 - - Hill 1520----261–264, 268 - - Hill 1542----257, 258, 266–268 - - Hill 1653----190, 263, 264 - - Hinds, 1stLt John R., 290 - - Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, 238, 243 - - Hoffstetter, Pfc Donald O., 67 - - Holland, 1stLt Dan C., 100_n_, 103, 113 - - Holloway, LCdr Charles K., USN, 99 - - Holmes, 1stLt Donald M., 65 - - Honeycutt, 1stLt J. H., 288_n_, 291 - - Hood, Maj H. E., 282_n_, 296 - - Hope, Bob, 31 - - Hopkins, 2dLt Frederick W., 65, 236, 241 - - Hospelhorn, Capt Cecil W., USA, 311 - - Hospital, 139, 197, 281 - - House, 1stLt Arthur E., 257 - - Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., 220, 258, 259_n_, 260, 264, 321 - - Hubbell, J. C., 327_n_ - - Huchanggangu, 132 - - Huichon, 132, 133, 146, 149 - - Huksu-ri, 109, 116_n_, 123, 131, 135, 140, 147, 149 - - Hull, Capt Milton A., 100_n_, 102, 102_n_, 108, 108_n_, 109, 154_n_, - 167_n_, 172_n_, 174, 187 - - Hungmun-ni, 201 - - Hungnam, 9, 22, 23, 58, 75, 76, 95, 96, 109, 125, 126, 131, 136, 138, - 139, 141, 148, 150, 200, 205, 246, 281, 305, 325, 327, 332, - 333, 335, 336, 338, 345, 346, 348, 357 - Cemetery, 341 - Evacuation, 338–343, 349 - Plans, 335–337 - Warnings, 239 - Mine clearance, 135 - Redeployment, 338, 355, 359 - Withdrawal to. _See_ Breakout. - - Hwachon, 35 - - Hyesanjin, 98, 132, 144 - - - Imjin, 62, 64, 66, 74 - - Inchon, 10, 11, 13–15, 17, 18, 21–27, 33, 143, 336, 340, 346 - Amphibious assault, 1 - Landing, 3, 5, 343 - Inchon-Seoul Operation, 10, 11_n_, 14, 281 - - _Incredible_ (AM) USS, 27 - - Indigestion, 351 - - Itami, 287, 342 - - Iwo Jima, 302 - - Iwon, 58, 75 - - - Jaeger, 2dLt John W., 236 - - Japan, 36, 43, 247, 279, 281, 311 - Logistical command, 10 - - Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 161_n_, 164, 165_n_, 166, 188_n_, 293 - - Jennings, 1stLt William E., 107_n_ - - Jessup, Ambassador Philip, 35_n_ - - Jeter, 1stLt Manning T., Jr., 288 - - Jochums, 1stLt Robert E., 217, 218, 235_n_ - - Johnson, Capt David G., 288 - - Johnson, 1stLt Horace L., Jr., 210, 211, 216 - - Johnson, Cdr Howard A., (MC) USN, 308 - - Johnson, Secretary of Defense Louis, 5 - - Johnson, 1stLt Richard M., 290 - - Johnson, 1stLt William E., 118, 267 - - Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5–9, 37, 128, 129 - - Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Operations Center (JOC), 348 - - Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). _See_ Far - East Command. - - Jones, Capt Clovis M., 205 - - Jones, 2dLt Donald R., 70, 316, 320 - - Jones, SSgt Donald T., 105 - - Jones, TSgt H. T., 72 - - Jones, Capt Jack R., 183, 184, 186, 293 - - Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 10, 13, 23, 25, 27, 43, 134, 140, 239, 336, - 337, 345, 348, 359 - - - Kaesong, 9, 15, 34 - - Kalma Peninsula, 17, 18, 22, 26, 39, 40 - - Kanggye, 97, 132–134, 146 - - Karig, Walter, 23_n_, 27_n_, 28_n_, 29_n_, 142_n_ - - Katsuma, 58 - - Kaufer, 1stLt Edward E., 49 - - Keeton, Sgt E. J., 229_n_ - - Kerr, Capt William A., 224 - - Kerrigan, Maj W. E., 172_n_ - - Kiernan, Capt J. I., Jr., 53_n_, 244_n_ - - Kiesling, Cpl Curtis J., 179 - - Kiester, 1stLt K. E., 244_n_ - - Kim Il Sung, 7 - - Kimpo, 32, 34 - - King, Capt George W., 219 - - Kite (AMS), USS, 27 - - Klepsig, Cpl D. E., 327_n_ - - Knox, TSgt Edwin L., 268, 270, 271 - - Kobe, 32 - - Kogae-gol, 148 - - Koingdong, 36 - - Kojo, 33, 38, 39, 44–46, 48–59, 76, 131 - Marine positions, 48 - Railroad station, 48 - - Korea, 359 - North, 8, 37 - Entry into, 7 - Orders, 5, 6, 89 - Plans, 7–10 - Political considerations, 2–5 - North Korean People’s Republic, 3 - People’s Political Council, 83 - People’s Army (NKPA), 1–3, 5–7, 34, 43, 46, 50, 53, 54, 59, 63, - 65, 66, 71, 79, 83, 100, 110, 125, 129, 146 - Prisoners of War, 40, 65, 71, 72, 74, 124 - Units - 2d Division, 50 - 5th Division, 50, 55 - 10th Division, 50 - 15th Division, 66, 74 - 10th Regiment, 49, 50 - 45th Regiment, 66, 71, 73 - 48th Regiment, 66 - 50th Regiment, 66 - 344th Tank Regiment, 105, 110, 114 - South - Republic of Korea, 2, 3, 90 - Army (ROKA), 3, 9, 22, 36, 37, 100, 213, 214, 342 - Units - I Corps, 22, 26, 38, 44, 58, 75, 131, 145, 337 - II Corps, 15, 146, 150 - Capital Division, 22, 35, 38 - 1st Division, 34 - 3d Division, 22, 38, 339 - 6th Division, 35, 81, 144_n_ - 7th Division, 35 - 8th Division, 35 - 18th Regiment, 123 - 22d Regiment, 2d Battalion, 46 - 26th Regiment, 61, 81, 98, 99, 128, 131, 140 - 101st Engineer Group (C), 44 - Navy. _See_ ships. - Marine Corps (KMC), 73 - 1st Regiment, 58, 59, 131, 337, 338 - 1st Battalion, 45 - 3d Battalion, 22, 73, 76 - 5th Battalion, 22, 45, 56, 58, 76 - Police, 307 - - Koto-ri, 80_n_, 82, 96, 98, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124, 135–137, 139–141, - 146–148, 201, 204, 205, 220, 222, 224–226, 228, 229, 231, 232, - 234, 235, 239, 245, 282–284, 286–288, 295–298, 300, 302, 303, - 305–309, 311, 312, 319, 323, 335, 355 - Airstrip (OY), 224, 279, 305, 307, 308 - Air support, 307 - Breakout air support plans, 313 - Breakout, 314–331 - Bridge, 309, 311, 312, 319, 322, 323 - Intelligence, 313 - Mass burial, 319 - Plans, 308, 309, 312–314, 325, 326 - Medical, 307, 308 - - Kowon, 126, 128 - - Krabbe, 2dLt Donald J., 156 - - Kraince, 1stLt F. R., 329_n_ - - Krieg, 1stLt Elmer A., 165 - - Krulak, Col Victor H., 58 - - Kulbes, Capt Philip A., 213 - - Kumwha, 35 - - Kunuri, 9, 35 - - Kuokka, Maj H. D., 287_n_, 