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+This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for
+eBook #65009 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/65009)
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-The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953
-Volume III (of 5), by Lynn Montross
-
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
-www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
-will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before
-using this eBook.
-
-Title: U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5)
-       The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
-
-Author: Lynn Montross
-        Nicholas Canzona
-
-Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65009]
-
-Language: English
-
-Character set encoding: UTF-8
-
-Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed
-             Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
-             produced from images generously made available by The Internet
-             Archive)
-
-*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
-1950-1953 VOLUME III (OF 5) ***
-
-
-
-
-[Illustration]
-
-[Illustration]
-
-
-
-
-  U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
-
-  1950–1953
-
-  VOLUME III
-
-  _The Chosin Reservoir Campaign_
-
-  by
-
-  LYNN MONTROSS
-
-  and
-
-  CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
-
-  Based on Research by
-  K. JACK BAUER, PHD.
-
-
-  [Illustration]
-
-
-  Historical Branch, G-3
-  Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
-  Washington, D. C., 1957
-
-
-
-
-  Preceding Volumes of
-  _U. S. Marine Operations in Korea_
-  Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”
-  Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation”
-
-
-  Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 57-60727
-
-  For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government
-    Printing Office
-  Washington 25, D. C. Price $2.75
-  Official Price of this Publication $2.75
-
-
-
-
-Foreword
-
-
-The breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir area
-will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics of our history.
-It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in the best tradition
-of American military annals.
-
-The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese
-divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot be
-explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the high
-degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the “uncommon
-valor” expected of all Marines.
-
-A great deal of initiative was required of unit commanders, and tactics
-had to be improvised at times on the spur of the moment to meet
-unusual circumstances. But in the main, the victory was gained by firm
-discipline and adherence to time-tested military principles. Allowing
-for differences in arms, indeed, the Marines of 1950 used much the same
-fundamental tactics as those employed on mountain roads by Xenophon
-and his immortal Ten Thousand when they cut their way through Asiatic
-hordes to the Black Sea in the year 401 B.C.
-
-When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might have
-accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the
-destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into the
-enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The decision
-of the commander and the determination of all hands to come out
-fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with the highest
-traditions of the United States Marine Corps.
-
-[Illustration: (signature)]
-
-                                             R. MCC. PATE
-                                     _General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
-                                   _Commandant of the Marine Corps._
-
-
-
-
-Preface
-
-
-This is the third in a series of five volumes dealing with the
-operations of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the period
-2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail the
-operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as a
-part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign.
-
-The time covered in this book extends from the administrative landing
-at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation which ended
-on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete, however, without
-reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions in Washington and
-Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast Korea and governed their
-employment.
-
-Credit is due the U. S. Army and Navy for support on land and sea, and
-the U. S. Navy and Air Force for support in the air. But since this is
-primarily a Marine Corps history, the activities of other services are
-described here only in sufficient detail to show Marine operations in
-their proper perspective.
-
-The ideal of the authors has been to relate the epic of the Chosin
-Reservoir breakout from the viewpoint of the man in the foxhole as well
-as the senior officer at the command post. Grateful acknowledgment is
-made to the 142 Marine officers and men who gave so generously of their
-time by contributing 338 narratives, letters, and interviews. In many
-instances this material was so detailed that some could not be used,
-because of space limitations. But all will go into the permanent Marine
-archives for the benefit of future historians.
-
-Thanks are also extended to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as
-Marine officers, who offered valuable comments and criticisms after
-reading the preliminary drafts of chapters. Without this assistance no
-accurate and detailed account could have been written.
-
-The maps contained in this volume, as in the previous ones, have been
-prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,
-Virginia. The advice of officers of the Current History Branch of the
-Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, has
-also been of aid in the preparation of these pages.
-
-[Illustration: (signature)]
-
-                                        E. W. SNEDEKER
-                              _Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,_
-                                _Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._
-
-
-
-
-Contents
-
-
-                                                                  _Page_
-
-     I  Problems of Victory                                            1
-
-          Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender
-          Message to NKPA Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of
-          Celerity--Logistical Problems of Advance--Naval
-          Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint
-          Planning for Wonsan Landing
-
-
-    II  The Wonsan Landing                                            21
-
-          ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and
-          Embarkation--Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation
-          Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at Objective--MacArthur Orders
-          Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine Division
-
-
-   III  First Blood at Kojo                                           43
-
-          1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The
-          All-Night Fight of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to
-          Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan Area--Marines
-          Relieved at Kojo
-
-
-    IV  Majon-ni and Ambush Alley                                     61
-
-          Marines Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of
-          Mission--Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop
-          of Supplies Requested--First Attack on Perimeter--KMC
-          Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st Marines to
-          Chigyong
-
-
-     V  Red China to the Rescue                                       79
-
-          Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New
-          Enemy--Communist Victory in Civil War--Organization of
-          the CCF--The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier--CCF Arms and
-          Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign--CCF
-          Strategy and Tactics
-
-
-    VI  The Battle of Sudong                                          95
-
-          The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved
-          by 7th Marines--CCF Counterattack at Sudong--Two
-          Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of NKPA Tank
-          Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF
-          Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines
-
-
-   VII  Advance to the Chosin Reservoir                              125
-
-          Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New
-          Enemy--The Turning Point of 15 November--Changes
-          in X Corps Mission--Marine Preparations for
-          Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN
-          Command--Marine Concentration on MSR
-
-
-  VIII  Crisis at Yudam-ni                                           151
-
-          Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before
-          CCF Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese
-          Seize Hill 1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of
-          North Ridge
-
-
-    IX  Fox Hill                                                     177
-
-          Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company
-          at Toktong Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North
-          Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not Enough
-          Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November
-
-
-     X  Hagaru’s Night of Fire                                       197
-
-          Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear
-          MSR--Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of
-          Marine Units--CCF Attacks from the Southwest--East Hill
-          Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting Fires--Marine
-          Attacks on East Hill
-
-
-    XI  Task Force Drysdale                                          221
-
-          CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by
-          Marine Tanks--The Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack
-          of George Company on East Hill--High Level Command
-          Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue
-          of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip
-
-
-   XII  Breakout From Yudam-ni                                       249
-
-          Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419
-          and 1542--March of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack
-          of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The Ridgerunners of Toktong
-          Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542--Advance of
-          Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter
-
-
-  XIII  Regroupment at Hagaru                                        277
-
-          4,312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements
-          Flown to Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning
-          for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at
-          Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of RCT-7
-          to the South--Advance of the Division Trains
-
-
-   XIV  Onward From Koto-ri                                          305
-
-          Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task
-          Force Dog--Air Drop of Bridge Sections--Division
-          Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in the
-          Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine
-          Operations of 9 and 10 December--Completion of Division
-          Breakout
-
-
-    XV  The Hungnam Redeployment                                     333
-
-          Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st
-          Marine Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines
-          Arrive at New Assembly Area--Contributions of Marine
-          Aviation--Losses Sustained by the Enemy--Results of the
-          Reservoir Campaign
-
-
-  _Appendixes_
-
-  A  Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations                   361
-
-  B  Task Organization, 1st Marine Division                          365
-
-  C  Naval Task Organization                                         373
-
-  D  Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division                       379
-
-  E  1st Marine Division Casualties                                  381
-
-  F  Command and Staff List, 8 October-15 December 1950,
-      1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing               383
-
-  G  Enemy Order of Battle                                           397
-
-  H  Air Evacuation Statistics                                       399
-
-  I  Unit Citations                                                  401
-
-  Bibliography                                                       405
-
-  Index                                                              413
-
-
-
-
-Illustrations
-
-
-_Photographs_
-
-Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 148 and 276.
-
-
-_Maps and Sketches_
-
-                                                                  _Page_
-   1  Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines                       4
-
-   2  Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division,
-        October-December 1950                                    12, 122
-
-   3  Wonsan and Harbor                                               16
-
-   4  Kojo Area                                                       47
-
-   5  Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan                                     62
-
-   6  Majon-ni Perimeter                                              64
-
-   7  The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division                97
-
-   8  Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase                                    101
-
-   9  Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November                             111
-
-  10  Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass                      115
-
-  11  1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives                        130
-
-  12  Yudam-ni                                                       153
-
-  13  Marine Attacks, 27 November                                    155
-
-  14  Battle of Northwest Ridge                                      162
-
-  15  Action at 3/5’s CP                                             169
-
-  16  The Battle of North Ridge                                      173
-
-  17  Hagaru Defensive Perimeter                                     199
-
-  18  East Hill Attacks, 29 November                                 212
-
-  19  Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December                      223
-
-  20  Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December           227
-
-  21  Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November                        230
-
-  22  East Hill Attacks, 30 November                                 237
-
-  23  Breaking off Action, 30 November                               252
-
-  24  Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December                             256
-
-  25  Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December                           269
-
-  26  Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December    289
-
-  27  Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December                             292
-
-  28  Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December                  295
-
-  29  Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December                   310
-
-  30  Hungnam Docks and Beaches                                      344
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER I
-
-Problems Of Victory
-
-_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel--Surrender Message to_ NKPA
-_Forces--MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity--Logistical Problems of
-Advance--Naval Missions Prescribed--X Corps Relieved at Seoul--Joint
-Planning for Wonsan Landing_
-
-
-It is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can
-be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was brought
-home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN) heads,
-both political and military, during the last week of September 1950.
-Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident
-that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in Korea, as
-represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA).
-
-Only a month before, such a result would have seemed a faint and
-unrealistic hope. Late in August the hard-pressed Eighth U. S. Army
-in Korea (EUSAK) was defending that southeast corner of the peninsula
-known as the Pusan Perimeter.
-
-“Nothing fails like success,” runs a cynical French proverb, and the
-truth of this adage was demonstrated militarily when the dangerously
-over-extended NKPA forces paid the penalty of their tenuous supply
-line on 15 September 1950. That was the date of the X Corps amphibious
-assault at Inchon, with the 1st Marine Division as landing force
-spearheading the advance on Seoul.
-
-X Corps was the strategic anvil of a combined operation as the Eighth
-Army jumped off next day to hammer its way out of the Pusan Perimeter
-and pound northward toward Seoul. When elements of the two UN forces
-met just south of the Republic of Korea (ROK) capital on 26 September,
-the routed NKPA remnants were left only the hope of escaping northward
-across the 38th parallel.[1]
-
-      [1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and
-          Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been
-          told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with
-          the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in
-          the Inchon-Seoul operation.
-
-The bold strategic plan leading up to this victory--one of the most
-decisive ever won by U. S. land, sea and air forces--was largely
-the concept of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, who was
-Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CinCUNC) as well as
-U. S. Commander in Chief in the Far East (CinCFE). It was singularly
-appropriate, therefore, that he should have returned the political
-control of the battle-scarred ROK capital to President Syngman Rhee on
-29 September. Marine officers who witnessed the ceremony have never
-forgotten the moving spectacle of the American general and the fiery
-Korean patriot, both past their 70th birthdays, as they stood together
-under the shell-shattered skylight of the Government Palace.[2]
-
-      [2] Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless
-          otherwise noted, all interviews have been by the authors.
-
-
-_Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel_
-
-“Where do we go from here?” would hardly have been an oversimplified
-summary of the questions confronting UN leaders when it became apparent
-that the NKPA forces were defeated. In order to appraise the situation,
-it is necessary to take a glance at preceding events.
-
-As early as 19 July, the dynamic ROK leader had made it plain that he
-did not propose to accept the pre-invasion _status quo_. He served
-notice that his forces would unify Korea by driving to the Manchurian
-border. Since the Communists had violated the 38th Parallel, the aged
-Rhee declared, this imaginary demarcation between North and South no
-longer existed. He pointed out that the sole purpose of the line in the
-first place had been to divide Soviet and American occupation zones
-after World War II, in order to facilitate the Japanese surrender and
-pave the way for a democratic Korean government.
-
-In May 1948, such a government had come about in South Korea by popular
-elections, sponsored and supervised by the UN. These elections had been
-scheduled for all Korea but were prohibited by the Russians in their
-zone. The Communists not only ignored the National Assembly in Seoul,
-but also arranged their own version of a governing body in Pyongyang
-two months later. The so-called North Korean People’s Republic thus
-became another of the Communist puppet states set up by the USSR.
-
-That the United Nations did not recognize the North Korean state in
-no way altered its very real status as a politico-military fact. For
-obvious reasons, then, all UN decisions relating to the Communist state
-had to take into account the possibility of reactions by Soviet Russia
-and Red China, which shared Korea’s northern boundary.
-
-At the outbreak of the conflict on 25 June 1950, the UN Security
-Council had, by a vote of 9-0, called for an immediate end to the
-fighting and the withdrawal of all NKPA forces to the 38th Parallel.[3]
-This appeal having gone unheeded, the Council on 27 June recommended
-“... that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to
-the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
-and to restore international peace and security in the area.”[4] It
-was the latter authorization, supplemented by another resolution on 7
-July, that led to military commitments by the United States and to the
-appointment of General MacArthur as over-all UN Commander.
-
-      [3] US Dept of State, _Guide to the UN in Korea_ (Washington,
-          1951). Yugoslavia abstained from the vote, and the USSR,
-          then boycotting the Council, was absent.
-
-      [4] _Ibid._
-
-These early UN actions constituted adequate guidance in Korea until
-the Inchon landing and EUSAK’s counteroffensive turned the tide. With
-the NKPA in full retreat, however, and UN Forces rapidly approaching
-the 38th Parallel, the situation demanded re-evaluation, including
-supplemental instructions to the military commander. The question arose
-as to whether the North Koreans should be allowed sanctuary beyond the
-parallel, possibly enabling them to reorganize for new aggression. It
-will be recalled that Syngman Rhee had already expressed his thoughts
-forcibly in this connection on 19 July; and the ROK Army translated
-thoughts into action on 1 October by crossing the border.
-
-The UN, in its 7 July resolution, having authorized the United States
-to form a unified military force and appoint a supreme commander in
-Korea, it fell upon the Administration of President Harry S. Truman
-to translate this dictum into workaday reality. Aiding the Chief
-Executive and his Cabinet in this delicate task with its far-reaching
-implications were the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Army
-member, General J. Lawton Collins, also functioned as Executive Agent
-of JCS for the United Nations Command in Korea, thus keeping intact
-the usual chain of command from the Army Chief of Staff to General
-MacArthur, who now served both the U. S. and UN.[5]
-
-      [5] Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary
-          manuscript (Comments).
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  EIGHTH ARMY ADVANCES
-  AND
-  RESTRAINING LINES
-
-  MAP-1
-]
-
-Late in August, two of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins and Admiral
-Forrest P. Sherman, USN, had flown to Japan to discuss the forthcoming
-Inchon landing with General MacArthur. In the course of the talks, it
-was agreed that CinCUNC’s objective should be the _destruction_ of the
-North Korean forces, and that ground operations should be extended
-beyond the 38th Parallel to achieve this goal. The agreement took the
-form of a recommendation, placed before Secretary of Defense Louis
-Johnson on 7 September.[6]
-
-      [6] JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50.
-          Unless otherwise stated, copies of all messages cited are
-          on file in Historical Branch, HQMC.
-
-A week later, JCS informed MacArthur that President Truman had approved
-certain “conclusions” relating to the Korean conflict, but that these
-were not yet to be construed as final decisions. Among other things,
-the Chief Executive accepted the reasoning that UN Forces had a legal
-basis for engaging the NKPA north of the Parallel. MacArthur would plan
-operations accordingly, JCS directed, but would carry them out only
-after being granted explicit permission.[7]
-
-      [7] JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman,
-          _Memoirs_, 2 vols (Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359.
-
-The historic authorization, based on recommendations of the National
-Security Council to President Truman, reached General Headquarters
-(GHQ), Tokyo, in a message dispatched by JCS on 27 September:
-
-  Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean
-  Armed Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to
-  conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne
-  landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea,
-  provided that at the time of such operations there has been no
-  entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces,
-  no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our
-  operations militarily in North Korea....
-
-The lengthy message abounded in paragraphs of caution, reflecting the
-desire of both the UN and the United States to avoid a general war. Not
-discounting the possibility of intervention by Russia or Red China,
-JCS carefully outlined MacArthur’s courses of action for several
-theoretical situations. Moreover, he was informed that certain broad
-restrictions applied regardless of developments:
-
-  ... under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the
-  Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no
-  non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces
-  bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian
-  border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of
-  the 38th parallel will not include Air or Naval action against
-  Manchuria or against USSR territory....[8]
-
-      [8] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360;
-          MajGen Courtney Whitney, _MacArthur, His Rendezvous
-          with History_ (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the
-          JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive
-          from the JCS on 27 September establishing my military
-          objective as ‘... the destruction of the North Korean
-          Armed Forces’ and in the accomplishment thereof
-          authorizing me to ‘... conduct military operations,
-          including amphibious and airborne landings or ground
-          operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea ...’
-          made it mandatory rather than discretionary ... that
-          the UN Forces operate north of that line against enemy
-          remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans
-          governing operations north of that Parallel were designed
-          to implement the resolution passed by the UN General
-          assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically
-          approved by the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives
-          assigned by the JCS, and the military-political
-          objectives established by said resolution of the UN could
-          have been accomplished in no other way.” Gen D. MacArthur
-          letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56.
-
-Thus MacArthur had the green light, although the signal was shaded by
-various qualifications. On 29 September, the new Secretary of Defense,
-George C. Marshall, told him in a message, “... We want you to feel
-unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th
-parallel....”[9]
-
-      [9] JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation
-          see Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398.
-
-
-_Surrender Message to NKPA Forces_
-
-Meanwhile, a step was taken by the U. S. Government on 27 September in
-the hope that hostilities might end without much further loss or risk
-for either side. By dispatch, JCS authorized MacArthur to announce, at
-his discretion, a suggested surrender message to the NKPA.[10] Framed
-by the U. S. State Department, the message was broadcast on 1 October
-and went as follows:
-
-     [10] JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
-
-  To: The Commander-in-chief, North Korean Forces. The early and
-  total defeat and complete destruction of your Armed Forces and war
-  making potential is now inevitable. In order that the decision of
-  the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further
-  loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations
-  Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and the forces under your
-  command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down
-  your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision
-  as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all
-  United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your
-  control and to make adequate provision for their protection, care,
-  maintenance, and immediate transportation to such places as I
-  indicate.
-
-  North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of
-  the United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care
-  indicated by civilized custom and practice and permitted to return
-  to their homes as soon as practicable.
-
-  I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to
-  avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of
-  property.[11]
-
-     [11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in
-          EUSAK _War Diary_ (_WD_), 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg
-          92762, 27 Sep 50.
-
-The surrender broadcast evoked no direct reply from Kim Il Sung,
-Premier of North Korea and Commander in Chief of the NKPA. Instead, the
-reaction of the Communist bloc came ominously from another quarter. Two
-days after MacArthur’s proclamation, Red China’s Foreign Minister Chou
-En-Lai informed K. M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, that
-China would intervene in the event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel.
-He added, however, that such action would not be forthcoming if only
-ROK troops entered North Korea.[12]
-
-     [12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct
-          50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361–362. The information was
-          forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that he
-          had never been informed of it. _Military Situation in
-          the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed
-          Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United
-          States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To
-          Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far
-          East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of
-          the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that
-          area_ (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter _MacArthur
-          Hearings_), 109.
-
-It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September
-permitted operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the
-time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by
-major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, _no announcement of intended
-entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North
-Korea_....”[13] In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s plans
-for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled after
-Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war ran high
-among the United Nations at this time, and CinCUNC shortly received
-supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS--the one establishing
-legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the other reaffirming
-military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution adopted on 7
-October, the United Nations directed that
-
-     [13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 360;
-          Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397. Italics supplied.
-
-  All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability
-  throughout Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the
-  establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government
-  in the Sovereign State of Korea....[14]
-
-     [14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in _Guide to the UN in Korea_, 20.
-
-Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur could
-attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea militarily
-and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified its early
-instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows:
-
-  Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in
-  Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement,
-  you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action
-  by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of
-  success. In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington
-  prior to taking any military actions against objectives in Chinese
-  territory.[15]
-
-     [15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 362;
-          Whitney, _MacArthur_, 404.
-
-
-_MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity_
-
-Anticipating his authority for crossing the 38th Parallel, CinCUNC
-on 26 September had directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations
-Group (JSPOG) to develop a plan for operations north of the border.
-He stipulated that Eighth Army should make the main effort in either
-the west or the east, and that however this was resolved, there should
-be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast--at Chinnampo,
-Wonsan, or elsewhere.[16] Despite recommendations of key staff members,
-MacArthur did not place X Corps under EUSAK command for the forthcoming
-campaign but retained General Almond’s unit as a separate tactical
-entity under GHQ.[17]
-
-     [16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The
-          Chief of Military History (OCMH).
-
-     [17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict: Policy,
-          Planning, Direction_. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M.
-          Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” _Army_, vii,
-          no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65.
-
-JSPOG, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s G-3,
-rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework of CinCUNC’s
-directive. And the following day, 27 September, a proposed Operation
-Plan (OpnPlan) 9-50 was laid before the commander in chief.[18] This
-detailed scheme of action evolved from two basic assumptions: (1) that
-the bulk of the NKPA had already been destroyed; and (2) that neither
-the USSR nor Red China would intervene, covertly or openly.
-
-     [18] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_.
-
-Eighth Army, according to plan, would attack across the 38th
-Parallel, directing its main effort in the west, along the axis
-Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang (see Map 1). JSPOG designated the latter
-city--capital of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea--as final
-objective of the first phase. Further, it recommended that EUSAK’s
-drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a X Corps
-amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After establishing a
-beachhead, Almond’s force would attack 125 road miles westward through
-the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with General Walker’s army,
-thereby trapping North Korean elements falling back from the south.[19]
-
-     [19] _Ibid._, and CinCFE _OpnPlan_ 9-50. Copy at OCMH.
-
-JSPOG suggested that both commands should then advance north to the
-line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging roughly from 50 to
-100 miles below the Manchurian border. Only ROK elements would proceed
-beyond the restraining line, in keeping with the spirit and letter of
-the 27 September dispatch from JCS.[20]
-
-     [20] _Ibid._
-
-Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as CinCUNC’s chief of staff
-during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the JSPOG draft
-of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur
-forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message with this
-reassurance:
-
-  There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by
-  major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces.[21]
-
-     [21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II,
-          361; Whitney, _MacArthur_, 397–398.
-
-Within three days, he received word from the Joint Chiefs that they
-approved his plan.[22] On 2 October it became the official operation
-order for the attack.[23]
-
-     [22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 361;
-          Whitney, _MacArthur_, 398. All dates in the narrative and
-          in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the
-          action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the
-          30th in Tokyo.
-
-     [23] UNC _Operation Order_ (_OpnO_) 2, 2 Oct 50.
-
-
-_Logistical Problems of Advance_
-
-On 29 September, the day before he received the JCS endorsement of his
-plan, General MacArthur arrived in Seoul to officiate at the ceremony
-restoring control of South Korea to the legal ROK government. During
-the visit, he met with the principals named in the Task Organization of
-OpnPlan 9-50:
-
-  Eighth U. S. Army               LtGen Walton H. Walker, USA
-  Naval Forces Far East           VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN
-  Far East Air Forces (FEAF)      LtGen George E. Stratemeyer, USAF
-  X Corps                         MajGen Edward M. Almond, USA
-
-Missing from the top-level conference, Major General Walter L. Weible,
-USA, of the Japan Logistical Command, probably was already aware of
-things to come.[24]
-
-     [24] LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA,
-          14 Jun 55.
-
-MacArthur outlined his concept of operations in North Korea to those
-present. He set 20 October as D-Day for the Wonsan amphibious assault
-by the 1st Marine Division, which, with all X Corps Troops, would
-embark for the operation from Inchon. The 7th Infantry Division, also a
-part of X Corps, would motor 200 miles to Pusan and there load out for
-an administrative landing behind the Marines.[25]
-
-     [25] _Ibid._
-
-Initial overland routing of the 7th Division was made necessary by
-problems arising out of Inchon’s limited port facilities. General
-MacArthur gave EUSAK the logistic responsibility for all UN Forces in
-Korea, including X Corps. To carry out this charge, General Walker
-could rely on only two harbors, Pusan and Inchon. There were no other
-ports in South Korea capable of supporting large-scale military
-operations. Meeting the tight Wonsan schedule would require that X
-Corps have immediate priority over the whole of Inchon’s capacity, even
-with the 7th Division being shunted off on Pusan. And it still remained
-for Walker to mount and sustain Eighth Army’s general offensive
-_before_ the Wonsan landing!
-
-In the light of logistical considerations, then, Wonsan had more than
-mere tactical significance as the objective of X Corps. Its seizure
-would open up the principal east-coast port of Korea, together with
-vital new road and rail junctions. But while MacArthur had decided on
-an amphibious assault by a separate tactical unit as the proper stroke,
-there existed a school of dissenters among his closest advisers.
-Generals Hickey and Wright had recommended that X Corps be incorporated
-into EUSAK at the close of the Inchon-Seoul Operation. Major General
-George L. Eberle, MacArthur’s G-4, held that supplying X Corps in
-North Korea would be simpler if that unit were a part of Eighth Army.
-And General Almond himself, while hardly a dissenter, had expected
-his corps to be placed under General Walker’s command after the Seoul
-fighting.[26]
-
-     [26] _Ibid._; Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_; Blumenson,
-          “MacArthur’s Divided Command.” Gen MacArthur stated: “If
-          such a dissension existed it was never brought to my
-          attention. To the contrary, the decision to retain as a
-          function of GHQ command and coordination between Eighth
-          Array and X Corps until such time as a juncture between
-          the two forces had been effected was, so far as I know,
-          based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members
-          of my staff....” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has
-          stated: “Neither General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I
-          objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps should
-          have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after
-          the close of the Inchon-Seoul operation.” MajGen E. K.
-          Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56.
-
-
-_Naval Missions Prescribed_
-
-Logistical problems were magnified by the tight embarkation schedule
-laid out for the amphibious force. In submitting its proposed plan for
-North Korean operations to General MacArthur on 27 September, JSPOG had
-listed the following “bare minimum time requirements:”
-
-  For assembling assault shipping      6 days
-  For planning                         4 days
-  For loading                          6 days
-  For sailing to Wonsan                4 days
-
-Thus it was estimated that the 1st Marine Division could assault Wonsan
-10 days after receiving the order to load out of Inchon, provided
-that shipping had already been assembled and planning accomplished
-concurrently.[27]
-
-     [27] JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,”
-          27 Sep 50. Copy at OCMH.
-
-Following CinCUNC’s meeting in the capitol building on the 29th,
-General Almond called a conference of division commanders and staff
-members at his X Corps Headquarters in Ascom City, near Inchon.
-MacArthur’s strategy was outlined to the assembled officers, so that
-planning could commence on the division level. Almond set 15 October
-as D-Day for the Wonsan landing. He based this target date on the
-assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve X Corps on 3
-October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin arriving
-at Inchon.[28]
-
-     [28] 1stMarDiv _Special Action Report for the
-          Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct-15 Dec
-          50_ (hereafter 1stMarDiv _SAR_), 10.
-
-On 29 September, the 1st Marine Division was still committed tactically
-above Seoul, two regiments blocking and one attacking. If the first
-vessels began arriving at Inchon on 3 October, the assault shipping
-would not be completely assembled until the 8th, according to the JSPOG
-estimate. Four days would be required to get to the objective, leaving
-two days, instead of the planned six, for outloading the landing
-force. Neither Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General (CG)
-1stMarDiv, nor his staff regarded this as a realistic schedule.[29]
-
-     [29] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, _Notes
-          on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the
-          First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51_ (MS),
-          (hereafter Smith, _Notes_), 370–371.
-
-[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS
-
-1st Marine Division
-
-October-December 1950
-
-  MAP-2
-]
-
-The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge
-of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available to the
-division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and no
-intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay firm
-plans along either administrative or tactical lines.[30]
-
-     [30] _Ibid._
-
-Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), issued
-his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming
-operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force
-7 (JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these
-missions:
-
-   1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of
-      Chongjin.
-
-   2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as
-      directed.
-
-   3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as
-      required.
-
-   4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and
-      support en route.
-
-   5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead
-      in the Wonsan area on D-Day.
-
-   6. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistical support
-      to X Corps at Wonsan until relieved.[31]
-
-     [31] ComNavFE _OpnPlan 113-50_. Copy at OCMH.
-
-Admiral Joy’s directive also warned: “The strong probability exists
-that the ports and possible landing beaches under control of the North
-Koreans have been recently mined. The sighting of new mines floating in
-the area indicates that mines are being seeded along the coast.”[32]
-
-     [32] _Ibid._, B, 11.
-
-
-_X Corps Relieved at Seoul_
-
-The related events, decisions, and plans of September 1950 had unfolded
-with startling rapidity. Before the scattered UN forces could
-shift from one phase of operations to another, a transitional gap
-developed during the early days of October. Orders might flow forth in
-abundance, but not until MacArthur’s land, sea and air forces wound up
-one campaign could they begin another. Thus, from the standpoint of
-Marine operations, the first week of October is more a story of the
-Inchon-Seoul action than of preparations for the Wonsan landing.
-
-On 2 October, when Eighth Army commenced the relief of X Corps, General
-Almond ordered the 7th Infantry Division to begin displacing to Pusan
-by motor and rail.[33] There was as yet no such respite for the 1st
-Marine Division, which on the same day lost 16 killed in action (KIA)
-and 81 wounded (WIA). Practically all of the casualties were taken
-by the 7th Regiment, then approaching Uijongbu on the heels of the
-enemy.[34]
-
-     [33] X Corps _OpnO 3_, 2 Oct 50.
-
-     [34] MajGen Oliver P. Smith: _Chronicle of the Operations of
-          the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months
-          of the Korean War, 1950–1951_ (MS), (hereafter, Smith,
-          _Chronicle_), 54.
-
-Despite the limited planning data in the hands of the 1st Marine
-Division, General Smith’s staff put a cautious foot forward on 3
-October.[35] Word of the pending Wonsan operation went out by message
-to all subordinate units, with a tentative task organization indicating
-the formation of three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs).
-
-     [35] Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely _not_ a complete
-          lack of planning data. I doubt if any operation ever
-          had more planning data available. It may not have been
-          in General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was
-          available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56.
-
-The 1st and 7th Marines were earmarked to launch the amphibious
-attack. Each would plan on the basis of employing two battalions in
-the assault. These battalions were to embark on LSTs and hit the beach
-in LVTs. All tactical units were to combat-load out of Inchon. And
-although still uninformed as to available shipping, the Marine planners
-named likely embarkation groups and listed tentative arrangements for
-loading tanks and amphibious vehicles.[36]
-
-     [36] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning
-          Information,” 3 Oct 50.
-
-The following day saw the publication of X Corps OpnO 4, specifying
-subordinate unit missions. The 7th Infantry Division, together with the
-92d and 96th Field Artillery (FA) Battalions, was instructed to mount
-out of Pusan and to land at Wonsan on order (see Map 2). These tasks
-were assigned to the 1st Marine Division:
-
-   1. Report immediately to the Attack Force Commander (Commander,
-      Amphibious Group One) of the Seventh Fleet as the landing force
-      for the Wonsan attack.
-
-   2. Seize and secure X Corps base of operations at Wonsan,
-      protect the Wonsan Airfield, and continue such operations
-      ashore as assigned.
-
-   3. Furnish logistic support for all forces ashore until relieved
-      by Corps Shore Party.[37]
-
-     [37] Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt _Interim
-          Evaluation Rpt #1_, annex DD, 11; 1stMarDiv _Historical
-          Diary_ (_HD_), Oct 50; X Corps _OpnO 4_, 4 Oct 50.
-
-As Almond’s order went out for distribution on 4 October, EUSAK’s 1st
-Cavalry Division, bound for Kaesong, passed through the 5th Marines
-northwest of Seoul. Simultaneously, the II ROK Corps began assembling
-along the road to Uijongbu, captured by the 7th Marines the previous
-day.[38]
-
-     [38] Smith, _Chronicle_, 54.
-
-After 20 days in the line, the weary battalions of the 5th Marines
-retired on 5 October across the Han River to an assembly area at
-Inchon. They were followed on the 6th by the 1st Regiment, and
-on the next day by the 7th Marines. The withdrawal of the latter
-unit completed the relief of X Corps, and General Almond’s command
-officially reverted to GHQ Reserve.[39]
-
-     [39] _Ibid._, 55.
-
-October 7th also marked the displacement of the 1st Marine Division
-command post (CP) to Inchon, where planning and reality had finally
-merged to the extent that preparations for Wonsan could begin in
-earnest. Two days earlier, Vice Admiral Struble had re-created JTF-7
-out of his Seventh Fleet; and by publication of his OpnO 16-50 on
-the same date, 5 October, he set in motion the operational elements
-involved in the projected amphibious envelopment. His new task
-organization, almost identical to that which had carried out the Inchon
-Operation with historic dispatch, was as follows:
-
-  TF 95 (Advance Force)                 RAdm Allen E. Smith
-  TG 95.2 (Covering & Support)          RAdm Charles C. Hartman
-  TG 95.6 (Minesweeping)                Capt Richard T. Spofford
-  TF 90 (Attack Force)                  RAdm James H. Doyle
-  TF 79 (Logistical Support Force)      Capt Bernard L. Austin
-  TF 77 (Fast Carrier Force)            RAdm Edward C. Ewen
-  TG 96.8 (Escort Carrier Group)        RAdm Richard W. Ruble
-  TG 96.2 (Patrol & Reconnaissance)     RAdm George R. Henderson
-  TG 70.1 (Flagship Group)              Capt Irving T. Duke
-
-Struble, who had directed the Inchon assault from the bridge of the
-USS _Rochester_, would now fly his flag in the recently arrived USS
-_Missouri_, the sole American battleship in commission at this early
-stage of the Korean war.[40]
-
-     [40] ComSeventhFlt _OpnO 16-50_, 5 Oct 50.
-
-[Illustration: WONSAN AND HARBOR
-
-  MAP-3
-]
-
-
-_Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing_
-
-The Seventh Fleet directive of 5 October dispatched both the Fast
-Carrier and the Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces of JTF-7 on the usual
-search and attack missions preliminary to an amphibious assault. Task
-Force 77, consisting of the carriers _Boxer_, _Leyte_, _Philippine Sea_
-and _Valley Forge_, escorted by a light cruiser and 24 destroyers,
-was under orders to direct 50 per cent of the preparatory air effort
-against the local defenses of Wonsan. Simultaneously, the Advance
-Force, with its cruisers, destroyers and mine sweeping units, would
-close in to shell the target and wrest control of the offshore waters
-from the enemy.[41]
-
-     [41] _Ibid._
-
-Topographic and hydrographic studies made available to the Attack and
-Landing Forces showed Wonsan to be a far more accessible target than
-Inchon (see Map 3). Nestling in the southwestern corner of Yonghung
-Bay, 80 miles above the 38th Parallel, the seaport offers one of the
-best natural harbors in Korea. A vast anchorage lies sheltered in the
-lee of Kalma Peninsula which, finger-like, juts northward from a bend
-in the coastline. Tides range from seven to 14 inches, fog is rare, and
-currents are weak. Docks can accommodate vessels drawing from 12 to 25
-feet, and depths in the bay run from 10 fathoms in the outer anchorage
-to 15 feet just offshore.[42]
-
-     [42] The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM,
-          Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater
-          Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, _Terrain Study
-          No. 6, Northern Korea_, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv _OpnO
-          15-50_, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3, 10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv
-          _SAR_, annex B (hereafter G-2 _SAR_), sec 2, 1.
-
-Beaches around Wonsan are of moderate gradient, and the floor at
-water’s edge consists of hard-packed sand. Though slightly wet landings
-might be expected, amphibious craft could easily negotiate any of the
-several desirable approaches. The coastal plain, ranging from 100
-yards to two miles in depth, provides an acceptable lodgment area, but
-the seaward wall of the Taebaek mountain range renders inland egress
-difficult from the military standpoint.
-
-In 1940, the population of Wonsan included 69,115 Koreans and 10,205
-Japanese, the latter subsequently being repatriated to their homeland
-after World War II. Under the Japanese program of industrialization,
-the city had become Korea’s petroleum refining center. The construction
-of port facilities, railways, and roads kept pace with the appearance
-of cracking plants, supporting industries, and huge storage areas.
-
-Two airfields served the locale in 1950. One of these, situated on the
-coast about five miles north of the seaport, was of minor importance.
-The other, known as Wonsan Airfield, on Kalma Peninsula across the
-harbor, ranked high as a military prize. Spacious and accessible, it
-was an excellent base from which to project air coverage over all of
-Korea and the Sea of Japan. The Japanese first developed the field as
-an air adjunct to the naval base at Wonsan; but after World War II,
-a North Korean aviation unit moved in and used it until July 1950.
-Thereafter, with the skies dominated by the UN air arm, Wonsan Airfield
-temporarily lost all military significance. Its vacant runways,
-barracks, and dispersal areas were given only passing attention in the
-UN strategic bombing pattern, although the nearby industrial complex
-was demolished.
-
-In addition to being situated on an excellent harbor, Wonsan is the
-eastern terminus of the Seoul-Wonsan corridor, the best of the few
-natural routes across the mountainous nation. This 115-mile road and
-rail passageway, once considered as a possible overland approach for
-X Corps, separates the northern and southern divisions of the Taebaek
-range, which rises precipitously from Korea’s east coast to heights of
-5000 feet. Railroads and highways, primitive by western standards, also
-trace the seaward base of the Taebaek Mountains to connect Wonsan with
-Hamhung in the north and Pusan far to the south. Still another road and
-railway leads to Pyongyang, 100 miles across the narrow neck of the
-peninsula in the western piedmont.
-
-The climate along Korea’s northeast coast is comparable to that of the
-lower Great Lakes region in the United States. Mean summer temperatures
-range between 80 and 88 degrees, although highs of 103 degrees have
-been recorded. Winter readings drop as low as -7 degrees, but the
-season is usually temperate with winds of low velocity. Despite light
-snowfalls and moderate icing, the period from October through March is
-best suited to military operations, for the heavy rains of spring and
-summer create difficulties on the gravel-topped roads.
-
-Although members of Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group One (PhibGruOne)
-staff met with planners of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon early
-in October, it soon became apparent that the projected D-Day of 15
-October could not be realized. Maps and intelligence data necessary
-for planning did not reach the Attack Force-Landing Force team until 6
-October. The relief of X Corps by EUSAK was completed, not on 3 October
-as General Almond had anticipated, but on the 7th. Moreover, the first
-transport vessels to reach Inchon ran behind schedule, and they had not
-been pre-loaded with a ten-day level of Class I, II, and V supplies,
-as was promised. Planning and outloading consequently started late and
-from scratch, with the result that D-Day “... was moved progressively
-back to a tentative date of 20 October.”[43]
-
-     [43] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 10. The classes of supply are as
-          follows: I, rations; II, supplies and equipment, such
-          as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios etc, for
-          which specific allowances have been established; III,
-          petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL);
-          IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification
-          and construction materials, cold weather clothing, etc,
-          for which specific allowances have not been established;
-          V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, etc.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER II
-
-The Wonsan Landing
-
-_ROK Army Captures Wonsan--Marine Loading and Embarkation--Two
-Weeks of Mine Sweeping--Operation Yo-Yo--Marine Air First at
-Objective--MacArthur Orders Advance to Border--Landing of 1st Marine
-Division_
-
-
-On 6 OCTOBER 1950, after the arrival of the initial assault shipping
-at Inchon, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to commence
-embarkation on the 8th. Similar instructions were issued by X Corps
-the following day.[44] Thus, the first troops and equipment were to be
-loaded even before the G-2 Section of the Landing Force could begin
-evaluating the enemy situation at the objective, since it was not until
-8 October that the intelligence planners received X Corps’ OpnO 4,
-published four days earlier. Summing up the outlook at the time, G-2
-later reported:
-
-     [44] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (_EmbO_) 2-50, 6 Oct 50;
-          Smith, _Notes_, 394.
-
-  Inasmuch as subordinate units of the Division were scheduled to
-  embark aboard ship some time prior to 15 October 1950, it was
-  immediately obvious that preliminary intelligence planning, with
-  its attendant problems of collection, processing, and distribution
-  of information, and the procurement and distribution of graphic
-  aids, would be both limited and sketchy.... Fortunately ...
-  the section [G-2] had been previously alerted on the projected
-  operation, and while elements of the Division were yet engaged with
-  the enemy at Uijongbu, had requested reproductions of some 100
-  copies of pertinent extracts of the JANIS (75) of Korea. Thus it
-  was ... that subordinate units would not be wholly unprepared for
-  the coming operation.[45]
-
-     [45] G-2 _SAR_, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint
-          Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
-
-General Smith’s OpnO 16-50, published on 10 October, climaxed the
-accelerated planning at Inchon. Worked out jointly by the staffs
-of PhibGruOne and the 1st Marine Division, this directive covered
-the Wonsan attack in detail and pinpointed subordinate unit
-responsibilities.
-
-Kalma Peninsula was chosen as the point of assault, with two beaches,
-YELLOW and BLUE, marked off on the eastern shore. Ten high-ground
-objectives described the semicircular arc of the beachhead, which
-focused on Wonsan and fanned out as far as five miles inland. The 1st
-and 7th Marines were to hit YELLOW and BLUE Beaches, respectively and
-drive inland to their assigned objectives. The 5th, upon being ordered
-ashore, would assemble west of Wonsan, prepared for further operations.
-Two battalions of the 11th Marines were to land on call in direct
-support of the assault units, and the remainder of the artillery would
-initially function in general support.
-
-Other subordinate units drew the usual assignments. The Reconnaissance
-Company, after landing on order, was to screen the Division’s left
-flank by occupying specified objectives. Attached to the 1st and 7th
-Regiments respectively, the 5th and 3d Korean Marine Corps (KMC)
-Battalions would also go ashore on call.[46]
-
-     [46] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 16-50_, 10 Oct 50.
-
-
-_ROK Army Captures Wonsan_
-
-At 0815, 10 October, coincidentally with the publication of 1stMarDiv
-OpnO 16-50, troops of I ROK Corps, advancing rapidly up the east coast
-of Korea, entered Wonsan. By evening of the next day, the ROK 3d and
-Capital Divisions were mopping up minor resistance in the city and
-guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula.[47]
-
-     [47] EUSAK _War Diary Summary_ (_WD Sum_), _Oct 50_, 14–16.
-
-Overland seizure of the 1st Marine Division’s amphibious objective did
-not come as a surprise either at GHQ in Tokyo or at General Smith’s CP
-aboard the _Mount McKinley_ in Inchon Harbor. General MacArthur had, in
-fact, prepared for this eventuality by considering an alternate assault
-landing at Hungnam, another major seaport, about 50 air miles north
-of Wonsan. On 8 October, therefore, the JSPOG completed a modified
-version of CinCFE OpnPlan 9-50. Eighth Army’s mission--the capture of
-Pyongyang--remained unchanged in this draft, but X Corps would now
-land “... in the vicinity of Hungnam in order to cut the lines of
-communications north of Wonsan and envelop the North Korean forces in
-that area.”
-
-Although the choice of a new objective seemed logical on the basis of
-the ROK Army’s accomplishment, certain logistical obstacles at once
-loomed in the path of the alternate plan. Not unaware of the most
-imposing of these, JSPOG commented:
-
-  The harbor at Wonsan cannot accommodate at docks the large vessels
-  lifting the 7th Division. Since most of the amphibious type boats
-  are carried on ships lifting the 1st Marine Division, the plans for
-  off-loading the 7th Division will have to be revised.[48]
-
-     [48] CinCFE _OpnPlan 9-50_ (_Alternate_), 8 Oct 50.
-
-But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised. If
-the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it would
-have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the same
-landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam,
-the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland
-drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land
-almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division
-landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy would
-be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also by the
-problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously.
-
-From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in Korea,
-there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment
-of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would be
-compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence
-information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt to
-dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word of
-the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his staff
-wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE persisted
-in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with the final
-result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the whole X
-Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.[49] Coming events were to
-uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing itself was
-delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November before the
-first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.[50]
-
-     [49] C/S Notes in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne,
-          “Report of ... Operations ... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,”
-          11; Smith, _Chronicle_, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig,
-          _et al_, _Battle Report_: _The War In Korea_ (New York,
-          1952), 301–302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur’s G-3,
-          “Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the
-          Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.”
-          Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.
-
-     [50] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
-
-
-_Marine Loading and Embarkation_
-
-On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the _Mount McKinley_,
-General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The 1st
-Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps OpnO
-4, even though its objective had already been captured.[51]
-
-     [51] Smith, _Chronicle_, 59.
-
-During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at Inchon
-an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military Sea
-Transport Service (MSTS), and Japanese-manned LSTs (SCAJAP).[52] With
-the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the total shipping
-assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight APAs,
-two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM, and six
-commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).[53]
-
-     [52] ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the
-          abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under
-          this designation were American ships lent to Japan after
-          World War II, of which many were recalled during the
-          Korean War to serve as cargo vessels.
-
-     [53] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex D (hereafter G-4 _SAR_), 2.
-
-Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and
-thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating
-job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing forces
-for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon as a port.
-Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock activity to
-a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part of the
-amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were delivering
-vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate, according
-to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles had to be
-left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was temporarily
-diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to Pusan; and
-although unavailable for port operations when needed, it returned at
-the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s heavy beach
-equipment.[54] Out of conditions and developments such as these grew
-the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October, the date initially
-set by General Almond, to the 20th.
-
-     [54] _Ibid._, 3.
-
-For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping
-space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with less
-than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.[55]
-Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks
-of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they
-would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was anybody’s
-guess at this stage of the war.[56]
-
-     [55] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days;
-          individual assault rations for one day; POL for five
-          days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five
-          units of fire (U/F). _Ibid._; 1stMarDiv _Administrative
-          Order_ (_AdmO_) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a
-          convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of
-          ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds
-          per weapon.
-
-     [56] G-4 _SAR_, 1.
-
-In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not
-materialize), Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks
-and trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies
-and 16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply
-trains would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to
-maintain ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving
-situation.[57]
-
-     [57] _Ibid._, 3.
-
-On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General Smith to
-effect his OpnPlan 113-50.[58] Coincidentally, the first contingents of
-the 5th Marines boarded the _Bayfield_ (1/5), _George Clymer_ (2/5),
-and _Bexar_ (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel
-Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment, opened his CP in
-the _Bayfield_, and his unit completed embarkation.[59]
-
-     [58] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others,
-          0200 8 Oct 50.
-
-     [59] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv
-          _SAR_, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 _SAR_), 4,
-          appendix B (hereafter 2/5 _SAR_), 6, and appendix C
-          (hereafter 3/5 _SAR_), 4.
-
-Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th Marines
-loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments could
-not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that the LSTs
-had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor. General Smith
-opened his CP in the _Mount McKinley_ at 1200 on the 11th.[60] The
-last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the morning of
-the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the objective. By
-evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the way, but the
-_Mount McKinley_ and _Bayfield_ did not depart until the next day.[61]
-
-     [60] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 373.
-
-     [61] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar _SAR_), 9;
-          Smith, _Notes_, 399, 409; 1stMar _HD Oct 50_, 3.
-
-Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and X
-Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers
-and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were on
-the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows:
-
-  Marine officers                        1119
-  Marine enlisted                      20,597
-  Navy officers                           153
-  Navy enlisted                          1002
-  U. S. Army & KMC officers attached      189
-  U. S. Army & KMC enlisted attached     2339[62]
-
-     [62] 1stMarDiv _Embarkation Summary_, 16 Oct 50; and “Special
-          Report 1stMarDiv,” 12.
-
-Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure,
-new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It
-will be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the
-Wonsan assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on
-signal, went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an
-administrative landing by the Division on RED Beach, north of Wonsan,
-instead of Kalma Peninsula.[63]
-
-     [63] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 17-50_, 10 Oct 50.
-
-As a result of discussions during a X Corps staff conference on 13
-October, a party headed by General Almond flew to Wonsan the next
-day.[64] The purpose of his visit was to reconnoiter the objective
-and to explain his latest operational directive to the I ROK Corps
-commander, who would come under his control.[65] This new order,
-published on the 14th, called for an administrative landing by X
-Corps and a rapid advance westward along the Wonsan--Pyongyang axis
-to a juncture with EUSAK. Assigned to the 1st Marine Division was an
-objective northeast of Pyongyang, the Red capital.[66]
-
-     [64] “... Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown
-          to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which
-          materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a
-          matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even
-          some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be
-          removed from the shipping prior to our sailing.” Col A.
-          L. Bowser, Comments, n. d.
-
-     [65] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith,
-          _Chronicle_, 59.
-
-     [66] X Corps _Operation Instruction_ (_OI_) _11_, 14 Oct 50;
-          Smith, _Notes_, 385.
-
-It was this tactical scheme, then, that prevailed as the Marines
-departed Inchon from 15 to 17 October and the 7th Infantry Division
-prepared to embark from Pusan. General Smith, of course, placed into
-effect his alternate order for a landing on RED Beach.[67] While there
-may be a note of humor in the fact that on 15 October ComPhibGruOne
-issued his OpnO 16-50 for the “assault landing” at Wonsan, it must be
-remembered that the ship-to-shore movement would remain essentially
-the same from the Navy’s standpoint, regardless of the swift march of
-events ashore.
-
-     [67] According to General Smith, “The reason for issuing
-          1stMarDiv OpnO 17-50 was to provide for an administrative
-          landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where
-          there would be easy access to the existing road net. The
-          ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv OpnO
-          16-50 was retained intact. This plan [OpnO 17-50] had
-          to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was
-          completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much
-          quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula
-          where we eventually landed ... 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450
-          24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv OpnOs 16 and 17 and
-          provided for an administrative landing on the Kalma
-          Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to
-          authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated,
-          letters may be assumed to be to the authors.
-
-
-_Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping_
-
-Mine sweeping for the Wonsan landing commenced on 8 October, when Task
-Group 95.6, commanded by Captain Spofford, began assembling for the
-mission of clearing a path ahead of the 250-ship armada bringing the
-1st Marine Division and other units of X Corps. It had been known for a
-month that the waters of the east coast were dangerous for navigation.
-The first mine was discovered off Chinnampo on the west coast on 7
-September, and four days later Admiral Joy ordered the United Nations
-Blocking and Escort Force to stay on the safe side of the 100-fathom
-line along the east coast. But it was not until 26 and 28 September
-that more definite information was acquired the hard way when the U. S.
-destroyer _Brush_ and the ROK mine sweeper _YMS 905_ were damaged by
-east coast mines.[68]
-
-     [68] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1090.
-
-On the 28th ComNavFE issued his OpnO 17-50 covering operations of mine
-sweepers in Korean waters. The herculean task awaiting the 12 available
-American vessels of this type may be judged by the fact that more than
-a hundred had been employed off Okinawa in World War II.
-
-Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption
-that North Korean mining activities, beginning in late July or early
-August, were speeded by the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy
-to the peril of further amphibious operations. Russian instructors
-had trained Korean Reds at Wonsan and Chinnampo in the employment of
-Soviet-manufactured mines. Sampans, junks, and wooden coastal barges
-were used to sow a field of about 2000 in the harbor and approaches to
-Wonsan.[69]
-
-     [69] _Ibid._, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, _Notes_, 404; Karig,
-          _Korea_, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK _WD_, 24
-          Oct 50.
-
-Captain Spofford’s TG 95.6 commenced its sweep off Wonsan on 10 October
-after a sortie from Sasebo. Unfortunately, the three large fleet
-sweepers, _Pledge_, _Pirate_, and _Incredible_, were not well adapted
-to the shallow sweeping necessary at Wonsan. More dependence could
-be placed in the seven small wooden-hulled U. S. motor mine sweepers
-_Redhead_, _Mocking Bird_, _Osprey_, _Chatterer_, _Merganser_, _Kite_,
-and _Partridge_, which were rugged even though low-powered. Spofford’s
-two big high-speed sweepers, _Doyle_ and _Endicott_, had their
-limitations for this type of operation; and the nine Japanese and
-three ROK sweepers lacked some of the essential gear.[70]
-
-     [70] CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, VI, 1004;
-          Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily
-          SitRpt) 105; Karig, _Korea_, 311–314.
-
-The U. S. destroyers _Collett_, _Swenson_, _Maddox_, and _Thomas_ were
-in the Wonsan area as well as the cruiser _Rochester_. On the 9th the
-_Rochester’s_ helicopter sighted 61 mines in a reconnaissance, and the
-next day the observer found them too numerous to count. In spite of
-these grim indications, rapid progress the first day led to predictions
-of a brief operation. By late afternoon a 3000-yard channel had been
-cleared from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom line. But hopes
-were dashed at this point by the discovery of five additional lines of
-mines.[71]
-
-     [71] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE
-          Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations
-          Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig,
-          _Korea_, 315.
-
-On 12 and 13 October the naval guns of TG 95.2 bombarded Tanchon and
-Songjin on the northeast coast. While the USS _Missouri_ treated the
-marshaling yards of Tanchon to 163 16″ rounds, the cruisers _Helena_,
-_Worcester_, and _Ceylon_ fired at bridges, shore batteries, and
-tunnels in the Chongjin area.[72]
-
-     [72] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in
-          CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, 13–15;
-          ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in _Ibid._, 7.
-
-Spofford tried to save time on the morning of the 12th by
-counter-mining as 39 planes from the carriers _Leyte Gulf_ and
-_Philippine Sea_ dropped 50 tons of bombs. It was found, however,
-that even the explosion of a 1000-pound bomb would not set off nearby
-mines by concussion.[73] According to Admiral Struble, “The results
-of this operation simply bore out our experience in World War II, but
-were tried out on the long chance that they might be effective in the
-current situation.”[74]
-
-     [73] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal,
-          X Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE
-          IntSum 82; Karig, _Korea_, 315.
-
-     [74] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.
-
-The 12th was a black day for the sweeping squadron. For the steel
-sweepers _Pledge_ and _Pirate_ both were blown up by mines that
-afternoon and sank with a total of 13 killed and 87 wounded. Rescue of
-the survivors was handicapped by fire from enemy shore batteries.[75]
-
-     [75] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in
-          CinCPacFlt _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, H4;
-          ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15;
-          Karig, _Korea_, 318–322.
-
-While the blast of a half-ton bomb had not been powerful enough,
-Spofford reasoned that depth charges might start a chain reaction in
-which mines would detonate mines. But a precision drop by naval planes
-met with no success, and there was nothing left but a return to the
-slow, weary, and dangerous work of methodical sweeping.[76]
-
-     [76] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.
-
-The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to assist
-by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting
-mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an
-effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays
-of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all
-mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were of
-considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.[77]
-
-     [77] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt
-          _Interim Evaluation Report No. 1_, D8.
-
-On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the _JMS-14_, hit a mine
-and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No
-attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept
-into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the
-landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more
-disillusioning when the ROK _YMS 516_ disintegrated on 19 October
-after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG
-95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with
-magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could
-be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it
-exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least
-13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.[78]
-
-     [78] Smith, _Notes_, 404–407; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326.
-
-The _Mount McKinley_ having arrived off Wonsan that same day, Admiral
-Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps staff, went
-by boat to the battleship _Missouri_ for a conference with Admiral
-Struble. CJTF-7 asserted that he would not authorize the administrative
-landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from the shipping lane--a
-task which he estimated would take three more days. This announcement
-led to General Almond’s decision to fly ashore in the _Missouri’s_
-helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP in Wonsan.[79] So rapidly
-had the situation changed, it was hard to remember that this date had
-once been set as D-Day when the Marine landing force would fight for a
-beachhead.
-
-     [79] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,”
-          11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean
-          Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, lxxx,
-          no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, _Korea_, 324–326;
-          1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50.
-
-
-_Operation Yo-Yo_
-
-Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept
-through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s
-over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan
-for embarkation to the States.”
-
-Rumor seemed to have the support of fact on this occasion, for compass
-readings left no doubt that the armada had indeed executed a maritime
-“about face” to head southward. What the men on the transports did
-not know was that the reversal of direction had been ordered for
-purely military reasons as a result of the conference that day on the
-_Missouri_.
-
-It was puzzling enough to the troops the following morning when the
-ships resumed their original course. But this was nothing as compared
-to their bewilderment late that afternoon as the Tractor and Transport
-Groups turned southward again.
-
-Every twelve hours, in accordance with the directive of CJTF-7,
-the fleet was to reverse course, steaming back and forth off the
-eastern coast of Korea until the last of the magnetic mines could be
-cleared from the lane in preparation for an administrative landing at
-Wonsan.[80]
-
-     [80] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, _Notes_,
-          404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.
-
-Marines have always been ready with a derisive phrase, and “Operation
-Yo-Yo” was coined to express their disgust with this interlude of
-concentrated monotony. Never did time die a harder death, and never
-did the grumblers have so much to grouse about. Letters to wives and
-sweethearts took on more bulk daily, and paper-backed murder mysteries
-were worn to tatters by bored readers.
-
-On the 22d, at CJTF-7’s regular daily meeting, Admirals Struble and
-Doyle conferred in the destroyer _Rowan_ with Admiral Smith and Captain
-Spofford. It was agreed that the sweeping could not be completed
-until the 24th or 25th, which meant that Operation Yo-Yo might last a
-week.[81]
-
-     [81] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments,
-          16 Mar 56.
-
-The situation had its serious aspects on LSTs and transports which
-were not prepared for a voyage around Korea taking nearly as long as
-a crossing of the Pacific. Food supplies ran low as gastro-enteritis
-and dysentery swept through the crowded transports in spite of strict
-medical precautions. The MSTS transport _Marine Phoenix_ alone had
-a sick list of 750 during the epidemic. A case of smallpox was
-discovered on the _Bayfield_, and all crewmen as well as passengers
-were vaccinated that same day.[82]
-
-     [82] _Ibid._, 11; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex VV, (hereafter
-          7thMTBn _SAR_), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27
-          Oct 50.
-
-On the 23d, as the _Mount McKinley_ proceeded into the inner harbor
-at Wonsan, there could be no doubt that the final mine sweeping would
-be completed by the 25th. Operation Yo-Yo came to an end, therefore,
-when Admiral Doyle directed the amphibious fleet to arrive on the 25th,
-prepared for an administrative landing. The order of entry called for
-the Transport Group to take the lead, followed by the vessels of the
-Tractor Group.[83]
-
-     [83] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X
-          Corps _WD_ 10–25 Oct 50.
-
-On the morning of the 25th, Admirals Struble and Doyle held a final
-conference with General Almond and Captain Spofford. By this time they
-had decided to land the Marines over YELLOW and BLUE Beaches on Kalma
-Peninsula, as originally conceived in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50. The inner
-harbor of Wonsan would remain closed until completely clear of mines,
-and then it would be developed as a supply base.[84]
-
-     [84] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450
-          24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.
-
-
-_Marine Air First at Objective_
-
-The sense of frustration which oppressed the Marine ground forces
-during Operation Yo-Yo would have been increased if they had realized
-that the air maintenance crews had beaten them to Wonsan by a margin
-of twelve days. Even more humiliating to the landing force troops,
-Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell were flown to the objective area. On the
-evening of the 24th they put on a USO show spiced with quips at the
-expense of the disgruntled Leathernecks in the transports.
-
-Planning for Marine air operations in northeast Korea had been modified
-from day to day to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic
-situation. On 11 October, when ROK forces secured Wonsan, preparations
-for air support of an assault landing were abandoned. Two days later
-Major General Field Harris, CG 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Tactical
-Air Command X Corps (TAC X Corps), flew to Wonsan. After inspecting
-the airfield he decided to begin operations without delay.[85]
-
-     [85] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW
-          _HD_, _Oct 50_; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K (hereafter MAG-12
-          _SAR_), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF-312 _SAR_), 3, 5–6;
-          and Smith, _Notes_, 433–441.
-
-These developments, of course, were accompanied by amendments to the
-original plan which had assigned Marine Fighter Squadrons (VMFs)-214
-and -323 the air support role in the naval task force, with Marine
-Aircraft Group (MAG)-12 to be landed as soon as the field at Wonsan was
-secured.
-
-In response to changing conditions, VMF-312 aircraft flew from Kimpo
-to Wonsan on the 14th, and R5Ds lifted 210 personnel of the advance
-echelons of Headquarters Squadron (Hedron)-12, Service Squadron
-(SMS)-12, and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron (VMF(N))-513. Two
-LSTs sailed from Kobe with equipment of MAG-12, and Combat Cargo
-Command aircraft of Far East Air Force began flying in aviation
-gasoline. Bombs and rockets were flown to Wonsan by the planes of
-VMF(N)-513.[86]
-
-     [86] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin
-          Reservoir,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul
-          52), 19–20; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix H (hereafter
-          VMF(N)-513 _SAR_), sec 6, 2.
-
-On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off Wonsan
-in the CVE’s _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_. From the following day
-until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air cover
-for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing 1st Marine
-Division administrative landing.[87]
-
-     [87] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214
-          _SAR_), 2.
-
-TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated the
-opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon within
-three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield were to be
-dependent on airlift for all supplies.
-
-The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine field
-made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped by
-hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground about
-a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to substitute
-for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep and eight
-bomb trailers for moving ammunition.[88]
-
-     [88] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,”
-          20; 1stMAW _HD_, _Oct 50_; TAC X Corps _OpnO 2-50_, 15
-          Oct 50, in _Ibid._
-
-Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were
-speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP
-at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed
-reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on
-retreating bodies of NKPA troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight
-surprised a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles
-southeast of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses.
-
-There were administrative as well as operational problems to be solved.
-If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the provision
-for air support would have been planned in a manner similar to that of
-Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused the 1st MAW
-to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces. This was in
-accordance with a CinCFE directive to the effect that when both FEAF
-and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination control
-would be exercised by CG FEAF. He had in turn delegated that control
-north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations of
-carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force.
-
-An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth AF
-procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes to
-be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously,
-the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air Force
-Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance in
-time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which Major
-General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave General
-Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions for X
-Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the Fifth AF.
-
-His decision was made on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the
-authority of CG 1st MAW to take action “in emergencies.” In practice,
-the arrangement worked out smoothly during this preliminary period, and
-on 12 November CG Fifth Air Force confirmed his oral agreement with a
-written directive.
-
-Direction of air operations in support of X Corps was exercised by
-MAG-12 for the 1st MAW from 15 October to 9 November. Night operations
-did not begin until late in October for lack of runway lights at
-Wonsan, so that VMF(N)-513 flew daytime missions along with VMF-312.
-The two carrier-based squadrons conducted flights in a similar manner.
-Aircraft reported at designated times to specified Tactical Air Control
-Parties (TACPs) for operations directed by a daily Fifth AF order, some
-of them in response to previously submitted requests of ground units
-for air support.
-
-Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-6
-was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, though
-it was under the administrative direction of MAG-12. Two helicopter
-pilots, Captain Wallace D. Blatt and First Lieutenant Chester C. Ward,
-flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 23 October. The rest of the squadron had
-proceeded by LST. A flight echelon of helicopters, commanded by Captain
-Victor A. Armstrong, VMO-6 executive officer, remained temporarily at
-Kimpo at the request of the Fifth Air Force to evacuate casualties of
-the 187th Airborne RCT in the Sukchon area.[89]
-
-     [89] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex WW (hereafter VMO-6 _SAR_), 2.
-
-
-_MacArthur Orders Advance to Border_
-
-From all that has gone before, it might be expected that UN strategy
-and tactics, after frequent modification, had finally been decided upon
-by mid-October 1950. This was not the case, and a brief recapitulation
-of events in western and central Korea is now necessary in order to set
-the scene for the sweeping changes that followed.
-
-General Walker’s Eighth Army, as mentioned earlier, had deployed along
-the 38th Parallel after relieving X Corps above Seoul on 7 October. Two
-days later, armored elements of the 1st Cavalry Division crossed the
-boundary to spearhead the U. S. I Corps drive on Sariwon and Pyongyang.
-The former city was secured on 17 October with the help of the 27th
-Commonwealth Brigade, while the 24th Infantry Division moved up the
-west coast on the left of the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis.[90] The
-1st Cavalry Division continued the attack toward Pyongyang on the
-18th, entering the Red capital with the 1st ROK Division the next day.
-Pyongyang was secured on 21 October, and elements of the 1st Cavalry
-Division also occupied the undefended port city of Chinnampo, 35 miles
-to the southwest.[91]
-
-     [90] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 13–23.
-
-     [91] _Ibid._, 25–30.
-
-A vertical envelopment on 20 October had come as a dramatic supplement
-to the attack on Pyongyang. The 187th Airborne RCT parachuted
-successfully into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, about 30 miles north of
-the city, thereby cutting the two principal NKPA escape routes to
-Manchuria. After watching the drop from his plane, General MacArthur
-stopped off at Pyongyang and declared that the surprise stroke had
-closed the trap on the enemy. At his Tokyo headquarters the next day,
-he predicted that the war would end shortly.[92]
-
-     [92] Schnabel, _The Korean Conflict_.
-
-In mountainous central Korea on the right flank of I US Corps, the 6th
-ROK Division had been leading the rapid advance of South Korean forces
-under EUSAK. With Hwachon captured on 8 October, the division went on
-to take the vital hubs of Chorwon on the 10th and Kumwha on the 11th.
-It made contact with ROK Capitol Division elements from Wonsan the
-following day. During the next 24 hours, the 6th Division advanced 20
-miles, and the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions fanned out to exploit the
-deepening penetration. On 14 October the 6th closed on Yangdok, about
-midway between Wonsan and Pyongyang.[93]
-
-     [93] EUSAK _WD Sum, Oct 50_, 11–20.
-
-Thereafter the ROK forces in the center of the peninsula began veering
-northwest, so that by 22 October, the day after Pyongyang fell to I
-Corps, the vanguard 6th Division was bearing down on Kunu-ri,[94] about
-45 air miles to the north of the capital.
-
-     [94] _Ibid._, 20–32.
-
-From the foregoing, it is obvious that a trans-peninsular drive by
-X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. In fact, both in
-Washington and in Tokyo the attitude prevailed that the Korean war
-was nearing an end. President Truman had deemed a meeting of minds
-appropriate at this time, and he flew to Wake Island for a conference
-with General MacArthur on 15 October.[95]
-
-     [95] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is
-          primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., _Substance
-          of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October
-          15, 1950_ (Washington, 1951); and Truman, _Memoirs_,
-          II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in
-          MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 36. For a differing account of
-          the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain,
-          _MacArthur 1941–1951_ (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney,
-          _MacArthur_, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen.
-          MacArthur Makes His Reply,” _Life_, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb
-          56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides
-          Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank
-          Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea
-          John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of
-          State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt;
-          Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM
-          Headquarters.
-
-Various aspects of American policy in the Far East were discussed at
-the meeting, but the Korean situation ranked high on the agenda. When
-asked by President Truman about the chances of Russian or Chinese
-interference in the war, General MacArthur replied, “Very little.” His
-conclusion agreed with that held by many in high government circles,
-although officials in both Washington and Tokyo realized that the
-possibility of Communist intervention could not be dismissed entirely.
-
-MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Chinese troops were stationed in
-Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed along
-the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only 50,000 to
-60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted to
-move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be “slaughtered,” owing to the
-proximity of UN air bases.
-
-The commander in chief added that Russia had no troops immediately
-available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks for
-a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter
-would have set in. And while Russia had a fairly good air force in
-Siberia and Manchuria, tactical support of Chinese ground troops would
-be difficult to control. “I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese
-as often as they would bomb us,” MacArthur remarked.[96]
-
-     [96] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the
-          Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air
-          employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to
-          do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained
-          for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as
-          the marines but they are effective.”
-
-Part of the conference dealt with the rehabilitation of Korea and
-the eventual departure of UN troops after the fighting had ceased.
-MacArthur expressed his belief that organized resistance would end by
-Thanksgiving (23 November). He hoped to withdraw EUSAK to Japan by
-Christmas, leaving X Corps, reconstituted with the 2d and 3d U. S.
-Infantry Divisions and other UN detachments, as a security force until
-peace and order were fully restored. All present seemed to agree that
-elections should be held early to achieve stability in the re-united
-country, and that the ROK Army must be made tough enough to deter the
-Chinese Communists from any aggressive moves.
-
-The conference ended on a note of general optimism. President Truman
-pinned a Distinguished Service Medal on the commander in chief (his
-fifth), and the latter boarded his plane and departed shortly after the
-meeting.
-
-Once back in Tokyo, MacArthur issued on 17 October a new order that
-would become effective if Pyongyang fell before X Corps landed at
-Wonsan (as was the case four days later). This draft established
-parallel zones of action for EUSAK and X Corps in North Korea, with
-the Taebaek Range as the dividing line. The restraining line for UN
-Forces was advanced as much as 60 miles to a lateral drawn through
-Chongsanjangsi-Koingdong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin (see Map
-1). ROK Forces, of course, would still drive all the way to the borders
-of Manchuria and the USSR.[97]
-
-     [97] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50;
-          Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.
-
-On 24 October, just as the 1st Marine Division was preparing to land
-at Wonsan, General MacArthur did away with the restraining line
-altogether. The original restriction on the advance of UN elements,
-he told his subordinate commanders, was based on the possibility of
-enemy capitulation. Since there appeared to be no prospect of a formal
-surrender, he now authorized Generals Walker and Almond to use whatever
-of their ground forces were necessary to secure all of North Korea. And
-he enjoined them “... to drive forward with all speed and with full
-utilization of all their force.”[98]
-
-     [98] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov
-          50_, 5.
-
-The commander in chief received a message from JCS the next day,
-telling him that they considered his new order “not in consonance”
-with their 27 September authorization, which had stipulated a policy
-of using only ROK ground forces in the provinces bordering Russia and
-Manchuria. The matter had caused some concern in Washington, the Joint
-Chiefs said, and they wanted to know MacArthur’s reasons for making the
-decision.[99]
-
-     [99] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.
-
-In reply they were informed that the commander in chief’s decision was
-a “matter of military necessity,” since the ROK Army lacked both the
-strength and the seasoned commanders required for securing North Korea.
-MacArthur added that the 27 September authorization had “... merely
-enunciated the [restraining line] provision as a matter of policy,”
-and had admitted the possibility of JCS instructions being modified in
-accordance with developments. He stated further that he possessed the
-authority to so modify from Secretary of Defense Marshall himself, who
-had told him “... to feel unhampered tactically and strategically....”
-Assuring the Joint Chiefs that he understood the reasons for their
-apprehension, he warned that “... tactical hazards might even result
-from other action than that which I have directed.”[100]
-
-    [100] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 372.
-
-And there the matter rested.
-
-
-_Landing of 1st Marine Division_
-
-It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond
-disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the
-new Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon
-establishing his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed
-command of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and
-east of the Taebaek Range.[101]
-
-    [101] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
-
-By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung, Hungnam,
-and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured on 17
-October during the swift drive northward.[102] The ROK 3d Division had
-one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en route to
-Hamhung.[103]
-
-    [102] EUSAK _WD_, 23 Oct 50.
-
-    [103] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50.
-
-On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion
-of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK
-regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could beach
-there safely, since SCAJAP ships had already done so. Learning of the
-proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral Struble
-forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not justify
-the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing was
-called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of Kojo.[104]
-
-    [104] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in _Ibid._;
-          ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, _Notes_,
-          404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.
-
-On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed X
-Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin line. The
-1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of the extended
-corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security of its
-assigned sector.[105] But again planning went for naught when, two
-days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard the
-restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly
-to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X
-Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the
-Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the Chosin
-and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun their
-advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles north of
-Hamhung.[106]
-
-    [105] 1stMarDiv _OpnPlan_ 4-50, 22 Oct 50. “G-3 (Col Bowser)
-          and G-4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through
-          a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of
-          October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted
-          at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan
-          area was made to select and mark administrative assembly
-          areas for units of the Division. Included in this
-          reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was
-          selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view
-          of its projected employment to the north shortly after
-          landing.” Bowser Comments.
-
-    [106] X Corps _WD_, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in
-          _ibid._; Smith, _Notes_, 285.
-
-It was also on the 25th that the 1st Marine Division finally began its
-administrative landing at Wonsan--as anticlimactic a landing as Marines
-have ever made. Five LSTs loaded with Engineer, Shore Party, and Combat
-Service Group elements beached on Kalma Peninsula in the evening. Since
-the approaches had not been declared clear until late afternoon, the
-main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the next day. Thus, 26
-October actually became D-Day--or “Doyle Day,” as it was referred to by
-an impatient General Almond.[107]
-
-    [107] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar _SAR_), 4;
-          and Smith, _Notes_, 407–409. The orders covering the
-          actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90
-          msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg
-          to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to
-          subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was
-          given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.
-
-At first light on the 26th, landing craft clustered around the
-transport vessels in the swept channel as troops spilled down
-debarkation nets. The first of 39 scheduled waves were shortly on
-the way, with amphibious craft of every description churning the
-water.[108] LSUs began disgorging armor of the 1st Tank Battalion at
-0730, and the big machines, fitted with deep-water fording adapters,
-thrashed through the surf and onto the loose sand.[109] Simultaneously,
-swarms of vehicles of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion crawled
-ashore shuttling troops and cargo.[110]
-
-    [108] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought
-          that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore
-          movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making
-          a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to
-          execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16-50]
-          for the assault landing without issuing an entire new
-          order.” Bowser Comments.
-
-    [109] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn _SAR_), 2–8.
-
-    [110] 1stAmphTracBn _HD Oct 50_, 2–3.
-
-At 0900, LSTs landed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines on
-YELLOW Beach, while Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s regimental headquarters
-splashed ashore out of landing craft dispatched from the _Noble_. The
-reserve battalion, 2/1, remained on board ship until the 28th. By 1700,
-the 3d Battalion was in position for the night and the 1st was well on
-the way to Kojo for a special mission. In the midst of the landing,
-Colonel Puller received a message from General Smith congratulating him
-on his being selected for promotion to brigadier general.[111]
-
-    [111] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26
-          Oct 50.
-
-Troops of the 7th Marines marched ashore on BLUE Beach without
-incident, and the assembled battalions moved to assigned areas north
-of Wonsan. At 1300, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg opened his regimental
-CP at St. Benedict’s Abbey, which had been gutted by the retreating
-Communists.[112]
-
-    [112] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628
-          26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St.
-          Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, _The
-          History of the Chaplains Corps_, _U. S. Navy_, (MS) V.
-
-Advance parties of the 5th Marines began landing over both beaches at
-0800. Priority was given to unloading the reserve unit’s cargo, and the
-majority of troops remained on board transports for the night. Most
-of the regiment debarked the next day and assembled about three miles
-northwest of Wonsan, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray established his CP
-at 1800.[113]
-
-    [113] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar _SAR_), 8.
-
-Only the 2d Battalion and several reconnaissance parties of the 11th
-Marines landed on the 26th. The remainder of the artillery regiment
-went ashore the next day and bivouacked at the coastal town of
-Munpyong-ni, five miles above Wonsan. Colonel James H. Brower, the
-regimental commander, detached 2/11 to the 1st Marines at 1715 on 27
-October, but the other battalions “... remained in a mobile state
-awaiting further orders.”[114]
-
-    [114] 11thMar _UnitReport_ (_URpt_), 21–28 Oct 50.
-
-The Wonsan landing, though tactically insignificant at the moment,
-was a major logistical undertaking to such units as the 1st Engineer
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge), the 1st Shore Party
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe), and the 1st Combat
-Service Group (Colonel John H. Cook, Jr.).
-
-Representatives from these and other support and service units had
-flown to the objective area several days before the Division’s arrival.
-After completing an inspection of Wonsan, the Shore Party detachment
-employed 500 North Korean POWs and 210 civilians to improve landing
-sites and beach exits. This work continued 24 hours a day for nine
-days, until the vanguard LSTs grated ashore on Kalma Peninsula in the
-evening of 25 October.[115] At this point, Shore Party Group C (Major
-George A. Smith) assumed responsibility for YELLOW Beach in the north,
-and Group B (Major Henry Brzezinski) took over BLUE Beach.
-
-    [115] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from
-          1stMarDiv _SAR_, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn SAR), 5–8,
-          and UU (hereafter 1st CSG _SAR_) 6 and 1stSPBn, _HD for
-          Advance Party_, 1–2.
-
-With the arrival of the first waves of LSTs, LSUs, LVTs, and landing
-craft in the morning, there began a routine of unremitting toil that
-would abate only after all of X Corps had landed weeks later. Because
-of the shallow offshore gradient, many amphibious craft could not
-reach the beach with their heavy cargoes, and the Shore Party troops
-had to construct ramps which projected 30 feet into the water. These
-improvised piers were made of rice bags filled with sand, with the
-result that their maintenance required considerable effort in men and
-heavy equipment. A pontoon causeway constructed on 27 October lessened
-the difficulties connected with getting troops ashore, but other
-problems persisted.
-
-One of these had to do with a sandbar that stretched across the boat
-lanes about 50 yards from the coast. Heavier craft frequently grounded
-here, and while some could be towed ashore by tractor dozers (TD-18s)
-and LVTs, others had to be unloaded in the water by cranes operating
-off the ramps and from barges.
-
-Once men and supplies finally reached dry land, there was the
-difficulty of transporting them inland over the loose sand and around
-the sprawling dunes of the peninsular beaches. Trucks and trailers
-often bogged down to such depths that they had to be uprooted and towed
-by LVTs or dozers. This tied up the overworked tracked vehicles when
-they were badly needed elsewhere.
-
-The Combat Service Group established its Class I, III, and V dumps
-according to plan on 26 October, but Class II and IV supplies arrived
-on the beach “... in a completely mixed condition,” owing to the haste
-of the outloading at Inchon. From D-Day onward, from 1500 to 2000
-Korean civilians were hired daily to help segregate and issue supplies.
-
-Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the intact
-port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November. During
-the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by rail to
-Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November, the group was
-attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter assuming
-specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of all port
-facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all equipment
-and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty evacuation;
-maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing local security;
-traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing field
-maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area.
-
-The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a survey
-of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October, when
-the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24 cargo
-vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo in the
-order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with 30,189
-personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534 troops were
-outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in November, as the
-MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured ashore, the total of
-ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs, adding 30,928 personnel,
-51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles to the short-lived build-up
-in Northeast Korea.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER III
-
-First Blood At Kojo
-
-_1/1 Sent to Kojo--Marine Positions in Kojo Area--The All-Night Fight
-of Baker Company--2/1 Ordered to Kojo--Security Provided for Wonsan
-Area--Marines Relieved at Kojo_
-
-
-It was perhaps inevitable after the NKPA collapse that an
-end-of-the-war atmosphere should prevail. This attitude was found in
-the CP as well as the foxhole. General MacArthur, while witnessing the
-Eighth Army paratroop landings north of the captured enemy capital, was
-quoted by the newspapers as saying:
-
-  The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. With
-  the closing of that trap there should be an end to organized
-  resistance.[116]
-
-    [116] _Newsweek_, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30.
-
-As another straw in the wind, General Smith had received a dispatch
-from ComNavFE on 21 October which stated that on the conclusion of
-hostilities it was his intention to recommend to CinCFE that the 1st
-Marine Division be returned to the United States, less an RCT to be
-stationed in Japan.[117]
-
-    [117] Smith, _Notes_, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n.
-          d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: “The Establishment of
-          a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the
-          Western Pacific,” 19 Oct 50.
-
-On the 24th the Marine commander learned that X Corps had received
-a document, for planning purposes only, providing that the Corps
-commander would become commander of the occupation forces. These were
-to consist of a single American division, probably the 3d Infantry
-Division, while the remainder of the Eighth Army returned to Japan.[118]
-
-    [118] Smith, _Notes_, 403.
-
-Such indications seemed less reassuring after an incident which
-occurred at Wonsan on the evening of D-day. Two Marines, gathering
-firewood on the beach, had been blown to pieces by a booby trap. They
-were the only casualties from enemy action in the Wonsan landing.[119]
-
-    [119] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50.
-          Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby
-          trapped.
-
-As early as 24 October the Marine division CP aboard the _Mount
-McKinley_ had been advised of an ancillary mission. Immediately
-following the landing one battalion was to be sent 39 miles south of
-Wonsan to the small seaport of Kojo. There it was to protect a supply
-dump of the ROK I Corps.[120]
-
-    [120] Smith, _Notes_, 385; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex C (hereafter
-          G-3 _SAR_), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J.
-          Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to
-          CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning
-          and intelligence resulting from this order being received
-          while underway.
-
-X Corps issued OI 13 on the 25th but General Smith did not receive
-his copy until two days later. Corps orders now assigned the Marine
-division a zone of action more than 300 road miles from north to south
-and 50 road miles in width. The missions prescribed for the Marines
-were those of an occupation rather than a fighting force:
-
-   (1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of Wonsan.
-
-   (2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in Kojo and zone.
-
-   (3) To protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, employing not less
-        than one RCT, and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.
-
-   (4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.
-
-   (5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in
-        the Chongjin area rapidly on order.
-
-   (6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) (ROK) in the repair of
-        the Yonghung-Hamhung railroad, employing not less than one
-        engineer company.[121]
-
-    [121] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6.
-
-The 1st Marine Division in turn assigned these tasks to the following
-units in OpnO 18-50, issued at 0800 on the 28th but communicated orally
-to most of the designated commanding officers during the preceding 48
-hours:
-
-   (1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in
-        Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni zone, establish necessary road blocks
-        to prevent movement into the area, patrol roads, and destroy
-        enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain one reinforced battalion at
-        Kojo until further orders.
-
-   (2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps along the
-        Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the
-        northern tip of the reservoir and Changjin, prepared for
-        further advance to the northern border of Korea, and to
-        destroy enemy in zone.
-
-   (3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-7, relieve
-        elements of I ROK Corps in the vicinity of Fusen Reservoir,
-        establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the
-        area, patrol the roads and destroy the enemy.
-
-   (4) BLT1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to
-        the designated commander for operational control and landing
-        in the vicinity of Chongjin.
-
-   (5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an
-        assembly area in the vicinity of Hamhung, to be prepared for
-        operating in the zone of any RCT.[122]
-
-    [122] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to
-          COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50.
-
-Two of the objectives mentioned in these orders, Chongjin and the
-northern border of Korea, were more than 300 road miles north of
-Wonsan. With the exception of the main coastal route, most of the roads
-in the 1st Marine Division zone were mere mountain trails, unfit for
-tanks or heavy vehicles.
-
-OpnO 18-50 was modified the next day to provide for attaching the 1st
-Battalion, KMC Regiment, to the 5th Marines, and the 5th KMC Battalion
-to the 1st Marines. The security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas
-(13 and 32 miles north of Wonsan respectively) was assigned for the
-time being to the 5th Marines, reinforced by Company A of the 1st Tank
-Battalion.
-
-On the 27th General Smith moved from the _Mount McKinley_ at 1000 to
-the new Division CP, a mile north of Wonsan. An old Russian barracks,
-it was too small and badly in need of repairs. The building occupied by
-the 1st Marine Air Wing was in even worse shape, but carpenters were
-soon busy at boarding up windows and doors blown out by bombs.[123]
-
-    [123] Smith, _Chronicle_, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments,
-          22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A. Craig, “Notes concerning Wonsan
-          Administrative Landing and events immediately following,
-          October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950,” 4 Sep 56.
-
-
-_1/1 Sent to Kojo_
-
-A holiday spirit prevailed among the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st
-Marines, as they entrained on the morning of 26 October 1950 at a
-railhead near the Wonsan airfield. Physical activity was a treat after
-the monotony and confinement of Operation Yo-Yo, and 1/1 had been
-selected for the Kojo mission. Immediately after the landing on YELLOW
-Beach at 0900 that morning, preparations were made for departure by
-rail of the rifle companies at noon. Supplies and reinforcing units
-were scheduled to follow on the 27th on a second train and a convoy
-consisting of 1/1 and Motor Transport Battalion vehicles; Battery F,
-2d Battalion, 11th Marines; 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Engineer
-Battalion; and a detachment of Company D, 1st Medical Battalion.[124]
-
-    [124] This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv,
-          1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar _SAR_, 4; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_)
-          7; 1stMar _HD_, Oct 50, 4; X Corps _Periodic Operations
-          Report_ (_POR_) 30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55;
-          Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d.
-
-At 1330 a wheezing Korean engine manned by a Korean crew pulled out of
-Wonsan with the rifle companies riding in gondola cars. It was a bright
-blue day, with a hint of frost in the air; and not a sign of enemy
-resistance appeared along the 39-mile route, though several tunnels
-might have been utilized for a guerrilla attack.
-
-Upon their arrival late that afternoon, Kojo proved to be the most
-attractive town the men had seen in Korea--an almost undamaged small
-seaport flanked by the white beaches and sparkling blue waters of the
-bay.
-
-There remained for the Marines the task of relieving ROK units and
-protecting an area consisting of a coastal plain about 5000 yards in
-diameter which stretched from the bay to a semicircle of hills ranging
-from 150 to 600 feet in height (see Map 4). The ROK officers assured
-the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins, that his men
-would find their duty at Kojo a tame assignment. They admitted that
-small bands of escaping NKPA soldiers had sometimes raided the villages
-for rice, but added that ROK patrols had scoured the hills without
-meeting any organized resistance.
-
-The night passed uneventfully for the battalion in a perimeter
-northwest of Kojo while the ROKs occupied outposts along the southern
-fringe of the coast plain. In the morning the Marines found the rice
-paddies glazed with the first ice of the autumn. After completing
-the relief of the 2d Battalion of the 22d ROK Regiment at 1200, they
-watched with amusement that afternoon as the Koreans crowded into the
-gondola cars with their women, children, dogs, and chickens for the
-ride back to Wonsan. When it seemed that the train could not hold
-another human being, a ROK officer barked out an order and everyone
-squeezed farther back with audible sighs and grunts. At last, as a
-grand climax, the officer shouted a final command and the entire
-trainload of Koreans sat down simultaneously, like collapsing dominoes.
-
-It was an ironical circumstance that the ROKs on the overcrowded train
-took with them the remnants of the supply dump that 1/1 was assigned to
-guard. However important this dump may have been in its heyday, it had
-apparently been consumed by the ROKs to the point where only a few
-drums of fuel oil remained along with other odds and ends.
-
-[Illustration: KOJO AREA
-
-Unit locations are those of 1700
-
-27 Oct 50
-
-  MAP-4
-]
-
-That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident,
-bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And
-though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they
-had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized
-enemy was about to launch a surprise attack.
-
-
-_Marine Positions in Kojo Area_
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for
-his battalion.
-
-  Mindful of my mission--to protect the supply dump until removed--I
-  had to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this
-  end [he commented]. The supply dump was located at the railroad
-  station in the flat ground south of Kojo--a point difficult to
-  defend, since it was on low ground and could be approached by the
-  enemy from any direction. I considered the most likely direction
-  of enemy approach to be from the south along the coastal road
-  or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest.
-  Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to
-  cover these approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be
-  deployed on the hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the
-  area or counterattack if necessary to prevent loss of the supplies
-  at the railroad station. I did not consider this disposition
-  ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive strength, but
-  it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex
-  terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason
-  to expect an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event
-  such a contingency should occur, it was planned that Company B, the
-  outpost, would withdraw to the main battle position.[125]
-
-    [125] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins
-          made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had
-          taken the supply dump with them.
-
-Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about two miles
-south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies. From
-east to west the company held three isolated points of high ground:
-
-1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one
-section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on
-the east slope of Hill 109;
-
-3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company Headquarters,
-reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one section of light
-machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of 3.5″ rocket
-launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west and south of
-the 1st Platoon;
-
-2d Platoon (First Lieutenant George G. Chambers), reinforced by one
-section of 81mm mortars, one section of light machine guns, a 75mm
-recoilless rifle and one squad of 3.2″ rocket launchers, on Hill 185.
-
-The remainder of 1/1 occupied positions west of Kojo. Captain Robert
-P. Wray’s Charlie Company held a continuous line of foxholes in the
-hills that rose from the rice paddies a mile and a half north of Baker
-Company’s positions. From west to east were First Lieutenant Francis
-B. Conlon’s 2d Platoon, First Lieutenant William A. Craven’s 1st and
-Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey’s 3d. About 250 yards to the east
-were two platoons of Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Able Company. On the
-slopes north of Barrow stood Colonel Hawkins’ CP and the tubes of First
-Lieutenant Edward E. Kaufer’s 4.2″ Mortar Platoon. Captain Barrow’s
-third platoon occupied the topographical crest of Hill 117.[126]
-
-    [126] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27–28 Oct 50, revised and
-          annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren
-          rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55;
-          Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56.
-
-While the Marines organized their positions during the afternoon of
-27 October, a column of refugees “almost as long as the eye could
-see” appeared in the valley southwest of Kojo headed for the seaport.
-Colonel Hawkins estimated that there were 2000 to 3000 people in the
-column. Since he did not have the time to examine all the refugees
-before darkness, Hawkins had them herded into the peninsula northeast
-of Kojo for the night.[127]
-
-    [127] Hawkins ltr, n. d.
-
-After a quiet afternoon on the 27th, the first hint of enemy opposition
-came at 1600 when a wire team was fired upon in the vicinity of Hill
-185. Two hours later a truck and a jeep borrowed from the S-3, Major
-David W. Bridges, received fire from the high ground west of Hill
-109. Both were abandoned after the truck broke down, and a Baker
-Company patrol had a brief fire fight at 1900 when it recovered the
-vehicles.[128]
-
-    [128] 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv
-          4 Nov 55.
-
-These first indications of Red Korean activity in the Kojo area were
-attributed to the forays of guerrilla bands. Not until after the
-battle did the Marines learn from POW interrogations that the enemy
-consisted of an estimated 1000 to 1200 men of the 10th Regiment, 5th
-NKPA Division. This regiment, commanded by Colonel Cho Il Kwon, former
-director of the Communist Party at Wonsan, was believed to have its CP
-in the large village of Tongchon, about two miles south of the Baker
-Company outposts. Other units of the NKPA division, which was credited
-with a total strength of 7000 to 8000 men, occupied areas farther to
-the south.[129]
-
-    [129] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct
-          50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 29 Oct
-          50; X Corps _Periodic Intelligence Report_ (_PIR_) 33.
-
-After the Red Korean collapse, the 2d, 5th, and 10th NKPA Divisions
-had maintained their organization, though much depleted in strength by
-casualties. Withdrawing to the Wonsan area, they kept to the secondary
-roads and raided the villages for food. It is a tribute to Communist
-discipline that the outfits had not lost their cohesion at a time when
-their cause seemed to be collapsing. But the 5th NKPA Division was
-one of the units made up almost entirely of Koreans who had served in
-the Chinese Civil War, and its officers were fanatically dedicated to
-Communist principles.[130]
-
-    [130] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 26; X Corps _PIR_ 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv
-          _PIR_ 20, encl 2.
-
-Only well trained and led troops could have launched the attacks which
-hit both ends of the Baker Company’s chain of outposts simultaneously
-about 2200, after the first few hours of darkness had passed in
-comparative quiet punctuated by occasional shots. Normal security
-measures were taken on a cold night with a 50 per cent watch--one
-rifleman remaining on the alert in the two-man foxholes while the other
-burrowed for warmth into a partially closed sleeping bag. The 81mm and
-60mm mortars were registered on the hills just beyond the 2d and 3d
-platoons.[131]
-
-    [131] 1stMar _SAR_, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55.
-
-These two units came under attack shortly before First Lieutenant
-Carlon’s position at the extreme west of Charlie Company’s line was
-assailed. In each instance the enemy infiltrated within grenade
-throwing distance before his presence was detected. Past contacts with
-American soldiers had given the Red Koreans some knowledge of the
-language, and for purposes of deception the NKPA assault troops shouted
-phrases in broken English:
-
-“Come this way!... Don’t shoot! We’re friends.”[132]
-
-    [132] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24
-          Jan 56.
-
-
-_The All-Night Fight of Baker Company_
-
-The surprise was devastating, particularly in the Baker Company zone.
-On the eastern slope of Hill 109 the 1st Platoon had no inkling until
-men yelled warnings from the foxholes just as the enemy grenades
-exploded and Red Koreans in estimated strength of two platoons overran
-the position. Seven Marines were killed before they could get out of
-their sleeping bags, and others lost contact in the darkness.
-
-The 3d Platoon and Company CP were attacked from three points to the
-south and southeast. Marine 60mm mortars fired within 50 yards of the
-front line while the 81s laid down a barrage directly forward of the
-position. After a brief and bitter struggle, Communists believed to
-number three platoons were repulsed.
-
-In the Charlie Company zone, Lieutenant Carlon’s position was hardest
-hit. The North Koreans closed within ten feet before they were noticed.
-During the confused fighting which followed, the enemy won a brief
-foothold. An estimated 20 Marines were cut off but got back safely the
-next morning.
-
-After recovering from the initial surprise the Charlie Company outposts
-repulsed all further attacks. Wray’s men lost 6 killed and 16 wounded
-during the night’s encounters but could count 92 Korean bodies the next
-morning.
-
-At 2215 the 3d Platoon of Baker Company had a second attack at the same
-points as the first one. The Red Koreans appeared to Captain Noren to
-be exceptionally well disciplined and controlled in spite of heavy
-casualties inflicted on them by combination of mortar, machine-gun and
-small-arms fire, and grenades.[133]
-
-    [133] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon
-          the 1stMar _SAR_ 4–5, appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges
-          interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar, _HD Oct
-          50_, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.;
-          Statement of Lt James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51.
-
-The plight of Belli’s platoon was first made known when 2/B on Hill
-185 received a message to the effect that 1/B had withdrawn from Hill
-109 with 30 men missing. The retirement was made possible by the brave
-stand of Sergeant Clayton Roberts, who covered the movement with a
-light machine gun until he was surrounded and killed.
-
-The 3d Platoon beat off another attack meanwhile as the enemy closed in
-from the left rear as well as the front. With machine-gun fire coming
-from both directions, Noren informed the battalion CP at 2350 that his
-position was untenable and asked permission to withdraw. His request
-being granted, he directed Lieutenant Chambers to pull back from Hill
-185, covering the withdrawal of 3/B with 81mm fire.
-
-The intersection of the dike and railway track was designated as the
-meeting place for the three Baker Company platoons. Noren covered
-the rear of the 3/B withdrawal while his executive officer, First
-Lieutenant Chester B. Farmer, took charge of the point. Opposite Hill
-109 they encountered Staff Sergeant Robert Fisher and five men whom
-Belli had directed to remain at the dike and pick up stragglers while
-the rest of 1/B continued to pull back.
-
-Fisher reported that the attack on Hill 109 had been conducted with
-skill and discipline. Whistles and red and green flares were used for
-signaling by Communists who cut off a listening post and overran a
-squad on the right flank. The assault force numbered 160, according to
-POW testimony.
-
-The methodical, position-by-position withdrawal of the three Baker
-Company platoons was conducted so skilfully that remarkably few
-casualties resulted. Noren lost all contact for a short time when
-enemy fire severed the antenna on his last operative SCR-300. At about
-0215 Chambers’ platoon was last to reach the meeting place, having
-beaten off several attacks during its withdrawal from Hill 185. With
-another large-scale enemy assault threatening, Noren organized a 360°
-defense on both sides of the railway track just south of the village
-of Chonchon-ni. One Marine was killed and six wounded by enemy fire
-received from the west as well as east.
-
-Fox Battery of the 11th Marines had arrived in the Kojo area about
-midnight and set up its guns on the beach northeast of the town at
-about 0200.[134] Baker Company had no radio in operation, however,
-until parts of two damaged SCR-300’s were combined into one to restore
-communication. Contact was made with the 4.2″ mortars, which registered
-about 0300, directed by Captain Noren, and broke up the NKPA attack.
-The 81mm mortars made it hot for the enemy in Chonchon-ni, and at 0330
-the Communists apparently disengaged to withdraw east of the railway
-track and northward toward Kojo. Marine artillery had registered by
-0400, but all was quiet in the area the rest of the night.
-
-    [134] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11
-          _SAR_), 14.
-
-Although a few NKPA mortar shells were received, enemy equipment
-appeared to be limited for the most part to automatic weapons, small
-arms, and grenades. There were indications that Korean civilians had
-been used in several instances as human shields for an attacking
-force.[135]
-
-    [135] Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50.
-
-The NKPA withdrawal to Kojo led to the Marine speculation that the
-Communists meant to make enforced recruits of some of the hapless
-residents allotted a refuge in the peninsula north of the town. As
-it proved, they were not harmed by the NKPA troops. The last enemy
-effort, just before dawn, was an attack in platoon strength on Second
-Lieutenant John J. Swords’ Able Company platoon by Reds who had
-infiltrated through Kojo. A brief fight ensued on Hill 117 as the
-Marines beat off the assault at the cost of one man killed and two
-wounded.
-
-Baker Company elements had meanwhile resumed their withdrawal along
-the railway track north of Chonchon. All was quiet at first light when
-Noren began the task of evacuating his wounded in ponchos through rice
-paddies which were knee-deep in mud and water under a thin skin of ice.
-Marines came out from the Able Company positions to lend a hand.
-
-The evacuation had nearly been completed when about 200 enemy troops
-suddenly moved out from Kojo in a westerly direction across the rice
-paddies. Whether they meant to interfere with the evacuation or merely
-to escape was never made clear. For the Marines of Able and Baker
-Companies as well as the gunners of Fox Battery opened up in broad
-daylight and found lucrative targets. An estimated 75 Communists were
-killed and wounded before the rest scurried out of range into the hills
-west of the coastal plain.
-
-Some contact was maintained with the enemy until 1000 by elements of
-Charlie Company, then the action was gradually broken off as the planes
-of VMF(N)-513 came in low with close support.[136] Although the strikes
-by air were largely uncontrolled because of poor radio communications
-between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) and the planes, they were very
-helpful to the Marines on the ground.[137]
-
-    [136] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 _WD Oct 50_; 1/1
-          msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren
-          Comments n. d.
-
-    [137] Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6
-          Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
-
-
-_2/1 Ordered to Kojo_
-
-The radio message bringing the first news of the Kojo fight was sent
-by 1/1 at 0418 on the 28th. Owing to transmission difficulty, it was
-picked up by the 7th Marines, relayed to the 1st Marines at 0700, and
-telephoned to the 1st Marine Division.[138] It stated briefly that
-the battalion had been under attack since 1700 by an estimated 1000
-enemy and had suffered a large number of casualties. Helicopters were
-requested for air evacuation and an LSTH for water evacuation of the
-wounded. Air support was required, the message continued, adding that
-the destroyer in direct support of the battalion had not yet arrived on
-station.
-
-    [138] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO
-          7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1825 29 Oct 50.
-
-At 0830 an officer from 1/1 reported in to 1st Marines CP with a
-further account. He reported a platoon of B Company cut off and
-estimated 150 casualties.[139]
-
-    [139] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
-
-A third report from 1/1 reached the CP of the 1st Marine Division as an
-intercepted radio message at 1238 on the 28th while General Almond was
-conferring with General Smith. Sent from Kojo at 1000, the message said:
-
-  Received determined attack from South North and West from sunset
-  to sunrise by large enemy force. Estimated from 1000 to 1200.
-  One company still heavily engaged. Civilian reports indicate
-  possibility 3000 enemy this immediate area. Have suffered 9 KIA,
-  39 WIA, 34 MIA [Missing in Action] probably dead. Two positions
-  overrun during night. If this position is to be held a regiment
-  is required. Enemy now to South North and West of us but believe
-  road to North is still open. Harbor is in our hands and ROK LST has
-  been here. Shall we hold here or withdraw to North? ROK supply dump
-  ... removed. Request immediate instructions. Send all available
-  helicopters for wounded. Suggest send instructions by both radio
-  and helicopters.[140]
-
-    [140] 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points
-          out, the request for instructions refers to his only
-          orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no
-          longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d.
-
-The Corps and Division commanders agreed immediately that Kojo should
-be held, since a large-scale NKPA attack appeared to be in the making.
-Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump. Nobody at the
-Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been removed, but General
-Smith directed his G-3 to issue the necessary orders to send Colonel
-Puller, CO of the 1st Marines, and a battalion of reinforcements to
-Kojo. Within five minutes Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, 1stMarDiv G-3,
-telephoned Corps to request that a train be assembled on the Wonsan
-siding immediately for a battalion lift.[141]
-
-    [141] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 28 Oct 50; Craig
-          “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3
-          X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _HD, Oct 50_, 4; LtCol R.
-          E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55.
-
-Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC of the 1st Marine Division,
-was on his way to a conference at the 1st Marines CP when he met
-General Almond and Colonel Puller, and the three compared notes from
-their jeeps. Craig informed them that action toward the providing of
-transportation had already been initiated by Division. A request had
-later been made for a second destroyer to provide gunfire support (the
-first having already arrived) and an LSTH for casualty evacuation.
-Another LST had been requested for the purpose of sending tanks to
-Kojo, since the road and bridges would not bear the weight of armor.
-
-The possibility of a major engagement taking place at Kojo seemed to
-be confirmed by two later reports 1/1 sent at 1415 and 1840. The first
-relayed prisoner of war statements to the effect that an estimated 7000
-men of the NKPA 5th Division were located at Tongchon.[142] The second,
-a radio message, read:
-
-    [142] 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n.
-          d.
-
-  Reinforcement train has not arrived as of 1800. NK prisoners
-  revealed large enemy force plans attack over position tonight.
-  Recommend LVTs with LSTs stand by at daylight in case of emergency
-  evacuation necessary. In view of large numbers of troops facing us
-  as previously reported and face enemy on all sides except seaward,
-  consider situation critical. Request higher authority visit.[143]
-
-    [143] 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
-
-By that time Colonel Puller and the troops were on the way. Making up
-a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies
-in three and a half hours had been something of an administrative feat,
-particularly when the battalion was just coming off landing craft.
-Yet Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter’s 2/1 and the Regimental Command
-Group pulled out for Kojo at 1630 and a second train followed two hours
-later.[144]
-
-    [144] Craig, “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; Col A. Sutter
-          Comments n. d.
-
-Upon arrival at 2230, CO 1stMar learned that there had been no major
-enemy contact since 1000. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins had contracted his
-unit that afternoon to his main position along the high ground forming
-a semicircle around Hill 117. The 2d Battalion and supporting arms
-having tied in with the 1st for the night, Colonel Puller concluded
-that no further cause for alarm existed. And since the battery
-positions at Kojo were limited, he radioed General Smith that more
-artillery would not be needed.[145]
-
-    [145] Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55.
-
-Seventeen Marines previously listed as MIA by 1/1 had returned unhurt
-to their units on the 28th after being cut off during the confusion
-of the night’s fighting. Marine air had all but obliterated Tongchon
-that afternoon while the U. S. destroyers _Hank_ and _English_ were
-bombarding Kojo.
-
-The request for water as well as air evacuation of serious casualties
-had resulted in immediate action. Within an hour after receiving the
-message, CTF-90 had the transport _Wantuck_ on the way with a surgical
-team, and VMO-6 sent five helicopters which flew 17 wounded men to a
-hospital ship at Wonsan on the 29th.[146]
-
-    [146] CTF-90 msg to USS _Wantuck_, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 _SAR_,
-          23.
-
-Ten tanks of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded in LST 883 at
-Wonsan on the 28th, but the ship was delayed by running aground. Upon
-arrival at Kojo the next day, it again became necessary for the LST to
-be pulled off the bar by a tug. By this time the military situation was
-so well in hand that the tanks were taken back to Wonsan without being
-unloaded.[147]
-
-    [147] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650
-          29 Oct 50.
-
-
-_Security Provided for Wonsan Area_
-
-Responsibility for the security of the Wonsan area having been assigned
-to the 1st Marines, something of an administrative problem was created
-on the 28th by the order sending 2/1 to reinforce 1/1 at Kojo. For the
-3d Battalion of the regiment had departed that same day to relieve
-a ROK unit at Majon-ni, 28 miles west of Wonsan. Since this left
-no troops to patrol roads in the Wonsan area and maintain blocking
-positions at Anbyon, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 5th KMC
-Battalion were attached to the 1st Marines for those missions.
-
-Also available to the 1st Marines for such security duties as guarding
-the Wonsan airfield and harbor area were the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
-1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and Company B of the 1st Armored
-Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[148]
-
-    [148] 1stSPBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stMar _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_,
-          annex TT (hereafter 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_) 4–5, appendix 2,
-          3–4.
-
-By the morning of the 29th, moreover, it had already become apparent
-that one or both of the battalions in the Kojo area could soon be
-spared. When General Craig arrived by helicopter, he found the
-situation well in hand.[149]
-
-    [149] Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, _Notes_, 450.
-
-About 60 percent of the seaport had been destroyed by air strikes
-and the guns of the destroyers when a patrol consisting of Dog and
-Fox Companies combed the ruins on the morning of the 29th without
-finding any evidences of enemy occupation. Meanwhile an Easy Company
-patrol ranged to the west of the coastal plain with equally negative
-results.[150]
-
-    [150] 2/1 _SAR_, 3; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to
-          CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct 50; 1stMar Fwd _ISUM_, 1900 29
-          Oct 50.
-
-Captain George B. Farish of VMO-6 was making a reconnaissance flight
-when he discerned the word HELP spelled out in rice straw near a
-straw-stack a mile northeast of Tongchon. A Marine crawled out from
-concealment, and the pilot landed his helicopter to pick up PFC William
-H. Meister, who had been hiding since losing touch with his unit during
-the enemy night attack on Hill 109. This was the first of four such
-rescues completed by Farish that day.[151]
-
-    [151] VMO-6 _HD Oct 50_; VMO-6 _SAR_, 3.
-
-On the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Noren led a patrol along the
-railway track south of Kojo and retraced the route of his fighting
-withdrawal in the darkness. In the vicinity of Hill 109, where
-Lieutenant Belli’s platoon had been surprised, he found 12 Marine
-bodies. None had been despoiled by the enemy of arms or equipment.
-
-Pushing farther south, Noren encountered sniper fire from the ruins of
-Tongchon, destroyed by Marine air, and called for more strikes. The
-Corsairs flushed out a group of 20 enemy troops, 16 of whom were cut
-down by the machine guns of the Baker Company patrol.[152]
-
-    [152] Smith, _Notes_, 451; Noren Comments.
-
-By the 29th, when General Almond made a trip of inspection to Kojo, it
-was possible to revise the original Marine casualty list as the MIA
-casualties were reduced. The final count was 23 KIA, 47 WIA and four
-MIA.[153]
-
-    [153] Smith, _Notes_, 451; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_,
-          29 Oct 40.
-
-Twenty-four wounded Marines were evacuated to Wonsan that day by APD.
-LST 883, when it returned to Wonsan with the tanks, took the bodies of
-19 Marines and 17 prisoners.
-
-Enemy losses, in addition to 83 POW, were estimated at 250 KIA and
-an unknown number of WIA on the basis of more than 165 bodies found
-by Marine patrols. Curiously enough, the Communists had shown little
-interest in the equipment which fell into their hands, and two Marine
-75mm recoilless rifles, rendered inoperative, were recovered with
-their carts and ammunition in the vicinity of Chonchon-ni. Almost all
-abandoned equipment was found in usable condition.[154]
-
-    [154] Smith, _Notes_, 451–452; 1stMar _SAR_, appendix 5, 2;
-          Noren Comments.
-
-
-_Marines Relieved at Kojo_
-
-Each of the Marine rifle companies set up outposts in front of its
-zone. Morning and afternoon patrolling, with air on station, went on
-during the last two days of October with negative results. Harassing
-and interdiction fires were also continued until 1/1 departed.
-
-LST 973 arrived off Kojo at 1430, 31 October, and disembarked the 5th
-Battalion of the KMC Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’ battalion,
-accompanied by Colonel Puller, left Kojo at 0700 the next morning
-on the return trip of the LST. The ship docked at Wonsan at 1230 on
-2 November. That afternoon 1/1 relieved elements of the 1st Tank
-Battalion at the road block near Katsuma, four miles southeast of
-Wonsan.
-
-Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CG FMFPac, who was acting
-in an informal capacity as amphibious adviser to General MacArthur,
-inspected 2/1 at Kojo by helicopter on 31 October. Having arrived at
-Wonsan that day with Colonel Victor H. Krulak, his G-3, he conferred
-at X Corps Headquarters with Admiral Struble and Generals Almond and
-Smith.[155]
-
-    [155] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO
-          1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv
-          msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 453–454; 1stMar
-          _SAR_, 6–7; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments.
-
-Among the other subjects of discussion was the news that Chinese
-Communist Forces (CCF) prisoners had been taken in the area north of
-Hamhung by ROK units which were soon to be relieved by the 7th Marines.
-Several clashes with organized Chinese forces during the last days of
-October had also been reported by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division
-of the Eighth Army in western Korea.
-
-The 7th Marines had been given the mission of spearheading the Marine
-advance to the northern border of Korea as directed in Corps orders.
-After parkas and other cold weather clothing had been issued from the
-beach dumps at Wonsan, the regiment completed the movement to Hamhung
-by motor convoy from 29 to 31 October. By this time the Corps drive to
-the Yalu was shifting into second gear, with the I ROK Corps far in
-advance along the coastal highway. Two U. S. Army units were soon to
-be involved. The 7th Infantry Division, which landed at Iwon from 29
-October to 8 November, had Corps orders to push on toward the border;
-and it was planned that the 3d Infantry Division, due to land its
-first units on the 8th at Wonsan, would relieve 1st Marines units south
-of Hamhung.[156]
-
-    [156] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 18-50, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne,
-          “Operations Report”, 13–14; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 12; X Corps
-          _WDs_, 29 Oct-8 Nov 50.
-
-Corps orders of 2 November called for 2/1 to return to Wonsan
-immediately. The southern boundary of X Corps was to be moved 70 miles
-farther south, effective on the departure of the battalion from Kojo.
-In order to cover the new zone, the KMC regiment had already been
-detached from the 1st Marine Division and given responsibility for the
-Corps zone south of the 39th Parallel. The relief of the 2d Battalion
-of the 5th Marines was completed by KMC elements that same day at
-Anbyon, eight miles southeast of Wonsan, thus freeing that unit for a
-motor lift northward to rejoin its regiment.[157]
-
-    [157] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps 01 14,
-          29 Oct 50; X Corps _OI_ 16, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr
-          to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to 1stMar, 1803
-          2 Nov 50.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2/1 and the artillery battery departed Kojo
-the following day. A small train and a truck convoy sent from Wonsan
-were used chiefly for the transport of supplies, and most of the troops
-traveled by shanks’ mare. The column was on the way when the report
-came that the rail line had been blown up at Anbyon by guerrillas.
-The battalion halted there and set up a perimeter for the night which
-included both the train and truck convoys. At 0730 in the morning the
-convoys moved out again for Wonsan. Delayed slightly by another rail
-break, Sutter completed the movement at noon.[158]
-
-    [158] 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov
-          50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1
-          msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 _SAR_, 14–15; Sutter
-          Comments.
-
-The track-blowing incident gave evidence that the Marines must deal
-with a third type of enemy. In addition to the NKPA remnants, and the
-forces of Red China, it now appeared that account must be taken of
-thousands of uprooted Koreans prowling in small bands for food and
-loot--the flotsam of a cruel civil war. Called guerrillas by courtesy,
-they were actually outlaws and banditti, loyal to no cause. And by
-virtue of their very furtiveness, they were capable of doing a great
-deal of mischief to organized forces.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER IV
-
-Majon-ni and Ambush Alley
-
-_Marine Units Tied in for Defense--Political Aspects of Mission--Roads
-Patrolled by Rifle Companies--Air Drop of Supplies Requested--First
-Attack on Perimeter--KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni--Movement of 1st
-Marines to Chigyong_
-
-
-From a distance the Y-shaped mountain valley, encircled by peaks and
-crossed by two swift, clear streams, might have been taken for a scene
-in the Alps. This impression was borne out by the village of Majon-ni,
-which nestled close to the earth, as seen from afar, with the tranquil
-and untroubled air of a Swiss hamlet.
-
-On closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only prove
-to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village was
-a new schoolhouse with the onion-shaped dome of Russian architecture.
-An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small peasant
-community, it had been erected not so much for the instruction of
-children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles.
-
-Majon-ni, in short, had been for five years a hotbed of forced culture
-in the doctrines of the Communist puppet state set up in northern Korea
-after World War II by the occupation forces of Soviet Russia. And it
-was here that the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines arrived on 28 October
-1950. Relief of elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at 1600 enabled those
-troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which had brought 3/1.[159]
-
-    [159] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar _URpt_
-          (_S-3_) 7, 2.
-
-The Marines had been assigned the mission of “setting up a defensive
-position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the use
-of this road net.” In addition, the unit was “to patrol roads to the
-north, south, and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and
-Wonsan.”[160]
-
-    [160] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also
-          CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar
-          _OpnO 9-50_, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv _AdmO 14-50_, 27 Oct 50.
-
-This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions
-relieving the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the
-Wonsan-Majon-ni road. The reason for the change was apparent when the
-troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons
-on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial
-plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot
-pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which
-are ideal for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be
-known to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it
-offered too much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the
-dispatch of the iron elephants.[161]
-
-    [161] Col T. L. Ridge, _Notes on Operations in North Korea_,
-          9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, _Notes_) and comments on
-          preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, _The New
-          Breed_ (New York, 1952), 203.
-
-[Illustration: MAJON-NI AND ROAD TO WONSAN
-
-  A  Ambush of 2 Nov 50
-  B  Ambush of 3 Nov 50
-  C  Ambush of 7 Nov 50
-  D  Ambush of 12 Nov 50
-  E  Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50
-
-  MAP-5
-]
-
-The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position
-at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading
-east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They were being
-traveled extensively at this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in
-civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military effort.
-
-It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more than
-15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such an
-important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni.[162]
-Thus the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s reinforced
-battalion were sent as a blocking and screening force.
-
-    [162] Smith, _Notes_, 393–394; G-3 _SAR_, 5–6.
-
-
-_Marine Units Tied In for Defense_
-
-In addition to H&S, Weapons, and the three rifle companies, the task
-organization consisted on 28 October of Battery D of the 2d Battalion,
-11th Marines, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, and
-detachments from ANGLICO, 1st Signal Battalion; Company D, 1st Medical
-Battalion; and H&S Company, 1st Marines.[163]
-
-    [163] Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based
-          on: Ridge, _Notes_; and Comments, 28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H.
-          Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, “The
-          Dead End of Ambush Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvi,
-          no. 11 (Nov 51), 38–45.
-
-The battalion commander and his S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter, decided
-after a survey of the terrain that the commanding ground was too far
-from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The logical
-solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with daytime
-company OPs and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads. In order
-to tie in all units of a perimeter 3770 yards in circumference, it was
-necessary to create provisional platoons of such H&S, artillery and
-engineer troops as could be spared from their regular duties. Even so,
-the defense was spread thin in places.
-
-The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the battalion CP.
-Communication within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid
-from the CP to artillery and mortar positions as well as company and
-platoon CPs. Radio communication was established with the regiment and
-the division but due to the terrain remained irregular at best.
-
-First Lieutenant Leroy M. Duffy and his engineers were assigned the
-task of constructing on OY strip on the east side of the perimeter
-which was completed on 2 November. A parallel cliff made it necessary
-to land planes at a dangerous angle, but no better site could be had
-in this steep-sided valley.
-
-[Illustration: MAJON-NI PERIMETER
-
-All roadblocks manned by Weapons Co. Perimeter between A and B manned
-by H&S Co, 3/1 and Btry D, 2/11, 28 Oct-4 Nov 50, by Able Co., 1/1, 5–7
-Nov; and by H&S Co., 3/1, and Btry D, 2/11, 8–9 Nov. Perimeter between
-C and D manned by 3d Bn, KMC Regt, 10–14 Nov 50.
-
-  MAP-6
-]
-
-Topography also limited Captain Andrew J. Strohmenger’s cannoneers,
-who were almost literally “firing out of a barrel.” Close-in support
-was out of the question in the bowl-like valley ringed with peaks, but
-the six howitzers were emplaced so that they could be swung to fire on
-any avenue of approach, especially toward the three roads leading into
-Majon-ni.[164]
-
-    [164] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger,
-          ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep 55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n.
-          t. 2 Nov 50.
-
-No difficulty was found in deciding on a water point, for tests
-established the purity of the water from both branches of the Imjin
-flowing through the perimeter. Lieutenant Duffy explained that he added
-chlorine only because the Marines were accustomed to the flavor.
-
-
-_Political Aspects of Mission_
-
-The Marine mission had its political as well as military side. Major
-Edwin H. Simmons, CO of Weapons Company, was given the responsibility
-for defending the three road blocks of the perimeter with Weapons
-Company personnel. At each of them he stationed a heavy machine gun
-section and a 3.5″ rocket launcher section. These barriers were also
-ports of entry where all Korean transients were searched for weapons.
-When a group of 20 to 30 accumulated, they were escorted under guard to
-the prison stockade, just across the road from the battalion CP.[165]
-
-    [165] This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4
-          Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56.
-
-There they were “processed” by the Civil Affairs Section, consisting of
-12 Marine enlisted men under the command of First Lieutenant Donald M.
-Holmes and Master Sergeant Marian M. Stocks, known facetiously as the
-mayor and sheriff respectively of Majon-ni. Their decisions were based
-largely on the findings of the 181st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
-team and the battalion S-2, Second Lieutenant Frederick W. Hopkins.
-The CIC specialists proved to be indispensable by contributing daily
-intelligence based on civilian as well as POW interrogations.
-
-As might be supposed, the question of whether a transient was an
-escaping NKPA soldier or a harmless peasant might have perplexed
-Solomon himself. But the Marines came up with a simple off-the-cuff
-solution. Time did not permit a lengthy screening, and each Korean
-was given a brief examination with the aid of interpreters. If his
-head was still close-cropped in the NKPA manner, if his neck showed
-a tanned V-line recently left by a uniform, if his feet bore the
-tell-tale callouses left by military footgear--if he could not pass
-these three tests, the transient was sent to the prison stockade as a
-fugitive Red Korean soldier. Now that Chinese Communist troops had been
-encountered both on the X Corps and Eighth Army fronts, it was all the
-more important that battlewise NKPA elements should be prevented from
-joining their new allies if Red China intervened.
-
-Some of the prisoners were admittedly NKPA veterans, weary of the war
-and ready to give up voluntarily. Manifestations of this spirit caused
-Lieutenant Colonel Ridge to send a radio request for an air drop of
-surrender leaflets.
-
-The first full day’s operations, on 29 October, resulted in 24
-prisoners being taken. But this was a trickle as compared to the
-torrent which would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was
-maintained during the 17 days of the operations.
-
-
-_Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies_
-
-Each of the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out daily
-motorized or foot patrols while manning, as required, company OPs. The
-three roads were assigned as follows:
-
-  George Company (Captain Carl L. Sitter), the road to Wonsan;
-  How Company (Captain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.) the road to Seoul;
-  Item Company (First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher), the road to
-    Pyongyang.[166]
-
-    [166] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 4.
-
-All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days.
-Nevertheless, a system of artillery and 81mm mortar harassing and
-interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was put into
-effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms Coordinator
-(SAC), and OYs were used for artillery spotting and to call air strikes
-when planes were on station.[167]
-
-    [167] _Ibid._, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.
-
-The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity for
-maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would
-permit. Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times,
-and the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council along with
-such laws or customs as did not conflict with the Marine mission.[168]
-A policy of justice and fairness had its reward when the inhabitants
-warned the CIC team of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops.
-
-    [168] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51.
-
-POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy
-unit as the 15th NKPA Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th
-regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Chol. Following the NKPA
-collapse, the division had been able to maintain its organization
-while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and raiding the
-villages for food. The mission was reported to be the occupation and
-control of the upper Imjin valley as a base for guerrilla operations,
-with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of the main
-objectives.[169]
-
-    [169] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 8; 1st MarDiv _PIRs 21_ and
-          _22_.
-
-Enemy numbers were said to reach a total of 11,000. But that figure,
-like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the
-traditional grain of salt.
-
-At any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on the morning of
-2 November that they were opposed by a resolute enemy skilled at
-guerrilla tactics. Second Lieutenant Harvey A. Goss’ platoon of How
-Company, reinforced with 81mm mortars, light machine guns, an artillery
-forward observer (FO) team and a FAC, was ambushed in a deep gorge
-five miles south of Majon-ni while conducting a motorized patrol. The
-Marines, raked by rifle and automatic small-arms fire from an unseen
-enemy hidden along the heights on both sides, got off only the message,
-“We’ve been hit, send help, send help” before the radio was hit.[170]
-
-    [170] The account of the How Company ambush is derived from:
-          3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 3/1
-          memo: “Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600,” 2 Nov
-          50; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 8_, 3; 2/11 _SAR_, 16; Simmons
-          interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan 56; Capt R. A. Doyle
-          Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d.
-
-Effective deployment in the narrow road was prevented by stalled
-vehicles. Casualties were mounting when Second Lieutenant Kenneth A.
-Bott and PFC Donald O. Hoffstetter ran the gauntlet of fire in a jeep.
-They reached Majon-ni unhurt although one tire of the jeep had been
-shot.
-
-The 3/1 CP was delayed in summoning air because of the difficulties
-in radio transmission.[171] This break in communications alarmed
-Major Simmons, acting as SAC. He persuaded the pilot of an OY to fly
-him over the scene of the ambush. From his point of vantage Simmons
-had a good view of the deployment of Captain Corley’s remaining two
-rifle platoons, riding artillery trucks and reinforced with heavy
-machine guns and 81mm mortars, which had been sent out from Majon-ni
-to extricate the patrol. The 81mm mortars were set up just off the
-road and began pounding the North Korean cliffside positions. PFC Jack
-Golden, a one-man task force, climbed with a 94-pound heavy machine
-gun to a height where he could fire down on the Communists. Marine
-Corsairs came on station, somewhat tardily because of the poor radio
-communication, and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the hills.
-
-    [171] As a result of this experience a radio which could
-          contact planes was later requested. 3/1 msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
-
-Lieutenant Robert J. Fleischaker, (MC) USN, the battalion medical
-officer, and his assistants cared for the less critical Marine
-casualties. One man died during the night but most of the others were
-evacuated during the next day in three helicopter flights--much to
-the astonishment of the natives. Fleischaker and his assistants also
-treated Korean civilians on occasion, and the saving of a village boy’s
-life by an emergency appendectomy did much to gain the good will of the
-community.[172]
-
-    [172] LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle
-          Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker Comments, n. d.
-
-
-_Air Drop of Supplies Requested_
-
-Radio communication between Majon-ni and Wonsan was so uncertain,
-because of the intervening hill mass, that it was possible to
-get through for only a few hours at night. The surest means of
-communication was a written message carried by helicopter or OY pilots,
-who had to insure delivery to regiment after landing at the Wonsan
-airfield.[173]
-
-    [173] Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments.
-
-The supply problem had already begun to pinch before the first week
-ended. A convoy came through from Wonsan without molestation on 29
-October, but it was the last for a week. On 1 November, just to play
-safe, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge requested a practice air drop which went
-off satisfactorily. His judgment was upheld on the morning of the How
-Company ambush when a 3/1 supply convoy was attacked seven miles west
-of Wonsan (see Map 5) and forced to turn back.
-
-First Lieutenant James D. Beeler commanded the George Company rifle
-platoon escorting the column of supply vehicles which was under the
-charge of Second Lieutenant James L. Crutchfield of H&S Company. The
-third truck in line, loaded with diesel fuel and C-3 composition,[174]
-burst into flames after running into a hail of enemy rifle and
-automatic weapons bullets. Meanwhile the first two trucks continued
-until they came to a roadblock created by blowing a crater. Turning
-around under intense fire, they got back to the point of original
-ambush just as the other vehicles were trying to reverse direction; and
-in the confusion two trucks went off the narrow road, making a total of
-three lost.
-
-    [174] C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used
-          chiefly by military engineers for demolitions work.
-
-A flight of three VMF-312 Corsairs led by Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank
-Cole dispersed an enemy force estimated at 200 to 300 men. The convoy
-was extricated and brought back to Wonsan after the 1st Marines sent
-out a task force consisting of four tanks, a tank dozer and six trucks
-filled with infantry. Personnel losses in the ambush were nine men
-killed and 15 wounded.[175]
-
-    [175] S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to
-          G-3 1stMarDiv, 1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 _SAR_, 8–9; 1stTkBn
-          _SAR_, 11; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 2–3; 1stLt J. L.
-          Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56.
-
-Ridge now had to call for an air drop in earnest. Gasoline, rations,
-grenades and artillery, mortar and machine gun ammunition to a total of
-more than 21 tons were packaged at the Wonsan airfield on 2 November
-by Captain Hersel D. C. Blasingame’s 1st Air Delivery Platoon. Four
-hours after the receipt of the message, the Air Force C-47s released
-152 parachutes over the Majon-ni perimeter. This was one of the 141
-replenishment missions of the Air Delivery Platoon in November,
-amounting to 864 man-hours of flying time and 377 tons of supplies
-dropped.[176]
-
-    [176] 1stAirDelPlat, _HD_, _Nov 50_; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_,
-          3.
-
-Less than the usual amount of breakage resulted, but Colonel Puller
-considered it so necessary to push a truck convoy through to
-Majon-ni that he assigned a rifle company as guards. This mission
-fell to Captain Barrow’s Able Company, reinforced by one platoon of
-Captain Lester G. Harmon’s Company C engineers, Technical Sergeant
-Shelly Wiggins’ section of 81mm mortars, and Second Lieutenant
-Harold L. Coffman’s section of 75mm recoilless rifles. Thirty-four
-supply vehicles were in the column which left Wonsan at 1430 on 4
-November.[177]
-
-    [177] The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj
-          R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct 55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3,
-          1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2010 5
-          Nov 50; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _8_, 3–4.
-
-The late hour of departure was a handicap; and though an OY flew
-reconnaissance, the convoy had no FAC. A TACP jeep well back in the
-column could communicate with the OY, which relayed the message to the
-two VMF-312 Corsairs on station.
-
-Barrow reasoned that because so many of the enemy roadblocks required
-engineer equipment, it would be advisable for Harmon’s vehicles to
-lead, followed by First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s infantry
-platoon. This scheme promised well when four undefended crater
-roadblocks were encountered and speedily filled in by the engineers.
-The fifth, however, was the scene of an ambush by Red Koreans occupying
-the steep heights on both sides of the narrow, winding road.
-
-The engineers soon had a hot fire fight on their hands. Taking cover
-behind the vehicles, they gave a good account of themselves. But the
-stalled trucks delayed the infantry platoon coming to their aid;
-and lack of a FAC resulted in less effective close air support than
-the Corsairs usually rendered. Thus, with the early November dusk
-approaching, Captain Barrow decided on a return to Wonsan.
-
-By a near-miracle the trucks turned about safely on the narrow shelf
-that passed for a road. As the enemy long-range fire increased, Barrow
-ordered lights out when the column commenced its eight-mile return
-trip. In the darkness a truck loaded with 20 Marines missed a hairpin
-turn and plunged over the edge. Fortunately, the accident happened at
-one of the few spots where the vehicle could land on a wooded shoulder
-instead of hurtling through space to the rocky valley floor several
-hundred feet below. It was found that nothing worse than broken bones
-and concussion had resulted after a human chain brought the injured men
-back up to the road.
-
-Lights were turned on and the convoy got back without further trouble.
-Barrow reported to his regimental commander at Togwon that his losses
-amounted to eight men wounded and 16 injured in addition to five
-vehicles destroyed.
-
-Colonel Puller assured him that his failure had been due to an
-unavoidably late start and lack of a FAC rather than faulty judgment.
-
-The following morning, after departing Wonsan at 0830, the air
-controller was not needed. Barrow had put into effect a new tactical
-plan based on the premise that the guerrillas of Ambush Alley would be
-waiting as usual for the sound of approaching trucks. He prepared a
-surprise, therefore, by directing his infantry platoons to take turns
-at leading the column on foot, keeping a thousand yards or more in
-advance of the vehicles.
-
-The scheme worked to perfection as Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones’
-platoon rounded a bend near the scene of yesterday’s ambush and
-surprised about 70 guerrillas as they were eating. The ambushers had
-in effect been ambushed. The Marines opened up with everything they
-had, and only a few of the Reds escaped with their lives. There was
-no further trouble after the convoy got under way again, arriving
-at Majon-ni early in the afternoon of 5 November without a single
-casualty. Losses of 51 killed and three prisoners were inflicted on the
-enemy.
-
-
-_First Attack on Perimeter_
-
-The supplies were no less welcome than the Marines who brought
-them, for the CIC team had warned of an attack on Majon-ni at 0100
-the following night. Colonel Puller placed Able Company under the
-operational control of 3/1 for the defense, and the commanding officer
-assigned the three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements a
-sector between How and George Companies on the perimeter.
-
-This addition to his strength made it possible for Lieutenant
-Colonel Ridge to send out his executive officer, Major Reginald R.
-Myers, in command of a motorized patrol large enough to cope with a
-reported enemy build-up of 2000 to 3000 men about six miles northwest
-of Majon-ni on the Pyongyang road. Intelligence received by Corps
-indicated that this force was assembling in an old mining area, and a
-3/1 reconnaissance in force was ordered.
-
-The Marine task force, consisting of George and Item Companies, plus
-elements of Weapons Company, was supported by artillery from Majon-ni.
-Nothing more formidable was encountered than a few guerrillas firing at
-long-range, but Myers brought back 81 willing prisoners.[178]
-
-    [178] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _9_;
-          Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative of Capt H. L. Coffman, n.
-          d.
-
-That night at 0130, trip flares and exploding booby traps were the
-prelude to the first NKPA probing attacks on the perimeter. The enemy
-was half an hour late, but otherwise the assault developed pretty much
-as the CIC team had predicted, even to the identification of elements
-of the 45th Regiment of the 15th NKPA Division. The assailants showed
-no disposition to close, and the assault turned into a desultory fire
-fight. At 0500, with a fog reducing visibility almost to zero, the
-enemy could be heard but not seen in his assault on the battalion
-OP. This position was located on the How Company front and manned by
-wiremen and artillery and mortar FO teams. When their ammunition ran
-out, these Marines were forced to withdraw; but Captain Thomas E.
-McCarthy, Second Lieutenants Charles Mattox and Charles R. Stiles with
-an assortment of H&S Company personnel recaptured the position the
-moment that the fog lifted. The enemy withdrew into the hills after the
-Corsairs came on station, and the action ended at 0730 with two wounded
-Marines representing the casualty list of 3/1 in the engagement.[179]
-
-    [179] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar
-          _SAR_, 10, 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 5–6; 2/11 _SAR_,
-          17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 25 Jan
-          56; Corley Comments.
-
-Able Company returned to Wonsan that morning with 619 of the prisoners
-who had been accumulating at Majon-ni until the stockade was almost
-overflowing with Korean humanity. Captain Barrow packed the captives
-into open trucks covered with tarpaulins. This precaution was taken
-in order not to advertise the nature of the cargo while passing
-through Ambush Alley, since it might be embarrassing if the guerrillas
-attempted to liberate prisoners who outnumbered their keepers three to
-one.
-
-Simultaneously with the return of Able Company, Colonel Puller ordered
-his 2d Battalion (-) to proceed via the Majon-ni road to Munchon-ni.
-Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s mission was similar to that of Lieutenant
-Colonel Ridge at Majon-ni: to block enemy movement along the trails
-leading north and to screen civilians. The hamlet of Munchon-ni
-squatted near the top of the highest pass along Ambush Alley. Trucks
-could be supplied for only one reinforced rifle company--Easy--which
-departed Wonsan at 0830.
-
-Four miles short of the objective, the motorized column entered a
-horseshoe bend large enough to contain all the vehicles. On the left
-of the road was a sheer drop, and on the right rose cliffs 200 feet in
-height. The last truck had just entered the bend when the first was
-stopped by a landslide roadblock. As the column ground to a halt the
-enemy opened up with rifles and automatic weapons from well camouflaged
-positions in the high ground at the far end of the horseshoe.[180]
-
-    [180] The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from:
-          1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 2/1 _SAR_, 6–7; Col A. Sutter
-          Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d.
-
-The Marines scrambled out of the trucks and returned the fire. But it
-was necessary to attack in order to dislodge the enemy, and during
-the advance Easy Company took a total of 46 casualties--8 KIA and
-38 WIA--in addition to six wounded truck drivers. Five of the seven
-officers were wounded, including the company commander, Captain Charles
-D. Frederick.
-
-It was estimated that the roadblock had been defended by about 200 Red
-Koreans, who left 61 counted dead behind them and probably removed at
-least as many wounded. Fifty cases of 120mm mortar ammunition were
-destroyed by the Marines and 300 cases of small arms cartridges.
-
-At 1615 Sutter and the remainder of the 2/1 force arrived on the scene
-from Wonsan just as Able Company and its prisoners appeared from the
-opposite direction. Helicopters having already evacuated the Easy
-Company’s critical casualties, Able Company brought the lightly wounded
-and prisoners to Wonsan without further enemy interference. Sutters’
-force proceeded to Munchon-ni as originally planned.
-
-
-_KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni_
-
-At Majon-ni an OP manned by two squads of Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s
-2d Platoon of How Company was threatened with encirclement on the 8th
-when a Red Korean force gradually built up to an estimated 250 men
-worked around to the rear. The other two platoons of the company,
-reinforced with heavy machine guns and an Item Company platoon, were
-sent out from the perimeter. Artillery and mortars helped to scatter
-the enemy in confusion with estimated 40 per cent losses. Marine
-casualties were one man killed and ten wounded.[181]
-
-    [181] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50;
-          2/11 _SAR_, 17; Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See
-          also Corley Comments.
-
-On 10 November, reflecting the concern of CO 1st Marines over enemy
-activity in the Majon-ni area, the 3d KMC Battalion arrived as
-reinforcements together with a convoy of supplies. CO 3/1 assigned the
-unit to the sector in the perimeter recently vacated by Able Company of
-1/1.[182]
-
-    [182] 2/1 _SAR_, 7. Ridge, _Notes_.
-
-The celebration of the 175th birthday of the U. S. Marine Corps was not
-neglected at Majon-ni. Somehow the cooks managed to bake a prodigious
-cake, with thinly spread jam serving as frosting, and all hands were
-rotated a few at a time to their company CPs to receive a slice.[183]
-
-    [183] Geer, _The New Breed_, 215.
-
-That afternoon an OY of VMO-6 spotted an estimated 300 enemy
-troops about four miles west of Majon-ni. Under direction of the
-aerial observers, Captain Strohmenger’s howitzers broke up this
-concentration.[184]
-
-    [184] VMO-6 _SAR_, 8; X Corps, _Guerrilla Activities X Corps
-          Zone, Nov 50_, 1; 1stMarDiv _PIR 18_; 2/11 _SAR_, 17.
-
-The CIC team warned that another attack on the perimeter by the 45th
-NKPA Regiment would take place on the night of 11–12 November. As
-a prelude, General Pak made an effort to terrorize inhabitants who
-had kept the team informed of his plans and movements. Some of the
-villagers took his threats seriously enough to prepare for a hurried
-leavetaking, but the Civil Affairs section reassured them and put a
-curfew into effect.[185]
-
-    [185] Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55.
-
-After such a menacing build-up, the second attack on the perimeter
-fizzled out like a damp firecracker. A few probing jabs, beginning at
-0130, were followed by a weak main assault on the KMC front which was
-easily repulsed. The enemy tried again to overrun the OP but gave up
-the attempt after stumbling into a field of “Bouncing Betty” mines.
-At 0600 the last action of the Majon-ni operation came to an end as
-the Communists withdrew. Friendly losses were two men killed and six
-wounded.[186]
-
-    [186] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 6. 1stMarDiv _URpt_ (_S-3_)
-          9. 1stMar _SAR_, 11; 2/11 _SAR_, 17. The “Bouncing Betty”
-          type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring
-          which sent it several feet into the air to explode with
-          maximum destructive effect.
-
-This was the final appearance of the 15th NKPA Division, which
-apparently abandoned Majon-ni as an objective and transferred its
-guerrilla operations southward along the Imjin valley. The relief of
-the Marines and KMCs on position began the next afternoon as elements
-of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U. S. 3d Infantry Division,
-arrived to take over the perimeter.
-
-The Army column, including 34 Marine supply vehicles, had moved out
-from Wonsan at 1030 the day before. Although 2/1 (less Dog Company)
-had maintained its blocking positions at Munchon-ni, the convoy was
-stopped a few miles beyond the Marine outposts by a wrecked bridge and
-three large craters. Guerrillas poured in small-arms fire from the high
-ground which resulted in two soldiers being killed and four wounded.
-Two Marine trucks and a jeep were destroyed.
-
-Extensive repairs to the road being needed, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
-M. Blanchard, the commanding officer of 1/15, formed a defensive
-perimeter for the night. The column reached Majon-ni without further
-incident at 1530 on the 13th.[187]
-
-    [187] Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50;
-          S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO
-          1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMarDiv
-          tel to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv _POR 146_;
-          3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_, 3–4, 6–7; 2/1 _SAR_, 9; 1stMar
-          _SAR_, 11–12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, _3d Infantry
-          Division in Korea_ (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28
-          Feb 56.
-
-Following relief by the Army unit, the Marine battalion departed
-at 1015 on the 14th by truck for the Wonsan area. A total of 1395
-prisoners had been taken during the 17 days of Majon-ni--a large
-proportion of them voluntary--and more than 4000 Korean transients
-screened. Enemy battle casualties were estimated at 525 killed and an
-unknown number wounded.[188]
-
-    [188] 3/1 _SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50_. General Ruffner, Chief of
-          Staff of X Corps, later commented: “Personally, I always
-          had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at
-          Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment
-          and in the second place I always felt that it broke up
-          what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army
-          that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of
-          trouble in our backyard at Wonsan. A lot of determined
-          enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have been
-          most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably
-          slowed down our subsequent movement to the north.” MajGen
-          C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56.
-
-Losses of the Marine battalion numbered 65--16 KIA, 4 DOW and 45 WIA.
-Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, owing to strict enforcement
-of sanitary and health regulations.[189]
-
-    [189] 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_, 7.
-
-The vulnerability of a tenuous MSR must also be taken into account, and
-casualties of nine killed and 81 wounded or injured were incurred by
-Marines escorting supply convoys through Ambush Alley.
-
-
-_Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong_
-
-From the 1st Marines in the Wonsan area to the 7th Marines leading the
-northward advance, a distance of more than 130 road miles separated the
-elements of the 1st Marine Division. But the arrival of more U. S. Army
-units made possible a first step toward concentration.
-
-On 29 October the 17th RCT of the 7th Infantry Division had begun
-landing at Iwon (see Map 2), about 60 air miles northeast of Hungnam.
-Other units and reinforcing elements followed until all had completed
-unloading by 8 November--a total of 28,995 troops, 5924 vehicles, and
-30,016 short tons of cargo.[190]
-
-    [190] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13–14; X Corps _WD_,
-          29 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 35_.
-
-Transports had been sent by CTF-90 on 31 October to Moji, Japan, for
-the first units of the 3d Infantry Division. The 65th RCT landed at
-Wonsan on 5 November, but it was not until the 18th that the last
-elements arrived.[191] All four of the major units of X Corps--the two
-Army divisions as well as the 1st Marine Division and I ROK Corps--were
-then in the zone of operations, even though dispersed over a wide area.
-
-    [191] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; X Corps _WD_,
-          5 Nov 50; X Corps _POR 40_.
-
-The commanding generals of both Army units were “old China hands.”
-Major General Robert H. Soule, CG 3d Infantry Division, had been U. S.
-military attaché in Nationalist China during the last months of the
-civil war. During this same period Major General David G. Barr, CG 7th
-Infantry Division, was senior officer of the United States Military
-Advisory Group in China.[192]
-
-    [192] Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs,
-          Department of State, _United States Relations with
-          China: With Spacial Reference to the Period 1944–1949_
-          (hereafter _U. S. Relations with China_), (Washington,
-          1949), 318, 331.
-
-On 31 October, by order of ComNavFE, JTF-7 had been dissolved and the
-TG 95.2 Support and Covering Group passed to the operational control
-of CTF-90, Admiral Doyle. As the center of gravity of X Corps gradually
-shifted to the north, General Almond moved his advanced CP from Wonsan
-to Hamhung on 2 November and the remainder of his headquarters on the
-10th. He was joined four days later by Admiral Doyle and his staff as
-the _Mount McKinley_ anchored off Hungnam.[193]
-
-    [193] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; ComNavFE msg
-          to NavFE, 0204 30 Oct 50; X Corps _POR 150_; LtGen E. A.
-          Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56.
-
-The 1st Marine Division CP had displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam on 4
-November as the 5th and 7th Marines carried out assignments in the
-north. This movement included 2/5, which had been under the operational
-control of the 1st Marines for patrolling missions in the Wonsan area.
-Not until a week later was General Smith able to plan the northward
-advance of Colonel Puller’s regiment. On the 12th, X Corps OpnO 6
-directed the 3d Infantry Division to relieve elements of the 1st
-Marines. The mission of the Army division was to protect the left flank
-of X Corps and prepare for an advance to the west.[194]
-
-    [194] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50.
-
-For a time it had appeared that 1/1, which had the responsibility for
-security in the Wonsan area after its return from Kojo, might be sent
-to Chongjin, 220 air miles northeast of Wonsan, in accordance with
-X Corps OI-13 of 25 October. This battalion was designated for the
-mission in 1stMarDiv OpnO 10-50, issued on 5 November, but four days
-later X Corps cancelled this requirement.[195]
-
-    [195] 1stMar _OpnO 19-50_, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9
-          Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 459–460. 1/5 had been initially
-          assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1 on
-          its return from Kojo.
-
-Before departing the Wonsan area, Puller’s headquarters had another
-false alarm. Small craft sighted by air on 8 November, and two
-mysterious explosions, led to the report that 500 to 1000 enemy boats
-were attempting an amphibious landing ten miles north of Wonsan.
-An armored patrol of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, was sent to
-investigate but reported no contact.[196]
-
-    [196] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50;
-          1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) 9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 14. Ruffner ltr
-          13 Jan 56.
-
-X Corps directed that upon the relief of the Marines by the 3d Infantry
-Division, the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions, which had been under the
-operational control of RCT-1, would then be attached to the Army
-unit.[197]
-
-    [197] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 12 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 492–493;
-          Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 73; CG
-          1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50.
-
-After lack of transport imposed a delay of two days, 1/1 initiated
-the northward movement of RCT-1 by rail and closed Chigyong, eight
-miles southwest of Hamhung, by 1820, 14 November. A motor convoy
-followed.[198]
-
-    [198] 1stMarDiv _POR_ 145; Smith, _Notes_, 494; 1/1 msg to
-          CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry
-          Division in Korea_, 73.
-
-Relief of 2/1(-), which had been holding screening and blocking
-positions on Ambush Alley, was completed on the 15th by the 3d
-Battalion of the 15th Infantry. Other Army elements relieved Dog
-Company in the rear area near Wonsan. On the 16th 2/1 moved by rail
-to Chigyong, followed by 3/1 and the last elements of RCT-1 the next
-day.[199]
-
-    [199] 2/1 _SAR_, 9–10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15
-          Nov 50; 3/1 _SAR_ 7 _Oct-25 Nov 50_; 1stMar _SAR_, 12;
-          1stMarDiv _POR 154_; Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in
-          Korea_, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56.
-
-Thus the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative and temporary degree
-of concentration. The farthest distance between components had been
-reduced from 130 to less than 60 miles by the middle of November, but a
-new dispersion of units was already in progress.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER V
-
-Red China to the Rescue
-
-_Chinese in X Corps Zone--Introducing the New Enemy--Communist
-Victory in Civil War--Organization of the CCF--The Chinese Peasant
-as a Soldier--CCF Arms and Equipment--Red China’s “Hate America”
-Campaign--CCF Strategy and Tactics_
-
-
-Up to this time the 1st Marine Division had virtually been waging two
-separate wars. In the southern zone, as was related in the last two
-chapters, blocking and screening operations were conducted by RCT-1
-against NKPA remnants. RCT-7, with RCT-5 in reserve, had meanwhile been
-confronted in the north by some of the first Chinese Communist troops
-to enter the Korean conflict.
-
-In order to trace the movements of these two Marine regiments, it will
-be necessary to go back over chronological ground previously covered.
-Division OpnO 18-50, issued on 28 October to implement X Corps OI-13
-and supplementary telephone orders received from Corps, assigned RCT-7
-the mission of proceeding from Wonsan to Hamhung, prepared for an
-advance to the Manchurian border 135 miles to the north. RCT-5 was
-assigned a zone behind RCT-7 (see end-paper maps).
-
-Plans for the northward advance brought up the vital problem of
-providing security for the 78-mile main supply route (MSR) and the
-parallel railway stretching along the coast from Wonsan to Hamhung.
-Division orders of the 28th assigned RCT-5 (less 2/5), temporarily
-under the operational control of RCT-1, the responsibility for the
-security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas, 16 and 57 miles north of
-Wonsan respectively. Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, attached to RCT-5,
-had orders to establish blocking positions on three main roads joining
-the MSR from the west.[200]
-
-    [200] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50; Smith, _Notes_,
-          463–464.
-
-RCT-7, after being partially issued cold weather clothing at Wonsan,
-moved by road and rail to the Hamhung area during the last three
-days of October. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion and Division
-Reconnaissance Company were attached along with other reinforcing
-units, since this regiment had been designated to lead the advance of
-the 1st Marine Division to the Manchurian border.[201]
-
-    [201] 7thMar _SAR_, 12; CO 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t.,
-          28 Oct 50; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0850 1 Nov 50;
-          1stMarDiv _OpnO 18-50_, 28 Oct 50. See the detailed
-          account of the move in Col R. G. Davis Comments, 7
-          May 56. RCT-7 did not receive all of its cold weather
-          clothing until after it reached Koto-ri. MajGen H.
-          L. Litzenberg Comments, 18 Jul 56; LtCol M. E. Roach
-          Comments, 17 May 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep
-          56.
-
-RCT-5 completed a motor march meanwhile from its assembly area near
-Wonsan to assigned positions along the Wonsan-Hamhung MSR. General
-Almond’s OI-15 (30 October) had directed the dispatch of two Marine
-RCTs to the Hamhung area, which meant that Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s
-regiment was to follow RCT-7. On the 31st General Smith ordered him
-to advance a battalion to Chigyong, eight miles southwest of Hamhung.
-Murray selected his 1st Battalion and directed that one of its
-companies be detached to relieve an RCT-7 company guarding the Advance
-Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, five miles southwest of Hungnam.[202]
-
-    [202] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2118 31 Oct 50; CO 5thMar
-          msg to CO 1/5, 1013 1 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 463–464;
-          5thMar _SAR_, 8–9; 5thMar _URpt 2_; 1/5 _SAR_, 5; 3/5
-          _SAR_, 5; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.
-
-Two additional Marine units were assigned to assembly areas along
-the MSR. The 1st Tank Battalion (less Company C, attached to the 1st
-Marines) moved up to Munchon and regained its Company A. Since the
-landing of the 11th Marines (less the battalions attached to RCTs) the
-artillery regiment (-) had occupied positions at Munpyong-ni, five
-miles northwest of Wonsan.[203]
-
-    [203] 1stMarDiv msg to 1stTkBn, 1750 31 Oct 50; 1stTkBn _SAR_,
-          11. The move was made 1 Nov. 11thMar _URpt 2–28 Oct 50_.
-
-When four days passed without enemy contacts along the MSR, General
-Almond decided to expedite the movement of RCT-5 to the Hamhung
-area. In a conference with General Smith on 2 November, he outlined
-a plan for using patrols instead of blocking positions. Under this
-system RCT-1, with elements of the 1st Tank Battalion, would be made
-responsible for MSR security as far north as Munchon. The 54-mile
-stretch between Munchon and Chigyong would be assigned to the Special
-Operations Company, USA, and Korean agents, both under Corps control.
-As soon as these arrangements could be put into effect, RCT-5 would
-be free to advance to Hamhung. That same day, 2 November, the 2d
-Battalion was released from operational control of RCT-1 and moved to
-Hamhung.[204]
-
-    [204] CG’s Diary in X Corps _WD_, 2 Nov 50. Smith, _Notes_,
-          463–464. The Special Operations Company was a
-          commando-type U. S. Army organization, generally employed
-          in such operations as raids and reconnaissance. The
-          strength, weapons, and organization depended on the
-          mission.
-
-Ironically, the 2d was also the date of the first guerrilla raid on the
-MSR. A patrol from the 1st Tank Battalion was sent by Division to the
-aid of the Special Operations Company, which had reported an attack
-west of Munchon resulting in a wound casualty and loss of equipment.
-The Marines drove the guerrillas back into the hills.[205]
-
-    [205] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1300 2 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv
-          _PIR_ 9.
-
-
-_Chinese in X Corps Zone_
-
-Red Korean guerrilla activities were overshadowed by confirmation of
-reports that organized CCF units had appeared in the X Corps zone
-as well as on the Eighth Army front. After crossing the Yalu, they
-had secretly infiltrated through the mountains, marching by night
-and hiding by day from air observation. Their numbers and intentions
-remained a mystery at this date, but late in October the 8th U. S.
-Cavalry Regiment and the 6th ROK Division were surprised by Chinese in
-northwest Korea and badly mauled.[206]
-
-    [206] EUSAK _WDs_ 29 Oct-1 Nov 50.
-
-First-hand evidence of CCF penetrations in northeast Korea was obtained
-by three Marine officers of RCT-7. Shortly after arrival in the Hamhung
-area, the regimental commander sent out reconnoitering parties in
-preparation for the northward advance of 1 November. The 1/7 patrol on
-31 October consisted of a fire team in three jeeps led by Captain Myron
-E. Wilcox and First Lieutenants William G. Graeber and John B. Wilson.
-As a result of their visit to the CP of the 26th ROK Regiment of the
-3d ROK Division, which RCT-7 was scheduled to relieve near Sudong (see
-Map 7) on 2 November, the Marine officers reported to their regimental
-headquarters that they had seen one Chinese prisoner.[207]
-
-    [207] Maj J. B. Wilson and Capt W. G. Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
-
-As a matter of fact, the ROK regiment took 16 Chinese prisoners in all.
-They were identified as belonging to two regiments of the 124th CCF
-Division, one of the three divisions of the 42d CCF Army. This force
-had crossed the Yalu about 16 October, according to POW testimony, and
-moved southward without being observed into the Chosin Reservoir area
-during the following ten days.[208]
-
-    [208] Smith, _Notes_, 534; 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 4; 1stMarDiv _SAR_,
-          30. These prisoners were later interrogated by Gen Almond
-          himself and formed the basis of the first official report
-          of Chinese intervention. Almond Comments, 21 Jun 56;
-          FECOM msg C67881, 31 Oct 50.
-
-Not only was Colonel Litzenberg aware that he would be facing Chinese
-adversaries in this area; he also suspected that they had infiltrated
-toward his left rear. He sent a patrol consisting of 20 men and five
-jeeps of Recon Company as far as Chigyong on the 31st without making
-any enemy contacts. The following morning CO RCT-7 ordered Recon
-Company in 21 jeeps to conduct a reconnaissance to the Huksu-ri area,
-approximately 45 miles northwest of Hamhung. After bypassing a blown
-bridge, First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman’s force dug in for the night
-4500 yards short of its objective. Shots were exchanged several times
-that night and early the following morning with North Korean guerrillas
-in company strength, but the patrol returned with a negative report as
-far as Chinese forces were concerned.[209]
-
-    [209] Maj R. B. Crossman, Capt C. R. Puckett, and Capt D. W.
-          Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; HqBn, 1stMarDiv (hereafter
-          HqBn) _URpt 8_ (_Supplementary_), 2. Maj Webb D. Sawyer,
-          CO 2/7 and Maj James F. Lawrence also made helicopter
-          reconnaissances of the same ground looking for possible
-          flanking routes to Koto-ri. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.
-
-News was received on 1 November of the heavy losses taken by the 1st
-Cavalry Division at the hands of the Chinese in northwest Korea. There
-was no change, however, in Corps orders calling for the advance of
-Litzenberg’s regiment to the border. Koto-ri, 23 road miles north of
-Majon-dong, was the first objective. The right flank of the Eighth Army
-was about 60 air miles southwest of Majon-dong, so that RCT-7 must
-advance without protection for its left flank except for Division Recon
-Company, which was to be relieved as soon as possible by RCT-1.
-
-“Under these circumstances,” commented General Smith at a later date,
-“there was no alternative except to continue forward in the hope that
-the Eighth Army situation would right itself and that we would succeed
-in our efforts to close up the entire 1st Marine Division behind
-RCT-7.”[210]
-
-    [210] Smith, _Notes_, 523–524. See also: Smith, _Chronicle_, 70.
-
-
-_Introducing the New Enemy_
-
-Here it is hardly a digression to pause for a brief survey of the
-organization, tactics and aims of the new enemy who was about to
-prolong the Korean conflict by intervening on behalf of the beaten
-NKPA. The powerful, ever-ready military instrument which the Chinese
-Reds knew as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been forged and
-tempered in the fires of civil strife. It came into being in the late
-summer of 1927 during the abortive Nanchang rebellion. Following their
-defeat, the Communists found a refuge in Kiangsi Province of south
-China and gained strength as disaffected Kuomintang units came over to
-their side.[211]
-
-    [211] Richard L. Walker, _China under Communism_ (New Haven,
-          1954), 111–112; Order of Battle Branch, Office of the
-          AC/S G-2, HQ Eighth United States Army (Fwd), _CCF Army
-          Histories_ (hereafter _CCF Army Histories_), 1.
-
-The infant PLA managed with difficulty to survive the first four
-“bandit suppression campaigns” waged by Chiang Kai-shek. When he
-launched his fifth in 1933, the Chinese Reds planned the celebrated
-“Long March” which has become one of their most cherished traditions.
-Breaking out of Chiang’s encirclement in October, 1934, they took a
-circuitous, 6000-mile route to avoid Nationalist armies. Of the 90,000
-who started, only 20,000 were left a year later when the PLA reached
-Yenan in Shensi Province.[212]
-
-    [212] _U. S. Relations with China_, 43–44, 207, 323.
-
-This destination in northwest China gave the Communists a refuge with
-Mongolia and Soviet Russia at their backs. There Mao Tse-tung and his
-colleagues alternately fought and negotiated with the Government.
-Finally, in 1941, the Communists and Nationalists agreed to cease
-fighting one another in order to make common cause against the Japanese
-invaders.
-
-The Communists took advantage of their membership in the People’s
-Political Council--a Nationalist-sponsored organization which
-theoretically united all factions in China against the Japanese--to
-continue their “boring-from-within” tactics. Chiang’s estimate of his
-troublesome allies was summed up in a quotation attributed to him in
-1941:
-
-  You think it is important that I have kept the Japanese from
-  expanding.... I tell you it is more important that I have kept the
-  Communists from spreading. The Japanese are a disease of the skin;
-  the Communists are a disease of the heart.[213]
-
-    [213] Quoted in George Moorad, _Lost Peace in China_ (New York,
-          1949), 33.
-
-
-_Communist Victory in Civil War_
-
-In late 1945, with the Japanese no longer a menace, the grapple for
-mastery began anew. Chiang Kai-shek held the material and moral
-advantage as a result of the arms and other assistance supplied by the
-United States.
-
-The Nationalists controlled all the important centers of population
-and industry and the major lines of communication. The Communists,
-with their backs to the wall, eagerly accepted the United States
-proposal for a cease fire in January 1946. General George C. Marshall,
-as personal representative of President Truman, flew out to Nanking
-in December, 1945, and tried for 12 months to arrange a workable
-compromise between two irreconcilable ideologies. Meanwhile, the Reds
-retrained and reequipped their forces with the vast supply of weapons
-which had fallen into their hands as a result of the collapse of the
-Japanese Army in Manchuria in August, 1945. By the spring of 1947, they
-were ready again for war. They denounced the truce and recommenced
-military operations. From that time the balance of power swung steadily
-in their favor.[214]
-
-    [214] _U. S. Relations with China_, 352–363.
-
-Although the PLA had seized the initiative, the Government still
-had an army of about 2,700,000 men facing 1,150,000 Reds, according
-to estimates of American military advisers in China. But Chiang
-was committed to a positional warfare; his forces were dangerously
-over-extended, and for reasons of prestige and political considerations
-he hesitated to withdraw from areas of dubious military value. Mao’s
-hard and realistic strategy took full advantage of these lapses. As a
-result the Communists won the upper hand in Manchuria and Shantung and
-by the end of the year had massed large forces in central China.
-
-Early in 1948, the year of decision, the PLA recaptured Yenan along
-with thousands of Government troops. But the most crushing Communist
-victory of all came with the surrender of Tsinan, the capital of
-Shantung, and its garrison of 85,000 to 100,000 Nationalists.
-
-In his summary of Nationalist reverses, Major General David G. Barr,
-senior officer of the United States Military Advisory Group in China,
-reported to the Department of the Army on 16 November 1948:
-
-  No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition
-  and equipment. Their [the Chinese Nationalists’] military debacles
-  in my opinion can all be attributed to the world’s worst
-  leadership and many other morale destroying factors that lead to a
-  complete loss of will to fight.[215]
-
-    [215] _U. S. Relations with China_, 358.
-
-By the early spring of 1949 the military collapse of the Nationalists
-had gone so far that the enemy controlled the major centers of
-population and the railroads from Manchuria south to the Yangtze
-Valley. Nanking, Hangkow, and Shanghai were soon to fall into the hands
-of Communists whose military strength increased every day as they
-captured Nationalist arms and were joined by Nationalist deserters.
-Perhaps the best summary of the Chinese Civil War was put in a few
-words by Dean Acheson, the U. S. Secretary of State:
-
-  The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they
-  disintegrated.[216]
-
-    [216] _Ibid._, xiv-xv.
-
-In addition to the aid extended during World War II, Washington had
-authorized grants and credits to Nationalist China amounting to two
-billion dollars since V-J Day. Nor was American assistance confined
-to arms and monetary grants. From 1945–1947 the occupation of certain
-key cities in North China, e. g., Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao[217]
-etc., by sizeable U. S. Marine forces held those bases secure for the
-Nationalist government and permitted the release of appreciable numbers
-of Chiang’s soldiers for offensive operations, who would otherwise have
-been tied up in garrison type duty.[218]
-
-    [217] Marines remained in Tsingtao until early 1949.
-
-    [218] The first blows between the Marine and the Chinese
-          Communists took place not in Korea, but along the
-          Peiping-Tientsin highway as early as October, 1945.
-
-The Marines, upon their withdrawal, were directed to turn over vast
-stores of weapons and munitions to the Chinese Nationalists. In
-addition, the Nationalists were “sold” large quantities of military and
-civilian war surplus property, with a total procurement cost of more
-than a billion dollars, for a bargain price of 232 million.[219]
-
-    [219] _U. S. Relations with China_, xiv-xv.
-
-
-_Organization of the CCF_
-
-Although the victorious army continued to be called the People’s
-Liberation Army by the Chinese Reds themselves, it was known as the
-Chinese Communist Forces by commentators of Western nations. At the
-head of the new police state were the 72 regular and alternate members
-of the Central Committee, or Politburo. Formed at the Seventh Party
-Congress in 1945, this body consisted for the most part of Mao’s close
-associates--leaders identified with the revolutionary movement from the
-beginning.
-
-From top to bottom of the Chinese state, the usual Communist dualism
-of high political and military rank prevailed. The highest governing
-body, the People’s Revolutionary Military Council, consisted of leaders
-holding both positions. After they determined policies, the execution
-was left to the General Headquarters of the army.[220]
-
-    [220] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on
-          the following sources: GHQ, FECOM, _Order of Battle
-          Information, Chinese Third Field Army_ (1 Mar 51) and
-          _Chinese Fourth Field Army_ (7 Nov 50); 164-MISDI,
-          ADVATIS, and ADVATIS FWD rpts in EUSAK _WDs_, _passim_;
-          X Corps _PIRs_; 1stMarDiv _PIRs_; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 30;
-          G-2 _SAR_, 16–18; Far East Command, Allied Translator
-          and Interpreter Service (ATIS), _Enemy Documents, Korean
-          Operations_, _passim_; Fleet Marine Force Pacific
-          (FMFPac), _Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea_,
-          5–11; Maj R. C. W. Thomas, “The Chinese Communist Forces
-          in Korea,” _The Army Quarterly_, Oct 52 (digested
-          in _Military Review_, xxxii, no. 11 (Feb 53), 87);
-          LtCol Robert F. Rigg, _Red China’s Fighting Hordes_
-          (Harrisburg, 1951); Walker: _China Under Communism_.
-
-This organization comprised a general staff section, a rear Services
-section and a general political bureau. Largest CCF administrative unit
-was the field army, which reported directly to Headquarters. Composed
-of two or more army groups, the field army had a small headquarters of
-its own.
-
-The army group, as the largest unit encountered by UN forces, was
-comparable to an army in the American military system. CCF army groups
-in Korea consisted of two to four armies with an average total strength
-of 60,000–120,000 troops. Equivalent to an American corps was the
-CCF army, an organization including three infantry divisions and an
-artillery regiment. Thus the average strength of a CCF army was about
-30,000 men.
-
-The CCF infantry division, with a paper strength of 10,000 men,
-averaged from 7,000 to 8,500 men in Korea, according to various
-estimates. Triangular in organization, it included three infantry
-regiments and an artillery battalion.
-
-Divisional units consisted of reconnaissance and engineer companies of
-about 100 men, a 150-man transport company, a 100-man guard company,
-and a 60-man communications company. Transport companies had only draft
-animals and carts, since little motor transport was organic to a CCF
-division at that time.
-
-The CCF infantry regiment, averaging about 2,200 men in the field,
-broke down into the following units: three infantry battalions; an
-artillery battery of four to six guns; a mortar and bazooka company; a
-guard company; a transportation company; a medical unit with attached
-stretcher personnel (often composed of impressed civilians) and a
-combined reconnaissance and signal company.
-
-The CCF infantry battalion, with an authorized strength of 852 men
-and an actual strength of perhaps 700, consisted of a mortar and
-machine gun or heavy weapons company, a signal squad, a medical squad
-and a small battalion headquarters in addition to the three rifle
-companies of about 170 men each. Each of the latter was composed of a
-headquarters platoon, a 60mm mortar platoon and three rifle platoons.
-
-The CCF artillery battalion, organic to every division, must be
-considered theoretical rather than actual as far as Korean operations
-of 1950 are concerned. As a rule, only a few horse-drawn or pack
-howitzers were brought into action by an infantry division depending
-chiefly on mortars.
-
-
-_The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier_
-
-Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the CCF, from the viewpoint
-of a Western observer, was the lack of any official provision for the
-honorable discharge of a soldier. Once he became a cog in the CCF
-military machine, a man remained in the ranks until he was killed,
-captured, became a deserter, or was incapacitated for active service by
-reason of wounds, disease or old age.
-
-Theoretically depending on a “volunteer” system, the recruiting
-officers of the CCF knew how to apply political or economic pressure
-so that a man found it prudent to become a soldier. After putting on
-a uniform, he was vigorously indoctrinated in political as well as
-military subjects.
-
-Both self-criticism and criticism of comrades were encouraged at
-platoon meetings held for that purpose. Every recruit was subjected
-to a course of psychological mass coercion known to the Chinese as
-_hsi-nao_ and to the non-Communist world as “brain-washing.” Spying on
-comrades and reporting political or military deviations was a soldier’s
-duty.[221]
-
-    [221] Walker, _China under Communism_, 51–76.
-
-Inured to hardships from birth, the peasant in the ranks did not find
-that the military service demanded many unwonted privations. He was
-used to cold and hunger, and he could make long daily marches on a diet
-which the American soldier would have regarded as both insufficient
-and monotonous. It would appear, however, that some of the Western
-legends about Oriental stoicism and contempt for death were a little
-far-fetched. At any rate, the CCF had to deal with the problem of
-straggling from the battlefield; and U. S. Marines in Korea could
-attest that on occasion the Chinese soldier showed evidences of fear
-and low morale. Nor was he as much of a fanatic as might have been
-expected, considering the extent of his political indoctrination.
-
-Although the CCF departed in most respects from the Chinese military
-past, the policy of organizing units along ethnic lines was retained.
-Men from the same village were formed into a company; companies
-from the same area into battalions; and battalions from the same
-province into regiments or divisions. Replacements were drawn from the
-localities where the unit was originally recruited.[222]
-
-    [222] FMFPac, _CCF Tactics_, 9.
-
-On the other hand, the Chinese Reds broke with both Nationalist and
-Communist tradition in their policy of avoiding a permanent rank
-system. Officers (in Korea denoted by red piping on their sleeves) were
-divided into company, field, and general groups. The company commander
-and political officer held about equal authority in an infantry unit,
-and the only NCOs mentioned in CCF field reports are sergeants and
-squad leaders.[223]
-
-    [223] ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK _WD_, 14 Nov 50; G-3 _SAR_,
-          21–22.
-
-
-_CCF Arms and Equipment_
-
-The CCF depended on a wide assortment of weapons, so that it was
-not uncommon to find several different kinds of rifles of varying
-calibers in the same regiment. Japanese arms acquired after the
-surrender of 1945; Russian arms furnished by the Soviets; and American,
-German, Czech, British, and Canadian arms taken from the Chinese
-Nationalists--these were some of the diverse sources. And it is a
-tribute to the adaptability of the Chinese Reds that they managed to
-utilize such military hand-me-downs without disastrous confusion.
-
-Paper work was at a minimum in a force which kept few records and
-numbered a great many illiterates. As for logistics, each soldier
-was given a four-day food supply in the winter of 1950–1951 when he
-crossed the Yalu--usually rice, millet or soy beans carried in his
-pack. Afterwards, food was to be procured locally by extortion or
-confiscation, though the Communists were fond of using such euphemisms
-as “purchase” or “donation” to denote those processes.[224]
-
-    [224] There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops
-          from division stocks. See ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK _WD_, 4
-          Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in _Ibid._, 1 Nov 50. Normal
-          CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be
-          committed to combat for about six days and then withdrawn
-          to replenish its supplies and replace casualties. This
-          procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an
-          attack by the CCF and prevented the maintenance of the
-          momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G. Barr
-          testimony in _MacArthur Hearing_, 2650; Bowser Comments,
-          23 Apr 56.
-
-The CCF soldiers who fought in Korea during the winter of 1950–1951
-wore a two-piece, reversible mustard-yellow and white uniform of
-quilted cotton and a heavy cotton cap with fur-lined ear flaps. Issued
-to the troops just before crossing the Yalu, the quilted cotton blouse
-and trousers were worn over the standard summer uniform and any other
-layers of clothing the soldier may have acquired.
-
-The first CCF units in action had canvas shoes with crepe rubber soles.
-Later arrivals were issued a half-leather shoe or even a full leather
-boot. Chinese footwear was of poor quality and few of the troops wore
-gloves in cold weather. The consequence was a high rate of frostbitten
-hands and feet.[225]
-
-    [225] X Corps msg X 11792; G-2 _SAR_, 21–22; SSgt Robert W.
-          Tallent, “New Enemy,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxxiv, No.
-          2 (Feb 51), 12–15; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 11.
-
-The CCF soldier usually carried a shawl-like blanket in addition to the
-small pack containing his food as well as personal belongings. These
-were few and simple, for it could never be said that the Chinese Reds
-pampered their soldiers.
-
-
-_China’s “Hate America” Campaign_
-
-It was essentially an Asiatic guerrilla army which came to the rescue
-of beaten Red Korea in the autumn of 1950. CCF strategic aims had been
-summed up years before by Mao Tse-tung himself:
-
-  We are against guerilla-ism of the Red Army, yet we must admit its
-  guerrilla character. We are opposed to protracted campaigns and
-  a strategy of quick decision while we believe in a strategy of
-  protracted war and campaigns of quick decision. As we are opposed
-  to fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, we believe in
-  unfixed operational fronts and a war of maneuvers. We are against
-  simply routing the enemy, and believe in a war of annihilation.
-  We are against two-fistism in strategic directions and believe
-  in one-fistism. We are against the institution of a big rear and
-  believe in a small rear. We are against absolute centralized
-  command and believe in a relatively centralized command.[226]
-
-    [226] Mao Tse-tung: _Strategic Problems of Chinese
-          Revolutionary Wars_, Ed by LtCol F. B. Nihart (Quantico,
-          1951), 17–18. Adapted from an English translation
-          published in the _China Digest_, of Hong Kong.
-
-Mao was held in such reverence as a veteran Chinese Communist leader
-that long passages of his writings were committed to memory. His
-strategic ideas, therefore, deserve more than passing consideration.
-In the first place, his concept of war itself differed from that of
-Western nations.
-
-“There are only two kinds of war in history, revolutionary and
-counter-revolutionary,” he wrote. “We support the former and oppose the
-latter. Only a revolutionary war is holy.”[227]
-
-    [227] _Ibid._, 4.
-
-From the Western viewpoint, Mao’s followers had fought four different
-wars in close succession--against the Chinese Nationalists from
-1927 to 1936; against the Japanese from 1937 to 1945; against the
-Nationalists in a second war from 1946 to 1949; and against the
-United Nations, beginning in 1950. But Mao and his colleagues saw
-this period as one prolonged war in which revolutionists were pitted
-against counter-revolutionary adversaries. The fact that the conflict
-had lasted for a generation did not disturb Communist leaders who
-envisioned a continual state of war “to save mankind and China from
-destruction.”
-
-“The greatest and most ruthless counter-revolutionary war is pressing
-on us,” continued Mao. “If we do not hoist the banner of revolutionary
-war, a greater part of the human race will face extinction.”[228]
-
-    [228] _Ibid._
-
-Early in December, 1949, following Red China’s victory over the
-Nationalists, Mao arrived in Moscow for a series of talks with Stalin
-which lasted until 4 March 1950. The decisions reached in these
-conferences are not known, but it was probably no coincidence that
-the Communist puppet state in North Korea violated the world’s peace
-a few months later. It is perhaps also significant that the head
-of the Soviet Military Mission in Tokyo, Lieutenant General Kuzma
-Derevyanko, was absent from Tokyo during the same period and reported
-in Moscow.[229]
-
-    [229] LtGen E. M. Almond Comments, 22 Jun 56.
-
-It was the Year of the Tiger in the Chinese calendar, and a “Resist
-America, Aid Korea” movement was launched in Red China when the United
-States came to the aid of the Republic of Korea. Every dictatorship
-must have some object of mass hatred, and Mao found the United States
-ideal for the purpose. A “Hate America” campaign was inaugurated after
-the CCF intervention, with the following serving as an example of
-anti-American propaganda:
-
-  This [the United States] is the paradise of gangsters, swindlers,
-  rascals, special agents, fascist germs, speculators, debauchers,
-  and all the dregs of mankind. This is the world’s manufactory
-  and source of such crimes as reaction, darkness, cruelty,
-  decadence, corruption, debauchery, oppression of man by man, and
-  cannibalism. This is the exhibition ground of all the crimes which
-  can possibly be committed by mankind. This is a living hell,
-  ten times, one hundred times, one thousand times worse than can
-  possibly be depicted by the most sanguinary of writers. Here the
-  criminal phenomena that issue forth defy the imagination of human
-  brains. Conscientious persons can only wonder how the spiritual
-  civilization of mankind can be depraved to such an extent.[230]
-
-    [230] Excerpt from a series of three articles, “Look, This
-          is the American Way of Life,” used as a primer in the
-          “Hate America” campaign. Quoted in Walker, _China Under
-          Communism_, 13.
-
-Communist doctrine held that the people must be incited by such
-propaganda to a constant high pitch of emotional intensity for the
-sacrifices demanded by total war. The prevalence of illiteracy made
-it necessary to depend largely on street-corner loud speakers blaring
-forth radio harangues. Realistic broadcasts of the torture and
-execution of political deviates were also heard at times, and such
-spectacles were exhibited for the edification of the public.[231]
-
-    [231] _Ibid._
-
-
-_CCF Strategy and Tactics_
-
-CCF strategy was so rudimentary at first that its basic tenets could be
-summed up in a 16-word principle adopted by the Central Committee:
-
-  Enemy advancing, we retreat; enemy entrenched, we harass; enemy
-  exhausted, we attack; enemy retreating, we pursue.[232]
-
-    [232] Mao, _Strategic Problems_, 31.
-
-But as time went on, other principles were added. Mao favored a planned
-defensive-offensive as the only valid strategy against superior enemy
-numbers. He made it plain, however, that any withdrawal was to be
-merely temporary as the preliminary to advancing and striking at the
-first advantageous opportunity. And he reiterated that annihilation of
-the enemy must always be the final goal of strategy.[233]
-
-    [233] _Ibid._
-
-It was in the field of tactics that the essentially guerrilla character
-of the CCF was most fully revealed. Since Communist dialectics
-insisted that there was a correct (Marxist) and an incorrect (“petty
-bourgeois” or “opportunist” or “reactionary”) way of doing everything,
-CCF tactics were reduced to principles whenever possible.
-
-A generation of warfare against material odds had established a pattern
-of attack which proved effective against armies possessing an advantage
-in arms and equipment. One Marine officer has aptly defined a Chinese
-attack as “assembly on the objective.”[234] The coolie in the CCF ranks
-had no superior in the world at making long approach marches by night
-and hiding by day, with as many as fifty men sharing a hut or cave and
-subsisting on a few handfuls of rice apiece. Night attacks were so much
-the rule that any exception came as a surprise. The advancing columns
-took such natural routes as draws or stream beds, deploying as soon as
-they met resistance. Combat groups then peeled off from the tactical
-columns, one at a time, and closed with rifles, submachine guns, and
-grenades.
-
-    [234] Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.
-
-Once engaged and under fire, the attackers hit the ground. Rising at
-any lull, they came on until engaged again; but when fully committed,
-they did not relinquish the attack even when riddled with casualties.
-Other Chinese came forward to take their places, and the build-up
-continued until a penetration was made, usually on the front of one
-or two platoons. After consolidating the ground, the combat troops
-then crept or wriggled forward against the open flank of the next
-platoon position. Each step of the assault was executed with practiced
-stealth and boldness, and the results of several such penetrations on a
-battalion front could be devastating.[235]
-
-    [235] The above description was derived from S. L. A. Marshall,
-          “CCF in the Attack” (EUSAK Staff Memorandum ORO-S-26), 5
-          Jan 51.
-
-The pattern of attack was varied somewhat to suit different occasions.
-As an example of an action in which the CCF used mortars, the following
-is quoted from a Marine field report:
-
-  Five to nine men [CCF] patrols were sent out forward of the main
-  body in an attempt to locate or establish [our] front lines and
-  flanks. After these patrols had withdrawn or been beaten off, white
-  phosphorus mortar shells were dropped about the area in an attempt
-  to inflict casualties. By closely watching the area for movement
-  in removing these casualties, they attempted to establish the
-  location of our front lines. After establishing what they believed
-  were the front lines, white phosphorous shells were dropped in the
-  lines and used as markers. While this was taking place, the assault
-  troops crawled forward to distances as close as possible to the
-  front lines ... [and] attacked at a given signal. The signal in
-  this particular instance was three blasts of a police whistle.
-  The attacking troops then rose and in a perfect skirmish formation
-  rushed the front line.[236]
-
-    [236] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9_. The remainder of the
-          section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: _Ibid._;
-          G-2 _SAR_, 13–45; 1stMar _SAR_, 28–29; 5thMar _SAR_,
-          38–44; EUSAK _Combat Information Bulletin No. 4_; FMFPac,
-          _CCF Tactics_, 1–5.
-
-It might be added that this attack resulted in a CCF penetration on a
-platoon front. Friendly lines were restored only by dawn counterattacks.
-
-The ambush was a favorite resort of Chinese commanders. Whatever the
-form of attack, the object was usually fractionalization of an opposing
-force, so that the segments could be beaten in detail by a local
-superiority in numbers.
-
-CCF attacking forces ranged as a rule from a platoon to a company in
-size, being continually built up as casualties thinned the ranks.
-Reports by newspaper correspondents of “hordes” and “human sea”
-assaults were so unrealistic as to inspire a derisive Marine comment:
-
-“How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?”
-
-After giving CCF tactics due credit for their merits, some serious
-weaknesses were also apparent. The primitive logistical system put such
-restrictions on ammunition supplies, particularly artillery and mortar
-shells, that a Chinese battalion sometimes had to be pulled back to
-wait for replenishments if the first night’s attack failed. At best the
-infantry received little help from supporting arms.[237]
-
-    [237] These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early
-          months of CCF participation in the Korean conflict.
-          Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951--an
-          interlude with the enemy exploited for military
-          purposes--the Chinese gradually built up to an equality
-          with UN forces in mortars and artillery.
-
-POW interrogations revealed that in many instances each soldier was
-issued 80 rounds of small arms ammunition upon crossing the Yalu.
-This was his total supply. The artillery and mortars were so limited
-that they must reserve their fire for the front line while passing
-up lucrative targets in the rear areas. Some attempts were made to
-bring reserve stocks up to forward supply dumps about 30 miles behind
-the front, but not much could be accomplished with animal and human
-transport.
-
-A primitive communications system also accounted for CCF shortcomings.
-The radio net extended only down to the regimental level, and
-telephones only to battalions or occasionally companies. Below the
-battalion, communication depended on runners or such signaling devices
-as bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights.[238]
-
-    [238] 164-MISDI-1232, 1260, 1266, 1274, and 1275 in EUSAK _WD_,
-          19, 26, and 28 Nov and 1 Dec 50; ADVATIS FWD #1. Rpt 0271
-          in EUSAK _WD_ 4 Dec 50; X Corps _PIR 81_, Annex 2; G-2
-          _SAR_, 17–18.
-
-The consequence was a tactical rigidity which at times was fatal.
-Apparently CCF commanding officers had little or no option below the
-battalion level. A battalion once committed to the attack often kept on
-as long as its ammunition lasted, even if events indicated that it was
-beating out its brains against the strongest part of the opposing line.
-The result in many such instances was tactical suicide.
-
-After these defects are taken into full account, however, the Chinese
-soldier and the Korean terrain made a formidable combination.
-Ironically, Americans fighting the first war of the new Atomic Age
-were encountering conditions reminiscent of the border warfare waged
-by their pioneer forefathers against the Indians. These aborigines,
-too, were outweighed in terms of weapons and equipment. But from time
-immemorial the night has always been the ally of the primitive fighter,
-and surprise his best weapon. Thus the Americans in Korea, like their
-ancestors on the Western plains, could never be sure when the darkness
-would erupt into flame as stealthy foes seemed to spring from the very
-earth.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER VI
-
-The Battle of Sudong
-
-_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni--ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines--CCF
-Counterattack at Sudong--Two Marine Battalions Cut Off--End of
-NKPA Tank Regiment--The Fight for How Hill--Disappearance of CCF
-Remnants--Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_
-
-
-The coastal plain of the Songchon estuary is one of the most spacious
-flatlands in all North Korea. Its 100 square miles divide into two
-irrigation districts, which regulate cultivation in a virtual sea of
-rice paddies. The Songchon River, swollen by tributaries in its descent
-from the northern hinterland, nourishes this agricultural complex
-before flowing into the Sea of Japan.
-
-Flanking the mouth of the waterway are the port city of Hungnam to the
-north and the town of Yonpo, with its modern airfield, to the south.
-Eight miles upstream lies Hamhung, an important transportation center
-with a population of approximately 85,000 Koreans and Japanese in 1940.
-
-Hamhung straddles the main railroad connecting Wonsan and Sonjin
-as it follows the coastal route to the border of Soviet Russia. A
-narrow-gauge line (2′ 6″) stems from Hungnam and passes through Hamhung
-before penetrating into the mountainous heart of North Korea. Parallel
-to this railroad is the only highway that could be utilized by the
-transport of the 1st Marine Division for its advance to the north.
-
-
-_The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni_
-
-Soon the eyes of the world would be fixed on maps of the narrow,
-winding 78-mile stretch of dirt and gravel road leading from the
-supply port of Hungnam to the forlorn village of Yudam-ni at the
-western tip of the Chosin Reservoir. Distances in road miles between
-points along the route are as follows:
-
-  Hungnam to Hamhung           8
-  Hamhung to Oro-ri            8
-  Oro-ri to Majon-dong        14
-  Majon-dong to Sudong         7
-  Sudong to Chinhung-ni        6
-  Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri      10
-  Koto-ri to Hagaru           11
-  Hagaru to Yudam-ni          14
-                            ----
-                              78
-
-The first half of the distance--the 43 miles from Hungnam to
-Chinhung-ni--is traversed by a two-lane road passing through
-comparatively level terrain. Rolling country is encountered north of
-Majon-dong, but it is at Chinhung-ni that the road makes its abrupt
-climb into a tumbled region of mile-high peaks. There are few straight
-or level stretches all the rest of the 35 miles to Yudam-ni, but the
-route from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri is the most difficult.
-
-Funchilin Pass, comprising eight of these ten miles, represents an
-ascent of 2500 feet for a straining jeep or truck. The road is merely
-a twisting, one-way shelf, with a cliff on one side and a chasm on the
-other.
-
-About two miles south of Koto-ri the trail reaches a rugged plateau
-region. There it rejoins the railway along the Changjin River, though
-the narrow-gauge line was operative only from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni.
-
-Hagaru, at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, with highways
-branching off on both sides of that body of water, was an important
-communications center before the war. And even though many buildings
-had been flattened by bombing, the town was still impressive as
-compared to such wretched mountain hamlets as Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri.
-
-The road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni climbs from the tableland at the foot
-of the Chosin Reservoir and winds its way up to 4000-foot Toktong Pass.
-Descending through gloomy gorges, it finally reaches a broad valley
-leading to Yudam-ni, where roads branch off to the north, west, and
-south from a western arm of the Reservoir.
-
-This was the 78-mile main supply route that would soon be claiming
-its page in history. In only a few weeks it would be known to thousands
-of Marines as _the_ MSR, as if there never had been another.
-
-[Illustration: THE MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION
-
-November-December 1950
-
-  MAP-7
-]
-
-Officers and NCOs of the 7th Marines, which was fated to be the first
-United States unit to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle, were
-given a verbal preview of the MSR and the part it might play in their
-future. This was as the result of a flight of inspection made by
-Major Henry J. Woessner on 30 October, following a briefing at the X
-Corps CP in Wonsan. The S-3 of the 7th Marines was fortunate enough
-to arrive just in time to hear the briefing given General Barr by
-General Almond. Pointing to the map, the X Corps commander indicated
-that the 7th Infantry Division would push northward to Hyesanjin on
-the Yalu. Meanwhile the Marines were to head for the border by way of
-Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru while the 3d Infantry Division took
-over responsibility for the rear area.
-
-“When we have cleared all this out,” concluded General Almond, pointing
-again to the map, “the ROKs will take over, and we will pull our
-divisions out of Korea.”[239]
-
-    [239] Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance
-          flight are based on LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov
-          56.
-
-At the X Corps CP, Woessner met a U. S. Army liaison officer just
-returned from the 26th ROK Regiment with a report of that unit’s
-encounter with Chinese Communists. The ROKs had been north of Sudong
-when they collided with the new enemy and were pushed back, after
-taking 16 prisoners.
-
-Colonel Edward H. Forney, ranking Marine officer on the X Corps staff,
-arranged for Major Woessner to make a reconnaissance flight over the
-Hamhung-Hagaru route in an Air Force T-6. The S-3 saw no sign of
-enemy troop movements all the way to the northern end of the Chosin
-Reservoir, but he did not fail to note the formidable character of the
-terrain through which the new MSR passed.
-
-When he returned that evening with his report, Colonel Litzenberg
-called a meeting of officers and NCOs at the regimental CP. In an
-informal talk, he told them that they might soon be taking part in the
-opening engagement of World War III.
-
-“We can expect to meet Chinese Communist troops,” he concluded, “and it
-is important that we win the first battle. The results of that action
-will reverberate around the world, and we want to make sure that the
-outcome has an adverse effect in Moscow as well as Peiping.”[240]
-
-    [240] Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov
-          56; Maj M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is
-          from Litzenberg.
-
-
-_ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines_
-
-On 1 November the 7th Marines trucked out of Hamhung to an assembly
-area midway between Oro-ri and Majon-dong. Moving into position behind
-the 26th ROK Regiment without incident, Colonel Litzenberg ordered a
-reconnaissance which took Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st
-Battalion about four miles northward to the South Korean positions
-above Majon-dong. Late that afternoon the regiment secured for the
-night in a tight perimeter.[241]
-
-    [241] 7thMar _SAR_, 5, 7.
-
-Attached to the regiment were the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Major
-Francis F. Parry); Division Reconnaissance Company (First Lieutenant
-Ralph B. Crossman); Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion (Captain Byron
-C. Turner); 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Olin L.
-Beall); Company E, 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Charles
-K. Holloway); and detachments from the 1st Signal Battalion, 1st
-Service Battalion, and Division Military Police Company.[242]
-
-    [242] _Ibid._, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
-
-Intelligence based on the questioning of the 16 prisoners taken by the
-ROKs had revealed that they had been attacked by elements of the 370th
-Regiment of the 124th CCF Division. Along with the 125th and 126th, the
-other two divisions of the 42d CCF Army, the 124th had crossed the Yalu
-during the period 14–20 October. After marching southeast via Kanggye
-and Changjin, the unit deployed for the defense of the Chosin Reservoir
-power complex while the 126th pushed eastward to the Fusen Reservoir
-and the 125th protected the right flank of the 42d CCF Army.[243]
-
-    [243] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
-
-X Corps G-2 officers concluded that these CCF forces were “probably
-flank security” for the enemy’s 4th Army Group across the peninsula in
-the EUSAK zone.[244] The G-2 section of the 1st Marine Division arrived
-at this interpretation:
-
-    [244] X Corps _WD Sum_, _Nov 50_, 24.
-
-  The capture by the 26th ROK Regt. of 16 POWs identified as being
-  members of the 124th CCF Division ... would seem to indicate
-  that the CCF has decided to intervene in the Korean War. It
-  would indicate, also, that this reinforcement is being effected
-  by unit rather than by piecemeal replacement from volunteer
-  cadres. However, until more definite information is obtained it
-  must be presumed that the CCF has not yet decided on full scale
-  intervention.[245]
-
-    [245] 1stMarDiv _PIR_ 6.
-
-Division intelligence officers concluded their analysis with the
-comment, “The advantage to be gained by all-out intervention, at a
-time when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not
-readily apparent.”[246]
-
-    [246] _Ibid._
-
-There was little activity in the valley on 31 October and 1 November.
-The ROKs, upon learning that they would be relieved shortly by the
-7th Marines, withdrew from advance positions near Sudong to a valley
-junction about four miles south of that town. Here, at 0600 on 2
-November, they were hit by an enemy “counterattack” which, since it was
-of about two-platoon strength and of only 30 minutes duration, amounted
-really to a CCF combat patrol action.[247]
-
-    [247] 1stMarDiv _PIRS 7 & 8_; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
-
-Shortly after this clash, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st
-Battalion, 7th Marines, moved out of the regimental assembly area and
-marched toward the ROK lines at Majon-dong in route column. Major Webb
-D. Sawyer’s 2d Battalion followed at an interval of 500 yards, while
-overhead the Corsairs of VMF-312 orbited on station for reconnaissance
-and close air support missions.[248]
-
-    [248] The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived
-          from: 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter
-          3/11 _SAR_), 3; G-3 _SAR_, 16; 7thMar _SAR_, 12; VMF-312
-          _SAR_, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, sec 6, 10; Col H. L.
-          Litzenberg interv by HistDiv HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul
-          51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51;
-          Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell
-          interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.; W. J. Davis interv, 18
-          Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n.
-          d.; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen
-          H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser
-          Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.;
-          Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments,
-          15 Apr 56; Bey Comments, 24 Apr 51.
-
-The passage of lines proceeded smoothly and quietly, save for the drone
-of aircraft as they probed the reaches of the valley. It was over by
-1030. Thereafter, progress to the front was slow and watchful. Led
-by Company A, under Captain David W. Banks, the 1st Battalion took
-ineffectual long-range CCF fire with only a few casualties. Batteries G
-and H of 3/11 displaced forward during the morning, and at noon Battery
-I opened up with the first of 26 missions fired by the artillery
-battalion that day.
-
-Though second in the tactical column, 2/7 was responsible for high
-ground on both sides of the MSR, dominated on the left by Hill 698.
-Company D ascended the eastern slopes early in the afternoon to relieve
-a ROK unit that apparently had been unable to hold the crest. When the
-South Koreans saw the Marines approaching, they promptly abandoned
-their position about midway up the slope and headed for the rear.
-
-[Illustration: BATTLE OF SUDONG 1ST PHASE
-
-MAP-8]
-
-Dog Company continued up the exposed hillside. Scattered enemy shots
-from the top of the ridge gradually merged into a pattern of light
-resistance as the Marines climbed higher. Captain Milton A. Hull
-ordered his troops to halt, deployed his machine guns for return
-fire, and radioed for an air strike. Within a few minutes a flight of
-Corsairs swept down and worked over the ridgeline.
-
-Hull’s only assault route traversed a barren area about 50 yards from
-the crest. His two assault platoons, fully exposed to the enemy’s
-observation, inched upward by fire and movement, taking casualties,
-and finally reached the top. Their foothold on the ridgeline did not
-discourage the Red Chinese, who continued to pour fire from skillfully
-camouflaged positions. To prevent continued attrition among his now
-exhausted troops (by this time they had climbed some 1600 vertical
-feet from ground level over an average gradient of 25 per cent),
-Hull recalled the two platoons to the eastern slopes and radioed for
-supporting fire.
-
-This fire was not forthcoming. Company D held a line near the summit
-until about 2200 when Easy Company passed through to occupy a small
-plateau about 150 yards below the crest for the night.
-
-Meanwhile, down in the valley, Litzenberg’s “walking perimeter”
-completed a 1300-yard advance by 1630. Owing to the nature of the
-terrain, with the attendant 360-degree vulnerability, the regimental
-commander stipulated that the 7th Marines’ column extend not less than
-4000 (the minimum distance which would allow for close-in artillery
-support) nor more than 6000 yards in length. This allowed sufficient
-depth for over-all protection, with no loss of mutual support among the
-three infantry battalions.
-
-Enemy resistance had flared up now and then in the course of the
-day, but Marine supporting arms so ruled the valley that no serious
-challenge by the Chinese developed. VMF-312 flew 12 close support
-missions in the Sudong area, and VMF(N)-513 assisted with several
-more. The whole precipitous skyline on either side of the regiment was
-blasted with 500-pound bombs, 20mm shells, and high-velocity rockets.
-
-By way of reply to the heavy shelling and bombing, Chinese mortars and
-at least one small artillery piece began to fire sporadically as the
-day wore on. A 120mm mortar round struck 1/7’s CP at 1700 and wounded
-three men.
-
-
-_CCF Counterattack at Sudong_
-
-Although the unit commanders of the 7th Marines anticipated more
-fighting with the new enemy, they probably did not suspect what the
-night held in store when the regiment dug in at dusk on 2 November.
-They did not know that the 371st Regiment, 124th CCF Division, was
-massed to the north and west, nor that the 370th Regiment occupied high
-ground east of the MSR in strength--both units within easy striking
-distance of Litzenberg’s perimeter. The 372d Regiment, in reserve,
-stood poised in its hidden encampment several miles to the rear.[249]
-
-    [249] This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from:
-          G-3 _SAR_, 18–19; 7thMar _SAR_, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n.
-          p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 9_ & _10_; Litzenberg
-          interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51;
-          Holland-Theros-Connell interv, n. d.; Wilson-Graeber
-          interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct
-          55; Geer, _The New Breed_, 228–235; Capt William J.
-          Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, MS.;
-          Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G.
-          Davis Comments, n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56;
-          Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer
-          Comments, n. d.
-
-Leading elements of the 7th Marines deployed defensively less than
-a mile south of Sudong (see Map 8). To the right of the MSR, Able
-Company’s 3d, 2d, and 1st Platoons, in that order, formed a line which
-extended across Hill 532 and part way up a spur of massive Hill 727,
-then bent rearward sharply to refuse the east flank. Emplaced along
-the road in anti-mechanized defense was the company’s 3.5-inch rocket
-squad. The 60mm mortar section and company CP set up in the low ground
-behind the spur, but Captain Banks himself decided to spend the night
-in an OP with his rifle platoons.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Davis of 1/7 deployed Charlie Company (-) across the
-MSR from Able, on the northeast slopes of Hill 698.[250] To the rear,
-headquarters and one platoon of Company B dug in on an arm of the same
-hill, while the other two platoons went into position on the lower
-reaches of Hill 727 behind Company A. One platoon of Charlie Company,
-Davis’ CP and the battalion 81mm mortars were located in low ground
-behind Able Company and the elements of Baker on the right of the road.
-
-    [250] Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company
-          was unable to move position until dusk. As Col Davis
-          has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed
-          Charlie to move into position unseen by the Chinese and
-          was a major factor in trapping the Chinese in the valley
-          the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3.
-
-South of 1/7 lay Major Sawyer’s 2d Battalion with Company D at the foot
-of Hill 698, E on its crest and slopes, and F spread along the steep
-incline of 727. Sawyer’s CP and elements of the 7th Marines’ Antitank
-and 4.2-inch Mortar Companies were situated in a shallow meadow along
-the road beneath the Fox Company positions. Several hundred yards
-to the rear, south of a sharp bend in the road, Major Maurice E.
-Roach’s 3d Battalion deployed in what was in effect a second perimeter
-protecting the regimental train, 3/11, and Litzenberg’s CP on the
-valley floor. Tieing in at the MSR, Companies H and I occupied ridges
-on the left and right of the road respectively, while G (-) arched
-through the low ground as the southernmost element of the regiment.
-Colonel Litzenberg was concerned about the valley which joined the
-Sudong Valley below Oro-ri lest it contain Chinese. He had Major Roach
-make a helicopter reconnaissance during the afternoon. Roach sighted
-nothing.[251]
-
-    [251] LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
-
-Except for the occasional thump of an incoming mortar round, night
-settled on the valley and the Marine perimeter with deceptive quiet.
-Deceptive, since at Sudong two CCF battalions were poised to smash at
-the 7th Marines with a well-coordinated double envelopment.
-
-At 2300, Davis’ 1st Battalion reported itself under attack from the
-right flank, the enemy apparently descending the higher slopes of
-Hill 727. This announcement was somewhat premature, as the Marines of
-Company A were merely experiencing the infiltration and probing that
-precede almost every Communist assault. At 2400, 2/7 reported two enemy
-battalions on the left flank.[252] During the first hour of 3 November,
-sobering messages were received from Litzenberg’s northernmost units.
-What had begun at 2300 as a staccato of small-arms fire swelled in
-volume by imperceptible degrees until Hills 698 and 727 were engulfed
-in a ceaseless din. And by 0100 the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 7th
-Marines bent under the weight of a full-scale attack on both flanks.
-
-    [252] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither
-          D nor F Companies was involved at this time, the
-          information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however,
-          doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E
-          Company was made by more than 20 men. Capt R. T. Bey
-          Comments, 24 Apr 56.
-
-Avoiding the obvious approach through the corridor leading south from
-Sudong, the commander of the 371st CCF Regiment had dispatched a
-battalion along each of the ridgelines bordering the valley. Bursting
-flares and bugle calls signaled when the two assault units came
-abreast of the Marine positions on the lower reaches of Hills 727 and
-698. Then, treading swiftly and silently in their rubber sneakers,
-the Chinese infantrymen swept down obliquely and struck Able and Fox
-Companies on the east and Baker on the west. Charlie on the slopes
-of Hill 698 was undisturbed. Where the Chinese met resistance, they
-slugged it out at close range with grenades and submachine guns.
-Where they found gaps, they poured through and raced to the low
-ground. To the Marines, the specific CCF objectives were not readily
-apparent in those hectic hours before dawn, for the enemy seemed to be
-everywhere.[253]
-
-    [253] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_; 7thMar msg
-          to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530 3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51.
-
-Shortly after the battle was joined high on the hillsides, Marines at
-Able Company’s CP heard the clanking sounds of a tracked vehicle on
-the MSR to the north. When the machine passed the rocket section at
-the roadblock without incident, they dropped their guards momentarily,
-believing it to be a friendly bulldozer. The big vehicle rumbled into
-the CP and stopped, one headlight glaring at exposed mortar crews and
-headquarters personnel.
-
-“Tank!” shouted Staff Sergeant Donald T. Jones, section chief of Able
-Company’s 60mm mortars.
-
-It was a Russian T-34, one of the five remaining to the 344th North
-Korean Tank Regiment, supporting the 124th CCF Division. The troops at
-the roadblock had been caught napping.
-
-A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank sent the lightly armed
-Marines scurrying for cover. The armored vehicle quickly withdrew
-to the road and drove farther south, into 1/7s’ CP. After a short,
-inquisitive pause, it rumbled toward the 1st Battalion’s 81mm mortar
-positions. The Russian 85mm rifle flashed four times in the darkness,
-but the shells screamed harmlessly over the mortars and detonated in
-the high ground beyond.
-
-Rocket launchers of Charlie Company and the recoilless rifles of
-7th Marines Antitank Company opened up from positions around 1/7’s
-headquarters. At least one 75mm round struck home, and the belt of
-sandbags around the T-34’s turret began to burn. The tank swung back
-onto the MSR and headed north. Approaching Able Company’s roadblock,
-through which it had entered the Marine position, it took a hit from
-the 3.5-inch rocket section. In reply, one 85mm shell at pistol range
-all but wiped out the Marine antitank crew. The enemy vehicle, trailing
-flame and sparks, clanked around a bend in the road and disappeared.
-
-Not long after this astounding foray, the fighting on Hills 698 and 727
-spread down to the MSR. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, pressed
-now from three directions and suffering heavy casualties, retracted to
-the 3d Platoon positions at the tip of the spur. Some of the men were
-cut off and forced back on the Baker Company elements east of the MSR.
-Ultimately, one of the two Company B platoons in this area was driven
-down to the low ground, and the other forced to fall back. Later they
-counterattacked and recovered their foxholes.
-
-West of the MSR, the remainder of Company B fought off assaults on its
-left flank and rear by Chinese who had skirted around Charlie Company’s
-advance positions.[254] Lieutenant Colonel Davis sent the battalion
-reserve, Lieutenant Graeber’s 2d Platoon of Baker, to reinforce the
-hard pressed left platoon. Attempting to lead his men across the MSR,
-Graeber found the route effectively blocked by the enemy in the river
-bed.
-
-    [254] _Ibid._
-
-Descending now from both sides of the road, enemy infantrymen swarmed
-over the valley floor. They overran most of the 7th Marines 4.2-inch
-Mortar Company and captured one of its tubes. They seriously threatened
-the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs and the AT Company in the same general
-idea. High on the slopes in 2/7’s zone, Companies E and F were beset
-by small bands of infiltrators. And though these two companies held
-their ground, the Reds found their flanks, slipped behind them, and
-entrenched at the key road bend separating 2/7 from 3/7 to the south.
-The principal Marine unit at the sharp curve in the MSR was Battery I,
-whose position in the low ground became increasingly precarious as the
-night wore on.
-
-
-_Two Marine Battalions Cut Off_
-
-Dawn of 3 November revealed a confused and alarming situation in
-the valley south of Sudong. Enemy troops shared the low ground with
-Marine elements between the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs, and they had
-blown out a section of the MSR in this locale.[255] The 2d Battalion’s
-commander later remarked, “When daylight came, we found that we were
-in a dickens of a mess. The rifle companies were well up in the hills,
-and the Chinese were occupying the terrain between the CP and the
-companies.”[256]
-
-    [255] The demolition had little more than dramatic effect,
-          however, since the Songchon river bed was negotiable to
-          vehicles of all types.
-
-    [256] Sawyer Comments.
-
-Between 2/7 and 3/7, a company of Reds had dug in on a finger of
-high ground overlooking the road bend and Battery I from the east.
-Scattered Chinese forces roamed Hills 698 and 727 almost at will.
-On the latter height, elements of the 371st CCF Regiment had been
-reinforced by a battalion of the 370th, so that pressure against the
-right flank of 1/7 and 2/7 continued long after daybreak.[257]
-
-    [257] _Ibid._; X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50; 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv,
-          1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 235–236.
-
-With his lead battalions thrown back on the defensive, Colonel
-Litzenberg relied on overwhelming superiority in supporting arms to
-tip the scales on 3 November and regain the initiative. While the
-regimental 4.2-inch mortars fired, howitzers of Batteries G and H
-thundered almost ceaselessly the whole night long from positions within
-3/7’s perimeter. Battery I, after being extricated from the enemy
-dominated road bend at 1100 with the help of a platoon of G Company,
-added its metal to the bombardment. In the course of the day, the
-18 field pieces of the battalion fired a total of 1431 rounds in 49
-missions.[258]
-
-    [258] 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d.
-
-VMF-312 provided constant air cover after first light. Its planes not
-only scourged enemy assault troops left exposed on the ridges, but
-also searched out and attacked CCF artillery positions and vehicles.
-This squadron alone flew 18 close support missions on 3 November, the
-alternating flights being led by Major Daniel H. Davis, Captain Harry
-G. C. Henneberger, Captain George E. McClane, and First Lieutenant
-Shelby M. Forrest.[259] VMF(N)-513 dispatched a flight of night
-fighters to Sudong at 0910 under Major Robert L. Cochran. After raking
-enemy troops with 1500 rounds from their 20mm cannon, Cochran and his
-three pilots unloaded three general purpose and fragmentation bombs
-along with 15 high-velocity rockets.[260]
-
-    [259] VMF-312 _SAR_, 12.
-
-    [260] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 11. The others on this flight were Capt
-          Edwin Pendry, 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E.
-          Jennings.
-
-As much supporting fire fell within the 7th Regiment’s perimeter as
-outside. Since the crack of dawn it had been the principal mission
-of the advance Marine elements to eject scores of Chinese troops,
-individuals and small bands, who were scattered along the hillsides
-and valley floor within the zones of the 1st and 2d Battalions. While
-accomplishing this task, the Marines established a tactical principle
-for coming weeks: that to nullify Chinese night tactics, regardless of
-large-scale penetrations and infiltration, defending units had only to
-maintain position until daybreak. With observation restored, Marine
-firepower invariably would melt down the Chinese mass to impotency.
-
-This was the case on 3 November, although the melting down process was
-a savage, all-day affair. With the help of air, artillery, and mortars,
-the 1st Battalion cleared the low ground by midmorning and restored its
-right flank later in the day. The Chinese in the valley were crushed,
-the main group being annihilated by the heavy machine guns of Weapons
-Company as they attempted to march northward along the railroad in
-column at daylight. Counted enemy dead in 1/7’s zone alone amounted to
-662.[261]
-
-    [261] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar
-          _SAR_, 13; R. G. Davis Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments.
-
-The main effort in the 2d Battalion’s zone was aimed at the CCF
-concentration on the spur of Hill 727 overlooking the bend in the
-MSR. Owing to this barrier, Litzenberg had to call for an airdrop of
-supplies to sustain his leading elements on 3 November.[262] Major
-Sawyer ordered Company D, on the base of Hill 698 to the south of the
-roadblock, to move up the valley, cross the river, and clean out the
-spur at Hill 727. Finding the low ground blocked by heavy fire, Captain
-Hull circled to the left along the incline of Hill 698, intending to
-come abreast of the Chinese strong point before striking at it across
-the MSR.[263]
-
-    [262] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul
-          51.
-
-    [263] Goggin interv; Hull Comments.
-
-Meanwhile, Captain Walter D. Phillips’ Easy Company, perched on the
-side of Hill 698, struggled to secure the peak of that hill mass. A
-rush by First Lieutenant John Yancey’s 2d Platoon at about 0800 secured
-a small plateau about 50 yards below the crest against the opposition
-of one Chinese soldier. First Lieutenant Robert T. Bey’s 3d Platoon
-then passed through and frontally assaulted the peak only to be thrown
-back by what Bey calls “the most concentrated grenade barrage this
-writer has had the dubious distinction to witness.” Following an air
-strike at about 1400 Easy Company secured the crest with its 40 Chinese
-dead.[264]
-
-    [264] Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
-
-With all of the rifle companies involved in fire fights or security
-missions, Litzenberg resorted to supporting arms and headquarters
-troops to knock out the roadblock. From his regimental CP he dispatched
-First Lieutenant Earl R. Delong, Executive Officer of the AT Company,
-with a reserve 75mm recoilless rifle and a makeshift crew. Delong moved
-into position opposite the strong point at a range of 500 yards, while
-air and artillery hammered the enemy positions.[265]
-
-    [265] 7thMar msg to CG 1st MarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E.
-          R. Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
-
-Simultaneously, the Division Reconnaissance Company ascended the high
-ground east of the MSR in the vicinity of Litzenberg’s headquarters,
-then advanced northward along the ridge to envelop the roadblock. This
-unit, just returned from an active, overnight patrol to Huksu-ri, moved
-into a hillside position and took the rear of the Chinese under fire
-across an intervening gulley.[266]
-
-    [266] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, EE (hereafter HqBn _SAR_), 10; HqBn
-          _URpt 8_, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
-
-Delong’s 75 had begun firing high explosive and white phosphorus into
-the enemy’s front; and Company D, after cleaning up the scattered
-resistance on the slopes of Hill 698, closed on the roadblock under
-cover of two air strikes and prepared to assault. The Chinese,
-obviously shaken by the pounding of supporting arms, had commenced a
-withdrawal into the hills east of the roadbend when Hull’s men began
-their assault. From Recon Company’s positions, Lieutenant Crossman
-called for air and artillery to catch the retreating Reds in the
-open. But the request was turned down because Dog Company troops were
-already filtering through the objective area. By 1810 the roadblock was
-eliminated, although Dog Company had to withstand two counterattacks
-before its hold on the spur was secure. The Chinese had left behind 28
-dead, strewn among the boulders and recesses of a natural redoubt.[267]
-
-    [267] _Ibid._, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and
-          7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments.
-
-The main enemy encroachments having been smashed, the 7th Marines’
-MSR was again clear for traffic, save for long-range harassment by an
-occasional CCF rifleman hidden in the hills. At dusk, trucks streamed
-northward from the regimental CP to deliver supplies to the 1st and
-2d Battalions and to evacuate about 100 battle casualties from those
-units. The wounded were rushed to the Division Hospital and the 121st
-Army Evacuation Hospital in Hungnam.[268]
-
-    [268] 7thMar _SAR_, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3
-          1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50; and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
-          Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action
-          reports, since all 7th Marines’ records were destroyed
-          before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni in early December
-          1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those
-          casualty figures for the Division as a whole can be
-          reported with consistent accuracy.
-
-
-_End of NKPA Tank Regiment_
-
-The coming of darkness on 3 November marked the finish of the first
-phase. Litzenberg’s perimeter remained essentially the same as on the
-previous day, the only changes being Company D’s occupation of the
-high ground east of the road bend, Recon Company’s assumption of local
-security at the regimental CP, and 3/11’s tighter concentration within
-the zone of 3/7. What few light contacts occurred during the night were
-decided quickly by Marine artillery and mortars.[269]
-
-    [269] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn
-          _URpt 8_, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and
-          1508 4 Nov 50.
-
-Later intelligence evaluations proved that these contacts could have
-involved only CCF patrols or stragglers, for it was in this same period
-that the 370th and 371st CCF Regiments withdrew some three miles from
-Sudong to a defense line established by elements of the 372d Regiment
-north of Chinhung-ni. The two assault units had paid a high price for
-failure during the 2–4 November fighting. The 371st Regiment lost the
-equivalent of five companies out of its 1st and 3d Battalions, with the
-total dead estimated at 793. And the 3d Battalion, 370th Regiment, was
-reduced by the destruction of two companies.[270]
-
-    [270] X Corps _PIR 44_, annex 2; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 11_ and _12_,
-          encl 1; 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
-
-It was a wobbly 124th CCF Division, then, that dug in with heavy
-machine guns and mortars on two massive hills, 987 and 891, flanking
-the MSR about two miles north of Chinhung-ni. The depleted 344th NKPA
-Tank Regiment could not avail itself of such defensible terrain,
-for until Marine engineers widened the tortuous cliff road through
-Funchilin Pass it would not accommodate armor.[271]
-
-    [271] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn _SAR_), 8;
-          and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
-
-Apparently the Chinese Communists had left their North Korean comrades
-of the 344th to fend for themselves. The NKPA unit had already dwindled
-considerably from its original organization of three armored and
-three infantry companies. On 2 November it comprised only five T-34s
-and their crews. One of these machines, after being damaged during
-the single-handed raid on the 7th Marines’ perimeter that night, was
-abandoned the next day. The NKPA crews put the remaining four vehicles
-into camouflaged positions next to the MSR at Chinhung-ni, where they
-waited resignedly at a tactical dead-end.[272]
-
-    [272] G-2 _SAR_, 34; and 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.
-
-Colonel Litzenberg was aware of the probability of further resistance
-along the road, since on 3 November Marine air had reported
-approximately 300 enemy trucks--in groups of 15 or 20--on the move
-south of the Chosin Reservoir.[273] At dawn of 4 November, after
-a night of relative calm around the old perimeter, he ordered his
-subordinates to conduct vigorous patrolling preparatory to continuing
-the advance.[274]
-
-    [273] 1stMarDiv _PIR 10_.
-
-    [274] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50.
-
-[Illustration: CHINHUNG-NI TANK FIGHT
-
-4 November
-
-  MAP-9
-]
-
-Troops of 1/7 moved forward in the early light and scouted the valley
-as far north as the edge of Sudong. They met no opposition and returned
-to the perimeter. Litzenberg then formed the 7th Marines in column,
-with the Reconnaissance Company in the lead, followed by 1/7 and 3/7 in
-that order. He left the 2d Battalion in position on Hills 698 and 727
-to protect the regimental flanks.[275]
-
-    [275] The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with
-          enemy tanks is derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 13;
-          Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, _The New
-          Breed_, 236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC,
-          21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50;
-          R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman Comments,
-          n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56.
-
-Recon Company moved out in jeeps at 0800, First Lieutenant Ernest C.
-Hargett’s 1st Platoon in the point. Entering Sudong a short time later,
-the vanguard rounded a bend in the middle of town and surprised a group
-of CCF soldiers. In a 30-minute fight, Hargett’s men killed three and
-captured about 20. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the Reconnaissance Company
-meanwhile inspected the high ground above Sudong without opposition.
-
-Lieutenant Crossman reorganized his company in column on the road and
-set out for Chinhung-ni with Second Lieutenant Donald W. Sharon’s 2d
-Platoon in the lead. About the same time, 1000, the 1st Battalion moved
-out of the 7th Marines’ perimeter south of Sudong and traced Crossman’s
-route through the low ground.
-
-At Chinhung-ni the highway runs along the east side of the river while
-the railroad traces the west side. The narrow-gauge track enters
-the village over a bridge spanning a branch stream. Just beyond is
-Samgo station, which served as a railhead for the cable-car system of
-Funchilin Pass. As the Reconnaissance Company approached Chinhung-ni on
-4 November, a small group of Chinese soldiers milled around the train
-cars and buildings of Samgo Station. They probably had some tactical
-connection with the four T-34 tanks camouflaged opposite them across
-the river and road; but the two forces seemed oblivious not only of
-each other but also of the Marines bearing down on them.
-
-Lieutenant Sharon’s platoon advanced rapidly from Sudong at 1400,
-followed closely by the rest of the Reconnaissance Company and
-a section of 75mm recoilless rifles. About 2000 yards south of
-Chinhung-ni they halted on sighting fresh tank tracks but quickly
-moved out again on orders of Lieutenant Colonel Davis. At the highway
-entrance to Chinhung-ni, Sharon’s troops unknowingly passed the first
-T-34, hidden on the right of the road. Coming abreast of the second
-Communist tank, which also remained undetected for the moment, the
-Marines spotted the Chinese soldiers across the river at Samgo Station
-and opened fire.
-
-The CCF infantrymen scattered under the hail of small-arms fire and
-many of them were cut down. This was fortunate for Company C of 1/7,
-which was marching along the railroad tracks and just then nearing
-the bridge south of the station, where it could have been taken under
-enfilade fire by the enemy soldiers and tanks.
-
-It was during the exchange with the Chinese that Sharon and his men
-spotted the second North Korean tank under a pile of brush on the right
-of the road. The platoon leader, accompanied by Staff Sergeant Richard
-B. Twohey and Corporal Joseph E. McDermott, climbed upon the dormant
-vehicle. Suddenly the periscope began to revolve. McDermott smashed the
-glass and Twohey dropped in a grenade. With Sharon they jumped to the
-ground just as the grenade exploded inside the machine.
-
-The tank engine roared and the vehicle lurched toward the three
-Marines. Twohey jumped on it again and dropped another grenade down
-the periscope. After the dull thump of the second explosion, the T-34
-stopped dead and began smoking.
-
-By this time Staff Sergeant William L. Vick’s 75mm recoilless gun
-section and 3.5-inch rocket crews of Company C had moved up. Together
-they gave the _coup de grace_ to the damaged T-34. Simultaneously,
-Sharon’s men saw a thatched hut farther down the road disintegrate
-as tank number three emerged, its 85mm rifle swinging menacingly
-toward the valley crowded with Marines and vehicles. First Lieutenant
-Raymond J. Elledge fired his 75s from their carts, and Company C’s
-rocket launchers opened up. The T-34 took hits but rumbled on. Seconds
-earlier, First Lieutenant Dan C. Holland, Forward Air Controller
-for 1/7, had radioed overhead Corsairs for assistance. One of the
-gull-winged planes plummetted out of formation and unleashed a pair of
-five-inch rockets. They were direct hits. The T-34 blew up and died on
-the road.[276]
-
-    [276] Available records do not indicate whether tank number
-          three should be credited to VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513,
-          both of which had close-support flights in the area.
-
-Sharon and his men moved forward cautiously. While passing the blazing
-hulk, they spotted enemy tank Number Four, camouflaged against a
-hillside just ahead. At almost the same moment, Marines passing
-Chinhung-ni stumbled upon docile tank Number One in the midst of their
-formation. Recoilless rifles and rocket launchers blasted the machine,
-and its crew climbed out and surrendered. Sharon then led the antitank
-crews through the river bed toward the fourth T-34. The Communist
-tankmen, entrenched on the slope behind their empty vehicle, gave up
-without a fight. The tank itself was knocked out by 3.5-inch rockets
-and 75mm shells; and the 344th NKPA Tank Regiment ceased to exist.
-
-
-_The Fight for How Hill_
-
-After the destruction of enemy armor, Colonel Litzenberg began
-deploying the 7th Marines in perimeter around the valley junction at
-Chinhung-ni. The advance had netted about 6000 yards by midafternoon,
-and the remaining daylight was needed to bring all elements forward and
-consolidate the newly won ground.[277]
-
-    [277] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; and 1stMarDiv _POR 116_.
-
-Aware that the Chinese were at the top of Funchilin Pass but not that
-he was directly under their guns, the regimental commander at 1600
-ordered Reconnaissance Company to patrol some 2000 yards into Funchilin
-Pass and outpost the southern tip of Hill 891. The high ground selected
-for the outpost coincided with the eastern half of the Chinese forward
-line, and it would later be remembered as “How Hill” in honor of
-Company H of 3/7.[278]
-
-    [278] 7thMar _SAR_, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv,
-          20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56.
-
-As 1/7 dug in on the heights flanking Chinhung-ni, Recon Company, with
-Second Lieutenant Charles R. Puckett’s 3d Platoon leading, advanced
-in motorized column about a mile into the pass. At this point, Hill
-987 looms up on the west and the highway veers sharply to the east for
-approximately 1000 yards. After a hairpin turn, the road climbs on a
-parallel line almost to its starting point, then resumes its northerly
-course, clinging to the rocky wall of Hill 891 which rises abruptly
-from the chasm that separates it from Hill 987.
-
-Puckett’s platoon had approached the road bend warily, for a sizeable
-enemy group had been spotted earlier near the base of Hill 987 across
-the gorge. At 1630 the first two jeeps of the column eased around the
-curve and immediately came under fire from Hill 987 to the left, 891 to
-the front, and from a CCF patrol to the right, on the road itself.[279]
-
-    [279] HqBn _URpt 8_, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20
-          Oct 55.
-
-For 45 minutes Puckett and his men were pinned to the road and
-hillside, and only darkness and a strike by Marine air finally
-enabled the whole column to withdraw to the 7th Marines’ lines. The
-clash cost Recon two killed and five wounded, and heavy machine-gun
-fire had destroyed the two lead jeeps.[280]
-
-    [280] _Ibid._
-
-[Illustration: ACTION OF 4–5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS
-
-  MAP-10
-]
-
-During the relatively quiet night of 4–5 November, Colonel Litzenberg
-issued his order for the next day’s advance. The 1st Battalion was
-to hold the flanks at Chinhung-ni while 3/7, followed at a distance
-of 500–1000 yards by 2/7, passed through and attacked into Funchilin
-Pass. Major Parry’s 3/11 and the 4.2 Mortar Company were to support
-the infantry by high-angle fire from positions south of Sudong.[281]
-Resistance could be expected, for even as the 7th Marines peacefully
-sat out the hours of darkness, the night fighters of VMF(N)-513 were
-bombing and strafing enemy convoys around the southern tip of the
-Chosin Reservoir.[282]
-
-    [281] 7thMar _SAR_, 13; 3/11 _SAR_, 3.
-
-    [282] VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 12.
-
-At 0700 Lieutenant Hargett’s 1st Platoon of Recon Company departed
-Chinhung-ni along the MSR to patrol on the right flank. Reaching the
-hairpin curve, the platoon was pinned down by enemy fire at exactly the
-same place where Puckett’s unit had come to grief. VMF-312 and 3/11
-promptly went into action, and Hargett ultimately withdrew his patrol
-under the shield of their supporting fire. Marine casualties were four
-wounded.[283]
-
-    [283] HqBn _SAR_, 12; HqBn _URpt 9_, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon
-          interv, 20 Oct 55; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237–238;
-          Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last
-          employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it
-          was detached and ordered back to Majon-dong to patrol the
-          road to Huksu-ri and the division’s left flank.
-
-Major Roach’s 3d Battalion moved out for the attack at 0800, passing
-through the high-ground positions of 1/7 on either side of Chinhung-ni.
-Company I advanced toward Hill 987 and G toward 891 (see Map 10).
-Both units were hit hard by small-arms and machine-gun fire as they
-came abreast of the road bend; and for the remainder of the day, the
-“advance was negligible.”[284]
-
-    [284] The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar
-          _SAR_, 13–14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 3/11 _SAR_, 3; VMF-312
-          _SAR_, 9; VMF(N)-513 _SAR_, 13; 1stMarDiv _OpnO 19-50_,
-          5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W.
-          J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stMarDiv _PIRs 12 & 13_;
-          Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130
-          5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200,
-          1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215 5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245,
-          1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar _ISUM 14_;
-          1stMarDiv _POR 122_; and Geer, _The New Breed_, 237-240;
-          Capt H. H. Harris Comments, n. d.; Earney Comments, 2–8;
-          Capt M. P. Newton, “The Attack on ‘How’ Hill,” (MS);
-          Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
-
-From 1000 onward, the second phase of the battle roared to a climax
-as a duel between supporting arms. In 26 missions during 5 November,
-the batteries of 3/11 threw 943 shells into the enemy positions. The
-Chinese answered with counterbattery fire from their 122mm mortars,
-but toward the end of the day these weapons were silenced by Marine
-howitzer barrages. A forward observer with Company G reported an enemy
-ammunition dump destroyed. This information was later verified by a
-POW who mentioned the following additional losses in CCF mortars: 10
-crewmen killed and 17 wounded, one mortar destroyed, two mortars put
-out of action, and the dispersal of “most of the remaining personnel.”
-
-VMF-312 flew 37 sorties in 90 hours of close support combat on the
-5th. Between Chinhung-ni and the Chosin Reservoir, 21 enemy trucks
-were destroyed. Pilots reported that “the surrounding ridges were
-filled with enemy troops” and that their strikes against these Chinese
-were “extremely effective.” Led by Major Cochran and Captain Otis W.
-S. Corman, flights from VMF(N)-513 blasted troops, buildings, supply
-vehicles, and gun emplacements scattered from Koto-ri at the top of
-Funchilin Pass to Hagaru at the reservoir. General Smith, during a
-helicopter visit to Litzenberg’s CP, remarked that a “considerable
-number of planes ... really worked the place over.”[285]
-
-    [285] Smith, _Chronicle_, 73.
-
-On the ground, the fight ended at dusk with the Chinese retaining their
-firm grip on these well camouflaged positions studding Hills 891 and
-987 despite heavy losses.[286] Marine casualties were light, for it
-was the tortuous terrain in conjunction with enemy bullets, not enemy
-fire alone, that obstructed the attackers. Since General Smith earlier
-in the day had named Koto-ri as the 7th Marines’ immediate objective,
-Colonel Litzenberg ordered the 3d Battalion to resume the advance at
-0800 the next morning.
-
-    [286] One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms
-          that he could, then climbed out of his bunker and walked
-          into G Company’s lines to surrender. On interrogation
-          he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987,
-          one on Hill 891, and the reserve battalion in the saddle
-          between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
-
-The night of 5–6 November witnessed only minor contacts around the
-regimental perimeter. Some 200 Korean laborers accounted for most of
-the activity during darkness as they carried supplies to forward Marine
-positions and evacuated casualties to the rear.
-
-Major Roach’s plan for 6 November called for How Company, supported by
-the fire of George, to envelop the southeast slope of Hill 891 while
-Item continued its attack on Hill 987. At about 0800 First Lieutenant
-Howard H. Harris led How Company out of its reserve position. It took
-him until nearly 1500 to traverse the rugged landscape and get into
-position. Meanwhile, Item Company under First Lieutenant William E.
-Johnson had beaten off one counterattack and edged about 300 yards
-closer to Hill 987, with its most effective opposition coming from
-bunkers on a spur overlooking the MSR.
-
-Captain Thomas E. Cooney had been wounded twice the previous day while
-leading Company G against the trenches and foxholes on the southern tip
-of Hill 891. Except for a feint by one platoon along the MSR into the
-hairpin turn, his company spent the day in a long-range fight with the
-Chinese defenders.
-
-Lieutenant Harris led his men over the high ground behind G into
-positions to the east. Cooney’s experience showed that the only
-possible approach to Hill 891 was to flank it from the southeast.
-Although the fresh company arrived sometime after 1400, its attack
-was held up until about 1600 to await air. Following a strike by two
-Corsairs, the howitzers of 3/11 and the regimental 4.2 mortars began
-pounding the Chinese positions.
-
-How Company jumped off at about 1615. Two assault platoons, led by
-Second Lieutenants Robert D. Reem and Minard P. Newton, descended into
-the intervening gulley at the tip of the hairpin curve. During a quick
-reorganization in the low ground, machine guns were posted to cover
-the ascent. Then the platoons started up towards the enemy-held summit
-through companion draws, Harris accompanying Newton’s outfit on the
-left.
-
-The powdery soil of the steep slope made climbing difficult and
-exhausting. About a hundred yards up, Newton’s platoon began receiving
-light fire, followed a few yards farther by a hail of grenades and
-machine gun slugs. The Marines inched forward and were stopped by
-the Chinese fire. On the right, meanwhile, Reed climbed against
-no opposition, so it appeared that the envelopment was working.
-Unexpectedly, the two draws converged near the top of the hill, with
-the result that the platoons met.
-
-Lieutenant Harris revised his plans by directing Newton, with his left
-squad supporting by BAR fire, to lead Reem to the top of the hill. Once
-there, Newton was to swing right and Reem left to envelop the Chinese
-positions. Newton worked a squad up onto a nose extending out from
-the summit. The Chinese replied with a renewed barrage of grenades
-and counterattacked Newton’s left. Sergeant Charlie Foster, seeing
-apparent victory turning into defeat, lunged forward to break up the
-attack. He reached the top and died but the men behind him repulsed the
-Reds.
-
-During the close fighting on the left, Lieutenant Reem had gathered
-his squad leaders for instructions preparatory to the final assault on
-the right. An enemy grenade fell into the midst of the group, and Reem
-was killed as he smothered the explosion with his body. Staff Sergeant
-Anthony J. Ricardi took over the platoon.
-
-At about 1800 Harris radioed Roach that his troops were exhausted.
-Although it was already dusk, he was bringing up his reserve platoon,
-he said, for the Chinese still held the crest in strength. Company
-H had taken only eight casualties, but ammunition was low and the
-approaching darkness prevented the dispatching of more fresh troops.
-The battalion commander relayed the report to Colonel Litzenberg, who
-immediately ordered the company to disengage and withdraw. The fighting
-descent under cover of a 4.2 mortar and artillery bombardment brought
-Company H back within the lines of 3/7 by 2000 with its six wounded and
-the body of Lieutenant Reem.
-
-
-_Disappearance of CCF Remnants_
-
-Darkness on the night of 6 November descended like a cloak over the
-124th CCF Division. In the morning the Chinese had vanished. The 3d
-Battalion, 7th Marines, encountered no opposition whatever as it
-occupied the southern tips of Hills 891 and 987.[287]
-
-    [287] 7thMar _SAR_ 14.
-
-The mysterious disappearance of this unit, following the equally
-strange withdrawal of the Chinese Reds who made the first CCF contacts
-in the EUSAK zone, aroused no end of speculation. Officers of the
-7th Marines believed that enemy losses had been heavy enough for a
-disabling effect. This opinion was confirmed the following year when
-a Marine Corps Board visited Korea for a special analytical study
-of Marine operations of 1950, based on all Army and Marine records
-available at that time as well as interviews and interrogations. The
-Board concluded that “the 124th CCF Division was estimated to have been
-rendered militarily noneffective.”[288]
-
-    [288] _Marine Corps Board Study_ (hereafter _MCB Study_),
-          II-C-16. _CCF Army Histories_, 31, states that the 124th
-          was in action in west central Korea by the middle of
-          November.
-
-Following the enemy’s disappearance on the night of 6–7 November, the
-7th Marines occupied the southern reaches of Hills 891 and 987 while
-reconnoitering to the top of 891. The rest of the day and all the next
-was devoted to consolidating positions along the MSR and sending out
-patrols in a vain search for the vanished 124th CCF Division.[289]
-
-    [289] 7thMar _SAR_, 14; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May
-          56.
-
-On 8 November, General Almond visited the 7th Marines. Upon hearing
-of the valor of Captain Cooney at “How Hill,” he awarded that officer
-the Silver Star medal on the spot. There being neither pendant nor
-citation available, the Corps Commander pinned a slip of paper to
-Cooney’s jacket in the brief ceremony. Scrawled on the fragment was the
-inscription, “Silver Star Medal for Gallantry in Action--Almond.”[290]
-
-    [290] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG’s Diary in X
-          Corps _WD_, 8 Nov 50; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
-
-While the 7th Marines advanced astride the MSR, a volunteer patrol of
-fifteen men, led by First Lieutenant William F. Goggin of 2/7, traced
-a lonely, circuitous route in the mountains to the west. Having left
-Chinhung-ni at 1200 on 8 November, the scouting party covered some 25
-miles through perpendicular wilds during the following 26 hours. This
-journey brought it to the Chosin Reservoir plateau at a point just
-southwest of Koto-ri.
-
-Lieutenant Goggin, his slight wound the only scar of the patrol’s
-single clash with Chinese, radioed Colonel Litzenberg that Koto-ri was
-clear of enemy. He then led his party southward, and in the evening of
-the 9th, returned through the lines of 3/7.[291]
-
-    [291] 7thMar _SAR_, 13–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 243–247;
-          Goggin interv.
-
-The Marines had been told that big game animals were hunted before
-the war in the mountains of northeast Korea. But not until the
-otherwise calm night of 9–10 November did a four-legged enemy invade
-the positions of RCT-7. Near the cable-car trestle, midway through
-Funchilin Pass, an unfriendly bear, no doubt a Russian bear, paid a
-nocturnal visit to the 1st Platoon of George Company. An unnamed Marine
-PFC, awakened in his sleeping bag, swore afterwards that the animal was
-wearing a hammer and sickle emblem. However this may be, the intruder
-was routed by his startled yell and disappeared into the night.[292]
-
-    [292] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55.
-
-
-_Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines_
-
-At 0830 on 10 November--the Marine Corps Birthday--the 1st Battalion
-passed through the 3d and emerged from Funchilin Pass onto the open
-plateau. Koto-ri (designated as Objective One) was occupied without
-opposition an hour and a half later. Litzenberg halted his column and
-drew up a perimeter around the mountain village.
-
-Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the 7th Marines was first to meet a
-new enemy who would take a heavier toll in casualties than the Chinese.
-This was General Winter, who has won many a historic campaign. When
-the first cold blasts struck, “our men were not conditioned for it,”
-commented Litzenberg. “The doctors reported numerous cases where the
-men came down to the sickbay suffering from what appeared to be shock.
-Some of them would come in crying; some of them were extremely nervous;
-and the doctors said it was simply the sudden shock of the terrific
-cold when they were not ready for it.”[293]
-
-    [293] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45.
-
-The Marines recovered quickly after “thawing out,” and platoon warming
-tents, heated by camp stoves burning fuel oil, were set up at Koto-ri.
-Buckets of steaming water were provided for the warming of “C” rations.
-
-Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting weather
-as compared to sub-zero cold which seems to numb the spirit as well
-as flesh. Cold weather clothing is a handicap to movement and the
-use of firearms; and some weapons, particularly the carbine, are not
-dependable at low temperatures. It was probably as well for morale
-that the Marines at Koto-ri could not foresee that this was only the
-beginning of a prolonged operation in sub-zero weather without a
-parallel in the nation’s history.[294]
-
-    [294] Marshall, _CCF in the Attack_. See also FECOM, _Terrain
-          Study No. 6_, XIX-8; R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett
-          Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments, n.
-          d.
-
-Until 13 November, when the 7th Marines advanced toward Hagaru, patrols
-from Koto-ri repeatedly sighted bands of Chinese in the distance.
-Except for a fight on 11 November in which C Company claimed to have
-inflicted 40 casualties on the enemy and lost four killed and four
-wounded, there was little action. With a little pressure on the
-ground or from the air, the enemy vanished, and thus the uneasy calm
-continued.[295]
-
-    [295] 7th Mar _SAR_, 15–16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400
-          10 Nov 50; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56.
-
-[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS
-
-1st Marine Division
-
-October-December 1950
-
-  MAP-2
-]
-
-While the 7th Regiment had been fighting, marching, and climbing toward
-the Chosin Reservoir in early November, the 5th Marines peacefully
-combed the approaches to the Fusen Reservoir to the east. After
-detaching 1/5 to Division control on 4 November and stationing 3/5
-near Oro-ri, Lieutenant Colonel Murray sent the 2d Battalion into the
-Sinhung Valley to relieve the 18th ROK Regiment. The relief took place
-at 1145 on the 4th, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed 2/5
-around a valley junction five miles north and 15 miles east of the then
-embattled 7th Marines.[296]
-
-    [296] 2/5 _SAR_, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and
-          2202 3 Nov 50; CG X Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO
-          5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2″ MCo, 2100 3
-          Nov 50; 2/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 2.
-
-Roise’s mission was twofold: to block the Sinhung corridor while
-determining the strength and disposition of the enemy, if any; and to
-check certain northerly routes shown on maps as possibly leading to
-either the Fusen or Chosin Reservoirs, or both. Reconnaissance patrols
-in squad strength and combat patrols of reinforced platoons and company
-size fanned out in a broad arc during 5–9 November. They determined
-that no usable route led to either reservoir from the south, but that
-the highway continuing northeast from the town of Sinhung, leading
-to the 7th Infantry Division’s zone and the Manchurian border, would
-carry military traffic. From 7 November, Roise’s troops made daily
-contact with Army patrols coming down the highway, but no units tried
-to penetrate the apparent screen of enemy defenses close to the Fusen
-Reservoir.[297]
-
-    [297] 2/5 _SAR_, 10.
-
-Major Merlin R. Olson, 1/5’s Executive Officer, led Companies A and B
-on 7 November in a reconnaissance in force to Huksu-ri, that annoying
-road junction west of Oro-ri. On the 8th Olson’s force had a running
-fight with North Koreans before being recalled while still short of his
-objective. Olson’s recall resulted from reports of 2000 North Koreans
-moving towards the MSR.[298]
-
-    [298] CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; “Special
-          Reconnaissance of the 1st Bn 5thMar, 7–9 Nov 50,” 10 Nov
-          50.
-
-On 8 November, Company D (Reinf) made an overnight trek deep into a
-branch valley northwest of Sinhung, reaching a point about 10 miles due
-east of Koto-ri. One CCF soldier was captured while asleep in a house.
-He said he belonged to the 126th Division and that Red China would
-commit a total of 24 divisions against the UN forces in Korea.[299]
-
-    [299] 2/5 _SAR_, 10, 32.
-
-On 9 November, Colonel Murray received orders to concentrate his
-regiment along the MSR leading to the Chosin Reservoir. During the
-next two days he deployed the 1st and 3d Battalions at Majon-dong and
-Chinhung-ni respectively. The ambush of a Charlie Company patrol on the
-10th delayed the departure of 1/5 from the Chigyong area. The patrol
-had to be rescued by a battalion attack the next day before the force
-could move to Majon-dong.[300] On the 13th while operating out of
-Majon-dong a 1/5 patrol ran into 50–150 enemy who inflicted 7 KIA and 3
-WIA before withdrawing.[301]
-
-    [300] 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 5;
-          5thMar _URpt 4_.
-
-    [301] 5thMar _URpt 4_; 1/5 _HD_, _Nov 50_, 6.
-
-The 2d Battalion moved out of the Sinhung Valley on 13 and 14 November
-to relieve the 7th Marines of the responsibility for defending Koto-ri
-and thus free Colonel Litzenberg’s regiment for the advance to Hagaru
-and the north. Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion had completed its
-mission without firing more than a few shots and with a total prisoner
-bag of 12 North Koreans and one Chinese.[302]
-
-    [302] 5thMar _SAR_, 12; 5thMar _URpt 4_.
-
-Although the new enemy had seemingly evaporated from the path of the
-1st Marine Division, there was good reason to believe that he was not
-forsaking his aggressive designs in North Korea. For in addition to
-the ominous but questionable predictions of Chinese POWs, eyewitness
-accounts of pilots of VMF(N)-542 provided G-2 officers with information
-of the gravest portent in early November. The Marine airmen made
-nightly strikes from the 1st to the 9th against Sinuiju at the mouth
-of the Yalu, and they repeatedly reported a steady stream of trucks
-moving into northwest Korea from Antung, Manchuria. Time after time
-they blasted Sinuiju with bombs, rockets, and 20mm shells, and though
-parts of the city were continuously aflame, it still seethed with
-activity. They described southward bound traffic as “heavy,” “very
-heavy,” and even “tremendous,” and at least one convoy was reported to
-be “gigantic.”[303]
-
-    [303] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542
-          _SAR_), 1–8.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER VII
-
-Advance To The Chosin Reservoir
-
-_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR--Appraisals of the New Enemy--The
-Turning Point of 15 November--Changes in X Corps Mission--Marine
-Preparations for Trouble--Supplies Trucked to Hagaru--Confidence of UN
-Command--Marine Concentration on MSR_
-
-
-On 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with the
-Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam. General
-Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d, recommended the
-abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts as the best
-location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside the city where
-the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a perfect row.
-All had been victims of the retreating NKPA forces.[304]
-
-    [304] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.
-
-A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites
-were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by
-helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th.
-That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters
-Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En route
-it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.[305]
-
-    [305] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv
-          msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W.
-          Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.
-
-A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun
-positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new CP.
-Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions
-and outposts being connected by telephone.
-
-During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the
-existence of 250 tons of NKPA high explosive, stored only 600 yards
-from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this
-enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A
-16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive
-could be removed and detonated.[306]
-
-    [306] HqBn _SAR_, 10–11; Smith, _Notes_, 513–514. Some
-          explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the
-          caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.
-
-
-_Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR_
-
-Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance as
-the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This
-responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps
-on 3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The 1st
-Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security
-from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion of
-the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong.
-This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon without any
-protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents and the Special
-Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control.
-
-On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North Koreans
-were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon Corps
-notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired on
-railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.[307]
-
-    [307] Smith, _Notes_, 472–473; G-3 _SAR_, 21. The previous day
-          an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a
-          short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, _SAR_, 12.
-
-On 6 November, immediately after landing at Wonsan, the 65th RCT of
-the 3d Infantry Division (less one battalion, placed temporarily under
-1st Marine Division control for the Majon-ni operation) was ordered by
-Corps to relieve elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, USA,
-which had been recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT was assigned a
-mission of protecting the Yonghung-Kowon area and patrolling to the
-west (see map on Page 122).[308]
-
-    [308] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, _3d Infantry
-          Division in Korea_, 69; Smith, _Notes_, 473.
-
-The Wonsan-Hamhung rail line took on special importance after the
-announcement that water transportation would be delayed until
-enemy mines were cleared from the harbor at Hungnam. This made it
-necessary for the 1st Marine Division to send daily supply trains from
-Wonsan.[309] The first two completed the run without incident, but
-after departing Wonsan at dusk on the 6th the third train was halted
-at Kowon by the destruction of rails ahead. North Korean guerrillas
-attacked the train, guarded by a lieutenant and 38 men from Company C
-of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.[310]
-
-    [309] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
-
-    [310] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived
-          from: 1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn _HD_, _Nov
-          50_, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.
-
-The detachment was taken by surprise in the darkness by foes firing
-from both sides of the track. When the Marines attempted to reverse the
-train, the enemy wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler with
-grenades. In the darkness the guard became separated into two groups,
-the smaller of which was surrounded in a car. The guerrillas fired
-through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines to the floor, and threw
-grenades through the windows until all ten men were killed or wounded,
-only two of them surviving.
-
-The remaining 29 men of the guard made a stand on an embankment about
-200 yards from the track. Six Marines were wounded in the ensuing fire
-fight. The train guard broke off the action and withdrew to the area of
-the Army artillery battalion.
-
-An empty train from Hamhung, guarded by a platoon from Company A of
-the Amtracs, was halted at 1700 on the afternoon of 6 November by
-railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of guerrilla activity in the
-area had proved to be only too well founded when elements of the 96th
-Field Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their
-perimeter south of the town was breached with losses to the Army unit
-of equipment and ammunition.
-
-The 2d Battalion of the 65th RCT, which arrived at Yonghung late that
-afternoon, had its baptism of fire within a few hours. Guerrillas
-in estimated strength of 500 to 800 attacked at 0300 on the 7th,
-inflicting casualties of six killed and 14 wounded. Troops of the 96th
-Field Artillery Battalion also came under attack, as did elements of
-the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion
-sent a Marine tank and “Weasel” (M-29) to evacuate the wounded with
-the assistance of the Amtrac platoon guarding the empty train at
-Yonghung.[311]
-
-    [311] G-3 _SAR_, 24; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 13.
-
-At 1400 that afternoon the empty train resumed its run to Wonsan.
-Only two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six cars were
-derailed by a split rail and wrecked just south of Yonghung. Personnel
-losses amounted to one man killed and 14 injured.[312]
-
-    [312] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon:
-          1stAmphTracBn _SAR_, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn HD, _Nov 50_, 3;
-          Dolcater _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 69; G-3 _SAR_,
-          24; X Corps _POR 42_; and _1stMarURpt (S-3) 9_; D/Tks tel
-          to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50.
-
-At almost exactly this same hour the fourth supply train was stopped
-south of Kowon by a blown section of track. The guard proceeded on
-foot to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the
-third supply train, abandoned by the enemy after being plundered.
-One ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car the
-bodies of the trapped Marines were found. So extensive was the damage
-to tracks and switches that rail service could not be resumed until 9
-November.[313]
-
-    [313] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7
-          Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 475–478.
-
-The Corps commander summoned General Smith to Wonsan that morning for
-a conference on measures for the security of the rail line. It was
-decided that only daytime runs would be made thereafter, with the train
-guard increased from 38 to 50 men. The 65th RCT, the 26th ROK Regiment
-and a battery of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were placed under
-the temporary control of the 1st Marine Division with a mission of
-guarding bridges and other key points.[314]
-
-    [314] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps
-          _WD_ 7 Nov 50.
-
-General Smith worked out a plan for the ROK regiment to drive the
-guerrillas southward from the Chigyong area toward the 65th RCT at
-Yonghung. As it proved, elements of both units were given Corps
-commitments which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect.
-They remained only a few days under nominal Division control, being
-used for a variety of security missions along the Wonsan-Hamhung
-MSR.[315]
-
-    [315] Smith, _Notes_, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.
-
-By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their runs,
-95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat Service
-Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead at the
-Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open gondola
-cars.[316]
-
-    [316] 1st CSG _SAR_, 8.
-
-
-_Appraisals of the New Enemy_
-
-It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have
-enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs
-of Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war,
-division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far
-ahead.
-
-Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first
-place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and
-vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff
-had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November
-the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had
-crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria. Three
-days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence summary
-warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale
-counteroffensive.[317]
-
-    [317] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in
-          Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_.
-
-General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half
-of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in Korea,
-indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these units had
-appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps zone north
-of Hamhung.
-
-“At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial
-reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in
-Manchuria, and into Korea.”[318]
-
-    [318] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations
-          in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept
-          State, _United Nations Action in Korea_ (Washington,
-          1951), 9.
-
-Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of
-his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called
-volunteers making a demonstration to encourage the beaten _NKPA_
-remnants? Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military
-intervention?
-
-President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General
-MacArthur an estimate of the situation.[319] The general’s reply stated
-that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of
-Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended “...
-that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of
-military facts.”[320]
-
-    [319] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman _Memoirs_ II, 373.
-
-    [320] Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.
-
-During the next three days the issue of bombing bridges across the Yalu
-posed a question that has remained a controversial subject ever since.
-General MacArthur was granted permission, after being at first refused,
-but cautioned “that extreme care be taken to avoid violation [of]
-Manchurian territory and airspace.”[321]
-
-    [321] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50;
-          JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 375–376;
-          Whitney, _MacArthur_, 405–411.
-
-[Illustration: 1ST MARINE DIVISION ZONE AND OBJECTIVES
-
-November 1950
-
-  MAP-11
-]
-
-In two messages of 7 November, the UN commander confirmed his original
-appraisal to the effect that the Chinese were not making a full-scale
-intervention. But he conceded that reinforcements might enable the new
-enemy to stop the UN advance or even throw it into reverse. He planned
-a resumption of the initiative, he said, in order to take “accurate
-measure ... of enemy strength.” And he repeated that the restriction of
-his bombing operations provided “a complete sanctuary for hostile air
-immediately upon their crossing of the Manchuria-North Korean border.”
-This factor, he warned, could “assume decisive proportions....”[322]
-
-    [322] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman,
-          _Memoirs_, II, 377.
-
-On this same date, with the wary phase of UN strategy at its height,
-General Almond flew to Hungnam to confer with General Smith. The X
-Corps commander still wore another hat as General MacArthur’s chief of
-staff; and though he could not function actively in this position, he
-kept in close touch with strategic aims at Tokyo. Thus the cautious
-spirit of the UN commander’s messages of 7 November was reflected in
-Almond’s changed viewpoint. Where he had previously urged haste in the
-X Corps drive to the border, he was now disposed to put on the brakes
-and carry out that mission with less scattering of forces.
-
-The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed, and the Marine general
-recommended that only enough territory be held for the security of
-Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan. Almond believed that Hagaru should also
-be included, but he agreed that a greater degree of concentration was
-advisable.[323]
-
-    [323] Smith, _Notes_, 552–553.
-
-As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance,
-however, operations again took on the character of an occupation rather
-than a drive which might end in a collision with a powerful new enemy.
-
-X Corps OpnO 6, issued at 2400 on 11 November, called for an advance
-to the border by I ROK Corps on the right, the 7th Infantry Division
-in the center and the 1st Marine Division on the left. The 3d Infantry
-Division, with the 26th ROK Regiment attached, was to have the
-responsibility for the Wonsan-Yonghung area after relieving elements
-of the 1st Marine Division; the Marines were directed to take blocking
-positions at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni. In the Corps rear, the 1st KMC
-Regiment (-) had a zone to the south and west of Kojo.
-
-The Marine zone on the Yalu, about 40 miles in width, was approached
-and bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin area. One of
-them ended at Huchanggangu and the other at Singalpajin. From that
-point the zone of the 7th Infantry Division extended east to Hyesanjin
-(where the border turns north at a right angle) and thence again
-eastward to the Hapsu area. I ROK Corps was to operate from the line
-Hapsu-Chuchonhujang and drive northward along the coast with Chongjin
-as an objective.[324]
-
-    [324] X Corps _OpnO 6_, 11 Nov 50.
-
-Such a dispersion of forces, depending for supplies on poor secondary
-roads through wild mountain regions, could hardly have been
-contemplated if large-scale CCF opposition were expected. As a further
-indication of renewed confidence, General MacArthur asked informally
-and indirectly that X Corps do everything possible to assist the Eighth
-Army in its drive to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal
-letter of 11 November from General Wright, G-3 of FECOM, to the Corps
-commander.[325]
-
-    [325] _X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10
-          Dec 50, 9_; X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5.
-
-
-_The Turning Point of 15 November_
-
-The date of General Almond’s reply, the 15th, is worthy of recognition
-as a turning point. For it was also the occasion of messages from the
-UN commander-in-chief and the commanding general of the 1st Marine
-Division which had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course
-of the Chosin Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions as
-a result of the concepts advanced in these three communications of 15
-November 1950.
-
-Obviously the gap of 80 miles separating the Eighth Army from X Corps
-would have to be reduced before much help could be given by the latter.
-General Almond replied to General Wright in a letter proposing that X
-Corps attack to the west of the Chosin Reservoir while also continuing
-to advance northward in zone to complete its original mission.
-
-That same day, while the letter was en route to Tokyo, General
-MacArthur came to a far-reaching decision. In a radio message he
-directed the X Corps commander to develop, as an alternative to
-OpnO 6, a plan for reorienting his attack to the west on reaching
-Changjin in order to cut the Chinese MSR, as represented by the
-Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon road and rail line.
-
-This was the first indicated change in mission, according to the X
-Corps command report, since CinCFE’s directive late in October calling
-for a drive to the border. The amendment “was made necessary,” the
-report continued, “by the enemy build-up in front of the Eighth Army
-and the fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt ...
-to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of the Eighth
-Army situation ... fixed the relative combat power as 100,000 UN to
-100,000 enemy with UN forces having air superiority and superior
-artillery support.... The enemy was given an offensive capacity which
-he could implement with an estimated reserve of 140,000 CCF troops
-north of the Yalu River. In view of the enemy’s offensive capacity,
-Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to make a general advance
-with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the enemy
-MSR (Huichon-Kanggye). This course of action was designed to meet any
-course of action which might be adopted by the enemy. To assist the
-Eighth Army advance, X Corps was to initiate a main attack to the West
-from the Chosin Reservoir area, cutting the enemy MSR at Mupyong-ni,
-and advance in a northwesterly direction to the Yalu River line at
-Manpojin.”[326]
-
-    [326] X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 4–5.
-
-By a coincidence it was also on Wednesday, 15 November, that General
-Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military events.
-Addressed to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
-this communication made it plain that the 1st Marine Division commander
-and his staff did not share in the renewed optimism as to the course
-of the UN war effort. Not only did the Marines accept the possibility
-of imminent and formidable CCF intervention, but they were making
-preparations to meet it.
-
-  So far our MSR north of Hamhung has not been molested, but there is
-  evidence that this situation will not continue....
-
-  Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to
-  what is our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border.
-  The Eighth Army, 80 miles to the southwest, will not attack until
-  the 20th. Manifestly, we should not push on without regard to the
-  Eighth Army. We would simply get further out on a limb. If the
-  Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision will have to be
-  made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign in the
-  mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier
-  or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this
-  area during the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and
-  wounded.
-
-The letter mentioned such preparations as the work done by Marine
-engineers to strengthen the Hamhung-Hagaru road for tanks and heavy
-vehicles. Plans had been approved, added General Smith, for an airstrip
-at Hagaru capable of landing cargo planes for resupply and casualty
-evacuation.
-
-He emphasized that he did not mean to be pessimistic. “Our people are
-doing a creditable job,” he said; “their spirit is fine, and they will
-continue to do a fine job.” But in conclusion he reiterated his doubts
-about his “wide open left flank” and his concern over “the prospect of
-stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for 120
-air miles from Hamhung to the border.”[327]
-
-    [327] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen
-          Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of
-          General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps
-          conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very
-          thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the
-          assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or
-          landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation
-          to be expected by plane from the air field that we were
-          to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.
-
-General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter when two
-Navy officers called at the CP--Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse,
-chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of
-staff to Admiral Doyle. Both were old acquaintances of the Marine
-general, who had led the assault landing force on Peleliu in 1944 while
-Sears commanded an LST group. Smith felt that he could speak frankly,
-therefore, and expressed his concern over the aspects of the strategic
-situation he had discussed in the letter.[328]
-
-    [328] Smith, _Chronicle_, 31.
-
-CinCFE had requested in his message of the 1st that the plan for
-reorienting the X Corps attack be submitted to him as an alternative to
-OpnO 6. General Almond put his staff to work on the 16th, and that same
-day Draft No. 1, of OpnO Plan 8 was completed. This was a concept of an
-attack on Kanggye by means of a drive westward from Changjin.[329]
-
-    [329] This section is based on: X Corps _Special Report, Chosin
-          Reservoir_, 9; and X Corps _WDSum, Nov 50_, 5–6, 51–52.
-
-
-_Changes in X Corps Mission_
-
-Almond disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the MSR of the
-Corps element making the effort would be too far extended. He requested
-the preparation of a new plan based on the concept of an advance
-farther south on the Hagaru-Mupyong-ni axis and west of the zone of the
-1st Marine Division. The X Corps commander also directed:
-
-  (1) That the Hamhung-Hagaru road be developed as a Corps MSR with
-  intensive effort on the part of Corps troops, including Corps
-  engineers;
-
-  (2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of
-  seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st
-  Marine Division.
-
-The Corps commander considered that Changjin and Mupyong-ni were too
-widely separated as objectives to be assigned to a single division,
-not to mention the difficult terrain. His staff worked for four days
-on Draft No. 2 of OpnO Plan 8 before submitting it to him. He accepted
-it with several modifications and directed that the third draft be
-taken to Tokyo by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, the Corps G-3, for
-presentation to GHQ.
-
-
-_Marine Preparations for Trouble_
-
-General Smith, for his part, lost no time in putting into effect his
-preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack. The
-completion of mine clearance at Hungnam had opened that port on 15
-November, thus easing the transportation situation. That same day the
-7th Marines occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of four
-degrees below zero which threatened an early and bleak winter.
-
-Only four days previously, X Corps OpnO No. 6 had directed the 1st
-Marine Division to take up blocking positions to the west, at Huksu-ri
-and Yudam-ni, while continuing the northward advance to the Yalu. This
-meant a further dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce the 163
-road miles separating his infantry battalions.
-
-In order to carry out the Corps directives, Division OpnO 21-50 of 13
-November assigned the following tasks:
-
-   RCT-1--to seize Huksu-ri;
-
-   RCT-7--to seize Hagaru, and, on order, to seize Yudam-ni;
-
-   RCT-5--to protect the MSR from positions at Majon-dong,
-          Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri, while preparing to pass through
-          RCT-7 in the Hagaru area and advance to Changjin
-          (approximately 40 miles northward);
-
-   Division Reconnaissance Company--to screen the Division right
-          flank by operating in the Soyang-ni-Sinhung valley to the
-          east Division boundary.[330]
-
-    [330] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 21-50_, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the
-          seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a
-          battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv
-          FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a
-          fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-          1437 14 Nov 50.
-
-In connection with the mission of RCT-7, the words “on order” deserve
-special notice. For the commanding officer was directed by Smith’s
-oral instructions to take up blocking positions at Toktong Pass, about
-halfway between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, until additional units of the
-Division could be moved up to the Hagaru area. In other words, the
-Division commander believed that the possibilities of large-scale
-CCF intervention were such as to justify caution in the drive to
-Yudam-ni.[331]
-
-    [331] Smith, _Notes_, 592–594.
-
-Not only would the concentration of the Marine units ease General
-Smith’s concern over the tactical situation; it would also greatly
-simplify the administrative load. Colonel Bowser has commented,
-“Division was faced with the problem of handling a division scattered
-from Wonsan and Majon-ni in the south to the heavy engagement of the
-7th Mar in the north. Add to this the problem of guerrilla bandits
-between Wonsan and Hungnam/Hamhung as well as a completely unknown
-situation to the West, and you have a task of considerable magnitude
-for any division staff.”[332]
-
-    [332] Bowser Comments.
-
-RCT-1 was delayed several days by lack of railway facilities in its
-move 70 miles northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wonsan
-area by the 3d Infantry Division.[333] But most of the other Marine
-units had been pulled up--a battalion or even a company at a time--as
-far as the Hungnam area. Along the new MSR north of Hamhung, the column
-of advance on 15 November consisted of these units:
-
-    [333] 1stMar _SAR_, 13.
-
-   Hagaru--RCT-7;
-
-   Koto-ri--2d Battalion, RCT-5;
-
-   Chinhung-ni--3d Battalion, RCT-5; Battery K, 4th Battalion,
-      11th Marines; Detachment 1st Ordnance Battalion; Detachment
-      1st Service Battalion; 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, 1st
-      Engineer Battalion; Company B (less 3d Platoon), 1st Engineer
-      Battalion;
-
-   Majon-dong--1st Battalion RCT-5; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion.
-
-The Division command and staff took a dim view of the possibility of
-completing “the race to the Yalu” before winter. It was already too
-late, if sub-zero temperatures were any indication; and preparations
-must now be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter
-campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were the
-selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips along the
-MSR, and the strengthening of the road to make it fit for tanks and
-heavy vehicles.
-
-Hagaru, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, had been recommended by
-General Craig as the best location for a forward base when he visited
-here on the 15th. The commanding generals of the Division and Wing
-arrived for a tour of inspection the next day. General Harris made
-the trip at the express request of General Almond, who believed that
-a strip long enough to land R4Ds was necessary to insure resupply
-and casualty evacuation in a midwinter emergency. One of the few
-comparatively flat pieces of real estate in northeast Korea was found
-just south of the town. The black loam promised to make a hard surface
-in freezing weather, so that the prevailing arctic temperatures offered
-at least one consolation.[334]
-
-    [334] Smith, _Notes_, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.
-
-An OY strip had been completed on 13 November at Koto-ri, but heavier
-engineer equipment was needed at Hagaru. Before it could be brought
-forward, the road from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri required strengthening
-and widening. This task had already been assigned to Lieutenant Colonel
-Partridge, commanding the 1st Engineer Battalion. After a survey by
-jeep, he decided to begin operations at the highest point of the
-one-way dirt road.
-
-“By working down,” he explained, “we could first of all provide for
-what we considered to be a dangerous accumulation of snow, and the
-problem of land slides.... The work on the road involved a good bit
-of drainage in order to insure that the melting snows from day to day
-during the sunlight hours would not filter across and destroy the road
-bed. It involved demolitions and drilling and a good deal of dozer and
-grader work.”[335]
-
-    [335] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51,
-          31–32.
-
-Enough progress had been made by 18 November so that armor could be
-sent forward to support RCT-7. Only the day before, the 1st Tank
-Battalion had begun functioning with its Headquarters and Service
-Companies at Soyang-ni, eight miles northwest of Hamhung. The road
-between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri was still impassable for M-26
-(Pershing) tanks until the engineers could widen some of the turns. But
-Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized
-a provisional tank platoon consisting of two M4A3 (Sherman) tanks from
-Headquarters Company and four dozer tanks from Company D at Majon-dong.
-They proceeded without incident on the 18th to Hagaru, operating as a
-gun platoon.[336]
-
-    [336] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare
-          the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO
-          1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.
-
-Opening the mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the
-18th to begin work on the Hagaru airstrip. Five large dozers with pans
-of eight cubic yards capacity arrived at the site the next day, and
-Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking out
-a runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called for a cut
-of 90,000 cubic yards and a fill of 60,000 for a 3200-foot runway. The
-rub was that engineering field manuals prescribed a runway of 3600 feet
-for R4Ds or C-47s at sea level, plus an additional 1000 feet for each
-1000 feet of altitude. And since Hagaru was about 4000 feet above sea
-level, it could only be hoped that pilots were right in estimating that
-a strip of 3000 to 4500 feet might do in a pinch.[337]
-
-    [337] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge
-          interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40.
-
-The 19th also dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station
-at Hagaru for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this
-time, the 1st Service and 1st Ordnance Battalions had been in charge
-of division dumps at Hamhung. Supplies arrived by rail after being
-unloaded from the ships at Wonsan by the 1st Shore Party Battalion and
-the 1st Combat Service Group.
-
-The completion of mine clearance made it possible to order the latter
-organization to Hungnam by sea to operate in-transit depots for X
-Corps. Practically all Division supplies were soon being received by
-sea at this port, where the 1st Combat Service Group separated the
-incoming cargo into proper classifications and forwarded it to the
-dumps at Hamhung. Port operation was the responsibility of the 2d
-Engineer Special Brigade, USA. After the project got into full swing,
-from 2000 to 2500 Korean laborers were employed at Hungnam and as many
-as 6000 tons of cargo unloaded in 24 hours.[338]
-
-    [338] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” _Marine
-          Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54.
-
-A limited amount of rolling stock was available for the narrow-gauge
-railway from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. But it was up to the Marines
-to put the line back into operation, for the X Corps Railway
-Transportation Section already had its hands full with the
-Wonsan-Hamhung route. The 1st Service Battalion was authorized to make
-the attempt, and enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the
-trains. Chinhung-ni thus became the railhead for supplies tracked the
-rest of the way to Hagaru.[339]
-
-    [339] _Ibid._
-
-Preparations were also made for large-scale casualty evacuation to the
-Division hospital at Hungnam. H&S, A and B Companies of the 1st Medical
-Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital while D, C
-and E Companies were attached to RCTs 1, 5 and 7 respectively. As the
-Division center of gravity shifted northward, medical officers foresaw
-the need of a hospital-type facility at Hagaru in addition to the
-clearing stations contemplated at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. Plans were
-approved, therefore, for Companies C and E to pool their resources at
-Hagaru and establish a medical supply dump. Additional surgical teams
-were to be flown to Hagaru in an emergency by Companies A and B from
-the hospital at Hungnam.
-
-Meanwhile the hospital ship _Consolation_, commanded by Captain John
-W. McElroy, USNR, prepared to move from Wonsan to Hungnam. There the
-Division hospital had been enlarged to 400 beds, and an additional 100
-to 150 were planned for the new annex at Hamhung. In order to speed up
-casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars were equipped for that
-purpose on the 35-mile narrow-gauge line from Chinhung-ni.[340]
-
-    [340] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50;
-          1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn _SAR_), 4–7.
-
-
-_Supplies Trucked to Hagaru_
-
-Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were
-included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November. As a
-preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect the
-Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum of a
-battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the MSR in
-zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
-
-RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a battalion
-through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of the Chosin
-Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of Hagaru; and
-(3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni, some 20 miles
-north of Hagaru.
-
-Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the MSR
-in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its 4th
-Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on order.
-
-OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to establish
-a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the dumps of
-RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni; and (3)
-to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The following supply
-levels were fixed:
-
-   Classes I and III, five days;
-
-   Class V, 1 Unit of fire;
-
-   Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the
-      north and west of Koto-ri.[341]
-
-    [341] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 22-50_, 17 Nov 50.
-
-Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission of
-RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement
-from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on the
-18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the
-employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with
-the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at
-a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong to
-execute its mission.[342]
-
-    [342] 1stMar _SAR_, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220
-          18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.
-
-Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps
-verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the
-modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed
-the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to
-establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.[343]
-
-    [343] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; X Corps _OI 17_, 22 Nov 50. See
-          also G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in
-          G-3 Journal, X Corps _WD_, 20 Nov 50.
-
-Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress
-toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which he
-regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy
-positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he could
-now push ahead.
-
-As an added factor, the 1st Marine Division had just acquired a new
-unit. Early in November Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith could
-use the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. This British unit
-of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
-Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached to ComNavFE in Japan, had requested
-service with the U. S. Marines. Smith replied that he would be glad to
-have these fine troops. Highly trained in reconnaissance, they could
-operate with the Division Reconnaissance Company in protecting the
-flank of the Marine advance. The British Marines arrived at Hungnam on
-the 20th and reported to the 1st Marine Division.[344]
-
-    [344] Smith, _Notes_, 638–639; 1stMarDiv _POR 164_.
-
-Division OpnO 23-50, issued at 0800 on the 23d, directed the Commandos
-to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging as far as
-13 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit and the
-Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out CCF troops beyond the
-reach of routine infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to elements of
-the Division were as follows:
-
-   RCT-7--to seize Yudam-ni and maintain one battalion in that
-          position;
-
-   RCT-5--to seize Kyolmul-li (20 miles north of Hagaru) and be
-          prepared to seize Toksil-li (10 miles northwest of
-          Kyolmul-li) and Tuan-di (15 miles northeast of Kyolmul-li)
-          on order;
-
-   RCT-1--to relieve elements of RCT-7 in the vicinity of Hagaru and
-          Koto-ri and protect the Division MSR from positions in the
-          vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni;
-
-   1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)--to protect the MSR from
-          positions in the vicinity of Majon-dong and Soyang-ni;
-
-   1st Engineer Battalion--to support Division operations with
-          priority to the maintenance of the MSR and construction of
-          the airfield at Hagaru.
-
-OpnO 23-50 also provided that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment
-continue operation of the truckhead at Hagaru and stock supplies at
-the following levels: Classes I and III, 8 days; Classes II and IV, as
-required; and Class V, one and one-third U/F for all troops operating
-to the north and west of Chinhung-ni.[345]
-
-    [345] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 23-50_, 23 Nov 50.
-
-The trucking facilities of the Division had been strained to the
-limit ever since the Wonsan landing. Shortly afterwards the bulk of
-the 7th Motor transport Battalion was taken under the operational
-control of X Corps, and it became necessary to attach the 1st Motor
-Transport Battalion to RCT-7. On 19 November, however, the 1st MT (less
-detachments) had passed to the control of the 1st Supply Regulating
-Detachment at Hagaru. There the truckers not only built up the
-stockpile of supplies but rendered the best support that units of the
-division had known so far along the MSR.[346]
-
-    [346] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn _SAR_), 4,
-          7; 7th MTBn _SAR_, 2–3.
-
-
-_Confidence of UN Command_
-
-General MacArthur did not appear to be shaken by EUSAK G-2 reports
-during the third week of November which called attention to a
-formidable CCF build-up on both sides of the Yalu. On the contrary,
-a UN order of the 20th, giving directions for the conduct of troops
-at the border, indicated that an occupation rather than a fight was
-expected:
-
-  Elements of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate
-  vicinity of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or
-  vehicles will go beyond the boundary between Korea and Manchuria,
-  or between Korea and the USSR, nor will fire be exchanged with, or
-  air strikes be requested on forces north of the northern boundary
-  of Korea. Rigid control of troop movements in vicinity of northern
-  boundary will be exercised. _Damage, destruction or disruption of
-  service of power plants will be avoided._ No personnel, military
-  or civilian, will be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the
-  Manchurian or USSR border. Commanders will insure that the sanctity
-  of the international border is meticulously preserved.[347]
-
-    [347] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.
-
-The italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made
-converts in high State Department as well as Defense circles in
-Washington. The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned
-chiefly with defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the power
-complexes along the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that early in
-November the Sinuiju radio described the CCF troops crossing the river
-as a “volunteer corps” for the protection of the hydro-electric plants
-along the Yalu serving Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Proceeding from
-this premise, it was a logical conclusion that if no provocation were
-given these forces, a large-scale fight might be avoided.[348]
-
-    [348] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists
-          Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, _Memoirs_,
-          II, 372.
-
-General MacArthur, after receiving a qualified permission to bomb the
-Yalu bridges, had enjoined UN airmen not to violate territory or air
-space on the other side of the river. This meant that the bomber crews
-must take much greater risks, since their restricted axes of approach
-and flight paths were known to enemy antiaircraft gunners in advance.
-Moreover, CCF jet fighters could attack and retire to the sanctuary of
-Manchuria when hard-pressed.[349]
-
-    [349] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50;
-          Schnabel, _Korean Conflict_. See also Karig, _Korea_,
-          376–378.
-
-Despite these handicaps, Air Force and Navy bombers knocked out four of
-the twelve international bridges and damaged most of the others. These
-efforts doubtless imposed delays, but troops and supplies continued
-to cross throughout November.[350] After arrival in North Korea, they
-seemed to vanish into that void of mystery which had swallowed up
-Chinese Communist troops ever since they broke off contact.
-
-    [350] Schnabel _Korean Conflict_. Bombing of the bridges ceased
-          6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, _Report
-          from the Secretory of Defense ... on Operations in
-          Korea_, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.
-
-Students of history may have recalled at this time that one of the most
-significant engagements of modern history was known as the Battle of
-the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the clash of 30 April
-1904 was not a great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking at
-Chemulpo (Inchon) and marching up the Korean peninsula, numbered five
-times the Russian force which opposed the crossing of the Yalu at Uiji,
-just east of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless to be expected,
-yet a new page of history had opened. For the first time in modern
-chronicles, an Asiatic army had successfully challenged a European army
-with the weapons and tactics of the Machine Age.
-
-Now, nearly half a century later, history was repeating itself as
-another Asiatic army crossed the Yalu with unknown capabilities and
-intentions. If the Chinese Communists were merely sending a force to
-guard the hydro-electric complexes and frontier, hopes of peace by
-Christmas might be realized. But if the invaders were secretly massing
-for an all-out counter-offensive, a great new war might soon be flaming
-up from the ashes of the old.
-
-Little fault can be found with current G-2 estimates of CCF numbers,
-which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the wisdom of
-hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of CCF intentions
-by the UN command, and there can be no doubt that an end-of-the-war
-atmosphere prevailed on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive of 24
-November.
-
-Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in Korea
-and the United States in a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious
-peace which seemed almost within grasp. It was a tribute to American
-bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were
-served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside
-restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units,
-included shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, roast young tom turkey with
-cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes, fruit salad, fruit cake, mince
-pie and coffee.[351]
-
-    [351] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.
-
-As an item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned the
-day before that the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division had
-reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin. Not a single Chinese soldier had
-been encountered by troops who had troubles enough with sub-zero
-temperatures and mountain roads.[352]
-
-    [352] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north
-          as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the
-          6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to
-          be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first
-          CCF attacks. EUSAK, _WDSum, Oct 50_, 38, 44.
-
-Since the first week of November, in fact, there had been no clashes of
-any importance with the invaders from Red China. On the 24th, as usual,
-the front was quiet everywhere except for minor patrol contacts. Yet
-this was the D-day of the great Eighth Army offensive, and the stirring
-communique of the commander-in-chief was read to all troops in Korea.
-It was a message in the bold spirit of Inchon, and no one could doubt
-the confidence of the UN command after hearing these words:
-
-  The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea
-  against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its
-  decisive effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air
-  forces of all types, have for the past three weeks, in a sustained
-  attack of model coordination and effectiveness, successfully
-  interdicted enemy lines of support from the north so that further
-  reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and essential
-  supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with
-  noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding
-  enveloping position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the
-  enemy’s geographical potential. This morning the western sector
-  of the pincer moves forward in general assault in an effort to
-  complete the compression and close the vise. If successful, this
-  should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and
-  unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations
-  military forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean
-  people and nation of full sovereignty and international equality.
-  It is that for which we fight.[353]
-
-                                        /s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,
-                                              _General of the Army_,
-                                                 _United States Army_,
-                                                 _Commander-in-Chief_.
-
-    [353] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.
-
-Eighth Army troops found it something of an anticlimax, after this
-message, to jump off without meeting any large-scale opposition.
-General MacArthur, who flew to the front for the occasion, watched from
-his plane as the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a
-motor march.
-
-“The Army offensive began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours on 24 November,”
-said the EUSAK report. “Since for some time there had been little
-contact with enemy forces the advance of EUSAK elements was in the
-nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance in the
-initial stage. Across the Eighth Army front as a whole, advances were
-made from 4000 to 16,000 yards.”[354]
-
-    [354] EUSAK _WD_, 24 Nov 50.
-
-
-_Marine Concentration on MSR_
-
-On this same day Lieutenant Colonel Chiles presented X Corps OpnPlan 8,
-Draft 3, at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC Headquarters with only one
-modification--the shifting of the proposed boundary between X Corps and
-Eighth Army farther to the south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division.
-
-This plan was the basis of X Corps OpnO 7. Issued on the 25th, it
-provided for a reorientation of the X Corps attack to provide more
-assistance for Eighth Army. H-hour was to be 0800 on the 27th, and the
-principal units of X Corps were assigned these tasks:
-
-  1st Marine Division--to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu;
-
-  7th Infantry Division--(1) to attack from east side of Chosin
-  Reservoir and advance to Yalu in zone; (2) to secure Pungsan area,
-  coordinating with 1 ROK Corps;
-
-  1 ROK Corps--to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas, destroying
-  enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea;
-
-  3rd Infantry Division--(1) to gain and maintain contact with the
-  right flank of Eighth Army in zone; (2) to protect the left flank
-  of X Corps; (3) to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps
-  order; (4) to protect harbor and airfield at Wonsan; (5) to destroy
-  enemy guerrillas in zone.[355]
-
-    [355] X Corps _OpnO 7_, 25 Nov. 50.
-
-A Corps warning order, issued on the evening of the 24th, was
-supplemented by a briefing session at Corps Headquarters at 1000 the
-next morning. General Smith learned that his division was to be the
-northern arm of the pincers in the “massive compression envelopment”
-while the 7th Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission
-of advancing east of the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu.[356]
-
-    [356] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps
-          _WD_, 25 Nov 50; Smith, _Notes_, 727.
-
-The new Marine boundary cut across Korea to the north of Eighth Army.
-From Yudam-ni the Marine route of advance led to Mupyong-ni 55 miles to
-the west. This objective was about halfway between Huichon in the south
-and Kanggye in the north (see map, Page 130). From the latter, which
-was believed to be the assembly area of the NKPA remnants, a good road
-led about 40 miles north to Manpojin on the Yalu.
-
-In accordance with Corps OpnO 7, the rear boundary of the 1st Marine
-Division had been moved north to a line just south of Hagaru. The 3d
-Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south of Hagaru,
-but this unit had so many other commitments that it could assign few
-troops to the task. General Smith was granted permission, therefore,
-to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. This left the 3d
-Infantry Division responsible for the protection of the MSR from Sudong
-southward to Hamhung.[357]
-
-    [357] Smith, _Notes_, 727–729.
-
-Corps OpnO 7, in short, provided for a wide envelopment to be
-spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division on 27 November. The other arm
-of the pincers, of course, was to be the Eighth Army; but on the
-evening of the 25th came the disturbing news that its right wing, the
-II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke.
-This reverse took place in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles
-southwest of Yudam-ni.[358]
-
-    [358] _Ibid._, 728; EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov 50.
-
-EUSAK intelligence reports, as it proved, were not far off the mark in
-estimating enemy strength on the Eighth Army front at 149,741 troops
-at this time.[359] During the past few days, however, estimates of
-probable enemy courses of action had been so reassuring as to justify
-the confidence of CinCFE’s communique on D-day. Even the setback of the
-25th was not regarded as alarming.
-
-    [359] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of
-          95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of the day before. EUSAK
-          _PIR 136_, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 25 Nov 50.
-
-“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the
-east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the
-EUSAK attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks
-in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to be
-“an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong local
-counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities with
-bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by CCF
-or USSR forces.”[360]
-
-    [360] EUSAK _PIR 137_, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK _WD_, 26 Nov
-          50.
-
-On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave
-General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units
-and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1
-from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry
-regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5 to
-advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to Yudam-ni.
-
-Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate
-transportation had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only
-by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to
-Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines
-on 23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1
-Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles,
-3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to
-Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.[361]
-
-    [361] 1stMar _SAR_, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_,
-          2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.
-
-All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin
-Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at
-Hagaru, however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance
-in this quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th
-when a platoon-size patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove
-nearly to the northern end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups
-were flushed out and an abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit
-resulting in five Chinese killed and one captured. This was one
-of the few encounters in an area combed by patrols from all three
-battalions, and no signs of large-scale enemy activity were reported
-by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter
-reconnaissance.[362]
-
-    [362] 5thMar _SAR_ 15–18. Smith, _Notes_, 626.
-
-Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had first
-been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But until
-RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander limited
-the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated 150 to
-200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered with the
-aid of air strikes and artillery support.
-
-On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion
-led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant Colonel
-Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped but
-undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along
-the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the
-24th with a full, hot turkey dinner--their last full meal for 17
-days--and seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible
-resistance.[363] The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11
-(-) followed.
-
-    [363] 7thMar _SAR_, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19
-          Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
-
-Marine operations east of the Chosin Reservoir came to an end at
-1200 on the 25th with the relief of RCT-5 by the 1st Battalion, 32d
-Infantry, 7th Infantry Division. Corps orders called for this unit
-to remain under operational control of the 1st Marine Division until
-the assumption of command in the area by the CO, 31st Infantry. All
-elements of RCT-5 were to be relieved by the following noon for the
-mission of advancing to Yudam-ni and then passing through RCT-7 to lead
-the attack toward Mupyong-ni.[364]
-
-    [364] 5thMar _SAR_, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25
-          Nov 50.
-
-This was in accordance with Division OpnO 24-50, issued at 0800 on the
-26th to implement the provisions of Corps OpnO 7. The jump-off was to
-be at 0800 on 27 November, with the first objective the road junction
-at Yongnim-dong (27 road miles west of Yudam-ni), in preparation for
-further advance on order to the high ground about one mile south of
-Kogae-gol and 35 miles west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions of OpnO 24-50
-were as follows:
-
-   RCT-7--to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when
-          passed through by RCT-5, to protect the Division MSR from
-          Sinhung-ni (7 miles west of Hagaru) to Yudam-ni;
-
-   RCT-5--to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27
-          November, advance to the west and seize first objective,
-          prepared for further advance;
-
-   RCT-1--in Division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of
-          Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru for the protection of the
-          MSR;
-
-   11th Marines--less detachments, to provide general support from
-          positions in the vicinity of Yudam-ni;
-
-   41st Commando--reinforced, to move to Yudam-ni prepared for
-          operations to the southwest to protect Division left flank;
-
-   Reconnaissance Company--to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the
-          north in co-ordination with operations of RCT-7.[365]
-
-    [365] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 24-50_, 26 Nov 50.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 421351
-
-  _Operation Yo-Yo--Back and forth, changing course at
-  twelve-hour intervals, the ships bearing the Marines and their
-  gear mark time during mine clearance operations at Wonsan._
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 351586
-]
-
-  _Wonsan Arrivals--Above, Bob Hope entertaining Marine airmen
-  who were first to reach the seaport; and, below, Marine
-  infantry disembarking from cargo nets of_ Marine Phoenix _into
-  the LCVPs_.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 421451
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  USN Photo 421319                                USN Photo 421362
-]
-
-  _Administrative Landing--Above, an LCM and a troop-laden
-  amtrac in Wonsan harbor; and, below, LSTs drawn up abreast to
-  land the thousands of tons of supplies required by a division._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 421388
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 351722
-]
-
-  _Wonsan Scenes--Above, a camouflaged hangar on Wonsan
-  airfield; below, Marine infantry in railway station awaiting
-  transportation shortly after their debarkation._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4552
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4323
-]
-
-  _First Action in Northeast Korea--Two views of Marine infantry
-  mopping up guerrillas after surprise counterattack in Kojo
-  area by NKPA troops escaping to join Chinese Reds._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4327
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  USN Photo 423189                 Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
-]
-
-  _On the Planning Level--Above, RAdm J. H. Doyle, CTF-90, and
-  BrigGen E. A. Craig, ADC of 1st Marine Division; below, V/Adm
-  A. D. Struble, Cdr JTF-7, and MajGen E. M. Almond, CG X Corps,
-  in the USS_ Missouri.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 422376
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 391740
-]
-
-  _Command Conference--Above, left to right, MajGen W. J.
-  Wallace, USMC; LtGen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC; MajGen O.
-  P. Smith, USMC; MajGen E. A. Almond, USA; and MajGen Field
-  Harris, USMC; below, 1st Marine Division CP at Hungnam._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4534
-]
-
-  _First Chinese Resistance--Above, infantry of 7th Marines
-  setting up mortar during initial encounter with Chinese in
-  northeast Korea; and, below, enemy tank killed by Marine fire._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  Photo courtesy Maj R. B. Crossman
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4550
-]
-
-  _Advance of RCT-7--Above, artillery emplacement of Battery
-  G, 11th Marines, on 3 November 1950; and, below, supplies
-  transported over railroad from Wonsan to Hamhung._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 352741
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 365268
-]
-
-  _As Seen from the Air--Above, “Frozen Chosin” and the rugged
-  terrain of the Reservoir area; and, below, an aerial view of
-  the MSR winding its precarious way through Funchilin Pass--“a
-  cliff on one side and a chasm on the other.”_
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5389
-]
-
-  _As Seen by the Infantry--Here are two views of the sort
-  of terrain encountered by the infantry of the 1st Marine
-  Division; sometimes it was as difficult to complete an
-  approach march as to dislodge the enemy after arrival._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5432
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  USMC Photo A 4841      USMC Photo A 4912
-]
-
-  _Air Supply and Evacuation--Above, an air drop of supplies
-  and helicopter evacuation of casualties at Yudam-ni; below,
-  parachute-rigged cases of ammunition in an Air Force C-47._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 353608
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4860
-]
-
-  _Preparations for Yudam-ni Breakout--Above, Marines selecting
-  gear for breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; and, below, the
-  first stages of the three-day fighting advance._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4843
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4500
-]
-
-  _Chinese Communist POWs--Above, these CCF prisoners don’t seem
-  unhappy about their captivity; below, a Chinese officer being
-  interrogated with the aid of an interpreter._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5206
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5675
-]
-
-  _Marines on the March--These two pictures give some idea of
-  the exhaustion of Marines, many of them walking wounded, as
-  they huddle by the roadside during halts of the Yudam-ni
-  breakout._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5676
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5356
-]
-
-  _Covered by Artillery--Above, a 105mm howitzer fires to the
-  rear as the infantry fights its way forward from Yudam-ni;
-  below, a quarter of a mile per hour was considered good
-  progress._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4863
-]
-
-General Smith, flying by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on the
-morning of the 26th, could survey the MSR below him and reflect with
-satisfaction that it was now easier to count the Marine outfits south
-of Chinhung-ni than those to the north. These included the 1st Tank
-Battalion with the exception of the provisional platoon at Hagaru and
-the 2d Platoon of Company D at Chinhung-ni. Transportation had not yet
-been provided for the 41st Commando, but the new unit was scheduled
-to move up in convoy on the 28th with Headquarters Battalion when the
-Division CP displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru. By that time only service
-units and a few platoons of tanks and engineers would be left in the
-rear area.
-
-At Hagaru the C-47 airstrip was taking shape as the dozers hacked away
-at the frozen earth night and day, working under flood lights in the
-darkness. Companies C and E of the 1st Medical Battalion had set up
-clearing stations and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop units
-at Hagaru and Yudam-ni had two days’ supplies of rations and fuel, but
-only a unit of fire was stockpiled at Hagaru in addition to the half
-unit carried by the troops.
-
-Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting mountain
-road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack in the
-morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP, General
-Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a
-rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter
-dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury
-resulted to passenger, pilot or machine.[366]
-
-    [366] Smith, _Chronicle_, 89.
-
-On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines,
-reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They
-asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army
-had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted
-men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from
-Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.[367]
-
-    [367] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.
-
-X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast from
-Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast
-of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified
-in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates
-of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although Chinese
-attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung
-axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a continued
-westward withdrawal more likely.[368]
-
-    [368] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 32;
-          1stMarDiv _PIR 33_.
-
-Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and staff
-that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country west
-of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the relatively
-fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.[369]
-
-    [369] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, _Chronicle_, 79,
-          82, 87.
-
-It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned to
-Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on either
-side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad
-hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine
-general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse
-in west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated
-on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d
-Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the
-Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the
-Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United
-Nations envelopment.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER VIII
-
-Crisis at Yudam-ni
-
-_Marine Attack on 27 November--Marine Disposition Before CCF
-Attack--The Battle of Northwest Ridge--Chinese Seize Hill
-1403--Fighting at 3/5’s CP--The Battle of North Ridge_
-
-
-The 2d battalion, vanguard of the 5th Marines, completed its move
-from the east coast of the Chosin Reservoir to Yudam-ni during the
-afternoon and evening of 26 November. After deploying his command south
-of the village, Lieutenant Colonel Roise and his S-3, Major Theodore
-F. Spiker, made a reconnaissance in preparation for the next day’s
-attack.[370]
-
-    [370] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9.
-
-Yudam-ni lies in the center of a broad valley surrounded by five great
-ridges, named in relation to their direction from the village: North,
-Northwest, Southwest, South, and Southeast. Beginning at the rim of
-the valley, each of these ridges extends several thousand yards and
-includes many peaks, spurs, and draws, certain of which took on special
-significance as the crisis at Yudam-ni unfolded.
-
-A finger of the Chosin Reservoir reaches toward Yudam-ni in the
-valley between North and Southeast Ridges. The other four corridors
-radiating from the valley are highway routes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise
-surveyed the westerly road, which leaves Yudam-ni between Northwest and
-Southwest Ridges. His assigned objective encompassed distant spurs of
-these heights, bordering the road about a mile and a half west of the
-village.[371]
-
-    [371] 5thMar _OpnO 39-50_, 26 Nov 50.
-
-The 7th Marines (-) was disposed in perimeter around Yudam-ni on
-terminal hills of four of the five ridges: D and E Companies (attached
-to 1/7) on North Ridge, 3/7 on Southwest, and 1/7 on South and
-Southeast.[372] Since the high ground occupied by 3/7 overlooked the
-route of attack and Roise’s objective, Colonel Litzenberg[373] later
-in the day specified a new destination for 2/5, a pass ten miles west
-of Yudam-ni. It was a big order, but Litzenberg’s troops would support
-the 5th Marines’ outfit by making limited advances along the skylines
-of Northwest and Southwest Ridges. With this protection on his flanks
-initially, Roise could concentrate more strength for the drive through
-the low ground.[374]
-
-    [372] The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines
-          prevented H&S and Weapons (-) Companies from moving to
-          Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on the 27th
-          while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support
-          Fox Company. The two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni
-          were assigned to 1/7 for operational control. MajGen H.
-          L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D.
-          Sawyer Comments, 7 Sept 56.
-
-    [373] Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines
-          in the absence of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines.
-          The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col
-          Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as
-          senior officer present. See Col R. L. Murray Comments, n.
-          d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner
-          Comments, 13 Nov 56.
-
-    [374] 7thMar _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 14; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 8–9;
-          Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7
-          Sep 56. Roise Comments.
-
-Nightfall of 26 November was accompanied by an abrupt temperature drop
-to zero degrees Fahrenheit. The north wind screamed across the frozen
-reservoir and lashed the Marines on the valley floor and hillsides
-around Yudam-ni. At 2200, a group of half-frozen company commanders
-gathered within the flapping walls of Roise’s blackout tent to receive
-their orders. The attack was to start at 0800 the next morning,
-with 2/5 passing through the 7th Marines in a column of companies.
-Recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch mortars of the 5th Marines would support
-the advance, along with First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards’ 2d Platoon
-of Able Company Engineers. Two Corsairs of VMF-312 and a spotter
-plane from VMO-6 were to provide aerial reconnaissance and close air
-support.[375]
-
-    [375] 2/5 _SAR_, 14.
-
-In other wind-blown tents, 7th Regiment officers learned of their
-missions as assigned by Colonel Litzenberg. The 3d Battalion would
-move farther along the crest of Southwest Ridge on 27 November and
-also seize the terminal peak, Hill 1403, of Northwest Ridge across
-the MSR, in order to support 2/5’s attack more effectively. Dog and
-Easy Companies were to patrol North Ridge and the west coast of the
-Reservoir, while 1/7 scouted both South and Southeast Ridges and
-their adjoining corridors. Particular attention would be paid to the
-valley running southward between these hill masses, for therein lay the
-vital road to Hagaru.[376]
-
-    [376] 7thMar FragO, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 20–21.
-
-[Illustration: YUDAM-NI
-
-  MAP-12
-]
-
-
-_Marine Attack on 27 November_
-
-The Yudam-ni perimeter was quiet throughout the long, frigid night
-of 26–27 November. At dawn the basin and hillsides came alive with
-parka-clad figures stamping and clapping life back into leaden limbs.
-Gradually they began to cluster around small fires to thaw out the
-morning rations and their weapons.
-
-Companies G and H of 3/7 jumped off in the attack at 0815, the former
-to extend the foothold on Southwest Ridge, the latter to seize Hill
-1403, terminal height of Northwest Ridge. Led by Captain Leroy M.
-Cooke, How Company advanced unopposed and secured its objective by
-midmorning.[377] Captain Cooney’s Company G moved rapidly 1200 yards
-along the crest of Southwest Ridge and occupied a commanding peak,
-Hill 1426, at 0845 without meeting opposition. But when Cooney resumed
-the advance, his troops almost immediately came under fire from enemy
-positions on another peak 500 yards away.[378]
-
-    [377] Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and
-          Lieutenant H. H. Harris reverted to ExecO.
-
-    [378] Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from:
-          7thMar _SAR_, 20–21; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.;
-          2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9; 1stMarDiv _SAR_,
-          annex SS, appendix A (hereafter 1/11 _SAR_), 8–9; VMF-312
-          _SAR_, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50;
-          LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.
-
-During 3/7’s operations on the high ground the 2d Battalion, 5th
-Marines, had marched out of Yudam-ni and launched the main attack along
-the road. Company F, under Captain Uel D. Peters, led 2/5 as it passed
-beneath the steep walls of Southwest and Northwest Ridges. The first
-objective was a long spur of the latter height, 500 yards across a draw
-from the 7th Marines on Hill 1403. Approaching the mouth of the draw
-on the right of the road, Fox Company was hit by long-range small-arms
-fire from enemy emplacements on the objective. About the same time,
-0935, a message from the VMO-6 spotter plane told of CCF positions all
-across the front. Captain Peters held up momentarily to appraise the
-situation, and engineers moving behind his outfit began to clear the
-first of nine unmanned enemy roadblocks that obstructed the MSR.
-
-[Illustration: MARINE ATTACKS - 27 NOV
-
-  MAP-13
-]
-
-According to plan, Company F ascended part way up the slopes of Hill
-1403 and then advanced across the front of the 7th Marines to the head
-of the long draw that set off the Communist-held spur. Simultaneously,
-4.2-inch and 81mm mortar crews positioned their weapons along the road
-to support this envelopment. The flatlands south of Yudam-ni trembled
-as the 105mm howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel Harvey A. Feehan’s
-1st Battalion, 11th Marines, opened up at 1015 with a 15-minute
-preparation.[379]
-
-    [379] Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood
-          who had commanded 1/11 since its arrival in Korea with
-          the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50.
-
-While Company F moved overland to strike at the left (north) flank of
-the CCF position, Captain Samuel S. Smith’s Dog Company edged forward
-along the MSR to the mouth of the draw. Like the earlier unit, it was
-met by a hail of bullets. The regimental 4.2-inch mortars opened fire
-on the crest of the spur, and recoilless rifles slammed 75mm shells
-into bunkers just now sighted on the forward slopes. At 1115, after
-ground supporting arms had partially neutralized the CCF positions,
-Corsairs of VMF-312 blasted the objective with rockets and bombs.
-
-In the wake of the air strike, First Lieutenant Gerald J. McLaughlin
-led Fox Company’s 1st Platoon against the enemy’s north flank, the rest
-of the company supporting the assault by fire from Hill 1403. Most of
-the Chinese defenders fled to the west, and McLaughlin’s troops cleared
-the northern half of the spur by 1300, capturing three Red soldiers.
-The 2d Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Donald J. Krabbe, then
-passed through to secure the southern half, overlooking the road.
-Although the attackers encountered only negligible local resistance,
-they were slowed by heavy machine-gun fire sweeping in from a peak 1000
-yards farther west.
-
-During Company F’s action on the high ground, Dog Company filed around
-the road bend at the south end of the spur and moved toward a valley
-junction a few hundred yards away. This fork is dominated by Sakkat
-Mountain to the west; and the Chinese, in order to block the Marine
-advance, had dug tiers of entrenchments on the eastern slopes of the
-massive height. Frontal fire from these positions converged on Company
-D’s column. Faced by such formidable resistance and terrain Lieutenant
-Colonel Roise discontinued the attack. At 1430 he ordered Fox Company
-to set up on Northwest Ridge for the night, and Dog to deploy
-defensively across the MSR on a spur of Southwest Ridge.
-
-On the crest of the latter, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had found
-progress increasingly costly during the afternoon of 27 November. The
-peak beyond Hill 1426 was occupied by Company G at 1500,[380] bringing
-that unit on line with Dog Company of 2/5 in the low ground to the
-north. Like the 5th Marines’ outfit, Company G was now confronted with
-the broad crescent of CCF fortifications buttressed by the defensive
-complex on Sakkat Mountain. Machine-gun barrages drove the 7th Marines’
-unit off the hilltop, and Company I of 3/7 rushed forward from the high
-ground overlooking Yudam-ni to add its firepower in support. Baker
-Company of 1/7, on patrol in the valley between Southwest and South
-Ridges, ascended into the bullet-swept zone at 1230 to help out. When
-it became heavily engaged, elements of Company C were ordered forward
-from the Yudam-ni vicinity as reinforcement. Thus parts of three
-battalions, 2/5, 3/7, and 1/7, felt the storm of steel and lead on
-Southwest Ridge throughout the afternoon.
-
-    [380] While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements,
-          George Company’s commander, Capt Cooney, was mortally
-          wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.
-
-While fighting raged in an arc from south to west on the 27th, another
-danger area was discovered to the north and northeast, completing a
-vast semicircle of known CCF concentrations in proximity to Yudam-ni.
-A patrol from Company D of 2/7, moving over North Ridge along the
-west coast of the reservoir, ran into heavy machine-gun and mortar
-fire about 4000 yards from the village. Marine air struck at the
-entrenchments of an estimated enemy company, and at 1645 the patrol
-withdrew with several casualties to Company D’s lines on the southern
-tip of North Ridge.
-
-At dusk on the 27th a general calm settled over Yudam-ni, broken only
-occasionally by scattered exchanges of small-arms fire. The main Marine
-attack had netted about 1500 yards, placing 2/5 on the objective
-originally assigned by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel
-Murray. That the Chinese did not allow this battalion to advance three
-more miles, to its new objective and into hopeless entrapment, seems
-inconsistent in view of the CCF plans for the night of 27–28 November.
-The auxiliary attack by 3/7 won 1200 more yards of the crest of
-Southwest Ridge, and the occupation of Hill 1403 by How Company of that
-battalion represented a gain of about 2000.
-
-In a few hours, the Marines would give thanks that their successes on
-27 November had been modest ones.
-
-
-_Marine Dispositions Before CCF Attack_
-
-The units of Yudam-ni will be listed counter-clockwise, beginning with
-those on North Ridge, according to the positions they occupied around
-the perimeter on the night of 27–28 November. North Ridge, bounded on
-the east by the reservoir and on the west by the valley separating
-Northwest Ridge, lay closest to the village and was therefore of
-immediate tactical importance. Facing this hill mass from Yudam-ni,
-one sees four distinct terminal heights: Hill 1167 on the right, Hills
-1240 and 1282 in the center, and the giant spur of Hill 1384 on the
-left. Companies D and E of the 7th Marines, occupied Hills 1240 and
-1282 respectively. Since the combined front of these two units was a
-mile wide, they concentrated on their assigned hilltops and relied on
-periodic patrols to span the gaping, 500-yard saddle between. Although
-both flanks of each company dangled “in the air,” they were backed by
-two-thirds of the 5th Marine Regiment in the valley of Yudam-ni.[381]
-
-    [381] This section is derived from: 5thMar _SAR_, 19–20; 7thMar
-          _SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 11–12; 2/5 _SAR_, 15–18; 3/5 _SAR_,
-          13.
-
-The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had arrived from the east coast of the
-Chosin Reservoir at noon on the 27th, while the attacks to the west
-were in full progress. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett placed his unit in an
-assembly area at the base of North Ridge, beneath the large, unoccupied
-spur leading to Hill 1384. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, did not
-complete its move to Yudam-ni from the east side of the reservoir
-until after dark. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Stevens, II, secured for
-the night in the valley below Hills 1282 and 1240; and with Taplett’s
-nearby command, 1/5 thus comprised a formidable reserve behind the thin
-high-ground defenses of Companies D and E of 2/7.
-
-To the left of North Ridge, going round the clock, Company H of
-3/7 dug in on the crest of Hill 1403, terminal height of Northwest
-Ridge. Farther to the left, in the broad draw through which Company
-F had earlier enveloped the CCF-held spur, Company E of 2/5 took up
-strong blocking positions. The latter unit was not tied in with the
-7th Marines’ troops on Hill 1403, there being a steep and rugged gap
-of about 200 yards on the intervening hillside. Easy Company’s line
-extended up the left side of the draw and connected with Fox’s on the
-northern tip of the newly won spur. Company F manned the remainder
-of that finger of high ground, its left flank overlooking the road
-separating Southwest Ridge.
-
-As mentioned before, Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied
-a finger of Southwest Ridge jutting out toward the road and directly
-opposite Fox Company’s spur. To the left, but beyond physical contact,
-Companies G and I of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, defended the
-topographical crest of Southwest Ridge. As an example of altitudes
-and distances involved around the perimeter, the latter company,
-perched atop Hill 1426 (meters), sat 1200 feet above the valley floor
-at Yudam-ni[382] and at a lineal distance of a mile and a half from
-the village. To its left rear, 2000 yards away on the same hill mass,
-Company A of 1/7 defended a terminal peak, Hill 1294, overlooking the
-broad valley separating South Ridge. A platoon of Company C, 1/7, was
-deployed on the valley floor to block that avenue into Marine artillery
-positions.
-
-    [382] Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level.
-
-South Ridge, capped by a conical peak jutting 1600 feet skyward, points
-at Yudam-ni and the reservoir like a great arrowhead. Company B of 1/7,
-after returning from the active patrol mentioned earlier, entrenched on
-the tip, Hill 1276, to cover the deep gorge between South and Southeast
-Ridges. In this narrow ribbon of low ground, the MSR from Yudam-ni
-travels southward four miles before turning abruptly east into Toktong
-Pass. Company C of 1/7, less one platoon, occupied a spur of Southeast
-Ridge near the sharp turn--three miles from the Valley of Yudam-ni and
-five from the village itself.
-
-Even farther out on a tactical limb was Fox Company of 2/7, which
-had departed Hagaru at noon on 27 November[383] to take up hilltop
-positions in the center of Toktong Pass. Its mission, like that of
-Company C, was to guard the vulnerable MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.
-But it was seven miles from the friendly perimeter at Hagaru on the
-one side and over two mountainous miles from Company C on the other.
-Fox Company, numerically and geographically, appeared to be fair game
-for some CCF regiment on the prowl--although appearances are sometimes
-deceiving.
-
-    [383] Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51.
-
-This, then, was the disposition of the 5th and 7th Marines in the
-evening of 27 November: a total of ten understrength rifle companies
-of both regiments on the high ground around Yudam-ni; two battalions
-of the 5th in the valley near the village; and two rifle companies,
-Charlie and Fox, of the 7th in isolated positions along the 14-mile
-route to Hagaru.
-
-The regimental command posts of Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant
-Colonel Murray were located at Yudam-ni along with the usual
-headquarters elements, except for the Antitank Company of the 7th
-Marines, at Hagaru. Also at Hagaru were Lieutenant Colonel Randolph S.
-D. Lockwood’s headquarters of 2/7,[384] and Weapons Company (-) of that
-battalion. For this reason, Companies D and E, on Hills 1240 and 1282
-at Yudam-ni, came under temporary control of 1/7.
-
-    [384] LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov.
-
-Despite the lack of tanks,[385] the Yudam-ni perimeter encompassed
-an impressive array of Marine supporting arms. The 1st and 4th
-Battalions, together with Batteries G and I of the 3d, represented
-almost three-fourths of the fire power of the 11th Regiment. The 48
-howitzers--thirty 105mm and eighteen 155mm--were emplaced in the
-expansive flats generally south of the village, in the direction of
-South and Southeast Ridges. In position to the north were the 75mm
-recoilless rifles of the 5th Marines and the 4.2-inch mortar companies
-of both infantry regiments.
-
-    [385] Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had
-          attempted to come through from Hagaru but gave up the
-          attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one
-          M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese
-          cut the road before the others could follow. 1stTkBn,
-          _SAR_, 21.
-
-The Yudam-ni lines bristled with enough firepower to give any commander
-confidence, but the supply situation was not reassuring. Although
-Captain Robert A. Morehead and a detachment from the 1st Service
-Battalion arrived during the 27th to begin establishment of a division
-dump, the supply level was low. The dumps of the 5th and 7th Marines
-contained about 3 days’ rations, 3 days’ POL, and 2 U/F of small arms
-ammunition in addition to amounts in the hands of the troops. Very
-little artillery ammunition was available beyond that held by the
-firing batteries. During the 27th Colonel Litzenberg sent his S-4,
-Major Maurice E. Roach, to Hagaru to arrange for the dispatching of
-about five truckloads each of rations, POL, and ammunition. They
-arrived late on the evening of the same day--the last supplies to
-get through from Hagaru. That same evening Lieutenant Colonel Beall,
-commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, led all the
-organic vehicles (except 40-50) of the 5th and 7th Marines back to
-Hagaru with the intent of returning them the following day loaded. The
-Chinese, who had already invested the road, for some reason permitted
-the trucks to pass. Beall reached Hagaru without incident. The trucks
-were never able to return.[386]
-
-    [386] 7thMar _SAR_, 42–43; 5thMar _SAR_, 45-50; 1stMarDiv
-          _SAR_, annex FF (1stServBn); 1stMTBn _SAR_, 9; Roach
-          Comments, 24 Jul 56.
-
-
-_The Battle of Northwest Ridge_
-
-At 1830, two hours after the looming mass of Sakkat Mountain had
-blotted out the sun on 27 November, Yudam-ni was pitch black. The
-temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero.[387]
-
-    [387] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from
-          7thMar _SAR_, 21, n. p.; RCT 7 _URpt 5_; 2/5 _SAR_,
-          17–18; 2/5 _HD Nov 50_, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 2253 27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt
-          Samuel Jaskilka, “Easy Alley,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
-          xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n.
-          d.
-
-On Northwest Ridge the infantrymen of 3/7 and 2/5 slowly grew numb from
-the penetrating cold. Trigger fingers, though heavily gloved, ached
-against the brittle steel of weapons, and parka hoods became encrusted
-with frozen moisture. In the cumbersome shoe-pacs, perspiration-soaked
-feet gradually became transformed into lumps of biting pain.
-
-When men are immobilized for hours in such temperatures, no amount of
-clothing will keep them warm. Yet, even more disturbing to the Marines
-on the Yudam-ni perimeter was the effect of the weather on carbines and
-BARs. These weapons froze to such a degree that they became unreliable
-or, in some cases, completely unserviceable. The M-1 rifle and Browning
-machine guns showed stubborn streaks but retained their effectiveness,
-provided they had been cared for properly.
-
-While the Marines sat in their holes and cursed the frigid night, the
-quiet hills around them came alive with thousands of Red Chinese on the
-march. Unseen and unheard, the endless columns of quilted green wound
-through valleys and over mountain trails leading toward the southern
-tips of North and Northwest Ridges. These were the assault battalions
-of the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions. With seven other divisions they
-comprised Red China’s 9th Army Group led by Sung Shin-lun, one of the
-best field commanders in the CCF. Lin Pao, commanding the 3d Field
-Army, had dispatched Sung’s army group to northeast Korea specifically
-to destroy the 1st Marine Division. The knockout blow, aimed at
-the northwest arc of the Yudam-ni perimeter, amounted to a massive
-frontal assault. Another CCF division, the 59th, had completed a wide
-envelopment to the south, driving in toward South Ridge and Toktong
-Pass to cut the MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.[388]
-
-    [388] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, 31–32; G-2 _SAR_, 15, 30–31; _CCF Army
-          Histories_, 13, 21.
-
-[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE
-
-  MAP-14
-]
-
-This was the main effort of the CCF in northeast Korea: three divisions
-against two regiments of Marines. And in addition to the advantage
-of mass, the Reds held the trump cards of mobility and surprise.
-They enjoyed superior mobility because they were unencumbered by
-heavy weapons and hence could use primitive routes of approach in the
-darkness. They had the advantage of surprise because their practice
-of marching by night and hiding by day had concealed their approach
-to a large degree from UN air observation. To offset these odds, the
-outnumbered Marines would have to rely on superior firepower, command
-of the air, and another weapon called _esprit_.
-
-By 2100, Northwest Ridge was crawling with Chinese only a few hundred
-yards from the positions of Companies E and F, 5th Marines, and
-Company H, 7th Marines. The enemy troops, padding silently in their
-rubber sneakers, had as yet given no hint of their presence. To divert
-attention, the Red commander sent a patrol against 2/5’s roadblock on
-the MSR between Northwest and Southwest Ridges. Troops of Company D,
-5th Marines, exchanged grenades with the Chinese and killed two of
-them. The remainder they quickly dispersed with mortar fire.
-
-Simultaneously with the thrust at the roadblock, small enemy teams
-probed Fox Company’s line on the spur of Northwest Ridge, vanishing
-into the night after each light contact. These disturbances in the
-center of 2/5’s zone enabled CCF infiltrators and grenadiers on the
-northern tip of the spur to crawl undetected within a few yards of the
-limiting point between Company F and Company E on the right. Bugle
-calls cut through the darkness, and the grenadiers began heaving their
-missiles while the submachine gunners opened up. The din of this first
-attempt to unnerve the defenders lasted several minutes. Then came a
-sustained mortar bombardment of Marine front lines. While the shells
-rained down, the Chinese opened fire with crew-served automatic weapons
-emplaced all across Northwest Ridge.
-
-At 2125 the mortar eruptions began to walk toward the Marine rear.
-Whistles screeched, enemy machine guns fell silent, and the first
-Chinese assault waves hurled themselves against the juncture of
-Companies E and F. The enemy attacked on an extremely narrow front in
-order to maintain control. His troops advanced in column within grenade
-range, then deployed abruptly into skirmish lines that flailed the
-Marine positions ceaselessly and without regard to losses.
-
-The machine guns and rifles of Companies E and F piled the attackers
-in grotesque heaps up and down the front, but the pressure of human
-tonnage was unremitting. Ultimately, the Reds broke through on the
-northern tip of the spur, where the two units were joined. They
-poured troops into the gap, and as they attempted to roll back the
-newly exposed flanks, they overran part of Fox Company’s right wing
-platoon. Captain Samuel Jaskilka, commanding Easy Company in the draw,
-dispatched a light machine-gun section and a squad from his 3d Platoon
-(deployed in the rear) to reinforce his 1st Platoon at the edge of the
-breakthrough. The latter unit, under Second Lieutenant Jade L. Nolan,
-held firm and bent back its left to prevent encroachment on the rear.
-Staff Sergeant Russell J. Borgomainero, of the 1st Platoon, deployed
-the reinforcements to contain the penetration, while 2/5’s 81mm mortars
-laid barrages on the salient.
-
-At 2215, as the attack against Companies E and F was reaching its
-height, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered H&S Company of 2/5 to deploy
-for the immediate defense of his command post. The Chinese, blocked in
-their attempts to get behind Easy Company, continued to stab at the
-rear of Fox. If their envelopment succeeded, they could swarm over the
-headquarters and supporting arms positions of the 2d Battalion.
-
-Roise’s precaution proved unnecessary. As fast as the Red commander
-sent troops into the salient, they were cut down by mortar,
-machine-gun, and rifle fire. The few who did worm their way into
-Marine supporting positions died in individual combat. At 2230, on the
-right of Company E’s front, the 2d Platoon turned its machine guns on
-a native hut 200 yards up the draw and set it ablaze. The brilliant
-illumination exposed all CCF troops in the narrow corridor and on the
-adjoining slopes; and the Marines commenced a turkey shoot that ended
-at 2400 with the virtual annihilation of the main enemy force.
-
-The Chinese maintained their grip on the northern tip of the
-spur, however, and fought off patrols from Easy Company trying to
-re-establish contact with Fox. Since the gap remained, leaving the
-enemy in position to fire on the Marine rear, Roise shifted the
-reserve platoon of Company D to Fox Company’s side of the salient.
-This redeployment, in conjunction with Company E’s earlier action on
-the other side, converted the penetration area into a gantlet for the
-Chinese. Already weakened by casualties numbering in the hundreds, the
-Red commander apparently wrote off the salient as a net loss, for he
-never used it again.
-
-
-_Chinese Seize Hill 1403_
-
-At 2135, just as the first assault waves were pounding 2/5’s front, the
-vanguard of another enemy force began to feel out the lines of Company
-H, 3/7, on Hill 1403 to the north. Captain Cooke’s three platoons were
-deployed in an arc from the road to the peak of the hill to protect
-the line of communication to the valley of Yudam-ni. Out of physical
-contact with all friendly elements, How Company was assailable from
-every direction, as the Chinese quickly discovered.[389]
-
-    [389] Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section
-          are: 7thMar _SAR_; RCT 7 _URpt_ 6; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 2/5
-          _HD_, _Nov 50_, 9–10; 2/5 _SAR_, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to
-          CG 1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, “Easy
-          Alley,” 18–19; Capt M. P. Newton Comments, n. d.
-
-Following a half hour of lightning probes, the enemy launched a strong
-attack against First Lieutenant Elmer A. Krieg’s platoon on the right
-front. Communications with Cooke’s CP went out almost immediately, and
-in the space of a few minutes the Marine right flank collapsed under
-the weight of CCF numbers. Krieg shifted his remaining men to the left
-and joined Second Lieutenant Paul E. Denny’s platoon.
-
-At the company CP on the reverse slope, Captain Cooke and his forward
-observers radioed for all available supporting arms. The prompt
-barrages by artillery and mortars in the valley stopped the Communists
-on the right half of the summit and enabled Cooke to reorganize his
-forward platoons. As the supporting fires lifted, he personally led
-an assault to restore the right flank. But the CCF machine guns and
-grenades smashed the counterattack, and Cooke was cut down at the head
-of his men.
-
-Second Lieutenant James M. Mitchell, executive officer, temporarily
-took command of Company H. When word of Cooke’s death reached 3/7’s CP,
-Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris[390] dispatched Lieutenant Harris
-(no relation), recently returned to duty after illness, to take over
-the beleaguered unit.
-
-    [390] LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved
-          Maj Roach on 11 Nov.
-
-The younger Harris, who had been out of action since shortly after the
-“How Hill” battle in early November, safely ascended the enemy-infested
-slopes of Hill 1403 in the darkness. About midnight he reached How
-Company’s positions and found all of Cooke’s officers wounded but one,
-Lieutenant Newton. The platoons of Krieg and Denny were badly depleted,
-but Harris moved Newton’s platoon from the left flank to the right.
-Newton’s men regained enough ground in a counterattack to cement the
-company’s position.
-
-After these first attacks against 2/5 and H/7 over the two-mile breadth
-of Northwest Ridge, the Chinese remained generally inactive for a
-period of about two hours. They had paid heavily for minor gains--so
-heavily that fresh battalions were called from reserve to stamp out the
-Marine resistance on the tip of the ridge. And at 0300, several hundred
-CCF riflemen, grenadiers, and submachine gunners commenced the second
-general assault, striking at 2/5 and Company H simultaneously.
-
-In the low ground at the center of the two-mile front, Jaskilka’s Easy
-Company threw a curtain of machine-gun fire across the draw in the path
-of 300 Chinese advancing frontally. The first enemy ranks marched into
-the fire lanes and were mowed down like rows of grain. The CCF soldiers
-in subsequent formations apparently viewed the grisly, corpse-strewn
-corridor with misgivings, for they stopped several hundred yards up the
-narrow valley and took cover. Thereafter, the main fighting in Company
-E’s zone involved long-range exchanges of machine-gun and mortar fire,
-although clashes at close quarters occasionally flared up on the flanks.
-
-Approximately 200 Communist troops had concentrated meanwhile against
-Fox Company on the spur to the left, where the ground afforded more
-cover and space for maneuver. Stumbling over a carpet of their own
-dead, the Reds thrust repeatedly at the center of the Marine line. They
-inflicted many casualties on the defenders and ultimately overran two
-machine-gun positions. But this was the sum total of their success; and
-fighting on the north half of the spur, at the edge of the gap between
-Companies E and F, continued sporadically for the rest of the night
-with neither side gaining any appreciable advantage.
-
-On the right of the 2d Battalion, the second CCF onslaught had struck
-the front and both flanks of Company H on Hill 1403. Human cannon
-fodder of Red China was hurled against the Marine positions for a full
-hour, but Lieutenant Harris’ command held. H Company’s roadblock,
-commanded by Sergeant Vick, decisively beat off a Chinese attack in the
-valley; and at 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Harris ordered the hard pressed
-company to pull back toward the rear of Easy Company, 2/5. Two hours
-later How Company completed its fighting withdrawal.
-
-The loss of Hill 1403 posed a grave threat to the whole defensive
-network around the village. Not only were the Chinese now ideally
-situated to strike at the rear of 2/5 and sever it from the two
-regiments, but in sufficient strength they could attack the rear and
-flanks of the Marine units on North and Southwest Ridges. Moreover, at
-dawn, they would be looking down the throats of some 2000 Marines on
-the valley floor.
-
-
-_Fighting at 3/5’s CP_
-
-The partially successful assault on Northwest Ridge involved two
-regiments, the 266th and 267th, of the 89th CCF Division. Operating
-abreast of this force, the 79th Division had meanwhile advanced over
-the rugged spine of North Ridge toward the two isolated companies of
-the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, occupying terminal Hills 1282 and 1240
-of that huge land mass. Elements of the 79th Division’s three regiments
-were in the fore, and each regiment was apparently disposed in a column
-of battalions. Facing south toward the Marine positions on North Ridge,
-the CCF order of battle, with probable objectives assigned, was as
-follows:
-
-   237th Regt    235th Regt    236th Regt
-
-   Hill 1384     Hill 1240      Hill 1167
-
-  (Unoccupied)     (D/7)      (Unoccupied)
-
-For reasons unknown, the commander of the 235th Regiment did not
-include Hill 1282 in his plan for seizing the high ground above
-Yudam-ni. He ordered his 1st Battalion to take only Hill 1240, and the
-commanding officer of that unit in turn assigned the mission to his
-1st and Special Duty Companies. After these two outfits had seized
-the objective, the 2d and 3d Companies would pass through and, in
-conjunction with other CCF forces in the locale, “... annihilate the
-enemy at Yudam-ni.”[391]
-
-    [391] ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 84,
-          38. Except where otherwise noted, this section is based
-          on: _Ibid._, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May
-          56; 1stLt R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52;
-          RCT 7 _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28
-          Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-          0730 28 Nov 50; 3/5 _SAR_, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J.
-          H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation contains a
-          number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of
-          small unit actions. An earlier translation is to be found
-          in ATIS, _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_, Issue 66,
-          87–134.
-
-Approaching the terminal high ground in darkness, the 1st Battalion,
-235th Regiment, veered off its course and mistakenly ascended a spur
-toward Hill 1282. The 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment, keeping contact
-as it advanced on the left, participated in the error and wound up
-at the foot of Hill 1240. Thus confronted with this precipitous mass
-instead of low, gently sloping Hill 1167, the 3d Battalion floundered
-for several hours and did not take part in the first attack against
-the Marine perimeter. It did, however, send out the usual screen of
-infiltrators.
-
-At 2200, submachine gunners and grenadiers of the 1st and Special Duty
-Companies, 1/235, commenced the preliminaries against Company E, 7th
-Marines on Hill 1282, believing they were engaging a Marine platoon on
-Hill 1240. The harassing force was driven off after failing to disrupt
-the Marine defenses. Almost two hours later, at 2345, Company D of 2/7
-reported enemy infiltration on Hill 1240 a thousand yards to the east.
-Both Marine companies cancelled the patrols scheduled for the long
-saddle connecting their positions and went on a 100% alert.
-
-Captain Phillips, commanding Easy Company, had arranged two platoons in
-perimeter around the summit of Hill 1282, and the third he had deployed
-to the right rear, on a spur that dipped toward Yudam-ni. At midnight,
-after a period of silence across the company front, the initial CCF
-assault wave slammed into the northeastern arc of the perimeter,
-manned by First Lieutenant Yancey’s platoon. Marine firepower blunted
-this frontal attack, and the Reds tried to slip around the east side
-of the hilltop. They ran head-on into First Lieutenant Bey’s platoon
-entrenched on the spur and were thrown back.
-
-Resorting to grinding tactics, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted Company
-E’s position from midnight to 0200. Whistles and bugles blared over the
-reaches of North Ridge, and the charging squads of infantry met death
-stoically, to the tune of weird Oriental chants. When one formation
-was cut to pieces by machine-gun fire and grenades, another rose out
-of the night to take its place. By 0200, as the first attack began to
-taper off, the northeastern slopes of Hill 1282 lay buried under a mat
-of human wreckage. An hour later, the 1st and Special Duty Companies
-of the 1st Battalion, 235th CCF Regiment, had ceased to exist, having
-lost nearly every man of their combined total of over 200. Company E’s
-casualties had been heavy, but the Marines still held Hill 1282.
-
-[Illustration: ACTION AT 3/5’S CP
-
-  MAP-15
-]
-
-On Hill 1240, a thousand yards to the east, infiltrators of the 3d
-Battalion, 236th CCF Regiment, probed Dog Company’s perimeter while
-Easy was under attack. By 0030, some of the harassing parties had
-side-slipped through the saddle separating Hill 1282 and opened fire on
-the 5th and 7th Regimental headquarters in Yudam-ni.
-
-The sniping from the slopes of North Ridge did not surprise the Marines
-in the valley, for they had long been preparing for a possible threat
-from that direction. Early in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett
-had re-deployed 3/5 from an assembly area just north of the village to
-a broad tactical perimeter in the same locale. Companies H and I, the
-latter on the right, he positioned facing Northwest Ridge--specifically
-Hill 1403. Two platoons of Company G held blocking positions near the
-base of Southwest Ridge, and the third manned an outpost on the slopes
-of that high ground. At the bottom of North Ridge, in the draw between
-Hill 1282 and the spur of 1384, Taplett established his CP with H&S and
-Weapons Companies providing local security.
-
-When 3/5’s commander learned that the spur of Hill 1384 was unoccupied,
-he dispatched a platoon of Company I to an outpost position 500 yards
-up the slope. About 300 yards behind the Item Company unit, on a
-portion of the spur directly above the battalion CP, a platoon of South
-Korean police deployed with two heavy machine guns.
-
-At 2045, fifteen minutes before any other unit on the Yudam-ni reported
-a contact, the outpost platoon of Item Company began receiving fire
-from above. This harassment, probably involving advance elements of
-the 237th CCF Regiment, continued sporadically for several hours,
-throughout the period of the first Communist attacks against other
-fronts.
-
-In the valley at 2120, a few men of How Company, 7th Marines, entered
-3/5’s positions barefooted and partially clothed. Taplett, personally
-noting the time of their arrival, questioned them in the battalion aid
-station, and they told how their 60mm mortar position on Hill 1403 had
-been seized by the Chinese.[392]
-
-    [392] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56.
-
-The battalion commander returned to his CP, and after listening to the
-far-off din of the initial Communist attacks, placed his perimeter on
-a 100% alert at 0115. Half an hour later, the Item Company platoon
-on the spur of Hill 1384 reported an increase in enemy fire coming
-from above. A message from H/7 next warned that CCF troops were moving
-around Hill 1403 to cut the MSR. Company I observed activity in that
-quarter shortly afterwards, and at 0218 opened fire on an enemy
-platoon, which promptly retracted.
-
-A few minutes later, a company--possibly two companies--of Chinese
-swept down the spur of Hill 1384, overran the Item Company platoon
-outpost, and continued on towards the police platoon. The South
-Koreans, after inflicting heavy casualties on the Reds with their two
-machine guns, vacated the high ground. Enemy troops then spread out
-along the crest and poured plunging fire into H&S and Weapons Companies
-defending the draw.
-
-Weapons Company, on the far side of the depression, held its ground,
-but H&S, directly under the gun, shortly fell back across the MSR.
-Taplett’s CP was left in a no man’s land, with enemy bullets raining
-down out of the night and Marine fire whistling back from across the
-draw and road. Upon learning of the withdrawal, the battalion commander
-elected to remain in the tent in order to keep telephone contact with
-his rifle companies, which were as yet uninvolved. He did not consider
-the situation too serious, and it seemed as though the police platoon’s
-machine guns had taken the sting out of the enemy assault.
-
-Except for a few individuals, the Chinese did not descend from the
-spur. Nor did they direct much fire at Taplett’s blackout tent, which
-they probably took to be unoccupied. Inside, the battalion commander
-studied his maps, received reports and issued instructions over the
-field phone while his S-3, Major Thomas A. Durham, sat nearby with
-pistol drawn. Major John J. Canney, the executive officer, left the
-CP to retrieve H&S Company and was killed as he approached the MSR.
-Private First Class Louis W. Swinson, radio operator, whose instrument
-had proved unreliable in the severe cold, took position outside
-the tent and covered the approaches with his rifle. This unique
-situation--a battalion commander under fire in an exposed position
-while his rifle companies lay peacefully entrenched several hundred
-yards away--lasted for over an hour.
-
-
-_The Battle of North Ridge_
-
-At approximately 0300, when Taplett, Durham, and Swinson began their
-lonely vigil, the 79th CCF Division launched another assault on North
-Ridge (see Map 16).[393] As a result of the enemy’s first attack,
-and in anticipation of the second, Colonel Murray earlier had moved
-elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into position behind 3/5.
-
-    [393] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from:
-          1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 1/5 _HD, Nov 50_; 7thMar _SAR_, 21;
-          7thMar _URpt 5_; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28
-          Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven
-          Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56;
-          Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun
-          56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.
-
-Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell’s 1st Platoon of Company A
-left the battalion assembly area in the valley at 0100 and started up
-the steep incline of Hill 1282. Climbing the icy slopes by day was
-difficult enough, but darkness and a minus-20-degree temperature made
-it a gruelling and perilous ordeal. Trapnell’s outfit did not reach the
-crest until after 0300, when the CCF assault was at the height of its
-fury and Company E was facing imminent annihilation. The Able Company
-unit moved into position with Lieutenant Bey’s platoon on the spur
-jutting back from the peak. As yet, the full force of the Chinese drive
-had not spread to this area.
-
-The Red commander of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, used his 3d
-Company for the second attack against the cap of Hill 1282. With the
-few survivors of the 1st and Special Duty Companies attached, the fresh
-unit probably numbered about 125 troops. In squads of eight to ten,
-the Chinese struck again and again at the perimeter on the summit, and
-the two depleted platoons of Easy Company dwindled to a mere handful
-of tired, desperate Marines. First Lieutenant Robert E. Snyder’s 3d
-Platoon of A/5, having been sent up from the valley shortly after
-Trapnell’s outfit, arrived as reinforcements. Snyder did not have
-contact with Bey and Trapnell, whose platoons were still intact, so he
-integrated his men with the remnants of the two platoons on the peak.
-
-Both sides suffered crippling losses during the close fighting on Hill
-1282. The Reds finally drove a wedge between the Marine defenders on
-the summit and the platoons of Bey and Trapnell on the spur. According
-to Bey:
-
-  It soon became obvious that a penetration had been made to our
-  left. The positions atop the hill and the Command Post area were
-  brightly illuminated by flares and other explosions. By this
-  time [approximately 0400] nothing but Chinese could be heard on
-  the telephone in the command post and my Platoon Sergeant, Staff
-  Sergeant Daniel M. Murphy, requested permission to take what men we
-  could spare in an attempt to close the gap between the left flank
-  of the platoon and the rest of the company. I told him to go ahead
-  and do what he could.[394]
-
-    [394] Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52.
-
-[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF NORTH RIDGE
-
-  MAP-16
-]
-
-Meanwhile, the center and rear of Easy Company’s perimeter was reduced
-to the chaos of a last stand. Yancey, already wounded, was hit again
-as he tried to reorganize the few Marine survivors on the peak. First
-Lieutenant Leonard M. Clements, the other platoon leader, fell wounded
-as did First Lieutenant William J. Schreier of the mortar section and
-Lieutenant Snyder. Captain Phillips, hurling grenades in the midst of
-the melee, was killed. His executive officer, First Lieutenant Raymond
-O. Ball, took command of Company E, shouting out encouragement as he
-lay immobilized by two wounds. He was hit several more times before he
-lapsed into unconsciousness and died after reaching the aid station.
-Lieutenant Snyder took command.
-
-By 0500, CCF infantrymen of the 3d Company, 1/235, occupied the summit
-of Hill 1282, still believing it to be Hill 1240. The remnants of
-the platoons of Yancey, Clements, and Snyder had been driven to the
-reverse slope in the west, while the units of Trapnell and Bey clung to
-the crest of the southeastern spur, overlooking Yudam-ni. Up to this
-point, Chinese casualties on Hill 1282 probably numbered about 250,
-with Marine losses approximating 150. Easy Company had been reduced to
-the effective strength of a rifle platoon (split in two), and the pair
-of A/5 platoons paid with upwards of 40 killed and wounded during the
-brief time on the battle line; only six effectives remained of Snyder’s
-platoon.
-
-The danger from enemy-held Hill 1282 was compounded by the success of
-the 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment on Hill 1240 to the east. At about
-0105 the Chinese who had previously been content only to make probing
-attacks on Captain Hull’s Dog Company shifted to a full-scale assault.
-Sergeant Othmar J. Reller’s platoon, holding the northwest portion of
-the company perimeter, beat off three attacks before being overrun at
-about 0230. First Lieutenant Richard C. Webber, the machine gun platoon
-leader, attempted to plug the gap with the available reinforcements but
-was prevented by a fire fight outside the Company CP. First Lieutenant
-Edward M. Seeburger’s platoon holding the perimeter on the right (east)
-was under too heavy an attack to extend to the left and tie in with
-Webber. The Chinese overran Hull’s CP at about 0300, and he ordered
-Seeburger and First Lieutenant Anthony J. Sota, commanding the rear
-platoon, to reorganize at the foot of Hill 1240.
-
-Captain Hull, wounded, his command cut to the size of a few squads,
-rallied his troops on the hillside and led a counterattack against
-the crest. The surprised Chinese recoiled and the Marines won a small
-foothold. Then the enemy smashed back from the front, right flank, and
-right rear. Hull was wounded again but continued in action as his hasty
-perimeter diminished to the proportions of a squad position. With the
-approach of dawn, he had only 16 men left who could fight. The enemy
-was on the higher ground to his front, on both flanks, and on the
-slopes in his rear.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER IX
-
-Fox Hill
-
-_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7--Fox Company at Toktong
-Pass--Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge--Deadlock on Hill 1240--The
-Fight for Northwest Ridge--Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill--Not
-Enough Tents for Casualties--The Turning Point of 30 November_
-
-
-Of the Marine artillery units at Yudam-ni, those most directly
-imperiled by CCF gains on North Ridge were Major Parry’s 3d Battalion
-and Battery K of the 4th. The latter, under First Lieutenant Robert C.
-Messman, lay beneath the southeastern spur of Hill 1282, having gone
-into position at 2100 on 27 November. Rearward of King Battery, 3/11
-was positioned below the steep slopes of Hill 1240 where its 105s had
-fired in direct support of the 7th Marines on 26 and 27 November (see
-Map 12).[395]
-
-    [395] 3/11 _SAR_, 6; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS, appendix 4,
-          (hereafter 4/11 _SAR_), 5.
-
-The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which had arrived at Yudam-ni
-early on the 27th to support the 5th Regiment, was emplaced in the
-valley between the tips of South and Southwest Ridges. Major William
-McReynolds, commanding the 4th Battalion, reached the perimeter with
-his outfit later. He had two batteries in action by 1900 and all three
-by 2300 on the low ground separating South and Southeast Ridges.
-Battery K, firing under the direction of 1/11 pending the arrival of
-the parent unit, then reverted to McReynolds’ control, although it did
-not displace rearward to 4/11’s positions until the next day.
-
-The TD-14 bulldozers of the 11th Marines had proved to be no match
-for the eight-inch frostline around the Reservoir, with the result
-that all batteries and security positions sat fully exposed on
-the concrete-like flatlands. Incoming mortar fire harassed the
-artillerymen throughout the day of 27 November, and after dark CCF
-flat trajectory weapons stepped up the tempo of bombardment. Marine
-casualties in the valley were light, however, for the enemy gunners
-seemed unable to group their erratic pot shots into effective
-barrages.[396]
-
-    [396] 1/11 _SAR_, 8; 4/11 _SAR_, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv,
-          26 Nov 56.
-
-It was the imminent threat of Communist infantry attack from North
-Ridge that weighed down on the artillerymen of the 11th Regiment
-during the predawn hours of 28 November. Since the beginning of the
-CCF onslaught, they had been firing their howitzers almost ceaselessly
-in a 180-degree arc, and ammunition stocks were fast dwindling to a
-critical level. Their gun flashes providing brilliant targets for enemy
-infiltrators, they could reasonably expect a full-scale assault in the
-event of the dislodgment of Easy and Dog Companies from Hills 1282 and
-1240. The effect of countermoves by Colonels Litzenberg and Murray
-would not be known until after dawn, and meanwhile the Marine gunners
-kept on firing their howitzers while the black outline of North Ridge
-loomed ever more menacing.
-
-
-_Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7_
-
-While the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions pounded the northwest arc of
-the Yudam-ni perimeter during the night of 27–28 November, the 59th
-completed its wide end-sweep to the southeast and moved against the
-14-mile stretch of road to Hagaru. At the moment the Communist effort
-in that quarter could be considered a secondary attack, but if ever a
-target fulfilled all the qualifications of a prime objective, it was
-this critical link in the MSR--the very lifeline to most of the 1st
-Marine Division’s infantry and artillery strength.
-
-During the 27th Captain Wilcox’s Baker Company of the 7th Marines
-patrolled along South Ridge. As darkness fell, it was heavily engaged
-and incumbered with a number of litter casualties. With the permission
-of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Davis led Captain John
-F. Morris’s Charlie Company (-) down the MSR to positions across the
-road from Hill 1419. Aided by Charlie Company, Baker was then able to
-withdraw and return to Yudam-ni with Davis while Morris and his reduced
-company took up positions on Hill 1419.[397]
-
-    [397] Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56.
-
-He deployed his two rifle platoons and 60mm mortar section in a
-crescent on the lower slopes of the eastern spur, facing the distant
-crest. At 0230, five hours after Yudam-ni came under attack, a CCF
-force descended from the high ground and struck the right flank.[398]
-
-    [398] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived
-          from: Geer, _The New Breed_, 288–290; Lynn Montross,
-          “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” _Marine Corps Gazette_,
-          xxxvii, no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7thMar ISUM 67; and 7thMar
-          msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50.
-
-After overrunning part of First Lieutenant Jack A. Chabek’s platoon
-and inflicting heavy casualties, the Reds lashed out at the left flank
-of the crescent-shaped defense. Here Staff Sergeant Earle J. Payne’s
-platoon, less one squad in an outpost on higher ground, bent under the
-weight of the attack and was soon in danger of being driven out of
-position. Captain Morris reinforced the platoons on each flank with
-men from his headquarters and the mortar section. The reshuffling was
-accomplished in the nick of time and just barely tipped the scales in
-favor of the defenders. A seesaw battle raged until after dawn on the
-28th when, with the help of artillery fire from Yudam-ni, the Marines
-drove the Chinese back into the hills.
-
-Although the critical pressure eased at daybreak, Company C remained
-pinned down by enemy fire coming from every direction, including the
-crest of Hill 1419 directly above. The Chinese were in absolute control
-of the MSR to the south, toward Toktong Pass, and to the north, in
-the direction of Yudam-ni. Morris had taken about 40 casualties--a
-dangerously high proportion, since he had only two of his three rifle
-platoons. His radio had been knocked out by enemy bullets, and the 60mm
-mortar section was left with but a few rounds of ammunition. For want
-of communication, he could get no help from the Marine Corsairs on
-station overhead.
-
-The outpost squad from Payne’s platoon could not be contacted in
-its position on the higher slopes of Hill 1419. Corporal Curtis J.
-Kiesling, who volunteered to search for the lost unit, was killed by
-CCF machine-gun fire as he attempted to scale the rugged incline. Other
-men of Company C repeatedly exposed themselves in order to drag wounded
-comrades to the relative safety of a draw leading down to the MSR.
-
-Surrounded and outnumbered, Morris had no alternative but to await
-help from Yudam-ni. He contracted his perimeter on the hillside east
-of the road, and from this tiny tactical island, for the rest of the
-morning, his men watched Communist troops jockey for position around a
-360-degree circle.
-
-
-_Fox Company at Toktong Pass_
-
-Where Morris had taken a reduced infantry company into its lonely
-assignment on the MSR, Captain William E. Barber went into position at
-Toktong Pass on the 27th with a heavily reinforced outfit.[399] His
-Fox Company of 2/7, augmented by heavy machine gun and 81mm mortar
-sections of Weapons Company, numbered 240 officers and men. At the
-midway point of the pass, Barber chose an isolated hill just north of
-the MSR for his company perimeter. He placed the 3d Platoon (First
-Lieutenant Robert C. McCarthy) on the summit, facing generally north,
-with the 1st (First Lieutenant John M. Dunne) on the right and the 2d
-(First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson) on the left. The 3d Platoon formed
-a hilltop perimeter with two squads forward and the third in reserve
-to the rear. Tied in on each flank, the 1st and 2d Platoons stretched
-down the respective hillsides and bent back toward the MSR. These two
-were connected on the reverse slope by company headquarters and the
-rocket squad. Just below, at the base of the hill next to the road,
-were Barber’s CP together with the 81mm and 60mm mortar sections. All
-machine guns, including the heavies from Weapons Company, were emplaced
-with the rifle platoons.
-
-    [399] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is
-          derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” _Marine
-          Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no. 3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross,
-          “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar _SAR_,
-          20–21; 7thMar _URpt_ 5; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-          1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A.
-          Z. Freeman, 3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and SSgt R. R.
-          Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 Jul 51.
-
-During the first half of the night of 27–28 November, Toktong Pass
-rumbled with the reverberations of truck convoys--the final serials
-of 1/5 and 4/11 outbound for Yudam-ni and Lieutenant Colonel Beall’s
-empty trucks inbound for Hagaru. It was after 2000 before the last
-trucks climbed to the summit, then nosed downhill, whining and roaring
-through the night as they made the twisting descent. Chinese Communists
-had already launched their first attacks against Southwest Ridge at
-Yudam-ni, but Fox Company’s perimeter remained quiet, even during the
-first hour of 28 November.
-
-It was actually too quiet at 0115 when Lieutenant McCarthy inspected
-the 3d Platoon positions atop Fox Hill, now glittering in the light
-of a full moon. Finding his men numbed by the severe cold, he called
-together his squad leaders and admonished them to be more alert. A
-short time later, during his next inspection, McCarthy heard the proper
-challenges ring out at every point.
-
-There was no lack of watchfulness at 0230. For it was then that Chinese
-in estimated company strength lunged out of the night and assaulted the
-north, west, and south arcs of Company F’s perimeter. On the summit,
-the two forward squads of McCarthy’s platoon were overwhelmed almost
-immediately, losing 15 killed and nine wounded out of a total of 35
-men. Three others would later be listed as missing. The eight uninjured
-fell back to the reserve squad’s position on the military crest to the
-rear, and the enemy took over the topographical peak.
-
-Fighting with small arms and grenades also raged on the hillside to the
-left, where the Chinese attempted to drive a wedge between the 2d and
-3d Platoons. Repeated assaults were hurled back with grievous losses to
-the Reds, and they apparently threw in fresh units in their bid for a
-critical penetration. That they failed was due largely to the valor of
-three Marines who made a determined stand at the vital junction: PFC
-Robert F. Benson and Private Hector A. Cafferatta of the 2d Platoon,
-and PFC Gerald J. Smith, a fire team leader of the 3d. These men,
-assisted by the members of Smith’s team, are credited with annihilating
-two enemy platoons.
-
-While the enemy had undoubtedly planned the attack on the two rifle
-platoons with typical precision, it seems that he literally stumbled
-into the rear of Fox Company’s position. Corporal Donald R. Thornton,
-member of a rocket launcher crew, reported that a group of Chinese
-walking along the MSR suddenly found themselves at the edge of Barber’s
-CP and the mortar positions. The Communist soldiers recovered from the
-surprise and closed in aggressively, forcing the company commander and
-the mortar crews to ascend the hill to a protective line of trees. An
-embankment where the MSR cut through the base of the hill prevented
-pursuit by the Chinese. When they tried to climb over it they were cut
-down by small-arms fire; when they hid behind it they were riddled by
-grenades that the Marines rolled downhill; when they finally gave up
-and tried to flee, they were shot as they ran into the open.
-
-On the right (east) side of the perimeter, the 1st Platoon was engaged
-only on the flanks, near the summit where it tied in with the 3d and
-down the slope where it joined the headquarters troops and mortar crews
-defending the rear.
-
-Fighting around the 270° arc of the perimeter continued until after
-daybreak. Despite losses of 20 dead and 54 wounded, Fox Company was in
-complete control of the situation. Lieutenant McCarthy described the
-breaking-off action as follows:
-
-  By 0630, 28 November, the Chinese had received so many casualties
-  that the attack could no longer be considered organized. Few
-  Chinese remained alive near the company perimeter. Individual
-  Chinese continued to crawl up and throw grenades. A Marine would
-  make a one-man assault on these individuals, shooting or bayoneting
-  them. The attack could be considered over, although three Marines
-  ... were hit by rifle fire at 0730. We received small arms fire
-  intermittently during the day, but no attack.
-
-McCarthy estimated that enemy dead in front of the 2d and 3d Platoons
-numbered 350, while yet another 100 littered the 1st Platoon’s zone and
-the area at the base of the hill along the MSR.[400]
-
-    [400] These figures would indicate the complete destruction of
-          a CCF Battalion.
-
-
-_Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge_
-
-As Companies C and F of the 7th Marines were fighting on the MSR in the
-hours just before dawn of 28 November, the first of a series of Marine
-counterattacks commenced at Yudam-ni. It was essential to the very
-survival of the 5th and 7th Regiments that the Chinese be driven back,
-or at least checked, on the high ground surrounding the village.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Taplett, operating his CP in the no man’s land at
-the base of North Ridge, ordered Company G of 3/5 to counterattack the
-spur of Hill 1384 at about 0300.[401] The platoon of George Company
-outposting Southwest Ridge was left in position, but the other two
-platoons, under Second Lieutenants John J. Cahill and Dana B. Cashion,
-moved out abreast shortly after 0300. Driving northward aggressively,
-they crossed the MSR, “liberated” Taplett’s CP, and cleared the draw
-in which Weapons Company of 3/5 was still entrenched. Troops of H&S
-Company followed the attackers and reoccupied their old positions in
-the gulley.
-
-    [401] The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from:
-          5thMar _SAR_, 21–22; 3/5 _SAR_, 14; Taplett interv, 3 May
-          56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d.
-
-Cahill and Cashion, displaying remarkable cohesion on unfamiliar ground
-in the darkness, led the way up Hill 1384. Their men advanced swiftly
-behind a shield of marching fire and routed the few[402] Chinese on
-the spur. The position earlier vacated by the police platoon was
-recaptured, and the Marines saw numerous enemy dead in front of the
-South Korean machine gun emplacements. About 500 yards beyond the
-battalion CP the two platoons halted until daylight. The seven men
-who had formed the Item Company outpost on Hill 1384 arrived shortly
-afterwards and were integrated into Cashion’s platoon.
-
-    [402] Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came
-          from 25–30 Chinese.
-
-He continued the attack soon after daybreak, with Cahill’s platoon
-giving fire support. Cashion and his men plunged into enemy territory
-along the ridge line leading northward to the topographical crest of
-Hill 1384, about 1000 yards distant. They had reached the final slopes
-when Taplett received the radio message, almost incredible to him,
-that the two platoons were nearing the peak of Hill 1384. He directed
-them to discontinue the attack and withdraw to the top of the spur.
-There they were to establish a defense line overlooking Yudam-ni until
-receiving further orders. The spirited drive led by the two young
-officers had taken considerable pressure off the Marine units in the
-valley west of the village. One immediate effect was that approximately
-80 officers and men of How Company, 7th Marines, were able to retire
-into 3/5’s perimeter from the slopes of Hill 1403 on Northwest Ridge.
-
-To the east of 3/5, a second successful counterattack by the 5th
-Marines brought stability to yet another critical point. Company C of
-1/5 had deployed shortly after midnight to back up 3/5, in the event
-of a breakthrough in the valley. Owing to the adverse developments on
-Hills 1282 and 1240, however, it was later placed under operational
-control of the 7th Marines. One platoon left for Hill 1240 in the
-middle of the night to reinforce D/7, and the remainder of the company,
-led by Captain Jack R. Jones, ascended 1282 to assist E/7 and the two
-platoons of A/5 earlier committed.[403]
-
-    [403] The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from
-          5thMar _SAR_, 21; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar _SAR_, 21; 7th
-          Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 _HD, Nov
-          50_, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26
-          Jun 52; ATIS _Enemy Documents: Korean Operations_ Issue
-          66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens,
-          II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19
-          Jun 56; SSgt R. C. Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.
-
-Charlie Company moved up a draw with Jones and his executive officer,
-First Lieutenant Loren R. Smith, in the van of the column, followed by
-the 1st and 2d Platoons and the 60mm mortar section. Light machine-gun
-sections were attached to the rifle platoons. The climb took almost two
-hours in the predawn darkness, the company frequently halting while
-Jones questioned wounded men descending from the top. Numb from cold,
-shock, and loss of blood, they could give no intelligible picture of a
-situation described as grim and confused.
-
-At approximately 0430, the head of the column came under heavy fire
-from above as it reached a point just below the military crest, about
-100 yards from the summit of 1282. Here, Jones found Staff Sergeant
-Murphy from E/7’s 3d Platoon which, along with Trapnell’s, was out of
-sight on the spur to the right. Also out of sight but far to the left
-were Snyder’s platoon of A/5 and a handful of men of Easy Company.
-While CCF grenades and small-arms fire rained down, Murphy explained
-that E/7’s main position had been overrun and that he was attempting to
-form a holding line in the center with some 20 survivors of the summit
-battle.
-
-Jones quickly deployed his two platoons for the attack, the 2d under
-Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness on the right, the 1st under Second
-Lieutenant Max A. Merrit on the left. Murphy’s small contingent joined
-the formation. Second Lieutenant Robert H. Corbet set up his 60mm
-mortar section to support the advance, then took a place in the assault
-line. Down in the valley the 81mm mortars of 1/5 opened up with a
-preparatory barrage. Artillery could not fire because of the short
-distance between friendly and enemy lines, and the first flight of
-Corsairs was not yet on station.
-
-The frontal attack against the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 235th CCF
-Regiment began shortly after daybreak. Jones personally led the Marine
-skirmishers against more than 50 enemy soldiers armed with machine
-guns and grenades. His troops moved upward through a hail of fire and
-overran the Communists after a savage clash that included hand-to-hand
-fighting. The Marines then deployed with the just-arrived 2d Platoon
-of Able Company bridging the gap between Jones and Trapnell in time to
-thwart the advance of enemy reinforcements.
-
-According to enemy reports, only six or seven men survived the 3d
-Company’s defeat. One of them happened to be the company political
-officer, who conveniently had retired from the battle line during the
-crucial stage of the struggle. At 1/235’s CP, a few hundred yards
-to the rear, he was given a platoon of the 2d Company “in order to
-evacuate the wounded and to safeguard the occupied position on Hill
-1282....” The fresh unit ascended the northern slopes of the height
-while Jones’ company was battling its way up from the south. By the
-time the Red soldiers of the 2d Company neared the summit, they were
-confronted from above by the muzzles of Marine rifles and machine guns.
-The whole story unfolds in CCF records as follows:
-
-  As soon as the 1st Platoon [2d Company] advanced to the 3d
-  Company’s position its assistant company commander came up with
-  the platoon. At that time, the enemy [C/5] counterattacked very
-  violently. Accordingly, the assistant company commander ordered
-  the 1st Platoon to strike the enemy immediately and determinedly.
-  Before the 1st Platoon’s troops had been deployed, Lee Feng Hsi,
-  the Platoon Leader, shouted: “Charge!” So both the 1st and 2d
-  Squads pressed forward in swarms side by side. When they were
-  within a little more than ten meters of the top of the hill they
-  suffered casualties from enemy hand grenades and short-range fire.
-  Consequently, they were absolutely unable to advance any farther.
-  At that time, the assistant company commander and the majority of
-  the platoon and squad leaders were either killed or wounded.
-
-  While the 1st and 2d Squads were encountering the enemy’s
-  counterattack, the 3d Squad also deployed and joined them in an
-  effort to drive the enemy to the back of the hill. As a result,
-  more than half of the 3d Squad were either killed or wounded. When
-  the second assistant platoon leader attempted to reorganize, his
-  troops suffered again from enemy flanking fire and hand grenades.
-  Thus, after having fought for no more than ten minutes, the entire
-  platoon lost its attacking strength and was forced to retreat
-  somewhat to be able to defend firmly the place it held.
-
-Meanwhile, according to Chinese accounts, Tsung Hui Tzu, commander of
-the 2d Company, had arrived at the CP of 1/235 with his 2d Platoon at
-0620. Noting that his 1st Platoon was in trouble, he said to the leader
-of the 2d, “There are some enemy soldiers on the hill [1282] in front
-of us; attack forward determinedly.”
-
-The 2d Platoon jumped off immediately with two squads abreast and one
-trailing. Within 30 meters of the crest, the Reds attempted to rush
-Charlie Company’s position behind a barrage of hand grenades. The
-assault failed. On the right the assistant platoon leader fell at the
-head of the 4th squad, which was reduced to three survivors. Tsung, the
-company commander, rushed forward and led the 6th squad on the left.
-He was wounded and the squad cut to pieces. Incredibly, the platoon
-leader ordered the three remaining men of the 4th squad to assault the
-summit again. They tried and only one of them came back. The 5th squad,
-advancing out of reserve, had no sooner begun to deploy than it lost
-all of its NCOs. “As it mixed with the 4th and 6th squads to attack,
-they suffered casualties again from enemy flanking fire and hand
-grenades from the top of the hill. Therefore, the entire platoon lost
-its combat strength, with only seven men being left alive.”
-
-Not only was the commanding officer of 1/235 down to his last company,
-but that company was down to its last platoon. Forever hovering in the
-rear, the 2d Company’s political officer, Liu Sheng Hsi, ordered the
-platoon to “continue the attack.” The assault began with two squads
-forward, led by the platoon leader and his assistant. They charged
-uphill into the teeth of Charlie Company’s position. Like all the
-others, they were ground into the mat of corpses on the blood-soaked
-snow. To complete the suicide of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, the
-reserve squad of this last platoon was committed. A few minutes later,
-“... there were only six men left.”
-
-The 2d Company paid for its failure with 94 of the original 116
-officers and men. This loss, added to those of the 1st, 3d, and
-Special Duty Companies, would place 1/235’s casualties on Hill 1282 at
-approximately 400, including practically all the company commanders,
-platoon leaders, and NCOs. It can be assumed that nearly all of the
-wounded succumbed, since evacuation was well nigh impossible with
-Marines in control of the summit for the next 24 hours.
-
-Marine losses were not light. Able and Charlie Companies of 1/5
-together suffered 15 KIA and 67 WIA. Easy Company of 2/7, according
-to best estimates, made its stand at a cost of about 120 killed and
-wounded.
-
-
-_Deadlock on Hill 1240_
-
-At daybreak of 20 November, several of Easy Company’s casualties still
-lay in their foxholes on the forward slopes of Hill 1282. To recover
-them was an undertaking of great risk, even after the defeat of 1/235;
-for CCF survivors continued to fire at the summit from positions on the
-lower slopes. Captain Jones directed the evacuation and repeatedly ran
-forward of his lines to rescue half-frozen Marines who were immobilized
-by wounds.[404]
-
-    [404] L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, _The New Breed_, 285.
-
-Headquarters personnel of 1/5 spent the whole morning removing
-casualties from 1282 and carrying them to the battalion and regimental
-aid stations, which soon were filled to overflowing. In the meantime,
-Able Company joined Charlie on the crest and assimilated the depleted
-platoons of Trapnell and Snyder. A new defensive line was drawn across
-the vital peak with C/5 in the center, A/5 on the right, and E/7,
-now under the command of Lieutenant Bey, on the left. By midmorning,
-despite the continued exchange of fire with CCF troops on the slopes,
-there was no doubt that the Marines would hold the hill.[405]
-
-    [405] 5thMar _SAR_, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56.
-
-This was not the case 1000 yards to the right, where daybreak had
-found the shattered remnants of D/7 clinging to a toehold on Hill 1240
-and beset from every direction by troops of the 3d Battalion, 236th CCF
-Regiment.[406] The 3d Platoon of C/5, which had been dispatched from
-the valley at 0400 to help, was delayed by darkness and terrain. Second
-Lieutenant Harold L. Dawe’s small relief force became hotly engaged
-on the lower slopes, far short of Dog Company’s position, but made a
-fighting ascent after dawn.
-
-    [406] The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from:
-          5thMar _SAR_, 12; 1/5 _SAR_, 12–13; 7thMar msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 288;
-          Capt H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d.
-
-Initially Dawe missed contact with the beleagured outfit, but
-afterwards the two forces cleared the Chinese from 1240. From his
-position on the northeastern spur of the hill he could see the enemy
-massing on the reverse slopes of 1240 and 1282. Communications were out
-and he could not call for fire. At about 1100 the Reds counterattacked
-with an estimated two or more battalions and forced Dawe to withdraw
-about 150 yards. There his depleted platoon and the 16 remaining men of
-Dog Company held under heavy mortar fire until relieved by B/5 at 1700.
-The price of a stalemate on Hill 1240 was to Dawe about half of his
-platoon, and to Hull practically his whole company.
-
-
-_The Fight for Northwest Ridge_
-
-To the left of North Ridge, dawn of 28 November revealed a tactical
-paradox on the looming massif of Northwest Ridge. Both Marines and
-Red Chinese occupied the terminal high ground, and it was difficult
-to determine which had emerged victorious from the all-night battle.
-How Company, 7th Marines, had withdrawn from Hill 1403, and from this
-commanding peak soldiers of the 89th CCF Division could observe and
-enfilade the whole of Yudam-ni valley. In addition to the 80 officers
-and men of How Company who had pulled back to the lines of 3/5 during
-the early morning, another group found its way to the rear of Easy
-Company, 2/5, as mentioned earlier.[407]
-
-    [407] 3/5 _SAR_, 14, and 2/5 _SAR_, 18; 7thMar msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50.
-
-The appearance of the latter contingent at 0430 was a cause of
-consternation to Lieutenant Colonel Roise. His rifle companies had
-thrown back repeated CCF attacks along the draw and spur on the left
-of the 7th Marines’ outfit, but the loss of 1403 now offset his
-victory and gravely imperiled his line of communications to the rest
-of the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni, a mile to the rear. Nevertheless, 2/5
-continued to hold. At 0600 Company E counterattacked and drove the
-Chinese from the northern tip of the spur which they had occupied
-during the night. Fox Company, its right flank now restored and in
-contact with Easy, lashed out at 0800 and recaptured the two machine
-guns overrun by the enemy four hours earlier. Fifteen CCF soldiers who
-had found their way into the rear of Company F some time in the night
-were destroyed. Easy Company, after its successful counterattack on the
-spur, drove off a large Communist force attempting to move against its
-right flank.[408]
-
-    [408] _Ibid._; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.”
-
-Incredibly, 2/5’s losses for the night-long fight were 7 KIA, 25 WIA,
-and 60 weather casualties. Chinese dead piled across the front of Easy
-and Fox Companies numbered 500, according to a rough count.[409] There
-was no estimate made by How Company, 7th Marines, of enemy losses on
-Hill 1403.
-
-    [409] 2/5 _HD, Nov 50_, 9–10.
-
-At 0145 on the 28th, Roise had received Murray’s order to continue the
-attack to the west after daybreak, so that 3/5 could move forward,
-deploy, and add its weight to the X Corps offensive. Events during the
-night altered Murray’s plans, of course, and at 0545 the regimental
-commander alerted Roise to the probability of withdrawing 2/5 to
-Southwest Ridge later in the morning. The battalion commander, not
-realizing the extent of the crisis at Yudam-ni, thought a mistake had
-been made when he checked the map coordinates mentioned in the message.
-Despite the fact that his whole front was engaged at the time, he was
-prepared to continue the westward drive, and he questioned regimental
-headquarters about the “error” which would take his battalion rearward.
-Needless to say, the correctness of the map coordinates was quickly
-confirmed.[410]
-
-    [410] 5thMar _SAR_, 21; 2/5 _SAR_, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv
-          13 Jun 56.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Murray visited Colonel Litzenberg at dawn on the
-28th, while elements of the 5th Marines were counterattacking the
-Chinese forces on North and Northwest Ridges. They agreed that the
-enemy had appeared in sufficient strength to warrant a switch to
-the defensive by both regiments, and Murray cancelled the scheduled
-westward attack by his 2d and 3d Battalions. At 1100 he ordered 2/5
-to pull back to Southwest Ridge, tying in on the left with 3/7 on the
-same hill mass, and on the right with 3/5, whose line extended from
-the valley northwest of Yudam-ni to the crest of North Ridge.[411]
-
-    [411] _Ibid._; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.
-
-Orders officially halting the northwestward advance and directing the
-5th Marines to coordinate positions with the 7th Marines were sent
-by General Smith at 1650.[412] Twenty-three minutes earlier he had
-ordered the 7th Marines to attack to the south and reopen the MSR to
-Hagaru.[413]
-
-    [412] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50.
-
-    [413] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50.
-
-To coordinate better the defense of the new perimeter, Murray moved his
-CP from the northwestern edge of Yudam-ni to the center of the village,
-where the 7th Marines’ headquarters was located. He spent most of his
-time thereafter with Litzenberg, while Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L.
-Stewart, his executive officer, ran the 5th Regiment command post.[414]
-Through constant contact and a policy of close cooperation in all
-matters, the two regimental commanders and their staffs came up with
-joint plans for the defense of Yudam-ni and the ultimate breakout to
-Hagaru.
-
-    [414] _Ibid._; 5th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50.
-
-The first of these plans had to do with the realignment of forces at
-Yudam-ni and the rescue of Charlie and Fox Companies, 7th Marines.
-Early in the afternoon of 28 November, 2/5 began withdrawing from
-Northwest Ridge a company at a time, with Company E providing covering
-fire as rear guard. The battalion’s displacement to Southwest Ridge was
-completed by 2000 against CCF resistance consisting only of harassing
-fires.[415]
-
-    [415] 2/5 _SAR_, 19.
-
-Directly across the valley of Yudam-ni, Company I of 3/5 relieved the
-elements of 1/5 on Hill 1282 of North Ridge in late afternoon. George
-and How Companies of 3/5 deployed in the low ground to protect the
-corridor approaches to Yudam-ni from the northwest. Lieutenant Colonel
-Stevens, keeping the bulk of 1/5 in reserve, dispatched Company B at
-1400 to relieve the battered handful of Marines on Hill 1240.
-
-While this reshuffling took place on the 28th, Colonel Litzenberg
-listened anxiously to the grim reports from his 1st Battalion, which
-had set out in the morning to retrieve both Charlie and Fox Companies
-from their encircled positions on the MSR leading to Hagaru.[416]
-Able Company led off for the relief force at 1015, entering the gorge
-between South and Southeast Ridges. Five hours of fighting, marching,
-and climbing took it to a point about three miles from the Yudam-ni
-perimeter and one mile short of Company C’s position. Here, while
-moving through the high ground east of the MSR, the vanguard met heavy
-resistance and was stopped cold.
-
-    [416] The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar
-          _SAR_, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450,
-          1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar
-          msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 290–291.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Davis, who was following with the remainder of
-the 1st Battalion, committed Company B to a flanking movement west
-of the road. Air and 81mm mortars supported the auxiliary attack and
-routed the Chinese. Both companies advanced to high-ground positions
-abreast of Charlie Company’s perimeter, then bent toward the MSR to
-provide a protective crescent between the beleaguered outfit and the
-enemy-infested ground to the south.
-
-By now it was dark. Fox Company, according to plan, was supposed
-to have fought its way from Toktong Pass. Owing to the burden of
-casualties and the ring of Chinese around its distant hilltop, it was
-not able to do so. Litzenberg, concerned lest 1/7 be similarly trapped
-in the gorge, recalled Davis to Yudam-ni. The relief force returned at
-2110 with Charlie Company and its 46 wounded.
-
-
-_Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill_
-
-Fox Company, with 54 wounded on its hands, spent an active day at
-the top of Toktong Pass.[417] After the Chinese attacks subsided
-in the morning, Barber’s men collected ammunition and weapons from
-Marine casualties and Communist dead. Included among enemy arms were
-several of the familiar U. S. Thompson submachine guns and Model 1903
-Springfield rifles.
-
-    [417] This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is
-          derived from: 7thMar _SAR_, 18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,”
-          16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv 4
-          Jul 51; Geer, _The New Breed_, 300–302; Statement of Cpl
-          C. R. North, n. d.
-
-At 1030 a flight of Australian F-51s (Mustangs) blasted CCF positions
-around Toktong Pass, particularly a rocky promontory several hundred
-yards to the north on Hill 1653, which the enemy already had
-transformed into a redoubt. Within the Marine perimeter, the wounded
-were placed in two tents on a sheltered hillside where Navy corpsmen
-attended them constantly. According to Lieutenant McCarthy’s account,
-the medics, “by candlelight ... changed the bandages, slipped men in
-and out of sleeping bags, warmed C-rations for the men, and melted the
-morphine syrettes in their mouths before the injections. Because the
-plasma was frozen the corpsmen had to watch men die for the lack of it.”
-
-During late morning and the afternoon, Barber sent out patrols to
-screen the areas immediately beyond his lines. The scouting parties
-met only sniper fire, but other evidence of enemy activity indicated
-that Fox Hill was completely surrounded. An appeal for resupply by air
-was answered later in the day when Marine R5Ds dropped medical kits
-and ammunition at the base of the hill. At a cost of two wounded, the
-precious supplies were recovered before sundown.
-
-Fox Company’s perimeter for the night of 28–29 November was the same as
-before, except that the ranks were noticeably thinner. Nevertheless, a
-feeling of confidence pervaded the men on the hilltop; they believed
-implicitly that they could hold. They believed it despite the fact that
-strong relief columns from both Yudam-ni and Hagaru had been unable to
-break through to them.
-
-All was quiet on Fox Hill until 0215, when CCF mortar rounds killed one
-Marine and wounded two others in the 3d Platoon, now reduced to some 20
-able-bodied men. About 40 Chinese made a penetration in this area after
-a series of probing attacks all along the line. One Marine crew turned
-its light machine gun about and brought it to bear on the bunched-up
-attackers with deadly effect. A gap in the lines on both flanks caused
-the platoon to pull back about 20 yards. At sunrise, however, Staff
-Sergeant John D. Audas led a counterattack which regained the lost
-ground at a cost of only two wounded.
-
-The second night’s fighting cost Fox Company a total of five killed and
-29 wounded. Both Captain Barber and Lieutenant McCarthy suffered leg
-wounds, but continued in action after receiving first aid. The company
-commander directed that the open ground on Fox Hill be marked with
-colored parachutes from the previous day’s air drops. This provision
-resulted in accurate drops and easy recoveries when Marine transport
-planes arrived at 1030 on the 29th with ammunition and supplies.
-Shortly afterwards First Lieutenant Floyd J. Englehardt of VMO-6 landed
-with batteries for the SCR-300 and 619 radios. Although his helicopter
-was damaged by hits from long-distance Chinese fire, he managed to take
-off safely.
-
-Air drops that afternoon by C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command missed
-the marked zone at times, and much of the mortar ammunition landed
-about 500 yards to the west of the perimeter. Lieutenant Peterson,
-already twice wounded, led Marines who recovered some of the rounds
-but were pinned down by CCF fire and got back, one at a time, with
-difficulty. At dusk, under cover of fire from How Battery, another
-detail recovered the ammunition without enemy interference.
-
-
-_Not Enough Tents for Casualties_
-
-The night of 28–29 November passed with only minor activity in the
-Yudam-ni area for the infantry of RCT-5; but the regimental surgeon,
-Lieutenant Commander Chester M. Lessenden (MC) USN, had his hands full.
-During the fighting of the previous night the joint aid station had
-been west of Yudam-ni. Tents sheltering the wounded were riddled by
-enemy small-arms fire from the North Ridge battle, and on the morning
-of the 28th the aid station displaced to a safer location southwest
-of Yudam-ni. The seriously wounded filled the few tents initially
-available, and the others were protected from freezing by being placed
-outdoors, side by side, and covered by tarpaulins while lying on straw.
-Primitive as this hospitalization was, DOW cases were no more than
-might have been expected under better conditions.[418]
-
-    [418] 5thMar _SAR_, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 _SAR_,
-          5; McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
-
-The crowding in the aid stations was much relieved on 30 November by
-the erection of sufficient tentage by 4/11 to provide shelter for
-approximately 500 casualties.
-
-“Everything was frozen,” said Lessenden later in an interview with
-Keyes Beech, a press correspondent. “Plasma froze and the bottles
-broke. We couldn’t use plasma because it wouldn’t go into solution and
-the tubes would clog up with particles. We couldn’t change dressings
-because we had to work with gloves on to keep our hands from freezing.
-
-“We couldn’t cut a man’s clothes off to get at a wound because he
-would freeze to death. Actually a man was often better off if we left
-him alone. Did you ever try to stuff a wounded man into a sleeping
-bag?”[419]
-
-    [419] Keyes Beech: _Tokyo and Points East_ (New York, 1954),
-          196.
-
-The joint defense plan for the night of 28–29 November provided for
-RCT-5 to take the responsibility for the west and north sectors, while
-RCT-7 was to defend to the east, south and southwest. Enemy mortar
-fire was received during the night in both regimental zones, but
-there were few infantry contacts. This lack of activity could only be
-interpreted as a temporary lull while the enemy regrouped for further
-efforts.
-
-As for the next attempt to relieve Fox Company and open the MSR to
-Hagaru, the joint planners at Yudam-ni decided on the night of the
-28th that all troops of the two regiments now in line were needed for
-defense. There were actually no men to spare for a relief column, and
-yet Division had ordered the effort to be made. The solution seemed
-to be a composite battalion consisting of perimeter reserve units.
-In order to replace these troops, personnel were to be assigned from
-headquarters units and artillery batteries. This was the genesis of the
-Composite Battalion, consisting of elements from Able Company of 1/5,
-Baker Company of 1/7 and George Company of 3/7, reinforced by a 75mm
-recoilless section and two 81mm mortar sections from RCT-7 battalions.
-These troops were directed to assemble at the 1/7 CP on the morning
-of the 29th, with Major Warren Morris, executive officer of 3/7, in
-command.[420]
-
-    [420] This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from
-          the following sources: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n.
-          d., 5–8; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.
-
-At 0800 the striking force moved out southward with the dual mission of
-relieving Captain Barber and opening up the MSR all the way to Hagaru.
-After an advance of 300 yards, heavy machine-gun fire hit the column
-from both sides of the road. Groups of Chinese could be plainly seen on
-the ridges, affording remunerative targets for the 81mm mortars and 75
-recoilless guns. Forward air controllers soon had the Corsairs overhead
-to lead the way. At a point about 4500 yards south of Yudam-ni,
-however, Marine planes dropped two messages warning that the enemy was
-entrenched in formidable force along the high ground on both sides of
-the MSR.
-
-Similar messages were delivered by the aircraft to the regimental CP at
-Yudam-ni. They caused Colonel Litzenberg to modify the orders of the
-Composite Battalion and direct that it relieve Fox Company and return
-to Yudam-ni before dark.
-
-By this time Morris’ troops had become engaged with large numbers of
-Chinese who were being constantly reinforced by groups moving into the
-area along draws masked from friendly ground observation. Litzenberg
-was informed on a basis of air observation that Morris was in danger of
-being surrounded, and at 1315 he sent an urgent message directing the
-force to return to Yudam-ni. Contact was broken off immediately with
-the aid of air and artillery cover and the Composite Battalion withdrew
-without further incident.
-
-
-_The Turning Point of 30 November_
-
-The Yudam-ni area had a relatively quiet night on 29–30 November. But
-even though there was little fighting, the continued sub-zero cold
-imposed a strain on the men when at least a fifty per cent alert must
-be maintained at all times. This was the third virtually sleepless
-night for troops who had not had a warm meal since the Thanksgiving
-feast.
-
-“Seldom has the human frame been so savagely punished and continued to
-function,” wrote Keyes Beech. “Many men discovered reserves of strength
-they never knew they possessed. Some survived and fought on will power
-alone.”[421]
-
-    [421] Beech, _Tokyo and Points East_, 197.
-
-Certainly there was no lack of will power on Fox Hill as Captain Barber
-called his platoon leaders together at about 1700 on 29 November and
-told them not to expect any immediate relief. Chinese attacks, he
-warned, might be heavier than ever this third night, but they would be
-beaten off as usual.
-
-The area was quiet until about 0200 on the 30th, when an Oriental
-voice called out of the darkness in English, “Fox Company, you are
-surrounded. I am a lieutenant from the 11th Marines. The Chinese will
-give you warm clothes and good treatment. Surrender now!”[422] The
-Marines replied with 81mm illumination shells which revealed targets
-for the machine guns as the Chinese advanced across the valley from the
-south.
-
-    [422] This description of the third night on Fox Hill is
-          derived from McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 21.
-
-Thanks to the afternoon’s air drops, Fox Hill had enough mortar
-ammunition and hand grenades for the first time, and good use was made
-of both. An estimated three CCF companies were cut to pieces at a cost
-of a single Marine wounded.
-
-At sunrise, as the Corsairs roared over, all tension vanished on Fox
-Hill. For it was generally agreed that if the Chinese couldn’t take the
-position in three nights, they would never make the grade.
-
-The troops in the Yudam-ni area also felt that the enemy had shot
-his bolt without achieving anything more than a few local gains at a
-terrible cost in killed and wounded. It was recognized that some hard
-fighting lay ahead, but the morning of the 30th was a moral turning
-point both in the foxhole and the CP.
-
-It was evident even on the platoon level at Yudam-ni that big events
-were in the wind. Marine enlisted men are traditionally shrewd at
-sizing up a tactical situation, and they sensed that a change was
-at hand. For three days and nights they had been on the defensive,
-fighting for their lives, and now the word was passed from one man to
-another that the Marines were about to snatch the initiative.
-
-The regimental commanders and staff officers had a worry lifted from
-their minds when a helicopter brought the news that Hagaru had passed
-a quiet night after repulsing large enemy forces in a dusk-to-dawn
-battle the night before. It would have added enormously to the task
-of the Yudam-ni troops, of course, if the Chinese had seized that
-forward base with its air strip and stockpiles of supplies. Thus it was
-heartening to learn that a single reinforced Marine infantry battalion
-and an assortment of service troops had beaten off the attacks of large
-elements of a Chinese division at Hagaru. The following two chapters
-will be devoted to an account of that critical battle and its aftermath
-before returning to Yudam-ni.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER X
-
-Hagaru’s Night of Fire
-
-_Four-Mile Perimeter Required--Attempts to Clear MSR--Intelligence
-as to CCF Capabilities--Positions of Marine Units--CCF Attacks from
-the Southwest--East Hill Lost to Enemy--The Volcano of Supporting
-Fires--Marine Attacks on East Hill_
-
-
-The importance of Hagaru in the Marine scheme of things was starkly
-obvious after the Chinese cut the MSR. Hagaru, with its supply dumps,
-hospital facilities and partly finished C-47 airstrip, was the one
-base offering the 1st Marine Division a reasonable hope of uniting its
-separated elements. Hagaru had to be held at all costs, yet only a
-reinforced infantry battalion (less one rifle company and a third of
-its Weapons Company) and two batteries of artillery were available for
-the main burden of the defense.
-
-Owing to transportation shortages, the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines
-did not arrive at Hagaru until after dusk on 26 November. Even so, it
-had been necessary to leave George Company and a platoon of Weapons
-Company behind at Chigyong for lack of vehicles.[423]
-
-    [423] This section is derived from: 1stMar _HD, Nov 50_, 2; 3/1
-          _SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep
-          55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons Comments,
-          n. d.
-
-The parka-clad Marines, climbing down stiffly from the trucks, had
-their first sight of a panorama which reminded one officer of old
-photographs of a gold-rush mining camp in the Klondike. Tents, huts,
-and supply dumps were scattered in a seemingly haphazard fashion about
-a frozen plain crossed by a frozen river and bordered on three sides by
-low hills rising to steep heights on the eastern outskirts. Although
-many of the buildings had survived the bombings, the battered town
-at the foot of the ice-locked Chosin Reservoir was not a spectacle
-calculated to raise the spirits of newcomers.
-
-It was too late to relieve 2/7(-) that evening. Lieutenant Colonels
-Ridge and Lockwood agreed that Fox Company, 7th Marines, and Weapons
-Company (-) of 2/7 would occupy positions jointly with 3/1. The hours
-of darkness passed quietly and relief was completed the next day. Fox
-Company then moved to its new positions near Toktong Pass.
-
-
-_Four-Mile Perimeter Required_
-
-On the morning of 27 November, of course, an all-out enemy attack was
-still in the realm of speculation. But it was evident to Lieutenant
-Colonel Ridge, CO of 3/1, that one to two infantry regiments and
-supporting arms would be required for an adequate defense of Hagaru.
-With only a battalion (-) at his disposal, he realized that he must
-make the best possible use of the ground. For the purposes of a
-survey, he sent his S-3, Major Trompeter, on a walking reconnaissance
-with Major Simmons, CO of Weapons Company and 3/1 Supporting Arms
-Coordinator.
-
-After a circuit of the natural amphitheater, the two officers agreed
-that even to hold the reverse slopes would require a perimeter of more
-than four miles in circumference (see Map 17). The personnel resources
-of 3/1 would thus be stretched to an average of one man for nearly
-seven yards of front. This meant that the commanding officer must take
-his choice between being weak everywhere or strong in a few sectors to
-the neglect of others. In either event, some areas along the perimeter
-would probably have to be defended by supporting fires alone.[424]
-
-    [424] Ridge, _Notes_; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55.
-
-“Under the circumstances,” commented General Smith, “and considering
-the mission assigned to the 1st Marine Division, an infantry component
-of one battalion was all that could be spared for the defense of
-Hagaru. This battalion was very adequately supported by air, and had
-sufficient artillery and tanks for its purposes.”[425]
-
-    [425] Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56.
-
-The terrain gave the enemy two major covered avenues of approach for
-troop movements. One was the hill mass east of Hagaru, the other a draw
-leading into the southwest side of the town, where the new airstrip
-was being constructed. Nor could the possibility of a surprise attack
-from some other quarter be dismissed entirely, since CCF observers
-would be able to watch Marine preparations from the surrounding hills
-in daylight hours.
-
-[Illustration: HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER
-
-28–29 November 1950
-
-  MAP-17
-]
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Ridge decided that final troop dispositions must
-depend not only on terrain but equally on intelligence as to enemy
-capabilities. Until he had more information, the units of 3/1 were to
-remain in the areas formerly occupied by 2/7.
-
-
-_Attempts to Clear MSR_
-
-The Battalion CP had been set up in a pyramidal tent at the angle of
-the road to Yudam-ni. Most of the day on the 27th was given over to
-improving positions. At the southwest end of the perimeter, First
-Lieutenant Fisher’s Item Company took over from Captain Barber’s Fox
-Company, the only rifle company of 2/7 remaining at Hagaru.
-
-On the strength of preliminary S-2 reports, Ridge instructed the
-commanders of his two rifle companies to improve their sectors, which
-included the entire south and southwest curve of the perimeter. All the
-Division Headquarters troops except one motor convoy had reached Hagaru
-by the 27th, and it was due to leave Hungnam the next morning. The new
-Division CP was located in the northeast quarter of town, near the long
-concrete bridge over the frozen Changjin River. Rows of heated tents
-surrounded a Japanese type frame house repaired for the occupancy of
-General Smith, who was expected by helicopter in the morning. Already
-functioning at the CP were elements of the General Staff Sections and
-Headquarters Company.[426]
-
-    [426] Smith, _Notes_, 689–690.
-
-The busiest Marines at Hagaru on the 27th were the men of the 1st
-Engineer Battalion. While a Company B platoon built tent decks for the
-Division CP, detachments of Company A were at work on the maintenance
-of the MSR in the area, and Company D had the job of hacking out
-the new airstrip. Apparently the latter project had its “sidewalk
-contractors” even in sub-zero weather, for this comment found its way
-into the company report:
-
-  Dozer work [was] pleasing to the eye of those who wanted activity
-  but contributed little to the overall earth-moving problem of
-  90,000 cubic yards of cut and 60,000 cubic yards of fill.[427]
-
-    [427] D/Engr _SAR_.
-
-Motor graders and scrapers with a 5.8 cubic yard capacity had been
-moved up from Hamhung. So difficult did it prove to get a bite of the
-frozen earth that steel teeth were welded to the blades. When the pan
-was filled, however, the earth froze to the cutting edges until it
-could be removed only by means of a jack hammer.
-
-The strip was about one-fourth completed on the 27th, according to
-minimum estimates of the length required. Work went on that night
-as usual under the flood lights.[428] Not until the small hours of
-the morning did the first reports reach Hagaru of the CCF attacks on
-Yudam-ni and Fox Hill.
-
-    [428] 1stEngrBn _SAR_, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51.
-
-Some remnants of 2/7 were still at Hagaru, for lack of transportation,
-when Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood, commanding officer of the battalion,
-received a dispatch from Colonel Litzenberg directing him to proceed to
-Toktong Pass and assist Fox Company. At 0530 he requested the “loan”
-of a rifle company of 3/1 to reinforce elements of Weapons Company
-(-), 2/7. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge could spare only a platoon from How
-Company, and at 0830 the attempt was cancelled. An hour later Weapons
-Company and three tanks from the 2d Platoon of Company D, 1st Tank
-Battalion, made another effort. They pushed half-way to the objective,
-only to be turned back by heavy Chinese small-arms and mortar fire
-from the high ground on both sides of the road. Supporting fires from
-3/1 helped the column to break off contact and return to Hagaru at
-1500.[429]
-
-    [429] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 21; 3/1 msg
-          to CO 1stMar, 1845 28 Nov 50.
-
-No better success attended a reinforced platoon of How Company, 3/1,
-accompanied by three Company D tanks, when it set out on the road to
-Koto-ri. On the outskirts of Hagaru, within sight of Captain Corley’s
-CP, the men were forced to climb down from their vehicles and engage in
-a hot fire fight. They estimated the enemy force at about 50, but an OY
-pilot dropped a message warning that some 300 Chinese were moving up
-on the flanks of the patrol. The Marines managed to disengage at 1530,
-with the aid of mortar and artillery fires from Hagaru, and returned to
-the perimeter with losses of one killed and five wounded.[430]
-
-    [430] _Ibid._; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d.
-
-A similar patrol from Item Company, 3/1, struck off to the southwest of
-the perimeter in the direction of Hungmun-ni. Late in the morning of
-the 28th, this reinforced platoon encountered an estimated 150 enemy
-and called for artillery and mortar fires. After dispersing this CCF
-group, the patrol routed a second enemy detachment an hour later after
-a brief fire fight.[431]
-
-    [431] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon
-          [sic] interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 28 May 51.
-
-Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the Chinese attack on the MSR
-were dispelled by reports from the OY and HO3S-1 pilots of VMO-6. They
-disclosed that defended enemy road blocks had cut off Yudam-ni, Fox
-Hill, Hagaru, and Koto-ri from any physical contact with one another.
-The advance units of the 1st Marine Division had been sliced into
-four isolated segments as CCF columns penetrated as far south as the
-Chinhung-ni area.[432]
-
-    [432] VMO-6 tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg
-          to CG 1stMarDiv, 1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO
-          1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50.
-
-
-_Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities_
-
-There was no question at all in the minds of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge
-and his officers as to whether the Chinese would attack at Hagaru. As
-early as the morning of the 27th, the problem had simply been one of
-when, where, and in what strength. It was up to the S-2 Section to
-provide the answers, and upon their correctness would depend the fate
-of Hagaru, perhaps even of the 1st Marine Division.
-
-Second Lieutenant Richard E. Carey, the S-2, was a newcomer to the
-battalion staff, recently transferred from a George Company infantry
-platoon. His group consisted of an assistant intelligence chief,
-Staff Sergeant Saverio P. Gallo, an interpreter, and four scout
-observers.[433] There were also two CIC agents assigned to 3/1 by
-Division G-2.
-
-    [433] This section is based on Ridge, _Notes_, and Comments,
-          7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The
-          need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the
-          former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had
-          been transferred from the S-2 Section just before the
-          move to Hagaru.
-
-At Hagaru, as at Majon-ni, the Marines had won respect at the outset by
-allowing the Korean residents all privileges of self-government which
-could be reconciled with military security. The police department and
-town officials had been permitted to continue functioning. They in turn
-briefed the population as to restricted areas and security regulations,
-particularly curfew. Korean civilians entering Hagaru through Marine
-road blocks were searched before being taken to the police station
-where they were questioned by an interrogation team from the S-2
-Section.
-
-Hagaru’s resemblance to a gold-rush mining camp was heightened on the
-27th by a tremendous influx both of troops and Koreans from outlying
-districts. A large truck convoy from Headquarters Battalion arrived
-to set up the new Division CP, and detachments from various Marine or
-Army service units entered in a seemingly endless stream. The Korean
-refugees had much the same story to tell; most of them came from areas
-to the north and west of Hagaru, and they had been evicted from their
-homes by large numbers of CCF troops.
-
-Carey instructed his CIC agents to converse with incoming Koreans and
-learn everything possible about the enemy situation. Again, as at
-Majon-ni, people who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with Communism
-were found “highly co-operative.” As untrained observers, however,
-their estimates of CCF numbers and equipment could not be taken too
-literally. Since their statements agreed that the enemy was in close
-proximity, Carey decided to take the risk of sending his two CIC agents
-on the dangerous mission of establishing direct contact. They were
-enjoined to make a circuit of the perimeter, mingling whenever possible
-with the Chinese and determining the areas of heaviest concentration.
-
-The results went beyond Carey’s fondest expectations. Not only did
-his agents return safely from their long hike over the hills, but
-they brought back vital information. Well led and equipped Chinese
-Communist units had been encountered to the south and west of Hagaru.
-And since Marine air also reported unusual activity in this area, it
-was a reasonable assumption that the enemy was concentrated there
-approximately in division strength.
-
-This answered the questions as to “how many” and “where.” There
-remained the problem as to “when” the attack might be expected, and
-again on the 28th Carey sent out his CIC agents to make direct contact.
-“I expected little or no information,” he recollected, “but apparently
-these men had a way with them. Upon reporting back, they told me that
-they had talked freely with enemy troops, including several officers
-who boasted that they would occupy Hagaru on the night of 28 November.”
-
-Major enemy units were reported to be five miles from the perimeter.
-Dusk was at approximately 1800, with complete darkness setting in
-shortly afterwards. Adding the estimate of three and a half hours for
-Chinese movements to the line of departure, the S-2 Section calculated
-that the enemy could attack as early as 2130 on the night of the 28th
-from the south and west in division strength.[434]
-
-    [434] The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was
-          considered, since Chinese forces were known to be east of
-          the hill. Col Ridge states, “I assume[d] that the build
-          up of such forces would not allow their capability of a
-          strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56.
-
-
-_Positions of Marine Units_
-
-These intelligence estimates were accepted by Lieutenant Colonel
-Ridge as the basis for his planning and troop dispositions. As
-the main bastion of defense, the tied-in sectors of How and Item
-Companies were extended to include the south and southwest sides
-of the perimeter--nearly one-third of the entire circumference--in
-a continuous line 2300 yards in length, or more than a mile and a
-quarter. Each platoon front thus averaged about 380 yards, which meant
-that supporting arms must make up for lack of numbers.[435]
-
-    [435] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the
-          following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_; Ridge,
-          _Notes_; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17
-          Aug 55; Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher,
-          n. d.; Simmons Comments.
-
-East Hill, considered the second most likely point of enemy attack, was
-to be assigned to George Company on arrival. Captain Sitter’s outfit
-had orders to depart the Chigyong area on the morning of the 28th, so
-that it could be expected at Hagaru before dark.
-
-The southeast quarter of the perimeter, between East Hill and the
-left flank of How Company, was to be held by the following units: (1)
-Weapons Company (less detachments reinforcing the rifle companies and
-its 81mm mortars emplaced near the battalion CP) manning a road block
-on the route to Koto-ri and defending the south nose of East Hill; (2)
-Dog Company, 1st Engineer Battalion (less men at work on the airstrip),
-occupying the ground south of the concrete bridge; and (3) Dog Battery,
-2d Battalion, 11th Marines, which had the mission of covering 75 per
-cent of the perimeter with observed indirect fire and 25 per cent with
-direct fire.
-
-These dispositions left a gap between Weapons Company and the engineer
-and artillery units on the west bank of the Changjin River. But this
-stretch of frozen marshland was so well covered by fire that an enemy
-attack here would have been welcomed.
-
-The first reports of the CCF onslaughts at Yudam-ni and Fox Hill, as
-interpreted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, “clearly indicated that no
-time was to be lost at buttoning up the Hagaru perimeter.” He called
-on Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3, on the morning of the 28th and
-recommended that an overall defense commander be designated with
-operational control over all local units. Ridge also requested that
-George Company and the 41st Commando be expedited in their movement to
-Hagaru.
-
-Before a decision could be reached, General Smith arrived by
-helicopter and opened the Division CP at 1100. A Marine rear echelon
-had remained at Hungnam to cope with supply requirements. Colonel
-Francis A. McAlister, the G-4, left in command, accomplished during the
-forthcoming campaign what General Smith termed “a magnificent job” in
-rendering logistical support.[436]
-
-    [436] Smith, _Notes_, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units,
-          1015 28 Nov 50.
-
-The CP at Hagaru had been open only half an hour when General Almond
-arrived in a VMO-6 helicopter to confer with the Division commander.
-Departing at 1255, he visited the 31st Infantry troops who had been
-hard hit the night before by CCF attacks east of the Chosin Reservoir.
-On his return to Hamhung, the Corps commander was informed that CinCFE
-had directed him to fly immediately to Tokyo for a conference. There
-he learned that the Eighth Army was in full retreat, with some units
-taking heavy losses both in personnel and equipment. Generals Almond,
-Walker, Hickey, Willoughby, Whitney, and Wright took turns at briefing
-the commander in chief during a meeting which lasted from midnight to
-0130.[437]
-
-    [437] CG Diary, in X Corps _WD_, 28 Nov 50; X Corps _WDSum_,
-          Nov 50, 16.
-
-At Hagaru it was becoming more apparent hourly to Ridge that his
-prospects of employing Captain Sitter’s company on East Hill were
-growing dim. As he learned later, the unit had left Chigyong that
-morning in the trucks of Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion,
-commanded by Captain Clovis M. Jones. Sitter was met at Koto-ri by
-Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of RCT-1, and
-directed to report to the regimental S-3, Major Robert E. Lorigan.
-Efforts to open up the road to Hagaru had failed, he was told, and
-it would be necessary for George Company to remain overnight at
-Koto-ri.[438]
-
-    [438] Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d.
-
-The probability of such an outcome had already been accepted by Ridge
-on the basis of the resistance met on the road to Koto-ri by his How
-Company patrol. With this development added to his worries, he received
-a telephone call at 1500 from Colonel Bowser, informing him that he had
-been named defense commander at Hagaru by General Smith.[439]
-
-    [439] This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate
-          Units, 1625 28 Nov 50.
-
-Just ten minutes later a single CCF shell, assumed to be of 76mm
-caliber, exploded in the Battalion CP area and fatally wounded Captain
-Paul E. Storaasli, the S-4. The perimeter was so cluttered with tents
-and dumps that artillery fire at random could hardly have been wasted;
-but the enemy gun remained silent the rest of the day, doubtless to
-avert Marine counter-battery reprisals.
-
-Only three hours of daylight remained when the newly designated defense
-commander summoned unit commanders to an initial conference. It was
-not made clear just what troops had been placed under his operational
-control. “A primary reason,” commented Ridge, “was that no one knew
-what units were there, this being compounded by the numerous small
-elements such as detachments, advance parties, etc., of which many were
-Corps and ROK units. Hence, the Battalion S-1 and his assistants were
-a combination of town criers and census takers. We did, however, get
-most of the commanders of major units (if such they could be called)
-to the initial conference, but the process of locating and identifying
-smaller units was thereafter a continuous process which we really never
-accurately completed.”[440]
-
-    [440] Ridge, _Notes_, 27–28.
-
-The larger outfits could be summoned to the conference by telephone but
-it was necessary to send out runners in other instances. With George
-Company not available, the question of defending East Hill loomed
-large. Ridge decided against all proposals that one of the two rifle
-companies be used for that purpose. On the strength of the S-2 report,
-he preferred to concentrate as much strength as possible against an
-attack from the southwest. This meant taking his chances on East Hill
-with such service troops as he could scrape up, and it was plain that a
-strong CCF effort in this quarter would have to be met in large part by
-fire power from supporting arms.
-
-The two main detachments selected for East Hill (excluding the south
-nose) were from Dog Company of the 10th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA,
-and elements of X corps Headquarters. Since the mission called for
-control of mortar and artillery fires as well as tactical leadership,
-two officers of Weapons Company, 3/1, were assigned--Captain John C.
-Shelnutt to the Army engineer company, and First Lieutenant John L.
-Burke, Jr., to the Headquarters troops. Each was to be accompanied by a
-Marine radio (SCR 300) operator.
-
-Smaller detachments were later sent to East Hill from two other service
-units--the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and the 4th
-Signal Battalion of X Corps.
-
-The Antitank Company of the 7th Marines defended the area to the north
-of East Hill. Next came How Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, which
-had the primary mission of supporting Fox Company, 2/7, on the hill
-near Toktong Pass. But by moving gun trails the cannoneers could with
-some difficulty fire on the 270° arc of the perimeter stretching from
-the right flank of Item Company around to the north nose of East Hill.
-
-Between the sectors held by How Battery, 3/11, and Item Company, 3/1,
-were troops of five Marine units: Regulating Detachment, 1st Service
-Battalion; 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Marine Tactical Air Control
-Squadron 2 (MTACS-2); Division Headquarters Battalion; and H&S Company
-3/1. The only other unit in this quarter was Weapons Company (-), 2/7,
-which held the road block on the route to Yudam-ni.
-
-At the conference it was decided that since Lieutenant Colonel Charles
-L. Banks’ Regulating Detachment had taken the lead in organizing the
-Supply Area on the north side of Hagaru, the arc of the perimeter east
-of the river and west of East Hill was to be made into a secondary
-defense zone. Banks thus became in effect a sub-sector commander.
-The only infantry troops in the Supply Area being detachments of 2/7
-units, it was also agreed that tactical decisions concerning the zone
-should be discussed with the two ranking battalion officers--Lieutenant
-Colonel Lockwood, the commander, and Major Sawyer, the executive.[441]
-
-    [441] “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific
-          mission because it was assumed that his uncanceled order
-          from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts in
-          the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56.
-
-These matters having been settled, the conference broke up shortly
-after 1700 and the various commanders hastened back to their outfits to
-make last-minute preparations for the night’s attack. A strange hush
-had fallen over the perimeter, broken only by the occasional crackle of
-small-arms fire, and the damp air felt like snow.
-
-
-_CCF Attack from the Southwest_
-
-How and Item Companies were ready. All platoon positions were well dug
-in, though the earth was frozen to a depth of six to ten inches.
-
-The men of Item Company used their heads as well as hands after
-Lieutenant Fisher managed to obtain a thousand sandbags and several
-bags of C3. This explosive was utilized in ration cans to make
-improvised shape charges which blasted a hole through the frozen crust
-of snow and earth. Then it became a simple matter to enlarge the hole
-and place the loose dirt in sandbags to form a parapet.[442] This
-ingenious system resulted in de luxe foxholes and mortar emplacements
-attaining to the dignity of field fortifications.
-
-    [442] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1
-          tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov 50; Ridge, _Notes_; Simmons
-          interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley
-          narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug
-          55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors, 10 Oct 55; and Sgt
-          K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55.
-
-Both company fronts bristled with concertinas, trip flares, booby
-traps, and five-gallon cans of gasoline rigged with thermite bombs for
-illumination. Three probable routes of enemy attack channeled the low
-hills to the southwest--a main draw leading to the junction between the
-two company sectors, and a lesser draw providing an approach to each.
-The ground in front of the junction had been mined, and two tanks from
-the Provisional Platoon were stationed in this quarter. Detachments
-from Weapons Company also reinforced both rifle companies. Thus the six
-platoons faced the enemy in the following order:
-
-            ITEM COMPANY                          HOW COMPANY
-              Lt Fisher                           Capt Corley
-  Lt Degerne   Lt Hall   Lt Needham   Lt Barrett   Lt Endsley   Lt Mason
-     1st         3d          2d          1st           3d          2d
-
-Beginning at 1700, hot food was served to all hands in rotation. A
-fifty per cent alert went into effect after dark as the men were sent
-back on regular schedule for coffee and a smoke in warming tents
-located as close to the front as possible. The first snowflakes
-fluttered down about 1950, muffling the clank of the dozers at work as
-usual under the floodlights on the airstrip behind the How Company’s
-sector. Just before 2130, the expected time of CCF attack, both company
-commanders ordered a hundred per cent alert, but the enemy did not
-show up on schedule. It was just over an hour later when three red
-flares and three blasts on a police whistle signaled the beginning of
-the attack. Soon trip flares and exploding booby traps revealed the
-approach of probing patrols composed of five to ten men.
-
-A few minutes later, white phosphorus mortar shells scorched the Marine
-front line with accurate aim. The main CCF attack followed shortly
-afterwards, with both company sectors being hit by assault waves
-closing in to grenade-throwing distance.
-
-The enemy in turn was staggered by the full power of Marine supporting
-arms. Snowflakes reduced an already low visibility, but fields of fire
-had been carefully charted and artillery and mortar concentrations
-skillfully registered in. Still, the Communists kept on coming in spite
-of frightful losses. Second Lieutenant Wayne L. Hall, commanding the 3d
-Platoon in the center of Item Company, was jumped by three Chinese whom
-he killed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol after his carbine jammed.
-The third foe pitched forward into Hall’s foxhole.
-
-On the left flank, tied in with How Company, First Lieutenant Robert
-C. Needham’s 2d Platoon sustained most of the attack on Item Company.
-The fire of Second Lieutenant James J. Boley’s 60mm mortars and Second
-Lieutenant John H. Miller’s light machine guns was concentrated in
-this area. It seemed impossible that enemy burp guns could miss such a
-target as Lieutenant Fisher, six feet two inches in height and weighing
-235 pounds. But he continued to pass up and down the line, pausing at
-each foxhole for a few words of encouragement. By midnight the enemy
-pressure on Needham’s and Hall’s lines had slackened, and on the right
-flank Second Lieutenant Mayhlon L. Degernes’ 1st Platoon received only
-light attacks.
-
-This was also the case on the left flank of How Company, where Second
-Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s 2d Platoon saw little action as compared
-to the other two. A front of some 800 yards in the center of the
-2300-yard Marine line, including two platoon positions and parts of two
-others, bore the brunt of the CCF assault on How and Item Companies.
-
-Captain Corley had just visited his center platoon when the first
-attacks hit How Company. Second Lieutenant Wendell C. Endsley was
-killed while the company commander was on his way to Second Lieutenant
-Roscoe L. Barrett’s 1st Platoon, on the right, which soon had its left
-flank heavily engaged.
-
-Never was CCF skill at night attacks displayed more effectively.
-Barrett concluded that the Chinese actually rolled down the slope into
-the How Company lines, so that they seemed to emerge from the very
-earth. The 3d Platoon, already thinned by accurate CCF white phosphorus
-mortar fire, was now further reduced in strength by grenades and burp
-gun bursts. About this time the company wire net went out and Corley
-could keep in touch with his platoons only by runners. The battalion
-telephone line also being cut, he reported his situation by radio to
-the Battalion CP.
-
-Two wiremen were killed while trying to repair the line. The Chinese
-continued to come on in waves, each preceded by concentrations of
-light and heavy mortar fire on the right and center of the How Company
-position. About 0030 the enemy broke through in the 3d Platoon area
-and penetrated as far back as the Company CP. A scene of pandemonium
-ensued, the sound of Chinese trumpets and whistles adding to the
-confusion as it became difficult to tell friend from foe. “Tracers were
-so thick,” recalled Sergeant Keith E. Davis, “that they lighted up the
-darkness like a Christmas tree.”[443]
-
-    [443] K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55.
-
-Corley and five enlisted men operated as a supporting fire team while
-First Lieutenant Harrison F. Betts rounded up as many men as he could
-find and tried to plug the gap in the 3d Platoon line. This outnumbered
-group was swept aside as the next wave of CCF attack carried to the
-rear of How Company and threatened the engineers at work under the
-floodlights.
-
-A few Chinese actually broke through and fired at the Marines operating
-the dozers. Second Lieutenant Robert L. McFarland, the equipment
-officer, led a group of Dog Company engineers who counterattacked and
-cleared the airstrip at the cost of a few casualties. Then the men
-resumed work under the floodlights.[444]
-
-    [444] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun
-          56, questions whether the floodlights were on during the
-          whole attack.
-
-The Battalion reserve, if such it could be called, consisted of any
-service troops who could be hastily gathered to meet the emergency.
-Shortly before midnight Ridge sent a platoon-strength group of X Corps
-signalmen and engineers under First Lieutenant Grady P. Mitchell to
-the aid of How Company. Mitchell was killed upon arrival and First
-Lieutenant Horace L. Johnson, Jr., deployed the reinforcements in a
-shallow ditch as a company reserve.
-
-About midnight the fight had reached such a pitch of intensity that
-no spot in the perimeter was safe. The Company C medical clearing
-station, only a few hundred yards to the rear of Item Company, was
-repeatedly hit by machine gun bullets whipping through the wooden walls
-as surgeons operated on the wounded. The Division CP also took hits,
-and a bullet which penetrated General Smith’s quarters produced unusual
-sound effects when it ricocheted off pots and pans in the galley.[445]
-
-    [445] Smith, _Chronicle_, 93.
-
-The Chinese seemed to be everywhere in the How Company zone. Shortly
-after midnight they surrounded the CP, portable galley and provision
-tent. “It is my personal opinion,” commented Captain Corley, “that if
-the enemy had decided to effect a major breakthrough at this time,
-he would have experienced practically no difficulty. However, he
-seemed content to wander in and around the 3d Platoon, galley and hut
-areas.”[446]
-
-    [446] Corley narrative.
-
-The Chinese, in short, demonstrated that they knew better how to
-create a penetration than to exploit one. Once inside the How Company
-lines, they disintegrated into looting groups or purposeless tactical
-fragments. Clothing appealed most to the plunderers, and a wounded
-Marine in the 3d Platoon area saved his life by pretending to be dead
-while Communists stripped him of his parka.
-
-About 0030 the Battalion CP advised Corley by radio that more
-reinforcements were on the way. Lieutenant Johnson met the contingent,
-comprising about 50 service troops, and guided them into the company
-area, where they were deployed as an added reserve to defend the
-airstrip.
-
-Item Company was still having it hot and heavy but continued to beat
-off all CCF assaults. Elements of Weapons Company, manning the south
-road block, came under attack at 0115. Apparently a small enemy column
-had lost direction and blundered into a field of fire covered by heavy
-machine guns. The hurricane of Marine fire caught the Communists before
-they deployed and the result was virtual annihilation.
-
-
-_East Hill Lost to Enemy_
-
-Half an hour later, with the situation improving in the How Company
-zone, the Battalion CP had its first alarming reports of reverses
-on East Hill. The terrain itself had offered difficulties to men
-scrambling up the steep, icy slopes with heavy burdens of ammunition.
-These detachments of service troops, moreover, included a large
-proportion of newly recruited ROKs who had little training and
-understood no English.
-
-[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS
-
-29 November
-
-  MAP-18
-]
-
-The largest of the East Hill units, Company D of the 10th Engineer
-Combat Battalion, commanded by Captain Philip A. Kulbes, USA, was
-composed of 77 American enlisted men and 90 ROKs. Combat equipment
-(in addition to individual weapons) consisted of four .50 caliber
-machine guns, five light .30 caliber machine guns, and six 3.5 rocket
-launchers.[447]
-
-    [447] References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt
-          Norman R. Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John
-          G. Westover, Ed., _Combat Support in Korea_ (Washington,
-          1955), 206–208.
-
-The Army engineers had arrived at Hagaru at 1200 on the 28th, shortly
-before the enemy cut the MSR. After being assigned to the East Hill
-sector during the afternoon, the company used the few remaining hours
-of daylight to move vehicles and gear back to an equipment park in the
-perimeter. It was 2030 before the four platoons got into position on
-East Hill after an exhausting climb in the darkness with heavy loads of
-ammunition. Some use was made of existing holes, but most of the men
-were not dug in when the Chinese attacked.
-
-On the left the collapse of a ROK platoon attached to X Corps
-Headquarters led rapidly to confusion everywhere on East Hill. Captain
-Shelnutt, the Marine officer assigned to the Army engineers, found
-that he could not close the gap by extending the line to the left. Nor
-did the men, particularly the ROKs, have the training to side-slip
-to the left under fire and beat off flank attacks. The consequence
-was a general withdrawal on East Hill, attended in some instances by
-demoralization. Shelnutt was killed as the four engineer platoons fell
-back some 250 yards in “a tight knot,” according to Lieutenant Norman
-R. Rosen, USA, commander of the 3d Platoon.
-
-This was the situation as reported by the Marine radio operator, PFC
-Bruno Podolak, who voluntarily remained as an observer at his post, now
-behind enemy lines. At 0230 a telephone call to Colonel Bowser from the
-3/1 CP was recorded in the message blank as follows:
-
-“How Company still catching hell and are about ready to launch
-counterattack to restore line. About an hour ago, enemy appeared on
-East Hill. A group of enemy sneaked up to a bunch of Banks’ men and
-hand-grenaded hell out of them and took position. Sending executive
-officer over to see if we can get some fire on that area. Should be
-able to restore the line but liable to be costly. Reserve practically
-nil. Do have a backstop behind the break in How lines on this side of
-airstrip, composed of engineers and other odds and ends.”[448]
-
-    [448] 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50.
-
-At 0400 there was little to prevent the enemy from making a complete
-breakthrough on East Hill and attacking the Division CP and the supply
-dumps. A friendly foothold had been retained on reverse slopes of the
-southern nose, but the northern part was held only by artillery fires.
-Along the road at the bottom of East Hill a thin line of service troops
-with several tanks and machine guns formed a weak barrier.
-
-All indications point to the fact that the Chinese themselves were not
-in sufficient strength to follow up their success. Their attack on East
-Hill was apparently a secondary and diversionary effort in support of
-the main assault on the sectors held by How and Item Companies. At any
-rate, the enemy contented himself with holding the high ground he had
-won.
-
-Some of the defenders of East Hill had fought with bravery which is the
-more admirable because of their lack of combat training. Battle is a
-business for specialists, and Lieutenant Rosen relates that the Army
-engineers “had a great deal of difficulty with our weapons because they
-were cold and fired sluggishly. We had gone into action so unexpectedly
-that it had not occurred to us to clean the oil off our weapons.” As
-an example of the difficulties imposed by the language barrier, the
-officers were given to understand by the ROKs that they had no more
-ammunition. “Weeks later,” commented Rosen, “we found that most of
-them had not fired their ammunition this night, but continued to carry
-it.”[449]
-
-    [449] Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209.
-
-In view of such circumstances, the service troops put up a creditable
-if losing fight in the darkness on East Hill. The 77 Americans of the
-Army engineer company suffered losses of 10 KIA, 25 WIA, and nine MIA;
-and of the 90 ROKs, about 50 were killed, wounded, or missing, chiefly
-the latter.[450]
-
-    [450] _Ibid._, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29
-          Nov 50.
-
-
-_The Volcano of Supporting Fires_
-
-As usual, the men in the thick of the fight saw only what happened in
-their immediate area. The scene as a whole was witnessed by a young
-Marine officer of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, on duty at a
-sawmill two miles north of Hagaru. From the high ground he could look
-south down into the perimeter, and the awesome spectacle of a night
-battle made him think of a volcano in eruption. Gun flashes stabbing
-the darkness were fused into a great ring of living flame, and the
-thousands of explosions blended into one steady, low-pitched roar.[451]
-
-    [451] Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56.
-
-Seldom in Marine history have supporting arms played as vital a part as
-during this night at Hagaru. It is possible that a disaster was averted
-on East Hill when the Marines of Captain Benjamin S. Read’s How Battery
-shifted trails and plugged the hole in the line with howitzer fires
-alone. Lieutenant Colonel Banks and Major Walter T. Warren, commanding
-the antitank company of the 7th Marines, acted as observers. Reporting
-by telephone to the gun pits, they directed the sweating gunners so
-accurately that an enemy attack would have come up against a curtain of
-fire.[452]
-
-    [452] Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns
-          Never Got Cold,” _Saturday Evening Post_, ccxxiii (7 Apr
-          51), 145.
-
-Captain Strohmenger’s Dog Battery had been attached to 3/1 so long
-that a high degree of co-ordination existed. His 105s fired about
-1200 rounds that night, and POW interrogations disclosed that enemy
-concentrations in rear areas were repeatedly broken up.
-
-When CCF guns replied, shortly before midnight, there was danger of
-a fuel or ammunition dump being hit and starting a chain reaction of
-detonations in the crowded perimeter. Strohmenger ordered five of his
-howitzers to cease fire while he moved the sixth out about 150 yards to
-act as a decoy. Its flashes drew fire from the enemy, as he had hoped,
-revealing the positions of the Chinese artillery. Dog Battery officers
-set up two aiming circles and calculated the range and deflection. Then
-the command was given for all six Marine howitzers to open up. The
-enemy guns were silenced for the night. A later survey established that
-two CCF 76mm guns had been destroyed and two others removed.[453]
-
-    [453] Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55.
-
-The 60mm mortars of the two rifle companies fired a total of more than
-3200 rounds; and on both fronts the heavy machine guns of Weapons
-Company added tremendously to the fire power. Illuminating shells
-being scarce, two Korean houses on the Item Company’s front were set
-ablaze by orders of Lieutenant Fisher. The flames seemed to attract CCF
-soldiers like moths, and the machine guns of the two tanks stationed
-here reaped a deadly harvest. Curiously enough, the Chinese apparently
-did not realize what excellent targets they made when silhouetted
-against the burning buildings.
-
-By 0400 it was evident that the enemy’s main effort had failed. No
-further attacks of any consequence were sustained by the two rifle
-companies. It remained only to dispose of the unwelcome CCF visitors
-sealed off in the How Company zone, and at 0420 Captain Corley rounded
-up men for a counterattack.
-
-“It will be just as dark for them as for us,” he told his NCOs.
-
-Second Lieutenant Edward W. Snelling was directed to fire all his
-remaining 60mm mortar ammunition in support. Corley and Betts led the
-service troops sent as reinforcements while Johnson advanced on the
-left. A bitter fight of extermination ensued, and by 0630 the MLR had
-been restored. How Company, which sustained the heaviest losses of any
-Marine unit that night, had a total of 16 men killed and 39 wounded,
-not including attached units.[454]
-
-    [454] Corley and Barrett narratives.
-
-After it was all over, the stillness had a strange impact on ears
-attuned the whole night long to the thump of mortars and clatter of
-machine guns. The harsh gray light of dawn revealed the unforgettable
-spectacle of hundreds of Chinese dead heaped up in front of the two
-Marine rifle companies.[455] Shrouds of new white snow covered many of
-them, and crimson trails showed where the wounded had made their way to
-the rear.
-
-    [455] POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this
-          sector had been one regiment. CIC tel to G-2 1stMarDiv,
-          1715 29 Nov 50.
-
-
-_Marine Attacks on East Hill_
-
-But even though the enemy’s main attack had failed, his secondary
-effort on East Hill represented a grave threat to perimeter security.
-At 0530 Ridge decided to counterattack, and Major Reginald R. Myers
-volunteered to lead an assault column composed of all reserves who
-could be scraped together for the attempt.
-
-It was broad daylight before the Battalion executive officer moved out
-with an assortment of Marine, Army, and ROK service troops, some of
-them stragglers from the night’s withdrawals from East Hill (see Map
-18). Their total strength compared to that of an infantry company.
-About 55 separate units were represented at Hagaru, many by splinter
-groups, so that most of Myers’ men were strangers to one another as
-well as to their officers and NCOs.
-
-The largest Marine group was the platoon led by First Lieutenant Robert
-E. Jochums, assistant operations officer of the 1st Engineer Battalion.
-Clerks, typists, and truck drivers were included along with Company D
-engineers. Armed with carbines or M-1s and two grenades apiece, the men
-carried all the small arms ammunition they could manage. Few had had
-recent combat experience and the platoon commander knew only one of
-them personally--a company clerk whom he made his runner.
-
-It was typical of the informality attending this operation that a
-Marine NCO with a small group attached themselves to Jochums, giving
-him a total of about 45. They had an exhausting, 45-minute climb up the
-hill to the line of departure, where Myers directed them to attack on
-the left of his main force.
-
-The early morning fog enshrouded East Hill and Myers’ attack had to
-wait until it cleared. The jump-off line lay along a steep slope with
-little or no cover. From the outset the advancing troops were exposed
-to scattered small-arms fire as well as grenades which needed only
-to be rolled downhill. New snow covering the old icy crust made for
-treacherous footing, so that the heavily laden men took painful falls.
-
-Myers’ little task force can scarcely be considered a tactical
-organization. His close air support was excellent; but both artillery
-and mortar support were lacking. Jochums did not notice any weapons
-save small arms and grenades.
-
-“Our plane assaults were very effective, especially the napalm
-attacks,” he commented on the basis of a personal log kept at the time.
-“During these strikes, either live or dry runs, the enemy troops in the
-line of fire would often rise and run from their positions to those in
-the rear.”[456]
-
-    [456] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.
-
-Marine air came on station at 0930 as VMF-312 planes peeled off to hit
-the enemy with napalm and bombs. The squadron flew 31 sorties that
-day at Hagaru, nearly all in the East Hill area. Enemy small-arms
-fire crippled one aircraft; but the pilot, First Lieutenant Harry W.
-Colmery, escaped serious injuries by making a successful crash landing
-within the perimeter.[457]
-
-    [457] VMF-312 _SAR_, 15–16.
-
-All accounts agree that the ground forces met more serious opposition
-from the terrain at times than from the enemy. So cut up into ridges
-and ravines was this great hill mass that the troops seldom knew
-whether they were advancing in defilade or exposing themselves to
-the fire of hidden adversaries. Thus the attack became a lethal game
-of hide-and-seek in which a step to the right or left might make the
-difference between life and death. On the other hand, when the Corsairs
-provided shooting gallery targets by flushing out opponents, only a
-few men could get into effective firing position along the narrow,
-restricted ridges before the Communists scuttled safely to new cover.
-
-It took most of the energies of the attackers to keep on toiling
-upward, gasping for breath, clutching at bushes for support, and
-sweating at every pore in spite of the cold. At noon, after snail-like
-progress, the force was still far short of the main ridge recognized as
-the dividing line between friendly forces and the enemy. By this time
-more than half of Myers’ composite company had melted away as a result
-of casualties and exhaustion. Jochums saw no more than 15 wounded men
-in the attacking force during the day. He noted about the same number
-of dead Chinese. As for enemy strength, he estimated that the total may
-have amounted to a company or slightly more.
-
-It was his conviction that “three well organized platoons could have
-pressed the assault without serious consequences and seized the
-immediate highest objective. What was behind that I am unable to
-say, but I feel that taking this high ground would have solved the
-problem.”[458]
-
-    [458] Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we]
-          could not control movement of the enemy on the reverse
-          side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.”
-
-Most of the friendly casualties were caused by the grenades and grazing
-machine-gun fire of concealed opponents who had the law of gravity
-fighting on their side. Jochums was painfully wounded in the foot but
-continued with his platoon. “The age-old problem of leadership in such
-an operation,” he concluded, “may be compared to moving a piece of
-string--pulling it forward will get you farther than pushing.”
-
-Enemy small-arms fire increased in volume when Myers’ remnants,
-estimated at 75 men, reached the military crest of the decisive ridge.
-There the groups in the center and on the right were halted by the
-Chinese holding the topographical crest and reverse slope. On the left
-Jochums’ men managed to push on to an outlying spur before being
-stopped by CCF fire from a ridge to the northeast. Jochums’ position
-was still short of the commanding high ground, yet it was destined to
-be the point of farthest penetration on East Hill.
-
-Myers ordered his men to take what cover they could find and draw up
-a defensive line “short of the topographical crest” while awaiting
-a supporting attack.[459] This was to be carried out by elements of
-Captain George W. King’s Able Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion,
-which had been stationed at a sawmill two miles north of Hagaru to
-repair a blown bridge. These troops reached the perimeter without
-incident at noon and proceeded immediately to the assault.
-
-    [459] Myers Comments.
-
-First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st Platoon led the column.
-Orders were to ascend the southwestern slope of East Hill, pass
-through Myers’ force and clear the ridge line. But after completing
-an exhausting climb to the military crest, the engineer officer was
-directed to retrace his steps to the foot. There Captain King informed
-him that a new attack had been ordered on the opposite flank, from a
-starting point about 1000 yards to the northeast.
-
-Moving to the indicated route of approach, Canzona began his second
-ascent with two squads in line, pushing up a spur and a draw which
-became almost perpendicular as it neared the topographical crest. Only
-his skeleton platoon of about 20 men was involved. There were neither
-radios nor supporting arms, and a light machine gun was the sole weapon
-in addition to small arms and grenades.
-
-Upon reaching the military crest, the engineers were pinned down by CCF
-machine-gun fire along a trail a few feet wide, with nearly vertical
-sides. Only Canzona, Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPhersen and PFC Eugene
-B. Schlegel had room for “deployment,” and they found the platoon’s one
-machine gun inoperative after it was laboriously passed up from the
-rear. Schlegel was wounded and rolled downhill like a log, unconscious
-from loss of blood.
-
-Another machine gun, sent up from the foot, enabled the platoon to hold
-its own even though it could not advance. Canzona put in a request by
-runner for mortar support, but only two 81mm rounds were delivered
-after a long delay. It was late afternoon when he walked downhill
-to consult King, who had just been ordered to withdraw Company A to
-a reverse slope position. Canzona returned to his men and pulled
-them back about half-way down the slope while McPherson covered the
-retirement with machine-gun fire. The winter sun was sinking when
-the weary engineers set up a night defense, and at that moment the
-howitzers of How Battery cut loose with point-detonation and proximity
-bursts which hit the Chinese positions with deadly accuracy.
-
-Canzona estimated the enemy strength in his zone at no more than a
-platoon, which might have been dislodged with the aid of artillery or
-even mortar fire.[460]
-
-    [460] Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that
-          the Chinese positions were defiladed from artillery fire.
-          Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.
-
-About 500 yards south of the engineers, Major Myers held a defensive
-position with his remaining force of about two platoons. The Battalion
-CP had reason to believe that the outposts on East Hill would be
-relieved shortly by George Company, with the 41st Commando in perimeter
-reserve. Both had departed Koto-ri that morning in a strong convoy
-which also included an Army infantry company, four platoons of Marine
-tanks, and the last serial of Division Headquarters Battalion.
-
-It was still touch and go at Hagaru at dusk on the 29th, but the
-defenders could take satisfaction in having weathered the enemy’s
-first onslaught. General Smith, courteous and imperturbable as always,
-visited the Battalion CP to commend Ridge and his officers for the
-night’s work. Two rifle companies had inflicted a bloody repulse on
-several times their own numbers, and the counterattacking forces on
-East Hill had at least hung on by their eyelashes.
-
-In the final issue, a bob-tailed rifle battalion, two artillery
-batteries and an assortment of service troops had stood off a CCF
-division identified as the 58th and composed of the 172d, 173d, and
-174th Infantry Regiments reinforced with organic mortars and some
-horse-drawn artillery. Chinese prisoners reported that the 172d, taking
-the principal part in the attacks on How and Item Companies, had
-suffered 90 per cent casualties. Elements of the 173d were believed
-to have figured to a lesser extent, with the 174th being kept in
-reserve.[461]
-
-    [461] 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_, 9–10; Ridge, _Notes_; Carey
-          narrative.
-
-This was the situation in the early darkness of 29 November, when the
-disturbing news reached Hagaru that George Company and the Commandos
-were being heavily attacked on the road from Koto-ri and had requested
-permission to turn back.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XI
-
-Task Force Drysdale
-
-_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri--Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks--The
-Fight in Hell Fire Valley--Attack of George Company on East Hill--High
-Level Command Conference--CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru--Rescue
-of U. S. Army Wounded--First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_
-
-
-Before the Chinese struck at Yudam-ni, they had penetrated 35 miles
-farther south along the MSR. At Chinhung-ni, on the night of 26
-November, the Marines of the 1st Battalion, RCT-1, exchanged shots in
-the darkness with several elusive enemy groups making “light probing
-attacks.”
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, the new battalion commander,
-had set up a defensive perimeter upon arrival with his three rifle
-companies reinforced by 4.2-inch mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle
-platoons.[462] The identity of the enemy on the night of the 26th was
-not suspected, and patrols the next day made no contacts. At 1900 on
-the 27th, however, another light attack on the perimeter was repulsed.
-During the next two days, patrol actions definitely established that
-Chinese in estimated battalion strength were in a mountain valley to
-the west, hiding in houses by day and probing by night apparently in
-preparation for a determined attack.
-
-    [462] This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar
-          _SAR_, 13–14; 1stMar _URpt_ (_S-3_) _13_, 1–2; VMF-312
-          _SAR_, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W.
-          L. Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D.
-          M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
-
-Schmuck decided to strike first. On the 29th, a Baker Company
-reconnaissance patrol searched out the enemy positions, and the next
-day the battalion commander led an attacking force composed of Captain
-Barrow’s Able Company and part of Captain Noren’s Baker Company,
-reinforced by 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars under the direction of Major
-William L. Bates, Jr., commanding the Weapons Company.
-
-While First Lieutenant Howard A. Blancheri’s Fox Battery of 2/11 laid
-down supporting fires, the infantry “ran the Chinese right out of the
-country,” according to Major Bates’ account. “We burned all the houses
-they had been living in and brought the civilians back with us. We had
-no more difficulty with the Chinese from that valley.”
-
-The Communists were found to be warmly clothed in new padded cotton
-uniforms and armed with American weapons presumably captured from the
-Nationalists. An estimated 56 were killed by the ground forces before
-the Corsairs of VMF-312 took up a relentless pursuit which lasted until
-the enemy remnants scattered into hiding. Some of the Chinese were
-mounted on shaggy Mongolian ponies.[463]
-
-    [463] Schmuck Comments.
-
-
-_CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri_
-
-During this same period, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2d Battalion of
-RCT-1 had several hard-fought encounters with the new enemy. After
-arriving at Koto-ri on the 24th, he set up a perimeter defense facing
-west, north, and east which included a 4.2-inch Mortar Platoon as well
-as Easy Battery of 2/11, commanded by Captain John C. McClelland, Jr.
-Some commanding ground was left unoccupied, but Sutter believed that
-a tight perimeter offered advantages over widely separated blocking
-positions. In addition to 2/1, the regimental CP and H&S Company,
-the AT Company (-), the 4.2 Mortar Company (-), Company D of the 1st
-Medical Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 11th Marines (less
-Batteries D and F) were at Koto-ri.
-
-The perimeter, second in importance only to Hagaru as a base, was to be
-jammed during the next few days with hundreds of Marine and Army troops
-held up by CCF roadblocks to the north. On 27 November, the enemy made
-his presence known. A motorized patrol of platoon strength from Captain
-Jack A. Smith’s Easy Company, supported by a section of tanks, engaged
-in a fire fight with about 25 Chinese in the hills west of Koto-ri. Two
-wounded CCF soldiers were left behind by the dispersed enemy. At this
-point the patrol proceeded on foot until it was stopped by the fire of
-an estimated 200 Communists dug in along ridge lines. At 1600 the
-Marines returned to the perimeter with two men wounded.
-
-[Illustration: KOTO-RI PERIMETER
-
-28 November – 7 December
-
-  MAP-19
-]
-
-Enemy losses were reported as eight killed and 15 wounded in addition
-to the two prisoners. Upon being questioned, these Chinese asserted
-that they belonged to a Chinese division assembling to the west of
-Koto-ri with a headquarters in a mine shaft.[464]
-
-    [464] 1stMar _SAR_, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 1815 and 1930 27 Nov 50.
-
-There could be no doubt the next day that the enemy had swarmed into
-the area in fairly large numbers. A Marine outpost on a hill northeast
-of the perimeter received heavy small-arms fire at 0845 and was
-reinforced by a platoon from Easy Company. Finally these troops had to
-be withdrawn and an air strike called on the hill to evict the enemy.
-
-At 1058 General Smith ordered Colonel Puller to push a force up the MSR
-to make contact with the tank patrol being sent south from Hagaru and
-to clear the MSR.[465] Groups of Chinese, sighted during the day to
-the north, west and east, were taken under artillery fire by Captain
-McClelland’s battery. Reconnaissance planes landing at the Koto-ri OY
-strip reported CCF roadblocks on the way to Hagaru; and at 1330 Captain
-Gildo S. Codispoti, the S-3, dispatched Captain Welby W. Cronk’s Dog
-Company in vehicles with orders to open up the route. Following in Dog
-Company’s wake came the last serial of Division Headquarters troops, on
-its way to Hagaru.[466]
-
-    [465] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50.
-
-    [466] The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 _SAR_,
-          12–13; HqBn _URpt 12_. LtCol J. C McClelland, Jr., ltr,
-          21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d.
-
-Less than a mile north of the perimeter, the convoy ran into a storm
-of rifle and automatic weapons fire from Chinese entrenched along the
-high ground on both sides of the road. The Marines of Dog Company piled
-out of their vehicles and deployed for a hot fire fight, supported from
-Koto-ri by 81mm mortars of Captain William A. Kerr’s Weapons Company.
-Two platoons swung around to clear the enemy from the ridge. The other
-platoon and the Headquarters troops advanced along the road.
-
-At 1615 a platoon from Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company was
-ordered out to assist in evacuating casualties. But as the afternoon
-wore on, it grew apparent that the Chinese were in greater strength
-than had been anticipated, and all troops were directed to return to
-Koto-ri at 1735. They did so under cover of strikes by the Corsairs of
-VMF-312.
-
-Marine losses numbered four KIA or DOW and 34 WIA. Enemy casualties
-were estimated at 154 killed and 83 wounded in addition to three
-prisoners taken from a unit identified as the 179th Regiment of the
-60th CCF Division. Captured Chinese weapons included 130 rifles, 25
-machine guns, and two cases of grenades.
-
-That evening George Company of 3/1, 41st Commando, Royal Marines, and
-Baker Company of the 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, arrived at
-Koto-ri on their way to Hagaru (see Map 20). Colonel Puller and his
-S-3, Major Lorigan, organized the newcomers into a task force under the
-command of Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, CO of the British unit, with
-orders to fight its way to Hagaru the following day.
-
-Luckily the enemy did not elect to attack the overcrowded perimeter on
-the night of the 28th. Every warming tent was packed to capacity, and a
-CCF mortar round could hardly have landed anywhere without doing a good
-deal of damage.
-
-After a quiet night the Chinese began the new day by digging
-emplacements in the hills to the west under harassing fire from F
-Company. The howitzers of Easy Battery and the mortars of 2/1 provided
-supporting fires for Task Force Drysdale when it moved out at 0945
-followed by a convoy of Division Headquarters troops. A platoon of Easy
-Company, 2/1, went along with corpsmen and ambulances to assist in
-evacuating any early wounded back to Koto-ri. Stubborn CCF resistance
-resulted in casualties from the outset, and it was 1600 before the Easy
-Company escort platoon got back to the perimeter.
-
-The Chinese, keeping the perimeter under observation all day, evidently
-concluded that the northern rim, defended by Easy Company, offered the
-best opportunity for a penetration. Marine air strikes were called
-on the Chinese swarming over the near-by high ground during the last
-minutes of daylight, but enemy mortar rounds hit Easy Company at 1745.
-They were followed by bugle calls and whistle signals as the CCF
-infantry attacked from the high ground to the northeast.
-
-The assault force was estimated at company strength, with the remainder
-of a battalion in reserve. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they had
-made their intentions clear all day with unusual activity in the
-surrounding hills, and Easy Company was not surprised. Major Clarence
-J. Mabry, the 2/1 executive officer, could be heard above the machine
-guns as he shouted encouragement to Marines who poured it into the
-advancing Communists. They came on with such persistence that 17
-managed to penetrate within the lines, apparently to attack the warming
-tents.[467] All were killed. In addition, about 150 CCF bodies lay in
-front of the sector when the enemy withdrew at 1855, after suffering a
-complete repulse.
-
-    [467] LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56.
-
-It was conjectured that the Chinese had interpreted the return of the
-Easy Company platoon late that afternoon as an indication that a gap
-in the line needed to be hastily plugged. But the supposed weak spot
-did not materialize, and at 1935 the enemy signed off for the night
-after pumping four final mortar rounds in the vicinity of the Battalion
-CP without doing any harm. Losses of 2/1 for the day were six KIA and
-18 WIA, total CCF casualties being estimated at 175 killed and 200
-wounded. Ten heavy machine guns, seven LMGs, 12 Thompson submachine
-guns, 76 rifles, four pistols, and 500 grenades were captured.
-
-That was all at Koto-ri, where Recon Company arrived during the day
-to add its weight to the defense. But during intervals of silence the
-sound of heavy and continuous firing to the north gave proof that Task
-Force Drysdale was in trouble.
-
-
-_Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks_
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale’s plan of attack had called for his British
-Marines to lead out at 0930 and seize the first hill mass to the east
-of the road. Captain Sitter’s George Company of 3/1 was to follow
-and pass through to attack Hill 1236, with Baker Company of the 31st
-Infantry in reserve. LtCol Sutter, assisted by his staff, had the
-responsibility for planning and coordinating preparatory artillery and
-mortar fires from Koto-ri and attaching an air liaison officer to the
-task force.[468]
-
-    [468] Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO
-          41st Commando ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn
-          _SAR_, 23–27; Smith, _Notes_, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter
-          ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas
-          ltr to HistBr G-3, 18 Dec 55; Narrative of Capt M. J.
-          Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan
-          56; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” _Marine
-          Corps Gazette_, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51), 28–32; 1stMar
-          tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J.
-          Catania, “Truck Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, _Combat
-          Support in Korea_, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM,
-          Comments, n. d.
-
-The first hill was taken without meeting serious resistance, but Sitter
-came up against well entrenched CCF troops when he attacked Hill 1236,
-about a mile and a half north of Koto-ri. It was nip and tuck until
-Master Sergeant Rocco A. Zullo fired his 3.5 rocket launcher at a
-range of 200 yards. Several rounds brought the Chinese out of their
-holes and the Marines took possession of the hill.
-
-[Illustration: ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE HAGARU
-
-28 November-1 December
-
-  MAP-20
-]
-
-The Commandos and George Company moved up about a mile astride of the
-road toward the third objective, Hill 1182. There the enemy resisted
-strenuously with well-placed mortar as well as machine-gun fire from
-strong positions on the high ground. The impetus of the attack had been
-stopped when Sitter received orders from the task force commander to
-break off action, withdraw to the road, and await new instructions.
-
-Drysdale had received a message from RCT-1 at 1130 advising him that
-the armor of Company D (less 2d platoon), 1st Tank Battalion, would be
-available to him at 1300. He decided to wait, therefore, and re-form
-the column before continuing the advance.
-
-The two platoons of Company D tanks, reinforced by the tank platoon
-of the AT Company, RCT-5, reached Koto-ri at noon after moving out
-that morning from Majon-dong. Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, departed
-Tongjong-ni, just south of Majon-dong, but did not arrive at Koto-ri
-until 1500. The 2d Platoon being attached to Sutter’s battalion, the
-remainder of the company was directed to bring up the rear of the Task
-Force Drysdale, which by that time had renewed its attack. Thus the
-convoy was made up of the following components, including the elements
-which joined in the late afternoon of 29 November:
-
-  -----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
-              Unit             |Estimated|Estimated|Estimated
-                               |Strength |Vehicles |  Tanks
-  -----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
-  41 Ind. Commando, RM         |     235 |         |
-  Co. G, 3/1                   |     205 |         |
-  Co. B, 31st Infantry, USA    |     190 |      22 |
-  Det. Div. Hq. Bn.            |      62 |      17 |
-  Det. 1st Sig. Bn.            |       8 |       4 |
-  Det. 7th MT Bn.[469]         |      12 |      22 |
-  Det. Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn. |      18 |      31 |
-  Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn.       |      86 |      23 |      12
-  Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn.       |      77 |      22 |      12
-  Tank Plat., AT Co., RCT-5    |      29 |         |       5
-  -----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
-               Total           |     922 |     141 |      29
-  -----------------------------+---------+---------+---------
-
-    [469] Trailers are included among the vehicles. George Company,
-          3/1 lacked organic transport and was mounted in the
-          vehicles of 7thMTBn. For similar reasons ServCo, 1stTkBn,
-          supplied the transportation for the 41st Commando and
-          377th Transportation Truck Company, USA, for B/31stInf.
-
-At 1350 the head of the column had resumed the advance, with the order
-of march as shown below:
-
-  D/TKs & AT/5  --  G/1  --  41 Cmdo  --  B/31  --  HqBn  --  B/TKs
-     17 tks       22 veh     31 veh      22 veh    66 veh    12 tks
-
-Shortly after moving out, Sitter’s men were hit by heavy small-arms
-fire from houses on the right of the road. The company commander went
-forward and requested the tanks to open up with their 90mm guns, and
-the Chinese flushed out of the houses were destroyed by machine-gun
-fire.
-
-Progress was slow because of the necessity of further halts while the
-tanks blasted out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as
-small-arms fire was encountered, and a round scored a direct hit on
-one of the trucks carrying personnel of 3d Platoon of George Company,
-wounding every man in the vehicle.
-
-Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over roadblocks
-or around craters. For the three infantry companies, the advance
-consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes in
-which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage in fire fights.
-Finally, about 1615, the column ground to a complete halt about four
-miles north of Koto-ri. At that time the tanks of Company B were just
-leaving the 2/1 perimeter to join the convoy.
-
-
-_The Fight in Hell Fire Valley_
-
-Drysdale and Sitter were informed by the tank officers that they
-thought the armor could get through, but that further movement for the
-trucks was inadvisable in view of road conditions and increasing enemy
-resistance. The task force commander requested a decision from Division
-Headquarters as to whether he should resume an advance which threatened
-to prove costly. It was a difficult choice for General Smith to make,
-but in view of the urgent necessity for reinforcements at Hagaru he
-directed Drysdale to continue.[470]
-
-    [470] Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are
-          the same as the preceding, plus: Statement of Capt M. C.
-          Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton,
-          and Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb
-          51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51;
-          CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C.
-          W. Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt
-          J. B. Nash, and TSgt C L. Harrison intervs by HistDiv
-          HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt
-          Shutts, 26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov
-          56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson, Estess, and Williams were
-          among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped from
-          Chinese imprisonment several months later.
-
-The tanks had to refuel, so that more time was lost. CCF fire was
-only moderate during this delay, thanks to the air strikes of VMF-321
-planes directed by Captain Norman Vining. When the column stopped,
-the vehicles had pulled off into a dry stream bed. Upon resuming the
-advance, unit integrity was lost and infantry elements mingled with
-headquarters troops.
-
-[Illustration: TASK FORCE DRYSDALE AMBUSH
-
-29 November
-
-  MAP-21
-]
-
-Not far south of the halfway point to Hagaru, increased enemy fire
-caused an abrupt halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply
-on the right of the road, while on the left a frozen creek wound
-through a plain several hundred yards wide, bordered by the Changjin
-River and wooded hills. This was Hell Fire Valley--a name applied by
-Drysdale--and it was to be the scene of an all-night fight by half the
-men of the convoy (see Map 21).
-
-Such a possibility was far from their thoughts when they piled out of
-the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all day, to return
-the enemy’s fire. It did not even seem significant when an enemy
-mortar shell set one of the trucks in flames at the far end of the
-valley, thus creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy
-took advantage of the opportunity to pour in small-arms and mortar
-fire which pinned down the troops taking cover behind vehicles or in
-the roadside ditches and prevented removal of the damaged truck.
-During this interlude the head of the column, consisting of Dog/Tanks,
-George Company, nearly three-fourths of the 41st Commando and a few
-Army infantrymen, continued the advance, with Drysdale in command, in
-obedience to orders to proceed to Hagaru at all costs. Left behind in
-Hell Fire Valley were 61 Commandos, most of Company B, 31st Infantry,
-and practically all the Division Headquarters and Service troops.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, assistant Division G-4 and
-senior officer caught south of the roadblock, ordered the barred
-vehicles to turn around and attempt a return to Koto-ri. Before his
-orders could be carried out, a Chinese attack severed the convoy about
-200 yards to the north of him. Other enemy attacks cut the road south
-of the stalled convoy, both Chidester and Major James K. Eagan being
-wounded and captured.
-
-Shallow ditches on either side of the road and the unused narrow-gauge
-railway were utilized by the isolated troops as protection from the
-fire of the Chinese occupying the high ground rising abruptly at the
-right. The valley was about a mile long, covered with a frozen crust
-of snow; and far from affording much cover, it offered the enemy a
-convenient approach to the rear by way of the wide plain and frozen
-river.
-
-The Chinese fire was not heavy at first. But when darkness put an end
-to Marine air strikes, the enemy became increasingly bolder. Even so,
-there was no attempt for several hours to close within grenade-throwing
-distance. During this interlude the defenders had time to recover from
-their confusion and take defensive positions.
-
-As nearly as the scene can be reconstructed from confused and
-contradictory accounts, one large and three small perimeters were
-strung out over a distance of perhaps 1200 yards from north to south.
-Toward the north, near the outskirts of the village of Pusong-ni,
-was the largest perimeter. It contained the troops caught north
-of the second fracture of the column and was led by Major John N.
-McLaughlin.[471] His hodge-podge of 130 to 140 men included Captain
-Charles Peckham and part of his B Company, 31st Infantry; Warrant
-Officer Lloyd V. Dirst and a group of Marine MPs; some Commandos,
-Associated Press photographer Frank Noel, and assorted Marine service
-and headquarters troops.
-
-    [471] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had
-          transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G-3
-          and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.
-
-The three smaller perimeters appear to have resulted from the
-splintering of a larger group originally containing nearly all the men
-caught south of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seeley,
-Division motor transport officer, attempted to form a perimeter with
-these men but was frustrated by Chinese attacks which forced the men
-to fall back in small groups. About 300 yards south of McLaughlin’s
-perimeter the remnants of two Army platoons crouched in a drainage
-ditch. Apparently several Marines, including CWO Dee R. Yancey, were
-with them. Some 30 yards farther down the ditch were Captain Michael
-J. Capraro, the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck, General
-Craig’s aide, and about 15 headquarters troops. A few other Marines
-clustered around Major Seeley, perhaps a hundred yards south of
-Capraro’s group.[472]
-
-    [472] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable
-          that estimates made by participants in the darkness
-          varied a great deal.
-
-There was some hope at first that the tanks of Baker Company, 1st Tank
-Battalion, would come to the rescue. But the Marine armor ran into
-heavy opposition near Hills 1236 and 1182 along the road cleared only a
-few hours before by Task Force Drysdale.
-
-When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split the
-motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That
-is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks nearest to
-Koto-ri got back without much trouble at 2110 after the enemy cut the
-column into three groups. The middle group, comprising most of the
-service trucks, was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walseth,
-the Division G-1, was wounded as this group finally fought back to
-Koto-ri at 0230 after heavy losses in trucks. This left the tank
-platoon which had proceeded farthest; and it formed a tight perimeter
-for the night about half a mile south of Seeley’s position, boxed in by
-friendly artillery fires from Koto-ri. At dawn the tanks returned to
-Koto-ri without further enemy interference.
-
-No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in Hell
-Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks might arrive to the
-aid of men who had no weapons larger than a single 75mm recoilless in
-addition to rifles, carbines, and grenades. There were also a few 60mm
-mortars but no ammunition for them.
-
-Fortunately, no determined Chinese attacks were received up to
-midnight. Looting the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the
-Asiatics, and their officers contented themselves with keeping the
-perimeters pinned down and enveloped on three sides.
-
-Not until the early hours of 30 November did the Communists resort to
-probing attacks by small groups armed with grenades. The headquarters
-and service troops gave a good account of themselves in the fire fight.
-Signalmen, clerks, cooks, truck drivers, military policemen--the
-Marines of Hell Fire Valley included a good many veterans of World War
-II, and they proved as steady as the tough combat-trained Commandos.
-Once again the value of the Marine Corps insistence on good basic
-training showed itself.
-
-Major McLaughlin sent reconnaissance parties south in an unsuccessful
-attempt to link up with the other perimeters. He decided, therefore, to
-remain in his positions and fight off the Chinese until air could come
-on station at dawn. The wounded were placed in the deepest of the three
-ditches and Army medics gave first aid.
-
-As the night wore on, McLaughlin’s situation became increasingly grave.
-By 0200 his men were out of grenades. An Army crew performed valiantly
-with the 75mm recoilless, firing at enemy mortar flashes until all the
-soldiers were killed or wounded and the gun put out of action. Twice
-McLaughlin’s men drove the Chinese from their mortars only to have them
-return.
-
-Some of the Commandos managed to slip out of the perimeter in an effort
-to reach Koto-ri and summon assistance. But an attempt by Noel and two
-men to run the gantlet in a jeep between 0200 and 0300 ended in their
-capture before they proceeded a hundred yards.
-
-At about 0430 the Chinese sent their prisoners to the perimeter with
-a surrender demand. McLaughlin, accompanied by a Commando, went out
-to parley through an interpreter in the hope of stalling until help
-arrived, or at least until some of the men escaped.
-
-“Initially I demanded a CCF surrender!” he recalls. “But it made little
-impression.”
-
-The Marine officer stalled until the Chinese threatened to overrun the
-perimeter with an all-out attack. They gave him ten minutes to discuss
-the capitulation with his officers. McLaughlin went from one to another
-of the approximately 40 able bodied men he had left. Some had no rifle
-ammunition at all and none had more than eight rounds. For the sake of
-his wounded, he consented to surrender on condition that the serious
-cases be evacuated. The Chinese agreed and the fight in Hell Fire
-Valley ended.
-
-McLaughlin succeeded in killing enough time so that more men were given
-the opportunity to slip away while the enemy relaxed his vigilance
-during the prolonged negotiations. Largest of these groups was composed
-of the survivors of the three small perimeters. Capraro and Buck,
-both of whom were slightly wounded, managed to unite with the Army
-infantrymen just north of them and nine Commandos, who joined them at
-about 0200. An hour and a half later they linked up with the Marines
-under Seeley, who led the combined group in a withdrawal to the high
-ground across the river. Outdistancing their CCF pursuers, after
-shooting down several, they made it safely to Koto-ri.
-
-Other groups, including three more Commandos and 71 Army infantrymen,
-also contrived to straggle back to the 2/1 perimeter.
-
-Although the Chinese did not keep their word as to evacuation of the
-wounded, they did not interfere with the removal of the more critical
-cases to a Korean house. When the enemy retired to the hills for
-the day, an opportunity was found to evacuate these casualties to
-Koto-ri.[473]
-
-    [473] LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the
-          end of the conflict, when the exchanges of prisoners took
-          place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has
-          been able to secure, it appears that both officers died
-          of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp. McLaughlin
-          Comments, 5 Nov 56.
-
-An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will
-probably never be made, but the following estimate is not far from the
-mark:
-
-  -----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
-                         | KIA       |   Total    |
-                         | and       |   Battle   |  Vehicles
-  Unit                   | MIA   WIA | Casualties |   Lost[A]
-  -----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
-  41st Commando          |  18    43 |         61 |
-  Co. G, 3/1             |   8    40 |         48 |
-  Co. B, 1/31            | 100    19 |        119 |       22
-  Div. Hq. Bn.           |  25    25 |         50 |       18
-  1st Sig. Bn.           |   4     2 |          6 |
-  7th MT Bn.             |   2     3 |          5 |        4
-  Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn |   5     6 |         11 |       30
-  Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn  |   0    12 |         12 |
-  Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn  |   0     8 |          8 |        1
-  Plat, AT Co., RCT-5    |   0     1 |          1 |
-  -----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
-              Total      | 162   159 |        321 |       75
-  -----------------------+-----------+------------+-------------
-
-      [A] Smith, _Notes_, 867–868.