347_n_ - - Kuomintang, 83 - - Kurcaba, 1stLt Joseph R., 260, 264, 265, 270, 318 - - Kyolmul-ni, 139, 141 - - - Landing Signal Officer, Carrier, 306, 307 - - Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., USA, 316 - - Lawrence, Maj James F., 82 - - Lee, Lt Chew Een, 318 - - Lee, Maj Christian C., 296, 299 - - Lee, Feng Hsi, 185 - - Lee, Doctor Tong Kak, 243_n_ - - Leeds, Cpl Joseph, 316 - - Lessenden, LCdr Chester M. (MC) USN, 192, 278 - - Lett, Cpl C. P., 330 - - _Leyte Gulf_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286 - - Lice, 315 - - Lin Pao, 161 - - Lipscomb, 1stLt W. R., 244_n_ - - Litters, 259 - - Litzenberg, Col Homer L., 39, 80_n_, 82, 98, 99, 100_n_, 102, 103, - 103_n_, 104, 107, 108_n_, 109, 110, 114, 116, 116_n_, 117, - 118, 120, 121, 121_n_, 148_n_, 152, 160, 170_n_, 178, 188, - 189, 193, 201, 249, 250_n_, 251_n_, 253, 254_n_, 258, 259_n_, - 264_n_, 266_n_, 267_n_, 271, 272, 285, 287_n_, 288, 293, - 294_n_, 296, 312, 317 - Command Post, 117 - - Liu Sheng Hsi, 185 - - Lockwood, LtCol Randolph, 160, 198, 201, 207, 296, 297, 317, 324 - - Lodge, Capt O. R., 274 - - Longstaff, 1stLt Robert A., 246 - - Lorigan, Maj Robert E., 44_n_, 54_n_, 205, 225, 226_n_ - - - Mabry, Maj Clarence J., 225 - - MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, USA, 2, 3, 5, 6, 6_n_, 7–11, - 11_n_, 14, 22, 23, 34–36, 36_n_, 37, 38, 43, 129, 131, 132, - 133, 144, 146, 205, 334, 340, 345, 346, 358 - Communique of 24 November, 144 - - MacLean, Col Allan D., USA, 243 - - _Maddox_ (DD), USS, 28 - - _Marine Phoenix_ (T-AP), USNS, 30 - - Magness, 2dLt B. L., 184 - - Main Supply Route (MSR), 95, 96, 98, 100, 103–106, 108–110, 114, 116, - 118, 120, 123, 124, 133, 140, 141, 146–149, 154, 156, 159, - 161, 163, 171, 178–182, 189, 193, 197, 202, 213, 221, 224, - 239, 249, 250, 253, 254, 257, 261–263, 267, 268, 272, 274, - 275, 283, 294, 296, 297, 312–315, 317, 318, 321, 324–329 - Near Sudong, 3 November, 106 - Wonsan to Hamhung, 79 - - Majon-dong, 82, 96, 99, 100, 116_n_, 124, 135–137, 139, 141, 228, 284, - 326, 327, 331 - - Majon-ni, 44, 56, 61–74, 126, 202, 203 - Logistics, 68 - - Manchuria, 6, 9, 34, 36, 37, 79, 80, 84, 85, 129, 142 - - Manpojin, 132, 133, 146 - - Mao Tse-tung, 70, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 90_n_, 91_n_ - Strategic Aims, 89 - Moscow, December of 1949, 90 - - Marine Corps, U. S. - Air, 157, 293 - Birthday, 73, 121 - Units, - Fleet Marine Force - Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 63, 341 - 1st Air Delivery Platoon, 69, 311 - 1st Combat Service Group, 39–41, 128, 138 - 7th Motor Transport Battalion, 141, 228, 234 - Company B, 205 - 1st Marine Air Wing, 33, 45, 254, 279, 282, 286, 313, 341, - 346, 348–350 - Commanding General, 33 - Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1), 341, 348 - Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), 207, 296, 341 - Air Defense Section, 341, 348 - Air Support Section, 349 - Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32–34, 42, 239, 342, 348 - Headquarters Squadron 12, 32, 239 - Service Squadron 12, 32 - VMF-212, 273, 287, 347, 349 - VMF-214, 32, 273, 287, 347–349 - VMF-311, 350 - VMF-312, 32, 33, 68, 69, 100, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 152, - 156, 217, 222, 224, 264, 273, 299, 307, 349 - VMF-321, 230 - VMF-323, 32, 273, 286, 347 - VMF(N)-513, 32, 33, 53, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 273, 307 - VMF(N)-542, 124, 266, 273, 282, 326 - VMR-152, 296, 350 - VMO-6, 34, 56, 73, 152, 154, 191, 202, 205, 245, 272, 307, 350, 351 - 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 2_n_ - 1st Marine Division, 1, 10, 11, 14, 18, 21–27, 32, 34, 37–39, 41, - 43–45, 54, 59, 63, 75, 77, 79, 80, 95, 99, 124, 126, 128, - 131–134, 140, 145, 146, 148, 161, 178, 197, 198, 202, 222, - 238, 246, 280, 281, 282, 302, 303, 305, 309, 312, 319, 323, - 326, 332, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 346, 353–356, 358, 359 - Command Post, 15, 25, 45, 54, 76, 125, 149, 150, 200, 203, 205, - 211, 214, 222, 229, 238, 241, 245, 285, 287, 293, 325, 341 - Rear Command Post, 340 - 1st Marine Command Group, 331 - Headquarters Battalion, 125, 149, 203, 207, 220, 224, 225, 228, - 229, 231, 234, 281, 282, 299 - Military Police Company, 99, 299, 303 - Reconnaissance Company, 22, 80, 82, 99, 109, 110, 112, 114, 135, - 139–141, 148, 226, 326, 328, 331 - Headquarters Company, 299, 303 - Composite Battalion, 193, 194, 251 - 1st Marines, 14, 15, 22, 40, 44, 45, 54–56, 59, 68, 75, 76, 79, - 80, 82, 126, 135, 136, 139–141, 147, 148, 228, 281, 284, 306, - 312, 321, 325, 328, 335. _See also_ Col Lewis B. Puller - Headquarters, 147 - Commanding Officer, 73 - H&S Company, 63, 71, 325, 328 - Anti-tank Company, 222 - 4.2 Mortar Company, 222 - 1st Battalion, 39, 45, 46, 49, 53–56, 58, 76, 147, 221, 308, - 309, 312–316, 320, 321, 325, 328, 331 - Command Post, 211 - Company A, 49, 53, 69, 71–73, 221, 314–316, 320, 324, 331 - Company B, 48–54, 57, 221, 314–316, 320, 325 - Company C, 49–51, 53, 314, 315 - Weapons Company, 222 - 2d Battalion, 39, 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 72, 77, 147, 222, 225, - 229, 279, 306, 319, 325, 326, 328 - Command Post, 226 - Company D, 57, 77, 224, 319 - Company E, 57, 72, 72_n_, 222, 224, 225 - Company F, 57, 224, 225 - Weapons Company, 224 - 3d Battalion, 39, 56, 61–63, 71, 77, 147, 197, 198, 200, 201, - 215, 242, 