-
-“The casualties of Task Force Drysdale were heavy,” commented General
-Smith, “but by its partial success the Task Force made a significant
-contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the Division.
-To the slender infantry garrison of Hagaru were added a tank company of
-about 100 men and some 300 seasoned infantrymen. The approximately 300
-troops which returned to Koto-ri participated thereafter in the defense
-of that perimeter.”[474]
-
-    [474] _Ibid._ A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was
-          written the following spring in front-page headlines
-          announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17
-          enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five
-          NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages.
-          Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either
-          escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and
-          were liberated in Operation Big Switch.
-
-The head of the Task Force Drysdale column, with the Company D tanks
-leading George Company and the Commandos, was not aware at dusk on the
-29th that the convoy had been cut behind them. There had been previous
-gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy fire, and it was
-supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would catch up with
-the vanguard.
-
-Progress was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high
-ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about
-2200 yards from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated
-CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged by a
-satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several vehicles were
-set afire. After Drysdale was wounded the command passed to Sitter,
-who formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse of the Chinese
-permitted the march to be resumed.[475]
-
-    [475] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been
-          derived from the following sources: 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15
-          Dec 50_, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn _SAR_, 24–25; Ridge, _Notes_;
-          Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums
-          ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey
-          narrative, 3 Feb 56.
-
-Several pyramidal tents just outside the Hagaru perimeter were assumed
-to be occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity destroyed
-two George Company trucks and caused several casualties. Later it was
-learned that the tents had been originally occupied by troops of the
-10th Engineer Battalion and abandoned when the Chinese attacked on the
-28th.
-
-At 1915, Captain Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who
-directed that George Company and the 41st Commando spend the night in
-perimeter reserve. After their all-day fight, the men of the column
-could scarcely believe their eyes when they saw the Marine engineers at
-work on the airstrip under the floodlights.
-
-Contrary to expectations, the hours of darkness on 29–30 November
-passed in comparative quiet at Hagaru except for CCF harassing fires.
-It was not a coincidence that the enemy kept his distance. Attacks on
-the East Hill and Item and How Company positions of 3/1 actually had
-been planned and partly executed by troops of the 58th CCF Division,
-according to POW testimony. They were broken up by Marine air attacks
-and supporting fires which hit the assembly areas.
-
-The effectiveness of these fires owed a good deal to the intelligence
-brought back to Lieutenant Carey, the Battalion S-2, by CIC agents who
-circulated among Chinese troops on 27 and 28 November. The Battalion
-S-2 had a work table at the CP beside Major Simmons, the SAC, who
-directed six sorties of the night hecklers of VMF(N)-542. He guided
-the planes through the darkness to their targets with a fiery arrow
-as converging machine-gun tracer bullets crossed over suspected CCF
-assembly areas.
-
-The 81mm mortars of Weapons Company, 3/1, fired about 1100 rounds
-during the night, and the corresponding unit of 2/7 made a noteworthy
-contribution. The following day, according to Carey, Chinese prisoners
-reported that “most of the units employed around Hagaru were very badly
-hit.”[476]
-
-    [476] This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of
-          29–30 November is based on: Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56;
-          LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15
-          Dec 50_, 4–5.
-
-A few white phosphorus mortar rounds fell in the lines of How and Item
-Companies, and a CCF green flare caused an alert for an attack which
-never materialized. In the early morning hours of the 30th an enemy
-concentration appeared to be taking place on the Item Company front,
-but intensive 60mm mortar fire put an end to the threat.
-
-
-_Attack of George Company on East Hill_
-
-At 0800, the battalion commander ordered George Company to retake East
-Hill while the Commandos remained in reserve. Sitter’s plan called for
-his 1st and 2d platoons, commanded by Second Lieutenants Frederick W.
-Hopkins and John W. Jaeger respectively, to pass through Myers’ group,
-then make a sharp left turn and attack on either side of the ridge.
-First Lieutenant Carl E. Dennis’ 3d Platoon and two platoons of Able
-Company engineers were to follow in reserve.
-
-Slow progress caused the George Company commander to modify the plan
-by giving his 3d platoon and the two engineer platoons the mission of
-enveloping the CCF right flank (see Map 22). Lieutenant Dennis led
-the attack, with First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt’s and Lieutenant
-Canzona’s engineer platoons following.
-
-[Illustration: EAST HILL ATTACKS
-
-30 November
-
-  MAP-22
-]
-
-Neither of the George Company attacks was successful. The trampling of
-hundreds of feet over the snow had made the footing more treacherous
-than ever; and once again the combination of difficult terrain and
-long-range Chinese fire accounted for failure to retake East Hill.
-Sitter’s request to set up defense positions on the ground previously
-occupied by Myers was granted. Meanwhile Dennis’ platoon and the
-engineers were directed to withdraw to the foot of the hill, so that
-the Corsairs could work the CCF positions over with rockets and bombs.
-
-
-_High Level Command Conference_
-
-Although the Marines at Hagaru had little to do with the higher levels
-of strategy, it was evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth
-Army in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of X Corps.
-Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the
-three battalions (two infantry and one artillery) of the 7th Infantry
-Division east of the Chosin Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I.
-Hodes, assistant division commander, informed General Smith at noon on
-the 29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties
-while falling back toward Hagaru and were unable to fight their way out
-to safety. At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area,
-including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational
-control of the Marine commander by X Corps. The 1st Marine Division
-was directed to “redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni area to
-Hagaru area, gain contact with elements of the 7th Inf Div E of Chosin
-Reservoir; co-ordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru in a perimeter
-defense based on Hagaru; open and secure Hagaru-Koto-ri MSR.”[477]
-
-    [477] X Corps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50.
-
-On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at Hagaru in
-the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr, and Hodes were informed
-at the briefing session that a disaster threatened the three Army
-battalions.[478]
-
-    [478] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 16–17;
-          CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_, 30 Nov 50.
-
-Almond was also much concerned about the attacks on the Marine MSR. He
-had been given a firsthand account that morning by the senior Marine
-officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney, who had just
-returned from Koto-ri.[479]
-
-    [479] Col E. H. Forney, _Transcript of Special Report, Deputy
-          Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August, 21 December 1950_, 3.
-
-At the Hagaru conference the X Corps commander announced that he had
-abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the Chosin Reservoir
-area. Stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward Hamhung,
-he promised Smith resupply by air after authorizing him to burn or
-destroy all equipment which would delay his withdrawal to the seacoast.
-
-The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by his
-ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out, he
-added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was his intention,
-therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.[480]
-
-    [480] Smith, _Chronicle_, 95. These decisions were confirmed by
-          CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50.
-
-Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule
-for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those
-two generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the
-Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an
-inconclusive note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received.
-It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy to
-the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to the
-Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”[481]
-
-    [481] X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps _WD Sum,
-          Nov 50_, 16–17; and CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps _WD_
-          30 Nov 50.
-
-The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the
-evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12
-to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the three combat
-squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at once. Transfer of
-the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many instances the planes
-took off on combat missions from Wonsan and landed at Yonpo, so that
-the ground forces were not deprived of air support.[482]
-
-    [482] MAG-12 _HD Nov 50_, 8; 1stMAW _HD Dec 50_; CO MAG-12 msg
-          to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in
-          _ibid._ VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_.
-
-High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation
-of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy foresaw
-as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth Army
-continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back and
-being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous
-quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date
-that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in
-turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either by
-an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.[483]
-
-    [483] ComPhibGruOne, _Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment,
-          December 1950_, 1.
-
-
-_CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru_
-
-During the early hours of darkness on 30 November, it appeared that
-Hagaru might have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were heard
-by Item Company at 2015, and the enemy sent up a green flare an hour
-later. But no unusual CCF activity was reported until 2330, when small
-patrols began probing for weak spots in the Item Company lines.
-
-The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area for such
-research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up an elaborate system
-of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps; and his sandbagged
-foxholes and weapon emplacements afforded his men maximum protection.
-At midnight, when the enemy came on in strength, each successive
-assault wave shattered against the terrific fire power which a Marine
-rifle company, aided by artillery, tanks, 81mm mortars, and heavy
-machine guns, could concentrate.
-
-Several times the enemy’s momentum carried him to the Item Company
-foxholes but no Communists lived to exploit their advantage. On one
-of these occasions Sergeant Charles V. Davidson, having expended his
-ammunition, proved that cold steel still has its uses by bayoneting the
-last of his attackers.[484]
-
-    [484] Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55.
-
-Again, as on the night of the 28th, the enemy had chosen to launch his
-major attack against Marine strength, though his daytime observation
-must have disclosed the preparations for a hot reception in the Item
-Company sector. An estimated 500 to 750 Chinese were killed on this
-front at a cost to Fisher’s men of two KIA and 10 WIA.[485]
-
-    [485] 3/1 _SAR_ 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, _Notes_.
-
-The Chinese also repeated themselves by carrying out another attack on
-East Hill which ended in a second costly stalemate. The western slope
-up to the military crest was held by the following units from right
-to left: First Lieutenant Ermine L. Meeker’s 1st Platoon of Baker
-Company engineers; the 2d, 1st, and 3d Platoons of George Company; and
-Lieutenant Skelt’s 3d Platoon of Able Company Engineers. To the left of
-Skelt, near the foot of the hill, were Lieutenant Canzona’s 1st Platoon
-of Able engineers; two tanks of the AT Company, 2/7; and elements of
-Lieutenant Colonel Banks’ 1st Service Battalion.[486]
-
-    [486] Sources for the balance of this section are as follows:
-          Smith, _Chronicle_, 97–100; 3/1 _SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50_,
-          5–6; Ridge, _Notes_; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona
-          narrative, 8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14
-          Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10 Apr 56.
-
-The action began shortly before midnight with one of those comedy
-situations which develop on the grimmest occasions. The sign or
-password was “Abraham” and the countersign “Lincoln,” but two Company A
-engineers on a listening post did not pause for the customary exchange.
-Having been jumped by what their startled eyes took to be a Chinese
-regiment, they sprinted downhill yelling, “Abraham Lincoln! Abraham
-Lincoln!” as they slid into Skelt’s lines with the enemy close behind.
-
-His engineers had no leisure for a laugh. Within a few seconds they
-were mixing it in a wild melee with Communists who seemed literally to
-drop on them from above. Meanwhile, George Company was hard hit by well
-aimed mortar fire which threatened to wipe out Lieutenant Hopkins’ 1st
-Platoon. The ensuing double-headed CCF attack bent back the left flank
-of George Company, with both the 1st and 3d Platoons giving ground.
-
-On the left Skelt’s platoon was pushed down to the foot of the hill by
-superior enemy numbers after exactly half of his 28 men were killed or
-wounded. Here the fight continued with Banks’ service troops lending a
-hand until the Chinese were exterminated.
-
-This penetration was a hollow triumph for the enemy. No friendly forces
-being left in the center, the How Battery howitzers walked shells up
-and down the western slope. Mortars and machine guns chimed in, and
-Lieutenant Canzona’s platoon was in position to direct the fire of the
-two tanks of AT Company 2/7.
-
-The scene became bright as day after an enemy artillery shell set 50
-drums of gasoline ablaze in a Supply Area dump. Like an enormous torch,
-the flames illuminated the battle so vividly that General Smith looked
-on from the doorway of his CP, some 1200 yards away. Several bullets
-pierced the roof and walls during the night.
-
-Again, as in the fight of 28–29 November, Marine fire power blocked the
-gap on the central and northwest slopes of East Hill. Marine and Army
-service troops took a part in the fighting which is the more creditable
-considering that they were ordered out in the middle of the night,
-placed in a provisional unit with strange troops, and marched off into
-the darkness to attack or defend at some critical point.
-
-Lieutenant Meeker’s engineer platoon, on the right of George Company,
-had a long-drawn fire fight but got off with losses of one man killed
-and three wounded. At 0100 the CCF pressure on Sitter’s troops was
-so heavy that Lieutenant Carey, former commander of the 1st Platoon,
-was taken from his S-2 duties to lead a group of reinforcements which
-he described as “all available hands from the CP or any other units
-in Hagaru who could spare personnel.” Carrying as much ammunition as
-possible, he arrived at the George Company CP to find Sitter still
-commanding in spite of his wound. Scarcely a full squad was left of
-Carey’s old outfit when he helped to restore the lines.
-
-It was necessary for Ridge to send a further reinforcement consisting
-of British Marines of the 41st Commando before George Company’s left
-flank was secured. A counterattack at daybreak regained lost ground,
-and the situation was well under control when air came on station at
-0900.
-
-Thus ended another night of confusion and frustration for both sides
-on East Hill. While the Chinese attack had been better organized and
-in larger force than the effort of the 29th, it was too little and too
-late for decisive results in spite of heavy losses. On the other hand,
-George Company and its reinforcing elements had suffered an estimated
-60 men killed and wounded.
-
-Although the Marines of Hagaru could not have suspected it on the
-morning of 1 December, the enemy had, for the time being, shot his
-bolt. His first two large-scale attacks, as POW interrogations were
-to confirm, had used up not only the personnel of a division but most
-of the limited supplies of ammunition available. Thus it is probable
-that the following estimates of CCF casualties, as published in the 3/1
-report, for the period of 28 November to 5 December, were nearer to
-accuracy than most such summaries:
-
-   (1) 58th CCF Division: Estimated casualties of 3300 for the 172d
-       Regiment; 1750 each for the 173d and 174th Regiments.
-
-   (2) 59th CCF Division: Estimated 1750 casualties for the 176th
-       Regiment. No other units identified.
-
-The known Chinese dead in the two night battles amounted to at least
-1500; and if it may be assumed that three or four times that number
-were wounded, the total casualties would have crippled an enemy
-infantry division of 7500 to 10,000 men, plus an additional regiment.
-Considering the primitive state of CCF supply and medical service,
-moreover, it is likely that hundreds died of wounds and privations
-behind their own lines.
-
-The losses of 3/1 at Hagaru were given as 33 KIA, 10 DOW, 2 MIA, and
-270 WIA--a total of 315 battle casualties, nearly all of which were
-incurred from 28 November to 1 December.[487] There are no over-all
-casualty figures for Marine or Army service troops, but it is probable
-that their total losses exceeded those of 3/1.
-
-    [487] Ridge, _Notes_; Smith, _Notes_, 854.
-
-
-_Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded_
-
-Casualties estimated as high as 75 per cent were suffered by the three
-U. S. Army battalions east of the Reservoir. At 2200 on the night
-of 1 December, the first survivors, most of them walking wounded,
-reached the Marine lines north of Hagaru with tales of frightful losses
-suffered in the five days of continual fighting since the first CCF
-attack on the night of 27–28 November.
-
-Following this action Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commanding the 31st
-Infantry, had set up a perimeter near Sinhung-ni with the 3d Battalion
-of his regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 57th Field Artillery.
-Along the shore farther to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith,
-USA, held a separate perimeter with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry
-(see Map 20).[488]
-
-    [488] The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith,
-          unless otherwise noted, are: Statement of Capt Edward P.
-          Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak,
-          n. d.; Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,”
-          in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, _Combat Actions in Korea_,
-          63–86; X Corps _WD Sum, Nov 50_, 33–34. Chinese accounts
-          of these actions may be found in ATIS _Enemy Documents:
-          Korean Campaign_, Issue 84, 7–15 and 20–25. LtCol Faith
-          had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to
-          MajGen Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d
-          Airborne Div.
-
-Both positions were hard hit by the Chinese on the night of 27–28
-November and isolated from each other. During the next 24 hours they
-beat off CCF attacks with the support of Marine and FEAF planes, and
-Faith fought his way through to a junction with the Sinhung-ni force.
-
-When the senior officer was killed, Faith took command of all three
-battalions. Immobilized by nearly 500 casualties, he remained in the
-Sinhung-ni perimeter, where he was supplied by air. On the 29th General
-Hodes sent a relief force in company strength from 31st Infantry units
-in the area just north of Hagaru. These troops, supported by several
-Army tanks, were hurled back by superior CCF numbers with the loss of
-two tanks and heavy personnel casualties.
-
-On 1 December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in his Sinhung-ni
-perimeter, Faith attempted to break through to Hagaru. After destroying
-the howitzers and all but the most essential equipment, the convoy with
-its hundreds of wounded moved out under the constant cover of Marine
-close air support, controlled by Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC.[489]
-
-    [489] VMF(N)-542 _SAR_, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)-542 _HD_, Dec 50,
-          1–2; 1stMAW _SAR_, annex J, (hereafter MAG-33 _SAR_), sec
-          B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in 1stLt
-          H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan
-          51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan
-          51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan
-          51; and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18
-          Feb 51.
-
-Progress was slow and exhausting, with frequent stops for fire fights.
-There were many instances of individual bravery in the face of
-adversity, but losses of officers and NCOs gradually deprived the units
-of leadership. As an added handicap, a large proportion of the troops
-were ROKs who understood no English.
-
-The task force came near to a breakout. At dusk it was only four and a
-half miles from Hagaru when Faith fell mortally wounded and the units
-shattered into leaderless groups.[490] Soon the column had ceased to
-exist as a military force. A tragic disintegration set in as wounded
-and frostbitten men made their way over the ice of the Reservoir in
-wretched little bands drawn together by a common misery rather than
-discipline.
-
-    [490] The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a
-          Congressional Medal of Honor.
-
-By a miracle the first stragglers to reach Hagaru got through the mine
-fields and trip flares without harm. Before dawn a total of about 670
-survivors of Task Force Faith had been taken into the warming tents of
-Hagaru.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Beall, commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport
-Battalion, made a personal search in the morning for other survivors.
-Finding more than his jeep could carry, he organized a task force of
-trucks, jeeps, and sleds. The only CCF opposition to the Marines came
-in the form of long-distance sniping which grew so troublesome late in
-the afternoon that the truckers set up a machine gun section on the
-ice for protection. Far from hindering the escape of the Army wounded,
-the Chinese actually assisted in some instances, thus adding to the
-difficulty of understanding the Oriental mentality.[491]
-
-    [491] The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force
-          Faith is based upon: 1stMar Div _SAR_, annex Q (hereafter
-          DivSurgeon _SAR_), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement
-          of LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv _POR 197_; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 902–906; and Smith, _Chronicle_, 98, 100.
-
-Of the 319 soldiers rescued by Beall on 2 December, nearly all were
-wounded or frostbitten. Some were found wandering about in aimless
-circles on the ice, in a state of shock.
-
-A company-size task force of Army troops from Hagaru, supported by
-tanks, moved out that day to bring in any organized units of the three
-shattered battalions which might have been left behind. Known as Task
-Force Anderson after Lieutenant Colonel Berry K. Anderson, senior Army
-officer at Hagaru, the column met heavy CCF opposition and was recalled
-when it became evident that only stragglers remained.[492]
-
-    [492] 1stMarDiv G-3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G-3 1stMarDiv
-          tel to S-3 11–12 Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50.
-
-Beall and his men kept up their rescue work until the last of an
-estimated 1050 survivors of the original 2500 troops had been saved.
-A Marine reconnaissance patrol counted more than 300 dead in the
-abandoned trucks of the Task Force Faith convoy, and there were
-apparently hundreds of MIA. The 385 able-bodied soldiers who reached
-Hagaru were organized into a provisional battalion and provided with
-Marine equipment.[493]
-
-    [493] _Ibid._ Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by
-          air from Hagaru as casualties run as high as 1500, but
-          no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover,
-          would have to include men from the Army units stationed
-          at Hagaru as well as survivors of the Task Force Faith
-          disaster.
-
-
-_First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip_
-
-Casualty evacuation had become such a problem by 1 December that
-Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, the Division surgeon, called at
-General Smith’s CP that morning. He reported that some 600 casualties
-at Hagaru were putting a severe strain on the limited facilities of C
-and E Companies of the 1st Medical Battalion. It was further estimated
-that 500 casualties would be brought in by the Yudam-ni units and 400
-from the three Army battalions east of the Reservoir.[494]
-
-    [494] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–994, and
-          _Chronicle_, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R. Hering, “Address Before
-          U. S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and
-          “Address Before American Medical Association Convention,”
-          14 Jun 51.
-
-Although both figures were to prove far too low, they seemed alarmingly
-high at a time when only the most critical casualties could be
-evacuated by helicopter or OY. Flying in extreme cold and landing
-at high altitudes where the aircraft has less than normal lift, the
-pilots of Major Gottschalk’s VMO-6 saved scores of lives. From 27
-November to 1 December, when the transports took over, 152 casualties
-were evacuated by the OYs and helicopters--109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from
-Hagaru, and seven from Koto-ri.[495]
-
-    [495] VMO-6 _SAR_, 14–15; Smith, _Notes_, 844.
-
-Altogether, 220 evacuation flights and 11 rescue missions were
-completed during the entire Reservoir campaign by a squadron which on
-1 November included 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, eight OY-2 and two
-L5G observation planes and nine HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. First
-Lieutenant Robert A. Longstaff was killed by enemy small-arms fire near
-Toktong Pass while on an evacuation flight, and both Captain Farish and
-Lieutenant Englehardt had their helicopters so badly riddled by CCF
-bullets that the machines were laid up for repairs.[496]
-
-    [496] _Ibid._ See also Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New
-          York, 1954), 134–136.
-
-Two surgical teams from Hungnam had been flown to Hagaru by helicopter,
-but the evacuation problem remained so urgent on 1 December that the
-command of the 1st Marine Division authorized a trial landing on the
-new airstrip. Only 40 per cent completed at this time, the runway was
-2900 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 2 per cent grade to the north.
-
-It was a tense moment, at 1430 that afternoon, when the knots of
-parka-clad Marine spectators watched the wheels of the first FEAF
-C-47 hit the frozen, snow-covered strip. The big two-motored aircraft
-bounced and lurched its way over the rough surface, but the landing
-was a success. An even more nerve-racking test ensued half an hour
-later when the pilot took off with 24 casualties. It seemed for a
-breath-snatching instant that the run wouldn’t be long enough for the
-machine to become airborne, but at last the tail lifted and the wings
-got enough “bite” to clear the hills to the south.
-
-Three more planes landed that afternoon, taking off with about 60 more
-casualties. The last arrival, heavily loaded with ammunition, collapsed
-its landing gear on the bumpy strip and had to be destroyed and
-abandoned.[497]
-
-    [497] DivSurgeon _SAR_, n. p.; Smith, _Notes_, 990–991, and
-          _Chronicle_, 98–99.
-
-At the other end of the evacuation chain, clearing stations had been
-established by X Corps at Yonpo Airfield to receive and distribute
-casualties. A 30-day evacuation policy was maintained, and the
-casualties to remain in the area went to the 1st Marine Division
-Hospital in Hungnam, the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital in Hamhung, and
-the USS _Consolation_ in Hungnam harbor. Casualties requiring more than
-30 days of hospitalization were flown from Yonpo to Japan, though a
-few critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaru to Japan.[498]
-
-    [498] _Ibid._
-
-It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru to fly both supplies
-and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on 1 December, the 1st Marine
-Division had its first C-119 air drop from Japan. Known as “Baldwins,”
-these drops consisted of a prearranged quantity of small arms
-ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies, though the
-amounts could be modified as desired.[499]
-
-    [499] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n.
-          d.
-
-Air drops, however, did not have the capability of supplying an RCT in
-combat, let alone a division. At this time the Combat Cargo Command,
-FEAF, estimated its delivery capabilities at only 70 tons per day;
-and even though in practice this total was stepped up to 100, it fell
-five short of the requirements of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight
-of the Division commander and staff had enabled the Supply Regulating
-Detachment to build up a level of six days’ rations and two units of
-fire at Hagaru.[500] This backlog, plus such quantities as could be
-delivered by Baldwin drops, promised to see the Division through the
-emergency.
-
-    [500] Smith, _Notes_, 1001–1004.
-
-Infantrymen are seldom given to self-effacement, but at nightfall on 1
-December only an ungrateful gravel-cruncher could have failed to pay a
-silent tribute to the other services as well as to the supporting arms
-of the Marine Corps. Navy medics, FEAF airmen, Army service units--they
-had all helped to make it possible for the Marines to plan a breakout.
-Yet it is likely that the 1st Engineer Battalion came first in the
-affections of wounded men being loaded in the C-47s for evacuation.
-
-In just twelve days and nights the engineers of Company D had hacked
-this airstrip out of the frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could never
-forget the two critical nights of battle when they looked back over
-their shoulders from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of the
-dozers puffing and huffing under the floodlights. In a pinch Lieutenant
-Colonel Partridge’s specialists had doubled as riflemen, too, and
-several platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to
-the engineers, the Hagaru base was no longer isolated on 1 December.
-And though the enemy did not yet realize it, he had lost the initiative
-on this eventful Friday. The Marines at Yudam-ni were coming out, and
-they were coming out fighting with their casualties and equipment.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XII
-
-Breakout From Yudam-ni
-
-_Joint Planning for Breakout--The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542--March
-of 1/7 Over the Mountains--Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December--The
-Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass--CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and
-1542--Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December--Entry into Hagaru Perimeter_
-
-
-The first steps toward regaining the initiative were taken by the
-Marine command as early as 29 November. Upon being informed that the
-composite battalion had failed to open up the MSR south of Yudam-ni,
-General Smith concluded that it was a task for a regiment. At 1545 that
-afternoon he issued the following orders to RCTs 5 and 7:
-
-  RCT-5 assume responsibility protection Yudam-ni area adjusting
-  present dispositions accordingly. RCT-7 conduct operations clear
-  MSR to Hagaru without delay employing entire regiment.[501]
-
-    [501] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50.
-
-That same evening the Division CP received X Corps OI 19, providing
-that an RCT be redeployed from the Yudam-ni area to Hagaru.[502] No
-further directives from Division were necessary to implement this
-instruction, since it had been anticipated in General Smith’s orders.
-
-    [502] XCorps _OI 19_, 29 Nov 50.
-
-Upon receipt, the two Yudam-ni regimental commanders began joint
-planning for measures to be taken. The unusual command situation at
-Yudam-ni, in the absence of the assistant division commander, was
-explained by Colonel Litzenberg:
-
-  The 5th and 7th Marines were each acting under separate orders
-  from the Division. The Division would issue orders to one regiment
-  with information to the other, so that Division retained the
-  control; and, of course, the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, in
-  general support of both regiments, was not actually under the
-  control of either of us. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ... operated
-  in very close coordination with me, sometimes at his own command
-  post and sometimes at mine. We called in [Major] McReynolds,
-  the commander of 4/11, discussed the situation with him, and
-  thereafter Lieutenant Colonel Murray and I issued orders jointly as
-  necessary.... This command arrangement functioned very well. There
-  was never any particular disagreement.[503]
-
-    [503] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj
-          McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col
-          Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds
-          Comments, 15 Aug 56.
-
-For purposes of planning the supporting fires for the breakout, an
-artillery groupment was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Feehan given the
-responsibility of coordination. It was further agreed that no air drops
-of 155mm ammunition would be requested because of the greater number of
-105mm rounds which could be received with fewer difficulties.[504]
-
-    [504] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds
-          Comments, 15 Aug 56.
-
-The problems of the two RCTs, commented General Smith, could not be
-separated. “The only feasible thing for them to do was pool their
-resources.... The assignment of command to the senior regimental
-commander was considered but rejected in favor of cooperation.”[505]
-
-    [505] Smith, _Notes_, 918–919.
-
-At 0600 on the 30th, the two RCTs issued their Joint OpnO 1-50, which
-called for the regroupment of the Yudam-ni forces in a new position
-south of the village and astride the MSR as a first step toward a
-breakout.[506] Thus in effect the two RCTs and supporting troops would
-be exchanging an east-and-west perimeter for one pointing from north
-to south along the road to Hagaru. Not only was the terrain south of
-the village more defensible, but a smaller perimeter would serve the
-purpose.
-
-    [506] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted,
-          is derived from: RCT 5 and RCT 7 _Joint OpnO 1-50_, 30
-          Nov 50; X Corps _OpnO 8_, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar _SAR_, 22–23;
-          3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; 2/5 _SAR_, 20–21; Litzenberg interv,
-          27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen O. P. Smith Comments, 13
-          Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D.
-          Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Winecoff, Assistant G-3 of the Division, flew to
-Yudam-ni on the 30th to observe and report on the situation. He was
-given a copy of Joint OpnO 1-50 for delivery to General Smith on his
-return to Hagaru.[507]
-
-    [507] A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an
-          evacuation helicopter but it did not reach the Division
-          CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments.
-
-That same afternoon, during a conference with General Almond at
-Hagaru, the Marine commander received X Corps OpnO 8, directing him
-to operate against the enemy in zone, withdrawing elements north and
-northwest of Hagaru to that area while securing the Sudong-Hagaru MSR.
-And at 1920 that evening, Division issued the following dispatch orders
-to RCTs 5 and 7:
-
-  Expedite execution of Joint OpnO 1-50 and combined movement RCT-5
-  and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy
-  any supplies and equipment which must be abandoned during this
-  withdrawal.[508]
-
-    [508] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1920 30 Nov 50.
-          See also Smith, _Notes_, 923–924.
-
-As a prerequisite, a good deal of reorganization had to be effected
-at Yudam-ni. In order to provide a force to hold the shoulders of the
-high ground through which RCT-7 would advance, it was decided to put
-together another composite battalion.
-
-The new unit consisted of George Company, 3/7, Able Company, 1/5,
-and the remnants of Dog and Easy Companies, 2/7, combined into a
-provisional company under Captain Robert J. Polson; a section of
-81s each from 2/7 and 3/7’s Weapons Companies; and a communications
-detachment from 3/7. Major Maurice E. Roach, regimental S-4 placed in
-command, realized that such a jury-rigged outfit might be subject to
-morale problems. Noting that one of the men had made a neckerchief
-out of a torn green parachute, he seized upon the idea as a means
-of appealing to unit pride. Soon all the men were sporting green
-neckerchiefs, and Roach gave the new unit added distinction by
-christening it the Damnation Battalion after adopting “Damnation” as
-the code word.[509]
-
-    [509] This account of the organization of the “Damnation”
-          Battalion is based upon: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney,
-          n. d., 9–10; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; LtCol
-          M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. “I trust,” commented Gen
-          Litzenberg dryly, “that the green neckerchiefs were all
-          made of _torn_ parachutes!”
-
-Beginning in the early morning hours of the 30th, regroupment was the
-chief activity at Yudam-ni. Enemy opposition during the night took the
-form of scattered small-arms fire varied with minor probing attacks.
-This comparative lull lasted until 0710, when Item Company of 3/5
-beat off an enemy assault on Hill 1282 (North Ridge) with the support
-of Marine air strikes and 81mm mortar fire. In the same area George
-Company had a brisk fire fight from 1315 to dusk.
-
-The plan of the regroupment envisioned a gradual withdrawal from the
-north and west of Yudam-ni by RCT-5 for the purpose of relieving units
-of RCT-7 and enabling them to extend the perimeter southward from the
-village (see Map 23). It fell to 2/5 to execute the most difficult
-maneuver of the day. Roise’s battalion held a line stretching from Hill
-1426 on Southwest Ridge along the high ground to 3/5’s positions on
-Hill 1282. After disengaging with the help of Marine air and artillery,
-2/5 gave up Hill 1426 and pulled back nearly a mile, relieving elements
-of 3/7 on the left. Roise’s new line included Hill 1294 on Southwest
-Ridge, overlooking the MSR, and extended northeast to Hill 1282 as
-before. Meanwhile 1/5 continued to hold a defensive line from Hill 1240
-eastward to Hill 1167.
-
-[Illustration: BREAKING OFF ACTION
-
-30 Nov 50
-
-  MAP-23
-]
-
-These movements freed 3/7 to re-deploy to new positions astride the
-MSR about 4000 yards south of Yudam-ni. In this same general area, 1/7
-continued to block the valley to the southwest while holding Hill 1276,
-of South Ridge, about 2500 yards south of the village.
-
-“The question of whether we should make these movements during daylight
-or at night was a difficult one,” said Colonel Litzenberg. “We finally
-decided to make the movements in daylight when we could have advantage
-of observation for air cover and artillery. The movement, piecemeal by
-battalion, was successfully executed.”[510]
-
-    [510] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55.
-
-The enemy took surprisingly little advantage of the readjustment.
-Movements were completed in an orderly and methodical manner as the
-units drew rations and ammunition for the breakout. Preparations were
-made for the destruction of all equipment which could not be carried
-out, and air drops of ammunition and other supplies were received.
-
-As a solution for the problem of casualty evacuation, General Smith had
-suggested the construction of an OY strip. A start was made at 0900 on
-the 30th by the TD-18 dozers of Major McReynolds’ artillery battalion,
-but the area came under enemy fire the next day and the nearly
-completed strip could be used only twice.[511]
-
-    [511] _Ibid._, McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
-
-
-_Joint Planning for Breakout_
-
-The plan, as finally agreed upon, called for a combination of the two
-solutions. Since it was essential to relieve hard-pressed Fox Company
-and secure vital Toktong Pass prior to the arrival of the main column,
-one force would advance across country. And since it would have been
-physically impossible to carry the wounded over the mountains, the main
-body would fight its way along the road to Toktong Pass.[512]
-
-    [512] This section is derived from: RCT-5 and RCT-7 _Joint OpnO
-          2-50_, 1 Dec 50; 5thMar _SAR_, 26–27; 3/5 _SAR_, 15;
-          7thMar _SAR_, 23; Smith, _Notes_, 923–927; Litzenberg
-          interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 58–59; Col J. L. Stewart
-          Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. V. Fridrich interv, 21 Apr
-          56; Narrative of LtCol R. G. Davis, 11 Jan 53; Taplett
-          Comments, 9 Aug 56; Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56; McReynolds
-          Comments, 15 Aug 56.
-
-The over-all plan for the Yudam-ni breakout, after being flown to
-Hagaru by helicopter for General Smith’s approval, was incorporated
-into Joint OpnO 2-50. This directive, later modified by fragmentary
-orders, was issued in the morning of 1 December 1950.
-
-It meant dispensing with the vehicles and heavy equipment of the
-cross-country force. Only the barest military necessities could be
-taken by men loaded down with ammunition while struggling through
-snow-drifts.
-
-The unit selected for the attempt was the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
-commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davis. The plan of maneuver called for
-him to strike off across the mountain tops under cover of darkness on
-the night of 1 December. As the other units moved out astride the MSR
-from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 3/5 was to be the advance guard.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s battalion had the mission of passing
-through 3/7 to seize the commanding ground on both sides of the road
-and lead the way for the rest of the Yudam-ni troops. Thus the attacks
-of 1/7 and 3/5 would converge in the general area of Fox Hill and
-Toktong Pass.
-
-The point of the advance was to be the only Marine tank to reach
-Yudam-ni while the MSR was still open. It was left stranded after the
-recall of the crew to Hagaru; but Staff Sergeant Russell A. Munsell
-and another crewman were flown up from Hagaru by helicopter at Colonel
-Litzenberg’s request. They were to man Tank D-23 when it moved out with
-the point. Plans also called for a battery of 3/11 to advance near the
-head of the column, so that it could go into position near Sinhung-ni
-and provide covering fires for the rearguard while other artillery
-units displaced.
-
-The 4th Battalion of the 11th Marines had orders to fire most of its
-155mm ammunition before departure. All the men who could be spared from
-this unit were formed into nine provisional infantry platoons. Two were
-assigned to reinforce the 7th Marines and three to the 5th Marines;
-four were retained under Major McReynold’s command to protect the
-flanks of the vehicle train. It was further prescribed that the guns of
-4/11 were to bring up the rear of the convoy, so that the road would
-not be blocked in the event of any of its vehicles becoming immobilized.
-
-Only drivers and seriously wounded men were permitted to ride the
-trucks in the middle of the column along with critical equipment and
-supplies. Since all additional space in the vehicles would doubtless be
-needed for casualties incurred in the breakout as well as Fox Company
-casualties, it was decided not to bring out the dead from Yudam-ni. A
-field burial was conducted by chaplains for 85 officers and men.[513]
-
-    [513] After the cease-fire of July 1953, the remains were
-          returned to the United States, in accordance with the
-          terms of the Korean Armistice.
-
-All available Marine aircraft were to be on station. Moreover, carrier
-planes of TF 77 had been released from other missions by the Fifth
-AF to reinforce the aircraft of the 1st MAW in direct support of the
-Yudam-ni troops.
-
-
-_The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542_
-
-The transition from planning to execution began on the morning of 1
-December. Only the 1st and 3d Battalions of RCT-5 were left to the
-north of Yudam-ni, and pulling them out was to prove equivalent to
-letting loose of the tiger’s tail.
-
-The 3d Battalion began its withdrawal at 0800, followed 90 minutes
-later by the 1st. The initial phases of the maneuver were carried out
-without great difficulty. The first major problem came when 3/5’s last
-unit, George Company, pulled down from Hill 1282 (see Map 24). There
-the Marines had been in such close contact with the enemy that grenades
-were the main weapon of both sides. The problem of preventing the
-Chinese from swarming over the top of the ridge at the critical moment
-and pursuing the Marines down the slope was solved by First Lieutenant
-Daniel Greene, the FAC, with a dummy run by close supporting aircraft.
-While the first pass of the Corsairs kept the Communists down, Captain
-Chester R. Hermanson commenced his withdrawal. As soon as his men
-moved out at a safe distance he signalled to the FAC, who called for
-live runs of Marine air in coordination with the fires directed by the
-artillery liaison officer, First Lieutenant Henry G. Ammer. First
-Lieutenant Arthur E. House’s 81mm mortar platoon also rendered skillful
-support during the withdrawal.[514]
-
-    [514] The description of the withdrawal of 1/5 and 3/5 is based
-          on: 5thMar _SAR_, 26; 1/5 _SAR_, 15–16; 3/5 _SAR_, 15;
-          LtCol R. D. Taplett and Maj R. E. Whipple, “Darkhorse
-          Sets the Pace,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxxvii, no.
-          6 (Jun 53), 22–23; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55; Taplett
-          Comments, 9 Aug 56; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 25
-          Jul 56.
-
-[Illustration: BREAKOUT FROM YUDAM-NI
-
-1500 to 2400 1 Dec 1950
-
-  MAP-24
-]
-
-The ancient ruse was so successful that George Company disengaged
-without a single casualty. Ammunition left behind by the rifle platoons
-was detonated just as the rockets, bombs, and napalm of the Corsairs
-hit the Chinese, followed by artillery and mortar shells. Hill 1282
-seemed to erupt in one tremendous explosion. While Captain Hermanson’s
-men crossed the bridge south of the burning town, an engineer
-demolitions crew waited to destroy the span.
-
-The rear guard unit for the withdrawal of the two battalions was First
-Lieutenant John R. Hancock’s Baker Company of 1/5. He felt that his
-best chance would be to “sneak off” Hill 1240. Accordingly he requested
-that no supporting fires be furnished Baker Company, except at his
-request. Making very effective use of his light machine guns to cover
-his withdrawal with a spray of fire, Hancock disengaged without a
-casualty.
-
-The next stage of the regroupment was carried out in preparation for
-the attacks of 3/5 and 1/7. In order to clear the way on both sides of
-the MSR, 3/7 (minus How Company) moved out at 0900 on 1 December to
-attack Hill 1542 while How Company went up against Hill 1419.
-
-Joint OpnO 1-50 was modified meanwhile by verbal instructions directing
-2/5, instead of 3/5, to relieve 1/7 on Hill 1276, thus freeing Colonel
-Davis’ battalion for its assigned mission. The 1st Battalion of RCT-5
-took positions stretching from Hill 1100 on the west side of the MSR
-to the low ground southeast of the arm of the Reservoir. This meant
-that after 3/7 (-) seized Hill 1542, three Marine infantry battalions
-would occupy a defensive line about three and a half miles in length,
-stretching diagonally northeast from that position to the arm of the
-Reservoir, with Hill 1276 as its central bastion.[515]
-
-    [515] 5thMar _SAR_, 26–27; 7thMar _SAR_, 23; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.;
-          1/5 _SAR_, 15–16; 2/5 _SAR_, 21–22; 3/5 _SAR_, 15. CO
-          7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50.
-
-Shortly before dusk Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 arrived in
-position to pass through Lieutenant Colonel Harris’ 3/7. The two
-battalion commanders agreed that 3/5 would execute the movement even
-though 3/7 had not yet secured its objectives, and 3/5 attacked
-astride the MSR at 1500.[516]
-
-    [516] Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
-
-Harris’ battalion had been having it hot and heavy all day on Hills
-1419 and 1542 after jumping off at 0900. These objectives were too far
-apart for a mutually supported attack and the Chinese defended the
-difficult terrain with tenacity.
-
-Item Company, reinforced by artillerymen and headquarters troops, made
-slow progress west of the road against the Chinese dug in on Hill 1542.
-At 1700 George Company moved into position on the left. Both companies
-attempted an assault but the 3/7 report states, “Each attack by ‘I’
-Co and ‘G’ Co never reached full momentum before it was broken up.”
-One platoon of Item Company reached the military crest before being
-repulsed. When night fell, the Marines were still on the eastern slopes
-of 1542.[517]
-
-    [517] 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.
-
-On Hill 1419, about 1000 yards east of the road, How Company of 3/7 met
-stiff opposition from Chinese dug in along four finger ridges as well
-as the main spur leading to the topographical crest. It became evident
-that How Company alone could not seize the hill and about noon Able
-Company of Davis’ battalion joined the attack, on How’s left.
-
-The heavy undergrowth gave concealment to the enemy, though it also
-offered footholds to the Marines scrambling up the steep and icy
-slopes. Air strikes were laid down just ahead of them, blasting the
-Chinese with bombs, rockets, and 20mm fire. Artillery support, however,
-was limited by the relative blindness of the forward observer in the
-brush, but mortars succeeded in knocking out several enemy positions.
-How Company’s attack had come to a standstill because of casualties
-which included Lieutenant Harris. First Lieutenant Eugenous M.
-Hovatter’s Able Company regained the momentum, thanks to the efforts of
-First Lieutenant Leslie C. Williams’ 1st Platoon. Aided by How and by
-Baker, which was committed late in the afternoon, Able Company secured
-Hill 1419 about 1930. Thus the jump-off point for the 1/7 advance
-across the mountain tops had been seized.
-
-After setting up hasty defenses, Davis directed that all dead and
-wounded be evacuated to 3/5’s aid station on the road. How Company
-was attached to his battalion by order of Colonel Litzenberg, since
-all units had been thinned by casualties. Then the battalion tail was
-pulled up the mountain and the last physical tie broken with other
-Marine units in the Yudam-ni area.[518]
-
-    [518] 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53;
-          Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; CO 7thMar msg to CG
-          1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50; LtCol R. G. Davis interv by
-          Capts K. W. Shutts and A. Z. Freeman, 6 Apr 51; Maj E. M.
-          Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 56.
-
-The Marines had seized the initiative, never again to relinquish it
-during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.
-
-
-_March of 1/7 Over the Mountains_
-
-Planning at the battalion level was done by Davis, his executive
-officer, Major Raymond V. Fridrich, and his S-3, Major Thomas B. Tighe.
-It was decided to take only two of the 81mm mortars and six heavy
-machine guns. They were to be manned with double crews, so that enough
-ammunition could be carried to keep them in action.
-
-Pack-set radios (AN/GRC-9) were to provide positive communications
-in case the portable sets (SCR-300) would not reach to the Yudam-ni
-perimeter. The artillery liaison officer was to carry a pack set
-(SCR-610) to insure artillery communication.[519]
-
-    [519] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based on
-          Davis narrative; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul
-          51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr
-          51; and Capt W. J. Davis interv, 4 Jun 56.
-
-All personnel not sick or wounded were to participate, leaving behind
-enough walking wounded or frostbite cases to drive the vehicles and
-move the gear left behind with the regimental train. Extra litters were
-to be taken, each serving initially to carry additional mortar and
-machine gun ammunition; and all men were to carry sleeping bags not
-only for the protection of the wounded but also to save their own lives
-if the column should be cut off in the mountains for several days.
-Every man was to start the march with an extra bandolier of small arms
-ammunition, and personnel of the reserve company and headquarters group
-were to carry an extra round of 81mm mortar ammunition up the first
-mountain for replenishment of supplies depleted at that point.
-
-After driving the enemy from the topographical crest of Hill 1419, the
-four companies were not permitted a breathing spell. Davis feared the
-effects of the extreme (16 degrees below zero) cold on troops drenched
-with sweat from clawing their way up the mountain. He pressed the
-reorganization with all possible speed, therefore, after no enemy
-contacts were reported by patrols ranging to the southeast. And at 2100
-on the night of 1 December the column set out in this order:
-
-  Baker Company        First Lieutenant Kurcaba
-  1/7 Command Group    Lieutenant Colonel Davis
-  Able Company         First Lieutenant Hovatter
-  Charlie Company      Captain Morris
-  Headquarters Group   Major Fridrich
-  How Company          Second Lieutenant Newton
-
-The night was dark but a few stars showed over the horizon in the
-general direction to be taken. They served as a guide, with a prominent
-rock mass being designated the first objective.
-
-The snow-covered peaks all looked alike in the darkness, and the guide
-stars were lost to sight when the column descended into valleys.
-Repeated compass orientations of the map examined by flashlight under a
-poncho never checked out. The artillery was called upon to place white
-phosphorus on designated hills, but the splash of these rounds could
-seldom be located.
-
-The point was slowed by the necessity of breaking trail in snow that
-had drifted knee-deep in places. After a path had been beaten, the
-icy footing became treacherous for the heavily burdened Marines. Some
-painful falls were taken on the downhill slopes by men who had to climb
-the finger ridges on hands and knees.
-
-Apparently the enemy had been caught by complete surprise, for the
-Marines had the desolate area to themselves. A more immediate danger
-was loss of direction, and the head of the column veered off to the
-southwest while crossing the second valley. A drift in this direction
-would eventually take the battalion toward the enemy-held road to
-Hagaru (see Map 25), which had been scheduled by the Marine artillery
-for harassing and interdiction fires.
-
-Radio failures kept Kurcaba, at the point, from receiving messages
-sent in warning. An attempt was made to communicate by word of mouth,
-but the shouts from behind often did not penetrate to ears protected
-from the cold by parka hoods. At last the loss of direction became so
-alarming that Davis himself hurried forward with his radio operator
-and runner. In the darkness he lost touch with them and floundered on
-alone, panting and stumbling.
-
-It took such effort to overtake the point that he did not make it until
-the men were scrambling up the next steep ridge. There the westward
-drift was corrected just in time, for the battalion was running into
-its first CCF opposition.
-
-The column had been heading up Hill 1520, the eastern and western
-slopes of which were held by the enemy. An increasing volume of
-small-arms fire was received as Davis gave his company commanders
-orders to reorganize units in preparation for attack. Exhausted though
-the men were, they summoned a burst of energy and advanced in two
-assault columns supported by 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns. Now
-the exertion of carrying extra ammunition paid dividends as Baker and
-Charlie Companies closed in on a CCF position held in estimated platoon
-strength. Some of the Chinese were surprised while asleep or numbed
-with the cold, and the Marines destroyed the enemy force at a cost of
-only a few men wounded.
-
-The attack cleared the enemy from the eastern slope of Hill 1520, but
-distant small-arms fire was received from ridges across the valley to
-the east. Davis called a halt for reorganization, since the troops
-had obviously reached the limit of their endurance. Suddenly they
-began collapsing in the snow--“like dominoes,” as the commanding
-officer later described the alarming spectacle. And there the men lay,
-oblivious to the cold, heedless of the Chinese bullets ricocheting off
-the rocks.
-
-A strange scene ensued in the dim starlight as company officers and
-NCOs shook and cuffed the prostrate Marines into wakefulness. The
-officers could sympathize even while demanding renewed efforts, for the
-sub-zero cold seemed to numb the mind as well as body.
-
-Davis had even requested his company commanders to check every order
-he gave, just to make sure his own weary brain was functioning
-accurately. At 0300 he decided to allow the men a rest--the first in
-20 hours of continuous fighting or marching under a double burden. As
-a preliminary, the battalion commander insisted that the perimeter be
-buttoned up and small patrols organized within companies to insure a
-25 per cent alert. Then the pack radio was set up to establish the
-night’s first contact with the regimental CP, and the men took turns at
-sleeping as an eerie silence fell over the wasteland of ice and stone.
-
-
-_Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December_
-
-Returning to the Yudam-ni area, it may be recalled that Lieutenant
-Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 had passed through 3/7 at 1500 on 1 December
-with a mission of attacking astride the MSR to lead the way for the
-main column. Tank D-23, a How Company platoon and a platoon of Able
-Company engineers set the pace, followed by the rest of How Company
-and the other two rifle companies. After an advance of 1400 yards the
-battalion column was stopped by heavy CCF fire from both sides. How and
-Item Companies fanned out west and east of the road and a longdrawn
-firefight ensued before the Marines cleared the enemy from their flanks
-at 1930.[520]
-
-    [520] Descriptions of 3/5 operations in this section are based
-          on the 3/5 _SAR_, 15; Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse
-          Sets the Pace,” II, 46-50; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
-
-Artillery support for the breakout was provided by 1/11 and 3/11 (minus
-Battery H). The plan called for 1/11 to take the main responsibility
-for furnishing supporting fires at the outset while 3/11 displaced as
-soon as possible to the vicinity of Sinhung-ni, whence the last lap of
-the march to Hagaru could be effectively covered. The 1st Battalion
-would then join the vehicle column and move with it to Hagaru.[521]
-
-    [521] 11thMar _SAR_, 7; _MCB Study_, II-C-72.
-
-Taplett gave 3/5 a brief rest after securing his first objectives--the
-high ground on both sides of the road just opposite the northern spurs
-of Hill 1520. Then he ordered a renewal of the attack shortly before
-midnight. How Company on the right met only moderate opposition, but
-was held up by the inability of Item Company to make headway against
-Chinese dug in along the western slope of Hill 1520. Neither 1/7 nor
-3/5 had any idea at the moment that they were simultaneously engaged on
-opposite sides of the same great land mass, though separated by enemy
-groups as well as terrain of fantastic difficulties. So rugged was this
-mile-high mountain that the two Marine outfits might as well have been
-in different worlds as far as mutual support was concerned.
-
-Item Company stirred up such a hornet’s nest on the western slope that
-Captain Harold O. Schrier was granted permission by the battalion
-commander to return to his jump-off position, so that he could better
-defend the MSR. There he was attacked by Chinese who alternated
-infantry attacks with mortar bombardments. Radio communication failed
-and runners sent from the battalion CP to Item Company lost their way.
-Thus the company was isolated during an all-night defensive fight.
-Second Lieutenant Willard S. Peterson took over the command after
-Schrier received a second wound.
-
-Taplett had ordered his reserve company, George, and his attached
-engineers into defensive positions to the rear of Item Company. The
-engineers on the right flank were also hit by the Chinese and had
-several wounded, including the platoon commander, First Lieutenant
-Wayne E. Richards, before repulsing the attack.
-
-Counted CCF dead in the Item Company area totaled 342 at daybreak on
-the 2d, but the Marines had paid a heavy price in casualties. Less
-than 20 able-bodied men were left when George Company passed through
-to renew the attack on Hill 1520. For that matter, both George and
-How Companies were reduced to two-platoon strength. Taplett requested
-reinforcement by an additional company, and was assigned the so-called
-Dog-Easy composite company made up of the remnants of 2/7. This outfit
-moved directly down the road between George and How Companies.[522]
-
-    [522] “Item Company upon relief was temporarily non-effective.
-          In fact it ceased to exist except on paper. Some of the
-          survivors were assigned to G/5 and the wounded who were
-          able to walk were assigned to a provisional rifle unit
-          organized from H&S Co and under the command of Lt George
-          Bowman.” Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
-
-It took George Company until 1200 to secure the western slope of Hill
-1520. The composite company ran into difficulties meanwhile at a point
-on the MSR where the Chinese had blown a bridge over a deep stream bed
-and set up a roadblock defended by machine guns. While George Company
-attacked down a long spur above the enemy, Dog-Easy Company maneuvered
-in defilade to outflank him. Lieutenant Greene, the FAC, directed
-the F4Us on target and the ground forces were treated to a daring
-exhibition of close support by Corsairs which barely cleared the ridge
-after pulling out of their runs. The roadblock was speedily wiped out,
-but the vehicle column had to wait until the engineers could construct
-a bypass. Then the advance of 3/5 was resumed, with George and How
-Companies attacking on opposite sides of the MSR, and the composite
-company astride the road, following the tank and engineer platoons.
-
-
-_The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass_
-
-All the rest of their lives the survivors of the two spearhead Marine
-battalions would take pride in nicknames earned during the breakout
-from Yudam-ni. For Taplett’s outfit it was “Darkhorse,” after the radio
-call sign of the battalion, while Davis’ men felt that they had a right
-to be known as the “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass.”
-
-At daybreak on 2 December, 1/7 corrected its westward drift of the
-previous night and attacked toward Hill 1653, a mountain only about a
-mile and a half north of Fox Hill. Davis’ men got the better of several
-firefights at long range with CF groups on ridges to the east, but the
-terrain gave them more effective opposition than the enemy.[523]
-
-    [523] This section is based on R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan
-          53; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich
-          interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and W.
-          G. Davis interv, 4 June 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 20
-          Aug 56; Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 5.
-
-The radios of 1/7 could not contact Marine planes when they came on
-station, and relays through tactical channels proved ineffective.
-Moreover, all efforts to reach Fox Company by radio had failed. This
-situation worried the battalion commander, who realized that he was
-approaching within range of friendly 81mm mortar fire from Fox Hill.
-
-The ancient moral weapon of surprise stood Davis and his men in good
-stead, however, as the column encountered little opposition on the
-western slope of Hill 1653. How Company, bringing up the rear with the
-wounded men, came under an attack which threatened for a moment to
-endanger the casualties. But after the litters were carried forward,
-Newton managed to keep the Chinese at a respectful distance without aid
-from the other companies.
-
-Charlie Company was given the mission of seizing a spur covering the
-advance of Able and Baker companies east from Hill 1520 to Hill 1653.
-The command group had just passed Morris on this position when the
-radio operator shouted to Davis:
-
-“Fox Six on the radio, sir.”
-
-Captain Barber’s offer to send out a patrol to guide 1/7 to his
-position was declined, but Fox Company did control the strike by planes
-of VMF-312 which covered the attack of Kurcaba’s company on the final
-objective--a ridge about 400 yards north of Fox Hill. Aided by the
-air attack and supporting 81mm mortar fires, Baker Company seized the
-position and Able Company the northern portion of Hill 1653. It was
-1125 on the morning of 2 December 1950 when the first men of Baker
-Company reached Fox Company’s lines.
-
-Able Company held its position on Hill 1653 until the rest of the
-battalion was on Fox Hill. After grounding their packs, men from the
-forward companies went back to help carry the 22 wounded men into
-the perimeter. While supervising this task, the regimental surgeon,
-Lieutenant Peter A. Arioli, (MC) USN, was instantly killed by a Chinese
-sniper’s bullet. There were no other death casualties, though two men
-had to be placed in improvised strait jackets after cracking mentally
-and physically under the strain. Both died before evacuation was
-possible.
-
-The first objective had been reached, but there was to be no rest until
-Toktong Pass was secured. Baker Company paused on Fox Hill only long
-enough for Kurcaba’s men to eat a hasty meal of air-dropped rations.
-Then they moved out to seize the high ground commanding the vital
-terrain feature at a point where the road describes a loop from north
-to south. Able Company followed shortly afterwards and the two outfits
-set up a single perimeter for the night while the rest of the battalion
-manned perimeters on the high ground east of Fox Hill. Barber’s men
-remained in their positions.
-
-Five days and nights of battle had left Fox Company with 118
-casualties--26 KIA, 3 MIA, and 89 WIA. Six of the seven officers were
-wounded, and practically all the unwounded men suffered from frostbite
-and digestive ills.
-
-
-_CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542_
-
-While the two spearhead battalions advanced, the Marine elements in
-the rear could not complain of being neglected by the enemy. All three
-infantry battalions were kept busy with CCF attacks which persisted
-from midnight until long after daybreak (see Map 24).
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2/5, which had been designated as rearguard,
-was hit on Hill 1276 in the early morning hours of 2 December. Under
-cover of rifle and machine-gun fire, the Chinese advanced on the Fox
-Company positions with their “inverted wedge” assault formation.
-Testimony as to its effectiveness is found in the 2/5 report:
-
-  The [Chinese] ... used fire and movement to excellent advantage.
-  They would direct a frontal attack against our positions while
-  other elements of their attacking force moved in closer to “F”
-  Company flanks in an attempt at a double envelopment. Then in turn
-  the forces on both flanks would attack while the forces directly to
-  our front would move closer to our position. In this, the enemy, by
-  diverting our attention in the above manner, were able to maneuver
-  their forces to within hand grenade range of our positions.
-
-One Fox platoon, assailed from three sides, was forced to withdraw
-at 0110 and consolidate with the rest of the company. At 0200 the
-FAC requested an air strike from two night fighters on station. The
-aircraft were directed on the target by 60mm mortar white phosphorus
-bursts and conducted effective strafing and rocket runs within 200
-yards of the Marine front line. In all, five aircraft of VMF(N)-542
-were employed with excellent results during the night.
-
-At 0230 Roise directed Fox Company to retake the left-flank hill from
-which the platoon had been driven. Two attempts were made before
-daybreak with the support of 4.2-inch mortar fire, but enemy machine
-guns stopped the assault. At 0730 an air strike was requested. After
-strafing and rocket runs, Fox Company fought its way to the crest, only
-to find the position untenable because of machine-gun fire from the
-reverse slope. At 1000 the Corsairs blasted the enemy for 25 minutes
-with napalm and 500-pound bombs, and CCF troops were observed vacating
-the objective area. It was nearly time for the battalion to displace
-as the rearguard, however, and the enemy was left in possession of a
-scarred and scorched piece of real estate.
-
-Both Dog and Easy Companies received probing attacks which the Chinese
-did not attempt to push home. At daybreak some of them broke and ran
-along the Dog Company front, throwing away their weapons as they
-scattered in disorder. Marine fire pursued the retreating Communists
-and cut down many of them. Captain Arthur D. Challacombe’s provisional
-company of artillerymen on Dog Company’s right counted over 50 dead in
-front of its positions.[524]
-
-    [524] 2/5 _SAR_, 22; Stewart Comments; McReynolds Comments, 15
-          Aug 56.
-
-On the eastern flank 1/5 came under attack about 2100 by 75–100 Chinese
-who crossed the arm of the reservoir on ice. Mortar and artillery fire
-drove them back at 0100 with heavy losses, but attempts at infiltration
-continued throughout the night. In the morning 51 CCF dead were counted
-in front of one Charlie Company machine gun, and total enemy KIA were
-estimated at 200.[525]
-
-    [525] 1/5 _SAR_, 16; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.
-
-At the other end of the Marine line, a CCF attack hit 3/7 (-) on Hill
-1542. The assault force, according to the enemy report, consisted of
-Sung-Wei-shan’s 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 235th Regiment, the 5th
-Company of 2/235, and apparently two other companies of 3/235. All were
-units of the 79th CCF Division, and their mission was “to annihilate
-the defending enemy before daylight.”[526]
-
-    [526] The description of the fight on Hill 1542 is derived
-          from: ATIS _Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign_, Issue 66,
-          88–93; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; Maj W.
-          R. Earney ltr to Gen Litzenberg, 16 Jul 56.
-
-George and Item Companies of 3/7, following their repulse from the
-upper reaches of Hill 1542, had formed a defensive perimeter on the
-eastern slope. As reinforcements the depleted units were assigned a
-composite outfit known as Jig Company and consisting of about 100
-cannoneers, headquarters troops, and any other elements which could
-be hastily put together. First Lieutenant Alfred I. Thomas, of Item
-Company, was placed in command of men who were for the most part
-strangers to him as well as to one another.
-
-Sung led the 9th Company’s attacking column. Although the Chinese
-account states that his men were advancing from the northwest toward
-the topographical crest of Hill 1542, they actually held the summit.
-Their attack was downhill, though some climbing of spurs and finger
-ridges may have been necessary. After reconnoitering to a point
-within 25 yards of the Marines, the Chinese jumped off at 0430 with
-the support of fires from battalion weapons. Relying on the “inverted
-wedge,” the attackers bored in alternately right and left while seeking
-an opportunity for a knockout blow. The 2d Platoon on the Chinese
-left took a severe mauling, losing its commander and almost half of
-its men. The other two platoons had heavy casualties but succeeded in
-routing the jury-rigged Jig Company. Since it was a composite outfit
-not yet 24 hours old, there is no record of either its operations or
-losses. Apparently, however, a majority of the men straggled back to
-their original units. Lieutenant Thomas, who had commanded ably under
-difficult circumstances, rejoined First Lieutenant William E. Johnson’s
-Item Company with such men as he had left. The Marines gave ground
-slowly under Chinese pressure until daybreak, when they held positions
-abreast of George Company, which had not been heavily engaged.
-
-The two companies were reduced to a total of fewer than 200 men. After
-being reinforced by H&S Company personnel, they formed a defensive line
-in an arc stretching from the MSR about 1100 yards and taking in the
-eastern slopes of Hill 1542.[527]
-
-    [527] General Litzenberg points out that “it was necessary for
-          3/7 to maintain protection for the main column until it
-          passed by Hill 1542. They [3/7] held high enough to keep
-          Chinese small arms fire at a sufficient distance from the
-          Road.” Litzenberg Comments, 7 Aug 56.
-
-Apparently the Communists, like military forces everywhere, did not
-err on the light side when estimating the casualties of opponents. The
-Marine losses for the night were listed in the CCF report as “killed,
-altogether 100 enemy troops.” This figure, indicating total casualties
-of several hundred, is manifestly too high. Owing to the loss of 7th
-Marines records, the statistics for Item Company are not available, but
-it does not appear that more than 30 to 40 men were killed or wounded.
-
-
-_Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December_
-
-Several CCF daylight attacks in platoon strength were received between
-Hills 1542 and 1276 during the morning hours of 2 December. All Marine
-units in this area were in process of disengaging, so that the emphasis
-was placed on breaking off action rather than attempting to defend
-ground soon to be evacuated.
-
-The vehicle train in the rear made slow progress during the afternoon
-of 2 December. Infantry strength was not sufficient to occupy all
-the commanding terrain during the passage of the motor column, and
-CCF groups infiltrated back into areas vacated by Marine riflemen.
-Effective air support reduced most of these efforts to harassing
-attacks, but Marine vehicle drivers were singled out for special
-attention, making it necessary to find replacements among near-by
-troops.
-
-To 1/5 fell the mission of furnishing close-in flank protection on the
-left. Marine air and artillery supported infantry attacks clearing
-the flanks and the column jolted on with frequent halts. The night
-passed without incident except for a CCF attack on 3/11. George Battery
-gunners had to employ direct fire to repulse the Communists, and a
-105mm howitzer was lost as well as several vehicles.
-
-Darkhorse, leading the way, was meanwhile fighting for nearly every
-foot of the road during the advance of 2 December. George Company
-on the left went up against Hill 1520 while Dog-Easy moved astride
-the MSR. By noon George had secured its objective. Dog-Easy advanced
-against moderate resistance to a point about 300 yards beyond Hill
-1520 where a demolished bridge had spanned a rock ravine as the road
-turns from south to east. Here Chinese automatic weapons fire halted
-the column until a strike by 12 Corsairs cleared the enemy from the
-ravine. On the right Captain Harold B. Williamson’s How Company was to
-have joined in the attack, moving through the high ground south of the
-bend in the road. A Chinese strongpoint delayed its advance and How was
-pinned down by heavy enemy fire while attempting to cross a stream bed
-halfway to its objective. The last air strike of the day freed Captain
-Williamson’s unit, which secured its objective after dark. During
-the last minutes of daylight, the engineer platoon, now commanded by
-Technical Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, constructed a bypass around the
-blasted bridge. About 1900 the first vehicles followed the tank across.
-
-[Illustration: BREAKOUT FROM YUDAM-NI
-
-2–4 Dec 50
-
-  MAP-25
-]
-
-Taplett’s battalion continued its slow progress with George and How
-Companies clearing the high ground on opposite sides of the road while
-Dog-Easy moved astride the MSR. At about 0200 on the 3d the advance
-came to a halt 1000 yards short of Fox Hill. Dog-Easy, which had
-suffered heavy casualties, particularly among its key NCOs, had reached
-the limit of exhaustion, and 3/5 secured for the rest of the night. Not
-until daylight did How Company discover that it had halted 300 yards
-short of its final objective, the hill mass southwest of Fox Hill.
-
-At dawn on 3 December the ground was covered with six inches of new
-snow, hiding the scars of war and giving a deceptively peaceful
-appearance to the Korean hills as the Marine column got under way again
-with Sergeant Knox’s engineers at the point, just behind Sergeant
-Munsell’s lone tank. Alternately serving as engineers and riflemen,
-this platoon came through with 17 able-bodied men left out of the 48
-who started.
-
-Dog-Easy Company having been rendered ineffective by its casualties,
-Taplett moved George Company down from the left flank to advance
-astride the road. First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize took over the
-reorganized outfit, assisted by Second Lieutenant August L. Camaratta.
-The two riddled Dog-Easy platoons were combined with George Company
-under the command of Second Lieutenant John J. Cahill and Technical
-Sergeant Don Faber.
-
-Cahill had the distinction of leading the platoon which fought the
-first action of Marine ground forces in the Korean conflict. But it
-hardly seemed possible on this sub-zero December morning that the
-encounter had taken place barely four months before, or that the
-temperature that August day had been 102° in the non-existent shade.
-Korea was a land of extremes.
-
-Darkhorse was not far from a junction with the Ridgerunners. The
-night of 2–3 December had passed quietly in Toktong Pass, where the
-five companies occupied separate perimeters. The Marines on Fox Hill
-lighted warming fires in the hope of tempting the enemy to reveal his
-positions. The Chinese obliged by firing from two near-by ridges. One
-CCF group was dug in along a southern spur of the hill held by Able
-and Baker Companies, and the other occupied a ridge extending eastward
-beyond Toktong Pass in the direction of Hagaru.
-
-Simultaneous attacks in opposite directions were launched by 1/7. Davis
-led Morris’ and Newton’s companies against the CCF force barring the
-way to Hagaru. Tighe moved out with Kurcaba’s and Hovatter’s companies
-meanwhile against a larger CCF force on high ground south of the big
-bend in the road. This stroke took the Chinese by surprise. As they
-fell back in disorder, the Communists did not realize that they were
-blundering into the path of the oncoming Marines of Williamson’s How/5,
-attacking south of the MSR. Colonel Litzenberg, who had been informed
-by radio, turned to Lieutenant Colonel Murray and said, “Ray, notify
-your Third Battalion commander that the Chinese are running southwest
-into his arms!”[528]
-
-    [528] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 61. Other
-          sources for this section are as follows: LtCol Taplett
-          interv, 8 Jun 56 and Comments, 9 and 14 Aug 56; TSgt
-          E. L. Knox interv, 30 May 56; _MCB Study_, II-C-78–80;
-          Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse Leads the Way,” II,
-          49-50; Smith, _Notes_, 932–946; R. G. Davis narrative, 11
-          Jan 53; 5thMar _SAR_, 29; Geer, _The New Breed_, 338–341.
-
-Taplett was unaware that Tighe’s attack was forcing about a battalion
-of Chinese into his lap. He had spotted the Chinese in strength on the
-high ground south of the road when day broke. Attempts to lay artillery
-on the Chinese having failed because of the range from Hagaru, the 3/5
-commander called for an air strike. The overcast lifted just as the
-Corsairs came on station. They hit the demoralized Communists with
-napalm and rockets while the 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns of
-the two converging Marine forces opened up with everything they had.
-Probably the greatest slaughter of the Yudam-ni breakout ended at 1030
-with the CCF battalion “completely eliminated,” as the 3/5 report
-phrased it, and How Company in possession of the CCF positions.
-
-At 1300 on 3 December, after Davis had cleared the enemy from the ridge
-northeast of Toktong Pass, the basic maneuver of the breakout was
-completed by the junction of 3/5 and 1/7. Several more fights awaited
-Taplett’s men on the way to Hagaru, but at Toktong Pass they had
-fulfilled their mission. That the victory had not been gained without
-paying a price in casualties is indicated by the following daily
-returns of effective strength in the three rifle companies:
-
-  ---------------+--------+--------+--------+--------
-       Unit      | 1 Dec. | 2 Dec. | 3 Dec. | 4 Dec.
-  ---------------+--------+--------+--------+--------
-  George Company |    114 |     96 |     84 |     80
-  How Company    |    180 |    167 |    131 |     73
-  Item Company   |    143 |     41 |     41 |     41
-  ---------------+--------+--------+--------+--------
-          Total  |    437 |    304 |    256 |    194
-  ---------------+--------+--------+--------+--------
-
-This is a total of 243 battle and non-battle casualties as compared to
-the 144 suffered by the same units during the CCF attacks of 27 to 30
-November.
-
-
-_Entry into Hagaru Perimeter_
-
-When the truck column with its wounded men reached Toktong Pass, it
-halted to receive the casualties of 1/7, 3/5, and Fox Company of 2/7.
-Lieutenant Commander John H. Craven, chaplain of the 7th Marines,
-helped to assist the litter cases into vehicles. Since there was not
-room for all, the walking wounded had to make room for helpless men.
-They complied with a courage which will never be forgotten by those
-who saw them struggling painfully toward Hagaru alongside the truck
-column.[529]
-
-    [529] Stewart Comments.
-
-When the tank leading the 3/5 column reached Toktong Pass it halted
-only long enough for Colonels Taplett and Davis to confer. D-23 then
-moved out and the four companies of 1/7 came down from their hillside
-positions and fell in behind.
-
-Stevens’ 1/5, having leap-frogged 3/5, followed next on the way to
-blocking positions farther east on the MSR. Taplett remained in Toktong
-Pass until after midnight, acting as radio relay between Colonels
-Litzenberg and Murray, by now in Hagaru, and 2/5 in the rear. At about
-midnight the 3/5 commander sent G and H Companies into the vehicle
-column to furnish security for the artillery, and an hour later the
-remainder of the battalion joined the column. Roise’s 2/5, which had
-passed through 3/7 came next, followed by Harris’ rear guard.
-
-Interspersed among the infantry were elements of artillery and service
-troops with their vehicles, and the column became more scrambled after
-each halt.[530] Two observation planes of VMO-6 circled overhead to
-give warning of enemy concentrations. Marine planes were on station
-continuously during daylight hours, strafing and rocketing to the front
-and along both flanks. A total of 145 sorties, most of them in close
-air support of troops advancing along the Hagaru-Yudam-ni MSR, were
-flown on 3 December by the following units:[531]
-
-    [530] Sources for this section, unless otherwise noted, are
-          the same as those for the last and: 3/1 tels to G-3
-          1stMarDiv, 0430 and 1715 4 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to
-          11thMar, 0730 4 Dec 50; 7thMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv,
-          0830 and 0925 4 Dec 50: G-3 1stMarDiv tels to 3/1, 0950
-          and 1330 4 Dec 50; Stevens Comments, 25 Jul 56.
-
-    [531] MAG-33 _SAR_ sec B 6–7; VMF-214 _SAR_, 5; 1stMAW _HD_,
-          Dec 50.
-
-  Squadron     Sorties
-  VMF-214         36
-  VMF-323         28
-  VMF-212         27
-  VMF-312         34
-  VMF(N)-513       7
-  VMF(N)-542      13
-                ----
-                 145
-
-At the other end of the route the Royal Marine Commandos, reinforced by
-a platoon of tanks, were sent out from Hagaru at 1630 on 3 December, to
-drive the Chinese from the road leading into that perimeter.
-
-Thanks to excellent air support, 1/7 met no opposition save harassing
-attacks. One of Davis’s flanking patrols reported the flushing out of a
-few Chinese so exhausted by cold and hardships that they had abandoned
-their weapons and holed up together for warmth. If these Marines had
-been in a mood for such reflections, they might have recalled that
-the American press of late had been bemoaning the supposed decline of
-the nation’s young manhood. UN reverses in the summer of 1950 had led
-editorial writers to conclude that our troops had neither the legs
-for long marches nor the backs for the bearing of military burdens.
-Mechanization had gone so far, they lamented, that we had become
-the servants rather than the masters of our own wheeled and tracked
-vehicles.
-
-The Marines of Davis’ battalion might have taken a grim satisfaction,
-therefore, in encountering Chinese peasants, inured all their lives to
-privations, whose will to fight had been broken by the hardships of
-the past week. These Marines had not known a full night’s sleep during
-that week. They had subsisted on a diet of crackers varied with canned
-rations thawed by body heat. They had been under continuous nervous
-pressure as well as physical strain, and yet they were able to summon
-one last burst of pride when the point neared the Hagaru perimeter at
-1900 on 3 December 1950. Several hundred yards from the entrance a halt
-was called while the men closed up into a compact column.[532] Then
-they came in marching, their shoulders thrown back and their shoepacs
-beating a firm tread on the frozen road.
-
-    [532] Since the four rifle companies had been left on key
-          points, controlling the last two and a half miles into
-          Hagaru, the column consisted mostly of H&S and Weapons
-          Company personnel. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56.
-
-The Marines at the head of the column were followed by the walking
-wounded and the vehicles loaded with more serious cases, some of whom
-had been strapped to the hoods. All casualties were given medical care
-and the remaining troops taken into warming tents for hot coffee. Many
-of them appeared dazed and uncomprehending at first. Others wandered
-about aimlessly with blank faces. But there were few who had suffered
-any psychological disturbances that could not be cleared up with a good
-night’s sleep and some hot food.
-
-Troops of 4/11 and 3/5 were due to arrive next at Hagaru while 1/5
-and 2/5 echeloned companies forward along the MSR to provide flank
-protection. Not all the Chinese had lost aggressiveness, but the
-column had little difficulty until 0200 on 4 December. Then it came to
-an abrupt halt when prime movers of eight 155mm howitzers ran out of
-diesel fuel. As far back as Sinhung-ni 150 gallons had been requested
-but none had been delivered.[533] While the troops ahead, including G
-and H of 3/5, continued on towards Hagaru, unaware of the break, a bad
-situation developed around the stalled guns.
-
-    [533] Lieutenant Meeker, dispatched from Hagaru with fuel, was
-          unable to get through to the stalled artillery because
-          of Chinese fire. Some of his men, however, did pass
-          the Chinese block and served as part of CWO Carlson’s
-          improvised gun crew. Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 19 Jul 56.
-
-Following the halting of the convoy Major Angus J. Cronin, in charge of
-4/11’s vehicle column, and his handful of truck drivers and cannoneers
-drove off a platoon of Chinese. These Marines were soon joined by
-Lieutenant Colonel Feehan’s 1/11 and Able Company of 1/5. By the time
-Lieutenant Colonel Taplett arrived, the 155s had been moved off the
-road by Captain O. R. Lodge of 4/11, who continued in spite of a wound
-until more severely wounded in the head.
-
-Roise and Stevens arrived shortly afterwards and the three battalion
-commanders drew up a hasty plan. While 3/5 built up a base of fire a
-platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, would move through the ridge north of
-the road to knock out the Chinese strong point. Up to this time there
-had been few and minor instances of panic during the breakout from
-Yudam-ni. But some confusion resulted when the enemy took advantage of
-the delay to blow a small bridge ahead and increase his rate of fire.
-Thus a new roadblock awaited after the howitzers were removed, and two
-truck drivers were killed while the engineers repaired the break. Other
-drivers bypassed the bridge and made a dash for safety by crossing the
-little stream on the ice.
-
-A comparatively few men, giving way to panic, were endangering the
-entire column. Behind one of the fleeing trucks an angry warrant
-officer pounded in pursuit, shouting some of the most sulphurous
-profanity that Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had ever heard.[534] This
-was CWO Allen Carlson of Baker Battery, 1/11. He disappeared around a
-bend in the road, only to return a moment later with a chastened driver
-towing a 105mm howitzer. Carlson hastily recruited a crew and set up
-the piece beside the road for point-blank fire at the enemy position
-while Taplett directed the fire of a 75mm recoilless rifle.
-
-    [534] Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56.
-
-A Charlie Battery howitzer and a 1/5 heavy machine gun added their
-contribution as a platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, attacked under cover of
-air strikes. The Chinese position was overrun at 0830 at an estimated
-cost to the enemy of 150 dead. Two other attacks were launched by
-infantry units of Roise’s battalion on the high ground to the left
-before the MSR was cleared.
-
-When the 155mm howitzers were pushed off the road, it had been assumed
-that they would be retrieved. Only 1000 yards farther down the MSR
-was a cache of air-dropped diesel fuel, but efforts to bring back
-replenishments were frustrated by enemy fire. Attempts at recovery by
-the British Marines failed later that day, and orders were given for
-the destruction by air of the eight stalled howitzers plus a ninth
-which had previously been abandoned after skidding off the road. This
-was the largest loss of weapons in the Yudam-ni breakout.
-
-At 1400 on 4 December the last elements of the rearguard, 3/7, entered
-the perimeter and the four-day operation passed into history. Some
-1500 casualties were brought to Hagaru, a third of them being in the
-non-battle category, chiefly frostbite cases. It had taken the head of
-the column about 59 hours to cover the 14 miles, and the rear units 79
-hours.
-
-“Under the circumstances of its execution,” commented General Smith,
-“the breakout was remarkably well conducted. Since centralized control
-of the widespread elements was a difficult task, particularly with a
-joint command, unit commanders were required to exercise a high degree
-of initiative.... The spirit and discipline of the men under the most
-adverse conditions of weather and terrain was another highly important
-factor contributing to the success of the operation and also reflecting
-the quality of the leadership being exercised.”[535]
-
-    [535] Smith, _Notes_, 948.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5679
-]
-
-  _This Was Hagaru--Two views of the Marine forward base
-  at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, with East Hill in
-  the background; here the troops reorganized for the final
-  breakout._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 4971
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5434
-]
-
-  _Patrol Actions--Task forces, ranging in size from a squad
-  to a battalion, sometimes supported by tanks as well as air
-  and artillery, were employed for specific missions during the
-  breakout._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5445
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5438
-]
-
-  _Before and After Taking--Two views, only a few seconds apart,
-  of the effective close air support given Marine infantry; the
-  plane is hidden by the dense cloud of black smoke._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5440
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5685
-]
-
-  _The Hagaru Airstrip--Above, walking wounded awaiting
-  evacuation in an Air Force C-47 which flew in artillery
-  ammunition; below, casualties leave their rifles behind but
-  will take out much-needed parachutes shown in the foreground._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5683
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5398
-]
-
-  _Helicopter and Ambulance Evacuation--Above, the helicopters
-  of VMO-6 flew out casualties from areas which otherwise could
-  not have been reached; below, ambulances had their moments,
-  too, as this bullet-riddled specimen shows._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5461
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5409
-]
-
-  _Breakout from Hagaru--Above, crippled vehicles are simply
-  pushed off the road; below, at every halt the weary
-  gravel-crunchers sink exhausted into the snow._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5428
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  Photos courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig and Capt R. W. Crook
-]
-
-  _Victims of Communist Aggression--Three views of the Korean
-  refugees, ranging from infants to patriarchs, who followed the
-  Marine column all the way to Hungnam._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 355017
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 130426
-]
-
-  _Magnificent Air Support--Above, crewmen check rockets of a
-  Corsair fighter-bomber; and, below, one of the old Grumman
-  TBMs resurrected for casualty evacuation from Koto-ri._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 130442
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5361
-]
-
-  _Fighting in the Heavyweight Division--Above, Marine tanks
-  awaiting withdrawal from Koto-ri; below, Army self-propelled
-  155mm howitzers firing from the Chinhung-ni area._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 354246
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5372
-]
-
-  _Through the Swirling Flakes--The march southward from Koto-ri
-  begins in a snowstorm as a Marine infantry battalion attacks
-  northward from Chinhung-ni to open up the MSR._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5370
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5382
-]
-
-  _The Endless Column of March--Two more views of the column,
-  the first elements of which reached Chinhung-ni before the
-  last troops departed Koto-ri, ten miles to the rear._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5356
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  USMC Photo A 5466                               USMC Photo A 5444
-]
-
-  _Clearing the Flanks--Tanks and infantry work together to
-  clear the flanks of enemy combat groups which watched for
-  every opportunity to attack from the high ground._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5369
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5376
-]
-
-  _A job for the Engineers--Above, this gap had to be spanned
-  if the vehicles were to be brought out from Koto-ri; below,
-  infantry crossing over air-dropped Treadway bridge._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USMC Photo A 5408
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-  USN Photo 424506                                USN Photo 424527
-]
-
-  _The Hungnam Redeployment--Above, two views of Marines who
-  were first X Corps troops to embark; below, a glimpse of the
-  thousands of tons of equipment to be loaded._
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USA Photo SC 355022
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 423914
-]
-
-  _Waterfront Panoramas--Above, these two LSTs were among the
-  last to be loaded; below, the final demolitions scene, with
-  the USS_ Begor _(APD 127) shown in the foreground_.
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 424297
-]
-
-[Illustration:
-
-                                                  USN Photo 424567
-
-  _The Honored Dead--On the day of his departure from Hungnam
-  the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division visits the
-  cemetery for a last silent tribute to the dead._
-]
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XIII
-
-Regroupment at Hagaru
-
-_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements Flown to
-Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1
-Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of
-RCT-7 to the South--Advance of the Division Trains_
-
-
-The marines at Hagaru would have been astonished to learn how much
-anxiety over their “encirclement” was being currently felt in the
-United States. It had been a rude shock for Americans who believed
-that the troops in Korea would be “home by Christmas” to realize that
-the unexpected Chinese intervention had created virtually a new war.
-This war, moreover, was apparently going against the UN forces. On
-Thanksgiving Day the victory over Communist aggression had seemed
-almost complete, yet only a week later the headlines announced major
-reverses. The Eighth Army was in full retreat, and an entire Marine
-division was said to be “trapped.”
-
-So disturbing were the reports from Korea, newspaper readers and
-radio listeners could scarcely have imagined the mood of confidence
-prevailing at Hagaru after the arrival of the troops from Yudam-ni.
-Even prior to that event, few Marines had any doubts as to the ability
-of the Division to fight its way out to the seacoast.
-
-The Hagaru perimeter presented a scene of bustling activity during the
-first days of December. Trucks and jeeps bounced along the bumpy roads
-in such numbers as to create a traffic problem. Twin-engined planes
-roared in and out of the snow-covered airstrip at frequent intervals
-throughout the daylight hours. Overhead the “Flying Boxcars” spilled a
-rainbow profusion of red, blue, yellow, green and orange parachutes to
-drift earthward with heavy loads of rations, gasoline and ammunition.
-
-The busy panorama even had its humorous aspects. Parka-clad Marines
-displaying a five-day growth of beard went about with their cheeks
-bulging from an accumulation of Tootsie Rolls--a caramel confection
-much esteemed by Stateside youngsters for its long-lasting qualities.
-The Post Exchange Section had originally brought merchandise into
-Hagaru on the assumption that it would be established as a base. No
-space in vehicles was available for its removal and the commanding
-general directed that the entire remaining stock, $13,547.80 worth,
-chiefly candies and cookies, should be issued gratuitously to the
-troops.[536] Tootsie Rolls proved to be a prime favorite with men who
-would have scorned them in civilian life. Not only were they more
-tasty than half-frozen “C” rations, but they resulted in no intestinal
-disorders. Moreover, they were useful as temporary repairs for leaking
-radiators.
-
-    [536] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith,
-          _Notes_, 1017–1018.
-
-There was nothing during the daytime to indicate the presence of
-CCF troops near Hagaru. Even in hours of darkness the enemy was
-quiet throughout the first five nights of December. Apparently the
-Chinese were powerless to renew the attack until reinforcements and
-replenishments of supplies and ammunition reached the area.
-
-
-_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air_
-
-Evacuation of the wounded was the chief problem on 2 December, when
-it became evident that previous estimates of losses at Yudam-ni and
-among the Army troops east of the Reservoir were far too low. A total
-of 914 casualties were flown out by the C-47s and R4Ds that day and
-more than 700 on the 3d. Captain Hering and his assistants had assumed
-that the Air Force evacuation officer was screening the casualties
-until he informed them that this was not his responsibility. The
-Division surgeon then set a Spartan standard. He passed personally on
-all controversial cases and approved for evacuation only those in as
-bad shape as Lieutenant Commander Lessenden, the 5th Marines surgeon
-who had refused to be flown out and continued on duty after both feet
-were painfully frozen. Apparently it was not too severe a test for
-men who could stand the pain, since Lessenden suffered no permanent
-injuries.[537]
-
-    [537] Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U. S. Navy, Public
-          Information Release, 21 Apr 51; LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC)
-          USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address
-          Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.”
-
-Captain Hering had to use his medical authority in several instances to
-overcome the objections of Yudam-ni casualties who declined evacuation,
-though in obvious need of hospitalization.[538]
-
-    [538] _Ibid._ Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin
-          Reservoir campaign led to the adoption of the thermal
-          boot as an effective preventive measure during the
-          operations of the following two winters of the Korean
-          conflict.
-
-The liaison airstrip at Koto-ri had been of little use, since it was
-outside the perimeter and exposed to enemy fire. But the completion of
-a new strip on the 2d made it possible to evacuate about 47 casualties
-that day from the 2/1 perimeter.[539]
-
-    [539] 2/1 _SAR_, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X
-          Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 844; VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18.
-
-More than 1400 casualties remained at Hagaru on the morning of 5
-December. They were all flown out before nightfall, making a total
-of 4312 men (3150 Marines, 1137 Army personnel and 25 Royal Marines)
-evacuated from Hagaru by air in the first five days of December,
-according to Marine figures.[540] X Corps estimated a total of 4207 for
-the same period.[541]
-
-    [540] Smith, _Notes_, 998–999.
-
-    [541] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93.
-
-R4Ds of the 1st MAW, flying under Wing operational control, were
-represented in the flights to and from Hagaru as well as the C-47s
-of the Combat Cargo Command, FEAF.[542] The large-scale casualty
-evacuation was completed without losing a man, even though the aircraft
-landing on the rough strip careened precariously as they bounced along
-the frozen runway. Only two planes could be accommodated simultaneously
-at first, but Marine engineers widened the 2900-foot strip until six
-planes could be parked at a time.
-
-    [542] Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56.
-
-A four-engine Navy R5D made a successful landing with stretchers flown
-in from Japan. After taking off with a load of wounded, the pilot
-barely cleared the surrounding hills, and it was decided to risk no
-further evacuations with such large aircraft. Two crash landings marred
-operations on the field. An incoming Marine R4D, heavily loaded with
-artillery ammunition, wiped out its landing gear on the rough surface
-and was abandoned after its load had been put to good use by the
-gunners. A second accident involved an Air Force C-47 which lost power
-on the take off and came down just outside the Marine lines without
-injury to its load of casualties. Troops from the perimeter were
-rushed out immediately to rescue its occupants but the plane had to be
-destroyed.[543]
-
-    [543] _Ibid._, Smith, _Notes_, 998–999.
-
-Not until long later were final official casualty reports rendered for
-the period of the Yudam-ni regroupment and breakout. Regimental figures
-are not available, and the totals included the losses suffered by the
-troops at Hagaru during the night of 30 November-1 December. Following
-are the figures for the 1st Marine Division as a whole throughout this
-five-day period:
-
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
-           |     |     |     |     | Total  |
-           | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Battle | Non-Battle[B]
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
-  30 Nov   |  27 |   6 |   6 | 183 |   222  |     102
-  1 Dec    |  27 |  14 |   6 | 111 |   158  |     134
-  2 Dec    |  55 |   2 |  33 | 231 |   321  |     180
-  3 Dec    |  16 |   1 |   6 | 194 |   217  |     196
-  4 Dec    |  10 |   6 |   4 | 202 |   222  |     582
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
-    Totals | 135 |  29 |  55 | 921 |  1140  |    1194
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
-
-      [B] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix
-          II, 3.
-
-
-_537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru_
-
-At 1359, on 3 December, X Corps issued OI 22, directing the 1st
-Marine Division to withdraw all elements to Hamhung area via the
-Hagaru-Hamhung axis as rapidly as evacuation of wounded and other
-preparations would permit.[544] General Almond flew to Hagaru that same
-day for a conference with General Smith. Nothing further was said about
-destruction of equipment. At that very time, in fact, various critical
-items were being salvaged and flown out from Hagaru when space on
-planes was available.
-
-    [544] X Corps _OI 22_, 2 Dec 50.
-
-Surplus weapons had accumulated as a result of casualties and the
-Marine general wished to avoid the destruction of any material that
-could be removed by air without interfering with casualty evacuation.
-It was particularly necessary to salvage and fly out the parachutes and
-packages used for air drops, since a critical shortage of these had
-been reported from Japan. Before leaving Hagaru, the Division also
-planned to evacuate large quantities of stoves, tents, typewriters,
-rifles, machine guns and damaged 4.2″ mortars.[545]
-
-    [545] This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived
-          from the following sources: G-1 _SAR_, 6–7 and G-4 _SAR_
-          6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps _Special Report, Chosin
-          Reservoir_; Smith, _Notes_, 1011–1015, and _Chronicle_,
-          103–105; Forney, _Special Report_, 3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton
-          interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51.
-
-Space in empty planes landing at Hagaru was utilized not only for
-bringing in equipment and medical supplies, but also replacements.
-Since the Wonsan landing some hundreds of Marines, most of them wounded
-in the Inchon-Seoul operation, had returned from hospitals in Japan.
-These men, upon reporting at Hungnam, were temporarily assigned to
-the Headquarters Battalion, since the Division had no provision in
-its T/O for a replacement organization. Ordinarily they would have
-been returned to their units, but enemy action made this procedure
-impossible until the completion of the airstrip.
-
-During the first five days of December, therefore, 537 replacements
-were flown to Hagaru, fit for duty and equipped with cold-weather
-clothing. Those destined for the 1st Marines were assigned to the 3d
-Battalion for perimeter defense, and personnel for the 5th and 7th
-Marines joined those units after their arrival at Hagaru.
-
-Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, the chief of the Combat Cargo
-Command, expressed astonishment during his visit of 5 December on
-learning about these replacements. He had come to offer his C-47s for
-troop evacuation after the casualties were flown out, but General Smith
-explained that all able-bodied men would be needed for the breakout.
-
-
-_Air Drops of Ammunition_
-
-Visitors and press correspondents arrived daily at Hagaru in the empty
-C-47s and R4Ds. Among them was Miss Marguerite Higgins, reporter for
-the New York _Herald-Tribune_. General Smith ruled that for her own
-protection, considering the possibility of enemy attack, she must leave
-the perimeter before nightfall.
-
-French and British publications were represented as well as most of
-the larger American dailies and wire services. At one of the press
-conferences the question arose as to the proper name of the Marine
-operation. A British correspondent had intended to refer to it as a
-“retreat” or “retirement,” but General Smith held that there could be
-no retreat when there was no rear. Since the Division was surrounded,
-he maintained, the word “retreat” was not a correct term for the coming
-breakout to the coast.[546]
-
-    [546] Smith, _Notes_, 977–978; _Chronicle_, 103–106.
-
-General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Murray were interviewed for
-television by Charles de Soria, who also “shot” Marines on infantry
-duty and casualties awaiting evacuation. These pictures and recordings
-were later shown in the United States under the title _Gethsemane_.
-
-The correspondents were astonished to find the Hagaru perimeter so
-lacking in enemy activity. This quiet was shattered at 2010 on 5
-December when two B-26s bombed and strafed the area. Marine night
-fighters were absent on a search mission, but one was recalled to offer
-protection against further efforts of the sort. A possible explanation
-was advanced by First Lieutenant Harry S. Wilson, of VMF(N)-542, who
-reported that he had received orders by radio to attack Hagaru. It was
-his conviction that Chinese use of captured radio equipment accounted
-for the B-26 attack.[547]
-
-    [547] 1stMarDiv _G-3 Journal_, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E.
-          Hood, memo: Close Air Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv,
-          29 Jan 51.
-
-The interlude of CCF inactivity gave the 1st Marine Division an
-opportunity to build up a stock of air-dropped ammunition and supplies.
-Poor communications had prevented the obtaining of advance information
-as to the requirements of the Yudam-ni troops, and their needs had to
-be estimated by the assistant G-4.
-
-It was planned that units moving out from Hagaru would take only enough
-supplies for the advance to Koto-ri. Materiel would be air-dropped
-there to support the next stage of the breakout.
-
-The C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command were called upon to fly in the
-largest part of the total of the 372.7 tons requested for air delivery
-at Hagaru. C-47s and R4Ds were available for some items, particularly
-of a fragile nature; and specially packaged small drops to meet
-specific needs could be made by planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
-
-Officers and men of the Headquarters Battalion at Hagaru were ordered
-to assist the 1st Regulating Detachment in the operation of the Hagaru
-airhead. Army service troops were also assigned to the task, and
-dumps were set up adjacent to the drop zone for the direct issuing of
-supplies. The major items requested were artillery, mortar and small
-arms ammunition, hand grenades, gasoline and diesel oil, rations, and
-communication wire.[548]
-
-    [548] HqBn _URpt 13_; G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F.
-          Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56.
-
-There is no record of the amounts actually received. Pilots sometimes
-missed the drop zone so far that the containers were “captured” by the
-enemy or landed in areas where recovery was not feasible because of
-enemy fire. In other instances, the supplies fell near the positions of
-front-line units which issued them on the spot without any formalities
-of bookkeeping.
-
-Breakage rates were high, due to the frozen ground. About 70 per cent
-of the POL products and 70 to 80 per cent of the rations were recovered
-in usable condition. Of the artillery ammunition delivered to the drop
-zone, 40 per cent was badly damaged and only 25 per cent ever reached
-the gun positions. About 45 per cent of the small arms ammunition
-was recovered and usable. A hundred per cent of the requested mortar
-ammunition and 90 per cent of the 81mm rounds were put into the air
-over the drop zone, though the damage rate was nearly as high as that
-of the artillery shells.[549]
-
-    [549] G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 3–5.
-
-In spite of the seemingly low percentages of receipts as compared
-to requests, it was considered that the Hagaru air drops had been
-successful on the whole. “Without the extra ammunition,” commented
-General Smith, “many more of the friendly troops would have been
-killed.... There can be no doubt that the supplies received by this
-method proved to be the margin necessary to sustain adequately the
-operations of the division during this period.”[550]
-
-    [550] Smith, _Notes_, 1010.
-
-
-_Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri_
-
-The need of the Yudam-ni troops for recuperation was so urgent that 6
-December was set as the D-day of the attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri. On
-the recommendation of his staff, General Smith decided that the need
-of the troops for rest and regroupment outweighed the advantages of a
-speedy advance, even though the enemy would be allowed more time to get
-his forces into position along the MSR.
-
-Another factor influencing this decision was the thinning of the
-command group and staff sections of the Division. It will be recalled
-that General Craig, the Assistant Division Commander, had recently been
-returned on emergency leave to the United States. Colonel Walseth (G-1)
-was wounded on 30 November, while Lieutenant Colonel Chidester, had
-been MIA since that date. Colonel McAlister (G-4) had been directed to
-remain at Hungnam to co-ordinate logistic functions.
-
-A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel.
-This was due in part to the casualties suffered by the last convoy of
-Headquarters troops to move up from Hungnam. Moreover, the office force
-had been depleted by calls for reinforcements to defend the perimeter.
-
-By dint of working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout
-to Koto-ri was completed on schedule. OpnO 25-50, issued at 0800 on 5
-December, provided for an advance of the 1st Marine Division at first
-light the following morning on the Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni-Majon-dong
-axis to close the Hamhung area. The principal subordinate units were
-assigned these tasks:
-
-   (a) RCT-5 (3/1 attached) to relieve all elements on perimeter
-        defense in the Hagaru area by 1200, 5 December; to cover
-        the movement of RCT-7 out of Hagaru to the south; to follow
-        RCT-7 to the south on the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis;
-        to protect the Division rear from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and to
-        follow RCT-7 from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area as Division
-        reserve.
-
-   (b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the
-        Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis to close the Hamhung area.
-
-   (c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni,
-        protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the
-        Division through Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear
-        from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area.[551]
-
-    [551] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 25-50_, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the
-          remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv _AdmO 20-50_, 4
-          Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec
-          50; Smith, _Chronicle_, 104–106.
-
-All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators,
-casualties and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to
-march on foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security.
-It was directed that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the
-side of the road and destroyed if not operative by the time the column
-passed. During halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be
-established.
-
-Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for
-reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions
-to clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were
-planned by the Division Engineer Officer.
-
-Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed that
-the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days, equally
-distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected
-items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and the
-following provision was made for ammunition:
-
-  On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle,
-  minimum 1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps
-  depleted or transportation capacity exceeded.
-
-Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other
-casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated in vehicles
-of the column.
-
-Two Division trains were set up by AdminO 20-50. Lieutenant Colonel
-Banks commanded Train No. 1, under RCT-7; and No. 2, under RCT-5, was
-in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne. Each motor serial in the trains
-was to have a commander who maintained radio communication with the
-train commander.
-
-Truck transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment
-at Hagaru, a Division destruction plan was issued on 4 December, making
-unit commanders responsible for disposing of all excess supplies and
-equipment within their own areas. “Commanding officer 1st Regulating
-Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies and
-equipment remaining in dumps,” the order continued. “Unit commanders
-and CO 1st Regulating Detachment report types and amounts of supplies
-and equipment to this headquarters (G-4) prior to destruction.
-Permission to use fuel and ammunition for destruction purposes must be
-obtained from this headquarters (G-4).”
-
-
-_3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru_
-
-General Smith held conferences on 4 and 5 December of senior unit
-commanders. During the afternoon of the 4th General Almond arrived by
-plane and was briefed on the plan for the breakout. In a brief ceremony
-at the Division CP he presented the Distinguished Service Cross to
-General Smith, Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonels Murray and
-Beall.
-
-The night of 5–6 December was the fifth in a row to pass without enemy
-activity at Hagaru. But if Division G-2 summaries were to be credited,
-it was the calm before the storm. For the Chinese were believed to
-be assembling troops and supplies both at Hagaru and along the MSR
-to Koto-ri. Up to this time seven CCF divisions, the 58th, 59th,
-60th, 76th, 79th, 80th and 89th, had been identified through POW
-interrogations. But there were evidences that the 77th and 78th were
-also within striking distance.[552]
-
-    [552] Smith, _Notes_, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps
-          _Command Report Annex (CR)_, 4 Dec 50.
-
-At 1200 on 5 December the 5th Marines relieved 3/1 of the
-responsibility for the defense of the Hagaru area. Division elements
-other than infantry were withdrawn from the front line, leaving
-Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s three battalions, with 3/1 attached,
-disposed around the perimeter as follows:
-
-   1/5--From the Yudam-ni road around the north of Hagaru and astride
-        the Changjin Valley to a point at the base of the ridge about
-        1,000 yards east of the bridge over the Changjin River.
-
-   2/5--In position on western slopes of East Hill.
-
-   3/5--From the south nose of East Hill west across the river to
-        link up with 3/1 south of the airstrip.
-
-   3/1--South and southwest of airstrip in sector formerly held by
-        How and Item Companies of 3/1.[553]
-
-    [553] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec
-          50; 5th Mar _SAR_, 30–31.
-
-Not only were the CCF positions on East Hill a threat to Hagaru; they
-also dominated the road leading south to Koto-ri. Thus the plan for the
-breakout called for simultaneous attacks to be launched at first light
-on the 6th--RCT-5 to regain the enemy-held portion of East Hill, and
-RCT-7 to lead the advance of the Division motor column toward Koto-ri.
-
-A plan for air support, prepared by the command and staff of the 1st
-MAW, was brought to Hagaru by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman,
-Assistant Wing Commander, on 5 December. Aircraft were to be on station
-at 0700 to furnish close support for the attack on East Hill. Along
-the MSR to Koto-ri an umbrella of 24 close support aircraft was to
-cover the head, rear and flanks of the breakout column while search
-and attack planes scoured the ridges flanking the road and approaches
-leading into it. Support was also to be furnished after dark by the
-night hecklers. All strikes within three miles of either side of the
-MSR were to be controlled by the ground forces while the planes were
-free to hit any targets beyond.
-
-The concentration of aircraft covering the advance south from Hagaru
-was one of the greatest of the whole war. Marine planes at Yonpo would,
-of course, continue approximately 100 daily sorties to which VMF-323
-would add 30 more from the _Badoeng Strait_. The Navy’s fast carriers,
-_Leyte_, _Valley Forge_, _Philippine Sea_, and _Princeton_ were to
-abandon temporarily their deep support or interdiction operations
-and contribute about 100 or more attack sorties daily. The Fifth Air
-Force was to add more power with additional U. S. and Australian
-fighter-bombers as well as medium and heavy bomber interdiction
-beyond the bomb line. To augment the carrier support for the X Corps
-consolidation and possible redeployment by sea, VMF-212 had departed
-Yonpo on 4 December and was re-equipping in Itami for return to
-battle aboard the newly arrived USS _Bataan_. The _Sicily_ was also
-heading for the area to take back aboard the Corsairs of VMF-214 on 7
-December.[554]
-
-    [554] 1stMAW _OpnO 2-50_, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air
-          Support for 6 Dec,” 5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex
-          CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation
-          Report No. 1_, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg
-          Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D. Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56.
-          1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_. The VMF-214 pilots casually made
-          their transition from shore to carrier base between
-          sorties.
-
-Continuous artillery support, both for RCT-5 and RCT-7, was planned
-by the 11th Marines. Two batteries of the 3d Battalion and one of the
-4th were to move out at the head of the RCT-7 train, the two from 3/11
-to occupy initial positions halfway to Koto-ri to support the attack
-southward to that objective, and the 4/11 battery to take position in
-Koto-ri and provide general support northward in combination with the
-battery of 2/11 attached to that perimeter. The remaining batteries of
-the 3d and 4th Battalions would provide initial support from Hagaru
-southward until ordered to move out.
-
-The three batteries of 1/11, with D/11 attached, were to support the
-operations of RCT-5 in a similar manner. Two batteries would move out
-at the head of the regimental train to positions halfway to Koto-ri,
-the remaining two would fire to the south in support of withdrawing
-units and then displace when the first two were in position.[555]
-
-    [555] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar _SAR_), 8. As
-          a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during
-          the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was
-          reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers
-          each.
-
-Throughout the night of 5–6 December, the darkness was stabbed by
-flashes as the artillery at Hagaru fired concentrations to saturate
-the area along the Hagaru-Koto-ri axis. In order to prevent cratering
-of the road the 155’s fired VT rounds. A secondary purpose of this
-bombardment was to expend profitably the surplus of ammunition which
-could not be brought out.[556]
-
-    [556] _Ibid._, 1stMarDiv _POR_ 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W.
-          McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.
-
-At daybreak on the 6th the Division Headquarters broke camp. General
-Smith had decided to fly the command group to Koto-ri in advance of
-the troops, so that planning could begin immediately for the breakout
-from Koto-ri southward. General Barr visited during the morning and
-was informed that the 7th Infantry Division casualties who had reached
-Hagaru had been flown out. The remaining 490 able-bodied men (including
-385 survivors of Task Force Faith) had been provided with Marine
-equipment and organized into a provisional battalion under the command
-of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, USA. This battalion was attached to the
-7th Marines and sometimes referred to as 31/7.
-
-Throughout the morning General Smith kept in close touch with the
-progress of RCT-7 toward Koto-ri. At 1400 a reassuring message was
-received from Colonel Litzenberg, and the commanding general took off
-from Hagaru by helicopter. Ten minutes later he and his aide, Captain
-Martin J. Sexton, landed at Koto-ri. The other members of the command
-group, following by OY and helicopter, set up in a large tent at
-Koto-ri and started planning for the next stage.[557]
-
-    [557] Smith, _Notes_, 1058–1060; HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_, 5.
-
-
-_East Hill Retaken from Chinese_
-
-Meanwhile, at Hagaru, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had designated his
-2d Battalion for the assault on East Hill. At 0700 on 6 December, as
-the 4.2″ mortars began their planned preparation, the 7th Marines had
-already initiated the breakout to Koto-ri. When Marine planes arrived
-on station at 0725, a shortage of napalm tanks limited the air attack
-to bombing, rocket and strafing runs. These had little apparent effect
-on the objective. Further air strikes were directed by the FAC, First
-Lieutenant Manning T. Jeter, Jr., who was severely wounded while
-standing on the crest to direct the Corsairs to the target. Captain
-David G. Johnson, the air liaison officer, took his place. A total of
-76 planes participated in the day’s air attacks.
-
-At 0900 Captain Smith’s Dog Company moved out to the assault (see Map
-26) with First Lieutenant George A. Sorenson’s 3d Platoon in the lead,
-followed by the 2d and 1st Platoons in that order.[558] Attacking to
-the northward, Sorensen was pinned down by fire from Objective A before
-he had covered 50 yards. This was the enemy’s main forward position
-on East Hill, which he had held against Marine attacks ever since
-seizing it in the early morning hours of 29 November. First Lieutenant
-John R. Hinds replaced Sorensen, after that officer was wounded. While
-he engaged the enemy frontally, First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s
-2d Platoon poured in flanking fires and First Lieutenant Richard M.
-Johnson’s 1st Platoon executed a flanking movement.
-
-    [558] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon
-          the following sources: 5thMar _SAR_, 31–32; 1/5 _SAR_,
-          17–18; 2/5 _SAR_, 27–29; Smith, _Notes_, 1031–1033; Geer,
-          _The New Breed_, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R.
-          Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H. Honeycutt interv by Capt K.
-          A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L.
-          Murray, Comments, n. d.
-
-[Illustration: SEIZURE OF EAST HILL AND CHINESE COUNTER ATTACK
-
-6–7 December
-
-  MAP-26
-]
-
-Chinese resistance suddenly collapsed about 1100. Thus it seemed almost
-an anticlimax that East Hill, after holding out against the Marines
-more than a week, should have been retaken at a cost of one man killed
-and three wounded. About 30 CCF dead were found.
-
-As events were to prove, however, this was but the first round in a
-hard-fought 22-hour battle for the hill mass. The next phase began
-at 1130, when Roise ordered Captain Peters’ Fox Company to relieve
-Smith so that Dog Company could resume the attack against Objective
-B, a ridge about 500 yards to the southeast. The lower slopes of this
-position were now being cleared by 2/7.
-
-After a 10-minute artillery preparation, the three platoons of Dog
-Company jumped off at 1250. The Chinese put up a stubborn resistance
-and it took until 1430 to seize the new objective. Marine casualties
-were moderate, however, and Captain Smith set up three platoon
-positions along the ridge running to the south whence he could control
-the road leading out of Hagaru.
-
-Late in the day the enemy appeared to be massing for a counterattack in
-the saddle between the two objectives. Johnson called an air strike and
-all Dog and Fox Company troops within range opened up with everything
-they had as McNaughton led a patrol against the Chinese in the saddle.
-Caught between the infantry fires and the rocket and strafing runs of
-the Corsairs, the CCF survivors surrendered en masse to McNaughton and
-his platoon. About 220 prisoners were taken to set a record for the 1st
-Marine Division in the Reservoir campaign.[559]
-
-    [559] 2/5 _SAR_, 28–29.
-
-At the request of Captain Smith, the saddle between the two Marine
-companies was occupied by reinforcements consisting of an officer and
-11 men from the regimental AT Company and an officer and 32 men from
-the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Shortly after dark the enemy launched
-a vigorous counterattack. Tanks and 81mm mortars fired in support of
-Marines who made good use of 2.36″ white phosphorus rockets at close
-range.
-
-Although the Chinese endured frightful casualties, they returned again
-and again to the attack until midnight. It was evident that they
-considered this a fight to a finish for East Hill, and at 0205 they
-renewed the assault against all three companies of the 2d Battalion as
-well as Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion.
-
-The struggle during the next three hours was considered the most
-spectacular if not the most fiercely contested battle of the entire
-Reservoir campaign even by veterans of the Yudam-ni actions. Never
-before had they seen the Chinese come on in such numbers or return
-to the attack with such persistence. The darkness was crisscrossed
-with a fiery pattern of tracer bullets at one moment, and next the
-uncanny radiance of an illumination shell would reveal Chinese columns
-shuffling in at a trot, only to go down in heaps as they deployed.
-Marine tanks, artillery, mortars, rockets and machine guns reaped
-a deadly harvest, and still the enemy kept on coming with a dogged
-fatalism which commanded the respect of the Marines. Looking like
-round little gnomes in their padded cotton uniforms, groups of Chinese
-contrived at times to approach within grenade-throwing distance before
-being cut down.
-
-The fight was not entirely one-sided. The Marines took a pounding from
-CCF mortars and machine guns, and by 0300 Dog Company was hard-pressed
-in its three extended positions pointed like a pistol at the heart of
-the enemy’s assembly areas. Both McNaughton and the executive officer,
-First Lieutenant James H. Honeycutt, were wounded but remained in
-action.
-
-This was the second time in three months that Dog Company had
-spearheaded a Marine attack on a desperately defended hill complex.
-Northwest of Seoul in September, only 26 able-bodied men had survived
-to break the back of North Korean resistance. The company commander,
-First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, had died a hero’s death at the moment
-of victory, and First Lieutenant Karle F. Seydel was the unit’s only
-unwounded officer.
-
-Now another Smith commanded Dog Company, and Seydel was killed as enemy
-pressure from front and flank threatened to overwhelm the three riddled
-platoons. Casualties of 13 KIA and 50 WIA were taken in the battle
-for East Hill as Dog Company and the provisional platoons fell back
-fighting to the former Objective A and tied in with Fox Company.
-
-[Illustration: THE LAST NIGHT AT HAGARU
-
-6–7 DECEMBER 1950
-
-  MAP-27
-]
-
-Along the low ground at the northern end of East Hill the Chinese
-were beaten off with ruinous losses by Jaskilka’s Easy Company of 2/5,
-Jones’ Charlie Company of 1/5 and three Army tanks (see Map 27). Enemy
-troops had to cross a comparatively level expanse which provided a
-lucrative field of fire for Marine supporting arms. Heaps of CCF dead,
-many of them charred by white phosphorus bursts, were piled up in front
-of the Marine positions.
-
-Next, the Chinese hit Captain James B. Heater’s Able Company of 1/5,
-still farther to the left, and overran several squad positions. One
-platoon was forced to withdraw to the rise on which the Division CP had
-previously been located. The lines were restored at 0546 with the help
-of Lieutenant Hancock and his Baker Company, which had been in reserve.
-Altogether the 1st Battalion had suffered casualties of ten killed
-and 43 wounded, while the counted CCF slain numbered 260 in front of
-Charlie Company and 200 in the area of Able Company. George Company
-of 3/1 also beat off a Chinese attack on the south of the perimeter.
-With the coming of daylight these Marines found that they had one of
-the Chinese withdrawal routes under their guns. Mortar and rifle fire
-annihilated one group of about 60 enemy and another group of 15 Reds
-surrendered.[560]
-
-    [560] Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13.
-
-The new day revealed a scene of slaughter which surpassed anything
-the Marines had seen since the fight for the approaches of Seoul in
-September. Estimates of CCF dead in front of the 2d Battalion positions
-on and around East Hill ran as high as 800, and certain it is that the
-enemy had suffered a major defeat.
-
-When Marine air came on station, the Chinese as usual scattered for
-cover. About 0200 Murray ordered 3/5, which had not been in contact
-with the enemy during the night, to displace to the south at the head
-of Division Train No. 2, followed by 1/5 and Ridge’s battalion of the
-1st Marines. This meant that Roise’s men with a platoon of tanks and
-the engineers in charge of demolitions would be the last troops out of
-Hagaru.
-
-
-_Attack of RCT-7 to the South_
-
-During the 22-hour battle on East Hill the 7th Marines had been
-attacking toward Koto-ri (see Map 28). On the eve of the breakout the
-gaps in the infantry ranks were partially filled with 300 artillerymen
-from the 11th Marines, bringing Litzenberg’s strength up to about 2200
-men. 7th Mar OpnO 14-50 called for the advance to be initiated at first
-light on 6 December as follows:
-
-  1st Battalion--to move out at 0430 to clear the ground to the right
-  of the river;
-
-  2d Battalion--supported by tanks, to attack as advanced guard along
-  the MSR;
-
-  Provisional Battalion (31/7)--to clear the ground to the left of
-  the MSR;[561]
-
-    [561] Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to
-          permit advance through the high ground, the Provisional
-          Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear enemy
-          from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5
-          Oct 56.
-
-3d Battalion--to bring up the rear of the regimental train, with George
-Company disposed along both flanks as security for the vehicles.[562]
-
-    [562] Sources for this section, except where otherwise
-          noted, are: 7thMar _SAR_, 24; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 1029–1031, 1033–1047; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 1stLt
-          J. B. Chandler, “Thank God I’m a Marine,” _Leatherneck
-          Magazine_, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25–26; MajGen H. L.
-          Litzenberg, Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to
-          Koto-ri, 6–7 December 1950, 2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct
-          56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments,
-          7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M.
-          E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56.
-
-Daybreak revealed a peculiar silvery fog covering the Hagaru area.[563]
-The 1st Battalion, with Charlie Company in assault, had as its first
-objective the high ground southeast of Tonae-ri. No resistance was
-encountered, though 24 Chinese were surprised asleep in their positions
-near the objective and 17 of them killed.
-
-    [563] Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56.
-
-The 2d Platoon of Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion, was attached to
-2/7 when the advance guard jumped off at 0630 from the road block
-south of Hagaru. Almost immediately the column ran into trouble. Upon
-clearing the road block the lead dozer-tank took three hits from a
-3.5 bazooka. Within twenty minutes the column came under heavy fire
-from CCF positions on the high ground on the left. Fox Company, in the
-lead, was allowed to pass before the enemy opened up on the Battalion
-Command Group, Dog-Easy Company and Weapons Company. The fog prevented
-air support initially. When it lifted, First Lieutenant John G.
-Theros, FAC of 2/7, brought in Marine aircraft and 81mm fire on the
-CCF position.[564] It took a coordinated attack by the two infantry
-companies and the tanks, however, before the resistance could be put
-down and the advance resumed at 1200. Two and a half hours later the
-upper reaches of this hill were cleared by D/5.
-
-    [564] 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16
-          Feb 51; Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56.
-
-After 2/7 and air smothered the initial Chinese resistance, Fox Company
-and the platoon of Dog/Tanks advanced down the road. About 4000 yards
-south of Hagaru they met the next resistance. Although the Chinese
-positions were in plain sight of 1/7, neither 2/7 nor air could spot
-them. Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood attempted to
-co-ordinate mortar fires from 2/7 with observation from 1/7, but were
-unsuccessful because of poor radio communications. Following an erratic
-artillery barrage and some good shooting by the tanks, Fox Company
-cleared the enemy position about 1500, aided by a Dog-Easy flanking
-attack and the Provisional Battalion. In order to assist 2/7, Baker
-Company of 1/7 came down from the ridge west of the river to act as
-right flank guard.
-
-[Illustration: THE BREAKOUT FROM HAGARU TO KOTO-RI
-
-6–7 December 1950
-
-  A--1/7’s Initial Objective
-  B--CCF Position Overlooking the MSR
-  C--2/7 Held Up by CCF Machine Guns
-  D--Blown Bridge
-  E--3/7 B Regtl Train Held Up
-  F--Commandos Rescued
-  G--3/11’s Fire Fight
-  H--Division Train 1 Held Up
-  I--Pusong-ni
-  J--Hell Fire Valley
-
-  MAP-28
-]
-
-Meanwhile 1/7 continued to push ahead methodically to the right of the
-MSR as the three rifle companies leapfrogged one another. Enemy contact
-was continual but no serious opposition developed during the daytime
-hours. On the left flank the Provisional Battalion had several fire
-fights, while the advance was uneventful for the 3d Battalion following
-in the rear of the regimental train.
-
-About 5000 yards had been covered by dusk. Enemy resistance stiffened
-after dark, as had been anticipated. The planners had realized that
-the movement could have been made in daylight hours with fewer losses
-in personnel and equipment. But intelligence of the expected arrival
-of CCF reinforcements influenced the decision to continue the march
-throughout the night even at the cost of increased opposition. By noon
-long lines of Chinese could be seen along the sky Line to the east of
-the road moving towards the MSR. Air attacked these reinforcements but
-could not stop their movement, as later events proved.
-
-About 8000 yards south of Hagaru, in Hell Fire Valley, a Chinese
-machine gun on the left stopped the 2d Battalion at 2200. The column
-was held up until midnight before Army tank fire knocked out the enemy
-gun. After covering 1200 more yards a blown bridge caused another halt
-while Dog Company engineers made repairs. Movement was resumed at 0200
-when a second blown bridge resulted in a delay of an hour and a half
-before it could be bypassed.
-
-Dawn brought a significant innovation in air support. Circling above
-the 11-mile column inching toward Koto-ri was an airborne Tactical Air
-Direction Center (TADC) installed in an R5D of VMR-152 and operated
-by Major Harlen E. Hood and his communicators from MTACS-2. Major
-Christian C. Lee, Commanding Officer of MTACS-2, had made arrangements
-when he realized that with his radios packed in trucks and jeeps he
-could not control close air support effectively. Only the addition of
-one radio to those standard in the aircraft was necessary to provide
-basic communications, but when being readied for the predawn takeoff
-the mission faced failure because an engine wouldn’t start. Minus a
-refueler truck, the crew chief, Technical Sergeant H. C. Stuart, had
-worked all night to pour 2400 gallons of gas into the craft by hand.
-Now, in the bitter cold of dawn, he set about to overhaul the starting
-motor. Two hours later Major John N. Swartley was piloting the plane
-over the MSR.[565]
-
-    [565] 1stMAW _SAR_, Annex I (VMR-152), 11–12, and annex K,
-          appendix J, (hereafter MTACS-2_SAR_), 25; Air Officer’s
-          Rpt, in X Corps _CR_, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley ltr
-          to authors, 15 Oct 56.
-
-No trouble was encountered by 2/7 along the last few miles of the
-route and the battalion was first to arrive at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, the
-3d Battalion had been assigned the additional mission of replacing
-the Provisional Battalion as protection for the left flank as well as
-rear of the 7th Marines train. A brief fire fight developed at about
-2100 as the Chinese closed to hand-grenade range. Lieutenant Colonel
-Harris deployed George and Item Companies around the vehicles and drove
-the enemy back to a respectful distance. Between 0200 and 0430, Item
-Company of 3/7 and a platoon of tanks were sent back up the road to
-clear out a troublesome Chinese position near Hell Fire Valley.
-
-About 0200, during a halt for bridge repairs, the 7th Marines train
-was hit by enemy fire. The regimental command group suffered most.
-Captain Donald R. France and First Lieutenant Clarence E. McGuinness
-were killed and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Dowsett was wounded.
-While Lieutenant (jg) Robert G. Medemeyer, (MC), USN, gave first aid,
-Chaplain (Lieutenant (jg)) Cornelius J. Griffin entered an ambulance to
-console a dying Marine. CCF machine gun bullets shattered his jaw and
-killed Sergeant Matthew Caruso at his side. Lieutenant Colonel Harris
-and Major Roach supervised the deployment of How Company troops to beat
-off the attack.
-
-About 0530 Lieutenant Colonel Harris disappeared. A search was made for
-him to no avail and he was listed as a MIA. It was later determined
-that he had been killed.
-
-The 1st Battalion of RCT-7, after a relatively uneventful march over
-the high ground west of the river, moved down the slope to join the
-regimental column. Major Warren Morris assumed command of the 3d
-Battalion, which reached Koto-ri about 0700. At about 1100, after a
-brief rest, the men were ordered together with Lockwood’s troops to
-move back up along the MSR to the north and set up blocking between
-Koto-ri and Hill 1182 to keep the road open for other units of the
-Division.[566] While carrying out this mission, the 2d Battalion helped
-to bring in 22 British Marines who had been stranded ever since the
-Task Force Drysdale fight on the night of 29–30 November. Their plight
-was not known until 4 December, when an OY pilot saw the letters
-H-E-L-P stamped out in the snow and air-dropped food and medical
-supplies.
-
-    [566] 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO,
-          0930 7 Dec 50.
-
-
-_Advance of the Division Trains_
-
-By 1700 on 7 December all elements of RCT-7 were in the perimeter at
-Koto-ri. Division Train No. 1 was due next, and the planners had hoped
-that the rifle battalions would clear the way for the vehicles. As it
-proved, however, the Chinese closed in behind RCT-7 and attacked the
-flanks of the convoy, with the result that the service troops actually
-saw more action than the infantrymen.
-
-One of the causes may be traced to the fact that Division Train No. 1
-had to wait at Hagaru until 1600 on the 6th before RCT-7 made enough
-progress toward Koto-ri to warrant putting the convoy on the road.
-About 2000 yards south of Hagaru elements of the 3d Battalion, 11th
-Marines, were hit in the early darkness by CCF mortar and small-arms
-fire. The gunners of George and How Batteries deployed as infantrymen
-and repulsed the enemy at the cost of a few casualties.
-
-Upon resuming the march, a second fire fight took place after 1500 more
-yards had been covered. Several vehicles, set afire by Chinese mortar
-shells, blocked the road and brought the convoy to a halt. At daybreak
-the enemy swarmed to the attack in formidable numbers. It was nip and
-tuck as all pieces of How Battery and three howitzers of George Battery
-were emplaced between the trucks of the 1st MT Battalion.
-
-There was no opportunity to dig in the trails of guns employing time
-fire with fuses cut for ranges of 40 to 500 yards. But the Chinese were
-stopped cold by two hours of continuous fire after approaching within
-40 yards. All but about 50 of an estimated 500 to 800 enemy were killed
-or wounded before the remainder fled, according to the estimate of the
-gunners.[567]
-
-    [567] Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement
-          of the division trains is based on: HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_,
-          6–9; HqBn, _URpt 13_; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A.
-          Shutts, 11 Apr 51.
-
-The convoy of the Division Headquarters Company also had to fight
-its way. Small arms ammunition had been distributed throughout the
-column, and light machine guns were mounted on top of truck loads.
-All able-bodied men with the exception of drivers and radio operators
-walked in single file on either side of the vehicles carrying the
-wounded.
-
-Progress was slow, with many halts caused by CCF fire. At 0130 several
-trucks were set aflame by enemy mortar shells and 2.36 rockets.
-Headquarters troops deployed in roadside ditches while two machine guns
-manned by bandsmen kept the Chinese at a distance. At 0200 the clouds
-cleared enough to permit strikes by night hecklers of VMF (N)-513. They
-stopped the Chinese until just before daylight, when a company-size
-group penetrated within 30 yards of the convoy. During this fight First
-Lieutenant Charles H. Sullivan, who measured six feet four and weighed
-240 pounds, emptied his carbine at advancing Chinese. Then he hurled it
-like a javelin to drive the bayonet into the chest of an opponent at 15
-feet.
-
-Under the coaching of the MTACS commander, Major Lee, two more
-night fighters--Major Albert L. Clark and First Lieutenant Truman
-Clark--pinned the Chinese down with strafing runs as close as 30 yards
-from the Marine ground troops. At dawn Major Percy F. Avant, Jr.,
-and his four-plane division from VMF-312 dumped about four tons of
-explosives and napalm on Chinese who broke and ran for cover. The fire
-fight had cost Headquarters Battalion 6 KIA and 14 WIA.[568]
-
-    [568] This description of the headquarters convoy fight is
-          based on: _Ibid._; Cpl G. L. Coon, “Versatility,”
-          _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18–19;
-          Simpson Comments, 24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 _SAR_, 19; Maj
-          C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 7 Feb 51,
-          Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56.
-
-The MP Company, just forward of Headquarters Company, had the problem
-of guarding about 160 Chinese prisoners. Captives unable to walk had
-been left behind at Hagaru, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed
-that the wounded be given shelter and provided with food and fuel by
-the departing Marines. The prisoners escorted by the MPs were lying
-in the middle of the road during the attack when the enemy seemed to
-concentrate his fire on them while shouting in Chinese. A scene of
-pandemonium ensued as some of the able-bodied prisoners attempted to
-make a break. Now the Marines as well as the enemy fired into them and
-137 were killed in the wild melee.
-
-When the convoy got under way again, two Communists were captured
-and 15 killed after being flushed out of houses in the village of
-Pusong-ni. At daybreak a halt was called in Hell Fire Valley for the
-purpose of identifying bodies of MPs and Headquarters troops, killed
-in the Task Force Drysdale battle, which were to be picked up later.
-Attempts to start the looted and abandoned vehicles met with no success
-and the convoy continued the movement to Koto-ri without incident,
-arriving about 1000 on the 7th.
-
-At this hour the last Marine troops had not yet left Hagaru, so that
-the column as a whole extended the entire 11 miles of the route.
-Division Train No. 2 had formed up during the afternoon of the 6th,
-but was unable to start until after dark. At midnight the train had
-moved only a short distance out of Hagaru. Lieutenant Colonel Milne
-requested infantry support and 3/5 was given the mission of advancing
-at the head of the column, along with the 5th Marines regimental train,
-to eliminate enemy resistance.[569] Taplett had only two companies, one
-of which proceeded astride the road while the other echeloned to the
-left rear. The late start proved to be a blessing, since Division Train
-No. 2 completed most of its movement by daylight under an umbrella of
-Marine air and met only light and scattered resistance. The head of the
-column reached Koto-ri at 1700, and at 2300 all of the major Division
-units were in the perimeter except 2/5, the rear guard.[570]
-
-    [569] Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.
-
-    [570] The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and
-          3/1 are based on: 3/5 _SAR_, 17; 3/1, _SAR_, 26 Nov-15
-          Dec 50, 7; 5th Mar _SAR_, 32–34; 1/5 _SAR_, 18–19; 2/5
-          _SAR_, 29–30, 37.
-
-Both 1/5 and 3/1 had formed up in Hagaru on the morning of the 7th and
-moved out as rapidly as traffic would permit, which was slow indeed.
-They were accompanied by the 41st Commando, which had earned the esteem
-of all U. S. Marines by valor in combat. British imperturbability was
-at its best when Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale held an inspection shortly
-before departing Hagaru. Disdainful of the scattered shots which were
-still being heard, the officers moved up and down the rigid lines, and
-men whose gear was not in the best possible shape were reprimanded.
-
-By 1000 nobody was left in the battered town except Roise’s battalion,
-First Lieutenant Vaughan R. Stuart’s tank platoon and elements of Able
-Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Captain William R. Gould.
-This unit and CWO Willie S. Harrison’s Explosive Ordnance Section of
-Headquarters Company engineers were attached to the 5th Marines for the
-mission of the demolitions at Hagaru.[571]
-
-    [571] Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru
-          are based on these sources: 1st Engr Bn _SAR_, 13;
-          Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A.
-          Canzona, 13 Jul 56.
-
-Gould had formed five demolitions teams, each composed of an officer
-and four to six men. On the evening of 6 December they began
-preparations for burning stockpiles of surplus clothing and equipment
-along with the buildings of the Hagaru train yard. There was also the
-duty of placing charges in the dumps of mortar and artillery ammunition
-which could not be transported to Hagaru.
-
-One of the main problems was the disposal of a small mountain of frozen
-surplus rations. A team of engineers spent hours on the 6th at the task
-of smashing cans and crates of food with a bulldozer and saturating the
-dump with fuel oil.
-
-The Able Company engineers came under the operational control of
-the 2d Battalion after the other units of the 5th Marines departed.
-Demolitions were to await the order of Lieutenant Colonel Roise on the
-morning of the 7th. Hagaru was full of combustibles, however, and fires
-of mysterious origin sent up dense clouds of smoke before the engineers
-touched off the oil-soaked food supplies and the buildings of the train
-yard.
-
-As the Marines of 2/5 pulled back toward the southern tip of East Hill,
-smoke blotted out the surrounding area so that enemy movements could
-not be detected. Worse yet, premature explosions sent up fountains
-of debris just as the engineers were setting up their fuses for a
-20-minute delay. Detonations shook the earth on all sides. Rockets
-sliced through the air, shells shattered into vicious fragments,
-and large chunks of real estate rained down everywhere. Roise was
-understandably furious, since his troops were endangered during
-their withdrawal. By a miracle they came off East Hill without any
-casualties, and the engineers were the last Marines left in Hagaru.
-Soon the entire base seemed to be erupting like a volcano. Visibility
-was reduced to zero when the engineers pulled out, after setting a last
-tremendous charge to blow the bridge.
-
-So compelling was the lure of loot that small groups of Chinese came
-down from the high ground toward the man-made hell of flame and
-explosions. Between clouds of smoke they could be seen picking over the
-debris, and the Marine tanks cranked off a few rounds at targets of
-opportunity.
-
-It is not likely that any of Roise’s weary troops paused for a last
-sentimental look over their shoulders at the dying Korean town.
-Hagaru was not exactly a pleasure resort, and yet hundreds of Marines
-and soldiers owed their lives to the fact that this forward base
-had enabled the Division to evacuate all casualties and fly in
-replacements while regrouping for the breakout to the seacoast.
-
-If it had not been for the forethought of the Division and Wing
-commanders, with the concurrence of General Almond, there would have
-been no R4D airstrip, no stockpiles of ammunition, rations and medical
-supplies. And though the Marines might conceivably have fought their
-way out of the CCF encirclement without a Hagaru, it would have been
-at the cost of abandoning much equipment and suffering much higher
-casualties.
-
-Only a few weeks before, this Korean town had been merely an unknown
-dot on the map. But on 7 December 1950 the name was familiar to
-newspaper readers and radio listeners all over the United States as
-they anxiously awaited tidings of the breakout. Already it had become a
-name to be remembered in U. S. Marine annals along with such historical
-landmarks as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Iwo Jima.
-
-Prospects of a warm meal and a night’s sleep meant more than history
-to Roise’s troops when the column moved out at last shortly after
-noon, with the engineers bringing up the rear to blow bridges
-along the route. A pitiful horde of Korean refugees followed the
-troops--thousands of men, women and children with such personal
-belongings as they could carry. Efforts on the part of the engineers to
-warn the refugees of impending demolitions were futile. Although these
-North Koreans had enjoyed for five years the “blessings” of Communist
-government, the prospect of being left behind to the tender mercies
-of the Chinese Communists was so terrifying that they took appalling
-risks. Knowing that a bridge was about to blow up at any instant, they
-swarmed across in a blind panic of flight. Never did war seem more
-harsh or its victims more pathetic.[572]
-
-    [572] Sexton interv, 16 May 51.
-
-The rear guard had less air and artillery support than any of the
-preceding troops, yet CCF opposition was confined to scattered
-small-arms fire all the way to Hell Fire Valley. There the enemy lobbed
-over a few mortar shells during a long halt at dusk, but the rest of
-the advance was uneventful. Gould’s engineers took chances repeatedly
-of being cut off when they fell behind to burn abandoned vehicles or
-blow bridges. On several occasions a small group found itself entirely
-isolated as the infantry and even the refugees pushed on ahead. Luckily
-the engineers made it without any casualties, and by midnight the last
-troops of the 1st Marine Division had entered the perimeter at Koto-ri.
-
-Thus the first stage of the Division breakout came to a close. In
-proportion to total numbers, the service troops of Division Train
-No. 1 had taken the heaviest losses--six killed and 12 wounded for
-the Division Headquarters Company; one killed and 16 wounded for the
-Military Police Company; four killed and 28 wounded for the 1st Motor
-Transport Battalion; one killed and 27 wounded for the 1st Ordnance
-Battalion; and three killed and 34 wounded for the 3d Battalion of the
-11th Marines. Battle casualties for the entire 1st Marine Division,
-including those of the East Hill battle, were as follows:
-
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
-    Dates  | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
-  6 Dec    |  32 |   4 |   7 | 218 |  261
-  7 Dec    |  51 |  16 |   0 | 288 |  355
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
-    Totals |  83 |  20 |   7 | 506 |  616[573]
-  ---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
-
-    [573] Div Adjutant _SAR_, Appendix II, 3.
-
-About 38 hours were required for the movement of some 10,000 troops
-and more than 1,000 vehicles. The new arrivals filled the perimeter at
-Koto-ri to the bursting point, but there was to be no pause at this
-point. Division OpnO 26-50, issued at 1815 on the 7th, before the last
-troops had arrived, provided for the advance to be resumed from Koto-ri
-at first light the following morning.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XIV
-
-Onward from Koto-ri
-
-_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri--Activation of Task Force Dog--Air
-Drop of Bridge Sections--Division Planning for Attack--Battle of 1/1 in
-the Snowstorm--Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5--Marine Operations of 9 and
-10 December--Completion of Division Breakout_
-
-
-The progress of the 1st Marine Division breakout depended in no small
-degree on the reliable communications provided by the division radio
-relay linking up Hagaru, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Hungnam. At 1440 on
-6 December the vehicles of the Hagaru relay terminal joined Division
-Train No. 1, whereupon the station at Koto-ri became in turn the
-terminal.[574]
-
-    [574] Smith, _Notes_, 1056.
-
-This station was located on the highest point of ground just south of
-the Koto-ri perimeter. And though it was outside the defense area, the
-Chinese did not bother it until the Marines were breaking camp. Then
-the opposition consisted only of harassing small-arms fires instead of
-the attack which might have been expected.[575]
-
-    [575] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.
-
-In fact, the enemy did not launch another large-scale assault on
-Koto-ri after his costly repulse on the night of 28–29 November.
-Although the perimeter was surrounded throughout the first six days of
-December, incipient CCF attacks were broken up in the enemy’s assembly
-areas. Excellent observation as well as casualty evacuation was
-provided by the OYs taking off from the Koto-ri airstrip. They were the
-eyes of an impressive array of Marine fire power--tanks, 4.2-inch, and
-81mm mortars as well as aircraft and Captain McClelland’s Easy Battery
-of 2/11.
-
-“The artillery 105’s and the mortars did a grand job,” commented Major
-Bartley. “They were always available, shifted their fires quickly
-and accurately, and serviced their pieces amazingly well in the cold
-weather.”[576]
-
-    [576] Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on
-          1stMar _SAR_, 18–24, and the 2/1 _SAR_, 15–18.
-
-As a further asset, the Koto-ri perimeter was defended by adequate
-numbers in comparison to Hagaru during the first critical week of
-CCF attacks. On 30 November, when Baker Company of the 1st Tank
-Battalion returned to Koto-ri after the Task Force Drysdale battle,
-three platoons of tanks were added to the Dog Company platoon already
-attached to 2/1. The next day Colonel Puller’s RCT-1 (-) was further
-strengthened by the arrival of the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry,
-7th Infantry Division, the last unit to reach Koto-ri from the south.
-These Army troops had been ordered to Hagaru, but owing to the changing
-situation they were directed by X Corps on 1 December to remain at
-Koto-ri. Under the operational control of Colonel Puller, 2/31 took
-over a sector at the southern end of the perimeter.
-
-Sporadic CCF small-arms fire was received on each of the first six days
-of December, and enemy troop movements were observed at all points of
-the compass. On several occasions a few mortar shells were lobbed into
-the perimeter. Not a single Marine casualty was suffered during the
-period,[577] though CCF losses were estimated at 646 killed and 322
-wounded.
-
-    [577] Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA
-          expanding the perimeter to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar
-          msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50.
-
-Daily air drops were required to keep the perimeter supplied with
-ammunition, rations, and other essentials. Captain Norman Vining, the
-Battalion FAC, who had once been a carrier landing signal officer,
-guided planes to satisfactory drop zones with makeshift paddles. One
-day a case of .30 caliber cartridges broke free from its chute and
-hurtled through the top of Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s tent during a
-conference. Narrowly missing several officers, it hit the straw at
-their feet and bounced high into the air before landing on a crate used
-as a table.
-
-
-_Assembly of Division at Koto-ri_
-
-Koto-ri being second only to Hagaru as an advance base, Colonel Puller
-at times had responsibilities which are usually shouldered by an ADC.
-On 29 November he had been the organizer of Task Force Drysdale, and on
-6 December it became his task to make ready for the reception of the
-10,000 troops from Hagaru.
-
-Although the Koto-ri perimeter was already overcrowded, Puller directed
-that hot food and warming tents be provided for all Hagaru troops upon
-arrival. More than 14,000 men would then be organized for the next
-stage of the breakout. Strength estimates were as follows:[578]
-
-    [578] Smith, _Notes_, 1069–1071.
-
-  Marine garrison at Koto-ri                         2,640
-  U. S. Army units at Koto-ri                        1,535
-  Royal Marine Commandos at Koto-ri                     25
-  Marines arriving from Hagaru                       9,046
-  U. S. Army troops arriving from Hagaru               818
-  Royal Marine Commandos arriving from Hagaru          125
-  ROK police attached to RCT-5                          40
-                                                   -------
-                                                    14,229
-
-Puller dealt with the problem of casualty evacuation at Koto-ri by
-ordering that the OY strip be lengthened so that larger aircraft could
-land. The engineers of Charlie Company started the job on 6 December,
-and progress speeded up as the Dog Company engineers arrived next day
-from Hagaru with their heavy equipment.
-
-The strip had been widened by 40 feet and extended by 300 on 7 December
-when the first TBM landed. These planes had been borrowed from the Navy
-and 1stMAW administrative flight lines and assigned to VMO-6. They
-could fly out several litter patients and as many as nine ambulatory
-cases. Captain Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., of VMO-6 and First Lieutenant
-Truman Clark of VMF(N)-513, evacuated a total of 103 casualties. The
-carrier landing training of the Marines stood them in good stead as
-Captain Malcolm G. Moncrief, Jr., a qualified landing signal officer
-of VMF-312, directed the TBMs to their landings at Koto-ri with
-paddles.[579]
-
-    [579] “Carrier Deck,” _Leatherneck Magazine_, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar
-          51), 19–20; 1stMar _SAR_, 23; 2/1 _SAR_, 17–18; 1stEngrBn
-          _SAR_, 13; 1stMedBn _SAR_, 12; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 17–18;
-          1stMAW _SAR_, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d.
-
-The clearing station established at Koto-ri by Company D of the 1st
-Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Gustave T. Anderson (MC), USN
-had a normal bed capacity of only 60 but somehow continued to handle
-a total of 832 cases, including non-battle casualties. The Company D
-medics were assisted during their last few days at Koto-ri by Captain
-Hering, the Division surgeon, and Commander Howard A. Johnson (MC),
-USN, the CO of the 1st Medical Battalion. Captain Richard S. Silvis
-(MC), USN, surgeon of the 2d Marine Division, on temporary duty in
-Korea as an observer, also took an active part.[580]
-
-    [580] 1stMedBn _SAR_, 3–7.
-
-Surgical assistance was welcomed by the Company D medics, since
-operations at Koto-ri were performed under the most difficult
-conditions. Only tents being available for patients, the hundreds
-of casualties brought from Hagaru added to the necessity for speedy
-evacuation. About 200 cases were flown out on the 7th by TBMs and
-liaison aircraft. By the following morning the engineers had lengthened
-the OY strip to 1750 feet, but a heavy snowfall put an end to nearly
-all air activity. In spite of the risks involved, one Air Force C-47
-did get through to Koto-ri, where it could be heard but not seen while
-circling blindly about the perimeter. By a miracle the plane landed
-safely and took off with 19 casualties. The following day saw air
-evacuation of casualties in full swing, with about 225 being flown out
-to clear the hospital tents of all serious cases.[581]
-
-    [581] _Ibid._ See also Smith, _Notes_, 995–998, 1110–1112.
-
-
-_Activation of Task Force Dog_
-
-A large tent in the middle of the perimeter served both as office
-and sleeping quarters for General Smith and his staff. Planning was
-immediately resumed after they arrived at Koto-ri on the afternoon of 6
-December. Before leaving Hagaru it had been recognized that the enemy
-might be saving his main effort for the mountainous ten-mile stretch
-from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. In such terrain a mere CCF platoon could
-do a great deal of mischief, and the planners agreed that it would be
-necessary for 1/1 to attack northward from Chinhung-ni and clear the
-road. This meant that the battalion must be relieved by an Army unit,
-and a request was made verbally to General Almond.[582]
-
-    [582] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064.
-
-X Corps had received orders on 1 December for the 3d Infantry Division
-to assemble in the Wonsan area prepared for further operations,
-possibly to join the Eighth Army in west Korea. Although General Almond
-initiated execution of the order immediately, he sent the highest
-ranking Marine officer on his staff, Colonel Forney, and the Corps
-G-2, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn, to Tokyo to explain the
-implications of the withdrawal of this Army division from northeast
-Korea. Following a conference with General Hickey, GHQ Chief of Staff,
-the Division was released back to X Corps on the 3d, and General Almond
-ordered it to return to the Hamhung area to protect this vital port
-area and to assist the breakout of the 1st Marine Division by relieving
-1/1 at Chinhung-ni.[583]
-
-    [583] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 17–18;
-          Forney, _Special Report_, 3.
-
-At 2115 on 6 December the 1st Marine Division requested by dispatch
-that the relief be completed the next day in order to free 1/1 for
-the attack to the north. The relief column, designated Task Force Dog
-and commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, ADC of the 3d
-Infantry Division, consisted of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, the
-92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, plus detachments of engineers,
-signalmen, and antiaircraft troops. Brushing aside some Chinese
-roadblocks, it arrived at Chinhung-ni on the afternoon of the 7th and
-relieved 1/1 immediately.[584]
-
-    [584] Smith, _Notes_, 1063–1064; X Corps _Special Report,
-          Chosin Reservoir_, 20–24; X Corps _OI 26_, 5 Dec 50;
-          and Dolcater, _3d Infantry Division in Korea_, 90; CG
-          1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps
-          msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
-
-
-_Air Drop of Bridge Sections_
-
-Another problem which the 1st Marine Division planners had faced at
-Hagaru called for an engineering solution. As early as 4 December the
-commanding general was notified that a critical bridge three and a
-half miles south of Koto-ri (see Map 29) had been blown by the enemy
-for the third time. At this point water from the Chosin Reservoir was
-discharged from a tunnel into four penstocks, or large steel pipes,
-which descended sharply down the mountainside to the turbines of the
-power plant in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road, they
-were covered on the uphill side by a concrete gatehouse, without a
-floor. On the downhill side was the one-way bridge over the penstocks
-which the enemy had thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer
-drop down the mountainside there was no possibility of a bypass. Thus
-the gap of 16 feet (24 feet, counting the abutments) must be spanned if
-the Division was to bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns.[585]
-
-    [585] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based
-          on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51,
-          48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73;
-          Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn
-          _SAR_, 3–14; Geer, _The New Breed_, 361–362, 369; LtCol
-          J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.
-
-Following the destruction of the original concrete bridge, the enemy
-had blown a temporary wooden structure and an M-2 steel treadway span
-installed by Army engineers. No prefabricated bridging was available at
-Hagaru, and time did not permit the construction of a timber trestle
-bridge. The possibility of Bailey bridge sections was considered but
-rejected for technical reasons. Finally, after a detailed study of
-the break from the air on 6 December, Lieutenant Colonel Partridge
-estimated that four sections of an M-2 steel treadway bridge would be
-required. Prospects did not appear bright when a bridge section was
-badly damaged on the 6th after being test-dropped at Yonpo by an Air
-Force C-119. Nevertheless, it was decided to go ahead the next day with
-the drop at Koto-ri.[586]
-
-    [586] Smith, _Notes_, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge
-          interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53; 1stEngBn _SAR_, 13–14.
-
-[Illustration: FUNCHILIN PASS AND ADVANCES OF
-
-8–10 December
-
-SEIZURE OF HILL 1081
-
-  MAP-29
-]
-
-There were four U. S. Army treadway bridge (Brockway) trucks at
-Koto-ri, two of which were operative. After conferring with First
-Lieutenant George A. Babe of the 1st Engineer Battalion and Colonel
-Hugh D. McGaw of the 185th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA, Partridge
-decided to request a drop of eight sections in order to have a 100%
-margin of safety in case of damage.
-
-After analyzing the causes of the unsuccessful test drop, Captain
-Blasingame of the Air Delivery Platoon had larger parachutes flown to
-Yonpo from Japan, accompanied by Captain Cecil W. Hospelhorn, USA, and
-a special crew of Army parachute riggers. Blasingame and a hundred-man
-work detail from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion worked all night
-at Yonpo to make ready for the drop next day by eight C-119s of the Air
-Force.
-
-At 0930 on 7 December three of the 2500-pound bridge sections were
-dropped inside the Koto-ri perimeter and recovered by the Brockway
-trucks. The remaining five sections were delivered by noon, one of them
-falling into the hands of the Chinese and one being damaged.
-
-Plywood center sections were also dropped so that the bridge could
-accommodate any type of Marine wheel or tracked vehicle. Thus the tanks
-could cross on the metal spans only, while the trucks could manage with
-one wheel on the metal span and the other on the plywood center.[587]
-
-    [587] Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn,
-          “Aerial Supply in Korea,” _Combat Forces Journal_, I, no.
-          10 (May 51), 29–30.
-
-All the necessary equipment having been assembled at Koto-ri by the
-late afternoon of the 7th, the next problem was to transport it three
-and a half miles to the bridge site. Colonel Bowser, the Division
-G-3, directed the engineers to coordinate their movements with the
-progress made by RCT-7 the following morning. Lieutenant Colonel
-Partridge attended a briefing conducted by Colonel Litzenberg on the
-eve of the assault, and it was agreed that the trucks with the bridge
-section would accompany the regimental train. First Lieutenant Ewald
-D. Vom Orde’s First Platoon of Company D engineers was designated as
-the escort. First Lieutenant Charles C. Ward’s engineers led the 7th
-Marines trains. Both platoons were assigned the task of installing the
-bridge sections.
-
-
-_Division Planning for Attack_
-
-On the assumption that the gap over the penstocks would be successfully
-spanned, the 1st Marine Division issued OpnO 26-50 at 1850 on 7
-December. Although the last operation order had specified the Hamhung
-area as the objective, it was found necessary at Koto-ri to give more
-explicit instructions for the advance to the southward.
-
-The plan was simple. Recognizing the sharp cleft of Funchilin Pass as
-the most difficult defile of the entire breakout, General Smith ordered
-the seizure of the heights overlooking the pass from the north end of
-Hill 1081, dominating the road through the pass. In its details the
-plan shaped up as follows:
-
-  (1) RCT-7 (reinforced with the Provisional Army battalion)
-  to attack south from Koto-ri at 0800 on 8 December and seize
-  Objectives A and B--the first being the southern extension of Hill
-  1328, about 2500 yards southwest of Koto-ri, and the other the
-  second nose due south of Koto-ri.
-
-  (2) RCT-5 to attack and seize Objective D (Hill 1457, two and a
-  half miles south of Koto-ri) while RCT-7 continued its attack and
-  seized Objective C (a nose dominating the MSR two and three-fourths
-  miles south of Koto-ri).
-
-  (3) At 0800, as RCT-7 jumped off at Koto-ri, the 1st Battalion of
-  RCT-1 was to attack from Chinhung-ni and seize Objective E (Hill
-  1081, three miles to the north).
-
-  (4) RCT-1 (less the 1st Battalion but reinforced by 2/31) was to
-  protect Koto-ri until the Division and regimental trains cleared,
-  whereupon it was to relieve RCTs 5 and 7 on Objectives A, B, C and
-  D.
-
-  (5) Upon relief by RCT-1, RCTs 5 and 7 were to proceed south along
-  the MSR to the Hamhung area.
-
-  (6) RCT-1 was to follow RCT-5 and protect the Division rear.[588]
-
-    [588] 1stMarDiv _OpnO_ 26-50, 7 Dec 50. The task organization
-          remained as it was during the move from Hagaru to
-          Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar _OpnO_
-          16-50, 7 Dec 50; 5thMar _OpnO_ 44-50, 7 Dec 50; and
-          7thMar _Frag O_, 7 Dec 50. Other sources for this section
-          are: 11thMar _SAR_, 9; and Smith, _Notes_, 1062.
-
-Artillery plans provided for one battery of 2/11 and one of 3/11 to
-answer the calls of RCT-7 for supporting fires. The other batteries
-of 3/11 were to move south with the motor column while two batteries
-of 1/11 supported RCT-5. The remaining battery of 3/11 was attached
-to 2/11 with a mission of moving south to Chinhung-ni and taking a
-position from which to support the withdrawal of RCT-1 as rearguard.
-Easy Battery of 2/11, left behind at Koto-ri, was laid to fire to the
-north and west, while Fox Battery of 2/11 and the 92d Armored Field
-Artillery Battalion at Chinhung-ni supported the attack of 1/1 on Hill
-1081.
-
-The plan of the 1stMAW for air support was essentially the same as the
-one which proved so effective during the advance from Hagaru to Koto-ri.
-
-An object lesson of that movement had been the personnel and equipment
-losses suffered by the Division trains as a consequence of a late
-start. The planners were determined not to repeat this mistake. As a
-further precautionary measure, General Smith directed that the tanks
-form the last elements of the motor column.[589] Thus in the event of a
-breakdown on the twisting, single-lane road, it would not be necessary
-to abandon all the vehicles behind a crippled tank.
-
-    [589] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100
-          8 Dec 50.
-
-As for the enemy situation, G-2 summaries indicated that early in
-December the CCF 26th Corps, consisting of the 76th, 77th and 78th
-Divisions, reinforced by the 94th Division of the 32d Corps, had moved
-down from the north and taken positions on the east side of the MSR
-between Hagaru and Koto-ri. There they relieved the 60th Division,
-which moved into the area south of Koto-ri. The 76th and 77th Divisions
-occupied positions along the MSR in the Koto-ri area, while the 78th
-and 94th Divisions were apparently held in reserve. Elements of the
-89th Division, operating from the mountainous area southwest of
-Koto-ri, conducted harassing operations against the MSR in the vicinity
-of Chinhung-ni as well as Koto-ri.
-
-The 60th CCF Division held prepared positions on the high ground
-south of Koto-ri commanding Funchilin Pass and the MSR leading to
-Chinhung-ni. That these positions included Hill 1081, the dominating
-terrain feature, was revealed by prisoners taken in the vicinity by
-patrols of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, prior to 8 December.
-
-
-_Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm_
-
-Division plans had not called for the swirling snowstorm which reduced
-visibility to 50 feet and precluded air support at first light on 8
-December. In spite of weather conditions, the assault battalions of
-RCT-7 moved out from Koto-ri on schedule after 1/1 attacked northward
-from Chinhung-ni.
-
-The planners had realized that the success of the movement to
-Chinhung-ni would depend to a large extent on the seizure of Objective
-E--Hill 1081. On 2 December Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a
-reconnaissance patrol into Funchilin Pass as far north as this
-position. Sighting large numbers of Chinese on both sides of the road,
-he called for artillery fires with good effect. This reconnaissance did
-much to establish Hill 1081 as the key terrain feature.
-
-Although 1/1 had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged in
-no large-scale actions so far in the Reservoir campaign. The men were
-fresh, well-rested and spoiling for a fight when they moved out at 0200
-on 8 December from an assembly area south of Chinhung-ni after being
-relieved by Task Force Dog.
-
-Schmuck’s battle plan provided for the three companies to advance in
-column along the MSR in the predawn darkness. Since orders were to
-attack at 0800, a start at 0200 was considered necessary in order to
-make the six-mile approach march.
-
-Captain Wray’s Charlie Company, in the lead, was to take Objective 1,
-the southwestern nose of Hill 1081, and hold it while the other two
-companies passed through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow’s
-Able Company was to attack east of the MSR and fight its way to the
-summit of Hill 1081; and Captain Noren’s Baker Company to advance to
-the left flank, along the slopes between Barrow and the MSR.[590]
-
-    [590] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived
-          from the following sources: _Ibid._; 1stMar _SAR_, 19–20,
-          24–26; 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_; Bates interv, 16 Mar
-          53, 108–112, Geer, _The New Breed_, 364–368; Col D. M.
-          Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv,
-          8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the
-          two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in
-          the _Marine Corps Gazette_, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23,
-          and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14
-          Dec 56.
-
-The combination of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to zero
-as 1/1 set out along the slippery MSR five hours before daybreak. All
-heavy equipment had been sent to the rear from Chinhung-ni, and the
-only vehicles were two ambulances and a radio jeep.
-
-In the snow-muffled silence of the night the men took on protective
-coloring as feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective 1 was
-seized shortly after dawn, following a difficult approach march against
-negligible resistance. The battalion commander prepared for the next
-phase by bringing up 81mm mortars and an attached platoon of 4.2s and
-emplacing those weapons in Wray’s position. He also directed that the
-five attached Army self-propelled quad-.50 caliber and twin 40mm guns
-of B Company 50th AAA (AW) Bn be moved to a little rise off to the
-left of the road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang. From this
-position they covered the MSR as far as the bridge over the penstocks.
-
-At 1000 the main attack was set in motion. Baker Company advanced along
-the wooded western slope of Hill 1081 as Barrow attacked up the hogback
-ridge leading to the summit. The snowstorm fought on the side of the
-Marines by hiding their movements from the Chinese occupying the high
-ground east of the MSR around the great horseshoe bend where the road
-passed under the cable car line.
-
-Noren’s men saw hundreds of enemy footprints but met only scattered
-opposition until they came to the first CCF roadblock on their left
-flank. There they were stopped by two machine guns, but a Marine patrol
-worked around on the uphill side and routed the Communists with a
-machine gun and 60mm mortar attack.
-
-In the absence of air and artillery support, the 4.2s and 81mm mortars
-emplaced in the Charlie Company position were called upon whenever
-visibility permitted. Surprise was Noren’s best resource, however, when
-Baker Company came up against the CCF bunker complex on the western
-slope of Hill 1081. The enemy had so little warning that the Marines
-found a kettle of rice cooking in the largest bunker, an elaborate
-log and sandbag structure which had evidently been a CCF command
-post. The entire complex was taken after a brief but savage fight in
-which all defenders were killed or routed. Schmuck set up his CP in a
-captured bunker, where he and his officers soon discovered that several
-regiments of Chinese lice had not yet surrendered.
-
-Only enough daylight was left for the sending out of patrols, whereupon
-Noren secured for the night. His losses amounted to three killed and
-six wounded.
-
-Barrow’s men had no physical contact with Baker Company while clawing
-their way upward along an icy ridge line too narrow for deployment.
-A sudden break in the snow afforded the Able Company commander a
-glimpse of a CCF stronghold on a knob between him and his objective,
-the topographical crest of Hill 1081. The drifting flakes cut off the
-view before he could direct mortar fire, but Barrow decided to attack
-without this support and rely upon surprise. Advancing in column along
-the steep and narrow approach, he sent Lieutenant Jones with two squads
-of the 2d Platoon to execute a wide enveloping movement on the left.
-Lieutenant McClelland’s 1st Platoon had a similar mission on the right.
-Barrow himself led Staff Sergeant William Roach’s 3d Platoon in a front
-attack.
-
-It took more than an hour for the two flanking forces to get into
-position. Not until they had worked well around the Chinese bunker
-complex did Barrow give the signal for attack. Perhaps because silence
-had been enforced during the stealthy advance, the assault troops
-yelled like Indians as they closed in on the foe. Out of the snowstorm
-Barrow’s men “erupted with maximum violence,” and the enemy was too
-stunned to put up much of a fight. The only effective resistance
-came from a single CCF machine gun which caused most of the Marine
-casualties before Corporal Joseph Leeds and his fire team knocked it
-out, killing nine Communists in the process.
-
-More than 60 enemy bodies were counted after the Marines cleaned out
-the bunkers and shot down fleeing Chinese. Barrow’s losses were 10 men
-killed and 11 wounded.
-
-By this time it was apparent that the Chinese had held an integrated
-system of bunkers and strong points extending to the summit of Hill
-1081. The battalion had been strictly on its own all day, all contact
-with the infantry of Task Force Dog having ended with the relief. When
-communications permitted, however, 1/1 could count on the excellent
-direct support of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, USA,
-commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie. The Army cannoneers had
-set up near Fox Battery of 2/11, using the fire control data of this
-Marine artillery unit.
-
-The night was clear, promising air and artillery support in the
-morning, as Able Company consolidated in the captured CCF positions.
-Although the battalion aid station was only 700 yards away, the terrain
-was so difficult that litter bearers took several hours to struggle
-down with the Marine wounded. About midnight the Chinese interrupted
-with an attack in estimated platoon strength, but Barrow’s men drove
-them off with CCF losses of 18 killed.
-
-The rest of the night passed quietly, and Baker Company had no
-disturbance on the high ground overlooking the MSR.
-
-
-_Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5_
-
-While these events were taking place, the attack to the south from
-Koto-ri also fell short of the day’s objectives. Colonel Litzenberg’s
-plan called for two of his four battalions (the fourth being the
-Provisional Battalion of Army troops) to clear the high ground on
-either side of the road so that a third battalion could advance astride
-the MSR, followed by the reserve battalion and regimental train.
-
-Major Morris, commanding 3/7, had been assigned the task of attacking
-on the right at 0800 and seizing Objective A, the southernmost of
-the cluster of hills known collectively as Hill 1328. He made such
-slow progress against CCF and small-arms fire that at 1100 Colonel
-Litzenberg suggested the commitments of 3/7’s reserve company. “All
-three companies,” replied Morris, “are up there--fifty men from George,
-fifty men from How, thirty men from Item. That’s it!”[591]
-
-    [591] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69.
-
-Early in the afternoon of 8 December, Litzenberg committed his reserve,
-2/7, to assist 3/7. Lockwood’s battalion was on the road south of 3/7
-and attacked west in an attempt to get in the rear of the enemy holding
-up 3/7. Easy and Fox Companies attacked abreast and by 1800 the two
-battalions had joined on the northeastern slopes of the objective. In
-view of the approaching darkness, however, the attack was postponed
-until morning, and the troops consolidated for the night short of the
-objective, which was seized the following morning.
-
-Litzenberg’s plan for the seizure of the heights overlooking the
-northern entrance to Funchilin Pass provided for the Army Provisional
-Battalion to take Objective B. The soldiers jumped off at 0800, on the
-left of the MSR, supported by two tanks of the 5th Marines AT Company.
-By 0900 the battalion had secured its objective without meeting any
-resistance. Litzenberg then ordered a further advance of 800 yards to
-the northwestern tip of Hill 1457. At 1330 the Army troops secured
-their second objective, still without resistance and tied in with 1/5
-for the night.[592]
-
-    [592] FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X
-          Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 7thMar _SAR_, 25;
-          3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 17
-          Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Davis having become regimental executive officer
-after Dowsett was wounded, Major Sawyer took over command of 1/7. His
-plan called for the battalion to advance about 2000 yards down the road
-and wait for 3/7 to come up on his right flank. Then the two battalions
-would move along together.
-
-The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800 and reached its phase line without
-opposition. First Lieutenant Bobbie B. Bradley’s platoon advanced down
-the road to gain contact with the Chinese while the remainder of the
-battalion halted. When 2/7 began its attack in support of 3/7, Sawyer’s
-battalion moved out. Bradley’s patrol having run into opposition
-from the northern reaches of Hill 1304, Companies A and C moved west
-of the MSR in a double envelopment of the enemy position. Company B
-continued the advance towards Objective C, meeting a heavy cross fire
-from Chinese to their front and on Hill 1304. Lieutenant Kurcaba was
-killed and Lieutenants Chew Een Lee and Joseph R. Owen wounded. First
-Lieutenant William W. Taylor took command and managed to clear the
-enemy from his front just before dusk.
-
-Able and Charlie Companies faced less resistance in overrunning the
-foxholes and two bunkers on Hill 1304. With dusk falling, Sawyer did
-not attempt a further advance. Able and Charlie Companies dug in on
-Hill 1304 while Baker set up a perimeter slightly short of Objective C.
-The first serials of the truck convoy had moved closely on the heels
-of 1/7 and had to be backed up to a level area near Objective A. There
-they formed a perimeter reinforced with H&S and Weapons Companies of
-1/7.[593]
-
-    [593] 7thMar _SAR_, 25; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; CO 1/7 msg to CO
-          7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, _The New Breed_, 362–363.
-          LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.
-
-Division OpnO 26-50 had directed Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s RCT-5 to
-await orders before attacking Objective D. It was nearly noon on the
-8th before the 1st Battalion, in assault, was directed to move out from
-Koto-ri.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for a mile, then sent
-two companies out to the left to occupy the objective, Hill 1457.
-Baker Company seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover
-the attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the ridge leading to
-the objective. Charlie Company fell in with a patrol from the Army
-Provisional Battalion attached to the RCT-7, and the two combined
-forces to drive the enemy off the high ground about 1550. A weak
-Chinese counterattack was easily repulsed, and at 1700 as darkness fell
-Baker and Charlie Companies tied in with the Army troops while Able
-Company formed its own perimeter overlooking the MSR. In reserve, the
-41st Commando moved into the high ground behind 1/5 to guard against
-infiltration.[594]
-
-    [594] 1/5 _SAR_, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8
-          Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50;
-          5thMar _SAR_, 34; Smith, _Notes_, 1072.
-
-The day’s story would not be complete without reference to the
-Treadway bridge train, which moved out about 1400 on the 8th in the
-trace of 1/7. Instructions were to install the sections at the first
-opportunity, but the site had not been secured as darkness approached.
-A few Chinese mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the vulnerable
-Brockway trucks influenced a decision to return them closer to
-Koto-ri.[595]
-
-    [595] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3
-          1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in G-3
-          Journal, X Corps _CR_, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs _SAR_, 10.
-
-Summing up the attacks of 8 December, weather and terrain had done more
-than the enemy to prevent all assault units of the 1st Marine Division
-from securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been heavy,
-however, and for the most part the troops were in a position for a
-renewal of their efforts in the morning.
-
-As for the Koto-ri perimeter, the 8th had passed with only scattered
-small-arms fire being received by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st
-Marines, in Division reserve. All day the Dog Company roadblock, on
-the route to Hagaru, was like a dam holding back the human torrent of
-Korean refugees. From this throng rose a low-pitched wail of misery
-as homeless men, women, and children huddled without shelter in the
-snowstorm of the 8th. It was a distressing spectacle to the Marines in
-the perimeter, yet the refugees could not be admitted because of the
-probability that Chinese soldiers had infiltrated among them, watching
-for an opportunity to use hidden weapons. There was little the Marines
-could offer by way of succor except medical care in some instances.
-Two women gave birth during the bitterly cold night of the 8th with
-the assistance of Navy medics. In the morning the crowd of refugees,
-swollen by new arrivals, waited with the patience of the humble to
-follow the Marine rear guard to the seacoast.[596]
-
-    [596] 2/1 _SAR_, 18–19.
-
-White is the color of mourning in Korea, and snowflakes drifted down
-gently over the common grave in which 117 Marines, soldiers, and Royal
-Marine Commandos were buried on the 8th at Koto-ri. Lack of time had
-prevented the digging of individual graves in the frozen soil.[597]
-Although the necessity of conducting a mass burial was regretted, all
-available space in planes and vehicles was needed for the evacuation of
-casualties.
-
-    [597] Smith, _Notes_, 1112–1113; Smith, _Chronicle_, 110.
-          According to the terms of the Armistice of 27 July 1953,
-          the remains were delivered to the Americans after the
-          cease-fire.
-
-
-_Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December_
-
-New snow sparkled in the sunlight as the day of 9 December dawned
-bright, clear, and cold. A brief reconnaissance convinced Captain Noren
-that in the early darkness of the previous evening he had stopped
-one ridge short of his objective--the northwest slopes of Hill 1081,
-covering the approach to the cable underpass. Baker Company of 1/1
-moved forward without CCF interference to the position.
-
-Captain Barrow had his men test-fire their weapons before mounting
-the final assault on the dominating knob of the hill. This proved to
-be a wise precaution, since many of the mechanisms had frozen. After
-thawing them out, Able Company attacked in column with the 1st Platoon
-in the lead. Although the assault troops had the benefit of excellent
-air, artillery, and mortar support, they came under intense small-arms
-fire from Communists occupying camouflaged log and sandbag bunkers.
-McClelland’s men were hard hit but his left flank squad worked its way
-forward in brief rushes to positions within 200 yards of Objective E,
-the topographical crest of Hill 1081. At this point Staff Sergeant
-Ernest J. Umbaugh organized a squad grenade attack which wiped out the
-first CCF bunker.
-
-A stretch of about 175 yards, swept bare in places by the icy wind, now
-lay between the Marines and the final knob. Barrow perceived that this
-deadly CCF field of fire could be skirted by troops working their way
-around a shelf jutting from the military crest. Under cover of fire
-from his 60mm mortars and a strike by four Corsairs, he brought up his
-2d and 3d platoons. While McClelland profited by the cover of scrub
-trees to come up behind the objective, Jones built up a base of fire to
-cover the direct assault of Roach’s platoon as it stormed up the crest.
-McClelland had to contend with the enemy’s last-ditch stand in two log
-bunkers which the 1st platoon knocked out by tossing grenades through
-the embrasures. The Communists resisted to the last gasp, but at 1500
-the Marines were in undisputed possession of Hill 1081.
-
-Sergeant Umbaugh paid with his life at the moment of victory, and
-Barrow had only 111 able-bodied men left of the 223 he had led out
-from Chinghung-ni. But the Marines had won the decisive battle of the
-advance from Koto-ri; they held the key height dominating Funchilin
-Pass, though 530 counted enemy dead testified to the desperation of the
-CCF defense.
-
-Able Company had the most spectacular part, but the victory owed to
-the united efforts of all three rifle companies and supporting arms.
-While Barrow held the crest of the hill, Noren pushed farther along
-the cable car track, meeting stubborn resistance from scattered enemy
-groups.[598]
-
-    [598] 1stMar _SAR_, 24–26; Bates interv, 16Mar53, 108–112;
-          Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last
-          Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments.
-
-The collapse of CCF resistance on Hill 1081 had a beneficial effect
-on the Marine advance from Koto-ri. RCT-7 continued its attack on the
-morning of the 9th with effective air and artillery support. Lieutenant
-Hovatter’s Able Company of 1/7 seized the remainder of Hill 1304 while
-Lieutenant Taylor’s Baker Company moved south to Objective C. The Army
-Provisional Battalion occupied the high ground between Objectives C and
-D.
-
-These movements were carried out against ineffectual enemy resistance
-or none at all. Whenever a few Communists dared to raise their heads
-along the MSR, the airborne TADC in the R5D had the communications
-equipment to control aircraft on station and to direct their employment
-in response to ground force units.
-
-The 1st Battalion of RCT-5 maintained its positions on Objective D
-(Hill 1457) all day. At Koto-ri the other two battalions and regimental
-headquarters made preparations to move out the following day.
-
-As a preliminary to the withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) from Koto-ri, the 3d
-Battalion was relieved in its positions along the perimeter by the 41st
-Commando. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s men then moved out to relieve
-3/7 on Objective A and occupy Objective B. The 2d Battalion of RCT-7
-(less a company with the regimental train) outposted the MSR between
-Objectives A and C at about 1630.[599]
-
-    [599] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.;
-          1stMar _SAR_, 25; 3/1 _SAR_, 8; 5thMar _SAR_, 35; 1/5
-          _SAR_, 19; Smith, _Notes_, 1077; Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct
-          56.
-
-Captain Morris’ Charlie Company and a platoon of Baker Company,
-1/7, moved down the MSR and secured the bridge site after a short
-fight. While Charlie Company outposted the area, the Baker platoon
-crossed behind the broken bridge and suddenly found about 50 Chinese
-in foxholes. “They were so badly frozen,” reported Sawyer, “that
-the men simply lifted them from the holes and sat them on the road
-where Marines from Charlie Company took them over.”[600] Late in the
-afternoon a patrol from 1/7 attempted to make contact with 1/1 by
-moving down the MSR. Chinese fire forced the men off the road and
-they scrambled across the defile below the overpass and into 1/1’s
-lines.[601]
-
-    [600] Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.
-
-    [601] _Ibid._, Schmuck Comments.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Partridge arrived with Weapons Company, 1/7, and the
-bridge sections followed in the Brockway truck. Even the enemy lent a
-hand when Communist prisoners were put to work as laborers. After the
-abutments were constructed, a Brockway truck laid the treadways and
-plywood panels in position so that both trucks and tanks could cross.
-
-At about 1530, three hours after the start, the bridge was in place.
-Partridge drove his jeep to the top of the pass to inform Lieutenant
-Colonel Banks, Commanding Division Train No. 1, that he could begin the
-descent.
-
-Sawyer’s troops had not been idle that afternoon and a total of about
-60 CCF prisoners were taken during attacks to drive the enemy back
-from the bridge site. At about 1700 Partridge returned, and an hour
-later the first elements of the Division trains began to cross. Only
-a few vehicles had reached the other side when a disastrous accident
-threatened to undo everything that had been accomplished. A tractor
-towing an earth-moving pan broke through the plywood center panel,
-rendering it useless. And with the treadways spaced as they were, the
-way was closed to wheeled vehicles.
-
-A first ray of hope glimmered when an expert tractor driver, Technical
-Sergeant Wilfred H. Prosser, managed to back the machine off the
-wrecked bridge. Then Partridge did some mental calculations and came up
-with the answer that a total width of 136 inches would result if the
-treadways were placed as far apart as possible. This would allow a very
-slight margin at both extremes--two inches to spare for the M-26s on
-the treadways; and barely half an inch for the jeeps using the 45-inch
-interval between the metal lips on the inboard edges of the treadways.
-
-Thanks to skillful handling of the bulldozers the treadways were soon
-respaced. And in the early darkness Partridge’s solution paid off
-when the first jeep crossed, its tires scraping both edges. Thus the
-convoy got under way again as an engineer detachment guided vehicles
-across with flashlights while Sawyer’s troops kept the enemy at a
-distance.[602]
-
-    [602] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65.
-
-Advance reports of the bridge drop had brought press representatives
-flocking to Koto-ri in casualty evacuation planes. David Duncan, of
-_Life_, a former Marine, took realistic photographs of the troops which
-attracted nation-wide attention. Keyes Beech sent out daily reports
-while making notes for a book about his adventures in Korea. Miss
-Marguerite Higgins, who refused to be outdone by male colleagues, was
-twice requested to leave Koto-ri before nightfall by Marine officers
-who respected her pluck as a reporter but felt that the perimeter was
-no place for a woman in the event of an enemy attack.
-
-Hundreds of words were written about the bridge drop. Some of these
-accounts were so dramatized as to give Stateside newspaper readers
-the impression that the span had been parachuted to earth in one
-piece, settling down neatly over the abutments. Headlines reported the
-progress of the 1st Marine Division every day, and front-page maps made
-every American household familiar with the names of such obscure Korean
-mountain hamlets at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
-
-General Shepherd and Colonel Frederick P. Henderson flew up to the
-perimeter on the 9th for a conference with General Smith. Before their
-departure they were informed that all remaining casualties at Koto-ri
-would be evacuated that day.[603]
-
-    [603] Smith, _Notes_, 1114; _Chronicle_, 111–112.
-
-All night long on 9–10 December an endless stream of troops and
-vehicles poured across the span that was doubtless the world’s most
-famous bridge for the moment. “The sensation throughout that night,”
-recalled Lieutenant Colonel Partridge in retrospect, “was extremely
-eerie. There seemed to be a glow over everything. There was no
-illumination and yet you seemed to see quite well; there was artillery
-fire, and the sound of many artillery pieces being discharged; there
-was the crunching of the many feet and many vehicles on the crisp snow.
-There were many North Korean refugees on one side of the column and
-Marines walking on the other side. Every once in a while, there would
-be a baby wailing. There were cattle on the road. Everything added to
-the general sensation of relief, or expected relief, and was about as
-eerie as anything I’ve ever experienced in my life.”[604]
-
-    [604] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66.
-
-Advancing jerkily by stops and starts, the column met no serious
-opposition from Chinese who appeared to be numbed by cold and defeat.
-Prisoners taken that night brought the total up to more than a hundred
-during the movement from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. Some of them were
-suffering from gangrene, the result of neglected frozen limbs, and
-others showed the effects of prolonged malnutrition. These captives
-testified that CCF losses from both battle and non-battle casualties
-had been crippling.
-
-At 0245 on the morning of the 10th the leading elements of the 1st
-Battalion, RCT-7, began to arrive at Chinhung-ni. A traffic regulating
-post had been set up at that point the day before by Colonel Edward
-W. Snedeker, Division Deputy Chief of Staff, for the purpose of
-controlling the movement of Marine units to the south.[605]
-
-    [605] Smith, Notes, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr
-          51].
-
-The remaining elements of RCT-7 were strung out from Objective C
-to the cableway crossing of the MSR. Traffic moved without a hitch
-until 0400, when two trucks bogged down in a U-shaped bypass across a
-partially frozen stream about 2000 yards beyond the treadway bridge.
-Major Frederick Simpson, commanding the 1st Divisional Train, had the
-vehicles pushed off to one side while the engineers built up the road.
-After a delay of three hours the column got under way again, with the
-first vehicles reaching Chinhung-ni at 0830. Ultimately both Division
-trains got through without a fight, thanks to avoiding the delays
-which had caused so much trouble during the advance from Hagaru to
-Koto-ri.[606]
-
-    [606] HqBn _HD Dec 50_, 9; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 13; Simpson interv,
-          11 Apr 51; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56.
-
-Following the trains, the 7th Marines moved through the Pass.
-Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood’s 2/7 (less Company E, guarding the
-regimental train) led the way for the regimental command group, the
-Provisional Army Battalion, 3/7 and the 3d Battalion of the 11th
-Marines.[607]
-
-    [607] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 3/11 _SAR_, 9.
-
-During the early morning hours of the 10th George Company of 3/1
-beat off an attack on Objective A by an enemy force estimated at 350
-men. This was the only noteworthy instance of CCF activity otherwise
-limited to scattered shots, and it was believed that the Communists
-were side-slipping southward, parallel with the MSR. Confirmation of
-that assumption came at 1200, when Able Company of 1/1 sighted Chinese
-marching in platoon and company columns through the valley only about
-1000 yards east of Hill 1081. Almost simultaneously other dense CCF
-columns crossed the field of fire of the attached Army self-propelled
-AAA guns while pouring around an adjacent slope. Lieutenant Colonel
-Schmuck called immediately for air strikes and artillery fires. Able
-Company hit the enemy with 4.2″ and 81mm mortar rounds, and the Army
-teams cut loose with .50 cal. and 40mm bursts. The slaughter continued
-for an hour as the Chinese kept on moving southward with that fatalism
-which never failed to astonish the Marines.
-
-Baker Company of 1/1 launched an assault with close air support at
-1300 on a CCF strong point adjacent to the railroad and north of
-the battalion’s positions overlooking the MSR. Noren’s men found
-3.5″ rocket launchers their most effective weapon when clearing the
-Communists from heavily timbered and sandbagged bunkers. Excellent
-close air support was received, though two Marine KIA casualties
-resulted from an error by Navy planes.[608]
-
-    [608] 1stMarDiv _PIR 47_. Bates interv, 16Mar53;
-          Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments.
-
-All day the seemingly endless column of vehicles and troops wound
-southward along the twisting mountain road. At 1030 General Smith
-and key members of his staff displaced from Koto-ri and proceeded by
-C-47 and helicopter to the rear CP of the Division at Hungnam. By
-1800 both Division trains, all elements of RCT-7 and the 1st, 3d, and
-4th Battalions of the 11th Marines had closed Chinhung-ni. There the
-infantrymen entrucked for Hungnam.[609]
-
-    [609] 7thMar _SAR_, 26; 11thMar _SAR_, 9–10; Smith _Chronicle_,
-          112; 1stMTBn _SAR_, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.
-
-The 5th Marines column followed the 7th, with 3/5 leading the way
-and 2/5 close behind. Just south of Objective A a brief fire fight
-was necessary to silence a CCF machine gun, whereupon the movement
-continued without further incident until the two battalions reached
-Chinhung-ni at dusk. The 1st Battalion was not relieved by 2/1 until
-1800 and did not close Chinhung-ni until the early morning hours of the
-11th.[610]
-
-    [610] 5thMar _SAR_, 34–36; 1/5 _SAR_, 20; 2/5 _SAR_, 31; 3/5
-          _SAR_, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct
-          56.
-
-The withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) and attached units from Koto-ri commenced
-on the afternoon of the 10th. The 3d Battalion, it will be recalled,
-had relieved RCT-7 units the day before on Objectives A, B and C, and
-the 1st Battalion occupied Objective E. The regimental plan called for
-1/1 to hold the Hill 1081 area and protect the MSR until the other
-units of the regiment passed through, whereupon Schmuck’s battalion was
-to pull out with the tanks at the end of the column as the rear guard.
-
-The movement from the Koto-ri perimeter commenced at 1500 when H&S
-Company of RCT-1 departed. The 2d Battalion (-) of the 11th Marines
-fell in behind, followed in order by a detachment of the 185th (C)
-Engineers, USA, the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, USA, the 2d
-Battalion of RCT-1, the Division Reconnaissance Company and Lieutenant
-Colonel Milne’s tank column, consisting of Companies B and D of the 1st
-Tank Battalion, the Tank Company of the 31st Infantry, USA, and the
-Tank Platoon of the 5th Marines AT Company.[611]
-
-    [611] 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 2/1 _SAR_, 19; 1stMar _(S-3) URpt
-          13_, 16–17. The Marine Provisional Tank Platoon had
-          reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which
-          had to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded
-          and integrated with its remaining M4A3 into B and D
-          Companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s.
-
-As the last elements left Koto-ri the 92d FA Battalion at Chinhung-ni
-began laying heavy concentrations on the evacuated base. Only scattered
-shots were received by the tail of the column from Chinese troops
-mingling with the Korean refugees. Several small enemy groups on the
-flanks of the column were taken under fire and dispersed.[612] But with
-3/1 guarding Objectives A, B and C, no serious opposition developed
-during the first stage of the withdrawal.
-
-    [612] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A.
-          Youngdale Comments, 19 Nov 56.
-
-
-_Completion of Division Breakout_
-
-At dusk on 10 December all indications made it appear that the movement
-of the 1st Marine Division southward would be completed according to
-plan with only minor losses of personnel and equipment. Following the
-seizure of Hill 1081, casualties had been comparatively light and enemy
-resistance ineffectual. Then, between midnight and 0100 on 11 December,
-two reverses occurred in areas the Marines supposed to be safe.
-
-The MSR south of Chinhung-ni was under the protection of troops of the
-3d Infantry Division--Task Force Dog at Chinhung-ni, and two battalions
-of the 65th Infantry in the vicinity of Sudong and Majon-dong. It was
-manifestly impossible, of course, for the Army troops to guard every
-yard of the road, for the rugged terrain offered many potential ambush
-sites.[613] Guerrilla activity had been reported near Sudong, but the
-division trains and the 5th and 7th Marines had passed through without
-incident.
-
-    [613] MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D.
-          Mead, USA, ltr to Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56.
-
-On the afternoon of the 10th, Korean civilians warned of an impending
-attack by Chinese soldiers who had infiltrated into this village. As
-previously indicated, Colonel Snedeker had arrived at Chinhung-ni
-the previous afternoon. At his suggestion Task Force Dog sent out an
-infantry patrol which returned with a report of no enemy activity.
-
-At dusk an attack on the traffic turnaround outside Sudong caused
-Snedeker to halt all traffic at Chinhung-ni until the MSR was cleared.
-After a fire fight in the darkness, elements of the 65th Infantry
-reported at dusk that the enemy roadblock had been cleared, and the
-Marine column resumed its movement southward.[614]
-
-    [614] This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv
-          _CR, Dec 50_, as occurring at 0130 11 Dec. The account of
-          the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar _SAR_, 26; 1stMar
-          _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston,
-          USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L. Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16
-          May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr., 6
-          Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12
-          Incredible Days of Col John Page,” _Readers Digest_,
-          lxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston
-          material is in the possession of Capt Canzona.
-
-During the next few hours Colonel Snedeker’s worst problem was lack
-of transport. The Division had requested that the maximum number of
-trucks, ambulances and narrow-gauge freight cars be collected at
-Majon-dong, the new railhead. Only about 150 trucks were actually made
-available, however, 110 of them being from Division service units in
-the Hungnam area.
-
-In spite of this shortage, the flow of traffic was being maintained
-when an explosion of CCF activity brought every thing to a stop at
-Sudong shortly after midnight. Mountain defiles had usually been the
-scene of enemy ambushes, but this time the Chinese swarmed out from
-behind houses in the village with grenades and burp guns. Several truck
-drivers of the RCT-1 regimental train were killed by the first shots
-and their vehicles set on fire. In the flickering light a confused
-fight ensued as trucks to the rear stopped. The Marines of the RCT-1
-train resisted as best they could, but leadership was lacking until
-Lieutenant Colonel John U. D. Page, USA, and Marine PFC Marvin L.
-Wasson teamed up as a two-man task force which routed a group of
-about 20 Chinese at the head of the vehicle column. The valiant Army
-artillery officer paid with his life, and Wasson received two wounds
-from a grenade explosion. Pausing only for first aid, he got back
-into the fight as another Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Waldon
-C. Winston, commanding the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, USA,
-directed a counterattack by Marine and Army service troops. Harry
-Smith, a United Press correspondent, also had a part in the action.
-
-Wasson called for a machine gun to cover him while he fired three white
-phosphorus rounds from a 75mm recoilless at a house serving the enemy
-as a stronghold. It burst into flames and the survivors who ran out
-were cut down by machine-gun fire. The Marine PFC, a jeep driver who
-was dubbed “The Spirit of ’76” by Winston, then volunteered to help
-push trucks of exploding ammunition off the road.
-
-Winston gradually brought order out of chaos, but it was daybreak
-before the MSR was cleared so that the column could start moving again.
-The RCT-1 regimental train had suffered casualties of eight killed and
-21 wounded, while equipment losses consisted of nine trucks and an
-armored personnel carrier.
-
-Lack of infantry protection was a factor in another reverse which
-occurred at the tail of the Division column. General Smith’s final
-orders for withdrawal provided that the tanks were to come out behind
-the 1st Marines’ train with the infantry of that regiment bringing up
-the rear.[615] Thus a breakdown in the armored column would not block
-the road for wheeled vehicles, yet the tanks would have protection
-against close-in attack.
-
-    [615] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec
-          50.
-
-The 1st Marines prepared detailed plans for the leapfrogging of
-battalions during the final withdrawal phase. In effect these called
-for 2/1 to relieve 1/5 on Objective D and remain there until relieved
-in turn by 2/31. The Army battalion would hold until 3/1 passed
-through, then follow Ridge’s battalion down the MSR. After 2/1, 3/1 and
-2/31 had passed through Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck’s positions around
-Hill 1081, 1/1 would follow as rear guard.[616]
-
-    [616] 1stMar _OpnO 16-50_, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before
-          the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group
-          makes no mention of protecting the armor.
-
-The first departure from plan occurred when Lieutenant Colonel Sutter
-discovered, after starting up Hill 1457, that Objective D was so far
-from the road and so steep that most of the night would be required
-merely for the battalion to make the climb. No enemy having been
-sighted, he asked permission to return to the road and continue along
-the MSR. This request was granted by Colonel Puller and 2/1 resumed
-the march, followed by 2/11(-), 2/31 and H&S Company of RCT-1 in that
-order. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3/1, which remained on Objectives A,
-B and C until 2100, fell in at the end of the regimental column.[617]
-
-    [617] 1stMar _URpt (S-3) 13_, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.
-
-About midnight, after waiting for 3/1 to move down the pass, the
-tank column began its descent with only Recon Company as protection.
-Lieutenant Hargett’s platoon of 28 men guarded the last ten tanks and
-the other two platoons screened the middle and head of the column.[618]
-Behind the last machine, approaching as close as they dared, were the
-thousands of refugees. CCF soldiers had mingled with them, watching
-for an opportunity to strike, and Hargett had the task of keeping the
-Koreans at a respectful distance.
-
-    [618] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company,
-          nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were
-          screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams
-          Comments, 26 Dec 56.
-
-Progress was slow as the 40 tanks inched around the icy curves with
-lights on and dismounted crewmen acting as guides. Shortly before
-0100 the ninth machine from the rear had a brake freeze which brought
-the tail of the column to a halt for 45 minutes. The rest of the
-tanks clanked on ahead, leaving the last nine stranded along the MSR
-southwest of Hill 1457 and about 2000 yards from the treadway bridge.
-The enemy took advantage of the delay when five CCF soldiers emerged
-in file from among the refugees as a voice in English called that they
-wished to surrender.[619]
-
-    [619] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank
-          column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by
-          HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman
-          [sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt
-          C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K.
-          A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; _MCB Study_, II-C-111–113; Smith,
-          _Notes_, 1087; HqBn _URpt 14_; Williams Comments, 26 Dec
-          56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56.
-
-Hargett went to meet them cautiously, covered by Corporal George A. J.
-Amyotte’s BAR. Suddenly the leading Chinese stepped aside to reveal
-the other four producing hidden burp guns and grenades. Hargett pulled
-the trigger of his carbine but it failed him in the sub-zero cold. The
-former all-Marine football star then hurled himself at the enemy group,
-swinging his carbine. He crushed a Chinese skull like an eggshell, but
-a grenade explosion wounded him as the ambush developed into an attack
-from the high ground on the flank as well as the rear.
-
-Before the remaining four Chinese could do Hargett any further harm,
-Amyotte shot them down, one by one. The fight turned into a wild melee
-in which friend could hardly be distinguished from foe.
-
-Hargett’s platoon slowly fell back until the last tank was lost to
-the enemy along with its crew. The men in the next to last tank had
-buttoned up and could not be aroused to their danger by banging on the
-hull with rifle butts. While making the effort Hargett was stunned by
-an enemy explosive charge which blew PFC Robert D. DeMott over the
-sheer drop at the side of the road, leaving him unconscious on a
-ledge. The other men of his platoon believed that he had been killed
-and continued their withdrawal, only to find the next seven tanks
-abandoned with their hatches open.
-
-Amyotte, wearing body armor, was covering the retirement, firing from
-prone, when a CCF grenade exploded after landing squarely on his back.
-The Chinese must have suspected black magic when he went on cooly
-picking off opponents as if nothing had happened.[620]
-
-    [620] Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical
-          Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, the ordinary utility
-          jackets contained thin plates of fiberglas which would
-          stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred
-          jackets had been air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division
-          for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority
-          during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50
-          garments sent to Recon Company were worn in combat. Lynn
-          Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” _Marine Corps
-          Gazette_, xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of
-          the development of body armor, one of the most important
-          tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told
-          in the next two volumes of this series.
-
-It was a precarious situation for Hargett and his remaining 24 men. But
-they fought their way out without further casualties, and meanwhile
-tank crewmen had succeeded in freeing the brake of the lead tank
-and driving two tanks down the road. One of them was brought out by
-Corporal C. P. Lett, who had never driven before. “I’m going to get
-this tank out of here even if I get killed doing it!” he told Hargett.
-By sheer determination, coupled with luck, he maneuvered around the
-obstacles ahead and down the icy road to safety.
-
-Captain Gould and his demolitions crew of engineers had been waiting
-for hours to blow the treadway bridge after the last elements of the
-Division crossed. With the passage of the two tanks and Hargett’s
-platoon, it was believed that all Marines who could be extricated were
-safely over the span. On this assumption, which later proved to be
-erroneous, CWO Willie Harrison set off the demolition charges.
-
-The losses of the Recon platoon were three men MIA (two of them later
-changed to KIA) and 12 wounded. Crews of the two rear tanks were
-missing and presumed dead.[621] Hargett’s losses would have been more
-severe except for the fact that some of his men were wearing Marine
-body armor made of light-weight plastics.
-
-    [621] CO 1stTkBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives
-          tank personnel losses as 4 MIA.
-
-To another man of Hargett’s platoon went the distinction of being the
-last Marine out at the finish of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. When
-durable PFC DeMott recovered consciousness, after being blown over the
-brink by the CCF pack charge explosion, he found himself precariously
-perched on a ledge overhanging the chasm. Slightly wounded, he
-managed to climb back on the road, where he encountered only Korean
-refugees. Upon hearing a tremendous detonation he realized that the
-bridge had been blown. He remembered, however, that pedestrians could
-cross through the gatehouse above the penstocks, and he came down the
-mountain with the refugees to Chinhung-ni. There he was given a welcome
-befitting one who has cheated death of a sure thing.
-
-The remaining tanks made it safely to Chinhung-ni without benefit of
-infantry protection other than what was afforded by Recon Company.[622]
-Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck did not receive a copy of 1stMar OpnO 16-50,
-he explained, his only information being a Frag O designating 1/1 as
-rear guard and “a hasty, 30-second conference” with Colonel Puller
-when the 1st Marine command group passed through. “I was informed,” he
-added, “that the tanks were in the rear of the 1st Marines, that 2d Bn,
-31st Infantry was bringing up the rear, and that as soon as that unit
-passed, I would employ my battalion as rear guard.... No mention at all
-was made of the Reconnaissance Company. In order to check off the units
-that passed endlessly through my lines, I established a check point at
-the incline railway overpass and kept a close record of movement.”
-
-    [622] 1stTkBn _SAR_, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement
-          of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.
-
-A great deal of intermingling of units was observed by the 1/1
-commander. At 0300, after sighting the lights of the tanks, he
-gave orders for Able Company to commence the withdrawal, in order
-“to consolidate my battalion for the rear guard action prior to
-daybreak.... When the first tanks reached my position, I was first
-startled to find no 2/31 accompanying them and then flabbergasted to
-discover that the Recon Company was somewhere out there ‘screening’ the
-movement. This canceled my carefully laid covering plan.”[623]
-
-    [623] Schmuck Comments.
-
-No further trouble resulted for the tanks and Recon Company. Ahead
-of them the infantry units continued the movement southward from
-Chinhung-ni chiefly by marching because of the shortage of trucks.
-Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s men proved that footslogging is not a
-lost art by covering the 22 miles from Koto-ri to Majon-dong in a
-20-hour hike with packs, heavy parkas, individual weapons and sleeping
-bags.[624]
-
-    [624] LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.
-
-Battle casualties of the division for the final stage, the attack from
-Koto-ri southward, were as follows:
-
-  ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------
-       Date   |   KIA   |   DOW   |   MIA   |   WIA   | Totals[625]
-  ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------
-   8 Dec      |      29 |       8 |       4 |     127 |       168
-   9 Dec      |       6 |       7 |       1 |      46 |        60
-  10 Dec      |       7 |       5 |       8 |      45 |        65
-  11 Dec      |       9 |       4 |       3 |      38 |        54
-  ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------
-      Totals  |      51 |      24 |      16 |     256 |       347
-  ------------+---------+---------+---------+---------+------------
-
-    [625] DivAdjutant _SAR_, appendix II, 3.
-
-At 1300 on 11 December the last elements of the Division cleared
-Chinhung-ni. Majon-dong had been left behind at 1730 without audible
-regrets; and by 2100 all units, with the exception of the tanks, had
-reached assigned assembly areas in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. The
-armored column arrived at the LST staging area of Hungnam half an hour
-before midnight, thus bringing to an end the breakout of the 1st Marine
-Division.[626]
-
-    [626] Smith, _Notes_, 1091.
-
-
-
-
-CHAPTER XV
-
-The Hungnam Redeployment
-
-_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st Marine
-Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines Arrive at New Assembly
-Area--Contributions of Marine Aviation--Losses Sustained by the
-Enemy--Results of the Reservoir Campaign_
-
-
-“Wave and look happy!” These were the first words to greet some of the
-weary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. They
-grinned obligingly in response to the press photographers snapping
-pictures of the motor column from the roadside. They were happy indeed
-to be back in a world of hot meals and hot baths. They were happy to be
-alive.
-
-Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing as well as
-flattering to learn that such expressions as “epic” and “saga” and
-“miracle of deliverance” were being applied to the breakout in American
-newspapers. The press correspondents in turn were astonished to learn
-that never for a moment had the men doubted that they would slug their
-way out to the seacoast.
-
-“The running fight of the Marines and two battalions of the Army’s 7th
-Infantry Division from Hagaru to Hamhung--40 miles by air but 60 miles
-over the icy, twisting mountainous road--was a battle unparalleled in
-U. S. military history,” commented _Time_. “It had some aspects of
-Bataan, some of Anzio, some of Dunkirk, some of Valley Forge, some of
-the ‘Retreat of the 10,000’ (401–400 B. C.) as described in Xenophon’s
-_Anabasis_.”
-
-Not until the Marines had fought their way as far as Chinhung-ni, the
-weekly newsmagazine continued, did there appear to be much hope that
-they would come out as an organized force. Then “for the first time it
-looked as if most of the 20,000 [Marines] would get through.”[627]
-
-    [627] _Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine_, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50),
-          (Pacific Edition), 18–19.
-
-By reading contemporary press accounts it is possible to recapture
-the mood of the American public upon realization of the disaster
-which had overtaken the Eighth Army. “It was defeat--the worst defeat
-the United States ever suffered,” reported _Time_ in the issue of 11
-December 1950. “The Nation received the fearful news from Korea with a
-strange-seeming calmness--the kind of confused, fearful, half-believing
-matter-of-factness with which many a man has reacted upon learning that
-he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news of Pearl Harbor, nine years ago
-to the month, had pealed out like a fire bell. But the numbing facts
-of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness slowly
-out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques; days passed
-before its enormity finally became plain.”[628]
-
-    [628] _Time_, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.
-
-_Newsweek_ called it “America’s worst military licking since Pearl
-Harbor. Perhaps it might become the worst military disaster in American
-history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately
-two-thirds of the U. S. Army that had been thrown into Korea might have
-to be evacuated in a new Dunkerque to save them from being lost in a
-new Bataan.”[629]
-
-    [629] _Newsweek_, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. “Such
-          quotations,” comments General MacArthur, referring to
-          the excerpts from _Time_ and _Newsweek_, “certainly
-          do not reflect the mood of the American public at the
-          time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible
-          writers.... Neither [of the two news magazines] had the
-          slightest access to the basic information and factors
-          which involved the decisions and operations of our
-          government and its higher military commanders.... The
-          unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the
-          situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing
-          them with the actual military reports by the commands
-          involved.” Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker,
-          17 Oct 56.
-
-The situation in west Korea was depressing enough. But at least the
-Eighth Army had a line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension
-that the American public stared at front-page maps showing the
-“entrapment” of the 1st Marine Division and attached U. S. Army units
-and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases from Korea did
-not encourage much expectation that the encircled troops could save
-themselves from destruction by any means other than surrender. In
-either event the result would be a military catastrophe without a
-parallel in the Nation’s history.
-
-The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the Marines
-had seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through Chinese
-blocking the route to Hagaru. Then came the thrilling reports of the
-air drops of supplies at Hagaru and the mass evacuation of casualties
-by air. Much of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wiped
-clean by pride as General Smith’s troops fought through to Koto-ri and
-Chinhung-ni in sub-zero cold. The air drop of the bridge sections was
-a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was now
-a fact--the Chosin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted
-a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony of
-POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF corps was the
-annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but the result had
-been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation of the
-CCF units themselves.
-
-It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore, that Americans
-read about the column of grimy, parka-clad men which came out of the
-mountains of northeast Korea on 11 December 1950. They had come out
-fighting and they had brought their wounded and most of their equipment
-out with them.
-
-
-_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area_
-
-As late as 9 December it had been General Smith’s understanding
-that the 1st Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector south
-and southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam was
-notified by X Corps that plans for the defense of the Hungnam area
-had been changed, so that the Marines were to embark immediately for
-redeployment by water to South Korea. General Smith was informed on the
-10th, and so promptly was the new plan put into effect that the first
-Marine units were already loading out before the last elements of the
-Division arrived at Hungnam.[630]
-
-    [630] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of
-          its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the
-          following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50.
-          EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.
-
-No changes were necessary in the plans for the reception of Marine
-units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel Snedeker and Colonel
-McAllister on orders of General Smith. On 8 December, Snedeker had
-issued detailed instructions which designated defensive sectors for
-RCT-1 at Chigyong and for RCT-5 and RCT-7 in the vicinity of Yonpo
-Airfield. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged with making
-such preparations to receive the returning troops as putting up tents,
-installing stoves, erecting heads and equipping galleys.[631]
-
-    [631] Smith, _Notes_, 1065–1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: “Plan
-          for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area,”
-          0800 8 Dec 50.
-
-The Navy, as usual, was ready. On 15 November, it may be recalled,
-General Smith had candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic
-outlook to Admiral Morehouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was chief of
-staff to Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, and Sears served in a like capacity
-under Admiral Doyle, CTF-90. This frank discussion had not fallen
-upon deaf ears; and on the 28th, only a few hours after the first CCF
-attacks at Yudam-ni, ComNavFE alerted CTF-90 as to the possible need
-for a redeployment operation by sea. The following day Joy advised that
-events in the Chosin Reservoir area made it desirable for ships of
-TF-90 to be on six hours’ notice either in Korean waters or at Sasebo,
-Japan.[632]
-
-    [632] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this
-          section is based on the following sources: ComPhibGruOne,
-          _Action Report, Hungnam_, 1–2, 4–6; Forney _Special
-          Report_, 5–7; X Corps, _OpnO_ 9, 5 Dec 50; X Corps,
-          _Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation_, 2–3; X Corps _OI
-          27_, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E.
-          W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56.
-
-CTF-90 commenced planning immediately for either an administrative or
-emergency outloading. His OpnO 19-50, issued on the 28th for planning
-purposes, provided for half of the amphibious force to conduct
-redeployment operations on the east coast under Doyle as ComPhibGruOne,
-while the other half had a similar mission on the west coast under
-Admiral Thackrey, ComPhibGruThree.
-
-At this time ComPhibGruThree and most of the amphibious units were
-in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All were directed by
-Admiral Joy on the 29th to proceed to Sasebo.
-
-ComPhibGruOne had just completed the opening of Hungnam as a major
-resupply port and was preparing to withdraw to Japan with the remaining
-amphibious force. On 30 November, however, the deteriorating situation
-of ground forces in Korea made it necessary for all units of TF-90 to
-be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared to be more critical on
-the west coast, and two-thirds of the smaller amphibious ships were
-allotted to the Inchon area while the transports were divided equally
-between Inchon and Hungnam.
-
-The first week of December was devoted to planning and preparing for a
-redeployment of X Corps by sea which appeared more likely every day.
-Mine sweeping operations were resumed at Hungnam to enlarge the swept
-anchorage area and provide swept channels for gunfire support ships.
-
-X Corps OpnO 9-50, issued on 5 December, provided for the defense of
-the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final defense line
-about seven miles in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area,
-converging on the harbor, were assigned to the following major units
-from east to west--1st ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin), 7th
-Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division (with the 1st KMC Regiment(-)),
-and the 1st Marine Division. The Marine sector included Yonpo Airfield.
-
-On 8 December a conference held on board the _Mount McKinley_ by
-ComNavFE and CTF-90 was attended by Vice Admiral Struble, Com7thFlt,
-Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, ComCruDivFive, and Lieutenant General
-Shepherd, CG FMFPac.
-
-General Shepherd was present as “Representative of Commander Naval
-Forces, Far East, on matters relating to the Marine Corps and for
-consultation and advice in connection with the contemplated amphibious
-operation now being planned.”[633]
-
-    [633] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50.
-          “Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my
-          command functions,” commented General Shepherd, “I had
-          been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford
-          and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall,
-          I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of
-          the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the
-          Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with
-          these instructions I exercised close overall supervision
-          of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to
-          both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the
-          embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from
-          Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.
-
-General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea and
-to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after assembling
-in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the 1st ROK Corps as
-soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok area. An assembly area
-in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from the other units of X
-Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division.
-
-CTF-90 was assigned the following missions:
-
-  (1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of
-  UN forces in Korea as directed;
-
-  (2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated
-  embarkation areas;
-
-  (3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports;
-
-  (4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of
-  friendly units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan;
-
-  (5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations,
-  including ROK forces and UN prisoners of war;
-
-  (6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other
-  commands as appropriate;
-
-  (7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or
-  other designated Korean embarkation area.
-
-No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and
-Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted since
-Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not wait on
-detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had to be done.
-
-An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available
-source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked,
-and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must be
-evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains
-of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a
-comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the
-perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against
-an enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of
-launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the
-Hamhung-Hungnam area.
-
-It was aptly dubbed “an amphibious landing in reverse,” since the
-plan called for the methodical shrinking of the perimeter, under
-cover of air strikes and naval gunfire, until the last platoon of the
-ground forces had embarked. Then would come the grand finale of the
-demolitions.
-
-
-_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_
-
-The Wonsan evacuation was instructive as a rehearsal for the Hungnam
-redeployment. From 2 to 10 December, Lieutenant Colonel Crowe’s 1st
-Shore Party Battalion had charge of the outloading while sharing the
-defense of the harbor with a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division
-and two KMC battalions. Another Marine outfit, Company A of the 1st
-Amphibian Truck Battalion, speeded up the operation by making hundreds
-of round trips between docks and ships with DUKWs.[634]
-
-    [634] The sources of this section, unless otherwise stated, are
-          as follows: Forney, _Special Report, 8–18_; _MCB Study_,
-          II-C-114–115; ComPhibGruOne _Action Report, Hungnam_,
-          5–10, 25; 1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_, 1–2; Smith, _Notes_,
-          120–1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, _Report on Amphibious
-          Withdrawal of the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea_,
-          1–9; MGCIS-1 _HD, Dec 50_; X Corps _OpnO 10_, 11 Dec 50;
-          1stMarDiv _EmbO 3-50_, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct
-          56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8
-          Dec 56.
-
-Air cover and naval gunfire from supporting ships of TE-90.21 was so
-effective that Wonsan had no enemy interference worth mentioning.
-Covering missions continued to be fired until the last friendly troops
-withdrew, and operations were completed without the necessity of
-destroying UN supplies and equipment. Altogether, 3834 troops, 7009
-Korean civilians, 1146 vehicles, and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo had
-been outloaded when the operation was completed on 10 December. One
-detachment of Shore Party troops sailed for Pusan with the DUKWs in
-preparation for unloading the 1st Marine Division upon its arrival at
-that port.
-
-The Hungnam evacuation plan, as outlined in X Corps OpnO 10-50, issued
-on 11 December, provided for the immediate embarkation of the 1st
-Marine Division and the 3d ROK Division. A smaller perimeter than
-the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th and 3d
-Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility.
-Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only
-reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points.
-Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be stepped up as the
-perimeter contracted.
-
-CTF-90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10 December after
-approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers
-and representatives of X Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of
-Staff, X Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer with
-responsibility for the operation of the Hungnam port and was assigned
-a small staff. Major Richard W. Shutts, of General Shepherd’s party,
-was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two more former TTUPac
-Marines on the X Corps staff were assigned sections--Major Charles
-P. Weiland, the Loading Section; and Major Jack R. Munday, the Navy
-Liaison Section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moisell, USA, headed the
-Movement Section, and Captain William C. Cool, USA, the Rations Section.
-
-Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren served as Colonel Forney’s
-executive officer until he was incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved
-by Lieutenant Colonel Crowe.
-
-The 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA, was responsible for operation
-of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas, and for
-furnishing Japanese stevedores, winch operators, cargo handling
-equipment, and dunnage. A reinforced company from the 1st Shore Party
-Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches while controlling the
-lighterage for ships loading in the stream.
-
-It was decided on 11 December that 1st Marine Division staging to
-assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading had to be expedited
-so that ships could be used for a second and even third turn-around.
-Embarkation Order 3-50, issued by the Division on the 11th, assigned
-vehicle and cargo assembly areas to units, and an embarkation control
-office was set up in the dock area.
-
-As compensation for the cramped confines of the Hungnam harbor, the
-tidal range was less than a foot as compared to the maximum of 31
-feet at Inchon. And though the docks had space for only seven ships,
-Major Weiland planned to double-berth four additional ships and load
-them from the outboard side. In addition, 11 LSTs could be handled
-simultaneously--seven at GREEN Beach One, and the others at GREEN Beach
-Two.
-
-Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a standby basis, ready to
-begin loading at once upon assignment of space by the embarkation
-officer. The Division rear CP at Hungnam had become the only CP with
-General Smith’s arrival; and on the 11th General Craig, the ADC,
-returned from emergency leave.
-
-General MacArthur flew to Yonpo Airfield on the 11th for a brief
-conference with General Almond and approved the X Corps plan. A date of
-27 December was set for Corps units to pass under the control of the
-Eighth Army in South Korea.
-
-The outloading of the 1st Marine Division was making good progress on
-the 12th when General Smith visited the docks on a tour of inspection.
-That evening he and General Shepherd attended a dinner at the Corps CP
-in honor of General Almond’s 58th birthday. The Army was represented
-by Major Generals Barr, Soule, and Clark L. Ruffner, X Corps Chief of
-Staff.
-
-By the following day the 5th and 7th Marines were ready to sail.
-Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning as they went
-along. Not knowing in advance what type of ship might be assigned,
-they found that carefully calculated stowage diagrams were out of the
-question. Under these circumstances, amphibious training and experience
-were invaluable.
-
-Space in the tent city established by X Corps to the rear of the LST
-beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation.
-Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas to the
-beach.
-
-While the Marines were outloading, the two Army divisions defending
-the perimeter had only minor patrol actions. Their artillery supplied
-most of the interdiction fires at the outset, with naval gunfire giving
-the deep support. Vigorous air support by Navy, Air Force, and Marine
-planes also did much to discourage any hostile intentions the enemy may
-have had.
-
-MGCIS-1, the ground control intercept squadron at Yonpo, stopped
-directing the high altitude fighters on 11 December and passed over to
-the USS _Mount McKinley_ the task of keeping the perimeter clear of
-any enemy planes. Over-all control of air still remained ashore with
-MTACS-2.
-
-At 1500 on the 13th General Smith went aboard the USS _Bayfield_ and
-opened the Division CP. As his last duty on shore, he attended memorial
-services held by the Division at the Hungnam Cemetery. While the
-commanding general paid his tribute to the honored dead, Chinese POWs
-were making preparations for the interment of the last bodies brought
-down from Chinhung-ni.
-
-The Marine loading was completed on the 14th. At a conference that
-day with CTF-90 on board the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith inquired
-as to the possibility of having the ships carrying the Marines unload
-at Masan instead of Pusan, thus saving a 40-mile movement by truck.
-Admiral Doyle pointed out that this procedure was not feasible
-because of the lack of lighterage facilities at Masan. The additional
-turn-around time, moreover, would have delayed the evacuation of
-remaining Corps units.
-
-The 14th was also the day when Marine air strikes from Yonpo ended
-with the departure of the last of the Wing’s land-based fighters for
-Japan. Shortly after midnight the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2
-passed control of all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy’s Tactical
-Air Control Squadron One of TF-90 aboard the USS _Mount McKinley_. The
-Marine squadron then set up a standby TACC aboard an LST until the
-final withdrawal on 24 December.
-
-At 1030 on 15 December, as the _Bayfield_ sailed, the curtain went
-down on one of the most memorable campaigns in the 175-year history of
-the Marine Corps. A total of 22,215 Marines had embarked in shipping
-consisting of an APA, an AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7 commercial
-cargo ships.
-
-The Yonpo airlift continued, however, until 17 December when the
-field was closed and a temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was
-made available to twin-engine R4D’s for the final phase of the air
-evacuation. The only Marine units left in Hungnam were a reinforced
-Shore Party company, an ANGLICO group and one and a half companies (88
-LVTs) of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the
-operational control of X Corps to assist in the outloading of Army
-units. Also, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton, commanding MAG-12, had moved
-to Hungnam for the final evacuation of his air group from Yonpo and to
-arrange for loading its heavy equipment and remaining personnel aboard
-SS _Towanda Victory_. Then on 18 December he flew his command post to
-Itami.[635]
-
-    [635] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; MAG-12 _WD, Dec 50_.
-
-
-_The Last Ten Days at Hungnam_
-
-With ten days remaining for the embarkation of the two Army divisions,
-the problem of Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule. But
-CTF-90 contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the homeless Koreans
-were willing to put up with any hardships to escape from Communist
-domination. It became standard practice to embark at least 5000 on
-an LST, not counting children in arms, and no less than 12,000 human
-sardines found standing room on one commercial cargo ship.[636]
-
-    [636] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are
-          the same as for the last.
-
-The most fragile link in the complex chain of operations was
-represented by the two 390-ton diesel electric tugs. No others were
-available, nor were spare parts to be had, yet both tugs had clocked
-more than 5000 running hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed
-almost a miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours in
-all, and repairs were made with materials at hand.
-
-On the 18th, when the last ROKs sailed for Samchok, the 7th Infantry
-Division was in the midst of its outloading. By 20 December all troops
-of this unit had embarked, according to schedule. Responsibility for
-the defense of Hungnam then passed to Admiral Doyle as General Almond
-and his staff joined CTF-90 on board the flagship _Mount McKinley_.
-General Soule’s 3d Division now manned the shore defenses alone.[637]
-
-    [637] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.
-
-When the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam,
-following the evacuation of Hamhung and Yonpo Airfield, two cruisers,
-seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire
-front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of
-nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support
-ships, with the battleship _Missouri_ contributing 162 16-inch rounds
-at the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and
-12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during the
-naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing.
-
-Seven embarkation sites were employed (see Map 30). From left to right
-they were designated as PINK Beach, BLUE Beach, GREEN One and Two
-Beaches, and YELLOW One, Two, and Three Beaches. The 7th RCT, holding
-the left sector, was to embark from PINK Beach. BLUE and GREEN One
-Beaches were assigned to the 65th RCT in the center, while the 15th RCT
-had GREEN Two and the three YELLOW Beaches.
-
-H-hour had been set at 1100 on the 24th, and seven LSTs were beached at
-0800 to receive 3d Infantry Division troops. Soon the three regiments
-were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering forces while
-the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdrawals were
-conducted methodically along specified routes by units using marking
-panels. Then the battalions themselves pulled out, leaving only seven
-reinforced platoons manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment
-came to an end when these platoons boarded an LST after a search for
-stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful
-finish except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on
-PINK Beach, resulting in two men killed and 21 wounded.
-
-All beaches were clear by 1436 on Sunday afternoon, the 24th, with Able
-and Baker Companies of the Amtrac Battalion sticking it out to the end.
-Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the last
-withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops from PINK Beach.
-With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition dump explosion
-on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were safely reembarked on LSDs at
-the finish of the operation.[638]
-
-    [638] 1stAmphTracBn _HD, Dec 50_, 5.
-
-Remarkably few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping
-space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500
-thousand-pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring
-demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown
-sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which
-left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins.
-
-The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the _Mount McKinley_ about
-to sail for Ulsan with CTF-90 and Generals Almond and Shepherd after
-an eminently successful operation. It had been pretty much the Navy’s
-show, in the absence of enemy interference, and the final statistics
-were staggering--105,000 military personnel, 91,000 Korean refugees,
-17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo loaded out in
-193 shiploads by 109 ships.
-
-[Illustration: HUNGNAM DOCKS AND BEACHES
-
-  MAP-30
-]
-
-“With naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead,
-we were able to take our time and get everything out,” commented
-Admiral Joy on 26 December. “Admiral Doyle has turned in another
-brilliant performance. We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk--not even
-faintly.”[639]
-
-    [639] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached
-          report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in _New
-          York Times_, 27 Dec 50.
-
-
-_Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area_
-
-While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam, the
-Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to their
-new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the ADC, had
-gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and made arrangements
-for the reception of the Division.[640]
-
-    [640] Smith, _Notes_, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival
-          of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be
-          found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.
-
-News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the Eighth
-Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated that the
-advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive shortly.
-Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by UN
-forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique of 26
-December that operations “were skilfully conducted without loss of
-cohesion and with all units remaining intact....
-
-  In its broad implications I consider that these operations,
-  initiated on 24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam]
-  redeployment, have served a very significant purpose--possibly in
-  general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted
-  during the course of the Korean campaign.
-
-  The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without
-  warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command
-  but without attaining a decision.
-
-  Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or
-  even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.
-
-  But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable
-  period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed
-  before too late secret political and military decisions of
-  enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at
-  surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces
-  with one mighty extended blow.”[641]
-
-    [641] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.
-
-Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal
-turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well
-as military implications. Press representatives, military critics
-and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a
-great victory at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that
-the Eighth Army withdrawal of November and December was a costly
-reverse.[642]
-
-    [642] General MacArthur’s comments are as follows: “This,
-          again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the
-          facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders
-          present.... It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm
-          and annihilate, through a ‘sneak’ attack, the Eighth
-          Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming
-          forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war,
-          against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be
-          no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory
-          advance which uncovered the enemy’s plot before he had
-          assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic
-          withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a
-          ‘Pearl Harbor’ nature.... This was undoubtedly one of the
-          most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable
-          with and markedly similar to Wellington’s great Peninsula
-          withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken
-          and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I
-          have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X
-          Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both
-          were preserved with practically undiminished potential
-          for further action. I have always regarded this action,
-          considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties
-          and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and
-          satisfying I have ever commanded.” MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct
-          56.
-
-Marine officers in Korea had no first-hand knowledge of EUSAK
-operations. It was obvious, however, that an Eighth Army retirement
-south of the 38th Parallel had made it desirable if not actually
-necessary for X Corps to withdraw from northeast Korea, even though
-General Almond held that a Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter could be defended
-throughout the winter.
-
-
-_Contributions of Marine Aviation_
-
-The close coordination of aviation with the ground forces in the Chosin
-campaign was due in large measure to the assignment of additional
-pilots to the 1st Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had
-been plucked from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time to
-join their battalions before embarking at Inchon. Increasing the number
-of FACs to two per battalion did much to bring air support down to the
-company level when needed.[643]
-
-    [643] Air Officer _SAR_, 4.
-
-Air units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names, grid
-coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands of the ground
-troops. Here the Marine system of the man on the ground talking the
-pilot onto the target by reference to visual land marks paid off.
-
-Cloudy, stormy weather was common. Three night fighter pilots were
-lost because of icing, disorientation, and insufficient radio aids
-to navigation. Two VMF-212 land-based pilots saved themselves from
-destruction only by landing on the _Badoeng Strait_ with their last
-drops of gas.
-
-With the approach of winter and cold weather, aircraft on the landing
-strips had to be run up every two hours at night to keep the oil warm
-enough for early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped. Planes
-skidded on icy runways. Once, after a six inch snow, 80 men and ten
-trucks worked all night to clear and sand a 150-foot strip down the
-runway at Yonpo.[644]
-
-    [644] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12
-          _SAR_, annex C, 10; VMF-214 _SAR_, annex F, 23; 1stMAW
-          _SAR_, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW
-          _SAR_, 5–7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.
-
-As early as mid-November it once took hours of scraping and chipping
-on the _Badoeng Strait_ to clear three inches of glazed ice and snow
-off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, and barriers. Planes which
-stood the night on the flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar
-deck to thaw out. On another occasion VMF-214 had to cancel all flight
-operations because 68-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures
-covered the _Sicily’s_ flight deck and aircraft with a persistent coat
-of ice.
-
-One pilot of VMF-323 had to return shortly after takeoff because water
-vapor froze in his oil breather tube in flight. With the back pressure
-throwing oil all over his windshield and billowing black vapor and
-smoke out of his cowl, he landed only to have the front of his Corsair
-burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the hot exhaust
-stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished the fire.
-
-A hazard as great as being shot down was a crash landing or bail-out
-at sea, where the water was cold enough to kill a man in 20 minutes.
-Survival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could barely
-get into their cockpits.
-
-Maintenance and servicing problems ashore, complicated by dirt, dust,
-and the scarcity of parts, kept mechanics working to the point of
-exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the ground crews to refuel and
-arm planes by hand, often from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive
-crashes, one fatal, were attributed to accumulated water in gasoline.
-
-Aboard ship until mid-November, VMF-214 was able to keep 91 per cent
-of its planes operative. When suddenly deployed ashore to Wonsan, its
-aircraft availability dropped to 82 per cent and at Yonpo to 67 per
-cent. Once back at sea again in December, it jumped up to 90 per cent.
-
-Basic difference in close air support doctrine between the Navy and
-Marines and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison
-between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force commands;
-by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force
-Operations Center at Seoul; and by indoctrination of non-Marine
-units of the X Corps in the Marine-Navy style of close air support.
-Difficulties in inter-service communications slowed Fifth Air Force
-operations orders to carrier squadrons, both Navy and Marine. Messages
-were routed via FEAF and ComNavFe in Tokyo and arrived hours late.
-Ashore, even MAG-12 during the first two weeks at Wonsan received
-its Fifth Air Force mission orders six to 36 hours late. A direct
-radio teletype between 1st MAW and 5thAF headquarters alleviated the
-situation. And when the CG 1st MAW received full control of the air
-over the X Corps area on 1 December, these problems were eased.
-
-Actual control of air support for the scattered ground units
-demonstrated close cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. This
-was evident from the time the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron One
-on the USS _Mount McKinley_ passed control to the Air Defense Section
-of MTACS-2 at Hamhung to the time that control returned to the ship in
-the Hungnam evacuation.
-
-When the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an emergency TACC
-and acted as a radar reporting station for MTACS-2. When control
-was passed back afloat, the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 stood
-by as a standby TACC aboard an LST until the last man was pulled
-off the beach. Furthermore, three officers from MGCIS-1 went aboard
-_Mount McKinley_ to help out as Air Defense controllers. They were
-experienced. All through the Wonsan-Chosin campaign, the MGCIS had
-directed the defensive fighter patrols, circling Wonsan and Yonpo, to
-check all unidentified aircraft before the latter got close enough to
-do any damage, MGCIS-1 also steered lost planes to base in bad weather,
-occasionally vectored them into the GCA radar-controlled landing
-pattern, and even assisted MTACCS-2 in directing air support planes to
-FACs.[645]
-
-    [645] MGCIS-1 _HD Dec 50_, 2; MTACS-2 _HD Dec 50_, 7.
-
-Tactical air support in the X Corps zone was directed to the ground
-units by the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. From 26 October to 11
-December, 3703 sorties in 1053 missions were controlled by the TACPs
-of Marine, Army, and ROK units. Close air support missions accounted
-for 599 of the total (468 for 1st Marine Division, 8 for 3d Infantry
-Division, 56 for 7th Infantry Division, and 67 for ROKs). The remaining
-454 missions were search and attack.[646]
-
-    [646] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is
-          based upon Smith, _Notes_, 1149–1161, 1222.
-
-When FAC communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft became
-radio relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the airborne
-TADC, orbiting over the road from Hagaru.
-
-Approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of
-non-Marine ground units. The ROK and the U. S. Army units were not as
-well supplied with experienced FACs as the 1st Marine Division. In
-these areas four Air Force “Mosquitos” (AT-6 “Texan” training planes)
-were assigned to X Corps to assist in the control of air support.[647]
-
-    [647] 1stMAW _HDs, Oct-Dec 50_.
-
-When shore-based Marine air support was about to cease with the closing
-of Yonpo air field, VMF-214 and VMF-212 quickly moved their operations
-aboard carrier; and during the final phases of the Hungnam evacuation,
-almost half of the Marine tactical air strength was operating from
-carrier bases. VMF-214 flew back aboard _Sicily_ on 7 December without
-missing a mission and VMF-212, which had moved to Itami on 4 December
-to draw and test a new complement of carrier Corsairs, was aboard the
-USS _Bataan_ eight days later. When the month ended, still another
-squadron, VMF-312, was polishing up its carrier landing technique for
-seaborne duty.[648]
-
-    [648] VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_, 2.
-
-The outcome of the Hagaru withdrawal owed much to air-dropped supplies
-and to casualty evacuations by General Tunner’s Combat Cargo Command
-(CCC). Assisting Combat Cargo in Marine support were the Wing’s R4D
-twin engine transports and TBM World War II type torpedo bombers,
-both of which were flown largely by the field-desk pilots on the Wing
-and Group staffs. Most of the Marines’ share of the heavy airlifting,
-however, was done by the four engine R5D transports of Colonel Dean C.
-Roberts’ VMR-152. Early in October this squadron had been temporarily
-shifted from the trans-Pacific airlift of the Navy’s Fleet Logistics
-Air Wing to support the Marines in the Wonsan campaign. In Korea its
-operations were controlled by the Combat Cargo Command, which committed
-an average of five Marine R5D’s a day into the CCC airlift. In such
-missions these transports supported all UN units from Pyongyang to
-Yonpo and points north. Marine transports not committed by the CCC
-for general UN support in Korea were available for Wing use. From 1
-November until Christmas, VMR-152 safely carried five million pounds of
-supplies to the front and evacuated more than 4000 casualties.[649]
-
-    [649] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg
-          to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152,
-          0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 _SAR_, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman
-          Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when
-          VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790
-          miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of
-          cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers,
-          including 4276 casualties.
-
-The Chosin Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in Marine
-aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne TADC to control
-the air support of the division column between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni.
-The second was the appearance of VMF-311, the first Marine jet squadron
-to fly in combat. Beginning on 10 December the newly arrived squadron
-flew interdiction missions for four days from Yonpo. Then it moved to
-Pusan to operate for the remainder of the month with 5th Air Force jets
-streaking up the long peninsula to cover the withdrawal of the Eighth
-Army.[650]
-
-    [650] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311
-          _HD, Dec 50_.
-
-Appreciation for the assistance given by Marine aviation to Marine
-ground forces was expressed in a letter of 20 December from General
-Smith to General Harris, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air
-Wing. The Division Commander said:
-
-  Without your support our task would have been infinitely more
-  difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and
-  in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or
-  clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar
-  of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the
-  presence of a night heckler was reassuring.
-
-  Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing
-  proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of
-  understanding has been established that will never be broken.[651]
-
-    [651] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.
-
-The story of air support in the Chosin Reservoir campaign would not
-be complete without a summary of the results of VMO-6. Marines took a
-proprietary interest in Major Gottschalk’s squadron, which had put
-into effect the helicopter techniques worked out at Quantico by the
-experimental squadron, HMX-1. Some of these techniques were having
-their first test in combat, for the development of rotary-wing aircraft
-in 1950 was at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed-wing
-aircraft in the first year of World War I. On 28 October, VMO-6 had a
-strength of 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, ten light fixed-wing aircraft
-(eight OY-2s, two L5Gs) and nine HO3S-1 helicopters. From that date
-until 15 December the squadron made 1544 flights for a total of 1624.8
-hours. The principal missions were as follows:
-
-  Reconnaissance--OYs, 393; helicopters, 64; Transportation--OYs,
-  130; helicopters, 421; Evacuation--OYs, 29; helicopters, 191;
-  Liaison--OYs, 35; helicopters, 90; Artillery spot--OYs, 39;
-  helicopters, 0; Utility--OYs, 26; helicopters, 60; Rescue--OYs, 0;
-  helicopters, 11.[652]
-
-    [652] VMO-6 _SAR_, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, _Transcript of
-          Informal Remarks at HQMC_, 17 May 51.
-
-But statistics can give no idea of the most significant achievement
-of VMO-6 in the Reservoir campaign. For during the most critical
-period the only physical contact between units separated by enemy
-action was provided by the OYs and helicopters. The importance of this
-contribution can hardly be overestimated.
-
-
-_Losses Sustained by the Enemy_
-
-Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of
-the Navy, included a total of 4418 battle casualties from 26 October
-to 15 December 1950--604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3508 WIA. The
-7313 non-battle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and
-indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty.[653] Eight
-Marine pilots were KIA or died of wounds, four were MIA, and three
-were wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the non-battle
-casualties were returned to duty during the operation.[654]
-
-    [653] Smith, _Notes_, 1146–1149. See Appendix E for a
-          day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties.
-
-    [654] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.
-
-Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of
-37,500--15,000 killed and 7500 wounded by Marine ground forces, plus
-10,000 killed and 5000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance can
-be placed in such figures as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy
-testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists. This
-evidence goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere with the
-Hungnam redeployment.
-
-Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have been candid
-in admitting failures and unsparing in self-criticism. Among captured
-documents are summaries of the operations of the three CCF armies
-encountered by the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. These major
-units, representing at least 11 and probably 12 divisions, were as
-follows:
-
-  20th CCF Army--58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions, with the 89th
-  Division of the 30th Army attached;
-
-  26th CCF Army--76th, 77th, and 78th Division, with probably the
-  94th Division of 32d Army attached;
-
-  27th CCF Army--79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, with the 70th
-  Division of 24th Army attached.[655]
-
-    [655] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and
-          therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of
-          a U. S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is
-          derived from the _MCB Study_, II-C-116–125, which in turn
-          is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations
-          and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting
-          of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of
-          preparing “an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps
-          forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50–15 Dec
-          50.”
-
-All three armies were major units of the 9th Army Group of the 3d
-CCF Field Army. In mid-October the leading elements of the 4th CCF
-Field Army had crossed the Yalu to oppose the U. S. Eighth Army. The
-operations of X Corps in northeast Korea being considered a threat to
-the left flank, the 42d Army was detached with a mission of providing
-flank protection, pending relief by units of the 3d CCF Field Army.
-Three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th were represented. While
-the last hovered on the left flank of the 4th Field Army, the 124th was
-hard hit near Sudong during the first week of November by RCT-7 of the
-1st Marine Division.
-
-In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the 125th Division
-moved south of Hagaru from the Fusen Reservoir area. Both CCF divisions
-then fell back to Yudam-ni, where they were relieved by units of the
-20th Army, 3d Field Army. This ended the operations of the 4th Field
-Army in northeast Korea.
-
-Shortly after the appearance of the 20th Army in the Yudam-ni area, the
-27th Army moved into positions north of the Chosin Reservoir. Thus the
-enemy had available eight divisions for the attacks of 27–28 November
-on the Marines in the Yudam-ni area and the three 7th Infantry Division
-battalions east of the Chosin Reservoir. If it may be assumed that
-these CCF divisions averaged 7500 men each, or three-fourths of full
-strength, the enemy had a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve.
-
-The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish their basic mission,
-which prisoners agreed was the destruction of the 1st Marine Division.
-In every instance the efforts of the first night were the most
-formidable, with enemy effectiveness declining sharply after a second
-or third attack. The explanation seems to be that the 12 divisions
-were sent into northeast Korea with supplies which would have been
-sufficient only if the first attempts had succeeded. The following
-comment by the 26th Army supports this conclusion:
-
-  A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it
-  impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops.
-  As a result, our soldiers frequently starve. From now on, the
-  organization of our rear service units should be improved.[656]
-
-    [656] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section
-          are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group,
-          Document 204141, “Compilation of Battle Experiences
-          Reported by Various Armies in their Operation Against
-          U. S. Forces in Korea.” Among the units covered are the
-          20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.
-
-The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few
-potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical
-strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated....
-The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we
-used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.
-
-The enemy’s tactical rigidity and tendency to repeat costly errors are
-charged by the 20th Army to inferior communications:
-
-  Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it
-  took more than two days to receive instructions from higher level
-  units. Rapid changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion
-  of our signal communication caused us to lose our opportunities
-  in combat and made the instructions of the high level units
-  ineffective....
-
-  We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but
-  we failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed
-  to carry out the orders of the higher echelon. For example, the
-  failure to annihilate the enemy at Yut’an-ni [Yudam-ni] made it
-  impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hakalwu-ri [Hagaru]. The
-  higher level units’ refusal of the lower level units’ suggestion of
-  rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy one by one
-  gave the enemy a chance to break out from the encirclement.
-
-One of the most striking instances of the tactical inflexibility
-which stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru. With only a
-depleted Marine Infantry battalion and service troops available to
-defend a perimeter four miles in circumference, the enemy needed mere
-daylight observation to ascertain and avoid the most strongly defended
-positions. Yet these were just the positions chosen for the attack,
-not only on the first night but also the second occasion 48 hours later.
-
-“The [CCF] tactics were mechanical,” commented the 27th Army.
-“We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and
-consequently the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower
-echelon units were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance
-between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations
-of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close,
-and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was
-not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net and suffered
-heavy casualties.”
-
-Summing up the reasons why the Marines at Yudam-ni were not
-“exterminated promptly,” the 27th Army concludes that it was “because
-our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions
-and the troops suffered too many casualties.” This would seem to be
-another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine
-Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt.
-At any rate, evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly to
-crippling losses both from Marine fire power and non-battle casualties
-chargeable to lack of equipment and supplies.
-
-The 20th Army had a hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper care
-of wounds. Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated by typhus or
-ailments of malnutrition and indigestion.
-
-More than 90 per cent of the 26th Army suffered from frostbite. The
-27th Army complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties alone out of a
-strength of four divisions:
-
-  The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough
-  houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was
-  the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel
-  (more than 10 thousand persons), the weapons were not used
-  effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow-covered ground
-  during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in
-  one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades;
-  the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar
-  tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells
-  failed to detonate; skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and
-  the mortar tubes.
-
-Testimony as to the effects of Marine fire power is also given by the
-26th Army:
-
-  The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and
-  airplanes is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for
-  the depth, the enemy carries with him automatic light firearms
-  which, coordinated with rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are
-  disposed at the front line. The characteristic of their employment
-  is to stay quietly under cover and open fire suddenly when we come
-  to between 70 and 100 meters from them, making it difficult for our
-  troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us.
-
-The 20th and 27th Armies appear to have been bled white by the losses
-of the first week. Early in December, units of the 26th Army appeared
-on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and this unit
-furnished most of the opposition from 6 to 11 December.
-
-Seven divisions in all were identified by the 1st Marine Division; and
-since the taking of prisoners was not a matter of top priority with
-men fighting for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were
-encountered. The CCF 9th Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned
-on 7 December, included a total of 12 divisions. This POW gave the
-following statement:
-
-  Missions of the four (4) armies in 9th Group are to annihilate the
-  1st Division which is considered to be the best division in the
-  U. S. After annihilating the 1st Marine Division they are to move
-  south and take Hamhung.[657]
-
-    [657] 1stMarDiv PIR 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by
-          the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the
-          30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been
-          attached to each of the other three armies.
-
-As to the reason why the Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam
-redeployment, there seems little doubt that the 9th Army Group was too
-riddled by battle and non-battle casualties to make the effort. This is
-not a matter of opinion. Following the Hungnam redeployment, as the U.
-S. Eighth Army braced itself to meet a new CCF offensive, UN and FECOM
-G-2 officers were naturally concerned as to whether the remaining 9th
-Army Group troops in northeast Korea would be available to strengthen
-the CCF 4th Field Army. It was estimated that only two weeks would
-be required to move these troops to West Korea, where they had the
-capability of reinforcing the CCF attack against the Eighth Army.
-
-Efforts to locate the 9th Army Group were unavailing for nearly three
-months. Then a prisoner from the 77th Division of the 26th Army was
-captured by U. S. Eighth Army troops on 18 March 1951. During the
-following week POW interrogations established that three divisions of
-the 26th Army were in contact with Eighth Army units northeast of Seoul.
-
-“The only conclusion to be drawn,” comments the _Marine Corps Board
-Study_, “based on information collected by 1stMarDiv and X Corps,
-and that by UN and FEC, is that all corps of 9th Army Group had been
-rendered militarily ineffective in the Chosin Reservoir operation and
-required a considerable period of time for replacement, re-equipment,
-and reorganization.”[658]
-
-    [658] _MCB Study_, II-C-125.
-
-Thus it appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the
-Chosin Reservoir fights; they also saved U. S. Eighth Army from being
-assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the CCF offensive
-which exploded on the last night of 1950.
-
-
-_Results of the Reservoir Campaign_
-
-There could be no doubt, after taking into account the CCF mission,
-that the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, had sustained a reverse in
-northeast Korea which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand, it
-might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such as the Marine
-breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed, could be
-termed a victory.
-
-This question involves issues too complex for a clearcut positive
-answer, but it would be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in
-the _Marine Corps Board Study_:
-
-  Although the operations of this phase constitute a withdrawal,
-  despite the fact that CG 1stMarDiv characterized them as “an attack
-  in a new direction,” the withdrawal was executed in the face of
-  overwhelming odds and conducted in such a manner that, contrary to
-  the usual withdrawal, some very important tactical results were
-  achieved. These may be summarized as follows:
-
-  1. Extricated 1stMarDiv from a trap sprung by overwhelming enemy
-  ground forces by skilful employment of integrated ground and air
-  action which enabled the Division to come through with all operable
-  equipment, with wounded properly evacuated and with tactical
-  integrity.
-
-  2. Outfought and outlasted at least seven CCF divisions under
-  conditions of terrain and weather chosen by the enemy and reputedly
-  to his liking. Although frostbite took a heavy toll of the Division
-  it hit CCF units far harder, perhaps decisively.
-
-  3. In the process of accomplishing “2” above, rendered militarily
-  non-effective a large part of 9th CCF Army Group. Those units not
-  contacted by 1stMarDiv were fixed in the Chosin Reservoir area for
-  possible employment against the Division and consequently suffered
-  from the ravages of sub-zero cold and heavy air attacks.
-
-  4. As a direct result of “3” above, enabled X Corps to evacuate
-  Hungnam without enemy interference and, consequently, as a combat
-  effective unit with all personnel and serviceable equipment.
-  Pressure on X Corps by 9th CCF Army Group during the seaward
-  evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult operation, would
-  undoubtedly have altered the result.[659]
-
-    [659] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted,
-          are from the _MCB Study_, II-C-125–127.
-
-Improvisations in tactics were now and then made necessary by unusual
-conditions of terrain, weather or enemy action. But on the whole the
-Marines saved themselves in the Reservoir campaign by the application
-of sound military tactics. In the doing they demonstrated repeatedly
-that the rear makes as good a front as any other for the militarily
-skilled and stout-hearted, and that a unit is not beaten merely because
-it is surrounded by a more numerous enemy.
-
-Inevitably the Marine campaign has been compared to that classic of all
-military breakouts--the march of the immortal Ten Thousand which is
-the subject of Xenophon’s _Anabasis_. Stranded in the hostile Persian
-Empire in the year 401 B. C., these Greek mercenaries cut their way to
-safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the tactics
-used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisophus to overcome road blocks
-in mountain country will have a familiar ring to Marine veterans of the
-Reservoir:
-
-  The enemy, by keeping up a continuous battle and occupying in
-  advance every narrow place, obstructed passage after passage.
-  Accordingly, whenever the van was obstructed, Xenophon, from
-  behind, made a dash up the hills and broke the barricade, and freed
-  the vanguard by endeavoring to get above the obstructing enemy.
-  Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisophus, in the same
-  way, made a detour, and by endeavoring to mount higher than the
-  barricaders, freed the passage for the rear rank; and in this way,
-  turn and turn about, they rescued each other, and paid unflinching
-  attention to their mutual needs.[660]
-
-    [660] Xenophon, _The Anabasis of Cyrus_, Henry C. Dakyns,
-          trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, _The Greek Historians_, (2
-          vols., New York, 1942), II, 297–298.
-
-Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazookas and machine
-guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the Reservoir breakout were
-essentially those which served Xenophon and the Ten Thousand more
-than 33 centuries ago. Organization, combat, training, spirit, and
-discipline enabled the Marines, like the Hellenes before them, to
-overcome numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic mountain roads
-to the sea.
-
-The over-all strategic effects of the Reservoir campaign, as summarized
-by the Marine Corps Board Study, were as follows:
-
-  1. Played a prominent part ... in enabling X Corps, a considerable
-  segment of the total UN forces in Korea, to be withdrawn from
-  Hungnam as a combat effective force available for employment
-  with the Eighth Army in South Korea at a time when that Army was
-  retreating and was in critical need of a reinforcement.
-
-  2. Were largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF
-  forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when
-  such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference
-  between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation
-  therefrom, by being instrumental in rendering 9th CCF Army
-  Group, a force of three corps of four divisions each, militarily
-  noneffective for a minimum period of three months.
-
-That the breakout of the 1st Marine Division had affected American
-political and military policy at the highest levels was the assertion
-of an editorial in _Time_. Referring to what it termed the “Great
-Debate,” in December 1950, as to whether American forces should be
-withdrawn from Korea, the news-magazine commented:
-
-  When the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the
-  “unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their
-  equipment, their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia
-  took on a different look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels
-  of the Hungnam action contributed more to forming U. S. policy
-  than all the words in the “Great Debate.” The nation--and the
-  revitalized Eighth Army--now knows that U. S. fighting men will
-  stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity is
-  found to punish Communist aggression.[661]
-
-    [661] _Time_, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).
-
-General Douglas MacArthur as CINCUNC, in his 11th report of operations
-of UN forces in Korea, submitted the following to the United Nations
-Organization regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation:
-
-  In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements
-  of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in
-  bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against
-  opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist Force divisions
-  which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part
-  to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The
-  basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage
-  displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their
-  integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior
-  forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded
-  had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and
-  equipment to the enemy.
-
-  United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close
-  support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming
-  numbers of Chinese Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by
-  the United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the
-  successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the
-  Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support
-  provided by the United States Marine Air Force and Naval Aircraft
-  in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground
-  force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of
-  tactical air operations in history.[662]
-
-    [662] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC _11th Report of the
-          Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces_, 31 Jan
-          51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit
-          Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished
-          Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW.
-
-Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful evacuation at
-Hungnam in large measure to the Marine breakout. Writing to General
-Smith several months later, he asserted that he had “filled in what has
-been a neglected page in the story of the Hungnam redeployment. It is
-simply this: that the destruction of enemy forces wrought by the First
-Marine Division on the march down the hill was a major factor in the
-successful withdrawal; and that the destruction was so complete the
-enemy was unable to exert serious pressure at any time on the shrinking
-perimeter. To my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the performance of
-the First Marine Division on that march constitutes one of the most
-glorious chapters in Marine Corps history.”[663]
-
-    [663] RAdm T. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.
-
-Letters of commendation were received by the 1st Marine Division from
-General Cates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General Collins,
-Chief of Staff, USA, General Almond, and many other high-ranking
-military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for sincerity and emotion,
-there was no message which appealed more to the officers and men of
-the Division than the concluding paragraph of this tribute from the
-commanding general who had guided their destinies with unswerving
-courage and who had come out with them, Major General Oliver P. Smith:
-
-  The performance of officers and men in this operation was
-  magnificent. Rarely have all hands in a division participated so
-  intimately in the combat phases of an operation. Every Marine
-  can be justly proud of his participation. In Korea, Tokyo and
-  Washington there is full appreciation of the remarkable feat of the
-  division. With the knowledge of the determination, professional
-  competence, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed
-  by officers and men of this division, my feeling is one of humble
-  pride. No division commander has ever been privileged to command a
-  finer body of men.[664]
-
-    [664] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX A
-
-Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations
-
-
-  ADC--Assistant Division Commander.
-  AdmO--Administrative Order.
-  AF--Air Force.
-  AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship.
-  AH--Hospital Ship.
-  AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon.
-  AirO--Air Officer.
-  AirSptSec--Air Support Section.
-  AKA--Assault Cargo Ship.
-  AKL--Cargo, Ship, Light.
-  AM--Minesweeper.
-  AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion.
-  AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion.
-  AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper.
-  ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.
-  AP--Transport.
-  APA--Assault Transport.
-  APD--High Speed Transport.
-  ARG--Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship.
-  ARL--Landing Craft Repair Ship.
-  ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion.
-  ARS--Salvage Vessel.
-  AT--Antitank.
-  ATF--Ocean Tug, Fleet.
-  AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company.
-  AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company.
-  BB--Battleship.
-  BLT--Battalion Landing Team.
-  Bn--Battalion.
-  Btry--Battery.
-  BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
-  C-47--Douglas Transport (same as R4D).
-  CA--Heavy Cruiser.
-  CCF--Chinese Communist Forces.
-  CG--Commanding General.
-  CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA.
-  CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East.
-  CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
-  CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.
-  CL--Light Cruiser.
-  CO--Commanding Officer.
-  Co--Company.
-  ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing.
-  ComNavFE--Commander Naval Forces Far East.
-  ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet.
-  ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One.
-  ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet.
-  ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort Force.
-  CP--Command Post.
-  CR--Command Report.
-  C/S--Chief of Staff.
-  CSG--Combat Service Group.
-  CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
-  CTF--Commander Task Force.
-  CTG--Commander Task Group.
-  CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier.
-  CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier.
-  DD--Destroyer.
-  DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer.
-  DE--Destroyer Escort.
-  Det--Detachment.
-  DMS--High Speed Minesweeper.
-  DOW--Died of Wounds.
-  EmbO--Embarkation Order.
-  EmbO--Embarkation Officer.
-  EngrBn--Engineer Battalion.
-  EUSAK--Eighth U. S. Army in Korea.
-  FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA).
-  FAC--Forward Air Controller.
-  FEAF--Far East Air Force.
-  FECOM--Far East Command.
-  F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Fighter-Bomber.
-  FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
-  FO--Forward Observer.
-  FragOrder--Fragmentary Order.
-  Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon.
-  GHQ--General Headquarters.
-  Gru--Group.
-  H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company.
-  HD--Historical Diary.
-  Hedron--Headquarters Squadron.
-  HMS--Her Majesty’s Ship.
-  HMAS--Her Majesty’s Australian Ship.
-  HMCS--Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship.
-  HMNZS--Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship.
-  HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter.
-  HQBn--Headquarters Battalion.
-  HQMC--Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.
-  InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA).
-  Interv--Interview.
-  ISUM--Intelligence Summary.
-  JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
-  JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.
-  JMS--Japanese Minesweeper.
-  JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group.
-  JTF--Joint Task Force.
-  KIA--Killed in Action.
-  KMC--Korean Marine Corps.
-  Ln--Liaison.
-  LSD--Landing Ship, Dock.
-  LSM--Landing Ship, Medium.
-  LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket.
-  LST--Landing Ship, Tank.
-  LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank--Casualty Evacuation.
-  LSU--Landing Ship, Utility.
-  Ltr--Letter.
-  LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked.
-  MAG--Marine Aircraft Group.
-  MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing.
-  MS--Manuscript.
-  MedBn--Medical Battalion.
-  MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company, USA.
-  MIA--Missing in Action.
-  MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA).
-  MP--Military Police.
-  MRO--Movement Report Office.
-  msg--Message.
-  MSR--Main Supply Route.
-  MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service.
-  MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.
-  MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion.
-  NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group.
-  NavFE--Naval Forces Far East.
-  NCO--Noncommissioned Officer.
-  NK--North Korea(n).
-  NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army.
-  N.d.--Date not given.
-  N.t.--Time not given.
-  O--Officer; Order.
-  OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA).
-  OI--Operation Instruction.
-  OpnO--Operation Order.
-  OpnPlan--Operation Plan.
-  OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion.
-  OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane.
-  PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel.
-  PF--Frigate.
-  PhibGru--Amphibious Group.
-  PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report.
-  PLA--People’s Liberation Army.
-  Plat--Platoon.
-  POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
-  POR--Periodic Operation Report.
-  POW--Prisoner of War.
-  QMPetDistCo--Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Company (USA).
-  QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA).
-  R4D--Douglas Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47).
-  RCT--Regimental Combat Team.
-  Recon--Reconnaissance.
-  Reinf--Reinforced.
-  RktBn--Rocket Battalion.
-  RM--Royal Marines.
-  ROK--Republic of Korea.
-  R & O File--Records and Orders File.
-  ROKA--Republic of Korea Army.
-  ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy.
-  SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator.
-  SAR--Special Action Report.
-  SCAJAP--Shipping Control Authority, Japan.
-  SecDef--Secretary of Defense.
-  ServBn--Service Battalion.
-  SigBn--Signal Battalion.
-  SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company.
-  SitRpt--Situation Report.
-  SP--Shore Party.
-  SMS--Marine Supply Squadron.
-  TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator; Tactical Air Commander.
-  TACP--Tactical Air Control Party.
-  Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron.
-  TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center.
-  T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS.
-  TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber.
-  TE--Task Element.
-  T/E--Table of Equipment.
-  Tel--Telephone Message.
-  TF--Task Force.
-  TG--Task Group.
-  TkBn--Tank Battalion.
-  Trk--Truck.
-  T/O--Table of Organization.
-  TU--Task Unit.
-  UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team.
-  U/F--Unit of Fire.
-  UN--United Nations.
-  UNC--United Nations Command.
-  URpt--Unit Report.
-  USA--United States Army.
-  USAF--United States Air Force.
-  USMC--United States Marine Corps.
-  USN--United States Navy.
-  VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron.
-  VMF(N)--All-Weather, Fighter Squadron.
-  VMO--Marine Observation Squadron.
-  VMR--Marine Transport Squadron.
-  WD--War Diary.
-  WD Sum--War Diary Summary.
-  WIA--Wounded in Action.
-  YMS--Motor Minesweeper.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX B
-
-Task Organization 1st Marine Division
-
-
-In order to present a true picture of the Task Organization of the
-1st Marine Division during its operations in northeast Korea the
-organization will be presented for the following periods:
-
-  1. Wonsan Landing (OpnO 16-50)
-  2. Advance to the Reservoir (OpnO 19-50)
-  3. Movement south from Hagaru (OpnO 25-50)
-  4. Hungnam Evacuation (OpnO 27-50)
-
-  1. TASK ORGANIZATION OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION FOR WONSAN LANDING
-
-  _1st Marine Division, (Reinf), FMF_       MajGen O. P. SMITH
-
-  HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less dets                LtCol M. T. STARR
-    163rd MISD, USA
-  441st CIC Det, USA
-  1st SigBn, less dets                      Maj R. L. SCHREIER
-    Carrier Plat, FMF
-    Det, 4th SigBn, USA
-    2d SigRepUnit, USA
-    Det, 205th SigRepCo, USA
-  1st ServBn, less dets                     LtCol C. L. BANKS
-  1stMTBn                                   LtCol O. L. BEALL
-  1st OrdBn                                 Maj L. O. WILLIAMS
-  1st SPBn, less dets                       LtCol H. P. CROWE
-    SPCommSec, 1stSigBn
-    Det, 1st CSG
-    Det, NavBchGru 1
-  1st MedBn, less dets                      Cdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN
-    2d Plat, 560thMedAmbCo, USA
-  7thMTBn                                   Maj J. F. STEPKA
-  1st CSG, less dets                        Col. J. S. COOK
-    1st Fum&BathPlat, FMF
-    1st AirDelPlat, FMF
-    Plat, 20th QMSubsistSupCo, USA
-    Plat, 506th QMPetDisCo, USA
-    NavBchGru 1, less dets
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 1_                Col L. B. PULLER
-
-    1st Marines
-    Det, 5th KMC Bn
-    Co C, 1st EngrBn
-    Co C, 1st MTBn
-    Co D, 1st MedBn
-    Plat, 1stArmd AmphBn
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    FO & LnO Secs, 2/11
-    LnDet, 1stTkBn
-    SP Gru B
-    Det, MP Co
-    Det, 1st CSG
-    Det, NavBchGru 1
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 5_                LtCol R. L. MURRAY
-
-    5th Marines
-    Co A, 1st EngrBn
-    Co D, 1st MTBn
-    Co C, 1st MedBn
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    FO & LnO Secs, 1/11
-    SP Gru A
-    Det, MP Co
-    Det, 1st CSG
-    Det, NavBchGru 1
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 7_                Col H. L. LITZENBERG
-
-    7th Marines
-    Det, 3d KMC Bn
-    Co D, 1st EngrBn
-    Co B, 1st MTBn
-    Co D, 1st MedBn
-    Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn
-    Det, 1st SigBn
-    FO & LnO Secs, 3/11
-    LnDet, 1st TkBn
-    SP Gru C
-    Det, MP Co
-    Det, 1st CSG
-    Det, NavBchGru 1
-
-  _11th Marines, Reinf_                     Col J. H. BROWER
-
-    Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn
-    1st AmphTrkCo, FMF
-
-  _1st Tank Battalion_, less dets           LtCol H. T. MILNE
-  _1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets       LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
-  _3d KMC Battalion_, less dets             Maj KIM YUN GUN
-  _5th KMC Battalion_, less dets            Col KIM TAI SHIK
-  _1st AmphTracBn, FMF_                     LtCol E. F. WANN
-  _Reconnaissance Company, 1stMarDiv_       1stLt R. B. CROSSMAN
-  _VMO-6_                                   Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
-
-  2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ADVANCE TO THE RESERVOIR
-
-  _1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_         MajGen O. P. SMITH
-
-    HqBn, less dets
-      163d MISD
-      441st CIC Det
-    1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets
-    1stServBn, Reinf, less dets
-      Co A. 7th MTBn (less 1 plat)
-    Det, 1st MTBn
-    1st OrdBn
-    1stMedBn, less dets
-    1st AmphTracBn
-      Co B, 1st ArmdAmphBn (less 1st Plat)
-    7th MT Bn, less dets
-    1st CSG, Reinf
-      1st AmphTrkCo
-      1st AirDelPlat
-      1st Fum&Bath Plat
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 1_              Col L. B. PULLER
-
-      1st Marines
-      2/11
-      Co D, 1st MedBn
-      Co C, 1st TkBn
-      Co C, Reinf, 1st EngrBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-      Det, 1stServBn
-      Det, MP Co
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 7_              Col H. L. LITZENBERG
-
-      7th Marines
-      3/11
-      Recon Co, 1stMarDiv
-      1st MTBn, less dets
-      Co D, Reinf, 1st EngrBn
-      Co E, 1st MedBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-      Det, MP Co
-      Det, 1stServBn
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 5_              LtCol R. L. MURRAY
-
-      5th Marines
-      1/11
-      Co A, Reinf, 1stEngrBn
-      Co C, 1stMedBn
-      Co, 1stMTBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-      Det, MP Co
-      Det, 1stServBn
-
-    _11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets        Col J. H. BROWER
-
-      Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn
-
-    _1st Tank Battalion, Reinf_, less dets  LtCol H. T. MILNE
-      Tk Plat, 5thMar
-      Tk Plat, 7thMar
-
-    _1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets     LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE
-    _VMO-6_                                 Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK
-
-  3. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MOVEMENT SOUTH FROM HAGARU
-
-  (Except where noted the organization remained the same for the
-  movement south from Koto-ri.).
-
-  _1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_         MajGen O. P. SMITH
-
-    HqBn, Reinf, less dets
-      163d MISD
-      181st CIC
-    1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets
-    1st ServBn, Reinf, less dets
-      Co A, 7thMTBn, less dets
-      AutoSup Co, 1stMTBn
-      AutoMaint Co, 1stMTBn
-    1stOrdBn, less dets
-    1stMedBn, Reinf, less dets
-      1st Fum&Bath Plat
-      2d Plat, 506thMedAmbCo, USA
-  (under opn control X Corps)
-    1stAmphTracBn, Reinf, less dets
-  1st CSG, Reinf
-    7thMTBn, less dets
-    Co A, 1stAmphTracBn
-    1st AirDel Plat
-  1stSPBn                                   (under opn control 3dInfDiv)
-  1stTkBn, less dets
-  VMO-6
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 5_                LtCol R. L. MURRAY
-
-    5th Marines, less Tk Plat
-    1/11
-      Btry D, 2/11                          (released to RCT 1 on
-                                              passage through Koto-ri)
-    11th Marines, Reinf, less dets
-      4/11, less Btry L
-      Det, 96th FABn, USA 3/1               (released to RCT 1 on
-                                              passage through Koto-ri)
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    Tk Co, 31st Inf, USA
-    Prov Plat, 1stTkBn
-    Co A, 1stEngrBn                         (released to RCT 1 on
-                                              passage through Koto-ri)
-    Det, 1stEngrBn
-    41 Commando, RM
-    Division Train 2                        LtCol H. T. MILNE
-      Traffic Plat, MP Co
-      Det, 513th TrkCo, USA
-      Det, 1stMTBn
-      Co D, 10thEngr(C)Bn, USA
-      Det, 1stMedBn
-      Det, 1stServBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-      Det, 515th Trk Co, USA
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 7_                Col H. L. LITZENBERG
-
-    7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11
-    Btry L, 4/11                            (released to RCT 1 on
-                                              arrival Koto-ri)
-    ProvBn, 31st Inf, USA
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    Co D, 1stTkBn
-    Co D, Reinf, 1stEngrBn
-    Division Train 1                        LtCol C. L. BANKS
-      Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv
-      Det, Hq X Corps
-    Det, 1stServBn
-      Det, 1stOrdBn
-      Det, 7thMTBn
-      Det, X Corps Ord Co, USA
-    MP Co, 1stMarDiv, less dets
-    1stMTBn, less dets
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    AirSptSec, MTACS-2
-    Det, 1stMedBn
-
-  _Regimental Combat Team 1_                Col L. B. PULLER
-
-    1st Marines, less 3/1 and Tk Plat
-    2/31, Reinf, USA
-    2/11, less Btry D                       (Btry D attached on passage
-                                              Koto-ri)
-      Btry L, 4/11                          (Btry L attached on arrival
-                                              Koto-ri)
-      Cos A & B, 7thMTBn
-    Co C, Reinf, 1stMTBn
-    Det, 1stSigBn
-    Det, 1stServBn
-    Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv
-    Det, 1stOrdBn
-    Cos B & D, 1stMedBn
-    Recon Co, 1stMarDiv
-    Det, 1stEngr Bn
-    Det, 7th Mar
-    Det, 41 Commando, RM                    (released to 41 Commando on
-                                              passage Koto-ri by RCT 5)
-    Co B, Reinf, 1stTkBn
-    Misc elms, USA
-
-  4. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM EVACUATION.
-
-  _Forward Echelon_                         BrigGen E. A. CRAIG
-
-  _Main Body, 1st Marine Division_,         MajGen O. P. SMITH
-
-    _Reinf, FMF_, less dets
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 7_              Col H. L. LITZENBERG
-
-      7th Marines, less Tk Plat
-      3/11
-      Co D, 1stEngrBn
-      1st CSG, less dets
-      Det, HqBn
-      1stServBn
-      Co A, 7th MTBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-      1stMedBn, Reinf
-        1st Fum&Bath Plat
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 5_              LtCol R. L. MURRAY
-
-      5th Marines
-      1/11
-      41 Commando, RM
-      Co A, 1stEngrBn
-      1stOrdBn
-      1stMTBn
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-
-    _Regimental Combat Team 1_              Col L. B. PULLER
-
-      1st Marines
-      2/11
-      Co C, 1stEngrBn
-      1stTkBn
-      Tk Plat, 5th Mar
-      Tk Plat, 7th Mar
-      Det, 1stSigBn
-
-    _HqBn, Reinf_, less dets                LtCol M. T. STARR
-
-      1stSigBn, less dets
-      163d MISD, USA
-      181st CIC Det, USA
-
-    _11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets        LtCol C. A. YOUNGDALE
-
-      Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn
-      1st EngrBn, less dets
-      7thMTBn, less dets
-      ANGLICO, 1stSigBn
-
-    _1stSPBn_, less dets                    LtCol H. P. CROWE
-
-    _1st AmphTracBn, Reinf, FMF_            LtCol E. F. WANN
-
-      Co A, Reinf, 1stAmphTrkBn, FMF
-      Co B, 1stArmdAmphBn, FMF
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX C
-
-Naval Task Organization
-
-
-1. _Wonsan Landing_
-
-  JTF 7                                          VAdm A. D. Struble
-    TF 90 Attack Force                           RAdm J. H. Doyle
-      TG 91.2 Landing Force (1st                 MajGen O. P. Smith
-        MarDiv)
-      TE 90.00 Flagship Element
-        _Mount McKinley_                 1 AGC
-      TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control              Cdr T. H. Moore
-        Element
-        TU 90.01.1 TacRon 1
-        TU 90.01.2 TacRon 3
-      TE 90.02 Naval Beach Group                 Capt W. T. Singer
-        Element
-        TU 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit
-        TU 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit              LCdr M. C. Sibisky
-        TU 90.02.3 Boat Unit One                 LCdr H. E. Hock
-        TU 90.02.4 Amphibious                    LCdr M. T. Jacobs, Jr.
-          Construction Bn.
-        TU 90.02.5 Underwater                    LCdr W. R. McKinney
-          Demolitions Team Unit
-      TG 90.1 Administrative Group               RAdm L. A. Thackery
-        TE 90.10 Flagship Element                Capt J. B. Stefonek
-          _Eldorado_                     1 AGC
-        TU 90.1.1 Medical Unit
-          _Consolation_                   1 AH
-          _LST 898_[665]
-          _LST 975_[665]                 2 LST
-        TU 90.1.2 Repair and Salvage             Capt P. W. Mothersill
-            Unit
-          _Lipan_
-          _Cree_
-          _Arikara_                      3 ATF
-          _Conserver_                    1 ARS
-          _Askari_                       1 ARL
-          _Gunston Hall_
-          _Fort Marion_
-          _Comstock_
-          _Catamount_
-          _Colonial_                     5 LSD
-          Plus other units as assigned
-        TU 90.1.3 Service Unit                   LCdr J. D. Johnston
-          15 LSU
-      TG 90.2 Transport Group                    Capt V. R. Roane
-        TE 90.21 Transport Division              Capt S. G. Kelly
-                                          ABLE
-          _Bayfield_
-          _Noble_
-          _Cavalier_
-          _Okanogan_                     4 APA
-          _Washburn_
-          _Seminole_
-          _Titania_
-          _Oglethorpe_
-          _Archenar_                     5 AKA
-          _Marine Phoenix_              1 T-AP
-        TE 90.22 Transport Division              Capt A. E. Jarrell
-                                         BAKER
-          _Henrico_
-          _George Clymer_
-          _Pickaway_
-          _Bexar_                        4 APA
-          _Union_
-          _Algol_
-          _Alshain_
-          _Winston_
-          _Montague_                     5 AKA
-          _Aiken Victory_               1 T-AP
-          _Robin Goodfellow_
-              1 Commercial freighter
-      TG 90.3 Tractor Group                      Capt R. C. Peden
-          _Gunston Hall_[666]
-          _Fort Marion_[666]
-          _Comstock_[666]
-          _Catamount_[666]
-          _Colonial_[666]                5 LSD
-          _LST 1123_
-          _LST 715_
-          _LST 742_
-          _LST 799_
-          _LST 802_
-          _LST 845_
-          _LST 883_
-          _LST 898_
-          _LST 914_
-          _LST 973_
-          _LST 975_
-          _LST 1048_                    12 LST
-          23 SCAJAP LSTs                23 LST
-      TG 90.4 Control Group                      LCdr C. Allmon
-          _PCEC 896_                    1 PCEC
-        TU 90.4.1 Control Unit                   Lt S. C. Pinksen
-            BLUE
-          _Wantuck_                      1 APD
-        TU 90.4.2 Control Unit                   Lt A. C. Ansorge
-            YELLOW
-          _Horace A. Bass_               1 APD
-      TG 95.6 Minesweeping and                   Capt R. T. Spofford
-        Protection Group
-          _Collett_                       1 DD
-          _Diachenko_                    1 APD
-          _Doyle_
-          _Endicott_                     2 DMS
-          _Pledge_
-          _Incredible_                    2 AM
-          _Kite_
-          _Merganser_
-          _Mockingbird_
-          _Osprey_
-          _Redhead_
-          _Chatterer_                    7 AMS
-          HMS _Mounts Bay_
-          HMNZS _Pukaki_
-          HMNZS _Putira_
-          _LaGrandiere_ (French)
-                                          4 PF
-          8 Japanese mine sweepers
-          4 Japanese mine destruction
-            and buoying vessels
-          1 ROKN                         1 AKL
-          Plus other units assigned
-      TG 90.6 Reconnaissance Group               Cdr S. C. Small
-          _Horace A. Bass_
-          _Wantuck_                      2 APD
-          UDT 1
-          UDT 3                          2 UDT
-      TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group               RAdm R. W. Ruble
-          _Badoeng Strait_
-          _Sicily_                       2 CVE
-          _Taussig_
-          _Hanson_
-          _George K. Mackenzie_
-          _Ernest G. Small_
-          _Southerland_
-          _Rowan_                         6 DD
-      TG 95.2 Gunfire Support Group              RAdm G. R. Hartman
-          _Helena_
-          _Rochester_
-          _Toledo_                        3 CA
-          HMS _Ceylon_                    1 CL
-          HMS _Cockade_
-          HMCS _Alhabaskan_
-          HMAS _Warramunga_
-          3 DD of DesRon 9                6 DD
-          LSMR 401[667]
-          LSMR 403[667]
-          LSMR 404[667]
-
-2. _Hungnam Evacuation_
-
-  TF 90 Amphibious Force, Naval Forces Far East  RAdm J. H. Doyle
-    TE 90.00 Flagship Element
-        _Mount McKinley_
-    TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element        Cdr R. W. Arndt
-      TacRon ONE
-    TE 90.02 Repair and Salvage Unit             Cdr L. C. Conwell
-        _Kermit Roosevelt_                 ARG
-        _Askari_                           ARL
-        _Bolster_
-        _Conserver_                      2 ARS
-        _Tawakoni_                         ATF
-    TE 90.03 Control Element                     LCdr C. Allmon
-        _Diachenko_
-        _Begor_                          2 APD
-        PCEC 882                          PCEC
-    TG 90.2 Transport Group                      Capt S. G. Kelly
-      TE 90.21 Transport Element                 Capt A. E. Jarrell
-        _Bayfield_
-        _Henrico_
-        _Noble_                          3 APA
-        _Winston_
-        _Seminole_
-        _Montague_                       3 AKA
-        _Begor_
-        _Diachenko_                      2 APD
-        PCEC 882                          PCEC
-        _Fort Marion_[668]
-        _Colonial_[668]
-        _Catamount_[668]                 3 LSD
-        LST 742
-        LST 715
-        LST 845
-        LST 802
-        LST 883
-        LST 799
-        LST 898
-        LST 914
-        LST 975
-        LST 973
-        LST 1048                        11 LST
-
-    TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group                RAdm R. H. Hillenkoetter
-        _St. Paul_
-        _Rochester_                       2 CA
-        _Zellars_
-        _Charles S. Sperry_
-        _Massey_
-        _Forrest Royal_                   4 DD
-        LSMR 401
-        LSMR 403
-        LSMR 404                        3 LSMR
-
-  Plus DD as assigned from TG 95.2
-    TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and                 RAdm J. M. Higgins
-          Minesweeping Group
-        _Rochester_                         CA
-        _English_
-        _Hank_
-        _Wallace L. Lind_
-        _Borie_                           4 DD
-        _Sausalito_
-        _Hoquiam_
-        _Gallup_
-        _Gloucester_
-        _Bisbee_
-        _Glendale_                        6 PF
-
-    TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group                   Capt R. T. Spofford
-        _Endicott_
-        _Doyle_                          2 DMS
-        _Incredible_                        AM
-        _Curlew_
-        _Heron_                          2 AMS
-
-  TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group                   RAdm R. W. Ruble
-      _Badoeng Strait_
-      _Sicily_                           2 CVE
-      _Bataan_                             CVL
-      _Lofberg_
-      _John A. Bole_
-      _Mackenzie_
-      _Taussig_
-      _Ernest G. Small_
-      _Brinkley Bass_
-      _Arnold J. Isbell_                  7 DD
-      _Hanson_                             DDR
-
-  Vessels attached TF 90 for
-    operational control.
-
-      _Missouri_                            BB
-      _Duncan_               DDR (from 10 Dec)
-      _Foss_                   DE (from 9 Dec)
-      _Consolation_
-                               AH (from 2 Dec)
-
-
-    [665] Reported to CTG 95.2 upon arrival at objective area.
-
-    [666] Carrying 3 LSU.
-
-    [667] Reported to CTF 90 when released by CTG 95.2.
-
-    [668] 3 LSU embarked
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX D
-
-Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division[669]
-
-
-  ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------
-            |Organic |Attached|Attached|        |
-     Date   |  USMC  | U. S.  | Royal  |Attached|
-            |and USN | Army   |Marines |  KMC   | Total
-  ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------
-   8 Oct 50 | 23,533 |     78 |      0 |  2,159 | 25,770
-  26 Oct 50 | 23,608 |     83 |      0 |  1,588 | 25,279
-  27 Nov 50 | 25,166 |     73 |    234 |      0 | 25,473
-   5 Dec 50 | 21,551 |  2,535 |    157 |      0 | 24,243
-   8 Dec 50 | 21,039 |  2,448 |    157 |      0 | 23,644
-  15 Dec 50 | 19,362 |     14 |    144 |      0 | 19,520
-  ----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------
-
-      [669] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex A (G-1), 4.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX E
-
-1st Marine Division Casualties[670]
-
-
-  --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------
-          |     |     |     |       | Non-battle
-    Date  | KIA | DOW | MIA |  WIA  | casualties
-  --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------
-   8Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         21
-   9Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         12
-  10Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         11
-  11Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         35
-  12Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         23
-  13Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          5
-  14Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          5
-  15Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          4
-  16Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          3
-  17Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          5
-  18Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          2
-  19Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          1
-  20Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          4
-  21Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          1
-  22Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          2
-  23Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          1
-  24Oct50 |     |     |     |       |          5
-  25Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         12
-  26Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         43
-  27Oct50 |  22 |     |   4 |    44 |         54
-  28Oct50 |   1 |     |     |     3 |         68
-  29Oct50 |     |     |     |       |        115
-  30Oct50 |   1 |     |     |     5 |         52
-  31Oct50 |     |     |     |       |         36
-   1Nov50 |     |     |     |       |         29
-   2Nov50 |  22 |   2 |     |    67 |         64
-   3Nov50 |  22 |   3 |   1 |   162 |         93
-   4Nov50 |  17 |   4 |     |    84 |        126
-   5Nov50 |   1 |   1 |     |    23 |         94
-   6Nov50 |   5 |   1 |     |    38 |         87
-   7Nov50 |  15 |     |     |    60 |         51
-   8Nov50 |   1 |   2 |     |    17 |         50
-   9Nov50 |   2 |   7 |     |       |         50
-  10Nov50 |   3 |     |     |    20 |         57
-  11Nov50 |   8 |     |     |    16 |         48
-  12Nov50 |   2 |     |     |     4 |         40
-  13Nov50 |   7 |     |     |     9 |         63
-  14Nov50 |     |     |     |       |         66
-  15Nov50 |     |     |     |     1 |        172
-  16Nov50 |   1 |     |     |     2 |        136
-  17Nov50 |     |     |     |     2 |         77
-  18Nov50 |     |     |     |       |         79
-  19Nov50 |     |     |     |     1 |         58
-  20Nov50 |     |     |     |       |         46
-  21Nov50 |   4 |     |     |     5 |         63
-  22Nov50 |     |     |     |       |         65
-  23Nov50 |   1 |     |     |     3 |         58
-  24Nov50 |   3 |     |     |     8 |         51
-  25Nov50 |     |     |     |     8 |         55
-  26Nov50 |   2 |     |   1 |     5 |         68
-  27Nov50 |  37 |   1 |  17 |   186 |         96
-  28Nov50 |  95 |   3 |  43 |   539 |        259
-  29Nov50 |  60 |  14 |  42 |   396 |        105
-  30Nov50 |  27 |   6 |   6 |   183 |        102
-   1Dec50 |  27 |  14 |   6 |   111 |        134
-   2Dec50 |  55 |   2 |  33 |   231 |        180
-   3Dec50 |  16 |   1 |   6 |   194 |        196
-   4Dec50 |  10 |   6 |   4 |   202 |        582
-   5Dec50 |   2 |   7 |   2 |    81 |        469
-   6Dec50 |  32 |   4 |   7 |   212 |        262
-   7Dec50 |  51 |  16 |     |   281 |        304
-   8Dec50 |  29 |   8 |   4 |   127 |        170
-   9Dec50 |   6 |   7 |   1 |    46 |        224
-  10Dec50 |   7 |   5 |   8 |    45 |        266
-  11Dec50 |   9 |   4 |   3 |    38 |        308
-  12Dec50 |     |   2 |   4 |     3 |        123
-  13Dec50 |     |     |     |     1 |         52
-  14Dec50 |     |     |     |       |        103
-  15Dec50 |     |   1 |     |       |         34
-  16Dec50 |     |     |     |       |         90
-  17Dec50 |     |     |     |     1 |        105
-  18Dec50 |     |     |     |       |        282
-  19Dec50 |     |     |     |       |        202
-  20Dec50 |     |     |     |       |        151
-  21Dec50 |     |     |     |     1 |        111
-  22Dec50 |     |     |     |       |         68
-  23Dec50 |     |     |     |     3 |         79
-  24Dec50 |   1 |     |     |    10 |         42
-  --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------
-    Total | 604 | 114 | 192 | 3,485 |      7,338
-  --------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------
-
-      [670] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E, appendix 2 (Casualty
-            Reporting Section, 12Jan51); Smith, _Notes_, 1147–1149.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX F
-
-Command and Staff List
-
-8 October-15 December 1950
-
-
-1ST MARINE DIVISION
-
-  Commanding General                 MajGen Oliver P. Smith
-  Assistant Division Commander       BrigGen Edward A. Craig
-  Chief of Staff                     Col Gregon A. Williams
-  Deputy Chief of Staff              Col Edward W. Snedeker
-  G-1                                Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 28 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold
-  G-2                                Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.
-  G-3                                Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.
-  G-4                                Col Francis A. McAlister
-
-
-_Special Staff_
-
-  Adjutant                           Maj Philip J. Costello
-  Air Officer                        Maj James N. Cupp
-  Artillery Officer                  Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)
-                                     Col Carl A. Youngdale
-  Amphibian Tractor Officer          LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.
-  Armored Amphibian Officer          LtCol Francis H. Cooper
-  Chaplain                           Cdr Robert H. Schwyhart (ChC), USN
-  Chemical Warfare and
-    Radiological Defense Officer     Maj John H. Blue
-  Dental Officer                     Capt Mack Meradith (DC), USN
-  Embarkation Officer                Maj Jules M. Rouse
-  Engineer Officer                   LtCol John H. Partridge
-  Exchange Officer                   Capt Wilbur C. Conley
-  Food Director                      Maj Norman R. Nickerson
-  Inspector                          Col John A. White
-  Historical Officer                 2dLt John M. Patrick
-  Legal Officer                      LtCol Albert H. Schierman
-  Motor Transport Officer            Maj Henry W. Seeley
-  Naval Gunfire Officer              LtCol Loren S. Fraser
-  Ordnance Officer                   Capt Donald L. Shenaut
-  Provost Marshal                    Capt John H. Griffin
-  Public Information Officer         Capt Michael Capraro (to 6 Nov)
-                                     Maj Carl E. Stahley
-  Shore Party Officer                LtCol Henry P. Crowe
-  Signal Officer                     LtCol Albert Creal
-  Special Services Officer           Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 29 Nov)
-                                     LtCol John M. Bathum
-  Supply Officer                     Col Gordon S. Hendricks
-  Surgeon                            Capt Eugene R. Hering (MC), USN
-  Tank Officer                       LtCol Harry T. Milne
-
-
-_Attached Units_
-
-  Commanding Officer, 163d Military
-    Intelligence Specialist
-    Detachment, USA                  Capt Fujio F. Asano, USA
-  Commanding Officer, 181st Counter
-    Intelligence Corps Detachment,
-    USA                              Maj Millard E. Dougherty, USA
-  Commanding Officer, 41st
-    Independent Commando,
-    Royal Marines                    LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM
-
-
-_Headquarters Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Marvin T. Starr
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Maj Frederick Simpson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Military Police Company          Capt John H. Griffin
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Reconnaissance Company           1stLt Ralph B. Crossman (to 23 Nov)
-                                     Maj Walter Gall
-
-
-_1st Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col Lewis B. Puller
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Robert W. Rickert
-  S-1                                Capt William G. Reeves
-  S-2                                Capt Stone W. Quillian
-  S-3                                Maj Robert E. Lorigan
-  S-4                                Maj Thomas T. Grady
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Frank P. Tatum
-  Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch
-    Mortar Company                   Capt Frank J. Faureck
-  Commanding Officer, Antitank
-    Company                          Capt George E. Petro
-
-
-_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Jack Hawkins (to 7 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Donald M. Schmuck
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Maurice H. Clarke
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt William B. Hopkins
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt Robert H. Barrow
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Wesley Noren
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt Robert P. Wray
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj William T. Bates, Jr.
-
-
-_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Allan Sutter
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Clarence J. Mabry
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Raymond Dewees, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Welby W. Cronk
-  Commanding Officer, E Company      Capt Charles D. Frederick (to 6 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Harold B. Wilson (6–17 Nov)
-                                     Capt Jack A. Smith
-  Commanding Officer, F Company      Capt Goodwin C. Groff
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons        Maj Whitman S. Bartley (to 16 Nov)
-    Company                          Capt William A. Kerr
-
-
-_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Thomas L. Ridge
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Reginald R. Myers
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Thomas E. McCarthy
-  Commanding Officer, G Company      Capt George C. Westover (to 30 Oct)
-                                     Capt Carl L. Sitter
-  Commanding Officer, H Company      Capt Clarence E. Corley
-  Commanding Officer, I Company      1stLt Joseph R. Fisher
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj Edwin H. Simmons
-
-
-_5th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Raymond L. Murray
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Joseph L. Stewart
-  S-1                                1stLt Alton C. Weed
-  S-2                                Maj William C. Easterline
-  S-3                                Maj Theodore J. Spiker
-  S-4                                Maj Harold Wallace
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Harold G. Schrier (to 9 Oct)
-                                     Capt Jack E. Hawthorn
-  Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch
-    Mortar Company                   1stLt Robert M. Lucy
-  Commanding Officer, Antitank
-    Company                          1stLt Almarion S. Bailey
-
-
-_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol George R. Newton (to 17 Nov)
-                                     LtCol John W. Stevens, II
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Merlin R. Olson
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Walter E. G. Godenius
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt John R. Stevens (to 17 Nov)
-                                     Capt James B. Heater
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Francis I. Fenton (to 13 Oct)
-                                     1stLt John R. Hancock
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (to 6 Nov)
-                                     Capt Jack R. Jones
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj John W. Russell
-
-
-_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Harold S. Roise
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 12Nov)
-                                     Maj Glen E. Martin (13–21Nov)
-                                     Maj John L. Hopkins
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              1stLt David W. Walsh (to 8 Oct)
-                                     Capt Franklin B. Mayer
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Samuel S. Smith
-  Commanding Officer, E Company      Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 12 Dec)
-                                     Capt Lawrence W. Henke, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, F Company      Capt Uel D. Peters (to 6 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Charles “H” Dalton
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj James W. Bateman (to 10 Oct)
-                                     Maj Glen E. Martin (11 Oct-12 Nov)
-                                     Maj James W. Bateman (13–21 Nov)
-                                     Maj Glen E. Martin
-
-
-_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Robert D. Taplett
-  Executive Officer                  Maj John J. Canney (to 28 Nov)
-                                     Maj Harold W. Swain
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Roland A. Marbaugh (to 4 Dec)
-                                     Capt Raymond H. Spuhler
-  Commanding Officer, G Company      1stLt Charles D. Mize (to 17 Nov)
-                                     Capt Chester R. Hermanson (18 Nov-2
-                                       Dec)
-                                     1stLt Charles D. Mize
-  Commanding Officer, H Company      1stLt Donald E. Watterson (to 8 Nov)
-                                     Capt Harold B. Williamson
-  Commanding Officer, I Company      Capt Harold G. Schrier
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj Murray Ehrlich (to 18 Nov)
-                                     Maj Harold W. Swain (19–28 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Hubert J. Shovlin
-
-
-_7th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to 7 Dec)
-                                     LtCol Raymond G. Davis
-  S-1                                Capt John R. Grove
-  S-2                                Capt Donald R. France (to 6 Dec)
-  S-3                                Maj Henry J. Woessner, II
-  S-4                                Maj David L. Mell (to 22 Nov)
-                                     Maj Maurice E. Roach
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Nicholas L. Shields (to 3 Dec)
-                                     Maj Walter T. Warren (4–7 Dec)[671]
-                                     Maj Rodney V. Reigard[672]
-  Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch
-    Mortar Company                   Maj Stanley D. Low (to 2 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Gordon Vincent (3–18 Nov)
-                                     Maj Rodney V. Reigard
-  Commanding Officer, Antitank
-    Company                          1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 20 Oct)
-                                     Maj Walter T. Warren (21 Oct-8 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Earl R. DeLong
-
-
-_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 7 Dec)
-                                     Maj Webb D. Sawyer
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Raymond V. Fridrich
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Elmer L. Starr (to 22 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt David W. Banks (to 20 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Myron E. Wilcox, Jr. (to 27 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Joseph R. Kurcaba (27 Nov-8-Dec)
-                                     1stLt William W. Taylor
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt William E. Shea (to 16 Nov)
-                                     Capt John F. Morris
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-  Company                            Maj William E. Vorhies
-
-
-_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 9 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Roland E. Carey (to 9 Nov)
-                                     Maj Webb D. Sawyer (10 Nov-8 Dec)
-                                     Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Walter R. Anderson
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Milton A. Hull (to 28 Nov)
-                                     1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, E Company      Capt Walter D. Phillips, Jr.
-                                       (to 28 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Raymond O. Ball (28 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Robert T. Bey
-  Commanding Officer, F Company      Capt Elmer J. Zorn (to 6 Nov)
-                                     Capt William E. Barber (7 Nov-3 Dec)
-                                     1stLt John M. Dunne (3–6 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Welton R. Abell
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. (to 12 Nov)
-                                     Maj Joseph L. Abel (13–19 Nov)
-                                     Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr.
-
-
-_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 10 Nov)
-                                     LtCol William F. Harris (11 Nov-6 Dec)
-                                     Maj Warren Morris
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Warren Morris (to 6 Dec)
-                                     Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt Eric R. Haars (to 29 Nov)
-  Commanding Officer, G Company      Capt Thomas E. Cooney (to 27 Nov)
-                                     Capt Eric R. Haars (29 Nov-3 Dec)
-                                     1stLt George R. Earnest
-  Commanding Officer, H Company      1stLt Howard H. Harris (to 11 Nov)
-                                     Capt Leroy M. Cooke (12–27 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Howard H. Harris (27 Nov-1 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge (1–5 Dec)
-                                     2dLt Minard P. Newton
-  Commanding Officer, I Company      Capt Richard H. Sengewald (to 14 Oct)
-                                     1stLt William E. Johnson
-                                       (15 Oct-3 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Alfred I. Thomas
-  Commanding Officer, Weapons
-    Company                          Maj Jefferson D. Smith (to 5 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Austin S. Parker (6–10 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Robert E. Hill
-
-
-_11th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Carl A. Youngdale
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 30 Nov)
-  S-1                                Maj Floyd M. McCorkle
-  S-2                                Capt William T. Phillips
-  S-3                                LtCol James O. Appleyard
-  S-4                                Maj Donald V. Anderson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Battery             Capt Albert H. Wunderly (to 7 Nov)
-                                     Capt Clarence E. Hixson (15–25 Nov)
-                                     1stLt William C. Patton
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Battery                  Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 16 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Joseph M. Brent
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch
-    Rocket Battalion                 1stLt Eugene A. Bushe
-
-
-_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Ransom M. Wood (to 15 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Harvey A. Feehan
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Francis R. Schlesinger
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Battery             Capt James W. Brayshay (to 25 Nov)
-  Commanding Officer, Service
-    Battery                          1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch
-  Commanding Officer, A Battery      Capt James D. Jordan
-  Commanding Officer, B Battery      Capt Arnold C. Hoffstetter (to 8 Oct)
-                                     Capt Gilbert N. Powell
-  Commanding Officer, C Battery      Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.
-
-
-_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Merritt Adelman
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Donald E. Noll (to 25 Oct)
-                                     Maj Neal G. Newell
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Battery             Capt George J. Batson
-  Commanding Officer, Service
-    Battery                          Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, D Battery      Capt Andrew J. Strohmenger (to 8 Dec)
-                                     Capt Richard E. Roach
-  Commanding Officer, E Battery      Capt John C. McClelland, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, F Battery      Capt George J. Kovich, Jr. (to 19 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Howard A. Blancheri
-
-
-_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Francis F. Parry
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Battery             1stLt Michael B. Weir (to 11 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Eugene H. Brown (12–18 Nov)
-                                     1stLt John J. Brackett
-  Commanding Officer, Service
-    Battery                          Capt Robert A. Thompson (to 17 Oct)
-                                     Capt Ernest W. Payne (18 Oct-30 Nov)
-                                     Capt Samuel A. Hannah
-  Commanding Officer, G Battery      Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 30 Nov)
-                                     Capt Ernest W. Payne
-  Commanding Officer, H Battery      Capt Benjamin S. Read (to 8 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Wilber N. Herndon
-  Commanding Officer, I Battery      Capt John M. McLaurin, Jr. (to 30 Nov)
-                                     Capt Robert T. Patterson
-
-
-_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj William McReynolds
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 8 Nov)
-                                     Maj Maurice J. Coffey
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Battery             Capt Charles S. Cummings (to 25 Oct)
-                                     Capt Paul L. Hirt
-  Commanding Officer, Service
-    Battery                          Capt Armand G. Daddazio
-  Commanding Officer, K Battery      1stLt Robert C. Messman (to 27 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Robert C. Parrott
-                                       (28 Nov-11 Dec)
-                                     Capt Arthur D. Challacombe
-  Commanding Officer, L Battery      Capt Lawrence R. Cloern
-  Commanding Officer, M Battery      Capt Vernon W. Shapiro
-
-
-_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Arthur J. Barrett
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Frank E. Granucci
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Maj James P. Treadwell
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Russell Hamlet
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Maj Arthur J. Noonan
-
-
-_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Francis H. Cooper
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Richard G. Warga
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarter Company              Capt Roger B. Thompson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Company                  Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt Bernard G. Thobe
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Lewis E. Bolts
-
-
-_1st Combat Service Group_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col John H. Cook, Jr.
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Edward A. Clark
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Francis L. Miller
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Maintenance Company              Maj Edward H. Voorhees
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Supply Company                   Maj Robert W. Hengesback
-  Commanding Officer, Support
-    Company                          Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, Truck Company  Capt John A. Pearson (to 11 Nov)
-                                     2dLt Alan G. Copp (11–30 Nov)
-                                     Capt Jack W. Temple
-  Commanding Officer, 1st
-    Fumigation and Bath Company      1stLt James L. Dumas
-  Commanding Officer, 1st Air
-    Delivery Platoon                 Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame
-
-
-_1st Engineer Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol John H. Partridge
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Richard M. Elliott
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt James H. McRoberts (to 20 Nov)
-                                     Maj Hewitt A. Snow
-                                     Capt Edward B. Newton
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Company                  Maj James W. McIllwain (to 22 Nov)
-                                     Capt Philip A. Terrell, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt George W. King (to 2 Dec)
-                                     Capt William R. Gould
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Orville L. Bibb
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 12 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Ronald L. Glendinning
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Byron C. Turner
-
-
-_1st Medical Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN
-  Executive Officer                  Cdr William S. Francis, USN
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Cdr William S. Francis, USN
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      LCdr James A. Kaufman, USN
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      LCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN
-  Commanding Officer, E Company      LCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (to 15 Oct)
-                                     Lt (jg) Ernest N. Grover, USN
-                                       (15–30 Oct)
-                                     LCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN
-
-
-_1st Motor Transport Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Olin L. Beall
-  Executive Officer                  Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt George B. Loveday
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt Arthur W. Ecklund
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt James C. Camp, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt Garfield M. Randall (to 30 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Norman E. Stow
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Bernard J. Whitelock (9 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Philip R. Hade
-  Commanding Officer, Automotive
-    Maintenance Company              Maj Edward L. Roberts
-  Commanding Officer, Automotive
-    Supply Company                   1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum
-  Commanding Officer, Amphibian
-    Truck Company, FMF[673]          Capt John Bookhout
-
-
-_1st Ordnance Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Lloyd O. Williams
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Theodore Tunis (to 13 Nov)
-                                     Capt Gordon H. Moore
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Ordnance Supply Company          Capt Russel S. LaPointe (to 5 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Victor F. Brown
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Ammunition Company               Capt Harvey W. Gagner (to 30 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Charles H. Miller
-  Commanding Officer, Ordnance
-    Maintenance Company              Capt George L. Williams
-
-
-_1st Service Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Charles L. Banks
-  Executive Officer                  Maj John R. Stone
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Morse “L” Holladay
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Company                  Capt Robert A. Morehead
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Support Company                  Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 27 Oct)
-                                     Capt Thomas M. Sagar
-
-
-_1st Shore Party Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Henry P. Crowe
-  Executive Officer                  LtCol Horace H. Figuers
-  Commanding Officer, Headquarters
-    and Service Company              Capt William T. Miller
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Maj William L. Batchelor (to 22 Nov)
-                                     Capt Nathaniel H. Carver
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Maj Henry Brzezinski
-  Commanding Officer C Company       Maj George A. Smith (to 24 Nov)
-                                     Maj Murray F. Rose
-
-
-_1st Signal Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Robert L. Schreier
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Elwyn M. Stimson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Howard K. Alberts (to 14 Nov)
-                                     Capt Earl F. Stanley
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Signal Company                   Maj Richard A. Glaeser
-  Commanding Officer, ANGLICO        Maj Fulton L. Oglesby (to 16 Nov)
-                                     Maj Frederick M. Steinhauser
-
-
-_1st Tank Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 LtCol Harry T. Milne
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 1 Dec)
-                                     Maj Philip C. Morrell
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             Capt Bruce W. Clarke (to 18 Nov)
-                                     1stLt Frederick L. Adams
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Company                  Capt Philip C. Morell (to 1 Dec)
-                                     Maj Douglas E. Haberlie
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt Gearl M. English (to 1 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Robert J. Craig
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Bruce F. Williams
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt Richard M. Taylor
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Lester T. Chase (to 18 Nov)
-                                     Capt Bruce W. Clarke (19 Nov-10 Dec)
-                                     1stLt Paul E. Sanders
-
-
-_7th Motor Transport Battalion_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Joseph F. Stepka (to 7 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Carl J. Cagle
-  Executive Officer                  Maj Vernon A. Tuson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Company             1stLt Reed T. King
-  Commanding Officer, A Company      Capt Ira N. Hayes
-  Commanding Officer, B Company      Capt Clovis M. Jones
-  Commanding Officer, C Company      Capt Fred B. Rogers
-  Commanding Officer, D Company      Capt Joseph L. Bunker
-
-
-_Marine Observation Squadron 6_
-
-  (Under operational control of
-    1stMarDiv and administrative
-    control of 1stMAW)
-  Commanding Officer                 Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk
-  Executive Officer                  Capt Victor A. Armstrong (to 13 Nov)
-                                     Capt Andrew L. McVickers
-
-
-1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
-
-  Commanding General                 MajGen Field Harris
-  Assistant Commanding General       BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman
-  Chief of Staff                     Col Kenneth H. Weir (8 Oct-1 Nov)
-                                     Col Caleb T. Bailey (2 Nov-15 Dec)
-  Deputy Chief of Staff for
-    Operations[674]                  Col Edward C. Dyer
-  G-1                                Col Raymond E. Hopper
-  G-2                                LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr.
-  G-3                                LtCol Howard A. York (to 9 Nov)
-                                     LtCol Paul J. Fontana
-                                       (10 Nov-28 Nov)[675]
-                                     LtCol Howard A. York
-                                       (29 Nov-15 Dec)
-  G-4                                Col Thomas J. Noon
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Rear Echelon, Itami              Col Roger T. Carleson
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Squadron, One       Capt Earl “B” Sumerlin, Jr.
-
-
-_Marine Aircraft Group 12_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col Boeker C. Batterton
-  Deputy Group Commander             LtCol Paul J. Fontana
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Squadron 12         Maj John E. Hays
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Service Squadron 12              Maj Claude H. Welch (to 4 Nov)
-                                     Maj Charles E. J. McLean
-
-
-_Marine Aircraft Group 33_
-
-  Commanding Officer                 Col Frank C. Dailey
-  Deputy Group Commander             LtCol Radford C. West
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Headquarters Squadron 33         Capt Walter “L” Hilton
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Service Squadron 33       LtCol James C. Lindsay
-
-
-_Squadrons_
-
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Fighter Squadron 212      LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Fighter Squadron 214      Maj Robert P. Keller (to 2 0Nov)
-                                     Maj William M. Lundin
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Fighter Squadron 312      LtCol “J” Frank Cole
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Fighter Squadron 311      LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (from 8 Nov)
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Fighter Squadron 323      Maj Arnold A. Lund
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine All-Weather Squadron 513  Maj J. Hunter Reinburg (to 4 Nov)
-                                     LtCol David C. Wolfe
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine All-Weather Fighter
-    Squadron 542                     LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr.
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Transport Squadron 152    Col Deane C. Roberts
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Ground Control
-    Intercept Squadron 1             Maj Harold E. Allen
-  Commanding Officer,
-    Marine Tactical Air Control
-    Squadron 2                       Maj Christian C. Lee
-
-
-    [671] Additional duty.
-
-    [672] Additional duty.
-
-    [673] Redesignated Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion,
-          15 Nov.
-
-    [674] Also Deputy C/S, Air Support, X Corps.
-
-    [675] Additional duty.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX G
-
-Enemy Order of Battle
-
-
-1. North Korean
-
-During operations around Wonsan the 1st Marine Division encountered
-fragments and stragglers from many NKPA divisions. The organized
-elements were chiefly from the 2d, 5th, and 15th Divisions.
-
-2. Chinese
-
-  42d Army
-    124th Division      In action against 7th Marines south of
-      370th Regiment    Sudong 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions
-      371st Regiment    of 3–6 Nov.
-      372nd Regiment
-    125th Division      Not in contact. Probably to west of
-      373rd Regiment    124th Division.
-      374th Regiment
-      375th Regiment
-    126th Division      Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru.
-      376th Regiment    Never heavily engaged.
-      377th Regiment
-      378th Regiment
-  20th Army
-    58th Division       First in action at Hagaru 28 Nov.
-      172nd Regiment    Badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru.
-      173rd Regiment
-      174th Regiment
-    59th Division       In contact with 7th Marines southwest
-      175th Regiment    of Yudam-ni 23 Nov. Later defended
-      176th Regiment    Toktong Pass.
-      177th Regiment
-    60th Division       In contact with 7th Marines southeast
-      178th Regiment    of Yudam-ni 25 Nov. Later moved to
-      179th Regiment    Funchilin Pass area.
-      180th Regiment
-    89th Division       First contacted by 7th Marines west
-      266th Regiment    of Hagaru 22 Nov. About 2 Dec
-      267th Regiment    moved south to Majon-dong area.
-      268th Regiment
-  27th Army
-    79th Division       Attacked Yudam-ni 27 Nov.
-      235th Regiment
-      236th Regiment
-      237th Regiment
-    80th Division       Attacked 7th Infantry Division units
-      238th Regiment    east of Reservoir 27 Nov.
-      239th Regiment
-      240th Regiment
-    81st Division       No report of contact until 13 Dec.
-      241st Regiment    May have been in Yudam-ni area.
-      242nd Regiment
-      243rd Regiment
-    90th Division       No contact reported. May have been
-      268th Regiment    in reserve near Hagaru.
-      269th Regiment
-      270th Regiment
-  26th Army
-    76th Division       First contacts east of Hagaru 5 Dec.
-      226th Regiment    Suffered heavy losses around Koto-ri.
-      227th Regiment
-      228th Regiment
-    77th Division       First contacts at Hagaru 5 Dec.
-      229th Regiment
-      230th Regiment
-      231st Regiment
-    78th Division       Not reported in contact. May not
-      232nd Regiment    have reached area in time for combat.
-      233rd Regiment
-      234th Regiment
-    88th Division       Not reported in contact. May not
-      263rd Regiment    have reached area in time for combat.
-      264th Regiment
-      265th Regiment
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX H
-
-Air Evacuation Statistics[676]
-
-
-  --------+------------------+------------------+-----------+-----
-          |      HAGARU      |     KOTO-RI      | YUDAM-NI  |
-          +----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----
-    Date  | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | HO4S |Total
-  --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----
-  27Nov50 | 19 |     0|    0 |   0|    0 |    0 |  0 |    2 |   21
-  28Nov50 | 24 |     0|   18 |   0|    0 |    0 |  0 |   32 |   74
-  29Nov50 | 31 |     0|   16 |   0|    0 |    0 |  0 |   22 |   69
-  30Nov50 | 62 |     0|    0 |   0|    0 |    0 |  0 |   49 |  111
-   1Dec50 | 52 |   157|    2 |   0|    0 |    7 |  1 |    3 |  222
-   2Dec50 |  0 |   960|    0 |  47|    0 |    0 |  0 |    0 |1,007
-   3Dec50 |  0 |   464|    0 |  53|    0 |    0 |  2 |    4 |  523
-   4Dec50 |  0 | 1,046|    0 |  89|    0 |    0 |  0 |    0 |1,135
-   5Dec50 |  0 | 1,580|    0 |  48|    0 |    2 |  0 |    0 |1,630
-   6Dec50 |  0 |   137|    0 |   0|    0 |    3 |  0 |    0 |  140
-   7Dec50 |  0 |     0|    0 | 226|    0 |    6 |  0 |    0 |  232
-   8Dec50 |  0 |     0|    0 |   0|   19 |    0 |  0 |    0 |   19
-   9Dec50 |  0 |     0|    0 |  21|  277 |    2 |  0 |    0 |  300
-  10Dec50 |  0 |     0|    0 |   0|    8 |    4 |  0 |    0 |   12
-  --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----
-  Totals  |188 | 4,344|   36 | 484|  304 |   24 |  3 |  112 |5,493
-  --------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----
-
-      [676] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith,
-            _Notes_, 844; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18. TBM evacuation
-            included under OY for Koto-ri, 2 to 7 December 1950.
-
-
-
-
-APPENDIX I
-
-Unit Citations
-
-
-THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
-
-WASHINGTON
-
-The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
-PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
-
-FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
-
-for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
-
-  “For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty
-  in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin Reservoir
-  and Koto-ri area of Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950.
-  When the full fury of the enemy counterattack struck both the
-  Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27 and 28 November 1950, the
-  First Marine Division, Reinforced, operating as the left flank
-  division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward
-  from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications
-  of hostile forces attacking the Eighth Army and, at the same
-  time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply
-  route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to
-  Chinhung-ni, approximately 35 miles distant. Ordered to withdraw to
-  Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly units in
-  the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area, the
-  Division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy Third
-  Route Army and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri
-  and Koto-ri held firmly against repeated and determined attacks by
-  hostile forces, gallantly fought its way successively to Hagaru-ri,
-  Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni and Hamburg over twisting, mountainous and
-  icy roads in sub-zero temperatures. Battling desperately night
-  and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a
-  period of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First
-  Marine Division, Reinforced, emerged from its ordeal as a fighting
-  unit with its wounded, with its guns and equipment and with its
-  prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy divisions, together
-  with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses which
-  seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces
-  for a considerable period of time. The valiant fighting spirit,
-  relentless perseverance and heroic fortitude of the officers and
-  men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, in battle against
-  a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with the highest
-  traditions of the United States Naval Service.”
-
-  The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division
-  participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea
-  from 27 November to 11 December 1950:
-
-  ORGANIC UNITS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION: First Marine Division
-  (less Detachment Headquarters Battalion; Detachment First Signal
-  Battalion; Detachment First Service Battalion; Detachment
-  Headquarters and Companies A and C, First Tank Battalion;
-  Automotive Supply Company, First Motor Transport Battalion;
-  Automotive Maintenance Company, First Motor Transport Battalion;
-  Detachment First Ordnance Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and
-  Company A, First Medical Battalion; First Shore Party Battalion;
-  4.5″ Rocket Battery and Service Battery, Fourth Battalion, Eleventh
-  Marines).
-
-  ATTACHED MARINE CORPS UNITS: Companies A and B, Seventh Motor
-  Transport Battalion; Detachment Radio Relay Platoon.
-
-  ATTACHED ARMY UNITS: Provisional Battalion (Detachments, 31st and
-  32nd Regimental Combat Teams); Company D, 10th Engineer Combat
-  Battalion; Tank Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Headquarters
-  Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Company B, 1st Battalion, 31st
-  Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (less
-  Company E); 185th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A).
-
-                                        For the President,
-
-                                        R. B. ANDERSON
-                                        _Secretary of the Navy_
-
-
-  GENERAL ORDERS                                DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
-
-  No. 72                           Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1951
-
-  DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION
-
-1. The 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, is cited for
-outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action
-against an armed enemy in the areas of Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru-ri, and
-Koto-ri, Korea, during the period 22 November to 14 December 1950. The
-historic role of close-support air missions flown by personnel on land
-and carrier based aircraft during the operations of the X Corps, United
-States Army, contributed immeasurably to the successful withdrawal of
-the X Corps when hordes of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops
-had encircled their positions endangering the entire operation. In
-their magnificent employment of close-support doctrine and in their
-exceedingly effective interdiction missions and night combat air
-patrols, the 1st Marine Air Wing flew 2,572 day and night sorties
-during this period, inflicting 10,313 enemy casualties and destroying
-723 buildings, 144 vehicles, 17 tanks, 9 bridges, 4 locomotives, 3
-command posts, 30 boxcars, 47 gun positions, and 19 supply, ammunition,
-and fuel dumps. These missions were flown over hazardous mountain
-terrain under extremely adverse weather conditions and in the face
-of intense enemy antiaircraft and small-arms fire. The normally
-ground-based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously improvised
-into an airborne center in a C-54 aircraft without appreciable loss
-of efficiency in operations and the responsibility for controlling
-aircraft was assumed and accomplished in a remarkable manner through
-day and night operations by controlling personnel. Airborne tactical
-air coordinators also were established to supplement the airborne
-center to direct specific strikes in areas not under surveillance of
-ground control parties to the end that every available sortie was
-utilized to maximum effectiveness. In the evacuation of friendly
-casualties by cargo airplanes, the use of helicopters for rescue of air
-personnel shot down by the enemy and the evacuation of wounded, and
-the high state of aircraft availability maintained by ground personnel
-working under hazardous and extremely adverse conditions because of
-intense cold, personnel of the entire 1st Marine Air Wing displayed
-fortitude, courage, and marked esprit de corps. Although suffering a
-considerable loss of personnel and equipment during this trying period,
-the morale and effectiveness of the 1st Marine Air Wing were sustained
-at a constantly high level. The repeated acts of valor and gallantry by
-the officers and men of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force,
-and their enviable combat record reflect great credit on the members
-thereof and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military
-service.
-
-By order of the Secretary of the Army:
-
-                                      J. LAWTON COLLINS
-                                      Chief of Staff, United States Army
-
-
-
-
-Bibliography
-
-
-Documents
-
-  Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of Special Report, Deputy
-    Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August-31 December 1950. Interviews
-    (Korea) File, Records and Research Section, Historical Branch,
-    G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC Historical).
-
-  Shutts, Richard W. Maj, USMC. Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of
-    the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea. Copy in Interviews (Korea)
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the Operations of the
-    1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean
-    War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the
-    First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Department of the Army. Joint Daily Situation Reports,
-    October-December 1950. Reports and Orders (1950-    ) (R&O) File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  U. S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War,
-    1950–54. Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Letters, memoranda, narratives, and statements received by
-    Historical Branch, G-3, concerning Korean operations. Monograph
-    and Comments File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  U. S. Marine Corps Board. _Marine Corps Board Study: An Evaluation
-    of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the
-    Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50)._ 2 vols. Copy in R&O File, HQMC
-    Historical.
-
-  Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report
-    Number 1, 25 June to 15 November 1950. 20 January 1951. 17 vols.,
-    processed. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Far East Command. Allied Translator and Interpreter Service. Enemy
-    Documents: Korean Operations. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical
-    and Document File Section.
-
-  ----. Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater
-    Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch. Terrain Study Number 6,
-    North Korea. 9 October 1950. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Operations Branch, Theater Intelligence Division, Military
-    Intelligence Section. Order of Battle Information Chinese
-    Communist Third Field Army. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in
-    Korea. 22 March 1951. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Staff Study: The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine
-    Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific. 19 October 1950.
-    R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. Combat Information Bulletin Number 4.
-    20 November 1950. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents,
-    October-December 1950. Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant
-    General’s Office, Alexandria, Va. (DRB, TAGO).
-
-  ----. Order of Battle Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of
-    Staff, G-2. CCF Army Histories. 1 December 1954. Copy at OCMH.
-
-  X Corps. Guerrilla Activities X Corps Zone, October-December 1950.
-    DRB, TAGO.
-
-  ----. Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10
-    December 1950. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, December 1950. DRB,
-    TAGO.
-
-  ----. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents,
-    October-December 1950. DRB, TAGO.
-
-  ----. G-2 Section. Periodic Intelligence Reports, October-December
-    1950. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing. Historical Diaries,
-    October-December 1950. Command Diary (Korea), Type B Report File
-    (Diary File), HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Special Action Report for the period 10 October 1950 to 15
-    December 1950. 7 May 1951.
-
-  Annexes
-    A     G-1
-    B     G-2
-    C     G-3
-    D     G-4
-    E     Medical
-    F     Special Services
-    G     Legal
-    H     Communications
-    I     VMR-152
-    J     Marine Air Group 33
-      Appendixes
-      A   S-1
-      B   S-2
-      C   S-3
-      D   S-4
-      E   Communications
-      F   Logistics
-      G   Medical
-      H   Public Information
-      I   Buildings and Ground
-      J   Ordnance
-      K   Transportation
-      L   Chaplain
-      M   Electronics
-      N   Photographic Unit
-      O   Engineering
-      P   Aerology
-      Q   VMF-214
-      R   VMF-212
-      S   VMF-323
-    K     Marine Air Group 12
-      Appendixes
-      A   Personnel
-      B   Intelligence
-      C Operations
-      D Logistics
-      E Supply
-      F VMF-311
-      G VMF-312
-      H VMF(N)-513
-      I VMF(N)-542
-      J MTACS-2
-      K MGCIS-1
-      L Engineering
-      M Ordnance
-      N Electronics
-      O Transportation
-      P Special Services
-      Q Mess
-      R Utilities
-      S Communications
-      T Medical
-      U Base Security
-      V Commanding Officer’s Comments
-
-  “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Marine Division, FMF. Historical Diaries, October-December
-    1950. Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Periodic Intelligence Reports, October-December 1950.
-    Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Periodic Operations Reports, October-December 1950.
-    Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Reports, messages, journals, correspondence, orders, and
-    miscellaneous matter, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-    1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Choshin (sic)
-    Reservoir Operation, 8 October-15 December 1950. 21 May 1951. 3
-    sections.
-
-  Annexes
-    A    G-1
-    B    G-2
-    C    G-3
-    D    G-4
-    E    Adjutant
-    F    Anti-tank
-    G    Chaplain
-    H    Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense
-    I    Dental
-    J   Embarkation
-    K   Engineer
-    L   Headquarters Commandant
-    M   Food Director
-    N   Historical
-    O   Inspector
-    P   Legal
-    Q   Medical
-    R   Motor Transport
-    S   Ordnance
-    T   Post Exchange
-    U   Public Information
-    V   Signal
-    W   Special Services
-    X   Supply
-    Y   Disbursing
-    Z   Civil Affairs
-    AA  Division Administration Center
-    BB  Fire Support Coordination Center
-    CC  Air and Air Observers
-    DD  Naval Gunfire
-    EE  Headquarters Battalion
-    FF  1st Service Battalion
-    GG  1st Signal Battalion
-    HH  1st Medical Battalion
-    II  1st Motor Transport Battalion
-    JJ  1st Amphibian Truck Company
-    LL  1st Ordnance Battalion
-    MM  1st Shore Party Battalion
-    NN  1st Engineer Battalion
-    OO  1st Tank Battalion
-    PP  1st Marines
-    QQ  5th Marines
-    RR  7th Marines
-    SS  11th Marines
-    TT  1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
-    UU  1st Combat Service Group
-    VV  7th Motor Transport Battalion
-    WW  VMO-6
-    XX  Cold Weather Operations
-
-  “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  Commander Amphibious Group One (CTF 90). Action Report Hungnam
-    Operation; Period 9 December 1950 through 25 December 1950. 21
-    January 1951. R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-    1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-    1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  7th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-    1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  11th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-    1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  Marine Air Group 12. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950.
-    Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Marine Air Group 33. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950.
-    Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion. Historical Diaries,
-    October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Shore Party Battalion. Historical Diary for Advance Party, R&O
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Unit Reports,
-    October-December 1950. Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea),
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special Action Report for Period 8
-    October to 15 December 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special Action Report for Period 7
-    October to 25 November 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. Special Action Report for Period 26 November to 15 December
-    1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December
-    1950. Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December
-    1950. Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Special Action Report for Period 8
-    October to 16 December 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF-212. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF-214. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF-312. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF-323. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-    HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF(N)-513. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  VMF(N)-542. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-    File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  1st Air Delivery Platoon, FMF. Historical Diaries, October-December
-    1950. Diary File, HQMC Historical.
-
-
-OTHER SOURCES
-
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-
-  Blumenson, Martin, Capt, USA. “MacArthur’s Divided Command,”
-    _Army_, 7, no. 4: 38–44, 65 (November 1956).
-
-  Bradley, Omar N., Gen, USA, Compiler. _Substance of Statements
-    Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950._ Washington:
-    Government Printing Office, 1951.
-
-  Canzona, Nicholas A. Capt, USMC, and John C. Hubbell. “The 12
-    Incredible Days of Col John Page,” _Readers Digest_, 69, no. 4:
-    84–89 (April 1956).
-
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-    1951).
-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-
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-    Gazette_, 37, no. 8: 28–32 (August 1951).
-
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-    Conflict,” _U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings_, 80, no. 12:
-    1337–1340 (December 1954).
-
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-    Korea._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.
-
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-    Reservoir,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 7: 18–27 (July 1952).
-
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-    Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954.
-
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-    Association Convention.” Copy in possession of Lynn Montross.
-
-  ----. “Address Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons.” Copy
-    in possession of Lynn Montross.
-
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-    Forces Journal_, 1, no. 10: 29–30 (May 1951).
-
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-    35, no. 5: 15–19 (May 1951).
-
-  Karig, Walter, Capt, USN, Cdr Malcolm Cagle, USN, and LtCdr Frank
-    A. Manson, USN. _Battle Report_: Vol VI, _The War in Korea_.
-    New York: Rinehart, 1952.
-
-  MacArthur, Douglas, Gen, USA. _Eleventh Report of the Operations
-    in Korea of United Nations Forces._ 31 January 1951. Washington:
-    Government Printing Office, 1951.
-
-  ----. “Gen. MacArthur Makes His Reply,” _Life_, 40, no. 7: 94–96,
-    101–102, 104, 107–108 (13 February 1956).
-
-  Mao Tze-tung. _Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolutionary War._
-    Edited by LtCol F. B. Nihart, USMC. Quantico: Marine Corps
-    Schools, 1951.
-
-  Marshall, S. L. A. CCF in the Attack. 5 January 1951. [EUSAK Staff
-    Memorandum ORO-S26]. Copy in R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
-  ----. “Last Barrier,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 37, no. 1: 20–23, no.
-    2: 40–46 (January-February 1953).
-
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-    Gazette_, 37, no. 3: 16–23 (March 1953).
-
-  Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U. S. Marine
-    Combat Helicopters._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.
-
-  ----. “Development of Body Armor,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 39, no.
-    6: 10–16 (June 1955).
-
-  ----. “Ridge Runners of Toktong Pass,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 37,
-    no. 5: 16–23 (May 1953).
-
-  Moorad, George. _Lost Peace in China._ New York: E. P. Dutton &
-    Co., 1949.
-
-  Office of the Chief of Military History. Report from the Secretary
-    of Defense to the President of the United States on Operations in
-    Korea. Draft no. 1. Copy in R&O File, HQMC Historical.
-
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-    Never Got Cold,” _Saturday Evening Post_, 223, no. 40: 32–3
-    (April 1951).
-
-  Rigg, Robert B., LtCol, USA. _Red China’s Fighting Hordes._
-    Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1951.
-
-  Schnabel, James F., Maj, USA. The Korean Conflict: Policy,
-    Planning, Direction. MS at OCMH.
-
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-    _Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, no. 11: 38–45 (November 1951).
-
-  Tallent, Robert W., SSgt, USMC. “New Enemy,” _Leatherneck
-    Magazine_, 34, no. 2: 12–15 (February 1951).
-
-  Taplett, Robert D., LtCol, USMC, and Maj Russell E. Whipple, USMC.
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-    14–23, no. 7: 44–51 (June-July 1953).
-
-  Thomas, R. C. W., Maj, British Army. “The Chinese Communist Forces
-    in Korea.” _The Army Quarterly_, October 1952, digested in
-    _Military Review_, 32, no. 11: 87–91 (February 1953).
-
-  Truman, Harry S. _Memoirs_, 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday,
-    1955–1956.
-
-  U. S. Department of State. _Guide to the U. N. in Korea._
-    Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. State
-    Department Publications 4229, Far East Series 47.
-
-  ----. _United Nations Actions in Korea._ Washington: U. S. Government
-    Printing Office, 1951. State Department Publications 4051.
-
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-    States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period
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-
-  Walker, Richard L. _China Under Communism: The First Five Years._
-    New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.
-
-  Westover, John G., Capt, USA, Editor. _Combat Support in Korea._
-    Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1955.
-
-  Whitney, Courtney, MajGen, USA. _MacArthur, His Rendezvous with
-    History._ New York: Knopf, 1956.
-
-  Willoughby, Charles A., and John Chamberlain. _MacArthur
-    1941–1951._ New York: McGraw Hill, [1954].
-
-  Xenophon. _The Anabasis of Cyrus._ Translated by Henry C. Dakyns.
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-    vols. New York: Random House, [1942].
-
-
-
-
-Index
-
-
-  Aid station, 192, 258, 316
-
-  Aircraft
-    Air Force and Navy Bombers, 143
-    AT-6 (Mosquito), 98, 349
-    B-26, 282
-    C-47, 69, 138, 246, 247, 278, 279, 281, 282, 308, 323
-    C-119, 191, 247, 282, 311
-    Carrier planes, 254
-    F4U (Corsair), 57, 67, 68, 70, 100, 102, 113, 118, 152, 156, 179,
-          193, 194, 218, 222, 224, 238, 255, 257, 263, 266, 268, 271,
-          287, 288, 290, 320, 347, 349
-    F-51 (Mustang), 190
-    HO3S-1 _See_ Helicopters.
-    L5G, 246, 351
-    Marine aircraft, 254, 264, 272
-    Mariners, 29
-    Navy planes, 325
-    Night fighters, 282
-    Observation planes (OY-2s), 66–69, 73, 152, 201, 202, 245, 246, 272,
-          288, 298, 305, 308, 351
-    R4D, 137, 138, 278, 279, 281, 282, 341, 349
-    R5D, 32, 191, 279, 296, 321, 349
-    Spotter plane, 154
-    Sunderlands, 29
-    TBM, 307, 349, 368
-    Transport planes, Marine, 191
-
-  Air drop, 68, 69, 191, 194, 243, 247, 250, 275, 277, 280, 282, 283,
-          306, 311, 322, 334, 349
-
-  Air Force, 311
-    Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 10, 35, 247
-      Combat Cargo Command, 32, 191, 247, 279, 281, 282, 349
-    Fifth Air Force, 34, 254, 287, 348, 350
-      Commanding general, 33
-      Headquarters, 33
-      RAAF Australian F-51s (Mustangs), 190
-
-  Air strikes, 56, 57, 109, 118, 147, 156, 224, 225, 230, 231, 238, 251,
-          258, 264, 265, 268, 271, 273, 288, 290, 320, 324, 326. _See
-          also_ Air Support.
-
-  Air strip
-    C-47, 149
-    OY strip (Yudam-ni), 253
-    OY strip (Hagaru), 137
-    OY strip (Majon-ni), 63
-
-  Air support, 54–56, 108, 109, 190, 194, 243, 253, 268, 286, 296, 302,
-          313, 320, 321, 339, 340, 343, 349, 350. _See also_
-          Air Strikes.
-    Breakout, 286, 287
-    Close, 70, 100, 102, 117, 152, 217, 254, 255, 263, 272, 286, 296,
-          299, 325, 348, 358
-    Evacuation, 278, 279, 281, 285, 308, 341
-    Observation, 163
-    Procedures, 33
-    Reconnaissance, 152, 163
-
-  Air operations, 349
-    Cargo, 349
-    Control, 348, 349
-      Air Defense Controllers, 348
-    Cover, 338
-    Innovations, 350
-    Problems, 347
-
-  Almond, Lt Gen Edward M., USA, 8–10, 10_n_, 11, 14, 15, 18, 24, 26,
-          29, 31, 32, 37–39, 54, 55, 57, 58, 76, 80, 82_n_, 90_n_, 98,
-          120, 126, 131, 132, 134, 134_n_, 137, 205, 238, 239, 250, 280,
-          285, 302, 308, 337, 340, 342, 343, 346, 339
-
-  Alvarez, SSgt. R. C, 183_n_, 257_n_, 266_n_, 288_n_
-
-  Ambushes, 70, 72
-
-  Ambush Alley, 62, 70, 72, 75, 77
-
-  Ammer, 1st Lt Henry G., 255
-
-  Ammunition, 194, 257, 259, 277, 282, 283, 285, 287, 302
-    Artillery, 160, 250, 254, 279
-    Bomb, 266
-    Mortar, 179, 201, 291, 324
-    Small arms, 144, 160
-
-  Amyotte, Cpl George A. J., 329, 330
-
-  Anbyon, 56, 59
-
-  Anderson, LtCol Berry K., USA, 245, 288
-
-  Anderson, LCdr Gustave T., (MC) USN, 307
-
-  Antung, Manchuria, 124
-
-  Anzio, 333
-
-  Arioli, Lt Peter E., (MC) USN, 264
-
-  Armor, body, 330
-
-  Armstrong, Capt Victor A., 34
-
-  Army, 247, 307
-
-  Army Units, U. S.
-    Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 1, 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 18, 26,
-          34–36, 43, 58, 63, 81, 82, 99, 118, 129, 132, 133, 142, 145,
-          146, 205, 238, 239, 277, 334, 337, 340, 345, 346, 350,
-          352, 355, 358
-      121st Army Evacuation Hospital, 189, 246
-      181st Counter Intelligence Corps team (CIC), 65
-      Fourth Signal Battalion, 127, 207, 290
-      Provisional Battalion, 245, 294, 296, 297, 312, 317, 318, 321, 324
-      Special Operations Company, 81, 126
-    IX Corps, 34, 35
-    X Corps, 1, 8–11, 14, 14_n_, 15, 18, 21–27, 33, 34, 36–38, 40–44,
-          59, 65, 75, 76, 81, 98, 125, 129, 131–134, 141, 143, 145, 147,
-          149, 188, 238, 240, 246, 280, 306, 308, 335–338, 340, 342,
-          352, 355, 357, 358
-      Command Post. _See_ Headquarters, X Corps, below.
-      Headquarters, 11, 29, 76, 98, 206, 340
-      Railway Transportation Section, 138
-      Tactical Air Command, (TAC X Corps), 31
-    1st Cavalry Division, 15, 34, 58, 82
-    2d Infantry Division, 36, 150
-    3d Infantry Division, 36, 43, 58, 59, 75, 76, 98, 126, 131, 136,
-          140, 145, 146, 308, 309, 326, 337–339, 342, 343
-    7th Infantry Division, 10, 14, 23, 24, 26, 58, 98, 123, 131, 135,
-          145, 146, 238, 288, 309, 333, 337, 339, 342, 352, 358
-    24th Infantry Division, 34
-    2d Engineer Special Brigade, 138, 139
-    187th Airborne RCT 34
-    7th Regimental Combat Team, 343
-    15th Regimental Combat Team, 343
-      1st Battalion, 74, 77
-    17th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 144
-    31st Infantry Regiment, 148, 205, 243, 288
-      Company B, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234
-      2d Battalion, 306, 312, 326, 328, 331
-      Tank Company, 326
-    32d Infantry Regiment, 243
-      1st Battalion, 140
-    65th Regimental Combat Team, 75, 126–128, 326, 327
-    2d Battalion, 127
-    10th Engineer Battalion, 235
-    Company D, 206, 213
-    185th Engineer Battalion, 311, 325
-    50th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic-weapons) Battalion, 315
-    57th Field Artillery Battalion, 243
-    92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 309, 313, 316, 326
-    96th Field Artillery Battalion, 14, 126–128
-
-  Artillery, 73
-    Army, 340
-    Chinese Communist Forces, 206, 220
-    Marine, 108–110, 117, 118, 165, 178, 201, 202, 240, 266,
-          272, 287, 291
-    Support, 100, 147, 156, 179, 194, 208, 217, 220, 253, 255, 257, 258,
-          260, 287, 290, 296, 302, 320, 321, 325
-
-  Ascom City, 11
-
-  Audas, SSgt John D., 191
-
-  Austin, Capt Bernard L., 15
-
-  Avant, Maj Percy F., Jr., 299
-
-
-  Babe, 1stLt George A., 311
-
-  _Badoeng Strait_ (CVE), USS, 32, 286, 347
-
-  Ball, 1stLt Raymond O., 174
-
-  Banks, LtCol Charles L., 207, 214, 215, 241, 285, 322
-
-  Banks, Capt David W., 100, 103
-
-  Barber, Capt William E., 180, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 264, 265
-
-  Barr, MajGen David G., USA, 75, 84, 84_n_, 98, 238, 239, 288, 340
-
-  Barrett, Capt R. L., Jr., 208_n_, 209, 216_n_
-
-  Barrow, Capt Robert H., 49, 51_n_, 55_n_, 69, 70, 72, 221,
-          314–316, 320
-
-  Bartley, LtCol Whitman S., 279_n_, 305_n_, 306
-
-  _Bataan_ (CVL), USS, 287, 333, 334, 349
-
-  Bates, Maj W. L., Jr., 221_n_, 222, 314_n_, 321, 355
-
-  Batterton, Col Boeker C., 342
-
-  _Bayfield_ (APA), USS, 25, 31, 341
-
-  Beaches
-    Hungnam
-      BLUE, 343
-      GREEN, 340, 343
-      PINK, 343
-      YELLOW, 342
-    Wonson
-      BLUE, 22, 31, 39, 40
-      RED, 26
-      YELLOW, 22, 31, 39, 40, 45
-
-  Beall, LtCol Olin L., 99, 160, 180, 244, 245, 285
-
-  Bear, 120
-
-  Beech, Keyes, 192, 194, 323
-
-  Beeler, 1stLt James D., 68
-
-  Belleau Wood, 302
-
-  Belli, 1stLt George S., 46_n_, 48, 51, 52, 57
-
-  Benson, Pfc Robert F., 181
-
-  Betts, 1stLt Harrison F., 210, 216
-
-  Bey, 1stLt R. T., 100_n_, 104_n_, 108, 108_n_, 167, 168, 172, 183_n_, 186
-
-  Beyes, 1stLt Warren J., 107_n_
-
-  Blanchard, LtCol Robert M., USA, 74
-
-  Blancheri, 1stLt Howard A., 222
-
-  Blankenship, Capt C. P., 244_n_
-
-  Blasingame, Capt Hersel D. C., 69, 311
-
-  Blatt, Capt Wallace D., 34
-
-  Blocking and Escort Force, United Nations, 27
-
-  Blumenson, Capt Martin, USA, 8_n_, 11_n_, 243_n_
-
-  Booby trap, 43, 71
-
-  Boley, 2dLt James J., 209
-
-  Borgomainero, SSgt Russell J., 164
-
-  Bott, 2dLt Kenneth A., 67
-
-  Bowman, Lt George, 263_n_
-
-  Bowser, Col Alpha L., 26_n_, 38_n_, 39_n_, 43_n_, 54, 60, 89_n_,
-          92_n_, 100_n_, 136, 205, 206, 213, 311
-
-  _Boxer_ (CV), USS, 17, 25
-
-  Bradley, 1stLt Bobbie B., 318
-
-  Bradley, Gen O. N., USA, 35_n_
-
-  Breakout
-    Logistics, 247
-    Plans, 238, 239, 250, 251
-
-  Bridge, 274, 286, 296, 297, 302
-    M-2 Steel Treadway, 311, 319, 329–331
-
-  Bridges, Maj David W., 46_n_, 49, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51_n_, 314_n_,
-          321_n_, 325_n_
-
-  Brower, Col. James H., 40, 220, 247_n_
-
-  _Brush_ (DD), USS, 27
-
-  Brzezinski, Maj Henry, 40
-
-  Buck, 1stLt John A., 226_n_, 232, 234
-
-  Bunkers, Chinese Communist Forces, 315, 316, 320, 325
-
-  Burke, 1stLt John L., Jr., 207
-
-
-  Cafferatta, Pvt Hector A., 181
-
-  Cahill, 2dLt John H., 167, 182, 270
-
-  Camaratta, 2dLt August L., 270
-
-  Camp Lejeune, 330_n_
-
-  Canney, Maj John J., 171
-
-  Canzona, 1stLt N. A., 215_n_, 219, 235, 238, 241, 300_n_, 327, 331_n_
-
-  Capraro, Capt M. J., 226_n_, 229_n_, 232, 234
-
-  Carey, 2dLt Richard E., 202, 203, 220_n_, 235_n_, 241_n_, 326
-
-  Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., 49–51
-
-  Carlson, CWO Allen, 275
-
-  Caruso, Sgt Matthew, 297
-
-  Cashion, 2dLt Dana B., 182, 182_n_
-
-  Casualties
-    Army, U. S., 74, 81, 127, 214, 243–245, 306_n_, 343
-    Chinese Communist Forces, 108–110, 112, 117, 121, 147, 164, 166,
-          168, 174, 181–183, 186, 188, 190, 194, 222, 224, 226, 241,
-          242, 263, 266, 290, 293, 294, 299, 306, 315, 316, 320, 324,
-          351, 354, 355
-    Enemy losses, 118
-    Evacuation, 55, 57, 138, 139, 245, 246, 253, 305, 307, 319, 334, 349
-      Control Officer, 339
-    Marine, 51, 52, 54, 57, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 100, 102, 109, 116–118,
-          121, 124, 127, 157, 166, 168, 174, 178, 179, 181, 182, 186,
-          188, 190–192, 194, 201, 210, 216, 219, 224, 225, 234, 240–243,
-          245, 247, 258, 264, 265, 272, 275, 278–281, 284, 290, 291,
-          293, 298, 299, 302, 303, 306–308, 315, 316, 319, 323, 325,
-          328, 330–332, 351, 385
-      Casualty list, 57
-    North Korean (NKPA), 51, 53, 70, 72, 73
-    Personnel losses, 69
-    Republic of Korea Army, 214
-
-  Catania, Lt Alfred J., 226_n_
-
-  Cates, Gen Clifton B., 133, 134_n_, 359
-
-  _Ceylon_ (CL), HMS, 28
-
-  Chabek, 1stLt Jack A., 179
-
-  Challacombe, Capt Arthur D., 266
-
-  Chamberlain, J., 35_n_
-
-  Chambers 1stLt George C, 49, 52
-
-  Chandler, 1stLt J. B., 294_n_
-
-  Changjin, 44, 96, 99, 132, 134, 135, 200, 204, 230, 286
-
-  _Chatterer_ (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Cherisophus, 357
-
-  Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 84
-
-  Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 231, 234, 283
-
-  Chigyong, 77, 80–82, 124, 126, 128, 136, 140, 147, 197, 204, 205, 335
-
-  Chiles, LtCol John H., USA, 135, 145
-
-  China, 3, 5, 7
-    Central Committee, 85
-    Civil War, 83–85
-    “Hate America” campaign, 91
-    Intervention, 35, 131
-    Kiangsi Province (South China), 83
-    North China, Occupation by Marines, 85
-    People’s Revolutionary Military Council, 86
-    “Resist America, Aid Korea” movement, 90
-    Seventh Party Congress, 85
-
-  Chinese Communist Forces, 5, 81, 85, 98, 99, 129, 203
-    Assault, 168
-    Bugle calls, 104
-    Bunkers. _See_ Bunkers.
-    Command Post, 315
-    Counterstroke, 146
-    Entrenchment, 156, 157
-    Equipment, 88
-    Fortifications, 157
-    Intervention, 128, 129, 142, 143
-    Jet fighters, 142
-    Logistics, 88, 93, 353
-    “Long March”, 83
-    Organization, 85, 86, 88
-    People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 83–85
-    Plans, 353
-    Rank, 88
-    Recruiting, 87
-    Reinforcements, 296
-    Roadblock, 109
-    Strategic concepts, 90
-    Strategy, 91
-    Strong point, 325
-    Tactics, 89, 91–94, 354
-    Training, 87
-    Troops, 79, 98
-    Uniforms, 89
-    Units
-      3d Field Army, 161, 352, 356
-      4th Field Army, 99, 352, 355
-      9th Army Group, 161, 352, 354–356, 358
-      20th Army, 149, 352–355
-      24th Army, 352
-      26th Army, 313, 352–355
-      27th Army, 352, 354, 355
-      30th Army, 352
-      32d Army, 313, 352
-      42d Army, 82, 99, 352
-      58th Division, 149, 220, 242, 285, 326, 352
-      59th Division, 149, 161, 242, 285, 352
-      60th Division, 149, 225, 285, 313, 352
-      70th Division, 352
-      76th Division, 352
-      77th Division, 286, 313, 352, 355
-      78th Division, 286, 313, 352
-      79th Division, 161, 167, 171, 178, 266, 285, 352
-      80th Division, 285, 352
-      81st Division, 352
-      89th Division, 161, 167, 178, 187, 285, 313, 352
-      94th Division, 313, 352
-      124th Division, 82, 99, 105, 110, 118, 120, 352
-      125th Division, 99, 332
-      126th Division, 99, 123, 167, 332
-      172d Regiment, 220, 242
-      173d Regiment, 220, 242
-      174th Regiment, 220, 242
-      176th Regiment, 242
-      179th Regiment, 225
-      235th Regiment, 167, 168, 172, 174, 184, 185, 186, 266
-      236th Regiment, 167, 168, 170, 174, 187
-      237th Regiment, 167, 170
-      267th Regiment, 167
-      370th Regiment, 99, 103, 107, 110
-      371st Regiment, 103, 104, 107, 110
-      372d Regiment, 103, 110
-    Chinese Nationalists, 84, 85
-
-  Chinhung-ni, 96, 98, 110, 112–114, 116, 117, 120, 124, 133–141,
-          146–149, 202, 221, 284, 303, 307–309, 312–314, 323–327, 331,
-          333, 333, 341, 330
-    Tank Battle, 113
-
-  Chinnampo, 8, 27, 34
-
-  Chonchon-ni, 52, 33, 37
-
-  Chongjin, 28, 44, 45, 76, 132, 145
-
-  Chongju, 9
-
-  Chongsanjangsi, 36–38
-
-  Chou En-Lai, 7
-
-  Chorwon, 35
-
-  Chosin, 38
-    Campaign, 346, 348, 336
-      Plans, 38
-      Results, 356–339
-    Reservoir, 82, 96, 98, 99, 110, 116, 117, 120, 123, 124, 132, 133,
-          137, 139, 145–149, 151, 198, 205, 238, 239, 266, 309, 350, 352
-    Withdrawal from. _See_ Breakout.
-
-  Cho Il Kwon, Col (NKPA), 50
-
-  Chuchonhujang, 132
-
-  CIC, 66, 70, 71, 73, 202, 203
-
-  Civil affairs, 65, 66, 73
-
-  Clark, Maj Albert L, 299
-
-  Clark, 1stLt Truman, 299, 307
-
-  Clearing stations, 139, 210, 211, 246, 307
-
-  Clements, 1stLt Leonard M., 174
-
-  Clothing, cold weather, 58, 80, 281
-
-  Cochran, Maj Robert L., 107, 117
-
-  Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., 224
-
-  Coffman, 2dLt Harold L., 69, 71_n_
-
-  Cole, LtCol J. Frank, 68
-
-  _Collett_ (DD), USS, 28
-
-  Collins, Capt E. E., 172_n_, 183_n_, 186_n_
-
-  Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 5, 359
-
-  Colmery, 1stLt Harry W., 217
-
-  Command Post. _See_ Unit concerned.
-
-  Commander in Chief Far East (CinCFE). _See_ General of the Army
-          Douglas MacArthur, USA.
-
-  Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt). _See_ Adm Arthur W.
-          Radford, USN.
-
-  Commander Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). _See_ VAdm A. D. Struble, USN.
-
-  Commiskey, 2dLt Henry A., 49
-
-  Communications, 210, 349
-    Wire, 282
-
-  Composite battalion, 251
-
-  Condit, Kenneth W., 32_n_, 138_n_
-
-  Conference, 33
-
-  Connell, Capt H. G., 100_n_, 103
-
-  _Consolation_ (AH), USS, 139, 246
-
-  Convoy, 43, 48, 70, 74, 73, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286
-    Enemy, 116
-    Motor, 38, 59, 62, 77, 149, 180, 200, 318
-    Supply, 68
-
-  Cook, Col John H., Jr., 40
-
-  Cooke, Capt Leroy M., 154, 165
-
-  Cool, Capt William C, 339
-
-  Coon, Cpl G. L., 294_n_
-
-  Cooney, Capt Thomas E., 118, 120, 154, 157_n_
-
-  Corbet, 2dLt R. H., 184
-
-  Corley, Capt Clarence E., Jr., 66, 67, 71_n_, 73_n_, 201, 204_n_,
-          208_n_, 208–211, 216
-
-  Corman, Capt Otis W. S., 117
-
-  Correspondents, press, 281, 282, 322
-
-  Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 45_n_, 54_n_, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 76_n_,
-          125, 125_n_, 137, 285, 340, 345
-
-  Craven, LCdr John H., USN, 121_n_, 172_n_, 272, 278
-
-  Craven, 1stLt William A., 49
-
-  Cronin, Maj Angus J., 274
-
-  Cronk, Capt Welby W., 224
-
-  Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., 82, 99, 109, 112_n_, 114_n_, 116_n_, 329
-
-  Crowe, LtCol Henry P., 40, 338, 339
-
-  Crutchfield, 2dLt James L., 68
-
-  Counter Intelligence Corps. _See_ CIC.
-
-  Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 286, 342
-
-
-  D-Day (Wonsan Landing), 11
-
-  Dairen, 142
-
-  Dakyns, Henry C., 357_n_
-
-  Damnation Battalion, 251
-
-  Dana, 1stLt C. C., 180_n_, 190_n_
-
-  Danford, SSgt R. R., 180_n_, 190_n_
-
-  Davidson, Sgt Charles V., 240
-
-  Davis, Maj Daniel H., 107
-
-  Davis, Sgt K. E., 208_n_, 210
-
-  Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 80_n_, 99, 99_n_, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106,
-          108_n_, 112, 112_n_, 121_n_, 148, 149, 178, 190, 254_n_, 257,
-          258, 259_n_, 260, 261, 263, 264, 270–273, 294, 317
-
-  Davis, Capt W. J., 100, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116_n_, 259_n_, 264
-
-  Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., 187
-
-  Degernes, 2dLt Mayhlon, L., 208, 209
-
-  Delong, 1stLt Earl R., 108, 109
-
-  Demolitions, 302
-    Teams, 301
-    C3 explosive, 208
-
-  DeMott, Pfc Robert D., 329, 330
-
-  Dennis, 1stLt Carl E., 236
-
-  Denny, 2dLt Paul E., 165
-
-  Derevyanko, LtGen Kuzma, (USSR), 90
-
-  Dickerson, Sgt C W., 229_n_
-
-  Dirst, WO Lloyd V., 231
-
-  Dolcater, Capt Max W., USA, 74_n_, 76_n_, 77_n_, 126_n_, 127_n_, 309_n_
-
-  Dowsett, LtCol Frederick W., 114_n_, 121_n_, 297, 317
-
-  Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 15, 23–25, 29–31, 38, 76, 134, 240, 336,
-          337, 341, 342_n_, 345, 359
-    Amphibious Group, 18
-
-  Doyle, Capt R. A., 67_n_, 68_n_
-
-  _Doyle_ (DMS), USS, 27
-
-  Drury, Clifford M., 40_n_
-
-  Drysdale, LtCol Douglas B., RM., 140, 225, 226, 228–231, 235, 300
-
-  Duffy, 1stLt Leroy M., 63, 64
-
-  Duke, Capt Irving T., 15
-
-  Dumps, 138
-    Ammunition, 215, 343
-      Enemy, 117
-    RCT-7, 140
-    Supply, 41, 46, 48, 160, 195, 197, 214, 282, 285
-      Area, 241
-      Medical, 139, 149
-      ROK, 44, 54
-
-  Duncan, David, 322
-
-  Dunkerque, 334
-
-  Dunkirk, 333, 345
-
-  Dunne, 1stLt John M., 180
-
-  Durham, Maj Thomas A., 171
-
-  Dyer, BrigGen E. C., 387_n_
-
-  Dysentery, 30
-
-
-  Eagan, Maj James K., 231, 234_n_
-
-  Earney, Maj W. R., 103_n_, 107_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_, 193_n_, 251, 266_n_
-
-  Eberle, MajGen George L., USA, 10, 11_n_
-
-  Edwards, LtCol H. W., 29_n_
-
-  Elledge, 1stLt Raymond J., 113
-
-  _Endicott_ (DMS), USS, 27
-
-  Endsley, 2dLt Wendell C., 208, 209
-
-  Enemy, 74
-
-  Engineers, 263, 279, 293, 302, 324
-    Army, 311
-    Demolitions crew, 257
-
-  _English_ (DD), USS, 56
-
-  Englehardt, 1stLt Floyd J., 191, 246
-
-  Estess, Sgt M. L., 229_n_
-
-  Ewen, RAdm Edward C., USN, 15
-
-
-  Faber, TSgt Don, 270
-
-  Faith, LtCol Don C., USA, 243, 244
-
-  Far East Command. _See_ General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.
-    General Headquarters, 5, 8, 22
-    Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 8, 9, 11, 13, 22, 23
-
-  Farish, Capt George B., 57, 246
-
-  Farmer, 1stLt Chester B., 52
-
-  Feehan, LtCol Harvey A., 156, 250, 274
-
-  Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., 66, 200, 204_n_, 208, 209, 216, 240
-
-  Fisher, Sgt Robert, 52
-
-  Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., (MC) USN, 67
-
-  Floodlights, 210, 247
-
-  Forney, Col Edward H., 98, 239, 281, 308, 336, 338, 339
-
-  Forrest, 1stLt Shelby M., 107
-
-  Forward Air Controller (FAC), 53, 67, 70, 113, 193, 255, 263, 265,
-          288, 294, 306, 346, 349
-
-  Forward Observer (FO) team, 67
-
-  Foster, Sgt Charles, 118
-
-  Foster, Pvt Richard J., 127_n_
-
-  France, Capt Donald R., 297
-
-  Frederick, Capt Charles D., 72
-
-  Freeman, Capt A. Z., 159_n_, 180_n_
-
-  Fridrich, LtCol R. V., 254_n_, 259_n_, 260, 264_n_
-
-  Frostbite, 351, 354
-
-  Fuel, 275, 285
-    Diesel oil, 282
-    Gasoline, 277, 282
-
-  Funchilin Pass, 96, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 312–314, 317, 320
-
-  Fusen Reservoir, 38, 99, 123
-
-
-  Gall, Maj W., 329
-
-  Gallo, SSgt Saverio P., 202
-
-  Gastro-enteritis, 30
-
-  GCA, 348
-
-  Geer, LtCol Andrew, 62_n_, 73_n_, 103_n_, 107_n_, 112_n_, 116_n_,
-          120_n_, 179_n_, 186_n_, 187_n_, 189_n_, 190_n_, 271_n_,
-          288_n_, 314_n_, 318_n_
-
-  _George Clymer_ (APA), USS, 25
-
-  Giusti, Ernest H., 32_n_
-
-  Godolphin, F. R. B., 357_n_
-
-  Goggin, 1stLt W. F., 100_n_, 108_n_, 109_n_, 110_n_, 120, 120_n_
-
-  Golden, Pfc Jack, 67
-
-  Goss, 2dLt Harvey A., 67
-
-  Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 34, 68_n_, 245, 350
-
-  Gould, Capt William R., 300–302, 330
-
-  Graeber, 1stLt William C., 81, 99_n_, 100_n_, 103_n_, 106
-
-  Grayson, MSgt E. F., 229_n_
-
-  Greene, 1stLt Daniel, 255, 263
-
-  Griffen, Lt (jg) Cornelius J., (ChC) USN, 297
-
-  Groff, Capt Goodwin C., 224
-
-  Ground Control Approach. _See_ GCA.
-
-  Guadalcanal, 302
-
-  Guerrillas, 59, 67, 70–72, 74, 81, 82, 125–128, 145, 326
-    First Raid on MSR, 81
-
-  Gugeler, Capt Russel A., USA, 243_n_
-
-
-  Hagaru, 96, 98, 117, 121, 124, 131, 134–141, 146–149, 151, 159–161,
-          178, 180, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 198, 200–205, 206_n_,
-          207–211, 213–220, 222, 225, 229–231, 235, 238–247, 249, 250,
-          254, 260, 262, 270, 271, 273, 274, 277, 278, 280–283, 285–291,
-          293, 294, 298, 305–309, 311, 313, 319, 324, 326, 333, 334,
-          349, 350, 353, 355
-    Airstrip, 134, 137, 138, 195, 197, 200, 210, 219, 235, 246,
-          247, 281, 302
-    Breakout, 287, 288, 294, 296–302
-      Air cover, 286, 287
-      Demolitions, 301
-      Plans, 283–286, 294
-    Destruction of excess material, 285
-    Intelligence, 202–204, 206, 285
-    Medical, 278, 279
-    Military government, 202, 203
-
-  Hall, 2dLt Wayne L., 208, 209
-
-  Hamhung, 7, 18, 38, 41, 45, 58, 59, 76, 77, 79–82, 95, 96, 98, 99,
-          125–128, 131, 133–138, 146, 150, 201, 205, 239, 246, 280, 304,
-          312, 332, 333, 338, 342, 346, 348, 355
-
-  Han River, 15
-
-  Hancock, 1stLt John R., 257, 293
-
-  Hangkow, 85
-
-  _Hank_ (DD), USS, 56
-
-  Hapsu, 132, 145
-
-  Hargett, 1stLt Ernest C., 112, 116, 328, 329_n_, 330
-
-  Harmon, Capt Lester G., 69
-
-  Harriman, Averell, 35_n_
-
-  Harris, MajGen Field, 31, 33, 137, 165_n_, 239, 350
-
-  Harris, 1stLt H. H., 103_n_, 116, 116_n_, 117, 118, 120_n_,
-          165, 166, 258
-
-  Harris, LtCol William F., 165, 257, 272, 297
-
-  Harrison, TSgt C. L., 229_n_
-
-  Harrison, Col C. W., 2_n_, 81_n_
-
-  Harrison, CWO Willie S., 300, 330
-
-  Hartman, RAdm Charles C., USN, 15
-
-  Hawkins, LtCol Jack, 44_n_, 46, 48, 48_n_, 49, 51_n_, 53_n_, 54_n_,
-          55, 55_n_, 58, 58_n_
-
-  Heater, Capt James B., 293
-
-  _Helena_ (CA), USS, 28
-
-  Helicopters, 54, 56–58, 68, 72, 104, 117, 125, 147–150, 191, 195, 205,
-          245, 254, 285, 288, 325, 351
-    HO3S-1, 202, 246, 351
-    HMX-1, 351
-
-  Hell Fire Valley, 230, 296, 297, 299, 302. _See also_ Task
-          Force, Drysdale.
-
-  Henderson, Col Frederick P., 323
-
-  Henderson, RAdm George R., USN, 15
-
-  Henneberger, Capt Harry G. C., 107
-
-  Hering, Capt Eugene R., (MC) USN, 245, 278, 279, 307
-
-  Hermanson, Capt Chester R., 255, 257
-
-  Hickey, MajGen Doyle O., USA, 9, 10, 11_n_, 205, 309
-
-  Highway, 95
-
-  Higginbotham, Capt S. W., 294_n_, 299_n_
-
-  Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, 337
-
-  Higgins, Marguerite, 281, 323
-
-  Hill D, 312. _See also_ Hill 1457.
-
-  Hill, East, 204–207, 213–220, 240–242, 286, 288, 290, 291, 293,
-          301, 303, 326
-
-  Hill, Fox, 180–182, 190, 191, 194, 201, 202, 204, 254, 264, 270
-
-  Hill, How, 114, 120. _See also_ Hill 891.
-
-  Hill 109----49, 51, 52, 57
-
-  Hill 117----49, 53, 55
-
-  Hill 185----49, 51, 52
-
-  Hill 532----103
-
-  Hill 698----100, 102, 103, 103_n_, 104, 105, 107–109, 112
-
-  Hill 727----103–105, 107, 108, 112
-
-  Hill 891----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118–120
-
-  Hill 987----110, 114, 116, 117, 117_n_, 118, 120
-
-  Hill 1081----312–316, 320, 321, 324–326, 328
-
-  Hill 1100----257
-
-  Hill 1167----158, 168, 253
-
-  Hill 1182----228, 232
-
-  Hill 1236----226, 232
-
-  Hill 1240----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 174, 177, 178, 183, 187,
-          189, 253, 257
-
-  Hill 1276----159, 253, 257, 265, 268
-
-  Hill 1282----158, 160, 167, 168, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 183–187,
-          251, 253, 255, 257. _See also_ Ridge, North.
-
-  Hill 1294----159, 253
-
-  Hill 1304----117_n_, 318, 321
-
-  Hill 1328----312, 317, 318, 327
-
-  Hill 1384----158, 167, 170, 171, 182
-
-  Hill 1403----152, 154, 156–158, 165, 166, 170, 183, 187, 188
-
-  Hill 1419----178, 179, 257–259
-
-  Hill 1426----154, 157, 159, 253
-
-  Hill 1457----312, 317, 318, 321, 328, 329
-
-  Hill 1520----261–264, 268
-
-  Hill 1542----257, 258, 266–268
-
-  Hill 1653----190, 263, 264
-
-  Hinds, 1stLt John R., 290
-
-  Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, 238, 243
-
-  Hoffstetter, Pfc Donald O., 67
-
-  Holland, 1stLt Dan C., 100_n_, 103, 113
-
-  Holloway, LCdr Charles K., USN, 99
-
-  Holmes, 1stLt Donald M., 65
-
-  Honeycutt, 1stLt J. H., 288_n_, 291
-
-  Hood, Maj H. E., 282_n_, 296
-
-  Hope, Bob, 31
-
-  Hopkins, 2dLt Frederick W., 65, 236, 241
-
-  Hospelhorn, Capt Cecil W., USA, 311
-
-  Hospital, 139, 197, 281
-
-  House, 1stLt Arthur E., 257
-
-  Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., 220, 258, 259_n_, 260, 264, 321
-
-  Hubbell, J. C., 327_n_
-
-  Huchanggangu, 132
-
-  Huichon, 132, 133, 146, 149
-
-  Huksu-ri, 109, 116_n_, 123, 131, 135, 140, 147, 149
-
-  Hull, Capt Milton A., 100_n_, 102, 102_n_, 108, 108_n_, 109, 154_n_,
-          167_n_, 172_n_, 174, 187
-
-  Hungmun-ni, 201
-
-  Hungnam, 9, 22, 23, 58, 75, 76, 95, 96, 109, 125, 126, 131, 136, 138,
-          139, 141, 148, 150, 200, 205, 246, 281, 305, 325, 327, 332,
-          333, 335, 336, 338, 345, 346, 348, 357
-    Cemetery, 341
-    Evacuation, 338–343, 349
-      Plans, 335–337
-      Warnings, 239
-    Mine clearance, 135
-    Redeployment, 338, 355, 359
-    Withdrawal to. _See_ Breakout.
-
-  Hwachon, 35
-
-  Hyesanjin, 98, 132, 144
-
-
-  Imjin, 62, 64, 66, 74
-
-  Inchon, 10, 11, 13–15, 17, 18, 21–27, 33, 143, 336, 340, 346
-    Amphibious assault, 1
-    Landing, 3, 5, 343
-    Inchon-Seoul Operation, 10, 11_n_, 14, 281
-
-  _Incredible_ (AM) USS, 27
-
-  Indigestion, 351
-
-  Itami, 287, 342
-
-  Iwo Jima, 302
-
-  Iwon, 58, 75
-
-
-  Jaeger, 2dLt John W., 236
-
-  Japan, 36, 43, 247, 279, 281, 311
-    Logistical command, 10
-
-  Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 161_n_, 164, 165_n_, 166, 188_n_, 293
-
-  Jennings, 1stLt William E., 107_n_
-
-  Jessup, Ambassador Philip, 35_n_
-
-  Jeter, 1stLt Manning T., Jr., 288
-
-  Jochums, 1stLt Robert E., 217, 218, 235_n_
-
-  Johnson, Capt David G., 288
-
-  Johnson, 1stLt Horace L., Jr., 210, 211, 216
-
-  Johnson, Cdr Howard A., (MC) USN, 308
-
-  Johnson, Secretary of Defense Louis, 5
-
-  Johnson, 1stLt Richard M., 290
-
-  Johnson, 1stLt William E., 118, 267
-
-  Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5–9, 37, 128, 129
-
-  Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Operations Center (JOC), 348
-
-  Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). _See_ Far
-          East Command.
-
-  Jones, Capt Clovis M., 205
-
-  Jones, 2dLt Donald R., 70, 316, 320
-
-  Jones, SSgt Donald T., 105
-
-  Jones, TSgt H. T., 72
-
-  Jones, Capt Jack R., 183, 184, 186, 293
-
-  Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 10, 13, 23, 25, 27, 43, 134, 140, 239, 336,
-          337, 345, 348, 359
-
-
-  Kaesong, 9, 15, 34
-
-  Kalma Peninsula, 17, 18, 22, 26, 39, 40
-
-  Kanggye, 97, 132–134, 146
-
-  Karig, Walter, 23_n_, 27_n_, 28_n_, 29_n_, 142_n_
-
-  Katsuma, 58
-
-  Kaufer, 1stLt Edward E., 49
-
-  Keeton, Sgt E. J., 229_n_
-
-  Kerr, Capt William A., 224
-
-  Kerrigan, Maj W. E., 172_n_
-
-  Kiernan, Capt J. I., Jr., 53_n_, 244_n_
-
-  Kiesling, Cpl Curtis J., 179
-
-  Kiester, 1stLt K. E., 244_n_
-
-  Kim Il Sung, 7
-
-  Kimpo, 32, 34
-
-  King, Capt George W., 219
-
-  Kite (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Klepsig, Cpl D. E., 327_n_
-
-  Knox, TSgt Edwin L., 268, 270, 271
-
-  Kobe, 32
-
-  Kogae-gol, 148
-
-  Koingdong, 36
-
-  Kojo, 33, 38, 39, 44–46, 48–59, 76, 131
-    Marine positions, 48
-    Railroad station, 48
-
-  Korea, 359
-    North, 8, 37
-      Entry into, 7
-        Orders, 5, 6, 89
-        Plans, 7–10
-        Political considerations, 2–5
-      North Korean People’s Republic, 3
-        People’s Political Council, 83
-        People’s Army (NKPA), 1–3, 5–7, 34, 43, 46, 50, 53, 54, 59, 63,
-          65, 66, 71, 79, 83, 100, 110, 125, 129, 146
-          Prisoners of War, 40, 65, 71, 72, 74, 124
-          Units
-            2d Division, 50
-            5th Division, 50, 55
-            10th Division, 50
-            15th Division, 66, 74
-            10th Regiment, 49, 50
-            45th Regiment, 66, 71, 73
-            48th Regiment, 66
-            50th Regiment, 66
-            344th Tank Regiment, 105, 110, 114
-    South
-      Republic of Korea, 2, 3, 90
-        Army (ROKA), 3, 9, 22, 36, 37, 100, 213, 214, 342
-          Units
-            I Corps, 22, 26, 38, 44, 58, 75, 131, 145, 337
-            II Corps, 15, 146, 150
-            Capital Division, 22, 35, 38
-            1st Division, 34
-            3d Division, 22, 38, 339
-            6th Division, 35, 81, 144_n_
-            7th Division, 35
-            8th Division, 35
-            18th Regiment, 123
-            22d Regiment, 2d Battalion, 46
-            26th Regiment, 61, 81, 98, 99, 128, 131, 140
-            101st Engineer Group (C), 44
-        Navy. _See_ ships.
-        Marine Corps (KMC), 73
-          1st Regiment, 58, 59, 131, 337, 338
-            1st Battalion, 45
-            3d Battalion, 22, 73, 76
-            5th Battalion, 22, 45, 56, 58, 76
-        Police, 307
-
-  Koto-ri, 80_n_, 82, 96, 98, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124, 135–137, 139–141,
-          146–148, 201, 204, 205, 220, 222, 224–226, 228, 229, 231, 232,
-          234, 235, 239, 245, 282–284, 286–288, 295–298, 300, 302, 303,
-          305–309, 311, 312, 319, 323, 335, 355
-    Airstrip (OY), 224, 279, 305, 307, 308
-    Air support, 307
-    Breakout air support plans, 313
-    Breakout, 314–331
-      Bridge, 309, 311, 312, 319, 322, 323
-      Intelligence, 313
-      Mass burial, 319
-      Plans, 308, 309, 312–314, 325, 326
-    Medical, 307, 308
-
-  Kowon, 126, 128
-
-  Krabbe, 2dLt Donald J., 156
-
-  Kraince, 1stLt F. R., 329_n_
-
-  Krieg, 1stLt Elmer A., 165
-
-  Krulak, Col Victor H., 58
-
-  Kulbes, Capt Philip A., 213
-
-  Kumwha, 35
-
-  Kunuri, 9, 35
-
-  Kuokka, Maj H. D., 287_n_, 347_n_
-
-  Kuomintang, 83
-
-  Kurcaba, 1stLt Joseph R., 260, 264, 265, 270, 318
-
-  Kyolmul-ni, 139, 141
-
-
-  Landing Signal Officer, Carrier, 306, 307
-
-  Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., USA, 316
-
-  Lawrence, Maj James F., 82
-
-  Lee, Lt Chew Een, 318
-
-  Lee, Maj Christian C., 296, 299
-
-  Lee, Feng Hsi, 185
-
-  Lee, Doctor Tong Kak, 243_n_
-
-  Leeds, Cpl Joseph, 316
-
-  Lessenden, LCdr Chester M. (MC) USN, 192, 278
-
-  Lett, Cpl C. P., 330
-
-  _Leyte Gulf_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286
-
-  Lice, 315
-
-  Lin Pao, 161
-
-  Lipscomb, 1stLt W. R., 244_n_
-
-  Litters, 259
-
-  Litzenberg, Col Homer L., 39, 80_n_, 82, 98, 99, 100_n_, 102, 103,
-          103_n_, 104, 107, 108_n_, 109, 110, 114, 116, 116_n_, 117,
-          118, 120, 121, 121_n_, 148_n_, 152, 160, 170_n_, 178, 188,
-          189, 193, 201, 249, 250_n_, 251_n_, 253, 254_n_, 258, 259_n_,
-          264_n_, 266_n_, 267_n_, 271, 272, 285, 287_n_, 288, 293,
-          294_n_, 296, 312, 317
-    Command Post, 117
-
-  Liu Sheng Hsi, 185
-
-  Lockwood, LtCol Randolph, 160, 198, 201, 207, 296, 297, 317, 324
-
-  Lodge, Capt O. R., 274
-
-  Longstaff, 1stLt Robert A., 246
-
-  Lorigan, Maj Robert E., 44_n_, 54_n_, 205, 225, 226_n_
-
-
-  Mabry, Maj Clarence J., 225
-
-  MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, USA, 2, 3, 5, 6, 6_n_, 7–11,
-          11_n_, 14, 22, 23, 34–36, 36_n_, 37, 38, 43, 129, 131, 132,
-          133, 144, 146, 205, 334, 340, 345, 346, 358
-    Communique of 24 November, 144
-
-  MacLean, Col Allan D., USA, 243
-
-  _Maddox_ (DD), USS, 28
-
-  _Marine Phoenix_ (T-AP), USNS, 30
-
-  Magness, 2dLt B. L., 184
-
-  Main Supply Route (MSR), 95, 96, 98, 100, 103–106, 108–110, 114, 116,
-          118, 120, 123, 124, 133, 140, 141, 146–149, 154, 156, 159,
-          161, 163, 171, 178–182, 189, 193, 197, 202, 213, 221, 224,
-          239, 249, 250, 253, 254, 257, 261–263, 267, 268, 272, 274,
-          275, 283, 294, 296, 297, 312–315, 317, 318, 321, 324–329
-    Near Sudong, 3 November, 106
-    Wonsan to Hamhung, 79
-
-  Majon-dong, 82, 96, 99, 100, 116_n_, 124, 135–137, 139, 141, 228, 284,
-          326, 327, 331
-
-  Majon-ni, 44, 56, 61–74, 126, 202, 203
-    Logistics, 68
-
-  Manchuria, 6, 9, 34, 36, 37, 79, 80, 84, 85, 129, 142
-
-  Manpojin, 132, 133, 146
-
-  Mao Tse-tung, 70, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 90_n_, 91_n_
-    Strategic Aims, 89
-    Moscow, December of 1949, 90
-
-  Marine Corps, U. S.
-    Air, 157, 293
-    Birthday, 73, 121
-    Units,
-      Fleet Marine Force
-        Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 63, 341
-        1st Air Delivery Platoon, 69, 311
-        1st Combat Service Group, 39–41, 128, 138
-        7th Motor Transport Battalion, 141, 228, 234
-          Company B, 205
-      1st Marine Air Wing, 33, 45, 254, 279, 282, 286, 313, 341,
-          346, 348–350
-        Commanding General, 33
-        Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1), 341, 348
-        Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), 207, 296, 341
-          Air Defense Section, 341, 348
-          Air Support Section, 349
-      Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32–34, 42, 239, 342, 348
-        Headquarters Squadron 12, 32, 239
-        Service Squadron 12, 32
-      VMF-212, 273, 287, 347, 349
-      VMF-214, 32, 273, 287, 347–349
-      VMF-311, 350
-      VMF-312, 32, 33, 68, 69, 100, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 152,
-          156, 217, 222, 224, 264, 273, 299, 307, 349
-      VMF-321, 230
-      VMF-323, 32, 273, 286, 347
-      VMF(N)-513, 32, 33, 53, 102, 107, 113_n_, 116, 117, 273, 307
-      VMF(N)-542, 124, 266, 273, 282, 326
-      VMR-152, 296, 350
-      VMO-6, 34, 56, 73, 152, 154, 191, 202, 205, 245, 272, 307, 350, 351
-      1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 2_n_
-      1st Marine Division, 1, 10, 11, 14, 18, 21–27, 32, 34, 37–39, 41,
-          43–45, 54, 59, 63, 75, 77, 79, 80, 95, 99, 124, 126, 128,
-          131–134, 140, 145, 146, 148, 161, 178, 197, 198, 202, 222,
-          238, 246, 280, 281, 282, 302, 303, 305, 309, 312, 319, 323,
-          326, 332, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 346, 353–356, 358, 359
-        Command Post, 15, 25, 45, 54, 76, 125, 149, 150, 200, 203, 205,
-            211, 214, 222, 229, 238, 241, 245, 285, 287, 293, 325, 341
-          Rear Command Post, 340
-        1st Marine Command Group, 331
-        Headquarters Battalion, 125, 149, 203, 207, 220, 224, 225, 228,
-          229, 231, 234, 281, 282, 299
-        Military Police Company, 99, 299, 303
-        Reconnaissance Company, 22, 80, 82, 99, 109, 110, 112, 114, 135,
-          139–141, 148, 226, 326, 328, 331
-        Headquarters Company, 299, 303
-        Composite Battalion, 193, 194, 251
-      1st Marines, 14, 15, 22, 40, 44, 45, 54–56, 59, 68, 75, 76, 79,
-          80, 82, 126, 135, 136, 139–141, 147, 148, 228, 281, 284, 306,
-          312, 321, 325, 328, 335. _See also_ Col Lewis B. Puller
-        Headquarters, 147
-        Commanding Officer, 73
-        H&S Company, 63, 71, 325, 328
-        Anti-tank Company, 222
-        4.2 Mortar Company, 222
-        1st Battalion, 39, 45, 46, 49, 53–56, 58, 76, 147, 221, 308,
-          309, 312–316, 320, 321, 325, 328, 331
-          Command Post, 211
-          Company A, 49, 53, 69, 71–73, 221, 314–316, 320, 324, 331
-          Company B, 48–54, 57, 221, 314–316, 320, 325
-          Company C, 49–51, 53, 314, 315
-          Weapons Company, 222
-        2d Battalion, 39, 55, 56, 58, 59, 71, 72, 77, 147, 222, 225,
-          229, 279, 306, 319, 325, 326, 328
-          Command Post, 226
-          Company D, 57, 77, 224, 319
-          Company E, 57, 72, 72_n_, 222, 224, 225
-          Company F, 57, 224, 225
-          Weapons Company, 224
-        3d Battalion, 39, 56, 61–63, 71, 77, 147, 197, 198, 200, 201,
-          215, 242, 243, 284, 286, 300, 321, 325, 326, 328
-          Commanding Officer, 73
-          Command Post, 67, 200, 204, 206, 210, 211, 213, 220, 242
-          H&S Company, 63, 68, 207
-          Company G, 66, 68, 71, 147, 204–206, 220, 225, 226, 228, 229,
-          231, 234, 235, 241, 242, 293, 324, 326
-          Company H, 66–68, 71, 73, 201, 204, 208, 209–211, 213, 214,
-          216, 220, 326
-          Company I, 66, 71, 73, 201, 204, 207–209, 211, 214, 216,
-          220, 240, 326
-          Weapons Company, 63, 65, 71, 197, 198, 204, 206, 208,
-          211, 215, 326
-      Fifth Marines, 15, 22, 25, 40, 44, 45, 76, 79, 80, 123, 135,
-          139–141, 147, 148, 150, 152, 158–160, 177, 182, 185, 188, 189,
-          192, 249, 251, 254, 278, 281, 284–287, 300, 312, 318, 325,
-          326, 335, 340. _See also_ LtCol Raymond L. Murray.
-        Command Post, 40
-        Headquarters, 170
-        Anti-tank Company, 228, 229, 234, 290, 317, 326
-        1st Battalion, 45, 80, 123, 124, 126, 136, 158, 172, 180, 184,
-          186, 189, 253, 255, 257, 266, 268, 272, 274, 275, 286, 293,
-          300, 317, 318, 321, 325, 328
-          Company A, 112, 123, 174, 184–186, 193, 251, 274, 293, 318
-          Company B, 123, 187, 189, 257, 293, 318
-          Company C, 124, 183, 185–187, 266, 291, 293
-        2d Battalion, 56, 59, 76, 79, 81, 123, 124, 136, 147, 151, 152,
-          154, 157, 161, 163–166, 188, 189, 251, 257, 265, 272, 274,
-          286, 288, 291, 293, 300, 301, 325
-          H&S Company, 164
-          Company D, 123, 156, 157, 159, 163, 164, 266, 288,
-          290, 291, 294
-          Company E, 158, 163, 164, 166, 186–189, 266, 274, 275, 293
-          Company F, 156, 163, 164, 166, 188, 265, 290, 291
-        3d Battalion, 123, 124, 136, 147, 158, 170, 172, 185, 187, 188,
-          253–255, 257, 258, 261–263, 268, 270–272, 274, 286,
-          293, 300, 325
-          Command Post, 170, 171, 182, 262
-          H&S Company, 170, 171, 182
-          Company G, 170, 182, 189, 251, 255, 257, 262, 263, 268,
-          271, 272, 274
-          Company H, 170, 189, 261–263, 268, 271, 272, 274
-          Company I, 170, 171, 183, 189, 251, 262, 271
-          Weapons Company, 170, 182
-      Seventh Marines, 14, 15, 22, 25, 44, 54, 58, 59, 76, 79–81,
-          98–100, 102–104, 107, 109, 109_n_, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118,
-          120, 121, 123–125, 135–137, 139–141, 147–149, 151, 152, 154,
-          156, 159, 160, 177, 182, 183, 187, 189, 192, 249, 251, 253,
-          254, 257–265, 270, 272, 273, 281, 284–288, 293, 294, 296–298,
-          312, 314, 317–319, 321, 324–326, 335, 340, 352. _See also_ Col
-          Homer L. Litzenberg.
-        Headquarters, 148, 170, 189
-        Command Post, 39, 40, 98, 103, 104, 108–110, 261
-        4.2-inch Mortar Company, 103, 116, 186
-        Anti-tank Company, 103, 105, 106, 108, 160, 207, 215, 241
-        1st Battalion, 81, 99, 100, 102–105, 107, 109, 112–114, 116,
-          121, 147, 152, 157, 189, 190
-          H&S Company, 273, 318
-          Command Post, 103, 105, 106, 149, 193
-          Company A, 100, 103–105, 159, 189, 190, 258, 260, 264, 270,
-          296, 318, 321
-          Company B, 103, 104, 106, 157, 159, 178, 190, 193, 258, 260,
-          261, 264, 265, 270, 318, 321
-          Company C, 103–106, 113, 121, 157, 159, 178, 179, 182, 189,
-          190, 260, 261, 264, 294, 318, 321
-          Weapons Company, 108, 273, 318, 322
-        2d Battalion, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104, 106–109, 112, 116, 120,
-          147, 160, 167, 198, 200, 201, 207, 263, 290, 294, 296–298,
-          317, 318, 321, 324
-          Command Post (Sudong, 3 November), 106
-          Command Group, 294
-          Company D, 100, 102, 103, 108, 109, 151, 152, 157, 158, 160,
-          167, 168, 170, 174, 178, 183, 187, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294, 296
-          Company E, 102, 103, 106, 108, 151, 132, 158, 160, 168, 170,
-          172, 174, 178, 183, 184, 186, 251, 263, 268, 270, 294,
-          296, 317, 324
-          Company F, 103, 104, 106, 154, 158, 159, 180–182, 189–191,
-          193, 198, 200, 201, 207, 253, 254, 264, 272, 294, 317
-          Weapons Company, 160, 180, 198, 201, 207, 251, 294, 326
-        3d Battalion, 106, 112, 116–118, 120, 121, 148, 152, 154, 157,
-          161, 184–188, 251, 253, 254, 257, 261, 266, 275, 294, 296,
-          297, 317, 318, 321, 324
-          Command Post, 165
-          H&S Company, 171, 267
-          Company G, 116–118, 120, 154, 157, 159, 193, 251, 258, 266,
-          267, 294, 297, 317
-          Company H, 104, 114, 117, 118, 154, 157, 158, 163, 165, 166,
-          170, 171, 185, 187, 188, 257, 258, 260, 264, 297, 317
-          Company I, 104, 116, 117, 157, 159, 258, 266, 267, 297, 317
-          Weapons Company, 71, 251
-          Company J, 267
-      Eleventh Marines, 22, 40, 45, 80, 139, 147, 148, 177, 178, 287, 293
-        1st Battalion, 156, 160, 177, 262, 274, 287, 313, 325
-          Battery B, 275
-          Battery C, 275
-        2d Battalion, 40, 222, 287, 313, 325, 328
-          Battery D, 63, 204, 215, 287
-          Battery E, 222, 225, 305, 313
-          Battery F, 45, 46, 52, 53, 222, 313, 316
-        3d Battalion, 99, 100, 104, 107, 110, 116–118, 148, 177, 254,
-          262, 268, 287, 298, 303, 313, 324, 325
-          Battery G, 100, 107, 160, 197, 202, 268, 298
-          Battery H, 107, 192, 207, 215, 220, 241, 262, 298
-          Battery I, 100, 106, 160
-        4th Battalion, 137, 160, 177, 180, 192, 249, 254, 274, 287, 325
-          Provisional infantry platoons, 254
-          Battery K, 136, 177
-      1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 39, 56, 311, 335, 341
-        Company A, 127, 338, 343
-        Company B, 343
-        Company C, 127
-      1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 56, 390
-        Company B, 56
-      1st Engineer Battalion, 39, 40, 137, 141, 200, 217, 247, 311
-        Headquarters Company, 300
-        Company A, 136, 152, 200, 215, 219, 236, 241, 262, 300, 301
-        Company B, 136, 200, 240
-        Company C, 46, 63, 69, 307
-        Company D, 99, 138, 204, 210, 212, 217, 247, 294, 296, 307
-      1st Medical Battalion, 308
-        H&S Company, 139
-        Division Hospital, 109, 139
-        Clearing stations, 149
-        Company A, 139
-        Company B, 139
-        Company C, 139, 149, 210
-        Company D, 46, 63, 139
-        Company E, 99, 139, 149, 245
-      1st Motor Transport Battalion, 45, 80, 99, 141, 160, 207,
-          244, 298, 303
-      1st Ordnance Battalion, 136, 138
-      1st Service Battalion, 99, 136, 138, 160, 207, 241
-        1st Regulating Detachment, 247, 282
-      1st Shore Party Battalion, 24, 39, 40, 56, 138, 338, 339
-        Shore Party Group C, 40
-      1st Signal Battalion, 99, 228, 234
-      1st Tank Battalion, 39, 58, 80, 81, 126, 137, 141, 149
-        H&S Company, 137, 228, 234
-        Company A, 45, 79, 80
-        Company B, 228, 229, 232–234, 306, 326
-        Company C, 56, 76
-        Company D, 127, 136, 137, 149, 201, 228, 229, 231, 234,
-          235, 306, 326
-
-  Marshall, George C., 6
-    General, USA, 84, 121_n_
-    Secretary of Defense, 37
-
-  Marshall, S. L. A., 92_n_, 314_n_, 321_n_
-
-  Martin, P. G., 112_n_
-
-  Masan, 337, 341, 345
-
-  Mason, Lt Ronald A., 73, 73_n_, 208, 209
-
-  Mattox, 2dLt Charles, 71
-
-  Maxwell, Marilyn, 31
-
-  McAlister, Col. Francis A., 38_n_, 205, 284, 335
-
-  McCaleb, Alfred F., Jr., 307
-
-  McCardell, Cpl E., 229_n_
-
-  McCarthy, 1stLt Robert C., 180, 182, 190, 191, 194_n_
-
-  McCarthy, Capt Thomas E., 71
-
-  McClane, Capt George E., 107
-
-  McClelland, Capt John C., Jr., 222, 224, 305
-
-  McClelland, 1stLt William A., 69, 316, 320
-
-  McDermott, Cpl Joseph E., 113
-
-  McDurmin, SSgt R. E., 103_n_
-
-  McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, 139
-
-  McFarland, 2dLt Robert L., 210
-
-  McGaw, Col Hugh D., 311
-
-  McGhee, Lt James M., 51_n_
-
-  McGuiness, 1stLt Clarence E., 297
-
-  McLaughlin, 1stLt Gerald J., 156
-
-  McLaughlin, LtCol J. N., 229_n_, 231–234
-
-  McNaughtton, 1stLt George C., 290, 291
-
-  McPhersen, SSgt Stanley B., 219
-
-  McReynolds, Maj William, 177, 192_n_, 250, 253, 254_n_, 287_n_
-
-  Mead, BrigGen Armistead D., USA, 309, 326_n_
-
-  Medical, 67
-
-  Medics, Navy, 247
-    Surgical teams, 139, 246
-
-  Medical supplies, 302
-    Plasma, 192
-
-  Meeker, 1stLt Ermine L., 240, 242, 274
-
-  Meister, Pfc William H., 57
-
-  Memorial services, 341
-
-  _Merganser_ (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Merrit, 2dLt Max A., 184
-
-  Messman, 1stLt Robert C., 177
-
-  Military Sea Transport Service, 24
-
-  Miller, Capt J. H., 208, 209, 240_n_
-
-  Milne, LtCol Harry T., 137, 285, 294_n_, 300, 326
-
-  Mines, naval, 13, 27
-
-  _Missouri_ (BB), USS, 15, 28–30, 343
-
-  Mitchell, 1stLt Grady P., 210
-
-  Mitchell, 2dLt James M., 165
-
-  Mize, 1stLt Charles D., 270
-
-  _Mocking Bird_ (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Moji, Japan, 75
-
-  Moisell, LtCol Harry E., 339
-
-  Moncrief, Capt Malcolm G., Jr., 307
-
-  Mongolia, 83
-
-  Monk, MSgt Matthew D., 48
-
-  Montross, Lynn, 179_n_, 180_n_, 246_n_, 330_n_
-
-  Mooney, 2dLt A. R., 103_n_, 116_n_, 120_n_
-
-  Moorad, George, 83_n_
-
-  Morehead, Capt Robert A., 160
-
-  Morehouse, RAdm Albert K., 134, 336
-
-  Morris, Capt. John F., 178–180, 260, 264, 270, 297, 321
-
-  Morris, Maj Warren, 193, 317
-
-  Moscow, 90, 98
-
-  Mortar support, 320
-
-  Motor march (Wonsan to Hamhung), 80
-
-  _Mount McKinley_ (AGC), USS, 22, 23, 25, 29, 31, 44, 45, 76, 337,
-          341–343, 348
-
-  Muccio, Ambassador to Korea John, 35_n_
-
-  Mukden, 142
-
-  Munchon, 45, 72, 74, 79–81, 126
-
-  Munday, Maj. Jack R., 339
-
-  Munsell, SSgt Russell A., 254
-
-  Mupyong-ni, 40, 80, 133–135, 145, 146, 148
-
-  Murphy, SSgt Daniel M., 172, 184
-
-  Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 25, 40, 80, 123, 124, 152_n_, 157, 160, 172,
-          178, 188, 212, 259, 271, 282, 285, 286, 288, 293, 299, 318
-
-  Myers, Maj Reginald R., 71, 216–218, 220, 236
-
-
-  Nanchang rebellion, 83
-
-  Nanking, 84, 85
-
-  Napalm, 266, 271, 288
-
-  Nash, SSgt J. B., 229_n_
-
-  National Security Council, 5
-
-  Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory, 330_n_
-
-  Naval gunfire, 338, 339, 343
-
-  Naval gunfire support, 54, 55, 343
-
-  Navy, U. S.
-    Units
-      Naval Forces Far East, 10
-        Commander, (ComNavFE). _See_ VAdm C. Turner Joy.
-        Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 350
-        Seventh Fleet, 17
-          Transport Squadron One, 24
-          Tactical Air Control Squadron One, 341, 348
-        Joint Task Force 7, 13, 30, 50, 75. _See also_ VAdm A. D. Struble.
-        Task Force 77, 15, 17, 254
-        Task Force 79, 15
-        Task Force 90, 15, 336
-          Commander (CTF 90), 336, 337, 339, 341, 342. _See also_ RAdm
-          J. H. Doyle.
-        Task Force 95, 15
-        Task Group 70.1, 15
-        Task Group 95.2 Support and Covering Group, 15, 28, 75
-        Task Group 95.6, 15, 27, 29
-        Task Group 96.2, 15
-        Task Group 96.8, 15
-        Tractor Group, 30, 31
-        Transport Group, 30, 31
-        Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1), 21, 336
-          Commander (PhiGru 1), 26, 336
-        Amphibious Group Three (PhiGru 3), 336
-        Task Element 90.21, 338
-
-  Needham, 1stLt R. C., 202, 208, 209
-
-  _Newsweek_, 334
-
-  Newton, 2dLt Minard P., 116, 118, 165, 165_n_, 260, 264, 270
-
-  _New York Times_, 345_n_
-
-  Nichols, Capt Warren, 347
-
-  Nihart, LtCol F. B., 90_n_
-
-  _Noble_ (APA), USS, 39
-
-  Noel, Frank, 231, 233
-
-  Nolan, 2dLt Jack L., 164
-
-  Noren, Capt Wesley B., 48, 49_n_, 50_n_, 51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 53_n_, 57,
-          57_n_, 221, 279_n_, 314, 315, 320, 321, 325
-
-  North, Cpl C. R., 190_n_
-
-
-  Objective A, 312, 321, 324–326, 328. _See also_ Hill 1328.
-
-  Objective B, 312, 317, 321, 325, 326, 328
-
-  Objective C, 312, 318, 321, 324–326, 328
-
-  Objective D, 312, 321, 328. _See also_ Hill 1457.
-
-  Objective E, 312, 325. _See also_ Hill 1081.
-
-  Observation Posts, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 103
-
-  Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH), 8_n_
-
-  Okinawa, 27, 338
-
-  Olson, Major M. R., 123
-
-  Operation _Yo-Yo_, 30, 31, 45
-
-  Oro-ri, 96, 99, 104, 123
-
-  _Osprey_ (AM) USS, 27
-
-  Owen, Lt Joseph, 318
-
-
-  Pace, Secretary of the Army Frank, 35_n_
-
-  Page, LtCol John U. D., USA, 327
-
-  Page, H. L., Jr., 327_n_
-
-  Pak, Sun Chol, MajGen (NKPA), 66, 73
-
-  Panikkar, K. M., 7
-
-  Parachute, 251, 277, 280
-
-  Parry, Maj Francis F., 99, 100_n_, 103_n_, 116, 177
-
-  Partridge, Gen Earle E., USAF, 33, 201, 210_n_, 247, 300_n_, 309_n_,
-          311, 312, 322, 323
-
-  Partridge, LtCol John H., 40, 137
-
-  _Partridge_ (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Patrick, 2dLt C. E., 329_n_
-
-  Patrols, 66
-
-  Payne, SSgt Earle J., 179
-
-  Pearl Harbor, 334
-
-  Peckham, Capt Charles, 231
-
-  Peiping, 85, 98
-
-  Peiping-Tientsin (highway), 85_n_
-
-  Peleliu, 134, 302
-
-  Pendas, TSgt G. D., 226_n_, 241_n_
-
-  Pendry, Capt Edwin, 107_n_
-
-  Penstock Bridge, 315. _See also_ Treadway Bridge.
-
-  Persian Empire, 357
-
-  Peters, Capt Uel D., 154, 290
-
-  Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., 180, 191, 192
-
-  Peterson, 2dLt Willard S., 262
-
-  Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), 160, 283
-
-  _Philippine Sea_ (CV), USS, 17, 28, 286
-
-  Phillips, Capt W. D., 108, 168, 174
-
-  _Pirate_ (AM), USS, 27, 28
-
-  Plans and Orders
-    United Nations Command (UNC)
-      Operation Order 2, 9_n_
-    Commander in Chief, Far East (CinCFE)
-      Operation Plan 9-50, 8, 9, 10, 22
-      Operation Plan 9-50 (Alternate), 23
-    Commander, Seventh Fleet
-      Operation Order 16-50, 15
-    Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
-      Operation Order 17-50, 27
-      Operation Plan 113-50, 13_n_, 25
-    Commander, Amphibious Group I
-      Operation Order 16-50, 26
-    Commander, Task Force 90
-      Operation Order 19-50, 336
-    X Corps
-      Operation Order 2-50, 32
-      Operation Order 3, 14_n_
-      Operation Order 4, 14, 15_n_, 21, 24
-      Operation Order 6, 76, 131, 132, 135, 147
-      Operation Order 7, 145, 146, 148
-      Operation Order 8-50, 239, 251
-      Operation Order 9-50, 336
-      Operation Order 10, 338_n_, 339
-      Operation Plan 8, 134, 135, 145
-      Operation Instruction (OI) 11, 26_n_
-      Operation Instruction 13, 76, 79
-      Operation Instruction 15, 80
-      Operation Instruction 17, 140
-      Operation Instruction 19, 249
-      Operation Instruction 22, 280
-    1st Marine Division
-      Administrative Order (AdmO) 13-50, 24_n_
-      Administrative Order 20-50, 284
-      Embarkation Order (EmbO) 2-50, 21_n_
-      Embarkation Order 3-50, 335, 338_n_, 340
-      Operation Plan 4-50, 38
-      Operation Order 15-50, 17_n_
-      Operation Order 16-50, 21, 22, 22_n_, 26_n_, 31, 331
-      Operation Order 17-50, 26_n_
-      Operation Order 18-50, 44, 45, 79
-      Operation Order 19-50, 76
-      Operation Order 21-50, 135
-      Operation Order 22-50, 139, 140
-      Operation Order 23-50, 141, 147
-      Operation Order 24-50, 148
-      Operation Order 25-50, 284
-      Operation Order 26-50, 303, 312, 318
-    5th Marines
-      Operation Order 39-50, 151_n_
-    7th Marines
-      Operation Order 14-50, 294
-    5th and 7th Marines
-      Joint Operation Order 1-50, 250, 257
-      Joint Operation Order 2-50, 254
-
-  _Pledge_ (AM), USS, 27, 28
-
-  Podolak, Pfc Bruno, 213
-
-  Pohujang, 315
-
-  Polson, Capt Robert J., 251
-
-  Port Arthur, 142
-
-  Post War planning, 43
-
-  Post Exchange Section, 278
-
-  Press correspondent. _See_ Correspondents.
-
-  Press photographers, 333
-
-  _Princeton_ (CV), USS, 286
-
-  Prisoners, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 58, 81, 98, 99, 156, 290,
-          293, 299, 322, 323, 341
-
-  Prisoners of War (POW), 42, 49, 57, 65
-    Interrogations, 66
-
-  Propaganda (Chinese), 91
-
-  Prosser, TSgt Wilfred H., 322
-
-  Provisional platoons, 63
-
-  Puckett, 2dLt C. R., 82_n_, 109, 112_n_, 114, 116
-
-  Puller, Col Lewis B., 39, 54, 55, 58, 69–72, 76, 224, 225, 306,
-          307, 328, 331
-
-  Pungsan, 36, 145
-
-  Pusan, 337, 339, 341, 345, 350
-
-  Pusan Perimeter, 1, 10, 14, 24, 30, 66, 346
-
-  Pusong-ni, 231, 299
-
-  Pyongyang, 3, 9, 18, 22, 23, 34, 36, 63, 66, 71, 350
-
-  Pyongwon, 36
-
-
-  Quantico, 351
-
-  Quinn, LtCol William W., USA, 308
-
-
-  Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 35_n_, 337
-
-  Radio, 67, 264, 282, 305
-    Communication, 68
-    Marine, 179, 191
-    AN/GRC-9, 259
-    SCR 300, 52, 207, 259
-    SCR 610, 259
-
-  Railroad, 95
-
-  Rations, 160, 277, 282, 284, 302
-    “C” rations, 121
-
-  Read, Capt Benjamin S., 215
-
-  _Redhead_ (AMS), USS, 27
-
-  Reem, 2dLt Robert D., 118, 119
-
-  Refugees, 49, 302, 319, 323, 326, 338, 342, 345
-
-  Reller, Sgt Othmar J., 174
-
-  Replacements, 281, 293, 294
-    USMC, 302
-
-  Rhee, President Syngman, 2, 3
-
-  Ricardi, SSgt Anthony J., 118
-
-  Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 152, 263
-
-  Rickert, LtCol Robert W., 205
-
-  Ridge, North, 151, 152, 157, 158, 161, 167, 168, 170, 172, 178, 182,
-          187–189, 192
-
-  Ridge, Northwest, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170,
-          183, 187–189
-
-  Ridge, South, 151, 152, 159–161, 177, 178, 190, 253
-
-  Ridge, Southeast, 151, 152, 159, 160, 177, 190
-
-  Ridge, Southwest, 151, 152, 154, 156–159, 163, 167, 170, 177, 180,
-          182, 188, 189, 253
-
-  Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., 62_n_, 63, 63_n_, 65, 66_n_, 68, 71, 71_n_,
-          72, 73_n_, 74_n_, 197, 198, 200–202, 204–207, 210, 216, 220,
-          226_n_, 235_n_, 240_n_, 243_n_, 295, 321, 328
-
-  Ridgway, MajGen Matthew B., USA, 243
-
-  Rigg, LtCol Robert F., 86_n_
-
-  Roach, Maj Maurice E., 80_n_, 98, 104, 116–118, 120, 157, 160, 165,
-          251, 254_n_, 294_n_, 297
-
-  Roach, SSgt William, 316, 320
-
-  Road, Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir, 44
-
-  Roadblocks, 69, 72, 74, 105, 166, 319
-    CCF, 222, 224, 263, 274, 309, 315
-    USMC, 294
-
-  Roberts, Sgt Clayton, 51
-
-  Roberts, Col Dean C., 350
-
-  Robinson, Capt R. B., 53_n_
-
-  _Rochester_ (CA), USS, 15, 28
-
-  Roise, LtCol Harold S., 66_n_, 123, 124, 151, 152, 156, 164, 187, 188,
-          253, 265, 266, 272, 274, 275, 290, 293, 300–302
-
-  Rosen, Lt Norman R., USA, 213, 214
-
-  _Rowan_ (DD) USS, 30
-
-  Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, 15
-
-  Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, 74_n_, 76, 340
-
-  Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State Dean, 35_n_
-
-
-  St. Benedict Abbey, 39, 40
-
-  Sakkat Mountain, 156, 157, 161
-
-  Samchok, 337, 342
-
-  Samgo Station, 112, 113
-
-  Sandbags, 208
-
-  Sariwon, 9, 34
-
-  Sasebo, Japan, 27, 32, 336
-
-  Sawyer Maj W. D., 80, 82, 100, 103, 106, 108, 152, 160, 207, 294_n_,
-          317, 318_n_, 321_n_, 322_n_
-    Command Post, 103
-
-  Schlegel, Pfc Eugene B., 219
-
-  Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, 5_n_, 8_n_, 11_n_, 35_n_, 36_n_, 129_n_,
-          142_n_, 143_n_
-
-  Schrier, Capt Harold O., 262
-
-  Schreier, 1stLt William J., 174
-
-  Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., 221, 309_n_, 314, 315, 321_n_, 322_n_, 324,
-          325, 328, 331
-
-  Sears, Capt Norman W., 134, 336
-
-  Seeburger, 1stLt Edward M., 174
-
-  Seeley, Maj Henry J., 232, 234
-
-  Seoul, 1, 3, 9, 11, 63, 66, 291, 293, 355
-
-  Sexton, Maj M. J., 281_n_, 288, 302_n_
-
-  Seydel, 1stLt Karle F., 291
-
-  Shanghai, 85
-
-  Shantung, 84
-
-  Sharon, 2dLt D. W., 82_n_, 109, 112–114, 116, 329_n_
-
-  Shea, Maj W. E., 103_n_
-
-  Shelnutt, Cape John C., 213
-
-  Shepherd, Capt G. E., 293
-
-  Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 58, 323, 336, 337_n_, 338_n_, 340, 359
-
-  Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 5
-
-  Ships
-    AGC, 24
-    AKA, 24, 341
-    AP, 24, 341
-    APA, 24, 341
-    APD, 57
-    Cargo, 42, 341, 342
-    Cruiser, 342
-    Destroyer, 342
-    Hospital, 56
-    JMS-14 (Japanese Mine Sweepers), 29
-    LSD, 24, 341, 343
-    LSM, 24, 42
-    LSMR, 342
-    LST, 14, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 38, 40, 42, 55, 339–343, 348
-    LST 883, 56, 57
-    LST 973, 58
-    LST (ROK), 54
-    LST (SCAJAP), 24
-    LSTH, 54, 55
-    LSU, 24, 40
-    LVT, 14, 40, 41, 55, 343
-    LVT (A), 343
-    Transports, 30
-    Tugs, 342
-    YMS 516 (ROK Minesweeper), 29
-    YMS 905 (ROK Mine Sweeper), 27
-    _See also_ Ship by name
-
-  Shore Party, 40, 41, 339, 341
-
-  Shutts, Capt K. A., 202_n_, 229_n_, 259_n_, 288_n_, 298_n_, 329_n_
-
-  Shutts, Maj R. W., 338_n_, 339
-
-  Siberia, 36
-
-  _Sicily_ (CVE), USS, 32, 287, 347, 349
-
-  Silvis, Capt Richard S. (MC), USN, 308
-
-  Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 63_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 67, 67_n_, 197, 198, 204,
-          208, 235, 326
-
-  Simpson, LtCol F., 282, 298, 299, 324
-
-  Singalpajin, 132
-
-  Sinhung-ni, 123, 135, 139, 148, 243, 254, 262, 274
-
-  Sinhung-ni force, 243
-
-  Sinhung Valley, 123, 124
-
-  Sinuiju, 124, 142, 143
-
-  Sitter, Capt Carl L., 66, 204, 205, 226, 228, 229, 235, 236, 241, 242
-
-  Skelt, 1stLt Earnest P., 238, 241
-
-  Sleeping bags, 259
-
-  Sleds, 244
-
-  Smith, RAdm Allen E., USN, 15, 30
-
-  Smith, Maj George A., 40
-
-  Smith, Pfc Gerald J., 181
-
-  Smith, Harry, 327
-
-  Smith, 1stLt H. J., 291
-
-  Smith, Capt Jack A., 222
-
-  Smith, 1stLt L. R., 183_n_, 186
-
-  Smith, Capt Samuel S., 156, 288, 290, 291
-
-  Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 13–15, 21, 23–27, 29–32, 38, 39, 43–45,
-          54–58, 63, 76, 77, 80–82, 117, 125, 126, 128, 131, 133–136,
-          140, 145–148, 150, 189, 198, 200, 205, 206, 211, 220, 224,
-          229, 234_n_, 235, 238, 239, 241_n_, 243_n_, 244_n_, 245,
-          247_n_, 249, 250_n_, 253, 254, 271_n_, 275, 279_n_, 280_n_,
-          281–283, 285, 287, 288_n_, 294_n_, 305_n_, 307_n_, 308_n_,
-          309_n_, 311_n_, 312, 313, 318, 319_n_, 321_n_, 323, 324_n_,
-          325, 328, 329_n_, 332_n_, 335, 336, 338_n_, 340, 341, 345_n_,
-          349–351, 359
-
-  Sneakers, rubber, 104
-
-  Snedeker, Col E. W., 45_n_, 74, 125, 324, 327, 334, 335, 336_n_, 338_n_
-
-  Snelling, 2dLt Edward W., 216
-
-  Sniping, CCF, 244
-
-  Sniper fire, 57
-
-  Snow, 270
-
-  Snyder, 1stLt Robert E., 172, 172_n_, 174, 184, 186
-
-  Songchon, 95
-
-  Songchon river, 106_n_
-
-  Songjin, 28, 36–38, 95, 337
-
-  Sorensen, 1stLt George A., 288
-
-  deSoria, Charles, 282
-
-  Sota, 1stLt Anthony J., 174
-
-  Soule, MajGen Robert H., USA, 75, 342
-
-  Soyang-ni, 135, 137, 141
-
-  Spiker, Maj Theodore F., 151
-
-  Spofford, Capt Richard T., USN, 15, 27, 30, 31
-
-  Stalin, 90
-
-  Stamford, Capt Edward P., 243, 244
-
-  Stevens, LtCol John W., II, 158, 183_n_, 189, 257_n_, 272_n_,
-          274, 318, 325_n_
-
-  Stewart, Col J. L., 254_n_, 266_n_, 272_n_, 300_n_
-
-  Stiles, 2dLt Charles R., 63_n_, 71, 71_n_
-
-  Stocks, MSgt Marian M., 65
-
-  Storaasli, Capt Paul E., 206
-
-  Stoves, 281
-
-  Strategy
-    Of Celerity, 8, 9
-    Massive compression envelopment, 144
-
-  Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 10
-
-  Stretchers, 279
-
-  Strohmenger, Capt Andrew J., 64, 73, 204_n_, 215
-
-  Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 15, 28–31, 38, 58, 337
-
-  Stuart, TSgt H. C., 297
-
-  Stuart, 1stLt Vaughan R., 300
-
-  Sudong, 81, 96, 98, 100, 103–110, 112, 116, 146, 251, 326, 327
-
-  Sudong ambush, 327, 328
-
-  Sukchon, 34
-
-  Sullivan, 1stLt Charles H., 299
-
-  Sunchon, 34
-
-  Sung Shin-lun, 161
-
-  Sung Wei-shan, 266, 267
-
-  Supplies, 24, 42, 117, 138, 282
-    In-transit depots, 138
-    Supply levels, 140
-    Advance Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, 80
-    Supply Regulating Station Detachment, 138, 140, 141
-    Supply trains, 126
-    _See also_ Dumps
-
-  Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC), 66, 67, 198
-
-  Supporting fire, 102
-
-  Surrender Message, 6, 8
-
-  Sutter, LtCol Allan, 55, 58, 59, 72, 77, 222, 224, 226, 228, 305_n_,
-          306, 328, 331
-
-  Swartley, LtCol J. N., 297
-
-  Sweeney, TSgt James E., 202_n_
-
-  _Swenson_ (DD), USS, 28
-
-  Swinson, Pfc Louis W., 171
-
-  Swords, 2dLt John J., 53
-
-
-  Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 341, 348
-
-  Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), 33, 69, 349
-
-  Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), 296, 349
-    Airborne TADC, 321, 350
-
-  Tactics, Marine, 107, 354
-
-  Taebeck, Mountain Range, 17, 18, 36, 38
-
-  Tallent, SSgt Robert W., 89_n_
-
-  Tanchon, 28
-
-  Tanks
-    Army, 244, 245, 293, 296
-    USMC, 55, 62, 68, 127, 134, 147, 160, 220, 222, 224, 229, 230, 232,
-          235, 240, 254, 261, 263, 268, 270, 272, 290, 291, 293, 294,
-          296, 300, 301, 305, 311, 313, 317, 326, 329–331
-    M4A3 (Sherman), 137, 326
-    M-26 (Pershing), 137, 160_n_, 322, 326
-    T-34 (NKPA), 105, 110, 112, 113
-    Tank-dozer, 68, 137, 138, 294
-    Provisional tank platoon, 137, 160_n_, 208, 291
-
-  Taplett, LtCol R. D., 147, 158, 167, 170, 171, 182, 183, 250, 254_n_,
-          257_n_, 258_n_, 261–263, 268, 271_n_, 272, 274, 275, 300
-
-  Task Force Anderson, 245
-
-  Task Force Dog, 309, 314, 316, 326, 327
-
-  Task Force Drysdale, 225, 226, 228–235, 298, 300, 306, 307
-
-  Task Force Faith, 244, 245, 288
-
-  Taylor, Capt R. M., 53_n_
-
-  Taylor, 1stLt William W., 318, 321
-
-  Tents, 281
-    Warming, 121
-
-  Thackrey, Adm Lyman A., USN, 336
-
-  Thanksgiving Day, 143, 148
-
-  Theros, Capt John G., 100_n_, 103_n_, 294
-
-  Thirty-eighth Parallel, 2, 3, 5–9, 54, 59, 346
-
-  _Thomas_ (DD), USS, 28
-
-  Thomas, 1stLt Alfred I., 267
-
-  Thomas, Maj R. C. W., 86_n_
-
-  Thornton, Cpl D. R., 159_n_, 180_n_, 181, 190_n_
-
-  Tientsin, 85
-
-  Tighe, Major Thomas B., 259, 270, 271
-
-  _Time_, 333, 334, 358_n_
-
-  Togwon, 70
-
-  Tokchon, 146
-
-  Toksil-li, 56, 141
-
-  Toktong Pass, 96, 101, 136, 147, 159, 179, 180, 190, 198, 201, 246,
-          253, 254, 265, 270–272
-
-  Tokyo, 35, 205, 308, 348, 359
-
-  Tonae-ri, 294
-
-  Tongchon, 50, 55–57
-
-  Tongjong-ni, 228
-
-  Tootsie Rolls, 278
-
-  _Towanda Victory_, SS, 342
-
-  Tractor Groups, 30
-
-  Tractor Dozers, 41, 149, 177, 210, 247, 253, 301
-
-  Trailers, 25
-
-  Transportation
-    Rail and Motor Transport, 140
-      Railway, 138
-      Railway cars, 139, 327
-    Train, 45, 46, 54, 55, 59
-      Kowon, 127
-      Divisional, 313
-        No. 1, 285, 303, 305, 322, 324–326
-        No. 2, 293, 300
-      Regimental
-        RCT-1, 327, 328
-        5th Marines, 300
-        7th Marines, 184, 294, 297, 312, 317, 321, 324
-      Supply, 128
-    Trucking Facilities, 141
-
-  Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., 172, 184, 186
-
-  Treadway Bridge, 309, 315
-
-  Trip Flares, 71, 208, 240
-
-  Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., 63, 198
-
-  Troop Training Unit Pacific, 339
-
-  Tsung Hui Tzu, 185
-
-  Truman, President Harry S., 3, 5_n_, 6_n_ 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35, 84,
-          129_n_, 142_n_
-
-  Tsinan, 84
-
-  Tsingtao, 85
-
-  Tuan-di, 141
-
-  Tunner, MajGen William H., USAF, 281, 338, 349
-
-  Turkish Brigade, 150
-
-  Turner, Capt Bryon C., 99
-
-  Twohey, SSgt. Richard B., 113
-
-  Typewriters, 281
-
-
-  Uiji, 143
-
-  Uijongbu, 14, 15
-
-  Ulsan, 337, 343
-
-  Umbaugh, SSgt Ernest J., 320
-
-  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 3, 5, 6
-    Intervention in the Korean War, 35–37, 83
-    Military Mission in Tokyo, 90
-
-  United Nations (UN), 1, 2
-    Forces, 5, 7, 8, 13
-    Headquarters, 145
-    Security Council, 3
-    Units
-      EUSAK. _See_ Army Units.
-      Independent Commando, Royal Marines, (41st Commandos), 140, 148,
-          149, 205, 220, 225, 226, 228–231, 233–236, 242, 273, 275, 300,
-          307, 318–321
-      Twenty-seventh Commonwealth Brigade, 34
-
-  United States, 90
-    Defense Department, U. S,, 142
-    Military Advisory Group in China, 75, 84
-    State Department, U. S. 3_n_, 6, 142
-
-  USO, 31
-
-
-  _Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 17, 233, 286
-
-  Vehicles, 42, 197, 268, 284, 325
-    Ambulances, USMC, 314, 327
-    Amtrac, 127
-    DUKWS, 338, 339
-    Jeeps, 114, 137, 233, 244, 277, 296, 314, 322
-    Supply, 69
-    Tractors, USMC, 322
-    Trucks, 25, 68–70, 72, 74, 109, 160, 197, 228–230, 232, 235, 244,
-          277, 285, 296, 299, 311, 327, 328, 331, 347
-      Brockway, 311, 312, 319, 322
-      Enemy, 110, 117, 124
-      Column, 231, 235, 272, 274, 286
-    “Weasel” (M-29), 127
-
-  Vick, SSgt William L., 113, 166
-
-  Vining, Capt Norman, 230, 306
-
-  Vom Orde, 1stLt Ewald D., 312
-
-  Vorhies, Maj W. E., 108_n_
-
-
-  Wake Island, 35
-    Conference, 35, 36
-
-  Walker, Richard L., 83_n_
-
-  Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 9–11, 34, 37, 83, 86, 91_n_, 205
-
-  Walseth Col H. S., 229_n_, 232, 283
-
-  _Wantuck_ (APD), USS, 56
-
-  Ward, 1stLt Charles C., 312
-
-  Ward, Lt Chester C., 34
-
-  Warren, LtCol Charles E., 339
-
-  Warren, Maj Walter T., 215
-
-  Washington, D. C., 35, 37, 142, 359
-
-  Wasson, Pfc Marvin L., 327, 327_n_
-
-  Weapons
-    Chinese
-      Artillery, 102, 107, 215
-        75mm, 147
-        76mm, 215
-      Automatic, 268
-      3.5 Bazooka, 294
-      Burp guns, 210
-      Flares, 104
-      Grenades, 105, 118, 184, 185, 210, 217, 218, 225, 226
-      Machine guns, 105, 110, 118, 147, 157, 163, 179, 184, 193, 197,
-          218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 266, 291, 296, 315, 316, 325
-      Mines, land (Bouncing Betty), 74
-      Mortars, 102, 110, 117, 157, 163, 178, 191–193, 201, 209, 210,
-          220, 225, 228, 229, 235, 291, 319
-      Pistol, 226
-      Rifles, 190, 225, 226
-      2.36 Rockets, 299
-      Small-arms, 201, 229, 235
-    North Korean People’s Army
-      Grenades, 127
-      High Explosives, 125
-      Mortars, 52, 298, 299, 302
-    South Korea
-      Machine guns, 170, 171
-    United States
-      Army self propelled AAA guns, 324
-      Bombs, 102
-      Grenades, 165
-        Marine, 113, 168, 181, 194, 217, 219, 232, 233, 255, 282
-      Howitzers
-        105mm, 156, 160, 215, 268, 275
-        155mm, 160, 274, 275, 287
-      Machine guns
-        Army, 213
-        Heavy, 67, 180, 183, 191, 194, 211, 215, 225, 240, 259, 261, 271
-        USMC, 163–166, 168, 209, 219, 225, 229, 244, 266, 281,
-          291, 315, 327
-          Light, 219, 257, 299
-      Mines
-        Booby traps, 43, 71, 208, 240
-        Clearance, 138
-      Mortars, 73, 108, 110, 184, 202, 225, 266
-        4.2 inch, 52, 107, 118, 152, 156, 160, 221, 222, 266, 281, 288,
-          305, 315, 324
-        60mm, 50, 51, 103, 105, 120, 178–180, 183, 209, 215, 216, 232,
-          265, 315, 320, 326
-        81mm, 50–52, 67, 103, 105, 156, 164, 165, 180, 184, 190, 193,
-          194, 204, 222, 224, 240, 251, 257, 259, 261, 264, 271, 290,
-          294, 305, 315, 326
-        Support, 217, 219
-      Pistol, 209
-      Rifles, 163, 164, 232, 281
-        BAR, 118, 161, 329
-        Carbine, 161, 209, 217, 232
-        M-1, 161, 217
-        75mm Recoilless, 57, 69, 105, 108, 109, 112, 113, 152, 156, 160,
-          193, 221, 232, 233, 275, 327
-      Rockets, 102, 271, 291
-        2.36, 290
-        5 inch, 113
-        3.5 launcher, 65, 103, 105, 113, 114, 185, 213, 226, 325
-      Small arms, 219
-
-  Weather, 121, 135, 136, 152, 161, 172, 194, 259, 297, 314, 315,
-          319, 320, 347
-
-  Webber, 1stLt Richard C., 174
-
-  Wedeneyer, Lt(jg) Robert G., (MC) USN, 297
-
-  Weible, Walter L., 10
-
-  Weiland, Maj Charles P., 339, 340
-
-  Westover, Capt John G., 213, 226_n_
-
-  Whipple, Maj R. E., 257_n_, 262, 271
-
-  Whitney, MajGen Courtney, USA, 6_n_, 7_n_, 8_n_, 9_n_, 35_n_, 129_n_, 205
-
-  Wiggins, TSgt Shelly, 69
-
-  Wilcox, Capt Myron E., 81, 178
-
-  Williams, Capt Bruce F., 329_n_, 331
-
-  Williams, Cpl C. W., 229_n_
-
-  Williams, 1stLt Leslie C., 258
-
-  Williamson, Capt Harold B., 268, 276
-
-  Willoughby, MajGen C. A., USA, 35_n_, 129, 205
-
-  Wilson, 1stLt H. S., 244, 282
-
-  Wilson, 1stLt John B., 81, 99, 100, 103_n_
-
-  Winecoff, Col J. L., 250_n_
-
-  Winston, LtCol Waldon C., USA, 327, 327_n_, 328
-
-  Wire, concertina, USMC, 240
-
-  Woessner, Maj Henry J., 98, 100_n_, 152_n_
-
-  Wonsan, 8–11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 34–37, 43–46, 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61,
-          63, 66, 68–72, 74–76, 79, 80, 95, 98, 125–128, 131, 136, 138,
-          145, 239, 308, 338, 348, 350
-    Airfield, 15, 18, 41, 56, 68, 69, 128, 239
-    Capture of, 22
-    Evacuation, 239, 338
-    Majon-ni Road, 62
-    Operation
-      Air, 31–33
-      Embarkation, 21
-      Intelligence, 17, 18, 21
-      Landing, 14, 31, 37–41, 44, 281
-      Logistics, 10, 11, 18, 19, 24, 25, 41, 42
-      Mine sweeping, 27–29
-      Movement to the Objective, 30, 31
-      Orders, 14, 15, 17
-      Outloading, 24–26
-      Plans, 11–15, 22–24
-    Personnel, Landed at, 42
-    Population, 17
-    Shore Party Groups, 40
-
-  Wood, LtCol Ransom M., 156
-
-  _Worcester_ (CL), USS, 28
-
-  World War I, 351
-
-  World War II, 2
-
-  Wray, Capt Robert P., 49–51, 314, 315
-
-  Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 8, 10, 11_n_, 14_n_, 23_n_, 132, 205
-
-
-  Xenophon, 333, 357
-
-
-  Yalu River, 36, 81, 82, 98, 99, 131, 133, 142–146, 352
-    Advance to, 132, 146, 147, 150
-      Logistics, 138, 140, 141
-      Medical, 138, 139
-      Orders, 145, 148
-      Plans, 131–136, 139–141
-    Battle of the, 143
-    Bridges across the, 129, 142, 143
-    Hydro-electric plants along the, 142, 143
-
-  Yancey, CWO Dee R., 229, 232
-
-  Yancy, 1st Lt John, 108, 168, 174
-
-  Yangdok, 35
-
-  Yangtze Valley, 85
-
-  Yeaman, Col R. R., 350
-
-  Yenan, 83, 84
-
-  Yonghung, 45, 79, 126–128, 131
-    Bay, 17
-
-  Yonghung-Hamhung Railroad, 44
-
-  Yongnim-dong, 148
-
-  Yonpo, 95, 239, 286, 311, 341, 347, 348, 350
-    Airfield, 38, 246, 335, 337, 340, 342, 349
-
-  Yongwon, 9
-
-  Youngdale, Col C. A., 326_n_
-
-  Yudam-ni, 96, 102, 109_n_, 131, 135, 136, 139–141, 146–152, 154,
-          156–161, 163–168, 170–172, 174, 177–180, 182–195, 200–202,
-          204, 207, 221, 238, 239, 245, 247, 249, 250, 251, 253–255,
-          277–280, 282, 283, 286, 291, 334, 336, 352–354
-    Artillery, 177, 250
-    Breakout, 220, 254, 255, 257–275
-    Casualties, 280
-    Command, 249, 250
-    Medical, 192
-
-  Yugoslavia, 3_n_
-
-
-  Zullo, MSgt Rocco A., 226
-
-
-  ✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957--425570
-
-
-Semper Fi Mac
-
-[Illustration]
-
-[Illustration]
-
-
-
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-
-<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5), by Lynn Montross</div>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>
-This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
-most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
-whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
-of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
-at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you
-are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the
-country where you are located before using this eBook.
-</div>
-
-<table style='min-width:0; padding:0; margin-left:0; border-collapse:collapse'>
-  <tr><td>Title:</td><td>U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953 Volume III (of 5)</td></tr>
-  <tr><td></td><td>The Chosin Reservoir Campaign</td></tr>
-</table>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona</div>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: April 06, 2021 [eBook #65009]</div>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div>
-
-<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive)</div>
-
-<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK U.S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA 1950-1953 VOLUME III (OF 5) ***</div>
-
-<div class="transnote">
-<p class="center larger">Transcriber’s Note</p>
-
-<p class="covernote">Cover created by Transcriber, using the original
-cover and the text of the Title page, and placed
-into the Public Domain.</p>
-
-<p>Larger versions of most illustrations may be seen by right-clicking them
-and selecting an option to view them separately, or by double-tapping and/or
-stretching them.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="i_frontis1" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_001.jpg" width="1524" height="2321" alt="" /></div>
-
-<div id="i_frontis2" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_002.jpg" width="1529" height="2307" alt="" /></div>
-
-<div class="p4 center vspace2 wspace">
-<h1>
-U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA<br />
-
-1950–1953<br />
-
-VOLUME III<br />
-
-<span class="xxlarge"><i>The Chosin Reservoir Campaign</i></span></h1>
-
-<p>by<br />
-LYNN MONTROSS<br />
-and<br />
-CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC</p>
-
-<p class="p1">Based on Research by<br />
-K. JACK BAUER, <span class="smcap">PhD.</span></p>
-
-<div id="i_logo" class="figcenter logo">
-  <img src="images/i_003.png" width="467" height="461" alt="" /></div>
-
-<p class="p2">Historical Branch, G-3<br />
-Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps<br />
-Washington, D. C., 1957
-</p>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<p class="newpage p4 center vspace">
-Preceding Volumes of<br />
-<i>U. S. Marine Operations in Korea</i><br />
-Volume I, “The Pusan Perimeter”<br />
-Volume II, “The Inchon-Seoul Operation”<br />
-</p>
-
-<p class="p4 b2 center smaller">Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 57-60727</p>
-
-<p class="p1 center smaller"><span class="bt">For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office</span><br />
-Washington 25, D. C. Price $2.75<br />
-Official Price of this Publication $2.75
-</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_III">III</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Foreword">Foreword</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> breakout of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir
-area will long be remembered as one of the inspiring epics
-of our history. It is also worthy of consideration as a campaign in
-the best tradition of American military annals.</p>
-
-<p>The ability of the Marines to fight their way through twelve Chinese
-divisions over a 78-mile mountain road in sub-zero weather cannot
-be explained by courage and endurance alone. It also owed to the
-high degree of professional forethought and skill as well as the
-“uncommon valor” expected of all Marines.</p>
-
-<p>A great deal of initiative was required of unit commanders, and
-tactics had to be improvised at times on the spur of the moment to
-meet unusual circumstances. But in the main, the victory was gained
-by firm discipline and adherence to time-tested military principles.
-Allowing for differences in arms, indeed, the Marines of 1950 used
-much the same fundamental tactics as those employed on mountain
-roads by Xenophon and his immortal Ten Thousand when they cut
-their way through Asiatic hordes to the Black Sea in the year 401 B.C.</p>
-
-<p>When the danger was greatest, the 1st Marine Division might
-have accepted an opportunity for air evacuation of troops after the
-destruction of weapons and supplies to keep them from falling into
-the enemy’s hands. But there was never a moment’s hesitation. The
-decision of the commander and the determination of all hands to
-come out fighting with all essential equipment were in keeping with
-the highest traditions of the United States Marine Corps.</p>
-
-<div id="i_sig1" class="figright sig">
-  <img src="images/i_003sig1.png" width="750" height="191" alt="(signature)" />
-  </div>
-
-<p class="sigright clear">
-<span class="smcap l4">R. McC. Pate</span><br />
-<span class="l1"><i>General, U. S. Marine Corps,</i></span><br />
-<i>Commandant of the Marine Corps.</i>
-</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_V">V</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Preface">Preface</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">This</span> is the third in a series of five volumes dealing with the operations
-of the United States Marine Corps in Korea during the
-period 2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume III presents in detail
-the operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft
-Wing as a part of X Corps, USA, in the Chosin Reservoir campaign.</p>
-
-<p>The time covered in this book extends from the administrative
-landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 to the Hungnam evacuation
-which ended on Christmas Eve. The record would not be complete,
-however, without reference to preceding high-level strategic decisions
-in Washington and Tokyo which placed the Marines in northeast
-Korea and governed their employment.</p>
-
-<p>Credit is due the U. S. Army and Navy for support on land and
-sea, and the U. S. Navy and Air Force for support in the air. But
-since this is primarily a Marine Corps history, the activities of other
-services are described here only in sufficient detail to show Marine
-operations in their proper perspective.</p>
-
-<p>The ideal of the authors has been to relate the epic of the Chosin
-Reservoir breakout from the viewpoint of the man in the foxhole as
-well as the senior officer at the command post. Grateful acknowledgment
-is made to the 142 Marine officers and men who gave so generously
-of their time by contributing 338 narratives, letters, and
-interviews. In many instances this material was so detailed that some
-could not be used, because of space limitations. But all will go into
-the permanent Marine archives for the benefit of future historians.</p>
-
-<p>Thanks are also extended to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as
-well as Marine officers, who offered valuable comments and criticisms
-after reading the preliminary drafts of chapters. Without this assistance
-no accurate and detailed account could have been written.</p>
-
-<p>The maps contained in this volume, as in the previous ones, have
-been prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools,
-Quantico, Virginia. The advice of officers of the Current History
-Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
-the Army, has also been of aid in the preparation of these pages.</p>
-
-<div id="i_sig2" class="figright sig">
-  <img src="images/i_003sig2.png" width="804" height="175" alt="(signature)" />
-  </div>
-
-<p class="sigright">
-<span class="smcap l4">E. W. Snedeker</span><br />
-<i>Major General, U. S. Marine Corps,</i><br />
-<span class="l2"><i>Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.</i></span>
-</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_VII">VII</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Contents">Contents</h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="toc" summary="Contents">
-<tr class="smaller">
-  <td> </td>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Problems of Victory</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_I">1</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel—Surrender Message to <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Forces—MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity—Logistical Problems of Advance—Naval Missions Prescribed—X Corps Relieved at Seoul—Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">II</td>
-  <td class="tdl">The Wonsan Landing</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_II">21</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">ROK Army Captures Wonsan—Marine Loading and Embarkation—Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping—Operation Yo-Yo—Marine Air First at Objective—MacArthur Orders Advance to Border—Landing of 1st Marine Division</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">III</td>
-  <td class="tdl">First Blood at Kojo</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_III">43</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1/1 Sent to Kojo—Marine Positions in Kojo Area—The All-Night Fight of Baker Company—2/1 Ordered to Kojo—Security Provided for Wonsan Area—Marines Relieved at Kojo</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">IV</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Majon-ni and Ambush Alley</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">61</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Marines Units Tied in for Defense—Political Aspects of Mission—Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies—Air Drop of Supplies Requested—First Attack on Perimeter—KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni—Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">V</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Red China to the Rescue</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_V">79</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Chinese in X Corps Zone—Introducing the New Enemy—Communist Victory in Civil War—Organization of the CCF—The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier—CCF Arms and Equipment—Red China’s “Hate America” Campaign—CCF Strategy and Tactics</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">VI</td>
-  <td class="tdl">The Battle of Sudong</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">95</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni—ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines—CCF Counterattack at Sudong—Two Marine Battalions Cut Off—End of NKPA Tank Regiment—The Fight for How Hill—Disappearance of CCF Remnants—Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines<span class="pagenum" id="Page_VIII">VIII</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">VII</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Advance to the Chosin Reservoir</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">125</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR—Appraisals of the New Enemy—The Turning Point of 15 November—Changes in X Corps Mission—Marine Preparations for Trouble—Supplies Trucked to Hagaru—Confidence of UN Command—Marine Concentration on MSR</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">VIII</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Crisis at Yudam-ni</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">151</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Marine Attack on 27 November—Marine Disposition Before CCF Attack—The Battle of Northwest Ridge—Chinese Seize Hill 1403—Fighting at 3/5’s CP—The Battle of North Ridge</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">IX</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Fox Hill</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">177</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7—Fox Company at Toktong Pass—Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge—Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill—Not Enough Tents for Casualties—The Turning Point of 30 November</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">X</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Hagaru’s Night of Fire</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_X">197</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Four-Mile Perimeter Required—Attempts to Clear MSR—Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities—Positions of Marine Units—CCF Attacks from the Southwest—East Hill Lost to Enemy—The Volcano of Supporting Fires—Marine Attacks on East Hill</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">XI</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Task Force Drysdale</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">221</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri—Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks—The Fight in Hell Fire Valley—Attack of George Company on East Hill—High Level Command Conference—CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru—Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded—First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">XII</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Breakout From Yudam-ni</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">249</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Joint Planning for Breakout—The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542—March of 1/7 Over the Mountains—Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December—The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass—CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542—Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December—Entry into Hagaru Perimeter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">XIII</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Regroupment at Hagaru</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">277</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">4,312 Casualties Evacuated by Air—537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru—Air Drops of Ammunition—Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri—3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru—East Hill Retaken from Chinese—Attack of RCT-7 to the South—Advance of the Division Trains<span class="pagenum" id="Page_IX">IX</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">XIV</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Onward From Koto-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">305</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Assembly of Division at Koto-ri—Activation of Task Force Dog—Air Drop of Bridge Sections—Division Planning for Attack—Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm—Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5—Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December—Completion of Division Breakout</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdr">XV</td>
-  <td class="tdl">The Hungnam Redeployment</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">333</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area—Embarkation of 1st Marine Division—The Last Ten Days at Hungnam—Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area—Contributions of Marine Aviation—Losses Sustained by the Enemy—Results of the Reservoir Campaign</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head appx">
-  <td class="tdc larger" colspan="3"><i>Appendixes</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">A</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_A">361</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">B</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Task Organization, 1st Marine Division</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_B">365</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">C</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Naval Task Organization</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_C">373</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">D</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_D">379</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">E</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1st Marine Division Casualties</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_E">381</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">F</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Command and Staff List, 8 October-15 December 1950, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_F">383</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">G</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Enemy Order of Battle</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_G">397</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">H</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Air Evacuation Statistics</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_H">399</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Unit Citations</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#APPENDIX_I">401</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Bibliography</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Bibliography">405</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="head">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Index</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#Index">413</a></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_X">X</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Illustrations">Illustrations</h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="center larger"><i>Photographs</i></p>
-
-<p class="center">Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages <a href="#ip_148">148</a> and <a href="#ip_276">276</a>.</p>
-
-<p class="p2 center larger"><i>Maps and Sketches</i></p>
-
-<table id="loi" summary="Illustrations">
-<tr class="smaller">
-  <td> </td>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"><i>Page</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Eighth Army Advances and Restraining Lines</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_1">4</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Area of Operations, 1st Marine Division, October-December 1950</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_2">12</a>, <a href="#ip_2a">122</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Wonsan and Harbor</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_3">16</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Kojo Area</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_4">47</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">5</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Majon-ni and Road to Wonsan</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_5">62</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">6</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Majon-ni Perimeter</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_6">64</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">7</td>
-  <td class="tdl">The Main Supply Route of the 1st Marine Division</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_7">97</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">8</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Battle of Sudong, 1st Phase</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_8">101</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">9</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Chinhung-ni Tank Fight, 4 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_9">111</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">10</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Action of 4–5 November and Funchilin Pass</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_10">115</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">11</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1st Marine Division Zone and Objectives</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_11">130</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">12</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Yudam-ni</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_12">153</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">13</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Marine Attacks, 27 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_13">155</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">14</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Battle of Northwest Ridge</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_14">162</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">15</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Action at 3/5’s CP</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_15">169</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">16</td>
-  <td class="tdl">The Battle of North Ridge</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_16">173</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">17</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Hagaru Defensive Perimeter</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_17">199</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">18</td>
-  <td class="tdl">East Hill Attacks, 29 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_18">212</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">19</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Koto-ri Perimeter, 28 November-7 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_19">223</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">20</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Attempts to Reinforce Hagaru, 28 November-1 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_20">227</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">21</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Task Force Drysdale Ambush, 28 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_21">230</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_XI">XI</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">22</td>
-  <td class="tdl">East Hill Attacks, 30 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_22">237</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">23</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Breaking off Action, 30 November</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_23">252</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">24</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Breakout from Yudam-ni, 1 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_24">256</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">25</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Breakout from Yudam-ni, 2–4 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_25">269</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">26</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Seizure of East Hill and Chinese Counterattack 6–7 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_26">289</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">27</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Last Night at Hagaru, 6–7 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_27">292</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">28</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Breakout from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_28">295</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">29</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Funchilin Pass and Advances of 8–10 December</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_29">310</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdr top">30</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Hungnam Docks and Beaches</td>
-  <td class="tdr"><a href="#ip_30">344</a></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">1</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Problems Of Victory</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel—Surrender Message to</i>
-<span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> <i>Forces—MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity—Logistical
-Problems of Advance—Naval Missions Prescribed—X Corps
-Relieved at Seoul—Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It</span> is a lesson of history that questions of how to use a victory can
-be as difficult as problems of how to win one. This truism was
-brought home forcibly to the attention of the United Nations (UN)
-heads, both political and military, during the last week of September
-1950. Already, with the fighting still in progress, it had become evident
-that the UN armies were crushing the forces of Communism in
-Korea, as represented by the remnants of the North Korean People’s
-Army (<span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span>).</p>
-
-<p>Only a month before, such a result would have seemed a faint and
-unrealistic hope. Late in August the hard-pressed Eighth U. S. Army
-in Korea (<span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>) was defending that southeast corner of the peninsula
-known as the Pusan Perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>“Nothing fails like success,” runs a cynical French proverb, and
-the truth of this adage was demonstrated militarily when the dangerously
-over-extended <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> forces paid the penalty of their tenuous
-supply line on 15 September 1950. That was the date of the X Corps
-amphibious assault at Inchon, with the 1st Marine Division as landing
-force spearheading the advance on Seoul.</p>
-
-<p>X Corps was the strategic anvil of a combined operation as the
-Eighth Army jumped off next day to hammer its way out of the Pusan
-Perimeter and pound northward toward Seoul. When elements of the
-two UN forces met just south of the Republic of Korea (ROK)<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">2</span>
-capital on 26 September, the routed <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> remnants were left only
-the hope of escaping northward across the 38th parallel.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the
-Pusan Perimeter has been told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with the 1st
-Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the Inchon-Seoul operation.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The bold strategic plan leading up to this victory—one of the most
-decisive ever won by U. S. land, sea and air forces—was largely the
-concept of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, who was
-Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (Cin<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span>)
-as well as U. S. Commander in Chief in the Far East (Cin<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span>). It
-was singularly appropriate, therefore, that he should have returned
-the political control of the battle-scarred ROK capital to President
-Syngman Rhee on 29 September. Marine officers who witnessed the
-ceremony have never forgotten the moving spectacle of the American
-general and the fiery Korean patriot, both past their 70th birthdays,
-as they stood together under the shell-shattered skylight of the Government
-Palace.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless otherwise noted, all
-interviews have been by the authors.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel</i></h3>
-
-<p>“Where do we go from here?” would hardly have been an oversimplified
-summary of the questions confronting UN leaders when it became
-apparent that the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> forces were defeated. In order to
-appraise the situation, it is necessary to take a glance at preceding
-events.</p>
-
-<p>As early as 19 July, the dynamic ROK leader had made it plain
-that he did not propose to accept the pre-invasion <i>status quo</i>. He
-served notice that his forces would unify Korea by driving to the
-Manchurian border. Since the Communists had violated the 38th Parallel,
-the aged Rhee declared, this imaginary demarcation between
-North and South no longer existed. He pointed out that the sole
-purpose of the line in the first place had been to divide Soviet and
-American occupation zones after World War II, in order to facilitate
-the Japanese surrender and pave the way for a democratic Korean
-government.</p>
-
-<p>In May 1948, such a government had come about in South Korea
-by popular elections, sponsored and supervised by the UN. These
-elections had been scheduled for all Korea but were prohibited by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">3</span>
-the Russians in their zone. The Communists not only ignored the
-National Assembly in Seoul, but also arranged their own version of a
-governing body in Pyongyang two months later. The so-called North
-Korean People’s Republic thus became another of the Communist
-puppet states set up by the USSR.</p>
-
-<p>That the United Nations did not recognize the North Korean state
-in no way altered its very real status as a politico-military fact. For
-obvious reasons, then, all UN decisions relating to the Communist
-state had to take into account the possibility of reactions by Soviet
-Russia and Red China, which shared Korea’s northern boundary.</p>
-
-<p>At the outbreak of the conflict on 25 June 1950, the UN Security
-Council had, by a vote of 9-0, called for an immediate end to the
-fighting and the withdrawal of all <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> forces to the 38th Parallel.<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a>
-This appeal having gone unheeded, the Council on 27 June recommended
-“... that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
-assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
-armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
-area.”<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> It was the latter authorization, supplemented by another resolution
-on 7 July, that led to military commitments by the United
-States and to the appointment of General MacArthur as over-all UN
-Commander.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> US Dept of State, <i>Guide to the UN in Korea</i> (Washington, 1951). Yugoslavia abstained
-from the vote, and the USSR, then boycotting the Council, was absent.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>These early UN actions constituted adequate guidance in Korea
-until the Inchon landing and <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>’s counteroffensive turned the tide.
-With the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> in full retreat, however, and UN Forces rapidly
-approaching the 38th Parallel, the situation demanded re-evaluation,
-including supplemental instructions to the military commander. The
-question arose as to whether the North Koreans should be allowed
-sanctuary beyond the parallel, possibly enabling them to reorganize
-for new aggression. It will be recalled that Syngman Rhee had already
-expressed his thoughts forcibly in this connection on 19 July;
-and the ROK Army translated thoughts into action on 1 October by
-crossing the border.</p>
-
-<p>The UN, in its 7 July resolution, having authorized the United
-States to form a unified military force and appoint a supreme commander
-in Korea, it fell upon the Administration of President Harry
-S. Truman to translate this dictum into workaday reality. Aiding the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">4</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span>
-Chief Executive and his Cabinet in this delicate task with its far-reaching
-implications were the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The
-Army member, General J. Lawton Collins, also functioned as Executive
-Agent of JCS for the United Nations Command in Korea, thus
-keeping intact the usual chain of command from the Army Chief of
-Staff to General MacArthur, who now served both the U. S. and UN.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary manuscript (Comments).</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_1" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_004.jpg" width="1380" height="2008" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p>
-EIGHTH ARMY ADVANCES<br />
-AND<br />
-RESTRAINING LINES
-</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-1</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Late in August, two of the Joint Chiefs, General Collins and Admiral
-Forrest P. Sherman, USN, had flown to Japan to discuss the
-forthcoming Inchon landing with General MacArthur. In the course
-of the talks, it was agreed that Cin<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span>’s objective should be the
-<i>destruction</i> of the North Korean forces, and that ground operations
-should be extended beyond the 38th Parallel to achieve this goal.
-The agreement took the form of a recommendation, placed before
-Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson on 7 September.<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50. Unless otherwise stated, copies
-of all messages cited are on file in Historical Branch, HQMC.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A week later, JCS informed MacArthur that President Truman had
-approved certain “conclusions” relating to the Korean conflict, but
-that these were not yet to be construed as final decisions. Among
-other things, the Chief Executive accepted the reasoning that UN
-Forces had a legal basis for engaging the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> north of the Parallel.
-MacArthur would plan operations accordingly, JCS directed, but
-would carry them out only after being granted explicit permission.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, 2 vols
-(Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The historic authorization, based on recommendations of the National
-Security Council to President Truman, reached General Headquarters
-(GHQ), Tokyo, in a message dispatched by JCS on 27
-September:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean Armed
-Forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military
-operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations
-north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operations
-there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese
-Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to
-counter our operations militarily in North Korea....</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The lengthy message abounded in paragraphs of caution, reflecting
-the desire of both the UN and the United States to avoid a general
-war. Not discounting the possibility of intervention by Russia or Red
-China, JCS carefully outlined MacArthur’s courses of action for several<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">6</span>
-theoretical situations. Moreover, he was informed that certain
-broad restrictions applied regardless of developments:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>... under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian
-or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean
-Ground Forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet
-Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of
-your operations north or south of the 38th parallel will not include Air or
-Naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory....<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 360; MajGen Courtney Whitney,
-<i>MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History</i> (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the
-JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive from the JCS on 27 September
-establishing my military objective as ‘... the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces’
-and in the accomplishment thereof authorizing me to ‘... conduct military operations,
-including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel
-in Korea ...’ made it mandatory rather than discretionary ... that the UN Forces operate
-north of that line against enemy remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans
-governing operations north of that Parallel were designed to implement the resolution
-passed by the UN General assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically approved by
-the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives assigned by the JCS, and the military-political
-objectives established by said resolution of the UN could have been accomplished in no
-other way.” Gen D. MacArthur letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Thus MacArthur had the green light, although the signal was
-shaded by various qualifications. On 29 September, the new Secretary
-of Defense, George C. Marshall, told him in a message, “... We
-want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed
-north of 38th parallel....”<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation see Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 398.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Surrender Message to NKPA Forces</i></h3>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, a step was taken by the U. S. Government on 27 September
-in the hope that hostilities might end without much further
-loss or risk for either side. By dispatch, JCS authorized MacArthur to
-announce, at his discretion, a suggested surrender message to the
-<span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span>.<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> Framed by the U. S. State Department, the message was
-broadcast on 1 October and went as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>To: The Commander-in-chief, North Korean Forces. The early and total
-defeat and complete destruction of your Armed Forces and war making
-potential is now inevitable. In order that the decision of the United Nations
-may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of
-property, I, as the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, call upon you and
-the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith
-to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervision<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">7</span>
-as I may direct and I call upon you at once to liberate all United
-Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees under your control and to
-make adequate provision for their protection, care, maintenance, and immediate
-transportation to such places as I indicate.</p>
-
-<p>North Korean forces, including prisoners of war in the hands of the
-United Nations Command, will continue to be given the care indicated by
-civilized custom and practice and permitted to return to their homes as soon
-as practicable.</p>
-
-<p>I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the
-further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in EUSAK <i>War Diary</i> (<i>WD</i>),
-1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The surrender broadcast evoked no direct reply from Kim Il Sung,
-Premier of North Korea and Commander in Chief of the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span>.
-Instead, the reaction of the Communist bloc came ominously from
-another quarter. Two days after MacArthur’s proclamation, Red
-China’s Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai informed K. M. Panikkar, the
-Indian Ambassador in Peiping, that China would intervene in the
-event UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. He added, however, that
-such action would not be forthcoming if only ROK troops entered
-North Korea.<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II,
-361–362. The information was forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that
-he had never been informed of it. <i>Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the
-Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate
-Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation
-in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
-from his assignments in that area</i> (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter <i>MacArthur
-Hearings</i>), 109.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It will be recalled that the JCS authorization of 27 September permitted
-operations north of the Parallel “... provided that at the time
-of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by
-major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, <i>no announcement of intended
-entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in
-North Korea</i>....”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> In view of the last two provisos, MacArthur’s
-plans for crossing the border could conceivably have been cancelled
-after Chou’s announcement. But optimism over the course of the war
-ran high among the United Nations at this time, and Cin<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span> shortly
-received supplemental authority from both the UN and JCS—the one
-establishing legal grounds for an incursion into North Korea, the
-other reaffirming military concurrence at the summit. In a resolution
-adopted on 7 October, the United Nations directed that</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">8</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 360; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 397.
-Italics supplied.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout
-Korea and all constituent acts be taken ... for the establishment of a
-unified, independent and democratic Government in the Sovereign State of
-Korea....<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in <i>Guide to the UN in Korea</i>, 20.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Since the enemy had ignored his surrender ultimatum, MacArthur
-could attend to the UN objectives only by occupying North Korea
-militarily and imposing his will. JCS, therefore, on 9 October amplified
-its early instructions to the Commander in Chief as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Hereafter, in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea
-of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should
-continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under
-your control offers a reasonable chance of success. In any case you will obtain
-authorization from Washington prior to taking any military actions against
-objectives in Chinese territory.<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 362; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 404.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>MacArthur’s Strategy of Celerity</i></h3>
-
-<p>Anticipating his authority for crossing the 38th Parallel, <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span> on
-26 September had directed his Joint Special Plans and Operations
-Group (<span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span>) to develop a plan for operations north of the border.
-He stipulated that Eighth Army should make the main effort in either
-the west or the east, and that however this was resolved, there should
-be an amphibious envelopment on the opposite coast—at Chinnampo,
-Wonsan, or elsewhere.<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Despite recommendations of key staff members,
-MacArthur did not place X Corps under <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> command for
-the forthcoming campaign but retained General Almond’s unit as a
-separate tactical entity under GHQ.<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The Chief of Military
-History (OCMH).</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> Maj J. F. Schnabel, <i>The Korean Conflict: Policy, Planning, Direction</i>. MS at OCMH.
-See also: Capt M. Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” <i>Army</i>, vii, no. 4 (Nov
-56), 38–44, 65.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span>, headed by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s
-G-3, rapidly fitted an earlier staff study into the framework
-of <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span>’s directive. And the following day, 27 September, a
-proposed Operation Plan (OpnPlan) 9-50 was laid before the commander
-in chief.<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> This detailed scheme of action evolved from two
-basic assumptions: (1) that the bulk of the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> had already been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">9</span>
-destroyed; and (2) that neither the USSR nor Red China would
-intervene, covertly or openly.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> Schnabel, <i>The Korean Conflict</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Eighth Army, according to plan, would attack across the 38th
-Parallel, directing its main effort in the west, along the axis Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang
-(see Map 1). <span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span> designated the latter city—capital
-of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea—as final
-objective of the first phase. Further, it recommended that <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>’s
-drive begin in mid-October, to be followed within a week by a
-X Corps amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast. After
-establishing a beachhead, Almond’s force would attack 125 road miles
-westward through the Pyongyang-Wonsan corridor and link up with
-General Walker’s army, thereby trapping North Korean elements
-falling back from the south.<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, and CinCFE <i>OpnPlan</i> 9-50. Copy at OCMH.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span> suggested that both commands should then advance north
-to the line Chongju-Kunuri-Yongwon-Hamhung-Hungnam, ranging
-roughly from 50 to 100 miles below the Manchurian border.
-Only ROK elements would proceed beyond the restraining line, in
-keeping with the spirit and letter of the 27 September dispatch from
-JCS.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Major General Doyle O. Hickey, acting as <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span>’s chief of staff
-during General Almond’s tour in the field, approved the <span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span> draft
-of 28 September. It thereby became OpnPlan 9-50 officially. MacArthur
-forwarded a summary to JCS the same day, closing his message
-with this reassurance:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by major Soviet
-or Chinese Communist Forces.<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 361; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>,
-397–398.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Within three days, he received word from the Joint Chiefs that
-they approved his plan.<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> On 2 October it became the official operation
-order for the attack.<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 361; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 398.
-All dates in the narrative and in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the action.
-Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the 30th in Tokyo.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> UNC <i>Operation Order</i> (<i>OpnO</i>) 2, 2 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Logistical Problems of Advance</i></h3>
-
-<p>On 29 September, the day before he received the JCS endorsement of
-his plan, General MacArthur arrived in Seoul to officiate at the ceremony<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">10</span>
-restoring control of South Korea to the legal ROK government.
-During the visit, he met with the principals named in the Task Organization
-of OpnPlan 9-50:</p>
-
-<table id="t10" summary="principles in OpnPlan 9-50">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Eighth U. S. Army</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtGen Walton H. Walker, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Naval Forces Far East</td>
-  <td class="tdl">VAdm C. Turner Joy, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Far East Air Forces (FEAF)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtGen George E. Stratemeyer, USAF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">X Corps</td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen Edward M. Almond, USA</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Missing from the top-level conference, Major General Walter L.
-Weible, USA, of the Japan Logistical Command, probably was already
-aware of things to come.<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA, 14 Jun 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>MacArthur outlined his concept of operations in North Korea to
-those present. He set 20 October as D-Day for the Wonsan amphibious
-assault by the 1st Marine Division, which, with all X Corps Troops,
-would embark for the operation from Inchon. The 7th Infantry Division,
-also a part of X Corps, would motor 200 miles to Pusan and
-there load out for an administrative landing behind the Marines.<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Initial overland routing of the 7th Division was made necessary by
-problems arising out of Inchon’s limited port facilities. General MacArthur
-gave <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> the logistic responsibility for all UN Forces in
-Korea, including X Corps. To carry out this charge, General Walker
-could rely on only two harbors, Pusan and Inchon. There were no
-other ports in South Korea capable of supporting large-scale military
-operations. Meeting the tight Wonsan schedule would require that X
-Corps have immediate priority over the whole of Inchon’s capacity,
-even with the 7th Division being shunted off on Pusan. And it still
-remained for Walker to mount and sustain Eighth Army’s general
-offensive <i>before</i> the Wonsan landing!</p>
-
-<p>In the light of logistical considerations, then, Wonsan had more
-than mere tactical significance as the objective of X Corps. Its seizure
-would open up the principal east-coast port of Korea, together with
-vital new road and rail junctions. But while MacArthur had decided
-on an amphibious assault by a separate tactical unit as the proper stroke,
-there existed a school of dissenters among his closest advisers. Generals
-Hickey and Wright had recommended that X Corps be incorporated
-into <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> at the close of the Inchon-Seoul Operation. Major
-General George L. Eberle, MacArthur’s G-4, held that supplying X
-Corps in North Korea would be simpler if that unit were a part of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">11</span>
-Eighth Army. And General Almond himself, while hardly a dissenter,
-had expected his corps to be placed under General Walker’s command
-after the Seoul fighting.<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; Schnabel, <i>The Korean Conflict</i>; Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command.”
-Gen MacArthur stated: “If such a dissension existed it was never brought to my attention.
-To the contrary, the decision to retain as a function of GHQ command and coordination
-between Eighth Array and X Corps until such time as a juncture between the two forces
-had been effected was, so far as I know, based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior
-members of my staff....” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has stated: “Neither
-General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps
-should have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after the close of the Inchon-Seoul
-operation.” MajGen E. K. Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Naval Missions Prescribed</i></h3>
-
-<p>Logistical problems were magnified by the tight embarkation schedule
-laid out for the amphibious force. In submitting its proposed plan for
-North Korean operations to General MacArthur on 27 September,
-<span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span> had listed the following “bare minimum time requirements:”</p>
-
-<table id="t11" summary="bare minimum time requirements">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">For assembling assault shipping</td>
-  <td class="tdl">6 days</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">For planning</td>
-  <td class="tdl">4 days</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">For loading</td>
-  <td class="tdl">6 days</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">For sailing to Wonsan</td>
-  <td class="tdl">4 days</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Thus it was estimated that the 1st Marine Division could assault
-Wonsan 10 days after receiving the order to load out of Inchon, provided
-that shipping had already been assembled and planning accomplished
-concurrently.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,” 27 Sep 50. Copy at
-OCMH.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CUNC</span>’s meeting in the capitol building on the 29th,
-General Almond called a conference of division commanders and staff
-members at his X Corps Headquarters in Ascom City, near Inchon.