243, 284, 286, 300, 321, 325, 326, 328 - Commanding Officer, 73 - Command Post, 67, 200, 204, 206, 210, 211, 213, 220, 242 - H&S Company, 63, 68, 207 - Company G, 66, 68, 71, 147, 204–206, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229, - 231, 234, 235, 241, 242, 293, 324, 326 - Company H, 66–68, 71, 73, 201, 204, 208, 209–211, 213, 214, - 216, 220, 326 - Company I, 66, 71, 73, 201, 204, 207–209, 211, 214, 216, - 220, 240, 326 - Weapons Company, 63, 65, 71, 197, 198, 204, 206, 208, - 211, 215, 326 - Fifth Marines, 15, 22, 25, 40, 44, 45, 76, 79, 80, 123, 135, - 139–141, 147, 148, 150, 152, 158–160, 177, 182, 185, 188, 189, - 192, 249, 251, 254, 278, 281, 284–287, 300, 312, 318, 325, - 326, 335, 340. _See also_ LtCol Raymond L. Murray. - Command Post, 40 - Headquarters, 170 - Anti-tank Company, 228, 229, 234, 290, 317, 326 - 1st Battalion, 45, 80, 123, 124, 126, 136, 158, 172, 180, 184, - 186, 189, 253, 255, 257, 266, 268, 272, 274, 275, 286, 293, - 300, 317, 318, 321, 325, 328 - Company A, 112, 123, 174, 184–186, 193, 251, 274, 293, 318 - Company B, 123, 187, 189, 257, 293, 318 - Company C, 124, 183, 185–187, 266, 291, 293 - 2d Battalion, 56, 59, 76, 79, 81, 123, 124, 136, 147, 151, 152, - 154, 157, 161, 163–166, 188, 189, 251, 257, 265, 272, 274, - 286, 288, 291, 293, 300, 301, 325 - H&S Company, 164 - Company D, 123, 156, 157, 159, 163, 164, 266, 288, - 290, 291, 294 - Company E, 158, 163, 164, 166, 186–189, 266, 274, 275, 293 - Company F, 156, 163, 164, 166, 188, 265, 290, 291 - 3d Battalion, 123, 124, 136, 147, 158, 170, 172, 185, 187, 188, - 253–255, 257, 258, 261–263, 268, 270–272, 274, 286, - 293, 300, 325 - Command Post, 170, 171, 182, 262 - H&S Company, 170, 171, 182 - Company G, 170, 182, 189, 251, 255, 257, 262, 263, 268, - 271, 272, 274 - Company H, 170, 189, 261–263, 268, 271, 272, 274 - Company I, 170, 171, 183, 189, 251, 262, 271 - Weapons Company, 170, 182 - Seventh Marines, 14, 15, 22, 25, 44, 54, 58, 59, 76, 79–81, - 98–100, 102–104, 107, 109, 109_n_, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, - 120, 121, 123–125, 135–137, 139–141, 147–149, 151, 152, 154, - 156, 159, 160, 177, 182, 183, 187, 189, 192, 249, 251, 253, - 254, 257–265, 270, 272, 273, 281, 284–288, 293, 294, 296–298, - 312, 314, 317–319, 321, 324–326, 335, 340, 352. _See also_ Col - Homer L. Litzenberg. - Headquarters, 148, 170, 189 - Command Post, 39, 40, 98, 103, 104, 108–110, 261 - 4.2-inch Mortar Company, 103, 116, 186 - Anti-tank Company, 103, 105, 106, 108, 160, 207, 215, 241 - 1st Battalion, 81, 99, 100, 102–105, 107, 109, 112–114, 116, - 121, 147, 152, 157, 189, 190 - H&S Company, 273, 318 - Command Post, 103, 105, 106, 149, 193 - Company A, 100, 103–105, 159, 189, 190, 258, 260, 264, 270, - 296, 318, 321 - Company B, 103, 104, 106, 157, 159, 178, 190, 193, 258, 260, - 261, 264, 265, 270, 318, 321 - Company C, 103–106, 113, 121, 157, 159, 178, 179, 182, 189, - 190, 260, 261, 264, 294, 318, 321 - Weapons Company, 108, 273, 318, 322 - 2d Battalion, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106–109, 112, 116, 120, - 147, 160, 167, 198, 200, 201, 207, 263, 290, 294, 296–298, - 317, 318, 321, 324 - Command Post (Sudong, 3 November), 106 - Command Group, 294 - Company D, 100, 102, 103, 108, 109, 151, 152, 157, 158, 160, - 167, 168, 170, 174, 178, 183, 187, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294, 296 - Company E, 102, 103, 106, 108, 151, 132, 158, 160, 168, 170, - 172, 174, 178, 183, 184, 186, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294, - 296, 317, 324 - Company F, 103, 104, 106, 154, 158, 159, 180–182, 189–191, - 193, 198, 200, 201, 207, 253, 254, 264, 272, 294, 317 - Weapons Company, 160, 180, 198, 201, 207, 251, 294, 326 - 3d Battalion, 106, 112, 116–118, 120, 121, 148, 152, 154, 157, - 161, 184–188, 251, 253, 254, 257, 261, 266, 275, 294, 296, - 297, 317, 318, 321, 324 - Command Post, 165 - H&S Company, 171, 267 - Company G, 116–118, 120, 154, 157, 159, 193, 251, 258, 266, - 267, 294, 297, 317 - Company H, 104, 114, 117, 118, 154, 157, 158, 163, 165, 166, - 170, 171, 185, 187, 188, 257, 258, 260, 264, 297, 317 - Company I, 104, 116, 117, 157, 159, 258, 266, 267, 297, 317 - Weapons Company, 71, 251 - Company J, 267 - Eleventh Marines, 22, 40, 45, 80, 139, 147, 148, 177, 178, 287, 293 - 1st Battalion, 156, 160, 177, 262, 274, 287, 313, 325 - Battery B, 275 - Battery C, 275 - 2d Battalion, 40, 222, 287, 313, 325, 328 - Battery D, 63, 204, 215, 287 - Battery E, 222, 225, 305, 313 - Battery F, 45, 46, 52, 53, 222, 313, 316 - 3d Battalion, 99, 100, 104, 107, 110, 116–118, 148, 177, 254, - 262, 268, 287, 298, 303, 313, 324, 325 - Battery G, 100, 107, 160, 197, 202, 268, 298 - Battery H, 107, 192, 207, 215, 220, 241, 262, 298 - Battery I, 100, 106, 160 - 4th Battalion, 137, 160, 177, 180, 192, 249, 254, 274, 287, 325 - Provisional infantry platoons, 254 - Battery K, 136, 177 - 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 39, 56, 311, 335, 341 - Company A, 127, 338, 343 - Company B, 343 - Company C, 127 - 1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 56, 390 - Company B, 56 - 1st Engineer Battalion, 39, 40, 137, 141, 200, 217, 247, 311 - Headquarters Company, 300 - Company A, 136, 152, 200, 215, 219, 236, 241, 262, 300, 301 - Company B, 136, 200, 240 - Company C, 46, 63, 69, 307 - Company D, 99, 138, 204, 210, 212, 217, 247, 294, 296, 307 - 1st Medical Battalion, 308 - H&S Company, 139 - Division Hospital, 109, 139 - Clearing stations, 149 - Company A, 139 - Company B, 139 - Company C, 139, 149, 210 - Company D, 46, 63, 139 - Company E, 99, 139, 149, 245 - 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 45, 80, 99, 141, 160, 207, - 244, 298, 303 - 1st Ordnance Battalion, 136, 138 - 1st Service Battalion, 99, 136, 138, 160, 207, 241 - 1st Regulating Detachment, 247, 282 - 1st Shore Party Battalion, 24, 39, 40, 56, 138, 338, 339 - Shore Party Group C, 40 - 1st Signal Battalion, 99, 228, 234 - 1st Tank Battalion, 39, 58, 80, 81, 126, 137, 141, 149 - H&S Company, 137, 228, 234 - Company A, 45, 79, 80 - Company B, 228, 229, 232–234, 306, 326 - Company C, 56, 76 - Company D, 127, 136, 137, 149, 201, 228, 229, 231, 234, - 235, 306, 326 - - Marshall, George C., 6 - General, USA, 84, 121_n_ - Secretary of Defense, 37 - - Marshall, S. L. A., 92_n_, 314_n_, 321_n_ - - Martin, P. G., 112_n_ - - Masan, 337, 341, 345 - - Mason, Lt Ronald A., 73, 73_n_, 208, 209 - - Mattox, 2dLt Charles, 71 - - Maxwell, Marilyn, 31 - - McAlister, Col. Francis A., 38_n_, 205, 284, 335 - - McCaleb, Alfred F., Jr., 307 - - McCardell, Cpl E., 229_n_ - - McCarthy, 1stLt Robert C., 180, 182, 190, 191, 194_n_ - - McCarthy, Capt Thomas E., 71 - - McClane, Capt George E., 107 - - McClelland, Capt John C., Jr., 222, 224, 305 - - McClelland, 1stLt William A., 69, 316, 320 - - McDermott, Cpl Joseph E., 113 - - McDurmin, SSgt R. E., 103_n_ - - McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, 139 - - McFarland, 2dLt Robert L., 210 - - McGaw, Col Hugh D., 311 - - McGhee, Lt James M., 51_n_ - - McGuiness, 1stLt Clarence E., 297 - - McLaughlin, 1stLt Gerald J., 156 - - McLaughlin, LtCol J. N., 229_n_, 231–234 - - McNaughtton, 1stLt George C., 290, 291 - - McPhersen, SSgt Stanley B., 219 - - McReynolds, Maj William, 177, 192_n_, 250, 253, 254_n_, 287_n_ - - Mead, BrigGen Armistead D., USA, 309, 326_n_ - - Medical, 67 - - Medics, Navy, 247 - Surgical teams, 139, 246 - - Medical supplies, 302 - Plasma, 192 - - Meeker, 1stLt Ermine L., 240, 242, 274 - - Meister, Pfc William H., 57 - - Memorial services, 341 - - _Merganser_ (AMS), USS, 27 - - Merrit, 2dLt Max A., 184 - - Messman, 1stLt Robert C., 177 - - Military Sea Transport Service, 24 - - Miller, Capt J. H., 208, 209, 240_n_ - - Milne, LtCol Harry T., 137, 285, 294_n_, 300, 326 - - Mines, naval, 13, 27 - - _Missouri_ (BB), USS, 15, 28–30, 343 - - Mitchell, 1stLt Grady P., 210 - - Mitchell, 2dLt James M., 165 - - Mize, 1stLt Charles D., 270 - - _Mocking Bird_ (AMS), USS, 27 - - Moji, Japan, 75 - - Moisell, LtCol Harry E., 339 - - Moncrief, Capt Malcolm G., Jr., 307 - - Mongolia, 83 - - Monk, MSgt Matthew D., 48 - - Montross, Lynn, 179_n_, 180_n_, 246_n_, 330_n_ - - Mooney, 2dLt A. R., 103_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_ - - Moorad, George, 83_n_ - - Morehead, Capt Robert A., 160 - - Morehouse, RAdm Albert K., 134, 336 - - Morris, Capt. John F., 178–180, 260, 264, 270, 297, 321 - - Morris, Maj Warren, 193, 317 - - Moscow, 90, 98 - - Mortar support, 320 - - Motor march (Wonsan to Hamhung), 80 - - _Mount McKinley_ (AGC), USS, 22, 23, 25, 29, 31, 44, 45, 76, 337, - 341–343, 348 - - Muccio, Ambassador to Korea John, 35_n_ - - Mukden, 142 - - Munchon, 45, 72, 74, 79–81, 126 - - Munday, Maj. Jack R., 339 - - Munsell, SSgt Russell A., 254 - - Mupyong-ni, 40, 80, 133–135, 145, 146, 148 - - Murphy, SSgt Daniel M., 172, 184 - - Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 25, 40, 80, 123, 124, 152_n_, 157, 160, 172, - 178, 188, 212, 259, 271, 282, 285, 286, 288, 293, 299, 318 - - Myers, Maj Reginald R., 71, 216–218, 220, 236 - - - Nanchang rebellion, 83 - - Nanking, 84, 85 - - Napalm, 266, 271, 288 - - Nash, SSgt J. B., 229_n_ - - National Security Council, 5 - - Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory, 330_n_ - - Naval gunfire, 338, 339, 343 - - Naval gunfire support, 54, 55, 343 - - Navy, U. S. - Units - Naval Forces Far East, 10 - Commander, (ComNavFE). _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy. - Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 350 - Seventh Fleet, 17 - Transport Squadron One, 24 - Tactical Air Control Squadron One, 341, 348 - Joint Task Force 7, 13, 30, 50, 75. _See also_ VAdm A. D. Struble. - Task Force 77, 15, 17, 254 - Task Force 79, 15 - Task Force 90, 15, 336 - Commander (CTF 90), 336, 337, 339, 341, 342. _See also_ RAdm - J. H. Doyle. - Task Force 95, 15 - Task Group 70.1, 15 - Task Group 95.2 Support and Covering Group, 15, 28, 75 - Task Group 95.6, 15, 27, 29 - Task Group 96.2, 15 - Task Group 96.8, 15 - Tractor Group, 30, 31 - Transport Group, 30, 31 - Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1), 21, 336 - Commander (PhiGru 1), 26, 336 - Amphibious Group Three (PhiGru 3), 336 - Task Element 90.21, 338 - - Needham, 1stLt R. C., 202, 208, 209 - - _Newsweek_, 334 - - Newton, 2dLt Minard P., 116, 118, 165, 165_n_, 260, 264, 270 - - _New York Times_, 345_n_ - - Nichols, Capt Warren, 347 - - Nihart, LtCol F. B., 90_n_ - - _Noble_ (APA), USS, 39 - - Noel, Frank, 231, 233 - - Nolan, 2dLt Jack L., 164 - - Noren, Capt Wesley B., 48, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 53_n_, 57, - 57_n_, 221, 279_n_, 314, 315, 320, 321, 325 - - North, Cpl C. R., 190_n_ - - - Objective A, 312, 321, 324–326, 328. _See also_ Hill 