-MacArthur’s strategy was outlined to the assembled officers, so that
-planning could commence on the division level. Almond set 15 October
-as D-Day for the Wonsan landing. He based this target date on the
-assumption that Eighth Army would pass through and relieve X Corps
-on 3 October, the date on which the necessary shipping was to begin
-arriving at Inchon.<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> 1stMarDiv <i>Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation,
-8 Oct-15 Dec 50</i> (hereafter 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>), 10.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 29 September, the 1st Marine Division was still committed tactically
-above Seoul, two regiments blocking and one attacking. If the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">12</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span>
-first vessels began arriving at Inchon on 3 October, the assault shipping
-would not be completely assembled until the 8th, according to the
-JSPOG estimate. Four days would be required to get to the objective,
-leaving two days, instead of the planned six, for outloading the landing
-force. Neither Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General
-(CG) 1stMarDiv, nor his staff regarded this as a realistic
-schedule.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, <i>Notes on the Operations of the
-1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51</i> (MS),
-(hereafter Smith, <i>Notes</i>), 370–371.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_2" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_012.jpg" width="1344" height="1971" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>AREA OF OPERATIONS</p>
-
-<p>1st Marine Division</p>
-
-<p>October-December 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-2</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The Marine officers came away from the conference without knowledge
-of the types and numbers of ships that would be made available
-to the division. And since they had no maps of the objective area and
-no intelligence data whatever, it was manifestly impossible to lay
-firm plans along either administrative or tactical lines.<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Vice Admiral Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE),
-issued his instructions on 1 October in connection with the forthcoming
-operations. To Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force 7
-(JTF-7), which had carried out the Inchon attack, he gave these
-missions:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>1. To maintain a naval blockade of Korea’s East coast south of Chongjin.</p>
-
-<p>2. To furnish naval gunfire and air support to Eighth Army as directed.</p>
-
-<p>3. To conduct pre-D-Day naval operations for the Wonsan landing as required.</p>
-
-<p>4. To load and transport X Corps to Wonsan, providing cover and support en route.</p>
-
-<p>5. To seize by amphibious assault, occupy, and defend a beachhead in the Wonsan area on D-Day.</p>
-
-<p>6. To provide naval gunfire, air, and initial logistical support to X Corps at Wonsan until relieved.<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> ComNavFE <i>OpnPlan 113-50</i>. Copy at OCMH.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Admiral Joy’s directive also warned: “The strong probability exists
-that the ports and possible landing beaches under control of the North
-Koreans have been recently mined. The sighting of new mines floating
-in the area indicates that mines are being seeded along the coast.”<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, B, 11.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>X Corps Relieved at Seoul</i></h3>
-
-<p>The related events, decisions, and plans of September 1950 had unfolded
-with startling rapidity. Before the scattered UN forces could<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">14</span>
-shift from one phase of operations to another, a transitional gap developed
-during the early days of October. Orders might flow forth in
-abundance, but not until MacArthur’s land, sea and air forces wound
-up one campaign could they begin another. Thus, from the standpoint
-of Marine operations, the first week of October is more a story
-of the Inchon-Seoul action than of preparations for the Wonsan
-landing.</p>
-
-<p>On 2 October, when Eighth Army commenced the relief of X Corps,
-General Almond ordered the 7th Infantry Division to begin displacing
-to Pusan by motor and rail.<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> There was as yet no such respite for
-the 1st Marine Division, which on the same day lost 16 killed in action
-(KIA) and 81 wounded (WIA). Practically all of the casualties
-were taken by the 7th Regiment, then approaching Uijongbu on the
-heels of the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 3</i>, 2 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> MajGen Oliver P. Smith: <i>Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division
-During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951</i> (MS), (hereafter, Smith,
-<i>Chronicle</i>), 54.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Despite the limited planning data in the hands of the 1st Marine
-Division, General Smith’s staff put a cautious foot forward on 3 October.<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a>
-Word of the pending Wonsan operation went out by message
-to all subordinate units, with a tentative task organization indicating
-the formation of three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs).</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely <i>not</i> a complete lack of planning data. I
-doubt if any operation ever had more planning data available. It may not have been in
-General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 1st and 7th Marines were earmarked to launch the amphibious
-attack. Each would plan on the basis of employing two battalions in
-the assault. These battalions were to embark on LSTs and hit the
-beach in LVTs. All tactical units were to combat-load out of Inchon.
-And although still uninformed as to available shipping, the Marine
-planners named likely embarkation groups and listed tentative arrangements
-for loading tanks and amphibious vehicles.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning Information,” 3 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The following day saw the publication of X Corps OpnO 4, specifying
-subordinate unit missions. The 7th Infantry Division, together
-with the 92d and 96th Field Artillery (FA) Battalions, was instructed
-to mount out of Pusan and to land at Wonsan on order (see Map 2).
-These tasks were assigned to the 1st Marine Division:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>1. Report immediately to the Attack Force Commander (Commander, Amphibious
-Group One) of the Seventh Fleet as the landing force for the
-Wonsan attack.</p>
-<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">15</span>
-<p>2. Seize and secure X Corps base of operations at Wonsan, protect the
-Wonsan Airfield, and continue such operations ashore as assigned.</p>
-
-<p>3. Furnish logistic support for all forces ashore until relieved by Corps
-Shore Party.<a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt <i>Interim Evaluation Rpt #1</i>, annex DD,
-11; 1stMarDiv <i>Historical Diary</i> (<i>HD</i>), Oct 50; X Corps <i>OpnO 4</i>, 4 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As Almond’s order went out for distribution on 4 October, <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>’s
-1st Cavalry Division, bound for Kaesong, passed through the 5th
-Marines northwest of Seoul. Simultaneously, the II ROK Corps began
-assembling along the road to Uijongbu, captured by the 7th Marines
-the previous day.<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 54.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After 20 days in the line, the weary battalions of the 5th Marines
-retired on 5 October across the Han River to an assembly area at Inchon.
-They were followed on the 6th by the 1st Regiment, and on the next
-day by the 7th Marines. The withdrawal of the latter unit completed
-the relief of X Corps, and General Almond’s command officially reverted
-to GHQ Reserve.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>October 7th also marked the displacement of the 1st Marine Division
-command post (CP) to Inchon, where planning and reality had finally
-merged to the extent that preparations for Wonsan could begin in
-earnest. Two days earlier, Vice Admiral Struble had re-created JTF-7
-out of his Seventh Fleet; and by publication of his OpnO 16-50 on
-the same date, 5 October, he set in motion the operational elements
-involved in the projected amphibious envelopment. His new task organization,
-almost identical to that which had carried out the Inchon
-Operation with historic dispatch, was as follows:</p>
-
-<table id="t15" summary="OpnO 16-50 task organization">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TF 95 (Advance Force)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm Allen E. Smith</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl in1">TG 95.2 (Covering &amp; Support)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm Charles C. Hartman</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl in1">TG 95.6 (Minesweeping)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard T. Spofford</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TF 90 (Attack Force)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm James H. Doyle</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TF 79 (Logistical Support Force)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bernard L. Austin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TF 77 (Fast Carrier Force)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm Edward C. Ewen</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl in1">TG 96.8 (Escort Carrier Group)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm Richard W. Ruble</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl in1">TG 96.2 (Patrol &amp; Reconnaissance)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm George R. Henderson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl in1">TG 70.1 (Flagship Group)</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Irving T. Duke</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Struble, who had directed the Inchon assault from the bridge of the
-USS <i>Rochester</i>, would now fly his flag in the recently arrived USS
-<i>Missouri</i>, the sole American battleship in commission at this early stage
-of the Korean war.<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">16</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> ComSeventhFlt <i>OpnO 16-50</i>, 5 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_3" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_016.png" width="2050" height="1384" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>WONSAN AND HARBOR</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-3</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">17</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Joint Planning for Wonsan Landing</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Seventh Fleet directive of 5 October dispatched both the Fast Carrier
-and the Patrol and Reconnaissance Forces of JTF-7 on the usual
-search and attack missions preliminary to an amphibious assault. Task
-Force 77, consisting of the carriers <i>Boxer</i>, <i>Leyte</i>, <i>Philippine Sea</i> and
-<i>Valley Forge</i>, escorted by a light cruiser and 24 destroyers, was under
-orders to direct 50 per cent of the preparatory air effort against the
-local defenses of Wonsan. Simultaneously, the Advance Force, with
-its cruisers, destroyers and mine sweeping units, would close in to shell
-the target and wrest control of the offshore waters from the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Topographic and hydrographic studies made available to the Attack
-and Landing Forces showed Wonsan to be a far more accessible target
-than Inchon (see Map 3). Nestling in the southwestern corner of
-Yonghung Bay, 80 miles above the 38th Parallel, the seaport offers
-one of the best natural harbors in Korea. A vast anchorage lies sheltered
-in the lee of Kalma Peninsula which, finger-like, juts northward from
-a bend in the coastline. Tides range from seven to 14 inches, fog is
-rare, and currents are weak. Docks can accommodate vessels drawing
-from 12 to 25 feet, and depths in the bay run from 10 fathoms in the
-outer anchorage to 15 feet just offshore.<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM, Military Intelligence
-Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, <i>Terrain Study
-No. 6, Northern Korea</i>, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 15-50</i>, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3,
-10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex B (hereafter G-2 <i>SAR</i>), sec 2, 1.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Beaches around Wonsan are of moderate gradient, and the floor at
-water’s edge consists of hard-packed sand. Though slightly wet landings
-might be expected, amphibious craft could easily negotiate any
-of the several desirable approaches. The coastal plain, ranging from
-100 yards to two miles in depth, provides an acceptable lodgment area,
-but the seaward wall of the Taebaek mountain range renders inland
-egress difficult from the military standpoint.</p>
-
-<p>In 1940, the population of Wonsan included 69,115 Koreans and
-10,205 Japanese, the latter subsequently being repatriated to their homeland
-after World War II. Under the Japanese program of industrialization,
-the city had become Korea’s petroleum refining center. The construction
-of port facilities, railways, and roads kept pace with the
-appearance of cracking plants, supporting industries, and huge storage
-areas.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">18</span></p>
-
-<p>Two airfields served the locale in 1950. One of these, situated on
-the coast about five miles north of the seaport, was of minor importance.
-The other, known as Wonsan Airfield, on Kalma Peninsula across the
-harbor, ranked high as a military prize. Spacious and accessible, it was
-an excellent base from which to project air coverage over all of Korea
-and the Sea of Japan. The Japanese first developed the field as an air
-adjunct to the naval base at Wonsan; but after World War II, a North
-Korean aviation unit moved in and used it until July 1950. Thereafter,
-with the skies dominated by the UN air arm, Wonsan Airfield temporarily
-lost all military significance. Its vacant runways, barracks, and
-dispersal areas were given only passing attention in the UN strategic
-bombing pattern, although the nearby industrial complex was
-demolished.</p>
-
-<p>In addition to being situated on an excellent harbor, Wonsan is the
-eastern terminus of the Seoul-Wonsan corridor, the best of the few
-natural routes across the mountainous nation. This 115-mile road and
-rail passageway, once considered as a possible overland approach for
-X Corps, separates the northern and southern divisions of the Taebaek
-range, which rises precipitously from Korea’s east coast to heights of
-5000 feet. Railroads and highways, primitive by western standards,
-also trace the seaward base of the Taebaek Mountains to connect Wonsan
-with Hamhung in the north and Pusan far to the south. Still another
-road and railway leads to Pyongyang, 100 miles across the narrow
-neck of the peninsula in the western piedmont.</p>
-
-<p>The climate along Korea’s northeast coast is comparable to that of
-the lower Great Lakes region in the United States. Mean summer temperatures
-range between 80 and 88 degrees, although highs of 103
-degrees have been recorded. Winter readings drop as low as -7
-degrees, but the season is usually temperate with winds of low velocity.
-Despite light snowfalls and moderate icing, the period from October
-through March is best suited to military operations, for the heavy rains
-of spring and summer create difficulties on the gravel-topped roads.</p>
-
-<p>Although members of Admiral Doyle’s Amphibious Group One
-(PhibGruOne) staff met with planners of the 1st Marine Division at
-Inchon early in October, it soon became apparent that the projected
-D-Day of 15 October could not be realized. Maps and intelligence data
-necessary for planning did not reach the Attack Force-Landing Force
-team until 6 October. The relief of X Corps by <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> was completed,
-not on 3 October as General Almond had anticipated, but on the 7th.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">19</span>
-Moreover, the first transport vessels to reach Inchon ran behind schedule,
-and they had not been pre-loaded with a ten-day level of Class I,
-II, and V supplies, as was promised. Planning and outloading consequently
-started late and from scratch, with the result that D-Day
-“... was moved progressively back to a tentative date of 20 October.”<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">21</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 10. The classes of supply are as follows: I, rations; II, supplies and
-equipment, such as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios etc, for which specific allowances
-have been established; III, petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL);
-IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification and construction materials, cold
-weather clothing, etc, for which specific allowances have not been established; V, ammunition,
-pyrotechnics, explosives, etc.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">The Wonsan Landing</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>ROK Army Captures Wonsan—Marine Loading and Embarkation—Two
-Weeks of Mine Sweeping—Operation Yo-Yo—Marine
-Air First at Objective—MacArthur Orders Advance to
-Border—Landing of 1st Marine Division</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">On</span> 6 <span class="smcap">October</span> 1950, after the arrival of the initial assault shipping
-at Inchon, General Smith ordered the 1st Marine Division to
-commence embarkation on the 8th. Similar instructions were issued
-by X Corps the following day.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Thus, the first troops and equipment
-were to be loaded even before the G-2 Section of the Landing Force
-could begin evaluating the enemy situation at the objective, since it was
-not until 8 October that the intelligence planners received X Corps’
-OpnO 4, published four days earlier. Summing up the outlook at the
-time, G-2 later reported:</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (<i>EmbO</i>) 2-50, 6 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 394.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Inasmuch as subordinate units of the Division were scheduled to embark
-aboard ship some time prior to 15 October 1950, it was immediately obvious
-that preliminary intelligence planning, with its attendant problems of collection,
-processing, and distribution of information, and the procurement
-and distribution of graphic aids, would be both limited and sketchy.... Fortunately
-... the section [G-2] had been previously alerted on the projected
-operation, and while elements of the Division were yet engaged with the
-enemy at Uijongbu, had requested reproductions of some 100 copies of
-pertinent extracts of the <span class="allsmcap">JANIS</span> (75) of Korea. Thus it was ... that subordinate
-units would not be wholly unprepared for the coming operation.<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Smith’s OpnO 16-50, published on 10 October, climaxed
-the accelerated planning at Inchon. Worked out jointly by the staffs of
-PhibGruOne and the 1st Marine Division, this directive covered
-the Wonsan attack in detail and pinpointed subordinate unit
-responsibilities.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">22</span></p>
-
-<p>Kalma Peninsula was chosen as the point of assault, with two beaches,
-<span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> and <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span>, marked off on the eastern shore. Ten high-ground
-objectives described the semicircular arc of the beachhead, which focused
-on Wonsan and fanned out as far as five miles inland. The 1st
-and 7th Marines were to hit <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> and <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span> Beaches, respectively
-and drive inland to their assigned objectives. The 5th, upon being
-ordered ashore, would assemble west of Wonsan, prepared for further
-operations. Two battalions of the 11th Marines were to land on call
-in direct support of the assault units, and the remainder of the artillery
-would initially function in general support.</p>
-
-<p>Other subordinate units drew the usual assignments. The Reconnaissance
-Company, after landing on order, was to screen the Division’s
-left flank by occupying specified objectives. Attached to the 1st and
-7th Regiments respectively, the 5th and 3d Korean Marine Corps
-(KMC) Battalions would also go ashore on call.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 16-50</i>, 10 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>ROK Army Captures Wonsan</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 0815, 10 October, coincidentally with the publication of 1stMarDiv
-OpnO 16-50, troops of I ROK Corps, advancing rapidly up the east
-coast of Korea, entered Wonsan. By evening of the next day, the ROK
-3d and Capital Divisions were mopping up minor resistance in the
-city and guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula.<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> EUSAK <i>War Diary Summary</i> (<i>WD Sum</i>), <i>Oct 50</i>, 14–16.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Overland seizure of the 1st Marine Division’s amphibious objective
-did not come as a surprise either at GHQ in Tokyo or at General Smith’s
-CP aboard the <i>Mount McKinley</i> in Inchon Harbor. General MacArthur
-had, in fact, prepared for this eventuality by considering an
-alternate assault landing at Hungnam, another major seaport, about
-50 air miles north of Wonsan. On 8 October, therefore, the JSPOG
-completed a modified version of <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span> OpnPlan 9-50. Eighth Army’s
-mission—the capture of Pyongyang—remained unchanged in this draft,
-but X Corps would now land “... in the vicinity of Hungnam in order
-to cut the lines of communications north of Wonsan and envelop the
-North Korean forces in that area.”</p>
-
-<p>Although the choice of a new objective seemed logical on the basis
-of the ROK Army’s accomplishment, certain logistical obstacles at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">23</span>
-once loomed in the path of the alternate plan. Not unaware of the
-most imposing of these, <span class="allsmcap">JSPOG</span> commented:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The harbor at Wonsan cannot accommodate at docks the large vessels
-lifting the 7th Division. Since most of the amphibious type boats are carried
-on ships lifting the 1st Marine Division, the plans for off-loading the 7th
-Division will have to be revised.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> CinCFE <i>OpnPlan 9-50</i> (<i>Alternate</i>), 8 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>But the plans for off-loading the 7th Division could not be revised.
-If the Army unit was to land within a reasonable length of time, it
-would have to go in on the heels of the 1st Marine Division, using the
-same landing craft. If the ship-to-shore movement took place at Hungnam,
-the 7th Division would be ill-disposed for beginning its overland
-drive to Pyongyang as planned; for it would have to backtrack by land
-almost all the way to Wonsan. On the other hand, if the Army division
-landed at Wonsan while the Marines assaulted Hungnam, the Navy
-would be handicapped not only by the lack of landing craft but also
-by the problem of sweeping mines from both harbors simultaneously.</p>
-
-<p>From the standpoint of Admiral Joy in Japan and Admiral Doyle in
-Korea, there was insufficient time for planning a new tactical deployment
-of X Corps at this late date. And the time-space handicap would
-be compounded by serious shortages of mine sweepers and intelligence
-information. Joy was unsuccessful on 8 October in his first attempt
-to dissuade MacArthur from the new idea. On the 9th, unofficial word
-of the pending change reached General Smith at Inchon, just as his
-staff wound up work on the draft for the Wonsan assault. ComNavFE
-persisted in his arguments with the commander in chief, however, with
-the final result that on 10 October the original plan for landing the
-whole X Corps at Wonsan was ordered into effect.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> Coming events
-were to uphold the Navy viewpoint; for while the Wonsan landing
-itself was delayed several days by enemy mines, it was 15 November
-before the first ships safely entered the harbor at Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> C/S Notes in X Corps <i>WD</i> 10–25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, “Report of ... Operations
-... 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51,” 11; Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 57–59; and Capt Walter Karig,
-<i>et al</i>, <i>Battle Report</i>: <i>The War In Korea</i> (New York, 1952), 301–302. According to Gen
-Wright, MacArthur’s G-3, “Admiral Joy may have ‘discussed’ this often with the Commander-in-Chief,
-but no one ever ‘argued’ with him.” Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Loading and Embarkation</i></h3>
-
-<p>On 11 October, the day after he opened his CP on the <i>Mount McKinley</i>,
-General Smith learned that the Hungnam plan had been dropped. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">24</span>
-1st Marine Division continued loading out in accordance with X Corps
-OpnO 4, even though its objective had already been captured.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 59.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During the period 4–10 October, Admiral Doyle had assembled at
-Inchon an assortment of Navy amphibious vessels, ships of the Military
-Sea Transport Service (<span class="allsmcap">MSTS</span>), and Japanese-manned LSTs (<span class="allsmcap">SCAJAP</span>).<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a>
-With the arrival of Transport Squadron One on 8 October, the
-total shipping assigned to the landing force consisted of one AGC, eight
-APAs, two APs, 10 AKAs, five LSDs, 36 LSTs, three LSUs, one LSM,
-and six commercial cargo vessels (“Victory” and C-2 types).<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 10. SCAJAP is the abbreviation for Shipping
-Control Authority, Japan. Under this designation were American ships lent to Japan
-after World War II, of which many were recalled during the Korean War to serve as
-cargo vessels.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex D (hereafter G-4 <i>SAR</i>), 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Loading a reinforced division, several thousand Corps troops and
-thousands of tons of supplies and equipment proved to be an aggravating
-job under the circumstances. Pressure on the attack and landing
-forces for an early D-Day only magnified the shortcomings of Inchon
-as a port. Limited facilities and unusual tide conditions held dock
-activity to a series of feverish bursts. Moreover, many ships not part
-of the amphibious force had to be accommodated since they were
-delivering vital materiel. The assigned shipping itself was inadequate,
-according to the Division G-4 and “considerable quantities” of vehicles
-had to be left behind. Much of the trucking that could be taken was
-temporarily diverted to help transport the 7th Infantry Division to
-Pusan; and although unavailable for port operations when needed, it
-returned at the last minute to disrupt outloading of the Shore Party’s
-heavy beach equipment.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Out of conditions and developments such
-as these grew the necessity for postponing D-Day from 15 October,
-the date initially set by General Almond, to the 20th.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>For purposes of expediting embarkation and economizing on shipping
-space, X Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to out-load with
-less than the usual amount of supplies carried by a landing force.<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a>
-Resupply shipping would be so scheduled as to deliver adequate stocks
-of Class I, II, III, and IV consumables “... prior to the time they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">25</span>
-would be needed,” even though when “they would be needed” was
-anybody’s guess at this stage of the war.<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; individual assault rations for
-one day; POL for five days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five units of fire
-(U/F). <i>Ibid.</i>; 1stMarDiv <i>Administrative Order</i> (<i>AdmO</i>) 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of
-fire is a convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of ammunition. It is based on
-a specific number of rounds per weapon.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> G-4 <i>SAR</i>, 1.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In anticipation of a rapid advance to the west (which did not materialize),
-Division G-4 not only assigned 16 pre-loaded trucks and
-trailers to each RCT, but also earmarked three truck companies and
-16 more trailers as a mobile logistical reserve. These supply trains
-would stay on the heels of the attacking regiments in order to maintain
-ammunition dumps as far forward as possible in a fast-moving
-situation.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 8 October, ComNavFE directed Admiral Doyle and General
-Smith to effect his OpnPlan 113-50.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> Coincidentally, the first contingents
-of the 5th Marines boarded the <i>Bayfield</i> (1/5), <i>George Clymer</i>
-(2/5), and <i>Bexar</i> (3/5). Three days later, on the 11th, Lieutenant
-Colonel Raymond L. Murray, commander of the reserve regiment,
-opened his CP in the <i>Bayfield</i>, and his unit completed embarkation.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, 0200 8 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex QQ, appendix
-A (hereafter 1/5 <i>SAR</i>), 4, appendix B (hereafter 2/5 <i>SAR</i>), 6, and appendix C (hereafter
-3/5 <i>SAR</i>), 4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although reserve and administrative elements of the 1st and 7th
-Marines loaded earlier, the four assault battalions of these regiments
-could not begin embarkation until 13 October, owing to the fact that
-the LSTs had been used for shuttle service around Inchon Harbor.
-General Smith opened his CP in the <i>Mount McKinley</i> at 1200 on the
-11th.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> The last of the landing ships were loaded by high tide on the
-morning of the 15th, and later that day all of them sailed for the
-objective. By evening of the 16th, most of the transports were on the
-way, but the <i>Mount McKinley</i> and <i>Bayfield</i> did not depart until the
-next day.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 373.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar <i>SAR</i>), 9; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 399, 409;
-1stMar <i>HD Oct 50</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Broken down into seven embarkation groups, the landing force and
-X Corps troops leaving Inchon comprised a grand total of 1902 officers
-and 28,287 men. Of this number, 1461 officers and 23,938 men were
-on the rolls of the 1st Marine Division, the breakdown being as follows:</p>
-
-<table id="t25" summary="landing force">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Marine officers</td>
-  <td class="tdr l2">1119</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Marine enlisted</td>
-  <td class="tdr l2">20,597</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Navy officers</td>
-  <td class="tdr l2">153</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Navy enlisted</td>
-  <td class="tdr l2">1002</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">U. S. Army &amp; KMC officers attached</td>
-  <td class="tdr l2">189</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">U. S. Army &amp; KMC enlisted attached</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2339<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> 1stMarDiv <i>Embarkation Summary</i>, 16 Oct 50; and “Special Report 1stMarDiv,” 12.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">26</span></p>
-
-<p>Even in the last stages of loading and during the actual departure,
-new orders had continued to flow out of higher headquarters. It will
-be recalled that General Smith issued his OpnO 16-50 for the Wonsan
-assault on 10 October. An alternate plan, to be executed on signal,
-went out to subordinate units the same day, providing for an administrative
-landing by the Division on <span class="allsmcap">RED</span> Beach, north of Wonsan,
-instead of Kalma Peninsula.<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 17-50</i>, 10 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As a result of discussions during a X Corps staff conference on
-13 October, a party headed by General Almond flew to Wonsan the
-next day.<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> The purpose of his visit was to reconnoiter the objective
-and to explain his latest operational directive to the I ROK Corps commander,
-who would come under his control.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> This new order, published
-on the 14th, called for an administrative landing by X Corps
-and a rapid advance westward along the Wonsan—Pyongyang axis to
-a juncture with <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>. Assigned to the 1st Marine Division was an
-objective northeast of Pyongyang, the Red capital.<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> “... Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown to Wonsan in accordance
-with a definite plan which materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a matter of
-fact the personnel for these parties and even some of the jeeps were already loaded out
-and had to be removed from the shipping prior to our sailing.” Col A. L. Bowser, Comments,
-n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 59.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> X Corps <i>Operation Instruction</i> (<i>OI</i>) <i>11</i>, 14 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 385.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was this tactical scheme, then, that prevailed as the Marines departed
-Inchon from 15 to 17 October and the 7th Infantry Division
-prepared to embark from Pusan. General Smith, of course, placed
-into effect his alternate order for a landing on <span class="allsmcap">RED</span> Beach.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> While there
-may be a note of humor in the fact that on 15 October ComPhibGruOne
-issued his OpnO 16-50 for the “assault landing” at Wonsan, it must
-be remembered that the ship-to-shore movement would remain essentially
-the same from the Navy’s standpoint, regardless of the swift
-march of events ashore.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">27</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> According to General Smith, “The reason for issuing 1stMarDiv OpnO 17-50 was
-to provide for an administrative landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where
-there would be easy access to the existing road net. The ship-to-shore movement provided
-for in 1stMarDiv OpnO 16-50 was retained intact. This plan [OpnO 17-50] had
-to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was completely blocked by mines,
-and that it would be much quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula where
-we eventually landed ... 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450 24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv
-OpnOs 16 and 17 and provided for an administrative landing on the Kalma Peninsula
-as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless
-otherwise stated, letters may be assumed to be to the authors.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Two Weeks of Mine Sweeping</i></h3>
-
-<p>Mine sweeping for the Wonsan landing commenced on 8 October,
-when Task Group 95.6, commanded by Captain Spofford, began assembling
-for the mission of clearing a path ahead of the 250-ship
-armada bringing the 1st Marine Division and other units of X Corps.
-It had been known for a month that the waters of the east coast were
-dangerous for navigation. The first mine was discovered off Chinnampo
-on the west coast on 7 September, and four days later Admiral Joy
-ordered the United Nations Blocking and Escort Force to stay on the
-safe side of the 100-fathom line along the east coast. But it was not
-until 26 and 28 September that more definite information was acquired
-the hard way when the U. S. destroyer <i>Brush</i> and the ROK mine sweeper
-<i>YMS 905</i> were damaged by east coast mines.<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> CinCPacFlt <i>Interim Evaluation Report No. 1</i>, VI, 1090.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 28th ComNavFE issued his OpnO 17-50 covering operations
-of mine sweepers in Korean waters. The herculean task awaiting the
-12 available American vessels of this type may be judged by the fact
-that more than a hundred had been employed off Okinawa in World
-War II.</p>
-
-<p>Although the exact date remained unknown, it was a safe assumption
-that North Korean mining activities, beginning in late July or early
-August, were speeded by the Inchon landing, which aroused the enemy
-to the peril of further amphibious operations. Russian instructors had
-trained Korean Reds at Wonsan and Chinnampo in the employment of
-Soviet-manufactured mines. Sampans, junks, and wooden coastal
-barges were used to sow a field of about 2000 in the harbor and
-approaches to Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 404; Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 301. See also ADVATIS
-Rpt 1225 in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 24 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Spofford’s TG 95.6 commenced its sweep off Wonsan on
-10 October after a sortie from Sasebo. Unfortunately, the three large
-fleet sweepers, <i>Pledge</i>, <i>Pirate</i>, and <i>Incredible</i>, were not well adapted to
-the shallow sweeping necessary at Wonsan. More dependence could
-be placed in the seven small wooden-hulled U. S. motor mine sweepers
-<i>Redhead</i>, <i>Mocking Bird</i>, <i>Osprey</i>, <i>Chatterer</i>, <i>Merganser</i>, <i>Kite</i>, and <i>Partridge</i>,
-which were rugged even though low-powered. Spofford’s two
-big high-speed sweepers, <i>Doyle</i> and <i>Endicott</i>, had their limitations for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">28</span>
-this type of operation; and the nine Japanese and three ROK sweepers
-lacked some of the essential gear.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> CinCPacFlt <i>Interim Evaluation Report No. 1</i>, VI, 1004; Dept Army, Joint Daily
-Situation Report (D/A Daily SitRpt) 105; Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 311–314.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The U. S. destroyers <i>Collett</i>, <i>Swenson</i>, <i>Maddox</i>, and <i>Thomas</i> were
-in the Wonsan area as well as the cruiser <i>Rochester</i>. On the 9th the
-<i>Rochester’s</i> helicopter sighted 61 mines in a reconnaissance, and the next
-day the observer found them too numerous to count. In spite of these
-grim indications, rapid progress the first day led to predictions of a
-brief operation. By late afternoon a 3000-yard channel had been
-cleared from the 100-fathom curve to the 30-fathom line. But hopes
-were dashed at this point by the discovery of five additional lines of
-mines.<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps <i>WD</i> 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE Intelligence Summary
-(IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt
-105; Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 315.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 12 and 13 October the naval guns of TG 95.2 bombarded Tanchon
-and Songjin on the northeast coast. While the USS <i>Missouri</i>
-treated the marshaling yards of Tanchon to 163 16″ rounds, the cruisers
-<i>Helena</i>, <i>Worcester</i>, and <i>Ceylon</i> fired at bridges, shore batteries, and
-tunnels in the Chongjin area.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in CinCPacFlt, <i>Interim Evaluation
-Report No. 1</i>, 13–15; ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in <i>Ibid.</i>, 7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Spofford tried to save time on the morning of the 12th by counter-mining
-as 39 planes from the carriers <i>Leyte Gulf</i> and <i>Philippine Sea</i>
-dropped 50 tons of bombs. It was found, however, that even the explosion
-of a 1000-pound bomb would not set off nearby mines by concussion.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a>
-According to Admiral Struble, “The results of this operation
-simply bore out our experience in World War II, but were tried out
-on the long chance that they might be effective in the current situation.”<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X Corps <i>WD</i> 10–25
-Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE IntSum 82; Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 315.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 12th was a black day for the sweeping squadron. For the steel
-sweepers <i>Pledge</i> and <i>Pirate</i> both were blown up by mines that afternoon
-and sank with a total of 13 killed and 87 wounded. Rescue of
-the survivors was handicapped by fire from enemy shore batteries.<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in CinCPacFlt <i>Interim Evaluation Report
-No. 1</i>, H4; ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15; Karig, <i>Korea</i>,
-318–322.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>While the blast of a half-ton bomb had not been powerful enough,
-Spofford reasoned that depth charges might start a chain reaction in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">29</span>
-which mines would detonate mines. But a precision drop by naval
-planes met with no success, and there was nothing left but a return to
-the slow, weary, and dangerous work of methodical sweeping.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The flying boats, Mariners and Sunderlands, were called upon to
-assist by conducting systematic aerial searches for moored and drifting
-mines, which they destroyed by .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Soon an
-effective new technique was developed as the seaplanes carried overlays
-of Hydrographic Office charts to be marked with the locations of all
-mines sighted. These charts were dropped to the sweepers and were
-of considerable assistance in pinpointing literally hundreds of mines.<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt <i>Interim Evaluation Report
-No. 1</i>, D8.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 18th one of the Japanese sweepers, the <i>JMS-14</i>, hit a mine
-and went down. In spite of this loss, the end seemed in sight. No
-attempt was being made to clear all the mines; but with a lane swept
-into the harbor, it remained only to check the immediate area of the
-landing beaches. So hopeful did the outlook appear that it was more
-disillusioning when the ROK <i>YMS 516</i> disintegrated on 19 October
-after a terrific explosion in the supposedly cleared lane. Thus was TG
-95.6 rudely introduced to the fact that the sweepers had to deal with
-magnetic mines in addition to the other types. The mechanism could
-be set to allow as many as 12 ships to pass over the mine before it
-exploded. This meant, of course, that the sweepers must make at least
-13 passes over any given area before it could be considered safe.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 404–407; Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 324–326.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The <i>Mount McKinley</i> having arrived off Wonsan that same day,
-Admiral Doyle and General Almond, with six members of the X Corps
-staff, went by boat to the battleship <i>Missouri</i> for a conference with
-Admiral Struble. <span class="allsmcap">CJTF</span>-7 asserted that he would not authorize the
-administrative landing until the magnetic mines were cleared from
-the shipping lane—a task which he estimated would take three more
-days. This announcement led to General Almond’s decision to fly
-ashore in the <i>Missouri’s</i> helicopter on the 20th and establish his CP
-in Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> So rapidly had the situation changed, it was hard to
-remember that this date had once been set as D-Day when the Marine
-landing force would fight for a beachhead.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">30</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne
-“Operations Report,” 11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of
-the Korean Conflict,” <i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, lxxx, no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340;
-Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 324–326; 1stMarDiv G-1 Journal 20 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Operation Yo-Yo</i></h3>
-
-<p>Shortly after 1700 on the afternoon of 19 October, a rumor swept
-through the 250 ships of the Tractor and Transport Groups. “War’s
-over!” shouted the excited Marines. “They’re taking us back to Pusan
-for embarkation to the States.”</p>
-
-<p>Rumor seemed to have the support of fact on this occasion, for
-compass readings left no doubt that the armada had indeed executed a
-maritime “about face” to head southward. What the men on the transports
-did not know was that the reversal of direction had been ordered
-for purely military reasons as a result of the conference that day on
-the <i>Missouri</i>.</p>
-
-<p>It was puzzling enough to the troops the following morning when
-the ships resumed their original course. But this was nothing as compared
-to their bewilderment late that afternoon as the Tractor and
-Transport Groups turned southward again.</p>
-
-<p>Every twelve hours, in accordance with the directive of <span class="allsmcap">CJTF</span>-7, the
-fleet was to reverse course, steaming back and forth off the eastern
-coast of Korea until the last of the magnetic mines could be cleared
-from the lane in preparation for an administrative landing at Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 404; Struble Comments,
-16 Mar 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Marines have always been ready with a derisive phrase, and “Operation
-Yo-Yo” was coined to express their disgust with this interlude of
-concentrated monotony. Never did time die a harder death, and never
-did the grumblers have so much to grouse about. Letters to wives and
-sweethearts took on more bulk daily, and paper-backed murder mysteries
-were worn to tatters by bored readers.</p>
-
-<p>On the 22d, at <span class="allsmcap">CJTF</span>-7’s regular daily meeting, Admirals Struble and
-Doyle conferred in the destroyer <i>Rowan</i> with Admiral Smith and Captain
-Spofford. It was agreed that the sweeping could not be completed
-until the 24th or 25th, which meant that Operation Yo-Yo might last
-a week.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The situation had its serious aspects on LSTs and transports which
-were not prepared for a voyage around Korea taking nearly as long
-as a crossing of the Pacific. Food supplies ran low as gastro-enteritis and
-dysentery swept through the crowded transports in spite of strict medical
-precautions. The <span class="allsmcap">MSTS</span> transport <i>Marine Phoenix</i> alone had a sick list<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">31</span>
-of 750 during the epidemic. A case of smallpox was discovered on the
-<i>Bayfield</i>, and all crewmen as well as passengers were vaccinated that
-same day.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 11; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex VV, (hereafter 7thMTBn <i>SAR</i>), 2; ComPhibGruOne
-msg to BuMed, 0034 27 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 23d, as the <i>Mount McKinley</i> proceeded into the inner harbor
-at Wonsan, there could be no doubt that the final mine sweeping would
-be completed by the 25th. Operation Yo-Yo came to an end, therefore,
-when Admiral Doyle directed the amphibious fleet to arrive on the
-25th, prepared for an administrative landing. The order of entry called
-for the Transport Group to take the lead, followed by the vessels of
-the Tractor Group.<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G-3 Journal, X Corps <i>WD</i> 10–25
-Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the morning of the 25th, Admirals Struble and Doyle held a
-final conference with General Almond and Captain Spofford. By this
-time they had decided to land the Marines over <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> and <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span>
-Beaches on Kalma Peninsula, as originally conceived in 1stMarDiv
-OpnO 16-50. The inner harbor of Wonsan would remain closed until
-completely clear of mines, and then it would be developed as a supply
-base.<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 407; CG 1stMarDiv
-msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Air First at Objective</i></h3>
-
-<p>The sense of frustration which oppressed the Marine ground forces
-during Operation Yo-Yo would have been increased if they had realized
-that the air maintenance crews had beaten them to Wonsan by a margin
-of twelve days. Even more humiliating to the landing force troops,
-Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell were flown to the objective area. On
-the evening of the 24th they put on a USO show spiced with quips at
-the expense of the disgruntled Leathernecks in the transports.</p>
-
-<p>Planning for Marine air operations in northeast Korea had been
-modified from day to day to keep pace with the rapidly changing strategic
-situation. On 11 October, when ROK forces secured Wonsan,
-preparations for air support of an assault landing were abandoned.
-Two days later Major General Field Harris, CG 1st Marine Aircraft
-Wing and Tactical Air Command X Corps (TAC X Corps), flew to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">32</span>
-Wonsan. After inspecting the airfield he decided to begin operations
-without delay.<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW <i>HD</i>, <i>Oct 50</i>; 1stMAW
-<i>SAR</i>, annex K (hereafter MAG-12 <i>SAR</i>), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>),
-3, 5–6; and Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 433–441.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>These developments, of course, were accompanied by amendments
-to the original plan which had assigned Marine Fighter Squadrons
-(VMFs)-214 and -323 the air support role in the naval task force,
-with Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-12 to be landed as soon as the
-field at Wonsan was secured.</p>
-
-<p>In response to changing conditions, VMF-312 aircraft flew from
-Kimpo to Wonsan on the 14th, and R5Ds lifted 210 personnel of the
-advance echelons of Headquarters Squadron (Hedron)-12, Service
-Squadron (SMS)-12, and Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron
-(VMF(N))-513. Two LSTs sailed from Kobe with equipment of
-MAG-12, and Combat Cargo Command aircraft of Far East Air Force
-began flying in aviation gasoline. Bombs and rockets were flown to
-Wonsan by the planes of VMF(N)-513.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” <i>Marine Corps
-Gazette</i>, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul 52), 19–20; 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, annex K, appendix H (hereafter
-VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>), sec 6, 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 16th, VMFs-214 and -323 departed Sasebo for station off
-Wonsan in the CVE’s <i>Sicily</i> and <i>Badoeng Strait</i>. From the following
-day until the 27th these two fighter squadrons were to provide air
-cover for the mine sweeping operations off Wonsan and the ensuing
-1st Marine Division administrative landing.<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="fnanchor">87</a> 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF-214 <i>SAR</i>), 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>TAC X Corps OpnO 2-50, issued on 15 October, had contemplated
-the opening of the port at Wonsan and arrival of the surface echelon
-within three days. Until then the two squadrons at Wonsan airfield
-were to be dependent on airlift for all supplies.</p>
-
-<p>The unforeseen ten-day delay in clearing a lane through the mine
-field made it difficult to maintain flight operations. Fuel was pumped
-by hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled along the ground
-about a mile from the dump to the flight line. Muscle also had to
-substitute for machinery in ordnance sections which had only one jeep
-and eight bomb trailers for moving ammunition.<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” 20; 1stMAW <i>HD</i>, <i>Oct 50</i>;
-TAC X Corps <i>OpnO 2-50</i>, 15 Oct 50, in <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Despite such difficulties, air operations from the new field were
-speeded up when General Almond landed to establish the X Corps CP<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">33</span>
-at Wonsan on the 20th, after taking control of I ROK Corps. Armed
-reconnaissance sorties were flown regularly and attacks made on retreating
-bodies of <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> troops. On the 24th a VMF-312 flight surprised
-a column of about 800 Korean Reds near Kojo, 39 miles southeast
-of Wonsan, and scattered it with heavy losses.</p>
-
-<p>There were administrative as well as operational problems to be
-solved. If an assault landing had been carried out at Wonsan, the
-provision for air support would have been planned in a manner similar
-to that of Inchon. But the change to an administrative landing caused
-the 1st MAW to be placed under the control of the Far East Air Forces.
-This was in accordance with a <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span> directive to the effect that when
-both <span class="allsmcap">FEAF</span> and Naval air were assigned missions in Korea, coordination
-control would be exercised by <span class="allsmcap">CG FEAF</span>. He had in turn delegated that
-control north of the 38th parallel, including close-support operations
-of carrier-borne planes, to CG Fifth Air Force.</p>
-
-<p>An effort was made at first by MAG-12 officers to comply with Fifth
-AF procedures, which required the schedule for any given day’s strikes
-to be submitted to that headquarters by 1800 the previous day. Obviously,
-the distance separating X Corps in Wonsan from Fifth Air
-Force Headquarters in Seoul made it virtually impossible to get clearance
-in time. This issue was speedily settled by a conference in which
-Major General Earle E. Partridge, USAF, CG Fifth Air Force, gave
-General Harris oral permission to plan and execute supporting missions
-for X Corps in northeast Korea while awaiting clearance from the
-Fifth AF.</p>
-
-<p>His decision was made on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the
-authority of CG 1st MAW to take action “in emergencies.” In practice,
-the arrangement worked out smoothly during this preliminary
-period, and on 12 November CG Fifth Air Force confirmed his oral
-agreement with a written directive.</p>
-
-<p>Direction of air operations in support of X Corps was exercised by
-MAG-12 for the 1st MAW from 15 October to 9 November. Night
-operations did not begin until late in October for lack of runway lights
-at Wonsan, so that VMF(N)-513 flew daytime missions along with
-VMF-312. The two carrier-based squadrons conducted flights in a
-similar manner. Aircraft reported at designated times to specified
-Tactical Air Control Parties (<span class="allsmcap">TACP</span>s) for operations directed by a daily
-Fifth AF order, some of them in response to previously submitted requests
-of ground units for air support.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">34</span></p>
-
-<p>Major Vincent J. Gottschalk’s Marine Observation Squadron
-(VMO)-6 was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division,
-though it was under the administrative direction of MAG-12.
-Two helicopter pilots, Captain Wallace D. Blatt and First Lieutenant
-Chester C. Ward, flew from Kimpo to Wonsan on 23 October. The
-rest of the squadron had proceeded by LST. A flight echelon of helicopters,
-commanded by Captain Victor A. Armstrong, VMO-6 executive
-officer, remained temporarily at Kimpo at the request of the
-Fifth Air Force to evacuate casualties of the 187th Airborne RCT in
-the Sukchon area.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex WW (hereafter VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>), 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>MacArthur Orders Advance to Border</i></h3>
-
-<p>From all that has gone before, it might be expected that UN strategy
-and tactics, after frequent modification, had finally been decided upon
-by mid-October 1950. This was not the case, and a brief recapitulation
-of events in western and central Korea is now necessary in order
-to set the scene for the sweeping changes that followed.</p>
-
-<p>General Walker’s Eighth Army, as mentioned earlier, had deployed
-along the 38th Parallel after relieving X Corps above Seoul on 7 October.
-Two days later, armored elements of the 1st Cavalry Division
-crossed the boundary to spearhead the U. S. I Corps drive on Sariwon
-and Pyongyang. The former city was secured on 17 October with the
-help of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, while the 24th Infantry
-Division moved up the west coast on the left of the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang
-axis.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> The 1st Cavalry Division continued the attack toward
-Pyongyang on the 18th, entering the Red capital with the 1st
-ROK Division the next day. Pyongyang was secured on 21 October,
-and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division also occupied the undefended
-port city of Chinnampo, 35 miles to the southwest.<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> EUSAK <i>WD Sum, Oct 50</i>, 13–23.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 25–30.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A vertical envelopment on 20 October had come as a dramatic supplement
-to the attack on Pyongyang. The 187th Airborne RCT parachuted
-successfully into the Sukchon-Sunchon area, about 30 miles north
-of the city, thereby cutting the two principal <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> escape routes to
-Manchuria. After watching the drop from his plane, General MacArthur
-stopped off at Pyongyang and declared that the surprise stroke<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">35</span>
-had closed the trap on the enemy. At his Tokyo headquarters the next
-day, he predicted that the war would end shortly.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> Schnabel, <i>The Korean Conflict</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In mountainous central Korea on the right flank of I US Corps, the
-6th ROK Division had been leading the rapid advance of South Korean
-forces under <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span>. With Hwachon captured on 8 October, the division
-went on to take the vital hubs of Chorwon on the 10th and Kumwha
-on the 11th. It made contact with ROK Capitol Division elements
-from Wonsan the following day. During the next 24 hours, the 6th
-Division advanced 20 miles, and the 7th and 8th ROK Divisions fanned
-out to exploit the deepening penetration. On 14 October the 6th closed
-on Yangdok, about midway between Wonsan and Pyongyang.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> EUSAK <i>WD Sum, Oct 50</i>, 11–20.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Thereafter the ROK forces in the center of the peninsula began veering
-northwest, so that by 22 October, the day after Pyongyang fell to
-I Corps, the vanguard 6th Division was bearing down on Kunu-ri,<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a>
-about 45 air miles to the north of the capital.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 20–32.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>From the foregoing, it is obvious that a trans-peninsular drive by
-X Corps was no longer necessary after mid-October. In fact, both in
-Washington and in Tokyo the attitude prevailed that the Korean war
-was nearing an end. President Truman had deemed a meeting of minds
-appropriate at this time, and he flew to Wake Island for a conference
-with General MacArthur on 15 October.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is primarily based on: Gen O. N.
-Bradley, Comp., <i>Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15,
-1950</i> (Washington, 1951); and Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 364–367. These accounts are
-strongly objected to in MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 36. For a differing account of the meeting
-see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, <i>MacArthur 1941–1951</i> (New York, 1954),
-382–383; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen. MacArthur
-Makes His Reply,” <i>Life</i>, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb 56), 107–108. Participants in the conference
-besides Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Ambassador
-Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary
-of State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt; Averell Harriman; and
-BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM Headquarters.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Various aspects of American policy in the Far East were discussed
-at the meeting, but the Korean situation ranked high on the agenda.
-When asked by President Truman about the chances of Russian or
-Chinese interference in the war, General MacArthur replied, “Very
-little.” His conclusion agreed with that held by many in high government
-circles, although officials in both Washington and Tokyo realized
-that the possibility of Communist intervention could not be dismissed
-entirely.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">36</span></p>
-
-<p>MacArthur stated that about 300,000 Chinese troops were stationed
-in Manchuria, of whom from 100,000 to 125,000 had been deployed
-along the Yalu River boundary with Korea. He estimated that only
-50,000 to 60,000 of these troops could get across the river. If they attempted
-to move on Pyongyang, he said, they would be “slaughtered,”
-owing to the proximity of UN air bases.</p>
-
-<p>The commander in chief added that Russia had no troops immediately
-available for a thrust into the peninsula. It would take six weeks
-for a Soviet division to assemble at the border, and by that time winter
-would have set in. And while Russia had a fairly good air force in
-Siberia and Manchuria, tactical support of Chinese ground troops would
-be difficult to control. “I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese
-as often as they would bomb us,” MacArthur remarked.<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the Marine Corps’ highly technical
-system of tactical air employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our
-marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces
-are not as good as the marines but they are effective.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Part of the conference dealt with the rehabilitation of Korea and
-the eventual departure of UN troops after the fighting had ceased.
-MacArthur expressed his belief that organized resistance would end
-by Thanksgiving (23 November). He hoped to withdraw <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> to
-Japan by Christmas, leaving X Corps, reconstituted with the 2d and
-3d U. S. Infantry Divisions and other UN detachments, as a security
-force until peace and order were fully restored. All present seemed to
-agree that elections should be held early to achieve stability in the
-re-united country, and that the ROK Army must be made tough enough
-to deter the Chinese Communists from any aggressive moves.</p>
-
-<p>The conference ended on a note of general optimism. President
-Truman pinned a Distinguished Service Medal on the commander in
-chief (his fifth), and the latter boarded his plane and departed shortly
-after the meeting.</p>
-
-<p>Once back in Tokyo, MacArthur issued on 17 October a new order
-that would become effective if Pyongyang fell before X Corps landed
-at Wonsan (as was the case four days later). This draft established
-parallel zones of action for <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> and X Corps in North Korea, with
-the Taebaek Range as the dividing line. The restraining line for UN
-Forces was advanced as much as 60 miles to a lateral drawn through
-Chongsanjangsi-Koingdong-Pyongwon-Toksil-li-Pungsan-Songjin (see
-Map 1). ROK Forces, of course, would still drive all the way to the
-borders of Manchuria and the USSR.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">37</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50; Schnabel, <i>Korean Conflict</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 24 October, just as the 1st Marine Division was preparing to
-land at Wonsan, General MacArthur did away with the restraining
-line altogether. The original restriction on the advance of UN elements,
-he told his subordinate commanders, was based on the possibility
-of enemy capitulation. Since there appeared to be no prospect of
-a formal surrender, he now authorized Generals Walker and Almond
-to use whatever of their ground forces were necessary to secure all of
-North Korea. And he enjoined them “... to drive forward with all
-speed and with full utilization of all their force.”<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps <i>WD Sum</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The commander in chief received a message from JCS the next day,
-telling him that they considered his new order “not in consonance”
-with their 27 September authorization, which had stipulated a policy
-of using only ROK ground forces in the provinces bordering Russia
-and Manchuria. The matter had caused some concern in Washington,
-the Joint Chiefs said, and they wanted to know MacArthur’s reasons
-for making the decision.<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 372.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In reply they were informed that the commander in chief’s decision
-was a “matter of military necessity,” since the ROK Army lacked both
-the strength and the seasoned commanders required for securing North
-Korea. MacArthur added that the 27 September authorization had
-“... merely enunciated the [restraining line] provision as a matter of
-policy,” and had admitted the possibility of JCS instructions being
-modified in accordance with developments. He stated further that he
-possessed the authority to so modify from Secretary of Defense Marshall
-himself, who had told him “... to feel unhampered tactically
-and strategically....” Assuring the Joint Chiefs that he understood
-the reasons for their apprehension, he warned that “... tactical hazards
-might even result from other action than that which I have directed.”<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 372.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>And there the matter rested.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Landing of 1st Marine Division</i></h3>
-
-<p>It was at a X Corps staff meeting on 18 October that General Almond
-disclosed MacArthur’s plan for parallel zones of action and the new
-Chongsanjansi-Songjin restraining line in North Korea. Upon establishing
-his CP at Wonsan two days later, he accordingly assumed command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">38</span>
-of all UN and ROK forces north of the 39° 10′ parallel and east of the
-Taebaek Range.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">101</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By this time the ROK Capitol Division was occupying Hamhung,
-Hungnam, and nearby Yonpo Airfield, all of which had been captured
-on 17 October during the swift drive northward.<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> The ROK 3d Division
-had one regiment at Wonsan, another at Kojo, and the third en
-route to Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">103</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 23 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 21st, General Almond requested CJTF-7 to land one battalion
-of Marines at Kojo immediately, for the purpose of relieving the ROK
-regiment defending that locale. He contended that Navy LSTs could
-beach there safely, since <span class="allsmcap">SCAJAP</span> ships had already done so. Learning of
-the proposed landing, Admiral Doyle argued against it and Admiral
-Struble forbade it on the ground that the military requirement did not
-justify the risk incident to negotiating unswept waters. Thus the landing
-was called off, although the Marines had not heard the last of
-Kojo.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">104</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in <i>Ibid.</i>; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13;
-Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 22 October, General Smith issued a new plan based on the proposed
-X Corps deployment as far north as the Chongsanjangsi-Songjin
-line. The 1st Marine Division would now occupy the southern part of
-the extended corps zone, with each regiment responsible for the security
-of its assigned sector.<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> But again planning went for naught when, two
-days later, General Almond received MacArthur’s order to disregard
-the restraining line and use whatever forces necessary to drive rapidly
-to the Manchurian and Soviet borders. On 25 October, therefore, X
-Corps directed the 1st Marine Division to concentrate one RCT in the
-Hamhung area and to relieve elements of the I ROK Corps at the
-Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs. South Korean troops had already begun
-their advance on these vital power centers, some 50 to 60 air miles
-north of Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">106</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">39</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnPlan</i> 4-50, 22 Oct 50. “G-3 (Col Bowser) and G-4 (Col McAlister)
-landed by boat at Wonsan through a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of
-October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted at this time and a reconnaissance
-of the entire Wonsan area was made to select and mark administrative assembly areas for
-units of the Division. Included in this reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which
-was selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view of its projected employment
-to the north shortly after landing.” Bowser Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> X Corps <i>WD</i>, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in <i>ibid.</i>; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 285.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was also on the 25th that the 1st Marine Division finally began
-its administrative landing at Wonsan—as anticlimactic a landing as
-Marines have ever made. Five LSTs loaded with Engineer, Shore Party,
-and Combat Service Group elements beached on Kalma Peninsula in
-the evening. Since the approaches had not been declared clear until
-late afternoon, the main ship-to-shore movement was delayed until the
-next day. Thus, 26 October actually became D-Day—or “Doyle Day,”
-as it was referred to by an impatient General Almond.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">107</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar <i>SAR</i>), 4; and Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 407–409.
-The orders covering the actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90 msgs to
-CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and
-CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was given in
-CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At first light on the 26th, landing craft clustered around the transport
-vessels in the swept channel as troops spilled down debarkation
-nets. The first of 39 scheduled waves were shortly on the way, with
-amphibious craft of every description churning the water.<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> LSUs
-began disgorging armor of the 1st Tank Battalion at 0730, and the big
-machines, fitted with deep-water fording adapters, thrashed through
-the surf and onto the loose sand.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> Simultaneously, swarms of vehicles
-of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion crawled ashore shuttling troops
-and cargo.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">110</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> “At the time of the administrative landing we thought that we might as well use the
-planned ship-to-shore movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making a new
-ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to execute by referring to our original plan
-[OpnO 16-50] for the assault landing without issuing an entire new order.” Bowser Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>), 2–8.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="fnanchor">110</a> 1stAmphTracBn <i>HD Oct 50</i>, 2–3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0900, LSTs landed the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines
-on <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> Beach, while Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s regimental headquarters
-splashed ashore out of landing craft dispatched from the
-<i>Noble</i>. The reserve battalion, 2/1, remained on board ship until the
-28th. By 1700, the 3d Battalion was in position for the night and the
-1st was well on the way to Kojo for a special mission. In the midst
-of the landing, Colonel Puller received a message from General Smith
-congratulating him on his being selected for promotion to brigadier
-general.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">111</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Troops of the 7th Marines marched ashore on <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span> Beach without
-incident, and the assembled battalions moved to assigned areas north
-of Wonsan. At 1300, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg opened his regimental<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">40</span>
-CP at St. Benedict’s Abbey, which had been gutted by the retreating
-Communists.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">112</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="fnanchor">112</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628 26 Oct 50. For a detailed
-account of the tragedy of St. Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, <i>The
-History of the Chaplains Corps</i>, <i>U. S. Navy</i>, (MS) V.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Advance parties of the 5th Marines began landing over both beaches
-at 0800. Priority was given to unloading the reserve unit’s cargo, and
-the majority of troops remained on board transports for the night.
-Most of the regiment debarked the next day and assembled about three
-miles northwest of Wonsan, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray established
-his CP at 1800.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">113</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="fnanchor">113</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar <i>SAR</i>), 8.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Only the 2d Battalion and several reconnaissance parties of the
-11th Marines landed on the 26th. The remainder of the artillery regiment
-went ashore the next day and bivouacked at the coastal town of
-Munpyong-ni, five miles above Wonsan. Colonel James H. Brower, the
-regimental commander, detached 2/11 to the 1st Marines at 1715 on
-27 October, but the other battalions “... remained in a mobile state
-awaiting further orders.”<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">114</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="fnanchor">114</a> 11thMar <i>UnitReport</i> (<i>URpt</i>), 21–28 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Wonsan landing, though tactically insignificant at the moment,
-was a major logistical undertaking to such units as the 1st Engineer
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John H. Partridge), the 1st Shore Party
-Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Henry P. Crowe), and the 1st Combat
-Service Group (Colonel John H. Cook, Jr.).</p>
-
-<p>Representatives from these and other support and service units had
-flown to the objective area several days before the Division’s arrival.
-After completing an inspection of Wonsan, the Shore Party detachment
-employed 500 North Korean POWs and 210 civilians to improve
-landing sites and beach exits. This work continued 24 hours a day for
-nine days, until the vanguard LSTs grated ashore on Kalma Peninsula
-in the evening of 25 October.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">115</a> At this point, Shore Party Group C
-(Major George A. Smith) assumed responsibility for <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> Beach
-in the north, and Group B (Major Henry Brzezinski) took over <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span>
-Beach.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="fnanchor">115</a> The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annexes MM
-(hereafter 1stSPBn SAR), 5–8, and UU (hereafter 1st CSG <i>SAR</i>) 6 and 1stSPBn, <i>HD for
-Advance Party</i>, 1–2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>With the arrival of the first waves of LSTs, LSUs, LVTs, and landing
-craft in the morning, there began a routine of unremitting toil that
-would abate only after all of X Corps had landed weeks later. Because<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">41</span>
-of the shallow offshore gradient, many amphibious craft could not
-reach the beach with their heavy cargoes, and the Shore Party troops
-had to construct ramps which projected 30 feet into the water.
-These improvised piers were made of rice bags filled with sand, with the
-result that their maintenance required considerable effort in men and
-heavy equipment. A pontoon causeway constructed on 27 October
-lessened the difficulties connected with getting troops ashore, but other
-problems persisted.</p>
-
-<p>One of these had to do with a sandbar that stretched across the boat
-lanes about 50 yards from the coast. Heavier craft frequently grounded
-here, and while some could be towed ashore by tractor dozers (TD-18s)
-and LVTs, others had to be unloaded in the water by cranes operating
-off the ramps and from barges.</p>
-
-<p>Once men and supplies finally reached dry land, there was the difficulty
-of transporting them inland over the loose sand and around the
-sprawling dunes of the peninsular beaches. Trucks and trailers often
-bogged down to such depths that they had to be uprooted and towed by
-LVTs or dozers. This tied up the overworked tracked vehicles when
-they were badly needed elsewhere.</p>
-
-<p>The Combat Service Group established its Class I, III, and V dumps
-according to plan on 26 October, but Class II and IV supplies arrived
-on the beach “... in a completely mixed condition,” owing to the
-haste of the outloading at Inchon. From D-Day onward, from 1500
-to 2000 Korean civilians were hired daily to help segregate and issue
-supplies.</p>
-
-<p>Upon the completion of mine sweeping in the inner harbor, the
-intact port facilities of Wonsan became operative on 2 November.
-During the next nine days, the Combat Service Group dispatched by
-rail to Hamhung 3900 tons of ammunition alone. On 9 November,
-the group was attached to X Corps for operational control, thereafter
-assuming specific responsibility for such varied tasks as: operation of
-all port facilities; unloading all X Corps elements; transporting all
-equipment and supplies to inland dumps and supply points; casualty
-evacuation; maintenance of an airhead at Wonsan Airfield; providing
-local security; traffic control in the port and its environs; and providing
-field maintenance for all units in the Wonsan area.</p>
-
-<p>The magnitude of the logistical operation can be imagined from a
-survey of statistics mentioned in Shore Party reports. By 31 October,
-when the 1st Marine Division’s landing was completed, a total of 24<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">42</span>
-cargo vessels, 36 LSTs, and one LSM had been unloaded. Bulk cargo
-in the order of 18,402 tons had moved across the beaches along with
-30,189 personnel and 4731 vehicles. During the same period, 2534
-troops were outloaded with 70 vehicles and 4323 POWs. And in
-November, as the MAG-12 elements and the rest of X Corps poured
-ashore, the total of ships handled soared to 76 cargo and 52 LSTs,
-adding 30,928 personnel, 51,270 tons of supplies, and 7113 vehicles
-to the short-lived build-up in Northeast Korea.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">43</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">First Blood At Kojo</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>1/1 Sent to Kojo—Marine Positions in Kojo Area—The All-Night
-Fight of Baker Company—2/1 Ordered to Kojo—Security
-Provided for Wonsan Area—Marines Relieved at Kojo</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">It</span> was perhaps inevitable after the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> collapse that an end-of-the-war
-atmosphere should prevail. This attitude was found in the
-CP as well as the foxhole. General MacArthur, while witnessing the
-Eighth Army paratroop landings north of the captured enemy capital,
-was quoted by the newspapers as saying:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The war is very definitely coming to an end shortly. With the closing of
-that trap there should be an end to organized resistance.<a id="FNanchor_116" href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">116</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_116" href="#FNanchor_116" class="fnanchor">116</a> <i>Newsweek</i>, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As another straw in the wind, General Smith had received a dispatch
-from ComNavFE on 21 October which stated that on the conclusion
-of hostilities it was his intention to recommend to Cin<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span> that the 1st
-Marine Division be returned to the United States, less an RCT to be
-stationed in Japan.<a id="FNanchor_117" href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">117</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_117" href="#FNanchor_117" class="fnanchor">117</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d. See also FMFPac Staff Study:
-“The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the Western
-Pacific,” 19 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 24th the Marine commander learned that X Corps had received
-a document, for planning purposes only, providing that the
-Corps commander would become commander of the occupation forces.
-These were to consist of a single American division, probably the 3d
-Infantry Division, while the remainder of the Eighth Army returned
-to Japan.<a id="FNanchor_118" href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">118</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_118" href="#FNanchor_118" class="fnanchor">118</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 403.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Such indications seemed less reassuring after an incident which occurred
-at Wonsan on the evening of D-day. Two Marines, gathering
-firewood on the beach, had been blown to pieces by a booby trap. They<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">44</span>
-were the only casualties from enemy action in the Wonsan landing.<a id="FNanchor_119" href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">119</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_119" href="#FNanchor_119" class="fnanchor">119</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50. Firewood being scarce in
-Korea, it was sometimes booby trapped.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As early as 24 October the Marine division CP aboard the <i>Mount
-McKinley</i> had been advised of an ancillary mission. Immediately following
-the landing one battalion was to be sent 39 miles south of Wonsan
-to the small seaport of Kojo. There it was to protect a supply
-dump of the ROK I Corps.<a id="FNanchor_120" href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">120</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_120" href="#FNanchor_120" class="fnanchor">120</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 385; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex C (hereafter G-3 <i>SAR</i>), 5. The assignment
-went to 1/1. See Col J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to
-CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning and intelligence resulting from
-this order being received while underway.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>X Corps issued OI 13 on the 25th but General Smith did not receive
-his copy until two days later. Corps orders now assigned the Marine
-division a zone of action more than 300 road miles from north to south
-and 50 road miles in width. The missions prescribed for the Marines
-were those of an occupation rather than a fighting force:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>(1) To land on beaches in the vicinity of Wonsan.</p>
-
-<p>(2) To relieve all elements of I ROK Corps in Kojo and zone.</p>
-
-<p>(3) To protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, employing not less than
-one RCT, and patrolling all roads to the west in zone.</p>
-
-<p>(4) To advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border.</p>
-
-<p>(5) To be prepared to land one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in the
-Chongjin area rapidly on order.</p>
-
-<p>(6) To assist the 101st Engineer Group (C) (ROK) in the repair of the
-Yonghung-Hamhung railroad, employing not less than one engineer
-company.<a id="FNanchor_121" href="#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">121</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_121" href="#FNanchor_121" class="fnanchor">121</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 393–394; G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 5–6.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 1st Marine Division in turn assigned these tasks to the following
-units in OpnO 18-50, issued at 0800 on the 28th but communicated
-orally to most of the designated commanding officers during the preceding
-48 hours:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>(1) RCT-1 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps in Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni
-zone, establish necessary road blocks to prevent movement into the
-area, patrol roads, and destroy enemy in zone. RCT-1 to maintain
-one reinforced battalion at Kojo until further orders.</p>
-
-<p>(2) RCT-7 to relieve elements of I ROK Corps along the Hamhung-Chosin
-Reservoir road, advance rapidly to the northern tip of the reservoir
-and Changjin, prepared for further advance to the northern border
-of Korea, and to destroy enemy in zone.</p>
-
-<p>(3) RCT-5 to move to an assigned zone behind RCT-7, relieve elements
-of I ROK Corps in the vicinity of Fusen Reservoir, establish necessary
-road blocks to prevent movement into the area, patrol the roads and
-destroy the enemy.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">45</span></p>
-
-<p>(4) BLT1/5 to be activated on order. Upon activation to report to the designated
-commander for operational control and landing in the vicinity
-of Chongjin.</p>
-
-<p>(5) The 11th Marines, reinforced and less detachments, from an assembly
-area in the vicinity of Hamhung, to be prepared for operating in the
-zone of any RCT.<a id="FNanchor_122" href="#Footnote_122" class="fnanchor">122</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_122" href="#FNanchor_122" class="fnanchor">122</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 18-50</i>, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar,
-7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Two of the objectives mentioned in these orders, Chongjin and the
-northern border of Korea, were more than 300 road miles north of
-Wonsan. With the exception of the main coastal route, most of the
-roads in the 1st Marine Division zone were mere mountain trails, unfit
-for tanks or heavy vehicles.</p>
-
-<p>OpnO 18-50 was modified the next day to provide for attaching the
-1st Battalion, KMC Regiment, to the 5th Marines, and the 5th KMC
-Battalion to the 1st Marines. The security of the Munchon and Yonghung
-areas (13 and 32 miles north of Wonsan respectively) was assigned
-for the time being to the 5th Marines, reinforced by Company
-A of the 1st Tank Battalion.</p>
-
-<p>On the 27th General Smith moved from the <i>Mount McKinley</i> at
-1000 to the new Division CP, a mile north of Wonsan. An old
-Russian barracks, it was too small and badly in need of repairs. The
-building occupied by the 1st Marine Air Wing was in even worse shape,
-but carpenters were soon busy at boarding up windows and doors
-blown out by bombs.<a id="FNanchor_123" href="#Footnote_123" class="fnanchor">123</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_123" href="#FNanchor_123" class="fnanchor">123</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A.
-Craig, “Notes concerning Wonsan Administrative Landing and events immediately following,
-October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950,” 4 Sep 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>1/1 Sent to Kojo</i></h3>
-
-<p>A holiday spirit prevailed among the men of the 1st Battalion, 1st
-Marines, as they entrained on the morning of 26 October 1950 at a railhead
-near the Wonsan airfield. Physical activity was a treat after the
-monotony and confinement of Operation Yo-Yo, and 1/1 had been
-selected for the Kojo mission. Immediately after the landing on <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span>
-Beach at 0900 that morning, preparations were made for departure by
-rail of the rifle companies at noon. Supplies and reinforcing units were
-scheduled to follow on the 27th on a second train and a convoy consisting
-of 1/1 and Motor Transport Battalion vehicles; Battery F, 2d<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">46</span>
-Battalion, 11th Marines; 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion;
-and a detachment of Company D, 1st Medical Battalion.<a id="FNanchor_124" href="#Footnote_124" class="fnanchor">124</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_124" href="#FNanchor_124" class="fnanchor">124</a> This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv, 1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 4;
-1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 7; 1stMar <i>HD</i>, Oct 50, 4; X Corps <i>Periodic Operations Report</i> (<i>POR</i>)
-30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1330 a wheezing Korean engine manned by a Korean crew pulled
-out of Wonsan with the rifle companies riding in gondola cars. It was
-a bright blue day, with a hint of frost in the air; and not a sign of enemy
-resistance appeared along the 39-mile route, though several tunnels
-might have been utilized for a guerrilla attack.</p>
-
-<p>Upon their arrival late that afternoon, Kojo proved to be the most
-attractive town the men had seen in Korea—an almost undamaged small
-seaport flanked by the white beaches and sparkling blue waters of the
-bay.</p>
-
-<p>There remained for the Marines the task of relieving ROK units
-and protecting an area consisting of a coastal plain about 5000 yards
-in diameter which stretched from the bay to a semicircle of hills ranging
-from 150 to 600 feet in height (see Map 4). The ROK officers
-assured the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Hawkins,
-that his men would find their duty at Kojo a tame assignment. They
-admitted that small bands of escaping <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> soldiers had sometimes
-raided the villages for rice, but added that ROK patrols had scoured
-the hills without meeting any organized resistance.</p>
-
-<p>The night passed uneventfully for the battalion in a perimeter northwest
-of Kojo while the ROKs occupied outposts along the southern
-fringe of the coast plain. In the morning the Marines found the rice
-paddies glazed with the first ice of the autumn. After completing the
-relief of the 2d Battalion of the 22d ROK Regiment at 1200, they
-watched with amusement that afternoon as the Koreans crowded into
-the gondola cars with their women, children, dogs, and chickens for
-the ride back to Wonsan. When it seemed that the train could not
-hold another human being, a ROK officer barked out an order and
-everyone squeezed farther back with audible sighs and grunts. At last,
-as a grand climax, the officer shouted a final command and the entire
-trainload of Koreans sat down simultaneously, like collapsing
-dominoes.</p>
-
-<p>It was an ironical circumstance that the ROKs on the overcrowded
-train took with them the remnants of the supply dump that 1/1 was
-assigned to guard. However important this dump may have been in its
-heyday, it had apparently been consumed by the ROKs to the point<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">47</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span>
-where only a few drums of fuel oil remained along with other odds
-and ends.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_4" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_047.png" width="999" height="1548" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>KOJO AREA</p>
-
-<p>Unit locations are those of 1700</p>
-
-<p>27 Oct 50</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-4</p></div></div>
-
-<p>That afternoon the train and truck convoys arrived without incident,
-bringing supplies and all reinforcing units except the artillery. And
-though the Marines at Kojo did not neglect security precautions, they
-had seen nothing during their first 24 hours to hint that an organized
-enemy was about to launch a surprise attack.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Positions in Kojo Area</i></h3>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins faced a problem in selecting positions for
-his battalion.</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Mindful of my mission—to protect the supply dump until removed—I had
-to dispose the battalion in a way designated to accomplish this end [he commented].
-The supply dump was located at the railroad station in the flat
-ground south of Kojo—a point difficult to defend, since it was on low ground
-and could be approached by the enemy from any direction. I considered the
-most likely direction of enemy approach to be from the south along the
-coastal road or through the valley leading toward Kojo from the southwest.
-Therefore, I decided to place Company B in outpost positions to cover these
-approaches.... The remainder of the battalion would be deployed on the
-hill massif west of Kojo, prepared to defend the area or counterattack if
-necessary to prevent loss of the supplies at the railroad station. I did not
-consider this disposition ideal by any means from the standpoint of defensive
-strength, but it appeared to be the best possible disposition in the complex
-terrain to protect the supply dump.... Also, I did not have reason to expect
-an organized attack by large enemy forces. In the event such a contingency
-should occur, it was planned that Company B, the outpost, would withdraw
-to the main battle position.<a id="FNanchor_125" href="#Footnote_125" class="fnanchor">125</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_125" href="#FNanchor_125" class="fnanchor">125</a> Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins made his dispositions
-before learning that the ROKs had taken the supply dump with them.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Wesley B. Noren’s Baker Company positions were about
-two miles south and southwest of Kojo across an expanse of rice paddies.
-From east to west the company held three isolated points of high
-ground:</p>
-
-<p>1st Platoon (First Lieutenant George S. Belli), reinforced by one
-section of light machine guns and one 3.2″ rocket launcher squad, on
-the east slope of Hill 109;</p>
-
-<p>3d Platoon (Master Sergeant Matthew D. Monk) and Company
-Headquarters, reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns, one
-section of light machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, one squad of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">49</span>
-3.5″ rocket launchers and a flame thrower, on high ground to the west
-and south of the 1st Platoon;</p>
-
-<p>2d Platoon (First Lieutenant George G. Chambers), reinforced by
-one section of 81mm mortars, one section of light machine guns, a
-75mm recoilless rifle and one squad of 3.2″ rocket launchers, on Hill
-185.</p>
-
-<p>The remainder of 1/1 occupied positions west of Kojo. Captain
-Robert P. Wray’s Charlie Company held a continuous line of foxholes
-in the hills that rose from the rice paddies a mile and a half north of
-Baker Company’s positions. From west to east were First Lieutenant
-Francis B. Conlon’s 2d Platoon, First Lieutenant William A. Craven’s
-1st and Second Lieutenant Henry A. Commiskey’s 3d. About 250 yards
-to the east were two platoons of Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Able
-Company. On the slopes north of Barrow stood Colonel Hawkins’ CP
-and the tubes of First Lieutenant Edward E. Kaufer’s 4.2″ Mortar
-Platoon. Captain Barrow’s third platoon occupied the topographical
-crest of Hill 117.<a id="FNanchor_126" href="#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">126</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_126" href="#FNanchor_126" class="fnanchor">126</a> Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27–28 Oct 50, revised and annotated in ltr to authors,
-22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55;
-Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>While the Marines organized their positions during the afternoon
-of 27 October, a column of refugees “almost as long as the eye could
-see” appeared in the valley southwest of Kojo headed for the seaport.
-Colonel Hawkins estimated that there were 2000 to 3000 people in
-the column. Since he did not have the time to examine all the refugees
-before darkness, Hawkins had them herded into the peninsula northeast
-of Kojo for the night.<a id="FNanchor_127" href="#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">127</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_127" href="#FNanchor_127" class="fnanchor">127</a> Hawkins ltr, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After a quiet afternoon on the 27th, the first hint of enemy opposition
-came at 1600 when a wire team was fired upon in the vicinity of Hill
-185. Two hours later a truck and a jeep borrowed from the S-3, Major
-David W. Bridges, received fire from the high ground west of Hill 109.
-Both were abandoned after the truck broke down, and a Baker Company
-patrol had a brief fire fight at 1900 when it recovered the vehicles.<a id="FNanchor_128" href="#Footnote_128" class="fnanchor">128</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_128" href="#FNanchor_128" class="fnanchor">128</a> 1stMar <i>HD, Oct 50</i>, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>These first indications of Red Korean activity in the Kojo area were
-attributed to the forays of guerrilla bands. Not until after the battle did
-the Marines learn from POW interrogations that the enemy consisted
-of an estimated 1000 to 1200 men of the 10th Regiment, 5th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">50</span></span>
-Division. This regiment, commanded by Colonel Cho Il Kwon, former
-director of the Communist Party at Wonsan, was believed to have its
-CP in the large village of Tongchon, about two miles south of the
-Baker Company outposts. Other units of the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> division, which
-was credited with a total strength of 7000 to 8000 men, occupied areas
-farther to the south.<a id="FNanchor_129" href="#Footnote_129" class="fnanchor">129</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_129" href="#FNanchor_129" class="fnanchor">129</a> 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; G-2 X Corps Rpt
-in G-3 Journal, X Corps <i>WD</i>, 29 Oct 50; X Corps <i>Periodic Intelligence Report</i> (<i>PIR</i>)
-33.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After the Red Korean collapse, the 2d, 5th, and 10th NKPA Divisions
-had maintained their organization, though much depleted in
-strength by casualties. Withdrawing to the Wonsan area, they kept to
-the secondary roads and raided the villages for food. It is a tribute to
-Communist discipline that the outfits had not lost their cohesion at a
-time when their cause seemed to be collapsing. But the 5th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span>
-Division was one of the units made up almost entirely of Koreans who
-had served in the Chinese Civil War, and its officers were fanatically
-dedicated to Communist principles.<a id="FNanchor_130" href="#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">130</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_130" href="#FNanchor_130" class="fnanchor">130</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 26; X Corps <i>PIR</i> 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv <i>PIR</i> 20, encl 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Only well trained and led troops could have launched the attacks
-which hit both ends of the Baker Company’s chain of outposts simultaneously
-about 2200, after the first few hours of darkness had passed
-in comparative quiet punctuated by occasional shots. Normal security
-measures were taken on a cold night with a 50 per cent watch—one
-rifleman remaining on the alert in the two-man foxholes while the other
-burrowed for warmth into a partially closed sleeping bag. The 81mm
-and 60mm mortars were registered on the hills just beyond the 2d and
-3d platoons.<a id="FNanchor_131" href="#Footnote_131" class="fnanchor">131</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_131" href="#FNanchor_131" class="fnanchor">131</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>These two units came under attack shortly before First Lieutenant
-Carlon’s position at the extreme west of Charlie Company’s line was
-assailed. In each instance the enemy infiltrated within grenade throwing
-distance before his presence was detected. Past contacts with
-American soldiers had given the Red Koreans some knowledge of the
-language, and for purposes of deception the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> assault troops
-shouted phrases in broken English:</p>
-
-<p>“Come this way!... Don’t shoot! We’re friends.”<a id="FNanchor_132" href="#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">132</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">51</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_132" href="#FNanchor_132" class="fnanchor">132</a> 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>The All-Night Fight of Baker Company</i></h3>
-
-<p>The surprise was devastating, particularly in the Baker Company zone.
-On the eastern slope of Hill 109 the 1st Platoon had no inkling until
-men yelled warnings from the foxholes just as the enemy grenades
-exploded and Red Koreans in estimated strength of two platoons overran
-the position. Seven Marines were killed before they could get
-out of their sleeping bags, and others lost contact in the darkness.</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Platoon and Company CP were attacked from three points
-to the south and southeast. Marine 60mm mortars fired within 50
-yards of the front line while the 81s laid down a barrage directly forward
-of the position. After a brief and bitter struggle, Communists
-believed to number three platoons were repulsed.</p>
-
-<p>In the Charlie Company zone, Lieutenant Carlon’s position was
-hardest hit. The North Koreans closed within ten feet before they
-were noticed. During the confused fighting which followed, the enemy
-won a brief foothold. An estimated 20 Marines were cut off but got
-back safely the next morning.</p>
-
-<p>After recovering from the initial surprise the Charlie Company outposts
-repulsed all further attacks. Wray’s men lost 6 killed and 16
-wounded during the night’s encounters but could count 92 Korean
-bodies the next morning.</p>
-
-<p>At 2215 the 3d Platoon of Baker Company had a second attack at
-the same points as the first one. The Red Koreans appeared to Captain
-Noren to be exceptionally well disciplined and controlled in spite
-of heavy casualties inflicted on them by combination of mortar, machine-gun
-and small-arms fire, and grenades.<a id="FNanchor_133" href="#Footnote_133" class="fnanchor">133</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_133" href="#FNanchor_133" class="fnanchor">133</a> This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the 1stMar <i>SAR</i> 4–5,
-appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar,
-<i>HD Oct 50</i>, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Statement of Lt
-James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The plight of Belli’s platoon was first made known when 2/B on Hill
-185 received a message to the effect that 1/B had withdrawn from Hill
-109 with 30 men missing. The retirement was made possible by the
-brave stand of Sergeant Clayton Roberts, who covered the movement
-with a light machine gun until he was surrounded and killed.</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Platoon beat off another attack meanwhile as the enemy
-closed in from the left rear as well as the front. With machine-gun
-fire coming from both directions, Noren informed the battalion CP
-at 2350 that his position was untenable and asked permission to withdraw.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">52</span>
-His request being granted, he directed Lieutenant Chambers to
-pull back from Hill 185, covering the withdrawal of 3/B with 81mm
-fire.</p>
-
-<p>The intersection of the dike and railway track was designated as the
-meeting place for the three Baker Company platoons. Noren covered
-the rear of the 3/B withdrawal while his executive officer, First Lieutenant
-Chester B. Farmer, took charge of the point. Opposite Hill 109
-they encountered Staff Sergeant Robert Fisher and five men whom
-Belli had directed to remain at the dike and pick up stragglers while the
-rest of 1/B continued to pull back.</p>
-
-<p>Fisher reported that the attack on Hill 109 had been conducted with
-skill and discipline. Whistles and red and green flares were used for
-signaling by Communists who cut off a listening post and overran a
-squad on the right flank. The assault force numbered 160, according
-to POW testimony.</p>
-
-<p>The methodical, position-by-position withdrawal of the three Baker
-Company platoons was conducted so skilfully that remarkably few
-casualties resulted. Noren lost all contact for a short time when enemy
-fire severed the antenna on his last operative SCR-300. At about 0215
-Chambers’ platoon was last to reach the meeting place, having beaten
-off several attacks during its withdrawal from Hill 185. With another
-large-scale enemy assault threatening, Noren organized a 360° defense
-on both sides of the railway track just south of the village of Chonchon-ni.
-One Marine was killed and six wounded by enemy fire received from
-the west as well as east.</p>
-
-<p>Fox Battery of the 11th Marines had arrived in the Kojo area about
-midnight and set up its guns on the beach northeast of the town at
-about 0200.<a id="FNanchor_134" href="#Footnote_134" class="fnanchor">134</a> Baker Company had no radio in operation, however,
-until parts of two damaged SCR-300’s were combined into one to restore
-communication. Contact was made with the 4.2″ mortars, which
-registered about 0300, directed by Captain Noren, and broke up the
-NKPA attack. The 81mm mortars made it hot for the enemy in Chonchon-ni,
-and at 0330 the Communists apparently disengaged to withdraw
-east of the railway track and northward toward Kojo. Marine
-artillery had registered by 0400, but all was quiet in the area the rest
-of the night.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_134" href="#FNanchor_134" class="fnanchor">134</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11 <i>SAR</i>), 14.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although a few <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> mortar shells were received, enemy equipment
-appeared to be limited for the most part to automatic weapons, small<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">53</span>
-arms, and grenades. There were indications that Korean civilians had
-been used in several instances as human shields for an attacking force.<a id="FNanchor_135" href="#Footnote_135" class="fnanchor">135</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_135" href="#FNanchor_135" class="fnanchor">135</a> Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> withdrawal to Kojo led to the Marine speculation that
-the Communists meant to make enforced recruits of some of the hapless
-residents allotted a refuge in the peninsula north of the town.
-As it proved, they were not harmed by the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> troops. The last enemy
-effort, just before dawn, was an attack in platoon strength on Second
-Lieutenant John J. Swords’ Able Company platoon by Reds who had
-infiltrated through Kojo. A brief fight ensued on Hill 117 as the
-Marines beat off the assault at the cost of one man killed and two
-wounded.</p>
-
-<p>Baker Company elements had meanwhile resumed their withdrawal
-along the railway track north of Chonchon. All was quiet at first light
-when Noren began the task of evacuating his wounded in ponchos
-through rice paddies which were knee-deep in mud and water under
-a thin skin of ice. Marines came out from the Able Company positions
-to lend a hand.</p>
-
-<p>The evacuation had nearly been completed when about 200 enemy
-troops suddenly moved out from Kojo in a westerly direction across
-the rice paddies. Whether they meant to interfere with the evacuation
-or merely to escape was never made clear. For the Marines of Able
-and Baker Companies as well as the gunners of Fox Battery opened up
-in broad daylight and found lucrative targets. An estimated 75 Communists
-were killed and wounded before the rest scurried out of range
-into the hills west of the coastal plain.</p>
-
-<p>Some contact was maintained with the enemy until 1000 by elements
-of Charlie Company, then the action was gradually broken off as the
-planes of VMF(N)-513 came in low with close support.<a id="FNanchor_136" href="#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">136</a> Although
-the strikes by air were largely uncontrolled because of poor radio communications
-between the Forward Air Controller (FAC) and the planes,
-they were very helpful to the Marines on the ground.<a id="FNanchor_137" href="#Footnote_137" class="fnanchor">137</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_136" href="#FNanchor_136" class="fnanchor">136</a> VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 <i>WD Oct 50</i>; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren Comments n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_137" href="#FNanchor_137" class="fnanchor">137</a> Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6 Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>2/1 Ordered to Kojo</i></h3>
-
-<p>The radio message bringing the first news of the Kojo fight was sent
-by 1/1 at 0418 on the 28th. Owing to transmission difficulty, it was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">54</span>
-picked up by the 7th Marines, relayed to the 1st Marines at 0700, and
-telephoned to the 1st Marine Division.<a id="FNanchor_138" href="#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">138</a> It stated briefly that the battalion
-had been under attack since 1700 by an estimated 1000 enemy
-and had suffered a large number of casualties. Helicopters were requested
-for air evacuation and an <span class="allsmcap">LSTH</span> for water evacuation of the
-wounded. Air support was required, the message continued, adding
-that the destroyer in direct support of the battalion had not yet arrived
-on station.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_138" href="#FNanchor_138" class="fnanchor">138</a> S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-1825 29 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0830 an officer from 1/1 reported in to 1st Marines CP with a
-further account. He reported a platoon of B Company cut off and
-estimated 150 casualties.<a id="FNanchor_139" href="#Footnote_139" class="fnanchor">139</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_139" href="#FNanchor_139" class="fnanchor">139</a> 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A third report from 1/1 reached the CP of the 1st Marine Division
-as an intercepted radio message at 1238 on the 28th while General
-Almond was conferring with General Smith. Sent from Kojo at 1000,
-the message said:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Received determined attack from South North and West from sunset to
-sunrise by large enemy force. Estimated from 1000 to 1200. One company
-still heavily engaged. Civilian reports indicate possibility 3000 enemy this
-immediate area. Have suffered 9 KIA, 39 WIA, 34 MIA [Missing in Action]
-probably dead. Two positions overrun during night. If this position is to be
-held a regiment is required. Enemy now to South North and West of us
-but believe road to North is still open. Harbor is in our hands and ROK
-LST has been here. Shall we hold here or withdraw to North? ROK supply
-dump ... removed. Request immediate instructions. Send all available helicopters
-for wounded. Suggest send instructions by both radio and helicopters.<a id="FNanchor_140" href="#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">140</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_140" href="#FNanchor_140" class="fnanchor">140</a> 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points out, the request for
-instructions refers to his only orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no
-longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Corps and Division commanders agreed immediately that Kojo
-should be held, since a large-scale <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> attack appeared to be in the
-making. Another factor in this decision was the ROK supply dump.
-Nobody at the Division CP seemed to know as yet that it had been
-removed, but General Smith directed his G-3 to issue the necessary
-orders to send Colonel Puller, CO of the 1st Marines, and a battalion
-of reinforcements to Kojo. Within five minutes Colonel Alpha L.
-Bowser, 1stMarDiv G-3, telephoned Corps to request that a train be
-assembled on the Wonsan siding immediately for a battalion lift.<a id="FNanchor_141" href="#Footnote_141" class="fnanchor">141</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">55</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_141" href="#FNanchor_141" class="fnanchor">141</a> CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 28 Oct 50; Craig “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5,
-1950”; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar <i>HD, Oct 50</i>,
-4; LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC of the 1st Marine Division,
-was on his way to a conference at the 1st Marines CP when he
-met General Almond and Colonel Puller, and the three compared notes
-from their jeeps. Craig informed them that action toward the providing
-of transportation had already been initiated by Division. A request
-had later been made for a second destroyer to provide gunfire support
-(the first having already arrived) and an <span class="allsmcap">LSTH</span> for casualty evacuation.
-Another LST had been requested for the purpose of sending tanks to
-Kojo, since the road and bridges would not bear the weight of armor.</p>
-
-<p>The possibility of a major engagement taking place at Kojo seemed
-to be confirmed by two later reports 1/1 sent at 1415 and 1840. The
-first relayed prisoner of war statements to the effect that an estimated
-7000 men of the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> 5th Division were located at Tongchon.<a id="FNanchor_142" href="#Footnote_142" class="fnanchor">142</a> The
-second, a radio message, read:</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_142" href="#FNanchor_142" class="fnanchor">142</a> 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Reinforcement train has not arrived as of 1800. NK prisoners revealed
-large enemy force plans attack over position tonight. Recommend LVTs with
-LSTs stand by at daylight in case of emergency evacuation necessary. In view
-of large numbers of troops facing us as previously reported and face enemy
-on all sides except seaward, consider situation critical. Request higher authority
-visit.<a id="FNanchor_143" href="#Footnote_143" class="fnanchor">143</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_143" href="#FNanchor_143" class="fnanchor">143</a> 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By that time Colonel Puller and the troops were on the way. Making
-up a train and loading it with a reinforced battalion and extra supplies
-in three and a half hours had been something of an administrative feat,
-particularly when the battalion was just coming off landing craft. Yet
-Lieutenant Colonel Allan Sutter’s 2/1 and the Regimental Command
-Group pulled out for Kojo at 1630 and a second train followed two
-hours later.<a id="FNanchor_144" href="#Footnote_144" class="fnanchor">144</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_144" href="#FNanchor_144" class="fnanchor">144</a> Craig, “Notes ... Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950”; Col A. Sutter Comments n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Upon arrival at 2230, CO 1stMar learned that there had been no
-major enemy contact since 1000. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins had contracted
-his unit that afternoon to his main position along the high
-ground forming a semicircle around Hill 117. The 2d Battalion and
-supporting arms having tied in with the 1st for the night, Colonel
-Puller concluded that no further cause for alarm existed. And since
-the battery positions at Kojo were limited, he radioed General Smith
-that more artillery would not be needed.<a id="FNanchor_145" href="#Footnote_145" class="fnanchor">145</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_145" href="#FNanchor_145" class="fnanchor">145</a> Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Seventeen Marines previously listed as MIA by 1/1 had returned unhurt
-to their units on the 28th after being cut off during the confusion<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">56</span>
-of the night’s fighting. Marine air had all but obliterated Tongchon
-that afternoon while the U. S. destroyers <i>Hank</i> and <i>English</i> were bombarding
-Kojo.</p>
-
-<p>The request for water as well as air evacuation of serious casualties
-had resulted in immediate action. Within an hour after receiving the
-message, CTF-90 had the transport <i>Wantuck</i> on the way with a surgical
-team, and VMO-6 sent five helicopters which flew 17 wounded men
-to a hospital ship at Wonsan on the 29th.<a id="FNanchor_146" href="#Footnote_146" class="fnanchor">146</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_146" href="#FNanchor_146" class="fnanchor">146</a> CTF-90 msg to USS <i>Wantuck</i>, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 23.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Ten tanks of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, were loaded in LST
-883 at Wonsan on the 28th, but the ship was delayed by running
-aground. Upon arrival at Kojo the next day, it again became necessary
-for the LST to be pulled off the bar by a tug. By this time the military
-situation was so well in hand that the tanks were taken back to Wonsan
-without being unloaded.<a id="FNanchor_147" href="#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">147</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_147" href="#FNanchor_147" class="fnanchor">147</a> 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650 29 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Security Provided for Wonsan Area</i></h3>
-
-<p>Responsibility for the security of the Wonsan area having been assigned
-to the 1st Marines, something of an administrative problem was created
-on the 28th by the order sending 2/1 to reinforce 1/1 at Kojo. For
-the 3d Battalion of the regiment had departed that same day to relieve
-a ROK unit at Majon-ni, 28 miles west of Wonsan. Since this left no
-troops to patrol roads in the Wonsan area and maintain blocking positions
-at Anbyon, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and 5th KMC Battalion
-were attached to the 1st Marines for those missions.</p>
-
-<p>Also available to the 1st Marines for such security duties as guarding
-the Wonsan airfield and harbor area were the 1st Shore Party Battalion,
-1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and Company B of the 1st Armored
-Amphibian Tractor Battalion.<a id="FNanchor_148" href="#Footnote_148" class="fnanchor">148</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_148" href="#FNanchor_148" class="fnanchor">148</a> 1stSPBn <i>SAR</i>, 5–6; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 6; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex TT (hereafter 1stAmphTracBn
-<i>SAR</i>) 4–5, appendix 2, 3–4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By the morning of the 29th, moreover, it had already become apparent
-that one or both of the battalions in the Kojo area could soon be
-spared. When General Craig arrived by helicopter, he found the situation
-well in hand.<a id="FNanchor_149" href="#Footnote_149" class="fnanchor">149</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_149" href="#FNanchor_149" class="fnanchor">149</a> Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 450.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>About 60 percent of the seaport had been destroyed by air strikes and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">57</span>
-the guns of the destroyers when a patrol consisting of Dog and Fox
-Companies combed the ruins on the morning of the 29th without finding
-any evidences of enemy occupation. Meanwhile an Easy Company
-patrol ranged to the west of the coastal plain with equally negative
-results.<a id="FNanchor_150" href="#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">150</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_150" href="#FNanchor_150" class="fnanchor">150</a> 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 3; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 8; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct
-50; 1stMar Fwd <i>ISUM</i>, 1900 29 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain George B. Farish of VMO-6 was making a reconnaissance
-flight when he discerned the word HELP spelled out in rice straw
-near a straw-stack a mile northeast of Tongchon. A Marine crawled
-out from concealment, and the pilot landed his helicopter to pick up
-PFC William H. Meister, who had been hiding since losing touch with
-his unit during the enemy night attack on Hill 109. This was the first
-of four such rescues completed by Farish that day.<a id="FNanchor_151" href="#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">151</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_151" href="#FNanchor_151" class="fnanchor">151</a> VMO-6 <i>HD Oct 50</i>; VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Noren led a patrol along the
-railway track south of Kojo and retraced the route of his fighting withdrawal
-in the darkness. In the vicinity of Hill 109, where Lieutenant
-Belli’s platoon had been surprised, he found 12 Marine bodies. None
-had been despoiled by the enemy of arms or equipment.</p>
-
-<p>Pushing farther south, Noren encountered sniper fire from the ruins
-of Tongchon, destroyed by Marine air, and called for more strikes.
-The Corsairs flushed out a group of 20 enemy troops, 16 of whom
-were cut down by the machine guns of the Baker Company patrol.<a id="FNanchor_152" href="#Footnote_152" class="fnanchor">152</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_152" href="#FNanchor_152" class="fnanchor">152</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 451; Noren Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By the 29th, when General Almond made a trip of inspection to
-Kojo, it was possible to revise the original Marine casualty list as the
-MIA casualties were reduced. The final count was 23 KIA, 47 WIA
-and four MIA.<a id="FNanchor_153" href="#Footnote_153" class="fnanchor">153</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_153" href="#FNanchor_153" class="fnanchor">153</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 451; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 29 Oct 40.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Twenty-four wounded Marines were evacuated to Wonsan that day
-by APD. LST 883, when it returned to Wonsan with the tanks, took
-the bodies of 19 Marines and 17 prisoners.</p>
-
-<p>Enemy losses, in addition to 83 POW, were estimated at 250 KIA
-and an unknown number of WIA on the basis of more than 165 bodies
-found by Marine patrols. Curiously enough, the Communists had
-shown little interest in the equipment which fell into their hands, and
-two Marine 75mm recoilless rifles, rendered inoperative, were recovered
-with their carts and ammunition in the vicinity of Chonchon-ni. Almost
-all abandoned equipment was found in usable condition.<a id="FNanchor_154" href="#Footnote_154" class="fnanchor">154</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">58</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_154" href="#FNanchor_154" class="fnanchor">154</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 451–452; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, appendix 5, 2; Noren Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marines Relieved at Kojo</i></h3>
-
-<p>Each of the Marine rifle companies set up outposts in front of its zone.
-Morning and afternoon patrolling, with air on station, went on during
-the last two days of October with negative results. Harassing and interdiction
-fires were also continued until 1/1 departed.</p>
-
-<p>LST 973 arrived off Kojo at 1430, 31 October, and disembarked the
-5th Battalion of the KMC Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins’
-battalion, accompanied by Colonel Puller, left Kojo at 0700 the next
-morning on the return trip of the LST. The ship docked at Wonsan
-at 1230 on 2 November. That afternoon 1/1 relieved elements of the
-1st Tank Battalion at the road block near Katsuma, four miles southeast
-of Wonsan.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., CG FMFPac, who was
-acting in an informal capacity as amphibious adviser to General MacArthur,
-inspected 2/1 at Kojo by helicopter on 31 October. Having
-arrived at Wonsan that day with Colonel Victor H. Krulak, his G-3,
-he conferred at X Corps Headquarters with Admiral Struble and Generals
-Almond and Smith.<a id="FNanchor_155" href="#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">155</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_155" href="#FNanchor_155" class="fnanchor">155</a> G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv
-msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 453–454; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 6–7; Hawkins
-ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Among the other subjects of discussion was the news that Chinese
-Communist Forces (CCF) prisoners had been taken in the area north
-of Hamhung by ROK units which were soon to be relieved by the 7th
-Marines. Several clashes with organized Chinese forces during the last
-days of October had also been reported by elements of the 1st Cavalry
-Division of the Eighth Army in western Korea.</p>
-
-<p>The 7th Marines had been given the mission of spearheading the
-Marine advance to the northern border of Korea as directed in Corps
-orders. After parkas and other cold weather clothing had been issued
-from the beach dumps at Wonsan, the regiment completed the movement
-to Hamhung by motor convoy from 29 to 31 October. By this
-time the Corps drive to the Yalu was shifting into second gear, with the
-I ROK Corps far in advance along the coastal highway. Two U. S.
-Army units were soon to be involved. The 7th Infantry Division,
-which landed at Iwon from 29 October to 8 November, had Corps
-orders to push on toward the border; and it was planned that the 3d<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">59</span>
-Infantry Division, due to land its first units on the 8th at Wonsan,
-would relieve 1st Marines units south of Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_156" href="#Footnote_156" class="fnanchor">156</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_156" href="#FNanchor_156" class="fnanchor">156</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO</i> 18-50, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report”, 13–14;
-1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 12; X Corps <i>WDs</i>, 29 Oct-8 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Corps orders of 2 November called for 2/1 to return to Wonsan
-immediately. The southern boundary of X Corps was to be moved 70
-miles farther south, effective on the departure of the battalion from
-Kojo. In order to cover the new zone, the KMC regiment had already
-been detached from the 1st Marine Division and given responsibility
-for the Corps zone south of the 39th Parallel. The relief of the 2d
-Battalion of the 5th Marines was completed by KMC elements that
-same day at Anbyon, eight miles southeast of Wonsan, thus freeing
-that unit for a motor lift northward to rejoin its regiment.<a id="FNanchor_157" href="#Footnote_157" class="fnanchor">157</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_157" href="#FNanchor_157" class="fnanchor">157</a> 1stMarDiv <i>POR</i> 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps 01 14, 29 Oct 50; X Corps
-<i>OI</i> 16, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to
-1stMar, 1803 2 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2/1 and the artillery battery departed
-Kojo the following day. A small train and a truck convoy sent from
-Wonsan were used chiefly for the transport of supplies, and most of
-the troops traveled by shanks’ mare. The column was on the way
-when the report came that the rail line had been blown up at Anbyon
-by guerrillas. The battalion halted there and set up a perimeter for
-the night which included both the train and truck convoys. At 0730
-in the morning the convoys moved out again for Wonsan. Delayed
-slightly by another rail break, Sutter completed the movement at noon.<a id="FNanchor_158" href="#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">158</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_158" href="#FNanchor_158" class="fnanchor">158</a> 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to
-G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1 msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 <i>SAR</i>, 14–15;
-Sutter Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The track-blowing incident gave evidence that the Marines must
-deal with a third type of enemy. In addition to the NKPA remnants,
-and the forces of Red China, it now appeared that account must be
-taken of thousands of uprooted Koreans prowling in small bands for
-food and loot—the flotsam of a cruel civil war. Called guerrillas by
-courtesy, they were actually outlaws and banditti, loyal to no cause.
-And by virtue of their very furtiveness, they were capable of doing a
-great deal of mischief to organized forces.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">61</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Majon-ni and Ambush Alley</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Marine Units Tied in for Defense—Political Aspects of Mission—Roads
-Patrolled by Rifle Companies—Air Drop of Supplies
-Requested—First Attack on Perimeter—KMC Battalion Sent to
-Majon-ni—Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">From</span> a distance the <span class="sans">Y</span>-shaped mountain valley, encircled by peaks
-and crossed by two swift, clear streams, might have been taken for
-a scene in the Alps. This impression was borne out by the village of
-Majon-ni, which nestled close to the earth, as seen from afar, with the
-tranquil and untroubled air of a Swiss hamlet.</p>
-
-<p>On closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only
-prove to be illusory. The most prominent building in the Korean village
-was a new schoolhouse with the onion-shaped dome of Russian
-architecture. An incongruous and pretentious structure for such a small
-peasant community, it had been erected not so much for the instruction
-of children as the indoctrination of adults in Communist principles.</p>
-
-<p>Majon-ni, in short, had been for five years a hotbed of forced culture
-in the doctrines of the Communist puppet state set up in northern
-Korea after World War II by the occupation forces of Soviet Russia.
-And it was here that the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines arrived on
-28 October 1950. Relief of elements of the 26th ROK Regiment at
-1600 enabled those troops to return to Wonsan in the vehicles which
-had brought 3/1.<a id="FNanchor_159" href="#Footnote_159" class="fnanchor">159</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_159" href="#FNanchor_159" class="fnanchor">159</a> CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 7, 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines had been assigned the mission of “setting up a defensive
-position at Majon-ni, destroying enemy forces, and denying them the
-use of this road net.” In addition, the unit was “to patrol roads to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">62</span>
-north, south, and west, and keep the road open between Majon-ni and
-Wonsan.”<a id="FNanchor_160" href="#Footnote_160" class="fnanchor">160</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_160" href="#FNanchor_160" class="fnanchor">160</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also CG 1stMarDiv msg to
-CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar <i>OpnO 9-50</i>, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv <i>AdmO
-14-50</i>, 27 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions relieving
-the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the Wonsan-Majon-ni
-road. The reason for the change was apparent when the
-troops of 3/1 covered the 28-mile route by motor lift in two echelons
-on the afternoon of the 28th. After leaving the seaport and alluvial
-plain, the shelf-like road twists precariously through a 3000-foot pass.
-This stretch abounds in hairpin turns and deep gorges which are ideal
-for setting a tactical trap, and the route was soon to be known to the
-troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversable by tanks, it offered too
-much danger from roadblocks and landslides to permit the dispatch
-of the iron elephants.<a id="FNanchor_161" href="#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">161</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_161" href="#FNanchor_161" class="fnanchor">161</a> Col T. L. Ridge, <i>Notes on Operations in North Korea</i>, 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge,
-<i>Notes</i>) and comments on preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>
-(New York, 1952), 203.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_5" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_062.png" width="846" height="569" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>MAJON-NI AND
-ROAD TO WONSAN</p></div>
-
-<div class="captionl"><p class="in0 in8 wspace">
-A  Ambush of 2 Nov 50<br />
-B  Ambush of 3 Nov 50<br />
-C  Ambush of 7 Nov 50<br />
-D  Ambush of 12 Nov 50<br />
-E  Ambush of H Co., 2 Nov 50
-</p></div>
-
-<div class="caption"><p class="imap">MAP-5</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The strategic importance of the Majon-ni area derived from its position
-at the headwaters of the river Imjin and the junction of roads leading<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">63</span>
-east to Wonsan, south to Seoul, and west to Pyongyang. They
-were being traveled extensively at this time by <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> troops escaping
-northward in civilian clothes after the collapse of the Red Korean military
-effort.</p>
-
-<p>It was natural that the 1st Marine Division, with a zone of more
-than 15,000 square miles to control, should be ordered to occupy such
-an important road junction and potential assembly area as Majon-ni.<a id="FNanchor_162" href="#Footnote_162" class="fnanchor">162</a>
-Thus the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge’s reinforced
-battalion were sent as a blocking and screening force.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_162" href="#FNanchor_162" class="fnanchor">162</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 393–394; G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 5–6.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Units Tied In for Defense</i></h3>
-
-<p>In addition to H&amp;S, Weapons, and the three rifle companies, the task
-organization consisted on 28 October of Battery D of the 2d Battalion,
-11th Marines, the 3d Platoon of Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion,
-and detachments from <span class="allsmcap">ANGLICO</span>, 1st Signal Battalion; Company D, 1st
-Medical Battalion; and H&amp;S Company, 1st Marines.<a id="FNanchor_163" href="#Footnote_163" class="fnanchor">163</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_163" href="#FNanchor_163" class="fnanchor">163</a> Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on: Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; and Comments,
-28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, “The
-Dead End of Ambush Alley,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvi, no. 11 (Nov 51), 38–45.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The battalion commander and his S-3, Major Joseph D. Trompeter,
-decided after a survey of the terrain that the commanding ground was
-too far from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The
-logical solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with daytime
-company OPs and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads.
-In order to tie in all units of a perimeter 3770 yards in circumference,
-it was necessary to create provisional platoons of such H&amp;S, artillery
-and engineer troops as could be spared from their regular duties. Even
-so, the defense was spread thin in places.</p>
-
-<p>The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the battalion CP. Communication
-within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid from
-the CP to artillery and mortar positions as well as company and platoon
-CPs. Radio communication was established with the regiment and the
-division but due to the terrain remained irregular at best.</p>
-
-<p>First Lieutenant Leroy M. Duffy and his engineers were assigned the
-task of constructing on OY strip on the east side of the perimeter which
-was completed on 2 November. A parallel cliff made it necessary to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">64</span>
-land planes at a dangerous angle, but no better site could be had in
-this steep-sided valley.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_6" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_064.png" width="845" height="682" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>MAJON-NI PERIMETER</p></div>
-
-  <div class="captionl">
-<p>All roadblocks manned by Weapons Co. Perimeter between A and B manned by H&amp;S Co, 3/1 and Btry D,
-2/11, 28 Oct-4 Nov 50, by Able Co., 1/1, 5–7 Nov; and by H&amp;S Co., 3/1, and Btry D, 2/11, 8–9 Nov.
-Perimeter between C and D manned by 3d Bn, KMC Regt, 10–14 Nov 50.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="caption">
-<p class="imap">MAP-6</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Topography also limited Captain Andrew J. Strohmenger’s cannoneers,
-who were almost literally “firing out of a barrel.” Close-in support
-was out of the question in the bowl-like valley ringed with peaks,
-but the six howitzers were emplaced so that they could be swung to
-fire on any avenue of approach, especially toward the three roads leading
-into Majon-ni.<a id="FNanchor_164" href="#Footnote_164" class="fnanchor">164</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_164" href="#FNanchor_164" class="fnanchor">164</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger, ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep
-55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n. t. 2 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>No difficulty was found in deciding on a water point, for tests established
-the purity of the water from both branches of the Imjin flowing
-through the perimeter. Lieutenant Duffy explained that he added chlorine
-only because the Marines were accustomed to the flavor.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">65</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Political Aspects of Mission</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Marine mission had its political as well as military side. Major
-Edwin H. Simmons, CO of Weapons Company, was given the responsibility
-for defending the three road blocks of the perimeter with
-Weapons Company personnel. At each of them he stationed a heavy
-machine gun section and a 3.5″ rocket launcher section. These barriers
-were also ports of entry where all Korean transients were searched for
-weapons. When a group of 20 to 30 accumulated, they were escorted
-under guard to the prison stockade, just across the road from the battalion
-CP.<a id="FNanchor_165" href="#Footnote_165" class="fnanchor">165</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_165" href="#FNanchor_165" class="fnanchor">165</a> This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There they were “processed” by the Civil Affairs Section, consisting
-of 12 Marine enlisted men under the command of First Lieutenant
-Donald M. Holmes and Master Sergeant Marian M. Stocks, known
-facetiously as the mayor and sheriff respectively of Majon-ni. Their
-decisions were based largely on the findings of the 181st Counter Intelligence
-Corps (CIC) team and the battalion S-2, Second Lieutenant
-Frederick W. Hopkins. The CIC specialists proved to be indispensable
-by contributing daily intelligence based on civilian as well as POW
-interrogations.</p>
-
-<p>As might be supposed, the question of whether a transient was an
-escaping <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> soldier or a harmless peasant might have perplexed
-Solomon himself. But the Marines came up with a simple off-the-cuff
-solution. Time did not permit a lengthy screening, and each Korean
-was given a brief examination with the aid of interpreters. If his head
-was still close-cropped in the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> manner, if his neck showed a tanned
-V-line recently left by a uniform, if his feet bore the tell-tale callouses
-left by military footgear—if he could not pass these three tests, the
-transient was sent to the prison stockade as a fugitive Red Korean
-soldier. Now that Chinese Communist troops had been encountered
-both on the X Corps and Eighth Army fronts, it was all the more
-important that battlewise <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> elements should be prevented from
-joining their new allies if Red China intervened.</p>
-
-<p>Some of the prisoners were admittedly <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> veterans, weary of the
-war and ready to give up voluntarily. Manifestations of this spirit
-caused Lieutenant Colonel Ridge to send a radio request for an air drop
-of surrender leaflets.</p>
-
-<p>The first full day’s operations, on 29 October, resulted in 24 prisoners<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">66</span>
-being taken. But this was a trickle as compared to the torrent which
-would follow until an average daily rate of 82 was maintained during
-the 17 days of the operations.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Roads Patrolled by Rifle Companies</i></h3>
-
-<p>Each of the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out daily
-motorized or foot patrols while manning, as required, company OPs.
-The three roads were assigned as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-<p>George Company (Captain Carl L. Sitter), the road to Wonsan;</p>
-<p>How Company (Captain Clarence E. Corley, Jr.) the road to Seoul;</p>
-<p>Item Company (First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher), the road to Pyongyang.<a id="FNanchor_166" href="#Footnote_166" class="fnanchor">166</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_166" href="#FNanchor_166" class="fnanchor">166</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days.
-Nevertheless, a system of artillery and 81mm mortar harassing and
-interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was put into
-effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms Coordinator
-(SAC), and OYs were used for artillery spotting and to call air
-strikes when planes were on station.<a id="FNanchor_167" href="#Footnote_167" class="fnanchor">167</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_167" href="#FNanchor_167" class="fnanchor">167</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity
-for maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would
-permit. Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times, and
-the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council along with
-such laws or customs as did not conflict with the Marine mission.<a id="FNanchor_168" href="#Footnote_168" class="fnanchor">168</a>
-A policy of justice and fairness had its reward when the inhabitants
-warned the CIC team of an impending attack by organized <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> troops.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_168" href="#FNanchor_168" class="fnanchor">168</a> LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>POW interrogations and reports by civilians identified the enemy
-unit as the 15th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Division, including the 45th, 48th, and 50th
-regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Chol. Following
-the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> collapse, the division had been able to maintain its organization
-while infiltrating northward from the Pusan Perimeter and
-raiding the villages for food. The mission was reported to be the occupation
-and control of the upper Imjin valley as a base for guerrilla
-operations, with the Majon-ni road junction being designated one of
-the main objectives.<a id="FNanchor_169" href="#Footnote_169" class="fnanchor">169</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">67</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_169" href="#FNanchor_169" class="fnanchor">169</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 8; 1st MarDiv <i>PIRs 21</i> and <i>22</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Enemy numbers were said to reach a total of 11,000. But that figure,
-like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had to be taken with the
-traditional grain of salt.</p>
-
-<p>At any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on the morning of
-2 November that they were opposed by a resolute enemy skilled at
-guerrilla tactics. Second Lieutenant Harvey A. Goss’ platoon of How
-Company, reinforced with 81mm mortars, light machine guns, an artillery
-forward observer (FO) team and a FAC, was ambushed in a
-deep gorge five miles south of Majon-ni while conducting a motorized
-patrol. The Marines, raked by rifle and automatic small-arms fire
-from an unseen enemy hidden along the heights on both sides, got off
-only the message, “We’ve been hit, send help, send help” before the
-radio was hit.<a id="FNanchor_170" href="#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">170</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_170" href="#FNanchor_170" class="fnanchor">170</a> The account of the How Company ambush is derived from: 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>,
-5; VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 8–9; 3/1 memo: “Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600,” 2 Nov
-50; 1stMar <i>URpt (S-3) 8</i>, 3; 2/11 <i>SAR</i>, 16; Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan
-56; Capt R. A. Doyle Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Effective deployment in the narrow road was prevented by stalled
-vehicles. Casualties were mounting when Second Lieutenant Kenneth
-A. Bott and PFC Donald O. Hoffstetter ran the gauntlet of fire in a
-jeep. They reached Majon-ni unhurt although one tire of the jeep
-had been shot.</p>
-
-<p>The 3/1 CP was delayed in summoning air because of the difficulties
-in radio transmission.<a id="FNanchor_171" href="#Footnote_171" class="fnanchor">171</a> This break in communications alarmed Major
-Simmons, acting as SAC. He persuaded the pilot of an OY to fly him
-over the scene of the ambush. From his point of vantage Simmons
-had a good view of the deployment of Captain Corley’s remaining two
-rifle platoons, riding artillery trucks and reinforced with heavy machine
-guns and 81mm mortars, which had been sent out from Majon-ni to
-extricate the patrol. The 81mm mortars were set up just off the road
-and began pounding the North Korean cliffside positions. PFC Jack
-Golden, a one-man task force, climbed with a 94-pound heavy machine
-gun to a height where he could fire down on the Communists. Marine
-Corsairs came on station, somewhat tardily because of the poor radio
-communication, and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the
-hills.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_171" href="#FNanchor_171" class="fnanchor">171</a> As a result of this experience a radio which could contact planes was later requested.
-3/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Robert J. Fleischaker, (MC) USN, the battalion medical
-officer, and his assistants cared for the less critical Marine casualties.
-One man died during the night but most of the others were evacuated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">68</span>
-during the next day in three helicopter flights—much to the astonishment
-of the natives. Fleischaker and his assistants also treated Korean
-civilians on occasion, and the saving of a village boy’s life by an
-emergency appendectomy did much to gain the good will of the
-community.<a id="FNanchor_172" href="#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">172</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_172" href="#FNanchor_172" class="fnanchor">172</a> LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker
-Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Air Drop of Supplies Requested</i></h3>
-
-<p>Radio communication between Majon-ni and Wonsan was so uncertain,
-because of the intervening hill mass, that it was possible to get through
-for only a few hours at night. The surest means of communication was
-a written message carried by helicopter or OY pilots, who had to insure
-delivery to regiment after landing at the Wonsan airfield.<a id="FNanchor_173" href="#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">173</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_173" href="#FNanchor_173" class="fnanchor">173</a> Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The supply problem had already begun to pinch before the first
-week ended. A convoy came through from Wonsan without molestation
-on 29 October, but it was the last for a week. On 1 November,
-just to play safe, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge requested a practice air
-drop which went off satisfactorily. His judgment was upheld on the
-morning of the How Company ambush when a 3/1 supply convoy was
-attacked seven miles west of Wonsan (see Map 5) and forced to turn
-back.</p>
-
-<p>First Lieutenant James D. Beeler commanded the George Company
-rifle platoon escorting the column of supply vehicles which was under
-the charge of Second Lieutenant James L. Crutchfield of H&amp;S Company.
-The third truck in line, loaded with diesel fuel and C-3 composition,<a id="FNanchor_174" href="#Footnote_174" class="fnanchor">174</a>
-burst into flames after running into a hail of enemy rifle and automatic
-weapons bullets. Meanwhile the first two trucks continued until they
-came to a roadblock created by blowing a crater. Turning around under
-intense fire, they got back to the point of original ambush just as the
-other vehicles were trying to reverse direction; and in the confusion
-two trucks went off the narrow road, making a total of three lost.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_174" href="#FNanchor_174" class="fnanchor">174</a> C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used chiefly by military engineers
-for demolitions work.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A flight of three VMF-312 Corsairs led by Lieutenant Colonel J.
-Frank Cole dispersed an enemy force estimated at 200 to 300 men.
-The convoy was extricated and brought back to Wonsan after the 1st
-Marines sent out a task force consisting of four tanks, a tank dozer<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">69</span>
-and six trucks filled with infantry. Personnel losses in the ambush were
-nine men killed and 15 wounded.<a id="FNanchor_175" href="#Footnote_175" class="fnanchor">175</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_175" href="#FNanchor_175" class="fnanchor">175</a> S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv,
-1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 8–9; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 11; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) <i>8</i>, 2–3;
-1stLt J. L. Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Ridge now had to call for an air drop in earnest. Gasoline, rations,
-grenades and artillery, mortar and machine gun ammunition to a total
-of more than 21 tons were packaged at the Wonsan airfield on 2 November
-by Captain Hersel D. C. Blasingame’s 1st Air Delivery Platoon.
-Four hours after the receipt of the message, the Air Force C-47s released
-152 parachutes over the Majon-ni perimeter. This was one of
-the 141 replenishment missions of the Air Delivery Platoon in November,
-amounting to 864 man-hours of flying time and 377 tons of supplies
-dropped.<a id="FNanchor_176" href="#Footnote_176" class="fnanchor">176</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_176" href="#FNanchor_176" class="fnanchor">176</a> 1stAirDelPlat, <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) <i>8</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Less than the usual amount of breakage resulted, but Colonel Puller
-considered it so necessary to push a truck convoy through to Majon-ni
-that he assigned a rifle company as guards. This mission fell to Captain
-Barrow’s Able Company, reinforced by one platoon of Captain Lester G.
-Harmon’s Company C engineers, Technical Sergeant Shelly Wiggins’
-section of 81mm mortars, and Second Lieutenant Harold L. Coffman’s
-section of 75mm recoilless rifles. Thirty-four supply vehicles were in
-the column which left Wonsan at 1430 on 4 November.<a id="FNanchor_177" href="#Footnote_177" class="fnanchor">177</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_177" href="#FNanchor_177" class="fnanchor">177</a> The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct
-55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3, 1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-2010 5 Nov 50; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) <i>8</i>, 3–4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The late hour of departure was a handicap; and though an OY
-flew reconnaissance, the convoy had no FAC. A <span class="allsmcap">TACP</span> jeep well back
-in the column could communicate with the OY, which relayed the message
-to the two VMF-312 Corsairs on station.</p>
-
-<p>Barrow reasoned that because so many of the enemy roadblocks required
-engineer equipment, it would be advisable for Harmon’s vehicles
-to lead, followed by First Lieutenant William A. McClelland’s
-infantry platoon. This scheme promised well when four undefended
-crater roadblocks were encountered and speedily filled in by the engineers.
-The fifth, however, was the scene of an ambush by Red
-Koreans occupying the steep heights on both sides of the narrow, winding
-road.</p>
-
-<p>The engineers soon had a hot fire fight on their hands. Taking cover
-behind the vehicles, they gave a good account of themselves. But the
-stalled trucks delayed the infantry platoon coming to their aid; and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">70</span>
-lack of a FAC resulted in less effective close air support than the
-Corsairs usually rendered. Thus, with the early November dusk approaching,
-Captain Barrow decided on a return to Wonsan.</p>
-
-<p>By a near-miracle the trucks turned about safely on the narrow shelf
-that passed for a road. As the enemy long-range fire increased, Barrow
-ordered lights out when the column commenced its eight-mile return
-trip. In the darkness a truck loaded with 20 Marines missed a hairpin
-turn and plunged over the edge. Fortunately, the accident happened
-at one of the few spots where the vehicle could land on a wooded
-shoulder instead of hurtling through space to the rocky valley floor
-several hundred feet below. It was found that nothing worse than
-broken bones and concussion had resulted after a human chain brought
-the injured men back up to the road.</p>
-
-<p>Lights were turned on and the convoy got back without further
-trouble. Barrow reported to his regimental commander at Togwon
-that his losses amounted to eight men wounded and 16 injured in addition
-to five vehicles destroyed.</p>
-
-<p>Colonel Puller assured him that his failure had been due to an unavoidably
-late start and lack of a FAC rather than faulty judgment.</p>
-
-<p>The following morning, after departing Wonsan at 0830, the air
-controller was not needed. Barrow had put into effect a new tactical
-plan based on the premise that the guerrillas of Ambush Alley would
-be waiting as usual for the sound of approaching trucks. He prepared
-a surprise, therefore, by directing his infantry platoons to take turns
-at leading the column on foot, keeping a thousand yards or more in
-advance of the vehicles.</p>
-
-<p>The scheme worked to perfection as Second Lieutenant Donald R.
-Jones’ platoon rounded a bend near the scene of yesterday’s ambush
-and surprised about 70 guerrillas as they were eating. The ambushers
-had in effect been ambushed. The Marines opened up with everything
-they had, and only a few of the Reds escaped with their lives. There
-was no further trouble after the convoy got under way again, arriving at
-Majon-ni early in the afternoon of 5 November without a single casualty.
-Losses of 51 killed and three prisoners were inflicted on the enemy.</p>
-
-<h3><i>First Attack on Perimeter</i></h3>
-
-<p>The supplies were no less welcome than the Marines who brought them,
-for the CIC team had warned of an attack on Majon-ni at 0100 the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">71</span>
-following night. Colonel Puller placed Able Company under the
-operational control of 3/1 for the defense, and the commanding officer
-assigned the three rifle platoons and their reinforcing elements a sector
-between How and George Companies on the perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>This addition to his strength made it possible for Lieutenant Colonel
-Ridge to send out his executive officer, Major Reginald R. Myers, in
-command of a motorized patrol large enough to cope with a reported
-enemy build-up of 2000 to 3000 men about six miles northwest of
-Majon-ni on the Pyongyang road. Intelligence received by Corps indicated
-that this force was assembling in an old mining area, and a 3/1
-reconnaissance in force was ordered.</p>
-
-<p>The Marine task force, consisting of George and Item Companies,
-plus elements of Weapons Company, was supported by artillery from
-Majon-ni. Nothing more formidable was encountered than a few
-guerrillas firing at long-range, but Myers brought back 81 willing
-prisoners.<a id="FNanchor_178" href="#Footnote_178" class="fnanchor">178</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_178" href="#FNanchor_178" class="fnanchor">178</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 5; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) <i>9</i>; Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative
-of Capt H. L. Coffman, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>That night at 0130, trip flares and exploding booby traps were the
-prelude to the first <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> probing attacks on the perimeter. The enemy
-was half an hour late, but otherwise the assault developed pretty much
-as the CIC team had predicted, even to the identification of elements of
-the 45th Regiment of the 15th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Division. The assailants showed
-no disposition to close, and the assault turned into a desultory fire fight.
-At 0500, with a fog reducing visibility almost to zero, the enemy could
-be heard but not seen in his assault on the battalion OP. This position
-was located on the How Company front and manned by wiremen and
-artillery and mortar FO teams. When their ammunition ran out, these
-Marines were forced to withdraw; but Captain Thomas E. McCarthy,
-Second Lieutenants Charles Mattox and Charles R. Stiles with an assortment
-of H&amp;S Company personnel recaptured the position the moment
-that the fog lifted. The enemy withdrew into the hills after the
-Corsairs came on station, and the action ended at 0730 with
-two wounded Marines representing the casualty list of 3/1 in the
-engagement.<a id="FNanchor_179" href="#Footnote_179" class="fnanchor">179</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_179" href="#FNanchor_179" class="fnanchor">179</a> S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 10, 3/1 <i>SAR
-7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 5–6; 2/11 <i>SAR</i>, 17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC,
-25 Jan 56; Corley Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Able Company returned to Wonsan that morning with 619 of the
-prisoners who had been accumulating at Majon-ni until the stockade was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">72</span>
-almost overflowing with Korean humanity. Captain Barrow packed the
-captives into open trucks covered with tarpaulins. This precaution was
-taken in order not to advertise the nature of the cargo while passing
-through Ambush Alley, since it might be embarrassing if the guerrillas
-attempted to liberate prisoners who outnumbered their keepers three
-to one.</p>
-
-<p>Simultaneously with the return of Able Company, Colonel Puller
-ordered his 2d Battalion (-) to proceed via the Majon-ni road
-to Munchon-ni. Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s mission was similar to that
-of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge at Majon-ni: to block enemy movement
-along the trails leading north and to screen civilians. The hamlet of
-Munchon-ni squatted near the top of the highest pass along Ambush
-Alley. Trucks could be supplied for only one reinforced rifle company—Easy—which
-departed Wonsan at 0830.</p>
-
-<p>Four miles short of the objective, the motorized column entered a
-horseshoe bend large enough to contain all the vehicles. On the left
-of the road was a sheer drop, and on the right rose cliffs 200 feet in
-height. The last truck had just entered the bend when the first was
-stopped by a landslide roadblock. As the column ground to a halt the
-enemy opened up with rifles and automatic weapons from well camouflaged
-positions in the high ground at the far end of the horseshoe.<a id="FNanchor_180" href="#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">180</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_180" href="#FNanchor_180" class="fnanchor">180</a> The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from: 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 9;
-2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 6–7; Col A. Sutter Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines scrambled out of the trucks and returned the fire. But
-it was necessary to attack in order to dislodge the enemy, and during
-the advance Easy Company took a total of 46 casualties—8 KIA and
-38 WIA—in addition to six wounded truck drivers. Five of the seven
-officers were wounded, including the company commander, Captain
-Charles D. Frederick.</p>
-
-<p>It was estimated that the roadblock had been defended by about 200
-Red Koreans, who left 61 counted dead behind them and probably
-removed at least as many wounded. Fifty cases of 120mm mortar ammunition
-were destroyed by the Marines and 300 cases of small arms
-cartridges.</p>
-
-<p>At 1615 Sutter and the remainder of the 2/1 force arrived on the
-scene from Wonsan just as Able Company and its prisoners appeared
-from the opposite direction. Helicopters having already evacuated the
-Easy Company’s critical casualties, Able Company brought the lightly
-wounded and prisoners to Wonsan without further enemy interference.
-Sutters’ force proceeded to Munchon-ni as originally planned.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">73</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>KMC Battalion Sent to Majon-ni</i></h3>
-
-<p>At Majon-ni an OP manned by two squads of Lieutenant Ronald A.
-Mason’s 2d Platoon of How Company was threatened with encirclement
-on the 8th when a Red Korean force gradually built up to an
-estimated 250 men worked around to the rear. The other two platoons
-of the company, reinforced with heavy machine guns and an Item Company
-platoon, were sent out from the perimeter. Artillery and mortars
-helped to scatter the enemy in confusion with estimated 40 per cent
-losses. Marine casualties were one man killed and ten wounded.<a id="FNanchor_181" href="#Footnote_181" class="fnanchor">181</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_181" href="#FNanchor_181" class="fnanchor">181</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50; 2/11 <i>SAR</i>, 17;
-Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See also Corley Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 10 November, reflecting the concern of CO 1st Marines over
-enemy activity in the Majon-ni area, the 3d KMC Battalion arrived
-as reinforcements together with a convoy of supplies. CO 3/1 assigned
-the unit to the sector in the perimeter recently vacated by Able
-Company of 1/1.<a id="FNanchor_182" href="#Footnote_182" class="fnanchor">182</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_182" href="#FNanchor_182" class="fnanchor">182</a> 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 7. Ridge, <i>Notes</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The celebration of the 175th birthday of the U. S. Marine Corps
-was not neglected at Majon-ni. Somehow the cooks managed to bake
-a prodigious cake, with thinly spread jam serving as frosting, and all
-hands were rotated a few at a time to their company CPs to receive
-a slice.<a id="FNanchor_183" href="#Footnote_183" class="fnanchor">183</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_183" href="#FNanchor_183" class="fnanchor">183</a> Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 215.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>That afternoon an OY of VMO-6 spotted an estimated 300 enemy
-troops about four miles west of Majon-ni. Under direction of the
-aerial observers, Captain Strohmenger’s howitzers broke up this
-concentration.<a id="FNanchor_184" href="#Footnote_184" class="fnanchor">184</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_184" href="#FNanchor_184" class="fnanchor">184</a> VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 8; X Corps, <i>Guerrilla Activities X Corps Zone, Nov 50</i>, 1; 1stMarDiv
-<i>PIR 18</i>; 2/11 <i>SAR</i>, 17.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The CIC team warned that another attack on the perimeter by the
-45th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Regiment would take place on the night of 11–12 November.
-As a prelude, General Pak made an effort to terrorize inhabitants
-who had kept the team informed of his plans and movements. Some
-of the villagers took his threats seriously enough to prepare for a
-hurried leavetaking, but the Civil Affairs section reassured them and
-put a curfew into effect.<a id="FNanchor_185" href="#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">185</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_185" href="#FNanchor_185" class="fnanchor">185</a> Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After such a menacing build-up, the second attack on the perimeter
-fizzled out like a damp firecracker. A few probing jabs, beginning at
-0130, were followed by a weak main assault on the KMC front<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">74</span>
-which was easily repulsed. The enemy tried again to overrun the
-OP but gave up the attempt after stumbling into a field of “Bouncing
-Betty” mines. At 0600 the last action of the Majon-ni operation came
-to an end as the Communists withdrew. Friendly losses were two men
-killed and six wounded.<a id="FNanchor_186" href="#Footnote_186" class="fnanchor">186</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_186" href="#FNanchor_186" class="fnanchor">186</a> 3/1 <i>SAR</i> 7 <i>Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 6. 1stMarDiv <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 9. 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 11; 2/11
-<i>SAR</i>, 17. The “Bouncing Betty” type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring
-which sent it several feet into the air to explode with maximum destructive effect.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This was the final appearance of the 15th <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Division, which
-apparently abandoned Majon-ni as an objective and transferred its guerrilla
-operations southward along the Imjin valley. The relief of the
-Marines and KMCs on position began the next afternoon as elements
-of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, U. S. 3d Infantry Division, arrived
-to take over the perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>The Army column, including 34 Marine supply vehicles, had moved
-out from Wonsan at 1030 the day before. Although 2/1 (less Dog
-Company) had maintained its blocking positions at Munchon-ni, the
-convoy was stopped a few miles beyond the Marine outposts by a
-wrecked bridge and three large craters. Guerrillas poured in small-arms
-fire from the high ground which resulted in two soldiers being killed
-and four wounded. Two Marine trucks and a jeep were destroyed.</p>
-
-<p>Extensive repairs to the road being needed, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
-M. Blanchard, the commanding officer of 1/15, formed a defensive
-perimeter for the night. The column reached Majon-ni without further
-incident at 1530 on the 13th.<a id="FNanchor_187" href="#Footnote_187" class="fnanchor">187</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_187" href="#FNanchor_187" class="fnanchor">187</a> Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3
-1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO 1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel
-to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv <i>POR 146</i>; 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>,
-3–4, 6–7; 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 9; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 11–12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, <i>3d Infantry
-Division in Korea</i> (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following relief by the Army unit, the Marine battalion departed at
-1015 on the 14th by truck for the Wonsan area. A total of 1395
-prisoners had been taken during the 17 days of Majon-ni—a large proportion
-of them voluntary—and more than 4000 Korean transients
-screened. Enemy battle casualties were estimated at 525 killed and
-an unknown number wounded.<a id="FNanchor_188" href="#Footnote_188" class="fnanchor">188</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">75</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_188" href="#FNanchor_188" class="fnanchor">188</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50</i>. General Ruffner, Chief of Staff of X Corps, later commented:
-“Personally, I always had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at
-Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment and in the second place I
-always felt that it broke up what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army
-that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of trouble in our backyard at
-Wonsan. A lot of determined enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have
-been most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably slowed down our subsequent
-movement to the north.” MajGen C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Losses of the Marine battalion numbered 65—16 KIA, 4 DOW and
-45 WIA. Non-battle casualties were remarkably low, owing to strict
-enforcement of sanitary and health regulations.<a id="FNanchor_189" href="#Footnote_189" class="fnanchor">189</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_189" href="#FNanchor_189" class="fnanchor">189</a> 3/1 <i>SAR</i> 7 <i>Oct-25 Nov 50</i>, 7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The vulnerability of a tenuous MSR must also be taken into account,
-and casualties of nine killed and 81 wounded or injured were incurred
-by Marines escorting supply convoys through Ambush Alley.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Movement of 1st Marines to Chigyong</i></h3>
-
-<p>From the 1st Marines in the Wonsan area to the 7th Marines leading
-the northward advance, a distance of more than 130 road miles separated
-the elements of the 1st Marine Division. But the arrival of
-more U. S. Army units made possible a first step toward concentration.</p>
-
-<p>On 29 October the 17th RCT of the 7th Infantry Division had begun
-landing at Iwon (see Map 2), about 60 air miles northeast of
-Hungnam. Other units and reinforcing elements followed until all
-had completed unloading by 8 November—a total of 28,995 troops,
-5924 vehicles, and 30,016 short tons of cargo.<a id="FNanchor_190" href="#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">190</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_190" href="#FNanchor_190" class="fnanchor">190</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13–14; X Corps <i>WD</i>, 29 Oct 50; X Corps
-<i>POR 35</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Transports had been sent by CTF-90 on 31 October to Moji, Japan,
-for the first units of the 3d Infantry Division. The 65th RCT landed
-at Wonsan on 5 November, but it was not until the 18th that the last
-elements arrived.<a id="FNanchor_191" href="#Footnote_191" class="fnanchor">191</a> All four of the major units of X Corps—the two
-Army divisions as well as the 1st Marine Division and I ROK Corps—were
-then in the zone of operations, even though dispersed over a
-wide area.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_191" href="#FNanchor_191" class="fnanchor">191</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; X Corps <i>WD</i>, 5 Nov 50; X Corps
-<i>POR 40</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The commanding generals of both Army units were “old China
-hands.” Major General Robert H. Soule, CG 3d Infantry Division, had
-been U. S. military attaché in Nationalist China during the last months
-of the civil war. During this same period Major General David G.
-Barr, CG 7th Infantry Division, was senior officer of the United States
-Military Advisory Group in China.<a id="FNanchor_192" href="#Footnote_192" class="fnanchor">192</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_192" href="#FNanchor_192" class="fnanchor">192</a> Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, <i>United States
-Relations with China: With Spacial Reference to the Period 1944–1949</i> (hereafter <i>U. S.
-Relations with China</i>), (Washington, 1949), 318, 331.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 31 October, by order of ComNavFE, JTF-7 had been dissolved
-and the TG 95.2 Support and Covering Group passed to the operational<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">76</span>
-control of CTF-90, Admiral Doyle. As the center of gravity of X
-Corps gradually shifted to the north, General Almond moved his advanced
-CP from Wonsan to Hamhung on 2 November and the remainder
-of his headquarters on the 10th. He was joined four days
-later by Admiral Doyle and his staff as the <i>Mount McKinley</i> anchored
-off Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_193" href="#Footnote_193" class="fnanchor">193</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_193" href="#FNanchor_193" class="fnanchor">193</a> ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14–15; ComNavFE msg to NavFE, 0204
-30 Oct 50; X Corps <i>POR 150</i>; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 1st Marine Division CP had displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam
-on 4 November as the 5th and 7th Marines carried out assignments
-in the north. This movement included 2/5, which had been under the
-operational control of the 1st Marines for patrolling missions in the
-Wonsan area. Not until a week later was General Smith able to plan
-the northward advance of Colonel Puller’s regiment. On the 12th, X
-Corps OpnO 6 directed the 3d Infantry Division to relieve elements
-of the 1st Marines. The mission of the Army division was to protect
-the left flank of X Corps and prepare for an advance to the west.<a id="FNanchor_194" href="#Footnote_194" class="fnanchor">194</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_194" href="#FNanchor_194" class="fnanchor">194</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 6</i>, 12 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>For a time it had appeared that 1/1, which had the responsibility
-for security in the Wonsan area after its return from Kojo, might be
-sent to Chongjin, 220 air miles northeast of Wonsan, in accordance
-with X Corps OI-13 of 25 October. This battalion was designated
-for the mission in 1stMarDiv OpnO 10-50, issued on 5 November,
-but four days later X Corps cancelled this requirement.<a id="FNanchor_195" href="#Footnote_195" class="fnanchor">195</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_195" href="#FNanchor_195" class="fnanchor">195</a> 1stMar <i>OpnO 19-50</i>, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9 Nov 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>,
-459–460. 1/5 had been initially assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1
-on its return from Kojo.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Before departing the Wonsan area, Puller’s headquarters had another
-false alarm. Small craft sighted by air on 8 November, and two
-mysterious explosions, led to the report that 500 to 1000 enemy boats
-were attempting an amphibious landing ten miles north of Wonsan.
-An armored patrol of Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, was sent to
-investigate but reported no contact.<a id="FNanchor_196" href="#Footnote_196" class="fnanchor">196</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_196" href="#FNanchor_196" class="fnanchor">196</a> 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50; 1stMar <i>URpt</i> (<i>S-3</i>) 9;
-1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 14. Ruffner ltr 13 Jan 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>X Corps directed that upon the relief of the Marines by the 3d
-Infantry Division, the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions, which had been
-under the operational control of RCT-1, would then be attached to
-the Army unit.<a id="FNanchor_197" href="#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">197</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">77</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_197" href="#FNanchor_197" class="fnanchor">197</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 6</i>, 12 Nov 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 492–493; Dolcater, <i>3d Infantry Division
-in Korea</i>, 73; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After lack of transport imposed a delay of two days, 1/1 initiated
-the northward movement of RCT-1 by rail and closed Chigyong, eight
-miles southwest of Hamhung, by 1820, 14 November. A motor convoy
-followed.<a id="FNanchor_198" href="#Footnote_198" class="fnanchor">198</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_198" href="#FNanchor_198" class="fnanchor">198</a> 1stMarDiv <i>POR</i> 145; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 494; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50;
-Dolcater, <i>3d Infantry Division in Korea</i>, 73.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Relief of 2/1(-), which had been holding screening and blocking
-positions on Ambush Alley, was completed on the 15th by the 3d
-Battalion of the 15th Infantry. Other Army elements relieved Dog
-Company in the rear area near Wonsan. On the 16th 2/1 moved by rail
-to Chigyong, followed by 3/1 and the last elements of RCT-1 the
-next day.<a id="FNanchor_199" href="#Footnote_199" class="fnanchor">199</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_199" href="#FNanchor_199" class="fnanchor">199</a> 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 9–10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15 Nov 50; 3/1 <i>SAR</i> 7 <i>Oct-25
-Nov 50</i>; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; 1stMarDiv <i>POR 154</i>; Dolcater, <i>3d Infantry Division in
-Korea</i>, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Thus the 1st Marine Division achieved a relative and temporary
-degree of concentration. The farthest distance between components
-had been reduced from 130 to less than 60 miles by the middle of
-November, but a new dispersion of units was already in progress.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">78</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Red China to the Rescue</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Chinese in X Corps Zone—Introducing the New Enemy—Communist
-Victory in Civil War—Organization of the CCF—The
-Chinese Peasant as a Soldier—CCF Arms and Equipment—Red
-China’s “Hate America” Campaign—CCF Strategy and
-Tactics</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Up</span> to this time the 1st Marine Division had virtually been waging
-two separate wars. In the southern zone, as was related in
-the last two chapters, blocking and screening operations were conducted
-by RCT-1 against <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> remnants. RCT-7, with RCT-5 in
-reserve, had meanwhile been confronted in the north by some of the
-first Chinese Communist troops to enter the Korean conflict.</p>
-
-<p>In order to trace the movements of these two Marine regiments, it
-will be necessary to go back over chronological ground previously covered.
-Division OpnO 18-50, issued on 28 October to implement X
-Corps OI-13 and supplementary telephone orders received from Corps,
-assigned RCT-7 the mission of proceeding from Wonsan to Hamhung,
-prepared for an advance to the Manchurian border 135 miles to the
-north. RCT-5 was assigned a zone behind RCT-7 (see end-paper
-maps).</p>
-
-<p>Plans for the northward advance brought up the vital problem of
-providing security for the 78-mile main supply route (MSR) and the
-parallel railway stretching along the coast from Wonsan to Hamhung.
-Division orders of the 28th assigned RCT-5 (less 2/5), temporarily
-under the operational control of RCT-1, the responsibility for the
-security of the Munchon and Yonghung areas, 16 and 57 miles north
-of Wonsan respectively. Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, attached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">80</span>
-to RCT-5, had orders to establish blocking positions on three main
-roads joining the MSR from the west.<a id="FNanchor_200" href="#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">200</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_200" href="#FNanchor_200" class="fnanchor">200</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 18-50</i>, 28 Oct 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 463–464.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>RCT-7, after being partially issued cold weather clothing at Wonsan,
-moved by road and rail to the Hamhung area during the last three
-days of October. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion and Division
-Reconnaissance Company were attached along with other reinforcing
-units, since this regiment had been designated to lead the advance of
-the 1st Marine Division to the Manchurian border.<a id="FNanchor_201" href="#Footnote_201" class="fnanchor">201</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_201" href="#FNanchor_201" class="fnanchor">201</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; CO 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 28 Oct 50; 7thMar msg to
-CG 1stMarDiv, 0850 1 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 18-50</i>, 28 Oct 50. See the detailed
-account of the move in Col R. G. Davis Comments, 7 May 56. RCT-7 did not receive all
-of its cold weather clothing until after it reached Koto-ri. MajGen H. L. Litzenberg
-Comments, 18 Jul 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer
-Comments, 7 Sep 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>RCT-5 completed a motor march meanwhile from its assembly area
-near Wonsan to assigned positions along the Wonsan-Hamhung MSR.
-General Almond’s OI-15 (30 October) had directed the dispatch of
-two Marine RCTs to the Hamhung area, which meant that Lieutenant
-Colonel Murray’s regiment was to follow RCT-7. On the 31st General
-Smith ordered him to advance a battalion to Chigyong, eight miles
-southwest of Hamhung. Murray selected his 1st Battalion and directed
-that one of its companies be detached to relieve an RCT-7 company
-guarding the Advance Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, five miles southwest
-of Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_202" href="#Footnote_202" class="fnanchor">202</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_202" href="#FNanchor_202" class="fnanchor">202</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2118 31 Oct 50; CO 5thMar msg to CO 1/5,
-1013 1 Nov 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 463–464; 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 8–9; 5thMar <i>URpt 2</i>; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-5; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 5; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Two additional Marine units were assigned to assembly areas along
-the MSR. The 1st Tank Battalion (less Company C, attached to the
-1st Marines) moved up to Munchon and regained its Company A.
-Since the landing of the 11th Marines (less the battalions attached to
-RCTs) the artillery regiment (-) had occupied positions at Munpyong-ni,
-five miles northwest of Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_203" href="#Footnote_203" class="fnanchor">203</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_203" href="#FNanchor_203" class="fnanchor">203</a> 1stMarDiv msg to 1stTkBn, 1750 31 Oct 50; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 11. The move was
-made 1 Nov. 11thMar <i>URpt 2–28 Oct 50</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>When four days passed without enemy contacts along the MSR,
-General Almond decided to expedite the movement of RCT-5 to the
-Hamhung area. In a conference with General Smith on 2 November,
-he outlined a plan for using patrols instead of blocking positions.
-Under this system RCT-1, with elements of the 1st Tank Battalion,
-would be made responsible for MSR security as far north as Munchon.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">81</span>
-The 54-mile stretch between Munchon and Chigyong would be assigned
-to the Special Operations Company, USA, and Korean agents,
-both under Corps control. As soon as these arrangements could be
-put into effect, RCT-5 would be free to advance to Hamhung. That
-same day, 2 November, the 2d Battalion was released from operational
-control of RCT-1 and moved to Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_204" href="#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">204</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_204" href="#FNanchor_204" class="fnanchor">204</a> CG’s Diary in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 2 Nov 50. Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 463–464. The Special Operations
-Company was a commando-type U. S. Army organization, generally employed in
-such operations as raids and reconnaissance. The strength, weapons, and organization
-depended on the mission.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Ironically, the 2d was also the date of the first guerrilla raid on the
-MSR. A patrol from the 1st Tank Battalion was sent by Division to the
-aid of the Special Operations Company, which had reported an attack
-west of Munchon resulting in a wound casualty and loss of equipment.
-The Marines drove the guerrillas back into the hills.<a id="FNanchor_205" href="#Footnote_205" class="fnanchor">205</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_205" href="#FNanchor_205" class="fnanchor">205</a> 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1300 2 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv <i>PIR</i> 9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Chinese in X Corps Zone</i></h3>
-
-<p>Red Korean guerrilla activities were overshadowed by confirmation of
-reports that organized CCF units had appeared in the X Corps zone
-as well as on the Eighth Army front. After crossing the Yalu, they
-had secretly infiltrated through the mountains, marching by night and
-hiding by day from air observation. Their numbers and intentions remained
-a mystery at this date, but late in October the 8th U. S. Cavalry
-Regiment and the 6th ROK Division were surprised by Chinese in
-northwest Korea and badly mauled.<a id="FNanchor_206" href="#Footnote_206" class="fnanchor">206</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_206" href="#FNanchor_206" class="fnanchor">206</a> EUSAK <i>WDs</i> 29 Oct-1 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>First-hand evidence of CCF penetrations in northeast Korea was
-obtained by three Marine officers of RCT-7. Shortly after arrival in the
-Hamhung area, the regimental commander sent out reconnoitering
-parties in preparation for the northward advance of 1 November. The
-1/7 patrol on 31 October consisted of a fire team in three jeeps led by
-Captain Myron E. Wilcox and First Lieutenants William G. Graeber
-and John B. Wilson. As a result of their visit to the CP of the 26th
-ROK Regiment of the 3d ROK Division, which RCT-7 was scheduled
-to relieve near Sudong (see Map 7) on 2 November, the Marine
-officers reported to their regimental headquarters that they had seen
-one Chinese prisoner.<a id="FNanchor_207" href="#Footnote_207" class="fnanchor">207</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">82</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_207" href="#FNanchor_207" class="fnanchor">207</a> Maj J. B. Wilson and Capt W. G. Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As a matter of fact, the ROK regiment took 16 Chinese prisoners
-in all. They were identified as belonging to two regiments of the 124th
-CCF Division, one of the three divisions of the 42d CCF Army. This
-force had crossed the Yalu about 16 October, according to POW testimony,
-and moved southward without being observed into the Chosin
-Reservoir area during the following ten days.<a id="FNanchor_208" href="#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">208</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_208" href="#FNanchor_208" class="fnanchor">208</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 534; 1stMarDiv <i>PIR</i> 4; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 30. These prisoners were
-later interrogated by Gen Almond himself and formed the basis of the first official report
-of Chinese intervention. Almond Comments, 21 Jun 56; FECOM msg C67881, 31 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Not only was Colonel Litzenberg aware that he would be facing
-Chinese adversaries in this area; he also suspected that they had infiltrated
-toward his left rear. He sent a patrol consisting of 20 men
-and five jeeps of Recon Company as far as Chigyong on the 31st without
-making any enemy contacts. The following morning CO RCT-7
-ordered Recon Company in 21 jeeps to conduct a reconnaissance to
-the Huksu-ri area, approximately 45 miles northwest of Hamhung.
-After bypassing a blown bridge, First Lieutenant Ralph B. Crossman’s
-force dug in for the night 4500 yards short of its objective. Shots were
-exchanged several times that night and early the following morning
-with North Korean guerrillas in company strength, but the patrol returned
-with a negative report as far as Chinese forces were concerned.<a id="FNanchor_209" href="#Footnote_209" class="fnanchor">209</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_209" href="#FNanchor_209" class="fnanchor">209</a> Maj R. B. Crossman, Capt C. R. Puckett, and Capt D. W. Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55;
-HqBn, 1stMarDiv (hereafter HqBn) <i>URpt 8</i> (<i>Supplementary</i>), 2. Maj Webb D. Sawyer,
-CO 2/7 and Maj James F. Lawrence also made helicopter reconnaissances of the same
-ground looking for possible flanking routes to Koto-ri. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>News was received on 1 November of the heavy losses taken by the
-1st Cavalry Division at the hands of the Chinese in northwest Korea.
-There was no change, however, in Corps orders calling for the advance
-of Litzenberg’s regiment to the border. Koto-ri, 23 road miles
-north of Majon-dong, was the first objective. The right flank of the
-Eighth Army was about 60 air miles southwest of Majon-dong, so that
-RCT-7 must advance without protection for its left flank except for
-Division Recon Company, which was to be relieved as soon as possible
-by RCT-1.</p>
-
-<p>“Under these circumstances,” commented General Smith at a later
-date, “there was no alternative except to continue forward in the hope
-that the Eighth Army situation would right itself and that we would
-succeed in our efforts to close up the entire 1st Marine Division behind
-RCT-7.”<a id="FNanchor_210" href="#Footnote_210" class="fnanchor">210</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">83</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_210" href="#FNanchor_210" class="fnanchor">210</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 523–524. See also: Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 70.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Introducing the New Enemy</i></h3>
-
-<p>Here it is hardly a digression to pause for a brief survey of the organization,
-tactics and aims of the new enemy who was about to prolong
-the Korean conflict by intervening on behalf of the beaten <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span>. The
-powerful, ever-ready military instrument which the Chinese Reds knew
-as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had been forged and tempered
-in the fires of civil strife. It came into being in the late summer of
-1927 during the abortive Nanchang rebellion. Following their defeat,
-the Communists found a refuge in Kiangsi Province of south China
-and gained strength as disaffected Kuomintang units came over to their
-side.<a id="FNanchor_211" href="#Footnote_211" class="fnanchor">211</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_211" href="#FNanchor_211" class="fnanchor">211</a> Richard L. Walker, <i>China under Communism</i> (New Haven, 1954), 111–112; Order
-of Battle Branch, Office of the AC/S G-2, HQ Eighth United States Army (Fwd),
-<i>CCF Army Histories</i> (hereafter <i>CCF Army Histories</i>), 1.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The infant PLA managed with difficulty to survive the first four
-“bandit suppression campaigns” waged by Chiang Kai-shek. When
-he launched his fifth in 1933, the Chinese Reds planned the celebrated
-“Long March” which has become one of their most cherished traditions.
-Breaking out of Chiang’s encirclement in October, 1934, they took a
-circuitous, 6000-mile route to avoid Nationalist armies. Of the 90,000
-who started, only 20,000 were left a year later when the PLA
-reached Yenan in Shensi Province.<a id="FNanchor_212" href="#Footnote_212" class="fnanchor">212</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_212" href="#FNanchor_212" class="fnanchor">212</a> <i>U. S. Relations with China</i>, 43–44, 207, 323.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This destination in northwest China gave the Communists a refuge
-with Mongolia and Soviet Russia at their backs. There Mao Tse-tung
-and his colleagues alternately fought and negotiated with the Government.
-Finally, in 1941, the Communists and Nationalists agreed
-to cease fighting one another in order to make common cause against
-the Japanese invaders.</p>
-
-<p>The Communists took advantage of their membership in the People’s
-Political Council—a Nationalist-sponsored organization which theoretically
-united all factions in China against the Japanese—to continue
-their “boring-from-within” tactics. Chiang’s estimate of his troublesome
-allies was summed up in a quotation attributed to him in 1941:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>You think it is important that I have kept the Japanese from expanding....
-I tell you it is more important that I have kept the Communists from spreading.
-The Japanese are a disease of the skin; the Communists are a disease of
-the heart.<a id="FNanchor_213" href="#Footnote_213" class="fnanchor">213</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">84</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_213" href="#FNanchor_213" class="fnanchor">213</a> Quoted in George Moorad, <i>Lost Peace in China</i> (New York, 1949), 33.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Communist Victory in Civil War</i></h3>
-
-<p>In late 1945, with the Japanese no longer a menace, the grapple for
-mastery began anew. Chiang Kai-shek held the material and moral
-advantage as a result of the arms and other assistance supplied by
-the United States.</p>
-
-<p>The Nationalists controlled all the important centers of population
-and industry and the major lines of communication. The Communists,
-with their backs to the wall, eagerly accepted the United States proposal
-for a cease fire in January 1946. General George C. Marshall, as personal
-representative of President Truman, flew out to Nanking in
-December, 1945, and tried for 12 months to arrange a workable compromise
-between two irreconcilable ideologies. Meanwhile, the Reds
-retrained and reequipped their forces with the vast supply of weapons
-which had fallen into their hands as a result of the collapse of the
-Japanese Army in Manchuria in August, 1945. By the spring of 1947,
-they were ready again for war. They denounced the truce and recommenced
-military operations. From that time the balance of power
-swung steadily in their favor.<a id="FNanchor_214" href="#Footnote_214" class="fnanchor">214</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_214" href="#FNanchor_214" class="fnanchor">214</a> <i>U. S. Relations with China</i>, 352–363.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although the PLA had seized the initiative, the Government still
-had an army of about 2,700,000 men facing 1,150,000 Reds, according
-to estimates of American military advisers in China. But Chiang was
-committed to a positional warfare; his forces were dangerously over-extended,
-and for reasons of prestige and political considerations he
-hesitated to withdraw from areas of dubious military value. Mao’s
-hard and realistic strategy took full advantage of these lapses. As a
-result the Communists won the upper hand in Manchuria and Shantung
-and by the end of the year had massed large forces in central
-China.</p>
-
-<p>Early in 1948, the year of decision, the PLA recaptured Yenan along
-with thousands of Government troops. But the most crushing Communist
-victory of all came with the surrender of Tsinan, the capital of
-Shantung, and its garrison of 85,000 to 100,000 Nationalists.</p>
-
-<p>In his summary of Nationalist reverses, Major General David G.
-Barr, senior officer of the United States Military Advisory Group in
-China, reported to the Department of the Army on 16 November 1948:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>No battle has been lost since my arrival due to lack of ammunition and
-equipment. Their [the Chinese Nationalists’] military debacles in my opinion<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">85</span>
-can all be attributed to the world’s worst leadership and many other morale
-destroying factors that lead to a complete loss of will to fight.<a id="FNanchor_215" href="#Footnote_215" class="fnanchor">215</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_215" href="#FNanchor_215" class="fnanchor">215</a> <i>U. S. Relations with China</i>, 358.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By the early spring of 1949 the military collapse of the Nationalists
-had gone so far that the enemy controlled the major centers of population
-and the railroads from Manchuria south to the Yangtze Valley.
-Nanking, Hangkow, and Shanghai were soon to fall into the hands of
-Communists whose military strength increased every day as they captured
-Nationalist arms and were joined by Nationalist deserters. Perhaps
-the best summary of the Chinese Civil War was put in a few
-words by Dean Acheson, the U. S. Secretary of State:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.<a id="FNanchor_216" href="#Footnote_216" class="fnanchor">216</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_216" href="#FNanchor_216" class="fnanchor">216</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, xiv-xv.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In addition to the aid extended during World War II, Washington
-had authorized grants and credits to Nationalist China amounting to
-two billion dollars since V-J Day. Nor was American assistance confined
-to arms and monetary grants. From 1945–1947 the occupation of
-certain key cities in North China, e. g., Tientsin, Peiping, Tsingtao<a id="FNanchor_217" href="#Footnote_217" class="fnanchor">217</a>
-etc., by sizeable U. S. Marine forces held those bases secure for the
-Nationalist government and permitted the release of appreciable numbers
-of Chiang’s soldiers for offensive operations, who would otherwise
-have been tied up in garrison type duty.<a id="FNanchor_218" href="#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">218</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_217" href="#FNanchor_217" class="fnanchor">217</a> Marines remained in Tsingtao until early 1949.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_218" href="#FNanchor_218" class="fnanchor">218</a> The first blows between the Marine and the Chinese Communists took place not in
-Korea, but along the Peiping-Tientsin highway as early as October, 1945.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines, upon their withdrawal, were directed to turn over vast
-stores of weapons and munitions to the Chinese Nationalists. In addition,
-the Nationalists were “sold” large quantities of military and
-civilian war surplus property, with a total procurement cost of more
-than a billion dollars, for a bargain price of 232 million.<a id="FNanchor_219" href="#Footnote_219" class="fnanchor">219</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_219" href="#FNanchor_219" class="fnanchor">219</a> <i>U. S. Relations with China</i>, xiv-xv.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Organization of the CCF</i></h3>
-
-<p>Although the victorious army continued to be called the People’s Liberation
-Army by the Chinese Reds themselves, it was known as the
-Chinese Communist Forces by commentators of Western nations. At
-the head of the new police state were the 72 regular and alternate
-members of the Central Committee, or Politburo. Formed at the Seventh
-Party Congress in 1945, this body consisted for the most part of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">86</span>
-Mao’s close associates—leaders identified with the revolutionary movement
-from the beginning.</p>
-
-<p>From top to bottom of the Chinese state, the usual Communist dualism
-of high political and military rank prevailed. The highest governing
-body, the People’s Revolutionary Military Council, consisted of
-leaders holding both positions. After they determined policies, the
-execution was left to the General Headquarters of the army.<a id="FNanchor_220" href="#Footnote_220" class="fnanchor">220</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_220" href="#FNanchor_220" class="fnanchor">220</a> Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the following sources: GHQ, FECOM,
-<i>Order of Battle Information, Chinese Third Field Army</i> (1 Mar 51) and <i>Chinese Fourth
-Field Army</i> (7 Nov 50); 164-MISDI, ADVATIS, and ADVATIS FWD rpts in EUSAK
-<i>WDs</i>, <i>passim</i>; X Corps <i>PIRs</i>; 1stMarDiv <i>PIRs</i>; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 30; G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 16–18;
-Far East Command, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), <i>Enemy Documents,
-Korean Operations</i>, <i>passim</i>; Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac), <i>Chinese Communist
-Forces Tactics in Korea</i>, 5–11; Maj R. C. W. Thomas, “The Chinese Communist Forces
-in Korea,” <i>The Army Quarterly</i>, Oct 52 (digested in <i>Military Review</i>, xxxii, no. 11
-(Feb 53), 87); LtCol Robert F. Rigg, <i>Red China’s Fighting Hordes</i> (Harrisburg, 1951);
-Walker: <i>China Under Communism</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This organization comprised a general staff section, a rear Services
-section and a general political bureau. Largest CCF administrative unit
-was the field army, which reported directly to Headquarters. Composed
-of two or more army groups, the field army had a small headquarters
-of its own.</p>
-
-<p>The army group, as the largest unit encountered by UN forces, was
-comparable to an army in the American military system. CCF army
-groups in Korea consisted of two to four armies with an average total
-strength of 60,000–120,000 troops. Equivalent to an American corps
-was the CCF army, an organization including three infantry divisions
-and an artillery regiment. Thus the average strength of a CCF army
-was about 30,000 men.</p>
-
-<p>The CCF infantry division, with a paper strength of 10,000 men,
-averaged from 7,000 to 8,500 men in Korea, according to various estimates.
-Triangular in organization, it included three infantry regiments
-and an artillery battalion.</p>
-
-<p>Divisional units consisted of reconnaissance and engineer companies
-of about 100 men, a 150-man transport company, a 100-man guard company,
-and a 60-man communications company. Transport companies
-had only draft animals and carts, since little motor transport was organic
-to a CCF division at that time.</p>
-
-<p>The CCF infantry regiment, averaging about 2,200 men in the field,
-broke down into the following units: three infantry battalions; an
-artillery battery of four to six guns; a mortar and bazooka company;
-a guard company; a transportation company; a medical unit with attached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">87</span>
-stretcher personnel (often composed of impressed civilians)
-and a combined reconnaissance and signal company.</p>
-
-<p>The CCF infantry battalion, with an authorized strength of 852 men
-and an actual strength of perhaps 700, consisted of a mortar and machine
-gun or heavy weapons company, a signal squad, a medical squad
-and a small battalion headquarters in addition to the three rifle companies
-of about 170 men each. Each of the latter was composed of a
-headquarters platoon, a 60mm mortar platoon and three rifle platoons.</p>
-
-<p>The CCF artillery battalion, organic to every division, must be considered
-theoretical rather than actual as far as Korean operations of
-1950 are concerned. As a rule, only a few horse-drawn or pack howitzers
-were brought into action by an infantry division depending chiefly
-on mortars.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Chinese Peasant as a Soldier</i></h3>
-
-<p>Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the CCF, from the viewpoint of
-a Western observer, was the lack of any official provision for the honorable
-discharge of a soldier. Once he became a cog in the CCF military
-machine, a man remained in the ranks until he was killed, captured,
-became a deserter, or was incapacitated for active service by reason of
-wounds, disease or old age.</p>
-
-<p>Theoretically depending on a “volunteer” system, the recruiting
-officers of the CCF knew how to apply political or economic pressure
-so that a man found it prudent to become a soldier. After putting on
-a uniform, he was vigorously indoctrinated in political as well as military
-subjects.</p>
-
-<p>Both self-criticism and criticism of comrades were encouraged at
-platoon meetings held for that purpose. Every recruit was subjected to
-a course of psychological mass coercion known to the Chinese as <i>hsi-nao</i>
-and to the non-Communist world as “brain-washing.” Spying on comrades
-and reporting political or military deviations was a soldier’s
-duty.<a id="FNanchor_221" href="#Footnote_221" class="fnanchor">221</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_221" href="#FNanchor_221" class="fnanchor">221</a> Walker, <i>China under Communism</i>, 51–76.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Inured to hardships from birth, the peasant in the ranks did not
-find that the military service demanded many unwonted privations.
-He was used to cold and hunger, and he could make long daily marches
-on a diet which the American soldier would have regarded as both insufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">88</span>
-and monotonous. It would appear, however, that some of the
-Western legends about Oriental stoicism and contempt for death were
-a little far-fetched. At any rate, the CCF had to deal with the problem
-of straggling from the battlefield; and U. S. Marines in Korea could
-attest that on occasion the Chinese soldier showed evidences of fear
-and low morale. Nor was he as much of a fanatic as might have been
-expected, considering the extent of his political indoctrination.</p>
-
-<p>Although the CCF departed in most respects from the Chinese military
-past, the policy of organizing units along ethnic lines was retained.
-Men from the same village were formed into a company; companies
-from the same area into battalions; and battalions from the same province
-into regiments or divisions. Replacements were drawn from the
-localities where the unit was originally recruited.<a id="FNanchor_222" href="#Footnote_222" class="fnanchor">222</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_222" href="#FNanchor_222" class="fnanchor">222</a> FMFPac, <i>CCF Tactics</i>, 9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the other hand, the Chinese Reds broke with both Nationalist
-and Communist tradition in their policy of avoiding a permanent rank
-system. Officers (in Korea denoted by red piping on their sleeves)
-were divided into company, field, and general groups. The company
-commander and political officer held about equal authority in an infantry
-unit, and the only NCOs mentioned in CCF field reports are
-sergeants and squad leaders.<a id="FNanchor_223" href="#Footnote_223" class="fnanchor">223</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_223" href="#FNanchor_223" class="fnanchor">223</a> ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 14 Nov 50; G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 21–22.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Arms and Equipment</i></h3>
-
-<p>The CCF depended on a wide assortment of weapons, so that it was
-not uncommon to find several different kinds of rifles of varying calibers
-in the same regiment. Japanese arms acquired after the surrender of
-1945; Russian arms furnished by the Soviets; and American, German,
-Czech, British, and Canadian arms taken from the Chinese Nationalists—these
-were some of the diverse sources. And it is a tribute to the
-adaptability of the Chinese Reds that they managed to utilize such
-military hand-me-downs without disastrous confusion.</p>
-
-<p>Paper work was at a minimum in a force which kept few records and
-numbered a great many illiterates. As for logistics, each soldier was
-given a four-day food supply in the winter of 1950–1951 when he
-crossed the Yalu—usually rice, millet or soy beans carried in his pack.
-Afterwards, food was to be procured locally by extortion or confiscation,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">89</span>
-though the Communists were fond of using such euphemisms as
-“purchase” or “donation” to denote those processes.<a id="FNanchor_224" href="#Footnote_224" class="fnanchor">224</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_224" href="#FNanchor_224" class="fnanchor">224</a> There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops from division stocks. See
-ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 4 Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in <i>Ibid.</i>, 1 Nov 50.
-Normal CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be committed to combat for
-about six days and then withdrawn to replenish its supplies and replace casualties.
-This procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an attack by the CCF and
-prevented the maintenance of the momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G.
-Barr testimony in <i>MacArthur Hearing</i>, 2650; Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The CCF soldiers who fought in Korea during the winter of 1950–1951
-wore a two-piece, reversible mustard-yellow and white uniform
-of quilted cotton and a heavy cotton cap with fur-lined ear flaps. Issued
-to the troops just before crossing the Yalu, the quilted cotton blouse
-and trousers were worn over the standard summer uniform and any
-other layers of clothing the soldier may have acquired.</p>
-
-<p>The first CCF units in action had canvas shoes with crepe rubber
-soles. Later arrivals were issued a half-leather shoe or even a full
-leather boot. Chinese footwear was of poor quality and few of the
-troops wore gloves in cold weather. The consequence was a high rate
-of frostbitten hands and feet.<a id="FNanchor_225" href="#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">225</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_225" href="#FNanchor_225" class="fnanchor">225</a> X Corps msg X 11792; G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 21–22; SSgt Robert W. Tallent, “New Enemy,”
-<i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, xxxiv, No. 2 (Feb 51), 12–15; 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 11.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The CCF soldier usually carried a shawl-like blanket in addition to
-the small pack containing his food as well as personal belongings.
-These were few and simple, for it could never be said that the Chinese
-Reds pampered their soldiers.</p>
-
-<h3><i>China’s “Hate America” Campaign</i></h3>
-
-<p>It was essentially an Asiatic guerrilla army which came to the rescue of
-beaten Red Korea in the autumn of 1950. CCF strategic aims had
-been summed up years before by Mao Tse-tung himself:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>We are against guerilla-ism of the Red Army, yet we must admit its guerrilla
-character. We are opposed to protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick
-decision while we believe in a strategy of protracted war and campaigns of
-quick decision. As we are opposed to fixed operational fronts and positional
-warfare, we believe in unfixed operational fronts and a war of maneuvers.
-We are against simply routing the enemy, and believe in a war of annihilation.
-We are against two-fistism in strategic directions and believe in one-fistism.
-We are against the institution of a big rear and believe in a small rear. We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">90</span>
-are against absolute centralized command and believe in a relatively centralized
-command.<a id="FNanchor_226" href="#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">226</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_226" href="#FNanchor_226" class="fnanchor">226</a> Mao Tse-tung: <i>Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolutionary Wars</i>, Ed by LtCol F. B.
-Nihart (Quantico, 1951), 17–18. Adapted from an English translation published in the
-<i>China Digest</i>, of Hong Kong.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Mao was held in such reverence as a veteran Chinese Communist
-leader that long passages of his writings were committed to memory.
-His strategic ideas, therefore, deserve more than passing consideration.
-In the first place, his concept of war itself differed from that of Western
-nations.</p>
-
-<p>“There are only two kinds of war in history, revolutionary and
-counter-revolutionary,” he wrote. “We support the former and oppose
-the latter. Only a revolutionary war is holy.”<a id="FNanchor_227" href="#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">227</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_227" href="#FNanchor_227" class="fnanchor">227</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>From the Western viewpoint, Mao’s followers had fought four different
-wars in close succession—against the Chinese Nationalists from
-1927 to 1936; against the Japanese from 1937 to 1945; against the
-Nationalists in a second war from 1946 to 1949; and against the United
-Nations, beginning in 1950. But Mao and his colleagues saw this period
-as one prolonged war in which revolutionists were pitted against counter-revolutionary
-adversaries. The fact that the conflict had lasted for
-a generation did not disturb Communist leaders who envisioned a continual
-state of war “to save mankind and China from destruction.”</p>
-
-<p>“The greatest and most ruthless counter-revolutionary war is pressing
-on us,” continued Mao. “If we do not hoist the banner of revolutionary
-war, a greater part of the human race will face extinction.”<a id="FNanchor_228" href="#Footnote_228" class="fnanchor">228</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_228" href="#FNanchor_228" class="fnanchor">228</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Early in December, 1949, following Red China’s victory over the
-Nationalists, Mao arrived in Moscow for a series of talks with Stalin
-which lasted until 4 March 1950. The decisions reached in these conferences
-are not known, but it was probably no coincidence that the
-Communist puppet state in North Korea violated the world’s peace
-a few months later. It is perhaps also significant that the head of the
-Soviet Military Mission in Tokyo, Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko,
-was absent from Tokyo during the same period and reported
-in Moscow.<a id="FNanchor_229" href="#Footnote_229" class="fnanchor">229</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_229" href="#FNanchor_229" class="fnanchor">229</a> LtGen E. M. Almond Comments, 22 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was the Year of the Tiger in the Chinese calendar, and a “Resist
-America, Aid Korea” movement was launched in Red China when the
-United States came to the aid of the Republic of Korea. Every dictatorship
-must have some object of mass hatred, and Mao found the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">91</span>
-United States ideal for the purpose. A “Hate America” campaign was
-inaugurated after the CCF intervention, with the following serving as
-an example of anti-American propaganda:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>This [the United States] is the paradise of gangsters, swindlers, rascals,
-special agents, fascist germs, speculators, debauchers, and all the dregs of mankind.
-This is the world’s manufactory and source of such crimes as reaction,
-darkness, cruelty, decadence, corruption, debauchery, oppression of man by
-man, and cannibalism. This is the exhibition ground of all the crimes which
-can possibly be committed by mankind. This is a living hell, ten times, one
-hundred times, one thousand times worse than can possibly be depicted by
-the most sanguinary of writers. Here the criminal phenomena that issue
-forth defy the imagination of human brains. Conscientious persons can only
-wonder how the spiritual civilization of mankind can be depraved to such
-an extent.<a id="FNanchor_230" href="#Footnote_230" class="fnanchor">230</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_230" href="#FNanchor_230" class="fnanchor">230</a> Excerpt from a series of three articles, “Look, This is the American Way of Life,”
-used as a primer in the “Hate America” campaign. Quoted in Walker, <i>China Under
-Communism</i>, 13.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Communist doctrine held that the people must be incited by such
-propaganda to a constant high pitch of emotional intensity for the
-sacrifices demanded by total war. The prevalence of illiteracy made it
-necessary to depend largely on street-corner loud speakers blaring forth
-radio harangues. Realistic broadcasts of the torture and execution of
-political deviates were also heard at times, and such spectacles were
-exhibited for the edification of the public.<a id="FNanchor_231" href="#Footnote_231" class="fnanchor">231</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_231" href="#FNanchor_231" class="fnanchor">231</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Strategy and Tactics</i></h3>
-
-<p>CCF strategy was so rudimentary at first that its basic tenets could be
-summed up in a 16-word principle adopted by the Central Committee:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Enemy advancing, we retreat; enemy entrenched, we harass; enemy exhausted,
-we attack; enemy retreating, we pursue.<a id="FNanchor_232" href="#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">232</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_232" href="#FNanchor_232" class="fnanchor">232</a> Mao, <i>Strategic Problems</i>, 31.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>But as time went on, other principles were added. Mao favored a
-planned defensive-offensive as the only valid strategy against superior
-enemy numbers. He made it plain, however, that any withdrawal was
-to be merely temporary as the preliminary to advancing and striking
-at the first advantageous opportunity. And he reiterated that annihilation
-of the enemy must always be the final goal of strategy.<a id="FNanchor_233" href="#Footnote_233" class="fnanchor">233</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_233" href="#FNanchor_233" class="fnanchor">233</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was in the field of tactics that the essentially guerrilla character
-of the CCF was most fully revealed. Since Communist dialectics insisted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">92</span>
-that there was a correct (Marxist) and an incorrect (“petty bourgeois”
-or “opportunist” or “reactionary”) way of doing everything,
-CCF tactics were reduced to principles whenever possible.</p>
-
-<p>A generation of warfare against material odds had established a pattern
-of attack which proved effective against armies possessing an advantage
-in arms and equipment. One Marine officer has aptly defined
-a Chinese attack as “assembly on the objective.”<a id="FNanchor_234" href="#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">234</a> The coolie in the
-CCF ranks had no superior in the world at making long approach
-marches by night and hiding by day, with as many as fifty men sharing
-a hut or cave and subsisting on a few handfuls of rice apiece. Night
-attacks were so much the rule that any exception came as a surprise.
-The advancing columns took such natural routes as draws or stream
-beds, deploying as soon as they met resistance. Combat groups then
-peeled off from the tactical columns, one at a time, and closed with
-rifles, submachine guns, and grenades.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_234" href="#FNanchor_234" class="fnanchor">234</a> Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Once engaged and under fire, the attackers hit the ground. Rising at
-any lull, they came on until engaged again; but when fully committed,
-they did not relinquish the attack even when riddled with casualties.
-Other Chinese came forward to take their places, and the build-up
-continued until a penetration was made, usually on the front of one
-or two platoons. After consolidating the ground, the combat troops
-then crept or wriggled forward against the open flank of the next
-platoon position. Each step of the assault was executed with practiced
-stealth and boldness, and the results of several such penetrations on a
-battalion front could be devastating.<a id="FNanchor_235" href="#Footnote_235" class="fnanchor">235</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_235" href="#FNanchor_235" class="fnanchor">235</a> The above description was derived from S. L. A. Marshall, “CCF in the Attack”
-(EUSAK Staff Memorandum ORO-S-26), 5 Jan 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The pattern of attack was varied somewhat to suit different occasions.
-As an example of an action in which the CCF used mortars, the following
-is quoted from a Marine field report:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Five to nine men [CCF] patrols were sent out forward of the main body
-in an attempt to locate or establish [our] front lines and flanks. After these
-patrols had withdrawn or been beaten off, white phosphorus mortar shells
-were dropped about the area in an attempt to inflict casualties. By closely
-watching the area for movement in removing these casualties, they attempted
-to establish the location of our front lines. After establishing what they
-believed were the front lines, white phosphorous shells were dropped in the
-lines and used as markers. While this was taking place, the assault troops
-crawled forward to distances as close as possible to the front lines ... [and]
-attacked at a given signal. The signal in this particular instance was three<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">93</span>
-blasts of a police whistle. The attacking troops then rose and in a perfect
-skirmish formation rushed the front line.<a id="FNanchor_236" href="#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">236</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_236" href="#FNanchor_236" class="fnanchor">236</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9</i>. The remainder of the section, unless otherwise
-noted, is based on: <i>Ibid.</i>; G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 13–45; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 28–29; 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 38–44;
-EUSAK <i>Combat Information Bulletin No. 4</i>; FMFPac, <i>CCF Tactics</i>, 1–5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It might be added that this attack resulted in a CCF penetration on a
-platoon front. Friendly lines were restored only by dawn counterattacks.</p>
-
-<p>The ambush was a favorite resort of Chinese commanders. Whatever
-the form of attack, the object was usually fractionalization of an
-opposing force, so that the segments could be beaten in detail by a
-local superiority in numbers.</p>
-
-<p>CCF attacking forces ranged as a rule from a platoon to a company
-in size, being continually built up as casualties thinned the ranks. Reports
-by newspaper correspondents of “hordes” and “human sea”
-assaults were so unrealistic as to inspire a derisive Marine comment:</p>
-
-<p>“How many hordes are there in a Chinese platoon?”</p>
-
-<p>After giving CCF tactics due credit for their merits, some serious
-weaknesses were also apparent. The primitive logistical system put
-such restrictions on ammunition supplies, particularly artillery and mortar
-shells, that a Chinese battalion sometimes had to be pulled back to
-wait for replenishments if the first night’s attack failed. At best the
-infantry received little help from supporting arms.<a id="FNanchor_237" href="#Footnote_237" class="fnanchor">237</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_237" href="#FNanchor_237" class="fnanchor">237</a> These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early months of CCF participation
-in the Korean conflict. Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951—an interlude
-with the enemy exploited for military purposes—the Chinese gradually built up to an
-equality with UN forces in mortars and artillery.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>POW interrogations revealed that in many instances each soldier
-was issued 80 rounds of small arms ammunition upon crossing the
-Yalu. This was his total supply. The artillery and mortars were so
-limited that they must reserve their fire for the front line while passing
-up lucrative targets in the rear areas. Some attempts were made to
-bring reserve stocks up to forward supply dumps about 30 miles behind
-the front, but not much could be accomplished with animal and human
-transport.</p>
-
-<p>A primitive communications system also accounted for CCF shortcomings.
-The radio net extended only down to the regimental level,
-and telephones only to battalions or occasionally companies. Below the
-battalion, communication depended on runners or such signaling devices
-as bugles, whistles, flares, and flashlights.<a id="FNanchor_238" href="#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">238</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">94</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_238" href="#FNanchor_238" class="fnanchor">238</a> 164-MISDI-1232, 1260, 1266, 1274, and 1275 in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 19, 26, and
-28 Nov and 1 Dec 50; ADVATIS FWD #1. Rpt 0271 in EUSAK <i>WD</i> 4 Dec 50;
-X Corps <i>PIR 81</i>, Annex 2; G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The consequence was a tactical rigidity which at times was fatal.
-Apparently CCF commanding officers had little or no option below
-the battalion level. A battalion once committed to the attack often
-kept on as long as its ammunition lasted, even if events indicated that
-it was beating out its brains against the strongest part of the opposing
-line. The result in many such instances was tactical suicide.</p>
-
-<p>After these defects are taken into full account, however, the Chinese
-soldier and the Korean terrain made a formidable combination. Ironically,
-Americans fighting the first war of the new Atomic Age were
-encountering conditions reminiscent of the border warfare waged by
-their pioneer forefathers against the Indians. These aborigines, too,
-were outweighed in terms of weapons and equipment. But from time
-immemorial the night has always been the ally of the primitive fighter,
-and surprise his best weapon. Thus the Americans in Korea, like their
-ancestors on the Western plains, could never be sure when the darkness
-would erupt into flame as stealthy foes seemed to spring from the very
-earth.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">95</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">The Battle of Sudong</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni—ROKs Relieved by
-7th Marines—CCF Counterattack at Sudong—Two Marine Battalions
-Cut Off—End of NKPA Tank Regiment—The Fight
-for How Hill—Disappearance of CCF Remnants—Koto-ri Occupied
-by 7th Marines</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> coastal plain of the Songchon estuary is one of the most
-spacious flatlands in all North Korea. Its 100 square miles divide
-into two irrigation districts, which regulate cultivation in a virtual sea
-of rice paddies. The Songchon River, swollen by tributaries in its
-descent from the northern hinterland, nourishes this agricultural complex
-before flowing into the Sea of Japan.</p>
-
-<p>Flanking the mouth of the waterway are the port city of Hungnam
-to the north and the town of Yonpo, with its modern airfield, to the
-south. Eight miles upstream lies Hamhung, an important transportation
-center with a population of approximately 85,000 Koreans and
-Japanese in 1940.</p>
-
-<p>Hamhung straddles the main railroad connecting Wonsan and Sonjin
-as it follows the coastal route to the border of Soviet Russia. A narrow-gauge
-line (2′ 6″) stems from Hungnam and passes through
-Hamhung before penetrating into the mountainous heart of North
-Korea. Parallel to this railroad is the only highway that could be
-utilized by the transport of the 1st Marine Division for its advance to
-the north.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The MSR from Hungnam to Yudam-ni</i></h3>
-
-<p>Soon the eyes of the world would be fixed on maps of the narrow,
-winding 78-mile stretch of dirt and gravel road leading from the supply<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">96</span>
-port of Hungnam to the forlorn village of Yudam-ni at the western
-tip of the Chosin Reservoir. Distances in road miles between points
-along the route are as follows:</p>
-
-<table id="t96" summary="distances between route points">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Hungnam to Hamhung</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Hamhung to Oro-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Oro-ri to Majon-dong</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Majon-dong to Sudong</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Sudong to Chinhung-ni</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr">10</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Koto-ri to Hagaru</td>
-  <td class="tdr">11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Hagaru to Yudam-ni</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"><span class="bt">78</span></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>The first half of the distance—the 43 miles from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni—is
-traversed by a two-lane road passing through comparatively
-level terrain. Rolling country is encountered north of Majon-dong,
-but it is at Chinhung-ni that the road makes its abrupt climb into a
-tumbled region of mile-high peaks. There are few straight or level
-stretches all the rest of the 35 miles to Yudam-ni, but the route from
-Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri is the most difficult.</p>
-
-<p>Funchilin Pass, comprising eight of these ten miles, represents an
-ascent of 2500 feet for a straining jeep or truck. The road is merely
-a twisting, one-way shelf, with a cliff on one side and a chasm on the
-other.</p>
-
-<p>About two miles south of Koto-ri the trail reaches a rugged plateau
-region. There it rejoins the railway along the Changjin River, though
-the narrow-gauge line was operative only from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni.</p>
-
-<p>Hagaru, at the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, with highways
-branching off on both sides of that body of water, was an important
-communications center before the war. And even though many buildings
-had been flattened by bombing, the town was still impressive as
-compared to such wretched mountain hamlets as Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri.</p>
-
-<p>The road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni climbs from the tableland at the
-foot of the Chosin Reservoir and winds its way up to 4000-foot Toktong
-Pass. Descending through gloomy gorges, it finally reaches a
-broad valley leading to Yudam-ni, where roads branch off to the north,
-west, and south from a western arm of the Reservoir.</p>
-
-<p>This was the 78-mile main supply route that would soon be claiming<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">97</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span>
-its page in history. In only a few weeks it would be known to
-thousands of Marines as <i>the</i> MSR, as if there never had been another.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_7" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_097.png" width="846" height="1290" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE MAIN SUPPLY
-ROUTE OF THE
-1ST MARINE DIVISION</p>
-
-<p>November-December
-1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-7</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Officers and NCOs of the 7th Marines, which was fated to be the
-first United States unit to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle,
-were given a verbal preview of the MSR and the part it might play in
-their future. This was as the result of a flight of inspection made by
-Major Henry J. Woessner on 30 October, following a briefing at the
-X Corps CP in Wonsan. The S-3 of the 7th Marines was fortunate
-enough to arrive just in time to hear the briefing given General Barr by
-General Almond. Pointing to the map, the X Corps commander indicated
-that the 7th Infantry Division would push northward to Hyesanjin
-on the Yalu. Meanwhile the Marines were to head for the border
-by way of Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru while the 3d Infantry
-Division took over responsibility for the rear area.</p>
-
-<p>“When we have cleared all this out,” concluded General Almond,
-pointing again to the map, “the ROKs will take over, and we will pull
-our divisions out of Korea.”<a id="FNanchor_239" href="#Footnote_239" class="fnanchor">239</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_239" href="#FNanchor_239" class="fnanchor">239</a> Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance flight are based on LtCol H. J.
-Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At the X Corps CP, Woessner met a U. S. Army liaison officer just
-returned from the 26th ROK Regiment with a report of that unit’s
-encounter with Chinese Communists. The ROKs had been north of
-Sudong when they collided with the new enemy and were pushed back,
-after taking 16 prisoners.</p>
-
-<p>Colonel Edward H. Forney, ranking Marine officer on the X Corps
-staff, arranged for Major Woessner to make a reconnaissance flight over
-the Hamhung-Hagaru route in an Air Force T-6. The S-3 saw no sign
-of enemy troop movements all the way to the northern end of the
-Chosin Reservoir, but he did not fail to note the formidable character
-of the terrain through which the new MSR passed.</p>
-
-<p>When he returned that evening with his report, Colonel Litzenberg
-called a meeting of officers and NCOs at the regimental CP. In an
-informal talk, he told them that they might soon be taking part in the
-opening engagement of World War III.</p>
-
-<p>“We can expect to meet Chinese Communist troops,” he concluded,
-“and it is important that we win the first battle. The results of that
-action will reverberate around the world, and we want to make sure
-that the outcome has an adverse effect in Moscow as well as Peiping.”<a id="FNanchor_240" href="#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">240</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">99</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_240" href="#FNanchor_240" class="fnanchor">240</a> Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Maj M. E. Roach
-Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is from Litzenberg.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>ROKs Relieved by 7th Marines</i></h3>
-
-<p>On 1 November the 7th Marines trucked out of Hamhung to an assembly
-area midway between Oro-ri and Majon-dong. Moving into
-position behind the 26th ROK Regiment without incident, Colonel
-Litzenberg ordered a reconnaissance which took Lieutenant Colonel
-Raymond G. Davis’ 1st Battalion about four miles northward to the
-South Korean positions above Majon-dong. Late that afternoon the
-regiment secured for the night in a tight perimeter.<a id="FNanchor_241" href="#Footnote_241" class="fnanchor">241</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_241" href="#FNanchor_241" class="fnanchor">241</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 5, 7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Attached to the regiment were the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Major
-Francis F. Parry); Division Reconnaissance Company (First Lieutenant
-Ralph B. Crossman); Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion (Captain
-Byron C. Turner); 1st Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel
-Olin L. Beall); Company E, 1st Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander
-Charles K. Holloway); and detachments from the 1st Signal
-Battalion, 1st Service Battalion, and Division Military Police Company.<a id="FNanchor_242" href="#Footnote_242" class="fnanchor">242</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_242" href="#FNanchor_242" class="fnanchor">242</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Intelligence based on the questioning of the 16 prisoners taken by
-the ROKs had revealed that they had been attacked by elements of the
-370th Regiment of the 124th CCF Division. Along with the 125th
-and 126th, the other two divisions of the 42d CCF Army, the 124th
-had crossed the Yalu during the period 14–20 October. After marching
-southeast via Kanggye and Changjin, the unit deployed for the
-defense of the Chosin Reservoir power complex while the 126th pushed
-eastward to the Fusen Reservoir and the 125th protected the right
-flank of the 42d CCF Army.<a id="FNanchor_243" href="#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">243</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_243" href="#FNanchor_243" class="fnanchor">243</a> 1stMarDiv <i>PIR</i> 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>X Corps G-2 officers concluded that these CCF forces were “probably
-flank security” for the enemy’s 4th Army Group across the peninsula
-in the <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> zone.<a id="FNanchor_244" href="#Footnote_244" class="fnanchor">244</a> The G-2 section of the 1st Marine Division
-arrived at this interpretation:</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_244" href="#FNanchor_244" class="fnanchor">244</a> X Corps <i>WD Sum</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 24.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The capture by the 26th ROK Regt. of 16 POWs identified as being members
-of the 124th CCF Division ... would seem to indicate that the CCF
-has decided to intervene in the Korean War. It would indicate, also, that
-this reinforcement is being effected by unit rather than by piecemeal replacement
-from volunteer cadres. However, until more definite information is
-obtained it must be presumed that the CCF has not yet decided on full scale
-intervention.<a id="FNanchor_245" href="#Footnote_245" class="fnanchor">245</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_245" href="#FNanchor_245" class="fnanchor">245</a> 1stMarDiv <i>PIR</i> 6.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Division intelligence officers concluded their analysis with the comment,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">100</span>
-“The advantage to be gained by all-out intervention, at a time
-when the NK forces are on the verge of complete collapse, is not
-readily apparent.”<a id="FNanchor_246" href="#Footnote_246" class="fnanchor">246</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_246" href="#FNanchor_246" class="fnanchor">246</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There was little activity in the valley on 31 October and 1 November.
-The ROKs, upon learning that they would be relieved shortly by the
-7th Marines, withdrew from advance positions near Sudong to a valley
-junction about four miles south of that town. Here, at 0600 on 2 November,
-they were hit by an enemy “counterattack” which, since it was
-of about two-platoon strength and of only 30 minutes duration,
-amounted really to a CCF combat patrol action.<a id="FNanchor_247" href="#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">247</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_247" href="#FNanchor_247" class="fnanchor">247</a> 1stMarDiv <i>PIRS 7 &amp; 8</i>; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Shortly after this clash, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis’ 1st
-Battalion, 7th Marines, moved out of the regimental assembly area and
-marched toward the ROK lines at Majon-dong in route column. Major
-Webb D. Sawyer’s 2d Battalion followed at an interval of 500 yards,
-while overhead the Corsairs of VMF-312 orbited on station for reconnaissance
-and close air support missions.<a id="FNanchor_248" href="#Footnote_248" class="fnanchor">248</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_248" href="#FNanchor_248" class="fnanchor">248</a> The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>,
-annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter 3/11 <i>SAR</i>), 3; G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 16; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; VMF-312
-<i>SAR</i>, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>, sec 6, 10; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv by HistDiv
-HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51;
-Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.;
-W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n. d.;
-7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments,
-19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.;
-Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Bey Comments,
-24 Apr 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The passage of lines proceeded smoothly and quietly, save for the
-drone of aircraft as they probed the reaches of the valley. It was over
-by 1030. Thereafter, progress to the front was slow and watchful. Led
-by Company A, under Captain David W. Banks, the 1st Battalion took
-ineffectual long-range CCF fire with only a few casualties. Batteries G
-and H of 3/11 displaced forward during the morning, and at noon
-Battery I opened up with the first of 26 missions fired by the artillery
-battalion that day.</p>
-
-<p>Though second in the tactical column, 2/7 was responsible for high
-ground on both sides of the MSR, dominated on the left by Hill 698.
-Company D ascended the eastern slopes early in the afternoon to relieve
-a ROK unit that apparently had been unable to hold the crest. When
-the South Koreans saw the Marines approaching, they promptly abandoned<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">101</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span>
-their position about midway up the slope and headed for the
-rear.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_8" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_101.png" width="848" height="1272" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>BATTLE OF SUDONG
-1ST PHASE</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-8</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Dog Company continued up the exposed hillside. Scattered enemy
-shots from the top of the ridge gradually merged into a pattern of light
-resistance as the Marines climbed higher. Captain Milton A. Hull
-ordered his troops to halt, deployed his machine guns for return fire,
-and radioed for an air strike. Within a few minutes a flight of Corsairs
-swept down and worked over the ridgeline.</p>
-
-<p>Hull’s only assault route traversed a barren area about 50 yards from
-the crest. His two assault platoons, fully exposed to the enemy’s observation,
-inched upward by fire and movement, taking casualties, and
-finally reached the top. Their foothold on the ridgeline did not discourage
-the Red Chinese, who continued to pour fire from skillfully
-camouflaged positions. To prevent continued attrition among his now
-exhausted troops (by this time they had climbed some 1600 vertical
-feet from ground level over an average gradient of 25 per cent), Hull
-recalled the two platoons to the eastern slopes and radioed for supporting
-fire.</p>
-
-<p>This fire was not forthcoming. Company D held a line near the
-summit until about 2200 when Easy Company passed through to occupy
-a small plateau about 150 yards below the crest for the night.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, down in the valley, Litzenberg’s “walking perimeter”
-completed a 1300-yard advance by 1630. Owing to the nature of the
-terrain, with the attendant 360-degree vulnerability, the regimental commander
-stipulated that the 7th Marines’ column extend not less than
-4000 (the minimum distance which would allow for close-in artillery
-support) nor more than 6000 yards in length. This allowed sufficient
-depth for over-all protection, with no loss of mutual support among
-the three infantry battalions.</p>
-
-<p>Enemy resistance had flared up now and then in the course of the day,
-but Marine supporting arms so ruled the valley that no serious challenge
-by the Chinese developed. VMF-312 flew 12 close support missions
-in the Sudong area, and VMF(N)-513 assisted with several more.
-The whole precipitous skyline on either side of the regiment was
-blasted with 500-pound bombs, 20mm shells, and high-velocity rockets.</p>
-
-<p>By way of reply to the heavy shelling and bombing, Chinese mortars
-and at least one small artillery piece began to fire sporadically as the
-day wore on. A 120mm mortar round struck 1/7’s CP at 1700 and
-wounded three men.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">103</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Counterattack at Sudong</i></h3>
-
-<p>Although the unit commanders of the 7th Marines anticipated more
-fighting with the new enemy, they probably did not suspect what the
-night held in store when the regiment dug in at dusk on 2 November.
-They did not know that the 371st Regiment, 124th CCF Division, was
-massed to the north and west, nor that the 370th Regiment occupied
-high ground east of the MSR in strength—both units within easy striking
-distance of Litzenberg’s perimeter. The 372d Regiment, in reserve,
-stood poised in its hidden encampment several miles to the rear.<a id="FNanchor_249" href="#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">249</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_249" href="#FNanchor_249" class="fnanchor">249</a> This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 18–19; 7thMar
-<i>SAR</i>, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 3; 1stMarDiv <i>PIRs 9</i> &amp; <i>10</i>; Litzenberg
-interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51; Holland-Theros-Connell interv,
-n. d.; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer,
-<i>The New Breed</i>, 228–235; Capt William J. Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” <i>Leatherneck
-Magazine</i>, MS.; Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments,
-n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56;
-LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Leading elements of the 7th Marines deployed defensively less than
-a mile south of Sudong (see Map 8). To the right of the MSR, Able
-Company’s 3d, 2d, and 1st Platoons, in that order, formed a line which
-extended across Hill 532 and part way up a spur of massive Hill 727,
-then bent rearward sharply to refuse the east flank. Emplaced along
-the road in anti-mechanized defense was the company’s 3.5-inch rocket
-squad. The 60mm mortar section and company CP set up in the low
-ground behind the spur, but Captain Banks himself decided to spend the
-night in an OP with his rifle platoons.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Davis of 1/7 deployed Charlie Company (-)
-across the MSR from Able, on the northeast slopes of Hill 698.<a id="FNanchor_250" href="#Footnote_250" class="fnanchor">250</a> To
-the rear, headquarters and one platoon of Company B dug in on an
-arm of the same hill, while the other two platoons went into position on
-the lower reaches of Hill 727 behind Company A. One platoon of
-Charlie Company, Davis’ CP and the battalion 81mm mortars were
-located in low ground behind Able Company and the elements of
-Baker on the right of the road.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_250" href="#FNanchor_250" class="fnanchor">250</a> Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company was unable to move position
-until dusk. As Col Davis has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed Charlie
-to move into position unseen by the Chinese and was a major factor in trapping the
-Chinese in the valley the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>South of 1/7 lay Major Sawyer’s 2d Battalion with Company D at the
-foot of Hill 698, E on its crest and slopes, and F spread along the steep
-incline of 727. Sawyer’s CP and elements of the 7th Marines’ Antitank
-and 4.2-inch Mortar Companies were situated in a shallow meadow<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">104</span>
-along the road beneath the Fox Company positions. Several hundred
-yards to the rear, south of a sharp bend in the road, Major Maurice E.
-Roach’s 3d Battalion deployed in what was in effect a second perimeter
-protecting the regimental train, 3/11, and Litzenberg’s CP on the valley
-floor. Tieing in at the MSR, Companies H and I occupied ridges on
-the left and right of the road respectively, while G (-) arched through
-the low ground as the southernmost element of the regiment. Colonel
-Litzenberg was concerned about the valley which joined the Sudong
-Valley below Oro-ri lest it contain Chinese. He had Major Roach make
-a helicopter reconnaissance during the afternoon. Roach sighted nothing.<a id="FNanchor_251" href="#Footnote_251" class="fnanchor">251</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_251" href="#FNanchor_251" class="fnanchor">251</a> LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Except for the occasional thump of an incoming mortar round, night
-settled on the valley and the Marine perimeter with deceptive quiet.
-Deceptive, since at Sudong two CCF battalions were poised to smash at
-the 7th Marines with a well-coordinated double envelopment.</p>
-
-<p>At 2300, Davis’ 1st Battalion reported itself under attack from the
-right flank, the enemy apparently descending the higher slopes of Hill
-727. This announcement was somewhat premature, as the Marines of
-Company A were merely experiencing the infiltration and probing that
-precede almost every Communist assault. At 2400, 2/7 reported two
-enemy battalions on the left flank.<a id="FNanchor_252" href="#Footnote_252" class="fnanchor">252</a> During the first hour of 3 November,
-sobering messages were received from Litzenberg’s northernmost
-units. What had begun at 2300 as a staccato of small-arms fire swelled
-in volume by imperceptible degrees until Hills 698 and 727 were engulfed
-in a ceaseless din. And by 0100 the 1st and 2d Battalions of the
-7th Marines bent under the weight of a full-scale attack on both flanks.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_252" href="#FNanchor_252" class="fnanchor">252</a> 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither D nor F Companies
-was involved at this time, the information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however,
-doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E Company was made by more than
-20 men. Capt R. T. Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Avoiding the obvious approach through the corridor leading south
-from Sudong, the commander of the 371st CCF Regiment had dispatched
-a battalion along each of the ridgelines bordering the valley.
-Bursting flares and bugle calls signaled when the two assault units
-came abreast of the Marine positions on the lower reaches of Hills 727
-and 698. Then, treading swiftly and silently in their rubber sneakers,
-the Chinese infantrymen swept down obliquely and struck Able and
-Fox Companies on the east and Baker on the west. Charlie on the
-slopes of Hill 698 was undisturbed. Where the Chinese met resistance,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">105</span>
-they slugged it out at close range with grenades and submachine guns.
-Where they found gaps, they poured through and raced to the low
-ground. To the Marines, the specific CCF objectives were not readily
-apparent in those hectic hours before dawn, for the enemy seemed to
-be everywhere.<a id="FNanchor_253" href="#Footnote_253" class="fnanchor">253</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_253" href="#FNanchor_253" class="fnanchor">253</a> X Corps <i>PIR 44</i>, annex 2; 1stMarDiv <i>PIR 10</i>; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530
-3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Shortly after the battle was joined high on the hillsides, Marines at
-Able Company’s CP heard the clanking sounds of a tracked vehicle on
-the MSR to the north. When the machine passed the rocket section at
-the roadblock without incident, they dropped their guards momentarily,
-believing it to be a friendly bulldozer. The big vehicle rumbled into the
-CP and stopped, one headlight glaring at exposed mortar crews and
-headquarters personnel.</p>
-
-<p>“Tank!” shouted Staff Sergeant Donald T. Jones, section chief of
-Able Company’s 60mm mortars.</p>
-
-<p>It was a Russian T-34, one of the five remaining to the 344th North
-Korean Tank Regiment, supporting the 124th CCF Division. The
-troops at the roadblock had been caught napping.</p>
-
-<p>A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank sent the lightly armed
-Marines scurrying for cover. The armored vehicle quickly withdrew to
-the road and drove farther south, into 1/7s’ CP. After a short, inquisitive
-pause, it rumbled toward the 1st Battalion’s 81mm mortar positions.
-The Russian 85mm rifle flashed four times in the darkness, but the
-shells screamed harmlessly over the mortars and detonated in the high
-ground beyond.</p>
-
-<p>Rocket launchers of Charlie Company and the recoilless rifles of
-7th Marines Antitank Company opened up from positions around
-1/7’s headquarters. At least one 75mm round struck home, and the
-belt of sandbags around the T-34’s turret began to burn. The tank
-swung back onto the MSR and headed north. Approaching Able Company’s
-roadblock, through which it had entered the Marine position,
-it took a hit from the 3.5-inch rocket section. In reply, one 85mm shell
-at pistol range all but wiped out the Marine antitank crew. The enemy
-vehicle, trailing flame and sparks, clanked around a bend in the road
-and disappeared.</p>
-
-<p>Not long after this astounding foray, the fighting on Hills 698 and
-727 spread down to the MSR. The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A,
-pressed now from three directions and suffering heavy casualties, retracted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">106</span>
-to the 3d Platoon positions at the tip of the spur. Some of the
-men were cut off and forced back on the Baker Company elements east
-of the MSR. Ultimately, one of the two Company B platoons in this
-area was driven down to the low ground, and the other forced to fall
-back. Later they counterattacked and recovered their foxholes.</p>
-
-<p>West of the MSR, the remainder of Company B fought off assaults
-on its left flank and rear by Chinese who had skirted around Charlie
-Company’s advance positions.<a id="FNanchor_254" href="#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">254</a> Lieutenant Colonel Davis sent the battalion
-reserve, Lieutenant Graeber’s 2d Platoon of Baker, to reinforce
-the hard pressed left platoon. Attempting to lead his men across the
-MSR, Graeber found the route effectively blocked by the enemy in the
-river bed.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_254" href="#FNanchor_254" class="fnanchor">254</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Descending now from both sides of the road, enemy infantrymen
-swarmed over the valley floor. They overran most of the 7th Marines
-4.2-inch Mortar Company and captured one of its tubes. They seriously
-threatened the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs and the AT Company in the
-same general idea. High on the slopes in 2/7’s zone, Companies E and
-F were beset by small bands of infiltrators. And though these two
-companies held their ground, the Reds found their flanks, slipped behind
-them, and entrenched at the key road bend separating 2/7 from
-3/7 to the south. The principal Marine unit at the sharp curve in the
-MSR was Battery I, whose position in the low ground became increasingly
-precarious as the night wore on.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Two Marine Battalions Cut Off</i></h3>
-
-<p>Dawn of 3 November revealed a confused and alarming situation in
-the valley south of Sudong. Enemy troops shared the low ground with
-Marine elements between the 1st and 2d Battalion CPs, and they had
-blown out a section of the MSR in this locale.<a id="FNanchor_255" href="#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">255</a> The 2d Battalion’s
-commander later remarked, “When daylight came, we found that we
-were in a dickens of a mess. The rifle companies were well up in the
-hills, and the Chinese were occupying the terrain between the CP and
-the companies.”<a id="FNanchor_256" href="#Footnote_256" class="fnanchor">256</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_255" href="#FNanchor_255" class="fnanchor">255</a> The demolition had little more than dramatic effect, however, since the Songchon
-river bed was negotiable to vehicles of all types.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_256" href="#FNanchor_256" class="fnanchor">256</a> Sawyer Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Between 2/7 and 3/7, a company of Reds had dug in on a finger of
-high ground overlooking the road bend and Battery I from the east.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">107</span>
-Scattered Chinese forces roamed Hills 698 and 727 almost at will. On
-the latter height, elements of the 371st CCF Regiment had been reinforced
-by a battalion of the 370th, so that pressure against the right
-flank of 1/7 and 2/7 continued long after daybreak.<a id="FNanchor_257" href="#Footnote_257" class="fnanchor">257</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_257" href="#FNanchor_257" class="fnanchor">257</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; X Corps <i>PIR 44</i>, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50;
-7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 235–236.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>With his lead battalions thrown back on the defensive, Colonel Litzenberg
-relied on overwhelming superiority in supporting arms to tip
-the scales on 3 November and regain the initiative. While the regimental
-4.2-inch mortars fired, howitzers of Batteries G and H thundered
-almost ceaselessly the whole night long from positions within 3/7’s
-perimeter. Battery I, after being extricated from the enemy dominated
-road bend at 1100 with the help of a platoon of G Company, added
-its metal to the bombardment. In the course of the day, the 18 field
-pieces of the battalion fired a total of 1431 rounds in 49 missions.<a id="FNanchor_258" href="#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">258</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_258" href="#FNanchor_258" class="fnanchor">258</a> 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>VMF-312 provided constant air cover after first light. Its planes not
-only scourged enemy assault troops left exposed on the ridges, but also
-searched out and attacked CCF artillery positions and vehicles. This
-squadron alone flew 18 close support missions on 3 November, the
-alternating flights being led by Major Daniel H. Davis, Captain Harry
-G. C. Henneberger, Captain George E. McClane, and First Lieutenant
-Shelby M. Forrest.<a id="FNanchor_259" href="#Footnote_259" class="fnanchor">259</a> VMF(N)-513 dispatched a flight of night fighters
-to Sudong at 0910 under Major Robert L. Cochran. After raking enemy
-troops with 1500 rounds from their 20mm cannon, Cochran and his
-three pilots unloaded three general purpose and fragmentation bombs
-along with 15 high-velocity rockets.<a id="FNanchor_260" href="#Footnote_260" class="fnanchor">260</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_259" href="#FNanchor_259" class="fnanchor">259</a> VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 12.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_260" href="#FNanchor_260" class="fnanchor">260</a> VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>, 11. The others on this flight were Capt Edwin Pendry, 1stLt
-Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E. Jennings.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As much supporting fire fell within the 7th Regiment’s perimeter as
-outside. Since the crack of dawn it had been the principal mission of
-the advance Marine elements to eject scores of Chinese troops, individuals
-and small bands, who were scattered along the hillsides and
-valley floor within the zones of the 1st and 2d Battalions. While accomplishing
-this task, the Marines established a tactical principle for
-coming weeks: that to nullify Chinese night tactics, regardless of large-scale
-penetrations and infiltration, defending units had only to maintain
-position until daybreak. With observation restored, Marine firepower
-invariably would melt down the Chinese mass to impotency.</p>
-
-<p>This was the case on 3 November, although the melting down process<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">108</span>
-was a savage, all-day affair. With the help of air, artillery, and mortars,
-the 1st Battalion cleared the low ground by midmorning and restored
-its right flank later in the day. The Chinese in the valley were
-crushed, the main group being annihilated by the heavy machine guns
-of Weapons Company as they attempted to march northward along
-the railroad in column at daylight. Counted enemy dead in 1/7’s zone
-alone amounted to 662.<a id="FNanchor_261" href="#Footnote_261" class="fnanchor">261</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_261" href="#FNanchor_261" class="fnanchor">261</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13; R. G. Davis
-Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The main effort in the 2d Battalion’s zone was aimed at the CCF
-concentration on the spur of Hill 727 overlooking the bend in the
-MSR. Owing to this barrier, Litzenberg had to call for an airdrop of
-supplies to sustain his leading elements on 3 November.<a id="FNanchor_262" href="#Footnote_262" class="fnanchor">262</a> Major Sawyer
-ordered Company D, on the base of Hill 698 to the south of the roadblock,
-to move up the valley, cross the river, and clean out the spur at
-Hill 727. Finding the low ground blocked by heavy fire, Captain Hull
-circled to the left along the incline of Hill 698, intending to come
-abreast of the Chinese strong point before striking at it across the
-MSR.<a id="FNanchor_263" href="#Footnote_263" class="fnanchor">263</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_262" href="#FNanchor_262" class="fnanchor">262</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_263" href="#FNanchor_263" class="fnanchor">263</a> Goggin interv; Hull Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, Captain Walter D. Phillips’ Easy Company, perched on
-the side of Hill 698, struggled to secure the peak of that hill mass. A
-rush by First Lieutenant John Yancey’s 2d Platoon at about 0800 secured
-a small plateau about 50 yards below the crest against the opposition
-of one Chinese soldier. First Lieutenant Robert T. Bey’s 3d
-Platoon then passed through and frontally assaulted the peak only to
-be thrown back by what Bey calls “the most concentrated grenade barrage
-this writer has had the dubious distinction to witness.” Following
-an air strike at about 1400 Easy Company secured the crest with its
-40 Chinese dead.<a id="FNanchor_264" href="#Footnote_264" class="fnanchor">264</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_264" href="#FNanchor_264" class="fnanchor">264</a> Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>With all of the rifle companies involved in fire fights or security
-missions, Litzenberg resorted to supporting arms and headquarters
-troops to knock out the roadblock. From his regimental CP he dispatched
-First Lieutenant Earl R. Delong, Executive Officer of the AT
-Company, with a reserve 75mm recoilless rifle and a makeshift crew.
-Delong moved into position opposite the strong point at a range of
-500 yards, while air and artillery hammered the enemy positions.<a id="FNanchor_265" href="#Footnote_265" class="fnanchor">265</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">109</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_265" href="#FNanchor_265" class="fnanchor">265</a> 7thMar msg to CG 1st MarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E. R. Delong interv,
-18 Oct 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Simultaneously, the Division Reconnaissance Company ascended the
-high ground east of the MSR in the vicinity of Litzenberg’s headquarters,
-then advanced northward along the ridge to envelop the roadblock.
-This unit, just returned from an active, overnight patrol to
-Huksu-ri, moved into a hillside position and took the rear of the
-Chinese under fire across an intervening gulley.<a id="FNanchor_266" href="#Footnote_266" class="fnanchor">266</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_266" href="#FNanchor_266" class="fnanchor">266</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, EE (hereafter HqBn <i>SAR</i>), 10; HqBn <i>URpt 8</i>, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon
-interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Delong’s 75 had begun firing high explosive and white phosphorus
-into the enemy’s front; and Company D, after cleaning up the scattered
-resistance on the slopes of Hill 698, closed on the roadblock under
-cover of two air strikes and prepared to assault. The Chinese, obviously
-shaken by the pounding of supporting arms, had commenced a withdrawal
-into the hills east of the roadbend when Hull’s men began their
-assault. From Recon Company’s positions, Lieutenant Crossman called
-for air and artillery to catch the retreating Reds in the open. But the
-request was turned down because Dog Company troops were already
-filtering through the objective area. By 1810 the roadblock was eliminated,
-although Dog Company had to withstand two counterattacks
-before its hold on the spur was secure. The Chinese had left behind
-28 dead, strewn among the boulders and recesses of a natural redoubt.<a id="FNanchor_267" href="#Footnote_267" class="fnanchor">267</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_267" href="#FNanchor_267" class="fnanchor">267</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The main enemy encroachments having been smashed, the 7th Marines’
-MSR was again clear for traffic, save for long-range harassment
-by an occasional CCF rifleman hidden in the hills. At dusk, trucks
-streamed northward from the regimental CP to deliver supplies to the
-1st and 2d Battalions and to evacuate about 100 battle casualties from
-those units. The wounded were rushed to the Division Hospital and
-the 121st Army Evacuation Hospital in Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_268" href="#Footnote_268" class="fnanchor">268</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_268" href="#FNanchor_268" class="fnanchor">268</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50;
-and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50. Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action
-reports, since all 7th Marines’ records were destroyed before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni
-in early December 1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those casualty
-figures for the Division as a whole can be reported with consistent accuracy.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>End of NKPA Tank Regiment</i></h3>
-
-<p>The coming of darkness on 3 November marked the finish of the first
-phase. Litzenberg’s perimeter remained essentially the same as on the
-previous day, the only changes being Company D’s occupation of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">110</span>
-high ground east of the road bend, Recon Company’s assumption of
-local security at the regimental CP, and 3/11’s tighter concentration
-within the zone of 3/7. What few light contacts occurred during the
-night were decided quickly by Marine artillery and mortars.<a id="FNanchor_269" href="#Footnote_269" class="fnanchor">269</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_269" href="#FNanchor_269" class="fnanchor">269</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 14; 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn <i>URpt 8</i>, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to
-CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and 1508 4 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Later intelligence evaluations proved that these contacts could have
-involved only CCF patrols or stragglers, for it was in this same period
-that the 370th and 371st CCF Regiments withdrew some three miles
-from Sudong to a defense line established by elements of the 372d
-Regiment north of Chinhung-ni. The two assault units had paid a
-high price for failure during the 2–4 November fighting. The 371st
-Regiment lost the equivalent of five companies out of its 1st and 3d
-Battalions, with the total dead estimated at 793. And the 3d Battalion,
-370th Regiment, was reduced by the destruction of two companies.<a id="FNanchor_270" href="#Footnote_270" class="fnanchor">270</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_270" href="#FNanchor_270" class="fnanchor">270</a> X Corps <i>PIR 44</i>, annex 2; 1stMarDiv <i>PIRs 11</i> and <i>12</i>, encl 1; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, n. p.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was a wobbly 124th CCF Division, then, that dug in with heavy
-machine guns and mortars on two massive hills, 987 and 891, flanking
-the MSR about two miles north of Chinhung-ni. The depleted 344th
-<span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> Tank Regiment could not avail itself of such defensible terrain,
-for until Marine engineers widened the tortuous cliff road through
-Funchilin Pass it would not accommodate armor.<a id="FNanchor_271" href="#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">271</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_271" href="#FNanchor_271" class="fnanchor">271</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn <i>SAR</i>), 8; and 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, n. p.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Apparently the Chinese Communists had left their North Korean
-comrades of the 344th to fend for themselves. The <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> unit had
-already dwindled considerably from its original organization of three
-armored and three infantry companies. On 2 November it comprised
-only five T-34s and their crews. One of these machines, after being
-damaged during the single-handed raid on the 7th Marines’ perimeter
-that night, was abandoned the next day. The <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> crews put the
-remaining four vehicles into camouflaged positions next to the MSR at
-Chinhung-ni, where they waited resignedly at a tactical dead-end.<a id="FNanchor_272" href="#Footnote_272" class="fnanchor">272</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_272" href="#FNanchor_272" class="fnanchor">272</a> G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 34; and 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, n. p.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Colonel Litzenberg was aware of the probability of further resistance
-along the road, since on 3 November Marine air had reported approximately
-300 enemy trucks—in groups of 15 or 20—on the move south
-of the Chosin Reservoir.<a id="FNanchor_273" href="#Footnote_273" class="fnanchor">273</a> At dawn of 4 November, after a night of
-relative calm around the old perimeter, he ordered his subordinates to
-conduct vigorous patrolling preparatory to continuing the advance.<a id="FNanchor_274" href="#Footnote_274" class="fnanchor">274</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">111</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_273" href="#FNanchor_273" class="fnanchor">273</a> 1stMarDiv <i>PIR 10</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_274" href="#FNanchor_274" class="fnanchor">274</a> CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_9" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_111.png" width="841" height="1282" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>CHINHUNG-NI TANK FIGHT</p>
-
-<p>4 November</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-9</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">112</span></p>
-
-<p>Troops of 1/7 moved forward in the early light and scouted the
-valley as far north as the edge of Sudong. They met no opposition and
-returned to the perimeter. Litzenberg then formed the 7th Marines in
-column, with the Reconnaissance Company in the lead, followed by
-1/7 and 3/7 in that order. He left the 2d Battalion in position on Hills
-698 and 727 to protect the regimental flanks.<a id="FNanchor_275" href="#Footnote_275" class="fnanchor">275</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_275" href="#FNanchor_275" class="fnanchor">275</a> The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with enemy tanks is derived from:
-7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>,
-236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC, 21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to
-CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50; R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman
-Comments, n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Recon Company moved out in jeeps at 0800, First Lieutenant Ernest
-C. Hargett’s 1st Platoon in the point. Entering Sudong a short time
-later, the vanguard rounded a bend in the middle of town and surprised
-a group of CCF soldiers. In a 30-minute fight, Hargett’s men killed
-three and captured about 20. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the Reconnaissance
-Company meanwhile inspected the high ground above Sudong
-without opposition.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Crossman reorganized his company in column on the road
-and set out for Chinhung-ni with Second Lieutenant Donald W. Sharon’s
-2d Platoon in the lead. About the same time, 1000, the 1st Battalion
-moved out of the 7th Marines’ perimeter south of Sudong and traced
-Crossman’s route through the low ground.</p>
-
-<p>At Chinhung-ni the highway runs along the east side of the river
-while the railroad traces the west side. The narrow-gauge track enters
-the village over a bridge spanning a branch stream. Just beyond is
-Samgo station, which served as a railhead for the cable-car system of
-Funchilin Pass. As the Reconnaissance Company approached Chinhung-ni
-on 4 November, a small group of Chinese soldiers milled around the
-train cars and buildings of Samgo Station. They probably had some
-tactical connection with the four T-34 tanks camouflaged opposite
-them across the river and road; but the two forces seemed oblivious not
-only of each other but also of the Marines bearing down on them.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Sharon’s platoon advanced rapidly from Sudong at 1400,
-followed closely by the rest of the Reconnaissance Company and a
-section of 75mm recoilless rifles. About 2000 yards south of Chinhung-ni
-they halted on sighting fresh tank tracks but quickly moved
-out again on orders of Lieutenant Colonel Davis. At the highway entrance
-to Chinhung-ni, Sharon’s troops unknowingly passed the first
-T-34, hidden on the right of the road. Coming abreast of the second<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">113</span>
-Communist tank, which also remained undetected for the moment, the
-Marines spotted the Chinese soldiers across the river at Samgo Station
-and opened fire.</p>
-
-<p>The CCF infantrymen scattered under the hail of small-arms fire
-and many of them were cut down. This was fortunate for Company C
-of 1/7, which was marching along the railroad tracks and just then
-nearing the bridge south of the station, where it could have been taken
-under enfilade fire by the enemy soldiers and tanks.</p>
-
-<p>It was during the exchange with the Chinese that Sharon and his
-men spotted the second North Korean tank under a pile of brush on the
-right of the road. The platoon leader, accompanied by Staff Sergeant
-Richard B. Twohey and Corporal Joseph E. McDermott, climbed upon
-the dormant vehicle. Suddenly the periscope began to revolve. McDermott
-smashed the glass and Twohey dropped in a grenade. With
-Sharon they jumped to the ground just as the grenade exploded inside
-the machine.</p>
-
-<p>The tank engine roared and the vehicle lurched toward the three
-Marines. Twohey jumped on it again and dropped another grenade
-down the periscope. After the dull thump of the second explosion, the
-T-34 stopped dead and began smoking.</p>
-
-<p>By this time Staff Sergeant William L. Vick’s 75mm recoilless gun
-section and 3.5-inch rocket crews of Company C had moved up. Together
-they gave the <i>coup de grace</i> to the damaged T-34. Simultaneously,
-Sharon’s men saw a thatched hut farther down the road disintegrate
-as tank number three emerged, its 85mm rifle swinging menacingly
-toward the valley crowded with Marines and vehicles. First
-Lieutenant Raymond J. Elledge fired his 75s from their carts, and
-Company C’s rocket launchers opened up. The T-34 took hits but
-rumbled on. Seconds earlier, First Lieutenant Dan C. Holland, Forward
-Air Controller for 1/7, had radioed overhead Corsairs for assistance.
-One of the gull-winged planes plummetted out of formation
-and unleashed a pair of five-inch rockets. They were direct hits. The
-T-34 blew up and died on the road.<a id="FNanchor_276" href="#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">276</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_276" href="#FNanchor_276" class="fnanchor">276</a> Available records do not indicate whether tank number three should be credited to
-VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513, both of which had close-support flights in the area.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Sharon and his men moved forward cautiously. While passing the
-blazing hulk, they spotted enemy tank Number Four, camouflaged
-against a hillside just ahead. At almost the same moment, Marines
-passing Chinhung-ni stumbled upon docile tank Number One in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">114</span>
-midst of their formation. Recoilless rifles and rocket launchers blasted
-the machine, and its crew climbed out and surrendered. Sharon then
-led the antitank crews through the river bed toward the fourth T-34.