1328. - - Objective B, 312, 317, 321, 325, 326, 328 - - Objective C, 312, 318, 321, 324–326, 328 - - Objective D, 312, 321, 328. _See also_ Hill 1457. - - Objective E, 312, 325. _See also_ Hill 1081. - - Observation Posts, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 103 - - Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH), 8_n_ - - Okinawa, 27, 338 - - Olson, Major M. R., 123 - - Operation _Yo-Yo_, 30, 31, 45 - - Oro-ri, 96, 99, 104, 123 - - _Osprey_ (AM) USS, 27 - - Owen, Lt Joseph, 318 - - - Pace, Secretary of the Army Frank, 35_n_ - - Page, LtCol John U. D., USA, 327 - - Page, H. L., Jr., 327_n_ - - Pak, Sun Chol, MajGen (NKPA), 66, 73 - - Panikkar, K. M., 7 - - Parachute, 251, 277, 280 - - Parry, Maj Francis F., 99, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116, 177 - - Partridge, Gen Earle E., USAF, 33, 201, 210_n_, 247, 300_n_, 309_n_, - 311, 312, 322, 323 - - Partridge, LtCol John H., 40, 137 - - _Partridge_ (AMS), USS, 27 - - Patrick, 2dLt C. E., 329_n_ - - Patrols, 66 - - Payne, SSgt Earle J., 179 - - Pearl Harbor, 334 - - Peckham, Capt Charles, 231 - - Peiping, 85, 98 - - Peiping-Tientsin (highway), 85_n_ - - Peleliu, 134, 302 - - Pendas, TSgt G. D., 226_n_, 241_n_ - - Pendry, Capt Edwin, 107_n_ - - Penstock Bridge, 315. _See also_ Treadway Bridge. - - Persian Empire, 357 - - Peters, Capt Uel D., 154, 290 - - Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., 180, 191, 192 - - Peterson, 2dLt Willard S., 262 - - Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), 160, 283 - - _Philippine Sea_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286 - - Phillips, Capt W. D., 108, 168, 174 - - _Pirate_ (AM), USS, 27, 28 - - Plans and Orders - United Nations Command (UNC) - Operation Order 2, 9_n_ - Commander in Chief, Far East (CinCFE) - Operation Plan 9-50, 8, 9, 10, 22 - Operation Plan 9-50 (Alternate), 23 - Commander, Seventh Fleet - Operation Order 16-50, 15 - Commander, Naval Forces, Far East - Operation Order 17-50, 27 - Operation Plan 113-50, 13_n_, 25 - Commander, Amphibious Group I - Operation Order 16-50, 26 - Commander, Task Force 90 - Operation Order 19-50, 336 - X Corps - Operation Order 2-50, 32 - Operation Order 3, 14_n_ - Operation Order 4, 14, 15_n_, 21, 24 - Operation Order 6, 76, 131, 132, 135, 147 - Operation Order 7, 145, 146, 148 - Operation Order 8-50, 239, 251 - Operation Order 9-50, 336 - Operation Order 10, 338_n_, 339 - Operation Plan 8, 134, 135, 145 - Operation Instruction (OI) 11, 26_n_ - Operation Instruction 13, 76, 79 - Operation Instruction 15, 80 - Operation Instruction 17, 140 - Operation Instruction 19, 249 - Operation Instruction 22, 280 - 1st Marine Division - Administrative Order (AdmO) 13-50, 24_n_ - Administrative Order 20-50, 284 - Embarkation Order (EmbO) 2-50, 21_n_ - Embarkation Order 3-50, 335, 338_n_, 340 - Operation Plan 4-50, 38 - Operation Order 15-50, 17_n_ - Operation Order 16-50, 21, 22, 22_n_, 26_n_, 31, 331 - Operation Order 17-50, 26_n_ - Operation Order 18-50, 44, 45, 79 - Operation Order 19-50, 76 - Operation Order 21-50, 135 - Operation Order 22-50, 139, 140 - Operation Order 23-50, 141, 147 - Operation Order 24-50, 148 - Operation Order 25-50, 284 - Operation Order 26-50, 303, 312, 318 - 5th Marines - Operation Order 39-50, 151_n_ - 7th Marines - Operation Order 14-50, 294 - 5th and 7th Marines - Joint Operation Order 1-50, 250, 257 - Joint Operation Order 2-50, 254 - - _Pledge_ (AM), USS, 27, 28 - - Podolak, Pfc Bruno, 213 - - Pohujang, 315 - - Polson, Capt Robert J., 251 - - Port Arthur, 142 - - Post War planning, 43 - - Post Exchange Section, 278 - - Press correspondent. _See_ Correspondents. - - Press photographers, 333 - - _Princeton_ (CV), USS, 286 - - Prisoners, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 58, 81, 98, 99, 156, 290, - 293, 299, 322, 323, 341 - - Prisoners of War (POW), 42, 49, 57, 65 - Interrogations, 66 - - Propaganda (Chinese), 91 - - Prosser, TSgt Wilfred H., 322 - - Provisional platoons, 63 - - Puckett, 2dLt C. R., 82_n_, 109, 112_n_, 114, 116 - - Puller, Col Lewis B., 39, 54, 55, 58, 69–72, 76, 224, 225, 306, - 307, 328, 331 - - Pungsan, 36, 145 - - Pusan, 337, 339, 341, 345, 350 - - Pusan Perimeter, 1, 10, 14, 24, 30, 66, 346 - - Pusong-ni, 231, 299 - - Pyongyang, 3, 9, 18, 22, 23, 34, 36, 63, 66, 71, 350 - - Pyongwon, 36 - - - Quantico, 351 - - Quinn, LtCol William W., USA, 308 - - - Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 35_n_, 337 - - Radio, 67, 264, 282, 305 - Communication, 68 - Marine, 179, 191 - AN/GRC-9, 259 - SCR 300, 52, 207, 259 - SCR 610, 259 - - Railroad, 95 - - Rations, 160, 277, 282, 284, 302 - “C” rations, 121 - - Read, Capt Benjamin S., 215 - - _Redhead_ (AMS), USS, 27 - - Reem, 2dLt Robert D., 118, 119 - - Refugees, 49, 302, 319, 323, 326, 338, 342, 345 - - Reller, Sgt Othmar J., 174 - - Replacements, 281, 293, 294 - USMC, 302 - - Rhee, President Syngman, 2, 3 - - Ricardi, SSgt Anthony J., 118 - - Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 152, 263 - - Rickert, LtCol Robert W., 205 - - Ridge, North, 151, 152, 157, 158, 161, 167, 168, 170, 172, 178, 182, - 187–189, 192 - - Ridge, Northwest, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170, - 183, 187–189 - - Ridge, South, 151, 152, 159–161, 177, 178, 190, 253 - - Ridge, Southeast, 151, 152, 159, 160, 177, 190 - - Ridge, Southwest, 151, 152, 154, 156–159, 163, 167, 