-The Communist tankmen, entrenched on the slope behind their empty
-vehicle, gave up without a fight. The tank itself was knocked out by
-3.5-inch rockets and 75mm shells; and the 344th NKPA Tank Regiment
-ceased to exist.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Fight for How Hill</i></h3>
-
-<p>After the destruction of enemy armor, Colonel Litzenberg began deploying
-the 7th Marines in perimeter around the valley junction at
-Chinhung-ni. The advance had netted about 6000 yards by midafternoon,
-and the remaining daylight was needed to bring all elements
-forward and consolidate the newly won ground.<a id="FNanchor_277" href="#Footnote_277" class="fnanchor">277</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_277" href="#FNanchor_277" class="fnanchor">277</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13; and 1stMarDiv <i>POR 116</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Aware that the Chinese were at the top of Funchilin Pass but not that
-he was directly under their guns, the regimental commander at 1600
-ordered Reconnaissance Company to patrol some 2000 yards into Funchilin
-Pass and outpost the southern tip of Hill 891. The high ground
-selected for the outpost coincided with the eastern half of the Chinese
-forward line, and it would later be remembered as “How Hill” in
-honor of Company H of 3/7.<a id="FNanchor_278" href="#Footnote_278" class="fnanchor">278</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_278" href="#FNanchor_278" class="fnanchor">278</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments,
-29 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As 1/7 dug in on the heights flanking Chinhung-ni, Recon Company,
-with Second Lieutenant Charles R. Puckett’s 3d Platoon leading, advanced
-in motorized column about a mile into the pass. At this point,
-Hill 987 looms up on the west and the highway veers sharply to the
-east for approximately 1000 yards. After a hairpin turn, the road
-climbs on a parallel line almost to its starting point, then resumes its
-northerly course, clinging to the rocky wall of Hill 891 which rises
-abruptly from the chasm that separates it from Hill 987.</p>
-
-<p>Puckett’s platoon had approached the road bend warily, for a sizeable
-enemy group had been spotted earlier near the base of Hill 987 across
-the gorge. At 1630 the first two jeeps of the column eased around the
-curve and immediately came under fire from Hill 987 to the left, 891
-to the front, and from a CCF patrol to the right, on the road itself.<a id="FNanchor_279" href="#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">279</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_279" href="#FNanchor_279" class="fnanchor">279</a> HqBn <i>URpt 8</i>, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>For 45 minutes Puckett and his men were pinned to the road and hillside,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">115</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span>
-and only darkness and a strike by Marine air finally enabled the
-whole column to withdraw to the 7th Marines’ lines. The clash cost
-Recon two killed and five wounded, and heavy machine-gun fire had
-destroyed the two lead jeeps.<a id="FNanchor_280" href="#Footnote_280" class="fnanchor">280</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_280" href="#FNanchor_280" class="fnanchor">280</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_10" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_115.png" width="820" height="1232" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>ACTION OF 4–5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-10</p></div></div>
-
-<p>During the relatively quiet night of 4–5 November, Colonel Litzenberg
-issued his order for the next day’s advance. The 1st Battalion was
-to hold the flanks at Chinhung-ni while 3/7, followed at a distance of
-500–1000 yards by 2/7, passed through and attacked into Funchilin
-Pass. Major Parry’s 3/11 and the 4.2 Mortar Company were to support
-the infantry by high-angle fire from positions south of Sudong.<a id="FNanchor_281" href="#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">281</a> Resistance
-could be expected, for even as the 7th Marines peacefully sat
-out the hours of darkness, the night fighters of VMF(N)-513 were
-bombing and strafing enemy convoys around the southern tip of the
-Chosin Reservoir.<a id="FNanchor_282" href="#Footnote_282" class="fnanchor">282</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_281" href="#FNanchor_281" class="fnanchor">281</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13; 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_282" href="#FNanchor_282" class="fnanchor">282</a> VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>, 12.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0700 Lieutenant Hargett’s 1st Platoon of Recon Company departed
-Chinhung-ni along the MSR to patrol on the right flank. Reaching
-the hairpin curve, the platoon was pinned down by enemy fire at
-exactly the same place where Puckett’s unit had come to grief. VMF-312
-and 3/11 promptly went into action, and Hargett ultimately withdrew
-his patrol under the shield of their supporting fire. Marine casualties
-were four wounded.<a id="FNanchor_283" href="#Footnote_283" class="fnanchor">283</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_283" href="#FNanchor_283" class="fnanchor">283</a> HqBn <i>SAR</i>, 12; HqBn <i>URpt 9</i>, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; and
-Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 237–238; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last
-employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it was detached and ordered
-back to Majon-dong to patrol the road to Huksu-ri and the division’s left flank.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Major Roach’s 3d Battalion moved out for the attack at 0800, passing
-through the high-ground positions of 1/7 on either side of Chinhung-ni.
-Company I advanced toward Hill 987 and G toward 891 (see Map 10).
-Both units were hit hard by small-arms and machine-gun fire as they
-came abreast of the road bend; and for the remainder of the day, the
-“advance was negligible.”<a id="FNanchor_284" href="#Footnote_284" class="fnanchor">284</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_284" href="#FNanchor_284" class="fnanchor">284</a> The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13–14; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.;
-3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 3; VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 9; VMF(N)-513 <i>SAR</i>, 13; 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 19-50</i>,
-5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55;
-1stMarDiv <i>PIRs 12 &amp; 13</i>; Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130
-5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200, 1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215
-5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245, 1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar <i>ISUM 14</i>;
-1stMarDiv <i>POR 122</i>; and Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 237-240; Capt H. H. Harris Comments,
-n. d.; Earney Comments, 2–8; Capt M. P. Newton, “The Attack on ‘How’ Hill,”
-(MS); Roach Comments, 7 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>From 1000 onward, the second phase of the battle roared to a climax<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">117</span>
-as a duel between supporting arms. In 26 missions during 5 November,
-the batteries of 3/11 threw 943 shells into the enemy positions. The
-Chinese answered with counterbattery fire from their 122mm mortars,
-but toward the end of the day these weapons were silenced by Marine
-howitzer barrages. A forward observer with Company G reported an
-enemy ammunition dump destroyed. This information was later verified
-by a POW who mentioned the following additional losses in CCF
-mortars: 10 crewmen killed and 17 wounded, one mortar destroyed, two
-mortars put out of action, and the dispersal of “most of the remaining
-personnel.”</p>
-
-<p>VMF-312 flew 37 sorties in 90 hours of close support combat on the
-5th. Between Chinhung-ni and the Chosin Reservoir, 21 enemy trucks
-were destroyed. Pilots reported that “the surrounding ridges were filled
-with enemy troops” and that their strikes against these Chinese were
-“extremely effective.” Led by Major Cochran and Captain Otis W. S.
-Corman, flights from VMF(N)-513 blasted troops, buildings, supply
-vehicles, and gun emplacements scattered from Koto-ri at the top of
-Funchilin Pass to Hagaru at the reservoir. General Smith, during a
-helicopter visit to Litzenberg’s CP, remarked that a “considerable number
-of planes ... really worked the place over.”<a id="FNanchor_285" href="#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">285</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_285" href="#FNanchor_285" class="fnanchor">285</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 73.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the ground, the fight ended at dusk with the Chinese retaining
-their firm grip on these well camouflaged positions studding Hills 891
-and 987 despite heavy losses.<a id="FNanchor_286" href="#Footnote_286" class="fnanchor">286</a> Marine casualties were light, for it was
-the tortuous terrain in conjunction with enemy bullets, not enemy fire
-alone, that obstructed the attackers. Since General Smith earlier in the
-day had named Koto-ri as the 7th Marines’ immediate objective, Colonel
-Litzenberg ordered the 3d Battalion to resume the advance at 0800 the
-next morning.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_286" href="#FNanchor_286" class="fnanchor">286</a> One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms that he could, then climbed
-out of his bunker and walked into G Company’s lines to surrender. On interrogation
-he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987, one on Hill 891, and the reserve
-battalion in the saddle between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The night of 5–6 November witnessed only minor contacts around
-the regimental perimeter. Some 200 Korean laborers accounted for most
-of the activity during darkness as they carried supplies to forward
-Marine positions and evacuated casualties to the rear.</p>
-
-<p>Major Roach’s plan for 6 November called for How Company, supported
-by the fire of George, to envelop the southeast slope of Hill
-891 while Item continued its attack on Hill 987. At about 0800 First<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">118</span>
-Lieutenant Howard H. Harris led How Company out of its reserve
-position. It took him until nearly 1500 to traverse the rugged landscape
-and get into position. Meanwhile, Item Company under First Lieutenant
-William E. Johnson had beaten off one counterattack and edged
-about 300 yards closer to Hill 987, with its most effective opposition
-coming from bunkers on a spur overlooking the MSR.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Thomas E. Cooney had been wounded twice the previous
-day while leading Company G against the trenches and foxholes on
-the southern tip of Hill 891. Except for a feint by one platoon along
-the MSR into the hairpin turn, his company spent the day in a long-range
-fight with the Chinese defenders.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Harris led his men over the high ground behind G into
-positions to the east. Cooney’s experience showed that the only possible
-approach to Hill 891 was to flank it from the southeast. Although the
-fresh company arrived sometime after 1400, its attack was held up
-until about 1600 to await air. Following a strike by two Corsairs, the
-howitzers of 3/11 and the regimental 4.2 mortars began pounding the
-Chinese positions.</p>
-
-<p>How Company jumped off at about 1615. Two assault platoons, led
-by Second Lieutenants Robert D. Reem and Minard P. Newton, descended
-into the intervening gulley at the tip of the hairpin curve.
-During a quick reorganization in the low ground, machine guns were
-posted to cover the ascent. Then the platoons started up towards the
-enemy-held summit through companion draws, Harris accompanying
-Newton’s outfit on the left.</p>
-
-<p>The powdery soil of the steep slope made climbing difficult and
-exhausting. About a hundred yards up, Newton’s platoon began receiving
-light fire, followed a few yards farther by a hail of grenades
-and machine gun slugs. The Marines inched forward and were stopped
-by the Chinese fire. On the right, meanwhile, Reed climbed against no
-opposition, so it appeared that the envelopment was working. Unexpectedly,
-the two draws converged near the top of the hill, with the
-result that the platoons met.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Harris revised his plans by directing Newton, with his
-left squad supporting by BAR fire, to lead Reem to the top of the hill.
-Once there, Newton was to swing right and Reem left to envelop the
-Chinese positions. Newton worked a squad up onto a nose extending
-out from the summit. The Chinese replied with a renewed barrage of
-grenades and counterattacked Newton’s left. Sergeant Charlie Foster,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">119</span>
-seeing apparent victory turning into defeat, lunged forward to break up
-the attack. He reached the top and died but the men behind him
-repulsed the Reds.</p>
-
-<p>During the close fighting on the left, Lieutenant Reem had gathered
-his squad leaders for instructions preparatory to the final assault on
-the right. An enemy grenade fell into the midst of the group, and
-Reem was killed as he smothered the explosion with his body. Staff
-Sergeant Anthony J. Ricardi took over the platoon.</p>
-
-<p>At about 1800 Harris radioed Roach that his troops were exhausted.
-Although it was already dusk, he was bringing up his reserve platoon,
-he said, for the Chinese still held the crest in strength. Company H
-had taken only eight casualties, but ammunition was low and the approaching
-darkness prevented the dispatching of more fresh troops. The
-battalion commander relayed the report to Colonel Litzenberg, who
-immediately ordered the company to disengage and withdraw. The
-fighting descent under cover of a 4.2 mortar and artillery bombardment
-brought Company H back within the lines of 3/7 by 2000 with its six
-wounded and the body of Lieutenant Reem.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Disappearance of CCF Remnants</i></h3>
-
-<p>Darkness on the night of 6 November descended like a cloak over the
-124th CCF Division. In the morning the Chinese had vanished. The
-3d Battalion, 7th Marines, encountered no opposition whatever as it
-occupied the southern tips of Hills 891 and 987.<a id="FNanchor_287" href="#Footnote_287" class="fnanchor">287</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_287" href="#FNanchor_287" class="fnanchor">287</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i> 14.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The mysterious disappearance of this unit, following the equally
-strange withdrawal of the Chinese Reds who made the first CCF contacts
-in the <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> zone, aroused no end of speculation. Officers of the 7th
-Marines believed that enemy losses had been heavy enough for a disabling
-effect. This opinion was confirmed the following year when a
-Marine Corps Board visited Korea for a special analytical study of
-Marine operations of 1950, based on all Army and Marine records
-available at that time as well as interviews and interrogations. The
-Board concluded that “the 124th CCF Division was estimated to have
-been rendered militarily noneffective.”<a id="FNanchor_288" href="#Footnote_288" class="fnanchor">288</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">120</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_288" href="#FNanchor_288" class="fnanchor">288</a> <i>Marine Corps Board Study</i> (hereafter <i>MCB Study</i>), II-C-16. <i>CCF Army Histories</i>,
-31, states that the 124th was in action in west central Korea by the middle of November.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following the enemy’s disappearance on the night of 6–7 November,
-the 7th Marines occupied the southern reaches of Hills 891 and 987
-while reconnoitering to the top of 891. The rest of the day and all
-the next was devoted to consolidating positions along the MSR and
-sending out patrols in a vain search for the vanished 124th CCF Division.<a id="FNanchor_289" href="#Footnote_289" class="fnanchor">289</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_289" href="#FNanchor_289" class="fnanchor">289</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 14; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 8 November, General Almond visited the 7th Marines. Upon
-hearing of the valor of Captain Cooney at “How Hill,” he awarded
-that officer the Silver Star medal on the spot. There being neither pendant
-nor citation available, the Corps Commander pinned a slip of
-paper to Cooney’s jacket in the brief ceremony. Scrawled on the fragment
-was the inscription, “Silver Star Medal for Gallantry in Action—Almond.”<a id="FNanchor_290" href="#Footnote_290" class="fnanchor">290</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_290" href="#FNanchor_290" class="fnanchor">290</a> Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG’s Diary in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 8 Nov 50;
-Roach Comments, 7 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>While the 7th Marines advanced astride the MSR, a volunteer patrol
-of fifteen men, led by First Lieutenant William F. Goggin of 2/7, traced
-a lonely, circuitous route in the mountains to the west. Having left
-Chinhung-ni at 1200 on 8 November, the scouting party covered some
-25 miles through perpendicular wilds during the following 26 hours.
-This journey brought it to the Chosin Reservoir plateau at a point just
-southwest of Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Goggin, his slight wound the only scar of the patrol’s
-single clash with Chinese, radioed Colonel Litzenberg that Koto-ri was
-clear of enemy. He then led his party southward, and in the evening
-of the 9th, returned through the lines of 3/7.<a id="FNanchor_291" href="#Footnote_291" class="fnanchor">291</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_291" href="#FNanchor_291" class="fnanchor">291</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 13–14; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 243–247; Goggin interv.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines had been told that big game animals were hunted before
-the war in the mountains of northeast Korea. But not until the otherwise
-calm night of 9–10 November did a four-legged enemy invade
-the positions of RCT-7. Near the cable-car trestle, midway through
-Funchilin Pass, an unfriendly bear, no doubt a Russian bear, paid a
-nocturnal visit to the 1st Platoon of George Company. An unnamed
-Marine PFC, awakened in his sleeping bag, swore afterwards that the
-animal was wearing a hammer and sickle emblem. However this may
-be, the intruder was routed by his startled yell and disappeared into
-the night.<a id="FNanchor_292" href="#Footnote_292" class="fnanchor">292</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">121</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_292" href="#FNanchor_292" class="fnanchor">292</a> Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Koto-ri Occupied by 7th Marines</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 0830 on 10 November—the Marine Corps Birthday—the 1st Battalion
-passed through the 3d and emerged from Funchilin Pass onto
-the open plateau. Koto-ri (designated as Objective One) was occupied
-without opposition an hour and a half later. Litzenberg halted his
-column and drew up a perimeter around the mountain village.</p>
-
-<p>Upon reaching the Koto-ri plateau the 7th Marines was first to meet
-a new enemy who would take a heavier toll in casualties than the
-Chinese. This was General Winter, who has won many a historic campaign.
-When the first cold blasts struck, “our men were not conditioned
-for it,” commented Litzenberg. “The doctors reported numerous
-cases where the men came down to the sickbay suffering from what
-appeared to be shock. Some of them would come in crying; some of
-them were extremely nervous; and the doctors said it was simply the
-sudden shock of the terrific cold when they were not ready for it.”<a id="FNanchor_293" href="#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">293</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_293" href="#FNanchor_293" class="fnanchor">293</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines recovered quickly after “thawing out,” and platoon
-warming tents, heated by camp stoves burning fuel oil, were set up at
-Koto-ri. Buckets of steaming water were provided for the warming
-of “C” rations.</p>
-
-<p>Hot weather, however uncomfortable it may be, is fighting weather as
-compared to sub-zero cold which seems to numb the spirit as well as
-flesh. Cold weather clothing is a handicap to movement and the use
-of firearms; and some weapons, particularly the carbine, are not dependable
-at low temperatures. It was probably as well for morale that
-the Marines at Koto-ri could not foresee that this was only the beginning
-of a prolonged operation in sub-zero weather without a parallel
-in the nation’s history.<a id="FNanchor_294" href="#Footnote_294" class="fnanchor">294</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_294" href="#FNanchor_294" class="fnanchor">294</a> Marshall, <i>CCF in the Attack</i>. See also FECOM, <i>Terrain Study No. 6</i>, XIX-8;
-R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments,
-n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Until 13 November, when the 7th Marines advanced toward Hagaru,
-patrols from Koto-ri repeatedly sighted bands of Chinese in the distance.
-Except for a fight on 11 November in which C Company claimed to
-have inflicted 40 casualties on the enemy and lost four killed and four
-wounded, there was little action. With a little pressure on the ground
-or from the air, the enemy vanished, and thus the uneasy calm continued.<a id="FNanchor_295" href="#Footnote_295" class="fnanchor">295</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">122</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_295" href="#FNanchor_295" class="fnanchor">295</a> 7th Mar <i>SAR</i>, 15–16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400 10 Nov 50; Litzenberg
-Comments, 19 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_2a" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_122.png" width="822" height="1208" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>AREA OF OPERATIONS</p>
-
-<p>1st Marine Division</p>
-
-<p>October-December 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-2</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">123</span></p>
-
-<p>While the 7th Regiment had been fighting, marching, and climbing
-toward the Chosin Reservoir in early November, the 5th Marines peacefully
-combed the approaches to the Fusen Reservoir to the east. After
-detaching 1/5 to Division control on 4 November and stationing 3/5
-near Oro-ri, Lieutenant Colonel Murray sent the 2d Battalion into the
-Sinhung Valley to relieve the 18th ROK Regiment. The relief took
-place at 1145 on the 4th, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise
-deployed 2/5 around a valley junction five miles north and 15 miles
-east of the then embattled 7th Marines.<a id="FNanchor_296" href="#Footnote_296" class="fnanchor">296</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_296" href="#FNanchor_296" class="fnanchor">296</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and 2202 3 Nov 50; CG X
-Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO 5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2″ MCo,
-2100 3 Nov 50; 2/5 <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Roise’s mission was twofold: to block the Sinhung corridor while
-determining the strength and disposition of the enemy, if any; and to
-check certain northerly routes shown on maps as possibly leading to
-either the Fusen or Chosin Reservoirs, or both. Reconnaissance patrols
-in squad strength and combat patrols of reinforced platoons and company
-size fanned out in a broad arc during 5–9 November. They determined
-that no usable route led to either reservoir from the south, but
-that the highway continuing northeast from the town of Sinhung, leading
-to the 7th Infantry Division’s zone and the Manchurian border,
-would carry military traffic. From 7 November, Roise’s troops made
-daily contact with Army patrols coming down the highway, but no
-units tried to penetrate the apparent screen of enemy defenses close to
-the Fusen Reservoir.<a id="FNanchor_297" href="#Footnote_297" class="fnanchor">297</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_297" href="#FNanchor_297" class="fnanchor">297</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 10.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Major Merlin R. Olson, 1/5’s Executive Officer, led Companies A
-and B on 7 November in a reconnaissance in force to Huksu-ri, that
-annoying road junction west of Oro-ri. On the 8th Olson’s force had a
-running fight with North Koreans before being recalled while still
-short of his objective. Olson’s recall resulted from reports of 2000
-North Koreans moving towards the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_298" href="#Footnote_298" class="fnanchor">298</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_298" href="#FNanchor_298" class="fnanchor">298</a> CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; “Special Reconnaissance of the 1st
-Bn 5thMar, 7–9 Nov 50,” 10 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 8 November, Company D (Reinf) made an overnight trek deep
-into a branch valley northwest of Sinhung, reaching a point about 10
-miles due east of Koto-ri. One CCF soldier was captured while asleep
-in a house. He said he belonged to the 126th Division and that Red
-China would commit a total of 24 divisions against the UN forces in
-Korea.<a id="FNanchor_299" href="#Footnote_299" class="fnanchor">299</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">124</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_299" href="#FNanchor_299" class="fnanchor">299</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 10, 32.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 9 November, Colonel Murray received orders to concentrate his
-regiment along the MSR leading to the Chosin Reservoir. During the
-next two days he deployed the 1st and 3d Battalions at Majon-dong and
-Chinhung-ni respectively. The ambush of a Charlie Company patrol
-on the 10th delayed the departure of 1/5 from the Chigyong area. The
-patrol had to be rescued by a battalion attack the next day before the
-force could move to Majon-dong.<a id="FNanchor_300" href="#Footnote_300" class="fnanchor">300</a> On the 13th while operating out
-of Majon-dong a 1/5 patrol ran into 50–150 enemy who inflicted 7 KIA
-and 3 WIA before withdrawing.<a id="FNanchor_301" href="#Footnote_301" class="fnanchor">301</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_300" href="#FNanchor_300" class="fnanchor">300</a> 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 5; 5thMar <i>URpt 4</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_301" href="#FNanchor_301" class="fnanchor">301</a> 5thMar <i>URpt 4</i>; 1/5 <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 6.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 2d Battalion moved out of the Sinhung Valley on 13 and 14
-November to relieve the 7th Marines of the responsibility for defending
-Koto-ri and thus free Colonel Litzenberg’s regiment for the advance to
-Hagaru and the north. Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion had completed
-its mission without firing more than a few shots and with a
-total prisoner bag of 12 North Koreans and one Chinese.<a id="FNanchor_302" href="#Footnote_302" class="fnanchor">302</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_302" href="#FNanchor_302" class="fnanchor">302</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; 5thMar <i>URpt 4</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although the new enemy had seemingly evaporated from the path
-of the 1st Marine Division, there was good reason to believe that he
-was not forsaking his aggressive designs in North Korea. For in addition
-to the ominous but questionable predictions of Chinese POWs, eyewitness
-accounts of pilots of VMF(N)-542 provided G-2 officers with
-information of the gravest portent in early November. The Marine airmen
-made nightly strikes from the 1st to the 9th against Sinuiju at the
-mouth of the Yalu, and they repeatedly reported a steady stream of
-trucks moving into northwest Korea from Antung, Manchuria. Time
-after time they blasted Sinuiju with bombs, rockets, and 20mm shells,
-and though parts of the city were continuously aflame, it still seethed
-with activity. They described southward bound traffic as “heavy,” “very
-heavy,” and even “tremendous,” and at least one convoy was reported
-to be “gigantic.”<a id="FNanchor_303" href="#Footnote_303" class="fnanchor">303</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">125</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_303" href="#FNanchor_303" class="fnanchor">303</a> 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542 <i>SAR</i>), 1–8.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Advance To The Chosin Reservoir</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR—Appraisals of the New
-Enemy—The Turning Point of 15 November—Changes in X
-Corps Mission—Marine Preparations for Trouble—Supplies
-Trucked to Hagaru—Confidence of UN Command—Marine
-Concentration on MSR</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">On</span> 4 November, while RCT-7 was at the height of its fight with
-the Chinese, the Division CP displaced from Wonsan to Hungnam.
-General Craig, the ADC, who inspected the area on the 2d,
-recommended the abandoned Engineering College on the western outskirts
-as the best location. During his visit he was shown a knoll outside
-the city where the bodies of some 200 Korean civilians were laid out in a
-perfect row. All had been victims of the retreating <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> forces.<a id="FNanchor_304" href="#Footnote_304" class="fnanchor">304</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_304" href="#FNanchor_304" class="fnanchor">304</a> LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A location in Hamhung would have been preferred, but available sites
-were already taken by X Corps. General Smith flew to Hungnam by
-helicopter and opened the new CP at 1100 on the morning of the 4th.
-That evening a train carrying 160 officers and men of Headquarters
-Battalion and the Division staff arrived at 2130 from Wonsan. En
-route it had been fired on by guerrillas but no casualties resulted.<a id="FNanchor_305" href="#Footnote_305" class="fnanchor">305</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_305" href="#FNanchor_305" class="fnanchor">305</a> HqBn <i>SAR</i>, 10–11; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate
-Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A perimeter defense, consisting of two outposts and eight machine-gun
-positions, was set up to command all likely approaches to the new
-CP. Defensive wiring and trip flares were installed, with the gun positions
-and outposts being connected by telephone.</p>
-
-<p>During these proceedings everyone was blissfully unaware of the
-existence of 250 tons of <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> high explosive, stored only 600 yards
-from the CP in three connecting caves. Undiscovered for a week, this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">126</span>
-enemy cache was believed capable of demolishing the command post. A
-16-man security detachment was placed on guard until the explosive
-could be removed and detonated.<a id="FNanchor_306" href="#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">306</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_306" href="#FNanchor_306" class="fnanchor">306</a> HqBn <i>SAR</i>, 10–11; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 513–514. Some explosive, too unstable to be
-moved, was left in the caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Attacks on Wonsan-Hungnam MSR</i></h3>
-
-<p>Protection of the Wonsan-Hungnam MSR took on added importance
-as the 1st Marine Division speeded up its move to the north. This
-responsibility, it may be recalled, was shared by Division and Corps on
-3 November in accordance with a decision by General Almond. The
-1st Marines and elements of the 1st Tank Battalion maintained security
-from Wonsan 15 miles northward to Munchon, while the 1st Battalion
-of the 5th Marines was responsible from Hamhung southward to Chigyong.
-This left the 54-mile stretch between Chigyong and Munchon
-without any protection except the patrols of the Korean CIC agents
-and the Special Operations Company, USA, both under Corps control.</p>
-
-<p>On 4 November this company reported that large numbers of North
-Koreans were moving into the area to the west. That same afternoon
-Corps notified Division that a group of mounted guerrillas had fired
-on railway police in the yards at Kowon, 15 miles north of Munchon.<a id="FNanchor_307" href="#Footnote_307" class="fnanchor">307</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_307" href="#FNanchor_307" class="fnanchor">307</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 472–473; G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 21. The previous day an A/Tks patrol had killed
-an estimated 150 NKs in a short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, <i>SAR</i>, 12.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On 6 November, immediately after landing at Wonsan, the 65th RCT
-of the 3d Infantry Division (less one battalion, placed temporarily
-under 1st Marine Division control for the Majon-ni operation) was
-ordered by Corps to relieve elements of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion,
-USA, which had been recently sent to Yonghung. The Army RCT
-was assigned a mission of protecting the Yonghung-Kowon area and
-patrolling to the west (see map on Page 122).<a id="FNanchor_308" href="#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">308</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_308" href="#FNanchor_308" class="fnanchor">308</a> CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, <i>3d Infantry Division in Korea</i>, 69;
-Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 473.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Wonsan-Hamhung rail line took on special importance after the
-announcement that water transportation would be delayed until enemy
-mines were cleared from the harbor at Hungnam. This made it necessary
-for the 1st Marine Division to send daily supply trains from Wonsan.<a id="FNanchor_309" href="#Footnote_309" class="fnanchor">309</a>
-The first two completed the run without incident, but after departing
-Wonsan at dusk on the 6th the third train was halted at Kowon
-by the destruction of rails ahead. North Korean guerrillas attacked<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">127</span>
-the train, guarded by a lieutenant and 38 men from Company C of the
-1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.<a id="FNanchor_310" href="#Footnote_310" class="fnanchor">310</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_309" href="#FNanchor_309" class="fnanchor">309</a> ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_310" href="#FNanchor_310" class="fnanchor">310</a> The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived from: 1stAmphTracBn <i>SAR</i>,
-5–6; 1stAmphTracBn <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The detachment was taken by surprise in the darkness by foes firing
-from both sides of the track. When the Marines attempted to reverse
-the train, the enemy wounded the engineer and put a hole in the boiler
-with grenades. In the darkness the guard became separated into two
-groups, the smaller of which was surrounded in a car. The guerrillas
-fired through the wooden sides, forcing the Marines to the floor, and
-threw grenades through the windows until all ten men were killed or
-wounded, only two of them surviving.</p>
-
-<p>The remaining 29 men of the guard made a stand on an embankment
-about 200 yards from the track. Six Marines were wounded in the
-ensuing fire fight. The train guard broke off the action and withdrew
-to the area of the Army artillery battalion.</p>
-
-<p>An empty train from Hamhung, guarded by a platoon from Company
-A of the Amtracs, was halted at 1700 on the afternoon of 6 November
-by railway officials at Yonghung. Reports of guerrilla activity in the
-area had proved to be only too well founded when elements of the 96th
-Field Artillery Battalion were attacked early that morning. Their perimeter
-south of the town was breached with losses to the Army unit
-of equipment and ammunition.</p>
-
-<p>The 2d Battalion of the 65th RCT, which arrived at Yonghung late
-that afternoon, had its baptism of fire within a few hours. Guerrillas
-in estimated strength of 500 to 800 attacked at 0300 on the 7th, inflicting
-casualties of six killed and 14 wounded. Troops of the 96th Field
-Artillery Battalion also came under attack, as did elements of the 4th
-Signal Battalion, USA. Company D of the 1st Tank Battalion sent a
-Marine tank and “Weasel” (M-29) to evacuate the wounded with the
-assistance of the Amtrac platoon guarding the empty train at Yonghung.<a id="FNanchor_311" href="#Footnote_311" class="fnanchor">311</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_311" href="#FNanchor_311" class="fnanchor">311</a> G-3 <i>SAR</i>, 24; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 13.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1400 that afternoon the empty train resumed its run to Wonsan.
-Only two miles had been covered when the locomotive and six cars were
-derailed by a split rail and wrecked just south of Yonghung. Personnel
-losses amounted to one man killed and 14 injured.<a id="FNanchor_312" href="#Footnote_312" class="fnanchor">312</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">128</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_312" href="#FNanchor_312" class="fnanchor">312</a> The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon: 1stAmphTracBn <i>SAR</i>, 5–6;
-1stAmphTracBn HD, <i>Nov 50</i>, 3; Dolcater <i>3d Infantry Division in Korea</i>, 69; G-3 <i>SAR</i>,
-24; X Corps <i>POR 42</i>; and <i>1stMarURpt (S-3) 9</i>; D/Tks tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0955
-8 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At almost exactly this same hour the fourth supply train was stopped
-south of Kowon by a blown section of track. The guard proceeded on
-foot to investigate and encountered the depressing spectacle of the third
-supply train, abandoned by the enemy after being plundered. One
-ammunition car was still burning and in another riddled car the bodies
-of the trapped Marines were found. So extensive was the damage to
-tracks and switches that rail service could not be resumed until
-9 November.<a id="FNanchor_313" href="#Footnote_313" class="fnanchor">313</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_313" href="#FNanchor_313" class="fnanchor">313</a> CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7 Nov 50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>,
-475–478.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Corps commander summoned General Smith to Wonsan that
-morning for a conference on measures for the security of the rail line.
-It was decided that only daytime runs would be made thereafter, with
-the train guard increased from 38 to 50 men. The 65th RCT, the 26th
-ROK Regiment and a battery of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion were
-placed under the temporary control of the 1st Marine Division with a
-mission of guarding bridges and other key points.<a id="FNanchor_314" href="#Footnote_314" class="fnanchor">314</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_314" href="#FNanchor_314" class="fnanchor">314</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i> 7 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Smith worked out a plan for the ROK regiment to drive the
-guerrillas southward from the Chigyong area toward the 65th RCT at
-Yonghung. As it proved, elements of both units were given Corps commitments
-which prevented this maneuver from being put into effect.
-They remained only a few days under nominal Division control, being
-used for a variety of security missions along the Wonsan-Hamhung
-MSR.<a id="FNanchor_315" href="#Footnote_315" class="fnanchor">315</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_315" href="#FNanchor_315" class="fnanchor">315</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By 9 November, when the Division supply trains resumed their
-runs, 95 loaded cars had accumulated at Wonsan. The 1st Combat
-Service Group continued to route supplies northward from the railhead
-at the Wonsan airfield. Corps orders required troops to ride in open
-gondola cars.<a id="FNanchor_316" href="#Footnote_316" class="fnanchor">316</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_316" href="#FNanchor_316" class="fnanchor">316</a> 1st CSG <i>SAR</i>, 8.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Appraisals of the New Enemy</i></h3>
-
-<p>It is understandable that an atmosphere of uncertainty should have
-enveloped military decisions of this period. With the Joint Chiefs of
-Staff and the UN command groping their way through a fog of war,
-division commanders in Korea could not be expected to see very far
-ahead.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">129</span></p>
-
-<p>Disconcerting as it had been to have the Chinese appear in the first
-place, it was even more disturbing to have them break off contact and
-vanish so inexplicably. Nevertheless, General MacArthur and his staff
-had a fairly accurate idea of CCF numbers at this time. On 2 November
-the UN command estimated that 16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers
-had crossed the Yalu and 450,000 CCF regulars were in Manchuria.
-Three days later, Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s intelligence
-summary warned that the Chinese had the potential to start a large-scale
-counteroffensive.<a id="FNanchor_317" href="#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">317</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_317" href="#FNanchor_317" class="fnanchor">317</a> GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in Schnabel, <i>Korean
-Conflict</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General MacArthur, reporting to the United Nations for the first half
-of November, stated that 12 CCF divisions had been identified in
-Korea, indicating a total of perhaps 100,000 troops. Nine of these
-units had appeared on the Eighth Army front and three in the X Corps
-zone north of Hamhung.</p>
-
-<p>“At the same time,” the report continued, “United Nations aerial
-reconnaissance disclosed heavy troop movements near the border, in
-Manchuria, and into Korea.”<a id="FNanchor_318" href="#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">318</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_318" href="#FNanchor_318" class="fnanchor">318</a> Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, for the Period 1
-to 15 November 1950 in Dept State, <i>United Nations Action in Korea</i> (Washington, 1951),
-9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Quite as important as the new enemy’s numbers was the question of
-his intentions. Did the CCF divisions consist merely of so-called volunteers
-making a demonstration to encourage the beaten <i>NKPA</i> remnants?
-Or were the Chinese contemplating an all-out military intervention?</p>
-
-<p>President Truman asked JCS on 4 November to obtain from General
-MacArthur an estimate of the situation.<a id="FNanchor_319" href="#Footnote_319" class="fnanchor">319</a> The general’s reply stated
-that it was “impossible to authoritatively appraise the actualities of
-Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.” He recommended
-“... that a final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation
-of military facts.”<a id="FNanchor_320" href="#Footnote_320" class="fnanchor">320</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_319" href="#FNanchor_319" class="fnanchor">319</a> C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman <i>Memoirs</i> II, 373.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_320" href="#FNanchor_320" class="fnanchor">320</a> Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During the next three days the issue of bombing bridges across the
-Yalu posed a question that has remained a controversial subject ever
-since. General MacArthur was granted permission, after being at first
-refused, but cautioned “that extreme care be taken to avoid violation
-[of] Manchurian territory and airspace.”<a id="FNanchor_321" href="#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">321</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">130</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_321" href="#FNanchor_321" class="fnanchor">321</a> CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50;
-Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 375–376; Whitney, <i>MacArthur</i>, 405–411.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_11" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_130.png" width="1270" height="825" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>1ST MARINE DIVISION
-ZONE AND OBJECTIVES</p>
-
-<p>November 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-11</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">131</span></p>
-
-<p>In two messages of 7 November, the UN commander confirmed his
-original appraisal to the effect that the Chinese were not making a
-full-scale intervention. But he conceded that reinforcements might enable
-the new enemy to stop the UN advance or even throw it into
-reverse. He planned a resumption of the initiative, he said, in order
-to take “accurate measure ... of enemy strength.” And he repeated
-that the restriction of his bombing operations provided “a complete
-sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing of the Manchuria-North
-Korean border.” This factor, he warned, could “assume
-decisive proportions....”<a id="FNanchor_322" href="#Footnote_322" class="fnanchor">322</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_322" href="#FNanchor_322" class="fnanchor">322</a> CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 377.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On this same date, with the wary phase of UN strategy at its height,
-General Almond flew to Hungnam to confer with General Smith. The
-X Corps commander still wore another hat as General MacArthur’s
-chief of staff; and though he could not function actively in this position,
-he kept in close touch with strategic aims at Tokyo. Thus the cautious
-spirit of the UN commander’s messages of 7 November was reflected in
-Almond’s changed viewpoint. Where he had previously urged haste in
-the X Corps drive to the border, he was now disposed to put on the
-brakes and carry out that mission with less scattering of forces.</p>
-
-<p>The prospect of a winter campaign was discussed, and the Marine
-general recommended that only enough territory be held for the security
-of Hamhung, Hungnam and Wonsan. Almond believed that Hagaru
-should also be included, but he agreed that a greater degree of concentration
-was advisable.<a id="FNanchor_323" href="#Footnote_323" class="fnanchor">323</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_323" href="#FNanchor_323" class="fnanchor">323</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 552–553.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As day after day passed without further CCF contacts of importance,
-however, operations again took on the character of an occupation rather
-than a drive which might end in a collision with a powerful new
-enemy.</p>
-
-<p>X Corps OpnO 6, issued at 2400 on 11 November, called for an
-advance to the border by I ROK Corps on the right, the 7th Infantry
-Division in the center and the 1st Marine Division on the left. The 3d
-Infantry Division, with the 26th ROK Regiment attached, was to have
-the responsibility for the Wonsan-Yonghung area after relieving elements
-of the 1st Marine Division; the Marines were directed to take
-blocking positions at Huksu-ri and Yudam-ni. In the Corps rear, the
-1st KMC Regiment (-) had a zone to the south and west of Kojo.</p>
-
-<p>The Marine zone on the Yalu, about 40 miles in width, was approached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">132</span>
-and bounded by two roads branching off from the Changjin
-area. One of them ended at Huchanggangu and the other at Singalpajin.
-From that point the zone of the 7th Infantry Division extended
-east to Hyesanjin (where the border turns north at a right angle) and
-thence again eastward to the Hapsu area. I ROK Corps was to operate
-from the line Hapsu-Chuchonhujang and drive northward along the
-coast with Chongjin as an objective.<a id="FNanchor_324" href="#Footnote_324" class="fnanchor">324</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_324" href="#FNanchor_324" class="fnanchor">324</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 6</i>, 11 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Such a dispersion of forces, depending for supplies on poor secondary
-roads through wild mountain regions, could hardly have been contemplated
-if large-scale CCF opposition were expected. As a further indication
-of renewed confidence, General MacArthur asked informally and
-indirectly that X Corps do everything possible to assist the Eighth Army
-in its drive to the Yalu. This request was conveyed in a personal letter
-of 11 November from General Wright, G-3 of <span class="allsmcap">FECOM</span>, to the Corps
-commander.<a id="FNanchor_325" href="#Footnote_325" class="fnanchor">325</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_325" href="#FNanchor_325" class="fnanchor">325</a> <i>X Corps Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 Nov to 10 Dec 50, 9</i>; X Corps
-<i>WDSum, Nov 50</i>, 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>The Turning Point of 15 November</i></h3>
-
-<p>The date of General Almond’s reply, the 15th, is worthy of recognition
-as a turning point. For it was also the occasion of messages from the
-UN commander-in-chief and the commanding general of the 1st Marine
-Division which had an effect on strategy. Indeed, the entire course
-of the Chosin Reservoir campaign was channeled into new directions
-as a result of the concepts advanced in these three communications of
-15 November 1950.</p>
-
-<p>Obviously the gap of 80 miles separating the Eighth Army from X
-Corps would have to be reduced before much help could be given by
-the latter. General Almond replied to General Wright in a letter proposing
-that X Corps attack to the west of the Chosin Reservoir while
-also continuing to advance northward in zone to complete its original
-mission.</p>
-
-<p>That same day, while the letter was en route to Tokyo, General MacArthur
-came to a far-reaching decision. In a radio message he directed
-the X Corps commander to develop, as an alternative to OpnO 6, a plan
-for reorienting his attack to the west on reaching Changjin in order to
-cut the Chinese MSR, as represented by the Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon
-road and rail line.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">133</span></p>
-
-<p>This was the first indicated change in mission, according to the X
-Corps command report, since CinCFE’s directive late in October calling
-for a drive to the border. The amendment “was made necessary,”
-the report continued, “by the enemy build-up in front of the Eighth
-Army and the fact that the enemy action had halted the first attempt
-... to advance Eighth Army to the border. An estimate of the Eighth
-Army situation ... fixed the relative combat power as 100,000 UN to
-100,000 enemy with UN forces having air superiority and superior
-artillery support.... The enemy was given an offensive capacity
-which he could implement with an estimated reserve of 140,000 CCF
-troops north of the Yalu River. In view of the enemy’s offensive
-capacity, Eighth Army adopted a conservative plan to make a general
-advance with the main effort in the center generally parallel to the
-enemy MSR (Huichon-Kanggye). This course of action was designed
-to meet any course of action which might be adopted by the enemy.
-To assist the Eighth Army advance, X Corps was to initiate a main
-attack to the West from the Chosin Reservoir area, cutting the enemy
-MSR at Mupyong-ni, and advance in a northwesterly direction to the
-Yalu River line at Manpojin.”<a id="FNanchor_326" href="#Footnote_326" class="fnanchor">326</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_326" href="#FNanchor_326" class="fnanchor">326</a> X Corps <i>WD Sum, Nov 50</i>, 4–5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By a coincidence it was also on Wednesday, 15 November, that
-General Smith wrote a letter which foreshadowed future military
-events. Addressed to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the
-Marine Corps, this communication made it plain that the 1st Marine
-Division commander and his staff did not share in the renewed optimism
-as to the course of the UN war effort. Not only did the
-Marines accept the possibility of imminent and formidable CCF intervention,
-but they were making preparations to meet it.</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>So far our MSR north of Hamhung has not been molested, but there is
-evidence that this situation will not continue....</p>
-
-<p>Someone in high authority will have to make up his mind as to what is
-our goal. My mission is still to advance to the border. The Eighth Army, 80
-miles to the southwest, will not attack until the 20th. Manifestly, we should
-not push on without regard to the Eighth Army. We would simply get
-further out on a limb. If the Eighth Army push does not go, then the decision
-will have to be made as to what to do next. I believe a winter campaign
-in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier
-or marine, and I doubt the feasibility of supplying troops in this area during
-the winter or providing for the evacuation of sick and wounded.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The letter mentioned such preparations as the work done by Marine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">134</span>
-engineers to strengthen the Hamhung-Hagaru road for tanks and heavy
-vehicles. Plans had been approved, added General Smith, for an airstrip
-at Hagaru capable of landing cargo planes for resupply and casualty
-evacuation.</p>
-
-<p>He emphasized that he did not mean to be pessimistic. “Our people
-are doing a creditable job,” he said; “their spirit is fine, and they will
-continue to do a fine job.” But in conclusion he reiterated his doubts
-about his “wide open left flank” and his concern over “the prospect
-of stringing out a Marine division along a single mountain road for
-120 air miles from Hamhung to the border.”<a id="FNanchor_327" href="#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">327</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_327" href="#FNanchor_327" class="fnanchor">327</a> MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen Almond comments:
-“I am very mindful of the skepticism of General Smith in all of the supply plans that X
-Corps conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very thoroughly. However, in my
-mind there was always the assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or landing
-them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation to be expected by plane from the air field
-that we were to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Smith had no more than finished dictating his letter when
-two Navy officers called at the CP—Rear Admiral Albert K. Morehouse,
-chief of staff to Admiral Joy, and Captain Norman W. Sears, chief of
-staff to Admiral Doyle. Both were old acquaintances of the Marine
-general, who had led the assault landing force on Peleliu in 1944 while
-Sears commanded an LST group. Smith felt that he could speak frankly,
-therefore, and expressed his concern over the aspects of the strategic
-situation he had discussed in the letter.<a id="FNanchor_328" href="#Footnote_328" class="fnanchor">328</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_328" href="#FNanchor_328" class="fnanchor">328</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 31.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span> had requested in his message of the 1st that the plan for reorienting
-the X Corps attack be submitted to him as an alternative to
-OpnO 6. General Almond put his staff to work on the 16th, and that
-same day Draft No. 1, of OpnO Plan 8 was completed. This was a
-concept of an attack on Kanggye by means of a drive westward from
-Changjin.<a id="FNanchor_329" href="#Footnote_329" class="fnanchor">329</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_329" href="#FNanchor_329" class="fnanchor">329</a> This section is based on: X Corps <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 9; and X Corps
-<i>WDSum, Nov 50</i>, 5–6, 51–52.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Changes in X Corps Mission</i></h3>
-
-<p>Almond disapproved the first draft on the grounds that the MSR of the
-Corps element making the effort would be too far extended. He requested
-the preparation of a new plan based on the concept of an advance
-farther south on the Hagaru-Mupyong-ni axis and west of the
-zone of the 1st Marine Division. The X Corps commander also directed:</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">135</span></p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>(1) That the Hamhung-Hagaru road be developed as a Corps MSR with
-intensive effort on the part of Corps troops, including Corps engineers;</p>
-
-<p>(2) That an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of seizing
-Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st Marine Division.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The Corps commander considered that Changjin and Mupyong-ni
-were too widely separated as objectives to be assigned to a single division,
-not to mention the difficult terrain. His staff worked for four days
-on Draft No. 2 of OpnO Plan 8 before submitting it to him. He accepted
-it with several modifications and directed that the third draft
-be taken to Tokyo by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Chiles, the Corps
-G-3, for presentation to GHQ.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Preparations for Trouble</i></h3>
-
-<p>General Smith, for his part, lost no time in putting into effect his
-preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack. The
-completion of mine clearance at Hungnam had opened that port on
-15 November, thus easing the transportation situation. That same day
-the 7th Marines occupied Hagaru, being greeted by a temperature of
-four degrees below zero which threatened an early and bleak winter.</p>
-
-<p>Only four days previously, X Corps OpnO No. 6 had directed the 1st
-Marine Division to take up blocking positions to the west, at Huksu-ri
-and Yudam-ni, while continuing the northward advance to the Yalu.
-This meant a further dispersion at a time when Smith hoped to reduce
-the 163 road miles separating his infantry battalions.</p>
-
-<p>In order to carry out the Corps directives, Division OpnO 21-50 of 13
-November assigned the following tasks:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang hang2">
-
-<p>RCT-1—to seize Huksu-ri;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-7—to seize Hagaru, and, on order, to seize Yudam-ni;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-5—to protect the MSR from positions at Majon-dong, Chinhung-ni
-and Koto-ri, while preparing to pass through RCT-7 in the
-Hagaru area and advance to Changjin (approximately 40 miles
-northward);</p>
-
-<p>Division Reconnaissance Company—to screen the Division right flank by
-operating in the Soyang-ni-Sinhung valley to the east Division
-boundary.<a id="FNanchor_330" href="#Footnote_330" class="fnanchor">330</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">136</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_330" href="#FNanchor_330" class="fnanchor">330</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 21-50</i>, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the seizure of Hagaru and the
-5th Mar’s movement of a battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv FragO,
-2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar
-msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1437 14 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In connection with the mission of RCT-7, the words “on order”
-deserve special notice. For the commanding officer was directed by
-Smith’s oral instructions to take up blocking positions at Toktong Pass,
-about halfway between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, until additional units
-of the Division could be moved up to the Hagaru area. In other words,
-the Division commander believed that the possibilities of large-scale
-CCF intervention were such as to justify caution in the drive to
-Yudam-ni.<a id="FNanchor_331" href="#Footnote_331" class="fnanchor">331</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_331" href="#FNanchor_331" class="fnanchor">331</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 592–594.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Not only would the concentration of the Marine units ease General
-Smith’s concern over the tactical situation; it would also greatly simplify
-the administrative load. Colonel Bowser has commented, “Division
-was faced with the problem of handling a division scattered from
-Wonsan and Majon-ni in the south to the heavy engagement of the 7th
-Mar in the north. Add to this the problem of guerrilla bandits between
-Wonsan and Hungnam/Hamhung as well as a completely unknown
-situation to the West, and you have a task of considerable magnitude
-for any division staff.”<a id="FNanchor_332" href="#Footnote_332" class="fnanchor">332</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_332" href="#FNanchor_332" class="fnanchor">332</a> Bowser Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>RCT-1 was delayed several days by lack of railway facilities in its
-move 70 miles northward to Chigyong after being relieved in the Wonsan
-area by the 3d Infantry Division.<a id="FNanchor_333" href="#Footnote_333" class="fnanchor">333</a> But most of the other Marine
-units had been pulled up—a battalion or even a company at a time—as
-far as the Hungnam area. Along the new MSR north of Hamhung,
-the column of advance on 15 November consisted of these units:</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_333" href="#FNanchor_333" class="fnanchor">333</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 13.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Hagaru—RCT-7;</p>
-
-<p>Koto-ri—2d Battalion, RCT-5;</p>
-
-<p>Chinhung-ni—3d Battalion, RCT-5; Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines;
-Detachment 1st Ordnance Battalion; Detachment 1st Service Battalion;
-1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion; Company B
-(less 3d Platoon), 1st Engineer Battalion;</p>
-
-<p>Majon-dong—1st Battalion RCT-5; Company D, 1st Tank Battalion.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The Division command and staff took a dim view of the possibility
-of completing “the race to the Yalu” before winter. It was already
-too late, if sub-zero temperatures were any indication; and preparations
-must now be made for tactical and logistical support of a midwinter
-campaign in the mountains. Among the most essential provisions were
-the selection of a forward base, the construction of airstrips along the
-MSR, and the strengthening of the road to make it fit for tanks and
-heavy vehicles.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">137</span></p>
-
-<p>Hagaru, at the foot of the Chosin Reservoir, had been recommended
-by General Craig as the best location for a forward base when he
-visited here on the 15th. The commanding generals of the Division
-and Wing arrived for a tour of inspection the next day. General Harris
-made the trip at the express request of General Almond, who believed
-that a strip long enough to land R4Ds was necessary to insure resupply
-and casualty evacuation in a midwinter emergency. One of the few
-comparatively flat pieces of real estate in northeast Korea was found
-just south of the town. The black loam promised to make a hard
-surface in freezing weather, so that the prevailing arctic temperatures
-offered at least one consolation.<a id="FNanchor_334" href="#Footnote_334" class="fnanchor">334</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_334" href="#FNanchor_334" class="fnanchor">334</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>An OY strip had been completed on 13 November at Koto-ri, but
-heavier engineer equipment was needed at Hagaru. Before it could
-be brought forward, the road from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri required
-strengthening and widening. This task had already been assigned to
-Lieutenant Colonel Partridge, commanding the 1st Engineer Battalion.
-After a survey by jeep, he decided to begin operations at the highest
-point of the one-way dirt road.</p>
-
-<p>“By working down,” he explained, “we could first of all provide for
-what we considered to be a dangerous accumulation of snow, and the
-problem of land slides.... The work on the road involved a good bit
-of drainage in order to insure that the melting snows from day to day
-during the sunlight hours would not filter across and destroy the road
-bed. It involved demolitions and drilling and a good deal of dozer
-and grader work.”<a id="FNanchor_335" href="#Footnote_335" class="fnanchor">335</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_335" href="#FNanchor_335" class="fnanchor">335</a> LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51, 31–32.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Enough progress had been made by 18 November so that armor
-could be sent forward to support RCT-7. Only the day before, the 1st
-Tank Battalion had begun functioning with its Headquarters and Service
-Companies at Soyang-ni, eight miles northwest of Hamhung. The
-road between Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri was still impassable for M-26
-(Pershing) tanks until the engineers could widen some of the turns.
-But Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Milne, the battalion commander, organized
-a provisional tank platoon consisting of two M4A3 (Sherman)
-tanks from Headquarters Company and four dozer tanks from Company
-D at Majon-dong. They proceeded without incident on the 18th to
-Hagaru, operating as a gun platoon.<a id="FNanchor_336" href="#Footnote_336" class="fnanchor">336</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">138</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_336" href="#FNanchor_336" class="fnanchor">336</a> 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare the MSR for tank use on
-6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Opening the mountain road to heavy traffic made it possible on the
-18th to begin work on the Hagaru airstrip. Five large dozers with
-pans of eight cubic yards capacity arrived at the site the next day, and
-Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion tackled the job of hacking
-out a runway from ground frozen as hard as granite. Plans called for a
-cut of 90,000 cubic yards and a fill of 60,000 for a 3200-foot runway.
-The rub was that engineering field manuals prescribed a runway of
-3600 feet for R4Ds or C-47s at sea level, plus an additional 1000 feet
-for each 1000 feet of altitude. And since Hagaru was about 4000 feet
-above sea level, it could only be hoped that pilots were right in estimating
-that a strip of 3000 to 4500 feet might do in a pinch.<a id="FNanchor_337" href="#Footnote_337" class="fnanchor">337</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_337" href="#FNanchor_337" class="fnanchor">337</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51,
-39–40.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 19th also dated the establishment of the Supply Regulating Station
-at Hagaru for the purpose of building up stockpiles. Prior to this
-time, the 1st Service and 1st Ordnance Battalions had been in charge of
-division dumps at Hamhung. Supplies arrived by rail after being
-unloaded from the ships at Wonsan by the 1st Shore Party Battalion
-and the 1st Combat Service Group.</p>
-
-<p>The completion of mine clearance made it possible to order the latter
-organization to Hungnam by sea to operate in-transit depots for X
-Corps. Practically all Division supplies were soon being received by
-sea at this port, where the 1st Combat Service Group separated the
-incoming cargo into proper classifications and forwarded it to the
-dumps at Hamhung. Port operation was the responsibility of the 2d
-Engineer Special Brigade, USA. After the project got into full swing,
-from 2000 to 2500 Korean laborers were employed at Hungnam and
-as many as 6000 tons of cargo unloaded in 24 hours.<a id="FNanchor_338" href="#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">338</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_338" href="#FNanchor_338" class="fnanchor">338</a> Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvii, no. 1
-(Jan 53), 53–54.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A limited amount of rolling stock was available for the narrow-gauge
-railway from Hungnam to Chinhung-ni. But it was up to the Marines
-to put the line back into operation, for the X Corps Railway Transportation
-Section already had its hands full with the Wonsan-Hamhung
-route. The 1st Service Battalion was authorized to make the attempt,
-and enough Korean crews were rounded up to operate the trains. Chinhung-ni
-thus became the railhead for supplies tracked the rest of the
-way to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_339" href="#Footnote_339" class="fnanchor">339</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_339" href="#FNanchor_339" class="fnanchor">339</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Preparations were also made for large-scale casualty evacuation to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">139</span>
-the Division hospital at Hungnam. H&amp;S, A and B Companies of the
-1st Medical Battalion remained there to set up the Division hospital
-while D, C and E Companies were attached to RCTs 1, 5 and 7 respectively.
-As the Division center of gravity shifted northward, medical
-officers foresaw the need of a hospital-type facility at Hagaru in addition
-to the clearing stations contemplated at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
-Plans were approved, therefore, for Companies C and E to pool their
-resources at Hagaru and establish a medical supply dump. Additional
-surgical teams were to be flown to Hagaru in an emergency by Companies
-A and B from the hospital at Hungnam.</p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile the hospital ship <i>Consolation</i>, commanded by Captain
-John W. McElroy, USNR, prepared to move from Wonsan to Hungnam.
-There the Division hospital had been enlarged to 400 beds, and
-an additional 100 to 150 were planned for the new annex at Hamhung.
-In order to speed up casualty evacuation, several heated railway cars
-were equipped for that purpose on the 35-mile narrow-gauge line from
-Chinhung-ni.<a id="FNanchor_340" href="#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">340</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_340" href="#FNanchor_340" class="fnanchor">340</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex
-HH (hereafter 1stMedBn <i>SAR</i>), 4–7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Supplies Trucked to Hagaru</i></h3>
-
-<p>Provisions for the advance of RCT-5 east of the Chosin Reservoir were
-included in Division OpnO 22-50, issued at 0800 on 17 November.
-As a preliminary, RCT-7 was given a two-fold mission: (1) to protect
-the Division left flank between Hagaru and Yudam-ni with a minimum
-of a battalion; and (2) to relieve elements of RCT-5 and protect the
-MSR in zone from positions in the vicinity of Hagaru, Koto-ri and
-Chinhung-ni.</p>
-
-<p>RCT-5 was assigned these missions: (1) to pass a minimum of a
-battalion through RCT-7 at Hagaru; (2) to move up the east side of
-the Chosin Reservoir and seize Sinhung-ni, about 7 miles northeast of
-Hagaru; and (3), on order, to seize the road junction at Kyolmul-ni,
-some 20 miles north of Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Division Reconnaissance Company was to screen the left flank of the
-MSR in the vicinity of Majon-dong, and the 11th Marines to maintain its
-4th Battalion in that area prepared for employment in the north on
-order.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">140</span></p>
-
-<p>OpnO 22-50 directed the Supply Regulating Detachment (1) to
-establish a truckhead at Hagaru after taking over and consolidating the
-dumps of RCT-7; (2) to control traffic between Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni;
-and (3) to support RCTs 5 and 7, with priority to RCT-5. The
-following supply levels were fixed:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>Classes I and III, five days;</p>
-
-<p>Class V, 1 Unit of fire;</p>
-
-<p>Classes II and IV, as required for all troops operating to the north and west
-of Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_341" href="#Footnote_341" class="fnanchor">341</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_341" href="#FNanchor_341" class="fnanchor">341</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 22-50</i>, 17 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although the advance westward to Huksu-ri remained the mission
-of RCT-1, the shortage of rail and motor transport slowed the movement
-from Wonsan to Chigyong. The last elements had not arrived on
-the 18th when Corps asked and received the consent of Division to the
-employment of the 26th ROK Regiment for the attack on Huksu-ri, with
-the understanding that the objective would be turned over to RCT-1 at
-a later date. On the morning of the 19th the ROK unit left Chigyong
-to execute its mission.<a id="FNanchor_342" href="#Footnote_342" class="fnanchor">342</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_342" href="#FNanchor_342" class="fnanchor">342</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; G-3 X Corps tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1220 18 Nov 50; 26thROK
-msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Two days later RCT-1 was relieved of this responsibility when Corps
-verbally notified Division that Huksu-ri had been placed within the
-modified boundary of the 3d Infantry Division. This was confirmed
-the next day by X Corps OI 17, which also directed the Division to
-establish blocking positions at Yudam-ni.<a id="FNanchor_343" href="#Footnote_343" class="fnanchor">343</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_343" href="#FNanchor_343" class="fnanchor">343</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 638–639; X Corps <i>OI 17</i>, 22 Nov 50. See also G-3 X Corps tel to
-G-3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in G-3 Journal, X Corps <i>WD</i>, 20 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Up to this time General Smith had not been able to make much progress
-toward Yudam-ni without dispersing his units to an extent which
-he regarded as imprudent. But with the availability of RCT-1 to occupy
-positions on the MSR behind the other two infantry regiments, he
-could now push ahead.</p>
-
-<p>As an added factor, the 1st Marine Division had just acquired a new
-unit. Early in November Admiral Joy had inquired if General Smith
-could use the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. This
-British unit of 14 officers and 221 enlisted men, commanded by Lieutenant
-Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, and attached to ComNavFE in
-Japan, had requested service with the U. S. Marines. Smith replied that
-he would be glad to have these fine troops. Highly trained in reconnaissance,
-they could operate with the Division Reconnaissance Company<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">141</span>
-in protecting the flank of the Marine advance. The British Marines
-arrived at Hungnam on the 20th and reported to the 1st Marine
-Division.<a id="FNanchor_344" href="#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">344</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_344" href="#FNanchor_344" class="fnanchor">344</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 638–639; 1stMarDiv <i>POR 164</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Division OpnO 23-50, issued at 0800 on the 23d, directed the Commandos
-to locate and destroy enemy forces on the left flank, ranging
-as far as 13 miles west of Koto-ri. It was hoped that the British unit
-and the Division Reconnaissance Company might flush out CCF troops
-beyond the reach of routine infantry patrols. Other tasks assigned to
-elements of the Division were as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang hang2">
-
-<p>RCT-7—to seize Yudam-ni and maintain one battalion in that position;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-5—to seize Kyolmul-li (20 miles north of Hagaru) and be prepared
-to seize Toksil-li (10 miles northwest of Kyolmul-li) and Tuan-di
-(15 miles northeast of Kyolmul-li) on order;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-1—to relieve elements of RCT-7 in the vicinity of Hagaru and Koto-ri
-and protect the Division MSR from positions in the vicinity of
-Hagaru, Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni;</p>
-
-<p>1st Tank Battalion (less detachments)—to protect the MSR from positions
-in the vicinity of Majon-dong and Soyang-ni;</p>
-
-<p>1st Engineer Battalion—to support Division operations with priority to the
-maintenance of the MSR and construction of the airfield at Hagaru.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>OpnO 23-50 also provided that the Supply Regulating Station Detachment
-continue operation of the truckhead at Hagaru and stock supplies
-at the following levels: Classes I and III, 8 days; Classes II and
-IV, as required; and Class V, one and one-third U/F for all troops
-operating to the north and west of Chinhung-ni.<a id="FNanchor_345" href="#Footnote_345" class="fnanchor">345</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_345" href="#FNanchor_345" class="fnanchor">345</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 23-50</i>, 23 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The trucking facilities of the Division had been strained to the limit
-ever since the Wonsan landing. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the
-7th Motor transport Battalion was taken under the operational control
-of X Corps, and it became necessary to attach the 1st Motor Transport
-Battalion to RCT-7. On 19 November, however, the 1st MT (less
-detachments) had passed to the control of the 1st Supply Regulating
-Detachment at Hagaru. There the truckers not only built up the stockpile
-of supplies but rendered the best support that units of the division
-had known so far along the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_346" href="#Footnote_346" class="fnanchor">346</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">142</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_346" href="#FNanchor_346" class="fnanchor">346</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn <i>SAR</i>), 4, 7; 7th MTBn <i>SAR</i>, 2–3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Confidence of UN Command</i></h3>
-
-<p>General MacArthur did not appear to be shaken by EUSAK G-2 reports
-during the third week of November which called attention to a
-formidable CCF build-up on both sides of the Yalu. On the contrary, a
-UN order of the 20th, giving directions for the conduct of troops at
-the border, indicated that an occupation rather than a fight was
-expected:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Elements of minimum size only will be advanced to the immediate vicinity
-of the geographical boundary of Korea. No troops or vehicles will go beyond
-the boundary between Korea and Manchuria, or between Korea and the
-USSR, nor will fire be exchanged with, or air strikes be requested on forces
-north of the northern boundary of Korea. Rigid control of troop movements
-in vicinity of northern boundary will be exercised. <i>Damage, destruction or
-disruption of service of power plants will be avoided.</i> No personnel, military
-or civilian, will be permitted to enter or leave Korea via the Manchurian or
-USSR border. Commanders will insure that the sanctity of the international
-border is meticulously preserved.<a id="FNanchor_347" href="#Footnote_347" class="fnanchor">347</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_347" href="#FNanchor_347" class="fnanchor">347</a> CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The italicized sentence emphasizes an assumption which had made
-converts in high State Department as well as Defense circles in Washington.
-The Chinese, according to this conjecture, were concerned
-chiefly with defending their Manchurian frontier and guarding the
-power complexes along the Yalu. As evidence, it was pointed out that
-early in November the Sinuiju radio described the CCF troops crossing
-the river as a “volunteer corps” for the protection of the hydro-electric
-plants along the Yalu serving Mukden, Dairen and Port Arthur. Proceeding
-from this premise, it was a logical conclusion that if no provocation
-were given these forces, a large-scale fight might be avoided.<a id="FNanchor_348" href="#Footnote_348" class="fnanchor">348</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_348" href="#FNanchor_348" class="fnanchor">348</a> See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists Intervention in Korea,”
-9 Nov 50; and Truman, <i>Memoirs</i>, II, 372.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General MacArthur, after receiving a qualified permission to bomb
-the Yalu bridges, had enjoined UN airmen not to violate territory or
-air space on the other side of the river. This meant that the bomber
-crews must take much greater risks, since their restricted axes of approach
-and flight paths were known to enemy antiaircraft gunners in advance.
-Moreover, CCF jet fighters could attack and retire to the
-sanctuary of Manchuria when hard-pressed.<a id="FNanchor_349" href="#Footnote_349" class="fnanchor">349</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">143</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_349" href="#FNanchor_349" class="fnanchor">349</a> JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50; Schnabel, <i>Korean
-Conflict</i>. See also Karig, <i>Korea</i>, 376–378.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Despite these handicaps, Air Force and Navy bombers knocked out
-four of the twelve international bridges and damaged most of the
-others. These efforts doubtless imposed delays, but troops and supplies
-continued to cross throughout November.<a id="FNanchor_350" href="#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">350</a> After arrival in North
-Korea, they seemed to vanish into that void of mystery which had
-swallowed up Chinese Communist troops ever since they broke off
-contact.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_350" href="#FNanchor_350" class="fnanchor">350</a> Schnabel <i>Korean Conflict</i>. Bombing of the bridges ceased 6 December with the
-freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, <i>Report from the Secretory of Defense ... on Operations
-in Korea</i>, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Students of history may have recalled at this time that one of the
-most significant engagements of modern history was known as the
-Battle of the Yalu. From a tactical viewpoint, to be sure, the clash of
-30 April 1904 was not a great affair. The Japanese army, after disembarking
-at Chemulpo (Inchon) and marching up the Korean peninsula,
-numbered five times the Russian force which opposed the crossing
-of the Yalu at Uiji, just east of Sinuiju. A Japanese victory was doubtless
-to be expected, yet a new page of history had opened. For the first
-time in modern chronicles, an Asiatic army had successfully challenged
-a European army with the weapons and tactics of the Machine Age.</p>
-
-<p>Now, nearly half a century later, history was repeating itself as another
-Asiatic army crossed the Yalu with unknown capabilities and
-intentions. If the Chinese Communists were merely sending a force to
-guard the hydro-electric complexes and frontier, hopes of peace by
-Christmas might be realized. But if the invaders were secretly massing
-for an all-out counter-offensive, a great new war might soon be flaming
-up from the ashes of the old.</p>
-
-<p>Little fault can be found with current G-2 estimates of CCF numbers,
-which hold up surprisingly well even when viewed with the wisdom
-of hindsight. Quite as much depended on interpretations of CCF intentions
-by the UN command, and there can be no doubt that an end-of-the-war
-atmosphere prevailed on the eve of the Eighth Army offensive of
-24 November.</p>
-
-<p>Thanksgiving Day, which fell on the 23d, was celebrated both in
-Korea and the United States in a spirit of rejoicing over a victorious
-peace which seemed almost within grasp. It was a tribute to American
-bounty as well as organizational genius that the troops in Korea were
-served a dinner which would have done credit to a first-rate Stateside
-restaurant. The menu, as proposed by X Corps to component units,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">144</span>
-included shrimp cocktail, stuffed olives, roast young tom turkey with
-cranberry sauce, candied sweet potatoes, fruit salad, fruit cake, mince
-pie and coffee.<a id="FNanchor_351" href="#Footnote_351" class="fnanchor">351</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_351" href="#FNanchor_351" class="fnanchor">351</a> X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As an item of good news for this Thanksgiving, it was learned the
-day before that the 17th Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division had
-reached the Yalu at Hyesanjin. Not a single Chinese soldier had been
-encountered by troops who had troubles enough with sub-zero temperatures
-and mountain roads.<a id="FNanchor_352" href="#Footnote_352" class="fnanchor">352</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_352" href="#FNanchor_352" class="fnanchor">352</a> This was the only American unit ever to push as far north as the border. On the
-Eighth Army front a regiment of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October,
-only to be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first CCF attacks. EUSAK,
-<i>WDSum, Oct 50</i>, 38, 44.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Since the first week of November, in fact, there had been no clashes
-of any importance with the invaders from Red China. On the 24th,
-as usual, the front was quiet everywhere except for minor patrol contacts.
-Yet this was the D-day of the great Eighth Army offensive, and
-the stirring communique of the commander-in-chief was read to all
-troops in Korea. It was a message in the bold spirit of Inchon, and no
-one could doubt the confidence of the UN command after hearing these
-words:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The United Nations massive compression envelopment in North Korea
-against the new Red Armies operating there is now approaching its decisive
-effort. The isolating component of the pincer, our air forces of all types,
-have for the past three weeks, in a sustained attack of model coordination
-and effectiveness, successfully interdicted enemy lines of support from the
-north so that further reinforcement therefrom has been sharply curtailed and
-essential supplies markedly limited. The eastern sector of the pincer, with
-noteworthy and effective naval support, has now reached commanding enveloping
-position, cutting in two the northern reaches of the enemy’s geographical
-potential. This morning the western sector of the pincer moves forward
-in general assault in an effort to complete the compression and close the vise.
-If successful, this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace
-and unity to Korea, enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military
-forces, and permit the complete assumption by the Korean people and
-nation of full sovereignty and international equality. It is that for which
-we fight.<a id="FNanchor_353" href="#Footnote_353" class="fnanchor">353</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="sigright">
-<span class="l2">/s/ DOUGLAS <span class="smcap">MacARTHUR</span>,</span><br />
-<span class="l1"><i>General of the Army</i>,</span><br />
-<i>United States Army</i>,<br />
-<i>Commander-in-Chief</i>.
-</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_353" href="#FNanchor_353" class="fnanchor">353</a> CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">145</span></p>
-
-<p class="p1">Eighth Army troops found it something of an anticlimax, after this
-message, to jump off without meeting any large-scale opposition. General
-MacArthur, who flew to the front for the occasion, watched from
-his plane as the UN columns moved out unmolested, as if conducting a
-motor march.</p>
-
-<p>“The Army offensive began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours on 24
-November,” said the <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> report. “Since for some time there had
-been little contact with enemy forces the advance of <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> elements
-was in the nature of a meeting engagement, with little or no resistance
-in the initial stage. Across the Eighth Army front as a whole, advances
-were made from 4000 to 16,000 yards.”<a id="FNanchor_354" href="#Footnote_354" class="fnanchor">354</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_354" href="#FNanchor_354" class="fnanchor">354</a> EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 24 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Concentration on MSR</i></h3>
-
-<p>On this same day Lieutenant Colonel Chiles presented X Corps OpnPlan
-8, Draft 3, at Tokyo. It was approved at UNC Headquarters with only
-one modification—the shifting of the proposed boundary between X
-Corps and Eighth Army farther to the south in the zone of the 1st
-Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>This plan was the basis of X Corps OpnO 7. Issued on the 25th, it
-provided for a reorientation of the X Corps attack to provide more
-assistance for Eighth Army. H-hour was to be 0800 on the 27th, and
-the principal units of X Corps were assigned these tasks:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>1st Marine Division—to seize Mupyong-ni and advance to the Yalu;</p>
-
-<p>7th Infantry Division—(1) to attack from east side of Chosin Reservoir
-and advance to Yalu in zone; (2) to secure Pungsan area, coordinating with
-1 ROK Corps;</p>
-
-<p>1 ROK Corps—to advance from Hapsu and Chongjin areas, destroying
-enemy in zone to north boundary of Korea;</p>
-
-<p>3rd Infantry Division—(1) to gain and maintain contact with the right
-flank of Eighth Army in zone; (2) to protect the left flank of X Corps;
-(3) to support the 1st Marine Division on X Corps order; (4) to protect
-harbor and airfield at Wonsan; (5) to destroy enemy guerrillas in zone.<a id="FNanchor_355" href="#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">355</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_355" href="#FNanchor_355" class="fnanchor">355</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 7</i>, 25 Nov. 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A Corps warning order, issued on the evening of the 24th, was
-supplemented by a briefing session at Corps Headquarters at 1000 the
-next morning. General Smith learned that his division was to be the
-northern arm of the pincers in the “massive compression envelopment”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">146</span>
-while the 7th Infantry Division took over the previous Marine mission
-of advancing east of the Chosin Reservoir to the Yalu.<a id="FNanchor_356" href="#Footnote_356" class="fnanchor">356</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_356" href="#FNanchor_356" class="fnanchor">356</a> CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 25 Nov 50;
-Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 727.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The new Marine boundary cut across Korea to the north of Eighth
-Army. From Yudam-ni the Marine route of advance led to Mupyong-ni
-55 miles to the west. This objective was about halfway between Huichon
-in the south and Kanggye in the north (see map, Page 130). From the
-latter, which was believed to be the assembly area of the <span class="allsmcap">NKPA</span> remnants,
-a good road led about 40 miles north to Manpojin on the Yalu.</p>
-
-<p>In accordance with Corps OpnO 7, the rear boundary of the 1st
-Marine Division had been moved north to a line just south of Hagaru.
-The 3d Infantry Division had the responsibility for the area south
-of Hagaru, but this unit had so many other commitments that it could
-assign few troops to the task. General Smith was granted permission,
-therefore, to retain garrisons at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni. This left
-the 3d Infantry Division responsible for the protection of the MSR
-from Sudong southward to Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_357" href="#Footnote_357" class="fnanchor">357</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_357" href="#FNanchor_357" class="fnanchor">357</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 727–729.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Corps OpnO 7, in short, provided for a wide envelopment to be
-spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division on 27 November. The other
-arm of the pincers, of course, was to be the Eighth Army; but on the
-evening of the 25th came the disturbing news that its right wing, the
-II ROK Corps, had been hurled back by a surprise CCF counterstroke.
-This reverse took place in the vicinity of Tokchon, about 70 air miles
-southwest of Yudam-ni.<a id="FNanchor_358" href="#Footnote_358" class="fnanchor">358</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_358" href="#FNanchor_358" class="fnanchor">358</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 728; EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 26 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> intelligence reports, as it proved, were not far off the mark
-in estimating enemy strength on the Eighth Army front at 149,741
-troops at this time.<a id="FNanchor_359" href="#Footnote_359" class="fnanchor">359</a> During the past few days, however, estimates of
-probable enemy courses of action had been so reassuring as to justify
-the confidence of <span class="allsmcap">C</span>in<span class="allsmcap">CFE</span>’s communique on D-day. Even the setback of
-the 25th was not regarded as alarming.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_359" href="#FNanchor_359" class="fnanchor">359</a> It is interesting to note that this is an increase of 95,741 over EUSAK’s estimate of
-the day before. EUSAK <i>PIR 136</i>, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 25 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>“With the possible exception of the relatively vague situation on the
-east flank,” said the next day’s G-2 report, “the enemy reaction to the
-<span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> attack has been one of active defense with local counterattacks
-in strength.” The enemy’s probable course of action was believed to
-be “an active defense in depth along present lines employing strong
-local counterattacks in conjunction with continued guerrilla activities<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">147</span>
-with bypassed units; limited air activity; and further reinforcement by
-CCF or USSR forces.”<a id="FNanchor_360" href="#Footnote_360" class="fnanchor">360</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_360" href="#FNanchor_360" class="fnanchor">360</a> EUSAK <i>PIR 137</i>, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK <i>WD</i>, 26 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the X Corps front the reorientation of the attack to the west gave
-General Smith a long-sought opportunity to collect his dispersed units
-and achieve a relative degree of concentration. The release of RCT-1
-from its Huksu-ri mission made it possible to bring that infantry
-regiment up behind the other two. This move in turn enabled RCT-5
-to advance east of the Chosin Reservoir and RCT-7 to push on to
-Yudam-ni.</p>
-
-<p>Progress might have been more rapid for all units if adequate transportation
-had been available for RCT-1 in the Chigyong area. Only
-by using vehicles of the 11th Marines was it possible to move 1/1 to
-Chinhung-ni, where it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines on
-23 November. During the next two days the 2d Battalion and RCT-1
-Headquarters relieved 2/5 at Koto-ri. After the return of the vehicles,
-3/1 (less Company G, left behind for lack of trucks) was lifted to
-Hagaru on the 26th to relieve the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines.<a id="FNanchor_361" href="#Footnote_361" class="fnanchor">361</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_361" href="#FNanchor_361" class="fnanchor">361</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs
-11th &amp; 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All three battalions of RCT-5 were operating east of the Chosin
-Reservoir by 24 November. Until supply levels were built up at Hagaru,
-however, General Smith kept a careful check on the advance in this
-quarter. The farthest penetration took place on the 25th when a platoon-size
-patrol of 3/5, reinforced by two tanks, drove nearly to the northern
-end of the Reservoir. Scattered enemy groups were flushed out and an
-abandoned 75mm gun destroyed after a pursuit resulting in five Chinese
-killed and one captured. This was one of the few encounters in an
-area combed by patrols from all three battalions, and no signs of large-scale
-enemy activity were reported by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D.
-Taplett, CO of 3/5, after a helicopter reconnaissance.<a id="FNanchor_362" href="#Footnote_362" class="fnanchor">362</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_362" href="#FNanchor_362" class="fnanchor">362</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i> 15–18. Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 626.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Meanwhile RCT-7 began its move to Yudam-ni. This objective had
-first been mentioned as early as 11 November in X Corps OpnO 6. But
-until RCT-1 could be brought up to the MSR, the Division Commander
-limited the advance to the vicinity of Toktong Pass. There an estimated
-150 to 200 enemy resisted with machine-gun fire but were scattered
-with the aid of air strikes and artillery support.</p>
-
-<p>On the 23d, in accordance with Division OpnO 23-50, the 1st Battalion
-led the advance of RCT-7. During the next two days Lieutenant<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">148</span>
-Colonel Davis’s reinforced battalion methodically cleared booby-trapped
-but undefended road blocks and scattered small groups of enemy along
-the route. The men of 1/7 belatedly celebrated Thanksgiving on the
-24th with a full, hot turkey dinner—their last full meal for 17 days—and
-seized battered Yudam-ni the next day against negligible resistance.<a id="FNanchor_363" href="#Footnote_363" class="fnanchor">363</a>
-The 3d Battalion, regimental headquarters, and 3/11 (-) followed.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_363" href="#FNanchor_363" class="fnanchor">363</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis
-Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Marine operations east of the Chosin Reservoir came to an end at
-1200 on the 25th with the relief of RCT-5 by the 1st Battalion, 32d
-Infantry, 7th Infantry Division. Corps orders called for this unit to
-remain under operational control of the 1st Marine Division until the
-assumption of command in the area by the CO, 31st Infantry. All elements
-of RCT-5 were to be relieved by the following noon for the mission
-of advancing to Yudam-ni and then passing through RCT-7 to
-lead the attack toward Mupyong-ni.<a id="FNanchor_364" href="#Footnote_364" class="fnanchor">364</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_364" href="#FNanchor_364" class="fnanchor">364</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This was in accordance with Division OpnO 24-50, issued at 0800
-on the 26th to implement the provisions of Corps OpnO 7. The jump-off
-was to be at 0800 on 27 November, with the first objective the road
-junction at Yongnim-dong (27 road miles west of Yudam-ni), in
-preparation for further advance on order to the high ground about one
-mile south of Kogae-gol and 35 miles west of Yudam-ni. Other provisions
-of OpnO 24-50 were as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang hang2">
-
-<p>RCT-7—to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay, and when passed
-through by RCT-5, to protect the Division MSR from Sinhung-ni
-(7 miles west of Hagaru) to Yudam-ni;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-5—to pass through RCT-7 west of Yudam-ni by 0800, 27 November,
-advance to the west and seize first objective, prepared for further
-advance;</p>
-
-<p>RCT-1—in Division reserve, to occupy positions in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni,
-Koto-ri and Hagaru for the protection of the MSR;</p>
-
-<p>11th Marines—less detachments, to provide general support from positions in
-the vicinity of Yudam-ni;</p>
-
-<p>41st Commando—reinforced, to move to Yudam-ni prepared for operations
-to the southwest to protect Division left flank;</p>
-
-<p>Reconnaissance Company—to move to Yudam-ni and reconnoiter to the
-north in co-ordination with operations of RCT-7.<a id="FNanchor_365" href="#Footnote_365" class="fnanchor">365</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_365" href="#FNanchor_365" class="fnanchor">365</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 24-50</i>, 26 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="p4"> </div>
-
-<div class="newpage photos">
-<div id="ip_148" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_148a.jpg" width="1626" height="2294" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USN Photo 421351
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Operation Yo-Yo—Back and forth, changing course at twelve-hour intervals,
-the ships bearing the Marines and their gear mark time during
-mine clearance operations at Wonsan.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148b.jpg" width="1634" height="1160" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USA Photo SC 351586<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Wonsan Arrivals—Above, Bob Hope entertaining Marine airmen who
-were first to reach the seaport; and, below, Marine infantry disembarking
-from cargo nets of</i> Marine Phoenix <i>into the LCVPs</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148bb.jpg" width="1603" height="1064" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USN Photo 421451</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148c.jpg" width="1663" height="1176" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit center">
-USN Photo 421319 <span class="in8">USN Photo 421362</span><br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Administrative Landing—Above, an LCM and a troop-laden amtrac
-in Wonsan harbor; and, below, LSTs drawn up abreast to land the thousands
-of tons of supplies required by a division.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148cb.jpg" width="1649" height="1024" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USN Photo 421388</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148d.jpg" width="1641" height="1189" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USA Photo SC 351722<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Wonsan Scenes—Above, a camouflaged hangar on Wonsan airfield;
-below, Marine infantry in railway station awaiting transportation shortly
-after their debarkation.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148db.jpg" width="1641" height="1056" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 4552</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148e.jpg" width="1643" height="1179" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4323<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>First Action in Northeast Korea—Two views of Marine infantry mopping
-up guerrillas after surprise counterattack in Kojo area by NKPA
-troops escaping to join Chinese Reds.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148eb.jpg" width="1643" height="1059" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 4327</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148f.jpg" width="1645" height="1187" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit center">
-USN Photo 423189 <span class="in6">Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig</span><br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>On the Planning Level—Above, RAdm J. H. Doyle, CTF-90, and
-BrigGen E. A. Craig, ADC of 1st Marine Division; below, V/Adm
-A. D. Struble, Cdr JTF-7, and MajGen E. M. Almond, CG X Corps,
-in the USS</i> Missouri.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148fb.jpg" width="1645" height="1020" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USN Photo 422376</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148g.jpg" width="1650" height="1175" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USA Photo SC 391740<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Command Conference—Above, left to right, MajGen W. J. Wallace,
-USMC; LtGen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC; MajGen O. P. Smith,
-USMC; MajGen E. A. Almond, USA; and MajGen Field Harris,
-USMC; below, 1st Marine Division CP at Hungnam.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148gb.jpg" width="1649" height="1009" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148h.jpg" width="1609" height="1121" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4534<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>First Chinese Resistance—Above, infantry of 7th Marines setting up
-mortar during initial encounter with Chinese in northeast Korea; and,
-below, enemy tank killed by Marine fire.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148hb.jpg" width="1609" height="1080" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">Photo courtesy Maj R. B. Crossman</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148i.jpg" width="1647" height="1132" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4550<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Advance of RCT-7—Above, artillery emplacement of Battery G, 11th
-Marines, on 3 November 1950; and, below, supplies transported over
-railroad from Wonsan to Hamhung.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148ib.jpg" width="1632" height="1031" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USA Photo SC 352741</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148j.jpg" width="1615" height="1178" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USA Photo SC 365268<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>As Seen from the Air—Above, “Frozen Chosin” and the rugged terrain
-of the Reservoir area; and, below, an aerial view of the MSR winding
-its precarious way through Funchilin Pass—“a cliff on one side and a
-chasm on the other.”</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148jb.jpg" width="1626" height="983" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">Photo courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148k.jpg" width="1650" height="1200" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5389<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>As Seen by the Infantry—Here are two views of the sort of terrain encountered
-by the infantry of the 1st Marine Division; sometimes it was
-as difficult to complete an approach march as to dislodge the enemy
-after arrival.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148kb.jpg" width="1650" height="1032" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5432</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148l.jpg" width="1588" height="1189" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit center">
-USMC Photo A 4841 <span class="in8">USMC Photo A 4912</span><br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Air Supply and Evacuation—Above, an air drop of supplies and helicopter
-evacuation of casualties at Yudam-ni; below, parachute-rigged
-cases of ammunition in an Air Force C-47.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148lb.jpg" width="1588" height="1024" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USA Photo SC 353608</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148m.jpg" width="1651" height="1162" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4860<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Preparations for Yudam-ni Breakout—Above, Marines selecting gear
-for breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru; and, below, the first stages
-of the three-day fighting advance.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148mb.jpg" width="1624" height="1060" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4843</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148n.jpg" width="1629" height="1166" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4500<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Chinese Communist POWs—Above, these CCF prisoners don’t seem unhappy
-about their captivity; below, a Chinese officer being interrogated
-with the aid of an interpreter.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148nb.jpg" width="1614" height="1092" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5206</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148o.jpg" width="1662" height="1089" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5675<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Marines on the March—These two pictures give some idea of the exhaustion
-of Marines, many of them walking wounded, as they huddle
-by the roadside during halts of the Yudam-ni breakout.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148ob.jpg" width="1631" height="1096" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5676</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148p.jpg" width="1613" height="1132" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5356<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Covered by Artillery—Above, a 105mm howitzer fires to the rear as the
-infantry fights its way forward from Yudam-ni; below, a quarter of a
-mile per hour was considered good progress.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_148pb.jpg" width="1602" height="1080" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 4863</p>
-</div></div>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">149</span></p>
-
-<p>General Smith, flying by helicopter from Hungnam to Yudam-ni on
-the morning of the 26th, could survey the MSR below him and reflect
-with satisfaction that it was now easier to count the Marine outfits
-south of Chinhung-ni than those to the north. These included the 1st
-Tank Battalion with the exception of the provisional platoon at Hagaru
-and the 2d Platoon of Company D at Chinhung-ni. Transportation had
-not yet been provided for the 41st Commando, but the new unit was
-scheduled to move up in convoy on the 28th with Headquarters Battalion
-when the Division CP displaced from Hungnam to Hagaru.
-By that time only service units and a few platoons of tanks and engineers
-would be left in the rear area.</p>
-
-<p>At Hagaru the C-47 airstrip was taking shape as the dozers hacked
-away at the frozen earth night and day, working under flood lights in
-the darkness. Companies C and E of the 1st Medical Battalion had set
-up clearing stations and built up dumps of medical supplies. Troop
-units at Hagaru and Yudam-ni had two days’ supplies of rations and
-fuel, but only a unit of fire was stockpiled at Hagaru in addition to the
-half unit carried by the troops.</p>
-
-<p>Marine motor columns were winding along the narrow, twisting
-mountain road from Hagaru to Yudam-ni in preparation for the attack
-in the morning. Upon arrival at Lieutenant Colonel Davis’s 1/7 CP,
-General Smith learned to his discomfort that the hovering ability of a
-rotary-wing aircraft is curtailed at high altitudes. The helicopter
-dropped like a stone the last ten feet, but fortunately no injury resulted
-to passenger, pilot or machine.<a id="FNanchor_366" href="#Footnote_366" class="fnanchor">366</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_366" href="#FNanchor_366" class="fnanchor">366</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 89.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the 26th intelligence arrived at Hamhung from the 7th Marines,
-reporting capture of three soldiers from the 60th CCF Division. They
-asserted that the 58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions of the 20th CCF Army
-had reached the Yudam-ni area on the 20th. According to these enlisted
-men, Chinese strategy envisioned a move south and southeast from
-Yudam-ni to cut the MSR after two Marine regiments passed.<a id="FNanchor_367" href="#Footnote_367" class="fnanchor">367</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_367" href="#FNanchor_367" class="fnanchor">367</a> CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>X Corps had received similar reports of Chinese movement southeast
-from Yudam-ni as well as air reports of enemy activity north and northeast
-of the Chosin Reservoir. Six Chinese divisions had now been identified
-in northeast Korea but both Corps and Division intelligence estimates
-of probable enemy action continued to be optimistic. Although
-Chinese attacks on the division’s MSR or along the Huichon-Huksu-ri-Hamhung<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">150</span>
-axis were not ruled out, G-2 officers seemed to consider a
-continued westward withdrawal more likely.<a id="FNanchor_368" href="#Footnote_368" class="fnanchor">368</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_368" href="#FNanchor_368" class="fnanchor">368</a> X Corps, <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 32; 1stMarDiv <i>PIR 33</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Division planning went ahead on the assumption of commander and
-staff that the enemy would be met in strength in the mountainous country
-west of Yudam-ni. This was the basis for the decision to pass the
-relatively fresh 5th Marines through the 7th for the attack westward.<a id="FNanchor_369" href="#Footnote_369" class="fnanchor">369</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_369" href="#FNanchor_369" class="fnanchor">369</a> Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 79, 82, 87.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was a cold, clear Sunday afternoon when General Smith returned
-to Hungnam. From his helicopter he could see for several miles on
-either side, and no signs of enemy activity were discerned in the snow-clad
-hills. After his arrival at the Division CP, however, the Marine
-general was informed that the situation had gone from bad to worse in
-west Korea. The II ROK Corps on the right flank had disintegrated
-on the 26th under a second day’s heavy blows, thus exposing the 2d
-Infantry Division and Turkish Brigade to flank attack. In short, the
-Eighth Army offensive had been brought to a standstill before the
-Marines could jump off in the morning as the other arm of the United
-Nations envelopment.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">151</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Crisis at Yudam-ni</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Marine Attack on 27 November—Marine Disposition Before
-CCF Attack—The Battle of Northwest Ridge—Chinese Seize
-Hill 1403—Fighting at 3/5’s CP—The Battle of North Ridge</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> 2d battalion, vanguard of the 5th Marines, completed its
-move from the east coast of the Chosin Reservoir to Yudam-ni
-during the afternoon and evening of 26 November. After deploying
-his command south of the village, Lieutenant Colonel Roise and his S-3,
-Major Theodore F. Spiker, made a reconnaissance in preparation for
-the next day’s attack.<a id="FNanchor_370" href="#Footnote_370" class="fnanchor">370</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_370" href="#FNanchor_370" class="fnanchor">370</a> 2/5 <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 8–9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Yudam-ni lies in the center of a broad valley surrounded by five great
-ridges, named in relation to their direction from the village: North,
-Northwest, Southwest, South, and Southeast. Beginning at the rim of
-the valley, each of these ridges extends several thousand yards and includes
-many peaks, spurs, and draws, certain of which took on special
-significance as the crisis at Yudam-ni unfolded.</p>
-
-<p>A finger of the Chosin Reservoir reaches toward Yudam-ni in the
-valley between North and Southeast Ridges. The other four corridors
-radiating from the valley are highway routes. Lieutenant Colonel Roise
-surveyed the westerly road, which leaves Yudam-ni between Northwest
-and Southwest Ridges. His assigned objective encompassed distant
-spurs of these heights, bordering the road about a mile and a half
-west of the village.<a id="FNanchor_371" href="#Footnote_371" class="fnanchor">371</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_371" href="#FNanchor_371" class="fnanchor">371</a> 5thMar <i>OpnO 39-50</i>, 26 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 7th Marines (-) was disposed in perimeter around Yudam-ni on
-terminal hills of four of the five ridges: D and E Companies (attached<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">152</span>
-to 1/7) on North Ridge, 3/7 on Southwest, and 1/7 on South and
-Southeast.<a id="FNanchor_372" href="#Footnote_372" class="fnanchor">372</a> Since the high ground occupied by 3/7 overlooked the
-route of attack and Roise’s objective, Colonel Litzenberg<a id="FNanchor_373" href="#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">373</a> later in the
-day specified a new destination for 2/5, a pass ten miles west of Yudam-ni.
-It was a big order, but Litzenberg’s troops would support the 5th
-Marines’ outfit by making limited advances along the skylines of Northwest
-and Southwest Ridges. With this protection on his flanks initially,
-Roise could concentrate more strength for the drive through the low
-ground.<a id="FNanchor_374" href="#Footnote_374" class="fnanchor">374</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_372" href="#FNanchor_372" class="fnanchor">372</a> The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines prevented H&amp;S and Weapons
-(-) Companies from moving to Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on
-the 27th while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support Fox Company. The
-two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni were assigned to 1/7 for operational control.
-MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments,
-7 Sept 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_373" href="#FNanchor_373" class="fnanchor">373</a> Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines in the absence of the Commanding
-Officer, 5th Marines. The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col
-Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as senior officer present. See Col R. L.
-Murray Comments, n. d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments,
-13 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_374" href="#FNanchor_374" class="fnanchor">374</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 20; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 14; 2/5 <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 8–9; Litzenberg Comments, 19 and
-20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56. Roise Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Nightfall of 26 November was accompanied by an abrupt temperature
-drop to zero degrees Fahrenheit. The north wind screamed across
-the frozen reservoir and lashed the Marines on the valley floor and
-hillsides around Yudam-ni. At 2200, a group of half-frozen company
-commanders gathered within the flapping walls of Roise’s blackout tent
-to receive their orders. The attack was to start at 0800 the next morning,
-with 2/5 passing through the 7th Marines in a column of companies.
-Recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch mortars of the 5th Marines would support
-the advance, along with First Lieutenant Wayne E. Richards’ 2d
-Platoon of Able Company Engineers. Two Corsairs of VMF-312 and
-a spotter plane from VMO-6 were to provide aerial reconnaissance and
-close air support.<a id="FNanchor_375" href="#Footnote_375" class="fnanchor">375</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_375" href="#FNanchor_375" class="fnanchor">375</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 14.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In other wind-blown tents, 7th Regiment officers learned of their missions
-as assigned by Colonel Litzenberg. The 3d Battalion would
-move farther along the crest of Southwest Ridge on 27 November and
-also seize the terminal peak, Hill 1403, of Northwest Ridge across the
-MSR, in order to support 2/5’s attack more effectively. Dog and Easy
-Companies were to patrol North Ridge and the west coast of the
-Reservoir, while 1/7 scouted both South and Southeast Ridges and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">153</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span>
-their adjoining corridors. Particular attention would be paid to the
-valley running southward between these hill masses, for therein lay
-the vital road to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_376" href="#Footnote_376" class="fnanchor">376</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_376" href="#FNanchor_376" class="fnanchor">376</a> 7thMar FragO, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 20–21.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_12" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_153.png" width="827" height="1182" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>YUDAM-NI</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-12</p></div></div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Attack on 27 November</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Yudam-ni perimeter was quiet throughout the long, frigid night
-of 26–27 November. At dawn the basin and hillsides came alive with
-parka-clad figures stamping and clapping life back into leaden limbs.
-Gradually they began to cluster around small fires to thaw out the
-morning rations and their weapons.</p>
-
-<p>Companies G and H of 3/7 jumped off in the attack at 0815, the
-former to extend the foothold on Southwest Ridge, the latter to seize
-Hill 1403, terminal height of Northwest Ridge. Led by Captain Leroy
-M. Cooke, How Company advanced unopposed and secured its objective
-by midmorning.<a id="FNanchor_377" href="#Footnote_377" class="fnanchor">377</a> Captain Cooney’s Company G moved rapidly
-1200 yards along the crest of Southwest Ridge and occupied a commanding
-peak, Hill 1426, at 0845 without meeting opposition. But
-when Cooney resumed the advance, his troops almost immediately came
-under fire from enemy positions on another peak 500 yards away.<a id="FNanchor_378" href="#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">378</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_377" href="#FNanchor_377" class="fnanchor">377</a> Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and Lieutenant H. H. Harris
-reverted to ExecO.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_378" href="#FNanchor_378" class="fnanchor">378</a> Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from: 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 20–21; RCT 7 <i>URpt
-5</i>; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15–18; 2/5 <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 9; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex SS,
-appendix A (hereafter 1/11 <i>SAR</i>), 8–9; VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG
-1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During 3/7’s operations on the high ground the 2d Battalion, 5th
-Marines, had marched out of Yudam-ni and launched the main attack
-along the road. Company F, under Captain Uel D. Peters, led 2/5 as
-it passed beneath the steep walls of Southwest and Northwest Ridges.
-The first objective was a long spur of the latter height, 500 yards across
-a draw from the 7th Marines on Hill 1403. Approaching the mouth
-of the draw on the right of the road, Fox Company was hit by long-range
-small-arms fire from enemy emplacements on the objective. About
-the same time, 0935, a message from the VMO-6 spotter plane told of
-CCF positions all across the front. Captain Peters held up momentarily
-to appraise the situation, and engineers moving behind his outfit began
-to clear the first of nine unmanned enemy roadblocks that obstructed
-the MSR.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">155</span></p>
-
-<div id="ip_13" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_155.png" width="847" height="1142" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>MARINE ATTACKS - 27 NOV</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-13</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">156</span></p>
-
-<p>According to plan, Company F ascended part way up the slopes of
-Hill 1403 and then advanced across the front of the 7th Marines to
-the head of the long draw that set off the Communist-held spur. Simultaneously,
-4.2-inch and 81mm mortar crews positioned their weapons
-along the road to support this envelopment. The flatlands south of
-Yudam-ni trembled as the 105mm howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel
-Harvey A. Feehan’s 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, opened up at 1015
-with a 15-minute preparation.<a id="FNanchor_379" href="#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">379</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_379" href="#FNanchor_379" class="fnanchor">379</a> Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood who had commanded
-1/11 since its arrival in Korea with the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>While Company F moved overland to strike at the left (north)
-flank of the CCF position, Captain Samuel S. Smith’s Dog Company
-edged forward along the MSR to the mouth of the draw. Like the
-earlier unit, it was met by a hail of bullets. The regimental 4.2-inch
-mortars opened fire on the crest of the spur, and recoilless rifles slammed
-75mm shells into bunkers just now sighted on the forward slopes.
-At 1115, after ground supporting arms had partially neutralized the
-CCF positions, Corsairs of VMF-312 blasted the objective with rockets
-and bombs.</p>
-
-<p>In the wake of the air strike, First Lieutenant Gerald J. McLaughlin
-led Fox Company’s 1st Platoon against the enemy’s north flank, the
-rest of the company supporting the assault by fire from Hill 1403.
-Most of the Chinese defenders fled to the west, and McLaughlin’s
-troops cleared the northern half of the spur by 1300, capturing three
-Red soldiers. The 2d Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Donald
-J. Krabbe, then passed through to secure the southern half, overlooking
-the road. Although the attackers encountered only negligible
-local resistance, they were slowed by heavy machine-gun fire sweeping
-in from a peak 1000 yards farther west.</p>
-
-<p>During Company F’s action on the high ground, Dog Company filed
-around the road bend at the south end of the spur and moved toward a
-valley junction a few hundred yards away. This fork is dominated by
-Sakkat Mountain to the west; and the Chinese, in order to block the
-Marine advance, had dug tiers of entrenchments on the eastern slopes
-of the massive height. Frontal fire from these positions converged on
-Company D’s column. Faced by such formidable resistance and terrain
-Lieutenant Colonel Roise discontinued the attack. At 1430 he ordered
-Fox Company to set up on Northwest Ridge for the night, and Dog
-to deploy defensively across the MSR on a spur of Southwest Ridge.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">157</span></p>
-
-<p>On the crest of the latter, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, had found
-progress increasingly costly during the afternoon of 27 November.
-The peak beyond Hill 1426 was occupied by Company G at 1500,<a id="FNanchor_380" href="#Footnote_380" class="fnanchor">380</a>
-bringing that unit on line with Dog Company of 2/5 in the low ground
-to the north. Like the 5th Marines’ outfit, Company G was now confronted
-with the broad crescent of CCF fortifications buttressed by the
-defensive complex on Sakkat Mountain. Machine-gun barrages drove
-the 7th Marines’ unit off the hilltop, and Company I of 3/7 rushed forward
-from the high ground overlooking Yudam-ni to add its firepower
-in support. Baker Company of 1/7, on patrol in the valley between
-Southwest and South Ridges, ascended into the bullet-swept zone at
-1230 to help out. When it became heavily engaged, elements of Company
-C were ordered forward from the Yudam-ni vicinity as reinforcement.
-Thus parts of three battalions, 2/5, 3/7, and 1/7, felt the storm
-of steel and lead on Southwest Ridge throughout the afternoon.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_380" href="#FNanchor_380" class="fnanchor">380</a> While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements, George Company’s commander,
-Capt Cooney, was mortally wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>While fighting raged in an arc from south to west on the 27th, another
-danger area was discovered to the north and northeast, completing
-a vast semicircle of known CCF concentrations in proximity to
-Yudam-ni. A patrol from Company D of 2/7, moving over North
-Ridge along the west coast of the reservoir, ran into heavy machine-gun
-and mortar fire about 4000 yards from the village. Marine air struck
-at the entrenchments of an estimated enemy company, and at 1645 the
-patrol withdrew with several casualties to Company D’s lines on the
-southern tip of North Ridge.</p>
-
-<p>At dusk on the 27th a general calm settled over Yudam-ni, broken
-only occasionally by scattered exchanges of small-arms fire. The main
-Marine attack had netted about 1500 yards, placing 2/5 on the objective
-originally assigned by the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel
-Murray. That the Chinese did not allow this battalion to advance three
-more miles, to its new objective and into hopeless entrapment, seems
-inconsistent in view of the CCF plans for the night of 27–28 November.
-The auxiliary attack by 3/7 won 1200 more yards of the crest of Southwest
-Ridge, and the occupation of Hill 1403 by How Company of that
-battalion represented a gain of about 2000.</p>
-
-<p>In a few hours, the Marines would give thanks that their successes
-on 27 November had been modest ones.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">158</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Dispositions Before CCF Attack</i></h3>
-
-<p>The units of Yudam-ni will be listed counter-clockwise, beginning with
-those on North Ridge, according to the positions they occupied around
-the perimeter on the night of 27–28 November. North Ridge, bounded
-on the east by the reservoir and on the west by the valley separating
-Northwest Ridge, lay closest to the village and was therefore of immediate
-tactical importance. Facing this hill mass from Yudam-ni, one
-sees four distinct terminal heights: Hill 1167 on the right, Hills 1240
-and 1282 in the center, and the giant spur of Hill 1384 on the left.
-Companies D and E of the 7th Marines, occupied Hills 1240 and 1282
-respectively. Since the combined front of these two units was a mile
-wide, they concentrated on their assigned hilltops and relied on periodic
-patrols to span the gaping, 500-yard saddle between. Although both
-flanks of each company dangled “in the air,” they were backed by two-thirds
-of the 5th Marine Regiment in the valley of Yudam-ni.<a id="FNanchor_381" href="#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">381</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_381" href="#FNanchor_381" class="fnanchor">381</a> This section is derived from: 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 19–20; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 11–12;
-2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15–18; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 13.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, had arrived from the east coast of
-the Chosin Reservoir at noon on the 27th, while the attacks to the west
-were in full progress. Lieutenant Colonel Taplett placed his unit in
-an assembly area at the base of North Ridge, beneath the large, unoccupied
-spur leading to Hill 1384. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, did
-not complete its move to Yudam-ni from the east side of the reservoir
-until after dark. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Stevens, II, secured for
-the night in the valley below Hills 1282 and 1240; and with Taplett’s
-nearby command, 1/5 thus comprised a formidable reserve behind the
-thin high-ground defenses of Companies D and E of 2/7.</p>
-
-<p>To the left of North Ridge, going round the clock, Company H of
-3/7 dug in on the crest of Hill 1403, terminal height of Northwest
-Ridge. Farther to the left, in the broad draw through which Company
-F had earlier enveloped the CCF-held spur, Company E of 2/5 took
-up strong blocking positions. The latter unit was not tied in with
-the 7th Marines’ troops on Hill 1403, there being a steep and rugged
-gap of about 200 yards on the intervening hillside. Easy Company’s
-line extended up the left side of the draw and connected with Fox’s
-on the northern tip of the newly won spur. Company F manned the
-remainder of that finger of high ground, its left flank overlooking the
-road separating Southwest Ridge.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">159</span></p>
-
-<p>As mentioned before, Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, occupied
-a finger of Southwest Ridge jutting out toward the road and
-directly opposite Fox Company’s spur. To the left, but beyond physical
-contact, Companies G and I of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, defended
-the topographical crest of Southwest Ridge. As an example of altitudes
-and distances involved around the perimeter, the latter company,
-perched atop Hill 1426 (meters), sat 1200 feet above the valley floor
-at Yudam-ni<a id="FNanchor_382" href="#Footnote_382" class="fnanchor">382</a> and at a lineal distance of a mile and a half from the
-village. To its left rear, 2000 yards away on the same hill mass, Company
-A of 1/7 defended a terminal peak, Hill 1294, overlooking the
-broad valley separating South Ridge. A platoon of Company C, 1/7,
-was deployed on the valley floor to block that avenue into Marine artillery
-positions.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_382" href="#FNanchor_382" class="fnanchor">382</a> Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>South Ridge, capped by a conical peak jutting 1600 feet skyward,
-points at Yudam-ni and the reservoir like a great arrowhead. Company
-B of 1/7, after returning from the active patrol mentioned earlier, entrenched
-on the tip, Hill 1276, to cover the deep gorge between South
-and Southeast Ridges. In this narrow ribbon of low ground, the MSR
-from Yudam-ni travels southward four miles before turning abruptly
-east into Toktong Pass. Company C of 1/7, less one platoon, occupied
-a spur of Southeast Ridge near the sharp turn—three miles from the
-Valley of Yudam-ni and five from the village itself.</p>
-
-<p>Even farther out on a tactical limb was Fox Company of 2/7, which
-had departed Hagaru at noon on 27 November<a id="FNanchor_383" href="#Footnote_383" class="fnanchor">383</a> to take up hilltop positions
-in the center of Toktong Pass. Its mission, like that of Company
-C, was to guard the vulnerable MSR between Hagaru and Yudam-ni.
-But it was seven miles from the friendly perimeter at Hagaru on the
-one side and over two mountainous miles from Company C on the
-other. Fox Company, numerically and geographically, appeared to be
-fair game for some CCF regiment on the prowl—although appearances
-are sometimes deceiving.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_383" href="#FNanchor_383" class="fnanchor">383</a> Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This, then, was the disposition of the 5th and 7th Marines in the
-evening of 27 November: a total of ten understrength rifle companies
-of both regiments on the high ground around Yudam-ni; two battalions
-of the 5th in the valley near the village; and two rifle companies,
-Charlie and Fox, of the 7th in isolated positions along the 14-mile
-route to Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">160</span></p>
-
-<p>The regimental command posts of Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant
-Colonel Murray were located at Yudam-ni along with the usual headquarters
-elements, except for the Antitank Company of the 7th Marines,
-at Hagaru. Also at Hagaru were Lieutenant Colonel Randolph S. D.
-Lockwood’s headquarters of 2/7,<a id="FNanchor_384" href="#Footnote_384" class="fnanchor">384</a> and Weapons Company (-) of that
-battalion. For this reason, Companies D and E, on Hills 1240 and 1282
-at Yudam-ni, came under temporary control of 1/7.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_384" href="#FNanchor_384" class="fnanchor">384</a> LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Despite the lack of tanks,<a id="FNanchor_385" href="#Footnote_385" class="fnanchor">385</a> the Yudam-ni perimeter encompassed
-an impressive array of Marine supporting arms. The 1st and 4th Battalions,
-together with Batteries G and I of the 3d, represented almost
-three-fourths of the fire power of the 11th Regiment. The 48 howitzers—thirty
-105mm and eighteen 155mm—were emplaced in the expansive
-flats generally south of the village, in the direction of South and Southeast
-Ridges. In position to the north were the 75mm recoilless rifles
-of the 5th Marines and the 4.2-inch mortar companies of both infantry
-regiments.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_385" href="#FNanchor_385" class="fnanchor">385</a> Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had attempted to come through
-from Hagaru but gave up the attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one
-M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese cut the road before the others
-could follow. 1stTkBn, <i>SAR</i>, 21.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Yudam-ni lines bristled with enough firepower to give any commander
-confidence, but the supply situation was not reassuring. Although
-Captain Robert A. Morehead and a detachment from the 1st
-Service Battalion arrived during the 27th to begin establishment of a
-division dump, the supply level was low. The dumps of the 5th and
-7th Marines contained about 3 days’ rations, 3 days’ POL, and 2 U/F
-of small arms ammunition in addition to amounts in the hands of the
-troops. Very little artillery ammunition was available beyond that held
-by the firing batteries. During the 27th Colonel Litzenberg sent his
-S-4, Major Maurice E. Roach, to Hagaru to arrange for the dispatching
-of about five truckloads each of rations, POL, and ammunition. They
-arrived late on the evening of the same day—the last supplies to get
-through from Hagaru. That same evening Lieutenant Colonel Beall,
-commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, led all the
-organic vehicles (except 40-50) of the 5th and 7th Marines back to
-Hagaru with the intent of returning them the following day loaded.
-The Chinese, who had already invested the road, for some reason permitted
-the trucks to pass. Beall reached Hagaru without incident. The
-trucks were never able to return.<a id="FNanchor_386" href="#Footnote_386" class="fnanchor">386</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">161</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_386" href="#FNanchor_386" class="fnanchor">386</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 42–43; 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 45-50; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex FF (1stServBn);
-1stMTBn <i>SAR</i>, 9; Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>The Battle of Northwest Ridge</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 1830, two hours after the looming mass of Sakkat Mountain had
-blotted out the sun on 27 November, Yudam-ni was pitch black. The
-temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero.<a id="FNanchor_387" href="#Footnote_387" class="fnanchor">387</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_387" href="#FNanchor_387" class="fnanchor">387</a> Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21, n. p.; RCT 7
-<i>URpt 5</i>; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18; 2/5 <i>HD Nov 50</i>, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 2253
-27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt Samuel Jaskilka, “Easy Alley,” <i>Marine Corps
-Gazette</i>, xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On Northwest Ridge the infantrymen of 3/7 and 2/5 slowly grew
-numb from the penetrating cold. Trigger fingers, though heavily
-gloved, ached against the brittle steel of weapons, and parka hoods became
-encrusted with frozen moisture. In the cumbersome shoe-pacs,
-perspiration-soaked feet gradually became transformed into lumps of
-biting pain.</p>
-
-<p>When men are immobilized for hours in such temperatures, no
-amount of clothing will keep them warm. Yet, even more disturbing to
-the Marines on the Yudam-ni perimeter was the effect of the weather
-on carbines and BARs. These weapons froze to such a degree that
-they became unreliable or, in some cases, completely unserviceable.
-The M-1 rifle and Browning machine guns showed stubborn streaks
-but retained their effectiveness, provided they had been cared for
-properly.</p>
-
-<p>While the Marines sat in their holes and cursed the frigid night,
-the quiet hills around them came alive with thousands of Red Chinese
-on the march. Unseen and unheard, the endless columns of quilted
-green wound through valleys and over mountain trails leading toward
-the southern tips of North and Northwest Ridges. These were the
-assault battalions of the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions. With seven
-other divisions they comprised Red China’s 9th Army Group led by
-Sung Shin-lun, one of the best field commanders in the CCF. Lin Pao,
-commanding the 3d Field Army, had dispatched Sung’s army group
-to northeast Korea specifically to destroy the 1st Marine Division. The
-knockout blow, aimed at the northwest arc of the Yudam-ni perimeter,
-amounted to a massive frontal assault. Another CCF division, the
-59th, had completed a wide envelopment to the south, driving in toward
-South Ridge and Toktong Pass to cut the MSR between Hagaru and
-Yudam-ni.<a id="FNanchor_388" href="#Footnote_388" class="fnanchor">388</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">162</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_388" href="#FNanchor_388" class="fnanchor">388</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, 31–32; G-2 <i>SAR</i>, 15, 30–31; <i>CCF Army Histories</i>, 13, 21.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_14" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_162.png" width="835" height="1136" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-14</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">163</span></p>
-
-<p>This was the main effort of the CCF in northeast Korea: three divisions
-against two regiments of Marines. And in addition to the advantage
-of mass, the Reds held the trump cards of mobility and surprise.
-They enjoyed superior mobility because they were unencumbered
-by heavy weapons and hence could use primitive routes of approach
-in the darkness. They had the advantage of surprise because their
-practice of marching by night and hiding by day had concealed their
-approach to a large degree from UN air observation. To offset these
-odds, the outnumbered Marines would have to rely on superior firepower,
-command of the air, and another weapon called <i>esprit</i>.</p>
-
-<p>By 2100, Northwest Ridge was crawling with Chinese only a few hundred
-yards from the positions of Companies E and F, 5th Marines, and
-Company H, 7th Marines. The enemy troops, padding silently in their
-rubber sneakers, had as yet given no hint of their presence. To divert
-attention, the Red commander sent a patrol against 2/5’s roadblock on
-the MSR between Northwest and Southwest Ridges. Troops of Company
-D, 5th Marines, exchanged grenades with the Chinese and killed
-two of them. The remainder they quickly dispersed with mortar fire.</p>
-
-<p>Simultaneously with the thrust at the roadblock, small enemy teams
-probed Fox Company’s line on the spur of Northwest Ridge, vanishing
-into the night after each light contact. These disturbances in the center
-of 2/5’s zone enabled CCF infiltrators and grenadiers on the northern
-tip of the spur to crawl undetected within a few yards of the limiting
-point between Company F and Company E on the right. Bugle calls
-cut through the darkness, and the grenadiers began heaving their missiles
-while the submachine gunners opened up. The din of this first
-attempt to unnerve the defenders lasted several minutes. Then came a
-sustained mortar bombardment of Marine front lines. While the shells
-rained down, the Chinese opened fire with crew-served automatic
-weapons emplaced all across Northwest Ridge.</p>
-
-<p>At 2125 the mortar eruptions began to walk toward the Marine rear.
-Whistles screeched, enemy machine guns fell silent, and the first Chinese
-assault waves hurled themselves against the juncture of Companies
-E and F. The enemy attacked on an extremely narrow front in order
-to maintain control. His troops advanced in column within grenade
-range, then deployed abruptly into skirmish lines that flailed the Marine
-positions ceaselessly and without regard to losses.</p>
-
-<p>The machine guns and rifles of Companies E and F piled the attackers
-in grotesque heaps up and down the front, but the pressure of human<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">164</span>
-tonnage was unremitting. Ultimately, the Reds broke through on the
-northern tip of the spur, where the two units were joined. They poured
-troops into the gap, and as they attempted to roll back the newly exposed
-flanks, they overran part of Fox Company’s right wing platoon. Captain
-Samuel Jaskilka, commanding Easy Company in the draw, dispatched a
-light machine-gun section and a squad from his 3d Platoon (deployed
-in the rear) to reinforce his 1st Platoon at the edge of the breakthrough.
-The latter unit, under Second Lieutenant Jade L. Nolan, held
-firm and bent back its left to prevent encroachment on the rear. Staff
-Sergeant Russell J. Borgomainero, of the 1st Platoon, deployed the
-reinforcements to contain the penetration, while 2/5’s 81mm mortars
-laid barrages on the salient.</p>
-
-<p>At 2215, as the attack against Companies E and F was reaching its
-height, Lieutenant Colonel Roise ordered H&amp;S Company of 2/5 to
-deploy for the immediate defense of his command post. The Chinese,
-blocked in their attempts to get behind Easy Company, continued to
-stab at the rear of Fox. If their envelopment succeeded, they could
-swarm over the headquarters and supporting arms positions of the 2d
-Battalion.</p>
-
-<p>Roise’s precaution proved unnecessary. As fast as the Red commander
-sent troops into the salient, they were cut down by mortar, machine-gun,
-and rifle fire. The few who did worm their way into Marine supporting
-positions died in individual combat. At 2230, on the right of Company
-E’s front, the 2d Platoon turned its machine guns on a native hut 200
-yards up the draw and set it ablaze. The brilliant illumination exposed
-all CCF troops in the narrow corridor and on the adjoining slopes; and
-the Marines commenced a turkey shoot that ended at 2400 with the
-virtual annihilation of the main enemy force.</p>
-
-<p>The Chinese maintained their grip on the northern tip of the spur,
-however, and fought off patrols from Easy Company trying to re-establish
-contact with Fox. Since the gap remained, leaving the enemy in
-position to fire on the Marine rear, Roise shifted the reserve platoon of
-Company D to Fox Company’s side of the salient. This redeployment,
-in conjunction with Company E’s earlier action on the other side, converted
-the penetration area into a gantlet for the Chinese. Already
-weakened by casualties numbering in the hundreds, the Red commander
-apparently wrote off the salient as a net loss, for he never used it again.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">165</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Chinese Seize Hill 1403</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 2135, just as the first assault waves were pounding 2/5’s front,
-the vanguard of another enemy force began to feel out the lines of
-Company H, 3/7, on Hill 1403 to the north. Captain Cooke’s three
-platoons were deployed in an arc from the road to the peak of the hill
-to protect the line of communication to the valley of Yudam-ni. Out of
-physical contact with all friendly elements, How Company was assailable
-from every direction, as the Chinese quickly discovered.<a id="FNanchor_389" href="#Footnote_389" class="fnanchor">389</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_389" href="#FNanchor_389" class="fnanchor">389</a> Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section are: 7thMar <i>SAR</i>; RCT 7 <i>URpt</i> 6;
-3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; 2/5 <i>HD</i>, <i>Nov 50</i>, 9–10; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to CG
-1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley,” 18–19; Capt M. P. Newton
-Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following a half hour of lightning probes, the enemy launched a
-strong attack against First Lieutenant Elmer A. Krieg’s platoon on the
-right front. Communications with Cooke’s CP went out almost immediately,
-and in the space of a few minutes the Marine right flank collapsed
-under the weight of CCF numbers. Krieg shifted his remaining
-men to the left and joined Second Lieutenant Paul E. Denny’s platoon.</p>
-
-<p>At the company CP on the reverse slope, Captain Cooke and his forward
-observers radioed for all available supporting arms. The prompt
-barrages by artillery and mortars in the valley stopped the Communists
-on the right half of the summit and enabled Cooke to reorganize his
-forward platoons. As the supporting fires lifted, he personally led an
-assault to restore the right flank. But the CCF machine guns and grenades
-smashed the counterattack, and Cooke was cut down at the head
-of his men.</p>
-
-<p>Second Lieutenant James M. Mitchell, executive officer, temporarily
-took command of Company H. When word of Cooke’s death reached
-3/7’s CP, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Harris<a id="FNanchor_390" href="#Footnote_390" class="fnanchor">390</a> dispatched Lieutenant
-Harris (no relation), recently returned to duty after illness, to take
-over the beleaguered unit.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_390" href="#FNanchor_390" class="fnanchor">390</a> LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved Maj Roach on 11 Nov.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The younger Harris, who had been out of action since shortly after
-the “How Hill” battle in early November, safely ascended the enemy-infested
-slopes of Hill 1403 in the darkness. About midnight he reached
-How Company’s positions and found all of Cooke’s officers wounded
-but one, Lieutenant Newton. The platoons of Krieg and Denny were
-badly depleted, but Harris moved Newton’s platoon from the left<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">166</span>
-flank to the right. Newton’s men regained enough ground in a counterattack
-to cement the company’s position.</p>
-
-<p>After these first attacks against 2/5 and H/7 over the two-mile
-breadth of Northwest Ridge, the Chinese remained generally inactive
-for a period of about two hours. They had paid heavily for minor gains—so
-heavily that fresh battalions were called from reserve to stamp out
-the Marine resistance on the tip of the ridge. And at 0300, several
-hundred CCF riflemen, grenadiers, and submachine gunners commenced
-the second general assault, striking at 2/5 and Company H simultaneously.</p>
-
-<p>In the low ground at the center of the two-mile front, Jaskilka’s Easy
-Company threw a curtain of machine-gun fire across the draw in the
-path of 300 Chinese advancing frontally. The first enemy ranks marched
-into the fire lanes and were mowed down like rows of grain. The CCF
-soldiers in subsequent formations apparently viewed the grisly, corpse-strewn
-corridor with misgivings, for they stopped several hundred yards
-up the narrow valley and took cover. Thereafter, the main fighting in
-Company E’s zone involved long-range exchanges of machine-gun and
-mortar fire, although clashes at close quarters occasionally flared up
-on the flanks.</p>
-
-<p>Approximately 200 Communist troops had concentrated meanwhile
-against Fox Company on the spur to the left, where the ground afforded
-more cover and space for maneuver. Stumbling over a carpet of their
-own dead, the Reds thrust repeatedly at the center of the Marine line.
-They inflicted many casualties on the defenders and ultimately overran
-two machine-gun positions. But this was the sum total of their success;
-and fighting on the north half of the spur, at the edge of the gap between
-Companies E and F, continued sporadically for the rest of the
-night with neither side gaining any appreciable advantage.</p>
-
-<p>On the right of the 2d Battalion, the second CCF onslaught had struck
-the front and both flanks of Company H on Hill 1403. Human cannon
-fodder of Red China was hurled against the Marine positions for a full
-hour, but Lieutenant Harris’ command held. H Company’s roadblock,
-commanded by Sergeant Vick, decisively beat off a Chinese attack in the
-valley; and at 0400 Lieutenant Colonel Harris ordered the hard pressed
-company to pull back toward the rear of Easy Company, 2/5. Two
-hours later How Company completed its fighting withdrawal.</p>
-
-<p>The loss of Hill 1403 posed a grave threat to the whole defensive
-network around the village. Not only were the Chinese now ideally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">167</span>
-situated to strike at the rear of 2/5 and sever it from the two regiments,
-but in sufficient strength they could attack the rear and flanks of the
-Marine units on North and Southwest Ridges. Moreover, at dawn, they
-would be looking down the throats of some 2000 Marines on the valley
-floor.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Fighting at 3/5’s CP</i></h3>
-
-<p>The partially successful assault on Northwest Ridge involved two
-regiments, the 266th and 267th, of the 89th CCF Division. Operating
-abreast of this force, the 79th Division had meanwhile advanced over
-the rugged spine of North Ridge toward the two isolated companies of
-the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, occupying terminal Hills 1282 and
-1240 of that huge land mass. Elements of the 79th Division’s three
-regiments were in the fore, and each regiment was apparently disposed
-in a column of battalions. Facing south toward the Marine positions
-on North Ridge, the CCF order of battle, with probable objectives assigned,
-was as follows:</p>
-
-<table id="t167" summary="CCF order of battle">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">237th Regt</td>
-  <td class="tdc">235th Regt</td>
-  <td class="tdc">236th Regt</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">Hill 1384</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Hill 1240</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Hill 1167</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">(Unoccupied)</td>
-  <td class="tdc">(D/7)</td>
-  <td class="tdc">(Unoccupied)</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>For reasons unknown, the commander of the 235th Regiment did
-not include Hill 1282 in his plan for seizing the high ground above
-Yudam-ni. He ordered his 1st Battalion to take only Hill 1240, and
-the commanding officer of that unit in turn assigned the mission to his
-1st and Special Duty Companies. After these two outfits had seized
-the objective, the 2d and 3d Companies would pass through and, in
-conjunction with other CCF forces in the locale, “... annihilate the
-enemy at Yudam-ni.”<a id="FNanchor_391" href="#Footnote_391" class="fnanchor">391</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">168</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_391" href="#FNanchor_391" class="fnanchor">391</a> ATIS, <i>Enemy Documents: Korean Operations</i>, Issue 84, 38. Except where otherwise
-noted, this section is based on: <i>Ibid.</i>, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May 56; 1stLt
-R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52; RCT 7 <i>URpt 5</i>; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-1000 28 Nov 50; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0730 28 Nov
-50; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J. H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation
-contains a number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of small unit actions.
-An earlier translation is to be found in ATIS, <i>Enemy Documents: Korean Operations</i>,
-Issue 66, 87–134.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Approaching the terminal high ground in darkness, the 1st Battalion,
-235th Regiment, veered off its course and mistakenly ascended a spur
-toward Hill 1282. The 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment, keeping contact
-as it advanced on the left, participated in the error and wound up at
-the foot of Hill 1240. Thus confronted with this precipitous mass
-instead of low, gently sloping Hill 1167, the 3d Battalion floundered
-for several hours and did not take part in the first attack against the
-Marine perimeter. It did, however, send out the usual screen of
-infiltrators.</p>
-
-<p>At 2200, submachine gunners and grenadiers of the 1st and Special
-Duty Companies, 1/235, commenced the preliminaries against Company
-E, 7th Marines on Hill 1282, believing they were engaging a
-Marine platoon on Hill 1240. The harassing force was driven off after
-failing to disrupt the Marine defenses. Almost two hours later, at
-2345, Company D of 2/7 reported enemy infiltration on Hill 1240 a
-thousand yards to the east. Both Marine companies cancelled the
-patrols scheduled for the long saddle connecting their positions and
-went on a 100% alert.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Phillips, commanding Easy Company, had arranged two
-platoons in perimeter around the summit of Hill 1282, and the third
-he had deployed to the right rear, on a spur that dipped toward Yudam-ni.
-At midnight, after a period of silence across the company front,
-the initial CCF assault wave slammed into the northeastern arc of the
-perimeter, manned by First Lieutenant Yancey’s platoon. Marine firepower
-blunted this frontal attack, and the Reds tried to slip around the
-east side of the hilltop. They ran head-on into First Lieutenant Bey’s
-platoon entrenched on the spur and were thrown back.</p>
-
-<p>Resorting to grinding tactics, the Chinese repeatedly assaulted Company
-E’s position from midnight to 0200. Whistles and bugles blared
-over the reaches of North Ridge, and the charging squads of infantry
-met death stoically, to the tune of weird Oriental chants. When one
-formation was cut to pieces by machine-gun fire and grenades, another
-rose out of the night to take its place. By 0200, as the first attack began
-to taper off, the northeastern slopes of Hill 1282 lay buried under a
-mat of human wreckage. An hour later, the 1st and Special Duty Companies
-of the 1st Battalion, 235th CCF Regiment, had ceased to exist,
-having lost nearly every man of their combined total of over 200.
-Company E’s casualties had been heavy, but the Marines still held
-Hill 1282.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">169</span></p>
-
-<div id="ip_15" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_169.png" width="830" height="1179" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>ACTION AT 3/5’S CP</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-15</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">170</span></p>
-
-<p>On Hill 1240, a thousand yards to the east, infiltrators of the 3d Battalion,
-236th CCF Regiment, probed Dog Company’s perimeter while
-Easy was under attack. By 0030, some of the harassing parties had side-slipped
-through the saddle separating Hill 1282 and opened fire on
-the 5th and 7th Regimental headquarters in Yudam-ni.</p>
-
-<p>The sniping from the slopes of North Ridge did not surprise the
-Marines in the valley, for they had long been preparing for a possible
-threat from that direction. Early in the evening, Lieutenant Colonel
-Taplett had re-deployed 3/5 from an assembly area just north of the
-village to a broad tactical perimeter in the same locale. Companies H
-and I, the latter on the right, he positioned facing Northwest Ridge—specifically
-Hill 1403. Two platoons of Company G held blocking
-positions near the base of Southwest Ridge, and the third manned an
-outpost on the slopes of that high ground. At the bottom of North
-Ridge, in the draw between Hill 1282 and the spur of 1384, Taplett
-established his CP with H&amp;S and Weapons Companies providing
-local security.</p>
-
-<p>When 3/5’s commander learned that the spur of Hill 1384 was
-unoccupied, he dispatched a platoon of Company I to an outpost
-position 500 yards up the slope. About 300 yards behind the Item
-Company unit, on a portion of the spur directly above the battalion CP,
-a platoon of South Korean police deployed with two heavy machine
-guns.</p>
-
-<p>At 2045, fifteen minutes before any other unit on the Yudam-ni
-reported a contact, the outpost platoon of Item Company began receiving
-fire from above. This harassment, probably involving advance
-elements of the 237th CCF Regiment, continued sporadically for several
-hours, throughout the period of the first Communist attacks against
-other fronts.</p>
-
-<p>In the valley at 2120, a few men of How Company, 7th Marines,
-entered 3/5’s positions barefooted and partially clothed. Taplett, personally
-noting the time of their arrival, questioned them in the battalion
-aid station, and they told how their 60mm mortar position on Hill 1403
-had been seized by the Chinese.<a id="FNanchor_392" href="#Footnote_392" class="fnanchor">392</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_392" href="#FNanchor_392" class="fnanchor">392</a> MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The battalion commander returned to his CP, and after listening to
-the far-off din of the initial Communist attacks, placed his perimeter
-on a 100% alert at 0115. Half an hour later, the Item Company platoon
-on the spur of Hill 1384 reported an increase in enemy fire coming<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">171</span>
-from above. A message from H/7 next warned that CCF troops were
-moving around Hill 1403 to cut the MSR. Company I observed activity
-in that quarter shortly afterwards, and at 0218 opened fire on an enemy
-platoon, which promptly retracted.</p>
-
-<p>A few minutes later, a company—possibly two companies—of Chinese
-swept down the spur of Hill 1384, overran the Item Company
-platoon outpost, and continued on towards the police platoon. The
-South Koreans, after inflicting heavy casualties on the Reds with their
-two machine guns, vacated the high ground. Enemy troops then spread
-out along the crest and poured plunging fire into H&amp;S and Weapons
-Companies defending the draw.</p>
-
-<p>Weapons Company, on the far side of the depression, held its ground,
-but H&amp;S, directly under the gun, shortly fell back across the MSR.
-Taplett’s CP was left in a no man’s land, with enemy bullets raining
-down out of the night and Marine fire whistling back from across the
-draw and road. Upon learning of the withdrawal, the battalion commander
-elected to remain in the tent in order to keep telephone contact
-with his rifle companies, which were as yet uninvolved. He did not
-consider the situation too serious, and it seemed as though the police
-platoon’s machine guns had taken the sting out of the enemy assault.</p>
-
-<p>Except for a few individuals, the Chinese did not descend from the
-spur. Nor did they direct much fire at Taplett’s blackout tent, which
-they probably took to be unoccupied. Inside, the battalion commander
-studied his maps, received reports and issued instructions over the field
-phone while his S-3, Major Thomas A. Durham, sat nearby with pistol
-drawn. Major John J. Canney, the executive officer, left the CP to
-retrieve H&amp;S Company and was killed as he approached the MSR.
-Private First Class Louis W. Swinson, radio operator, whose instrument
-had proved unreliable in the severe cold, took position outside the tent
-and covered the approaches with his rifle. This unique situation—a
-battalion commander under fire in an exposed position while his rifle
-companies lay peacefully entrenched several hundred yards away—lasted
-for over an hour.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Battle of North Ridge</i></h3>
-
-<p>At approximately 0300, when Taplett, Durham, and Swinson began
-their lonely vigil, the 79th CCF Division launched another assault on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">172</span>
-North Ridge (see Map 16).<a id="FNanchor_393" href="#Footnote_393" class="fnanchor">393</a> As a result of the enemy’s first attack,
-and in anticipation of the second, Colonel Murray earlier had moved
-elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, into position behind 3/5.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_393" href="#FNanchor_393" class="fnanchor">393</a> Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from: 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 12–13; 1/5 <i>HD,
-Nov 50</i>; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 7thMar <i>URpt 5</i>; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov
-50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven Comments, 24 Aug 56;
-Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments,
-19 Jun 56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Second Lieutenant Nicholas M. Trapnell’s 1st Platoon of Company A
-left the battalion assembly area in the valley at 0100 and started up the
-steep incline of Hill 1282. Climbing the icy slopes by day was difficult
-enough, but darkness and a minus-20-degree temperature made it a
-gruelling and perilous ordeal. Trapnell’s outfit did not reach the crest
-until after 0300, when the CCF assault was at the height of its fury
-and Company E was facing imminent annihilation. The Able Company
-unit moved into position with Lieutenant Bey’s platoon on the spur
-jutting back from the peak. As yet, the full force of the Chinese drive
-had not spread to this area.</p>
-
-<p>The Red commander of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, used his
-3d Company for the second attack against the cap of Hill 1282. With
-the few survivors of the 1st and Special Duty Companies attached, the
-fresh unit probably numbered about 125 troops. In squads of eight to
-ten, the Chinese struck again and again at the perimeter on the summit,
-and the two depleted platoons of Easy Company dwindled to a mere
-handful of tired, desperate Marines. First Lieutenant Robert E. Snyder’s
-3d Platoon of A/5, having been sent up from the valley shortly
-after Trapnell’s outfit, arrived as reinforcements. Snyder did not have
-contact with Bey and Trapnell, whose platoons were still intact, so he
-integrated his men with the remnants of the two platoons on the peak.</p>
-
-<p>Both sides suffered crippling losses during the close fighting on
-Hill 1282. The Reds finally drove a wedge between the Marine defenders
-on the summit and the platoons of Bey and Trapnell on the spur.
-According to Bey:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>It soon became obvious that a penetration had been made to our left. The
-positions atop the hill and the Command Post area were brightly illuminated
-by flares and other explosions. By this time [approximately 0400] nothing
-but Chinese could be heard on the telephone in the command post and my
-Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant Daniel M. Murphy, requested permission
-to take what men we could spare in an attempt to close the gap between the
-left flank of the platoon and the rest of the company. I told him to go ahead
-and do what he could.<a id="FNanchor_394" href="#Footnote_394" class="fnanchor">394</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">173</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_394" href="#FNanchor_394" class="fnanchor">394</a> Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_16" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_173.png" width="839" height="1193" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE BATTLE OF NORTH RIDGE</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-16</p></div></div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">174</span></p>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, the center and rear of Easy Company’s perimeter was
-reduced to the chaos of a last stand. Yancey, already wounded, was hit
-again as he tried to reorganize the few Marine survivors on the peak.
-First Lieutenant Leonard M. Clements, the other platoon leader, fell
-wounded as did First Lieutenant William J. Schreier of the mortar
-section and Lieutenant Snyder. Captain Phillips, hurling grenades in
-the midst of the melee, was killed. His executive officer, First Lieutenant
-Raymond O. Ball, took command of Company E, shouting out
-encouragement as he lay immobilized by two wounds. He was hit
-several more times before he lapsed into unconsciousness and died
-after reaching the aid station. Lieutenant Snyder took command.</p>
-
-<p>By 0500, CCF infantrymen of the 3d Company, 1/235, occupied the
-summit of Hill 1282, still believing it to be Hill 1240. The remnants
-of the platoons of Yancey, Clements, and Snyder had been driven to
-the reverse slope in the west, while the units of Trapnell and Bey clung
-to the crest of the southeastern spur, overlooking Yudam-ni. Up to
-this point, Chinese casualties on Hill 1282 probably numbered about
-250, with Marine losses approximating 150. Easy Company had been
-reduced to the effective strength of a rifle platoon (split in two), and
-the pair of A/5 platoons paid with upwards of 40 killed and wounded
-during the brief time on the battle line; only six effectives remained of
-Snyder’s platoon.</p>
-
-<p>The danger from enemy-held Hill 1282 was compounded by the
-success of the 3d Battalion, 236th Regiment on Hill 1240 to the east.
-At about 0105 the Chinese who had previously been content only to
-make probing attacks on Captain Hull’s Dog Company shifted to a
-full-scale assault. Sergeant Othmar J. Reller’s platoon, holding the
-northwest portion of the company perimeter, beat off three attacks
-before being overrun at about 0230. First Lieutenant Richard C. Webber,
-the machine gun platoon leader, attempted to plug the gap with
-the available reinforcements but was prevented by a fire fight outside
-the Company CP. First Lieutenant Edward M. Seeburger’s platoon
-holding the perimeter on the right (east) was under too heavy an
-attack to extend to the left and tie in with Webber. The Chinese overran
-Hull’s CP at about 0300, and he ordered Seeburger and First Lieutenant
-Anthony J. Sota, commanding the rear platoon, to reorganize
-at the foot of Hill 1240.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Hull, wounded, his command cut to the size of a few squads,
-rallied his troops on the hillside and led a counterattack against the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">175</span>
-crest. The surprised Chinese recoiled and the Marines won a small
-foothold. Then the enemy smashed back from the front, right flank,
-and right rear. Hull was wounded again but continued in action as
-his hasty perimeter diminished to the proportions of a squad position.
-With the approach of dawn, he had only 16 men left who could fight.
-The enemy was on the higher ground to his front, on both flanks, and
-on the slopes in his rear.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">177</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Fox Hill</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7—Fox Company at Toktong
-Pass—Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge—Deadlock
-on Hill 1240—The Fight for Northwest Ridge—Second Night’s
-Attacks on Fox Hill—Not Enough Tents for Casualties—The
-Turning Point of 30 November</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Of</span> the Marine artillery units at Yudam-ni, those most directly
-imperiled by CCF gains on North Ridge were Major Parry’s 3d
-Battalion and Battery K of the 4th. The latter, under First Lieutenant
-Robert C. Messman, lay beneath the southeastern spur of Hill 1282,
-having gone into position at 2100 on 27 November. Rearward of King
-Battery, 3/11 was positioned below the steep slopes of Hill 1240
-where its 105s had fired in direct support of the 7th Marines on 26
-and 27 November (see Map 12).<a id="FNanchor_395" href="#Footnote_395" class="fnanchor">395</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_395" href="#FNanchor_395" class="fnanchor">395</a> 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 6; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex SS, appendix 4, (hereafter 4/11 <i>SAR</i>), 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, which had arrived at Yudam-ni
-early on the 27th to support the 5th Regiment, was emplaced in the
-valley between the tips of South and Southwest Ridges. Major William
-McReynolds, commanding the 4th Battalion, reached the perimeter
-with his outfit later. He had two batteries in action by 1900 and all
-three by 2300 on the low ground separating South and Southeast
-Ridges. Battery K, firing under the direction of 1/11 pending the
-arrival of the parent unit, then reverted to McReynolds’ control,
-although it did not displace rearward to 4/11’s positions until the next
-day.</p>
-
-<p>The TD-14 bulldozers of the 11th Marines had proved to be no
-match for the eight-inch frostline around the Reservoir, with the result
-that all batteries and security positions sat fully exposed on the concrete-like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">178</span>
-flatlands. Incoming mortar fire harassed the artillerymen throughout
-the day of 27 November, and after dark CCF flat trajectory weapons
-stepped up the tempo of bombardment. Marine casualties in the valley
-were light, however, for the enemy gunners seemed unable to group
-their erratic pot shots into effective barrages.<a id="FNanchor_396" href="#Footnote_396" class="fnanchor">396</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_396" href="#FNanchor_396" class="fnanchor">396</a> 1/11 <i>SAR</i>, 8; 4/11 <i>SAR</i>, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was the imminent threat of Communist infantry attack from North
-Ridge that weighed down on the artillerymen of the 11th Regiment
-during the predawn hours of 28 November. Since the beginning of the
-CCF onslaught, they had been firing their howitzers almost ceaselessly
-in a 180-degree arc, and ammunition stocks were fast dwindling to a
-critical level. Their gun flashes providing brilliant targets for enemy
-infiltrators, they could reasonably expect a full-scale assault in the
-event of the dislodgment of Easy and Dog Companies from Hills 1282
-and 1240. The effect of countermoves by Colonels Litzenberg and
-Murray would not be known until after dawn, and meanwhile the
-Marine gunners kept on firing their howitzers while the black outline
-of North Ridge loomed ever more menacing.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Encirclement of Company C of RCT-7</i></h3>
-
-<p>While the 79th and 89th CCF Divisions pounded the northwest arc of
-the Yudam-ni perimeter during the night of 27–28 November, the
-59th completed its wide end-sweep to the southeast and moved against
-the 14-mile stretch of road to Hagaru. At the moment the Communist
-effort in that quarter could be considered a secondary attack, but if
-ever a target fulfilled all the qualifications of a prime objective, it was
-this critical link in the MSR—the very lifeline to most of the 1st Marine
-Division’s infantry and artillery strength.</p>
-
-<p>During the 27th Captain Wilcox’s Baker Company of the 7th Marines
-patrolled along South Ridge. As darkness fell, it was heavily
-engaged and incumbered with a number of litter casualties. With the
-permission of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Davis
-led Captain John F. Morris’s Charlie Company (-) down the MSR to
-positions across the road from Hill 1419. Aided by Charlie Company,
-Baker was then able to withdraw and return to Yudam-ni with Davis
-while Morris and his reduced company took up positions on Hill 1419.<a id="FNanchor_397" href="#Footnote_397" class="fnanchor">397</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_397" href="#FNanchor_397" class="fnanchor">397</a> Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>He deployed his two rifle platoons and 60mm mortar section in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">179</span>
-crescent on the lower slopes of the eastern spur, facing the distant crest.
-At 0230, five hours after Yudam-ni came under attack, a CCF force
-descended from the high ground and struck the right flank.<a id="FNanchor_398" href="#Footnote_398" class="fnanchor">398</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_398" href="#FNanchor_398" class="fnanchor">398</a> The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>,
-288–290; Lynn Montross, “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvii,
-no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7thMar ISUM 67; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000
-28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After overrunning part of First Lieutenant Jack A. Chabek’s platoon
-and inflicting heavy casualties, the Reds lashed out at the left flank
-of the crescent-shaped defense. Here Staff Sergeant Earle J. Payne’s
-platoon, less one squad in an outpost on higher ground, bent under
-the weight of the attack and was soon in danger of being driven out of
-position. Captain Morris reinforced the platoons on each flank with
-men from his headquarters and the mortar section. The reshuffling
-was accomplished in the nick of time and just barely tipped the scales
-in favor of the defenders. A seesaw battle raged until after dawn on
-the 28th when, with the help of artillery fire from Yudam-ni, the Marines
-drove the Chinese back into the hills.</p>
-
-<p>Although the critical pressure eased at daybreak, Company C remained
-pinned down by enemy fire coming from every direction, including
-the crest of Hill 1419 directly above. The Chinese were in absolute
-control of the MSR to the south, toward Toktong Pass, and to the north,
-in the direction of Yudam-ni. Morris had taken about 40 casualties—a
-dangerously high proportion, since he had only two of his three rifle
-platoons. His radio had been knocked out by enemy bullets, and the
-60mm mortar section was left with but a few rounds of ammunition.
-For want of communication, he could get no help from the Marine
-Corsairs on station overhead.</p>
-
-<p>The outpost squad from Payne’s platoon could not be contacted in
-its position on the higher slopes of Hill 1419. Corporal Curtis J.
-Kiesling, who volunteered to search for the lost unit, was killed by
-CCF machine-gun fire as he attempted to scale the rugged incline.
-Other men of Company C repeatedly exposed themselves in order to
-drag wounded comrades to the relative safety of a draw leading down
-to the MSR.</p>
-
-<p>Surrounded and outnumbered, Morris had no alternative but to await
-help from Yudam-ni. He contracted his perimeter on the hillside east
-of the road, and from this tiny tactical island, for the rest of the morning,
-his men watched Communist troops jockey for position around a
-360-degree circle.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">180</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Fox Company at Toktong Pass</i></h3>
-
-<p>Where Morris had taken a reduced infantry company into its lonely
-assignment on the MSR, Captain William E. Barber went into position
-at Toktong Pass on the 27th with a heavily reinforced outfit.<a id="FNanchor_399" href="#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">399</a> His Fox
-Company of 2/7, augmented by heavy machine gun and 81mm mortar
-sections of Weapons Company, numbered 240 officers and men. At
-the midway point of the pass, Barber chose an isolated hill just north
-of the MSR for his company perimeter. He placed the 3d Platoon (First
-Lieutenant Robert C. McCarthy) on the summit, facing generally north,
-with the 1st (First Lieutenant John M. Dunne) on the right and the
-2d (First Lieutenant Elmer G. Peterson) on the left. The 3d Platoon
-formed a hilltop perimeter with two squads forward and the third in
-reserve to the rear. Tied in on each flank, the 1st and 2d Platoons
-stretched down the respective hillsides and bent back toward the MSR.
-These two were connected on the reverse slope by company headquarters
-and the rocket squad. Just below, at the base of the hill next to
-the road, were Barber’s CP together with the 81mm and 60mm mortar
-sections. All machine guns, including the heavies from Weapons Company,
-were emplaced with the rifle platoons.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_399" href="#FNanchor_399" class="fnanchor">399</a> The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy,
-“Fox Hill,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvii, no. 3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross, “Ridgerunners
-of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 20–21; 7thMar <i>URpt</i> 5; 7thMar msg to
-CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman,
-3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and SSgt R. R. Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 Jul 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During the first half of the night of 27–28 November, Toktong Pass
-rumbled with the reverberations of truck convoys—the final serials of
-1/5 and 4/11 outbound for Yudam-ni and Lieutenant Colonel Beall’s
-empty trucks inbound for Hagaru. It was after 2000 before the last
-trucks climbed to the summit, then nosed downhill, whining and roaring
-through the night as they made the twisting descent. Chinese Communists
-had already launched their first attacks against Southwest Ridge
-at Yudam-ni, but Fox Company’s perimeter remained quiet, even during
-the first hour of 28 November.</p>
-
-<p>It was actually too quiet at 0115 when Lieutenant McCarthy inspected
-the 3d Platoon positions atop Fox Hill, now glittering in the light of
-a full moon. Finding his men numbed by the severe cold, he called
-together his squad leaders and admonished them to be more alert.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">181</span>
-A short time later, during his next inspection, McCarthy heard the
-proper challenges ring out at every point.</p>
-
-<p>There was no lack of watchfulness at 0230. For it was then that
-Chinese in estimated company strength lunged out of the night and
-assaulted the north, west, and south arcs of Company F’s perimeter.
-On the summit, the two forward squads of McCarthy’s platoon were
-overwhelmed almost immediately, losing 15 killed and nine wounded
-out of a total of 35 men. Three others would later be listed as missing.
-The eight uninjured fell back to the reserve squad’s position on the
-military crest to the rear, and the enemy took over the topographical
-peak.</p>
-
-<p>Fighting with small arms and grenades also raged on the hillside to
-the left, where the Chinese attempted to drive a wedge between the
-2d and 3d Platoons. Repeated assaults were hurled back with grievous
-losses to the Reds, and they apparently threw in fresh units in their
-bid for a critical penetration. That they failed was due largely to the
-valor of three Marines who made a determined stand at the vital junction:
-PFC Robert F. Benson and Private Hector A. Cafferatta of the
-2d Platoon, and PFC Gerald J. Smith, a fire team leader of the 3d.
-These men, assisted by the members of Smith’s team, are credited with
-annihilating two enemy platoons.</p>
-
-<p>While the enemy had undoubtedly planned the attack on the two
-rifle platoons with typical precision, it seems that he literally stumbled
-into the rear of Fox Company’s position. Corporal Donald R. Thornton,
-member of a rocket launcher crew, reported that a group of Chinese
-walking along the MSR suddenly found themselves at the edge of
-Barber’s CP and the mortar positions. The Communist soldiers recovered
-from the surprise and closed in aggressively, forcing the company
-commander and the mortar crews to ascend the hill to a protective line
-of trees. An embankment where the MSR cut through the base of the
-hill prevented pursuit by the Chinese. When they tried to climb over it
-they were cut down by small-arms fire; when they hid behind it they
-were riddled by grenades that the Marines rolled downhill; when they
-finally gave up and tried to flee, they were shot as they ran into the open.</p>
-
-<p>On the right (east) side of the perimeter, the 1st Platoon was
-engaged only on the flanks, near the summit where it tied in with the
-3d and down the slope where it joined the headquarters troops and
-mortar crews defending the rear.</p>
-
-<p>Fighting around the 270° arc of the perimeter continued until after<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">182</span>
-daybreak. Despite losses of 20 dead and 54 wounded, Fox Company
-was in complete control of the situation. Lieutenant McCarthy described
-the breaking-off action as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>By 0630, 28 November, the Chinese had received so many casualties that
-the attack could no longer be considered organized. Few Chinese remained
-alive near the company perimeter. Individual Chinese continued to crawl up
-and throw grenades. A Marine would make a one-man assault on these individuals,
-shooting or bayoneting them. The attack could be considered over,
-although three Marines ... were hit by rifle fire at 0730. We received small
-arms fire intermittently during the day, but no attack.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>McCarthy estimated that enemy dead in front of the 2d and 3d
-Platoons numbered 350, while yet another 100 littered the 1st Platoon’s
-zone and the area at the base of the hill along the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_400" href="#Footnote_400" class="fnanchor">400</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_400" href="#FNanchor_400" class="fnanchor">400</a> These figures would indicate the complete destruction of a CCF Battalion.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Counterattacks on North Ridge</i></h3>
-
-<p>As Companies C and F of the 7th Marines were fighting on the MSR
-in the hours just before dawn of 28 November, the first of a series of
-Marine counterattacks commenced at Yudam-ni. It was essential to the
-very survival of the 5th and 7th Regiments that the Chinese be driven
-back, or at least checked, on the high ground surrounding the village.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Taplett, operating his CP in the no man’s land
-at the base of North Ridge, ordered Company G of 3/5 to counterattack
-the spur of Hill 1384 at about 0300.<a id="FNanchor_401" href="#Footnote_401" class="fnanchor">401</a> The platoon of George
-Company outposting Southwest Ridge was left in position, but the
-other two platoons, under Second Lieutenants John J. Cahill and Dana
-B. Cashion, moved out abreast shortly after 0300. Driving northward
-aggressively, they crossed the MSR, “liberated” Taplett’s CP, and
-cleared the draw in which Weapons Company of 3/5 was still entrenched.
-Troops of H&amp;S Company followed the attackers and reoccupied
-their old positions in the gulley.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_401" href="#FNanchor_401" class="fnanchor">401</a> The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from: 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21–22; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-14; Taplett interv, 3 May 56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Cahill and Cashion, displaying remarkable cohesion on unfamiliar
-ground in the darkness, led the way up Hill 1384. Their men advanced
-swiftly behind a shield of marching fire and routed the few<a id="FNanchor_402" href="#Footnote_402" class="fnanchor">402</a> Chinese
-on the spur. The position earlier vacated by the police platoon was
-recaptured, and the Marines saw numerous enemy dead in front of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">183</span>
-South Korean machine gun emplacements. About 500 yards beyond
-the battalion CP the two platoons halted until daylight. The seven men
-who had formed the Item Company outpost on Hill 1384 arrived
-shortly afterwards and were integrated into Cashion’s platoon.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_402" href="#FNanchor_402" class="fnanchor">402</a> Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came from 25–30 Chinese.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>He continued the attack soon after daybreak, with Cahill’s platoon
-giving fire support. Cashion and his men plunged into enemy territory
-along the ridge line leading northward to the topographical crest of
-Hill 1384, about 1000 yards distant. They had reached the final slopes
-when Taplett received the radio message, almost incredible to him,
-that the two platoons were nearing the peak of Hill 1384. He directed
-them to discontinue the attack and withdraw to the top of the spur.
-There they were to establish a defense line overlooking Yudam-ni until
-receiving further orders. The spirited drive led by the two young officers
-had taken considerable pressure off the Marine units in the valley west
-of the village. One immediate effect was that approximately 80 officers
-and men of How Company, 7th Marines, were able to retire into 3/5’s
-perimeter from the slopes of Hill 1403 on Northwest Ridge.</p>
-
-<p>To the east of 3/5, a second successful counterattack by the 5th
-Marines brought stability to yet another critical point. Company C of
-1/5 had deployed shortly after midnight to back up 3/5, in the event
-of a breakthrough in the valley. Owing to the adverse developments
-on Hills 1282 and 1240, however, it was later placed under operational
-control of the 7th Marines. One platoon left for Hill 1240 in the middle
-of the night to reinforce D/7, and the remainder of the company, led
-by Captain Jack R. Jones, ascended 1282 to assist E/7 and the two
-platoons of A/5 earlier committed.<a id="FNanchor_403" href="#Footnote_403" class="fnanchor">403</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_403" href="#FNanchor_403" class="fnanchor">403</a> The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-12–13; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 7th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 <i>HD,
-Nov 50</i>, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; ATIS <i>Enemy Documents:
-Korean Operations</i> Issue 66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens,
-II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56; SSgt R. C. Alvarez ltr,
-18 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Charlie Company moved up a draw with Jones and his executive
-officer, First Lieutenant Loren R. Smith, in the van of the column, followed
-by the 1st and 2d Platoons and the 60mm mortar section. Light
-machine-gun sections were attached to the rifle platoons. The climb
-took almost two hours in the predawn darkness, the company frequently
-halting while Jones questioned wounded men descending from
-the top. Numb from cold, shock, and loss of blood, they could give no
-intelligible picture of a situation described as grim and confused.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">184</span></p>
-
-<p>At approximately 0430, the head of the column came under heavy
-fire from above as it reached a point just below the military crest, about
-100 yards from the summit of 1282. Here, Jones found Staff Sergeant
-Murphy from E/7’s 3d Platoon which, along with Trapnell’s, was out
-of sight on the spur to the right. Also out of sight but far to the left
-were Snyder’s platoon of A/5 and a handful of men of Easy Company.
-While CCF grenades and small-arms fire rained down, Murphy explained
-that E/7’s main position had been overrun and that he was
-attempting to form a holding line in the center with some 20 survivors
-of the summit battle.</p>
-
-<p>Jones quickly deployed his two platoons for the attack, the 2d under
-Second Lieutenant Byron L. Magness on the right, the 1st under Second
-Lieutenant Max A. Merrit on the left. Murphy’s small contingent joined
-the formation. Second Lieutenant Robert H. Corbet set up his 60mm
-mortar section to support the advance, then took a place in the assault
-line. Down in the valley the 81mm mortars of 1/5 opened up with a
-preparatory barrage. Artillery could not fire because of the short distance
-between friendly and enemy lines, and the first flight of Corsairs
-was not yet on station.</p>
-
-<p>The frontal attack against the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 235th CCF
-Regiment began shortly after daybreak. Jones personally led the Marine
-skirmishers against more than 50 enemy soldiers armed with machine
-guns and grenades. His troops moved upward through a hail of fire and
-overran the Communists after a savage clash that included hand-to-hand
-fighting. The Marines then deployed with the just-arrived 2d
-Platoon of Able Company bridging the gap between Jones and Trapnell
-in time to thwart the advance of enemy reinforcements.</p>
-
-<p>According to enemy reports, only six or seven men survived the 3d
-Company’s defeat. One of them happened to be the company political
-officer, who conveniently had retired from the battle line during the
-crucial stage of the struggle. At 1/235’s CP, a few hundred yards to
-the rear, he was given a platoon of the 2d Company “in order to evacuate
-the wounded and to safeguard the occupied position on Hill
-1282....” The fresh unit ascended the northern slopes of the height
-while Jones’ company was battling its way up from the south. By the
-time the Red soldiers of the 2d Company neared the summit, they were
-confronted from above by the muzzles of Marine rifles and machine
-guns. The whole story unfolds in CCF records as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>As soon as the 1st Platoon [2d Company] advanced to the 3d Company’s
-position its assistant company commander came up with the platoon. At that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">185</span>
-time, the enemy [C/5] counterattacked very violently. Accordingly, the
-assistant company commander ordered the 1st Platoon to strike the enemy
-immediately and determinedly. Before the 1st Platoon’s troops had been
-deployed, Lee Feng Hsi, the Platoon Leader, shouted: “Charge!” So both
-the 1st and 2d Squads pressed forward in swarms side by side. When they
-were within a little more than ten meters of the top of the hill they suffered
-casualties from enemy hand grenades and short-range fire. Consequently,
-they were absolutely unable to advance any farther. At that time, the assistant
-company commander and the majority of the platoon and squad leaders were
-either killed or wounded.</p>
-
-<p>While the 1st and 2d Squads were encountering the enemy’s counterattack,
-the 3d Squad also deployed and joined them in an effort to drive the enemy
-to the back of the hill. As a result, more than half of the 3d Squad were
-either killed or wounded. When the second assistant platoon leader attempted
-to reorganize, his troops suffered again from enemy flanking fire and hand
-grenades. Thus, after having fought for no more than ten minutes, the entire
-platoon lost its attacking strength and was forced to retreat somewhat to be
-able to defend firmly the place it held.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, according to Chinese accounts, Tsung Hui Tzu, commander
-of the 2d Company, had arrived at the CP of 1/235 with his
-2d Platoon at 0620. Noting that his 1st Platoon was in trouble, he
-said to the leader of the 2d, “There are some enemy soldiers on the hill
-[1282] in front of us; attack forward determinedly.”</p>
-
-<p>The 2d Platoon jumped off immediately with two squads abreast
-and one trailing. Within 30 meters of the crest, the Reds attempted to
-rush Charlie Company’s position behind a barrage of hand grenades.
-The assault failed. On the right the assistant platoon leader fell at
-the head of the 4th squad, which was reduced to three survivors. Tsung,
-the company commander, rushed forward and led the 6th squad on the
-left. He was wounded and the squad cut to pieces. Incredibly, the
-platoon leader ordered the three remaining men of the 4th squad to
-assault the summit again. They tried and only one of them came back.
-The 5th squad, advancing out of reserve, had no sooner begun to
-deploy than it lost all of its NCOs. “As it mixed with the 4th and 6th
-squads to attack, they suffered casualties again from enemy flanking
-fire and hand grenades from the top of the hill. Therefore, the entire
-platoon lost its combat strength, with only seven men being left alive.”</p>
-
-<p>Not only was the commanding officer of 1/235 down to his last company,
-but that company was down to its last platoon. Forever hovering
-in the rear, the 2d Company’s political officer, Liu Sheng Hsi, ordered
-the platoon to “continue the attack.” The assault began with two squads
-forward, led by the platoon leader and his assistant. They charged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">186</span>
-uphill into the teeth of Charlie Company’s position. Like all the others,
-they were ground into the mat of corpses on the blood-soaked snow.
-To complete the suicide of the 1st Battalion, 235th Regiment, the
-reserve squad of this last platoon was committed. A few minutes later,
-“... there were only six men left.”</p>
-
-<p>The 2d Company paid for its failure with 94 of the original 116
-officers and men. This loss, added to those of the 1st, 3d, and Special
-Duty Companies, would place 1/235’s casualties on Hill 1282 at
-approximately 400, including practically all the company commanders,
-platoon leaders, and NCOs. It can be assumed that nearly all of the
-wounded succumbed, since evacuation was well nigh impossible with
-Marines in control of the summit for the next 24 hours.</p>
-
-<p>Marine losses were not light. Able and Charlie Companies of 1/5
-together suffered 15 KIA and 67 WIA. Easy Company of 2/7, according
-to best estimates, made its stand at a cost of about 120 killed and
-wounded.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Deadlock on Hill 1240</i></h3>
-
-<p>At daybreak of 20 November, several of Easy Company’s casualties still
-lay in their foxholes on the forward slopes of Hill 1282. To recover
-them was an undertaking of great risk, even after the defeat of 1/235;
-for CCF survivors continued to fire at the summit from positions on
-the lower slopes. Captain Jones directed the evacuation and repeatedly
-ran forward of his lines to rescue half-frozen Marines who were immobilized
-by wounds.<a id="FNanchor_404" href="#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">404</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_404" href="#FNanchor_404" class="fnanchor">404</a> L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 285.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Headquarters personnel of 1/5 spent the whole morning removing
-casualties from 1282 and carrying them to the battalion and regimental
-aid stations, which soon were filled to overflowing. In the meantime,
-Able Company joined Charlie on the crest and assimilated the depleted
-platoons of Trapnell and Snyder. A new defensive line was drawn
-across the vital peak with C/5 in the center, A/5 on the right, and
-E/7, now under the command of Lieutenant Bey, on the left. By midmorning,
-despite the continued exchange of fire with CCF troops on
-the slopes, there was no doubt that the Marines would hold the hill.<a id="FNanchor_405" href="#Footnote_405" class="fnanchor">405</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_405" href="#FNanchor_405" class="fnanchor">405</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This was not the case 1000 yards to the right, where daybreak had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">187</span>
-found the shattered remnants of D/7 clinging to a toehold on Hill 1240
-and beset from every direction by troops of the 3d Battalion, 236th
-CCF Regiment.<a id="FNanchor_406" href="#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">406</a> The 3d Platoon of C/5, which had been dispatched
-from the valley at 0400 to help, was delayed by darkness and terrain.
-Second Lieutenant Harold L. Dawe’s small relief force became hotly
-engaged on the lower slopes, far short of Dog Company’s position,
-but made a fighting ascent after dawn.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_406" href="#FNanchor_406" class="fnanchor">406</a> The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from: 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 12; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-12–13; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 288; Capt
-H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Initially Dawe missed contact with the beleagured outfit, but afterwards
-the two forces cleared the Chinese from 1240. From his position
-on the northeastern spur of the hill he could see the enemy massing
-on the reverse slopes of 1240 and 1282. Communications were out and
-he could not call for fire. At about 1100 the Reds counterattacked with
-an estimated two or more battalions and forced Dawe to withdraw
-about 150 yards. There his depleted platoon and the 16 remaining men
-of Dog Company held under heavy mortar fire until relieved by B/5
-at 1700. The price of a stalemate on Hill 1240 was to Dawe about
-half of his platoon, and to Hull practically his whole company.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Fight for Northwest Ridge</i></h3>
-
-<p>To the left of North Ridge, dawn of 28 November revealed a tactical
-paradox on the looming massif of Northwest Ridge. Both Marines and
-Red Chinese occupied the terminal high ground, and it was difficult
-to determine which had emerged victorious from the all-night battle.
-How Company, 7th Marines, had withdrawn from Hill 1403, and from
-this commanding peak soldiers of the 89th CCF Division could observe
-and enfilade the whole of Yudam-ni valley. In addition to the 80 officers
-and men of How Company who had pulled back to the lines of
-3/5 during the early morning, another group found its way to the rear
-of Easy Company, 2/5, as mentioned earlier.<a id="FNanchor_407" href="#Footnote_407" class="fnanchor">407</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_407" href="#FNanchor_407" class="fnanchor">407</a> 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 14, and 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 18; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The appearance of the latter contingent at 0430 was a cause of consternation
-to Lieutenant Colonel Roise. His rifle companies had thrown
-back repeated CCF attacks along the draw and spur on the left of the
-7th Marines’ outfit, but the loss of 1403 now offset his victory and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">188</span>
-gravely imperiled his line of communications to the rest of the 5th
-Marines at Yudam-ni, a mile to the rear. Nevertheless, 2/5 continued
-to hold. At 0600 Company E counterattacked and drove the Chinese
-from the northern tip of the spur which they had occupied during the
-night. Fox Company, its right flank now restored and in contact with
-Easy, lashed out at 0800 and recaptured the two machine guns overrun
-by the enemy four hours earlier. Fifteen CCF soldiers who had
-found their way into the rear of Company F some time in the night were
-destroyed. Easy Company, after its successful counterattack on the
-spur, drove off a large Communist force attempting to move against
-its right flank.<a id="FNanchor_408" href="#Footnote_408" class="fnanchor">408</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_408" href="#FNanchor_408" class="fnanchor">408</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Incredibly, 2/5’s losses for the night-long fight were 7 KIA, 25 WIA,
-and 60 weather casualties. Chinese dead piled across the front of
-Easy and Fox Companies numbered 500, according to a rough count.<a id="FNanchor_409" href="#Footnote_409" class="fnanchor">409</a>
-There was no estimate made by How Company, 7th Marines, of enemy
-losses on Hill 1403.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_409" href="#FNanchor_409" class="fnanchor">409</a> 2/5 <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 9–10.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0145 on the 28th, Roise had received Murray’s order to continue
-the attack to the west after daybreak, so that 3/5 could move forward,
-deploy, and add its weight to the X Corps offensive. Events during the
-night altered Murray’s plans, of course, and at 0545 the regimental
-commander alerted Roise to the probability of withdrawing 2/5 to
-Southwest Ridge later in the morning. The battalion commander, not
-realizing the extent of the crisis at Yudam-ni, thought a mistake had
-been made when he checked the map coordinates mentioned in the
-message. Despite the fact that his whole front was engaged at the
-time, he was prepared to continue the westward drive, and he questioned
-regimental headquarters about the “error” which would take
-his battalion rearward. Needless to say, the correctness of the map
-coordinates was quickly confirmed.<a id="FNanchor_410" href="#Footnote_410" class="fnanchor">410</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_410" href="#FNanchor_410" class="fnanchor">410</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv 13 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Murray visited Colonel Litzenberg at dawn on
-the 28th, while elements of the 5th Marines were counterattacking the
-Chinese forces on North and Northwest Ridges. They agreed that the
-enemy had appeared in sufficient strength to warrant a switch to the
-defensive by both regiments, and Murray cancelled the scheduled westward
-attack by his 2d and 3d Battalions. At 1100 he ordered 2/5 to
-pull back to Southwest Ridge, tying in on the left with 3/7 on the same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">189</span>
-hill mass, and on the right with 3/5, whose line extended from the
-valley northwest of Yudam-ni to the crest of North Ridge.<a id="FNanchor_411" href="#Footnote_411" class="fnanchor">411</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_411" href="#FNanchor_411" class="fnanchor">411</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Orders officially halting the northwestward advance and directing
-the 5th Marines to coordinate positions with the 7th Marines were sent
-by General Smith at 1650.<a id="FNanchor_412" href="#Footnote_412" class="fnanchor">412</a> Twenty-three minutes earlier he had ordered
-the 7th Marines to attack to the south and reopen the MSR to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_413" href="#Footnote_413" class="fnanchor">413</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_412" href="#FNanchor_412" class="fnanchor">412</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_413" href="#FNanchor_413" class="fnanchor">413</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>To coordinate better the defense of the new perimeter, Murray
-moved his CP from the northwestern edge of Yudam-ni to the center
-of the village, where the 7th Marines’ headquarters was located. He
-spent most of his time thereafter with Litzenberg, while Lieutenant
-Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, his executive officer, ran the 5th Regiment
-command post.<a id="FNanchor_414" href="#Footnote_414" class="fnanchor">414</a> Through constant contact and a policy of close cooperation
-in all matters, the two regimental commanders and their staffs
-came up with joint plans for the defense of Yudam-ni and the ultimate
-breakout to Hagaru.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_414" href="#FNanchor_414" class="fnanchor">414</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; 5th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The first of these plans had to do with the realignment of forces at
-Yudam-ni and the rescue of Charlie and Fox Companies, 7th Marines.
-Early in the afternoon of 28 November, 2/5 began withdrawing from
-Northwest Ridge a company at a time, with Company E providing
-covering fire as rear guard. The battalion’s displacement to Southwest
-Ridge was completed by 2000 against CCF resistance consisting only
-of harassing fires.<a id="FNanchor_415" href="#Footnote_415" class="fnanchor">415</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_415" href="#FNanchor_415" class="fnanchor">415</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 19.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Directly across the valley of Yudam-ni, Company I of 3/5 relieved
-the elements of 1/5 on Hill 1282 of North Ridge in late afternoon.
-George and How Companies of 3/5 deployed in the low ground to
-protect the corridor approaches to Yudam-ni from the northwest.
-Lieutenant Colonel Stevens, keeping the bulk of 1/5 in reserve, dispatched
-Company B at 1400 to relieve the battered handful of Marines
-on Hill 1240.</p>
-
-<p>While this reshuffling took place on the 28th, Colonel Litzenberg
-listened anxiously to the grim reports from his 1st Battalion, which
-had set out in the morning to retrieve both Charlie and Fox Companies
-from their encircled positions on the MSR leading to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_416" href="#Footnote_416" class="fnanchor">416</a> Able<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">190</span>
-Company led off for the relief force at 1015, entering the gorge between
-South and Southeast Ridges. Five hours of fighting, marching, and
-climbing took it to a point about three miles from the Yudam-ni
-perimeter and one mile short of Company C’s position. Here, while
-moving through the high ground east of the MSR, the vanguard met
-heavy resistance and was stopped cold.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_416" href="#FNanchor_416" class="fnanchor">416</a> The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG
-1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450, 1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar
-msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 290–291.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Davis, who was following with the remainder
-of the 1st Battalion, committed Company B to a flanking movement
-west of the road. Air and 81mm mortars supported the auxiliary attack
-and routed the Chinese. Both companies advanced to high-ground
-positions abreast of Charlie Company’s perimeter, then bent toward the
-MSR to provide a protective crescent between the beleaguered outfit
-and the enemy-infested ground to the south.</p>
-
-<p>By now it was dark. Fox Company, according to plan, was supposed
-to have fought its way from Toktong Pass. Owing to the burden of
-casualties and the ring of Chinese around its distant hilltop, it was
-not able to do so. Litzenberg, concerned lest 1/7 be similarly trapped
-in the gorge, recalled Davis to Yudam-ni. The relief force returned
-at 2110 with Charlie Company and its 46 wounded.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Second Night’s Attacks on Fox Hill</i></h3>
-
-<p>Fox Company, with 54 wounded on its hands, spent an active day at
-the top of Toktong Pass.<a id="FNanchor_417" href="#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">417</a> After the Chinese attacks subsided in the
-morning, Barber’s men collected ammunition and weapons from Marine
-casualties and Communist dead. Included among enemy arms
-were several of the familiar U. S. Thompson submachine guns and
-Model 1903 Springfield rifles.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_417" href="#FNanchor_417" class="fnanchor">417</a> This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is derived from: 7thMar <i>SAR</i>,
-18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv
-4 Jul 51; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 300–302; Statement of Cpl C. R. North, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1030 a flight of Australian F-51s (Mustangs) blasted CCF positions
-around Toktong Pass, particularly a rocky promontory several
-hundred yards to the north on Hill 1653, which the enemy already had
-transformed into a redoubt. Within the Marine perimeter, the wounded
-were placed in two tents on a sheltered hillside where Navy corpsmen
-attended them constantly. According to Lieutenant McCarthy’s account,
-the medics, “by candlelight ... changed the bandages, slipped men in
-and out of sleeping bags, warmed C-rations for the men, and melted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">191</span>
-the morphine syrettes in their mouths before the injections. Because
-the plasma was frozen the corpsmen had to watch men die for the
-lack of it.”</p>
-
-<p>During late morning and the afternoon, Barber sent out patrols to
-screen the areas immediately beyond his lines. The scouting parties
-met only sniper fire, but other evidence of enemy activity indicated that
-Fox Hill was completely surrounded. An appeal for resupply by air
-was answered later in the day when Marine R5Ds dropped medical
-kits and ammunition at the base of the hill. At a cost of two wounded,
-the precious supplies were recovered before sundown.</p>
-
-<p>Fox Company’s perimeter for the night of 28–29 November was the
-same as before, except that the ranks were noticeably thinner. Nevertheless,
-a feeling of confidence pervaded the men on the hilltop; they
-believed implicitly that they could hold. They believed it despite the
-fact that strong relief columns from both Yudam-ni and Hagaru had
-been unable to break through to them.</p>
-
-<p>All was quiet on Fox Hill until 0215, when CCF mortar rounds
-killed one Marine and wounded two others in the 3d Platoon, now
-reduced to some 20 able-bodied men. About 40 Chinese made a penetration
-in this area after a series of probing attacks all along the line.
-One Marine crew turned its light machine gun about and brought it
-to bear on the bunched-up attackers with deadly effect. A gap in the
-lines on both flanks caused the platoon to pull back about 20 yards.
-At sunrise, however, Staff Sergeant John D. Audas led a counterattack
-which regained the lost ground at a cost of only two wounded.</p>
-
-<p>The second night’s fighting cost Fox Company a total of five killed
-and 29 wounded. Both Captain Barber and Lieutenant McCarthy suffered
-leg wounds, but continued in action after receiving first aid.
-The company commander directed that the open ground on Fox Hill
-be marked with colored parachutes from the previous day’s air drops.
-This provision resulted in accurate drops and easy recoveries when
-Marine transport planes arrived at 1030 on the 29th with ammunition
-and supplies. Shortly afterwards First Lieutenant Floyd J. Englehardt
-of VMO-6 landed with batteries for the SCR-300 and 619 radios.
-Although his helicopter was damaged by hits from long-distance Chinese
-fire, he managed to take off safely.</p>
-
-<p>Air drops that afternoon by C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command
-missed the marked zone at times, and much of the mortar ammunition
-landed about 500 yards to the west of the perimeter. Lieutenant Peterson,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">192</span>
-already twice wounded, led Marines who recovered some of the
-rounds but were pinned down by CCF fire and got back, one at a time,
-with difficulty. At dusk, under cover of fire from How Battery, another
-detail recovered the ammunition without enemy interference.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Not Enough Tents for Casualties</i></h3>
-
-<p>The night of 28–29 November passed with only minor activity in the
-Yudam-ni area for the infantry of RCT-5; but the regimental surgeon,
-Lieutenant Commander Chester M. Lessenden (MC) USN, had his
-hands full. During the fighting of the previous night the joint aid
-station had been west of Yudam-ni. Tents sheltering the wounded
-were riddled by enemy small-arms fire from the North Ridge battle,
-and on the morning of the 28th the aid station displaced to a safer
-location southwest of Yudam-ni. The seriously wounded filled the few
-tents initially available, and the others were protected from freezing
-by being placed outdoors, side by side, and covered by tarpaulins while
-lying on straw. Primitive as this hospitalization was, DOW cases were
-no more than might have been expected under better conditions.<a id="FNanchor_418" href="#Footnote_418" class="fnanchor">418</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_418" href="#FNanchor_418" class="fnanchor">418</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 <i>SAR</i>, 5; McReynolds interv,
-26 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The crowding in the aid stations was much relieved on 30 November
-by the erection of sufficient tentage by 4/11 to provide shelter for
-approximately 500 casualties.</p>
-
-<p>“Everything was frozen,” said Lessenden later in an interview with
-Keyes Beech, a press correspondent. “Plasma froze and the bottles
-broke. We couldn’t use plasma because it wouldn’t go into solution
-and the tubes would clog up with particles. We couldn’t change dressings
-because we had to work with gloves on to keep our hands from
-freezing.</p>
-
-<p>“We couldn’t cut a man’s clothes off to get at a wound because he
-would freeze to death. Actually a man was often better off if we left
-him alone. Did you ever try to stuff a wounded man into a sleeping
-bag?”<a id="FNanchor_419" href="#Footnote_419" class="fnanchor">419</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_419" href="#FNanchor_419" class="fnanchor">419</a> Keyes Beech: <i>Tokyo and Points East</i> (New York, 1954), 196.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The joint defense plan for the night of 28–29 November provided
-for RCT-5 to take the responsibility for the west and north sectors,
-while RCT-7 was to defend to the east, south and southwest. Enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">193</span>
-mortar fire was received during the night in both regimental zones,
-but there were few infantry contacts. This lack of activity could only
-be interpreted as a temporary lull while the enemy regrouped for
-further efforts.</p>
-
-<p>As for the next attempt to relieve Fox Company and open the MSR
-to Hagaru, the joint planners at Yudam-ni decided on the night of the
-28th that all troops of the two regiments now in line were needed for
-defense. There were actually no men to spare for a relief column,
-and yet Division had ordered the effort to be made. The solution
-seemed to be a composite battalion consisting of perimeter reserve
-units. In order to replace these troops, personnel were to be assigned
-from headquarters units and artillery batteries. This was the genesis
-of the Composite Battalion, consisting of elements from Able Company
-of 1/5, Baker Company of 1/7 and George Company of 3/7,
-reinforced by a 75mm recoilless section and two 81mm mortar sections
-from RCT-7 battalions. These troops were directed to assemble at
-the 1/7 CP on the morning of the 29th, with Major Warren Morris,
-executive officer of 3/7, in command.<a id="FNanchor_420" href="#Footnote_420" class="fnanchor">420</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_420" href="#FNanchor_420" class="fnanchor">420</a> This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from the following sources: Narrative
-of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 5–8; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0800 the striking force moved out southward with the dual mission
-of relieving Captain Barber and opening up the MSR all the way
-to Hagaru. After an advance of 300 yards, heavy machine-gun fire
-hit the column from both sides of the road. Groups of Chinese could
-be plainly seen on the ridges, affording remunerative targets for the
-81mm mortars and 75 recoilless guns. Forward air controllers soon
-had the Corsairs overhead to lead the way. At a point about 4500
-yards south of Yudam-ni, however, Marine planes dropped two messages
-warning that the enemy was entrenched in formidable force
-along the high ground on both sides of the MSR.</p>
-
-<p>Similar messages were delivered by the aircraft to the regimental CP
-at Yudam-ni. They caused Colonel Litzenberg to modify the orders
-of the Composite Battalion and direct that it relieve Fox Company
-and return to Yudam-ni before dark.</p>
-
-<p>By this time Morris’ troops had become engaged with large numbers
-of Chinese who were being constantly reinforced by groups moving
-into the area along draws masked from friendly ground observation.
-Litzenberg was informed on a basis of air observation that Morris was
-in danger of being surrounded, and at 1315 he sent an urgent message<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">194</span>
-directing the force to return to Yudam-ni. Contact was broken off
-immediately with the aid of air and artillery cover and the Composite
-Battalion withdrew without further incident.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Turning Point of 30 November</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Yudam-ni area had a relatively quiet night on 29–30 November.
-But even though there was little fighting, the continued sub-zero cold
-imposed a strain on the men when at least a fifty per cent alert must
-be maintained at all times. This was the third virtually sleepless night
-for troops who had not had a warm meal since the Thanksgiving feast.</p>
-
-<p>“Seldom has the human frame been so savagely punished and continued
-to function,” wrote Keyes Beech. “Many men discovered reserves
-of strength they never knew they possessed. Some survived and
-fought on will power alone.”<a id="FNanchor_421" href="#Footnote_421" class="fnanchor">421</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_421" href="#FNanchor_421" class="fnanchor">421</a> Beech, <i>Tokyo and Points East</i>, 197.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Certainly there was no lack of will power on Fox Hill as Captain
-Barber called his platoon leaders together at about 1700 on 29 November
-and told them not to expect any immediate relief. Chinese attacks,
-he warned, might be heavier than ever this third night, but they would
-be beaten off as usual.</p>
-
-<p>The area was quiet until about 0200 on the 30th, when an Oriental
-voice called out of the darkness in English, “Fox Company, you are
-surrounded. I am a lieutenant from the 11th Marines. The Chinese
-will give you warm clothes and good treatment. Surrender now!”<a id="FNanchor_422" href="#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">422</a>
-The Marines replied with 81mm illumination shells which revealed
-targets for the machine guns as the Chinese advanced across the valley
-from the south.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_422" href="#FNanchor_422" class="fnanchor">422</a> This description of the third night on Fox Hill is derived from McCarthy, “Fox Hill,”
-21.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Thanks to the afternoon’s air drops, Fox Hill had enough mortar
-ammunition and hand grenades for the first time, and good use was
-made of both. An estimated three CCF companies were cut to pieces
-at a cost of a single Marine wounded.</p>
-
-<p>At sunrise, as the Corsairs roared over, all tension vanished on Fox
-Hill. For it was generally agreed that if the Chinese couldn’t take the
-position in three nights, they would never make the grade.</p>
-
-<p>The troops in the Yudam-ni area also felt that the enemy had shot<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">195</span>
-his bolt without achieving anything more than a few local gains at a
-terrible cost in killed and wounded. It was recognized that some hard
-fighting lay ahead, but the morning of the 30th was a moral turning
-point both in the foxhole and the CP.</p>
-
-<p>It was evident even on the platoon level at Yudam-ni that big events
-were in the wind. Marine enlisted men are traditionally shrewd at
-sizing up a tactical situation, and they sensed that a change was at
-hand. For three days and nights they had been on the defensive, fighting
-for their lives, and now the word was passed from one man to
-another that the Marines were about to snatch the initiative.</p>
-
-<p>The regimental commanders and staff officers had a worry lifted
-from their minds when a helicopter brought the news that Hagaru
-had passed a quiet night after repulsing large enemy forces in a dusk-to-dawn
-battle the night before. It would have added enormously to
-the task of the Yudam-ni troops, of course, if the Chinese had seized
-that forward base with its air strip and stockpiles of supplies. Thus it
-was heartening to learn that a single reinforced Marine infantry battalion
-and an assortment of service troops had beaten off the attacks
-of large elements of a Chinese division at Hagaru. The following two
-chapters will be devoted to an account of that critical battle and its
-aftermath before returning to Yudam-ni.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">197</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Hagaru’s Night of Fire</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Four-Mile Perimeter Required—Attempts to Clear MSR—Intelligence
-as to CCF Capabilities—Positions of Marine Units—CCF
-Attacks from the Southwest—East Hill Lost to Enemy—The
-Volcano of Supporting Fires—Marine Attacks on East
-Hill</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> importance of Hagaru in the Marine scheme of things was
-starkly obvious after the Chinese cut the MSR. Hagaru, with its supply
-dumps, hospital facilities and partly finished C-47 airstrip, was the
-one base offering the 1st Marine Division a reasonable hope of uniting
-its separated elements. Hagaru had to be held at all costs, yet only a
-reinforced infantry battalion (less one rifle company and a third of
-its Weapons Company) and two batteries of artillery were available
-for the main burden of the defense.</p>
-
-<p>Owing to transportation shortages, the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines
-did not arrive at Hagaru until after dusk on 26 November. Even
-so, it had been necessary to leave George Company and a platoon of
-Weapons Company behind at Chigyong for lack of vehicles.<a id="FNanchor_423" href="#Footnote_423" class="fnanchor">423</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_423" href="#FNanchor_423" class="fnanchor">423</a> This section is derived from: 1stMar <i>HD, Nov 50</i>, 2; 3/1 <i>SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>,
-2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep 55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons
-Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The parka-clad Marines, climbing down stiffly from the trucks, had
-their first sight of a panorama which reminded one officer of old photographs
-of a gold-rush mining camp in the Klondike. Tents, huts, and
-supply dumps were scattered in a seemingly haphazard fashion about a
-frozen plain crossed by a frozen river and bordered on three sides by
-low hills rising to steep heights on the eastern outskirts. Although
-many of the buildings had survived the bombings, the battered town<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">198</span>
-at the foot of the ice-locked Chosin Reservoir was not a spectacle calculated
-to raise the spirits of newcomers.</p>
-
-<p>It was too late to relieve 2/7(-) that evening. Lieutenant Colonels
-Ridge and Lockwood agreed that Fox Company, 7th Marines, and
-Weapons Company (-) of 2/7 would occupy positions jointly with
-3/1. The hours of darkness passed quietly and relief was completed
-the next day. Fox Company then moved to its new positions near
-Toktong Pass.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Four-Mile Perimeter Required</i></h3>
-
-<p>On the morning of 27 November, of course, an all-out enemy attack
-was still in the realm of speculation. But it was evident to Lieutenant
-Colonel Ridge, CO of 3/1, that one to two infantry regiments and
-supporting arms would be required for an adequate defense of Hagaru.
-With only a battalion (-) at his disposal, he realized that he must
-make the best possible use of the ground. For the purposes of a survey,
-he sent his S-3, Major Trompeter, on a walking reconnaissance with
-Major Simmons, CO of Weapons Company and 3/1 Supporting Arms
-Coordinator.</p>
-
-<p>After a circuit of the natural amphitheater, the two officers agreed
-that even to hold the reverse slopes would require a perimeter of more
-than four miles in circumference (see Map 17). The personnel resources
-of 3/1 would thus be stretched to an average of one man for
-nearly seven yards of front. This meant that the commanding officer
-must take his choice between being weak everywhere or strong in a
-few sectors to the neglect of others. In either event, some areas along
-the perimeter would probably have to be defended by supporting fires
-alone.<a id="FNanchor_424" href="#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">424</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_424" href="#FNanchor_424" class="fnanchor">424</a> Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>“Under the circumstances,” commented General Smith, “and considering
-the mission assigned to the 1st Marine Division, an infantry component
-of one battalion was all that could be spared for the defense
-of Hagaru. This battalion was very adequately supported by air, and
-had sufficient artillery and tanks for its purposes.”<a id="FNanchor_425" href="#Footnote_425" class="fnanchor">425</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_425" href="#FNanchor_425" class="fnanchor">425</a> Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The terrain gave the enemy two major covered avenues of approach
-for troop movements. One was the hill mass east of Hagaru, the other
-a draw leading into the southwest side of the town, where the new<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">199</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_200">200</a></span>
-airstrip was being constructed. Nor could the possibility of a surprise
-attack from some other quarter be dismissed entirely, since CCF observers
-would be able to watch Marine preparations from the surrounding
-hills in daylight hours.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_17" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_199.png" width="824" height="1211" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER</p>
-
-<p>28–29 November 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-17</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Ridge decided that final troop dispositions must
-depend not only on terrain but equally on intelligence as to enemy
-capabilities. Until he had more information, the units of 3/1 were
-to remain in the areas formerly occupied by 2/7.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Attempts to Clear MSR</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Battalion CP had been set up in a pyramidal tent at the angle of
-the road to Yudam-ni. Most of the day on the 27th was given over to
-improving positions. At the southwest end of the perimeter, First
-Lieutenant Fisher’s Item Company took over from Captain Barber’s
-Fox Company, the only rifle company of 2/7 remaining at Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>On the strength of preliminary S-2 reports, Ridge instructed the
-commanders of his two rifle companies to improve their sectors, which
-included the entire south and southwest curve of the perimeter. All
-the Division Headquarters troops except one motor convoy had reached
-Hagaru by the 27th, and it was due to leave Hungnam the next morning.
-The new Division CP was located in the northeast quarter of town,
-near the long concrete bridge over the frozen Changjin River. Rows
-of heated tents surrounded a Japanese type frame house repaired for
-the occupancy of General Smith, who was expected by helicopter in
-the morning. Already functioning at the CP were elements of the General
-Staff Sections and Headquarters Company.<a id="FNanchor_426" href="#Footnote_426" class="fnanchor">426</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_426" href="#FNanchor_426" class="fnanchor">426</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 689–690.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The busiest Marines at Hagaru on the 27th were the men of the 1st
-Engineer Battalion. While a Company B platoon built tent decks for
-the Division CP, detachments of Company A were at work on the
-maintenance of the MSR in the area, and Company D had the job of
-hacking out the new airstrip. Apparently the latter project had its
-“sidewalk contractors” even in sub-zero weather, for this comment
-found its way into the company report:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Dozer work [was] pleasing to the eye of those who wanted activity but contributed
-little to the overall earth-moving problem of 90,000 cubic
-yards of cut and 60,000 cubic yards of fill.<a id="FNanchor_427" href="#Footnote_427" class="fnanchor">427</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">201</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_427" href="#FNanchor_427" class="fnanchor">427</a> D/Engr <i>SAR</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Motor graders and scrapers with a 5.8 cubic yard capacity had been
-moved up from Hamhung. So difficult did it prove to get a bite of the
-frozen earth that steel teeth were welded to the blades. When the pan
-was filled, however, the earth froze to the cutting edges until it could
-be removed only by means of a jack hammer.</p>
-
-<p>The strip was about one-fourth completed on the 27th, according to
-minimum estimates of the length required. Work went on that night
-as usual under the flood lights.<a id="FNanchor_428" href="#Footnote_428" class="fnanchor">428</a> Not until the small hours of the morning
-did the first reports reach Hagaru of the CCF attacks on Yudam-ni
-and Fox Hill.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_428" href="#FNanchor_428" class="fnanchor">428</a> 1stEngrBn <i>SAR</i>, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Some remnants of 2/7 were still at Hagaru, for lack of transportation,
-when Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood, commanding officer of the
-battalion, received a dispatch from Colonel Litzenberg directing him
-to proceed to Toktong Pass and assist Fox Company. At 0530 he
-requested the “loan” of a rifle company of 3/1 to reinforce elements
-of Weapons Company (-), 2/7. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge could
-spare only a platoon from How Company, and at 0830 the attempt
-was cancelled. An hour later Weapons Company and three tanks from
-the 2d Platoon of Company D, 1st Tank Battalion, made another effort.
-They pushed half-way to the objective, only to be turned back by heavy
-Chinese small-arms and mortar fire from the high ground on both
-sides of the road. Supporting fires from 3/1 helped the column to
-break off contact and return to Hagaru at 1500.<a id="FNanchor_429" href="#Footnote_429" class="fnanchor">429</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_429" href="#FNanchor_429" class="fnanchor">429</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 4; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 21; 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1845
-28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>No better success attended a reinforced platoon of How Company,
-3/1, accompanied by three Company D tanks, when it set out on the
-road to Koto-ri. On the outskirts of Hagaru, within sight of Captain
-Corley’s CP, the men were forced to climb down from their vehicles
-and engage in a hot fire fight. They estimated the enemy force at
-about 50, but an OY pilot dropped a message warning that some 300
-Chinese were moving up on the flanks of the patrol. The Marines managed
-to disengage at 1530, with the aid of mortar and artillery fires
-from Hagaru, and returned to the perimeter with losses of one killed
-and five wounded.<a id="FNanchor_430" href="#Footnote_430" class="fnanchor">430</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_430" href="#FNanchor_430" class="fnanchor">430</a> <i>Ibid.</i>; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A similar patrol from Item Company, 3/1, struck off to the southwest
-of the perimeter in the direction of Hungmun-ni. Late in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">202</span>
-morning of the 28th, this reinforced platoon encountered an estimated
-150 enemy and called for artillery and mortar fires. After dispersing
-this CCF group, the patrol routed a second enemy detachment an hour
-later after a brief fire fight.<a id="FNanchor_431" href="#Footnote_431" class="fnanchor">431</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_431" href="#FNanchor_431" class="fnanchor">431</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon [sic] interv by Capt K. A.
-Shutts, 28 May 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Any lingering doubts as to the extent of the Chinese attack on the
-MSR were dispelled by reports from the OY and HO3S-1 pilots of
-VMO-6. They disclosed that defended enemy road blocks had cut off
-Yudam-ni, Fox Hill, Hagaru, and Koto-ri from any physical contact
-with one another. The advance units of the 1st Marine Division had
-been sliced into four isolated segments as CCF columns penetrated
-as far south as the Chinhung-ni area.<a id="FNanchor_432" href="#Footnote_432" class="fnanchor">432</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_432" href="#FNanchor_432" class="fnanchor">432</a> VMO-6 tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv,
-1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Intelligence as to CCF Capabilities</i></h3>
-
-<p>There was no question at all in the minds of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge
-and his officers as to whether the Chinese would attack at Hagaru. As
-early as the morning of the 27th, the problem had simply been one
-of when, where, and in what strength. It was up to the S-2 Section
-to provide the answers, and upon their correctness would depend the
-fate of Hagaru, perhaps even of the 1st Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>Second Lieutenant Richard E. Carey, the S-2, was a newcomer to the
-battalion staff, recently transferred from a George Company infantry
-platoon. His group consisted of an assistant intelligence chief, Staff
-Sergeant Saverio P. Gallo, an interpreter, and four scout observers.<a id="FNanchor_433" href="#Footnote_433" class="fnanchor">433</a>
-There were also two CIC agents assigned to 3/1 by Division G-2.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_433" href="#FNanchor_433" class="fnanchor">433</a> This section is based on Ridge, <i>Notes</i>, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt
-R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the
-former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had been transferred from the S-2
-Section just before the move to Hagaru.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At Hagaru, as at Majon-ni, the Marines had won respect at the
-outset by allowing the Korean residents all privileges of self-government
-which could be reconciled with military security. The police
-department and town officials had been permitted to continue functioning.
-They in turn briefed the population as to restricted areas and
-security regulations, particularly curfew. Korean civilians entering
-Hagaru through Marine road blocks were searched before being taken<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">203</span>
-to the police station where they were questioned by an interrogation
-team from the S-2 Section.</p>
-
-<p>Hagaru’s resemblance to a gold-rush mining camp was heightened
-on the 27th by a tremendous influx both of troops and Koreans from
-outlying districts. A large truck convoy from Headquarters Battalion
-arrived to set up the new Division CP, and detachments from various
-Marine or Army service units entered in a seemingly endless stream.
-The Korean refugees had much the same story to tell; most of them
-came from areas to the north and west of Hagaru, and they had been
-evicted from their homes by large numbers of CCF troops.</p>
-
-<p>Carey instructed his CIC agents to converse with incoming Koreans
-and learn everything possible about the enemy situation. Again, as at
-Majon-ni, people who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with Communism
-were found “highly co-operative.” As untrained observers,
-however, their estimates of CCF numbers and equipment could not be
-taken too literally. Since their statements agreed that the enemy was
-in close proximity, Carey decided to take the risk of sending his two
-CIC agents on the dangerous mission of establishing direct contact.
-They were enjoined to make a circuit of the perimeter, mingling whenever
-possible with the Chinese and determining the areas of heaviest
-concentration.</p>
-
-<p>The results went beyond Carey’s fondest expectations. Not only did
-his agents return safely from their long hike over the hills, but they
-brought back vital information. Well led and equipped Chinese Communist
-units had been encountered to the south and west of Hagaru.
-And since Marine air also reported unusual activity in this area, it was
-a reasonable assumption that the enemy was concentrated there approximately
-in division strength.</p>
-
-<p>This answered the questions as to “how many” and “where.” There
-remained the problem as to “when” the attack might be expected, and
-again on the 28th Carey sent out his CIC agents to make direct contact.
-“I expected little or no information,” he recollected, “but apparently
-these men had a way with them. Upon reporting back, they told me
-that they had talked freely with enemy troops, including several officers
-who boasted that they would occupy Hagaru on the night of 28
-November.”</p>
-
-<p>Major enemy units were reported to be five miles from the perimeter.
-Dusk was at approximately 1800, with complete darkness setting in
-shortly afterwards. Adding the estimate of three and a half hours for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">204</span>
-Chinese movements to the line of departure, the S-2 Section calculated
-that the enemy could attack as early as 2130 on the night of the 28th
-from the south and west in division strength.<a id="FNanchor_434" href="#Footnote_434" class="fnanchor">434</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_434" href="#FNanchor_434" class="fnanchor">434</a> The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was considered, since Chinese
-forces were known to be east of the hill. Col Ridge states, “I assume[d] that the build up of
-such forces would not allow their capability of a strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Positions of Marine Units</i></h3>
-
-<p>These intelligence estimates were accepted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge
-as the basis for his planning and troop dispositions. As the main bastion
-of defense, the tied-in sectors of How and Item Companies were extended
-to include the south and southwest sides of the perimeter—nearly
-one-third of the entire circumference—in a continuous line 2300
-yards in length, or more than a mile and a quarter. Each platoon front
-thus averaged about 380 yards, which meant that supporting arms must
-make up for lack of numbers.<a id="FNanchor_435" href="#Footnote_435" class="fnanchor">435</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_435" href="#FNanchor_435" class="fnanchor">435</a> This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources: 3/1 <i>SAR
-26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17 Aug 55;
-Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher, n. d.; Simmons Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>East Hill, considered the second most likely point of enemy attack,
-was to be assigned to George Company on arrival. Captain Sitter’s
-outfit had orders to depart the Chigyong area on the morning of the
-28th, so that it could be expected at Hagaru before dark.</p>
-
-<p>The southeast quarter of the perimeter, between East Hill and the
-left flank of How Company, was to be held by the following units:
-(1) Weapons Company (less detachments reinforcing the rifle companies
-and its 81mm mortars emplaced near the battalion CP) manning
-a road block on the route to Koto-ri and defending the south nose
-of East Hill; (2) Dog Company, 1st Engineer Battalion (less men at
-work on the airstrip), occupying the ground south of the concrete
-bridge; and (3) Dog Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, which had
-the mission of covering 75 per cent of the perimeter with observed
-indirect fire and 25 per cent with direct fire.</p>
-
-<p>These dispositions left a gap between Weapons Company and the
-engineer and artillery units on the west bank of the Changjin River.
-But this stretch of frozen marshland was so well covered by fire that
-an enemy attack here would have been welcomed.</p>
-
-<p>The first reports of the CCF onslaughts at Yudam-ni and Fox Hill,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">205</span>
-as interpreted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, “clearly indicated that no
-time was to be lost at buttoning up the Hagaru perimeter.” He called
-on Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3, on the morning of the 28th and
-recommended that an overall defense commander be designated with
-operational control over all local units. Ridge also requested that
-George Company and the 41st Commando be expedited in their movement
-to Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Before a decision could be reached, General Smith arrived by helicopter
-and opened the Division CP at 1100. A Marine rear echelon
-had remained at Hungnam to cope with supply requirements. Colonel
-Francis A. McAlister, the G-4, left in command, accomplished during
-the forthcoming campaign what General Smith termed “a magnificent
-job” in rendering logistical support.<a id="FNanchor_436" href="#Footnote_436" class="fnanchor">436</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_436" href="#FNanchor_436" class="fnanchor">436</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 1015 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The CP at Hagaru had been open only half an hour when General
-Almond arrived in a VMO-6 helicopter to confer with the Division
-commander. Departing at 1255, he visited the 31st Infantry troops who
-had been hard hit the night before by CCF attacks east of the Chosin
-Reservoir. On his return to Hamhung, the Corps commander was
-informed that CinCFE had directed him to fly immediately to Tokyo
-for a conference. There he learned that the Eighth Army was in full
-retreat, with some units taking heavy losses both in personnel and
-equipment. Generals Almond, Walker, Hickey, Willoughby, Whitney,
-and Wright took turns at briefing the commander in chief during a
-meeting which lasted from midnight to 0130.<a id="FNanchor_437" href="#Footnote_437" class="fnanchor">437</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_437" href="#FNanchor_437" class="fnanchor">437</a> CG Diary, in X Corps <i>WD</i>, 28 Nov 50; X Corps <i>WDSum</i>, Nov 50, 16.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At Hagaru it was becoming more apparent hourly to Ridge that his
-prospects of employing Captain Sitter’s company on East Hill were
-growing dim. As he learned later, the unit had left Chigyong that
-morning in the trucks of Company B, 7th Motor Transport Battalion,
-commanded by Captain Clovis M. Jones. Sitter was met at Koto-ri
-by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert, executive officer of RCT-1,
-and directed to report to the regimental S-3, Major Robert E. Lorigan.
-Efforts to open up the road to Hagaru had failed, he was told, and it
-would be necessary for George Company to remain overnight at
-Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_438" href="#Footnote_438" class="fnanchor">438</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_438" href="#FNanchor_438" class="fnanchor">438</a> Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The probability of such an outcome had already been accepted by
-Ridge on the basis of the resistance met on the road to Koto-ri by his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">206</span>
-How Company patrol. With this development added to his worries,
-he received a telephone call at 1500 from Colonel Bowser, informing
-him that he had been named defense commander at Hagaru by General
-Smith.<a id="FNanchor_439" href="#Footnote_439" class="fnanchor">439</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_439" href="#FNanchor_439" class="fnanchor">439</a> This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 1625 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Just ten minutes later a single CCF shell, assumed to be of 76mm
-caliber, exploded in the Battalion CP area and fatally wounded Captain
-Paul E. Storaasli, the S-4. The perimeter was so cluttered with tents
-and dumps that artillery fire at random could hardly have been wasted;
-but the enemy gun remained silent the rest of the day, doubtless to
-avert Marine counter-battery reprisals.</p>
-
-<p>Only three hours of daylight remained when the newly designated
-defense commander summoned unit commanders to an initial conference.
-It was not made clear just what troops had been placed under
-his operational control. “A primary reason,” commented Ridge, “was
-that no one knew what units were there, this being compounded by
-the numerous small elements such as detachments, advance parties,
-etc., of which many were Corps and ROK units. Hence, the Battalion
-S-1 and his assistants were a combination of town criers and census
-takers. We did, however, get most of the commanders of major units
-(if such they could be called) to the initial conference, but the process
-of locating and identifying smaller units was thereafter a continuous
-process which we really never accurately completed.”<a id="FNanchor_440" href="#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">440</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_440" href="#FNanchor_440" class="fnanchor">440</a> Ridge, <i>Notes</i>, 27–28.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The larger outfits could be summoned to the conference by telephone
-but it was necessary to send out runners in other instances. With George
-Company not available, the question of defending East Hill loomed
-large. Ridge decided against all proposals that one of the two rifle
-companies be used for that purpose. On the strength of the S-2
-report, he preferred to concentrate as much strength as possible against
-an attack from the southwest. This meant taking his chances on East
-Hill with such service troops as he could scrape up, and it was plain
-that a strong CCF effort in this quarter would have to be met in large
-part by fire power from supporting arms.</p>
-
-<p>The two main detachments selected for East Hill (excluding the
-south nose) were from Dog Company of the 10th Engineer (C) Battalion,
-USA, and elements of X corps Headquarters. Since the mission
-called for control of mortar and artillery fires as well as tactical leadership,
-two officers of Weapons Company, 3/1, were assigned—Captain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">207</span>
-John C. Shelnutt to the Army engineer company, and First Lieutenant
-John L. Burke, Jr., to the Headquarters troops. Each was to be accompanied
-by a Marine radio (SCR 300) operator.</p>
-
-<p>Smaller detachments were later sent to East Hill from two other
-service units—the 1st Service Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and the
-4th Signal Battalion of X Corps.</p>
-
-<p>The Antitank Company of the 7th Marines defended the area to
-the north of East Hill. Next came How Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th
-Marines, which had the primary mission of supporting Fox Company,
-2/7, on the hill near Toktong Pass. But by moving gun trails the cannoneers
-could with some difficulty fire on the 270° arc of the perimeter
-stretching from the right flank of Item Company around to the north
-nose of East Hill.</p>
-
-<p>Between the sectors held by How Battery, 3/11, and Item Company,
-3/1, were troops of five Marine units: Regulating Detachment,
-1st Service Battalion; 1st Motor Transport Battalion; Marine Tactical
-Air Control Squadron 2 (<span class="allsmcap">MTACS</span>-2); Division Headquarters Battalion;
-and H&amp;S Company 3/1. The only other unit in this quarter was
-Weapons Company (-), 2/7, which held the road block on the route
-to Yudam-ni.</p>
-
-<p>At the conference it was decided that since Lieutenant Colonel
-Charles L. Banks’ Regulating Detachment had taken the lead in organizing
-the Supply Area on the north side of Hagaru, the arc of the
-perimeter east of the river and west of East Hill was to be made into a
-secondary defense zone. Banks thus became in effect a sub-sector commander.
-The only infantry troops in the Supply Area being detachments
-of 2/7 units, it was also agreed that tactical decisions concerning
-the zone should be discussed with the two ranking battalion officers—Lieutenant
-Colonel Lockwood, the commander, and Major Sawyer,
-the executive.<a id="FNanchor_441" href="#Footnote_441" class="fnanchor">441</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_441" href="#FNanchor_441" class="fnanchor">441</a> “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific mission because it was
-assumed that his uncanceled order from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts
-in the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>These matters having been settled, the conference broke up shortly
-after 1700 and the various commanders hastened back to their outfits
-to make last-minute preparations for the night’s attack. A strange hush
-had fallen over the perimeter, broken only by the occasional crackle of
-small-arms fire, and the damp air felt like snow.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">208</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Attack from the Southwest</i></h3>
-
-<p>How and Item Companies were ready. All platoon positions were well
-dug in, though the earth was frozen to a depth of six to ten inches.</p>
-
-<p>The men of Item Company used their heads as well as hands after
-Lieutenant Fisher managed to obtain a thousand sandbags and several
-bags of C3. This explosive was utilized in ration cans to make improvised
-shape charges which blasted a hole through the frozen crust of
-snow and earth. Then it became a simple matter to enlarge the hole
-and place the loose dirt in sandbags to form a parapet.<a id="FNanchor_442" href="#Footnote_442" class="fnanchor">442</a> This ingenious
-system resulted in de luxe foxholes and mortar emplacements attaining
-to the dignity of field fortifications.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_442" href="#FNanchor_442" class="fnanchor">442</a> This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1 tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov
-50; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley
-narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug 55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors,
-10 Oct 55; and Sgt K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Both company fronts bristled with concertinas, trip flares, booby
-traps, and five-gallon cans of gasoline rigged with thermite bombs for
-illumination. Three probable routes of enemy attack channeled the low
-hills to the southwest—a main draw leading to the junction between
-the two company sectors, and a lesser draw providing an approach to
-each. The ground in front of the junction had been mined, and two
-tanks from the Provisional Platoon were stationed in this quarter.
-Detachments from Weapons Company also reinforced both rifle companies.
-Thus the six platoons faced the enemy in the following order:</p>
-
-<table id="t208" summary="Platoon leaders">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc larger" colspan="3">ITEM COMPANY</td>
-  <td class="tdc larger" colspan="3">HOW COMPANY</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">Lt Fisher</td>
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">Capt Corley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Degerne</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Hall</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Needham</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Barrett</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Endsley</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Lt Mason</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">1st</td>
-  <td class="tdc">3d</td>
-  <td class="tdc">2d</td>
-  <td class="tdc">1st</td>
-  <td class="tdc">3d</td>
-  <td class="tdc">2d</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Beginning at 1700, hot food was served to all hands in rotation.
-A fifty per cent alert went into effect after dark as the men were sent
-back on regular schedule for coffee and a smoke in warming tents
-located as close to the front as possible. The first snowflakes fluttered
-down about 1950, muffling the clank of the dozers at work as usual
-under the floodlights on the airstrip behind the How Company’s sector.
-Just before 2130, the expected time of CCF attack, both company commanders
-ordered a hundred per cent alert, but the enemy did not show
-up on schedule. It was just over an hour later when three red flares<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">209</span>
-and three blasts on a police whistle signaled the beginning of the attack.
-Soon trip flares and exploding booby traps revealed the approach of
-probing patrols composed of five to ten men.</p>
-
-<p>A few minutes later, white phosphorus mortar shells scorched the
-Marine front line with accurate aim. The main CCF attack followed
-shortly afterwards, with both company sectors being hit by assault
-waves closing in to grenade-throwing distance.</p>
-
-<p>The enemy in turn was staggered by the full power of Marine supporting
-arms. Snowflakes reduced an already low visibility, but fields of
-fire had been carefully charted and artillery and mortar concentrations
-skillfully registered in. Still, the Communists kept on coming in spite
-of frightful losses. Second Lieutenant Wayne L. Hall, commanding
-the 3d Platoon in the center of Item Company, was jumped by three
-Chinese whom he killed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol after his
-carbine jammed. The third foe pitched forward into Hall’s foxhole.</p>
-
-<p>On the left flank, tied in with How Company, First Lieutenant Robert
-C. Needham’s 2d Platoon sustained most of the attack on Item Company.
-The fire of Second Lieutenant James J. Boley’s 60mm mortars
-and Second Lieutenant John H. Miller’s light machine guns was concentrated
-in this area. It seemed impossible that enemy burp guns
-could miss such a target as Lieutenant Fisher, six feet two inches in
-height and weighing 235 pounds. But he continued to pass up and
-down the line, pausing at each foxhole for a few words of encouragement.
-By midnight the enemy pressure on Needham’s and Hall’s lines
-had slackened, and on the right flank Second Lieutenant Mayhlon L.
-Degernes’ 1st Platoon received only light attacks.</p>
-
-<p>This was also the case on the left flank of How Company, where
-Second Lieutenant Ronald A. Mason’s 2d Platoon saw little action as
-compared to the other two. A front of some 800 yards in the center
-of the 2300-yard Marine line, including two platoon positions and
-parts of two others, bore the brunt of the CCF assault on How and
-Item Companies.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Corley had just visited his center platoon when the first
-attacks hit How Company. Second Lieutenant Wendell C. Endsley was
-killed while the company commander was on his way to Second Lieutenant
-Roscoe L. Barrett’s 1st Platoon, on the right, which soon had its
-left flank heavily engaged.</p>
-
-<p>Never was CCF skill at night attacks displayed more effectively.
-Barrett concluded that the Chinese actually rolled down the slope into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">210</span>
-the How Company lines, so that they seemed to emerge from the very
-earth. The 3d Platoon, already thinned by accurate CCF white phosphorus
-mortar fire, was now further reduced in strength by grenades
-and burp gun bursts. About this time the company wire net went out
-and Corley could keep in touch with his platoons only by runners. The
-battalion telephone line also being cut, he reported his situation by
-radio to the Battalion CP.</p>
-
-<p>Two wiremen were killed while trying to repair the line. The Chinese
-continued to come on in waves, each preceded by concentrations of
-light and heavy mortar fire on the right and center of the How Company
-position. About 0030 the enemy broke through in the 3d Platoon area
-and penetrated as far back as the Company CP. A scene of pandemonium
-ensued, the sound of Chinese trumpets and whistles adding to the
-confusion as it became difficult to tell friend from foe. “Tracers were
-so thick,” recalled Sergeant Keith E. Davis, “that they lighted up the
-darkness like a Christmas tree.”<a id="FNanchor_443" href="#Footnote_443" class="fnanchor">443</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_443" href="#FNanchor_443" class="fnanchor">443</a> K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Corley and five enlisted men operated as a supporting fire team while
-First Lieutenant Harrison F. Betts rounded up as many men as he
-could find and tried to plug the gap in the 3d Platoon line. This outnumbered
-group was swept aside as the next wave of CCF attack carried
-to the rear of How Company and threatened the engineers at work
-under the floodlights.</p>
-
-<p>A few Chinese actually broke through and fired at the Marines
-operating the dozers. Second Lieutenant Robert L. McFarland, the
-equipment officer, led a group of Dog Company engineers who counterattacked
-and cleared the airstrip at the cost of a few casualties. Then
-the men resumed work under the floodlights.<a id="FNanchor_444" href="#Footnote_444" class="fnanchor">444</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_444" href="#FNanchor_444" class="fnanchor">444</a> Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56, questions whether the
-floodlights were on during the whole attack.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Battalion reserve, if such it could be called, consisted of any
-service troops who could be hastily gathered to meet the emergency.
-Shortly before midnight Ridge sent a platoon-strength group of X Corps
-signalmen and engineers under First Lieutenant Grady P. Mitchell to
-the aid of How Company. Mitchell was killed upon arrival and First
-Lieutenant Horace L. Johnson, Jr., deployed the reinforcements in a
-shallow ditch as a company reserve.</p>
-
-<p>About midnight the fight had reached such a pitch of intensity that
-no spot in the perimeter was safe. The Company C medical clearing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">211</span>
-station, only a few hundred yards to the rear of Item Company, was
-repeatedly hit by machine gun bullets whipping through the wooden
-walls as surgeons operated on the wounded. The Division CP also
-took hits, and a bullet which penetrated General Smith’s quarters produced
-unusual sound effects when it ricocheted off pots and pans in
-the galley.<a id="FNanchor_445" href="#Footnote_445" class="fnanchor">445</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_445" href="#FNanchor_445" class="fnanchor">445</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 93.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Chinese seemed to be everywhere in the How Company zone.
-Shortly after midnight they surrounded the CP, portable galley and
-provision tent. “It is my personal opinion,” commented Captain Corley,
-“that if the enemy had decided to effect a major breakthrough at this
-time, he would have experienced practically no difficulty. However,
-he seemed content to wander in and around the 3d Platoon, galley and
-hut areas.”<a id="FNanchor_446" href="#Footnote_446" class="fnanchor">446</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_446" href="#FNanchor_446" class="fnanchor">446</a> Corley narrative.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Chinese, in short, demonstrated that they knew better how to
-create a penetration than to exploit one. Once inside the How Company
-lines, they disintegrated into looting groups or purposeless tactical
-fragments. Clothing appealed most to the plunderers, and a wounded
-Marine in the 3d Platoon area saved his life by pretending to be dead
-while Communists stripped him of his parka.</p>
-
-<p>About 0030 the Battalion CP advised Corley by radio that more reinforcements
-were on the way. Lieutenant Johnson met the contingent,
-comprising about 50 service troops, and guided them into the company
-area, where they were deployed as an added reserve to defend the
-airstrip.</p>
-
-<p>Item Company was still having it hot and heavy but continued to
-beat off all CCF assaults. Elements of Weapons Company, manning
-the south road block, came under attack at 0115. Apparently a small
-enemy column had lost direction and blundered into a field of fire
-covered by heavy machine guns. The hurricane of Marine fire caught
-the Communists before they deployed and the result was virtual annihilation.</p>
-
-<h3><i>East Hill Lost to Enemy</i></h3>
-
-<p>Half an hour later, with the situation improving in the How Company
-zone, the Battalion CP had its first alarming reports of reverses on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">212</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_213">213</a></span>
-East Hill. The terrain itself had offered difficulties to men scrambling
-up the steep, icy slopes with heavy burdens of ammunition. These
-detachments of service troops, moreover, included a large proportion
-of newly recruited ROKs who had little training and understood no
-English.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_18" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_212.png" width="834" height="1246" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>EAST HILL ATTACKS</p>
-
-<p>29 November</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-18</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The largest of the East Hill units, Company D of the 10th Engineer
-Combat Battalion, commanded by Captain Philip A. Kulbes, USA, was
-composed of 77 American enlisted men and 90 ROKs. Combat equipment
-(in addition to individual weapons) consisted of four .50 caliber
-machine guns, five light .30 caliber machine guns, and six 3.5 rocket
-launchers.<a id="FNanchor_447" href="#Footnote_447" class="fnanchor">447</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_447" href="#FNanchor_447" class="fnanchor">447</a> References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt Norman R. Rosen, “Combat
-Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John G. Westover, Ed., <i>Combat Support in Korea</i> (Washington,
-1955), 206–208.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Army engineers had arrived at Hagaru at 1200 on the 28th,
-shortly before the enemy cut the MSR. After being assigned to the
-East Hill sector during the afternoon, the company used the few remaining
-hours of daylight to move vehicles and gear back to an equipment
-park in the perimeter. It was 2030 before the four platoons got into
-position on East Hill after an exhausting climb in the darkness with
-heavy loads of ammunition. Some use was made of existing holes, but
-most of the men were not dug in when the Chinese attacked.</p>
-
-<p>On the left the collapse of a ROK platoon attached to X Corps
-Headquarters led rapidly to confusion everywhere on East Hill. Captain
-Shelnutt, the Marine officer assigned to the Army engineers, found
-that he could not close the gap by extending the line to the left. Nor
-did the men, particularly the ROKs, have the training to side-slip to
-the left under fire and beat off flank attacks. The consequence was a
-general withdrawal on East Hill, attended in some instances by demoralization.
-Shelnutt was killed as the four engineer platoons fell back
-some 250 yards in “a tight knot,” according to Lieutenant Norman R.
-Rosen, USA, commander of the 3d Platoon.</p>
-
-<p>This was the situation as reported by the Marine radio operator,
-PFC Bruno Podolak, who voluntarily remained as an observer at his
-post, now behind enemy lines. At 0230 a telephone call to Colonel
-Bowser from the 3/1 CP was recorded in the message blank as follows:</p>
-
-<p>“How Company still catching hell and are about ready to launch
-counterattack to restore line. About an hour ago, enemy appeared on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">214</span>
-East Hill. A group of enemy sneaked up to a bunch of Banks’ men
-and hand-grenaded hell out of them and took position. Sending executive
-officer over to see if we can get some fire on that area. Should be
-able to restore the line but liable to be costly. Reserve practically nil.
-Do have a backstop behind the break in How lines on this side of
-airstrip, composed of engineers and other odds and ends.”<a id="FNanchor_448" href="#Footnote_448" class="fnanchor">448</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_448" href="#FNanchor_448" class="fnanchor">448</a> 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0400 there was little to prevent the enemy from making a complete
-breakthrough on East Hill and attacking the Division CP and
-the supply dumps. A friendly foothold had been retained on reverse
-slopes of the southern nose, but the northern part was held only by
-artillery fires. Along the road at the bottom of East Hill a thin line of
-service troops with several tanks and machine guns formed a weak
-barrier.</p>
-
-<p>All indications point to the fact that the Chinese themselves were
-not in sufficient strength to follow up their success. Their attack on
-East Hill was apparently a secondary and diversionary effort in support
-of the main assault on the sectors held by How and Item Companies.
-At any rate, the enemy contented himself with holding the high ground
-he had won.</p>
-
-<p>Some of the defenders of East Hill had fought with bravery which
-is the more admirable because of their lack of combat training. Battle
-is a business for specialists, and Lieutenant Rosen relates that the Army
-engineers “had a great deal of difficulty with our weapons because they
-were cold and fired sluggishly. We had gone into action so unexpectedly
-that it had not occurred to us to clean the oil off our weapons.”
-As an example of the difficulties imposed by the language barrier, the
-officers were given to understand by the ROKs that they had no more
-ammunition. “Weeks later,” commented Rosen, “we found that most
-of them had not fired their ammunition this night, but continued to
-carry it.”<a id="FNanchor_449" href="#Footnote_449" class="fnanchor">449</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_449" href="#FNanchor_449" class="fnanchor">449</a> Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In view of such circumstances, the service troops put up a creditable
-if losing fight in the darkness on East Hill. The 77 Americans of the
-Army engineer company suffered losses of 10 KIA, 25 WIA, and nine
-MIA; and of the 90 ROKs, about 50 were killed, wounded, or missing,
-chiefly the latter.<a id="FNanchor_450" href="#Footnote_450" class="fnanchor">450</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">215</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_450" href="#FNanchor_450" class="fnanchor">450</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>The Volcano of Supporting Fires</i></h3>
-
-<p>As usual, the men in the thick of the fight saw only what happened in
-their immediate area. The scene as a whole was witnessed by a young
-Marine officer of Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, on duty at a
-sawmill two miles north of Hagaru. From the high ground he could
-look south down into the perimeter, and the awesome spectacle of a
-night battle made him think of a volcano in eruption. Gun flashes
-stabbing the darkness were fused into a great ring of living flame, and
-the thousands of explosions blended into one steady, low-pitched roar.<a id="FNanchor_451" href="#Footnote_451" class="fnanchor">451</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_451" href="#FNanchor_451" class="fnanchor">451</a> Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Seldom in Marine history have supporting arms played as vital a
-part as during this night at Hagaru. It is possible that a disaster was
-averted on East Hill when the Marines of Captain Benjamin S. Read’s
-How Battery shifted trails and plugged the hole in the line with howitzer
-fires alone. Lieutenant Colonel Banks and Major Walter T. Warren,
-commanding the antitank company of the 7th Marines, acted as
-observers. Reporting by telephone to the gun pits, they directed the
-sweating gunners so accurately that an enemy attack would have come
-up against a curtain of fire.<a id="FNanchor_452" href="#Footnote_452" class="fnanchor">452</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_452" href="#FNanchor_452" class="fnanchor">452</a> Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns Never Got Cold,”
-<i>Saturday Evening Post</i>, ccxxiii (7 Apr 51), 145.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Strohmenger’s Dog Battery had been attached to 3/1 so
-long that a high degree of co-ordination existed. His 105s fired about
-1200 rounds that night, and POW interrogations disclosed that enemy
-concentrations in rear areas were repeatedly broken up.</p>
-
-<p>When CCF guns replied, shortly before midnight, there was danger
-of a fuel or ammunition dump being hit and starting a chain reaction of
-detonations in the crowded perimeter. Strohmenger ordered five of
-his howitzers to cease fire while he moved the sixth out about 150 yards
-to act as a decoy. Its flashes drew fire from the enemy, as he had hoped,
-revealing the positions of the Chinese artillery. Dog Battery officers
-set up two aiming circles and calculated the range and deflection. Then
-the command was given for all six Marine howitzers to open up. The
-enemy guns were silenced for the night. A later survey established that
-two CCF 76mm guns had been destroyed and two others removed.<a id="FNanchor_453" href="#Footnote_453" class="fnanchor">453</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_453" href="#FNanchor_453" class="fnanchor">453</a> Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 60mm mortars of the two rifle companies fired a total of more
-than 3200 rounds; and on both fronts the heavy machine guns of
-Weapons Company added tremendously to the fire power. Illuminating<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">216</span>
-shells being scarce, two Korean houses on the Item Company’s front
-were set ablaze by orders of Lieutenant Fisher. The flames seemed to
-attract CCF soldiers like moths, and the machine guns of the two tanks
-stationed here reaped a deadly harvest. Curiously enough, the Chinese
-apparently did not realize what excellent targets they made when
-silhouetted against the burning buildings.</p>
-
-<p>By 0400 it was evident that the enemy’s main effort had failed. No
-further attacks of any consequence were sustained by the two rifle companies.
-It remained only to dispose of the unwelcome CCF visitors
-sealed off in the How Company zone, and at 0420 Captain Corley
-rounded up men for a counterattack.</p>
-
-<p>“It will be just as dark for them as for us,” he told his NCOs.</p>
-
-<p>Second Lieutenant Edward W. Snelling was directed to fire all his
-remaining 60mm mortar ammunition in support. Corley and Betts
-led the service troops sent as reinforcements while Johnson advanced
-on the left. A bitter fight of extermination ensued, and by 0630 the
-MLR had been restored. How Company, which sustained the heaviest
-losses of any Marine unit that night, had a total of 16 men killed and
-39 wounded, not including attached units.<a id="FNanchor_454" href="#Footnote_454" class="fnanchor">454</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_454" href="#FNanchor_454" class="fnanchor">454</a> Corley and Barrett narratives.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After it was all over, the stillness had a strange impact on ears
-attuned the whole night long to the thump of mortars and clatter of
-machine guns. The harsh gray light of dawn revealed the unforgettable
-spectacle of hundreds of Chinese dead heaped up in front of the two
-Marine rifle companies.<a id="FNanchor_455" href="#Footnote_455" class="fnanchor">455</a> Shrouds of new white snow covered many
-of them, and crimson trails showed where the wounded had made their
-way to the rear.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_455" href="#FNanchor_455" class="fnanchor">455</a> POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this sector had been one regiment.
-CIC tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1715 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Attacks on East Hill</i></h3>
-
-<p>But even though the enemy’s main attack had failed, his secondary
-effort on East Hill represented a grave threat to perimeter security.
-At 0530 Ridge decided to counterattack, and Major Reginald R. Myers
-volunteered to lead an assault column composed of all reserves who
-could be scraped together for the attempt.</p>
-
-<p>It was broad daylight before the Battalion executive officer moved
-out with an assortment of Marine, Army, and ROK service troops, some<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">217</span>
-of them stragglers from the night’s withdrawals from East Hill (see
-Map 18). Their total strength compared to that of an infantry company.
-About 55 separate units were represented at Hagaru, many by
-splinter groups, so that most of Myers’ men were strangers to one
-another as well as to their officers and NCOs.</p>
-
-<p>The largest Marine group was the platoon led by First Lieutenant
-Robert E. Jochums, assistant operations officer of the 1st Engineer Battalion.
-Clerks, typists, and truck drivers were included along with
-Company D engineers. Armed with carbines or M-1s and two grenades
-apiece, the men carried all the small arms ammunition they
-could manage. Few had had recent combat experience and the platoon
-commander knew only one of them personally—a company clerk whom
-he made his runner.</p>
-
-<p>It was typical of the informality attending this operation that a
-Marine NCO with a small group attached themselves to Jochums, giving
-him a total of about 45. They had an exhausting, 45-minute climb
-up the hill to the line of departure, where Myers directed them to attack
-on the left of his main force.</p>
-
-<p>The early morning fog enshrouded East Hill and Myers’ attack had
-to wait until it cleared. The jump-off line lay along a steep slope with
-little or no cover. From the outset the advancing troops were exposed
-to scattered small-arms fire as well as grenades which needed only to
-be rolled downhill. New snow covering the old icy crust made for
-treacherous footing, so that the heavily laden men took painful falls.</p>
-
-<p>Myers’ little task force can scarcely be considered a tactical organization.
-His close air support was excellent; but both artillery and mortar
-support were lacking. Jochums did not notice any weapons save small
-arms and grenades.</p>
-
-<p>“Our plane assaults were very effective, especially the napalm attacks,”
-he commented on the basis of a personal log kept at the time.
-“During these strikes, either live or dry runs, the enemy troops in the
-line of fire would often rise and run from their positions to those in
-the rear.”<a id="FNanchor_456" href="#Footnote_456" class="fnanchor">456</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_456" href="#FNanchor_456" class="fnanchor">456</a> Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Marine air came on station at 0930 as VMF-312 planes peeled off
-to hit the enemy with napalm and bombs. The squadron flew 31 sorties
-that day at Hagaru, nearly all in the East Hill area. Enemy small-arms
-fire crippled one aircraft; but the pilot, First Lieutenant Harry W.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">218</span>
-Colmery, escaped serious injuries by making a successful crash landing
-within the perimeter.<a id="FNanchor_457" href="#Footnote_457" class="fnanchor">457</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_457" href="#FNanchor_457" class="fnanchor">457</a> VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 15–16.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All accounts agree that the ground forces met more serious opposition
-from the terrain at times than from the enemy. So cut up into
-ridges and ravines was this great hill mass that the troops seldom knew
-whether they were advancing in defilade or exposing themselves to the
-fire of hidden adversaries. Thus the attack became a lethal game of
-hide-and-seek in which a step to the right or left might make the difference
-between life and death. On the other hand, when the Corsairs
-provided shooting gallery targets by flushing out opponents, only a
-few men could get into effective firing position along the narrow,
-restricted ridges before the Communists scuttled safely to new cover.</p>
-
-<p>It took most of the energies of the attackers to keep on toiling upward,
-gasping for breath, clutching at bushes for support, and sweating
-at every pore in spite of the cold. At noon, after snail-like progress,
-the force was still far short of the main ridge recognized as the dividing
-line between friendly forces and the enemy. By this time more than half
-of Myers’ composite company had melted away as a result of casualties
-and exhaustion. Jochums saw no more than 15 wounded men in the
-attacking force during the day. He noted about the same number of
-dead Chinese. As for enemy strength, he estimated that the total may
-have amounted to a company or slightly more.</p>
-
-<p>It was his conviction that “three well organized platoons could have
-pressed the assault without serious consequences and seized the immediate
-highest objective. What was behind that I am unable to say, but
-I feel that taking this high ground would have solved the problem.”<a id="FNanchor_458" href="#Footnote_458" class="fnanchor">458</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_458" href="#FNanchor_458" class="fnanchor">458</a> Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we] could not control movement
-of the enemy on the reverse side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Most of the friendly casualties were caused by the grenades and
-grazing machine-gun fire of concealed opponents who had the law of
-gravity fighting on their side. Jochums was painfully wounded in the
-foot but continued with his platoon. “The age-old problem of leadership
-in such an operation,” he concluded, “may be compared to moving
-a piece of string—pulling it forward will get you farther than pushing.”</p>
-
-<p>Enemy small-arms fire increased in volume when Myers’ remnants,
-estimated at 75 men, reached the military crest of the decisive ridge.
-There the groups in the center and on the right were halted by the Chinese
-holding the topographical crest and reverse slope. On the left
-Jochums’ men managed to push on to an outlying spur before being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">219</span>
-stopped by CCF fire from a ridge to the northeast. Jochums’ position
-was still short of the commanding high ground, yet it was destined to be
-the point of farthest penetration on East Hill.</p>
-
-<p>Myers ordered his men to take what cover they could find and draw
-up a defensive line “short of the topographical crest” while awaiting a
-supporting attack.<a id="FNanchor_459" href="#Footnote_459" class="fnanchor">459</a> This was to be carried out by elements of Captain
-George W. King’s Able Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion, which
-had been stationed at a sawmill two miles north of Hagaru to repair a
-blown bridge. These troops reached the perimeter without incident at
-noon and proceeded immediately to the assault.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_459" href="#FNanchor_459" class="fnanchor">459</a> Myers Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>First Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona’s 1st Platoon led the column.
-Orders were to ascend the southwestern slope of East Hill, pass through
-Myers’ force and clear the ridge line. But after completing an exhausting
-climb to the military crest, the engineer officer was directed to
-retrace his steps to the foot. There Captain King informed him that a
-new attack had been ordered on the opposite flank, from a starting
-point about 1000 yards to the northeast.</p>
-
-<p>Moving to the indicated route of approach, Canzona began his second
-ascent with two squads in line, pushing up a spur and a draw which
-became almost perpendicular as it neared the topographical crest. Only
-his skeleton platoon of about 20 men was involved. There were neither
-radios nor supporting arms, and a light machine gun was the sole
-weapon in addition to small arms and grenades.</p>
-
-<p>Upon reaching the military crest, the engineers were pinned down
-by CCF machine-gun fire along a trail a few feet wide, with nearly
-vertical sides. Only Canzona, Staff Sergeant Stanley B. McPhersen and
-PFC Eugene B. Schlegel had room for “deployment,” and they found
-the platoon’s one machine gun inoperative after it was laboriously
-passed up from the rear. Schlegel was wounded and rolled downhill
-like a log, unconscious from loss of blood.</p>
-
-<p>Another machine gun, sent up from the foot, enabled the platoon
-to hold its own even though it could not advance. Canzona put in a
-request by runner for mortar support, but only two 81mm rounds
-were delivered after a long delay. It was late afternoon when he walked
-downhill to consult King, who had just been ordered to withdraw Company
-A to a reverse slope position. Canzona returned to his men and
-pulled them back about half-way down the slope while McPherson
-covered the retirement with machine-gun fire. The winter sun was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">220</span>
-sinking when the weary engineers set up a night defense, and at that
-moment the howitzers of How Battery cut loose with point-detonation
-and proximity bursts which hit the Chinese positions with deadly
-accuracy.</p>
-
-<p>Canzona estimated the enemy strength in his zone at no more than a
-platoon, which might have been dislodged with the aid of artillery or
-even mortar fire.<a id="FNanchor_460" href="#Footnote_460" class="fnanchor">460</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_460" href="#FNanchor_460" class="fnanchor">460</a> Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that the Chinese positions
-were defiladed from artillery fire. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>About 500 yards south of the engineers, Major Myers held a defensive
-position with his remaining force of about two platoons. The Battalion
-CP had reason to believe that the outposts on East Hill would be
-relieved shortly by George Company, with the 41st Commando in
-perimeter reserve. Both had departed Koto-ri that morning in a strong
-convoy which also included an Army infantry company, four platoons
-of Marine tanks, and the last serial of Division Headquarters Battalion.</p>
-
-<p>It was still touch and go at Hagaru at dusk on the 29th, but the
-defenders could take satisfaction in having weathered the enemy’s first
-onslaught. General Smith, courteous and imperturbable as always,
-visited the Battalion CP to commend Ridge and his officers for the
-night’s work. Two rifle companies had inflicted a bloody repulse on
-several times their own numbers, and the counterattacking forces on
-East Hill had at least hung on by their eyelashes.</p>
-
-<p>In the final issue, a bob-tailed rifle battalion, two artillery batteries
-and an assortment of service troops had stood off a CCF division identified
-as the 58th and composed of the 172d, 173d, and 174th Infantry
-Regiments reinforced with organic mortars and some horse-drawn
-artillery. Chinese prisoners reported that the 172d, taking the principal
-part in the attacks on How and Item Companies, had suffered 90 per
-cent casualties. Elements of the 173d were believed to have figured to
-a lesser extent, with the 174th being kept in reserve.<a id="FNanchor_461" href="#Footnote_461" class="fnanchor">461</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_461" href="#FNanchor_461" class="fnanchor">461</a> 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 9–10; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; Carey narrative.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This was the situation in the early darkness of 29 November, when
-the disturbing news reached Hagaru that George Company and the
-Commandos were being heavily attacked on the road from Koto-ri and
-had requested permission to turn back.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">221</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Task Force Drysdale</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri—Convoy Reinforced by Marine
-Tanks—The Fight in Hell Fire Valley—Attack of George Company
-on East Hill—High Level Command Conference—CCF
-Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru—Rescue of U. S. Army
-Wounded—First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">Before</span> the Chinese struck at Yudam-ni, they had penetrated 35
-miles farther south along the MSR. At Chinhung-ni, on the
-night of 26 November, the Marines of the 1st Battalion, RCT-1,
-exchanged shots in the darkness with several elusive enemy groups
-making “light probing attacks.”</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, the new battalion commander,
-had set up a defensive perimeter upon arrival with his three
-rifle companies reinforced by 4.2-inch mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle
-platoons.<a id="FNanchor_462" href="#Footnote_462" class="fnanchor">462</a> The identity of the enemy on the night of the 26th was not
-suspected, and patrols the next day made no contacts. At 1900 on the
-27th, however, another light attack on the perimeter was repulsed.
-During the next two days, patrol actions definitely established that
-Chinese in estimated battalion strength were in a mountain valley to
-the west, hiding in houses by day and probing by night apparently in
-preparation for a determined attack.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_462" href="#FNanchor_462" class="fnanchor">462</a> This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 13–14; 1stMar <i>URpt</i>
-(<i>S-3</i>) <i>13</i>, 1–2; VMF-312 <i>SAR</i>, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W. L.
-Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Schmuck decided to strike first. On the 29th, a Baker Company
-reconnaissance patrol searched out the enemy positions, and the next
-day the battalion commander led an attacking force composed of Captain
-Barrow’s Able Company and part of Captain Noren’s Baker Company,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">222</span>
-reinforced by 81mm and 4.2-inch mortars under the direction of
-Major William L. Bates, Jr., commanding the Weapons Company.</p>
-
-<p>While First Lieutenant Howard A. Blancheri’s Fox Battery of 2/11
-laid down supporting fires, the infantry “ran the Chinese right out of
-the country,” according to Major Bates’ account. “We burned all the
-houses they had been living in and brought the civilians back with us.
-We had no more difficulty with the Chinese from that valley.”</p>
-
-<p>The Communists were found to be warmly clothed in new padded
-cotton uniforms and armed with American weapons presumably captured
-from the Nationalists. An estimated 56 were killed by the ground
-forces before the Corsairs of VMF-312 took up a relentless pursuit
-which lasted until the enemy remnants scattered into hiding. Some of
-the Chinese were mounted on shaggy Mongolian ponies.<a id="FNanchor_463" href="#Footnote_463" class="fnanchor">463</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_463" href="#FNanchor_463" class="fnanchor">463</a> Schmuck Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Attacks on 2/1 at Koto-ri</i></h3>
-
-<p>During this same period, Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s 2d Battalion of
-RCT-1 had several hard-fought encounters with the new enemy. After
-arriving at Koto-ri on the 24th, he set up a perimeter defense facing
-west, north, and east which included a 4.2-inch Mortar Platoon as well
-as Easy Battery of 2/11, commanded by Captain John C. McClelland,
-Jr. Some commanding ground was left unoccupied, but Sutter believed
-that a tight perimeter offered advantages over widely separated blocking
-positions. In addition to 2/1, the regimental CP and H&amp;S Company,
-the AT Company (-), the 4.2 Mortar Company (-), Company D
-of the 1st Medical Battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 11th Marines
-(less Batteries D and F) were at Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>The perimeter, second in importance only to Hagaru as a base, was
-to be jammed during the next few days with hundreds of Marine and
-Army troops held up by CCF roadblocks to the north. On 27 November,
-the enemy made his presence known. A motorized patrol of platoon
-strength from Captain Jack A. Smith’s Easy Company, supported by a
-section of tanks, engaged in a fire fight with about 25 Chinese in the
-hills west of Koto-ri. Two wounded CCF soldiers were left behind by
-the dispersed enemy. At this point the patrol proceeded on foot until
-it was stopped by the fire of an estimated 200 Communists dug in along<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">223</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_224">224</a></span>
-ridge lines. At 1600 the Marines returned to the perimeter with two
-men wounded.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_19" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_223.png" width="841" height="1280" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>KOTO-RI PERIMETER</p>
-
-<p>28 November – 7 December</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-19</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Enemy losses were reported as eight killed and 15 wounded in addition
-to the two prisoners. Upon being questioned, these Chinese asserted
-that they belonged to a Chinese division assembling to the west of
-Koto-ri with a headquarters in a mine shaft.<a id="FNanchor_464" href="#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">464</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_464" href="#FNanchor_464" class="fnanchor">464</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1815 and
-1930 27 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There could be no doubt the next day that the enemy had swarmed
-into the area in fairly large numbers. A Marine outpost on a hill northeast
-of the perimeter received heavy small-arms fire at 0845 and was
-reinforced by a platoon from Easy Company. Finally these troops had
-to be withdrawn and an air strike called on the hill to evict the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>At 1058 General Smith ordered Colonel Puller to push a force up
-the MSR to make contact with the tank patrol being sent south from
-Hagaru and to clear the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_465" href="#Footnote_465" class="fnanchor">465</a> Groups of Chinese, sighted during the
-day to the north, west and east, were taken under artillery fire by Captain
-McClelland’s battery. Reconnaissance planes landing at the Koto-ri
-OY strip reported CCF roadblocks on the way to Hagaru; and at 1330
-Captain Gildo S. Codispoti, the S-3, dispatched Captain Welby W.
-Cronk’s Dog Company in vehicles with orders to open up the route.
-Following in Dog Company’s wake came the last serial of Division
-Headquarters troops, on its way to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_466" href="#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">466</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_465" href="#FNanchor_465" class="fnanchor">465</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_466" href="#FNanchor_466" class="fnanchor">466</a> The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 12–13; HqBn <i>URpt 12</i>. LtCol
-J. C McClelland, Jr., ltr, 21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Less than a mile north of the perimeter, the convoy ran into a storm
-of rifle and automatic weapons fire from Chinese entrenched along the
-high ground on both sides of the road. The Marines of Dog Company
-piled out of their vehicles and deployed for a hot fire fight, supported
-from Koto-ri by 81mm mortars of Captain William A. Kerr’s Weapons
-Company. Two platoons swung around to clear the enemy from the
-ridge. The other platoon and the Headquarters troops advanced along
-the road.</p>
-
-<p>At 1615 a platoon from Captain Goodwin C. Groff’s Fox Company
-was ordered out to assist in evacuating casualties. But as the afternoon
-wore on, it grew apparent that the Chinese were in greater strength
-than had been anticipated, and all troops were directed to return to
-Koto-ri at 1735. They did so under cover of strikes by the Corsairs of
-VMF-312.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">225</span></p>
-
-<p>Marine losses numbered four KIA or DOW and 34 WIA. Enemy
-casualties were estimated at 154 killed and 83 wounded in addition to
-three prisoners taken from a unit identified as the 179th Regiment of
-the 60th CCF Division. Captured Chinese weapons included 130 rifles,
-25 machine guns, and two cases of grenades.</p>
-
-<p>That evening George Company of 3/1, 41st Commando, Royal
-Marines, and Baker Company of the 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division,
-arrived at Koto-ri on their way to Hagaru (see Map 20). Colonel
-Puller and his S-3, Major Lorigan, organized the newcomers into a
-task force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, CO of
-the British unit, with orders to fight its way to Hagaru the following
-day.</p>
-
-<p>Luckily the enemy did not elect to attack the overcrowded perimeter
-on the night of the 28th. Every warming tent was packed to capacity,
-and a CCF mortar round could hardly have landed anywhere without
-doing a good deal of damage.</p>
-
-<p>After a quiet night the Chinese began the new day by digging emplacements
-in the hills to the west under harassing fire from F Company.
-The howitzers of Easy Battery and the mortars of 2/1 provided supporting
-fires for Task Force Drysdale when it moved out at 0945 followed
-by a convoy of Division Headquarters troops. A platoon of
-Easy Company, 2/1, went along with corpsmen and ambulances to
-assist in evacuating any early wounded back to Koto-ri. Stubborn CCF
-resistance resulted in casualties from the outset, and it was 1600 before
-the Easy Company escort platoon got back to the perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>The Chinese, keeping the perimeter under observation all day, evidently
-concluded that the northern rim, defended by Easy Company,
-offered the best opportunity for a penetration. Marine air strikes were
-called on the Chinese swarming over the near-by high ground during
-the last minutes of daylight, but enemy mortar rounds hit Easy Company
-at 1745. They were followed by bugle calls and whistle signals
-as the CCF infantry attacked from the high ground to the northeast.</p>
-
-<p>The assault force was estimated at company strength, with the remainder
-of a battalion in reserve. Unfortunately for the Chinese, they
-had made their intentions clear all day with unusual activity in the surrounding
-hills, and Easy Company was not surprised. Major Clarence
-J. Mabry, the 2/1 executive officer, could be heard above the machine
-guns as he shouted encouragement to Marines who poured it into the
-advancing Communists. They came on with such persistence that 17<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">226</span>
-managed to penetrate within the lines, apparently to attack the warming
-tents.<a id="FNanchor_467" href="#Footnote_467" class="fnanchor">467</a> All were killed. In addition, about 150 CCF bodies lay in front
-of the sector when the enemy withdrew at 1855, after suffering a complete
-repulse.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_467" href="#FNanchor_467" class="fnanchor">467</a> LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was conjectured that the Chinese had interpreted the return of the
-Easy Company platoon late that afternoon as an indication that a gap
-in the line needed to be hastily plugged. But the supposed weak spot
-did not materialize, and at 1935 the enemy signed off for the night after
-pumping four final mortar rounds in the vicinity of the Battalion CP
-without doing any harm. Losses of 2/1 for the day were six KIA and
-18 WIA, total CCF casualties being estimated at 175 killed and 200
-wounded. Ten heavy machine guns, seven LMGs, 12 Thompson submachine
-guns, 76 rifles, four pistols, and 500 grenades were captured.</p>
-
-<p>That was all at Koto-ri, where Recon Company arrived during
-the day to add its weight to the defense. But during intervals of silence
-the sound of heavy and continuous firing to the north gave proof that
-Task Force Drysdale was in trouble.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Convoy Reinforced by Marine Tanks</i></h3>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale’s plan of attack had called for his British
-Marines to lead out at 0930 and seize the first hill mass to the east of
-the road. Captain Sitter’s George Company of 3/1 was to follow and
-pass through to attack Hill 1236, with Baker Company of the 31st Infantry
-in reserve. LtCol Sutter, assisted by his staff, had the responsibility
-for planning and coordinating preparatory artillery and mortar
-fires from Koto-ri and attaching an air liaison officer to the task force.<a id="FNanchor_468" href="#Footnote_468" class="fnanchor">468</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_468" href="#FNanchor_468" class="fnanchor">468</a> Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO 41st Commando ltr to CG
-1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 23–27; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter
-ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas ltr to HistBr G-3, 18 Dec 55;
-Narrative of Capt M. J. Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan 56;
-LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51),
-28–32; 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J. Catania, “Truck
-Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, <i>Combat Support in Korea</i>, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale,
-RM, Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The first hill was taken without meeting serious resistance, but Sitter
-came up against well entrenched CCF troops when he attacked Hill
-1236, about a mile and a half north of Koto-ri. It was nip and tuck
-until Master Sergeant Rocco A. Zullo fired his 3.5 rocket launcher at a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">227</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_228">228</a></span>
-range of 200 yards. Several rounds brought the Chinese out of their
-holes and the Marines took possession of the hill.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_20" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_227.png" width="844" height="1276" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>ATTEMPTS TO REINFORCE HAGARU</p>
-
-<p>28 November-1 December</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-20</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The Commandos and George Company moved up about a mile
-astride of the road toward the third objective, Hill 1182. There the
-enemy resisted strenuously with well-placed mortar as well as machine-gun
-fire from strong positions on the high ground. The impetus of the
-attack had been stopped when Sitter received orders from the task force
-commander to break off action, withdraw to the road, and await new
-instructions.</p>
-
-<p>Drysdale had received a message from RCT-1 at 1130 advising him
-that the armor of Company D (less 2d platoon), 1st Tank Battalion,
-would be available to him at 1300. He decided to wait, therefore, and
-re-form the column before continuing the advance.</p>
-
-<p>The two platoons of Company D tanks, reinforced by the tank
-platoon of the AT Company, RCT-5, reached Koto-ri at noon after
-moving out that morning from Majon-dong. Company B, 1st Tank
-Battalion, departed Tongjong-ni, just south of Majon-dong, but did
-not arrive at Koto-ri until 1500. The 2d Platoon being attached to
-Sutter’s battalion, the remainder of the company was directed to bring
-up the rear of the Task Force Drysdale, which by that time had renewed
-its attack. Thus the convoy was made up of the following components,
-including the elements which joined in the late afternoon of 29 November:</p>
-
-<table id="t228" class="narrow30 bl" summary="convoy components">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl">Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Estimated<br />Strength</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Estimated<br />vehicles</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Estimated<br />Tanks</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">41 Ind. Commando, RM</td>
-  <td class="tdr">235</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. G, 3/1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">205</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. B, 31st Infantry, USA</td>
-  <td class="tdr">190</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Det. Div. Hq. Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">62</td>
-  <td class="tdr">17</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Det. 1st Sig. Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Det. 7th MT Bn.<a id="FNanchor_469" href="#Footnote_469" class="fnanchor">469</a></td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Det. Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">18</td>
-  <td class="tdr">31</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">86</td>
-  <td class="tdr">23</td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">77</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Tank Plat., AT Co., RCT-5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in4">Total</td>
-  <td class="tdr">922</td>
-  <td class="tdr">141</td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">229</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_469" href="#FNanchor_469" class="fnanchor">469</a> Trailers are included among the vehicles. George Company, 3/1 lacked organic transport
-and was mounted in the vehicles of 7thMTBn. For similar reasons ServCo, 1stTkBn,
-supplied the transportation for the 41st Commando and 377th Transportation Truck
-Company, USA, for B/31stInf.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1350 the head of the column had resumed the advance, with the
-order of march as shown below:</p>
-
-<table id="t229" summary="order of march">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">D/TKs &amp; AT/5</td>
-  <td class="tdc">—</td>
-  <td class="tdc">G/1</td>
-  <td class="tdc">—</td>
-  <td class="tdc">41 Cmdo</td>
-  <td class="tdc">—</td>
-  <td class="tdc">B/31</td>
-  <td class="tdc">—</td>
-  <td class="tdc">HqBn</td>
-  <td class="tdc">—</td>
-  <td class="tdc">B/TKs</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdc">17 tks</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc">22 veh</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc">31 veh</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc">22 veh</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc">66 veh</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc">12 tks</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Shortly after moving out, Sitter’s men were hit by heavy small-arms
-fire from houses on the right of the road. The company commander
-went forward and requested the tanks to open up with their 90mm guns,
-and the Chinese flushed out of the houses were destroyed by machine-gun
-fire.</p>
-
-<p>Progress was slow because of the necessity of further halts while the
-tanks blasted out pockets of CCF resistance. Enemy mortar as well as
-small-arms fire was encountered, and a round scored a direct hit on
-one of the trucks carrying personnel of 3d Platoon of George Company,
-wounding every man in the vehicle.</p>
-
-<p>Further delays resulted while the tanks made their way over roadblocks
-or around craters. For the three infantry companies, the advance
-consisted of brief periods of movement alternated with interludes
-in which the troops scrambled out of the trucks to engage in fire fights.
-Finally, about 1615, the column ground to a complete halt about four
-miles north of Koto-ri. At that time the tanks of Company B were just
-leaving the 2/1 perimeter to join the convoy.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Fight in Hell Fire Valley</i></h3>
-
-<p>Drysdale and Sitter were informed by the tank officers that they thought
-the armor could get through, but that further movement for the trucks
-was inadvisable in view of road conditions and increasing enemy resistance.
-The task force commander requested a decision from Division
-Headquarters as to whether he should resume an advance which threatened
-to prove costly. It was a difficult choice for General Smith to make,
-but in view of the urgent necessity for reinforcements at Hagaru he
-directed Drysdale to continue.<a id="FNanchor_470" href="#Footnote_470" class="fnanchor">470</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">230</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_470" href="#FNanchor_470" class="fnanchor">470</a> Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are the same as the preceding, plus:
-Statement of Capt M. C. Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton, and
-Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb 51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by
-Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C. W.
-Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt J. B. Nash, and TSgt C L. Harrison
-intervs by HistDiv HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt Shutts,
-26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson,
-Estess, and Williams were among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped
-from Chinese imprisonment several months later.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The tanks had to refuel, so that more time was lost. CCF fire was only
-moderate during this delay, thanks to the air strikes of VMF-321 planes
-directed by Captain Norman Vining. When the column stopped, the
-vehicles had pulled off into a dry stream bed. Upon resuming the advance,
-unit integrity was lost and infantry elements mingled with
-headquarters troops.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_21" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_230.png" width="834" height="601" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>TASK FORCE
-DRYSDALE
-AMBUSH</p>
-
-<p>29 November</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-21</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Not far south of the halfway point to Hagaru, increased enemy fire
-caused an abrupt halt in a long valley. The high ground rose sharply
-on the right of the road, while on the left a frozen creek wound through
-a plain several hundred yards wide, bordered by the Changjin River
-and wooded hills. This was Hell Fire Valley—a name applied by Drysdale—and
-it was to be the scene of an all-night fight by half the men
-of the convoy (see Map 21).</p>
-
-<p>Such a possibility was far from their thoughts when they piled out
-of the trucks once more, as they had done repeatedly all day, to return
-the enemy’s fire. It did not even seem significant when an enemy mortar
-shell set one of the trucks in flames at the far end of the valley, thus
-creating a roadblock and splitting the column. The enemy took advantage
-of the opportunity to pour in small-arms and mortar fire which
-pinned down the troops taking cover behind vehicles or in the roadside<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">231</span>
-ditches and prevented removal of the damaged truck. During this interlude
-the head of the column, consisting of Dog/Tanks, George Company,
-nearly three-fourths of the 41st Commando and a few Army infantrymen,
-continued the advance, with Drysdale in command, in obedience
-to orders to proceed to Hagaru at all costs. Left behind in Hell
-Fire Valley were 61 Commandos, most of Company B, 31st Infantry,
-and practically all the Division Headquarters and Service troops.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A. Chidester, assistant Division G-4 and
-senior officer caught south of the roadblock, ordered the barred vehicles
-to turn around and attempt a return to Koto-ri. Before his orders could
-be carried out, a Chinese attack severed the convoy about 200 yards
-to the north of him. Other enemy attacks cut the road south of the
-stalled convoy, both Chidester and Major James K. Eagan being
-wounded and captured.</p>
-
-<p>Shallow ditches on either side of the road and the unused narrow-gauge
-railway were utilized by the isolated troops as protection from
-the fire of the Chinese occupying the high ground rising abruptly at the
-right. The valley was about a mile long, covered with a frozen crust
-of snow; and far from affording much cover, it offered the enemy a
-convenient approach to the rear by way of the wide plain and frozen
-river.</p>
-
-<p>The Chinese fire was not heavy at first. But when darkness put an
-end to Marine air strikes, the enemy became increasingly bolder.
-Even so, there was no attempt for several hours to close within grenade-throwing
-distance. During this interlude the defenders had time to
-recover from their confusion and take defensive positions.</p>
-
-<p>As nearly as the scene can be reconstructed from confused and contradictory
-accounts, one large and three small perimeters were strung
-out over a distance of perhaps 1200 yards from north to south. Toward
-the north, near the outskirts of the village of Pusong-ni, was the largest
-perimeter. It contained the troops caught north of the second fracture
-of the column and was led by Major John N. McLaughlin.<a id="FNanchor_471" href="#Footnote_471" class="fnanchor">471</a> His hodge-podge
-of 130 to 140 men included Captain Charles Peckham and part
-of his B Company, 31st Infantry; Warrant Officer Lloyd V. Dirst and
-a group of Marine MPs; some Commandos, Associated Press photographer
-Frank Noel, and assorted Marine service and headquarters
-troops.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">232</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_471" href="#FNanchor_471" class="fnanchor">471</a> Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had transferred to the X Corps
-Staff. He was an Assistant G-3 and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The three smaller perimeters appear to have resulted from the
-splintering of a larger group originally containing nearly all the men
-caught south of the second cut in the convoy. Major Henry J. Seeley,
-Division motor transport officer, attempted to form a perimeter with
-these men but was frustrated by Chinese attacks which forced the men
-to fall back in small groups. About 300 yards south of McLaughlin’s
-perimeter the remnants of two Army platoons crouched in a drainage
-ditch. Apparently several Marines, including CWO Dee R. Yancey,
-were with them. Some 30 yards farther down the ditch were Captain
-Michael J. Capraro, the Division PIO, First Lieutenant John A. Buck,
-General Craig’s aide, and about 15 headquarters troops. A few other
-Marines clustered around Major Seeley, perhaps a hundred yards south
-of Capraro’s group.<a id="FNanchor_472" href="#Footnote_472" class="fnanchor">472</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_472" href="#FNanchor_472" class="fnanchor">472</a> Distances are approximate, since it is understandable that estimates made by participants
-in the darkness varied a great deal.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There was some hope at first that the tanks of Baker Company, 1st
-Tank Battalion, would come to the rescue. But the Marine armor ran
-into heavy opposition near Hills 1236 and 1182 along the road cleared
-only a few hours before by Task Force Drysdale.</p>
-
-<p>When attacking a convoy, the Chinese usually strove to split the
-motorized column into segments suitable for tactical mastication. That
-is what happened to Baker Company. The tanks and trucks nearest to
-Koto-ri got back without much trouble at 2110 after the enemy cut
-the column into three groups. The middle group, comprising most of
-the service trucks, was hit hardest. Lieutenant Colonel Harvey S. Walseth,
-the Division G-1, was wounded as this group finally fought back
-to Koto-ri at 0230 after heavy losses in trucks. This left the tank
-platoon which had proceeded farthest; and it formed a tight perimeter
-for the night about half a mile south of Seeley’s position, boxed in by
-friendly artillery fires from Koto-ri. At dawn the tanks returned to
-Koto-ri without further enemy interference.</p>
-
-<p>No knowledge of these events reached the beleaguered troops in
-Hell Fire Valley. They continued to hope that the tanks might arrive
-to the aid of men who had no weapons larger than a single 75mm
-recoilless in addition to rifles, carbines, and grenades. There were also
-a few 60mm mortars but no ammunition for them.</p>
-
-<p>Fortunately, no determined Chinese attacks were received up to
-midnight. Looting the trucks proved more alluring than fighting to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">233</span>
-Asiatics, and their officers contented themselves with keeping the perimeters
-pinned down and enveloped on three sides.</p>
-
-<p>Not until the early hours of 30 November did the Communists resort
-to probing attacks by small groups armed with grenades. The
-headquarters and service troops gave a good account of themselves in
-the fire fight. Signalmen, clerks, cooks, truck drivers, military policemen—the
-Marines of Hell Fire Valley included a good many veterans of
-World War II, and they proved as steady as the tough combat-trained
-Commandos. Once again the value of the Marine Corps insistence on
-good basic training showed itself.</p>
-
-<p>Major McLaughlin sent reconnaissance parties south in an unsuccessful
-attempt to link up with the other perimeters. He decided, therefore,
-to remain in his positions and fight off the Chinese until air
-could come on station at dawn. The wounded were placed in the deepest
-of the three ditches and Army medics gave first aid.</p>
-
-<p>As the night wore on, McLaughlin’s situation became increasingly
-grave. By 0200 his men were out of grenades. An Army crew performed
-valiantly with the 75mm recoilless, firing at enemy mortar flashes
-until all the soldiers were killed or wounded and the gun put out of action.
-Twice McLaughlin’s men drove the Chinese from their mortars
-only to have them return.</p>
-
-<p>Some of the Commandos managed to slip out of the perimeter in an
-effort to reach Koto-ri and summon assistance. But an attempt by Noel
-and two men to run the gantlet in a jeep between 0200 and 0300 ended
-in their capture before they proceeded a hundred yards.</p>
-
-<p>At about 0430 the Chinese sent their prisoners to the perimeter with
-a surrender demand. McLaughlin, accompanied by a Commando, went
-out to parley through an interpreter in the hope of stalling until help
-arrived, or at least until some of the men escaped.</p>
-
-<p>“Initially I demanded a CCF surrender!” he recalls. “But it made
-little impression.”</p>
-
-<p>The Marine officer stalled until the Chinese threatened to overrun
-the perimeter with an all-out attack. They gave him ten minutes to
-discuss the capitulation with his officers. McLaughlin went from one
-to another of the approximately 40 able bodied men he had left. Some
-had no rifle ammunition at all and none had more than eight rounds.
-For the sake of his wounded, he consented to surrender on condition
-that the serious cases be evacuated. The Chinese agreed and the fight
-in Hell Fire Valley ended.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">234</span></p>
-
-<p>McLaughlin succeeded in killing enough time so that more men were
-given the opportunity to slip away while the enemy relaxed his vigilance
-during the prolonged negotiations. Largest of these groups was composed
-of the survivors of the three small perimeters. Capraro and Buck,
-both of whom were slightly wounded, managed to unite with the Army
-infantrymen just north of them and nine Commandos, who joined them
-at about 0200. An hour and a half later they linked up with the Marines
-under Seeley, who led the combined group in a withdrawal to the
-high ground across the river. Outdistancing their CCF pursuers, after
-shooting down several, they made it safely to Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>Other groups, including three more Commandos and 71 Army infantrymen,
-also contrived to straggle back to the 2/1 perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>Although the Chinese did not keep their word as to evacuation of
-the wounded, they did not interfere with the removal of the more
-critical cases to a Korean house. When the enemy retired to the hills
-for the day, an opportunity was found to evacuate these casualties to
-Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_473" href="#Footnote_473" class="fnanchor">473</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_473" href="#FNanchor_473" class="fnanchor">473</a> LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the end of the conflict, when the
-exchanges of prisoners took place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has been
-able to secure, it appears that both officers died of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp.
-McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>An accurate breakdown of the Task Force Drysdale casualties will
-probably never be made, but the following estimate is not far from
-the mark:</p>
-
-<table id="t234" class="narrow30 bl" summary="Task Force Drysdale casualies">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl vbot">Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdc">KIA<br />and<br />WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc nobl vbot">WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Total<br />Battle<br />Casualties</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">Vehicles<br />Lost<a id="FNanchor_474" href="#Footnote_474" class="fnanchor">A</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">41st Commando</td>
-  <td class="tdr">18</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">43</td>
-  <td class="tdr">61</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. G, 3/1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">40</td>
-  <td class="tdr">48</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. B, 1/31</td>
-  <td class="tdr">100</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">19</td>
-  <td class="tdr">119</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Div. Hq. Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">25</td>
-  <td class="tdr">50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">18</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st Sig. Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">7th MT Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Serv. Co., 1st Tank Bn</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">11</td>
-  <td class="tdr">30</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. B(-), 1st Tank Bn</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">12</td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Co. D(-), 1st Tank Bn</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Plat, AT Co., RCT-5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in4">Total</td>
-  <td class="tdr">162</td>
-  <td class="tdr nobl">159</td>
-  <td class="tdr">321</td>
-  <td class="tdr">75</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_474" href="#FNanchor_474" class="fnanchor">A</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 867–868.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">235</span></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>“The casualties of Task Force Drysdale were heavy,” commented
-General Smith, “but by its partial success the Task Force made a significant
-contribution to the holding of Hagaru which was vital to the
-Division. To the slender infantry garrison of Hagaru were added a
-tank company of about 100 men and some 300 seasoned infantrymen.
-The approximately 300 troops which returned to Koto-ri participated
-thereafter in the defense of that perimeter.”<a id="FNanchor_475" href="#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">474</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_475" href="#FNanchor_475" class="fnanchor">474</a> <i>Ibid.</i> A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was written the following spring in
-front-page headlines announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17 enlisted
-Marines and a soldier. Among them were five NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts
-for these pages. Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either escaped or survived
-their prison camp experiences and were liberated in Operation Big Switch.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The head of the Task Force Drysdale column, with the Company D
-tanks leading George Company and the Commandos, was not aware
-at dusk on the 29th that the convoy had been cut behind them. There
-had been previous gaps during the stops and starts caused by enemy
-fire, and it was supposed at first that the thin-skinned vehicles would
-catch up with the vanguard.</p>
-
-<p>Progress was fairly good, despite intermittent fire from the high
-ground on the right of the road, until the tanks reached a point about
-2200 yards from Hagaru. There the column was stopped by concentrated
-CCF mortar and small-arms fire. One of the tanks was so damaged
-by a satchel charge that it had to be abandoned, and several
-vehicles were set afire. After Drysdale was wounded the command
-passed to Sitter, who formed his force into a perimeter until the repulse
-of the Chinese permitted the march to be resumed.<a id="FNanchor_476" href="#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">475</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_476" href="#FNanchor_476" class="fnanchor">475</a> This section, except where otherwise specified, has been derived from the following
-sources: 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 24–25; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>;
-Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative,
-27 Mar 56; Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Several pyramidal tents just outside the Hagaru perimeter were
-assumed to be occupied by friendly troops until enemy in the vicinity
-destroyed two George Company trucks and caused several casualties.
-Later it was learned that the tents had been originally occupied by
-troops of the 10th Engineer Battalion and abandoned when the Chinese
-attacked on the 28th.</p>
-
-<p>At 1915, Captain Sitter reported to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, who
-directed that George Company and the 41st Commando spend the night
-in perimeter reserve. After their all-day fight, the men of the column
-could scarcely believe their eyes when they saw the Marine engineers
-at work on the airstrip under the floodlights.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">236</span></p>
-
-<p>Contrary to expectations, the hours of darkness on 29–30 November
-passed in comparative quiet at Hagaru except for CCF harassing fires.
-It was not a coincidence that the enemy kept his distance. Attacks
-on the East Hill and Item and How Company positions of 3/1 actually
-had been planned and partly executed by troops of the 58th CCF Division,
-according to POW testimony. They were broken up by Marine
-air attacks and supporting fires which hit the assembly areas.</p>
-
-<p>The effectiveness of these fires owed a good deal to the intelligence
-brought back to Lieutenant Carey, the Battalion S-2, by CIC agents
-who circulated among Chinese troops on 27 and 28 November. The
-Battalion S-2 had a work table at the CP beside Major Simmons, the
-SAC, who directed six sorties of the night hecklers of VMF(N)-542.
-He guided the planes through the darkness to their targets with a fiery
-arrow as converging machine-gun tracer bullets crossed over suspected
-CCF assembly areas.</p>
-
-<p>The 81mm mortars of Weapons Company, 3/1, fired about 1100
-rounds during the night, and the corresponding unit of 2/7 made a
-noteworthy contribution. The following day, according to Carey, Chinese
-prisoners reported that “most of the units employed around Hagaru
-were very badly hit.”<a id="FNanchor_477" href="#Footnote_477" class="fnanchor">476</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_477" href="#FNanchor_477" class="fnanchor">476</a> This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of 29–30 November is based on:
-Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 <i>SAR 26 Nov-15
-Dec 50</i>, 4–5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A few white phosphorus mortar rounds fell in the lines of How and
-Item Companies, and a CCF green flare caused an alert for an attack
-which never materialized. In the early morning hours of the 30th an
-enemy concentration appeared to be taking place on the Item Company
-front, but intensive 60mm mortar fire put an end to the threat.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Attack of George Company on East Hill</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 0800, the battalion commander ordered George Company to retake
-East Hill while the Commandos remained in reserve. Sitter’s plan
-called for his 1st and 2d platoons, commanded by Second Lieutenants
-Frederick W. Hopkins and John W. Jaeger respectively, to pass through
-Myers’ group, then make a sharp left turn and attack on either side of
-the ridge. First Lieutenant Carl E. Dennis’ 3d Platoon and two platoons
-of Able Company engineers were to follow in reserve.</p>
-
-<p>Slow progress caused the George Company commander to modify the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">237</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_238">238</a></span>
-plan by giving his 3d platoon and the two engineer platoons the mission
-of enveloping the CCF right flank (see Map 22). Lieutenant
-Dennis led the attack, with First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt’s and Lieutenant
-Canzona’s engineer platoons following.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_22" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_237.png" width="838" height="1257" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>EAST HILL ATTACKS</p>
-
-<p>30 November</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-22</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Neither of the George Company attacks was successful. The trampling
-of hundreds of feet over the snow had made the footing more
-treacherous than ever; and once again the combination of difficult terrain
-and long-range Chinese fire accounted for failure to retake East
-Hill. Sitter’s request to set up defense positions on the ground previously
-occupied by Myers was granted. Meanwhile Dennis’ platoon
-and the engineers were directed to withdraw to the foot of the hill,
-so that the Corsairs could work the CCF positions over with rockets
-and bombs.</p>
-
-<h3><i>High Level Command Conference</i></h3>
-
-<p>Although the Marines at Hagaru had little to do with the higher levels
-of strategy, it was evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth
-Army in west Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of X Corps.
-Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the three
-battalions (two infantry and one artillery) of the 7th Infantry Division
-east of the Chosin Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes,
-assistant division commander, informed General Smith at noon on the
-29th that the Army troops had suffered approximately 400 casualties
-while falling back toward Hagaru and were unable to fight their way
-out to safety. At 2027 that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir
-area, including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational
-control of the Marine commander by X Corps. The 1st Marine
-Division was directed to “redeploy one RCT without delay from Yudam-ni
-area to Hagaru area, gain contact with elements of the 7th Inf
-Div E of Chosin Reservoir; co-ordinate all forces in and N of Hagaru
-in a perimeter defense based on Hagaru; open and secure Hagaru-Koto-ri
-MSR.”<a id="FNanchor_478" href="#Footnote_478" class="fnanchor">477</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_478" href="#FNanchor_478" class="fnanchor">477</a> X Corps <i>OI 19</i>, 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at
-Hagaru in the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr, and Hodes
-were informed at the briefing session that a disaster threatened the
-three Army battalions.<a id="FNanchor_479" href="#Footnote_479" class="fnanchor">478</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">239</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_479" href="#FNanchor_479" class="fnanchor">478</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 95; X Corps <i>WD Sum, Nov 50</i>, 16–17; CG’s Diary Extracts in X
-Corps <i>WD</i>, 30 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Almond was also much concerned about the attacks on the Marine
-MSR. He had been given a firsthand account that morning by the
-senior Marine officer on the X Corps staff, Colonel Edward H. Forney,
-who had just returned from Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_480" href="#Footnote_480" class="fnanchor">479</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_480" href="#FNanchor_480" class="fnanchor">479</a> Col E. H. Forney, <i>Transcript of Special Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps,
-19 August, 21 December 1950</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At the Hagaru conference the X Corps commander announced that
-he had abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the Chosin
-Reservoir area. Stressing the necessity for speed in falling back toward
-Hamhung, he promised Smith resupply by air after authorizing him to
-burn or destroy all equipment which would delay his withdrawal to
-the seacoast.</p>
-
-<p>The Marine general replied that his movements must be governed by
-his ability to evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way
-out, he added, and could not afford to discard equipment; it was his
-intention, therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.<a id="FNanchor_481" href="#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">480</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_481" href="#FNanchor_481" class="fnanchor">480</a> Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 95. These decisions were confirmed by CG X Corps msg X 13522,
-1 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule
-for extricating the Army battalions east of the Reservoir. Those two
-generals agreed, however, that not much could be done until the Yudam-ni
-Marines arrived at Hagaru, and the conference ended on an inconclusive
-note. That same afternoon X Corps OpnO 8-50 was received.
-It defined the Corps mission as “maintaining contact with the enemy
-to the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action, oriented to
-the Hamhung-Hungnam base of operation.”<a id="FNanchor_482" href="#Footnote_482" class="fnanchor">481</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_482" href="#FNanchor_482" class="fnanchor">481</a> X Corps <i>OpnO 8</i>, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps <i>WD Sum, Nov 50</i>, 16–17; and
-CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps <i>WD</i> 30 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The decision to concentrate X Corps forces in that area meant the
-evacuation of Wonsan. General Harris lost no time in directing MAG-12
-to move from Wonsan Airfield to Yonpo. Hedron-12 and the
-three combat squadrons began shifting personnel and equipment at
-once. Transfer of the aircraft was completed on 1 December. In many
-instances the planes took off on combat missions from Wonsan and
-landed at Yonpo, so that the ground forces were not deprived of air
-support.<a id="FNanchor_483" href="#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">482</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_483" href="#FNanchor_483" class="fnanchor">482</a> MAG-12 <i>HD Nov 50</i>, 8; 1stMAW <i>HD Dec 50</i>; CO MAG-12 msg to Movement
-Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in <i>ibid.</i> VMF-312 <i>HD, Dec 50</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>High level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation
-of northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral Joy
-foresaw as early as the 28th that if the retreat of the battered Eighth<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">240</span>
-Army continued, X Corps would have to choose between falling back
-and being outflanked. In view of the time needed to collect the enormous
-quantities of shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date
-that a large-scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle in
-turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment either
-by an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdrawal.<a id="FNanchor_484" href="#Footnote_484" class="fnanchor">483</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_484" href="#FNanchor_484" class="fnanchor">483</a> ComPhibGruOne, <i>Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950</i>, 1.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Attacks of 1 December at Hagaru</i></h3>
-
-<p>During the early hours of darkness on 30 November, it appeared that
-Hagaru might have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were
-heard by Item Company at 2015, and the enemy sent up a green flare an
-hour later. But no unusual CCF activity was reported until 2330, when
-small patrols began probing for weak spots in the Item Company lines.</p>
-
-<p>The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area for
-such research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up an elaborate
-system of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps; and his sandbagged
-foxholes and weapon emplacements afforded his men maximum protection.
-At midnight, when the enemy came on in strength, each successive
-assault wave shattered against the terrific fire power which a
-Marine rifle company, aided by artillery, tanks, 81mm mortars, and
-heavy machine guns, could concentrate.</p>
-
-<p>Several times the enemy’s momentum carried him to the Item Company
-foxholes but no Communists lived to exploit their advantage. On
-one of these occasions Sergeant Charles V. Davidson, having expended
-his ammunition, proved that cold steel still has its uses by bayoneting the
-last of his attackers.<a id="FNanchor_485" href="#Footnote_485" class="fnanchor">484</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_485" href="#FNanchor_485" class="fnanchor">484</a> Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Again, as on the night of the 28th, the enemy had chosen to launch
-his major attack against Marine strength, though his daytime observation
-must have disclosed the preparations for a hot reception in the Item
-Company sector. An estimated 500 to 750 Chinese were killed on this
-front at a cost to Fisher’s men of two KIA and 10 WIA.<a id="FNanchor_486" href="#Footnote_486" class="fnanchor">485</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_486" href="#FNanchor_486" class="fnanchor">485</a> 3/1 <i>SAR</i> 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Chinese also repeated themselves by carrying out another attack
-on East Hill which ended in a second costly stalemate. The western
-slope up to the military crest was held by the following units from
-right to left: First Lieutenant Ermine L. Meeker’s 1st Platoon of Baker<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">241</span>
-Company engineers; the 2d, 1st, and 3d Platoons of George Company;
-and Lieutenant Skelt’s 3d Platoon of Able Company Engineers. To the
-left of Skelt, near the foot of the hill, were Lieutenant Canzona’s 1st
-Platoon of Able engineers; two tanks of the AT Company, 2/7; and
-elements of Lieutenant Colonel Banks’ 1st Service Battalion.<a id="FNanchor_487" href="#Footnote_487" class="fnanchor">486</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_487" href="#FNanchor_487" class="fnanchor">486</a> Sources for the balance of this section are as follows: Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 97–100; 3/1
-<i>SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50</i>, 5–6; Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona narrative,
-8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14 Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10
-Apr 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The action began shortly before midnight with one of those comedy
-situations which develop on the grimmest occasions. The sign or password
-was “Abraham” and the countersign “Lincoln,” but two Company
-A engineers on a listening post did not pause for the customary
-exchange. Having been jumped by what their startled eyes took to be a
-Chinese regiment, they sprinted downhill yelling, “Abraham Lincoln!
-Abraham Lincoln!” as they slid into Skelt’s lines with the enemy close
-behind.</p>
-
-<p>His engineers had no leisure for a laugh. Within a few seconds they
-were mixing it in a wild melee with Communists who seemed literally
-to drop on them from above. Meanwhile, George Company was hard
-hit by well aimed mortar fire which threatened to wipe out Lieutenant
-Hopkins’ 1st Platoon. The ensuing double-headed CCF attack bent
-back the left flank of George Company, with both the 1st and 3d
-Platoons giving ground.</p>
-
-<p>On the left Skelt’s platoon was pushed down to the foot of the
-hill by superior enemy numbers after exactly half of his 28 men were
-killed or wounded. Here the fight continued with Banks’ service troops
-lending a hand until the Chinese were exterminated.</p>
-
-<p>This penetration was a hollow triumph for the enemy. No friendly
-forces being left in the center, the How Battery howitzers walked shells
-up and down the western slope. Mortars and machine guns chimed in,
-and Lieutenant Canzona’s platoon was in position to direct the fire
-of the two tanks of AT Company 2/7.</p>
-
-<p>The scene became bright as day after an enemy artillery shell set 50
-drums of gasoline ablaze in a Supply Area dump. Like an enormous
-torch, the flames illuminated the battle so vividly that General Smith
-looked on from the doorway of his CP, some 1200 yards away. Several
-bullets pierced the roof and walls during the night.</p>
-
-<p>Again, as in the fight of 28–29 November, Marine fire power blocked
-the gap on the central and northwest slopes of East Hill. Marine and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">242</span>
-Army service troops took a part in the fighting which is the more
-creditable considering that they were ordered out in the middle of the
-night, placed in a provisional unit with strange troops, and marched
-off into the darkness to attack or defend at some critical point.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Meeker’s engineer platoon, on the right of George Company,
-had a long-drawn fire fight but got off with losses of one man
-killed and three wounded. At 0100 the CCF pressure on Sitter’s troops
-was so heavy that Lieutenant Carey, former commander of the 1st
-Platoon, was taken from his S-2 duties to lead a group of reinforcements
-which he described as “all available hands from the CP or any
-other units in Hagaru who could spare personnel.” Carrying as much
-ammunition as possible, he arrived at the George Company CP to find
-Sitter still commanding in spite of his wound. Scarcely a full squad
-was left of Carey’s old outfit when he helped to restore the lines.</p>
-
-<p>It was necessary for Ridge to send a further reinforcement consisting
-of British Marines of the 41st Commando before George Company’s
-left flank was secured. A counterattack at daybreak regained lost
-ground, and the situation was well under control when air came on
-station at 0900.</p>
-
-<p>Thus ended another night of confusion and frustration for both
-sides on East Hill. While the Chinese attack had been better organized
-and in larger force than the effort of the 29th, it was too little and too
-late for decisive results in spite of heavy losses. On the other hand,
-George Company and its reinforcing elements had suffered an estimated
-60 men killed and wounded.</p>
-
-<p>Although the Marines of Hagaru could not have suspected it on the
-morning of 1 December, the enemy had, for the time being, shot his
-bolt. His first two large-scale attacks, as POW interrogations were
-to confirm, had used up not only the personnel of a division but most
-of the limited supplies of ammunition available. Thus it is probable
-that the following estimates of CCF casualties, as published in the 3/1
-report, for the period of 28 November to 5 December, were nearer to
-accuracy than most such summaries:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang">
-
-<p>(1) 58th CCF Division: Estimated casualties of 3300 for the 172d Regiment;
-1750 each for the 173d and 174th Regiments.</p>
-
-<p>(2) 59th CCF Division: Estimated 1750 casualties for the 176th Regiment.
-No other units identified.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The known Chinese dead in the two night battles amounted to at
-least 1500; and if it may be assumed that three or four times that
-number were wounded, the total casualties would have crippled an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">243</span>
-enemy infantry division of 7500 to 10,000 men, plus an additional
-regiment. Considering the primitive state of CCF supply and medical
-service, moreover, it is likely that hundreds died of wounds and privations
-behind their own lines.</p>
-
-<p>The losses of 3/1 at Hagaru were given as 33 KIA, 10 DOW, 2 MIA,
-and 270 WIA—a total of 315 battle casualties, nearly all of which
-were incurred from 28 November to 1 December.<a id="FNanchor_488" href="#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">487</a> There are no
-over-all casualty figures for Marine or Army service troops, but it is
-probable that their total losses exceeded those of 3/1.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_488" href="#FNanchor_488" class="fnanchor">487</a> Ridge, <i>Notes</i>; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 854.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Rescue of U. S. Army Wounded</i></h3>
-
-<p>Casualties estimated as high as 75 per cent were suffered by the three
-U. S. Army battalions east of the Reservoir. At 2200 on the night of
-1 December, the first survivors, most of them walking wounded, reached
-the Marine lines north of Hagaru with tales of frightful losses suffered
-in the five days of continual fighting since the first CCF attack
-on the night of 27–28 November.</p>
-
-<p>Following this action Colonel Allan D. MacLean, commanding the
-31st Infantry, had set up a perimeter near Sinhung-ni with the 3d Battalion
-of his regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 57th Field Artillery.
-Along the shore farther to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith,
-USA, held a separate perimeter with the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry
-(see Map 20).<a id="FNanchor_489" href="#Footnote_489" class="fnanchor">488</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_489" href="#FNanchor_489" class="fnanchor">488</a> The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise noted, are:
-Statement of Capt Edward P. Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n. d.;
-Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,” in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, <i>Combat
-Actions in Korea</i>, 63–86; X Corps <i>WD Sum, Nov 50</i>, 33–34. Chinese accounts of these
-actions may be found in ATIS <i>Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign</i>, Issue 84, 7–15
-and 20–25. LtCol Faith had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to MajGen
-Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d Airborne Div.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Both positions were hard hit by the Chinese on the night of 27–28
-November and isolated from each other. During the next 24 hours they
-beat off CCF attacks with the support of Marine and FEAF planes, and
-Faith fought his way through to a junction with the Sinhung-ni force.</p>
-
-<p>When the senior officer was killed, Faith took command of all three
-battalions. Immobilized by nearly 500 casualties, he remained in the
-Sinhung-ni perimeter, where he was supplied by air. On the 29th General
-Hodes sent a relief force in company strength from 31st Infantry
-units in the area just north of Hagaru. These troops, supported by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">244</span>
-several Army tanks, were hurled back by superior CCF numbers with
-the loss of two tanks and heavy personnel casualties.</p>
-
-<p>On 1 December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in his Sinhung-ni
-perimeter, Faith attempted to break through to Hagaru. After
-destroying the howitzers and all but the most essential equipment, the
-convoy with its hundreds of wounded moved out under the constant
-cover of Marine close air support, controlled by Captain Edward P.
-Stamford, USMC.<a id="FNanchor_490" href="#Footnote_490" class="fnanchor">489</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_490" href="#FNanchor_490" class="fnanchor">489</a> VMF(N)-542 <i>SAR</i>, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)-542 <i>HD</i>, Dec 50, 1–2; 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>,
-annex J, (hereafter MAG-33 <i>SAR</i>), sec B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in
-1stLt H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan 51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv
-by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan 51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan 51;
-and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18 Feb 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Progress was slow and exhausting, with frequent stops for fire fights.
-There were many instances of individual bravery in the face of adversity,
-but losses of officers and NCOs gradually deprived the units of leadership.
-As an added handicap, a large proportion of the troops were
-ROKs who understood no English.</p>
-
-<p>The task force came near to a breakout. At dusk it was only four and
-a half miles from Hagaru when Faith fell mortally wounded and the
-units shattered into leaderless groups.<a id="FNanchor_491" href="#Footnote_491" class="fnanchor">490</a> Soon the column had ceased to
-exist as a military force. A tragic disintegration set in as wounded and
-frostbitten men made their way over the ice of the Reservoir in wretched
-little bands drawn together by a common misery rather than discipline.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_491" href="#FNanchor_491" class="fnanchor">490</a> The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a Congressional Medal of
-Honor.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By a miracle the first stragglers to reach Hagaru got through the
-mine fields and trip flares without harm. Before dawn a total of about
-670 survivors of Task Force Faith had been taken into the warming
-tents of Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Beall, commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport
-Battalion, made a personal search in the morning for other survivors.
-Finding more than his jeep could carry, he organized a task force
-of trucks, jeeps, and sleds. The only CCF opposition to the Marines
-came in the form of long-distance sniping which grew so troublesome
-late in the afternoon that the truckers set up a machine gun section on
-the ice for protection. Far from hindering the escape of the Army
-wounded, the Chinese actually assisted in some instances, thus adding
-to the difficulty of understanding the Oriental mentality.<a id="FNanchor_492" href="#Footnote_492" class="fnanchor">491</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">245</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_492" href="#FNanchor_492" class="fnanchor">491</a> The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force Faith is based upon: 1stMar
-Div <i>SAR</i>, annex Q (hereafter DivSurgeon <i>SAR</i>), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement of
-LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv <i>POR 197</i>; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 902–906; and Smith,
-<i>Chronicle</i>, 98, 100.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Of the 319 soldiers rescued by Beall on 2 December, nearly all were
-wounded or frostbitten. Some were found wandering about in aimless
-circles on the ice, in a state of shock.</p>
-
-<p>A company-size task force of Army troops from Hagaru, supported
-by tanks, moved out that day to bring in any organized units of the
-three shattered battalions which might have been left behind. Known
-as Task Force Anderson after Lieutenant Colonel Berry K. Anderson,
-senior Army officer at Hagaru, the column met heavy CCF opposition
-and was recalled when it became evident that only stragglers remained.<a id="FNanchor_493" href="#Footnote_493" class="fnanchor">492</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_493" href="#FNanchor_493" class="fnanchor">492</a> 1stMarDiv G-3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to S-3 11–12
-Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Beall and his men kept up their rescue work until the last of an estimated
-1050 survivors of the original 2500 troops had been saved. A
-Marine reconnaissance patrol counted more than 300 dead in the abandoned
-trucks of the Task Force Faith convoy, and there were apparently
-hundreds of MIA. The 385 able-bodied soldiers who reached Hagaru
-were organized into a provisional battalion and provided with Marine
-equipment.<a id="FNanchor_494" href="#Footnote_494" class="fnanchor">493</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_494" href="#FNanchor_494" class="fnanchor">493</a> <i>Ibid.</i> Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by air from Hagaru as casualties
-run as high as 1500, but no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover, would
-have to include men from the Army units stationed at Hagaru as well as survivors of
-the Task Force Faith disaster.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>First Landings on Hagaru Airstrip</i></h3>
-
-<p>Casualty evacuation had become such a problem by 1 December that
-Captain Eugene R. Hering, (MC) USN, the Division surgeon, called
-at General Smith’s CP that morning. He reported that some 600 casualties
-at Hagaru were putting a severe strain on the limited facilities
-of C and E Companies of the 1st Medical Battalion. It was further
-estimated that 500 casualties would be brought in by the Yudam-ni
-units and 400 from the three Army battalions east of the Reservoir.<a id="FNanchor_495" href="#Footnote_495" class="fnanchor">494</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_495" href="#FNanchor_495" class="fnanchor">494</a> DivSurgeon <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 990–994, and <i>Chronicle</i>, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R.
-Hering, “Address Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and “Address
-Before American Medical Association Convention,” 14 Jun 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Although both figures were to prove far too low, they seemed alarmingly
-high at a time when only the most critical casualties could be
-evacuated by helicopter or OY. Flying in extreme cold and landing at
-high altitudes where the aircraft has less than normal lift, the pilots
-of Major Gottschalk’s VMO-6 saved scores of lives. From 27 November
-to 1 December, when the transports took over, 152 casualties were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">246</span>
-evacuated by the OYs and helicopters—109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from
-Hagaru, and seven from Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_496" href="#Footnote_496" class="fnanchor">495</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_496" href="#FNanchor_496" class="fnanchor">495</a> VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 14–15; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 844.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Altogether, 220 evacuation flights and 11 rescue missions were completed
-during the entire Reservoir campaign by a squadron which on
-1 November included 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, eight OY-2 and two
-L5G observation planes and nine HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters. First
-Lieutenant Robert A. Longstaff was killed by enemy small-arms fire
-near Toktong Pass while on an evacuation flight, and both Captain
-Farish and Lieutenant Englehardt had their helicopters so badly riddled
-by CCF bullets that the machines were laid up for repairs.<a id="FNanchor_497" href="#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">496</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_497" href="#FNanchor_497" class="fnanchor">496</a> <i>Ibid.</i> See also Lynn Montross, <i>Cavalry of the Sky</i> (New York, 1954), 134–136.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Two surgical teams from Hungnam had been flown to Hagaru by
-helicopter, but the evacuation problem remained so urgent on 1 December
-that the command of the 1st Marine Division authorized a trial
-landing on the new airstrip. Only 40 per cent completed at this time,
-the runway was 2900 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 2 per cent grade
-to the north.</p>
-
-<p>It was a tense moment, at 1430 that afternoon, when the knots of
-parka-clad Marine spectators watched the wheels of the first <span class="allsmcap">FEAF</span> C-47
-hit the frozen, snow-covered strip. The big two-motored aircraft
-bounced and lurched its way over the rough surface, but the landing
-was a success. An even more nerve-racking test ensued half an hour
-later when the pilot took off with 24 casualties. It seemed for a breath-snatching
-instant that the run wouldn’t be long enough for the machine
-to become airborne, but at last the tail lifted and the wings got enough
-“bite” to clear the hills to the south.</p>
-
-<p>Three more planes landed that afternoon, taking off with about 60
-more casualties. The last arrival, heavily loaded with ammunition, collapsed
-its landing gear on the bumpy strip and had to be destroyed and
-abandoned.<a id="FNanchor_498" href="#Footnote_498" class="fnanchor">497</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_498" href="#FNanchor_498" class="fnanchor">497</a> DivSurgeon <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 990–991, and <i>Chronicle</i>, 98–99.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At the other end of the evacuation chain, clearing stations had been
-established by X Corps at Yonpo Airfield to receive and distribute casualties.
-A 30-day evacuation policy was maintained, and the casualties
-to remain in the area went to the 1st Marine Division Hospital in Hungnam,
-the Army 121st Evacuation Hospital in Hamhung, and the USS
-<i>Consolation</i> in Hungnam harbor. Casualties requiring more than 30<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">247</span>
-days of hospitalization were flown from Yonpo to Japan, though a few
-critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaru to Japan.<a id="FNanchor_499" href="#Footnote_499" class="fnanchor">498</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_499" href="#FNanchor_499" class="fnanchor">498</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru to fly both supplies
-and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on 1 December, the 1st Marine
-Division had its first C-119 air drop from Japan. Known as “Baldwins,”
-these drops consisted of a prearranged quantity of small arms
-ammunition, weapons, water, rations, and medical supplies, though the
-amounts could be modified as desired.<a id="FNanchor_500" href="#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">499</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_500" href="#FNanchor_500" class="fnanchor">499</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Air drops, however, did not have the capability of supplying an RCT
-in combat, let alone a division. At this time the Combat Cargo Command,
-<span class="allsmcap">FEAF</span>, estimated its delivery capabilities at only 70 tons per day;
-and even though in practice this total was stepped up to 100, it fell
-five short of the requirements of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight of
-the Division commander and staff had enabled the Supply Regulating
-Detachment to build up a level of six days’ rations and two units of
-fire at Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_501" href="#Footnote_501" class="fnanchor">500</a> This backlog, plus such quantities as could be delivered
-by Baldwin drops, promised to see the Division through the
-emergency.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_501" href="#FNanchor_501" class="fnanchor">500</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1001–1004.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Infantrymen are seldom given to self-effacement, but at nightfall on
-1 December only an ungrateful gravel-cruncher could have failed to
-pay a silent tribute to the other services as well as to the supporting
-arms of the Marine Corps. Navy medics, FEAF airmen, Army service
-units—they had all helped to make it possible for the Marines to plan
-a breakout. Yet it is likely that the 1st Engineer Battalion came first
-in the affections of wounded men being loaded in the C-47s for evacuation.</p>
-
-<p>In just twelve days and nights the engineers of Company D had
-hacked this airstrip out of the frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could
-never forget the two critical nights of battle when they looked back
-over their shoulders from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of
-the dozers puffing and huffing under the floodlights. In a pinch Lieutenant
-Colonel Partridge’s specialists had doubled as riflemen, too, and
-several platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to
-the engineers, the Hagaru base was no longer isolated on 1 December.
-And though the enemy did not yet realize it, he had lost the initiative on
-this eventful Friday. The Marines at Yudam-ni were coming out, and
-they were coming out fighting with their casualties and equipment.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">249</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XII">CHAPTER XII<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Breakout From Yudam-ni</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Joint Planning for Breakout—The Fight for Hills 1419 and
-1542—March of 1/7 Over the Mountains—Attack of 3/5 on
-1–2 December—The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass—CCF Attacks
-on Hills 1276 and 1542—Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3
-December—Entry into Hagaru Perimeter</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> first steps toward regaining the initiative were taken by the
-Marine command as early as 29 November. Upon being informed
-that the composite battalion had failed to open up the MSR south of
-Yudam-ni, General Smith concluded that it was a task for a regiment.
-At 1545 that afternoon he issued the following orders to RCTs 5 and 7:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>RCT-5 assume responsibility protection Yudam-ni area adjusting present
-dispositions accordingly. RCT-7 conduct operations clear MSR to Hagaru
-without delay employing entire regiment.<a id="FNanchor_502" href="#Footnote_502" class="fnanchor">501</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_502" href="#FNanchor_502" class="fnanchor">501</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>That same evening the Division CP received X Corps OI 19, providing
-that an RCT be redeployed from the Yudam-ni area to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_503" href="#Footnote_503" class="fnanchor">502</a>
-No further directives from Division were necessary to implement this
-instruction, since it had been anticipated in General Smith’s orders.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_503" href="#FNanchor_503" class="fnanchor">502</a> XCorps <i>OI 19</i>, 29 Nov 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Upon receipt, the two Yudam-ni regimental commanders began joint
-planning for measures to be taken. The unusual command situation at
-Yudam-ni, in the absence of the assistant division commander, was
-explained by Colonel Litzenberg:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The 5th and 7th Marines were each acting under separate orders from the
-Division. The Division would issue orders to one regiment with information
-to the other, so that Division retained the control; and, of course, the 4th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">250</span>
-Battalion, 11th Marines, in general support of both regiments, was not actually
-under the control of either of us. Lieutenant Colonel Murray ... operated
-in very close coordination with me, sometimes at his own command
-post and sometimes at mine. We called in [Major] McReynolds, the commander
-of 4/11, discussed the situation with him, and thereafter Lieutenant
-Colonel Murray and I issued orders jointly as necessary.... This command
-arrangement functioned very well. There was never any particular disagreement.<a id="FNanchor_504" href="#Footnote_504" class="fnanchor">503</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_504" href="#FNanchor_504" class="fnanchor">503</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj McReynolds had already placed
-his battalion under Col Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds
-Comments, 15 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>For purposes of planning the supporting fires for the breakout, an
-artillery groupment was formed and Lieutenant Colonel Feehan given
-the responsibility of coordination. It was further agreed that no air
-drops of 155mm ammunition would be requested because of the greater
-number of 105mm rounds which could be received with fewer difficulties.<a id="FNanchor_505" href="#Footnote_505" class="fnanchor">504</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_505" href="#FNanchor_505" class="fnanchor">504</a> LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The problems of the two RCTs, commented General Smith, could not
-be separated. “The only feasible thing for them to do was pool their
-resources.... The assignment of command to the senior regimental
-commander was considered but rejected in favor of cooperation.”<a id="FNanchor_506" href="#Footnote_506" class="fnanchor">505</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_506" href="#FNanchor_506" class="fnanchor">505</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 918–919.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 0600 on the 30th, the two RCTs issued their Joint OpnO 1-50,
-which called for the regroupment of the Yudam-ni forces in a new position
-south of the village and astride the MSR as a first step toward a
-breakout.<a id="FNanchor_507" href="#Footnote_507" class="fnanchor">506</a> Thus in effect the two RCTs and supporting troops would
-be exchanging an east-and-west perimeter for one pointing from north
-to south along the road to Hagaru. Not only was the terrain south of
-the village more defensible, but a smaller perimeter would serve the
-purpose.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_507" href="#FNanchor_507" class="fnanchor">506</a> The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: RCT 5 and
-RCT 7 <i>Joint OpnO 1-50</i>, 30 Nov 50; X Corps <i>OpnO 8</i>, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 22–23;
-3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 20–21; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen
-O. P. Smith Comments, 13 Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D.
-Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Winecoff, Assistant G-3 of the Division, flew to
-Yudam-ni on the 30th to observe and report on the situation. He was
-given a copy of Joint OpnO 1-50 for delivery to General Smith on his
-return to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_508" href="#Footnote_508" class="fnanchor">507</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_508" href="#FNanchor_508" class="fnanchor">507</a> A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an evacuation helicopter but it did
-not reach the Division CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>That same afternoon, during a conference with General Almond at<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">251</span>
-Hagaru, the Marine commander received X Corps OpnO 8, directing
-him to operate against the enemy in zone, withdrawing elements north
-and northwest of Hagaru to that area while securing the Sudong-Hagaru
-MSR. And at 1920 that evening, Division issued the following dispatch
-orders to RCTs 5 and 7:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Expedite execution of Joint OpnO 1-50 and combined movement RCT-5
-and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy any
-supplies and equipment which must be abandoned during this withdrawal.<a id="FNanchor_509" href="#Footnote_509" class="fnanchor">508</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_509" href="#FNanchor_509" class="fnanchor">508</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1920 30 Nov 50. See also Smith, <i>Notes</i>,
-923–924.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As a prerequisite, a good deal of reorganization had to be effected at
-Yudam-ni. In order to provide a force to hold the shoulders of the
-high ground through which RCT-7 would advance, it was decided to
-put together another composite battalion.</p>
-
-<p>The new unit consisted of George Company, 3/7, Able Company,
-1/5, and the remnants of Dog and Easy Companies, 2/7, combined into
-a provisional company under Captain Robert J. Polson; a section of 81s
-each from 2/7 and 3/7’s Weapons Companies; and a communications
-detachment from 3/7. Major Maurice E. Roach, regimental S-4 placed
-in command, realized that such a jury-rigged outfit might be subject to
-morale problems. Noting that one of the men had made a neckerchief
-out of a torn green parachute, he seized upon the idea as a means of
-appealing to unit pride. Soon all the men were sporting green neckerchiefs,
-and Roach gave the new unit added distinction by christening
-it the Damnation Battalion after adopting “Damnation” as the code
-word.<a id="FNanchor_510" href="#Footnote_510" class="fnanchor">509</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_510" href="#FNanchor_510" class="fnanchor">509</a> This account of the organization of the “Damnation” Battalion is based upon: Narrative
-of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 9–10; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; LtCol
-M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. “I trust,” commented Gen Litzenberg dryly, “that
-the green neckerchiefs were all made of <i>torn</i> parachutes!”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Beginning in the early morning hours of the 30th, regroupment was
-the chief activity at Yudam-ni. Enemy opposition during the night took
-the form of scattered small-arms fire varied with minor probing attacks.
-This comparative lull lasted until 0710, when Item Company of 3/5
-beat off an enemy assault on Hill 1282 (North Ridge) with the support
-of Marine air strikes and 81mm mortar fire. In the same area George
-Company had a brisk fire fight from 1315 to dusk.</p>
-
-<p>The plan of the regroupment envisioned a gradual withdrawal from
-the north and west of Yudam-ni by RCT-5 for the purpose of relieving
-units of RCT-7 and enabling them to extend the perimeter southward
-from the village (see Map 23). It fell to 2/5 to execute the most difficult<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">252</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_253">253</a></span>
-maneuver of the day. Roise’s battalion held a line stretching from
-Hill 1426 on Southwest Ridge along the high ground to 3/5’s positions
-on Hill 1282. After disengaging with the help of Marine air and artillery,
-2/5 gave up Hill 1426 and pulled back nearly a mile, relieving
-elements of 3/7 on the left. Roise’s new line included Hill 1294 on
-Southwest Ridge, overlooking the MSR, and extended northeast to Hill
-1282 as before. Meanwhile 1/5 continued to hold a defensive line from
-Hill 1240 eastward to Hill 1167.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_23" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_252.png" width="830" height="1222" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>BREAKING OFF ACTION</p>
-
-<p>30 Nov 50</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-23</p></div></div>
-
-<p>These movements freed 3/7 to re-deploy to new positions astride
-the MSR about 4000 yards south of Yudam-ni. In this same general
-area, 1/7 continued to block the valley to the southwest while holding
-Hill 1276, of South Ridge, about 2500 yards south of the village.</p>
-
-<p>“The question of whether we should make these movements during
-daylight or at night was a difficult one,” said Colonel Litzenberg. “We
-finally decided to make the movements in daylight when we could
-have advantage of observation for air cover and artillery. The movement,
-piecemeal by battalion, was successfully executed.”<a id="FNanchor_511" href="#Footnote_511" class="fnanchor">510</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_511" href="#FNanchor_511" class="fnanchor">510</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The enemy took surprisingly little advantage of the readjustment.
-Movements were completed in an orderly and methodical manner as
-the units drew rations and ammunition for the breakout. Preparations
-were made for the destruction of all equipment which could not be
-carried out, and air drops of ammunition and other supplies were
-received.</p>
-
-<p>As a solution for the problem of casualty evacuation, General Smith
-had suggested the construction of an OY strip. A start was made at 0900
-on the 30th by the TD-18 dozers of Major McReynolds’ artillery battalion,
-but the area came under enemy fire the next day and the nearly
-completed strip could be used only twice.<a id="FNanchor_512" href="#Footnote_512" class="fnanchor">511</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_512" href="#FNanchor_512" class="fnanchor">511</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Joint Planning for Breakout</i></h3>
-
-<p>The plan, as finally agreed upon, called for a combination of the two
-solutions. Since it was essential to relieve hard-pressed Fox Company
-and secure vital Toktong Pass prior to the arrival of the main column,
-one force would advance across country. And since it would have<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">254</span>
-been physically impossible to carry the wounded over the mountains,
-the main body would fight its way along the road to Toktong Pass.<a id="FNanchor_513" href="#Footnote_513" class="fnanchor">512</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_513" href="#FNanchor_513" class="fnanchor">512</a> This section is derived from: RCT-5 and RCT-7 <i>Joint OpnO 2-50</i>, 1 Dec 50; 5thMar
-<i>SAR</i>, 26–27; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 23; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 923–927; Litzenberg interv,
-27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 58–59; Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. V. Fridrich
-interv, 21 Apr 56; Narrative of LtCol R. G. Davis, 11 Jan 53; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56;
-Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The over-all plan for the Yudam-ni breakout, after being flown to
-Hagaru by helicopter for General Smith’s approval, was incorporated
-into Joint OpnO 2-50. This directive, later modified by fragmentary
-orders, was issued in the morning of 1 December 1950.</p>
-
-<p>It meant dispensing with the vehicles and heavy equipment of the
-cross-country force. Only the barest military necessities could be taken
-by men loaded down with ammunition while struggling through snow-drifts.</p>
-
-<p>The unit selected for the attempt was the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,
-commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Davis. The plan of maneuver called
-for him to strike off across the mountain tops under cover of darkness
-on the night of 1 December. As the other units moved out astride the
-MSR from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 3/5 was to be the advance guard.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s battalion had the mission of passing
-through 3/7 to seize the commanding ground on both sides of the road
-and lead the way for the rest of the Yudam-ni troops. Thus the attacks
-of 1/7 and 3/5 would converge in the general area of Fox Hill and
-Toktong Pass.</p>
-
-<p>The point of the advance was to be the only Marine tank to reach
-Yudam-ni while the MSR was still open. It was left stranded after the
-recall of the crew to Hagaru; but Staff Sergeant Russell A. Munsell
-and another crewman were flown up from Hagaru by helicopter at
-Colonel Litzenberg’s request. They were to man Tank D-23 when it
-moved out with the point. Plans also called for a battery of 3/11 to
-advance near the head of the column, so that it could go into position
-near Sinhung-ni and provide covering fires for the rearguard while
-other artillery units displaced.</p>
-
-<p>The 4th Battalion of the 11th Marines had orders to fire most of
-its 155mm ammunition before departure. All the men who could be
-spared from this unit were formed into nine provisional infantry platoons.
-Two were assigned to reinforce the 7th Marines and three to
-the 5th Marines; four were retained under Major McReynold’s command<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">255</span>
-to protect the flanks of the vehicle train. It was further prescribed
-that the guns of 4/11 were to bring up the rear of the convoy, so that
-the road would not be blocked in the event of any of its vehicles becoming
-immobilized.</p>
-
-<p>Only drivers and seriously wounded men were permitted to ride the
-trucks in the middle of the column along with critical equipment and
-supplies. Since all additional space in the vehicles would doubtless be
-needed for casualties incurred in the breakout as well as Fox Company
-casualties, it was decided not to bring out the dead from Yudam-ni. A
-field burial was conducted by chaplains for 85 officers and men.<a id="FNanchor_514" href="#Footnote_514" class="fnanchor">513</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_514" href="#FNanchor_514" class="fnanchor">513</a> After the cease-fire of July 1953, the remains were returned to the United States, in
-accordance with the terms of the Korean Armistice.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All available Marine aircraft were to be on station. Moreover, carrier
-planes of TF 77 had been released from other missions by the
-Fifth AF to reinforce the aircraft of the 1st MAW in direct support of
-the Yudam-ni troops.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Fight for Hills 1419 and 1542</i></h3>
-
-<p>The transition from planning to execution began on the morning of
-1 December. Only the 1st and 3d Battalions of RCT-5 were left to
-the north of Yudam-ni, and pulling them out was to prove equivalent
-to letting loose of the tiger’s tail.</p>
-
-<p>The 3d Battalion began its withdrawal at 0800, followed 90 minutes
-later by the 1st. The initial phases of the maneuver were carried out
-without great difficulty. The first major problem came when 3/5’s last
-unit, George Company, pulled down from Hill 1282 (see Map 24).
-There the Marines had been in such close contact with the enemy that
-grenades were the main weapon of both sides. The problem of preventing
-the Chinese from swarming over the top of the ridge at the
-critical moment and pursuing the Marines down the slope was solved
-by First Lieutenant Daniel Greene, the FAC, with a dummy run by close
-supporting aircraft. While the first pass of the Corsairs kept the Communists
-down, Captain Chester R. Hermanson commenced his withdrawal.
-As soon as his men moved out at a safe distance he signalled
-to the FAC, who called for live runs of Marine air in coordination with
-the fires directed by the artillery liaison officer, First Lieutenant Henry<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">256</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_257">257</a></span>
-G. Ammer. First Lieutenant Arthur E. House’s 81mm mortar platoon
-also rendered skillful support during the withdrawal.<a id="FNanchor_515" href="#Footnote_515" class="fnanchor">514</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_515" href="#FNanchor_515" class="fnanchor">514</a> The description of the withdrawal of 1/5 and 3/5 is based on: 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 26; 1/5
-<i>SAR</i>, 15–16; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15; LtCol R. D. Taplett and Maj R. E. Whipple, “Darkhorse Sets
-the Pace,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxxvii, no. 6 (Jun 53), 22–23; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55;
-Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 25 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_24" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_256.png" width="832" height="1286" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>BREAKOUT FROM
-YUDAM-NI</p>
-
-<p>1500 to 2400 1 Dec 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-24</p></div></div>
-
-<p>The ancient ruse was so successful that George Company disengaged
-without a single casualty. Ammunition left behind by the rifle platoons
-was detonated just as the rockets, bombs, and napalm of the Corsairs
-hit the Chinese, followed by artillery and mortar shells. Hill 1282
-seemed to erupt in one tremendous explosion. While Captain Hermanson’s
-men crossed the bridge south of the burning town, an engineer
-demolitions crew waited to destroy the span.</p>
-
-<p>The rear guard unit for the withdrawal of the two battalions was
-First Lieutenant John R. Hancock’s Baker Company of 1/5. He felt
-that his best chance would be to “sneak off” Hill 1240. Accordingly
-he requested that no supporting fires be furnished Baker Company,
-except at his request. Making very effective use of his light machine guns
-to cover his withdrawal with a spray of fire, Hancock disengaged without
-a casualty.</p>
-
-<p>The next stage of the regroupment was carried out in preparation for
-the attacks of 3/5 and 1/7. In order to clear the way on both sides
-of the MSR, 3/7 (minus How Company) moved out at 0900 on 1 December
-to attack Hill 1542 while How Company went up against Hill
-1419.</p>
-
-<p>Joint OpnO 1-50 was modified meanwhile by verbal instructions
-directing 2/5, instead of 3/5, to relieve 1/7 on Hill 1276, thus freeing
-Colonel Davis’ battalion for its assigned mission. The 1st Battalion of
-RCT-5 took positions stretching from Hill 1100 on the west side of
-the MSR to the low ground southeast of the arm of the Reservoir. This
-meant that after 3/7 (-) seized Hill 1542, three Marine infantry battalions
-would occupy a defensive line about three and a half miles in
-length, stretching diagonally northeast from that position to the arm of
-the Reservoir, with Hill 1276 as its central bastion.<a id="FNanchor_516" href="#Footnote_516" class="fnanchor">515</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_516" href="#FNanchor_516" class="fnanchor">515</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 26–27; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 23; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15–16; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-21–22; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Shortly before dusk Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 arrived in position
-to pass through Lieutenant Colonel Harris’ 3/7. The two battalion
-commanders agreed that 3/5 would execute the movement even though<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">258</span>
-3/7 had not yet secured its objectives, and 3/5 attacked astride the
-MSR at 1500.<a id="FNanchor_517" href="#Footnote_517" class="fnanchor">516</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_517" href="#FNanchor_517" class="fnanchor">516</a> Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Harris’ battalion had been having it hot and heavy all day on Hills
-1419 and 1542 after jumping off at 0900. These objectives were too far
-apart for a mutually supported attack and the Chinese defended the
-difficult terrain with tenacity.</p>
-
-<p>Item Company, reinforced by artillerymen and headquarters troops,
-made slow progress west of the road against the Chinese dug in on
-Hill 1542. At 1700 George Company moved into position on the left.
-Both companies attempted an assault but the 3/7 report states, “Each
-attack by ‘I’ Co and ‘G’ Co never reached full momentum before it was
-broken up.” One platoon of Item Company reached the military crest
-before being repulsed. When night fell, the Marines were still on the
-eastern slopes of 1542.<a id="FNanchor_518" href="#Footnote_518" class="fnanchor">517</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_518" href="#FNanchor_518" class="fnanchor">517</a> 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On Hill 1419, about 1000 yards east of the road, How Company of
-3/7 met stiff opposition from Chinese dug in along four finger ridges
-as well as the main spur leading to the topographical crest. It became
-evident that How Company alone could not seize the hill and about
-noon Able Company of Davis’ battalion joined the attack, on How’s
-left.</p>
-
-<p>The heavy undergrowth gave concealment to the enemy, though it
-also offered footholds to the Marines scrambling up the steep and icy
-slopes. Air strikes were laid down just ahead of them, blasting the
-Chinese with bombs, rockets, and 20mm fire. Artillery support, however,
-was limited by the relative blindness of the forward observer in
-the brush, but mortars succeeded in knocking out several enemy positions.
-How Company’s attack had come to a standstill because of
-casualties which included Lieutenant Harris. First Lieutenant Eugenous
-M. Hovatter’s Able Company regained the momentum, thanks to the
-efforts of First Lieutenant Leslie C. Williams’ 1st Platoon. Aided by
-How and by Baker, which was committed late in the afternoon, Able
-Company secured Hill 1419 about 1930. Thus the jump-off point for
-the 1/7 advance across the mountain tops had been seized.</p>
-
-<p>After setting up hasty defenses, Davis directed that all dead and
-wounded be evacuated to 3/5’s aid station on the road. How Company
-was attached to his battalion by order of Colonel Litzenberg, since all
-units had been thinned by casualties. Then the battalion tail was pulled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">259</span>
-up the mountain and the last physical tie broken with other Marine units
-in the Yudam-ni area.<a id="FNanchor_519" href="#Footnote_519" class="fnanchor">518</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_519" href="#FNanchor_519" class="fnanchor">518</a> 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; CO
-7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50; LtCol R. G. Davis interv by Capts K. W.
-Shutts and A. Z. Freeman, 6 Apr 51; Maj E. M. Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines had seized the initiative, never again to relinquish it
-during the Chosin Reservoir campaign.</p>
-
-<h3><i>March of 1/7 Over the Mountains</i></h3>
-
-<p>Planning at the battalion level was done by Davis, his executive officer,
-Major Raymond V. Fridrich, and his S-3, Major Thomas B. Tighe. It
-was decided to take only two of the 81mm mortars and six heavy machine
-guns. They were to be manned with double crews, so that enough
-ammunition could be carried to keep them in action.</p>
-
-<p>Pack-set radios (AN/GRC-9) were to provide positive communications
-in case the portable sets (SCR-300) would not reach to the
-Yudam-ni perimeter. The artillery liaison officer was to carry a pack
-set (SCR-610) to insure artillery communication.<a id="FNanchor_520" href="#Footnote_520" class="fnanchor">519</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_520" href="#FNanchor_520" class="fnanchor">519</a> This section, except when otherwise noted, is based on Davis narrative; Litzenberg
-interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51;
-and Capt W. J. Davis interv, 4 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All personnel not sick or wounded were to participate, leaving behind
-enough walking wounded or frostbite cases to drive the vehicles
-and move the gear left behind with the regimental train. Extra litters
-were to be taken, each serving initially to carry additional mortar and
-machine gun ammunition; and all men were to carry sleeping bags not
-only for the protection of the wounded but also to save their own lives
-if the column should be cut off in the mountains for several days. Every
-man was to start the march with an extra bandolier of small arms ammunition,
-and personnel of the reserve company and headquarters
-group were to carry an extra round of 81mm mortar ammunition up
-the first mountain for replenishment of supplies depleted at that point.</p>
-
-<p>After driving the enemy from the topographical crest of Hill 1419,
-the four companies were not permitted a breathing spell. Davis feared
-the effects of the extreme (16 degrees below zero) cold on troops
-drenched with sweat from clawing their way up the mountain. He
-pressed the reorganization with all possible speed, therefore, after no<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">260</span>
-enemy contacts were reported by patrols ranging to the southeast. And
-at 2100 on the night of 1 December the column set out in this order:</p>
-
-<table id="t260" summary="column order">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Baker Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">First Lieutenant Kurcaba</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1/7 Command Group</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Lieutenant Colonel Davis</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Able Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">First Lieutenant Hovatter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Charlie Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Captain Morris</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Headquarters Group</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Major Fridrich</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">How Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Second Lieutenant Newton</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>The night was dark but a few stars showed over the horizon in the
-general direction to be taken. They served as a guide, with a prominent
-rock mass being designated the first objective.</p>
-
-<p>The snow-covered peaks all looked alike in the darkness, and the
-guide stars were lost to sight when the column descended into valleys.
-Repeated compass orientations of the map examined by flashlight
-under a poncho never checked out. The artillery was called upon to
-place white phosphorus on designated hills, but the splash of these
-rounds could seldom be located.</p>
-
-<p>The point was slowed by the necessity of breaking trail in snow that
-had drifted knee-deep in places. After a path had been beaten, the
-icy footing became treacherous for the heavily burdened Marines. Some
-painful falls were taken on the downhill slopes by men who had to
-climb the finger ridges on hands and knees.</p>
-
-<p>Apparently the enemy had been caught by complete surprise, for the
-Marines had the desolate area to themselves. A more immediate danger
-was loss of direction, and the head of the column veered off to the
-southwest while crossing the second valley. A drift in this direction
-would eventually take the battalion toward the enemy-held road to
-Hagaru (see Map 25), which had been scheduled by the Marine artillery
-for harassing and interdiction fires.</p>
-
-<p>Radio failures kept Kurcaba, at the point, from receiving messages
-sent in warning. An attempt was made to communicate by word of
-mouth, but the shouts from behind often did not penetrate to ears protected
-from the cold by parka hoods. At last the loss of direction became
-so alarming that Davis himself hurried forward with his radio
-operator and runner. In the darkness he lost touch with them and
-floundered on alone, panting and stumbling.</p>
-
-<p>It took such effort to overtake the point that he did not make it until
-the men were scrambling up the next steep ridge. There the westward
-drift was corrected just in time, for the battalion was running into its
-first CCF opposition.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">261</span></p>
-
-<p>The column had been heading up Hill 1520, the eastern and western
-slopes of which were held by the enemy. An increasing volume of
-small-arms fire was received as Davis gave his company commanders
-orders to reorganize units in preparation for attack. Exhausted though
-the men were, they summoned a burst of energy and advanced in two
-assault columns supported by 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns.
-Now the exertion of carrying extra ammunition paid dividends as
-Baker and Charlie Companies closed in on a CCF position held in estimated
-platoon strength. Some of the Chinese were surprised while
-asleep or numbed with the cold, and the Marines destroyed the enemy
-force at a cost of only a few men wounded.</p>
-
-<p>The attack cleared the enemy from the eastern slope of Hill 1520,
-but distant small-arms fire was received from ridges across the valley
-to the east. Davis called a halt for reorganization, since the troops had
-obviously reached the limit of their endurance. Suddenly they began
-collapsing in the snow—“like dominoes,” as the commanding officer
-later described the alarming spectacle. And there the men lay, oblivious
-to the cold, heedless of the Chinese bullets ricocheting off the rocks.</p>
-
-<p>A strange scene ensued in the dim starlight as company officers and
-NCOs shook and cuffed the prostrate Marines into wakefulness. The
-officers could sympathize even while demanding renewed efforts, for
-the sub-zero cold seemed to numb the mind as well as body.</p>
-
-<p>Davis had even requested his company commanders to check every
-order he gave, just to make sure his own weary brain was functioning
-accurately. At 0300 he decided to allow the men a rest—the first in
-20 hours of continuous fighting or marching under a double burden.
-As a preliminary, the battalion commander insisted that the perimeter
-be buttoned up and small patrols organized within companies to insure
-a 25 per cent alert. Then the pack radio was set up to establish the
-night’s first contact with the regimental CP, and the men took turns at
-sleeping as an eerie silence fell over the wasteland of ice and stone.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Attack of 3/5 on 1–2 December</i></h3>
-
-<p>Returning to the Yudam-ni area, it may be recalled that Lieutenant
-Colonel Taplett’s 3/5 had passed through 3/7 at 1500 on 1 December
-with a mission of attacking astride the MSR to lead the way for the
-main column. Tank D-23, a How Company platoon and a platoon of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">262</span>
-Able Company engineers set the pace, followed by the rest of How
-Company and the other two rifle companies. After an advance of 1400
-yards the battalion column was stopped by heavy CCF fire from both
-sides. How and Item Companies fanned out west and east of the road
-and a longdrawn firefight ensued before the Marines cleared the enemy
-from their flanks at 1930.<a id="FNanchor_521" href="#Footnote_521" class="fnanchor">520</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_521" href="#FNanchor_521" class="fnanchor">520</a> Descriptions of 3/5 operations in this section are based on the 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 15; Taplett
-and Whipple, “Darkhorse Sets the Pace,” II, 46-50; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Artillery support for the breakout was provided by 1/11 and 3/11
-(minus Battery H). The plan called for 1/11 to take the main responsibility
-for furnishing supporting fires at the outset while 3/11 displaced
-as soon as possible to the vicinity of Sinhung-ni, whence the last
-lap of the march to Hagaru could be effectively covered. The 1st Battalion
-would then join the vehicle column and move with it to Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_522" href="#Footnote_522" class="fnanchor">521</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_522" href="#FNanchor_522" class="fnanchor">521</a> 11thMar <i>SAR</i>, 7; <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-72.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Taplett gave 3/5 a brief rest after securing his first objectives—the
-high ground on both sides of the road just opposite the northern spurs
-of Hill 1520. Then he ordered a renewal of the attack shortly before
-midnight. How Company on the right met only moderate opposition,
-but was held up by the inability of Item Company to make headway
-against Chinese dug in along the western slope of Hill 1520. Neither
-1/7 nor 3/5 had any idea at the moment that they were simultaneously
-engaged on opposite sides of the same great land mass, though separated
-by enemy groups as well as terrain of fantastic difficulties. So
-rugged was this mile-high mountain that the two Marine outfits might
-as well have been in different worlds as far as mutual support was concerned.</p>
-
-<p>Item Company stirred up such a hornet’s nest on the western slope
-that Captain Harold O. Schrier was granted permission by the battalion
-commander to return to his jump-off position, so that he could better
-defend the MSR. There he was attacked by Chinese who alternated
-infantry attacks with mortar bombardments. Radio communication
-failed and runners sent from the battalion CP to Item Company lost
-their way. Thus the company was isolated during an all-night defensive
-fight. Second Lieutenant Willard S. Peterson took over the command
-after Schrier received a second wound.</p>
-
-<p>Taplett had ordered his reserve company, George, and his attached
-engineers into defensive positions to the rear of Item Company. The
-engineers on the right flank were also hit by the Chinese and had several<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">263</span>
-wounded, including the platoon commander, First Lieutenant
-Wayne E. Richards, before repulsing the attack.</p>
-
-<p>Counted CCF dead in the Item Company area totaled 342 at daybreak
-on the 2d, but the Marines had paid a heavy price in casualties.
-Less than 20 able-bodied men were left when George Company passed
-through to renew the attack on Hill 1520. For that matter, both George
-and How Companies were reduced to two-platoon strength. Taplett
-requested reinforcement by an additional company, and was assigned
-the so-called Dog-Easy composite company made up of the remnants of
-2/7. This outfit moved directly down the road between George and
-How Companies.<a id="FNanchor_523" href="#Footnote_523" class="fnanchor">522</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_523" href="#FNanchor_523" class="fnanchor">522</a> “Item Company upon relief was temporarily non-effective. In fact it ceased to exist
-except on paper. Some of the survivors were assigned to G/5 and the wounded who
-were able to walk were assigned to a provisional rifle unit organized from H&amp;S Co and
-under the command of Lt George Bowman.” Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It took George Company until 1200 to secure the western slope of
-Hill 1520. The composite company ran into difficulties meanwhile at a
-point on the MSR where the Chinese had blown a bridge over a deep
-stream bed and set up a roadblock defended by machine guns. While
-George Company attacked down a long spur above the enemy, Dog-Easy
-Company maneuvered in defilade to outflank him. Lieutenant
-Greene, the FAC, directed the F4Us on target and the ground forces
-were treated to a daring exhibition of close support by Corsairs which
-barely cleared the ridge after pulling out of their runs. The roadblock
-was speedily wiped out, but the vehicle column had to wait until the
-engineers could construct a bypass. Then the advance of 3/5 was resumed,
-with George and How Companies attacking on opposite sides
-of the MSR, and the composite company astride the road, following
-the tank and engineer platoons.</p>
-
-<h3><i>The Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass</i></h3>
-
-<p>All the rest of their lives the survivors of the two spearhead Marine battalions
-would take pride in nicknames earned during the breakout from
-Yudam-ni. For Taplett’s outfit it was “Darkhorse,” after the radio call
-sign of the battalion, while Davis’ men felt that they had a right to be
-known as the “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass.”</p>
-
-<p>At daybreak on 2 December, 1/7 corrected its westward drift of the
-previous night and attacked toward Hill 1653, a mountain only about<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">264</span>
-a mile and a half north of Fox Hill. Davis’ men got the better of several
-firefights at long range with CF groups on ridges to the east, but the
-terrain gave them more effective opposition than the enemy.<a id="FNanchor_524" href="#Footnote_524" class="fnanchor">523</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_524" href="#FNanchor_524" class="fnanchor">523</a> This section is based on R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Litzenberg interv, 27–30
-Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and W. G.
-Davis interv, 4 June 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56; Hovatter Comments,
-19 Jul 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The radios of 1/7 could not contact Marine planes when they came
-on station, and relays through tactical channels proved ineffective.
-Moreover, all efforts to reach Fox Company by radio had failed. This
-situation worried the battalion commander, who realized that he was
-approaching within range of friendly 81mm mortar fire from Fox Hill.</p>
-
-<p>The ancient moral weapon of surprise stood Davis and his men in
-good stead, however, as the column encountered little opposition on
-the western slope of Hill 1653. How Company, bringing up the rear
-with the wounded men, came under an attack which threatened for a
-moment to endanger the casualties. But after the litters were carried forward,
-Newton managed to keep the Chinese at a respectful distance
-without aid from the other companies.</p>
-
-<p>Charlie Company was given the mission of seizing a spur covering
-the advance of Able and Baker companies east from Hill 1520 to Hill
-1653. The command group had just passed Morris on this position
-when the radio operator shouted to Davis:</p>
-
-<p>“Fox Six on the radio, sir.”</p>
-
-<p>Captain Barber’s offer to send out a patrol to guide 1/7 to his position
-was declined, but Fox Company did control the strike by planes
-of VMF-312 which covered the attack of Kurcaba’s company on the
-final objective—a ridge about 400 yards north of Fox Hill. Aided
-by the air attack and supporting 81mm mortar fires, Baker Company
-seized the position and Able Company the northern portion of Hill
-1653. It was 1125 on the morning of 2 December 1950 when the first
-men of Baker Company reached Fox Company’s lines.</p>
-
-<p>Able Company held its position on Hill 1653 until the rest of the
-battalion was on Fox Hill. After grounding their packs, men from the
-forward companies went back to help carry the 22 wounded men into
-the perimeter. While supervising this task, the regimental surgeon,
-Lieutenant Peter A. Arioli, (MC) USN, was instantly killed by a Chinese
-sniper’s bullet. There were no other death casualties, though two
-men had to be placed in improvised strait jackets after cracking mentally<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">265</span>
-and physically under the strain. Both died before evacuation was possible.</p>
-
-<p>The first objective had been reached, but there was to be no rest
-until Toktong Pass was secured. Baker Company paused on Fox Hill
-only long enough for Kurcaba’s men to eat a hasty meal of air-dropped
-rations. Then they moved out to seize the high ground commanding
-the vital terrain feature at a point where the road describes a loop from
-north to south. Able Company followed shortly afterwards and the
-two outfits set up a single perimeter for the night while the rest of the
-battalion manned perimeters on the high ground east of Fox Hill.
-Barber’s men remained in their positions.</p>
-
-<p>Five days and nights of battle had left Fox Company with 118
-casualties—26 KIA, 3 MIA, and 89 WIA. Six of the seven officers were
-wounded, and practically all the unwounded men suffered from frostbite
-and digestive ills.</p>
-
-<h3><i>CCF Attacks on Hills 1276 and 1542</i></h3>
-
-<p>While the two spearhead battalions advanced, the Marine elements in
-the rear could not complain of being neglected by the enemy. All three
-infantry battalions were kept busy with CCF attacks which persisted
-from midnight until long after daybreak (see Map 24).</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s 2/5, which had been designated as rearguard,
-was hit on Hill 1276 in the early morning hours of 2 December.
-Under cover of rifle and machine-gun fire, the Chinese advanced on the
-Fox Company positions with their “inverted wedge” assault formation.
-Testimony as to its effectiveness is found in the 2/5 report:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The [Chinese] ... used fire and movement to excellent advantage. They
-would direct a frontal attack against our positions while other elements of
-their attacking force moved in closer to “F” Company flanks in an attempt
-at a double envelopment. Then in turn the forces on both flanks would
-attack while the forces directly to our front would move closer to our position.
-In this, the enemy, by diverting our attention in the above manner, were able
-to maneuver their forces to within hand grenade range of our positions.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>One Fox platoon, assailed from three sides, was forced to withdraw
-at 0110 and consolidate with the rest of the company. At 0200 the
-FAC requested an air strike from two night fighters on station. The
-aircraft were directed on the target by 60mm mortar white phosphorus
-bursts and conducted effective strafing and rocket runs within 200 yards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">266</span>
-of the Marine front line. In all, five aircraft of VMF(N)-542 were
-employed with excellent results during the night.</p>
-
-<p>At 0230 Roise directed Fox Company to retake the left-flank hill
-from which the platoon had been driven. Two attempts were made
-before daybreak with the support of 4.2-inch mortar fire, but enemy
-machine guns stopped the assault. At 0730 an air strike was requested.
-After strafing and rocket runs, Fox Company fought its way to the
-crest, only to find the position untenable because of machine-gun fire
-from the reverse slope. At 1000 the Corsairs blasted the enemy for
-25 minutes with napalm and 500-pound bombs, and CCF troops were
-observed vacating the objective area. It was nearly time for the battalion
-to displace as the rearguard, however, and the enemy was left in possession
-of a scarred and scorched piece of real estate.</p>
-
-<p>Both Dog and Easy Companies received probing attacks which the
-Chinese did not attempt to push home. At daybreak some of them
-broke and ran along the Dog Company front, throwing away their
-weapons as they scattered in disorder. Marine fire pursued the retreating
-Communists and cut down many of them. Captain Arthur D. Challacombe’s
-provisional company of artillerymen on Dog Company’s
-right counted over 50 dead in front of its positions.<a id="FNanchor_525" href="#Footnote_525" class="fnanchor">524</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_525" href="#FNanchor_525" class="fnanchor">524</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 22; Stewart Comments; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the eastern flank 1/5 came under attack about 2100 by 75–100
-Chinese who crossed the arm of the reservoir on ice. Mortar and artillery
-fire drove them back at 0100 with heavy losses, but attempts at
-infiltration continued throughout the night. In the morning 51 CCF
-dead were counted in front of one Charlie Company machine gun, and
-total enemy KIA were estimated at 200.<a id="FNanchor_526" href="#Footnote_526" class="fnanchor">525</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_526" href="#FNanchor_526" class="fnanchor">525</a> 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 16; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At the other end of the Marine line, a CCF attack hit 3/7 (-) on
-Hill 1542. The assault force, according to the enemy report, consisted
-of Sung-Wei-shan’s 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 235th Regiment, the
-5th Company of 2/235, and apparently two other companies of 3/235.
-All were units of the 79th CCF Division, and their mission was “to
-annihilate the defending enemy before daylight.”<a id="FNanchor_527" href="#Footnote_527" class="fnanchor">526</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_527" href="#FNanchor_527" class="fnanchor">526</a> The description of the fight on Hill 1542 is derived from: ATIS <i>Enemy Documents:
-Korean Campaign</i>, Issue 66, 88–93; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; Maj W. R.
-Earney ltr to Gen Litzenberg, 16 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>George and Item Companies of 3/7, following their repulse from
-the upper reaches of Hill 1542, had formed a defensive perimeter on
-the eastern slope. As reinforcements the depleted units were assigned
-a composite outfit known as Jig Company and consisting of about 100<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">267</span>
-cannoneers, headquarters troops, and any other elements which could
-be hastily put together. First Lieutenant Alfred I. Thomas, of Item
-Company, was placed in command of men who were for the most part
-strangers to him as well as to one another.</p>
-
-<p>Sung led the 9th Company’s attacking column. Although the Chinese
-account states that his men were advancing from the northwest
-toward the topographical crest of Hill 1542, they actually held the
-summit. Their attack was downhill, though some climbing of spurs
-and finger ridges may have been necessary. After reconnoitering to a
-point within 25 yards of the Marines, the Chinese jumped off at 0430
-with the support of fires from battalion weapons. Relying on the
-“inverted wedge,” the attackers bored in alternately right and left
-while seeking an opportunity for a knockout blow. The 2d Platoon on
-the Chinese left took a severe mauling, losing its commander and
-almost half of its men. The other two platoons had heavy casualties
-but succeeded in routing the jury-rigged Jig Company. Since it was a
-composite outfit not yet 24 hours old, there is no record of either its
-operations or losses. Apparently, however, a majority of the men straggled
-back to their original units. Lieutenant Thomas, who had commanded
-ably under difficult circumstances, rejoined First Lieutenant
-William E. Johnson’s Item Company with such men as he had left.
-The Marines gave ground slowly under Chinese pressure until daybreak,
-when they held positions abreast of George Company, which
-had not been heavily engaged.</p>
-
-<p>The two companies were reduced to a total of fewer than 200 men.
-After being reinforced by H&amp;S Company personnel, they formed a
-defensive line in an arc stretching from the MSR about 1100 yards
-and taking in the eastern slopes of Hill 1542.<a id="FNanchor_528" href="#Footnote_528" class="fnanchor">527</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_528" href="#FNanchor_528" class="fnanchor">527</a> General Litzenberg points out that “it was necessary for 3/7 to maintain protection
-for the main column until it passed by Hill 1542. They [3/7] held high enough to
-keep Chinese small arms fire at a sufficient distance from the Road.” Litzenberg Comments,
-7 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Apparently the Communists, like military forces everywhere, did
-not err on the light side when estimating the casualties of opponents.
-The Marine losses for the night were listed in the CCF report as “killed,
-altogether 100 enemy troops.” This figure, indicating total casualties
-of several hundred, is manifestly too high. Owing to the loss of 7th
-Marines records, the statistics for Item Company are not available,
-but it does not appear that more than 30 to 40 men were killed or
-wounded.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">268</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Advance of Darkhorse on 2–3 December</i></h3>
-
-<p>Several CCF daylight attacks in platoon strength were received between
-Hills 1542 and 1276 during the morning hours of 2 December. All
-Marine units in this area were in process of disengaging, so that the
-emphasis was placed on breaking off action rather than attempting to
-defend ground soon to be evacuated.</p>
-
-<p>The vehicle train in the rear made slow progress during the afternoon
-of 2 December. Infantry strength was not sufficient to occupy
-all the commanding terrain during the passage of the motor column,
-and CCF groups infiltrated back into areas vacated by Marine riflemen.
-Effective air support reduced most of these efforts to harassing attacks,
-but Marine vehicle drivers were singled out for special attention, making
-it necessary to find replacements among near-by troops.</p>
-
-<p>To 1/5 fell the mission of furnishing close-in flank protection on
-the left. Marine air and artillery supported infantry attacks clearing
-the flanks and the column jolted on with frequent halts. The night
-passed without incident except for a CCF attack on 3/11. George Battery
-gunners had to employ direct fire to repulse the Communists, and
-a 105mm howitzer was lost as well as several vehicles.</p>
-
-<p>Darkhorse, leading the way, was meanwhile fighting for nearly every
-foot of the road during the advance of 2 December. George Company
-on the left went up against Hill 1520 while Dog-Easy moved astride
-the MSR. By noon George had secured its objective. Dog-Easy advanced
-against moderate resistance to a point about 300 yards beyond
-Hill 1520 where a demolished bridge had spanned a rock ravine as
-the road turns from south to east. Here Chinese automatic weapons fire
-halted the column until a strike by 12 Corsairs cleared the enemy from
-the ravine. On the right Captain Harold B. Williamson’s How Company
-was to have joined in the attack, moving through the high ground
-south of the bend in the road. A Chinese strongpoint delayed its
-advance and How was pinned down by heavy enemy fire while attempting
-to cross a stream bed halfway to its objective. The last air strike
-of the day freed Captain Williamson’s unit, which secured its objective
-after dark. During the last minutes of daylight, the engineer platoon,
-now commanded by Technical Sergeant Edwin L. Knox, constructed a
-bypass around the blasted bridge. About 1900 the first vehicles followed
-the tank across.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_25" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_269.png" width="1219" height="830" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>BREAKOUT FROM
-YUDAM-NI</p>
-
-<p>2–4 Dec 50</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-25</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Taplett’s battalion continued its slow progress with George and How<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">269</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_270">270</a></span>
-Companies clearing the high ground on opposite sides of the road while
-Dog-Easy moved astride the MSR. At about 0200 on the 3d the
-advance came to a halt 1000 yards short of Fox Hill. Dog-Easy, which
-had suffered heavy casualties, particularly among its key NCOs, had
-reached the limit of exhaustion, and 3/5 secured for the rest of the
-night. Not until daylight did How Company discover that it had halted
-300 yards short of its final objective, the hill mass southwest of Fox Hill.</p>
-
-<p>At dawn on 3 December the ground was covered with six inches of
-new snow, hiding the scars of war and giving a deceptively peaceful
-appearance to the Korean hills as the Marine column got under way
-again with Sergeant Knox’s engineers at the point, just behind Sergeant
-Munsell’s lone tank. Alternately serving as engineers and riflemen,
-this platoon came through with 17 able-bodied men left out of the 48
-who started.</p>
-
-<p>Dog-Easy Company having been rendered ineffective by its casualties,
-Taplett moved George Company down from the left flank to advance
-astride the road. First Lieutenant Charles D. Mize took over the reorganized
-outfit, assisted by Second Lieutenant August L. Camaratta.
-The two riddled Dog-Easy platoons were combined with George Company
-under the command of Second Lieutenant John J. Cahill and
-Technical Sergeant Don Faber.</p>
-
-<p>Cahill had the distinction of leading the platoon which fought the
-first action of Marine ground forces in the Korean conflict. But it
-hardly seemed possible on this sub-zero December morning that the
-encounter had taken place barely four months before, or that the temperature
-that August day had been 102° in the non-existent shade.
-Korea was a land of extremes.</p>
-
-<p>Darkhorse was not far from a junction with the Ridgerunners. The
-night of 2–3 December had passed quietly in Toktong Pass, where the
-five companies occupied separate perimeters. The Marines on Fox
-Hill lighted warming fires in the hope of tempting the enemy to reveal
-his positions. The Chinese obliged by firing from two near-by ridges.
-One CCF group was dug in along a southern spur of the hill held by
-Able and Baker Companies, and the other occupied a ridge extending
-eastward beyond Toktong Pass in the direction of Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Simultaneous attacks in opposite directions were launched by 1/7.
-Davis led Morris’ and Newton’s companies against the CCF force barring
-the way to Hagaru. Tighe moved out with Kurcaba’s and Hovatter’s
-companies meanwhile against a larger CCF force on high ground<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">271</span>
-south of the big bend in the road. This stroke took the Chinese by
-surprise. As they fell back in disorder, the Communists did not realize
-that they were blundering into the path of the oncoming Marines of
-Williamson’s How/5, attacking south of the MSR. Colonel Litzenberg,
-who had been informed by radio, turned to Lieutenant Colonel Murray
-and said, “Ray, notify your Third Battalion commander that the Chinese
-are running southwest into his arms!”<a id="FNanchor_529" href="#Footnote_529" class="fnanchor">528</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_529" href="#FNanchor_529" class="fnanchor">528</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 61. Other sources for this section are
-as follows: LtCol Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56 and Comments, 9 and 14 Aug 56; TSgt E. L.
-Knox interv, 30 May 56; <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-78–80; Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse
-Leads the Way,” II, 49-50; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 932–946; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53;
-5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 29; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 338–341.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Taplett was unaware that Tighe’s attack was forcing about a battalion
-of Chinese into his lap. He had spotted the Chinese in strength
-on the high ground south of the road when day broke. Attempts to lay
-artillery on the Chinese having failed because of the range from
-Hagaru, the 3/5 commander called for an air strike. The overcast
-lifted just as the Corsairs came on station. They hit the demoralized
-Communists with napalm and rockets while the 81mm mortars and
-heavy machine guns of the two converging Marine forces opened up
-with everything they had. Probably the greatest slaughter of the
-Yudam-ni breakout ended at 1030 with the CCF battalion “completely
-eliminated,” as the 3/5 report phrased it, and How Company in possession
-of the CCF positions.</p>
-
-<p>At 1300 on 3 December, after Davis had cleared the enemy from the
-ridge northeast of Toktong Pass, the basic maneuver of the breakout
-was completed by the junction of 3/5 and 1/7. Several more fights
-awaited Taplett’s men on the way to Hagaru, but at Toktong Pass they
-had fulfilled their mission. That the victory had not been gained without
-paying a price in casualties is indicated by the following daily
-returns of effective strength in the three rifle companies:</p>
-
-<table id="t271" class="narrow30 bl" summary="rifle company effective strength">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl">Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdc">1 Dec.</td>
-  <td class="tdc">2 Dec.</td>
-  <td class="tdc">3 Dec.</td>
-  <td class="tdc">4 Dec.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">George Company</td>
-  <td class="tdr">114</td>
-  <td class="tdr">96</td>
-  <td class="tdr">84</td>
-  <td class="tdr">80</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">How Company</td>
-  <td class="tdr">180</td>
-  <td class="tdr">167</td>
-  <td class="tdr">131</td>
-  <td class="tdr">73</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Item Company</td>
-  <td class="tdr">143</td>
-  <td class="tdr">41</td>
-  <td class="tdr">41</td>
-  <td class="tdr">41</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl nobl in4">Total</td>
-  <td class="tdr">437</td>
-  <td class="tdr">304</td>
-  <td class="tdr">256</td>
-  <td class="tdr">194</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">272</span></p>
-
-<p>This is a total of 243 battle and non-battle casualties as compared to
-the 144 suffered by the same units during the CCF attacks of 27 to 30
-November.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Entry into Hagaru Perimeter</i></h3>
-
-<p>When the truck column with its wounded men reached Toktong Pass,
-it halted to receive the casualties of 1/7, 3/5, and Fox Company of 2/7.
-Lieutenant Commander John H. Craven, chaplain of the 7th Marines,
-helped to assist the litter cases into vehicles. Since there was not room
-for all, the walking wounded had to make room for helpless men. They
-complied with a courage which will never be forgotten by those who
-saw them struggling painfully toward Hagaru alongside the truck
-column.<a id="FNanchor_530" href="#Footnote_530" class="fnanchor">529</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_530" href="#FNanchor_530" class="fnanchor">529</a> Stewart Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>When the tank leading the 3/5 column reached Toktong Pass it
-halted only long enough for Colonels Taplett and Davis to confer.
-D-23 then moved out and the four companies of 1/7 came down from
-their hillside positions and fell in behind.</p>
-
-<p>Stevens’ 1/5, having leap-frogged 3/5, followed next on the way
-to blocking positions farther east on the MSR. Taplett remained in
-Toktong Pass until after midnight, acting as radio relay between
-Colonels Litzenberg and Murray, by now in Hagaru, and 2/5 in the
-rear. At about midnight the 3/5 commander sent G and H Companies
-into the vehicle column to furnish security for the artillery, and an
-hour later the remainder of the battalion joined the column. Roise’s
-2/5, which had passed through 3/7 came next, followed by Harris’
-rear guard.</p>
-
-<p>Interspersed among the infantry were elements of artillery and
-service troops with their vehicles, and the column became more scrambled
-after each halt.<a id="FNanchor_531" href="#Footnote_531" class="fnanchor">530</a> Two observation planes of VMO-6 circled overhead
-to give warning of enemy concentrations. Marine planes were on
-station continuously during daylight hours, strafing and rocketing to
-the front and along both flanks. A total of 145 sorties, most of them
-in close air support of troops advancing along the Hagaru-Yudam-ni
-MSR, were flown on 3 December by the following units:<a id="FNanchor_532" href="#Footnote_532" class="fnanchor">531</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">273</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_531" href="#FNanchor_531" class="fnanchor">530</a> Sources for this section, unless otherwise noted, are the same as those for the last
-and: 3/1 tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0430 and 1715 4 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to 11thMar,
-0730 4 Dec 50; 7thMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0830 and 0925 4 Dec 50: G-3 1stMarDiv
-tels to 3/1, 0950 and 1330 4 Dec 50; Stevens Comments, 25 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_532" href="#FNanchor_532" class="fnanchor">531</a> MAG-33 <i>SAR</i> sec B 6–7; VMF-214 <i>SAR</i>, 5; 1stMAW <i>HD</i>, Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<table id="t273" summary="squadron sorties">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Squadron</td>
-  <td class="tdr">Sorties</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF-214</td>
-  <td class="tdr">36</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF-323</td>
-  <td class="tdr">28</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF-212</td>
-  <td class="tdr">27</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF-312</td>
-  <td class="tdr">34</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF(N)-513</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMF(N)-542</td>
-  <td class="tdr">13</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"><span class="bt">145</span></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>At the other end of the route the Royal Marine Commandos, reinforced
-by a platoon of tanks, were sent out from Hagaru at 1630 on
-3 December, to drive the Chinese from the road leading into that
-perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>Thanks to excellent air support, 1/7 met no opposition save harassing
-attacks. One of Davis’s flanking patrols reported the flushing out of
-a few Chinese so exhausted by cold and hardships that they had abandoned
-their weapons and holed up together for warmth. If these
-Marines had been in a mood for such reflections, they might have
-recalled that the American press of late had been bemoaning the supposed
-decline of the nation’s young manhood. UN reverses in the
-summer of 1950 had led editorial writers to conclude that our troops
-had neither the legs for long marches nor the backs for the bearing of
-military burdens. Mechanization had gone so far, they lamented, that
-we had become the servants rather than the masters of our own wheeled
-and tracked vehicles.</p>
-
-<p>The Marines of Davis’ battalion might have taken a grim satisfaction,
-therefore, in encountering Chinese peasants, inured all their lives
-to privations, whose will to fight had been broken by the hardships of
-the past week. These Marines had not known a full night’s sleep during
-that week. They had subsisted on a diet of crackers varied with canned
-rations thawed by body heat. They had been under continuous nervous
-pressure as well as physical strain, and yet they were able to summon
-one last burst of pride when the point neared the Hagaru perimeter at
-1900 on 3 December 1950. Several hundred yards from the entrance
-a halt was called while the men closed up into a compact column.<a id="FNanchor_533" href="#Footnote_533" class="fnanchor">532</a>
-Then they came in marching, their shoulders thrown back and their
-shoepacs beating a firm tread on the frozen road.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_533" href="#FNanchor_533" class="fnanchor">532</a> Since the four rifle companies had been left on key points, controlling the last two
-and a half miles into Hagaru, the column consisted mostly of H&amp;S and Weapons Company
-personnel. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Marines at the head of the column were followed by the walking<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">274</span>
-wounded and the vehicles loaded with more serious cases, some of
-whom had been strapped to the hoods. All casualties were given medical
-care and the remaining troops taken into warming tents for hot
-coffee. Many of them appeared dazed and uncomprehending at first.
-Others wandered about aimlessly with blank faces. But there were few
-who had suffered any psychological disturbances that could not be
-cleared up with a good night’s sleep and some hot food.</p>
-
-<p>Troops of 4/11 and 3/5 were due to arrive next at Hagaru while
-1/5 and 2/5 echeloned companies forward along the MSR to provide
-flank protection. Not all the Chinese had lost aggressiveness, but the
-column had little difficulty until 0200 on 4 December. Then it came
-to an abrupt halt when prime movers of eight 155mm howitzers ran out
-of diesel fuel. As far back as Sinhung-ni 150 gallons had been requested
-but none had been delivered.<a id="FNanchor_534" href="#Footnote_534" class="fnanchor">533</a> While the troops ahead, including
-G and H of 3/5, continued on towards Hagaru, unaware of the break,
-a bad situation developed around the stalled guns.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_534" href="#FNanchor_534" class="fnanchor">533</a> Lieutenant Meeker, dispatched from Hagaru with fuel, was unable to get through
-to the stalled artillery because of Chinese fire. Some of his men, however, did pass the
-Chinese block and served as part of CWO Carlson’s improvised gun crew. Capt E. L.
-Meeker interv, 19 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following the halting of the convoy Major Angus J. Cronin, in charge
-of 4/11’s vehicle column, and his handful of truck drivers and cannoneers
-drove off a platoon of Chinese. These Marines were soon joined
-by Lieutenant Colonel Feehan’s 1/11 and Able Company of 1/5. By
-the time Lieutenant Colonel Taplett arrived, the 155s had been moved
-off the road by Captain O. R. Lodge of 4/11, who continued in spite of
-a wound until more severely wounded in the head.</p>
-
-<p>Roise and Stevens arrived shortly afterwards and the three battalion
-commanders drew up a hasty plan. While 3/5 built up a base of fire
-a platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, would move through the ridge north
-of the road to knock out the Chinese strong point. Up to this time there
-had been few and minor instances of panic during the breakout from
-Yudam-ni. But some confusion resulted when the enemy took advantage
-of the delay to blow a small bridge ahead and increase his rate of
-fire. Thus a new roadblock awaited after the howitzers were removed,
-and two truck drivers were killed while the engineers repaired the
-break. Other drivers bypassed the bridge and made a dash for safety
-by crossing the little stream on the ice.</p>
-
-<p>A comparatively few men, giving way to panic, were endangering
-the entire column. Behind one of the fleeing trucks an angry warrant<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">275</span>
-officer pounded in pursuit, shouting some of the most sulphurous profanity
-that Lieutenant Colonel Taplett had ever heard.<a id="FNanchor_535" href="#Footnote_535" class="fnanchor">534</a> This was
-CWO Allen Carlson of Baker Battery, 1/11. He disappeared around
-a bend in the road, only to return a moment later with a chastened
-driver towing a 105mm howitzer. Carlson hastily recruited a crew and
-set up the piece beside the road for point-blank fire at the enemy position
-while Taplett directed the fire of a 75mm recoilless rifle.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_535" href="#FNanchor_535" class="fnanchor">534</a> Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A Charlie Battery howitzer and a 1/5 heavy machine gun added
-their contribution as a platoon of Easy Company, 2/5, attacked under
-cover of air strikes. The Chinese position was overrun at 0830 at an
-estimated cost to the enemy of 150 dead. Two other attacks were
-launched by infantry units of Roise’s battalion on the high ground to
-the left before the MSR was cleared.</p>
-
-<p>When the 155mm howitzers were pushed off the road, it had been
-assumed that they would be retrieved. Only 1000 yards farther down
-the MSR was a cache of air-dropped diesel fuel, but efforts to bring
-back replenishments were frustrated by enemy fire. Attempts at recovery
-by the British Marines failed later that day, and orders were given
-for the destruction by air of the eight stalled howitzers plus a ninth
-which had previously been abandoned after skidding off the road. This
-was the largest loss of weapons in the Yudam-ni breakout.</p>
-
-<p>At 1400 on 4 December the last elements of the rearguard, 3/7,
-entered the perimeter and the four-day operation passed into history.
-Some 1500 casualties were brought to Hagaru, a third of them being
-in the non-battle category, chiefly frostbite cases. It had taken the
-head of the column about 59 hours to cover the 14 miles, and the rear
-units 79 hours.</p>
-
-<p>“Under the circumstances of its execution,” commented General
-Smith, “the breakout was remarkably well conducted. Since centralized
-control of the widespread elements was a difficult task, particularly
-with a joint command, unit commanders were required to exercise a
-high degree of initiative.... The spirit and discipline of the men under
-the most adverse conditions of weather and terrain was another highly
-important factor contributing to the success of the operation and also
-reflecting the quality of the leadership being exercised.”<a id="FNanchor_536" href="#Footnote_536" class="fnanchor">535</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_536" href="#FNanchor_536" class="fnanchor">535</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 948.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="newpage photos">
-<div id="ip_276" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276c.jpg" width="1630" height="1112" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5679<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>This Was Hagaru—Two views of the Marine forward base at the foot
-of the Chosin Reservoir, with East Hill in the background; here the
-troops reorganized for the final breakout.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276cb.jpg" width="1630" height="1104" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 4971</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276d.jpg" width="1613" height="1178" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5434<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Patrol Actions—Task forces, ranging in size from a squad to a battalion,
-sometimes supported by tanks as well as air and artillery, were employed
-for specific missions during the breakout.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276db.jpg" width="1613" height="1044" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5445</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276e.jpg" width="1659" height="1155" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5438<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Before and After Taking—Two views, only a few seconds apart, of the
-effective close air support given Marine infantry; the plane is hidden
-by the dense cloud of black smoke.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276eb.jpg" width="1640" height="1048" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5440</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276f.jpg" width="1612" height="1135" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5685<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>The Hagaru Airstrip—Above, walking wounded awaiting evacuation
-in an Air Force C-47 which flew in artillery ammunition; below, casualties
-leave their rifles behind but will take out much-needed parachutes
-shown in the foreground.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276fb.jpg" width="1612" height="1072" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5683</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276g.jpg" width="1653" height="1199" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5398<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Helicopter and Ambulance Evacuation—Above, the helicopters of
-VMO-6 flew out casualties from areas which otherwise could not have
-been reached; below, ambulances had their moments, too, as this bullet-riddled
-specimen shows.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276gb.jpg" width="1653" height="987" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5461</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276h.jpg" width="1605" height="1128" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5409<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Breakout from Hagaru—Above, crippled vehicles are simply pushed
-off the road; below, at every halt the weary gravel-crunchers sink exhausted
-into the snow.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276hb.jpg" width="1605" height="1082" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5428</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276i.jpg" width="1654" height="1186" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-Photos courtesy LtGen E. A. Craig and Capt R. W. Crook<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Victims of Communist Aggression—Three views of the Korean refugees,
-ranging from infants to patriarchs, who followed the Marine
-column all the way to Hungnam.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276ib.jpg" width="1642" height="1018" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USA Photo SC 355017</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276j.jpg" width="1638" height="1195" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 130426<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Magnificent Air Support—Above, crewmen check rockets of a Corsair
-fighter-bomber; and, below, one of the old Grumman TBMs resurrected
-for casualty evacuation from Koto-ri.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276jb.jpg" width="1626" height="1032" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 130442</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276k.jpg" width="1638" height="1178" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5361<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Fighting in the Heavyweight Division—Above, Marine tanks awaiting
-withdrawal from Koto-ri; below, Army self-propelled 155mm howitzers
-firing from the Chinhung-ni area.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276kb.jpg" width="1629" height="1040" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USA Photo SC 354246</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276l.jpg" width="1628" height="1162" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5372<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Through the Swirling Flakes—The march southward from Koto-ri begins
-in a snowstorm as a Marine infantry battalion attacks northward
-from Chinhung-ni to open up the MSR.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276lb.jpg" width="1628" height="1056" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5370</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276m.jpg" width="1651" height="1144" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5382<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>The Endless Column of March—Two more views of the column, the
-first elements of which reached Chinhung-ni before the last troops
-departed Koto-ri, ten miles to the rear.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276mb.jpg" width="1651" height="1080" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5356</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276n.jpg" width="1630" height="1163" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit center">
-USMC Photo A 5466 <span class="in8">USMC Photo A 5444</span><br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Clearing the Flanks—Tanks and infantry work together to clear the
-flanks of enemy combat groups which watched for every opportunity
-to attack from the high ground.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276nb.jpg" width="1619" height="1050" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5369</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276o.jpg" width="1621" height="1133" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USMC Photo A 5376<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>A job for the Engineers—Above, this gap had to be spanned if the
-vehicles were to be brought out from Koto-ri; below, infantry crossing
-over air-dropped Treadway bridge.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276ob.jpg" width="1625" height="1044" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USMC Photo A 5408</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276p.jpg" width="1630" height="1187" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit center">
-USN Photo 424506 <span class="in8">     USN Photo 424527</span><br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>The Hungnam Redeployment—Above, two views of Marines who were
-first X Corps troops to embark; below, a glimpse of the thousands of
-tons of equipment to be loaded.</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276pb.jpg" width="1630" height="1044" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USA Photo SC 355022</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276q.jpg" width="1651" height="1181" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USN Photo 423914<br />
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Waterfront Panoramas—Above, these two LSTs were among the last
-to be loaded; below, the final demolitions scene, with the USS</i> Begor
-<i>(APD 127) shown in the foreground</i>.</p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_276qb.jpg" width="1651" height="1040" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">USN Photo 424297</p>
-</div></div>
-
-<div class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_276r.jpg" width="1609" height="2302" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption">
-
-<p class="credit">
-USN Photo 424567
-</p></div></div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>The Honored Dead—On the day of his departure from Hungnam the
-commanding general of the 1st Marine Division visits the cemetery for
-a last silent tribute to the dead.</i></p>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">277</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIII">CHAPTER XIII<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Regroupment at Hagaru</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air—537 Replacements Flown to
-Hagaru—Air Drops of Ammunition—Planning for Breakout to
-Koto-ri—3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru—East Hill Retaken
-from Chinese—Attack of RCT-7 to the South—Advance
-of the Division Trains</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> marines at Hagaru would have been astonished to learn how
-much anxiety over their “encirclement” was being currently felt
-in the United States. It had been a rude shock for Americans who
-believed that the troops in Korea would be “home by Christmas” to
-realize that the unexpected Chinese intervention had created virtually
-a new war. This war, moreover, was apparently going against the UN
-forces. On Thanksgiving Day the victory over Communist aggression
-had seemed almost complete, yet only a week later the headlines announced
-major reverses. The Eighth Army was in full retreat, and an
-entire Marine division was said to be “trapped.”</p>
-
-<p>So disturbing were the reports from Korea, newspaper readers and
-radio listeners could scarcely have imagined the mood of confidence
-prevailing at Hagaru after the arrival of the troops from Yudam-ni.
-Even prior to that event, few Marines had any doubts as to the ability
-of the Division to fight its way out to the seacoast.</p>
-
-<p>The Hagaru perimeter presented a scene of bustling activity during
-the first days of December. Trucks and jeeps bounced along the bumpy
-roads in such numbers as to create a traffic problem. Twin-engined
-planes roared in and out of the snow-covered airstrip at frequent intervals
-throughout the daylight hours. Overhead the “Flying Boxcars”
-spilled a rainbow profusion of red, blue, yellow, green and orange
-parachutes to drift earthward with heavy loads of rations, gasoline and
-ammunition.</p>
-
-<p>The busy panorama even had its humorous aspects. Parka-clad<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">278</span>
-Marines displaying a five-day growth of beard went about with their
-cheeks bulging from an accumulation of Tootsie Rolls—a caramel confection
-much esteemed by Stateside youngsters for its long-lasting
-qualities. The Post Exchange Section had originally brought merchandise
-into Hagaru on the assumption that it would be established as a
-base. No space in vehicles was available for its removal and the commanding
-general directed that the entire remaining stock, $13,547.80
-worth, chiefly candies and cookies, should be issued gratuitously to the
-troops.<a id="FNanchor_537" href="#Footnote_537" class="fnanchor">536</a> Tootsie Rolls proved to be a prime favorite with men who
-would have scorned them in civilian life. Not only were they more
-tasty than half-frozen “C” rations, but they resulted in no intestinal
-disorders. Moreover, they were useful as temporary repairs for leaking
-radiators.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_537" href="#FNanchor_537" class="fnanchor">536</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1017–1018.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There was nothing during the daytime to indicate the presence of
-CCF troops near Hagaru. Even in hours of darkness the enemy was
-quiet throughout the first five nights of December. Apparently the
-Chinese were powerless to renew the attack until reinforcements and
-replenishments of supplies and ammunition reached the area.</p>
-
-<h3><i>4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air</i></h3>
-
-<p>Evacuation of the wounded was the chief problem on 2 December,
-when it became evident that previous estimates of losses at Yudam-ni
-and among the Army troops east of the Reservoir were far too low.
-A total of 914 casualties were flown out by the C-47s and R4Ds that
-day and more than 700 on the 3d. Captain Hering and his assistants
-had assumed that the Air Force evacuation officer was screening the
-casualties until he informed them that this was not his responsibility.
-The Division surgeon then set a Spartan standard. He passed personally
-on all controversial cases and approved for evacuation only
-those in as bad shape as Lieutenant Commander Lessenden, the 5th
-Marines surgeon who had refused to be flown out and continued on
-duty after both feet were painfully frozen. Apparently it was not too
-severe a test for men who could stand the pain, since Lessenden suffered
-no permanent injuries.<a id="FNanchor_538" href="#Footnote_538" class="fnanchor">537</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">279</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_538" href="#FNanchor_538" class="fnanchor">537</a> Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U. S. Navy, Public Information Release, 21 Apr 51;
-LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC) USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address
-Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Hering had to use his medical authority in several instances
-to overcome the objections of Yudam-ni casualties who declined evacuation,
-though in obvious need of hospitalization.<a id="FNanchor_539" href="#Footnote_539" class="fnanchor">538</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_539" href="#FNanchor_539" class="fnanchor">538</a> <i>Ibid.</i> Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin Reservoir campaign led to the
-adoption of the thermal boot as an effective preventive measure during the operations of
-the following two winters of the Korean conflict.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The liaison airstrip at Koto-ri had been of little use, since it was
-outside the perimeter and exposed to enemy fire. But the completion
-of a new strip on the 2d made it possible to evacuate about 47 casualties
-that day from the 2/1 perimeter.<a id="FNanchor_540" href="#Footnote_540" class="fnanchor">539</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_540" href="#FNanchor_540" class="fnanchor">539</a> 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X Corps, <i>Special Report, Chosin
-Reservoir</i>, 93; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 844; VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 13–18.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>More than 1400 casualties remained at Hagaru on the morning of
-5 December. They were all flown out before nightfall, making a total
-of 4312 men (3150 Marines, 1137 Army personnel and 25 Royal Marines)
-evacuated from Hagaru by air in the first five days of December,
-according to Marine figures.<a id="FNanchor_541" href="#Footnote_541" class="fnanchor">540</a> X Corps estimated a total of 4207 for
-the same period.<a id="FNanchor_542" href="#Footnote_542" class="fnanchor">541</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_541" href="#FNanchor_541" class="fnanchor">540</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 998–999.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_542" href="#FNanchor_542" class="fnanchor">541</a> X Corps <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 93.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>R4Ds of the 1st MAW, flying under Wing operational control, were
-represented in the flights to and from Hagaru as well as the C-47s of
-the Combat Cargo Command, <span class="allsmcap">FEAF</span>.<a id="FNanchor_543" href="#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">542</a> The large-scale casualty evacuation
-was completed without losing a man, even though the aircraft
-landing on the rough strip careened precariously as they bounced along
-the frozen runway. Only two planes could be accommodated simultaneously
-at first, but Marine engineers widened the 2900-foot strip
-until six planes could be parked at a time.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_543" href="#FNanchor_543" class="fnanchor">542</a> Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A four-engine Navy R5D made a successful landing with stretchers
-flown in from Japan. After taking off with a load of wounded, the
-pilot barely cleared the surrounding hills, and it was decided to risk
-no further evacuations with such large aircraft. Two crash landings
-marred operations on the field. An incoming Marine R4D, heavily
-loaded with artillery ammunition, wiped out its landing gear on the
-rough surface and was abandoned after its load had been put to good
-use by the gunners. A second accident involved an Air Force C-47 which
-lost power on the take off and came down just outside the Marine lines
-without injury to its load of casualties. Troops from the perimeter were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">280</span>
-rushed out immediately to rescue its occupants but the plane had to be
-destroyed.<a id="FNanchor_544" href="#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">543</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_544" href="#FNanchor_544" class="fnanchor">543</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 998–999.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Not until long later were final official casualty reports rendered for
-the period of the Yudam-ni regroupment and breakout. Regimental
-figures are not available, and the totals included the losses suffered by
-the troops at Hagaru during the night of 30 November-1 December.
-Following are the figures for the 1st Marine Division as a whole
-throughout this five-day period:</p>
-
-<table id="t280" class="narrow30 bl" summary="casualties 30Nov-1Dec">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">KIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">DOW</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">MIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Total<br />Battle</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Non-<br />Battle<a id="FNanchor_545" href="#Footnote_545" class="fnanchor">B</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">30 Nov</td>
-  <td class="tdr">27</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">183</td>
-  <td class="tdr">222</td>
-  <td class="tdr">102</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  1 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">27</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">111</td>
-  <td class="tdr">158</td>
-  <td class="tdr">134</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  2 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">55</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">33</td>
-  <td class="tdr">231</td>
-  <td class="tdr">321</td>
-  <td class="tdr">180</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  3 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">194</td>
-  <td class="tdr">217</td>
-  <td class="tdr">196</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  4 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">10</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">202</td>
-  <td class="tdr">222</td>
-  <td class="tdr">582</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in2">Totals</td>
-  <td class="tdr">135</td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-  <td class="tdr">55</td>
-  <td class="tdr">921</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1140</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1194</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_545" href="#FNanchor_545" class="fnanchor">B</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix II, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru</i></h3>
-
-<p>At 1359, on 3 December, X Corps issued OI 22, directing the 1st Marine
-Division to withdraw all elements to Hamhung area via the Hagaru-Hamhung
-axis as rapidly as evacuation of wounded and other preparations
-would permit.<a id="FNanchor_546" href="#Footnote_546" class="fnanchor">544</a> General Almond flew to Hagaru that same day
-for a conference with General Smith. Nothing further was said about
-destruction of equipment. At that very time, in fact, various critical
-items were being salvaged and flown out from Hagaru when space on
-planes was available.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_546" href="#FNanchor_546" class="fnanchor">544</a> X Corps <i>OI 22</i>, 2 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Surplus weapons had accumulated as a result of casualties and the
-Marine general wished to avoid the destruction of any material that
-could be removed by air without interfering with casualty evacuation.
-It was particularly necessary to salvage and fly out the parachutes and
-packages used for air drops, since a critical shortage of these had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">281</span>
-reported from Japan. Before leaving Hagaru, the Division also planned
-to evacuate large quantities of stoves, tents, typewriters, rifles, machine
-guns and damaged 4.2″ mortars.<a id="FNanchor_547" href="#Footnote_547" class="fnanchor">545</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_547" href="#FNanchor_547" class="fnanchor">545</a> This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources:
-G-1 <i>SAR</i>, 6–7 and G-4 <i>SAR</i> 6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps <i>Special Report, Chosin
-Reservoir</i>; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1011–1015, and <i>Chronicle</i>, 103–105; Forney, <i>Special Report</i>,
-3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Space in empty planes landing at Hagaru was utilized not only for
-bringing in equipment and medical supplies, but also replacements.
-Since the Wonsan landing some hundreds of Marines, most of them
-wounded in the Inchon-Seoul operation, had returned from hospitals
-in Japan. These men, upon reporting at Hungnam, were temporarily
-assigned to the Headquarters Battalion, since the Division had no
-provision in its T/O for a replacement organization. Ordinarily they
-would have been returned to their units, but enemy action made this
-procedure impossible until the completion of the airstrip.</p>
-
-<p>During the first five days of December, therefore, 537 replacements
-were flown to Hagaru, fit for duty and equipped with cold-weather
-clothing. Those destined for the 1st Marines were assigned to the 3d
-Battalion for perimeter defense, and personnel for the 5th and 7th
-Marines joined those units after their arrival at Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, the chief of the Combat
-Cargo Command, expressed astonishment during his visit of 5 December
-on learning about these replacements. He had come to offer his
-C-47s for troop evacuation after the casualties were flown out, but
-General Smith explained that all able-bodied men would be needed
-for the breakout.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Air Drops of Ammunition</i></h3>
-
-<p>Visitors and press correspondents arrived daily at Hagaru in the empty
-C-47s and R4Ds. Among them was Miss Marguerite Higgins, reporter
-for the New York <i>Herald-Tribune</i>. General Smith ruled that for her
-own protection, considering the possibility of enemy attack, she must
-leave the perimeter before nightfall.</p>
-
-<p>French and British publications were represented as well as most of
-the larger American dailies and wire services. At one of the press conferences
-the question arose as to the proper name of the Marine operation.
-A British correspondent had intended to refer to it as a “retreat”
-or “retirement,” but General Smith held that there could be no retreat<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">282</span>
-when there was no rear. Since the Division was surrounded, he maintained,
-the word “retreat” was not a correct term for the coming breakout
-to the coast.<a id="FNanchor_548" href="#Footnote_548" class="fnanchor">546</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_548" href="#FNanchor_548" class="fnanchor">546</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 977–978; <i>Chronicle</i>, 103–106.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Murray were interviewed for
-television by Charles de Soria, who also “shot” Marines on infantry
-duty and casualties awaiting evacuation. These pictures and recordings
-were later shown in the United States under the title <i>Gethsemane</i>.</p>
-
-<p>The correspondents were astonished to find the Hagaru perimeter
-so lacking in enemy activity. This quiet was shattered at 2010 on 5
-December when two B-26s bombed and strafed the area. Marine night
-fighters were absent on a search mission, but one was recalled to offer
-protection against further efforts of the sort. A possible explanation
-was advanced by First Lieutenant Harry S. Wilson, of VMF(N)-542,
-who reported that he had received orders by radio to attack Hagaru.
-It was his conviction that Chinese use of captured radio equipment
-accounted for the B-26 attack.<a id="FNanchor_549" href="#Footnote_549" class="fnanchor">547</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_549" href="#FNanchor_549" class="fnanchor">547</a> 1stMarDiv <i>G-3 Journal</i>, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E. Hood, memo: Close Air
-Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv, 29 Jan 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The interlude of CCF inactivity gave the 1st Marine Division an
-opportunity to build up a stock of air-dropped ammunition and supplies.
-Poor communications had prevented the obtaining of advance information
-as to the requirements of the Yudam-ni troops, and their needs
-had to be estimated by the assistant G-4.</p>
-
-<p>It was planned that units moving out from Hagaru would take only
-enough supplies for the advance to Koto-ri. Materiel would be air-dropped
-there to support the next stage of the breakout.</p>
-
-<p>The C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command were called upon to fly
-in the largest part of the total of the 372.7 tons requested for air delivery
-at Hagaru. C-47s and R4Ds were available for some items, particularly
-of a fragile nature; and specially packaged small drops to meet
-specific needs could be made by planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.</p>
-
-<p>Officers and men of the Headquarters Battalion at Hagaru were
-ordered to assist the 1st Regulating Detachment in the operation of
-the Hagaru airhead. Army service troops were also assigned to the
-task, and dumps were set up adjacent to the drop zone for the direct
-issuing of supplies. The major items requested were artillery, mortar
-and small arms ammunition, hand grenades, gasoline and diesel oil,
-rations, and communication wire.<a id="FNanchor_550" href="#Footnote_550" class="fnanchor">548</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">283</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_550" href="#FNanchor_550" class="fnanchor">548</a> HqBn <i>URpt 13</i>; G-4 <i>SAR</i>, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>There is no record of the amounts actually received. Pilots sometimes
-missed the drop zone so far that the containers were “captured” by the
-enemy or landed in areas where recovery was not feasible because of
-enemy fire. In other instances, the supplies fell near the positions of
-front-line units which issued them on the spot without any formalities
-of bookkeeping.</p>
-
-<p>Breakage rates were high, due to the frozen ground. About 70 per
-cent of the POL products and 70 to 80 per cent of the rations were
-recovered in usable condition. Of the artillery ammunition delivered
-to the drop zone, 40 per cent was badly damaged and only 25 per cent
-ever reached the gun positions. About 45 per cent of the small arms
-ammunition was recovered and usable. A hundred per cent of the
-requested mortar ammunition and 90 per cent of the 81mm rounds
-were put into the air over the drop zone, though the damage rate was
-nearly as high as that of the artillery shells.<a id="FNanchor_551" href="#Footnote_551" class="fnanchor">549</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_551" href="#FNanchor_551" class="fnanchor">549</a> G-4 <i>SAR</i>, appendix II, 3–5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In spite of the seemingly low percentages of receipts as compared to
-requests, it was considered that the Hagaru air drops had been successful
-on the whole. “Without the extra ammunition,” commented General
-Smith, “many more of the friendly troops would have been killed....
-There can be no doubt that the supplies received by this method
-proved to be the margin necessary to sustain adequately the operations
-of the division during this period.”<a id="FNanchor_552" href="#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">550</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_552" href="#FNanchor_552" class="fnanchor">550</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1010.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri</i></h3>
-
-<p>The need of the Yudam-ni troops for recuperation was so urgent that
-6 December was set as the D-day of the attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri.
-On the recommendation of his staff, General Smith decided that the
-need of the troops for rest and regroupment outweighed the advantages
-of a speedy advance, even though the enemy would be allowed more
-time to get his forces into position along the MSR.</p>
-
-<p>Another factor influencing this decision was the thinning of the command
-group and staff sections of the Division. It will be recalled that
-General Craig, the Assistant Division Commander, had recently been
-returned on emergency leave to the United States. Colonel Walseth
-(G-1) was wounded on 30 November, while Lieutenant Colonel Chidester,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">284</span>
-had been MIA since that date. Colonel McAlister (G-4) had
-been directed to remain at Hungnam to co-ordinate logistic functions.</p>
-
-<p>A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel.
-This was due in part to the casualties suffered by the last convoy of
-Headquarters troops to move up from Hungnam. Moreover, the office
-force had been depleted by calls for reinforcements to defend the
-perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>By dint of working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout
-to Koto-ri was completed on schedule. OpnO 25-50, issued at 0800
-on 5 December, provided for an advance of the 1st Marine Division
-at first light the following morning on the Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni-Majon-dong
-axis to close the Hamhung area. The principal subordinate units
-were assigned these tasks:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang hang1">
-
-<p>(a) RCT-5 (3/1 attached) to relieve all elements on perimeter defense in
-the Hagaru area by 1200, 5 December; to cover the movement of
-RCT-7 out of Hagaru to the south; to follow RCT-7 to the south on
-the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis; to protect the Division rear
-from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and to follow RCT-7 from Koto-ri to the
-Hamhung area as Division reserve.</p>
-
-<p>(b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni
-axis to close the Hamhung area.</p>
-
-<p>(c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni, protecting
-the approach and passage of the remainder of the Division through
-Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear from Koto-ri to the Hamhung
-area.<a id="FNanchor_553" href="#Footnote_553" class="fnanchor">551</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_553" href="#FNanchor_553" class="fnanchor">551</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO 25-50</i>, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the remainder of this section
-are: 1stMarDiv <i>AdmO 20-50</i>, 4 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area,
-4 Dec 50; Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 104–106.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators, casualties
-and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to march on
-foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security. It was directed
-that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the side of the road
-and destroyed if not operative by the time the column passed. During
-halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be established.</p>
-
-<p>Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for
-reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions to
-clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were planned
-by the Division Engineer Officer.</p>
-
-<p>Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed
-that the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days,
-equally distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">285</span>
-items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and
-the following provision was made for ammunition:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle, minimum
-1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps depleted or transportation
-capacity exceeded.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other
-casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated in vehicles
-of the column.</p>
-
-<p>Two Division trains were set up by AdminO 20-50. Lieutenant
-Colonel Banks commanded Train No. 1, under RCT-7; and No. 2,
-under RCT-5, was in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne. Each motor
-serial in the trains was to have a commander who maintained radio
-communication with the train commander.</p>
-
-<p>Truck transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment
-at Hagaru, a Division destruction plan was issued on 4 December,
-making unit commanders responsible for disposing of all excess supplies
-and equipment within their own areas. “Commanding officer 1st
-Regulating Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies
-and equipment remaining in dumps,” the order continued. “Unit
-commanders and CO 1st Regulating Detachment report types and
-amounts of supplies and equipment to this headquarters (G-4) prior
-to destruction. Permission to use fuel and ammunition for destruction
-purposes must be obtained from this headquarters (G-4).”</p>
-
-<h3><i>3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru</i></h3>
-
-<p>General Smith held conferences on 4 and 5 December of senior unit
-commanders. During the afternoon of the 4th General Almond arrived
-by plane and was briefed on the plan for the breakout. In a brief
-ceremony at the Division CP he presented the Distinguished Service
-Cross to General Smith, Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonels
-Murray and Beall.</p>
-
-<p>The night of 5–6 December was the fifth in a row to pass without
-enemy activity at Hagaru. But if Division G-2 summaries were to be
-credited, it was the calm before the storm. For the Chinese were believed
-to be assembling troops and supplies both at Hagaru and along
-the MSR to Koto-ri. Up to this time seven CCF divisions, the 58th,
-59th, 60th, 76th, 79th, 80th and 89th, had been identified through POW<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">286</span>
-interrogations. But there were evidences that the 77th and 78th were
-also within striking distance.<a id="FNanchor_554" href="#Footnote_554" class="fnanchor">552</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_554" href="#FNanchor_554" class="fnanchor">552</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps <i>Command Report Annex (CR)</i>,
-4 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1200 on 5 December the 5th Marines relieved 3/1 of the responsibility
-for the defense of the Hagaru area. Division elements other
-than infantry were withdrawn from the front line, leaving Lieutenant
-Colonel Murray’s three battalions, with 3/1 attached, disposed around
-the perimeter as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot hang hang1">
-
-<p>1/5—From the Yudam-ni road around the north of Hagaru and astride the
-Changjin Valley to a point at the base of the ridge about 1,000 yards
-east of the bridge over the Changjin River.</p>
-
-<p>2/5—In position on western slopes of East Hill.</p>
-
-<p>3/5—From the south nose of East Hill west across the river to link up with
-3/1 south of the airstrip.</p>
-
-<p>3/1—South and southwest of airstrip in sector formerly held by How and
-Item Companies of 3/1.<a id="FNanchor_555" href="#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">553</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_555" href="#FNanchor_555" class="fnanchor">553</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec 50; 5th Mar <i>SAR</i>,
-30–31.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Not only were the CCF positions on East Hill a threat to Hagaru;
-they also dominated the road leading south to Koto-ri. Thus the plan
-for the breakout called for simultaneous attacks to be launched at first
-light on the 6th—RCT-5 to regain the enemy-held portion of East Hill,
-and RCT-7 to lead the advance of the Division motor column toward
-Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>A plan for air support, prepared by the command and staff of the
-1st MAW, was brought to Hagaru by Brigadier General Thomas J.
-Cushman, Assistant Wing Commander, on 5 December. Aircraft were
-to be on station at 0700 to furnish close support for the attack on East
-Hill. Along the MSR to Koto-ri an umbrella of 24 close support aircraft
-was to cover the head, rear and flanks of the breakout column
-while search and attack planes scoured the ridges flanking the road
-and approaches leading into it. Support was also to be furnished after
-dark by the night hecklers. All strikes within three miles of either side
-of the MSR were to be controlled by the ground forces while the planes
-were free to hit any targets beyond.</p>
-
-<p>The concentration of aircraft covering the advance south from Hagaru
-was one of the greatest of the whole war. Marine planes at Yonpo
-would, of course, continue approximately 100 daily sorties to which
-VMF-323 would add 30 more from the <i>Badoeng Strait</i>. The Navy’s
-fast carriers, <i>Leyte</i>, <i>Valley Forge</i>, <i>Philippine Sea</i>, and <i>Princeton</i> were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">287</span>
-to abandon temporarily their deep support or interdiction operations
-and contribute about 100 or more attack sorties daily. The Fifth Air
-Force was to add more power with additional U. S. and Australian
-fighter-bombers as well as medium and heavy bomber interdiction beyond
-the bomb line. To augment the carrier support for the X Corps
-consolidation and possible redeployment by sea, VMF-212 had departed
-Yonpo on 4 December and was re-equipping in Itami for return
-to battle aboard the newly arrived USS <i>Bataan</i>. The <i>Sicily</i> was also
-heading for the area to take back aboard the Corsairs of VMF-214 on
-7 December.<a id="FNanchor_556" href="#Footnote_556" class="fnanchor">554</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_556" href="#FNanchor_556" class="fnanchor">554</a> 1stMAW <i>OpnO 2-50</i>, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air Support for 6 Dec,”
-5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, <i>Interim Evaluation
-Report No. 1</i>, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D.
-Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56. 1stMAW <i>HD, Dec 50</i>. The VMF-214 pilots casually made
-their transition from shore to carrier base between sorties.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Continuous artillery support, both for RCT-5 and RCT-7, was
-planned by the 11th Marines. Two batteries of the 3d Battalion and
-one of the 4th were to move out at the head of the RCT-7 train, the
-two from 3/11 to occupy initial positions halfway to Koto-ri to support
-the attack southward to that objective, and the 4/11 battery to take
-position in Koto-ri and provide general support northward in combination
-with the battery of 2/11 attached to that perimeter. The remaining
-batteries of the 3d and 4th Battalions would provide initial support
-from Hagaru southward until ordered to move out.</p>
-
-<p>The three batteries of 1/11, with D/11 attached, were to support
-the operations of RCT-5 in a similar manner. Two batteries would
-move out at the head of the regimental train to positions halfway to
-Koto-ri, the remaining two would fire to the south in support of withdrawing
-units and then displace when the first two were in position.<a id="FNanchor_557" href="#Footnote_557" class="fnanchor">555</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_557" href="#FNanchor_557" class="fnanchor">555</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar <i>SAR</i>), 8. As a consequence of the loss
-of nine 155mm howitzers during the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11
-was reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers each.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Throughout the night of 5–6 December, the darkness was stabbed
-by flashes as the artillery at Hagaru fired concentrations to saturate
-the area along the Hagaru-Koto-ri axis. In order to prevent cratering of
-the road the 155’s fired VT rounds. A secondary purpose of this bombardment
-was to expend profitably the surplus of ammunition which
-could not be brought out.<a id="FNanchor_558" href="#Footnote_558" class="fnanchor">556</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_558" href="#FNanchor_558" class="fnanchor">556</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, 1stMarDiv <i>POR</i> 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At daybreak on the 6th the Division Headquarters broke camp. General
-Smith had decided to fly the command group to Koto-ri in advance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">288</span>
-of the troops, so that planning could begin immediately for the breakout
-from Koto-ri southward. General Barr visited during the morning
-and was informed that the 7th Infantry Division casualties who had
-reached Hagaru had been flown out. The remaining 490 able-bodied
-men (including 385 survivors of Task Force Faith) had been provided
-with Marine equipment and organized into a provisional battalion under
-the command of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, USA. This battalion
-was attached to the 7th Marines and sometimes referred to as 31/7.</p>
-
-<p>Throughout the morning General Smith kept in close touch with the
-progress of RCT-7 toward Koto-ri. At 1400 a reassuring message was
-received from Colonel Litzenberg, and the commanding general took
-off from Hagaru by helicopter. Ten minutes later he and his aide, Captain
-Martin J. Sexton, landed at Koto-ri. The other members of the
-command group, following by OY and helicopter, set up in a large
-tent at Koto-ri and started planning for the next stage.<a id="FNanchor_559" href="#Footnote_559" class="fnanchor">557</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_559" href="#FNanchor_559" class="fnanchor">557</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1058–1060; HqBn, <i>HD, Dec 50</i>, 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>East Hill Retaken from Chinese</i></h3>
-
-<p>Meanwhile, at Hagaru, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had designated his
-2d Battalion for the assault on East Hill. At 0700 on 6 December, as
-the 4.2″ mortars began their planned preparation, the 7th Marines had
-already initiated the breakout to Koto-ri. When Marine planes arrived
-on station at 0725, a shortage of napalm tanks limited the air attack
-to bombing, rocket and strafing runs. These had little apparent effect on
-the objective. Further air strikes were directed by the FAC, First Lieutenant
-Manning T. Jeter, Jr., who was severely wounded while standing
-on the crest to direct the Corsairs to the target. Captain David G. Johnson,
-the air liaison officer, took his place. A total of 76 planes participated
-in the day’s air attacks.</p>
-
-<p>At 0900 Captain Smith’s Dog Company moved out to the assault
-(see Map 26) with First Lieutenant George A. Sorenson’s 3d Platoon
-in the lead, followed by the 2d and 1st Platoons in that order.<a id="FNanchor_560" href="#Footnote_560" class="fnanchor">558</a> Attacking
-to the northward, Sorensen was pinned down by fire from Objective
-A before he had covered 50 yards. This was the enemy’s main forward<span class="pagenum" id="Page_289">289</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_290">290</a></span>
-position on East Hill, which he had held against Marine attacks ever
-since seizing it in the early morning hours of 29 November. First
-Lieutenant John R. Hinds replaced Sorensen, after that officer was
-wounded. While he engaged the enemy frontally, First Lieutenant
-George C. McNaughton’s 2d Platoon poured in flanking fires and First
-Lieutenant Richard M. Johnson’s 1st Platoon executed a flanking movement.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_560" href="#FNanchor_560" class="fnanchor">558</a> This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources:
-5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 31–32; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 27–29; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1031–1033;
-Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R. Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H.
-Honeycutt interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L.
-Murray, Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_26" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_289.png" width="1279" height="838" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>SEIZURE OF EAST
-HILL AND CHINESE
-COUNTER ATTACK</p>
-
-<p>6–7 December</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-26</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Chinese resistance suddenly collapsed about 1100. Thus it seemed
-almost an anticlimax that East Hill, after holding out against the
-Marines more than a week, should have been retaken at a cost of one
-man killed and three wounded. About 30 CCF dead were found.</p>
-
-<p>As events were to prove, however, this was but the first round in a
-hard-fought 22-hour battle for the hill mass. The next phase began at
-1130, when Roise ordered Captain Peters’ Fox Company to relieve
-Smith so that Dog Company could resume the attack against Objective
-B, a ridge about 500 yards to the southeast. The lower slopes of this
-position were now being cleared by 2/7.</p>
-
-<p>After a 10-minute artillery preparation, the three platoons of Dog
-Company jumped off at 1250. The Chinese put up a stubborn resistance
-and it took until 1430 to seize the new objective. Marine casualties were
-moderate, however, and Captain Smith set up three platoon positions
-along the ridge running to the south whence he could control the road
-leading out of Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Late in the day the enemy appeared to be massing for a counterattack
-in the saddle between the two objectives. Johnson called an air
-strike and all Dog and Fox Company troops within range opened up
-with everything they had as McNaughton led a patrol against the
-Chinese in the saddle. Caught between the infantry fires and the rocket
-and strafing runs of the Corsairs, the CCF survivors surrendered en
-masse to McNaughton and his platoon. About 220 prisoners were taken
-to set a record for the 1st Marine Division in the Reservoir campaign.<a id="FNanchor_561" href="#Footnote_561" class="fnanchor">559</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_561" href="#FNanchor_561" class="fnanchor">559</a> 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 28–29.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At the request of Captain Smith, the saddle between the two Marine
-companies was occupied by reinforcements consisting of an officer and
-11 men from the regimental AT Company and an officer and 32 men
-from the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Shortly after dark the enemy
-launched a vigorous counterattack. Tanks and 81mm mortars fired in
-support of Marines who made good use of 2.36″ white phosphorus
-rockets at close range.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_291">291</span></p>
-
-<p>Although the Chinese endured frightful casualties, they returned
-again and again to the attack until midnight. It was evident that they
-considered this a fight to a finish for East Hill, and at 0205 they renewed
-the assault against all three companies of the 2d Battalion as well as
-Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion.</p>
-
-<p>The struggle during the next three hours was considered the most
-spectacular if not the most fiercely contested battle of the entire Reservoir
-campaign even by veterans of the Yudam-ni actions. Never before
-had they seen the Chinese come on in such numbers or return to the
-attack with such persistence. The darkness was crisscrossed with a
-fiery pattern of tracer bullets at one moment, and next the uncanny
-radiance of an illumination shell would reveal Chinese columns shuffling
-in at a trot, only to go down in heaps as they deployed. Marine tanks,
-artillery, mortars, rockets and machine guns reaped a deadly harvest,
-and still the enemy kept on coming with a dogged fatalism which
-commanded the respect of the Marines. Looking like round little
-gnomes in their padded cotton uniforms, groups of Chinese contrived
-at times to approach within grenade-throwing distance before being
-cut down.</p>
-
-<p>The fight was not entirely one-sided. The Marines took a pounding
-from CCF mortars and machine guns, and by 0300 Dog Company was
-hard-pressed in its three extended positions pointed like a pistol at the
-heart of the enemy’s assembly areas. Both McNaughton and the executive
-officer, First Lieutenant James H. Honeycutt, were wounded but
-remained in action.</p>
-
-<p>This was the second time in three months that Dog Company had
-spearheaded a Marine attack on a desperately defended hill complex.
-Northwest of Seoul in September, only 26 able-bodied men had survived
-to break the back of North Korean resistance. The company commander,
-First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, had died a hero’s death at the
-moment of victory, and First Lieutenant Karle F. Seydel was the unit’s
-only unwounded officer.</p>
-
-<p>Now another Smith commanded Dog Company, and Seydel was killed
-as enemy pressure from front and flank threatened to overwhelm the
-three riddled platoons. Casualties of 13 KIA and 50 WIA were taken in
-the battle for East Hill as Dog Company and the provisional platoons
-fell back fighting to the former Objective A and tied in with Fox
-Company.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_27" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_292.png" width="837" height="1255" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE LAST NIGHT AT HAGARU</p>
-
-<p>6–7 DECEMBER 1950</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-27</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Along the low ground at the northern end of East Hill the Chinese<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">292</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_293">293</a></span>
-were beaten off with ruinous losses by Jaskilka’s Easy Company of 2/5,
-Jones’ Charlie Company of 1/5 and three Army tanks (see Map 27).
-Enemy troops had to cross a comparatively level expanse which provided
-a lucrative field of fire for Marine supporting arms. Heaps of
-CCF dead, many of them charred by white phosphorus bursts, were
-piled up in front of the Marine positions.</p>
-
-<p>Next, the Chinese hit Captain James B. Heater’s Able Company of
-1/5, still farther to the left, and overran several squad positions. One
-platoon was forced to withdraw to the rise on which the Division CP
-had previously been located. The lines were restored at 0546 with the
-help of Lieutenant Hancock and his Baker Company, which had been
-in reserve. Altogether the 1st Battalion had suffered casualties of ten
-killed and 43 wounded, while the counted CCF slain numbered 260
-in front of Charlie Company and 200 in the area of Able Company.
-George Company of 3/1 also beat off a Chinese attack on the south of
-the perimeter. With the coming of daylight these Marines found that
-they had one of the Chinese withdrawal routes under their guns. Mortar
-and rifle fire annihilated one group of about 60 enemy and another
-group of 15 Reds surrendered.<a id="FNanchor_562" href="#Footnote_562" class="fnanchor">560</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_562" href="#FNanchor_562" class="fnanchor">560</a> Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The new day revealed a scene of slaughter which surpassed anything
-the Marines had seen since the fight for the approaches of Seoul in
-September. Estimates of CCF dead in front of the 2d Battalion positions
-on and around East Hill ran as high as 800, and certain it is that the
-enemy had suffered a major defeat.</p>
-
-<p>When Marine air came on station, the Chinese as usual scattered for
-cover. About 0200 Murray ordered 3/5, which had not been in contact
-with the enemy during the night, to displace to the south at the head
-of Division Train No. 2, followed by 1/5 and Ridge’s battalion of the
-1st Marines. This meant that Roise’s men with a platoon of tanks and
-the engineers in charge of demolitions would be the last troops out of
-Hagaru.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Attack of RCT-7 to the South</i></h3>
-
-<p>During the 22-hour battle on East Hill the 7th Marines had been attacking
-toward Koto-ri (see Map 28). On the eve of the breakout the
-gaps in the infantry ranks were partially filled with 300 artillerymen
-from the 11th Marines, bringing Litzenberg’s strength up to about 2200<span class="pagenum" id="Page_294">294</span>
-men. 7th Mar OpnO 14-50 called for the advance to be initiated at
-first light on 6 December as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>1st Battalion—to move out at 0430 to clear the ground to the right of the
-river;</p>
-
-<p>2d Battalion—supported by tanks, to attack as advanced guard along the
-MSR;</p>
-
-<p>Provisional Battalion (31/7)—to clear the ground to the left of the
-MSR;<a id="FNanchor_563" href="#Footnote_563" class="fnanchor">561</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_563" href="#FNanchor_563" class="fnanchor">561</a> Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to permit advance through
-the high ground, the Provisional Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear
-enemy from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>3d Battalion—to bring up the rear of the regimental train, with George
-Company disposed along both flanks as security for the vehicles.<a id="FNanchor_564" href="#Footnote_564" class="fnanchor">562</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_564" href="#FNanchor_564" class="fnanchor">562</a> Sources for this section, except where otherwise noted, are: 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 24; 3/7
-<i>SAR</i>, n. p.; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1029–1031, 1033–1047; RCT-7 <i>URpt 6</i>; 1stLt J. B. Chandler,
-“Thank God I’m a Marine,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25–26; MajGen
-H. L. Litzenberg, Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to Koto-ri, 6–7 December 1950,
-2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments,
-7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments,
-27 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Daybreak revealed a peculiar silvery fog covering the Hagaru area.<a id="FNanchor_565" href="#Footnote_565" class="fnanchor">563</a>
-The 1st Battalion, with Charlie Company in assault, had as its first
-objective the high ground southeast of Tonae-ri. No resistance was
-encountered, though 24 Chinese were surprised asleep in their positions
-near the objective and 17 of them killed.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_565" href="#FNanchor_565" class="fnanchor">563</a> Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 2d Platoon of Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion, was attached to
-2/7 when the advance guard jumped off at 0630 from the road block
-south of Hagaru. Almost immediately the column ran into trouble.
-Upon clearing the road block the lead dozer-tank took three hits from
-a 3.5 bazooka. Within twenty minutes the column came under heavy
-fire from CCF positions on the high ground on the left. Fox Company,
-in the lead, was allowed to pass before the enemy opened up on the
-Battalion Command Group, Dog-Easy Company and Weapons Company.
-The fog prevented air support initially. When it lifted, First
-Lieutenant John G. Theros, FAC of 2/7, brought in Marine aircraft and
-81mm fire on the CCF position.<a id="FNanchor_566" href="#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">564</a> It took a coordinated attack by the
-two infantry companies and the tanks, however, before the resistance
-could be put down and the advance resumed at 1200. Two and a half
-hours later the upper reaches of this hill were cleared by D/5.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_566" href="#FNanchor_566" class="fnanchor">564</a> 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16 Feb 51; Litzenberg
-Recollections, 2 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>After 2/7 and air smothered the initial Chinese resistance, Fox Company
-and the platoon of Dog/Tanks advanced down the road. About<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">295</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_296">296</a></span>
-4000 yards south of Hagaru they met the next resistance. Although
-the Chinese positions were in plain sight of 1/7, neither 2/7 nor air
-could spot them. Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood
-attempted to co-ordinate mortar fires from 2/7 with observation from
-1/7, but were unsuccessful because of poor radio communications. Following
-an erratic artillery barrage and some good shooting by the
-tanks, Fox Company cleared the enemy position about 1500, aided by a
-Dog-Easy flanking attack and the Provisional Battalion. In order to
-assist 2/7, Baker Company of 1/7 came down from the ridge west of
-the river to act as right flank guard.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_28" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_295.png" width="828" height="1225" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>THE BREAKOUT FROM
-HAGARU TO KOTO-RI</p>
-
-<p>6–7 December 1950</p>
-
-<p>
-A—1/7’s Initial Objective<br />
-B—CCF Position Overlooking the MSR<br />
-C—2/7 Held Up by CCF Machine Guns<br />
-D—Blown Bridge<br />
-E—3/7 B Regtl Train Held Up<br />
-F—Commandos Rescued<br />
-G—3/11’s Fire Fight<br />
-H—Division Train 1 Held Up<br />
-I—Pusong-ni<br />
-J—Hell Fire Valley
-</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-28</p></div></div>
-
-<p>Meanwhile 1/7 continued to push ahead methodically to the right
-of the MSR as the three rifle companies leapfrogged one another. Enemy
-contact was continual but no serious opposition developed during the
-daytime hours. On the left flank the Provisional Battalion had several
-fire fights, while the advance was uneventful for the 3d Battalion following
-in the rear of the regimental train.</p>
-
-<p>About 5000 yards had been covered by dusk. Enemy resistance stiffened
-after dark, as had been anticipated. The planners had realized
-that the movement could have been made in daylight hours with fewer
-losses in personnel and equipment. But intelligence of the expected
-arrival of CCF reinforcements influenced the decision to continue the
-march throughout the night even at the cost of increased opposition.
-By noon long lines of Chinese could be seen along the sky Line to the
-east of the road moving towards the MSR. Air attacked these reinforcements
-but could not stop their movement, as later events proved.</p>
-
-<p>About 8000 yards south of Hagaru, in Hell Fire Valley, a Chinese
-machine gun on the left stopped the 2d Battalion at 2200. The column
-was held up until midnight before Army tank fire knocked out the
-enemy gun. After covering 1200 more yards a blown bridge caused
-another halt while Dog Company engineers made repairs. Movement
-was resumed at 0200 when a second blown bridge resulted in a delay
-of an hour and a half before it could be bypassed.</p>
-
-<p>Dawn brought a significant innovation in air support. Circling above
-the 11-mile column inching toward Koto-ri was an airborne Tactical
-Air Direction Center (<span class="allsmcap">TADC</span>) installed in an R5D of VMR-152 and
-operated by Major Harlen E. Hood and his communicators from
-<span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>. Major Christian C. Lee, Commanding Officer of <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>,
-had made arrangements when he realized that with his radios packed
-in trucks and jeeps he could not control close air support effectively.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">297</span>
-Only the addition of one radio to those standard in the aircraft was
-necessary to provide basic communications, but when being readied for
-the predawn takeoff the mission faced failure because an engine
-wouldn’t start. Minus a refueler truck, the crew chief, Technical
-Sergeant H. C. Stuart, had worked all night to pour 2400 gallons of gas
-into the craft by hand. Now, in the bitter cold of dawn, he set about to
-overhaul the starting motor. Two hours later Major John N. Swartley
-was piloting the plane over the MSR.<a id="FNanchor_567" href="#Footnote_567" class="fnanchor">565</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_567" href="#FNanchor_567" class="fnanchor">565</a> 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, Annex I (VMR-152), 11–12, and annex K, appendix J, (hereafter
-MTACS-2<i>SAR</i>), 25; Air Officer’s Rpt, in X Corps <i>CR</i>, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley
-ltr to authors, 15 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>No trouble was encountered by 2/7 along the last few miles of the
-route and the battalion was first to arrive at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, the
-3d Battalion had been assigned the additional mission of replacing the
-Provisional Battalion as protection for the left flank as well as rear of
-the 7th Marines train. A brief fire fight developed at about 2100 as the
-Chinese closed to hand-grenade range. Lieutenant Colonel Harris deployed
-George and Item Companies around the vehicles and drove the
-enemy back to a respectful distance. Between 0200 and 0430, Item
-Company of 3/7 and a platoon of tanks were sent back up the road to
-clear out a troublesome Chinese position near Hell Fire Valley.</p>
-
-<p>About 0200, during a halt for bridge repairs, the 7th Marines train
-was hit by enemy fire. The regimental command group suffered most.
-Captain Donald R. France and First Lieutenant Clarence E. McGuinness
-were killed and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Dowsett was
-wounded. While Lieutenant (jg) Robert G. Medemeyer, (MC), USN,
-gave first aid, Chaplain (Lieutenant (jg)) Cornelius J. Griffin entered
-an ambulance to console a dying Marine. CCF machine gun bullets
-shattered his jaw and killed Sergeant Matthew Caruso at his side. Lieutenant
-Colonel Harris and Major Roach supervised the deployment of
-How Company troops to beat off the attack.</p>
-
-<p>About 0530 Lieutenant Colonel Harris disappeared. A search was
-made for him to no avail and he was listed as a MIA. It was later determined
-that he had been killed.</p>
-
-<p>The 1st Battalion of RCT-7, after a relatively uneventful march over
-the high ground west of the river, moved down the slope to join the
-regimental column. Major Warren Morris assumed command of the
-3d Battalion, which reached Koto-ri about 0700. At about 1100, after
-a brief rest, the men were ordered together with Lockwood’s troops to
-move back up along the MSR to the north and set up blocking between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">298</span>
-Koto-ri and Hill 1182 to keep the road open for other units of the
-Division.<a id="FNanchor_568" href="#Footnote_568" class="fnanchor">566</a> While carrying out this mission, the 2d Battalion helped
-to bring in 22 British Marines who had been stranded ever since the
-Task Force Drysdale fight on the night of 29–30 November. Their
-plight was not known until 4 December, when an OY pilot saw the
-letters H-E-L-P stamped out in the snow and air-dropped food and
-medical supplies.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_568" href="#FNanchor_568" class="fnanchor">566</a> 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO, 0930 7 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Advance of the Division Trains</i></h3>
-
-<p>By 1700 on 7 December all elements of RCT-7 were in the perimeter
-at Koto-ri. Division Train No. 1 was due next, and the planners had
-hoped that the rifle battalions would clear the way for the vehicles.
-As it proved, however, the Chinese closed in behind RCT-7 and attacked
-the flanks of the convoy, with the result that the service troops actually
-saw more action than the infantrymen.</p>
-
-<p>One of the causes may be traced to the fact that Division Train No. 1
-had to wait at Hagaru until 1600 on the 6th before RCT-7 made enough
-progress toward Koto-ri to warrant putting the convoy on the road.
-About 2000 yards south of Hagaru elements of the 3d Battalion, 11th
-Marines, were hit in the early darkness by CCF mortar and small-arms
-fire. The gunners of George and How Batteries deployed as infantrymen
-and repulsed the enemy at the cost of a few casualties.</p>
-
-<p>Upon resuming the march, a second fire fight took place after 1500
-more yards had been covered. Several vehicles, set afire by Chinese
-mortar shells, blocked the road and brought the convoy to a halt. At
-daybreak the enemy swarmed to the attack in formidable numbers. It
-was nip and tuck as all pieces of How Battery and three howitzers of
-George Battery were emplaced between the trucks of the 1st MT Battalion.</p>
-
-<p>There was no opportunity to dig in the trails of guns employing time
-fire with fuses cut for ranges of 40 to 500 yards. But the Chinese were
-stopped cold by two hours of continuous fire after approaching within
-40 yards. All but about 50 of an estimated 500 to 800 enemy were
-killed or wounded before the remainder fled, according to the estimate
-of the gunners.<a id="FNanchor_569" href="#Footnote_569" class="fnanchor">567</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_299">299</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_569" href="#FNanchor_569" class="fnanchor">567</a> Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement of the division trains is
-based on: HqBn, <i>HD, Dec 50</i>, 6–9; HqBn, <i>URpt 13</i>; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A.
-Shutts, 11 Apr 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The convoy of the Division Headquarters Company also had to fight
-its way. Small arms ammunition had been distributed throughout the
-column, and light machine guns were mounted on top of truck loads.
-All able-bodied men with the exception of drivers and radio operators
-walked in single file on either side of the vehicles carrying the wounded.</p>
-
-<p>Progress was slow, with many halts caused by CCF fire. At 0130
-several trucks were set aflame by enemy mortar shells and 2.36 rockets.
-Headquarters troops deployed in roadside ditches while two machine
-guns manned by bandsmen kept the Chinese at a distance. At 0200
-the clouds cleared enough to permit strikes by night hecklers of VMF
-(N)-513. They stopped the Chinese until just before daylight, when a
-company-size group penetrated within 30 yards of the convoy. During
-this fight First Lieutenant Charles H. Sullivan, who measured six feet
-four and weighed 240 pounds, emptied his carbine at advancing Chinese.
-Then he hurled it like a javelin to drive the bayonet into the chest of an
-opponent at 15 feet.</p>
-
-<p>Under the coaching of the <span class="allsmcap">MTACS</span> commander, Major Lee, two more
-night fighters—Major Albert L. Clark and First Lieutenant Truman
-Clark—pinned the Chinese down with strafing runs as close as 30 yards
-from the Marine ground troops. At dawn Major Percy F. Avant, Jr.,
-and his four-plane division from VMF-312 dumped about four tons of
-explosives and napalm on Chinese who broke and ran for cover. The fire
-fight had cost Headquarters Battalion 6 KIA and 14 WIA.<a id="FNanchor_570" href="#Footnote_570" class="fnanchor">568</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_570" href="#FNanchor_570" class="fnanchor">568</a> This description of the headquarters convoy fight is based on: <i>Ibid.</i>; Cpl G. L. Coon,
-“Versatility,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18–19; Simpson Comments,
-24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 <i>SAR</i>, 19; Maj C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham,
-7 Feb 51, Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The MP Company, just forward of Headquarters Company, had
-the problem of guarding about 160 Chinese prisoners. Captives unable
-to walk had been left behind at Hagaru, where Lieutenant Colonel
-Murray directed that the wounded be given shelter and provided with
-food and fuel by the departing Marines. The prisoners escorted by
-the MPs were lying in the middle of the road during the attack when
-the enemy seemed to concentrate his fire on them while shouting in
-Chinese. A scene of pandemonium ensued as some of the able-bodied
-prisoners attempted to make a break. Now the Marines as well as the
-enemy fired into them and 137 were killed in the wild melee.</p>
-
-<p>When the convoy got under way again, two Communists were captured
-and 15 killed after being flushed out of houses in the village of
-Pusong-ni. At daybreak a halt was called in Hell Fire Valley for the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">300</span>
-purpose of identifying bodies of MPs and Headquarters troops, killed
-in the Task Force Drysdale battle, which were to be picked up later.
-Attempts to start the looted and abandoned vehicles met with no success
-and the convoy continued the movement to Koto-ri without incident,
-arriving about 1000 on the 7th.</p>
-
-<p>At this hour the last Marine troops had not yet left Hagaru, so that
-the column as a whole extended the entire 11 miles of the route. Division
-Train No. 2 had formed up during the afternoon of the 6th, but
-was unable to start until after dark. At midnight the train had moved
-only a short distance out of Hagaru. Lieutenant Colonel Milne requested
-infantry support and 3/5 was given the mission of advancing
-at the head of the column, along with the 5th Marines regimental train,
-to eliminate enemy resistance.<a id="FNanchor_571" href="#Footnote_571" class="fnanchor">569</a> Taplett had only two companies, one
-of which proceeded astride the road while the other echeloned to the
-left rear. The late start proved to be a blessing, since Division Train
-No. 2 completed most of its movement by daylight under an umbrella
-of Marine air and met only light and scattered resistance. The head
-of the column reached Koto-ri at 1700, and at 2300 all of the major
-Division units were in the perimeter except 2/5, the rear guard.<a id="FNanchor_572" href="#Footnote_572" class="fnanchor">570</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_571" href="#FNanchor_571" class="fnanchor">569</a> Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_572" href="#FNanchor_572" class="fnanchor">570</a> The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and 3/1 are based on: 3/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-17; 3/1, <i>SAR</i>, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 7; 5th Mar <i>SAR</i>, 32–34; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 18–19; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>,
-29–30, 37.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Both 1/5 and 3/1 had formed up in Hagaru on the morning of the
-7th and moved out as rapidly as traffic would permit, which was slow
-indeed. They were accompanied by the 41st Commando, which had
-earned the esteem of all U. S. Marines by valor in combat. British
-imperturbability was at its best when Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale held
-an inspection shortly before departing Hagaru. Disdainful of the scattered
-shots which were still being heard, the officers moved up and down
-the rigid lines, and men whose gear was not in the best possible shape
-were reprimanded.</p>
-
-<p>By 1000 nobody was left in the battered town except Roise’s battalion,
-First Lieutenant Vaughan R. Stuart’s tank platoon and elements of
-Able Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Captain William
-R. Gould. This unit and CWO Willie S. Harrison’s Explosive Ordnance
-Section of Headquarters Company engineers were attached to
-the 5th Marines for the mission of the demolitions at Hagaru.<a id="FNanchor_573" href="#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">571</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_301">301</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_573" href="#FNanchor_573" class="fnanchor">571</a> Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru are based on these sources:
-1st Engr Bn <i>SAR</i>, 13; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona,
-13 Jul 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Gould had formed five demolitions teams, each composed of an officer
-and four to six men. On the evening of 6 December they began
-preparations for burning stockpiles of surplus clothing and equipment
-along with the buildings of the Hagaru train yard. There was also
-the duty of placing charges in the dumps of mortar and artillery ammunition
-which could not be transported to Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>One of the main problems was the disposal of a small mountain of
-frozen surplus rations. A team of engineers spent hours on the 6th
-at the task of smashing cans and crates of food with a bulldozer and
-saturating the dump with fuel oil.</p>
-
-<p>The Able Company engineers came under the operational control of
-the 2d Battalion after the other units of the 5th Marines departed.
-Demolitions were to await the order of Lieutenant Colonel Roise on the
-morning of the 7th. Hagaru was full of combustibles, however, and
-fires of mysterious origin sent up dense clouds of smoke before the
-engineers touched off the oil-soaked food supplies and the buildings of
-the train yard.</p>
-
-<p>As the Marines of 2/5 pulled back toward the southern tip of East
-Hill, smoke blotted out the surrounding area so that enemy movements
-could not be detected. Worse yet, premature explosions sent up fountains
-of debris just as the engineers were setting up their fuses for a
-20-minute delay. Detonations shook the earth on all sides. Rockets
-sliced through the air, shells shattered into vicious fragments, and large
-chunks of real estate rained down everywhere. Roise was understandably
-furious, since his troops were endangered during their withdrawal.
-By a miracle they came off East Hill without any casualties, and the
-engineers were the last Marines left in Hagaru. Soon the entire base
-seemed to be erupting like a volcano. Visibility was reduced to zero
-when the engineers pulled out, after setting a last tremendous charge
-to blow the bridge.</p>
-
-<p>So compelling was the lure of loot that small groups of Chinese came
-down from the high ground toward the man-made hell of flame and
-explosions. Between clouds of smoke they could be seen picking over
-the debris, and the Marine tanks cranked off a few rounds at targets
-of opportunity.</p>
-
-<p>It is not likely that any of Roise’s weary troops paused for a last
-sentimental look over their shoulders at the dying Korean town. Hagaru
-was not exactly a pleasure resort, and yet hundreds of Marines and
-soldiers owed their lives to the fact that this forward base had enabled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_302">302</span>
-the Division to evacuate all casualties and fly in replacements while
-regrouping for the breakout to the seacoast.</p>
-
-<p>If it had not been for the forethought of the Division and Wing
-commanders, with the concurrence of General Almond, there would
-have been no R4D airstrip, no stockpiles of ammunition, rations and
-medical supplies. And though the Marines might conceivably have
-fought their way out of the CCF encirclement without a Hagaru, it
-would have been at the cost of abandoning much equipment and suffering
-much higher casualties.</p>
-
-<p>Only a few weeks before, this Korean town had been merely an unknown
-dot on the map. But on 7 December 1950 the name was familiar
-to newspaper readers and radio listeners all over the United States as
-they anxiously awaited tidings of the breakout. Already it had become
-a name to be remembered in U. S. Marine annals along with such historical
-landmarks as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Iwo Jima.</p>
-
-<p>Prospects of a warm meal and a night’s sleep meant more than history
-to Roise’s troops when the column moved out at last shortly after noon,
-with the engineers bringing up the rear to blow bridges along the route.
-A pitiful horde of Korean refugees followed the troops—thousands of
-men, women and children with such personal belongings as they could
-carry. Efforts on the part of the engineers to warn the refugees of impending
-demolitions were futile. Although these North Koreans had
-enjoyed for five years the “blessings” of Communist government, the
-prospect of being left behind to the tender mercies of the Chinese Communists
-was so terrifying that they took appalling risks. Knowing that
-a bridge was about to blow up at any instant, they swarmed across in a
-blind panic of flight. Never did war seem more harsh or its victims
-more pathetic.<a id="FNanchor_574" href="#Footnote_574" class="fnanchor">572</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_574" href="#FNanchor_574" class="fnanchor">572</a> Sexton interv, 16 May 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The rear guard had less air and artillery support than any of the
-preceding troops, yet CCF opposition was confined to scattered small-arms
-fire all the way to Hell Fire Valley. There the enemy lobbed over
-a few mortar shells during a long halt at dusk, but the rest of the
-advance was uneventful. Gould’s engineers took chances repeatedly of
-being cut off when they fell behind to burn abandoned vehicles or blow
-bridges. On several occasions a small group found itself entirely isolated
-as the infantry and even the refugees pushed on ahead. Luckily
-the engineers made it without any casualties, and by midnight the last
-troops of the 1st Marine Division had entered the perimeter at Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_303">303</span></p>
-
-<p>Thus the first stage of the Division breakout came to a close. In proportion
-to total numbers, the service troops of Division Train No. 1
-had taken the heaviest losses—six killed and 12 wounded for the Division
-Headquarters Company; one killed and 16 wounded for the Military
-Police Company; four killed and 28 wounded for the 1st Motor
-Transport Battalion; one killed and 27 wounded for the 1st Ordnance
-Battalion; and three killed and 34 wounded for the 3d Battalion of the
-11th Marines. Battle casualties for the entire 1st Marine Division, including
-those of the East Hill battle, were as follows:</p>
-
-<table id="t303" class="narrow30 bl" summary="1st Marine Division casualties">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl">Dates</td>
-  <td class="tdc">KIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">DOW</td>
-  <td class="tdc">MIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Totals</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">6 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">32</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">218</td>
-  <td class="tdr l3">261</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">7 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">51</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">288</td>
-  <td class="tdr l3">355</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in2">Totals</td>
-  <td class="tdr">83</td>
-  <td class="tdr">20</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">506</td>
-  <td class="tdr">616<a id="FNanchor_575" href="#Footnote_575" class="fnanchor">573</a></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_575" href="#FNanchor_575" class="fnanchor">573</a> Div Adjutant <i>SAR</i>, Appendix II, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>About 38 hours were required for the movement of some 10,000
-troops and more than 1,000 vehicles. The new arrivals filled the perimeter
-at Koto-ri to the bursting point, but there was to be no pause
-at this point. Division OpnO 26-50, issued at 1815 on the 7th, before
-the last troops had arrived, provided for the advance to be resumed
-from Koto-ri at first light the following morning.</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">305</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XIV">CHAPTER XIV<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Onward from Koto-ri</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Assembly of Division at Koto-ri—Activation of Task Force Dog—Air
-Drop of Bridge Sections—Division Planning for Attack—Battle
-of 1/1 in the Snowstorm—Advance of RCT-7 and
-RCT-5—Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December—Completion
-of Division Breakout</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">The</span> progress of the 1st Marine Division breakout depended in no
-small degree on the reliable communications provided by the division
-radio relay linking up Hagaru, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni, and Hungnam.
-At 1440 on 6 December the vehicles of the Hagaru relay terminal
-joined Division Train No. 1, whereupon the station at Koto-ri became
-in turn the terminal.<a id="FNanchor_576" href="#Footnote_576" class="fnanchor">574</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_576" href="#FNanchor_576" class="fnanchor">574</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1056.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>This station was located on the highest point of ground just south
-of the Koto-ri perimeter. And though it was outside the defense area,
-the Chinese did not bother it until the Marines were breaking camp.
-Then the opposition consisted only of harassing small-arms fires instead
-of the attack which might have been expected.<a id="FNanchor_577" href="#Footnote_577" class="fnanchor">575</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_577" href="#FNanchor_577" class="fnanchor">575</a> Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>In fact, the enemy did not launch another large-scale assault on Koto-ri
-after his costly repulse on the night of 28–29 November. Although
-the perimeter was surrounded throughout the first six days of December,
-incipient CCF attacks were broken up in the enemy’s assembly
-areas. Excellent observation as well as casualty evacuation was provided
-by the OYs taking off from the Koto-ri airstrip. They were the
-eyes of an impressive array of Marine fire power—tanks, 4.2-inch, and
-81mm mortars as well as aircraft and Captain McClelland’s Easy Battery
-of 2/11.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_306">306</span></p>
-
-<p>“The artillery 105’s and the mortars did a grand job,” commented
-Major Bartley. “They were always available, shifted their fires quickly
-and accurately, and serviced their pieces amazingly well in the cold
-weather.”<a id="FNanchor_578" href="#Footnote_578" class="fnanchor">576</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_578" href="#FNanchor_578" class="fnanchor">576</a> Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 18–24, and the 2/1
-<i>SAR</i>, 15–18.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As a further asset, the Koto-ri perimeter was defended by adequate
-numbers in comparison to Hagaru during the first critical week of CCF
-attacks. On 30 November, when Baker Company of the 1st Tank
-Battalion returned to Koto-ri after the Task Force Drysdale battle, three
-platoons of tanks were added to the Dog Company platoon already attached
-to 2/1. The next day Colonel Puller’s RCT-1 (-) was further
-strengthened by the arrival of the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry,
-7th Infantry Division, the last unit to reach Koto-ri from the south.
-These Army troops had been ordered to Hagaru, but owing to the
-changing situation they were directed by X Corps on 1 December to
-remain at Koto-ri. Under the operational control of Colonel Puller,
-2/31 took over a sector at the southern end of the perimeter.</p>
-
-<p>Sporadic CCF small-arms fire was received on each of the first six
-days of December, and enemy troop movements were observed at all
-points of the compass. On several occasions a few mortar shells were
-lobbed into the perimeter. Not a single Marine casualty was suffered
-during the period,<a id="FNanchor_579" href="#Footnote_579" class="fnanchor">577</a> though CCF losses were estimated at 646 killed
-and 322 wounded.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_579" href="#FNanchor_579" class="fnanchor">577</a> Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA expanding the perimeter
-to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Daily air drops were required to keep the perimeter supplied with
-ammunition, rations, and other essentials. Captain Norman Vining, the
-Battalion FAC, who had once been a carrier landing signal officer,
-guided planes to satisfactory drop zones with makeshift paddles. One
-day a case of .30 caliber cartridges broke free from its chute and
-hurtled through the top of Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s tent during a
-conference. Narrowly missing several officers, it hit the straw at their
-feet and bounced high into the air before landing on a crate used as a
-table.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Assembly of Division at Koto-ri</i></h3>
-
-<p>Koto-ri being second only to Hagaru as an advance base, Colonel Puller
-at times had responsibilities which are usually shouldered by an ADC.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_307">307</span>
-On 29 November he had been the organizer of Task Force Drysdale,
-and on 6 December it became his task to make ready for the reception
-of the 10,000 troops from Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Although the Koto-ri perimeter was already overcrowded, Puller
-directed that hot food and warming tents be provided for all Hagaru
-troops upon arrival. More than 14,000 men would then be organized
-for the next stage of the breakout. Strength estimates were as follows:<a id="FNanchor_580" href="#Footnote_580" class="fnanchor">578</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_580" href="#FNanchor_580" class="fnanchor">578</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1069–1071.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<table id="t307" summary="breakout strength estimates">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Marine garrison at Koto-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2,640</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">U. S. Army units at Koto-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,535</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Royal Marine Commandos at Koto-ri</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Marines arriving from Hagaru</td>
-  <td class="tdr">9,046</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">U. S. Army troops arriving from Hagaru</td>
-  <td class="tdr">818</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Royal Marine Commandos arriving from Hagaru</td>
-  <td class="tdr">125</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">ROK police attached to RCT-5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">40</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr"><span class="bt">14,229</span></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p>Puller dealt with the problem of casualty evacuation at Koto-ri by
-ordering that the OY strip be lengthened so that larger aircraft could
-land. The engineers of Charlie Company started the job on 6 December,
-and progress speeded up as the Dog Company engineers arrived next
-day from Hagaru with their heavy equipment.</p>
-
-<p>The strip had been widened by 40 feet and extended by 300 on 7
-December when the first TBM landed. These planes had been borrowed
-from the Navy and 1stMAW administrative flight lines and
-assigned to VMO-6. They could fly out several litter patients and as
-many as nine ambulatory cases. Captain Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., of
-VMO-6 and First Lieutenant Truman Clark of VMF(N)-513, evacuated
-a total of 103 casualties. The carrier landing training of the
-Marines stood them in good stead as Captain Malcolm G. Moncrief, Jr.,
-a qualified landing signal officer of VMF-312, directed the TBMs to
-their landings at Koto-ri with paddles.<a id="FNanchor_581" href="#Footnote_581" class="fnanchor">579</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_581" href="#FNanchor_581" class="fnanchor">579</a> “Carrier Deck,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 19–20; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>,
-23; 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18; 1stEngrBn <i>SAR</i>, 13; 1stMedBn <i>SAR</i>, 12; and VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18;
-1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The clearing station established at Koto-ri by Company D of the 1st
-Medical Battalion (Lieutenant Commander Gustave T. Anderson
-(MC), USN had a normal bed capacity of only 60 but somehow continued
-to handle a total of 832 cases, including non-battle casualties.
-The Company D medics were assisted during their last few days at
-Koto-ri by Captain Hering, the Division surgeon, and Commander<span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">308</span>
-Howard A. Johnson (MC), USN, the CO of the 1st Medical Battalion.
-Captain Richard S. Silvis (MC), USN, surgeon of the 2d Marine Division,
-on temporary duty in Korea as an observer, also took an active
-part.<a id="FNanchor_582" href="#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">580</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_582" href="#FNanchor_582" class="fnanchor">580</a> 1stMedBn <i>SAR</i>, 3–7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Surgical assistance was welcomed by the Company D medics, since
-operations at Koto-ri were performed under the most difficult conditions.
-Only tents being available for patients, the hundreds of casualties
-brought from Hagaru added to the necessity for speedy evacuation.
-About 200 cases were flown out on the 7th by TBMs and liaison aircraft.
-By the following morning the engineers had lengthened the OY strip
-to 1750 feet, but a heavy snowfall put an end to nearly all air activity.
-In spite of the risks involved, one Air Force C-47 did get through to
-Koto-ri, where it could be heard but not seen while circling blindly
-about the perimeter. By a miracle the plane landed safely and took off
-with 19 casualties. The following day saw air evacuation of casualties
-in full swing, with about 225 being flown out to clear the hospital tents
-of all serious cases.<a id="FNanchor_583" href="#Footnote_583" class="fnanchor">581</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_583" href="#FNanchor_583" class="fnanchor">581</a> <i>Ibid.</i> See also Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 995–998, 1110–1112.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Activation of Task Force Dog</i></h3>
-
-<p>A large tent in the middle of the perimeter served both as office and
-sleeping quarters for General Smith and his staff. Planning was immediately
-resumed after they arrived at Koto-ri on the afternoon of
-6 December. Before leaving Hagaru it had been recognized that the
-enemy might be saving his main effort for the mountainous ten-mile
-stretch from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. In such terrain a mere CCF platoon
-could do a great deal of mischief, and the planners agreed that
-it would be necessary for 1/1 to attack northward from Chinhung-ni
-and clear the road. This meant that the battalion must be relieved by
-an Army unit, and a request was made verbally to General Almond.<a id="FNanchor_584" href="#Footnote_584" class="fnanchor">582</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_584" href="#FNanchor_584" class="fnanchor">582</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1063–1064.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>X Corps had received orders on 1 December for the 3d Infantry Division
-to assemble in the Wonsan area prepared for further operations,
-possibly to join the Eighth Army in west Korea. Although General
-Almond initiated execution of the order immediately, he sent the highest
-ranking Marine officer on his staff, Colonel Forney, and the Corps G-2,
-Lieutenant Colonel William W. Quinn, to Tokyo to explain the implications<span class="pagenum" id="Page_309">309</span>
-of the withdrawal of this Army division from northeast Korea.
-Following a conference with General Hickey, GHQ Chief of Staff, the
-Division was released back to X Corps on the 3d, and General Almond
-ordered it to return to the Hamhung area to protect this vital port area
-and to assist the breakout of the 1st Marine Division by relieving 1/1
-at Chinhung-ni.<a id="FNanchor_585" href="#Footnote_585" class="fnanchor">583</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_585" href="#FNanchor_585" class="fnanchor">583</a> X Corps <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 17–18; Forney, <i>Special Report</i>, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 2115 on 6 December the 1st Marine Division requested by dispatch
-that the relief be completed the next day in order to free 1/1 for the
-attack to the north. The relief column, designated Task Force Dog and
-commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, ADC of the 3d
-Infantry Division, consisted of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, the 92d
-Armored Field Artillery Battalion, plus detachments of engineers,
-signalmen, and antiaircraft troops. Brushing aside some Chinese roadblocks,
-it arrived at Chinhung-ni on the afternoon of the 7th and
-relieved 1/1 immediately.<a id="FNanchor_586" href="#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">584</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_586" href="#FNanchor_586" class="fnanchor">584</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1063–1064; X Corps <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 20–24; X
-Corps <i>OI 26</i>, 5 Dec 50; and Dolcater, <i>3d Infantry Division in Korea</i>, 90; CG 1stMarDiv
-msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M.
-Schmuck Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Air Drop of Bridge Sections</i></h3>
-
-<p>Another problem which the 1st Marine Division planners had faced at
-Hagaru called for an engineering solution. As early as 4 December
-the commanding general was notified that a critical bridge three and a
-half miles south of Koto-ri (see Map 29) had been blown by the enemy
-for the third time. At this point water from the Chosin Reservoir was
-discharged from a tunnel into four penstocks, or large steel pipes, which
-descended sharply down the mountainside to the turbines of the power
-plant in the valley below. Where the pipes crossed the road, they were
-covered on the uphill side by a concrete gatehouse, without a floor. On
-the downhill side was the one-way bridge over the penstocks which the
-enemy had thrice destroyed. Between the cliff and the sheer drop down
-the mountainside there was no possibility of a bypass. Thus the gap
-of 16 feet (24 feet, counting the abutments) must be spanned if the
-Division was to bring out its vehicles, tanks and guns.<a id="FNanchor_587" href="#Footnote_587" class="fnanchor">585</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_587" href="#FNanchor_587" class="fnanchor">585</a> Except when otherwise specified, this section is based on the following sources:
-Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73;
-Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn <i>SAR</i>, 3–14; Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>,
-361–362, 369; LtCol J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following the destruction of the original concrete bridge, the enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_310">310</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_311">311</a></span>
-had blown a temporary wooden structure and an M-2 steel treadway
-span installed by Army engineers. No prefabricated bridging was available
-at Hagaru, and time did not permit the construction of a timber
-trestle bridge. The possibility of Bailey bridge sections was considered
-but rejected for technical reasons. Finally, after a detailed study of the
-break from the air on 6 December, Lieutenant Colonel Partridge estimated
-that four sections of an M-2 steel treadway bridge would be required.
-Prospects did not appear bright when a bridge section was
-badly damaged on the 6th after being test-dropped at Yonpo by an
-Air Force C-119. Nevertheless, it was decided to go ahead the next
-day with the drop at Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_588" href="#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">586</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_588" href="#FNanchor_588" class="fnanchor">586</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53;
-1stEngBn <i>SAR</i>, 13–14.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div id="ip_29" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_310.png" width="822" height="1259" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>FUNCHILIN PASS
-AND ADVANCES OF</p>
-
-<p>8–10 December</p>
-
-<p>SEIZURE OF
-HILL 1081</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-29</p></div></div>
-
-<p>There were four U. S. Army treadway bridge (Brockway) trucks at
-Koto-ri, two of which were operative. After conferring with First
-Lieutenant George A. Babe of the 1st Engineer Battalion and Colonel
-Hugh D. McGaw of the 185th Engineer (C) Battalion, USA, Partridge
-decided to request a drop of eight sections in order to have a 100%
-margin of safety in case of damage.</p>
-
-<p>After analyzing the causes of the unsuccessful test drop, Captain
-Blasingame of the Air Delivery Platoon had larger parachutes flown
-to Yonpo from Japan, accompanied by Captain Cecil W. Hospelhorn,
-USA, and a special crew of Army parachute riggers. Blasingame and
-a hundred-man work detail from the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
-worked all night at Yonpo to make ready for the drop next day by
-eight C-119s of the Air Force.</p>
-
-<p>At 0930 on 7 December three of the 2500-pound bridge sections
-were dropped inside the Koto-ri perimeter and recovered by the Brockway
-trucks. The remaining five sections were delivered by noon, one
-of them falling into the hands of the Chinese and one being damaged.</p>
-
-<p>Plywood center sections were also dropped so that the bridge could
-accommodate any type of Marine wheel or tracked vehicle. Thus the
-tanks could cross on the metal spans only, while the trucks could manage
-with one wheel on the metal span and the other on the plywood
-center.<a id="FNanchor_589" href="#Footnote_589" class="fnanchor">587</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_589" href="#FNanchor_589" class="fnanchor">587</a> Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn, “Aerial Supply in Korea,”
-<i>Combat Forces Journal</i>, I, no. 10 (May 51), 29–30.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All the necessary equipment having been assembled at Koto-ri by the
-late afternoon of the 7th, the next problem was to transport it three and
-a half miles to the bridge site. Colonel Bowser, the Division G-3,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">312</span>
-directed the engineers to coordinate their movements with the progress
-made by RCT-7 the following morning. Lieutenant Colonel Partridge
-attended a briefing conducted by Colonel Litzenberg on the eve of the
-assault, and it was agreed that the trucks with the bridge section would
-accompany the regimental train. First Lieutenant Ewald D. Vom Orde’s
-First Platoon of Company D engineers was designated as the escort.
-First Lieutenant Charles C. Ward’s engineers led the 7th Marines
-trains. Both platoons were assigned the task of installing the bridge
-sections.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Division Planning for Attack</i></h3>
-
-<p>On the assumption that the gap over the penstocks would be successfully
-spanned, the 1st Marine Division issued OpnO 26-50 at 1850 on
-7 December. Although the last operation order had specified the Hamhung
-area as the objective, it was found necessary at Koto-ri to give
-more explicit instructions for the advance to the southward.</p>
-
-<p>The plan was simple. Recognizing the sharp cleft of Funchilin Pass
-as the most difficult defile of the entire breakout, General Smith ordered
-the seizure of the heights overlooking the pass from the north end of
-Hill 1081, dominating the road through the pass. In its details the
-plan shaped up as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>(1) RCT-7 (reinforced with the Provisional Army battalion) to attack
-south from Koto-ri at 0800 on 8 December and seize Objectives A and B—the
-first being the southern extension of Hill 1328, about 2500 yards southwest
-of Koto-ri, and the other the second nose due south of Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>(2) RCT-5 to attack and seize Objective D (Hill 1457, two and a half
-miles south of Koto-ri) while RCT-7 continued its attack and seized Objective
-C (a nose dominating the MSR two and three-fourths miles south of
-Koto-ri).</p>
-
-<p>(3) At 0800, as RCT-7 jumped off at Koto-ri, the 1st Battalion of RCT-1
-was to attack from Chinhung-ni and seize Objective E (Hill 1081, three
-miles to the north).</p>
-
-<p>(4) RCT-1 (less the 1st Battalion but reinforced by 2/31) was to protect
-Koto-ri until the Division and regimental trains cleared, whereupon it
-was to relieve RCTs 5 and 7 on Objectives A, B, C and D.</p>
-
-<p>(5) Upon relief by RCT-1, RCTs 5 and 7 were to proceed south along
-the MSR to the Hamhung area.</p>
-
-<p>(6) RCT-1 was to follow RCT-5 and protect the Division rear.<a id="FNanchor_590" href="#Footnote_590" class="fnanchor">588</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_313">313</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_590" href="#FNanchor_590" class="fnanchor">588</a> 1stMarDiv <i>OpnO</i> 26-50, 7 Dec 50. The task organization remained as it was during
-the move from Hagaru to Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar <i>OpnO</i> 16-50,
-7 Dec 50; 5thMar <i>OpnO</i> 44-50, 7 Dec 50; and 7thMar <i>Frag O</i>, 7 Dec 50. Other
-sources for this section are: 11thMar <i>SAR</i>, 9; and Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1062.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Artillery plans provided for one battery of 2/11 and one of 3/11 to
-answer the calls of RCT-7 for supporting fires. The other batteries of
-3/11 were to move south with the motor column while two batteries
-of 1/11 supported RCT-5. The remaining battery of 3/11 was attached
-to 2/11 with a mission of moving south to Chinhung-ni and
-taking a position from which to support the withdrawal of RCT-1 as
-rearguard. Easy Battery of 2/11, left behind at Koto-ri, was laid to fire
-to the north and west, while Fox Battery of 2/11 and the 92d Armored
-Field Artillery Battalion at Chinhung-ni supported the attack of 1/1
-on Hill 1081.</p>
-
-<p>The plan of the 1stMAW for air support was essentially the same
-as the one which proved so effective during the advance from Hagaru
-to Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>An object lesson of that movement had been the personnel and equipment
-losses suffered by the Division trains as a consequence of a late
-start. The planners were determined not to repeat this mistake. As a
-further precautionary measure, General Smith directed that the tanks
-form the last elements of the motor column.<a id="FNanchor_591" href="#Footnote_591" class="fnanchor">589</a> Thus in the event of a
-breakdown on the twisting, single-lane road, it would not be necessary
-to abandon all the vehicles behind a crippled tank.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_591" href="#FNanchor_591" class="fnanchor">589</a> CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100 8 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As for the enemy situation, G-2 summaries indicated that early in
-December the CCF 26th Corps, consisting of the 76th, 77th and 78th
-Divisions, reinforced by the 94th Division of the 32d Corps, had moved
-down from the north and taken positions on the east side of the MSR
-between Hagaru and Koto-ri. There they relieved the 60th Division,
-which moved into the area south of Koto-ri. The 76th and 77th Divisions
-occupied positions along the MSR in the Koto-ri area, while the
-78th and 94th Divisions were apparently held in reserve. Elements of
-the 89th Division, operating from the mountainous area southwest of
-Koto-ri, conducted harassing operations against the MSR in the vicinity
-of Chinhung-ni as well as Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>The 60th CCF Division held prepared positions on the high ground
-south of Koto-ri commanding Funchilin Pass and the MSR leading to
-Chinhung-ni. That these positions included Hill 1081, the dominating
-terrain feature, was revealed by prisoners taken in the vicinity by patrols
-of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, prior to 8 December.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">314</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Battle of 1/1 in the Snowstorm</i></h3>
-
-<p>Division plans had not called for the swirling snowstorm which reduced
-visibility to 50 feet and precluded air support at first light on
-8 December. In spite of weather conditions, the assault battalions of
-RCT-7 moved out from Koto-ri on schedule after 1/1 attacked northward
-from Chinhung-ni.</p>
-
-<p>The planners had realized that the success of the movement to Chinhung-ni
-would depend to a large extent on the seizure of Objective E—Hill
-1081. On 2 December Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck had led a
-reconnaissance patrol into Funchilin Pass as far north as this position.
-Sighting large numbers of Chinese on both sides of the road, he called
-for artillery fires with good effect. This reconnaissance did much to
-establish Hill 1081 as the key terrain feature.</p>
-
-<p>Although 1/1 had patrolled aggressively, the battalion had engaged
-in no large-scale actions so far in the Reservoir campaign. The men
-were fresh, well-rested and spoiling for a fight when they moved out
-at 0200 on 8 December from an assembly area south of Chinhung-ni
-after being relieved by Task Force Dog.</p>
-
-<p>Schmuck’s battle plan provided for the three companies to advance
-in column along the MSR in the predawn darkness. Since orders were
-to attack at 0800, a start at 0200 was considered necessary in order to
-make the six-mile approach march.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Wray’s Charlie Company, in the lead, was to take Objective
-1, the southwestern nose of Hill 1081, and hold it while the other two
-companies passed through to carry out their missions. Captain Barrow’s
-Able Company was to attack east of the MSR and fight its way
-to the summit of Hill 1081; and Captain Noren’s Baker Company to
-advance to the left flank, along the slopes between Barrow and the
-MSR.<a id="FNanchor_592" href="#Footnote_592" class="fnanchor">590</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_592" href="#FNanchor_592" class="fnanchor">590</a> This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources:
-<i>Ibid.</i>; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 19–20, 24–26; 1stMar <i>URpt (S-3) 13</i>; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53,
-108–112, Geer, <i>The New Breed</i>, 364–368; Col D. M. Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges,
-LtCol W. L. Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the two-part
-article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in the <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, xxvii, no. 1
-(Jan 53), 20–23, and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The combination of snow and darkness reduced visibility almost to
-zero as 1/1 set out along the slippery MSR five hours before daybreak.
-All heavy equipment had been sent to the rear from Chinhung-ni, and
-the only vehicles were two ambulances and a radio jeep.</p>
-
-<p>In the snow-muffled silence of the night the men took on protective<span class="pagenum" id="Page_315">315</span>
-coloring as feathery flakes clung to their parkas. Objective 1 was seized
-shortly after dawn, following a difficult approach march against negligible
-resistance. The battalion commander prepared for the next
-phase by bringing up 81mm mortars and an attached platoon of 4.2s and
-emplacing those weapons in Wray’s position. He also directed that
-the five attached Army self-propelled quad-.50 caliber and twin 40mm
-guns of B Company 50th AAA (AW) Bn be moved to a little rise
-off to the left of the road in the vicinity of the village of Pehujang.
-From this position they covered the MSR as far as the bridge over the
-penstocks.</p>
-
-<p>At 1000 the main attack was set in motion. Baker Company advanced
-along the wooded western slope of Hill 1081 as Barrow attacked up the
-hogback ridge leading to the summit. The snowstorm fought on the
-side of the Marines by hiding their movements from the Chinese occupying
-the high ground east of the MSR around the great horseshoe
-bend where the road passed under the cable car line.</p>
-
-<p>Noren’s men saw hundreds of enemy footprints but met only scattered
-opposition until they came to the first CCF roadblock on their
-left flank. There they were stopped by two machine guns, but a Marine
-patrol worked around on the uphill side and routed the Communists
-with a machine gun and 60mm mortar attack.</p>
-
-<p>In the absence of air and artillery support, the 4.2s and 81mm mortars
-emplaced in the Charlie Company position were called upon whenever
-visibility permitted. Surprise was Noren’s best resource, however,
-when Baker Company came up against the CCF bunker complex on the
-western slope of Hill 1081. The enemy had so little warning that the
-Marines found a kettle of rice cooking in the largest bunker, an elaborate
-log and sandbag structure which had evidently been a CCF command
-post. The entire complex was taken after a brief but savage fight in
-which all defenders were killed or routed. Schmuck set up his CP in a
-captured bunker, where he and his officers soon discovered that several
-regiments of Chinese lice had not yet surrendered.</p>
-
-<p>Only enough daylight was left for the sending out of patrols, whereupon
-Noren secured for the night. His losses amounted to three killed
-and six wounded.</p>
-
-<p>Barrow’s men had no physical contact with Baker Company while
-clawing their way upward along an icy ridge line too narrow for deployment.
-A sudden break in the snow afforded the Able Company
-commander a glimpse of a CCF stronghold on a knob between him and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_316">316</span>
-his objective, the topographical crest of Hill 1081. The drifting flakes
-cut off the view before he could direct mortar fire, but Barrow decided
-to attack without this support and rely upon surprise. Advancing in
-column along the steep and narrow approach, he sent Lieutenant Jones
-with two squads of the 2d Platoon to execute a wide enveloping
-movement on the left. Lieutenant McClelland’s 1st Platoon had a
-similar mission on the right. Barrow himself led Staff Sergeant William
-Roach’s 3d Platoon in a front attack.</p>
-
-<p>It took more than an hour for the two flanking forces to get into
-position. Not until they had worked well around the Chinese bunker
-complex did Barrow give the signal for attack. Perhaps because silence
-had been enforced during the stealthy advance, the assault troops yelled
-like Indians as they closed in on the foe. Out of the snowstorm Barrow’s
-men “erupted with maximum violence,” and the enemy was too
-stunned to put up much of a fight. The only effective resistance came
-from a single CCF machine gun which caused most of the Marine
-casualties before Corporal Joseph Leeds and his fire team knocked it
-out, killing nine Communists in the process.</p>
-
-<p>More than 60 enemy bodies were counted after the Marines cleaned
-out the bunkers and shot down fleeing Chinese. Barrow’s losses were
-10 men killed and 11 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>By this time it was apparent that the Chinese had held an integrated
-system of bunkers and strong points extending to the summit of Hill
-1081. The battalion had been strictly on its own all day, all contact
-with the infantry of Task Force Dog having ended with the relief.
-When communications permitted, however, 1/1 could count on the
-excellent direct support of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion,
-USA, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie. The Army
-cannoneers had set up near Fox Battery of 2/11, using the fire control
-data of this Marine artillery unit.</p>
-
-<p>The night was clear, promising air and artillery support in the morning,
-as Able Company consolidated in the captured CCF positions.