170, 177, 180, - 182, 188, 189, 253 - - Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., 62_n_, 63, 63_n_, 65, 66_n_, 68, 71, 71_n_, - 72, 73_n_, 74_n_, 197, 198, 200–202, 204–207, 210, 216, 220, - 226_n_, 235_n_, 240_n_, 243_n_, 295, 321, 328 - - Ridgway, MajGen Matthew B., USA, 243 - - Rigg, LtCol Robert F., 86_n_ - - Roach, Maj Maurice E., 80_n_, 98, 104, 116–118, 120, 157, 160, 165, - 251, 254_n_, 294_n_, 297 - - Roach, SSgt William, 316, 320 - - Road, Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir, 44 - - Roadblocks, 69, 72, 74, 105, 166, 319 - CCF, 222, 224, 263, 274, 309, 315 - USMC, 294 - - Roberts, Sgt Clayton, 51 - - Roberts, Col Dean C., 350 - - Robinson, Capt R. B., 53_n_ - - _Rochester_ (CA), USS, 15, 28 - - Roise, LtCol Harold S., 66_n_, 123, 124, 151, 152, 156, 164, 187, 188, - 253, 265, 266, 272, 274, 275, 290, 293, 300–302 - - Rosen, Lt Norman R., USA, 213, 214 - - _Rowan_ (DD) USS, 30 - - Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, 15 - - Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, 74_n_, 76, 340 - - Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State Dean, 35_n_ - - - St. Benedict Abbey, 39, 40 - - Sakkat Mountain, 156, 157, 161 - - Samchok, 337, 342 - - Samgo Station, 112, 113 - - Sandbags, 208 - - Sariwon, 9, 34 - - Sasebo, Japan, 27, 32, 336 - - Sawyer Maj W. D., 80, 82, 100, 103, 106, 108, 152, 160, 207, 294_n_, - 317, 318_n_, 321_n_, 322_n_ - Command Post, 103 - - Schlegel, Pfc Eugene B., 219 - - Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, 5_n_, 8_n_, 11_n_, 35_n_, 36_n_, 129_n_, - 142_n_, 143_n_ - - Schrier, Capt Harold O., 262 - - Schreier, 1stLt William J., 174 - - Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., 221, 309_n_, 314, 315, 321_n_, 322_n_, 324, - 325, 328, 331 - - Sears, Capt Norman W., 134, 336 - - Seeburger, 1stLt Edward M., 174 - - Seeley, Maj Henry J., 232, 234 - - Seoul, 1, 3, 9, 11, 63, 66, 291, 293, 355 - - Sexton, Maj M. J., 281_n_, 288, 302_n_ - - Seydel, 1stLt Karle F., 291 - - Shanghai, 85 - - Shantung, 84 - - Sharon, 2dLt D. W., 82_n_, 109, 112–114, 116, 329_n_ - - Shea, Maj W. E., 103_n_ - - Shelnutt, Cape John C., 213 - - Shepherd, Capt G. E., 293 - - Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 58, 323, 336, 337_n_, 338_n_, 340, 359 - - Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 5 - - Ships - AGC, 24 - AKA, 24, 341 - AP, 24, 341 - APA, 24, 341 - APD, 57 - Cargo, 42, 341, 342 - Cruiser, 342 - Destroyer, 342 - Hospital, 56 - JMS-14 (Japanese Mine Sweepers), 29 - LSD, 24, 341, 343 - LSM, 24, 42 - LSMR, 342 - LST, 14, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 40, 42, 55, 339–343, 348 - LST 883, 56, 57 - LST 973, 58 - LST (ROK), 54 - LST (SCAJAP), 24 - LSTH, 54, 55 - LSU, 24, 40 - LVT, 14, 40, 41, 55, 343 - LVT (A), 343 - Transports, 30 - Tugs, 342 - YMS 516 (ROK Minesweeper), 29 - YMS 905 (ROK Mine Sweeper), 27 - _See also_ Ship by name - - Shore Party, 40, 41, 339, 341 - - Shutts, Capt K. A., 202_n_, 229_n_, 259_n_, 288_n_, 298_n_, 329_n_ - - Shutts, Maj R. W., 338_n_, 339 - - Siberia, 36 - - _Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 32, 287, 347, 349 - - Silvis, Capt Richard S. (MC), USN, 308 - - Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 63_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 67, 67_n_, 197, 198, 204, - 208, 235, 326 - - Simpson, LtCol F., 282, 298, 299, 324 - - Singalpajin, 132 - - Sinhung-ni, 123, 135, 139, 148, 243, 254, 262, 274 - - Sinhung-ni force, 243 - - Sinhung Valley, 123, 124 - - Sinuiju, 124, 142, 143 - - Sitter, Capt Carl L., 66, 204, 205, 226, 228, 229, 235, 236, 241, 242 - - Skelt, 1stLt Earnest P., 238, 241 - - Sleeping bags, 259 - - Sleds, 244 - - Smith, RAdm Allen E., USN, 15, 30 - - Smith, Maj George A., 40 - - Smith, Pfc Gerald J., 181 - - Smith, Harry, 327 - - Smith, 1stLt H. J., 291 - - Smith, Capt Jack A., 222 - - Smith, 1stLt L. R., 183_n_, 186 - - Smith, Capt Samuel S., 156, 288, 290, 291 - - Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 13–15, 21, 23–27, 29–32, 38, 39, 43–45, - 54–58, 63, 76, 77, 80–82, 117, 125, 126, 128, 131, 133–136, - 140, 145–148, 150, 189, 198, 200, 205, 206, 211, 220, 224, - 229, 234_n_, 235, 238, 239, 241_n_, 243_n_, 244_n_, 245, - 247_n_, 249, 250_n_, 253, 254, 271_n_, 275, 279_n_, 280_n_, - 281–283, 285, 287, 288_n_, 294_n_, 305_n_, 307_n_, 308_n_, - 309_n_, 311_n_, 312, 313, 318, 319_n_, 321_n_, 323, 324_n_, - 325, 328, 329_n_, 332_n_, 335, 336, 338_n_, 340, 341, 345_n_, - 349–351, 359 - - Sneakers, rubber, 104 - - Snedeker, Col E. W., 45_n_, 74, 125, 324, 327, 334, 335, 336_n_, 338_n_ - - Snelling, 2dLt Edward W., 216 - - Sniping, CCF, 244 - - Sniper fire, 57 - - Snow, 270 - - Snyder, 1stLt Robert E., 172, 172_n_, 174, 184, 186 - - Songchon, 95 - - Songchon river, 106_n_ - - Songjin, 28, 36–38, 95, 337 - - Sorensen, 1stLt George A., 288 - - deSoria, Charles, 282 - - Sota, 1stLt Anthony J., 174 - - Soule, MajGen Robert H., USA, 75, 342 - - Soyang-ni, 135, 137, 141 - - Spiker, Maj Theodore F., 151 - - Spofford, Capt Richard T., USN, 15, 27, 30, 31 - - Stalin, 90 - - Stamford, Capt Edward P., 243, 244 - - Stevens, LtCol John W., II, 158, 183_n_, 189, 257_n_, 272_n_, - 274, 318, 325_n_ - - Stewart, Col J. L., 254_n_, 266_n_, 272_n_, 300_n_ - - Stiles, 2dLt Charles R., 63_n_, 71, 71_n_ - - Stocks, MSgt Marian M., 65 - - Storaasli, Capt Paul E., 206 - - Stoves, 