-Although the battalion aid station was only 700 yards away, the terrain
-was so difficult that litter bearers took several hours to struggle
-down with the Marine wounded. About midnight the Chinese interrupted
-with an attack in estimated platoon strength, but Barrow’s men
-drove them off with CCF losses of 18 killed.</p>
-
-<p>The rest of the night passed quietly, and Baker Company had no
-disturbance on the high ground overlooking the MSR.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">317</span></p>
-
-<h3><i>Advance of RCT-7 and RCT-5</i></h3>
-
-<p>While these events were taking place, the attack to the south from
-Koto-ri also fell short of the day’s objectives. Colonel Litzenberg’s plan
-called for two of his four battalions (the fourth being the Provisional
-Battalion of Army troops) to clear the high ground on either side of the
-road so that a third battalion could advance astride the MSR, followed
-by the reserve battalion and regimental train.</p>
-
-<p>Major Morris, commanding 3/7, had been assigned the task of attacking
-on the right at 0800 and seizing Objective A, the southernmost
-of the cluster of hills known collectively as Hill 1328. He made such
-slow progress against CCF and small-arms fire that at 1100 Colonel
-Litzenberg suggested the commitments of 3/7’s reserve company. “All
-three companies,” replied Morris, “are up there—fifty men from
-George, fifty men from How, thirty men from Item. That’s it!”<a id="FNanchor_593" href="#Footnote_593" class="fnanchor">591</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_593" href="#FNanchor_593" class="fnanchor">591</a> Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Early in the afternoon of 8 December, Litzenberg committed his reserve,
-2/7, to assist 3/7. Lockwood’s battalion was on the road south
-of 3/7 and attacked west in an attempt to get in the rear of the enemy
-holding up 3/7. Easy and Fox Companies attacked abreast and by
-1800 the two battalions had joined on the northeastern slopes of the
-objective. In view of the approaching darkness, however, the attack
-was postponed until morning, and the troops consolidated for the night
-short of the objective, which was seized the following morning.</p>
-
-<p>Litzenberg’s plan for the seizure of the heights overlooking the
-northern entrance to Funchilin Pass provided for the Army Provisional
-Battalion to take Objective B. The soldiers jumped off at 0800, on
-the left of the MSR, supported by two tanks of the 5th Marines AT
-Company. By 0900 the battalion had secured its objective without
-meeting any resistance. Litzenberg then ordered a further advance of
-800 yards to the northwestern tip of Hill 1457. At 1330 the Army
-troops secured their second objective, still without resistance and tied
-in with 1/5 for the night.<a id="FNanchor_594" href="#Footnote_594" class="fnanchor">592</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_594" href="#FNanchor_594" class="fnanchor">592</a> FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X Corps <i>CR</i>, 8 Dec 50;
-RCT-7 <i>URpt 6</i>; 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 25; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments,
-17 Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Davis having become regimental executive officer
-after Dowsett was wounded, Major Sawyer took over command of
-1/7. His plan called for the battalion to advance about 2000 yards down
-the road and wait for 3/7 to come up on his right flank. Then the two
-battalions would move along together.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_318">318</span></p>
-
-<p>The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0800 and reached its phase line
-without opposition. First Lieutenant Bobbie B. Bradley’s platoon advanced
-down the road to gain contact with the Chinese while the remainder
-of the battalion halted. When 2/7 began its attack in support
-of 3/7, Sawyer’s battalion moved out. Bradley’s patrol having run into
-opposition from the northern reaches of Hill 1304, Companies A and
-C moved west of the MSR in a double envelopment of the enemy position.
-Company B continued the advance towards Objective C, meeting
-a heavy cross fire from Chinese to their front and on Hill 1304. Lieutenant
-Kurcaba was killed and Lieutenants Chew Een Lee and Joseph R.
-Owen wounded. First Lieutenant William W. Taylor took command
-and managed to clear the enemy from his front just before dusk.</p>
-
-<p>Able and Charlie Companies faced less resistance in overrunning
-the foxholes and two bunkers on Hill 1304. With dusk falling, Sawyer
-did not attempt a further advance. Able and Charlie Companies dug
-in on Hill 1304 while Baker set up a perimeter slightly short of Objective
-C. The first serials of the truck convoy had moved closely on
-the heels of 1/7 and had to be backed up to a level area near Objective
-A. There they formed a perimeter reinforced with H&amp;S and Weapons
-Companies of 1/7.<a id="FNanchor_595" href="#Footnote_595" class="fnanchor">593</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_595" href="#FNanchor_595" class="fnanchor">593</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 25; RCT-7 <i>URpt 6</i>; CO 1/7 msg to CO 7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer,
-<i>The New Breed</i>, 362–363. LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Division OpnO 26-50 had directed Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s
-RCT-5 to await orders before attacking Objective D. It was nearly
-noon on the 8th before the 1st Battalion, in assault, was directed to
-move out from Koto-ri.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Stevens followed the MSR for a mile, then sent
-two companies out to the left to occupy the objective, Hill 1457. Baker
-Company seized the intervening high ground and set up to cover the
-attack of Charlie Company up the slopes of the ridge leading to the
-objective. Charlie Company fell in with a patrol from the Army Provisional
-Battalion attached to the RCT-7, and the two combined forces
-to drive the enemy off the high ground about 1550. A weak Chinese
-counterattack was easily repulsed, and at 1700 as darkness fell Baker
-and Charlie Companies tied in with the Army troops while Able Company
-formed its own perimeter overlooking the MSR. In reserve, the
-41st Commando moved into the high ground behind 1/5 to guard
-against infiltration.<a id="FNanchor_596" href="#Footnote_596" class="fnanchor">594</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">319</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_596" href="#FNanchor_596" class="fnanchor">594</a> 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8 Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel
-to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50; 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 34; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1072.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The day’s story would not be complete without reference to the Treadway
-bridge train, which moved out about 1400 on the 8th in the trace
-of 1/7. Instructions were to install the sections at the first opportunity,
-but the site had not been secured as darkness approached. A few Chinese
-mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the vulnerable Brockway
-trucks influenced a decision to return them closer to Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_597" href="#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">595</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_597" href="#FNanchor_597" class="fnanchor">595</a> G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3
-X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in G-3 Journal, X Corps <i>CR</i>, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs <i>SAR</i>, 10.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Summing up the attacks of 8 December, weather and terrain had done
-more than the enemy to prevent all assault units of the 1st Marine Division
-from securing their assigned objectives. Casualties had not been
-heavy, however, and for the most part the troops were in a position
-for a renewal of their efforts in the morning.</p>
-
-<p>As for the Koto-ri perimeter, the 8th had passed with only scattered
-small-arms fire being received by the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st
-Marines, in Division reserve. All day the Dog Company roadblock,
-on the route to Hagaru, was like a dam holding back the human torrent
-of Korean refugees. From this throng rose a low-pitched wail of misery
-as homeless men, women, and children huddled without shelter in the
-snowstorm of the 8th. It was a distressing spectacle to the Marines in
-the perimeter, yet the refugees could not be admitted because of the
-probability that Chinese soldiers had infiltrated among them, watching
-for an opportunity to use hidden weapons. There was little the Marines
-could offer by way of succor except medical care in some instances.
-Two women gave birth during the bitterly cold night of the 8th with the
-assistance of Navy medics. In the morning the crowd of refugees,
-swollen by new arrivals, waited with the patience of the humble to
-follow the Marine rear guard to the seacoast.<a id="FNanchor_598" href="#Footnote_598" class="fnanchor">596</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_598" href="#FNanchor_598" class="fnanchor">596</a> 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 18–19.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>White is the color of mourning in Korea, and snowflakes drifted down
-gently over the common grave in which 117 Marines, soldiers, and
-Royal Marine Commandos were buried on the 8th at Koto-ri. Lack of
-time had prevented the digging of individual graves in the frozen soil.<a id="FNanchor_599" href="#Footnote_599" class="fnanchor">597</a>
-Although the necessity of conducting a mass burial was regretted, all
-available space in planes and vehicles was needed for the evacuation of
-casualties.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">320</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_599" href="#FNanchor_599" class="fnanchor">597</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1112–1113; Smith, <i>Chronicle</i>, 110. According to the terms of the
-Armistice of 27 July 1953, the remains were delivered to the Americans after the cease-fire.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marine Operations of 9 and 10 December</i></h3>
-
-<p>New snow sparkled in the sunlight as the day of 9 December dawned
-bright, clear, and cold. A brief reconnaissance convinced Captain
-Noren that in the early darkness of the previous evening he had stopped
-one ridge short of his objective—the northwest slopes of Hill 1081,
-covering the approach to the cable underpass. Baker Company of 1/1
-moved forward without CCF interference to the position.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Barrow had his men test-fire their weapons before mounting
-the final assault on the dominating knob of the hill. This proved to be a
-wise precaution, since many of the mechanisms had frozen. After thawing
-them out, Able Company attacked in column with the 1st Platoon
-in the lead. Although the assault troops had the benefit of excellent
-air, artillery, and mortar support, they came under intense small-arms
-fire from Communists occupying camouflaged log and sandbag bunkers.
-McClelland’s men were hard hit but his left flank squad worked its way
-forward in brief rushes to positions within 200 yards of Objective E,
-the topographical crest of Hill 1081. At this point Staff Sergeant Ernest
-J. Umbaugh organized a squad grenade attack which wiped out the
-first CCF bunker.</p>
-
-<p>A stretch of about 175 yards, swept bare in places by the icy wind,
-now lay between the Marines and the final knob. Barrow perceived that
-this deadly CCF field of fire could be skirted by troops working their
-way around a shelf jutting from the military crest. Under cover of fire
-from his 60mm mortars and a strike by four Corsairs, he brought up
-his 2d and 3d platoons. While McClelland profited by the cover of
-scrub trees to come up behind the objective, Jones built up a base of
-fire to cover the direct assault of Roach’s platoon as it stormed up the
-crest. McClelland had to contend with the enemy’s last-ditch stand
-in two log bunkers which the 1st platoon knocked out by tossing grenades
-through the embrasures. The Communists resisted to the last gasp,
-but at 1500 the Marines were in undisputed possession of Hill 1081.</p>
-
-<p>Sergeant Umbaugh paid with his life at the moment of victory, and
-Barrow had only 111 able-bodied men left of the 223 he had led out
-from Chinghung-ni. But the Marines had won the decisive battle of
-the advance from Koto-ri; they held the key height dominating Funchilin
-Pass, though 530 counted enemy dead testified to the desperation
-of the CCF defense.</p>
-
-<p>Able Company had the most spectacular part, but the victory owed to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">321</span>
-the united efforts of all three rifle companies and supporting arms.
-While Barrow held the crest of the hill, Noren pushed farther along the
-cable car track, meeting stubborn resistance from scattered enemy
-groups.<a id="FNanchor_600" href="#Footnote_600" class="fnanchor">598</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_600" href="#FNanchor_600" class="fnanchor">598</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 24–26; Bates interv, 16Mar53, 108–112; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv,
-8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The collapse of CCF resistance on Hill 1081 had a beneficial effect
-on the Marine advance from Koto-ri. RCT-7 continued its attack on
-the morning of the 9th with effective air and artillery support. Lieutenant
-Hovatter’s Able Company of 1/7 seized the remainder of Hill
-1304 while Lieutenant Taylor’s Baker Company moved south to Objective
-C. The Army Provisional Battalion occupied the high ground
-between Objectives C and D.</p>
-
-<p>These movements were carried out against ineffectual enemy resistance
-or none at all. Whenever a few Communists dared to raise their
-heads along the MSR, the airborne TADC in the R5D had the communications
-equipment to control aircraft on station and to direct their
-employment in response to ground force units.</p>
-
-<p>The 1st Battalion of RCT-5 maintained its positions on Objective D
-(Hill 1457) all day. At Koto-ri the other two battalions and regimental
-headquarters made preparations to move out the following day.</p>
-
-<p>As a preliminary to the withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) from Koto-ri, the
-3d Battalion was relieved in its positions along the perimeter by the
-41st Commando. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s men then moved out to
-relieve 3/7 on Objective A and occupy Objective B. The 2d Battalion
-of RCT-7 (less a company with the regimental train) outposted the
-MSR between Objectives A and C at about 1630.<a id="FNanchor_601" href="#Footnote_601" class="fnanchor">599</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_601" href="#FNanchor_601" class="fnanchor">599</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 26; RCT-7 <i>URpt 6</i>; 3/7 <i>SAR</i>, n. p.; 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 25; 3/1 <i>SAR</i>, 8;
-5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 35; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 19; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1077; Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Captain Morris’ Charlie Company and a platoon of Baker Company,
-1/7, moved down the MSR and secured the bridge site after a short
-fight. While Charlie Company outposted the area, the Baker platoon
-crossed behind the broken bridge and suddenly found about 50 Chinese
-in foxholes. “They were so badly frozen,” reported Sawyer, “that
-the men simply lifted them from the holes and sat them on the road
-where Marines from Charlie Company took them over.”<a id="FNanchor_602" href="#Footnote_602" class="fnanchor">600</a> Late in the
-afternoon a patrol from 1/7 attempted to make contact with 1/1 by
-moving down the MSR. Chinese fire forced the men off the road and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_322">322</span>
-they scrambled across the defile below the overpass and into 1/1’s
-lines.<a id="FNanchor_603" href="#Footnote_603" class="fnanchor">601</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_602" href="#FNanchor_602" class="fnanchor">600</a> Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_603" href="#FNanchor_603" class="fnanchor">601</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, Schmuck Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Partridge arrived with Weapons Company, 1/7,
-and the bridge sections followed in the Brockway truck. Even the enemy
-lent a hand when Communist prisoners were put to work as laborers.
-After the abutments were constructed, a Brockway truck laid the treadways
-and plywood panels in position so that both trucks and tanks
-could cross.</p>
-
-<p>At about 1530, three hours after the start, the bridge was in place.
-Partridge drove his jeep to the top of the pass to inform Lieutenant
-Colonel Banks, Commanding Division Train No. 1, that he could begin
-the descent.</p>
-
-<p>Sawyer’s troops had not been idle that afternoon and a total of about
-60 CCF prisoners were taken during attacks to drive the enemy back
-from the bridge site. At about 1700 Partridge returned, and an hour
-later the first elements of the Division trains began to cross. Only a
-few vehicles had reached the other side when a disastrous accident
-threatened to undo everything that had been accomplished. A tractor
-towing an earth-moving pan broke through the plywood center panel,
-rendering it useless. And with the treadways spaced as they were, the
-way was closed to wheeled vehicles.</p>
-
-<p>A first ray of hope glimmered when an expert tractor driver, Technical
-Sergeant Wilfred H. Prosser, managed to back the machine off the
-wrecked bridge. Then Partridge did some mental calculations and
-came up with the answer that a total width of 136 inches would result
-if the treadways were placed as far apart as possible. This would
-allow a very slight margin at both extremes—two inches to spare for the
-M-26s on the treadways; and barely half an inch for the jeeps using
-the 45-inch interval between the metal lips on the inboard edges of
-the treadways.</p>
-
-<p>Thanks to skillful handling of the bulldozers the treadways were soon
-respaced. And in the early darkness Partridge’s solution paid off when
-the first jeep crossed, its tires scraping both edges. Thus the convoy got
-under way again as an engineer detachment guided vehicles across with
-flashlights while Sawyer’s troops kept the enemy at a distance.<a id="FNanchor_604" href="#Footnote_604" class="fnanchor">602</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_604" href="#FNanchor_604" class="fnanchor">602</a> Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Advance reports of the bridge drop had brought press representatives
-flocking to Koto-ri in casualty evacuation planes. David Duncan, of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">323</span>
-<i>Life</i>, a former Marine, took realistic photographs of the troops which
-attracted nation-wide attention. Keyes Beech sent out daily reports
-while making notes for a book about his adventures in Korea. Miss
-Marguerite Higgins, who refused to be outdone by male colleagues,
-was twice requested to leave Koto-ri before nightfall by Marine officers
-who respected her pluck as a reporter but felt that the perimeter was
-no place for a woman in the event of an enemy attack.</p>
-
-<p>Hundreds of words were written about the bridge drop. Some of
-these accounts were so dramatized as to give Stateside newspaper readers
-the impression that the span had been parachuted to earth in one piece,
-settling down neatly over the abutments. Headlines reported the progress
-of the 1st Marine Division every day, and front-page maps made
-every American household familiar with the names of such obscure
-Korean mountain hamlets at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.</p>
-
-<p>General Shepherd and Colonel Frederick P. Henderson flew up to
-the perimeter on the 9th for a conference with General Smith. Before
-their departure they were informed that all remaining casualties at
-Koto-ri would be evacuated that day.<a id="FNanchor_605" href="#Footnote_605" class="fnanchor">603</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_605" href="#FNanchor_605" class="fnanchor">603</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1114; <i>Chronicle</i>, 111–112.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All night long on 9–10 December an endless stream of troops and
-vehicles poured across the span that was doubtless the world’s most
-famous bridge for the moment. “The sensation throughout that night,”
-recalled Lieutenant Colonel Partridge in retrospect, “was extremely
-eerie. There seemed to be a glow over everything. There was no illumination
-and yet you seemed to see quite well; there was artillery
-fire, and the sound of many artillery pieces being discharged; there was
-the crunching of the many feet and many vehicles on the crisp snow.
-There were many North Korean refugees on one side of the column and
-Marines walking on the other side. Every once in a while, there would
-be a baby wailing. There were cattle on the road. Everything added
-to the general sensation of relief, or expected relief, and was about as
-eerie as anything I’ve ever experienced in my life.”<a id="FNanchor_606" href="#Footnote_606" class="fnanchor">604</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_606" href="#FNanchor_606" class="fnanchor">604</a> Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Advancing jerkily by stops and starts, the column met no serious opposition
-from Chinese who appeared to be numbed by cold and defeat.
-Prisoners taken that night brought the total up to more than a hundred
-during the movement from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni. Some of them
-were suffering from gangrene, the result of neglected frozen limbs, and
-others showed the effects of prolonged malnutrition. These captives<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">324</span>
-testified that CCF losses from both battle and non-battle casualties had
-been crippling.</p>
-
-<p>At 0245 on the morning of the 10th the leading elements of the 1st
-Battalion, RCT-7, began to arrive at Chinhung-ni. A traffic regulating
-post had been set up at that point the day before by Colonel Edward W.
-Snedeker, Division Deputy Chief of Staff, for the purpose of controlling
-the movement of Marine units to the south.<a id="FNanchor_607" href="#Footnote_607" class="fnanchor">605</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_607" href="#FNanchor_607" class="fnanchor">605</a> Smith, Notes, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr 51].</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The remaining elements of RCT-7 were strung out from Objective C
-to the cableway crossing of the MSR. Traffic moved without a hitch
-until 0400, when two trucks bogged down in a U-shaped bypass across
-a partially frozen stream about 2000 yards beyond the treadway bridge.
-Major Frederick Simpson, commanding the 1st Divisional Train, had the
-vehicles pushed off to one side while the engineers built up the road.
-After a delay of three hours the column got under way again, with the
-first vehicles reaching Chinhung-ni at 0830. Ultimately both Division
-trains got through without a fight, thanks to avoiding the delays which
-had caused so much trouble during the advance from Hagaru to Koto-ri.<a id="FNanchor_608" href="#Footnote_608" class="fnanchor">606</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_608" href="#FNanchor_608" class="fnanchor">606</a> HqBn <i>HD Dec 50</i>, 9; 1stMTBn <i>SAR</i>, 13; Simpson interv, 11 Apr 51; LtCol F.
-Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Following the trains, the 7th Marines moved through the Pass. Lieutenant
-Colonel Lockwood’s 2/7 (less Company E, guarding the regimental
-train) led the way for the regimental command group, the
-Provisional Army Battalion, 3/7 and the 3d Battalion of the 11th
-Marines.<a id="FNanchor_609" href="#Footnote_609" class="fnanchor">607</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_609" href="#FNanchor_609" class="fnanchor">607</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 26; 3/11 <i>SAR</i>, 9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During the early morning hours of the 10th George Company of 3/1
-beat off an attack on Objective A by an enemy force estimated at 350
-men. This was the only noteworthy instance of CCF activity otherwise
-limited to scattered shots, and it was believed that the Communists
-were side-slipping southward, parallel with the MSR. Confirmation of
-that assumption came at 1200, when Able Company of 1/1 sighted Chinese
-marching in platoon and company columns through the valley only
-about 1000 yards east of Hill 1081. Almost simultaneously other dense
-CCF columns crossed the field of fire of the attached Army self-propelled
-AAA guns while pouring around an adjacent slope. Lieutenant Colonel
-Schmuck called immediately for air strikes and artillery fires. Able
-Company hit the enemy with 4.2″ and 81mm mortar rounds, and the
-Army teams cut loose with .50 cal. and 40mm bursts. The slaughter<span class="pagenum" id="Page_325">325</span>
-continued for an hour as the Chinese kept on moving southward with
-that fatalism which never failed to astonish the Marines.</p>
-
-<p>Baker Company of 1/1 launched an assault with close air support at
-1300 on a CCF strong point adjacent to the railroad and north of the
-battalion’s positions overlooking the MSR. Noren’s men found 3.5″
-rocket launchers their most effective weapon when clearing the Communists
-from heavily timbered and sandbagged bunkers. Excellent
-close air support was received, though two Marine KIA casualties resulted
-from an error by Navy planes.<a id="FNanchor_610" href="#Footnote_610" class="fnanchor">608</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_610" href="#FNanchor_610" class="fnanchor">608</a> 1stMarDiv <i>PIR 47</i>. Bates interv, 16Mar53; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56;
-Schmuck Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All day the seemingly endless column of vehicles and troops wound
-southward along the twisting mountain road. At 1030 General Smith
-and key members of his staff displaced from Koto-ri and proceeded by
-C-47 and helicopter to the rear CP of the Division at Hungnam. By
-1800 both Division trains, all elements of RCT-7 and the 1st, 3d, and
-4th Battalions of the 11th Marines had closed Chinhung-ni. There the
-infantrymen entrucked for Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_611" href="#Footnote_611" class="fnanchor">609</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_611" href="#FNanchor_611" class="fnanchor">609</a> 7thMar <i>SAR</i>, 26; 11thMar <i>SAR</i>, 9–10; Smith <i>Chronicle</i>, 112; 1stMTBn <i>SAR</i>, 14;
-Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 5th Marines column followed the 7th, with 3/5 leading the way
-and 2/5 close behind. Just south of Objective A a brief fire fight was
-necessary to silence a CCF machine gun, whereupon the movement continued
-without further incident until the two battalions reached Chinhung-ni
-at dusk. The 1st Battalion was not relieved by 2/1 until 1800
-and did not close Chinhung-ni until the early morning hours of the
-11th.<a id="FNanchor_612" href="#Footnote_612" class="fnanchor">610</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_612" href="#FNanchor_612" class="fnanchor">610</a> 5thMar <i>SAR</i>, 34–36; 1/5 <i>SAR</i>, 20; 2/5 <i>SAR</i>, 31; 3/5 <i>SAR</i>, 17–18; LtCol J. W.
-Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The withdrawal of RCT-1 (-) and attached units from Koto-ri commenced
-on the afternoon of the 10th. The 3d Battalion, it will be
-recalled, had relieved RCT-7 units the day before on Objectives A, B
-and C, and the 1st Battalion occupied Objective E. The regimental
-plan called for 1/1 to hold the Hill 1081 area and protect the MSR
-until the other units of the regiment passed through, whereupon
-Schmuck’s battalion was to pull out with the tanks at the end of the
-column as the rear guard.</p>
-
-<p>The movement from the Koto-ri perimeter commenced at 1500 when
-H&amp;S Company of RCT-1 departed. The 2d Battalion (-) of the 11th
-Marines fell in behind, followed in order by a detachment of the 185th<span class="pagenum" id="Page_326">326</span>
-(C) Engineers, USA, the 2d Battalion of the 31st Infantry, USA, the
-2d Battalion of RCT-1, the Division Reconnaissance Company and
-Lieutenant Colonel Milne’s tank column, consisting of Companies B
-and D of the 1st Tank Battalion, the Tank Company of the 31st Infantry,
-USA, and the Tank Platoon of the 5th Marines AT Company.<a id="FNanchor_613" href="#Footnote_613" class="fnanchor">611</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_613" href="#FNanchor_613" class="fnanchor">611</a> 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 26; 2/1 <i>SAR</i>, 19; 1stMar <i>(S-3) URpt 13</i>, 16–17. The Marine Provisional
-Tank Platoon had reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which had
-to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded and integrated with its remaining
-M4A3 into B and D Companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As the last elements left Koto-ri the 92d FA Battalion at Chinhung-ni
-began laying heavy concentrations on the evacuated base. Only
-scattered shots were received by the tail of the column from Chinese
-troops mingling with the Korean refugees. Several small enemy groups
-on the flanks of the column were taken under fire and dispersed.<a id="FNanchor_614" href="#Footnote_614" class="fnanchor">612</a> But
-with 3/1 guarding Objectives A, B and C, no serious opposition developed
-during the first stage of the withdrawal.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_614" href="#FNanchor_614" class="fnanchor">612</a> CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A. Youngdale Comments,
-19 Nov 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Completion of Division Breakout</i></h3>
-
-<p>At dusk on 10 December all indications made it appear that the movement
-of the 1st Marine Division southward would be completed according
-to plan with only minor losses of personnel and equipment. Following
-the seizure of Hill 1081, casualties had been comparatively light
-and enemy resistance ineffectual. Then, between midnight and 0100
-on 11 December, two reverses occurred in areas the Marines supposed
-to be safe.</p>
-
-<p>The MSR south of Chinhung-ni was under the protection of troops
-of the 3d Infantry Division—Task Force Dog at Chinhung-ni, and two
-battalions of the 65th Infantry in the vicinity of Sudong and Majon-dong.
-It was manifestly impossible, of course, for the Army troops to
-guard every yard of the road, for the rugged terrain offered many potential
-ambush sites.<a id="FNanchor_615" href="#Footnote_615" class="fnanchor">613</a> Guerrilla activity had been reported near Sudong,
-but the division trains and the 5th and 7th Marines had passed through
-without incident.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_615" href="#FNanchor_615" class="fnanchor">613</a> MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D. Mead, USA, ltr to
-Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>On the afternoon of the 10th, Korean civilians warned of an impending
-attack by Chinese soldiers who had infiltrated into this village. As<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">327</span>
-previously indicated, Colonel Snedeker had arrived at Chinhung-ni the
-previous afternoon. At his suggestion Task Force Dog sent out an
-infantry patrol which returned with a report of no enemy activity.</p>
-
-<p>At dusk an attack on the traffic turnaround outside Sudong caused
-Snedeker to halt all traffic at Chinhung-ni until the MSR was cleared.
-After a fire fight in the darkness, elements of the 65th Infantry reported
-at dusk that the enemy roadblock had been cleared, and the Marine
-column resumed its movement southward.<a id="FNanchor_616" href="#Footnote_616" class="fnanchor">614</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_616" href="#FNanchor_616" class="fnanchor">614</a> This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv <i>CR, Dec 50</i>, as occurring
-at 0130 11 Dec. The account of the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar <i>SAR</i>, 26;
-1stMar <i>URpt (S-3) 13</i>, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston, USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L.
-Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16 May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr.,
-6 Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12 Incredible Days of Col John
-Page,” <i>Readers Digest</i>, lxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston material
-is in the possession of Capt Canzona.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>During the next few hours Colonel Snedeker’s worst problem was
-lack of transport. The Division had requested that the maximum number
-of trucks, ambulances and narrow-gauge freight cars be collected
-at Majon-dong, the new railhead. Only about 150 trucks were actually
-made available, however, 110 of them being from Division service units
-in the Hungnam area.</p>
-
-<p>In spite of this shortage, the flow of traffic was being maintained
-when an explosion of CCF activity brought every thing to a stop at
-Sudong shortly after midnight. Mountain defiles had usually been the
-scene of enemy ambushes, but this time the Chinese swarmed out from
-behind houses in the village with grenades and burp guns. Several
-truck drivers of the RCT-1 regimental train were killed by the first
-shots and their vehicles set on fire. In the flickering light a confused
-fight ensued as trucks to the rear stopped. The Marines of the RCT-1
-train resisted as best they could, but leadership was lacking until Lieutenant
-Colonel John U. D. Page, USA, and Marine PFC Marvin L.
-Wasson teamed up as a two-man task force which routed a group of
-about 20 Chinese at the head of the vehicle column. The valiant Army
-artillery officer paid with his life, and Wasson received two wounds
-from a grenade explosion. Pausing only for first aid, he got back into
-the fight as another Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Waldon C.
-Winston, commanding the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, USA,
-directed a counterattack by Marine and Army service troops. Harry
-Smith, a United Press correspondent, also had a part in the action.</p>
-
-<p>Wasson called for a machine gun to cover him while he fired three
-white phosphorus rounds from a 75mm recoilless at a house serving<span class="pagenum" id="Page_328">328</span>
-the enemy as a stronghold. It burst into flames and the survivors who
-ran out were cut down by machine-gun fire. The Marine PFC, a jeep
-driver who was dubbed “The Spirit of ’76” by Winston, then volunteered
-to help push trucks of exploding ammunition off the road.</p>
-
-<p>Winston gradually brought order out of chaos, but it was daybreak
-before the MSR was cleared so that the column could start moving
-again. The RCT-1 regimental train had suffered casualties of eight
-killed and 21 wounded, while equipment losses consisted of nine trucks
-and an armored personnel carrier.</p>
-
-<p>Lack of infantry protection was a factor in another reverse which
-occurred at the tail of the Division column. General Smith’s final orders
-for withdrawal provided that the tanks were to come out behind the
-1st Marines’ train with the infantry of that regiment bringing up the
-rear.<a id="FNanchor_617" href="#Footnote_617" class="fnanchor">615</a> Thus a breakdown in the armored column would not block the
-road for wheeled vehicles, yet the tanks would have protection against
-close-in attack.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_617" href="#FNanchor_617" class="fnanchor">615</a> CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The 1st Marines prepared detailed plans for the leapfrogging of
-battalions during the final withdrawal phase. In effect these called for
-2/1 to relieve 1/5 on Objective D and remain there until relieved in
-turn by 2/31. The Army battalion would hold until 3/1 passed
-through, then follow Ridge’s battalion down the MSR. After 2/1, 3/1
-and 2/31 had passed through Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck’s positions
-around Hill 1081, 1/1 would follow as rear guard.<a id="FNanchor_618" href="#Footnote_618" class="fnanchor">616</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_618" href="#FNanchor_618" class="fnanchor">616</a> 1stMar <i>OpnO 16-50</i>, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before the decision to send the
-tanks down the MSR in one group makes no mention of protecting the armor.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The first departure from plan occurred when Lieutenant Colonel
-Sutter discovered, after starting up Hill 1457, that Objective D was
-so far from the road and so steep that most of the night would be
-required merely for the battalion to make the climb. No enemy having
-been sighted, he asked permission to return to the road and continue
-along the MSR. This request was granted by Colonel Puller and 2/1
-resumed the march, followed by 2/11(-), 2/31 and H&amp;S Company
-of RCT-1 in that order. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge’s 3/1, which remained
-on Objectives A, B and C until 2100, fell in at the end of the
-regimental column.<a id="FNanchor_619" href="#Footnote_619" class="fnanchor">617</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_619" href="#FNanchor_619" class="fnanchor">617</a> 1stMar <i>URpt (S-3) 13</i>, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>About midnight, after waiting for 3/1 to move down the pass,
-the tank column began its descent with only Recon Company as protection.
-Lieutenant Hargett’s platoon of 28 men guarded the last ten<span class="pagenum" id="Page_329">329</span>
-tanks and the other two platoons screened the middle and head of the
-column.<a id="FNanchor_620" href="#Footnote_620" class="fnanchor">618</a> Behind the last machine, approaching as close as they dared,
-were the thousands of refugees. CCF soldiers had mingled with them,
-watching for an opportunity to strike, and Hargett had the task of
-keeping the Koreans at a respectful distance.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_620" href="#FNanchor_620" class="fnanchor">618</a> Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company, nor his platoon leaders
-realized that Hargett’s men were screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams
-Comments, 26 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Progress was slow as the 40 tanks inched around the icy curves with
-lights on and dismounted crewmen acting as guides. Shortly before
-0100 the ninth machine from the rear had a brake freeze which brought
-the tail of the column to a halt for 45 minutes. The rest of the tanks
-clanked on ahead, leaving the last nine stranded along the MSR southwest
-of Hill 1457 and about 2000 yards from the treadway bridge. The
-enemy took advantage of the delay when five CCF soldiers emerged in
-file from among the refugees as a voice in English called that they
-wished to surrender.<a id="FNanchor_621" href="#Footnote_621" class="fnanchor">619</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_621" href="#FNanchor_621" class="fnanchor">619</a> This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank column is based upon: Capt
-E. C. Hargett, interv by HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman [sic],
-1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon,
-interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-111–113; Smith, <i>Notes</i>,
-1087; HqBn <i>URpt 14</i>; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments,
-17 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Hargett went to meet them cautiously, covered by Corporal George
-A. J. Amyotte’s BAR. Suddenly the leading Chinese stepped aside to
-reveal the other four producing hidden burp guns and grenades. Hargett
-pulled the trigger of his carbine but it failed him in the sub-zero
-cold. The former all-Marine football star then hurled himself at the
-enemy group, swinging his carbine. He crushed a Chinese skull like
-an eggshell, but a grenade explosion wounded him as the ambush
-developed into an attack from the high ground on the flank as well
-as the rear.</p>
-
-<p>Before the remaining four Chinese could do Hargett any further
-harm, Amyotte shot them down, one by one. The fight turned into a
-wild melee in which friend could hardly be distinguished from foe.</p>
-
-<p>Hargett’s platoon slowly fell back until the last tank was lost to the
-enemy along with its crew. The men in the next to last tank had buttoned
-up and could not be aroused to their danger by banging on the
-hull with rifle butts. While making the effort Hargett was stunned
-by an enemy explosive charge which blew PFC Robert D. DeMott over
-the sheer drop at the side of the road, leaving him unconscious on a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_330">330</span>
-ledge. The other men of his platoon believed that he had been killed
-and continued their withdrawal, only to find the next seven tanks
-abandoned with their hatches open.</p>
-
-<p>Amyotte, wearing body armor, was covering the retirement, firing
-from prone, when a CCF grenade exploded after landing squarely on
-his back. The Chinese must have suspected black magic when he
-went on cooly picking off opponents as if nothing had happened.<a id="FNanchor_622" href="#Footnote_622" class="fnanchor">620</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_622" href="#FNanchor_622" class="fnanchor">620</a> Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory at Camp
-Lejeune, the ordinary utility jackets contained thin plates of fiberglas which would
-stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred jackets had been air-shipped to the
-1st Marine Division for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority during the
-Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50 garments sent to Recon Company were worn
-in combat. Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>,
-xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of the development of body armor, one
-of the most important tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told in the
-next two volumes of this series.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>It was a precarious situation for Hargett and his remaining 24 men.
-But they fought their way out without further casualties, and meanwhile
-tank crewmen had succeeded in freeing the brake of the lead tank
-and driving two tanks down the road. One of them was brought out
-by Corporal C. P. Lett, who had never driven before. “I’m going to get
-this tank out of here even if I get killed doing it!” he told Hargett. By
-sheer determination, coupled with luck, he maneuvered around the
-obstacles ahead and down the icy road to safety.</p>
-
-<p>Captain Gould and his demolitions crew of engineers had been
-waiting for hours to blow the treadway bridge after the last elements
-of the Division crossed. With the passage of the two tanks and
-Hargett’s platoon, it was believed that all Marines who could be extricated
-were safely over the span. On this assumption, which later proved
-to be erroneous, CWO Willie Harrison set off the demolition charges.</p>
-
-<p>The losses of the Recon platoon were three men MIA (two of them
-later changed to KIA) and 12 wounded. Crews of the two rear tanks
-were missing and presumed dead.<a id="FNanchor_623" href="#Footnote_623" class="fnanchor">621</a> Hargett’s losses would have been
-more severe except for the fact that some of his men were wearing
-Marine body armor made of light-weight plastics.</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_623" href="#FNanchor_623" class="fnanchor">621</a> CO 1stTkBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives tank personnel losses as
-4 MIA.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>To another man of Hargett’s platoon went the distinction of being
-the last Marine out at the finish of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. When
-durable PFC DeMott recovered consciousness, after being blown over
-the brink by the CCF pack charge explosion, he found himself precariously
-perched on a ledge overhanging the chasm. Slightly wounded,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_331">331</span>
-he managed to climb back on the road, where he encountered only
-Korean refugees. Upon hearing a tremendous detonation he realized
-that the bridge had been blown. He remembered, however, that pedestrians
-could cross through the gatehouse above the penstocks, and he
-came down the mountain with the refugees to Chinhung-ni. There he
-was given a welcome befitting one who has cheated death of a sure
-thing.</p>
-
-<p>The remaining tanks made it safely to Chinhung-ni without benefit
-of infantry protection other than what was afforded by Recon Company.<a id="FNanchor_624" href="#Footnote_624" class="fnanchor">622</a>
-Lieutenant Colonel Schmuck did not receive a copy of 1stMar
-OpnO 16-50, he explained, his only information being a Frag O designating
-1/1 as rear guard and “a hasty, 30-second conference” with
-Colonel Puller when the 1st Marine command group passed through.
-“I was informed,” he added, “that the tanks were in the rear of the
-1st Marines, that 2d Bn, 31st Infantry was bringing up the rear, and
-that as soon as that unit passed, I would employ my battalion as rear
-guard.... No mention at all was made of the Reconnaissance Company.
-In order to check off the units that passed endlessly through my lines,
-I established a check point at the incline railway overpass and kept a
-close record of movement.”</p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_624" href="#FNanchor_624" class="fnanchor">622</a> 1stTkBn <i>SAR</i>, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement of N. A. Canzona, n. d.;
-Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>A great deal of intermingling of units was observed by the 1/1 commander.
-At 0300, after sighting the lights of the tanks, he gave orders
-for Able Company to commence the withdrawal, in order “to consolidate
-my battalion for the rear guard action prior to daybreak.... When
-the first tanks reached my position, I was first startled to find no 2/31
-accompanying them and then flabbergasted to discover that the Recon
-Company was somewhere out there ‘screening’ the movement. This
-canceled my carefully laid covering plan.”<a id="FNanchor_625" href="#Footnote_625" class="fnanchor">623</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_625" href="#FNanchor_625" class="fnanchor">623</a> Schmuck Comments.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>No further trouble resulted for the tanks and Recon Company.
-Ahead of them the infantry units continued the movement southward
-from Chinhung-ni chiefly by marching because of the shortage of trucks.
-Lieutenant Colonel Sutter’s men proved that footslogging is not a lost
-art by covering the 22 miles from Koto-ri to Majon-dong in a 20-hour
-hike with packs, heavy parkas, individual weapons and sleeping bags.<a id="FNanchor_626" href="#Footnote_626" class="fnanchor">624</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_626" href="#FNanchor_626" class="fnanchor">624</a> LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Battle casualties of the division for the final stage, the attack from
-Koto-ri southward, were as follows:</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">332</span></p>
-
-<table id="t332" class="narrow30 bl" summary="Battle casualties of the division for the final stage">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl">Date</td>
-  <td class="tdc">KIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">DOW</td>
-  <td class="tdc">MIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Totals<a id="FNanchor_627" href="#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">625</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">127</td>
-  <td class="tdr">168</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  9 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">46</td>
-  <td class="tdr">60</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">10 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">45</td>
-  <td class="tdr">65</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">11 Dec</td>
-  <td class="tdr">9</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">38</td>
-  <td class="tdr">54</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in2">Totals</td>
-  <td class="tdr">51</td>
-  <td class="tdr">24</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">256</td>
-  <td class="tdr">347</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_627" href="#FNanchor_627" class="fnanchor">625</a> DivAdjutant <i>SAR</i>, appendix II, 3.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>At 1300 on 11 December the last elements of the Division cleared
-Chinhung-ni. Majon-dong had been left behind at 1730 without audible
-regrets; and by 2100 all units, with the exception of the tanks, had
-reached assigned assembly areas in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. The
-armored column arrived at the LST staging area of Hungnam half an
-hour before midnight, thus bringing to an end the breakout of the
-1st Marine Division.<a id="FNanchor_628" href="#Footnote_628" class="fnanchor">626</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_333">333</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_628" href="#FNanchor_628" class="fnanchor">626</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1091.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_XV">CHAPTER XV<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">The Hungnam Redeployment</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p><i>Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area—Embarkation of 1st Marine
-Division—The Last Ten Days at Hungnam—Marines
-Arrive at New Assembly Area—Contributions of Marine Aviation—Losses
-Sustained by the Enemy—Results of the Reservoir
-Campaign</i></p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="drop-cap"><span class="smcap1">“Wave and look happy!”</span> These were the first words to greet
-some of the weary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the
-Hamhung-Hungnam area. They grinned obligingly in response to the
-press photographers snapping pictures of the motor column from the
-roadside. They were happy indeed to be back in a world of hot meals
-and hot baths. They were happy to be alive.</p>
-
-<p>Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing as well as
-flattering to learn that such expressions as “epic” and “saga” and
-“miracle of deliverance” were being applied to the breakout in American
-newspapers. The press correspondents in turn were astonished to
-learn that never for a moment had the men doubted that they would
-slug their way out to the seacoast.</p>
-
-<p>“The running fight of the Marines and two battalions of the Army’s
-7th Infantry Division from Hagaru to Hamhung—40 miles by air but
-60 miles over the icy, twisting mountainous road—was a battle unparalleled
-in U. S. military history,” commented <i>Time</i>. “It had some aspects
-of Bataan, some of Anzio, some of Dunkirk, some of Valley Forge,
-some of the ‘Retreat of the 10,000’ (401–400 B. C.) as described in
-Xenophon’s <i>Anabasis</i>.”</p>
-
-<p>Not until the Marines had fought their way as far as Chinhung-ni,
-the weekly newsmagazine continued, did there appear to be much hope
-that they would come out as an organized force. Then “for the first
-time it looked as if most of the 20,000 [Marines] would get through.”<a id="FNanchor_629" href="#Footnote_629" class="fnanchor">627</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">334</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_629" href="#FNanchor_629" class="fnanchor">627</a> <i>Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine</i>, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 18–19.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>By reading contemporary press accounts it is possible to recapture
-the mood of the American public upon realization of the disaster which
-had overtaken the Eighth Army. “It was defeat—the worst defeat the
-United States ever suffered,” reported <i>Time</i> in the issue of 11 December
-1950. “The Nation received the fearful news from Korea with a strange-seeming
-calmness—the kind of confused, fearful, half-believing matter-of-factness
-with which many a man has reacted upon learning that
-he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news of Pearl Harbor, nine years
-ago to the month, had pealed out like a fire bell. But the numbing
-facts of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness
-slowly out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques; days
-passed before its enormity finally became plain.”<a id="FNanchor_630" href="#Footnote_630" class="fnanchor">628</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_630" href="#FNanchor_630" class="fnanchor">628</a> <i>Time</i>, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p><i>Newsweek</i> called it “America’s worst military licking since Pearl
-Harbor. Perhaps it might become the worst military disaster in American
-history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately
-two-thirds of the U. S. Army that had been thrown into Korea might
-have to be evacuated in a new Dunkerque to save them from being lost
-in a new Bataan.”<a id="FNanchor_631" href="#Footnote_631" class="fnanchor">629</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_631" href="#FNanchor_631" class="fnanchor">629</a> <i>Newsweek</i>, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. “Such quotations,” comments General
-MacArthur, referring to the excerpts from <i>Time</i> and <i>Newsweek</i>, “certainly do not reflect the
-mood of the American public at the time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible
-writers.... Neither [of the two news magazines] had the slightest access to the basic
-information and factors which involved the decisions and operations of our government and
-its higher military commanders.... The unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates
-of the situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing them with the actual
-military reports by the commands involved.” Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W.
-Snedeker, 17 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The situation in west Korea was depressing enough. But at least the
-Eighth Army had a line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension
-that the American public stared at front-page maps showing the “entrapment”
-of the 1st Marine Division and attached U. S. Army units
-and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases from Korea did
-not encourage much expectation that the encircled troops could save
-themselves from destruction by any means other than surrender. In
-either event the result would be a military catastrophe without a parallel
-in the Nation’s history.</p>
-
-<p>The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the Marines
-had seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through Chinese
-blocking the route to Hagaru. Then came the thrilling reports of the
-air drops of supplies at Hagaru and the mass evacuation of casualties by
-air. Much of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wiped<span class="pagenum" id="Page_335">335</span>
-clean by pride as General Smith’s troops fought through to Koto-ri and
-Chinhung-ni in sub-zero cold. The air drop of the bridge sections was
-a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was
-now a fact—the Chosin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and
-inflicted a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony
-of POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF
-corps was the annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but
-the result had been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation
-of the CCF units themselves.</p>
-
-<p>It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore, that Americans
-read about the column of grimy, parka-clad men which came out of the
-mountains of northeast Korea on 11 December 1950. They had come
-out fighting and they had brought their wounded and most of their
-equipment out with them.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area</i></h3>
-
-<p>As late as 9 December it had been General Smith’s understanding
-that the 1st Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector south and
-southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam was
-notified by X Corps that plans for the defense of the Hungnam area
-had been changed, so that the Marines were to embark immediately for
-redeployment by water to South Korea. General Smith was informed
-on the 10th, and so promptly was the new plan put into effect that the
-first Marine units were already loading out before the last elements of
-the Division arrived at Hungnam.<a id="FNanchor_632" href="#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">630</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_632" href="#FNanchor_632" class="fnanchor">630</a> The Division Embarkation Section began revision of its standby embarkation order
-on 10 December and the following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50.
-EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>No changes were necessary in the plans for the reception of Marine
-units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel Snedeker and Colonel
-McAllister on orders of General Smith. On 8 December, Snedeker
-had issued detailed instructions which designated defensive sectors for
-RCT-1 at Chigyong and for RCT-5 and RCT-7 in the vicinity of
-Yonpo Airfield. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged
-with making such preparations to receive the returning troops as putting
-up tents, installing stoves, erecting heads and equipping galleys.<a id="FNanchor_633" href="#Footnote_633" class="fnanchor">631</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_336">336</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_633" href="#FNanchor_633" class="fnanchor">631</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1065–1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: “Plan for receiving 1stMarDiv
-Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area,” 0800 8 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Navy, as usual, was ready. On 15 November, it may be recalled,
-General Smith had candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic
-outlook to Admiral Morehouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was
-chief of staff to Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, and Sears served in a like
-capacity under Admiral Doyle, CTF-90. This frank discussion had
-not fallen upon deaf ears; and on the 28th, only a few hours after the
-first CCF attacks at Yudam-ni, ComNavFE alerted CTF-90 as to the
-possible need for a redeployment operation by sea. The following day
-Joy advised that events in the Chosin Reservoir area made it desirable
-for ships of TF-90 to be on six hours’ notice either in Korean waters
-or at Sasebo, Japan.<a id="FNanchor_634" href="#Footnote_634" class="fnanchor">632</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_634" href="#FNanchor_634" class="fnanchor">632</a> Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this section is based on the following
-sources: ComPhibGruOne, <i>Action Report, Hungnam</i>, 1–2, 4–6; Forney <i>Special Report</i>,
-5–7; X Corps, <i>OpnO</i> 9, 5 Dec 50; X Corps, <i>Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation</i>,
-2–3; X Corps <i>OI 27</i>, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker,
-25 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>CTF-90 commenced planning immediately for either an administrative
-or emergency outloading. His OpnO 19-50, issued on the 28th
-for planning purposes, provided for half of the amphibious force to
-conduct redeployment operations on the east coast under Doyle as
-ComPhibGruOne, while the other half had a similar mission on the
-west coast under Admiral Thackrey, ComPhibGruThree.</p>
-
-<p>At this time ComPhibGruThree and most of the amphibious units
-were in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All were directed
-by Admiral Joy on the 29th to proceed to Sasebo.</p>
-
-<p>ComPhibGruOne had just completed the opening of Hungnam as
-a major resupply port and was preparing to withdraw to Japan with
-the remaining amphibious force. On 30 November, however, the
-deteriorating situation of ground forces in Korea made it necessary for
-all units of TF-90 to be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared
-to be more critical on the west coast, and two-thirds of the smaller
-amphibious ships were allotted to the Inchon area while the transports
-were divided equally between Inchon and Hungnam.</p>
-
-<p>The first week of December was devoted to planning and preparing
-for a redeployment of X Corps by sea which appeared more likely
-every day. Mine sweeping operations were resumed at Hungnam to
-enlarge the swept anchorage area and provide swept channels for gunfire
-support ships.</p>
-
-<p>X Corps OpnO 9-50, issued on 5 December, provided for the defense
-of the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final defense line<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">337</span>
-about seven miles in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area,
-converging on the harbor, were assigned to the following major units
-from east to west—1st ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin),
-7th Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division (with the 1st KMC Regiment(-)),
-and the 1st Marine Division. The Marine sector included
-Yonpo Airfield.</p>
-
-<p>On 8 December a conference held on board the <i>Mount McKinley</i> by
-ComNavFE and CTF-90 was attended by Vice Admiral Struble,
-Com7thFlt, Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, ComCruDivFive, and
-Lieutenant General Shepherd, CG FMFPac.</p>
-
-<p>General Shepherd was present as “Representative of Commander
-Naval Forces, Far East, on matters relating to the Marine Corps and
-for consultation and advice in connection with the contemplated amphibious
-operation now being planned.”<a id="FNanchor_635" href="#Footnote_635" class="fnanchor">633</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_635" href="#FNanchor_635" class="fnanchor">633</a> ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50. “Although it was
-not necessary for me to exercise my command functions,” commented General Shepherd,
-“I had been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford and Joy if I considered it
-expedient. As I recall, I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of the evacuation
-of Hungnam as Representative of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance
-with these instructions I exercised close overall supervision of this phase of the operation
-and made suggestions to both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the embarkation
-and evacuation of the Marine Forces from Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea
-and to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after
-assembling in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the
-1st ROK Corps as soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok
-area. An assembly area in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from
-the other units of X Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>CTF-90 was assigned the following missions:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>(1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of UN
-forces in Korea as directed;</p>
-
-<p>(2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated embarkation
-areas;</p>
-
-<p>(3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports;</p>
-
-<p>(4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of friendly
-units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan;</p>
-
-<p>(5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations, including
-ROK forces and UN prisoners of war;</p>
-
-<p>(6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other commands
-as appropriate;</p>
-
-<p>(7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or other
-designated Korean embarkation area.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_338">338</span></p>
-
-<p>No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and
-Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted
-since Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not
-wait on detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had
-to be done.</p>
-
-<p>An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available
-source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked,
-and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must
-be evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains
-of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a
-comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the
-perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against an
-enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of
-launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the
-Hamhung-Hungnam area.</p>
-
-<p>It was aptly dubbed “an amphibious landing in reverse,” since the
-plan called for the methodical shrinking of the perimeter, under cover
-of air strikes and naval gunfire, until the last platoon of the ground
-forces had embarked. Then would come the grand finale of the demolitions.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Embarkation of 1st Marine Division</i></h3>
-
-<p>The Wonsan evacuation was instructive as a rehearsal for the Hungnam
-redeployment. From 2 to 10 December, Lieutenant Colonel Crowe’s
-1st Shore Party Battalion had charge of the outloading while sharing
-the defense of the harbor with a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division
-and two KMC battalions. Another Marine outfit, Company A of
-the 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, speeded up the operation by making
-hundreds of round trips between docks and ships with <span class="allsmcap">DUKW</span>s.<a id="FNanchor_636" href="#Footnote_636" class="fnanchor">634</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_636" href="#FNanchor_636" class="fnanchor">634</a> The sources of this section, unless otherwise stated, are as follows: Forney, <i>Special
-Report, 8–18</i>; <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-114–115; ComPhibGruOne <i>Action Report, Hungnam</i>,
-5–10, 25; 1stMAW <i>HD, Dec 50</i>, 1–2; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 120–1123; Maj R. W. Shutts,
-<i>Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea</i>, 1–9;
-MGCIS-1 <i>HD, Dec 50</i>; X Corps <i>OpnO 10</i>, 11 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv <i>EmbO 3-50</i>, 11 Dec
-50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker,
-8 Dec 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Air cover and naval gunfire from supporting ships of TE-90.21
-was so effective that Wonsan had no enemy interference worth mentioning.
-Covering missions continued to be fired until the last friendly
-troops withdrew, and operations were completed without the necessity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">339</span>
-of destroying UN supplies and equipment. Altogether, 3834 troops,
-7009 Korean civilians, 1146 vehicles, and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo
-had been outloaded when the operation was completed on 10 December.
-One detachment of Shore Party troops sailed for Pusan with the
-DUKWs in preparation for unloading the 1st Marine Division upon
-its arrival at that port.</p>
-
-<p>The Hungnam evacuation plan, as outlined in X Corps OpnO 10-50,
-issued on 11 December, provided for the immediate embarkation of
-the 1st Marine Division and the 3d ROK Division. A smaller perimeter
-than the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th
-and 3d Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility.
-Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only
-reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points.
-Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be stepped up as the
-perimeter contracted.</p>
-
-<p>CTF-90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10 December
-after approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers
-and representatives of X Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of
-Staff, X Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer with
-responsibility for the operation of the Hungnam port and was assigned
-a small staff. Major Richard W. Shutts, of General Shepherd’s party,
-was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two more former
-TTUPac Marines on the X Corps staff were assigned sections—Major
-Charles P. Weiland, the Loading Section; and Major Jack R. Munday,
-the Navy Liaison Section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moisell, USA,
-headed the Movement Section, and Captain William C. Cool, USA,
-the Rations Section.</p>
-
-<p>Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren served as Colonel Forney’s
-executive officer until he was incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved
-by Lieutenant Colonel Crowe.</p>
-
-<p>The 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA, was responsible for operation
-of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas, and for
-furnishing Japanese stevedores, winch operators, cargo handling equipment,
-and dunnage. A reinforced company from the 1st Shore Party
-Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches while controlling
-the lighterage for ships loading in the stream.</p>
-
-<p>It was decided on 11 December that 1st Marine Division staging to
-assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading had to be
-expedited so that ships could be used for a second and even third turn-around.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_340">340</span>
-Embarkation Order 3-50, issued by the Division on the 11th,
-assigned vehicle and cargo assembly areas to units, and an embarkation
-control office was set up in the dock area.</p>
-
-<p>As compensation for the cramped confines of the Hungnam harbor,
-the tidal range was less than a foot as compared to the maximum of
-31 feet at Inchon. And though the docks had space for only seven
-ships, Major Weiland planned to double-berth four additional ships
-and load them from the outboard side. In addition, 11 LSTs could be
-handled simultaneously—seven at <span class="allsmcap">GREEN</span> Beach One, and the others at
-<span class="allsmcap">GREEN</span> Beach Two.</p>
-
-<p>Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a standby basis, ready
-to begin loading at once upon assignment of space by the embarkation
-officer. The Division rear CP at Hungnam had become the only CP
-with General Smith’s arrival; and on the 11th General Craig, the ADC,
-returned from emergency leave.</p>
-
-<p>General MacArthur flew to Yonpo Airfield on the 11th for a brief
-conference with General Almond and approved the X Corps plan.
-A date of 27 December was set for Corps units to pass under the control
-of the Eighth Army in South Korea.</p>
-
-<p>The outloading of the 1st Marine Division was making good progress
-on the 12th when General Smith visited the docks on a tour of
-inspection. That evening he and General Shepherd attended a dinner
-at the Corps CP in honor of General Almond’s 58th birthday. The
-Army was represented by Major Generals Barr, Soule, and Clark L.
-Ruffner, X Corps Chief of Staff.</p>
-
-<p>By the following day the 5th and 7th Marines were ready to sail.
-Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning as they went
-along. Not knowing in advance what type of ship might be assigned,
-they found that carefully calculated stowage diagrams were out of the
-question. Under these circumstances, amphibious training and experience
-were invaluable.</p>
-
-<p>Space in the tent city established by X Corps to the rear of the LST
-beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation.
-Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas
-to the beach.</p>
-
-<p>While the Marines were outloading, the two Army divisions defending
-the perimeter had only minor patrol actions. Their artillery supplied
-most of the interdiction fires at the outset, with naval gunfire
-giving the deep support. Vigorous air support by Navy, Air Force,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">341</span>
-and Marine planes also did much to discourage any hostile intentions
-the enemy may have had.</p>
-
-<p><span class="allsmcap">MGCIS-1</span>, the ground control intercept squadron at Yonpo, stopped
-directing the high altitude fighters on 11 December and passed over to
-the USS <i>Mount McKinley</i> the task of keeping the perimeter clear of
-any enemy planes. Over-all control of air still remained ashore with
-<span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>.</p>
-
-<p>At 1500 on the 13th General Smith went aboard the USS <i>Bayfield</i>
-and opened the Division CP. As his last duty on shore, he attended
-memorial services held by the Division at the Hungnam Cemetery.
-While the commanding general paid his tribute to the honored dead,
-Chinese POWs were making preparations for the interment of the last
-bodies brought down from Chinhung-ni.</p>
-
-<p>The Marine loading was completed on the 14th. At a conference
-that day with CTF-90 on board the <i>Mount McKinley</i>, General Smith
-inquired as to the possibility of having the ships carrying the Marines
-unload at Masan instead of Pusan, thus saving a 40-mile movement by
-truck. Admiral Doyle pointed out that this procedure was not feasible
-because of the lack of lighterage facilities at Masan. The additional
-turn-around time, moreover, would have delayed the evacuation of
-remaining Corps units.</p>
-
-<p>The 14th was also the day when Marine air strikes from Yonpo
-ended with the departure of the last of the Wing’s land-based fighters
-for Japan. Shortly after midnight the Air Defense Section of <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>
-passed control of all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy’s Tactical
-Air Control Squadron One of TF-90 aboard the USS <i>Mount McKinley</i>.
-The Marine squadron then set up a standby <span class="allsmcap">TACC</span> aboard an LST until
-the final withdrawal on 24 December.</p>
-
-<p>At 1030 on 15 December, as the <i>Bayfield</i> sailed, the curtain went
-down on one of the most memorable campaigns in the 175-year history
-of the Marine Corps. A total of 22,215 Marines had embarked in shipping
-consisting of an APA, an AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7
-commercial cargo ships.</p>
-
-<p>The Yonpo airlift continued, however, until 17 December when the
-field was closed and a temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was made
-available to twin-engine R4D’s for the final phase of the air evacuation.
-The only Marine units left in Hungnam were a reinforced Shore Party
-company, an <span class="allsmcap">ANGLICO</span> group and one and a half companies (88 LVTs)
-of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the operational<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">342</span>
-control of X Corps to assist in the outloading of Army units.
-Also, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton, commanding MAG-12, had moved
-to Hungnam for the final evacuation of his air group from Yonpo and
-to arrange for loading its heavy equipment and remaining personnel
-aboard SS <i>Towanda Victory</i>. Then on 18 December he flew his command
-post to Itami.<a id="FNanchor_637" href="#Footnote_637" class="fnanchor">635</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_637" href="#FNanchor_637" class="fnanchor">635</a> LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; MAG-12 <i>WD, Dec 50</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>The Last Ten Days at Hungnam</i></h3>
-
-<p>With ten days remaining for the embarkation of the two Army divisions,
-the problem of Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule.
-But CTF-90 contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the
-homeless Koreans were willing to put up with any hardships to escape
-from Communist domination. It became standard practice to embark
-at least 5000 on an LST, not counting children in arms, and no less than
-12,000 human sardines found standing room on one commercial cargo
-ship.<a id="FNanchor_638" href="#Footnote_638" class="fnanchor">636</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_638" href="#FNanchor_638" class="fnanchor">636</a> Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are the same as for the last.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The most fragile link in the complex chain of operations was represented
-by the two 390-ton diesel electric tugs. No others were available,
-nor were spare parts to be had, yet both tugs had clocked more than
-5000 running hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed almost a
-miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours in all, and
-repairs were made with materials at hand.</p>
-
-<p>On the 18th, when the last ROKs sailed for Samchok, the 7th Infantry
-Division was in the midst of its outloading. By 20 December all
-troops of this unit had embarked, according to schedule. Responsibility
-for the defense of Hungnam then passed to Admiral Doyle as General
-Almond and his staff joined CTF-90 on board the flagship <i>Mount
-McKinley</i>. General Soule’s 3d Division now manned the shore defenses
-alone.<a id="FNanchor_639" href="#Footnote_639" class="fnanchor">637</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_639" href="#FNanchor_639" class="fnanchor">637</a> VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>When the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam,
-following the evacuation of Hamhung and Yonpo Airfield, two
-cruisers, seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire
-front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of
-nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support<span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">343</span>
-ships, with the battleship <i>Missouri</i> contributing 162 16-inch rounds at
-the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and
-12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during
-the naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing.</p>
-
-<p>Seven embarkation sites were employed (see Map 30). From left to
-right they were designated as <span class="allsmcap">PINK</span> Beach, <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span> Beach, <span class="allsmcap">GREEN</span> One and
-Two Beaches, and <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> One, Two, and Three Beaches. The 7th
-RCT, holding the left sector, was to embark from <span class="allsmcap">PINK</span> Beach. <span class="allsmcap">BLUE</span>
-and <span class="allsmcap">GREEN</span> One Beaches were assigned to the 65th RCT in the center,
-while the 15th RCT had <span class="allsmcap">GREEN</span> Two and the three <span class="allsmcap">YELLOW</span> Beaches.</p>
-
-<p>H-hour had been set at 1100 on the 24th, and seven LSTs were
-beached at 0800 to receive 3d Infantry Division troops. Soon the three
-regiments were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering
-forces while the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdrawals
-were conducted methodically along specified routes by units
-using marking panels. Then the battalions themselves pulled out,
-leaving only seven reinforced platoons manning strong points. The
-Hungnam redeployment came to an end when these platoons boarded
-an LST after a search for stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support
-had made it an uneventful finish except for the accidental explosion of
-an ammunition dump on <span class="allsmcap">PINK</span> Beach, resulting in two men killed and
-21 wounded.</p>
-
-<p>All beaches were clear by 1436 on Sunday afternoon, the 24th, with
-Able and Baker Companies of the Amtrac Battalion sticking it out to
-the end. Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of
-the last withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops
-from <span class="allsmcap">PINK</span> Beach. With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition
-dump explosion on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were
-safely reembarked on LSDs at the finish of the operation.<a id="FNanchor_640" href="#Footnote_640" class="fnanchor">638</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_640" href="#FNanchor_640" class="fnanchor">638</a> 1stAmphTracBn <i>HD, Dec 50</i>, 5.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Remarkably few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping
-space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500 thousand-pound
-bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring
-demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown
-sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which
-left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins.</p>
-
-<p>The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the <i>Mount McKinley</i>
-about to sail for Ulsan with CTF-90 and Generals Almond and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">344</span><span class="pagenum hidep"><a id="Page_345">345</a></span>
-Shepherd after an eminently successful operation. It had been pretty
-much the Navy’s show, in the absence of enemy interference, and the
-final statistics were staggering—105,000 military personnel, 91,000
-Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of
-cargo loaded out in 193 shiploads by 109 ships.</p>
-
-<div id="ip_30" class="figcenter land">
-  <img src="images/i_344.png" width="1259" height="839" alt="" />
-  <div class="caption"><p>HUNGNAM DOCKS AND
-BEACHES</p>
-
-<p class="imap">MAP-30</p></div></div>
-
-<p>“With naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead,
-we were able to take our time and get everything out,” commented
-Admiral Joy on 26 December. “Admiral Doyle has turned in
-another brilliant performance. We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk—not
-even faintly.”<a id="FNanchor_641" href="#Footnote_641" class="fnanchor">639</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_641" href="#FNanchor_641" class="fnanchor">639</a> CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached report from Gen Almond
-and a Navy announcement in <i>New York Times</i>, 27 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<h3><i>Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area</i></h3>
-
-<p>While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam,
-the Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to
-their new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the
-ADC, had gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and
-made arrangements for the reception of the Division.<a id="FNanchor_642" href="#Footnote_642" class="fnanchor">640</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_642" href="#FNanchor_642" class="fnanchor">640</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival of the 1st Marine Division at
-Pusan and Masan will be found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the
-Eighth Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated
-that the advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive
-shortly. Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated
-by UN forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique
-of 26 December that operations “were skilfully conducted without
-loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact....</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on
-24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam] redeployment, have
-served a very significant purpose—possibly in general result the most significant
-and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign.</p>
-
-<p>The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning
-thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command but without
-attaining a decision.</p>
-
-<p>Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even
-detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.</p>
-
-<p>But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_346">346</span>
-defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret
-political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance
-enemy preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of
-destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.”<a id="FNanchor_643" href="#Footnote_643" class="fnanchor">641</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_643" href="#FNanchor_643" class="fnanchor">641</a> CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal
-turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well
-as military implications. Press representatives, military critics and soldiers
-of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a great victory
-at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that the Eighth Army
-withdrawal of November and December was a costly reverse.<a id="FNanchor_644" href="#Footnote_644" class="fnanchor">642</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_644" href="#FNanchor_644" class="fnanchor">642</a> General MacArthur’s comments are as follows: “This, again, is a non-professional
-estimate belied by the facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders present.... It
-was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm and annihilate, through a ‘sneak’ attack, the
-Eighth Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming forces of a new power,
-not heretofore committed to war, against which it knew or rightly surmised there
-would be no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory advance which uncovered
-the enemy’s plot before he had assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt
-strategic withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a ‘Pearl Harbor’ nature....
-This was undoubtedly one of the most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable
-with and markedly similar to Wellington’s great Peninsula withdrawal. Had the
-initiative action not been taken and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I have
-no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X Corps both would have been annihilated.
-As it was, both were preserved with practically undiminished potential for further action.
-I have always regarded this action, considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties
-and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and satisfying I have ever commanded.”
-MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Marine officers in Korea had no first-hand knowledge of <span class="allsmcap">EUSAK</span> operations.
-It was obvious, however, that an Eighth Army retirement south
-of the 38th Parallel had made it desirable if not actually necessary for
-X Corps to withdraw from northeast Korea, even though General
-Almond held that a Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter could be defended
-throughout the winter.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Contributions of Marine Aviation</i></h3>
-
-<p>The close coordination of aviation with the ground forces in the Chosin
-campaign was due in large measure to the assignment of additional
-pilots to the 1st Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had
-been plucked from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time
-to join their battalions before embarking at Inchon. Increasing the
-number of FACs to two per battalion did much to bring air support
-down to the company level when needed.<a id="FNanchor_645" href="#Footnote_645" class="fnanchor">643</a></p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">347</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_645" href="#FNanchor_645" class="fnanchor">643</a> Air Officer <i>SAR</i>, 4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Air units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names, grid
-coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands of the ground
-troops. Here the Marine system of the man on the ground talking the
-pilot onto the target by reference to visual land marks paid off.</p>
-
-<p>Cloudy, stormy weather was common. Three night fighter pilots
-were lost because of icing, disorientation, and insufficient radio aids to
-navigation. Two VMF-212 land-based pilots saved themselves from
-destruction only by landing on the <i>Badoeng Strait</i> with their last drops
-of gas.</p>
-
-<p>With the approach of winter and cold weather, aircraft on the landing
-strips had to be run up every two hours at night to keep the oil
-warm enough for early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped.
-Planes skidded on icy runways. Once, after a six inch snow, 80 men
-and ten trucks worked all night to clear and sand a 150-foot strip down
-the runway at Yonpo.<a id="FNanchor_646" href="#Footnote_646" class="fnanchor">644</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_646" href="#FNanchor_646" class="fnanchor">644</a> The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12 <i>SAR</i>, annex C, 10; VMF-214
-<i>SAR</i>, annex F, 23; 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW
-<i>SAR</i>, 5–7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As early as mid-November it once took hours of scraping and chipping
-on the <i>Badoeng Strait</i> to clear three inches of glazed ice and snow
-off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, and barriers. Planes which
-stood the night on the flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar
-deck to thaw out. On another occasion VMF-214 had to cancel all
-flight operations because 68-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures
-covered the <i>Sicily’s</i> flight deck and aircraft with a persistent
-coat of ice.</p>
-
-<p>One pilot of VMF-323 had to return shortly after takeoff because
-water vapor froze in his oil breather tube in flight. With the back pressure
-throwing oil all over his windshield and billowing black vapor and
-smoke out of his cowl, he landed only to have the front of his Corsair
-burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the hot exhaust
-stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished the fire.</p>
-
-<p>A hazard as great as being shot down was a crash landing or bail-out
-at sea, where the water was cold enough to kill a man in 20 minutes.
-Survival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could barely
-get into their cockpits.</p>
-
-<p>Maintenance and servicing problems ashore, complicated by dirt,
-dust, and the scarcity of parts, kept mechanics working to the point of
-exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the ground crews to refuel and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">348</span>
-arm planes by hand, often from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive
-crashes, one fatal, were attributed to accumulated water in gasoline.</p>
-
-<p>Aboard ship until mid-November, VMF-214 was able to keep 91 per
-cent of its planes operative. When suddenly deployed ashore to Wonsan,
-its aircraft availability dropped to 82 per cent and at Yonpo to
-67 per cent. Once back at sea again in December, it jumped up to
-90 per cent.</p>
-
-<p>Basic difference in close air support doctrine between the Navy and
-Marines and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison
-between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force commands;
-by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint Eighth Army-Fifth
-Air Force Operations Center at Seoul; and by indoctrination of non-Marine
-units of the X Corps in the Marine-Navy style of close air
-support. Difficulties in inter-service communications slowed Fifth Air
-Force operations orders to carrier squadrons, both Navy and Marine.
-Messages were routed via <span class="allsmcap">FEAF</span> and ComNavFe in Tokyo and arrived
-hours late. Ashore, even MAG-12 during the first two weeks at Wonsan
-received its Fifth Air Force mission orders six to 36 hours late.
-A direct radio teletype between 1st MAW and 5thAF headquarters
-alleviated the situation. And when the CG 1st MAW received full
-control of the air over the X Corps area on 1 December, these problems
-were eased.</p>
-
-<p>Actual control of air support for the scattered ground units demonstrated
-close cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. This
-was evident from the time the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron
-One on the USS <i>Mount McKinley</i> passed control to the Air Defense
-Section of <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span> at Hamhung to the time that control returned to
-the ship in the Hungnam evacuation.</p>
-
-<p>When the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an emergency
-TACC and acted as a radar reporting station for <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>. When control
-was passed back afloat, the Air Defense Section of <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span> stood
-by as a standby <span class="allsmcap">TACC</span> aboard an LST until the last man was pulled off
-the beach. Furthermore, three officers from <span class="allsmcap">MGCIS-1</span> went aboard
-<i>Mount McKinley</i> to help out as Air Defense controllers. They were
-experienced. All through the Wonsan-Chosin campaign, the <span class="allsmcap">MGCIS</span>
-had directed the defensive fighter patrols, circling Wonsan and Yonpo,
-to check all unidentified aircraft before the latter got close enough
-to do any damage, <span class="allsmcap">MGCIS-1</span> also steered lost planes to base in bad
-weather, occasionally vectored them into the GCA radar-controlled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">349</span>
-landing pattern, and even assisted <span class="allsmcap">MTACCS-2</span> in directing air support
-planes to FACs.<a id="FNanchor_647" href="#Footnote_647" class="fnanchor">645</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_647" href="#FNanchor_647" class="fnanchor">645</a> MGCIS-1 <i>HD Dec 50</i>, 2; MTACS-2 <i>HD Dec 50</i>, 7.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Tactical air support in the X Corps zone was directed to the ground
-units by the Air Support Section of <span class="allsmcap">MTACS-2</span>. From 26 October to 11
-December, 3703 sorties in 1053 missions were controlled by the <span class="allsmcap">TACP</span>s
-of Marine, Army, and ROK units. Close air support missions accounted
-for 599 of the total (468 for 1st Marine Division, 8 for 3d Infantry
-Division, 56 for 7th Infantry Division, and 67 for ROKs). The remaining
-454 missions were search and attack.<a id="FNanchor_648" href="#Footnote_648" class="fnanchor">646</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_648" href="#FNanchor_648" class="fnanchor">646</a> The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon Smith, <i>Notes</i>,
-1149–1161, 1222.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>When FAC communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft
-became radio relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the
-airborne <span class="allsmcap">TADC</span>, orbiting over the road from Hagaru.</p>
-
-<p>Approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of
-non-Marine ground units. The ROK and the U. S. Army units were
-not as well supplied with experienced FACs as the 1st Marine Division.
-In these areas four Air Force “Mosquitos” (AT-6 “Texan” training
-planes) were assigned to X Corps to assist in the control of air support.<a id="FNanchor_649" href="#Footnote_649" class="fnanchor">647</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_649" href="#FNanchor_649" class="fnanchor">647</a> 1stMAW <i>HDs, Oct-Dec 50</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>When shore-based Marine air support was about to cease with the
-closing of Yonpo air field, VMF-214 and VMF-212 quickly moved
-their operations aboard carrier; and during the final phases of the Hungnam
-evacuation, almost half of the Marine tactical air strength was
-operating from carrier bases. VMF-214 flew back aboard <i>Sicily</i> on 7
-December without missing a mission and VMF-212, which had moved
-to Itami on 4 December to draw and test a new complement of carrier
-Corsairs, was aboard the USS <i>Bataan</i> eight days later. When the month
-ended, still another squadron, VMF-312, was polishing up its carrier
-landing technique for seaborne duty.<a id="FNanchor_650" href="#Footnote_650" class="fnanchor">648</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_650" href="#FNanchor_650" class="fnanchor">648</a> VMF-312 <i>HD, Dec 50</i>, 2.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The outcome of the Hagaru withdrawal owed much to air-dropped
-supplies and to casualty evacuations by General Tunner’s Combat
-Cargo Command (CCC). Assisting Combat Cargo in Marine support
-were the Wing’s R4D twin engine transports and TBM World War II
-type torpedo bombers, both of which were flown largely by the field-desk
-pilots on the Wing and Group staffs. Most of the Marines’ share
-of the heavy airlifting, however, was done by the four engine R5D<span class="pagenum" id="Page_350">350</span>
-transports of Colonel Dean C. Roberts’ VMR-152. Early in October
-this squadron had been temporarily shifted from the trans-Pacific airlift
-of the Navy’s Fleet Logistics Air Wing to support the Marines in the
-Wonsan campaign. In Korea its operations were controlled by the
-Combat Cargo Command, which committed an average of five Marine
-R5D’s a day into the CCC airlift. In such missions these transports
-supported all UN units from Pyongyang to Yonpo and points north.
-Marine transports not committed by the CCC for general UN support
-in Korea were available for Wing use. From 1 November until
-Christmas, VMR-152 safely carried five million pounds of supplies
-to the front and evacuated more than 4000 casualties.<a id="FNanchor_651" href="#Footnote_651" class="fnanchor">649</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_651" href="#FNanchor_651" class="fnanchor">649</a> ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg to ComNavFE, 2245
-2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152, 0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 <i>SAR</i>, 6; Col
-R. R. Yeaman Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when VMR-152
-returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790 miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800
-pounds of cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers, including 4276 casualties.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The Chosin Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in Marine
-aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne <span class="allsmcap">TADC</span> to control
-the air support of the division column between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni.
-The second was the appearance of VMF-311, the first Marine jet
-squadron to fly in combat. Beginning on 10 December the newly
-arrived squadron flew interdiction missions for four days from Yonpo.
-Then it moved to Pusan to operate for the remainder of the month
-with 5th Air Force jets streaking up the long peninsula to cover the
-withdrawal of the Eighth Army.<a id="FNanchor_652" href="#Footnote_652" class="fnanchor">650</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_652" href="#FNanchor_652" class="fnanchor">650</a> 1stMAW <i>SAR</i>, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311 <i>HD, Dec 50</i>.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Appreciation for the assistance given by Marine aviation to Marine
-ground forces was expressed in a letter of 20 December from General
-Smith to General Harris, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine
-Air Wing. The Division Commander said:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Without your support our task would have been infinitely more difficult
-and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and in the snow storms
-many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or clearing weather when he
-knew he would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out
-destruction to the enemy. Even the presence of a night heckler was reassuring.</p>
-
-<p>Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing proof of
-its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of understanding
-has been established that will never be broken.<a id="FNanchor_653" href="#Footnote_653" class="fnanchor">651</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_653" href="#FNanchor_653" class="fnanchor">651</a> MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The story of air support in the Chosin Reservoir campaign would not
-be complete without a summary of the results of VMO-6. Marines took
-a proprietary interest in Major Gottschalk’s squadron, which had put<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">351</span>
-into effect the helicopter techniques worked out at Quantico by the
-experimental squadron, HMX-1. Some of these techniques were having
-their first test in combat, for the development of rotary-wing
-aircraft in 1950 was at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed-wing
-aircraft in the first year of World War I. On 28 October, VMO-6 had
-a strength of 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, ten light fixed-wing aircraft
-(eight OY-2s, two L5Gs) and nine HO3S-1 helicopters. From that
-date until 15 December the squadron made 1544 flights for a total of
-1624.8 hours. The principal missions were as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Reconnaissance—OYs, 393; helicopters, 64; Transportation—OYs, 130;
-helicopters, 421; Evacuation—OYs, 29; helicopters, 191; Liaison—OYs, 35;
-helicopters, 90; Artillery spot—OYs, 39; helicopters, 0; Utility—OYs, 26;
-helicopters, 60; Rescue—OYs, 0; helicopters, 11.<a id="FNanchor_654" href="#Footnote_654" class="fnanchor">652</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_654" href="#FNanchor_654" class="fnanchor">652</a> VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, <i>Transcript of Informal Remarks at HQMC</i>,
-17 May 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>But statistics can give no idea of the most significant achievement
-of VMO-6 in the Reservoir campaign. For during the most critical
-period the only physical contact between units separated by enemy
-action was provided by the OYs and helicopters. The importance of
-this contribution can hardly be overestimated.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Losses Sustained by the Enemy</i></h3>
-
-<p>Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of the
-Navy, included a total of 4418 battle casualties from 26 October to 15
-December 1950—604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3508 WIA. The
-7313 non-battle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and
-indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty.<a id="FNanchor_655" href="#Footnote_655" class="fnanchor">653</a> Eight Marine
-pilots were KIA or died of wounds, four were MIA, and three were
-wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the non-battle casualties
-were returned to duty during the operation.<a id="FNanchor_656" href="#Footnote_656" class="fnanchor">654</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_655" href="#FNanchor_655" class="fnanchor">653</a> Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 1146–1149. See <a href="#APPENDIX_E">Appendix E</a> for a day-by-day accounting of Marine
-casualties.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_656" href="#FNanchor_656" class="fnanchor">654</a> Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of 37,500—15,000
-killed and 7500 wounded by Marine ground forces, plus
-10,000 killed and 5000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance
-can be placed in such figures as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy
-testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">352</span>
-This evidence goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere
-with the Hungnam redeployment.</p>
-
-<p>Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have been candid
-in admitting failures and unsparing in self-criticism. Among captured
-documents are summaries of the operations of the three CCF armies
-encountered by the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. These major
-units, representing at least 11 and probably 12 divisions, were as follows:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>20th CCF Army—58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions, with the 89th Division
-of the 30th Army attached;</p>
-
-<p>26th CCF Army—76th, 77th, and 78th Division, with probably the 94th
-Division of 32d Army attached;</p>
-
-<p>27th CCF Army—79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, with the 70th Division
-of 24th Army attached.<a id="FNanchor_657" href="#Footnote_657" class="fnanchor">655</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_657" href="#FNanchor_657" class="fnanchor">655</a> A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and therefore might be considered
-generally the equivalent of a U. S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements
-is derived from the <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-116–125, which in turn is based on an analysis
-of CCF prisoner interrogations and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting of
-senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of preparing “an evaluation of the influence
-of Marine Corps forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50.”</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>All three armies were major units of the 9th Army Group of the
-3d CCF Field Army. In mid-October the leading elements of the 4th
-CCF Field Army had crossed the Yalu to oppose the U. S. Eighth Army.
-The operations of X Corps in northeast Korea being considered a threat
-to the left flank, the 42d Army was detached with a mission of providing
-flank protection, pending relief by units of the 3d CCF Field Army.
-Three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th were represented. While
-the last hovered on the left flank of the 4th Field Army, the 124th was
-hard hit near Sudong during the first week of November by RCT-7
-of the 1st Marine Division.</p>
-
-<p>In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the 125th Division
-moved south of Hagaru from the Fusen Reservoir area. Both CCF
-divisions then fell back to Yudam-ni, where they were relieved by units
-of the 20th Army, 3d Field Army. This ended the operations of the 4th
-Field Army in northeast Korea.</p>
-
-<p>Shortly after the appearance of the 20th Army in the Yudam-ni area,
-the 27th Army moved into positions north of the Chosin Reservoir.
-Thus the enemy had available eight divisions for the attacks of 27–28
-November on the Marines in the Yudam-ni area and the three 7th
-Infantry Division battalions east of the Chosin Reservoir. If it may be
-assumed that these CCF divisions averaged 7500 men each, or three-fourths<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">353</span>
-of full strength, the enemy had a total of 60,000 men in assault
-or reserve.</p>
-
-<p>The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish their basic mission,
-which prisoners agreed was the destruction of the 1st Marine Division.
-In every instance the efforts of the first night were the most formidable,
-with enemy effectiveness declining sharply after a second or third
-attack. The explanation seems to be that the 12 divisions were sent
-into northeast Korea with supplies which would have been sufficient
-only if the first attempts had succeeded. The following comment by
-the 26th Army supports this conclusion:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it impossible to
-accomplish the mission of supplying the troops. As a result, our soldiers
-frequently starve. From now on, the organization of our rear service units
-should be improved.<a id="FNanchor_658" href="#Footnote_658" class="fnanchor">656</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_658" href="#FNanchor_658" class="fnanchor">656</a> Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section are found in HQ 500th
-Military Intelligence Group, Document 204141, “Compilation of Battle Experiences Reported
-by Various Armies in their Operation Against U. S. Forces in Korea.” Among
-the units covered are the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few
-potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical strength
-for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated.... The fire
-power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we used our guns
-there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The enemy’s tactical rigidity and tendency to repeat costly errors are
-charged by the 20th Army to inferior communications:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it took
-more than two days to receive instructions from higher level units. Rapid
-changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion of our signal communication
-caused us to lose our opportunities in combat and made the instructions
-of the high level units ineffective....</p>
-
-<p>We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but we
-failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed to carry out the
-orders of the higher echelon. For example, the failure to annihilate the
-enemy at Yut’an-ni [Yudam-ni] made it impossible to annihilate the enemy
-at Hakalwu-ri [Hagaru]. The higher level units’ refusal of the lower level
-units’ suggestion of rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy
-one by one gave the enemy a chance to break out from the encirclement.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>One of the most striking instances of the tactical inflexibility which
-stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru. With only a depleted
-Marine Infantry battalion and service troops available to defend a
-perimeter four miles in circumference, the enemy needed mere daylight
-observation to ascertain and avoid the most strongly defended positions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_354">354</span>
-Yet these were just the positions chosen for the attack, not only on the
-first night but also the second occasion 48 hours later.</p>
-
-<p>“The [CCF] tactics were mechanical,” commented the 27th Army.
-“We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and
-consequently the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower
-echelon units were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance
-between the three leading divisions was very long, while the
-formations of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were
-too close, and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance
-was not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net
-and suffered heavy casualties.”</p>
-
-<p>Summing up the reasons why the Marines at Yudam-ni were not
-“exterminated promptly,” the 27th Army concludes that it was “because
-our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions
-and the troops suffered too many casualties.” This would seem to be
-another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine
-Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt.
-At any rate, evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly
-to crippling losses both from Marine fire power and non-battle casualties
-chargeable to lack of equipment and supplies.</p>
-
-<p>The 20th Army had a hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper
-care of wounds. Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated
-by typhus or ailments of malnutrition and indigestion.</p>
-
-<p>More than 90 per cent of the 26th Army suffered from frostbite.
-The 27th Army complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties alone out
-of a strength of four divisions:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough houses to
-live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for the
-excessive non-combat reduction in personnel (more than 10 thousand persons),
-the weapons were not used effectively. When the fighters bivouacked
-in snow-covered ground during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were
-frozen together in one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand
-grenades; the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar
-tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells failed to detonate;
-skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>Testimony as to the effects of Marine fire power is also given by
-the 26th Army:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and airplanes
-is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for the depth, the
-enemy carries with him automatic light firearms which, coordinated with
-rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are disposed at the front line. The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_355">355</span>
-characteristic of their employment is to stay quietly under cover and open
-fire suddenly when we come to between 70 and 100 meters from them,
-making it difficult for our troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties
-upon us.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>The 20th and 27th Armies appear to have been bled white by the
-losses of the first week. Early in December, units of the 26th Army
-appeared on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and
-this unit furnished most of the opposition from 6 to 11 December.</p>
-
-<p>Seven divisions in all were identified by the 1st Marine Division; and
-since the taking of prisoners was not a matter of top priority with men
-fighting for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were encountered.
-The CCF 9th Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned on
-7 December, included a total of 12 divisions. This POW gave the
-following statement:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Missions of the four (4) armies in 9th Group are to annihilate the 1st
-Division which is considered to be the best division in the U. S. After
-annihilating the 1st Marine Division they are to move south and take Hamhung.<a id="FNanchor_659" href="#Footnote_659" class="fnanchor">657</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_659" href="#FNanchor_659" class="fnanchor">657</a> 1stMarDiv PIR 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by the POW were the
-20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the 30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions
-had been attached to each of the other three armies.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>As to the reason why the Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam
-redeployment, there seems little doubt that the 9th Army Group was
-too riddled by battle and non-battle casualties to make the effort. This
-is not a matter of opinion. Following the Hungnam redeployment, as
-the U. S. Eighth Army braced itself to meet a new CCF offensive, UN
-and <span class="allsmcap">FECOM</span> G-2 officers were naturally concerned as to whether the
-remaining 9th Army Group troops in northeast Korea would be available
-to strengthen the CCF 4th Field Army. It was estimated that only
-two weeks would be required to move these troops to West Korea,
-where they had the capability of reinforcing the CCF attack against
-the Eighth Army.</p>
-
-<p>Efforts to locate the 9th Army Group were unavailing for nearly
-three months. Then a prisoner from the 77th Division of the 26th
-Army was captured by U. S. Eighth Army troops on 18 March 1951.
-During the following week POW interrogations established that three
-divisions of the 26th Army were in contact with Eighth Army units
-northeast of Seoul.</p>
-
-<p>“The only conclusion to be drawn,” comments the <i>Marine Corps
-Board Study</i>, “based on information collected by 1stMarDiv and X<span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">356</span>
-Corps, and that by UN and FEC, is that all corps of 9th Army Group
-had been rendered militarily ineffective in the Chosin Reservoir operation
-and required a considerable period of time for replacement, re-equipment,
-and reorganization.”<a id="FNanchor_660" href="#Footnote_660" class="fnanchor">658</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_660" href="#FNanchor_660" class="fnanchor">658</a> <i>MCB Study</i>, II-C-125.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Thus it appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the
-Chosin Reservoir fights; they also saved U. S. Eighth Army from being
-assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the CCF offensive
-which exploded on the last night of 1950.</p>
-
-<h3><i>Results of the Reservoir Campaign</i></h3>
-
-<p>There could be no doubt, after taking into account the CCF mission,
-that the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, had sustained a reverse in
-northeast Korea which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand, it
-might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such as the
-Marine breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed,
-could be termed a victory.</p>
-
-<p>This question involves issues too complex for a clearcut positive
-answer, but it would be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in
-the <i>Marine Corps Board Study</i>:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>Although the operations of this phase constitute a withdrawal, despite the
-fact that CG 1stMarDiv characterized them as “an attack in a new direction,”
-the withdrawal was executed in the face of overwhelming odds and conducted
-in such a manner that, contrary to the usual withdrawal, some very
-important tactical results were achieved. These may be summarized as
-follows:</p>
-
-<p>1. Extricated 1stMarDiv from a trap sprung by overwhelming enemy
-ground forces by skilful employment of integrated ground and air action
-which enabled the Division to come through with all operable equipment,
-with wounded properly evacuated and with tactical integrity.</p>
-
-<p>2. Outfought and outlasted at least seven CCF divisions under conditions
-of terrain and weather chosen by the enemy and reputedly to his liking.
-Although frostbite took a heavy toll of the Division it hit CCF units far
-harder, perhaps decisively.</p>
-
-<p>3. In the process of accomplishing “2” above, rendered militarily non-effective
-a large part of 9th CCF Army Group. Those units not contacted
-by 1stMarDiv were fixed in the Chosin Reservoir area for possible employment
-against the Division and consequently suffered from the ravages of
-sub-zero cold and heavy air attacks.</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_357">357</span></p>
-
-<p>4. As a direct result of “3” above, enabled X Corps to evacuate Hungnam
-without enemy interference and, consequently, as a combat effective unit with
-all personnel and serviceable equipment. Pressure on X Corps by 9th CCF
-Army Group during the seaward evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult
-operation, would undoubtedly have altered the result.<a id="FNanchor_661" href="#Footnote_661" class="fnanchor">659</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_661" href="#FNanchor_661" class="fnanchor">659</a> Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted, are from the <i>MCB Study</i>,
-II-C-125–127.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Improvisations in tactics were now and then made necessary by
-unusual conditions of terrain, weather or enemy action. But on the
-whole the Marines saved themselves in the Reservoir campaign by the
-application of sound military tactics. In the doing they demonstrated
-repeatedly that the rear makes as good a front as any other for the
-militarily skilled and stout-hearted, and that a unit is not beaten merely
-because it is surrounded by a more numerous enemy.</p>
-
-<p>Inevitably the Marine campaign has been compared to that classic of
-all military breakouts—the march of the immortal Ten Thousand
-which is the subject of Xenophon’s <i>Anabasis</i>. Stranded in the hostile
-Persian Empire in the year 401 B. C., these Greek mercenaries cut their
-way to safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the
-tactics used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisophus to overcome
-road blocks in mountain country will have a familiar ring to Marine
-veterans of the Reservoir:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The enemy, by keeping up a continuous battle and occupying in advance
-every narrow place, obstructed passage after passage. Accordingly, whenever
-the van was obstructed, Xenophon, from behind, made a dash up the hills
-and broke the barricade, and freed the vanguard by endeavoring to get above
-the obstructing enemy. Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisophus,
-in the same way, made a detour, and by endeavoring to mount higher
-than the barricaders, freed the passage for the rear rank; and in this way,
-turn and turn about, they rescued each other, and paid unflinching attention
-to their mutual needs.<a id="FNanchor_662" href="#Footnote_662" class="fnanchor">660</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_662" href="#FNanchor_662" class="fnanchor">660</a> Xenophon, <i>The Anabasis of Cyrus</i>, Henry C. Dakyns, trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin,
-<i>The Greek Historians</i>, (2 vols., New York, 1942), II, 297–298.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazookas and machine
-guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the Reservoir breakout were essentially
-those which served Xenophon and the Ten Thousand more than
-33 centuries ago. Organization, combat, training, spirit, and discipline
-enabled the Marines, like the Hellenes before them, to overcome
-numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic mountain roads to the
-sea.</p>
-
-<p>The over-all strategic effects of the Reservoir campaign, as summarized
-by the Marine Corps Board Study, were as follows:</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_358">358</span></p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>1. Played a prominent part ... in enabling X Corps, a considerable segment
-of the total UN forces in Korea, to be withdrawn from Hungnam as a
-combat effective force available for employment with the Eighth Army in
-South Korea at a time when that Army was retreating and was in critical
-need of a reinforcement.</p>
-
-<p>2. Were largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces
-on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement
-might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining
-a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom, by being instrumental in
-rendering 9th CCF Army Group, a force of three corps of four divisions
-each, militarily noneffective for a minimum period of three months.</p>
-</div>
-
-<p>That the breakout of the 1st Marine Division had affected American
-political and military policy at the highest levels was the assertion of an
-editorial in <i>Time</i>. Referring to what it termed the “Great Debate,” in
-December 1950, as to whether American forces should be withdrawn
-from Korea, the news-magazine commented:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>When the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the
-“unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their equipment,
-their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia took on a different
-look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels of the Hungnam action contributed
-more to forming U. S. policy than all the words in the “Great
-Debate.” The nation—and the revitalized Eighth Army—now knows that
-U. S. fighting men will stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity
-is found to punish Communist aggression.<a id="FNanchor_663" href="#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">661</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_663" href="#FNanchor_663" class="fnanchor">661</a> <i>Time</i>, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>General Douglas MacArthur as <span class="allsmcap">CINCUNC</span>, in his 11th report of
-operations of UN forces in Korea, submitted the following to the
-United Nations Organization regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements of the 7th
-Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in bitter cold along a
-narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against opposition of from six to eight
-Chinese Communist Force divisions which suffered staggering losses. Success
-was due in no small part to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air
-support. The basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly
-courage displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their
-integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior forces,
-consistently held their positions until their wounded had been evacuated, and
-doggedly refused to abandon supplies and equipment to the enemy.</p>
-
-<p>United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close support
-of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming numbers of Chinese
-Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by the United Nations aircraft
-contributed in large measure to the successful move of our forces from the
-Chosin Reservoir to the Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against<span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">359</span>
-them. Air support provided by the United States Marine Air Force and Naval
-Aircraft in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground
-force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of tactical
-air operations in history.<a id="FNanchor_664" href="#Footnote_664" class="fnanchor">662</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_664" href="#FNanchor_664" class="fnanchor">662</a> Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC <i>11th Report of the Operations in Korea of
-United Nations Forces</i>, 31 Jan 51. See <a href="#APPENDIX_H">Appendix H</a> for transcript of Presidential Unit
-Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded to the
-1stMAW.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful evacuation
-at Hungnam in large measure to the Marine breakout. Writing to
-General Smith several months later, he asserted that he had “filled in
-what has been a neglected page in the story of the Hungnam redeployment.
-It is simply this: that the destruction of enemy forces wrought
-by the First Marine Division on the march down the hill was a major
-factor in the successful withdrawal; and that the destruction was so
-complete the enemy was unable to exert serious pressure at any time on
-the shrinking perimeter. To my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the
-performance of the First Marine Division on that march constitutes
-one of the most glorious chapters in Marine Corps history.”<a id="FNanchor_665" href="#Footnote_665" class="fnanchor">663</a></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_665" href="#FNanchor_665" class="fnanchor">663</a> RAdm T. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<p>Letters of commendation were received by the 1st Marine Division
-from General Cates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General
-Collins, Chief of Staff, USA, General Almond, and many other high-ranking
-military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for sincerity and
-emotion, there was no message which appealed more to the officers and
-men of the Division than the concluding paragraph of this tribute
-from the commanding general who had guided their destinies with
-unswerving courage and who had come out with them, Major General
-Oliver P. Smith:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>The performance of officers and men in this operation was magnificent.
-Rarely have all hands in a division participated so intimately in the combat
-phases of an operation. Every Marine can be justly proud of his participation.
-In Korea, Tokyo and Washington there is full appreciation of the remarkable
-feat of the division. With the knowledge of the determination, professional
-competence, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed by officers
-and men of this division, my feeling is one of humble pride. No division
-commander has ever been privileged to command a finer body of men.<a id="FNanchor_666" href="#Footnote_666" class="fnanchor">664</a></p>
-</div>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_361">361</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_666" href="#FNanchor_666" class="fnanchor">664</a> 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_A">APPENDIX A<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Glossary of Technical Terms
-and Abbreviations</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<ul>
-<li>ADC—Assistant Division Commander.</li>
-<li>AdmO—Administrative Order.</li>
-<li>AF—Air Force.</li>
-<li>AGC—Amphibious Force Flagship.</li>
-<li>AH—Hospital Ship.</li>
-<li>AirDelPlat—Air Delivery Platoon.</li>
-<li>AirO—Air Officer.</li>
-<li>AirSptSec—Air Support Section.</li>
-<li>AKA—Assault Cargo Ship.</li>
-<li>AKL—Cargo, Ship, Light.</li>
-<li>AM—Minesweeper.</li>
-<li>AmphTracBn—Amphibian Tractor Battalion.</li>
-<li>AmphTrkBn—Amphibian Truck Battalion.</li>
-<li>AMS—Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper.</li>
-<li>ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.</li>
-<li>AP—Transport.</li>
-<li>APA—Assault Transport.</li>
-<li>APD—High Speed Transport.</li>
-<li>ARG—Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship.</li>
-<li>ARL—Landing Craft Repair Ship.</li>
-<li>ArmdAmphBn—Armored Amphibian Battalion.</li>
-<li>ARS—Salvage Vessel.</li>
-<li>AT—Antitank.</li>
-<li>ATF—Ocean Tug, Fleet.</li>
-<li>AutoMaintCo—Automotive Maintenance Company.</li>
-<li>AutoSupCo—Automotive Supply Company.</li>
-<li>BB—Battleship.</li>
-<li>BLT—Battalion Landing Team.</li>
-<li>Bn—Battalion.</li>
-<li>Btry—Battery.</li>
-<li>BuMed—Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.</li>
-<li>C-47—Douglas Transport (same as R4D).</li>
-<li>CA—Heavy Cruiser.</li>
-<li>CCF—Chinese Communist Forces.</li>
-<li>CG—Commanding General.</li>
-<li>CIC—Counter Intelligence Corps, USA.</li>
-<li>CinCFE—Commander in Chief, Far East.</li>
-<li>CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.</li>
-<li>CinCUNC—Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.</li>
-<li>CL—Light Cruiser.</li>
-<li>CO—Commanding Officer.</li>
-<li>Co—Company.</li>
-<li>ComFltAirWing—Commander Fleet Air Wing.</li>
-<li>ComNavFE—Commander Naval Forces Far East.</li>
-<li>ComPacFlt—Commander Pacific Fleet.</li>
-<li>ComPhibGruOne—Commander Amphibious Group One.</li>
-<li>ComSeventhFlt—Commander Seventh Fleet.</li>
-<li>ComUNBlockandCortFor—Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort Force.</li>
-<li>CP—Command Post.</li>
-<li>CR—Command Report.</li>
-<li>C/S—Chief of Staff.</li>
-<li>CSG—Combat Service Group.</li>
-<li>CSUSA—Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.</li>
-<li>CTF—Commander Task Force.</li>
-<li>CTG—Commander Task Group.</li>
-<li>CVE—Escort Aircraft Carrier.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">362</span></li>
-<li>CVL—Light Aircraft Carrier.</li>
-<li>DD—Destroyer.</li>
-<li>DDR—Radar Picket Destroyer.</li>
-<li>DE—Destroyer Escort.</li>
-<li>Det—Detachment.</li>
-<li>DMS—High Speed Minesweeper.</li>
-<li>DOW—Died of Wounds.</li>
-<li>EmbO—Embarkation Order.</li>
-<li>EmbO—Embarkation Officer.</li>
-<li>EngrBn—Engineer Battalion.</li>
-<li>EUSAK—Eighth U. S. Army in Korea.</li>
-<li>FABn—Field Artillery Battalion (USA).</li>
-<li>FAC—Forward Air Controller.</li>
-<li>FEAF—Far East Air Force.</li>
-<li>FECOM—Far East Command.</li>
-<li>F4U—Chance-Vought “Corsair” Fighter-Bomber.</li>
-<li>FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.</li>
-<li>FO—Forward Observer.</li>
-<li>FragOrder—Fragmentary Order.</li>
-<li>Fum&amp;BathPlat—Fumigation and Bath Platoon.</li>
-<li>GHQ—General Headquarters.</li>
-<li>Gru—Group.</li>
-<li>H&amp;SCo—Headquarters and Service Company.</li>
-<li>HD—Historical Diary.</li>
-<li>Hedron—Headquarters Squadron.</li>
-<li>HMS—Her Majesty’s Ship.</li>
-<li>HMAS—Her Majesty’s Australian Ship.</li>
-<li>HMCS—Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship.</li>
-<li>HMNZS—Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship.</li>
-<li>HO3S—Sikorsky Helicopter.</li>
-<li>HQBn—Headquarters Battalion.</li>
-<li>HQMC—Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.</li>
-<li>InfDiv—Infantry Division (USA).</li>
-<li>Interv—Interview.</li>
-<li>ISUM—Intelligence Summary.</li>
-<li>JANIS—Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.</li>
-<li>JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.</li>
-<li>JMS—Japanese Minesweeper.</li>
-<li>JSPOG—Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group.</li>
-<li>JTF—Joint Task Force.</li>
-<li>KIA—Killed in Action.</li>
-<li>KMC—Korean Marine Corps.</li>
-<li>Ln—Liaison.</li>
-<li>LSD—Landing Ship, Dock.</li>
-<li>LSM—Landing Ship, Medium.</li>
-<li>LSMR—Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket.</li>
-<li>LST—Landing Ship, Tank.</li>
-<li>LSTH—Landing Ship, Tank—Casualty Evacuation.</li>
-<li>LSU—Landing Ship, Utility.</li>
-<li>Ltr—Letter.</li>
-<li>LVT—Landing Vehicle, Tracked.</li>
-<li>MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.</li>
-<li>MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.</li>
-<li>MS—Manuscript.</li>
-<li>MedBn—Medical Battalion.</li>
-<li>MedAmbCo—Medical Ambulance Company, USA.</li>
-<li>MIA—Missing in Action.</li>
-<li>MISD—Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA).</li>
-<li>MP—Military Police.</li>
-<li>MRO—Movement Report Office.</li>
-<li>msg—Message.</li>
-<li>MSR—Main Supply Route.</li>
-<li>MSTS—Military Sea Transport Service.</li>
-<li>MTACS—Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.</li>
-<li>MTBn—Motor Transport Battalion.</li>
-<li>NavBchGru—Naval Beach Group.</li>
-<li>NavFE—Naval Forces Far East.</li>
-<li>NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.</li>
-<li>NK—North Korea(n).</li>
-<li>NKPA—North Korean Peoples Army.</li>
-<li>N.d.—Date not given.</li>
-<li>N.t.—Time not given.</li>
-<li>O—Officer; Order.</li>
-<li>OCMH—Office of the Chief of Military History (USA).<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">363</span></li>
-<li>OI—Operation Instruction.</li>
-<li>OpnO—Operation Order.</li>
-<li>OpnPlan—Operation Plan.</li>
-<li>OrdBn—Ordnance Battalion.</li>
-<li>OY—Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane.</li>
-<li>PCEC—Escort Amphibious Control Vessel.</li>
-<li>PF—Frigate.</li>
-<li>PhibGru—Amphibious Group.</li>
-<li>PIR—Periodic Intelligence Report.</li>
-<li>PLA—People’s Liberation Army.</li>
-<li>Plat—Platoon.</li>
-<li>POL—Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.</li>
-<li>POR—Periodic Operation Report.</li>
-<li>POW—Prisoner of War.</li>
-<li>QMPetDistCo—Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Company (USA).</li>
-<li>QMSubsistSupCo—Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA).</li>
-<li>R4D—Douglas Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47).</li>
-<li>RCT—Regimental Combat Team.</li>
-<li>Recon—Reconnaissance.</li>
-<li>Reinf—Reinforced.</li>
-<li>RktBn—Rocket Battalion.</li>
-<li>RM—Royal Marines.</li>
-<li>ROK—Republic of Korea.</li>
-<li>R &amp; O File—Records and Orders File.</li>
-<li>ROKA—Republic of Korea Army.</li>
-<li>ROKN—Republic of Korea Navy.</li>
-<li>SAC—Supporting Arms Coordinator.</li>
-<li>SAR—Special Action Report.</li>
-<li>SCAJAP—Shipping Control Authority, Japan.</li>
-<li>SecDef—Secretary of Defense.</li>
-<li>ServBn—Service Battalion.</li>
-<li>SigBn—Signal Battalion.</li>
-<li>SigRepCo—Signal Repair Company.</li>
-<li>SitRpt—Situation Report.</li>
-<li>SP—Shore Party.</li>
-<li>SMS—Marine Supply Squadron.</li>
-<li>TAC—Tactical Air Coordinator; Tactical Air Commander.</li>
-<li>TACP—Tactical Air Control Party.</li>
-<li>Tacron—Tactical Air Control Squadron.</li>
-<li>TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center.</li>
-<li>T-AP—Transport Operated by MSTS.</li>
-<li>TBM—General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber.</li>
-<li>TE—Task Element.</li>
-<li>T/E—Table of Equipment.</li>
-<li>Tel—Telephone Message.</li>
-<li>TF—Task Force.</li>
-<li>TG—Task Group.</li>
-<li>TkBn—Tank Battalion.</li>
-<li>Trk—Truck.</li>
-<li>T/O—Table of Organization.</li>
-<li>TU—Task Unit.</li>
-<li>UDT—Underwater Demolitions Team.</li>
-<li>U/F—Unit of Fire.</li>
-<li>UN—United Nations.</li>
-<li>UNC—United Nations Command.</li>
-<li>URpt—Unit Report.</li>
-<li>USA—United States Army.</li>
-<li>USAF—United States Air Force.</li>
-<li>USMC—United States Marine Corps.</li>
-<li>USN—United States Navy.</li>
-<li>VMF—Marine Fighter Squadron.</li>
-<li>VMF(N)—All-Weather, Fighter Squadron.</li>
-<li>VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.</li>
-<li>VMR—Marine Transport Squadron.</li>
-<li>WD—War Diary.</li>
-<li>WD Sum—War Diary Summary.</li>
-<li>WIA—Wounded in Action.</li>
-<li>YMS—Motor Minesweeper.</li>
-</ul>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_365">365</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_B">APPENDIX B<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Task Organization 1st Marine Division</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<p>In order to present a true picture of the Task Organization of the 1st Marine
-Division during its operations in northeast Korea the organization will be presented
-for the following periods:</p>
-
-<ul class="in4">
-<li>1.  Wonsan Landing (OpnO 16-50)</li>
-<li>2.  Advance to the Reservoir (OpnO 19-50)</li>
-<li>3.  Movement south from Hagaru (OpnO 25-50)</li>
-<li>4.  Hungnam Evacuation (OpnO 27-50)
-</li>
-</ul>
-
-<table id="t365" class="narrow35" summary="Task Organization 1st Marine Division">
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">1. <span class="smcap">Task Organization Of 1st Marine Division For Wonsan Landing</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl w60"><i>1st Marine Division, (Reinf), FMF</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen O. P. SMITH</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol M. T. STARR</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">163rd MISD, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">441st CIC Det, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st SigBn, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj R. L. SCHREIER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Carrier Plat, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 4th SigBn, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">2d SigRepUnit, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 205th SigRepCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st ServBn, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol C. L. BANKS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1stMTBn</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol O. L. BEALL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st OrdBn</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj L. O. WILLIAMS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st SPBn, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol H. P. CROWE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">SPCommSec, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st CSG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, NavBchGru 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st MedBn, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">2d Plat, 560thMedAmbCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">7thMTBn</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj J. F. STEPKA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st CSG, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col. J. S. COOK</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Fum&amp;BathPlat, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st AirDelPlat, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Plat, 20th QMSubsistSupCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Plat, 506th QMPetDisCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">NavBchGru 1, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 1</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col L. B. PULLER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 5th KMC Bn<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">366</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co C, 1st EngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co C, 1st MTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, 1st MedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Plat, 1stArmd AmphBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">FO &amp; LnO Secs, 2/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">LnDet, 1stTkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">SP Gru B</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st CSG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, NavBchGru 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 5</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol R. L. MURRAY</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">5th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co A, 1st EngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, 1st MTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co C, 1st MedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">FO &amp; LnO Secs, 1/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">SP Gru A</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st CSG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, NavBchGru 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 7</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col H. L. LITZENBERG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 3d KMC Bn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, 1st EngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co B, 1st MTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, 1st MedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st SigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">FO &amp; LnO Secs, 3/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">LnDet, 1st TkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">SP Gru C</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st CSG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, NavBchGru 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>11th Marines, Reinf</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col J. H. BROWER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st AmphTrkCo, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>1st Tank Battalion</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol H. T. MILNE<span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">367</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>1st Engineer Battalion</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>3d KMC Battalion</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj KIM YUN GUN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>5th KMC Battalion</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col KIM TAI SHIK</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>1st AmphTracBn, FMF</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol E. F. WANN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Reconnaissance Company, 1stMarDiv</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt R. B. CROSSMAN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>VMO-6</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">2. <span class="smcap">Task Organization For Advance To The Reservoir</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen O. P. SMITH</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">HqBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">163d MISD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">441st CIC Det</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stServBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A. 7th MTBn (less 1 plat)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1st MTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st OrdBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stMedBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st AmphTracBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co B, 1st ArmdAmphBn (less 1st Plat)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7th MT Bn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st CSG, Reinf</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st AmphTrkCo</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st AirDelPlat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st Fum&amp;Bath Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 1</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col L. B. PULLER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">2/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co D, 1st MedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co C, 1st TkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co C, Reinf, 1st EngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 7</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col H. L. LITZENBERG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">7th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">3/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Recon Co, 1stMarDiv<span class="pagenum" id="Page_368">368</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st MTBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co D, Reinf, 1st EngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co E, 1st MedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 5</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol R. L. MURRAY</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">5th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A, Reinf, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co C, 1stMedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co, 1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>11th Marines, Reinf</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col J. H. BROWER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>1st Tank Battalion, Reinf</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol H. T. MILNE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Tk Plat, 5thMar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Tk Plat, 7thMar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>1st Engineer Battalion</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>VMO-6</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">3. <span class="smcap">Task Organization For Movement South From Hagaru</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">(Except where noted the organization remained the same<br />for the movement south from Koto-ri.).</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen O. P. SMITH</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">HqBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">163d MISD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">181st CIC</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st ServBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A, 7thMTBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">AutoSup Co, 1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">AutoMaint Co, 1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stOrdBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stMedBn, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st Fum&amp;Bath Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">2d Plat, 506thMedAmbCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">(under opn control X Corps)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stAmphTracBn, Reinf, less dets<span class="pagenum" id="Page_369">369</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1st CSG, Reinf</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7thMTBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co A, 1stAmphTracBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st AirDel Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1stSPBn</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(under opn control 3dInfDiv)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1stTkBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">VMO-6</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 5</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol R. L. MURRAY</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">5th Marines, less Tk Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Btry D, 2/11</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">11th Marines, Reinf, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">4/11, less Btry L</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 96th FABn, USA 3/1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Tk Co, 31st Inf, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Prov Plat, 1stTkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co A, 1stEngrBn</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(released to RCT 1 on passage through Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">41 Commando, RM</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Division Train 2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol H. T. MILNE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Traffic Plat, MP Co</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 513th TrkCo, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co D, 10thEngr(C)Bn, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stMedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 515th Trk Co, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 7</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col H. L. LITZENBERG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Btry L, 4/11</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(released to RCT 1 on arrival Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">ProvBn, 31st Inf, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, 1stTkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co D, Reinf, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Division Train 1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol C. L. BANKS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">370</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, Hq X Corps</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stOrdBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 7thMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, X Corps Ord Co, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">MP Co, 1stMarDiv, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1stMTBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">AirSptSec, MTACS-2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stMedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Regimental Combat Team 1</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col L. B. PULLER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Marines, less 3/1 and Tk Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">2/31, Reinf, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">2/11, less Btry D</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(Btry D attached on passage Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Btry L, 4/11</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(Btry L attached on arrival Koto-ri)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Cos A &amp; B, 7thMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co C, Reinf, 1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stOrdBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Cos B &amp; D, 1stMedBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Recon Co, 1stMarDiv</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 1stEngr Bn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 7th Mar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Det, 41 Commando, RM</td>
-  <td class="tdl">(released to 41 Commando on passage Koto-ri by RCT 5)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Co B, Reinf, 1stTkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Misc elms, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">4. <span class="smcap">Task Organization For Hungnam Evacuation</span>.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Forward Echelon</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">BrigGen E. A. CRAIG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl"><i>Main Body, 1st Marine Division</i>,</td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen O. P. SMITH</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Reinf, FMF</i>, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 7</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col H. L. LITZENBERG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">7th Marines, less Tk Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">3/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co D, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st CSG, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, HqBn<span class="pagenum" id="Page_371">371</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stServBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A, 7th MTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stMedBn, Reinf</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">1st Fum&amp;Bath Plat</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 5</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol R. L. MURRAY</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">5th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">41 Commando, RM</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stOrdBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stMTBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>Regimental Combat Team 1</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col L. B. PULLER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">2/11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co C, 1stEngrBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stTkBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Tk Plat, 5th Mar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Tk Plat, 7th Mar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Det, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>HqBn, Reinf</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol M. T. STARR</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1stSigBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">163d MISD, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">181st CIC Det, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>11th Marines, Reinf</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol C. A. YOUNGDALE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">1st EngrBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">7thMTBn, less dets</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">ANGLICO, 1stSigBn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>1stSPBn</i>, less dets</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol H. P. CROWE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdl sub1"><i>1st AmphTracBn, Reinf, FMF</i></td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol E. F. WANN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co A, Reinf, 1stAmphTrkBn, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Co B, 1stArmdAmphBn, FMF</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_373">373</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_C">APPENDIX C<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Naval Task Organization</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="t373" summary="Naval Task Organization">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">1. <i>Wonsan Landing</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">JTF 7</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">VAdm A. D. Struble</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TF 90 Attack Force</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm J. H. Doyle</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 91.2 Landing Force (1st MarDiv)</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen O. P. Smith</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TE 90.00 Flagship Element</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Mount McKinley</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 AGC</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr T. H. Moore</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.01.1 TacRon 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.01.2 TacRon 3</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TE 90.02 Naval Beach Group Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt W. T. Singer</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr M. C. Sibisky</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.02.3 Boat Unit One</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr H. E. Hock</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.02.4 Amphibious Construction Bn.</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr M. T. Jacobs, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.02.5 Underwater Demolitions Team Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr W. R. McKinney</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 90.1 Administrative Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm L. A. Thackery</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TE 90.10 Flagship Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt J. B. Stefonek</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Eldorado</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 AGC</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.1.1 Medical Unit</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Consolation</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 AH</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 898</i><a id="FNanchor_667" href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">665</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 975</i><a href="#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">665</a></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 LST</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.1.2 Repair and Salvage Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt P. W. Mothersill</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Lipan</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Cree</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Arikara</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 ATF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Conserver</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 ARS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Askari</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 ARL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Gunston Hall</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Fort Marion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Comstock</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Catamount</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Colonial</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">5 LSD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">Plus other units as assigned</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.1.3 Service Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr J. D. Johnston</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">15 LSU<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">374</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 90.2 Transport Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt V. R. Roane</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TE 90.21 Transport Division</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt S. G. Kelly</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">ABLE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Bayfield</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Noble</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Cavalier</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Okanogan</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">4 APA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Washburn</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Seminole</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Titania</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Oglethorpe</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Archenar</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">5 AKA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Marine Phoenix</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 T-AP</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TE 90.22 Transport Division</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt A. E. Jarrell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">BAKER</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Henrico</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>George Clymer</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Pickaway</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Bexar</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">4 APA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Union</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Algol</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Alshain</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Winston</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Montague</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">5 AKA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Aiken Victory</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 T-AP</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Robin Goodfellow</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub5">1 Commercial freighter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 90.3 Tractor Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt R. C. Peden</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Gunston Hall</i><a id="FNanchor_668" href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">666</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Fort Marion</i><a href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">666</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Comstock</i><a href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">666</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Catamount</i><a href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">666</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Colonial</i><a href="#Footnote_668" class="fnanchor">666</a></td>
-  <td class="tdr">5 LSD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 1123</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 715</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 742</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 799</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 802</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 845</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 883</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 898</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 914</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 973</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 975</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LST 1048</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">12 LST</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">23 SCAJAP LSTs</td>
-  <td class="tdr">23 LST<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">375</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 90.4 Control Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr C. Allmon</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>PCEC 896</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 PCEC</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.4.1 Control Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Lt S. C. Pinksen</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub5">BLUE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Wantuck</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">TU 90.4.2 Control Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Lt A. C. Ansorge</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub5">YELLOW</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Horace A. Bass</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 95.6 Minesweeping and</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt R. T. Spofford</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">Protection Group</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Collett</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 DD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Diachenko</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Doyle</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Endicott</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 DMS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Pledge</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Incredible</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 AM</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Kite</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Merganser</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Mockingbird</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Osprey</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Redhead</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Chatterer</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">7 AMS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMS <i>Mounts Bay</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMNZS <i>Pukaki</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMNZS <i>Putira</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>LaGrandiere</i> (French)</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4 PF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">8 Japanese mine sweepers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">4 Japanese mine destruction</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub5">and buoying vessels</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">1 ROKN</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 AKL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">Plus other units assigned</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 90.6 Reconnaissance Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr S. C. Small</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Horace A. Bass</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Wantuck</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">UDT 1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">UDT 3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 UDT</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm R. W. Ruble</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Badoeng Strait</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Sicily</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 CVE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Taussig</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Hanson</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>George K. Mackenzie</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Ernest G. Small</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Southerland</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Rowan</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">6 DD<span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">376</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TG 95.2 Gunfire Support Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm G. R. Hartman</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Helena</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Rochester</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4"><i>Toledo</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 CA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMS <i>Ceylon</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">1 CL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMS <i>Cockade</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMCS <i>Alhabaskan</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">HMAS <i>Warramunga</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">3 DD of DesRon 9</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6 DD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">LSMR 401<a id="FNanchor_669" href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">667</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">LSMR 403<a href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">667</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub4">LSMR 404<a href="#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">667</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tpad">
-  <td class="tdl">2. <i>Hungnam Evacuation</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TF 90 Amphibious Force, Naval Forces Far East</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm J. H. Doyle</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TE 90.00 Flagship Element</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Mount McKinley</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr R. W. Arndt</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TacRon ONE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TE 90.02 Repair and Salvage Unit</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr L. C. Conwell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Kermit Roosevelt</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">ARG</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Askari</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">ARL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Bolster</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Conserver</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 ARS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Tawakoni</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">ATF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TE 90.03 Control Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr C. Allmon</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Diachenko</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Begor</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">PCEC 882</td>
-  <td class="tdr">PCEC</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TG 90.2 Transport Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt S. G. Kelly</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">TE 90.21 Transport Element</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt A. E. Jarrell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Bayfield</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Henrico</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Noble</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 APA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Winston</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Seminole</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Montague</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 AKA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Begor</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Diachenko</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 APD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">PCEC 882</td>
-  <td class="tdr">PCEC<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">377</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Fort Marion</i><a id="FNanchor_670" href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">668</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Colonial</i><a href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">668</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Catamount</i><a href="#Footnote_670" class="fnanchor">668</a></td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 LSD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 742</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 715</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 845</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 802</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 883</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 799</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 898</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 914</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 975</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 973</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LST 1048</td>
-  <td class="tdr">11 LST</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm R. H. Hillenkoetter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>St. Paul</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Rochester</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 CA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Zellars</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Charles S. Sperry</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Massey</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Forrest Royal</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">4 DD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LSMR 401</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LSMR 403</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3">LSMR 404</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3 LSMR</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Plus DD as assigned from TG 95.2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and Minesweeping Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm J. M. Higgins</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Rochester</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">CA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>English</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Hank</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Wallace L. Lind</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Borie</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">4 DD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Sausalito</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Hoquiam</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Gallup</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Gloucester</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Bisbee</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Glendale</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">6 PF</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt R. T. Spofford</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Endicott</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Doyle</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 DMS</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Incredible</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">AM</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Curlew</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub3"><i>Heron</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 AMS<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">378</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group</td>
-  <td class="tdr"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">RAdm R. W. Ruble</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Badoeng Strait</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Sicily</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">2 CVE</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Bataan</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">CVL</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Lofberg</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>John A. Bole</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Mackenzie</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Taussig</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Ernest G. Small</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Brinkley Bass</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Arnold J. Isbell</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">7 DD</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Hanson</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">DDR</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Vessels attached TF 90 for operational control.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Missouri</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">BB</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Duncan</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">DDR (from 10 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Foss</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">DE (from 9 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2"><i>Consolation</i></td>
-  <td class="tdr">AH (from 2 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote f1">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_667" href="#FNanchor_667" class="fnanchor">665</a> Reported to CTG 95.2 upon arrival
-at objective area.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_668" href="#FNanchor_668" class="fnanchor">666</a> Carrying 3 LSU.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_669" href="#FNanchor_669" class="fnanchor">667</a> Reported to CTF 90 when released
-by CTG 95.2.</p>
-
-</div>
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_670" href="#FNanchor_670" class="fnanchor">668</a> 3 LSU embarked</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">379</span></p>
-
-<h2 title="APPENDIX D" class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_D">APPENDIX D<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Effective Strength of
-1st Marine Division<a id="FNanchor_671" href="#Footnote_671" class="fnanchor smaller">669</a></span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="t379" class="narrow30 bl" summary="1st Marine Division effective strength">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl vbot">Date</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Organic<br />USMC<br />and USN</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Attached<br />U. S.<br />Army</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Attached<br />Royal<br />Marines</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">Attached<br />KMC</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">Total</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8 Oct 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">23,533</td>
-  <td class="tdr">78</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2,159</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25,770</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">26 Oct 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">23,608</td>
-  <td class="tdr">83</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,588</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25,279</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">27 Nov 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25,166</td>
-  <td class="tdr">73</td>
-  <td class="tdr">234</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">25,473</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  5 Dec 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">21,551</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2,535</td>
-  <td class="tdr">157</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">24,243</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8 Dec 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">21,039</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2,448</td>
-  <td class="tdr">157</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">23,644</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bb">
-  <td class="tdl">15 Dec 50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">19,362</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-  <td class="tdr">144</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">19,520</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_671" href="#FNanchor_671" class="fnanchor">669</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex A (G-1), 4.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">381</span></p>
-
-<h2 title="APPENDIX E" class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_E">APPENDIX E<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">1st Marine Division Casualties<a id="FNanchor_672" href="#Footnote_672" class="fnanchor smaller">670</a></span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="t381" class="narrow30 bl" summary="1st Marine Division Casualties">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl vbot">Date</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">KIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">DOW</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">MIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc vbot">WIA</td>
-  <td class="tdc">Non-battle<br />casualties</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">21</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  9Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">10Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">11</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">11Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">35</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">12Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">23</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">13Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">14Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">15Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">16Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">17Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">18Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">19Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">20Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">21Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">22Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">23Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">24Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">25Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">26Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">43</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">27Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">44</td>
-  <td class="tdr">54</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">28Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">68</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">29Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">115</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">30Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">52</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">31Oct50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">36</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  1Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  2Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">67</td>
-  <td class="tdr">64</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  3Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">162</td>
-  <td class="tdr">93</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  4Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">17</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">84</td>
-  <td class="tdr">126</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  5Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">23</td>
-  <td class="tdr">94</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  6Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">38</td>
-  <td class="tdr">87</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  7Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">15</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">60</td>
-  <td class="tdr">51</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">17</td>
-  <td class="tdr">50</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  9Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">50</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">10Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">20</td>
-  <td class="tdr">57</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">11Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">48</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">12Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">40</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">13Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">9</td>
-  <td class="tdr">63</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">14Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">66</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">15Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">172</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">16Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">136</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">17Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">77</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">18Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">79</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">19Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">58</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">20Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">46</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">21Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">63</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">22Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">65</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">23Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">58</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">24Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">51</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">25Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">55</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">26Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">68<span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">382</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">27Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">37</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">17</td>
-  <td class="tdr">186</td>
-  <td class="tdr">96</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">28Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">95</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">43</td>
-  <td class="tdr">539</td>
-  <td class="tdr">259</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">29Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">60</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-  <td class="tdr">42</td>
-  <td class="tdr">396</td>
-  <td class="tdr">105</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">30Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">27</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">183</td>
-  <td class="tdr">102</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  1Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">27</td>
-  <td class="tdr">14</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">111</td>
-  <td class="tdr">134</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  2Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">55</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">33</td>
-  <td class="tdr">231</td>
-  <td class="tdr">180</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  3Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">194</td>
-  <td class="tdr">196</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  4Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">10</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">202</td>
-  <td class="tdr">582</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  5Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">81</td>
-  <td class="tdr">469</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  6Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">32</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">212</td>
-  <td class="tdr">262</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  7Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">51</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">281</td>
-  <td class="tdr">304</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">29</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">127</td>
-  <td class="tdr">170</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  9Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">46</td>
-  <td class="tdr">224</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">10Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">45</td>
-  <td class="tdr">266</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">11Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">9</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">38</td>
-  <td class="tdr">308</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">12Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">123</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">13Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">52</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">14Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">103</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">15Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">34</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">16Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">90</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">17Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">105</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">18Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">282</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">19Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">202</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">20Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">151</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">21Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">111</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">22Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">68</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">23Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">79</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">24Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdc"> </td>
-  <td class="tdr">10</td>
-  <td class="tdr">42</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in2">Total</td>
-  <td class="tdr">604</td>
-  <td class="tdr">114</td>
-  <td class="tdr">192</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3,485</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7,338</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_383">383</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_672" href="#FNanchor_672" class="fnanchor">670</a> 1stMarDiv <i>SAR</i>, annex E, appendix 2 (Casualty Reporting Section, 12Jan51); Smith,
-<i>Notes</i>, 1147–1149.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_F">APPENDIX F<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Command and Staff List<br />
-
-<span class="larger">8 October-15 December 1950</span></span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="t383" class="narrow35" summary="Command and Staff List, 8Oct-15Dec 1950">
-<tr class="bpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">1st Marine Division</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl w40">Commanding General</td>
-  <td class="tdl w40">MajGen Oliver P. Smith</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Assistant Division Commander</td>
-  <td class="tdl">BrigGen Edward A. Craig</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Chief of Staff</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Gregon A. Williams</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Edward W. Snedeker</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl w40">Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Francis A. McAlister</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Special Staff</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Adjutant</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Philip J. Costello</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Air Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James N. Cupp</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Artillery Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Carl A. Youngdale</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Amphibian Tractor Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Armored Amphibian Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Francis H. Cooper</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Chaplain</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr Robert H. Schwyhart (ChC), USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John H. Blue</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Dental Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Mack Meradith (DC), USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Embarkation Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Jules M. Rouse</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Engineer Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. Partridge</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Exchange Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Wilbur C. Conley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Food Director</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Norman R. Nickerson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Inspector</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col John A. White</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Historical Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">2dLt John M. Patrick</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Legal Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Albert H. Schierman</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Motor Transport Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Henry W. Seeley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Naval Gunfire Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Loren S. Fraser</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Ordnance Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Donald L. Shenaut</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Provost Marshal</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John H. Griffin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Public Information Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Michael Capraro (to 6 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Carl E. Stahley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Shore Party Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Henry P. Crowe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Signal Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Albert Creal</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Special Services Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 29 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol John M. Bathum<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">384</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Supply Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Gordon S. Hendricks</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Surgeon</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Eugene R. Hering (MC), USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Tank Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Harry T. Milne</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Attached Units</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 163d Military Intelligence Specialist Detachment, USA</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Fujio F. Asano, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 181st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, USA</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Millard E. Dougherty, USA</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Headquarters Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Marvin T. Starr</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Frederick Simpson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Military Police Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John H. Griffin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Ralph B. Crossman (to 23 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Walter Gall</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Lewis B. Puller</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert W. Rickert</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William G. Reeves</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Stone W. Quillian</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Robert E. Lorigan</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Thomas T. Grady</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Frank P. Tatum</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Frank J. Faureck</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Antitank Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George E. Petro</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Battalion, 1st Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Jack Hawkins (to 7 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Donald M. Schmuck</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Maurice H. Clarke</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William B. Hopkins</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert H. Barrow</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Wesley Noren<span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">385</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert P. Wray</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William T. Bates, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>2d Battalion, 1st Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Allan Sutter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Clarence J. Mabry</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Raymond Dewees, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Welby W. Cronk</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, E Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Charles D. Frederick (to 6 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Harold B. Wilson (6–17 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Jack A. Smith</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, F Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Goodwin C. Groff</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Whitman S. Bartley (to 16 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William A. Kerr</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>3d Battalion, 1st Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Thomas L. Ridge</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Reginald R. Myers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Thomas E. McCarthy</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, G Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George C. Westover (to 30 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Carl L. Sitter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, H Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Clarence E. Corley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, I Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Joseph R. Fisher</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Edwin H. Simmons</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>5th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond L. Murray</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Joseph L. Stewart</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Alton C. Weed</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William C. Easterline</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Theodore J. Spiker</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Harold Wallace</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harold G. Schrier (to 9 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Jack E. Hawthorn</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert M. Lucy</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Antitank Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Almarion S. Bailey</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Battalion, 5th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol George R. Newton (to 17 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol John W. Stevens, II<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">386</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Merlin R. Olson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Walter E. G. Godenius</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John R. Stevens (to 17 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt James B. Heater</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Francis I. Fenton (to 13 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt John R. Hancock</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (to 6 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Jack R. Jones</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John W. Russell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>2d Battalion, 5th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Harold S. Roise</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 12Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Glen E. Martin (13–21Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John L. Hopkins</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt David W. Walsh (to 8 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Franklin B. Mayer</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel S. Smith</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, E Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 12 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Lawrence W. Henke, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, F Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Uel D. Peters (to 6 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles “H” Dalton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James W. Bateman (to 10 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Glen E. Martin (11 Oct-12 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James W. Bateman (13–21 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Glen E. Martin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>3d Battalion, 5th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Robert D. Taplett</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John J. Canney (to 28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Harold W. Swain</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Roland A. Marbaugh (to 4 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Raymond H. Spuhler</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, G Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles D. Mize (to 17 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Chester R. Hermanson (18 Nov-2 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles D. Mize</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, H Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Donald E. Watterson (to 8 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harold B. Williamson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, I Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harold G. Schrier<span class="pagenum" id="Page_387">387</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Murray Ehrlich (to 18 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Harold W. Swain (19–28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Hubert J. Shovlin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>7th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to 7 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond G. Davis</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John R. Grove</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Donald R. France (to 6 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Henry J. Woessner, II</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj David L. Mell (to 22 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Maurice E. Roach</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Nicholas L. Shields (to 3 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Walter T. Warren (4–7 Dec)<a id="FNanchor_673" href="#Footnote_673" class="fnanchor">671</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Rodney V. Reigard<a id="FNanchor_674" href="#Footnote_674" class="fnanchor">672</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch Mortar Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Stanley D. Low (to 2 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Gordon Vincent (3–18 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Rodney V. Reigard</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Antitank Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 20 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Walter T. Warren (21 Oct-8 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Earl R. DeLong</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 7 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Webb D. Sawyer</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Raymond V. Fridrich</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Elmer L. Starr (to 22 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt David W. Banks (to 20 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Myron E. Wilcox, Jr. (to 27 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Joseph R. Kurcaba (27 Nov-8-Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt William W. Taylor</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William E. Shea (to 16 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John F. Morris</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William E. Vorhies</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">388</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>2d Battalion, 7th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 9 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Roland E. Carey (to 9 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Webb D. Sawyer (10 Nov-8 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Walter R. Anderson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Milton A. Hull (to 28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, E Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Walter D. Phillips, Jr. (to 28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Raymond O. Ball (28 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert T. Bey</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, F Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Elmer J. Zorn (to 6 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William E. Barber (7 Nov-3 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt John M. Dunne (3–6 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Welton R. Abell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. (to 12 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Joseph L. Abel (13–19 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>3d Battalion, 7th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 10 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol William F. Harris (11 Nov-6 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Warren Morris</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Warren Morris (to 6 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Eric R. Haars (to 29 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, G Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Thomas E. Cooney (to 27 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Eric R. Haars (29 Nov-3 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt George R. Earnest</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, H Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Howard H. Harris (to 11 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Leroy M. Cooke (12–27 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Howard H. Harris (27 Nov-1 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge (1–5 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">2dLt Minard P. Newton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, I Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard H. Sengewald (to 14 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt William E. Johnson (15 Oct-3 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Alfred I. Thomas<span class="pagenum" id="Page_389">389</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Weapons Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Jefferson D. Smith (to 5 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Austin S. Parker (6–10 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert E. Hill</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>11th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Carl A. Youngdale</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Floyd M. McCorkle</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William T. Phillips</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol James O. Appleyard</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">S-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Donald V. Anderson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Albert H. Wunderly (to 7 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Clarence E. Hixson (15–25 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt William C. Patton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 16 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Joseph M. Brent</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battalion</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Eugene A. Bushe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Battalion, 11th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Ransom M. Wood (to 15 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Harvey A. Feehan</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Francis R. Schlesinger</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt James W. Brayshay (to 25 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt James D. Jordan</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Arnold C. Hoffstetter (to 8 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Gilbert N. Powell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>2d Battalion, 11th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Merritt Adelman</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Donald E. Noll (to 25 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Neal G. Newell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George J. Batson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Andrew J. Strohmenger (to 8 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard E. Roach</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, E Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John C. McClelland, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, F Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George J. Kovich, Jr. (to 19 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Howard A. Blancheri</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_390">390</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>3d Battalion, 11th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Francis F. Parry</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Michael B. Weir (to 11 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Eugene H. Brown (12–18 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt John J. Brackett</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert A. Thompson (to 17 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Ernest W. Payne (18 Oct-30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel A. Hannah</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, G Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Ernest W. Payne</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, H Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Benjamin S. Read (to 8 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Wilber N. Herndon</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, I Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John M. McLaurin, Jr. (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert T. Patterson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>4th Battalion, 11th Marines</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William McReynolds</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 8 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Maurice J. Coffey</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Charles S. Cummings (to 25 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Paul L. Hirt</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Armand G. Daddazio</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, K Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert C. Messman (to 27 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert C. Parrott (28 Nov-11 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Arthur D. Challacombe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, L Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Lawrence R. Cloern</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, M Battery</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Vernon W. Shapiro</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Arthur J. Barrett</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Frank E. Granucci</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James P. Treadwell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Russell Hamlet</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Arthur J. Noonan</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Armored Amphibian Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Francis H. Cooper</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Richard G. Warga</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarter Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Roger B. Thompson<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">391</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bernard G. Thobe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Lewis E. Bolts</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Combat Service Group</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col John H. Cook, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Edward A. Clark</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Francis L. Miller</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Maintenance Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Edward H. Voorhees</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Supply Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Robert W. Hengesback</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Support Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Truck Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John A. Pearson (to 11 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">2dLt Alan G. Copp (11–30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Jack W. Temple</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 1st Fumigation and Bath Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt James L. Dumas</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery Platoon</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Engineer Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol John H. Partridge</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Richard M. Elliott</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt James H. McRoberts (to 20 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Hewitt A. Snow</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Edward B. Newton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj James W. McIllwain (to 22 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Philip A. Terrell, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George W. King (to 2 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William R. Gould</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Orville L. Bibb</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 12 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Ronald L. Glendinning</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Byron C. Turner</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Medical Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr William S. Francis, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr William S. Francis, USN<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">392</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr James A. Kaufman, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, E Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (to 15 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Lt (jg) Ernest N. Grover, USN (15–30 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Motor Transport Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Olin L. Beall</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George B. Loveday</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Arthur W. Ecklund</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt James C. Camp, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Garfield M. Randall (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Norman E. Stow</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bernard J. Whitelock (9 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Philip R. Hade</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Automotive Maintenance Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Edward L. Roberts</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Automotive Supply Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Amphibian Truck Company, FMF<a id="FNanchor_675" href="#Footnote_675" class="fnanchor">673</a></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt John Bookhout</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Ordnance Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Lloyd O. Williams</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Theodore Tunis (to 13 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Gordon H. Moore</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Ordnance Supply Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Russel S. LaPointe (to 5 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Victor F. Brown</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Ammunition Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Harvey W. Gagner (to 30 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Charles H. Miller</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Ordnance Maintenance Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt George L. Williams</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Service Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Charles L. Banks</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John R. Stone<span class="pagenum" id="Page_393">393</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Morse “L” Holladay</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Robert A. Morehead</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Support Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 27 Oct)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Thomas M. Sagar</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Shore Party Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Henry P. Crowe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Horace H. Figuers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt William T. Miller</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William L. Batchelor (to 22 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Nathaniel H. Carver</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Henry Brzezinski</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj George A. Smith (to 24 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Murray F. Rose</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Signal Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Robert L. Schreier</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Elwyn M. Stimson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Howard K. Alberts (to 14 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Earl F. Stanley</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Signal Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Richard A. Glaeser</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, ANGLICO</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Fulton L. Oglesby (to 16 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Frederick M. Steinhauser</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>1st Tank Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Harry T. Milne</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 1 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Philip C. Morrell</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bruce W. Clarke (to 18 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Frederick L. Adams</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Philip C. Morell (to 1 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Douglas E. Haberlie</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Gearl M. English (to 1 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Robert J. Craig</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bruce F. Williams</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Richard M. Taylor</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Lester T. Chase (to 18 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Bruce W. Clarke (19 Nov-10 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Paul E. Sanders</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">394</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>7th Motor Transport Battalion</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Joseph F. Stepka (to 7 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Carl J. Cagle</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Vernon A. Tuson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">1stLt Reed T. King</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, A Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Ira N. Hayes</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, B Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Clovis M. Jones</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, C Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Fred B. Rogers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, D Company</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Joseph L. Bunker</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Marine Observation Squadron 6</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">(Under operational control of 1stMarDiv and administrative control of 1stMAW)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Executive Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Victor A. Armstrong (to 13 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Andrew L. McVickers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">1st Marine Aircraft Wing</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding General</td>
-  <td class="tdl">MajGen Field Harris</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Assistant Commanding General</td>
-  <td class="tdl">BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Chief of Staff</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Kenneth H. Weir (8 Oct-1 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Caleb T. Bailey (2 Nov-15 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations<a id="FNanchor_676" href="#Footnote_676" class="fnanchor">674</a></td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Edward C. Dyer</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Raymond E. Hopper</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-3</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Howard A. York (to 9 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Paul J. Fontana (10 Nov-28 Nov)<a id="FNanchor_677" href="#Footnote_677" class="fnanchor">675</a></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Howard A. York (29 Nov-15 Dec)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">G-4</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Thomas J. Noon</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Rear Echelon, Itami</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Roger T. Carleson</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron, One</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Earl “B” Sumerlin, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Marine Aircraft Group 12</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Boeker C. Batterton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Deputy Group Commander</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Paul J. Fontana</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 12</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj John E. Hays<span class="pagenum" id="Page_395">395</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Service Squadron 12</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Claude H. Welch (to 4 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Charles E. J. McLean</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Marine Aircraft Group 33</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Frank C. Dailey</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Deputy Group Commander</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Radford C. West</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Headquarters Squadron 33</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Capt Walter “L” Hilton</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Service Squadron 33</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol James C. Lindsay</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="tbpad">
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="2"><i>Squadrons</i></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 212</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 214</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Robert P. Keller (to 2 0Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj William M. Lundin</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 312</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol “J” Frank Cole</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 311</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (from 8 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Fighter Squadron 323</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Arnold A. Lund</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Squadron 513</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj J. Hunter Reinburg (to 4 Nov)</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl"> </td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol David C. Wolfe</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron 542</td>
-  <td class="tdl">LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Transport Squadron 152</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Col Deane C. Roberts</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Harold E. Allen</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">Commanding Officer, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2</td>
-  <td class="tdl">Maj Christian C. Lee</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="footnote f1">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_673" href="#FNanchor_673" class="fnanchor">671</a> Additional duty.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_674" href="#FNanchor_674" class="fnanchor">672</a> Additional duty.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_675" href="#FNanchor_675" class="fnanchor">673</a> Redesignated Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, 15 Nov.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_676" href="#FNanchor_676" class="fnanchor">674</a> Also Deputy C/S, Air Support, X Corps.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_677" href="#FNanchor_677" class="fnanchor">675</a> Additional duty.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">397</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_G">APPENDIX G<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Enemy Order of Battle</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<p>1.  North Korean</p>
-
-<p>During operations around Wonsan the 1st Marine Division encountered fragments
-and stragglers from many NKPA divisions. The organized elements
-were chiefly from the 2d, 5th, and 15th Divisions.</p>
-
-<p>2.  Chinese</p>
-
-<table id="t397" class="narrow35" summary="Enemy Order of Battle">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl w35">42d Army</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl w35 sub1">124th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl w65" rowspan="4">In action against 7th Marines south of Sudong 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions of 3–6 Nov.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl w35 sub2">370th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">371st Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">372nd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">125th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Not in contact. Probably to west of 124th Division.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">373rd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">374th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">375th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">126th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru. Never heavily engaged.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">376th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">377th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">378th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">20th Army</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">58th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">First in action at Hagaru 28 Nov. Badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">172nd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">173rd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">174th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">59th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">In contact with 7th Marines southwest of Yudam-ni 23 Nov. Later defended Toktong Pass.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">175th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">176th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">177th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">60th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">In contact with 7th Marines southeast of Yudam-ni 25 Nov. Later moved to Funchilin Pass area.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">178th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">179th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">180th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">89th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">First contacted by 7th Marines west of Hagaru 22 Nov. About 2 Dec moved south to Majon-dong area.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">266th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">267th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">268th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">27th Army</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">79th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Attacked Yudam-ni 27 Nov.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">235th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">236th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">237th Regiment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_398">398</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">80th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Attacked 7th Infantry Division units east of Reservoir 27 Nov.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">238th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">239th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">240th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">81st Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">No report of contact until 13 Dec. May have been in Yudam-ni area.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">241st Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">242nd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">243rd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">90th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">No contact reported. May have been in reserve near Hagaru.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">268th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">269th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">270th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">26th Army</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">76th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">First contacts east of Hagaru 5 Dec. Suffered heavy losses around Koto-ri.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">226th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">227th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">228th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">77th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">First contacts at Hagaru 5 Dec.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">229th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">230th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">231st Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">78th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Not reported in contact. May not have reached area in time for combat.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">232nd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">233rd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">234th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">88th Division</td>
-  <td class="tdl" rowspan="4">Not reported in contact. May not have reached area in time for combat.</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">263rd Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">264th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">265th Regiment</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_399">399</span></p>
-
-<h2 title="APPENDIX H" class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_H">APPENDIX H<br />
-
-<span class="subhead">Air Evacuation Statistics<a id="FNanchor_678" href="#Footnote_678" class="fnanchor smaller">676</a></span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<table id="t399" class="narrow30 bl" summary="Air Evacuation Statistics">
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdc nobl vbot" rowspan="2">Date</td>
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">HAGARU</td>
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">KOTO-RI</td>
-  <td class="tdc" colspan="3">YUDAM-NI</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bb">
-  <td class="tdr">OY</td>
-  <td class="tdr">C-47</td>
-  <td class="tdr">HO4S</td>
-  <td class="tdr">OY</td>
-  <td class="tdr">C-47</td>
-  <td class="tdr">HO4S</td>
-  <td class="tdr">OY</td>
-  <td class="tdr">HO4S</td>
-  <td class="tdr">Total</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">27Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">19</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">21</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">28Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">24</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">18</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">32</td>
-  <td class="tdr">74</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">29Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">31</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">16</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">22</td>
-  <td class="tdr">69</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">30Nov50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">62</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">49</td>
-  <td class="tdr">111</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  1Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">52</td>
-  <td class="tdr">157</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">7</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">222</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  2Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">960</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">47</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,007</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  3Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">464</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">53</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">523</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  4Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,046</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">89</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,135</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  5Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,580</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">48</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">1,630</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  6Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">137</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">140</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  7Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">226</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">6</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">232</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  8Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">19</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">19</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">  9Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">21</td>
-  <td class="tdr">277</td>
-  <td class="tdr">2</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">300</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl">10Dec50</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">8</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">0</td>
-  <td class="tdr">12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr class="bt bb">
-  <td class="tdl in1">Totals</td>
-  <td class="tdr">188</td>
-  <td class="tdr">4,344</td>
-  <td class="tdr">36</td>
-  <td class="tdr">484</td>
-  <td class="tdr">304</td>
-  <td class="tdr">24</td>
-  <td class="tdr">3</td>
-  <td class="tdr">112</td>
-  <td class="tdr">5,493</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_401">401</span></p>
-
-<div class="footnote">
-
-<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_678" href="#FNanchor_678" class="fnanchor">676</a> X Corps, <i>Special Report, Chosin Reservoir</i>, 93; Smith, <i>Notes</i>, 844; and VMO-6 <i>SAR</i>, 13–18.
-TBM evacuation included under OY for Koto-ri, 2 to 7 December 1950.</p>
-
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter">
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX_I">APPENDIX I<br />
-
-<span class="subhead large">Unit Citations</span></h2>
-</div>
-
-<p class="center">THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY</p>
-
-<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Washington</span></p>
-
-<p class="p1">The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the <span class="smcap">Presidential
-Unit Citation</span> to the</p>
-
-<p class="p1 b1 center larger"><span class="smcap">First Marine Division, Reinforced</span></p>
-
-<p class="in0">for service as set forth in the following <span class="smcap">Citation</span>:</p>
-
-<div class="blockquot">
-
-<p>“For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action
-against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri area of
-Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950. When the full fury of the
-enemy counterattack struck both the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27
-and 28 November 1950, the First Marine Division, Reinforced, operating as
-the left flank division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward
-from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications of hostile
-forces attacking the Eighth Army and, at the same time, continued its mission
-of protecting a vital main supply route consisting of a tortuous mountain road
-running southward to Chinhung-ni, approximately 35 miles distant. Ordered
-to withdraw to Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly
-units in the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area, the
-Division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy Third Route Army
-and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri held firmly
-against repeated and determined attacks by hostile forces, gallantly fought its
-way successively to Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni and Hamburg over twisting,
-mountainous and icy roads in sub-zero temperatures. Battling desperately
-night and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a period
-of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First Marine Division,
-Reinforced, emerged from its ordeal as a fighting unit with its wounded, with
-its guns and equipment and with its prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy
-divisions, together with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses
-which seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces for a
-considerable period of time. The valiant fighting spirit, relentless perseverance
-and heroic fortitude of the officers and men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced,
-in battle against a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with
-the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”</p>
-
-<p>The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division participated in
-operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 27 November to
-11 December 1950:</p>
-
-<p class="p1 in0"><span class="smcap">Organic Units Of The First Marine Division</span>: First Marine Division (less
-Detachment Headquarters Battalion; Detachment First Signal Battalion; Detachment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_402">402</span>
-First Service Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and Companies A and C,
-First Tank Battalion; Automotive Supply Company, First Motor Transport
-Battalion; Automotive Maintenance Company, First Motor Transport Battalion;
-Detachment First Ordnance Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and Company
-A, First Medical Battalion; First Shore Party Battalion; 4.5″ Rocket
-Battery and Service Battery, Fourth Battalion, Eleventh Marines).</p>
-
-<p class="p1 in0"><span class="smcap">Attached Marine Corps Units</span>: Companies A and B, Seventh Motor Transport
-Battalion; Detachment Radio Relay Platoon.</p>
-
-<p class="p1 in0"><span class="smcap">Attached Army Units</span>: Provisional Battalion (Detachments, 31st and 32nd
-Regimental Combat Teams); Company D, 10th Engineer Combat Battalion;
-Tank Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Headquarters Company, 31st Infantry
-Regiment; Company B, 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion,
-31st Infantry Regiment (less Company E); 185th Engineer Combat Battalion
-(less Company A).</p>
-</div>
-
-<p class="in0 in50">
-For the President,<br /></p>
-
-<p class="p0 in0 in50"><span class="smcap">R. B. Anderson</span><br />
-<i>Secretary of the Navy</i>
-</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_403">403</span></p>
-
-<hr class="narrow" />
-
-<div class="newpage"></div>
-
-<p class="in0 fleft larger">GENERAL ORDERS</p>
-<p class="fright in0 larger">DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</p>
-
-<p class="in0 fleft">No. 72</p>
-<p class="fright in0">Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1951</p>
-
-<p class="in0 clear"><span class="smcap">Distinguished Unit Citation</span></p>
-
-<p>1. The 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, is cited for outstanding
-performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against an armed
-enemy in the areas of Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-ri, Korea, during
-the period 22 November to 14 December 1950. The historic role of close-support
-air missions flown by personnel on land and carrier based aircraft during
-the operations of the X Corps, United States Army, contributed immeasurably
-to the successful withdrawal of the X Corps when hordes of Chinese Communist
-and North Korean troops had encircled their positions endangering the entire
-operation. In their magnificent employment of close-support doctrine and in
-their exceedingly effective interdiction missions and night combat air patrols,
-the 1st Marine Air Wing flew 2,572 day and night sorties during this period,
-inflicting 10,313 enemy casualties and destroying 723 buildings, 144 vehicles,
-17 tanks, 9 bridges, 4 locomotives, 3 command posts, 30 boxcars, 47 gun positions,
-and 19 supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps. These missions were flown
-over hazardous mountain terrain under extremely adverse weather conditions
-and in the face of intense enemy antiaircraft and small-arms fire. The normally
-ground-based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously improvised into
-an airborne center in a C-54 aircraft without appreciable loss of efficiency in
-operations and the responsibility for controlling aircraft was assumed and
-accomplished in a remarkable manner through day and night operations by
-controlling personnel. Airborne tactical air coordinators also were established
-to supplement the airborne center to direct specific strikes in areas not under
-surveillance of ground control parties to the end that every available sortie was
-utilized to maximum effectiveness. In the evacuation of friendly casualties by
-cargo airplanes, the use of helicopters for rescue of air personnel shot down by
-the enemy and the evacuation of wounded, and the high state of aircraft availability
-maintained by ground personnel working under hazardous and extremely
-adverse conditions because of intense cold, personnel of the entire 1st Marine
-Air Wing displayed fortitude, courage, and marked esprit de corps. Although
-suffering a considerable loss of personnel and equipment during this trying
-period, the morale and effectiveness of the 1st Marine Air Wing were sustained
-at a constantly high level. The repeated acts of valor and gallantry by the
-officers and men of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, and their
-enviable combat record reflect great credit on the members thereof and are in
-keeping with the highest traditions of the military service.</p>
-
-<p>By order of the Secretary of the Army:</p>
-
-<p class="in0 in50">
-<span class="smcap">J. Lawton Collins</span><br />
-Chief of Staff, United States Army
-</p>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div id="biblio" class="chapter">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_405">405</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Bibliography">Bibliography</h2>
-
-<h3>Documents</h3>
-
-<div class="hang">
-
-<p>Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of Special Report, Deputy Chief of
-Staff, X Corps, 19 August-31 December 1950. Interviews (Korea) File,
-Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine
-Corps (HQMC Historical).</p>
-
-<p>Shutts, Richard W. Maj, USMC. Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of the
-U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea. Copy in Interviews (Korea) File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine
-Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS.
-Manuscript File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First
-Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Department of the Army. Joint Daily Situation Reports, October-December
-1950. Reports and Orders (1950-    ) (R&amp;O) File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>U. S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War, 1950–54.
-Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Letters, memoranda, narratives, and statements received by Historical
-Branch, G-3, concerning Korean operations. Monograph and Comments
-File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>U. S. Marine Corps Board. <i>Marine Corps Board Study: An Evaluation of the
-Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug
-50–15 Dec 50).</i> 2 vols. Copy in R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 1,
-25 June to 15 November 1950. 20 January 1951. 17 vols., processed. R&amp;O
-File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Far East Command. Allied Translator and Interpreter Service. Enemy Documents:
-Korean Operations. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical and Document
-File Section.</p>
-
-<p>——. Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division,
-Geographic Branch. Terrain Study Number 6, North Korea. 9 October
-1950. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Operations Branch, Theater Intelligence Division, Military Intelligence
-Section. Order of Battle Information Chinese Communist Third Field
-Army. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea. 22
-March 1951. R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Staff Study: The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force
-Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific. 19 October 1950. R&amp;O File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. Combat Information Bulletin Number 4. 20
-November 1950. R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents, October-December
-1950. Departmental Records Branch, The Adjutant General’s
-Office, Alexandria, Va. (DRB, TAGO).</p>
-
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_406">406</span></p>
-
-<p>——. Order of Battle Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
-CCF Army Histories. 1 December 1954. Copy at OCMH.</p>
-
-<p>X Corps. Guerrilla Activities X Corps Zone, October-December 1950. DRB,
-TAGO.</p>
-
-<p>——. Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 27 November to 10 December
-1950. R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation, December 1950. DRB,
-TAGO.</p>
-
-<p>——. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents, October-December
-1950. DRB, TAGO.</p>
-
-<p>——. G-2 Section. Periodic Intelligence Reports, October-December 1950.
-R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing. Historical Diaries, October-December
-1950. Command Diary (Korea), Type B Report File (Diary File),
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Special Action Report for the period 10 October 1950 to 15 December
-1950. 7 May 1951.</p>
-</div>
-
-<table id="bibannex1" class="narrow30" summary="annexes">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl" colspan="2">Annexes</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">A</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">B</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">C</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-3</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">D</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">E</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Medical</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">F</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Special Services</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Legal</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">H</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Communications</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMR-152</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">J</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Marine Air Group 33</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2" colspan="2">Appendixes</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">A</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">S-1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">B</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">S-2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">C</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">S-3</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">D</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">S-4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">E</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Communications</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">F</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Logistics</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">G</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Medical</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">H</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Public Information</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Buildings and Ground</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">J</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Ordnance</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">K</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Transportation</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">L</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Chaplain</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">M</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Electronics</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">N</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Photographic Unit</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">O</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Engineering</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">P</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Aerology</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Q</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF-214</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">R</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF-212<span class="pagenum" id="Page_407">407</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">S</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF-323</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">K</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Marine Air Group 12</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2" colspan="2">Appendixes</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">A</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Personnel</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">B</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Intelligence</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">C</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Operations</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">D</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Logistics</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">E</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Supply</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">F</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF-311</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">G</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF-312</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">H</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF(N)-513</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMF(N)-542</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">J</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">MTACS-2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">K</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">MGCIS-1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">L</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Engineering</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">M</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Ordnance</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">N</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Electronics</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">O</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Transportation</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">P</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Special Services</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">Q</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Mess</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">R</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Utilities</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">S</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Communications</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">T</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Medical</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">U</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Base Security</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub2">V</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Commanding Officer’s Comments</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="hang">
-
-<p>“SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Marine Division, FMF. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Periodic Intelligence Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence
-File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Periodic Operations Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence
-File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Reports, messages, journals, correspondence, orders, and miscellaneous
-matter, October-December 1950. Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea),
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Choshin (sic) Reservoir
-Operation, 8 October-15 December 1950. 21 May 1951. 3 sections.</p>
-</div>
-
-<table id="bibannex2" class="narrow30" summary="annexes">
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1" colspan="2">Annexes</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">A</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-1</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">B</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-2</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">C</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-3</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">D</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G-4</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">E</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Adjutant</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">F</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Anti-tank</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">G</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Chaplain</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">H</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">I</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Dental<span class="pagenum" id="Page_408">408</span></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">J</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Embarkation</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">K</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Engineer</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">L</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Headquarters Commandant</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">M</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Food Director</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">N</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Historical</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">O</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Inspector</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">P</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Legal</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Q</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Medical</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">R</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Motor Transport</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">S</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Ordnance</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">T</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Post Exchange</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">U</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Public Information</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">V</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Signal</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">W</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Special Services</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">X</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Supply</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Y</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Disbursing</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Z</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Civil Affairs</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">AA</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Division Administration Center</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">BB</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Fire Support Coordination Center</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">CC</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Air and Air Observers</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">DD</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Naval Gunfire</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">EE</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Headquarters Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">FF</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Service Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">GG</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Signal Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">HH</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Medical Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">II</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Motor Transport Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">JJ</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Amphibian Truck Company</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">LL</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Ordnance Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">MM</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Shore Party Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">NN</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Engineer Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">OO</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Tank Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">PP</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">QQ</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">5th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">RR</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">SS</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">11th Marines</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">TT</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">UU</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">1st Combat Service Group</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VV</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">7th Motor Transport Battalion</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">WW</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">VMO-6</td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">XX</td>
-  <td class="tdl sub1">Cold Weather Operations</td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<div class="hang">
-
-<p>“SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Commander Amphibious Group One (CTF 90). Action Report Hungnam
-Operation; Period 9 December 1950 through 25 December 1950. 21 January
-1951. R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-<span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">409</span>
-<p>——. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>7th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>11th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Unit Reports, October-December 1950. Correspondence File,
-1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Marine Air Group 12. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Marine Air Group 33. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950.
-Diary File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Shore Party Battalion. Historical Diary for Advance Party, R&amp;O File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Unit Reports, October-December
-1950. Correspondence File, 1stMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15
-December 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Special Action Report for Period 7 October to 25
-November 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. Special Action Report for Period 26 November to 15 December 1950.
-“SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary
-File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 16
-December 1950. “SAR” File (Korea), HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>VMF-212. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>VMF-214. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>VMF-312. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>VMF-323. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File, HQMC
-Historical.</p>
-
-<p>VMF(N)-513. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-<span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">410</span>
-<p>VMF(N)-542. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950. Diary File,
-HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>1st Air Delivery Platoon, FMF. Historical Diaries, October-December 1950.
-Diary File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-</div>
-
-<h3>OTHER SOURCES</h3>
-
-<div class="hang">
-
-<p>Beech, Keyes, <i>Tokyo and Points East.</i> New York: Doubleday, 1954.</p>
-
-<p>Blumenson, Martin, Capt, USA. “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” <i>Army</i>, 7,
-no. 4: 38–44, 65 (November 1956).</p>
-
-<p>Bradley, Omar N., Gen, USA, Compiler. <i>Substance of Statements Made at
-Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950.</i> Washington: Government
-Printing Office, 1951.</p>
-
-<p>Canzona, Nicholas A. Capt, USMC, and John C. Hubbell. “The 12 Incredible
-Days of Col John Page,” <i>Readers Digest</i>, 69, no. 4: 84–89 (April 1956).</p>
-
-<p>“Carrier Deck,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, 34, no. 3: 19–20 (March 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Chandler, James B. 1stLt, USMC. “Thank God I’m a Marine,” <i>Leatherneck
-Magazine</i>, 34, no. 6: 25–26 (June 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Condit, Kenneth W. “Marine Supply in Korea,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 37,
-no. 1: 48–55 (January 1953).</p>
-
-<p>Coon, Gene L., Cpl, USMC. “Versatility,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, 34, no. 3:
-18–19 (March 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Davis, William J., Capt, USMC. “Nightmare Alley,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>
-MS.</p>
-
-<p>Dolcater, Max W., Capt, USA. <i>3d Infantry Division in Korea.</i> Tokyo, 1953.</p>
-
-<p>Drury, Clifford M., Capt, USN. <i>The History of the Chaplain Corps, U. S. Navy</i>,
-v 5. MS in Chaplains Section, Bureau of Personnel, U. S. Navy.</p>
-
-<p>Drysdale, Douglas B., LtCol, RM. “41 Commando,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>,
-37, no. 8: 28–32 (August 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Edwards, Harry W., LtCol, USMC. “A Naval Lesson of the Korean Conflict,”
-<i>U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings</i>, 80, no. 12: 1337–1340 (December 1954).</p>
-
-<p>Geer, Andrew. <i>The New Breed: The Story of the U. S. Marines in Korea.</i>
-New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.</p>
-
-<p>Giusti, Ernest H., and Kenneth W. Condit. “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,”
-<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 36, no. 7: 18–27 (July 1952).</p>
-
-<p>Gugeler, Russell A., Capt, USA, Editor. <i>Combat Actions in Korea.</i> Washington:
-Combat Forces Press, 1954.</p>
-
-<p>Hering, Eugene R., Capt, USN. “Address Before American Medical Association
-Convention.” Copy in possession of Lynn Montross.</p>
-
-<p>——. “Address Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons.” Copy in
-possession of Lynn Montross.</p>
-
-<p>Hospelhorn, Cecil W., Capt, USA. “Aerial Supply in Korea,” <i>Combat Forces
-Journal</i>, 1, no. 10: 29–30 (May 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Jaskilka, Samuel, Capt, USMC. “Easy Alley,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 35, no. 5:
-15–19 (May 1951).</p>
-<span class="pagenum" id="Page_411">411</span>
-<p>Karig, Walter, Capt, USN, Cdr Malcolm Cagle, USN, and LtCdr Frank A.
-Manson, USN. <i>Battle Report</i>: Vol VI, <i>The War in Korea</i>. New York:
-Rinehart, 1952.</p>
-
-<p>MacArthur, Douglas, Gen, USA. <i>Eleventh Report of the Operations in Korea
-of United Nations Forces.</i> 31 January 1951. Washington: Government
-Printing Office, 1951.</p>
-
-<p>——. “Gen. MacArthur Makes His Reply,” <i>Life</i>, 40, no. 7: 94–96, 101–102,
-104, 107–108 (13 February 1956).</p>
-
-<p>Mao Tze-tung. <i>Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolutionary War.</i> Edited by
-LtCol F. B. Nihart, USMC. Quantico: Marine Corps Schools, 1951.</p>
-
-<p>Marshall, S. L. A. CCF in the Attack. 5 January 1951. [EUSAK Staff Memorandum
-ORO-S26]. Copy in R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>——. “Last Barrier,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 37, no. 1: 20–23, no. 2: 40–46
-(January-February 1953).</p>
-
-<p>McCarthy, Robert C., Capt, USMC. “Fox Hill,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 37,
-no. 3: 16–23 (March 1953).</p>
-
-<p>Montross, Lynn. <i>Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U. S. Marine Combat Helicopters.</i>
-New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.</p>
-
-<p>——. “Development of Body Armor,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 39, no. 6: 10–16
-(June 1955).</p>
-
-<p>——. “Ridge Runners of Toktong Pass,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 37, no. 5:
-16–23 (May 1953).</p>
-
-<p>Moorad, George. <i>Lost Peace in China.</i> New York: E. P. Dutton &amp; Co., 1949.</p>
-
-<p>Office of the Chief of Military History. Report from the Secretary of Defense
-to the President of the United States on Operations in Korea. Draft no. 1.
-Copy in R&amp;O File, HQMC Historical.</p>
-
-<p>Read, Benjamin S., Capt, USMC, as told to Hugh Morrow. “Our Guns Never
-Got Cold,” <i>Saturday Evening Post</i>, 223, no. 40: 32–3 (April 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Rigg, Robert B., LtCol, USA. <i>Red China’s Fighting Hordes.</i> Harrisburg:
-Military Service Publishing Co., 1951.</p>
-
-<p>Schnabel, James F., Maj, USA. The Korean Conflict: Policy, Planning, Direction.
-MS at OCMH.</p>
-
-<p>Stiles, Charles R., 1stLt, USMC. “Dead End of Ambush Alley,” <i>Marine Corps
-Gazette</i>, 36, no. 11: 38–45 (November 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Tallent, Robert W., SSgt, USMC. “New Enemy,” <i>Leatherneck Magazine</i>, 34,
-no. 2: 12–15 (February 1951).</p>
-
-<p>Taplett, Robert D., LtCol, USMC, and Maj Russell E. Whipple, USMC. “Darkhorse
-Sets the Pace,” <i>Marine Corps Gazette</i>, 37, no. 6; 14–23, no. 7: 44–51
-(June-July 1953).</p>
-
-<p>Thomas, R. C. W., Maj, British Army. “The Chinese Communist Forces in
-Korea.” <i>The Army Quarterly</i>, October 1952, digested in <i>Military Review</i>,
-32, no. 11: 87–91 (February 1953).</p>
-
-<p>Truman, Harry S. <i>Memoirs</i>, 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955–1956.</p>
-
-<p>U. S. Department of State. <i>Guide to the U. N. in Korea.</i> Washington: U. S.
-Government Printing Office, 1951. State Department Publications 4229, Far
-East Series 47.</p>
-<span class="pagenum" id="Page_412">412</span>
-<p>——. <i>United Nations Actions in Korea.</i> Washington: U. S. Government
-Printing Office, 1951. State Department Publications 4051.</p>
-
-<p>——. Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs. <i>United States Relations
-with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949.</i> Washington:
-U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949. State Department Publications
-3573, Far East Series 30.</p>
-
-<p>Walker, Richard L. <i>China Under Communism: The First Five Years.</i> New
-Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.</p>
-
-<p>Westover, John G., Capt, USA, Editor. <i>Combat Support in Korea.</i> Washington:
-Combat Forces Press, 1955.</p>
-
-<p>Whitney, Courtney, MajGen, USA. <i>MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History.</i>
-New York: Knopf, 1956.</p>
-
-<p>Willoughby, Charles A., and John Chamberlain. <i>MacArthur 1941–1951.</i> New
-York: McGraw Hill, [1954].</p>
-
-<p>Xenophon. <i>The Anabasis of Cyrus.</i> Translated by Henry C. Dakyns. In Francis
-R. B. Godolphin, Editor. <i>The Greek Historians.</i> 2 vols. New York: Random
-House, [1942].</p>
-</div>
-</div>
-
-<hr />
-
-<div class="chapter"><div class="index">
-<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_413">413</span></p>
-
-<h2 class="nobreak" id="Index">Index</h2>
-
-<ul class="index">
-<li class="ifrst">Aid station, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Aircraft</li>
-<li class="isub1">Air Force and Navy Bombers, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">AT-6 (Mosquito), <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">B-26, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">C-47, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">C-119, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Carrier planes, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">F4U (Corsair), <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">F-51 (Mustang), <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">HO3S-1 <i>See</i> <a href="#Helicopters">Helicopters</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub1">L5G, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Marine aircraft, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Mariners, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Navy planes, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Night fighters, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Observation planes (OY-2s), <a href="#Page_66">66–69</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">R4D, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">R5D, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Spotter plane, <a href="#Page_154">154</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Sunderlands, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">TBM, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Transport planes, Marine, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Air drop, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Air Force, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Far East Air Forces (FEAF), <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Combat Cargo Command, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Fifth Air Force, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Commanding general, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Headquarters, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">RAAF Australian F-51s (Mustangs), <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Air_strikes"></a>Air strikes, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Air_support">Air Support</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Air strip</li>
-<li class="isub1">C-47, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">OY strip (Yudam-ni), <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">OY strip (Hagaru), <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">OY strip (Majon-ni), <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Air_support"></a>Air support, <a href="#Page_54">54–56</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Air_strikes">Air Strikes</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub1">Breakout, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Close, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Evacuation, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Observation, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Procedures, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Reconnaissance, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Air operations, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Cargo, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Control, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Air Defense Controllers, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Cover, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Innovations, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Problems, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Almond, Lt Gen Edward M., USA, <a href="#Page_8">8–10</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37–39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_90">90<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Alvarez, SSgt. R. C, <a href="#Page_183">183<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_257">257<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_266">266<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_288">288<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ambushes, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ambush Alley, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ammer, 1st Lt Henry G., <a href="#Page_255">255</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ammunition, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Artillery, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Bomb, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Mortar, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Small arms, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Amyotte, Cpl George A. J., <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Anbyon, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Anderson, LtCol Berry K., USA, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Anderson, LCdr Gustave T., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Antung, Manchuria, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_414">414</span>Anzio, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Arioli, Lt Peter E., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Armor, body, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Armstrong, Capt Victor A., <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Army, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Army_Units"></a>Army Units, U. S.</li>
-<li class="isub1">Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">121st Army Evacuation Hospital, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">181st Counter Intelligence Corps team (CIC), <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Fourth Signal Battalion, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Provisional Battalion, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Special Operations Company, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">IX Corps, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">X Corps, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8–11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21–27</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40–44</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–134</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335–338</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Command Post. <i>See</i> <a href="#Headquarters">Headquarters, X Corps</a>, below.</li>
-<li class="isub2"><a id="Headquarters"></a>Headquarters, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Railway Transportation Section, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Tactical Air Command, (TAC X Corps), <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">1st Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">2d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">3d Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337–339</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">7th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">24th Infantry Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">2d Engineer Special Brigade, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">187th Airborne RCT <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">7th Regimental Combat Team, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">15th Regimental Combat Team, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">17th Regimental Combat Team, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">31st Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Company B, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Tank Company, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">32d Infantry Regiment, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">65th Regimental Combat Team, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126–128</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">10th Engineer Battalion, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Company D, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">185th Engineer Battalion, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">50th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic-weapons) Battalion, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">57th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">96th Field Artillery Battalion, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126–128</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Artillery, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Army, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Chinese Communist Forces, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Marine, <a href="#Page_108">108–110</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Support, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ascom City, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Audas, SSgt John D., <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Austin, Capt Bernard L., <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Avant, Maj Percy F., Jr., <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Babe, 1stLt George A., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Badoeng Strait</i> (CVE), USS, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ball, 1stLt Raymond O., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Banks, LtCol Charles L., <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Banks, Capt David W., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Barber, Capt William E., <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Barr, MajGen David G., USA, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Barrett, Capt R. L., Jr., <a href="#Page_208">208<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Barrow, Capt Robert H., <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_55">55<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314–316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bartley, LtCol Whitman S., <a href="#Page_279">279<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_305">305<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Bataan</i> (CVL), USS, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bates, Maj W. L., Jr., <a href="#Page_221">221<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Batterton, Col Boeker C., <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Bayfield</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Beaches</li>
-<li class="isub1">Hungnam</li>
-<li class="isub2">BLUE, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">GREEN, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">PINK, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">YELLOW, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Wonson</li>
-<li class="isub2">BLUE, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">RED, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li>
-<li class="isub2"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_415">415</span>YELLOW, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Beall, LtCol Olin L., <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bear, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Beech, Keyes, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Beeler, 1stLt James D., <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Belleau Wood, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Belli, 1stLt George S., <a href="#Page_46">46<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Benson, Pfc Robert F., <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Betts, 1stLt Harrison F., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bey, 1stLt R. T., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Beyes, 1stLt Warren J., <a href="#Page_107">107<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blanchard, LtCol Robert M., USA, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blancheri, 1stLt Howard A., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blankenship, Capt C. P., <a href="#Page_244">244<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blasingame, Capt Hersel D. C., <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blatt, Capt Wallace D., <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blocking and Escort Force, United Nations, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Blumenson, Capt Martin, USA, <a href="#Page_8">8<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_243">243<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Booby trap, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Boley, 2dLt James J., <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Borgomainero, SSgt Russell J., <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bott, 2dLt Kenneth A., <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bowman, Lt George, <a href="#Page_263">263<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bowser, Col Alpha L., <a href="#Page_26">26<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_38">38<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_39">39<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_43">43<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, 60, <a href="#Page_89">89<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_92">92<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Boxer</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bradley, 1stLt Bobbie B., <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bradley, Gen O. N., USA, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Breakout"></a>Breakout</li>
-<li class="isub1">Logistics, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Plans, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bridge, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">M-2 Steel Treadway, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329–331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Bridges, Maj David W., <a href="#Page_46">46<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_50">50<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_314">314<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_321">321<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_325">325<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Brower, Col. James H., <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Brush</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Brzezinski, Maj Henry, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Buck, 1stLt John A., <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Bunkers"></a>Bunkers, Chinese Communist Forces, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Burke, 1stLt John L., Jr., <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Cafferatta, Pvt Hector A., <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cahill, 2dLt John H., <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Camaratta, 2dLt August L., <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Camp Lejeune, <a href="#Page_330">330<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Canney, Maj John J., <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Canzona, 1stLt N. A., <a href="#Page_215">215<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Capraro, Capt M. J., <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Carey, 2dLt Richard E., <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_235">235<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_241">241<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Carlon, 1stLt Francis B., <a href="#Page_49">49–51</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Carlson, CWO Allen, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Caruso, Sgt Matthew, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cashion, 2dLt Dana B., <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Casualties</li>
-<li class="isub1">Army, U. S., <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243–245</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Chinese Communist Forces, <a href="#Page_108">108–110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181–183</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Enemy losses, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Evacuation, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Control Officer, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Marine, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190–192</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240–243</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278–281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306–308</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330–332</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Casualty list, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">North Korean (NKPA), <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Personnel losses, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Republic of Korea Army, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Catania, Lt Alfred J., <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cates, Gen Clifton B., <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Ceylon</i> (CL), HMS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chabek, 1stLt Jack A., <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Challacombe, Capt Arthur D., <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chamberlain, J., <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chambers 1stLt George C, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chandler, 1stLt J. B., <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Changjin, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Chatterer</i> (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cherisophus, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chiang Kai-shek, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chigyong, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80–82</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chiles, LtCol John H., USA, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">China, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Central Committee, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Civil War, <a href="#Page_83">83–85</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">“Hate America” campaign, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Intervention, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Kiangsi Province (South China), <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_416">416</span>North China, Occupation by Marines, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">People’s Revolutionary Military Council, <a href="#Page_86">86</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">“Resist America, Aid Korea” movement, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Seventh Party Congress, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chinese Communist Forces, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Assault, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Bugle calls, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Bunkers. <i>See</i> <a href="#Bunkers">Bunkers</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub1">Command Post, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Counterstroke, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Entrenchment, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Equipment, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Fortifications, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Intervention, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Jet fighters, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Logistics, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">“Long March”, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Organization, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">People’s Liberation Army (PLA), <a href="#Page_83">83–85</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Plans, <a href="#Page_353">353</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Rank, <a href="#Page_88">88</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Recruiting, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Reinforcements, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Roadblock, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Strategic concepts, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Strategy, <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Strong point, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Tactics, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91–94</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Training, <a href="#Page_87">87</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Troops, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Uniforms, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Units</li>
-<li class="isub2">3d Field Army, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">4th Field Army, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">9th Army Group, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354–356</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">20th Army, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352–355</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">24th Army, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">26th Army, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352–355</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">27th Army, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">30th Army, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">32d Army, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">42d Army, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">58th Division, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">59th Division, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">60th Division, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">70th Division, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">76th Division, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">77th Division, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">78th Division, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">79th Division, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">80th Division, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">81st Division, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">89th Division, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">94th Division, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">124th Division, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">125th Division, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">126th Division, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">172d Regiment, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">173d Regiment, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">174th Regiment, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">176th Regiment, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">179th Regiment, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">235th Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">236th Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">237th Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">267th Regiment, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">370th Regiment, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">371st Regiment, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">372d Regiment, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Chinese Nationalists, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chinhung-ni, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133–141</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–149</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307–309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312–314</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323–327</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Tank Battle, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chinnampo, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chonchon-ni, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chongjin, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chongju, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chongsanjangsi, <a href="#Page_36">36–38</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chou En-Lai, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chorwon, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chosin, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Campaign, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Results, <a href="#Page_356">356–339</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Reservoir, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145–149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Withdrawal from. <i>See</i> <a href="#Breakout">Breakout</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cho Il Kwon, Col (NKPA), <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Chuchonhujang, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="CIC"></a>CIC, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Civil affairs, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Clark, Maj Albert L, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Clark, 1stLt Truman, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Clearing stations, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Clements, 1stLt Leonard M., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Clothing, cold weather, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_417">417</span>Cochran, Maj Robert L., <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Codispoti, Capt Gildo S., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Coffman, 2dLt Harold L., <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cole, LtCol J. Frank, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Collett</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Collins, Capt E. E., <a href="#Page_172">172<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_183">183<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_186">186<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Colmery, 1stLt Harry W., <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Command Post. <i>See</i> Unit concerned.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Commander in Chief Far East (CinCFE). <i>See</i> <a href="#MacArthur_General_of_the_Army_Douglas">General of the Army Douglas MacArthur</a>, USA.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt). <i>See</i> <a href="#Radford_Adm_Arthur_W">Adm Arthur W. Radford</a>, USN.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Commander Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7). <i>See</i> <a href="#Struble_VAdm_Arthur_D">VAdm A. D. Struble</a>, USN.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Commiskey, 2dLt Henry A., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Communications, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Wire, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Composite battalion, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Condit, Kenneth W., <a href="#Page_32">32<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_138">138<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Conference, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Connell, Capt H. G., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Consolation</i> (AH), USS, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Convoy, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Enemy, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Motor, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cook, Col John H., Jr., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cooke, Capt Leroy M., <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cool, Capt William C, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Coon, Cpl G. L., <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cooney, Capt Thomas E., <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Corbet, 2dLt R. H., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Corley, Capt Clarence E., Jr., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_73">73<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208–211</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Corman, Capt Otis W. S., <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Correspondents"></a>Correspondents, press, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Craig, BrigGen Edward A., <a href="#Page_45">45<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_76">76<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Craven, LCdr John H., USN, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_172">172<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Craven, 1stLt William A., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cronin, Maj Angus J., <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cronk, Capt Welby W., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Crossman, 1stLt Ralph B., <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_114">114<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Crowe, LtCol Henry P., <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Crutchfield, 2dLt James L., <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Counter Intelligence Corps. <i>See</i> <a href="#CIC">CIC</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">D-Day (Wonsan Landing), <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dairen, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dakyns, Henry C., <a href="#Page_357">357<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Damnation Battalion, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dana, 1stLt C. C., <a href="#Page_180">180<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Danford, SSgt R. R., <a href="#Page_180">180<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Davidson, Sgt Charles V., <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Davis, Maj Daniel H., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Davis, Sgt K. E., <a href="#Page_208">208<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Davis, LtCol Raymond G., <a href="#Page_80">80<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270–273</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Davis, Capt W. J., <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dawe, 2dLt Harold L., <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Degernes, 2dLt Mayhlon, L., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Delong, 1stLt Earl R., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Demolitions, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Teams, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">C3 explosive, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">DeMott, Pfc Robert D., <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dennis, 1stLt Carl E., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Denny, 2dLt Paul E., <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Derevyanko, LtGen Kuzma, (USSR), <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dickerson, Sgt C W., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dirst, WO Lloyd V., <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dolcater, Capt Max W., USA, <a href="#Page_74">74<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_76">76<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_77">77<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_126">126<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_127">127<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_309">309<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dowsett, LtCol Frederick W., <a href="#Page_114">114<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Doyle_RAdm_James_H"></a>Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23–25</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–31</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Amphibious Group, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Doyle, Capt R. A., <a href="#Page_67">67<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_68">68<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Doyle</i> (DMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Drury, Clifford M., <a href="#Page_40">40<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Drysdale, LtCol Douglas B., RM., <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228–231</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Duffy, 1stLt Leroy M., <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Duke, Capt Irving T., <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Dumps"></a>Dumps, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Ammunition, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Enemy, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">RCT-7, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Area, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Medical, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">ROK, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Duncan, David, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dunkerque, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dunne, 1stLt John M., <a href="#Page_180">180</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Durham, Maj Thomas A., <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Dyer, BrigGen E. C., <a href="#Page_387">387<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">418</span>Dysentery, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Eagan, Maj James K., <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Earney, Maj W. R., <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_107">107<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_193">193<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Eberle, MajGen George L., USA, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Edwards, LtCol H. W., <a href="#Page_29">29<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Elledge, 1stLt Raymond J., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Endicott</i> (DMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Endsley, 2dLt Wendell C., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Enemy, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Engineers, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Army, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Demolitions crew, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>English</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Englehardt, 1stLt Floyd J., <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Estess, Sgt M. L., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ewen, RAdm Edward C., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Faber, TSgt Don, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Faith, LtCol Don C., USA, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Far_East_Command"></a>Far East Command. <i>See</i> <a href="#MacArthur_General_of_the_Army_Douglas">General of the Army Douglas MacArthur</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub1">General Headquarters, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Farish, Capt George B., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Farmer, 1stLt Chester B., <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Feehan, LtCol Harvey A., <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fisher, 1stLt Joseph R., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fisher, Sgt Robert, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fleischaker, Lt Robert J., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Floodlights, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Forney, Col Edward H., <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Forrest, 1stLt Shelby M., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Forward Air Controller (FAC), <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Forward Observer (FO) team, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Foster, Sgt Charles, <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Foster, Pvt Richard J., <a href="#Page_127">127<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">France, Capt Donald R., <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Frederick, Capt Charles D., <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Freeman, Capt A. Z., <a href="#Page_159">159<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_180">180<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fridrich, LtCol R. V., <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Frostbite, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fuel, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Diesel oil, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Gasoline, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Funchilin Pass, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312–314</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Fusen Reservoir, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Gall, Maj W., <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Gallo, SSgt Saverio P., <a href="#Page_202">202</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Gastro-enteritis, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="GCA"></a>GCA, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Geer, LtCol Andrew, <a href="#Page_62">62<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_73">73<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_107">107<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_179">179<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_186">186<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_187">187<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_189">189<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_271">271<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_288">288<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_314">314<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_318">318<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>George Clymer</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Giusti, Ernest H., <a href="#Page_32">32<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Godolphin, F. R. B., <a href="#Page_357">357<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Goggin, 1stLt W. F., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_109">109<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_110">110<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Golden, Pfc Jack, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Goss, 2dLt Harvey A., <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Gould, Capt William R., <a href="#Page_300">300–302</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Graeber, 1stLt William C., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Grayson, MSgt E. F., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Greene, 1stLt Daniel, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Griffen, Lt (jg) Cornelius J., (ChC) USN, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Groff, Capt Goodwin C., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ground Control Approach. <i>See</i> <a href="#GCA">GCA</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Guadalcanal, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Guerrillas, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70–72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125–128</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">First Raid on MSR, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Gugeler, Capt Russel A., USA, <a href="#Page_243">243<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Hagaru, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134–141</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159–161</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200–205</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_207">207–211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213–220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229–231</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238–247</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280–283</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285–291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305–309</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Airstrip, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Breakout, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296–302</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Air cover, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Demolitions, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_283">283–286</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Destruction of excess material, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Intelligence, <a href="#Page_202">202–204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Medical, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Military government, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hall, 2dLt Wayne L., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hamhung, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–82</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125–128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133–138</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, 304, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Han River, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">419</span>Hancock, 1stLt John R., <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hangkow, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Hank</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hapsu, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hargett, 1stLt Ernest C., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harmon, Capt Lester G., <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harriman, Averell, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harris, MajGen Field, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harris, 1stLt H. H., <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harris, LtCol William F., <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harrison, TSgt C. L., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harrison, Col C. W., <a href="#Page_2">2<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_81">81<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Harrison, CWO Willie S., <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hartman, RAdm Charles C., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hawkins, LtCol Jack, <a href="#Page_44">44<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_53">53<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Heater, Capt James B., <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Helena</i> (CA), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Helicopters"></a>Helicopters, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56–58</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–150</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">HO3S-1, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">HMX-1, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hell Fire Valley, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Task_Force_Drysdale">Task Force, Drysdale</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Henderson, Col Frederick P., <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Henderson, RAdm George R., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Henneberger, Capt Harry G. C., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hering, Capt Eugene R., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hermanson, Capt Chester R., <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hickey, MajGen Doyle O., USA, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Highway, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Higginbotham, Capt S. W., <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_299">299<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Higgins, RAdm John M., USN, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Higgins, Marguerite, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill D, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Hill_1457">Hill 1457</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill, East, <a href="#Page_204">204–207</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213–220</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240–242</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill, Fox, <a href="#Page_180">180–182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill, How, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Hill_891">Hill 891</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 109——<a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 117——<a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 185——<a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 532——<a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 698——<a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107–109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 727——<a href="#Page_103">103–105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Hill_891"></a>Hill 891——<a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_118">118–120</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 987——<a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Hill_1081"></a>Hill 1081——<a href="#Page_312">312–316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1100——<a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1167——<a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1182——<a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1236——<a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1240——<a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1276——<a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1282——<a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183–187</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Ridge_North">Ridge, North</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1294——<a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1304——117<i>n</i>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Hill_1328"></a>Hill 1328——<a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1384——<a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1403——<a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156–158</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1419——<a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257–259</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1426——<a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Hill_1457"></a>Hill 1457——<a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1520——<a href="#Page_261">261–264</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1542——<a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266–268</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hill 1653——<a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hinds, 1stLt John R., <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hodes, BrigGen Henry I., USA, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hoffstetter, Pfc Donald O., <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Holland, 1stLt Dan C., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Holloway, LCdr Charles K., USN, <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Holmes, 1stLt Donald M., <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Honeycutt, 1stLt J. H., <a href="#Page_288">288<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hood, Maj H. E., <a href="#Page_282">282<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hope, Bob, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hopkins, 2dLt Frederick W., <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hospelhorn, Capt Cecil W., USA, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hospital, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">House, 1stLt Arthur E., <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hovatter, 1stLt Eugenous M., <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hubbell, J. C., <a href="#Page_327">327<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Huchanggangu, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Huichon, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Huksu-ri, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hull, Capt Milton A., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_167">167<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_172">172<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hungmun-ni, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hungnam, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Cemetery, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_420">420</span>Evacuation, <a href="#Page_338">338–343</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_335">335–337</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Warnings, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Mine clearance, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Redeployment, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Withdrawal to. <i>See</i> <a href="#Breakout">Breakout</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hwachon, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Hyesanjin, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Imjin, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Inchon, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13–15</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21–27</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Amphibious assault, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Landing, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Inchon-Seoul Operation, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Incredible</i> (AM) USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Indigestion, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Itami, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Iwo Jima, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Iwon, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Jaeger, 2dLt John W., <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Japan, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Logistical command, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, <a href="#Page_161">161<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jennings, 1stLt William E., <a href="#Page_107">107<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jessup, Ambassador Philip, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jeter, 1stLt Manning T., Jr., <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jochums, 1stLt Robert E., <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, Capt David G., <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, 1stLt Horace L., Jr., <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, Cdr Howard A., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, Secretary of Defense Louis, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, 1stLt Richard M., <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Johnson, 1stLt William E., <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), <a href="#Page_5">5–9</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Operations Center (JOC), <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Joint Special Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG). <i>See</i> <a href="#Far_East_Command">Far East Command</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jones, Capt Clovis M., <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jones, 2dLt Donald R., <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jones, SSgt Donald T., <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jones, TSgt H. T., <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Jones, Capt Jack R., <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Joy_VAdm_C_Turner"></a>Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Kaesong, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kalma Peninsula, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kanggye, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132–134</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Karig, Walter, <a href="#Page_23">23<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_27">27<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_28">28<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_29">29<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_142">142<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Katsuma, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kaufer, 1stLt Edward E., <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Keeton, Sgt E. J., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kerr, Capt William A., <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kerrigan, Maj W. E., <a href="#Page_172">172<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kiernan, Capt J. I., Jr., <a href="#Page_53">53<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_244">244<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kiesling, Cpl Curtis J., <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kiester, 1stLt K. E., <a href="#Page_244">244<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kim Il Sung, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kimpo, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">King, Capt George W., <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kite (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Klepsig, Cpl D. E., <a href="#Page_327">327<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Knox, TSgt Edwin L., <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kobe, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kogae-gol, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Koingdong, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kojo, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44–46</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48–59</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Marine positions, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Railroad station, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Korea, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">North, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Entry into, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Orders, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Plans, <a href="#Page_7">7–10</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Political considerations, <a href="#Page_2">2–5</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">North Korean People’s Republic, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">People’s Political Council, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">People’s Army (NKPA), <a href="#Page_1">1–3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5–7</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Prisoners of War, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Units</li>
-<li class="isub5">2d Division, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">5th Division, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">10th Division, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">15th Division, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">10th Regiment, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">45th Regiment, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">48th Regiment, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">50th Regiment, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">344th Tank Regiment, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">South</li>
-<li class="isub2">Republic of Korea, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Army (ROKA), <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Units</li>
-<li class="isub5">I Corps, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">II Corps, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">Capital Division, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">1st Division, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">3d Division, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">6th Division, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub5"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_421">421</span>7th Division, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">8th Division, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">18th Regiment, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">22d Regiment, 2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_46">46</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">26th Regiment, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">101st Engineer Group (C), <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Navy. <i>See</i> <a href="#Ships">ships</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Marine Corps (KMC), <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">1st Regiment, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">5th Battalion, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Police, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Koto-ri, <a href="#Page_80">80<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–148</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224–226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282–284</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286–288</a>, <a href="#Page_295">295–298</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305–309</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Airstrip (OY), <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Air support, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Breakout air support plans, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Breakout, <a href="#Page_314">314–331</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Bridge, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Intelligence, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mass burial, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312–314</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Medical, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kowon, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Krabbe, 2dLt Donald J., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kraince, 1stLt F. R., <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Krieg, 1stLt Elmer A., <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Krulak, Col Victor H., <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kulbes, Capt Philip A., <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kumwha, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kunuri, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kuokka, Maj H. D., <a href="#Page_287">287<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_347">347<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kuomintang, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kurcaba, 1stLt Joseph R., <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Kyolmul-ni, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Landing Signal Officer, Carrier, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lavoie, LtCol Leon F., USA, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lawrence, Maj James F., <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lee, Lt Chew Een, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lee, Maj Christian C., <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lee, Feng Hsi, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lee, Doctor Tong Kak, <a href="#Page_243">243<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Leeds, Cpl Joseph, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lessenden, LCdr Chester M. (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lett, Cpl C. P., <a href="#Page_330">330</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Leyte Gulf</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lice, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lin Pao, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lipscomb, 1stLt W. R., <a href="#Page_244">244<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Litters, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Litzenberg_Col_Homer_L"></a>Litzenberg, Col Homer L., <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_148">148<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_251">251<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_264">264<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_266">266<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_267">267<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Command Post, <a href="#Page_117">117</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Liu Sheng Hsi, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lockwood, LtCol Randolph, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lodge, Capt O. R., <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Longstaff, 1stLt Robert A., <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Lorigan, Maj Robert E., <a href="#Page_44">44<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_54">54<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Mabry, Maj Clarence J., <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="MacArthur_General_of_the_Army_Douglas"></a>MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, USA, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_7">7–11</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–36</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Communique of 24 November, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">MacLean, Col Allan D., USA, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Maddox</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Marine Phoenix</i> (T-AP), USNS, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Magness, 2dLt B. L., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Main Supply Route (MSR), <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103–106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108–110</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–149</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178–182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261–263</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312–315</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–329</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Near Sudong, <a href="#Page_3">3</a> November, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Wonsan to Hamhung, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Majon-dong, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Majon-ni, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–74</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Logistics, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Manchuria, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Manpojin, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_422">422</span>Mao Tse-tung, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_91">91<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Strategic Aims, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Moscow, December of 1949, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Marine Corps, U. S.</li>
-<li class="isub1">Air, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Birthday, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Units,</li>
-<li class="isub2">Fleet Marine Force</li>
-<li class="isub3">Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Air Delivery Platoon, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Combat Service Group, <a href="#Page_39">39–41</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">7th Motor Transport Battalion, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company B, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Marine Air Wing, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348–350</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Commanding General, <a href="#Page_33">33</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-1), <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Air Defense Section, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub4"><a id="Air_Support_Section"></a>Air Support Section, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Marine Aircraft Group 12, <a href="#Page_32">32–34</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters Squadron 12, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Service Squadron 12, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-212, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-214, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347–349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-311, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-312, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-321, <a href="#Page_230">230</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF-323, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF(N)-513, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMF(N)-542, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMR-152, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">VMO-6, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Provisional Marine Brigade, <a href="#Page_2">2<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Marine Division, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21–27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37–39</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43–45</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131–134</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353–356</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Command Post, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub5">Rear Command Post, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Marine Command Group, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters Battalion, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Military Police Company, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Reconnaissance Company, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters Company, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Composite Battalion, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Marines, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54–56</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>. <i>See also</i> Col <a href="#Puller_Col_Lewis_B">Lewis B. Puller</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Commanding Officer, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Anti-tank Company, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_4">4</a>.2 Mortar Company, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53–56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312–316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_211">211</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company A, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71–73</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314–316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company B, <a href="#Page_48">48–54</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314–316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company C, <a href="#Page_49">49–51</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company D, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company E, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company F, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_224">224</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_423">423</span>3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61–63</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Commanding Officer, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company G, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204–206</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company H, <a href="#Page_66">66–68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209–211</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company I, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207–209</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Fifth Marines, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158–160</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284–287</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Murray_LtCol_Raymond_L">LtCol Raymond L. Murray</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Command Post, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Anti-tank Company, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company A, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184–186</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company B, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company C, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185–187</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163–166</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company D, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company E, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186–189</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company F, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253–255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261–263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270–272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company G, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company H, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261–263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company I, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Seventh Marines, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–81</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98–100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102–104</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123–125</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135–137</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147–149</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257–265</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284–288</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296–298</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317–319</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–326</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Litzenberg_Col_Homer_L">Col Homer L. Litzenberg</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Command Post, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108–110</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_4">4</a>.2-inch Mortar Company, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Anti-tank Company, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102–105</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company A, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103–105</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company B, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company C, <a href="#Page_103">103–106</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-<li class="isub4"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_424">424</span>Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106–109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296–298</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post (Sudong, <a href="#Page_3">3</a> November), <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Group, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company D, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company E, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company F, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180–182</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189–191</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184–188</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Command Post, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company G, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company H, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company I, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Weapons Company, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Company J, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Eleventh Marines, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Battalion, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery B, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery C, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">2d Battalion, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery D, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery E, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery F, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">3d Battalion, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery G, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery H, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery I, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">4th Battalion, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Provisional infantry platoons, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Battery K, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company A, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company B, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company C, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company B, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Engineer Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Headquarters Company, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company A, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company B, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company C, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company D, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Medical Battalion, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Division Hospital, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Clearing stations, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company A, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company B, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company C, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company D, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company E, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Motor Transport Battalion, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Ordnance Battalion, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Service Battalion, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">1st Regulating Detachment, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Shore Party Battalion, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_425">425</span>Shore Party Group C, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Signal Battalion, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">1st Tank Battalion, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">H&amp;S Company, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company A, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company B, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232–234</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company C, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Company D, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Marshall, George C., <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">General, USA, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Secretary of Defense, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Marshall, S. L. A., <a href="#Page_92">92<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_314">314<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_321">321<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Martin, P. G., <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Masan, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mason, Lt Ronald A., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mattox, 2dLt Charles, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Maxwell, Marilyn, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McAlister, Col. Francis A., <a href="#Page_38">38<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McCaleb, Alfred F., Jr., <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McCardell, Cpl E., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McCarthy, 1stLt Robert C., <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McCarthy, Capt Thomas E., <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McClane, Capt George E., <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McClelland, Capt John C., Jr., <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McClelland, 1stLt William A., <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McDermott, Cpl Joseph E., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McDurmin, SSgt R. E., <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McElroy, Capt John W., USNR, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McFarland, 2dLt Robert L., <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McGaw, Col Hugh D., <a href="#Page_311">311</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McGhee, Lt James M., <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McGuiness, 1stLt Clarence E., <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McLaughlin, 1stLt Gerald J., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McLaughlin, LtCol J. N., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_231">231–234</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McNaughtton, 1stLt George C., <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McPhersen, SSgt Stanley B., <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">McReynolds, Maj William, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_287">287<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mead, BrigGen Armistead D., USA, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Medical, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Medics, Navy, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Surgical teams, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Medical supplies, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Plasma, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Meeker, 1stLt Ermine L., <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Meister, Pfc William H., <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Memorial services, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Merganser</i> (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Merrit, 2dLt Max A., <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Messman, 1stLt Robert C., <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Military Sea Transport Service, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Miller, Capt J. H., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Milne, LtCol Harry T., <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mines, naval, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Missouri</i> (BB), USS, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28–30</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mitchell, 1stLt Grady P., <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mitchell, 2dLt James M., <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mize, 1stLt Charles D., <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Mocking Bird</i> (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Moji, Japan, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Moisell, LtCol Harry E., <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Moncrief, Capt Malcolm G., Jr., <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mongolia, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Monk, MSgt Matthew D., <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Montross, Lynn, <a href="#Page_179">179<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_180">180<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_246">246<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_330">330<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mooney, 2dLt A. R., <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_120">120<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Moorad, George, <a href="#Page_83">83<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Morehead, Capt Robert A., <a href="#Page_160">160</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Morehouse, RAdm Albert K., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Morris, Capt. John F., <a href="#Page_178">178–180</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Morris, Maj Warren, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Moscow, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mortar support, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Motor march (Wonsan to Hamhung), <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Mount McKinley</i> (AGC), USS, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341–343</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Muccio, Ambassador to Korea John, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mukden, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Munchon, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79–81</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Munday, Maj. Jack R., <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Munsell, SSgt Russell A., <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Mupyong-ni, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133–135</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Murphy, SSgt Daniel M., <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Murray_LtCol_Raymond_L"></a>Murray, LtCol Raymond L., <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Myers, Maj Reginald R., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216–218</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Nanchang rebellion, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Nanking, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Napalm, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Nash, SSgt J. B., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">National Security Council, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory, <a href="#Page_330">330<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Naval gunfire, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_426">426</span>Naval gunfire support, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Navy, U. S.</li>
-<li class="isub1">Units</li>
-<li class="isub2">Naval Forces Far East, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Commander, (ComNavFE). <i>See</i> <a href="#Joy_VAdm_C_Turner">VAdm C. Turner Joy</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Fleet Logistics Air Wing, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Seventh Fleet, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Transport Squadron One, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Tactical Air Control Squadron One, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Joint Task Force 7, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Struble_VAdm_Arthur_D">VAdm A. D. Struble</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Force 77, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Force 79, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Force 90, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Commander (CTF 90), <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Doyle_RAdm_James_H">RAdm J. H. Doyle</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Force 95, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Group 70.1, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Group 95.2 Support and Covering Group, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Group 95.6, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Group 96.2, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Group 96.8, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Tractor Group, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Transport Group, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Amphibious Group One (PhibGru 1), <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Commander (PhiGru 1), <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Amphibious Group Three (PhiGru 3), <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Task Element 90.21, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Needham, 1stLt R. C., <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Newsweek</i>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Newton, 2dLt Minard P., <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>New York Times</i>, <a href="#Page_345">345<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Nichols, Capt Warren, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Nihart, LtCol F. B., <a href="#Page_90">90<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Noble</i> (APA), USS, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Noel, Frank, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Nolan, 2dLt Jack L., <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Noren, Capt Wesley B., <a href="#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_50">50<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">North, Cpl C. R., <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Objective A, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Hill_1328">Hill 1328</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Objective B, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Objective C, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–326</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Objective D, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Hill_1457">Hill 1457</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Objective E, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Hill_1081">Hill 1081</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Observation Posts, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH), <a href="#Page_8">8<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Okinawa, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Olson, Major M. R., <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Operation <i>Yo-Yo</i>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Oro-ri, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Osprey</i> (AM) USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Owen, Lt Joseph, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Pace, Secretary of the Army Frank, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Page, LtCol John U. D., USA, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Page, H. L., Jr., <a href="#Page_327">327<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pak, Sun Chol, MajGen (NKPA), <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Panikkar, K. M., <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Parachute, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Parry, Maj Francis F., <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Partridge, Gen Earle E., USAF, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_309">309<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Partridge, LtCol John H., <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Partridge</i> (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Patrick, 2dLt C. E., <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Patrols, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Payne, SSgt Earle J., <a href="#Page_179">179</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pearl Harbor, <a href="#Page_334">334</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peckham, Capt Charles, <a href="#Page_231">231</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peiping, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peiping-Tientsin (highway), <a href="#Page_85">85<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peleliu, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pendas, TSgt G. D., <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_241">241<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pendry, Capt Edwin, <a href="#Page_107">107<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Penstock Bridge, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>. <i>See also</i> <a href="#Treadway_Bridge">Treadway Bridge</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Persian Empire, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peters, Capt Uel D., <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peterson, 1stLt Elmer G., <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Peterson, 2dLt Willard S., <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL), <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Philippine Sea</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Phillips, Capt W. D., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Pirate</i> (AM), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Plans and Orders</li>
-<li class="isub1">United Nations Command (UNC)</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 2, <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Commander in Chief, Far East (CinCFE)</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Plan 9-50, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Plan 9-50 (Alternate), <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Commander, Seventh Fleet</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 16-50, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Commander, Naval Forces, Far East</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 17-50, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Plan 113-50, <a href="#Page_13">13<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Commander, Amphibious Group I</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 16-50, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Commander, Task Force 90</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 19-50, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">X Corps</li>
-<li class="isub2"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_427">427</span>Operation Order 2-50, <a href="#Page_32">32</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 3, <a href="#Page_14">14<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 4, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 6, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 7, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 8-50, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 9-50, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 10, <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Plan 8, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction (OI) <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction 13, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction 15, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction 17, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction 19, <a href="#Page_249">249</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Instruction 22, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">1st Marine Division</li>
-<li class="isub2">Administrative Order (AdmO) 13-50, <a href="#Page_24">24<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Administrative Order 20-50, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Embarkation Order (EmbO) 2-50, <a href="#Page_21">21<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Embarkation Order 3-50, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Plan 4-50, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 15-50, <a href="#Page_17">17<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 16-50, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_26">26<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 17-50, <a href="#Page_26">26<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 18-50, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 19-50, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 21-50, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 22-50, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 23-50, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 24-50, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 25-50, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 26-50, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">5th Marines</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 39-50, <a href="#Page_151">151<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub1">7th Marines</li>
-<li class="isub2">Operation Order 14-50, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">5th and 7th Marines</li>
-<li class="isub2">Joint Operation Order 1-50, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Joint Operation Order 2-50, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Pledge</i> (AM), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Podolak, Pfc Bruno, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pohujang, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Polson, Capt Robert J., <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Post War planning, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Post Exchange Section, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Press correspondent. <i>See</i> <a href="#Correspondents">Correspondents</a>.</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Press photographers, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Princeton</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Prisoners, Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Prisoners of War (POW), <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Interrogations, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Propaganda (Chinese), <a href="#Page_91">91</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Prosser, TSgt Wilfred H., <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Provisional platoons, <a href="#Page_63">63</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Puckett, 2dLt C. R., <a href="#Page_82">82<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Puller_Col_Lewis_B"></a>Puller, Col Lewis B., <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69–72</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pungsan, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pusan, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pusan Perimeter, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pusong-ni, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pyongyang, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Pyongwon, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Quantico, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Quinn, LtCol William W., USA, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst"><a id="Radford_Adm_Arthur_W"></a>Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Radio, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Communication, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Marine, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">AN/GRC-9, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">SCR 300, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">SCR 610, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Railroad, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rations, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">“C” rations, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Read, Capt Benjamin S., <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Redhead</i> (AMS), USS, <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Reem, 2dLt Robert D., <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Refugees, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Reller, Sgt Othmar J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Replacements, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">USMC, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rhee, President Syngman, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ricardi, SSgt Anthony J., <a href="#Page_118">118</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rickert, LtCol Robert W., <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Ridge_North"></a>Ridge, North, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187–189</a>, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ridge, Northwest, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187–189</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ridge, South, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159–161</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ridge, Southeast, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_428">428</span>Ridge, Southwest, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156–159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ridge, LtCol Thomas L., <a href="#Page_62">62<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_74">74<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200–202</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204–207</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_235">235<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_240">240<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_243">243<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ridgway, MajGen Matthew B., USA, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rigg, LtCol Robert F., <a href="#Page_86">86<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roach, Maj Maurice E., <a href="#Page_80">80<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116–118</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roach, SSgt William, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Road, Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roadblocks, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">CCF, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">USMC, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roberts, Sgt Clayton, <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roberts, Col Dean C., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Robinson, Capt R. B., <a href="#Page_53">53<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Rochester</i> (CA), USS, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Roise, LtCol Harold S., <a href="#Page_66">66<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300–302</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rosen, Lt Norman R., USA, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Rowan</i> (DD) USS, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ruble, RAdm Richard W., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ruffner, MajGen Clark L., USA, <a href="#Page_74">74<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State Dean, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">St. Benedict Abbey, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sakkat Mountain, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Samchok, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Samgo Station, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sandbags, <a href="#Page_208">208</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sariwon, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sasebo, Japan, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sawyer Maj W. D., <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_321">321<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_322">322<i>n</i></a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Command Post, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Schlegel, Pfc Eugene B., <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Schnabel, Maj James F., USA, <a href="#Page_5">5<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_8">8<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_36">36<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_142">142<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_143">143<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Schrier, Capt Harold O., <a href="#Page_262">262</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Schreier, 1stLt William J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Schmuck, LtCol Donald M., <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_322">322<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sears, Capt Norman W., <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Seeburger, 1stLt Edward M., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Seeley, Maj Henry J., <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Seoul, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sexton, Maj M. J., <a href="#Page_281">281<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Seydel, 1stLt Karle F., <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shanghai, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shantung, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sharon, 2dLt D. W., <a href="#Page_82">82<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112–114</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shea, Maj W. E., <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shelnutt, Cape John C., <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shepherd, Capt G. E., <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Ships"></a>Ships</li>
-<li class="isub1">AGC, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">AKA, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">AP, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">APA, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">APD, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Cargo, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Cruiser, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Destroyer, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Hospital, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">JMS-14 (Japanese Mine Sweepers), <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LSD, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LSM, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LSMR, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LST, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339–343</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LST 883, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LST 973, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LST (ROK), <a href="#Page_54">54</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LST (SCAJAP), <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LSTH, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LSU, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LVT, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">LVT (A), <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Transports, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Tugs, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">YMS 516 (ROK Minesweeper), <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">YMS 905 (ROK Mine Sweeper), <a href="#Page_27">27</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><i>See also</i> Ship by name</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shore Party, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shutts, Capt K. A., <a href="#Page_202">202<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_259">259<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_288">288<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_298">298<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Shutts, Maj R. W., <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Siberia, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Sicily</i> (CVE), USS, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Silvis, Capt Richard S. (MC), USN, <a href="#Page_308">308</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Simmons, Maj Edwin H., <a href="#Page_63">63<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Simpson, LtCol F., <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Singalpajin, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sinhung-ni, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sinhung-ni force, <a href="#Page_243">243</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sinhung Valley, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sinuiju, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sitter, Capt Carl L., <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Skelt, 1stLt Earnest P., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_429">429</span>Sleeping bags, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sleds, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, RAdm Allen E., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, Maj George A., <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, Pfc Gerald J., <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, Harry, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, 1stLt H. J., <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, Capt Jack A., <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, 1stLt L. R., <a href="#Page_183">183<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, Capt Samuel S., <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Smith, MajGen Oliver P., <a href="#Page_13">13–15</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23–27</a>, <a href="#Page_29">29–32</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43–45</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54–58</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80–82</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133–136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145–148</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_234">234<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_241">241<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_243">243<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_244">244<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_279">279<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_280">280<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_281">281–283</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_294">294<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_305">305<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_307">307<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_308">308<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_309">309<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_311">311<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_321">321<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_332">332<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_345">345<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_349">349–351</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sneakers, rubber, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Snedeker, Col E. W., <a href="#Page_45">45<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_338">338<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Snelling, 2dLt Edward W., <a href="#Page_216">216</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sniping, CCF, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sniper fire, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Snow, <a href="#Page_270">270</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Snyder, 1stLt Robert E., <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Songchon, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Songchon river, <a href="#Page_106">106<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Songjin, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36–38</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sorensen, 1stLt George A., <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">deSoria, Charles, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sota, 1stLt Anthony J., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Soule, MajGen Robert H., USA, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Soyang-ni, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Spiker, Maj Theodore F., <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Spofford, Capt Richard T., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stalin, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stamford, Capt Edward P., <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stevens, LtCol John W., II, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_272">272<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stewart, Col J. L., <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_266">266<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_272">272<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_300">300<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stiles, 2dLt Charles R., <a href="#Page_63">63<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stocks, MSgt Marian M., <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Storaasli, Capt Paul E., <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stoves, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Strategy</li>
-<li class="isub1">Of Celerity, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Massive compression envelopment, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stretchers, <a href="#Page_279">279</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Strohmenger, Capt Andrew J., <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Struble_VAdm_Arthur_D"></a>Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28–31</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stuart, TSgt H. C., <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Stuart, 1stLt Vaughan R., <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sudong, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103–110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sudong ambush, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sukchon, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sullivan, 1stLt Charles H., <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sunchon, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sung Shin-lun, <a href="#Page_161">161</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sung Wei-shan, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Supplies, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">In-transit depots, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply levels, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Advance Supply Point at Yonpo Airfield, <a href="#Page_80">80</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply Regulating Station Detachment, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply trains, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><i>See also</i> <a href="#Dumps">Dumps</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Supporting Arms Coordinator (SAC), <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Supporting fire, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Surrender Message, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sutter, LtCol Allan, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Swartley, LtCol J. N., <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Sweeney, TSgt James E., <a href="#Page_202">202<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Swenson</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Swinson, Pfc Louis W., <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Swords, 2dLt John J., <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC), <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Airborne TADC, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tactics, Marine, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Taebeck, Mountain Range, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tallent, SSgt Robert W., <a href="#Page_89">89<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tanchon, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tanks</li>
-<li class="isub1">Army, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">USMC, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329–331</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">M4A3 (Sherman), <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">M-26 (Pershing), <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">T-34 (NKPA), <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Tank-dozer, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_430">430</span>Provisional tank platoon, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Taplett, LtCol R. D., <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_257">257<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_258">258<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_261">261–263</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Task Force Anderson, <a href="#Page_245">245</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Task Force Dog, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Task_Force_Drysdale"></a>Task Force Drysdale, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228–235</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Task Force Faith, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Taylor, Capt R. M., <a href="#Page_53">53<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Taylor, 1stLt William W., <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tents, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Warming, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thackrey, Adm Lyman A., USN, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thanksgiving Day, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Theros, Capt John G., <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thirty-eighth Parallel, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5–9</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_346">346</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Thomas</i> (DD), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thomas, 1stLt Alfred I., <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thomas, Maj R. C. W., <a href="#Page_86">86<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Thornton, Cpl D. R., <a href="#Page_159">159<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_180">180<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tientsin, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tighe, Major Thomas B., <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Time</i>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_358">358<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Togwon, <a href="#Page_70">70</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tokchon, <a href="#Page_146">146</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Toksil-li, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Toktong Pass, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270–272</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tokyo, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tonae-ri, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tongchon, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55–57</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tongjong-ni, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tootsie Rolls, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Towanda Victory</i>, SS, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tractor Groups, <a href="#Page_30">30</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tractor Dozers, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Trailers, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Transportation</li>
-<li class="isub1">Rail and Motor Transport, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Railway, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Railway cars, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Train, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Kowon, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Divisional, <a href="#Page_313">313</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">No. 1, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324–326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">No. 2, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Regimental</li>
-<li class="isub3">RCT-1, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">5th Marines, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">7th Marines, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Supply, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Trucking Facilities, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Trapnell, 2dLt Nicholas M., <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><a id="Treadway_Bridge"></a>Treadway Bridge, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Trip Flares, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Trompeter, Maj Joseph D., <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_198">198</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Troop Training Unit Pacific, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tsung Hui Tzu, <a href="#Page_185">185</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Truman, President Harry S., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_6">6<i>n</i></a> 7<i>n</i>, <a href="#Page_8">8<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_142">142<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tsinan, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tsingtao, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tuan-di, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Tunner, MajGen William H., USAF, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Turkish Brigade, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Turner, Capt Bryon C., <a href="#Page_99">99</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Twohey, SSgt. Richard B., <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Typewriters, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Uiji, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Uijongbu, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ulsan, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_343">343</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Umbaugh, SSgt Ernest J., <a href="#Page_320">320</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Intervention in the Korean War, <a href="#Page_35">35–37</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Military Mission in Tokyo, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">United Nations (UN), <a href="#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Forces, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Headquarters, <a href="#Page_145">145</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Security Council, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Units</li>
-<li class="isub2">EUSAK. <i>See</i> <a href="#Army_Units">Army Units</a>.</li>
-<li class="isub2">Independent Commando, Royal Marines, (41st Commandos), <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228–231</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233–236</a>, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>, <a href="#Page_318">318–321</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Twenty-seventh Commonwealth Brigade, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">United States, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Defense Department, U. S,, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Military Advisory Group in China, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">State Department, U. S. <a href="#Page_3">3<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">USO, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst"><i>Valley Forge</i> (CV), USS, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Vehicles, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Ambulances, USMC, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Amtrac, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">DUKWS, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Jeeps, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Supply, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Tractors, USMC, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_431">431</span>Trucks, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68–70</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228–230</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Brockway, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_322">322</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Enemy, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Column, <a href="#Page_231">231</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">“Weasel” (M-29), <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Vick, SSgt William L., <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Vining, Capt Norman, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Vom Orde, 1stLt Ewald D., <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Vorhies, Maj W. E., <a href="#Page_108">108<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Wake Island, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Conference, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Walker, Richard L., <a href="#Page_83">83<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, <a href="#Page_9">9–11</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Walseth Col H. S., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Wantuck</i> (APD), USS, <a href="#Page_56">56</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ward, 1stLt Charles C., <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Ward, Lt Chester C., <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Warren, LtCol Charles E., <a href="#Page_339">339</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Warren, Maj Walter T., <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Washington, D. C., <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wasson, Pfc Marvin L., <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Weapons</li>
-<li class="isub1">Chinese</li>
-<li class="isub2">Artillery, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">75mm, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">76mm, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Automatic, <a href="#Page_268">268</a></li>
-<li class="isub2"><a href="#Page_3">3</a>.5 Bazooka, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Burp guns, <a href="#Page_210">210</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Flares, <a href="#Page_104">104</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Grenades, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Machine guns, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mines, land (Bouncing Betty), <a href="#Page_74">74</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mortars, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191–193</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Pistol, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Rifles, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
-<li class="isub2"><a href="#Page_2">2</a>.36 Rockets, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Small-arms, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">North Korean People’s Army</li>
-<li class="isub2">Grenades, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">High Explosives, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mortars, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">South Korea</li>
-<li class="isub2">Machine guns, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">United States</li>
-<li class="isub2">Army self propelled AAA guns, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Bombs, <a href="#Page_102">102</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Grenades, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Marine, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Howitzers</li>
-<li class="isub3">105mm, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">155mm, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Machine guns</li>
-<li class="isub3">Army, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Heavy, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">USMC, <a href="#Page_163">163–166</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-<li class="isub4">Light, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mines</li>
-<li class="isub3">Booby traps, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Clearance, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mortars, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_4">4</a>.2 inch, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">60mm, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178–180</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">81mm, <a href="#Page_50">50–52</a>, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_326">326</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Support, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Pistol, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Rifles, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">BAR, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_329">329</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">Carbine, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">M-1, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li>
-<li class="isub3">75mm Recoilless, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Rockets, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_2">2</a>.<a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_5">5</a> inch, <a href="#Page_113">113</a></li>
-<li class="isub3"><a href="#Page_3">3</a>.5 launcher, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_185">185</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Small arms, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Weather, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href="#Page_297">297</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Webber, 1stLt Richard C., <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wedeneyer, Lt(jg) Robert G., (MC) USN, <a href="#Page_297">297</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Weible, Walter L., <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Weiland, Maj Charles P., <a href="#Page_339">339</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Westover, Capt John G., <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_432">432</span>Whipple, Maj R. E., <a href="#Page_257">257<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Whitney, MajGen Courtney, USA, <a href="#Page_6">6<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_7">7<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_8">8<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_9">9<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wiggins, TSgt Shelly, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wilcox, Capt Myron E., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Williams, Capt Bruce F., <a href="#Page_329">329<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Williams, Cpl C. W., <a href="#Page_229">229<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Williams, 1stLt Leslie C., <a href="#Page_258">258</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Williamson, Capt Harold B., <a href="#Page_268">268</a>, 276</li>
-
-<li class="indx">Willoughby, MajGen C. A., USA, <a href="#Page_35">35<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wilson, 1stLt H. S., <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wilson, 1stLt John B., <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Winecoff, Col J. L., <a href="#Page_250">250<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Winston, LtCol Waldon C., USA, <a href="#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_327">327<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wire, concertina, USMC, <a href="#Page_240">240</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Woessner, Maj Henry J., <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_152">152<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wonsan, <a href="#Page_8">8–11</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34–37</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43–46</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68–72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74–76</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125–128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Airfield, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Capture of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Evacuation, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_338">338</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Majon-ni Road, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Operation</li>
-<li class="isub2">Air, <a href="#Page_31">31–33</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Embarkation, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Intelligence, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Landing, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37–41</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Logistics, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Mine sweeping, <a href="#Page_27">27–29</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Movement to the Objective, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Orders, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Outloading, <a href="#Page_24">24–26</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_11">11–15</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22–24</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Personnel, Landed at, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Population, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Shore Party Groups, <a href="#Page_40">40</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wood, LtCol Ransom M., <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx"><i>Worcester</i> (CL), USS, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">World War I, <a href="#Page_351">351</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">World War II, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wray, Capt Robert P., <a href="#Page_49">49–51</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a>, <a href="#Page_315">315</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_14">14<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_23">23<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Xenophon, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Yalu River, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142–146</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Advance to, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Logistics, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Medical, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Orders, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-<li class="isub2">Plans, <a href="#Page_131">131–136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Battle of the, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Bridges across the, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Hydro-electric plants along the, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yancey, CWO Dee R., <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yancy, 1st Lt John, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yangdok, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yangtze Valley, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yeaman, Col R. R., <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yenan, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yonghung, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="#Page_126">126–128</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Bay, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yonghung-Hamhung Railroad, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yongnim-dong, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yonpo, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Airfield, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_340">340</a>, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yongwon, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Youngdale, Col C. A., <a href="#Page_326">326<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yudam-ni, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109<i>n</i></a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139–141</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146–152</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156–161</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163–168</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170–172</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_177">177–180</a>, <a href="#Page_182">182–195</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200–202</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href="#Page_253">253–255</a>, <a href="#Page_277">277–280</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352–354</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Artillery, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Breakout, <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257–275</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Casualties, <a href="#Page_280">280</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Command, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li>
-<li class="isub1">Medical, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li>
-
-<li class="indx">Yugoslavia, <a href="#Page_3">3<i>n</i></a></li>
-
-<li class="ifrst">Zullo, MSgt Rocco A., <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li>
-</ul>
-</div></div>
-
-<p class="p2 sigright wspace">
-<span class="small">✩ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1957—425570</span>
-</p>
-
-<p class="p2 larger bold wspace center">Semper Fi Mac</p>
-
-<div id="ip_frontis1end" class="figcenter port">
-  <img src="images/i_001.jpg" width="1524" height="2321" alt="" /></div>
-
-<div id="ip_frontis2end" class="figcenter port">
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