281 - - Strategy - Of Celerity, 8, 9 - Massive compression envelopment, 144 - - Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 10 - - Stretchers, 279 - - Strohmenger, Capt Andrew J., 64, 73, 204_n_, 215 - - Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 15, 28–31, 38, 58, 337 - - Stuart, TSgt H. C., 297 - - Stuart, 1stLt Vaughan R., 300 - - Sudong, 81, 96, 98, 100, 103–110, 112, 116, 146, 251, 326, 327 - - Sudong ambush, 327, 328 - - Sukchon, 34 - - Sullivan, 1stLt Charles H., 299 - - Sunchon, 34 - - Sung Shin-lun, 161 - - Sung Wei-shan, 266, 267 - - Supplies, 24, 42, 117, 138, 282 - In-transit depots, 138 - Supply levels, 140 - Advance Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, 80 - Supply Regulating Station Detachment, 138, 140, 141 - Supply trains, 126 - _See also_ Dumps - - Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC), 66, 67, 198 - - Supporting fire, 102 - - Surrender Message, 6, 8 - - Sutter, LtCol Allan, 55, 58, 59, 72, 77, 222, 224, 226, 228, 305_n_, - 306, 328, 331 - - Swartley, LtCol J. N., 297 - - Sweeney, TSgt James E., 202_n_ - - _Swenson_ (DD), USS, 28 - - Swinson, Pfc Louis W., 171 - - Swords, 2dLt John J., 53 - - - Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 341, 348 - - Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), 33, 69, 349 - - Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 296, 349 - Airborne TADC, 321, 350 - - Tactics, Marine, 107, 354 - - Taebeck, Mountain Range, 17, 18, 36, 38 - - Tallent, SSgt Robert W., 89_n_ - - Tanchon, 28 - - Tanks - Army, 244, 245, 293, 296 - USMC, 55, 62, 68, 127, 134, 147, 160, 220, 222, 224, 229, 230, 232, - 235, 240, 254, 261, 263, 268, 270, 272, 290, 291, 293, 294, - 296, 300, 301, 305, 311, 313, 317, 326, 329–331 - M4A3 (Sherman), 137, 326 - M-26 (Pershing), 137, 160_n_, 322, 326 - T-34 (NKPA), 105, 110, 112, 113 - Tank-dozer, 68, 137, 138, 294 - Provisional tank platoon, 137, 160_n_, 208, 291 - - Taplett, LtCol R. D., 147, 158, 167, 170, 171, 182, 183, 250, 254_n_, - 257_n_, 258_n_, 261–263, 268, 271_n_, 272, 274, 275, 300 - - Task Force Anderson, 245 - - Task Force Dog, 309, 314, 316, 326, 327 - - Task Force Drysdale, 225, 226, 228–235, 298, 300, 306, 307 - - Task Force Faith, 244, 245, 288 - - Taylor, Capt R. M., 53_n_ - - Taylor, 1stLt William W., 318, 321 - - Tents, 281 - Warming, 121 - - Thackrey, Adm Lyman A., USN, 336 - - Thanksgiving Day, 143, 148 - - Theros, Capt John G., 100_n_, 103_n_, 294 - - Thirty-eighth Parallel, 2, 3, 5–9, 54, 59, 346 - - _Thomas_ (DD), USS, 28 - - Thomas, 1stLt Alfred I., 267 - - Thomas, Maj R. C. W., 86_n_ - - Thornton, Cpl D. R., 159_n_, 180_n_, 181, 190_n_ - - Tientsin, 85 - - Tighe, Major Thomas B., 259, 270, 271 - - _Time_, 333, 334, 358_n_ - - Togwon, 70 - - Tokchon, 146 - - Toksil-li, 56, 141 - - Toktong Pass, 96, 101, 136, 147, 159, 179, 180, 190, 198, 201, 246, - 253, 254, 265, 270–272 - - Tokyo, 35, 205, 308, 348, 359 - - Tonae-ri, 294 - - Tongchon, 50, 55–57 - - Tongjong-ni, 228 - - Tootsie Rolls, 278 - - _Towanda Victory_, SS, 342 - - Tractor Groups, 30 - - Tractor Dozers, 41, 149, 177, 210, 247, 253, 301 - - Trailers, 25 - - Transportation - Rail and Motor Transport, 140 - Railway, 138 - Railway cars, 139, 327 - Train, 45, 46, 54, 55, 59 - Kowon, 127 - Divisional, 313 - No. 1, 285, 303, 305, 322, 324–326 - No. 2, 293, 300 - Regimental - RCT-1, 327, 328 - 5th Marines, 300 - 7th Marines, 184, 294, 297, 312, 317, 321, 324 - Supply, 128 - Trucking Facilities, 141 - - Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., 172, 184, 186 - - Treadway Bridge, 309, 315 - - Trip Flares, 71, 208, 240 - - Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 63, 198 - - Troop Training Unit Pacific, 339 - - Tsung Hui Tzu, 185 - - Truman, President Harry S., 3, 5_n_, 6_n_ 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35, 84, - 129_n_, 142_n_ - - Tsinan, 84 - - Tsingtao, 85 - - Tuan-di, 141 - - Tunner, MajGen William H., USAF, 281, 338, 349 - - Turkish Brigade, 150 - - Turner, Capt Bryon C., 99 - - Twohey, SSgt. Richard B., 113 - - Typewriters, 281 - - - Uiji, 143 - - Uijongbu, 14, 15 - - Ulsan, 337, 343 - - Umbaugh, SSgt Ernest J., 320 - - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 3, 5, 6 - Intervention in the Korean War, 35–37, 83 - Military Mission in Tokyo, 90 - - United Nations (UN), 1, 2 - Forces, 5, 7, 8, 13 - Headquarters, 145 - Security Council, 3 - Units - EUSAK. _See_ Army Units. - Independent Commando, Royal Marines, (41st Commandos), 140, 148, - 149, 205, 220, 225, 226, 228–231, 233–236, 242, 273, 275, 300, - 307, 318–321 - Twenty-seventh Commonwealth Brigade, 34 - - United States, 90 - Defense Department, U. S,, 142 - Military Advisory Group in China, 75, 84 - State Department, U. S. 3_n_, 6, 142 - - USO, 31 - - - _Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 17, 233, 286 - - Vehicles, 42, 197, 268, 284, 325 - Ambulances, USMC, 314, 327 - Amtrac, 127 - DUKWS, 338, 339 - Jeeps, 114, 137, 233, 244, 277, 296, 314, 322 - Supply, 69 - Tractors, USMC, 322 - Trucks, 25, 68–70, 72, 74, 109, 160, 197, 228–230, 232, 235, 244, - 277, 285, 296, 299, 311, 327, 328, 331, 347 - Brockway, 311, 312, 319, 322 - Enemy, 110, 117, 124 - Column, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286 - “Weasel” (M-29), 127 - - Vick, SSgt William L., 113, 166 - - Vining, Capt Norman, 230, 306 - - Vom Orde, 1stLt Ewald D., 312 - - Vorhies, Maj W. E., 108_n_ - - - Wake Island, 35 - Conference, 35, 36 - - Walker, Richard L., 83_n_ - - Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 9–11, 34, 37, 83, 86, 91_n_, 205 - - Walseth Col H. S., 229_n_, 232, 283 - - _Wantuck_ (APD), USS, 56 - - Ward, 1stLt Charles C., 312 - - Ward, Lt Chester C., 34 - - Warren, LtCol Charles E., 339 - - Warren, Maj Walter T., 215 - - Washington, D. C., 35, 37, 142, 359 - - Wasson, Pfc Marvin L., 327, 327_n_ - - Weapons - Chinese - Artillery, 102, 107, 215 - 75mm, 147 - 76mm, 215 - Automatic, 268 - 3.5 Bazooka, 294 - Burp guns, 210 - Flares, 104 - Grenades, 105, 118, 184, 185, 210, 217, 218, 225, 226 - Machine guns, 105, 110, 118, 147, 157, 163, 179, 184, 193, 197, - 218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 266, 291, 296, 315, 316, 325 - Mines, land (Bouncing Betty), 74 - Mortars, 102, 110, 117, 157, 163, 178, 191–193, 201, 209, 210, - 220, 225, 228, 229, 235, 291, 319 - Pistol, 226 - Rifles, 190, 225, 226 - 2.36 Rockets, 299 - Small-arms, 201, 229, 235 - North Korean People’s Army - Grenades, 127 - High Explosives, 125 - Mortars, 52, 298, 299, 302 - South Korea - Machine guns, 170, 171 - United States - Army self propelled AAA guns, 324 - Bombs, 102 - Grenades, 165 - Marine, 113, 168, 181, 194, 217, 219, 232, 233, 255, 282 - Howitzers - 105mm, 156, 160, 215, 268, 275 - 155mm, 160, 274, 275, 287 - Machine guns - Army, 213 - Heavy, 67, 180, 183, 191, 194, 211, 215, 225, 240, 259, 261, 271 - USMC, 163–166, 168, 209, 219, 225, 229, 244, 266, 281, - 291, 315, 327 - Light, 219, 257, 299 - Mines - Booby traps, 43, 71, 208, 240 - Clearance, 138 - Mortars, 73, 108, 110, 184, 202, 225, 266 - 4.2 inch, 52, 107, 118, 152, 156, 160, 221, 222, 266, 281, 288, - 305, 315, 324 - 60mm, 50, 51, 103, 105, 120, 178–180, 183, 209, 215, 216, 232, - 265, 315, 320, 326 - 81mm, 50–52, 67, 103, 105, 156, 164, 165, 180, 184, 190, 193, - 194, 204, 222, 224, 240, 251, 257, 259, 261, 264, 271, 290, - 294, 305, 315, 326 - Support, 217, 219 - Pistol, 209 - Rifles, 163, 164, 232, 281 - BAR, 118, 161, 329 - Carbine, 161, 209, 217, 232 - M-1, 161, 217 - 75mm Recoilless, 57, 69, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 152, 156, 160, - 193, 221, 232, 233, 275, 327 - Rockets, 102, 271, 291 - 2.36, 290 - 5 inch, 113 - 3.5 launcher, 65, 103, 105, 113, 114, 185, 213, 226, 325 - Small arms, 219 - - Weather, 121, 135, 136, 152, 161, 172, 194, 259, 297, 314, 315, - 319, 320, 347 - - Webber, 1stLt Richard C., 174 - - Wedeneyer, Lt(jg) Robert G., (MC) USN, 297 - - Weible, Walter L., 10 - - Weiland, Maj Charles P., 339, 340 - - Westover, Capt John G., 213, 226_n_ - - Whipple, Maj R. E., 257_n_, 262, 271 - - Whitney, MajGen Courtney, USA, 6_n_, 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35_n_, 129_n_, 205 - - Wiggins, TSgt Shelly, 69 - - Wilcox, Capt Myron E., 81, 178 - - Williams, Capt Bruce F., 329_n_, 331 - - Williams, Cpl C. W., 229_n_ - - Williams, 1stLt Leslie C., 258 - - Williamson, Capt Harold B., 268, 276 - - Willoughby, MajGen C. A., USA, 35_n_, 129, 205 - - Wilson, 1stLt H. S., 244, 282 - - Wilson, 1stLt John B., 81, 99, 100, 103_n_ - - Winecoff, Col J. L., 250_n_ - - Winston, LtCol Waldon C., USA, 327, 327_n_, 328 - - Wire, concertina, USMC, 240 - - Woessner, Maj Henry J., 98, 100_n_, 152_n_ - - Wonsan, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 34–37, 43–46, 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, - 63, 66, 68–72, 74–76, 79, 80, 95, 98, 125–128, 131, 136, 138, - 145, 239, 308, 338, 348, 350 - Airfield, 15, 18, 41, 56, 68, 69, 128, 239 - Capture of, 22 - Evacuation, 239, 338 - Majon-ni Road, 62 - Operation - Air, 31–33 - Embarkation, 21 - Intelligence, 17, 18, 21 - Landing, 14, 31, 37–41, 44, 281 - Logistics, 10, 11, 18, 19, 24, 25, 41, 42 - Mine sweeping, 27–29 - Movement to the Objective, 30, 31 - Orders, 14, 15, 17 - Outloading, 24–26 - Plans, 11–15, 22–24 - Personnel, Landed at, 42 - Population, 17 - Shore Party Groups, 40 - - Wood, LtCol Ransom M., 156 - - _Worcester_ (CL), USS, 28 - - World War I, 351 - - World War II, 2 - - Wray, Capt Robert P., 49–51, 314, 315 - - Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 8, 10, 11_n_, 14_n_, 23_n_, 132, 205 - - - Xenophon, 333, 357 - - - Yalu River, 36, 81, 82, 98, 99, 131, 133, 142–146, 352 - Advance to, 132, 146, 147, 150 - Logistics, 138, 140, 141 - Medical, 138, 139 - Orders, 145, 148 - Plans, 131–136, 139–141 - Battle of the, 143 - Bridges across the, 129, 142, 143 - Hydro-electric plants along the, 142, 143 - - Yancey, CWO Dee R., 229, 232 - - Yancy, 1st Lt John, 108, 168, 174 - - Yangdok, 35 - - Yangtze Valley, 85 - - Yeaman, Col R. R., 350 - - Yenan, 83, 84 - - Yonghung, 45, 79, 126–128, 131 - Bay, 17 - - Yonghung-Hamhung Railroad, 44 - - Yongnim-dong, 148 - - Yonpo, 95, 239, 286, 311, 341, 347, 348, 350 - Airfield, 38, 246, 335, 337, 340, 342, 349 - - Yongwon, 9 - - Youngdale, Col C. A., 326_n_ - - Yudam-ni, 96, 102, 109_n_, 131, 135, 136, 139–141, 146–152, 154, - 156–161, 163–168, 170–172, 174, 177–180, 182–195, 200–202, - 204, 207, 221, 238, 239, 245, 247, 249, 250, 251, 253–255, - 277–280, 282, 283, 286, 291, 334, 336, 352–354 - Artillery, 177, 250 - Breakout, 220, 254, 255, 257–275 - Casualties, 280 - Command, 249, 250 - Medical, 192 - - Yugoslavia, 3_n_ - - - Zullo, MSgt Rocco A., 226 - - - ✩ U. S. 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